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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

NELSON WILLIS,

 Plaintiff,

v.

ADAM M. ARON,

 Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-732-ALM-KPJ

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Nelson Willis’s (“Plaintiff”) fourth motion for 

extension of time to file his responses to Defendant Adam M. Aron’s (“Defendant”) Motion to 

Dismiss (Dkt. 10) and Motion for Protective Order (Dkt. 12) (the “Fourth Motion for Extension”) 

(Dkt. 26), which was filed on March 11, 2024. On February 26, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s 

third motion for extension, extending the deadline to file his responses to March 15, 2024. See 

Dkt. 25 at 3.

In the Fourth Motion for Extension (Dkt. 26), Plaintiff represents that he is currently 

working on his amended complaint that now spans over 254 pages and involves additional 

defendants.

1 Dkt. 26 at 1. Plaintiff requests that his deadlines be extended to April 26, 2024. Id.

1 Plaintiff represents that “[t]he nature and complexity of my case have led to the expanded length of my First Amended 

Verified Complaint (FAVC), which currently spans over 210 pages.” Dkt. 23. The pleading standard established in 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 

to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). “The underlying purpose of Rule 8 is to eliminate prolixity in 

pleading and to achieve brevity, simplicity, and clarity.” Jaser v. AT&T Servs. Inc., No. 18-cv-3429, 2020 WL 

1329151, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2020) (quoting Gordon v. Green, 602 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1979)) (cleaned up). 

Courts in this circuit have dismissed lengthy complaints when they are overly repetitious and difficult to follow. See 

id. (dismissing the plaintiff’s 180-page complaint because “the operative complaint [was] far too lengthy and 

repetitious”); Kluksdahl v. Loyola Univ. New Orleans, No. CV 16-2990, 2016 WL 4261732, at *1–2 (E.D. La. Aug. 

12, 2016) (dismissing the plaintiff’s 130-page complaint because of “rambling, scattered arguments and factual 

allegations which unquestionably” violated Rule 8); McZeal v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA, No. CIV.A. 13-6754, 

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On March 13, 2024, Defendant filed a response (Dkt. 27) to Plaintiff’s Fourth Motion for 

Extension (Dkt. 26), wherein Defendant represents he is opposed to Plaintiff’s request because 

“Plaintiff’s conduct in seeking this fourth extension demonstrates a pattern of delay.” Dkt. 27 at 1.

Defendant argues that “Plaintiff failed to show in his Motion that any real progress has been made 

by him since his first, second, and third requests were granted by this Court.” Id. Defendant also 

contends that “Plaintiff continues to provide the same explanations as to why he needs the 

additional time.” Id. Further, Defendant contends that an extension until April 26, 2024 will 

prejudice him and constitute undue delay because Plaintiff has already been provided an additional 

three months to respond to the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 10) and two and a half months to respond 

to the Motion for Protective Order (Dkt. 12). Id. at 2. Thus, Defendant requests that the Court deny 

the Fourth Motion for Extension (Dkt. 26). Id.

“When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, 

extend the time[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b). If the court acts or the request is made prior to the 

expiration of the time limit at issue, the court “may extend the period for any reason, upon a party’s 

motion or even on its own initiative.” L.A. Pub. Ins. Adjusters, Inc. v. Nelson, 17 F.4th 521, 524 

(5th Cir. 2021) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(A)). “An application for extension of time under 

Rule 6(b)(1)(A) normally will be granted in the absence of bad faith on the part of the party seeking 

relief or prejudice to the adverse party.” Reed Migraine Ctrs. of Tex., PLLC v. Chapman, No. 14-

cv-1204, 2020 WL 869888, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2020) (quoting 4B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 

& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1165 (4th ed. 2023)).

2014 WL 3166715, at *6 (E.D. La. July 7, 2014) (dismissing 57-page complaint that was “written in an impenetrably 

dense, jargon-laden, and largely incomprehensible prose,” and used “haphazard combinations of legal terms to make 

conclusory statements about” the defendants’ behavior); Muniz v. Medtronic, Inc., 2014 WL 1236314, at *2 (W.D. 

Tex. Mar. 20, 2014) (dismissing 77-page complaint for failing to comply with Rule 8).

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Here, the Court finds that the circumstances set forth in the Fourth Motion for Extension 

(Dkt. 26) do not constitute good cause to extend Plaintiff’s deadline because Plaintiff has provided 

the same excuses for the need for an extension as in his previous motions. See Dkt. 26 at 1; 13 at 

1; 17 at 1; 23 at 1. In the Fourth Motion for Extension (Dkt. 26), Plaintiff asserts that he is working 

on the amended complaint that now spans over 254 pages and involves additional defendants and 

that he has been consulting potential attorneys to assist him in this case. Dkt. 26 at 1. However, 

this is the same reasoning that Plaintiff provided in each of his previous requests for extension. 

See Dkts. 13, 17, 23. Moreover, the extensions granted have already caused a three-month delay 

in this case. See Dkts. 13, 17, 23, 26. Plaintiff’s original deadline to respond to Defendant’s Motion 

to Dismiss (Dkt. 10) and Motion for Protective Order (Dkt. 12) was December 14, 2023, and 

December 22, 2023, respectively. See Dkt. 25 at 3. It is now April 8, 2024; if the Court were to 

grant the requested extension the delay would be over four months. Plaintiff’s requests are verging 

on bad faith because he has asserted in each motion that he is almost done with his amended 

complaint, but on the eve of each of his deadlines, requests another extension from the Court 

asserting that his amended complaint is not quite ready. See Dkts. 13, 17, 23, 26. Thus, the Court 

finds it appropriate to grant Plaintiff’s request only to the extent necessary to enable him to file his 

amended complaint and response to the Motion for Protective (Dkt. 12) in their current form for 

the Court’s consideration.

Upon consideration, the Fourth Motion for Extension (Dkt. 23) is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file his response, if any, to the Motion to Dismiss 

(Dkt. 10) and the Motion for Protective Order (Dkt. 12) no later than April 15, 2024. The Court 

will grant no further extensions to Plaintiff related to his responses to the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 

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10) and the Motion for Protective Order (Dkt. 12). Defendant shall have seven (7) days from the 

date the response is served to file his reply, if any. See LOC. R. CV-7(f).

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