NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JARED M., AMBER M., Appellants, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.M., M.M., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0085 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. JS17188 

The Honorable Connie Contes, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale 

By Christopher Stavris 

Counsel for Appellant Mother 

Heavenly Gates Law Firm, Phoenix 

By S. Marie Gates 

Counsel for Appellant Father 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Amanda Adams 

Counsel for Appellee 
JARED M., AMBER M. v. DCS, A.M., M.M. 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined. 

H O W E, Judge: 

¶1 Amber M. (“Mother”) and Jared M. (“Father”) appeal the 

juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to A.M., born May 

2011, and M.M., born April 2012, on ground of neglect and willful abuse. 

For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In February 2012, when Mother and Father already had three 

foster children in their care, including A.M. and M.M., the Department1

placed two-year-old J.C. with them. The parents subsequently adopted 

A.M. and M.M. During the seven months J.C. was in Mother and Father’s 

exclusive care, the child suffered two injuries. As a result, the Department 

petitioned for dependency and then termination of Mother and Father’s 

parental rights to A.M. and M.M. on ground of neglect and willful abuse. 

¶3 In January 2013, J.C. dislocated his right hip. Father took J.C. 

to urgent care, but he was sent in an ambulance to a children’s hospital for 

treatment. Father reported to the hospital staff that he was lifting J.C. over 

the rails of the child’s bed and accidentally dropped him. Father thought 

that the child might have hit a part of the bed during his fall. J.C. fell about 

2.5 to 3 feet and landed on his right side. Father said that J.C. behaved 

“normally” afterwards, however, and not until the next morning did the 

child complain of pain in his right leg and became incapable of carrying 

anything with his right arm. 

¶4 Although J.C.’s hospital discharge papers stated that the 

incident was an “accidental trauma,” one of the consulting doctors—a 

forensic child abuse expert—noted in her report that such an injury was 

 

1

 The Department of Child Safety was substituted for the Arizona 

Department of Economic Security in this matter. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 

27; S.B. 1001, Section 157, 51st Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) (enacted). 

For convenience, we refer to both as “the Department.”
JARED M., AMBER M. v. DCS, A.M., M.M. 

Decision of the Court 

3

uncommon for a child under five and found Father’s explanation that J.C. 

could walk afterwards “curious.” She opined that the injury could have 

been an accident or was inflicted. The doctor also noted scratch marks on 

the child’s neck and chin and a bite mark on his cheek. Father explained 

that J.C. often scratched himself when he was upset and a foster sibling had 

bitten him. The Department was notified of J.C.’s injury, but did not remove 

him. 

¶5 Several months later from June 24 to 27, J.C. was at vacation 

bible school. J.C.’s camp counselor said that during bible school, he was 

“very active” and “use[d] both his arms” and “was happy as a clam but 

spastic.” No reports were submitted that J.C. was injured. 

¶6 After J.C. returned to Mother and Father’s house, the family 

left for South Dakota on June 28. When they stopped for lunch, Father 

noticed that “when [J.C.] got down out of the van, he would like push 

himself along the floor and he just wasn’t putting all of his weight on his 

left arm.” They nonetheless continued driving to Colorado. There, J.C. 

struggled to take his shirt off and complained of pain, but the family 

resumed their journey. When they stopped at a rest area, Father observed 

that J.C. “was not playing as he normally should. . . . He was standing 

against the wall.” Despite Father’s observation, the family continued to 

South Dakota. There, J.C. was in more pain; he had “less movement and 

more whines.” Although “everybody” in the family noticed J.C.’s injury, 

Mother and Father “did not believe it was the extent that it—that he was 

making it to be.”

¶7 On June 30, Mother noticed that J.C.’s arm was swollen and 

that J.C. did not use his arm. Four days later, she took J.C. to the emergency 

room. She explained to the hospital staff that J.C. “was swimming yesterday 

and seemed to be using the arm normally,” but after waking up that 

morning, his arm “was quite swollen” and he could not move it. The 

treating physician told Mother that the x-rays were normal and 

recommended that J.C. wear a sling. J.C. stopped wearing the sling three 

days later, however, because the swelling “was getting worse.” The family 

returned to Arizona on July 8, J.C. saw his pediatrician the next day, and he

had a MRI on July 12, revealing a left fractured humerus. 

¶8 On July 15, J.C. returned to the same children’s hospital where 

he had received treatment for his dislocated hip. J.C. was admitted and 

received additional imaging and a full skeletal survey, which showed a one 

to three months’ old right scapular fracture that was healing. J.C. was 
JARED M., AMBER M. v. DCS, A.M., M.M. 

Decision of the Court 

4

reported to the hospital’s child protection team for suspected nonaccidental trauma. 

¶9 The same child abuse expert who had been consulted about 

J.C.’s prior hip dislocation examined his swollen arm. She opined that the 

left fracture of the humerus was two to four weeks old and that the fracture 

would have “require[d] [a] significant force . . . and would [have] cause[d] 

considerable pain at the time . . . and for a week or more after.” She also 

opined that it was “very unlikely that the fracture happened accidently . . . 

[or] was unrecognized at the time because of the pain.” She further opined 

that the previous x-rays were probably misread because J.C.’s fracture was 

through the growth plate and missing such a fracture was common. She 

noted that “inflicted injury continue[d] to be the . . . primary concern” and 

recommended that J.C. participate in a forensic interview and that the 

Department protect him and his foster siblings while it and the police 

investigated the situation. 

¶10 That evening Mother and Father participated in forensic 

interviews. Father reported that they were not sure what happened to J.C.’s 

shoulder. During the trip, J.C. was not using his left arm or putting any 

weight on it and was “kind of . . . whimpering.” Only when they noticed 

that his arm was swelling did they take him to the emergency room. Father 

also reported that he, J.C., and A.M. had fallen into a pool while in South 

Dakota. The incident occurred on July 2, “after [they] had already had 

[their] initial appointment . . . at the Emergency Room.” Father was holding 

the boys’ hands, lost his balance, and slipped into the pool, and J.C. fell into 

the water. 

¶11 Mother reported that they had first noticed that J.C. was not 

using his left arm on June 30, after they had arrived in South Dakota.

Mother reported that the family had gone swimming that day and Father, 

J.C., and A.M. fell into the pool. They took him to the emergency room 

because his arm was swollen. Mother reported that J.C. did not complain 

about his arm during the drive to South Dakota. 

¶12 Based on these interviews and the circumstances, the 

Department took custody of J.C., A.M., and M.M. after J.C. was discharged 

from the hospital on July 17 and placed each of them in separate foster 

homes. The Department petitioned for dependency alleging that A.M. and 

M.M. were dependent as to Mother and Father. It alleged that the parents 

had either abused J.C. or had failed to protect him from abuse and that A.M. 

and M.M. were at risk of future abuse as a result of the parents’ action or 

inaction, respectively. 
JARED M., AMBER M. v. DCS, A.M., M.M. 

Decision of the Court 

5

¶13 While J.C. was in foster care, Mother and Father sent the child 

some toys. When he saw one of them, J.C. threw it in the trash. The child’s 

foster mother told him not to throw his toy away, and he became 

frightened, grabbed his left arm, and told her “please don’t hurt my arm.” 

¶14 J.C. participated in a forensic interview and reported that he 

got an “owie” from the “T.V.” and that “mommy did it at the hotel” and 

“it’s swollen.” J.C. also reported that “mom and dad were there,” “mom hit 

him,” and “daddy saw.” When asked where Mother hit him, he rubbed his 

left arm with his right hand and responded “on my arm.” When asked what 

Mother hit him with, he pointed to his hand and said “this one.”

¶15 By that time, the Department had placed A.M. and M.M. 

together in a different foster home, this time with family friends at the 

parents’ request. Soon after, the foster family reported that A.M. exhibited

aggressive behavior, hoarding food, and having nightmares. They also 

explained that M.M. was constantly sucking his thumb, especially after 

returning from visits with his parents. They further reported that if A.M. 

heard the song, “Head, Shoulders, Knees, and Toes,” he would hide behind 

the couch and scream. The daycare supervisor reported that both children 

were withdrawn. 

¶16 The following month, the parents participated in 

psychological evaluations. Mother reported that she did not know what 

happened to J.C.’s arm and believed “it may have been accidental.” The 

psychologist found that Mother was “fairly defensive” and was not able to 

admit to any shortcomings. He also found that Mother “may not have 

answered in a completely forthright manner.” The psychologist 

recommended that Mother participate in individual counseling and childmanagement classes. The psychologist opined that a child in Mother’s care 

would be at risk of physical harm and that her prognosis for being able to 

parent in the foreseeable future was “not good.” 

¶17 Father also reported that he did not know what happened to 

J.C.’s arm. He reported that he heard J.C. cry “a few times” while the family 

was packing for their trip and suggested that perhaps J.C. was “jumping 

and fell.” The psychologist found that Father was defensive and 

recommended that he participate in counseling and child-management 

classes. The psychologist opined that Father “could be able to demonstrate 

adequate parenting skills if it [was] determined that he was not the cause 

of [J.C.’s] injuries.” 
JARED M., AMBER M. v. DCS, A.M., M.M. 

Decision of the Court 

6

¶18 Mother and Father then participated in masters– and 

Ph.D.–level individual counseling, supervised visits, parenting classes, and 

parent aide services, including one-on-one parenting instruction. Although 

they participated in the services, they refused to acknowledge that J.C. had 

suffered non-accidental trauma and denied any knowledge of or 

responsibility for J.C.’s injuries. A.M. and M.M. were both referred to play 

therapy and participated in psychological evaluations and were diagnosed 

with post-traumatic stress disorder and reactive attachment disorder. A.M. 

also received speech and physical therapy and M.M. occupational therapy. 

¶19 Meanwhile, J.C. had a second forensic interview and 

continued to talk about his injuries. He reported that Father had hurt his 

right shoulder “in the bathroom” and that Mother had hurt his left shoulder

“at the hotel room.” He also reported that Mother bit and slapped him in 

the face. J.C.’s foster mother reported that he would “shake, cry and [wet 

himself] when he was disciplined,” “experienced night terrors,” and was 

fearful of “running into his old parents.” In November 2013, J.C.’s foster 

parents adopted him. 

¶20 The following month, A.M. was identified as an Indian child 

subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63. On 

the eve of the dependency hearing, the Alaskan Native village where he 

was eligible for enrollment had not yet been served. Thus, instead of 

holding a dependency hearing for A.M., the juvenile court ordered an initial 

dependency hearing. For M.M., however, the court held a dependency 

hearing and adjudicated him dependent as to both parents. The court found 

that the parents had abused J.C. because of the “uncontroverted expert 

medical testimony” that J.C., who was in the parents’ “care, custody, and 

control” “sustained two (2) fractures.” 

¶21 Because the Department had indicated that it would move for 

termination of parents’ parental rights to A.M. and M.M., the juvenile court 

thereafter ordered concurrent case plans of family reunification and 

severance and adoption for M.M. The parents then moved for a finding that 

the Department had not made reasonable efforts to achieve the case plan 

goal of family reunification as ICWA required. At A.M.’s dependency 

hearing, the juvenile court deferred its reasonable efforts finding until the 

next hearing, but found that A.M. was dependent as to both parents. 

¶22 In April 2014, because the parents were still unable to provide 

a sufficient explanation for J.C.’s injuries, the Department petitioned to 

terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights to A.M. and M.M. on ground 

of neglect and willful abuse. The juvenile court thereafter ordered the 
JARED M., AMBER M. v. DCS, A.M., M.M. 

Decision of the Court 

7

children’s case plan as severance and adoption. The parents once again 

moved for a finding that the Department had not made reasonable efforts 

to achieve the case plan and that it had not made active efforts to prevent 

the family’s breakup with regards to A.M. The court deferred making a 

finding and ordered the parties to brief aspects of ICWA and the 

Department’s efforts. 

¶23 At the contested severance hearing, the juvenile court took 

judicial notice of all the testimony presented at M.M.’s dependency hearing 

and admitted the transcripts. The caseworker testified that the foster family 

was willing to adopt the children, and if they were unable to adopt, she 

would have no trouble finding another adoptive family. She also testified 

that adoption was in the children’s best interests because then they would 

be able to grow in a home healthy, happy, and free from abuse. 

¶24 The children’s psychologist testified that they were 

adoptable. Although the children had attachment issues, they were making 

progress in therapy and needed to be placed with a family willing to help 

them build strong primary bonds. She also testified that the children 

needed to feel safe and secure for their emotional growth. The case manager 

testified that adoption was in the children’s best interests because then they 

would be able to grow in a home free of abuse. 

¶25 The children’s psychologist, child abuse expert, and case 

manager all testified that A.M. and M.M. would be at risk of physical abuse 

if they remained in the parents’ care. The juvenile court terminated Mother 

and Father’s parental rights on ground of neglect and willful abuse and 

found that termination was in the children’s best interests. It also found that 

the Department had made active efforts to prevent the family’s breakup as 

ICWA required, but the efforts were unsuccessful. Mother and Father 

timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION 

As relevant to our disposition of this appeal, Mother and 

Father argue that the juvenile court erred in terminating their parental 

rights to A.M. and M.M. on ground of neglect and willful abuse and in 

finding that termination was in the children’s best interests and that their 

continue custody of A.M. would likely result in serious emotional or 

physical damage to the child. Father also argues that the court erred in 

finding that the Department made active and reasonable efforts to prevent 

the family’s breakup as ICWA required and that he was denied due process 

in A.M. and M.M.’s severance proceedings because the Department 
JARED M., AMBER M. v. DCS, A.M., M.M. 

Decision of the Court 

8

allowed J.C. to be adopted before the termination hearing. Because 

reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s order and findings, the 

court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother and Father’s 

parental rights to A.M. and M.M. 

1. Termination of Parental Rights 

¶26 Mother and Father argue that insufficient evidence supports 

the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to the children 

and its finding that termination was in the children’s best interests. We 

review a termination order for an abuse of discretion. E.R. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 59 ¶ 9, 344 P.3d 842, 844 (App. 2015). We accept the 

juvenile court’s factual findings unless no reasonable evidence supports 

them, and we will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous. 

Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 508 ¶ 1, 200 P.3d 1003, 1005 

(App. 2008). Further, we will affirm the termination if any statutory ground 

is proven and if termination is in the children’s best interests. Raymond F. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377 ¶ 14, 231 P.3d 377, 381 (App. 2010). 

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother and 

Father’s parental rights on ground of neglect and willful abuse and finding 

that termination was in the children’s best interests.

 1a. Statutory Ground for Termination 

¶27 Mother and Father first argue that the evidence does not 

support the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to A.M. 

and M.M. A parent’s right to care, custody, and control of his or her children 

has long been recognized as fundamental, but that right is not absolute. 

Linda V. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 76, 78 ¶ 6, 117 P.3d 795, 797 

(App. 2005). The State may terminate a parent’s fundamental right to a child 

under statutorily enumerated conditions after following specified 

procedures. Id. 

¶28 The juvenile court may sever a parent’s rights to a child if the 

parent has “neglected or willfully abused a child.” A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(2). 

“Abuse” is “serious physical or emotional injury or situations in which the 

parent knew or reasonably should have known that a person was abusing 

or neglecting a child.” Id. As relevant, “neglect” is “the inability or 

unwillingness of a parent . . . of a child to provide that child with 

supervision, food, clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or 

unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of harm to the child’s health or 

welfare.” A.R.S. § 8–201(24)(a). 
JARED M., AMBER M. v. DCS, A.M., M.M. 

Decision of the Court 

9

¶29 Parents who abuse or neglect their children, or who permit 

another person to abuse or neglect their children, can have their parental 

rights to their other children terminated even if no evidence shows that the 

other children were abused or neglected. Tina T. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 236 

Ariz. 295, 299 ¶ 17, 339 P.3d 1040, 1044 (App. 2014). When the ground for 

termination is based on abuse of another child, however, the Department 

“must show a constitutional nexus between the prior abuse and the risk of 

future abuse” to the children at issue. Id. That nexus may exists when 

evidence of recent abuse of another child is available and the circumstances 

contributing to that abuse continue to exist, which creates a risk of future 

abuse to the children at issue. See Mario G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 

Ariz. 282, 286–87 ¶¶ 19–20, 257 P.3d 1162, 1166–67 (App. 2011) (finding 

sufficient constitutional nexus to terminate father’s rights to child born nine 

months after termination of his rights to other child where circumstances of

prior abuse persisted). 

¶30 Here, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights on ground of neglect 

and willful abuse and a constitutional nexus existed between J.C.’s prior 

abuse and the risk of future abuse to A.M. and M.M. The record shows that 

while in the parents’ sole custody and care, J.C. suffered three traumatic 

injuries: a displaced hip, a fractured humerus, and a fractured scapula. 

J.C.’s treating physicians concluded that each of the injuries required a 

significant amount of force inflicted on the child and would have caused 

him a considerable amount of pain. 

¶31 In response to the parents’ explanation that J.C.’s hip was 

injured when Father dropped him upon picking him up from his bed, one 

physician testified that such a short fall would not have displaced J.C.’s hip. 

The doctor explained that if that had happened, the child would not have 

been able to walk afterwards. Although the child’s hospital discharge 

papers stated that the hip displacement was because of an “accidental 

trauma,” the child abuse expert opined that the injury could have been 

either accidental or inflicted. She noted, however, that such an injury was 

uncommon for a child under five. She also questioned Father’s explanation 

that the child was able to walk afterwards. J.C.’s treating physician testified 

that he continued to treat the child’s hip and shoulder because he was 

concerned about “possible joint destruction” and “injuries to the growth 

plates.” He also testified that the child has not suffered any further 

dislocations or fractures after being removed from the parents’ care.

¶32 Moreover, the child abuse expert testified that the parent’s 

failure to seek any medical treatment for J.C.’s scapular fracture and to seek 
JARED M., AMBER M. v. DCS, A.M., M.M. 

Decision of the Court 

10

prompt medical treatment for his humerus fracture caused an unreasonable 

risk of harm to the child’s health and welfare. She explained that without 

prompt medical treatment, the bone fragments would have likely 

continued to move, resulting in considerable pain, additional bleeding, and 

tissue damage. She also explained that the child would have started crying 

or whimpering within 15 to 30 minutes of sustaining the fractures and that 

he would have been in considerable pain for another week until the bone 

stabilized. She opined that a reasonable parent would have known that 

something was wrong because the child would have difficulty moving his 

arm. 

¶33 Although Mother and Father suggested—with varying 

details—several reasons for J.C.’s injuries, the child abuse expert testified 

that none of the explanations the parents proffered could have caused the 

scapular or humerus fractures. She explained that breaking the child’s 

growth plate required specific, blunt force directly to it while another force 

was holding the bone still. She also explained that the scapular fracture was 

caused by a “very high energy, blunt force trauma.” The expert opined that 

in child abuse cases, parents commonly either could not provide any 

explanation for the injuries or provided a minimal explanation that by itself 

could not account for the injury. Mother and Father tried both. 

¶34 Moreover, J.C. consistently reported to a forensic interviewer 

and his foster mother that his parents had abused him. His disclosures were 

spontaneous and age-appropriate, including saying that “daddy broke” 

and grabbed his butt and “mommy broke” and grabbed his arm. He also 

told his foster mother that Mother had bitten and slapped him. Consistent 

with this statement, the hospital staff noted scratches on his neck and chin 

and a bite mark on his right cheek when J.C. was being treated for his hip 

dislocation. The parents gave conflicting explanations, however. Mother 

said that J.C. did not intentionally scratch himself when he was upset, yet 

this was the explanation Father gave to the hospital staff. Further, J.C.’s 

behaviors at his foster home indicated that he had been abused and 

neglected; he had emotional outbursts, hoarded food, and experienced 

night terrors and enuresis. 

¶35 Additionally, a constitutional nexus existed between J.C.’s 

prior abuse and the risk of future abuse to A.M. and M.M. The record shows 

that J.C. suffered three severe injuries over a one-year period while in the 

parents’ exclusive care and control. Mother and Father refused to 

acknowledge that J.C. suffered non-accidental trauma, however, and 

denied any knowledge of or responsibility for J.C.’s injuries. They also 

refused to acknowledge that the other parent could have abused J.C. and 
JARED M., AMBER M. v. DCS, A.M., M.M. 

Decision of the Court 

11

admitted that if A.M. and M.M. were returned to them, they would leave 

the children with the other parent. Further, several individuals closely 

involved with treating of the children and the parents—including the 

children’s psychologist, the parent’s psychologist, the child abuse expert, 

and the case manager—opined consistently that the children would be at 

risk of physical abuse if they remained in the parents’ care. Specifically, the 

child abuse expert testified that any child in the parents’ care would be at a 

“significant risk of physical injury.” Thus, a sufficient nexus existed 

between the prior abuse and the risk that such abuse would occur to A.M. 

and M.M. Consequently, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

order terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights to A.M. and M.M. on 

ground of neglect and willful abuse.

1b. The Children’s Best Interests

¶36 Mother and Father next argue that the evidence does not 

support the juvenile court’s finding that termination was in the children’s 

best interests. A finding of one of the statutory grounds for severance under 

A.R.S. § 8–533, standing alone, does not permit termination of parental 

rights; severance must also be in the children’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8–

533(B). Severance of parental rights is in the children’s best interests if the 

children would either benefit from the termination or be harmed by the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship. Id. In determining whether 

the children would benefit, relevant factors include whether the placement 

is meeting the children’s needs, an adoption plan is in place, and the 

children’s adoptability. See Tina T., 236 Ariz. at 300 ¶ 19, 339 P.3d at 1045; 

Mario G., 227 Ariz. at 288 ¶ 26, 257 P.3d at 1168. The juvenile court need 

only find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the 

children’s best interests. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 288 ¶ 41, 110 P.3d at 1022. 

¶37 Here, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

finding that termination was in the children’s best interests. The children’s

caseworker testified that the foster family was willing to adopt them, and if 

the family could not, she would have no problem finding another adoptive 

family. Both she and the case manager testified that termination was in the 

children’s best interests because then they would be able to grow in a home 

free from abuse. The children’s psychologist testified that they were 

adoptable and that they were making progress in therapy and needed to be 

placed with a family that was willing to help them build strong primary 

bonds. Consequently, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s

finding that termination was in the children’s best interests.
JARED M., AMBER M. v. DCS, A.M., M.M. 

Decision of the Court 

12

2. The Indian Child Welfare Act 

¶38 Mother and Father also contend that the juvenile court erred 

in finding that their continuing custody of A.M. would likely result in 

serious emotional or physical damage to the child as ICWA required. We 

review the juvenile court’s application of the federal statute de novo. Jared 

P. v. Glade T., 221 Ariz. 21, 24 ¶ 17, 209 P.3d 157, 160 (App. 2009). ICWA 

requires that an order terminating a parent’s rights to an Indian child 

include “a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable 

doubt, including testimony of a qualified expert witness, that the continued 

custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in 

serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). The 

expert testimony’s subject matter must be “forward looking—relating to 

the likelihood of future harm to the child.” Steven H. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 218 Ariz. 566, 571 ¶ 19, 190 P.3d 180, 185 (2008). However, “ICWA does 

not require that the expert’s testimony provide the sole basis for the court’s 

conclusion; ICWA simply requires that the testimony support that 

conclusion.” Id. at ¶ 20. The expert need not recite specific language from 

ICWA, nor does the testimony need to be expressed in a particular way. Id.

at 572 ¶ 22, 190 P.3d at 186. 

¶39 Here, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

finding that the parents’ continuing custody of A.M. was likely to result in 

serious emotional or physical damage to him. The record shows that the 

child abuse expert served as the Department’s ICWA expert. She testified 

that any child would be at risk of physical abuse in Mother and Father’s 

care. She opined that J.C. suffered at least two, possibly three, serious 

inflicted injuries while in their exclusive care. She further opined that any 

child in their care was therefore “at risk for the same treatment.” Further, 

both Mother and Father refused to acknowledge that the other parent could 

have abused J.C. and testified that if the children were returned to their 

care, they would leave them in the other parent’s care. Most notably, 

Mother testified that she would “probably not” believe A.M. if he told her 

that someone was abusing him. Consequently, reasonable evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s finding that the parents’ continuing custody 

of A.M. was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to him. 

¶40 Father also argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that 

the Department made reasonable and active efforts to prevent the breakup 

of the Indian family as ICWA required. But Father waived this argument 

because he provides no references to the record and cites no legal 

authorities for review to support this contention. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 

13(a)(7) (providing that an argument “must contain . . . contentions 
JARED M., AMBER M. v. DCS, A.M., M.M. 

Decision of the Court 

13

concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for 

each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate 

references to the portions of the record on which the appellant relies”); State 

v. Felkins, 156 Ariz. 37, 38 n.1, 749 P.2d 946, 947 n.1 (App. 1988) (claim 

abandoned when not supported by sufficient authority). 

¶41 Despite the waiver, the record shows that the Department 

made active and reasonable efforts to provide remedial services and 

rehabilitative programs to prevent the breakup of the family. The services 

included parent aide services, supervised visitation, two psychological 

evaluations, a bonding/best interests evaluation, master-level counseling, 

Ph.D.-level counseling, counseling for the children, Interstate Compact on 

the Placement of Children requests, a rapid response evaluation, services 

through Arizona Early Intervention Program, and monetary allowances. 

Although the Department’s efforts did not prevent the family’s breakup, 

the efforts were nonetheless active and reasonable. Consequently, the 

record supports the juvenile court’s finding that the Department provided 

active and reasonable efforts to prevent the breakup of the family. 

3. Father’s Due Process 

¶42 Father also contends that he and Mother were denied due 

process because the Department permitted J.C. to be adopted before the 

severance hearing, which prevented them from obtaining further medical 

evidence on the child. We review constitutional claims de novo, State v. 

Nordstrom, 230 Ariz. 110, 117 ¶ 27, 280 P.3d 1244, 1251 (2012), but because 

Father raises the due process claim for the first time on appeal, we review 

for fundamental error only, see Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 

236, 239 ¶¶ 15–16, 282 P.3d 437, 440 (App. 2012). Father therefore bears the 

burden of establishing that error occurred, the error was fundamental, and 

the error caused him prejudice. Id. at 239 ¶ 16, 282 P.3d at 440. 

¶43 Here, Father cannot show error because he does not provide 

any authority—and this Court has been unable to find any—that requires 

that the Department delay J.C.’s adoption and make the child available for 

medical testing. Father’s argument contravenes the state’s authority to 

regulate and expedite the adoption of neglected and willfully abused 

children to promote their well-being. See Matter of Appeal in Pima Cty. 

Juvenile Severance Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 97, 876 P.2d 1121, 1132 

(1994) (“The law favors rapid placement so that the child can bond with 

those who will be the legal parents and not with those from whom the child 

may be taken. This sound policy benefits the child, the natural parents, the 

prospective adoptive parents, and society.”); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 
JARED M., AMBER M. v. DCS, A.M., M.M. 

Decision of the Court 

14

Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 16, 995 P.2d 682, 685 (2000) (providing that prompt 

finality in severance proceedings is paramount to protect the child’s 

interests). 

¶44 Regardless whether the juvenile court erred, Father cannot 

show prejudice. On appeal, Father merely argues that the parents could not 

perform “any independent medical evaluations” and fails to specify what 

additional testing could have been performed and how the testing would 

have affected the trial’s outcome. The record shows, however, that J.C. 

engaged in a number of medical evaluations and Father and Mother had 

access to all his medical documents. For example, the child was tested for 

possible genetic disorders, including metabolic bone disorder and 

connective tissue disorder, and underwent a genetic evaluation to rule out 

a possible “syndrome, metabolic issue, or connective tissue issue” that 

might explain the multiple bone fractures. J.C. also underwent testing for 

brittle bone disease, which were negative for the disease. Moreover, the 

child abuse expert testified that J.C.’s test results ruled out any type of 

genetic disorder and the child’s treating physician testified that no further 

genetic testing was needed because J.C.’s pattern of injuries was 

inconsistent with a metabolic or connective tissue disorder. 

¶45 Because the record shows that J.C. engaged in a number of 

medical evaluations regarding his physical state, Father cannot 

demonstrate that he was denied due process or that he was prejudiced. 

Consequently, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion because 

reasonable evidence supports its order terminating Mother and Father’s 

parental rights to A.M. and M.M. and finding that termination was in the 

children’s best interests.

CONCLUSION 

¶46 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.