NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEHAN ZEB MIR, M.D.,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 20

- 56403

D.C. No. 2:19

- cv

- 03960

- SVW

- SK

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 15, 2022 * *

Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Jehan Zeb Mir, M.D.
, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his action alleging federal and state law claims stemming from denial

of Mir’s insurance claim

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo. Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc. , 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 18 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 20

- 56403

2003). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Mir’s claims for

breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing because Mir’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations,

and Mir failed to establish any basis for tolling. See Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2(i)(2)

( “Any arbitration instituted pursuant to this section shall be concluded . . . [w]ithin

five years from the institution of the arbitration proceeding.” ); id. § 11580.2(k)

(providing for tolling if the insurer fails to provide written notice of the applicable

statute of limitations “ at least 30 days before the expiration ”) ; see also id.

§ 11580.2(i)(3) (excusing a party’s noncompliance with the statute of limitations

on the basis of estoppel, waiver, impossibility, impracticality, and futility ).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mir’s motion for

reconsideration because Mir failed to establish any basis for such relief. See Sch.

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc. , 5 F.3d 1255, 1262

- 63 (9th

Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for recon sideration).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendant’s

application to quash the deposition subpoena of Rosenwasser because Mir failed to

demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interio r ,

342 F. 3d 1080 , 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review and

explaining that a district court’s “ decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed3 20

- 56403

except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery results in actual and

substantial p rejudice to the complaining litigant ” (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)).

We reject as without merit Mir’s contention that the district court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction or that the September 24, 2012 letter was fabricated

.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Mir’s motion for judicial notice is d enied as unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.