J-S51001- 14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 K.K.B., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. E.D.B., Appellant No. 217 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered December 19 , 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s): 13

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BEFORE: BOWES, OTT, and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2014 E.D.B . (“Father”) appeals from the final protection from ab use (“PFA”) order entered on December 19, 2013. The order abrog ated the existing custody arrangement with K.K.B. (“Mother”) and prohibi ted Father from contacting Mother and six of their seven children for t hree years. 1 We affirm, and we deny the remaining aspect of Father’s m otion for intervention. Mother and Father endured a turbulent and violent marriage that produced six children between 2002 and 2010. When the most recent episode underlying this appeal occurred, the parties we re separated but

____________________________________________ 1 The couple has an additional child who no longer lives at home. She was not listed on the PFA petition as a person seeking pr otection from abuse and she is not subject to the no-contact order.J-S51001- 14

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remained legally married. The custody order in effect at the relevant time awarded the parties shared legal custody and granted Mo ther primary physical custody of the children. Father exercised peri ods of supervised partial physical custody with the children. Addition ally, Berks County Child and Youth Services (“CYS”) is involved with the family. Four of the parties’ children have been adjudicated dependent. Three child ren reside with Mother, and the oldest child remains in CYS placement in a therapeutic foster home. As part of the children’s safety plan, CY S insisted that Father’s visitations be supervised. Mother is a homemaker. Father is employed as a corr ectional officer at SCI Graterford in Collegeville, Pennsylvania. Be tween 3:30 and 4:00 p.m., on December 4, 2013, Mother was in the off ice of her attorney, Lauren Marks, Esquire, who represented her in the de pendency proceedings. Attorney Marks’s office was located on the first floor of 12 North 6 th Street in Reading, Pennsylvania. Mother went to the office dir ectly from a hearing at the Berks County Courthouse located across the street. Sh e was hysterical and ranting about several baseless accusations that Father leveled against her to the FBI, CYS, and her parole officers in a fut ile attempt to have her probation revoked. Mother did not have an appointm ent, and Attorney Marks was counseling another client in her office . Accordingly, Attorney Marks and her secretary received Mother in th e front lobby of the firm. While Mother and Attorney Marks were discussing F ather’s actions, Mother was advised that Father was loitering across the st reet from theJ-S51001- 14

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building, peering through the law firm’s window at Mother as she engaged in her consultation. Attorney Marks went to the window a nd observed Father “standing there . . . in the same jacket that he is we aring in court today, staring into my office . . .” N.T., 12/19/13, at 115. Attorney Marks knew Father from her involvement as Mother’s counsel dur ing the previous year in the dependency proceedings. She was present at several C YS hearings that Father attended, the most recent occurring only weeks p rior to the December 4, 2013 episode. As Mother was visibly shaken , Attorney Marks guided her to a windowless office as her secretary continu ed to watch Father standing across the street. Eventually, Father boarded a bus and left the

area. Mother was terrified by Father’s actions, and based up on the history of his abusive behavior, the next day, she filed a PFA pe tition seeking protection against him on behalf of herself and six of their children: A.K.B., H.B., E.B. III, M.B., J.B. and D.B. The petition i nvoked Father’s false reports, harassment, and alleged that he stalked her an d the children on several prior occasions. She added that Father was arrest ed during 2005 for pointing a firearm at her head and again during 200 9 for attempting to kidnap the children following Mother’s award of prima ry custody. On the same day that Mother filed the PFA petition, the tri al court issued a temporary ex parte PFA order that prohibited Father from contacting Mot her and the six children and barred him from possessing, tra nsferring or acquiring any firearms for the duration of the order. On December 12,J-S51001- 14

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2013, the trial court amended the order to permit Fa ther to continue to possess his firearm “to perform his essential job functions a s a Correctional Officer.” Trial Court Order, 12/13/12. The latter a mendment was effective pending the final PFA order. Id

. During the ensuing PFA hearing, at which both parties were represented by counsel, Mother testified about several instances of abuse that occurred over the course of the parties’ tumultuous relationship, including Father’s stalking behavior on December 4, 201 3. Mother also presented her mother’s testimony and called Attorney Ma rks as a rebuttal witness. The oldest child listed on the PFA petition, A.K.B., testified in

camera about Father’s behavior generally, including his cland estine attendance at her afterschool functions and her observa tion of him sitting in his vehicle parked outside of Mother’s residence during a sibling’s birthday party. Father testified that he was working at the secured fa cility at SCI Graterford on December 4, 2013, and he presented thre e witnesses to support his alibi. In addition, a family friend, who opened her home to Mother and Father for two months in the past, testif ied that she did not observe any physical abuse and that, while Mother and Father argued often, she never fear ed for either person’s safety during that period. Fin ally, Father attempted to introduce two exhibits into evide nce: (1) a time sheet from the prison logging his hours of employment on the relevant dates; and (2) a set of receipts depicting his travel to and from work in Collegeville onJ-S51001- 14

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the Pennsylvania Turnpike. The trial court admitted the receipts into evidence but sustained Mother’s objections to the time she ets. Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the trial court enter ed the abovereferenced PFA order that, inter alia , prohibited Father from contacting Mother or the six enumerated children for a period of three years and directed him to relinquish his firearms to the Sherri ff of Berks County or a third party in possession of a safekeeping permit. This timely pro se appeal followed. On April 23, 2014, Father filed with this Court a sel f-styled Motion for Intervention With an Extension of Time to File Brie fs. The motion alleged, in pertinent part, that he possessed new evidence that woul d have altered the outcome of the PFA proceeding if it had been submitted to the trial court. Father requested additional time to prepare and file his pro se brief in light of the new evidence. 2 On April 30, 2014, we granted Father a thirty-day extension to file his brief and deferred any considerat ion of the newevidence claim to the merits panel.

____________________________________________ 2 Although the motion did not identify the purportedl y new and extraordinary evidence, Father attached a petition to vacate the PFA order that he previously filed with the trial court. That petition invoked new extraordinary evidence in the form of a time-stamped digital video recording of the shift change at SCI Graterford on December 4, 2013. He contends that the video recording substantiates the alibi defense he proffered during the PFA hearing. The trial court denied the petitio n to vacate without prejudice due to a lack of jurisdiction. Father has rea sserted this allegation in his reply brief filed with this Court.J-S51001- 14

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Father levels twelve assertions of trial court error:
1. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it initially allowed allegations from plaintiff that were clearly a tactical maneuver in current custody, divorce, and dependency proceedings?
2. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when i t did not allow defendant’s evidence to be submitted as exhibits? 3. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when i t allowed testimony by plaintiff from other court proceedings?
4. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when i t allowed plaintiff to testify [about] allegations that alleged ly occurred more then [sic] three (3) years ago?
5. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when i t acted in a prejudice, biased , and ill will manner in favor of the plaintiff? 6. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when i t allowed the parties[’] minor eleven (11) year old daughter t o testify?
7. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when i t allowed Plaintiff[ ’ ]s attorney from another proceeding to testify? 8. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when i t placed a final order without plaintiff producing any evide nce? 9. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when i t placed a final order when the plaintiff neglected to prove allegations of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence? 10. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when i t placed a final order when the plaintiff neglected to show clear and convincing evidence of abuse?
11. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when i t issued an order which prohibits appellant from having a ny contact with his children for a period of three years a bsent a showing that any abuse ever occurred?J-S51001- 14

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12. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it ga ve more weight to the testimony of plaintiff’s witness, be cause of her status of an attorney, in spite of evidence demon stration plaintiff did not meet her burden? Father’s brief at 10

- 12. For judicial convenience we separate Father’s twelve unwieldy assertions into three manageable categories: (1) allega tions that the Mother adduced insufficient evidence to satisfy her burden of p roof; (2) contentions that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting or excluding evidence; and (3) the assertion that the trial court erred in i mposing the no-contact order notwithstanding the existing custody order. We address these categories seriatim

. 3
In Ferko-Fox v. Fox , 68 A.3d 917, 921 (Pa.Super. 2013), we reiterated, “T he purpose of the PFA act is to protect victims of dome stic violence from the perpetrators of that type of abuse a nd to prevent domestic violence from occurring.” The petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations of abuse. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(a). This Court “review[s] the propriety of a PF A order for an abuse

____________________________________________ 3 Even though six of Appellant’s first seven complaints assa il the trial court’s evidentiary determinations, we do not review Father ’s sufficiency claims on a diminished record. Commonwealth v. Weaver , 76 A.3d 562, 569 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal granted , 86 A.3d 862 (Pa. 2014) (law is clear that we are required to consider all evidence that was actua lly received without consideration as to admissibility of evidence or whether court's evidentiary rulings were correct).J-S51001- 14

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of discretion or an error of law.” Ferko-Fox , at 920. Our Supreme Court has defined abuse of discretion as follows: The term ‘discretion’ imports the e xercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the pur pose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion mu st be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to pre judice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Dis cretion is abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unr easonable or where the law is not applied or where the record sh ows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. Commonwealth v. Widmer , 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000), (quoting Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Co. , 625 A.2d 1181, 1184-855 (Pa. 1993)). The first category of arguments subsume issues five, eigh t, nine, ten, and twelve. Essentially, Father complains that the tr ial court erred in concluding that Mother established by a preponderance o f the evidence that he abused her and the children. 4 He asserts that Mother simply proffered unsubstantiated allegations of his conduct and failed t o submit any documentation, reports, or corroborating witnesses. See Father’s brief at 35. He characterizes Mother’s allegations as fraudulent and relies upon “new extraordinary evidence” that he fa iled to present during the hearing in

____________________________________________ 4 To the extent that Father asserts that Mother was requ ired to establish abuse by clear and convincing evi dence, he is mistaken. The PFA act’s statement on a petitioner’s burden of proof is unambig uous, “Within ten business days of the filing of a petition under this cha pter, a hearing shall be held before the court, at which the plaintiff must prove the allegation of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence .” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(a) (emphasis added).J-S51001- 14

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an attempt to counter Mother’s statements. Id . at 36-38. For the following reasons, Father’s claims fail. As noted supra , Mother was required to establish the statutory definition of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence , the least demanding evidentiary burden. We previously explained that “th e preponderance of evidence standard is defined as the greater weight of t he evidence, i.e. , to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or requirement for preponderance of the evidence.” Ferri v. Ferri , 854 A.2d 600 (Pa.Super. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the PFA act defines abuse as, The occurrence of one or more of the following acts bet ween family or household members, sexual or intimate partne rs or persons who share biological parenthood: (1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury, serious bodily injury, r ape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault or incest with or without a deadly weapon. (2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury. (3) The infliction of false imprisonment pursuant to 18 P a.C.S. § 2903 (relating to false imprisonment). (4) Physically or sexually abusing minor children, includi ng such terms as defined in Chapter 63 (relating to child protective services). (5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts toward another person, including follow ing the person, without proper authority, under circumstance s which place the person in reasonable fear of bodily inj ury. The definition of this paragraph applies only to proce edingsJ-S51001- 14

- 10 - commenced under this title and is inapplicable to any criminal prosecutions commenced under Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses). 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a). The record belies Father’s assertion of error. Instantl y, Mother, the maternal grandmother, and eleven-year-old A.K.B. al l testified about past episodes of physical abuse, threats, and other behavior designed to place Mother in reasonable fear of bodily injury. For exa mple, in addition to describing the December 4, 2013 episode at Attorney Mar ks’s office, Mother described two other recent events involving Father’s cour se of conduc t. First, approximately one week after the December 4, 2 013 incident, A.K.B. advised Mother that she had observed Father sitting in his automobile parked across the street from the family’s residence. N.T ., 12/19/13, at 9. While the child could not obse rve Father’s face from her vantage point, she recognized Father from the interior and exterior of the automobile, brand of cigarettes that he was smoking, and the placement of a t attoo on his forearm. Id . at 9. Father took several photographs of the home and left abruptly. Id . at 10. Mother inspected the exterior of her home, and since she found nothing out of the ordinary, she declined to report Father to the police for his actions. In addition, on the day prior to the PFA hearing, A .K.B. informed Mother that Father attended an after-school concert at her school earlier that day. Id . She explained that Father sat in the back of the audienceJ-S51001- 14

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during the concert wearing a hooded sweatshirt. Id . Mother also described damage to her door lock that she observed when she was l eaving her home the previous morning. Id . at 11. Specifically, she testified that the wood around the lock was chipped and the metal lock was dente d and misshapen. Id . She reported the incident to the police. Id

. As it is relevant to whether Father’s current conduct was suf ficient to induce in Mother a reasonable fear of bodily injury, we review Mother’s evidence regarding Father’s prior physical abuse of her and the children. In reciting the history of abuse, Mother indicated that F ather commonly threatened her with weapons and would use anything ne arby when he was
angry. Id . at 20, 25. The abuse varied from harassing her with a baseball bat to threatening to shoot her in the head with his sidearm. For example,

w hen Mother refused to lie to CYS about Father’s second physical assault of one of their children, Father struck her in the face wi th a telephone, grabbed her by the arms, and shook her. Id . at 25. During a later, unrelated ordeal, Father tormented Mother with a baseball bat by swing ing the bat but stopping it immediately prior to making contact. Id . at 21. An even more disturbing incident occurred during Januar y 2005, when Father became incensed at Mother following an argument , upended furniture, broke windows, and retrieved his sidearm f rom its safe. Id . at 12. As four of the children were home at that time, Mothe r immediately called the police. Id . at 12, 14. Before the authorities arrived, Father wielded hisJ-S51001- 14

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gun as he ranted about his hatred for Mother, and he threatened to kill her. Id . At one point, Father leveled the firearm at Moth er’s head from less than three feet away. Id . at 12-13. When the police arrived, Father denied brandishing the gun and informed the officers that his sidearm remained locked in the safe. Id . at 12. Father further apprised the police officers t hat he had lost the key to the locked safe. Id . at 13. Upon searching him, however, the police discovered the key hidden in Fathe r’s wallet. Id . When they opened the safe, the gun was missing. Id . It was subsequently discovered secreted between the cushions on the living ro om couch. Id . at 13 -14. Father was arrested, but he was released on bail the following day. Id . at 14. In addition to his array of weapons, Father has also assaulted Mother with his hands. The first incident of physical abuse occu rred during October of 2001, after Mother asked Father to take out the t rash. Id . at 22. Father was infuriated by the request. Id . He cornered Mother in a doorway and beat her with his fists. Id . Mother attempted to escape the deluge by sliding down the wall toward the floor but her effor ts were futile. Father simply ceased punching her and began to kick her as she knelt on the floor. Id . That assault continued for fifteen minutes. Id . The following year, Father punched Mother in the right eye during a disp ute over money. Id . at 23. That assault resulted in a black eye. Id

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Again, during February of 2007, while Mother was pre gnant with M.B., the third yo ungest of Father’s children, she attempted to leave the family home before another dispute with Father escalated to v iolence. Id . at 19. Father was furious when he discovered Mother packing cl othes for her and the children. Id . She reassured him, “I’m not leaving [you]. I’m j ust going [to my mother’s] for a little bit. I will be back. I’m not leaving.” Id

. Nevertheless, Father ripped the clothes to pieces, appreh ended Mother as she was descending the stairs, and kicked the back of her k nee out from under the weight of her body. Id . Mother lost her balance and sailed down the steps, struck a wall, and rolled to the floor in front of the children. Id

. at 20. After viewing the look of horror on her chil dren’s faces, Mother lied and told them that she was clumsy and had stumbled acci dently. Id . at 20. Mother did not report this incident to the police due to her concern for the children and because she felt “they never really helpe d.” Id

. In addition to slapping and punching Mother and knocki ng her down steps, Father also abused Mother with his brute strength . Mother testified about a May 2009 incident wherein she confronted Fathe r regarding his practice of commandeering the car keys and removing the computers and telephones from the home prior to going to work for the day. Id . at 16-17. During the ensuing confrontation, Father grabbed Moth er’s arm and attempted to throw her to the ground. Id . at 17. After Mother was able to regain her footing, Father woke all of the children sleeping on a couch in theJ-S51001- 14

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room, arranged them in a line, and exclaimed, “let’s w atch mommy get her ass beat.” Id . During the ensuing commotion, Mother grabbed Fathe r’s uniform shirt for stability and caused one of the butto ns to pop off. Id

. Enraged, Father placed Mother in a submission hold usi ng pressure points behind her ear and on her nose. Id . Father also twisted Mother’s arms behind her back, raised her wrists above her head, and planted his knee in her back. Id . at 17-18. The painful maneuver fractured a bon e in Mother’s elbow and caused nerve damage. Id . at 18. She testified that she was in a cast for more than six weeks following that ordeal. Id . at 18-19. Mindful that she could no longer defend herself and t hat Father would not discontinue the assault, Mother ceded her protests an d let Father leave the home with the keys and communication devices. Id . at 18. She testified, “I just laid on the floor until he left.” Id . Later that evening, after Father returned from work, Mother lulled him into co mplacency in order to obtain his permission to leave the house with the childr en. Id . at 18. Having successfully escaped from Father’s wrath, Mother sou ght refuge at her mother’s home in Philadelphia. Id

. Mother stressed that Father abused her regardless of her physical condition. When Mother was was eight months pregnant d uring 2001, Father attempted to stop her from walking away from him by pulling her leg while she was ascending stairs. Id . at 25. Mother fell on her stomach and was admitted to a hospital overnight. Id . at 25-26. Similarly, during 2002,J-S51001- 14

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when Mother was nine months pregnant with A.K.B., Fat her choked her and left a hand print on her neck. Id . at 23. More recently, during the summer of 2012, while Mother was approximately five months p regnant with her son from her current relationship, Father pushed her down five steps simply because he was in a bad mood. Id . at 15. Mother also described Father’s various assaults of their ch ildren. She explained that during 2002, Father smacked one of th eir daughters in the face, causing a black eye. Id . at 23-24. She covered for Father, telling the people attending an ensuing birthday party that the child was clumsy and would bump into things. Id . at 24. Again, during 2005, Father smacked a daughter and left a mark on her face. Id . Mother’s cooperation with CYS following the latter incident led to Father’s assault of her with the telephone that we described supra . Id . More recently, in 2011 Father smacked A.K.B. repeatedly across her face until she curled into a ball o n the floor. Id . at 28. The offense that Father believed warranted the beati ng was his daughter’s tracking blood around the house after cutting her foot on glass that Father broke and failed to clean. Id . The child’s wounds required stitches; however, before permitting Mother to take A.K.B. fo r treatment, Father taunted his daughter by sitting her on the countertop and feigning that he was going to mend the wound with a needle and thread

. Id . at 29. In sum, Mother testifie d that, in light of Father’s prior abuse, his current conduct frightens her and raises a concern for the safety of her andJ-S51001- 14

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the children. Id . at 29. Mother noted that, even after the imposit ion of the temporary PFA order, Father continued with suspicious behavior like maintaining photographic surveillance of her home, app earing surreptitiously at her daughter’s after -school activities, sending intimidating emails, and possibly tampering with her door locks. Id . at 26-27, 29. The maternal grandmother, D.M., also testified during the PFA hearing. Her testimony corroborated Mother’s statements regardin g the past incidences of physical abuse. Id . at 35- 43. She characterized Mother’s fifteen-year history with Father as brutal. Id . at 36. D.M. confirmed
Mo ther’s reports of abuse and noted her observations of va rious choke marks, bruises, black eyes and scratches on Mother and severa l of the children. Id . at 36-37, 39-42. She also reported receiving telep hone calls from Mother and hearing Father ranting in the backgr ound. Id . at 42. As noted supra , eleven-year-old A.K.B. testified in camera . She described seeing Father at her after-school concert the pr evious day. Id . at 47. Father’s attendance frightened her because she beli eved “he was going to do something bad.” Id . A.K.B. also described seeing Father outside of the home. Id . She explained, “when I was looking out the window[ ,] I saw him in th e car.” Id . She continued, “Yeah, I saw him. I was in my

room . . . , and I was looking out my window. I saw his white car, and I really thought it was him. He stuck his hand out of th e window and took aJ-S51001- 14

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picture of the house.” Id . at 48. A.K.B. also recognized a tattoo on Father’s

arm. Id

. A.K.B. added that, on another occasion, Father told h er of his surveillance and described what he observed during a bir thday party for one of the children. Id . She recounted, “He described the house and [M.B.’s] decorations, how we wrote on the window in marker, Ha ppy Birthday, [M.B.]. He said . . . my stepfather . . . was drinkin g beer. It wasn’t beer. It was an Arizona ice tea from Getty. I said, why didn’t you knock? He tried ignoring me and just [asked] o ther questions.” Id . at 48. On another occasion Father confided to A.K.B., “I know mom hits you guys and stuff because I see it.” Id . at 49. When the child inquired further, Father sim ply responded, “I’m around.” Id

. Additionally, A.K.B. recalled Fat her’s abuse stating, when Father gets angry, “He hits us and mommy.” Id . at 49. She testified about the episode where she cut her foot on the broken glass and Father smacked her for crying and making a mess. Id . at 50. She added that Father kicked her during the incident and slapped her on the way to th e hospital. Id . She testified that she was afraid of Father: “I felt like h e is going to do it all over again. He is going to

– well, try to take us and, you know, hit us again just to get mommy mad or something[.]” Id . at 55. Upon our review of the certified record, we conclude t hat the trial court did not err in finding that Mother established by a preponderance ofJ-S51001- 14

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evidence the allegations of abuse as the term is define d in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a). Notably, each of the prior incidents of ph ysical abuse satisfies the definition of abuse under the PFA. Between 2001 and 2012, Father doled out physical abuse liberally. The beatings resul ted in an array of injuries. Additionally, Father repeatedly tormented Mother with threats of imminent violence ranging from badgering her with a baseball bat to threatening to shoot her with his sidearm. In light of the tumultuous history of physical and emotional abuse that Mother and the children endured, Father’s stalking behaviors during December 2013, which form the basis of the PFA petitio n, constituted a course of conduct that placed Mother in reasonable fear o f bodily injury. Additionally, although Father was never formally conn ected to the damage inflicted upon Mother’s front door, he admitted to A.K.B. that he conducted surveillance on the home and described events that had o ccurred therein. In addition, Father stalked Mother outside of the Be rks County Courthouse, and he peered through her attorney’s offi ce window and watched while she was seeking guidance about how to confront his behaviors. Thus, Mother’s evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s findi ng by a preponderance of the evidence that Father committed ab use pursuant to § 6102(a)(5) (engaging in course of conduct, including f ollowing the person, under circumstances which place person in reasonable fear o f bodily injury).J-S51001- 14

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Moreover, to the extent that Father complains that Mo ther’s evidence was insufficient because it is not supported by docume ntary evidence, we observe that Mother’s testimony alone was sufficient to sa tisfy her burden of proof. See Coda v. Coda , 666 A.2d 741, 743 (Pa.Super. 1995) (petitioner’s testimony was sufficient to support protection from abu se order). Furthermore, Father asserts that the trial court erred in disregarding his countervailing evidence concerning the family’s dynamic w hen it was intact and a potential alibi for December 4, 2013. Contrar y to Father’s contentions, our review of the trial court’s det ermination is highly deferential because the trial court had the opportunity to hear a nd see the evidence presented. Hood-O'Hara v. Wills , 873 A.2d 757, 760 (Pa.Super. 2005). As the trial court exercised its discretion properly in ac cepting Mother’s evid ence as more credible than Father’s in the case at bar, we will not disturb its decision to enter the PFA order. The next group of arguments that Father raises in hi s brief relate to the trial court’s evidentiary proceedings. These claims implicate quest ions one through four, six, and seven. The following pri nciples are relevant to our review.
In Lykes v. Yates , 77 A.3d 27, 32 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Reott v. Asia Trend

, Inc. , 7 A.3d 830, 839 (Pa.Super. 2010)), we explained, We note that our standard of review for evidentiary rulings is a narrow one:J-S51001- 14

- 20 - When we review a trial court's ruling on admission of evidence, we must acknowledge that decisions on admissibility are within the sound discretion of the t rial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or misapplication of law. In addition, for a ruling on evidence to constitute reversible error, it m ust have been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party. With these principles in mind, we address Father’s list o f challenges to the court’s evidentiary ruling. Father’s first assertion, that the trial court ignored Mother’s motivations for filing the PFA petition, is devoid o f legal argument and unsupported by case law. In In re A.C. , 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa.Super. 2010) ( quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson , 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009)), we reiterated, “where an appellate brief fai ls to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant author ity or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review , that claim is waived.” Thus, Father’s first issue is waived. See also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (argument section of appellate brief shall contain discussi on of issues raised therein and citation to pertinent legal authorities) . Moreover, the certified record gives lie to Father’s claim that Mother’s asserted fear of abuse was pretext. Indeed, as outlined above, Father methodica lly tormented and physically abused Mother for at least the last thirtee n years. Accordingly, his claim that Mother’s petition was a ploy to gain an advantage in the child custody proceedings is manifestly without merit.J-S51001- 14

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Next, we address Father’s claim that the trial court err ed in precluding Father’s documentary evidence to support his alibi for December 4, 2013. Father also asserts that the excluded documents establish ed that Mother initiated the PFA proceedings in bad faith. As Appell ant failed to provide the trial court with the notes of testimony from the PFA h earing, the trial court was unable to address it directly. This claim relates to Father’s attempt to introduce a com puter printout of his check-in and check-out times at SCI Graterford on December 3-6, 2013. The document had a hand-written inscription, al legedly signed by a shift supervisor at the prison, that read “[Father] was a t SCI Graterford [on] 12/3 [and] 12/4 until 1600 hrs[.]” Defendant’s Exhibi t 1. Mother objected to the document’s authentication and the trial court ba rred it for that reas on. See N.T., 12/19/13, at 121. However, the subsequent Rul e 1925(a) opinion did not provide any further explanation for excludi ng the exhibit because the notes of testimony had not been transcribed when the o pinion was issued. On appeal, however, Mother asserts that the document w as inadmissible hearsay. See Pa.R.E. 802. Father does not proffer a cogent argument defending against the application of either evidentiary principle. As this Court can affirm the trial court’s determination based on any rea son supported by the record, and the evidence that Father sought to admit clearly was hearsay, we affirm the trial court’s decision to sustain Mother’s objection on that basis.J-S51001- 14

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Rule 802 bars hearsay statements offered to prove the t ruth of the matter asserted unless the statements fit within one of the delineated exceptions in Pa.R.E. 803, 803.1, or 804. Pa.R.E. 8 01(c) defines hearsay as “a statement that (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in e vidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Concomitant ly, Rule 801(a) explains that a person’s written assertion falls within the definition of a
statement. Herein, the printout of Father’s start and finish tim es and his supervisor’s inscription are out

- of -court statements pursuant to Rule 801(a). Indeed, Father does not dispute this fact nor that he p roffered the evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e. , that he was at work on the times listed on the document. Thus, the evidence fall s within the parameters of Rule 802. As the document that Father so ught to admit was inadmissible hearsay under Rule 802 and no exception t o the rule against hearsay was alleged to apply, no relief is due. The t rial court properly excluded Father’s out

- of -court statement from evidence. Next, we address Father’s claim that the trial court er red in considering evidence of his past physical abuse of Mothe r and some of the children. His assertion is two-fold. First, Father cla ims that the allegations that violence occurred between 2004 and 2009 are irrel evant to the current PFA. Second, Father reiterates his overarching complain t that Mother failedJ-S51001- 14

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to substantiate her allegations of abuse with documenta ry evidence. Again,
F ather’s arguments are meritless. At the outset, we reject Father’s latter assertion rega rding Mother’s evidentiary burden for the reasons we stated above, i.e. , Mother’s testimony was sufficient to satisfy her burden of proof. Coda , supra . As it relates to Father’s contention that the evidence of past abuse was t oo remote, we observe that, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 402, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible,” subject to enumerated exceptions and that irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Moreover, evidence is relevant if i t has a tendency to make a fact of consequence in the action more or less probable than it would be without it. See Pa.R.E. 401. Herein, the evidence that Father assai ls was relevant to whether he engaged in a course of condu ct under circumstances that placed Mother in reasonable fear of bo dily injury. In PFA proceedings, evidence of past abuse not only is re levant, but it is crucial for the trial court’s determination. See Buchhalter v. Buchhalter , 959 A.2d 1260 (Pa.Super. 2008). In Buchhalter , this Court addressed a similar issue and held that a trial court err ed in barring the petitioner’s testimony regarding prior abuse. Id . at 1263. Concluding that “[t]he facts surrounding the prior PFA consent order are relevant to an understand ing as to the reasonableness of [the petitioner’s] fear relative to the present petition[,]” we reiterated, In light of the protective purposes of the act, it was w ithin the trial court's discretion to hear any relevant evidence t hat wouldJ-S51001- 14

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assist it in its obligation to assess the appellee's entit lement to and need for a protection from abuse order. If the t rial court found the testimony to involve events too distant in t ime to possess great relevance to the case, it could certainly hav e assigned less weight to the testimony. However, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to hear the evi dence. Past abusive conduct on the appellant's part was a crucial inqu iry necessary for entry of a proper order. Id . (quoting Raker v. Raker , 847 A.2d 720,726 (Pa.Super. 2004)). Thus, based on these principles, we find the evidence of the family’s history of physical violence relevant and therefore ad missible. As we explained in Buchhalter , supra , evidence of Father’s past physical abuse established a contextual foundation that was necessary to understand the reasonableness of Mother’s fears relative to the instant petition. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in considerin g it. Next, we address Father’s contention the trial court ab used its di scretion in permitting A.K.B.’s in camera testimony. Father argues that the court erred in failing to hold a competency hearin g prior to considering her testimony, which he asserts that Mother tainted. H e also avers prejudice as a result of being excluded when the eleve n-year-old child testified in camera

. In addition, Father’s brief challenges the trial court ’s admission of Attorney Marks’s testimony as a fact witness regarding the incident that occurred outside of her law office on December 4, 2013, and her in-court identification of Father as wearing the same jacket as o n the date inJ-S51001- 14

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question. Noting that Attorney Marks is an officer of the court, Father challenges the propriety of the trial court’s decision t o permit her testimony. None of Father’ s claims warrants relief. Father failed to object duri ng the hearing to testimony of A.K.B. or Attorney Marks. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302, “Issues not raised in the lower court are waived an d cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Instantly, Father’s fa ilure to level any objections to the witnesses’ testimony deprived the trial court of an opportunity to confront the issue and remedy any perce ived prejudice. As Father failed to raise these claims during trial, the y are waived and we will not address them herein. The final class of argument raised in Father’s brief r elates to the PFA order’s three -year no-contact directive. This claim implicates issue e leven. Father does not call upon the interplay between the PFA order and the existing order that previously governed the child custo dy arrangement. Instead, he simply argues that Mother failed to prove that he physically abused the children. Father’s brief at 40. Father’s claim fails. The certified record establishes that the children not on ly watched Father physically abuse Mother and witnessed him threat en Mother with his sidearm, but at least two of the four children were sub ject to Father’s physical abuse. N.T., 12/19/13, at 14, 23-25, 29, 49 -50. The evidence reveals that he twice gave the oldest child black eyes b y slapping her in the face, and he hit A.K.B. on multiple occasions. Id . at 23-24, 39-42.J-S51001- 14

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Moreover, Father struck Mother when she was pregnant wi th several of the children, and the maternal grandmother testified that she observed various bruises and scratches on the children over the prior ten y ears. Id . at 15, 19, 23, 25, 36-37, 39-42. Finally, we observe that CYS imposed supervised visitation between Father and the children based upon its concern over the prior allegations of abuse. Id . at 100, 116-117. As the record supports the trial court’s finding that Father’s conduct created a rea sonable fear of danger to the children, we will not disturb it. 5 Finally, we address the deferred portion of Father’s self -styled motion for intervention. As noted supra , Father purports to invoke “new extraordinary evidence” in the form of a time -stamped video recording of the shift change at SCI Graterford on December 4, 20 13. He argues that the video establishes conclusively that he was at that facilit y at 3:54 p.m. on December 4, 2013, and therefore could not have stalked Mother outside of Attorney Marks’s office. Father continues that the testi mony presented by Mother and Attorney Marks was tantamount to perjury a nd further demonstrated that Mother prosecuted the PFA proceeding s in bad faith. For the following reasons, we disagree with all of Father ’s contentions.

____________________________________________ 5 Although Father does not challenge the propriety of t he no-contact directive in light of the existing custody order, we o bserve that the PFA act permits trial courts to obstruct an abuser’s physical custody of his chil dren when the record supports the trial court’s finding that he abused the children or poses a risk of abuse. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108(a)(4)(i)(A ) and § 6108(a)(4) (iii)(B).J-S51001- 14

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First, although Father styled the excerpt of a video recording from the SCI security camera as new evidence, he cannot explain wh y he was unable to obtain that evidence prior to the PFA hearing. I ndeed, while Father proffered fact witnesses, introduced turnpike receipts, a nd sought to introduce a computer printout of his start and finish t imes, he failed to mention the existence of relevant surveillance footage . It is apparent from these facts that Father’s evidence is not new. In actuali ty, the evidence existed prior to the evidentiary hearing and Father simply failed to present it. Father cannot claim evidence is new merely because h e failed to present it to the trial court in the first instance. Thus, no relief is due. Furthermore, even if Father presented the surveillance excerpt during the evidentiary proceedings and attempted to introduce it into evidence, he would have encountered similar obstacles to its omission that he was unable to overcome in relation to the time sheet. That is to say, it would be inadmissible pursuant to Pa.R.E. 901 for lack of authen tication. Pointedly, we observe that while Father asserts that the video de picts his exit from the facility at 3:55 p.m., he fails to identify any extri nsic evidence to authenticate that the recording is what he purports it to be. Under Pennsylvania jurisprudence, demonstrative evidence like an excerpt from a

su rveillance video “must be authenticated by evidence suff icient to support a finding that the demonstrative evidence fairly and a ccurately represents that which it purports to depict.” See Comment Rule 901(a) (citing Nyce v.J-S51001- 14

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Muffley , 119 A.2d 530 (Pa. 1956). Instantly, the excerpt f rom the surveillance video is not self-authenticating, nor does Father identify any witnesses with sufficient knowledge of the recording proce dure to verify that the excerpt is what he purports it to be. Moreover, the significance of the lack of authenticati on is highlighted by the fact that, upon viewing a copy of the surveilla nce recording that is contained in the certified record, we were unable to co nfirm if any of the male correctional officers recorded leaving the secured po rtion of the facility prior to 3:55 p.m. was Father. Father’s appearance i n the video excerpt is not self-evident and he does not provide any mechanism for this Court to identify him from the throng of people exiting the facility at the pertinent
time. For instance, Father could have indicated the precise ti me that he entered the frame of the excerpt or described himself by the uniform color, hairstyle, or other identifying attribute. He faile d to do any of these things. At best, the excerpt reveals eight unidentified males leaving the facility at the pertinent time. Absent some extrinsic evidence, it is impossible to determine whether any of the male correctional office rs is Father. Thus, despite Father’s protestation to the contrary, the exce rpt f rom the SCI Graterford surveillance camera does not definitively est ablish that he was at the facility on the date and time in question. Accordi ngly, for all of the foregoing reasons, upon review of the deferred aspect of Father’s motion forJ-S51001- 14

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intervention regarding new extraordinary evidence, w e deny his request to vacate the PFA based on the video recording. Order affirmed. Motion for intervention denied.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 9/9/2014