KEITH SASSER, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

No. 60091 FILE 

MAY 2 9 204 

TRACE K. LINDE N 

CLE OF 

BY 

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a gul;ty 

130 Nev., Advance Opinion 4j I 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

plea, of one count of robbery. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark 

County; David B. Barker, Judge. 

Affirmed. 

Legal Resource Group, LLC, and T. Augustas Claus, Henderson, 

for Appellant. 

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. 

Wolfson, District Attorney, and Jonathan VanBoskerck, Chief Deputy 

District Attorney, Clark County, 

for Respondent. 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC, 

OPINION 

By the Court, GIBBONS, C.J.: 

After pleading guilty to robbery, appellant Keith Sasser 

requested that the district court amend his presentence investigation 

report (PSI) prior to sentencing to correct an error. The district court 

amended Sasser's PSI in the judgment of conviction, rather than 

amending the PSI itself. In this opinion, we address whether the district 

court can properly amend a PSI in the judgment of conviction. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Sasser met Dominique Montenegro at a nightclub in Las 

Vegas. He offered to help Montenegro find her friends and indicated that 

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he was related to an individual in her group. After they were unable to 

find her group, she accepted a ride from him to her friend's house 

However, Montenegro alleges that Sasser did not stop the car when they 

arrived at her destination. She attempted to get out of the car while it 

was still moving but alleges that Sasser grabbed her hair, punched her in 

the face, and ran over her foot with his car to prevent her from escaping. 

The exact order of events is unclear from Montenegro's statement, but she 

alleges the following events occurred: (1) Sasser hit her causing her to lose 

consciousness; (2) she awoke outside the vehicle, and saw Sasser going 

through her purse; (3) Sasser sexually assaulted her multiple times; (4) 

Sasser told her to "[s]hut the [explicit] up," and she thought he was going 

to kill her; and (5) Sasser then apologized to her. Eventually, she escaped 

and checked into the University Medical Center (UMC). 

Sasser pleaded guilty to robbery, pursuant to North Carolina 

v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 1At sentencing, Sasser requested that the 

district court amend his PSI to exclude certain information that he alleged 

was unsupported. After hearing arguments from both parties, the district 

court found that two pages contained unsupported information and struck 

part of the conclusion. These stricken portions included: (1) the alleged 

threats from Sasser to kill Montenegro, and (2) a dismissed sexual assault 

charge against Sasser in an unrelated, subsequent case. The district court 

noted these amendments in Sasser's judgment of conviction. Sasser 

requested that additional information be stricken, however, the district 

'The United States Supreme Court in Alford concluded that a 

defendant can enter a plea agreement even though he or she maintains his 

or her innocence. 400 U.S. at 38. 

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court found sufficient evidence to support the remaining information. The 

district court then sentenced Sasser pursuant to his Alford plea to a 

minimum of 48 months and a maximum of 120 months. Sasser now 

appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Sasser argues that the district court erred in (1) 

amending his PSI in the judgment of conviction, (2) refusing to strike more 

information from the PSI, and (3) sentencing him. Initially, we note that a 

defendant has a right to object to his PSI and the district court will make 

a determination on the PSI information, so long as the defendant objects 

to it at the time of sentencing. Stockmeier v. State, Bd. of Parole Comm'rs, 

127 Nev. „ 255 P.3d 209, 213-14 (2012); see also NRS 176.156(1). 

However, since we have not addressed the specific procedure for amending 

a PSI, we take this opportunity to determine whether a district court may 

properly amend a defendant's PSI in the judgment of conviction. 

The district court did not err in amending Sasser's PSI in his judgment of 

conviction 

Sasser argues that the district court improperly amended the 

PSI with the judgment of conviction rather than returning it to the 

Division of Parole and Probation (P&P). 2We disagree. 

2Sasser also argues that it is unclear whether the district court 

struck the assertions concerning the subsequent arrest for sexual assault. 

We conclude that the judgment of conviction is sufficiently clear to 

determine (1) what information the district court intended to strike from 

the PSI, and (2) what information the district court found to be 

unsupported by evidence. 

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In Stockmeier, this court explained that it is important for a 

defendant to object to his PSI at the time of sentencing because "Nevada 

law does not provide any administrative or judicial scheme for amending a 

PSI after the defendant is sentenced." 127 Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 213. 

Further, this court acknowledged that "the process by which the district 

court must resolve objections to a PSI is not entirely clear." Id. However, 

it is clear that "any objections [that the defendant has] must be resolved 

prior to sentencing." 3 Id. at , 255 P.3d at 214. But other than 

requiring the defendant an opportunity to object, "the Nevada statutes are 

silent as to the process to be followed by either. . . [P&P] or the district 

court for allowing the defendant to make such objections, or for resolving 

the objections, and communicating the resolution to interested parties." 

Id. at 255 P.3d at 213-14. Based on this uncertainty, we take this 

opportunity to clarify that one way in which a district court may amend a 

defendant's PSI is by doing so in the judgment of conviction. 4 

30ther courts have held that when a court finds inaccurate 

information in a defendant's PSI, the district court has other procedures 

for amending the PSI instead of revising the actual PSI. State v. 

Waterfield, 248 P.3d 57, 59 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (requiring the district 

court to make findings on the record as to the inaccuracies in a defendant's 

PSI); State v. Craft, 490 S.E.2d 315, 319 (W. Va. 1997) (requiring the 

district court to make a written record of inaccuracies and append it to the 

PSI); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(C) (requiring federal district courts to 

append a copy of the court's amendment determinations to the PSI). 

4The State asks this court to overturn Stockmeier because of the 

burden it places on sentencing judges to amend a defendant's PSI when 

the defendant has opportunities prior to sentencing to amend it. We 

conclude that this is not a compelling reason to overturn precedent. 

Armenta-Carpio v. State, 129 Nev. „ 306 P.3d 395, 398 (2013). 

While we acknowledge that amending a defendant's PSI places a burden 

continued on next page . . . 

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Here, the district court explained its reasoning for amending 

Sasser's PSI in the judgment of conviction: "[What's fundamentally 

important is that there be accurate information in front of 

any. . . subsequent reviewing authority. And the two documents that 

follow each individual. . . through the corrective system, are the judgment 

of conviction and the PSI." 

We conclude that the district court did not err in amending the 

PSI in the judgment of conviction. Stockmeier did not specify how a 

district court should amend a PSI, so long as it was objected to and 

resolved prior to sentencing. The district court properly (1) heard 

argument on the defendant's objections, (2) resolved the objections prior to 

sentencing, and (3) made a record of its findings on the disputes it chose to 

resolve. By including its findings in the judgment of conviction, the 

district court effectively ensured that its findings will accompany the PSI 

throughout the parole process. 5 See generally NRS 176.159(1) (requiring 

courts to cause a copy of PSI to be delivered to Department of Corrections 

"not later than when the judgment of imprisonment is delivered pursuant 

. . . continued 

on district courts, we conclude that district courts are in the best position 

to determine whether a defendant's PSI contains impalpable or highly 

suspect evidence. 

5As a practical matter, the district court's approach in this case has 

the same effect as the procedure used in federal court when ruling on a 

disputed portion of a presentence report. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(C) 

(requiring court to append a copy of its determinations regarding disputed 

portions of the presentence report to any copy of the report made available 

to the Bureau of Prisons). 

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to NRS 176.335"); NRS 176.325 (requiring the judgment of conviction "be 

furnished to the officers whose duty it is to execute the judgment"); NRS 

176.335(2) (requiring sheriff to deliver certified copies of judgment of 

conviction to person from Department of Corrections who has been 

authorized to receive the prisoner). Therefore, we conclude that the 

district court did not err by amending Sasser's PSI in the judgment of 

conviction. We further note that this opinion should not be construed to 

require the district courts to amend a defendant's PSI through the 

judgment of conviction, but simply that it is not error to do so. 

The district court struck impalpable or highly suspect information from 

Sasser's PSI and only relied on the remaining supported information when 

sentencing Sasser 

Sasser argues that thefl district court should have stricken 

more information in the PSI. Sasser further argues that even though the 

district court's judgment of conviction ordered certain sections to be 

stricken, it did not actually strike the information in the PSI prior to 

sentencing. As a result, Sasser argues that the district court improperly 

relied on P&P's recommendation based on the inaccurate information in 

the PSI when it sentenced Sasser. 6We disagree. 

6Sasser also argues that he has a right to parole because "the 

Nevada Legislature has . . . created a constitutionally cognizable liberty 

interest [in parole] to invoke due process rights." We conclude that this 

argument is without merit based on the plain language of NRS 213.10705, 

which expressly states that there is no right to parole. To the extent that 

Sasser claims that the alleged inaccuracies in his PSI will affect his ability 

to receive parole in the future, we conclude that this argument is moot 

based on our conclusion that the district court did not err in finding that 

the remaining information in Sasser's PSI was not based on impalpable or 

highly suspect evidence. 

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The district court properly declined to strike information from 

Sasser's PSI that was not based on "impalpable and highly suspect 

evidence" 

"A district court's findings of fact are entitled to deference" on 

review. Browning v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 531, 188 P.3d 60, 70 (2008). A 

defendant's "PSI must not include information based on 'impalpable or 

highly suspect evidence." Stockmeier, 127 Nev. at , 255 P.3d at 213 

(quoting Goodson v. State, 98 Nev. 493, 496, 654 P.2d 1006, 1007 (1982)); 

see also Goodson, 98 Nev. at 496, 654 P.2d at 1007 (holding that 

information in a PSI indicating that the defendant was a drug trafficker 

was impalpable and highly suspect because it was merely a "bald 

assertion" and "unsupported by any evidence whatsoever"). However, this 

court will not interfere with the district court's sentence if the defendant 

was not prejudiced by the consideration of this impalpable or highly 

suspect evidence. Chavez v. State, 125 Nev. 328, 348, 213 P.3d 476, 490 

(2009). 

Sasser argues that the district court should have stricken 

more information in the PSI because the information was "inaccurate, 

unsupported by evidence, contradicted by the physical evidence and/or 

contradicted by Montenegro's own statements." 

Here, in addition to the PSI information regarding alleged 

threats to kill Montenegro and Sasser's subsequent sexual assault charge, 

which the district court struck, Sasser also objected to the following 

information in his PSI: (1) that Sasser had been unemployed since 

January 2010; (2) that officers observed that the victim had obvious 

bruises around her head and face and a swollen left foot; (3) the Sexual 

Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) report that found significant vaginal 

bruising and bleeding; (4) that Sasser pulled the car over in the desert, 

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struck the victim several times in the head and face with his fist, and the 

victim reported she was knocked unconscious; and (5) the PSI noted the 

violent nature of the offense, as well as the injuries inflicted on the victim 

through physical and sexual assaults, requiring medical treatment. 

In response, the State presented (1) a picture of Montenegro's 

injuries; (2) Montenegro's statement to police indicating that Sasser had 

hit her in the head; (3) Montenegro's statement that her foot was swelling, 

she had abrasions on her knees and foot, and blood on her foot; and (4) a 

statement from Montenegro's brother indicating that an officer observed 

swelling on her head. Further, regarding Sasser's unemployment, the 

State noted that Sasser had "been incarcerated for [some timel." 7 

The district court found that sufficient evidence supported the 

above allegations and explained that it was most concerned with the 

violent nature of the offense based on the photographs provided by both 

sides. 

We conclude that the district court properly declined to strike 

the above information from the PSI because the information was not based 

on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. While Sasser did cast some 

doubt on the PSI information, the State also provided evidence to support 

the information. The district court then had the discretion to decide 

whether any of the information was based on impalpable or highly suspect 

evidence. Considering the additional evidence presented to the district 

7When objecting to his PSI, Sasser informed the district court that 

he had been employed full-time until February 2010 and was precluded 

from employment since then due to incarceration. 

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court and Sasser's failure to provide this court with the photographs that 

the district court relied on in making its determination, 8we cannot say 

that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the 

information in the PSI was not based on impalpable or highly suspect 

evidence. 

The district court did not rely on impalpable or highly suspect 

evidence when sentencing Sasser 

Sasser claims that even though the district court ordered 

certain information stricken from the PSI, it did not actually strike the 

information prior to sentencing and, as a result, the district court 

improperly relied on P&P's recommendation, which was based on the 

inaccurate information in the PSI, when it sentenced Sasser. The record 

belies this claim. 

The district court expressly stated that it would not consider 

certain information included in the PSI: (1) the alleged threats to kill 

Montenegro, and (2) a dismissed charge of sexual assault in an unrelated 

subsequent case against Sasser. Further, when discussing the dismissed 

charge, the district court noted: 

I'm not going to consider it. It's not—I don't think 

it's going to be part of this analysis. Frankly, 

there's plenty of violence on the predicate offense 

to which Mr. Sasser's indicated he's guilty 

8See Riggins v. State, 107 Nev. 178, 182, 808 P.2d 535, 538 (1991) 

(concluding that if materials are not included in the record on appeal, the 

missing materials "are presumed to support the district court's decision"), 

rev'd on other grounds by Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 

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pursuant to the Alford decision. So I'm going 

to . . . be very clear here. I'm not going to consider 

that. 

The judgment of conviction reflects these findings. 

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

when sentencing Sasser because it expressly stated that it would not 

consider the information that it struck from the PSI. Its sentencing 

decision was based on the violence involved in the charge. The record does 

not reflect an abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to sentence 

Sasser to prison for a term of 4 to 10 years, a sentence that is well within 

the parameters provided by the relevant statute. See NRS 200.380(2) 

(providing that a person who is convicted of a robbery, "shall be punished 

by imprisonment. . . for a minimum term of not less than 2 years and a 

maximum term of not more than 15 years."). 9 

CONCLUSION 

Although a defendant's PSI is only one of many different 

considerations that the district court will evaluate when determining a 

defendant's sentence, Stockmeier gives a defendant the right to object to 

9Further, it is important to note that the PSI is only one of many 

different considerations that the district court uses when determining the 

appropriate sentence for a defendant. For example, the district court 

should also consider the arguments from each party during sentencing. 

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Gibbons 

factual errors in the PSI, so long as he or she objects before sentencing, 

and allows the district court to strike information that is based on 

impalpable or highly suspect evidence." 127 Nev. at 255 P.3d at 213 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The district court then has the 

discretion to amend the PSI itself, return it to P&P for amending, or 

amend it in the judgment of conviction. Accordingly, we affirm Sasser's 

judgment of conviction. 10 

We concurA: 

Vieku at 

Pickering 

A • 110 

Haria 

J. 

..‘i =2LISHACC 

Douglas 

J. 

Saitta 

, J. 

thWe have considered the parties' remaining arguments and 

conclude they are without merit. 

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