IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

SHUNDRA ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v. 

DOMINION FINANCIAL SERVICES, 

LLC,

Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:23-CV-00195-JRG

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is the Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 

(the “Motion”) filed by Defendant Dominion Financial Services, LLC (“Dominion”). (Dkt. No. 

8.) Plaintiff Shundra Anderson opposes the Motion. (See Dkt. No. 11.) For the following reasons, 

the Court finds that the Motion should be DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

Anderson filed suit against Dominion on April 28, 2023 alleging unlawful discrimination 

and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1; Dkt. No. 10 at 1.) Anderson 

resides in Henderson, Texas. (Dkt. No. 10 at ¶ 6.) Dominion is a Maryland limited liability 

company with its headquarters in Baltimore. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 8 at 4.)

Anderson worked for Dominion from her home in Texas providing services to the 

borrowing customers of Dominion. (Dkt. No. 10 at ¶ 6.) Dominion does not dispute that Anderson 

was a Texas resident working for Dominion from herhome in Texas at all times relevant to the 

case. (See Dkt. No. 11 at 1; Dkt. No. 12.) 

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Anderson’s employment with Dominion ended on September 24, 2021. (Dkt. No. 10 at ¶ 

9.) Anderson alleges that she was wrongly terminated and that her termination was both

discriminatory and retaliatory. (Id. at ¶¶ 11–13.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) requires a court to dismiss a claim if the court 

does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). It is the plaintiff’s 

burden to establish that personal jurisdiction exists, but the plaintiff only needs to present facts to 

make out a prima facie case supporting such jurisdiction. Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 

205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2000). “The Court may determine the jurisdictional issue by receiving 

affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any combination of the recognized 

methods of discovery.” Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985). Additionally, 

conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in favor of the 

plaintiff for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction has 

been made. Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990). The rule is well-established 

that “parties who choose to litigate actively on the merits thereby surrender any jurisdictional 

objections.” PaineWebber Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Private Bank (Switzerland), 260 F.3d 453, 459 

(5th Cir. 2001) (citing General Contracting & Trading Co., LLC v. Interpole, Inc., 940 F.2d 20 

(1st Cir. 1991)).

There are two steps to determine whether a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction 

over a nonresident defendant: (1) the forum state’s long-arm statute must confer personal 

jurisdiction over that defendant; and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with 

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 759 

(5th Cir. 2009). “As the Texas long-arm statute extends as far as constitutional due process allows,” 

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the Court only needs to consider the second step of the inquiry. Id.; Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO 

Gazprom, 481 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 

F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Because the Texas long-arm statute extends to the limits of federal 

due process, the two-step inquiry collapses into one federal due process analysis.”).

The due process analysis focuses on the number and nature of a defendant’s contacts with 

the forum to determine if the defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” such “that the 

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (1945). These contacts may give rise to specific 

or general jurisdiction. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138 (2014).

General jurisdiction applies to a defendant in “instances in which the continuous corporate 

operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on 

causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Goodyear Dunlop 

Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 917 (2011) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318); 

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, n.4 (1984). Thus, general 

jurisdiction applies in “only a limited set of affiliations with a forum [that] will render a defendant 

amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137. The Fifth Circuit has also 

stated that it is “incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place 

of incorporation or principal place of business” of a defendant. Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 

768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014).

Specific jurisdiction is a claim-specific inquiry—meaning that the factual basis for the 

plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s substantial contacts with the forum. 

Asashi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987); Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, 

Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 274 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Is specific personal jurisdiction a claim-specific inquiry? 

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We conclude that it is. A plaintiff bringing multiple claims that arise out of different forum contacts 

of the defendant must establish specific jurisdiction for each claim.”). The Supreme Court has 

recently reiterated that: 

there must be an “affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, 

principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State.” When 

there is no such connection, specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent 

of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State. . . . What is needed . . . is a 

connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (quoting Goodyear, 

564 U.S. at 919) (internal citations in original omitted) (emphasis added); see also Walden v. Fiore, 

571 U.S. 277, 284, 290 (2014) (“For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, 

the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State. . . 

. The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether 

the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”) (emphasis added).

To establish specific jurisdiction over a defendant, the plaintiff must demonstrate: 

“(1) whether the defendant . . . purposely directed its activities toward the forum state or purposely 

availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there; (2) whether the plaintiff’s cause of 

action arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 

F.3d 476, 484 (5th Cir. 2008).

“The ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry is fact intensive and no one element is decisive; rather 

the touchstone is whether the defendant’s conduct shows that it ‘reasonably anticipates being haled 

into court.’” McFadin, 587 F.3d at 759 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, 

Inc., 438 F.3d 469, 470 (5th Cir. 2006)). The plaintiff cannot supply the “only link between the 

defendant and the forum.” Carmona v. Leo Ship Mgmt., 924 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting 

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Walden, 571 U.S. at 285). Instead, the “defendant himself” must make deliberate contact with the 

forum. Id. (citing Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 

462, 475 (1985))).

“If the plaintiff successfully satisfies the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the defendant 

to defeat jurisdiction by showing that its exercise would be unfair or unreasonable.” Seiferth, 472 

F.3d at 271 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 382). To determine whether exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant would be unfair or unreasonable, the Court considers: (1) the 

burden on the nonresident defendant; (2) the forum state’s interests; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in 

securing relief; (4) the interest of the interstate judicial system in the efficient administration of 

justice; and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental social policies. 

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. Once a plaintiff has established sufficient minimum contacts with 

the forum, a defendant must make a “compelling case” that exercise of jurisdiction is unfair and 

unreasonable. Dontos v. Vendomation NZ, Ltd., 582 F. App’x 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 1999)). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) also permits a Court to exercise personal 

jurisdiction over a defendant; however, “the plaintiff’s claim must arise under federal law, the 

defendant must not be subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction, and 

exercise of jurisdiction must comport with due process.” Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 

F.3d 1403, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Rule 4(k)(2) applies if “‘the defendant contends that he cannot 

be sued in the forum state and refuses to identify any other where suit is possible[.]’” Id. at 1415 

(citation omitted). Thus, the Court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant pursuant 

to Rule 4(k)(2) if the defendant identifies another state in which the case could have been brought. 

Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

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IV. ANALYSIS

Dominion argues that it is not subject to general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction in 

Texas. (Dkt. No. 8 at 3–11.) Dominion argues that it is not subject to general jurisdiction because 

it is Maryland limited liability company with its headquarters in Baltimore. (Id. at 4.) Dominion 

further argues that there are no facts for the Court find that it is “at home” in Texas. (Id. at 4–5.) 

Regarding specific jurisdiction, Dominion argues that it did not have any minimum contacts with 

the state of Texas at the time the suit was filed, pointing out all the things it has not done in Texas. 

(Id. at 6–8.) Dominion also argues that its only contacts with Texas are “fortuitous” as they were 

dependent on Anderson’s choices, not Dominion’s. (Id. at 8–9 (citing Embry v. Hibbard Inshore,

L.L.C., 803 F. App’x 746, 748 (5th Cir. 2020); Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379 

F.3d 327, 344 (5th Cir. 2004)).) Dominion then argues that the suit “does not arise from any contact 

by Dominion with Texas” and that “[r]equiring Dominion to litigate in Texas is unfair and 

unreasonable.” (Id. at 9–11.)

In response, Anderson argues that Dominion is subject to general jurisdiction in Texas “by 

virtue of its election to do business in the State of Texas” and because it is registered to do business 

in Texas. (Dkt. No. 11 at 5–6.) Anderson also argues that Dominion is subject to specific 

jurisdiction in Texas because “Dominion has purposefully directed its activities at residents of the 

State of Texas by employing Anderson.” (Id. at 7–8 (citing Moreno v. Milk Train, Inc., 182 F. 

Supp. 2d 590 (W.D. Tex. 2002)).) Anderson then argues that it would be fair for Dominion to be 

subject to suit in Texas. (Id. at 8–9.)

Dominion argues in reply that it is not subject to general jurisdiction in Texas because it is 

not incorporated in Texas and does not have its principal place of business in Texas, and because 

this is not an “exceptional case” such that it would be appropriate to exercise general jurisdiction 

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over Dominion. (Dkt. No. 12 at 3.) Dominion also urges that there is no specific jurisdiction, 

primarily relying on Embry. (Id. at 3–5 (citing Embry, 803 F. App’x 746).)

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Dominion is not subject to general jurisdiction 

in Texas. Dominion’s election to do business in Texas (evidenced by its registering to do business 

in Texas) and the business it conducts in Texas are indeed contacts with the state, but they are not 

contacts that are so “‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [Dominion] at home in” Texas.

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. 

However, the Court reaches a different conclusion with regard to specific jurisdiction—

Dominion is subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas. 

First, Dominion has purposely directed its activities toward Texas. By Dominion’s own 

admission, Dominion employs six individuals who work remotely from Texas. (Dkt. No. 12 at 3.) 

Dominion conducts lending activities in Texas through these employees. (Id.) Dominion has also 

indisputably employed Anderson, and she worked from home in the Eastern District of Texas. (See 

id. at 3–6.) 

Dominion relies on Embry to argue that it should not be subject to personal jurisdiction, 

but Embry is distinguishable. 803 Fed. App’x 746. In Embry plaintiff Embry moved to Louisiana 

while he was employed by defendant Hibbard. Id. at 747–48. While in Louisiana, Embry and 

Hibbard had a wage dispute, so Embry filed suit. Id. at 748. The district court dismissed for lack 

of personal jurisdiction and Embry appealed. Id. On appeal, “Embry’s arguments focus[ed] on his 

own connections with Louisiana. Among the connections were his residence in that state, his 

attempts to communicate with Louisiana businesses in his capacity as a Hibbard employee, his 

paycheck stub had a Louisiana address on it, and he worked from Louisiana.” Id. In affirming the 

district court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that “[t]he Supreme Court has held that a 

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‘plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s 

conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for its 

jurisdiction over him.’” Id. at 749 (citing Walden, 574 U.S. at 285). Embry is distinguishable for 

the simple reason that Dominion has admitted that it has made contacts with Texas other than 

through plaintiff Anderson. Dominion has benefitted from these contacts. Accordingly, the Court 

finds that Dominion has directed its activities toward Texas.

Second, the Court finds that the case arises out of Dominion’s contacts with Texas. 

Dominion has customers in Texas. (Dkt. No. 12 at 3.) Anderson served some of those customers 

while she was in Dominion’s employ. (See id. at 4 (Dominion disputing scope of Anderson’s 

required duties, but not disputing that she served Dominion’s customers in Texas).) Dominion 

knew and accepted that Anderson was working from home in Texas while she was in Dominion’s 

employ. (See Dkt. No. 10 at ¶ 6.) Accordingly, Anderson’s termination arises out of Dominion’s 

contacts with Texas—had Dominion never made these contacts with Texas, Anderson’s 

employment with Dominion would have never ended (or started). In other words, there is a causal 

but-for relationship between Dominion’s contacts with Texas and the end of Anderson’s 

employment with Dominion. Moreover, employment claims form the basis for this action.

Finally, the Court finds that exercising personal jurisdiction over Dominion is fair and 

reasonable. Under the first Burger King factor, there exists a burden borne by Dominion to litigate 

in Texas because it is primarily based out of Maryland. However, under the second Burger King 

factor, Texas has an interest in ensuring that her residents are not discriminated against on the basis 

of their race and in ensuring that her residents are not retaliated against. The third factor also 

weighs in favor of exercising personal jurisdiction over Dominion because plaintiff has an interest 

in securing relief in her home state of Texas. As to the fourth and fifth factors, the Court finds that 

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there is no interest of the interstate judicial system or shared interest of the several states that 

weighs against exercising personal jurisdiction over Dominion in Texas. Accordingly, Dominion 

has not made a “compelling case” that exercise of jurisdiction is unfair and unreasonable. See 

Dontos, 582 F. App’x at 343 (quoting Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 195 F.3d at 215).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Motion (Dkt. No. 8) should be and 

hereby is DENIED.

.

____________________________________

RODNEY GILSTRAP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE So ORDERED and SIGNED this 5th day of September, 2023.

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