J-S81006-16

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JULIAN DESHIELDS

Appellant No. 1261 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 24, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001724-2016

BEFORE: BOWES AND MOULTON, JJ., AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2017

Julian DeShields appeals from the judgment of sentence of seven to 

twenty-three months incarceration followed by a consecutive period of three 

years probation imposed following a nolo contendere plea. Counsel filed a 

petition to withdraw from representation and a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 

A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We affirm and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. 

We rely on the facts from the affidavit of probable cause supporting 

the complaint as Appellant stipulated to the affidavit as providing the factual 

basis for his plea. On October 15, 2015, homeowners at Ruskin Lane 

contacted the Upper Darby Township Police Department to report a burglary. 

A neighbor provided surveillance video from a camera pointed towards the 
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victims’ residence, which revealed two males entering it through a basement 

window. The victims were shown still frame images of the males. The 

victim’s daughter, Appellant’s former girlfriend, identified the males as 

Appellant and his brother. The police confirmed that Appellant, who was 

fifteen years old at the time of this incident, was not present in school on 

October 15th. 

Based on the foregoing investigation, a juvenile delinquency petition 

was filed. The Commonwealth later sought transfer to the court of common 

pleas, which was granted on March 24, 2016. Appellant tended his nolo 

contendere plea that same day, whereupon the judge imposed the 

aforementioned sentence, which was recommended by the Commonwealth. 

On April 21, 2016, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion challenging 

the validity of the guilty plea. The next day, Appellant filed a notice of 

appeal.1 In lieu of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on 

appeal, counsel filed a Rule 1925(c)(4) statement indicating his intent to file 

an Anders brief. 

Appellant’s counsel now files a petition to withdraw and accompanying 

Anders brief, asserting that there are no non-frivolous issues to be 

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1

 The notice of appeal was filed by Assistant Public Defender Patrick J. 

Connors. The motion challenging the plea was filed by Assistant Public 

Defender James S. Wright, who represented Appellant at the plea. The 

application to withdraw states that the notice of appeal was filed at 

Appellant’s request. 
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reviewed. The brief sets forth one issue arguably supporting an appeal: 

“Whether [Appellant] entered a knowing, voluntary and intelligent [nolo 

contendere] plea given his young age?” Anders brief at 1. 

We first must address whether counsel has complied with the 

procedural requirements of Anders. Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 

A.3d 1030 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc). Counsel must: 

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the defendant that 

he or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise 

additional arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the 

court's attention. 

Id. at 1032 (citation omitted).

Counsel’s petition provides that he has thoroughly reviewed the case 

and concluded that this appeal is wholly frivolous. Copies of the petition and 

Anders brief were provided to Appellant, and the accompanying letter 

informed Appellant of his right to raise additional matters pro se or hire his 

own attorney. Thus, we find counsel has complied with the procedural 

requirements.

We next address whether the Anders brief complies with the 

requirements set forth by our Supreme Court in Santiago, supra: 

[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed 

counsel's petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a 

summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to 

the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel 

believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel's 
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conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel's 

reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel 

should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case 

law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that 

the appeal is frivolous. 

Id. at 361. The brief fully complies with these four requirements, as it sets 

forth the procedural history and relevant facts with citations to the record; 

refers to an arguably meritorious ground; concludes that the appeal is 

frivolous; and explains why counsel reached that conclusion. Therefore, 

counsel has fully complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago.

We now proceed to examine the issue raised by counsel in the brief. 

Counsel frames this issue as one implicating the trial judge’s duties in 

accepting a plea. To wit, counsel maintains that there is an issue of 

arguable merit as to whether Appellant’s age should have prompted the 

judge to engage in a more detailed colloquy to ascertain the voluntariness of 

the plea. 

Instantly, we note that in terms of its effect upon a case, a plea of 

nolo contendere is treated the same as a guilty plea. Commonwealth v. 

Leidig, 850 A.2d 743 (Pa.Super. 2004). Before accepting a plea of nolo 

contendere, the judge must determine, on the record, “after inquiry of the 

defendant that the plea is voluntarily and understandingly tendered.” 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 590(A)(3). The Comment delineates the areas of inquiry that, 

at a minimum, should be assessed by the trial judge:
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(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to 

which he or she is pleading guilty or nolo contendere?

(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?

(3) Does the defendant understand that he or she has the right 

to trial by jury?

(4) Does the defendant understand that he or she is presumed 

innocent until found guilty?

(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible range of sentences 

and/or fines for the offenses charged?

(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the 

terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts 

such agreement?

(7) Does the defendant understand that the Commonwealth has 

a right to have a jury decide the degree of guilt if the defendant 

pleads guilty to murder generally?

Comment, Pa.R.Crim.P. 590. Nothing in the Rule specifies additional 

measures that must be taken where the defendant is a juvenile. 

Additionally, we note that, in Commonwealth v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 

497 (Pa.Super. 1998), we reviewed the challenge by a minor defendant who 

pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for the Commonwealth 

agreeing to forego seeking the death penalty.2 Among other claims, the 

appellant asserted that refusing to permit him the opportunity to withdraw 

his plea was a manifest injustice because his legal guardian was not present 

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2

 This case predates the United States Supreme Court decision in Roper v. 

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which bars the execution of individuals 

who were under eighteen years old when they committed their crimes. 
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to aid him in his decision to plead guilty. Lewis likened his situation to that 

of a juvenile waiving his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 

(1966). See In re V.C., 66 A.3d 341, 351 (Pa.Super. 2013) (presence or 

absence of interested adult is one factor to consider in determining whether 

juvenile’s waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary). We disagreed, observing 

that “The crucial distinction between deciding to plead guilty and deciding to 

waive Miranda rights is that, at the guilty plea stage the juvenile is 

represented by counsel whose job is to ensure that his client voluntarily 

waives his rights.” Lewis, supra at 503, n.7. The same logic applies 

equally herein, where counsel was available to assist Appellant and ensure 

that the plea was a voluntary exercise of his rights.

Appellant’s counsel suggests that the trial judge should assume the 

responsibility of conducting a more probing and searching inquiry when 

accepting a guilty plea from a juvenile. However, for a plea to be 

constitutionally valid, “the guilty plea colloquy must affirmatively show that 

the defendant understood what the plea connoted and its consequences.” 

Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 832 (Pa. 2014). Our review 

of the guilty plea hearing transcript demonstrates that the trial judge 

followed the requirements set forth by Pa.R.Crim.P. 590. Appellant also 

completed an extensive guilty plea colloquy form, and answered in the 

negative when the trial court specifically asked if he had any questions of 

Attorney Wright or the court. These procedural safeguards ensured to the 
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judge’s satisfaction that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 

Additionally, Appellant did not raise any additional matters in response to 

counsel’s application to withdraw. Thus, there is nothing of record to 

indicate the plea was involuntary3in some capacity, and he would bear the 

burden of proving involuntariness. See Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 

997, 1002 (Pa.Super. 2013). Therefore, this issue is wholly frivolous. 

We have conducted an independent review of the record, as required 

by Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1249 (Pa.Super. 2015), 

and have concluded that there are no preserved non-frivolous issues that 

can be raised in this appeal. Hence, we concur with counsel's conclusion 

that this appeal is wholly frivolous and grant his application to withdraw.

Petition of Patrick J. Connors, Esquire to withdraw as counsel is 

granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/22/2017

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3

 The motion to withdraw the guilty plea stated, “That subsequent to said 

plea, documentation was provided to defendant tending to support his claim 

of innocence in this matter.” The motion does not elaborate on this 

purported documentation, and the Notice of Appeal was filed the next day.
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