J-S25038-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.S.V., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.R., MOTHER

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 44 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 5, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 79 AD 2018

IN RE: ADOPTION OF N.A.V., JR., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.R., MOTHER

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 45 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 5, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 78 AD 2018

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2019

D.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the Decrees granting the Petitions filed by 

D.B.R. and H.N.R. (“Adoptive Father” and “Adoptive Mother”, collectively, the

“Adoptive Parents”), and terminating Mother’s parental rights to her son, 

N.A.V., Jr., (born in January 2009), and her daughter, S.S.V. (born in October

2011), (collectively, “the Children”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), 
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(2), and (b).

1

 Mother’s counsel, Natalie Ryan Burston, Esquire (“Counsel”),

has filed with this Court a Motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We grant Counsel’s 

Motion, and affirm the Decrees entered by the trial court.

The trial court summarized the relevant history underlying the instant 

appeals as follows:

The [C]hildren ... currently reside with [the Adoptive 

Parents]. This living arrangement was the result of an 

intervention by Children and Youth [Services of Dauphin County

(“CYS”)] in which [Mother] agreed to sign over temporary physical 

and legal custody rights to the [A]doptive [P]arents on November 

14, 2017. This was the result of [Mother and Father] suffering 

from drug addictions. [Mother and Father] had tested positive for 

cocaine and THC. After the [A]doptive [P]arents took control of 

the [C]hildren, [CYS] closed their investigation. Since the signing 

of that agreement, the [C]hildren have remained with the 

[A]doptive [P]arents. It is important to note that the [A]doptive 

[P]arents and [Mother] are related. The [A]doptive [F]ather is the 

[C]hildren’s uncle and [Mother’s] brother.

Prior to living with the [A]doptive [P]arents, the [C]hildren 

spent approximately two years in a foster home. When the 

[C]hildren came into the care of the [A]doptive [P]arents, they

had a difficult time adjusting. The [C]hildren lacked the ability to 

care for themselves and suffered from physical and emotional 

issues. Specifically, the [C]hildren did not understand what it 

meant to be in a “forever home” because of how often they had 

been moved around. Additionally, the [C]hildren had issues with 

lying and overeating.

After the [C]hildren were placed with the [A]doptive 

[P]arents, they were taken to therapy and made great strides with 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the Children’s father, 

N.V.O. (“Father”). Father has not filed an appeal from the termination of his 

parental rights, nor is Father a party to the instant appeal.

 
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their physical and emotional problems. Now, they are excelling in 

school and learning coping mechanisms. At the time of the 

termination hearing, the [C]hildren had lived with the [A]doptive 

[Parents] for approximately one year. During that year, [Mother]

only visited with [the Children] twice[,] and there was no further 

contact. The [A]doptive [P]arents made attempts to reach out to 

[Mother], but they had no phone numbers that worked, and their 

Facebook messages were left unanswered. 

However, [Mother] did testify that she spent three (3) 

months in rehabilitation, three (3) months in a halfway house and 

time in a recovery house immediately preceding the termination 

hearing. During her testimony, [Mother] admitted that her 

current housing is not suitable for [the Children,] and that she 

may not be what is best for them. More importantly, she admitted 

to not having contact with [the Children] for at least a year. 

Currently, [Mother] is employed as a housekeeper at the 

Comfort Inn. [A]doptive [M]other is a part[-]time hair stylist and

spends ... much of her time at home with [the Children]. 

[A]doptive [F]ather is self[-]employed as a mechanic and is also 

employed through a garage. The [A]doptive [P]arents have been 

married for approximately two years. Testimony by the Guardian 

ad Litem (“GAL”) indicated that the [C]hildren’s needs were being 

met[,] and that they wanted to stay with the [A]doptive [P]arents. 

Ultimately, [the GAL] recommended that an adoption would be in 

the best interests of the [C]hildren.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/4/19, at 1-3 (footnote and citations to record omitted; 

paragraph breaks added).

On December 5, 2018, following a hearing, the trial court entered the 

Decrees terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children. On

January 2, 2019, Mother filed her Notices of Appeal from the termination 

Decrees.

2

 Counsel included a statement in the Notices of Appeal indicating

____________________________________________

2 On February 8, 2019, this Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated Mother’s 

separate Notices of Appeal for the Children.
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her intent to file a Motion to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(c)(4), in lieu of filing concise statements of errors complained of on 

appeal. 

On March 11, 2019, Mother’s counsel filed with this Court a Motion to 

withdraw as counsel. “When considering an Anders brief, this Court may not 

review the merits of the underlying issues until we address counsel’s request 

to withdraw.” In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237. In In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 

1274-75 (Pa. Super. 1992), this Court extended the Anders principles to 

appeals involving the termination of parental rights. Pursuant to Anders, 

when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous and wishes to withdraw from 

representation, he or she must

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after 

making a conscientious examination of the record ..., counsel has 

determined the appeal would be frivolous;

(2) file a brief referring to anything that might arguably support 

the appeal...; and 

(3) furnish a copy of the brief to [the client] and advise him of his 

right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional 

points he deems worthy of the court’s attention.

In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), our 

Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of Anders, i.e., the 

contents of an Anders brief, and required that the brief

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record;
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(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; 

and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. “After an appellate court receives an Anders

brief and is satisfied that counsel has complied with the aforementioned 

requirements, the Court then must undertake an independent examination of 

the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.” In re S.M.B., 

856 A.2d at 1237.

With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform 

the client of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court has 

held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter 

sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” Commonwealth v. 

Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

Counsel has complied with each of the requirements of Anders. 

Counsel indicates that she conscientiously examined the record and 

determined that the appeal on behalf of Mother would have no meritorious 

issues, and therefore, is wholly frivolous. Further, Counsel’s Anders brief 

comports with the requirements set forth by our Supreme Court in Santiago. 

Finally, attached to her Motion to withdraw is a copy of Counsel’s letter to 

Mother. In compliance with Millisock, the letter states Counsel’s intention to 
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seek permission to withdraw, and advises Mother of her right to retain private 

counsel to represent her on appeal or to file a pro se brief on her own behalf 

to raise any additional issues she deems worthy of appellate review. 

Accordingly, Counsel has complied with the procedural requirements for 

withdrawing from representation, and we will review the merits of Mother’s 

appeal.

In the Anders brief, Counsel raises the following issue:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion, or commit an error of 

law by determining it was in the [C]hildren’s best interest to have 

Mother’s parental rights terminated by clear and convincing 

evidence?

Anders Brief at 7 (footnote omitted).

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept 

the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court 

if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often 

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. 

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion 

only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

As we discussed in R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010),]

there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion 

standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial 

courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific 

determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are 

observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often 

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and 

parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 
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termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record 

and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of 

law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in [subsection] 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to [subsection] 2511(b): determination of 

the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare 

analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond 

between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). This Court may affirm the 

trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard 

to any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with consideration of Section 

2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 

Here, we will consider subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b),3 which provide 

as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

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3 We note that although Mother only challenges the trial court’s Decrees under 

subsection 2511(b), we will address subsection 2511(a) as a part of our 

independent review.
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. ...

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

The Supreme Court set forth the appropriate inquiry under Section 

2511(a)(2) as follows:

[Section] 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for 

termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear 

and convincing evidence that the repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions 

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent. ... 

This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for 

termination under [Section] 2511(a)(2):

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made 

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can 
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seldom be more difficult than when termination is based 

upon parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in 

enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent 

who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as 

parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (quotation marks, brackets, and 

citations omitted).

This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under 

Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to Section 

2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under 

Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are 

met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and 

welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include 

intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. In In re 

E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the 

determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires 

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and 

child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the 

effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (some citations and quotation 

marks omitted; brackets omitted).

A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this analysis: 

[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply 

because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only 

dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the 

dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be 

reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who, 

after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through 
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the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent. ... Nor 

are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the 

parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when 

considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to 

establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological 

aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the 

development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional 

health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations and quotation 

marks omitted).

This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent 

efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A 

parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding 

the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely 

or disingenuous. Id. at 340.

With regard to section 2511(a)(2) and (b), the trial court stated as 

follows:

In the present case, this [c]ourt believes that based on the 

testimony presented by both parties, there was sufficient evidence 

to warrant the termination of [Mother’s] parental rights. ... First, 

we find it important to note ... that two years prior to the [C]hildren 

living with their [A]doptive [P]arents, they were in foster care 

because [Mother] was unable to care for them. (N.T., 25-26). 

Secondly, on November 14, 2017, [CYS] intervened by removing 

the [C]hildren from [Mother’s] care; [sic] again, because [Mother]

was not capable of taking proper care of them. (N.T., 7). Since 

[CYS’s] intervention, the [C]hildren have remained in the care of 

[Mother’s] brother and sister-in-law, the [A]doptive [P]arents. 

The testimony indicated that the last time [Mother] had seen 

[C]hildren was November 21, 2017. Essentially, [Mother] has 

failed to partake in [C]hildren’s lives and has failed to perform her 

parental duties for approximately three years. As a result,
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[C]hildren have suffered trauma. (N.T., 27). Testimony was 

presented that the [C]hildren lacked the ability to care for 

themselves and suffered from emotional and physical problems.

(N.T., 7, 27). More specifically, the [C]hildren had issues with 

lying and overeating. (N.T., 27).

The [GAL] described the [C]hildren as not understanding 

what a “forever home” meant because they have been moved 

around so much. [(N.T., 27)]. Due to the [A]doptive [P]arents’

efforts, the [C]hildren have been placed in therapy and are making 

great strides physically, emotionally, and in their education. 

(N.T., 9). Finally, it was made clear to this [c]ourt that [Mother]

suffers from a heroin addiction, and that she does not currently 

possess the ability to properly care for [C]hildren. (N.T., 23). She 

admitted to this [c]ourt that she has been in rehab and at least 

two recovery houses for the past year, and does not have housing 

that would be suitable for the [C]hildren to live in. (N.T., 22-23). 

Additionally, a drug and alcohol evaluation presented to this

[c]ourt recommended that [Mother] partake in intensive 

outpatient care. (N.T., 27). We believed that terminating 

[Mother’s] parental rights was in the [C]hildren’s best interests[,]

[a]s it has been approximately a three-year time span that 

[Mother] has been unable to take the appropriate steps to 

adequately provide for [the C]hildren. This is evidenced by the 

fact that the [C]hildren spent two years in foster care and the past 

year with their [A]doptive [P]arents. 

Another factor that courts can consider pursuant to 

§ 2511(a)(2), [sic] is repeated and continued incapacity of a 

parent that has caused a child to be without essential parental 

care, control, or subsistence necessary for their physical and 

mental well-being. Again, we would repeat that [Mother] has left 

[the C]hildren’s lives in disarray by her inability to take care of

herself. It was clearly presented to this [c]ourt that the [C]hildren 

have suffered mental, physical, and emotional problems from 

never having a permanent home until living with the [A]doptive

[P]arents. [Mother’s] continued inability to provide for [the 

C]hildren is concerning to this [c]ourt, and we do not see it being 

remedied in the near future. We will not subject innocent children 

to the conditions they were previously living in, especially when 

they now have a stable, loving, and permanent home. Therefore, 

we believe that this factor has also been satisfied.
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As it stands now, we do not see a change in the conditions 

that led to the [C]hildren’s removal. [Mother] is still in need of 

intensive care for her addiction and she has not acquired adequate 

housing. Most importantly, we do not believe [Mother] has taken 

all the steps that she can to better herself and her situation. 

[Mother] herself even stated that the [C]hildren are in the best 

place that they can be, and this [c]ourt must agree. (N.T., 25). 

As a result, [Mother’s] parental rights were terminated because it 

was what was in the best interest of the [C]hildren. 

It is also important to note that [Mother] refused to agree 

to an Act 101 Agreement, even after extensive discussions with 

her attorney regarding such an agreement. (N.T., 29). Thus, we 

believe that granting the termination of her parental rights was 

the best alternative. As this [c]ourt stated at the hearing, the 

decision as to whether [Mother] will be permitted to see [the 

C]hildren in the future is left to the [A]doptive [P]arent’s 

discretion. [(N.T., 29-30)]. We believe that the [C]hildren are 

finally in a stable home environment and that is ultimately the 

reason for terminating [Mother’s] parental rights.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/4/19, at 4-6 (paragraph breaks added).

Although Mother claims that she loves the Children, see N.T., 12/5/18, 

at 22, this Court has held that a parent’s love of her child, alone, does not 

preclude a termination. See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(stating that a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, 

will not preclude termination of parental rights). It is well-settled that “we 

will not toll the well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re 

Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 

732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold 

in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting.”)).
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After a careful review of the record, this Court finds the trial court’s 

decision to terminate the parental rights of Mother under section 2511(a)(2)

and (b) is supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence in the 

record. See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Accordingly, finding 

no other issues of merit with regard to the termination Decrees, we affirm the 

trial court’s termination Decrees on the basis of the trial court’s reasoning, 

and grant Counsel’s Motion for leave to withdraw.

Decrees affirmed. Motion to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 06/20/2019