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Filed 4/30/14 P. v. Cook CA1/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

EVANS R. COOK, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 A140510 

 (Humboldt County 

 Super. Ct. No. CR1300946) 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 In August 2013, appellant entered a plea of guilty to attempted second degree 

murder and admitted two charged special allegations as part of an agreement intended to 

secure—and which did secure—a state prison term of 20 years. Pursuant to People v. 

Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, he appeals from the sentence imposed or other matters 

occurring after the plea which do not affect the validity of the plea. We find no issues 

deserving of further briefing regarding either the sentence imposed or any other matters 

occurring after the entry of appellant’s guilty plea and hence affirm the judgment, 

including the sentence imposed. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Starting in 2007, appellant and his sister, Teresa, lived in adjacent properties in 

Petrolia, Humboldt County. Living with the sister was the victim in this case, Charles 

Hower. There was, and apparently had been for some time, tension between appellant 

and Hower because, in 2008, Hower’s son had died in “an alcohol related automobile 

collision after he left” appellant’s residence. Additionally, appellant’s sister and Hower 
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were, at the time of the offense to be described, apparently attempting to evict appellant 

from his residence. 

 In the early afternoon of February 23, 2013,1

 Hower went out of his residential 

area to feed his horses, and then drove away from the barn housing them. As he did so, 

appellant appeared on the roadway near Hower’s residence and began shooting at Hower 

with a 30/30 caliber rifle from approximately 50 feet away. Appellant admitted to firing 

three shots at Hower, one of which resulted in a wound to Hower’s chest and another 

resulted in severing the little finger of his left hand. Other evidence, however, suggested 

he fired five rifle shots at Hower. Appellant told one of the investigators that “he had 

wanted the victim dead.” (Id., 176.) 

 On March 21, an information was filed charging appellant with attempted murder 

in the first degree, along with a special allegation of intentional discharge of a firearm 

causing great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a); 664; 12022.53, subd. (d).) 

 On August 7, appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty to attempted second 

degree murder and admitted the amended special allegation charged under Penal Code 

section 12022.53, subdivision (b), plus another special allegation under Penal Code 

section 12022.7, subdivision (a) (causing great bodily injury). This conditional plea was 

entered for a “stipulated term of 20 years in state prison,” calculated as a midterm of 

seven years for attempted murder, three years for the bodily injury enhancements and 10 

years for the firearm use enhancement. 

 On September 27, victim Hower wrote a letter to the trial court urging that 

appellant “should have to pay for this for the rest of his life,” i.e., the time he, Hower, 

would be suffering from the injuries he incurred in the shooting. In response, a statement 

in mitigation was filed on behalf of appellant urging the court to accept the stipulated 

term of imprisonment rather than extending that term as Hower had urged. 

 On October 30, the trial court sentenced appellant to the stipulated 20 years in 

state prison. He received a total of 287 days of conduct and custody credits. 

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 All subsequent dates noted are in 2013. 
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 On December 13, a notice of appeal was filed by appellant regarding the sentence 

imposed or other matters occurring after the entry of his plea. Appellant did not request 

the issuance of a certificate of probable cause. 

III. DISCUSSION 

 Where, as here, an appellant has pled guilty or no contest to an offense, the scope 

of reviewable issues is restricted to matters based on constitutional, jurisdictional, or 

other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings leading to the plea; guilt or 

innocence is not included. (People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895-896) 

In his brief to this court (see id. pp. 5-6), appellant submitted the “following items 

‘in the record that might arguably support the appeal.’ (Anders v. California [(1967) 386 

U.S. 738,] 744.): [¶] 1. During his probation interview appellant stated that he did not 

know if the 20 year prison term to which he had agreed was fair and hoped that his 

sentence would be reduced to 10 years. Was the sentence properly imposed in 

accordance with the plea bargain? [¶] 2. And, if appellant’s concern that the sentence 

should be reduced below the stipulated term was waived due to failure to object or 

otherwise bring appellant’s request to the sentencing court’s attention, did appellant 

receive ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object, and is there a reasonable 

possibility of a more favorable result had an objection been made? (Strickland v. 

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668.)” 

We have no difficulty in concluding that neither of these issues is deserving of 

further briefing. 

 First of all, in the trial court appellant’s counsel wrote that “[t]he 20 year 

resolution is a fair and just resolution of this case. . . . [¶] Mr. Cook is asking the court to 

uphold the joint recommendation of 20 years. It is a serious sentence that is appropriate 

to the serious nature of Mr. Cook’s actions. . . . [¶] Because of these mitigating factors we 

are asking the court to sentence Mr. Cook to 20 years in state prison rather than 

withdrawing the plea and seeking a greater sentence as suggested by Mr. Hower’s 

statement.” That counsel made essentially the same point in his verbal statement to the 

trial court at the time of appellant’s sentencing. 
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 The prosecutor promptly agreed with this statement; she replied: “It is in part by 

grace of the victim that the People agreed to the 20-year stipulated sentence. They were 

supportive of that disposition. They understood that Mr. Cook was facing a life sentence. 

They understood that Mr. Cook, I believe, was facing 40-to-life, I think. Certainly life 

sentence. So they understand that. So when the People conveyed the offer to the 

defense, it was with a lot of consideration for the victim and what they went through.” 

 Appellant’s statement that “he hopes his sentence can be reduced to 10 years” was 

explained by the following sentence in the probation officer’s report thusly: “He 

explained that the men in his family generally die around age 60, and he is concerned that 

he is going to die while imprisoned.” (Appellant was 53 at the time of his plea.) 

 The probation officer assigned to the case concluded that: “Considering the 

damage defendant has inflicted upon the victim and the potential risk he poses to the 

community, the prison term stipulated by defendant’s conditional plea is appropriate and 

such is recommended.” 

 The admonitions given appellant at the time he entered his plea fully conformed 

with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 

Cal.3d 122, and his waiver was knowing and voluntary. 

 The sentence imposed was clearly consistent with the plea bargain, and what that 

sentence was going to be was clearly understood by both appellant and his counsel at the 

hearing at which he entered his plea and the later sentencing hearing. 

 The record provides a factual basis for the plea and the sentence imposed is 

authorized by law. 

 Appellant was at all times represented by competent counsel who protected his 

rights and interests. Based on this record, there clearly was and is no possible ineffective 

assistance of counsel regarding the sentence imposed on appellant. Nor, especially 

considering the record quoted above, was there “a reasonable possibility of a more 

favorable result had an objection been made.” 

 The sentence imposed is authorized by law. 
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IV. DISPOSITION 

 Our independent review having revealed no arguable issues that require further 

briefing, the judgment of conviction, which includes the sentence imposed, is affirmed. 

 _________________________ 

 Haerle, J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

Kline, P.J. 

_________________________ 

Richman, J.