IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUFKIN DIVISION

WOODROW J. JONES, SR,

Plaintiff,

vs. 

GRAPELAND INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, DON JACKSON, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS/HER 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY; KRISTI BELL, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS/HER 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY; BRAD SPISAK, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS/HER 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY; DAVID MAASS, 

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 

COMMISSION, SUSANA NAHAS, 

INVESTIGATOR; DEIDRA HENRY, 

INVESTIGATOR; ELIZABETH PORRAS, 

TRAVIS M NICHOLSON, JAMES 

MARTIN, JOSH GOOLSBY, TIM 

HOWARD, CHANCE HUFF, ALLEN 

CHEATHAM, RYAN RICHIE, MELISSA 

COBB, KENDRA HUFF, LIGITA D. 

LANDRY,

Defendants.

No. 9:23-CV-00059-MJT-ZJH

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

This case is assigned to the Honorable Michael J. Truncale, United States District Judge, 

and is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a standing order. On 

March 22, 2023, Plaintiff Woodrow J. Jones, Sr. (“Jones”) sued Grapeland Independent School 

District (“GISD”), employees of the school district in both their official and individual capacities 

(collectively, “school district defendants”), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and 

several EEOC employees (collectively, “EEOC defendants”), alleging numerous claims under 

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state and federal law. Doc. No. 1. On April 4, 2023, Jones filed an Amended Complaint. Doc. 

No. 3. 

At the outset, the undersigned notes that Jones’ Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 3) is riddled 

with pleading deficiencies and is difficult to decipher throughout. Nonetheless, construing Jones’ 

claims liberally, the undersigned discerns the following claims from Jones’ Amended Complaint: 

breach of contract, violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 

the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 

deprivation of constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. 

at 5–7, 10–11, 22–23. Jones’ claims relate to his alleged demotion and termination from his 

employment with GISD. Id. at 21, ⁋ 34. 

Pending before the Court are three motions to dismiss: (1) the school district defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 34); (2) GISD’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 41); and the EEOC 

defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 66). The undersigned will address all three motions in 

the instant Report and Recommendation. After careful review of the filings and applicable law, 

the undersigned finds that Jones failed to plead sufficient facts to suggest a reasonable possibility 

of recovery on any of his claims alleged against the school district defendants, GISD, or the EEOC 

defendants. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting (1) the school district defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 34); (2) GISD’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 41); and (3) the EEOC 

defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 66). 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from an employment dispute between Jones and his former employer, 

Grapeland Independent School District. According to the facts alleged in Jones’ Amended 

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Complaint (Doc. No. 3), Jones was employed by GISD from 2018 through his termination in 2022. 

Doc. No. 3 at 13. Jones is African American. Id. Jones alleges that he was initially employed by 

GISD as a substitute teacher beginning in 2018. Doc. No. 3 at 16, ⁋ 19. In 2019, Jones was hired 

by GISD as a behavior specialist, where he oversaw in-school suspensions and managed student 

truancy. Id. Jones alleges that in 2020, he was promoted to Dean of Students, where he had the 

responsibility of assisting the principal with student disciplinary issues. Id., ⁋ 20.

At some point in 2021, while Jones was Dean of Students, he was involved in a dispute 

about his salary with Don Jackson (“Jackson”), the GISD superintendent at the time. Id. at 16, ⁋ 

20. Jones alleges that at some point during summer 2021, Jones and Jackson spoke on the phone 

about Jones’ salary. Id. at 18, ⁋ 22. On August 26, 2021, Jones emailed Julie Martin, a business 

manager with GISD, about his “new salary.” Id. at 18, ⁋ 22. Jones alleges that when he returned 

to work in fall 2021, he found that he had been demoted to Truancy Officer without notification or 

explanation. Id. at 16, ⁋ 20. Jackson scheduled a meeting in his office between himself and Jones 

on January 21, 2022 to discuss Jones’ job duties. Id. at 7, ⁋ 3; 18, ⁋ 24. At that meeting, Jackson

discussed the “Staff Input Survey” that Jones had submitted. Id., ⁋ 3. Jones alleges that his survey 

was forwarded to the superintendent, while other employees’ surveys were not. Id. at 7. 

Next, on January 24, 2022, Jones emailed an “employee complaint” to his supervisor, 

Principal Katie Doughty.1

 Id. at 7–8, ⁋ 3. On January 25, Jackson emailed Jones a summary of 

their meeting, and on January 26, Jones replied with a “rebuttal” to Jackson’s summary of the 

meeting. Id. at 8, ⁋ 3. On January 26, Jones and the superintendent again exchanged emails 

regarding scheduling another meeting. Id., ⁋ 4. On January 27, Jones filed his “employee 

1 The undersigned notes that while Jones does not specifically describe what his “employee complaint” was 

about, the surrounding facts suggest that his employee complaint pertained in some way to the January 21, 2022 

meeting between Jones and Jackson. 

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complaint form-Level One” against GISD. Id., ⁋ 5. On February 6, 2022, Jones amended his 

employee complaint to include Jackson. Id. at 9, ⁋ 5. Jones alleges that at some point after that, 

Jackson responded to the complaint. Id., ⁋ 6.

On March 28, 2022, the GISD Board of Trustees held a “Level-III Appeal Hearing” on 

Jones’ employee complaint. Id. at 19, ⁋ 28. Jones attempted to resolve his employee complaint 

by emailing attorney Morgan Beam and asking to settle the matter, but this was unsuccessful. Id. 

at 19. The GISD Board of Trustees dismissed Jones’ appeal of his employee complaint. Id. at 10, 

⁋ 8. Jones appealed the Board of Trustees’ dismissal of his complaint, and his appeal of the 

dismissal was also dismissed. Id. at 19, ⁋ 29. 

On May 13, 2022, Jones alleges that Jackson invited him to a meeting, but Jones was 

unavailable because he had received permission to leave work due to his “known and recorded 

disability.”2

 Id. at 19–20, ⁋ 30. Jones alleges that on May 16 or 17, 2022, Jackson invited Jones 

to another meeting. Id. at 20, ⁋ 31. Jones does not state whether he attended this second meeting. 

Jones alleges that Jackson then invited him to a third meeting and directed him to contact Jackson’s 

secretary to schedule the meeting. Id., ⁋ 33. However, Jones alleges that Jackson’s secretary failed 

to schedule the meeting, which led to Jones being disciplined for “a meeting that was never 

scheduled.” Id. On May 24, 2022, Jackson fired Jones. Id. at 21, ⁋ 34. 

On May 25, 2022, Jones filed another employee complaint expressing his disagreement 

with Jackson’s decision to terminate his employment. Id. at 21, ⁋ 35. On June 23, 2022, the GISD

Board of Trustees held a termination hearing on Jones’ complaint and ultimately dismissed his 

complaint. Id. On May 27, 2022, Jones filed his EEO complaint with the Texas Workforce Civil 

2 The undersigned notes that Jones fails to allege the nature of his disability anywhere in his Amended 

Complaint. Doc. No. 3. 

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Rights Division, Employment Section. Id. at 21, ⁋ 36. Jones alleges that he exhausted his 

administrative remedies and received notice of his right to sue. Id. at 11, ⁋ 11. 

On March 22, 2023, Jones filed his Complaint. Doc. No. 1. The undersigned subsequently 

ordered Jones to file an amended complaint that complied with Local Rule 3(d). Doc. No. 2. On 

April 4, 2023, Jones filed his Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 3. On May 22, 2023, the school 

district defendants filed their instant Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 34. On June 5, 2023, GISD 

filed its instant Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 41. On January 30, 2024, the EEOC defendants filed 

their instant Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 66. 

II. Legal Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

challenges the subject-matter jurisdiction of a federal district court. See FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 

The court “must presume that a suit lies outside [its] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of 

establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Gonzalez v. Limon, 

926 F.3d 186, 188 (5th Cir. 2019). “A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” 

Walmart, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice, 21 F.4th 300, 307 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Home

Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). A court 

must address a jurisdictional challenge before addressing a challenge on the merits under Rule 

12(b)(6). See Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).

When ruling on a 12(b)(1) motion, a court may consider “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the 

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint 

supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” In re S. Recycling,

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L.L.C., 982 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020). “[A] motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of 

facts in support of his claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plaintiffs must state enough facts to “nudge their 

claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. When assessing a motion to dismiss under this rule, the court must accept as true all 

well- pleaded facts in the plaintiffs’ complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiffs. Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023). However, “[c]onclusory allegations, 

unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions are not accepted as true.” Id. (internal 

quotations omitted). 

C. Pro Se Pleading Standards

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,” and “a pro se complaint, however 

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

However, regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or is represented by counsel, 

“conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice 

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to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Nix v. Major League Baseball, 62 F.4th 920, 928 (5th Cir. 2023), 

cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 165 (2023) (quoting Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 

(5th Cir. 2002)).

III. School District Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Jones alleges a variety of claims against the school district defendants in his Amended 

Complaint (Doc. No. 3) (Defendants Don Jackson, Kristi Bell, Brad Spisak, David Maas, James 

Martin, Josh Goolsby, Tim Howard, Allen Cheatham, Ryan Richie, Melissa Cobb, and Kendra 

Huff). Jones alleges claims against the school district defendants in both their individual and 

official capacities. Doc. No. 3 at 13, ⁋ 17. The school district defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 

No. 34) addresses Jones’ claims brought against these defendants in their individual capacities.3

Jones’ alleged claims include (1) breach of contract; (2) discrimination, retaliation, 

harassment, hostile work environment, and wrongful termination under Title VII; (3) violation of 

the ADA; (4) violation of the ADEA; (5) violation of the VRA; (6) discrimination under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981; (7) conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and (8) constitutional 

claims under the First, Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. No. 3 at 5–7, 10–11, 22–

23. The school district defendants move to dismiss all causes of action brought against them in 

their individual capacities.

4

 Doc. No. 34 at 8.

At the outset, the undersigned notes that throughout Jones’ entire 30-page Amended 

Complaint, he alleges specific claims against only one individual: Don Jackson, the former 

superintendent. Aside from Jackson, Jones’ Amended Complaint is a form of “shotgun pleading”

3 While the school district defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 34) addresses Jones’ claims brought 

against the school district defendants in their individual capacities, GISD’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 41) addresses 

Jones’ claims brought against these defendants in their official capacities (discussed below in Section IV).

4 The page numbers in the school district defendants’ motion (listed at the bottom of each page) differ from 

the court’s docket page identification number at the top of the page (stamped by the court clerk when docketed). For 

clarification, this report refers to the court’s page number stamped at the top of the page.

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that fails to provide any of the other 10 school district defendants of “adequate notice of the claims 

against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” See Valadez v. City of San Antonio, 

No. SA21CV0002JKPRBF, 2022 WL 1608016, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 20, 2022) (citing Weiland

v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015)). Specifically, Jones’ 

complaint asserts “multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the 

defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is 

brought against.” Id. Regarding the school district defendants, Jones fails to clearly allege which 

defendant is responsible for which conduct that allegedly gives rise to his litany of claims.

Dismissal of Jones’ claims is likely warranted on this basis alone. Nonetheless, the undersigned 

will consider the merits of each claim against the school district defendants. 

A. Breach of Contract

Jones asserts a breach of contract claim in his Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8.

First, the school district defendants contend that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 

Jones’ breach of contract claim because Jones failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with 

the Texas Commissioner of Education. Doc. No. 34 at 11–12. As a threshold matter, the 

undersigned notes that Jones has not pleaded sufficient facts to establish the existence of a contract 

between himself and any of the 11 named school district defendants, but a court must consider 

challenges to subject matter jurisdiction under FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) before it considers motions 

to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FED R.CIV. P. 12(b)(6). See Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. 

Here, Jones failed to plead any facts asserting that he properly exhausted his administrative 

remedies under Section 7.057(a) of the Texas Education Code. Jones contends that he was not 

required to exhaust his administrative remedies with the Texas Commissioner of Education 

because he was not hired as a teacher. See Doc. No. 37 at 2, ⁋ 3. Further, Jones maintains that he 

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exhausted any necessary administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC. See

Doc. No. 3 at 11, ⁋ 11. Jones is incorrect. He was required to exhaust his administrative remedies 

by filing a complaint with the Texas Commissioner of Education under Section 7.057(a) of the 

Texas Education Code before filing suit. See Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Farran, 409 S.W.3d 

653, 657 (Tex. 2013) (noting that under § 7.057(a)(2)(B), school district employees alleging a 

breach of an employment contract where facts are in dispute must generally exhaust administrative 

remedies by bringing an appeal to the Texas Commissioner of Education). “Until the [Texas 

Commissioner of Education] issues a final ruling with respect to a claim for breach of an 

employment contract, a plaintiff is deemed not to have exhausted [his] administrative remedies

and may not bring an independent breach of contract action.” Shackelford v. Bonham Indep. Sch.

Dist., No. 4:18-CV-00035, 2018 WL 3630153, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 31, 2018). Jones has not 

alleged facts showing that he received a final ruling from the Texas Commissioner of Education 

regarding his claim for breach of an employment contract. 

Additionally, whether Jones was hired as a teacher is irrelevant with respect to exhausting 

administrative remedies under Section 7.057(a)—both teachers and non-teachers must exhaust 

their administrative remedies if their claims fall within the statute’s purview. See, e.g., Houston 

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rose, No. 01-13-00018-CV, 2013 WL 3354724, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (noting that Texas law required a non-teacher employed on a one-year 

term contract to exhaust administrative remedies with the Texas Education Commission before 

filing suit). Jones failed to plead facts establishing that he exhausted his breach of contract claim 

against the school district defendants by first filing a complaint with the Texas Commissioner of 

Education pursuant to Section 7.057(a) of the Texas Education Code. Thus, the court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction over Jones’ breach of contract claim against the school district defendants. 

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Turning to the 12(b)(6) motion, the school district defendants contend that even if the court 

has subject matter jurisdiction over Jones’ breach of contract claim, he failed to plead sufficient 

facts to establish the existence of a contract between himself and any of the 11 individual school 

district defendants. The undersigned agrees. Under Texas law, to establish a breach of contract 

claim, a plaintiff must establish four elements: “(1) a valid contract exists; (2) the plaintiff 

performed or tendered performance as contractually required; (3) the defendant breached the 

contract by failing to perform or tender performance as contractually required; and (4) the plaintiff 

sustained damages due to the breach.” Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 

S.W.3d 882, 890 (Tex. 2019). Jones failed to plead any facts establishing the first element: the 

existence of a contract between him and any of the school district defendants. Instead, he alleges

only that the defendants are liable for “breach of contract.” Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8. This is simply 

a legal conclusion. Thus, Jones failed to plead sufficient facts to establish a plausible breach of 

contract claim against the school district defendants. Accordingly, Jones’ breach of contract 

claims against the school district defendants in their individual capacities should be dismissed. 

B. Title VII Claims

Jones asserts a variety of Title VII claims in his Amended Complaint but does not 

specifically allege that the school district defendants are liable for the alleged harm suffered. Doc. 

No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8; 11, ⁋ 11. Regardless, Jones cannot establish a Title VII claim against an individual

acting in their individual capacity. See Stelly v. Duriso, 982 F.3d 403, 408 n.6 (5th Cir. 2020) 

(noting that individual defendants acting in their individual capacity who do not meet the definition 

of employer cannot be liable under Title VII). Jones failed to plead sufficient facts to establish 

that any of the school district defendants acted in the capacity of his employer rather than their 

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individual capacities. Accordingly, Jones’ Title VII claims against the school district defendants

in their individual capacities should be dismissed. 

C. ADA Claims

Jones asserts an ADA claim in his Amended Complaint. See Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8. To the 

extent Jones’ ADA claim is brought against the school district defendants in their individual 

capacities, it must be dismissed because the ADA does not authorize claims against individual 

defendants. See Nottingham v. Richardson, 499 F. App’x 368, 376 n.6 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

a plaintiff may not sue a defendant in their individual capacity under the ADA). Accordingly, 

Jones’ ADA claims against the school district defendants in their individual capacities should be

dismissed. 

D. ADEA Claims

Jones asserts an ADEA claim in his Amended Complaint. See Doc. No. 3 at 7, ⁋ 2. To the 

extent Jones’ ADEA claim is brought against the school district defendants in their individual 

capacities, it must be dismissed because the ADEA does not authorize claims against individual 

defendants. See Malcolm v. Vicksburg Warren Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 709 F. App’x 243, 247 

(5th Cir. 2017) (noting that “the ADEA provides no basis for individual liability for supervisory 

employees”) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, Jones’ ADEA claims against the school 

district defendants in their individual capacities should be dismissed.

E. Voting Rights Act Claims

Jones asserts a claim under the VRA to challenge the at-large election system used by 

GISD to elect its Trustees. Doc. No. 3 at 22–23, ⁋ 39. To the extent that Jones asserts a VRA 

claim against the school district defendants in their individual capacities, these claims should be 

dismissed because VRA claims cannot be asserted against individual defendants. Rather, VRA 

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claims may be asserted only against a state or political subdivision. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (stating 

that “no voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be 

imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or 

abridgement of the right” to vote) (emphasis added). Accordingly, to the extent Jones alleges 

VRA claims against the school district defendants in their individual capacities, any such claims

should be dismissed. 

F. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claims

Jones asserts a race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against the school district 

defendants. See Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8. To establish a race discrimination claim under § 1981, 

Jones must show (1) he is a member of a racial minority; (2) the school district defendants 

intentionally discriminated against him due to his race; and (3) the discrimination concerns one or 

more of the enumerated activities in the statute. Morris v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 

751 (5th Cir. 2001). Here, Jones has not alleged sufficient facts to support the second element. 

Jones failed to plead any facts suggesting that the school district defendants discriminated against 

him due to his race. Thus, Jones failed to plead sufficient facts to establish a plausible race 

discrimination claim under § 1981. Accordingly, Jones’ race discrimination claims under 42 

U.S.C. § 1981 against the school district defendants in their individual capacities should be

dismissed. 

G. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Claims

Jones asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for a conspiracy to violate his civil rights. 

Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8. Section 1985(3) provides a civil cause of action to prevent conspiracies to 

deprive people of “equal protection of the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Jones does not specifically

allege a conspiracy under § 1985(3), but rather, vaguely mentions § 1985 as a cause of action 

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among his litany of other claims. Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8. Elsewhere in his complaint, Jones vaguely 

mentions violations of his equal protection rights. See id. at 7, ⁋ 2; 27. Thus, the undersigned 

construes Jones’ conclusory mention of § 1985 as a conspiracy claim falling under § 1985(3). 

To state a valid claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege that: (1) there was a 

conspiracy; (2) the conspiracy was made to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws; (3) 

there was an act under the conspiracy; (4) the act caused injury to a person, property, or deprivation 

of a right; and (5) a race-or class-based discriminatory animus underlay the conspiracy. Hilliard

v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652–53 (5th Cir. 1994). To allege the existence of a conspiracy, a

plaintiff must allege the involvement of two or more persons. See id. at 653. Here, Jones has not 

alleged the existence of a conspiracy because he has not alleged any facts regarding which specific 

defendants formed the conspiracy. Thus, he failed to establish the first element of a § 1985 claim. 

Accordingly, Jones’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against the school district defendants in their 

individual capacities should be dismissed.

H. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

Jones generally alleges violations of his First, Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights.

5

 Doc. No. 3 at 6. The school district defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified 

immunity from Jones’ constitutional claims. Doc. No. 34 at 17. Before turning to the school 

district defendants’ qualified immunity claims, the undersigned will first address whether Jones 

has pleaded sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for any of the four constitutional violations 

he alleges. The undersigned will consider each claim in turn. 

5 Additionally, Jones generally alleges a violation of his § 1983 rights by simply naming the statute in several 

places throughout his complaint. See id. at 10, ⁋⁋ 8–9, 23, ⁋ 41. This is insufficient to state a claim for relief because 

a plaintiff must state a violation of a constitutional right to allege a violation of § 1983. 

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First, Jones’ only First Amendment claim alleged with any degree of specificity is a First 

Amendment retaliation claim against Don Jackson, Kristi Bell, and the GISD school board. Doc. 

No. 3 at 6, ⁋⁋ 1–3. This claim relates to Jackson’s discussion of a staff input survey during a 

meeting between Jackson and Jones, and for Jackson, Bell, and GISD’s alleged actions in “singling 

Plaintiff out to retaliation, egregious hostile working environment,” and for “placing Plaintiff in a 

threatening and belligerent interrogation in front of Plaintiff’s supervisor.” Id. These facts do not 

support a First Amendment retaliation claim. To properly assert a First Amendment retaliation 

claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) he suffered an adverse employment decision, (2) he spoke as a 

citizen on a matter of public concern, (3) his interest in the speech outweighs the government’s 

interest in the efficient provision of public services, and (4) the protected speech motivated the 

adverse employment action.” Bevill v. Fletcher, 26 F.4th 270, 276 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Nixon 

v. City of Houston, 511 F.3d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2007)). 

Regarding the second element, any statements Jones made during the alleged meeting 

between him and Jackson are not protected by the First Amendment because Jones has not 

established that he spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern during the meeting. See Wilson

v. Tregre, 787 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that “[a]n employee is not speaking as a 

citizen—but rather in his role as an employee—when he makes statements pursuant to his official 

duties”). The Fifth Circuit has defined “pursuant to official duties” as “activities undertaken in the 

course of performing one’s job.” Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 313 (5th Cir. 2008). In 

analyzing whether a speaker made statements as a citizen or employee, courts focus on the role 

the speaker occupied when he engaged in the speech, not on the speech’s content. Id. at 312. 

Courts have considered several non-dispositive factors in determining when speech is made 

pursuant to an employee’s official duties, such as “the relationship between the topic of the speech 

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and the employee’s job; whether the employee spoke internally up the chain of command at [his] 

workplace; and whether the speech resulted from special knowledge gained as an employee.” 

Lewis v. San Jacinto Cnty. Appraisal Dist., No. CIV A H-09-2339, 2010 WL 3784492, at *5 (S.D. 

Tex. Sept. 23, 2010). Additionally, courts have noted that “[w]hether a communication is internal 

or external in nature may also be significant: where a public employee raises complaints or 

concerns up the chain of command at his workplace about his job duties, the speech is made 

pursuant to his official duties, but when an employee take[s] his job concerns to persons outside 

the work place in addition to raising them up the chain of command at his workplace, these external 

communications are typically made as a citizen, not an employee.” Petrie v. City of Grapevine, 

904 F. Supp. 2d 569, 577 (N.D. Tex. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Petrie v. Salame, 546 F. App’x 466 

(5th Cir. 2013) (citing Davis, 518 F.3d at 313) (internal quotations omitted). 

Here, Jones alleges that during the meeting between himself and Jackson, “the 

superintendent went right into addressing the Staff Input Survey,” which was a survey that “the 

superintendent requested all employees to fill out . . . about his stewardship of GISD.” Doc. No. 

3 at 7, ⁋ 3; 18, ⁋ 23. The topic of Jones’ alleged speech during the meeting was the survey Jones 

had filled out about Jackson’s leadership of GISD, which is Jones’ employer. Thus, the topic of 

this speech is clearly related to Jones’ job. Moreover, this meeting was an example of Jones 

speaking internally up the chain of command because the superintendent was his superior, and 

based on the facts in Jones’ Amended Complaint, it seems that only Jones and Jackson were present 

at the meeting. See id. at 7, ⁋ 3. Finally, Jones has not alleged any facts showing that he expressed

his “job concerns to persons outside the workplace” in addition to raising them up the chain of 

command during the meeting between him and Jackson. See Petrie, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 577. Based

on these factors, it is not plausible that Jones was speaking as a citizen, rather than as an employee 

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of GISD pursuant to his official duties. Thus, his speech is not protected under the First 

Amendment. Additionally, Jones failed to plead any facts establishing the third or fourth elements

of a First Amendment retaliation claim. Accordingly, Jones’ First Amendment retaliation claim 

against Jackson, Bell, and the GISD trustees fails. 

The undersigned discerns no other First Amendment claims against specific defendants 

aside from bare legal conclusions stating that Jones’ First Amendment rights were violated.6 These 

allegations are insufficient to establish a First Amendment claim. Accordingly, his First 

Amendment claims against the school district defendants in their individual capacities should be 

dismissed.

Second, Jones only generally alleged a Fifth Amendment violation among a litany of other 

claims. See Doc. No. 3 at 6 (alleging that “[t]he Superintendent and GISD has engaged in unlawful 

employment practice pursuant to . . . Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights, first, fifth, tenth, and 

fourteenth . . .”). Jones failed to plead sufficient facts to establish any plausible Fifth Amendment 

violation against the school district, and his singular mention of the Fifth Amendment in his 

Amended Complaint amounts to a mere legal conclusion. Accordingly, Jones’ Fifth Amendment 

claims against the school district defendants in their individual capacities should be dismissed.

Third, the undersigned discerns only two possible Fourteenth Amendment claims from 

Jones’ Amended Complaint.

7

 Doc. No. 3. First, Jones potentially alleges an equal protection claim

6 For instance, Jones states that “Plaintiff asserts and alleges pursuant to the Free Speech Clause the purpose 

of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 

It is closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which, the court have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under 

First Amendment . . . for forbidding school employees for expressing views when they are requested voluntary.” Doc. 

No. 3 at 5. This passage includes no facts supporting the existence of a plausible First Amendment claim. 

Additionally, Jones states that the “All-White school board [] failed to protect Plaintiff’s first [] amendments rights.” 

Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8. This is simply a legal conclusion that contains no facts supporting the existence of a plausible 

First Amendment claim. 

7 The undersigned notes that Jones mentions the Fourteenth Amendment elsewhere in his Amended 

Complaint only as a legal conclusion. See, e.g., id. at 5–6, 7, ⁋ 2. 

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against Jackson, the superintendent, based on Jones’ allegation that “the other employees Staff 

Input Survey was not forward to the superintendent as Plaintiff’s Survey had been.” Id. at 7, ⁋ 3, 

27. Second, the undersigned discerns a potential equal protection claim against the school board 

because Jones alleges that “different rules were enforced against Plaintiff, but not enforced against 

white employees.” Id. at 10, ⁋ 8. 

The Equal Protection Clause requires “that all persons similarly situated should be treated 

alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “To state a 

claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and section 1983, [a] plaintiff 

‘must allege and prove that [1] he received treatment different from that received by similarly 

situated individuals and [2] that the unequal treatment stemmed from a discriminatory intent.’” 

Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 424 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights

v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (noting that “[p]roof of racially 

discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause”). 

“Discriminatory purpose . . . implies that the decisionmaker singled out a particular group for 

disparate treatment and selected his course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its 

adverse effect on an identifiable group.” Taylor v. Johnson, 257 F.3d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 2001)

(internal quotations omitted and emphasis in original). 

Here, regarding Jones’ first potential equal protection claim, he has alleged that his “Staff 

Input Survey” was treated differently than other white employees’ surveys. However, Jones failed 

to plead any facts showing how this alleged differential treatment stemmed from a discriminatory 

intent by any of the school district defendants. A plaintiff who merely alleges differential treatment

does not state a plausible Equal Protection claim that is sufficient to survive dismissal under a 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—a plaintiff must allege some facts showing that the differential 

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treatment derived from a discriminatory intent by the defendant. Jones failed to do so, and his first 

potential equal protection claim should be dismissed. Regarding Jones’ second potential equal 

protection claim, his allegations amount to a legal conclusion unsupported by any specific facts 

showing (1) differential treatment between himself and other similarly situated individuals or (2) 

that such treatment was motivated by discriminatory intent. Thus, his second potential equal 

protection claim should be dismissed as well. Accordingly, Jones’ equal protection claims against 

the school district defendants should be dismissed. 

Finally, Jones’ Tenth Amendment claim amounts to an impermissible legal conclusion 

because he simply lists a violation of the Tenth Amendment in a litany of various claims without 

providing any facts supporting this claim. Doc. No. 3 at 6. Accordingly, Jones’ Tenth Amendment 

claim is dismissed. 

Turning to the issue of qualified immunity, the school district defendants contend that they 

are entitled to qualified immunity from Jones’ constitutional claims. Doc. No. 34 at 17. The 

undersigned agrees. “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so 

long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 

a reasonable person would have known.” Crane v. City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453, 463 (5th Cir. 

2022). Courts engage in a two-prong analysis when assessing claims of qualified immunity. Id. 

First, the court must ask whether the officer’s conduct violated a federal right; and second, the 

court asks whether that right was clearly established at the time of the violation. Id. A court may 

analyze these two prongs in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Here, 

Jones failed to plead sufficient facts establishing that the school district defendants violated any of 

his federal rights. Accordingly, the school district defendants are entitled to qualified immunity 

for all of Jones’ constitutional claims under the First, Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

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In sum, Jones failed to plead sufficient facts to plausibly establish any of his constitutional 

claims under the First, Fifth, Tenth, or Fourteenth Amendments, and accordingly, all of Jones’ 

constitutional claims asserted against the school district defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should

be dismissed. Thus, the school district defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on all of 

Jones’ constitutional claims. 

IV. GISD’s Motion to Dismiss

Jones asserts the same claims against GISD as against the school district defendants in his 

Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 3. GISD’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 41) addresses Jones’ 

claims against the school district and the school board members sued in their official capacities. 

GISD moves to dismiss all causes of action brought against the school board itself and all school 

board officials sued in their official capacities. Doc. No. 41 at 8. 

As with Jones’ claims against the school district defendants, his claims against GISD are a 

form of shotgun pleading because Jones asserts “multiple claims against multiple defendants 

without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which 

of the defendants the claim is brought against.” See Valadez, No. SA21CV0002JKPRBF, 2022 

WL 1608016, at *5 (citing Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323). It is difficult to decipher whether Jones 

asserts certain claims specifically against GISD, or whether he generally asserts all of his claims 

against GISD. Nonetheless, the undersigned construes Jones’ claims liberally and assumes that 

all of his claims asserted against the school district defendants are asserted against GISD as well.

First, the undersigned will consider Jones’ claims against the school board officials in their 

official capacities. Second, the undersigned will consider Jones’ claims against GISD.

 

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A. Jones’ Official Capacity Claims Against Individual Defendants

Jones alleges claims against three GISD board members in their official capacities: Don 

Jackson, Kristi Bell, and Brad Spisak. Doc. No. 3 at 1. Jones mentions no other defendants sued

in their official capacities in his Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 3). To the extent that Jones alleges 

claims against these officials in their official capacity, all are subject to dismissal because they are 

duplicative of his identical claims against GISD. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 

(1985) (holding that “[a]s long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to 

respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against 

the entity”); Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that official

capacity claims are properly dismissed when the “allegations duplicate claims against the

respective government entities themselves.”). 

Here, Jones’ claims against Jackson, Bell, and Spisak in their official capacities with GISD 

are identical to his claims asserted against GISD and should be dismissed. To the extent Jones 

asserts other claims against GISD officials in their official capacities in his Amended Complaint, 

these claims are also considered suits against GISD itself and should be dismissed. 

B. Jones’ Claims Against GISD

GISD’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 41) addresses Jones’ claims brought against GISD.

These include: (1) breach of contract; (2) discrimination, retaliation, harassment, hostile work 

environment, and wrongful termination under Title VII; (3) violation of the ADA; (4) violation of 

the ADEA; (5) violation of the VRA; (6) discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (7) conspiracy to 

interfere with civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and (8) constitutional claims under the First, 

Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. No. 3 at 5–7, 10–11, 22–23. GISD moves to 

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dismiss all causes of action brought against it. Doc. No. 41 at 8. The undersigned will consider 

each claim in turn. 

1. Breach of Contract Claim

Jones asserts a breach of contract claim against GISD in his Amended Complaint. Doc. 

No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8. GISD contends that Jones failed to plead facts showing the existence of a contract 

between himself and GISD. Doc. No. 41 at 13–14. The undersigned agrees. Under Texas law, to 

establish a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must establish four elements: “(1) a valid contract 

exists; (2) the plaintiff performed or tendered performance as contractually required; (3) the 

defendant breached the contract by failing to perform or tender performance as contractually 

required; and (4) the plaintiff sustained damages due to the breach.” Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc.

v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882, 890 (Tex. 2019). Jones’ breach of contract claim 

against GISD fails because he failed to plead any facts showing (1) the existence or (2) the breach 

of a contract between himself and GISD. Rather, Jones lists breach of contract as one claim in a 

litany of other claims. Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8. This is simply a legal conclusion. Hays, 65 F.4th at 

743. Accordingly, Jones’ breach of contract claim against GISD should be dismissed.

2. Discrimination Claims Under Title VII and the ADEA

Jones asserts discrimination claims against GISD under Title VII and the ADEA. See Doc. 

No. 3 at 7, ⁋ 2; 10, ⁋ 8. Jones asserts that GISD discriminated against him “based on Age, Color, 

Disability, National Origin, Race, Retaliation, and Sex.” Id. at 11, ⁋ 11. With respect to his Title 

VII claim, Jones also alleges that he is black, was qualified for the position of “Dean of Students,”

was demoted from that position “for no cause” and “ultimately discharged for other pretextual 

reason,” and that the position was ultimately filled by a white male. Id. at 10, ⁋ 9. GISD contends 

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that Jones failed to plead sufficient facts to establish any plausible discrimination claim against 

GISD under either Title VII or the ADEA. Doc. No. 41 at 15. 

First, turning to Jones’ ADEA claim, Jones failed to plead sufficient facts to allege a 

plausible discrimination claim under the ADEA. To establish an ADEA discrimination claim, a 

plaintiff must show “(1) they are within the protected class; (2) they are qualified for the position; 

(3) they suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) they were replaced by someone younger 

or treated less favorably than similarly situated younger employees.” Smith v. City of Jackson,

Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 196 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). Jones 

failed to plead any facts establishing (1) his age or (2) that he was replaced by someone younger 

than him or that he was treated less favorably than younger employees outside the protected group. 

Thus, Jones fails to establish a prima facie case of age-based discrimination. Accordingly, Jones’ 

ADEA discrimination claim against GISD should be dismissed.

Second, turning to Jones’ Title VII claim, the undersigned discerns that Jones attempts to 

establish a disparate treatment claim under Title VII for race discrimination. Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 

9. “Disparate-treatment discrimination addresses employment actions that treat an employee 

worse than others based on the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In such 

disparate-treatment cases, proof and finding of discriminatory motive is required.” Pacheco v.

Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 2006). “A plaintiff can prove discriminatory motive through 

either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Cicalese v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 

766 (5th Cir. 2019). 

When a plaintiff chooses to prove discriminatory motive through circumstantial evidence, 

as Jones does here, a court analyzes the plaintiff’s claim under the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework. See Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003). Generally, the

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first step in the McDonnell Douglas analysis places the burden on the plaintiff to establish the

presumption of discrimination by showing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. To establish

a prima facie case, Jones must show “that he (1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified

for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the 

employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside his protected group or was treated less

favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group.” Ernst v. Methodist

Hosp. Sys., 1 F.4th 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2021).

However, at the motion to dismiss stage, “a plaintiff need not make out a prima facie case

of discrimination [under McDonnell Douglas] in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim.” Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013). Rather, the

Fifth Circuit has noted that “it can be ‘helpful to reference’ [the McDonnell Douglas framework] 

when the court is determining whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged the ultimate elements of 

the disparate treatment claim.” Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 767. While it is improper for a district court

to require “a showing of each prong of the prima facie test for disparate treatment,” (see id. at 766),

nonetheless, plaintiffs must still “plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements of a

disparate treatment claim to make [their] case plausible.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836

F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016). 

The Fifth Circuit has identified two ultimate elements a plaintiff must plead to support a

disparate treatment claim under Title VII: “(1) an adverse employment action, (2) taken against a

plaintiff because of her protected status.” Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 767 (quoting Raj, 714 F.3d at 331)

(internal quotations omitted). In other words, a plaintiff must allege “facts, [either] direct or

circumstantial, that would suggest [the employer’s] actions were based on [the plaintiff’s] race or

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national origin or that [the employer] treated similarly situated employees of other races or national

origin more favorably.” Id. at 767. 

Jones failed to plead sufficient facts establishing the two ultimate elements of his disparate 

treatment claim for race discrimination under Title VII. In his Amended Complaint, Jones alleged

that he is black, was qualified for the position of “Dean of Students,” and was demoted and 

ultimately fired. Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 9. However, Jones failed to plead facts establishing that his

alleged demotion and firing occurred because of his race. Rather, Jones only pleaded that he was

“demoted from [the Dean of Students position] for no cause and ultimately discharged for other

pretextual reason, and the position remained open and was ultimately filled by a white male.” Id.

Additionally, Jones alleges that he was “replaced by a white male pretextual based on the

Superintendent agreeing to pay Plaintiff a salary increase.” Id. at 10, ⁋ 9; 17, ⁋ 21. 

The fact thatJones was replaced by a white male is insufficient, standing alone, to plausibly

allege one of the ultimate elements of his disparate treatment claim: that he was demoted and

terminated because of his race. While there is no requirement that Jones must prove every element

of his prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss, Jones must present some factual allegations

that the adverse employment action was taken because of Jones’ race. Jones failed to plead any

facts suggesting that GISD terminated him because of his race. Moreover, Jones failed to plead

any specific facts regarding the white male that allegedly filled his former role as to whether that

person was similarly situated to him. Accordingly, Jones’ Title VII discrimination claim should 

be dismissed.

To the extent Jones alleges discrimination claims under Title VII on the basis of his national 

origin and sex, any such claims amount to mere legal conclusions. See Doc. No. 3 at 11, ⁋ 11. 

Accordingly, to the extent that Jones asserts any discrimination claims under Title VII based on

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national origin or sex, any such claims should be dismissed because Jones failed to plead facts 

plausibly establishing discrimination on the basis of either characteristic. 

3. Discrimination Claim Under the ADA

Jones asserts a discrimination claim under the ADA. See Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8. Just as 

with Jones’ other numerous claims in his Amended Complaint, he lists his ADA claim in a string 

of other claims and alleges no specific facts plausibly establishing an ADA violation by GISD. To 

establish a prima facie discrimination claim under the ADA, a plaintiff “must prove: (1) that he 

has a disability; (2) that he was qualified for the job; [and] (3) that he was subject to an adverse 

employment decision on account of his disability.” Moss v. Harris Cnty. Constable Precinct One, 

851 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2017). Jones references a “known and recorded disability in Plaintiff 

file” and an “illness,” yet does not state what disability or illness he experienced. Without any 

mention of a specific disability or illness, these allegations are not specific enough to establish that 

he has a disability protected by the ADA or that he was allegedly demoted and terminated because 

of his disability. Thus, Jones fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on 

disability under the ADA. Accordingly, Jones’ ADA claim against GISD should be dismissed. 

4. Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA

Jones broadly asserts that he was retaliated against throughout his Amended Complaint, 

and the undersigned discerns that his retaliation claims could potentially be brought against GISD 

under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8. Specifically, Jones alleges that

GISD “violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under color of law by singling Plaintiff out to 

retaliation” and “[i]n response to Plaintiff’s outcry from the Superintendent’s revelations, the ‘AllWhite’ school board continued to allow the Superintendent to create . . . retaliation against Plaintiff, 

as well as harass and wrongfully terminate Plaintiff on the pretextual actions that Plaintiff was 

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subordinate.” Doc. No. 3 at 6, ⁋ 1; 10, ⁋ 8. GISD contends that Jones failed to plead sufficient 

facts to establish a plausible retaliation claim because he failed to show that he engaged in 

protected activity prior to his termination. Doc. No. 41 at 17. The undersigned agrees. 

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to retaliation claims under 

Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. See Outley v. Luke & Associates, Inc., 840 F.3d 212, 219 (5th 

Cir. 2016) (applying framework to Title VII); Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th 

Cir. 2010) (applying framework to ADEA); Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 304 

(5th Cir. 2020) (applying framework to ADA). A plaintiff need not plead all the elements of a 

prima facie case of retaliation to survive a motion to dismiss under FED R.CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Jenkins

v. La. Workforce Comm’n, 713 F. App’x 242, 244 (5th Cir. 2017). However, the prima-facie 

standard still “has some relevance at the motion-to-dismiss stage” because “a plaintiff must plead 

sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements to make her [retaliation claim] plausible.” Id.

(quotations omitted). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the ADEA, or 

the ADA, Jones must show that (1) he engaged in conduct protected under the statutes; (2) he 

suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the 

protected activity and the adverse action. Cabral v. Brennan, 853 F.3d 763, 766–67 (5th Cir. 

2017). 

Regarding the first element, “[a]n employee has engaged in activity protected by Title VII

if she has either (1) ‘opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice’ by Title VII or

(2) ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,

proceeding, or hearing’ under Title VII.” Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996). 

However, a “vague complaint, without any reference to an unlawful employment practice under

Title VII, does not constitute protected activity.” Davis v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 448 Fed.

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App’x. 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2011). See, e.g., Moore v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 150 F. App’x.

315, 319 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that plaintiff was not engaged in protected activity because

though he filed a grievance against his employer, the grievance did not protest racial discrimination

or any other unlawful employment practice protected under Title VII). 

Here, Jones has not established that he engaged in conduct protected by Title VII, the

ADEA, or the ADA. Jones broadly asserts that he was retaliated against but does not specify how

GISD retaliated against him. The undersigned construes two possible adverse employment actions

on which Jones might possibly base his retaliation claims: (1) his alleged demotion, and (2) his

alleged termination. See Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 9. Regarding Jones’ alleged demotion, he alleges that

he was demoted from his position as “Dean of Students” to “Truancy Officer” in fall 2021. Doc.

No. 3 at 16, ⁋ 20. Jones failed to plead any facts showing that he engaged in an activity protected

by Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA prior to his demotion. Further, Jones cannot establish a causal

connection between any protected activity and his alleged demotion. Accordingly, Jones cannot

establish a retaliation claim based on his demotion. 

Regarding Jones’ termination, he alleges that he was terminated following his multiple

employee complaints. Id. at 21, ⁋ 34. The undersigned construes his termination as a potential

basis for a retaliation claim. Between January and April 2022, Jones allegedly filed multiple

employee complaints: an “employee complaint” emailed to his supervisor (Id. at 8, ⁋ 3); an

“employee complaint form-Level One,” (Id. at 8, ⁋ 5); an appeal to the GISD Board of Trustees

(Id. at 19, ⁋ 28); and a subsequent appeal of the GISD Board of Trustee’s dismissal of his first

appeal (id. at 19, ⁋ 29). In May 2022, Superintendent Jackson attempted to meet with Jones three

times regarding his various complaints, but Jones never attended any meeting. Id., ⁋⁋ 24, 30–34.

Jones was terminated after the third meeting that he failed to attend. Id. at 21, ⁋ 34. 

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Jones failed to plead any facts showing that any of his multiple complaints were a form of

protected activity under Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA. While Jones need not plead facts

establishing an airtight prima facie case of retaliation, he has failed to plead any facts indicating

that he participated in protected activity, and in any case, that his ultimate termination was causally

connected to his participation in protected activity. Without some factual allegations supporting

the existence of a prima facie case of retaliation, Jones cannot establish a plausible claim for

retaliation. Accordingly, Jones’ retaliation claims against GISD under Title VII, the ADA, and

the ADEA should be dismissed. 

5. Hostile Work Environment Claims Under Title VII, the ADEA, and 

the ADA

Jones generally alleges a claim for hostile work environment. Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8. The 

undersigned discerns that this claim could potentially be brought under Title VII, the ADEA, or 

the ADA. See id. Specifically, Jones alleges that “[i]n response to Plaintiff’s outcry from the 

Superintendent’s revelations, the ‘All-White’ school board continued to allow the Superintendent 

to create a hostile work environment.” Id. GISD contends that Jones has failed to state a hostile 

work environment claim under any statute. Doc. No. 41 at 18–19. To state a claim for hostile 

work environment under Title VII, Jones must allege: “(1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he 

was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the claimed harassment was based on the protected 

characteristic; (4) the claimed harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; 

and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt 

remedial action.” Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 2012). See also 

Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 655 F.3d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying same elements to 

ADEA claims); Thompson v. Microsoft Corporation, 2 F.4th 460, 470–71 (5th Cir. 2021) 

(applying same elements to ADA claims).

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Here, Jones has not alleged facts establishing that GISD harassed him beyond his bare 

allegations that the GISD School Board “continued to allow the Superintendent to create a hostile 

work environment.” This statement amounts to a legal conclusion asserted without any supporting 

facts suggesting a plausible harassment claim. Moreover, Jones has alleged no facts at all 

indicating that any alleged harassment by GISD was based on his race, his age, or his disability 

status. Thus, Jones failed to establish two elements of a hostile work environment claim. 

Accordingly, Jones’ hostile work environment claims should be dismissed. 

6. Voting Rights Act Claim

Next, Jones asserts a claim under the Voting Rights Act against GISD. Doc. No. 3 at 22–

23, ⁋ 39. Specifically, Jones seeks to challenge “the ‘at-large’ election system used by Grapeland 

Independent School District to elect its Trustees, which has deprived hundreds of minority voters 

in GISD of their voting rights guaranteed by law.” Id. Though Jones does not specifically allege 

under which subsection of the Voting Rights Act he seeks to bring his claim, the undersigned 

discerns that Jones likely attempts to bring this claim pursuant to Section 2 of the Voting Rights 

Act of 1965. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973. GISD contends that for a plaintiff’s claim under the Voting 

Rights Act to survive a motion to dismiss under FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege 

sufficient facts plausibly establishing three threshold conditions established by the United States

Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). Doc. No. 41 at 19. GISD 

contends that Jones has not established any of the three threshold conditions articulated in Gingles. 

Id. The undersigned agrees.

To successfully plead a claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, Jones must make 

two showings. First, Jones must allege facts plausibly establishing all three Gingles 

“preconditions”: (1) The minority group must be sufficiently large and compact to constitute a 

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majority in a reasonably configured district, (2) the minority group must be politically cohesive, 

and (3) a majority group must vote sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minority 

group’s preferred candidate. Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Comm’n, 595 U.S. 

398, 402 (2022) (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50–51). Second, if these three preconditions are 

established, “a court considers the totality of circumstances to determine ‘whether the political 

process is equally open to minority voters.’” Id. Here, Jones offers several vague critiques

referencing GISD’s system of electing its trustees but fails to allege any facts plausibly establishing 

any of the three Gingles preconditions. See Doc. No. 3 at 22–24, ⁋⁋ 38–47. Accordingly, Jones’ 

claim against GISD under the Voting Rights Act should be dismissed. 

7. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claim

Jones asserts a claim against GISD under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8. To 

establish a race discrimination claim under § 1981, Jones must show (1) he is a member of a racial 

minority; (2) the school district defendants intentionally discriminated against him due to his race; 

and (3) the discrimination concerns one or more of the enumerated activities in the statute. Morris 

v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 751 (5th Cir. 2001). Jones’ § 1981 claim against GISD 

fails for the same reason as his § 1981 claim against the school district defendants: he failed to

plead sufficient facts to plausibly allege that GISD discriminated against him due to his race. Thus, 

he failed to establish one of the three required elements for a § 1981 discrimination claim. 

Accordingly, Jones’ § 1981 claim against GISD should be dismissed. 

8. 42 U.S.C. § 1985

Next, Jones asserts a claim against GISD under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Doc. No. 3 at 10, ⁋ 8. 

Though Jones does not specify which subsection of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 his claim is brought under, 

the undersigned construes his complaint to state a potential claim under § 1985(3). To state a valid 

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claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege that: (1) there was a conspiracy; (2) the conspiracy

was made to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws; (3) there was an act under the 

conspiracy; (4) the act caused injury to a person, property, or deprivation of a right; and (5) a raceor class-based discriminatory animus underlay the conspiracy. Hilliard, 30 F. 3d at 652–53. To

allege the existence of a conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege the involvement of two or more persons. 

See id. at 653. Moreover, “a school board and its employees constitute a single legal entity which 

is incapable of conspiring with itself for the purposes of § 1985(3).” Id. Jones’ § 1985 claim 

against GISD fails for the same reason as his § 1985 claim against the school district defendants: 

he failed to plead any facts establishing the existence of a conspiracy between two or more persons 

or entities. Accordingly, Jones’ claim against GISD under § 1985 should be dismissed. 

9. Constitutional Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Jones generally alleges violations of his First, Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights against GISD. Doc. No. 3 at 6. Jones’ claims against GISD are identical to his claims 

against the school district defendants. See id. Accordingly, Jones’ constitutional claims against 

GISD under § 1983 should be dismissed for the same reasons as his claims against the school 

district defendants: Jones failed to plead sufficient facts to establish any constitutional violation 

under the First, Fifth, Tenth, or Fourteenth Amendments. 

V. EEOC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Jones names the EEOC and several EEOC officials (“EEOC defendants”) as defendants in 

the caption of his Amended Complaint but sparingly discusses the EEOC defendants in the body 

of his complaint.8 The EEOC defendants’ instant Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 66) addresses 

8 The undersigned notes that Jones has previously filed similar claims against the EEOC in the Northern 

District of Texas, all of which were dismissed by the district court whose decision was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. See Jones v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, No. 3:21-CV-1953-E-BN, 2021 WL 3917007, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 

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Jones’ claims brought against the agency and individual defendants. The undersigned discerns

only one potential claim against the EEOC from Jones’ Amended Complaint, which is Jones’ 

allegation that the EEOC failed to file suit on his behalf after Jones reported his dispute with GISD 

to the EEOC. Doc. No. 3 at 26, ⁋ 59. Additionally, Jones asks the court to compel the EEOC to 

represent him in this matter. Id. at 28. The EEOC defendants move to dismiss all causes of action 

brought against them. Doc. No. 66 at 2.

The EEOC defendants contend that to the extent Jones has alleged any claims against the 

EEOC defendants, all such claims must be dismissed for three reasons. Doc. No. 66 at 5–7. First,

Title VII does not confer a right of action against the EEOC on a charging party. Id. at 5–6; see 

Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 232 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Jones v. EEOC, No. 21-10914, 

2021 WL 5444736, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 19, 2021) (holding that Title VII does not confer a right 

of action against the EEOC on a charging party in a previous case Jones filed against the EEOC). 

Second, the EEOC maintains sovereign immunity against suit because it is a federal agency. Id. 

at 6–7; see F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (holding that “[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign 

immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit”). See also Lane v. Pena, 

518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (holding that a “waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity 

must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text and will not be implied”) (internal citations 

omitted). The EEOC defendants contend that Jones has failed to identify a waiver of the EEOC’s 

sovereign immunity from suit. Id. at 6. Third, Jones has not stated a claim for relief based on the 

conclusory allegations in his Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 66 at 7. 

24, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:21-CV-1953-E, 2021 WL 3914039 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2021), 

aff’d, No. 21-10914, 2021 WL 5444736 (5th Cir. Nov. 19, 2021).

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The undersigned agrees with all three reasons advanced by the EEOC defendants. 

Accordingly, to the extent Jones has alleged any claim against the EEOC or EEOC officials, all 

such claims should be dismissed. 

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends GRANTING the School District 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 34); GISD’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 41); and the 

EEOC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 66). 

VII. Objections

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), each party to this action has the right to file 

objections to this Report and Recommendation. Objections to this Report must (1) be in writing, 

(2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, (3) be 

served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report, and (4) be 

no more than eight (8) pages in length. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); 

E.D. TEX. CIV. R. CV-72(c). A party who objects to this Report is entitled to a de novo

determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations 

to which a specific objection is timely made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3).

A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law contained in this Report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy 

of this Report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District 

Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and (2) appellate review, except on grounds 

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of plain error, of any such findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States 

District Judge. See Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1988); Douglass v. United 

Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 

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