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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TYLER DIVISION

FRED A. DIXON JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. 

JILL P COLEMAN, KATIE HAMILTON, 

SARAH PIERSON, ADDISON 

JENNIFER,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23-CV-00391-JDK

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Fred A. Dixon, an inmate of the Skyview Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice 

(TDCJ) proceeding pro se, filed this civil lawsuit without paying the filing fee or moving to 

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The case was referred to the undersigned for findings of fact, 

conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of the case. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), added by Act of Congress on April 26, 1996, as part of the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act, provides the following:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action 

or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on three or more prior 

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal 

in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the ground that it is frivolous, 

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the 

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Plaintiff has already accumulated more than three strikes for the purposes of this statute. See Dixon 

v. Skyview Unit, No. 3:22-cv-192 (S.D. Tex. Jun. 15, 2022) (“Court records confirm that Dixon is 

a ‘three-strikes’ inmate who is barred under § 1915(g) from proceeding without prepaying the 

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filing fee. See Dixon v. Montford Security, Civil No. 5:15-CV-00138-C (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2015) 

(outlining Dixon’s extensive record of filing frivolous lawsuits).”). In fact, “Dixon has been 

sanctioned previously for abusing judicial resources, and the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Texas has barred Dixon from filing any new civil actions without advance 

written permission.” Id. at 3 n.1.

To meet the imminent danger requirement of Section 1915(g), the threat of serious physical 

injury must be “real and proximate.” See Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Allegations of past harm do not suffice; instead, the harm must be imminent or occurring at the 

time that the complaint or notice of appeal is filed—and the exception refers to “a genuine 

emergency” in which “time is pressing.” See Heimerman v. Litscher, 337 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 

2003); see also Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Someone whose 

danger has passed cannot be reasonably be described as someone who ‘is’ in danger, nor can that 

past danger reasonably be described as ‘imminent.’”); Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 

(11th Cir. 1999) (“Congress’ use of the present tense in § 1915(g) confirms that a prisoner’s 

allegation that he faced imminent danger sometime in the past is an insufficient basis to allow him 

to proceed in forma pauperis....”). Moreover, to establish an imminent danger for the purpose of 

Section 1915(g), a plaintiff’s factual allegations must “not [be] fanciful, fantastic, or delusional.” 

Jones v. Hutto, No. 3:19-CV-1359-N-BN, 2019 WL 3307068, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 11, 2019), 

report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:19-CV-1359-N, 2019 WL 3304791 (N.D. Tex. July 

23, 2019).

Plaintiff’s complaint does not satisfy that standard. Though his allegations are barely 

legible, Plaintiff appears to be complaining about the side effects of certain medications, which he 

lists out. (Doc. No. 1.) These allegations do not support a finding of imminent serious injury. The 

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court should therefore bar Plaintiff from proceeding in forma pauperis in this case and dismiss it 

for nonpayment of the filing fee.

In addition, court records show that the Northern District of Texas has sanctioned Plaintiff 

$100.00 and directed that he must pay this sanction before he can even seek leave of court to file 

any other lawsuits. The docket of Dixon v. Angleton Sheriff’s Department, civil action no. 

3:05mc11, 2005 WL 309507 (N.D. Tex., February 5, 2005) in which the sanction was imposed, 

shows that Plaintiff has not satisfied the sanction. This court is bound by the sanctions imposed by 

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and honors sanctions imposed by other federal district courts in 

the State of Texas. See General Order No. 94-6 (E.D. Tex., February 2, 1994); Balawajder v. 

Scott, 160 F.3d 1066, 1068 (5th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff may not proceed until he provides proof that 

he has satisfied the sanctions imposed upon him by the Northern District of Texas, in addition to 

satisfying the requirements of Section 1915(g).

The court should accordingly deny Plaintiff leave to proceed without prepayment of the 

filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and summarily dismiss this action with prejudice as to 

the refiling of another in forma pauperis lawsuit raising the same claims, but without prejudice to 

the refiling of this lawsuit upon the satisfaction of three conditions: (1) proof of satisfaction of the 

$100.00 sanction imposed by the Northern District of Texas; (2) receipt of written permission to 

file a new lawsuit; and (3) payment of the full $402.00 filing fee or proof that Plaintiff is in 

imminent danger of serious physical injury as of the time of the filing of the complaint. Should 

Plaintiff fulfill all of these conditions within 15 days after the date of entry of dismissal of the 

present case, he should be allowed to proceed in this lawsuit as though the full fee had been paid 

from the outset.

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Within fourteen (14) days after receipt of the Magistrate Judge’s Report, any party may 

serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations contained in the Report. In 

order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which 

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s 

proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. 

An objection which merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate 

Judge is not specific, and the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general 

objections. See Battle v. United States Parole Commission, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).

A party’s failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and 

recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen days after being served with a copy 

shall bar that party from de novo review by the district judge of those findings, conclusions and 

recommendations and, except on grounds of plain error, from appellate review of unobjected-to 

factual findings and legal conclusions accepted and adopted by the district court. Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 10th day of August, 2023.

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