IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16

- 1031 Filed February 22, 2017
MYRON DENNIS BEHM, BURTON J. BROOKS, BOBBY LEE LANGSTON, DAVID LEON BRODSKY, JEFFREY R. OLSON and GEOFF TATE SMITH , Plaintiff s - Appell ants ,
vs. CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA and GATSO USA, INC. , Defendant s - Appell ees

.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Christopher L. Bruns , Judge.

Af ter unsuccessfully c hallenging the Cedar Rapids Automatic Traffic Enforcem ent system on numerous fronts, the p laintiffs appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of the defendants. AFFIRMED.

James C. Larew of Larew Law Office , Iowa City , for appellant s

. Paul D. Burns and Laura M. Hyer of Bradley & Riley P

. C

. , Iowa City , for appellee Gatso USA, Inc

. Elizabeth D. Jacobi of Cedar Rapids City Attorney’s Office, for appellee City of Cedar Rapids.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and McDo nald, JJ.2

DOYLE, Judge. Six motor vehicle owners sued the City of Cedar Rapids (City) and Gatso USA, Inc. (Gatso) , challenging the legitimacy of the Cedar Rapids Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system , arguing the ATE ordinance and its implementation by the City violate state law in numerous respects

. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and Gatso , and the vehicle owners appeal that ruling . We affirm.
I

. Background Facts

. A

. The ATE System

. The C ity established an ATE system by ordinance. See Cedar Rapids , Iowa, Mun

. Code § 61.138 (2016)

. 1 The district court ’s ruling succinctly describes the operation of the ATE system as follows: The ATE ordinance authorizes the City to erect an automated traffic enforcement system for making video images of vehicles that are speeding at designated locations. The system automatically produces images of vehicles that are traveling eleven mph or more in excess of the posted speed limit. The ATE ordinance allows the City to contract with a private entity, as the City did with [ Gatso ] , to install and maintain the cameras and provide video images of those vehicles in violation. After an initial screening, Gatso passes a long what it believe s to be instances of violations to the officers of the Cedar Rapids Police Department (CRPD), who then review and make the final determination of whether to issue a Notice of Violation. Once a CRPD officer determines that an ATE citation be

1 A printed or electronic copy of the ordinance is not in the record before us

. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.801. “When properly pleaded, the courts of this state shall take judicial notice of ordinances contained in a city code or city code supplement.” Iowa Code § 622.62(1) (2015). We therefore take judicial notice of Cedar Rapids Municipal Code section 61.13 8, which is available electronically at https://www.municode.com/library/ia/cedar_rapids/codes / code_of_ordinances?nodeId=C H61TRRE_61.138AUTREN

. The N otice of V iolation issued to motor vehicle owners indicates the owner may view the city ordinance at http://w ww.viewcitation.com ; however, to access information at this website about the alleged violation and the city ordinance , the owner must enter the citation number and PIN provided in the N otice.3
issued, Gatso mails such a notice to the registered owner of the vehicle. Vehicle owners are identified through the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (the “Nlets” database), to which the City has access. The City has also allowed Gatso access to that database. A vehicle owner who receives a Notice of Violation ha s two options to contest a citation

. (1) Municipal Code section 61.138(e)(1) provides that an owner may request an administrative hearing to be held at the CRPD before an administrative appea ls board consisting of one or more impartial fact

- finders. After the hearing, the board may either uphold or dismiss the citation. (2) Municipal Code section 61.138(e)(2) provides that a vehicle owner may alternatively request that a municipal infraction be issued and filed with the Small Claims Division of the Iowa District Court in Linn County. Thereafter, the vehicle owner can have her day in court and present evidence in support of her case before a judge. An owner who opts for an administrative hea ring may also appeal to the small claims court if she is unhappy with the result before the administrative board. 2
B

. The Plaintiffs’ ATE Notices of Violation

. The plaintiffs were each issued an ATE N otice of V iolation alleging their
vehicle s w ere traveling more than eleven miles per hour over the speed limit on Interstate 380 (I

- 380) in the City of Cedar Rapids. The p laintiff s contested the

n otice s by request ing administrative hearing s . Plaintiffs Behm, Langston, Brodsky, Olson, and Smith were e ach determined liable for the alleged speeding
violations

. 3 Plaintiffs Olson and Smith paid civil fines of $75 each. Plaintiff Brooks was found not liable for the alleged speeding violation . None of the

2 An other excellent detailed description of the procedures to b e followed after issuance of a N otice of V iolation is included in Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids , 112 F. Supp. 3d 817, 826

- 27 (N.D. Iowa 2015), aff ’ d in part , rev ’ d in part , 840 F.3d 987, 998 (8th Cir. 2016). 3 Plaintiffs Langston and Brodsky were issued two Notices of Violation for their jointly

owned vehicle. The Notices alleged the vehicle was speeding at 7:30 p.m. and at 8:02 p.m. on the same day. A hearing officer dismissed the 7:30 p.m. citation and found Langston and Brodsky liable for the 8:02 p. m. violation. Plaintiff Smith also received two Notices of Violation alleging his vehicle was speeding at 1:52 p.m. and 1:54 p.m. on the same day. A hearing officer found him liable for the 1:52 p.m. violation, but apparently the 1:54 p.m. violation was never addressed.4

plaintiffs appealed their administrative determina tions to the Small Claims Division of the Linn County District Court.
I I

. Proceedings

. The p laintiffs filed a class

- action petition 4 seeking declaratory relief, claiming the City’s ATE system is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection, Privileges and Immunities, and Due Process clauses of the Iowa Constitution ; is in violation of and preempted by Iowa law ; and constitutes an unlawful delegation of police power. The petition also asserted a private cause of action seek ing damages under the Iowa Constitution. The suit also sought damages for unjust enrichment and injunctive relief. The City and Gatso den ied the p laintiffs’ allegations and later filed a motion for summary judgment requesting the court to dismiss the p la intiffs’ suit. The p laintiffs resisted and the di s trict court considered
the motion for summary judgment on the parties’ briefs and filings. The court rejected the p laintiffs’ substantive and procedural due process claims. The court also rejected the p l aintiffs’ equal protection and privileges and immunities claims, as well as their claims of unlawful delegation of police power, preemption, and unjust enrichment. The court granted the motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The p laintiffs now appe al.
I II

. Summary Judgment Standard and Scope of Review

. We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling for the correction of errors at law. Mueller v

. Wellmark, Inc. , 818 N.W.2d 244, 253 (Iowa 2012). On appeal, the p laintiffs raise several constitutional arguments. We address only

4 The district court made no determination as to whether or not the action was to be maintained as a class action. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.262.5

the arguments properly preserved for appellate review. See Weltzin v. Nail , 618 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 2000) . “ Constitutional claims are reviewed de novo. ” City of Sioux City v. Jacobsma , 862 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Io wa 2015). In interpreting provisions of the Iowa Constitution, we may find federal authority persuasive, although it is not binding. S ee S tate v. Sweet , 879 N.W.2d 811, 832 (Iowa 2016).
IV

. Discussion

. A

. Procedural Due Process

. The p laintiffs argue t he i r procedural due process rights under the Iowa Constitution were violated. Article I , section 9 of the Iowa Constitution provides
that “ no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ” “Procedural due proc ess requires that before there can be a deprivation of a protected interest, there must be notice and opportunity to be heard in a proceeding that is ‘adequate to safeguard the rights for which the constitutional protection is invoked.’” Bowers v. Polk Ct y

. Bd. of Supervisors , 638 N.W.2d 682,
690

- 91 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted)

. The p laintiffs assert the City “forces all charged vehicle owners who contest the allegations set forth in [N] otices of [V] iolations to attend an administrative hearing.” They argue this is not the process they are “due” since Iowa Code section 364.22(6) mandates municipal infractions “ shall be tried before a magistrate, a district associate judge, or a district judge in the same manner as a small claim.” ( E mphasis added

. ) A v iolation of Cedar Rapids Municipal Code section 61.138 constitutes a municipal infraction. See Cedar6

Rapids , Iowa, Mun

. Code § 1.12 ( stating “any violation of a city ordinance, city code . . . constitutes a municipal infraction”)

. On its face, the ATE or dinance specifies two different methods of contesting a N otice of V iolation:

1. By submitting in a form specified by the City a request for an administrative hearing to be held at the [ CRPD ] before an administrative appeals board (the “ Board ” ) consisting of one or more impartial fact finders. Such a request must be filed within 30 days from the date on which Notice of the violation is sent to the Vehicle Owner. After a hearing, the Board may either uphold or dismiss the Automated Traffic Citation, and sh all mail its written decision within 10 days after the hearing, to the address provided on the request for hearing. If the citation is upheld, then the Board shall include in its written decision a date by which the fine must be paid, and on or before tha t date, the Vehicle Owner shall either pay the fine or submit a request pursuant to the next paragraph, (e.)(2.).
2. By submitting in a form specified by the City a request that in lieu of the Automated Traffic Citation, a municipal infraction citation b e issued and filed with the Small Claims Division of the Iowa District Court in Linn County. Such a request must be filed within 30 days from the date on which Notice of the violation is sent to the Vehicle Owner. Such a request will result in a court or der requiring the Vehicle Owner to file an answer and appearance with the Clerk of Court, as well as setting the matter for trial before a judge or magistrate

. If the Court finds the Vehicle Owner guilty of the municipal infraction, state mandated court c osts will be added to the amount of the fine imposed by this section.
Id

. § 61.138(e). Vehicle owners who use the administrative process may appeal to the
courts. See id

. Those unhappy with the magistrate’s or judge’s decision may
then appeal to the di strict court. See id. § 364.22(11). If disappointed with the results in district court, the vehicle owner may seek discretionary review from the supreme court. See id . § 631.16

.7
The administrative hearing is optional , not required. See Hughes , 112 F.Supp.3d at 847 ( Stating a person may participate in an administrative hearing or proceed to court), aff’d in part, rev’d in part , 840 F.3d at 998 (“ [T] he district court properly found that the ordinance provides two ways to contest the Notice of Violatio n
— a legal conclusion based on the plain text of the ordinance.”). I n other words, a vehicle owner may bypass the administrative process altogether and go directly to court to contest the notice of violation. 5 Here, the p laintiffs

5 It is somewhat troubling that the Notice of Violation issued to a vehicle owner is a bit misle ading, as it does not, on its face, inform the owner of the two alternatives to contest the violation. The Notice states:

I CONTEST THIS VIOLATION. You have the right to contest this violation in person at an administrative hearing or by mail if you res ide outside the state of Iowa. In order to state a valid defense supporting dismissal of this citation it is recommended that you review the city ordinance, the images and the actual recorded video (if applicable) of the infraction at www.viewcitation.com , before contesting your violation. If following such review, you feel that you have a valid defense against the violation you may contest at an Administrative Hearing or by mail. You may view the city ordinance at www.viewcitation.com

. The vehicle owner must review the ordinance to discover that he or she has two methods of contest ing the Notice of Violation. Even then, the ordinance can reasonably be read to require an administrative hearing as a prerequisite before seeking relief in the courts, as the ordinance does not clearly indicate the methods to contest the Notice are alternative options. Vehicle owners issued a “Findings, Decisions and Order” from an Administrative Hearing Officer are informed :

Pursuant to City ordinance 61.138(e)(2) and the finding of liable you have the option to request that in lieu of the Automated Traffic Citation, a municipal infraction be issued and filed in the Small claims division of the Iowa district Court in Linn County. For a copy of the request form and a compl ete reading of 61.138 go to the City of Cedar Rapids web site: [web site address]. Completed forms should be returned to the Cedar Rapids Police Department at [police department address]. V ehicle owner s issued a “Notice of Determination 2nd Notice” are informed: Citizens may elect to resolve this Notice of Determination of Liability by paying the assessed fine or by appealing to the Small Claims Division of the Iowa District Court in Linn County. You may challenge the matter in person or by mail. Rega rdless of the means you choose, you must initiate action on this matter within 30 days of the date listed on the front of this notice.8

elected to forego their right to a trial in court and utilized the administrative
process instead and did not appeal to the courts. Like the district court, we
conclude t here was no violation of the p laintiffs’ procedural due process rights. Additionally , we note t he p laintiffs ’ arguments on this issue were rejected by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa , s ee Hughes , 112 F. Supp. 3d at 847

- 48

. The p laintiffs further assert the ordinance’s irrebuttable presumption that the vehicle owner is responsible for the infraction is violative of their Due Process rights. Although the issue was raised before the district court, it was not specifically addressed in the court’s ruling. The p laintiffs did not file an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion to amend or enlarge the court’s ruling to
address the issue. “It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised a nd decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” To preserve error on even a properly raised issue on which the district court failed to rule, “the party who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preser ve error for appeal.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Schulte , 843 N.W.2d 876, 883

- 84 (Iowa 2014) (citations omitted). “[A] motion for enlargement [is] necessary to preserve error ‘when the district court fails to resolve an issue, claim, or legal theory properly su bmitted for adjudication.’” State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. , 801 N.W.2d 513, 543 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted). Error is not preserved even where the party arguably raised a legal issue before the district court but did not obtain a ruling on the specific issue

. . . . To challenge this Notice of Determination: Should you choose to do so, you are entitled to appeal this Notice of Determination and to request a trial before a judge or magistrate.9

raised on appeal. See Lounsberry v. Heath , No. 03

- 0878, 2004 WL 433928, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2004). Consequently, the p laintiffs failed to preserve this issue for our review. B. Preemption

. The p laintiffs also argue the process established by the ordinance unlawfully grants jurisdiction to an administrative board or hearing officer and is preempted by Iowa Code sections 602.6101 and 364.22(4), (6). The cornerstone of their argument is that an ATE N otice of V io lation constitutes a “municipal infraction.” Cedar Rapids Municipal Code section 1.12 provides that “ [a] ny violation of a city ordinance, city code, or any section, subsection, paragraph, subparagraph, or any other part thereof, constitutes a municipal in fraction subject to all the penalties, and other relief provisions set forth in [Iowa Code s] ection
364.22. ” The municipal code does not exempt violations of the ATE ordinance from section 1.12. Therefore, a violation of the ATE ordinance is a “municipal infraction.” Iowa Code section 364.22 governs municipal infractions. Section 364.22(4) provides:

An officer authorized by a city to enforce a city code or regulation may issue a civil citation to a person who commits a municipal infraction. A copy of the citation may be served by personal service as provided in rule of civil procedure 1.305, by certified mail addressed to the defendant at the defendant’s last known mailing address, return receipt requested, or by publication in the manner as provided i n rule of civil procedure 1.310

. . . . [ 6 ]

6 Under the ATE system, Gatso mails the Notice of Violation to the vehicle owner by regular mail.10

As noted above, s ection 364.22(6) (a) provides that municipal infractions “ shall be tried before a magistrate, a district associate judge, or a district judge.” ( E mphasis added

. ) S ection 6 0 2 .6101, which establishes a “unified trial court,” provides: A unified trial court is

. . . the “Iowa District Court”. The district court has exclusive, general, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings , and remedies, civil, criminal, probate, and juvenil e, except in cases where exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction is conferred upon some other court, tribunal, or administrative body. The district court has all the power usually possessed and exercised by trial courts of general jurisdiction, and is a cour t of record. And, as set out in full above, section 61.138(e) of the Cedar Rapids Municipal Code permits the vehicle o wner issued a N otice of V iol ation to contest the
violation by requesting either an administrative hearing or a trial in the Small Claims Division of the Iowa District Court in Linn County before a magistrate or judge. “Under [Iowa’s] home

- rule approach, except for taxing authority, municipalities ordinarily have the power to determine local affairs as they see fit
unless the l egislature has provided otherwise.” Madden v. City of Iowa City, 848 N.W.2d 40, 49 (Iowa 2014). “Under Iowa’s home rule amendment, a municipality cannot enact an ordinance that expressly or impliedly conflicts with state law.”
Jacobsma , 862 N.W.2d at 35 3 (citing Iowa Const. art III, § 38A; Seymour , 755 N.W.2d at 537

- 38). “A city may exercise its general powers subject only to limitations expressly imposed by a state or city law.” Iowa Code § 364.2(2).11
An overview of the principles of preemption is set forth in Seymour , 755 N.W.2d at 537

- 39 , and t o repeat them here would unnecessarily lengthen this opinion. Applicable here is the “conflict” form of implied preemption: In order to qualify for this branch of implied preemption, a local law must be “irreconcilable” with state law. Further, our cases teach that, if possible, we are to “interpret the state law in such a manner as to render it harmonious with the ordinance.” In applying implied preemption an alysis, we presume that the municipal ordinance is valid. The cumulative result of these principles is that for implied preemption to occur based on conflict with state law, the conflict must be obvious, unavoidable, and not a matter of reasonable debate. Seymour , 755 N.W.2d at 539 (internal citations omitted); see also Iowa Code § 364.2(3) (“An exercise of a city power is not inconsistent with a state law unless it is irreconcilable with the state law.”) ; Goodell v. Humboldt Cty

. , 575 N.W.2d 486, 500 (Io wa 1998) (“A local ordinance is not inconsistent with state law unless
it is irreconcilable with the state law.”)

. Th is legal standard is “demanding

. ” See Seymour , 755 N.W.2d at 539

. Here , the district court conclu ded : The ATE ordinance is not preempte d because vehicle owners are merely offered an additional forum to challenge their ATE citations. Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Mun

. Code § 61.138(e)(1). Owners may still submit a form specified by the City to have a municipal infraction, as opposed to ATE citation, issued and filed with the court

. Id

. § 61.138(e)(2). Accordingly, the ATE ordinance’s administrative hearing presents no conflict with the judicial process. For the same reason, the ATE ordinance does not conflict with Iowa Code section 364.22 (6) and (4) because, by providing an additional channel to challenge a traffic fine, the ATE ordinance leaves untouched the process of contesting a municipal infraction through a court of law.12
Furthermore, w e note the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa also rejected the claim that the ordinance is preempted by Iowa Code section 602.6101: Contrary to Plaintiffs ’ assertion, the ATE system does not “tak[e] jurisdiction for traffic enforcement matters away from the Iowa District Co urt.” Rather, the ATE system allows a person who receives a Notice of Violation an opportunity to first object to the alleged violation at a City

- sanctioned administrative hearing before proceeding to the Iowa district courts. Such a system amounts to, a t most, concurrent jurisdiction over alleged municipal violations. See Iowa v. Stueve, [ 150 N.W.2d 597, 602 ( Iowa 1967) ] (“‘Concurrent jurisdiction’

. . . means that jurisdiction exercised by different courts, at the same time, over the same subject

- matte r, and within the same territory, and wherein litigants may, in the first instance, resort to either court indifferently.”). Hughes , 112 F. Supp. 3d at 849. The Eighth Circuit affirmed this holding. See Hughes , 840 F.3d at 998

. Additionally , the Eight Circuit has also rejected drivers’ claims that a similar ATE ordinance is preempted by Iowa Code sections
602.6101 and 364.22(4), (6). See Brooks v. City of Des Moines , 844 F.3d 978 , 980 ( 8th Cir. 2016). Finally, our supreme court rejected a claim that a n ATE ordinance was preempted by Iowa Code section 3 6 4.22(5)(b) (now renumbered

as § 3 6 4.22(6)(b) (2015) )

. See Seymour , 755 N.W.2d at 542

. With the persuasive federal decisions in mind , along with our own supreme court’s ruling,
we conclude the district court correctly rejected the p laintiffs’ preemption argument. The p laintiffs also argue “ any citations issued based on evidence created by ATE equipment located on I

- 380 are directly inconsistent and irreconcilable with the Evaluation and Order of the [Io wa Department of Transportation (IDOT)]

. This ATE equipment is therefore also preempted by that agency action. ” In13

March 2015 , the IDOT issued an evaluation of the Cedar Rapids ATE system. The IDOT ruled, among other things, that certain cameras on I

- 380 should be
moved or removed by April 17, 2015 . It found that some cameras were “beyond the area of [safety] concern” or placed too close to a reduction in speed limit. 7 The district court did not rule on this specific preemption issue , and the p laintiffs did not file an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion to amend or enlarge the court’s ruling to address the issue. Con sequently, the p laintiffs failed to preserve th is issue for our review. See Schulte, 843 N.W.2d at 883

- 84

. In any event, b ecause the City’s appeal of the IDOT evaluation and order is still pending, this claim is not ripe for our review. See Hughes , 840 F.3d at 997 (citing Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr , 830 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2016)). The p laintiffs also assert the C ity’s implementation of the ATE ordinance has exempted “thousands of government vehicles from prosecution.” They
argue Iowa Code section 321.230 preempts the City’s exemption of government vehicles. Although the issue was raised before the district court, it apparently got lost in the shuffle and was not specifically addressed in the court’s ruling. No 1.904(2) motion wa s filed requesting the court address the issue. Consequently,
this issue was not preserved for our review. See Schulte , 843 N.W.2d at 883

- 84. C. Other Constitutional Issues.
1

. Substantive Due Process

.

7 The City’s appeal from the IDOT order is still pending in district court. See City o f Muscatine v. Iowa Dep ’ t of Transp

. , No. 05771 CVCV049988 (Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk Cty. petition filed June 10, 2015). The cities of Muscatine, Cedar Rapids, and Des Moines are petitioners in this judicial review of the agency’s action. A trial date is uncertain at this time.14
The p laintiffs argue t he i r substantive due proc ess rights under the Iowa Constitution were violated based on the violation of t he i r fundamental right to
interstate and intrastate travel

. 8 Iowa Const. art. I, § 9. The p laintiffs also assert

“ the City’s violation of S tate law (IDOT regulations and then subsequent Evaluation and Order) offends judicial notions of fairness and human dignity.”
The se due process argument s w ere r aised and r ejected in Hughes , 840 F.3d at
99 5

- 96

. For the same reasons, w e too reject the p laintiffs’ argument.
2

. Equal Protection

. The p laintiffs assert the ostensible purpose of the ATE ordinance is safety. They contend the under inclusive enforcement bear s no rational relationship to the interests of safety. 9 The p laintiffs argue their Equal Protection rights under the Iowa Constitution have therefore been violated. See Iowa Const. art I, § 6. This argument was also raised and rejected in Hughes , 840 F.3d at 99 6

- 97

. We likewise reject the p laintiffs’ argument. The p laintiffs also contend the placement of some equipment on I

- 380 bears no rational relationship to the interests of safety. The district court
concluded: “ Even if the IDOT conclusion is correct and the equipment on I

- 380 is not necessary for public safety, the City of Cedar Rapi ds has a legitimate interest
in enforcing the speed limit within the City limits. The ATE system is rationally

8 Our supreme court has not yet expressly recognized a fundamental right to intrastate travel under the Iowa Constitution. See City of Panora v. Simmons , 445 N.W.2d 363, 367

- 69 (Iowa 1989). But even if it were so recognized , our c onclusion would remain the same. 9 It is not disputed that the ATE system (a) captures only rear license plate images, as a result of which most semi

- truck owners, whose rear license plates are not included in the Nlets database, are immune from ATE citati ons, and (b) does not issue Notices of Violation to certain government vehicles because their license plates are also not in the Nlets database.15

related to promotion of that interest. ” We agree. In any event, as foot noted
above , t he City’s appeal from the IDOT order is still pending in the Iowa District Court for Polk County. Because the City’s appeal of the IDOT evaluation and order is still pending, this claim is not ripe for our review. See Hughes , 840 F.3d
at 997 (citing Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr , 830 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2016 ) ).
3

. Privileges and Immunities

. For the same reasons advanced in their Equal Protection argument s , The
p laintiffs claim their rights under the Privileges and Immunities clause of the Iowa Constitution were violated. See Iowa Const. a rt. I, § 6. For the same reasons we rejected their Equal Protection arguments, we reject their Privileges and Immunities arguments.
D

. Unlawful Delegation of Police Powers

. Cedar Rapids Municipal C ode section 61.138(a) explicitly provides that

“ [ t ] he p olice department will determine which vehicle owners are in violation of
the [C] ity ’ s traffic control ordinances and are to receive a [N] otice of [V] iolation for the offense. ” ( E mphasis added

. ) Nevertheless, the p laintiffs assert the City has unconstitutionally delegate d police powers to Gatso , a private company

. A municipality “‘cannot surrender, by contract or otherwise, any of its legislative and governmental functions and powers, including a partial surrender’ unless authorized by statute. ” Warren Cty

. Bd. of Health v. Warren C ty

. Bd. of Supervisors , 654 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Iowa 2002) (citations omitted). “It can, however, delegate its right to perform certain acts and duties necessary to16

transact and carry out its powers. These delegable a cts typically involve functions that require little judgment or discretion. ” Id . at 914. In respon ding to the p laintiffs’ wrongful

- delegation

- of

- police

- powers assertion, the district court found no genuine disputes of material fact existed : In response t o Defendants’ argument that Gatso’s initial screening process involves little discretion, Plaintiffs did not set forth specific and material evidentiary facts indicating otherwise. Neither does the c ourt find admissible evidence indicating significant dis cretion on Gatso’s part in the acts of running license plate numbers through the Nlets database to identify registered vehicle owners, calibrating the ATE equipment (also conducted by the City and tested by CRPD officers) or maintaining the City’s hotline or FAQs webpage regarding the ATE ordinance. Furthermore,

. . . it is the CRPD officers who make the ultimate decision regarding who will be issued ATE citations. The mechanical act of mailing out N otices does not involve any meaningful judgment or discr etion. Plaintiffs’ unlawful delegation of power claim is therefore without merit. ( I nternal citation and footnote omitted

. ) The Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in considering the City’s ATE ordinance. Hughes , 840 F.3d at 998 (“ [T] here is no improper delegation (or in statutory terms, conferral) of power upon Gatso.” ). 10 Given that it is the Cedar Rapids Police Department , not G atso , that determines which vehicle owners are in violation of the ATE ordinance and are to receive a notice of viola tion for the offense, we conclude, like the district
court and Eighth Circuit , the ordinance does not unconstitutionally delegate police power.
E

. Unjust Enrichment

. The p laintiffs assert the City and Gatso have been “unjustly enriched by the implementa tion of the unlawful ordinance.” To recover on their claim, The

10 The Hughes court also noted: “Subject to later development of the law, the Iowa Supreme court has allowed ATE systems to operate with private contractors, thus implicitly rejecting the delegation challenge.” 840 F.3d at 997

.17

p lain t iffs had to show (1) the defendant s w ere enriched by the receipt of a benefit; (2) the enrichment was at their expense ; and (3) it wa s unjust to allow the defendant s to retain the benef it under the circumstances

. S ee S tate ex rel. Palmer v. Unisys Corp. , 637 N.W.2d 142, 154

- 55 (Iowa 2001). The p laintiffs
assert it would be unjust for the defendants to retain the monies received based

on an unlawful delegation of police power , the enfor cement of an o rdinance whose provisions are unconstitutional based on the procedural and substantive due process defects, privileges and immunities and equal protection violations , and the preemption of the o rdinance by Iowa law . We have already concluded the ordinance and its implementation is not an unlawful delegation of police power, unconstitutional, or preempted. We also note the Eighth Circuit reached
the same result. See Hughes , 840 F.3d at 998 ( finding no improper delegati on of police power); see also Brooks , 844 F.3d at 981 (following Hughes )

. We , like the
district court and the federal court , conclude that the p laintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim fails.
F

. Private Cause of Action

. The p laintiffs asserted a private caus e of action under the Iowa Constitution claiming they were entitled to damages resulting from the violation of their constitutional rights. In its ruling, the district court noted in a footnote:

As conceded by Plaintiffs, the Iowa Court of Appeals in Con klin v. State , [ No. 14

- 0764, 2015 WL 1332003 , at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar

. 25, 2015) ] has held that the Iowa Constitution itself gives no private causes of action, which must be created by statutes. Id. at *3. Plaintiffs argue that Conklin is currently on appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court for final determination. However, until Conklin is reversed by the Iowa Supreme Court, this c ourt is inclined to follow it. Plaintiffs thus can state no private cause of action. As a18
result, this ruling o nly deals with Plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment. An application for further review was filed in Conklin on April 9, 2015. As of the day of the filing of this opinion, the Iowa S upreme C ourt has not yet ruled on the application. We stand by our opinion in Conklin and reject the p laintiffs’ arguments concerning their claim for a private cause of action.
V

. Conclusion

. We have considered all of the p laintiffs ’ arguments properly preserved for
review , whether or not set forth explicitly here in and any issues not specifically addressed are deemed of insufficient merit to warrant reversal. We find no error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.