### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 4, 200 6 S es sio n
ALEXANDER C. WELL S v . TENNESS EE BO ARD OF REGENTS , ET AL 

### .

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 95-2144-III Car ol McCoy, C hancellor

No. M2005- 00938-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on S eptem ber 27, 2006

F oll ow ing te rm inatio n o f h is e mpl oy me nt, a p r of e sso r at T e nn e sse e Sta te Un ive rs ity pr e va ile d in thi s pr o tr a c te d te n u r e te r mi n a ti o n p r o c e e d in g
. O n r e man d to Ch a n c e r y Co u r t f o ll o w in g a

succe ssful appea l, the profe ssor filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 moti on for r elief f rom the pre -appe al judg ment to as s er t a cl ai m for ba ck pay . The Chanc ellor g rante d relief and aw arde d back pay , which the de fe nd a nts c ha lle ng e on tw o g ro un ds . T he y c on t e ndthe c ou rt

abu se d it s d isc re tio n b y

a wa rd ing Rul e 60 relief , and be ca u s e b ac k pay

is not specifica lly

authorized by

statute, an a war d of bac k pay vio la te s th e so ve re ig n im mun ity do c tr ine . F ind ing no e rr or , w e a ff ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., joined. P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., filed a dissenting opinion. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; and B randy M. Gagli an o, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for the appellants, Tenne ssee Boa rd of Reg ents, Tenne ssee State Universit y , an d J ames Hef ner.
Phi lli p L . D a vid so n, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lle e , A le xan de r C . We lls

. OP IN ION

Alexander C. Wells was a tenure d profe ssor at Tenne ssee State Unive rsity in 1990 when a student filed a c omplaint accusing him of sexual hara ssment. Following an interna l investiga tion, the investig ating office r at t h e univer sitydetermined there was suff icient evidenc e to find that Professor Wells violated the university ’s sexual harassment policy . Professor Wells appea led that finding . An administrative law judg e conduc ted a f ull evidenti ar y h earing and determined that Pro fe s sor Wells viol ated the unive rsity ’s sexual harassment policy . That dec ision was then submitt ed to the univer sitypresident, who uphe ld the finding

. There afte r, tenure termination proce edi n g s w e r ein it ia te d

. T h euniversity ’s tenure committee ruled that Profe ssor Wells’s tenure should be terminated. Professor Wells appea led t he dec ision of-2-

the tenure committee to the uni versity president, who approve d the committee’s de cision. Professor Wells t h en appealed the univer sity ’s dec ision to t he Te nnesseeBoa rd of Reg ents (B oard)

. Chance llor Charles E. Smith conducted a revi ew after w hich he c oncurr ed with the univer sity ’s de c isi on . Pr of

e sso r We lls app e a le d th e Cha nc e llo r’ s d e c isi on to the B oa rd , w hic h d e nie d th e app e a l. Following the B oard’ s decision, Professor Wells i nitiated this action by filing a Petition for Review wi th the Da vid son Co un ty Cha nc e ry

Cou rt . T he Te nn e sse e B oa rdof Re g e nts , T e nn e sse e Sta te University , and James H efner, President of the university , wer e the na med def endants. The Cha nc e ry Cou rt c on du c te d a he ari ng fo llo wi ng wh ic h it re ve rs e d the B oa rd ’s de c isi on to t e rm inate Professor Wells. An orde r to t h at ef fe ct was entere d Aug ust 17, 1998. The def endants a ppeale d. Ultimately , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court aff irmed t he decision of t he C hance ry Court, following which the c ase w as re manded.

On re mand, Professor

Wells filed a Rule 60.02 (5 ) Motion for Relief fr om the pre- appea l order . The purpose of the motion was to ena ble him to assert a c laim for back pay for the time he
was wr ong fully

terminated. The Cha n ce l l or g rante d the Rule 60 motion and awa rded Prof essor Wells back pay

plus prejudg ment interest.

Th e de fe nd a nts pr e se nt t wo issue s o n a pp e a l. O ne , th e y

c on te ndthe c ou rt

abu se d it s discretion by

g ranting Professor Wells’ motion for Rule 60 re lief. Two, they contend the a war d of back pay , which is not specific ally authorized by

statute, violates the sover eig n immunit y doctrine.

T E NN . R. C IV . P. 60.02 R ELI EF
The func tion of Tenn. R

. Civ. P. 60.02 is "to strike a proper balanc e betwe en the c ompeting pri nci pl es o f fi nal it y

and ju st ice ." Jerk ins v. McKinney , 533 S.W .2d 275, 280 (Tenn. 1976) . I t is "an
esca pe valve from possible inequity that might otherwise arise from the unrele nting impos ition of th e pri nci pl e of fin ali tyim bed ded in ou r pr oced ural rul es. " Thompson v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. , 79 8 S. W.2 d 2 35 , 2 38 (T e nn . 1 99 0) . T e nn . R. Civ . P. 60 .0 2 p ro vid e s in pa rt : On motion and upon such terms a s are just, the court may re l i ev e a party or the p ar t y 's l eg al re prese ntative from a final judg ment, order

or proc eeding for the following rea sons: (1) mistake, inadvertence , surprise or excusable neg lect; (2) f raud (whe ther he retofor e denominate d intrinsic or extrinsi c), misre prese ntation, or other misconduct of an adver se party ; (3) the judg ment is void; (4) the judg ment has bee n satisfied, re lease d or dischar g ed, or a prior judgme nt upon w hich it is based has be en re ve rs e d o r o the rw ise va c a te d, or it i s n o lo ng e r e qu ita

ble that a ju dgmen t shou ld have p ro s pective a

pplication; or (5) a ny

other re ason justify ing r elief f rom the op e ratio n o f the jud g me nt.
A motion for re lief pursua nt to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 addre sses itself to the sound discretion of the trial judg e. Underwood v. Zurich Ins. Co. , 854 S.W .2d 9 4 , 9 7 (T enn. 1993). Our scope of revie w of such a decision is to determine if that discre tion was abused. Id .; Day v . Day , 931 S.W .2d 936, 939 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).-3-

Wh e n w e r e v i e w a tr i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n u n d e r t h e ab u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n s t a n d ard , w e wi ll uphold the tr i al co u rt 's rul ing “ so long a s rea sonable minds can disa g ree as to the propriety of the decision made .” Franklin Capital Assocs., L.P. v. Almost Family, Inc

. , 194 S.W .3d 392, 405 (Tenn. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 5 )( ci t i n g Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) ). Considering the equities of this ca se, we have c oncluded r easona ble minds could disag ree as to the propriety of the Chance llor’s decision. Acc ording ly , we f ind no error

with the Chance llor’s
e xer c ise of

he r d isc re tio n b y

a vo idi ng the po ssi ble ine qu ity that ma y ha ve ari se n h a d Pr of e sso r We lls been pr ocedur ally

deprive d of the opportunity to assert a

claim for ba ck pay

. There fore , we a ffirm t h e C h a n c e l l o r ’ s d i s c r e t i o n ar y d e c i s i o n t o g r a n tR u l e 6 0

. 0 2 ( 5 ) r e l i e f t o s e e k b a c k p a y.
S OVE RE I GN I M M U N I TY
Th is c a se c ome s to us fo llo wi ng the de te rm inatio n th a t Pr of e sso r We lls wa s w ro ng fu lly t e r m i n a t e d a s a t e n u r e d p r o f e s s o r a t T e n n e s s e e S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y, f o r w h i c h h e w a s a w ar d e d b a c k p a y, benef its, and prejudg ment int er es t for the pe riod of time he wa s wrong fully terminated. The defe ndants contend the awa rd violates the sove reig n immunit y doctrine.

The re levant statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8-304, does not expresslyprovide for the awa rd of back pay in the event a university fac ulty member who had been awarde d tenure is “vindicated
or re instated” following a re view of the profe ssor’s dismissal or suspension for cause
. I n pertinent part th e s tatu te p r o v id e s , “ a f a c u lt y me mb e r w h o h a s b e e n a w ar d e d te n u r e , a n d w h o has bee n dismiss ed or suspe nded for cause , may

obtain de novo judicial re view o f the fina l decision. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49- 8-304(a ).

The sover eig n immunit y

doctrine pr ovides that the state, a s a s o v er ei gn entity , is imm une f r o m s u it e xc e p t to th e e xte n t th a t it c o n sents to be sued. Br own v . S tat e , 783 S.W .2d 567, 571 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 8 9 )( ci t i n g Brewington v. Brewington , 215 Tenn. 475, 387 S.W.2d 777 (1965)). The rig h t t o f

il e a c a u s e o f a c ti o n a g a in s t th e s tate o r ig in a te s f r o m th e Co n s ti tu ti o n o f

T e n n e s s e e, which states “ [s] uits may be broug ht ag ainst the State in such m anner and in such c ourts as the L e g isl a tur e ma y

by la w d ir e c t.” Te nn . Co ns t. a rt

. I , § 17

. “ A s ta tut e pe rm itt ing su it a g a ins t th e Sta te must be strictly

construed, a nd jurisdiction cannot be enlar g ed by implication.” Br own , 783 S.W .2d at 5 7 1 (c i t i n g Stokes v . Univ. of Tenn. , 737 S.W .2d 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987))

. Th e statut e a t is su e do e s n ot e xpre ssl y pr ov ide a re me dy fo r b a c k p a y

a ndbe ne fi ts; thu s, it
wo u l d ap p ea r t h at P ro fe s s o r W el l s ’ c l a i m f o r b ac k p ayan d b en ef

i t s i s b arre d b y

t h e s o v er ei gn immunit y doctrine. That arg ument fails, however, in light of the S upreme Court’s holding in Sta te
ex re l. Chapdelaine v. Torrence , 532 S.W .2d 542, 550 (Tenn. 1976) . I n Chapdelaine , th e Sup re me Court was fa ced w ith the same arg ument prese nted here, t hat an awa rd of back pay to this professor violated principles of sovere ign immuni ty

. The Chancellor aw arde d the tenure d profe ssor the sum of $12,500 fo r b ack pay , which the Supre me Court found prope r. As the Court explained,-4-

Whil e the Cha nc e llo r t

re a te d this as “damag e s” , w e thi nk that is a n u nf

ortun a te char acte rization. The word “ damag es” c onnotes a re covery for hurt, harm or injury inflicted upon an injure d party . We are not dealing here with damag es in the conventional se nse of the w ord. The a war d was simply an en forced re stitut ion of unpaid wag es to the extent they wer e not m itigate d. I n common parla nce this wa s an a w ar d f o r b a c k p a y.
Ch a p delaine , 532 S.W .2d at 550. The Court we nt on to defuse the sove reig n immunit y defe nse, ex p l ai n i n g:
We are not impressed with the insistence that this action ag ainst these def endants, a s state of fi c ia ls e ng a g e d in the pu rs uit of the ir of

fi c ia l duti e s, is a suit

a g a ins t th e state a n d , t h e r e f

o r e , i s b arr e d b y s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y. Article 1, Section 17 of t he C onstitut ion of Tennessee provides in pertinent pa rt : Suits may be brought against the State in such m anner and in such courts as the L e g isl a tur e ma y

be la w d ir e c t. ( e mph a sis in o ri g ina l)
Section 49-1 4 1 7 T .C.A. g ives the Chance ry Court jurisdiction of actions br ou g ht b y

te nu re d te a c he rs to r e vie w the ir dis mis sa l.

Citi e s a ndc ou nti e s a

re arm s o f the state a nd su c h imm un ity a s th e y c la im i s wholly deriva tive from the state itself, and this Court has co n s i s t en tly approve d
awa rds of ba ck pay as to te ache rs in c ity and county school sy stems. Se e e .g ., J e ffe rs v. Stanley, supra; W

agner v. Elizabethton City Board of Education , 496 S.W .2d 468 (Tenn. 1973)

. Chapdelaine , 5 32 S.W. 2da t 55 0. Up on the fi lin g of a Pe tit ion to Re he ar by the state , th e Sup re me C o u rt re af

fi rm ed i t s h o l d i n g co n ce rn i n g t h e s o v er ei gn i m m u n i t y d ef en s e, ex p l ai n i n g:
The State' s petition insi sts that we fa iled to consider s 2 0

- 1 7 0 2 T.C.A. rela ting to the so ve re ig n imm un ity of the Sta te . Se c tio n V I I of the ma in o pin ion dis c us se s th is iss ue
. We re ite rate that “ we are no t imp re sse d wi th the ins ist e nc e (that th is) is a su it ag ainst the State and, ther efor e, is barr ed by sovere ign immunity .”

The c olleg e and univer sityteac hers' tenure law, as inc orporated in § 49-1421 T. C. A

. , a n d th e r e g u lati o n s p r o mu lg a te d p u r s u a n t th e r e to , w o u ldb e “ a s s o u n ding brass, or a tinkling cymbal”, if it did not carry with it the coordinate right of a tenur ed te a c he r t o s e e k b a c k p a y

in w ro ng fu l di smi ssa l c a se s. Chapdelaine , 532 S.W .2d at 551.-5-

The defenda nts have corre ctly noted t hat t he statute at issue in Chapdelaine wa s r e pe a le d in 1976. Ordinarily , that would be sig nificant. We note, howe ver, the statute was r epea led only to be
r e v iv e d a s p ar t o f a b r o a d e r s tatu to r y s c h e me
. T h a t s c h e me p e r tain e d to th e imp le me n tati o n of a State University and C ommunity College Sy stem, with the g overna nce, ma nag ement and c ontrol of the state un ive rs iti e s a nd c omm un ity c oll e g e s ves te d in one of the de fe nd a nts , th e B oa rdof Re g e nts

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49- 8-101, et. seq

. T h e c ap ti o n o f Se n a te B il l N o
. 2 1 0 1 , th e 1976 leg islation repe aling the Chapdelaine statut e , e xpla ine d it wa s
AN AC T t o r e pe a l T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d, Se c tio ns 49 -1 42 1 a nd 49 -1422; to authorize the B oard of

Reg ents t o promulg ate a tenure policy

for f aculty at i n s t i t u t ions withing the State Unive rsity and CommunityCollege Sy stem of Tenne ssee; to authorize the B oard to de fine the na t ure of tenure and rig hts and responsibilities thereunde r; . . . to a uth or ize the Bo ar d to prov ide for

ad e qu ate c au se for termination of

faculty w ith tenure, and the pr ocedure s for such termination ‘ and to provide for judicial review

. (empha sis added)
1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1275.

As we k n o w f

ro mre ad i n g Chapdelaine , th e fo rm e r statut e a uth orize d an d re qu ir e d the state board of education – the prede cessor to the Boa

rd of Reg ents – to establish a sy stem of tenure for
c oll e ge an d un iver sit y

te a c he rs a ndpr omu lg a te ru le s a ndre g ulatio ns fo r a te nu re sy ste m. Furthermore , that statute provided that the te ache r “ shall be entitled to a judicial rev iew of the action of the board for the sa me purposes a nd in the same manne r provided by s 49-1417.” Chapdelaine , 532 S.W .2d at 545. (e mphasis added) The ne w statutory s cheme provided that a fac ulty member who had be en aw arde d tenure , and who wa s d i s m i s sed for cause , may

obtain simil ar r elief to that
a va ila ble in the oldstatut e , th a t bei ng de no vo jud ic ia l re vie w by fi lin g a pe tit ion in c ha nc e ry

c ou rt

. Th e statut e in e ff

e c t to da y is a lso su bs ta nti a lly

sim ila r. I t r e a ds :
A fa culty member w ho has b ee n awa rded te nure, a nd who has be en dismissed or suspended f

or cause, may

obtain de novo judicial re view of t he fina l decision by filing a petition in a chanc ery

court. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 49- 8-304(a ).

The de fenda nts also point to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-511, whic h applies to te ache rs in the elementa ry and sec ondary

schools, and specifically provides for the award of ba ck pay in the event that a teac her is “ vindicated or reinstated” as a result of an investigation into t he suspension of the teac her by

the direc tor of schools. Te nn. Code Ann. § 49-5-511( a)( 3). They contend Te nn. Code Ann. § 49-5-511 show s a leg islative intent contrary to the holding in Chapdelaine . We are unpersua ded by

the ar g ument for two r easons. One , the statute does no t p er t ai n to colleg e and university profe ssors. Two, we view the d efe ndants sug g estion as at best faint evidence of leg islative int e nt a ndare c e rt a in the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y wo uld ha ve be e n mor e dir e c t. I t ha s h a d th irty y e ars to express a contra

ry intent, and we f

ind it has declined to do so.-6-

The Chapdelaine court a war ded the tenur ed prof es s o r back pay

when f ace d with a substantially simil ar statute as prese nted here

. We f ind no uncertainty in the Sup re m e C ourt’s holding in Chapdelaine , and we are oblige d to follow the lead of the Tenne ssee Supre me Court. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirme d, and this matter is rema nded with costs of a ppeal
a sse sse d a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nts

.

___________________________________ FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR ., J UDGE