United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 23-1179

___________________________ 

United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Roylee Richardson

 Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern

____________ 

Submitted: October 20, 2023

Filed: February 7, 2024

____________ 

Before GRUENDER, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

____________

STRAS, Circuit Judge.

A jury found Roylee Richardson guilty of witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1512(b), and possessing a firearm as a felon, id. § 922(g)(1). Although he argues 
-2- 

that the district court1 should have acquitted him of the former and prevented the 

jury from hearing about so many of his prior felony convictions, we affirm.

I. 

Richardson’s problems began after his then-girlfriend reported that he had 

“pistol-whipped” her and shot at her would-be rescuer’s van. The harassment

continued after his arrest. In a series of recorded jailhouse calls, he tried to get her 

to recant or refuse to testify, both directly and through others. After the jury heard 

the recordings, it found him guilty of two counts of witness tampering. 

II. 

Sufficient evidence supported the verdict on both counts. Witness tampering 

has two elements. See United States v. Craft, 478 F.3d 899, 900 (8th Cir. 2007). 

First, the defendant must “knowingly use[] intimidation, threaten[], or corruptly 

persuade[] another person,” such as a victim. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). Second, he must 

intend to “influence, delay, or prevent” another’s testimony “in an official 

proceeding” or “cause or induce” the person to “withhold” it from one. Id.

§ 1512(b)(1), (2)(A); see also United States v. Little Bird, 76 F.4th 758, 762 (8th Cir. 

2023) (setting out the elements for a conviction under § 1512(b)(1)); United States 

v. Crippen, 627 F.3d 1056, 1065 (8th Cir. 2010) (describing the elements under

§ 1512(b)(2)(A)). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, our review is de 

novo, but we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and 

draw all inferences in favor of the government. See United States v. Water, 413 F.3d 

812, 816 (8th Cir. 2005). 

1

The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of Iowa. 
-3- 

A.

Richardson’s first witness-tampering conviction arose out of a flurry of calls 

just days after his arrest. No federal prosecution existed yet, so the question is 

whether it is possible to “influence, delay, or prevent” someone’s testimony in a 

not-yet-pending “official proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1). 

Not just any proceeding will do. It must be federal, such as one “before a 

judge or court of the United States” or “a [f]ederal grand jury.” Id. § 1515(a)(1). 

State proceedings do not count. See United States v. Petruk, 781 F.3d 438, 444 (8th 

Cir. 2015). 

The “official proceeding,” although it has to be federal, does not have to “be

pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1). 

As long as a “particular, foreseeable” federal proceeding was “contemplated,” 

Petruk, 781 F.3d at 445 (emphasis added), at the time the “intimidation, threat[], or 

corrupt[] persua[sion]” took place, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), the crime is complete. 

Proving this type of “nexus” to a not-yet-pending proceeding can be a 

challenge. Petruk, 781 F.3d at 445. In Petruk, we considered whether an attempt to 

influence testimony when only a state proceeding existed satisfied the “particular, 

foreseeable” federal-proceeding requirement. Id. We concluded that the answer was 

no because the defendant had “referred only to his pending state[-]court 

proceedings” in a conversation about a possible alibi witness. Id. (emphasis added).

This case is different. Although Richardson was in state custody, he was 

already “contemplat[ing]” a federal felon-in-possession charge. Id. Consider the 

following conversation from three days after his arrest: 

ROYLEE RICHARDSON: . . . All they got to do is drop that 

intimidation [charge], because I ain’t shooting at nobody.

UNKNOWN MALE: Hell, no, you don’t want that. You don’t want 

the feds picking that shit up, brother. 
-4- 

ROYLEE RICHARDSON: I take the other charge. You feel me? The 

other charges I’ll take.

UNKNOWN MALE: The felon in possession? 

ROYLEE RICHARDSON: Yeah, I’ll take that.

UNKNOWN MALE: You gonna go federal though, man. Do you 

know how much you gonna be facing after your background with the 

feds, brother?

ROYLEE RICHARDSON: Yeah.

UNKNOWN MALE: You facing like 10, 15 years if the feds pick 

everything up right now, all those cases. . . . Just like that, brother, 

you’re going federal. 

ROYLEE RICHARDSON: Yeah. 

UNKNOWN MALE: You’re trippin. Hell no, you won’t take no felon 

in possession. . . . 

ROYLEE RICHARDSON: Man.

(Emphases added.) 

The call logs show that Richardson called the victim next, less than 20 minutes 

later. He began by professing his love for her and then insisted that she “say nothing” 

because he was “fighting the case.” After asking whether the police had found the

gun, he went on to explain that if she refused to appear in court or “g[o]t on the stand 

and sa[id] . . . that she [had] lied,” he “would be cool.” What he really feared, after 

all, was “spend[ing] his life in prison.” 

He asked again about the gun a few days later. When she said officers had 

found it, he told her that she had “bl[own]” it. He also explained that it “might” 

mean he “go[es] fed.” (Emphasis added.) A few minutes later, he instructed her to 

change her story. 

From these conversations, the jury drew the reasonable inference that 

Richardson’s attempts at “corruptly persuad[ing]” her to lie or refuse to testify had 

a nexus to the lengthy sentence he would face from a federal felon-in-possession 

charge. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). A “particular” federal prosecution was “foreseeable,” 

Petruk, 781 F.3d at 445, even if it was not yet “pending or about to be instituted,” 
-5- 

18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1). See United States v. Mink, 9 F.4th 590, 610 (8th Cir. 2021) 

(noting that the defendant had “contemplated criminal liability in a future 

proceeding” and “expressly acknowledged that the government was building a case 

against him”). And he thought that “influenc[ing]” her “testimony” or 

“prevent[ing]” it altogether would stave off a lengthy federal sentence. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1512(b)(1). The jury did not need to hear anything else to find him guilty. 

B. 

The tampering did not end there. After a federal grand jury indicted him on 

felon-in-possession and witness-tampering counts, he asked others to contact the 

victim. This time, the indictment made an official proceeding “before a judge or 

court of the United States” foreseeable, if not inevitable. Id. § 1515(a)(1)(A). So 

our focus shifts to whether these efforts involved “corrupt[] persua[sion].” Id.

§ 1512(b). 

Screenshots and audio recordings of various conversations revealed 

Richardson’s intentions. One woman, at his direction, tried to call the victim and 

make her feel guilty about testifying. The message she was supposed to relay was 

clear: her testimony would mean “he gonna be out when he like 60 years old.” He 

had someone else follow up with a text message two days later, pleading for her to

“let [it] go” so he could “come home and be with [his] family.”

Both times, Richardson’s goal was to convince the victim not to testify

through “corrupt[] persua[sion].” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). Take his instruction to the

caller to avoid writing anything down. It shows a “consciousness of wrongdoing,”

Little Bird, 76 F.4th at 762, a desire to keep law enforcement from learning about 

his actions because he knew they were “wrong[],” Arthur Andersen LLP v. United 

States, 544 U.S. 696, 705–06 (2005). Exactly the type of “wrongful, immoral, 

depraved, or evil” intentions required for a witness-tampering conviction. Id. at 705; 

see also United States v. Iu, 917 F.3d 1026, 1032 (8th Cir. 2019) (noting in a 

witness-tampering case that the jury was “entitled to consider, as evidence of . . . 
-6- 

consciousness of guilt,” statements urging the victim “to recant her story because of 

the negative consequences the allegations had on [the defendant]”). 

III. 

We would be facing a third sufficiency challenge if the government had not 

presented evidence of Richardson’s prior felony convictions. One element of a 

felon-in-possession charge is, as the name would suggest, that the possessor have a 

prior felony conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); United States v. Montgomery, 

701 F.3d 1218, 1221 (8th Cir. 2012). Another is knowledge that he was a felon. See 

Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). The parties agree on that 

much. 

The dispute here is over how the government proved these elements. See 

United States v. Richardson, 40 F.4th 858, 865 (8th Cir. 2022) (reviewing the 

admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion). What typically happens in a 

felon-in-possession case is that a defendant will formally admit his prior felony 

convictions in an Old Chief stipulation, which relieves the government of its burden

of proving them. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191 (1997). 

Although the arrangement may seem one-sided, the defendant gets a significant 

benefit: the details of prior crimes never get in front of the jury. See id.

In this case, Richardson refused to enter an Old Chief stipulation. So the

government had to prove that he both had a prior felony conviction—one 

“punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”—and knew he was a 

felon. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); see also United States v. Jones, 266 F.3d 804, 811 (8th 

Cir. 2001). The usual rules of evidence applied, meaning that the government could 

address the what (the name and nature of the offense), the who (the identity of the 

person who committed it), and the when (the timing of the offense and the length of 

the sentence). See Richardson, 40 F.4th at 866. All the details relevant to the 

elements he contested. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. 
-7- 

The government followed this formula during Richardson’s trial. After he 

decided against an Old Chief stipulation, the government introduced multiple prior 

felony convictions to prove he was a felon and knew it at the time. See Richardson, 

40 F.4th at 866. Having contested those elements, he cannot now “complain that the 

government introduced evidence to prove” them.2

 United States v. Aranda, 963 F.2d 

211, 215 (8th Cir. 1992); see Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 

It makes no difference that the government introduced more convictions than 

necessary. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (cautioning against the “needless[] present[ation] 

[of] cumulative evidence”). As we have explained, we allow “evidence of multiple 

prior felony convictions” because a defendant might successfully “contest[] one or 

more of [them] in front of the jury.” Richardson, 40 F.4th at 865–66 (citation 

omitted) (holding that “the probative value of the evidence of his prior convictions 

was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice”); see also United 

States v. Hellems, 866 F.3d 856, 862–63 (8th Cir. 2017) (describing the 

multiple-conviction rule as “settled law in this circuit”). 

The government may have pushed the envelope, however, when it offered 

three mug shots. See United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294, 1299 (8th Cir. 1978) 

(making clear that we do “not endorse the introduction into evidence of obvious 

‘mug shots’”). Richardson’s position is that the unfair prejudice from the jury seeing 

those photographs substantially outweighed their limited probative value. See 

Richardson, 40 F.4th at 866; see also Fed. R. Evid. 403. We disagree, but only 

because the government had to prove that Richardson himself committed those 

crimes and would have known about them. See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2199–200. 

There was no abuse of discretion, in other words, because the harm from showing 

the mug shots—that he had “a prior criminal record”—is exactly what the 

government had to prove. United States v. Harbin, 585 F.2d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 1978)

(per curiam). 

2

For that reason, we need not consider the government’s alternative arguments 

on knowledge, intent, absence of mistake, and lack of accident. See Fed. R. Evid. 

404(b)(2). 
-8- 

IV. 

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court. 

______________________________