This opinion is subject to revision before publication 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ARMED FORCES

_______________ 

UNITED STATES 

Appellee 

v. 

Calyx E. HARRELL, First Lieutenant 

United States Air Force, Appellant 

No. 16-0007 

Crim. App. No. 38538 

Argued April 5, 2016—Decided June 28, 2016 

Military Judge: Christopher Santoro 

For Appellant: Douglas L. Cody, Esq. (argued); Major 

Christopher D. James (on brief). 

For Appellee: Major Mary Ellen Payne (argued); Colonel

Katherine E. Oler and Gerald R. Bruce, Esq. (on brief). 

Amicus Curiae: Forrest Boone (law student) (argued); Jeremy Dalrymple (law student), Maurice Fitzgerald (law student), Julie Munns (law student), Gary Rowe (law student), and Cameron W. Fogle, Esq. (supervising attorney) 

(on brief) – University of Alabama School of Law. 

Chief Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the 

court, in which Judges STUCKY, RYAN, and OHLSON 

joined. Senior Judge COX filed a separate concurring 

opinion. 

_______________

 Chief Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.1

 Pursuant to her unconditional guilty plea, First Lieutenant 

Calyx E. Harrell was convicted at a general court-martial of a 

single specification of wrongful use of marijuana, in violation of 

Article 112a, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 

 1 We heard oral argument in this case at the University of Alabama School of Law, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, as part of the court’s 

“Project Outreach.” See United States v. Mahoney, 58 M.J. 346, 

347 n.1 (C.A.A.F. 2003). This practice was developed as part of a 

public awareness program to demonstrate the operation of a federal court of appeals and the military justice system. 
United States v. Harrell, No. 16-0007/AF 

Opinion of the Court 

2 

U.S.C. § 912a (2012). Pursuant to her conditional guilty pleas,2

Harrell was also convicted of one specification each of wrongful 

possession of marijuana and wrongful possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of Articles 112a and 133, UCMJ, 10 

U.S.C. § 933 (2012). A panel of officer members sentenced Harrell to a dismissal, 198 days of confinement (time served), and 

forfeiture of all pay and allowances. The convening authority 

approved the sentence as adjudged and the United States Air 

Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) affirmed the findings and sentence. United States v. Harrell, No. ACM 38538, 

2015 CCA LEXIS 279, at *37, 2015 WL 4626527, at *13 (A.F. 

Ct. Crim. App. July 1, 2015) (unpublished). 

 A traffic stop is “subject to the constitutional imperative 

that it will not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances,” 

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996), and a dog 

sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop “that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment,” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005). We 

granted review to determine whether Harrell’s traffic stop was 

unreasonably extended under the circumstances and whether 

the actions of the drug dog in this case violated the Fourth 

Amendment.3 We hold that any extension of the lawful traffic 

stop was justified by the officer’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and that the military judge did not clearly err by 

finding the drug dog sniff complied with the Fourth Amendment. We therefore affirm the AFCCA. 

BACKGROUND

 In the early morning hours of August 4, 2012, civilian police 

officer Robert Soltis stopped Harrell for traveling eighty miles 

per hour in a sixty mph zone near Solon, Ohio. The entire stop 

was recorded by the police car’s dashboard camera. After the 

stop, Soltis approached the car at 12:26 a.m. and asked Harrell 

“where [she was] going so fast,” where she was coming from, 

and how fast she thought she was traveling. Harrell provided 

the officer with her Pennsylvania driver’s license and explained 

 2 Harrell’s conditional pleas reserved the right to review the 

military judge’s ruling on her motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of her vehicle. 

3 We specified the following issue for review: 

Whether evidence obtained from a police search of 

Appellant’s vehicle on or about August 4, [2012], was 

obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 

should have been suppressed. 
United States v. Harrell, No. 16-0007/AF 

Opinion of the Court 

3 

she was driving from St. Louis, Missouri, to Nelson Ledges, a 

nearby campground in Ohio known to Soltis as a location commonly used for illegal drug activity. 

 According to Soltis, during his initial interaction with Harrell he noticed she appeared unkempt and unclean, her eyes 

were not completely open, her hands shook, she took long 

pauses before answering his questions, and she mumbled. 

Based on these observations, Soltis believed Harrell was possibly under the influence of alcohol or drugs and/or was engaged 

in drug trafficking. 

 At 12:28 a.m., Soltis told Harrell to “sit tight” in her car and 

returned to his vehicle. After requesting the assistance of a canine drug-detection unit, Soltis contacted his dispatch to validate Harrell’s out-of-state identification and to check for outstanding warrants. While Soltis was waiting for the results of 

his dispatch inquiry, he observed Harrell exit her vehicle, lean 

against the rear driver’s side, and light a cigarette. Soltis exited his patrol car and had Harrell move to the passenger side of 

her vehicle and away from traffic for her safety. Soltis then informed Harrell that a canine unit was on the way. Harrell 

asked why, to which Soltis responded: 

OFFICER 1: Well we’re stopping you for speeding— 

.... 

OFFICER 1: [S]o I’m still trying to figure out 

whether I’m giving you a ticket for going 20 over 

the speed limit or not. And you fit the profile and 

everything else matches for drug carrier— 

.... 

OFFICER 1: You’re on this street and where you’re 

going, where you’re coming from and all that stuff 

are all indicators. [I’m] not going to say you’re a 

[bad person]. I didn’t say you’re a drug dealer or 

drug user .... 

.... 

OFFICER 1: I’m just asking certain questions .... 

 At 12:32 a.m., Patrolman Matthew Troyer arrived with his 

drug dog, Stryker, and performed a drug-detection sniff of Harrell’s vehicle. As Stryker reached the front driver’s side window, he “went high” by rising up on his hind legs and placing 

his forepaws up to the plane of the open window. Stryker immediately “alerted” on the driver’s side of the vehicle by sitting 

down and staring at the door. Based on this positive alert for 

the presence of narcotics, the officers searched the vehicle and 
United States v. Harrell, No. 16-0007/AF 

Opinion of the Court 

4 

found 1.8 grams marijuana and two glass smoking pipes with 

marijuana residue. Harrell was placed under arrest and transported to the Solon County Jail, where an additional 9.6 grams 

of marijuana were found concealed on her person. 

 At trial, Harrell moved to suppress the evidence obtained at 

the traffic stop arguing that Soltis unreasonably prolonged the 

stop to perform the dog sniff, impermissibly broadened the 

scope of the stop, and conducted an unauthorized search of the 

interior of Harrell’s rental car, all in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. The military judge denied the motion after reviewing the dashboard footage and concluding Stryker “did not 

extend his nose into the passenger compartment” through the 

open window or otherwise break the plane of the window. The 

military judge further concluded the stop was not impermissibly extended in order to conduct a dog sniff. The AFCCA affirmed, holding that the traffic stop was “not extended in order 

to conduct the dog-sniff, ... the authority for the seizure had 

not ended at the time it occurred,” and that the military judge’s 

findings of fact were supported by the recording and, thus, not 

clearly erroneous. Harrell, 2015 CCA LEXIS 279, at *13, *17-

18, 2015 WL 4626527, at *5-6. 

DISCUSSION

 To resolve the specified issue we must separately address 

two sub-issues: (1) whether the traffic stop was unreasonably 

extended; and (2) whether Stryker’s actions violated the Fourth 

Amendment. This court reviews a military judge’s ruling on a 

motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Reister, 44 M.J. 409, 413 (C.A.A.F. 1996). While a 

military judge’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, 

conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. United States v. Rodriguez, 60 M.J. 239, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 

 1. Was the Traffic Stop Unreasonably Extended?

 Harrell initially argues that Soltis unlawfully prolonged the 

duration of the traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff. Specifically, Harrell asserts that the entire period between the officer’s return to the patrol car to contact dispatch and the end 

of the dog sniff—approximately seven or eight minutes in total—was an unreasonable addition to the stop. Harrell emphasizes that Soltis called for a canine unit prior to contacting dispatch and only minutes after stopping Harrell for speeding. 

Harrell contends that facts amounting to a reasonable suspi-
United States v. Harrell, No. 16-0007/AF 

Opinion of the Court 

5 

cion of criminal activity could not have possibly been established within this timeframe. 

 In response, the government urges this court to conclude 

the dog sniff was conducted within the time necessary to complete the tasks related to the traffic stop itself; therefore, the 

stop was not measurably extended. The government further 

argues that prolonging the stop would have been warranted in 

any event based on the officer’s reasonable and articulable suspicion that Harrell was engaged in drug-related activity. 

 As noted above, “[a]n automobile stop is ... subject to the 

constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under 

the circumstances.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. Generally, “the 

decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police 

have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Id. However, an officer’s authority to keep an individual at a traffic stop ends “when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” 

Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015). There 

is no bright-line rule governing whether the length of a traffic 

stop is “reasonable,” rather, “it [is] appropriate [for the court] to 

examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions 

quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). 

 However, during a traffic stop an officer may continue detention where he has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 

sufficient to justify that detention. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 

1609. A “reasonable suspicion” is less than probable cause, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), and has been defined 

as a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. 

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). This inquiry must be based 

on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Robinson, 

58 M.J. 429, 433 (C.A.A.F. 2003). “The analysis proceeds with 

various objective observations, [including] consideration of the 

modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. 

From th[is] data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes 

deductions ... that might well elude an untrained person.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418. Recognizing that “[t]his process of inferences and deductions does not deal with hard certainties, but 

with probabilities,” Robinson, 58 M.J. at 433 (citation omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted), “[d]ue weight” is afforded 

“to the factual inferences drawn by the law enforcement officer,” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002). 

 According to the testimony of Officer Soltis and the factual 

findings of the military judge, when the officer initially spoke 

with Harrell he observed her unkempt and unclean appearance 
United States v. Harrell, No. 16-0007/AF 

Opinion of the Court 

6 

and noticed that her eyes were not completely open. Harrell’s 

hands shook as the officer questioned her and she took long 

pauses before responding. When Harrell did speak, Soltis described her responses as “mumbled.” Based on these observations, the officer believed Harrell was under the influence of 

alcohol or drugs. Officer Soltis also believed Harrell might have 

been engaged in drug trafficking because she had driven a 

rental car a long distance in order to reach an area locally 

known for drug activity, but an area that would likely be unknown to most people coming from St. Louis. Officer Soltis further testified that, in his fifteen years of experience, every person that he had stopped who was on his or her way to Nelson 

Ledges was also in possession of drugs. We conclude that Officer Soltis’s considerations were legitimate. See, e.g., Illinois v. 

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“officers are not required to 

ignore the relevant characteristics of a location” and an individual’s “nervous, elusive behavior is a pertinent factor” in determining reasonable suspicion); United States v. Thomas, 913 

F.2d 1111, 1116 (4th Cir. 1990) (it was relevant that the “illegal 

transport of drugs often involves the use of rental cars traveling from source cities”); United States v. Maguire, 359 F.3d 71, 

77 (1st Cir. 2004) (it is relevant that the suspect’s “appearance 

was disheveled” when determining whether the officer had a 

reasonable suspicion). 

 Taken together and based on the officer’s training and experience, these observations establish a particularized and objective basis to suspect Harrell was involved in drug use or 

trafficking. Having reached the conclusion that a reasonable 

suspicion of drug use or activity existed, we need not further 

analyze whether, in the absence of this suspicion, the traffic 

stop was unreasonably extended. 

 

2. Did the Dog Sniff Violate the Fourth Amendment?

 Harrell also argues that the police lacked probable cause to 

search her vehicle until Stryker alerted at the driver’s side 

door. According to Harrell, because Stryker only alerted after 

his nose improperly entered the interior of the vehicle, any evidence seized based on his alert was the product of a Fourth 

Amendment violation. In making this contention, Harrell relies 

on Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), to support her 

position that a drug dog’s physical intrusion into an individual’s vehicle constitutes a clear-cut Fourth Amendment violation. 

The government responds that the military judge did not 

abuse his discretion when he concluded the dog sniff and the 

search that followed did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
United States v. Harrell, No. 16-0007/AF 

Opinion of the Court 

7 

Furthermore, even if the military judge clearly erred by concluding Stryker’s nose did not enter the vehicle, the government urges this court to hold that there was no constitutional 

violation because Stryker acted instinctually and without urging from his handler. In the alternative, the government asserts that the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle 

prior to any improper intrusion. 

 “[C]onducting a dog sniff [does] not change the character of 

a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, unless the dog sniff itself infringed [on the appellant’s] constitutionally protected interest 

in privacy.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. Harrell’s Fourth 

Amendment arguments are predicated on her assertion that 

the dog’s nose entered the interior of the vehicle without probable cause. However, after reviewing the patrol car’s dashboard 

footage, the military judge made the following findings of fact 

before ruling on Harrell’s motion to suppress the evidence 

seized from her rental vehicle: 

Officer Troyer and Stryker began with a sniff of the 

vehicle’s exterior, starting with the passenger’s side 

headlight and working counter-clockwise around 

the vehicle. When Stryker got to the driver’s door, 

Officer Troyer noted that Styker’s breathing 

changed. Officer Troyer continued walking toward 

the rear of the vehicle but Stryker “went high,” 

meaning that he reached his paws up the side of 

the car to get his nose closer to the open window. 

Stryker momentarily placed his paws on the door 

but did not extend his nose into the passenger compartment. 

 Having reviewed the entire record, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we find no 

basis for concluding the military judge’s factual findings are 

clearly erroneous. 

DECISION

 The police did not impermissibly extend the traffic stop nor 

did the military judge clearly err when he concluded the drug 

dog’s nose did not penetrate the interior of the open car window. Therefore, the dog sniff and subsequent search of Harrell’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The specified issue is answered in the negative and the decision of the 

United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. 
United States v. Harrell, No. 16-0007/AF 

Senior Judge COX (concurring):

I concur in the well-reasoned opinion of the Chief Judge 

and I agree with the standard of review of the military 

judge’s findings of facts in this case and applying that 

standard, conclude, as did the Chief Judge, there was no 

“physical intrusion” into a constitutionally protected zone. 

However, whether the nose of a trained drug detection 

dog crossed or did not cross the invisible plane of an open 

car window (probably less than five mm in thickness) is a 

slender reed to cling to when determining whether a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free from a warrantless search have been violated. I write separately to expand upon the holding that the military judge did not 

abuse his discretion in denying the motion to suppress the 

results of the traffic stop. 

 “[C]onducting a dog sniff [does] not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and 

otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, unless the dog 

sniff itself infringed [the appellant’s] constitutionally protected interested in privacy.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 

405, 408 (2005). While “interior sniffs may become constitutionally infirm in the event that the interior sniff is accomplished or facilitated by the officer-handler,” a dog’s instinctual behavior does not violate the Fourth Amendment 

where the canine acts “of its own initiative and is neither 

encouraged nor placed into the vehicle by law enforcement.” United States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616, 619-20 (6th 

Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); see also United States v. 

Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying the “considerable body of jurisprudence” to conclude that the dog’s 

sniffs around the interior of the vehicle did not violate the 

Fourth Amendment where the handler neither caused nor 

directed the dog to do so); United States v. Winningham,

140 F.3d 1328, 1331 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding a constitutional violation where the police officer opened the 

vehicle and thus “facilitated” the dog’s intrusion into the 

interior). 

 In this case, when Stryker, the drug dog, “went high” 

and placed his forepaws below the driver’s side window, he 

did so without prompting, urging, or facilitation by his 
United States v. Harrell, No. 16-0007/AF 

Senior Judge COX, concurring 

2 

handler or the other officers. In addition, Harrell had left 

the window open when she exited the vehicle to smoke a 

cigarette. Based on these established facts, I conclude that 

when Stryker leapt up on the car, whether his nose penetrated the interior of the car or not, his actions were instinctual and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 

 Accordingly, I join Chief Judge Erdmann’s opinion.