COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Elder and Bray 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

ARTHUR O. ROGERS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0808-96-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 JANUARY 14, 1997 

NORA KATHERINE ROGERS DAMRON 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TAZEWELL COUNTY 

Donald R. Mullins, Judge 

 Thomas P. Walk (Altizer, Walk & White, on 

briefs), for appellant. 

 James R. Henderson IV (Felicia H. de Courcy; 

Henderson and de Courcy, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Arthur O. Rogers (husband) appeals from a decision of the 

Circuit Court of Tazewell County (trial court) denying his 

motions to vacate an order finding him in contempt, to quash a 

capias, and to declare void a prior decree incorporating a 

settlement agreement. He contends that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to institute a contempt proceeding against him 

because the court order on which the contempt proceeding was 

based was void. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 I. 

 FACTS 

 Husband and Nora Katherine Rogers Damron (wife) were married 

in 1960, and husband filed for divorce in 1979. Wife filed an 

answer and cross bill requesting, among other things, spousal 

support. On April 23, 1981, the trial court granted husband a 
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divorce a vinculo matrimonii. In the decree, the trial court 

reserved jurisdiction over spousal support and property issues by 

stating: 

 It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED 

that this Court retain jurisdiction of this 

case for the purpose of adjudicating and 

determining all the rights of the wife for 

spousal support and property rights existing 

between the parties until such property 

rights and rights to spousal support are 

fully considered and determined. 

 On July 17, 1981, the parties entered into a settlement 

agreement. Under the agreement, husband agreed to transfer 

certain property to wife, to make annual payments to wife over a 

ten-year period, to pay specified debts, and to obtain a term 

life insurance policy as security for his obligations under the 

agreement. Wife agreed "to release and discharge . . . all [of 

her] interest by dower and any and all claims which she may or 

might have for alimony and for support and maintenance for 

herself or otherwise." On November 4, 1981, the trial court 

entered a decree that ratified and incorporated the agreement 

between the parties (settlement decree). 

 In 1986, wife began contempt proceedings to enforce the 

terms of the settlement decree. On April 23, 1993, the trial 

court found that husband was in arrears in the payment of his 

obligations under the settlement decree. It held that husband 

was in contempt of court and ordered the issuance of a capias for 

his arrest. 

 On November 22, 1994, husband filed motions to quash the 
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capias, to vacate the finding of contempt and to void the 

settlement decree. The trial court denied husband's motions. 

 II. 

VALIDITY OF THE 1981 SETTLEMENT DECREE 

 Husband contends that the trial court erred when it denied 

his motions because the 1981 settlement decree enforced by the 

trial court was void. We disagree. 

 A decree is void ab initio if it "has been procured by 

extrinsic or collateral fraud, or entered by a court that did not 

have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the parties." Rook 

v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987). A void 

judgment may be attacked collaterally or directly in any court at 

any time. Id.

 Husband's attack on the 1981 settlement decree is based 

solely on his contention that the trial court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction to incorporate the settlement agreement into 

the decree. Subject matter jurisdiction may be fixed only by the 

constitution or a statute, and it may not be conferred upon a 

court by the consent of the parties. See Barnes v. American 

Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705-06, 130 S.E. 902, 906 (1925). 

In Virginia, jurisdiction over divorce matters is 

statutorily-based. See Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 578, 311 

S.E.2d 786, 788 (1984). A court has jurisdiction over the 

subject matter if it has jurisdiction over the cause of action 

and of the relief sought. See Nolde Bros. v. Chalkley, 184 Va. 
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553, 561, 35 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1945). 

 Husband does not argue that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction over the cause of action in this case.1

 Instead, 

husband contends that the 1981 settlement decree is void because 

the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by 

wife: the incorporation of the settlement agreement in a decree 

issued after the entry of the divorce decree.2 Husband relies on 

 1 In 1981, the trial court had jurisdiction over suits for 

divorce and the adjudication of related support, custody and 

property issues. Code §§ 20-96, 20-107 (1975 & Supp. 1980). In 

addition, the court properly used its inherent equity power to 

bifurcate the divorce proceeding when it expressly reserved its 

consideration of the spousal support and property issues beyond 

the entry of the divorce decree. See Erickson-Dickson v. 

Erickson-Dickson, 12 Va. App. 381, 388, 404 S.E.2d 388, 392 

(1991) (stating that "when a court acquires jurisdiction over the 

subject matter and over the person, the court retains 

jurisdiction until the matter before it has been fully 

adjudicated"); Morris v. Morris, 3 Va. App. 303, 306, 349 S.E.2d 

661, 662-63 (1986) (holding that trial court had power to reserve 

jurisdiction over attorney's fees, spousal support, custody, and 

equitable distribution after entry of divorce decree); Parra v. 

Parra, 1 Va. App. 118, 127, 336 S.E.2d 157, 161-62 (1985) 

(stating that once subject matter jurisdiction attaches, only a 

statute can prevent a trial court from using its inherent powers 

in equity); Brinn v. Brinn, 147 Va. 277, 285, 137 S.E. 503, 505 

(1927) (describing inherent equity powers of a court of 

chancery). 

 2 We disagree with wife's argument that the power of a 

divorce court to incorporate a settlement agreement is a 

procedural matter rather than an issue of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction encompasses both 

jurisdiction over the cause of action and the power to grant the 

relief sought. See Nolde Bros., 184 Va. at 561, 35 S.E.2d at 

830. Wife's reliance on Morrison v. Bestler is misplaced. 239 

Va. 166, 387 S.E.2d 753 (1990). In Morrison, the Virginia 

Supreme Court held that compliance with the notice requirement 

and waiting period associated with a medical malpractice tort 

claim was not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 239 Va. 

at 173, 387 S.E.2d at 757-58. However, unlike the issue in this 

case, these procedural matters concern neither the court's 

underlying grant of jurisdiction to adjudicate tort claims nor 
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the language of the 1981 version of Code § 20-109.1 stating that 

a divorce court may incorporate a settlement agreement "by 

reference in its . . . decree of divorce . . . ." (1975 & Supp. 

1980).3

 Husband argues that the plain meaning of Code 

§ 20-109.1 in 1981 divested the trial court of its subject matter 

jurisdiction to incorporate settlement agreements after the 

decree of divorce became final. We disagree. 

 We hold that the 1981 version of Code § 20-109.1 did not 

deprive the trial court of its power to incorporate a settlement 

agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce 

 and that the 1981 settlement decree is not void for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. Both the legal framework on which 

the court's power to grant the relief sought in such cases: 

money damages. The issue in this case, on the other hand, 

centers on the power of the trial court to incorporate a 

settlement agreement into a post-divorce decree at the request of 

a party, which was the relief sought by wife in November, 1981. 

Thus, husband's appeal attacks the settlement decree for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, an issue that may be raised at any 

time. 

 3 In 1981, Code § 20-109.1 stated in relevant part: 

 Any court may affirm, ratify and incorporate 

by reference in its . . . decree of divorce 

whether from the bond of matrimony or from 

 bed and board, any valid agreement between 

 the parties, or provisions thereof, 

concerning conditions of the maintenance of 

the parties, or either of them and the care, 

custody and maintenance of their minor 

children, or establishing or imposing any 

other condition or consideration, monetary or 

nonmonetary. . . . 

(1975 & Supp. 1980). 
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Code § 20-109.1 was grafted and the purpose of Code § 20-109.1 

support this conclusion. 

 First, Code § 20-109.1 was not intended to alter the divorce 

court's power that existed prior to the statute's enactment to 

incorporate settlement agreements into its decrees. Before Code 

§ 20-109.1 was enacted in 1970, a divorce court had an 

"incidental authority to approve bona fide and valid agreements 

between the parties for the settlement of property rights and 

claims for [support]." Barnes, 144 Va. at 710, 714, 130 S.E. at 

907, 909 (holding that a trial court has a right to set forth in 

its decrees a settlement agreement entered between the parties in 

a divorce proceeding). This incidental authority of a divorce 

court extended to the enforcement of the agreement through its 

contempt power if the court had incorporated the terms of the 

settlement agreement instead of merely ratifying them. See Gloth 

v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 548, 153 S.E. 879, 891 (1930) (stating 

that a trial court has jurisdiction in a divorce suit to enforce 

the terms of a settlement agreement when it incorporates them in 

its decree); see also Casilear v. Casilear, 168 Va. 46, 55, 190 

S.E. 314, 318 (1937) (stating that a trial court retains 

jurisdiction after a final decree of divorce to enforce 

agreements between the parties); McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 211 

Va. 365, 368, 177 S.E.2d 781, 783, (1970) (stating that prior to 

the enactment of Code § 20-109.1, the incorporation of a 

settlement agreement "meant the court could use its contempt 
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power to enforce the agreement"). Soon after the enactment of 

Code § 20-109.1, the Virginia Supreme Court stated that this 

statute merely codified the preexisting power of a divorce court 

to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree and to enforce 

it through its contempt power. See McLoughlin, 211 Va. at 368, 

n.1, 177 S.E.2d at 783, n.1. 

 In addition, the conclusion that a divorce court may in a 

bifurcated proceeding incorporate a settlement agreement 

following the entry of a decree of divorce is consistent with the 

purpose of Code § 20-109.1. "The primary objective of statutory 

construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative 

intent." Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 

337, 338 (1983). A statute is construed "to promote the end for 

which it was enacted." Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 

840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1994). The purpose of Code 

§ 20-109.1 is to encourage dispute resolution and the formation 

of settlement agreements in divorce proceedings by facilitating 

their enforcement "by the contempt power of the court." Morris 

v. Morris, 216 Va. 457, 459, 219 S.E.2d 864, 866-67 (1975). When 

it enacted Code § 20-109.1, the General Assembly was presumably 

aware of a divorce court's inherent equity power to adjudicate 

separately the issues associated with a divorce. See Morris v. 

Morris, 3 Va. App. 303, 306, 349 S.E.2d 661, 662-63 (1986) 

(holding that trial court has inherent equity power to reserve 

jurisdiction over attorney's fees, spousal support, custody, and 
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equitable distribution after entry of divorce decree) (citing 

Brinn v. Brinn, 147 Va. 277, 285, 137 S.E. 503, 505 (1927)); see

also cases cited in supra note 1. In a bifurcated divorce 

proceeding, the only construction of Code § 20-109.1 that 

promotes the statute's purpose is one that permits a divorce 

court to incorporate settlement agreements after the entry of a 

divorce decree. When a divorce court decrees a divorce while 

reserving consideration of support, custody, or property issues, 

it provides the parties with additional time to resolve their 

differences. In these circumstances, a divorce court must 

possess the power to incorporate in a subsequent decree, rather 

than merely ratify, any settlement negotiated by the parties in 

order to facilitate the trial court's enforcement of such 

agreements through the contempt power of the court. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's 

denial of husband's motions to vacate the order finding him in 

contempt, to quash the capias and to declare void the 1981 

settlement decree. 

Affirmed.