2010 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

9-29-2010 

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w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2010/537NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________ No. 10-1431

_______________ JAMES J. DOYLE; JOAN E. DOYLE, h/w

v. SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA

TRANSPORATION AUTHORITY James J. Doyle, Appellant

_______________ On Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-08-cv-04273) District Judge: Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II

_______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) September 21, 2010

_______________ Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge , AMBRO and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: September 29, 2010)

_______________ OPINION

_______________ AMBRO, Circuit JudgePlaintiff-Appellant James Doyle appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on his claim thathis employer, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”), violated an arbitration award ordering that Mr. Doyle be reinstated to his job “immediately.” We affirm. 1 I. Background We set out only those facts that are rele vant to our holding. SEPTA terminated Doyle from his position as a railroad conductor in its Regional Rail Division on July 14, 2006. Thereafter, his exclusive collec tive bargaining representative, United Transportation Union Local 61 (“the Unio n”), filed a grievance challenging the termination pursuant to the terms of the co llective bargaining agr eement between SEPTA and the Union. SEPTA denied the grievance, and the Union appealed the denial to the Public Law Board (“PLB”), an arbitrati on panel empowered under the collective bargaining agreement to hear appeals from denials of grievances. Following the completion of arbitration proceedings, the PLB ordered SEPTA to reinstate Doyle. The PLB’s award, issued Ma rch 15, 2008, states in relevant part: Claimant Doyle is to be reinstated immediately without backpay, but with all seniority intact. Carrier should a ttempt to expedite any administrative processes and refresher training associ ated with his reinstatement. The claim of the Union is sustained to this extent.

1 Because Doyle filed suit under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. , the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Ass’n of Flight Attendants v. USAIR, Inc. , 960 F.2d 345, 347 (3d Cir. 1992).

2However, before Doyle could return to work as a conductor, he was required to undergo a recertification process pursuant to SEPTA’s operating rules. 2 One step of the recertification process was designed to en sure Doyle’s knowledge of the “physical characteristics” of some or all SEPTA tr ain lines. The parties dispute how much “physical characteristics” re-qualification Doyle had to complete: Doyle asserts that he had to become re-qualified on only those routes on which he would actually be working, but SEPTA asserts that he was required by the relevant operating rules to become requalified on each route on which he had been qualified before his termination (which, in Doyle’s case, was every route). Discussions ensued between SEPTA, the Union, and Do yle regarding when Doyle would be permitted to return to work. On May 1, SEPTA General Manager Joe Casey instructed that Doyle should be permitted to bid for a work assignment by participating in a “general picking.” There is some dispute in the record about th e precise content of Casey’s instructions, but it is clear that the next general picking took place in August
2008. Just before that general picking, on August 1, 2008, SEPTA and the Union memorialized an agreement regarding Doyle’s return to work. That agreement states in relevant part: 1. As an accommodation, pending his re-qualification as a Conductor, Mr. Doyle will be permitted to pick an A ssistant Conductor run at the next scheduled picking, which is currently scheduled to begin August 7, 2008

2 Before the District Court, Doyle disputed th is statement, maintain ing that the terms of the arbitration award required that SEPTA rein state him as a conductor even before he finished recertifying. However, he ha s abandoned that argument on appeal. 3and become effective September 7, 2008. 2. Once Mr. Doyle is reinstated to th e rolls of the Authority, he must requalify as a Conductor by Oc tober 7, 2008. If Mr. Doyle fails to re-qualify as a Conductor by October 7, 2008, he will be dropped from the rolls of the Authority for lack of qualifications. 3. He is required to re-qualify on his own time and in doing so must complete all his assigned duties withou t jeopardizing his ability to complete an assignment due to a potential vi olation of the hours of service requirements. 4. The COBRA payments made by M r. Doyle while he was terminated from the Authority will be reimbursed to him upon his retu rn to work as soon as administratively feasible. 5. The terms and conditions of Mr. Doyle's reinstatement are final and binding. They are based solely upon the facts and circumstances of this particular case and do not establish an y precedent. It will not be referred to by either party in any other grievance, special board of adjustment, or any other forum or proceeding except one involving Mr. Doyle. Doyle participated in the August 7 general picking. Then, on September 7, he began work as a conductor, though 1) he had not yet completed physical characteristics requalification on all SEPTA lines , and 2) under the August 1 agreement his entitlement to return was at the assist ant conductor level. On September 5, 2008, Doyle and his wife 3 filed suit under the Railway Labor Act, claiming that SEPTA violated the arb itrators’ order that Doyle be reinstated “immediately.” Doyle sought compensatory dama ges for lost income during the period from March 15, 2008 (the date of the arbitr ators’ award) until September 7, 2008. Following discovery, Doyle an d SEPTA cross-moved for summary judgment. In January 2010, the District Court granted SEPTA’ s motion for summary judgment and denied

3 She later withdrew from the case. 4Doyle’s. It held that the August 1 agr eement waived Doyle’s rights to challenge the terms and conditions of his reinstatement a nd, in any event, the arbitrators’ award conditioned Doyle’s return to work on his completion of th e recertification process, which Doyle had not completed as of September 7, 2008. II. Discussion We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo , affirming only if “viewing the record in the light mo st favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all inferences in that party’s favor, th ere is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to ju dgment as a matter of law.” U.S. ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA, Inc. , 554 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009). However, the correct interpretation of a contract is a questi on of law that we review de novo

. U.S. v. Hardwick , 544 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2008); South Bay Boston Mgmt., Inc. v. Unite Here, Local 26 , 587 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2009). On appeal, Doyle argues th at the August 1 agreement did not waive his right to file suit challenging SEPTA’s co mpliance with the arbitration award. He also argues that the arbitration award itself entitled him to retu rn to work as soon as he was re-qualified on the physical characteristics of the line on which he woul d be working. Additionally, he argues that SEPTA was required to offer him an assistant conductor position while he re-qualified as a conductor.

5A. The Effect of the August 1 Agreement. Doyle seeks to import from Pennsylvania law the principle that legal rights can be waived only th rough a “clear and unequivocal” statemen t. Building on that principle, he argues that the August 1 agreement did not cl early and unequivocally waive his right to sue to enforce the arbitrati on award because the agreemen t did not contain the words “waiver,” “release,” or “settlement.” We do not agree that Pennsylvania princi ples of contract interpretation apply to this Railway Labor Act case. In the labor cont ext, “state contract law must yield to the developing federal common law, lest common terms in bargaining agreements be given different and potentially inconsistent interpretations in different jurisdictions.” Livadas v. Bradshaw , 512 U.S. 107, 122 (1994). 4 This is the case ev en though the August 1 agreement was not itself a comprehensive colle ctive bargaining agreement, but rather an agreement regarding the return to work of one employee. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed in a similar situation, an agre ement between a union and an employer regarding the terms under which an employee will return to work is “a creature wholly begotten by th e [collective bargai ning agreement].” Jones v. General Motors Corp. , 939 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Ci r. 1991) (holding that stat e law claim regarding breach

4 Livadas arose under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), but the same rule applies to suits arising under the RLA. See, e.g. , Local 107 Office & Prof’l Employees Int’l Union v. Offshore Logistics, Inc. , 380 F.3d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 2004) (applying federal common law to interpret collective bargaining agreement governed by RLA); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. , 210 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying federal co mmon law in RLA case to determine whether party to collective bargaining agreement improperly used alter ego to evade that agreement). 6of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law); see also Davis v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc. , 110 F.3d 245, 249 (4 th Cir. 1997) (same); Stallcop v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. , 820 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 1 987) (holding that oral agreement made in connection with reinstatement should be treated as part of collective bargaining agreement). Thus, we interpret the Augus t 1 agreement under the same federal-law principles that we would apply to interpre t the collective bargaini ng agreement itself. Nonetheless, unions’ waivers of employees ’ federal statutory rights are generally enforced under federal law only if “clear and unmistakable.” Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp. , 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998) (h olding that “clear and unmistakable” standard applied to “union-negotiated waiver of employ ees’ statutory right to a judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination.”). With out deciding whether that standard applies to Doyle’s claim in this cas e, we conclude that the August 1 agreement clearly and unmistakably waived Doyle’s ri ght to bring suit to enforce the terms of the arbitration award. 5 First, the agreement contains the “final and binding” terms of Doyle’s reinstatement. He cannot now seek to add an additional term in th e form of a judgment requiring SEPTA to pay back wages and bene fits during the March 15-September 7 time period. Second, the agreement addresses Doyle’s entitlement to back wages and benefits

5 Doyle’s argument that SEPTA “implicitly c onceded that the August 1, 2008 Letter Agreement does not constitute a clear-and-une quivocal waiver” fares no better. SEPTA stated in its brief that “[t]he remedy Doyle clai ms in this action . . . is precisely what the August 1, 2008 Agreement says he is not entitled to receive. The bargain struck was that Doyle could come back to work before he fini shed requalifying, but he would not be paid for any of the time before he actually came ba ck to work.” Appellee Br. at 20 (emphasis in original).

7by stating that he would be reimbursed for COBRA payments made while he was terminated from SEPTA. It w ould make no sense to construe the agreement’s silence as to other forms of back compensation as leav ing open the possibility of a lawsuit. Accordingly, we affirm the District C ourt’s conclusion that the August 1, 2008 agreement waived Doyle’s right to su e to enforce the arbitration award. B. The Arbitration Award Even ignoring the August 1 agreement, Doyl e’s claim fails. He argues that, to be reinstated as a conductor, he needed to re- qualify on the physical characteristics of only the route on which he would be working, rather than all of the routes on which he had been certified prior to his termination. On this point, the collective bargaining agreement is clear, and it does not support Doyle: “[i] f [an] employee’s phys ical characteristics qualifications on any territory have expire d, [the] employee must requalify all portions previously held.” Nonetheless, in his opening brief Doyle ar gues that the fact th at SEPTA eventually waived in part the re-qualification requirement creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether SEPTA could have waived that requirement (and gotten Doyle back to work) earlier. This argument stretches past its br eaking point the language in the arbitration award directing that SEPTA “attempt to e xpedite any administrative processes and refresher training associated with [Doyle’s] reinstatement.” Itwould have been within its rights to demand that Doyle actually complete the re-qualification pr ocess in accordance with the relevant rules; that it made an ex ception is evidence of good, not bad, faith.

89 Finally, the arbitration award did not en title Doyle to return to SEPTA as an assistant conductor while he became re-qualifi ed as a conductor. The award said that Doyle should be “reinstated.” Reinstatement “means putting the plaintiff back in his old job . . . .” Dhaliwal v. Woods Div., Hesston Corp. , 930 F.2d 547, 548 (7th Cir. 1991); see also NLRB v. Hearst , 102 F.2d 658, 663 (9th Cir. 1939) (“Reinstatement me ans to return to a post previously held”); Shea v. Icelandair , 925 F.Supp. 1014, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“reinstatement means that the employment di scrimination plaintiff is returned to the same position as if he had ne ver been subject to adverse employment action”). Because the award did not require SEPTA to return Doyle to any job for which he was qualified, his argument that he was entitled to an “i nterim” posting to an assistant conductor position fails. 6
* * * * * Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to
SEPTA.

6 At times, Doyle argues that, under the aw ard, SEPTA could have returned Doyle to work as an assistant conduc tor. However, whether Doyle c ould have returned as an assistant conductor is not dispositive of whet her SEPTA was required to return him as an assistant conductor.