UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

DANTE LIZALDE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 19-cv-0956 (KBJ)

)

MARTIN G. GOLDBERG, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In 1998, a jury found plaintiff Dante Lizalde guilty of conspiring to distribute 

and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, conspiring to import cocaine, and 

aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute; as a result of 

these convictions, Lizalde was sentenced to three concurrent terms of 292 months of 

imprisonment. See Lizalde v. United States, No. 07-cv-5082, 2007 WL 4373287, at *1 

(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007). Lizalde’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, United 

States v. Lizalde, 38 F. App’x 657 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1059 (2002), 

and his motions seeking collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 were denied. See 

Lizalde, 2007 WL 4373287, at *1–2; Lizalde v. United States, Nos. 13-3038, 13-4390

(2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2013).

1

Proceeding pro se, Lizalde has filed the instant Complaint against Attorney 

General William Barr and President Donald Trump, as well as three of the attorneys 

 1

 According to records from the Federal Bureau of Prisons that are available online, Lizalde is 

currently incarcerated at FCI Victorville and is scheduled to be released on December 26, 2019.
2

who represented him in his prior criminal proceedings (collectively, “Defendants”). 

(See Compl., ECF No. 1.) See also United States v. Lizalde, No. 97-cr-0649-12

(E.D.N.Y.).

2

 Lizalde alleges that, during the course of his trial, his defense attorneys 

and the government conspired to “drag[] him to a court’s hearing where he was 

compelled to be a witness against himself” (Compl. at 1), and that jury’s verdict is 

“NULL AND VOID” because the jury “never found Lizalde guilty of the drug type nor 

the drug amount” (id. at 2; see also id. at 4 (asserting that “[t]he government, in 

conspiracy with Lizalde’s attorney[s], kept Lizalde under slavery for almost 20 years,

without any remedy”)). Lizalde further asserts that Defendants have violated his 

constitutional rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (See id. at 4.) As 

a remedy for these alleged violations, Lizalde seeks an award of compensatory and 

punitive damages. (See id. at 5.)

Upon sua sponte review of Lizalde’s complaint, this Court has determined that 

the pleading is subject to dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 

12(b)(6), for the reasons stated below.

I.

“Ordinarily, the sufficiency of a complaint is tested by a motion brought under 

Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim” upon which 

relief can be granted. Bauer v. Marmara, 942 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing 

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). “However, if the complaint’s failure to 

state a claim for the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is patent, it is practical and fully 

consistent with plaintiffs’ rights and the efficient use of judicial resources for the court 

 2 The defendant attorneys are Martin G. Goldberg, Richard B. Lind, and Marcia Shein.
3

to act on its own initiative and dismiss the action.” Shaw v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 

LLC, No. 14-cv-2203, 2015 WL 4932204, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2015) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, under Rule 8(a), a court may

dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility 

“is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility 

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The plausibility standard is satisfied “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted).

That said, it is well established that pro se pleadings are entitled to liberal 

interpretation. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). “However, this 

consideration does not constitute a license for a plaintiff filing pro se to ignore the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the Court to decide what claims a plaintiff 

may or may not want to assert.” Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). 

Indeed, district courts have discretion to dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s complaint sua 

sponte where there is simply “no factual or legal basis for alleged wrongdoing by 

defendants,” such that it is “‘patently obvious’ that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the 

facts alleged in the complaint.” Perry v. Discover Bank, 514 F. Supp. 2d 94, 95 

(D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 726–27 

(D.C. Cir. 1990)).

II.
4

Turning first to Lizalde’s claim for damages under the United Nations Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights, this Court finds that it is patently obvious that this claim 

fails as a matter of law because “[t]his declaration is merely a nonbinding resolution, 

not a treaty. It is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal 

obligation.” Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1406 (D.D.C. 

1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff’d sub nom. Haitian Refugee 

Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “It is plain, therefore, that this 

declaration provides no right of action for the plaintiff[].” Id.; see also Ficken v. Rice, 

No. 04-cv-1132, 2006 WL 123931, at *5–6 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2006) (dismissing claims 

seeking damages based on violation of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 

because “[t]hough the U.N. Declaration may be considered evidence of customary 

international law, it is not legally binding or self-executing” (citation omitted)). 

With respect to Lizalde’s demand for monetary damages from the Attorney 

General and the President for purported violations of his constitutional rights stemming 

from his allegedly invalid trial and convictions, this Court finds that any such claim—

whether viewed as a claim for individual capacity damages under Bivens v. Six 

Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or an 

official capacity damages claim—necessarily fails under the Supreme Court’s ruling in 

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). In Heck v. Humphrey, the plaintiff 

brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prosecutors and police investigators 

involved in his criminal prosecution, alleging that the prosecutors and police had 

engaged in unlawful conduct that led to his arrest and unconstitutional conviction. 512 

U.S. at 479. The Supreme Court noted that “the hoary principle that civil tort actions 
5

are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal 

judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to 

prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement[.]” Id. at 486. And the Court 

specifically held that

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by 

actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or 

sentence invalid, a . . . plaintiff must prove that the conviction 

or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal 

authorized to make such determination, or called into question 

by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.] 

Id. at 486–87 (footnote omitted); see also Williams v. Hill, 74 F.3d 1339, 1340–41 

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (applying the rule announced in Heck to Bivens actions). 

Accordingly, when faced with a civil action against a federal defendant related to a 

prior criminal proceeding, “the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor 

of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it 

would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the 

conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

Here, Lizalde’s constitutional claims necessarily implicate the validity of his 

convictions and sentence, and he does not plead in his complaint that his convictions or 

sentence have been reversed or otherwise invalidated. Therefore, consistent with 

binding Supreme Court precedent, his constitutional claims for damages against the 

President and the Attorney General necessarily fail. See, e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 699 

F. Supp. 2d 159, 171 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Johnson v. Fenty, No. 10-5105, 

2010 WL 4340344 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 2010); Jones v. Yanta, No. 07-1172, 2008 WL 
6

2202219, at *1 (D.D.C. May 27, 2008).

Finally, with respect to Lizalde’s claims against his three former defense counsel 

for alleged constitutional violations, it is clear that “[t]here can be no violation of the 

Constitution without governmental action. . . and governmental action requires that the 

party charged with the deprivation must be a person or entity who may fairly be said to 

be a governmental actor.” Woytowicz v. George Washington Univ., 327 F. Supp. 3d 

105, 115 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted); see 

also Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999). And the law is 

likewise clear that that criminal defense attorneys, regardless of whether they are 

retained counsel, public defenders, or court-appointed, are not governmental actors for 

purposes of constitutional claims. See Hinton v. Rudasill, 624 F. Supp. 2d 48, 50 n.2 

(D.D.C. 2009) (citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)). Thus, Lizalde’s 

damages claims against Goldberg, Lind, and Shein must be dismissed as well.

III.

For the reasons explained above, this Court will dismiss Lizalde’s complaint 

under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6) sua sponte. A separate, final 

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

DATE: May 7, 2019 Ketanji Brown Jackson

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON

United States District Judge