UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4393

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GREGORY SENTERRIO SPENCER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District 

Judge. (3:09-cr-00825-CMC-2)

Submitted: September 30, 2011 Decided: October 24, 2011

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Charles T. Brooks, III, THE BROOKS LAW OFFICES, LLC, Sumter, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. Mark C. Moore, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Gregory Senterrio Spencer pled guilty, pursuant to a 

written plea agreement, to conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and five grams or more 

of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The 

district court sentenced Spencer to 216 months’ imprisonment. 

Through counsel, Spencer now appeals his conviction and sentence 

in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

presenting no meritorious grounds and raising no specific 

questions for our review. The Government moves to dismiss the 

appeal on the basis of a waiver of appellate rights provision in 

Spencer’s plea agreement. We affirm in part and dismiss in part

A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the 

right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United States v. 

Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. 

Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). This court reviews 

the validity of an appellate waiver de novo and will enforce the 

waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed falls within the 

scope of that waiver. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 

(4th Cir. 2005).

After reviewing the record, we conclude that Spencer 

knowingly and intelligently waived the right to appeal his 

sentence. We note that the language and meaning of the appeal 

waiver in this case is clear and unmistakable, and both Spencer 
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and his attorney signed the agreement, indicating that Spencer 

had been fully advised about and understood the terms of the 

plea agreement, including the appellate waiver. Further, the 

district court fully questioned Spencer about the appeal waiver

at the properly conducted Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing. 

Accordingly, the waiver is valid. Although Spencer does not 

allege any specific error as to his sentence, any potentially 

meritorious sentencing issues would fall within the scope of the 

appellate waiver. We therefore grant in part the Government’s 

motion to dismiss and dismiss this portion of the appeal.

The appellant waiver, however, does not preclude our 

Anders review of Spencer’s conviction. We have thoroughly 

reviewed the record in this case and conclude that the district 

court complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting 

Spencer’s guilty plea. Thus, we hold that the record 

affirmatively shows there was a factual basis for Spencer’s 

plea, that Spencer understood the constitutional rights he 

waived in pleading guilty, and that Spencer’s guilty plea was 

knowing and voluntary. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 

114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). We therefore deny in part the 

Government’s motion to dismiss and affirm the conviction.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no unwaived meritorious 

issues for appeal. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we 
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affirm Spencer’s conviction and grant the Government’s motion to 

dismiss in part and dismiss the appeal as to his sentence. This 

court requires that counsel inform Spencer, in writing, of the 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Spencer requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Spencer. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART