Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed August 17, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D20-0338

Lower Tribunal No. 18-13783

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D-I Davit International-Hische GMBH,

Appellant,

vs.

Jelen Carpio, etc., et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade 

County, Valerie R. Manno Schurr, Judge.

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP, and Steven C. 

Jones and Anthony P. Strasius, for appellant.

Lipcon, Margulies, Alsina & Winkleman, P.A., and Michael A. 

Winkleman and Carol L. Finklehoffe, for appellee Jelen Carpio.

Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and BOKOR, JJ. 

BOKOR, J.
2

Jelen Carpio brought this action as personal representative of the 

estate of her late husband, Diogenes Carpio, who died during lifeboat/rescue 

boat drills aboard a Norwegian Cruise Lines vessel, the Norwegian 

Breakaway. In this appeal, we address two claims against D-I Davit 

International-Hische GmbH (Davit DE): a tort claim for products liability under 

a theory of strict liability and a claim for breach of implied warranty of fitness 

for merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.1 Davit DE moved to 

dismiss both state law claims for lack of personal jurisdiction and appeals 

the trial court’s denial of such motion.2 As further explained below, we agree 

with Davit DE that Ms. Carpio failed to establish Florida’s general or specific 

jurisdiction as it pertains to the claims at issue.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Carpio worked for NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. as a seaman with the rank 

of second officer.3

 On July 20, 2016, Mr. Carpio was working aboard the 

Norwegian Breakaway in the navigable waters around Bermuda. On that

day, Mr. Carpio was assigned to participate in several lifeboat/rescue boat 

1 We recognize the extensive procedural history of this case and the 

existence of multiple claims not addressed in this appeal. However, this 

appeal only addresses Ms. Carpio’s state law claims against Davit DE in 

counts VI and VII of the amended complaint.

2 We have jurisdiction. Fla. App. R. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).

3 Mr. Carpio was a Filipino citizen, not a resident of Florida, at the time of the 

accident resulting in his fatal injury.
3

drills. During one such drill, Mr. Carpio entered a rescue boat on Deck 7 of 

the vessel. Once inside the rescue boat, a wire on the davit supporting the 

rescue boat snapped, causing Mr. Carpio to fall nearly six stories into the 

water on top of other seamen participating in the drill. Mr. Carpio passed 

away from his injuries. This fatal accident gave rise to the action against the 

defendants below.

 Davit DE, a German corporation, manufactures and sells davits, 

which are crane-like devices used to support, hoist, and lower equipment 

including lifeboats. Davit DE is the parent company of D-I Davit International, 

Inc. (Davit US). The amended complaint alleges that Davit DE does 

business in Florida through its agent or representative, Davit US. Davit US 

is a foreign, for-profit corporation registered to do business in Florida. 

The amended complaint alleges that Davit DE manufactured “and/or” 

sold the davits for the lifeboat system used aboard the Norwegian 

Breakaway when Mr. Carpio passed away and that Davit US “and/or” Davit 

DE “provided aftersales customer support to Defendant NCL, as to all 

aspects of the davits and lifeboat systems, including but not limited to annual 

and periodic inspections . . . as well as maintenance, repairs, technical help 

and crew training.” The amended complaint relies primarily on these after-
4

sales inspection contracts, solicited in Florida, as the basis for personal 

jurisdiction over Davit DE. 

ANALYSIS

We review de novo a trial court’s order denying a motion to dismiss for 

lack of jurisdiction. Fincantieri-Cantieri Navali Italiani S.p.A. v. Yuzwa, 241 

So. 3d 938, 941 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). General jurisdiction over a non-resident 

defendant requires “substantial and not isolated activity within this state.” §

48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2016).4 That is, a plaintiff must show that a defendant 

engaged in “‘continuous and systematic general business contact’ with the 

state.” Banco de los Trabajadores v. Cortez Moreno, 237 So. 3d 1127, 1134 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (citing Vos, B.V. v. Payen, 15 So. 3d 734, 736 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 2009)); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 

564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (explaining that a court may assert general 

jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when “their affiliations with the State 

are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in 

the forum State”) (citations omitted). Here, Ms. Carpio alleges that Davit DE 

is a foreign for-profit corporation “doing business in Florida through its agent 

4 Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, reads: “A defendant who is engaged in 

substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is 

wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the 

courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.” 
5

and/or representative,” Davit US, who is “registered to do business in Florida 

with offices and an officer/director in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.” Davit DE 

refutes, by affidavit, the allegation that it engages in business in Florida. 

Accordingly, the bare allegation of the amended complaint, without more, 

fails to establish general jurisdiction over Davit DE. See Gadea v. Star 

Cruises, Ltd., 949 So. 2d 1143, 1146 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (quoting Qualley 

v. Int’l Air Serv. Co., 595 So. 2d 194, 196 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“[T]he 

‘presence of a subsidiary corporation within Florida is not enough, without 

more, to subject a non-Florida parent corporation to long-arm jurisdiction 

within this state.’”). In Gadea, this court explained:

A substantial body of Florida law makes clear that it 

is only where a parent corporation exerts such 

extensive operational control over a subsidiary that 

the subsidiary is no more than an agent existing to 

serve only the parent’s needs, that jurisdiction over 

the parent exists. Sharing some officers and 

directors, having a unified or “global” strategy and 

goals, cross-selling in promotional materials, and 

performing services for one another is not sufficient 

to satisfy this test.

949 So. 2d at 1146. Ms. Carpio failed to allege any facts demonstrating that 

Davit DE itself engaged in any business activities in this state,

5 or that Davit 

5 The fact that Davit DE’s affidavit admits that it rented warehouse space in 

Florida, on its own and without more, fails to constitute “continuous and 

systematic general business contact with the state” necessary to establish 

general jurisdiction.
6

DE exerts substantial control over Davit US such that Davit US is no more 

than an agent controlled by Davit DE. Accordingly, Ms. Carpio fails to allege 

sufficient facts to establish general jurisdiction over Davit DE.

Ms. Carpio similarly fails to allege facts sufficient to establish specific 

jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction requires a “claim-specific” analysis, 

governed by section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes.6 Banco, 237 So. 3d at 

1133. The “provisions of Florida’s long-arm statute governing specific 

jurisdiction expressly require allegations both: (i) that the defendant does one 

of the enumerated acts within Florida, and (ii) that the plaintiff’s cause of 

action ‘arise from’ one of the enumerated acts occurring in Florida.” Id. at 

1135. These dual requirements are known as the statute’s connexity 

requirement. Id. Accordingly, we conduct a separate analysis for each 

claim.

6 Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes, explains that: 

[a] person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this 

state, who personally or through an agent does any of 

the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby 

submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural 

person, his or her personal representative to the 

jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of 

action arising from any of the following acts . . . .
7

Here, the amended complaint alleges the elements of a strict liability 

claim. The elements for strict liability are: “(1) that a defect was present in 

the product; (2) that it caused the injuries complained of; and (3) that it 

existed at the time the retailer or supplier parted possession with the 

product.” Lesnik v. Duval Ford, LLC, 185 So. 3d 577, 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2016). But there’s no connexity between the tort and Florida. The 

declaration filed by Davit DE’s corporate representative, unrefuted by any 

other record evidence, establishes that the davits were designed, 

manufactured, and installed on the subject vessel in Germany, and that any 

Davit DE maintenance and inspection personnel boarded the vessel in New 

York and performed the inspection work at sea. 

To sidestep this jurisdictional flaw, Ms. Caprio argues that Mr. Caprio 

was a third-party beneficiary of an inspection contract entered into between 

Davit DE and NCL (in Florida). This argument fails. The purported connexity 

to Florida must relate to the actual tort alleged, in this case, the tort of strict 

liability as to the manufacture or installation of the davits. None of the acts 

related to the alleged tort occurred in Florida. Neither Davit DE’s alleged 

negligence in the performance of the separate inspection contract nor its

alleged misrepresentations, directed to NCL in Florida regarding the fitness 

of the davits, relate to a strict liability claim for the design, manufacture, or 
8

installation of davits in Germany.7 Because Ms. Carpio failed to connect her 

cause of action for strict liability to any activity that took place in Florida, it 

fails to satisfy the connexity requirement and Davit DE’s motion should have 

been granted as to this count. 

Ms. Carpio’s cause of action for breach of warranty claims suffers from 

a similar deficiency. The claim “requires a [showing that a contract was 

breached] in Florida ‘by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be 

performed in this state.’” Woodruff-Sawyer & Co. v. Ghilotti, 255 So. 3d 423, 

430 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (applying section 48.193(1)(a)(7), Florida Statutes).

An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 

is conditioned upon the buyer’s reliance on the skill 

7 Davit DE attached the declaration of Joachim Wiese, general manager of 

Davit DE, to its motion to dismiss. Wiese attested that: (1) Davit DE’s 

products, including the subject davits, are designed and manufactured by 

Davit DE in Germany; (2) Davit DE manufactured and sold the subject davits 

in Germany pursuant to an October 29, 2010 purchase order from the Mayer 

Werft shipyard, located in Papenburg, Germany; (3) the subject davits were 

installed on the Norwegian Breakaway in Papenburg, Germany; (4) 

construction of the Norwegian Breakaway was completed in February 2013; 

(5) NCL engaged Davit DE for annual inspection services regarding the 

davits installed aboard the Norwegian Breakaway; and (6) Davit DE 

personnel embarked on the Norwegian Breakaway in New York City and 

performed all work “on sea” onboard the vessel. See Venetian Salami Co. 

v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502–03 (Fla. 1989) (explaining that a 

defendant contests allegations of the complaint concerning jurisdiction by 

filing affidavit(s) supporting his position and that the burden shifts to the 

plaintiff to prove by affidavit the basis upon which jurisdiction may be 

obtained). In response, Ms. Carpio filed Wiese’s Deposition which refutes 

none of the salient points in the declaration. 
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and judgment of the seller to supply a commodity 

suitable for the intended purpose. The warranty of 

merchantability applies when goods are offered for 

consumption by the public generally. Therefore, in 

order to be merchantable the goods must be fit for 

ordinary uses for which such goods are sold.

McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 174 So. 2d 736, 

738 (Fla. 1965) (citations omitted). A cause of action for breach of an implied 

warranty of fitness for a particular purpose focuses on the relationship 

between the buyer and the seller; here, Meyer Werft8 and Davit DE. See

Atlantic Distribs., Inc. v. Alson Mfg. Co., 141 So. 2d 305, 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 

1962) (“An implied warranty of fitness for which an article is purchased arises 

as a matter of law where a buyer makes known to the seller the purpose for 

which he buys an article and relies upon the seller’s skill and judgment.”)

(emphasis added); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Miller, 310 So. 2d 356, 357 

(Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (defining implied warranty of fitness for a particular 

purpose as, “[w]here a seller at the time of contracting has reason to know 

any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer 

is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, 

8 Davit DE manufactured and sold the subject davits in Germany pursuant to 

an October 29, 2010 purchase order from the Meyer Werft shipyard, located 

in Papenburg, Germany where Meyer Werft constructed the Norwegian 

Breakaway. Additionally, the davits were installed on the subject vessel in 

Germany.
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there is . . . an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose”) 

(emphasis added). 

Ms. Carpio fails to connect the subject contract, the contract for sale

between Meyer Werft and Davit DE, to Florida. The contract for sale, rather 

than any inspection contract entered between Davit DE and NCL, forms the 

basis for a breach of warranty claim. Accordingly, Ms. Carpio’s attempt to 

create a nexus to Florida by claiming that Mr. Carpio was a third-party 

beneficiary of the inspection contract necessarily fails to establish the 

requisite connexity between the breach of warranty claim and Florida.9 

Further, the record establishes that Meyer Werft and Davit DE entered the 

subject contract in Germany. As such, the complaint fails to satisfy Florida’s 

long-arm requirements for specific jurisdiction as it relates to the breach of 

warranty claim. See § 48.193(1)(a)(7), Fla. Stat. 

Ms. Carpio’s claims lack a sufficient jurisdictional connection with the 

forum state to support either general or specific jurisdiction over the claims 

9 As explained, Mr. Carpio, a citizen of the Philippines, lacked any connection 

to Florida and the accident underlying the causes of action occurred outside 

of Florida’s jurisdiction. By interjecting the inspection contracts entered in 

Florida, Ms. Carpio attempts to provide the necessary hook to trigger specific 

jurisdiction over the claims at issue. The attempt fails, however, because 

even if we were to agree that the inspection contract conferred third-party 

beneficiary status on Mr. Carpio, the lack of connexity to the claims alleged 

bars a finding of specific jurisdiction. 
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discussed herein. Accordingly, Davit DE’s motion to dismiss counts VI and 

VII of the amended complaint should have been granted.

Reversed and remanded.