RENDERED: APRIL 26, 2018 

TO BE PUBLISHED 

2017-SC-000580-MR 

MIKI THOMPSON, ADMINISTRATRIX OF 

THE ESTATE OF KARA VANCE AND DARBY 

JANE VANCE, BY AND THROUGH HER 

GUARDIAN MIKI THOMPSON 

APPELLANTS 

v. 

ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS 

CASE NO. 2017-CA-001118 

PIKE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 13-CI-01349 

HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN (JUDGE, 

PIKE CIRCUIT COURT) 

AND 

APPELLEE 

TIMOTHY R. LAVENDER, D.O. AND 

PIKEVILLE DERMATOLOGY & COSMETIC 

CENTER,PSC 

REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON 

AFFIRMING 

The Court of Appeals denied Miki Thompson's petition for a writ 

prohibiting the trial court from enforcing discovery orders entered for 

inspection and discovery in a wrongful death and negligence action pending in 

the Pike Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals declined to issue the writ because 

Thompson failed to show irreparable injury without the writ or the existence of 

facts sufficient to justify issuance of a writ under the special-case exception. 

Accordingly, we affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 

Kara Vance committed suicide by hanging. Miki Thompson, 

Administratrix of the Estate of Kara Vance, and Darby Jane Vance, by and 

through her guardian, Miki Thompson, sued Timothy Lavender, D.O., and 

Pikeville Dermatology and Cosmetic Center, P.S.C., claiming that Lavender's 

negligent prescribing of the acne medicine, Accutane, caused Vance's suicide. 

Tho:i:npsoi:l resisted Lavender and Pikeville Dermatology's requests for . 

pretrial inspection of Vance's cellphone, computer, and social media account. 

The trial court entered three separate ·orders allowing inspection, which 

provided (1) inspection by a third-party specialist of Lavender and Pikeville 

Dermatology's choosing, (2) the information subject to inspection would be 

limited to a time limit of one year before Vance's suicide, and (3) a protective 

order limiting the use of information gleaned from the inspections. In the writ 

action that followed, the Court of Appeals declined to issue a writ prohibiting 

the trjal court from enforcing these orders. 

II. ANALYSIS. 

A writ is an extraordinary remedy that we apply with great caution. 

When ruling on a writ petition, we must first determine whether issuance of a 

writ is an available .remedy. Only if a writ is available will we then look to the 

merits of the petition to review the trial court's decision. The decision to issue a 

writ is entirely within this Court's discretion. 1 We have recognized two specific 

situations wher~ this type of relief is appropriate: 

i Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2004) (citations omitted). 

2 
[U]pon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about 

to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy 

through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the 

lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although 

within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by 

appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will 

result if petition is not granted.2 · 

. As the Court of Appeals noted, Thompson asserted the trial court 

proceed.ed erroneously within its jurisdiction. Thompson argues that the trial 

court's computer-inspection order fails to limit the parameter of topics to be 

searched, is overbroad with respect to the time period to be inspected and fails 

to provide an opportunity for review by Thompson's counsel or for Thompson to 

request an in-camera review of the potentially captured materials before 

delivery to Lavender and Pikeville Dermatology. Thompson also asserts that 

that the discovery order for Vance's Facebook account is inappropriate and 

makes other general objections. 

We agree with the Court of Appeals that complying with the trial court's 

orders will not lead to an irreparable injury for Thompson, so we must decline 

to exercise our supervisory power to interrupt the trial court.'s orderly process.3 

Thompson's assertion that our holding in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dickinson 

requires the trial judge to specify the relation of the premises to be inspected as 

it relates to personal property is meritless. 4 We believe the relevancy of the 

2 Id. at 10. 

3 National Gypsum Company v. Corns, 736 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Ky. 1987). 

4 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dickinson, 29 S.W.3d 796 (Ky. 2000). 

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requested discovery is self-evident because Thompson has placed Vance's 

mental state at issue by filing this claim. 

A. The Computer-Inspection Order Is Not Erroneous. 

As the Court of Appeals rightly acknowledged, an expedition for the 

discovery of irrelevant information may lead to a special-cases circumstance.s 

_/ . 

But that is not the case today. Civil Rule 26.02 provides "[p]arties may obtain 

. discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 

matter involved in the pending action ... It is not ground for objection that the 

information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the discovery sought appears 

to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."6 

And we construe discovery rules liberally. 7 

We find no reason to prohibit the inspection of Vance'~ GOmputer. 

Thompson has not asserted that the computer contains any privileged 

information. And coroner's testimony indicated that the way Vance killed 

herself suggested advanced understanding and planning. It is not 

unreasonable to believe that Vance may have used her computer or phone to 

• 

research the suicide method. We note that the· trial court provided sufficieri.t 

protective orders to protect against malicious use or dissemination of 

information captured. Accordingly, we find no error. 

s Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 811 (Ky. 2004). 

6 Kentucky Civil Rule 26.02. 

1 See Primm v. Issac 127 S.W.3d 630 (~y. 2004). 

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B. A One-Year Time Perio·d to Capture or Search is Not Overbroad! 

Thompson asserts that the period of discovery for one-year prior to 

Vance's suicide is overbroad. Thompson makes this argument citing no case 

law and does so in one paragraph. Thompson would have this Court limit the 

discovery to the 39 days of medical treatment, but for us to do so would 

circumvent the full and open discovery process that our rules allow. The record 

suggests that Vance had unstable personal relationships and mental health 

concerns before being prescribed Accutane. Limiting discovery to 39 days of 

medical treatment would be improper. The trial court's decision to allow 

discovery for one year before Vance's suicide was not improper. 

C. Thompson is not En,titled to Review Captured Information Before 

· Producing it to Lavender and Pikeville Dermatology.· 

The trial court order requires simultaneous sharing of information 

discovered via inspection of the computer, cell phone, and social media 

account. Thompson argues that she should be able to screen the information 

and create an objection long before the information is shared with Lavender 

and Pikeville Dermatology. But Thompson cites no case law or civil rule that 

would require the procedure she requests. And we are not aware of any civil 

rules or case law to support her assertion. As the Court of Appeals noted, r 

Thompson has been in possession of these materials since before the beginning 

of litigation and has had ample opportunity to do her own inspection. We find 

no error in the trial court's order. 

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D. The Trial Court's Social Media Order does not Satisfy the 

Requirements for a Writ. 

Thompson argues that the trial court's order granting Lavender and 

Pikeville Dermatology broad authority to review Vance's social media accounts 

satisfies the requirements for the issuance of a writ. We disagree. 

As the Court of Appeals noted, Thompson makes no claim of privilege to 

Vance's social media accounts. The argument appears to be that most of the 

information obtained will simply be irrelevant. Even if Thompson is ultimately 

correct, this does not warrant the issuance of a writ. 

As discussed earlier, Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 26.02 is a 

rule that is to be read liberally. To ensure a fair trial, one of the tenets of our 

current civil-justice system is that both parties must have access to evidence or 

information leading to evidence, allowing a full case to be brought to trial. The 

discovery order provides appropriate restraint as it pertains to irrelevant 

information. Not only did the trial court limit the discovery period to one year 

but also provided a protective order, ensuring all information is properly 

guarded. The protective order requires all information obtained be treated as 

"strictly confidential" and lists eleven separate restrictions on how the 

information collected may be used. In accordance with prior cases, we are 

confident that the trial court's protective order will sufficiently prevent any 

inappropriate use of irrelevant information obtained.a 

s See Edwards v. Hickman, 237 S.W.3d 183 (Ky. 2007). 

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III. CONCLUSION. 

We find that the trial court committed no error in its discovery orders. 

Further, after assessing the string of "general objections" by Thompson, we find 

that they are without merit. We affirm the Court of Appeals' denial of the writ. 

All sitting. All concur. 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: 

Herman Michael Lucas 

Carter & Lucas 

Honorable Eddy Coleman, Judge 

Pike Circuit Court 

COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST: TIMOTHY R. LAVENDER, D.O. 

AND PIKEVILLE DERMATOLOGY & COSMETIC CENTER: 

Clayton Lee Robinson 

Nicholas Edwards 

Robinson & Havens, PSC 

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