NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of: 

TWYLA LAWANNA SHARON BOATLEY, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

RODERIC DJUAN MIXON, SR., Respondent/Appellee.

Nos. 1 CA-CV 15-0362 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. FC2011-001470, FC2013-007019 

(Consolidated) 

The Honorable Roger E. Brodman, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Twyla Boatley, Phoenix 

Petitioner/Appellant 

Roderic Djuan Mixon Sr., Phoenix 

Respondent/Appellee 
BOATLEY v. MIXON 

Decision of the Court 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge John C. Gemmill joined. 

D O W N I E, Judge: 

¶1 Twyla Boatley (“Mother”) appeals an order of the superior 

court that dismissed her petition to modify legal decision-making 

authority, parenting time, and child support. For the following reasons, we 

affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Mother and Roderic Mixon Sr. (“Father”) are the parents of 

twin girls born in 2010. The parties have been involved in both family court 

proceedings — beginning with a petition to establish Father’s paternity —

and in dependency proceedings in the juvenile court.1

¶3 In October 2013, the family court issued a minute entry stating 

that the juvenile court had ordered that Mother have no visitation with the 

children; it entered the same order in the family court proceedings. 

Thereafter, the family court held an evidentiary hearing on a petition Father 

had filed to establish orders for legal decision-making authority and 

parenting time. 

¶4 After reviewing the record, which included a report from a 

psychiatrist who had evaluated Mother, the family court affirmed Father’s

sole legal decision-making authority and ordered that Mother have no 

contact with the children, Father, or the children’s stepmother. In support 

of its ruling, the court cited the psychiatrist’s diagnosis of Antisocial 

Personality Disorder that “is likely to substantially interfere with [Mother’s] 

ability to provide her children with a safe and secure environment.” The 

 

1 We have limited portions of the juvenile court record, including a 

Temporary Custody Notice reflecting that the children were removed from 

Mother’s care on January 14, 2013 because she was “unable to meet the 

intensive medical needs of the twins.” Also in the appellate record is an 

October 30, 2013 juvenile court minute entry stating that the girls were 

doing “very well” in Father’s care and were “no longer at risk of abuse or 

neglect,” leading to the dismissal of the dependency action. 
BOATLEY v. MIXON 

Decision of the Court 

court further noted the psychiatrist’s belief that the likelihood of Mother 

“demonstrating minimally adequate parenting skills in the future” was 

“poor,” as well as the evaluator’s opinion that a child in Mother’s care 

would be at risk of abuse. 

¶5 After the tragic death of one of the twins, Mother filed a 

petition to modify legal decision-making authority, parenting time, and 

child support. She alleged her daughter’s death was due to lack of medical 

attention and “false reporting” of her “well being.” Mother also alleged 

Father and his wife had “criminal and domestic violence background[s]”

that placed the surviving child “in danger.”

¶6 After obtaining additional information from the Phoenix 

Police Department and the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”), the family 

court dismissed Mother’s petition. The court noted “serious concerns about 

Mother’s mental state and her ability to care for the children” and stated 

that the child’s death was not being investigated by law enforcement or 

DCS. The court concluded: 

Although tragic, there is no basis for the Court to believe that 

the child’s death resulted from misconduct from Father. 

There is no reason to believe that a child placed in Father’s 

care is seriously endangered. As a result, Mother’s petition is 

untimely under A.R.S. § 25-411. 

¶7 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(2).

DISCUSSION 

¶8 Mother raises several arguments that are unrelated to the 

dismissal of her modification petition. Because our review “is limited to 

the rulings specified in the notice of appeal,” Ruesga v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 

L.L.C., 215 Ariz. 589, 599, ¶ 38 (App. 2007), we do not address those issues. 

Additionally, Mother’s opening brief fails to comply with the Arizona Rules 

of Civil Appellate Procedure. It does not include citations to the record or 

legal authority. Although we could consider Mother’s appellate arguments 

waived,2 we will address her claims about the dismissal of her modification 

 

2 See ARCAP 13(a)(7) (a brief must set forth arguments containing 

citations to authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied upon); Ritchie 

v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (failure to support arguments 

with legal authority may constitute waiver and abandonment of that claim). 
BOATLEY v. MIXON 

Decision of the Court 

petition as we understand them. We review the family court’s order for an 

abuse of discretion. See Pridgeon v. Superior Court (LaMarca), 134 Ariz. 177, 

179 (1982); Siegert v. Siegert, 133 Ariz. 31, 33 (App. 1982). 

¶9 “A person shall not make a motion to modify a legal decisionmaking or parenting time decree earlier than one year after its date, unless 

the court permits it to be made on the basis of affidavits that there is reason 

to believe the child’s present environment may seriously endanger the 

child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health.” A.R.S. § 25-411(A). 

Mother’s modification petition was filed only six months after the most 

recent order establishing legal decision-making authority and parenting 

time. It included only conclusory allegations about Father, with no 

corroborating evidence. Medical records attached to the petition state that 

the child was admitted to the hospital “with sickle cell crisis” and 

specifically state: “no abuse concerns, no[] neglect.”

¶10 To modify legal decision-making, or to trigger the need for an 

evidentiary hearing on the petition before expiration of the one-year 

waiting period, considerably more was required. The relevant provision, 

A.R.S. § 25-411(L), states: 

To modify any type of legal decision-making or parenting 

time order a person shall submit an affidavit or verified 

petition setting forth detailed facts supporting the requested 

modification . . . . The court shall deny the motion unless it 

finds that adequate cause for hearing the motion is 

established by the pleadings, in which case it shall set a date 

for hearing on why the requested modification should not be 

granted. 

¶11 The family court followed the statutory procedures and, 

based on the record before it, reasonably concluded that Mother’s petition 

did not demonstrate that “the child’s present environment may seriously 

endanger [her] physical, mental, moral or emotional health.” Under these 

circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion. See Siegert, 133 Ariz. at 

33 (“There is necessarily wide discretion resting with the trial court in its 

determination as to whether or not there is adequate cause for [a] 

hearing.”).
BOATLEY v. MIXON 

Decision of the Court 

CONCLUSION 

¶12 We affirm the judgment of the superior court.