## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS

NO. P D-1473-06

THE ST AT E OF TEX AS

v . JAMES VASILAS, Ap pellee
ON AP P ELLEE ’S P ETIT ION F OR DI SCRETIO NA RYRE VI EW IN CA USE NO . 0 5- 04 -0 03 28 -C R F RO M THE F IF TH CO UR T OF AP P EA LS CO LLIN CO UN TY
H O L C O MB , J., de liv e re d th eop inio n of the Cour t, in w hich M E YE RS , P RI CE , W OM ACK , J OHN S ON , K

EASLER , H ERV EY , and C OCH RAN , JJ., joined. K ELLER , P .J., concurred. O P I N I O N I n this case, we must determine whe ther the c ourt of appe als er red in concluding that the Te xas P e na l Co de Se c tio n 3 7. 10 (a )( 5) and the Te xas R

ule of Civ il Pr oc e du re 13 are no t in p ar i

ma te ria . We a ff

ir m. Back ground Appellee J ames Vasilas is a n attorney whose client was c harg ed with the state ja il felony of delivery of marijuana . Appellee ’s client wa s convicted of the lesser -included of fense of possession of marijuana . After this conviction, appellee si g ned and filed a petition for expunction of the rec ordsVASI L AS - Pag e 2

Tex. P en. Code § 37.10. 1 relating to his client’s a

rre st on the delivery

char g e. On De cembe r 16, 2 0 0 3 , the State cha rg ed

a ppell ee in a four -c ount i nd ic tme nt f or tampe ri ngwi th a

g ov e rnme nta l r e c or d. Ea c h o f t he fi rs t 1 three counts of the indictment a lleg ed that appellee had made a false e ntry

in a g overnme ntal rec ord, i.e ., the pe tit ion

fo r e xpun c tio n of re c or ds , wi th the int e nt to d e fr a ud and ha rm the State of

Te xas. The four th count alleg ed that app ell ee ma de, pre sented, a nd used a g overnme ntal rec ord, i.e., the petition for ex punction of records, with knowledg e of its falsity , intending to de fra ud and har

m the State of Te xas. Ap pe lle e fi le d a

no ns uit of the e xpun c tio n la

ws uit

. Su b s e qu e n tl y , a

p p e ll e e f il e d a mo ti o n to qu a s h th e in d ic tm e n t o n tw o g r o u n d s . F ir s t, he

asser ted that Texas Penal Code Section 37.10 and Te x as R u l e o f C ivil P roce dure 13 a re in p ar i

ma te ria , a

nd tha t Ru le 13 c on tr ols ov e r S e c tio n 3 7. 10 . Se c on d, he c la ime d th a t pl e a din g s in c ivi l suits are not “g overnme ntal rec ords” as define d by Section 37.01(2)( A). The trial court, a fter he aring oral a rg ument, g rante d the motion to quash without fili ng finding s of fa ct or conclusions of law. The State abandone d its appeal of the trial court’s gr anting the motion to quash the first three counts of the indictment, but co n t es t ed its decision as to the four th count (alleg ing tha

t appellee made,
pr e se nte d, and

us e d a g ov e rnme nta l r e c or d, i.e ., the pe tit ion fo r e xpun c tio n of rec or ds , w ith kn ow le dg e of

its fa lsi ty , int e nd ingto d e fr a ud and ha rm the State of

Te xas) on

tw o g ro un ds . F ir st, the State argue d th a t Se c tio n 3 7. 10 and Rul e 13 are no t in p ar i m ate ria

. Second, the State a sserted that the trial cour

t erre d in concluding that the peti t i o n fo r ex punction was not a g overnme ntal

rec ord. The c ourt of appe als addre ssed the State’s se cond issue, c o n cl u d i n g that “the pe tition for expunction filed by appellee was not a gover nmental record within the mea ning of chapte r 37 of theVASI L AS - Pag e 3

We note for c larity

that even thoug h Mr. Vasilas is the pe titioner for the pr esent re view, 2 we will continue to re fer

to him as the “appe llee” in this opinion beca use he ha d preva iled in the or ig ina l tr ia l c ourt

pr oc e e din g s. We note that two amicus-c uriae briefs w ere filed supporting appellee ’s petition for 3 dis c re tio na

ry re vie w. On e wa s f

ile d o n b e ha lf

of the L iti g a tio n Se c tio n o f t he State B ar o f T e xas, L eague of U nited L atin Americ an Citiz ens (Te x as), National Association for the A dvance ment of Colored Persons (Te x as State Confer ence ), Texas Criminal Defe nse L awy ers Assoc iation, and Te xas T ri a l L awy e rs As so c iatio n. B ut t his br ie f l ite ra lly

tr a c ks on e of

a pp e lle e ’s ow n a

rgume nts , differ ing e ssentially

in that it subst itutes the words “c ourt of appe als” for appellee ’s inadver

tent use of the w ord “State” in challeng ing the court of a ppeals’ holding . A sec ond, much shorter br ie f f ile d b y the Te xas A sso c ia tio n o f D e fe ns e Couns e l, e c ho e s th e same c on c e rn s a s th os e alre ady articulated by

appellee and the other amici . Thus, neither br ief a ctually adds to the prese nt discussion. W e will, there fore , addre ss appellee ’s own ar g uments, but confine the dis c us sio n o nly

to t he iss ue be fo re us . p en al co de.” State v. Vasilas , 1 53 S.W. 3d 72 5, 72 7 ( Te x. Ap p. — D a lla s 2 00 5) . G ive n th is resolution of the c ase, the court of a ppeals de clined to addr ess the S tate’s first issue of whe ther the statute and the r

ule wer e in p ar i m ate ria , and af firmed the tr ial court. Id. We reve rsed, c oncluding that “the leg islature’s definition of a g overnme ntal rec ord i s clea r and una mbiguous a

nd may include

a cour t rec ord, such a s the petition for ex punction at issue,” State v. Vasilas , 187 S.W .3d 486, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), and re manded the c ase to the c ourt of ap p ea l s fo r consider ation of the State’s first issue of whe ther the statute and the rule wer e in p ar i m ate ria

. Id. at 492. On re mand, the cour t of appe als conc luded that “se ction 37.10(a) (5) of the Penal Code and rule of c ivil procedure 13 are no t in pa ri m ate ria ” and tha t th e tr ia l c ourt

the re fo re “ e rr e d in

g ra nti nga pp e lle e ’s mot ion

to quash Count I V of the indictment.” State v. Vasilas , 198 S.W .3d 480, 486-87 (Te x . App.— Dallas 2 0 0 6 ). W e gr an t edap p el l ee ’s p et i t i o nt o re v i ew t h at h o l d i n g. 2
Discussion 3 Appellee argues that the c ourt of appeals erred in applying the in p ar i m ate ria doctrine, a nd that it “should have c oncluded that § 37.10 nece ssarily conce rns the same subject matter a nd personsVASI L AS - Pag e 4

Se e, e .g ., Az e e

z v . S tat e , 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 329 (Tex. C rim. App. Marc h 5, 4 2008) (c omp ari so n o f t

wo statut e s) ; Bu rk

e v . S tat e , 28 S.W .3d 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (s a me ); Che ne

yv . S tat e , 7 55 S.W. 2d

12 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 88 ) ( same ); Mi lls v . S tat e , 722 S.W. 2d 41 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ) ( same ); Ex parte W ilkinson , 6 41 S.W. 2d

92 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 82 ) ( same ); Al e

jos v . S tat e , 555 S.W .2d 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (same)

. I n fac t, the only

discussion of the in pari materia doctrine that we could f ind in the Texas 5 Jurisprudence , the American J urisprudence and the Corpus Juris Secundum was in the statutes sections; and eve n there , we c ould not find a single case in which the doctr ine had be en applied to compare a statute with a c ourt-made rule of c ivil or criminal proce dure. See, e .g., 67 T EX
. J UR . 3d Statutes § 133 (2003 & Supp. 2008); 73 A M . J UR . 2d Sta tut es § 205 (2001 & Supp. 2007); 82 C.J .S. Statutes § 352 (1999 & Supp. 2007). Se e als o 2B N . Singer , S UTHE R L AND S T A T U T O RY C ONS TR UC TI ON § 51.03 (2000 & Supp. 2007-08); 1 W. L aF ave, S UB S TANTI VE C R I MI NAL L AW § 2.2(j) (2d e d. 2003). I ndeed, the in p ar i m ate ria doctrine is so intrinsically associate d with statutes that 6 c omm on re fe re nc e so ur c e s, su c h a s e nc y c lop e dia s a nd dic tio na ri e s, de fi ne the do c tr ine in t e rm s of only that association. See, e .g., B LACK ’ S L AW D I CT I O N A RY 807 (8 ed. 2004)( defining the in th pa ri m ate ria doctrine a s “a c anon of c onstruction that statutes that are in pari mater ia may be construed tog ether , so that inconsistencies in one statute ma y be re solved by

looking at another statute on the same subje ct.”) ; 8 T HE G UI DE T O A MER I C AN L AW 115 (1984) ( defining “par i materia ” as the “phra se used in conne ction with two laws relating to the same subject matter that must be analy

zed with each othe r.”) ; 31 W OR DS AND P HRAS ES 120 (1957) ( “The purpose of ‘par i materia’ rule is to asce rtain and to c arr y into effe ct the L eg islature’s intention.”)

. and serve s the same purposes as the sanctions laws that alre ady and compr ehensive ly

regulate lawy er and litiga nt conduct with re g ard to c ourt filings.” We note at the outset that the in p ar i m ate ria do c tr ine ha s tr a dit ion a lly be e n a pp lie d o nly

to
a compa rison of two or more statutes. I ndeed, in spite of our extensive r esea rch, w e could not find (and a ppellee a nd the amicifailed to c ite) any case , treatise or other sour ce of law that stated or 4 5 6 imp li e d th a t th is d o c tr in e w a s a p p li c a b le to tw o s u c h d iv e r s e le g a l s o u r c e s a s th o s e a t is s u e in the
prese nt case , i.e., a statute pa ssed by the L eg islature and a

court-ma de rule . On the contr ary , as we have p reviously

noted, the “doc trine of pari materia is, simpl y put, a principle of

statutoryVASI L AS - Pag e 5

i n t er p re t at i o n . I t i s a r

u l e c o u rt s m ay

u s e i nd et erm i n i n g t h e i n t en to f t h e Legi s l at u re i nen ac t i n g a particula r statute or statutes.” Che ne yv . S tat e , 755 S.W .2d 123, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). See als o Bu rk e v . S tat e , 28 S.W. 3d 54 5, 54 6 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ) (“ Th e ru le of in pa ri mat eri a is

no thi ng mor e tha

n a pri nc ipl e of statut or

y int e rp re ta tio n, a

me ans of de vin ing(s ic ) a

nd g ivi ngfu ll ef fe ct t o l egi s l at i v e i n t en t ” ( qu o t i n g Mi lls v . S tat e , 722 S.W .2d 411, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). I ndeed, we ha

ve consistently

explained the in par i m ate ria d o ct ri n e i nt er m s o f t h e f o l l o wi n g p as s age fr om Texas Jurisprudenc e , which clea rly indicates the a

pplicability

of the doc trine to a c omparison

o f s t a tu t e s o n l y:

I t is a s e tt le d r u le o f s tatuto r y in te r p r e tati o nth a t s tatute s th a t d e a l w it h the same g ener al s ubject, have t he same g ener al purpose, or relate to t he same person or t h i n g o r c l as s o f p er s o n s o r t h i n gs , a r e co n s i d er edas b ei n g i np ar i m at er i a t h o u gh they contain no re fer ence to one anoth er , and though they wer e passe d at diffe rent times or at diffe rent sessions of the le g islature. I n order to arrive at a proper

construction of a

statute, and de termine the e x act leg islative intent, a ll a cts and parts of acts in pa ri materia will, ther efore, b e t ak en, rea d, and construed t og ether , eac h enac tment in refe renc e to the other , as thoug h they wer e par ts of one and the same law . Any conflict be tween the ir provisions will be ha rm on ize d, if

po ssi ble , a

nd e ff e c t wi ll b e g ive n to a ll the pr ov isi on s o f e a c h a c t if t h e y c anb e m a d e t o s t an d t o g e t h e r an d h a v e c o n c u r

r e n te f f i c a c y. Th e purp os e of

the in pari ma te ri a ru le of c on str uc tio n is to c arr

y ou t the fu ll le g isl a tiv e int e nt, by

g ivi nge ff

e c t to all law s and

pr ov isi on s b e ari ngon

the same subject. Th e ru l e proce eds on the supposition that severa l statutes relatingto one subject are gover

ned by one spirit and policy , and ar e intended to be consistent and ha rm on iou s in

the ir se ve ra l pa

rt s and pr ov isi on s. Thus , it a pp lie s whe re on e statut e deals with a subject in c omprehe nsive terms and another [st atute] de als with a portion of the same subject in a more definite way

. But whe re a g ener al statute and a

more detailed e nactment a

re in c onflict, the latter will prevail, re g ardle ss of whethe r it was passed pr ior or su bsequently to the g ener al statute, unless it appea rs that the leg islature intended to make the g ener al ac t controlling. A nd, the rule is not applicable to enac tments that cover dif fer ent situations and that wer e appa rently not intended to be c onsidered tog ether

. 53 T EX . J UR . 2d Statutes § 186 (1964) ( quoted in Az e e z v . S tat e , 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 329,VASI L AS - Pag e 6

See 67 T EX . J UR . 3d Statutes § 133 (2003): 7
I n construing a statute, whe ther or not the statute is considere d ambig uous on its f a c e , a c o u rt m ay c o n s i d e r a m o n g o t h e r m a t t e r s l aw s o n t h e s a m e su bje c ts. Statut e s w hic h invo lve the same g e ne ra l su bje c t matter and

a lso po sse ss t

he same g ener al purpose a

re “ in pari mater ia” e ven thoug h the statutes may fail to contain a ny ref ere nce in one to the other a nd even thoug h the statutes may have be en passe d at dif fe re nt t ime s o r at di ff

e re nt l e g isl a tiv e se ssi on s. I n order to arrive at a pr oper c onstruction of a statute, and determine the exact leg islative intent, all acts and pa rts of ac ts dealing with the same subjec t and having the same purp os e wi ll, the re fo re , b e take n a nd re a d toge the r, e a c h e na c tme nt i n ref ere nce to the othe r, as thoug h they wer e par ts of one and the same law. Thus, two statut e s th a t are in p ari ma te ri a are to b e c on str

ue d to g e the r, e a c h e na c tme nt i n ref ere nce to the other, as though they wer e part of one and the same la w; any conflict be tw e e n th e ir

pr ov isi on s w ill be ha

rm on ize d, if po ssi ble , an d e ff e c t w ill be g ive n to all the provisions of ea ch ac t if they can be made to stand to get h er and have c o n c u r r e n te f f i c a c y. The rule pro ce ed s o n the supposition that several statutes r elating to one subject are g overne d by one spirit a nd policy , and are intended to be consistent and harmonious in their seve ral pa rts and provisions. Where one statute dea l s with a subject in g ener al terms, and another [st atute] de als with a part of the same subjec t in a more de tailed way , the two should be harmonized if possible; howeve r, if ther e is any conflict, the latter will preva il, reg ardle ss of whether it was passed pr ior to the g ener al statute, unless it appea rs that the leg islature intended to make the g ener al ac t co n t ro l l i n g. Although subse quent ena ctments may be some evidenc e of the leg islature’s intent in a prior ver sion of a statute, c ou rt s s h ould give littl e we ight to such subsequent ena ctments in interpre ting the pr ior law. (Citations omi tted.) *23-24 (Tex. Crim. App. March 5, 2008) ; Cheney , 755 S.W .2d at 126; Al e jos v . S tat e , 555 S.W .2d 444, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977))(c itations omi tted). I n 2003, Texas Jurisprudenc e updated the a bove oft-qu o ted desc ription of the in p ar i m ate ria doctrine, but t h e new de scription still clea rly showed that the doc trine wa s applicable to a
compar ison betwee n statutes only

. The most rec ent update of Texas Jurisprudenc e makes that point 7VASI L AS - Pag e 7

The L eg islature passe s the laws which a re the n applicable to all persons in a g iven 8 jurisdiction. I n contra st, the rules of c ivil procedure (applica ble to the pre sent ca se since Rule 13, the rule at issue, is a rule of c ivil procedure ) ar e made by the Texas Supreme Court and a re applicable only

to the litigants in a c ase. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 1 (Objective of Rules) : The prope r objec tive of rules of civil proce dure is to obtain a just, fair , equitable a

nd impartial adjudication of the rig hts of litigants under established pr inc ipl e s o f s ub sta

nti ve law. To the e nd

that th is o bje c tiv e may

be a tta ine d w ith as g reat expediti on and dispatch a nd at the lea st ex pense both to the litiga nts and to the state as may

be pra cticable , these rule s shall be g iven a liber al construc tion. even c lear er, e x pressly

stating that “‘[p] ara

materia ,’ which ap

pli es on ly if

two sta tut es have the same purpose or

object, provide s that where one statute de als with a subject in g ener al terms, and a nother de a ls w itha

pa rt of the same subj ect in a mo re de ta ile d w ay , th e tw o s ho uld be ha rm on ize d if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will preva il.” 67 T EX . J UR . 3d Statutes § 133 (Supp. 2008) (e mphasis added) (citations omitted). I n short, all the ca ses and tre atises on the subject appea r to be in consensus that the doc trine of in p ar i m ate ria is a

pplicable only

to a compar ison of statutes. This is understandable considering that the purpose of

the doctri n e is to harmonize the diffe rent provisions of the la w passed by

the
same g overnme ntal entity : the leg islature. Burke , 28 S.W. 3d a t 54 6 (“ Th e ru le of in p ari ma te ri a is

no thi ngmor e tha

n a pr inc ipl e of

statut or y int e rp re ta tio n, a me ans of de vin ing (s ic ) a nd g ivi ngfu ll ef fe ct t o l egi s l at i v e i n t en t ”) (qu o t i n g Mi lls , 722 S.W .2d at 413); Cheney , 755 S.W .2d at 126 (“ The doctrine of

pari materia is, simply put, a principle of statutory interpre tation. I t is a rule courts may use in deter

mining the intent of the L eg islature in ena cting a particula r statute or statutes.”). But no such justification exist s for apply ing the in pari materia doctrine to a statute and a

court-ma de rule ,
e a c h o f w hic h is c re a ted by a dif fe re nt b ra nc h o f g ov e rnme nt f

or its ow n p art ic ula

r p ur po se s. 8
I ndeed, it would be like compar ing apples and orang es to apply the doctrine to two such diverse leg alVASI L AS - Pag e 8

so ur c e s. Conclusion The co u rt of appe als in the prese nt case applied the in pari materia doctrine to de termine whether Penal Code Section 37.10(a) (5) or Rule of Civil Procedur e 13 controlled a ppellee’ s case . I n light of our resear ch, however, we hol d that the in p ar i m ate ria doctrine is not applicable to the
prese nt case . This acc ords with the basic purpose of the doctrine: to ha rmonize diff

ere nt provisions

enac ted by

the same le g al source , i.e., the leg islature. Howe ver, w e ar e re luctant to say that the cour

t of a pp e a ls e rr e d b y a

pp lying the do c tr ine in the pr e se nt ca se be c a us e thi s a pp e ars to b e a

c a se of fi rs t imp re ssi on (i n wh ic h a pa rt y ha s a sk e d th e c ourt s to a

pp ly the do c tr ine to s uc h d ive rs e le g a l so ur c e s:
a statute a

nd a cour t-made r ule) a nd the cour

t o f ap p ea ls did not have the bene fit of our holding today . Be cause the court of appea ls still r eac hed the cor rec t result by

holding that the statute and the

ru le are no t in p ar i m ate ria , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

hat c ourt

.

DEL I VERED: MAY 7, 2008. PUB L I SH