Filed 6/6/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

WERTHEIM, LLC,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CURRENCY CORPORATION,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B277633

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC328263)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Mark A. Borenstein, Judge. Reversed and 

remanded.

The Law Offices of F. Jay Rahimi, F. Jay Rahimi; Matthew 

D. Kanin; AlvaradoSmith, W. Michael Hensley for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Krane & Smith, Jeremy D. Smith, Daniel L. Reback; Diem 

Law, Robin L. Diem for Defendant and Respondent.

___________________________________
2

After Wertheim LLC obtained a money judgment against 

Currency Corporation, Currency obtained a bond to secure the 

judgment and appealed. We affirmed the judgment and issued a 

remittitur in July 2012. Wertheim sought to satisfy the 

judgment from the appeal bond but Currency blocked 

disbursement. After the issuer deposited the bond funds with the 

superior court and withdrew itself from the dispute, Wertheim 

and Currency litigated their respective entitlement to the funds, 

resulting in another trial and two more appeals that ultimately 

determined the parties’ rights under the judgment.

In 2016, Wertheim moved for postjudgment enforcement 

costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 685.080,1 which 

requires that such costs be sought by noticed motion before the 

judgment is “satisfied.” The trial court denied Wertheim’s motion 

as untimely on the ground that the bond issuer’s deposit of 

appeal bond funds with the superior court satisfied the judgment

long before Wertheim’s motion, notwithstanding Currency’s 

successful efforts to forestall disbursement.

We reverse. Disputed funds on deposit with the superior 

court do not satisfy a judgment for purposes of a postjudgment 

motion for costs. Wertheim’s motion was therefore timely, and 

we remand the matter for the trial court to determine its merits. 

Additionally, Currency has moved this court for monetary 

sanctions against Wertheim and its counsel and to dismiss the 

appeal based on being frivolous. We have considered this motion 

and deny it on the merits.

 

1

All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
3

BACKGROUND

A. Original Lawsuit

We recount some of the facts from an opinion authored by 

Division Five of this District in the second of two related appeals, 

which we will call Wertheim III. (Wertheim, LLC v. Currency 

Corp. (Aug. 25, 2017, B270926) [nonpub. opn.].)

In 2009, a jury in Department 44 of the superior court 

found Currency liable to Wertheim for breach of contract, and 

awarded it $38,554.48. The trial court entered judgment in this 

amount in June 2009, and in February 2010 amended the 

judgment to add $152,164 in attorney fees and costs, bringing the 

total to $190,718.48. Both parties appealed.

To stay enforcement of the judgment during pendency of 

the appeal Currency obtained an appeal bond from The Bar Plan 

Mutual Insurance Company (Insurer) in the amount of $286,078. 

(See § 917.1 [the perfecting of an appeal does not stay 

enforcement of the judgment absent an undertaking].)

We affirmed the judgment in May 2012, and issued a 

remittitur on July 25, 2012. (Wertheim v. Currency Corp. (May 

22, 2012, B218547) [nonpub. opn.] (Wertheim I).)

Nearly 16 months later, on November 18, 2013, Wertheim 

submitted a claim to Insurer requesting payment of $275,000.37

from appeal bond funds, comprising the judgment of $190,718.48 

plus interest at 10 percent. (See §§ 695.210, subd. (b), 685.010, 

subd. (a) [the amount required to satisfy a money judgment 

includes the judgment plus interest].) Currency opposed release 

of any funds on the ground that the amount Wertheim sought 

was excessive and failed to take into account offsets arising from

six liens Currency held against Wertheim from judgments in 

other cases. 
4

Wertheim moved in department 44 to enforce liability on 

the appeal bond, which Currency also opposed. The court denied 

the motion as untimely under section 996.440, subdivision (b), 

which requires that a motion in the original action to enforce 

liability on a bond be brought within a year after any appeal is 

finally determined.2 

On December 17, 2013, while Wertheim’s motion to enforce 

liability on the appeal bond was pending, Insurer deposited a 

check in the full amount of the appeal bond ($286,078) to the 

Clerk of the Los Angeles Superior Court for disbursement “as the 

Court sees fit.”

B. Parallel Action

Although Wertheim’s motion to enforce liability on the 

appeal bond was untimely under section 996.440, section 996.430 

provides that liability on a bond may also be enforced by way of a 

separate lawsuit, to which both the principal and surety must be 

joined.3 Accordingly, Wertheim filed a new lawsuit in February 

 

2

Section 996.440 provides in pertinent part: “(a) If a bond 

is given in an action or proceeding, the liability on the bond may 

be enforced on motion made in the court without the necessity of 

an independent action. [¶] (b) The motion shall not be made 

until after entry of the final judgment in the action or . . . until 

[any] appeal is finally determined. The motion shall not be made 

. . . more than one year after the later of the preceding dates.”

3

Section 996.430 provides in pertinent part: “The liability 

on a bond may be enforced by civil action. Both the principal and 

the sureties shall be joined as parties to the action. [¶] . . . . If 

the bond was given other than in an action or proceeding, the 

action shall be commenced in any court of competent 

jurisdiction . . . .”
5

2014 against Insurer and Currency (the parallel action), which 

was assigned to department 39. 

Insurer, now a defendant, responded by filing a motion 

pursuant to section 386.5, which allows a defendant holding 

money in which it claims no interest to apply for an order 

discharging it from liability and dismissing it from the action (a 

deposit and discharge motion).4Department 39 ultimately 

granted the motion, discharged Insurer from liability, awarded it 

attorney fees (charged solely to Wertheim), and dismissed it from 

the case. 

After our colleagues in Division Five affirmed these orders

(Wertheim, LLC v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co. (Dec. 1, 2016, B268539) 

[nonpub. opn.] (Wertheim II)), the parallel action proceeded to 

trial on the only remaining issues: When did interest on the 

judgment begin and end, and on what principal amount? 

Wertheim contended interest began accruing on the full 

amount of the judgment ($190,718.48) in June 2009, when 

judgment was entered in the original proceeding, and had never 

ceased because Wertheim had not yet been paid. Currency 

admitted that interest on the original judgment ($38,554.48) 

began accruing in June 2009 but argued interest on the costs 

portion of the amended judgment ($152,164) did not begin to 

accrue until February 2010, when they were added. Currency 

 

4

Section 386.5 provides in pertinent part: “Where the only 

relief sought against one of the defendants is the payment of a 

stated amount of money alleged to be wrongfully withheld, such 

defendant may . . . apply to the court for an order discharging 

him from liability and dismissing him from the action on his 

depositing with the clerk of the court the amount in dispute . . . .”
6

further argued that interest ceased accruing in July 2012, when 

our remittitur issued in the original proceeding.

Department 39, Judge Feffer, ultimately found, as 

pertinent here, that the judgment was “satisfied” on July 25, 

2012, the date our remittitur issued, because the funds were 

theoretically available to Wertheim then, and interest stopped 

running at that time. The court entered judgment accordingly, 

and both sides appealed. (The judgment also included an offset of 

$5,161.56 for two judgment liens held by Currency.)

Division Five held that interest on the full judgment, 

including the costs portion, began accruing in June 2009, when 

the original judgment was entered. (Wertheim III, supra, 

B270926, at pp. 11-12.) 

This ruling effectively vindicated Wertheim’s November 18, 

2013 claim on the appeal bond for $275,000.37.

Division Five agreed with the trial court that interest 

stopped running when the judgment was satisfied, but held

contrary to the trial court that satisfaction occurred not in July 

2012, when our remittitur issued, but December 2013, when 

Insurer deposited appeal bond funds with the superior court. 

(Wertheim III, supra, B270926, at pp. 16-17.) (Division Five also 

affirmed the trial court’s refusal to apply a third lien, in the 

amount of $8,535.14, to offset the judgment, as Currency had 

failed to perfect it.)

C. Motion for Postjudgment Costs

On March 10, 2016, while the cross-appeals in Wertheim III

were pending, Wertheim moved in the original proceeding for 

postjudgment attorney fees incurred to date pursuant to section 
7

685.080. Such a motion must be filed before the subject judgment 

has been “satisfied.”

5

Department 44, considering itself bound by department 

39’s yet-extant finding that the judgment was satisfied in July 

2012—which Wertheim III later reversed—denied the motion as 

“untimely due to the finding of [department 39] that the 

judgment was satisfied in [July] 2012.” 

Wertheim now appeals this ruling.

Wertheim filed its opening appellate brief before Wertheim 

III was decided, and in it addressed issues that have since been 

obviated by that opinion.

Currency filed its respondent’s brief after Wertheim III, 

raising the new argument that even if, as Division Five held, 

judgment satisfaction occurred in December 2013 rather than 

July 2012, Wertheim’s motion for postjudgment costs was still 

untimely because it was not made until March 10, 2016.

To afford the parties an opportunity to address the impact 

of Wertheim III, we invited and received supplemental briefs from 

both sides. 

DISCUSSION

Wertheim contends the trial court erred in finding its 

motion for postjudgment costs was made after the judgment was 

 

5

Section 685.080, today’s workhorse, provides in pertinent 

part: “The judgment creditor may claim costs authorized by 

Section 685.040 by noticed motion. The motion shall be made 

before the judgment is satisfied in full, but not later than two 

years after the costs have been incurred. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . The 

court shall make an order allowing or disallowing the costs to the 

extent justified under the circumstances of the case.” (Italics 

added.)
8

satisfied, because to this day the judgment remains unpaid. It 

argues Wertheim III’s holding that the judgment was satisfied in 

December 2013 pertains only to cessation of interest, not to the 

timeliness of postjudgment motions. We agree.

A. Standard of Review and Relevant Law

We review both statutory interpretation and entitlement to 

attorney fees de novo. (Conservatorship of Ribal (2019) 31 

Cal.App.5th 519, 524.)

A judgment between two parties is a bilateral construct 

that finally determines the rights and corresponding obligations 

of each side. (See § 577 [“A judgment is the final determination 

of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding”].) “ ‘There 

can be but one final judgment in an action, and that is one which 

in effect ends the suit in the court in which it was entered, and 

finally determines the rights of the parties in relation to the 

matter in controversy.’ ” (Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings

Ass’n v. Superior Court (1942) 20 Cal.2d 697, 701-702.)

“Satisfaction” of such a judgment is also necessarily 

bilateral, as it both compensates the judgment creditor for harm 

inflicted by the judgment debtor and insulates the debtor against 

further claims from the creditor. (See Borba Farms, Inc. v. 

Acheson (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 597, 605 [satisfaction of a 

judgment compensates for some harm and bars further 

recovery].)

1. Satisfaction—General Rule

A money judgment may be satisfied—and the judgment 

creditor compensated and the debtor insulated against further 

claims—“by payment of the full amount required to satisfy the 
9

judgment or by acceptance by the judgment creditor of a lesser 

sum in full satisfaction of the judgment.” (§ 724.010, subd. (a).)6 

“ ‘Payment to a judgment creditor is governed by the cases 

and statutes which govern commercial transactions.’ [Citation.] 

. . . [T]hat means California Uniform Commercial Code section 

3310[, which states:] ‘Unless otherwise agreed, if a certified 

check, cashier’s check, or teller’s check is taken for an obligation, 

the obligation is discharged to the same extent discharge would 

result if an amount of money equal to the amount of the 

instrument were taken in payment of the obligation.’ ” (Gray1

CPB, LLC v. SCC Acquisitions, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 882, 

893-894 (Gray1).) Therefore, for purposes of judgment 

satisfaction, “payment” means either (1) the tender of cash or (2) 

the tender and acceptance of a certified check or similar

instrument. (See Conservatorship of McQueen (2014) 59 Cal.4th 

602, 615 (McQueen); Gray1, at pp. 892-893, 896.) 

In other words, because a judgment creditor has the right 

to demand payment in cash, an unaccepted noncash tender 

neither constitutes payment nor satisfies the judgment. 

(McQueen, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 615; Gray1, supra, 233

Cal.App.4th at p. 894.)

B. Satisfaction for Purposes of Interest Cessation

Interest accrues on a judgment at a rate of 10 percent. 

(§ 685.010, subd. (a).) Because a judgment creditor may reject a 

noncash tender, a judgment debtor unable immediately to pay in 

cash—for example in the case of a sizeable judgment—would be 

 

6 Other modes of satisfaction include offset, a covenant not 

to enforce, and operation of law. (Legis. Com. com., Deering’s 

Ann. Code Civ. Proc., § 724.010 (2014 ed.) p. 502.)
10

at the mercy of the creditor with respect to interest accumulating 

after the tender. But “there is no reason a judgment creditor 

should continue to earn interest on its judgment after refusing 

payment of the judgment.” (Gray1, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 

896.)

Therefore, in section 685.030, titled “Cessation of interest,” 

the Legislature has provided that interest will cease to accrue on 

a judgment on the date “satisfaction is tendered to the judgment 

creditor or deposited in court for the judgment creditor.” 

(§ 685.030, subds. (b) & (d); see Gray1, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 895 [“Interest on a judgment ceases to accrue [on] . . . ‘the date 

satisfaction is tendered to the judgment debtor or deposited in 

court’ ”].)7

 

7

 Section 685.030 provides in relevant part:

“(b) If a money judgment is satisfied in full other than 

pursuant to a writ under this title, interest ceases to accrue on 

the date the judgment is satisfied in full.

“(c) If a money judgment is partially satisfied . . . interest 

ceases to accrue as to the part satisfied on the date the part is 

satisfied.

“(d) For the purposes of subdivisions (b) and (c), the date a 

money judgment is satisfied in full or in part is the earliest of the 

following times:

“(1) The date satisfaction is actually received by the 

judgment creditor.

“(2) The date satisfaction is tendered to the judgment 

creditor or deposited in court for the judgment creditor.

“(3) The date of any other performance that has the effect of 

satisfaction.”
11

Although section 685.030 defines this tender or deposit as 

“satisfaction” of the judgment, it expressly limits the scope of the 

definition only “[f]or the purposes of” interest cessation. 

(§ 685.030, subd. (d).) No authority expands this definition for 

use outside the interest cessation context.

C. Satisfaction for Purposes of Postjudgment Motions

Pursuant to the Enforcement of Judgments Law (§ 680.010 

et seq.), a judgment creditor may claim authorized costs incurred 

while enforcing a judgment, including authorized attorney fees 

(§§ 685.040, 685.090). Section 685.080 requires that a motion for 

such costs be made before the judgment is “satisfied in full.” 

(§ 685.080, subd. (a).) The time limitation is “ ‘ “to avoid a 

situation where a judgment debtor has paid off the entirety of 

what he [justifiably] believes to be his obligation in the entire 

case, only to be confronted later with a motion for yet more 

fees.” ’ ” (Gray1, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 891.) Section 

685.080 does not define the phrase “satisfied in full,” but absent 

some legislative indication to the contrary, of which there is none, 

satisfaction requires payment.

Comerica Bank v. Runyon (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 473

(Runyon) illustrates the point. There, the creditor obtained a 

joint and several judgment against several defendants in the sum 

of almost $430,000. After some judgment debtors settled with 

the creditor a balance of $1,350 remained unpaid. One of the 

debtors then moved for contribution from another debtor 

pursuant to section 883, which permits a co-judgment debtor to 

apply on noticed motion for an order determining liability for 

contribution from other judgment debtors. Such an application 
12

must be made before the judgment is “satisfied in full,” or within 

30 days thereafter. (§ 883, subd. (a).)8 

The appellate court held the debtor’s application was timely 

because the creditor had not yet been fully paid—there was an 

outstanding balance of $1,350—when the application was filed. 

The court stated that “[a] judgment cannot be satisfied within the 

meaning of section 883, subdivision (a) until the judgment 

creditor is paid in full and has no outstanding claim and the 

obligation of the judgment debtor has been fully extinguished.” 

(Runyon, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 482.)

Here, Insurer tendered a certified check or similar 

instrument in December 2013, when it deposited appeal bond 

funds with department 39. However, Wertheim never accepted 

the funds; it was prevented from doing so when Currency 

disputed the amount due. Because Wertheim has not been paid, 

the judgment has not been satisfied. Therefore, Wertheim’s 

motion for postjudgment costs, filed on March 10, 2016, was 

timely.

Currency argues that the definition of judgment 

satisfaction prescribed by section 685.030 for interest cessation 

should apply to postjudgment costs motions as well. No principle 

or authority supports the argument. We think the better rule is 

that described in Runyon, which like the instant case involved a 

 

8

Section 883 provides in pertinent part: “A judgment 

debtor entitled to compel contribution or repayment pursuant to 

this chapter may apply on noticed motion to the court that 

entered the judgment for an order determining liability for 

contribution or repayment. The application shall be made at any 

time before the judgment is satisfied in full or within 30 days 

thereafter.”
13

post-judgment motion that had to be made before the judgment 

was “satisfied in full.” A judgment is not satisfied for purposes of 

postjudgment motions until the judgment creditor has been paid.

This rule makes sense from a policy standpoint as well. 

Sections 685.030, 685.080 and 883, pertaining respectively to 

interest cessation, postjudgment costs, and postjudgment 

contribution, vest a measure of control over postjudgment 

charges in the party to be charged. Section 685.030 enables a 

judgment debtor to limit its liability for postjudgment interest by 

tendering satisfaction of the judgment, whether or not the 

creditor chooses to accept the tender. Section 883 enables a 

judgment co-debtor to retain the option of seeking contribution so 

long as the debtor chooses not to satisfy his or her portion of the 

judgment, and provides a measure of insulation (30 days) should 

the judgment otherwise be satisfied. Section 685.080 enables a 

creditor to recoup its postjudgment costs notwithstanding an 

unperfected tender by filing its motion before accepting the 

tender. In each case the rights of the party at risk are insulated 

from unilateral acts of third parties over whom it may have no 

control.

This rule also works no mischief on the judgment debtor, 

who could unilaterally avoid further postjudgment costs simply 

by delivering cash.

In conclusion, satisfaction of a judgment for purposes of 

interest cessation does not satisfy the judgment for all purposes. 

In the context of a postjudgment motion for costs, the judgment is 

not satisfied until the judgment creditor has been paid. Because 

Wertheim has not yet been paid, its judgment remains 

unsatisfied, and its postjudgment motion, which otherwise was 

brought within two years of the costs having been incurred, was 
14

timely. The order denying Wertheim’s motion on untimeliness 

grounds is therefore reversed and the matter is remanded to the 

trial court for determination of the motion on its merits.

DISPOSITION

The order is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial 

court for further proceedings as set forth above. Appellant is to 

recover its costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

CHANEY, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.*

 

*

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.