NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANCISCO BERNAL-GARCIA, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 18-71856 

Agency No. A205-647-803 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 2, 2020**

Seattle, Washington

Before: GOULD, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Francisco Bernal-Garcia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review 

of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from

an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his applications for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 5 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and we deny the petition. We review 

the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims for substantial 

evidence. Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that BernalGarcia failed to meet his burden of establishing past persecution based on harm he 

allegedly suffered by his father. See Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023

(9th Cir. 2010). Bernal-Garcia’s testimony that his father used to hit him as a young 

child, especially when he does not personally remember the alleged abuse, and that 

he once witnessed his father hit his mother, does not compel a finding that BernalGarcia experienced harm rising to the level of persecution. See Lolong v. Gonzales,

484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“We must uphold the BIA’s 

determination unless ‘the evidence not only supports, but compels the conclusion 

that the asylum decision was incorrect.’” (quoting Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107, 

1112 (9th Cir. 2000))); Kohli v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1061, 1070 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(noting that persecution “is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of 

treatment our society regards as offensive” (quoting Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 

667, 672 (9th Cir. 2004))). 

2. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that, even 

assuming that Bernal-Garcia alleged membership in cognizable social groups, 

Bernal-Garcia failed to meet his burden to establish a reasonable fear of future 
3 

persecution based on his family membership and on his membership in the proposed 

social group Bernal-Garcia describes as “young, Mexican males in a conscriptive 

relationship that they are unable to leave.” This second social group is based on 

Bernal-Garcia’s fear of recruitment by drug cartels. 

As to Bernal-Garcia’s proposed social group based on family membership, 

Bernal-Garcia testified that he feared retribution by people in Mexico who had been

harmed by Bernal-Garcia’s father. However, Petitioner also testified that his 

paternal grandparents and uncles continue to live in Mexico unharmed, undermining 

his fear of future harm on this basis. See Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 

743 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Where the claimed group membership is the family, a family 

member’s continuing safety is an even more persuasive factor in considering a 

petitioner’s well-founded fear.”), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas 

v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 

As to Bernal-Garcia’s other proposed social group, Bernal-Garcia testified 

that no one in Mexico, other than his father, treated him poorly, and he specifically 

denied personally having any contact with Mexican gangs or cartels. See DelgadoOrtiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Asylum is not available to 

victims of indiscriminate violence, unless they are singled out on account of a 

protected ground.”). Bernal-Garcia argues that this proposed social group is similar

to that in Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 388, 388 (BIA 2014) (holding that
4 

“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” 

constituted a cognizable particular social group). That argument is unpersuasive, as

Bernal-Garcia’s proposed social group is based on his fear of generalized violence 

by drug cartels, which this Court has held bears no nexus to a protected ground.

1

 See

Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] desire to be free from 

harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members 

bears no nexus to a protected ground.”). 

The applications for asylum and withholding of removal were therefore 

correctly denied. See Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(noting that the standard for withholding of removal is “more stringent” than the 

standard for asylum).

3. Finally, the agency did not err when it determined that Bernal-Garcia 

did not establish that he will more likely than not be tortured upon returning to 

Mexico. Without more than generalized claims of violence, Bernal-Garcia cannot 

meet his burden. See Delgado-Ortiz, 600 F.3d at 1152 (“[G]eneralized evidence of 

violence and crime in Mexico . . . is insufficient to meet [the CAT] standard.”). 

Therefore, the agency’s decision that Bernal-Garcia failed to show that he is entitled 

to CAT protection is also supported by substantial evidence.

1 Matter of A-R-C-G- was overruled by Matter of A-B-, 27 I & N Dec. 316 (AG

2018) shortly after the BIA’s decision in this case. 
5 

PETITION DENIED.