Filed 9/6/24 Vanesyan v. Aperian CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

LARISA VANESYAN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MAXIM APERIAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B331463

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BD541888)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Jeffrey W. Korn, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Cynthia A. de Petris and Cynthia A. de 

Petris for Defendant and Appellant.

Larisa Vanesyan, self-represented litigant, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

I. INTRODUCTION

Maxim Aperian (Maxim) appeals from an order denying his 

request for order (RFO)1 to modify or terminate a permanent 

restraining order against him. We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Permanent Restraining Order

Maxim and petitioner Larisa Vanesyan (Larisa) were 

married until their divorce in 2013. On May 19, 2011, Larisa 

filed a petition for a domestic violence restraining order 

protecting her from Maxim; and, on August 9, 2011, the trial 

court granted the order, which was set to expire in two years. 

Larisa subsequently requested that the restraining order be 

made permanent. (Fam. Code2, § 6345, subd. (a).) On June 27, 

2013, the trial court renewed the restraining order against 

Maxim and ordered it be permanent. (See In re Marriage of L.A. 

& M.A. (B289451, Apr. 15, 2020) [nonpub. opn.].) Among other 

things, the restraining order required that Maxim stay at least 

100 yards away from Larisa’s home, vehicle, job or workplace, 

and their children’s school.

1 “In family law proceedings under the Family Code, the 

term ‘request for order’ (RFO) ‘has the same meaning as the 

terms “motion” or “notice of motion” when used in the Code of 

Civil Procedure.’ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.92(a)(1)(A).)” (In re 

Marriage of DeWolfe (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 906, 908, fn. 3.)

2 Further statutory references are to the Family Code unless 

otherwise stated.
3

B. RFOs to Modify or Terminate Restraining Order

On September 30, 2021, Maxim filed an RFO to modify or 

terminate the restraining order. On January 26, 2022, the trial 

court denied the RFO. Maxim did not appeal from that order.

On March 14, 2023, Maxim filed another RFO to terminate 

or modify the permanent restraining order. In his RFO, Maxim 

claimed that he had never “intentionally or maliciously violated 

the restraining order” but also admitted that he was found in 

violation of the protective order in 2015, and pleaded guilty to a 

misdemeanor. Maxim also claimed that he was “ordered to 

complete all terms of probation, take 52 weeks of anger 

management classes, [and] take parenting classes . . .” 

Notwithstanding his admission of having been ordered to 

complete these requirements, Maxim also claimed that he 

completed the terms of probation “voluntarily.”

In his attached declaration, Maxim claimed that he was 

pulled over and harassed by the police “all because of my 

Restraining Order.” Maxim attached a copy of his Driver’s 

License information in support of his assertion. That report, 

however, does not make reference to the existence of a 

restraining order. Maxim also claimed that the existence of the 

restraining order prevented him from attending his brother’s 

funeral, explaining that when he arrived at the airport to fly to 

Armenia, “some type of alert” was triggered, which caused him to 

be placed in a ”suspended terrorist line.” Because “there were 22 

people ahead of [him,]” he missed his flight.

Maxim also described his feelings about his divorce and 

Larisa. He claimed that he could not “function properly at [his] 

work, due to the pressure and stress, given the process of divorce” 
4

and was therefore laid off and ultimately became homeless. He 

claimed that all of his “financial institutions were seized and 

given to [Larisa].” He explained that he had a new girlfriend and 

believed that “LARISA is . . . purposely trying to make [his] life 

miserable, because [he] moved on.” He stated that when Larisa 

advised the court that she had a “terminal illness,” Maxim sent 

her a photograph of himself lighting a candle for her at a church, 

along with a message that stated he did not “wish [her] a death” 

and instead wished that she “would be happy and healthy.” She 

responded, “Thank you so much! I’m so happy that you finally 

feel happy! Picture was not necessary.” He also declared that he 

had sent Larisa Mother’s Day greetings but that she did not 

respond and “simply ignored [him].”

Finally, Maxim submitted a letter from Dr. Richard Ciasca, 

dated February 27, 2023, who wrote that he had treated Maxim 

since 2015 and “[Maxim] does not pose a threat to anyone 

including the mother of his children.”

Larisa responded to the RFO, asserting among other things 

that there was no material change of circumstances. She 

submitted a declaration in support, which stated that in July 

2014, the superior court issued two criminal restraining orders 

against Maxim, protecting Larisa and the oldest child. And, in

2016, Maxim had been placed on a psychiatric hold after 

reporting to his doctor that he intended to kill Larisa. Larisa also 

reported that during court-ordered visits between Maxim and his 

youngest child in 2019, Maxim was aggressive and hostile 

towards Larisa, the child, and the monitor. Larisa submitted 

visitation reports prepared by the visit monitors, including one 

dated April 16, 2019, in which Maxim told the monitor, “[t]hat 

bitch made all of this, she is the one that doesn’t want me to have 
5

a relationship with [our daughter].” When the monitor requested 

that Maxim not speak about mother, Maxim responded, “I don’t 

care, you could write everything down, I don’t care. I will run her 

to the ground financially, I don’t care if the fuck-en [sic] court 

knows it. She made the soup now she has to stir it and eat it.” 

Larisa also declared that Maxim constantly followed her and 

knew when she and the children were far from home. He falsely 

reported to the police that she was neglecting the children, which 

resulted in investigations by the Department of Protective 

Services, which determined that the claims were unfounded. As 

a result, the police no longer responded to Maxim’s reports. 

Finally, Larisa declared that on several occasions, Maxim 

appeared near Larisa’s work. On those occasions, Larisa did not 

contact the police because she did not wish to have her clients 

involved in her personal matters. Instead, she had her friends 

stay with her in order to ensure her safety.

Maxim replied to Larisa’s response, arguing that he never 

intentionally or maliciously violated the restraining order in the 

past 12 years and that he was no longer a “reasonable threat of 

future harm toward [Larisa].”

On May 11, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on the 

RFO. Both Larisa and Maxim testified. The record does not

include a reporter’s transcript of those proceedings, or a suitable 

substitute, such as an agreed or settlement statement, of the 

hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b).)

3 The court denied 

the RFO.

3 In his notice designating the record on appeal, Maxim 

elected to proceed without a record of the oral proceedings. 

Contrary to Maxim’s assertion, the court’s statement of decision 

is not a suitable substitute for a reporter’s transcript. (See Foust 
6

On July 5, 2023, the trial court issued a statement of 

decision. The court stated that the conduct that initially gave 

rise to the protective order was “severe and extended over time 

and included surveillance of [Larisa]. The abuse in this case was 

a course of conduct, not a single bad incident.” The court further 

found that Larisa’s testimony about her fear of abuse was 

credible and not objectively unreasonable. Maxim timely 

appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

“A domestic violence restraining order is a type of 

injunction, as it is an ‘order requiring a person to refrain from a 

particular act.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 525 [defining an ‘injunction’].) 

. . . Code of Civil Procedure section 533 sets forth the standards 

for a trial court to apply when considering whether to dissolve an 

v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 

186.) Further, we reject Maxim’s request to stay proceedings so 

that he can secure a settled statement. (See Ct. App., Second 

Dist., Local Rules, rule 2(b) [“Appellant should file requests for 

augmentation in one motion within 40 days of the filing of the 

record or the appointment of counsel. . . . Thereafter, motions to 

augment will not be granted except upon a showing of good cause 

for the delay”]; Russi v. Bank of America National Trust & 

Savings Assn. (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 100, 102 [“‘Even where the 

matter sought to be added is proper, or the proposed correction is 

warranted, neither augmentation nor correction is a matter of 

right; they both may be denied for inexcusable neglect in 

preparing the record, for delay in presenting the application, or 

for other reasons’”].)
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injunction. ‘In any action, the court may on notice modify or 

dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a 

showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon 

which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, 

that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining 

order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would 

be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or 

temporary restraining order.’ (Code. Civ. Proc., § 533; see also 

Luckett v. Panos (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 77, 85 [Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 533 ‘articulates three independent bases on which a 

modification [or termination] of an injunction may be 

predicated—(1) change in the facts, (2) change in the law, or 

(3) ends of justice[ ]’].)” (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 

Cal.App.4th 1495, 1503–1504 (Loeffler).)

“[W]here the party protected by a restraining order has 

already made the required showing to obtain a renewal of the 

order, and the restrained party later seeks to terminate the 

restraining order, the burden is on the restrained party to show 

by a preponderance of the evidence that one of the circumstances 

set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 533 is present and 

justifies a termination of the restraining order.” (Loeffler, supra, 

174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504.) “As in any review of an order 

denying a motion to dissolve an injunction, we apply an abuse of 

discretion standard of review.” (Id. at p. 1505.)

B. Analysis

Maxim contends that the trial court’s finding that Larisa 

reasonably feared future abuse by Maxim is not supported by the 

evidence, and was based entirely on her testimony that she was 
8

still “‘afraid’” of Maxim. He also contends that the trial court was 

required to grant the RFO based on a change of circumstances 

because (1) Maxim was not represented by counsel at the hearing 

in 2013, when the permanent restraining order was issued, 

whereas he was represented by counsel for his RFO; (2) he did 

not further violate the protective order; and (3) his psychiatrist 

opined that Maxim did not pose a threat to Larisa. Finally, in 

Maxim’s view, the trial court was required to grant the RFO 

because there was no reasonable risk that acts of domestic 

violence were likely to recur in the future.

Maxim cannot prevail on any of his arguments because he 

has failed to provide an adequate record on appeal. “[T]he 

absence of a court reporter at trial court proceedings and the 

resulting lack of a verbatim record of such proceedings will 

frequently be fatal to a litigant’s ability to have his or her claims 

of trial court error resolved on the merits by an appellate court.

This is so because it is a fundamental principle of appellate 

procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to 

be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on 

the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the 

trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the 

judgment. [Citations.] ‘This is not only a general principle of 

appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine 

of reversible error.’ [Citations.] ‘In the absence of a contrary 

showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial 

court’s action will be made by the appellate court. “[I]f any 

matters could have been presented to the court below which 

would have authorized the order complained of, it will be 

presumed that such matters were presented.”’ [Citation.] ‘“A 

necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate 
9

for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of 

the trial court should be affirmed.”’ [Citation.] ‘Consequently, 

[the appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate record. 

[Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue 

requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ 

[Citation.]” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609, fn. 

omitted.)

Here, we do not have a record of Maxim or Larisa’s 

testimony. The trial court, however, found Larisa’s testimony 

about her ongoing fear of Maxim to be both credible and 

reasonable. We do not disturb this finding on appeal. (In re 

Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1531.) 

Moreover, we have no record of what, if any, other evidence was 

admitted. Accordingly, although Maxim contends that his 

psychiatrist’s letter required the granting of the RFO, we have no 

record of whether the letter was admitted into evidence, excluded 

as hearsay, or, if admitted, whether it was deemed either 

probative or credible by the trial court. We therefore reject each 

of Maxim’s arguments.
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IV. DISPOSITION

The order denying the RFO to modify or terminate the 

permanent restraining order is affirmed. Larisa is awarded costs 

on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM, J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

DAVIS, J.

 Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.