NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________ No. 14 -3366

CALVIN A. MANN, Appellant

v. COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

App eal from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Delaware (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-09- cv -00122) District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet

________________ Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on March 6, 2015 Before: SHWARTZ, SCIRICA and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 13, 2016)

OPINION *

ROTH , Circuit Judge

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full C ourt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

Calvin A. Mann appeals the District Court’s order , affirming the C ommissioner’s
denial of his applicat ion for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income under the Socia l Security Act. We will affirm.
I.
Mann ’s alleged disability arose from an injury he sustained in a December 3, 1998, accident when he fell off a lad der and broke his l eft wrist. The Administrativ e Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mann had degenerative disc disease , a “severe” impairment , but determined that the impairment did not meet or equal a Listing of Impairments under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1

. T he ALJ found that Mann retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work, and rejected Mann’s testimony of more severe
limitatio ns as “not entirely credible.” Accordingly, t he ALJ determined that Mann was not eligible for benefits under the Act. T he District Court affirmed , and Mann appealed.
II. 1
We exerc ise plenary review over the ALJ’ s legal conclusions and review the factual findings for substantial evidence. 2 Substantial evidence is “ more than a mere scintilla, ” and is defined as “ such rele vant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. ” 3
III.

1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 2 See Zirnsak v. Colvin , 777 F.3d 607 , 610

- 11 (3d Cir. 2014)

. 3 Plummer v. Apfel , 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) ( citation and quotation marks omitted).3

Mann contends that the ALJ erred at n step three by failing to find Mann per se
disabled under Listing § 1.07 , relating to “[f]racture of an upper extremity with nonunion
of a fracture o f the shaft of the humerus, radius, or ulna, under continuing surgical management . . . directed toward restoration of functional use of the extremity, and such function was not restored or expected to be restored within 12 months of onset

. ” 4
In determi ning whether a claimant has met his burden of showing that his impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, it is the Commissioner’ s duty to first identify and specify those listings that potentially apply to t he claimant’ s impairment s. 5
Because the AL J concluded that Mann had degenerative disc disease, a musculoskeletal impairment, he properly focused on the impairments listed in Section 1.00 of the Regulations, relating to the musculoskeletal s ystem. The ALJ determined that t he

“ record does not repor t the existence of any functional limitations and or diagnostic test results, which would suggest that the impairments meet or equal the criteria of any specific listing .” The ALJ noted that he “ specifically considered ” Listing § 1.02, major dysfunction of a joint, § 1 .04, disorders of the spine, a nd § 1.08, soft tissue injury, and concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Mann’s impairment met the criteria in those listings.

4 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sub pt. P, app. 1, § 1.07. 5 See Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 220 F.3d 112, 120 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that identifying the most applicable listing is within the “realm of the ALJ’ s expertise” and “[p]utting the responsibility on the ALJ to identify the relevant listed impairment(s) is consistent with the nature of Social Security disability proceedings”).4

A n ALJ’s evaluation of the record must permit me aningful review of the step

three considerations. 6 Here, t he ALJ’s opinion set forth the facts used in rendering his
d ecision and provided a thorough examination of the medical evidence. The ALJ discussed Mann’s medical history , specifically the findings of Mann’s treating and examining physicians, occupational therapist, and five state agency medical consultants.
The ALJ accorded little weight to Mann’s subjective complaints, finding that Mann’s testimony regarding “the intensity, persistence and limiti ng effects of [the alleged] symptoms [were] not entirely credible.” The ALJ found no clinical findings that would establish the criteria required by any of the listings. The ALJ’s decision, read as a whole,
illustrates that he determined that the appropr iate factors of Mann ’s disability did not

meet any of the listed impairments ; this would includ e Listing § 1.07. 7
T o the extent that Mann argues that the ALJ erred by not identify ing the listing
that came closest to matching his impairmen ts, we disagree

. It is clear from the record
that the ALJ identified and discussed the evidence

. Significantly, the ALJ does not have
“to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis,” but must merely ensure “that there be suffici ent explanation to provide meaningful
review of the step three determination.” 8 Here , the ALJ clearly and fully evaluated and explained the medical evidence set forth in the record. His analysis was sufficient.

6 See Jones v. Barnhart , 364 F.3d 501, 504

- 05 (3d Cir. 2004). 7 Section 1.07 requires that the individual have a “nonunion” of a fracture and the reco rds do not suggest that Mann had a nonunion. 8 Id. at 505.5

Mann next asserts that the hypothetical question posed by the ALJ to the
vocatio nal expert (VE) was flawed because the question did not contain all of Mann’s
restrictions. When posing a hypothetical question to the VE, “t he ALJ must accurately convey to the vocational expert all of a claimant’s credibly established limitations .” 9 The question need not contain “every impairment alleged by a claimant.” 10 The ALJ’s hypothetical question asked the VE to assume a person who has “moderate pain and discomfort, severe on occasion in that left upper ext remity, shoulder and knee.” The ALJ was not required to present Mann’s pain limi tation with greater specificity because t he doctors’ clinical findings did not align with Mann’s subjective complaints of pain. 11 Mann complained of “constant,” “horrible,” “e xcruciating” pain, but the ALJ found those complaints “concerning the intensity, persis tence, and limiting effects” of the pain “not entirely credible” because they were not supported by Mann’s medical record. Indeed , as of March 2003, Mann’s treating phy sician reported that Mann’s “[s]ubjective complaints are now out of proportion to his objective findings.” Accordingly, we conclude that t he ALJ’s hypothetical question sufficiently conveyed all of Mann’s credibly established
limitations.
IV.
For the for egoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

9 Rutherford v. Barnhart , 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005). 10 Id. 11 See Burns v. Barnhart , 312 F.3d 113, 123 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that the question posed to the vocational expert must include im pairments supported by “medically undisputed evidence in the record”).