In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 17-2476

WORLD OUTREACH CONFERENCE 

CENTER, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 06 C 2891 — Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Judge.

ARGUED MAY 29, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2018

Before BAUER, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. This is the third time World Outreach

Conference Center’s (World Outreach) long-running dispute

with the City of Chicago has appeared before us. See World

Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 591 F.3d 531 (7th Cir.

2009) (“World Outreach I”); World Outreach Conference Ctr. v.
2 No. 17-2476

City of Chicago, 787 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2015) (“World Outreach

II”). In this appeal, World Outreach contends that the district

court erred by making a 70% across-the-board reduction to its

award of attorney’s fees. We find no reason to disrupt the

district court’s determination and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The dispute and its ensuing litigation between World

Outreach and the City of Chicago has a history beginning in

2005. We assume familiarity with our earlier opinions and

abbreviate our discussion.

In July 2005, World Outreach, a Christian religious organization, purchased a building in the Roseland neighborhood on

Chicago’s south side from the YMCA. The building contains

168 single-room occupancy (SRO) units. The YMCA operated

a community center and the SROs for the previous 80 years

with little interference from the City’s zoning authority. The

community center was a “legal nonconforming use,” meaning

that the use of the center had previously conformed to zoning

regulations, and when the zoning regulations changed to

prohibit that use, the YMCA was allowed to continue using

the building as a community center. See Chicago Zoning

Ordinance § 17-15-0301.

The legal nonconforming status meant the YMCA, and

ultimately World Outreach, did not need to obtain a Special

Use Permit to operate the center. According to the City’s

zoning ordinance, the “[n]onconforming status runs with the

land and is not affected by changes of tenancy, ownership, or

management.” Chicago Zoning Ordinance § 17-15-0106. The

YMCA and World Outreach only needed to obtain the neces-
No. 17-2476 3

sary licenses from the City to operate the community center

and the SROs.

When World Outreach applied for the necessary community center and SRO licenses in August 2005, the City informed

World Outreach that it needed a Special Use Permit. The

mystery as to why the City refused to issue the licenses and

insist on the Special Use Permits, despite the legal

nonconforming status, is not relevant and has been discussed

in our previous opinions. See World Outreach I, 591 F.3d at 536;

World Outreach II, 787 F.3d at 841–42. Regardless, the City’s

denial of the licenses and insistence on obtaining a Special Use

Permit was unlawful.

While the City was preventing World Outreach from

operating its community center and SROs, Hurricane Katrina

struck New Orleans in late August 2005. Thousands of

residents from the Big Easy were evacuated and transplanted

to other cities, including Chicago. Representatives from the

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) contacted

World Outreach’s director, Pastor Pamela Blossom, about

entering into a contract to utilize their SROs. World Outreach

claimed that it had a verbal agreement with FEMA to use the

rooms at $750 per room, per month, for one year. However,

World Outreach never received any evacuees.

In December 2005, the City pursued its unlawful demands

by suing World Outreach in Illinois state court for operating

the community center without a Special Use Permit. The suit

was frivolous, and the City voluntarily dismissed it in April

2006 after World Outreach presented the City with its affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Shortly thereafter, World
4 No. 17-2476

Outreach turned around and filed a new lawsuit in state court

against the City, which the City removed to federal court.

However, the City continued to deprive World Outreach of the

necessary licenses. Finally, in January 2007, the City signed off

on World Outreach’s license applications, and issued the

licenses in August 2007.

World Outreach’s nine-count lawsuit put forward a variety

of claims, including claims under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc. The district court initially dismissed the complaint for

failure to state a claim, but we reversed in part, sending the

RLUIPA claims back, among others. See World Outreach I, 591

F.3d at 537–38. On remand, the City and World Outreach each

filed motions for summary judgment; the City on all remaining

claims, and World Outreach only on its RLUIPA claims. The

district court granted summary judgment to World Outreach

on part of its RLUIPA claim relating to defending the frivolous

lawsuit, but found in favor of the City on all the remaining

claims. The court awarded damages to World Outreach for the

amount of fees and expenses incurred in responding to the

frivolous lawsuit, and the parties entered into an agreed final

judgment order in November 2013, awarding $15,000 to World

Outreach.

The City and World Outreach cross-appealed, and we

affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

World Outreach on the RLUIPA claim relating to the frivolous

lawsuit. However, we reversed and remanded again, but only

with respect to World Outreach’s RLUIPA claim regarding

the City’s unlawful deprivation of the licenses. See World

Outreach II, 787 F.3d at 843–45. We provided the district court
No. 17-2476 5

“guidance” on remand, and noted that the largest element of

damages from the deprivation of the licenses related to the lost

opportunity to house Hurricane Katrina evacuees. Id. at 844

(“$750 times 12 months times 168 rooms is $1,512,000”).

Importantly, we stated that the evidence put forth by World

Outreach was “weak,” and there was uncertainty as to

“whether World Outreach would have received any, let alone

168, evacuees, let alone for a full year.” Id. We concluded that

“[t]here has been a failure of proof, which leaves us uncertain

whether World Outreach can recover substantial damages,”

but that ultimately, there were questions of fact that needed to

be resolved at trial. Id. at 844–45. 

On remand, World Outreach continued to produce a

significant amount of discovery on its damages theory.

Throughout the litigation, World Outreach consistently made

substantial damages claims: September 2007, $1.89 million;

February 2010, $2.44 million; December 2015, $1.09 million.

However, by February 2016, World Outreach significantly

reduced its damages claim to $363,000. On April 1, 2016, the

City made an offer of judgment to World Outreach in the

amount of $25,001 “plus reasonable costs and attorney’s fees

accrued as of the date of this offer ... as determined by the

Court.” Three days later, the City filed an emergency motion

for leave to file a motion for summary judgment on damages,

and to continue the trial date based on World Outreach’s

repeated revision of its damages claims and belated production

of discovery. That same day, World Outreach accepted the

City’s offer of judgment.

World Outreach then filed a petition for $1,913,929.20 in

attorney’s fees. The City responded with numerous objections,
6 No. 17-2476

and the district court modified the lodestar to $1,559,991.50.

World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 234 F. Supp. 3d

904, 909–19 (N.D. Ill. 2017). After calculating the lodestar, the

court determined that a 70% across-the-board reduction was

warranted, reducing the lodestar to $467,973.45. Id. at 920–22.

The court justified its reduction by noting that World Outreach’s award of $40,001 was a “dismal failure” in contrast to

the substantial damages it had sought for nearly nine years. Id.

at 920. Additionally, the court stated that the reduction

“recognizes that World Outreach’s attorneys never had a

realistic valuation of the case,” and that “[i]t might have settled

much earlier had counsel ... been less concerned with recovering a large fee award.” Id. at 922.

II. DISCUSSION

A district court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to a

prevailing party in RLUIPA actions. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). We

review a court’s award of attorney’s fees for an abuse of

discretion. Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547, 552–53 (7th Cir.

2014). A “district court is in the best position to make the

‘contextual and fact-specific’ assessment of what fees are

reasonable.” Id. at 553 (quoting Sottoriva v. Claps, 617 F.3d 971,

975 (7th Cir. 2010)).

World Outreach does not challenge the district court’s

modified lodestar calculation. Instead, it only challenges the

court’s 70% across-the-board reduction to the lodestar.

“Although the lodestar yields a presumptively reasonable fee,

the court may nevertheless adjust the fee based on factors not

included in the computation.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

A crucial factor in determining whether to adjust an award
No. 17-2476 7

upward or downward is the result obtained by the prevailing

party, particularly when “a plaintiff is deemed ‘prevailing’

even though he succeeded on only some of his claims for

relief.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). The district

court must determine whether “the plaintiff achieve[d] a level

of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a

satisfactory basis for making a fee award.” Id. When “a

plaintiff has obtained excellent results, [the] attorney should

recover a fully compensatory fee,” but, if “a plaintiff has

achieved only partial or limited success, [the lodestar] may be

an excessive amount.” Id. at 435–36.

World Outreach offers no reason to disturb the district

court’s thoughtful determination that the lodestar was not a

reasonable amount based on the results World Outreach

obtained. The court correctly found that World Outreach’s

damages award was a far cry from its lofty goals. From

September 2007 until February 2016, World Outreach continuously pursued a seven-figure damages award, yet only

obtained $40,001 after nine years of litigation. Given World

Outreach’s demands throughout, its ultimate damages award

could hardly be characterized as an excellent result.

World Outreach argues that the City engaged in a

“scorched earth defense,” which it claims resulted in the

case being dragged out for nine years. Yet, World Outreach

admitted in its fee petition below that its lawsuit had “two

central purposes:” (1) defeat the frivolous lawsuit; and

(2) obtain the necessary licenses. Both of those objectives were

achieved by August 2007, and from that point until April 2016,

this case was primarily about damages. The district court

judge, who oversaw the case from December 2010 until this
8 No. 17-2476

appeal,1 found that World Outreach’s attorneys “never had a

realistic valuation of the case,” and that the parties might have

settled earlier had World Outreach been more concerned with

resolving the case. In the court’s view, World Outreach was

primarily responsible for the considerable length of the

litigation. This was a reasonable conclusion given that World

Outreach had achieved the equitable relief it sought by August

2007.

The district court did note that World Outreach obtained

some success throughout the litigation. The court considered

that World Outreach prevailed twice before us, which did

delay the resolution of the case, and it acknowledged that

World Outreach II had established precedent under RLUIPA. It

also acknowledged that the litigation resulted in a public

benefit to the Roseland community, although any benefit was

achieved by August 2007 when the City issued the necessary

licenses. World Outreach raises these exact same points on

appeal, but we have no reason to upset the court’s careful

balancing of these successes versus the limited damages award

it ultimately obtained.

We have previously upheld these sorts of reductions to

the lodestar when plaintiffs have achieved limited success. See

Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 650–52 (7th Cir.

2017); Montanez, 755 F.3d at 556–57. There is no particular

algorithm for making such reductions to the lodestar. Richardson v. City of Chicago, 740 F.3d 1099, 1103 (7th Cir. 2014).

1

 The case was reassigned on December 8, 2010, from another district court

judge. 
No. 17-2476 9

However, the district court is in a better position to assess

whether a particular damages award “is a spectacular success,

a dismal failure, or something in between; and whether the

plaintiff’s lawyers would have spent substantially less time on

the case had they been more realistic.” Montanez, 755 F.3d at

556.

Even with the 70% across-the-board reduction, the court

awarded $467,973.45 in attorney’s fees, hardly an insignificant

amount and 12 times the damages award of $40,001. The court

properly exercised its discretion in reducing the lodestar, and

awarded reasonable attorney’s fees to World Outreach in light

of the limited results it achieved.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

award of attorney’s fees.