J-S29045-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JASON BROWN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 492 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 21, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0010963-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED JULY 21, 2020

Jason Brown (Brown) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered 

on December 21, 2018,1 by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Brown’s notice of appeal purported to appeal from the trial court order of 

November 9, 2017. As there was no order entered on the trial court docket 

on that date, we issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be 

quashed. Brown filed a response to the rule averring that the notice of appeal 

had listed the wrong date in error, but argued that jurisdiction was proper 

because the notice was filed within 30 days of the denial of his post-sentence 

motion. See Response to Rule to Show Cause, 4/16/20, at 3-4 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Lahoud, 488 A.2d 307 (Pa. Super. 1985)). This court 

discharged the rule to show cause and referred the issue to the merits panel. 

Our review of the record reveals that Brown was sentenced on December 21, 

2018, and filed a post-sentence motion on December 28, 2018. The motion 

was denied on February 8, 2019, and Brown filed his notice of appeal on 

February 12, 2019. Because Brown perfected his appeal by timely filing his 

notice of appeal, we conclude that the defect in the notice was harmless and 
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(trial court) following his convictions for aggravated assault, robbery, theft by 

unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, possession of an instrument of 

crime, terroristic threats, simple assault and recklessly endangering another 

person.2 Brown raises challenges to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence 

and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.

I.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts in this case as follows:

At trial, the victim testified that, on November 7, 2017, he worked

for a repossession company and was hooking up a Cadillac to his

tow truck on the 6100 block of Hawthorne Street when [Brown]

as well as another man approached. Both males were verbally

aggressive, and [Brown] said, “Fuck you, fuck your life, I don't

care,” to the victim. [Brown] and the other individual then left

the scene. Consequently, the victim finished securing the Cadillac

to his tow truck and drove to the parking lot of a dollar store at

6100 Frankford Avenue where he continued to properly secure the

Cadillac.

While the victim was placing straps onto the tires of the Cadillac,

[Brown] drove a silver pickup truck into the parking lot. As the

victim stood near the rear of the driver’s side of his tow truck,

[Brown] drove directly towards him and collided with the rear of

the tow truck. To avoid being struck by [Brown’s] vehicle, the

victim jumped on top of his tow truck. Then [Brown] exited his

vehicle while holding a silver baseball bat and said, “What now,

motherfucker.” The victim ran away, because he felt threatened. 

[Brown] chased the victim approximately twenty feet, then

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decline to quash. Commonwealth v. Kornicki, 515 A.2d 925, 927 n.1 (Pa. 

Super. 1986). We have corrected the caption accordingly. See 

Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001) 

(en banc).

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(4), 3701(a)(1)(iv), 3921(a), 3925(a), 907(a), 

2706(a)(1), 2701(a), 2705.
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returned to the tow truck. The victim watched [Brown] reach into

the tow truck, shut it off, and abscond with the victim’s keys. The

victim called 9-1-1, providing a description of [Brown] to the

officers, who responded to the scene. A short time later, the

victim identified [Brown].

During [Brown’s] trial, the Commonwealth played a video of the

incident, which was moved into evidence as Commonwealth

Exhibit Twelve. Also, the Commonwealth played recorded jail

phone calls, which were dated November 19, 2017, and November

20, 2017. During one of the calls, which were collectively marked

as Commonwealth Exhibit Thirteen, [Brown] admitted, “I took his

keys[.]”

Trial Court Opinion, 1/2/20, at 3-4 (citations omitted).

Brown proceeded to a bench trial on October 15, 2018, and was found

guilty of the above-mentioned charges. The next day, Brown filed a motion

in arrest of judgment challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support

the convictions. After hearing arguments, the trial court denied the motion.

Prior to sentencing, Brown submitted several character letters from

family and friends for the court’s review.3 Additionally, Brown’s son testified

that his father had always been hardworking and cared for his family and that

he and Brown had started a snow plowing business together shortly before

the events in this case. He opined that his father was a kind and caring person

who had lost his temper and made a mistake. Brown’s fiancée testified

similarly, telling the court that Brown had been very supportive and caring

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3 These letters were not made part of the certified record on appeal.
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towards her and her children. She also believed that the incident was a

mistake and not within Brown’s usual character.

Brown spoke on his own behalf and said that he regretted his actions in

this case but that he did not intend to scare the victim or put him in danger. 

He said that he did not usually “let [his] emotions get the best of [him]” and

that during his pretrial incarceration, he had missed his daughter’s wedding

and the birth of his grandchild. Notes of Testimony, 12/21/18, at 28. He

acknowledged that he had a lengthy criminal record and had been sentenced

to state prison in the past, but emphasized that it had been seven years since

he was released and he had not otherwise reoffended in that time.

Following the reception of the evidence, the trial court sentenced Brown

to 4 to 8 years’ incarceration on the counts of aggravated assault and robbery

to be served concurrently with no further penalty on the remaining charges. 

As Brown was a repeat felony offender (RFEL), the sentence was in the

standard range of the sentencing guidelines. Brown timely filed a postsentence motion. The trial court denied the motion and Brown timely

appealed. Brown and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

II.

Brown first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

convictions for aggravated assault and robbery.4 He argues that the 

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4 Our standard of review is well-settled:
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Commonwealth failed to prove that he had the specific intent to cause bodily 

injury with a deadly weapon as required for the aggravated assault conviction. 

He contends that the trial court’s factual finding that Brown drove his truck 

directly at the victim is not supported by the video of the incident and argues 

that “[t]he fact that [Brown’s] vehicle traveled in the vicinity where the 

[victim] is standing is insufficient, without more, to support a finding that he 

acted with the specific intent to inflict bodily injury with his vehicle.” Brown’s 

Brief at 14. Similarly, in challenging his conviction for robbery, Brown 

contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he intended to 

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The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying [this] test, we may not weigh the 

evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 79 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted).
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place the victim in fear of immediate bodily injury. He argues that the victim 

was not near his truck when Brown took the keys and was a “mere observer” 

of a theft. Brown’s Brief at 18.

A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he “attempts to cause or 

intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly 

weapon.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4). A person is guilty of robbery if, in the 

course of committing theft, he “inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens 

another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury.” 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iv). The Commonwealth may rely on circumstantial 

evidence to prove intent or any other element of an offense. See 

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 561 A.2d 699, 704 (Pa. 1989). “[T]he law 

permits the fact finder to infer that one intends the natural and probable 

consequences of his acts.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 955 A.2d 441, 444 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, the trial court credited the victim’s testimony. Brown first 

confronted the victim while he was attempting to repossess a vehicle. While 

Brown did not own the vehicle in question, he nonetheless angrily approached 

the victim and started yelling at him. The victim left the scene without fully 

securing the car to the tow truck and parked in a nearby parking lot to 

correctly secure the vehicle. While the victim was standing near the driver’s 

side of the tow truck, Brown entered the parking lot and drove his truck at the 

victim, hitting the rear bumper of the tow truck. The victim testified that he 
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had to jump on top of his truck to avoid being hit by Brown’s truck. Brown 

then exited his truck holding a baseball bat and chased the victim for 

approximately 20 feet. After chasing the victim away, Brown returned to the 

tow truck, removed the victim’s keys and left the scene.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude 

that Brown intended to inflict bodily injury when he attempted to hit the victim 

with his truck. Brown initiated a confrontation with the victim, a stranger, and 

continued the confrontation after the victim attempted to leave the scene. 

The victim had to climb on top of his truck to avoid Brown’s attack. The trial 

court was entitled to conclude from this circumstantial evidence that Brown 

intended to inflict bodily injury by driving his vehicle at the victim.5

This evidence is also sufficient to support Brown’s conviction for robbery, 

and Brown’s argument that the victim was a “mere observer” of a theft is 

meritless. The victim's testimony and the video of the incident establish that 

the events in the parking lot took place in quick succession, with Brown driving 

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5 Brown cites Commonwealth v. Alford, 880 A.2d 666, 671 (Pa. Super. 

2005), for the proposition that merely pointing a gun at an individual is 

insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault and argues that 

driving his vehicle at the victim was akin to pointing a gun. However, Brown 

did not merely sit in his vehicle while facing the victim; rather, he drove his 

vehicle directly at the victim such that he had to jump on top of his truck to 

avoid being hit. These actions are more like firing a gun at a victim than

merely pointing it, and Alford is distinguishable.
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his vehicle at the victim’s truck, immediately exiting with a baseball bat to 

chase the victim, and then returning to the tow truck to steal the keys. 

Brown’s actions, viewed in the totality, evidenced a clear intent to threaten 

the victim with bodily injury or inflict fear of bodily injury in the course of the 

theft. Regardless of where the victim was standing when the keys were stolen, 

Brown facilitated the theft by attempting to assault the victim twice: first with 

the car and then with the baseball bat. See Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 151 

A.3d 662, 665 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted) (stating that a robbery 

may occur when an item is taken from “the presence of another” as “common 

sense dictates that a person need not be in actual physical possession of 

property to have it taken from his person”). These facts are sufficient to 

support the trial court’s conclusion that Brown intended to place the victim in 

fear of bodily injury during the course of the theft. Brown’s challenges to the 

sufficiency of the evidence are meritless.

III.

Next, Brown contends that his convictions were against the weight of 

the evidence and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 

motion for a new trial.6 While his argument on appeal is underdeveloped, 

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6 When evaluating a challenge to the weight of the evidence to support a 

conviction, this court does not reweigh the evidence presented at trial, but 

rather evaluates the trial court’s denial of the motion for a new trial for an 

abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (Pa. 

2013). An abuse of discretion occurs “where the course pursued represents 
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Brown primarily contends that the video of the incident contradicts the trial 

court’s factual findings. Brown’s Brief at 19.

“An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is 

addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 

820 A.2d 795, 805-06 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). A new trial is 

appropriate only when the verdict “is so contrary to the evidence as to shock 

one’s sense of justice.” Commonwealth v. Olsen, 82 A.3d 1041, 1049 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “[T]he evidence must be so tenuous, vague 

and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” 

Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 326 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). In evaluating the verdict, this court does not 

independently assess the credibility of the evidence, as this is purely within 

the province of the fact-finder. Olsen, supra.

After review of the transcripts and the video of the incident, we discern 

no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Brown’s motion for a new 

trial. The trial court, sitting as fact-finder, was entitled to credit the victim’s 

testimony describing Brown’s attack. No evidence was adduced at trial to cast 

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not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly 

unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that 

the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. (citation 

omitted). A trial court’s determination that the verdict was not against the 

weight of the evidence is “[o]ne of the least assailable reasons for granting a 

new trial.” Id. (citation omitted).
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doubt on this version of events or to render the trial court’s credibility 

determinations unsupported by the record. While Brown argues that the trial 

court’s factual findings are not supported by the video,7 our review of the 

video and the victim’s testimony reveals that the two are consistent in all 

material respects. Just as the victim testified, the video depicts Brown’s truck 

entering the parking lot at a high rate of speed and stopped abruptly near the 

tow truck, such that the tow truck and vehicle attached to the back vibrate

with the collision. The victim is seen jumping over the hook mechanism on 

the back of the tow truck to move away from Brown’s truck, and Brown then 

exits his truck holding a bat and walks to the front of the tow truck, appearing 

to gesture and yell at the victim in the distance. There are no inconsistencies 

between the victim’s testimony, the video and the trial court’s factual findings, 

and this court may not reweigh the evidence properly admitted and considered 

by the trial court. As the trial court’s reasoning was well-supported by the 

evidence, this claim is meritless.

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7 Brown faults the trial court for finding that “the only reason the [victim] was 

not hit is because he was standing between the two vehicles.” Brown’s Brief 

at 19. Our review of the video reveals that the victim was standing at the 

bumper of the tow truck, between the tow truck and the Cadillac the victim 

was repossessing.
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IV.

Finally, Brown challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence of 4 

to 8 years of incarceration.8 “The right to appellate review of the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for 

permission to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Pa. 

Super. 2018) (citation omitted). An appellant must preserve his claims at the 

time of sentencing or in a post-sentence motion, file a timely notice of appeal, 

include a statement of reasons for allowance of appeal pursuant to Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 2119(f) in his brief, and raise a substantial question for 

review. Id. Brown fulfilled the first three requirements by filing a timely postsentence motion seeking modification of his sentence, a timely notice of 

appeal, and including a 2119(f) statement as an appendix to his brief.

We now turn to whether Brown has raised a substantial question for

review. “A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” 

Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281, 1286–87 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citation omitted). While his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement is sparse, Brown

contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence

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8 We review this claim for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 

112 A.3d 656, 661 (Pa. Super. 2015).
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without considering the required factors under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). We have

previously held that such a claim presents a substantial question for our

review. Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Moving on to the merits of Brown’s claim, the standard range of the

sentencing guidelines for aggravated assault is a minimum of 40 to 52 months

of incarceration, and the standard range for robbery is a minimum of 35 to 45

months of incarceration. Brown was sentenced within the standard range of

the guidelines to 4 to 8 years’ incarceration at each count of aggravated

assault and robbery, imposed concurrently. For all additional charges, he

was sentenced to no further penalty.

When imposing a sentence, a trial court must ensure that the sentence

is “consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the

rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). When reviewing

the discretionary aspects of a sentence that falls within the sentencing

guidelines, we must affirm unless “application of the guidelines would be

clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2). Finally, “[w]here the

sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report (“ PSI”),

we can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along

with mitigating statutory factors. Further, where a sentence is within the

standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as
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appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d

1104, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal quotations & citation omitted).

The record reveals that the trial court gave due consideration to all

required factors in crafting its sentence. The trial court began by considering

the facts underlying the offenses and concluded that Brown had committed an

“act of terror” when he drove his car at the victim. Notes of Testimony,

12/21/18, at 29. The trial court considered Brown’s testimony that he did not

intend to scare the victim, but found it incredible in light of the video of the

incident. It recognized that vehicles can be used as a deadly weapon and are

inherently dangerous, concluding that Brown knew he could cause substantial

harm to the victim by driving his car at him.

The trial court also considered Brown’s personal characteristics,

including that he was 45 years old, had a substantial criminal record and had

served time in state prison before he committed the crimes in question. It

acknowledged that Brown’s family cared for him and supported him, but found

that based on his history, Brown was aware of the potential consequences of

his actions. The trial court did credit Brown for “spar[ing] the Commonwealth

and the court system the expense of a jury trial,” but emphasized the

seriousness of the offenses, as the aggravated assault and robbery charges

were both graded as second-degree felonies. Id. at 32. Finally, the trial court

ordered and reviewed a PSI before imposing the sentence so we presume that

it was aware of and weighed all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. 
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Hill, supra. Under all of these circumstances, the trial court determined that

a standard-range sentence was appropriate. We conclude that the trial court

weighed and considered all required factors and did not abuse its discretion in

sentencing Brown to 4 to 8 years of incarceration.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/21/20