IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

SHUNDRA ANDERSON §

§

v. § Case No. 2:23-cv-00195-RSP

§

DOMINION FINANCIAL SERVICES, 

LLC

§

§

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Dominion Financial Services, LLC’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment on Plaintiff Shundra Anderson’s Claims for discrimination and retaliation in violation 

of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Dkt. No. 40. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the Motion.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). Any evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 

158–59 (1970)). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute of material fact. 

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the 

mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise 

properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine

[dispute] of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48 (emphasis added). The substantive law 

identifies the material facts, and disputes over facts that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not 

defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” 

when the evidence is “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Id.

Case 2:23-cv-00195-RSP Document 63 Filed 12/12/24 Page 1 of 4 PageID #: 1202
2

The moving party must identify the basis for granting summary judgment and evidence 

demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

“If the moving party does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, the party 

‘must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or 

defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element 

to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.’” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T Mobile USA, 

Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00577-JRG, 2018 WL 5809267, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2018) (quoting Nissan 

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff Shundra Anderson brings claims against her former employer for job 

discrimination and retaliation. Defendant moves for summary judgment claiming that Anderson 

has not adduced evidence to support her claims. Dkt. No. 40. Because Anderson has adduced 

sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material facts, the court denies the motion.

a. Discrimination

At the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, Anderson must make a prima facie

case that (1) she belongs to a protected group, (2) she was qualified for her position, (3) she 

suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) a similarly situated employee outside of her 

protected group was treated more favorably. See Watkins v. Tregre, 997 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 

2021). 

Anderson makes a prima facie case of race discrimination. First, Anderson is African 

American and therefore a member of a protected group. Dkt. No. 42 at 10. Second, Anderson was 

qualified for her position. See id. at 10–11. Third, Anderson’s firing is obviously an adverse 

employment action. Fourth, Anderson marshals competent summary judgment evidence, namely 

Case 2:23-cv-00195-RSP Document 63 Filed 12/12/24 Page 2 of 4 PageID #: 1203
3

her deposition, that shows that Lindsey Sheely, a similarly situated white female employee, was 

treated more favorably. Id. at 11; see Dkt. No. 42-1 at 11: 9–20. Sheely was not fired nor 

disciplined for not meeting her quota. Dkt. No. 42 at 11.

Dominion indisputably offers legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for Anderson’s 

termination. See Dkt. No. 40.; Dkt. No. 42 at 13. The burden thus shifts back to Anderson to show 

pretext. See Watkins, 997 F.3d 275 at 282. 

Anderson relies on evidence of disparate treatment to show pretext. See Stennet v. Tupelo 

Pub. Sch. Dist., 619 F. App’x 310, 317 (5th Cir. 2015). Specifically, according to Anderson:

Dominion Financial sabotaged Anderson’s performance by holding her responsible 

for a customer interaction for which she had no control, having been assigned to a 

White peer. Dominion Financial allowed White peer to commit the action with the 

customer for which Anderson was terminated. While Dominion Financial’s HR 

person was provided evidence that Anderson was wrongly accused of contacting 

the customer, she proceeded directly to termination. There was no discipline issued 

to her White peer.

Dkt. No. 42 at 14; Dkt. No. 42-5; Dkt. No. 42-6. Anderson also points to lack of investigation into 

her race discrimination complaint. Dkt. No. 42 at 14–15. Taking Anderson’s evidence as whole 

and in a light most favorable to her, as the Court must at the summary judgment stage, she has met 

her burden of showing substantial evidence of pretext. 

b. Retaliation

Anderson also provides sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her retaliation 

claim. To prove retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) the employee engaged 

in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse employment action against the 

employee; and (3) a causal connection exists between that protected activity and the adverse 

employment action.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. EmCare, Inc., 857 F.3d 678, 683 (5th 

Cir. 2017). First, Anderson engaged in protected activity by complaining and reporting 

Case 2:23-cv-00195-RSP Document 63 Filed 12/12/24 Page 3 of 4 PageID #: 1204
4

discrimination and retaliation to Dominion’s HR department and to the EEOC. Dkt. No. 42 at 11–

12. This is undisputed. Second, Anderson was disciplined and terminated, which are indisputably 

adverse employment actions. Id. at 12. Third, Anderson points to the temporal proximity of her 

discipline and firing to her complaint. There were 30 days between the two events. Id. Further 

Anderson provides an account of the reasons for her termination that differs from Dominion’s 

creating a factual dispute for the jury to resolve. Id. at 12–13; Dkt. No. 42-5. Finally, the same 

pretext analysis applies to this claim as to the discrimination claim

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment.

.

____________________________________

ROY S. PAYNE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2012. SIGNED this 12th day of December, 2024.

Case 2:23-cv-00195-RSP Document 63 Filed 12/12/24 Page 4 of 4 PageID #: 1205