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state habeas corpus action. An appellate court is not obligated 

to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the 

case and controversy before it.12 And for the same reason, we 

do not reach the merits of these issues. The Court of Appeals’ 

discussion of res judicata and the applicability of the law-ofthe-case doctrine is dicta and should not be regarded as precedential.13 The applicability of the law-of-the-case doctrine 

in a state habeas corpus action is an issue to be resolved in 

another case on another day.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals, as modified.

Affirmed as modified.

12 State v. Pangborn, 286 Neb. 363, 836 N.W.2d 790 (2013); State v. Au, 285 

Neb. 797, 829 N.W.2d 695 (2013).

13 See Blue Tee Corp. v. CDI Contractors, Inc., 247 Neb. 397, 529 N.W.2d 

16 (1995).

Jeremy Schaffer, appellant, v. 

Cass County et al., appellees.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed May 15, 2015. No. S-14-542.

1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, 

for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion 

irrespective of the decision made by the court below.

2. Administrative Law: Appeal and Error. Sheriffs’ merit commissions are considered “tribunals” under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1901 (Reissue 2008).

3. Jurisdiction: Time: Appeal and Error. A failure to file a timely appeal deprives 

the district court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

4. Statutes. Where general and special provisions of statutes are in conflict, the 

general law yields to the special provision or more specific statute.

Appeal from the District Court for Cass County: Daniel

E. Bryan, Jr., Judge. Reversed and remanded for further 

proceedings.
Nebraska Advance Sheets

SCHAFFER v. CASS COUNTY 893

Cite as 290 Neb. 892

Steven M. Delaney and A. Bree Robbins, of Reagan, Melton 

& Delaney, L.L.P., for appellant.

Erin L. Ebeler, of Woods & Aitken, L.L.P., for appellees.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, 

Miller-Lerman, and Cassel, JJ.

McCormack, J.

NATURE OF CASE

This action stems from an employment relationship between 

the Cass County sheriff’s office and Jeremy Schaffer, a deputy 

sheriff. Schaffer appealed a disciplinary action through a hearing with the Cass County Merit Commission (the Commission). 

Schaffer appealed the Commission’s finding within 30 days of 

the written order, but not within 30 days of the oral pronouncement. This dispute centers over whether an oral announcement 

of a decision triggers the 30-day time period for appeal or 

whether Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-1734(1) and (2) (Reissue 2012) 

requires a written and certified order before the appeal period 

begins to toll.

BACKGROUND

Appellant, Schaffer, was employed as a deputy sheriff at 

the Cass County sheriff’s office. The appellees in this case are 

Cass County, Nebraska; the Cass County sheriff’s office; Cass 

County Sheriff William Brueggeman; and the Commission. The 

Commission is an administrative body authorized to affirm, 

modify, or revoke decisions of management of the Cass County 

sheriff’s office and Cass County.

On January 17, 2014, the sheriff’s office informed Schaffer 

that he was being suspended for 10 days. The notification 

stated the suspension began on January 15. Schaffer filed 

a grievance of his suspension. The sheriff’s office declared 

Schaffer’s grievance unsubstantiated. Schaffer appealed his 

grievance to the Commission.

The Commission held a hearing regarding Schaffer’s grievance on February 24, 2014. At the hearing, the Commission 

voted and announced on the record its decision to affirm the 
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894 290 NEBRASKA REPORTS

actions of the sheriff’s office. The Commission stated that a 

written order would follow.

The Commission thereafter issued a written decision dated 

March 6, 2013, and entitled “Deputy Sheriff Jeremy Schaffer 

Merit Commission Decision on Grievance.” Although the date 

on the order says March 6, 2013, we assume the Commission 

intended the date to be March 6, 2014, since all operative 

facts in this case occurred in 2014. The Commission faxed the 

decision to Schaffer’s counsel on March 21. The Commission 

mailed the decision by certified mail to Schaffer’s counsel on 

March 21. Schaffer states his counsel received the decision via 

certified mail on March 26.

Schaffer’s counsel filed a petition in error with the Cass 

County District Court on April 7, 2014. This was 42 days 

from the date the Commission orally announced its decision. 

This was 32 days from the issuance of the decision; but the 

30th day from the issuance of the decision fell on April 5, 

which was a Saturday. According to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2221 

(Cum. Supp. 2014), the time for appeal was thus extended 

to the next workday, which was April 7, the same day that 

Schaffer filed his petition in error. The notice of appeal was 

filed 17 days from the date the decision was faxed and mailed 

to counsel.

The district court dismissed Schaffer’s appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. The court reasoned that Schaffer did not file for a 

review in accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1931 (Reissue 

2008), because the appeal was not filed within the 30-day time 

period. The court determined that the period for filing began 

the date of the oral pronouncement, February 24, 2014, and 

that because Schaffer filed 42 days after this date, Schaffer 

was outside the 30-day time period. The court did not agree 

with Schaffer that § 23-1734(1) and (2) require a “certified 

or written order delivered to the sheriff” before the judgment 

or final order is rendered under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1901 

(Reissue 2008).

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Schaffer argues the district court improperly dismissed his 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because it erred in finding that 
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SCHAFFER v. CASS COUNTY 895

Cite as 290 Neb. 892

a judgment or final order rendered by an inferior tribunal under 

§ 25-1901 is when the decision is orally announced on the 

record, not when it was written, certified, and delivered pursuant to § 23-1734(1) and (2). Schaffer argues that since he filed 

his appeal with the district court within 30 days of the time the 

decision was written, certified, and delivered, the district court 

should not have declined jurisdiction.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for 

which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the 

court below.1

ANALYSIS

Schaffer argues that there are two statutes that may apply in 

this case and that because one is more specific to the facts at 

hand, the more specific statute should control over the more 

general statute. Schaffer claims that § 23-1734 was intentionally created by the Legislature to require sheriff’s merit commissions to follow specific procedures before implementing 

sanctions on an employee. Schaffer contends that according to 

§ 23-1734, an appeal is timely filed if it is filed within 30 days 

from when the “written order was certified and delivered.”2

Therefore, the district court should not have declined jurisdiction over the case for failure to comply with the 30-day appeal 

date, because his appeal was filed within the statutory 30 

days of both issuance and delivery of the Commission’s written order.

The appellees argue that § 23-1734 does not require a 

written order as a precondition to a merit commission’s finding and decision for purposes of appeal. The appellees state 

that the time for appeal begins upon the oral pronouncement 

of the judgment or order and that the written “‘transmittal 

1 Underwood v. Nebraska State Patrol, 287 Neb. 204, 842 N.W.2d 57 

(2014).

2 Brief for appellant at 7.
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896 290 NEBRASKA REPORTS

of the order to the parties is not an integral part of the judicial act.’”3

[2,3] There is no debate that under § 25-1901, Schaffer 

needed to file his appeal 30 days from the date judgment was 

rendered. Under § 25-1901, a “judgment rendered or final 

order made by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court 

may be reversed, vacated, or modified by the district court.” 

We have treated sheriff’s merit commissions as tribunals under 

§ 25-1901.4 Such appeal under § 25-1901 “shall be commenced 

within thirty days after the rendition of the judgment or making 

of the final order complained of.”5 A failure to file an appeal 

within 30 days of the judgment or final order deprives the district court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.6

 The issue is when

the “rendition of the judgment” occurred.7

In contrast to the written notation or order required when 

appealing from a district court decision, we have interpreted a 

“judgment rendered” by an inferior tribunal within Neb. Rev. 

Stat. §§ 25-1901 through 25-1931 (Reissue 2008) to be an oral 

announcement of the decision or a pronounced vote at a hearing.8

 We have said that when the decision is pronounced by an 

inferior tribunal under § 25-1901, then, for purposes of appeal, 

only an oral pronouncement is necessary, and not the entry of 

the final decision or vote on the record.9

3 Brief for appellee at 9, quoting Marcotte v. City of Omaha, 196 Neb. 217, 

241 N.W.2d 838 (1976).

4 See, e.g., Pierce v. Douglas Cty. Civil Serv. Comm., 275 Neb. 722, 748 

N.W.2d 660 (2008).

5 § 25-1931 (emphasis supplied).

6 See, e.g., Brown v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 224, 137 N.W.2d 814 (1965).

7 See §§ 25-1901 and 25-1931.

8 See, McNally v. City of Omaha, 273 Neb. 558, 731 N.W.2d 573 (2007); 

Marcotte v. City of Omaha, supra note 3; Brown v. City of Omaha, supra

note 6.

9 See id.
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SCHAFFER v. CASS COUNTY 897

Cite as 290 Neb. 892

In McNally v. City of Omaha,

10 in determining the timeliness of the appeal, we held that an “administrative body’s 

pronounced vote . . . is the final order to be appealed from, 

not any entry of that vote on the record.” The appellants had 

assigned as error the board’s failure to ever render a decision in 

writing. We found that because the record contained a copy of 

the minutes reflecting the board’s decision at the hearing, there 

was no merit to such assignment of error.11

In Marcotte v. City of Omaha,

12 a city employee sought 

review of the city personnel board’s decision regarding his suspension and dismissal. We found that the oral pronouncement 

of the judgment was “‘rendered’” when it was announced and 

that “the transmittal of the order to the parties is not an integral 

part of the judicial act.”13

But in McNally and Marcotte, the lower tribunal, board, 

or commission was not governed by a statute specifying the 

board’s procedure for rendering a final judgment. It can be 

inferred that our holdings in those cases were limited to situations in which no other statute specified the requirements for a 

final judgment. Schaffer argues that § 23-1734 is a more specific statute that requires a written order before the judgment of 

the Commission is considered rendered, and we agree.

Section 23-1734(2) states in relevant part:

After hearing or reviewing the grievance, the commission 

shall issue a written order either affirming or denying the 

grievance. Such order shall be delivered to the parties 

to the grievance or their counsel or other representative 

within seven calendar days after the date of the hearing or 

the submission of the written grievance.

(Emphasis supplied.)

10 McNally v. City of Omaha, supra note 8, 273 Neb. at 565, 731 N.W.2d 

at 580.

11 McNally v. City of Omaha, supra note 8.

12 Marcotte v. City of Omaha, supra note 3.

13 Id. at 218, 241 N.W.2d at 840.
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898 290 NEBRASKA REPORTS

Brown v. City of Omaha14 is the only case in which we 

have specifically addressed when a law enforcement merit 

commission renders its judgment. In Brown, the appellant had 

sought review of his dismissal as a city police officer. We held 

that the date a city board orally announced its decision was 

the date that commenced the 1-month appeal time.15 However, 

the decision in Brown occurred approximately 4 years before 

the passing of § 23-1734, which occurred in 1969.

[4] Where general and special provisions of statutes are 

in conflict, the general law yields to the special provision or 

more specific statute.16 Section 23-1734 specifically prescribes 

procedures for a deputy sheriff’s grievance filing and for the 

resolution of such grievances, including that a written order is 

required for the rendition of judgment.

Though under §§ 25-1901 and 25-1931, we have found in 

other circumstances that the final judgment was rendered at 

the time of the oral announcement of a decision of an inferior 

tribunal, board, or commission,17 § 23-1734 necessitates more 

specific requirements for a final order of a sheriff’s merit commission. Since we have a statute that specifically pertains to 

orders of a sheriff’s merit commission, the statutory language 

prevails over our own common-law interpretation of another, 

more general statute that also applies.18

Subsection (2) of § 23-1734 requires that orders of a 

merit commission be written and delivered to the parties or 

counsel. Since the order in this case was not written and

delivered until March 21, 2014, the order was not finalized 

until that date. Schaffer filed his petition in error by April 

7, which was within 30 days of March 21. Even if the clock 

ran from issuance of the opinion on March 6, April 7 was 

14 Brown v. City of Omaha, supra note 6.

15 Id.

16 See, Sack v. Castillo, 278 Neb. 156, 768 N.W.2d 429 (2009); Bergan 

Mercy Health Sys. v. Haven, 260 Neb. 846, 620 N.W.2d 339 (2000).

17 See, Marcotte v. City of Omaha, supra note 3; Brown v. City of Omaha, 

supra note 6.

18 See, Sack v. Castillo, supra note 16; Bergan Mercy Health Sys. v. Haven, 

supra note 16.
Nebraska Advance Sheets

BAUERMEISTER DEAVER ECOL. v. WASTE MGMT. CO. 899

Cite as 290 Neb. 899

the first workday after the 30-day appeal time ended on 

Saturday, April 5. The petition was filed within the statutory 30-day time period of both issuance and delivery of the 

Commission’s order. Thus, the petition in error was timely 

filed, and the district court erred when it dismissed the case 

for lack of jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

Although, typically, decisions rendered by an inferior tribunal, board, or commission are final when they are announced 

on the record, the specificity in § 23-1734 overrides that 

general rule. An order is not final until it meets the requirements in § 23-1734. Those requirements state that the order 

must be in writing, “certified” to the sheriff, and delivered. 

This order was not in writing until it was issued on March 

6, 2014, and not delivered until March 21. March 21 is the 

earliest date from which the order can be considered final 

under § 23-1734(2), because the order was not delivered to 

the parties until that date. The appeal was taken well within 30 

days of this date. We reverse the district court’s judgment and 

remand the cause for further proceedings.

 Reversed and remanded for

further proceedings.

Bauermeister Deaver Ecology Land Use Development, 

LLC, as Successor in Interest to Dorothy L. 

Bauermeister, individually, et al., appellant, 

v. Waste Management Co. of

Nebraska, Inc., appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed May 15, 2015. No. S-14-553.

1. Equity: Quiet Title: Accounting. An action to quiet title and for an accounting 

sound in equity.

2. Equity: Appeal and Error. On appeal from an equity action, an appellate 

court resolves questions of law and fact independently of the trial court’s 

determinations.

3. Waiver: Words and Phrases. Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a 

known right.