UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 97-30101

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DOUGLAS TURCK COENEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

_________________________________________________________________

February 18, 1998

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, GARWOOD, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

In appealing his sentence for transmission of child

pornography, Douglas Turck Coenen challenges the special conditions

of supervised release requiring community notification of his

conviction, claiming also that the district court did not give

notice that it might impose them. We AFFIRM.

I.

Having pled guilty to four counts of transmission of child

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1), Coenen was

sentenced to 33 months imprisonment and three years supervised

release on each count, to be served concurrently. In addition to

the standard conditions of supervised release, the district court

imposed, inter alia, special conditions. This was done pursuant to
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a recommendation from the social worker who interviewed Coenen

during the pre-sentence investigation, and found that he met the

diagnostic criteria of pedophilia (“recurrent, intensely sexually

arousing ... behaviors generally involving ... children ... that

occur over a period of at least 6 months” that “could be said to

cause clinical[] impairment in social and occupational, or other

important areas of functioning”).

The special conditions are:

3. As directed by the probation officer, the

defendant shall give notice of the crime for

which he was convicted and his name and

address to:

a. The chief of police in the

municipality and the sheriff of the parish in

which the defendant will reside. The

defendant shall register with the sheriff of

the parish in which he will reside.

b. All people who live within a one

mile radius (rural area), and a three square

block area (urban/suburban area) of

defendant’s residence after release.

c. The superintendent of the school

district where the defendant will reside. The

superintendent will notify the principal of

any school he deems necessary of this

information.

Above notifications must be given by mail

within 30 days of release on supervision

and/or within 30 days of setting up residence

in that locale and shall be at the defendant’s

own expense.

4. As directed by the probation officer, the

defendant shall publish notice in the official

journal of the governing authority of the

parish where the defendant plans to reside on

two separate days within the 30 days of

setting up residence in that local[e]. The

notice shall be published at the defendant’s

own expense.
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5. As directed by the probation officer, the

defendant shall give notice as deemed

appropriate, such as signs, handbills, bumper

stickers, clothing labels, and door-to-door

oral communication. The notice shall be at

the defendant’s own expense. 

The notification conditions were based on the provisions of

the Louisiana Registration of Sex Offenders Act, LA. R.S. 15:542,

which requires a convicted sex offender to register with law

enforcement authorities and to provide notice of his crime of

conviction, name, and address to neighbors and the superintendent

of the school district in which he resides, for a period of ten

years following release from imprisonment. LA. R.S. 15:542(B)(1).

It is undisputed that the Louisiana Act does not apply to Coenen as

a federal offender. 

II.

Coenen challenges the community notification conditions. In

that regard, he also contends that he was entitled to notice that

the court was considering imposing them.

Special conditions of supervision are reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Along this line, “[s]ection 5D1.3 of the Guidelines

gives a sentencing court broad discretion to impose conditions on

supervised release if they are reasonably related to (1) the nature

and circumstances of the offense, (2) the need for adequate

deterrence of further criminal conduct, and (3) the need to protect

the public.” United States v. Mills, 959 F.2d 516, 519 (5th Cir.

1992) (emphasis added).

The foregoing language from Mills reflects that, in addition

to certain mandatory conditions of supervised release, sentencing
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courts are authorized to “order, as a further condition of

supervised release”, the discretionary conditions of probation set

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(1)-(10) and (12)-(20) (which do not

provide for any community notification requirements), as well as

“any other condition it considers to be appropriate”,

to the extent that such condition

(1) is reasonably related to the factors

set forth in section 3553(a)(1),(a)(2)(B),

(a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D);

(2) involves no greater deprivation of

liberty than is reasonably necessary for the

purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B),

(a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and

(3) is consistent with any pertinent

policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)....

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 

Thus, a special condition must be reasonably related to “the

nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant”, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); and must

involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably

necessary in the light of the need “to afford adequate deterrence

to criminal conduct”, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), “to protect the

public from further crimes of the defendant”, 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)(2)(C), and “to provide the defendant with needed

educational or vocational training, medical care, or other

correctional treatment in the most effective manner”, 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)(2)(D).

The Sentencing Guidelines track the statute, see U.S.S.G. §

5D1.3; and a policy statement sets forth recommended conditions of
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supervised release, see U.S.S.G. § 5B1.4 (p.s.). Among those

recommended “standard” conditions is the following:

[A]s directed by the probation officer, the

defendant shall notify third parties of risks

that may be occasioned by the defendant’s

criminal record or personal history or

characteristics, and shall permit the

probation officer to make such notifications

and to confirm the defendant’s compliance with

such notification requirement.

U.S.S.G. § 5B1.4(a)(13)(p.s.). This condition was included among

the boilerplate standard conditions of supervised release included

in the judgment against Coenen. 

A.

In maintaining that the district court should have given him

notice that it might require community notification, Coenen

analogizes to such notice requirements for an upward departure, and

for victim notification which, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3555, may be

imposed upon a defendant found guilty of fraud. 

1.

Before considering whether Coenen was entitled to notice, we

first must determine whether he properly presented this issue in

district court. The pre-sentence investigation report (PSR) noted

that the social worker who had examined Coenen had recommended that

he be required to “comply with the sexual offender notification

regulations of the State of Louisiana”, but Coenen did not object

to that portion of the PSR. Likewise, at the sentencing hearing,

he did not object when the court announced that it “intend[ed] to

invoke the current laws that the State of Louisiana has regarding

notification of neighbors of this offense”. Nor did he object at
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sentencing when the court stated: “I think for the protection of

the children that the sexual offender notification regulations of

the State of Louisiana need to be invoked in this particular case

once this defendant is released from custody.” Finally, he did not

object when the district court imposed the sentence, including the

special conditions at issue. 

On the other hand, Coenen’s counsel apparently tried to make

an objection after the district court completed imposition of the

sentence. He stated, “Your Honor, let me if I can --”; but the

court said “Let me just finish”. Accordingly, after the court

advised Coenen of his right to appeal, counsel made the following

objection:

Your Honor, let me register an objection at

this time to your imposition of the notice

requirements to the extent that Part V,

sentencing options, paragraph seventy through

eighty of the presentence [report], did not

reflect that and to the extent that they are

not specifically authorized by the Guidelines

or any other federal statutes that I know of

and that Your Honor is tracking the state’s

statutes, we would object to it on the grounds

that it is a sentence that is greater than

that authorized by the Guidelines or statutes,

or -- and that is a condition that is not

authorized by the Guidelines or statutes.

(Emphasis added.) However, counsel did not then request a

continuance in order to locate and/or present evidence in

opposition to the conditions. After allowing the Government to

respond, the court stated why it was imposing the notification

requirement. 

Arguably, this objection was not sufficient to apprise the

district court of Coenen’s position that Rule 32 requires notice
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similar to that required for an upward departure. On the other

hand, neither prior to, nor when it announced its intention to

impose the notification requirement, did the court ask for

additional evidence or for comments on that point. (As discussed

supra and infra, the evidence before the district court included

the PSR and the social worker’s report.) And, when the requirement

was imposed, counsel did note that, in the PSR section for

sentencing options, there was no suggestion for community

notification. 

In short, the comment by Coenen’s counsel can be fairly read

as being equivalent to “no notice” and that it is required.

Accordingly, we find, dubitante, that he did sufficiently object.

2.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1) provides, in

pertinent part: “At the sentencing hearing, the court must afford

counsel for the defendant and for the Government an opportunity to

comment on the probation officer’s determinations and on other

matters relating to the appropriate sentence”. In Burns v. United

States, 501 U.S. 129, 138 (1991), the Court held: “before a

district court can depart upward on a ground not identified as a

ground for upward departure either in the presentence report or in

a prehearing submission by the Government, Rule 32 requires that

the district court give the parties reasonable notice that it is

contemplating such a ruling.” (Emphasis added.) In addition, the

“notice must specifically identify the ground on which the district

court is contemplating an upward departure.” Id. at 139. 
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The Court reasoned that an interpretation that did not require

notice of the grounds under consideration for upward departure

would be “inconsistent with Rule 32's purpose of promoting focused,

adversarial resolution of the legal and factual issues relevant to

fixing Guidelines sentences”. Id. at 137. Similarly, in United

States v. Pankhurst, 118 F.3d 345, 357 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 630 (1997), we held that the Government

has the same right to pre-sentencing notice of a downward departure

that Burns requires for an upward departure.

As noted, Coenen asserts that the notification conditions are

analogous to an order requiring a defendant convicted of fraud or

intentionally deceptive practices to give notice and explanation of

the conviction to victims, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3555. In that

regard, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(d) requires pre-sentencing notice: 

Prior to imposing an order of notice pursuant

to section 3555, ... the court shall give

notice to the defendant and the Government

that it is considering imposing such an order.

Upon motion of the defendant or the

Government, or on its own motion, the court

shall—

(1) permit the defendant and the

Government to submit affidavits and written

memoranda addressing matters relevant to the

imposition of such an order;

(2) afford counsel an opportunity in open

court to address orally the appropriateness of the

imposition of such an order; and

(3) include in its statement of reasons

pursuant to subsection (c) specific reasons

underlying its determinations regarding the

nature of such an order.
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18 U.S.C. § 3553(d). Coenen maintains that similar notice should

be required when a district court is contemplating imposition of

community notification conditions such as those imposed upon him.

Neither party has cited, nor have we found, any cases directly

on point. In United States v. Mills, our court considered whether

pre-sentencing notice of the imposition of occupational

restrictions on supervised release was required under Burns and

Rule 32. The defendant in Mills pleaded guilty to charges of mail

fraud and altering odometers on cars sold from his dealership. 959

F.2d at 517. The district court imposed the following occupational

restriction as a special condition of supervised release:

That defendant shall not own or operate a new

or used car business during the term of

supervised release. Defendant shall seek

employment in an occupation other than

automobile sales and shall not accept any

employment without approval of the probation

officer. Defendant shall close his current

business ... within 60 days of the entry of

this order.

Id. at 518. Mills contended that imposition of this occupational

restriction constituted an upward departure, entitling him to presentencing notice; he also asserted that the restriction was not

necessary to protect the public from continued unlawful conduct.

Id.

Our court concluded that the occupational restriction was not

an upward departure from the Guidelines, requiring pre-sentencing

notice to the defendant, but was, instead, “simply an exercise of

the district judge’s authorized discretion to impose additional

terms of probation or supervised release”. Id. at 519. The court
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distinguished Burns on the basis that it involved a situation “in

which the court[s] imposed a term of confinement exceeding the

maximum range set forth in the Guidelines’ sentencing table.” Id.

We do not believe it to be in the interest of

justice or the efficient administration of the

sentencing process to extend the notice

requirements of Burns to cases where the

defendant’s term of confinement is not at

stake. Requiring trial judges to give prior

notice of their intent to impose an

occupational restriction would only further

encumber the lengthy sentencing process

without adding anything to defendant’s

existing procedural protections.

Id. (emphasis added). 

Along this line, our court reasoned that it would be

“impractical to require a sentencing judge to give detailed notice

of an intended sentence before” the sentencing hearing and that,

“[i]f either side is dissatisfied with the proposed sentence,

counsel can request a continuance for further preparation”; if a

continuance is denied, “counsel can move for reconsideration or

modification after the sentence is imposed, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and

failing success at the district court level, can appeal.” Id. In

sum, our court upheld the condition requiring Mills to seek

employment in an occupation other than automobile sales, but

concluded that the record did not warrant imposition of the

condition requiring Mills to sell his business. Id. at 519-20.

In United States v. Edgin, 92 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 1996),

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 714 (1997), the Tenth

Circuit considered the propriety of a special condition of

supervised release preventing the defendant from contacting his
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son. Id. at 1048. The defendant challenged the condition for the

first time on appeal. Because the condition was imposed after the

court had resolved all of the objections to the PSR and after the

defendant had made a final statement, and the defendant was given

no notice of or opportunity to comment on the condition, the court

concluded that the defendant’s “attack on the special condition was

not waived by his failure to assert it below”. Id. at 1049 (citing

Burns, 501 U.S. at 134, and FED. R. CRIM. P. 32). It is not clear

what type of notice would be required under Edgin, because the

court addressed the lack of notice only in the context of whether

the defendant had preserved his challenge to the imposition of the

special condition. However, it may well be that the court’s

citation to Burns and Rule 32 indicates that it believed that at

least some pre-sentencing notice was required.

The Government asserts that Mills is controlling, citing our

court’s conclusion that it is not “in the interest of justice or

the efficient administration of the sentencing process to extend

the notice requirements of Burns to cases where the defendant’s

term of confinement is not at stake.” Mills, 959 F.2d at 519. At

issue in Mills, however, was an occupational restriction that is

quite dissimilar to — indeed, far less invasive than — the

community notification conditions at issue. Arguably, the “term of

confinement is not at stake” language is dicta; it was not

necessary in order to dispose of the specific item in issue. See

F.D.I.C. v. Enventure V, 77 F.3d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1996)

(statements which are not necessary to the holding of a case are
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dicta); United States v. Nixon, 777 F.2d 958, 966 (5th Cir. 1985)

(same). In any event, the Guidelines make specific provisions for

occupational restrictions such as the one imposed in Mills, see

U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5, and the commentary to § 5F1.5 does not

contemplate or require pre-sentencing notice.

Likewise, as noted, the Guidelines policy statement recommends

as a standard condition of supervised release the notification of

third parties of “risks that may be occasioned by the defendant’s

criminal record or personal history or characteristics”, U.S.S.G.

§ 5B1.4(a)(13) (p.s.). But, that general statement does not

expressly contemplate imposition of far-reaching conditions of

community notification such as those imposed in this case. 

Section 5F1.4 is the only other pertinent provision in the

part of the Guidelines dealing with “Sentencing Options”. It

provides that the court may order the defendant to pay the cost of

giving the earlier mentioned 18 U.S.C. § 3555 notice to victims (as

discussed, § 3555 provides that, in cases where a defendant has

been convicted of an offense involving fraud or intentionally

deceptive practices, the court may order the defendant to “give

reasonable notice and explanation of the conviction” to victims of

the offense). The commentary to § 5F1.4 states that, “[i]f an

order of notice to victims is under consideration, the court must

notify the government and the defendant”, as required by 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(d). U.S.S.G. § 5F1.4, comment.

We agree with Coenen that the notification conditions at

issue, which include not only notice to law enforcement officials,
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neighbors, and school officials, but also, if the probation officer

so directs, signs, handbills, bumper stickers, clothing labels, and

door-to-door oral communication, are far more analogous to an

upward departure or to the § 3555 notice to victims that may be

imposed in cases in which the defendant has been convicted of

fraud, both of which require pre-sentencing notice, than to the

occupational restriction imposed in Mills, which does not require

such notice. And, because the type of notification provisions

imposed in this case are not expressly contemplated by the

Guidelines, we believe that requiring pre-sentencing notice will

serve to greatly further Rule 32's “purpose of promoting focused,

adversarial resolution of the legal and factual issues relevant to

fixing Guidelines sentences”. See Burns, 501 U.S. at 137; see also

United States v. Edgin, 92 F.3d at 1048 (remanding case for

district court to state reasoning for sua sponte imposition of

special condition prohibiting defendant from contacting his son,

because special condition implicates defendant’s liberty interest

in maintaining his familial relationship with his son). 

Accordingly, Coenen was entitled, under Rule 32 and Burns, to

receive reasonable pre-sentencing notice that such notification

provisions were under consideration.

3. 

The Government responds, in the alternative, that Coenen had

actual knowledge of the possibility that the court would order

community notification and, therefore, had ample notice/opportunity

to be heard. In Burns, the Court did not address the question of
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the timing of reasonable notice, or specify a uniform procedure for

how such notice was to be given. See Burns, 501 U.S. at 135, 139

n.6. It stated, however, that “[i]n the ordinary case, the

presentence report or the Government’s own recommendation will

notify the defendant that an upward departure will be at issue and

of the facts that allegedly support such a departure.” Id. at 135.

As emphasized supra, the Court held that notice was required before

a district court “can depart upward on a ground not identified ...

either in the presentence report or in a prehearing submission by

the Government”. Id. at 138 (emphasis added).

Our court, as well as others, have interpreted Burns to

require notice either from the court, the PSR, or a pre-hearing

submission by the Government. See Pankhurst, 118 F.3d at 357

(“Under Burns, Rule 32 requires that, before a district court may

depart upward, the defendant must have notice, either in the PSR

(see Rule 32(b)(4)(B)), or in a pre-hearing submission by the

Government, or from the court.”); United States v. Singleton, 49

F.3d 129, 135 (5th Cir.) (defendant received sufficient notice of

possible departure where both PSR and government’s motion for

upward departure “identified the grounds for departure upon which

the district court ultimately relied”), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,

116 S. Ct. 324 (1995); United States v. Doucette, 979 F.2d 1042,

1047 n.4 (5th Cir. 1992) (PSR’s “reference to criminal history as

a potential ground for upward departure ... clearly satisfies the

notice requirement set out in Burns”); United States v. Ewing, 129

F.3d 430, 436-37 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Of course, a presentence report
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listing specific factors that may warrant an upward departure

provides adequate notice.”).

As noted, in the section entitled “Offender Characteristics”,

the PSR reported that the examining social worker had recommended

that Coenen be required to comply with Louisiana’s sexual offender

notification regulations. But, the section entitled “Sentencing

Options” (paragraphs 70-80, referred to, and relied upon, by Coenen

in his district court objection) does not contain any reference to

notification conditions in the subsection discussing the statutory

and Guidelines provisions for supervised release.

We question whether the PSR’s reporting of the social worker’s

recommendation was adequate to give Coenen reasonable notice that

community notification was being considered by the district court.

But, we need not so decide; the record contains other information

indicating that Coenen had actual knowledge of the possibility that

those conditions would be imposed.

The social worker’s report reflects that Coenen was informed

of the report and the social worker’s findings on 22 November 1996

(more than a month prior to the 3 January sentencing hearing). In

addition, the probation officer informed Coenen in a telephone

conversation on 5 December 1996 that it was possible that the

notification requirements would be imposed; she also discussed this

possibility with Coenen’s attorney (replaced before sentencing by

another) several times during the pre-sentence investigation.

Thus, even assuming that the PSR was insufficient to notify

Coenen that the notification conditions were under consideration,
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Coenen and his attorney were given notice through these other

means. Such actual knowledge satisfies the “reasonable notice”

requirements of Rule 32 and Burns.

B.

Turning to the merits, it bears repeating that, pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3583(d), a special condition of supervised release must be

reasonably related to “the nature and circumstances of the offense

and the history and characteristics of the defendant”, 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)(1); and must involve no greater deprivation of liberty than

is reasonably necessary in the light of the need “to afford

adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”, 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)(2)(B), “to protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant”, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C), and “to provide the

defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical

care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective

manner”, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). (Emphasis added.) 

Coenen asserts that the damage to his reputation and the

invasion of his right to privacy which accompanies notification

implicates a protected liberty interest; that notification will

subject him to harassment, possible vigilante reprisals, loss of

employment, and banishment; and that the conditions effectuate a

far greater deprivation of that liberty interest than is reasonably

necessary for purposes of deterrence, protection of the public, or

rehabilitation. In this regard, he maintains that the imposition

of the conditions was an abuse of discretion, claiming in support

that his conviction for transmitting child pornography on the
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Internet was not a violent offense and that there is no evidence

that he has ever engaged in, or had any interest in engaging in,

sexual activity with children.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in determining that the notification conditions are

reasonably related to Coenen’s history and characteristics, and the

nature and circumstances of his offenses. Coenen told the agents

who searched his residence that he began collecting and trading

child pornography approximately seven months earlier, in January

1996; that he had uploaded into and downloaded child pornography

from several news groups on the Internet; and, for that relatively

short period of time, that he had 1,000 or more images of child

pornography on his computer hard drive. 

In addition, Coenen admitted to the interviewing social worker

that he found children in photographs as attractive as adults; and

that he continued to have an interest in sexually explicit

photographs of children. (Militating against this is his telling

the probation officer during the pre-sentence investigation that he

was getting bored with the photographs and had planned, before the

search warrant was executed, to delete the material from his hard

drive. But, as discussed infra, this could mean that, no longer

satisfied with pictures, Coenen would start molesting or otherwise

assaulting children.) Although the social worker reported that

Coenen “has displayed no behaviors, that I have seen clinically, in

what may be termed a predatory pedophile”, he also stated that

Coenen “does seem to have many features associated with the
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Diagnostic & Statistical Manual, IV (DSM,IV) diagnostic criteria of

Pedophilia”. As stated, the social worker concluded that Coenen

“indicate[d] a recurrent, intensely sexually arousing behaviors

[sic] generally involving children that occur over a period of at

least 6 months ... [and] could be said to cause clinical[]

impairment in social and occupational, or other important areas of

functioning”. 

Although the social worker reported that Coenen had no access

to children, “does not baby-sit any children nor does he like to”,

and that he did not seem to have offended any children, Coenen

testified at sentencing that a woman who had a small female child

had lived with him and that he had “baby-sat other children over

the years”. We note also that agents executing the search warrant

at Coenen’s residence seized a pair of girl’s underwear; Coenen

told them that he did not know where it came from. Coenen also told

them that he expected them to find one or two photographs of a nude

child, which had been taken in his residence, but that he did not

take them and did not know how they were in his home. The

photographs were not located during the search.

We conclude also that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in determining that the conditions involve no greater

deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary in the light of

the sentencing goals of deterrence and protection of the public.

The district court found that Coenen “has very serious mental

problems and I believe the public-at-large, particularly young

children, are at risk when they are around him”; that it did not
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know whether Coenen’s “boredom” with pictures meant that he would

start molesting children, but could not take that chance; and that,

“if something is not done, he is going to hurt some children”. The

court stated that the community notification conditions were

necessary “for the protection of the children ... once this

defendant is released from custody”, and concluded that it “would

be an injustice to a lot of potential injured children that this

man could come in contact with” not to require notification. 

Coenen asserts that the notification conditions will serve

primarily to shame, humiliate, and further isolate him, rather than

furthering his reintegration back into society to become a

productive citizen. These concerns have been recognized by others.

See Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1266

(3d Cir. 1996) (such notification may subject defendants to

ostracism, “possible vigilante reprisals and loss of employment”);

Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (such

notification is “the modern-day equivalent of branding and

shaming”, which may result in “banishment of sex offenders both

literally and psychologically”, making it “difficult if not

impossible for them to reintegrate into society”), aff’d in part

and rev’d in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997).

On the other hand, as the Government points out, the

conditions require the release of limited information: Coenen’s

name, address, and the crime for which he was convicted —

transmission of child pornography, not assaults on children. In

this regard, his name and conviction are already matters of public
- 20 -

record. And, as the Government points out, much of the stigma and

community reactions feared by Coenen would not be directly

attributable to the conditions of his supervised release, but to

the crime he committed. See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1280-81

(2d Cir. 1997); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1099-1100 (3d Cir.

1997). Moreover, although Coenen will be required to publish

notice in the newspaper following his release, the conditions

require direct notification by mail only to law enforcement

officials and to individuals whose proximity to Coenen may make

their children particularly vulnerable. 

Additional notification (such as signs, handbills, bumper

stickers, clothing labels, and door-to-door oral communication) is

required only if the probation officer deems it to be appropriate

and necessary. Toward that end, the district court stated: “[I]f

things work out and [Coenen] goes through therapy and he is out on

probation and he is doing everything he is supposed to do, and the

probation officer believes that this is no longer necessary, you

can always modify these conditions”. As no such additional

notification has yet been required, and we have no indication any

will be, the propriety of any particular form or manner of

additional notification, or the circumstances which might justify

it, is not now before us.

In sum, the notification conditions are consistent with the

Guidelines policy statement, which contemplates notification to

“third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant’s

criminal record or personal history or characteristics”. U.S.S.G.
- 21 -

§ 5B1.4(a)(13)(p.s.). In the light of the nature and circumstances

of the offense and the social worker’s report concerning Coenen’s

personal history and characteristics, the district court did not

abuse its broad discretion in finding that children might be at

risk, and that, therefore, community notification is necessary to

protect them from such risks.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the sentence is

AFFIRMED.