United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 30, 2020

Decided May 1, 2020

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1535

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANTHONETTE STROWDER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 17-CR-30120-NJR-01

Nancy J. Rosenstengel,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Anthonette Strowder pleaded guilty to several drug-possession and distribution 

charges, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and the district court declined to release her on bond 

before sentencing. Almost immediately afterward, she sought to withdraw the plea. The 

court denied her motion, stating that Strowder had “reacted impulsively” when she 

learned she would be detained, and later sentenced her to 240 months’ imprisonment. 

Strowder appeals, but counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to 

withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Strowder opposes counsel’s 

motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses 

potential issues that an appeal of this kind might involve. Because the analysis appears 

thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses and those in 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 19-1535 Page 2

Strowder’s response. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant 

the motion and dismiss the appeal. 

Having confirmed that Strowder wishes to contest her guilty plea, see United 

States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012), counsel first considers whether she 

could raise a nonfrivolous challenge to the validity of the plea colloquy, and correctly 

concludes that she could not. A transcript of the plea colloquy reflects that the district 

court substantially complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See Konczak, 

683 F.3d at 349. The court satisfied itself that Strowder was competent, that she 

understood the charges against her, and that she was pleading guilty of her own free 

will. The government provided a factual basis for the charges, and Strowder admitted 

that the government could prove the facts as stated. 

Counsel relatedly represents that Strowder wishes to argue that she should be 

allowed to have her guilty plea set aside for reasons that she had not presented to the 

district court—that the district court and others coerced her plea, and that she was 

actually innocent of the charges. To the extent that counsel proposes to raise additional 

arguments not included in Strowder’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea, our review 

of the plea colloquy and the voluntariness of the plea would be for plain error. United 

States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62–63 (2002); United States v. Dyer, 892 F.3d 910, 913–14 

(7th Cir. 2018).

We agree with counsel that such a challenge would be frivolous. A “defendant 

does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea before sentencing, although the 

court may allow him to do so if he has a fair and just reason for doing so.” United States 

v. Chavers, 515 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2008). As for coercion, counsel points to a 

statement by the prosecutor to the judge at sentencing over a “look[]” he had received 

from the previous judge (since retired)—who, Strowder presumably believes, meant to

encourage the government to offer a favorable plea deal to benefit the court. But 

however the government may have interpreted the “look,” this ambiguous statement

would be insufficient under plain-error review to reflect any impropriety on the court’s 

part in the plea discussions. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); see also United States v. 

O’Malley, 739 F.3d 1001, 1007–09 (7th Cir. 2014). Strowder also suggests that her family 

and lawyer coerced her plea, but there is no evidence of this—let alone evidence of her 

innocence—in the record. See United States v. Chavers, 515 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Counsel next concludes correctly that Strowder could not plausibly challenge her 

below-guidelines sentence. Her sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment (against a 

guidelines range of 360 months to life) did not exceed the statutory maximum penalties. 
No. 19-1535 Page 3

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii), (C). As for the guidelines calculations, counsel asks 

whether Strowder could challenge the denial of acceptance of responsibility, but 

counsel rightly reasons that Strowder cannot have it both ways when she now argues 

that she is innocent. See United States v. Lopinski, 240 F.3d 574, 575–76 (7th Cir. 2001). The 

court addressed her primary mitigating arguments concerning her age and medical 

condition. See United States v. Castaldi, 743 F.3d 589, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2014). And the court 

adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, focusing on her 

extensive criminal history, the harm her drug sales caused the community, and her 

continued sales even while on bond.

Counsel also correctly concludes that any challenges to her terms of supervised 

release would be frivolous. The district court imposed a within-guidelines term of five 

years of supervised release for the drug possession count and three years for the 

remaining counts. And Strowder waived any challenges to the conditions when she 

declined the court’s invitation to object to them, after already having reviewed them 

with her attorney before the hearing. See United States v. Anderson, 948 F.3d 910, 911–12 

(7th Cir. 2020). 

Counsel finally considers whether Strowder could raise a nonfrivolous challenge 

to the court’s reliance on the Special Sessions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 141(b)(1), to hold her 

sentencing hearing in the Western District of Tennessee rather than in the Southern 

District of Illinois. Owing to her physical size (Strowder was 5’1” tall and weighed 570 

pounds at sentencing) and her underlying medical conditions, the Western Tennessee 

Detention Facility was the nearest facility that could accommodate her. Recognizing the 

logistical difficulties in transporting Strowder to the Southern District, the court found

that there was no reasonably available location within the district to accommodate her 

special circumstances. So the district judge traveled to the facility in Tennessee to hold 

her sentencing hearing, with a live video feed back to the courtroom in the Southern 

District. Considering these detailed findings and the agreement between the 

government and defense counsel with regard to that arrangement, we agree with 

counsel that Strowder could not raise a nonfrivolous argument concerning the Act. 

Strowder raises two additional arguments but neither would be appropriate. 

First, she asserts that her previous counsel was ineffective, but this claim is better 

addressed in a collateral proceeding so that a more complete record could be 

developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003). Strowder also 

proposes challenging her sentence under the First Step Act on grounds that it bars 
No. 19-1535 Page 4

enhancements for certain prior convictions, see 21 U.S.C. § 851, but that challenge would 

be irrelevant because Strowder received no such enhancements. 

Strowder recently filed two motions with this court seeking compassionate 

release. But this relief cannot be granted by this court as an initial matter. She must 

present the request first to the Bureau of Prisons and then to the district court. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see also 28 C.F.R. § 571.61.

And to the extent Strowder seeks through either motion credit for any prior 

custody, she must similarly present the request first through administrative avenues 

and then to the district court. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992); see also 

United States v. Walker, 917 F.3d 989, 993–94 (7th Cir. 2019). 

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.