alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ex10_16.htm


Exhibit.10.16 


FIRST MODIFICATION TO PROMISSORY NOTE


 


 

 


     THIS MODIFICATION TO PROMISSORY NOTE (this “Modification”) is entered into as of  March 31, 2012, by and between AMBASSADORS GROUP, INC. (“Borrower”), and WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (“Bank”).


 

 


RECITALS


 

 


     WHEREAS, Borrower is currently indebted to Bank pursuant to the terms and conditions of that certain Revolving Line of Credit Note in the maximum principal amount of $20,000,000.00, executed by Borrower and payable to the order of Bank, dated as of May 31, 2011 (the "Note") , which Note is subject to the terms and conditions of a loan agreement between Borrower and Bank dated as of May 30, 2008, as amended from time to time (the "Loan Agreement").


 

 


     WHEREAS, Bank and Borrower have agreed to certain changes in the terms and conditions set forth in the Note, and have agreed to modify the Note to reflect said changes.


 

 


     NOW, THEREFORE, for valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree that the Note shall be modified as follows:


 

 


     1.     The fixed rate of interest applicable to the Note is hereby modified to be one and three-quarters percent (1.75%) above LIBOR in effect on the first day of each Fixed Rate Term.




 


     2.     The effective date of the changes set forth herein shall be March 31, 2012.


 

 


     3.     Except as expressly set forth herein, all terms and conditions of the Note remain in full force and effect, without waiver or modification.  All terms defined in the Note or the Loan Agreement shall have the same meaning when used in this Modification.  This Modification and the Note shall be read together, as one document.


 

 


     4.     Borrower certifies that as of the date of this Modification there exists no Event of Default under the Note, nor any condition, act or event which with the giving of notice or the passage of time or both would constitute any such Event of Default.


 

 


ORAL AGREEMENTS OR ORAL COMMITMENTS TO LOAN MONEY, EXTEND CREDIT OR TO FORBEAR ENFORCING REPAYMENT OF A DEBT ARE NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER WASHINGTON LAW.


 

 


     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Modification to be executed as of the day and year first written above.


                  

 



	 	 	 WELLS FARGO BANK,
	 AMBASSADORS GROUP, INC.	 	 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
	 By: /s/ Anthony F. Dombrowik	 	 By:/s/ Thomas Thoen
	 Anthony F. Dombrowik,	 	 Thomas Thoen,
	 Chief Financial Officer   	 	 Relationship Manager
Ricky DAVIS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 19-5905

Supreme Court of the United States.

Feb. 24, 2020

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
Gregory L. BROWN, petitioner, v. Shawn HATTON, Warden.

No. 18-6759.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 7, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
1

Filed 11/9/23 P. v. Black CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(El Dorado)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRANDON GARRET BLACK,

Defendant and Appellant. C097618

(Super. Ct. No. 22CR1295)

Appointed counsel for defendant Brandon Garret Black asked this court to review

the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. ( People v.

Wende (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a

disposition more favorable to defendant, w e will affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged with resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69) an d it

was also alleged defendant had a prior strike. On August 9, 2022, the trial court found2

defendant competent to stand trial. On October 10, 2022, the trial court granted

defendant’s request to represent himself.

At defendant’s trial, a hotel manager testified to calling police because she saw

defendant putting a candle to a hotel room’s door. Police officers testified that when they

arrived, they saw he had a knife in a sheath on his hip. One officer told defend ant he was

removing the knife for their safety , defendant appeared to reach for the knife, and then

the officers tried to detain defendant while defendant wrestled and struggled with the

officers. One of the officers had to use his Taser on defendant mult iple times before they

were able to eventually arrest him.

The jury found defendant guilty of resisting an executive officer. The trial court

found defendant’s prior strike and several sentencing enhancements true beyond a

reasonable doubt.

On December 19, 2022, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his

strike and sentenced him to two years (midterm), double d to four years for the prior

strike.

DISCUSSION

Appointed counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and

as king this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable

issues on appeal. ( People v. Wende

, supra , 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by

counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing t he

opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and we received no communication from

defendant.

Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error

that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.3 DISPOSITI ON

The judgment is affirmed.

\ s \

, Krause, J.

We concur:

\ s \

, Robie, Acting P. J.

\ s \

, Mauro, J.
Sigifredo MOLINA-VARELA, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-6593.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 10, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.

Justice GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
EXHIBIT 32.2


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of XDOGS, Inc., ("the Company") on Form
10-KSB/A for the period ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof ("the Report"), I, Kent A. Rodriguez, as
President and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:


(1)  the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o (d)); and

(2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of the Company.


Date:  July 11, 2005




/s/  Kent A. Rodriguez
----------------------------------
     Kent A. Rodriguez
     President and Principal Financial Officer
Order entered November ,2012

In The

 ifalj iatritt ot txaa at aIlaa

No. 05-12-00196-CR

ERIC KEITH SCOTT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No.

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 006-85362-2011

ORDER

The Court REINSTATES the appeal.

On October 11, 2012, we ordered the trial court to make findings regarding why the

clerk’s and reporter’s records have not been filed. We ADOPT the trial court’s findings that

based on counsel’s representations that appellant has not contacted him and has not made

arrangements to pay for the record, appellant no longer desires to pursue the appeal. We will

dispose of the appeal in due course. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b).

DAVID L. BRIDGES

JUSTICE
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 6102** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. ANTHONY MARVIN GAMBLE , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Charleston
. David C. Norton , District Judge. ( 2:10

- cr - 00020

- DCN

- 1; 2:11

- cv - 03339

- DCN )

Submitted : July 30, 2013 Decided: August 14, 2013

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Anthony Marvin Gamble, Appellant Pro Se. Matthew J. M odica, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Anthony Marvin Gamble seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 ( West Supp. 2013 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (200 6 ). A certi ficate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (200 6 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that

re asonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relie f on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently revie wed the record and conclude that Gamble has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Gamble’s motion for appointment of counsel, deny a certificate of appealability , and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
**Exhibit 31.2**

**CERTIFICATION**

I,Thomas F. Wolfe, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of AffinityGroup, Inc., certify that:

1.             I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q ofAffinity Group, Inc.;

2.             Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;

3.             Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, andother financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly presentin all material respects the financial condition, results of operations andcash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;

4.             Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures, (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant, and we have:

(a)     Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during theperiod in which this report is being prepared;

(b)     Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered bythis report based on such evaluation; and

(c)     Disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5.             Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

(a)     Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

(b)     Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal controls over financialreporting.
| Date:  November 3, 2006 |   | /s/ Thomas F. Wolfe              |
|-------------------------|--------|----------------------------------|
|                    |   | Thomas F. Wolfe                  |
|                    |   |  Senior Vice  President and |
|                    |   |  Chief  Financial Officer   |

 

33

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                           1,101
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  107,212
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    106,416
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               218,309
<PP&E>                                          39,176
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 290,209
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           93,804
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           144
<OTHER-SE>                                     196,261
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   290,209
<SALES>                                         63,236
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                74,117
<CGS>                                           34,600
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   71,372
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 6,844
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 192
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,553
<INCOME-TAX>                                       970
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,553
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,553
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.11


</TABLE>
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-19-00149-CR

Jose Salvador Aguilar, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF COMAL COUNTY

NO. 2016CR1020, THE HONORABLE CHARLES A. STEPHENS II, JUDGE PRESIDING

O R D E R A N D M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

PER CURIAM

Jose Salvador Aguilar was convicted of driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal 

Code § 49.04. Prior to trial, Aguilar filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic 

stop. The district court denied the motion after hearing argument from the parties. Following his 

conviction, Aguilar filed a motion requesting the district court to issue findings of fact and 

conclusions of law related to its ruling on his motion to suppress. The record before us does not 

contain any findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the motion to suppress, and Aguilar 

has filed a motion asking this Court to abate the appeal and remand the case in order to allow the 

district court to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its ruling.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “upon the request of the losing 

party on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court shall state its essential findings,” which the 

court defined as “findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate to provide an appellate court 
2

with a basis upon which to review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.” State v. 

Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The findings must be “adequate and 

complete, covering every potentially dispositive issue that might reasonably be said to have arisen 

in the course of the suppression proceedings.” State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667, 676 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011). Findings of fact and conclusions of law “ensure that reviewing courts need not 

presume, assume, or guess at what historical facts a trial judge actually found when making a 

ruling in a motion to suppress hearing.” State v. Mendoza, 365 S.W.3d 666, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2012). Moreover, “Rule 44.4 authorizes the court of appeals to remand the case to the trial 

court so that the court of appeals is not forced to infer facts from an unexplained ruling.” Cullen, 

195 S.W.3d at 698 (citing Tex. R. App. P. 44.4).

Accordingly, we abate the appeal and remand the cause to the district court so that 

it may make findings of fact and conclusions of law pertaining to its denial of Aguilar’s motion to 

suppress. The district court is instructed to file with this Court a supplemental clerk’s record 

containing those findings of fact and conclusions of law no later than January 6, 2020. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 34.5(c). This appeal will be reinstated once the supplemental clerk’s record is filed.

It is so ordered December 6, 2019.

Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Kelly

Abated and Remanded

Filed: December 6, 2019

Do Not Publish
Charles G. KINNEY, petitioner, v. Michele R. CLARK, et al.

No. 18-515.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 7, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
```
 
 
CRUDE OIL, LIGHT SWEET - ICE FUTURES EUROPE                          Code-067411
FUTURES ONLY POSITIONS AS OF 07/02/13                         |
--------------------------------------------------------------| NONREPORTABLE
      NON-COMMERCIAL      |   COMMERCIAL    |      TOTAL      |   POSITIONS
--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------
  LONG  | SHORT  |SPREADS |  LONG  | SHORT  |  LONG  | SHORT  |  LONG  | SHORT
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(CONTRACTS OF 1,000 BARRELS)                         OPEN INTEREST:      552,035
COMMITMENTS
  89,336   31,992  151,154  294,218  346,650  534,708  529,796   17,327   22,239

CHANGES FROM 06/25/13 (CHANGE IN OPEN INTEREST:     -1,309)
   8,108   -3,603   -6,991   -3,114    8,032   -1,997   -2,562      688    1,253

PERCENT OF OPEN INTEREST FOR EACH CATEGORY OF TRADERS
    16.2      5.8     27.4     53.3     62.8     96.9     96.0      3.1      4.0

NUMBER OF TRADERS IN EACH CATEGORY (TOTAL TRADERS:      152)
      42       36       55       65       65      135      132
```

----

Updated July 8, 2013
Alexis D. NEGRON-CRUZ, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-6421.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 3, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

JONATHAN LAMAR SIMPSON, #380719 

VS. 

PHILLIP LINDER, ET AL. 

§

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23cv692 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

This case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Kimberly C. Priest Johnson, who 

issued a Report and Recommendation concluding that Plaintiff’s lawsuit should be dismissed 

without prejudice for want of prosecution. The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate 

Judge, which contains proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of such 

action, has been presented for consideration. No objections having been timely filed, the Court 

concludes that the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct and adopts the 

same as the findings and conclusions of the Court. 

It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. 

All motions by either party not previously ruled on are hereby DENIED. 

Case 4:23-cv-00692-ALM-KPJ Document 11 Filed 12/18/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 30
I

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 2094

To amend the Webb-Kenyon Act to allow any State, territory, or possession

of the United States to bring an action in Federal court to enjoin

violations of that Act or to enforce the laws of such State, territory,

or possession with respect to such violations, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 9, 1999

Mr. EHRLICH introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Commerce,

for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case

for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the

committee concerned

A BILL

To amend the Webb-Kenyon Act to allow any State, territory, or possession of the United States to bring an

action in Federal court to enjoin violations of that Act

or to enforce the laws of such State, territory, or possession with respect to such violations, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘State Responsible Al5 cohol Access Enforcement Act’’.
2

•HR 2094 IH

1 SEC. 2. ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS PROHIBITING SHIPMENTS

2 OF ALCOHOL.

3 The Act of March 1, 1913 (commonly referred to as

4 the ‘‘Webb-Kenyon Act’’), and section 202(b) of the Liq5 uor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act (27 U.S.C. 122)

6 are amended by adding at the end the following: ‘‘Any

7 State, the District of Columbia, any territory of the

8 United States, or any place noncontiguous to but subject

9 to the jurisdiction of the United States may bring an ac10 tion in the appropriate United States district court, or in

11 the case of a territory or place outside the United States,

12 in an appropriate court of Federal jurisdiction, to enjoin

13 the shipment or transportation of liquor in violation of this

14 section or to enforce the laws of such State, the District

15 of Columbia, such territory, or such place, as the case may

16 be, with respect to such shipment or transportation.’’.

17 SEC. 3. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STUDY.

18 The Federal Trade Commission shall conduct a study

19 to determine if the Commission needs additional authority

20 under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15

21 U.S.C. 45) to regulate the sale, marketing, and adver22 tising of alcoholic beverages in commerce through all

23 forms of remote commerce. Such study shall include an

24 examination of the current state of alcoholic beverage re25 tailing through all forms of remote commerce.

Æ