IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MARSHALL DIVISION

HEADWATER RESEARCH LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD and 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 2:23-CV-00103-JRG-RSP 

SAMSUNG’S DAUBERT MOTION AND 

MOTION TO STRIKE EXPERT REPORT OF DR. ANDREAS GROEHN 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 2

A. Dr. Groehn’s Study Is Performed for a Different Litigation .................................. 2

B. Dr. Groehn’s Recycled Conjoint Survey ................................................................ 3

C. Dr. Groehn’s Conjoint Analysis ............................................................................. 4

II. LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 5

III. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 6

A. Dr. Groehn’s Survey Is Divorced from the Facts of the Case ................................ 6

B. Dr. Groehn’s Repurposed Survey Is Unreliable Because “Standard” 

Battery Life Has No Objective Meaning ................................................................ 9

1. Dr. Groehn’s Survey Did Not Define “Standard” Battery Life, 

Leaving Each Survey Respondent to Attribute Their Own, 

Subjective Meaning .................................................................................... 9

2. The Supposed Incremental Value of “5%” Or “10%” Increase 

Is Equally Vague, Rendering the Results Unreliable ................................ 11

C. Conjoint Analysis Is Inappropriate for Estimating Price ...................................... 12

IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 15

 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases Page(s) 

Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 

No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 794328 (N.D. Cal Feb. 25, 2014) ......................................8 

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 

509 U.S. 579 (1993) .....................................................................................................1, 5, 6, 12 

Fractus, S.A. v. Samsung, et al., 

No. 09-cv-203-LED, 2011 WL 7563820 (E.D. TX Apr. 29, 2011) ..........................................8 

Headwater Research LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 

Case No. 2:22-cv-00422 (E.D. Tex.) .............................................................................1, 2, 6, 7 

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 

526 U.S. 137 (1999) ...................................................................................................................6 

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 

No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2012 WL 850705 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012) ....................................12 

Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 

2008 WL 2323856 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2008) ...........................................................................9 

Unwired Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc., 

No. 14-cv-04134-VC, 2017 WL 589195 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) .........................................8 

Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 

767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..........................................................................................12, 14 

Visteon Glob. Techs., Inc. v. Garmin Int'l, Inc., 

No. 10-CV-10578, 2016 WL 5956325 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 14, 2016) ..................................13, 14 

Other Authorities 

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ........................................................................................1, 5, 6, 8, 13 

Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 104(a) .............................................................................................6 

 

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EXHIBIT INDEX AND NOTES 

Exhibit Description 

A Report of Dr. Andreas Groehn, dated September 26, 2024 

B Excerpts from the Deposition of Dr. Andreas Groehn, taken May 13, 2024 

C Excerpts from the Rough Deposition of Dr. Andreas Groehn, taken Oct. 18, 

2024 

D Allenby 2019 

* Emphasis added unless otherwise noted. 

** Form objections are omitted from deposition transcript quotations unless otherwise noted. 

*** In this brief, “Headwater” refers to Plaintiff and its purported predecessors. 

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Dr. Groehn’s opinions lack any factual basis from this case. Instead of conducting an 

independent analysis, he repurposed a study he performed for a different case involving entirely 

different patents and technology. Indeed, he was hired by Headwater’s lawyers to parrot the same 

conjoint survey from the HW1 case. By his own admission, for this case, Dr. Groehn: 

 never reviewed the asserted patents, 

 never reviewed the accused features, 

 never consulted the technical expert to understand what feature(s) to test, 

 never reviewed a single Samsung-produced document in this case, and 

 never read any Samsung witness deposition in this case. 

Ex. C (Groehn 10/18/2024 Rough Tr.) at 26:16–27:05, 27:06–09, 27:16–19, 27:24–28:03, 29:08–

10, 32:21–24, 32:25–33:03, 35:01–03, 37:05–08. Dr. Groehn simply cannot provide testimony 

that is “based on sufficient facts or data” or “reflects a reliable application of the principles and 

methods to the facts of the case—as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 702—when he concedes 

that he never engaged with the facts of this case to begin with. Dr. Groehn may have expertise, 

but he is not an independent expert who can offer probative opinions here. 

More fundamentally, Dr. Groehn’s methodology fails to pass muster under Daubert, as he 

misapplied a well-established statistical method. Conjoint analysis has a time and place: it is useful 

for assessing consumers’ relative preferences, such as comparing their preference for screen size 

versus camera quality. However, Dr. Groehn goes too far, by improperly attempting to use 

conjoint analysis to produce absolute results—specifically, to determine exact price points 

consumers would pay for incremental increases in “battery life”—an undefined and subjective 

feature. The literature is clear that this is a misuse of conjoint analysis, and Headwater cannot 

point to any non-litigation example where it has been used this way. Dr. Groehn’s approach 

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distorts the methodology, risking confusion for the jury by presenting it as an accepted practice. 

Given the complexity of the analysis, cross-examination is insufficient to educate the jury on the 

bounds of conjoint analysis, and the Court must intervene to prevent misleading and unreliable 

evidence from being introduced at trial. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

A. Dr. Groehn’s Study Is Performed for a Different Litigation 

The opinions and conclusions presented in Dr. Groehn’s report were not developed for this 

case. Dr. Groehn’s report is a near-carbon copy of the report he issued in Headwater Research 

LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., Case No. 2:22-cv-00422 (E.D. Tex.) (hereinafter “HW1”). 

Critically, the underlying “pilot” survey and “conjoint” survey were conducted for HW1 and the 

results were merely reused in this case. But while the parties in that prior litigation are the same, 

the patents and technology are not. 

In the prior case, Headwater accused several power-savings technologies, such as “Power 

Saving Mode” and “Doze Mode.” See HW1 Dkt. 266, at 14. In that case, Dr. Groehn was asked 

by Headwater’s lawyers to “measure the economic value of increased battery life in mobile phones 

designed and manufactured by [Samsung].” Ex. B (Groehn 5/13/2024 Tr.) at 113:07–14 (“When 

I was retained by Headwater through counsel to measure the economic value of battery life or 

improvement in battery life. I had no reason -- no other reason to investigate the economic value 

of battery life.”). 

Here, however, the accused technology is not focused solely on power savings; it is a 

specific method of performing push notifications. But instead of instructing Dr. Groehn to conduct 

a new survey on how consumers value the accused push notifications systems, Headwater’s 

lawyers directed Dr. Groehn to simply reuse the survey from HW1. Ex. C (Groehn 10/18/2024 

Rough Tr.) 47:12–18 (“A: In Headwater versus Samsung 2 we relied on the same pilot survey and 

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then conjoint analysis as in Headwater versus Samsung 1.”). In fact, his report does not 

acknowledge the technology in this case at all—instead noting that the sole assignment was to 

“assess the economic value of increased battery life.” Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) ¶ 14. 

B. Dr. Groehn’s Recycled Conjoint Survey 

The methodology Dr. Groehn used from the prior litigation involved conducting a conjoint 

survey to evaluate the price consumers would pay for a 5% or 10% improvement over “standard” 

battery life. Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) at ¶¶ 9, 146, 155. Conjoint surveys are designed to measure 

trade-offs and relative demand for various product features. Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) at ¶ 88 

(“Respondents repeatedly make a trade-off between products with varying attributes. By 

analyzing these responses, researchers can establish a demand curve for specific products and 

determine the shift in demand when levels of attributes are changed.”). Dr. Groehn’s survey 

asked respondents to choose between two product options, as shown below. 

Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) at Fig. 23. 

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Respondents repeated this choice fifteen times, with each prompt randomizing the seven 

attributes: model, water resistance, storage capacity, battery life, screen size, camera performance, 

and price. The stated purpose of Dr. Groehn’s analysis was to “quantify the economic value of 

battery life,” which he identified as the “Feature of Interest.” Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) ¶ 15. He 

referred to the remaining features as “decoy” attributes. Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) ¶ 67. For each decoy 

feature, Dr. Groehn presented respondents with multiple real-world, objective options: 

Decoy Feature Options 

Model Galaxy S24, Edge (2023), or iPhone 15 

Storage 128 GB, 256 GB, or 512 GB 

Camera low light camera included or not included

Water Resistance IP66 or IP68 compliant 

Screen Size 6.1” or 6.7” 

Following this pattern, one would expect Dr. Groehn to present objective, quantifiable 

battery life options for his “feature of interest,” such as 8 hours, 16 hours, or 24 hours. Instead, 

Dr. Groehn presented subjective options with no point of reference: “Standard battery life,” 

“Battery life increased by 5% under normal usage,” and “Battery life increased by 10% under 

normal usage.” Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) at Figure 17. Critically, Dr. Groehn neither defined the term 

“standard battery life” for survey respondents nor asked them what their understanding of the term 

was, which, by Dr. Groehn’s own admission, is different to every user. Ex. B (Groehn 5/13/2024 

Tr.) at 177:18–179:04; Ex. C (Groen 10/18/2024 Rough Tr.) at 90:02–16. 

C. Dr. Groehn’s Conjoint Analysis 

Dr. Groehn used the results of his recycled survey to conduct a conjoint analysis (here, by 

calculating part-worths, running a regression, and generating demand curves) to allegedly illustrate 

the “incremental profit”1

 Samsung could receive for improvements in battery life of 5% to 10% 

1

 Dr. Groehn admits he assumed an “incremental cost” of zero. Ex. B (Groehn 5/13/2024 Tr.) at 

129:05–13. 

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above “standard battery life.” Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) at ¶¶ 127–146. This is precisely what Dr. 

Groehn’s cited literature cautions that conjoint analysis cannot be used for. Ex. D (Allenby 2019) 

at -81 (“[i]t should be emphasized that conjoint analysis can only estimate demand. Conjoint 

survey data, alone, cannot be used to compute market equilibrium outcomes such as market 

prices...”). In fact, Dr. Groehn acknowledges in his report: (1) battery life is “clearly 

interdependent” with other features like battery capacity (which was not included in his study), 

Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) ¶ 151; and (2) one Samsung internal conjoint analysis showed a dramatically 

smaller “lift” in battery life when expressly tested in 8-hour increments (i.e., battery lives of 8 

hours, 16 hours, 24 hours, etc.) than his results testing for a much smaller amount of increase in 

battery time. (id. ¶¶ 150–51). He also admits that, unlike his use of conjoint analysis, Samsung 

uses conjoint analyses only to understand consumer preferences for features, and not to set prices 

of individual features. Ex. B (Groehn 5/13/2024 Tr.) at 139:04–140:06. In the face of these 

admissions, he purports to have still “carefully analyzed” the prices of the phones and then 

concluded that Samsung earned an “incremental profit” per phone of based on 

battery life. Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) at ¶ 80, Table 7. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702, an expert may offer opinion testimony if “the 

testimony is based on sufficient facts or data,” “the testimony is the product of reliable principles 

and methods,” and “the expert's opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and 

methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. The Rule “assign[s] to the trial judge the 

task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the 

task at hand.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594, 597 (1993). As part of 

that analysis, courts consider whether the “technique is ‘generally accepted’ as reliable in the 

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relevant scientific community.” Id. at 584, 593–94; see also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 

526 U.S. 137, 145 (1999). 

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was recently modified to confirm that the proponent of the 

testimony bears the burden of establishing the testimony “is more likely than not . . . the product 

of reliable principles and methods.” Fed. Rule of Evid. 702 & subd. (b)–(c). The Advisory 

Committee Notes distinguish the prior rule noting, “many courts have held that the critical 

questions of the sufficiency of an expert’s basis, and the application of the expert’s methodology, 

are questions of weight and not admissibility. These rulings are an incorrect application of Rules 

702 and 104(a).” 

III. ARGUMENT 

A. Dr. Groehn’s Survey Is Divorced from the Facts of the Case 

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires that “the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable 

application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Yet Dr. Groehn has made no 

attempt to tailor or tie his study from HW1 to the facts of this case, which is undisputedly about 

different technology. First, Headwater’s lawyers—not Headwater experts in this case—merely 

reused Dr. Groehn’s prior assignment “to measure the economic value of increased battery life in 

mobile phones”: 

Q: Who told you to analyze battery life in this case? 

A: I believe counsel explained to me that battery life was the attribute of interest in 

this matter. 

... 

Q: Other than Headwater’s lawyers, did you have any other independent reason to 

study battery life for this case? 

A: I don’t think so. 

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Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) ¶ 9; Ex. C (Groehn 10/18/2024 Rough Tr.) 26:16–27:05. Indeed, Dr. Groehn 

could only vaguely recall that the features at issue are push notifications, and could not describe 

anything further than that, including how push notifications purportedly relate to battery life. Ex. 

C (Groehn 10/18/2024 Rough Tr.) at 27:24–28:03 (“Q: Do you know what the accused features of 

the Samsung products are in this case? A: I learned it’s something about push notifications but 

that is all I know.”). And Dr. Groehn did not consider any facts specific to this case: 

 Dr. Groehn was not provided the patents from this case (id., see also Ex. C (Groehn 

10/18/2024 Rough Tr.) at 29:08–10 (“Q: You didn’t review the asserted patents in this case 

then. Correct? A: I did not review the patents.”)) 

 Dr. Groehn could not confirm whether the patents in this litigation were different from 

HW1. Ex. C (Groehn 10/18/2024 Rough Tr.) at 27:06–09 (“Q: Are you aware that the 

patents asserted in Headwater 1 and Headwater 2 are different patents? A: That’s 

possible.”). 

 Dr. Groehn did not know that the accused products in this case are different from those 

accused in HW1. Ex. C (Groehn 10/18/2024 Rough Tr.) at 27:16–19 (“Q: Are you aware 

that the accused products in Headwater 1 and Headwater 2 are different? A: I don’t think 

I’m aware of that.”).2

 

 Dr. Groehn was not provided a single document unique to this case. Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) 

at 66 (Materials Considered List); see also Ex. C (Groehn 10/18/2024 Rough Tr.) at 32:21–

24 (“Q: Do you know if you were given access to all of the documents produced in 

Headwater 2? A: I do not know.”). 

2

 Additionally, while Dr. Groehn’s survey studied only consumers’ preferences with respect to 

smartphones, Mr. Dell’s analysis improperly extrapolates—without any basis—those results to 

tablets and watches, neither of which were the subject of Dr. Groehn’s analysis. 

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 Dr. Groehn was not provided any deposition transcripts from this litigation. Ex. A (Groehn 

Rpt.) at 66 (Materials Considered List); see also Ex. C (Groehn 10/18/2024 Rough Tr.) at 

32:25–33:3 (“Q: Do you know if you were given access to all of the deposition transcripts 

in Headwater 2? A: I do not know.”). 

Indeed, Dr. Groehn conceded he never spoke to Headwater’s technical expert or reviewed the 

opinions set forth in his report. Ex. C (Groehn 10/18/2024 Rough Tr.) at 31:21–24 (“Q: Besides 

Mr. Dell, did you speak with Dr. De La Iglesia [Headwater’s technical expert] in this case? A: 

That name does not sound familiar to me.”). Finally, Dr. Groehn did not verify his inputs or results 

with any Headwater expert. Ex. C (Groehn 10/18/2024 Rough Tr.) at 37:05–08. 

Acting in their role as gatekeeper, courts regularly exclude conjoint surveys when the 

disparity between the patented features and the subject of the survey is so substantial such that the 

survey no longer relates to the facts of the case and thus is not helpful to the jury. See Unwired 

Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 14-cv-04134-VC, 2017 WL 589195, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) 

(excluding conjoint survey results and all damages analysis derived therefrom because survey’s 

feature descriptions were so different from the patented features that survey was effectively 

“targeted at an invention other than the one at issue in this litigation”); Fractus, S.A. v. Samsung, 

et al., No. 09-cv-203-LED, 2011 WL 7563820, at *1 (E.D. TX Apr. 29, 2011) (same); cf. Apple, 

Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 794328, at *18 (N.D. Cal Feb. 25, 

2014) (noting that, where a survey’s description of patented features “may vary so much from what 

is claimed that the survey no longer relates to any issue in the case and is not relevant and, ergo, 

non-helpful [to the trier of fact],” the survey “must be excluded under Rule 702(a).”). “One of the 

worst abuses in civil litigation is the attempted spoon-feeding of client-prepared and lawyerorchestrated ‘facts’ to a hired expert who then ‘relies’ on the information to express an opinion.” 

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Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 2008 WL 2323856, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2008). 

Because there is no evidence that Dr. Groehn even attempted to connect his work to the facts and 

evidence of this case, his repurposed, untailored, and generic analysis from a prior litigation should 

be excluded. 

B. Dr. Groehn’s Repurposed Survey Is Unreliable Because “Standard” Battery 

Life Has No Objective Meaning 

Even assuming that Dr. Groehn had demonstrated that surveying respondents about battery 

life was an appropriate method of valuing the benefit provided by the asserted patents (he has not), 

Dr. Groehn did not test “battery life” using any quantifiable, objective metric, instead presenting 

that “Feature of Interest” as a subjective “standard battery life,” which makes his entire opinion 

unreliable. Specifically, Dr. Groehn’s survey asked people to choose between “standard battery 

life,” “battery life increased by 5% under normal usage,” and “battery life increased by 10% under 

normal usage.” Without clear, objective definitions of either his feature of interest (“battery life”) 

or of the levels tested (“standard,” “5% more”, “10% more”), the survey fails to meet the basic 

best practices required and regularly used by survey practitioners in the field. The failure to clearly 

and objectively define his terms causes his survey to yield useless results: the value of a supposed 

boost of 5% or 10% in battery life dramatically varies depending on the subjective “standard” 

baseline chosen for each survey taker and the ability of each respondent to accurately calculate a 

specific understanding of 5% or 10% more than their random baseline. 

1. Dr. Groehn’s Survey Did Not Define “Standard” Battery Life, Leaving 

Each Survey Respondent to Attribute Their Own, Subjective Meaning 

Dr. Groehn’s survey presented respondents with three choices for the “battery life” feature 

of interest: “standard battery life,” “battery life increased by 5% under normal usage,” or “battery 

life increased by 10% under normal usage.” Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) ¶ 76. Dr. Groehn did not tell 

survey takers how to measure “standard” battery life, even though “standard” has no commonly 

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accepted meaning. Dr. Groehn admitted there would be a different perception of “standard” for 

each survey taker. Ex. B (Groehn 5/13/2024 Tr.) at 172:04–173:10. 

As Dr. Groehn concedes, battery life varies considerably between individuals based on use 

of the phone, screen size, features used, etc. Ex. B (Groehn 5/13/2024 Tr.) at 41:09–25 (e.g., 

explaining capacity of the battery, efficiency, software, screen size, all have potential impact on 

battery life). But his survey did not instruct participants on any number of hours, or minutes, or 

days, of battery life that should be considered “standard.” Id. at 175:22–176:16. Thus, the survey 

provides the participants with no way of understanding if “standard battery life” would be suitable 

for their purposes or if they might need or want something more. Instead, Dr. Groehn admits that 

every individual survey taker may have had his or her own, different understanding of the battery 

life that is “standard.” Id. at 172:20–173:01 (“[T]he standard . . . battery life [is what] a respondent 

would expect.”). 

Juxtaposing how Dr. Groehn described “battery life” against other attributes further 

underscores the survey’s unreliability. For other features, Dr. Groehn provided precise, objective 

options that survey takers frequently encounter in the real marketplace: Brand/Model (Apple 

iPhone 15, Samsung Galaxy S24, Motorola Edge), Storage Capacity (128 GB, 256 GB, 512 GB), 

Low Light Camera (Yes, No), Water Resistance (IP 66, IP 68), and Screen Size (6.1 inches, 6.2 

inches, 6.6 inches, 6.7 inches, 6.8 inches (coinciding with brand/model)), and prices. But for 

battery life, Dr. Groehn took a markedly different approach, offering instead the subjective 

“standard” battery life as a baseline, and a “5% more” or “10% more” multiplier. In the real 

marketplace, smartphone buyers usually encounter information about battery life in the length of 

time on a single charge (not in percentage increases), which Dr. Groehn appears to understand. 

Ex. B (Groehn 5/13/2024 Tr.) at 116:11–117:05, 120:03–16; Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) at Fig. 17. 

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Samsung, for example, advertises battery in terms of hours or days—both of which are objective, 

quantifiable metrics. Ex. B (Groehn 5/13/2024 Tr.) at 120:03–16. 

Dr. Groehn’s relative measurement of battery life in his survey leads to inconsistent results 

among respondents. For example, one respondent who understood “standard” battery life to be 10 

hours would interpret a 5% increase as 30 minutes of additional battery and a 10% increase as an 

hour of battery. However, another respondent who understood “standard” battery life to be only 

3 hours would interpret the same incremental increases as only 9 minutes and 18 minutes. The 

survey’s reliance on the respondents’ perception of “standard” battery life thus leads to illogical 

assignments of the same “incremental value” for different levels of additional battery. 

Yet, Dr. Groehn chose to not present the levels of battery life in terms of hours. The failure 

to properly define the terms of a survey, particularly the feature of interest, is well established to 

be a fundamental flaw in survey methodology. Here, the vague, subjective framing of battery life 

levels, which leaves the definition up to each individual survey respondent, then renders the 

untethered survey results meaningless and unable to be used to determine quantifiable “profit” or 

“price.” Accordingly, Dr. Groehn’s opinions here are unreliable as based on an unreliable survey 

method which produced unreliable results, particularly considering that Dr. Groehn ignored realworld, available advertised battery life information (in number of days and hours) for the phones 

he tested. Ex. B (Groehn 5/13/2024 Tr.) at 177:02–16. 

2. The Supposed Incremental Value of “5%” Or “10%” Increase Is 

Equally Vague, Rendering the Results Unreliable 

The practical implication of Dr. Groehn’s failure to define a “standard” battery life is to 

confirm the unreliability of his methods. Dr. Groehn alleges that the difference between a 5% 

increase in battery life versus a 10% increase is not linear, and would instead vary wildly 

depending on the “standard” battery life. Ex. B (Groehn 5/13/2024 Tr.) at 172:04–176:08. 

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According to Dr. Groehn, if a smartphone has a 5% increase in battery life above “standard” battery 

life—which as noted above could range from minutes to hours—Samsung makes at least 

in incremental profit. Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) ¶ 146, Fig. 32, Table 7. If Samsung provides a 10% 

increase above “standard” battery life, then Samsung’s incremental profit supposedly jumps up to 

at least (and potentially as high as ). Id. In other words, the first 5% increase above 

“standard” supposedly produces in extra profit per unit, whereas the second 5% (increasing 

from 5% to 10% above “standard”) yields an additional to in profit (i.e., and 

 minus ). That would mean Samsung gains one-and-a-half to three times the increase 

in profit for exactly the same incremental increase battery life (5%), based only on the arbitrary 

selection of “standard” battery life as a starting point. Dr. Groehn does not explain why he thinks 

consumers are willing to pay more for the second 5% increase for the very same phone than the 

first 5% increase, regardless of what battery life is considered to be “standard.” That disparity 

alone is suspect, but it becomes entirely irrational when one considers the impact of a subjective 

“standard” battery life, which warrants exclusion. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-

03561 WHA, 2012 WL 850705, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012); Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 

Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Thus, both Dr. Groehn’s conjoint survey and 

subsequent conjoint analysis, which depends on the survey, are unreliable and must be excluded. 

C. Conjoint Analysis Is Inappropriate for Estimating Price 

According to scientific articles cited by Dr. Groehn himself, conjoint (regression) analysis 

cannot reliably identify the “pricing” or “incremental profit” of an individual feature in the 

complex real-world market for smartphone devices. See Daubert at 593–94. In fact, Dr. Groehn 

admitted smartphone makers do not use conjoint analysis the way he proposes. Ex. B (Groehn 

5/13/2024 Tr.) at 125:23–126:05 (“I believe economic value of battery life to the manufacturer is 

something specific to patent cases and would probably not be calculated in the normal course of 

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business.”). As Dr. Groehn’s own sources state unequivocally, “[i]t should be emphasized that 

conjoint analysis can only estimate demand. Conjoint survey data, alone, cannot be used to 

compute market equilibrium outcomes such as market prices. . . .” Ex. D (Allenby 2019) at -81 

(emphasis added).3 Again, Dr. Groehn has failed to show “sufficiency” of the “application of the 

expert’s methodology,” a question that the Advisory Committee made clear goes to admissibility, 

not weight, in amending Rule 702. 

Dr. Groehn has only studied consumer value in his conjoint analysis, yet his conclusions 

are in terms of real-world dollars for real-world phones. His analysis does not account for costs 

or competition—the key elements necessary to actually determine real-world market prices in this 

particularly complex, nuanced market for smartphones. Indeed, Dr. Groehn’s cited source again 

confirms that the calculations he performed in his regression do not account for market 

competition. Ex. D (Allenby 2019) at -89 (“A monetary conversion of the part-worth of a product 

feature, however, is not sufficient for measuring economic value because it does not consider the 

effects of competitors in the market.”) Dr. Groehn’s survey and subsequent analysis do not 

recreate the actual competition in the market because the survey does not account for different 

prices across different retailers of the same smartphones (Ex. B (Groehn 5/13/2024 Tr.) at 181:07–

185:03 (admitting “we don’t need to get the prices exactly right...”)); testing less than all of the 

features that are known to motivate customer choice in the smartphone market including numerous 

3 See Visteon Glob. Techs., Inc. v. Garmin Int'l, Inc., No. 10-CV-10578, 2016 WL 5956325, at *7 

(E.D. Mich. Oct. 14, 2016) (where the expert explained “[i]t is important to recognize that these 

values do not represent the actual amounts consumers would be willing [to] pay for the inclusion 

of the patented features in a competitive market. It would be incorrect to suggest that these four 

patented features alone are responsible for $50.68 of the price of a GPS system. Price is primarily 

determined by three factors: consumer value, producer costs, and competition. I studied only one, 

consumer value.” Even with expert’s acknowledgement of this foundational limitation of conjoint 

analysis, the court still excluded conjoint analysis as unreliably applied to stand for price without 

proper adjustments.) 

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non-patented features (Ex. A (Groehn Rpt.) at Fig. 13 (citing Samsung internal study identifying 

at least 

)); and improperly skewing the primary driver of market demand, 

brand (by combining brand with model, offering only one flagship model per brand), (Ex. A 

(Groehn Rpt.) at Fig. 12 (citing Samsung internal study stating 

). Regression calculations cannot correct market-divorced survey 

results such that they could even estimate actual market preferences. Ex. D (Allenby 2019) at -

81 (“Conjoint practitioners have chosen the unfortunate term ‘market simulation’ to describe 

demand predictions based on conjoint analyses. These practices are not simulations of any market 

outcome and must be understood for their limitations . . . .”); see also id. (“Even with existing 

products for which marketplace data is observed, there are many situations in which it is not 

possible to identify consumer preferences.” (emphasis added)). 

Just as in Visteon Global, “it is undisputed, that Dr. [Groehn’s] study did not attempt to 

determine a real world price for the [] patented features, and did not endeavor to value any nonpatented features or to determine the value of the [] patented features relative to the multitude of 

non-patented features in the accused devices,” therefore Dr. Groehn’s conjoint analysis cannot be 

admissible here because his results are applied in a manner inconsistent with accepted 

methodologies in the field of economics. Visteon Glob., 2016 WL 5956325, at *6. The Federal 

Circuit “has consistently held that “a reasonable royalty analysis requires a court to ... carefully tie 

proof of damages to the claimed invention’s footprint in the market place,” which Dr. Groehn’s 

analysis does not do due to all the failures discussed above. Virnetx, 767 F.3d at 1327. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Samsung respectfully requests the Court exclude Dr. Groehn’s 

opinions, which are based on his conjoint survey and analysis. 

 

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Dated: October 25, 2024 Respectfully submitted, 

By: /s/ Katherine H. Reardon 

 Ruffin B. Cordell 

TX Bar No. 04820550 

Michael J. McKeon 

DC Bar No. 459780 

mckeon@fr.com 

Jared Hartzman 

DC Bar No. 1034255 

hartzman@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

1000 Maine Avenue, SW, Ste 1000 

Washington, D.C. 20024 

Telephone: (202) 783-5070 

Facsimile: (202) 783-2331 

Thad C. Kodish 

GA Bar No. 427603 

tkodish@fr.com 

Benjamin K. Thompson 

GA Bar No. 633211 

bthompson@fr.com 

Jonathan B. Bright 

GA Bar No. 256953 

jbright@fr.com 

Christopher O. Green 

GA Bar No. 037617 

cgreen@fr.com 

Noah C. Graubart 

GA Bar No. 141862 

graubart@fr.com 

Sara C. Fish 

GA Bar No. 873853 

sfish@fr.com 

Katherine H. Reardon 

NY Bar No. 5196910 

reardon@fr.com 

Nicholas A. Gallo 

GA Bar No. 546590 

gallo@fr.com 

Vivian C. Keller (pro hac vice) 

GA Bar No. 651500 

keller@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

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1180 Peachtree St. NE, Fl. 21 

Atlanta, GA 30309 

Telephone: (404) 892-5005 

Facsimile: (404) 892-5002 

Leonard E. Davis 

TX Bar No. 05521600 

ldavis@fr.com 

Andria Rae Crisler 

TX Bar No. 24093792 

crisler@fr.com 

Thomas H. Reger II 

Texas Bar No. 24032992 

reger@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

1717 Main Street, Suite 5000 

Dallas, TX 75201 

Telephone: (214)747-5070 

Facsimile: (214) 747-2091 

John-Paul R. Fryckman (pro hac vice) 

CA Bar No. 317591 

John W. Thornburgh 

CA Bar No. 154627 

thornburgh@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

12860 El Camino Real, Ste. 400 

San Diego, CA 92130 

Telephone: (858) 678-5070 

Facsimile: (858) 678-5099 

Katherine D. Prescott (pro hac vice) 

CA Bar No. 215496 

prescott@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

500 Arguello Street 

Suite 400 

Redwood City, CA 94063 

Telephone: (650) 839-5180 

Facsimile: (650) 839-5071 

Kyle J. Fleming (pro hac vice) 

NY Bar No. 5855499 

kfleming@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

7 Times Square, 20th Floor, 

New York, NY 10036 

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Telephone: (212) 765-5070 

Facsimile: (212) 258-2291 

Melissa R. Smith 

State Bar No. 24001351 

Melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com 

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP 

303 South Washington Avenue 

Marshall, Texas 75670 

Telephone: (903) 934-8450 

Facsimile: (903) 934-9257 

Andrew Thompson (“Tom”) Gorham 

State Bar No. 24012715 

tom@gillamsmithlaw.com 

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP 

102 N. College, Suite 800 

Tyler, Texas 75702 

Telephone: (903) 934-8450 

Facsimile: (903) 934-9257 

Michael E. Jones 

State Bar No. 10929400 

mikejones@potterminton.com 

Shaun W. Hassett 

State Bar No. 24074372 

shaunhassett@potterminton.com 

POTTER MINTON, P.C. 

102 N. College Ave., Suite 900 

Tyler, Texas 75702 

Telephone: (903) 597-8311 

Facsimile: (903) 593-0846 

Lance Lin Yang 

CA. Bar No. 260705

Lanceyang@quinnemanuel.com 

Kevin (Gyushik) Jang 

CA Bar No. 337747 

kevinjang@quinnemanuel.com 

Sean S. Pak 

CA Bar No. 219032 

seanpak@quinnemanuel.com 

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN, LLP

50 California Street, 22nd Floor 

San Francisco, CA 94111 

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Telephone: (415) 875-6600 

Brady Huynh (admitted pro hac vice) 

CA Bar No. 339441 

bradyhuynh@quinnemanuel.com 

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN, LLP 

555 Twin Dolphin Drive, 5th Floor 

Redwood Shores, CA 94065 

Telephone: (650) 801-5000 

Facsimile: (650) 801-5100 

Jon Bentley Hyland 

Texas Bar No. 24046131 

jhyland@hilgersgraben.com 

Grant K. Schmidt 

Texas Bar No. 24084579 

gschmidt@hilgersgraben.com 

HILGERS GRABEN PLLC 

7859 Walnut Hill Lane, Suite 335 

Dallas, Texas 75230 

Telephone: (972) 645-3097 

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

 

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CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE 

The undersigned hereby certifies that counsel for Defendants have complied with the meet 

and confer requirement in Local Rule CV-7(h). This motion is opposed. The personal conference 

required by Local Rule CV-7(h) was conducted on October 23, 2024. The parties were unable to 

reach agreement as to Samsung’s requested relief. 

/s/ Sara C. Fish 

 Sara C. Fish 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed 

electronically in compliance with Local Rule CV-5 on October 25, 2024. As of this date, all 

counsel of record had consented to electronic service and are being served with a copy of this 

document through the Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(a)(3)(A). 

/s/ Katherine H. Reardon 

Katherine H. Reardon 

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