SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1330-15T2

JAIME MORA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DEBORA MORA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Submitted February 27, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Currier.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, 

Docket No. FM-02-000252-15.

Gilberto M. Garcia, attorney for appellant.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Debora Mora appeals from an October 21, 2015 trial 

court order denying her motion to set aside a June 10, 2015 final 

judgment of divorce ("FJOD"). The court entered the FJOD after 

defendant defaulted. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

March 16, 2017
2 A-1330-15T2

We derive the following facts from the sparse appellate 

record. Plaintiff and defendant were married twice. The parties 

divorced in 1979, remarried in 1988, and separated in 2010. In 

2014, plaintiff filed a divorce complaint. Defendant failed to 

answer the complaint. 

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Proposed Final Judgment on May 

13, 2015. Plaintiff directed the notice to defendant. The notice 

included an itemization of the parties' assets, which included 

real property in Englewood and Union City, a business, three 

vehicles, a bank account, and personal property. The notice also 

specified June 10, 2015, as the proposed trial date. 

On June 10, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing and 

entered a FJOD at its conclusion. Defendant was present at the 

hearing. The FJOD ordered the parties to list the Englewood and 

Union City properties for sale by specified dates and divide the 

net proceeds equally. The FJOD addressed who would remain at the 

residential property pending its sale, who would collect the rents 

from the rental properties, and how the properties' carrying costs 

would be allocated. The FJOD provided terms on which the parties' 

jointly owned business was to be sold and the salaries to be paid 

pending the sale. The FJOD granted possession and title of the 

2003 Cadillac Escalade to defendant, and possession and title of 
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the 2007 Chevrolet Avalanche to plaintiff. It ordered the parties 

to transfer title to the 2005 Acura 3.2 TL to their son. 

Plaintiff was to retain possession of his personal Wells 

Fargo bank account, containing approximately $2500. The Wells 

Fargo safe deposit box was to be relinquished to the bank and its 

contents divided as appropriate. Lastly, the FJOD provided for 

the equitable distribution of the parties' personal property and 

bank account.

On September 4, 2015, nearly three months after the trial and 

entry of the FJOD, defendant moved to vacate the FJOD. On October 

21, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion. 

Defendant has not included in the appellate record the 

certification she presumably filed in support of her motion to 

vacate the default judgment. We glean from the parties' and 

court's comments during oral argument that defendant claimed 

plaintiff's attorney had a conflict of interest and should have 

told her to seek other counsel; she had not been served with the 

divorce complaint; and was unaware of the pending divorce.1 

When oral argument commenced, the court asked defense counsel 

whether he had obtained transcripts of "the two proceedings which 

occurred on June 10th of this year." Counsel had not. The court 

 

1 The appellate record does not include a copy of the June 10, 

2015 proceedings.
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explained that plaintiff's attorney had filed a responding 

certification which demonstrated no conflict of interest existed. 

In addition, though defendant certified she had not been served 

with a divorce complaint, the affidavit of service established the 

complaint had been served on her twenty-three-year-old son, a fact 

plaintiff verified. 

The judge also recounted that during the June proceedings he 

noted defendant received notices in January, March, and May 2015, 

and "[w]hen [he] went through that, [he] made sure that the notices 

were sent to [defendant] in both English and Spanish." Further, 

defendant asked plaintiff for an attorney in July 2014, "which 

leads one to the conclusion . . . she knew about the divorce 

proceedings from the inception[.]" The court noted on the record 

during the June 10 proceedings "there were ample proofs [defendant] 

was properly served with the request for divorce and she was 

properly served with a notice of proposed final judgment in 

accordance with our [c]ourt rules." 

In response to defendant's arguments that the proceedings 

were difficult to understand and she was not given an opportunity 

to speak, the judge noted the court utilized an interpreter, 

defendant answered the judge several times when addressed 

directly, and defendant did not ask any questions despite the 
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clarification of her right to do so. Instead, defendant complained 

about her "pittance salary" and lack of alimony. 

Turning to defendant's arguments in support of her motion to 

vacate the default judgment, the court noted it had "addressed the 

issues of alimony and equitable distribution extensively on the 

record during [the June 10] hearings." The court explained 

plaintiff did not provide for alimony in his proposed final 

judgment because the parties "would continue to take the same 

amount out of [their business]" and defendant would collect the 

rental income from their rental properties. That arrangement 

provided defendant with "a more comfortable lifestyle than . . . 

plaintiff, who is only receiving a salary and has no rental 

income." 

Defendant alleged a potential Sheridan2 issue, as she believed 

plaintiff signed defendant's name on their joint tax returns. The 

judge evaluated and dismissed this contention as a non-issue.

The judge analyzed defendant's motion to vacate the default 

judgment under Rule 4:50-1. He noted:

[while] mindful that our [a]ppellate courts 

have told us . . . we must exercise great 

liberality and should tolerate every 

reasonable ground for . . . indulgence . . . 

with a view to opening default judgments in 

order that a just result is reached[,]

 

2 Sheridan v. Sheridan, 247 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 1990).
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. . . .

[g]enerally, a defendant seeking to reopen a 

default judgment because of excusable neglect 

must show that the failure to answer was 

excusable under the circumstances and that a 

meritorious defense is available.

The court ultimately determined "there was no showing of 

excusable neglect in failing to answer the complaint or otherwise" 

failing to participate in the litigation, and affirmed the FJOD 

in an October 21, 2015 order.

Defendant appeals. In arguments devoid of any significant 

discussion of the standard of review for vacating a default 

judgment, defendant contends the equitable distribution was 

unfair, she should have the opportunity to be heard as to alimony, 

and the trial court's consideration of her Sheridan argument was 

inadequate. As to the business, the FJOD ordered it be sold four 

years after entry of the FJOD, the net proceeds to be divided 

equally. Defendant asserts she should not be "precluded from 

obtaining her 50% in the business and her commercial property for 

a four-year period[.]" 

The trial court decided defendant's motion under Rule 4:50-

1, which provides:

On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms 

as are just, the court may relieve a party or 

the party's legal representative from a final 

judgment or order for the following reasons: 

(a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
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excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered 

evidence which would probably alter the 

judgment or order and which by due diligence 

could not have been discovered in time to move 

for a new trial under R. 4:49; (c) fraud 

(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other 

misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the 

judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment 

or order has been satisfied, released or 

discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon 

which it is based has been reversed or 

otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 

equitable that the judgment or order should 

have prospective application; or (f) any other 

reason justifying relief from the operation 

of the judgment or order.

When a trial court considers a motion to vacate a default 

judgment, the motion must be "viewed with great liberality, and 

every reasonable ground for indulgence is tolerated to the end 

that a just result is reached." Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 

N.J. Super. 313, 319 (App. Div.) (citation omitted), aff'd, 43 

N.J. 508 (1964). This is especially so in family actions, because 

"a judgment by default is not favored in divorce suits." Curry 

v. Curry, 108 N.J. Super. 527, 530 (App. Div. 1970) (citation 

omitted).

Nonetheless, a trial court's decision under Rule 4:50-1 is 

entitled to "substantial deference, and should not be reversed 

unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion." US Bank N.A. 

v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) (citation omitted). As to 

the first section of Rule 4:50-1, a motion to vacate a judgment 
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under Rule 4:50-1(a) "should be granted sparingly, and is addressed 

to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination 

will be left undisturbed unless it results from a clear abuse of 

discretion." Fineberg v. Fineberg, 309 N.J. Super. 205, 215 (App. 

Div. 1998) (citing Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J.

274, 283-84 (1994)). An abuse of discretion occurs "when a 

decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably 

departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible 

basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) 

(citation omitted). 

Here, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to set 

aside the default judgment did not constitute an abuse of 

discretion. Although difficult to discern on this sparse record, 

it appears defendant moved for relief under Rule 4:50-1(a). The 

grounds defendant asserted to support her motion were unsupported 

by, and in some instances contrary to, the facts. Additionally, 

the court gave defendant the opportunity to participate in the 

proof hearing by questioning plaintiff, but defendant declined the 

opportunity to do so. Lastly, assuming defendant sought relief 

under Rule 4:50-1(f), defendant has not demonstrated the trial 

court's decision was inherently unfair or contrary to applicable 

legal principles, nor has defendant established "any other reason 

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Ibid. 
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Affirmed.