[Cite as State ex rel. Bradford v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2017-Ohio-7300.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State ex rel. Pele K. Bradford, : 

 Relator, : 

v. : No. 16AP-750 

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Correction, 

 : 

 Respondent. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on 

 

On brief: Pele K. Bradford, pro se. 

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Ina 

Avalon, for respondent. 

 

IN MANDAMUS 

ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION 

SADLER, J. 

{¶ 1} Relator, Pele K. Bradford, an inmate of the Lebanon Correctional 

Institution, brings this original action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, 

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("DRC"), to correct its records 

consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Bradford v. 

Dinkelacker, 146 Ohio St.3d 219, 2016-Ohio-2916, and to conduct another review of his 

application for executive clemency filed April 24, 2014.1 DRC moved this court to dismiss 

 

1 Though the governor's letter denying relator's April 24, 2014 application for executive clemency is attached 

to relator's complaint as an exhibit, relator has not submitted a copy of DRC's decision and recommendation 

on the April 24, 2014 application. 
No. 16AP-750 2 

the complaint, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), for failure to state a claim on which relief may 

be granted. 

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of 

Appeals, we referred this matter to a magistrate who rendered a decision and 

recommendation that includes findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended 

hereto. Therein, the magistrate determined that the Bradford decision does not present 

"significant new information that was not and could not have been presented in the 

earlier application." Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-15(I). The magistrate concluded that 

relator's complaint failed to state a claim on which a writ of mandamus may be granted. 

Accordingly, the magistrate recommended dismissal of the complaint. 

{¶ 3} On March 30, 2017, relator filed the following objections to the magistrate's 

decision: 

I. The Magistrate failed to employ the proper legal analysis 

for Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions in accordance with the Tenth 

Appellate District Court's rationale in Modern Office Methods, 

Inc. v. Ohio Sate Univ., 2012-Ohio-3587. 

II. The Magistrate has taken the relief sought by relator out of 

context. 

III. The Magistrate's analysis is clearly erroneous when this 

Honorable Court considers the Ohio Supreme Court's findings 

in Layne v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 97 Ohio St. 3d 456. 

IV. In the interest of justice, this Honorable Court cannot 

adopt the "sweep it under the rug" approach proffered by the 

magistrate in this matter. 

{¶ 4} In his first objection, relator argues that the magistrate failed to conduct the 

proper review of his complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and this court's decision in 

Modern Office Methods, Inc. v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1012, 2012-Ohio3587. Appellant's argument in support of his objection, however, does not explain how 

the magistrate misapplied the rule or this court's prior decision in Modern Office 

Methods. Appellant's conclusory assertion notwithstanding, our review of the 

magistrate's analysis reveals compliance with Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and Modern Office 

Methods. Accordingly, appellant's first objection is overruled. 
No. 16AP-750 3 

{¶ 5} In his second objection, relator contends that the magistrate misconstrued 

his claim in recommending dismissal of his complaint. We disagree. 

{¶ 6} The crux of appellant's claim is that in 2004 the trial court erroneously 

convicted him of "[a]ggravated Murder with Specifications #1 and #2, 2903-01A/ORCN, 

SF," even though the jury found him guilty of "Aggravated Murder 2903.01(B) as charged 

in Count I of the Indictment." Bradford at ¶ 2. Appellant now seeks a writ of mandamus 

ordering DRC to acknowledge the sentencing court's error, correct its record with regard 

to the offense for which he was convicted, and to reconsider his April 24, 2014 application 

for clemency in accordance with State ex rel. Keith v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 141 Ohio 

St.3d 375, 2014-Ohio-4270. 

{¶ 7} In both its motion to dismiss relator's complaint and in its response to 

relator's objections, DRC argues that relator is not entitled to a writ of mandamus because 

relator had an adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal both from his 2004 conviction 

and Judge Dinkelacker's subsequent entry denying his motion to correct the judgment 

entry. The Supreme Court of Ohio reached this very conclusion in denying relator's 

mandamus action filed in the First District Court of Appeals seeking an order requiring 

Judge Dinkelacker to correct the judgment entry of relator's conviction. Therein, the 

court found as follows: 

To be entitled to extraordinary relief in mandamus, Bradford 

must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear 

legal duty on the part of Judge Dinkelacker to provide it, and 

the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the 

law. State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-

Ohio-69, ¶ 6, 960 N.E.2d 452. 

Appeal is generally considered an adequate remedy sufficient 

to preclude a writ of mandamus. Shoop v. State, 144 Ohio St. 

3d 374, 2015-Ohio-2068, ¶ 8, 43 N.E.3d 432, citing State ex 

rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 

631 (1967), paragraph three of the syllabus. Bradford could 

have raised the mistake in the original journal entry as part of 

his direct appeal of his conviction. He also could have 

appealed Judge Dinkelacker's entry denying his motion to 

correct the judgment entry. He therefore had an adequate 

remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 

Bradford at ¶ 5-6. 
No. 16AP-750 4 

{¶ 8} For similar reasons, relator's mandamus action against DRC must also be 

dismissed. Contrary to appellant's assertion, the court in Bradford did not hold that 

Judge Dinkelacker's judgment entry of conviction and sentence contained an error. 

Rather, the court determined that relator had an adequate remedy at law by way of a 

direct appeal from the judgment entry of conviction or an appeal from Judge 

Dinkelacker's subsequent entry denying relator's motion to correct the judgment entry. 

The Supreme Court decision in Bradford makes it clear that res judicata barred relator 

from relitigating the alleged error in the judgment of conviction in any subsequent action 

and that Judge Dinkelacker's journalized judgment entry is no longer subject to 

correction. Id. Because the legal remedy of appeal had been available to relator, the 

Supreme Court dismissed relator's complaint seeking a writ of mandamus. Id.

{¶ 9} As the Supreme Court recognized in Bradford, relator had an opportunity 

to remedy any alleged error in the judgment of conviction either by a direct appeal from 

his conviction or an appeal from Judge Dinkelacker's entry denying his motion to correct 

the judgment entry. However, relator failed to appeal from either judgment. 

{¶ 10} In Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176 (1994), the Supreme Court set 

forth three requirements for application of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. State 

ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 174 Ohio App.3d 135, 2007-Ohio-6594, ¶ 18 

(10th Dist.). "Collateral estoppel applies when the fact or issue (1) was actually and 

directly litigated in the prior action, (2) was passed upon and determined by a court of 

competent jurisdiction, and (3) when the party against whom collateral estoppel is 

asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior action." Thompson at 183. "The 

essential test in determining whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to be applied is 

whether the party against whom the prior judgment is being asserted had full 

representation and a 'full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the first action.' " 

Cashelmara Villas Ltd. Partnership v. Dibenedetto, 87 Ohio App.3d 809, 813 (8th 

Dist.1993), quoting Hicks v. De La Cruz, 52 Ohio St.2d 71, 74-75 (1977). 

{¶ 11} Because relator did not exhaust available legal remedies to correct the 

alleged error in the judgment of conviction, the judgment entry of conviction is conclusive 

as to the offense for which appellant was convicted. Bradford; Thompson. Because the 

trial court judgment of conviction is no longer subject to correction, relator does not have 
No. 16AP-750 5 

a clear right to the relief requested in his complaint, and DRC does not have a clear legal 

duty to "correct" its record. Here, DRC's record is consistent with the final, unappealed 

judgment entries at issue. Accordingly, the magistrate was correct in determining that 

nothing in the Bradford decision imposes a duty on DRC to correct its record regarding 

relator's conviction. We agree with the magistrate. 

{¶ 12} For the foregoing reasons, relator's second objection is overruled. 

{¶ 13} In his third objection, relator argues that the magistrate's conclusion that 

DRC did not have a duty to correct its record in considering his clemency application 

conflicts with the decision of the Supreme Court in Layne v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 97 

Ohio St.3d 456, 2002-Ohio-6719. In support of this argument, relator cites the following 

language from the Layne decision wherein the Supreme Court approved the reasoning of 

the Second District Court of Appeals in Randolph v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 2d Dist. No. 

99-CA-17 (Jan. 21, 2000): 

[T]he court in Randolph determined that the APA must begin 

its decision-making process concerning parole eligibility by 

assigning an inmate the offense category score that 

corresponds to the actual offense of which the inmate was 

convicted. 

Layne at ¶ 25. 

{¶ 14} Without deciding whether the rule of law in Layne applies to clemency 

applications, we recognize that the Supreme Court decision in Bradford makes clear that 

Judge Dinkelacker's journalized judgment entry is no longer subject to correction. 

Pursuant to Bradford, relator's conviction of "[a]ggravated Murder with Specifications #1 

and #2, 2903-01A/ORCN, SF" is legally correct. Id. at ¶ 2. Thus, we agree with the 

magistrate's conclusion that the Bradford decision does not constitute "significant new 

information that was not and could not have been presented in the earlier application." 

Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-15(I). Accordingly, relator's third objection is overruled. 

{¶ 15} In relator's fourth objection, relator criticizes the magistrate for "refusing to 

take any action" to "rectify this gross injustice." (Objs. at 5.) As noted above, the 

Bradford decision makes it clear that relator's previous failure to exhaust the legal 

remedies available to him following his conviction prevents this court from granting the 

relief appellant now requests. Unlike the error made by the parole authority in Keith
No. 16AP-750 6 

where the parole authority miscalculated the number of times the applicant had been 

paroled, the alleged error in this case was made by the trial court in the journalized 

judgment of conviction, a judgment which is no longer subject to correction. 

{¶ 16} For the foregoing reasons, relator's fourth objection is overruled. 

{¶ 17} Following an independent review of the magistrate's decision and the 

objections filed by relator, we find that the magistrate has determined the pertinent facts 

and properly applied the relevant law. Accordingly, we adopt the magistrate's decision as 

our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law as modified herein. For the 

reasons set forth in the magistrate's decision and those expressed herein, relator's 

objections are overruled, and relator's complaint is dismissed.

Objections overruled; 

motion to dismiss granted; 

writ of mandamus denied.

TYACK, P.J., and BRUNNER, J., concur. 

________________ 
No. 16AP-750 7 

A P P E N D I X

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

The State ex rel. Pele K. Bradford, : 

 

 Relator, : 

 

v. : No. 16AP-750 

 

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Correction, 

 : 

 Respondent. 

 : 

 

M A G I S T R A T E ' S D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on March 21, 2017

 

Pele K. Bradford, pro se. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Ina Avalon, for 

respondent.

 

IN MANDAMUS 

ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 

{¶ 18} In this original action, relator, Pele K. Bradford, an inmate of the Lebanon 

Correctional Institution ("LCI") requests a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Ohio 

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC") "to correct the record" based on 

the factual scenario presented in State ex rel. Bradford v. Dinkelacker, 146 Ohio St.3d 

219, 2016-Ohio-2916, such as to indicate that the jury found him guilty of aggravated 

murder under R.C. 2903.01(B) as charged in Count 1 of an indictment filed in the 

Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. 

{¶ 19} Also, relator requests that the writ order respondent to conduct another 

review of his application for executive clemency filed April 24, 2014, to determine, 
No. 16AP-750 8 

pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-15(I), whether "significant new information" has 

been presented by relator's filing of his second application on August 31, 2016. 

Findings of Fact: 

{¶ 20} 1. On November 1, 2016, relator, an LCI inmate, filed this original action 

against respondent. 

{¶ 21} 2. On December 16, 2016, citing Civ.R. 12(B)(6), respondent moved for 

dismissal of this action on grounds that the complaint fails to state a claim on which 

relief in mandamus can be granted. 

{¶ 22} 3. On December 28, 2016, relator filed his memorandum in opposition to 

the motion to dismiss. 

{¶ 23} 4. On February 2, 2017, respondent filed a reply.

{¶ 24} 5. As indicated in the complaint, this action is premised on the May 12, 

2016 decision of the Supreme Court in Bradford, and the October 7, 2014 decision of 

the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Keith v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 141 Ohio St.3d 375, 

2014-Ohio-4270 ("Keith II"). 

{¶ 25} 6. As reported by the Supreme Court, Pele K. Bradford filed a mandamus 

action in the First District Court of Appeals to correct the judgment entry of his 

conviction for aggravated murder. Bradford at ¶ 1. The court of appeals dismissed the 

action, and Bradford appealed as of right to the Supreme Court. 

{¶ 26} On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate 

court. In Bradford, the Supreme Court explains: 

Bradford was convicted of aggravated murder in 2004. The 

jury found him guilty "of Aggravated Murder 2903.01(B) as 

charged in Count I of the Indictment." However, the court's 

journal entry stated "[a]ggravated Murder with 

Specifications #1 and #2, 2903-01A/ORCN, SF." 

In January 2015, Bradford filed a motion in the Hamilton 

County Court of Common Pleas to correct the judgment 

entry. Respondent, Judge Patrick T. Dinkelacker, denied the 

motion. Bradford then filed an action in mandamus in the 

First District Court of Appeals. Judge Dinkelacker filed a 

motion to dismiss the mandamus action, arguing that 

Bradford failed to meet the requirements under R.C. 2953.23 

for a late petition for postconviction relief and that his 
No. 16AP-750 9 

motion to correct the judgment entry was barred by res 

judicata. 

The court of appeals granted Judge Dinkelacker's motion to 

dismiss. Bradford appealed. 

To be entitled to extraordinary relief in mandamus, Bradford 

must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a 

clear legal duty on the part of Judge Dinkelacker to provide 

it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 

of the law. State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 

2012-Ohio-69, ¶ 6, 960 N.E.2d 452. 

Appeal is generally considered an adequate remedy sufficient 

to preclude a writ of mandamus. Shoop v. State, 144 Ohio 

St.3d 374, 2015-Ohio-2068, ¶ 8, 43 N.E.3d 432, citing State 

ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 

N.E.2d 631 (1967), paragraph three of the syllabus. Bradford 

could have raised the mistake in the original journal entry as 

part of his direct appeal of his conviction. He also could have 

appealed Judge Dinkelacker's entry denying his motion to 

correct the judgment entry. He therefore had an adequate 

remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 

Judgment affirmed and motions for reversal of judgment, to 

file citation to relevant authority, and to take judicial notice 

of controlling authority denied as moot. 

Id. at ¶ 2-6. 

{¶ 27} 7. According to the complaint filed in this action, relator filed with the 

Ohio Parole Board an application for executive clemency on April 24, 2014. 

{¶ 28} 8. According to the complaint, the Ohio Parole Board forwarded the 

application to the Governor on September 30, 2014 with a recommendation that the 

application be denied. 

{¶ 29} 9. According to the complaint, by letter dated May 9, 2016, the Governor 

informed relator that his application for executive clemency has been denied.

{¶ 30} 10. According to the complaint, on August 31, 2016, relator filed another 

executive clemency application with the Ohio Parole Board. 

{¶ 31} 11. By letter dated August 31, 2016, respondent informed relator that it 

was returning the second application to him. 
No. 16AP-750 10 

{¶ 32} 12. The body of the complaint (excluding exhibits) contains 40 

enumerated paragraphs. Helpful here is the reproduction of paragraphs 10, 21, 23, 24, 

25, 38, 39 and 40: 

10. The Respondent has failed to correct the record of the 

Relator in regards to the proper offense of conviction in 

count 1 as found by the jury, i.e., R.C. 2903.01(B). 

* * * 

21. As a matter of law, the fact that the mistake in the 

original journal entry in Bradford's trial court case did not 

involve a legal decision is the fundamental reason why the 

Supreme Court concluded that the clerical mistake could 

have been raised on appeal. Indeed, the reference to 

R.C. 2903.01(A) in the journal entry was merely a clerical 

mistake that did not affect the conviction and sentence 

imposed under R.C. 2903.01(B) in count 1. 

* * * 

23. In fact, no controversy exists concerning the fact that "a 

jury found him [Bradford] guilty of aggravated murder under 

R.C. 2903.01(B). However, in the sentencing entry, the trial 

court mistakenly noted that Relator had been convicted 

under R.C. 2903.01(A)." 

24. In concluding, the Ohio Supreme Court in Keith held: 

[W]here credible allegation of substantive inaccuracies in a 

prisoner's record is made, the OAPA is obligated to correct 

those errors before considering the inmate for parole. 

25. Accordingly, the Respondent, has an obligation to correct 

the clerical error in the record of the prisoner, inaccurately 

referencing a conviction under R.C. 2903.01(A) as opposed 

to R.C. 2903.01(B) in count 1 in trial court Case No. B0400169, pursuant to State ex rel. Keith v. Ohio Adult Parole 

Auth., 141 Ohio St.3d 375. 

(Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis sic.) 
No. 16AP-750 11 

Conclusions of Law: 

{¶ 33} It is the magistrate's decision that this court grant respondent's motion to 

dismiss, as more fully explained below. 

{¶ 34} A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint. 

State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 72 Ohio St.3d 94, 95, 

1995 Ohio 202 (1995), citing State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 

Ohio St.3d 545 (1992). 

{¶ 35} In reviewing the complaint, the court must take all of the material 

allegations as admitted and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. 

{¶ 36} "'A complaint in mandamus states a claim if it alleges the existence of the 

legal duty and the want of an adequate remedy at law with sufficient particularity so that 

the respondent is given reasonable notice of the claim asserted.'" Hanson at 548, 

quoting State ex rel. Alford v. Willoughby, 58 Ohio St.2d 221, 223-24 (1979). 

{¶ 37} "In order for a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted (Civ.R. 12(B)(6)), it must appear beyond doubt from 

the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery." 

O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975), syllabus. 

{¶ 38} Because relator relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Keith II, a 

careful review of that case is in order.

{¶ 39} In Keith II, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this court 

rendered in State ex rel. Keith v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-408, 

2013-Ohio-2514 ("Keith I"). 

{¶ 40} In November 2011, Keith entered Lorain Correctional Institution to serve a 

six-month sentence. In December 2011, a hearing officer determined that Keith's 

previous parole should be revoked, and a parole release hearing was scheduled for 

February 2012. Keith II at ¶ 5. 

{¶ 41} That hearing was held by video conference on February 17, 2012. The 

parole board denied parole and set the next parole hearing for 62 months later. In 
No. 16AP-750 12 

explaining its rationale, the Ohio Parole Board cited several factors and stated that Keith 

had been paroled eight times. Keith II at ¶ 6. 

{¶ 42} Keith sent a letter to Cynthia Mausser, then the Chair of the Ohio Parole 

Board. In his letter, Keith requested that the decision be corrected to reflect the correct 

number of times he had been paroled and that the parole board grant him a new 

hearing. Keith II at ¶ 7. The Ohio Parole Board responded that Keith's request did not 

meet the standard for reconsideration of a board decision and that it would make no 

modification of the decision. Id. 

{¶ 43} In May 2012, Keith filed an action in mandamus in this court requesting 

that the OAPA be compelled to correct the record and to provide Keith with a rehearing. 

Keith II at ¶ 8. 

{¶ 44} The OAPA filed a motion to dismiss Keith's case, and Keith responded 

with a memorandum and a motion for summary judgment to which two affidavits and 

several exhibits were appended. Keith then moved to supplement the pleadings with 

another affidavit and more exhibits, raising additional claims of further errors in his 

records. Keith II at ¶ 9. 

{¶ 45} The OAPA responded with an affidavit from Mausser in which she 

asserted that Keith's record had been corrected to reflect the correct number of times he 

had been paroled. She further asserted that after the correction was made, she had 

submitted the matter to the parole board to consider the correction. The Ohio Parole 

Board voted not to modify its previous decision and not to grant Keith a new hearing. 

Keith II at ¶ 10. 

{¶ 46} The magistrate appointed by this court granted Keith's motion to 

supplement the pleadings. The magistrate also converted OAPA's motion to dismiss 

into a motion for summary judgment and gave notice that both motions for summary 

judgment were set for a non-oral hearing on August 2, 2012. Keith II at ¶ 11. 

{¶ 47} On the merits, the magistrate recommended that this court grant OAPA's 

motion for summary judgment and deny Keith's motion for summary judgment. The 

magistrate found that, even if Keith had the right to the correction of an error, his 

request was moot, as the OAPA records had been corrected to reflect that Keith had 

been paroled six times. Keith II at ¶ 12. 
No. 16AP-750 13 

{¶ 48} Keith filed objections to the decision of the magistrate. This court 

overruled the objections finding that, based on Mausser's affidavit, the Ohio Parole 

Board had performed the acts sought in Keith's request for relief, and that the 

magistrate was correct in declaring the case moot. Keith II at ¶ 13. 

{¶ 49} Keith appealed as of right the decision of this court to the Supreme Court 

of Ohio. Keith II at ¶ 14. 

{¶ 50} On appeal to the Supreme Court, Keith asserted five propositions of law. 

In his first proposition of law, Keith asserted that this court failed to consider all his 

claims. The Supreme Court found that Keith is correct. "Because Keith was allowed to 

supplement the complaint, Keith's assertions of additional errors in his parole records 

are at issue and should have been considered by the court of appeals." Keith II at ¶ 17. 

In granting the writ and reversing the judgment of this court, 

the Supreme Court in Keith II explains: We recognize that 

the OAPA's discretion in parole matters is wide-ranging. 

[Layne v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 97 Ohio St.3d 456, 2002-

Ohio-6719] ¶ 28, citing State ex rel. Lipschutz v. Shoemaker, 

49 Ohio St.3d 88, 90, 551 N.E.2d 160 (1990). R.C. 2967.03 

vests discretion in OAPA to "grant a parole to any prisoner 

for whom parole is authorized, if in its judgment there is 

reasonable ground to believe that * * * paroling the prisoner 

would further the interests of justice and be consistent with 

the welfare and security of society." However, as in Layne,

that discretion must yield to statutory or regulatory 

requirements. Therefore, we hold that in any parole 

determination involving indeterminate sentencing, the 

OAPA may not rely on information that it knows or has 

reason to know is inaccurate. 

This is not to say that the OAPA must conduct an extensive 

investigation on the information it reviews for every prisoner 

to ensure accuracy, nor does it mean that the OAPA must 

credit every unsupported allegation by a prisoner that the 

information is inaccurate. 

But where there are credible allegations, supported by 

evidence, that the materials relied on at a parole hearing 

were substantively inaccurate, the OAPA has an obligation to 

investigate and correct any significant errors in the record of 

the prisoner. 
No. 16AP-750 14 

Here, Keith's assertions go beyond mere allegation. For 

example, he points out that a memorandum of 

August 12, 2010 from Ohio Department of Rehabilitation 

and Correction employee Lora Turjanica indicates that Keith 

had been continuously incarcerated from May 1991 until 

May 2000. This makes it impossible for him to have been 

permitted to "remain on supervision" in July 1992 despite a 

parole violation, as asserted in OAPA member Trayce 

Thalheimer's letter of June 5, 2012. 

Thus, Keith has made a showing that there may be 

substantive errors in his record that may influence the 

OAPA's consideration of his parole. There is no evidence on 

the record that any error beyond the number of times Keith 

was paroled has been corrected. OAPA must therefore 

conduct an investigation into Keith's allegations and correct 

any substantive errors discovered in the record it uses to 

consider him for parole. 

* * * 

Conclusion 

The OAPA has and retains wide-ranging discretion in parole 

matters. A prisoner lacks any constitutional or statutory 

right to parole. However, having established a parole system, 

and having put in place statutory and regulatory language 

requiring the OAPA to consider relevant information 

regarding a prisoner it is considering for parole, the state has 

created a minimal due-process expectation that the 

information will actually and accurately pertain to the 

prisoner whose parole is being considered. Therefore, where 

a credible allegation of substantive inaccuracies in a 

prisoner's record is made, the OAPA is obligated to correct 

those errors before considering the inmate for parole. We 

therefore reverse and grant a writ ordering appellees to 

investigate Keith's allegations and correct any substantive 

errors in the record used to consider him for parole. 

Keith II at ¶ 26-30, 32. 

Analysis

{¶ 51} Analysis begins with the observation that respondent has no authority to 

correct the judgment entry of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas regarding 
No. 16AP-750 15 

relator's aggravated murder conviction. As indicated in Bradford, relator moved the 

common pleas court in January 2015 to correct the judgment entry. After Judge 

Dinkelacker denied the motion, relator failed to appeal Judge Dinkelacker's decision. 

Instead, relator filed a mandamus action in the First District Court of Appeals, but the 

court dismissed the action. Relator's appeal as of right to the Supreme Court of Ohio 

resulted in the decision of the Supreme Court that relator claims requires respondent "to 

correct the record." Clearly, the decision of the Supreme Court does not order 

respondent to take any action. However, relator, in effect, asserts that the factual 

scenario set forth in the Bradford case requires respondent "to correct the record." 

{¶ 52} It can be observed from a review of relator's complaint that the May 12, 

2016 decision of the Supreme Court in Bradford occurred after the Ohio Parole Board 

forwarded to the Governor its recommendation to deny the application for executive 

clemency filed on April 24, 2014. 

{¶ 53} Also, the Bradford decision on which relator relies was issued after the 

May 12, 2016 decision of the Governor that denied the April 24, 2014 application for 

executive clemency. 

{¶ 54} Clearly, to state the obvious, respondent could not have "corrected the 

record" until, at the earliest, the date of the Bradford decision. Moreover, on that date, 

the only conceivable action that respondent could have undertaken would be to place a 

copy of the Bradford decision in relator's prison file. However, relator has not alleged in 

his complaint that he ever asked respondent to do that prior to his filing of this 

mandamus action. 

{¶ 55} Clearly, the publication of the Bradford decision by the Supreme Court 

does not require respondent to conduct another review of relator's April 24, 2014 

executive clemency application that was ultimately denied by the Governor. 

{¶ 56} Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-15(I) provides: 

If the parole board receives an application for pardon, 

commutation or reprieve for a person for whom executive 

clemency was denied within two years from the date the 

denial was issued by the governor, the parole board shall 

review the application to determine whether it contains any 

significant new information that was not and could not have 

been presented in the earlier application. If the application 
No. 16AP-750 16 

contains no such new information, the parole board shall 

return the application to the applicant. The parole board 

shall inform the applicant of the date on which the applicant 

may reapply for consideration. 

{¶ 57} Clearly, the Bradford decision does not present "significant new 

information that was not and could not have been presented in the earlier application." 

{¶ 58} Given the above analysis, it is clear that the complaint fails to state a claim 

on which relief in mandamus can be granted. O'Brien.

{¶ 59} Accordingly, it is the magistrate's decision that this court grant 

respondent's motion to dismiss. 

 /S/ MAGISTRATE 

 KENNETH W. MACKE 

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES 

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as 

error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or 

legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a 

finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects 

to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(b).