United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 00-2884

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Clifton Berglee, DVM,

Appellant,

v.

First National Bank of Brookings,

South Dakota,

Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

District of South Dakota.

[PUBLISHED]

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Submitted: October 15, 2001

 Filed: April 19, 2002

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Before BOWMAN, BRIGHT, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Dr. Berglee brought this coercive action to recover $252,876.71 from the First

National Bank (Bank) based on a Montana federal district court's declaratory

judgment that the Bank had disbursed funds from Berglee's line of credit without his

authorization. Berglee also claimed in this action that the Bank committed fraud in

the wrongful handling of his accounts and converted proceeds from the sale of his

cattle. On motions for summary judgment, the district court determined that Berglee

was entitled to coercive relief but that his tort claims were barred by res judicata. Our
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A more detailed recitation of the facts and procedural history of this case can

be found in our earlier opinion. 

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The Honorable John B. Jones, United States District Judge for the District of

South Dakota.

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court reversed the district court and remanded for a trial on the merits of Berglee's

claims. See Berglee v. First Nat'l Bank, 159 F.3d 342 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).

We held that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar Berglee's tort claims and that a

trial on the coercive relief claim was necessary to ascertain whether the Bank had

already credited Berglee's accounts for the unauthorized disbursements.1

 Id. at 344-

45. In relation to the conversion claim, we noted that Berglee was entitled to pursue

his theory that the Bank sold nearly $1.2 million worth of his cattle but did not fully

credit his loan accounts with the proceeds from the sale. At trial, the district court2

granted the Bank's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Berglee's fraud claim,

and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Bank on the remaining claims. Id. at

345. The district court denied Berglee's motion for a new trial, and Berglee appeals.

Berglee argues that the district court failed to give the Montana district court's

declaratory judgment the preclusive effect it deserves. See Austin v. Super Valu

Stores, Inc., 31 F.3d 615, 618 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing when one federal district

court exercising diversity jurisdiction must give full faith and credit to the decision

of a federal district court in another forum state). In Berglee's previous appeal, we

made it clear that the declaratory judgment action established that "the Bank must

credit Berglee's account with $252,876.71, and that credit must be given as of

October 4, 1989, the date of the unauthorized disbursement." Berglee, 159 F.3d at

345. The district court instructed the jury in conformance with our statement and

submitted to the jury the question of whether the Bank had actually credited Berglee's

accounts. We find nothing to suggest that the district court permitted any issue to be

reopened that already had been resolved in the previous declaratory judgment action.
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We similarly conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when

it excluded from evidence the written court decisions and judgments that have been

issued in this litigation's history. See United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Historic Pres. Trust,

265 F.3d 722, 727 (8th Cir. 2001) ("District courts have broad discretion to place

reasonable limits on the presentation of evidence to prevent undue delay, waste of

time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."). There was ample evidence

presented at trial documenting the nature of the past court proceedings. Moreover,

the district court eliminated any need for the actual court documents by instructing

the jury on the factual and legal issues that already had been litigated and resolved in

the prior proceedings. 

Berglee argues that the district court committed reversible error by refusing to

instruct the jury that the Bank's responses to requests for admissions conclusively

established that the Bank retained certain proceeds from the sale of his cattle without

crediting his accounts. In general, our review of a district court's instructions to the

jury "is limited to whether the instructions, viewed on the whole, fairly and

adequately represent the evidence and applicable law in light of the issues presented

to the jury in a particular case." Klisch v. Meritcare Med. Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 1356,

1358 (8th Cir.1998). Where a district court fails to instruct on a particular issue, we

will reverse the district court if that failure is prejudicial. Scamardo v. Scott County,

189 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 1999). Given our court's previous decision winnowing

Berglee's conversion claim, the district court committed no error in permitting the

Bank to present evidence explaining the generic financial information contained in

the Bank's responses to Berglee's requests for admissions. See Rolscreen Co. v. Pella

Prods. of St. Louis, Inc., 64 F.3d 1202, 1210 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The conclusive effect

envisioned by the rule may not be appropriate where requests for admissions or the

responses to them are subject to more than one interpretation."). In order to

determine whether the Bank properly credited Berglee's accounts, the jury needed

detailed information about the sale of the cattle and the accounts that were credited

with the proceeds. The Bank's responses alone did not contain adequate information
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to permit the jury to disentangle the convoluted financial transactions that occurred.

As a consequence, Berglee was not prejudiced by the district court's refusal to instruct

the jury that the Bank's admissions were conclusive on any particular issue.

The remaining arguments Berglee raises on appeal lack merit. The district

court addressed and rejected these arguments when Berglee raised them as grounds

for a new trial, and Berglee has not provided any relevant legal authority on appeal

to show that the district court erred. See Molasky v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 149

F.3d 881, 885 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting arguments on appeal where no legal authority

was cited to support them). In any event, we agree with the district court's thorough

and well-reasoned decision. Finding no grounds for reversal, we affirm the judgment

of the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.