In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-1170 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

MONTA GROCE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 15-cr-78-wmc-01 — William M. Conley, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2020 — DECIDED MARCH 20, 2020 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and ST. EVE, Circuit 

Judges. 

WOOD, Chief Judge. Monta Groce challenges two conditions of supervised release that were imposed as part of his 

sentence for various sex trafficking crimes. In the district 

court, Groce did not object to either of the two conditions, 

even though he objected to four others and waived his right 

to have the district court read each condition and its justification. We have faced this situation in several recent decisions 
2 No. 19-1170 

and have found that these circumstances normally amount to 

waiver. There is nothing unusual in Groce’s case that would 

call for a different result. We thus hold that he waived his appellate challenges to the two conditions, and we affirm. 

I 

In 2016, a jury convicted Groce of eight charges in a ninecount indictment: three counts of sex trafficking in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1) and (b)(1); conspiracy to engage in 

interstate transportation for prostitution in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 371; interstate transportation for prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421 and 2422; maintaining a drug house 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1); using or carrying a firearm 

in maintaining the drug house in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c); and witness retaliation in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1513(b)(2). The district court sentenced Groce to 25 years in 

prison, to be followed by 20 years of supervised release. 

Groce appealed and challenged his convictions for witness 

retaliation and sex trafficking. The government conceded that 

the jury instruction regarding the retaliation count was erroneous and that vacating this count of conviction was appropriate. We agreed with that assessment and so we vacated the 

retaliation count, affirmed the district court’s judgment in all 

other respects, and remanded for resentencing. United States 

v. Groce, 891 F.3d 260, 271 (7th Cir. 2018). 

Before resentencing, the probation officer issued a revised 

presentence investigation report (PSR). The revised PSR recommended eleven standard conditions of supervised release 

and seven special conditions. Among those conditions are the 

two Groce now challenges in this, his second appeal: 
No. 19-1170 3

Conditions 11 and 18. Condition 11, which was slightly altered from the original PSR, states: 

As directed by the probation officer, defendant shall 

notify employers and third parties providing volunteer opportunities and educational opportunities; organizations to which defendant belongs; and neighbors and family members with minor children, of defendant’s criminal record based on risk associated with 

his offense, his obligations to register as a sexual offender, and the legal requirements under the Sex Offender Notification Act. The probation officer may also 

take steps to confirm defendant’s compliance with this 

notification requirement or provide such notifications 

directly. 

Condition 18 states: 

Have no contact with the victim in person, through 

written or electronic communication, or through a 

third party, unless authorized by the supervising U.S. 

probation officer. Defendant shall not enter the premises or loiter within 1,000 feet of the victim’s residence 

or place of employment. 

At his resentencing, Groce confirmed that he had read his 

PSR and reviewed it with his counsel. He objected to conditions 4, 8, 15, and 17. The district court addressed those objections and modified one condition. Groce waived reading of 

the remaining conditions and their justifications. His counsel 

stated, “I’m aware of no grounds for objecting to the remaining conditions, and we’re willing to waive the reading.” The 

district court resentenced Groce to 25 years of imprisonment 

and 20 years of supervised release. 
4 No. 19-1170 

II 

Groce has now presented challenges to Conditions 11 and 

18, both of which he contends are vague and overbroad. Groce 

complains that Condition 11 is particularly unclear. He professes to be unsure whether he must disclose only his criminal 

record to third parties or whether he must also disclose the 

risks associated with his offense, his obligations to register as 

a sexual offender, and the legal requirements under the Sex 

Offender Notification Act. With respect to Condition 18, 

Groce asserts that he needs the names of the victim or victims 

whom he is supposed to avoid, and that the condition is invalid insofar as it does not require his contacts to be knowing. 

Although Groce’s criticisms may be valid (though we 

make no ruling on them one way or the other), he cannot proceed unless he can clear the waiver hurdle. We recently clarified our approach to appeals in which the defendant challenges a supervised release condition for the first time on appeal. In United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019), we 

held: 

We will find waiver, as we do here, when the defendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful opportunity to object, and she asserts (through 

counsel or directly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions, waives reading of those conditions 

and their justifications, challenges certain conditions 

but not the one(s) challenged on appeal, or otherwise 

evidences an intentional or strategic decision not to object. 

Id. at 450. In reaching that decision, we took into account the 

fact that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) permits defendants to 
No. 19-1170 5

challenge a condition of supervised release, unlike other 

terms of a sentence, at any time. Id. at 451. 

Here, all the evidence points toward a waiver. At resentencing, Groce confirmed that he had the opportunity to read 

and discuss the revised PSR. In addition, Groce objected to 

four conditions at the resentencing but not the two conditions 

he now challenges. Groce also chose to waive reading of the 

two conditions and their justifications. By choosing to pursue 

certain arguments and forgoing others, Groce waived other 

possible challenges. “Nor is this the ‘rare and limited instance’ 

when we may choose to overlook a waiver because the challenged condition concerns activity protected by the First 

Amendment.” United States v. Anderson, 948 F.3d 910, 912 (7th 

Cir. 2020) (citing Flores, 929 F.3d at 450). 

Realizing that Flores controls this case, Groce asks us to 

overturn that recent decision, arguing that it is inconsistent 

with the Supreme Court’s definitions of waiver and forfeiture. 

He cites United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) which 

states: “Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture 

is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is 

the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 

right.’” Id. at 733 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 

(1938)). Groce emphasizes that waiver must be intentional on 

the part of the defendant and should be knowing and voluntary. Such intent should not be inferred, he contends, when a 

defendant merely fails to object to a condition of supervised 

release. Groce concludes that Flores incorrectly expanded the 

definition of waiver. 

Flores, however, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s explanations of both waiver and forfeiture. In the end, the question whether a defendant waived or forfeited a point depends 
6 No. 19-1170 

on a factual analysis of the proceedings. The circumstances in 

which Flores said that we would normally find waiver are reliable indicia that a defendant is intentionally relinquishing a 

known right. Contrary to Groce’s accusation, we are not 

simply relying on a defendant’s silence. Flores alerts defendants that the proper place to raise challenges to supervised release conditions is in the district court. If the defendant fails 

to raise such a challenge, as mentioned above, the defendant 

may still petition the district court for a modification of the 

condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). The record here leaves 

no doubt that Groce intentionally refrained from challenging 

Condition 11 and Condition 18, and so his appeal must fail at 

the threshold. 

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.