# IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS

AP -76,035
EX P ARTE ROY GENE SMITH, Appl icant
On A pplic at ion forWr itof Ha be as Co r pus in Caus e No. 512673- B of the 208th Judicial Dis tric t Court , Harris County
W O M ACK 

## , J ., de liv e re d th eop ini on of t heun an im ous Co ur t. This is a subsequent post-convic tion application for writ of habea s corpus. The a pplicant claims that he is entitled to relief from his death sentence“bec ause heprese nted significant mitigatingevidenc e re lated to his moral culpability and the a ppropriate ness of a

death se ntence that could not be g iven full eff ect by the sentenc ing jur

y .” We find that the trial c ourt err ed by not providingthe jury

a constitutionally

adequate vehicleby

which it could fully

consider a

nd g ive eff ect to the a

pplicant’s re levant evide nce of poverty , a crime-ridden ne ighbor hood, and drug addiction. We also find that the applica nt was egreg iously

harme d by

this error. We ther efor e re mand to t he tria l c ourt

fo r n e w p un ishme nt p ro c e e din g s.R oy G en e S m i t h - 2

See J ohns on v . Te xas , 50 9 U
. S. 35 0 , 36 0 (19 9 3 ) ( reco gni zi ng “ som e t ensi o n” b et ween t he t wo pri nci p l es)
. 1 G re gg v . G e o rg ia , 42 8 U
. S. 15 3 , 16 9 (19 7 6 ). 2 Id
. , at 18 9 (ci t i ng F u rm a n v . G e o rg ia , 40 8 U
. S. 23 8 (19 7 2 ))
. 3 W oods on v . Nor t h Car ol i na , 4 2 8 U .S . 2 8 0 , 3 0 3 -0 5 (1 9 7 6 ); se e a lso L o c k e tt v . O h io , 438 U
. S. 586, 604 4 ( 19 78 ) ( “ [ T ] he E i gh t h a nd Four t een t h Amendm ent s r equi r e t hatt he s ent enc er , i n a l l but t he r ar es t ki nd of ca pi t al c a se , no t b e p re c lud e d fro m c o n sid e rin g , as a m i t igat i ng f act or , any aspect o f

t he d ef end ant ’ s charact er or record and a n y c irc u m sta n c e s o f t h e o ff e n se tha t t h e d e fen d a n t p ro ff e rs a s a b a sis fo r a se n te n c e les s tha n d e a th.” ) (e m p h a sis in o rig ina l); Penr

y v. Ly naugh , 49 2 U
. S. 30 2 , 31 8 (19 8 9 ) ( P enr y I ) (“ U nd erl y i ng L o c k e tta n d E d d i n g s [ v . Ok l a h o ma , 4 5 5 U
. S. 10 4 (19 8 2 ), ] i s t he p ri nci p l e t hat punis hm ent s ho ul d be dir ect l y rel at ed t o t he p ers o nal cul p ab i l i t y of t he cri m i nal de f

end ant . ”). M cKoy v . Nor t h Car ol i na , 49 4 U
. S. 43 3 , 44 0 (19 9 0 ) ( q uo t i ng St at e v. M cKoy , 37 2 S
. E. 2d 12 , 45 ( N
. C. 5 1 9 8 8 ) (E x u m , C .J ., d isse n ting )) ; s ee als o Tenn ard v. D r etke , 542 U
. S. 274, 284- 85 ( 2004) ( “ ‘ [ T ] h e mea n i n g of re le v a n c e is no d iff

e re n t i n the c o n te x t o f m iti g a ting e v id e n c e intro d u c e d in a c a p ital se n te n c ing p ro c e e d ing ’ t h a n in any o t her context
. . . ”) ( q uo t i ng M cKoy , 49 4 U
. S., at 44 0 ); T EX . R. E V ID . 40 1 (“ ‘ R el eva nt ev i dence ’ means ev i dence havi ng any t end ency t o m ake t he exi st ence o f any f act t hat i s o f

co nsequenc e t o t he d et erm i nat i o n of t he act i o n m o re p rob ab l e o r l ess pro b ab l e t han i t wo ul d be wi t ho ut t he evi d ence.”)
. 

## I . Constitutional Ba ckground The United States Supre me Court has established two ke y principles that guide the pr oc e ss b y

wh ic h a jur y may a sse ss t he de ath p e na lty
. F ir st, wh ilethede ath p e na lty is n ot pe r se 1


## c ru e l and unus ua l pu

nis hme nt i n v iol atio n o f t he Ei ghth Am e ndme nt, a

jur y ’s dis c re tio n to 2 

## assess the de ath pena lty

“must be suitably

direc ted and limited so as to minimi ze the risk of wh oll y arb itr ary a nd c a pric iou s a c tio n. ” Se c on d, thejur y mus t bepr ov ide d a

ve hic le by

wh ic h to 3 

## fully consider a

nd g ive ef

fec t to mit iga

ting e videnceof “the char acte r and r ecord of the individual offende r and the circ umstances of the offe nse.” 4 

## With respe ct to the sec ond principle, the Supre me Court has held that the mitig ating evidenc e must first be re levant. Releva nt evidencein this contex t is “evidenc e which te nds log ic a lly to p ro ve or

dis pr ov e so me fa c t or

c ir c ums tanc e wh ic h a

fa c t- fi nd e r c ou ld r e a so na bly d e e mt o h av e m i t i g at i n gv a l u e . ” Av e h i c l e n e e d n o tb e p r o v i d e d

wh e nth e e v i d e n c e h a s “ o n l y a 5R oy G en e S m i t h - 3

A b d u l-K a b ir v. Q uar t er m an , 55 0 U
. S. 23 3 , 25 3 n. 1 4 (20 0 7 ) ( em p hasi s i n ori gi nal ). 6 T en n a rd , 542 U
. S. , a t 285. 7 Jur ek v . Te xas , 42 8 U
. S. 26 2 , 27 1 (19 7 6 ). 8 C o mp a re A b d u l-K a b ir , 550 U
. S. , a t 261 ( f i n di n g e v i den ce of

“ par t i cu l ar i ze d c h i l dh ood e x per i en ce s of 9 ab use and negl ect ” t o be outs i d e t he scop e o f t he special i ss ues) wi t h G r aham v . Col l i ns , 506 U
. S. 461, 476 ( 1993) ( f i ndi ng ev i dence of

y out h, t r ans i entupbri ng i ng , an d nonvi ol entch ar act er t o be wi t hi n t he s cope of t he s peci al i ss ues) and Johns on , 50 9 U
. S., at 36 8 (f i nd i ng evi d ence o f

y o ut h t o be wi t hi n t he scop e o f t he special i ss ues)
. Se e, e . g. , Br ewe r v . Q uar t er m an , 550 U
. S. 286, 294- 95 ( 2007) ( “ [ T ] h e T ex as s pec i al i s s u es do n ot 10 pr ov i de f

or a dequ at e con s i der at i on of a de f en dan t ’ s mi t i g at i n g e v i den ce w h en t h ate v i den ce f u n ct i on s a s a ‘ t woed ged s wo rd.’ ”).

P enr y I, 492 U
. S. , a t 328. 11 Penr y v. J ohns on , 53 2 U
. S. 78 2 , 80 4 (20 0 1 ) ( P en ry I I ). 12 

## tenuous conne ction–‘ somearguable r eleva nce’ – to the defe ndant’s culpa bility ,” but only

when the evidenc e “ma

y have me aning ful rele vanceto the defe ndant’s mora l culpability ‘beyond the scope of the spec ial issues.’” Oncethis “low threshold for r eleva nce” is met, the jury

must be 6 7 

## provided a

n adequate vehicleby

which to fully

consider a

nd g ive ef

fec t to the evidence
. At the time the applica

nt was sentenc ed, the jury was re quired to answe r spec ial issues of de lib e rate ne ss, futur e da

ng e ro us ne ss, and , if

ra ise d b y thee vid e nc e , p ro vo c atio n. Th e Sup re me Court fo un d th at th e se sp e c ia l is su e s a de qu ate ly dir e c te d a

nd lim ite d th e jur

y ’s dis c re tio n. B ut i f

8 

## a def endant pr esente d rele vant mitigatingevidenc e that wa s outside the scope of the spec ial iss ue s, or that ha d a

n a g gra vatin ge ff e c t whe n c on sid e re d w ith in t he sc op e of

thesp e c ia l is su e s, 9 1 0 

## the spec ial issues werea constitutionally inadequate vehiclefor the jur y to fully consider a

nd g ive ef fec t to the miti g atingevidenc e. Where the spe cial issues we re a n inadequate vehicle , a 11 

## “nullification instruction,” such a s the one g iven to the applica nt’s jury , was insuffic ient to cure thec on sti tut ion a l in a de qu a c y of thesp e c ia l is su e s. 12R oy G en e S m i t h - 4 

## I I . Procedur al History A. Trial In May 1990, a jury

convicted theapplicant of capital murde r. At the c onclusion of the punis hme nt p ha se , th e tria l c ourt ins tr uc te d th e jur

y to a ns we r t hr e e sp e c ia l is su e s: (1) Was the c onduct of the de fenda nt, Roy GeneSmith, that cause d the death of the dec ease d committed deliberately and with the re asonable expectation that the de ath o f t he de c e a se d o r a

no the r w ou ld r e su lt? (2 ) I s th e rea

pr ob a bil ity that th e de fe nd ant, Roy

Ge ne Smit

h, wo uld c omm it c r i m i n a l a c t s o f

v i o l e n c e th atw o u l d

c o n s t i tut e a

c o nt i nu i n gthr e att o s o c i e ty? (3) Was the c onduct of the de fenda nt, Roy GeneSmith, in killi ngthe dec ease d unrea sonable in re sponse to the provoc ation, if any , by the dec ease d? In response to Penry I

, the trial cour

t also g ave thejury

the following“nullification instruction”: You ar e instructed that when you deliberate on the questions posed in the spec ial issues, you areto consider mitigating c ircumstance s, if any , supported by the evidenc e pre sented in both phases of the trial, whe ther pre sented by the State or the def endant. A mitig atingcirc umstance ma y include, but is not lim ited to, any aspec t of the def

endant’ s char acte r, bac kground, re cord, or circ umstances of

the c r i m e wh i c hyo ub e l i e v e c o u l d m ak e a d e aths e nt e n c e i n a

p p r o p r i at e i nth i s c a s e . If you find that thereareany mitigatingcirc umstances in this case , you must decide ho w muc h w e ight t

he y de se rv e , a

nd the re a ft e r, g ivee ff

e c t and c on sid e ratio n to them in assessingthe def endant’ s persona l culpability at the time you answe r the sp e c ia l is su e . I f you

de te rm ine , whe n g ivi nge ff e c t to themit ig atin ge vid e nc e , if any , that a life se ntence , as re flec ted by a neg ative findingto the issue under consideration, rather tha

n a death sentence , is an appropriate re sponse to the pe rs on a l c ulp a

bil ity of thede fe nd ant, the n a

ne g ativ e fi nd ingsh ou ld b e g ive n to that specia l issue under c onsideration. The jury answe red the specia l issues affirmatively and did not employ

the nullification instruction. The trial cour t sentence d the applica

nt to death. B. D irec t Appeal The a pplicant appe aled his convic tion and sentenc e dire ctly to this C ourt. In his first point of er ror, the a pplicant contende d that “the tria l court er red by g iving the jur

y anR oy G en e S m i t h - 5

R o y G e n e S m ith v . S ta te , N o. 71, 099, s l i p op. a t 1 ( T ex . Cr
. App. Fe b. 24, 1993) ( n ot de s i g n at ed f or 13 p ub l i cat i o n).

I d. , a t 2. 14 I d. , a t 2- 3. 15 Ex p a rte R o y G e n e S m ith , N o. W R- 42, 801- 01 ( T ex . Cr
. App. Se p. 29, 1999) ( n ot de s i g n at ed f or 16 p ub l i cat i o n). 

## unauthorized instruction on miti g ation which fa iled to advise them of a compre hensible method of dete rmining a

nd utiliz ing mitig atingevidenc e.” We found that the nullification instruction 13 

## was “ sufficie nt to overcome the constitutional infirmity of Penry [I

].” We also found that the 14


## a pp lic ant “ fa ile d to make a c onte mpo ra

ne ou s o bje c tio n to thec ourt ’s c ha rg e ,” and

ult imate ly 15


## a ff ir me d th e jud gme nt a

nd se nte nc e of

thetria l c ourt . C. Initial St ate Application In April 1997, the applica nt filed his initi al state a

pplication for writ of habea s corpus. He
c la ime d th at hewa s d e nie d th e e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l be c a

us e his c ouns e l f

a ile d to adequately

investigate his history

and re tain a mitigation specialist. The trial c ourt made the 16 

## followingfinding s of fa ct desc ribingthe applica nt’s mitigatingevidenc e: 1 0
. Duri n g th e p un i s hm en tp h as e o f tri al , th e ap p l i cantt es t i fi edth ath e u s eddru gs twenty-four

hours a da

y ever y day of the we ek, and that the drug s must have put him in the posit ion that he was in a s a re sult of the crime. 11. Duringthe punishment phase of trial, the applica

nt testified that other c rimes he had c ommitt ed we re influe nced by “drinkingheavy

and smokingwee d.” 12. Duringthe punishment phase of trial, the applica

nt testified that he nee ded mon e y to s up po rt

his ha bit
.

. . . 15. Duringthe punishment phase of trial, the applica

nt’s mother testified that the applicant’ s father

died in 1971.R oy G en e S m i t h - 6

Id
. 17 R o y G e n e S m ith v . C o c k re ll , C A N o . H
- 0 0
- 1 7 7 1 (S. D
. T ex. M arch 31 , 20 0 3 ). 18 

## 16. Duringthe punishment phase of trial, the applica

nt’s mother testified that she curr ently supports herse lf by

welfa re while living in a house with thirteen other fa mil y me mbe rs . 17. Duringthe punishment phase of trial, the applica

nt’s mother testified that she lived in a high-crime are a, and that she would have left the ne ighbor hood if she could haveaff

orded to move. 18. Duringthe punishment phase of trial, the applica

nt’s mother testified that the applicant attempted to help raise his son and that the applicant wor ked at a steel plant in Ba

y town.

. . . 20. Duringthe punishment phase of trial, the applica

nt’s mother testified that the a p p l i c antd i d

w e l l wh e nh e w a s s t ayi n gi nth e p e n i t e nt i ar y.

. . . 22. Duringthe punishment phase of trial, the applica

nt’s sister described the ne ighb or ho od in whic h th e a

pp lic ant l ive d, inc ludingthepr e va le nc e of dr ug s, robberies, and prostitution. 23. Duringthe punishment phase of trial, the applica

nt’s sister related an incide nt wher e both she a

nd the applica

nt wererobbed a

t gun- point in the middl e of the str e e t. 24. Duringthe punishment phase of trial, the applica

nt’s sister stated that the applicant ha d been r aised in the c hurch. In an unpublished orde r, we stated that we had re viewed therec ord and that “[t] he finding s and conclusion by

the trial cour

t aresupported by

the re cord.” We denied re lief on this basis.

17 

## D. Fe dera l Petiti on In May 2000, the applica

nt filed a pe tition for writ of habe as cor pus in feder al district court. Thedistrict court dismissed the petition, but the United States Court of Appea ls for the 18R oy G en e S m i t h - 7

R oy G ene Sm i t h v. D r etke , 42 2 F.3d 26 9 (5 C i r. 20 0 5 ). th 19 Roy G ene Sm i t h v
. Q uar t er m an , 5 1 5 F .3 d 3 9 2 (5 th C ir. 2 0 0 8 ). 20 I d. , a t 407. 21 Id
. , a t 409. 22 Id
. , a t 409- 10. 23 Id
. , a t 410. 24 

## Fifth Circuit grante d a ce rtificateof appe alability on two issues: (1) whe ther the a pplicant’s trial counsel provide d ineffe ctive represe ntation, and (2) whether the jury instructions at the sentenc ing pha se violated Penry I
. 19 

## The F ifth Circuit ulti mately denied r elief on both issues. With respe ct to Penry I , the 20 

## Fifth Circuit discussed f

our categ ories of mitig atingevidenc e: “pove rty ; drugaddiction and int oxic atio n; c ha

ra c te r e vid e nc e ; and

gro wi ngup in t

he c ri me -ridd e n n e ighb or ho od of theF if th Ward o f H ou sto n. ” Th e F if th C ir c uit fo un d th at th e jur

y wa s a bleto g ivefu ll e ff

e c t and e xpre ss 21 

## their re asoned mora l response to the a pplicant’s evide nce of

drugaddiction and intoxi cation throu gh th e sp e c ia l is su e s. I f j ur or s d e te rm ine d th at th e a pp lic ant’ s su

bs tanc e a bu se hin de re d h is ability to make a c onscious decision to commit capital murder , they could haveanswe red the deliberateness spec ial issue in the neg ative. I f jurors r easona bly assumed that the a

pplicant 22 

## would not have a cce ss to drug s and could re ceivereha bilitative services in prison, a nd there fore his proclivities toward violent beha vior would lessen a fter ove rcominghis addictions, the jurors
c ou ld h ave ans we re d th e futur e -d ang e ro us ne ss s pe c ia l is su e in t he ne g ativ e . Th e F if

th C ir c uit 23 

## did not find authority

for dr ugaddiction as a

mitigatingfac tor that could re duce a defe ndant’s
mor a l c ulp a

bil ity outsi de its re le va

nc e to t he sp e c ia l is su e s. 24R oy G en e S m i t h - 8

Id
. , a t 412. 25 Id
. , at 41 3 (ci t i ng A b d u l-K a b ir , 550 U
. S. , at 2 5 3 n. 1 4 ). 26 Id
. , at 41 4 (quo t i ng A b d u l-K a b ir , 55 0 U
. S., at 26 1 ). 27 Id
. , a t 414. 28 Id
. 29 T he St at e a gr ees t hatwe may cons i der t he meri t s of t hi s s ubs equen t appl i cat i on i n l i gh t of t he new l aw 30 anno unced by t he Sup rem e C o urt i n P en ry I I, 53 2 U
. S., at 80 4 (f

i nd i ng a nul l i f

i cat i o n i nst ruct i o n i nsuf f i ci ent t o cure the c o n stitutio n a l i n a d e q u a c y o f sp e c ia l i ssu e s)
. P en ry I I was un ava i l abl e a s a l ega l bas i s f or t he A pp l i can t ’ s cl ai m at the ti m e o f his d ire c t ap p e a l an d initial a p p lica tio n fo r w rit o f ha b e a s c o rp u s. See T EX . C O D E C R IM . P R OC . ar t . 11. 07, § 5. 

## The F ifth Circuit also found that the applica nt’s evidenc e of growingup in an impoverished and c rime-ridden neighborhood wa s “cle arly rele vant mitigatingevidenc e,” a nd
wa s o uts idethesc op e of

thesp e c ia l is su e s, but ul tim ate ly ha d “ on ly

a te nu ou s c onne c tio n to 25 

## any attempt to dimini sh [the applica nt’s] m oral c ulpability

for his crime.” The ty

pes of 26 

## experience s the applica

nt presente d wer e not “pa rticularized childhood experienc es of a buse and neg lect.” In fac t, the only specific example of victimiz ation that the applica nt presente d 27


## occur red in 1988, whe n the applica nt was at lea st 29 year s old. The F ifth Circuit emphasized 28 

## that “our holdinghereis a narrow one, ba sed on our de tailed re view of the rec ord which c ontains no evidenc e of a

connec tion between thepoverty and crime of the F ifth Ward and [the applicant’ s] charac ter.” 29 

## I I I . Ana ly sis The a pplicant now cla ims that he is entitled to relief “be causehe pre sented significant mitigatingevidenc e re lated to his moral culpability and the a ppropriate ness of a

death se ntence that could not be g iven full eff ect by the sentenc ing jur

y .” The a

pplicant spec ifically

cites the 30 

## followingmitigatingevidenc e:R oy G en e S m i t h - 9

T h e Appl i ca n t ’ s de s cr i pt i on of h i s mi t i g at i n g e v i den ce l ar g el y mi r r or s t h e f i n di n g s of

f ac t pr odu ce d by 31 t h e t r i al c ou r t i n r es pon s e t o t h e Appl i ca n t ’ s i n i t i al w r i t a ppl i ca t i on , a s w el l a s t h e mi t i g at i n g e v i den ce de s cr i bed by t he Fi f t h Ci r cui t . T he St at e does not di s put e t hi s des cr i pt i on of t he mi t i gat i ng ev i dence
. 

## [The applicant’s] family

lived in poverty , cause d in part by the loss of his father wh e n h e wa s 1 2 ye ars old . [T he a pp lic ant’ s] mo the r, . . . w or kin ga s a ma id, c ou ld not afford to move the family from Houston’s “ Fifth Ward,”a dang erous neighborhood filled with prostitution, drugs, a nd crime. At the time of the crime, fourtee n people lived in [the applicant’s mother ’s] three-be droom home. [The mother of the a

pplicant’s son] was violently killed, so [ the applica

nt’s mother] took [ the applica

nt’s son] i nto her house a s well. Shortly befor e the c rime, [the a pp lic ant] a

nd his young e r s ist e r, . . . w e revio le nt c ri me vic tim s th e mse lve s – with [ the applica

nt’s] si ster forced to strip in public in front of him, and [the applicant] assaulted with a gun that misfired as it was he ld to his t emple. Sur ro un de d b y

dr ug s and po ve rt y a ll h is l if e , [th e a pp lic ant] b e c ame a

dr uga dd ic t, using c rac k whene ver hecould g et a hold of it. L ackingeducation and any job skills or opportuniti es, [the applicant] beg an to steal to support his addiction. 31 

## Th e a pp lic ant a rgue s th at th is e vid e nc e “ g ave imp or tant c onte xt to [h is] c ri me s, and a pr op e rl y ins tr uc te d ju ry c ou ld w e ll h ave c on c lud e d th at [he ] wa s le ss d e se rv ingof thede ath p e na lty

a s a result of his own deprivations, victimi zation, and addiction.” Hefurther argues that the trial c ourt
err ed bec ause the evidenc e could not be g iven meaning ful eff ect unde r the spec ial issues, and the
nu lli fi c atio n in str

uc tio n d id n ot c or

re c t th at prob le m. F ina lly , h e argue s th at hepr e se rv e d th is
error at trial, a

nd in any event hewas e greg iously harme d by

the er ror. In the alter

native, he invites us to reconsider

whether harm a naly sis is appropriate f

or er rors of this ty

pe. The State doe s not contest the insufficie ncy of the nullification instruction to cureany error in the spec ial issues. Instead, the State f ollows the rea soning of

the Fif th Circuit and argues that some of the a

pplicant’s evide nce did not wa rra nt a vehiclefor its consider ation, and the specia l issues werea suff icient vehiclefor other

evidenc e. To de monstrate er ror, ther efor e, the applicant must show that his miti g atingevidenc e (1) was re levant, and ( 2) wa s either outside the scope of the spec ial issues, or had a n ag gravating potential whe n considere d within the scope ofRoy Gene Sm i t h - 10

In Roy G ene Sm i t h v
. Q uar t er m an , t h e F ift h C irc u it a n a lyz e d the sa m e a rg u m e n ts tha t ar e b e fo re us . W e 32 a re no t b o u n d b y the c o n c lus io n s o f t h e F ift h C irc u it, b u t we w ill a d o p t i ts re a so n ing if it is p e rs u a siv e . See G uz m an v . S ta te , 85 S. W
. 3d 242 , 249 n. 24 (T ex. Cr. Ap p. 200 2) ( “ A l t houg h w e a r e n ot r equi r ed t o f ol l ow l ower f

eder al c o u rt inte rp re ta tio n s o f a fe d e ra l co n stitutio n a l righ t, w e m a y fi n d the re a so n ing in tho se c a se s p e rs u a siv e .” ).

Roy G ene Sm i t h v
. Q uar t er m an , 515 F. 3d, a t 412. 33 A b d u l-K a b ir , 5 5 0 U .S ., at 2 5 3 n. 1 4 (“T h e ru le tha t we re a ff irm to d a y– a ru le tha t ha s b e e n c le a rly 34 est ab l i shed si nce o ur decis i o n i n P en ry I

– is t his: S p ec i al i nstructi o ns are ne ce ssary wh en t he jury co uld no t o t he rw i se g ive m e a n ing ful e ff

e c t t o a d e fen d a n t’s m iti g a ting e v id e n c e . T h e ru le is na rr o w e r th a n the sta n d a rd ur g e d b y G r aham b e c a u se sp e c ia l i n stru c tio n is no t re q u ire d w h e n m iti g a ting e v id e n c e ha s o n ly a te n u o u s c o n n e c tio n -‘ so m e a rg u a b le r el eva nce ’
- t o t he def

endan t ’ s mo r al cu l pabi l i t y . B ut s peci al i ns t r uct i on i s ne ces s ar y wh en t he def endan t ’ s ev i dence may ha ve meani ng f

ul r el eva nce t o t he def

endan t ’ s mo r al cu l pabi l i t y ‘ bey ond t he s cope of t he s peci al i s s ues . ’ ”) (i nt ernal ci t at i o ns o m i t t ed ).

Roy G ene Sm i t h v
. Q uar t er m an , 515 F. 3d, a t 412. 35 Id
. , a t 413. 36 

## the spec ial issues. The mitigating e videncecited by the applica

nt may be broken into three cat egori es f

or the p urp os es o f our ana ly si s: (A) p ov erty andcri me- ri dd en n eighb orh oo d, (B) victimiz ation, and (C) dr

ugaddiction. 32 

## A. Poverty

and Crime-Ridden Ne ighbor hood The F ifth Circuit found that the applica nt’s evidenc e of pove rty

and a c rime-ridden neighborhood wa s “cle arly rele vant mitigatingevidenc e” a nd did not fit withi n the spec ial issues. Neve rtheless, ba sed on its interpretation of Te nn ar d, Brewer , a

nd pa rt ic ula rl y fo otn ote 33 

## 14 of Ab du l-Kab ir , theF if th C ir c uit state d th at “ theinq

uir y do e s n ot e nd

he re .” Th e F if

th 34 35 

## Circuit proce eded to e x plain that the jury did not need an a dequatevehicle be causethe evidenc e had “only a tenuous c onnection to any attempt to dimini sh [the applica nt’s] m oral c ulpability

for his crime.” 36 

## We do not find the Fifth Circuit’s interpr etation of Te nn ar d, Brewer , and Ab du l-Kab ir to be per suasive. In our opinion, a fa ir rea ding of those ca ses sug g ests that the “inquiry” consists ofRoy Gene Sm i t h - 11

T en n a rd , 5 4 2 U .S ., at 2 8 4 -8 5 ; B r ewer , 5 5 0 U .S ., at 2 9 4
. 37 T en n a rd , 542 U
. S. , a t 285. 38 See M cKoy , 49 4 U
. S., at 44 0 (Re l evant evi d ence i s “evi d ence which t end s l o gi cal l y t o pro ve o r di spro ve 39 s ome f ac t or c i r cu ms t an ce w h i ch a f ac t - f i n der c ou l d r ea s on abl y de em t o h av e mi t i g at i n g v al u e. ”)
. I n t h e l an g u ag e of T exas R ul e o f

E vi d ence 4 0 1 , t he A p p l i cant ’ s evi d ence o f l i f e i n po vert y and a cri m e- ri d d en nei ghb o rhoo d i s rel evant b ecause i t has a t end ency t o m ake a d ep ri ved and t roub l ed chi l d ho o d m o re pro b ab l e t han i t wo ul d be wi t ho ut t he e v id e n c e . S te w a rt v . S ta te , 12 9 S.W
. 3 d 93 , 96 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 4 ).

40 A b d u l-K a b ir , 550 U
. S. , a t 261. 41 S ee , e.g ., Ex p a rt e H a t h o rn , 29 6 S.W
. 3 d 57 0 , 57 2
- 7 3 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 9 ) ( negl ect , phys i cal and 42 em o t i o nal ab use, and vi o l ent and dys f unct i o nal hom e envi ronm ent ); M o re n o v . S ta te , 24 5 S.W
. 3 d 41 9 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 8 ) ( ad o p t i o n, de f o rmit y , and uns t ab l e ho m e). 

## only two steps: (1) whe ther the e videnceis releva nt, and (2) whether

the evidenc e fa lls outsi de the scope of the spec ial issues or may be conside red a g gravating whe n considere d within the scope of the spec ial issues. We understand f ootnote 14 of Ab du l-Kab ir to further define the 37



## “ l o wthr e s h o l d

f o r r e l e v an c e , ” r ath e r

th ant o a d d

a s e p ar at e th i r d

s t e p t o th e i n qu i r

y. 38 

## Fur thermore , a jury

could find that the a

pplicant’s evide nce of

life in poverty

and a c rimeri dd e n n e ighb or

ho od do e s h ave mor e tha

n a “ te nu ou s c onne c tio n” to h is m or a l c ulp a bil ity . T his evidenc e tends log ically

to prove that the a

pplicant suffe red the sort of deprived and trouble d childhood that a fa ct-finde r could re asonably deem to havemitigatingvalue. As with g ener al 39 

## questions of rele vance , the evidenc e “ne ed not by itself prove or

disprove a pa

rticular f act to be rele vant; it is sufficient if the evide nce provides a small nudg e toward provingor disproving some fac t of conseque nce.” The we ight of the applica

nt’s mitigatingevidenc e may be 40 

## signific antly

less than the evide nce of “par ticularized childhood experience s of abuse and neg lect” in Penry I

, Ab du l-Kab ir , and seve ral c ases de cided by this Court. But que stions of the 41 42Roy Gene Sm i t h - 12

T en n a rd , 542 U
. S. , a t 283- 87. 43 Roy G ene Sm i t h v
. Q uar t er m an , 515 F. 3d, a t 412. 44 See J ohns on , 509 U
. S. , at 368 ( “ T he r el eva nce of y out h a s a mi t i gat i ng f act or der i ves f

r om t he f

act t hat 45 t he s i gn at ur e qua l i t i es of y out h a r e t r ans i ent ; as i ndi vi dual s mat ur e, t he i mp et uous nes s an d re ckl es s nes s t hatmay d o m i na t e in yo un ge r years c an sub si d e. W e b eli ev e there i s am p l e ro o m i n the a ssessm en t o f f uture d an ge ro usne ss f o r a j uror t o t ake acco unt of t he d i f f i cul t i es of

y o ut h as a m i t i gat i ng f o rce i n t he sent enci ng de t erm i nat i o n. ”). 

## weight or sufficie ncy

of the e videncearenot beforeus. The question bef ore us is whe ther the evidenc e mee ts the “low threshold for rele vance .” 43 

## We agreewith the Fifth Circuit that this evidencewas outside the sc ope of the specia l issues. Be causethe evidenc e wa s releva nt and outside the scopeof the spec ial issues, we 44 

## there forefind that the trial cour t erre d in failingto provide a c onstitut ionally adequate vehiclefor its consideration. B. V ictimiz ation Th e a pp lic ant a lle g e s th at “

jus t be fo rethec omm iss ion of thepr e se nt o ff

e ns e ,” he and

his sister wer e violently

assaulted, a

nd he wa s “humiliated by his inability

to protect his sister fr om assault.” We find that this evidenc e of vic timiz ation “shortly befor e the c rime” f

ell within the scope of the future -dang erousne ss special issue a s a transie nt feature of theapplicant’ s char acte r. This evidencewas mitigating within the spec ial issue beca use, if the jury

believed 45 

## that th e a pp lic ant’ s c ri me wa s o nly a re a c tio n to thelin g e ri nghumil iatio n, str e ss, or oth e r e ff e c ts from t he a ssa ult , th e y wo uld have ans we re d th e sp e c ia l is su e in t he ne g ativ e . T he tria l c ourt did not err w ith respec t to this evidenc e. C. DrugAddiction The F ifth Circuit did not find prece dent “c onsider[ing] drugaddiction as a mitigating fac tor that reduc es a c riminal defe ndant’s mora l culpability outside its relevanc e to the spec ialRoy Gene Sm i t h - 13

Roy G ene Sm i t h v
. Q uar t er m an , 515 F. 3d, a t 410. 46 B r ewer , 550 U
. S. , a t 292- 93. 47 2 3 3 S .W .3 d 3 1 9 (T e x . C r. A p p . 2 0 0 7 ). 48 Id
. , at 32 3 (ci t i ng A b d u l-K a b ir ). 49 A gai n, we m ake no co m m ent on t he wei ght of t hi s evi d ence. W e al so d o not i m p l y t hat evi d ence o f drug 50 addi ct i on or s ubs t anc e a bus e wi l l al way s be r el eva nt mi t i gat i ng ev i dence an d out s i de t he s cope of t he s peci al i s s ues re g a rd le ss o f t h e sp e c ifi c e v id e n c e o f ad d ic tio n o r a b u se intro d u c e d b y the d e fen d a n t. 

## issues.” We, however , do find such pre cede nt. In Brewer , th e Sup re me Court did no t di sc us s 46 

## independe ntly

the def endant’ s evidenc e of dr

ugabuse, but found it to be among e videncethat operated as a

“‘two- edg ed sword’ beca use it tended to conf

irm the State’s evide nce of future dang erousne ss as well as to lessen his c ulpability for the c rime.” Simi larly , in Martinez v. 47 

## Sta te , we d i d

n o td i s cu s s i n d ep en d en t l y th e d ef en d an t ’s ev i d en ce o f a l co h o l ab u s e s i n ce th e a ge 48 

## of thirteen, but f

ound it to be amongevidenc e that did not neg ate the spe cial issues and provided “an e x planation for his be havior that might reduc e his moral culpa bility .” 49 

## In light of Bre we r and Martinez , we f ind that the applicant’ s evidenc e of a sever e drug addiction that was suppor ted by proce eds fr om violent crime is both releva nt and outside the
sc op e of thesp e c ia l is su e s. Th e e vid e nc e te nd s lo g ic a lly to s ho w that th e a

pp lic ant’ s a

bil ity to exercise mora l judgment ( as compa red to his ability

to exercise contr ol of his conduct) w as ov e rc omeby

his se ve redr

uga dd ic tio n. A f

a c t- fi nd e r c ou ld r e a so na

bly de e m th is c ir c ums tanc e to have mitig atingvalue. While it did not di sprove de liberate ness or futur e dang erousne ss, it was an explanation for his behavior that might re duce his mora l culpability
. The trial c ourt there fore 50


## err ed in fa iling to provide the jury a constitutionally

adequate vehicleby

which to fully

consider and g ive ef

fec t to the evidence
.Roy Gene Sm i t h - 14

Lar oyc e Sm i t h v
. Te xas , 5 5 0 U
. S. 29 7 , 31 3
- 1 4 (20 0 7 ) ( La royce Sm i t h II ) (fin d ing c o n stitutio n a l er ro r in 51 t he special i ss ues and error preserved up o n ob ject i o n t o t he special i ss ues, de spi t e l ack o f ob ject i o n t o t he nul l i f i cat i o n i nst ruct i o n). T EX . C O D E C R IM . P R OC . a rt. 3 6 .1 9 ; Ex p a rte L a ro y c e S m ith , 185 S. W
. 3d 455, 463- 64 ( T ex . Cr
. App. 52 2 0 0 6 ), rev’d o n other gro u n ds by La royce Sm i t h II ; A lm a n za v . S ta te , 68 6 S.W
. 2 d 15 7 , 17 1 (T ex. C r. A p p . 19 8 5 ).

A l m a n za , 6 8 6 S .W .2 d , at 1 7 1 ; see a lso Ex p a rt e H a t h o rn , 29 6 S.W
. 3 d 57 0 , 57 2 (T ex. C r. A p p . 20 0 9 ) ( In 53 the c o n te x t o f P enr

y error, “ no rma l l y , an egregi o us harm s t and ard i s p rop er i n anal y zi ng un- o b ject ed
- t o charge e rr o r.” ); Ex p a rte L a ro y c e S m ith , 185 S. W
. 3d , at 463 ( “ T he A l m a n za s t an dar d a ppl i es bot h on di r ec t a ppea l a n d on t he revi ew o f

hab eas corp us ap p l i cat i o ns. ”). A l m a n za , 6 8 6 S .W .2 d , at 1 7 2 ; Ex p a rte L a ro y c e S m ith , 18 5 S.W
. 3 d , at 46 4 n. 2 3 (app l y i ng A l m a n za ). 54 R o y G e n e S m ith v . S ta te , N o. 71, 099, s l i p op. a t 2- 3. 55 

## IV. Har m The c onstitut ional error in this case w as in the fa ilure of the spe cial issues to provide a vehicle f or the jury

to consider the a

pplicant’s mitigating e vidence , rathe r than the f ailure of the nullification instruction to provide such a ve hicle. Despite this error in the spec ial issues, we 51 

## shall not gr ant re lief fr om the judgme nt unless the applicant de monstrates har m. I f the e rror

was 52 

## not objected to at tria l, we shall grant re lief only if “the e rror

is so egreg ious and cre ated suc h harm that [the applicant] ‘has not had a fair a nd impartial trial.’” Error cre atingegreg ious harm 53 

## is also describe d as er

ror that must “g o to the very basis of the c ase,”or “vitally aff ect [the defe ndant’s] defensive theory .” 54 

## In our 1993 opinion on direct a ppeal, wefound that the a pplicant had “ failed to makea contempora

neous objec tion to the court’s cha rg e.” In this subsequent writ application, the 55 

## applicant a

rgues that this finding r equire s ree x amination in light of Laroyce Sm ith II . The applicant a lleg es that bef

ore the trial, he objec ted to former Article 37.071 of

the Code of Criminal Proce dure a s “den[ying] the De fe nd ant p ro te c tio n f

ro m c ru e l and

unus ua l pu

nis hme nt, ” sp e c if

ic a lly be c a us e the statutorily

mandated spe cial issues did not allow jurors to answe r “the life orRoy Gene Sm i t h - 15

G r egg , 428 U
. S. , a t 169. 56 550 U
. S. , a t 313- 14. 57 

## death que stion;” the statute permitted the c ourt only to submit“these three (3) rathe r mea

ningle ss issues, affirmative answe rs to which re sult in a mandatory death se ntence .” When this moti on was c onsidered by the cour t as trial beg an, [the Ap pli c ant’ s] c ouns e l r e pe ate d th at “ thelang uag e of thestatut e is s o –

it w ou ld re qu ir e an a ff

ir mativ e ans we r t o a ll o f t

he iss ue s, ” a dd ingthat th is e ff e c t “ is a denial of dueproce ss in the 8 amendment, with re g ard to the de ath pena lty in a th 

## capital murde r ca se.” We will not overturn our pre vious finding. Theobjections cited by the applica

nt mention neither Penry I nor any

thing a bout the adequa cy

of the ve hicle by

which the jury

could consider and g ive ef

fec t to mit igating e vidence . Rather, the c ited objections cha lleng e the a dequac y of the specia l issues to satisfy

the principle that the jury ’s discre tion mustbe “suitably direc ted and limit ed so as to minimiz e the risk of wholly arbitra ry and ca pricious ac tion.” Laroyce Sm ith II 56 

## does not help the a

pplicant bec ause the defe ndant in that casedid object to the fa ilure of the specia l issues to allow consideration of miti g atingevidenc e. 57 

## Havingfailed to makea suff icient objection, the a

pplicant must demonstrate e greg ious harm. Consideringthe evidenc e introduce d and the a pplicant’s def

ensive theories at the punishment phase of his trial, wefind that the er ror did egreg iously

harm the a

pplicant. The applicant put significant e mphasis on miti g ation duringthe punishment phase. His e videnceof drugaddiction, pover

ty , and a c rime-ridden neighborhood wa s at the hea rt of his mitigation the or y . Wh ilewec ann ot s ay

wh at c re dib ili ty

or we ight t he juror s mi ght h ave g ive n it , s inc e it
we nt t o th e he art

of thea pp lic ant’ s d e fe ns ivethe or y , s uc h mi tig atin ge vid e nc e wa s n on e the le ss re le va nt a nd outsi de thesc op e of

thesp e c ia l is su e s. Th e re fo re , th e tria l c ourt wa s r e qu ir e d to provide a constitutionally

adequate vehiclefor the jur y to fully consider a

nd g ive ef

fec t to it. TheRoy Gene Sm i t h - 16

S e e Ex p a rte L a ro y c e S m ith , 1 8 5 S .W .3 d , at 4 6 4 n.2 3
. 58 H a v ing fo u n d tha t t h e A p p lica n t wa s e g re g io u sly ha rm e d , w e d e c line the A p p lica n t’s i n v itatio n to re v isit 59 the p ro p rie ty o f ha rm a n a lysis in the c o n te x t o f P en ry err o r. 

## trial court’ s failure to do so “[went] to the very basis of the c ase”and “vitally aff ecte d [the applicant’ s] defensive theor y” at the punishment phase, be causethe jury had no ade quate mea

ns 58 

## to a c t up on

thea pp lic ant’ s mi tig atio n th e or y , s uc h a s it

wa s. 59 

## Be causethere was c onstitut ional error in the punishment phase of the applica

nt’s trial by which he w as egreg iously harme d, we r emand this ca se to the trial cour t for new punishment pr oc e e din g s.

W o m a c k , J.

Deliver ed April 28, 2010. Publis h.