United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 11, 2017 Decided February 10, 2017

No. 16-7055

SINA CHENARI,

APPELLANT

v.

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:14-cv-00929)

Jason J. Bach argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. Tracy D. Rezvani entered an appearance.

Nicholas S. McConnell argued the cause for appellee. 

With him on the brief was James N. Markels.

Before: TATEL, MILLETT, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: After George Washington 

University Medical School expelled appellant for cheating on 

an exam, he brought suit in federal court for breach of 
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contract and discrimination based on disability. The district 

court granted summary judgment to the University, deferring 

to its view that appellant broke its honor code and finding no 

violation of the relevant disability statutes. For the reasons set 

forth in this opinion, we affirm.

I.

On December 14, 2012, appellant Sina Chenari, a thirdyear medical student at George Washington University, took 

the Step 1 Surgery Shelf Exam, a standardized test published 

by the National Board of Medical Examiners (NBME). 

Before the exam, the proctor read aloud the instructions from

NBME’s official Chief Proctor’s Manual, including that 

students must complete the exam in two and a half hours and 

that “[n]o additional time [would] be allowed for transferring 

answers” from the test booklet to the answer sheet. Chenari 

also received a copy of the “Exam Guidelines,” which 

contained a similar warning. 

In his deposition, Chenari explained that when the 

proctor called time, he discovered that he had failed to

transfer some twenty or thirty answers from the test booklet to 

the front side of the answer sheet. According to Chenari, he 

“panicked” and “continued to transfer my answers.” Chenari 

Dep. 267:7–:9. The proctor “asked me to stop,” but “I 

continued to bubble in [the answer sheet].” Id. at 269:6–:18. 

When the proctor then “reached over me to try to get the 

exam, I just put my hand over the booklet and the exam and 

just continued to bubble in my answers.” Id. at 270:3–:6. 

Once Chenari finished, he “sat back” and the proctor “picked 

[the exam] up.” Id. at 278:21–280:11. As Chenari concedes, 

he ended up taking an additional “90 seconds to two 

minutes.” Id. at 271:12–:13.
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The proctor reported Chenari to the medical school’s 

administration, as did another student present at the exam. In 

response, Associate Dean for Students Rhonda Goldberg met 

with Chenari to discuss the incident. According to Goldberg’s 

deposition, Chenari told her that he “needed to” finish

bubbling in his answers but “probably made a mistake” by 

doing so. Goldberg Dep. 23:1–:3.

Pursuant to University procedures, Goldberg formed an 

Honor Code Council subcommittee to investigate. After 

holding a hearing, the subcommittee issued a report 

recommending Chenari’s dismissal for academic dishonesty. 

The subcommittee forwarded its recommendation to the

Medical Student Evaluation Committee, and in a written 

statement to that Committee Chenari took responsibility for 

his “deplorable behavior” toward the proctor, acknowledging

his “clear violation of the most basic rules of th[e]

University.” Chenari Dep. Ex. 37 at 1. He nonetheless asked 

for leniency because, he insisted, his “behavior did not 

involve deception” and he had no prior disciplinary 

infractions. Id. After a hearing, the Committee unanimously 

recommended Chenari’s dismissal. The Medical School Dean 

then reviewed the reports, met with Chenari, and upheld the 

recommendation of dismissal. Now represented by counsel, 

Chenari appealed to the Provost, arguing in a written 

submission that his conduct lacked “an element of deceit” like 

“cheat[ing]” or “l[ying].” Chenari Dep. Ex. 40 at 1. Rather, 

his “mistake” was “completely out in the open.” Id. at 2. The 

Provost denied the appeal, and the University dismissed

Chenari from the medical school.

On May 30, 2014, Chenari filed this action in the U.S. 

District Court for the District of Columbia seeking 

reinstatement and damages. He alleged several theories of 

relief. First, he argued that he never violated the University’s 
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Honor Code, so the University’s decision to dismiss him 

breached its contract with him and the contract’s implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Second, he claimed 

that he has a disability, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 

Disorder (ADHD), which he alleged the University failed to 

accommodate in violation of the Rehabilitation Act (“Rehab 

Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Although Chenari

also claimed that he suffered from anxiety, he never argued, 

either here or in the district court, that his anxiety qualified as 

a disability under the disability statutes. See Adams v. Rice, 

531 F.3d 936, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing “disability” as

a “term of art under the statute[s]”). Finally, Chenari argued 

that the University discriminated against him for his ADHD 

and retaliated against him “when he began to advocate for his 

rights,” claims he does not pursue on appeal. Compl. ¶¶ 44, 

55. The University moved for summary judgment, which the 

district court granted. Chenari v. George Washington 

University, 172 F. Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. 2016). 

II.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, 

viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the nonmoving party. Foster v. Sedgwick Claims 

Management Services, Inc., 842 F.3d 721, 725 (D.C. Cir. 

2016). Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant, here 

the University, “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute about a 

material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Johnson v. Perez, 823 F.3d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 

(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

We begin with Chenari’s contract claims.
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A.

Under District of Columbia law, which governs here, 

“‘the relationship between a university and its students is 

contractual in nature.’” Manago v. District of Columbia, 934 

A.2d 925, 927 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Basch v. George 

Washington University, 370 A.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. 1977) 

(per curiam)). In breach of contract cases against a university, 

“a judgment by school officials that a student has not 

performed adequately to meet the school’s academic 

standards is a determination that usually calls for judicial 

deference.” Alden v. Georgetown University, 734 A.2d 1103, 

1108 (D.C. 1999). This rule stems from the principle that a 

diploma publicly signals a school’s confidence in a student’s 

knowledge and skills, so the “‘decisions surrounding the 

issuance of these credentials [should] be left to the sound 

judgment of the professional educators who monitor the 

progress of their students on a regular basis.’” Id. at 1109

(quoting Olsson v. Board of Higher Education, 402 N.E.2d 

1150, 1153 (N.Y. 1980)). A university “will be entitled to 

summary judgment unless the plaintiff can provide some 

evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that there 

was no rational basis for the decision or that it was motivated 

by bad faith or ill will unrelated to academic performance.”

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, 

to show that a university breached the implied covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must allege “either bad 

faith or conduct that is arbitrary and capricious” and, in 

resolving such cases, courts must not “substitut[e] their 

judgment improperly for the academic judgment of the 

school.” Wright v. Howard University, 60 A.3d 749, 754–55

(D.C. 2013) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)

(citing Allworth v. Howard University, 890 A.2d 194, 202

(D.C. 2006); Alden, 734 A.2d at 1111 n.11). True, all these

cases involve decisions about academic performance, not 

honor code violations, but Chenari does not argue—nor do we 
6

decide—that a different standard should apply here. Cf. 

Hajjar-Nejad v. George Washington University, 37 F. Supp. 

3d 90, 116–18 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[C]ourts have concluded that, 

particularly for medical students, professional comportment 

issues fall under the umbrella of deference to academic 

decisions.”). Because the standards for breach of contract and 

implied covenant cases overlap, we address Chenari’s two 

claims together.

The University dismissed Chenari for violating its Honor 

Code. Section F(2)(a) of that Code prohibits students from

“giv[ing] or receiv[ing]” unpermitted aid on tests and 

assignments, plagiarizing, falsifying reports, infringing on the 

rights of other students, or “violat[ing] any other commonly 

understood principles of academic honesty.” Goldberg Decl. 

Ex. A at 8. The University concluded that Chenari violated 

the Code’s “any other” clause by “knowingly continu[ing] to 

fill in his answers on his answer sheet after time was called 

and until he completed his answer sheet despite having been 

instructed by a university proctor three times to stop doing 

so.” Chenari Dep. Ex. 37 at 4. We agree with the district court 

that this represents a perfectly “rational basis” for disciplining

Chenari. Alden, 734 A.2d at 1109. As the district court 

explained, Chenari “stole time,” gaining “an unfair advantage 

over the peers who adhered to the rules”—an obvious breach 

of an Honor Code that prohibits violation of “commonly 

understood principles of academic honesty.” Chenari, 172 F. 

Supp. 3d at 49; see Alden, 734 A.2d at 1111 (“Far from 

lacking a rational basis for dismissal, the Committee on 

Students had sufficient academic evidence in the record from 

which to determine that Alden should be dropped from the 

school's rolls.”).

Chenari nonetheless argues, for four separate reasons, 

that the University’s decision lacked a rational basis. First, he 
7

points out that the proctor failed to cite the Honor Code or 

Exam Guidelines in her initial report to the University, but he

cites nothing in the University’s rules requiring that she do so.

Second, he claims that he made no “attempt . . . to conceal his 

actions.” Appellant’s Br. 19. This is absurd. Just as stealing is 

stealing, whether at gunpoint or in secret bank transfers, so 

cheating is cheating, whether in front of a proctor or behind 

the proctor’s back. Third, and “most importantly” to Chenari, 

the University scored his completed answer sheet and 

“determined that [he] did in fact pass the exam.” Appellant’s 

Br. 20. This too is absurd—so absurd that it hardly requires a

response, other than to point out that Chenari may well have 

passed the exam because he took an additional ninety seconds 

to fill in his answer sheet. 

Chenari’s only argument that could conceivably raise 

doubts about the University’s explanation is his assertion that 

transferring answers from a test booklet to the answer sheet 

after time expired represented a “common and accepted 

practice of the GWU medical school.” Appellant’s Br. 19. But 

if that is so, why in his deposition did Chenari state that he 

had seen his classmates do so “covertly,” and why, during the 

disciplinary process, did he characterize his conduct as an act 

“with blatant disregard for the rules and for the rights of my 

fellow students”? Chenari Dep. 272:21–:22, Ex. 37 at 1. In 

any event, whatever the common practice at the medical 

school, this exam was administered under NBME procedures, 

which expressly warned that “[n]o additional time will be 

allowed for transferring answers” from the test booklet to the 

answer sheet. Ruiz Decl. at 2.

Finally, Chenari argues that the University acted in bad 

faith by dismissing him rather than accommodating his 

ADHD. As the district court explained, however, Chenari has 

pointed to no record evidence that “the [University] or any 
8

individual involved in the [disciplinary] process acted out of 

bad faith or ill will.” Chenari, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 48. Nor does 

he claim that dismissing him for cheating was either excessive 

or discriminatory. Chenari simply urges us to infer that the 

University acted in bad faith because it “did absolutely 

nothing to help him.” Appellant’s Br. 20. But even if such an 

inference would be appropriate, Chenari’s argument turns 

entirely on how the University in fact responded to his

claimed disability, an issue to which we now turn.

B.

Chenari argues that the University discriminated against 

him in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132,

and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

Title II, however, prohibits discrimination only by a “public 

entity,” a term the ADA defines as “any State or local 

government,” an instrumentality of a state or local 

government, “the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 

and any commuter authority.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1), 12132.

Because George Washington University, a private institution,

fits none of these definitions, Chenari’s Title II claim fails. Cf. 

Singh v. George Washington University School of Medicine 

and Health Services, 508 F.3d 1097, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182) (deciding a similar case under 

Title III of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination by a

“place of public accommodation”). This pleading error, 

however, makes little difference because Chenari may pursue 

his claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 

American Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 

1260 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that the Rehab Act and 

Title II of the ADA “are similar in substance and 

consequently cases interpreting either are applicable and 

interchangeable” (alterations, citations, and internal quotation 

marks omitted)); Harrison v. Rubin, 174 F.3d 249, 253 (D.C. 
9

Cir. 1999) (“Claims and defenses under the two statutes are 

virtually identical.”).

To prevail on his failure-to-accommodate claim, Chenari

must “produce sufficient evidence (a) that [he] was disabled 

for the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, (b) that [the 

University] had notice of [his] disability, and (c) that [the 

University] denied [his] request for a reasonable 

accommodation of [his] disability.” Stewart v. St. Elizabeths 

Hospital, 589 F.3d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations 

omitted); see Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 259–60 (2d Cir. 

2016) (“A plaintiff may base her [section 504] discrimination 

claim on . . . failure to make a reasonable accommodation.”); 

see also American Council, 525 F.3d at 1260 & n.2, 1266–67 

& n.14 (allowing a failure-to-accommodate theory to proceed

under the Rehab Act and “constru[ing] section 504 in pari 

materia with Title II of the ADA”); McElwee v. County of 

Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 640 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (treating as 

“interchangabl[e]” Title II’s “reasonable modifications” 

requirement and Title I’s “reasonable accommodations” 

requirement). The district court granted summary judgment to 

the University because, in its view, Chenari had offered no 

evidence showing either that the University had notice of his 

disability or that he had requested an accommodation. 

Chenari, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 51–56.

On appeal, Chenari insists that he did give the University 

notice of his ADHD. In support he cites his deposition, in 

which he claims that, in a meeting with Goldberg and another 

University official in October 2012—two months before the 

surgery exam—he informed them of his ADHD diagnosis, 

including that he had been prescribed medication for the 

disorder. In her deposition, however, Goldberg denied 

Chenari’s account of the meeting, claiming that they 

discussed only his academic performance.
10

This is a classic “genuine dispute as to [a] material fact.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under oath, Chenari testified that he 

informed Goldberg of his ADHD. Under oath, Goldberg 

denied it. At summary judgment, a court “may not . . . believe 

one witness over another if both witnesses observed the same 

event in materially different ways.” Johnson, 823 F.3d at 705.

Indeed, a court “may not believe” the movant’s witness—here 

the University’s—given its obligation to view the record “in a 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party”—here, Chenari.

Robinson v. Pezzat, 818 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

In dismissing Chenari’s testimony as “insufficient to 

create a genuine dispute of material fact,” Chenari, 172 F.

Supp. 3d at 54, the district court applied the well-accepted

rule that courts may “lawfully put aside testimony that is so 

undermined as to be incredible.” Robinson, 818 F.3d at 10 

(quoting Johnson v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority, 883 F.2d 125, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1989), abrogated on 

other grounds by Robinson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 

1255, 1258 (D.C. 1990)). That scenario is “most likely when a 

plaintiff’s claim is supported solely by the plaintiff’s own 

self-serving testimony, unsupported by corroborating

evidence, and undermined either by other credible evidence, 

physical impossibility or other persuasive evidence that the 

plaintiff has deliberately committed perjury.” Johnson, 883 

F.2d at 128. This is not such a case.

The University cites nothing to indicate that Chenari’s 

testimony is “undermined . . . by other credible evidence, 

physical impossibility or other persuasive evidence.” 

Moreover, as this court has explained, evidence sufficient to 

dismiss a plaintiff’s uncorroborated, self-serving testimony—

the situation here—is “rare[].” Robinson, 818 F.3d at 10. For 

example, summary judgment is proper when a plaintiff’s 

statement is demonstrably false after review of a “quite 
11

clear[]” videotape, or when the testimony is contradicted by 

“multiple disinterested witnesses.” Id. (citing Scott v. Harris, 

550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Johnson, 883 F.2d at 128–29).

Here, by contrast, we have only Goldberg’s contradictory 

testimony and, as the district court pointed out, that Chenari 

never mentioned his ADHD in other meetings with University

officials, including during his disciplinary proceedings. See 

Chenari, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 52–54. Those facts certainly go to 

Chenari’s credibility, but nothing about them is “remotely 

compelling enough to require a jury to disregard” his

testimony. Robinson, 818 F.3d at 11.

Although the district court thus erred in granting 

summary judgment on the notice question, this does not end 

the matter. As explained above, in order to prevail on his

failure-to-accommodate claim, Chenari must demonstrate not 

only that he gave notice, but also that the University denied a 

requested accommodation. After considering the evidence, the 

district court found that Chenari failed to seek a reasonable 

accommodation. See Chenari, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 54–56.

Chenari concedes that he never requested an 

accommodation, but argues that his “repeated notifications to 

the administration created an obligation on [the University] to 

investigate and implement reasonable accommodations.” 

Appellant’s Br. 28. To be sure, there may well be cases where 

the plaintiff’s need for an accommodation is so apparent that 

the defendant must offer one regardless of whether the 

plaintiff requested it. See, e.g., Pierce v. District of Columbia, 

128 F. Supp. 3d 250, 269–70 (D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting “the 

District’s suggestion that a prison facility need not act to 

accommodate an obviously disabled inmate if the inmate does 

not ask for accommodations”). Although we doubt that this is 

such a case, we have no need to consider the question given 
12

that the record makes abundantly clear that the University did

offer Chenari an accommodation.

As Chenari conceded in his deposition, University 

officials twice referred him to counseling and therapy, 

including once to a specific counselor to deal with his anxiety 

about a course involving roleplaying. Chenari acknowledged

that he never followed up on those referrals, insisting that he

had “no time,” though he never requested time off to seek 

therapy—as he also concedes. Chenari Dep. 246:8–:9.

In addition to these express offers of assistance, the 

University has an Office of Disability Support Services, 

which, according to its director, “receive[s] and evaluate[s] 

requests for accommodations from students.” McMenamin 

Decl. 1. Goldberg explained in her declaration that she tells 

all first-year students that “if they have a disability and need 

to request an accommodation, it is the student’s responsibility 

to go to [the Office] to pursue that matter.” Goldberg Decl. 1.

Moreover, the University’s “First Year Survival Guide” for 

medical students instructs “[s]tudents who suspect that they 

may have a disability[] which may require an 

accommodation” to contact the Office. 

Finally, the Office of Disability Support Services

maintains a website that walks students through the process 

for obtaining a reasonable accommodation. See Disability 

Support Services, George Washington University,

https://disabilitysupport.gwu.edu/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2017). 

At the time Chenari attended the University, the website 

included specific instructions about how students with ADHD 

could obtain accommodations. Although Chenari testified that 

he “did not know” about the website, he admitted receiving 

and “looking through” the First Year Survival Guide, and as 

noted above, Goldberg reported that she told all entering 
13

students about the disability office. Chenari Dep. at 176:19, 

186:18–19.

To sum up, then, the University not only twice offered 

Chenari counseling, but also, through its Disability Office and 

that office’s website, offered all students a procedure for 

obtaining any reasonable accommodation they might need. 

The Rehabilitation Act requires nothing more.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

So ordered.