J-A05007-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: H.C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: H.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1243 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 31, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): Adopt-019-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: MARCH 18, 2022

Appellant, H.H., (“Mother”) appeals from the August 31, 2021 order 

terminating her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938 to her dependent child, H.C., who was born in 

December 2010. We remand this case in order that the trial court may 

prepare a comprehensive opinion in accordance with this memorandum.

The record demonstrates the following procedural history.1 On August 

21, 2019, Susquehanna County Services for Children and Youth (“SCSCY”)

filed a petition for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to H.C.

(“termination petition”) pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court’s August 31, 2021 amended order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights does not provide a detailed procedural and factual history of 

this case, as discussed more fully infra.
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(a)(5), and (b).2 On September 28, 2020, Mother executed a consent to 

adoption in which she agreed to the voluntary termination of her parental 

rights to, and adoption of, H.C. Petition to Confirm Consent, 11/5/20, at 

Exhibit A (“Consent to Adoption”). SCSCY petitioned the trial court to confirm 

Mother’s consent to voluntary termination of her parental rights and adoption 

on November 5, 2020. On January 15, 2021, the trial court found that Mother 

wished to revoke her consent to voluntary termination of parental rights and 

adoption, and the trial court entered an order granting Mother’s motion to 

revoke her consent and ordered that the matter proceed with an involuntary 

termination hearing. Trial Court Order, 1/15/21.

The trial court conducted an involuntary termination hearing virtually 

via advanced communication technology due to the COVID-19 global 

pandemic on March 1, 2021, March 23, 2021, June 30, 2021, and August 13, 

2021, and conducted a person-to-person in-camera review of the child on July 

1, 2021, at which only the child and guardian ad litem were present by 

stipulation of the parties. On August 23, 2021, the trial court entered an order 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to H.C. Trial Court Order, 8/23/21. On 

August 31, 2021, the trial court entered an amended order terminating 

____________________________________________

2 A review of the certified record reveals that the parental rights of J.C., the 

child’s biological father, (“Father”) were involuntarily terminated by trial court 

order dated September 30, 2020, and entered October 5, 2020. Trial Court 

Order, 10/5/20. Father did not appeal the order terminating his parental 

rights and he is not a party to this appeal.
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Mother’s parental rights to H.C. that included a correction as to Father’s last 

name.3 Trial Court Amended Order, 8/31/21. This appeal followed.

____________________________________________

3 On September 17, 2021, Mother appealed from the August 23, 2021 order 

terminating her parental rights to H.C., and this Court docketed the appeal at 

1242 MDA 2021. That same day, Mother also appealed from the August 31, 

2021 amended order terminating her parental rights to H.C., and this Court 

docketed that appeal at 1243 MDA 2021.

In an October 25, 2021 per curiam order, this Court directed Mother to show 

cause why her appeal docketed at 1242 MDA 2021 should not be quashed for 

lack of jurisdiction in light of the amended order entered on August 31, 2021. 

Mother filed a response with this Court on November 4, 2021, stating that she 

filed a notice of appeal from both trial court orders terminating her parental 

rights in order to preserve her appellate rights. Mother requested that this 

Court consolidate the two appeals. In a November 8, 2021 per curiam order, 

this Court quashed Mother’s appeal docketed with this Court at 1242 MDA 

2021 on the basis “it appears that the August 2[3], 2021 [order] is a legal 

nullity” in light of the August 31, 2021 amended order.

Section 5505 of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code states that, “[e]xcept as 

otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties

may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, 

notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if no appeal from 

such order has been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (emphasis 

added). Therefore, the trial court in the case sub judice was permitted 

pursuant to Section 5505 of the Judicial Code to modify its August 23, 2021 

order terminating Mother’s parental rights to H.C. but only after providing 

notice to the parties. See Commonwealth v. Renninger, ___ A.3d ___, 

2022 WL 16581, at *13 (Pa. Super. 2022 Filed January 3, 2022) (en banc) 

(slip opinion). Here, the certified record contains no such notice. However, 

unlike the circumstances in Renninger, supra, where the appellant objected 

to the trial court’s failure to provide notice and the modified order included a 

substantive change to the original order, the parties in the case sub judice did 

not raise an objection to the trial court’s failure to provide notice to the parties 

prior to entering the August 31, 2021 amended order. Moreover, a review of 

the August 31, 2021 amended order demonstrates that the only modification 

was to correct a typographical error pertaining to Father’s last name. As such, 

we find that Mother’s appeal properly lies from the August 31, 2021 order 

terminating her parental rights to H.C. despite the trial court’s failure to 
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Mother raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] Did the trial court err [or] abuse its discretion in terminating 

the parental rights of [Mother], where [SCSCY] failed to 

present sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) or [another] section not specifically 

mentioned in the trial court's [August 31, 2021] amended 

order?

[2.] Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in terminat[ing]

the parental rights of [Mother], where [SCSCY] failed to 

present sufficient evidence to establish that termination was 

in the best interest of H.C., [pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(b)]?

[3.] Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law [or]

manifestly abused its discretion by not sufficiently stating 

with specificity [and] reference to the record its basis for

terminating [Mother’s] parental rights [pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b)]?

[4.] Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law [or] 

manifestly abused its discretion in determining whether 

[SCSCY] presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the

grounds for termination of [Mother’s] parental rights under 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) or [another] section not 

specifically mentioned in the trial court's [August 31, 2021] 

amended order?

[5.] Even if [this Court] determines [SCSCY] presented sufficient 

evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of [Mother’s]

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) of the 

Adoption Act or [another] section not specifically mentioned 

in the trial court's [August 31, 2021 amended] order, 

[whether] the trial court nevertheless erred as a matter of 

law [or] manifestly abused its discretion in determining 

____________________________________________

provide notice pursuant to Section 5505. See Commonwealth v. Garzone, 

993 A.2d 1245, 1254 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating that an appeal properly 

lies from an order modified pursuant to Section 5505), aff’d, 34 A.3d 67 (Pa. 

2012).
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termination of [Mother’s] parental rights [was] in the best 

interests of [H.C., pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)]?

Mother’s Brief at 7-8 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

4

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is well-settled.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or 

abused its discretion.” Id. “A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id. The 

trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

____________________________________________

4 The fourth and fifth issues raised by Mother on appeal are duplicative of the 

first and second issues raised by Mother, respectively. Moreover, a review of 

the argument section of counsel’s appellate brief demonstrates that there is 

only one argument section that addresses all five issues. Pennsylvania Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 2119(a) directs that the argument section of an 

appellate brief “shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to 

be argued; and shall have at the head of each part - in distinctive type or in 

type distinctively displayed - the particular point treated therein, followed by 

such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” See

Mother’s Brief at 19-24 (setting forth a single argument section entitled “The 

trial court erred in finding that [SCSCY] presented clear and convincing 

evidence that involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights was 

appropriate under [Section] 2511(a) and would best meet the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of [H.C.] under [Section] 2511(b) 

and erred by not specifically stating with specificity [and] reference to the 

record its basis for termination of Mother's parental rights” (extraneous 

capitalization omitted; spelling errors corrected)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a).
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multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 

2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (original brackets omitted). “[T]he 

trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and 

is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in 

the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation 

omitted). “If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will 

affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re B.J.Z., 

207 A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis5 of the grounds for 

termination followed by an assessment of the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the [trial] 

court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. 

The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the [trial] 

court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the [trial] 

court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to 

Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare 

of the child under the standard of best interests of the 

child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

____________________________________________

5 An analysis is a detailed and comprehensive statement by the trial court 

that, in the context of an order terminating parental rights, sets forth the 

applicable law, i.e., Section 2511, and explains the trial court’s rationale 

underpinning a decision to terminate, or not terminate, an individual’s 

parental rights by detailing, with citation and reference to the record, its 

application of the law to the facts, as determined by the trial court.
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parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 921 (citation omitted; emphasis added). We have defined 

clear and convincing evidence as that which is “so clear, direct, weighty, and 

convincing as to enable the trier[-]of[-]fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re Z.P., 994 

A.2d 1108, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). A child has a right to 

a stable, safe, and healthy environment in which to grow, and the “child's life 

simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the 

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 9 

(Pa. Super. 2009).

Here, without analysis, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights to H.C. pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). Trial Court Amended Order, 

8/31/21, at ¶13 (stating, “[p]ursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), grounds 

exist for involuntary termination of [] Mother’s [parental] rights”).

Sections 2511(a)(2) provides as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must 

be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal has caused the child to be without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence necessary for his[, or her,] 

physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (citation omitted). “The grounds for termination due to 

parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to 

affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may 

include acts of refusal[,] as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(citations omitted).

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015).

Unlike subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a 

parent's refusal or failure to perform parental duties, but instead 

emphasizes the child's present and future need for essential 

parental care, control[,] or subsistence necessary for his physical 

or mental well-being. Therefore, the language in subsection 

(a)(2) should not be read to compel courts to ignore a child's need 

for a stable home and strong, continuous parental ties, which the 

policy of restraint in state intervention is intended to protect. This 

is particularly so where disruption of the family has already 

occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.

Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117 (citation omitted). “[W]hen a parent has 

demonstrated a continued inability to conduct his[, or her] life in a fashion 

that would provide a safe environment for a child, whether that child is living 

with the parent or not, and the behavior of the parent is irremediable as 

supported by clear and competent evidence, the termination of parental rights 
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is justified.” Id. at 1118 (citation omitted). “A parent's vow to cooperate, 

after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability 

of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” Id.

(citation and original quotation marks omitted).

Section 2511, in “permitting the termination of parental rights[,] 

outlines certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must 

provide for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the 

requirements within a reasonable time following intervention by the state may 

properly be considered unfit and have his [or her] parental rights terminated.” 

Id. (citation and original quotation marks omitted).

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his[, or 

her,] ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize 

all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in 

the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while 

others provide the child with the child's physical and emotional 

needs.

Id. at 1119 (citation and original brackets omitted).

Once the trial court determines that involuntary termination of parental 

rights is warranted under Section 2511(a), the trial court is required to 

engage in an analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b) to determine 

whether termination is in the best interests of the child. Section 

2511(b) states,
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§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(b). The analysis under Section 2511(b)

focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best 

serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, [Section] 

2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the 

term “bond” is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 

between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of 

our analysis. While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the [Section] 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, 

and stability the child might have with the foster parent. 

Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should 

consider the importance of continuity of relationships and 

whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943-944 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

and original brackets omitted), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 979 (Pa. 2018). A 
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trial court may rely on a caseworker or social worker to determine the status 

of and nature of a parent-child bond. J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 944 (holding, a trial 

court “is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding 

evaluation be performed by an expert” (citation omitted)); see also In re 

C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding, a trial court must 

“discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention 

to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond” (citation 

omitted)).

In terminating Mother’s parental rights to H.C., the trial court set forth 

the following 18 findings of fact in its August 31, 2021 amended order:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The subject child is [H.C.], [who was born in] December []

2010.

2. The petitioner is [SCSCY] with an address of 75 Public 

Avenue, Montrose, Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania,

18801.

3. [Mother was born in] July [] 1991 and [resides in]

Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania[.]

4. [Father was born in] May [] 1986, and [his] address is 

unknown.

5. [] Father's parental rights [to H.C.] were terminated [by trial 

court order dated] September 30, 2020[, and entered 

October 5, 2020].

6. The minor child was found dependent [by the trial] court on 

August 11, 2016.

7. The minor [child] has been in placement since [August 

2016,] and has expressed that she would like to be adopted 

by her pre-adoptive foster parents.
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8. The minor has had six [] previous placements.

9. [] Mother has not shown significant progress towards 

alleviating the circumstances that necessitated placement.

10. [] Mother has not shown that she is able to maintain stable, 

consistent housing.

11. [] Mother has not maintained any ongoing [or] significant

contact with the child since placement.

12. [] Mother has relocated to Missouri.

13. Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), grounds exist for 

involuntary termination of [] Mother's rights in that the 

repeated and continuous inability, neglect[,] and refusal of 

[] Mother to perform her parental duties has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control[,] or 

subsistence necessary for her physical and mental 

well-being, and the conditions and causes of the neglect and 

refusal cannot and will not be remedied by [] Mother.

14. The minor child has been removed from the care of [Mother]

by the [trial] court or under a voluntary agreement with 

[SCSCY] for a period of at-least six [] months, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child continue 

to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those 

conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services 

or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not 

likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child within a reasonably period of time[,]

and termination of the parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the minor child.

15. [] Mother has not [] perform[ed] any parental duties for the 

minor child for a period in excess of six [] months.

16. [SCSCY] desires to terminate the parental rights of []

Mother so that the minor child can be adopted by suitable 

persons, previously identified in the dependency matter.

17. [SCSCY] is willing and able to take continued custody of the 

minor child until adoption can be finalized.

18. To the best of [SCSCY’s] knowledge, [Mother] is not entitled 

to the benefits of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 

1940, as amended 50 U.S.C.A. § 501, et seq.
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Trial Court Amended Order, 8/31/21, at 1-3 (extraneous capitalization 

omitted). Without an analysis, including a summation of credible testimony 

provided during the course of the termination hearing or reference to the 

certified record or other evidence, the trial court summarily terminated

Mother’s parental rights to H.C. in a one sentence statement as follows:

Mother has, through her course of conduct continuing for a period 

of over six [] months, failed to perform her parental duties and 

has caused the subject child to be without essential parental care, 

control[,] or subsistence necessary for the subject child's physical 

and mental well-being.

Id. at 3.

“A parent's right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 

control of his or her children is among the oldest of fundamental rights.” In 

re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). “[A] decree terminating 

parental rights is widely regarded as the civil law equivalent to the death 

penalty, forever obliterating the fundamental legal relationships between 

parent and child.” Id. at 362. A decision to terminate parental rights has 

far-reaching and intentionally irreversible consequences for the parent and 

the child and, as such, the significant gravity of such a decision should not 

escape the jurists of this great Commonwealth. Because a child’s future hangs 

in the balance during termination proceedings, trial courts should be 

ever-mindful to give full attention to the matter, proceed as expeditiously as 

possible, and provide a comprehensive, thorough analysis explaining its 

decision to terminate, or not terminate, parental rights, by detailing the
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applicable law as it applies to the individual circumstances of the case with 

reference to the certified record in support thereof. Anything short of such a 

comprehensive and thorough analysis constitutes an injustice to the child.6

Simply put, in the case sub judice, the trial court’s August 31, 2021 

amended order terminating Mother’s parental rights to H.C., while it included 

findings of fact interspersed with statements of law, lacked an analysis, much 

less a comprehensive and thorough analysis, of the facts of the case as they 

apply to the law that explains in detail with reference to the certified record

the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(2) and (b).7 We are unable to conduct a meaningful appellate 

____________________________________________

6 As our Supreme Court in Daniels v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd. 

(Tristate Transport), 828 A.2d 1043 (Pa. 2003) explained,

One of the virtues of the legal profession - and it is a virtue that 

certainly applies to the judicial decision-making process - is that 

it depends upon reasoned articulation. Views are oftentimes 

shaped, molded, and changed in the very process of articulation. 

In addition, a [trial court’s] expression of the basis for a decision 

may reveal distinct legal error, as in the misapprehension of a 

governing standard or a material fact.

Daniels, 828 A.2d at 1054 n.8.

7

It may be inferred from the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to H.C. that the trial court found termination of parental rights to be in 

the best interest of the child, albeit without reference to Section 2511(b).

Section 2511(a)(5) states that “[t]he rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed” when
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review of the amended order terminating Mother’s parental rights to H.C.

because the trial court’s amended order lacked an analysis with reference to 

the certified record. See Commonwealth v. Moto, 23 A.3d 989, 995-996 

(Pa. 2011) (explaining that, while appellate courts presume, absent evidence 

to the contrary, that a trial court applies the facts in its possession and 

“carefully consider[s] the entire record,” what a “trial court must do is to 

explain the rationale for its decision in legal and factual detail sufficient to 

allow meaningful review” (emphasis in original)); see also Artzt v. Artzt, 

556 A.2d 409, 410 (Pa. Super. 1989) (stating that, when a comprehensive 

opinion, which includes a thorough analysis of the record, findings of fact, and 

conclusions of law, is not filed, remand for filing of such an opinion is 

____________________________________________

The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the

court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period 

of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal 

or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or 

will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of 

time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent 

are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal 

or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and 

termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) (emphasis added). Although the trial court does 

not cite to Section 2511(a)(5) as a ground for terminating Mother’s parental 

rights, the trial court does state that “[t]he minor child has been removed 

from the care of [Mother] by the [trial] court . . . for a period of at-least 

six months[.]” Trial Court Amended Order, 8/31/21, at ¶14 (emphasis 

added). Due to the lack of comprehensive analysis, it is unclear whether the 

trial court also found sufficient grounds for termination of Mother’s parental 

rights to H.C. pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5).
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mandated), appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 1991); Crowther v. Waida, 

414 A.2d 675, 676 (Pa. Super. 1979) (stating that, in order to conduct a 

meaningful review on appeal, this Court requires a comprehensive opinion 

reflecting the trial court’s thorough analysis of the record and specifying the 

reasons for its ultimate decision); Pennsylvania Social Servs. Local 668 v. 

Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 392 A.2d 256, 260 (Pa. 1978) (stating, 

“In order for review to be meaningful, the [trial court’s opinion] must contain 

statements of the reasons and basis for the decision which are sufficient to 

demonstrate to the appellate court that the adjudication was not an abuse of 

discretion. What is sufficient will vary from case to case.”). Therefore, we 

are constrained to remand this matter in order that the trial court may prepare 

a comprehensive Rule 1925(a) opinion analyzing the applicable law and the 

facts of the case sub judice. The trial court shall file its comprehensive opinion 

within 30 days of this decision. Thereafter, Mother shall have 14 days in which 

to file a response. Upon the filing of Mother’s response, if any, SCSCY and 

the guardian ad litem for H.C. shall have 14 days in which to file a response. 

The certified record shall be returned to this Court no later than 60 days from 

the date of this decision.

Case remanded. Jurisdiction retained.