### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NASHVILLE October 6, 2004 Se ssion

STATE OF TENN ESSEE v. CHARLE S SAWYER
Appeal by P ermis sion from the Court

of Crimi nal Appeals Circuit Court for Marshall County No. 14856 William C. Lee, Judge

No. M2002-01062-SC-R11-CO - Filed February 25, 2005

The defendant, Charles Sawy er, was arrested by

the police for aggra

vated sexual battery. F ollowing his arrest, Sawyer made an oral statement to the polic e after

an offic er rea

d to Sawy er an af fidavit supporting the arrest warrant but before the office r advise d Sawy

er of his Fifth Ame

ndment rig

hts pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Sawyer filed a motion to suppress his oral statemen t. Based upon the nature of the facts contained in the affidavit supporting the issuance of the arrest warrant and the circumstanc es sur rounding his arrest and detention, we conclude the statement resulte d from an unconstitutional custodial interrogation and therefore should be suppressed. Accordingly , we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proce edings consistent with this opinion.
Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appe al by Per mission; Judgment of the Cour

t of Crim inal Appeals Affirmed; Remanded to the Trial Court

J ANICE M. H OLDER , J., delivered the opinion of the cour t, in which F RANK F. D ROWOT A , III, C.J., and E. R IL EY ANDERSON and W IL LI AM M. B ARKER , JJ., and A LLE N W. W ALLACE , S P .J. joined.

Paul G. Summers , Attorne y G eneral and Repor

ter; Mich ael E. Moore, Solic itor Gene ral; Eliza beth T. Rya n, Se ni or Co un se l; Mi ke Mc Co we n, Di st ri ct At to rn ey G eneral ; and Weakley E. B arnard, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.

F. Shayne Br

asfield, Franklin, Tennessee, and Michael Eugene Gilmer, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellee, Charles Sawy er.
OPINION

BACKGROUND

OnOctober 25, 2001, Det ective K evin Clar k and Chie f Deputy

Billy Lamb of the Ma

rshall County S heriff’ s Department obtained an arrest warra nt for the defendant, Charles Sawy er, for aggravated

sexual battery. The two Marshall County officers a nd a Maury

County officer tra

veled1 Sawyer t est if ied the of

fice rs read t

he warran t and af

fidavi t to h im a tot al of t hree t imes: once whil e at Saw yer’s resi dence, once while en route to t he sheriff

’s department, and once while i nside the detecti ve’s offi ce. The tr ial court

foun d t hat the off

icer read the warrant and affidavit to Sawyer on only one occasion, whil e inside the detecti ve’s offi ce.

2 At the suppression heari ng, Sawyer denied making the st atement. The trial court decline d to det ermine whether Sawyer made t

he sta tement, concludi ng that the jury s hould decide this is sue if t he statement is admi ssi ble at trial.
-2- to Sawyer’ s residence in Maury County, Tennessee. Detective Clark informed Sawy er of the charge and arrested him. Detective Clark told Sawy er that they “

would go down to the jai l, an d [t he y] would discuss what was going on.”

Detective Clark and

Chief Deputy Lamb handcuffed Sawy er, placed him in the back seat of
a patrol car, and transported him to the Marshall County jail. Other than merely infor

ming Sawye

r of the charge, the officer

s did not discus s the charg e with Saw ye r, nor did they advise hi m of his Fifth Amendment rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Imme diately

upon arriving at

the jail, Sawyer wa s escorted to Detective Clark’s office where Detective Clark intended to co nduct an in terview. The officers removed Sawy er’s handcuffs and seated him facing Detective Clark, who sat behind a de sk. Detective Clark read the arrest warra nt and the affidavit of complaint to Sawyer. 1 The arr est warrant stated only

that Sawyer wa s charged with aggravated sexual battery . The affidavit of complaint stated that “on or about July

27th 2001 Charles Sawyer did rub

the leg and

vagina l area o f [the alle ged vic tim], who is 12ye ars of a ge. Thi s inci dent occurr

ed at 1489Bridle [L]ane in Cha pel Hill. T

his did occ

ur in Mar shall Count

y Tennessee.”

Detective Clark testified that after he read the affidavit but bef ore he advised Sawy

er of his rights, Sawyer state d, “I admit to rubbing her le g, but I didn’t do the other. And I admit to rubbing the other girl’s hair.” Saw yer mad e the sta

tement ap proximatel

y th irty minutes af

ter his ar rest. 2 Detective Clark thenadvised Sawyer of his Fifth Amendmen

t rights, and Sawy

er requ ested co unsel. Detective Clark escorted Sawy er to be booked.

Detective Clark testified that he read the warr ant and a ffidavit to Sawyer pursuant to standard procedure “[t]o let [Sawyer] know exactly what the charges were

and [the identity of] the victim.” The detectiv e denied

reading the aff idavit of c omp laint for pu rposes of eliciting a statement from Sawyer. Sawyer testified he had been arrested approximately four yea rs prior to the present case and
was awa re of his rights, including

his righ t to remai n silent.

Th e trial cou

rt gra nted Sawy

er’s moti on to suppr

ess, find ing that Sawy er’s sta tement re sult e d froman imper

missible c

ustodial in

terrog ation. The

trial cou rt found that: 1) Sawyer ma de the statement while in c

ustody at the jai l thirty minutes following his arre st and that the statement was nota “spontaneous” response to his arrest; 2) Sawye

r made the statement after being a dvised of the details of the allega

tions cont ained in the affidavit, not after he was read the general charg e; and 3) the office r’s acti ons in rea

ding the affida vit were “the functional equivalent of interrog ation” a s “it-3-

would be reasonable to expect

a response” under the se circ umstance s even tho

ugh the office rs did not deliberately se ek to elicit a response from Sawy er.
The State filed an interlocutory appeal to the Court

of Cri minal Appe als pursu ant to Tenness ee Rule o f Appella te Proce dure 9. T

he Court o f Criminal

Appeals granted the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s judgment suppressing the defendant’s statement. We granted re view.

ANALYSIS

The finding s of fac t made by the trial court at a heari ng on a motion to sup

press are binding upon an appellate

court unl ess the e

vidence containe d in the re cord pre pondera tes aga inst those finding s. State v. Saylor , 117 S.W.3d 239, 244 (Tenn. 2003). As trier of fact, the trial court has the ability to assess the credibility of the witnesse s, determine the weight and value to be af forded the evidence, and resolve any

conflicts in the evidence. State v. Odom , 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). As the prevailingparty , the def endant is entitled t o the stro ngest le gitimate

view of the evidence as well as to all reasonable inferences dra wn from that

evidence. State v. Damron , 151 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tenn. 2 004); State v. Hicks , 55 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001). However, we review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. State v. Daniel , 12 S.W.3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000).

The issues in th

is case c oncern t

he fede ral and s tate con stitutiona l protec tions ag ainst compelled

self-inc riminatio n. See State v. Walton , 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001). The SelfIncrimination

Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United State s Cons titut

ion pr ovide s that

“[n]o person . . . shall be compelle d in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” See Malloy v. Hogan , 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (concluding that the Self-I ncrimination Clause is applicable to the states). Article I, section nine of the Te nnessee Constitution provides that “in al l crimina l prosecu tions, the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence ag ainst himself.” We have hel d t hat “th e te st of v ol unt ari nes s fo r co nfe ss io ns u nde r Ar ti cle I, [section] 9 is broader and more protective of individual rights than the test of voluntariness under the Fifth Amendment.” Walton , 41 S.W.3d at 82 (citation omitted).

In Mira nda , the United States Supreme Court held that “the prosecution may notus e statemen ts, whether

exculpato ry

or inculp atory , stemming from cus todial inte

rrog ation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of proced ural s afeguar ds effe ctive to sec ure th e priv ilege agains tself-incrimination.” Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444. These procedural safeguards require that the police advise a defendant being que stioned while in custody

that he has the

right to remain si lent, tha t anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to th e presenc e of an a

ttorney , and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be ap pointed f or him prior to any

questioni ng if he so desire s.
Id. at 479; see State v. B ush , 942 S.W.2d 489, 499 (Tenn. 1997).-4-

Anofficer

must provide Miranda

warnings to an accused when the a ccused is in custody and is subjected to interrogation or its functional equivalent. See Rhode I sland v. I nnis , 446 U.S. 291, 298 (1980). In the present c ase, Sawye r was in custody when the

officers placed him under formal arrest. See Stansbury

v. Califor

nia , 511 U.S. 31 8, 322 (19 94); State v. Anderson , 937 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tenn. 1996). We must therefore determine whether the police officers su bjected Sawy er to interrog ation or it s functio nal equiv alent by reading the aff idavit of c omplaint to

him.
Interroga tion “refers not only

to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the pol ice (oth er than t hose normally

attenda nt to arre st and cus tody

) that the police sh ould know are re asonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis , 446 U.S. at 301. Interroga

tion also includes any “pra ctice t hat the po lice should know is likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect.” Id. The definition of interrogation focuses primarily upon the accused’s perception rather tha n on the police officer’s intent. Id. at 301. However, the officer’s intentmay be re levant to determine wh ether the officer should have known his or her words or actions were reasonably

likely to invoke an incriminating r esponse. Id. at 301 n.7.

Whether the reading of the affidavit of complaint to an accused is the functional equivalent of interrogation is an issue of first impression in this Court. Som e jurisdic tio ns have held that an officer’s statement

advising an accused of the speci fi c charges is not the functional equivalent of interrogation. See e.g. , Enoch v. Gramley , 70 F.3d 1490, 1499-1500 (7 th Cir. 1995) (officer advised the defendant that he was charg ed with murder and identified the victim ); People v. Celestine , 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (officer informed the defenda nt that he was under ar

rest for “possession of

rock coc aine for

sale”) ; United States v. Brown , 737 A.2d 1016, 1021 (D.C. 1999) (officer told the defendant tha

t he was cha

rged w ith murder

and ident

ified the victim); People v. Par ker , 801 N.E.2d 162, 167 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (officer read arrest warrant to the def endant ) ; Commonwea

lthv. Lark , 477 A.2d 857, 861 (Pa. 1984) (of ficer a dvised the

defenda nt of his rights and the char ges); Gates v. Commonwe alth , 516 S.E.2d 731, 733 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (officer read arrest warran t to the de fendant

). Had th e offic ers in this

case re ad only

the warr ant to the defe

ndant, we would agree.

H owever, the facts and circumstances in this case g o beyond mere ly reading the arres t warrant or other wise informing the defendant of the charg e. See Commonwealth v. DeJesus , 787 A.2d 394, 403 (Pa. 2001) (holding that although informing a defe ndant of the basis of

the charge and the statemen

ts of the witnesses was “informational,” theofficer’s actions amounted to the functional equivalent

of interrogation). While at Sawyer’ s residence, Detective Clark informed Sawy er of the charge, arrested

him, and st

ated the y “ would go down to the jail, and [they] would discuss what was goingon.” The

office rs transp orted Saw

ye r from his residence directly

to Detective Clark’s office inside the Marshall County Sheriff’ s Department. Sawyer was placed in a chair in front of a desk, and Detective Clark sat directly across from

Sawyer. Appr

oximately thirty

minutes following the arrest, Detective Clark read Sawyer the a rrest warrant charging him with agg ravated sexual battery and the aff idavit of c omplaint alleging that he had rubbed the leg and vag inal area of the twelve-yearold victim. Detective Clark had no t advised Sawy er of his Miranda

rights prior to reading the affida vit. Sawyer mad e the s tatem ent on ly after he aring t he det ailed allega t ions contained in the affida vit.-5-

The detective’s actions placed Saw yer in an environm ent in whic h he could

reasona bly believe that he wa s to be interrogated. See Hill v. United States , 858 A.2d 435, 443-47 (D.C. 2004) (informing a defendant who is handcuffed in an interview r oom that he is charged with second degree mur der and

that his accomplice has given a statement is the functional equiva lent of interrogation). Mor eover, althou gh Sawyer had been arrested and a dvised of his rights on a prior occasion, the detective’s actions under the facts and c ircumstances of this case were “ likely

to evoke
anincriminating response.” Innis , 446 U.S. at 301; see also United States v. Wiseman , 158 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1252-53 (D. Kan. 2001) (holding that the defendant’s statements resulted from custodial interrogation

even thou

gh the d efenda nt had bee n advised of his rig hts on prio r occas ions); Jones v. State , 119 S.W.3d 766, 774 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Sawyer c ould have reasonably believed that the detective had begun interrog ating him and that the d

etective ’s read

ing of th e affid

avit was a statemen t requiring a response. Although De tective Clark testified he did not read the affidavit for purposes of eliciting a statement from Sawy er, the detective stated he escorted Sawy er to his office, intending to conduct an interview. “The disclosure of incriminating evidence to a suspect . . . does notnecess arily con stit ute in terro ga tion wi thin the meaning of Innis .” State v. Ma raschie llo , 88 S.W.3d 586, 603 ( Tenn. Cri m. App. 2000) (holding

that the d

efenda nt volunta

rily confess ed to murder upon bein

g advise d of his Miranda

rights on two occasions and observing offic ers as they investigated

his case and gathered evidenc e). However, we conclude that unde r t he facts and circumstances of the pr

esent ca se, the de

tective’ s action in

reading the aff idavit to Sawyer

was the functional equivalent of interrogation.

CONCLUSION

We hold that under the facts and circumstances of this case, Sawy er’s statement was made
as the resu

lt of the de

tective’ s reading

of the ar rest war rant and the aff idavit to Sawyer

, which was the functional equivalent of int er rogation. Therefore, we conclude that Sawy er’s statement to the detective should be suppressed. Accordingly , we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment suppressing the statement and rema nd to the tr

ial cour t for fur ther pro ceeding s consiste nt with this opinion. Costs of appeal are taxed to the appellant, State of Tennessee.

___________________________________ JANICE M. HOL DER, JUSTI CE