W hen we refer t o t he p l ai nt i f f i n t he si ngul ar, we are ref erri ng t o t he i njured p art y , D eb b y Fo x. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT KNOXVI LLE Ma y 10, 200 4 S es sio n

BI LL FOX, ET AL 

### . v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Tennessee Claim s Com m ission , Eastern Division No. 20101550 Vance W. C heek, Jr., Com m ission er

No. E2003-02024-COA- R3-CV - F ILED OCTO BER 27, 2004

I n th is p re mis e s lia

bil ity a c tio n, De bb y

F ox (“ the plaint if

f” ) a ndhe r h us ba nd , B ill F ox, f ile d a c la im 1
ag ainst the State of Tennessee (“the State”) for damag es sus tained by the Foxes when the plaintiff

wa s in jur e d a s a re su lt o f a fa ll fr om a sta g e du ri ng a play re he ars a l on the c a mpu s o f the Un ive rs ity of Tenne ssee at Knox ville (“UT” ). The claims commission found in f avor of the State, holding ( 1) that the plaintiff fa iled to prove he r cla im of neg lige nce and (2) that she was g uiltyof 100% of the fault in the ac cident. The plaintiff and he r husb an d appea l, arg uing, int e r a lia , that the evidenc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th e c la ims c omm iss ion ’s de te rm inatio ns . We a ff ir m.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Claim s Com m ission Aff irm ed; Case R em anded

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J
., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined.

W. A n d r e w F o x, K n o xv il le
, T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e ap p e ll a n ts , B il l F o x a n d D e b b y F o x.

Ronald C. L eadbe tter, Knoxvil le, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

I.

I n the sp ri ng of

20 00 , Re ne e Ha

ra lso n, a se nio r at U T, dir e c te d a

pla y on the UT c a mpu s to satisfy a required component of her theatre major. Cast members included UT students as we ll as non-students with whom Ms. Hara l s o n h ad wor ked on pre vious theatrica l projects. The play was set to be per formed at the Carousel The atre , which, as its name sug g ests, is a theatre -in-the- round. T h e p l a i n t i f

f
, a n o n

- s t u d e n t , w a s a

c a s tm e m b e r

i n t h e p l a y.-2-

Th e p la in ti f

f h a d e xte n s iv e th e a tr e e xp e r ie n c e

. Sh e ap p e ar e d in h e r f ir s t p lay s h o r tly

afte r her m ar ri age i n 1 976. She had ac ted in some 30 to 35 “full stag e produc tions.” Her e x tensive experience in local theatr e led he r to appe ar in produc tions at the Oak Ridg e Playhouse, the Te nn e sse e Th e a tr e , th e B ijo u T he a tr e , a ndthe Cla re nc e B ro wn Th e a tr e on the UT c a mpu s, a s w e ll as the Car ousel Theatre.

The Car ousel Theatre is desig ned with seve ral c oncentric desc ending levels or steps – e ach of which a

ppear from the photog raphs in the r ecor d to be appr ox imately 3 fee t in depth – that encir cle the e ntire theatre; t he audience is seate d in chair s on eac h of these ste ps, with severa l space s left for the aisles desc ending down to a lar g e round a rea with a concre te floor. Pre sumably , many theatric al produc tions are stag ed in this lower floor a rea . Howeve r, in the ca se at ba r, a r aised platform or stag e wa s built on t op of the lower few steps of the theatre, whic h stag e enc ompassed approximately

one-f ourth of the total ar ea of the ci rc u l ar l evels. To g ive the re ader a better understanding of this config uration, we have attached one o f t h e ex hibits i n the instant case as an appendix to thi s opinion. The sole purpose of the appe ndix is to g ive the rea der a g ener al orienta tion of the lay out of the Carouse l Theatre

.
Af te r Ms. Ha

ra lso n ha d ass e mbl e d he r ca st, sh e c on du c te d most of the play re he ars a ls at a loc a l c hu rc h. Ho we ve r, a pp ro xima te ly

on e to t wo we e ks prior

to the Ap ri l 26 , 2 00 0, op e nin g nig ht,

re he ars a ls we re mov e d to the Caro us e l Th e a tr e . O nc e the re he ars a ls m ov e d to the the a tr e , th e c a st and cr ew ha d their first re hea rs al s with stag e lig hts and blackouts; blackouts a re of ten used in a theatre for sc ene c hang es, as we ll as to signify the beg inning and end of the play . To assist the actor s and stag ehands w ho must mane uver and plac e sets and pr ops on the stag e during the blackout, “ g low tape” is placed on the edg es of the se t pieces, a s well as the e dg es of platf orms and steps, among other thing s. Glow tape, wh i ch i s a st aple in the theatre business, is a photoluminescent tape that

s to r e s li g h t e n e r g y a n d g lo w s in th e d ark

. A t o n e o f th e r e h e ar s a ls in th e th e a tr e , w hich occ urre d ei t h ero n Ap ri l 2 0
, 2 0 0 0
, o r A p ri l 2 1
, 2 0 0 0
, ca s tm em b erL i s a S l agl e c o m p l ai n ed t o t h e s t age manag er that she could not se e to make one of her e ntranc es – that the stag e wa s too dark and that there was not e noug h g low tape plac ed on the se t pieces ne ar he r entrance. She r eporte d that the lack of g low tape ha d cause d her to stumble into the piece s of the set a nd fall.

On Sa tur da y , April 22, 20 00 , the c a st an d cr e w g a the re d f or wh a t w a s a

pp are ntl y the fi rs t f ull dress re hear sal. Prior to the rehe arsa l, the cast met with Ms. Har alson to g o over the notes she had made during the previous re hear sal; the cast was g ather ed in the audienc e ar ea of the theatr e. At the

me e tin g , M s. Ha

ra lso n me nti on e d that mor e g low tape ha d be e n p la c e d o n th e se t in re sp on se to Lisa Sla g le ’s c omp la int . A ft e r s he ha d r e vie we d h e r n ote s w ith the c a st a ndc re w, sh e c a lle d f or “ pla c e s” and the r ehea

rsal wa s set to beg in.
The plaintiff’ s initi al entra nce w as not to be on the stag e prope r; rathe r s he wa s scheduled t o e n t e r t h e t h e a tr e b y

w a y o f o n e o f t h e d e s c e n d i n g a i s l e s , s o m e d i s t a n c e f r o mt h e s t a g e i t s e l f

. In other wor ds, her initial appea ranc e would be dow n an aisle w ith audience members sitting on e ither side of her . She would be ente ring , in the parla nce of the theatre
, from the wing s at “stag e rig ht.” Fr om the perspe ctive of the audienc e in front of the stag e, she w ould be entering from the left of the-3-

stag e complex. Howeve r, rather than taking her place in the right wing s, the pl aintiff discove red tha t she nee ded some props in order to make her e ntranc e and he aded ba ckstag e to re trieve, a mong othe r things, a purse f rom the prop r oom. The prop r oom was loca ted to the rear of the t heatr e. Onc e she

rea ched the prop room, she discove red that it was locked. At that p o i nt, the plaintiff dec ided she

c ou ld u se he r o wn pu rs e , w hic h s he ha d le ft in the a ud ie nc e are a

of the the a tr e – a

po int a lmo st exactly opposite from the spot from whic h she wa s to make her entra nce.

When the p l ai ntiff left the ba ck hallway wher e the pr op room was located, she discove red that the t heatr e was pitch black. Ms. Har alson had called for a blackout, but the plaintiff did not hear this a s it a

ppare ntly occur

red while she was in the hallway behind the theatre . W h en t h e p laintiff la te r d e sc ri be d th e le ve l of da rkne ss, sh e state d tha t she wa s “ sh oc ke d w he n [sh e ] sa w h ow bla c k it

wa s o ut the re .” I n s pit e of the tot a l da

rknes s, th e pl aint if

f m a de the de c isi on to r e tr ie ve he r p ur se from the audience are a in front of the stag e bef ore positioning he rself f

or her entra nce. It appea

rs that the plaintiff’s plan was to pr ocee d down the steps of one of the aisles that was a djace nt to the state – to her sta g e rig ht – until s he re ache d t h e co n cre te floor of the theatr e, and the n cross the

concr ete f loor to the audienc e sec tion where her pur se wa s located.

W h en t h e p l ai n t i ff

re ac h ed s t age ri gh t , s h e c a m e u p o n s t ep s t h at we re m ar k ed at t h e e d ge with glow ta

pe. The plaintiff slowly

made he r wa y down t he st eps. When she reache d an ar ea that had no g low tape, the plaintiff assumed that she wa s standing on the concr ete f loor of the theatre a nd be g a n wa lki ng fo rw ard

. Ho we ve r, the plaint if f w a s a c tua lly

sta nd ing on the sta g e , w hic h a pp are ntl y was on the sa me level a s one of the ste ps; we can only conclude that, rathe r than walking down the steps in a straig ht line, the plaintiff unknowing ly was wa lking in a dia g onal fa shion, which caused her to unwitting ly

end up on the stag e. After taking approximately five steps, the pla intiff walked off the front of the stage and fe ll to the concre te floor, c ausing her to sustain a ba dly broken a nkle.

As a re sult of her injury , the plaintiff filed her claim ag ainst the State, claiming that UT wa s neg lige nt in that it failed to place g low tape on the edg e of the stag e. The plaintiff claims that if the stag e had be en edg ed with g low tape, she wo uld have r ealized that she wa s not standing on the

concr ete f loor and c onsequently , she would not have fallen and sustained her injury . Mr. Fox joined his wi fe ’s c la im, se e kin g da ma g e s fo r los s of c on so rt ium

. Th e Sta te a ns we re d th e F oxe s’ joi nt c la im, deny ing a ll claims of neg lige nce.

The c laims commissi on hear d the ca se in M ay , 2 0 0 3

. Following the hea ring , the commissioner ent er ed a j udg ment, finding that the plaintiff had f ailed to prove that the State was neg lige nt in its plac ement of g low tape. As an alternative holding, the commissioner opined that the pla int if f wa s 10 0% a t fa

ult in the a c c ide nt. F ro m th is j ud g me nt, the plaint if f andhe r h us ba ndapp e a l.

II.

I n th is n on -j ury

c a se , o ur re vie w i s de novo upon the re cord of the proc eeding s below; but the re cord c omes to us w ith a presumption of corr ectne ss a s to the trial court’ s fac tual determinations – one that we must honor unless the evidenc e pre p o n d erates otherwise . Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d);-4-

W ri g h t v
. C i t y o f K nox v ill e , 898 S.W. 2d17 7, 18 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) ; Union C arbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 8 54 S.W. 2d87 , 9 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) . O ur re vie w of qu e sti on s o f l a w i s de novo with no presumption of cor

rec tness attaching to the trial court’ s conclusions of law. Cam pbell v. Florida Steel Corp.
, 91 9 S .W.2d26 , 3 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; Pre sle y v . Be nne tt , 860 S.W .2d 857, 859 (Tenn. 1993).

III

.
Th e plaint if

fs raise fo ur iss ue s on app e a l, wh ic h we thi nk c a n be su c c inc tly state d a s f

oll ow s:

1. Does the evidence preponde rate ag ainst the claims commi ssion’s finding that the plaintiff fa iled to prove that the State was liable to he r
u n d e r a p r e m i s e s l i ab i l i t y t h e o r y?

2. Does the evidenc e preponde rate ag ainst the claims commission’s finding , under a

compar ative fault analy sis, th at t he plaintiff wa s 10 0% a t f a ult ?

3. Did the trial co urt err

in allowing w itnesses Renee Har alson and L aura Simm s to offe r t heir opini on testimony , as said witnesses w ere not qualified as e x perts under Tenn. R. Evid. 702?

We will address ea ch of the se issues in turn.

I V.

A.
The plaint i ff ’s primary

assertion on appeal is that the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst the claims commission’s holding that the plaintiff f ailed to prove that the S tate was liable to her unde r a pre mises liabilit y

theory . We ag ree with the conclusions re ache d by the claims commission.
The plain t i ff b ro u ght her c laim under Te nn. Code Ann. § 9-8- 307 (Supp. 2003), which pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
(a) (1) The commission or eac h commissioner sitti ng individuallyhas exclusive jurisdiction t o determine all monetar y claims ag ainst the state base d on the ac ts or omissions of “state employ ees,” . . . , falling wi thi n o ne (1 ) o r m or e of the fo llo wi ng c a te g orie s:

* * *-5- (C ) N e g lig e ntl y

c re a te d o r m a int a ine d d a ng e ro us c on dit ion s o n s ta te

c on tr oll e d r e a l pr op e rt y . T he c laimant u nd e r this su bs e c tio n mu st establish the fore seea

bility of t he risks and noti ce g iven to the prope r state of fi c ia ls at a

tim e su ff ic ie ntl y prior to the inj ury fo r the state to ha ve take n a

pp ro pr ia te me a su re s;

* * *

(H ) N e g lig e nt c on str

uc tio n o f s ta te sid e wa lks a ndbu ild ing s;

* * *

(c) The de termination of t he st ate’ s liability in tort shall be base d on the traditional tort conc epts of duty an d t he re asonably prudent person’ s standard of

car e.

Te nn . Co de An n. § 9- 8- 30 7. Th us , in or de r to pr e va il un de r thi s statut e , a plaint if f mus t pr ov e a ll of the e lements of neg lige nce:

(1) a duty of car e owed by the def endant to the plaintiff; ( 2) conduc t by the def endant f alling be low t h e s t andard of ca re a mounting to a brea ch of the duty ; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and ( 5) proxi mate ca

usation.

Ric e v . Sa bir , 979 S.W .2d 305, 308 (Tenn. 1998)

.

T h e p l ai n t i ff

ar gu es t h at t h e S t at e w as n egl i gen ti n fa i l i n g t o p l ac e glo w t ap e “ al o n g t h e e d ge of the e levated sta g e, which w ould warn of the dang erous c ondition of t h e el ev ated stage .” Moreove r, the plaintiff c ontends that the State wa s put on notice of the dang erous c ondition when cast membe r Lisa S l agl e co m p lained about the la ck of g low tape on se t pieces just a da y or two befor e the plaintiff’ s acc ident.

I n determining that the plaintiff failed to c arry her burden of proving neg lige nce on the part of the State, the claims commission re lied heavily upon the ca se of Hame s v . St ate , 808 S.W .2d 41 (Tenn. 1991) . I n Ham es , a g olfer’ s widow broug ht a claim for wrong ful dea th ag ainst the State. Her husband had be en struck by lightning and killed while on a State- owned g olf course

. Id. at 42, 43. The plaintiff br oug ht her c laim under Te nn. Code Ann. § 9-8- 307(a) (1)( C ), o n t h e t h eory that the Sta te wa s n e g lig e nt i n f

a ili ng to prov ide lig htn ing -p ro of sh e lte rs or

wa rn ing de vic e s o n th e g olf

course

. Id. at 42, 43. The c laims commissi on found in favor of the State, ruling that there was “ no industry standard r equiring storm shelters or wa rning device s and that ‘common knowledg e tells one that lightning is dang erous.’ ” Id. at 43. T h i s co u rt reversed, f inding, int e r a lia , that the State had notice of the dang erous c ondition. Id.-6-

T h e T en n es s ee S u p re m e C o u rt re v er s ed t h e C o u rt o f A p p ea l s , an d s t at ed t h e f o l l o wi n g:

I t is a ls o s ig n if

ic a n t th a t th e r e is n o in d u s try s tan d ar d to implement

warning de vices or she lters that ar e li g htning proof; indeed, the pr oof clea rly reve als that most golf c ourses do not conta in ei ther wa rning device s or lightning proof she lters. Custo m ar y conduct, while not

co n cl u s i v e o r c o n tro l l i n g , m a y b e c o n s i d er ed as fu rn i s h i n g a sta nd ard ize d g a ug e a nd a s on e c ir c ums ta nc e to b e we ig he d a lon g wi th all o t hers in dete rmining w hether or not ordinary

car e has be en exercised. . .

. I n sum, we hold that the def endant’ s conduct did not fa ll b e low the applic able sta nd ardof c are , r e a so na

ble ne ss u nd e r a ll the circ umstances, a nd thus there wa s no neg lige nce.

Ham es , 808 S.W .2d at 45-46 (internal citation omitted).

I n the instant case , the claims commission analog ized Ham es to the plaintiff’s ca se, pointing out that the plaintiff’s own e x pert witness testified that there w as no industr ystandard f or the place ment of g low tape. I ndeed, the claims commission found that the place ment of g low tape wa s a “ fl u i d p ro ce s s ” a n d wa s ap p l i ed as ca s tan d cr ew m em b er s re q u es t ed i t

. W i t h re s p ec tt o t h e e d ge
o f t h e s t a g e , t h e c o m m i s s i o n ers p ec i fi ca l l y fo u n d t h at t h er e w as n o i n d u s trys t an d ar d “r eq u i r[ i n g] the application of g low-tape on the stag e boundary .” Acc ording ly
, the claims commission found that the plainti ff h ad fa iled to prove the e x istence of a duty owed to the plaintiff w ith respec t to the place ment of g low tape, and, as a conseque nce of that finding , that the plaintiff’s “ fall and r esulting injury wer e unfortunate ac cidents that do not amount to the leg al def inition of neg lige nce on the part of the State of T ennesse e.”

B.

I n the ca se at ba

r, the State owe d the plaintiff a duty of re asonable car e under all of the circ umstances, i.e. , a duty “to maintain [it s] premises in a reasonably safe and suitable c ondition.” Eat on v . M c La in
, 89 1 S. W.2 d 5 87 , 5 93 (T e nn . 1 99 4) . T o b or ro w l a ng ua g e fr om Eaton , th is d uty “includ ed the responsibilit y of either removing or wa

rning ag ainst any

latent dang erous c ondition on the pre mises of which the [State was] awar e or should have been a war e throug h the exercise of

rea sonable dilig ence .” Id

. at 594. As the Supreme Court instructed in Eaton , the fa cts of the instant

c a se re qu ir e us to d e te rm ine wh e the r the g ener al du ty ou tli ne d a

bo ve inc lud e s a

mor e “ sp e c if

ic responsibility ,” which, based upon the alleg ations in the instant case, w ould be the duty to place g low tape at the front edg e of the elevated stag e.
The que stion of whether , in a neg lige nce case , a defenda nt owes a duty of care to the plaintiff is a question of law f

or the c ourt. Bradsh aw v. Daniel
, 854 S.W .2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1993) . I n the Eaton c a se , th e Sup re me Cou rt e xten siv e ly

a dd re sse d th e c or

re c t a na ly sis re g ard ing du ty of c are in

a n egl i gen ce ac t i o n

. I n p ar t , i ts ai d t h e f o l l o wi n g:-7- T h e te r m r e a s o n ab le c ar e mu s t b e g iv e n me a n in g in r e lati o n to the

c ir c ums ta nc e s. [ci ta tio n omi tte d]. Or din ary , or re a so na ble , c are is t o be estimated by

the risk entailed throug h probable dang ers attending the particular situation and is to be commensurate with the risk of inj ur y

. [c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ]. T h e r i s k i n v o l v e d i s t h a tw h i c h is fore seea ble; a risk is fore seea

ble if a re asonable person c ould forese e the proba bilityof its oc curr ence or if the person was on notice that the likelihood of dang er to the party to w hom is owe d a duty is probable. For esee ability is the test of neg lige nce. I f the injury which occ urre d could not have be en re asonably fore seen, the duty

of c ar e d o es not arise, a nd even thoug h the ac t of the de fenda nt in fact c aused the inj ury , th e re is n o negli ge nc e a ndno lia bil ity . “ Th e plaint if

f m us t sh ow that the inj ury wa s a

re a so na bly fo re se e able pr ob abil ity , n ot j us t

a re mot e po ssi bil ity , a ndthat so me a c tio n w ith in the [de fe nd a nt’ s] power more pro b ably

than not would have pr evente d the injury .” [c it a ti o n o mi tt e d ].

* * *
The pe rtinent question is whether there was any showing from which it can be sa id that the defe nd ants rea sonably knew or should have known of the pr obability o f an occurr ence such as the one which

c a us e d th e pla intif

f’ s in jurie s.

Eaton
, 8 9 1 S

. W

. 2 d at 5 9 4 (q u o t i n g Doe v. Linder Constr. Co.
, 845 S.W .2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1992) (citations in Doe omitted in Eaton ).

Th e tr ia l c ou rt c on c lud e d – a nd we are he re a g a in b or ro wi ng la ng ua g e fr om Eaton – that the pla int if f “ fa ile d to su bmi t le g a lly su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e a s to the du ty e le me nt o f [the plaint if

f’ s] c la ims of neg lige nce.” Eaton , 891 S.W .2d at 593. Our re view of the rec ord per suades us that the tria l court

was c orre ct in concluding , as a matter of law , that, based upon the rec ord bef ore the commission and now b efor e us, the plaintiff f ailed to establish that the State owe d a duty to her to plac e g low tape at the site of the pla intiff’s ac cident at the time she fell off the stag e.
The plaintiff c ontends that the State wa s put on notice of this dang erous c ondition, i.e. , the lack of g low tape on the e dg e of the stag e, when cast member L isa Slagle complained about the lac k of g low tape on se t pi e c e s a t a re hear sal just p ri or

to the re he ars a l du ri ng wh ic h th e plaint if f f e ll. Ho we ve r, the fa c t th a t a

c a st m e mbe r r e qu e ste d th e pla c e me nt of g low tape on pie c e s of a s e t that

were some distance from the edge of the stage certainly does not g ive rise to notice that there w as any dang erous c ondition in another part of the stag e. Ms. Slagle ’s complaint has no bearing on the issue of whe ther the la ck of g low tape at the edg e of the stag e was a dang er of which the State wa s on notice.-8-

The issue of duty of car e “involves an analy sis of the fore seea bilityof the risk to which [the plaintiff in the instant case] was e x posed.” Eaton
, 891 S.W .2d at 594. This analy sis prompts the following inquiry : Has the plaintiff made a “show ing f rom which it ca n be said that the defendant [] reasonably knew or should have known of the probability of an occurrenc e such as the one which

c au se d [ he r] inj ur ie s. ” Id

. at 5 9 4 (q u o t i n g Doe , 845 S.W .2d at 178 (e mphasis in Eaton ).

When the theatre was placed in complete darkness, none of t he actors were to be on the stag e. Furthermore , acc ording to the script, none of t he actors were to move ont o the stag e until after the lights had c ome up. As pertinent to the claim befor e us, the plaintiff w as to enter the theatr e fr om a point some distance f

rom the stag e, i.e. , a t the top of on e of the de sc e nd ing a isl e s. Th e Sta te did not know, and had no r eason to for esee , that the plaintiff, an e x perie nced a ctor, wou ld v e ntu re into the dark at a place where she w as not supposed to be . There was no re ason to believe that the lack of g low ta pe a t th e e dg e of

the sta g e , e ve n w he n the s ta g e a ndthe su rr ou nd ing e nv ir on s w e re in complete da

rkness, wa s a dang er w hen no one was t o be on the stag e, or e nter the e levated sta g e, until the lights came back up. A ccor dingly , we a g ree with the trial court that the pla intiff has fa iled to present leg ally

sufficie nt evidence to e stablish the duty alleg ed in he r cla im. I n our judg ment, the application of the duty

analy sis found in Eaton to the fac ts of this c ase is a complete a nswer to the plaintiff’s first issue.

C.
The plaintiff ne x t contends that the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst the claims commi ssion’s finding that she wa s 100% at fault. W hile the plain t i ff ac k nowledg es that she ha d a duty to act

r e a s o n ab ly u n d e r th e c ir c u ms ta n c e s , s h e a s s e r ts th a t n a v ig a ti n g in th e d ark is s imp ly a part of a n actor ’s job and that, as an actor , she m ust rely upon the cr ew to do its job properly . Thus, she ar g ues that the fa ilure of the c rew to place glow tape in the appropriate places contributed more to her injury than did any

neg lige nce on he r part.

The c laims commissi on rec og nized that, in finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the element of

duty , the neg lige nce inquiry had ende d and ther e was no need to a ddress the issue of compar ative fault. However , in obiter dictum , the commissioner noted that ha d the plaintiff bee n
succe s s fu l i n m ak i ng out a claim for neg lige nce, “ any

neg lige nce on the [p] art of [the plaintiff] would equal or exceed any neg lige nce of the State.” The claims commission we nt on to sta t e t he fo l l o wi n g:

Her own neg lige nce for knowing ly entering a darke ned hall and

ele ct i n g to desce nd a flig ht of stairs was the proxi mate ca use of he r
acc ident and fa

r excee ded any

potential neg lige n[ce] on behalf of the State. Given the facts and circumstanc es of this Claim, the Commi ssion F INDS that [th e plaint iff ] didha ve a n o pp ortun ity to avoid the dang ers p re s ented he r and the ref ore the Commi ssion HOLDS that one hundre d perc ent (100%) of the liability for [the plaintiff’s] injury

rests upon her

shoulders.T en n. R

. E vid

. 7 0 2 p ro vid es a s fo l l o w s: 2

If

s ci ent i f i c, t echni cal
, or o t her spe ci al i zed kno wl ed ge wi l l sub st ant i al l y ass i st t he
t rier o f f ac t t o und erstan d t he ev i d en ce o r t o d e te rm i ne a fact i n iss ue , a w i t ne ss qual i f i ed as an ex pert by kn owl edge, s ki l l
, ex peri enc e, t r ai ni ng , or educa t i on may t es t i f y i n t he f orm of

an opi ni on or ot her wi s e.

-9- (Capitalization and bold print in original).

Un de r T e nn e sse e ’s do c tr ine of mod if ie d c omp arativ e fault, the qu e sti on fo r the c ou rt to

c on sid e r i s w he ther “ the fa ult a ttribu ta ble to [the ] pla intif

f [i s] e qu a l to or

g re a te r tha n th e fa

ult attributable to the de fenda nt.” Eaton , 891 S.W .2d at 590 (empha sis in orig inal omitted). Thus, a finding that a plaintiff is 100% at fault is no differ ent, in le g al eff ect, than a f

inding that a

plaintiff is 50% at fault – in either situation, the plaintiff’s re covery is barre d.

I f i t w e re to b e de te rm ine d in the ins ta nt c a se that th e Sta te didow e a du ty to the plaint if f t o pla c e g low tape a t the e dg e of the e le va te d s ta g e , w e sti ll h oldthat th e plaint if f c a nn ot r e c ov e r. Th is is because we find that the evidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the claims commission’s finding that the plaintiff’s fault equale d or exceede d any fault on the pa rt of the State. While the plaintiff, up on re a lizin g that th e the a tr e wa s p itc h b la c k, c ou ld ha ve a sk e d the sta g e ma na g e r to raise the lig hts

so sh e c ou ld s e e he r w a y , s he c ho se no t to do so . Ins te a d, sh e c ho se to p ro c e e d in tot a l da rkne ss. We a re no t pe rs ua de d –

no r wa s the c la ims c omm iss ion – b y the plaint if

f’ s a sse rt ion that it

wo uld have be en improper

for he r to stop the rehe arsa l and ask for lig hts. I ndeed, the plaintiff’s own e x pert

a dmi tte d a t tria l th a t sa fe ty c on c e rn s wo uldou tw e ig h th e imp ro prie ty of sto pp ing a

dr e ss r e he ars a l. Mo re ov e r, by

the pla int if

f’ s ow n te sti mon y , the re he ars a l ha d n ot y e t be g un wh e n s he fe ll. We f a il to s e e ho w a sk ing fo r l ig hts a t th a t ti me wo uldha ve in any way hin de re d th e re he ars a l or a dv e rs e ly aff ecte d the plaintiff’s r eputation as an actor. We theref ore hold that the e vidence preponde rate s in favor of

the finding that the plaintiff wa s 50% or more at fault in thi s case

.

D.

Th e plaint if

f a sse rt s tha t the c la ims c omm iss ion e rr e d in pe rm itt ing Ms. Ha ra lso n a ndL isa Simm s to give opinion testim ony as, acc ording to the plaintiff, they had not be en qualified a s expert witnesses in ac corda nce w ith Tenn. R. E v i d

. 702. Wit h respe ct to Ms. Hara lson, the plaintiff 2 ob je c te d to he r t e sti mon y

a s to wh e re g low tape sh ou ld be pla c e d ba se d up on “ he r e xpe ri e nc e a s a dire c to r

. ” L ik e w is e , th e p la in ti f f o b je c te d to th e te s ti mo n y

o f M s

. Si mm s p e r tain in g to h er experience with the rules g overning the interruption of dress rehear sals. The plainti ff c ontended that this, too, was expert testimonyg iven by one not prope rly

qualified.

Both witn e s s e s w e r e q u a li f ie d b y “ e xp e r ie n c e ” to “ te s ti f y in th e f o r m o f a n o p in io n or otherwise.” Tenn. R. Evid. 702. We find no err or in the trial court’s rec eipt of this evidence . Even if in er ro r, the a dmi ssi on of thi s evi de nc e did no t “in vo lv[e ] a s ub sta nti a l r ig ht [that] mo re pr ob ably than not aff

ecte d the judg ment.” Te nn. R. App. P. 36(b).-10- E.

The S tate arg ues t hat M s. Har alson and others involved in the produc tion of the play wer e not employ ees or

ag ents of the State. Henc e, so the ar g ument g oes, the State is not responsible for the neg lige nt acts, if any , of those individuals. I n view of our ruling s with r espec t to the issues of duty and compa

rative f ault, we do not find it nec essary to rea ch the State’ s issue.

V.
The judg ment of the claims commission is aff irmed. This c ase is r emande d for the collec tion of c os ts a sse sse d b e low , p ur su a nt t o a pp lic able la w. Cos ts o n a

pp e a l are ta xedto the app e lla nts , B ill

a n d D e b b y

F o x.

_______________________________ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE