Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DAVID P. LYNCH GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Amy Noe Law Attorney General of Indiana

Richmond, Indiana

LYUBOV GORE

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

THOMAS HOLLIDAY, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 89A04-1404-CR-177

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE WAYNE SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Gregory A. Horn, Judge

Cause No. 89D02-1208-MR-10

November 12, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CRONE, Judge
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Case Summary

Thomas Holliday appeals his fifty-five-year sentence imposed following his guilty 

plea to murder. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the nature 

of the crime was an aggravating circumstance and that his sentence is inappropriate based on 

the nature of the offense and his character. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion and that Holliday has failed to carry his burden to show that his sentence is 

inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

The facts supporting Holliday’s guilty plea are found in the probable cause affidavit,

which the parties stipulated to. Holliday normally carried a .380 semiautomatic handgun. 

Holliday met sixty-nine-year-old Richard Smith in the summer of 2010 and worked for him 

doing odd jobs and driving him on errands. Smith had a coin collection that he gave to 

Holliday to sell for him because Holliday claimed that he could sell the coins for more money 

than their appraised value. On September 10 and 15, 2010, Holliday sold several coins from 

Smith’s collection to a gallery. 

On November 29, 2010, Smith wrote a letter to Holliday directing him to either return 

the coin collection or pay $26,000 by December 1, 2010. Smith’s friend, Jane Bumbalough, 

accompanied Smith to Holliday’s house to place the letter on Holliday’s door. Holliday’s 

daughter found the letter and read it. She knew that her father had been trying to sell Smith’s 

coins. She left Smith’s letter for her father.
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Holliday read Smith’s letter. Holliday told a friend that he was so mad at “the old 

man” that he wanted to kill him because he wanted his coins back. Appellant’s App. at 14.

On November 30, 2010, Holliday showed Smith’sletter to his brother James. Holliday asked 

James to drive him to Smith’s house so that he could “get rid of him” since he did not have 

the money or all the coins. Id. at 16. James refused to assist Holliday. Holliday also 

mentioned Smith’sletter to his brother Robert. Holliday told Robert that he had to “get rid of 

him” because he did not have the money or the coins. Id. 

On December 1, 2010, at around 1:15 p.m., Holliday and Robert drove to Smith’s 

house. At 2:09 p.m., Smith called Jane and said that Holliday had come to the house and that 

he was scared. Jane told Holliday to keep his cell phone open in his pocket so that she could 

hear the conversation. Jane listened to the conversation for about thirty minutes when the 

phone call disconnected. Jane went to Smith’s house, found him murdered in the cellar, and

called the police. They searched Smith’s body and found the cell phone open in his pocket, 

but there was no cell phone signal in the cellar. An autopsy revealed that Smith died from a 

gunshot wound to the head, that the bullet was of medium caliber such as a .380, .38, or .357, 

and that the range of fire was close to intermediate. 

That night, James received phone calls from both Holliday and Robert. Both told 

James that Holliday had shot Smith. Holliday eventually admitted to the police that he went 

to Smith’s house and they went to the basement where Holliday shot him in the head with a 

pistol. 
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In August 2012, the State charged Holliday with murder. In February 2014, Holliday 

filed a notice of intention to plead guilty as charged, and the State agreed to dismiss charges 

in cause number 89D02-1201-FD-19. Following a change of plea hearing, the trial court 

entered judgment of conviction for murder.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found the following mitigating factors: (1) 

Holliday lived a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time; and (2) he pled guilty five 

days prior to the trial date saving the time and expense of trial. The trial court found the 

following aggravating factors: (1) the victim was sixty-nine years old; (2) the nature of the 

crime, including that Holliday “took the victim to a small, dark cellar and shot the victim in 

the back of the head, execution style, in a cold calculated manner;” (3) Holliday had shown 

no remorse; and (4) he had engaged in violent misconduct while incarcerated. Id. at 97. The 

trial court found that the mitigating and aggravating facts balanced and sentenced Holliday to

fifty-five years executed. Holliday appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – Abuse of Discretion

Holliday asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him by finding 

that the nature of the crime was an aggravating circumstance. We observe that as long as the

trial court imposes a sentence within the statutory range, its sentencing decision is reviewable 

only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), 

clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, 
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probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. at 491. A trial court abuses its 

sentencing discretion by (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all, (2) entering a 

sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by 

the record, (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported 

by the record, or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper 

as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. 

Specifically, Holliday contends that the trial court’s finding that he “took the victim to 

a small, dark cellar and shot the victim in the back of the head, execution style, in a cold 

calculated manner” is unsupported by the record. Appellant’s App. at 97. Holliday 

complains that there is no evidence that he took Smith to the cellar or that the cellar was 

small and dark, but it is undisputed that Holliday shot Smith in the cellar. Holliday also 

states that there is no evidence that Smith was shot in the back of the head, but the record 

shows that Smith was shot in the head at close to medium range. Finally, Smith asserts that 

there is no evidence that the shooting was “execution style” or in a cold and calculating 

manner. Not only did Holliday shoot Smith in the head at close to medium range, but the 

evidence also shows that Holliday’s decision to kill Smith rested solely on Smith’s wish to

have his coin collection returned or be compensated for it. Holliday told people that he 

wanted to kill Smith, he found Smith, and he killed him. From these facts, the trial court 

could reasonably infer that Holliday shot Smith in a cold and calculating manner. The details 

that Holliday focuses on, such as whether the cellar was small and dark and where in the 

head Smith was shot, are insignificant and do not diminish the central determination that 
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Holliday shot Smith in a cold and calculating manner. We conclude that the trial court’s 

finding is not clearly against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before it. 

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the nature of the crime 

was an aggravating factor.

Section 2 – Inappropriateness of Sentence

Holliday also contends that his sentence is inappropriate pursuant to Indiana Appellate 

Rule 7(B), which states, “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in 

light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” When reviewing a 

sentence, our principal role is to leaven the outliers rather than necessarily achieve what is 

perceived as the correct result. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). “We 

do not look to determine if the sentence was appropriate; instead we look to make sure the 

sentence was not inappropriate.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). Holliday 

has the burden to show that his sentence is inappropriate. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494.

The advisory sentence for murder is fifty-five years, with a range of forty-five years to 

sixty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. Holliday received the advisory sentence. Holliday 

argues that the minimum sentence is warranted.

Turning first to the nature of the offense, we observe that “the advisory sentence is 

the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Pierce v. 

State, 949 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. 2011). “The nature of the offenses is found in the details 

and circumstances of the commission of the offenses and the defendant’s participation.” 
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Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “One factor we consider when 

determining the appropriateness of a deviation from the advisory sentence is whether there is 

anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it 

different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory 

sentence.” Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Rich v. 

State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied). Here, Holliday took 

advantage of an elderly man. He killed Smith simply because Smith wanted his coin 

collection back. Instead of returning the remaining coins and giving Smith the proceeds from 

the sale of his coins, Holliday decided to kill Smith and keep his coins and money. Holliday 

went to Smith’s house and, having previously expressed a desire to kill him, shot him in the 

head. The nature of the crime does not recommend a sentence below the advisory.

As for Holliday’s character, he has led a law-abiding life, with only one misdemeanor 

conviction for disorderly conduct in 1998. He also asserts that he is deeply committed to his 

family and has played a positive role in his community by serving as vice president of the 

local branch of the Marine Corps League, raising money to benefit children, and facilitating 

development of a new park. Holliday’s argument ignores the fact that he has shown no 

remorse for his actions and that he has engaged in violent conduct while incarcerated. 

Holliday threated to kill other inmates. He made a shank out of a sharpened toothbrush and 

threatened to use a pencil as a weapon while in a conflict with another inmate. Appellant’s 

App. at 81. Holliday’s character does not warrant a reduced sentence.
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We conclude that Holliday has failed to carry his burden to show that his sentence is 

inappropriate based on the nature of his crime and his character. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.