IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

BEAUMONT DIVISION

EDWARD LEE GONZALES and MICHELE 

RENEE GONZALES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LARISSA M. HILE, et al.,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-227-MJT-CLS

MEMORANDUM ORDER OVERRULING

PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS AND ADOPTING THE REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE [Dkt. 61]

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules of Court for the Assignment of Duties to 

United States Magistrate Judges, the District Court referred this proceeding to the Honorable 

Christine L. Stetson to conduct all pretrial proceedings, to enter findings of fact and recommend 

disposition on case-dispositive matters, and to determine non-dispositive matters. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); E.D. TEX. LOC. R. CV-72. 

On December 6, 2023, Judge Stetson issued a Report and Recommendation [Dkt. 61] 

with the following conclusions and recommendations: (1) Plaintiff Edward Lee Gonzales fails to 

state a claim for which relief can be granted under §1983 against either Defendant Orange 

County or Defendant Mooney (hereinafter “County Defendants”), (2) Plaintiff Michele Renee 

Gonzales disavows any claims against County Defendants, and (3) the Court should grant 

County Defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.

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I. Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Report and Recommendation are Overruled

A. Legal Standard

On December 26, 2023, Plaintiffs filed timely objections to the Report and 

Recommendation [Dkt. 67]. A party who timely files specific, written objections to a magistrate 

judge’s Report and Recommendation is entitled to a de novo determination of those findings or 

recommendations to which the party specifically objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b)(2)-(3). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the 

place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is 

found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the 

magistrate judge is not specific. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be 

considered by the district court.” Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) 

(en banc), overruled on other grounds by Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1412 

(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

B. Discussion

Although Plaintiffs filed written objections in a timely manner, they failed to specifically 

identify the findings or recommendations to which they objected—including the place in the 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found—in 

several portions of the objections [Dkt. 67]. Additionally, much of the objections merely restates

arguments from Plaintiffs’ complaint [Dkt. 1] and their response to County Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss [Dkt. 38], and are somewhat disorganized and irrelevant to Judge Stetson’s Report 

and Recommendation. Nonetheless, the Court will conduct a de novo review of the findings and 

recommendations of the Report and Recommendation [Dkt. 61] to which Plaintiffs have 

discernably objected.

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Plaintiffs do not object to Judge Stetson’s finding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim 

against County Defendants under §1983. Plaintiffs, instead, provide the Court with pages of 

analysis on false imprisonment, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, tort law as it applies 

to federal employees, and standards in summary judgment cases. [Dkt. 67]. None of these 

topics are relevant to the motion before the Court. Plaintiffs do not allege, nor does the record 

reflect, that County Defendants are federal employees who falsely imprisoned Plaintiffs. County 

Defendants have not invoked Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. In fact, counties are 

not entitled to sovereign immunity. See SW. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 243 F.3d 936 (5th 

Cir. 2001) (noting “political subdivisions of states are generally not entitled to Eleventh 

Amendment immunity”). Likewise, the instant motion is a Motion to Dismiss, not a Motion for 

Summary Judgment.

Proceeding pro se, Plaintiffs’ pleadings are necessarily held to “less stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” and are liberally construed by the Court. See Haines 

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Perez v. United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194-95 (5th Cir. 

2002). Even under the less stringent standards placed on a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings, the Court 

agrees with Judge Stetson that Plaintiffs did not plead any violations of their constitutional rights 

by County Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ §1983 claims against County Defendants are 

dismissed with prejudice.

II. The Court’s Authority Over a Judge’s Recusal

Plaintiffs also believe Judge Stetson should recuse herself from the case due to her 

employment before taking the bench [Dkt. 67 at 2]. This determination is not for the Court to 

make at this time. Under 28 U.S.C. §455(a), “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the 

United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 

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reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. §455(a) (emphasis added). Likewise, 28 U.S.C. §455(b)

places the burden of deciding a motion for recusal on Judge Stetson herself. 28 U.S.C. §455(b). 

Plaintiffs appeared to have filed a Limited Objection [Dkt. 63] which contains their 

request for Judge Stetson’ recusal. The Court construes this filing as the operative motion for 

recusal and defers judgment to Judge Stetson as is required under federal law. 28 U.S.C. 

§455(a)-(b); see, e.g., Blue v. Hill, No. 3:10-CV-2269-L, 2014 WL 1461613, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 

Apr. 15, 2014), aff'd (Oct. 8, 2014), aff'd sub nom. Hill v. Schilling, 593 F. App'x 330 (5th Cir. 

2014). After Judge Stetson rules on the construed motion for recusal [Dkt. 63], Plaintiffs may 

request that the Court review her decision. The Court, however, may only overrule Judge 

Stetson if her decision is clearly erroneous or contrary to the law. 28 U.S.C. §626(b)(1)(A); FED.

R. CIV. P. 72(a).

III. Conclusion and Order

The Court has conducted a de novo review of Plaintiffs’ objections in relation to the 

pleadings and the applicable law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). After careful consideration, 

Plaintiffs’ objections [Dkt. 67] are OVERRULED. The Report and Recommendation of the 

United States Magistrate Judge [Dkt. 61] is ADOPTED. County Defendants Motion to Dismiss

[Dkt. 10] is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ claims against County Defendants are DISMISSED with 

prejudice.

____________________________

Michael J. Truncale

United States District Judge SIGNED this 11th day of January, 2024.

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