IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TYLER DIVISION

JAY WILLIAMS §

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23cv217

MARY STEPHENSON §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Jay Williams, an inmate of the Henderson County Jail proceeding pro se, filed a

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. #1.) The case was referred to the 

undersigned for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of 

the case.

On May 3, 2023, the Court observed that Plaintiff had neither paid the required filing fee 

nor sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). (Dkt. #2.) Accordingly, the Court gave him 

thirty days to satisfy the filing fee requirement to proceed with this case by either paying the fee 

or filing a properly supported IFP application. (Id.) Plaintiff has not complied with that order.

Instead, Plaintiff filed a handwritten document labeled “coupon” for $402 addressed to the 

Clerk of Court. (Dkt. #3.) The statutes cited on the face of the coupon simply define the terms 

“obligation or other security of the United States” and “financial institution” as they are used 

elsewhere in federal law. 18 U.S.C. §§ 8, 20. They do not establish that Plaintiff’s manufactured 

“coupon” is federal currency, and they have no bearing on his obligation to pay the filing fee for 

this case. It is a matter of public record that the Clerk of Court accepts payments by checks, money 

orders, credit cards, and debit cards. See United States District Court – Eastern District of Texas 

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Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/?q=frequently-askedquestions (last visited June 15, 2023). Plaintiff’s submission of this “coupon” is in bad faith and 

does not constitute an attempt to comply with the Court’s Order. 

A district court may dismiss an action for the failure of a litigant to prosecute or to comply

with any order of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 

1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The court possesses the inherent authority to dismiss the action sua sponte, 

without motion by a defendant.”). Dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order 

is an extreme sanction that should be employed only when “the plaintiff’s conduct has threatened

the integrity of the judicial process [in a way that] leav[es] the Court no choice but to deny that 

plaintiff its benefit.” McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Rogers v. 

Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1982)). A court should consider lesser sanctions, such as 

fines, costs, damages, conditional dismissals, and dismissal without prejudice, among other lesser 

measures, prior to dismissing an action with prejudice. McNeal, 842 F.2d at 793.

Here, Plaintiff’s failure to pay his filing fee or comply with the Court’s orders is not an 

action that threatens the judicial process—thereby rendering a dismissal with prejudice 

unwarranted. Therefore, upon consideration of all relevant factors, the Court has determined that 

the interests of justice are best served by a dismissal of this case without prejudice.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff be denied leave to proceed IFP

and this action be dismissed without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with an Order of 

the Court and failure to take the steps necessary to prosecute this case.

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Within fourteen (14) days after receipt of the Magistrate Judge’s Report, any party may 

serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations contained in the Report.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and 

recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen days after being served with a copy 

shall bar that party from de novo review by the district judge of those findings, conclusions and 

recommendations and, except on grounds of plain error, from appellate review of unobjected-to 

factual findings and legal conclusions accepted and adopted by the district court. Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

The Clerk shall refuse to accept any submissions from Plaintiff other than a fee payment, 

an IFP application, an objection to this Report, or a motion for extension of time to object.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 20th day of June, 2023.

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