IN THE SIJPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

IN THE MATTER OF KEITH WAYNE WOOD, 

a Youth under the age of Eighteen. 

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APPEAL FROM: The Youth Court of the Eleventh Judicial If$~tri~, - - 

In and for the Countv of Flathead, I. I.: 17.1 . ' The Honorable Michael H. Keedy, Judge pres&d??ng?3 

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COUNSEL OF RECORD: m 

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For Appellant: 

Stephen J. Nardi; Sherlock & Mardi, Kalispell, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Honorable Marc Racicot, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

George Schunk, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Ted 0. Lympus, Flathead County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana 

Submitted: November 15, 1988 

Decided: February 14, 1989 0 

Filed: 

-- X 

Clerk s - 
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., del-j-vered the Opinj-on of 

the Court. 

Pursuant to 5 41-5-206 (3), MCA, the youth court of the 

Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, ordered the case 

of Keith Wavne Wood, a youth, transferred to District Court. 

The youth appeals the transfer, arguing that S 41-5-206(3), 

MCA, is unconstitutional. We affirm the District Court. 

The following issues were raised on appeal. 

1. Is § 41-5-206(3), MCA, unconstitutional because it: 

(a) denies a youth's right to due process? 

(b) denies a youth's right to equal protection? 

(c) violates the separation of powers doctrine of the 

Montana Constitution? 

Keith Wayne Wood, a youth, was arrested on March 30, 

1988 for two counts of deliberate homicide. He was brought 

before the youth court on March 31, 1988 for the purpose of 

appointing him a counsel and determining whether he should be 

detained. On April 4, 1988, the county attorney for Flathead 

County filed a motion pursuant to 5 41-5-206(3), MCA, in the 

youth court to transfer the case to the District Court. Wood 

appeared before the youth court on May 6, 1988, at which time 

he conceded he was 16 years old at the time of the wrongful. 

acts alleged in the petition and, if true, the acts alleged 

would constitute two counts of deliberate homicide under 

45-5-102, MCA. 

On May 10, 1988, the youth court, by written order, 

granted the county attorney's motion and transferred 

jurisdiction over the matter of Keith Wayne Wood to the 

District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead 

County. In its findings of fact, the youth court found that 

at the time of the alleged wronqful acts Wood was 16 vears of 
age, the acts, if true, would constitute deliberate homicide 

as defined in 45-5-102, MCA, and probable cause existed to 

conclude that Wood committed the alleged acts. 

In granting the order, the youth court relied. on 5 

41-5-206(3), MCA, which states that 

The court shall grant the motion to t-ransfer if the 

youth was 16 years old or older at the time of the 

conduct alleged to be unlawful and the unlawful act 

would constitute deliberate homicide as defined in 

45-5-102, mitigated deliherate homicide as defined 

in 45-5-103, or the attempt, as defined in 

45-4-103, of either deliberate or mitigated 

deliberate homicide if the act had been committed 

by an adult. 

The youth court found this statute rationally based upon the 

age of the offenders and the seriousness of the offenses. 

The youth court thus found that the statute does not create 

an unreasonable age classification and therefore does not 

violate a youth's right to due process nor to equal 

prot.ection. The youth court also found that the statute does 

not violate the constitutional guarantee of the separation of 

legislative and judicial powers, but rather found that 

redefining the Youth Court Act is a valid exercise of 

legislative authority. Wood appeals the transfer to District 

Court, presenting three constitutional issues for review. 

The first issue raised on appeal is whether 5 

41-5-206(3), MCA, denies a youth's constitutional right tc? 

due process. 

One of the purposes of the Montana Youth Court Act, SS 

41-5-101 through 41-5-809, MCA (1987), is to substitute 

rehabilitation in lieu of punishment for youths who have 

violated the law. Section 41-5-102(2), MCA. To further this 

purpose, the youth court is granted exclusive original. 

jurisdiction of youths who have violated any law other than a 

traffic or fish and game law prior to having reached 18 years 
of age. Section 41-5-203(l), MCA. The Act, however, also 

pro~rides for a youth's transfer to district court upon a 

motion of the county attorney in certain instances. Section 

41-5-206, MCA. 

Wood argues that § 41-5-206(3), MCA, is unconstitutional 

because the provision denies a youth, aged 16 years or older 

and who has allegedly committed or attempted to commit 

deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide, the right to a 

hearing whereby a youth court considers mitigating factors in 

its determination of whether to transfer the youth to 

district court. In particular, Wood argues that § 

41-5-206 (1) , MCA, grants these youths a hearing to determine 

whether to transfer them to district court, hut that S 

41-5-206 (3), MCA, dictates the outcome of the hearing by 

mandating the youth court to grant the county attorney's 

motion to transfer these youths. 

In asserting this argument, Wood relies upon a United 

States Supreme Court decision, Kent v. United States (19661, 

383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84. In Kent, a 16 

year old youth from the District of Columbia was charged with 

housebreaking, robbery, and rape. Before transferring a 

youth aged 16 years or older from youth court to district 

court, the District of Columbia statute required a "full 

investigation." The youth court transferred jurisdiction of 

the youth to district court without a hearing or any 

investigation. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543-48, 86 S.Ct. at 

1048-51, 16 L.Ed.2d at 87-90. The Supreme Court stated that 

the statute "assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the 

particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of 

due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the 

statutory requirement of a ' full investigation. ' " Kent, 383 

U.S. at 553, 86 S.Ct. at 1053, 16 L.Ed.2d at 93. The Court 

therefore held that procedural due process is required by the 
F0urteent.h Amendment when transferring a youth from youth 

court to district court. Kent, 383 U.S. at 557-63, 86 S.Ct. 

The United States Supreme Court in Rreed v. Jones 

(1975), 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346, however, 

recognized that it has 

never attempted to prescribe criteria for, or the 

nature and quantum of evidence that must support, a 

decision to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult 

court. We require only that, whatever the relevant 

criteria, and whatever the evidence demanded, a 

State determine whether it wants to treat a 

juvenile within the juvenile-court system before 

entering upon a proceeding that may result in an 

adjudicatj-on that he has violated a criminal law 

and in a substantial deprivation of liberty, rather 

than subject him to the expense, delay, strain, and 

embarrassment of two such proceedings. Breed, 421 

1J.S. at 537-38, 95 S.Ct. at 1790, 44 L.Ed.?d at 

360. 

Subsequent United States' Court of Appeals decisions have 

held that a state's treatment of youths outside of the 

criminal system is not an inherent right and may be redefined 

or restricted by state legislation, so long as no arhitrarv 

or discriminatory classification is in~~olved. Woodard v. 

Wainwright (5th Cir. 1977), 556 F.2d 781, 785, cert. denied, 

434 U.S. 1088, 98 S.Ct. 1285, 55 L.Ed.2d 794 (1978); -- see also 

IJnited States v. Quinones (1st Cir. 1975), 516 ~.2d 1309, 

1311, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 852, 96 S.Ct. 97, 46 L.Ed.2d 76; 

Cox v. United States (4th Cir. 1973), 473 F.2d 334, 336, 

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869, 94 S.Ct. 183, 38 L.Ed.2d 116. 

Wood recognizes that a youth's treatment outside of the 

criminal system may be redefined or restricted by the state 

legislature, hut asserts that under S 41-5-206 (1) , MCA, the 

legislature qranted all youths a hearing before being 

transferred to djstrict court and. that 5 41-5-206 (3), MCA, 
dictates the outcome of that hearing for youths aged 16 vears 

or older and who have committed or attempted to commit 

deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide. We disagree 

with Wood's basic assertion. Section 41-5-206 (1) (a) (i) , MCA, 

provides that youths, aged 12 years or older and who have 

committed sexual intercourse without consent or who have 

committed or attempted to commit deliberate or mitigated 

deliberate homicide, may be transferred, after a hearina, to 

district court by motion of the county attorney. Section 

41-5-206(3), MCA, however, provides that youths aged 16 years 

or older who have allegedly committed or attempted to commit 

one of these offenses--deliberate or mitigated deliberate 

homicide--must -- he transferred to district court upon a motion 

by the county attorney. 

This Court first recognizes that S 41-5-206, MCA, is 

presumed constitutional and that the party attacking the 

statute, Wood, has a significant burden in proving its 

invalidity. T & W Chevrolet v. Darvial (19821, 196 Mont. 

287, 292, 641 P.2d 1368, 1370. We hold that Wood failed to 

meet this burden. When interpreting statutes, this Court 

must adhere to the legislators' intent. State v. Hubbard 

(1982), 200 Mont. 1.06, 110-11, 649 P.2d 1331, 1333. Prior to 

1987, S 41-5-206, MCA, required a hearing for all youths 

before transferring them to district court. The legislature 

amended the statute in 1987 by enacting S 41-5-206(3), MCA. 

This provision provides for automatic transfer of youths aged 

16 years or older and who have allegedly committed or 

attempted to commit deliberate or mitigated deliberate 

homicide. The presumption exists that, by adopting an 

amendment to a statute, the legislature intended to make some 

change in existing law. Foster v. Kovich (1983), 207 Mont. 

139, 144-45, 673 P.2d 1239, 1243. This Court must also, if 

possible, give effect to all of the provisions. Darb~ Spar, 
Ltd. v. Dept. of Revenue (Mont. 19851, 705 P.2d 111, 113, 42 

St.Rep. 1262, 1264-65. We therefore hold that S 41-5-206(3), 

MCA, which applies to youths aged 16 years or older, has the 

effect of limiting S 41-5-206(1), MCA, to youths aged 12 

years or older hut under the age of 16 years when the alleged 

offense is deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide or the 

attempt of either. Section 41-5-206 (3) , MCA, therefore does 

not dictate the outcome of a hearing, since the youths who 

fall under this provision are not granted an initial hearing. 

Any other interpretation of the entire statute would render 

the legislature's enactment of subsection 3 of the statute 

meaningless. 

Wood was transferred from youth court to district court 

under 41-5-206(3), MCA. No procedural irregularities were 

alleged, nor were any evident in the record. Section 

41-5-206 (3) , MCA, therefore meets the minimum federal 

requirements and does not violate Wood's right to due process 

under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The next issue raised on appeal is whether $5 

41-5-206(3), MCA, denies a youth's right to equal protection. 

In asserting his equal protection argument, Wood only 

refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 

Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. 14, 1. As previously 

stated, youths aged 16 years or older and who have committed 

or attempted to commit deliberate or mitiqated deliberate 

homicide are not granted a hearing prior to transfer to 

district court as a result of S 41-5-206(3), MCA. Since a 

state's treatment of youths outside of the criminal svstem is 

not an inherent right and. may be redefined or restricted by 

state legislation, see Woodard, 556 F.2d at 785, this Court 

needs to determine next whether such a classification is 

constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. 
The United States Supreme Court recognizes three levels 

of scrutiny when determining whether a system o" 

classification found within a state statute is 

constitutional. The strict scrutinv analvsis, requiring the 

most exacting scrutiny, is applied when the classification is 

based on an inherently suspect class--race, national origin 

or al.i.enage--or when the classification infringes on a 

fundamental right. See, e.g., Loving v. ~irginia (1967), 388 

U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (race); Graham v. 

Richardson (1971), 403 1J.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 

534 (alienage); Oyama v. California (1948), 332 U.S. 633, 68 

S.Ct. 269, 92 L.Ed. 249 (national origin); Shapiro v. 

Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 

(fundamental right to travel interstate); Dunn v. ~lumstein 

(1972), 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 

(fundamental right to vote) . When applying the strict 

scrutiny test, the government has the burden of proving that 

the statute is justified by a compelling state interest, 

narrowly tailored, and no other avenues less burdensome are 

avail-able in which to accomplish the objective. Dunn, 405 

U.S. at 342-43, 92 S.Ct. at 1003, 31 L.Ed.2d at 284-85. 

The intermediate level of scrutiny employed by the 

United States Supreme Court generally applies when 

classifications are based on gender or illegitimacy. -- See, 

e.g., Clark v. Jeter (1988), - U. S. , 108 S.Ct. 1910, 

100 L.Ed.2d 465 (illegitimacy); Mississippi University for 

Women v. Hogan (1982), 458 U.S. 718, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 

L. Ed. 2d 1090 (gender) . To withstand intermediate scrutiny, 

the party seeking to uphold the statutory classification must 

show that the classification is substantially related to an 

important governmental objective. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724, 73 

S.Ct. at 3336, 73 L.Ed.26 at 1098. 
All other classifications scrutinized under the United 

States Constitution are subject to the minimal rational basis 

standard of review. Under this standard, classifications are 

presumed constitutional and the party challenging the statute 

bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the classification is not rationally related to a legitimate 

state objective. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. 

(1981) , 449 U.S. 456, 464, 101 S.Ct. 715, ?24, 66 L.Ed.2d 

659, 668-69, reh. denied, 450 U.S. 1027, 101 S.Ct. 1735, 68 

L.Ed.2d 222. The United States Supreme Court applies this 

standard of review when classifications are based on 

economics or social welfare. Dandridge v. b7illiams (1970) , 

397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 

501-02. 

Wood argues that 5 41-5-206 (3), MCA, deprives him, and 

all such youths si-milarly situated, to equal. protection by 

infringing on his "'fundamental right' of due process of 

law." In asserting this argument, Wood argues that the 

strict scrutiny analysis is applicabl-e and that the stat-e 

therefore has the burden of showing that classifying youths 

who have violated the law on the basis of age and seriousness 

of the offense is justified by a compelling state interest. 

Wood recognizes the protection of the community as the 

state's interest in this matter, and then argues that 

classifying youths on the bases of their age and seriousness 

of the offense is neither rationally related to a legitimate 

state interest nor justified by a compelling state interest. 

We disagree with Wood's basic assertion that procedural 

due process, as mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is also 

a fundamental right. No support exists for this assertion. 

On the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has limited 

its recognition of fundamental rights, requiring a strict 

scrutiny analvsis, to interstate travel, voting, privacy, and 
the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, which includes 

the freedom of speech, press, religion, association and 

belief, and the right to assemble peaceably and to petition 

the government for redress of grievances. - See, e-g., 

Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 

(interstate travel); Dunn, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 

L.Ed.2d 274 (voting); Stanley v. Georgia (1969), 394 U.S. 

557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (privacy); widmar 17. 

Vincent (1981), 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 ~.~d.2d 440 

(speech) ; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1984) , 464 

11.s. 501, 1.04 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (press); Wisconsin v. 

Yoder (1972), 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 ~.~d.2d 15 

(religion); Shelton v. Tucker (1960), 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 

247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (association and belief); and Hague v. 

C.I.O. (1939), 307 1J.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.E~. 1423 

(assemble peaceably and petition government for redress of 

grievances) . The classification found in 5 41-5-206(3), MCA, is based 

on both age and gravity of the offense. The United States 

Supreme Court has held that age is not a suspect class 

requiring a strict scrutiny analysis. Massachusetts Board of 

Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427 U.S. 307, 313-15, 96 S.Ct. 

2562, 2566-67, 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 524-26. The classification is 

also not based on gender or illegtimacy, and therefore not 

subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny. 

In light of the above, we hold that the proper standard 

of review in this case is whether the classification found in 

5 41-5-206, MCA, is rationally related to a legitimate state 

interest. Wood therefore has the burden of showing that the 

age and seriousness of the offense are not rationally related 

to a legitimate state interest. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. 

Co. v. Brownell (1935), 294 1J.S. 580, 584, 55 S.Ct. 538, 540, 

79 L.Ed. 1070, 1072-73. Me hold that. Wood has failed to meet 
this burden. The legislative history of House Bill 470, the 

legislative vehicle of 5 41-5-206(3), MCA, reveals that the 

legislature recognized the increase in the number of 

homicides committed by today's teenagers and expressed that 

the passage of House Bill 470 would aid in dealins 

effectively with these youths. Minutes of Montana House 

Judiciary Committee, at 8-9 (February 17, 1987). 

Wood bases his argument on the Equal Protection Clause 

of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. 14, S 

1, and in light of the federal cases noted above, we hold 

that $ 41-5-206, MCA, does not violate this clause. Wood, 

however, does not refer to the Montana Constitution. 

Nonetheless, this Court reserves "the power to examine 

constitutional issues that involve broad public concerns to 

avoid future litigation on a point of law." In the Matter 

of N.B. (Mont. 1980), 620 P.2d 1228, 1231, 37 St.Rep. 2033., 

2033. We choose to exercise this power to determine whether 

§ 41-5-206, MCA, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Montana Constitution. 

In examining whether a statute is constitutional under 

our state Equal Protection Clause, Mont. Const. art. 11, S 4, 

this Court also recognizes a three tier analysis. This 

Court, however, has chosen not to follow the exact standards 

as set forth in the United States Supreme Court's decisions. 

Pfost v. State (Mont. 1985), 713 P.2d 495, 500-01, 42 St.Rep. 

1957, 1963-64; Butte Community Union v. Lewis (Mont. 19861, 

712 P.2d 1309, 1313, 43 St.Rep. 65, 70. When a fundamental 

right, as enumerated by the Montana Constitution, is being 

deprived, or when a suspect classification exists, this Court 

will apply the strict scrutiny analysis. -- Pfost, 713 P.2d at 

501, 42 St.Rep. at 1964. 

The middle tier analysis, first developed in -- Butte 

Community . -- Union, is applicable when a benefit, not. found 
within the Declaration of Rights, is nonetheless lodged 

within the Montana Constitution. In Butte Community Union, 

we held that no fundamental right to welfare exists, but. 

noted that Article XII, S 3(3), directed the legislature to 

provide necessary assistance to the misfortunate. e 

therefore held that in determining whether a classification 

found within a welfare statute is constitutional, the state 

must demonstrate that 1) the classification is reasonable and 

2) the state's interest in the classification is more 

important than the people's interest in obtaining welfare 

benefits. Butte Community Union, 712 P.2d at 1312-14, 43 

St.Rep. at 68-71. In other circumstances, this Court applies 

the rational basis analysis. - See Cottrill v. Cottrill 

Sodding Service (Mont. 1987), 744 P.2d 895, 897, 44 St.Rep. 

1762, 1764; Godfrey v. Montana State Fish and Game Comm'n. 

(Mont. 1981), 631 P.2d 1265, 1267-68, 38 St.Rep. 661, 663-65. 

The Montana Constitution provides that "the rights of 

persons under 18 years of age shall include, hut not be 

limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless 

specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection 

of such persons." Mont. Const. art. 11, 5 15. The Equal 

Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution provides that 

"Inlo person shall be denied the equal protection of the 

laws. . . ." Mont. Const. art. 11, 5 4. No provision exists 

in the Montana Constitution that provides a youth with a 

fundamental right to be treated specially, nor are anv 

benefits lodged within the Montana Constitution that would 

provide a youth with an interest whose statutory abridgement 

requires something more than a rational relationship to a 

legitimate government objective. We therefore hold that the 

rational basis analysis is applicable in this case to 

determine whether the statute is constitutional under the 
Montana Constitution. As we noted above, we hold that the 

statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 

Other jurisdictions faced with the same issue, utilized 

a rational relationship test and upheld classifications based 

on age and seriousness of the offense. See People v. J. S. 

(Ill. 1984), 469 N.E.2d 1090, 1094-95; State v. Anderson 

(Idaho 1985), 700 P.2d 76, 80; People v. Drayton (N.Y. 19761, 

350 N.E.2d 377, 379-80; People v. Thorpe (Colo. 19821, 641 

P.2d 935, 937-40. As already noted, treatment as a juvenile 

is not an inherent right and the legislature may restrict or 

qualify that right. We therefore conclude that the 

classification found in S 41-5-206, MCA, based on age and 

seriousness of the offense, is rationally related to the 

legitimate state objective of curbing homicides committed by 

teenagers and protecting society from these violent offenders 

under both the United States and Montana Constitutions. 

The last issue raised on appeal is whether § 41-5-306, 

MCA, violates the separation of powers doctrine of the 

Montana Constitution. 

Wood argues that the legislature is attempting to 

control a judicial function by enacting § 41-5-206 (3) , MCA. 

Specifically, Wood argues that the legislature has usurped 

the judiciary's power to hear and decide motions brought 

before it and that this violates the doctrine of separation 

of powers under the Montana Constitution and must be declared 

invalid. We disagree. 

The legislature's power to create the youth courts is 

unquestionable. The Montana Constitution provides that 

"[tlhe judicial power of the state is vested in one supreme 

court, district courts, justice courts, - and -- such other courts --- 

- as may - be provided & - law " (emphasis added). Mont. Const. 

art. VII, 1. Under this section, the legislature 

established the vouth courts to provjde iudicial protection 
for youths who have violated the law. As previously noted, 

the legislature also has the inherent power to redefine that 

protection to achieve a legitimate state objective. The 

legislature pursued this option in 1987 by revising the 

legislatively-created transfer of jurisdiction mechanism. 

We held above that by the enactment of S 41-5-206(3), 

MCA, the legislature does not grant youths age 16 years or 

older who have committed or attempted to commit deliberate or 

mitigated deliberate homicide, a hearing to consider 

mitigating factors before transferring the youth to district 

court. No violation of the separation of power doctrine 

occurs under the Montana Constitution when the legislature 

acts to revise the protections afforded youths which were 

created. under its own legislative power. In light of the 

above we hold that 41-5-206, MCA, does not violate the 

separation of powers doctrine of the Montana Constit.ution. 

Affirmed. 

We Concur 

CL; , r 

Chief Justice