United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-11231

In the Matter of: Life Partners Holdings, 

Incorporated

Debtor,

H. Thomas Moran, II, as Trustee for Life Partners 

Holdings, Inc.; Life Partners, Incorporated; Life 

Partners Financial Services, Incorporated; Alan M. 

Jacobs, As Trustee for Life Partners Creditors' Trust; 

Life Partners Creditors' Trust, 

Appellees,

versus

Richard Bryan Simpson, 

Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:16-cv-300

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Ho and Engelhardt, Circuit 

Judges.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 6, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Per Curiam:*

Richard Simpson had actual notice of a court-ordered settlement 

conference but did not participate in the conference. The district judge

ordered a default judgment against Simpson. Simpson claims to not have

received notice of the default judgment until several months later. The 

district court denied Simpson’s motion to set aside the judgment. Because 

Simpson has not offered a meritorious defense, we affirm.

I

Simpson is one of many defendants in an adversarial bankruptcy 

proceeding. In the interest of brevity, we limit our discussion of the facts of 

this case to those directly relevant to the instant appeal. A more detailed 

statement of the facts underlying this case may be found in our prior opinions 

regarding this dispute.1 This proceeding has gone on for several years, and

Simpson had retained counsel for the vast majority of it. In June 2020, 

pursuant to local rules, the district court ordered the parties to engage in 

settlement conferences before September 30, 2020 or face default judgment

“without further notice.” Simpson does not dispute that he received notice 

of this order.

Sometime before September 2, 2020, Simpson informed his attorney, 

Thomas Brandon, that he would not be renewing Brandon’s retainer. 

Brandon replied that he would move to withdraw. In his withdrawal motion 

to the court, Brandon cited as his reasons for withdrawal not only Simpson’s 

refusal to pay, but also the fact that Simpson was not cooperating with 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

1 See, e.g., Life Partners Creditors’ Tr. v. Cowley, 926 F.3d 103 (5th Cir. 2019); SEC 

v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 854 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2017).

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preparation for the required settlement conference. Brandon also sent an 

email saying as much to Simpson.

Before withdrawing, Brandon informed Simpson—again—of the 

requirement of a settlement conference prior to September 30, 2020, and the 

possibility of default if he did not engage in the conference. Brandon

suggested that Simpson reach out to opposing counsel (McGee) to see how 

they wanted to proceed. Simpson does not dispute that he received this 

notice. On September 4, 2020, McGee sent Simpson a letter by certified mail 

requesting Simpson’s participation in a settlement conference on either 

September 16th or 17th and again reiterating the necessity of conferring prior 

to the end of the month. Simpson replied via email on September 16th that 

he would send McGee some financial documents necessary to the 

conference. Simpson claims to have sent the documents, although it is 

undisputed that he never attended a settlement conference.

The district court instructed McGee to move to strike Simpson’s 

answer and for default judgment. McGee did so and the court granted the 

default judgment. Simpson claims to not have received notice of this 

judgment until a debt collector came calling in May 2021. The reason, 

according to Simpson, is that Brandon provided the court with an incorrect 

email address for Simpson, so the court’s electronic notifications did not 

reach him.

In October 2021, nearly a full year after judgment, Simpson moved to 

set aside the default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).2 

He argued that the judgment should be set aside due to his mistaken email 

address and because he did not receive notice of the default judgment. The 

court denied the motion, stating that Simpson had not pressed a meritorious 

2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

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defense and had not adequately kept himself apprised of the litigation. After 

an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration, Simpson appealed to this court.

II

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a court “may set aside 

a final default judgment.”3 It “may relieve a party” from a judgment due to,

inter alia, “excusable neglect,” “mistake,” or “void[ness].”4 This court 

reviews a denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment for abuse of 

discretion.

5 We consider “whether the default was willful, whether setting it 

aside would prejudice the adversary, and whether a meritorious defense is 

presented.”6

A

Simpson argues that his judgment should be set aside due to 

Brandon’s mistake regarding the email address. 7 Although the mistake is 

uncontested,8the district court rested its order on the fact that Simpson had 

declined to present a meritorious defense to the underlying claim. Simpson’s

only argument was that his email was recorded incorrectly such that he did 

3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).

4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (4).

5 Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 500 (5th Cir. 2015).

6

Id. (citation omitted); see also Jenkens & Gilchrist v. Groia & Co., 542 F.3d 114, 

119-20 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 2000) (“A 

district court has the discretion to refuse to set aside a default judgment . . . if the defendant 

‘fails to present a meritorious defense sufficient to support a finding on the merits for the 

defaulting party.’”)).

7 Life Partners has declined to file an appellee’s brief, so we consider only 

Simpson’s arguments.

8 The Northern District of Texas’s clerk’s office eventually changed the email on 

file for Simpson, but it informed him that he could have updated the email on file at any 

time.

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not receive notice of the judgment against him. He did not offer a defense to 

the judgment itself. Nor does Simpson press a defense on appeal—let alone 

a meritorious one. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion 

in denying Simpson’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion based on the email mistake.9

B

Simpson also contends that he was deprived of due process because 

he was not given notice of the default judgment.10 While we liberally construe 

pro se briefs, there must be an argument for us to construe.11 There is a single 

mention of this argument in Simpson’s brief. But even assuming Simpson 

has sufficiently presented this argument on appeal, he did not raise it at the 

district court. “A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in the first 

instance in the district court . . . .”12 This argument is forfeited, and we do 

not consider it.

* * *

Because Simpson has not pressed a meritorious defense, we 

AFFIRM.

9 See Wooten, 788 F.3d at 500.

10 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) (providing for relief from “void” judgments); 

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010) (holding that rule 

60(b)(4) applies “in the rare instance where a judgment is premised . . . on a violation of 

due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard”).

11 Rutila v. Dep’t of Transp., 12 F.4th 509, 511 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“‘A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.’”)); 

Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993).

12 Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021).

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