IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MARSHALL DIVISION

HEADWATER RESEARCH LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD and 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 2:23-CV-00103-JRG-RSP 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

SAMSUNG’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION 

TO STRIKE EXPERT REPORT OF DR. ANDREAS GROEHN (DKT. NO. 181) 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 249 Filed 11/20/24 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:

18945
ii 

EXHIBIT INDEX AND NOTES 

Exhibit Description 

E Excerpts of the deposition transcript of Andreas Groehn, Ph.D., taken May 13, 

2024 

F Excerpts of the deposition transcript of Dr. Andreas Groehn, taken October 18, 

20234 

* Emphasis added unless otherwise noted. 

Abbreviations/Definitions 

 ROG 11: Samsung’s Interrogatory No. 11 

 Headwater Research LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., Case No. 2:22-cv-00422 (E.D. 

Tex.) (hereinafter “HW1”)

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 249 Filed 11/20/24 Page 2 of 12 PageID #:

18946
1 

As confirmed by Headwater’s Response, Dr. Groehn’s conjoint analysis must be struck 

because neither of Headwater’s damages experts can connect the conjoint analysis to the facts of 

the case. Specifically, Headwater does not dispute Dr. Groehn’s analysis was done in a vacuum, 

and Headwater now tries to justify Dr. Groehn’s analysis only by saying, “[p]ut simply, Dr. Groehn 

conducted a consumer survey, and that was the result.” Dkt. 199 at 13. They then suggest it is 

Mr. Dell who will provide the appropriate patent context for Dr. Groehn’s numbers. But Mr. Dell 

incorrectly assumed Dr. Groehn’s opinions actually isolated the purported benefit of the patents 

and the accused features. 

Moreover, Headwater misses other critical points that prove the unreliability of Dr. 

Groehn’s survey. First, as established by Dr. Groehn’s own cited literature, conjoint analysis 

cannot reliably identify “pricing” or “incremental profit” of an individual feature of a smartphone 

divorced from the complex real-world market. Dkt. 181-4 (Allenby 2019) at GROEHN_00003439 

(“[C]onjoint analysis can only estimate demand. Conjoint survey data, alone, cannot be used to 

compute market equilibrium outcomes such as market prices. . . .”). Second, Headwater admits 

that Dr. Groehn ultimately was assigned with the impossible task of putting an actual profit number 

on a feature that Headwater’s experts all admit is subjective. As Dr. Groehn has consistently 

testified, the subjective measure of “battery life” varies greatly depending on the user and their 

individual practices. Regardless, Dr. Groehn improperly offers an objective, exact price 

measurement stemming from this subjective basis. 

I. NEITHER DR. GROEHN NOR MR. DELL CONNECT DR. GROEHN’S 

CALCULATIONS TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE 

Headwater admits Dr. Groehn analyzed only a broad, subjective feature (battery life) that 

is not an accused feature in this case, and that he did so with no understanding of the facts of 

this case. Dkt. 199 at 3 (stating Dr. Groehn’s goal was only to “measure the economic value of 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 249 Filed 11/20/24 Page 3 of 12 PageID #:

18947
2 

increased battery life”). Headwater does not dispute that Dr. Groehn had no understanding of the 

asserted patents, the alleged benefits of the patents, never spoke to the technical experts, never 

reviewed a single Samsung-produced document in this case, and never read any Samsung witness 

deposition in this case. Dkt. 181-3 (Groehn Rough Tr.) at 26:16–27:5, 27:6–9, 27:16–19, 27:24–

28:3, 29:8–10, 32:21–24, 32:25–33:3, 35:1–3, 37:5–8. 

As Headwater cites in its motion to strike Mr. Perryman’s opinions, “[i]f an expert ‘fails to 

tie the theory to the facts of the case, the testimony must be excluded.’” Dkt. 182 at 10 (citing 

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Trying to sidestep 

this failure, Headwater argues that Dr. Groehn’s untethered analysis remains admissible because 

it is Mr. Dell that supposedly ties Dr. Groehn’s results to the value of the patents. Dkt. 199 at 10 

(“the incremental profit per unit directly attributable to the patented contribution to battery life.”). 

Not so;1

 instead, it is Mr. Dell who relies on Dr. Groehn’s analysis to tie the purported value of the 

patents to “the value of battery life savings to smartphone users, and by extension, the value to 

Samsung.” Dkt. 186-1 (Dell Rpt.) ¶ 304. At best, Dr. Groehn’s survey is simply a general survey 

regarding battery life savings—it is not tied in any way to battery life savings by the patented 

features. As Headwater readily admits, “Dr. Groehn did not analyze anything related to push 

notifications,” and yet offers the exact same opinions here as in the HW1 case, which accused 

power-savings features. Dkt. 199 at 9. As Headwater argues in its opposition, “in Fractus, S.A. 

v. Samsung, the court excluded survey evidence . . . [that] punishes beyond the reach of the statute. 

1

 This also confirms the unreliability of Dr. Groehn’s analysis in this case: he jumps from broad, 

irrelevant battery life survey results to offering calculations of Samsung’s profits. Dr. Groehn 

clearly states (and Headwater ignores) that for his “profit” calculations, he assumes zero costs, 

rendering his “profit” calculations not actual profits in any meaningful sense of the term. Ex. E 

(Groehn 5/13/2024 Dep.) at 100:5-19, 106:12-107:9 (“...under the assumption that including or 

excluding this feature has zero marginal cost...”); 128:17-129:13. Headwater ignores this. 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 249 Filed 11/20/24 Page 4 of 12 PageID #:

18948
3 

No. 6:09-cv-208-LED-JDL, 2011 WL 7563820, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2011).” Dkt. 199 at 11. 

Headwater cannot be allowed to present the same damages theory as in HW1 here. 

II. HEADWATER AGREES “BATTERY LIFE” IS UNDEFINED 

Dr. Groehn’s survey also must be found irrelevant and unreliable because the survey 

measured only a subjective feature as imagined by each individual respondent. See Earl v. Boeing 

Co., No. 4:19-cv-507, 2021 WL 3140545, at *8 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2021) (“district courts 

nationwide have overwhelmingly found conjoint analyses insufficient when they measure ‘only 

consumers’ subjective valuation or willingness to pay’—i.e., demand factors”). At his deposition, 

Dr. Groehn could not offer any testimony to tie “battery life” to any objective measure of 

valuation: 

Q: And battery life is typically described to consumers in hours. Correct? 

A: I think it depends. 

Q: What does it depend on? 

A: . . . [B]attery life really depends on the experience or the situation of each 

individual consumer. 

... 

Q: Time is in terms of hours and minutes. Correct? 

A: . . . Talk time very much depends on the distance from the signal mass from 

the antenna, from – it might depend on the weather and other parameters that are 

– that are unique to each individual consumer that use the phone. 

Q: But talk time, video playback time, that’s a measure of time. Right? . . . 

A: Yes, but with the caveat that we know that talk time, for example, very much 

depends on the personal circumstances of each consumer for whom we are 

measuring talk time. 

Ex. F (Groehn 10/18/2024 Dep.) 91:13–93:06. Headwater admits as much, acknowledging the 

survey measures “[w]hat standard battery life means for a given respondent ‘depends on the 

situation of each individual respondent . . . . Each respondent will experience battery life in a 

different way . . . .’” Dkt. 199 at 12. Indeed, if Dr. Groehn was offering a consumer’s “willingness 

to pay” for that subjective feature, then it would run directly afoul of Earl’s holding. But Dr. 

Groehn is suggesting the actual profit value of the subjective battery life. Dr. Groehn’s subjective 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 249 Filed 11/20/24 Page 5 of 12 PageID #:

18949
4 

survey of “battery life” thus poses an even greater risk than the survey of cell phone antennae (an 

objectively observable, physical attribute) excluded in Fractus, S.A. v. Samsung, No. 6:09-cv-203-

LED-JDL, 2011 WL 7563820, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2011). The Fractus court reiterated 

“[a]llowing the jury to hear such evidence not tied to the claimed invention risks ‘compensation 

for infringement [that] punishes beyond the reach of the statute,’” and that “admissible expert 

testimony must ‘carefully tie proof of damages to the claimed invention’s footprint in the market 

place.’” Fractus at *1 (quoting ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 

2010)). 

III. DR. GROEHN IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM HEADWATER’S CASES 

Dr. Groehn’s analysis’ unreliability and disconnect from the facts of this case are markedly 

different from the types of survey evidence held admissible in Headwater’s cited cases. In Earl,

2021 WL 3140545, at *6–9, the court found each of movant’s narrow arguments lacking in 

specificity and each going to the weight of his report, not admissibility, particularly where many 

arguments were “incomplete at best, and misleading at worst” and contradicted “what Defendants’ 

own expert stated when deposed.” Id. at *8, n.7 (emphasis original). Conversely, here, all experts 

agree “battery life” is too subjective to be meaningfully tested, and Dr. Groehn’s survey is simply 

too disconnected from the facts of the case. It is Headwater’s burden to prove otherwise, and they 

have not. Id. at *1 (reiterating that “[t]he party offering an expert’s testimony must prove ‘(1) the 

expert is qualified, (2) the evidence is relevant to the suit, and (3) the evidence is reliable.’” 

(citations omitted)) In Estech, the Court admitted a conjoint survey regarding “based on seven 

attributes: five attributes corresponding to patented features, one distractor attribute, and one price 

attribute.” Estech Sys. IP, LLC v. Carvana LLC, No. 2:21-CV-00482-JRG-RSP, 2023 WL 

2934920, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2023). The Estech court found the expert connected the survey 

to the alleged patented benefits by citing the asserted patents directly for support that the surveyed 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 249 Filed 11/20/24 Page 6 of 12 PageID #:

18950
5 

VoIP features were, in fact, the alleged benefit of the patents. Id. at *3 (“see also ’684 Patent at 

12:24–44 and 14:30–46 (describing advantage of the ’684 Patent invention as it relates to voice 

data transmission)”). Headwater and Dr. Groehn offer no such citations connecting the broad 

concept of “battery life” surveyed by Dr. Groehn to the text of the asserted patents. They do not 

because 1) Dr. Groehn admitted he knew nothing of the asserted patents and accused features, Dkt. 

181-3 (Groehn 10/18/2024 Rough Tr.) at 29:08–10, 27:06–09, 27:16–19) Headwater does not 

dispute that counsel simply instructed Dr. Groehn to survey the generic concept of “battery life,” 

Dkt. 181-3 (Groen 10/18/2024 Rough Tr.) at 26:16–27:5, Dkt. 181-1 (Groehn Rpt.) ¶ 9. Dr. 

Groehn’s opinions and analysis should be excluded. 

 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 249 Filed 11/20/24 Page 7 of 12 PageID #:

18951
6 

Dated: November 12, 2024 Respectfully submitted, 

By: /s/ Thomas H. Reger II 

 Ruffin B. Cordell 

TX Bar No. 04820550 

Michael J. McKeon 

DC Bar No. 459780 

mckeon@fr.com 

Jared Hartzman 

DC Bar No. 1034255 

hartzman@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

1000 Maine Avenue, SW, Ste 1000 

Washington, D.C. 20024 

Telephone: (202) 783-5070 

Facsimile: (202) 783-2331 

Thad C. Kodish 

GA Bar No. 427603 

tkodish@fr.com 

Benjamin K. Thompson 

GA Bar No. 633211 

bthompson@fr.com 

Jonathan B. Bright 

GA Bar No. 256953 

jbright@fr.com 

Christopher O. Green 

GA Bar No. 037617 

cgreen@fr.com 

Noah C. Graubart 

GA Bar No. 141862 

graubart@fr.com 

Sara C. Fish 

GA Bar No. 873853 

sfish@fr.com 

Katherine H. Reardon 

NY Bar No. 5196910 

reardon@fr.com 

Nicholas A. Gallo 

GA Bar No. 546590 

gallo@fr.com 

Vivian C. Keller (pro hac vice) 

GA Bar No. 651500 

keller@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 249 Filed 11/20/24 Page 8 of 12 PageID #:

18952
7 

1180 Peachtree St. NE, Fl. 21 

Atlanta, GA 30309 

Telephone: (404) 892-5005 

Facsimile: (404) 892-5002 

Leonard E. Davis 

TX Bar No. 05521600 

ldavis@fr.com 

Andria Rae Crisler 

TX Bar No. 24093792 

crisler@fr.com 

Thomas H. Reger II 

Texas Bar No. 24032992 

reger@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

1717 Main Street, Suite 5000 

Dallas, TX 75201 

Telephone: (214)747-5070 

Facsimile: (214) 747-2091 

John-Paul R. Fryckman (pro hac vice) 

CA Bar No. 317591 

John W. Thornburgh 

CA Bar No. 154627 

thornburgh@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

12860 El Camino Real, Ste. 400 

San Diego, CA 92130 

Telephone: (858) 678-5070 

Facsimile: (858) 678-5099 

Katherine D. Prescott (pro hac vice) 

CA Bar No. 215496 

prescott@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

500 Arguello Street 

Suite 400 

Redwood City, CA 94063 

Telephone: (650) 839-5180 

Facsimile: (650) 839-5071 

Kyle J. Fleming (pro hac vice) 

NY Bar No. 5855499 

kfleming@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

7 Times Square, 20th Floor, 

New York, NY 10036 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 249 Filed 11/20/24 Page 9 of 12 PageID #:

18953
8 

Telephone: (212) 765-5070 

Facsimile: (212) 258-2291 

Melissa R. Smith 

State Bar No. 24001351 

Melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com 

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP 

303 South Washington Avenue 

Marshall, Texas 75670 

Telephone: (903) 934-8450 

Facsimile: (903) 934-9257 

Andrew Thompson (“Tom”) Gorham 

State Bar No. 24012715 

tom@gillamsmithlaw.com 

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP 

102 N. College, Suite 800 

Tyler, Texas 75702 

Telephone: (903) 934-8450 

Facsimile: (903) 934-9257 

Michael E. Jones 

State Bar No. 10929400 

mikejones@potterminton.com 

Shaun W. Hassett 

State Bar No. 24074372 

shaunhassett@potterminton.com 

POTTER MINTON, P.C. 

102 N. College Ave., Suite 900 

Tyler, Texas 75702 

Telephone: (903) 597-8311 

Facsimile: (903) 593-0846 

Lance Lin Yang 

CA. Bar No. 260705

Lanceyang@quinnemanuel.com 

Kevin (Gyushik) Jang 

CA Bar No. 337747 

kevinjang@quinnemanuel.com 

Sean S. Pak 

CA Bar No. 219032 

seanpak@quinnemanuel.com 

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN, LLP

50 California Street, 22nd Floor 

San Francisco, CA 94111 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 249 Filed 11/20/24 Page 10 of 12 PageID

#: 18954
9 

Telephone: (415) 875-6600 

Brady Huynh (admitted pro hac vice) 

CA Bar No. 339441 

bradyhuynh@quinnemanuel.com 

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN, LLP 

555 Twin Dolphin Drive, 5th Floor 

Redwood Shores, CA 94065 

Telephone: (650) 801-5000 

Facsimile: (650) 801-5100 

Jon Bentley Hyland 

Texas Bar No. 24046131 

jhyland@hilgersgraben.com 

Grant K. Schmidt 

Texas Bar No. 24084579 

gschmidt@hilgersgraben.com 

HILGERS GRABEN PLLC 

7859 Walnut Hill Lane, Suite 335 

Dallas, Texas 75230 

Telephone: (972) 645-3097 

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 249 Filed 11/20/24 Page 11 of 12 PageID

#: 18955
10 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed 

electronically in compliance with Local Rule CV-5 on November 12, 2024. As of this date, all 

counsel of record had consented to electronic service and are being served with a copy of this 

document through the Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(a)(3)(A). 

/s/ Thad C. Kodish 

Thad C. Kodish 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 249 Filed 11/20/24 Page 12 of 12 PageID

#: 18956