Exhibit 5

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL 

Case No. SA CV 17-00596-DOC-JDE Date: April 18, 2022 

Title: XR COMMUNICATIONS, LLC V. D-LINK SYSTEMS, INC. ET AL. 

PRESENT: 

THE HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE 

Dajanae 

Carrigan/Karlen 

Dubon 

 Not Present 

Courtroom Clerk Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR 

PLAINTIFF: 

None Present

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR 

DEFENDANT: 

None Present

 

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER ADOPTING SPECIAL 

MASTER’S REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS RE: CLAIM 

CONSTRUCTION [280] 

On January 27, 2022, Special Master David Keyzer submitted to the Court his 

Report and Recommendations (“R&R”) regarding claim construction of United States 

Patents No. 7,729,728 (“the ’728 Patent”), 8,289,939 (“the ’939 Patent”) and 10,594,376 

(“the ’376 Patent”) (Dkt. 280-1). 

Defendants D-Link Systems, Inc., Belkin International, Inc., Netgear, Inc., Aruba 

Networks, LLC, and Ubiquiti Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) objected to certain claim 

constructions in the Report (“Objs.”) on February 17, 2022 (Dkt. 284). Plaintiff XR 

Communications, LLC d/b/a Vivato Technologies (“Plaintiff” or “XR” or “Vivato”) 

responded (“Resp.”) on March 1, 2022 (Dkt. 288). The Court heard oral arguments on 

March 28, 2022. The Court addresses each objection in turn. 

The Court reviews de novo all objections to a Special Master’s report and 

recommendation, including legal conclusions and findings of fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

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53(f)(3), (4); Seaman v. Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, LLP, No. 8:11-CV-00664-

DOC, 2014 WL12700973, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014). Accordingly, “[t]he court 

may ‘accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations 

made by the [special master].’ The [court] may also receive further evidence or recommit 

the matter to the [special master] with instructions.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Commodore Bus. Machs., Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(C)). 

I. The ’376 Patent 

 The R&R recommends construing “a processor configured to: . . .” and “wherein 

one or more of the processor, the transceiver, or the smart antenna is further configured 

to: . . .” to have their plain meaning. See R&R at 7–32. As to the latter term, the R&R 

also recommends finding that “the claims require only that ‘one or more’ ‘is further 

configured,’ not necessarily that each and every one of ‘the processor,’ ‘the transceiver,’ 

and ‘the smart antenna’ is so configured.” Id. at 25, 32. 

“Defendants’ primary objection to the R&R’s treatment of the [35 U.S.C.] § 112, 

¶ 6 limitations (such as the processor limitations) is that the Special Master’s analysis is 

inconsistent with legal standards set forth in Williamson, Egenera and this Court’s claim 

construction Order in Syneron.” Objs. at 3. Defendants argue that “[t]he R&R only 

considers the term ‘processor’ in a vacuum and never in the context of the claimed 

functions.” Id. at 5. Defendants urge that “if a claimed function is performed by all 

processors, that term in and of itself may be sufficient,” “[b]ut if a claimed function is not 

common to all processors and, as an example, requires special purpose programming, the 

claim should be subject to §112, ¶ 6, unless the claim itself includes sufficient detail as to 

the structure for performing the special purpose function.” Id. at 7. 

As to the set of functions recited as performed by “one or more of the processor, 

the transceiver, or the smart antenna,” Defendants argue that “[w]hile the claim may be 

infringed by any one of the processor, the transceiver, or the smart antenna performing 

the claimed functions, its construction and commensurate claim scope must take into 

account each of the three options.” Id. at 3. Defendants argue that “the scope of the ’376 

Patent claims encompass a networking apparatus in which the processor performs all 

recited functions,” and “[t]he fact that the claim recites alternatives to the processor does 

not excuse the Court from construing the claim according to the alternative of the 

processor performing all of the functions.” Id. at 11 (citation omitted). 

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Plaintiff responds that “[c]ontrary to Defendants’ implication, the R&R correctly 

stated and applied the Williamson test for means-plus-function treatment.” Resp. at 1. 

Plaintiff further argues: 

As Vivato explained, where [the] term “processor” is a known structure or class of 

structures, and the claim describes functions of a processor in a wireless networking 

apparatus, it is unnecessary to conduct a mini-trial on whether a “processor” in isolation 

is known to be actually capable of performing the recited functions. See R&R at 14:1–6, 

16:8–17:6. But critically, even if that were the test, Vivato provided extensive evidence 

based on the claims, specification, and expert testimony that a POSITA would understand 

that the claimed “processor” in the ’376 patent is capable of performing the recited 

functions. See id. For both reasons, Defendants failed to meet their burden that meansplus-function applies. The R&R agreed with Vivato on both counts. 

Pl. Resp. at 2. Plaintiff also urges that even though other structures in the claim may 

assist the processor in performing functions such as receiving or transmitting data over a 

wireless medium, this does not mean that the “processor” lacks sufficient structure to 

avoid means-plus-function treatment. Id. at 10. 

Claim 1 of the ’376 Patent, for example, recites (emphasis added): 

1. A data-communications networking apparatus, comprising: 

a processor configured to: 

generate a probing signal for transmission to at least a first client 

device and a second client device; 

generate a first data stream for transmission to the first client device; 

and 

generate a second data stream for transmission to the second client 

device; and 

 a transceiver operatively coupled to the processor and configured to: 

transmit the probing signal to at least the first client device and the 

second client device via a smart antenna; 

wherein the smart antenna is operatively coupled to the transceiver 

and comprises a first antenna element and a second antenna 

element; 

wherein one or more of the processor, the transceiver, or the smart antenna is 

further configured to: 

receive a first feedback information from the first client device in 

response to the transmission of the probing signal; 

receive a second feedback information from the second client device 

in response to the transmission of the probing signal; 

determine where to place transmission peaks and transmission nulls 

within one or more spatially distributed patterns of 

electromagnetic signals based in part on the first and the second 

feedback information; 

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transmit the first data stream to the first client device via the one or 

more spatially distributed patterns of electromagnetic signals; 

and 

transmit the second data stream to the second client device via the 

one or more spatially distributed patterns of electromagnetic 

signals; 

wherein transmission of the first data stream and transmission of at 

least part of the second data stream occur at the same time; and 

wherein the one or more spatially distributed patterns of 

electromagnetic signals are configured to exhibit a first 

transmission peak at a location of the first client device and a 

second transmission peak at a location of the second client 

device. 

Defendants urge that the R&R fails to consider the claim limitations as a whole, 

including the recited functions, and thereby fails to consider whether the claims recite 

sufficient structure for performing the recited functions. Objs. at 5. Defendants reiterated 

their arguments in this regard at the March 28, 2022 hearing. 

The R&R finds that the term “processor” connotes structure. See R&R at 18–32. 

The R&R addresses the Williamson and Egenera decisions by the Federal Circuit as well 

as the Limestone and Syneron decisions by this Court. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 

792 F.3d 1339, 1347–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 972 F.3d 

1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Limestone Memory Sys., LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. 

8:15-CV-00278-DOC, 2019 WL 6655273, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2019); Syneron 

Med. Ltd. v. Invasix, Inc., No. 8:16-CV-00143-DOC, 2018 WL 4696971, at *12–*14 

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2018). 

Defendants’ renewed reliance on these Federal Circuit decisions and these 

decisions of this Court does not undercut the analysis set forth in the R&R. See R&R at 

19–20, 23–25, 27–30. In particular, the R&R properly found Limestone and Syneron

distinguishable on their facts. See id. at 27–30. Also, in response to Defendants’ 

objections, Plaintiff persuasively cites an additional portion of the Tek Global case cited 

in the R&R, which reinforces the general proposition that 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 “does not 

apply when ‘the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art 

to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” TEK Global, S.R.L. v. 

Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc., 920 F.3d 777, 786 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Diebold Nixdorf, 

Inc. v. ITC, 899 F.3d 1291, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see R&R at 25; Resp. at 6–7. 

Even if one assumes for the sake of argument that more is required, the claims 

satisfy what Defendants refer to as the “objectives and operations” test. See Objs. at 8. In 

arguing that this test is not met, Defendants characterize the “objectives” too narrowly. 

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See id. at 8–10. In particular, Defendants assert that the “objectives” are all of the 

individual recited functions. See, e.g., id. at 10. This leads Defendants to then argue that 

the claim provides no “operations” for performing each of these individual functions. See 

id. A fair reading of these claims, however, is that the objective is more general and 

relates to conducting data communications, and the various functional limitations recite 

specific operations that the processor is configured to perform so as to conduct data 

communications. 

Likewise, whereas Syneron found that the “processor [is] defined only by the 

function [it] perform[s],” 2018 WL 4696971 at *14, substantially all of above-reproduced 

Claim 1 of the ’376 Patent, for example, sets forth details regarding the functional 

configuration of the processor. 

As to Defendants’ argument that the claims encompass a processor for performing 

the functions of generating a probing signal, receiving feedback information, and 

performing beamforming, see Objs. at 3, 10–11, considering all of these functions does 

not alter the analysis finding that the “processor” terms connote structure and indeed 

connote sufficient structure for performing the functions. The R&R addressed this issue, 

considered expert opinions and expert testimony, and found the opinions of Plaintiff’s 

expert, Dr. Branimir Vojcic, persuasive as to the sufficiency of a “processor” in the 

context of the functional language recited in the claims. See R&R at 25–27. 

Finally, Plaintiff submitted two notices of supplemental authority (Dkts. 294, 296) 

identifying two decisions handed down by the Federal Circuit just a few days before the 

March 28 hearing on the present objections, namely Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp., No. 

2021-1725, __ F.4th __, 2022 WL 870209 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 24, 2022), and VDPP, LLC v. 

Vizio, Inc., No. 2021-2040, 2022 WL 885771 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 25, 2022). Plaintiff 

addressed Dyfan and VDPP at the hearing, and the Court’s own review of those cases 

reinforces the analysis set forth above that the “processor” terms are not means-plusfunction terms under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Even in light of Plaintiff’s notices of 

supplemental authority and Plaintiff’s arguments at the hearing, Defendants did not 

directly address either Dyfan or VDPP at the hearing, instead focusing their oral 

arguments on above-discussed decisions such as Egenera and Syneron, which the Court 

finds were properly distinguished in the R&R. Plaintiff’s reading of the above-discussed 

Federal Circuit authorities is persuasive, particularly in light of how Dyfan and VDPP

applied those authorities to terms reciting “code” and “processor,” respectively. See 2022 

WL 870209, at *5–*7; see also VDPP, 2022 WL 885771, at *3–*4. 

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendants’ objections and ADOPTS the 

Special Master’s recommendations as to the ’376 Patent. 

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II. The ’939 Patent 

A. “wireless input/output (I/O) unit” 

The Special Master recommends construing “wireless input/output (I/O) unit” to 

have its plain meaning. See R&R at 38–44. Defendants present similar arguments for this 

term as discussed above for the “processor” terms, arguing that “[r]ather than considering 

whether this term conveys structure in the context of the claimed functions, the R&R 

only analyzes whether ‘wireless I/O unit’ connotes structure on its own.” Objs. at 12 

(citation omitted). Defendants argue that the R&R lacks any factual support for finding 

that the phrase “wireless input/output” imparts any structural meaning to the nonce word 

“unit.” Id. at 13. 

Plaintiff responds that “the R&R correctly analyzed and found that ‘wireless I/O 

unit’ has a well-known meaning in the art as a term for structure,” and Plaintiff argues 

that “the R&R considered evidence that the known structure of a wireless I/O unit is 

known by ordinary artisans to be capable of the recited function of establishing access 

points. R&R 43:11–12, citing D.I. 256-5 (“Vojcic Decl.”) ¶¶ 107–117.” Resp. at 11. 

Defendants argue that “the R&R errs by looking at the specification to provide 

structure that is missing from the claim.” (Defs. Objs. at 13.) Defendants cite the analysis 

of the Federal Circuit in MTD Products Inc. v. Iancu, 933 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 

2019), arguing that any reliance on structures disclosed in the specification as a basis for 

finding that a term is not means-plus-function “would seem to leave § 112, ¶ 6 without 

any application: any means-plus-function limitation that met the statutory requirements, 

i.e., which includes having corresponding structure in the specification, would end up not 

being a means-plus-function limitation at all.” 933 F.3d at 1344. Defendants reiterated 

this argument at the March 28, 2022 hearing, and Defendants also argued that the 

disclosed structures cited by Plaintiff, such as an antenna array, are separate from the 

wireless input/output unit. 

However, Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive because the analysis of whether 

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies is conducted using generally applicable claim construction 

principles, including that the claims are analyzed in light of the specification. See TEK 

Global, 920 F.3d at 785; see also Apple Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1296 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Williamson, 792 F.3d 1339 (“The overall 

means-plus-function analysis is a two-step process. Naturally, there is some analytical 

overlap between these two steps. In the first step, we must determine if the claim 

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limitation is drafted in means-plus-function format. As part of this step, we must construe 

the claim limitation to decide if it connotes ‘sufficiently definite structure’ to a person of 

ordinary skill in the art, which requires us to consider the specification (among other 

evidence). In the second step, if the limitation is in means-plus-function format, we must 

specifically review the specification for ‘corresponding structure.’ Thus, while these two 

‘structure’ inquiries are inherently related, they are distinct.”). Disclosure in the 

specification of the same structure that is recited in the claim does not necessarily compel 

means-plus-function treatment. 

The Kyocera decision cited by Defendants in their objections was issued by the 

Federal Circuit after the parties presented oral argument on claim construction, but 

Kyocera does not compel a different outcome because the facts of Kyocera are not 

analogous to the present dispute. See Kyocera Senco Industrial Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Kyocera found that the term “lifter 

member,” in a claim directed to a mechanical “fastener driving tool,” was a means-plusfunction term because: “[t]hat phrase, alone, does not connote structure” and “is a nonstructural generic placeholder (member) modified by functional language (lifter)”; the 

claim provided a “purely functional description”; and “[n]othing in the written 

description provides a clear and unambiguous definition of ‘lifter member.’” Id.

Defendants emphasize the finding in Kyocera that the specification there “provide[d] an 

example of a lifter member, rather than a definition of the lifter member.” Id.

In the present case, however, the R&R finds that the phrase “wireless input/output 

(I/O) unit” itself connotes structure. See R&R at 40–43. The R&R cites Skky, Inc. v. 

MindGeek, s.a.r.l., 859 F.3d 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017), which involved the term “wireless 

device means.” Skky found that the presumption in favor of applying 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 

to this “means” term was rebutted: 

Although the term uses the word “means” and so triggers a presumption, the full term recites 

structure, not functionality; the claims do not recite a function or functions for the wireless device 

means to perform, and “wireless device” is “used in common parlance . . . to designate structure.” 

Id. at 1020 (quoting TecSec, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 731 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013)). 

In the present case, the term “wireless input/output (I/O) unit” appears in 

independent Claims 1, 15, and 30 of the ’939 Patent, all three of which recite “a wireless 

input/output (I/O) unit that is configured to establish a plurality of access points.” In 

attempting to distinguish Skky, Defendants evidently rely on the latter portion of this 

phrase (“establish a plurality of access points”) as being functional. In doing so, 

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Defendants downplay the finding in Skky that “‘wireless device’ is ‘used in common 

parlance . . . to designate structure.’” Id.; see TEK Global, 920 F.3d at 786 (noting that 

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 “does not apply when ‘the words of the claim are understood by 

persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for 

structure’”) (citation omitted). 

Moreover, the Federal Circuit has noted that functional claim language is 

permissible, including as to claim limitations that are not subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. 

Cf. BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e 

have long held that nothing in the law precludes, for indefiniteness, defining a particular 

claim term by its function.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Finally, the specification confirms that the term “wireless input/output (I/O) unit” 

connotes structure because, as noted in the R&R, “the specification refers to a wireless 

I/O unit as including structures and as being part of a structure.” R&R at 42 (citing ’939 

Patent at 4:17–23 (“[a]ccess station 102 includes wireless I/O unit 206”; “[w]ireless I/O 

unit 206 includes an antenna array 208 that is implemented as two or more antennas, and 

optionally as a phased array of antennas”), 5:30–37 (similar), 6:60–64 (“Such a wireless 

I/O unit 206 may also optionally include one or more of Ethernet switch/router 602, 

beamformer 612, and antenna array 208.”)). 

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendants’ objections and ADOPTS the 

Special Master’s recommendation. 

B. “signal transmission/reception coordination logic” 

The R&R recommends finding that “signal transmission/reception coordination 

logic” is a means-plus-function term governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 and that the 

corresponding structure is “signal transmission/reception coordination logic 404 (with the 

characteristics and configuration set forth for the signal transmission/reception 

coordination logic 404 in the ’939 Patent), and equivalents thereof.” See R&R at 44–59. 

Neither side objects to the finding in the R&R that the term “signal 

transmission/reception coordination logic” is a means-plus-function term governed by 35 

U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. See R&R at 49–52. 

Defendants argue that “the signal transmission/reception coordination logic 404 

that is at the heart of the R&R is not sufficient structure that ‘corresponds to the claimed 

function’: it is only a black box without any explanation on the algorithm for performing 

the claimed function of restraining transmission on a different channel than the channel 

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on which a signal is received.” Objs. at 16. In this regard, Defendants emphasized at the 

March 28, 2022 hearing that no party objects to the finding in the R&R that the phrase 

“signal transmission/reception coordination logic” (as recited in the claim) does not 

connote structure. 

Defendants also urge that the R&R “never explains which ‘characteristics and 

configuration’ are clearly associated with performing the claimed functions, including the 

required functionality of restraining transmission on a different channel—which served as 

the basis for the examiner determining that the claims were patentable over the prior art.” 

Id. (citations omitted). In this regard, Defendants further argued at the March 28, 2022 

hearing that whereas the signal transmission/reception coordination logic is the point of 

novelty, there is no explanation in the patent as to what is being added to an off-the-shelf 

chip or how it is able to perform the claimed functions. Plaintiff responded that 

Defendants’ argument regarding any purported lack of “how” is an enablement argument 

and does not affect the sufficiency of the disclosure of the signal transmission/reception 

coordination logic 404 as corresponding structure. Plaintiff also argued that even if 

Defendants were found to be correct that logic 404 is not a sufficient disclosure of 

structure, then the corresponding structure would be the disclosed algorithms. 

Upon review and as set forth herein, the R&R properly finds that the 

corresponding structure is “signal transmission/reception coordination logic 404.” See id.

at 52–59; see, e.g., ’939 Patent at 6:22–53 (“signal transmission/reception coordination 

logic 404 may restrain transmission on one channel on the basis of reception on another 

channel”). 

Defendants rely on the principle that “[s]imply disclosing a black box that 

performs the recited function is not a sufficient explanation of the algorithm required to 

render the means-plus-function term definite.” Augme Techs., Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., 755 

F.3d 1326, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The “signal transmission/reception coordination logic 

404” disclosed in the specification is a sufficient corresponding structure. Whereas 

Defendants argue that this “signal transmission/reception coordination logic 404” is 

merely a “black box” that lacks any algorithm or other structural meaning, the R&R 

refers to “signal transmission/reception coordination logic 404 (with the characteristics 

and configuration set forth for the signal transmission/reception coordination logic 404 

in the ’939 Patent),” thus limiting this structure to the algorithms and configuration 

disclosed for this structure in the specification. See R&R at 52–59 (emphasis added). 

These disclosures are more than merely restatements of the recited functions. See id.

(citing disclosures); see also ’939 Patent at 15:23–48. To whatever extent an algorithm 

requirement applies, see, e.g., Augme, 755 F.3d at 1338, the algorithm requirement is met 

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by these disclosures in the specification regarding signal transmission/reception 

coordination logic 404. 

The R&R also finds: “As to Plaintiff’s proposal that ‘MAC coordinator logic 606’ 

is an alternative corresponding structure, Plaintiff does not persuasively show that this 

structure is ‘clearly link[ed]’ to the above-noted claimed functions.” R&R at 57. 

Although the R&R finds that the claimed functions are linked to the “signal 

transmission/reception coordination logic 404” and not the “MAC coordinator logic 

606,” this finding might give rise to confusion because the specification discloses that 

“[i]n a more-specific implementation with reference to FIGS. 6 and 8, signal 

transmission/reception coordination logic 404 may be realized as MAC coordinator logic 

606.” ’939 Patent at 15:49–51 (emphasis added). Plaintiff likewise argued at the March 

28, 2022 hearing that MAC 606 is an example of a way to implement the logic 404. See 

id., see also id. at 18:12–19. Having considered the oral arguments and the disclosures 

cited by the parties, the Court finds that the “MAC coordinator logic 606” is thus 

subsumed within the recommended corresponding structure recommended by the R&R 

(“signal transmission/reception coordination logic 404 (with the characteristics and 

configuration set forth for the signal transmission/reception coordination logic 404 in the 

’939 Patent)”). R&R at 57–59. 

The Court accordingly OVERRULES Defendants’ objections and ADOPTS IN 

PART the Special Master’s recommendation: the Court MODIFIES the recommended 

analysis by noting that the “MAC coordinator logic 606” is subsumed within the 

recommended corresponding structure. 

C. “responsive to . . .” 

The R&R recommends construing the “responsive to . . .” terms to have their plain 

meaning. See R&R at 59–65. 

Defendants argue that their “construction . . . is intended to resolve the parties’ 

dispute as to what the plain an[d] ordinary meaning of the claim language is, which 

Plaintiff contends does not require the receiving to be on-going at the time of the 

restraining, which is directly contrary to the claim’s grammatical construction.” Objs. at 

18. Defendants also argue that the R&R errs in relying on the doctrine of claim 

differentiation because “[t]he Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that claim 

differentiation is merely a claim construction principle and not an absolute rule for claim 

construction.” Id. at 19. 

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Plaintiff responds that “[t]here is no support for construing the ‘restraining’ step to 

be contemporaneous with the prior ‘ascertaining . . . that a first access point is receiving’ 

step. The plain meaning of ‘responsive to’ is broad enough to cover a restraining step that 

occurs after the ascertaining step by some amount of time.” Resp. at 17. 

At the March 28, 2022 hearing, Defendants urged that the disclosed objective of 

preventing signal degradation would not be achieved unless the other signal is being 

received at the same time that the restraining is being performed. Plaintiff responded that 

“responsive to” could mean at the same time or could be in response to ascertaining a 

moment ago. Plaintiff argued that it would be improper to limit the plain meaning of 

these terms so as to achieve the objective advanced by Defendants. 

The R&R found that “Defendants have not demonstrated that one action being 

‘responsive to’ another action necessarily requires the actions to be contemporaneous.” 

R&R at 63. 

Defendants argue that the R&R failed to consider these terms as a whole, but the 

R&R identified much more than merely the phrase “responsive to” as being in dispute. 

See id. at 59–60 (“responsive to the ascertaining that the access point of the plurality of 

access points is receiving the signal on a second different channel” (’939 Patent, 

Claim 1); “responsive to the ascertaining that the first access point is receiving the first 

signal and that the second access point is receiving the second signal that is ongoing-on 

the second channel” (’939 Patent, Claim 15); “responsive to the ascertaining that the first 

access point is receiving the first signal” (’939 Patent, Claim 30)). 

Defendants rely on the grammatical structure of these limitations as a whole, but 

the R&R found: 

Defendants argue that “the claims use the present progressive tense (‘is receiving’) to indicate 

that the reception of a signal is a presently occurring action” (Def. CC Opening at 26), but 

Defendants do not show how this necessarily requires the “restrain[ing]” to be contemporaneous 

with the “ascertaining.” 

R&R at 63–64. Defendants also argue that the doctrine of claim differentiation is not a 

rigid rule, but the doctrine of claim differentiation can be considered and weighed in the 

analysis of these disputed terms, as done in the R&R. See id. at 64. And even if the 

doctrine of claim differentiation were deemed completely inapplicable, the R&R did not 

rely exclusively on claim differentiation, stating instead that “[t]he doctrine of claim 

differentiation reinforces th[e] conclusion.” Id. 

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Finally, Defendants’ briefing on its objection does not address, and therefore 

appears to accept, the R&R’s rejection of Defendants’ reliance on the prosecution history. 

See R&R at 64–65. 

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendants’ objections and ADOPTS IN 

PART the Special Master’s recommendation: the Court CLARIFIES the claim 

construction by expressly construing the following disputed terms: 

Term Construction 

“responsive to the ascertaining that the access point of 

the plurality of access points is receiving the signal on a 

second different channel” (’939 Patent, Claim 1) 

Plain meaning 

“responsive to the ascertaining that the first access point 

is receiving the first signal and that the second access 

point is receiving the second signal that is ongoing-on 

the second channel” (’939 Patent, Claim 15) 

Plain meaning 

“responsive to the ascertaining that the first access point 

is receiving the first signal” (’939 Patent, Claim 30) 

Plain meaning 

D. “802.11 standard” 

The Special Master recommends construing “802.11 standard” to mean “one of 

the IEEE 802.11 standards that existed at the time of the invention.” R&R at 32–38. 

Defendants “object to the R&R only to the extent that its reference to standards

(plural) is unclear because only one IEEE 802.11 standard existed at the time of the 

invention – IEEE 802.11-1999.” Objs. at 19. Defendants submit that “[t]o the extent that 

the R&R’s reference to ‘one of the IEEE 802.11 standards’ means ‘the IEEE 802.11-

1999 standard and its (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h) amendments’, which are the 

amendments adopted prior to the priority date of the ’376 and ’939 Patents, Defendants 

do not object to this construction.” Id. at 19–20. 

Plaintiff responds that “Defendants’ proposal to exclude certain 802.11 standards 

that existed at the time of the invention should be rejected.” Resp. at 18. Plaintiff further 

argues: 

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If Defendants wanted to enumerate a specific list of standards, it was incumbent on them to state 

that proposal during the disclosure and briefing process and to support it with evidence. Now, it is 

far too late—and their position is not even consistent with their briefing. Limiting this term to the 

802.11-1999 standard contradicts Defendants’ prior statement that “[a]s of the priority date of the 

’376 and ’939 Patents, only the IEEE’s 802.11-1997 standard existed.” Dkt. No. 272 at 22:6–7. 

Resp. at 18. 

The recommended construction refers to the 802.11 standards “that existed at the 

time of the invention.” R&R at 38 (emphasis added); see id. at 37. Defendants appear to 

propose limiting the term “802.11 standard” to IEEE 802.11-1999, thereby excluding 

802.11-1997. See Dkt. 272 at 22 (Defs.’ Resp. Claim Construction Br. referring to several 

802.11 standards). That is, Defendants propose limiting the term “802.11 standard” to 

only the 802.11 standard that was current or “active,” so to speak, at the time of the 

invention. Defs. Objs. at 19 (“As of the priority dates of the ’376 and ’939 Patents, the 

IEEE 802.11-1997 standard had been replaced by the IEEE with the 802.11-1999 

standard.”). Defendants’ objection almost seems to imply that the adoption of 802.11-

1999 somehow erased 802.11-1997 from existence. Defendants do not persuasively 

justify narrowing the scope of the term “802.11 standard” so as to exclude an 802.11 

standard that had been superseded but that nonetheless still existed. 

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendants’ objections and ADOPTS the 

Special Master’s recommendation. In particular, the Court expressly REJECTS 

Defendants’ argument that the construction is limited to IEEE 802.11-1999. 

III. Disposition 

 For the reasons given above, the Court OVERRULES Defendants’ objections and 

ADOPTS WITH MODIFICATIONS the Special Master’s Report as follows: 

(a) as to the term “signal transmission/reception coordination logic,” 

the Court MODIFIES the recommended analysis by noting that 

the “MAC coordinator logic 606” is subsumed within the 

recommended corresponding structure; and 

(b) as to the “responsive to . . .” terms, the Court CLARIFIES the 

claim construction by expressly construing the entire disputed 

terms as set forth above and in the chart below. 

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Based on all of the foregoing, the Court hereby CONSTRUES the disputed terms 

as set forth in the following chart: 

Term Construction 

1.(a) “a processor configured to: 

. . .” 

(’376 Patent, Claims 1, 12, 22, 

32) 

Plain meaning 

(See R&R at 7–32) 

1.(b) “wherein one or more of the 

processor, the transceiver, or the 

smart antenna is further 

configured to: . . .” 

(’376 Patent, Claims 1–6, 10, 12–

17, 22–29, 32–34) 

Plain meaning 

(See R&R at 7–32) 

(As discussed in the R&R, the claims require only that 

“one or more” “is further configured,” not necessarily 

that each and every one of “the processor,” “the 

transceiver,” and “the smart antenna” is so configured, 

see R&R at 25.) 

2. “an 802.11 standard” 

(’376 Patent, Claims 10, 21) 

“one of the IEEE 802.11 standards that existed at the 

time of the invention” 

(See R&R at 32–38) 

3. “wireless input/output (I/O) 

unit” 

(’939 Patent, Claims 1–3, 15, 18–

19, 30–32) 

Plain meaning 

(See R&R at 38–44) 

4. “signal transmission/ 

reception coordination logic” 

(’939 Patent, Claims 1, 7–8, 11–

17, 30) 

Means-plus-function term governed by 35 U.S.C. § 

112, ¶ 6

Function: 

Claim 1: “ascertaining, by monitoring the plurality of 

access points for received signals, that a first access 

point of the plurality of access points is receiving a first 

signal” and “restrain[ing] at least two other access points 

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of the plurality of access points from transmitting signal 

responsive to the ascertaining that the first access point 

is receiving the first signal” 

Claim 1: “restrain[ing] at least one other access point 

of the plurality of access points from transmitting the 

other signal on a first channel responsive to the 

ascertaining that the access point of the plurality of 

access points is receiving the signal on a second 

different channel” 

Claim 7: “restrain[ing] at least one other access point 

of the plurality of access points from transmitting a 

downlink signal” 

Claim 13: “affect[ing] a baseband unit” 

Claim 14: “affect[ing] a radio frequency (RF) part” 

Claim 15: “ascertaining, by monitoring the plurality 

of access points for received signals, that:” (i) “a first 

access point of the plurality of access points is receiving 

a first signal on a first channel,” (ii) “a second access 

point of the plurality of access points is receiving a 

second signal that is ongoing on a second channel,” (iii) 

“restrain[ing] at least a third access point of the plurality 

of access points from transmitting a third signal on a 

third channel responsive to the ascertaining that the first 

access point is receiving the first signal and that the 

second access point is receiving the second signal that is 

ongoing-on the second channel, wherein the restraining 

at least the third access point prevents degradation to the 

first and second signals” 

Claim 30: “ascertaining, by monitoring the plurality 

of access points for received signals, that a first access 

point of the plurality of access points is receiving a first 

signal on a first channel” and “restrain[ing] at least a 

second access point of the plurality of access points from 

transmitting a second signal on a second channel 

different from the first channel responsive to the 

ascertaining that the first access point is receiving the 

first signal” 

Structure: 

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“signal transmission/reception coordination logic 

404 (with the characteristics and configuration set 

forth for the signal transmission/reception 

coordination logic 404 in the ’939 Patent), and 

equivalents thereof” 

(See R&R at 44–59) 

5.(a) “responsive to the 

ascertaining that the access point 

of the plurality of access points is 

receiving the signal on a second 

different channel” 

(’939 Patent, Claim 1) 

Plain meaning 

(See R&R at 59–65) 

5.(b) “responsive to the 

ascertaining that the first access 

point is receiving the first signal 

and that the second access point 

is receiving the second signal that 

is ongoing-on the second 

channel” 

(’939 Patent, Claim 15) 

Plain meaning 

(See R&R at 59–65) 

5.(c) “responsive to the 

ascertaining that the first access 

point is receiving the first signal” 

(’939 Patent, Claim 30) 

Plain meaning 

(See R&R at 59–65) 

6.(a) “one other access point” 

(’939 Patent, Claims 1, 7–8) 

Plain meaning 

(See R&R at 66–72) 

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6.(b) “the access point” 

(’939 Patent, Claims 1, 4–5, 33–

34) 

The term “the access point” refers back to “a first 

access point” for antecedent basis. 

(See R&R at 66–72) 

6.(c) “the other signal” 

(’939 Patent, Claim 1) 

Indefinite 

(See R&R at 66–72) 

6.(d) “the signal” 

(’939 Patent, Claim 1) 

Indefinite 

(See R&R at 66–72) 

7. “at least one IEEE 802.11 

standard” 

(’939 Patent, Claims 3, 19, 32) 

“at least one of the IEEE 802.11 standards that 

existed at the time of the invention” 

(See R&R at 72–74) 

8.(a) “a beam downlink” 

(’728 Patent, Claims 1, 7) 

Plain meaning 

(See R&R at 74–80) 

8.(b) “[a]/[the] different beam 

downlink” 

(’728 Patent, Claims 1, 7) 

Plain meaning 

(See R&R at 74–80) 

 

The Clerk shall serve this minute order on the parties. 

MINUTES FORM 11 

CIVIL-GEN

Initials of Deputy Clerk: dca/kdu

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