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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TYLER DIVISION

JAY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. 

BOTIE HILLHOUSE, UNIDENTIFIED 

DEPUTIES, NANCY PERRYMAN, 

JUDGE EVANS, SCOTT MCKEE, CLINT 

DAVIS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY JENNY 

PALMER, BETH NUE, JONATHON 

STORMENT, C TINSLEY, BROOK 

FULKS,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23-CV-00300-JCB

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Jay Williams is an inmate currently incarcerated in the Henderson County Jail. On 

June 12, 2023, proceeding pro se, he filed the instant action complaining of violations pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1.) He has not paid the filing fee or submitted a motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court shall review, before docketing if feasible or in any event 

as soon as practicable after docketing, any complaint in a civil action wherein a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer, or employee of a governmental entity. During its 

review, the court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof 

if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Section 1915A applies regardless of whether the plaintiff has paid a 

filing fee or is proceeding IFP. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The plain 

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language of [§ 1915A] . . . indicates that it applies to any suit by a prisoner regardless of whether 

that prisoner is or is not proceeding IFP.”).

A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Samford v. Dretke, 562 

F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit has held that a complaint lacks an arguable basis

in fact when “the facts alleged are fantastic or delusional scenarios or the legal theory upon which 

a complaint relies is indisputably meritless.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 

(5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, during the initial screening 

under section 1915A, a court may determine that a prisoner’s complaint is frivolous if it rests upon 

delusional scenarios or baseless facts—and dismiss the complaint. See Henry v. Kerr County, 

Texas, 2016 WL 2344231 *3 (W.D. Tex. May 2, 2016) (“A court may dismiss a claim as factually 

frivolous only if the facts alleged are clearly baseless, fanciful, fantastic, delusional, or otherwise 

rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, regardless of whether there are judicially 

noticeable facts available to contradict them.”) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 

(1992)). 

Moreover, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted where it does 

not allege sufficient facts which, taken as true, state a claim which is plausible on its face and thus 

does not raise a right to relief above the speculative level. See Montoya v. FedEx Ground 

Packaging Sys. Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim has factual plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows 

the court to draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See 

Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2010); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard is not akin to a probability standard; rather, 

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the plausibility standard requires more than the mere possibility that the defendant has acted 

unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (emphasis supplied). 

All well-pleaded facts are taken as true, but the district court need not accept as true 

conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions. See Whatley v. Coffin, 

496 F. App’x 414 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citing Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 

(5th Cir. 2005)). Crucially, while the federal pleading rules do not require “detailed factual 

allegations,” the rule does “demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading offering “labels and conclusions” or a 

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice, nor does a complaint 

which provides only naked assertions that are devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. 

Plaintiff is no stranger to filing in federal court. Since May 1, 2023, he has filed twentynine cases in this district alone. See Case Nos. 6:23-cv-211, 6:23-cv-212, 6:23-cv-213, 6:23-cv214, 6:23-cv-215, 6:23-cv-216, 6:23-cv-217, 6:23-cv-218, 6:23-cv-219, 6:23-cv-220, 6:23-cv221, 6:23-cv-222, 6:23-cv-223, 6:23-cv-224, 6:23-cv-225, 6:23-cv-226, 6:23-cv-227, 6:23-cv228, 6:23-cv-229, 6:23-cv-230, 6:23-cv-236, 6:23-cv-256, 6:23-cv-257, 6:23-cv-258, 6:23-cv260, 6:23-cv-263, 6:23-cv-298, 6:23-cv-300, and 6:23-cv-301. In the present case, Plaintiff sues 

Botie Hillhouse, Nancy Perryman, Judge Evans, Scott McKee, Clint Davis, District Attorney 

Jenny Palmer, Beth Nue, Jonathon Storment, C Tinsley, Brook Fulks, and a number of unidentified 

Defendants. Plaintiff has already sued several of these individuals in this court and has been 

warned that repetitive filing of the same threadbare claims is malicious. See, e.g., Case No. 6:23-

cv-212 (Doc. No. 3), citing Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that under 

§ 1915(d) it was “‘malicious’ for a pauper to file a lawsuit that duplicates allegations of another 

pending federal lawsuit by the same plaintiff.”); Rhine v. Schmidt, 517 F. App’x 274 (5th Cir. 2013) 

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(holding that a complaint that was duplicative of a previously filed claim in another case was 

malicious under § 1915A(b)(1) and should have been dismissed without prejudice); Scroggins v. 

Winn Corr. Ctr., 693 F. App’x 343, 344 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[a] prisoner’s civil rights action is subject 

to dismissal as malicious if it repeats virtually identical claims based on a common series of 

occurrences.”). 

Plaintiff’s present allegations state only conclusory claims that Defendants failed to 

accommodate a disabled individual, and that Plaintiff emailed Clint Davis prior to being arrested 

about ADA violations. (Doc. No. 1, at 1.) As was previously explained to Plaintiff, any claims for 

failure to prosecute against Clint Davis are barred because “[a] prosecutor is absolutely immune 

from suit for any acts taken within the scope of his prosecutorial role.” See Harrell v. Rosenthal, 

No. 08-20120, 2008 WL 4649067, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 2008). Moreover, Plaintiff has no 

constitutional right to have anyone investigated or prosecuted. Oliver v. Collins, 914 F.2d 56, 60 

(5th Cir. 1990) (“Contrary to Oliver’s contention, he does not have a constitutional right to have 

someone criminally prosecuted.”); Van Meter v. Warder, No. 3-06-CV-0431-L, 2006 WL 

8436927, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 2006), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:06-CV0431-L, 2006 WL 8436928 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2006) (“[T]he court sua sponte notes that a private 

citizen has no right to have someone criminally prosecuted or investigated.”). Plaintiff’s present 

conclusory allegations fail to overcome prosecutorial immunity or state a claim for relief. Instead, 

Plaintiff has repeatedly filed the same conclusory claims, without any facts in support, against the 

same Defendants, rendering the filing of the claims malicious. See, e.g., Pittman, 980 F.2d at 995. 

Plaintiff’s only other allegations are that the court lacks integrity and that he is being denied 

prescription drugs. (Doc. No. 1.) These threadbare allegations fail to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. In order to state a plausible claim for relief, a pleading must contain (1) “a short and plain 

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statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” (2) “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and (3) “a demand for the relief sought.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts in his complaint, as required under the second 

prong of Rule 8. Plaintiff must meet the Rule 8 requirements, and he must do so with particularity, 

providing sufficient facts supporting his allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S at 545 (interpreting 

Rule 8); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684–85 (applying Twombly generally to civil actions pleaded 

under Rule 8). Allegations that are implausible and unsupported by facts or evidence are 

insufficient to state a claim. Id. Plaintiff must include enough information to support each request 

for relief so that the named Defendants can understand the claims that are being brought against 

them and how they allegedly caused Plaintiff’s harm. Plaintiff has failed to do so here as he has 

failed to allege a constitutional violation or a basis for which the numerous named Defendants

could be sued pursuant to § 1983. See Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[t]o 

establish a cause of action under § 1983, [] a party must [] show that the defendant, while acting 

under color of law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United 

States”) (internal quotations omitted).

Having conducted screening pursuant to § 1915A, the court finds that the above-captioned 

action should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Although a court should allow a 

pro se plaintiff every reasonable opportunity to amend his pleadings, Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 

1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998), Section 1915A does not require that a plaintiff be given notice of an 

impending dismissal. Moreover, giving a plaintiff an opportunity to amend is not necessary if he 

has pleaded his “best case,” such that an amended claim would remain frivolous. See Norman v. 

Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals, 582 F. App’x 430, 431 (Mem) (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished); 

Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Cockerham v. Jackson, No. CV 

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SA-17-CA-463-DAE, 2017 WL 8794288, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 13, 2017) (finding that a show 

cause order advising the plaintiff of the deficiency of his allegations and giving the plaintiff an 

opportunity to amend would be pointless given the frivolous nature of the allegations). 

Given that Plaintiff has asserted a variety of the same threadbare legal conclusions in 

twenty-nine different cases filed before this court, the court has serious doubts as to Plaintiff’s 

desire or ability to assert a plausible claim in any of these actions. Plaintiff’s repeated filing of 

frivolous actions is an abuse of the judicial process. The dismissal of the above-captioned action

shall count as a qualifying dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 

383 (5th Cir. 1996) abrogated in part on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 

534–41 (2015).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, the court RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed 

with prejudice pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1). The court further RECOMMENDS that the dismissal 

of the above-captioned case shall count as a qualifying dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 

Adepegba, 103 F.3d 383. 

Within fourteen (14) days after receipt of the Magistrate Judge’s Report, any party may 

serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations contained in the Report. A 

party’s failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and recommendations 

contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that 

party from de novo review by the district judge of those findings, conclusions and 

recommendations and, except on grounds of plain error, from appellate review of unobjected-to 

factual findings and legal conclusions accepted and adopted by the district court. Douglass v. 

United States Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996).

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So ORDERED and SIGNED this 28th day of June, 2023.

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