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Filed 12/5/22 Guttridge v. Aurora Capital CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

MICHAEL J. GUTTRIDGE,

Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and 

Respondent,

v.

AURORA CAPITAL, LLC, et al.,

Defendants, Cross-complainants and 

Appellants;

RYAN VOORHEES,

Cross-defendant and Respondent.

C086358

(Super. Ct. Nos. 34-2012-

00129930-CU-MC-GDS & 

34201300156423)

In their appeal from the judgment entered in consolidated cases, appellants Aurora 

Capital, LLC, and Chun Mei Dodge request that we vacate the judgment pursuant to 
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Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8).1 They assert this relief is 

appropriate following the parties’ execution of a postjudgment stipulation for settlement. 

However, as respondents Michael J. Guttridge and Ryan Voorhees emphasize, that 

stipulation for settlement, the very basis on which appellants seek to vacate the judgment,

is not part of the record on appeal, and Guttridge and Voorhees do not agree the judgment 

should be vacated.

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 Moreover, appellants have failed to make any showing of 

entitlement to the relief they seek. Their factual assertions are unsupported by citation to 

the record or by facts in the record. The extent of their citation to legal authority in their 

opening brief is a single citation to section 128, subdivision (a)(8). In short, they assert 

their entitlement to relief rather than establishing it. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We need not set forth the underlying background of this matter to resolve this 

appeal. Nor could we, for that matter, given the sparse record appellants have provided 

in their appendix. That appendix consists solely of an amended judgment filed on June 

25, 2018, and the notice of appeal. For purposes of resolving this appeal, it is sufficient 

to state that this matter consists of two cases consolidated in the trial court. Very 

generally, one case involved the dissolution of Aurora Capital LLC and the validity of a 

land purchase agreement between Aurora Capital LLC and Voorhees. The other case 

involved Dodge’s claims asserted against Guttridge individually and as manager of 

Aurora Capital LLC seeking damages and other relief. In the amended judgment, the 

trial court, among other things, ordered Aurora Capital LLC dissolved with its funds, 

after satisfaction of certain obligations, distributed to Guttridge, and ordered that Dodge 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2 Appellants insist Voorhees is not a proper respondent on this appeal. Whether 

Voorhees is or is not a proper respondent, and the arguments Voorhees made before this 

court, do not affect our determinations.
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shall recover nothing on her claims and cross-claims against Guttridge and Aurora 

Capital LLC.3

DISCUSSION

Appellants do not seek reversal or modification of the amended judgment. Rather, 

they assert the “parties have reached a complete agreement upon all the issues that would 

have been tried, neither party has a need for the trial that would come from Appellant[s] 

prevailing in the appeal,” and they “have no wish to litigate further . . . .” According to 

appellants, “[a]ll that remains is for this Court to vacate the Judgment entered on 

September 14, 2017.” According to appellants, the only action they seek is that the 

judgment be vacated “per the stipulated settlement agreement. Once that occurs 

Appellant[s] will request a dismissal of the appeal with prejudice.”

I

The Stipulation for Settlement

The rules of appellate procedure “require an appellate brief to support each point 

by argument and, if possible, by citation to authority and to provide a citation to the 

record for a factual assertion.” (County of Sacramento v. Rawat (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 

3 During oral argument, counsel stated that the litigation has been going on a long 

time and this appeal has been pending for five years. In response, we provide the 

following history of the appeal process for this case. Appellants filed their notice of 

appeal in January 2018. In September 2019, efforts at mediation were terminated as 

unsuccessful, resuming the schedule for designating the record on appeal and briefing. 

Appellants designated the record on appeal in October 2019. The reporter’s transcript 

was not filed until April 2021. Between May 2021 and February 2022, we granted five 

requests by appellants for extensions of time to file their appendix and opening brief. In 

March 2022, we returned appellants’ opening brief for nonconformance with the 

California Rules of Court. After appellants filed their conforming opening brief and 

appendix, we granted respondents two extensions of time to file their respondent’s briefs. 

We returned Voorhees’s initial respondent’s brief for nonconformance and subsequently 

returned appellants’ initial reply brief for nonconformance. The matter was fully briefed 

and assigned to this panel in August 2022. We conducted oral argument on November 

18, 2022, after which the case was deemed submitted.
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858, 861 (County of Sacramento), citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).) 

“ ‘[W]e may disregard factual contentions that are not supported by citations to the record 

[citation] or are based on information that is outside the record [citation]. We may 

disregard legal arguments that are not supported by citations to legal authority [citation] 

or are conclusory [citation].’ [Citations.] Further, we may treat a point that is not 

supported by cogent legal argument as forfeited.” (County of Sacramento, at p. 861.)

Appellants elected to use an appendix to prosecute their appeal. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.124.) Their appendix consists only of the amended judgment and the notice 

of appeal. Appellants’ opening brief contains three citations to the appellate record, two 

to the amended judgment and one to the notice of appeal. They refer to the stipulation for

settlement on three occasions in their opening brief. However, this stipulation for

settlement upon which appellants rely in asking us to vacate the judgment—the very 

basis for their request—is not included in the appendix. “ ‘[W]e may disregard factual 

contentions that are not supported by citations to the record [citation] or are based on 

information that is outside the record.’ ” (County of Sacramento, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 861.) Thus, we could disregard appellants’ contention that we should vacate the 

judgment based on the stipulation for settlement, as that contention is both not supported 

by citation to the record and is based on information outside the record. (Ibid.)

Respondents both oppose vacating the judgment and note there is no stipulation or 

agreement to vacate the judgment. After the respondents each pointed out that the 

stipulation for settlement is not part of the record on appeal, appellants assert in their 

reply brief that respondents’ “assertion that [the] Stipulation is not before this Court is 

nonsense.” In their reply brief, appellants reveal that the stipulation for settlement was an 

attachment to an application for an extension of time to file their opening brief. There is 

a stipulation for settlement attached to appellants’ application for an extension of time, 

filed November 17, 2021. However, appellants chose not to include that stipulation for
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settlement in their appendix, which they filed five months later, on April 15, 2022.4

Therefore, it is not part of the record on appeal. The fact that it was an attachment to an 

application for an extension of time to file a brief does not render the stipulation part of 

the record on appeal. Appellants could have sought to augment the record to include the 

stipulation. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155.) They did not. Nor have they 

requested that we take judicial notice of the stipulation for settlement.5 (See Evid. Code, 

§§ 450, 451, 452, 459.)

Because the very basis for appellants’ request that we vacate the judgment—the 

stipulation for settlement—is not part of the record on appeal, we could dispose of the

appeal on this ground alone. Their foundational contention, that the stipulation for

settlement justifies vacating the judgment, is without any support in the record on 

appeal.6 However, we shall briefly address appellants’ contentions pursuant to section 

128.

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In their notice designating the record on appeal (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.121), 

appellants designated an appendix under California Rules of Court, rule 8.124 as their 

record on appeal. Appellants also designated a reporter’s transcript under California 

Rules of Court, rule 8.130. No party cites or refers to the reporter’s transcript.

5 At oral argument before this court, appellants orally requested leave to augment 

the record. We deny appellants’ belated request.

6 We note appellants state that an “integral part” of the stipulation “and a major 

condition was the dismissal of this appeal by Dodge . . . .” Of course, seeking to 

voluntarily dismiss an appeal (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.244(c)) and seeking vacatur of 

an underlying judgment are not one and the same and do not have the same effect. It 

appears the complete relief appellants desire is vacatur of the judgment, to which they 

have not established their entitlement, followed by their voluntary dismissal of the 

appeal, which would not be possible after we had decided the appeal.
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II

Code of Civil Procedure Section 128, Subdivision (a)(8)

Appellants’ opening brief contains but one citation to authority, specifically 

section 128, subdivision (a)(8). That subdivision provides that every court has the power 

to “amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and 

justice. An appellate court shall not reverse or vacate a duly entered judgment upon an 

agreement or stipulation of the parties unless the court finds both of the following: [¶] 

(A) There is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be 

adversely affected by the reversal. [¶] (B) The reasons of the parties for requesting 

reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a 

judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive 

for pretrial settlement.” (§ 128, subd. (a)(8).)

Appellants assert the “reasons for the reversal are sound and significant and 

outweigh any potential [e]ffect on the public trust as there is no aspect of public reliance 

on this Judgment remaining.” However, appellants do no more than merely advance this 

assertion. They offer neither analysis nor proof that there is “is no reasonable possibility 

that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by” vacating the 

judgment, or that the reasons they seek vacatur “outweigh the erosion of public trust that 

may result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the availability of 

stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.” (§ 128, subd. (a)(8); 

see Hardisty v. Hinton & Alfert (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 999, 1007 [“parties must now 

submit memoranda of points and authorities and declarations and other documentary 

evidence persuasively demonstrating that reversal of the judgment in question will not 

adversely affect nonparties or the public, erode public trust, or reduce the incentive for 

pretrial settlement, and the courts must now fully consider and weigh these factors on a 

case-by-case basis”].)
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Appellants assert it is “immaterial” that Voorhees could be negatively affected by 

vacating the judgment. They assert Voorhees “did not act in reliance on this Judgment as 

his relevant actions preceded the trial and were not dependent upon the trial outcome.” 

They then go on to refer to Voorhees’s purchase of property and cite a related

Sacramento County Superior Court case involving the parties. In the following

paragraph, appellants recite additional factual and procedural background. However, 

throughout, appellants cite to nothing in the record. Again, “ ‘[w]e may disregard factual 

contentions that are not supported by citations to the record [citation] or are based on 

information that is outside the record.’ ” (County of Sacramento, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 861.)

According to appellants, the proposed vacatur of the judgment “is not a stipulated 

reversal but rather the Court respecting an agreement whereby Guttridge will not oppose 

or contest the set aside Appellant is requesting. Overturning the trial result is the proper 

outcome. It is the avoidance of a new trial, which would occur when Appellant succeeds 

on appeal, but only after further delay for the aging parties (late seventies and mid 

eighties) a situation for which the parties have bargained. The stipulation into which 

Guttridge and Dodge entered in October 2021 also resolves their differences in the two 

other cases, stayed while this appeal is being reviewed. Appellants’ requested result, an 

immediate ruling vacating the Judgment, rather than a future ruling and a long off trial, 

will facilitate the removal of the stays so those other matters can proceed to a timely 

Superior Court trial.” Once again, appellants neither cite the record nor cite to applicable 

legal authority.

Thus, in advancing their arguments, appellants cite to nothing in the record to 

support their factual claims, refer to facts not in the record, rely on the stipulation that 

does not appear in the record on appeal, and simply assert their entitlement to relief in 

conclusory fashion without any support in the record or citation to legal authority beyond 

citing section 128, subdivision (a)(8) once. Appellants have failed to establish any 
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factual or legal basis entitling them to have the judgment vacated pursuant to section 128, 

subdivision (a)(8). Additionally, while not determinative here, it is clear Guttridge does 

indeed “oppose or contest the set aside [of the judgment] Appellant is requesting.”

“ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct.’ ” (Denham v. 

Superior Court of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “It is the appellant’s burden to 

demonstrate the existence of reversible error.” (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 

95 Cal.App.4th 761, 766.) Because appellants have neither established their entitlement 

to vacatur of the judgment nor established reversible error, we shall affirm.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

 /s/

HOCH,J.

We concur:

 /s/

DUARTE, Acting P. J.

 /s/

RENNER, J.