11-2383-cv 

Lohnas v. Astrue 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or 

after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and 

this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a 

party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary 

order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by 

counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 31st 

day of January, two thousand thirteen. 

PRESENT: 

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ 

DARLENE M. LOHNAS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 

 v. No. 11-2383-cv 

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

_____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Darlene M. Lohnas, pro se, Lockport, N.Y. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Benil Abraham, Stephen P. Conte, for William 

J. Hochul, Jr., United States Attorney, United 

States Attorney’s Office for the Western 

District of New York. 

 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New 

York (William M. Skretny, Chief Judge). 
2 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the District Court’s March 31, 2011 Decision and Order is 

AFFIRMED. 

 Darlene M. Lohnas appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of her complaint, which 

seeks review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). The 

Commissioner previously had denied her application for disability insurance benefits. We assume 

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case, as well as the 

issues on appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

 This Court reviews de novo orders granting motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See Jasinski v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2003). 

When reviewing determinations made by the Commissioner, this Court conducts a “plenary review 

of the administrative record.” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). This Court may set aside the Commissioner’s decision only if the 

factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, or if incorrect legal standards were 

applied. See, e.g., id. at 127. 

 Under the Social Security Act, a “disability” is an “inability to engage in any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of 

not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether an individual is disabled, 

the Social Security Administration Commission created a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520. The analysis proceeds as follows: 

First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in 

substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether 

the claimant has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits his physical or 

mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, 

the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an 

impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such 

an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him disabled without considering 

vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience; the [Commissioner] 

presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to 

perform substantial gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed 

impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, 

he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the 
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claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then determines 

whether there is other work which the claimant could perform. 

Rivera v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 719, 722 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d 

Cir. 1982)). The claimant bears the burden of proving the first four elements, and, with regard to 

the fifth element, there is a limited burden shift to the Commissioner only to show “that there is 

work in the national economy that the claimant can do . . . .” Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d 

Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2)). 

 Having conducted a careful and plenary review of the administrative record, we conclude 

that the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record, and we affirm 

the judgment of the District Court substantially for the reasons stated in its comprehensive and wellreasoned decision.1

 With regard to Lohnas’s argument that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

failed to consider the evidence or standards underlying the determination of disability by the 

Department of Veterans Affairs, we note simply that, although a determination made by another 

governmental agency that a social security claimant is disabled is entitled to “some weight and 

should be considered,” that determination is not binding. See Cutler v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1282, 

1286 (2d Cir. 1975). Here, the ALJ did acknowledge the Department of Veterans Affairs’ 

determination of disability. Because the Commissioner is not bound by another agency’s disability 

determination, and because the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, any 

alleged failure by the ALJ to consider fully the disability determination by the Department of 

Veterans Affairs does not affect our decision to affirm. 

CONCLUSION 

 We have considered all of Lohnas’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, the District Court’s March 31, 2011 Decision and Order is AFFIRMED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 

 

1 In affirming the District Court’s judgment, we note that because this Court generally does not review arguments raised 

for the first time on appeal, see Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1976), we only consider Lohnas’s arguments raised 

below, including that (1) the ALJ erred by finding that her depression was not severe, and (2) that the ALJ failed to 

consider the evidence or standards underlying the determination of disability by the Department of Veterans Affairs.