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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

CHRISTOPHER DAVID YOES

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CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 4:23-CR00103-ALM-AGD

REPORT AND RECOMENDATION 

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pending before the court is Defendant Christopher David Yoes’ Motion to Suppress 

(“Motion”) (Dkt. #10). After considering the Motion (Dkt. #10), the Government’s response (Dkt. 

#12), Defendant’sreply and Supplemental Motion to Suppress (Dkt. #15), all other relevant filings, 

and the evidence and oral argument of counsel at the Hearing, the court recommends that 

Defendant’s Motions (Dkts. #10, 15) be DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

Procedural Background

On May 10, 2023, Defendant was charged in a one-count indictment with a violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person (Dkt. #1). On August 

21, 2023, Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress, seeking to suppress all evidence from the 

traffic stop on April 19, 2023 (Dkt. #10 at 1). On August 31, 2023, the Government filed its 

response to Defendant’s Motion, arguing that Defendant’s Motion should be denied because 

there was reasonable suspicion and probable cause to initiate the traffic stop on April 19, 2023 

(Dkt. #12 at 2). On September 1, 2023, District Judge Amos Mazzant referred Defendant’s 

Motion to the undersigned (Dkt. #14). On the same day, Defendant filed a reply and a 

supplement (noted on the court’s docket sheet as a Supplemental Motion to Suppress) to his 

Motion (Dkt. #15). The court held a hearing on the Motion (“the Hearing”) on October 19, 

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2023 (Dkt. #17). At the Hearing, Pilot Point Police Corporal Justin Hull (“Hull”) and 

Krugerville Police Officer Jeff Pruett (“Pruett”) testified on behalf of the Government, and 

Investigator Steve Vedral (“Vedral”) testified for the defense. The court admitted the 

following exhibits: 

Government Exhibit 1: Pole camera video 

Defense Exhibit 1: Still image taken from pole camera video 

Defense Exhibit 2: Still image taken from pole camera video 

Defense Exhibit 3: Still image taken from pole camera video 

Defense Exhibit 4: Still image taken from pole camera video 

Defense Exhibit 5: Photo of rear of Home Depot truck 

Defense Exhibit 6: Photo of rear of Home Depot truck – left taillight

Defense Exhibit 7: Photo of rear of Home Depot truck – right taillight

Factual Background

On April 19, 2023, Defendant was arrested following a high-speed chase. At the Hearing, 

Hull testified that he was on duty in Pilot Point, Texas at around 2 a.m. on April 19, 2023. Hull 

was sitting in an unmarked patrol car when he observed a Home Depot rental truck traveling at 

approximately 100 miles per hour with defective taillights. Hull was aware of perpetrators’ recent 

use of rental trucks to commit crimes. He noted that the time of morning, along with Defendant’s 

high rate of speed, may have indicated that the driver was under the influence. Hull pulled out 

behind the truck and activated the lights and sirens on his patrol car. Because the car was 

unmarked, the police department did not equip Hull’s car with a dash camera. In response, the 

driver of the truck, which neither party disputes was Defendant, failed to yield and increased his 

speed. Hull pursued Defendant for nearly an hour from Pilot Point to Fort Worth. On the recording 

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of the conversation between Hull and police dispatch, Hull updated dispatch regarding Defendant’s 

speed, with statements such as “speed 100” or “speed 90.” While Pilot Point policy requires a body 

camera, Hull was not wearing a body camera on the morning of April 19, 2023. In Fort Worth, 

Defendant, while traveling northbound in a southbound lane, collided with another vehicle. A pole 

camera facing the intersection captured a video of the collision.

Pruett testified that he was on patrol the morning of April 19, 2023, when dispatch alerted 

him regarding a vehicle that had failed to yield. Dispatch alerted Pruett that Defendant was heading 

towards Pruett. Accordingly, Pruett activated his radar, which captured Defendant’s speed at 96 

miles per hour. Pruett then joined the pursuit of Defendant and was present when Defendant’s 

truck collided with the other vehicle. After the collision, Pruett restrained Defendant, and in doing 

so, noticed an empty gun holster on Defendant’s hip. The officers subsequently recovered a gun 

on the dashboard of the truck. The officers did not conduct field sobriety tests on Defendant or 

charge Defendant with driving under the influence. Pruett’s patrol car was equipped with a dash 

camera.

Vedral, an investigator for the Federal Public Defender’s Office, testified that he inspected 

trucks at Home Depot that were similar to the truck driven by Defendant. Vedral spoke to Home 

Depot employees but was not able to determine if Home Depot equips its rental trucks with speed 

governors. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Traffic stops are considered seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. U.S. 

v. Grant, 349 F.3d 192, 196 (5th Cir. 2003). The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against 

unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. The legality of a traffic stop is 

analyzed under the framework articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and its progeny. See 

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Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998); U.S. v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) 

(en banc). To determine whether a seizure is reasonable, the court considers (1) “whether the 

officer’s action was justified at its inception,” and (2) “whether the officer’s subsequent actions 

were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.” Brigham, 382 F.3d 

at 506 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20).

When considering whether an officer’s actions were justified at their inception, the 

Supreme Court has stated that the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer’s action is supported 

by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity “may be afoot.” U.S. v. Arvivu, 534 U.S. 

266, 273 (2002) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). The Supreme Court has specifically instructed 

that, when courts make reasonable suspicion determinations, they must look at the “totality of the 

circumstances” to see whether the officer has a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting 

legal wrongdoing. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). The totality of the 

circumstances standard allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training 

to make inferences from cumulative information that might “well elude an untrained person.” Id. 

(quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418). An officer may not rely on a mere “hunch” to justify a stop. 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. However, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level 

required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the 

evidence standard. Arvivu, 534 U.S. at 274. 

The Fifth Circuit has applied the first prong of the Terry test to traffic stop situations. U.S. 

v. Banuelos-Romero, 597 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2010). For a traffic stop to be justified at its 

inception, an officer must have an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal 

activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle. Id. 

A reasonable suspicion exists when the officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, 

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taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the seizure. Id.

(citation omitted); U.S. v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2002). 

ANALYSIS

Having heard the evidence presented, the court finds that Hull had reasonable suspicion 

to initiate a traffic stop on April 19, 2023 due to Defendant’s excessive speed. Hull testified 

that he first observed Defendant while Defendant was traveling at speeds significantly 

exceeding the speed limit. This testimony alone is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion 

for Hull to initiate a traffic stop.

1 Hull’s testimony is corroborated by the recording of Hull’s 

communications with dispatch, Pruett’s radar measuring Defendant’s speed at 96 miles per 

hour, and the pole camera footage showing Defendant traveling at high speeds on the wrong 

side of the road before colliding with another vehicle. Defendant’s speed is a “specific and 

articulable fact[],” which if taken together with rational inferences from that fact, “reasonably 

warrant[ed]” Hull’s conduct on April 19, 2023. See Banuelos-Romero, 597 F.3d at 766. The 

officers did not violate Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Because the gun was found and 

seized as a result of a valid traffic stop, Defendant’s Motion must be denied. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends that Defendant Christopher David Yoes’ 

Motions to Suppress (Dkts. #10, 15) be DENIED. 

Within fourteen (14) days after service of the magistrate judge’s report, any party must 

serve and file specific written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate 

judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

1 At the Hearing, Defendant repeatedly attempted to use Hull’s report regarding the taillights on the truck to call the 

accuracy of Hull’s testimony into question. Because the court finds that the Motion must be denied due to 

Defendant’s speed, it does not reach any analysis regarding the truck’s taillights. 

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finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed 

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing 

before the magistrate judge is not specific.

Failure to file specific, written objections will bar the party from appealing the unobjectedto factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted by the district 

court, except upon grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that 

such consequences will result from a failure to object. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 

79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).

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