2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-18-2014

Justice Allah v. Greg Bartkowski

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 13-3466

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-3466

___________

JUSTICE RASIDEEN ALLAH,

 Appellant

v.

GREG BARTKOWSKI, Administrator New Jersey State Prison; MICHELE R. RICCI, 

Director of the Division of Operations New Jersey Department of Corrections/Former 

Administrator of New Jersey State Prison; CHRISTOPHER HOLMES, Associate 

Administrator, New Jersey State Prison; WILLIAM MOLIENS, Former Associate 

Administrator, New Jersey State Prison; JAMES (JIMMY) BARNES, Assistant 

Superintendent New Jersey State Prison; CRYSTAL ANN RAUPP, Record Keeper 

Management Control Unit Review Committee/Acting Supervisor of Social Services New 

Jersey State Prison; DR. FLORA DEFILIPPO, Supervisor of Mental Health Services for 

UMDNJ and/or New Jersey State Prison; MR. ZELL, Professional Services 

Representative, New Jersey State Prison; THOMAS STECKEL, Former Social Services 

Supervisor New Jersey State Prison; HATIMA ISMAIL, Professional Services 

Representative, New Jersey State Prison; CAPTAIN RICHARD ORTIZ, Custody 

Supervisor, New Jersey State Prison; CAPTAIN B. KENNEDY, Custody Supervisor, 

New Jersey State Prison; LIEUTENANT ALAIMO, Custody Supervisor, New Jersey 

State Prison

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-11-cv-03153)

District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 16, 2014

Before: HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 18, 2014)
2

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Justice Rasideen Allah, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the 

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey’s order sua sponte dismissing 

with prejudice and without leave to amend his civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and an order denying his motion for reconsideration. For the foregoing reasons, 

we will vacate and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Allah, a prisoner at New Jersey State Prison, alleged that in November 2006 he 

was assigned to Management Control Unit Detention (“MCU”), a close-custody unit in a 

separate wing of the prison where prisoners are kept in solitary confinement. See N.J. 

Admin. Code § 10A:5-1.3. The Management Control Unit Review Committee 

(“MCURC”) held a hearing in January 2007 to determine whether Allah should be 

housed in the MCU. At that hearing, the MCURC determined that Allah should be 

placed in the MCU because, inter alia, he had masterminded a scheme to launder money 

and introduce contraband into the prison. After the MCURC’s initial decision to place 

Allah in the MCU was upheld on administrative appeal, Allah sought review with the 

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. The Superior Court affirmed the 

MCURC’s decision and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied his petition for 
3

certification. Allah v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., No. A-4422-06T1, 2008 WL 2245599 (N.J. 

Super. Ct. App. Div. June 3, 2008), cert. denied, 957 A.2d 1172 (N.J. 2008) (table). On 

at least one occasion, Allah has appealed a determination of the MCURC that continued 

his placement in the MCU. See Allah v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 2012 WL 2345390 (N.J. 

Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21, 2012).

In 2011, Allah filed a complaint in the District Court, generally raising two sets of 

claims: (1) that hearings reviewing his placement in the MCU violated his Fourteenth 

Amendment due process rights, and (2) that his confinement in the MCU was cruel and 

unusual in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.1

 Allah’s due process claims 

primarily relate to the January 2007 hearing that resulted in his placement in the MCU, 

subsequent routine hearings reviewing his placement in the MCU, and his administrative 

appeals from those hearings. Allah’s claims of cruel and unusual punishment relate to 

the conditions of his confinement in the MCU. Allah alleged that he is confined almost 

entirely to his cell; that other inmates on the block are mentally ill and create 

disturbances; and that other inmates are unsanitary, resulting in unsanitary common 

areas, rodent infestation, and noxious stenches.

The District Court reviewed Allah’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and dismissed it for failure to state claim. The District Court did not 

 1 Allah also raised several New Jersey state law claims concerning his 

confinement. However, after dismissing Allah’s federal claims the District Court 

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Allah’s state law claims.
4

grant leave to amend after determining that amendment would be futile. Allah filed a 

motion for reconsideration. In the motion, Allah contended that the District Court 

overlooked several of his claims. Allah also argued that the District Court’s treatment of 

his due process claim violated Wilkinson v. Austin, which held that, in conjunction with 

other factors, prolonged solitary confinement can create a liberty interest. 545 U.S. 209, 

223-24 (2005). The District Court denied Allah’s motion for reconsideration. Allah 

timely appealed both the order denying his motion for reconsideration and the order 

dismissing his complaint. 

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise 

plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). The legal 

standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is 

the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. “To survive a motion to 

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We review the denial 

of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 

F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
5

III.

We will vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Allah’s Eighth Amendment 

claims. The Eighth Amendment imposes upon prison officials a duty to provide 

‘“humane conditions of confinement.”’ Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 

249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). “For the 

conditions of confinement to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, they 

must deny the ‘“minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 835). Unsanitary conditions can be cruel and unusual. Young v. Quinlan, 

960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act of 

1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as recognized in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 

65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000). To assert an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement 

claim, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective (“Was the deprivation sufficiently 

serious?”) and subjective (“Did the officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of 

mind?”) test. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Allah alleged that he was 

allowed a 10-minute shower every day and a 90-minute yard period every second or third 

day. The remaining time he was confined to a small cell in a cell block that held 

mentally ill inmates who banged and kicked on the cell doors throughout the day. The 

noise caused headaches and sleep deprivation. Allah also alleged that the mentally ill 

inmates did not clean themselves or their cells. Due to the unsanitary conditions, the cell 

block smelled of urine and excrement, and was infested with pests. Further contributing 

to the unsanitary conditions was the fact that inmates were not permitted access to toilets 
6

during the 90-minute yard period, which caused some inmates to relieve themselves on 

the ground.

The District Court concluded that Allah failed to state an Eighth Amendment 

claim because “[h]e does not allege that he is not given toiletries and cleaning products to 

keep himself and his own cell clean. His alleged denial of drinking water and a toilet is 

limited to a 90-minute yard exercise that occurs only several days a week.” In his motion 

for reconsideration, Allah alleged that the District Court overlooked his claims of sleep 

deprivation and unsanitary conditions. In its opinion denying Allah’s motion, the District 

Court determined that Allah’s allegations did not establish that the conditions 

contributing to his sleep deprivation had persisted “for a lengthy or consistent period of 

time,” and that its earlier opinion adequately considered Allah’s “surrounding sanitary 

environment.” We conclude that the unsanitary conditions in the surrounding 

environment that Allah alleges “serve[] no ‘legitimate penological objectiv[e].’” Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 833 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 548 (1984)) (second alteration 

in original). We also conclude that Allah’s allegation that “special needs inmates . . . 

kick and bang on the cell doors and walls nearly every single day, for hours at a time, at 

all times of the day,” sufficiently alleges that the disturbance was consistent and ongoing. 

Compl. 48, June 2, 2011, ECF No. 1. Allah has alleged that prison officials were aware 

of the conditions in the MCU, but failed to remedy them. See id. at 837 (holding that to 

establish deliberate indifference a prison official must both know of and disregard an 
7

excessive risk to an inmate’s health or safety). In light of these allegations, we conclude 

that it was error to dismiss Allah’s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim. 

We will also vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Allah’s Fourteenth 

Amendment claims. The District Court concluded that Allah’s confinement in the MCU 

did not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding such confinement. A liberty interest is 

created when a prison’s action imposes “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate 

in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 

(1995). When considering whether an inmate’s placement in segregated housing triggers 

a legally cognizable interest courts should consider: (1) the amount of time spent in 

segregation; and (2) whether the conditions of segregation were significantly more 

restrictive than those imposed on other inmates in segregation. Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 

140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). In its opinion denying Allah’s 

motion for reconsideration, the District Court noted that Allah has been confined in the 

MCU for six years. While housed in the MCU, Allah was strictly confined to his cell, 

less the aforementioned periods to shower and exercise in the yard. According to his 

complaint, inmates placed in the MCU face harsher restrictions than inmates placed in 

administrative segregation. For example, inmates in administrative segregation, unlike 

those in the MCU, can receive “window visits,” purchase canteen items, and have 

outdoor recreation in an area that is not caged. Read together, Allah’s allegations of the 

duration and conditions of confinement in the MCU state an atypical and significant 

hardship that implicates a liberty interest. See, e.g., Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223-24.
8

However, as the District Court noted, establishment of a liberty interest does not 

end the procedural due process inquiry. In its November 2012 opinion, the District 

Court, after concluding that Allah’s confinement did not implicate a liberty interest, 

nevertheless examined whether he was provided with the process he would have been 

due had a liberty interest been implicated. The District Court concluded that Allah was 

given a meaningful opportunity to respond and be heard at the initial MCU placement 

hearing, at the routine reviews every 90 days, and at the annual reviews. However, Allah 

alleged a litany of defects during these hearings that violated his due process rights. 

Primarily, Allah alleged that several of his administrative appeals were ignored; that 

members of the MCURC were unfamiliar with and often violated, inter alia, Sections 

10A:5-2.3 to .5 of the New Jersey Administrative Code governing MCURC proceedings; 

that MCURC hearings were perfunctory and without substance; that at least one MCURC 

member, Dr. Flora DeFillipo, was unaware that she was an MCURC member; that Dr. 

DeFillipo signed off on MCURC decisions without realizing she had done so; and that 

Dr. DeFillipo never engaged in factfinding or weighing of the evidence. 2

 Reading these 

 2 In his motion for reconsideration, Allah addressed his allegations concerning Dr. 

DeFillipo, which were derived from deposition testimony that she gave in a separate civil 

action. In its opinion denying Allah’s motion for reconsideration, the District Court 

concluded that Allah’s allegations concerning Dr. DeFillipo were not proper for review 

because the deposition testimony did not qualify as “new evidence.” However, excerpts 

of the deposition testimony were attached to Allah’s complaint, and he raised allegations 

derived from that testimony in his complaint. See Compl. 45 to 46, ECF No. 1; Compl. 

Ex. 1-84 47 to 55, June 2, 2011, ECF No. 1-5. Despite concluding that the evidence was 

not new, the District Court determined that the evidence did not alter its conclusion that 

the MCURC’s placement and review of Allah’s confinement in the MCU comported with 
9

allegations, we determine that Allah has stated Fourteenth Amendment claims that should 

not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim.3

 See City of W. Covina v. Perkins, 

525 U.S. 234, 239 (1999) (holding that due process requirements include a meaningful 

opportunity to be heard); Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1986).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s November 8, 2012 

and July 30, 2013 orders and remand for further proceedings. Allah’s motion to 

supplement the record is denied as moot.4

 

due process.

3 We note that in determining that Allah did not state a due process claim, the 

District Court relied on decisions from the New Jersey Superior Court in which Allah had 

appealed his initial placement hearing and one of his review hearings. See Allah v. N.J. 

Dep’t of Corr., 2012 WL 2345390; Allah v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 2008 WL 2245599. It 

appears that in those cases Allah presented similar claims of due process violations. 

While we express no opinion on the matter, we note that on remand these cases may have 

a preclusive effect on Allah’s Fourteenth Amendment claims.

4 Judge Roth would have affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of Allah’s 

Fourteenth Amendment claims.