This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2019 UT 3

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

OSMAN MOHAMMED NOOR,

Appellant.

No. 20160797

Filed January 18, 2019

On Direct Appeal

Third District, Salt Lake

The Honorable Vernice S. Trease

No. 09195211

Attorneys:

Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Daniel W. Boyer, Asst. Solic. Gen., 

Salt Lake City, for appellee

Samuel Alba, Robert T. Denny, Salt Lake City, for appellant

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court, in which

JUSTICE HIMONAS and JUSTICE PEARCE joined.

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined in the 

majority as to Section I.

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE filed a dissenting opinion in which 

JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:

Introduction

¶1 Osman Mohammed Noor, a pro se petitioner and Somalian 

refugee, timely filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Remedies 

Act (PCRA) seeking relief from his convictions. In his original 

petition, he claimed that relief under the PCRA was warranted 

because, among other reasons, his trial counsel was ineffective in 
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

2

failing to alert the district court to his lack of fluency with the 

English language and his cultural background. Before the district 

court determined the merits of his petition, the court appointed 

Mr. Noor pro bono counsel, but only after the one-year statute of 

limitations period on his PCRA petitions had expired. With 

permission from the court, pro bono counsel amended his petition 

by removing all previous claims from the original petition and 

replacing them with a claim that Mr. Noor’s trial counsel was 

ineffective for (1) failing to secure competent interpreters for 

Mr. Noor at trial, (2) failing to allow him to participate in his own 

defense, and (3) failing to inform him that he would be deported if 

convicted.

¶2 The State moved to dismiss the allegations raised in the 

amended petition, arguing that they were time-barred under the 

PCRA’s statute of limitations and that the amended claim in the 

amended petition did not arise out of the same conduct, transaction, 

or occurrence as the original claims, as required by rule 15(c) of the 

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court agreed with the 

State and held that the amended petition was time-barred under the 

PCRA. 

¶3 On appeal, Mr. Noor argues that the district court erred in 

applying rule 15(c) to his amended petition because (1) the court had 

sufficient discretion to review his amended petition irrespective of 

whether the petition was filed after the one-year limitations period, 

and (2) rule 15(c) does not apply to amendments to PCRA petitions. 

Alternatively, he argues that if rule 15(c) does apply, his claim in the 

amended petition arises from the same conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence as the claim set forth in the original petition, and so his 

new claim is not time barred but instead relates back to the date of 

the original petition. 

¶4 We hold that the district court did not err in concluding that 

rule 15(c) applies to proposed amendments made to PCRA petitions. 

Both the PCRA’s language and Utah caselaw support applying rule 

15(c)’s relation-back test to the PCRA and its procedural companion, 

rule 65C. This is consistent with recent amendments to the PCRA 

and rule 65C, which removed exceptions for time-barred petitions.

¶5 The district court did err, however, in concluding that the 

claim in Mr. Noor’s amended petition did not satisfy rule 15(c) and 

so was time barred under the PCRA. Mr. Noor’s amended petition 

did satisfy rule 15(c). He did not assert a new or different claim in his 

amended pleading and, under a liberal reading of the amendment, 

the State received notice of the factual grounds for his amended 
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Opinion of the Court 

3

claim. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

Background1

¶6 Osman Mohammed Noor, a Somalian immigrant, entered 

his apartment manager’s dwelling without her permission. He did so 

after an altercation with the manager. Once inside, Mr. Noor 

removed his clothing, pulled the manager on top of him, and 

attempted to kiss her repeatedly. He also simulated oral sex over her 

clothing and touched her genitals under her pants. He performed all 

of these acts against her will. During the incident, the manager 

repeatedly demanded that Mr. Noor stop his advances and leave her 

apartment. She also called the police, who arrived just as the 

manager broke free from Mr. Noor and ran from her apartment.

¶7 Mr. Noor was arrested and subsequently charged with one 

count each of burglary, forcible sexual abuse, and lewdness. Because 

he had difficulty understanding and communicating in English, he 

was provided with several interpreters to assist him throughout the 

course of his criminal proceedings. He was also appointed counsel 

from the legal defender’s office, who communicated to Mr. Noor 

through the same interpreters.

¶8 In January 2011, Mr. Noor was tried by a jury on the three 

charges. He once again received assistance from two interpreters and 

representation by appointed counsel during the trial. At trial, the 

State put on two witnesses—the manager and the police officer who 

responded to her emergency call. After the State’s case in chief, 

Mr. Noor’s counsel moved for a directed verdict based on 

insufficient evidence, which motion the district court denied. The 

jury found Mr. Noor guilty on all three charges. The district court 

subsequently sentenced Mr. Noor to concurrent one- to fifteen-year 

prison terms for burglary and forcible sexual abuse, and the court 

ordered credit for time served on his lewdness conviction.

_____________________________________________________________

1 “In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to 

the verdict.” State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, ¶ 2, 57 P.3d 977 (citation 

omitted). While here we are asked to review a district court’s denial 

of post-conviction relief, and not a jury verdict, we view the facts 

through the same lens.
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

4

¶9 Following his conviction and sentence, Mr. Noor appealed 

the jury’s determination to the Utah Court of Appeals, again through 

his appointed counsel.2 On appeal, he argued that “the State failed to 

present sufficient evidence to prove that he had the requisite intent 

to commit lewdness or forcible sexual abuse.”3 Specifically, he 

argued that “subjugation and domination of women is acceptable 

and even encouraged in the highly patriarchal Somali culture” and 

that because of this “his actions should be viewed only as a 

misguided attempt to express love and affection and that he had no 

intent to commit forcible sexual abuse or lewdness.”4 He also 

claimed that his “lack of fluency in the English language and his 

intoxication impaired his ability to understand [the manager’s] 

demands that he stop his advances and leave her apartment.”5

¶10 The court of appeals held that Mr. Noor had failed to 

preserve these arguments for appeal. It noted that Mr. Noor’s motion 

for directed verdict never mentioned the arguments he raised on 

appeal, and instead merely “move[d] for a directed verdict of 

acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence,“which the district court 

immediately denied.6 “This exchange,” the court reasoned, “did not 

apprise the district court that Noor was asserting that his cultural 

background, intoxication, and difficulties understanding English 

rendered him unable to form the requisite intent as to the crimes 

charged against him.”7 The court therefore declined to address the 

merits of these arguments and affirmed all three convictions on 

July 12, 2012.8

¶11 Mr. Noor thereafter petitioned this court for certiorari, 

which we denied on October 17, 2012.9 He did not pursue an 

additional appeal to the United States Supreme Court. On 

_____________________________________________________________

2 State v. Noor, 2012 UT App 187, 283 P.3d 543.

3 Id. ¶ 4.

4 Id. ¶ 6.

5 Id.

6 Id. ¶ 7.

7 Id.

8 Id. ¶ 8.

9 State v. Noor, 288 P.3d 1045 (Table) (Utah 2012), 2012 WL 

5544861.
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

Opinion of the Court 

5

November 5, 2013, Mr. Noor—this time without the assistance of 

counsel—filed a petition (Original Petition) for relief under the 

PCRA. He also simultaneously filed a request for court-appointed 

counsel to help him in pursuing his PCRA claims, which the district 

court denied on December 30, 2013. In his Original Petition, he made 

three claims for post-conviction relief, one of which is relevant to this 

dispute: “[d]enial of effective assistance of trial counsel” for his 

appointed counsel’s failure to “br[ing] to the trial court’s attention 

that [Mr. Noor’s] lack of fluency in English . . . impaired his ability to 

understand the victim’s demands that he stop his advances” and for 

counsel’s failure to “br[ing] to the trial court’s attention the fact that 

[Mr. Noor’s] cultural background prevented him from forming the 

requisite intent” in this case. It is undisputed that Mr. Noor’s 

Original Petition was filed two months before the PCRA’s statutory 

deadline of January 15, 2014.10

¶12 In response to the Original Petition, the State filed its initial 

motion for summary judgment. Before filing an opposition to the 

State’s motion, Mr. Noor wrote the district court explaining his 

difficulty reading and writing in English and requested that the 

court appoint counsel to assist him with his PCRA claims. In 

response, on April 7, 2014, the court ordered that Mr. Noor be 

appointed pro bono counsel and requested the Utah State Bar’s 

assistance in making that appointment. On October 7, 2014, the first 

pro bono counsel entered an appearance on Mr. Noor’s behalf, but, 

due to a conflict, was allowed to withdraw as Mr. Noor’s counsel by 

the district court on December 8, 2014. Mr. Noor was then appointed 

his current pro bono counsel, Sam Alba, on March 4, 2015. At a 

status conference on April 27, 2015, the district court asked Mr. Alba 

if he “wanted time to file a supplemental or amended petition as 

counsel for Mr. Noor.” Mr. Alba responded that he believed the 

Original Petition was not “adequate” and that he “need[ed] an 

opportunity to try and put some substance to it.” The State did not 

object and the district court granted leave to amend the Original 

Petition.

¶13 Mr. Noor filed his amended petition (Amended Petition) on 

August 28, 2015—more than a year and seven months after the 

PCRA’s statute of limitations had run. The Amended Petition 

omitted all three claims for relief listed in the Original Petition. In 

their place, Mr. Noor asserted a per se ineffective assistance of 

_____________________________________________________________

10 See UTAH CODE § 78B-9-107(1). 
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

6

counsel claim for his counsel’s alleged failure to “seek a competent 

interpreter for Mr. Noor at trial.” He also alleged three other 

grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel, asserting that his 

counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to carry out his “obligation to 

make sure that Mr. Noor understood what was happening at 

trial,”(2) “not let[ting] Mr. Noor aid in his own defense prior to 

trial”; and (3) “failing to advise Mr. Noor of the risk of deportation if 

a jury found him guilty.”

¶14 The State filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to 

dismiss all of Mr. Noor’s allegations in the Amended Petition on the 

basis that, in addition to other grounds, they were time-barred under 

the PCRA’s one-year statute of limitations and did not relate back to 

the claims in the Original Petition. In response, Mr. Noor did not 

dispute that the Amended Petition was filed after the one-year 

deadline, but instead argued that the amendments should be 

deemed timely because the district court, pursuant to its authority, 

granted him leave to amend the Original Petition at the status 

conference. Alternatively, he argued that the claims in the Amended 

Petition related back to the claims in the Original Petition.

¶15 The district court disagreed with Mr. Noor on both 

arguments. The court first rejected his argument that the court’s 

grant of leave to amend excused him from the PCRA’s one-year time 

bar, noting that when it had granted leave to Mr. Noor’s counsel at 

the status conference “the limitations period was not raised by the 

parties or addressed [by] the Court.” The court further stated that 

“even if the statute of limitations issue would have been raised, it is 

doubtful that the Court had any authority to extend the limitations 

period at the time of the status conference” because “the legislature 

has sharply restricted a district court’s ability to consider an 

untimely petition for postconviction relief.”

¶16 The court also rejected Mr. Noor’s alternative argument—

that the claims raised in the Amended Petition related back to the 

Original Petition. The court determined that amendments to 

post-conviction petitions are governed by rule 15(c) of the Utah 

Rules of Civil Procedure—so that in order for a new claim filed after 

the one-year bar to be declared timely “the new claim must ‘ar[i]se 

out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth . . . in the 

original pleading.” The court then held that “even the most liberal 

reading of the allegations in the Original and Amended Petition 

cannot sustain a reasonable inference that the claims in the Amended 

Petitions arise from the same factual allegations as the claims in the 

Original Petition.” The district court therefore granted summary 
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

Opinion of the Court 

7

judgment in favor of the State and dismissed all of the claims raised 

by Mr. Noor in the Amended Petition.

¶17 Mr. Noor timely appealed the district court’s decisions and 

the court of appeals certified this case to us. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(b).

Standard of Review

¶18 Mr. Noor effectively raises two issues on appeal: (1) 

whether the relation-back doctrine provided in rule 15(c) of the Utah 

Rules of Civil Procedure must be satisfied when a petitioner amends 

his or her PCRA petition after the expiration of the one-year statute 

of limitations set forth in Utah Code section 78B-9-107(1); and, (2) if 

so, whether the district court erred in dismissing the claims raised in 

Mr. Noor’s Amended Petition on the ground that they did not relate 

back to the claims in his Original Petition. “We review an appeal 

from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction 

relief for correctness without deference to the lower court’s 

conclusions of law.”11 Similarly, “[w]e review the district court’s 

decision to grant summary judgment for correctness, granting no 

deference to the [district] court.”12 We likewise have held that “[a] 

district court’s interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which 

we also review for correctness.”13

Analysis

¶19 On appeal, Mr. Noor first argues that the district court erred 

in holding that it lacked authority to allow him to add new claims to 

his Original Petition after the one-year statute of limitations had run. 

He argues that both the PCRA and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of 

Civil Procedure14 grant the court discretion to allow amended PCRA 

petitions even when they raise claims unrelated to claims filed in a 

petitioner’s original petition, and even after the statute of limitations 

_____________________________________________________________

11 Taylor v. State, 2012 UT 5, ¶ 8, 270 P.3d 471 (citation omitted).

12 Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 2012 

UT 4, ¶ 17, 270 P.3d 441 (citation omitted) (second alteration in 

original).

13 Id.

14 Rule 65C sets forth the procedural rules that “govern[]

proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under the 

Post-Conviction Remedies Act.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 65C(a). 
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

8

in section 78B-9-107(1) has expired. He further argues that the

district court has sufficient discretion to allow new claims in PCRA 

petitions, even when the new claims fail to satisfy rule 15(c)’s 

relation-back test.15

¶20 But Mr. Noor fails to account for language within the PCRA 

which explicitly states that the rules of civil procedure apply. He 

likewise ignores our recent case, Gordon v. State,

16 where we held that 

rule 7(e) is implicitly incorporated into rule 65C. Additionally, as 

noted by the district court, amendments made to both the PCRA and 

Rule 65C show that district courts’ discretion to grant time-barred 

petitions has been restricted. Accordingly, we hold that the district 

court correctly concluded it lacked discretion to allow new claims 

that do not meet rule 15(c)’s relation-back test after the limitations 

period had run.

¶21 In the alternative, Mr. Noor argues that even if the district 

court lacked authority to allow the new claims raised in the 

Amended Petition, these new claims satisfy rule 15(c)’s relation-back

test. He asserts that his Original Petition contained claims for 

ineffective assistance of counsel, mentioned the fact that he had 

trouble understanding English, and noted his cultural background. 

He argues that these arguments were “the core of [his] amended

claims.” He also contends that rule 15(c) should be liberally 

construed given rule 15(a)’s mandate and in light of the fact that he 

filed his Original Petition pro se. We agree.

¶22 The district court erred in holding that Mr. Noor’s amended 

claims did not relate back to his Original Petition. The allegations 

raised in his Amended Petition did not involve “new and different 

cause[s] of action,” which are prohibited under our relation-back 

jurisprudence.17 Instead, the amendments merely expanded the 

_____________________________________________________________

15 Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 

“[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the 

original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense 

that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or 

attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.”

16 2016 UT 11, ¶ 39 n. 17, 369 P.3d 1255.

17 See Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 

1983).
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

Opinion of the Court 

9

claims Mr. Noor pled in his Original Petition. We reverse on this 

ground.

I. The District Court Correctly Held That It Did Not Have Discretion 

to Allow an Amendment to Mr. Noor’s PCRA Petition Filed After 

the One-Year Statute of Limitations Unless the Amendment Met the 

Relation-Back Test of Rule 15(c)

¶23 Mr. Noor first argues that the district court had sufficient 

discretion to allow him to amend his PCRA petition after the statute 

of limitations had expired, regardless of whether his allegations in 

the Amended Petition related back to the Original Petition under 

rule 15(c). Specifically, he asserts that rule 65C exclusively governs 

PCRA petitions, and amendments to petitions, and that rule 15(c) 

does not apply to PCRA amendments filed after the one-year statute 

of limitations, because rule 65C makes no mention of rule 15(c). For 

support, he points to language within the PCRA, which states that 

“[p]rocedural provisions for filing and commencement of a petition 

are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.”18 According 

to Mr. Noor, this language indicates that the legislature intended 

rule 65C to exclusively govern PCRA claims. 

¶24 He also points to two provisions within rule 65C that deal 

with amendments to PCRA petitions. First, he points to subsection 

(h)(3), which provides that when a claim is “deficient due to a 

pleading error or failure to comply with the requirements of [rule 

65C], the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to 

amend within 21 days,” and that the “court may grant one 

additional 21-day period to amend for good cause shown.”19

Mr. Noor argues that “[t]his provision places no restriction on the 

claims that may be raised in the amended petition” and “does not 

suggest that such claims must be the same or relate back to the 

original petition.” Second, he cites subsection (k), which sets out the 

requirements for answers and other responses and states that “[n]o 

further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered 

by the court.”20 He asserts that “[t]his provision leaves it within the 

trial court’s discretion as to whether to allow amended PCRA 

petitions.” Accordingly, Mr. Noor believes these two provisions 

_____________________________________________________________

18 UTAH CODE § 78B-9-102(1)(a).

19 UTAH R. CIV. P. 65C(h)(3).

20 Id. 65C(k).
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

10

show that the trial court has discretion when determining whether to 

allow a petitioner to file an amended petition, “even if it raises new 

claims and even after the statute of limitations has expired.”

¶25 In response, the State argues the district court correctly 

concluded that amended petitions filed after the statute of 

limitations are subject to rule 15(c). It asserts that while rule 65C 

generally governs PCRA petitions, “when rule 65C does not 

specifically address a procedural issue, the remainder of the rules of 

civil procedure govern.” In support, the State cites to language in 

section 78B-9-102(1)(a), which provides that “[p]roceedings under 

[the PCRA] are civil and are governed by the rules of civil 

procedure.” The State also argues that while rule 65C does contain 

provisions governing amended petitions, these provisions are silent 

on whether claims are time barred when raised in an amended 

petition that falls outside of the PCRA’s statute of limitations. We 

agree with the State on this point. 

¶26 The district court correctly held that, for several reasons, 

PCRA petitions are governed by rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure. First, the language of the PCRA supports this conclusion. 

Section 78B-9-102 provides in relevant part: 

This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person 

who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal 

offense and who has exhausted all other legal 

remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided 

in Subsection (2). This chapter replaces all prior 

remedies for review, including extraordinary or 

common law writs. Proceedings under this chapter are 

civil and are governed by the rules of civil procedure. 

Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of a 

petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure.

21

As shown above, the legislature expressly stated that the rules of 

civil procedure will govern “[p]roceedings” in PCRA claims. 

Although the statute provides that “[p]rocedural” requirements to 

PCRA petitions are “found in Rule 65C,” this line cannot be read in 

isolation. When both provisions are read together, it appears the 

legislature intended PCRA claims to be governed by all of the rules 

of civil procedure and that a court should make “procedural” 

_____________________________________________________________

21 UTAH CODE § 78B-9-102(1)(a) (emphasis added).
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Opinion of the Court 

11

departures from the rules only when expressly called for in rule 65C.

Because rule 65C does not explicitly address new claims in amended 

petitions filed after the one-year statute of limitations, other rules of 

civil procedure, including rule 15(c), should be used to fill in the 

gaps.

¶27 Second, our caselaw supports an incorporation of rule 15(c) 

into rule 65C. Recently, in Gordon v. State, we reviewed a district 

court’s failure to allow a PCRA petitioner an opportunity to reply to 

the State’s response to his petition.22 After reviewing the petitioner’s 

motion for reconsideration on this matter, the district court denied 

the petitioner’s motion on the ground that “the PCRA does not 

explicitly give a petitioner a right to reply to a response by the 

State.”23 On appeal, we held that, even absent such explicit language, 

the petitioner had a right to file a reply under the PCRA pursuant to 

the rules of civil procedure.24 Specifically, we stated that “[c]ivil rule 

65C(k) does not expressly call for a reply, but we find such a right 

incorporated in rule 7(e)” and that “rule 65C’s reference to 

disposition by ‘hearing or otherwise’ [was] an incorporation of other 

rules of civil procedure.”25

¶28 Gordon may very well signal an express adoption of “other 

rules of civil procedure” into the PCRA by this court. At a minimum, 

our holding in Gordon shows our willingness to use “other rules of 

civil procedure” to answer questions raised by the text of rule 65C.

We expressed no reservation in incorporating rule 7(e) into rule 65C, 

despite the lack of any express language indicating that we should. 

Incorporating rule 15(c) into rule 65C for claims in amended 

petitions filed after the one-year deadline therefore is consistent with 

our jurisprudence. 

¶29 Finally, amendments to the PCRA and rule 65C support the 

district court’s reading of rule 65C to include rule 15(c)’s 

relation-back test. In 2008, the legislature substantially altered the 

language and structure of the PCRA. Prior to 2008, the PCRA was 

considered only “a substantive legal remedy” for a petitioner 

_____________________________________________________________

22 2016 UT 11, 369 P.3d 1255.

23 Id. ¶ 8.

24 Id. ¶ 39.

25 Id. ¶ 39 nn. 17–18.
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

12

challenging a conviction or sentence.26 After 2008, the legislature 

reformed the PCRA to make it the “sole legal remedy” for such 

challenges.27 We noted that these changes to the PCRA worked to 

limit our courts’ ability to review the merits of statutorily-barred 

petitions.28

¶30 The most important of these amendments, for the purposes 

of this case, was the removal of an explicit exception to the one-year 

time bar under the PCRA. The pre-2008 PCRA expressly permitted a 

district court to excuse the one-year time bar if justice required: “If 

the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may 

excuse a petitioner’s failure to file within the time limitations.”29 The 

2008 amendment to the PCRA removed this “interests of justice” 

exception entirely and instead replaced it with three limited 

circumstances where the limitations period would be tolled: when 

“the petitioner was prevented from filing a petition” (1) “due to state 

action in violation of the United States Constitution”; (2) “due to 

physical or mental incapacity”; or (3) “due to force, fraud, or 

coercion.”30

¶31 The removal of the “interests of justice” exception in the 

2008 PCRA amendments curtailed a district court’s discretion to 

_____________________________________________________________

26 UTAH CODE § 78-35a-102 (1996).

27 Id. § 78B-9-102(1) (2008).

28 For example, we have acknowledged that the 2008 amendment 

“appears to have extinguished our common law writ authority” to 

review the merits of certain time-barred petitions. Peterson v. 

Kennard, 2008 UT 90, ¶ 16 n.8, 201 P.3d 956; see also Gardner v. State, 

2010 UT 46, ¶ 91, 234 P.3d 1115. While our common law writ 

authority appears to have been eliminated, we have suggested, 

although we have not reached the question, that this court may have 

ongoing constitutional authority to review the merits of such 

petitions. See Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85, ¶ 28, 293 P.3d 259; 

Gardner, 2010 UT 46, ¶ 93. But because Mr. Noor has not argued that 

this court has constitutional authority to review the merits of a 

petition that is time-barred under the PCRA, we offer no opinion on 

whether such authority exists. 

29 UTAH CODE § 78-35a-107(3) (1996).

30 Id. § 78B-9-107(3) (2016). The third circumstance listed above 

was not part of the original 2008 amendment but was added later.
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Opinion of the Court 

13

review time-barred PCRA petitions. Instead of granting a district 

court discretion to allow a petitioner to file a late claim where the 

court believed that the interests of justice require, the legislature 

limited the court’s ability to allow time-barred petitions to three 

specific circumstances. The legislature therefore effectively limited 

the district court’s broad discretion in hearing time-barred petitions. 

And by removing the interests of justice exception, along with the 

common law writs for post-conviction relief, the legislature indicated 

its intent that the PCRA, and its limitations period, be strictly 

followed. 

¶32 In light of these changes, it seems highly unlikely that the 

legislature intended to grant a district court complete discretion to 

hear what would otherwise be time-barred claims in amended 

petitions filed after the limitations period had expired. Such a 

reading would undermine these amendments to the PCRA—a 

petitioner could simply rely on the broad discretion of the district 

court by amending its original petition and asserting new claims 

instead of filing a new petition that would ultimately be barred. 

Accordingly, holding that district courts do not have discretion to 

review new claims in amended petitions, unless these claims relate 

back to a claim filed in a timely original petition, gives effect to these 

amendments.

¶33 Amendments to rule 65C further illustrate that a district 

court’s discretion to review barred claims under the PCRA has been 

statutorily curtailed. In 2009, this court amended rule 65C of the 

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.31 Prior to these amendments, rule 65C 

permitted a petitioner to file, in addition to claims asserted in the 

original petition, “[a]dditional claims relating to the legality of the 

conviction or sentence” when “good cause [is] shown.”32 This 

exception was removed by the 2009 amendments. The advisory 

committee notes state that this was done to “embrace Utah’s 

Post-Conviction Remedies Act as the law governing post-conviction 

_____________________________________________________________

31 The 2009 amendments did not actually take effect until January 

2010. However, because the advisory committee notes to rule 65C 

refer to these amendments as the “2009 amendments,” we refer to 

them in the same manner.

32 UTAH R. CIV. P. 65C(c) (2009).
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

14

relief,”33 or, in other words, to give effect to the PCRA’s statement 

that it is the “sole legal remedy” for post-conviction relief. We 

therefore removed the good cause exception from rule 65C to 

embrace the changes made to the PCRA that limited a district court’s 

discretion for review of time-barred petitions. Removing the “good 

cause” exception in rule 65C therefore illustrates our intention to 

align our rules with the amended PCRA and thus shows our 

intention to strictly enforce its one-year statute of limitations. 

Because district courts’ discretion was also limited by rule 65C, it 

follows that the district court does not have broad discretion to 

review new claims in amended petitions after the limitations period 

has expired.

¶34 Here, Mr. Noor argued to the district court that it had 

authority to review the claims in the Amended Petition without 

engaging in a relation-back analysis and that it had granted 

Mr. Noor leave to amend pursuant to that authority at the status 

conference. The district court determined, however, that it could not 

review the merits of Mr. Noor’s claims in the Amended Petition 

unless those claims satisfied the relation-back test set forth in rule 

15(c). In its memorandum decision, the court stated that it was 

“doubtful that the Court had any authority to extend the limitations 

period at the time of the status conference,” reasoning that, through 

the amendments to the PCRA, “the legislature has sharply restricted 

a district court’s ability to consider an untimely petition for 

post-conviction relief.” Because of this restriction, the court 

concluded that “it does not appear that the Court had authority to 

extend the limitations period when it granted Mr. Noor’s leave to 

amend the Original Petition.” This conclusion was correct. 

¶35 As stated above, the amendments to the PCRA and rule 65C 

work to restrict a district court’s discretion to hear time-barred 

petitions. Of course, this restriction would likewise extend to a 

court’s ability to hear amended petitions after the limitations period 

has run. Otherwise, the amendments would be useless, as petitioners 

would merely amend their original petitions in order to bring new 

time-barred claims before the court. So the district court correctly 

held it was precluded from reviewing the merits of the Amended 

_____________________________________________________________

33 UTAH R. CIV. P. 65C (2010) (advisory committee notes to the 

2009 amendments).
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

Opinion of the Court 

15

Petition unless the claims listed therein satisfied rule 15(c)’s 

relation-back test.34

¶36 Accordingly, because the language of the PCRA, our 

caselaw, and the amendments to the PCRA and rule 65C support the 

district court’s application of rule 15(c) in this case, we hold that the 

district court correctly concluded that it did not have discretion to 

review Mr. Noor’s claims in his Amended Petition unless the claims 

related back to the claims in the Original Petition under rule 15(c).

II. The PCRA’s Statute of Limitations Did Not Bar Mr. Noor’s 

Claims in His Amended Petition Because These Claims 

Relate Back To His Original Petition

¶37 Having established that rule 15(c) applies to PCRA petitions, 

we now turn to whether the district court erred in determining that 

Mr. Noor’s claims in his Amended Petition did not relate back to his 

Original Petition. We hold that the court erred by applying an 

overly-narrow interpretation of rule 15(c)’s relation-back test. The 

proper test under Utah law is whether, under a liberal reading, the 

amended pleading imports “a new and different cause of action” or 

whether the amended pleading merely “expands or modifies” the 

same causes of action originally pled. Because Mr. Noor’s Amended 

Petition permissibly expands upon the cause of action (ineffective 

assistance of counsel) he pled in the Original Petition, we hold that 

his claims in the Amended Petition relate back to the date his 

Original Petition was filed and therefore are not barred by the 

PCRA’s statute of limitations.

¶38 Under Utah law, when “a new claim relates back to the date 

of the original pleading, a party may include it even when the statute 

_____________________________________________________________

34 Mr. Noor’s other arguments in regard to the district court’s 

authority are also unpersuasive. Mr. Noor cites Gregg v. State, 2012 

UT 32, 279 P.3d 396, for the notion that our caselaw implies that a 

district court’s authority to allow an amendment under rule 65C also 

includes the power to allow an untimely filing of a new claim. But no 

one raised the time-bar argument in Gregg and therefore his reliance 

is misplaced. Likewise, Mr. Noor cites Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, 

165 P.3d 1195, for the same proposition. But Benvenuto dealt with a 

PCRA petition under the pre-2008 PCRA, and we explicitly 

dismissed the petitioner’s claim there because he failed to meet the 

“‘interests of justice’ exception to the PCRA time bar.” Id. ¶ 27. So 

Benvenuto also does not support Mr. Noor’s argument.
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

16

of limitations has otherwise run on that claim.”35 Rule 15(c) of the 

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs when a claim “relates back.”36

It provides that “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the 

date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a 

claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original 

pleading.”37 Thus, in order for his claims in the Amended Petition to 

survive, Mr. Noor must show that they originated out of the same 

“conduct, transaction, or occurrence” set out (or attempted to be set 

out) in the Original Petition. 

¶39 While this court has never explicitly defined the meaning of 

the terms “conduct, transaction, or occurrence,” we have consistently 

held that, for purposes of rule 15(c), claims in an amended pleading 

relate back to the date of the original pleading when the 

“amendment . . . does not import into a case a new and different 

cause of action”38 and “does not introduce a substantially new 

issue.”39

_____________________________________________________________

35 James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (Bench, 

J., concurring); see also Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 

(Utah 1996) (“When the statute of limitations has expired before an 

amendment to a pleading is made, the amendment must relate back 

to the date of the original complaint if the amendment is to be 

effective.”).

36 UTAH R. CIV. P. 15(c).

37 Id.

38 Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 

1983). 

39 Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 881 & n.2 (Utah 1981).

The dissent takes issue with the cases we have relied upon, arguing 

that this court has never made a ruling on rule 15(c), and so, in its 

view, the case before us presents a matter of first impression. While 

we acknowledge that this court has never expressly defined the 

meaning of the words “conduct, transaction, or occurrence,” we 

certainly have established a standard as it relates to rule 15(c). As 

Justice Lee notes, in Behrens, we explicitly cited to rule 15(c) in 

holding that an amendment relates back when it “does not import 

into a case a new and different cause of action.” 675 P.2d at 1182. 

Similarly, in Hjorth v. Whittenberg, we cited to the Utah Rules of Civil 

(Continued)
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

Opinion of the Court 

17

¶40 But this does not mean that an amended pleading cannot 

relate back when the amendment differs from the original pleading. 

Relation back is proper under rule 15(c) “[w]here the amendment . . . 

expands or amplifies what is alleged in the original [pleading], even 

though imperfectly, in support of the cause of action.”40 In fact, we 

 

Procedure, which had been in existence for two years at that time, 

for the exact same proposition—that an amendment to a complaint 

relates back when it “d[oes] not import into the case a new and 

different cause of action.” 241 P.2d 907, 908 (Utah 1952). And in 

Meyers, we again spoke of rule 15(c) (although we mistakenly called 

it rule 15(e), which has never existed) in describing the relation back 

doctrine. There, we stated that an “amendment is allowed if it does 

not introduce a substantially new issue” because “[i]f no new issue is 

involved[,] the notice received . . . in the original complaint is 

deemed sufficient to alert [the defendant] to the need for gathering 

his evidence and preparing his case.” Meyers at 881 & n.2. And 

Meyers is a case we have subsequently relied upon in our discussion 

of rule 15(c). See Russell v. Standard Corp, 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 

1995) (citing Meyers, after quoting the language of rule 15(c), for the 

proposition that rule 15(c) “allows a plaintiff to cure defects in his or 

her original complaint despite the intervening running of a statute of 

limitations”). These cases show that rule 15(c) has been interpreted 

by this court for many years, so we are not interpreting it here as a 

matter of first impression.

40 Peterson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 8 P.2d 627, 630 (Utah 1932). The 

dissent argues that our reliance on Peterson is misplaced. It first 

contends that the language in Peterson we cite today has no 

application to the question before us, because Peterson was decided 

before Utah adopted its rules of civil procedure. See infra ¶ 76 (Lee, 

A.C.J., dissenting). But the dissent misinterprets our caselaw. While 

it is true Peterson was decided before rule 15(c) was formally adopted 

in Utah, this court has relied upon Peterson for our interpretation of 

the relation back doctrine under rule 15(c) after its adoption. See 

Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1182–83 (citing both rule 15(c) and Peterson for 

the assertion that an amended pleading survives a statute of 

limitations bar if it does not import into the case “a new or different 

cause of action” than the original pleading); Hjorth, 241 P.2d at 908 

(citing Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 135 P.2d 919, 922 

(Utah 1943), which in turn cites Peterson, in addressing the relation 

back doctrine under our rules of civil procedure). So we have 

(Continued)
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

18

have stated that a pleading may relate back even when the 

amendment provides an additional ground for the same claim 

 

consistently held that Peterson correctly reflects our relation back 

standard under rule 15(c). 

The dissent also contends that we incorrectly state the “operative 

legal test” in Peterson, and so our opinion, in its view, “finds no 

footing in the Peterson opinion.” See infra ¶ 74 (Lee, A.C.J., 

dissenting). Specifically, it states that the legal test set forth by the 

Peterson court did not focus on whether the amended pleading 

invoked a new or different cause of action or whether the 

amendment merely expanded or amplified what was alleged in the 

original complaint. We are perplexed by this assertion. In 

determining whether Mr. Peterson’s amended complaint related 

back to the date of the original complaint, we expressly defined the 

legal question in the case: “[t]he question . . . is whether or not the 

amended complaint states a new or different cause of action so that 

the limitation intervenes and cuts off the right.” Peterson, 8 P.2d at 

630. We provided that “[i]t is well established that a new or different 

cause of action may not be alleged under the guise of an amendment, 

. . . and also that an amendment which does not set up a new cause 

of action relates back to the commencement of the action.” Id.

(citation omitted). We continued by stating that “[w]hen a cause of 

action set forth in an amended pleading is new, different, and 

distinct from that originally set up, there is not relation back, and the 

amendment is the equivalent to the filing of a new action,” but 

“[w]here the amendment merely expands or amplifies what is 

alleged in the original complaint, even though imperfectly, in 

support of the cause of action, it is properly allowed.” Id. And in our 

conclusion, we stated that “[w]hen we compare the amendment with 

the original complaint in the light of the foregoing rules, we think 

there is such an identity of the cause of action as justifies us in 

holding that the amendment does not state a new or different cause of 

action, and therefore the limitation of time has not run against the 

cause of action stated therein.” Id. (emphasis added). Clearly the 

operative test in Peterson was whether an amended pleading set forth 

a new cause of action or whether it was merely an expansion of the 

original claim. And the fact that the Peterson court admitted that this 

test is sometimes difficult to apply does not, as the dissent suggests, 

mean that the court invoked a different test. So Peterson does support 

our holding today. 
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

Opinion of the Court 

19

resulting from the same injury.41 Thus, when the issue presented in 

the amendment is sufficiently related to the issue presented in the 

first claim so as to be reasonably construed as an expansion or 

modification of the first claim, rule 15(c) is satisfied. 

¶41 Prohibiting new causes of action, while at the same time 

permitting expansions and modifications in amendments, gives 

effect to rule 15(c)’s general purpose. Rule 15 “provides liberally for 

[the] amendment of pleadings and supplemental pleadings to the 

end that litigation may be disposed of on the merits.”42 In this vein, 

rule 15(c) “allows a plaintiff to cure defects in his or her original 

complaint despite the intervening running of a statute of 

limitations.”43 This means that we will liberally construe 

amendments to pleadings when conducting our relation-back 

analysis in order to “permit[] a complete adjudication of the matters 

in controversy.”44 This is especially true “where there is reasonable 

ground for holding that the amendment is an amplification of 

allegations already stated.”45

¶42 Additionally, “[t]he rationale of . . . Rule 15(c) is that a party 

who has been notified of litigation concerning a particular 

occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes of limitations 

_____________________________________________________________

41 See Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1182 (“Even the setting forth of ‘an 

additional ground of negligence as the cause of the same injury’ is 

not a new cause of action.” (citation omitted)).

42 Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1182 (citation omitted); see also Peterson, 8 

P.2d at 630 (“[A] pleading should be liberally construed with a view 

to substantial justice between the parties.”); Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 57 

P.2d 1132, 1136 (Utah 1936) (holding that the relation back doctrine

works “toward liberality in allowance of amendments to pleadings 

for the purpose of permitting a complete adjudication of the matters 

in controversy and in furtherance of justice”) (overruled on other 

grounds by statue as stated in Allred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass’n of Utah, 

909 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1996)).

43 Donjuan v. McDermott, 2011 UT 72, ¶ 14, 266 P.3d 839 (quoting 

Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995)).

44 Johnson, 57 P.2d at 1136.

45 Peterson, 8 P.2d at 630.
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

20

were intended to provide.”46 So analysis under rule 15 also typically 

involves an “inquir[y] into whether the opposing party has been put 

on notice regarding the [amended] claim.”47 This means that an 

amended pleading may relate back as long as the parties in an action 

have been reasonably put on notice of the new claims before the 

statute of limitations has expired.48 This is done to “safeguard the 

rights of the other party to have a reasonable time to meet a new 

issue if he so requests.”49 Accordingly, rule 15(c) works to “strike a 

balance between the policy of deciding a case on its merits and 

allowing a party to enjoy the benefits [(notice)] of the statute of 

limitations.”50

¶43 Below, the district court did not rely on our caselaw in its 

rule 15(c) determination. Instead, it relied on federal law interpreting 

rule 15(c)’s relation-back test.51 Citing Mayle v. Felix,

52 the court held 

that a new pleading relates back under rule 15(c) only when both 

“the original and [new claims] are tied to a common core of 

operative facts.”53 The court reasoned that the new claims in the 

_____________________________________________________________

46 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC, 2017 UT 

29, ¶ 18, 408 P.3d 313 (citation omitted).

47 6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure

§ 1497 (3d ed. 2010).

48 Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963) (“What [parties] are 

entitled to [under our rules] is notice of the issues raised and an 

opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all that 

is required.”).

49 Id.

50 Dos Lagos, 2017 UT 29, ¶ 18.

51 The dissent’s opinion likewise suffers from this same 

shortcoming. Although the dissent argues extensively that our 

caselaw does not support the legal standard we articulate today, it 

does not make any attempt to square its own proposed standard 

with that caselaw. Instead, the dissent eschews the standard we have 

employed for nearly seventy years—since the codification of rule 

15(c) in 1950—in favor of a federal standard that did not exist, even 

in federal courts, at the time of the rule’s adoption.

52 545 U.S. 644 (2005).

53 Id. at 664.
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

Opinion of the Court 

21

Amended Petition did not arise from the same factual allegations as 

the Original Petition, noting that “[w]hile the Original Petition does 

mention Mr. Noor’s difficulty speaking and understanding English, 

the Original Petition does not discuss any problems with the 

interpreters at trial or in Mr. Noor’s communication with counsel.” 

And it explained that “the Original Petition only alludes to 

Mr. Noor’s difficulty with the English language in connection with 

the claim that Mr. Noor could not have formed the intent necessary 

to have committed the underlying crimes.” Operating under this 

standard, the court concluded that “it cannot reasonably be inferred 

that the allegations and claims in the Amended Petition are based on 

the same operative facts and claims as the Original Petition.”

¶44 Mr. Noor claims this was error. He asserts that the district 

court should have interpreted rule 15(c) more liberally because he 

filed his petition pro se and rule 15(a) provides that courts “should 

freely give permission” to parties to amend their pleadings “when 

justice requires.”54 He additionally argues that the district court’s 

narrow interpretation of a “transaction” or “occurrence” under rule 

15(c) in this circumstance would “hobbl[e] counsel” and would 

unfairly harm “poor prisoners who need appointed counsel,” but do 

not receive counsel until after the limitations period has run.55

¶45 Alternatively, he argues that his claims in the Amended 

Petition relate back even if Mayle does reflect the relation-back test 

under Utah law. Specifically, he contends that his claims in both the 

Original and Amended Petitions arise from a common core of 

operative facts because the “lack of English Fluency and his 

counsel’s failure to adequately address this language barrier is the 

core of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his original and 

amended petition.” He therefore claims that had the district court 

construed the factual allegations in his Original Complaint liberally, 

as required under rule 15, it would have allowed the amended 

claims to be heard. 

¶46 Conversely, the State argues that rule 15(c) should be 

interpreted narrowly. Like the district court, it relies on the majority 

opinion in Mayle v. Felix, which interpreted the federal analog to rule 

15(c) to allow relation back only when the claims added by 

amendment “arise from the same core facts as the timely filed 

_____________________________________________________________

54 See UTAH R. CIV. P. 15(a).

55 See Mayle, 545 U.S. at 675–76 (Souter, J., dissenting).
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

22

claims,” and not when “the new claims depend upon events separate 

in ‘both time and type’” from the original episode.56 The State argues 

that Mr. Noor’s amended claims “shared no common core of 

operative facts with the claims raised in his original petition.” We 

disagree.

¶47 While the standard articulated in Mayle may be 

informative,

57 as discussed above, we have consistently held that for 

purposes of rule 15(c) new claims in an amended pleading relate 

back to the date of the original pleading when the “amendment . . . 

does not import into a case a new and different cause of action,”58

_____________________________________________________________

56 Id. at 656–57 (citation omitted).

57 In Mayle, a majority of the United States Supreme Court 

rejected the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation of “conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence” as meaning the new claim must stem 

from the same “trial, conviction, or sentence,” and adopted the rule 

in the majority of jurisdictions that interpret the language of rule 

15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as allowing relation 

back “only when the claims added by the amendment arise from the 

same core facts as the timely filed claims.” 545 U.S. at 657. We have 

not expressly adopted the “common core of operative facts” 

provision from Mayle and we do not do so here. While we have 

stated that “[i]nterpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 

‘substantially similar,’” Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 

UT 54, ¶ 7 n.2, 53 P.3d 947, we have not stated that such 

interpretations are dispositive. Because it is well established in our 

caselaw that we look to the cause of action, and whether, under a 

liberal reading, the amendment can be said to expand or modify the 

original cause of action stated, there is no need to import this 

interpretation into our caselaw.

58 Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1182. The dissent asserts that Behrens does 

not support the standard we articulate today. Specifically, it argues 

the Behrens court did not endorse a standard that focuses on whether 

the cause of action in the amended pleading is generally the same as 

in the original pleading in order for an amendment to relate back. See 

infra ¶ 79 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). But that is exactly what Behrens

said. There, the defendant argued that “the claim for punitive 

damages is a new claim for relief that is barred by the statute of 

limitations.” 675 P.2d at 1182 (emphasis added). Rather than dismiss 

(Continued)
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

Opinion of the Court 

23

but instead “merely expands or amplifies what is alleged in the 

original [pleading].”59 This means that the cause of action or claim 

 

the defendant’s argument for failing to focus on the “correct” legal 

standard, as the dissent suggests it did, the court clearly accepted 

this test as the operative legal test for relation back under rule 15(c), 

holding that “an amendment to include damages does not import into 

a case a new and different cause of action.” Id. (emphasis added). It then 

went on to note that even the setting forth of “an additional ground 

of negligence as the cause of the same injury is not a new cause of 

action.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

And because it concluded that the punitive damages claim was not a 

new or different cause of action than the one asserted in the original 

pleading, it held that the statute of limitations did not apply. Id. So 

contrary to what the dissent argues, the Behrens court did focus on 

whether the amended complaint asserted a new or different cause of 

action, or whether it instead merely asserted the same cause of 

action. 

The dissent also asserts that the operative test provided by the 

Behrens court was whether the proposed amendment to the 

complaint “raise[s] no new legal issues” and “does not refer to new 

or different acts of misconduct.” Infra ¶ 78 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting) 

(quoting id.). But the Behrens court looked only at whether there were 

different acts of misconduct for purposes of the notice of intent to 

sue, a prerequisite to sue a healthcare provider under the 

predecessor to Utah Code section 78B-3-412. That statute states that a 

plaintiff must provide a healthcare provider with notice that he or 

she intends to sue 90 days before commencing a formal action. As 

part of this requirement, a plaintiff must include within the notice 

“specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the prospective 

defendant.” UTAH CODE § 78B-3-412(2)(e). In Behrens, the defendant 

argued, in addition to his rule 15(c) argument, that the plaintiff had 

failed to satisfy the statutory notice of intent to sue requirement. It 

was only in reviewing this second argument that the court stated 

that “[t]he proposed amendment to the complaint does not refer to 

new or different acts of misconduct.” Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1183. So 

the court’s focus on the “misconduct” asserted in the original 

complaint pertained only to the notice requirement under the Utah 

Code, not rule 15(c). The “misconduct” standard the dissent relies 

upon from Behrens was not the operative legal standard for rule 

15(c). 

59 Peterson, 8 P.2d at 630.
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

24

asserted must generally be the same in both pleadings, and the issue 

presented in the amendment must factually relate to the issue 

presented in the first pleading.60 We reaffirm this standard as our 

relation-back test. Thus, an amendment arises out of the same 

“conduct, transaction, or occurrence” when it arises out of the same 

cause of action and alleges the same kind of factual basis as the 

original allegation.61 Under a liberal reading of the Amended 

Petition, Mr. Noor meets this test. 

_____________________________________________________________

60 See, e.g., Dos Lagos, 2017 UT 29, ¶ 18 (“Rule 15(c) is based on the 

notion that once litigation involving particular conduct or a given 

transaction or occurrence has been instituted, the parties are not 

entitled to the protection of the statute of limitations against the later 

assertion by amendment of defenses or claims that arise out of the 

same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as set forth in the original 

pleading.” (citation omitted)); Johnson, 57 P.2d at 1137 (holding that 

relation back was proper when the plaintiffs changed the instrument 

it relied upon for its water right claim from a contract to a deed in 

the amended petition because “[b]oth pleadings relate to the same 

subject-matter [(water)], the same transaction, and damages for the 

same wrong.”).

61 The dissent takes issue at length with the language we invoke 

in our articulation of the relation back standard—particularly with 

our assertions that rule 15(c) requires the issue presented in the 

amendment to be “based on factual allegations that ‘expanded upon 

the factual basis’ of the original pleading.” See infra ¶ 68 (Lee, A.C.J., 

dissenting). In the dissent’s view, our standard is “incompatible” 

with the text of Rule 15(c). Infra ¶ 69 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). So, in 

order to avoid our “fuzzy standard,” Infra ¶ 99 (Lee, A.C.J., 

dissenting), the dissent chooses to “focus on the factual 

circumstances giving rise to the claim,” infra ¶ 105 (Lee, A.C.J., 

dissenting), and endorse a line of federal cases holding that “relation 

back is allowed ‘only when the claims added by amendment arise 

from the same core of facts as the timely filed claims.’” Infra ¶¶ 94 

(Lee, A.C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). But the dissent has 

essentially endorsed the same standard we set forth today. There is 

little, if any, distinction between requiring an amendment to 

“allege[] the same kind of factual basis as the original petition” and 

requiring that the amendment “arise from the same core of facts.” 

This is just a preference in word choice. Both standards contain the 

(Continued)
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

Opinion of the Court 

25

¶48 Here, Mr. Noor did not assert a new or different cause of 

action in his Amended Petition. In his Original Petition, he listed 

“[d]enial of effective assistance of trial counsel” as the first of three 

claims for which he believes he was entitled to post-conviction relief. 

Then, in his Amended Petition, he alleged his trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness as his sole claim (although with different variations 

of grounds for that claim) for relief. But in changing the grounds, he 

did not change the legal theory asserted in his Original Petition, nor 

did he introduce a substantially different legal issue. He therefore 

has not asserted a new or different cause of action.

62

¶49 But this is not enough to satisfy rule 15(c). Mr. Noor must 

also show that his amendment may be reasonably construed as an 

expansion or modification of the original claim brought. In other 

words, he must show that the factual basis of the amended claim is 

sufficiently similar to the factual basis of the claim brought in the 

first case. And he has.

 

same requirement that we focus on the factual circumstances giving 

rise to the claim. 

Here, Mr. Noor has asserted the same core fact in both his 

Petitions—that his counsel failed to present argument based on his 

inability to understand English. The dissent parses this fact further, 

drawing a distinction between how counsel’s failure to argue that 

Mr. Noor’s inability to understand English affected his interactions 

with the victim, as opposed to his interactions with his counsel. Infra

¶¶ 64–65 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). This core fact could, no doubt, be 

parsed even further. But this is not what rule 15(c), nor our caselaw, 

demands. Rather, these authorities mandate that we read 

amendments liberally. See supra ¶¶ 41–45.

62 The dissent also criticizes our focus on whether a “new and 

different cause of action” is asserted in the amended pleading. 

Specifically, it argues that we are incorrectly limiting amendments 

permissible under rule 15(c) to those that assert the same “legal 

theory” as the original pleading. See infra ¶¶ 68 n. 73, 101 (Lee, 

A.C.J., dissenting). But we have not suggested this. Rather, we view 

the demand that the cause of action be the same in both pleadings as 

a practical, rather than literal, requirement. This means an amended 

pleading need not contain the exact same legal theory to relate back 

to the date of the original pleading. But we note that when the 

amended pleading contains an identical legal theory as the original, 

this certainly weighs in favor of relation back.
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

26

¶50 Mr. Noor’s amended claim, when construed liberally, 

expands and amplifies the claim brought in the Original Petition. In 

his Original Petition, he identified several grounds for his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim. Specifically, he claimed that his trial 

counsel was ineffective because, among other reasons, counsel did 

not “br[ing] to the trial court’s attention the fact that [Mr. Noor’s] 

cultural background prevented him from forming the requisite 

intent,” and counsel failed to “br[ing] to the court’s attention that 

[Mr. Noor’s] lack of fluency of English impaired his ability to 

understand the victim’s demands that he stop his advances.” In his 

Amended Petition he altered these grounds, alleging that trial 

counsel was ineffective because counsel “fail[ed] to seek a competent 

interpreter for Mr. Noor at trial” and failed to “let Mr. Noor aid in 

his own defense.”63 In raising these new grounds, he argued that he 

“had a difficult time understanding the translation at trial,” that he 

“did not even understand his accuser’s testimony against him,” and 

that his counsel “should have . . . ma[d]e sure that Mr. Noor 

understood” both “the police report” and “what was happening at 

trial . . . so that Mr. Noor could aid in his own defense.”

¶51 While the new grounds listed in the Amended Petition are 

not identical to those in the Original, when read liberally,64 they are 

sufficiently related to the grounds set forth in the Original. 

Mr. Noor’s focus in his Amended Petition on counsel’s failure to 

obtain a competent translator and failure to ensure Mr. Noor 

understood those speaking at trial can be reasonably construed as an 

expansion of his allegation in the Original Petition that his counsel 

_____________________________________________________________

63 Mr. Noor also claimed in his Amended Petition that trial 

counsel was ineffective because he “fail[ed] to advise Mr. Noor of 

the risk of deportation if a jury found him guilty.” But he conceded 

at oral argument that this ground does not relate back under rule 

15(c). We therefore do not address it here.

64 A liberal reading of Mr. Noor’s claims is not only supported by 

rule 15, but is also supported by the fact that he is pro se. We have 

stated that a party acting pro se “should be accorded every 

consideration that may be reasonably indulged” because “of his lack 

of technical knowledge of law and procedure.” State v. Winfield, 2006 

UT 4, ¶ 19, 128 P.3d 1171 (citation omitted). “Accordingly, this court 

generally is lenient with pro se litigants.” Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 

11, ¶ 4, 67 P.3d 1000.
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

Opinion of the Court 

27

was ineffective in failing to alert the court to his lack of fluency of 

English. Mr. Noor’s claim in the Original Petition focused on trial 

counsel’s failure to present an adequate defense on his behalf, a 

defense that hinged in large part on his inability to understand 

English and upon his cultural differences. In his Amended Petition, 

he expanded upon this factual basis, arguing that his counsel should 

have secured competent interpreters so that he could effectively 

defend against the allegations he faced. The State was therefore 

placed on notice that Mr. Noor was alleging ineffective assistance of 

counsel based upon counsel’s failure to appreciate and highlight 

Mr. Noor’s inability to understand English. Because Mr. Noor’s 

amended claim, when construed liberally, is reasonably related to 

the claim he asserted in the Original Petition, it relates back for 

purposes of rule 15(c).

¶52 The dissent believes that the claim Mr. Noor raised in his 

Amended Petition did not arise out of the conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence alleged in the Original Petition. Instead, it contends that 

Mr. Noor’s new claims “arose from an occurrence that was ‘distinct 

in time and place’ from that alleged in the [original] petition” and 

dealt with a different “actor.”65 We disagree. In both petitions, 

Mr. Noor alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective at trial for 

failing to argue the significance of his inability to understand 

English. In other words, Mr. Noor alleged in both petitions the same 

actor (his trial counsel), the same cause of action (ineffective 

assistance of counsel), the same time and place (his trial), and the 

same grounds for his cause of action (his inability to understand 

English). His amended claim was not distinct in time, place, or actor. 

So even under the dissent’s proposed standard Mr. Noor’s claims 

survive. 

¶53 Further, the dissent completely fails to take into account the 

full language of rule 15(c). Rule 15(c) states that not only will an 

amendment relate back to the date of the original pleading when the 

amendment asserts a claim that arose out of the conduct, transaction,

or occurrence set out in the original pleading, but that an 

amendment will also relate back when the claim asserted “arose out 

of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence . . . attempted to be set out . . . 

in the original pleading.”66 The dissent does not adequately account 

_____________________________________________________________

65 Infra ¶¶ 67–68 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting).

66 Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2) (emphasis added).
STATE v. NOOR

Opinion of the Court 

28

for this language in its opinion.67 But this language is as much a part 

of the rule as the “set out” language the dissent relies upon for its 

argument. The inclusion of the words “attempted to be set out”

suggests that a party need not perfectly set out the conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence at issue in the original complaint, but 

must show only that the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 

referenced in the original petition was an attempt to set out the 

occurrence pled in the amended petition. In other words, the 

language of rule 15(c) itself requires a liberal reading of an 

amendment. 

¶54 Here, Mr. Noor clearly “attempted to . . . set out” that his 

counsel was deficient at trial for failing to present argument based 

upon his inability to understand English. While the Original Petition 

may not have perfectly “set out” the conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence he would later set out in his Amended Petition, it seems a

stretch to argue that he (as a pro se litigant who does not understand 

English) failed to even “attempt to . . . set out” the conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence set forth in his Amended Petition. His 

Original Petition contained the same actor, the same legal theory, the 

same time and place, and the same underlying basis for that theory. 

So when the rule is read in its entirety, Mr. Noor’s claim in his 

Amended Petition relates back.

¶55 We have repeatedly reinforced this liberal reading 

requirement. We have stated that “Rule 15 provides liberally for 

amendment of pleadings and supplemental pleadings to the end that 

litigation may be disposed of on the merits.”68 We have also held 

that “rule 15 should be interpreted liberally so as to allow parties to 

have their claims fully adjudicated.”69 We have therefore made it 

clear that we should read both rule 15 and the amendments made 

thereunder liberally. 

¶56 But the dissent fails to do so. Instead, it reads rule 15(c) 

strictly, arguing that because Mr. Noor did not specifically affix the 

fact that he did not understand English to his trial counsel’s 

_____________________________________________________________

67 See infra ¶¶ 61, 76, 99 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting).

68 Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1182 (citation omitted); see also Peterson, 8 

P.2d at 630 (“[A] pleading should be liberally construed with a view 

to substantial justice between the parties.”).

69 Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993).
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

Opinion of the Court 

29

interaction with himself, but instead affixed it to his interaction with 

the victim of his crime, he cannot meet rule 15(c)’s standard. In so 

doing, the dissent contradicts our caselaw and the liberal reading 

requirement mandated by rule 15 itself.70

¶57 The dissent also fails to assign any weight to the fact that 

Mr. Noor is a Somalian immigrant who has difficulty understanding 

English, that he filed his Original Petition pro se, and that, despite 

his best efforts to alert the court to his inability to read and write in 

English, he was unable to secure counsel until well after the 

limitation period had run on his PCRA claim. As mentioned above, 

we have always been lenient to pro se litigants because of their lack 

of knowledge of law and procedure.71 We accordingly grant pro se 

litigants “every consideration that may reasonably be indulged.”72

This is particularly true where the party amending the original 

pleading cannot even understand the language needed to effectively 

represent him or herself. So under our lenient pro se standard 

Mr. Noor’s new claims should likewise survive.

¶58 Because a liberal reading of his Amended Petition is 

mandated by rule 15(c), our caselaw, and Mr. Noor’s pro se status,

we should not read rule 15(c) in the overly-narrow fashion suggested 

by the dissent. Instead, we should read it liberally. And under such a 

reading, his new claims arise out of the conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence he attempted to set forth in his Original Pleading. His 

claim therefore relates back to the date of his Original Pleading 

under rule 15(c).73

¶59 Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for 

further proceedings consistent with our ruling.

_____________________________________________________________

70 See UTAH R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (stating that a “court should freely 

give permission [to a party to amend his or her petition] when justice 

requires”).

71 See Lundahl, 2003 UT 11, ¶¶ 3–4.

72 Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 19 (citation omitted).

73 In its final critique, the dissent argues that our holding today 

“sets a new course for our law under rule 15(c)” and is “sure to bring 

unrest and uncertainty to this important area of Utah procedure.” 

Infra ¶ 104 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). But we have merely applied to 

the case at hand the standard our court has used for almost a 

century. See Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1182; Peterson, 8 P.2d at 630.
STATE v. NOOR

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

30

Conclusion

¶60 We hold that rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 

applies to amended PCRA petitions filed after the one-year 

limitations period. Both the language of the PCRA and our caselaw 

support such a reading. Further, the amendments to the PCRA and 

rule 65C illustrate that a district court’s broad discretion to grant 

amendments to PCRA petitions has been limited. Additionally, we 

hold that the district court erred in its rule 15(c) determination. 

Mr. Noor did not allege a different cause of action in his Amended 

Petition. Rather, when his Amended Petition is viewed liberally, it is 

clear that he merely expanded on his claim that counsel was 

ineffective for not presenting argument based on his inability to 

understand English. We therefore reverse the district court’s

relation-back determination and remand for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, dissenting:

¶61 Rule 15(c) states that “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates 

back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment 

asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, 

or occurrence set out . . . in the original pleading.” UTAH R. CIV. P.

15(c)(2). The key question presented here concerns the meaning of 

“conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” The majority treats this 

question as a matter dictated by our precedent, particularly Behrens 

v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), and Peterson v. 

Union Pac. R.R. Co., 8 P.2d 627 (Utah 1932). See supra ¶¶ 39–40, 47. It 

says that these cases call for relation back of an amended claim when 

it is based on the same legal theory as that alleged in an earlier 

pleading and “expand[s] upon [the] factual basis” giving rise to that 

complaint. Supra ¶¶ 47, 51. 

¶62 I disagree. The cited cases do not support the standard 

announced by the majority. None of our cases attempt to interpret—

or even quote or paraphrase—the operative text of rule 15(c). So the 

question presented here is a matter of first impression. And the 

standard called for by the text of the rule is different from that 

adopted by the court.

¶63 I would interpret the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” 

standard in light of a body of federal case law clarifying the meaning 

of this legal term of art (which our Utah rule borrowed from the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). And I would affirm the district 

court’s decision granting the State’s motion to dismiss Osman Noor’s 
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

31

amended PCRA petition because his new claim for ineffective 

assistance of counsel arises out of an entirely distinct transaction or 

occurrence from that which gave rise to his initial set of claims.

¶64 The claim in Noor’s original petition arose out of the 

allegation that his Somali background and “lack of fluency in 

English” “prevented him from forming the requisite intent to 

commit lewdness or forcible sexual abuse” and “impaired his ability 

to understand the victim’s demands that he stop his advances.” 

Noor asserted that no reasonably competent attorney would have 

failed to assert a mens rea defense in these circumstances. So the 

relevant “transaction” giving rise to Noor’s earlier claim was his 

lawyer’s failure to appreciate the culture and language barriers to 

Noor’s interactions with the victim of his crimes. 

¶65 This was not the “transaction” giving rise to Noor’s 

amended claim. That claim arose out of his counsel’s failure to 

appreciate the language barriers to Noor’s interactions with his 

attorney. That is a distinct transaction. It may arise out of “expanded” 

factual circumstances related to the earlier claim. But rule 15(c) 

requires more than a vague notion of factual expansion. It calls for 

relation back only where both sets of claims arise out of the same

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original 

complaint. 

¶66 I respectfully dissent because I think the district court was 

right to deny Noor’s motion for leave to amend. And I write 

separately to highlight some problems that will result from the 

majority’s reformulation of the standard that governs relation back 

under civil rule 15(c).

I. The Majority’s Standard

¶67 The majority seeks to trace its relation back standard to a 

“consistent[]” line of precedent from this court. Supra ¶ 47. Citing 

Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp. Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), and 

Peterson v. Union Pac. R.R Co., 8 P.2d 627 (Utah 1932), the court says 

that “it is well established in our caselaw that we look to the cause of 

action” stated in the original pleading and ask “whether, under a 

liberal reading,” a proposed amendment “can be said to expand or 

modify the original cause of action stated.” Supra ¶ 47 n.57. 

¶68 Based on these cases, the majority holds that an amendment 

relates back to the date of an original pleading “when the 
STATE v. NOOR

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

32

‘amendment . . . does not import into a case a new and different 

cause of action,’ but instead ‘merely expands or amplifies what is 

alleged in the original [pleading].’”74 Supra ¶ 47 (alterations in 

original). And it states that “an amendment arises out of the same 

‘conduct, transaction, or occurrence’ when it arises out of the same 

cause of action,” supra ¶ 47, as that alleged in the original pleading 

and is based on factual allegations that “expanded upon the factual 

basis” of the original pleading. Supra ¶ 51.

¶69 I disagree with the majority’s standard and its application of 

our case law. Our cases have never interpreted the language of rule 

15(c). So we should begin by interpreting the operative text. That text 

is incompatible with the majority’s standard. Instead of asking 

whether the amended pleading “expand[s] upon [the] factual basis” 

of the earlier one, the rule requires that both claims arise from the 

same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” The majority’s standard 

is likewise incompatible with our case law. And the cases cited by 

the majority do not support its proposed standard. 

A. Peterson v. Union Pacifiic Railroad Co.

¶70 The seminal Utah case is Peterson v. Union Pacific Railroad 

Co., 8 P.2d 627 (Utah 1932). The Peterson case involved tort claims 

asserted by the estate of John Peterson against his employer, Union 

Pacific Railroad Company. Peterson was killed while working to 

clear rocks off of a railroad track. Id. at 628. His estate filed a 

complaint asserting negligence claims under the Federal Employers’ 

Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59. Id. The original complaint was 

timely—within the two-year statute of limitations set forth in the 

federal statute. Id. But the estate later sought to file an amended 

complaint beyond the limitations period. Id. Union Pacific sought 

_____________________________________________________________

74 The majority seems to try to walk this back at a couple of places 

in the opinion. In footnote 62, for example, the court says that it has 

“not suggested” that it is “limiting amendments permissible under 

rule 15(c) to those that assert the same ‘legal theory’ as the original 

pleading.” Supra ¶ 48, n.62. Fair enough. The court doesn’t strictly 

limit amendments under rule 15 to those based on the same legal 

theory. But it certainly highlights this as a factor of relevance to its 

analysis. See supra ¶ 48 (noting Noor “did not change the legal 

theory” from his original petition); id. ¶ 54 (listing “same legal 

theory” as a factor weighing in favor of relation back). And I see no 

basis for that in rule 15(c).
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

33

dismissal of the amended pleading on the ground that it “set[] out an 

entirely new act of negligence or cause of action,” and was therefore 

time-barred. Id. at 628.

¶71 We concluded that the amended negligence claim related 

back to the date of the original complaint. And in so doing we stated, 

as the majority notes, that an amendment that “merely expands or 

amplifies what is alleged in the original complaint” is “properly 

allowed.” Id. at 630 (citations omitted). But this was not the 

articulation of an operative legal test (and it could not have been an 

interpretation of rule 15(c), which was not in existence at the time of 

this decision).75 It was merely a statement of the court’s holding. The 

court emphasized, moreover, that “[t]he cases are in considerable 

conflict” in their attempt to articulate a governing standard for 

distinguishing new claims from mere expansions of existing ones. Id.

And the court’s ultimate holding turned on the fact that both sets of 

negligence claims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence. Id.

at 630-31.

¶72 Peterson was killed by a rock that fell from a cliff or ledge 

above the part of the track where he was clearing rocks. That much 

was undisputed. But the precise source of the falling rock was 

unknown. The initial (timely) “complaint proceeded on the theory 

that the rock fell from the overhanging ledge left upon excavation of 

the right of way out of the mountain side.” Id. at 629. The amended 

(untimely) complaint, on the other hand, “proceeded upon the 

theory that the rock rolled down the mountain side from above the 

precipitous ledge.” Id. And this difference yielded somewhat 

different sets of allegations of the nature of the railroad’s 

negligence—with the original complaint focusing on an alleged 

“failure to provide a safe place to work” and failure to inspect or 

warn of falling rocks or that no inspection had been made, and the 

_____________________________________________________________

75 The “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” test was first 

introduced as a matter of federal procedure in 1937, when the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. FED. R. CIV. P., 

Historical Note (2012). And the test was first imported into Utah law 

in 1950, when we adopted the first version of our Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 15(c) (1950) (“Whenever the claim or 

defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 

original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the 

original pleading.”). 
STATE v. NOOR

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

34

amended complaint abandoning the “acts of negligence respecting 

the ledge” while “retain[ing] and amplif[ying]” the failure to warn 

allegation as “applied to rocks rolling down the mountain side.” Id.

at 630. 

¶73 We concluded that the amended complaint asserted a claim 

that “merely expand[ed] or amplifie[d] what [was] alleged in the 

original complaint.” Id. But we emphasized the “difficulty” of 

distinguishing new claims from mere expansions of existing ones. Id.

And we based our decision on the fact that “the transaction alleged 

in the amendment is the same as in the original complaint”—in that 

“[t]he accident is the same, the person killed [is] the same, the 

manner in which the rock struck the deceased is the same, the time 

and circumstances the same except that in the first complaint it was 

alleged that the rock fell from the top or face of the cliff rather than 

farther up the mountain side.” Id. In other words, we said that a 

mere change in theory as to the “place from which” the rock fell 

“does not essentially change the character of the action, nor state a 

new or different cause of action.” Id. at 631. We held that “[i]t would 

be too narrow and technical a construction to hold that this is an 

entirely new and different cause of action from the one stated in the 

original complaint.” Id. 

¶74 The majority opinion accordingly finds no footing in the 

Peterson opinion. Peterson does not say that an amended claim relates 

back when it “arises out of the same cause of action” and “expand[s] 

upon th[e] factual basis” of the original pleading. Supra ¶¶ 47, 51. It 

requires that both claims arise out of the same transaction. Peterson, 8 

P.2d at 630 (noting that “an amplification of allegations already 

stated” may be permitted “where the transaction alleged in the 

amendment is the same as in the original complaint”) (emphases 

added)).

¶75 The Peterson opinion admittedly speaks in terms of a 

distinction between “new” claims and those that merely “expand” 

on existing ones. But it also emphasizes that line-drawing in this area 

is “difficult.” And its holding ultimately turns on the fact that the 

two sets of claims in the case arise out of the same transaction or 

occurrence (and not merely that they make factual allegations that 

expand on the original pleading).

¶76 To the extent Peterson articulates a test that speaks of new

claims versus existing ones, it is at odds with the text of Rule 15(c).

Peterson was handed down well before our adoption of the Utah 

Rules of Civil Procedure. And the question presented in this case 

concerns the meaning of the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” 
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

35

test set forth in Rule 15(c). Because that rule was adopted well after 

Peterson, we cannot cite that case as establishing a controlling 

precedent under the rule.76

B. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc.

¶77 The next case cited by the majority is Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 

Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). Behrens is a wrongful death 

case against a hospital. The decedent was admitted for treatment for 

alcohol abuse at the defendant hospital and was given a razor when 

he asked to be allowed to shave. Id. at 1181. He then killed himself 

with the razor. His estate sued the hospital for wrongful death and 

received a judgment for $100,000 in a jury trial. Id. The trial court 

granted a motion for new trial, however, based on the failure to give 

a jury instruction for comparative negligence. Id. At that point the 

plaintiff sought to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive 

damages. Id. The defendant asserted “that the claim for punitive 

damages [was] a new claim for relief that [was] barred by the statute 

of limitations.” Id. at 1182. 

¶78 This court rejected that argument. We held that “an 

amendment to include damages does not import into a case a new 

and different cause of action,” and thus concluded that the punitive 

damages claim related back to the date of the original complaint. Id.

(citations omitted). In so holding we cited rule 15(c), which was then 

in effect. See id. at 1183. But we did not quote the operative language 

of the rule or offer any interpretation of it. Instead we relied on 

precedent in Utah and elsewhere holding that a request for punitive 

_____________________________________________________________

76 The majority seeks to avoid this problem by asserting that our 

subsequent cases have somehow transformed the Peterson standard 

into an interpretation of a rule promulgated decades later. See supra

¶ 39 nn.38,39 (citing Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 

1182 (Utah 1983); Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 241 P.2d 907, 908 (Utah 

1952)). But I see nothing in the cited cases to support that view. In 

Behrens we made no attempt to analyze Peterson. See Behrens, 675 

P.2d at 1183. Nor did we engage with—much less analyze—the text 

of Rule 15(c). Id. So I see no way to read our passing reference to 

Peterson as a decision to “rel[y] upon Peterson for our interpretation” 

of rule 15(c). The Hjorth case provides even less support for the 

majority’s view. I find no reference to Peterson whatsoever in Hjorth.
STATE v. NOOR

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

36

damages relates back where it “raise[s] no new legal issues” and 

“does not refer to new or different acts of misconduct.” Id.

¶79 Behrens does not support the majority’s new standard. 

Nowhere does the court endorse the view that a claim in an 

amended pleading relates back when it “arises out of the same cause 

of action” and is a factual expansion of allegations in that pleading. 

Supra ¶ 47. The two claims in Behrens, in fact, were in some sense 

distinct: “The proposed amendment to the complaint [did] not refer 

to new or different acts of misconduct; rather, the amendment 

relie[d] upon a different legal characterization of the same 

conduct”—in extending the initial allegation that the defendant’s 

conduct was “negligent” to include an allegation that it was also 

“‘grossly negligent’ or reckless.” 675 P.2d at 1183. 

II. My Approach

¶80 For reasons explained above this case presents a question of 

first impression. Because our cases have never interpreted the 

“conduct, transaction, or occurrence” standard in rule 15(c) we 

should start with first principles. Those principles begin with the 

language of the rule. See Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, 

¶ 9, 248 P.3d 465. And the operative text says that an amended claim 

relates back when it arises out of the same “conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence” set forth in the original complaint. UTAH R. CIV. P. 15(c). 

¶81 The quoted language was imported from rule 15(c) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B); see also 

UTAH R. CIV. P. 15(c) & Foreword (1950). Our adoption of Utah Rule 

15(c) was accordingly an adoption of the cluster of principles 

embedded in federal law.77 And I would thus start with the body of 

case law interpreting the federal rule in seeking to understand the 

meaning of “conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” 

_____________________________________________________________

77 See Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ¶ 7 n.2, 53 

P.3d 947 (noting that precedent interpreting federal rules “are 

persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 

‘substantially similar’”); Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, ¶ 16, 250 P.3d 48 

(“Because the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned after the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where there is little Utah law 

interpreting a specific rule, we may . . . look to the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure for guidance.”) (citation omitted).
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

37

¶82 I am not saying that we are required to follow the federal 

case law. See supra ¶ 47 n.57. The federal standard is in no way 

binding on this court. The applicable rule is a Utah Rule of Civil 

Procedure. So it is ours to interpret. But the question of 

interpretation presented in this case is a matter of first impression. 

Our cases have never interpreted the operative “conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence” standard in rule 15(c). We should offer an 

interpretation of that language now. And the starting point for our 

interpretation should be the text of that rule.

¶83 This text incorporates a longstanding legal term of art. And 

we should thus interpret the rule’s language by reference to the body 

of case law establishing the meaning of these terms. Maxfield v. 

Herbert, 2012 UT 44, ¶ 31, 284 P.3d 647 (“[W]hen a word or phrase is 

‘transplanted from another legal source . . . it brings the old soil with 

it.’”(citation omitted)). 

¶84 I would do so here. In light of a longstanding, settled body 

of cases under federal rule 15(c) I would hold that the “conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence” test means what it says—it has reference 

to the factual circumstances giving rise to a set of claims. Thus, I 

would hold that an amended claim relates back to an original 

complaint when the new claim arises from the same set of factual 

circumstances alleged in the earlier complaint.78

_____________________________________________________________

78 The majority seeks to rehabilitate its approach—and to criticize 

mine—by pointing to a different clause in rule 15(c). It notes that rule 

15(c) “states that not only will an amendment relate back to the date 

of the original pleading when the amendment asserts a claim that 

arose out of the conduct[,] transaction[,] or occurrence set out in the 

original pleading, but that an amendment will also relate back when 

the claim asserted ‘arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence . . . attempted to be set out . . . in the original pleading.’” 

Supra ¶ 53 (alteration in original). The majority chides me for failing 

to consider this language. And it asserts that the “attempted to be set 

out” language “requires a liberal reading” of the rule that supports 

its approach. Id.

I beg to differ. The quoted language does not enlarge the scope of 

what counts as the relevant “conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” It 

just says that an amendment should relate back even if the original 

complaint was inartfully drafted in its attempt to lay out the relevant 

facts. It is thus inconsistent with the text of the rule to read the 

(Continued)
STATE v. NOOR

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

38

¶85 This standard is easy to state in the abstract but sometimes 

difficult to articulate with particularity—and occasionally difficult to 

apply. But this case is an easy one. The transaction alleged in the 

original petition is quite distinct from that set forth in the amended 

pleading. In the first petition Noor focused on his trial lawyer’s 

failure to appreciate the culture and language barriers to Noor’s 

interactions with the victim of his crime. He alleged ineffective 

assistance of counsel in his trial lawyer’s failure to assert a mens rea

defense in light of these problems—a defense based on the idea that 

Noor’s cultural background (Somali) and “lack of fluency in 

English” “prevented him from forming the requisite intent to 

commit lewdness or forcible sexual abuse” and “impaired his ability 

to understand the victim’s demands that he stop his advances.” But 

Noor changed the subject in his amended petition. He abandoned 

the focus on his lawyer’s failure to appreciate the culture and 

language barriers to Noor’s interactions with the victim of his 

crimes. Instead he asserted a claim arising from his lawyer’s failure 

to appreciate the language barriers to Noor’s interactions with his 

attorney. This claim asserted ineffective assistance in failing to engage 

an interpreter at trial, as allegedly necessary to allow Noor to 

communicate with his lawyer concerning his defense and strategy at 

trial. 

¶86 The two petitions accordingly arise from distinct 

transactions. I would affirm the district court on this basis. I would 

conclude that Noor’s amended claim for ineffective assistance of 

counsel cannot be viewed as arising from the same “conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence” set forth in the original complaint. 

A. The Standard in Rule 15(c)

¶87 The standard in rule 15(c) is straightforward. It says that an 

amended claim relates back when it arises from the same “conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence” alleged in the original complaint. The 

rule is accordingly focused on the factual circumstances giving rise 

to the plaintiff’s claims. Courts have long held that an amended 

claim relates back if it arises out of the same factual circumstances—

or the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence”—set forth in the original 

 

“attempted to be set out” language as mandating a liberal reading of 

what was attempted to be set out. This requires leniency only in 

assessing how it was set out.
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

39

complaint.79 And that holds regardless of whether the plaintiff’s 

theory of recovery (or nature of the “cause of action,” to use the 

majority’s term) is distinct.80

¶88 The courts have sometimes struggled to state a 

comprehensive test delineating the scope of the relevant “conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence.”81 But the factual relationship between 

_____________________________________________________________

79 See, e.g., United States v. Craycraft, 167 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 

1999) (“If the ineffective conduct alleged by [petitioner] in his first 

petition cannot be said to have arisen out of the same set of facts as 

his amended claim, his amendment cannot relate back . . . .”); Holmes 

v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 757 F.2d 1563, 1566 (5th Cir. 1985) 

(concluding that an amended claim did not relate back because that 

claim was “based on entirely different facts”); Santana v. Holiday Inns, 

Inc., 686 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Once the defendant is in court 

on a claim arising out of a particular transaction or set of facts, he is 

not prejudiced if another claim, arising out of the same facts, is 

added.”); Wiren v. Paramount Pictures, 206 F.2d 465, 468 (D.C. Cir. 

1953) (concluding that an amended claim did not arise out of the 

same conduct, transaction, or occurrence even though the 

subsequent conduct “grew out of” the original pleading because it 

was “independent and distinct”). 

80 See, e.g., Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 141, 146 

(2012) (“[I]t does not matter whether the new claim is premised on a 

legal theory different from the one set out in the original complaint.” 

(citations omitted)); Kuba v. Ristow Trucking Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 1053, 

1055 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that an amendment to include treble 

damages related back to the original negligence claim because res 

judicata would preclude the prosecution of both claims in separate 

actions); Johansen v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d 1377, 

1380 (5th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the amended complaint for 

breach of implied and express warranty related to the original 

products liability claim even though the theory of recovery was 

wholly different); White v. Holland Furnace Co., 31 F. Supp. 32, 34 

(S.D. Ohio 1939) (“To give effect to Rule 15(c), . . . the Court should 

allow an amendment of a pleading where the factual situation was 

not changed though a different theory of recovery is presented.”). 

81 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 

PROCEDURE § 1497 (3d ed. 2018) (noting that “[j]udicial opinions

occasionally have recited mechanical tests in an attempt to determine 

whether a particular amendment should relate back,” such as by 

(Continued)
STATE v. NOOR

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

40

the original and amended petition has always required more than 

expansion on the facts in the initial pleading. Both sets of claims 

must arise from the same set of factual circumstances. And an 

amended claim—even one based on the same legal theory or cause 

of action as that set forth in the original complaint—does not relate 

back where it arises from conduct, a transaction, or an occurrence 

that was “distinct in time and place” from that alleged in the first 

pleading.82

¶89 The mere existence of factual expansion has never been 

sufficient. I am not aware of a single case prior to this one in which a 

court has concluded that a claim relates back so long as it expands 

upon the facts of an earlier pleading.83 The majority nowhere 

 

asking whether a “judgment on the claim set forth in either 

pleading” would “bar an independent action on the other,” whether 

“the same evidence” would “support both the original and amended 

pleadings,” and whether the “measure of damages” is “the same in 

each case”; and concluding that “[a]lthough each of these 

formulations expresses a relevant factor, none of them fully 

embraces the philosophy of Rule 15(c)” (citations omitted)).

82 Oja v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 

2006) (concluding that the amended complaint does not relate back 

to the earlier complaint because the acts of disclosure were “distinct 

in time and place”); see also Phelan v. City of Chicago, 125 F. Supp. 2d 

870, 877 (N.D. Ill. 2000), aff’d, 347 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding 

that “separate employment actions at different times by different 

City departments involving different jobs do not constitute the ‘same 

conduct, transaction or occurrence’ under Rule 15(c)(2)”); United 

States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that “Rule 

15(c) does not apply where the [petitioner’s] proposed amendment 

makes claims or is based on occurrences ‘totally separate and 

distinct, “in both time and type” from those raised in his original 

motion’” (quoting United States v. Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d 501, 505 

(10th Cir. 2000) & Craycraft, 167 F.3d at 457)); Nat’l Distillers & Chem. 

Corp. v. Brad’s Mach. Prods., Inc., 666 F.2d 492, 496 (11th Cir. 1982) 

(concluding that the additional claims in the amendment did not 

relate back to the original complaint because the allegations “were 

separate and distinct from the price fixing violations alleged in the 

original complaint”).

83 The majority does not cite such a case—or any support for this 

notion. Instead it seeks to frame my proposed standard as the 

(Continued)
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A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

41

explains how much “expansion” would be allowed under its novel 

standard. Such a standard, moreover, will undermine the notice 

rationale of rule 15(c). See supra ¶ 42 (highlighting this rationale). A 

standard allowing mere factual expansion to relate back will always 

beg the question of how much expansion is too much. And the 

arbitrary nature of that inquiry means that a defendant will have no 

notice of the range of claims that may later be deemed to relate back 

to an earlier pleading.

¶90 The way to provide notice is to adhere to the text of the rule. 

That text suggests that “a party who has been notified of a litigation 

concerning a particular occurrence has been given all the notice that 

statutes of limitations were intended to provide.” Supra ¶ 42 (citation 

omitted). I would stick to that standard. I believe that doing so is the 

only way to advance the notice rationale highlighted by the majority.

B. Mayle v. Felix

¶91 The United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Mayle v. Felix, 

545 U.S. 644 (2005), though not binding on this court, is also 

instructive. In Mayle the court was presented with a federal analogue 

to the question presented here—the standard for relation back under 

federal rule 15(c) for an amended claim for post-conviction review 

under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(AEDPA). 545 U.S. at 648. That statute imposes a one-year limitation 

period for federal habeas petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). And, as in 

this case, the petitioner in Mayle asserted a timely post-conviction 

claim but then later sought to amend the petition by adding a new 

claim. The timely claim in Mayle asserted that “the admission into 

evidence of videotaped testimony of a witness for the prosecution 

violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 

 

substantial equivalent of the one it applies—asserting that “[t]here is 

little, if any” real distinction between our standards except perhaps 

“word choice.” Supra ¶ 47, n.61. I see the matter differently. My 

approach admittedly looks at “the factual circumstances giving rise 

to the claim.” Id. But the factual circumstances I would consider are 

set forth in the text of rule 15(c)—the “conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence” giving rise to the claim. UTAH R. CIV. P. 15(c)(2). The 

majority’s test is much broader, and less definite. And it considers 

(in some unspecified way) whether the proposed amendment

“expand[s] or modif[ies] the original cause of action stated.” Supra

¶ 47 n.57. This is a far less determinate inquiry than the one I would 

embrace. 
STATE v. NOOR

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

42

Clause.” 545 U.S. at 648. The untimely claim, alleged in an amended 

pleading filed five months after the expiration of AEDPA’s time 

limit, asserted that “in the course of pretrial interrogation, the police 

used coercive tactics to obtain damaging statements from him, and 

that admission of those statements at trial violated his Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination.” Id. at 649.

¶92 The district court in Mayle denied the petitioner’s motion for 

leave to amend to add this claim, holding that petitioner’s “allegedly 

involuntary statements to police d[id] not arise out of the same 

conduct, transaction or occurrence as the videotaped interrogation” 

of the prosecution witness. Id. at 652 (alteration in original). The 

Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that the relevant “transaction” under 

federal rule 15(c) was petitioner’s “trial and conviction in state 

court.” Id. at 653 (citation omitted).

¶93 The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion by Justice 

Ginsburg. It noted that “[t]he key words are ‘conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence.’” Id. at 656. And it explained that the Ninth Circuit’s 

“comprehensive definition” of those words would allow “virtually 

any new claim introduced in amended petition” under AEDPA to 

“relate back.” Id. at 656–57. After all, Justice Ginsburg explained, 

“federal habeas claims, by their very nature, challenge the 

constitutionality of a conviction or sentence, and commonly attack 

proceedings anterior thereto.” Id. at 657 (citations omitted). 

¶94 The Mayle Court also noted that a “majority” of federal 

circuit courts had adopted a much narrower standard than that 

embraced by the Ninth Circuit. Id. Under the majority view, relation 

back is allowed “only when the claims added by amendment arise 

from the same core facts as the timely filed claims, and not when the 

new claims depend upon events separate in ‘both time and type’ 

from the originally raised episodes.” Id. (citation omitted). 

¶95 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court embraced this 

majority view. It held that “relation back depends on the existence of 

a common ‘core of operative facts’ uniting the original and newly 

asserted claims.” Id. at 659 (citations omitted). And it emphasized 

that the rule 15(c) standard must be defined in a way that “relaxes, 

but does not obliterate, the statute of limitations” in the operative 

statute (AEDPA). Id. (citation omitted).

¶96 The Mayle Court also connected its “common core of 

operative facts” test to longstanding federal case law. It cited a long 

string of federal court of appeals cases requiring an amended claim 

to arise from a single episode identified in the original complaint. See 

id. at 657–60. And it explained that its approach was likewise 
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

43

consonant with the standard set forth in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line 

Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 574 (1945). 

¶97 Tiller is a counterpart to our Peterson case. It involved a tort 

claim against a railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. 

The plaintiff “initially alleged various negligent acts,” but then 

sought to file an amended pleading adding “a claim under the 

Federal Boiler Inspection Act for failure to provide the train’s 

locomotive with a rear light.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 659. Tiller “held that 

the amendment related back, and therefore avoided a statute of 

limitations bar, even though the amendment invoked a legal theory 

not suggested by the original complaint and relied on facts not 

originally asserted.” Id. But the Federal Boiler Inspection Act claim 

nonetheless related back because “[t]here was but one episode-insuit in Tiller”—“a worker’s death attributed from the start to the 

railroad’s failure to provide its employee with a reasonable safe 

place to work.” Id. at 660. Thus, the plaintiff in Tiller “based her 

complaint on a single ‘occurrence,’ an accident resulting in her 

husband’s death.” Id. But the Mayle Court emphasized that that 

standard was not met in the case before it, given that the petitioner 

“targeted separate episodes, the pretrial police interrogation of [a] 

witness . . . in [the] original petition” and the petitioner’s “own 

interrogation at a different time and place in [the] amended 

petition.” Id. And it declined to find relation back under federal rule 

15(c). 

¶98 In so doing the Mayle Court also highlighted the effects of a 

contrary conclusion on the one-year limitations period set forth in 

AEDPA. It noted that “AEDPA’s limitation period would have slim 

significance” under the Ninth Circuit’s standard. Id. at 662 (citations 

omitted). And it emphasized that “it would be anomalous to allow 

relation back under” federal rule 15(c) “based on a broader reading 

of the words ‘conduct, transaction, or occurrence’ in federal habeas 

proceedings than in ordinary civil litigation.” Id. at 663.

¶99 These are all salient points. And in my view they cut 

strongly against the majority’s fuzzy standard and in favor of a 

standard based on the plain language of rule 15(c). First and 

foremost, the Mayle opinion reinforces the fact that the settled, 

majority interpretation of “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” is 

incompatible with the approach adopted by our court today. 

Nobody in Mayle was arguing for a “same cause of action” test or a 

hazy “factual expansion” qualifier. Certainly none of the lower 

federal courts had embraced such a standard. Everyone understood 

the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” test to require a focus on 
STATE v. NOOR

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

44

the specific factual circumstances set forth in the original complaint. 

The only question was how to define the relevant set of factual 

circumstances.

¶100 The Mayle Court, moreover, emphasizes the need to assure 

that the rule 15(c) standard does not override the operative statute of 

limitations. And it shows how the standard approach to “conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence” preserves a role for a statute of 

limitations applicable to post-conviction review claims.

¶101 The majority’s standard here is perhaps narrower than 

that embraced by the Ninth Circuit in Mayle. But the court never 

clearly identifies the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” that is 

relevant to our inquiry.84 Instead it says that what really matters is 

that the new claim be the same “cause of action” (meaning the same 

legal theory of relief) as that asserted in the original complaint. And 

where that is so (as it often will be under the PCRA, in that the core 

claim arising under the PCRA is a claim for ineffective assistance of 

counsel), the court merely requires that the new claim be rooted in 

the “same kind of factual basis” as that set forth in the original 

petition. Supra ¶ 47. 

¶102 The court’s standard, however, is incompatible with the 

longstanding approach of the federal courts—an approach that was 

_____________________________________________________________

84 At one point the majority implies that Mr. Noor’s entire trial 

could qualify as the “same time and place” for purposes of rule 15(c) 

analysis. Supra ¶ 52. Elsewhere it says that the relevant “core fact” 

giving rise to both sets of claims is the fact that “his counsel failed to 

present argument based on [Noor’s] inability to understand 

English.” Supra ¶ 47 n.61. Neither of those views of the relevant 

“conduct, transaction, or occurrence” is tenable. The first is the same 

untenably broad approach embraced by the Ninth Circuit in Mayle

(and rejected by the Supreme Court). And the second underscores 

the fact that the majority is allowing widely disparate events to relate 

back under the guise of “factual expansion” instead of focusing on 

the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” The “conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence” giving rise to Noor’s first claim involved 

Noor’s interactions with the victim of his crimes. See supra ¶ 50. And 

the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” giving rise to his amended 

claim was very different. This claim arose out of events at a different 

time and place and involving different actors—Noor’s interactions 

with his trial counsel. Id.
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

45

well settled by the time our Utah rule was adopted. See White v. 

Holland Furnace Co., 31 F. Supp. 32, 34 (S.D. Ohio 1939) (discussing 

the amendments to the federal rule 15(c) and noting that “[t]he 

emphasis of the courts has been shifted from a theory of law as the 

cause of action, to the specified conduct of the defendant upon 

which the plaintiff tries to enforce his claim” (citing N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. 

Kinney, 260 U.S. 340 (1922); United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 

288 U.S. 62 (1933)).85 And the court’s standard is fuzzy and illdefined. We are told very little about what it means for a new claim 

to be rooted in the “same kind of factual basis” as that alleged in an 

earlier petition. The closest the court comes to elaborating on this 

standard is to say that it is enough for the new pleading to “expand” 

upon the facts of the earlier one. Supra ¶ 51. I have no idea where 

this standard comes from or what it will mean going forward. It 

seems aimed at opening the door for future courts to override the 

statute of limitations in our PCRA on the arbitrary ground that an 

entirely new set of circumstances is merely an “expansion” of the 

facts in the original pleading.

¶103 The court’s standard, moreover, will presumably apply 

outside the PCRA. Because we have never before interpreted the 

terms of rule 15(c) the majority opinion in this case will set the 

standard for relation back for any of a range of claims. And so long 

as a new claim happens to state the same “cause of action” as that 

advanced in a prior complaint, the new claim will relate back so long 

as it has a “factual basis” that “expands” upon the initial pleading. 

¶104 The court’s standard sets a new course for our law under 

rule 15(c). I am unsure how it will play out in the future. But it seems 

sure to bring unrest and uncertainty to this important area of Utah 

procedure.86

_____________________________________________________________

85 The majority seeks to undermine my approach on the ground 

that the federal standard that I embrace “did not exist” at the time of 

Rule 15(c)’s adoption. Supra ¶ 43 n.51. But these and other cases put 

that notion to rest. My approach is not to “strictly” interpret rule 

15(c). Supra ¶ 56. It is to interpret it fairly, in light of the language of 

the federal rule that we imported into our Utah rule. And we cannot 

interpret this language without considering the federal counterpart 

to our Utah rule.

86 The majority seeks to avoid these and other problems by 

pointing to Mr. Noor’s immigration status, his lack of English 

(Continued)
STATE v. NOOR

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

46

C. Application of the Rule 15(c) Test to this Case

¶105 For the above reasons I would apply a standard dictated 

by the plain language of rule 15(c). I would hold that an amended 

claim relates back to an earlier complaint only where it arises out of 

the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” set forth previously. 

And I would define that standard as a long line of federal courts 

have—to focus on the factual circumstances giving rise to the claim, 

without regard to whether the claim is rooted in the same legal 

theory as asserted previously.

¶106 I would hold that a new claim relates back to an earlier 

one only where it arises from the same core of operative facts alleged 

in the original complaint. And I would clarify that it does not relate 

back where it arises from facts that were “distinct in time and place” 

from that alleged in the first pleading. See supra ¶ 31 & n.5.

¶107 I would also affirm the district court’s decision under this 

standard. I would hold that Noor’s new claim for ineffective 

assistance of counsel does not relate back to the original petition 

 

proficiency, and his pro se status. Supra ¶ 57. Yet it nowhere explains 

how these considerations affect the standard that it applies—except 

to suggest that we should be “lenient” to pro se litigants and give a 

“liberal” interpretation to motions to amend under rule 15. Supra

¶ 51 n.64. And I fail to see the salience of the majority’s concerns. 

Certainly I bear some human sympathy for those who are left to 

navigate the legal system without either counsel or proficiency in the 

predominant language of our culture. Yet to my knowledge we have 

never cited those concerns as grounds for altering our view of the 

law—or its application to a pro se party. We can be lenient to 

unrepresented parties by giving them the benefit of the doubt in the 

interpretation of their legal filings. That is all the leniency that our 

law has called for. See McNair v. State, 2014 UT App 127, ¶ 12, 328 

P.3d 874 (noting that a “pro se document ‘is to be liberally 

construed’” to excuse “inartful[] plead[ing]” (internal quotations and 

citations omitted)).

But the problem here is not an ambiguity in or failure of 

pleading. It is in the interpretation of rule 15(c) and its application to 

this important case. And I fear that a goal of solicitude for Mr. Noor 

may invoke the maxim that hard facts make bad law. See N. Sec. Co. 

v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J. dissenting) 

(“Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law.”).
Cite as: 2019 UT 3

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

47

because the new claim arose from an occurrence that was “distinct in 

time and place” from that alleged in the petition. 

¶108 Noor’s original claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 

arose out of his counsel’s failure to appreciate the language and 

culture barriers to Noor’s interactions with the victim of his crimes. 

The amended petition had a different focus. It arose out of alleged 

barriers to Noor’s effective communication with his trial attorney. 

Thus, the second pleading is in some sense a factual expansion of the 

first—insofar as it deals with a completely new set of facts. But the 

two claims did not arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence. They focused on two very different relationships that 

were “distinct in time and place” (and actor).87

¶109 The amended claims at issue here accordingly do not arise 

from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the 

original complaint. And for that reason they cannot relate back to the 

original petition. I would so hold. I would affirm the district court on 

the ground that Noor’s amended claims are barred by the statute of 

limitations set forth in the PCRA.

III

¶110 The standard in rule 15(c) is straightforward. A claim in an 

amended pleading relates back to an earlier pleading if both arise 

from the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” The majority 

distorts that standard by allowing relation back so long as a new 

claim alleges the same kind of cause of action as that in an earlier 

_____________________________________________________________

87 The majority challenges this conclusion on the ground that 

Noor alleged in both petitions “that his trial counsel was ineffective 

at trial for failing to argue the significance of his inability to 

understand English.” Supra ¶ 52. It also emphasizes that Noor’s 

focus in both petitions was “trial counsel,” that his “cause of action” 

in both cases was a claim for “ineffective assistance of counsel,” and 

that the “time and place” where both claims arose was at “trial.” Id. 

This just underscores the problematic nature of the majority’s 

inquiry—and its incompatibility with the text of rule 15(c). If trial 

counsel is the relevant “actor” and the relevant “transaction” is the 

trial then few, if any, ineffective assistance claims will fall outside of 

rule 15(c). The only limiting factor will be the ability to identify a 

way to frame the new pleading as a simple “expansion” of the 

earlier. And most any enterprising lawyer can find some plausible 

way of doing so.
STATE v. NOOR

A.C.J. Lee, dissenting 

48

pleading and expands upon the facts laid out therein. I dissent 

because this new standard is incompatible with our rule. I also fear 

that it will lead to arbitrary results going forward. 

¶111 There is a sense in which it could be said that both of 

Noor’s claims arose out of a common “transaction.” If the relevant 

transaction is defined as Noor’s trial then any claim for ineffective 

assistance at trial arose out of that transaction. That cannot be the 

relevant transaction for purposes of a PCRA claim for ineffective 

assistance under rule 15(c), however. The PCRA requires that any 

post-conviction claim for ineffective assistance be asserted within 

one year. UTAH CODE § 78B-9-107. And rule 15(c) must be interpreted 

in a manner that preserves some application of that statute of 

limitations. Cf. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 657, 659 (2005) (rejecting 

the trial-as-the-transaction concept because “virtually any new claim 

introduced in an amended petition will relate back, for federal 

habeas claims, by their very nature” and thus would “obliterate[] the 

statute of limitations”). We thus cannot conclude that the trial was 

the relevant transaction, or that the claim at issue here relates back 

because it arose out of that transaction.

¶112 The majority stops a half-step short of identifying the 

relevant transaction at that level of generality. But it adds a gloss that 

is not compatible with the text of rule 15(c), and that will distort the 

development of our law in this field. I respectfully dissent on that 

basis.