NO. 82-139 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1983 

DUANE E. DORN, individually and 

as representative for all initiative 

petitioners, 

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

VS. 

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BILLINGS 

SCHOOL DISTRICT #2, Yellowstone 

County; VIRGIL POORE, Superintendant 

of School District #2, et al., 

Defendants and Respondents. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone 

Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellants: 

Jenkins Law Firm, Helena, Montana 

Kelly Jenkins argued, Helena, Montana 

Patten & Renz, Billings, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana 

David Hoefer argued, Deputy County Attorney, Billings 

Montana 

Felt & Martin, Billings, Montana 

Laurence R. Martin argued and Sol Lovas argued, Billings, 

Montana 

For Amicus Curiae: 

T. G. Speare, Billings, Montana 

submitted : December 12, 1982 

~ecided: March 17, 1983 

Filed: 

- 

CLerk 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

This appeal results from a Thirteenth Judicial District 

Court judgment declaring that respondent's school policy, 

which prohibits the collection of initiative petition 

signatures within buildings being used as polling places on 

election days, does not violate appellant's statutory or 

constitutional rights. 

This court is asked to decide whether the class 

appellant represents has a right to collect initiative 

petition signatures within school buildings being used as 

polling places on election days and whether the school 

district's policy of exclusion violates that right. 

Appellant asserts his collection activity within school 

buildings used as polling places is protected from the school 

district's exclusionary policy under section 13-35-218(5), 

MCA and several provisions of the state and federal 

constitutions. Appellant specifically claims the policy 

violates equal protection, the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments and their state counterparts, and the express 

right to initiative guaranteed by the 1972 Montana 

Constitution. 

Before the 1981 general election appellant Dorn 

contacted Rimrock Elementary School officials to inform them 

that he intended to collect signatures on an initiative 

petition inside the Rimrock School on election day. 

Respondent school district denied him permission to enter the 

school building for that purpose. 

On November 3, 1981, over the protests of the Rimrock 

School principal, appellant entered the school building. In 

the hallway appellant approached two people who were on their 
way to vote in the gymnasium where the voting booths were 

located. The voters signed the initiative petition after it 

was explained to them. The principal then returned to 

admonish appellant that respondent Poore intended to have him 

ejected from the building by the police. Appellant remained. 

Shortly thereafter, respondent Poore and police arrived and 

requested appellant leave the premises. Under threat of 

arrest appellant left the building. 

Appellant, later that day, returned to the school 

building with several other persons to solicit signatures. 

Appellant and associates entered the building under authority 

of a Thirteenth Judicial District Court temporary restraining 

order enjoining the school district from preventing appellant 

from soliciting signatures within school buildings being used 

as polling places. 

Pursuant to party agreement and court approval, hearing $ 

on the temporary order a.nd order to show cause was cancelled. 

The temporary order expired by its own terms. Thereafter, 

the District Court joined respondent Halland, Yellowstone 

County's election administrator, as party defendant and 

certified appellant Dorn to represent a class of persons who 

collect or intend to collect initiative petition signatures 

at polling places on election days. The cause was submitted 

to the trial court on a set of agreed facts and motions for 

summary judgment. 

The District Court rendered summary judgment on behalf 

of respondents, concluding: 

I1 1. The school district, as a property owner, 

has the right to prohibit the solicitation of 

initiative petition signatures within its buildings 

while they are being used as polling places. 

2. The school district's policy permitting 

plaintiff initiative petitioners to solicit 

signatures outside, but not inside, school 

buildings while they are being used as polling 
places is a reasonable regulation of materially 

disruptive conduct. 

3. The school district's policy permitting 

plaintiff initiative petitioners to solicit 

signatures outside, but not inside, school 

buildings while they are being used as polling 

places does not violate any right of the plaintiffs 

guaranteed by the United States or Montana 

Constitutions. 

4. The school district's policy permitting 

plaintiff initiative petitioners to solicit 

signatures outside, but not inside, school 

buildings while they are being used as polling 

places does not violate the provisions of Section 

13-35-218(5), MCA, or any other Montana statute. 

5. The private owners of property used as 

polling places may at a.ny time and for any reason 

prohibit the solicitation of initiative petition 

signatures thereon. 

6. The County Election Administrator has a 

duty and may prohibit persons gathering signatures 

for an initiative petition at any time that he 

believes said process is interfering with the 

election process." 

We hereafter detail.the agreed facts and the District 

Court findings which bear upon the issues to be resolved. 

Posted throughout school buildings within the school 

district were signs requesting that all persons who enter 

school buildings, other than students and school personnel, 

report to the school principal to obtain permission to be in 

the building. The school board waives this requirement for 

voters because of the limited purpose and duration of their 

visit. 

Additionally the school district has a written policy 

prohibiting school or students from serving as enrollment 

centers or publicity agents for in non-school connected 

activities. This policy has been interpreted to prohibit any 

kind of solicitation within school buildings, including the 

solicitation of initiative petition signatures on election 

days; however, under this policy, the school district has 

granted standing approval to several children's organizations 

to distribute information about their organization and 

activities in school buildings on designated days. 
Meanwhile the school district has applied its policy to 

deny all requests to solicit initiative petition signatures 

in school buildings on election days. Access to school 

buildings has been denied to signature solicitors without 

regard to the contents of a particular petition or the 

conduct of an individual solicitor. Those who have atempted 

to solicit signatures in contravention of this policy have 

been asked to leave. 

The policy does not pertain to solicitation of 

initiative petition signatures on grounds adjacent to school 

buildings. Such solicitation occurs regularly on election 

days. The school board has made no attempt to prohibit or 

otherwise regulate outdoor solicitation. 

In Yellowstone County polling places are located in 

rooms or hallways of private and public buildings. In the 

past approximately twenty (20) schools within the school 

district have been used as polling places. Upon entering a 

school building voters are directed to the polling area by 

posted signs. Most signature solicitors congregate outside 

the main entrance to school buildings because that is where 

most voters enter. 

At the time this dispute arose approximatley eight to 

ten initiative petitions either had been or were in the 

process of being approved for signature collection. Though 

some were highly controversial none of the initiative 

petitions for which signatures were sought were ballot issues 

at the time of solicitation. 

The conduct and status of individual solicitors varies 

in that some are paid and others volunteer; some are peaceful 

and others are not. It is agreed that each solicitor 

explains the initiative petition to the voter in the process 

of requesting his or her signature. When attempts to 
persuade a voter to sign precipitate arguments, the 

instigator may be either solicitor or voter. Under the 

present school district policy these arguments necessarily 

occur outside school buldings; were the policy changed it is 

stipulated that any such arguments would occur inside school 

buildings. 

It is agreed noise in hallways distracts students, 

impairs their concentration, lowers their level of 

functioning, and affects classroom discipline and teaching 

effectiveness. 

The school district acknowledges the main purpose behind 

its policy prohibiting solicitation within school buildings 

is to prevent problems before they start. Its primary 

concerns are potential disruption of school activities and 

possible security risks that would attend a more permissive 

solicitation policy. 

The District Court found that the school district's 

reasons for prohibiting indoor solicitation were valid 

concerns and fully justified its policy. 

The District Court further found that the past 

activities of solicitors outside school buildings had 

reasonably lead the school district to forecast substantial 

disruption and material interference with school functioning 

if initiative petitioners were permitted inside school 

buildings. 

Finally the District Court found that the process of 

soliciting initiative petition signatures is not part of the 

election process. 

ISSUE ONE: Whether the school district's policy violates 

section 13-35-218, MCA? 

Appellant contends the school district's policy violates 

section 13-35-218 (5), MCA, because it prohibits solicitation 
which otherwise would be permitted under statute. Appellant 

believes the legislative history of a recent amendment to 

section 13-35-218, MCA, supports his contention. 

Prior to 1981, section 13-35-218, MCA, provided in 

pertinent part, " [nlo person may obstruct the doors or 

entries of any polling place." Section 13-35-218(4), MCA 

(1-979). During the 1981 legislative session House Bill 336 

was introduced to amend section 13-35-218, MCA, to prohibit 

solicitation of signatures for ballot issues within or near 

polling places. However, the legislature rejected an 

absolute ban on solicitation at polling places and revised 

the bill to amend the statute to its present form. Section 

13-35-218 (5) , MCA, states: 

"No person on election day may obstruct the doors 

or entries of any polling place or engage in any 

solicitation of a voter within the room where votes 

are being cast or elsewhere in any manner which in 

any way interferes with the election process or 

obstructs the access of voters to or from the 

polling place." 

Appellant concludes that the legislature's intention in 

amending the statute was to preserve the right to collect 

initiative petition signatures within and at polling places 

and the school district's policy must be permanently enjoined 

because it thwarts that intent. 

The Court is not persuaded by appellant's argument. Its 

function in construing and applying statutes is to effect 

legislative intent. The primary tool for ascertaining intent 

is the plain meaning of the words used. The Court properly 

refers to legislative history only when intent cannot be 

determined from the content of the statute. The instant 

statute does not necessitate such an inquiry. 

Section 13-35-218(5), MCA, clearly and unarnbj-guously 

proscribes a manner of solicitation which results 

interference with the election process or obstruction of 
access to and from polling places. In no way does its 

wording constitute a guarantee of access to the polling place 

to those persons whose manner of solicitation effects no 

interference or obstruction. Whatever the extent of 

appellant's right to collect initiative petition signatures, 

its origin is not in section 13-35-218(5), MCA. The most 

that can be read from the words chosen by the legislature is 

that some manner of solicitation at polling places on 

election day may be permitted. That is not equivalent to 

saying it is guaranteed. 

We hold that section 13-35-218(5), MCA, in and of 

itself, does not preclude the school district from 

prohibiting solicitation of initiative petition signatures 

within school buildings used as polling places. The District 

Court committed. no error in concluding the school district's 

policy did not violate that statute. 

ISSUE TWO: Whether the school district's policy violates 

appellant's federal and state constitutional rights -- of free 

speech, assembly and petition - or initiative? 

Appellant asserts his right to collect signatures for 

initiative petitions is guaranteed by equivalent but 

independent provisions of the state and federal constitution. 

The 1972 Montana Constitution reserves unto the people 

the power of initiative. Article V, section 1, Montana 

Constitution (1972). This reservation would be ineffectual 

if the means by which initiative is invoked, were not 

afforded constitutions,- protection. Therefore, we hold that 

the First Amendment and its state counterpart, Article 11, 

section 6 and 7, Montana Constitution (1972), protects 

appellant's activities. The First Amendment was fashioned to 

embrace precisely what the initiative process promotes: 

"[the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about 
of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth 

v. United States (1956) 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 

1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, cited in Lewis v. Reader's Digest 

(1973) 162 Mont. 401, 409, 512 P.2d 702, 706. Accord, State 

v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc. (1973) 82 Wash.2d 94, 508 P.2d 

149. 

The remaining question is whether appellant can be 

constitutionally prohibited from exercising his First 

Amendment liberties in school buildings being used as polling 

places. 

First Amendment protection does not assure appellant's 

activities will be beyond restriction, as the First Amendment 

does not prohibit all regulation of expressive activities. 

First Amendment rights may be governed by appropriate 

limitations on the time, place and manner of their exercise. 

See, e.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna 

Consciousness, Inc., (1981) 452 U.S. 640, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 

L.Ed.2d 298 (state fair rule prohibiting sale or distribution 

of any merchandise including printed or written material 

except from fixed location); Cox v. New Hampshire (1941) 312 

U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed 1049. (statute prohibiting 

parade or procession upon a public street without a special 

license). And, the state has the power to substantially 

restrict or even prohibit exercise of First Amendment rights 

on property owned by the government "to preserve the property 

under its control for the use to which it is lawfully 

dedicated." Adderley v. Florida (1966) 385 U.S. 39, 47, 87 

S.Ct. 242, 247, 17 Ij.Ed.2d 149 (criminal trespass convictions 

upheld where demonstration on jailhouse grounds not 

ordinarily open to public obstructed the jail driveway) . 

Indeed, the so-called "non-public forum" cases consistently 

establish that government ownership or control of a facility 
does not guarantee the public absolute and unrestricted 

access for the purpose of exercising First Amendment 

liberties. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Service v. Council of 

Greenburgh Civic Associations (1981) 453 U.S. 114, 101 S.Ct. 

2676, 69 L.Ed.2d 517 (statute prohibiting distribution of 

unstamped mailable matter in authorized letterboxes) ; Jones 

v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. (1977) 433 

U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (prison regulation 

prohibiting a prisoner's union from holding meetings, 

soliciting other inmates for membership or obtaining bulk 

mailing privileges) ; Greer v. Spock (1976) 424 U.S. 828, 96 

S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (army regulation prohibiting 

political speeches on military base); and Lehman v. City of 

Shaker Heights (1974) 418 U.S. 298, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 

770 (municipal policy prohibiting paid political advertising 

in its mass transit system). 

It is equally well established, however, that when a 

government owned or controlled facility is opened as a forum 

for assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not 

prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of 

what they intend to say, Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. 

Mosley (1972) 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212, and 

differential access policies must be factually based and 

finely tailored to serve substantial state interests. See, 

e. g. , Perry Local Educators ' Association v. Hohlt (7th Cir. 

1981) 652 F.2d 1286 prob. juris. noted, 454 U.S. 1140; Gay 

Students Organization v. Bonner (1st Cir. 1974) 509 F.2d 652; 

National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers (4th Cir. 

1973) 473 F.2d 1010; Hennessey v. Independent School District 

No. 4 (Okla. 1976) 552 P.2d 1141. 

Likewise, when property owned or controlled by the 

government is a public forum, few restrictions on its use for 
exercise of First Amendment freedoms are tolerated; any 

regulation must not only be content-neutral but must he 

closely related to a significant governmental interest and 

must be the least restrictive means of serving that interest. 

See, e.g., New York City Unemployed and Welfare Council v. 

Brezenoff (2nd Cir. 1982) 677 F.2d 232; ACORN v. Dallas 

County Hospital District (5th Cir. 1982) 670 F.2d 629, 

modifying 656 F.2d 1175 and reversing 478 F.Supp 1250. 

Appellant contends this Court should employ the test 

articulated in Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 

104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, to determine whether the 

school district's policy constitutes reasonable regulation of 

expressive activity in school buildings on election days. We 

In Grayned, several persons who participated in a 

demonstration on a public sidewalk near a high school were 

convicted under an anti-noise ordinance, which read in 

pertinent part, as follows: 

"[Nlo person, while on public or private grounds 

adjacent to any building in which a school or any 

class thereof is in session, shall willfully make 

or assist in the making of any noise or diversion 

which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or 

good order of such school session or class thereof. I1 e. 

Evidence at trial was sharply contradictory regarding the 

disruptive nature of the demonstration. The demonstrators 

challenged the ordinance on its face as being overbroad 

contending it unduly interfered with their First and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights to picket on a public sidewalk 

near a school. 

The United States Supreme Court upheld the ordinance and 

reiterated that reasonable "time, place, and manner" 

regulations on the right to use a public place for expressive 
activity, may be necessary to further significant 

governmental interests. The Court explained: 

"The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal 

activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of 

time, place, and manner that are reasonable.' 

Although a silent vigil may not unduly interfere 

with a public library, making a speech in the 

reading room almost certainly would. That same 

speech should be perfectly appropriate in a park. 

- The crucial question is whether the manner of 

expression is basical5 incompatible with the 

normal actizty - of - a particular placeat? - 

particular time . . [Iln assessing the 

reasonableness of a regulation, we must weigh 

heavily the fact that communication is involved; 

the regulation must be narrowly tailored to further 

the State's legitimate interest . . Free 

expression 'must not, in the guise of regulation, 

be abridged or denied. ' " (citations and footnotes 

omitted) 408 U.S. at 116-117, 92 S.Ct. at 

2303-2304. (emphasis added). 

In upholding the ordinance, the Court emphasized that: 

"[the] antinoise ordinance goes no further than 

Tinker [v. Des Moines Independent Community School 

District (1969) 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 

L.Ed.2d 7311 says a municipality may go to prevent 

interference with its schools. It is narrowly 

tailored to further Rockford's compelling state 

interest in having an undisrupted school session 

conducive to the students' learning, and does not 

unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment 

rights. -- Far from having an impermissibly broad 

prophylatic ordinance, ~ozford punishes only 

conduct which disrupts - or - is about to disrupt 

normal school activities." 408 U.S. 119, 92 

S.Ct. at 2305. (emphasis added). 

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 

District, supra, struck down a school policy of suspending 

students who refused to remove armbands worn to protest the 

Vietnam War. The record disclosed the involved students 

neither interrupted school activities nor sought to intrude 

in school affairs or the lives of others; their expression 

caused discussion outside the classroom but no interference 

with work or disorder. 

In accomodating First Amendment rights with the "special 

characteristics of the school environment,' 393 U.S. at 506, 

89 S.Ct. at 736, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
that "'wide exposure to . . . robust exchange of ideas'" is 

"an important part of the educational process" and should be 

nurtured. 393 U.S. at 512, 89 S.Ct. at 739-740. 

The Court concluded that free expression could not be 

barred from all parts of a school building or its immediate 

environs, but that expressive activity may be prohibited if 

it "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial 

disorder or invasion of the rights of others1'. 393 U.S. at 

513, 89 S.Ct. at 740. The Court made clear that 

"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not 

enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression". 393 

U.S. at 508, 89 S.Ct. at 737. 

The District Court erred by failing to apply the 

incompatibility test of Grayned and by neglecting to 

carefully scrutinize the school district's policy in light of 

Grayned and Tinker. One simply cannot equate public schools 

with military reservations or jail enclosures and conclude 

that the uses to which they are dedicated cannot be preserved 

unless expressive activities are prohibited or substantially 

restricted. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 121, fn 49, 92 S.Ct. at 

2306; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512, fn 6, 89 S.Ct. at 739. Nor is 

it appropriate to conclude, as the school district suggests, 

that because expressive activities may be constitutionally 

prohibited in privately owned shopping centers not dedicated 

to public use, Lloyd Corporation, Ltd. v. Tanner (1972) 407 

U.S. 551, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131, appellant's 

a.ctivities may be excluded from public school buildings 

expressly dedicated to public use for education of students 

and elections. See, sections 13-3-105 (4), 20-1-305 (1) , 

20-6-602, MCA. 

In the context of a school environment, incompatible 

expression must be found in substantial disruption of or 
material interference with normal school activities, Grayned, 

408 U.S. at 118, 92 S.Ct. at 2304; "undifferentiated fear or 

apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the 

right of freedom of expression". Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 89 

S.Ct. at 737. Moreover, a decision as to whether a manner of 

expression is incompatible, must be on an individual basis, 

given a particular fact situation, Grayned, 408 U.S. at 119, 

92 S.Ct. at 2305, and not by means of broad classifications, 

especially those based on subject matter. Mosley, 408 U.S. 

at 101, 92 S.Ct. at 2293; see, also, Consolidated Edison Co. 

v. Public Service Commission (1980) 447 U.S. 530, 100 S.Ct. 

2326, 65 L.Ed.2d 319. Finally, to be permissible, any 

regulation of expressive activities must be the least 

restrictive means of furthering the state's interest in 

providing a school environment conducive to student's 

learning, Grayned, supra. 

The policy prohibiting appellant's solicitation 

activities is not premised on any actual instances in which 

indoor or outdoor solicitation activities have either 

substantially disrupted, or threatened to substantially 

disrupt, normal school activities. From the stipulated 

facts, the most that can be said regarding the 

incompatibility of solicitation activities and school 

functioning is that the hallways might be noisier or more 

congested while solicitors converse with registered voters 

regarding the contents and merits of a particular initiative 

petition. That is not analogous to making a speech in the 

reading room of a library, which is how the United States 

Supreme Court illustrated the incompatibility test it 

articulated in Grayned. Furthermore, the record is devoid of 

any facts to substantiate the school districts's security 

concern. 
Finally the school district's policy is not narrowly 

tailored to further its interests in undisrupted school 

functioning. Less restrictive means of achieving the 

objective were not tried. 

Unlike the ordinance upheld in Grayned, the school 

district's policy applies throughout the day, irrespective of 

whether or not classes are in session, and reaches all 

solicitors, irrespective of whether or not they conduct their 

activities peaceably. Like the ordinance struck down by 

Moslev, the school district's policy selectively excludes 

solicitation on the basis of subject matter and 

undifferentiated fear of disruption. 

In its present form the school district's policy 

unnecessarily infringes on the First Amendment liberties of 

appellant and the class he represents. Therefore, the 

District Court's order is reversed and the school district's 

policy is hereby declared to b 

We concur: 

Chief Justice 

Justices 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber concurs and dissents as 

follows : 

I agree with the holding of the majority that in its 

present form the school district's policy unnecessarily 

infringes on the First Amendment liberties of the appellant 

and the class he represents and is theref ore 

unconstitutiona.1. I am also in agreement with the general 

principles of law set forth in the majority opinion upon 

which the conclusion was reached. 

However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that 

the policy prohibiting solicitation is not premised on any 

actual instances in which solicitation activities have 

substantially disrupted or threatened to substantially 

disrupt normal school activities. Paragraph 21 of the facts 

stipulated to by all parties states in pertinent part: 

"21. Exercising the right to vote does not require 

conversation, except for purposes of confirming 

registration and signing the precinct register. 

The solicitation of petition signatures requires 

conversation between solicitors and solicitees, to 

explain the proposal, request signatures, and 

discuss the issues. The process of collecting 

signatures includes not only the request to sign, 

but also the attempt to persuade to sign. -- In fact, 

arguments between voters - and solicitors have 

occurred, sometimes precipated 2 voters - and 

sometimes precipitated solicitors. Noise -- in the 

hallways distracts - the students, impairs their 

and 

concentration. lowers their level of functionina. d. 

classroom disciplineand teachin 

effectiveness. Under present ~chx Distric: 

policy, the noise and arguments occur outside 

school buildings. If solicitation were permitted 

inside school buildings, any such arguments would 

occur inside." (Emphasis added) 

These stipulated facts establish something significantly 

greater than an "undifferentiated fear of disruption." In 

view of these stipulated and agreed facts, it is reasonable 

to conclude that the school district properly could apply its 

policies to those periods of time when classes are in session 

and students would be adversely affected. I would therefore 
approve such a policy which is properly limited in time and 

place in order to protect undisrupted school functioning. 

Such a limited or restricted policy would clearly meet the 

test of Grayned, in which the United States Supreme Court 

approved an anti-noise ordinance directed at the "making of 

any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the 

peace or good order of such school session or class thereof 

. . . " Sufficient facts have been established in this case 

to warrant a policy of the type adopted by the school board. 

Simply stated, the present policy is too broad. 

My purpose is to emphasize that a policy of this type 

may be adopted if it is properly limited in the manner 

described in the majority opinion. 

Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell: 

I concur in the foregoing separate opinion of Mr. 

Justice Fred J. Weber.