1

Filed 5/9/17 Modified and certified for partial publication 6/5/17 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

In re A.K., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

C081545

SACRAMENTO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.L. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

(Super. Ct. No. JD234416)

Appellants A.L. (mother) and S.K. (father), appeal from the juvenile court’s orders

terminating parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§§ 366.26, 395.)1 They contend the juvenile court erred in determining the beneficial 

relationship exception to adoption did not apply. Father also contends the juvenile court 

 

1

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2

should have continued the hearing to consider placement of the minor with the paternal 

grandmother. We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

FACTUAL AN PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 5, 2014, Sacramento Department of Health and Human Services (the 

Department) filed a section 300 petition, alleging that the one-year-old minor came 

within section 300, subdivision (a) in that the minor was at substantial risk of serious 

physical harm due to parents’ history of domestic violence in the minor’s presence, which 

resulted in physical confrontations, including an incident wherein the minor fell to the 

ground when father pushed her to get her out of the way and another incident wherein 

father punched the minor on her left thigh. The petition also alleged the minor came 

within section 300, subdivision (b) in that the minor was at substantial risk of serious 

physical harm because of the lack of adequate parental supervision or protection due to 

parents’ history of domestic violence and to father’s untreated anger management 

problem—which was exacerbated when he drank alcohol and which has contributed to 

his extensive history of violent crimes. 

The social worker’s report stated that father had a criminal record, including 

convictions for felony domestic violence in 2011 and 2012. A police report from January 

of 2014 reported that mother had stated that the parents got in an argument, father took 

away mother’s phone, punched her in the back with a fist, and pushed and knocked over 

the baby. In February of 2014, mother went to the police department counter reporting 

threats by father and allegations that father had beaten her and the minor. Mother applied 

for a restraining order in February 2014, but changed her mind. Her affect was “ ‘matterof-fact’ ” when she explained that obtaining the restraining order was “ ‘too stressful and 

expensive to travel back and forth to court’ ” and that she would prefer a family friend 

adopt her child. 

During her subsequent interview with the social worker, mother denied any 

domestic violence, claiming she had made a false report. Father also denied any 
3

domestic violence. The social worker interviewed a friend of mother who stated she had 

witnessed father hit the minor and that mother had reported father was abusive to the 

minor. The friend also stated that mother hit the minor when she was angry, cursed at the 

minor, and told the minor she wished she had died at birth. 

On May 22, 2014, the juvenile court sustained the allegations in the Department’s 

amended section 300 petition. Parents were ordered to participate in reunification 

services, including services for domestic violence, anger management, and parenting. 

Mother was also referred for a mental health assessment and father was ordered to 

participate in general counseling and substance abuse services. 

Mother reported another incident of domestic violence with father in June 2014, 

after father punched her repeatedly in the face. She obtained a restraining order and left 

the home in September 2014. Thereafter, mother moved in with a new boyfriend and 

became pregnant with his child. In January 2015, mother called the police after father 

contacted her and her boyfriend, despite the restraining order in place. 

The social worker discovered mother’s boyfriend had 23 Child Protective Services

(CPS) referrals for abuse/neglect and was facing criminal charges for sexual abuse, 

including vaginal penetration and forced oral copulation, of his daughter in New York. 

Nonetheless, mother was unable to clearly identify any “red flags,” did not believe the 

allegations, and blamed the daughter’s mother for causing trouble. 

Both parents were participating in services and reunification services were 

continued at the six-month review hearing. 

The social worker’s 12-month permanency review report, dated April 23, 2015, 

recommended termination of reunification services. With regard to father, the social 

worker reported that while he had completed many of his reunification requirements, he 

“continues to minimize” his role in domestic violence, and he denies that domestic 

violence led to the minor’s removal from the home. He also denies he violated the 

restraining order against him by contacting mother and her boyfriend in January 2015. 
4

Father failed “to progress in the amount of time or frequency that he has seen [the minor] 

and has missed eight of his 25 visits.” Father thereafter missed several more visits, 

testing dates, and appointments with the social worker. Father told the social worker that 

if the judge refuses to return the child to his custody, “then I just will tell the judge, send 

her to her mother’s[.] I am done with this.” 

With regard to mother, the social worker reported that while mother had 

completed the majority of her case plan, she did not follow through with individual 

counseling and was adamant that she will not do so because she does not see the need for 

it. She was not independent and had moved in with her boyfriend, whose female baby 

she was carrying, despite safety concerns surrounding the boyfriend’s numerous CPS 

referrals and that he was awaiting trial on charges that he molested his daughter. 

Mother’s visits with the minor remained supervised and she had been redirected many 

times about bribing the minor or using hurt and pain to gain the minor’s attention. 

The juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 

hearing. The social worker’s section 366.26 hearing report recommended termination of 

parental rights. 

The minor was in good health and developmentally on target. She had been 

placed with her current foster parents since March 2014 and they were interested in 

adopting her. She had developed a close and affectionate relationship with her foster 

parents and they had fully integrated her into the family. Father objected to the 

termination of parental rights, requested return of the minor or, alternatively, placement 

of the minor with the paternal grandmother. 

At the section 366.26 hearing, both parents testified regarding the nature of their 

visits and relationships with the minor. Both parents argued that they had established the 

requisite requirements to prove the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption. 

The juvenile court found the minor was likely to be adopted, that termination of parental 

rights would not be detrimental to the minor, and that no exception to adoption applied. 
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The juvenile court then terminated parental rights and selected a permanent plan of 

adoption. 

DISCUSSION

1.0 Beneficial Relationship Exception to Adoption

Both mother and father contend the juvenile court erred by failing to find the 

beneficial relationship exception to adoption applied. We disagree.

At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a 

juvenile court must choose one of the several “ ‘possible alternative permanent plans for 

a minor child. . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption.

[Citation.]’ [Citation.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental 

rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re 

Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.)

There are only limited circumstances that permit the court to find a “compelling 

reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the 

child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One such circumstance is when “[t]he parents have 

maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

To prove that the beneficial parental relationship exception applies, the parent 

must show there is a significant, positive emotional attachment between the parent and 

child. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.) And even if there is 

such a bond, the parent must prove that the parental relationship “ ‘promotes the wellbeing of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a 

permanent home with new, adoptive parents.’ ” (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 

297, quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575; accord, In re Jasmine D.

(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1345.) “In other words, the court balances the strength and 

quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security 

and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural 
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parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional 

attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is 

overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 

27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) On the other hand, “[w]hen the benefits from a stable and 

permanent home provided by adoption outweigh the benefits from a continued 

parent/child relationship, the court should order adoption.” (In re Jasmine D., supra, 

78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350; In re Autumn H., at p. 575.) “Because a section 366.26 

hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the 

child’s needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights 

will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D., 

at p. 1350.)

In April 2015, the social worker reported that father had missed eight out of 25 

visits. Thereafter, he missed four more visits between July 27, 2015 and September 30, 

2015. Additionally, father’s visits were limited to weekly one-hour supervised visits and 

he never requested unsupervised visits. Likewise, mother missed nine visits between 

July 1, 2015 and September 30, 2015 (when she was pregnant with her boyfriend’s child) 

and also never progressed beyond supervised visits. Thus, although the juvenile court did 

not rely on parents’ inconsistent visitation, parents’ visitation was not consistent. 

Moreover, even if parents’ missed visits were not considered, neither parent 

established that they had such a positive emotional bond with the minor that maintenance 

of such in a tenuous placement was so beneficial as to outweigh the benefits the minor 

would gain by being placed in a permanent home. 

Until February 2015, mother was satisfied visiting the minor once a week and 

declined to have her visits increased, either in duration or frequency. Her visits were 

increased to twice a week in February 2015, but mother often did not stay for the full 90 

minutes. Mother struggled with interacting with the minor and coming up with activities 
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and would use candy as a bribing tool in order to receive affection from the minor. 

Thereafter, in August 2015, mother requested her visits be reduced to once a week. 

By January 2016, mother’s visits had improved. Mother was attentive to the 

minor and connected to her through dance, singing, and reading. The minor was 

beginning to stay engaged in the play, rather than becoming easily bored. The minor 

initiated and reciprocated affection and appeared happy prior, during, and after visits. 

Mother testified the minor would also inquire when she would be going home with her. 

Likewise, father’s visits with the minor were generally appropriate and went well. 

Father was able to interact with the minor for the full one-hour duration of his weekly 

visits and the minor appeared happy to greet him. Father also testified she would 

sometimes ask if visits could last longer. The minor also, however, transitioned to the 

foster parents “very well” at the end of visits. Additionally, father resisted bringing any 

food other than McDonald’s fast food for the minor at visits, insisting that “she only eats 

chicken nuggets and French fries” and that McDonald’s food did not have any fat in it. 

In January 2016, it was reported that father had recently begun to bring homemade food 

for the minor. Father did not want his visits increased and indicated if the minor was not 

returned to parental custody, he “was done with this.” 

But while parents established that the minor referred to them as “mommy” and 

“daddy,”2 and that visits generally went well, they did not meet their burden to establish 

that the minor’s bond with them was so substantial and positive that the minor would be 

greatly harmed by its termination, or that maintaining the bond would promote the wellbeing of the minor to such a degree that it would outweigh that which the minor would 

gain in a permanent home. (See In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) 

“[P]leasant and cordial . . . visits are, by themselves, insufficient to mandate a permanent 

 

2

 The minor also referred to her foster parents as “mommy” and “daddy.” 
8

plan other than adoption.” (In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 924.) Even 

frequent and loving contact is not sufficient to establish this benefit absent a significant, 

positive, emotional attachment between parent and child. (In re C.F. (2011) 

193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555; In re Autumn H., at p. 575; In re Beatrice M., supra,

29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.)

Here, the minor was removed from parental custody when she was a year old. 

Although the minor showed some distress, such as crying and tantrums, when initially 

removed from parental custody, after approximately six months, she appeared to be a 

happy child and the frequency of her tantrums declined to that of an average child her 

age. Even observers’ reports that minor was sad at the end of father’s visits ceased.3 By 

the time of the section 366.26 hearing, she had been living with her foster parents nearly 

two-thirds of her young life, had developed a strong and loving bond with them, and 

looked to them to meet her emotional and physical needs. Thus, it appeared she had been 

able to develop a positive attachment to caretakers other than parents and was adjusting 

well to placement out of parents’ care. 

In sum, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that the minor’s 

relationship with mother and/or father did not rise to the type of substantial, positive, and 

emotional attachment that would cause the minor great harm if severed and did not 

outweigh the benefits of a stable and permanent home.

2.0 Relative Placement Preference

“Section 361.3 gives ‘preferential consideration’ to a relative’s request for 

placement, which means ‘that the relative seeking placement shall be the first placement 

to be considered and investigated.’ (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).)” (Cesar V. v. Superior Court

(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1033 (Cesar V.).) “When considering whether to place the 

 

3

 Father claimed the minor got “emotional” at the end of visits and she would get a sad 

facial expression. 
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child with a relative, the juvenile court must apply the [section 361.3] placement factors, 

and any other relevant factors, and exercise its independent judgment concerning the 

relative’s request for placement.” (In re Isabella G. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 708, 719.)

The relative placement provisions in section 361.3 apply when a child is taken 

from her parents and placed outside the home pending the determination whether 

reunification is possible. (In re Sarah S. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 274, 285.) The relative 

placement preference also applies to placements made after the dispositional hearing, 

even when reunification efforts are no longer ongoing, whenever a child must be moved. 

(§ 361.3, subd. (d); see Cesar V., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1031-1032.) However, the 

relative placement preference does not apply to an adoptive placement; there is no 

relative placement preference for adoption. (In re Lauren R. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 

841, 855; see In re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 65-66.) Instead, at the 

section 366.26 hearing, the court must apply the caretaker preference under 

section 366.26, subdivision (k).

Here, father contends the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights must be 

reversed because the Department and juvenile court failed to assess the paternal 

grandmother’s request for placement under the requirements of section 361.3. We 

conclude father lacks standing to raise this contention and, in any event, forfeited it by 

failing to raise it in the juvenile court.

2.1 Father’s Standing

Whether a person has standing to raise a particular issue on appeal depends upon 

whether the person’s rights were injuriously affected by the judgment or order appealed 

from. (Cesar V., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1034-1035.) A person does not have 

standing to urge errors on appeal that affect only the interests of others. (In re Gary P.

(1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 875, 877.) Accordingly, a parent is precluded from raising issues 

on appeal which do not affect his or her own rights. (In re Jasmine J. (1996) 

46 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1806.)
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The section 361.3 relative placement preference requires “preferential 

consideration” be given to a relative’s request for placement of a dependent child. 

(§ 361.3, subd. (a).) This section protects a relative’s “separate interest” in a relationship 

with the child. (Cesar V., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1034-1035.) In contrast, a 

parent’s interest in a dependency proceeding is in reunifying with the child. (In re 

Vanessa Z. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 258, 261; § 361.5.) The parental interest in 

reunification is distinguished from a relative’s “separate interest” in preferential 

placement consideration or in having a relationship with the child. (Cesar V., at 

pp. 1034-1035.)

In view of this distinction, the court in Cesar V. held that a parent does not have 

standing to raise relative placement issues on appeal, where the parent’s reunification 

services have been terminated. (Cesar V., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1035.) This is 

because decisions concerning placement of the child do not affect the parent’s interest in 

reunification, where the parent is no longer able to reunify with the child. (See id. at 

pp. 1034-1035.) In contrast, where the parent’s reunification services have not been 

terminated, placement of the child with a relative arguably affects the parent’s chances of 

reunifying with the child. Thus, where reunification remains a possibility, the parent has 

standing to raise relative placement issues on appeal. (Id. at p. 1035, citing In re Daniel 

D. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1823, 1833-1834.) 

Here, father’s reunification services had been terminated. Father cannot establish 

that his rights and interest in reunification are injuriously affected by any failure to 

consider the paternal grandmother for placement at the section 366.26 hearing, from 

which he has filed his appeal.

Nevertheless, father argues that placement with the paternal grandmother could 

have triggered the relative caregiver exception to adoption under section 366.26, 

subdivision (c)(1)(A), which provides that the court need not terminate parental rights 

when “[t]he child is living with a relative who is unable or unwilling to adopt the child 
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because of circumstances that do not include an unwillingness to accept legal or financial 

responsibility for the child, but who is willing and capable of providing the child with a 

stable and permanent environment through legal guardianship, and the removal of the 

child from the custody of his or her relative would be detrimental to the emotional wellbeing of the child. . . .” (See In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1053-

1054; In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 9-10.) Accordingly, he reasons he has 

standing because if the juvenile court had ordered placement with the paternal 

grandmother, it would have advanced his argument that parental rights should not be 

terminated under this exception. We disagree. 

Even if the juvenile court had decided placement of the minor with the paternal 

grandmother was appropriate, it would have then immediately proceeded to the 

permanency determinations of the section 366.26 hearing. That placement would not 

have advanced father’s argument that the relative caretaker exception under 

section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) applied because (1) there was no indication the 

paternal grandmother was willing to adopt the minor, and (2) the minor would not have 

been living with her paternal grandmother for any length of time so she would not have 

developed a relationship with the paternal grandmother that would have made removal 

detrimental to the minor’s emotional well-being. 

Accordingly, father is not an aggrieved party and lacks standing to assert error—

in the failure to place the minor with the paternal grandmother or otherwise raise the 

relative placement—under the section 361.3 issue on appeal. 

2.2 Forfeiture

Even if father had standing to raise the relative placement preference, he forfeited 

his contentions that the Department and juvenile court failed to assess the paternal 

grandmother’s request for placement under the requirements of section 361.3 by failing 

to pursue the matter in the juvenile court.
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Father argues that reversal is required because it does not appear in the record that 

the social worker conducted a proper search for potential relative placements within 30 

days from when the minor was removed from parental custody, as required by 

section 361.3, subdivision (a)(8) and section 309, subdivision (e). He also argues that 

reversal is required because the social worker did not do enough to assist the paternal 

grandmother when she came forward in December 2014, just after the six-month review 

hearing, and stated she was interested in placement. These contentions are forfeited.

“Dependency appeals are governed by section 395, which provides in relevant 

part: ‘A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed from in the same 

manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from as from 

an order after judgment.’ ” (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1149.) 

Section 395 makes the dispositional order the appealable “judgment.” Therefore, all 

subsequent orders are directly appealable, except for orders setting a section 366.26 

hearing, challenged by a timely writ petition, which was summarily denied or not decided 

on the merits. (In re Meranda P., at p. 1150; § 366.26, subd. (l).) If father believed the 

social worker had not complied with statutory requirements in pursuing the paternal 

grandmother as a relative placement, he could have raised the issue in the juvenile court 

and, thereafter, on appeals from the disposition order, the 12-month review order, or 

other appealable orders. He did not do so. He therefore forfeited his objection.

Even if father could still challenge the adequacy of the social worker’s pursuit of 

placement with the paternal grandmother at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, father 

still forfeited his claim by failing to raise his relative placement preference objection at 

the hearing. Although father identified the “[d]etermination of whether the Department 

has taken sufficient measures to investigate Paternal Grandmother’s ability to take 

custody of the minor child” as a “factual issue” in his pretrial brief, he did not present 

evidence on this issue, request factual findings, or request any ruling regarding whether 

the paternal grandmother was properly investigated for placement or entitled, at any 
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point, to relative placement preference. By failing to litigate this issue or request a ruling 

from the juvenile court, father failed to preserve the issue on appeal. (People v. Ramirez

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 472-473; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 54 [appellate 

court in a dependency proceeding normally may not consider an objection raised for the 

first time on appeal].)

Relying in part on Cesar V., father argues the juvenile court should have held a 

hearing under section 361.3 to evaluate the paternal grandmother for placement because 

the Department had not fulfilled its duties to do so. He further argues that the juvenile 

court had a duty to hold this hearing sua sponte, again relying on Cesar V. Cesar V. is 

inapposite in nearly every way. 

In Cesar V., the children’s foster family was not interested in adoption, 

necessitating a change of placement as the case approached the section 366.26 hearing, 

and the parties stipulated to the evaluation of a specific relative. (Cesar V., supra, 

91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1027.) The social worker’s subsequent section 366.26 report stated 

that the subject relative was found not to be a suitable placement. (Cesar V., at pp. 1027-

1028.) At the section 366.26 hearing, father’s counsel challenged the denial of placement 

with the relative and, after discussions, the parties stipulated to proceed in a bifurcated 

fashion and resolve the challenge to placement prior to the permanency issues. (Cesar 

V., at p. 1028.) The juvenile court then heard five days of testimony and argument on the 

issue. (Ibid.) The juvenile court thereafter found the agency “acted upon its order” to 

assess the relative for placement and found the agency had not “abuse[d] its discretion” in 

deciding not to place the minor with the relative. (Id. at p. 1030.)

The appellate court in Cesar V. first held that the relative placement preference 

applied, even after termination of reunification services, because a new placement 

became necessary. (Cesar V., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1033.) Thus, the juvenile 

court still had the power and duty to make an independent placement decision under 
14

section 361.3, rather than reviewing the agency’s decision for abuse of discretion. (Cesar 

V., at p. 1033.) 

Here, the minor’s foster parents were interested in adoption so there was no need 

to make a change in placement, which would have triggered the post-reunification 

preferential consideration of relative placement. Moreover, father did not challenge the 

failure to place the minor with the paternal grandmother, present evidence and argument, 

or request a ruling on the matter. Nor did father or the paternal grandmother request a 

hearing regarding placement with the paternal grandmother. Thus, the occasion to hold a 

section 361.3 hearing was not presented to the juvenile court. And while Cesar V. found 

that the juvenile court, under the circumstances presented, was to independently assess 

the facts relative to placement, rather than deferring the agency’s decision, it never found 

the juvenile court has a general duty to hold a relative placement hearing sua sponte.

Accordingly, we conclude father forfeited any contentions he had regarding the 

adequacy of the Department’s assessment, or the juvenile court’s consideration, of the 

paternal grandmother for placement under the requirements of section 361.3.

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

/s/ 

Butz, J.

We concur:

/s/ 

Raye, P. J.

/s/ 

Hoch, J.
1

Filed 6/5/17

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLISHED*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

In re A.K., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

C081545

SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.L. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

(Super. Ct. No. JD234416)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION 

AND CERTIFYING OPINION

FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Natalie S. 

Lindsey, Referee. Affirmed as modified.

Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant A.L. 

Carolyn S. Hurley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant S.K. 

 

*

 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified 

for publication with the exception of part 1.0 of the Discussion.
2

Robyn Truitt Drivon, County Counsel, and Lilly C. Frawley, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above entitled matter filed on May 9, 2017, was not certified for 

partial publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion should 

be partially published in the Official Reports with the exception of part 1.0 of the Discussion,

and it is so ordered. 

The opinion shall be modified in the following particulars:

1. On page 2 of the slip opinion, delete the word “AN” in the heading and replace it with 

“AND” so the heading now reads, “FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND”.

2. On page 11, in part 2.1 of the slip opinion, in the first full paragraph, which begins “Even 

if the juvenile court”, replace the word “willing” in clause “(1)” of the second sentence with

“unwilling” so that clause (1) now reads:

(1) there was no indication the paternal grandmother was 

unwilling to adopt the minor, and

There is no change in judgment. (CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION.)

FOR THE COURT:

 RAYE , P. J.

 BUTZ , J.

 HOCH , J.