Fl LE 

IN CLERKS OFFICE 

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHNmlH 

DATE MAY 0 9 2013 

~4Jit 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

NO. 86145-5 

Respondent, 

v. ENBANC 

BRANDON S. CORISTINE, 

Filed MAY 0 9 2013 

Petitioner. 

STEPHENS, J.-This case asks us to determine whether the trial court 

violated petitioner Brandon Coristine's constitutional rights by offering an 

affirmative defense instruction over his objection. Coristine argues that offering 

the instruction to the jury violated his right to control his defense. We hold that 

where a defendant chooses not to argue or invoke an affirmative defense, offering 

an instruction on the defense over the defendant's objection violates the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. We reverse the Court of Appeals 

and remand for a new trial. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Coristine was charged with rape in the second degree arising out of events 

during a house party at his residence in Spokane, Washington. To prove rape in 
State v. Coristine (Brandon S.), 86145-5 

the second degree, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with someone who was incapable of 

consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated. RCW 

9A.44.050(1 )(b). 

At trial, the State presented testimony that Coristine's alleged victim, L.F., 

drank heavily at the party and went to sleep and that some time later Coristine 

came into her room and had sexual intercourse with her as she lay on her stomach 

coming in and out of consciousness. Coristine and two other defense witnessesCoristine's wife and his sister-in-law-testified that L.F. consumed alcohol at the 

party but did not appear to be intoxicated. Coristine also testified that L.F. initiated 

the sexual intercourse and was an active and willing participant. 

After the close of evidence, the trial court held an instruction conference at 

which the sole contested issue was whether to read a jury instruction on the 

statutory affirmative defense of "reasonable belief." See RCW 9A.44.030(1). 

Coristine's counsel objected to the instruction, arguing that Coristine's defense was 

simply that the State failed to prove L.F. was incapacitated. 3 Verbatim Report of 

Proceedings (VRP) at 397. The prosecutor argued in favor of giving the 

instruction, asserting the court was required to give the instruction if Coristine 

"bolster[ ed]" his case by offering "any additional evidence" that the victim was not 

incapacitated, including witness testimony. 3 VRP at 395. The trial court was 

skeptical at first, noting that Coristine was free to choose his own defense, but 

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State v. Coristine (Brandon S.), 86145-5 

eventually accepted the State's argument. 3 VRP at 395-99. Over Coristine's 

objection, the court read the following pattern instruction to the jury: 

It is a defense to a charge of rape in the second degree that at the time of the 

act the defendant reasonably believed that [L.F.] was not mentally 

incapacitated or physically helpless. The defendant has the burden of 

proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance of 

the evidence means that you must be persuaded, considering all of the 

evidence in the case, that it is more probably true than not true. If you find 

that the defendant has established this defense, it will be your duty to return 

a verdict of not guilty as to this charge. 

3 VRP at 409-10; see 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY 

INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 19.03, at 296 (3d ed. 2008). After the instructions were 

given, each side presented closing argument. Coristine reiterated his failure-ofproof defense, arguing that testimony from defense witnesses about L.F.' s alcohol 

consumption and behavior at the party cast doubt on the State's allegation that L.F. 

was physically helpless or mentally incapacitated during sexual intercourse. 

Neither side mentioned the affirmative defense of reasonable belief. 

The jury deliberated for two days and found Coristine guilty of rape in the 

second degree. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. State v. Coristine, 

161 Wn. App. 945, 252 P.3d 403 (2011). We granted discretionary review. State 

v. Coristine, 172 Wn.2d 1014,262 P.3d 63 (2011). 

ANALYSIS 

In order to further the truth-seeking aim of a criminal trial and to respect 

individual dignity and autonomy, the Sixth Amendment gives the accused the right 

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State v. Coristine (Brandon S.), 86145-5 

to present a defense. Consistent with this right, the Sixth Amendment requires 

deference to the defendant's strategic decisions. 

Because an affirmative defense is one the defendant may raise, the Sixth 

Amendment requires courts to honor an intelligent and voluntary choice to forgo 

an affirmative defense. Instructing the jury on an affirmative defense over the 

defendant's objection violates the Sixth Amendment by interfering with the 

defendant's autonomy to present a defense. 

A. The Sixth Amendment Protects a Defendant's Autonomy 

The Sixth Amendment guaranties of compulsory process, confrontation, and 

the assistance of counsel help ensure fair trials. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 

806, 818-21, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975); Washington v. Texas, 388 

U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967). These assurances safeguard 

the truth-seeking function of criminal trials. In putting the State to its proof, a 

defendant may call witnesses, cross-examine the State's witnesses, and have the 

assistance of counsel, thereby guarding against a wrongful conviction. See, e.g., 

Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1975) 

("[P]artisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate 

objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."). 

Presenting one's own defense also affirms individual dignity and autonomy. 

See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77, 104 S. Ct. 944, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122 

(1984) (noting that the Sixth Amendment right to conduct one's own defense 

"exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused"); see also Portuondo v. 

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State v. Coristine (Brandon S.), 86145-5 

Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 76, 120 S. Ct. 1119, 146 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2000) (Stevens, J., 

concurring) (noting that a "defendant's Sixth Amendment right 'to be confronted 

with the witnesses against him' ... reflects respect for the defendant's individual 

dignity and reinforces the presumption of innocence"). 

To further the truth-seeking function of trial and to respect the defendant's 

dignity and autonomy, the Sixth Amendment recognizes the defendant's right to 

control important strategic decisions. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177 ("[T]he 

primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his 

case in his own way."); State v. Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735, 742, 644 P.2d 1216 (1983) 

(defendant's fundamental right to make decisions about the course of the defense is 

mandated by "'.respect for [his or her] freedom as a person"' (quoting Frendak v. 

United States, 408 A.2d 364, 376 (D.C. 1979))). 

B. Courts Must Respect a Defendant's Right To Forgo an Affirmative Defense 

The Sixth Amendment right to control one's defense encompasses the 

decision to present an affirmative defense. We first recognized this principle in 

Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735. In Jones, the trial court entered a plea of not guilty by 

reason of insanity over the defendant's objection and allowed the introduction of 

evidence of insanity after the defense presented its case. Id. at 739. The jury 

found the defendant to be insane at the time he committed the crime. ld. at 738. 

We granted the defendant a new trial. Relying on Faretta, we observed that 

"a defendant has a constitutional right to at least broadly control his own defense." 

Jones, 99 Wn.2d at 740. In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court held the 

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State v. Coristine (Brandon S.), 86145-5 

Sixth Amendment grants criminal defendants the personal right to selfrepresentation at trial. 422 U.S. at 819. We noted that Faretta stands for "'the 

conviction that a defendant has the right to decide, within limits, the type of 

defense he wishes to mount."' Jones, 99 Wn.2d at 740 (quoting United States v. 

Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979)); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 

U.S. 25, 33, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970) (quoting Tremblay v. 

Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569, 570 (D.D.C. 1961) ("[Courts] should not 'force any 

defense on a defendant in a criminal case."')). 

In line with Faretta and Alford, we reasoned that "'respect for a defendant's 

freedom as a person mandates that he or she be permitted to make fundamental 

decisions about the course of proceedings."' Jones, 99 Wn.2d at 742 (quoting 

Frendak, 408 A.2d at 376). Such respect demands that "courts do not impose ... 

defenses on unwilling defendants." !d. at 7 43. Imposing a defense on an unwilling 

defendant impinges on the independent autonomy the accused must have to defend 

against charges. As the Court proclaimed in Faretta in upholding the right to selfrepresentation, "[u]nless the accused has acquiesced ... , the defense presented is 

not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is 

not his defense." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821. We concluded that the court must 

honor the intelligent and voluntary choice of a competent defendant to forgo an 

insanity defense. Jones, 99 Wn.2d at 746. 

Our reasoning in Jones was followed in State v. McSorely, 128 Wn. App. 

598, 116 P.3d 431 (2005). There, the State requested an instruction on an 

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State v. Coristine (Brandon S.), 86145-5 

affirmative defense to the charge of child luring, an instruction to which the 

defendant "most strenuously" objected. Id. at 603. Nevertheless, the trial court 

granted the State's motion, instructing the jury that '"[i]t is a defense to a charge of 

luring that ... [t]he defendant's actions were reasonable under the circumstances[] 

and . . . [ t ]he defendant did not have any intent to harm the health, safety, or 

welfare ofthe minor."' Id. (quoting Clerk's Papers at 13). 

Relying on Jones, Alford, and Faretta, the Court of Appeals reversed, 

holding a new trial was required. McSorely, 128 Wn. App. at 605. Quoting Jones, 

the McSorely court emphasized that the Sixth Amendment prohibits courts from 

"'forc[ing] any defense on a defendant in a criminal case."' Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 33). 

In concluding the Sixth Amendment gives a defendant the right to forgo an 

available affirmative defense, the McSorely court correctly extended Jones. As 

with the decision to plead guilty by reason of insanity, the decision to offer an 

affirmative defense cannot be forced on an unwilling defendant. See Jones, 99 

Wn.2d at 743. An affirmative defense places a burden of proof on the defendant, 

thus shaping the defense by introducing elements it must prove. This process may 

influence a wide range of strategic trial decisions, such as who is called to testify, 

the questions asked on direct- and cross-examination, and what arguments are 

made in summation. 

Instructing the jury to consider an affirmative defense over the defendant's 

objection interferes with the accused's right to present a chosen defense. The Sixth 

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State v. Coristine (Brandon S.), 86145-5 

Amendment places this important strategic decision squarely in the hands of the 

defendant, not the prosecutor or the trial court. 

C. Instructing the Jury on "Reasonable Belief," Over Coristine's Objection, 

Violated His Sixth Amendment Rights 

Coristine maintains he elected to forgo an affirmative defense as a matter of 

strategy; his sole defense was that the State failed to prove its case. The State 

disputes this, arguing that Coristine raised the affirmative defense by testifying that 

L.F. did not "appear" drunk. But Coristine's testimony served to cast doubt on the 

State's case, consistent with his defense that L.F. was capable of consent. There is 

no basis to conclude Coristine offered this testimony in support of an unargued 

defense that he reasonably believed that L.F. was not mentally incapacitated or 

physically helpless. Rather, it supported his argument that she was not in fact 

incapacitated or helpless. 

Writing approvingly of the trial court's decision to force an affirmative 

defense on Coristine, the Court of Appeals argued that failure to give the 

instruction "might well have been error." Coristine, 161 Wn. App. at 951. This is 

incorrect. While an attorney's failure to recognize and raise an affirmative defense 

can fall below the constitutional minimum for effective representation, the record 

here confirms a valid strategic decision. See In re Pers. Restraint of Hubert, 138 

Wn. App. 924, 928-29, 158 P.3d 1282 (2007) ("'[S]trategic choices made after 

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 

-8-
State v. Coristine (Brandon S.), 86145-5 

unchallengeable."' (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91, 104 

S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984))). 

The distinction is between failing to recognize a defense and validly waiving 

one. Once a trial court determines that a defendant's waiver of an affirmative 

defense is voluntary and intelligent, it cannot direct the defense it believes is 

necessary to ensure constitutionally effective counsel at the expense of the 

defendant's right to control a chosen defense. Because Coristine validly waived 

his right to mount a reasonable belief affirmative defense, the trial court violated 

his Sixth Amendment rights when it failed to respect his decision. 

D. The Sixth Amendment Violation Is Not Harmless 

We must determine whether the constitutional error in this case warrants 

vacating Coristine's conviction and remanding for a new trial. Some fundamental 

constitutional errors "are so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal," 

but for "all other constitutional errors," we apply harmless-error analysis to 

determine whether reversal is appropriate. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 

7, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999). In Jones, we recognized that a 

violation of the defendant's right to control his own defense may be subject to 

review for harmless error. 99 Wn.2d at 748. 1 

1 To be clear, absolute denial of a defendant's right to control the defense is 

structural error and not subject to harmless-error analysis. See, e.g., McKaskle, 465 U.S. 

at 177 n.8. However, we review lesser deprivations of this right for harmless error. See 

Jones, 99 Wn.2d at 748. As in Jones, the error here was not an absolute deprivation. We 

therefore presume that it caused prejudice and reverse and remand for a new trial unless 

the State proves it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 

U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). 

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State v. Cor is tine (Brandon S.), 86145-5 

The notion of constitutional harmless error arrived relatively late to 

American courts. Although federal law and procedure had long allowed appellate 

courts to decide cases "without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the 

substantial rights of the parties," 28 U.S.C. § 2111, and although all 50 states had 

harmless-error statutes in place by 1967, the Supreme Court's ratification of 

constitutional harmless-error analysis in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 

87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967) was a landmark. 

Chapman held that if trial error is of constitutional magnitude, prejudice is 

presumed and the State bears the burden of proving it was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. !d. at 24; accord State v. Irby, 170 Wn.2d 874, 886, 246 P.3d 

796 (20 11 ). The Court announced this rule as a constitutional minimum protection 

for the rights of accused persons, observing that "we cannot leave to the States the 

formulation of the authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect 

people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights." Chapman, 

386 U.S. at 21. Although Justice Gonzalez's dissent today invites the court to 

adopt an imaginative new test for harmless error, the parties did not brief this issue 

and we did not grant review to consider it. We therefore decline to engage in an 

unnecessary debate about the merits of our present test. 

Under the Chapman standard, the State has not demonstrated that forcing an 

affirmative defense upon Coristine after the close of the evidence was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Preliminarily, the error in this case was not merely the 

giving of a gratuitous or unnecessary correct instruction. This is because the injury 

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State v. Coristine (Brandon S.), 86145-5 

was not to Coristine' s right to be tried by a jury applying accurate instructions of 

law. Instead, the trial court erred by denying Coristine his Sixth Amendment right 

to mount the defense of his choosing. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177-78. A 

deprivation of this right respecting individual autonomy is error even if the trial 

court's instructions in the law are a model of accuracy. Indeed, if seizing control 

over a defendant's trial strategy were harmless so long as the court correctly 

instructed the jury in the defense it chose, little would remain of the Sixth 

Amendment right to control one's defense. 

On the facts of this case, the presence of the unwanted instruction was not 

inconsequential to the jury's deliberations. First, the instruction risked confusion 

between the jury's consideration of the victim's capacity and Coristine's 

"reasonable belief' in her capacity, an issue that had not been directly addressed in 

the evidence. We need not determine whether the affirmative defense instruction 

shifted the burden of proof to the defense on the issue of capacity, as Coristine 

asserts. It certainly impacted jury deliberations by interfering with Coristine' s 

straightforward presentation of his sole defense-that L.F. was in fact not 

incapacitated. The likelihood of confusion was compounded here by the fact that 

the jury heard no testimony about reasonable belief, as the instruction was not 

forced upon Coristine until after the close of the evidence. 

Chief Justice Madsen, in a separate dissent, argues that the timing of the 

decision to give the affirmative defense instruction-after the close of the 

evidence-was somehow less prejudicial than the alternative. Dissent (Madsen, 

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State v. Coristine (Brandon S.), 86145-5 

C.J.) at 4. The argument rests solely on a comparison between this case and Jones, 

i.e., at least Coristine was not required to maintain inconsistent theories of defense 

from the start of the trial, as was Jones. But we cannot conclude Coristine suffered 

less prejudice as a result. Because the trial court in Jones forced the defendant to 

mount an insanity defense at the outset of his trial, Jones had the opportunity to 

present evidence, expert or other testimony, and cross-examination addressing this 

alternative theory. Jones, 99 Wn.2d at 738-39. In Coristine's case, the affirmative 

defense was presented to the jury after the opportunity had passed for Coristine to 

offer evidence to support it. 3 VRP at 393, 399. We cannot agree with Chief 

Justice Madsen that a defendant who does not have the opportunity to support an 

unwanted defense by offering evidence somehow suffers less prejudice than one 

who does? 

The presence of an unwanted affirmative defense instruction is particularly 

problematic in a case, such as this, that involves the relative credibility of a handful 

of eyewitnesses, including the victim and the accused. We do not share the 

dissenters' confidence that the instruction was inconsequential or that the two 

defenses were essentially consistent. Indeed, the mere fact that the parties thought 

2 We also note that the errors in Jones, while different from those here, do not 

constitute the necessary or sufficient facts for a finding of reversible error. The question 

of whether error is harmless or reversible does not rest on bright-line rules; it is 

contextual and arises from the facts of the case. Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 

684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986) (reciting "a host of factors" to consider in 

determining whether error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). The question here 

is not whether or to what degree this case resembles Jones, but whether the error was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. At any rate, Coristine was in fact saddled with 

inconsistent defenses during the critical period of the jury's deliberations. 

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State v. Coristine (Brandon S.), 86145-5 

it mattered and strenuously debated the g1vmg of the affirmative defense 

instruction should undermine such confidence. Given the nature of the issues 

involved, the absence of an opportunity to present evidence tailored to the 

affirmative defense, and the tension between Coristine's chosen defense and the 

theory of "reasonable mistake," we cannot say that instructing the jury over his 

objection was not the "slight impetus" that affected the verdict. Glasser v. United 

States, 315 U.S. 60, 67,62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942). Accordingly, we hold 

that the violation of Coristine' s Sixth Amendment right to control his defense was 

not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the Chapman standard, a new trial 

is required. 

CONCLUSION 

The trial court violated Coristine's Sixth Amendment right to control his 

own defense by instructing the jury on an affirmative defense that Coristine did not 

want to pursue. This constitutional violation was not harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for a new trial. 

-13-
State v. Coristine (Brandon S.), 86145-5 

WE CONCUR: 
State v. Coristine (Brandon S.) 

No. 86145-5 

MADSEN, C.J. (dissenting)-! agree with much of what the majority says about 

the right of a criminal defendant to control his or her defense. However, I disagree with 

the majority's discussion and resolution of harmless error. Although Justice Gonzalez's 

dissent correctly concludes that the error is harmless, I am reluctant to adopt a framework 

for harmless error for which neither of the parties advocates. Thus, I write separately to 

affirm. 

Discussion 

As Justice Gonzalez's dissent correctly notes, we follow the United States 

Supreme Court's precedent in reviewing federal constitutional error in criminal trials. 

Dissent (Gonzalez, J.) at 5. Applying that precedent, it is clear that "most constitutional 

errors can be harmless." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 

L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991). There is a very limited class of cases-cases involving structural 

error-in which a harmless error analysis is inappropriate. See Neder v. United States, 

527 U.S. 1, 7-8, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999) (collecting cases involving 

structural error). The error in this case does not fit within this small class of cases. 
No. 86145-5 

Madsen, C.J., dissenting 

Rather, as the majority correctly notes, the error here, in the broadest sense, is a violation 

of the Brandon Coristine's right to control his defense. See generally State v. Jones, 99 

Wn.2d 735, 664 P.2d 1216 (1983). More specifically, however, the error was giving an 

affirmative defense jury instruction over Coristine's objection. It is the effect of that 

error that we must evaluate. 

In Jones, this court held that interposing a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity 

over the defendant's objection violated the defendant's right "to plead guilty and/or 

control his own defense." !d. at 740. In deciding whether the defendant was entitled to a 

new trial, the court reviewed the evidence and the defense theories that were argued. The 

court first observed that the most "obvious" prejudice to the defendant was that "the jury 

was faced with two defense attorneys arguing conflicting defense theories."· !d. at 748. 1 

The court went on to review all of the evidence that would have been excluded had the 

insanity plea not been entered and the jury not been instructed on the defense, including 

the testimony of the defense psychiatrist. Although the Jones court was unclear 

regarding its harmless error test, it concluded that "[i]n light of these evidentiary 

considerations, it is impossible for us to conclude that Mr. Jones was not prejudiced by 

the trial court's error." !d. at 750. 

Since Jones was decided, this court has clarified that in the case of constitutional 

error, "we must 'conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have 

1 The trial court appointed amicus counsel to argue the insanity defense. "While one attorney 

was arguing that the defendant was acting as 'a reasonable and ordinarily cautious and prudent 

person' (Clerk's Papers, at 22 (self-defense instruction)), the other was arguing that he was 

acting under the influence of paranoid delusions." Jones, 99 Wn.2d at 748. 

2 
No. 86145-5 

Madsen, C.J., dissenting 

been the same absent the error."' State v. Brown, 147 Wn.2d 330, 341, 58 P.3d 889 

(2002) (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 19). Applying this test I would hold the error in this 

case was harmless. 2 

Considering the nature of the error, the first question is whether, by instructing the 

jury on the affirmative defense, the defendant was saddled with inconsistent defenses. 

The answer is no. Coristine was charged with second degree rape under RCW 

9A.44.050(1)(b). In order to convict Coristine under that statute, the State was required 

to prove that Coristine engaged in sexual intercourse with another person who was 

incapable of consent by reason of being mentally incapacitated or physically helpless. 

Coristine's theory of defense was that the complaining witness consented to sex and that 

she was competent to consent. Coristine intended to make the State prove its case by 

proving incompetency to consent. The "to convict instruction" did exactly that and 

nothing about the affirmative defense instruction contradicted that defense theory. 

Indeed, Coristine's evidence, if believed, proved both that the complaining witness was 

competent to consent and that Coristine reasonably believed she was competent. 

Coristine also complains that by instructing the jury on the "reasonable belief' 

affirmative defense, the trial court shifted the burden of proof to the defense. However, 

the State was required to prove mental incapability before the jury could even consider 

2 The majority criticizes my reliance on Jones for the factors to consider in making a harmless 

error determination. Majority at 12 n.2. However, Jones is the only case from this court that has 

recognized a constitutional right of a defendant to control his or her defense or to apply a 

harmless error analysis to the violation of this right. Thus, a comparison with Jones is very 

instructive. 

3 
No. 86145-5 

Madsen, C.J., dissenting 

the affirmative defense instruction to which Coristine objected. As the Court of Appeals 

recently said in State v. Powell, 150 Wn. App. 139, 157 n.12, 206 P.3d 703 (2009), 

"[t]his affirmative defense was relevant only once the State proved the elements of the 

offense. Thus, a 'reasonable belief' instruction would not have shifted the initial burden 

of proof'' to the defendant. Even without the instruction, the jury could have believed the 

victim's testimony and found Coristine guilty. 

Finally, in Jones, the court also considered whether any evidence was admitted 

that would otherwise have been omitted absent the error. Unlike in Jones, where the trial 

court entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, appointed a second attorney to 

argue insanity, and permitted psychiatric testimony during the trial, the trial court here 

did not give the offending instruction until after the parties had rested, and Coristine 

points to no evidence that was improperly admitted due to the court's error.

3 

Using the test adopted by this court, I would hold that the error was harmless and 

that the conviction must be affirmed. 

3 The majority criticizes my harmless error analysis but offers scant analysis of its own. Boiled 

down, the majority reverses this conviction because it says the affirmative defense instruction 

"risked confusion" by "interfering" with Coristine's "sole" defense that L.F. was not 

incapacitated. Majority at 11. Yet, the majority does not argue that the instruction shifted the 

State's burden to prove L.F.'s incapacity or explain why the jury would even reach the 

affirmative defense instruction unless it had determined that the State had met its burden to show 

L.F. was incapacitated. The only other point upon which the majority relies-that the case 

involved the credibility of a handful of witnesses-is left completely unexplained. 

4 
No. 86145-5 

Madsen, C.JI, dissenting 

5 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (GonzaJez, J. dissenting) 

No. 86145,.5 

GONZALEZ, J. ( dissenting)-A jury convicted Brandon Coristine of raping his 

new roommate on her first night at her new place of residence. I agree with the 

majority that giving an affirmative defense instruction over Coristine's objection 

violated his Sixth Amendment right to control his own defense. But not every error 

merits reversal. This one certainly does not. I respectfully dissent. 

I also write separately to observe that we have not established a clear 

framework of harmless error review in Washington. Until we build and consistently 

follow such a framework, our opinions in this area will be confusing and inconsistent, 

and review for harmless error will continue to be "an arbitrary exercise of judicial 

authority." Dennis J. Sweeney, An Analysis of Harmless Error in Washington: A 

Principled Process, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 277, 323 (1996). 

We can do better. A review of our case law reveals workable standards and 

suggests a framework that would foster clarity and consistency in this difficult area of 

the law. In my view, this court should explicitly require a three-step process for 

appellate review of constitutional errors at criminal trials. First, an appellate court 

should evaluate whether the error in question requires automatic reversal-what is 

sometimes called "structural" error. See, e.g., State v. Frost, 160 Wn.2d 765, 779-82, 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

161 P.3d 361 (2007). If the error is among these rarest of errors, the court should 

simply reverse. Second, if the error is not structural, the court should consider 

whether the error was plausibly relevant to the verdict. See, e.g., State v. Bobenhouse, 

166 Wn.2d 881, 894, 214 P.3d 907 (2009). Ifthe court is convinced, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that the error was not plausibly related to the verdict, the court 

should affirm the conviction. Third, if the error is plausibly relevant to the challenged 

guilty verdict, the court should reverse unless it is persuaded, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, in light of the full record, that the error did not tip the scales from innocence to 

guilt. See, e.g., State v. Rice, 120 Wn.2d 549, 569, 844 P.2d 416 (1993); State v. 

Easter, 130 Wn.2d 228, 242, 922 P.2d 1285 (1996). This three-step process would 

provide our courts with a clear, workable, and effective way of conducting harmless 

error review and adjudicating whether a constitutional error at trial is harmless. It 

would foster clearer, more consistent, and more objective precedents. It would help 

'"cleanse the judicial process of prejudicial error without becoming mired in harmless 

error."' State v. Grenning, 169 Wn.2d 47,59 n.8, 234 P.3d 169 (2010) (quoting 

ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 81 (1970)). 

1. Harmless Error: Federal Standards 

United States Supreme Court precedent has established the minimum 

requirements state courts must follow in evaluating constitutional error. See Chapman 

v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20-21, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). An 

otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside where a reviewing court is 

2 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Errors are 

inevitable, and many errors, even constitutional ones, do not call the fundamental 

fairness of the trial into question nor affect the final outcome. See Delaware v. Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,681, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986). Upholding fair 

criminal convictions "promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on 

the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of 

immaterial error." VanArsdall, 475 U.S. at 681. It avoids the myriad costs associated 

with retrials, both to the justice system and to the witnesses haled into court again and 

again. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509, 103 S. Ct. 1974,76 L. Ed. 2d 

96 (1983). In contrast, reversing for harmless errors "'encourages litigants to abuse 

the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it.'" VanArsdall, 475 U.S. at 

681 (quoting TRAYNOR, supra, at 50). 

There are a limited number of errors that warrant automatic reversal. See, e.g., 

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148-50 & n.4, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 165 L. 

Ed. 2d 409 (2006); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L. Ed. 

2d 35 (1999). Such errors are sometimes referred to as "structural" errors. See, e.g., 

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148. An error may be deemed structural because it is 

intrinsically harmful, Neder, 527 U.S. at 7, because it necessarily brings into question 

the fundamental fairness or reliability of the entire trial process, id. at 8-9; Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991), 

because assessing its effect in a given case is highly difficult or impossible, Gonzalez3 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n.4, 150, or because the error substantially implicates some 

weighty interest other than ensuring a reliable and accurate outcome, id. at 149 n.4; 

McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 944, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1984). 

I wholeheartedly agree with the majority that the error here was not structural. 

For all other constitutional errors, the appellate court must consider whether the 

error actually might have affected the trial's outcome in order to determine whether 

reversal is appropriate. See, e.g., Neder, 527 U.S. at 17-19. Ifthe court is persuaded, 

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not affect the verdict, the conviction 

should be upheld. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. at 681; see also Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 

Most constitutional errors are subject to harmless error review, Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 

U.S. at 148, and most such errors are indeed harmless, Hasting, 461 U.S. at 509. The 

court will consider any plausible effects that such an error might have had on a 

rational jury, and the error will be deemed harmless if the reviewing court concludes 

beyond a reasonable doubt that "the jury verdict would have been the same absent the 

error" and thus "the error 'did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' Neder, 527 

U.S. at 17 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). 

Neder was convicted of fraud for using wildly inflated real estate appraisals to 

secure loans, concealing his ownership interests in various shell corporations, and 

falsifying documentation. !d. at 4-5. The trial court failed to instruct the jury that the 

defendant's false statements must have been "material[]" to convict, omitting an 

element of the charged crimes. !d. at 6. The evidence establishing the materiality of 

4 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

the false statements was uncontroverted and overwhelming. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 6, 

18-20. Thus, the court had little difficulty determining the error was harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt. 

The United States Supreme Court requires that harmless error analysis be 

thorough and substantive. The appellate court must consider the error in the context 

of the trial as a whole. Neder, 527 U.S. at 19. The appellate court also must provide 

substantive reasoning a~d analysis in support of its conclusions. See Clemons v. 

Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738,753-54, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 108 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1990) 

(vacating state court's "cryptic holding" ofharmlessness that was unsupported and 

"difficult to accept" without "a detailed explanation based on the record"). Requiring 

thorough review of the record and detailed explanation helps to ensure that harmless 

error review is conducted properly and consistently over time. State courts must 

comply with these minimum federal requirements and abide by the standards that the 

United States Supreme Court has established. Beyond these established federal 

standards and minimum requirements, states are left to develop their own concrete 

and detailed frameworks and standards, consistent with federal law, to govern 

harmless error review in state courts. See, e.g., State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 425-

26,705 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-8, 275 P.3d 110. 

2. Harmless Error: Washington 

Washington does not have a clear, workable, and effective legal framework to 

govern judicial review of constitutional errors at criminal trials. See, e.g., Sweeney, 

5 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

supra, at 287 (noting that our cases have done "little ... to provide the analytical 

framework necessary to apply the doctrine of harmless error"). As a result, our 

adjudications of harmlessness have been unpredictable. The closest this court has 

come to adopting a comprehensive framework to govern harmless error review was in 

Guloy, when we intended "to settle the question of what type of standard this court 

will use in its harmless error analysis," and with little discussion or explanation 

selected '"the overwhelming untainted evidence"' test over "the contribution test." 

104 Wn.2d at 425-26; see also State v. Evans, 96 Wn.2d 1, 6-10, 633 P.2d 83 (1981) 

(Brachtenbach, C.J., concurring) (discussing these two tests). Specifically, we 

decided that harmlessness would not depend on whether the error could have played a 

part in the actual jury's determination of guilt (the contribution test) and decided that 

harmlessness would instead depend on whether "the untainted evidence is so 

overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of guilt" (the overwhelming 

evidence test). Guloy, 104 Wn.2d at 426. The contribution test has since been 

rejected by the United States Supreme Court. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 11-13, 17-18. 

Unfortunately, the overwhelming evidence test fares little better. 

The overwhelming evidence test ignores a wide variety of potential trial errors 

with differing effects and is an overly broad standard that properly applies in only a 

limited set of circumstances. First, the standard ignores that some trial errors are 

plausibly relevant only to discrete elements or issues. In Neder, for example, the jury 

instructions omitted one element of the crime, and that error was properly found 

6 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

harmless because of uncontested and overwhelming evidence of the omitted element, 

not of guilt generally. 527 U.S. at 18. Second, the overwhelming evidence test 

ignores that some trial errors are not plausibly relevant to the verdict at all. For 

example, in State v. Kroll, 87 Wn.2d 829, 558 P.2d 173 (1976), the jury instructions 

erroneously shifted the burden of proof to the defendant as to a certain element of 

second degree murder but properly instructed the jury as to first degree murder. The 

jury convicted on first degree murder, and we rightly concluded that the error was 

harmless. 87 Wn.2d at 840-41. Our conclusion did not depend on any quantum of 

evidence because the error was not even plausibly relevant to the challenged verdict in 

the first place. Third, the overwhelming evidence test ignores that the amount of 

untainted evidence necessary to render an error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 

depends upon the force with which the error plausibly might have swayed the jury 

toward guilt. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 67-68, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. 

Ed. 680 (1942). In sum, the overwhelming evidence test is appropriate only when an 

error is plausibly relevant to the entire verdict and might have exerted substantial 

force in swaying the jury toward guilt. It is probably for this reason that the United 

States Supreme Court originally cautioned against "overemphasis" on "'overwhelming evidence'" in harmless error review. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. 

In light of the overwhelming evidence test's clear failings, it is not surprising 

that this court has not consistently applied it. Instead, we have frequently determined 

harmlessness not by weighing the error against the evidence but by considering the 

7 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

limited relevance of an error to the challenged verdict. In some cases, errors have 

been relevant only to discrete elements or issues, and thus, in determining 

harmlessness we have considered only evidence related to those elements or issues. 

See, e.g., State v. Watt, 160 Wn.2d 626, 639-40, 160 P.3d 640 (2007); State v. 

Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 844-45, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). In many cases, errors simply 

have not been plausibly relevant to the challenged verdict, and we have found those 

errors harmless for that reason alone, regardless of the evidence of guilt. See, e.g., 

Bobenhouse, 166 Wn.2d at 894-95; State v. Berube, 150 Wn.2d 498, 509, 79 P.3d 

1144 (2003). 1 Thus, although we often speak of the overwhelming evidence test as if 

it were our universal standard for harmlessness, see, e.g., Frost, 160 Wn.2d at 782; 

Watt, 160 Wn.2d at 635-36; Guloy, 104 Wn.2d at 426, we also often ignore it. This 

inconsistency will continue until we identify a clear, workable, and effective 

framework to govern review of constitutional errors at criminal trials. 

1

Myriad examples exist. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731,776,24 P.3d 1006 (2001) 

("Clark's shackling on the first day of voir dire was more than logically offset by over two weeks 

of observing Clark in the courtroom without shackles."); State v. Bourgeois, 133 Wn.2d 389, 

407-08, 945 P.2d 1120 (1997) (improper communication with juror held harmless because no 

information was '"communicated ... to the jury that was in any manner harmful to the 

appellant"' (quoting State v. Johnson, 56 Wn.2d 700, 709, 355 P.2d 13 (1960))); State v. 

Handran, 113 Wn.2d 11, 16,775 P.2d 453 (1989); State v. Caliguri, 99 Wn.2d 501, 509, 664 

P .2d 466 (1983) (tape improperly played to jury outside defendant's presence could not plausibly 

have been harmful notwithstanding its containing a "colorful expression of [an] agent's desire to 

place Caliguri under arrest, a desire which Caliguri' s presence at trial must already have made 

the jury aware of''); State v. Bonds, 98 Wn.2d 1, 17-18,653 P.2d 1024 (1982); State v. Hall, 95 

Wn.2d 536, 539-40, 627 P.2d 101 (1981) (failure of instruction to discriminate between victims 

irrelevant where only evidence was of indiscriminate firing at all three alleged victims); Kroll, 87 

Wn.2d at 840-41 (erroneous instruction related to charge upon which defendant was found not 

guilty). 

8 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

3. Synthesis 

The three-step framework I propose reflects existing federal standards and 

much of our own precedent. If adopted explicitly, this framework would provide a 

clear, workable, and effective way of promoting consistent and just adjudications in 

this difficult area of the law. 

First, the reviewing court must determine whether the error warrants automatic 

reversal or is instead subject to constitutional harmless error analysis. See, e.g., 

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148-50 & n.4; Frost, 160 Wn.2d at 779-82. If an error is 

structural, the defendant's conviction must be reversed. 

Second, if the error is subject to harmless error analysis, the State must show 

that the error was not plausibly relevant to the verdict. See, e.g., Kroll, 87 Wn.2d at 

840-41. Properly determining whether and how a given type of error had the potential 

to sway an honest, fair-minded, and reasonable jury away from innocence and toward 

guilt must depend upon logic, common sense, experience, and scientific inquiry. 

Mere speculation is insufficient in light of the fact that "academic" and "technical" 

errors are the very reason the harmless error doctrine was created in the first place. 

Guloy, 104 Wn.2d at 426. Whether a given error was plausibly relevant to a particular 

verdict will depend upon the context of the error and often will require a searching 

review ofthe record. See, e.g., State v. Bonds, 98 Wn.2d 1, 17-18,653 P.2d 1024 

(1982) Uury' s related finding rendered instructional error logically irrelevant); State v. 

Maupin, 128 Wn.2d 918, 929, 913 P.2d 808 (1996) (noting that "a witness's proffered 

9 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

testimony [may be] so incredible that its exclusion is harmless error," but such a 

determination must be made "from the record"). If the court concludes, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that the error was not plausibly relevant to the verdict, it must be 

found harmless. 

Third, if the error was plausibly relevant to the verdict, the State must establish 

that the error could not plausibly have been the cause of a guilty verdict from an 

honest, fair-minded, and reasonable jury. See, e.g., Rice, 120 Wn.2d at 569; Easter, 

130 Wn.2d at 242; Watt, 160 Wn.2d at 639-40. This step requires consideration of all 

relevant untainted evidence and a determination of whether eliminating the error 

plausibly could have tipped the scales from guilt to innocence. A searching review of 

the record often will be necessary. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 171 Wn.2d 764, 770, 

254 P.3d 815 (2011). The stronger the plausible sway of the error, the more 

compelling that the relevant untainted evidence must be. See Glasser, 315 U.S. at 67-

68. If the error plausibly could have exerted substantial force on the jury in some 

way, overwhelming evidence to the same effect will be necessary to find the error 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Some errors are egregious enough that the State 

will bear a significant burden persuading the court that the error did not contribute to 

the verdict. See, e.g., State v. Monday, 171 Wn.2d 667, 680-81, 257 P.3d 551 (2011). 

Once again, these determinations must be informed by logic, common sense, 

experience, and scientific inquiry. In the end, to find an error harmless, the reviewing 

court must be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no honest, fair-minded, and 

10 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

reasonable jury plausibly would have been swayed from innocence to guilt because of 

the error. If an error was harmless, the conviction should not be disturbed. 

Although it is unlikely that any framework will ever render harmless error 

analysis entirely objective and consistent, faithful adherence to this three-step process 

will allow for the development of useful precedent and proper adjudication of 

harmlessness. This is true especially because at all steps of this process, a reviewing 

court must provide substantive analysis and reasoning in support of its conclusions. 

See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 753-54. 

4. Application 

Reversal is improper in this case. As the majority properly notes, imposing this 

instruction was not structural error. Majority at 9 n.1. It was also not plausibly 

relevant to the guilty verdict, and clearly did not tip the scales from innocence to guilt. 

I am persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless and Coristine's 

conviction should be upheld. 

Coristine does not challenge the legal accuracy of the instruction itself. Such a 

challenge would not succeed; it is drawn from the pattern jury instructions and is 

based on the statutory language. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 20; 11 WASHINGTON 

PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 19.03, at 296 (3d 

ed. 2008). Instructional error is generally subjected to constitutional harmless error 

review. See Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 60-61, 129 S. Ct. 530, 172 L. Ed. 2d 

388 (2008); State v. Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735, 748-49, 664 P.2d 1212 (1983). Giving an 

11 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

affirmative defense instruction over defendant's objection does implicate the 

defendant's dignity and autonomy. See majority at 4-5. But standing alone, it does 

not warrant reversal unless, at least, it plausibly might have affected the outcome of 

his trial. 

In my view, the affirmative defense instruction simply was not plausibly 

relevant to the jury's verdict. The decision to give the gratuitous instruction was 

rendered only after the parties rested, and neither party so much as mentioned the 

affirmative defense in closing arguments. It could have had no effect on trial strategy 

or presentation. The instruction was a proper statement of the law. See RCW 

9A.44.030(1). It was not misleading. It cast no doubt on the State's burden of proving 

Coristine's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

I also cannot see how this instruction might have confused the jury. Contra 

majority at 11. One can always speculate about fanciful ways that an error might have 

affected the final verdict. In Kroll, for example, we could have speculated about the 

jury becoming confused because of the erroneous instruction on second degree 

murder and then also speculated about the possible effects of that theoretical 

confusion on the first degree murder conviction. But such confusion would not have 

been plausible. We instruct jurors to consider the greater charges first before reaching 

the lesser degree. E.g., 11 A WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY 

INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 155.00, at 626 (3d ed. 2008). Since the jurors convicted on 

the greater charge, they would not have reached the lesser and any chance of 

12 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

confusion would have been so remote as to be dismissed beyond a reasonable doubt. 

In contrast, as a result of the forced insanity defense, there was an actual conflict 

between Jones's defense and the defense forced upon him, and potentially damaging 

psychiatric evidence was admitted. Jones, 99 Wn.2d at 748-50. 

Nothing like what happened in Jones happened here. There simply was no 

conflict between the statutory affirmative defense that "the defendant reasonably 

believed that [the victim] was not mentally incapacitated," CP at 20, and the 

defendant's theory of the case that the victim was not mentally incapacitated. If the 

jurors had found that "the defendant reasonably believed that [the victim] was not 

mentally incapacitated or physically helpless," "it [was their] duty to return a verdict 

of not guilty." CP at 20. If the jurors concluded the state had not "proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt" that the victim "was incapable of consent by reason of being 

physically helpless or mentally incapacitated," it was their "duty to return a verdict of 

not guilty." CP at 16. If anything, the affirmative defense instruction helped 

Coristine by giving the jury another way to acquit him. We can say-we should saythat we are confident, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the improper instruction did not 

contribute to the verdict. 

The actual evidence presented in this case confirms this. The rape took place at 

Coristine's residence. His victim had just moved in and was one of many roommates. 

L.F. testified that she drank heavily at the party and went to bed when her head began 

to "spin[]." 2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 92. The following day, L.F. 

13 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

went to the hospital and reported to a nurse and police officer that she had been raped 

while "in and out of a conscious state" while intoxicated in her own bed. 2 VRP at 

182. L.F. testified that Coristine subsequently called her at the hospital and told her "I 

think it was me, I'm sorry." Id. at 108. Coristine allegedly explained that he had been 

"really drunk" and asked L.F. not to tell his wife. Id. L.F. moved out of the house the 

next day. 

When a detective interviewed him, Coristine admitted he had talked to L.F. on 

the phone while she was at the hospital, but he denied making self-incriminating 

statements. At the same time, he told the detective that he was very intoxicated at the 

party and that he remained unsure of what he had done. Coristine's DNA 

(deoxyribonucleic acid) was retrieved from L.F.'s body. 

At trial, Coristine testified that he initially did not remember having sex with 

L.F. but that "after a couple days [he] did remember everything." 3 VRP at 358, 380. 

He testified that when he came upstairs after the party in response to a noise, L.F. 

pulled him into her bedroom and goaded him into having sex with her. ld. at 354-55 

("I was kind of intoxicated but I still had a level head, but I kind of lost my balance 

and fell into the room."). Coristine testified that he did not resist for fear of hurting 

L.F. and that he did not call out for help because he assumed they were making 

enough noise in the doorway for someone to hear. Coristine' s sister-in-law testified 

that she was awake at the time and in her bedroom across the hall, but she did not hear 

any noise from L.F.' s room. 

14 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

The record as a whole clearly demonstrates Coristine's guilt. His version of 

events was implausible and self-serving. Numerous inconsistencies and farfetched 

allegations riddled Coristine's testimony. He acknowledged that L.F. had gone to 

sleep for the night but then alleged that she later grabbed him and physically forced 

him into her room. Coristine' s assertion that he could not physically resist L.F.' s 

advances without injuring her defies common sense. Coristine also alleged he did not 

call for help because he and L.F. were making a lot of noise-an explanation which is 

dubious on its own and flatly was contradicted by the testimony of a third party. 

Beyond a reasonable doubt, the error did not contribute to the verdict. 

There will be real consequences to the court's decision today. L.F. already had 

to endure the trial and testify; she should not have to do so again, and she may not be 

able to do so again. See 2 VRP at 88 ("[I]t's something I've tried really, really hard to 

block out as best I can .... Last night things came back to me that I didn't want to 

come back."). There is no guarantee that other relevant witnesses will be available or 

remain able to recall relevant details. In either case, the resources expended at the 

first trial will have been needlessly wasted. Our constitution does not demand this 

result. 

I respectfully dissent. 

15 
State v. Coristine, No. 86145-5 (Gonzalez, J. dissenting) 

16