NO. 07-99-0507-CR

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL A

	OCTOBER 18, 2000

	______________________________

	JAMES BIBBS, JR., APPELLANT

	V.

	THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

	_________________________________

	FROM THE 99TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

	NO. 99-429-709; HONORABLE MACKEY HANCOCK, JUDGE

	_______________________________

Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.

	Upon a plea of not guilty, appellant James Bibbs, Jr. was convicted by a jury of

delivery of a controlled substance, cocaine, less than 200 grams but at least 4 grams, and

punishment was assessed by the trial court at 25 years confinement.  Presenting only one

issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the defense of vicarious entrapment was established.  For the reasons stated

herein, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

	Because appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, and tThe underlying facts of appellant’s offense are not in dispute and need only be

briefly mentioned.   On May 20, 1998, appellant and Olga Castillo were living together as

girlfriend and boyfriend.  As part of a Drug Enforcement Agency (D.E.A.) Task Force,

Lubbock Police Sergeant Neal Brumley and D.E.A. Agent Stephen Thomas focused their

investigation “that particular day” on Olga Castillo, from whom Sergeant Brumley had bought crack cocaine from in the past.  After it was determined that Ms. Castillo could not

furnish the amount of cocaine that law enforcement wanted to purchase, appellant got in

a car with Agent Thomas and at the direction of the appellant,  the two drove to the residence

of Artie Dean Taylor, a known drug trafficker.  When they arrived,  Agent Thomas gave

appellant $500 and waited inside the car while appellant purchased 5.7 grams of cocaine

from Taylor.  Appellant was arrested a few days later on a warrant and charged with

delivery of a controlled substance.

	Appellant presents a sole issue contending  the trial court erred in denying his motion

for a directed verdict contending that  the defense of vicarious entrapment was clearly

established.  By this argument, he contends that he was induced by law enforcement to

participate in the buy/bust operation because of his age, need for money, and the fact he

was a drug user.  Appellant also contends the prosecutor’s argument that the original focus of the investigation was on Ms. Castillo is irrelevant because law enforcement personnel

knew appellant lived with her and principally argues that he is protected under section 8.06

of the Texas Penal Code because he was entrapped vicariously.1  We disagree.

	Entrapment may be raised as a defense when two elements are satisfied:  (1) a law

enforcement officer induces the defendant to commit the crime (subjective element), and

(2) the means used in the inducement would likely cause other persons to commit the

crime (objective element).  England v. State, 887 S.W.2d 902, 908-13 (Tex.Cr.App. 1994). 

There is, however, no vicarious entrapment defense in Texas.  Ramirez v. State, 822

S.W.2d 240, 248 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d) (citing Norman v. State, 588 S.W.2d 340, 346 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 909, 100 S.Ct. 1836, 64 L.Ed.2d 261).  In Norman, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:

The vicarious entrapment defense espoused by the appellant attenuates the

"cost-benefit" policy by allowing a defendant to discredit the inducement

methods of State agents when she was never a party to such inducements. 

Such a policy would allow entrapment defenses by all defendants involved

to prevail ad infinitum from the original improper use of governmental power by the State agent, regardless of whether each defendant was ever induced

by the government to commit the crime in the first place.  

See Norman, 588 S.W.2d at 346.

	Because Texas law does not recognize a defense known as vicarious entrapment, 

appellant’s sole issue is overruled. 

	Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

							Don H. Reavis			 				     			     Justice

Do not publish.initionßTåÆ<AAæÆ:DefinitionßLåÆ8ææÅ6DefinitionåÆ(''æÆ&H1åÆ(üüæÆ&H2åÆ(üüæÆ&H3åÆ(üüæÆ&H4åÆ(üüæÆ&H5åÆ(üüæÆ&H6åÆ2æææÆ0AddressåÆ8MMæÆ6BlockquoteåÆ,ææÅ*CITEåÆ,dlÅ*CODEåÆ4ææÅ2EmphasisåÆ6íÉÅ4HyperlinkåÆ<íÉÅ:FollowedHypeåÆ4goÅ2KeyboardåÆ<æÆ:PreformattedåÆ<æÆ:zBottomßofß&ÆúçÅÃÆÆdÃÆdåC)ÄÅ1ùÆdxd'ÆùdxdåÆ<æÆ:zTopßofßForåC)ÄÅ2ùàdxdåÆ0KSÅ.SampleåÆ0ææÅ.StrongåÆ8dlÅ6TypewriteråÆ4ææÅ2VariableåÆ:ØÇÅ8HTMLßMarkupåÆ2ãÅ0CommentàÜúùß!"#$ß35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.<å9`(ÑñúCourierßNewÖêöâèâ`õèñ&TimesßNewßRoman%nd affirm the judgment.

							Brian Quinn

					  		    Justice				 			

Do not publish.