alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1


                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.2


                               TAKE-OUT NOTICE



                                                                  March 19, 1997


AIM Management Group, Inc.
AIM Distributors, Inc.
AIM Advisors, Inc.
11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1919
Houston, Texas 77046

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant to that certain Purchase and Sale Agreement dated as of May 2, 1995
(as amended and supplemented, the Purchase Agreement) among AIM Management
Group Inc., Citibank, N.A. and the undersigned Citicorp North America, Inc., we
hereby deliver this Take-out Notice advising you that on January 31, 1997 the
Purchaser completed a Take-out Transaction in connection with the Series 1997-1
Asset Backed Certificates issued by the Mutual Fund Fee Trust III.  The
"Take-out Adjustment Amount" in connection with such Take-out Transaction is
$44,900,000.  Capitalized terms used herein and which are not otherwise defined
herein shall have the meanings assigned to such terms in the Purchase
Agreement.


                                          Very truly yours,
                                          
                                          CITICORP NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
                                          as Program Agent
                                          
                                          
                                          By:  ILLEGIBLE             
                                              -----------------------------
                                                  Authorized Signatory


<PAGE>   2
Page 2
Take-Out Notice
March 19, 1997



Acknowledged and agreed as of the date
first written above:

AIM MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.

By:  /s/ CAROL F. RELIHAN     
   ------------------------------
      Authorized Signatory


AIM DISTRIBUTORS, INC.

By:  /s/ CAROL F. RELIHAN     
   ------------------------------
      Authorized Signatory


AIM ADVISORS, INC.

By:  /s/ CAROL F. RELIHAN     
   ------------------------------
      Authorized Signatory
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00510-CR

MICHAEL JEROME HAYES APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant Michael Jerome Hayes was convicted by a jury of possession of 

one or more but less than four grams of cocaine and was sentenced to thirty-two 

years’ confinement. This court affirmed Appellant’s conviction on October 19, 

2006. See Hayes v. State, No. 02-05-00431-CR, 2006 WL 2986660 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth Oct. 19, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication). On May 18, 2011, Appellant filed in the trial court a pro se ―Motion 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

For Reconsideration For A New Trial.‖ The trial court denied the motion by 

written order the same day. In October 2011, Appellant filed a notice of appeal in 

this court in which he clearly attempts to appeal the order denying his motion for 

new trial.

No Texas statute authorizes a direct appeal from the denial of a motion for 

new trial independently of the direct appeal from an underlying conviction. See 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02 (West 2006) (―A defendant in any criminal 

action has the right of appeal under the rules hereinafter prescribed . . . .‖) 

(emphasis added); see also id. art. 11.07 (West Supp. 2011). We generally have 

jurisdiction to consider an appeal by a criminal defendant only from a judgment of 

conviction. See McKown v. State, 915 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

1996, no pet.).

Concerned that we may not have jurisdiction over his appeal of the denial 

of his motion for new trial, we sent Appellant a letter on November 15, 2011, 

notifying him that the appeal may be dismissed unless, on or before November 

28, 2011, he or any party filed a response showing grounds for continuing the 

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.3. Appellant requested and received an 

extension of time to respond and filed a response to our letter on December 7, 

2011. The response does not, however, show grounds for continuing the appeal. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(a); In re R.V., Jr., 8 S.W.3d 692, 693–94 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
3

We hold that we lack jurisdiction over Appellant’s appeal of the denial of 

his motion for new trial. Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MCCOY, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: December 29, 2011
Carline CURRY, petitioner, v. CITY OF MANSFIELD, OHIO, et al.

No. 18-5567.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 3, 2018.

Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* denied.
Floyd ROSE, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-373.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 7, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.
Justin Michael WOLFE, petitioner, v. VIRGINIA.

No. 18-227.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 7, 2019.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Virginia. Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Supreme Court of Virginia for further consideration in light of *Class v. United States,* 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 798, 200 L.Ed.2d 37 (2018).
1

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2237

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Western District of Missouri.

*

Darryl Lee Williams, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 7, 2006

Filed: March 20, 2006

___________

Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Darryl Williams appeals the district court’s1

 denial of his Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b) motion challenging the district court’s 1993 denial of his 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 motion. We deny a certificate of appealability (COA) and dismiss the appeal.

In 1990, this court affirmed Williams’s conviction and sentence on drug

charges. See United States v. Turpin, 920 F.2d 1377, 1380 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, 499 U.S. 953 (1991). In August 1993, Williams filed a section 2255 motion,
-2-

alleging that his sentence was improperly enhanced. The district court denied the

motion in November 1993, and this court dismissed the appeal, see Williams v. United

States, No. 94-1828 (8th Cir. June 8, 1994) (unpublished disposition). In January

2004, Williams filed the instant motion under Rule 60(b), arguing that the district

court erred in dismissing his habeas motion. The district court denied the motion, and

Williams appeals.

We find Williams’s motion was in reality a successive section 2255 motion, as

he attempted to reargue the claims in the original motion by attacking the district

court’s November 1993 ruling on substantive rather than procedural grounds. Cf.

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S. Ct. 2641, 2647-48 (2005) (Rule 60(b) motion should not

be treated as successive habeas motion if it attacks district court’s previous resolution

of claim on procedural grounds); United States v. Patton, 309 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th

Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (inmates may not bypass authorization requirement of § 2255

by purporting to invoke some other procedure). Thus, the district court’s dismissal

was proper, see Boyd v. United States, 304 F.3d 813, 814 (8th Cir. 2002) (if district

court determines Rule 60(b) motion is actually second habeas petition, court has

discretion to dismiss it for failure to obtain authorization, or transfer it to court of

appeals), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 953 (2003), and we deny a COA, see United States v.

Lambros, 404 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (COA is required to appeal

denial of any motion that ultimately seeks habeas relief), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2953

(2005).

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

______________________________
EXHIBIT 99.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of First American Capital
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending
December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the "Report"), I, Harland E. Priddle, Secretary, Treasurer and Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. To my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by
the Report.

Date 3/31/03			/s/ Harland E. Priddle
     ---------------            ----------------------
		                Harland E. Priddle
                    	        Secretary, Treasurer and
                                Chief Financial Officer
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

May 29, 2019

No. 04

- 18

- 00693

- CR

Badesire BAHINDWA,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016CR5024

The Honorable Mark Luitjen, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Irene Rios, Justice

Appellant has file d a pro se motion requesting the appointment of counsel . Appellant is

represented by Michael S. Raign , who has filed an Anders brief in this appeal and whose motion

to withdraw has been held in abeyance

. See In re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d 403, 410

– 11 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008) (“ Under the Anders procedure, the motion to withdraw will not be granted

until the app ellate court decides whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous, or whether there

are any arguable claims of merit. In either event, the motion to withdraw will then be granted

and either the appeal will be [disposed of] or the case abated to the tr ial court for appointment of

new counsel. ”). By order dated January 9, 2019, appellant was ordered to file his pro se brief by

March 11, 2019. No pro se brief was filed, and the appeal is set to be submitted on July 9, 2019.

Appellant’s motion is DENIED

. It is so ORDERED on May 29, 2019

. PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO: _________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
John Benjamin CLOPTON, Jr., petitioner, v. Mary MURPHY, Judge, District Court of Grayson County, Texas.

No. 17-8867.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 3, 2018.

Petition for rehearing denied.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

BEAUMONT DIVISION

BRIAN MELONSON §

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23cv197

ZENA STEPHENS, ET AL. §

MEMORANDUM ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE

JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Brian Melonson, an inmate at the Jefferson CountyCorrectional Facility located

in Beaumont, Texas, proceeding pro se, brought the above-styled lawsuit. 

The court referred this matter to the Honorable Zack Hawthorn, United States Magistrate

Judge, at Beaumont, Texas, for consideration pursuant to applicable laws and orders of this court. 

The magistrate judge recommends dismissing this action without prejudice. 

The court has received and considered the Report and Recommendation of United States

Magistrate Judge filed pursuant to such referral, along with the record, pleadings and all available

evidence. A copy of the report and recommendation was mailed to plaintiff at the address

provided to the court. No objections to the Report and Recommendation of United States

Magistrate Judge have been filed.

O R D E R

Accordingly, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the magistrate judge are

correct and the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge is ADOPTED. A separate 

Case 1:23-cv-00197-MJT-ZJH Document 7 Filed 02/26/24 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 20
final judgment will be entered in this case in accordance with the magistrate judge’s

recommendations.

2

____________________________

Michael J. Truncale

United States District Judge SIGNED this 26th day of February, 2024.

Case 1:23-cv-00197-MJT-ZJH Document 7 Filed 02/26/24 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 21
LodgeNet Interactive Corporation
    
    Form 10-Q
 Exhibit 32
 LODGENET INTERACTIVE CORPORATION
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
   
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of LodgeNet.
 th
 /s/ Scott C. PetersenScott C. PetersenChief Executive Officer/s/ Gary H. RitondaroGary H. RitondaroChief Financial Officer
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

VOLTEON LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. 

ZTE CORPORATION,

Defendant. 

Case No. 2:23-cv-00137-JRG

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Volteon LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) Unopposed Second Motion for 

Extension of Time to Serve Infringement Contentions, and for Defendant ZTE Corporation 

(“Defendant”) to Serve Invalidity Contentions and Subject-Matter Eligibility Contentions (the 

“Motion”). Dkt. No. 18. 

Having considered the Motion, and noting that it is unopposed, the Court finds that it 

should be and hereby is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that the deadline for 

Plaintiff to comply with P.R. 3-1 and 3-2 (Infringement Contentions) is extended up to and 

including February 1, 2024. It is further ORDERED that the deadline for Defendant to comply 

with P.R. 3-3 and 3-4 (Invalidity Contentions) and the Standing Order Regarding Subject-Matter 

Eligibility Contentions is extended up to and including April 11, 2024. 

Case 2:23-cv-00137-JRG Document 18-1 Filed 01/17/24 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 67
Case 4:23-cv-00541-ALM-AGD   Document 5-4   Filed 12/22/23   Page 1 of 3 PageID #:  26

Case 4:23-cv-00541-ALM-AGD   Document 5-4   Filed 12/22/23   Page 2 of 3 PageID #:  27

Case 4:23-cv-00541-ALM-AGD   Document 5-4   Filed 12/22/23   Page 3 of 3 PageID #:  28
4514 Travis Street, Suite 300, Dallas, Texas 75205

Office 214.528.2444♦Fax 214.599.0602

January 5, 2021

Jerral Wayne Jones

c/o Jason Cohen, Esq.

jcohen@DallasCowboys.net

Re: Parentage of Alexandra Davis

Dear Mr. Jones:

This law firm has been retained to represent Alexandra Davis in establishing parentage of 

you as her biological and legal father. 

As I am sure you are aware, Alexandra’s mother is Cynthia Davis from Arkansas. 

Alexandra is 25 years old. I do not feel it is necessary to go into any detail in explaining why 

Alexandra believes you are her biological father. However, Alexandra is more than willing to 

participate in genetic determination.

Texas law provides a relatively simple, non-intrusive, inexpensive, quick procedure for 

establishing parentage if you are willing to cooperate. Hopefully you will avail yourself of this 

opportunity. I am confident that your attorneys can explain the details required under the Uniform 

Parentage Act (the “Act”) for what can be an easy, voluntary process. 

Please have your legal representative(s) contact me within seven (7) days of the date of this 

letter so we can discuss the least intrusive method for moving forward under the Act for 

determining and establishing this parentage issue. No one is trying to embarrass or harass you in 

any way. Hopefully this can be resolved in an amicable manner, which is certainly Alexandra’s 

intent. 

If I do not hear from you or your legal representatives within the seven (7) days, we will 

assume that you have no interest in cooperating and we will proceed with the legal process.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Yours Very Truly,

Andrew A. Bergman

Andrew A. Bergman

bergman@bergmangray.com

Exhibit 1
H. R. 1791

One Hundred Sixth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday,

the twenty-fourth day of January, two thousand

An Act

To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide penalties for harming animals

used in Federal law enforcement.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Federal Law Enforcement Animal

Protection Act of 2000’’.

SEC. 2. HARMING ANIMALS USED IN LAW ENFORCEMENT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 65 of title 18, United States Code,

is amended by adding at the end the following:

‘‘§ 1368. Harming animals used in law enforcement

‘‘(a) Whoever willfully and maliciously harms any police animal,

or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title

and imprisoned not more than 1 year. If the offense permanently

disables or disfigures the animal, or causes serious bodily injury

or the death of the animal, the maximum term of imprisonment

shall be 10 years.

‘‘(b) In this section, the term ‘police animal’ means a dog or

horse employed by a Federal agency (whether in the executive,

legislative, or judicial branch) for the principal purpose of aiding

in the detection of criminal activity, enforcement of laws, or

apprehension of criminal offenders.’’.
H. R. 1791—2

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 65 of title 18, United States Code, is amended

by adding at the end the following new item:

‘‘1368. Harming animals used in law enforcement.’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
Juan Ortega LARA, petitioner, v. Raymond MADDEN, Warden.

No. 18-6439.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 7, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
```
  
 
WHEAT - MINNEAPOLIS GRAIN EXCHANGE                                   Code-001626
OPTION AND FUTURES COMBINED POSITIONS AS OF 05/22/12          |
--------------------------------------------------------------| NONREPORTABLE
      NON-COMMERCIAL      |   COMMERCIAL    |      TOTAL      |   POSITIONS
--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------
  Long  | Short  |Spreads |  Long  | Short  |  Long  | Short  |  Long  | Short
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(CONTRACTS OF 5,000 BUSHELS)                         OPEN INTEREST:       39,723
COMMITMENTS
   9,531    4,838    1,776   21,960   22,224   33,267   28,838    6,456   10,885

CHANGES FROM 05/15/12 (CHANGE IN OPEN INTEREST:       -152)
    -375      393      254     -222     -386     -343      261      191     -413

PERCENT OF OPEN INTEREST FOR EACH CATEGORY OF TRADER
    24.0     12.2      4.5     55.3     55.9     83.7     72.6     16.3     27.4

NUMBER OF TRADERS IN EACH CATEGORY (TOTAL TRADERS:       55)
       8       12        7       29       22       40       38
```

----

Updated May 25, 2012
I

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1894

To provide that a plaque be placed at the diplomatic entrance of the

Department of State.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 20, 1999

Mr. LEACH introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on International Relations

A BILL

To provide that a plaque be placed at the diplomatic entrance

of the Department of State.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. PLACEMENT OF PLAQUE AT THE DEPARTMENT

4 OF STATE.

5 The Secretary of State shall cause to be placed at

6 the diplomatic entrance of the Department of State a

7 plaque containing the following text:
2

•HR 1894 IH

1 ‘‘PRINCIPLES FOR PRUDENT DIPLOMACY

2 ‘‘(1) Good intentions are a necessary but insufficient

3 grounds for action; consequences and costs must be taken

4 into consideration before policies are put into effect.

5 ‘‘(2) Intervention in civil wars seldom works.

6 ‘‘(3) Hubris is a hallmark of all politics; it is always

7 dangerous.

8 ‘‘(4) Moralizing is no substitute for acting morally;

9 while nothing is more compelling than a good example,

10 little is more resented than gratuitous lecturing.

11 ‘‘(5) Trade embargoes tend to be counter-productive.

12 ‘‘(6) Great powers don’t need to threaten; the greater

13 the power, the more cautious should be its application.

14 ‘‘(7) Power can be illusory; many conflicts do not

15 yield to its application.

16 ‘‘(8) Beware of domino decisionmaking processes

17 which prevent changes in strategy when initial judgments

18 prove frail.

19 ‘‘(9) Never fail to put yourself in an adversary’s

20 shoes; leaving an opponent without an exit reduces options

21 for both sides.

22 ‘‘(10) Nationalism is a force which policy makers ha23 bitually underestimate.

24 ‘‘(11) There are more similarities than differences in

25 religions of the world, but dissimilarities become accen-
3

•HR 1894 IH

1 tuated in the way religion mixes with politics in various

2 cultures.

3 ‘‘(12) Policies which lack support of the American

4 people are unsustainable.

5 ‘‘(13) Great causes may necessitate great sacrifice,

6 but force should be the last resort; peace is preferable to

7 war.’’.

Æ
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CONSOLIDATED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF HASKEL INTERNATIONAL, INC, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH ANNUAL 10-K.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-31-1997
<CASH>                                       8,490,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               12,294,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   543,000
<INVENTORY>                                 10,335,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            32,937,000
<PP&E>                                      10,704,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               5,328,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              41,232,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        8,842,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    13,874,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  14,793,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                41,232,000
<SALES>                                     51,400,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            51,400,000
<CGS>                                       27,938,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               27,938,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            15,939,000<F1>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                27,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             118,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              7,775,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                 3,041,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          4,734,000
<DISCONTINUED>                             (7,624,000)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,890,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.60)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0<F2>
<FN>
<F1>OTHER EXPENSES ARE COMPRISED OF SELLING, GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE,
ENGINEERING, DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT.
<F2>FULLY DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE IS NOT DISCLOSED IN THE COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SINCE THE MAXIMUM DILUTIVE EFFECT IS NOT MATERIAL.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>