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*********************************************** 
ZHE ZHENG v. FEIFEI XIA

(AC 43948)

Lavine, Prescott and Suarez, Js.*

Syllabus

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the trial court’s order granting the

defendant’s postdissolution motion to modify child support, claiming

that the court improperly ordered him to pay the defendant a certain

percentage of his annual bonus income as supplemental child support.

In issuing its order, the trial court deviated from the child support

guidelines on the basis of the significant disparity between the parties’

incomes. Held that the trial court’s reason for deviating from the child

support guidelines constituted an abuse of its legal discretion: the court

made no specific finding as to why the guidelines were inequitable or

inappropriate, save for alluding to the significant disparity between the

parties’ incomes, and that reason to deviate from the child support

guidelines failed as a matter of law because, although our Supreme

Court has stated that income disparity may be considered when the

custodial parent has the higher income and deviation from the presumptive support amount would enhance the noncustodial parent’s ability

to foster a relationship with the child, that was not the situation in the

present case, in which the unemployed defendant was the custodial

parent who had no income aside from child support, and, accordingly,

the court improperly considered the disparity between the parties’

incomes in ordering the defendant to pay a certain percentage of his

net bonus income as supplemental child support.

Submitted on briefs December 3, 2020—officially released May 4, 2021

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, Hon. Stanley Novack, judge trial referee, rendered judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief

in accordance with the parties’ separation agreement;

thereafter, the court, M. Moore, J., granted the defendant’s motion to modify child support, and the plaintiff

appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings.

Zhe Zheng, self-represented, filed a brief as the appellant (plaintiff).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Zhe Zheng,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting

the postjudgment motion to modify child support filed

by the defendant, Feifei Xia.1 On appeal, the plaintiff

claims that the court improperly ordered him to pay

the defendant 13 percent of his annual bonus as supplemental child support. In issuing its order, the trial court

deviated from the child support guidelines on the basis

of the ‘‘significant disparity in the parties’ income.’’ The

reason to deviate given by the court is not a permissible

rationale under the child support guidelines and Maturo

v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 99–103, 995 A.2d 1 (2010). We

therefore reverse in part the judgment of the trial court

and remand the case for further proceedings.

The following facts and procedural history, as disclosed by the record, are relevant to our resolution

of the plaintiff’s appeal. The parties were married in

Stamford on March 28, 2010. Their only child was born

in September, 2011. On January 26, 2012, the plaintiff

commenced an action for dissolution of marriage on

the basis of irretrievable breakdown. At the time the

action was commenced, the plaintiff was employed as

a hedge fund analyst, and the defendant was a law

student. The parties entered into a separation agreement that included a detailed parenting plan, which

the trial court, Hon. Stanley Novak, judge trial referee,

incorporated into the uncontested judgment of dissolution rendered on July 23, 2013. Pursuant to the agreement, the parties share joint legal custody of their child,

who is in the primary physical custody of the defendant.

Judge Novak, pursuant to the separation agreement,

ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant unallocated

alimony and child support in the amount of $1600 per

month until August 2, 2014. On May 13, 2015, the court,

Tindill, J., ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant

$161 per week in child support. Since that time, the

parties have filed numerous motions for orders of contempt and motions to modify child support. The present

appeal concerns the motion to modify that was filed in

early 2020.2

On January 22, 2020, the defendant, representing herself, filed a motion to modify child support (motion to

modify), in which she represented that the plaintiff was

a partner in a hedge fund who receives annual income

consisting of an annual base salary, end-of-year

bonuses, and partnership distributions. She also represented that, on June 29, 2017, a family support magistrate, Wayne R. Keeney, ordered the plaintiff to pay the

defendant child support in the amount of $273 per week

and lump sum, supplemental child support of $10,868,

which was 12.97 percent of his net bonus. In her motion

to modify, the defendant claimed that, as of January

15, 2020, there had been a substantial change in circumstances because the plaintiff’s annual base salary had
increased from $200,000 to $250,000 and because his

2019 bonus income was $466,418. The defendant, therefore, sought an upward modification of the plaintiff’s

child support obligation, specifically, that his basic child

support obligation be increased to an amount consistent

with his new gross annual income and that he pay

supplemental lump sum child support that he owes on

his 2019 bonus. The defendant represented that she

is not employed3 and has no income other than child

support. On February 5, 2020, the self-represented parties appeared before the court, M. Moore, J., on the

motion to modify.4

Judge Moore commenced the hearing by stating that

she had ‘‘received the child support guidelines from

family services, and pursuant to these guidelines . . .

the [presumptive] child support is $416 per week.’’5 The

plaintiff questioned the percentage of the increase in

child support because the increase was greater than

the percentage increase in his base salary. The court

explained to the plaintiff how the amount of child support is calculated. The plaintiff stated in response that,

for the past couple of years, his base salary was used

to calculate weekly child support because that amount

was relatively stable. He also stated that his bonus varies ‘‘quite differently every year’’ and, for that reason,

a lump sum, supplemental payment was made for each

year in which he received a bonus. The plaintiff argued

that his net income was more than $4000 per week

and that the maximum amount under the child support

guidelines is 12 percent of his net income. In response,

the court stated: ‘‘So when your . . . net income

[exceeds the highest amount on] the child support

guidelines [schedule], I can deviate. I can determine

based on all the factors what the child support figure is.’’

The plaintiff, who remarried and has a child (qualified

child) with his new wife, stated that he had one qualified

child to consider and that he believed 10 percent of his

net income was the proper percentage to use. The court

stated that the child support guidelines worksheet provided to it had considered the plaintiff’s qualified child.6

The plaintiff represented that his net income from

the $466,418 gross bonus that he received in 2019 was

$234,736. In response to the court’s inquiry as to

whether the defendant agreed with the figures, the

defendant stated that she agreed with the gross amount

but disagreed with the plaintiff’s self-reported net

income for two reasons: first, that the child support

guidelines provide that the deductions should consider

taxes and credits and that the plaintiff had utilized the

maximum tax deductions without considering tax credits, and, second, that the plaintiff received ‘‘a lot of

credits back.’’ The court stated that it understood the

defendant’s objection.7 At the time of the hearing, the

plaintiff had not yet filed his 2019 tax returns. The

defendant presented the court with copies of past

orders regarding the plaintiff’s supplemental child sup-
port obligations, which demonstrated a range of percentages to be paid on various amounts of the plaintiff’s

annual bonus income.8 On the basis of past orders, the

defendant requested that the plaintiff pay 12 percent of

his net bonus as lump sum, supplemental child support.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Moore stated

in relevant part: ‘‘After conducting a hearing, the court

finds a substantial change in circumstance and grants

the defendant’s motion for modification of child support

based on the plaintiff’s increase in income. The court

finds the plaintiff’s income for 2019 to be $666,000 gross

as shown on his financial affidavit. The court finds the

presumptive child support to be $416 per week and

orders the plaintiff to pay said sum weekly. The court

makes the finding that the application of child support

guidelines in this case is inequitable and inappropriate.

The court orders that the plaintiff must pay to the defendant 13 percent of his net bonuses as additional child

support annually. This order is a deviation from the

guidelines based on coordination of total family support

and significant disparity in the parties’ income. . . .

[The plaintiff] shall pay . . . 13 percent of his net

bonus to the defendant within seven days of his receipt

of said bonus annually as additional child support. . . .

The court finds [that] the plaintiff owes the defendant

$30,115.68, equal to 13 percent of his bonus for 2019.’’9

The court also ordered that, in future years, the plaintiff

will be obligated to pay 13 percent of any bonus income

he receives as lump sum, supplemental child support.

The plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) ordered him to pay 13 percent of his net 2019

bonus income and future bonus income as supplemental child support, (2) abused its discretion by deviating

from the child support guidelines, and (3) failed to consider his qualified child when calculating his supplemental child support obligation.10 Notably, the plaintiff

does not claim that the court improperly found a substantial change of circumstances, ordered him to pay

the defendant $416 a week in child support, or ordered

him to pay supplemental child support. Although the

plaintiff has raised several claims on appeal, the core

of his challenge to the judgment is to the percentage

of his net income that the court ordered him to pay the

defendant as supplemental child support. In support of

his claim, he relies on § 46b-215a-2c (c) (1) (B) (i) of

the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, which

provides in relevant part that a supplemental order may

be entered only when the percentage is ‘‘generally consistent with the [child support guidelines] schedule

. . . .’’11 (Emphasis added.)

Although the plaintiff’s principal claim is that the

court improperly ordered him to pay 13 percent of his

bonus as supplemental child support, the issue, in substance, is whether the court abused its discretion by
deviating from the child support guidelines. We conclude that the court’s reason for deviating from the

child support guidelines constituted an abuse of its

legal discretion; see Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297

Conn. 358, 999 A.2d 721 (2010); Maturo v. Maturo,

supra, 296 Conn. 99–101; and, therefore, we conclude

that the court improperly ordered the plaintiff to pay

the defendant 13 percent of his annual bonus as lump

sum, supplemental child support.

The standard of review in domestic relations cases

is well established. ‘‘[T]his court will not disturb trial

court orders unless the trial court has abused its legal

discretion or its findings have no reasonable basis in

the facts. . . . As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly

advantageous position to assess the personal factors

significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn.

494, 502, 927 A.2d 894 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether

a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic

relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn.

733, 740, 785 A.2d 197 (2001). ‘‘Notwithstanding the

great deference accorded the trial court in dissolution

proceedings, a trial court’s ruling . . . may be reversed

if, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court applies

the wrong standard of law. . . . The question of

whether, and to what extent, the child support guidelines apply, however, is a question of law over which

this court should exercise plenary review.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, supra, 297 Conn. 367.

We begin with a review of the statutory scheme

regarding child support and the guidelines. ‘‘The legislature has enacted several statutes to assist courts in

fashioning child support orders. [General Statutes §]

46b-84 provides in relevant part: ‘(a) Upon or subsequent to the . . . dissolution of any marriage . . . the

parents of a minor child of the marriage, shall maintain

the child according to their respective abilities, if the

child is in need of maintenance. Any postjudgment procedure afforded by chapter 906 shall be available to

secure the present and future financial interests of a

party in connection with a final order for the periodic

payment of child support. . . .

‘‘ ‘(d) In determining whether a child is in need of

maintenance and, if in need, the respective abilities of

the parents to provide such maintenance and the

amount thereof, the court shall consider the age, health,

station, occupation, earning capacity, amount and

sources of income, estate, vocational skills and employability of each of the parents, and the age, health, station, occupation, educational status and expectation,

amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate and needs of the child.’ ’’ Maturo

v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 89–90.

General Statutes § 46b-215a provides for a commission to establish child support guidelines in order to

ensure that child support awards are appropriate. See

id., 90. ‘‘The . . . guidelines issued pursuant to section

46b-215a . . . and in effect on the date of the support

determination shall be considered in all determinations

of child support award amounts . . . . In all such

determinations, there shall be a rebuttable presumption

that the amount of such awards which resulted from

the application of such guidelines is the amount to

be ordered. A specific finding on the record that the

application of the guidelines would be inequitable or

inappropriate in a particular case, as determined

under the deviation criteria established by the Commission for Child Support Guidelines under section 46b215a, shall be required in order to rebut the presumption in such case.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes

§ 46b-215b (a).

‘‘The support guidelines are codified in §§ 46b-215a1 and 46b-215a-2[c] of the Regulations of Connecticut

State Agencies.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Hayward v. Hayward, 53 Conn. App. 1, 7, 752 A.2d 1087 (1999). The

preamble to the child support guidelines ‘‘explains that

the guidelines are based on the income shares model,

which considers the income of both parents and presumes that the child should receive the same proportion

of parental income as he or she would have received

if the parents lived together. . . . Children’s economic

needs do not increase automatically, however, with an

increase in household income. Although parents may

spend more on their children in absolute dollars as

their income grows, thus raising the child’s station and

standard of living, the income shares model reflects the

principle that spending on children as a percentage of

household income actually declines as family income

rises. The preamble specifically notes that economic

studies have found that spending on children declines

as a proportion of family income as that income

increases, and a diminishing portion of family income

is spent on each additional child.’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Maturo v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 93; see Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2015), preamble, § (d),

pp. v–vi.

‘‘[T]he applicable statutes, as well as the guidelines,

provide all child support awards must be made in accordance with the principles established therein to ensure

that such awards promote equity, uniformity and consistency for children at all income levels.’’ (Emphasis

in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo

v. Maturo, supra, 296 Conn. 94–95. ‘‘[A]lthough courts

may, in the exercise of their discretion, determine the

correct percentage of the combined net weekly income
assigned to child support in light of the circumstances

in each particular case, including a consideration of

other, additional obligations imposed on the noncustodial parent, any deviation from the schedule or the

principles on which the guidelines are based must be

accompanied by the court’s explanation as to why the

guidelines are inequitable or inappropriate and why the

deviation is necessary to meet the needs of the child.’’

Id., 95–96.

In the present case, the court found that ‘‘the application of [the] child support guidelines . . . is inequitable

and inappropriate’’ and ordered the plaintiff ‘‘pay to the

defendant 13 percent of his net bonuses as additional

child support annually. This order is a deviation from

the guidelines based on [the] coordination of total family support and significant disparity in the parties’

income.’’ The court, however, made no specific finding

as to why the child support guidelines were inequitable

and inappropriate, save for alluding to the significant

disparity between the parties’ incomes. That reason to

deviate from the child support guidelines, i.e., disparity

between the incomes of the parties, fails as a matter

of law. Our Supreme Court has stated that ‘‘[i]ncome

disparity may be considered . . . only when the custodial parent has the higher income and deviation from

the presumptive support amount would enhance the

lower income [noncustodial] parent’s ability to foster

a relationship with the child . . . . This consideration

is unambiguously intended to protect the noncustodial

parent in circumstances where the income of the custodial parent far exceeds the income of the parent obligated to pay child support . . . .’’ (Citation omitted;

emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 101. That is not the situation in the present case,

in which the unemployed defendant is the custodial

parent who has no income aside from child support. The

court, therefore, improperly considered the disparity

between the parties’ incomes when it ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant 13 percent of his net bonus

income as supplemental child support. For this reason,

we reverse the judgment only with respect to the lump

sum, supplemental child support order.

The judgment is reversed only as to the lump sum,

supplemental child support order and the case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date the appeal was submitted on briefs.

1 The defendant did not file a brief or otherwise participate in the present

appeal. We have considered the claims raised by the plaintiff on the basis

of his brief and the record. See, e.g., Rosario v. Rosario, 198 Conn. App.

83, 84 n.1, 232 A.3d 1105 (2020).

2 The parties’ relationship is highly litigious. The trial court docket contains

more than 270 entries, with at least 100 of them having been entered after

the judgment of dissolution was rendered.

3 During the hearing, the plaintiff protested the defendant’s lack of employ-
ment stating that she has a master’s degree and had attended law school.

The defendant stated to the court that she is seeking employment but that her

immigration status and lack of a green card present employability problems.

4 The court also addressed the defendant’s motion for contempt, which

concerned the child’s summer camp activities and who would pay the associated fees. The motion for contempt is not at issue in the present appeal.

5 The child support guidelines worksheet filed in court on February 5,

2020, indicates that the plaintiff’s weekly gross income was $4807 and that

his net weekly income was $3005. The plaintiff’s presumptive child support

amount was $416 per week, which constituted 13.84 percent of his net

income.

6 Pursuant to § 46b-215a-2c (d) (A) of the Regulations of Connecticut State

Agencies, ‘‘A qualified child is one: (i) who is currently living in the same

household with the parent; (ii) who is a dependent of the parent; (iii) who

is not a subject of the support determination; and (iv) for whom the parent

has not claimed a deduction under section 46b-215a-1 (1) (l) of the regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.’’

The child support guidelines worksheet filed in court on February 5, 2020,

indicates that the plaintiff’s qualified child was taken into consideration

when the plaintiff’s child support obligation was calculated. The amount

reserved for the plaintiff’s qualified child was $318 per week.

7 The court stated to the plaintiff that his accurate net income, when

taxes are taken into account, are ‘‘not taxes that you decide, taxes that the

government decides.’’ The court also noted that the plaintiff had failed to

include his bonus income on some of his financial affidavits. The court also

found that the plaintiff had included only a portion of his bonus income

on his financial affidavits, that which he had been paid to date, not the

total amount.

8 The defendant stated with respect to the prior child support orders:

‘‘[F]or 2017 bonus income, [the plaintiff] receive[d] $767,905. Even though,

you know, [it] exceeds the maximum number in the guideline[s] even though

[the] magistrate court still ordered him to pay . . . $47,253.72, which . . .

is 17.67 percent of the net—his self-reported net, 6.15 percent of gross. So

that number—I mean, for that year the bonus—the gross bonus income is

far more than the number now.’’

9 Our review of the transcript of the hearing discloses that the court found

that the plaintiff’s net income from his 2019 bonus was $234,736. The plaintiff

does not challenge that finding. The plaintiff did not file a motion for articulation of the court’s succinct order.

10 We reverse, in part, the judgment of the trial court on the ground that

the reason given by the court to deviate from the child support guidelines

was improper. We need not reach the plaintiff’s remaining claims as we are

not persuaded that they are likely to arise on remand. See State v. Norman

P., 169 Conn. App. 616, 618 n.2, 151 A.3d 877 (2016) (generally speaking, if

judgment is reversed and remanded for new trial, appellate court may review

other claims that are likely to arise on retrial), aff’d, 329 Conn. 440, 186

A.3d 1143 (2018).

11 This court construed the meaning of ‘‘ ‘generally consistent’ ’’ in Gentile

v. Carneiro, 107 Conn. App. 630, 644, 946 A.2d 871 (2008).