[Cite as State v. Williams, 2019-Ohio-1104.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: 

 Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J 

 Plaintiff – Appellee Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

 Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- 

 Case No. 18CA51 

CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS 

 

 Defendant – Appellant O P I N IO N 

 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Richland County Court of 

Common Pleas, Case No. 2017-CR-0644 

 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 26, 2019 

APPEARANCES: 

 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

GARY BISHOP JON J. SAIA 

Prosecuting Attorney JESSICA G. D’VARGA 

 713 South Front Street 

JOSEPH C. SNYDER Columbus, Ohio 43206 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

38 South Park Street 

Mansfield, Ohio 44902 

 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 2 

Hoffman, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant Christopher Williams appeals the judgment entered by the 

Richland County Common Pleas Court convicting him of having a weapon under disability 

(R.C. 2923.13(A)(3)) with four weapons forfeiture specifications, and two counts of 

identity fraud (R.C. 2913.49(B)(1), (2)), and sentencing him to three years community 

control. Appellee is the state of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} On July 3, 2017, Trooper Shane Morrow of the Ohio State Highway Patrol 

was sitting in a crossover along Interstate 71. As Appellant drove past, Tpr. Morrow 

noticed his window tint appeared impermissibly dark. Tpr. Morrow followed Appellant off 

the interstate, and eventually pulled him over. 

{¶3} Tpr. Morrow checked the license plate and found the vehicle registered to 

James Stafford, who had a CCW permit. When the trooper approached the vehicle, he 

learned Stafford was the passenger in the vehicle. Appellant provided a driver’s license 

with the name Scott Williams. Tpr. Morrow noted Appellant was “overly nervous.” Supp. 

Tr. 24. Appellant’s hands were shaking, his breathing was heavy, and the trooper could 

see his heart beating in his chest. In contrast, Stafford was relaxed and calm. 

{¶4} Tpr. Morrow tested the window and found the tint to be 37%, below the legal 

limit of 50%. He removed Appellant from the vehicle and placed him in the back of his 

cruiser. When asked about the nervousness, Appellant told him it was due to caffeine 

and energy drinks. Appellant also told the trooper there were a lot of guns in the car 

because they were going target shooting when stopped. 

{¶5} The trooper read Appellant his Miranda rights, and requested a records and 

driving status check of Appellant and Stafford. Prior to receiving the results of the records 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 3 

check, Trooper Morrow advised Stafford he would be receiving a warning for the window 

tint violation. Upon talking with Stafford, Stafford admitted both he and Appellant use 

marijuana. Stafford consented to a search of the car. 

{¶6} Almost immediately after Stafford consented to the search of the car, the 

records check on both occupants of the vehicle came back clean. The trooper went back 

to his cruiser to get his gloves for the search of the car, and also to get a leash for the pit 

bull riding in Stafford’s car in order to remove the dog from the vehicle for the search. He 

spoke with Appellant when he returned to his cruiser, notifying Appellant he was going to 

search the car. 

{¶7} Trooper Morrow then asked Appellant to consent to a search of his person. 

Appellant initially said if the trooper didn’t have a reason to, he’d rather not be searched. 

Tr. 30. The trooper asked what he had to hide. Appellant paused and then said the 

trooper could search him. The trooper asked if he was sure, and Appellant responded 

affirmatively. 

{¶8} Upon searching Appellant, Tpr. Morrow found an Ohio ID card with the 

name Christopher Williams. Appellant admitted the driver’s license he produced earlier 

was his brother’s license. Upon running a LEADS check of Appellant’s ID card, the 

trooper learned Appellant had a license forfeiture suspension and a warrant out of Medina 

County on a charge of drug paraphernalia. The trooper also discovered Appellant was 

court-martialed for drugs while serving in the military. During the search of the trunk, 

Stafford identified which guns were his, and which guns belonged to Appellant. 

{¶9} Appellant was indicted by the Richland County Grand Jury with two counts 

of having a weapon under a disability and two counts of identity fraud, with five gun 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 4 

forfeiture specifications. His motion to suppress was overruled. The case proceeded to 

bench trial in the Richland County Common Pleas Court. Prior to trial, the State dismissed 

one count of weapons under disability. The court found Appellant guilty on the remaining 

counts, and guilty of four of the five forfeiture specifications. He was sentenced to three 

years community control. 

{¶10} It is from the May 23, 2018 judgment of conviction and sentence Appellant 

prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error: 

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING MR. WILLIAMS 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. 

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING 

MR. WILLIAMS GUILTY OF HAVING WEAPONS UNDER DISABILITY. 

I. 

{¶11} Appellant argues the court erred in overruling his motion to suppress. He 

argues there was no reasonable suspicion to justify a prolonged detention after the initial 

traffic stop, and the court further erred in finding the search of his person was consensual. 

{¶12} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a 

motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. In 

reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said 

findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio 

St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 597 N.E.2d 

1141(1991); State v. Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592, 621 N.E.2d 726(1993). Second, an 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 5 

appellant may argue the trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the 

findings of fact. In that case, an appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing 

an error of law. State v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (1993). Finally, 

assuming the trial court's findings of fact are not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence and it has properly identified the law to be applied, an appellant may argue the 

trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to 

suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate court must independently 

determine, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether the facts meet the 

appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 641 

N.E.2d 1172 (1994); State v. Claytor, 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 620 N.E.2d 906 (1993); 

Guysinger, supra. As the United States Supreme Court held in Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 

690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), “... as a general matter 

determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo

on appeal.” 

{¶13} When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier 

of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility 

of witnesses. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 1995–Ohio–243, 652 N.E.2d 

988; State v. Fanning , 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). 

{¶14} Appellant argues the stop should have terminated when the warning was 

given for the window tint violation, or in the alternative when the criminal records check 

of both driver’s licenses presented to Tpr. Morrow came back clear. 

{¶15} “‘[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a 

motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.’” State v. Batchili, 113 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 6 

Ohio St.3d 403, 865 N.E.2d 1282, 2007-Ohio-2204, at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Keathley, 55 

Ohio App.3d 130, 131, 562 N.E.2d 932 (1988). “This measure includes the period of time 

sufficient to run a computer check on the driver's license, registration, and vehicle plates.” 

Id., citing State v. Bolden, 12th Dist. No. CA2003–03–007, 2004-Ohio-184, ¶ 17, citing 

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Further, 

“‘[i]n determining if an officer completed these tasks within a reasonable length of time, 

the court must evaluate the duration of the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances 

and consider whether the officer diligently conducted the investigation.’” Id. 

{¶16} However, “[a]n officer may not expand the investigative scope of the 

detention beyond that which is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the 

initial stop unless any new or expanded investigation is supported by a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion that some further criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Woodson, 5th 

Dist. Stark No. 2007-CA-00151, 2008-Ohio-670, ¶ 22. 

{¶17} At the time Trooper Morrow received consent from Stafford to search the 

vehicle, he had not yet fully addressed the infraction which was the purpose of the stop. 

While he had given a warning for the tint violation, he had not yet received the results of 

the computer check on the driver and the owner of the vehicle. Approximately 12-13 

minutes passed while the officer waited for the results of the records check. The trial 

court found this was not an unreasonable delay, given the extreme nervousness of the 

driver and the presence of a weapon on Stafford. We agree, particularly given the 

representation there were multiple weapons in the trunk of the vehicle, and Stafford 

admitted both he and Appellant use marijuana. 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 7 

{¶18} Where an officer observes a violation of law, lawfully stops the individual in 

connection with that violation, and, prior to completing the purpose of the stop, asks 

permission to conduct a search, the request occurs during a lawful detention. State v. 

Scarberry, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-775, 2016-Ohio-7065, 72 N.E.3d 173, ¶ 39. In 

the instant case, the officer had not completed the purpose of the stop when Stafford 

gave consent to search the vehicle. Stafford’s consent to search “stopped the clock” 

regarding the lawfulness of the continued detention. State v. Johnson, 2nd Dist. 

Montgomery No. 27574, 2017-Ohio-8909, ¶22. 

{¶19} Appellant further argues his consent to search his person was not voluntary. 

When a person is lawfully detained by police and consents to a search, the state must 

show by clear and convincing evidence the consent was freely and voluntarily given. 

Scarberry, supra, at ¶19. Important factors in determining the voluntariness of consent 

are: (1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2) the presence of coercive 

police procedures; (3) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with the police; 

(4) the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse to consent; (5) the defendant's 

education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence 

will be found. State v. Myer, 5th Dist. No. 16-CA-00007, 2017-Ohio-1046, 87 N.E.3d 671, 

¶ 13. 

{¶20} Appellant testified he did not voluntarily consent. He contended he was 

coerced into consenting because he had been in a confined space in the rear of the 

cruiser for fourteen minutes, with the Trooper’s canine partner present in the compartment 

next to Appellant. He testified, “I just felt like I was being pestered. He was continually 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 8 

asking the same question over and over again until he got the answer that he wanted.” 

Supp. Tr. 94. 

{¶21} However, on cross-examination, Appellant admitted the trooper did not 

brandish his weapon, tell him he was required to consent, or touch Appellant. He further 

testified, when asked how long it took between the first time Trooper Morrow asked for 

consent until he provided consent, “I would say it was probably about 3 seconds, but it 

felt like forever.” Supp. Tr. 99. 

{¶22} We note from the backseat video of the stop, Appellant gave consent 

approximately 20 seconds after he was first asked for consent by Trooper Morrow. 

Further, although the dog can be heard barking occasionally, the dog was confined in a 

compartment in which he was not visible to Appellant, and therefore not a threatening 

presence. The trial court found: 

The court is not persuaded that Mr. Williams’ consent was 

involuntarily [sic]. Mr. Williams had been fully advised of his right to insist 

on an attorney and of his other Miranda rights. The audio-video recording 

shows that Tpr. Morrow is not belligerent or intimidating. While the trooper 

has apparently been trained to encourage consent in these circumstances, 

Mr. Williams appears to be an articulate and intelligent person making 

decisions based on a balancing of his own best interests. 

{¶23} Judgment, March 27, 2018. 

{¶24} We find the trial court did not err in finding Appellant’s consent voluntary. 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 9 

{¶25} The trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s motion to suppress. The 

first assignment of error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶26} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues the court erred as a 

matter of law in finding him guilty of having a weapon under disability, as the State failed 

to present sufficient evidence he was under a disability by reason of a prior felony. 

{¶27} Appellant was convicted of having a weapon under disability in violation of 

R.C. 2923.13(A)(3): 

(A) Unless relieved from disability under operation of law or legal 

process, no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm 

or dangerous ordnance, if any of the following apply: 

(3) The person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any 

felony offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, 

distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse or has been adjudicated a 

delinquent child for the commission of an offense that, if committed by an 

adult, would have been a felony offense involving the illegal possession, 

use, sale, administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse. 

{¶28} The State presented evidence while in the Air Force, Appellant was courtmartialed for conspiracy to commit the wrongful use of heroin, in violation of Article 112.A 

of the Code of Military Justice. The maximum penalty was five years confinement. 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 10 

Appellant received 45 days confinement and a bad conduct discharge. The Code of 

Military Justice does not classify offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. 

{¶29} In finding Appellant guilty, the court found as follows: 

The defendant argued that he was not convicted of a felony drug 

offense because there was no proof that the defendant’s military conviction 

was a felony drug offense. His sentence was less than a year and the 

punishment under the military code is “confinement” not “imprisonment.” 

R.C. 2901.02(E) defines what is a felony under Ohio law. It says “any 

offense not specifically classified is a felony if imprisonment for more than 

one year may be imposed as a penalty.” It is the potential penalty, not the 

actual penalty imposed which determines classification as a felony. The 

potential penalty for Mr. Williams’ offense according to military law is 5 years 

confinement. There is no significant difference in deprivation of liberty 

between imprisonment and confinement. His military conviction is a felony 

drug offense. 

{¶30} Decision after Bench Trial, April 2, 2018. 

{¶31} We find the State’s reliance on the definition of a felony found in R.C. 

2901.02(E) is misplaced in the instant case. R.C. 2901.02 begins with the words, “As 

used in the Revised Code.” From the legislative notes, it appears the purpose of the 

statute is not to define out-of-state convictions, but to classify Ohio offenses: 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 11 

This section classifies offenses into two degrees of murder, four 

degrees each of felony and misdemeanor, minor misdemeanors, and 

offenses not specifically classified. The purpose of the classification is to 

permit a high level of flexibility in characterizing offenses and assessing 

penalties for their violation according to their comparative seriousness. 

Also, the section is intended to preserve a distinction between 

felonies and misdemeanors, and in some measure to integrate into the new 

code existing offenses which will retain the former penalty scheme. 

{¶32} We find R.C. 2901.02(E) does not resolve whether Appellant’s military 

offense was a felony. The offense is not unclassified under Ohio law, but rather is 

unclassified under military law. Construing the statute strictly against the State1, R.C. 

2901.02(E) applies to the classification of offenses within the Ohio Revised Code, and 

not to the classification of offenses from outside of Ohio. 

{¶33} R.C. 2901.04(C) provides guidance as to the determination of when a 

conviction from outside Ohio constitutes a disability within the meaning of R.C. 2913.13: 

(C) Any provision of a section of the Revised Code that refers to a 

previous conviction of or plea of guilty to a violation of a section of the 

Revised Code or of a division of a section of the Revised Code shall be 

construed to also refer to a previous conviction of or plea of guilty to a 

substantially equivalent offense under an existing or former law of this state, 

 

1See R.C. 2901.04(A). 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 12 

another state, or the United States or under an existing or former municipal 

ordinance (emphasis added). 

{¶34} Further, R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) refers to a prior felony conviction involving a 

drug of abuse. R.C. 2925.01 defines “drug abuse offense” as follows: 

(G) “Drug abuse offense” means any of the following: 

(1) A violation of division (A) of section 2913.02 that constitutes theft 

of drugs, or a violation of section 2925.02, 2925.03, 2925.04, 2925.041, 

2925.05, 2925.06, 2925.11, 2925.12, 2925.13, 2925.22, 2925.23, 2925.24, 

2925.31, 2925.32, 2925.36, or 2925.37 of the Revised Code; 

(2) A violation of an existing or former law of this or any other state 

or of the United States that is substantially equivalent to any section listed 

in division (G)(1) of this section (emphasis added). 

{¶35} Appellant was court-martialed under the Code of Military Justice, which is 

enacted by Congress and included in the United States Code. We therefore find 

Appellant’s military conviction was a violation of a law of the United States, and R.C. 

2901.04(C) and R.C. 2925.01(G) therefore apply. 

{¶36} The Ohio Supreme Court considered similar “substantially equivalent” 

language in the sex offender registration statutes, holding as follows: 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 13 

[I]n order to determine whether an out-of-state conviction is substantially 

equivalent to a listed Ohio offense, a court must initially look only to the fact of 

conviction and the elements of the relevant criminal statutes, without considering 

the particular facts disclosed by the record of conviction. If the out-of-state statute 

defines the offense in such a way that the court cannot discern from a comparison 

of the statutes whether the offenses are substantially equivalent, a court may go 

beyond the statutes and rely on a limited portion of the record in a narrow class of 

cases where the factfinder was required to find all the elements essential to a 

conviction under the listed Ohio statute. To do so, courts are permitted to consult 

a limited range of material contained in the record, including charging documents, 

plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, presentence reports, findings of 

fact and conclusions of law from a bench trial, jury instructions and verdict forms, 

or some comparable part of the record. 

{¶37} State v. Lloyd, 132 Ohio St.3d 135, 970 N.E.2d 870, 2012–Ohio–2015, ¶ 

31. 

{¶38} The State bears the burden of proving an out-of-state offense is the 

substantial equivalent of the Ohio offense upon which it seeks to rely. Id. at ¶ 46, 970 

N.E.2d 870. 

{¶39} In State v. Bushner, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26532, 2012-Ohio-5996, the Ninth 

District Court of Appeals applied the reasoning of Lloyd, supra, to determine whether a 

defendant’s Florida conviction constituted a prior felony of violence within the meaning of 

R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), preventing him from possessing a weapon. The State argued the 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 14 

offense was substantially equivalent to abduction in Ohio, which would be a felony of 

violence. The defendant argued the offense would be substantially equivalent to unlawful 

restraint in Ohio, which is not an offense of violence. The Court of Appeals found a 

comparison of the statutory elements was insufficient to determine whether the 

appellant’s prior conviction was substantially equivalent to abduction or unlawful restraint. 

Because the trial court ruled on the issue prior to trial, the State presented only the record 

of conviction, and the record was insufficient to determine whether the Florida offense 

was an offense of violence. The court therefore remanded the matter for a hearing to 

receive evidence and arguments on the nature of the appellant’s Florida conviction. Id. 

at ¶11. 

{¶40} The burden of proof in the instant case was on the State to prove Appellant 

had a prior “felony offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, 

distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse.” From the statutes and case law cited 

above, we find the proper inquiry is whether the State proved Appellant’s prior conviction 

was substantially equivalent to an Ohio felony drug offense. 

{¶41} The State stated in closing argument Ohio does not have a “wrongful use” 

statute. However, the State presented evidence Appellant was convicted of violation of 

Article 112a of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which provides: 

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who wrongfully uses, 

possesses, manufactures, distributes, imports into the customs territory of 

the United States, exports from the United States, or introduces into an 

installation, vessel, vehicle, or aircraft used by or under the control of the 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 15 

armed forces a substance described in subsection (b) shall be punished as 

a court-martial may direct. 

(b) The substances referred to in subsection (a) are the following: 

(1) opium, heroin, cocaine, amphetamine, lysergic acid diethylamide, 

methamphetamine, phencyclidine, barbituric acid, and marijuana, and any 

compound or derivative of any such substance. 

{¶42} Specifically, Appellant was convicted of wrongful use of heroin. Article 112a 

provides the elements of wrongful use of a controlled substance are, “(a) That the 

accused used a controlled substance, and (b) That the use by the accused was wrongful.” 

The Article further provides in subsection (7)(1)(a) for a maximum punishment of 

dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement of five 

years. See State’s Exhibits 3 and 14. 

{¶43} Although Ohio does not have a “wrongful use” statute, R.C. 2925.11(A) 

provides, “No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a 

controlled substance analog.” (Emphasis added). Pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(C), when a 

violation of this statute is by virtue of heroin, violation thereof is always a felony. 

Therefore, we find the offense of which Appellant was convicted is substantially 

equivalent to a felony violation of R.C. 2925.11. Further, R.C. 2925.11 is specifically 

included in the language defining “drug abuse offense” as set forth in R.C. 2925.01(G). 

Therefore, the State presented sufficient evidence Appellant was under disability from 

possessing a weapon by virtue of his military conviction, which was substantially 

equivalent to a felony drug offense under Ohio law. 
Richland County, Case No. 2018-CA-0051 16 

{¶44} Appellant also argues he was not informed that by pleading guilty to 

wrongful use of heroin, he would be under disability from owning a weapon. “A conviction 

for violation of the offense of having weapons while under disability as defined by R.C. 

2923.13(A)(3) does not require proof of a culpable mental state for the element that the 

offender is under indictment for or has been convicted of any offense involving the illegal 

possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse.” 

State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 107, 2010-Ohio-6301, 942 N.E.2d 347 (2010), syllabus 

1. The State was not required to prove Appellant was informed he was under disability 

by virtue of his past conviction, as there is no culpable mental state for the element of his 

past conviction. 

{¶45} The second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶46} The judgment of the Richland County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

By: Hoffman, P.J. 

Delaney, J. and 

Baldwin, J. concur