[J-49-2023] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v. 

MARCUS WOMACK,

 Appellant

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No. 110 MAP 2022

Appeal from the Order of the 

Superior Court at No. 445 MDA 

2021 dated April 29, 2022 Affirming 

the Judgment of Sentence of the 

Huntingdon County Court of 

Common Pleas, Criminal Division, 

at No. CP-31-CR-0000851-2018 

entered November 12, 2020.

ARGUED: September 14, 2023

OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: May 31, 2024

I. Introduction

In this discretionary appeal, we consider the computation of time for the purposes 

of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 where the Commonwealth files two different criminal complaints 

against a defendant arising out of the same criminal episode. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm the Superior Court’s order denying relief.

II. Background 

On October 6, 2017, law enforcement officers, including Pennsylvania State 

Trooper Andrew Corl, executed a search warrant at the home of Tyler and Bobbi Martin 

in Huntingdon County. The search followed a year-long investigation, which revealed 

that Appellant, Marcus Womack, had been selling drugs from that location. During the 

search, law enforcement officers recovered from Appellant’s person a large sum of 
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money, drugs, and a stolen firearm. They also found an additional stolen firearm 

elsewhere in the residence. Appellant was placed under arrest. That same day, Trooper 

Corl filed a criminal complaint (“first complaint”), charging Appellant with nine offenses,

including possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), conspiracy to commit PWID, and 

possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. The trial court set Appellant’s bail at

$250,000.00. Unable to post bail, Appellant remained in custody.

Following the execution of the search warrant, Trooper Corl learned from the 

Martins and other arrestees more information about the scope of Appellant’s drug 

enterprise, which extended to both Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. Law enforcement officers 

executed additional search warrants. Trooper Corl also reviewed data from Appellant’s 

cell phone, which had been seized during the search that took place on October 6, 2017. 

His preliminary review of this information revealed the possibility of a more sophisticated 

operation than originally anticipated. Based on the foregoing, the Huntingdon County 

District Attorney’s Office sought the assistance of the Office of the Attorney General

(“OAG”) in pursuing additional charges. 

The OAG accepted jurisdiction and submitted the case to a statewide investigating 

grand jury. During this time, at the request of the OAG, the Huntingdon County District 

Attorney’s Office placed the first complaint on hold. The grand jury investigation

commenced in late 2017 and ended on October 23, 2018.1 On October 31, 2018, the 

Commonwealth filed another criminal complaint (“second complaint”), charging Appellant 

with a total of twenty-eight offenses including four counts of PWID, conspiracy to commit 

PWID, and two counts of corrupt organizations. The charges alleged in the second 

complaint were not identical to the first complaint but were based upon evidence gathered 

1 On April 10, 2018, Appellant, who remained incarcerated, moved for nominal bail 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(2). The trial court granted the motion, but Appellant 

remained in custody due to a parole detainer from a previous case in Philadelphia.
[J-49-2023] - 3

by law enforcement before, during, and shortly after Appellant’s arrest and the filing of 

charges in the first complaint. The OAG’s grand jury investigation also led to the arrest 

of over thirty other individuals for drug-related criminal activity. 

On February 13, 2019, Appellant moved to dismiss the second complaint pursuant 

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1).

2 After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. On March 

13, 2019, Appellant similarly moved to dismiss the first complaint on Rule 600 grounds. 

The trial court granted this motion on May 9, 2019, and the Commonwealth did not appeal. 

Soon thereafter, the OAG filed an amended second complaint, reducing the number of 

charges from twenty-eight to thirteen and providing date ranges, some of which were after 

the filing of the initial complaint for the remaining counts of PWID.

On September 6, 2019, at a pre-trial conference, Appellant rejected the 

Commonwealth’s plea offer of 111⁄2 to 23 years’ imprisonment, asserting the trial court 

should have granted his motion to dismiss the second complaint under Rule 600. In light 

of this, Appellant asked the trial court to certify the issue for an interlocutory appeal nunc 

pro tunc. Though the trial court granted this request, Appellant failed to file such appeal 

and instead filed another Rule 600 motion alleging the Commonwealth attempted to 

2 Rule 600(D)(1) provides: 

When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods set 

forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial, the defendant's attorney, or 

the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that the 

charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been 

violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney for the 

Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing 

on the motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1).
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circumvent Rule 600 by filing two criminal complaints based on the same criminal 

conduct. The trial court similarly denied this motion on August 11, 2020.3 

On October 8, 2020, Appellant proceeded to a bench trial on the second complaint. 

The trial court found Appellant guilty of the following offenses: three counts of PWID, 

conspiracy to commit PWID, dealing in proceeds of unlawful activity, corrupt 

organizations, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, carrying a firearm without 

a license, and criminal use of a communication facility. He was acquitted of the remaining 

charges. On November 12, 2020, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 39

to 90 years’ imprisonment. He received 224 days of credit for time served from October 

6, 2017 to April 10, 2018. This spanned the period of time between Appellant’s arrest on 

the first complaint and the date the state parole detainer was lodged. He timely appealed

to the Superior Court, maintaining the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss 

the second complaint and asserting that the computation of time for Rule 600 purposes 

should have been based on the filing date of the first complaint.

The Superior Court affirmed in a unanimous, unpublished memorandum decision. 

See Commonwealth v. Womack, 445 EDA 2021; 2022 WL 1284618 (Pa. Super. filed April 

29, 2022). The court recognized that “Rule 600 does not specify which start date to use 

when two complaints are filed against one defendant,” but explained that “the second 

complaint generally provides the starting point for the calculation” where “the first 

complaint was properly dismissed.” Id. at *6 (citing Commonwealth v. Genovese, 425 

A.2d 367, 370 (Pa. 1981)). It noted, however, that if the Commonwealth attempts to 

circumvent Rule 600, then the first complaint becomes the starting point for calculation 

purposes. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 359 A.2d 174, 177 (Pa. 1976); 

3 Appellant, whose sentence on the Philadelphia case expired on August 7, 2020, was 

released from custody on his own recognizance.
[J-49-2023] - 5

Commonwealth v. Lynn, 815 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super. 2003)). The court also noted 

that the Commonwealth “does not get the benefit of the filing date of an identical second 

complaint” where it fails to exercise due diligence in “prosecuting its first complaint.” Id. 

(citing Meadius, 870 A.2d at 808). 

The court then discussed two cases it found particularly instructive. It first 

recounted this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Earp, 382 A.2d 1215 (Pa. 1978). Id. 

Earp was charged with murder, conspiracy, and other offenses. Both the murder and 

conspiracy charges were dismissed after a preliminary hearing, while the remaining 

offenses were held for court. The Commonwealth subsequently arrested Earp for the 

same murder and conspiracy, which kept him confined between his first arrest and trial. 

Id. (citing Earp, 382 A.2d at 1216). A plurality of this Court determined that the speedy 

trial period “begins to run on all charges arising out of a criminal transaction upon the 

initiation of criminal proceedings charging the defendant with any offense arising out of 

that transaction.” Id. (quoting Earp, 382 A.2d at 1217). It also found instructive 

Commonwealth v. Simms, 500 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1985), which involved a two-complaint 

scenario with different charges.4 Id. There, the Commonwealth initially filed a complaint 

charging Simms with aggravated assault, but following the victim’s death, filed a second 

complaint charging Simms with criminal homicide. Id. (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 802). 

In finding that the date of the second complaint controlled, this Court held that “[i]n cases 

where an aggravated assault charge is filed, the victim later dies, and, thereafter, a 

homicide complaint is filed, the [speedy trial] period for trial on the homicide charge should 

4 It is unclear whether the first complaint in Simms was withdrawn, dismissed, or neither 

prior to the filing of the second complaint. Simms, 500 A.2d at 803 (“[T]he record does 

not reveal what disposition was made of the complaint initially filed against [Simms]

charging him with the offense of aggravated assault. It is not clear that the complaint was 

ever formally withdrawn or dismissed, and there is no evidence that any judicial review of 

the matter occurred.”).
[J-49-2023] - 6

be deemed to commence with the filing of the latter complaint.5 Id. (citing Simms, 500 

A.2d at 804).

Based on the foregoing, the court discerned no abuse of discretion or error of law 

in the trial court’s decision denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss the second complaint. 

In its view, based on Simms, “[t]he difference between the offenses charged in the 

complaints demonstrates that the Commonwealth did not try to circumvent Rule 600.” Id.

at *7 (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 803-04). As the second complaint was filed on October 

31, 2018, the court used this as the starting point for its Rule 600 calculations. It explained 

that approximately 230 days of pre-trial delay were caused by Appellant. The court also 

recognized that Rule 600 was suspended from March 16, 2020 through October 8, 2020 

due to the COVID-19 pandemic and thus time excludable. Even so, the court highlighted 

its skepticism concerning “the Commonwealth’s tactics in leaving [the first complaint] 

open despite not intending to prosecute it.” Id. at *8. It nevertheless concluded that the 

Commonwealth’s lack of diligence in prosecuting the first complaint was “irrelevant [to] 

the Rule 600 calculation of [the second complaint].” Id. The court therefore affirmed 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which this Court granted to 

consider the following question:

Does Rule 600 run from the first or second criminal complaint when the first 

complaint is still pending against a defendant who is in pretrial detention

and the second complaint is premised on grand jury proceedings that 

subsumed the case underlying the first complaint?

Commonwealth v. Womack, 288 A.3d 865 (Pa. 2022) (per curiam). 

III. Parties’ Arguments

5 Both Earp and Simms involved Pa.R.A.P. 1100, the predecessor to Rule 600. In 

contrast to the current version, Rule 1100 required the Commonwealth to bring a 

defendant to trial within 180 days of filing its complaint.
[J-49-2023] - 7

Appellant asks this Court to find that “Rule 600 runs from the filing date of a first 

complaint unless the Commonwealth demonstrates that it exercised due diligence 

throughout the prosecution of the two complaints, which also focuses on the period of 

delay between the filing of the two complaints.” Appellant’s Brief at 29. Turning to the 

plain language of Rule 600, Appellant argues the rule clearly establishes that due 

diligence is required to obtain the benefit of prosecution. He then notes that the Comment 

to Rule 600 states: 

In cases in which the Commonwealth files a criminal complaint, withdraws 

that complaint, and files a second complaint, the Commonwealth will be 

afforded the benefit of the date of the filing of the second complaint for 

purposes of calculating the time for trial when . . . the Commonwealth has 

exercised due diligence . . . .

Id. at 31 (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment).

6 In light of this Comment, Appellant 

asserts “there is no justifiable reason” that the due diligence standard does not also apply 

here, where the Commonwealth filed two complaints involving different charges. Id. at 

31. He then explains that this Comment, derived from our decision in Commonwealth v. 

Meadius, 870 A.2d 802 (Pa. 2005), suggests that the Commonwealth must act with due 

diligence as to the first complaint and demonstrate that its use of an investigating grand 

jury was reasonable. Id. at 31-32. 

With regard to investigating grand juries, Appellant notes the Commonwealth is 

not required to submit its case to one in order to prosecute. Nor does any law prevent 

the prosecutor from withdrawing from one where it is apparent investigation is no longer 

necessary. He therefore concludes that requiring the Commonwealth to demonstrate the 

reasonable necessity of an investigating grand jury would not disturb the prosecutor’s 

authority and would advance the dual purposes of Rule 600, those being “more effectively 

protect[ing] the right of criminal defendants to a speedy trial, and the efficient 

6 This Comment is discussed infra, where it is reproduced in its entirety.
[J-49-2023] - 8

administration of justice.” Id. at 32-33 (quoting Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600, 

615 (Pa. 2021) (additional quotations omitted)). Appellant asserts that due diligence here 

would require the Commonwealth to present some evidence to justify his continued 

detention and the lack of action on his first complaint. Id. at 33. 

To the extent the Commonwealth asserts due diligence only applies to the second 

complaint in this case, Appellant maintains we have declined to adopt such a 

construction. Id. at 34 (citing Meadius, 870 A.2d at 808-810 (Eakin, J., dissenting)). He 

argues this approach would allow the Commonwealth to “hide behind the sluggish 

[investigating grand jury] process – a product of [its own] operation – when the process 

may not be reasonably necessary to prosecute a particular defendant.” Id. at 34. 

Applying this test, Appellant asserts the Commonwealth failed to exercise due 

diligence. He maintains the first complaint served no purpose other than keeping him “on 

ice,” knowing the initial complaint would never be pursued while continuing on with the 

investigating grand jury. He avers the Commonwealth has failed to present any evidence 

that the grand jury was necessary to shroud its investigation in secrecy or as a 

prosecutorial tool to investigate him in particular. Id. at 37. Appellant recognizes that the 

record demonstrates Trooper Corl compiled an extensive amount of evidence just prior 

to and after Appellant’s arrest, which served as the “cornerstone of the Commonwealth’s 

case.” Id. The Commonwealth therefore knew most of what it learned about his 

involvement shortly after the first complaint was filed. Finally, Appellant suggests the 

Commonwealth had several courses of action it could have taken that did not involve the 

first complaint sitting in limbo while it pursued other options. Id. at 38. In conclusion, 

Appellant asks this Court to reverse the Superior Court’s decision and find that Rule 600 

began running when the first complaint was filed. Because Appellant’s trial commenced 
[J-49-2023] - 9

more than 365 days after the first complaint was filed and the Commonwealth failed to 

demonstrate due diligence, dismissal was warranted. 

Conversely, the Commonwealth maintains the lower courts applied longstanding 

speedy trial precedent concerning two complaint cases and reached the correct 

conclusion that the clock began when it filed the second complaint. It similarly points out 

that the Comment to Rule 600, which relies on Meadius, provides that the speedy trial 

period begins with the second complaint where the Commonwealth’s new filing is 

“necessitated by factors beyond its control, the Commonwealth has exercised due 

diligence, and the refiling is not an attempt to circumvent the time limitation of Rule 600.” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 22 (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment). In its view, these 

considerations are especially compelling in cases like this one where the Commonwealth 

files new charges based upon new evidence. 

The Commonwealth then discusses Simms, which it purports involved a twocomplaint scenario similar to this case. As noted above, the Commonwealth charged 

Simms with aggravated assault, but following the victim’s death, filed a second complaint 

charging Simms with homicide. This Court concluded that the speedy trial period began 

to run with the second complaint, considering “events beyond the control of the 

prosecution [ ] operated to change the nature of the offense for which [the] defendant 

[was] to be tried.” Id. (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 802-04). The Commonwealth avers that 

the difference in charges between the first and second complaint in Simms negated any 

inference that the Commonwealth attempted to circumvent then-Rule 1100, now Rule 

600. Id. at 22-23. In its view, the critical question instantly is “whether the Commonwealth 

could have charged the crimes brought in the second complaint at the time of the filing of 

the first complaint, but instead chose to delay the charges in order to circumvent Rule 

600.” Id. at 23. The Commonwealth asserts that cannot be the case where the second
[J-49-2023] - 10

complaint involves new charges that could not have been filed at the time of the first 

complaint. Id.

The Commonwealth rejects Appellant’s assertion “that the Commonwealth knew 

enough at the time of the first complaint to charge him with all the crimes brought in the 

second complaint” as factually incorrect, as determined by the trial court, and also 

irrelevant. Id. at 23-24. The Commonwealth explains that any issue concerning delay in 

bringing the first trial is a moot point because that case was dismissed under Rule 600, 

and any delay in bringing the second case is a non-issue because Rule 600 does not 

begin until charges are brought. It goes on to explain that much of what was charged in 

the second complaint was not known when the first complaint was filed. Id. at 25-30 

(citing Trial Ct. Op., 4/21/21, at 32-34).

The Commonwealth disagrees with Appellant’s claim that it “nefariously used the 

first complaint as a ‘placeholder’ to keep him ‘on ice’ during the subsequent investigation.” 

Id. at 30. It maintains it could not have known what evidence it would uncover from its 

investigation, which is the point of investigations. The Commonwealth goes on to explain 

that its investigation “produced over 20 new witnesses and revealed that [Appellant] was 

not the bit player he appeared to be when the charges were filed. He was a leading 

member of a sophisticated trafficking ring consisting of more than 30 other conspirators.” 

Id. at 31. The Commonwealth acknowledges that it should have withdrawn the first 

complaint sooner after realizing the subsequent investigation produced significant 

evidence, but nonetheless points out that Appellant “received relief on those original 

charges, and sentencing credit for all the time he served on them.” Id. In light of the 

foregoing, the Commonwealth asks us to affirm the Superior Court’s order denying relief.7 

7 Appellant’s reply brief reiterates many of the same points addressed in his principal

brief. See generally Appellant’s Reply Brief.
[J-49-2023] - 11

IV. Analysis

Our standard of review in evaluating speedy trial issues is “whether the trial court 

abused its discretion, and our scope of review is limited to the trial court's findings and 

the evidence on the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” 

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 989 A.2d 883, 899 (Pa. 2010) (citing Meadius, 870 A.2d at

805). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a 

conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will . . . discretion is abused.” 

Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693, 700 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted)). 

This Court has previously explained that Rule 600 was adopted in order “to protect 

defendants’ constitutional rights to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, in 

response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 

514 (1972). Id. at 701 (citation omitted). We have also recognized that “Rule 600 has 

the dual purpose of both protecting a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial rights and 

protecting society’s right to effective prosecution in criminal cases.” Id. (citations omitted). 

“In determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, 

consideration must be given to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, 

both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it.” Simms, 500 

A.2d at 805 (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 409 A.2d 308, 311 n.4 (Pa. 1979)). 

Turning to its text, Rule 600 requires that “[t]rial in a court case in which a written 

complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date 

on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). Rule 600 further provides:

(C) Computation of Time

(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage of the 

proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has 
[J-49-2023] - 12

failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the 

time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be 

excluded from the computation.

. . .

(D) Remedies

(1) When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods 

set forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial, the defendant's attorney, 

or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that 

the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has 

been violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney for the 

Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing 

on the motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1)-(D)(1).

Rule 600 does not explicitly address the way in which two-complaint scenarios 

should be handled, and this Court has had minimal opportunity to examine the rule in that

context. The most recent case addressing such a scenario is Meadius. There, the 

Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint charging Meadius with several offenses,

including forgery and insurance fraud on January 16, 2001. Meadius, 870 A.2d at 803. 

The Commonwealth was unable to proceed with the preliminary hearing on three 

occasions for various reasons and ultimately withdrew the complaint. Id. On March 27, 

2001, after receiving assurances from various witnesses concerning their ability to testify 

at a future preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth filed a second complaint alleging the 

identical offenses. Id. Meadius was scheduled to proceed to trial on February 4, 2002, 

which would have been more than one year after the first complaint, but not the second 

complaint, was filed. Id. Meadius moved to dismiss the charges with prejudice under 

Rule 600, asserting the Commonwealth failed to bring him to trial within the period of time 

required by law. Id. at 803-04. 

The trial court granted Meadius’ motion to dismiss, reasoning the Commonwealth 

failed to comply with Rule 600. Because the Commonwealth failed to bring Meadius to 
[J-49-2023] - 13

trial within one year of filing the first complaint, it was not entitled to the benefit of the filing 

date of the second identical complaint. Id. at 804. In doing so, the trial court rejected the 

Commonwealth’s argument that the case was controlled by Commonwealth v. Whiting, 

500 A.2d 806 (Pa. 1985). In Whiting, the Commonwealth sought dismissal of its case at 

the preliminary hearing and filed an identical second complaint almost one year later. 

This Court calculated the speedy trial period from the filing date of the second complaint, 

finding the record did not demonstrate any effort by the Commonwealth to evade or 

manipulate the speedy trial period. Id. (citing Whiting, 500 A.2d at 806-808). The trial 

court in Meadius distinguished Whiting on the basis that Whiting involved “dismissal by 

an impartial magistrate, not withdrawal of charges by executive action.” Id. at 804. It 

instead found applicable the two-part test set forth in Commonwealth v. Sires, 424 A.2d 

1386 (Pa. 1981). There, this Court found that the speedy trial period begins with the 

second complaint where: “(1) the first complaint was properly dismissed by a competent 

judicial authority; and (2) the record does not reveal any prosecutorial attempt to 

circumvent or evade the rule’s mandate.” Id. at 804 (citing Sires, 424 A.2d at 1387). 

Finding neither prong met, the trial court granted Meadius’ motion to dismiss. The 

Superior Court reversed, applying Whiting. It viewed Whiting more broadly than the trial 

court, emphasizing the fact that “the initial complaint in Whiting was dismissed on the 

Commonwealth’s motion without independent review by the district magistrate, thus 

prompting this Court to deem it ‘a voluntary withdrawal of the prosecution by the 

Commonwealth.’” Id. at 804 (citation omitted). The Superior Court also found the 

Commonwealth had not attempted to circumvent or manipulate Rule 600. Id. at 804-05. 

On appeal, the Meadius Court first examined the text of Rule 600 and noted its 

plain language makes clear that a trial court must grant a Rule 600 motion “unless it finds 

the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence and that the circumstances occasioning 
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the postponement were beyond its control.” Id. at 805. We acknowledged that previous 

case law, particularly Whiting, provided some support for the position that such Rule 600 

matters should be disposed of based solely on whether the Commonwealth attempted to 

evade or manipulate the speedy trial requirements. Id. at 806 (citing Whiting, 500 A.2d 

at 808). We explained, however, that Whiting “did not consider a scenario where the 

Commonwealth’s failure to act diligently precipitates a withdrawal of the complaint 

followed by a re-filing of identical charges.” Id. at 807. In addition to considering the 

Commonwealth’s intent to evade or manipulate Rule 600, the Meadius Court believed the 

appropriate test should also consider the Commonwealth’s exercise of due diligence,

explaining:

The rule’s focus upon allowing the prosecution time extensions only 

where it has acted diligently and where the delays in question were 

caused by factors beyond its control supports an interpretation 

whereby it must forego the benefit of a second filing date when these 

conditions are not met. Indeed, a contrary result would undermine the 

rule’s own facial requirements directed to prosecutorial diligence, as well its 

objectives, which include advancing society’s interest in seeing those 

accused of crime prosecuted in a timely manner, as well as ensuring the 

efficient management of criminal cases as a means of avoiding substantial 

backlogs[.]

Id. at 808 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Applying this standard, in light 

of the trial court’s findings, the Meadius Court found the Commonwealth failed to proceed 

with due diligence in bringing Meadius to trial in the required time period. It therefore 

reversed the Superior Court’s decision and reinstated that of the trial court. Id.

Though the specific provision of Rule 600 at issue in Meadius is no longer present 

in the current version of the rule, Rule 600(C)(1) imposes a due diligence requirement on 

the Commonwealth. Additionally, the test developed in Meadius appears in the 

Comments of the current version of Rule 600 and continues to be applied to cases 

involving two-complaint scenarios. That Comment states:
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In cases in which the Commonwealth files a criminal complaint, withdraws 

that complaint, and files a second complaint, the Commonwealth will be 

afforded the benefit of the date of the filing of the second complaint for 

purposes of calculating the time for trial when the withdrawal and re-filing of 

charges are necessitated by factors beyond its control, the Commonwealth 

has exercised due diligence, and the refiling is not an attempt to circumvent 

the time limitation of Rule 600. See Commonwealth v. Meadius, 582 Pa. 

174, 870 A.2d 802 (2005).

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment. 

We find the Meadius test applicable herein, as it seeks to reach a balance between 

the twin aims of Rule 600. We first address due diligence. This Court has explained that 

it is the Commonwealth’s burden to demonstrate due diligence by a preponderance of the 

evidence to avail itself of an exclusion under Rule 600. See Commonwealth v. Selenski, 

994 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. 2010). Perhaps most importantly, this Court has recognized 

that “[d]ue diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does not require 

perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the Commonwealth has put 

forth a reasonable effort.” Id. In the context of Meadius, and other similar two-complaint 

cases, the due diligence inquiry relates to whether the Commonwealth’s basis for filing 

the second complaint was precipitated by its lack of diligence in prosecuting the first 

complaint. Meadius, 870 A.2d at 807. That is because, more often than not, twocomplaint cases involve a situation where the Commonwealth re-files an identical 

complaint due to some barrier in prosecuting its initial complaint. When the 

Commonwealth fails to exercise diligence with respect to the first complaint, it does not 

receive the benefit of the filing date of the second identical complaint. 

Here, the Commonwealth’s filing of the second complaint cannot be attributed to 

a lack of diligence in prosecuting the first complaint, but is directly tied to its need for 

further investigation after discovering that Appellant’s drug enterprise extended beyond 

the jurisdiction of Huntingdon County. The relevant period of time for due diligence 

purposes under the unique facts of this case therefore becomes the period of time 
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between the filing of the first and second complaint. Here, the Commonwealth’s 

undertaking of grand jury proceedings can only be understood as an exercise of due 

diligence. As mentioned previously, the OAG’s grand jury investigation was necessitated 

by the revelation the Appellant’s criminal conduct extended beyond Huntington County 

and throughout the Commonwealth. The OAG’s investigation began almost immediately 

after learning additional information that grand jury proceedings would be necessary, and 

the second complaint was filed promptly after the conclusion of those proceedings. 

Although the Commonwealth concedes it could have withdrawn the first complaint while 

the investigation occurred, Appellant’s Rule 600 challenge to the first complaint resulted 

in dismissal of that complaint. Dismissal of the second complaint, however, is clearly not 

the proper remedy. Appellant’s retrospective focus on the result of the grand jury 

proceedings also misconstrues the due diligence inquiry, as due diligence is not outcome 

based but rather an assessment of the Commonwealth’s affirmative actions. See

Selenski, 994 A.2d at 1089. Nevertheless, it is clear the Commonwealth’s grand jury 

investigation bore fruit in the form of additional charges against Appellant that were not, 

and could not have been, included in the Commonwealth’s initial complaint. See Trial Ct. 

Op., 4/21/21, at 32-35. We reject Appellant’s argument to the contrary as unsupported 

by the record. See Wholaver, 989 A.2d at 809; Bradford, 46 A.3d at 700.8 

8 In his concurring opinion, Justice Wecht initially expresses hesitation with our decision

not to “engage independently in the close, record-based inspection of the charges that is 

required in a case like this[,]” but ultimately agrees with our decision to do so given the 

thoroughness of the trial court’s opinion. Wecht, J., Concurring at 12-13. To be clear, 

our reliance on the trial court’s analysis in this case rests not only on the fact that the trial 

court’s opinion was indeed extremely thorough, but also on the standard of review being 

an abuse of discretion. As such, the trial court’s determinations carry a degree of 

deference. In many cases involving Rule 600, this Court has stressed the consideration 

owed to the trial court’s factual findings and analysis, where supported by the record, in 

resolving motions for dismissal. See e.g., Meadius, 870 A.2d at 808.
[J-49-2023] - 17

 We must now address the remaining Meadius factors, specifically, whether the 

Commonwealth’s filing of the second complaint was necessitated by factors beyond its 

control and whether its actions were an attempt to circumvent or manipulate the timing 

requirements of Rule 600. Meadius, 870 A.2d at 808. As to the former, the 

Commonwealth’s filing of the second complaint was the result of becoming aware of 

additional information after the first complaint was filed. This information was made 

available only after multiple arrestees came forward with additional information following 

the execution of the October 6, 2017 search warrant, which ultimately led the 

Commonwealth to conduct additional investigation through the grand jury process. As 

such, we conclude the Commonwealth’s filing of the second complaint was necessitated 

by factors beyond its control. 

With respect to the final factor, the Commonwealth’s filing of the second complaint 

was not an attempt to manipulate the speedy trial requirements. As noted above, many 

two-complaint cases involve the re-filing of a second complaint with charges identical to 

the first complaint. In these cases, the goal is to extend the speedy trial clock where 

factors came in the way of a speedy prosecution the first time around. In contrast, the 

second complaint in this case involved some of the same charges from the first complaint 

but also included additional charges based on information discovered during the grand 

jury process. The filing of additional charges based on additional information is hardly an 

attempt to evade the speedy trial requirements, but rather an effort to hold Appellant 

accountable to the full extent of his criminal activity. We therefore conclude the 

Commonwealth’s filing of the second complaint was not an attempt to manipulate the 
[J-49-2023] - 18

speedy trial requirements. As the Commonwealth has met each of the Meadius factors, 

the Superior Court properly denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss.

9

V. Conclusion

Where the Commonwealth files two different criminal complaints against a 

defendant, the Commonwealth receives the benefit of the filing date of the second 

complaint for Rule 600 purposes where it demonstrates that it acted with due diligence 

between the period in which the complaints were filed. The Commonwealth must also 

establish that the filing of the second complaint was necessitated by factors beyond its 

control and that its actions were not an attempt to circumvent or manipulate the speedy 

trial requirements. Under the specific facts of this case, the Commonwealth has met 

these requirements.

10 We therefore affirm the order of the Superior Court denying 

Appellant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600.

9 Appellant’s argument focuses solely on which complaint controls the starting point of 

the Rule 600 calculation. He does not contend that his trial was untimely from the date 

of the second complaint to the commencement of his trial. In any event, we agree with 

the Superior Court that, considering the delays attributable to Appellant and the trial court, 

Rule 600 was not violated. See Womack, 2022 WL 1284618 at *9.

10 Justice Donohue authors a concurring opinion disagreeing with our application of the 

Meadius framework. She explains: “[I]t is only where the second set of charges is part of 

the same criminal episode as the first set of charges and where the evidentiary basis for 

those charges was available to the Commonwealth at the time the first complaint was 

filed that the Meadius test comes into play.” Donohue, J., Concurring at 3 (emphasis 

added). With respect to the former, it is difficult to deny that the charges in both criminal

complaints arose from the same underlying drug trafficking incident in a general sense, 

though much of the information supporting the charges in the second complaint was

unknown to the authorities when the first complaint was filed. We acknowledge that the 

discovery of new information necessitating the filing of a second complaint does not lend 

itself to a straightforward application of the Meadius test, but nonetheless find its due 

diligence approach of assessing whether the charges in the second complaint could have 

been brought with the first is appropriate under the circumstances. We are hesitant to 

inject compulsory joinder principles into our analysis here where there is clearly no such

issue. Section 110 details when a subsequent prosecution is barred by a former 

prosecution for different offenses and only applies where, inter alia, the first prosecution 

resulted in an acquittal or conviction. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. That is not the case herein. 
[J-49-2023] - 19

Chief Justice Todd and Justices Dougherty, Wecht and Brobson join the opinion.

Justice Donohue files a concurring opinion.

Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion.

Additionally, Section 109 explains when a prosecution is barred by a former prosecution 

for the same offense and none of the circumstances contained therein apply instantly. 

See 18 Pa.C.S. § 109 (explaining when prosecution barred by former prosecution for 

same offense). Thus, although the Commonwealth filed two complaints arising from the 

same conduct, Appellant was never prosecuted for the offenses in the first as

contemplated by Sections 109 and 110.