31856 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 101 / Wednesday, May 25, 2022 / Notices 

1On August 13, 2018, the President signed into 

law the John S. McCain National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which 

includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 

U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While Section 1766 of 

ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export 

Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2401 et seq. 

(‘‘EAA’’), (except for three sections which are 

inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, 

in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, 

and other forms of administrative action that were 

made or issued under the EAA, including as 

continued in effect pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 

et seq. (‘‘IEEPA’’), and were in effect as of ECRA’s 

date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue 

in effect according to their terms until modified, 

superseded, set aside, or revoked through action 

undertaken pursuant to the authority provided 

under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA 

authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 

50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5). 

Census and will present them to the GU. 

The cost of a Special Census varies 

depending on the GU’s housing and 

population counts and whether a 

government requests a full or partial 

Special Census. The cost estimate 

outlines the anticipated costs to the 

sponsoring government for staffing, 

materials, data processing and 

tabulation. Included with the cost 

estimate is a Memorandum of 

Agreement (MOA). Once a signed MOA 

and initial payment are transmitted to 

the Census Bureau, the Special Census 

process will begin. When data 

collection, processing, disclosure 

avoidance, and tabulation have been 

completed, the GU will receive official 

census statistics on the population and 

housing unit counts for the entire 

jurisdiction or parts of the jurisdiction, 

as defined in the MOA at the beginning 

of the Special Census process. All 

Special Census statistics will be subject 

to disclosure avoidance using 

differential privacy methods, consistent 

with the processes and methods used 

for 2020 Census data products, prior to 

their release to the public. Requests for 

cost estimates from GUs will be 

accepted through May 2027. 

II. Method of Collection 

The Census Bureau plans to use an 

internet self-response instrument for 

respondents to respond online to the 

Special Census questionnaire. 

Respondents will have a number of 

weeks to respond to the Special Census 

questionnaire using the internet selfresponse instrument. At the start of the 

Special Census, the Census Bureau will 

send an invitation letter to housing 

units in the GU’s Special Census area 

with information needed to respond 

online. Reminder letters and postcards 

will be sent to each housing unit to 

encourage self-response and provide 

information needed to do so. 

Approximately two weeks after the 

end of the Special Census self-response 

period, the Census Bureau will conduct 

follow-up operations in the field to 

enumerate housing units that did not 

respond using the internet self-response 

instrument. Housing units that do not 

respond online will be contacted by a 

field representative who will conduct a 

Special Census interview using a paper 

questionnaire. The field operations will 

also enumerate group quarters and 

transitory locations in the GU’s Special 

Census area. The Census Bureau plans 

to use a paper questionnaire to conduct 

Special Census interviews at transitory 

locations and group quarters. During the 

field operations, Special Census field 

representatives will also update the 

addresses of living quarters as needed, 

based on their observation of housing 

units, transitory locations, and group 

quarters. 

Several quality assurance measures 

will be implemented for each Special 

Census to ensure that high quality data 

are gathered using the most efficient and 

cost-effective procedures. These include 

edits incorporated into the online 

questionnaire and the ability to validate 

potentially erroneous responses in the 

field. Independent quality assurance 

checks and reinterview of a sample of 

field questionnaires will also be 

implemented to ensure the quality of 

the data collected in the field. 

As the Census Bureau develops 

automated tools and methods for data 

collection and listing for the 2030 

Decennial Census, the Special Census 

Program may incorporate this additional 

automation throughout the decade. 

Updates to the operational design will 

be implemented no earlier than 2026. 

The incorporation of additional 

automation may increase data collection 

quality and efficiency, resulting in a 

cost savings for GUs, but the extent of 

those cost savings is currently 

unknown. 

III. Data 

OMB Control Number: 0607–0368. 

Form Number(s): SC–Q, SC–CQ, SC– 

Q–TL, SC–CQ–TL, SC–Q–GE, SC–RQ, 

SC–900 RCE. 

Type of Review: Regular submission, 

Request for a Reinstatement, with 

Change, of a Previously Approved 

Collection. 

Affected Public: Individuals or 

households; State, Local, or Tribal 

government. 

Estimated Number of Respondents: 

340,000. 

Estimated Time per Response: 

approximately 10 minutes. 

Estimated Total Annual Burden 

Hours: 56,667. 

Estimated Total Annual Cost to 

Public: $0. (This is not the cost of 

respondents’ time, but the indirect costs 

respondents may incur for such things 

as purchases of specialized software or 

hardware needed to report, or 

expenditures for accounting or records 

maintenance services required 

specifically by the collection.) 

Respondent’s Obligation: Voluntary. 

Legal Authority: Title 13 U.S.C. 

Section 196. 

IV. Request for Comments 

We are soliciting public comments to 

permit the Department/Bureau to: (a) 

Evaluate whether the proposed 

information collection is necessary for 

the proper functions of the Department, 

including whether the information will 

have practical utility; (b) Evaluate the 

accuracy of our estimate of the time and 

cost burden for this proposed collection, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; (c) 

Evaluate ways to enhance the quality, 

utility, and clarity of the information to 

be collected; and (d) Minimize the 

reporting burden on those who are to 

respond, including the use of automated 

collection techniques or other forms of 

information technology. 

Comments that you submit in 

response to this notice are a matter of 

public record. We will include, or 

summarize, each comment in our 

request to OMB to approve this ICR. 

Before including your address, phone 

number, email address, or other 

personal identifying information in your 

comment, you should be aware that 

your entire comment—including your 

personal identifying information—may 

be made publicly available at any time. 

While you may ask us in your comment 

to withhold your personal identifying 

information from public review, we 

cannot guarantee that we will be able to 

do so. 

Sheleen Dumas, 

Department PRA Clearance Officer, Office of 

the Chief Information Officer, Commerce 

Department. 

[FR Doc. 2022–11218 Filed 5–24–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–07–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Rossiya Airlines, Pilotov St 18–4, St. 

Petersburg, Russia, 196210; Order 

Temporarily Denying Export Privileges 

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the 

Export Administration Regulations, 15 

CFR parts 730–774 (2021) (‘‘EAR’’ or 

‘‘the Regulations’’),1 the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’), U.S. 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 101 / Wednesday, May 25, 2022 / Notices 31857 

2Aeroflot is the subject of a Temporary Denial 

Order issued on April 8, 2022. See 87 FR 21611 

(April 12, 2022). 3 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). Additionally, BIS 

published a final rule effective April 8, 2022, which 

imposed licensing requirements on items controlled 

on the Commerce Control List (‘‘CCL’’) under 

Categories 0–2 that are destined for Russia or 

Belarus. Accordingly, now all CCL items require 

export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) licenses 

if destined for or within Russia or Belarus. 87 FR 

22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). 

4 87 FR 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022). 

5Section 736.2(b)(10) of the EAR provides: 

General Prohibition Ten—Proceeding with 

transactions with knowledge that a violation has 

occurred or is about to occur (Knowledge Violation 

to Occur). You may not sell, transfer, export, 

reexport, finance, order, buy, remove, conceal, 

store, use, loan, dispose of, transport, forward, or 

otherwise service, in whole or in part, any item 

subject to the EAR and exported or to be exported 

with knowledge that a violation of the Export 

Administration Regulations, the Export 

Administration Act or any order, license, License 

Exception, or other authorization issued thereunder 

has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to 

occur in connection with the item. Nor may you 

rely upon any license or License Exception after 

notice to you of the suspension or revocation of that 

license or exception. There are no License 

Exceptions to this General Prohibition Ten in part 

740 of the EAR. (emphasis in original). 

Department of Commerce, through its 

Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’), 

has requested the issuance of an Order 

temporarily denying, for a period of 180 

days, the export privileges under the 

Regulations of Russian airline Rossiya 

Airlines (‘‘Rossiya’’). OEE’s request and 

related information indicates that 

Rossiya is headquartered in St. 

Petersburg, Russia, and Aeroflot Russian 

Airlines JSC, a/k/a PJSC Aeroflot 

(‘‘Aeroflot’’) is Rossiya’s majority 

shareholder.2 The Russian Federal 

Government is the majority owner of 

Aeroflot, through its Federal Agency for 

State Property Management. 

I. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may 

issue an order temporarily denying a 

respondent’s export privileges upon a 

showing that the order is necessary in 

the public interest to prevent an 

‘‘imminent violation’’ of the 

Regulations, or any order, license or 

authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR 

766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ‘‘A violation 

may be ‘imminent’ either in time or 

degree of likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 

766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ‘‘either that 

a violation is about to occur, or that the 

general circumstances of the matter 

under investigation or case under 

criminal or administrative charges 

demonstrate a likelihood of future 

violations.’’ Id. As to the likelihood of 

future violations, BIS may show that the 

violation under investigation or charge 

‘‘is significant, deliberate, covert and/or 

likely to occur again, rather than 

technical or negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of 

information establishing the precise 

time a violation may occur does not 

preclude a finding that a violation is 

imminent, so long as there is sufficient 

reason to believe the likelihood of a 

violation.’’ Id. 

II. OEE’s Request for a Temporary 

Denial Order (‘‘TDO’’) 

The U.S. Commerce Department, 

through BIS, responded to the Russian 

Federation’s (‘‘Russia’s’’) further 

invasion of Ukraine by implementing a 

sweeping series of stringent export 

controls that severely restrict Russia’s 

access to technologies and other items 

that it needs to sustain its aggressive 

military capabilities. These controls 

primarily target Russia’s defense, 

aerospace, and maritime sectors and are 

intended to cut off Russia’s access to 

vital technological inputs, atrophy key 

sectors of its industrial base, and 

undercut Russia’s strategic ambitions to 

exert influence on the world stage. 

Effective February 24, 2022, BIS 

imposed expansive controls on aviationrelated (e.g., Commerce Control List 

Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia, 

including a license requirement for the 

export, reexport or transfer (in-country) 

to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts 

specified in Export Control 

Classification Number (ECCN) 9A991 

(Section 746.8(a)(1) of the EAR).3 BIS 

will review any export or reexport 

license applications for such items 

under a policy of denial. See Section 

746.8(b). Effective March 2, 2022, BIS 

excluded any aircraft registered in, 

owned, or controlled by, or under 

charter or lease by Russia or a national 

of Russia from being eligible for license 

exception Aircraft, Vessels, and 

Spacecraft (AVS) (Section 740.15 of the 

EAR).4 Accordingly, any U.S.-origin 

aircraft or foreign aircraft that includes 

more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin 

content, and that is registered in, 

owned, or controlled by, or under 

charter or lease by Russia or a national 

of Russia, is subject to a license 

requirement before it can travel to 

Russia. 

OEE’s request is based upon facts 

indicating that Rossiya engaged in 

recent conduct prohibited by the 

Regulations by operating aircraft subject 

to the EAR and classified under ECCN 

9A991 on flights into Russia after March 

2, 2022, without the required BIS 

authorization. 

Specifically, OEE’s investigation, 

including publicly available flight 

tracking information, indicates that after 

March 2, 2022, Rossiya operated 

multiple U.S.-origin aircraft subject to 

the EAR, including, but not limited to, 

those identified below, on flights into 

and out of Moscow, Russia and St. 

Petersburg, Russia from/to Sharjah, 

United Arab Emirates; Tel Aviv, Israel; 

and Dubai, United Arab Emirates. 

Pursuant to Section 746.8 of the EAR, 

all of these flights would have required 

export or reexport licenses from BIS. 

Rossiya flights would not be eligible to 

use license exception AVS. No BIS 

authorizations were either sought or 

obtained by Rossiya for these exports or 

reexports to Russia. The information 

about those flights includes the 

following: 

Tail No. Serial No. Aircraft type Departure/arrival cities Dates 

VQ–BVU ..................................... 41202 737–8LJ (B738) Sharjah, AE/Moscow, RU .................................... March 7, 2022. 

VP–BUS ...................................... 44435 737–8MC (B738) Tel Aviv, IL/St. Petersburg, RU ............................ March 3, 2022. 

VP–BUS ...................................... 44435 737–8MC (B738) Dubai, AE/St. Petersburg, RU ............................. March 4, 2022. 

VP–BUS ...................................... 44435 737–8MC (B738) Dubai, AE/St. Petersburg, RU ............................. March 5, 2022. 

VP–BUS ...................................... 44435 737–8MC (B738) Dubai, AE/St. Petersburg, RU ............................. March 6, 2022. 

VQ–BWJ ..................................... 41212 737–8LJ (B738) Sharm el-Sheikh, EG/St. Petersburg, RU ............ March 6, 2022. 

EI–XLH ........................................ 27650 747–446 (B744) Hurghada, EG/Moscow, RU ................................. March 8, 2022. 

Based on this information, there are 

heightened concerns of future violations 

of the EAR, given that any subsequent 

actions taken with regard to any of the 

listed aircraft, or other Rossiya aircraft 

illegally exported or reexported to 

Russia after March 2, 2022, may violate 

the EAR. Such actions include, but are 

not limited to, refueling, maintenance, 

repair, or the provision of spare parts or 

services. See General Prohibition 10 of 

the EAR at 15 CFR 736.2(b)(10).5 Even 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
31858 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 101 / Wednesday, May 25, 2022 / Notices 

6https://www.rossiya-airlines.com/en/about/ 

news/rossiya-completes-the-process-of-transferringaircraft-to-russian-jurisdiction/. 7The aircraft was previously registered in Ireland 

with tail number EI–XLC. 

Rossiya’s continued use of such U.S.- 

origin aircraft only on domestic routes 

within Russia runs afoul of General 

Prohibition 10, which (among other 

restrictions) prohibits the continued use 

of an item that was known to have been 

exported or reexported in violation of 

the EAR. For example, publicly 

available flight tracking data shows that, 

between April 14 and April 15, 2022, 

aircraft VQ–BVU (SN: 41202), VP–BUS 

(SN: 44435), and VQ–BWJ (SN: 41212) 

flew on flights into and out of St. 

Petersburg, Russia to/from Kaliningrad, 

Russia, Sochi, Russia, Omsk, Russia, 

Kazan, Russia, and Moscow, Russia, 

respectively. 

Moreover, additional concerns of 

future violations of the Regulations are 

raised by public information indicating 

efforts by Rossiya to have aircraft reregistered in Russia and assigned 

Russian tail numbers, suggesting that 

Rossiya intends not only to maintain 

control over the aircraft but also to 

continue operating them in likely 

violation of the EAR. Specifically, a 

public statement dated March 30, 2022, 

and available as of the signing of this 

order states ‘‘Rossiya completes the 

process of transferring aircraft to 

Russian jurisdiction.’’ 6 Publicly 

available information further shows, for 

example, that in March 2022, Rossiya 

re-registered a U.S.-origin 747 (SN: 

27100) in Russia and assigned the 

aircraft Russian tail number RA–73283.7

Given BIS’s review policy of denial 

under Section 746.8(a) of the 

Regulations for exports and reexports to 

Russia, it is foreseeable that Rossiya will 

attempt to evade the Regulations in 

order to obtain new or additional 

aircraft parts for or service its existing 

aircraft that were exported or reexported 

to Russia in violation of Section 746.8 

of the Regulations. 

III. Findings 

Under the applicable standard set 

forth in Section 766.24 of the 

Regulations and my review of the entire 

record, I find that the evidence 

presented by BIS convincingly 

demonstrates that Rossiya took actions 

in apparent violation of the Regulations 

by exporting or reexporting the aircraft 

cited above, among many others, on 

flights into Russia after March 2, 2022, 

without the required BIS authorization. 

Moreover, the continued operation of 

these aircraft by Rossiya, even on 

domestic routes within Russia, and the 

company’s on-going need to acquire 

replacement parts and components, 

many of which are U.S.-origin, presents 

a high likelihood of imminent violations 

warranting imposition of a TDO. 

Additionally, given that Rossiya and its 

majority shareholder Aeroflot both own 

and operate a number of similar models 

of U.S-origin aircraft requiring the same 

spare parts, I find it necessary to issue 

this Order not only to prevent further 

violations involving Rossiya’s aircraft 

but also to prevent evasion of the 

Aeroflot TDO that I issued on April 8, 

2022. I further find that such apparent 

violations have been ‘‘significant, 

deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur 

again, rather than technical or 

negligent[.]’’ Therefore, issuance of the 

TDO is necessary in the public interest 

to prevent imminent violation of the 

Regulations and to give notice to 

companies and individuals in the 

United States and abroad that they 

should avoid dealing with Rossiya, in 

connection with export and reexport 

transactions involving items subject to 

the Regulations and in connection with 

any other activity subject to the 

Regulations. 

This Order is being issued on an ex 

parte basis without a hearing based 

upon BIS’s showing of an imminent 

violation in accordance with Section 

766.24 and 766.23(b) of the Regulations. 

IV. Order 

It is therefore ordered: 

First, Rossiya Airlines, Pilotov St 18– 

4, St. Petersburg, Russia, 196210, when 

acting for or on their behalf, any 

successors or assigns, agents, or 

employees may not, directly or 

indirectly, participate in any way in any 

transaction involving any commodity, 

software or technology (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’) 

exported or to be exported from the 

United States that is subject to the EAR, 

or in any other activity subject to the 

EAR including, but not limited to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using 

any license (except directly related to 

safety of flight), license exception, or 

export control document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the EAR except directly 

related to safety of flight and authorized 

by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of 

the Regulations, or engaging in any 

other activity subject to the EAR except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or 

C. Benefitting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the EAR, or from any 

other activity subject to the EAR except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. 

Second, that no person may, directly 

or indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export, reexport, or transfer (incountry) to or on behalf of Rossiya any 

item subject to the EAR except directly 

related to safety of flight and authorized 

by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of 

the Regulations; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by 

Rossiya of the ownership, possession, or 

control of any item subject to the EAR 

that has been or will be exported from 

the United States, including financing 

or other support activities related to a 

transaction whereby Rossiya acquires or 

attempts to acquire such ownership, 

possession or control except directly 

related to safety of flight and authorized 

by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of 

the Regulations; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or 

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from Rossiya of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been 

exported from the United States except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; 

D. Obtain from Rossiya in the United 

States any item subject to the EAR with 

knowledge or reason to know that the 

item will be, or is intended to be, 

exported from the United States except 

directly related to safety of flight and 

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 

764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service 

any item subject to the EAR that has 

been or will be exported from the 

United States and which is owned, 

possessed or controlled by Rossiya, or 

service any item, of whatever origin, 

that is owned, possessed or controlled 

by Rossiya if such service involves the 

use of any item subject to the EAR that 

has been or will be exported from the 

United States except directly related to 

safety of flight and authorized by BIS 

pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the 

Regulations. For purposes of this 

paragraph, servicing means installation, 

maintenance, repair, modification, or 

testing. 

Third, that, after notice and 

opportunity for comment as provided in 

section 766.23 of the EAR, any other 

person, firm, corporation, or business 

organization related to Rossiya by 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 101 / Wednesday, May 25, 2022 / Notices 31859 

1See 19 CFR 351.225(o). 

2See Notice of Scope Rulings, 87 FR 7425 

(February 9, 2022). 

ownership, control, position of 

responsibility, affiliation, or other 

connection in the conduct of trade or 

business may also be made subject to 

the provisions of this Order. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, Rossiya 

may, at any time, appeal this Order by 

filing a full written statement in support 

of the appeal with the Office of the 

Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast 

Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South 

Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202– 

4022. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may 

seek renewal of this Order by filing a 

written request not later than 20 days 

before the expiration date. A renewal 

request may be opposed by Rossiya as 

provided in Section 766.24(d), by filing 

a written submission with the Assistant 

Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement, which must be received 

not later than seven days before the 

expiration date of the Order. 

A copy of this Order shall be provided 

to Rossiya and shall be published in the 

Federal Register. 

This Order is effective immediately 

and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 

Dated: May 20, 2022. 

Matthew S. Axelrod, 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2022–11214 Filed 5–24–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

International Trade Administration 

Notice of Scope Rulings 

AGENCY: Enforcement and Compliance, 

International Trade Administration, 

Department of Commerce. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce 

(Commerce) hereby publishes a list of 

scope rulings and anti-circumvention 

determinations made during the period 

January 1, 2022, through March 31, 

2022. We intend to publish future lists 

after the close of the next calendar 

quarter. 

DATES: Applicable May 25, 2022. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Marcia E. Short, AD/CVD Operations, 

Customs Liaison Unit, Enforcement and 

Compliance, International Trade 

Administration, U.S. Department of 

Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue 

NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: 

202–482–1560. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Commerce regulations provide that it 

will publish in the Federal Register a 

list of scope rulings on a quarterly 

basis.1 Our most recent notification of 

scope rulings was published on 

February 9, 2022.2 This current notice 

covers all scope rulings and anticircumvention determinations made by 

Enforcement and Compliance from 

January 1, 2022, through March 31, 

2022. 

Scope Rulings Made January 1, 2022, 

Through March 31, 2022 

Mexico 

A–201–820: Fresh Tomatoes From 

Mexico 

Requestor: Simply Fresh, LLC. Fresh 

Roma tomatoes for processing that are 

preserved by a commercial process 

using chemical additives, used in 

Simply Fresh LLC’s salsa products, are 

outside the scope of the suspension 

agreement and the suspended 

investigation; January 12, 2022. 

People’s Republic of China (China) 

A–570–073 and C–570–074: Common 

Alloy Aluminum Sheet From China 

Requestor: Hammond Power 

Solutions, Inc. Specially processed, 

beveled aluminum foil conductor for 

transformer coil windings is covered by 

the scope of the antidumping and 

countervailing duty orders on common 

alloy aluminum sheet (CAAS) because 

the further processing performed on the 

CAAS in Canada would neither remove 

the CAAS from the scope of the orders 

if it were performed in China, nor 

constitutes ‘‘substantial transformation’’ 

that renders the resulting product a 

product of Canada; January 20, 2022. 

A–570–051 and C–570–052: Certain 

Hardwood Plywood Products From 

China 

Requestor: EAPA Referral from U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection. Twoply panels produced in China are 

covered by the scope of the 

antidumping and countervailing duty 

orders on certain hardwood plywood 

products (hardwood plywood) from 

China. The hardwood plywood that 

Vietnam Finewood Company Limited 

exported to the United States, which 

was assembled in the Socialist Republic 

of Vietnam (Vietnam) using two-ply 

panels imported from China, are 

Chinese country of origin because the 

two-ply panels are not substantially 

transformed by the processing occurring 

in Vietnam; January 21, 2022. 

A–570–929: Small Diameter Graphite 

Electrodes From China 

Requestor: Boart Longyear Company. 

The graphite rods subject to the request 

are within the scope of the antidumping 

duty order on small diameter graphite 

electrodes from China because the 

products have the same physical 

characteristics as unfinished small 

diameter graphite electrodes and can be 

machined into graphite pin joining 

systems, i.e., subject merchandise, after 

importation; February 1, 2022. 

A–570–967 and C–570–968: Aluminum 

Extrusions From China 

Requestor: Discount Ramps.com LLC. 

The aluminum extrusions within 

Discount Ramps.com LLC’s bogie wheel 

kit are covered by the scope of the 

antidumping and countervailing duty 

orders on aluminum extrusions from 

China because they are made from an 

Aluminum Association 6-series alloy, 

and the bogie wheel kit does not meet 

the criteria for the scope exclusion for 

finished goods kits because it does not 

contain, at the time of importation, all 

of the necessary parts to fully assemble 

a final finished good; February 4, 2022. 

Taiwan 

A–583–869: Passenger Vehicle and 

Light Truck Tires From Taiwan 

Requestor: Cheng Shin Rubber Ind. 

Col Ltd. Three models of light-truck 

tires are not covered by the scope of the 

antidumping duty order on passenger 

vehicle and light truck tires from 

Taiwan because they have been 

designed and marketed exclusively for 

use as temporary-use spare tires for light 

trucks and meet the additional technical 

requirements under the fifth exclusion 

of the scope; February 14, 2022. 

Notification to Interested Parties 

Interested parties are invited to 

comment on the completeness of this 

list of completed scope inquiries and 

anti-circumvention determinations 

made during the period January 1, 2022, 

through March 31, 2022. Any comments 

should be submitted to the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for Antidumping 

and Countervailing Duty Operations, 

Enforcement and Compliance, 

International Trade Administration, via 

email to CommerceCLU@trade.gov. 

This notice is published in 

accordance with 19 CFR 351.225(o). 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1