United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 16, 2010

Decided December 22, 2010

Before

JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

   

No. 10‐1146

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

RICHARD L. CANSLER,

Defendant‐Appellant.                 

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Evansville Division.

No. 3:07CR00042‐009

Richard L. Young,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Richard Cansler was stopped by police while driving from a meeting where he

picked up one pound of methamphetamine and three pounds of marijuana.  The officers

discovered the drugs, and Cansler was charged with several drug‐related counts, including

possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  Cansler

pleaded guilty to that count as a part of a written plea agreement in which he specifically

bargained for a sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment, see FED. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C), and

waived his right to appeal the conviction or sentence.  The district court accepted the plea

agreement, and sentenced Cansler to 192 months.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 10‐1146 Page 2

Despite agreeing to the appeal waiver and receiving the sentence to which he agreed,

Cansler filed a notice of appeal.  His appointed counsel has concluded that the appeal is

frivolous and seeks permission to withdraw.  See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

Cansler opposes counselʹs motion.  See CIR. R. 51(b).  We limit our review to the potential

issues identified in counsel’s facially adequate brief and in Cansler’s response.  See United

States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002).  

According to counsel, Cansler wants us to set aside his guilty plea (and with it his

appeal waiver), and thus counsel begins by evaluating the adequacy of the plea colloquy

and the voluntariness of the plea.  See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670‐71 (7th Cir.

2002).  Cansler did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court, so we would

examine the plea colloquy only for plain error. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59

(2002); United States v. Griffin, 521 F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2008).  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure details the steps a district court must follow before accepting a guilty

plea.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1); United States v. Polak, 573 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 2009).

Neither Rule 11 nor this court requires rigid adherence to the provisions of Rule 11, United

States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir.2003); United States v. Fernandez, 205 F.3d 1020,

1024 (7th Cir. 2000), and even where there has been a significant omission, a defendant will

not be able to establish plain error unless he can “show why the omission made a difference

to him,”  United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2007).  

Counsel has identified only one omission in the plea colloquy: the district court did

not advise Cansler that forfeiture could be ordered.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1)(J).  Yet

Cansler knew about the possibility of forfeiture: his indictment includes a count seeking

criminal forfeiture, and months before he pleaded guilty, Cansler was aware that a parallel

claim for civil forfeiture had been dismissed on the government’s motion on the condition

that the same property would be sought in the criminal case.  Thus, we agree with appellate

counsel that it would be frivolous for Cansler to argue on appeal that the district court

committed plain error by omitting mention of the ongoing forfeiture proceeding during the

Rule 11 colloquy. See Blalock, 321 F.3d at 688; Schuh, 289 F.3d at 975.

Because the guilty plea would stand, so would Cansler’s appeal waiver.  See Sura,

511 F.3d at 658‐59; United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v.

Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995).  That waiver forecloses the potential argument

about drug quantity, which Cansler proposes in his Rule 51(b) response.  Even apart from

the waiver, however, we would not have jurisdiction to review Cansler’s sentencing issues

because Cansler agreed to a specific sentence under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) as a part of his plea

agreement.  A defendant who agrees to a specific sentence cannot appeal the sentence

imposed unless it exceeds the sentence he bargained for or was imposed in violation of law.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1), (c)(1); United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 363‐64 (7th Cir.
No. 10‐1146 Page 3

2005); United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 1996).  And because 192 months is

both the sentence Cansler agreed to and is within the statutory maximum, a life sentence,

for the offense, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), we would lack jurisdiction to review the

sentence.  

Counselʹs motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.