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[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1835 Introduced in House (IH)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1835

   To impose conditions on assistance authorized for North Korea, to 
impose restrictions on nuclear cooperation and other transactions with 
                  North Korea, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 18, 1999

 Mr. Gilman (for himself, Mr. Brown of Ohio, Mr. Cox, Mr. Kasich, Mr. 
 Knollenberg, Mr. Sanford, and Mr. McIntosh) introduced the following 
  bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To impose conditions on assistance authorized for North Korea, to 
impose restrictions on nuclear cooperation and other transactions with 
                  North Korea, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 
1999''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Under the Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994, the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) committed 
        to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear program, in 
        exchange for annual deliveries of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel 
        oil, and the construction of two 1,000 megawatt light water 
        nuclear power reactors costing approximately $5,000,000,000.
            (2) The discovery of an apparent underground nuclear-
        related facility at Kumchang-ri, North Korea brought into 
        question North Korea's commitment to abide by the conditions of 
        the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework.
            (3) North Korea's ongoing development, production, testing, 
        deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles presents a 
        clear and present danger to forward-deployed United States 
        Armed Forces in Asia, United States friends and allies, and the 
        United States.
            (4) North Korea has become the largest recipient of United 
        States foreign assistance in East Asia, valued at over 
        $225,000,000 in 1998 alone.
            (5) North Korea is a major producer of opium and 
        increasingly is involved in illicit narcotics trafficking.

SEC. 3. ASSISTANCE FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
              ORGANIZATION.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
            (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated for 
        fiscal year 2000 $55,000,000 for assistance to the Korean 
        Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).
            (2) Additional requirement.--Assistance under paragraph (1) 
        may be provided notwithstanding any other provision of law 
        (other than subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this 
        section).
    (b) Prohibition on Assistance to Nuclear Reactor Construction.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds 
authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), or made available 
under any other provision of law, may be used to assist the 
construction of nuclear reactors in North Korea.
    (c) Conditions for Release of Funds.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by 
subsection (a), or made available under any other provision of law, may 
be made available to KEDO, or for assistance to North Korea for 
purposes related to the Agreed Framework, until the President 
determines and reports to the Committees on International Relations and 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committees on 
Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate that--
            (1) the parties to the Agreed Framework have taken and 
        continue to take demonstrable steps to implement the Joint 
        Declaration on Denuclearization in which the Government of 
        North Korea has committed not to test, manufacture, produce, 
        receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons, and 
        not to possess nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment 
        facilities;
            (2) the parties to the Agreed Framework have taken and 
        continue to take demonstrable steps to pursue the North-South 
        dialogue;
            (3) North Korea is complying with all provisions of the 
        Agreed Framework;
            (4) the effort to can and safely store all spent fuel from 
        North Korea's graphite-moderated nuclear reactors has been 
        successfully concluded;
            (5) North Korea has not diverted assistance provided by the 
        United States for purposes for which it was not intended;
            (6) the United States has reached agreement with North 
        Korea satisfying United States concerns regarding suspect 
underground construction, and North Korea has complied with its 
obligations under that agreement;
            (7) North Korea is not seeking to develop or acquire the 
        capability to enrich uranium, or any additional capability to 
        reprocess spent nuclear fuel; and
            (8) the United States has made and is continuing to make 
        significant progress on eliminating the North Korean ballistic 
        missile threat, including its ballistic missile exports.
    (d) Withholding of Funds Pending Solicitation of All Potential 
Donor Governments to KEDO.--Amounts appropriated in excess of 
$35,000,000 pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under 
subsection (a) may not be made available to KEDO until the President 
determines and reports to the Committees on International Relations and 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committees on 
Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate that--
            (1) the United States has asked all potential donor 
        governments, including Taiwan, to contribute to KEDO;
            (2) no contributions offered unconditionally by such 
        governments to KEDO have been declined; and
            (3) even after such contributions are received, KEDO will 
        have financial requirements in fiscal year 2000 that can only 
        be met by the provision of more than $35,000,000 in assistance 
        from the United States.
    (e) Limitation on Use of Special Authorities.--The authority of 
section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2364) may 
not be used to authorize the provision of assistance that cannot be 
provided due to any prohibition, restriction, or condition on release 
of funds that is contained in subsection (b), (c), or (d).

SEC. 4. FOOD ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds 
authorized to be appropriated by section 3(a), or made available under 
any other provision of law, may be made available for food assistance 
for North Korea until the President determines and reports to the 
Committees on International Relations and Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and 
Appropriations of the Senate that--
            (1) the Government of the Republic of Korea concurs in the 
        delivery and procedures for delivery of United States food 
        assistance to North Korea;
            (2) previous United States food assistance to North Korea 
        has not been significantly diverted to military use;
            (3) North Korean military stocks have been expended to 
        respond to unmet food aid needs in North Korea;
            (4) the United Nations World Food Program or other private 
        voluntary organizations registered with the United States 
        Agency for International Development have been permitted to 
        take and have taken all reasonable steps to ensure that food 
        deliveries will not be diverted from intended recipients, 
        including unannounced, unscheduled, and unsupervised visits to 
        recipient institutions and farmers' markets by Korean-speaking 
        monitors affiliated with the United Nations World Food Program 
        or other private voluntary organizations registered with the 
        United States Agency for International Development; and
            (5) the United States Government has directly, and 
        indirectly through appropriate international organizations, 
        encouraged North Korea to initiate fundamental structural 
        reforms of its agricultural sector.

SEC. 5. RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH NORTH KOREA.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any 
international agreement, no agreement for cooperation (as defined in 
sec. 11 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.)) 
between the United States and North Korea may become effective, no 
license may be issued for export directly or indirectly to North Korea 
of any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, 
services, or technology that would be subject to such agreement, and no 
approval may be given for the transfer or retransfer directly or 
indirectly to North Korea of any nuclear material, facilities, 
components, or other goods, services, or technology that would be 
subject to such agreement, until--
            (1) the President determines and reports to the Committee 
        on International Relations of the House of Representatives and 
        the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that--
                    (A) North Korea has come into full compliance with 
                its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), 
                and has taken all steps that have been deemed necessary 
                by the IAEA in this regard;
                    (B) North Korea has permitted the IAEA full access 
                to all additional sites and all information (including 
                historical records) deemed necessary by the IAEA to 
                verify the accuracy and completeness of North Korea's 
                initial report of May 4, 1992, to the IAEA on all 
                nuclear sites and material in North Korea;
                    (C) North Korea is in full compliance with its 
                obligations under the Agreed Framework;
                    (D) North Korea is in full compliance with its 
                obligations under the Joint Declaration on 
                Denuclearization;
                    (E) North Korea does not have the capability to 
                enrich uranium, and is not seeking to acquire or 
                develop such capability, or any additional capability 
                to reprocess spent nuclear fuel;
                    (F) North Korea has terminated its nuclear weapons 
                program, including all efforts to acquire, develop, 
                test, produce, or deploy such weapons; and
                    (G) the transfer to North Korea of key nuclear 
                components, under the proposed agreement for 
                cooperation with North Korea and in accordance with the 
                Agreed Framework, is in the national interest of the 
                United States; and
            (2) there is enacted a joint resolution stating in 
        substance that the Congress concurs in the determination and 
        report of the President submitted pursuant to paragraph (1).
    (b) Construction.--The restrictions contained in subsection (a) 
shall apply in addition to all other applicable procedures, 
requirements, and restrictions contained in the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 and other laws.

SEC. 6. CONTINUATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSACTIONS WITH NORTH KOREA 
              PENDING PROGRESS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE ISSUES.

    (a) Continuation of Restrictions.--
            (1) Continuation of restrictions.--All prohibitions and 
        restrictions on transactions and activities with North Korea 
        imposed under section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act 
        (as in effect on July 1, 1977), as set forth in part 500 of 
        title 31, Code of Federal Regulations as in effect on April 1, 
        1999, shall remain in effect until the President submits the 
        determination and report described in subsection (b), and--
                    (A) the authority of section 501.803 of title 31, 
                Code of Federal Regulations (relating to the authority 
                to modify chapter V of title 31, Code of Federal 
                Regulations) and other provisions of law may not be 
                used to modify such prohibitions and restrictions, as 
                in effect on such date, and
                    (B) no prohibition or restriction on transactions 
                or activities set forth in subpart B of part 500 of 
                title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on 
                April 1, 1999, may be authorized after that date, other 
                than those transactions and activities specifically 
                authorized under subpart E of such part,
        until such determination and report are so submitted.
            (2) Revocation of prior modifications and authorizations.--
        Any modification otherwise prohibited under paragraph (1)(A) 
        that is made after April 1, 1999, and before the date of 
        enactment of this Act, and any authorization granted after 
        April 1, 1999, and before the date of enactment of this Act, 
        for a transaction or activity otherwise prohibited under 
        paragraph (1)(B), shall be revoked as of such date of 
        enactment.
    (b) Termination of Restrictions.--The determination and report 
referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by the President, 
reported to the Committee on International Relations of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, 
that--
            (1) North Korea has agreed to institute a total ban on 
        exports of missiles, missile components, and missile 
        technology;
            (2) there is no credible evidence that North Korea has, 
        during the 1-year period prior to the date of the President's 
        determination, exported missiles, missile components, or 
        missile technology;
            (3) North Korea has terminated its long-range missile 
        program, including all efforts to acquire, develop, test, 
        produce, or deploy such missiles;
            (4) North Korea is in full compliance with its obligations 
        under the Agreed Framework;
            (5) North Korea is in full compliance with its obligations 
        under the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization;
            (6) North Korea does not have the capability to enrich 
        uranium, and is not seeking to acquire or develop such 
        capability, or any additional capability to reprocess spent 
        nuclear fuel; and
            (7) North Korea has terminated its nuclear weapons program, 
        including all efforts to acquire, develop, test, produce, or 
        deploy such weapons; and
    (c) Reimposition of Restrictions.--Should the President become 
aware of information establishing that North Korea--
            (1) has exported missiles, missile components, or missile 
        technology,
            (2) is seeking to acquire, develop, test, produce, or 
        deploy long-range missiles,
            (3) is not in full compliance with its obligations under 
        the Agreed Framework or the Joint Declaration on 
        Denuclearization,
            (4) has the capability to enrich uranium or is seeking to 
        acquire or develop such capability, or additional capability to 
        reprocess spent nuclear fuel, or
            (5) is seeking to acquire, develop, test, produce, or 
        deploy nuclear weapons,
then the requirements of subsection (a) shall be reimposed 
notwithstanding any determination and report submitted under subsection 
(b).

SEC. 7. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

    (a) Policy of the United States.--It shall be the policy of the 
United States to work with friendly governments in the Asia-Pacific 
region to develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses capable of 
countering ballistic missile threats in the region.
    (b) Joint Early Warning System.--Of the funds appropriated to carry 
out the provisions of section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act for 
fiscal year 2000, up to $10,000,000 is authorized to be made available 
to support the establishment of a joint early warning system in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Such system shall have as its purpose the 
continuous sharing of information on missile launches detected by the 
governments participating in the system, and may include the 
establishment by such governments of a joint early warning center.

SEC. 8. REFUGEES FROM NORTH KOREA.

    (a) Policy of the United States.--It shall be the policy of the 
United States to oppose the involuntary return of North Korean refugees 
to North Korea, to support the provision of international assistance to 
such refugees in the People's Republic of China and other countries of 
asylum, and to facilitate the resettlement of such refugees in South 
Korea and other neighboring countries.
    (b) Authorization of Assistance for Refugees From North Korea.--Of 
the funds appropriated for ``Migration and Refugee Assistance'' for 
fiscal year 2000, up to $30,000,000 is authorized to be made available 
for assistance to North Korean refugees in the People's Republic of 
China and other countries of asylum, and to support the resettlement of 
such refugees in South Korea and other neighboring countries.

SEC. 9. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

    Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
President shall submit to the Committees on International Relations and 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committees on 
Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate a report on the 
following:
            (1) The projected total cost of the two 1000 MW(e) light 
        water nuclear reactors that are to be constructed in North 
        Korea pursuant to the Agreed Framework, the portion of this 
        total cost that South Korea and Japan have committed to pay, 
        the potential sources of funding for the portion of this total 
        cost that South Korea and Japan have not committed to pay, and 
        the maximum portion of this total cost, if any, that the 
        President anticipates will be paid by the United States.
            (2) Of the projected total cost identified in response to 
        paragraph (1), the portion of this cost that North Korea will 
        be obligated to repay, the likely terms upon which such 
        repayment will be required, and the possible sources of revenue 
        from which such repayment will be made.
            (3) The degree to which North Korea's electrical power 
        distribution network will have to be upgraded in order to 
        distribute the electrical power that will be generated by the 
        two 1000 MW(e) light water nuclear reactors that are to be 
        constructed in North Korea pursuant to the Agreed Framework, 
        the projected cost of such upgrades, and the possible sources 
        of funding for such upgrades.
            (4) The advantages to North Korea of building non-nuclear 
        power plants rather than light water nuclear power plants, 
        including--
                    (A) the cost saving that could be realized by 
                building non-nuclear electric power plants with a total 
                generation capacity of 2000 MW(e) rather than two light 
                water nuclear power plants with that same capacity;
                    (B) the projected date by which non-nuclear 
                electric power plants with a total generation capacity 
                of 2000 MW(e) could be completed, compared with the 
                projected date by which two light water nuclear power 
                plants with that same capacity will be completed; and
                    (C) the advantages for electric power distribution 
                that could be realized by building a number of non-
                nuclear electric power plants with a total generation 
                capacity of 2000 MW(e) rather than two light water 
                nuclear power plants with that same capacity.

SEC. 10. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Agreed framework.--The term ``Agreed Framework'' means 
        the ``Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and 
        the Democratic People's Republic of Korea'', signed in Geneva 
        on October 21, 1994, and the Confidential Minute to that 
        Agreement.
            (2) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency.
            (3) KEDO.--The term ``KEDO'' means the Korean Peninsula 
        Energy Development Organization.
            (4) North korea.--The term ``North Korea'' means the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
            (5) Long range missile.--The term ``long range missile'' 
        means a missile with a range of 1000 kilometers or more.
            (6) Joint declaration on denuclearization.--The term 
        ``Joint Declaration on Denuclearization'' means the Joint 
        Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 
        signed by the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea on January 1, 1992.
                                 <all>
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