N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT

UNITED STATES OF AM ER IC A, Plaintiff - Appe lle e , v. R IC ARDO R

UB IO-GAR C IA, De fe nda

nt - Appe lla

nt. No. 14-50555

D.C . No. 2:08-c r-00713-DSF-58
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Sta t e s Distric t C ourt for the C e ntra l Distric t of C a lifornia Da le S. Fisc he r, Distric t Judge , Pre siding A rgue d and Subm itte d Ja

nua ry 8, 2016 Pa sa de n a , C a l ifornia B e fore : W ATFORD a

nd FR IEDLAND, C irc uit Judge s, a nd M OTZ, ** Se n i or Distric t Judge
. 1. Suffic ie nt e vide nc e supports R ic a rdo R ubio-Ga rc ia ’ s c onvic tion for posse s sion of c oc a ine with inte nt to distribute . Vie w e d in the light m ost fa vora ble to the gove rnm e n t , se e Unite d S tate s v . N e v ils , 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th C ir. 2010)



# FIL ED
FEB 25 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3.
** The Honora

ble J. Fre de ric k

M otz , Se nior Distric t

Judge for the U.S. Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of M ary l an d, sitting by de signa t ion.Pa ge 2 of 7

(e n ba nc ), the e vide nc e showe d tha t R ubio ga ve dire c tions to a

M e xic an drug supplie r that we re to be re la y e d to a drug c ourie r. R

u bio the n m e t the c ourie r a t a pre a rra nge d loc a tion, brie fly

spoke with him , a

nd got in the pa sse nge r se at of the
c ourie r’ s ve hic l e . R

ubio dire c te d the c ourie r— whose ve hic le wa s tra

nsporting te n kilogra m s of c oc a i ne hidde n a

way in se c re t c om

pa rtm e nts— to a sta sh house whe re the d rugs c ould be re m ove d. The jury a lso he ard e xpe rt te stim ony tha t drug tra ffic king orga

niz ations ty

p ic a lly do not e ntrust individua

ls unfa m i lia r with the de ta ils of the c rim ina l e n te rprise with the loc a tion of a sta s h house , give n the high
va lue of the na

rc otic s store d the re . A re a s ona ble jury c ould infe r from

this
e vide nc e “ that [R

u b io] a ssoc ia te d with the c rim ina l ve nture , pa rtic ipate d in it, a

nd sought, by

his a c tions, to m a ke it a

suc c e ss.” Unite d State

s v . Boy k in , 785 F.3d 1352, 1359 (9th C ir. 2015). No m ore wa s re quire d to c onvic t R ubio unde r a n
a iding-a n d-a be tting the ory , for whic h the gove rnm e nt a rgue d a nd on whic h the jury wa s instruc t e d. Se e id. 2. Suffic ie nt e vide nc e supports R ubio’ s c o nspira c y

c o nvic tion a s we l l. The
a bove -narra te d e vide nc e a m ply de m onstra

te d tha t R ubio a gre e d

with a t le a st the supplie r a nd the c o urie r to pa rtic ipate in a

drug de a l a

nd tha t he inte nde d to a id in its a c c o m plishm e nt. Se e Unite d

State s v . Iriarte -Orte

g a , 113 F.3d 1022, 1024 (9th C ir. 1997). The e vide nc e a lso showe d tha t the ve hic le R

ubio wa s dire c ting drovePa ge 3 of 7

in a pa tte rn c onsiste nt with c ounte r-surve illa nc e a c tivitie s, whic h “ qua lify a s a c ts in furthe ra n c e of a

c onspira c y .” Unite d State s v . Pe n agos , 823 F.2d 346, 348 (9th C ir. 1987). It is im m a te ria l whe the r the e vide nc e showe d tha t R u bio wa s a ware of the
e ntire t y of the broa de r drug c o nspira c y c ha rge d in the indic tm e nt. The re wa s no
c onstruc tive a m e ndm e nt, sinc e the proof at tria l wa s na rrowe r tha

n the c h arge s in the i ndic t m e nt. Se e Unite d

State s v . W i lbur , 674 F.3d 1160, 1178 (9th C ir. 2012). And a ny va rianc e from

the c ha rge d c onspira c y wa s not pre judic ia l. Se e Unite d State s v . Morse , 785 F.2d 771, 775 (9th C i r. 1986). First, this wa s not a c a se in whic h the e vide n c e sugge ste d the e xiste nc e of two te m pora lly se pa ra te
c onspira c ie s, whic h m ight c a st doubt on the jury ’ s una

nim ity
. Se e Unite d

State s v . Ec he v e rry , 698 F.2d 375, 377 (9th C ir. 1983) (pe r c uriam ). Se c ond, a s e ve n R ubio
c onc e de s, the de fe nse wa s not unprepa re d for the e v ide nc e a t tria l. And third, a n y risk of pre

judic ia l spillove r from

e vide nc e irre le va

nt to the na

rrowe r c onspira c y
wa s slight. Unlike

in K otte ak os v . Unite d State

s , 328 U.S. 750 (1946), R u bio wa s trie d a l one , a nd the jury

wa s not instruc te d

on tra nsfe re nc e of guilt a

m ong c oc onspira tors. Se e Unite d State

s v . Duran , 189 F.3d 1071, 1082–83 (9th C ir. 1999). 3. The distric t c ourt did not pla inly e rr in a dm itting im

prope r opinion te stim ony . The c a se a ge nt in c h arge of the inve stiga tion into the

broa de r drugPa ge 4 of 7

c onspira c y

te stifie d a s to his inte

rpre ta tion of va

rious inte rc e pte d

phone c a l ls involving the

supplie r, the c ourie r, R

ubio, a nd othe rs; he a lso te stifie d re ga rding his pe rc e p tions of R

ubio’ s a c tivitie s on the da y of the drug de a l. Tha

t he re vie we d transla tions of theinte rc e pte d c onve rsa tions a n d did not liste

n to the c a lls in re a l tim e doe s not m e an tha

t his te stim ony

la c ke d prope r founda

tion. He re lie d on his
a m ple “ knowle dge and inve stiga tion in this c a se ” in form ing his opinions, whic h is
a ll tha t is re quire d in this c onte xt. Se e Unite d State s v . Torralba-Me ndia , 784 F.3d 652, 660–61 (9th C ir. 2015). In a ddition, the va st m a j ority of the c a se a g e nt’ s opinion te stim o ny

wa s he l pful to the jury

and not ba se d

on e xpe rt knowle d ge . Se e id. Howe v e r, not a ll of the c a se a ge nt’ s te stim ony wa s prope rly a dm itte d. The
c a se a ge nt e xpla ine d the m e aning of a fe w words a

nd phra se s tha

t we re we ll within the c om m on unde rsta

nding of the jurors, a

nd thus not he lpful unde r Fe de ra l R ule of Evide nc e 701. Se e Unite d State s v . Fre e man , 498 F.3d 893, 905 (9th C ir. 2007). He a lso initially

ba se d his opinion tha

t R ubio wa s dire c ting the loa d ve hic le to a sta sh house on his “ tra ining a n d e xpe rie n c e , ” an d he provide d som e te stim ony on wha t is “ ty

pic a l” of drug de a ls. Ea c h of the se opinions fe ll outside the bounds of prope r la y opinion. Se e Fe d. R
. Evid. 701, 702; Torralba-Me ndia , 784 F.3d a t 660.Pa ge 5 of 7

B ut R ubio c annot show tha

t a ny of the se e rrors viola

t e d his substa

ntia l rights. The c a se a ge nt’ s te stim ony a bout wha t drug de a ls ty

pic a lly e nta il m e re ly duplic a te d wha

t the gove rnm e nt’ s e xpe rt ha d a l re a dy sa id, so a ny im pa c t the e rror ha d on the jury

wa s lim ite d
. Se e Unite d State s v . Ve ra , 770 F.3d 1232, 1240 (9th C ir. 2014). And the

gove rnm e nt c orre c te d the c a se a ge nt’ s im prope r te stim ony
a bout R ubio’ s role in the c ar im

m e diate ly a fte r it wa s introduc e d. De fe n se c ounse l obje c te d on founda

tion grounds, which le d the prose c ution to e lic it te stim ony
a bout R ubio’ s role in the loa d ve hic le tha t wa s c le arly

ba s e d on the c a s e a ge nt’ s pe rsona l work on the c a se . 4. The distric t c ourt’ s fa ilure to instruc t the jury on the distinc tion be twe e n the c a se a ge nt’ s la

y te stim ony

and his e xpe rt te stim ony

did not rise

to the le ve l of pla i n e rror. Se e Torralba-Me ndia , 784 F.3d a t 658–59. The

c a se a ge n t wa s not qua lifie d a s a

n e xpe rt a nd, a s e xpla ine d a

bove , ne arly

a ll of his te stim ony

wa s we l l within thebounds of prope r la y opinion te s tim ony . Any

possible c onfusion a

nd pre j udic e we re the re fore lim ite d , sinc e the jury wa s not a

ware of the c a se a ge nt’ s dua l role s. Se e Ve ra , 770 F.3d a t 1242. 5. The distric t c ourt did not pla inly e rr in a dm itting e xpe rt te stim ony a bout the s truc t ure of drug orga

niz a tions. R

ubio wa s c ha

rge d with c onspira c y

to distributeand posse ss c oc a ine
. The e xpe rt te stim ony in que stion wa s re le va

nt toPa ge 6 of 7

the j ury ’ s de t e rm ination of whe the r a c onspira c y

e xiste d a nd whe the r R

u bio knowingly

pa rtic ipate d in it. Se e Torralba-Me n dia , 784 F.3d a t 662–63; Unite d State s v . Vale nc ia-Ame

zc ua , 278 F.3d 901, 908–09 (9th C ir. 2002). 6. The gove rnm e nt’ s introduc tion of e xpe rt te stim ony tha t drug tra ffic king orga niz a tions do not use so-c a lle d “ blind m ule s” doe s not ne c e ssita

te re ve rsa l. W he the r or not som e drug c arte ls do in fa c t use c ourie rs who a

re una ware tha t the y
are t ra n sporting drugs is irre le va nt in this c a s e , sinc e R

u bio wa s not a

drug
c ourie r. 1 Vie we d in the light m ost fa vora b le to the gove rnm e nt, the e vide nc e showe d tha

t R ubio kne w the loc a tion of the sta sh house , whic h the jury wa s told is
a c ruc ia l a nd highly gua rde d pie c e of inform a tion within drug c onspira c ie s. R ubio ha s c om e forward with nothing to im pugn the ve ra c ity of the e xpe rt’ s te stim ony that drug orga

niz a tions ty

pic a lly do not e ntrust individua

l s unfa m ilia r with the de ta ils of the c rim ina l e n te rprise with the loc a tion of the ir sta sh house s . He thus
c annot sa tisfy the re quire m e nts of pla in e rror re vie w . Se e Unite d State s v . Sanc he

z , 659 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th C ir. 2011).

1 Pe r R ubio’ s unoppose d re que st, this c ourt ta ke s judic ia l notic e of the c om pla i nt in Unite d State

s v . C hav e z , C a se No. 11-3330-G (W .D. Te x. 2011), in whic h the Unite d

Sta te s c h a

rge d a de fe n d ant with c onspiring with a drug tra ffic king orga

niz ation (se pa

ra te from the one a t

issue he re ) that m a de wide spre a d use of blind m

ule s.Pa ge 7 of 7

7. The prose c ution’ s m isc onduc t in que s tioning the

sole de fe nse witne ss doe s not provide

a ba s is for re ve rsa l. All of the c a lls a bout whic h the witne ss te stifie d we re a dm itte d into e vide nc e , whic h a llowe d the jury

to inde pe nde ntly
e va luate the voic e s a t issue . And e ve n R ubio a c knowle dge s tha

t the witne s s— whose voic e -ide ntific a tion te s tim o ny wa s riddle d with e rrors— “ did not offe r the m ost c om

pe lling te stim ony

on [his] be h a l f.” 8. R e ve rsa l is not re quire d on a c c ount of c um ulative e rror. Se e P arle

v . Runne ls , 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th C ir. 2007). The fe w e rrors a t tria l fa l l short of fa ta lly unde rm i ning the gove rnm e nt’ s c a se , a s the e vide nc e m o re tha n suffic e d to de m onstra

te R ubio’ s guilt on both c ounts. AFFIRM E D.1

United States v. Rubio

- Garcia , No. 14

- 50555
FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge, dissenting: M ultiple evidentiary errors and instances of prosecutorial misconduct marred Rubio’s trial . Because I believe that the cumulative effect of these mistakes rendered the verdicts entirely unreliable, I would reverse both convictions and remand for a new trial. 1 First, in my view, there can be no question that the conspiracy the Government sought to prove at trial varied from that with which Rubio was charged. The Gr and Jury in this case returned an indictment charging thirty co defendants , including Rubio, with participating in a single, wide

- ranging conspiracy run by the Sendis

- Ramirez organization to traffic cocaine and other narcotics from Mexico into the United S tates spanning the period from May 2007 through November 2012. But because the district court failed to read or describe the indictment, and instead only informed the jury that Rubio was charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, the jury was not “fai rly apprised of the nature of [this] charge []. ” Robles v. United States , 279 F.2d 401, 403

- 04 (9th Cir. 1960).

1 Althoug h I believe the errors at trial should require us to reverse the convictions, I would hold that sufficient evidence was presented to permit a retrial. Cf. United States v. Bibbero , 749 F.2d 581, 586 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the Double Jeopardy Cla use precludes retrial when a conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence). 

# FILED
FEB 25 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

Likewise, in a departure from our model jury instruction, see Ninth Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instruction 9.19 (20 15 ), the district court’s instruc tion on the conspiracy charge did not state the timeframe of the alleged conspiracy but instead allowed the jury to convict Rubio if it found that he joined any agreement between two or more persons to distribute cocaine
. Given that the argument and evide nce at trial focused almost entirely on the single transaction in which Rubio was allegedly involved, it seems clear that the jury convicted Rubio of a much narrower conspiracy than that charged

— one limited to an agreement among perhaps four people to distribute a single load of cocaine on a single occasion. See United States v. Wilbur , 674 F.3d 1160, 1178 (9th Cir. 2012) (providing that a variance occurs when “the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different from tho se a lleged in the indictment” ( quoting United States v. Hartz , 458 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2006)) )
. The majority finds that no prejudice attached to this variance. I disagree. The defense came to trial prepared to convince the jury that “the government never connected [Rubio] to the larger Sendis Ramirez organization.” This strategy was rendered irrelevant by the variance because it was not responsive to the theory that Rubio conspir ed to carry out the single transaction. Further, the confusion about t he scope of the conspiracy at issue permitted evidence about the Sendis

- Ramirez organization and drug deals in which Rubio had no alleged involvement to spill3

into his trial. Once admitted without even a limiting instruction, this largely irrelevant evide nce created a danger that the jury would unfairly impute to Rubio guilt attributable to members of the Sendis

- Ramirez organization. As the majority concedes, this was not the only flaw in Rubio’s trial. There also was the admission of improper lay and p utative exp ert testimony by the case agent without a dual

- role instruction , which created the risk that the jury would give the officer’s lay opinion s unmerited credibility. See United States v. Freeman , 498 F.3d 893, 903

- 04 (9th Cir. 2007). And t here wa s the undisputed prosecutorial misconduct during cross

- examination of the sole defense witness

— when the prosecutor was permitted, over defense objection s , to repeatedly invoke hearsay conversation s with other prosecutors to impeach the witness’s résumé
. E ven more problematically, there was the admission of false testimony by the Government’s “drug expert,” that drug trafficking organizations do not use
un knowing couriers, or “blind mules,” despite this court’s repeated admonition against such testimony’s introduction. See United States v. Flores , 510 F. App’x 594 , 595 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished); United States v. Venagas

- Reynoso , 524 F. App’x 373 , 377 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). The use of knowingly false testimony to obtain a criminal conviction c ontravenes due process and can be cause for reversal. Napue v. Illinois , 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); see United States v. Houston , 6 4 8 F.3d 806, 814 ( 9th Cir. 2011).4

The majority contends that the introduction of the blind mule testimony was not material to Rubio’s conviction because Rubio was not himself a drug courier. Respectfully, I believe the majority misapprehends the way the Government used the testimony at trial. The Government elicited the testimony to support the inference that drug trafficking organizations never employ unknowing participants in their transactions and thereby to undercut Rubio’s theory of defense that he was
an unwitting participant in the drug deal at issue
. Indeed, the prosecution explicitly asked the jury to draw this very i nference during its closing remarks when it told them that Rubio’s defense was directly contradicted by the special agent’s expert testimony that drug trafficking organizations do not use individuals “who [do not] know that a drug deal is going on.” The G overnment’s evidence and argument that drug organizations do not use unwitting persons in their drug deals went directly to Rubio’s mental state and therefore to an essential element of the crimes char ged. There can be little confidence in a verdict obtained in this manner. See Hayes v. Brown , 399 F.3d 9 72, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (explaining that the m ateriality standard contemplates “not whether the defendant would more likely than not have receive d a different verdict . . . , but whether . . . he received a fair trial, understood5

as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of con fidence” ( quoting Hall v. Dir. o f Corr. , 343 F.3d 976, 98 3

- 8 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam ) ) )
. 2 T ogether these errors unfairl y prejudiced Rubio by “render[ing] [his] defense ‘far less persuasive than it might have been.’” Parle v. Runnels , 505 F.3d 922, 934 ( 9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)) ; see United States v. Wallace , 848 F.2d 1464, 1476 n.21 ( 9th Cir. 1988) ( determining that error not objected to at trial may be aggregated together with preserved errors in cumulative error analysis). The deleterious effect of cumulative error is particularly severe here given the weakness of the Government’s case, which was built on Rubio’s participation in a single phone call in which no mention of drugs was made and the short period of time he spent in the passenger seat of the load car. See United States v. Frederick , 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]here the government’s case is weak, a defendant is more likely to be prejudiced by the effect of cumulative errors.”)

. Because I have no

2 I also reject the Government’s specious argument that the testimony was not actually false because the case agent premised the statements as being based on his personal experience. As the jury was repeatedly told, the case agent testified as an expert on drug trafficking, not based on his percipient observations. Further, the implication of the Government’s argument is that the prosecution could overcome Napue in almost every case by asking an expert to qualify false testimony as being based on his or he r experience. I decline to endorse an outcome that would create such an end run around the Napue bar. Testimony that is “so misleading as to amount to falsity,” United States v. Vozzella , 124 F.3d 389, 390 (2d Cir. 1997), deserves no place in a criminal trial.6

confidence in the proc ess through which the jury reached its verdict s , I would reverse to permit Rubio to confront the Government’s case on a fair playing field.