PLAINTIFF DAVIS’ ANSWER TO DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

ALEXANDRA DAVIS,

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

VS.

JERRAL W. JONES, DALLAS COWBOYS 

FOOTBALL CLUB, LTD., JAMES 

WILKINSON, TRAILRUNNER 

INTERNATIONAL, LLC, and DONALD JACK, 

JR.

Defendants,

VS.

CYNTHIA DAVIS-SPENCER

Third-Party Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:23-CV-00032-RWS

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PLAINTIFF DAVIS’ ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 

TO DEFENDANT JONES’ COUNTERCLAIM

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW, Alexandra Davis, Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant (“Davis”), and files this 

her Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Defendant Jerral W. Jones’ (“Jones”) Counterclaims 

Against Plaintiff Alexandra Davis and Third-Party Complaint Against Cynthia Davis-Spencer (the 

“Counterclaim”) and would respectfully show the Court the following:

1. Davis denies the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the Counterclaim.

2. Davis denies the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the Counterclaim.

3. Davis admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the Counterclaim.

4. Davis admits the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the Counterclaim.

5. Davis admits the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the Counterclaim.
PLAINTIFF DAVIS’ ANSWER TO DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM 2

6. Davis admits the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the Counterclaim.

7. Davis admits the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the Counterclaim.

8. Davis admits the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Counterclaim.

9. Davis is without actual knowledge or information sufficient upon which to base a 

reasonable belief as to the accuracy of the allegations in paragraph 9 and, therefore, Davis is 

unable to admit or deny the allegations at this time. 

10. Davis is without actual knowledge or information sufficient upon which to base a 

reasonable belief as to the accuracy of the allegations in paragraph 10 and, therefore, Davis is 

unable to admit or deny the allegations at this time. 

11. Davis is without actual knowledge or information sufficient upon which to base a 

reasonable belief as to the accuracy of the allegations in paragraph 11 and, therefore, Davis is 

unable to admit or deny the allegations at this time. 

12. Davis is without actual knowledge or information sufficient upon which to base a 

reasonable belief as to the accuracy of the allegations in paragraph 12 and, therefore, Davis is 

unable to admit or deny the allegations at this time. 

13. Davis denies the allegations in paragraph 13 of the Counterclaim.

14. Davis is without actual knowledge or information sufficient upon which to base a 

reasonable belief as to the accuracy of the allegations in paragraph 14 and, therefore, Davis is 

unable to admit or deny the allegations at this time. 

15. Davis admits the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Counterclaim that the Settlement 

Agreement1established two trusts- the Funding Trust and the Distribution Trust (collectively the 

1 The term “Settlement Agreement” as used in this Answer refers specifically to the Settlement, Release, and Covenant 

Not to Sue Agreement that Jones alleges Davis and Defendant Davis-Spencer breached. Jones refers to that document 

as “Settlement Agreement” in the Counterclaim, and, for the convenience of the Court, Davis also uses the term in 
PLAINTIFF DAVIS’ ANSWER TO DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM 3

“Trusts”). Davis admits that the Funding Trust provided monthly, annual, and special contributions 

to the Distribution Trust. Davis denies the allegation in paragraph 15 of the Counterclaim that the 

Distribution Trust provided the same payment and funding to Davis from childhood until she 

attained the age of 21 years of age. Davis admits that there were also distribution payments of the 

Trust to be paid upon Davis attaining the ages of 24, 26, and 28. Davis denies the remaining 

allegations in paragraph 15 of the Counterclaim.

16. Davis denies the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Counterclaim.

17. Davis denies the allegations in paragraph 17 of the Counterclaim.

18. Davis admits the language quoted from the Settlement Agreement in paragraph 18 is 

language from the Settlement Agreement. Davis denies the remaining allegations in paragraph 18 

of the Counterclaim. 

19. Davis admits the Settlement Agreement also included the language that is quoted in 

paragraph 19. To the extent, Jones references that there was a “confidentiality obligation whereby 

the parties promised to refrain from disclosing the facts and terms of the settlement,” Davis denies 

that she was a party to the Settlement Agreement or that she had any obligation under the 

Settlement Agreement. Davis denies the remaining allegations in paragraph 19 of the 

Counterclaim.

20. Davis denies the allegations in paragraph 20 of the Counterclaim.

21. Davis denies the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Counterclaim.

22. Davis denies the allegations in paragraph 22 of the Counterclaim.

23. Davis admits the allegation in paragraph 23 of the Counterclaim that she filed a declaratory 

action against Jones that sought to declare that she was not bound to a settlement agreement that 

reference to the same document. For the Court’s reference, Davis refers to the “Settlement Agreement” as the 

“Settlement Documents,” in her Original Complaint. See Docket No. 1, p. 4, ¶ 18.
PLAINTIFF DAVIS’ ANSWER TO DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM 4

was entered into when she was one-year old without court approval. Davis denies the remaining 

allegations in paragraph 23 of the Counterclaim.

24. Davis admits that she dismissed the declaratory action.2 Davis denies the remaining 

allegations in paragraph 24 of the Counterclaim.

25. Davis admits the allegation in paragraph 25 that Davis then filed a Parentage Action against 

Jones to establish the parent-child relationship. Davis denies the remaining allegations in 

paragraph 25 of the Counterclaim.

26. Davis admits the allegation in paragraph 26 of the Counterclaim that Cynthia DavisSpencer provided an affidavit to Davis during the Parentage Action.

3 Davis denies the remainder 

of the allegations in paragraph 26 of the Counterclaim.

27. Davis admits the allegation in paragraph 27 of the Counterclaim that she filed the instant 

action in March 2023. Davis denies the remaining allegations in paragraph 27 of the Counterclaim.

28. Davis reincorporates her responses to all the preceding allegations.

29. Davis denies the allegations in paragraph 29 of the Counterclaim.

30. Davis denies the allegations in paragraph 30 of the Counterclaim.

31. Davis denies the allegations in paragraph 31 of the Counterclaim.

32. Davis denies the allegations in paragraph 32 of the Counterclaim.

33. Davis reincorporates her responses to all the preceding allegations.

34. Davis denies the allegations contained in paragraph 34 of the Counterclaim.

2 For the convenience of the Court, Davis notes the declaratory action referenced above is referred to as the 

“Lawsuit” in Plaintiff’s Original Complaint and the “First Lawsuit,” in Jones’ Counterclaim. 

3 The “Parentage Action” discussed above is also referred to as the “Second Lawsuit,” in Jones’ Counterclaim. 
PLAINTIFF DAVIS’ ANSWER TO DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM 5

35. Davis admits the allegation in paragraph 35 that Jones is seeking a declaration by the Court. 

Davis denies that Jones is entitled to any such relief and denies any remaining allegations contained 

in paragraph 35 of the Counterclaim.

36. Davis is without actual knowledge or information sufficient upon which to base a 

reasonable belief as to the accuracy of the allegations in paragraphs 36-43 of the Counterclaim

as the paragraphs do not relate to claims against her; therefore, Davis is not able to admit or deny

the allegations in paragraphs 36-43 of the Counterclaim.

37. Davis admits the allegation contained in paragraph 44 of the Counterclaim that Jones is 

seeking costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees, but she denies that Jones is entitled to such relief.

38. Davis admits the allegation contained in paragraph 45 of the Counterclaim that Jones is 

seeking costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees, but she denies that Jones is entitled to such relief.

39. Davis denies the allegations contained in paragraph 46 of the Counterclaim.

40. Davis admits the allegation contained in paragraph 47 of the Counterclaim and concurs in 

the demand for a jury trial.

41. Davis denies all allegations not specifically admitted herein. 

42. Davis denies that Jones is entitled to any of the relief prayed for in the Counterclaim.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

43. Davis affirmatively asserts that she was a minor at the time the Settlement Agreement was 

entered into by Jones and her mother, Cynthia Davis-Spencer. There was neither an ad litem

appointed to protect Davis’ interest, nor was there any review by a court of the Settlement 

Agreement to ensure Davis’ interests were protected. Therefore, the Settlement Agreement is not 

enforceable against Davis, who did not have the capacity, at one-year of age, to enter into a 

contract.
PLAINTIFF DAVIS’ ANSWER TO DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM 6

44. Davis affirmatively asserts that she is excused from performance of the confidentiality 

provisions of the Settlement Agreement as Jones materially breached the confidentiality provisions

prior to any alleged breach by Davis, thereby, excusing any performance by Davis.

45. Davis affirmatively asserts that the Settlement Agreement was against public policy. It is 

the public policy to establish parentage for any child. It is against public policy to allow a biological 

father to avoid his parentage through the entering of a “hush money” agreement with the child’s 

mother. Furthermore, it is against public policy for a biological father to be allowed to buy his way 

out of parentage. Public policy is always “in the best interest of the child” and not “in the best 

interest of the parent” as Jones seeks. Therefore, the confidentiality clause that Jones seeks to 

enforce against Davis is against public policy. 

46. Davis affirmatively asserts there was fraud by Jones in the inducement of the Settlement 

Agreement. Jones knew at the time that he entered into the Settlement Agreement that entering 

into a contract which attempted to bind a one-year-old minor—without having an ad litem

appointed to protect the minor’s interests or having a court approve the agreement—was not 

enforceable. 

47. Davis affirmatively asserts the doctrine of unclean hands. Jones attempts to enforce a 

confidentiality clause against Davis, which is contained in an agreement entered into when Davis 

was one-year old. Jones, rather than providing for someone to protect Davis’ interests, chose to 

enter into a secret agreement with Davis’ mother, to protect his own interests in keeping his 

paternity out of the public forum.

48. Davis affirmatively asserts that Jones is not entitled to court costs, attorneys’ fees, or other 

expenses under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”). The Fifth Circuit has ruled that 
PLAINTIFF DAVIS’ ANSWER TO DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM 7

the TCPA does not apply to diversity cases in federal court. See Klocke v. Watson, 936 F. 3d 240, 

242 (5th Cir. 2019).

49. Davis reserves the right to raise all affirmative defenses available to her under the Texas 

Rules of Civil Procedure, Texas law, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal law, the Rules 

of this Court, or otherwise in law or equity, whether now existing or arising later, as may be 

discovered throughout litigation. 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Davis prays that on final trial of this matter 

that Defendant Jerral W. Jones take nothing on his counterclaim against Davis, that Davis be 

awarded costs of court including attorney’s fees, and such other and further relief for which Davis

may be entitled. 

Respectfully submitted,

_/s/ Matt Keil____________ _/s/ Jay K. Gray_______

KEIL LAW FIRM, PLLC BERGMANGRAY LLP

Matt Keil Jay K. Gray

State Bar No. 11181750 State Bar No. 08324050

Erin Keil Andrew A. Bergman

State Bar No. 24120462 State Bar No. 02196300

Hailee Amox 4514 Travis Street

State Bar No. 24085176 Travis Walk, Suite 300

406 Walnut Street Dallas, Texas 75205

Texarkana, Arkansas 71854 214-528-2444 

870-772-4113 214-599-0602 [fax]

870-773-2967 [fax] gray@bergmangray.com

mkeil@kglawfirm.com bergman@bergmangray.com

ekeil@kglaqwfirm.com LEAD COUNSEL 

hamox@kglawfirm.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DAVIS AND COUNTER-DEFENDANT ALEXANDRA DAVIS
PLAINTIFF DAVIS’ ANSWER TO DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM 8