IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

February 3, 2015 Session Heard at Memphis1

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BRADLEY COX

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Henderson County

No. 130571 Roy B. Morgan, Judge

No. W2014-00800-CCA-R3-CD - Filed June 17, 2015

The Defendant-Appellant, Bradley Cox, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of 

one count of aggravated sexual battery and two counts of rape of a child. The trial court 

sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of 37 years‟ confinement, to be served 

at 100% as a violent offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) he is entitled to a 

new trial based upon the State‟s failure to timely disclose certain exculpatory evidence, 

and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm 

the judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT 

WILLIAMS and ROGER A. PAGE, JJ., joined.

David W. Camp, Jackson, Tennessee, for the Defendant-Appellant, Bradley Cox.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Tracy L. Alcock, Assistant 

Attorney General; Jerry Woodall, District Attorney General; and Angela R. Scott, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On June 11, 2013, the Defendant was indicted by the Henderson County Grand 

Jury for three counts of rape of a child for three incidents involving his minor 

 

1 Oral Argument was heard in this case on February 3, 2015, at Cecil C. Humphreys School of 

Law at the University of Memphis in Memphis, Tennessee, as part of the S.C.A.L.E.S. (Supreme Court 

Advancing Legal Education for Students) project. 
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stepdaughter, J.C.2 A jury trial was held on December 18, 2013, at which the following 

evidence was presented.

State’s Proof. The victim testified that she was born on April 20, 2001, and was 

five years old when her adopted mother, T.C., married the Defendant in July 2006. At

the time of the incidents, the victim was living with T.C., the Defendant, and her three 

siblings. 

The victim testified that the first incident occurred in September or October 2008. 

She recalled that it was “crisp” outside, the leaves had started changing colors, and she 

had drawn a leaf at school. One afternoon after the victim arrived home from school, the 

Defendant called her to his bedroom where he was lying on the bed. He asked her about 

her day, hugged and kissed her, and pulled her onto the bed. The victim lay on her side 

while the Defendant lay next to her. He then pulled down her pants and her panties and 

touched the outside and the inside of her vagina, which she referred to as her “private 

area,” with his finger. While touching her, the Defendant told her that he loved her. The 

victim testified that it hurt when the Defendant touched inside and outside of her vagina 

and that she kept her eyes closed during the incident. She estimated that the incident 

lasted 45 minutes and recalled that after it ended, she went to the bathroom to check her 

underwear because she thought she had “messed [her]self.” She did not tell anyone about 

the incident at the time.

The second incident occurred in October 2009. The victim recalled that it was 

after her birthday, and it was cold outside. The victim was playing on the computer at 

her house after school one afternoon when the Defendant called her to his bedroom. He 

was lying on the bed under the covers. He asked her about her day and hugged and 

kissed her. He then pulled her onto the bed and under the covers. The victim testified

that the Defendant was “already naked,” and he pulled off her pants and her panties and 

“put his penis into [her] vagina.” The Defendant kissed the victim and told her that he 

loved her. The victim testified that it “just sort of felt weird and it kind of hurt” when the 

Defendant put his penis in her vagina. She estimated that the incident lasted 45 minutes. 

Afterwards, she went to the bathroom and discovered “clear stuff” on her underwear. 

She did not tell anyone about the incident. 

The third incident occurred on December 27, 2012. The victim testified that it was 

a couple of days after Christmas, and her grandmother was sick. The victim recalled that 

her mother, great-grandmother, brothers, and the Defendant were at home with her that 

evening. Around 11 p.m., after everyone else had gone to bed, the victim was playing 

 

2

It is the policy of this court to protect the victims of sex crimes by identifying them and their 

relatives by their initials only. 
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with her iPod while the Defendant sat in the loveseat in the living room watching 

television. The Defendant called the victim to the loveseat to watch television with him. 

While they were lying together in the loveseat, the Defendant started kissing the victim, 

pulled down her pants and panties, and pulled down his pants and underwear. He put his 

finger in her vagina and her buttocks, which “hurt” the victim, and then put his penis into 

her vagina. The Defendant kissed the victim and told her that he loved her. After the 

incident, the victim was tired so the Defendant carried her to her bed. 

After the victim returned to school, she told two friends about the incidents with 

the Defendant. A few months later, she disclosed the abuse to her school counselor, Mr. 

Warren. When she arrived home from school that day, she observed a black vehicle in 

her driveway and a woman waiting to speak to her. The victim testified that she “knew 

who it was” because Mr. Warren informed her that he was “going to call people” and she

“already knew all about Child Services[.]” The victim told the woman what happened 

with the Defendant. Thereafter, the Defendant called the victim and asked whether 

anyone had visited the house. The victim responded, “Yes, the Child Services lady.” 

The Defendant asked the victim what she told Child Services, and she responded, “I told 

[Child Services] that . . . [y]ou had touched me inappropriately.” The Defendant told the 

victim that she “had to lie” and she “couldn‟t tell that, and it was going to ruin the family 

and that [she] just couldn‟t tell anybody.” The victim responded, “I‟m sorry, I can‟t tell a 

lie. You‟ve raised me not to. I can‟t.” The Defendant continued to call the victim 

approximately 15 times from the time she arrived home from school until her aunt arrived 

at the house, repeatedly asking her why she told Child Services about the incidents and 

urging her to lie. He told the victim to tell Child Services that she had “misunderstood” 

and that he accidently touched her private area while they were wrestling. When she 

responded that she was not going to lie, he said, “Please [J.C.], you have to. Please.” 

The victim did not see or speak to the Defendant again until trial. 

Subsequently, the victim participated in a forensic interview and received 

counseling at the Carl Perkins Center for Child Abuse Prevention. She identified the 

Defendant in court and stated that she was “certain” he was the person that touched her. 

On cross-examination, the victim agreed that during the last six or eight months of her 

parents‟ marriage, T.C. and the Defendant fought a lot, which made her angry. She 

acknowledged that she told her grandmother that if her parents separated, she wanted to 

live with the Defendant. She explained that T.C. was “so unbearable” and the two “never 

really got along[.]” She stated that she was not afraid of the Defendant, and she “thought 

[she] could handle it.” She agreed that she did not tell anyone about the abuse for nearly 

four years, explaining, “[I]t just never came up in a conversation.” 

Investigator David Dowdy with the Henderson County Sheriff‟s Office 

investigated the victim‟s case. After watching the victim‟s forensic interview, 
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Investigator Dowdy set up an interview with the Defendant. When the Defendant 

voluntarily came to the Sheriff‟s Office a few days later for the interview, his initial 

statement to Investigator Dowdy was “something to [the] effect” of “[I am] in trouble.” 

Investigator Dowdy read the Defendant his Miranda rights and informed him of the 

allegations against him. The Defendant signed a form acknowledging and waiving his 

rights and agreed to talk with Investigator Dowdy about the allegations. Investigator 

Dowdy recalled that the Defendant was nervous and upset and that he cried periodically 

throughout the interview. He initially denied the allegations and claimed that the victim 

may have been lying due to her parents‟ marital problems. He later told Investigator 

Dowdy that the victim is “a truthful girl” and “she doesn‟t tell lies,” and he stated that he 

was proud of her for telling the truth. The Defendant admitted to Investigator Dowdy 

that he occasionally took Ambien and recalled waking up with his hands down the 

victim‟s pants, touching her inappropriately and kissing her. Although he could not 

remember specifics, the Defendant said that it happened several different times, including 

December 27, 2012. When Investigator Dowdy asked the Defendant whether he 

penetrated the victim‟s vagina with his penis, he stated that he did not remember doing 

that. 

After the Defendant‟s admission, Investigator Dowdy left the interview room to 

allow the Defendant to write out a statement. The statement, which was introduced into 

evidence and read to the jury, described the incidents with the victim as follows: 

After taking my Ambien[,] I would sometimes lie down on the 

loveseat or couch. Sometimes [the victim] would watch TV with me. I 

remember waking up on a couple different occasions and I was kissing her 

on the face and rubbing her inappropriately on her panties. After waking 

up I sent her to bed, as well as I did.

When Investigator Dowdy informed the Defendant that the victim would be given a 

medical examination, the Defendant said the medical findings would come back to him 

and stated that he would kill himself if the examination showed that she was pregnant. 

At that point, Investigator Dowdy advised the Defendant that he was under arrest. 

Dr. Lisa Piercey, Vice President of West Tennessee Healthcare and medical 

director of the Madison County Child Advocacy Center, testified as an expert in child 

abuse. She evaluated the victim in this case and conducted a physical examination on 

January 7, 2013. Dr. Piercey testified that the victim had a “normal physical examination 

except for her genitals.” The victim had an absence of the posterior rim of hymen tissue, 

which Dr. Piercey opined indicated penetration. She explained that this injury was a 

“pretty significant finding” and “pretty abnormal” because it occurs in less than fifteen

percent of all sex abuse cases. Based on her findings, Dr. Piercey opined that the victim 
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suffered sexual abuse with “definitive evidence of blunt force penetrating trauma”

consistent with the victim‟s disclosure of abuse. Dr. Piercey acknowledged that the 

victim did not show any symptoms of a sexually transmitted disease although the 

Defendant is a carrier of genital herpes and genital warts. She explained, however, that it 

is unlikely that a sexually transmitted disease spreads every time a person with the 

disease has sex. She further noted that genital warts is a lifelong disease and that a carrier 

may not show symptoms for 20 to 30 years.

On cross-examination, Dr. Piercey reiterated that “hymenal injury is actually 

extraordinarily rare outside of penetrating trauma” and stated that when there is an 

“interruption of that lower edge of the hymenal rim, it‟s pretty much always indicative of 

penetrating trauma.” Dr. Piercey agreed that she did not collect any DNA evidence from 

the victim but explained that the incidents occurred well beyond the 72-hour time frame 

in which DNA evidence may have been available. 

Defense’s Proof. The Defendant testified that at the time of the alleged incidents, 

he was married to T.C., the victim‟s adoptive mother. In the last few years of the 

marriage, their relationship had become “pretty rocky,” and the two divorced in the 

summer of 2013. The Defendant testified about T.C.‟s prescription drug use and recalled 

that it would “get almost to the point where [T.C.] couldn‟t even speak.” He 

acknowledged that the couple occasionally argued in front of the children and that the 

children asked whether the Defendant and T.C. were going to get a divorce. The 

Defendant testified that when he met with Investigator Dowdy, his “whole intention was 

just to keep [the victim] out of trouble and stuff.” He adamantly denied ever having sex 

with the victim “in any way.” When asked why he admitted to Investigator Dowdy that 

he inappropriately touched the victim, the Defendant stated, “[Y]ou would do just about 

anything to protect [your children],” and explained that he was trying to “take the heat” 

off of the victim. 

On cross-examination, the Defendant agreed that he signed a waiver of his 

Miranda rights before talking with Investigator Dowdy and that he wrote out a statement 

admitting to inappropriately touching the victim. He claimed, however, that the 

statement was not true and that he lied to Investigator Dowdy to “protect [his] daughter.” 

The Defendant testified that T.C. sent him text messages over the weekend before he met 

with Investigator Dowdy “coach[ing]” him and telling him, “This is what‟s happening, 

this is what you need to do. You need to say something to keep [the victim] out of 

trouble.” The State asked whether the Defendant remembered a certain text message sent 

to his old phone number. The Defendant recalled the text, but he did not recall his 

response to this text message. The prosecutor read the Defendant‟s reply, “You are a 

wonderful person and none of this is your fault,” and the Defendant agreed that he 

“probably said that.” When asked whether this text message was his idea of T.C. 
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coaching him, the Defendant responded, “[I]t seem[s] like you picked and chose what 

you want[ed] to show me. . . . That can‟t be the only thing I replied to her.” When asked 

what messages the State was “supposedly picking and choosing,” the Defendant 

responded, “I can‟t remember back twelve months ago. . . . I don‟t have that [phone] 

number anymore.” 

The Defendant‟s mother and victim‟s grandmother, testified that she spent a lot of 

time with the victim. During the Thanksgiving holiday in 2012, the victim and her 

siblings spent four days and nights with her. She testified that the victim never told her 

about any incidents of mistreatment or abuse by the Defendant and stated, “[The victim] 

loved her dad.” She testified that the victim told her that T.C. and the Defendant were 

fighting a lot and that if they separated, the victim wanted to live with the Defendant. 

Four character witnesses, Rebecca Rose, Amy Howard, Jerry Maynard Franks, 

and Jeremy Simpson, each testified that he or she had known the Defendant for his entire 

life and that he was entitled to be believed under oath. 

Following deliberation, the jury convicted the Defendant of one count of 

aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child and two counts of 

rape of a child. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to 10 years‟ confinement for the 

aggravated sexual battery conviction in count one and 27 years‟ confinement for each 

rape of a child conviction in counts two and three, with all sentences to be served at 

100% as a violent offender. The court ordered the Defendant to serve counts two and 

three concurrently with each other but consecutively to count one, for an effective 

sentence of 37 years‟ confinement. 

On March 12, 2014, the Defendant timely filed a motion for judgment of acquittal 

or new trial. A hearing was held on March 25, 2014, after which the trial court denied 

the motion. The court entered an order setting out the same on April 28, 2014. The

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to this court on April 21, 2014.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues for our review: (1) whether he is 

entitled to a new trial based upon the State‟s failure to timely disclose certain exculpatory 

evidence, and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon our 

review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

I. Late Disclosure of Evidence. The Defendant first argues that he is entitled to a 

new trial based upon the State‟s failure to timely disclose text messages exchanged 

between the Defendant and T.C. He asserts that this evidence was potentially 
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exculpatory as some of the messages could have supported his position that T.C. coached 

him into falsely admitting his guilt and that the State‟s failure to timely disclose these 

messages prevented him from effectively using them at trial. The Defendant further 

argues that the State‟s failure to timely disclose the text messages violated Rule 16 of the 

Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State responds that the Defendant failed to 

show a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) or Tennessee Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 16, and thus, he is not entitled to relief. We agree with the State.

 

In regard to the late disclosure issue, during cross-examination of the Defendant, 

the Defendant testified that his wife, T.C., coached him through text messages into 

falsely admitting his guilt to protect the victim. In response to this testimony, the State 

confirmed that the Defendant had participated in text messages with his wife the weekend 

before he was investigated. The State then asked whether the Defendant recalled the 

following text message from his wife:

Was I that bad of a wife that you did this? [The victim] has been scarred 

for life. There were things – you were her father. She looked up to you. 

Do you realize what you have done to our family? . . . There is no way [the 

victim] made these up.

Defense counsel then objected on the grounds that the text message was not 

included in the discovery materials. The State responded that the text message had been 

added to its discovery file at least a week before trial and under its open file policy, 

defense counsel could have obtained copies at any time. The State also offered to 

provide copies to defense counsel at that time. After a brief bench conference, the trial 

court allowed the State to continue questioning the Defendant about the text message. 

The Defendant did not recall his response to this text message and was unable to 

articulate the substance of any other text messages to support his theory that T.C. coached 

him.

To resolve this issue, our review of the record reveals only one text message, 

outlined above, which was read by the prosecution and agreed to by the Defendant during 

cross-examination. To the extent that the Defendant argues that the State violated Brady

in failing to timely disclose this text, we disagree. As an initial matter, we fail to see how 

the above text is exculpatory. It does not aid the Defendant‟s case, challenge the 

credibility of a key witness, or call into question a key element of the prosecution‟s case. 

See Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d 52, 55-56 (Tenn. 2001). Even if considered exculpatory, 

the Defendant agreed to participating in the text exchanges with his wife on his phone the 

weekend before the investigation. Clearly, the Defendant was aware of the information 

contained in the text before trial because (1) he discussed it at length during trial; and (2) 

it was transmitted to his phone. The State has no duty to disclose “information that the 
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accused already possesses or is able to obtain, or information which is not possessed by 

or under the control of the prosecution . . .” State v. Colvett, No. M2013-02488-CCAR3-CD, 2014 WL 7223775, at *22 (citing State v. Marshall, 845 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1992)); Berry v. State, 366 S.W.3d 160, 179-80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) 

(“There is no Brady violation where a defendant knew or should have known the 

essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory information, or where 

the evidence is available . . . from another source, because in such cases there is really

nothing for the government to disclose.” (quoting Owens v. Guida, 549 F.3d 399, 415) 

(6th Cir. 2008)). Moreover, “when exculpatory evidence is equally available to the 

prosecution and the accused, the accused „must bear the responsibility of [his] failure to 

seek its discovery.‟” Marshall, 845 S.W.2d at 233 (citing and quoting United States v. 

McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1086 (1986)). 

Because the Defendant failed to do so in this case, he is not entitled to relief.

We must acknowledge that the Defendant‟s case theory was that the victim‟s 

mother “coached” him into admitting his guilt, presumably via text message. In his brief 

to this court and during oral argument, the Defendant alluded to other text messages in 

the State‟s possession that were potentially exculpatory. He argued that the single text 

message listed above “undermine[d his] defense that [he] was lying to protect his 

daughter and that the wife had coached him on doing this.” He further claimed that 

because he no longer had the cell phone that was used to transmit the texts and could not 

remember all the text communications, the State possessed information which “may have 

been of assistance” to his defense. It is indeed possible that more text messages were in 

the State‟s possession.

3 However, review of this issue is impossible because the

Defendant did not include the text messages in the record on appeal. Without the text 

messages or a meaningful proffer, we are unable to determine the content of the text 

messages or whether they were favorable and material to the Defendant. Accordingly, 

the Defendant is not entitled to relief.

The Defendant also argues that notwithstanding any Brady violation, the State 

violated Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(c) by failing to notify him of the 

addition of the text messages to its discovery file. Subsection (c) of Rule 16 imposes a 

continuing duty upon the State to “promptly disclose” the existence of additional 

evidence or material discovered before or during trial if, “(1) the evidence is subject to 

discovery or inspection under this rule, and (2) the other party previously requested, or 

the court ordered, its production.” 

 

3 After reading the text message from the Defendant‟s wife into evidence, the State asked the 

Defendant whether that was his “idea of her coaching” him? The Defendant asked, “Are those the only 

ones,” to which the State responded, “Oh, there‟s a lot more.” In addition, after the bench conference 

concerning the text message, the State offered to provide defense counsel with copies of the text 

messages. It is unclear from the record whether the State did so. 
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Here, the Defendant has simply failed to establish that the State‟s failure to notify 

him of the text messages was so prejudicial that exclusion of the evidence was the only 

appropriate remedy. The State offered to provide copies of the text messages to defense 

counsel prior to continuing its cross-examination of the Defendant, and defense counsel 

failed to request a continuance to allow the Defendant to review the undisclosed 

evidence. A continuance would likely have been an appropriate remedy had it been 

requested, and by failing to seek a continuance, the Defendant risked waiver. See Tenn 

R. App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to 

a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably 

available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”). Exclusion of evidence, 

although necessary in some cases, is a “drastic remedy and should not be implemented 

unless there is no other reasonable alternative.” State v. Gann, 251 S.W.3d 446, 457 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Smith, 926 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1995)). Further, as noted by the trial court, the Defendant was certainly aware of 

the existence of the text messages as he testified that T.C. coached him through text 

messages into admitting his guilt. Although he claims that he was “unduly prejudice[ed]” 

by the State‟s use of the messages, he has failed to establish what he would have done 

differently had the messages, otherwise admissible, been disclosed prior to trial. Rule 

16(d) provides that a trial court may fashion an appropriate remedy as it “deems just 

under the circumstances.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2). In this case, we are unable to 

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant‟s request that 

the questioning concerning the text messages be excluded. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The Defendant next argues that the evidence is 

insufficient to sustain his convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child.

The State responds that based upon the evidence presented, a rational juror could find the 

Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all three counts. We agree with the State. 

When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the State is entitled to 

the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be 

drawn from that evidence. State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011) (citing 

State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Tenn. 2010)). When a defendant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review applied by this court is “whether, after 

reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Similarly, Rule 13(e) of the Tennessee 

Rules of Appellate Procedure states, “Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the 

trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the finding by 

the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” “Because a verdict of guilt removes 

the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the criminal defendant 
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bears the burden on appeal of showing that the evidence was legally insufficient to 

sustain a guilty verdict.” State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009).

Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence, 

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 

776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (citing State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 

1977); Farmer v. State, 343 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1961)). The standard of review for 

sufficiency of the evidence “„is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or 

circumstantial evidence.‟” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting 

State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)). The jury as the trier of fact must 

evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight given to witnesses‟ 

testimony, and reconcile all conflicts in the evidence. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 

331, 335 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1978)). Moreover, the jury determines the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence 

and the inferences to be drawn from this evidence, and the extent to which the 

circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence are questions 

primarily for the jury. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379 (citing State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 

646, 662 (Tenn. 2006)). When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this court 

shall not reweigh the evidence or substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of 

fact. Id.

As relevant to this case, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-504(a)(4) 

defines aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, as “unlawful sexual contact with a 

victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim . . . [where] [t]he victim is less than 

thirteen (13) years of age.” Sexual contact means “the intentional touching of the 

victim‟s, the defendant‟s, or any other person‟s intimate parts, or the intentional touching 

of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim‟s, the defendant‟s, or any other 

person‟s intimate parts, if that intentional touching can be reasonably construed as being 

for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.” T.C.A. § 39-13-501(6). Intimate parts 

“includes semen, vaginal fluid, the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttock or 

breast of a human being.” Id. § 39-13-501(2). Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-

522(a) defines rape of a child, a Class A felony, as “the unlawful sexual penetration of 

the victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim, if the victim is more than three

(3) years of age but less than thirteen (13) years of age.” Sexual penetration means 

“sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, 

however slight, of any part of a person‟s body or of any object in the genital or anal 

openings of the victim‟s, the defendant‟s, or any other person‟s body, but emission of 

semen is not required.” Id. § 39-13-501(7).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence in the case sub judice 

established that on three separate occasions, the Defendant sexually abused the victim. 
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At the time of all of the offenses, the victim was less than thirteen years of age. In the 

first instance, the Defendant called the victim to his bedroom and, after hugging and 

kissing her, pulled her onto the bed beside him. As the two lay side-to-side, the 

Defendant removed the victim‟s pants and panties and touched the outside and inside of 

her vagina with his finger. In the second incident, the Defendant again called the victim 

to his bedroom and pulled her onto the bed where he was lying naked under the covers. 

He removed the victim‟s pants and panties and put his penis into her vagina. In the third 

incident, the Defendant called the victim to the loveseat in the living room where he was 

watching television after the other family members had gone to bed. While sitting 

together in the loveseat, the Defendant removed the victim‟s pants and panties and his 

own pants and underwear. He placed his finger inside the victim‟s vagina and buttocks 

and then put his penis into her vagina. 

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the Defendant does not contest the 

evidence establishing the elements of any particular conviction. Instead, he attacks the 

credibility of the victim‟s testimony, noting that she did not reveal the abuse to her 

mother or any other adult for four years after the first incident and that there was no 

evidence that she contracted a sexually transmitted disease although he is a carrier of 

genital warts and genital herpes. This argument is without merit. As previously noted, 

credibility determinations and weight afforded to the evidence are matters reserved for 

the jury. This Court, on appeal, will not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. Moreover, 

the testimony of a child victim, alone, is sufficient to uphold a conviction for child rape. 

State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578, 582-83 (Tenn. 2003). Here, the victim testified in 

specific detail about each incident of abuse. Although not necessary to uphold a 

conviction, this testimony was corroborated by the physical evidence in the case. Dr. 

Piercey testified that the victim‟s injuries to her hymen were “definitive evidence of blunt 

force penetrating trauma” consistent with the victim‟s disclosure of abuse. She also 

explained that it is possible that the victim did not contract genital warts or genital herpes 

from her sexual encounters with the Defendant as the disease is not spread every time a 

carrier has sex. Additionally, the Defendant‟s statement to police, in which he admits to 

kissing the victim and touching her on her panties after taking Ambien, further 

corroborates the victim‟s account of the incidents. Viewed in the light most favorable to 

the State, we conclude that a rational juror could find the Defendant guilty on all three 

counts beyond a reasonable doubt. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authority and analysis, we affirm the judgments of the trial 

court. 

_________________________________ 

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE