UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

JAMES GAUTHIER, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

versus § CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-281

§

GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., §

§

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Pending before the court is Defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.’s (“Goodyear”)

Motion for Summary Judgment (#40). Plaintiff James Gauthier (“Gauthier”) filed a response in

opposition, and Goodyear and Gauthier have filed a reply and sur-reply respectively. Having

considered the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, the record, and the

applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion should be granted.

I. Background

On June 16, 2023, Gauthier filed suit in the 60th Judicial District Court of Jefferson

County, Texas, alleging various causes of action against Goodyear, including retaliation,

negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, a Sabine Pilot cause of action, and First

Amendment retaliation. Goodyear removed the suit to this court and moved to dismiss all claims

alleged against it (#8). Gauthier filed his First Amended Complaint (#11), retaining only his

Sabine Pilot cause of action based on Goodyear’s alleged retaliation against Gauthier for his

refusal to commit an illegal act. 

The events relevant to Gauthier’s claims began on Saturday, June 12, 2021, when a

reportable hydrocarbon leak occurred at the Goodyear plant in Beaumont, Texas. A reportable

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 1 of 18 PageID #: 561
event, like the hydrocarbon leak, must be reported to the Texas Commission on Environmental

Quality (“TCEQ”) “as soon as possible but not later than 24 hours after the discovery of the spill

or discharge.” 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 327.3(b). Goodyear, however, did not report the leak

until Tuesday, June 15, 2021. A copy of the report, attached as Exhibit B-4 to Goodyear’s Motion

for Summary Judgment, explains that on Saturday, June 12, 2021, at 4:40 a.m., “the capacitance

probe on C-Decanter failed and released hydrocarbons to the wastewater treatment ditch . . . . 

The problem was identified at 12:35 p.m.” The report is dated June 15, 2021, at 8:30 a.m.

At the time of the leak, Gauthier was working as a board operator along with Team Lead

John Cooper (“Cooper”) and outside operator Brian Bergeron (“Bergeron”). In his position as

board operator, Gauthier was responsible for monitoring trends and equipment pressure, including

checking to ensure that the machines were operating correctly and there were no chemical leaks. 

At approximately 6:30 a.m., the hydrocarbon alarm began to sound, but according to Gauthier’s

deposition testimony, neither Cooper nor Bergeron could locate or confirm a hydrocarbon leak

outside. The alarm continued to sound intermittently throughout the morning, until approximately

11:00 a.m., when Gauthier discovered that a control valve on a decanter, which was located

outside in a ditch, had opened to 100 percent. Gauthier testified that he reported the open valve

to Cooper and called an Instrument and Electrician (“I&E”) technician. The I&E technician,

along with Cooper, worked to get the valve “under control” and told Gauthier that it was possible

that hydrocarbons had been released into the ditch. Gauthier further stated in his deposition

testimony that, at approximately 12:15 p.m. or 12:30 p.m., he and Cooper called the Site Shift

Manager (“SSM”), Margarito Sonny Garcia (“Garcia”), to report the problem with a faulty valve. 

Gauthier also indicated that Garcia was informed that there was a hydrocarbon leak. Garcia, in

2

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 2 of 18 PageID #: 562
a sworn declaration, contended that on Saturday, June 12, 2021, he was “only informed of an

issue with a valve and [he] was told that the [I&E] technician was working on the decanter.” 

Garcia further averred that it was not until Monday, June 14, 2021, that he learned that there was

a hydrocarbon leak in the ditch. According to Gauthier, around 3:00 p.m., on June 12, 2024, the

presence of hydrocarbons was detected in the ditch, confirming a hydrocarbon leak. At

approximately 3:52 p.m. that day, Gauthier submitted a work order for the hydrocarbon detector,

indicating that the alarm was faulty, even though the hydrocarbon leak had already been confirmed

prior to that time, suggesting that the alarm was functioning properly and had detected the leak

at the outset.

On Monday, June 14, 2021, Gauthier’s Unit Supervisor, Brittnee Witmire, contacted the

Human Resources Department to initiate an investigation into the hydrocarbon leak. As part of

the investigation, Gauthier was asked to provide a written statement, which he prepared that same

day, Monday, June 14, 2021. As previously noted, while the Human Resource’s investigation was

ongoing, Goodyear reported the leak to the TCEQ on Tuesday, June 15, 2021, at 8:30 a.m. 

There is conflicting testimony regarding whether Gauthier was later interviewed by

Goodyear’s Human Resources Representative, Shalyn Bevil (“Bevil”), on Tuesday,June 15, 2021,

or Wednesday, June 16, 2021.1 Construing the evidence in Gauthier’s favor, he and Bevil met

on Tuesday, June 15, 2021, in the afternoon. Specifically, in his deposition, Gauthier stated that

he was asked to come in early to meet with Bevil on “Tuesday before [he] started shift on nights,”

1 Gauthier testified that he met with Bevil on Tuesday afternoon. Yet, in her sworn declaration,

Bevil stated that she met with Gauthier on Wednesday, June 16, 2021. Additionally, Bevil’s handwritten

notes from the interview include what appears to be Gauthier’s signature with the date—“6/16/21.” In his

deposition, however, Gauthier claimed he had never seen Bevil’s notes before and that he did not sign

them.

3

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 3 of 18 PageID #: 563
and that he and Bevil met “that afternoon.” Gauthier further testified that: “They called me that

morning, some time that morning, I don’t remember the time, and they asked me to be up at the

plant two hours early which we normally made relief at 4:00. So, I believe I was there at 2:00. 

I may have gotten there at 1:30, 2:00 o’clock.” According to Bevil’s declaration, one of the

reasons she interviewed Gauthier was because his “written statement did not appear to be accurate

and did not match up with the physical evidence of the work orders or Mr. Cooper’s or Mr.

Bergeron’s statements.” Bevil stated that she “decided to give Mr. Gauthier a chance to explain

his discrepancy and rectify any errors he may have made in his written statement.” Gauthier

declined to make any changes to his written statement.

Thereafter, on June 17, 2021, Goodyear terminated Gauthier’s employment. In his

Amended Complaint, Gauthier asserts that Goodyear asked him to alter the timeline of his written

statement so that the company could avoid a violation for releasing hydrocarbons and failing to

report and respond to the release in a timely manner. Gauthier contends that Goodyear terminated

his employment for refusing to amend his report. Goodyear avers that Gauthier was terminated

for failing to report the hydrocarbon leak in a timely manner and falsification of work orders.

II. Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A party may move for summary judgment without regard to whether the movant is a

claimant or a defending party. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Palestine, 41 F.4th 696, 703 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 579 (2023); Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d

369, 380 (5th Cir. 2019); Apache Corp. v. W&T Offshore, Inc., 626 F.3d 789, 793 (5th Cir.

2010). Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall

4

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 4 of 18 PageID #: 564
be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Union Pac. R.R. Co.,

41 F.4th at 703; United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv.

Workers Int’l Union v. Anderson, 9 F.4th 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2021); Smith v. Harris County, 956

F.3d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 2020); Parrish, 917 F.3d at 378. The party seeking summary judgment

bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those

portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); MDK Sociedad De Responsabilidad

Limitada v. Proplant Inc., 25 F.4th 360, 368 (5th Cir. 2022); Goldring v. United States, 15 F.4th

639, 644-45 (5th Cir. 2021); Playa Vista Conroe v. Ins. Co. of the W., 989 F.3d 411, 416-17 (5th

Cir. 2021); Jones v. United States, 936 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2019). To warrant judgment in

its favor, the movant “must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim

or defense.” Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Dewan

v. M-I, L.L.C., 858 F.3d 331, 334 (5th Cir. 2017)); accord Access Mediquip L.L.C. v.

UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., 662 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2011). 

“A fact issue is ‘material’ if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” 

Hemphill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 805 F.3d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Burrell

v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2007)); see MDK

Sociedad De Responsabilidad Limitada, 25 F.4th at 368; Lexon Ins. Co., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins.

Corp., 7 F.4th 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2021); Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020). 

“Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Tiblier v. Dlabal, 743

5

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 5 of 18 PageID #: 565
F.3d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986)); accord Valencia v. Davis, 836 F. App’x 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2020); see Dyer, 964 F.3d

at 379. “An issue is ‘genuine’ if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended,

or a sham.” Gerhart v. Barnes, 724 F. App’x 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bazan ex rel.

Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001)); accord Johnson v. City of San

Antonio, No. 22-50196, 2023 WL 3019686, at *6 n.7 (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2023); Nall v. BNSF Ry.

Co., 917 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2019). Thus, “[a] genuine dispute of material fact exists when

the ‘evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” 

MDK Sociedad De Responsabilidad Limitada, 25 F.4th at 368 (quoting Nola Spice Designs,

L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters., Inc., 783 F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015)); Sanchez Oil & Gas Corp. v.

Crescent Drilling & Prod., Inc., 7 F.4th 301, 309 (5th Cir. 2021); Dyer, 964 F.3d at 379; Hefren

v. McDermott, Inc., 820 F.3d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 2016). The moving party, however, “need not

negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case.” Terral River Serv., Inc. v. SCF Marine Inc., 20

F.4th 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.

1994)); Pioneer Expl., L.L.C. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 767 F.3d 503, 511 (5th Cir. 2014); see Savoy

v. Kroger Co., 848 F. App’x 158, 160 (5th Cir. 2021). 

Once a proper motion has been made, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere

allegations or denials in the pleadings but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific

facts, to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322

n.3; see Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)); Flowers v.

Wal-Mart Inc., 79 F.4th 449, 452 (5th Cir. 2023); MDK Sociedad De Responsabilidad Limitada,

25 F.4th at 368; Acadian Diagnostic Lab’ys, L.L.C. v. Quality Toxicology, L.L.C., 965 F.3d 404,

6

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 6 of 18 PageID #: 566
410 (5th Cir. 2020). The court “should review the record as a whole.” Black v. Pan Am. Lab’ys,

L.L.C., 646 F.3d 254, 273 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)); see Hacienda Recs., L.P. v. Ramos, 718 F. App’x 223, 234 (5th Cir.

2018); City of Alexandria v. Brown, 740 F.3d 339, 350 (5th Cir. 2014). All the evidence must

be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the court will not weigh the

evidence or evaluate its credibility. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150; Seigler v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex.,

L.L.C., 30 F.4th 472, 476 (5th Cir. 2022); Batyukova v. Doege, 994 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir.

2021); Lyons v. Katy Ind. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2020). The evidence of the

nonmovant is to be believed, with all justifiable inferences drawn and all reasonable doubts

resolved in his favor. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 255); Seigler, 30 F.4th at 476; Batyukova, 994 F.3d at 724; Lyons, 964 F.3d at 302. The

evidence is construed “in favor of the nonmoving party, but only where there is an actual

controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Spring

St. Partners-IV, L.P. v. Lam, 730 F.3d 427, 435 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Boudreaux v. Swift

Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005)); accord Lexon Ins. Co., Inc., 7 F.4th at 321;

Geovera Specialty Ins. Co. v. Odoms, 836 F. App’x 197, 200 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Little v.

Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)). 

Furthermore, the court’s obligation to draw reasonable inferences “does not extend so far

as to allow a wholly ‘unreasonable inference’ or one which amounts to ‘mere speculation and

conjecture.’” Mack v. Newton, 737 F.2d 1343, 1351 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Bridges v.

Groendyke Transp., Inc., 553 F.2d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1977)); accord McGill v. BP Expl. &

Prod., Inc., 830 F. App’x 430, 432 (5th Cir. 2020); Batyukova, 994 F.3d at 724 (“‘Conclusory

7

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 7 of 18 PageID #: 567
allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and

legalistic argumentation’ will not survive summary judgment.” (quoting Orr v. Copeland, 844

F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016))); Stearns Airport Equip. Co., Inc. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518,

528 (5th Cir. 1999) (“If the [nonmoving party’s] theory is . . . senseless, no reasonable jury could

find in its favor, and summary judgment should be granted.” (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v.

Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468-69 (1992))); Mills v. Warner-Lambert Co., 581 F.

Supp. 2d 772, 779 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (“[O]nly reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party can be drawn from the evidence.” (citing Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 468 n.14)). 

“[S]ummary judgment may not be thwarted by conclusional allegations, unsupported assertions,

or presentation of only a scintilla of evidence.” Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Axon

Pressure Prods. Inc., 951 F.3d 248, 256 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d

564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012)); accord Allaudin v. Perry’s Rests., Ltd., 805 F. App’x 297, 299 (5th

Cir. 2020); Acadian Diagnostic Lab’ys, L.L.C., 965 F.3d at 410 (quoting Turner v. Baylor

Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007)); see Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497

U.S. 871, 888 (1990).

Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to his case on which he bears the burden of proof

at trial. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Lyons,

964 F.3d at 302; Musser v. Paul Quinn Coll., 944 F.3d 557, 560 (5th Cir. 2019). “[W]here the

non-moving party fails to establish ‘the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,’ no genuine issue of material fact can

exist.” Goode v. Greenstream Int’l, L.L.C., 751 F. App’x 518, 521 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting

8

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 8 of 18 PageID #: 568
Nichols v. Enterasys Networks, Inc., 595 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 2007)); see Phillips v. Sanofi

U.S. Servs. (In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 994 F.3d 704, 710 (5th Cir. 2021). 

In such a situation, “‘[a] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial’ and ‘mandates the entry of

summary judgment’ for the moving party.” Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 389

(5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States ex rel. Farmer v. City of Houston, 523 F.3d 333, 337 (5th

Cir. 2008)); accord Guillot ex rel. T.A.G. v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743, 750 (5th Cir. 2023); Stingley

v. Watson Quality Ford, 836 F. App’x 286, 288 (5th Cir. 2020).

B. At-Will Employment and Sabine Pilot

In diversity cases, federal courts follow the choice of law rules of the forum state. Nix v.

Major League Baseball, 62 F.4th 920, 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 165 (2023); PCL

Civ. Constructors, Inc. v. Arch Ins. Co., 979 F.3d 1070, 1073 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020); Weber v.

PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 771 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.

Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941)). Because Texas is the forum state, the court will apply

Texas law.

In Texas, it has long been established that, in the absence of a contractual or statutory

restriction, an employment relationship is terminable at the will of either party, with or without

cause. See Heggemeier v. Caldwell County, 826 F.3d 861, 870 (5th Cir. 2016); Gentilello v.

Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010); Amigo Broad., L.P. v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., 521

F.3d 472, 481 (5th Cir. 2008); Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 358 (Tex. 2019);

County of Dallas v. Wiland, 216 S.W.3d 344, 347 (Tex. 2007); Montgomery Cnty. Hosp. Dist.

v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733,

9

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 9 of 18 PageID #: 569
734 (Tex. 1985); E. Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (Tex. 1888). “An

‘employment-at-will’ relationship is not binding upon either the employee or the employer. Either

may terminate the relationship at any time.” Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 827 S.W.2d

830, 832-33 (Tex. 1991). As the Texas Supreme Court observed in Wiland: “For well over a

century, the general rule in this State, as in most American jurisdictions, has been that absent a

specific agreement to the contrary, employment may be terminated by the employer or the

employee at will, for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.” 216 S.W.3d at 347 (quoting

Montgomery Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 965 S.W.2d at 502); accord Gentilello, 627 F.3d at 544; Fed.

Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993).

One “very narrow” exception exists which “covers only the discharge of an employee for

the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act.” Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc., 687

S.W.2d at 735; see Hillman, 579 S.W.3d 354, 358; City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209,

215 (Tex. 2000); Tex Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. 1995);

Herrera v. Resignato, 621 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.). “Sabine Pilot

is an extremely specific and narrow exception to the employment at will doctrine.” Physio GP,

Inc. v. Naifeh, 306 S.W.3d 886, 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.); accord

Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc., 687 S.W.2d at 735 (establishing the “very narrow” exception to the

employment-at-will doctrine); cf. Ed Rachal Found. v. D’Unger, 207 S.W.3d 330, 332 (Tex.

2006) (refusing to extend the Sabine Pilot exception to employees who are asked not to report a

crime); Winters v. Hous. Chron. Pub. Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. 1990) (declining to

recognize a cause of action for private employees who report illegal activities except where the

legislature has “enacted protection for a limited class of employees”). 

10

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 10 of 18 PageID #: 570
“To establish a wrongful termination claim, the plaintiff must prove that: ‘(1) [he] was

required to commit an illegal act which carries criminal penalties; (2) [he] refused to engage in the

illegality; (3) [he] was discharged; [and] (4) the sole reason for [his] discharge was [his] refusal

to commit an unlawful act.’” Karna v. BP Corp. N. Am., 609 F. App’x 814, 817 (5th Cir. 2015)

(quoting White v. FCI USA, Inc., 319 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2003)); see Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at

633 (“An employer who discharges an employee both for refusing to perform an illegal act and

for a legitimate reason or reasons cannot be liable for wrongful discharge.”); Sabine Pilot Serv.,

Inc., 687 S.W.2d at 735. “If there is no ‘directive to violate the law,’ then Sabine Pilot does not

provide a remedy.” Sandberg v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 600 S.W.3d 511, 523-25 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.) (holding that the plaintiff did not plead or present evidence that his

employer “ever required him to sign false tax statements or other financial documents. Instead,

the gist of his claim is that he was terminated for stating he would not execute the documents ‘if

there was a breach of the [Advanced Pricing Agreement] and improper adjusting entries were

included in the accounting figures’”). 

Here, the court determines that Gauthier has not created a triable material fact issue as to

the first element—that Goodyear required him to commit an illegal act which carries criminal

penalties. Gauthier avers that Goodyear terminated his employment because he refused to alter

a timeline he compiled covering the events that occurred on June 12, 2021. In his deposition,

however, Gauthier fails to provide any evidence that he was directed to commit an illegal act by

falsifying his timeline of events to aid Goodyear in avoiding an administrative penalty. 

Gauthier testified that no one other than Bevil asked him to change his written statement. 

Gauthier stated that during his interview with Bevil, they “went over [his] written statement.

11

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 11 of 18 PageID #: 571
[Bevil] told [Gauthier] there were some differences here and there.” Gauthier further stated that

Bevil told him “that some of the times were off” and “that things didn’t match up with the time

frame.” Gauthier then stated that Bevil asked him “if [he] wanted to change [his] statement. . . . 

Or if [he] would change [his] statement.” 

Gauthier did not suggest that Bevil clarified what discrepancies she believed existed with

his written statement.2 Nor does Gauthier assert or provide any evidence that Bevil specified a

particular change she wanted him to make or otherwise suggested that Goodyear was attempting

to avoid administrative penalties for failing to report the leak timely to the TCEQ. In fact, during

his deposition, Gauthier was asked, “Were you told why you should change your statement?” 

Gauthier answered, “No. I was told that things didn’t match up with the time frame, would you

be willing to change your statement.” In his deposition, Gauthier was also asked, “No one at

Goodyear told you that they wanted to backdate your statement to avoid a TCEQ fine, correct?” 

Gauthier responded, “No one told me.” Gauthier stated that when he declined to change his

timeline, Bevil “just moved on.” This accords with Bevil’s recounting of the interview:

I also informed Mr. Gauthier during the meeting that there were discrepancies with

his timeline. I asked Mr. Gauthier if he wanted to change his statement that would

be a company record in order to reconcile any difference in the timeline. Mr.

Gauthier declined to amend his statement. I did not force Mr. Gauthier to change

his statement, nor did I otherwise tell Mr. Gauthier that his employment was

contingent upon doing so or that his refusal to amend the statement would result in

any adverse employment action. 

2

In her declaration, Bevil indicated that one of the discrepancies was whether the SSM, Garcia,

was notified timely of the leak. In addition, Bevil states that it appeared that Gauthier “entered work

orders after the release was discovered, in an apparent effort to cover up the fact that he ignored the alarms

and create the impression that he did so because they were faulty.” As noted earlier, Bevil further averred

that Gauthier’s “written statement did not appear to be accurate and did not match up with the physical

evidence of the work orders or Mr. Cooper and Mr. Bergeron’s statements.”

12

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 12 of 18 PageID #: 572
In fact, according to Gauthier, it was not until after his interview with Bevil that he

suspected that he was being asked to do something illegal.3 Cf. Johnston v. Del Mar Distrib. Co.,

776 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (“It is implicit that in order

to refuse to do an illegal act, an employee must either know or suspect that the requested act is

illegal.”). During his deposition, Gauthier stated that: “At the moment that I refused to change

my statement, it wasn’t because I thought they were asking it illegally. It’s because I did not feel

there was any reason to change my statement because what I had written was factual . . . .” 

Gauthier cites to Higginbotham v. Allwaste, Inc. to support his contention that there exists

a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Goodyear requested him to engage in illegal

conduct. 889 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). In

Higginbotham, the plaintiff claimed that his employer terminated his employment because he

refused to follow his employer’s directive to hide material overstatements of profits from the

company’s internal auditor and refused to be a party to the reporting of any additional material

overstatements. Id. at 412. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was expressly instructed to

prepare schedules and rehearse answers to questions that would conceal information from the

employer’s internal auditor who had the responsibility of preparing the financial reports to be filed

with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Id. The resultant conduct could

eventually culminate in misleading reports being filed with that federal agency. Id. The Texas

appellate court held that an employer need not “directly confront an employee and make an

3

 In his response, Gauthier contends that because he testified that he “felt like [he] was asked to

change [his] statement so that [Goodyear] could backdate it and get out of the fine,” there exists a fact

issue as to whether Goodyear was requiring Gauthier to falsify a statement to cover up a regulatory

violation. This misconstrues Gauthier’s testimony. Gauthier testified that it was not until after he was

interviewed by Bevil, he learned that the TCEQ was going to fine Goodyear.

13

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 13 of 18 PageID #: 573
affirmative statement that the employee will be terminated if he refuses to perform an illegal act,”

in order to support a Sabine Pilot cause of action. Id. at 413. Rather, “when an employer asks

an employee to perform some act which is illegal, he automatically puts the employee to the

‘unacceptable’ choice of risking criminal liability or being discharged because the employee is

placed under the onus of being terminated for insubordination.” Id.

Here, however, Gauthier fails to provide any evidence that Goodyear asked him to alter

his statement in a manner that would constitute an illegal act. The case at hand is distinguishable

from Higginbotham where the plaintiff states that “he was expressly instructed to prepare

condensed schedules which would hide adjustments that were taken on a contract by [his

employer] in the third quarter,” and “[h]e averred he spent three months and over 100 hours

rehearsing answers to questions with [one of his managers].” Id. at 415. In contrast, in this

instance, Goodyear did not direct Gauthier to do anything. Goodyear did not expressly tell

Gauthier to forward or backdate his timeline of events. Goodyear did not ask Gauthier to provide

other false information or to conceal the leak. Rather, Gauthier was asked if he would be willing

to change his statement, and when he declined, Bevil “moved on.” Asking Gauthier if he was

willing to change his statement, without any further indication of how or why, does not amount

to directing him to commit an illegal act. 

In addition, the court observes that according to Gauthier, Bevil interviewed him on

Tuesday, June 15, 2021, in the afternoon, which is after Goodyear submitted a report to the TCEQ

at 8:30 a.m. that morning stating that on Saturday, June 12, 2021, a hydrocarbon leak started at

4:40 a.m. and was identified at 12:35 p.m. Thus, Gauthier’s contention that Goodyear asked him

to change his written statement in an effort to “get out of the fine” for failing to report the leak

14

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 14 of 18 PageID #: 574
in a timely manner is without rational basis. Drawing all justifiable inferences and resolving all

reasonable doubts resolved in Gauthier’s favor, any effort to “cover up a regulatory violation”

would need to have occurred before Goodyear reported the violation to the TCEQ. Specifically,

in order to avoid the administrative penalty for failing to report the leak timely, Goodyear would

have to convince Gauthier and his coworkers, including Cooper, Bergeron, and the I&E

technician, to forward date the time of the leak, not backdate the time of the leak, as stated by

Gauthier.4 Moreover, Goodyear would need to alter the physical evidence and documents, such

as all the time stamps recording when the alarm went off, the time of the leak, and the work orders

entered. In order to avoid the administrative penalty, these actions would need to have occurred

less than 24 hours prior to Goodyear’s initial report to the TCEQ, which is dated Tuesday, June

15, 2021, 8:30 a.m. 

Moreover, Gauthier has not established that changing his statement would constitute an

illegal act. Gauthier alleges that, had he changed his written statement, he would have committed

the following criminal acts: tampering with a witness (TEX. PENALCODE § 36.05); making a false

statement to law enforcement; making false statements under oath (TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.02);

and altering evidence in an ongoing investigation (TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.09). 

A witness or prospective witness in an official proceeding commits an offense if he

knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit on the representation or understanding

that he will: (1) testify falsely; (2) withhold any testimony, information, document, or thing; (3)

elude legal process summoning him to testify or supply evidence; (4) absent himself from an

official proceeding to which he has been legally summoned; or (5) abstain from, discontinue, or

4

 Backdating the time of the leak would only make the report more untimely.

15

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 15 of 18 PageID #: 575
delay the prosecution of another. TEX. PENALCODE § 36.05. An official proceeding is “any type

of administrative, executive, legislative, or judicial proceeding that may be conducted before a

public servant.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(33). According to Gauthier, it was Goodyear’s

standard practice following an incident like the hydrocarbon leak to ask employees to provide a

written statement to the Human Resources Department. Gauthier further agreed that the written

statement was an internal company statement. Goodyear’s internal investigation does not

constitute an “official proceeding,” under the Texas Penal Code. Furthermore, even if it were

deemed an official proceeding, there is no evidence, as already stated, that Goodyear asked

Gauthier to provide false information. 

Gauthier also generally contends that Goodyear asked him to make a false statement to law

enforcement. Gauthier’s written statement, however, was provided to Goodyear’s Human

Resources Department, not law enforcement. During his deposition, Gauthier was asked, “Which

law enforcement agency did Goodyear ask you to make a statement to?” Gauthier responded, “It

was not a law enforcement agency. It was the written statement to HR . . . .” By his own

admission, Goodyear did not ask Gauthier to provide a false statement to law enforcement. Again,

there is no evidence that Goodyear asked Gauthier to make a false statement.

Under Texas Penal Code § 37.02, “[a] person commits an offense if, with intent to deceive

and with knowledge of the statement’s meaning: (1) he makes a false statement under oath . . . ;

or (2) he makes a false unsworn declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies

Code.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.02. Chapter 132 generally requires that an unsworn declaration

be in writing and “subscribed by the person making the declaration as true under penalty of

perjury.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 132.001(c). Here, neither Gauthier’s written

16

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 16 of 18 PageID #: 576
statement nor his statements to Bevil were made under oath or were part of an unsworn declaration

made under penalty of perjury. There is also no evidence that Gauthier was asked to make a false

statement. Accordingly, § 37.02 of the Texas Penal Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.

Finally, Gauthier contends that he was asked to violate Texas Penal Code § 37.09. A

person commits the offense of Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence under Texas law

if, he knows that “an investigation or official proceeding is pending or in progress,” and he: 

(1) alters, destroys, or conceals any record, document, or thing with intent to

impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence in the investigation or

official proceeding; or 

(2) makes, presents, or uses any record, document, or thing with knowledge of its

falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation or official

proceeding. 

TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.09. While the court agrees that “[f]alsifying statements to evade

regulatory enforcement can constitute a criminal act,” here, as already pointed out, Gauthier was

asked as part of Goodyear’s internal investigation by its Human Resource Department if he would

be willing to change his statement. There is no evidence in the record to support the claim that

he was asked to provide a false statement.

Because Gauthier has not demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue for trial as to the

first element—that Goodyear required him to commit an illegal act which carries criminal

penalties—summary judgment is warranted. 

17

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 17 of 18 PageID #: 577
III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Goodyear’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#40) is GRANTED. Gauthier

fails to present a claim that warrants relief. There remain no material facts in dispute, and

Goodyear is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

18

Case 1:23-cv-00281-MAC Document 53 Filed 12/18/24 Page 18 of 18 PageID #: 578