[Cite as State v. Grow, 2021-Ohio-641.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LOGAN COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-20-27 

 v. 

LACEY B. GROW, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-20-28 

 v. 

LACEY B. GROW, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-20-29 

 v. 

LACEY B. GROW, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 
Case Nos. 8-20-27, 8-20-28, 8-20-29 

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Appeals from Logan County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court Nos. CR 16 01 0015, CR 16 03 0078 and CR 17 07 0237

Judgments Affirmed 

Date of Decision: March 8, 2021 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Samantha L. Berkhofer for Appellant 

 Sara J. Warren for Appellee 

ZIMMERMAN, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Lacey B. Grow (“Grow”), appeals the June 2, 

2020 judgment entries of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas revoking her 

community control and imposing prison sentences. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm. 

{¶2} The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. On May 11, 2020, the 

State filed a motion requesting that the trial court revoke Grow’s community control 

in case numbers CR16-01-0015, CR16-03-0078, and CR17-07-0237 after Grow 

violated the terms and conditions of her community control. (Case No. CR16-01-
Case Nos. 8-20-27, 8-20-28, 8-20-29 

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0015, Doc. No. 100); (Case No. CR16-03-0078, Doc. No. 82); (Case No. CR17-07-

0237, Doc. No. 56). It was alleged that Grow violated the condition of her 

community control requiring her to “obey federal, state and local laws and 

ordinances, including those related to illegal drug use” by possessing a “drug abuse 

instrument” and using “opiates/fentanyl” and “cocaine” on April 1, 2020; by 

possessing “drug abuse instruments” on April 23, 2020; and by operating a motor 

vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs of abuse (“OVI”) in 

Bellefontaine, Ohio and in Miami County, Ohio on April 23, 2020. (Id.); (Id.); (Id.). 

{¶3} After her preliminary-revocation hearing on May 21, 2020, the cases 

proceeded to a final-revocation hearing on June 2, 2020 during which the trial court 

concluded that Grow violated the terms and conditions of her community control 

after Grow admitted that she violated the terms and conditions of her community 

control. (Case No. CR16-01-0015, Doc. Nos. 104, 107); (Case No. CR16-03-0078, 

Doc. Nos. 86, 89); (Case No. CR17-07-0237, Doc. Nos. 62, 67). At the finalrevocation hearing, the State recited the evidence against Grow. (See June 2, 2020 

Tr. at 3-4). Accordingly, the trial court revoked Grow’s community control and 

sentenced her to 12 months in prison in case number CR16-01-0015, 12 months in 

prison in case number CR16-03-0078, and 12 months in prison in case number 

CR17-07-0237. (Case No. CR16-01-0015, Doc. No. 107); (Case No. CR16-03-

0078, Doc. No. 89). The trial court ordered that Grow serve the prison term imposed 
Case Nos. 8-20-27, 8-20-28, 8-20-29 

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in case number CR16-01-0015 concurrent to the prison term imposed in case 

number CR16-03-007. (Id.); (Id.). The trial court further ordered that Grow serve 

the concurrent prison terms imposed in case numbers CR16-01-0015 and CR16-03-

0078 consecutively to the prison term imposed in case number CR17-07-0237, for 

an aggregate sentence of 24 months in prison. (Case No. CR17-07-0237, Doc. No. 

67). 

{¶4} Grow filed her notices of appeal on June 22, 2020 in case numbers 

CR16-01-0015, CR16-03-0078, and CR17-07-0237, which were consolidated for 

purposes of appeal. (Case No. CR16-01-0015, Doc. No. 115); (Case No. CR16-03-

0078, Doc. No. 97); (Case No. CR17-07-0237, Doc. No. 76). She raises one 

assignment of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error 

Whether the Trial Court breached their duty by sentencing the 

defendant to [sic] a community control sanction without the 

defendant first admitting to the violation or being found in 

violation by hearing. 

{¶5} In her sole assignment of error, Grow argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion by revoking her community control. Specifically, Grow argues that 

the trial court erred by concluding that she violated the terms and conditions of her 

community control because she did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily 

admit to violating the terms and conditions of her community control and because 
Case Nos. 8-20-27, 8-20-28, 8-20-29 

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the trial court failed to “conduct a hearing on the merits prior to sentencing [her] to 

a prison sentence for violations of community control.”1

 (Appellant’s Brief at 10). 

Standard of Review 

{¶6} The decision of a trial court finding a community-control violation will 

not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. McKeithen, 3d Dist. Marion 

No. 9-08-29, 2009-Ohio-84, ¶ 7, citing State v. Ryan, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 14-06-

55, 2007-Ohio-4743, ¶ 7. An abuse of discretion suggests that a decision is 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-

158 (1980). 

Analysis 

{¶7} “A defendant under community control is entitled to both a preliminary 

and a final revocation hearing.” State v. Knerr, 3d Dist. Auglaize Nos. 2-14-03 and 

2-14-04, 2014-Ohio-3988, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Kiser, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas, 

No.2008 AP 030014, 2009-Ohio-1337, ¶ 12, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 

778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (1973). The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to 

determine if probable cause exists that the defendant violated the terms of his 

probation or community control. Id., citing State v. Delaney, 11 Ohio St.3d 231, 

233 (1984). “The purpose of the final revocation hearing is to give the defendant 

 

1

 In the body of her assignment of error, Grow argues that her trial counsel “failed to adequately represent 

her during her probation violations * * * .” (Appellant’s Brief at 9). Because Grow did not separately assign 

this issue as error, we will not address it. See State v. Glasser, 4th Dist. Athens No. 11CA11, 2012-Ohio3265, ¶ 23, citing App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7). 
Case Nos. 8-20-27, 8-20-28, 8-20-29 

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‘an opportunity to be heard and to show’ that he either did not violate his conditions 

or that certain mitigating circumstances ‘suggest that the violation does not warrant 

revocation.’” Id., quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593 

(1972). 

{¶8} “This Court has held that although a revocation proceeding must

comport with the requirements of due process, it is not a criminal proceeding.” 

McKeithen at ¶ 22, citing Ryan at ¶ 8, citing Gagnon at 782. “Therefore, the 

minimum due process requirements afforded a defendant in a probation revocation 

proceeding differ from those in a criminal trial.” Id. The minimum due-process 

requirements for revocation hearings are: 

(a) Written notice of the claimed violations; (b) disclosure of evidence 

against him or her; (c) the opportunity to be heard in person and to 

present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront 

and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (e) a neutral and detached

hearing body; and (f) a written statement by the fact finders as to the 

evidence relied on and reasons for revocation. 

Id., quoting State v. Miller, 42 Ohio St.2d 102, 104 (1975), quoting Morrissey at 

489. 

{¶9} Since a community-control-revocation hearing is not a criminal 

proceeding, “the State is not required to prove a violation of the terms of community 

control beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at ¶ 6, citing Ryan at ¶ 7. “The State must, 

instead, show ‘substantial’ evidence that the offender violated the terms of his 

community control sanctions.” Id. 
Case Nos. 8-20-27, 8-20-28, 8-20-29 

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{¶10} On appeal, Grow argues that the trial court erred by concluding that 

she violated the terms and conditions of her community control because she did not 

knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily admit to the violations. Specifically, Grow 

contends that “[a] review of the transcripts reveals that indeed [she] did not admit 

to any violation prior to being sentencing [sic] in the probation violation hearing.” 

(Appellant’s Brief at 9). “‘As a general matter, an unknowing waiver of a 

defendant’s right in a revocation hearing to present evidence and confront his 

accusers is invalid.’” State v. Patton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103737, 2016-Ohio4867, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Armstrong, 56 Ohio App.3d 105, 107 (8th Dist.1988). 

However, because a community-control-revocation hearing is not a criminal trial, 

“‘[a] defendant faced with revocation of probation or parole is not afforded the full 

panoply of rights given to a defendant in a criminal prosecution’ and ‘the 

requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2) do not apply to a community-control-violation 

hearing.’” Id., quoting State v. Parsons, 4th Dist. Athens No. 09CA4, 2009-Ohio7068, ¶ 11. 

{¶11} Instead, Crim.R. 32.3 applies to community-control revocation 

hearings. State v. Orr, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2008-G-2861, 2009-Ohio-5515, ¶ 22. 

That rule provides, in relevant part, 

(A) Hearing. The court shall not impose a prison term for violation 

of the conditions of a community control sanction or revoke probation 

except after a hearing at which the defendant shall be present and 

apprised of the grounds on which action is proposed. * * * 
Case Nos. 8-20-27, 8-20-28, 8-20-29 

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(B) Counsel. The defendant shall have the right to be represented by 

retained counsel and shall be so advised. 

Crim.R. 32.3(A), (B). 

{¶12} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the requirements 

of Crim.R. 32.3 were satisfied. Indeed, the record reveals that Grow was apprised 

of the grounds on which the revocation of her community control was proposed and 

given the opportunity for the hearing at which she (represented by trial counsel) 

indicated that she intended to enter an admission to the allegations. See State v. 

Malone, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-03-1299, 2004-Ohio-5246, ¶ 18. See also State v. 

Brown, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-04, 2015-Ohio-468, ¶ 16. Specifically, at a 

community-control-revocation hearing, “the relevant consideration is not whether 

the record proves that [a defendant] understood the rights he [is] waiving; it is 

whether the record in some way indicates that he did not understand the rights he 

[is] waiving.” Id. at ¶ 12. “Generally, without affirmative evidence in the record 

indicating otherwise, we presume regularity in trial court proceedings.” Id., citing 

State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, ¶ 19. 

{¶13} Presuming regularity in this instance would require us to presume that 

the trial court and the parties would not have proceeded past the evidentiary phase 

of the proceedings without Grow indicating her willingness to admit to violating the 

terms and conditions of her community control. See id. That is, the record reveals 
Case Nos. 8-20-27, 8-20-28, 8-20-29 

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that Grow submitted a letter to the trial court in which she accepted responsibility 

for her conduct as well as an exchange between Grow and the trial court in which 

Grow expressed remorse for her actions and a desire to receive treatment. (See June 

2, 2020 Tr. at 5-7). In other words, Grow did not dispute her probation officer’s 

recitation of the conduct of which she was alleged to have committed in violation 

of the terms and conditions of her community control. See Patton at ¶ 13 (noting 

that “[t]he record shows that Patton was able to confront his probation officer during 

the hearing” but that Patton failed to demonstrate “what evidence or witnesses he 

might have proffered to combat the allegations against him”). 

{¶14} Furthermore, the record reveals that Grow was familiar with the

community-control-revocation process since she had been subject to the revocation 

of her community control on two previous occasions in these cases, and, as such, 

Grow was aware of the effects of waiving the hearing and admitting to the 

violations. Compare State v. Dye, 4th Dist. Athens No. 16CA17, 2017-Ohio-9389, 

¶ 19 (“The record also reveals [Dye] was familiar with the revocation process, 

having previously been through the community control revocation process”), citing 

State v. Orr, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2008-G-2861, 2009-Ohio-5515, ¶ 43 (noting 

that because “Orr was familiar with community-control-revocation hearings,” he 

“fully understood the effects of waiving the hearing and admitting to the 

violations”). 
Case Nos. 8-20-27, 8-20-28, 8-20-29 

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{¶15} Therefore, we conclude that the community-control-revocation 

hearing comported with the requirements of due process and Crim.R. 32.3. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking 

Grow’s community control and overrule her assignment of error. 

{¶16} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Judgments Affirmed 

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur. 

/jlr