IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Honorable Maria Musti Cook, :

in her official capacity as the :

President Judge of the Court of :

Common Pleas of York County, :

Nineteenth Judicial District; and :

The Court of Common Pleas of :

York County, :

Petitioners :

 :

v. : No. 161 M.D. 2021

 : Argued: June 23, 2022

The Pennsylvania Labor Relations :

Board; and SEIU Local 668 PSSU, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: November 2, 2022

At issue is whether the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (Board) has 

jurisdiction when a judicial employer disciplines a judicially appointed employee. 

In this case, a probation officer received a written reprimand for violating York 

County’s (County) search and seizure policy. The probation officer, by and through 

his union representative, utilized the grievance process contained in the internal 

court process that had been incorporated into the County’s collective bargaining 

agreement (CBA). Thereafter, the probation officer’s discipline was enhanced from 

a written reprimand to a two-day suspension. As a result of this enhancement, the 

probation officer, with the assistance of his union, filed an unfair labor practice 

charge with the Board. 
2

The Secretary of the Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing on the 

unfair labor practice charge. The Court of Common Pleas of York County (Common 

Pleas) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Board was without 

jurisdiction based on the separation of powers doctrine as the discipline involved a 

judicially appointed employee. In SEIU Local 668 PSSU v. York County and York 

County Court of Common Pleas (York County), PERA-C-18-120-E (April 20, 2021), 

the Board denied the motion to dismiss but determined that no unfair labor practice 

occurred. The Honorable Maria Musti Cook, President Judge of the Court of 

Common Pleas of York County, and Common Pleas (together, Petitioners) filed a 

“Petition for Review in the Nature of an Appeal and, Alternatively, An Action for 

Declaratory Judgment” (Petition), seeking review of the Board’s determination in 

this Court’s appellate jurisdiction and/or seeking a declaration from this Court in its 

original jurisdiction that the Board was without jurisdiction to make that 

determination. Presently before this Court for disposition is the Application for 

Summary Relief pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1532(b), 

Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b) (Application), filed by the Board and the Service Employees 

International Union, Local 668, Pennsylvania Social Services Union (SEIU)

(together, Respondents). In the Application, Respondents seek the dismissal of the 

Petition in its entirety. Upon careful review, we deny Respondents’ Application and 

stay the appellate portion in the Petition while the Court resolves Petitioners’ request 

for declaratory judgment.

 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History 

These are the facts alleged in the Petition. The County is party to a CBA with 

SEIU, which is the bargaining agent for court-appointed employees, including those 
3

in the Probation and Parole and Domestic Relations units. (Petition ¶ 9.) The County 

is the bargaining representative for Common Pleas. (Id.) The County and SEIU 

have entered into various agreements over the years. (Id. ¶ 10, Exhibit (Ex.) B.) The 

CBA at issue contains a provision that states Common Pleas did not waive “its 

exclusive right to hire, fire, or supervise employees under Section 1620 of The 

County Code.”

1

 (Id. ¶ 11, Ex. B at 2-3.) 

On February 26, 2018, Adult Probation Officer Jason Walker (Probation 

Officer) received a written reprimand from Common Pleas “for failing to follow 

court procedures, failing to debrief his supervisor following an incident, and failing 

to submit a written incident report within 72 hours of an incident.” (Id. ¶ 13.) 

Probation Officer was disciplined because he “conduct[ed] a warrantless search of a 

residence that was not under the active supervision of the [Common Pleas’] 

Department of Probation Services,” he “ordered an individual not under court 

supervision to dispose of property,” and he “did not have the resident complete and 

sign a Consent to Search form, despite claiming to [have] receive[d] verbal 

permission to search the residence.” (Id. ¶ 14 (emphasis in original), Ex. C.) 

Thereafter, Probation Officer’s union, SEIU, filed a grievance on his behalf 

demanding that Common Pleas withdraw the reprimand. (Id. ¶ 15, Ex. C.) On 

March 5, 2018, April Billet-Barclay, Director of Probation Services (Probation 

Director), “objected to [SEIU’s] grievance on the basis of separation of powers 

principles,” responded to the grievance, and increased Probation Officer’s discipline 

to a two-day suspension. (Id. ¶ 16, Ex. C.) Probation Officer’s discipline was 

increased as a result of a “gross disregard for the Fourth Amendment[2]rights of the 

1 Act of August 9, 1955, P.L. 323, as amended, 16 P.S. § 1620. 

2 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

(Footnote continued on next page...)
4

citizens of [the] community[, Probation Officer’s] failure to accept any 

responsibility for [his] behavior, [his] complete disregard for department policy . . . , 

and the poor example [Probation Officer] set for rookie officers.” (Id., Ex. C at 3.) 

On May 25, 2018, SEIU filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board 

seeking to revert Probation Officer’s discipline from a two-day suspension to a 

written warning. (Id. ¶ 18.) The Board’s Secretary issued a complaint and notice of 

hearing on June 18, 2018. (Id., Ex. A.) Common Pleas filed a motion to dismiss the 

complaint, arguing that, under Beckert v. American Federation of State, County and 

Municipal Employees, 425 A.2d 859 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), the Board was without 

jurisdiction to review Probation Officer’s discipline based on the doctrine of 

separation of powers because the unfair labor charge “clearly involved discipline of 

a court employee.” (Id. ¶ 19.) In lieu of a hearing, the parties stipulated facts and 

briefed the matter before the Board’s hearing examiner. (Id. ¶ 20.) Common Pleas’ 

brief did not address the merits, continuing to assert the Board did not have 

jurisdiction. The hearing examiner issued a proposed decision and order on May 13, 

2019, that held that the “Board had jurisdiction, considered the merits of Probation 

Officer’s discipline, and ultimately concluded that” SEIU failed to establish an 

unfair labor practice and, as such, rescinded the complaint and dismissed the unfair 

practice charge. (Id. ¶ 21, Ex. A at 1.) 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 

seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5

Common Pleas filed exceptions to the proposed decision and order, again 

arguing that under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Board was “without 

jurisdiction to consider unfair labor practice charges that involve discipline of a court 

employee.” (Id. ¶ 22.) On April 20, 2021, the Board adopted the proposed decision 

and order and dismissed Common Pleas’ exceptions, concluding “there is binding 

precedent expressly holding that the Board has jurisdiction to hear unfair practice 

cases concerning the rights of court-appointed employees under” the Public 

Employe Relations Act (PERA).

3

 (Final Order at 1-2 (citing Teamsters Local 115 

v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 619 A.2d 382, 382 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992)).) Concluding it had 

jurisdiction, the Board reviewed the unfair labor practice charge and found that the 

facts “reveal[ed] that [SEIU] failed to meet its burden of proving a prima facie case 

of discrimination.” (Final Order at 2.) The Board, therefore, affirmed the hearing 

examiner’s proposed decision and order, rescinding the complaint and dismissing 

the unfair labor practice charge. 

B. The Petition and Response

Petitioners then filed the Petition invoking this Court’s appellate and original 

jurisdiction.4 In the Petition, Petitioners challenge the Board’s jurisdiction to review 

the discipline of a judicial employee, arguing that the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction 

violates the doctrine of separation of powers. (Petition ¶¶ 8, 30-31.) Petitioners 

request that this Court overrule the Board’s Final Order and further “find that absent 

an unfair labor practice charge alleging [Common Pleas] is interfering with, 

3 Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301. 

4 This Court’s scope of review of a final order of the Board “is limited to determining 

whether there was a violation of constitutional rights, whether an error of law was committed, or 

whether the [Board’s] necessary findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Lycoming 

County v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 943 A.2d 333, 341 n.20 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). 
6

coercing, or restraining organizing and bargaining activity of court employees, the 

Board is without jurisdiction to entertain an unfair labor practice charge involving 

the hire, fire, or supervision of court employees” after the initial bargaining and 

organizing period is over, and order the Board to dismiss the complaint before it for 

lack of jurisdiction. (Id. ¶ 38(a), (b).) Alternatively, Petitioners seek a declaratory 

judgment from the Court declaring that “absent an unfair labor practice charge 

alleging [Common Pleas] is interfering with, coercing, or restraining organizing and 

bargaining activity of court employees, the Board is without jurisdiction to entertain 

an unfair labor practice charge involving the hire, fire, or supervision of court 

employees.” (Id. ¶ 39.) In support of their claim that the Board is consistently 

exceeding its jurisdiction in reviewing the discipline of judicial employees, 

Petitioners cite to SEIU Local 668 v. Chester County and Chester County Court of 

Common Pleas, PERA-C-19-26-E (Proposed Decision & Order January 15, 2020)

(Chester County), as evidence of the Board’s extra-jurisdictional review. In that 

case, a Board hearing examiner held that the Board had jurisdiction to consider an 

unfair labor practice charge brought by SEIU based on allegations that the judicial 

employer held a meeting with an employee that could have resulted in discipline, the 

employee asked for a union representative,5 and a supervisor told the employee that 

the judicial employer’s position was that the employee did not have a right to have 

a union representative present. (Id. ¶ 32, Ex. D at 1-2.) Specifically, Petitioners 

assert that the Chester County matter is important in two respects: “[f]irst, the 

hearing [examiner] concluded that the judiciary must produce evidence that the 

[c]ourt has exercised its judicial function in order for separation of powers to apply,” 

5 This was an alleged violation of the judicial employee’s Weingarten rights, which is the 

right of a union employee to have a union representative at pre-disciplinary, investigative 

meetings. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
7

and “[s]econd, the hearing [examiner] determined that such evidence must show that 

(1) there was a clear and distinct act by the [c]ourt, in the form of a determination 

and communication of the [p]resident [j]udge, and (2) a clear reliance by the [c]ourt 

upon its statutory obligations.” (Petition ¶ 33.)6 

Respondents filed an Answer denying the allegations in the Petition and 

provided further answers to most of Petitioners’ averments, explaining why the 

Petition is without merit. 

II. THE APPLICATION AND THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS7

A. Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents filed their Application and a brief in support thereof arguing that 

they are entitled to summary relief on the original jurisdiction portion of the Petition 

because challenges to the Board’s jurisdiction require a case-by-case analysis of 

whether an unfair labor practice occurred and the blanket declaratory relief that 

Petitioners seek is, therefore, not appropriate. Respondents further assert that 

summary relief should be granted as to the appellate portion of the Petition because 

having prevailed before the Board, Petitioners lack standing to appeal the Board’s 

decision to this Court. 

On the first assertion, Respondents argue that Petitioners’ request for a 

“blanket declaratory judgment divesting court-appointed employes or their 

representatives of a forum to allege and present any claims of unfair practices under 

PERA is not consistent with due process, nor appropriate for declaratory relief.” 

6 Because the hearing examiner in Chester County concluded that these two things were 

not established, the hearing examiner denied the judicial employer’s motion to dismiss and found 

that it violated Section 1201(a)(1) of PERA, 43 P.S. § 1101.1201(a)(1). (Petition, Ex. D at 7.) The 

Board has not issued its decision in Chester County, and, thus, this matter is not before the Court 

at this time.

7 We have reorganized the parties’ arguments for ease of discussion. 
8

(Application ¶ 31; Respondents’ Brief (Br.) at 25.) Respondents assert that 

Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly held that “the [Board] has the exclusive 

jurisdiction, in the first instance, to decide if an unfair labor practice has occurred,”

8

and that this jurisdiction ends when it determines whether such practice has 

occurred. (Respondents’ Br. at 13-15 (citing Mazzie v. Commonwealth, 432 A.2d 

985 (Pa. 1981); Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Chester & Del. Cntys. Bartenders, Hotel & 

Rest. Emps. Union, Local No. 677, 64 A.2d 834 (Pa. 1949)).) Respondents argue 

that under the precedent, there are circumstances where the Board has jurisdiction, 

namely, where the unfair labor practice charge alleges that a court of common pleas 

is “interfering with, coercing, or restraining organizing and collective bargaining 

activity,” which Petitioners’ request for relief acknowledges. (Id. at 15 (citing 

Petition ¶ 39).) Respondents explain that such circumstances existed here because

the unfair labor practice charge alleged that Probation Director, “as the employer 

agent for . . . Common Pleas and York County, had interfered with, coerced, or 

restrained organizing and bargaining activity of court employes” under PERA, 

which includes the grievance process.9 (Id. at 23.) Therefore, Respondents assert,

under PERA and the precedent, the Board had the authority in the first instance to 

conclude whether this matter fell within its jurisdiction and, if so, whether a violation 

occurred. (Id.) Respondents argue Petitioners’ reliance on Chester County is 

misplaced because there has been no final order by the Board in that case, meaning 

that Petitioners cannot rely on it. (Id. (citing Section 763 of the Judicial Code, 42 

Pa.C.S. § 763; Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341, Pa.R.A.P. 341;

8 SEIU joined in the Board’s Brief. 

9 The United States Supreme Court has explained that filing grievances is part and parcel 

of collective bargaining. See United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 

29, 38 (1987). 
9

Angelucci v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 169 C.D. 2017, filed Apr. 3, 

2017)10); Application ¶ 32.) Thus, Respondents argue that Petitioners’ request for 

declaratory judgment must be dismissed as a matter of law. (Id. at 26-27.)

On the second assertion, Respondents argue that the requested relief in the 

Petition “has already been provided by the Board in the April 20, 2021 Final Order.” 

(Application ¶ 16.) Thus, “[h]aving prevailed before the Board on the very basis 

[of] the jurisdictional arguments raised in the Petition for Review, [Petitioners are] 

not aggrieved and lack[] standing to appeal the Board’s Final Order.” (Respondents’ 

Br. at 23 (citing City of Philadelphia v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1052 

C.D. 2019, filed Dec. 14, 2020)); Application ¶¶ 14-17.) Accordingly, Respondents 

request that this Court find that Petitioners lack standing as a matter of law and 

dismiss the appellate portion of the Petition on this basis. (Application ¶ 18.) 

B. Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners filed an Answer to Respondents’ Application and a brief in support 

thereof arguing as follows. Petitioners first argue that declaratory relief is proper 

because they have “always asserted a purely legal challenge to the Board’s 

jurisdiction.” (Petitioners’ Br. at 33 (citing Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. City of 

Philadelphia, 101 A.3d 79, 90 (Pa. 2014)).) Because Petitioners need “relief from 

[the] uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal 

relations” related to the Board’s continued assertion of jurisdiction over judicial 

employers’ decisions regarding the hiring, firing, and supervising of judicial 

employees, and the administrative remedies are insufficient to address these 

10 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126(b), Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), and 

Section 414(a) of the Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a), an 

unreported panel opinion, while not precedential, may be cited as persuasive.
10

concerns, Petitioners contend that declaratory relief is warranted. (Id. at 33-34.) 

Petitioners explain that both this matter and Chester County serve as “illustrative of 

a larger practice on the part of the Board of exercising jurisdiction in cases where 

the Constitution demands it should not.” (Id. at 34.) Additionally, Petitioners argue 

that they are seeking to have the Board follow Beckert and Teamsters Local 115 in 

this matter and moving forward. (Petitioners’ Answer to Respondents’ Application 

at 13.) Within the context of those cases, Petitioners contend that the Board has 

jurisdiction only if the unfair labor practice charge involves a court employee 

actually organizing co-workers or bargaining with a county, and the charge is based 

on some other time period, it must be dismissed by the Board for want of jurisdiction. 

(Id. at 13-14.) Thus, according to Petitioners, declaratory relief is proper because 

“[t]he Board’s disruption of judicial supervision is real and [] causing uncertainty 

and insecurity not only with respect to Petitioners’ ability to manage its employees, 

but with the Unified Judicial System’s ability to manage its workforce as a whole.” 

(Petitioners’ Br. at 35.)

Petitioners next argue that Respondents ignore the central issue in this matter, 

which is whether the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction in and of itself violated the 

separation of powers doctrine. According to Petitioners, the cases cited by 

Respondents in support of their position relate to actions by public employees 

generally under PERA, not judicial employees in particular, making those cases 

inapt. (Petitioners’ Br. at 12.) Petitioners contend that Respondents misstate the 

disposition in the Final Order and misperceive the relief sought in that matter, which 

was a determination that the Board lacked jurisdiction, not that no unfair labor 

practice occurred. According to Petitioners, contrary to Respondents’ 

characterization, this matter is a separation of powers case and not a labor case and, 
11

reviewed in that framework, the Application should be denied. (Id. at 13.) To that 

end, Petitioners maintain that “any attempt by other branches of Commonwealth 

government to assume jurisdiction over the judiciary’s ‘employee selection, 

supervision or discharge’ is unconstitutional.” (Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).) 

Petitioners point to Renner v. Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, 195 A.3d 

1070 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), Thomas v. Grimm, 155 A.3d 128 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), 

Russo v. Allegheny County, 125 A.3d 113 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), and L.J.S. v. State 

Ethics Commission, 744 A.2d 798 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000), as examples of where the 

Court has held that judicial employees are not subject to general statutes protecting 

employee rights.11 (Id. at 15-17.) Relying on Beckert, Petitioners contend that “the 

Board should have determined that it was without jurisdiction over [Probation 

Officer’s] unfair labor practice charge from the outset,” and dismissed the charge 

before reaching its merits. (Id. at 20.) “To hold otherwise would eradicate the 

[judiciary’s] inherent right to hire, fire and supervise its employees entirely.” (Id. at 

22 (citing First Jud. Dist. v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 727 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Pa. 

1999)).) 

Petitioners also argue that Common Pleas did not waive its supervisory rights 

when entering into the CBA or incorporating its internal grievance system into the 

CBA and “[it] certainly did not agree to any administrative agency oversight of its 

operations.” (Id. at 24.) Even if this was not the case, Petitioners argue that their 

agreement to follow an internal grievance process did not waive their protection 

under the separation of powers doctrine. (Id. (citing Thomas, 155 A.3d at 138-39).) 

11 The statutes at issue in those cases included: the Public Official and Employee Ethics 

Act, 65 Pa.C.S. §§ 1101-1113; the Whistleblower Law, Act of December 12, 1986, P.L. 1559, as 

amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1421-1428; and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Act of October 27, 

1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963.
12

According to Petitioners, any argument that a judicial district’s “internal policies are 

only effective if a non-judicial agency can exercise jurisdiction over their 

application” is misplaced because the “Unified Judicial System has its own . . . 

enforcement mechanisms for those policies.” (Id. at 25.) 

Finally, with respect to their alleged lack of standing, Petitioners argue that 

the challenge is not to the merits of the Board’s decision, i.e., that no unfair labor 

practice occurred, but to the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction at the outset. (Id. at 

31.) Petitioners maintain that “[t]here is no principle of law that stands for the notion 

that a tribunal can only determine jurisdiction once it has adjudicated the merits 

first,” and that it is well established law that jurisdictional questions are separate 

from the merits. (Id. at 28 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 

83, 94-95 (1998)).) Petitioners assert that Respondents’ reliance on City of 

Philadelphia is misplaced because that non-precedential decision acknowledged that 

“a party is aggrieved by an improper assertion of jurisdiction over that party because 

such a decision does create a direct, immediate, and substantial interest for that 

party.” (Petitioners’ Answer to Respondents’ Application at 11 (citing City of 

Philadelphia, slip op. at 6) (emphasis in original).) Petitioners also argue that our 

Supreme Court has held that “where an agency has proceeded to defend its 

interpretation of a statute and otherwise indicated that it intends to enforce that 

statute in a manner detrimental to another government unit, such a position creates 

an adverse, direct, and immediate impact to the affected government unit.” (Id. at 

12 (citing Off. of the Governor v. Donahue, 98 A.3d 1223, 1229-31 (Pa. 2014)).) 

Petitioners argue that, as reflected in this matter and in Chester County, the Board is 

continuing to exercise jurisdiction over matters involving the discipline and 

supervision of judicial employees, even where it should not.
13

Petitioners further contend that because the Board has “the power to make an 

initial determination as to the nature and extent of its own jurisdiction prior to issuing 

a complaint,” such decision should be made prior to holding a hearing and ruling on 

the merits. (Id. at 29-30 (footnote omitted).) As such, Petitioners argue that the 

Board erred in not making that determination and denying the motion to dismiss 

because the factual predicate here was not the same as in Teamsters Local 115, i.e., 

the initial organizing and bargaining stage. (Id. at 30-31.) Thus, even if the ultimate 

result was in Petitioners’ favor, Petitioners assert that they did not prevail before the 

Board because, despite their repeated attempts to contend the Board lacked

jurisdiction, the Board nevertheless exercised jurisdiction over the claim, which

violated the doctrine of separation of powers. As there is no “de minimis” exception 

to such violations and the “unconstitutional encroachment into the judiciary’s 

personnel matters is a remediable injury in and of itself,” Petitioners assert they have

standing to appeal. (Id. at 32 (citing Beckert, 425 A.2d at 864).) 

C. Respondents’ Replies

The Board filed a reply arguing that “the latest permutation of binding and 

controlling precedent for the Board on th[e] jurisdictional issue involving courtappointed employes is this Court’s holding in Teamsters Local 115 . . . .” (Board’s 

Amended Reply Br. at 1.) The Board contends that this Court, in Teamsters Local 

115,

found and held that the interests of the courts, and the administration of 

justice, were best served by allowing the Board to continue to 

administer all aspects of PERA with respect to court-appointed 

employes including entertaining unfair practice charges filed on behalf 

of court-appointed employes alleging interference, restraint, or 

coercion under Section 1201(a)(1) and (3) of PERA[, 43 P.S. 

§ 1101.1201(a)(1), (3)].
14

(Id. at 1-2.) Additionally, the Board argues that it is aware of the separation of 

powers when exercising jurisdiction that does not infringe on a court’s ability to hire, 

fire, discipline, or supervise judicial employees. (Id. at 2.) Given the appellate 

review of Board orders “that has existed and been applied consistently for decades,” 

(id.), the Board asserts this matter should be dismissed because the charges were 

dismissed and no remedy was ordered and, therefore, there is no order that injures 

Petitioners. Further, the Board argues, the request for declaratory relief is not 

meritorious because it is premised on an issue that requires a case-by-case review of 

the allegations and facts and the interlocutory order in Chester County. (Id. at 2-3.) 

SEIU replies, stating the unfair labor practice charge was based on Petitioners 

retaliating against Probation Officer for utilizing the grievance process, not for 

Petitioners’ failure to follow the grievance process as Petitioners argue. (SEIU’s 

Reply Br. at 1.) SEIU argues that the allegations contained in the unfair labor charge 

are, essentially, the same as those considered by the Court in Teamsters Local 115 –

the violation of a public employee’s rights under PERA. (Id.) SEIU argues that 

Petitioners erroneously rely on Teamsters Local 115 for the proposition that once a 

collective bargaining agreement is in place, the Board cannot exercise jurisdiction 

anymore. (Id. at 2.) SEIU asserts that “[t]o the contrary, the rights granted to court 

employees under [PERA] extend well beyond the ratification of a collective 

bargaining agreement.” (Id.) SEIU contends the protections afforded under PERA 

would be illusory “if court employees did not have the right to enforce contracts, 

internally organize[, and] establish shop structures free from the fear of retaliation.” 

(Id.) SEIU also argues that Beckert is distinguishable because, there, the issue was 

the discharge of an employee and a dispute over an internal grievance settlement. 

(Id.) Here, SEIU asserts the dispute is “not concerned with the level of discipline or 
15

whether a grievance was properly filed”; rather, SEIU filed the charge to “remedy 

the discriminatory actions of” Common Pleas. (Id.) Judicial employees’ “right to 

engage in collective bargaining will have been eviscerated” if they lose the Board as 

a forum. (Id. at 3.) As such, SEIU requests that this Court dismiss the Petition. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards for Summary Relief 

Applications for summary relief are governed by Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1532(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). It provides that “[a]t any time after 

the filing of a petition for review in an appellate or original jurisdiction matter, the 

court may[,] on application[,] enter judgment if the right of the applicant thereto is 

clear.” Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). Summary relief is reserved for disputes that are legal 

rather than factual, and we resolve all doubts as to the existence of disputed material 

fact against the moving party. Rivera v. Pa. State Police, 255 A.3d 677, 681 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2021). “An application for summary relief may be granted if a party’s right 

to judgment is clear and no material issues of fact are in dispute.” Leach v. Turzai, 

118 A.3d 1271, 1277 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), aff’d, 141 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2016). 

Respondents seek summary relief as to Petitioners’ appellate and original 

jurisdiction claims. 

B. Original Jurisdiction Petition for Review 

Respondents argue that declaratory relief is not proper because the 

determination of whether the Board has jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice 

charge involving a judicial employee requires a case-by-case determination, which 

renders the resolution of the issue unsuitable for the broad declaration that 

Petitioners seek. Petitioners respond that they are asserting a purely legal challenge 

of the Board’s jurisdiction in this matter and are seeking relief from the uncertainty 
16

and insecurity of the Board’s unlawful exercise of jurisdiction, as reflected both in 

this matter and Chester County. Specifically, Petitioners are requesting that this 

Court declare that the Board does not have jurisdiction over matters that relate to the 

hiring, firing, and supervision of judicial employees after the initial bargaining 

period is over and there is a CBA in place. 

1. Declaratory Judgment

The purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act “is to settle and to afford relief 

from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal 

relations, and [it] is to be liberally construed and administered.” Section 7541 of the 

Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7541. “Declaratory judgment as to the 

rights, status or legal relationships is appropriate only where an actual controversy 

exists.” Eleven Pa., LLC v. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 169 A.3d 141, 145 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2017) (citing McCord v. Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, 136 A.3d 1055 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)). “An actual controversy exists when litigation is both imminent 

and inevitable and the declaration sought will practically help to end the controversy 

between the parties.” McCord, 136 A.3d at 1061. It is within this Court’s sound 

discretion to either grant or deny a petition for declaratory relief. GTECH Corp v. 

Dep’t of Revenue, 965 A.2d 1276, 1285 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). Additionally, where 

the issue raised in a declaratory judgment action involves the jurisdiction of an 

executive agency and whether such exercise is constitutional, declaratory judgment 

is proper notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. P.J.S. v. State 

Ethics Comm’n, 669 A.2d 1105, 1109 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). 
17

2. Analysis

To prevail on their Application, Respondents must establish that their “right 

to judgment is clear.” Leach, 118 A.3d at 1277 n.5. Respondents argue that the 

Board can assert jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice charge if the unfair 

practice charge alleges that there is interference, coercion, or restraint of organizing 

and bargaining activity of court employees, which is what Respondents allege 

occurred here. Petitioners respond that the Board does not have jurisdiction over 

matters that affect the hire, discharge, and supervision of court employees as that is 

a matter left to the courts. 

“[T]o maintain the independence of the three branches of government, our 

system embodies a separation of powers,” which, under both the United States and 

Pennsylvania Constitutions, depends on two distinct concepts: “(1) no branch may 

usurp a function belonging to another and each must operate within its own separate 

sphere of power; and (2) a system of checks and balances exists, which prevents one 

branch from acting unchecked.” Jefferson Cnty. Court Appointed Emps. Ass’n v. 

Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 985 A.2d 697, 706 (Pa. 2009) (Jefferson County) (citing Loving 

v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996)). Allocating the power between the three 

branches avoids the danger inherent in concentrating the power in one branch, which 

could be viewed as tyranny. Id. at 706-07.

Article V, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, PA. CONST. art. V, § 1, 

“vests the judiciary with the power to administer justice.” Jefferson Cnty., 985 A.2d 

at 707. “The judicial branch’s right to hire, fire, and supervise employees is derived 

from that constitutional source.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The judiciary’s 

authority over court personnel is essential to the maintenance of an independent 
18

judiciary. Id. Thus, “[a]nother branch of government [] may not encroach upon this 

judicial power, although it is not unlimited.” Id. 

“The right of public employees to organize and bargain collectively was 

conferred by the General Assembly in 1970 with the enactment of PERA.” Pa. Lab. 

Rels. Bd. v. Am. Fed. of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., 526 A.2d 769, 772 (Pa. 1987) 

(AFSCME). To effectuate such a right, “a concomitant duty to negotiate and bargain 

with public employees was imposed on public employers.” Id. Section 1201(a)(1) 

of PERA prohibits a public employer from “[i]nterfering, restraining or coercing 

employes in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Article IV[, Section 401 of 

PERA, 43 P.S. § 1101.401,] of this act.” 43 P.S. § 1101.1201(a)(1). Among the 

rights guaranteed in PERA is the right of public employees to “engage in lawful 

concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and 

protection.” Section 401 of PERA, 43 P.S. § 1101.401. Additionally, Section 

1201(a)(3) and (5) prohibit public employers from, respectively, “[d]iscriminating 

in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment 

to encourage or discourage membership in any employe organization,” and 

“[r]efusing to bargain collectively in good faith with an employe representative 

which is the exclusive representative of employes in an appropriate unit, including 

but not limited to the discussing of grievances with the exclusive representative.” 

43 P.S. § 1101.1201(a)(3), (5). The Board is responsible for enforcing PERA.

In 1976, The County Code was amended by the General Assembly “to provide 

that the county commissioners would be the exclusive representatives of 

management in collective bargaining with public employees in counties of the third 

through eighth classes.” AFSCME, 526 A.2d at 772. Section 1620 of The County 

Code provides: 
19

The salaries and compensation of county officers shall be as now or 

hereafter fixed by law. The salaries and compensation of all appointed 

officers and employes who are paid from the county treasury shall be 

fixed by the salary board created by this act for such purposes:

Provided, however, That with respect to representation proceedings 

before the . . . Board or collective bargaining negotiations involving any 

or all employes paid from the county treasury, the board of county 

commissioners shall have the sole power and responsibility to 

represent judges of the court of common pleas, the county and all 

elected or appointed county officers having any employment powers 

over the affected employes. The exercise of such responsibilities by 

the county commissioners shall in no way affect the hiring, 

discharging and supervising rights and obligations with respect to 

such employes as may be vested in the judges or other county 

officers. 

16 P.S. § 1620 (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court addressed the effect of Section 

1620’s enactment on the judiciary in a number of decisions, ultimately concluding 

that judicial employers are public employers, judicial employees have the right to 

organize and collectively bargain under PERA, and Section 1620 does not violate 

the separation of powers doctrine because the judiciary retained its ability to hire, 

fire, and supervise its employees who are within a bargaining unit. AFSCME, 526 

A.2d at 773-75; Commonwealth ex rel. Bradley v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 388 A.2d 736, 

739-40 (Pa. 1978). This Court and our Supreme Court have vigorously defended 

against any encroachment by other branches of the government into the judiciary. 

In Russo, this Court had to decide whether the Whistleblower Law could be 

constitutionally applied to the judiciary without violating the separation of powers 

doctrine. In concluding that the law could not be applied to the judiciary, the Court 

explained that “[o]ur appellate courts have been steadfast in safeguarding the 

judiciary’s right to hire, fire and supervise its own employees and have struck down 

any legislation that interferes with that authority. 125 A.3d at 121 (citing Kremer v. 

State Ethics Comm’n, 469 A.2d 593, 595-96 (Pa. 1983) (concluding that the State 
20

Ethics Commission could not subject judges to financial disclosure requirement 

because it would interfere with the Supreme Court’s authority to supervise judges); 

Eshelman v. Comm’rs of the Cnty. of Berks, 436 A.2d 710, 713 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) 

(concluding that an arbitrator’s award pursuant to PERA concerning the hiring, 

supervision, and discharge of court-appointed employees usurped the exclusive role 

of the courts over employment decisions)). Thus, the Court concluded that the 

Whistleblower Law could not constitutionally be applied to the judiciary where it 

encroaches on the judiciary’s right to hire, supervise, and discharge employees. 

Russo, 125 A.3d at 121. 

The Court reaffirmed this proposition in Thomas. There, the Court, after 

examining decisions in which laws interfering with the judiciary’s right to hire, 

supervise, and discharge judicial employees, concluded that the Whistleblower Law 

could not be applied to judicial employees without violating separation of powers. 

The Court explained

[g]iven the great vigilance and care with which the Supreme Court has 

protected the independence of the Judiciary and the separation of 

powers, more than just a general description of a legislative enactment 

would be necessary to demonstrate the [Supreme] Court’s intent to 

bring the judiciary under the scope of the Whistleblower Law. 

Thomas, 155 A.3d at 139. The Court further explained that “even though the 

Supreme Court and the Legislature may both advance similar objectives such as 

those in Kremer and with regard to the protection of those who report wrongdoing, 

the Court does so independently through the promulgation of its own rules, policies, 

and procedures.” Id. (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court held that the 

Whistleblower Law could not be constitutionally applied to judicial employees. 
21

In Renner v. Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, 234 A.3d 411 (Pa. 

2020), our Supreme Court examined whether the application of the Pennsylvania 

Human Relations Act (PHRA)12 to the judicial branch violated the separation of 

powers doctrine. After analyzing the extensive history of the Court’s jurisprudence 

involving the application of the PHRA to the judiciary, the Supreme Court 

concluded that it cannot be constitutionally applied to the judiciary. In so 

concluding, the Court explained 

the Pennsylvania Constitution grants independence to the judiciary in 

its administration of the Unified Judicial System. . . . Additionally, the 

Constitution grants exclusive policy and rule-making power to the 

judiciary regarding the courts. . . . The constitutional power to 

administer justice and to promulgate employment policies and rules 

includes the judiciary’s power to select, discharge, and supervise its 

employees. . . . This being the case, as a co-equal and independent 

branch of government, the judiciary has the independent and 

exclusive constitutional right to enact employment policies and 

rules regarding its employees, and to supervise the employment of 

such individuals. 

Id. at 425 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The Court went on to state 

that application of the PHRA, no matter how admirable its goals, to 

judiciary personnel is in direct conflict with the judiciary’s 

constitutionally[ ]granted exclusive and independent right to administer 

the courts and to promulgate rules and polices regarding judicial 

employees, as well as its exclusive and independent authority to select, 

discharge, and supervise its employees. 

Id. Accordingly, “it is the Court, and only the Court, that provides protection for 

employees subject to discrimination, independent of the executive and legislative 

branches, through its own rules, policies, and procedures.” Id. at 426.

12 43 P.S. §§ 951-963.
22

Against this backdrop, we decide the issue here: whether the Board can 

exercise jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice charge where it involves the 

discipline of a judicial employee. In support of their positions, Respondents cite 

Teamsters Local 115 and Petitioners cite Beckert. After careful review of the cases 

and the separation of powers jurisprudence, the Court finds Beckert more in line with 

how similar cases have been decided. 

In Beckert, this Court addressed whether the Board had jurisdiction over an 

unfair labor practice charge brought by a judicial employee based on the employee’s 

discharge. There, the union entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 

with the county commissioners and the judges of the court of common pleas. 

Contained therein was article XVII, which provided a three-step procedure to resolve 

grievances or disputes between the parties, with the first step being with the 

employee’s supervisor, the second step being an appeal to the court administrator, 

and the third step an appeal to the president judge. Under article XVII, an employee 

could not be “demoted, suspended, discharged or disciplined without just cause,” 

and it provided that an employee could appeal any such action at “Step Two” of the 

grievance procedure. Beckert, 425 A.2d at 860. After the MOU was in place, a clerk 

of a district justice was discharged and commenced the grievance process at step 

two. “[A]n accord was reached between the [c]ourt [a]dministrator and the union, 

and[,] as a result[,] the employee was to be reinstated.” Id. The district justice 

appealed the matter to the president judge pursuant to step three, and two common 

pleas judges acting as designees of the president judge upheld the discharge. As a 

result of the clerk’s discharge, the union filed an unfair labor practice claim, alleging 

violations of Section 1201(a)(1) and (5) of PERA. The Board acted on the union’s 

allegations by issuing a complaint and notice of hearing. The president judge filed 
23

a petition for review with this Court seeking to enjoin the Board from exercising 

jurisdiction based on the contention that, because the discharge of a judicial 

employee is within the province of the courts, the Board lacked jurisdiction to review 

the discharge. 

This Court agreed that the discharge of judicial employees was within the sole 

province of the judiciary and could not be encroached upon by the Board. In so 

concluding, this Court recognized that “[b]ecause the power to select judicial 

assistants is an inherent corollary of the judicial power itself, the power to supervise 

or discharge such personnel must flow essentially from that same source,” and “the 

selection or hiring of judicial assistants is an exercise of judicial power; and so is 

their discharge.” Id. at 862. Thus, the Court concluded that the Board could not 

exercise jurisdiction over the discharge of a judicial employee as the employee’s 

discharge was “a judicial power vested by our Constitution in the courts.” Id. 

Further, this Court explained, “[t]he matter in controversy between the [judicial 

employer] and the union, and referred to the Board, is the judicial discharge of a 

judicial employee. That is the reality of the matter despite efforts by the union to 

color it an ‘unfair labor practice.’” Id. at 864. The Court further explained that 

a court of common pleas could in the exercise of its constitutional 

power provide for a grievance or hearing procedure prior to the 

discharge of a judicial employee. Such a procedure could be created 

by the court’s own initiative or be the result of an agreement with a 

representative of the employees. However, discharge decisions under 

such a procedure would have to remain finally with the court. For some 

non-judicial branch of government to be given the power to review such 

decisions would represent an encroachment on the judiciary’s control 

of hiring and discharging court employees. An agreement 

establishing grievance and hearing procedures may be the source 

of rights entitled to legal protection by an action of law or equity. But 

such an agreement cannot be deemed to transfer to some other 
24

branch of government a court’s constitutional power over the 

hiring and discharge of court employees.” 

Id. at 863 (emphasis added). 

The Court recognized that “PERA grants to judicial employees the right to 

organize and to bargain collectively with county commissioners, or other 

management representatives of the courts, concerning the financial terms of 

employment,” but also acknowledged that “PERA cannot constitutionally be 

interpreted as immunizing such employees from the inherent judicial power of 

discharge.” Id. at 863. Thus, the Court enjoined the Board from exercising 

jurisdiction over the clerk’s discharge noting that this “is not to say that an employee 

can be discharged for exercising a right conferred by statute or constitutionally 

protected without raising due process considerations.” Id. at 863 n.9.

In contrast to Beckert, the court in Teamsters Local 115 concluded that the 

Board did have jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice charge. There, a union 

started an organizational drive among court employees, which garnered positive 

response from various employee groups, including court criers, court officers, and 

judicial aides. After the organizational drive started, however, the court was advised 

that these positions would not appear in the following year’s budget and would, 

instead, be replaced by the position of tipstaff. The result of this change was the 

elimination of employees occupying these former positions, although some were 

rehired as tipstaff. In addition, within a week of the organizing drive, 100 custodial 

positions were eliminated based on the judicial employer’s decision to privatize. 

Because of the judicial employer’s actions, the union filed an unfair labor practice 

charge alleging that the reclassification of the judicial employees and privatization 

of the custodial positions was motivated by anti-union animus and to prevent 

unionization in violation of Section 1201(a)(1) and (3) of PERA. The Board refused 
25

to issue a complaint, citing Beckert, concluding that the doctrine of separation of 

powers prevented it from exercising jurisdiction over the charges where the judicial 

branch was the respondent.

On appeal, the union argued there was no separation of powers violation under 

these circumstances. In concluding the Board had jurisdiction, this Court 

distinguished Beckert, explaining that, in that case, the “judges . . . had already 

entered into a voluntary [CBA] or ‘[MOU],’” the terms of which provided that the 

president judge’s decision was final and not subject to arbitration. Teamsters Local 

115, 619 A.2d at 386 (emphasis omitted). Thus, the Court concluded “Beckert

stands for the proposition that the ultimate resolution of a dispute over a [CBA] 

which already exists cannot rest with the executive or legislative branches of 

government where the issue concerns the authority to select, discharge, or supervise 

court personnel,” which distinguished it from the situation in Teamsters Local 115. 

Id. at 387 (emphasis in original). 

Turning to the matter specifically before it, the Court in Teamsters Local 115 

recognized that the judiciary was allegedly refusing to allow its employees to 

organize for the purpose of bargaining. Thus, the issue before the Court was: “Does 

the Board possess jurisdiction to hear an unfair labor practice charge alleging that 

individual employees were fired as a result of the exercise of their right to organize 

granted by [PERA]?” Id. at 387. In concluding that the Board had jurisdiction, the 

Court explained that the issue in that case was “the competing rights of the courts to 

supervise their employees and the correlative right of all public employees in 

Pennsylvania, including judicial employees, to organize.” Id. at 388. The Court 

stated that “[t]he courts have the inherent right to hire, fire and discharge court 

employees and such right does not admit of any impingement on the part of the 
26

executive or legislative branches,” but its “employees possess the right to organize 

and bargain collectively, and the vindication of their rights is left to, in the first 

instance, the executive branch of government in the form of the Board.” Id. As 

such, the Court concluded that the employees must be given a forum to vindicate 

their rights to organize and collectively bargain, the interference with which is an 

unfair labor practice, and the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction in this case did not 

violate the separation of powers doctrine. The Court reasoned that it reached this 

conclusion “because the Board is the only forum which can entertain unfair labor 

practice charges, failure of the Board to accept jurisdiction in the instant case would 

eviscerate the rights of court employees under [PERA].” Id.

Unlike the situation in Teamsters Local 115, this case does not involve the 

organizing of employees. Rather, like in Beckert, the discipline of a judicial 

employee is at issue. “[T]he reality of the matter despite efforts by the union to color 

it an ‘unfair labor practice’” is the judicial discipline of a court employee. Beckert, 

425 A.2d at 864. The CBA here involves a two-step process for court employees to 

present their grievances. The first step is with the immediate supervisor and then, 

should the employees not be satisfied, they can proceed to step two and request a 

review with the District Court Administrator. (See Board Answer, Appendix B.) A 

judicial employee is not without recourse should said employee take issue with 

adverse employment decisions. Here, Probation Officer completed only step one of 

the grievance procedure, and never sought review of that decision by the District 

Court Administrator. The agreement “between the union and the other parties 

cannot validly give a court employee a right to have his [suspension] reviewed 

by a non-judicial branch of government[.]” Beckert, 425 A.2d at 864. Thus, based 

on a review of the separation of powers jurisprudence and given “the great vigilance 
27

and care with which the Supreme Court has protected the independence of the 

[j]udiciary and the separation of powers,” Thomas, 155 A.3d at 139, we conclude 

that Respondents have not established the clear right to relief needed to prevail on 

their Application and, as a result, their Application as to the original jurisdiction 

claim is denied. 

C. Appellate Petition for Review

We next consider Respondents’ assertion that they are entitled to summary 

relief, and dismissal of Petitioners’ appeal, because Petitioners were not aggrieved

by and, therefore, lack standing to appeal, the Final Order. Petitioners argue that 

they have standing because they consistently challenged the Board’s authority to 

exercise jurisdiction, a challenge upon which they were unsuccessful. The very fact 

that the Board reviewed the merits of the unfair labor practice charge based on the 

discipline of a judicial employee, Petitioners’ assert, infringes on their constitutional 

authority and causes the aggrievement needed to appeal.

Pursuant to Section 702 of the Administrative Agency Law, “[a]ny person 

aggrieved by an adjudication of a Commonwealth agency who has a direct interest 

in such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom. . . .” 2 Pa.C.S. § 702 

(emphasis added). In addition, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 501 

provides: “[e]xcept where the right of appeal is enlarged by statute, any party who 

is aggrieved by an appealable order . . . may appeal therefrom.” Pa.R.A.P. 501 

(emphasis added). Thus, the common theme is that only a person that is “aggrieved” 

by a decision has standing to challenge the tribunal’s order. See ACS Enters., Inc. 

v. Norristown Borough Zoning Hearing Bd., 659 A.2d 651, 653 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). 

Although the Administrative Agency Law and Appellate Rules do not define 

“aggrieved,” case law has established that a party is “aggrieved” if said party 
28

“(a) ha[s] a substantial interest in the subject[ ]matter of the litigation; (b) the interest 

[is] direct; and (c) the interest [is] immediate and not a remote consequence.” Beers 

v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 633 A.2d 1158, 1161 (Pa. 1993). Additionally, 

a party is “aggrieved” when “the party has been adversely affected by the decision 

from which the appeal is taken.” In re J.G., 984 A.2d 541, 546 (Pa. Super. 2009).13 

Generally, a party who prevailed in a proceeding is not an aggrieved party and, 

therefore, has no standing to appeal. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. 

Comm’n, 830 A.2d 941 (Pa. 2003). “A prevailing party that disagrees with the legal 

reasoning of an order o[f] a court or agency or may have had a particular issue 

decided against it lacks standing to appeal because it is not adversely affected by the 

order.” Maple Street A.M.E. Zion Church v. City of Williamsport, 7 A.3d 319, 322-

23 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). 

In examining whether Petitioners are aggrieved by an alleged improper 

assertion of jurisdiction, Penn Township v. Penn Township Police Association (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 905 C.D. 2007, filed May 13, 2008), and Donahue are instructive. 

In Penn Township, which involved a grievance arbitration, we explained that 

a party is aggrieved by an improper assertion of jurisdiction because such a decision 

creates a direct, immediate, and substantial interest for that party. Penn Twp., slip 

op. at 7.14 Because the arbitration in Penn Township was bifurcated, we explained 

the arbitrator’s jurisdictional decision could not be appealed before the merits were 

decided. In finding sufficient aggrievement to support standing to file an appeal, we 

13 While not binding on this Court, opinions of the Superior Court may be cited for their 

persuasive value. Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2018). 

14 The Court in City of Philadelphia also cited Penn Township for this proposition but 

ultimately found the petitioner there was not aggrieved because the petitioner challenged a 

statement in the Board’s opinion, which was dicta, and “[d]isagreement with dicta does not render 

a prevailing party aggrieved.” City of Philadelphia, slip op. at 6-8 (citation and emphasis omitted). 
29

stated that “[o]ur review here is of the decision on jurisdiction, and not on the merits; 

therefore[,] [the t]ownship had a direct, immediate, and substantial interest in the 

jurisdictional determination.” Id. Additionally, our Supreme Court in Donahue

explained that where an agency has proceeded to defend its interpretation of a statute 

and otherwise indicated that it intends to enforce that statute in a manner detrimental 

to another government unit, such a position creates an adverse, direct, and immediate 

impact to the affected governmental unit. 98 A.3d at 1229-31. 

That this was not a bifurcated proceeding as in Penn Township does not 

diminish that the Board assumed and exercised jurisdiction over the merits of the 

complaint, over Common Pleas’ objections. Common Pleas could not have appealed 

that assumption of jurisdiction until after the Board issued its Final Order. If 

Common Pleas is ultimately correct that the Board should not have exercised

jurisdiction over the merits of the alleged unfair labor practice here and to do so

violated Common Pleas’ constitutional rights, Common Pleas would be aggrieved 

by the Final Order. Moreover, Common Pleas is asserting that the Board is 

consistently interpreting PERA in a manner that is detrimental to the judiciary, as 

exemplified by this matter and Chester County, thus ignoring the constitutional 

separation of powers. If Common Pleas is correct, this, too, could give rise to an 

adverse, direct, and immediate impact on Common Pleas such that it would be 

aggrieved by the Final Order. Donahue, 98 A.3d at 1229-31. 

Additional guidance can be found in Beckert, where this Court explained that 

“Pennsylvania courts may enjoin an administrative agency from exercising powers 

forbidden to it by the Constitution.” 425 A.2d at 864. There, the Court rejected the 

argument advanced by the union “that the constitutional issue of this case must be 

first submitted to the Board as the exclusive tribunal of primary resort.” Id. The 
30

Court further explained that “it would be incongruous to conclude that the 

constitutional question itself should be passed on by the Board in the first instance. 

The power of the courts to decide all constitutional questions is traditional and 

inherent.” Id. (citing Stander v. Kelley, 250 A.2d 474, 478 (Pa. 1969)). If a court 

can enjoin the exercise of jurisdiction and preclude the agency from passing on the 

constitutional question, it would seem equally incongruous to say that the exercise 

of such forbidden powers, particularly over objection, would not create an injury 

sufficient to support Petitioners’ standing to appeal as an aggrieved party. Thus, 

Petitioners could be “adversely affected by the decision from which the appeal is 

taken,” In re J.G., 984 A.2d at 546, because the Board exercising jurisdiction may 

encroach on the judiciary’s right to hire, fire, or supervise judicial employees. Thus, 

Respondents have not established a clear right to dismissal of the appellate portion 

of the Petition based on Petitioners’ lack of aggrievement.

Accordingly, Respondents have not established the clear right to relief needed 

to prevail on their Application and, as a result, their Application as to the appellate 

claim is denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents are not entitled to summary relief and, 

therefore, their Application is denied. However, reviewing the Petition and 

Petitioners’ requested relief, it is apparent that Petitioners are seeking a 

determination of their rights as to all cases involving the discipline of a judicial 

employee, instead of one particular case. Thus, this question, at this time, appears 

to be better suited for consideration as a declaratory judgment action in this Court’s 

original jurisdiction instead of in the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, 
31

the appellate portion of the Petition is stayed pending the resolution of Petitioners’

declaratory judgment claim in this Court’s original jurisdiction. 

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Honorable Maria Musti Cook, :

in her official capacity as the :

President Judge of the Court of :

Common Pleas of York County, :

Nineteenth Judicial District; and :

The Court of Common Pleas of :

York County, :

Petitioners :

 :

v. : No. 161 M.D. 2021 

 : 

The Pennsylvania Labor Relations :

Board; and SEIU Local 668 PSSU, :

Respondents :

O R D E R

NOW, November 2, 2022, the Application for Summary Relief filed by the 

Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board and Service Employees International Union, 

Local 668, Pennsylvania Social Services Union is DENIED. The Appellate Petition 

for Review is hereby STAYED pending disposition of the original jurisdiction 

declaratory judgment action. 

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge