UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4352

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MIGUEL RUMBO-BUSTOS, a/k/a Miguel Bustos,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior

District Judge. (5:06-cr-00076-BR-1)

Submitted: August 13, 2010 Decided: August 25, 2010

Before AGEE, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne 

M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Miguel Rumbo-Bustos appeals from his twenty-four month 

sentence imposed pursuant to the revocation of his supervised 

release. On appeal, Rumbo-Bustos asserts that his sentence was 

procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to 

consider the Guidelines range and statutory sentencing factors 

and failed to provide sufficient explanation for the chosen 

sentence. We vacate Rumbo-Bustos’s sentence and remand for 

further proceedings. 

We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of 

supervised release if it is not plainly unreasonable. See

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). We

first assess the sentence for unreasonableness, “follow[ing] 

generally the procedural and substantive considerations that 

. . . [are] employ[ed] in . . . [the] review of original 

sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to take into 

account the unique nature of supervised release revocation 

sentences.” Id. at 438-39. A sentence imposed upon revocation 

of supervised release is plainly unreasonable if the district 

court fails to provide adequate explanation for the chosen 

sentence, in “contraven[tion of] clear circuit precedent.” 

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 548 (4th Cir. 2010).

A supervised release revocation sentence is 

procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the 
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Chapter Seven advisory policy statement range and the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2006) factors that it is permitted to consider in a 

supervised release revocation case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)

(2006); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. In evaluating the sentencing 

court’s explanation of a selected sentence, the district court 

“must make an individualized assessment based on the facts 

presented.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).

While the individualized assessment of each defendant need not 

be elaborate or lengthy, it must provide a rationale tailored to 

the particular case at hand and be adequate to permit appellate 

review. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 

2009). Thus, a recitation of the § 3553 factors and purposes is 

insufficient. Likewise, a conclusory statement that a specific 

sentence is the proper one does not satisfy the district court’s 

responsibilities. Id. at 328-29. In addition, we cannot 

presume that the district court adopted the arguments of one of 

the parties while imposing sentence; an appellate court may not 

guess at the district court’s rationale. Id.

Here, while the district court stated that it 

considered the Guidelines’ policy statements, the court did not 

discuss, calculate, or adopt the probation officer’s actual 

advisory Guidelines range. Nor did the court state that it 

considered the § 3553 statutory sentencing factors. Moreover, 

the court did not address Rumbo-Bustos’s arguments in favor of a 
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shorter/concurrent sentence, i.e. his mental disability, the 

circumstances surrounding his attempted illegal reentry into 

this country, his lack of ties to Mexico, and his work history. 

Likewise, the district court did not discuss the Government’s 

arguments for a consecutive sentence based upon Rumbo-Bustos’s 

criminal history and repeated deportations. Instead, the court 

stated only that it was “revealing” that Rumbo-Bustos did not 

foresee the consequences of violating his supervised release and 

that, while there is a lot of poverty in Mexico, “the law is the 

law.” Neither of these arguments was proffered by either party. 

Further, the court did not explain whether Rumbo-Bustos’s 

failure to foresee the consequences of his actions weighed in 

his favor or against him. Finally, while “the law is the law,” 

the law also provided for a shorter or concurrent sentence at 

the court’s discretion. The court gave no indication why it 

decided to exercise its discretion as it did, and any attempt to 

extrapolate as to the court’s intention would be guesswork.

Based on the foregoing, we vacate Rumbo-Bustos’s 

sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

VACATED AND REMANDED