COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-15-00027-CR

NO. 02-15-00028-CR

NO. 02-15-00029-CR

WILLIAM BRUCE SENN JR. APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 43RD DISTRICT COURT OF PARKER COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. CR14-0051, CR14-0052, CR14-0163

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant William Bruce Senn Jr. entered an open plea of guilty to count 

one in the two cases for which he was indicted for sexual assault of a child and to 

all three counts in the case for which he was indicted for possession of child 

pornography. The trial court accepted Senn’s guilty pleas but reserved a finding 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

of guilt. At the punishment hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of Senn’s 

presentence investigation report, the victim testified concerning the events that 

formed the basis of the three indictments, Senn’s military records were admitted 

into evidence, and Senn’s father-in-law provided character testimony on Senn’s 

behalf. After hearing the testimony and reviewing the evidence, the trial court

found Senn guilty in accordance with his five guilty pleas and sentenced him to 

twenty years’ confinement in each of the cases involving sexual assault of a child 

and to ten years’ confinement on each of the three counts in the case involving

possession of child pornography and ordered all five of the sentences to run 

concurrently. In a single issue, Senn argues that his guilty pleas were not made

knowingly. We will affirm.

Due process requires that a guilty plea be entered knowingly, intelligently, 

and voluntarily. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–44, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712

(1969); Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 549 

U.S. 1052 (2006). When the record reflects that a defendant was properly 

admonished, a prima facie showing exists that the guilty plea was entered 

knowingly and voluntarily. Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1998). The burden then shifts to the defendant to establish that, 

notwithstanding the statutory admonishments, he did not understand the 

consequences of his plea. Id.

The record reflects that Senn and his counsel signed written 

admonishments complying with article 26.13(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal 
3

Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a) (West Supp. 2014).

Senn signed his name right after the paragraph stating,

I sign this document after consulting with my attorney. I have read 

each and every paragraph above[,] . . . and I fully understand each 

and every paragraph and admonishment herein. I am aware of the 

consequences of my plea. Furthermore, I have no questions about 

these admonishments, as given by the Court. 

Senn orally reaffirmed his understanding of the admonishments when the trial 

court went over them at the plea hearing. Because the record reflects that Senn 

was properly admonished, the record constitutes a prima facie showing that 

Senn’s guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily made. See Martinez, 981 

S.W.2d at 197. The burden therefore shifts to Senn to establish that, 

notwithstanding the statutory admonishments, he did not understand the 

consequences of his guilty pleas. See id. 

Senn argues that his pleas were not made knowingly because there was a 

lack of both “a clear explanation” and “a clear understanding of the 

consequences” of his guilty pleas. With regard to his argument that a lack of a 

clear explanation of the admonishments exists, Senn points to a single 

admonishment—the admonishment that when there is no plea bargain, any 

appeal of a conviction based on a plea of guilty is limited to jurisdictional issues. 

Senn contends that this admonition “is inadequate and in fact amounts to no 

meaningful admonition.” The admonition that Senn complains of is not required 

to be given by article 26.13, and there are no statutory or judicial requirements 

that a defendant pleading guilty without the benefit of a plea bargain be advised 
4

of his limited right of appeal.

2

 See Fennell v. State, 958 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.). Thus, the inclusion of this admonition does not 

render Senn’s guilty plea involuntary.

With regard to his argument that there was a lack of a clear understanding 

of the consequences of his guilty pleas, Senn points to an impairment rating 

decision from the Department of Veterans Affairs, which was admitted as part of 

Senn’s military records. The records show that Senn suffers from post-traumatic 

stress disorder and that “[a]n evaluation of 70 percent is assigned for 

occupational and social impairment, with deficiencies in most areas, such as . . . 

judgment, thinking, . . . [and] impaired impulse control.” Senn argues that 

“[g]iven the evidence of [his] dramatic disabilities, it is unreasonable to conclude 

that Appellant, a lay person unschooled in the law, understood the meaning or 

the significance of ‘jurisdictional issues.’” Because, as explained above, the 

admonition that he complains of is not statutorily required to be given, an

understanding of the meaning or the significance of the term “jurisdictional 

issues” is not required in order for a plea to be made knowingly. See id. 

Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that Senn failed to understand the 

proceedings generally or the specific rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. 

 

2

To the extent that Senn’s argument can be broadly construed as 

requesting this court to rewrite the admonitions that are given by trial courts, such 

task must be left to the legislature. See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp v. State, 273 

S.W.3d 157, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (Cochran, J., concurring) (explaining 

that statutory inadequacies are best left to the legislature to remedy).
5

Senn has not shown how his mental impairment prevented him from knowingly 

making his guilty pleas. See Dickey v. State, Nos. 05-07-01090-CR, 05-07-

01214-CR, 2008 WL 2877761, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 25, 2008, pet ref’d) 

(not designated for publication). 

We hold that Senn failed to meet his burden of establishing that, 

notwithstanding the statutory admonishments, he did not understand the 

consequences of his guilty pleas and therefore hold that his guilty pleas were 

made knowingly and voluntarily. See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; Rudnick v. 

State, No. 03-02-00767-CR, 2003 WL 22023435, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 

29, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding appellant 

knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty without an agreed punishment 

recommendation, despite appellant’s claims that his guilty plea was not 

knowingly made because he did not understand he was not eligible for 

probation). We overrule Senn’s sole issue.

Having overruled Senn’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/s/ Sue Walker

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: October 1, 2015