In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-22-00177-CV 

 

IN RE WALTER LYNN JOHNSTON, RELATOR 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

December 20, 2022 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ. 

Walter “Lynn” Johnston has filed a document entitled “Petition for Writ of 

Mandamus or, in the Alternative, Writ of Habeas Corpus” seeking our determination that 

the contempt judgment filed by the Honorable Les Hatch, Presiding Judge of the 237th

District Court of Lubbock County, is void. We determine Lynn’s filing is a petition for writ 

of mandamus and conditionally grant his requested relief.

BACKGROUND

On February 28, 2019, Cassandra Johnston filed for divorce from Lynn. The trial 

court entered temporary orders on June 7, 2019, in which it ordered Lynn to, inter alia, 
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pay $1,253.00 each month for child support and to pay fifty percent of all unreimbursed 

health, vision, and dental care expenses. 

After Lynn failed to make certain child support payments, medical support 

payments, and debt payments, Cassandra filed a motion for enforcement and contempt. 

By this motion, Cassandra sought the trial court’s order holding Lynn in contempt for the 

late child and medical support payments. The trial court held hearings on contempt, 

enforcement, and the final divorce, which concluded on February 9, 2021. On December 

13, 2021, the trial court rendered a final decree of divorce, a judgment of contempt for 

violations of temporary orders, and a judgment of enforcement for violations of temporary 

orders. The trial court’s contempt judgment found that Lynn had committed forty-one 

violations of the temporary orders and ordered Lynn to serve a ninety-day jail sentence 

but suspended the sentence with “unsupervised probation” and with specified terms of 

probation. The contempt judgment also ordered Lynn to pay Cassandra $15,000 in 

attorney’s fees.

On March 11, 2022, Cassandra filed a motion to revoke Lynn’s probation. A 

hearing was scheduled for May of 2022 but was continued. On June 24, 2022, Lynn filed 

a motion for emergency relief with this Court seeking to stay proceedings in the trial court 

pending resolution of the matters raised in the instant original proceeding. By order dated 

June 28, 2022, we granted Lynn’s motion and stayed proceedings in the trial court. 

TYPE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
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Initially, we must determine the type of relief sought by Lynn. This proceeding 

involves a contempt judgment that orders confinement for a period of ninety days with 

that sentence suspended and Lynn placed on “unsupervised probation.” 

Generally, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the only method for attacking an 

order of contempt. In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 370 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding). 

However, “mandamus is available to challenge an order of contempt not involving 

confinement . . . .” Id. (citing In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig. 

proceeding) (per curiam), and Rosser v. Squier, 902 S.W.2d 962, 962 (Tex. 1995) (orig. 

proceeding) (per curiam)); see Tracy v. Tracy, 219 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2007, no pet.) (“Contempt orders involving confinement may be reviewed by writ of 

habeas corpus; contempt orders that do not involve confinement may be reviewed only 

through mandamus.”). While courts have extended the concept of “confinement” to 

include probation, the terms of probation typically must include some type of tangible 

restraint of liberty, such as house arrest or monthly reporting requirements. Ex parte 

Hughey, 932 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, orig. proceeding). 

Because Lynn was placed on “unsupervised probation,” we conclude that he seeks 

mandamus relief and we will analyze his claims accordingly.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Mandamus relief is proper only to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is 

no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 290 S.W.3d 

204, 207 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding). When seeking mandamus relief, the relator 

bears the burden of proving these two requirements. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 
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840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Contempt orders are not reviewable by appeal. 

Roisman v. Roisman, 651 S.W.3d 419, 433 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, orig. 

proceeding) (mem. op.). Because there is no adequate remedy by appeal for Lynn’s 

challenge to the contempt judgment, the question remaining here is whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in rendering the order. Id. at 434. A trial court clearly abuses its 

discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a 

clear and prejudicial error of law. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839. Because a trial court has 

no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts, a trial court’s

clear failure to analyze or apply the law correctly is an abuse of discretion. Roisman, 651 

S.W.3d at 434; Ex parte Dolenz, 893 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, orig. 

proceeding). 

An appellate court should issue a writ of mandamus only if the contempt judgment 

is void, and not if it is merely voidable. Ex parte Dolenz, 893 S.W.2d at 679. We review 

a contempt judgment to determine whether the findings are “so completely without 

evidentiary support [that] the order deprives a relator of due process of law.” Id. at 680. 

VALIDITY OF THE CONTEMPT JUDGMENT

Lynn’s first two issues challenge the specificity of Cassandra’s motion for 

enforcement and the resulting contempt judgment. 

Contempt of court has been defined as “disobedience to or disrespect of a court 

by acting in opposition to its authority.” In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tex. 2021) 

(per curiam). Because an alleged contemnor’s liberty is at stake, contempt should only 

be used as a last resort. Id. 
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Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and, as such, the contemnor is 

entitled to procedural due process throughout the proceedings. Roisman, 651 S.W.3d at 

434. To support a contempt judgment, the underlying order must set forth the terms of 

compliance in clear, specific, and unambiguous terms so that the person charged with 

obeying the decree will know exactly what duties and obligations are imposed upon him. 

Luther, 620 S.W.2d at 722. A court order that fails to meet these requirements of 

specificity is not definite and certain enough to support a contempt finding. Id. 

We will grant a relator relief only if the underlying order is void. See id. at 721–22; 

Ex parte Shaffer, 649 S.W.2d 300, 301–02 (Tex. 1983) (“[O]ne may not be held guilty of 

contempt for refusing to obey a void order”). A contempt order rendered without adequate 

notice is void. Roisman, 651 S.W.3d at 435. The relator bears the burden of showing 

that the contempt judgment is void. Id. 

Lynn contends that Cassandra’s motion for enforcement lacked sufficient 

specificity to support a finding of contempt. 

Family Code section 157.002 identifies the pleading requirements for motions to 

enforce. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.002. This section requires an enforcement 

motion to identify the provision of the order allegedly violated, state the manner of the 

respondent’s noncompliance, and state the relief movant requests. Id. § 157.002(a). “[A] 

respondent may be found in contempt only for violations that are specifically pled in the 

motion for enforcement . . . .” In re Office of Attorney Gen., 422 S.W.3d 623, 630 (Tex. 

2013) (orig. proceeding).
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Because the obligation to pay child support is a duty, not a debt, a person may be 

held in contempt and imprisoned for failing to pay child support. Roisman, 651 S.W.3d 

at 434. Medical support is a child-support obligation that is also enforceable by contempt. 

Id. 

Lynn contends that the contempt judgment is void because Cassandra’s motion 

for contempt failed to comply with the due process notice requirements. Cassandra’s 

motion references the temporary order’s medical support obligation as follows:

Pursuant to section 154.183(c) of the Texas Family Code, the reasonable 

and necessary health, vision, and dental-care expenses of the children that 

are not reimbursed by health, vision, or dental insurance, are allocated as 

follows: WALTER LYNN JOHNSTON is ORDERED to pay 50 percent and 

CASSANDRA JOY JOHNSTON is ORDERED to pay 50 percent of the 

unreimbursed health, vision, and dental-care expenses if, at the time the 

expenses are incurred, WALTER LYNN JOHNSTON is providing health,

vision, and dental insurance as ordered.

(emphasis in original). This language fails to provide Lynn notice as to when, how, and 

in what manner he was required to comply. The trial court found twenty-eight violations 

related to this medical support obligation. Because the underlying order does not set 

forth the terms of compliance in clear, specific, and unambiguous terms so that Lynn knew

exactly what duties and obligations are imposed upon him, Lynn was deprived of the 

notice required by due process and cannot be held in contempt for these medical support 

violations. See Luther, 620 S.W.3d at 722.

When a single punishment is assessed for multiple contemptuous acts but 

contempt could not be assessed for one or more of the acts, the entire judgment of 

contempt is void. Ex parte Jordan, 787 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (orig. 

proceeding); Ex parte Davila, 718 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (orig. 
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proceeding). As determined above, the contempt judgment is void as to Lynn’s medical 

support obligation because the temporary orders upon which the judgment is based do 

not specifically identify the terms of compliance. The contempt judgment finds that Lynn 

violated the temporary orders forty-one times, but twenty-eight of those violations were 

based on Lynn’s claimed failure to pay medical support. Because one sentence was 

assessed for forty-one violations but twenty-eight of them will not support an order of 

contempt, we find the entire contempt judgment in this case to be void.

Having found the contempt judgment void, we sustain Lynn’s first two issues.

ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARD

By his third issue, Lynn challenges the award of attorney’s fees in the contempt 

judgment as an abuse of discretion because the fees were not segregated between those 

arising from the enforcement action and the contempt action, the evidence shows the 

award is duplicative of other fees awarded, and the fees are void because they are 

awarded in a void contempt judgment.

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As addressed above, when a single punishment is assessed for multiple 

contemptuous acts but contempt could not be assessed for one or more of the acts, the 

entire judgment of contempt is void. Ex parte Jordan, 787 S.W.2d at 368; Ex parte Davila, 

718 S.W.2d at 282. When the entire judgment of contempt is void, we are unable to 

1 We acknowledge that Lynn does not raise the argument that the attorney’s fees award is void 

because it is part of a void contempt judgment in his petition for writ of mandamus. He first makes this 

argument in his reply brief. Nevertheless, we believe that the invalidity of the attorney’s fee award because 

it is contained in a void contempt judgment is a natural consequence of our determination that the contempt 

judgment is void. We also note that Cassandra anticipated this argument and addressed it in her responsive 

brief.
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reform the judgment by severing out the void portions. In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d 594, 598 

(Tex. 2005). 

As previously determined, the contempt judgment in the present case is void for 

assessing a punishment for twenty-eight violations that will not support contempt. 

Because the contempt judgment is void in its entirety, that must include its award of 

$15,000 in attorney’s fees. 

Having determined that the entire contempt judgment is void, we sustain Lynn’s 

third issue.

CONCLUSION

We lift the stay of proceedings in the trial court that we granted on June 28, 2022. 

Based on our conclusions that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by entering a 

void contempt judgment and Lynn has no adequate remedy by appeal, we conditionally 

grant mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate its judgment holding Lynn in 

contempt. We will issue our writ only if the trial court fails to comply.

Judy C. Parker

 Justice