2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-29-2010

Doyle v. SEPTA

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-1431

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Recommended Citation

"Doyle v. SEPTA" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 537.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/537
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_______________ 

No. 10-1431 

_______________ 

JAMES J. DOYLE; 

JOAN E. DOYLE, h/w 

v. 

SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 

TRANSPORATION AUTHORITY 

 James J. Doyle, Appellant 

_______________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-08-cv-04273) 

District Judge: Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 

_______________ 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

September 21, 2010 

_______________ 

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 29, 2010) 

_______________ 

OPINION 

_______________ 

AMBRO, Circuit Judge
 Plaintiff-Appellant James Doyle appeals the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment on his claim that his employer, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 

Authority (“SEPTA”), violated an arbitration award ordering that Mr. Doyle be reinstated 

to his job “immediately.” We affirm.1

I. Background 

 We set out only those facts that are relevant to our holding. SEPTA terminated 

Doyle from his position as a railroad conductor in its Regional Rail Division on July 14, 

2006. Thereafter, his exclusive collective bargaining representative, United 

Transportation Union Local 61 (“the Union”), filed a grievance challenging the 

termination pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between SEPTA 

and the Union. SEPTA denied the grievance, and the Union appealed the denial to the 

Public Law Board (“PLB”), an arbitration panel empowered under the collective 

bargaining agreement to hear appeals from denials of grievances. 

 Following the completion of arbitration proceedings, the PLB ordered SEPTA to 

reinstate Doyle. The PLB’s award, issued March 15, 2008, states in relevant part: 

Claimant Doyle is to be reinstated immediately without backpay, but with 

all seniority intact. Carrier should attempt to expedite any administrative 

processes and refresher training associated with his reinstatement. The 

claim of the Union is sustained to this extent. 

 

1

 Because Doyle filed suit under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., the 

District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, and we have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Ass’n of Flight Attendants v. USAIR, Inc., 960 

F.2d 345, 347 (3d Cir. 1992). 

2 
However, before Doyle could return to work as a conductor, he was required to undergo a 

recertification process pursuant to SEPTA’s operating rules.2

 One step of the 

recertification process was designed to ensure Doyle’s knowledge of the “physical 

characteristics” of some or all SEPTA train lines. The parties dispute how much 

“physical characteristics” re-qualification Doyle had to complete: Doyle asserts that he 

had to become re-qualified on only those routes on which he would actually be working, 

but SEPTA asserts that he was required by the relevant operating rules to become requalified on each route on which he had been qualified before his termination (which, in 

Doyle’s case, was every route). 

 Discussions ensued between SEPTA, the Union, and Doyle regarding when Doyle 

would be permitted to return to work. On May 1, SEPTA General Manager Joe Casey 

instructed that Doyle should be permitted to bid for a work assignment by participating in 

a “general picking.” There is some dispute in the record about the precise content of 

Casey’s instructions, but it is clear that the next general picking took place in August 

2008. 

 Just before that general picking, on August 1, 2008, SEPTA and the Union 

memorialized an agreement regarding Doyle’s return to work. That agreement states in 

relevant part: 

1. As an accommodation, pending his re-qualification as a Conductor, Mr. 

Doyle will be permitted to pick an Assistant Conductor run at the next 

scheduled picking, which is currently scheduled to begin August 7, 2008 

 

2

 Before the District Court, Doyle disputed this statement, maintaining that the terms of 

the arbitration award required that SEPTA reinstate him as a conductor even before he 

finished recertifying. However, he has abandoned that argument on appeal. 

3 
and become effective September 7, 2008. 

2. Once Mr. Doyle is reinstated to the rolls of the Authority, he must requalify as a Conductor by October 7, 2008. If Mr. Doyle fails to re-qualify 

as a Conductor by October 7, 2008, he will be dropped from the rolls of the 

Authority for lack of qualifications. 

3. He is required to re-qualify on his own time and in doing so must 

complete all his assigned duties without jeopardizing his ability to complete 

an assignment due to a potential violation of the hours of service 

requirements. 

4. The COBRA payments made by Mr. Doyle while he was terminated 

from the Authority will be reimbursed to him upon his return to work as 

soon as administratively feasible. 

5. The terms and conditions of Mr. Doyle's reinstatement are final and 

binding. They are based solely upon the facts and circumstances of this 

particular case and do not establish any precedent. It will not be referred to 

by either party in any other grievance, special board of adjustment, or any 

other forum or proceeding except one involving Mr. Doyle. 

Doyle participated in the August 7 general picking. Then, on September 7, he began 

work as a conductor, though 1) he had not yet completed physical characteristics requalification on all SEPTA lines, and 2) under the August 1 agreement his entitlement to 

return was at the assistant conductor level. 

 On September 5, 2008, Doyle and his wife3

 filed suit under the Railway Labor 

Act, claiming that SEPTA violated the arbitrators’ order that Doyle be reinstated 

“immediately.” Doyle sought compensatory damages for lost income during the period 

from March 15, 2008 (the date of the arbitrators’ award) until September 7, 2008. 

Following discovery, Doyle and SEPTA cross-moved for summary judgment. In January 

2010, the District Court granted SEPTA’s motion for summary judgment and denied 

 

3

 She later withdrew from the case. 

4 
Doyle’s. It held that the August 1 agreement waived Doyle’s rights to challenge the 

terms and conditions of his reinstatement and, in any event, the arbitrators’ award 

conditioned Doyle’s return to work on his completion of the recertification process, 

which Doyle had not completed as of September 7, 2008. 

II. Discussion 

 We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, affirming 

only if “viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and 

drawing all inferences in that party’s favor, there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” U.S. ex rel. Kosenske v. 

Carlisle HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009). However, the correct interpretation 

of a contract is a question of law that we review de novo. U.S. v. Hardwick, 544 F.3d 

565, 570 (3d Cir. 2008); South Bay Boston Mgmt., Inc. v. Unite Here, Local 26, 587 F.3d 

35, 40 (1st Cir. 2009). 

 On appeal, Doyle argues that the August 1 agreement did not waive his right to 

file suit challenging SEPTA’s compliance with the arbitration award. He also argues that 

the arbitration award itself entitled him to return to work as soon as he was re-qualified 

on the physical characteristics of the line on which he would be working. Additionally, 

he argues that SEPTA was required to offer him an assistant conductor position while he 

re-qualified as a conductor. 

5 
A. The Effect of the August 1 Agreement. 

 Doyle seeks to import from Pennsylvania law the principle that legal rights can be 

waived only through a “clear and unequivocal” statement. Building on that principle, he 

argues that the August 1 agreement did not clearly and unequivocally waive his right to 

sue to enforce the arbitration award because the agreement did not contain the words 

“waiver,” “release,” or “settlement.” 

 We do not agree that Pennsylvania principles of contract interpretation apply to 

this Railway Labor Act case. In the labor context, “state contract law must yield to the 

developing federal common law, lest common terms in bargaining agreements be given 

different and potentially inconsistent interpretations in different jurisdictions.” Livadas v. 

Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122 (1994).4

 This is the case even though the August 1 

agreement was not itself a comprehensive collective bargaining agreement, but rather an 

agreement regarding the return to work of one employee. As the Court of Appeals for the 

Sixth Circuit observed in a similar situation, an agreement between a union and an 

employer regarding the terms under which an employee will return to work is “a creature 

wholly begotten by the [collective bargaining agreement].” Jones v. General Motors 

Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that state law claim regarding breach 

 

4 Livadas arose under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 185(a), but the same rule applies to suits arising under the RLA. See, e.g., Local 107 

Office & Prof’l Employees Int’l Union v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 380 F.3d 832, 834 (5th 

Cir. 2004) (applying federal common law to interpret collective bargaining agreement 

governed by RLA); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 210 F.3d 

18, 26 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying federal common law in RLA case to determine whether 

party to collective bargaining agreement improperly used alter ego to evade that 

agreement). 

6 
of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law); see also Davis v. Bell 

Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., 110 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); Stallcop v. Kaiser 

Found. Hosps., 820 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that oral agreement 

made in connection with reinstatement should be treated as part of collective bargaining 

agreement). Thus, we interpret the August 1 agreement under the same federal-law 

principles that we would apply to interpret the collective bargaining agreement itself. 

 Nonetheless, unions’ waivers of employees’ federal statutory rights are generally 

enforced under federal law only if “clear and unmistakable.” Wright v. Universal Mar. 

Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998) (holding that “clear and unmistakable” standard 

applied to “union-negotiated waiver of employees’ statutory right to a judicial forum for 

claims of employment discrimination.”). Without deciding whether that standard applies 

to Doyle’s claim in this case, we conclude that the August 1 agreement clearly and 

unmistakably waived Doyle’s right to bring suit to enforce the terms of the arbitration 

award.5

 First, the agreement contains the “final and binding” terms of Doyle’s 

reinstatement. He cannot now seek to add an additional term in the form of a judgment 

requiring SEPTA to pay back wages and benefits during the March 15-September 7 time 

period. Second, the agreement addresses Doyle’s entitlement to back wages and benefits 

 

5

 Doyle’s argument that SEPTA “implicitly conceded that the August 1, 2008 Letter 

Agreement does not constitute a clear-and-unequivocal waiver” fares no better. SEPTA 

stated in its brief that “[t]he remedy Doyle claims in this action . . . is precisely what the 

August 1, 2008 Agreement says he is not entitled to receive. The bargain struck was that 

Doyle could come back to work before he finished requalifying, but he would not be paid 

for any of the time before he actually came back to work.” Appellee Br. at 20 (emphasis 

in original). 

7 
by stating that he would be reimbursed for COBRA payments made while he was 

terminated from SEPTA. It would make no sense to construe the agreement’s silence as 

to other forms of back compensation as leaving open the possibility of a lawsuit. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s conclusion that the August 1, 2008 

agreement waived Doyle’s right to sue to enforce the arbitration award. 

B. The Arbitration Award 

 Even ignoring the August 1 agreement, Doyle’s claim fails. He argues that, to be 

reinstated as a conductor, he needed to re-qualify on the physical characteristics of only 

the route on which he would be working, rather than all of the routes on which he had 

been certified prior to his termination. On this point, the collective bargaining agreement 

is clear, and it does not support Doyle: “[i]f [an] employee’s physical characteristics 

qualifications on any territory have expired, [the] employee must requalify all portions 

previously held.” 

 Nonetheless, in his opening brief Doyle argues that the fact that SEPTA eventually 

waived in part the re-qualification requirement creates a genuine issue of material fact as 

to whether SEPTA could have waived that requirement (and gotten Doyle back to work) 

earlier. This argument stretches past its breaking point the language in the arbitration 

award directing that SEPTA “attempt to expedite any administrative processes and 

refresher training associated with [Doyle’s] reinstatement.” It would have been within its 

rights to demand that Doyle actually complete the re-qualification process in accordance 

with the relevant rules; that it made an exception is evidence of good, not bad, faith. 

8 
9 

 

 Finally, the arbitration award did not entitle Doyle to return to SEPTA as an 

assistant conductor while he became re-qualified as a conductor. The award said that 

Doyle should be “reinstated.” Reinstatement “means putting the plaintiff back in his old 

job . . . .” Dhaliwal v. Woods Div., Hesston Corp., 930 F.2d 547, 548 (7th Cir. 1991); see 

also NLRB v. Hearst, 102 F.2d 658, 663 (9th Cir. 1939) (“Reinstatement means to return 

to a post previously held”); Shea v. Icelandair, 925 F.Supp. 1014, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 

(“reinstatement means that the employment discrimination plaintiff is returned to the 

same position as if he had never been subject to adverse employment action”). Because 

the award did not require SEPTA to return Doyle to any job for which he was qualified, 

his argument that he was entitled to an “interim” posting to an assistant conductor 

position fails.6

 

* * * * * 

 Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to 

SEPTA. 

6

 At times, Doyle argues that, under the award, SEPTA could have returned Doyle to 

work as an assistant conductor. However, whether Doyle could have returned as an 

assistant conductor is not dispositive of whether SEPTA was required to return him as an 

assistant conductor.