IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

BEAUMONT DIVISION

EDWARD LEE GONZALES and MICHELE 

RENEE GONZALES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LARISSA M. HILE, et al.,

Defendants.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-227-MJT-CLS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON 

ORANGE COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DIMISS (Doc. #10.)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules of Court for the Assignment of Duties to 

United States Magistrate Judges, the district court referred this proceeding to the undersigned 

magistrate judge to conduct all pretrial proceedings, to enter findings of fact and recommend 

disposition on case-dispositive matters, and to determine non-dispositive matters. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); E.D. TEX. LOC. R. CV-72. Pending before the court is Defendants Orange County 

Sherrif’s Department and Orange County Sherrif Jimmy Mooney’s (collectively, the “County 

Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. #10.) After review, the undersigned recommends 

granting the motion.

I. Plaintiffs’ Claims and Procedural History

Plaintiffs Edward Lee Gonzales and Michele Renee Gonzales, proceeding pro se, filed 

this action on June 12, 2023, against twenty defendants alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 

for violations of Mr. Gonzales’1constitutional rights under the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth,

1 Michele Gonzales is listed as a plaintiff and signed the complaint, but it was unclear until the case management 

conference which legal claims belonged to her.

Case 1:23-cv-00227-MJT-CLS Document 61 Filed 12/06/23 Page 1 of 7 PageID #:

973
2

Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as alleged state law violations under the 

Texas Penal Code. (Doc. #1 at 15.) 

Plaintiffs’ claims arose on June 24, 2022. (Id. at 16.) According to the complaint, at 

around 8:40 pm on that date, Plaintiffs brought their friend Tom Royston, who was bleeding 

uncontrollably, to Exceptional Emergency Center. (Id. at 3, 16.) Defendant Hile, an Exceptional 

Emergency Center employee, believed Mr. Gonzales was interfering with Royston’s treatment. 

(Id. at 16.) Defendant Hile asked Plaintiffs to leave. (Id.) Defendant Seeney, also an 

Exceptional Emergency Center employee, told Plaintiffs she “was instructed to get the Patients 

keys” from Mr. Gonzales. (Id.) Plaintiffs gave Defendant Seeney Royston’s keys and left. (Id.)

Donald Flannery, an unrelated bystander, drove the Plaintiffs to Royston’s home where Plaintiffs 

parked their car. (Id.) Around 10:56 pm, Plaintiffs returned to Exceptional Emergency Center to

pick up Royston. (Id.) There, Mr. Gonzales accused Defendant Seeney of lying about the keys 

and took photos of license plates of cars in the parking lot. (Id.) Defendant Hile called the 

police. (Id.) Mr. Gonzales was detained, questioned, and subsequently arrested by City of 

Orange police. (Id.)

Plaintiffs’ sole reference to either of the County Defendants in their complaint is that 

Plaintiff Edward Gonzales tried to make an appointment with Orange County Sherrif Jimmy L. 

Mooney on August 9, 2022, to discuss the above incident, but his request was never accepted. 

(Id. at 17.) From this interaction, Plaintiff Edward Gonzales alleges the County Defendants 

violated his constitutional rights under the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 

(Id. at 15.) 

County Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on July 11, 2023. (Doc. #10.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not assert County Defendants violated any constitutional 

rights, that Plaintiffs’ official capacity against Defendant Mooney should be dismissed as 

Case 1:23-cv-00227-MJT-CLS Document 61 Filed 12/06/23 Page 2 of 7 PageID #:

974
3

duplicative of the claims against the county, and alternatively that Plaintiffs have not overcome 

Defendant Mooney’s entitlement to qualified immunity. (Id. at 4-5.) Accordingly, County 

Defendants ask this court to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims against them under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

At the Rule 16 case management conference on September 12, 2023, it became apparent 

that not all motions were properly served to Plaintiffs, who are proceeding pro se and do not 

have access to electronic filings under the local rules of this court. (Doc. #34.) The undersigned 

thus granted Plaintiffs leave to file a response to County Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Id.) 

Also at the hearing, Plaintiffs admitted they had no legal support for their First Amendment 

claim against County Defendants and Mrs. Gonzales confirmed her only claims were against 

Defendants McDonald and Grantham.

2

 (Id.) Plaintiff Edward Gonzales (hereinafter “Plaintiff”)

filed his response on to the instant motion on September 19, 2023. (Doc. #39.) Plaintiff

reiterated the events of June 24, 2022, and again states the County Defendants violated his 

constitutional rights. Plaintiff did not directly address County Defendants’ arguments for 

dismissal. This motion is now ripe for review.

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, the complaint must contain sufficient facts, which accepted as true, “state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To be plausible, the complaint’s “[f]actual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Great Lakes 

Dredge & Dock Co. LLC v. Louisiana, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 

2 To date, Officer Grantham has not been served. Mrs. Gonzalez only live claims, therefore, are against Officer 

McDonald. Neither Officer Grantham nor Officer McDonald worked for the county at the relevant time. 

Case 1:23-cv-00227-MJT-CLS Document 61 Filed 12/06/23 Page 3 of 7 PageID #:

975
4

U.S. at 555). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in tandem with Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see 

also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. To decide whether the complaint 

states a valid claim for relief, the court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and construes the 

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Great Lakes Dredge, 624 F.3d at 210. 

However, the court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual 

inferences, or legal conclusions.” Id. (quoting Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th 

Cir. 2007)). “While legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they must be 

supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The inquiry focuses on the allegations 

in the pleadings and not on whether the plaintiff has sufficient evidence to succeed on the merits. 

Ackerson v. Bean Dredging, LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 209 (5th Cir. 2009).

Proceeding pro se, Plaintiffs’ pleadings are necessarily held to “less stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” and are liberally construed by the court. See Haines 

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Perez v. United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194-95 (5th Cir. 

2002). 

III. Discussion and Analysis

A. Claims Against Defendant Orange County

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims against the Orange County Sheriff’s

Department, (doc. #1 at 10.), and County Defendants’ motion to dismiss is signed on behalf of 

“Orange County Sheriff’s Department and Jimmy Mooney.” (Doc. #10 at 6.) A county 

department, however, is not a jural entity capable of being sued. See generally Jackson v. 

Case 1:23-cv-00227-MJT-CLS Document 61 Filed 12/06/23 Page 4 of 7 PageID #:

976
5

Tarrant Cnty. Corr. Ctr., No. 4:21-CV-187-O, 2021 WL 4805083, at *4 n. 6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 

2021), R&R adopted, No. 4:21-CV-00187-O, 2021 WL 4803800 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2021). 

Instead, a county is “the proper defendant” when its departments’ actions lead to legal 

controversy. Klimple v. Gillespie Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. A-05-CA-709-SS, 2006 WL 

8432753, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2006). 

After a liberal reading of pro se Plaintiff’s complaint, the undersigned construes 

Plaintiff’s claims against Orange County Sheriff’ Department as claims against Orange County. 

The undersigned notes that Defendants’ instant motion interchangeably refers to claims against 

“Orange County Sherrif’s Department” and “claims against the County,” and is signed by an 

Assistant County Attorney. (Id. at 2, 3, 10.) Additionally, County Defendants correctly note that 

any claims against Defendant Mooney in his official capacity “represent only another way of 

pleading an action” against the Defendant Orange County. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City 

of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n55 (1978). Accordingly, any of Plaintiffs claims against 

Orange County Sherrif’s Department and against Mooney in his official capacity are understood 

to be claims against Defendant Orange County.

When alleging a §1983 claim against a county, a party must plead “specific policy” and 

“plead facts connecting the offending policy or policies to each alleged constitutional violation.” 

Rojero v. El Paso Cnty., 226 F. Supp. 3d 768, 774 (W.D. Tex. 2016). As Plaintiffs have not 

alleged Defendant Orange County had an unconstitutional policy on June 24, 2022, they fail to 

state a claim for which relief can be granted under §1983. The undersigned, therefore,

recommends dismissing all claims against Defendant Orange County with prejudice.

B. Claims Against Defendant Mooney in his Individual Capacity

As Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the undersigned must liberally construe Plaintiffs 

pleadings. Plaintiff’s only allegation against Defendant Mooney is that he failed to answer 

Case 1:23-cv-00227-MJT-CLS Document 61 Filed 12/06/23 Page 5 of 7 PageID #:

977
6

Plaintiff’s request for a meeting about the June 24, 2022, incident. (Doc. #1 at 17.) At the 

September 12, 2023, conference, Plaintiff Edward Gonzales initially claimed Defendant 

Mooney’s failure to grant a meeting request violated his First Amendment right to petition the 

government. (Doc. #34.) Plaintiff Edward Gonzales, however, admitted he had no legal basis 

for this argument. (Id.) 

After review of the law, the undersigned finds that there is no constitutional right to have

a meeting with a county sheriff. See generally Hick v. Bexar Cnty., 973 F. Supp. 653, 686 (W.D. 

Tex. 1997), aff'd sub nom. Hicks v. Bexar Cnty., 137 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1998) (“While plaintiff 

may possess a constitutional right to petition his elected representatives, he does not possess a 

constitutional right to compel such officials to take specific action to address a matter properly 

before a separate judicial tribunal.”). Assuming arguendo that there is a constitutional right to 

request a meeting with a local official, there is still no constitutional right to receive an answer to

that request. See Logan v. Dallas Cnty., 331 F. Supp. 3d 640, 648 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (noting the 

government does not have “an affirmative duty to make available all possible avenues for 

petitioning the government”). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant 

Mooney under §1983 and the undersigned recommends dismissing these claims with prejudice.

IV. Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends County Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss (doc. #10) should be GRANTED. The undersigned finds that Plaintiff Edward Lee 

Gonzales has failed to state claims for which relief could be granted under §1983 against either 

Defendant Orange County or Defendant Mooney. To the extent Plaintiffs complaint is read to 

include claims by Plaintiff Michele Renee Gonzales, she specifically disavowed any claims 

against the county. Accordingly, all claims against the County Defendants should be 

DISMISSED with prejudice under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

Case 1:23-cv-00227-MJT-CLS Document 61 Filed 12/06/23 Page 6 of 7 PageID #:

978
7

V. Objections

Within fourteen (14) days after service of the magistrate judge’s report, any party must 

serve and file specific written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate 

judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding 

or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the 

place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is 

found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

magistrate judge is not specific.

Failure to file specific, written objections will bar the party from appealing the 

unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted by 

the district court, except upon grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served 

with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United 

Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on 

other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen 

days). 

.

___________________________________

Christine L Stetson

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SIGNED this the 6th day of December, 2023.

Case 1:23-cv-00227-MJT-CLS Document 61 Filed 12/06/23 Page 7 of 7 PageID #:

979