United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 22-1243

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jeremiah Ezekiel Brown

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

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 Submitted: January 9, 2023

Filed: May 9, 2023

[Unpublished]

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM. 

A jury convicted Jeremiah Ezekiel Brown of being a felon in possession of a

firearm. Law enforcement discovered the firearm during a traffic stop of his vehicle.
Brown appeals the district court’s1

 denial of his motion to suppress the weapon and

other evidence found during the traffic stop. He argues that the district court

erroneously denied his suppression motion because law enforcement lacked a

reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity and lacked probable

cause to believe that he had committed a traffic violation. We affirm.

I. Background

Detective Chris Papineau of the Columbia Police Department (CPD) received

information from a reliable confidential informant (CI) that Bridget Hartley was

selling cocaine and marijuana at her place of employment, Parkade Plaza. The CI

alleged that Hartley kept the drugs in her black backpack and was associated with a

silver Chrysler Pacifica. A federal defendant corroborated the CI’s information,

stating that Hartley was selling drugs on Brown’s behalf. 

On November 23, 2020, Detective Papineau and other law enforcement officers

surveilled Brown and Hartley. They saw Hartley leave a residence carrying a black

backpack. Brown was with her. Brown and Hartley got into a silver Chrysler Pacifica.

The officers followed Brown and Hartley for about an hour and a half. The vehicle

made stops at Hartley’s mother’s house, an address associated with Brown, and a

convenience store. 

Instead of a normal license plate, the silver Chrysler Pacifica bore a dealer tag

registered to Royal Motors, a car dealership. Detective Papineau knew that a license

plate search conducted on November 19, 2020, had revealed that the license plate was

registered to Royal Motors. During his several days of surveillance, Detective

Papineau never saw Hartley or Brown return to Royal Motors. 

1The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

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Detective Papineau was aware of a an incident on October 4, 2020, involving

Brown and the then-owner of Royal Motors. In the incident, the CPD and the

Missouri State Highway Patrol were investigating a vehicle with stolen license plates

abandoned on the side of a highway. When the CPD arrived, Brown was at the scene.

The vehicle belonged to the then-owner of Royal Motors. The police spoke to Royal

Motors’s owner. He informed them that the vehicle was a personal vehicle without

plates that he had loaned to Brown. When asked why he did not put Brown in a

company vehicle, the owner expressed a lack of trust in Brown due to past history.

Detective Papineau had reviewed body camera footage showing the interview of the

Royal Motors owner. Detective Papineau also knew that the owner had subsequently

passed away.

On November 24, 2020, Detective Papineau and other law enforcement officers

conducted surveillance at Parkade Plaza. They saw Hartley exit and reenter the

building multiple times over several hours. Each time, she carried her black backpack.

Brown collected Hartley from Parkade Plaza in the silver Chrysler Pacifica. Several

officers in both marked and unmarked vehicles followed the silver Chrysler Pacifica.

It was raining. Detective Papineau observed Brown driving the vehicle. Its windshield

wipers were on, but its headlights were not. Government surveillance footage

confirmed that the vehicle’s windshield wipers were on when it left Parkade Plaza.

Detective Papineau suspected that the silver Chrysler Pacifica was unregistered

and that Brown was not using the Royal Motors dealer tags for business purposes. He

thought it unlikely that someone driving a vehicle with a dealer plate for several days

would be taking a test drive or transporting the vehicle for maintenance purposes. 

The law enforcement officers communicated to one another during the

surveillance about the lack of vehicle registration and headlights usage. Detective

Papineau instructed CPD Detective Bradley Overton, who was driving a marked

patrol car, to stop the silver Chrysler Pacifica. In his report, Detective Overton

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documented that Detective Papineau instructed him to stop the silver Chrysler

Pacifica because of a concern that it was not properly registered. Detective Overton

was driving a marked patrol vehicle, with Detective Michael Kile riding as a

passenger. 

Rain continued to fall when Detective Overton stopped the vehicle. Detective

Overton had his vehicle’s windshield wipers on, and oncoming vehicles had their

wipers and headlights on. Detective Michael Kile, who was riding as Detective

Overton’s passenger, observed that the silver Chrysler Pacifica’s taillights were off.

He surmised that the headlights must be off, too. Government surveillance footage

shows that the silver Chrysler Pacifica had its taillights off at Parkade Plaza.

Detective Overton’s dashcam video shows that the taillights were off until just before

Detective Overton activated his siren.

Detective Overton activated his emergency lights and siren. Brown continued

driving for a short period before pulling over. Brown turned on the windshield wipers

as he pulled over for the traffic stop. The officers smelled marijuana when they got

out of their vehicles. Detective Overton got Brown out of the vehicle. Detective Kile

then frisked Brown and found a firearm in his waistband. Officers searched the

vehicle and found another firearm, marijuana, and cocaine.

Detective Papineau contacted Royal Motors the day after the traffic stop. He

spoke with Amber Minton, the new owner. Minton told Detective Papineau that she

had given Brown permission to drive the vehicle. Minton provided Brown with the

Royal Motors dealer plates. Detective Papineau learned from Minton that Brown was

a Royal Motors employee.

A federal grand jury indicted Brown on a charge of felon in possession of a

firearm. Brown moved to suppress evidence discovered during the traffic stop. He

challenged the constitutionality of the stop. He did not, however, challenge the

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subsequent frisk or vehicle search. Brown argued that law enforcement lacked “the

requisite suspicion of criminal activity” to initiate the stop because “[l]aw

enforcement did not observe Brown commit or engage in any criminal wrongdoing”

and “had no information that would warrant a prudent person to believe that a crime

was committed to justify the traffic stop.” R. Doc. 28, at 3–4. He also argued that

“there was no probable cause to stop the vehicle for a traffic violation for not utilizing

its headlights” because Detective Overton “made no mention of the Vehicle not

having on its headlights as a justification for the traffic stop” and “no rain could be

seen striking the Vehicle at the time of the traffic stop as documented by the officers’

body cameras.” Id. at 4. 

Following an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge concluded that “the

traffic stop was . . . supported by reasonable suspicion that Mr. Brown violated state

vehicle registration and license plate laws.” R. Doc. 55-1, at 7. The magistrate judge

found that Detective Papineau rationally inferred from the objective and

particularized facts that Brown could not lawfully operate a vehicle with Royal

Motors dealer tags. First, Detective Papineau knew “that the previous month, October

2020, Mr. Brown borrowed a vehicle from Royal Motors, the vehicle’s owner told

police the vehicle did not have license plates when he made the loan, and the vehicle

bore stolen license plates when Mr. Brown was found with it off of Highway 40.” Id.

Second, “Detective Papineau . . . knew the owner of Royal Motors had said he would

never allow Mr. Brown to drive a company vehicle.” Id. at 8. Third, “Detective

Papineau observed Mr. Brown driving the Chrysler on two consecutive days without

taking it to Royal Motors, other businesses, or a maintenance facility, but using it to

visit multiple residences, a convenience store, and Parkade Plaza.” Id.

These facts, the magistrate judge concluded, showed that “Detective Papineau

made a rational inference that Mr. Brown borrowed a vehicle with dealer tags for

personal use or affixed dealer tags to a vehicle to which they did not belong.” Id.

Based on this inference, Detective Papineau could reasonably suspect “that Mr.

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Brown had violated Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 301.130(5) (requiring vehicle to display their

proper license plates), 301.020(1) (requiring owners to register their vehicles), or

301.560(7) (prohibiting the display of dealer plates on a vehicle loaned to others).”

Id. The magistrate judge determined that “[b]ecause Detective Papineau ordered the

traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, what the officers who

conducted the stop observed or knew is immaterial to the reasonable suspicion

determination.” Id. at 8.

Additionally, the magistrate judge determined that the stop was supported by

probable cause to believe that Brown violated Mo. Ann. Stat. § 307.020(9) (requiring

a driver to use headlights “any time the weather conditions require usage of the motor

vehicle’s windshield wipers to operate the vehicle in a careful and prudent manner”).

The magistrate judge found that “[t]he officers’ testimony and dashcam video

strongly indicate that Mr. Brown was . . . driving without headlights in the rain.”

R. Doc. 55-1, at 9. First, “Detective Papineau testified that he directly observed Mr.

Brown driving the silver Chrysler Pacifica in the rain without headlights.” Id. Second,

“Officer Overton’s dashcam video shows that it was raining when they tailed Mr.

Brown’s vehicle, they had their windshield wipers on, and oncoming vehicles had

their windshield wipers and headlights on.” Id. Third, “Detective Kile observed that

Mr. Brown’s taillights were off, from which he reasonably concluded that the

headlights were off.” Id. Fourth, “[s]urveillance footage substantiates that Mr.

Brown’s taillights were off when he left Parkade Plaza and when he was being tailed

by Detective Overton, until moments before Detective Overton activated his siren.”

Id. 

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation

to deny the motion to suppress. After the district court denied the suppression motion,

Brown proceeded to trial. The jury found him guilty of being a felon in possession of

a firearm. 

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II. Discussion

Brown challenges the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. First,

he argues that law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in

criminal activity because he was lawfully operating the vehicle with a Royal Motors

dealer plate. Second, he argues that law enforcement lacked probable cause to believe

he committed a traffic violation because Missouri law did not require him to turn on

the vehicle’s headlights because he was not using its windshield wipers. 

A mixed standard of review applies to a district court’s denial of a suppression

motion: “We review factual findings for clear error, while we review de novo the

ultimate conclusion of whether the Fourth Amendment was violated.” United States

v. Brown, 60 F.4th 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 2023). 

“The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

A traffic stop is a reasonable seizure if it is supported by probable cause or reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. “It is well established that any traffic violation,

regardless of its perceived severity, provides an officer with probable cause to stop

the driver.” United States v. Holly, 983 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2020) (internal

quotation marks omitted). An officer has reasonable suspicion “to initiate a brief

investigative traffic stop when he has a particularized and objective basis for

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Kansas v. Glover, 140

S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). An officer’s “mere

hunch” of criminal activity is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion. Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). But “the level of suspicion the standard requires is

considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and

obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). “The standard depends on the factual and practical considerations of

everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Id.

at 1188 (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this standard, courts “must

permit officers to make commonsense judgments and inferences about human

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behavior.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The standard takes into account

the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” Id. at 1191 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Therefore, “we [must] look to the totality of the circumstances” “[i]n

analyzing whether an officer had reasonable suspicion.” Brown, 60 F.4th at 1182.

“Even an officer’s incomplete initial observations may give reasonable suspicion for

a traffic stop, and mistakes of law or fact, if objectively reasonable, may still justify

a valid stop.” Holly, 983 F.3d at 364 (cleaned up). Officers need not be perfect to be

reasonable, and the Fourth Amendment “allows for some mistakes on [their] part . . . ,

giving them fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Under the “collective knowledge doctrine,” the “collective knowledge of law

enforcement officers conducting an investigation is sufficient to provide reasonable

suspicion, and the collective knowledge can be imputed to the individual officer who

initiated the traffic stop when there is some communication between the officers.”

United States v. Mosley, 878 F.3d 246, 254 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v.

Thompson, 533 F.3d 964, 969 (8th Cir. 2008)).“The patrol officer himself need not

know the specific facts that caused the stop. Rather, the officer need only rely upon

an order that is founded on reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Jacobsen, 391

F.3d 904, 907 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (affirming denial of a motion to

suppress because the agent who ordered the traffic stop had reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity).

We have previously held that an officer’s “decision to stop [a vehicle] was

consistent with the Fourth Amendment, [where] it was supported by reasonable

suspicion to believe that the operator of the [vehicle] violated [a state’s] vehicle

registration statutes.” United States v. Sanchez, 572 F.3d 475, 478 (8th Cir. 2009).

Here, the district court determined that the detectives had reasonable suspicion to

believe that Brown was unlawfully operating a vehicle with a dealer license plate in

violation of Missouri law. 

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Under Missouri law, a car dealer need not register vehicles displaying dealer

plates. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 301.560.3 (“The issuance of [a] distinctive dealer license

number or certificate of number shall be in lieu of registering each motor vehicle

. . . dealt with by a . . . manufacturer, public motor vehicle auction, wholesale motor

vehicle dealer, wholesale motor vehicle auction or new or used motor vehicle

dealer.”). But Missouri law limits who can use vehicles with dealer plates and their

purposes when used. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 301.560.7. Dealer plates 

may be displayed on any motor vehicle . . . owned and held for resale by

a motor vehicle dealer for use by a customer who is test driving the

motor vehicle, for use by any customer while the customer’s vehicle is

being serviced or repaired by the motor vehicle dealer, for use and

display purposes during, but not limited to, parades, private events,

charitable events, or for use by an employee or officer, but shall not be

displayed on any motor vehicle or trailer hired or loaned to others or

upon any regularly used service or wrecker vehicle.

Id. (emphasis added); see also Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 12, § 10-26.060(3)–(6)

(2020). Missouri law authorizes police to seize dealer plates upon probable cause to

believe they are being misused. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 301.560.9 (“If any law enforcement

officer has probable cause to believe that any license plate or certificate of number

issued under subsection 3 or 6 of this section is being misused in violation of

subsection 7 or 8 of this section, the license plate or certificate of number may be

seized and surrendered to the department.”). 

At the time of the stop, Detective Papineau knew the following: (1) a little over

a month prior to the stop, the then-owner of Royal Motors loaned Brown a personal

vehicle without license plates, and the police had found stolen plates on that vehicle;

(2) the then-owner of Royal Motors told the police that he would not loan Brown a

company car to drive; (3) the owner of Royal Motors had subsequently passed away;

(4) during several days of surveillance, Brown did not drive the vehicle to or from the

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dealership, as would be expected of someone test driving a car; and (5) the license

plate on the vehicle was registered to Royal Motors. 

These facts known to Detective Papineau at the time of the traffic stop enabled

him to rationally infer that Brown was not lawfully operating a vehicle with Royal

Motors dealer plates based on what occurred the prior month; that is, Brown

borrowed a vehicle with dealer tags for personal use or affixed dealer tags to a vehicle

to which they did not belong. This conduct, in turn, could give rise to a reasonable

suspicion that Brown had violated Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 301.130(5) (requiring vehicles

to display their proper license plates), 301.020(1) (requiring owners to register their

vehicles), or 301.560(7) (prohibiting the display of dealer plates on a vehicle loaned

to others). In conducting the traffic stop of Brown, Detectives Overton and Kile

“rel[ied] upon [Detective Papineau’s] order that [was] founded on reasonable

suspicion.” Jacobsen, 391 F.3d at 907.

On appeal, Brown asks the court to focus on facts not known to Detective

Papineau at the time of the stop: (1) Brown was an employee of Royal Motors, and

(2) the new owner of Royal Motors, Amber Minton, gave Brown permission to

operate the vehicle. But “[t]o determine if probable cause or reasonable suspicion

existed, we look at what the officers ‘reasonably knew at the time,’ rather than

looking back with the benefit of hindsight.” United States v. Hanel, 993 F.3d 540,

543 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Hollins, 685 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir.

2012)). 

As previously explained, “[m]istakes of law or fact, if objectively reasonable,

may still justify a valid stop.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hollins, 685 F.3d

at 706). Detective Papineau’s “subjective intent is not determinative in deciding

whether the stop was reasonable.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mallari, 334 F.3d

765, 767 (8th Cir. 2003)). “Even if [Detective Papineau] invoke[d] the wrong offense

at the time, probable cause may still support the stop if an officer has an objective

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basis to make it.” Id. at 544 (cleaned up). Furthermore, “[t]he reasonableness of the

officer’s decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive

investigatory techniques.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989)

(explaining that “[s]uch a rule would unduly hamper the police’s ability to make

swift, on-the-spot decisions . . . and it would require courts to indulge in unrealistic

second-guessing” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Brown also argues that the traffic stop was unconstitutional because it was a

pretext to search the vehicle for drugs. Law enforcement was surveilling Brown’s

vehicle as part of a narcotics investigation. During the surveillance, an officer

reasonably believed he observed Brown commit a traffic violation. The traffic

violation gave law enforcement reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop based

on knowledge and observations unrelated to the surveillance. See Whren v. United

States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,

probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we hold that under the facts known to law enforcement at the time

of the traffic stop, they could have reasonably suspected Brown violated Missouri law

regulating display of license plates. Therefore, the traffic stop was objectively

reasonable.2 We affirm the judgment of the district court.3

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2Because we hold that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to stop the

vehicle for the license plate display infraction, we need not address whether probable

cause existed to stop the vehicle for Brown’s failure to turn on his headlights.

3We also deny Brown’s motion for appointment of new counsel.

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