IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

ALEXANDRA DAVIS,

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

v. 

JERRAL W. JONES, DALLAS COWBOYS 

FOOTBALL CLUB, LTD., JAMES 

WILKINSON, TRAILRUNNER 

INTERNATIONAL, LLC, DONALD JACK, 

JR.,

Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs,

&

CYNTHIA DAVIS-SPENCER,

 Third-Party Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:23-CV-00032-RWS

ORDER

Before the Court is Non-Party Movant Lisa Duffee, Esq.’s Objections, Amended Motion 

to Quash, and Amended Request for Protection. Docket No. 79.1 Counter-Plaintiff2Jerral W. 

Jones filed a response in opposition (Docket No. 81) to which Duffee replied (Docket No. 82). 

The Court held a hearing on this matter, where Duffee tendered allegedly privileged documents 

for in camera review. Docket No. 85. After the hearing, Third-Party Defendant Cynthia DavisSpencer joined Duffee’s motion. Docket No. 86. For the reasons stated below, Duffee’s motion 

to quash is DENIED and Duffee’s motion for protection is GRANTED-IN-PART.

1 The Court denied Duffee’s original motion without prejudice to refiling (Docket No. 77) and 

Duffee filed the present motion.

2 The Court recognizes that Counter-Plaintiff Jones has filed an unopposed motion to realign the 

parties. Docket No. 88. The Court will address Jones’s motion in a separate order, and until then, 

Jones remains the Counter-Plaintiff. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

I. Motion to Quash

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d), a court “must quash or modify a subpoena 

that: . . . (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver 

applies; or (iv) subjects a person to undue burden.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(A). To determine 

whether a subpoena is overbroad, the court may consider: “(1) relevance of the information 

requested, (2) the need of the party for the documents, (3) the breadth of the document request, 

(4) the time period covered by the request, (5) the particularity with which the party describes the 

requested documents, and (6) the burden imposed.” Bavely, Tr. of AAA Sports, Inc. v. Panini 

Am., Inc., No. 4:22-CV-093, 2023 WL 3686806, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2023) (quoting RYH 

Props., L.L.C. v. West, No. 5:08-CV-172, 2011 WL 13196550, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2011)). 

“[I]f the person to whom the document request is made is a non-party, the court may also 

consider the expense and inconvenience to the non-party.” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 

392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004). Modification of “a subpoena is preferable to quashing it 

outright.” Id. 

II. Motion for Protection

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), a “court may, for good cause, issue an 

order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden 

or expense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). “[A] protective order is warranted in those instances in 

which the party seeking it demonstrates good cause and a specific need for protection.” Bavely, 

2023 WL 3686806, at *2. “Rule 26(c) offers a variety of potential options that the court may use 

to protect the moving party, including forbidding or limiting the scope of discovery into certain 

matters or requiring other confidential commercial information not to be revealed or revealed in 

a certain way.” Dexon Comput., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 5:22-CV-53-RWS-JBB, 2023 WL 

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9283972, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2023) (citation omitted). “A trial court has wide discretion to 

determine whether to grant a motion for protective order.” Id. (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

Duffee states that Jones served her with a subpoena to produce documents relating to “all 

communications . . . with or concerning Alexandra Davis” and “Cynthia Davis.” See Docket No. 

79 at 1; see also Docket No. 79-1.

3 Duffee asks the Court to quash the subpoena, or in the 

alternative, to issue a protective order. Docket No. 79 at 5. Duffee characterizes the categories of 

documents sought by the subpoena as overbroad and protected by attorney-client privilege. Id. at 

3–5. Jones alleges that Duffee’s communications with Davis and Davis-Spencer are relevant to 

his breach of contract claim. Docket No. 81 at 1. Specifically, Jones asserts that Duffee possesses 

communications relating “to the confidential settlement agreement” that Davis and DavisSpencer allegedly breached. Id. Jones further alleges that Duffee coordinated communications 

between Davis-Spencer and Shy Anderson—Duffee’s client whom she represents (or 

represented) in a divorce proceeding against Jones’s daughter. Id. at 2–3.4

Relevancy is “broadly construed” and includes “any matter that bears on, or that could 

reasonably lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” 

Bavely, 2023 WL 3686806, at *1 (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 

351 (1978)). Jones persuasively argues the documents sought from Duffee are relevant to the 

breach of contract claims. The communications attached to Jones’s response, as well as Duffee’s 

3

Jones also served Duffee with a notice to take deposition. Docket No. 79 at 1. As indicated by 

the parties at the hearing, Jones no longer intends to take Duffee’s deposition so her objection to 

the notice of deposition is now moot. 

4

Jones provides communications between Davis-Spencer and Anderson referencing, among 

other things, statements made by Anderson’s lawyer regarding the paternity filing and the

Settlement Agreement. Docket No. 81 at 2; see also Docket No. 81-1 at 6.

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own admissions, demonstrate that Duffee possesses communications and information relating to 

the paternity action and the alleged breach of the Settlement Agreement. See Docket Nos. 79, 81-

1, 81-2. Jones has therefore met the low bar for relevancy under Rule 26(b)(1). Accordingly, the 

Court finds that quashing the subpoena “outright” is inappropriate. Not only is the information 

relevant, but the breadth of the documents and burden on Duffee is minimal.5See Bavely, 2023 

WL 3686806, at *2. 

Duffee’s request for protection, however, raises valid attorney-client privilege concerns. 

To assert privilege, a party must show “(1) that he made a confidential communication; (2) to a 

lawyer or his subordinate; (3) for the primary purpose of securing either a legal opinion or legal 

services, or assistance in some legal proceeding.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. BDO 

USA, L.L.P., 876 F.3d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 

971, 974 (5th Cir. 1997)). When a party “withholds information otherwise discoverable by 

claiming that the information is privileged or subject to protection” the party must “expressly 

make the claim” and “describe the nature of the documents [and] communications, . . . and do so 

in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other 

parties to assess the claim.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). 

Although Duffee and Davis-Spencer may not have had a formal attorney-client 

relationship, Davis-Spencer communicated with Duffee, an attorney, on multiple occasions for 

the purpose of seeking legal advice and with the intention that the communication was 

confidential or privileged. See BDO USA, L.L.P., 876 F.3d at 695; see also Docket Nos. 86, 82-1, 

82-2. Jones responds that Duffee fails to establish an attorney-client relationship between herself 

5

Indeed, Duffee has already tendered the documents to the Court for in camera review. Docket 

No. 85.

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and Davis-Spencer, but even if that relationship existed, Davis-Spencer waived any privilege by 

conveying Duffee’s advice to Anderson. See Docket No. 81 at 7–8.

Duffee, however, provides an affidavit declaring under penalty of perjury that DavisSpencer initially approached her seeking legal advice with respect to the paternity action. Docket 

No. 79 at 2, 7. While Duffee declined to represent Davis-Spencer, Davis-Spencer continued to 

sporadically seek legal advice from Duffee between approximately June of 2021 and June of 

2023. Id.

6

In addition, the text message communication where Davis-Spencer tells Anderson that 

his lawyer said Davis “could get a great payday” is not sufficient to waive the entirety of DavisSpencer or Duffee’s privilege assertion. Mere discussion about the potential outcome of a lawsuit 

or the fact that Davis-Spencer visited with an attorney does not disclose the details of their 

conversations, specific legal strategy, or advice given. See In re Microvast, Inc., No. 01-18-

00049-CV, 2018 WL 4131068, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2018) 

(explaining that disclosure of allegedly privileged information is statement-specific and 

disclosure of one privileged statement does not “result in wholesale subject-matter waiver of the 

attorney-client privilege”). Davis-Spencer did not waive privilege beyond the statement itself. Id. 

In addition, Duffee provided a privilege log to the Court at the hearing that identifies the 

parties involved, dates of communication, brief descriptions of the communications, and the 

basis for asserting privilege in accordance with Rule 26(b). See generally Docket No. 86-2.

Duffee also tendered the subpoenaed documents to the Court for an in camera review to assess 

privilege. Docket No. 85. Accordingly, Duffee and Davis-Spencer sufficiently established and 

asserted attorney-client privilege. 

6

In her motion, Duffee explains that she responded to Davis-Spencer’s “continual requests for 

legal counsel through June 1, 2023.” Docket No. 79 at 2. Duffee clarified at the hearing that 

those requests began in approximately June of 2021.

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Considering the parties’ briefing and having reviewed the tendered documents, it is 

ORDERED that Duffee’s motion to quash Jones’s subpoena in its entirety (Docket No. 

79) is DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that Duffee’s motion for protection (Docket No. 79) is GRANTED-INPART. The Court addresses Duffee’s request for protection on a document-by-document basis 

below, granting Duffee’s request where the Court believes privilege has been asserted 

appropriately and denying the request where it has not: 

LD000001–000002 GRANTED

Attorney-Client Communication and Attorney Work Product

LD000003 DENIED

LD000004 DENIED

LD000005–000006 DENIED

LD000007–000008 DENIED

LD000009–000010 GRANTED

Attorney-Client Communication

LD000011–000012 GRANTED

Attorney-Client Communication

LD000013–000021 GRANTED

Attorney-Client Communication

LD000022 GRANTED

Attorney-Client Communication

LD000023 DENIED

LD000025–000026 GRANTED for the designated portions only

Attorney-Client Communication

LD000036–000037 GRANTED for the designated portions only

Attorney-Client Communication

LD000038–000041 GRANTED

Attorney-Client Communication

LD000051–000052 GRANTED

Attorney-Client Communication

LD000053 GRANTED

Attorney-Client Communication

LD000060–000067 GRANTED

Attorney-Client Communication and Attorney Work Product

LD000068 GRANTED

Attorney-Client Communication and Attorney Work Product

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It is further ORDERED that Non-Party Movant Lisa Duffee PRODUCE any nonprivileged information subject to the subpoena, including documents containing both privileged 

and non-privileged information with the privileged information redacted, within seven (7) days

of the date of this Order.

 

____________________________________

ROBERT W. SCHROEDER III

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 10th day of May, 2024.

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