1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

TYLER DIVISION

JAY WILLIAMS §

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23cv224

MARY WRIGHT §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The PlaintiffJay Williams, an inmate of the Henderson County Jail proceeding pro se, filed 

this civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 complaining of alleged violations of his 

constitutional rights. The lawsuit was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) and (3) and the Amended Order for the Adoption of Local Rules 

for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. The sole named Defendant isan 

individual named Mary Wright, whom Plaintiff does not identify in his complaint; public records 

show that she is the county clerk for Henderson County.

On May 3, 2023, Plaintiff was ordered to file an amended complaint setting out a short and 

plain statement of his claim, including a concise statement of the claims which Plaintiff wishes to 

raise, the facts giving rise to these claims, identification of the individual or individuals whom 

Plaintiff wishesto sue, and a statement showing how each named Defendant isinvolved in the facts 

forming the basis of the claim. By separate order that same date, Plaintiff was directed to pay the 

statutory $402.00 filing fee or to properly seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis. A standard in 

forma pauperis application form was furnished to him along with the order.

To date, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint. In response to the order directing 

payment of the filing fee or obtaining leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff submitted a 

handwritten document labeled “Coupon.” The documentreads “Pay to U.S.Court Eastern, Amount

Case 6:23-cv-00224-JDK-KNM Document 5 Filed 06/13/23 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 10
2

$402.00, Four Hundred Two Dollars and 0/100, for filing fee. Title 18 U.S.C. Section 8, Title 18

U.S.C. Section 20(7)(10).”

Plaintiff’s “coupon” has no monetary value and is of no legal effect. See generally 

Turnbough v. Thaler, civil action no. 6:11cv336, 2011 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 115666, 2011 WL4592379 

(E.D.Tex., August 13, 2011), Report adopted at 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112654, 2011 WL 4592361 

(E.D.Tex., September 30, 2011) (plaintiff’s handwritten “affidavit for commercial discharge” was 

“an item of his own creation,” having no legal meaning or effect, and thus could not satisfy his 

obligation to pay the statutory filing fee).

Of the statutes Plaintiff cites, 18 U.S.C. §8 defines the term “obligations of other security 

of the United States” as “all bonds, certificates of indebtedness, national bank currency, Federal 

Reserve notes, Federal Reserve bank notes, coupons, United States notes, Treasury notes, gold 

certificates, silver certificates, fractional notes, certificates of deposit, bills, checks, or drafts for 

money, drawn by or upon authorized officers of the United States, stamps and other representatives 

of value, of whatever denomination, issued under any Act of Congress, and canceled United States 

stamps.” Plaintiff’s hand-written “coupon” does not fall into any of these categories.

18 U.S.C. §20(7) saysthat a Federal Reserve bank or a member bank of the Federal Reserve 

system is a “financial institution,” and §20(10) says that a mortgage lending business (as described 

in Section 27 of this title) or any person or entity that makes in whole or in part a federally related 

mortgage loan as defined in Section 3 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 is a 

“financial institution.” Plaintiff does not show, nor does it appear, that either of these sections are 

applicable to his hand-written “coupon.”

Because Plaintiff has not complied with the Court’s orders to amend his complaint or to pay 

the filing fee or properly seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis, his lawsuit may be dismissed for 

failure to prosecute or to obey an order of the Court. However, his case suffers from a more 

fundamental flaw.

Case 6:23-cv-00224-JDK-KNM Document 5 Filed 06/13/23 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 11
3

As noted above, the sole named Defendant is Mary Wright, whom public records identify 

asthe county clerk of Henderson County, Texas. Plaintiff’sstatement of claim reads, in its entirety, 

as follows:

Jay Williams paid house loan offin full. Tracking number on laptop. Loan company 

had a lawyer send notices that were not signed. Jay Williams sent documentation to 

County Attorney Clint Davis and Sheriff Hillhouse via email. See Lorraine v. 

Markel.1

After Jay Williams was kidnapped at gunpoint without a warrant by sheriff’s 

deputies, Jay Williams’ property wentup for sale. Jay Williams’ wife and disabled 

son with autism are homeless. Jordan Williams lost his job as a result. Amy does 

not work. Jay Williams is indigent.

Plaintiff goes on to list “points of authority” including the Bible, the U.S. Constitution, the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Texas Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, the 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Texas Rules of Evidence 406 and 602, the Texas Disciplinary 

Rules of Professional Conduct, and the RulesforJudges. He also refersto Title 18 of the U.S. Code, 

the Texas Constitution, the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act, the Hobbs Act, and “street gang.”

28 U.S.C. §1915Arequiresthat assoon as practicable, district courtsmustreviewcomplaints 

wherein prisoners seek redress from governmental entities or their employees and identify 

cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous, 

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 

defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted where it does not allege 

sufficient facts that, taken as true, state a claim that is plausible on its face and thus does not raise 

a right to relief above the speculative level. Montoya v. FedEx Ground Packaging System Inc., 614 

F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2010), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 

1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim has factual plausibility when the pleaded factual content

1Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D.Md. 2007) concerns the 

admissibility of electronically stored or transmitted information.

Case 6:23-cv-00224-JDK-KNM Document 5 Filed 06/13/23 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 12
4

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged. Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2010); Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). This plausibility standard is not akin to a 

probability requirement, but asksfor more than a possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but the claim must contain more than “an 

unadorned,the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-meaccusation.”Iqbal,556U.S.at677-78.Apleading 

offering “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation ofthe elements of a cause of action” will 

not suffice, nor does a complaint which provides only naked assertions that are devoid of further 

factual enhancement. Id. at 678.

A complaint may be dismissed if a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his] claims across the line from 

conceivable to plausible,” if the complaint pleads facts merely consistent with or creating a 

suspicion of the defendant’s liability, or if a complaint lacks a factual allegation regarding any 

required element necessary to obtain relief. Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 

2006). Pro se plaintiffs are held to a more lenient standard than are lawyers when analyzing a 

complaint, but pro se plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations which raise the right to relief 

above the speculative level. Chhim v. University of Texas at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 

2016). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asksfor more than 

a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Although all well-pleaded facts are taken as true, the district court need not accept as true 

conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, orlegal conclusions. Gentilello v.Rege, 627 

F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010), citing Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005). 

Dismissal is proper if a complaint lacks a factual allegation regarding any required element 

necessary to obtain relief. Rios, 444 F.3d at 421.

Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any allegations at all concerning MaryWright, the sole 

named Defendant in the case. He offers nothing to show, or to allow the Court to infer, that Wright

Case 6:23-cv-00224-JDK-KNM Document 5 Filed 06/13/23 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: 13
5

is responsible for any of the alleged misconduct. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted, and his lawsuit should be dismissed on this basis as well.

RECOMMENDATION

Itis accordingly recommended thatthe above-styled civilrightslawsuit be dismissedwithout 

prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, alternatively, for failure 

to prosecute or to obey an order of the Court.

A copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendationsshall be served on all partiesin 

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and 

recommendationsmustfile specificwritten objectionswithin 14 days after being served with a copy.

In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation 

to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate 

Judge’s proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is 

found. An objection which merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

Magistrate Judge is not specific, and the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or 

general objections. See Battle v. United States Parole Commission, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 

1987).

Failure to file specific written objections will bar the objecting party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which are accepted and adopted by 

the district court except upon grounds of plain error. Duarte v. City of Lewisville, 858 F.3d 348, 352 

(5th Cir. 2017).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 13th day of June, 2023.

Case 6:23-cv-00224-JDK-KNM Document 5 Filed 06/13/23 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: 14