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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

BEAUMONT DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

§

v. § No. 1:23-CR-10

§ Judge Crone

AHMED ADBALLA ALLAM §

§

GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO

ALLAM’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Ahmed Allam is charged with possessing a firearm in a place that he knew

and had reasonable cause to believe was a school zone, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(q)(2)(A). Dkt. 9 at 1. Allam moves to dismiss the charge, Dkt. 22 (“Mot.”), 

claiming that it violates the Second Amendment as construed in New York State Rifle 

& Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 

U.S. 570 (2008), and United States v. Rahimi, __ F.4th __, 2023 WL 1459240 (5th 

Cir. 2023). His claim fails for two reasons, either of which suffices to deny relief.

First, the Second Amendment does not protect Allam’s “course of conduct.” 

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2134. He was not carrying a firearm “publicly for self-defense.” 

Id. Nor was he keeping it at home. Rahimi, 2023 WL 1459240, at *1, *5. Instead,

armed with a semiautomatic rifle, Allam parked his SUV across the street from a

Catholic school and lurked there for hours at a time over the course of six days. 

Four of those days were school days. For much of that time, Allam was no further 

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than 40 feet from school grounds. The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear 

that the government may prohibit “the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such 

as schools and government buildings.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2133 (quoting Heller, 

554 U.S. at 626) (emphasis added); see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 

786 (2010) (plurality). That principle extends to where Allam set up shop. He was 

all but on school grounds. And absent intervention, he was well situated to attack 

students or school personnel.

Second, even assuming the Second Amendment “presumptively protects” 

Allam’s conduct, Section 922(q)(2) is valid because it is “consistent with this

Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126, 2130. 

Starting shortly after the Founding, some public universities heavily regulated 

firearms on campus. And starting in the latter half of the 19th century, some States 

heavily regulated firearms in and near schools. In some ways the restrictions were

narrower than Section 922(q)(2). But in other ways they were broader, and there 

was no apparent dispute about their constitutionality. Anyhow, under Bruen, a 

modern-day restriction need not be a “dead ringer for historical precursors.” Id. at 

2133. It need only be “relevantly similar” to the precursors in “how” and “why” it 

burdens the “right to armed self-defense.” Id. at 2132-2133. Section 922(q)(2) 

passes that test. The Court should uphold it and deny Allam’s motion.

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FACTS

On reading Allam’s motion, one might get the impression that he was just

passing through a school zone on a quiet Sunday evening, minding his own business,

when officers stopped him, arrested him, searched his car, and seized a firearm that 

as far as anyone could tell was for lawful self-defense. See, e.g., Mot. 5 (saying that 

he “was not engaged in any criminal activity at the time of his arrest,” and he 

“merely possessed a firearm in his vehicle on a public roadway”); Mot. 16 (saying 

that he “was arrested on a Sunday evening” when no children were present). His 

account omits important facts and distorts the rest.

Allam is from New York. When family members last saw him there in 2022, 

he “wasn’t in a good mental state of mind”: he was “freaking out” and “breaking 

things around the house.” Without explanation, he left for California, where he has 

no relatives. On the way, he bought the firearm at issue here, a Diamondback DB15. 

It is an AR-15 style semiautomatic rifle, and it uses a 30-round magazine.

Until December 2022, Allam was in California. By early January 2023, he 

turned up in Beaumont, Texas, where he likewise has no relatives or community 

ties. On January 5, a deacon at St. Anthony Cathedral Basilica saw Allam near the 

basilica. Also in January, Beaumont police received reports that Allam was parking 

his SUV for extended periods in front of Temple Emanuel, a Jewish synagogue.

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On January 24, a Tuesday, the principal of St. Anthony Cathedral Basilica 

School saw Allam’s SUV for the first time. The school is on Forsythe Street in 

Beaumont. Its grounds are shown in the aerial photograph attached hereto as 

Exhibit 1. A red line has been drawn to reflect the school’s boundary. For hours at 

a time from January 24 through January 29, Allam was parked on the right-hand 

side of Forsythe Street, facing northeast, just short of the intersection with Archie 

Street. As shown in Exhibits 2 and 3, Allam was parked a few feet ahead of a speedlimit sign that indicated a nearby school.

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In other words, for the better part of a week, when school was in session,

Allam was just across the street from St. Anthony’s gym and fields, and he was 

catty-corner to its playground. He was no more than 40 feet outside school grounds. 

From that vantage, he had a clear view of the on-grounds gym and fields, the ongrounds playground, and the off-grounds Jefferson Street crosswalk that students 

routinely use to cross Forsythe on their way to the off-grounds basilica.

Allam periodically got out of his SUV. The school principal called the police 

several times each day to express her concern. By Sunday, January 29, members of 

the school community had asked Allam to move his car. He refused, telling them 

that “[you] will not need to worry about me after Monday.” By that same day, police 

1

 Exhibit 2 is a patrol-video capture from the night of Allam’s arrest. It shows 

Allam’s SUV in its usual spot. For illustration, Exhibit 3 depicts a different SUV, from a 

different angle, in about the same spot.

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officers had interacted with Allam many times. When they asked him if he had a 

firearm, he said no.

That Sunday night, January 29, police officers stopped Allam for a traffic 

violation. He initially refused to roll down his window, and he did not comply with 

other instructions. Eventually he was arrested. On conducting an inventory search

and then a warranted search, officers found, among other things:

• The DB15 rifle.

• 150 rounds of matching ammunition, including 30 rounds in a fully loaded 

magazine detached from the rifle.

• Children’s clothing, even though Allam has no children.

• Pamphlets with information about Beaumont tourist attractions, including 

children’s museums.

• Pamphlets and business cards for military recruiters in California.

• A digital camera equipped with a telephoto lens.

• Six copies of a September 2022 tabloid depicting Osama bin Laden and 

Ayman al-Zawahiri. The tabloid’s subheading said: “Al Qaeda revenge for 

drone strike on bin Laden successor.” Exhibit 4 (typeface altered).

• Journal entries about rape, murder, “killing moms,” “taking the AR in,”

“taking no hostage,” and “blow[ing] up the base.” Dkt. No. 29 at 3.

Investigators reviewed Allam’s social media accounts. The accounts

contained images of buildings exploding and burning, along with a photo of the new 

World Trade Center under construction. See Exhibits 5 through 8.

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On February 1, the grand jury returned the 922(q)(2) charge. Dkt. 9 at 1. 

After a detention hearing in which the government presented many of the facts 

above, Dkt. 25, the magistrate judge ordered Allam detained pending trial, Dkt. 29. 

The judge found that no conditions of release would reasonably ensure community

safety. Dkt. 29 at 2. The judge cited, among other evidence, an FBI agent’s 

testimony that Allam “showed definite signs of radic[a]lization.” Dkt. 29 at 3.

ARGUMENT

I. Allam Does Not Show That the Second Amendment Protects His 

Possession of a Firearm in a Sensitive Place Next to School Grounds.

The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary 

to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 

not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. In Heller, the Supreme Court held that 

the Amendment guarantees “an individual right to keep and bear arms.” 554 U.S. 

at 595. The “central” aspect of that right, the Court observed, is “the inherent right 

of self-defense.” Id. at 628. The Court emphasized that, like other rights, “the right 

secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 626. And it cautioned 

that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 

prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 

forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 

government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 

commercial sale of arms.” Id. at 626-627. In a footnote, the Court added that those 

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were “examples” of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” and that the list 

was not “exhaustive.” Id. at 627 n.26.

Two years after Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment 

right applies to the States. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750. The plurality went out of 

its way to “repeat” the Court’s “assurances” that Heller “did not cast doubt on such 

longstanding regulatory measures as prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 

felons and the mentally ill, laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 

places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 

qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id. at 786 (quotation omitted).

Twelve years later, the Supreme Court decided Bruen. There, it struck down 

a New York law that prohibited a law-abiding citizen from carrying a firearm in 

public unless he could demonstrate a special need for self-defense. 142 S. Ct. at 

2122. In doing so, the Court rejected the use of “means-end scrutiny” because that 

methodology was “inconsistent with Heller’s historical approach.” Id. at 2129; see 

id. at 2126-2130. Making Heller’s approach “more explicit,” id. at 2134, the Court 

laid out a two-part framework for deciding whether a firearm restriction comports 

with the Second Amendment, see Rahimi, 2023 WL 1459240, at *5 (“Bruen

articulated two analytical steps”). The first question is whether “the Second 

Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126. 

If it does not, the analysis ends, and the restriction is valid. If instead the conduct is

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covered, the Constitution “presumptively protects” it, and the analysis continues to 

a second stage. Id. at 2126, 2130. At that stage, “the government must demonstrate 

that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm 

regulation.” Id. at 2126; see id. at 2130.

Bruen did not address which party has the burden to show, at the first stage, 

that the Second Amendment’s text does or does not cover the person’s conduct. But 

it assigned the second-stage burden to the government based on an analogy to the 

First Amendment. 142 S. Ct. at 2130. In that context, the Court explained, the 

government must prove the validity of a regulation that “restricts speech.” Id. 

(quotation omitted). Tellingly, in First Amendment cases, the Supreme Court and 

the Fifth Circuit have held that the challenging party must show at the outset that 

the regulation in fact restricts speech. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,

468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984) (“the person desiring to engage in assertedly 

expressive conduct” must “demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies”);

Voting for America, Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 388 (5th Cir. 2013) (“the party 

invoking the First Amendment’s protection” must, as a “threshold” matter, “prove 

that it applies”). The same burden-shifting approach should apply in the Second 

Amendment context, because the “general rule” in any context is that the “one 

seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to it.” Clark, 468 

U.S. at 293 n.5.

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In short, because Allam is the one who invokes the Second Amendment as a 

basis for relief, he has the initial burden of showing that it applies to his conduct. 

He does not meet that burden. He relies primarily on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in

Rahimi, where the defendant prevailed even though he was “neither responsible nor 

law-abiding.” 2023 WL 1459240, at *3; see Mot. 4-5. It is true that, under Rahimi, 

a defendant can sometimes satisfy the first part of Bruen even if he is not, in general, 

a law-abiding person.

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 But that does not excuse him from showing that the Second 

Amendment extends to his case-specific conduct. In Bruen, it was “undisputed” 

that petitioners Koch and Nash were law-abiding citizens, but the Court still went 

on to consider “whether the plain text of the Second Amendment protects Koch’s 

and Nash’s proposed course of conduct,” namely, “carrying handguns publicly for 

self-defense.” 142 S. Ct. at 2134 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit did 

not say one way or the other whether the Second Amendment would have extended

to Rahimi’s conduct if, e.g., he had stalked his ex-girlfriend with a rifle in hand. 

Rather, the court decided that the Second Amendment protected possession of the 

firearms that Rahimi kept at home. 2023 WL 1459240, at *1, *5.

2

 The government disagrees with Rahimi and will be seeking further review. See

Department of Justice, Statement from Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Regarding 

United States v. Rahimi (Feb. 2, 2023), justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-generalmerrick-b-garland-regarding-united-states-v-rahimi (last visited Feb. 18, 2023).

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Allam says that he had a right “to possess a firearm in his vehicle for his own 

protection.” Mot. 16. But he does not allege that that is what he was doing. Nor

would such an assertion square with his conduct, which was consistent with that of 

a potential shooter casing the scene and gearing up. Allam cites no decision holding

that the text of the Second Amendment extends to anything similar. The high-water 

mark is Rahimi, and it does not suggest that, for the sake of “security” and 

“free[dom],” U.S. CONST. amend. II, the government must wait until after an attack

to respond to conduct like Allam’s. See Rahimi, 2023 WL 1459240, at *11 (Ho, J., 

concurring) (the Second Amendment right is “entirely compatible” with “the 

fundamental role of government in protecting citizens against violence”).

Anyway, even when a person wishes to carry a firearm only for self-defense, 

he may not do so anywhere he chooses. Bruen reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s

earlier assurances that it was not casting doubt on “longstanding laws forbidding the 

carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.” 

142 S. Ct. at 2133 (quotation omitted). On reviewing the historical record, the Court 

discerned “no disputes regarding the lawfulness of such prohibitions” in places like 

legislative assemblies and courthouses. Id. Thus, the Court took it as “settled” that 

“these locations were ‘sensitive places’ where arms carrying could be prohibited 

consistent with the Second Amendment.” Id.

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 Against that backdrop, Allam cannot and does not argue that the text of the 

Second Amendment would protect his carrying a firearm in a sensitive place. 

Instead, he suggests that his base of operations—across the street from a school’s 

gym, fields, and playground—was not a sensitive place. He emphasizes that Heller

referred to carrying firearms “in sensitive places such as schools and government 

buildings,” and that he was not “in” a school building. Mot. 8 (emphasis in original; 

quotation omitted). But the Court’s use of “such as” indicates that a place outside 

the building may be just as sensitive for Second Amendment purposes. 

Post-Heller cases illustrate the point. In United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. 

App’x 874 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished), the defendant was convicted under 39 

C.F.R. § 232.1(l) for bringing a handgun to a post office parking lot. The Fifth 

Circuit affirmed, reasoning in part that the lot was “a place of regular government 

business” and therefore fit within “the ‘sensitive places’ exception recognized by 

Heller.” 350 F. App’x at 875. The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 

Bonidy v. USPS, 790 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2015). Both cases survive Bruen: 

Dorosan did not apply means-end scrutiny, 350 F. App’x at 875-876, and Bonidy

did so only as an “alternative basis for [its] holding,” 790 F.3d at 1125. 

 Especially instructive is the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Class, 

930 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. 2019). There, Class parked in a spot that was on the grounds 

of the United States Capitol but was “approximately 1,000 feet from the entrance to 

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the Capitol itself.” Id. at 462; see id. at 466. Class kept firearms in his car and was 

convicted under 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e) for possessing a firearm on Capitol grounds. 

Id. at 462. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting Class’s Second Amendment claim. 

Id. at 463-466, 470. The court held that, although the parking lot was “not a 

government building,” it was “sufficiently integrated with the Capitol for Heller[’]s 

sensitive places exception to apply.”3

 Id. at 464. “Several facts” led the court to 

that result, including the following (id.): 

• Capitol employees used the parking lot, making the area “a potential stalking 

ground for anyone wishing to attack congressional staff and disrupt the 

operations of Congress.”

• Those operations depended on the ability of Members and staff “to freely and 

safely travel to and from work.”

• The lot was “close to the Capitol and legislative office buildings.” Class’s 

car was “less than 1,000 feet away from the entrance to the Capitol, and a 

block away from the Rayburn House Office Building.”

The D.C. Circuit was unmoved by Class’s point—virtually identical to 

Allam’s—that Heller “refers only to bans on possession in sensitive places like 

government buildings.” 930 F.3d at 463 (emphasis in original; quotation omitted). 

3

 Before Bruen, the D.C. Circuit ordinarily applied a two-part test to firearms 

regulations: (1) “whether a particular provision impinges upon a right protected by the 

Second Amendment,” and (2) if so, “whether the provision passes muster under the 

appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.” Class, 930 F.3d at 463 (quotation omitted). 

In Class, the court held that the restriction did not impinge upon a right protected by the 

Second Amendment, so it expressly declined to decide whether the restriction would

withstand means-end scrutiny. Id. Class therefore remains valid after Bruen, which 

rejected only the second part of the D.C. Circuit’s test. 142 S. Ct. at 2127 n.4; see id. at 

2127 (“Step one of the predominant framework is broadly consistent with Heller[.]”).

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In the court’s view, that argument “slices Heller[ ] too thin.” Id. at 463-464. The 

court had “little trouble concluding that the same security interests which permit 

regulation of firearms ‘in’ government buildings permit regulation of firearms on 

the property surrounding those buildings as well.” Id. at 464. It held that, although 

there was “surely some outer bound on the distance Congress could extend the area 

of protection around the Capitol without raising Second Amendment concerns,” 

Class’s parking spot did not exceed that bound. Id.

Class’s reasoning applies with equal or greater force to Allam, who did not 

merely park near the school but lurked there, with a rifle and 150 rounds, for hours 

on end. His spot was much closer to the school than Class’s was to the Capitol 

building. And his spot was closer to the school’s gym, fields, and playground than 

Class’s was to the Rayburn building. Class, 930 F.3d at 464 (Class’s car was a 

“block away” from Rayburn). Much as in Class, then, Allam’s spot was a sensitive 

place because it was “a potential stalking ground for anyone wishing to attack” the

children across the street, and it was close enough to school grounds that 

unrestricted arms bearing there would threaten students’ ability “to freely and safely 

travel to and from” school. Id.

Given all of this, it does not matter that Allam was not on school grounds, 

contra Mot. 8. He was within 40 feet and had a clear view. The need for protection 

is no less acute on an exposed school playground than it is inside a school. Either 

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place—and any spot with a close vantage of either place—is a sensitive one for 

purposes of “Heller[’]s sensitive places exception.” Class, 930 F.3d at 464; see id. 

at 465 (“places are ‘sensitive’ for purposes of the Second Amendment because of 

the people found there or the activities that take place there”) (quotation omitted); 

accord United States v. Lewis, 2008 WL 5412013, at *2 (D.V.I. 2008) (holding, 

without applying means-end scrutiny, that “Heller unambiguously forecloses a 

Second Amendment challenge” to Section 922(q)(2) because a school zone “is 

precisely the type of location of which Heller spoke”).

II. Historical Analogues Support Section 922(q)(2).

Because Allam does not show that the Second Amendment reaches his 

conduct, the government need not “demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with 

this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126; 

see id. at 2129-2130. In any event, Section 922(q)(2) is consistent with that 

tradition, because it is “relevantly similar” to historical precursors in “how” and 

“why” it burdens “a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” Id. at 2132-

2133. Part A below discusses the scope of Section 922(q)(2), which is not as 

sweeping as Allam pretends. Part B then explains why, properly understood, the 

statute is “analogous enough” to “historical precursors” to “pass constitutional 

muster.” Id. at 2133.

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A. Section 922(q)(2)

As relevant here, Section 922(q)(2) makes it “unlawful for any individual 

knowingly to possess a firearm ... at a place that the individual knows, or has 

reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). A person 

is in a school zone if he is “in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private 

school,” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(26)(A), or if he is “within a distance of 1,000 feet from 

the grounds of a public, parochial or private school,” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(26)(B).

Allam challenges the latter aspect of the statute. He says that the application

of Section 922(q)(2)(A) to places within 1,000 feet of every public, parochial, or 

private school “impedes on the rights of firearm owners to drive in their vehicles 

with their firearms over a significant amount of geography,” Mot. 9, including on 

many “major highways,” Mot. 13. He provides maps of Beaumont schools and 

highways. Mot. 10-13. He lists other Texas communities in which “schools are 

located near major thoroughfares.” Mot. 13. He concludes: “Under this law, as the 

Government is applying it to Allam, tens of thousands of Texans are violating the 

law on a daily basis.” Mot. 13.

That sounds startling, but it is wrong. It ignores Section 922(q)(2)(B), which 

provides that Section 922(q)(2)(A) “does not apply to the possession of a firearm” 

in seven different circumstances. Taken together, two of those carveouts negate 

Allam’s purported concern for law-abiding citizens who travel with firearms.

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First, there is no violation “if the individual possessing the firearm is licensed 

to do so by the State in which the school zone is located or a political subdivision 

of the State, and the law of the State or political subdivision requires that, before an 

individual obtains such a license, the law enforcement authorities of the State or 

political subdivision verify that the individual is qualified under law to receive the 

license.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii). Texas law requires the Department of Public 

Safety—the law enforcement authority of the State, TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 411.002; see Westfall v. Miller, 77 F.3d 868, 872 n.1 (5th Cir. 1996)—to “issue a 

license to carry a handgun to an applicant if the applicant meets all the eligibility 

requirements and submits all the application materials.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 411.177(a) (emphasis added); see id. § 411.172(a) (eligibility requirements). 

Under at least one court’s reasoning, Texas law would satisfy Section 

922(q)(2)(B)(ii) because it requires DPS to verify that an applicant meets Texas’s

eligibility requirements. Cf. United States v. Tait, 202 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 

2000) (Alabama law). It should follow that, without violating Section 922(q)(2)(A), 

a law-abiding Texan can travel through a school zone with a firearm if the State has 

issued him a license to carry it.

Second, even if a person is not licensed by the State in which the school zone 

is located, he does not violate Section 922(q)(2)(A) if the firearm he possesses is 

“not loaded” and is “in a locked container, or a locked firearms rack that is on a 

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motor vehicle.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(iii). So when an out-of-stater fears that 

he may be traveling near a school, he can temporarily unload and lock his firearm.

Even apart from those two carveouts—not to mention the other five in 

subsection (B)—the mens rea element in subsection (A) protects an unwitting but 

otherwise well-intentioned armed citizen, contra Mot. 14-15. A person does not 

violate the statute unless he “knows” or “has reasonable cause to believe” that the 

place of possession is a school zone.4

 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). That element has 

teeth. At least two courts of appeals have reversed convictions for insufficient 

evidence where the government’s only proof of mens rea was the defendant’s 

proximity to the school. United States v. Guzmán-Montañez, 756 F.3d 1, 10-12 (1st 

Cir. 2014); United States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 207-209 (3d Cir. 2004). One 

of the courts added that, because the defendant “did not live in the neighborhood, 

his awareness had to be readily proven.” Guzmán-Montañez, 756 F.3d at 12.

To be clear, this discussion of the statute’s scope is not aimed at satisfying 

the means-end scrutiny that Bruen rejected. The point is that, for most law-abiding 

4

 Allam muddles knowledge of law and knowledge of fact. Ignorance of the law 

is no excuse, so a person cannot escape a firearm restriction just because he does not know 

of it. See United States v. Trevino, 989 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 2021) (Section 922(g)(1)). 

Thus, contrary to Allam’s apparent belief, Mot. 14-15, the government need not post signs 

that it is illegal to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school. What matters is if the

person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that he is within 1,000 feet of a school. 

Here, Allam parked next to a sign indicating that he was near a school. Exhibit 2. To top 

it off, a sign by the playground declared: “Drug Free Gun Free School Zone,” “Violators 

Will Face Federal and State Prosecution.” Exhibit 9 (typeface altered). Having spent six 

days near both signs, Allam cannot complain about notice.

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citizens most of the time—i.e., when they are in their home State—Section 

922(q)(2) is more akin to a licensing requirement than to a ban. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(q)(2)(B)(ii). And even when a law-abiding citizen is in a State in which he is 

not licensed, the statute is more akin to a transitory storage requirement than to a

ban. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(iii). Understood in that properly cabined way, 

Section 922(q)(2) is “relevantly similar” to the historical precursors below, both in 

“how” and “why” it burdens “a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” 

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2132-2133. It does not matter that the precursors did not ban 

everyone, always, from possessing firearms near a school, because Section 

922(q)(2) does not do that either.

B. Precursors

The non-exhaustive list below cites ten historical analogues falling into two 

categories: public-university restrictions relating to firearms on campus,5 and state 

restrictions relating to firearms in or near schools. Links to the university

restrictions are available online at Duke Law School’s research repository, under the 

subject “Sensitive Places and Times.” Duke Center for Firearms Law, Repository 

5

 In 1655, Harvard’s rules provided that “noe students shall be suffered to have [a 

g]un in his or theire chambers or studies, or keepeing for theire use any where else in the 

town.” A COPY OF THE LAWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE, 1655, at 10 (1876) (brackets in 

original). Similarly, in 1745, Yale’s rules prescribed punishment for “any Scholar” who 

“Shall keep a Gun or Pistol, or Fire one in the College-Yard or College.” II FRANKLIN 

BOWDITCH DEXTER, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE GRADUATES OF YALE COLLEGE:

MAY 1745–MAY 1763, at 8 (1896). In an abundance of caution, however, the list below 

omits those and other private-university restrictions.

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of Historical Gun Laws, law.duke.edu/gunlaws (last visited Feb. 18, 2023). The 

state restrictions, printed as session laws, are attached chronologically in Exhibit 10.

University restrictions:

• 1810. The University of Georgia “ordained” that “no student shall be 

allowed to keep any gun, pistol, ... or any other offensive weapon in College

or elsewhere,” including “out of the college.” THE MINUTES OF THE SENATUS

ACADEMICUS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, 1799–1842, at 86 (Aug. 1810).

• 1824. The University of Virginia Board of Visitors—whose six members 

included Thomas Jefferson and James Madison—resolved that: “No Student 

shall, within the precincts of the University, ... keep or use weapons or arms 

of any kind, or gunpowder[.]” UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA BOARD OF VISITORS 

MINUTES, at 6-7 (Oct. 1824).

• 1838. The University of North Carolina established that: “No Student shall 

keep a dog, or fire arms, or gunpowder. He shall not carry, keep, or own at 

the College ... any deadly weapon; nor shall he use fire arms without 

permission from the President.” ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND 

ORDINANCES OF THE TRUSTEES, FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND GOVERNMENT 

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH-CAROLINA, at 15 (Sept. 1838).

State restrictions relating to schools:

• 1871. Texas prohibited “any person” from carrying “a pistol or other 

firearm” into (inter alia) “any school room, or other place where persons are 

assembled for amusement or for educational or scientific purposes.” Law of 

Apr. 12, 1871, ch. 34, § 3, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws 25-26.

• 1878. Mississippi prohibited “any student of any university, college or 

school” from carrying, concealed or partly concealed, a pistol or other deadly 

weapon. Law of Feb. 28, 1878, ch. 46, § 4, 1878 Miss. Laws 175-176.

• 1879. Missouri prohibited “any person” from discharging “any gun, pistol 

or fire-arms of any description, in the immediate vicinity of any court house, 

church or building used for school or college purposes.” Law of Apr. 30, 

1879, § 1, 1879 Mo. Laws 90. The statute defined “immediate vicinity” to 

mean “a distance not exceeding two hundred yards.” Id. § 3, at 91.

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• 1883. Missouri also prohibited “any person” from carrying “any kind of fire 

arms” into (inter alia) “any school room or place where people are assembled 

for educational, literary or social purposes.” Law of Mar. 5, 1883, § 1, 1883

Mo. Laws 76.

• 1889. Arizona, then a territory, prohibited “any person” from carrying “a

pistol or other firearm” into (inter alia) “any school room, or other place 

where persons are assembled for amusement or for educational or scientific 

purposes.” Law of Mar. 18, 1889, No. 13, § 3, 1889 Ariz. Sess. Laws 30-31.

• 1890. Oklahoma, then a territory, prohibited “any person” from carrying a 

pistol or revolver into (inter alia) “any school room or other place where 

persons are assembled for public worship, for amusement, or for educational 

or scientific purposes.” The Statutes of Oklahoma, ch. 25, art. 47, § 7, 1890

Okla. Sess. Laws 495-496.

• 1903. Montana prohibited “any person” from carrying “a pistol or other 

firearm,” concealed or partly concealed, into (inter alia) “any school room 

or other place where persons are assembled for amusement or for educational 

or scientific purposes.” Law of Feb. 27, 1903, § 3, 1903 Mont. Laws 49-50. 

* * * * *

On average, those precursors were broad. The university restrictions applied 

to all students regardless of age; they prohibited possession everywhere on campus

(and “elsewhere,” in Georgia’s case); and they did not confer extensive licensing,

storage, and other exceptions of the sort found in Section 922(q)(2)(B). The school 

restrictions were broader still. They made limited exceptions for peace officers and 

the like, but they otherwise prohibited any person—adult or child—from carrying 

firearms in schools. And they, too, contained few or no carveouts akin to those in 

Section 922(q)(2)(B). But see Law of Feb. 27, 1903, § 4, 1903 Mont. Laws 50 (a 

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21

person who showed that he was “peaceable” and of “good moral character” could 

get judicial permission to carry a pistol or revolver).

To be sure, most of the precursors did not extend a prescribed distance

beyond the campus or school. But one did: Missouri prohibited discharging a 

firearm within 600 feet of a school. Law of Apr. 30, 1879, §§ 1, 3, 1879 Mo. Laws 

90-91. In a similar vein, Mississippi banned any student of any age from carrying 

any concealed firearm anywhere. Law of Feb. 28, 1878, ch. 46, § 4, 1878 Miss. 

Laws 175-176. And most notably, the more common prohibitions on any person

carrying any firearm into any school were not limited to the school itself. They

extended beyond “school room[s]” to unspecified “other place[s]” where children 

and others assembled for education, science, worship, or amusement.

Perhaps none of the precursors is an “historical twin” of Section 922(q)(2). 

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2133 (emphasis in original). But none needs to be a twin:

“analogical reasoning under the Second Amendment,” although not a “regulatory 

blank check,” is not a “regulatory straitjacket” either. Id. That goes double for 

statutes that regulate sensitive places. Crucially, Bruen held that courts may 

analogize to historical regulations governing previously-identified sensitive 

places—e.g., schools and government buildings—to uphold “modern regulations 

prohibiting the carry of firearms in new and analogous sensitive places.” Id. 

(emphasis in original).

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Even assuming that the statute’s 1,000-foot radius around school grounds is 

a “new” sensitive place, but see supra pp. 11-14, it passes muster because it closely 

parallels the aforementioned “other place[s]” where children congregated in the

19th century. And even assuming that the 1,000-foot radius exceeds the reach of

some precursors in terms of distance, the burden it puts on “a law-abiding citizen’s 

right to armed self-defense” (Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2133) is no heavier given all the 

exceptions in Section 922(q)(2)(B).

Accounting for the passage of two centuries, it would be unrealistic to expect 

even closer analogues. As Bruen cautioned, “cases implicating unprecedented 

social concerns or dramatic technological changes may require a more nuanced 

approach” to precursors. 142 S. Ct. at 2132. Plainly, the precursors here were aimed 

at minimizing the danger that deadly weapons pose when many young and naturally 

irresponsible people assemble in one place for many hours at a time. Over the years, 

that danger has only multiplied. See Dkt. 22-3 at 19-20, 22, 30-32, 39-44, 51-54, 

66-67, 75, 78 (legislative history).6

 Nineteenth-century legislators did not confront 

mass shootings on the modern scale. Nor did they have to address everyday juvenile

6

 According to one source, “[t]here have been 366 school shootings since 1999.” 

www.washingtonpost.com/education/interactive/school-shootings-database (last visited 

Feb. 18, 2023). Another source indicates that, since 2013, there have been “at least 1047 

incidents of gunfire on school grounds, resulting in 342 deaths and 737 injuries nationally.” 

k12ssdb.org/interactive-map (last visited Feb. 18, 2023). The government has not 

independently verified those statistics. But if they are even close to accurate, they help 

illustrate the general point.

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23 

assaults, gang violence, and drug trafficking. That conduct is inevitably more 

dangerous when committed with firearms. And much of it is committed near but 

not on school grounds. See, e.g., Dkt. 22-3 at 66 (“there are large numbers of kids 

between the ages of 17 and 21 ... standing on street corners dealing drugs”); id. at 

67 (gang members “frequent the area of the schools,” “furnish school-age students 

with weapons,” and “send them into the schools”); id. at 75 (violence occurs “in the 

areas around the schools”); id. at 91 (a significant percentage of gun violence occurs 

after school and while students are traveling to and from school). 

Taking those present-day problems together with present-day technology—

say, a telephoto lens, a semiautomatic rifle, a 30-round magazine, and 150 rounds 

of ammunition—it is neither surprising nor unconstitutional for Congress to make 

modest adjustments to traditional restrictions. 

CONCLUSION

Allam’s motion to dismiss should be denied. 

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Respectfully submitted, 

BRIT FEATHERSTON 

United States Attorney 

STEPHAN E. OESTREICHER, JR. 

Assistant United States Attorney

Maryland Bar No. 0112120169

101 E. Park Blvd., Suite 500 

Plano, Texas 75074 

(972) 415-6202

(972) 509-1209 (fax)

stephan.oestreicher@usdoj.gov

 /s/ John B. Ross 

JOHN B. ROSS 

Assistant United States Attorney

Texas Bar No. 00788325 

350 Magnolia, Suite 150 

Beaumont, Texas 77701-2237 

(409) 839-2538

(409) 839-2550 (fax)

john.ross5@usdoj.gov

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing response was served on Allam’s 

counsel via electronic filing on this 21st day of February, 2023. 

 /s/ John B. Ross 

JOHN B. ROSS 

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