United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided October 22, 2019

No. 19-3054

IN RE: ROGER JASON STONE, JR., ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

On Petition For Writ of Mandamus 

(1:19-cr-00018)

Bruce Rogow and Robert C. Bushcel were on the petition 

for writ of mandamus and the reply.

Jessie K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, Elizabeth Trosman and David 

B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and Adam C. Jed, 

Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, were on the opposition to the 

petition for a writ of mandamus.

Before: MILLETT, PILLARD, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Roger Stone and members of his 

family petition this Court for a writ of mandamus vacating the 

District Court’s orders modifying Stone’s conditions of 

release, arguing that the orders infringe on their First 

Amendment right to free speech. Where a mandamus 

petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy, however, we 

lack jurisdiction to grant the petition. In re Asemani, 455 F.3d 
2

296, 299-301 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (dismissing mandamus petition 

for lack of jurisdiction). Here, because Stone and his family 

members failed to avail themselves of adequate alternative 

remedies, we dismiss their petition.

I.

Roger Stone is a political consultant who has worked in 

U.S. politics for decades. During the 2016 presidential 

campaign, Stone served as an official for then-candidate

Donald J. Trump’s campaign. On January 24, 2019, a grand 

jury returned a seven-count indictment charging Stone with: 

one count of obstruction of proceedings, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 1505 and 2; five counts of false statements, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(2) and 2; and one count of 

witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1). The 

indictment, signed by Special Counsel Robert Mueller, alleges 

that Stone obstructed investigations by Congress and the FBI

into foreign interference in the 2016 presidential election. 

Specifically, the indictment alleges that Stone tried to block

inquiries into his communications with an organization that 

published files stolen by Russian hackers from the Democratic 

National Committee’s computer system. Federal agents 

arrested Stone, and Stone pleaded not guilty to the charges on 

January 29, 2019. He was released on personal recognizance, 

subject to limited conditions, including travel restrictions and a 

prohibition on communicating with witnesses disclosed by the 

government. 

During the initial status conference, the District Court 

explained that the case had received “considerable publicity, 

fueled in large part by extrajudicial statements of the defendant 

himself.” A.41. As such, the Court advised the attorneys that 

it was considering issuing an order under Local Criminal Rule 

57.7(c), which governs special orders restricting, among other 
3

things, “extrajudicial statements by parties, witnesses and 

attorneys likely to interfere with the rights of the accused to a 

fair trial by an impartial jury.” D.D.C. LCrR 57.7(c). The 

Court directed the parties to file submissions on the appropriate 

scope of such an order. 

On February 15, 2019, after receiving input from the 

parties, the Court entered the Rule 57.7(c) order. In its order, 

the Court explained its obligation to prevent improper 

influence on the jury pool and the possibility that “public 

pronouncements” may “inflame” the large and “vociferous[]” 

crowds that had been attending the proceedings. A.52. To that 

end, the Court first ordered that “Counsel for the parties and 

the witnesses must refrain from making statements to the media 

or in public settings that pose a substantial likelihood of 

material prejudice to this case.” A.53. This part of the order 

applied only to the attorneys. The second part of the order 

applied to all participants in the case, but it applied only to 

statements made in or around the courthouse: 

[A]ll interested participants in the matter, 

including the parties, any potential witnesses, 

and counsel for the parties and the witnesses, 

must refrain, when they are entering or exiting 

the courthouse, or they are within the immediate

vicinity of the courthouse, from making 

statements to the media or to the public that 

pose a substantial likelihood of material 

prejudice to this case or are intended to 

influence any juror, potential juror, judge, 

witness or court officer or interfere with the 

administration of justice.

A.53-54. The order imposed no conditions on Stone’s public 

remarks beyond the immediate vicinity of the courthouse, but 
4

clarified that the order “may be amended . . . if necessary.” 

A.54. The order also advised that, in deciding whether to grant 

“any future request for relief based on pretrial publicity,” the 

Court would consider “the extent to which the publicity was 

engendered by the defendant himself.” Id.

Three days later, on February 18, 2019, Stone posted an 

image on his Instagram account depicting the District Court 

judge in this case with crosshairs next to her head, alongside 

inflammatory commentary in which he accused her of bias. 

That same day, he removed the post and filed a “Notice of 

Apology,” apologizing to the Court for “the improper 

photograph and comment posted on Instagram today.” A.55. 

Stone himself signed the filing, but later admitted that he did 

not write it and had “signed it on the advice of counsel.” A.57, 

75. Even after taking the post down, however, Stone did a

media interview later the same day in which he continued to 

accuse the judge of bias. The day after the post went up and 

came down, the District Court ordered Stone to show cause 

why its February 15, 2019 order and/or Stone’s conditions of 

release should not be modified or revoked in light of his 

Instagram post, and set a hearing on the matter for February 21, 

2019.

At the hearing, Stone apologized directly to the Court, 

recognizing that he had “abused the latitude” the Court gave 

him and blaming his “stupid lapse of judgment” on “emotional 

stress.” A.69, 87. Stone stated he could “offer no excuse for 

[the post].” A.69. When the Court asked Stone whether he 

understood “that the posting could be viewed as a threat to the 

Court,” Stone replied, “I now realize that. That was not my 

intention.” A.70. Stone explained that he believed that the 

crosshairs were actually a “Celtic cross” or a “Celtic occult 

symbol,” the same explanation he had provided to media 

reporters shortly after posting the image. A.70, 74, 85. Stone 
5

also testified that, while he posted the image, he “did not select 

the image.” A.69, 77-78. According to Stone, one of the “five 

or six” people who “volunteer” for him selected the image, and 

Stone decided to post it. A.78-79, 88. However, when pressed 

for the name of this volunteer, Stone could not remember who 

had sent him the image. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court declared that it 

“d[id] not find any of [Stone’s] evolving and contradictory 

explanations credible” and that Stone had made “deliberate 

choices” to “express himself in a manner that can incite others 

who may feel less constrained,” which “posed a very real risk 

that others with extreme views and violent inclinations would 

be inflamed.” A.102. In addition, the Court noted that its 

initial order imposed no restrictions on Stone’s speech beyond 

the courthouse and that it took Stone just “three days” to abuse 

that trust. A.104-05. The Court found that Stone’s post had 

“the effect and very likely the intent” to “denigrate th[e 

judicial] process and taint the jury pool.” A.109. The Court 

further found that Stone’s apology “r[ang] quite hollow,” given 

that he “continued to adamantly defend the post, even after he 

took it down, thereby enhancing the risk that it would appeal to 

and stoke the passions of an angry crowd[.]” A.104.

Consistent with these findings, the Court decided to 

modify the conditions of Stone’s pretrial release. Before doing 

so, it asked counsel for Stone how to “craft an order that [Stone] 

would find clear enough to follow[.]” A.98. Counsel for Stone 

suggested an order that Stone not “talk[] about this Court” or 

the special prosecutor and that he not “impugn[] the integrity 

of the Court” or the government. A.98-99. 

The District Court modified the conditions of Stone’s 

pretrial release in a minute order the same day: 
6

[T]he conditions of defendant’s pretrial release 

are hereby modified to include the condition 

that, and the February 15, 2019 media 

communications order is hereby modified to 

provide that, the defendant is prohibited from 

making statements to the media or in public 

settings about the Special Counsel’s 

investigation or this case or any of the 

participants in the investigation or the case. The 

prohibition includes, but is not limited to, 

statements made about the case through the 

following means: radio broadcasts; interviews 

on television, on the radio, with print reporters, 

or on internet based media; press releases or 

press conferences; blogs or letters to the editor; 

and posts on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or 

any other form of social media. Furthermore, 

the defendant may not comment publicly about 

the case indirectly by having statements made 

publicly on his behalf by surrogates, family 

members, spokespersons, representatives, or 

volunteers. 

A.107-08, 114-15 (“February 21, 2019 order”). 

The gist of the February 21, 2019 order was that, beyond 

soliciting funds for his legal defense or maintaining his general 

innocence, Stone was not to discuss the case in any way. As 

the District Court explained, Stone could “send out as many 

emails, Tweets, posts as [he] choose[s] that say, [‘]Please 

donate to the Roger Stone defense fund to help me defend 

myself against these charges[’]” and could add that he is

“innocent of the charges.” A.108. The Court made clear, 

however, that Stone was permitted to speak publicly about “any 

other matter of public interest,” so long as he refrained from 
7

any specific discussion about the case or the people involved 

in it. Id. The Court declared that, under the Bail Reform Act, 

18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1) and (3), and Gentile v. State Bar of 

Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), these conditions were 

necessary and were the least restrictive means available to 

prevent “material prejudice to the case and the due 

administration of justice.” A.105-09. The Court also advised 

Stone that “any violation of this order will be a basis for 

revoking [his] bond and detaining [him] pending trial.” A.109. 

Neither Stone nor any of his family members challenged

the February 21, 2019 order in the District Court in any way or 

sought direct review of it from this Court.

About four months later, the Court learned that Stone had

violated the February 21, 2019 order in various ways. On June 

20, 2019, the government moved for an order to show cause 

why the Court should not modify further the conditions of 

Stone’s release, citing numerous examples of Stone’s 

communications it believed violated the February 21, 2019 

order. These communications include, among others, an 

Instagram post on March 3, 2019, with the title “who framed 

Roger Stone,” A.125, 192-93; an Instagram post on April 4, 

2019 featuring a headline about Stone’s arrest, with 

commentary from Stone asking what “could [the FBI] possibly

be hiding,” A153 n.1, 162; an Instagram post on May 16, 2019 

stating that Stone had “challenged the entire ‘Russians hacked

the DNC/CrowdStrike’ claim by the Special Counsel,” A.153

n.1, 164; and a text message in late February from Stone to 

Buzzfeed News stating that – contrary to testimony before 

Congress by President Trump’s former attorney Michael 

Cohen (a potential witness in the case against Stone) – Stone

had not told then-candidate Trump about his communications 

with anyone seeking to interfere in the election on Trump’s 
8

behalf, see A190-92. The government did not ask the Court to 

hold Stone in contempt or to revoke his bond. 

Stone responded to the motion, calling it a 

“disproportionate reaction” to his exercise of First Amendment 

rights and claiming that the government sought to “deprive 

[him] of the narrow latitude the Court left him[.]” A.170.

Stone argued that the examples cited by the government either 

involved Stone’s reposting articles or graphics originally 

produced by others, which did not constitute statements by 

Stone himself, or were mere “rhetorical question[s]” that were 

not “statements” about the case. A.170-75. 

The District Court held argument on the motion at a 

hearing on July 16, 2019 and ultimately concluded that Stone

had violated its clear instructions not to publicly discuss his 

case in any way. The Court found that “[i]t didn’t take a week”

after the February 21, 2019 order for Stone to contact a news 

outlet to “call[] a witness in this investigation a liar.” A.218. 

The Court also found that, while some of the social media posts 

“were initially statements made by other people,” Stone 

“posted and disseminated them himself again on his own 

Instagram feed, under his own name, to his own followers,” 

thereby “spreading it with his imprimatur.” A.220-21. Stone’s 

“obvious purpose,” the Court found, was “to gin up more 

public comment and controversy about the legitimacy of the 

Mueller investigation and the House investigation to get people 

to question the legitimacy of this prosecution.” A.222. Based 

on these clear violations, the Court explained that it was 

“obvious” that Stone was either unable to “differentiate 

between the very broad range of speech” he was entitled to and 

speech that was prohibited under his conditions of release, or 

he was simply refusing to comply with them. A.223.
9

Because Stone had shown himself “unwilling to stop 

talking about the investigation” despite the Court having “twice 

given [him] the benefit of the doubt,” the District Court 

recognized the need to “make the restriction even more clear 

so that it calls for no interpretation on [Stone’s] part

whatsoever.” A.223-24. To avoid generating even “more 

pretrial publicity and more concerning articles for the jury to 

read,” the Court deferred initiating contempt proceedings. 

A.222-23. The Court also declined to revoke Stone’s bond. 

Instead, the Court again modified the conditions of Stone’s 

release to include a blanket ban on using Instagram, Twitter, or 

Facebook. Specifically, the Court declared that during the 

pendency of the case, Stone is prohibited from posting “on 

Instagram, Twitter or Facebook in any way, on any subject,” 

and that this ban “includes, but is not limited to, forwarding, 

liking, re-posting or re-Tweeting anyone else’s posts or 

Tweets.” A.224. 

The next day, on July 17, 2019, the Court entered an order 

restating this modification and clarifying that “all other 

conditions of release, and all other provisions of the Court’s 

orders of February 15 and February 21, 2019, remain in force.”

A.229-30. The order emphasized in bold the existing 

restrictions on Stone’s discussion of the case through “any 

other form of social media” and “indirect” discussion of the 

case through “surrogates, family members, spokespersons, 

representatives, or volunteers.” Id. The order also stated that 

such prohibited statements “include, but are not limited to, 

statements about public filings or orders issued in the case, and 

the re-transmission, quotation, or dissemination of statements 

by others about the investigation or the case.” A.230. 

On August 2, 2019, Stone and four of Stone’s family 

members petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus seeking 

to vacate the District Court’s February 21, July 16, and July 17, 
10

2019 orders modifying Stone’s conditions of release and 

sought expedited review. The Petitioners argue that the orders 

constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on their speech. 

Shortly after they filed the petition, an individual named David 

Christenson moved to intervene. 

II.

“[T]he remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked 

only in extraordinary situations.” Allied Chem. Corp. v. 

Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980). To show entitlement to 

mandamus, a petitioner “must demonstrate (1) a clear and 

indisputable right to relief, (2) that the government agency or 

official is violating a clear duty to act, and (3) that no adequate 

alternative remedy exists.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 

F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “These three 

threshold requirements are jurisdictional; unless all are met, a 

court must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.” Id.

(citation omitted). Because the Petitioners possess adequate 

alternative remedies, they fail to satisfy the third prong of 

mandamus entitlement, and we must dismiss the petition for 

lack of jurisdiction.

A.

For his part, Stone could have appealed under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3145(c), which expressly provides for judicial review of a 

detention order. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 

752 (1987) (“The [Bail Reform] Act’s review provisions, 

§ 3145(c), provide for immediate appellate review of the 

detention decision.”). Indeed, we recently heard a direct appeal 

by a criminal defendant from a pretrial order regarding his 

conditions of release – in that case, a pretrial detention order. 
11

See United States v. Manafort, 897 F.3d 340 (D.C. Cir. 2018).1

And despite Stone’s protestation that “no adequate alternative 

remedy would suffice to expeditiously address the violation” 

he complains of, Pet’rs’ Reply Br. at 10-11, this provision

expressly requires expeditious review, stating that “[t]he appeal 

shall be determined promptly,” 18 U.S.C § 3145(c).2

Stone could have challenged the conditional release orders

by filing a notice of appeal within fourteen days after their

entry, see FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A), but failed to do so. Stone 

also could have filed a motion to modify his conditional release 

order and filed an appeal within fourteen days if unsuccessful. 

Instead, on August 2, 2019 – sixteen days after the July 17 

order and over six months after the February 21 order – he filed 

the instant petition for writ of mandamus. Thus, even if we 

were to construe his petition as a notice of appeal, we would 

have to dismiss the appeal because the government argued that 

the petition, so construed, would be untimely. See id.; United 

States v. Byfield, 522 F.3d 400, 402-03 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Stone 

had an adequate avenue of relief – direct appeal – but he failed 

to avail himself of it in a timely fashion, so we lack jurisdiction

1 See Appellant’s Opening Br. at 2, Manafort, 897 F.3d 340 (No. 18-

3037) (asserting 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as the 

basis for our jurisdiction).

2 Though the technical basis for appealability of pretrial release 

orders has confounded scholars and divided courts, see, e.g., 15B 

Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3918.2 

at 440 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that “the incorporation of [28 U.S.C.] 

§ 1291 [in 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)] is potentially ambiguous”), we need 

not decide this question here. Whether a criminal defendant’s appeal 

of his detention or release order is reviewable as a “final order” under 

28 U.S.C § 1291, see, e.g., United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 

317 (2d Cir. 2004), or as a “collateral order,” see, e.g., United States 

v. Schock, 891 F.3d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 2018), the end result is the 

same: an appealable order.
12

to grant the mandamus petition. See United States v. 

Gundersen, 978 F.2d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1992) (conditional 

release order was an appealable order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3145(c), and “[m]andamus, therefore, is inappropriate”); In 

re Ojeda Rios, 863 F.2d 202, 205 (2d Cir. 1988) (mandamus 

not available where appeal of pretrial detention order was still 

pending); see also In re Robinson, 713 F. App’x 764, 769 (10th

Cir. 2017) (court denied mandamus petition as moot where 

appeal of detention order was also filed); In re Williams, 364 

F. App’x 764, 765 (3d Cir. 2010) (pretrial detainee not entitled 

to mandamus relief when he could have appealed denial of his 

motion seeking review of detention order).

B.

Stone’s family members, who assert a somewhat different 

injury than Stone, also fail to establish that no adequate 

alternative remedy exists. Unlike Stone himself, Stone’s 

family members are free to use social media and free to speak 

about the case. The order merely enjoins Stone from 

vicariously expressing his speech about the case through 

anyone else. However, because the order expressly mentions 

his family members, they argue that it chills their speech rights 

in two ways. First, they contend that speaking about the case

could put Stone’s liberty at risk, because it could be “viewed 

as” speaking on his behalf. Petition at 27. Second, they fear 

that speaking about the case will “[a]t the least” subject them 

“to an inquiry by the court” as to whether they were acting as 

Stone’s “surrogates.” Id. (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 

U.S. 479, 487 (1965)). 

To the extent Stone’s family members assert a right to 

make statements about the case completely independent from 

Stone, and not on his behalf, their complaints about the District 

Court’s order appear somewhat exaggerated. Even if the 
13

District Court’s order did not contain the challenged provision 

prohibiting Stone from “comment[ing] publicly about the case 

indirectly by having statements made publicly on his behalf by 

surrogates, family members, spokespersons, representatives, or 

volunteers,” A.107-08, 114-15, 229-30, Stone’s family 

members would be in the same position they are now – that is, 

they would not be permitted to knowingly aid and abet Stone 

in contemptuously violating the Court’s orders. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2. Moreover, Stone cannot be automatically punished 

anytime one of his family members speaks about his criminal 

proceedings. Rather, the government would have the burden 

to establish such surrogacy by clear and convincing evidence. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b)(1)(B). Nevertheless, Stone’s family 

members also possess an adequate appellate remedy to 

challenge the alleged First Amendment violations, depriving us 

of mandamus jurisdiction. 

Though they lack the same appellate rights Stone has 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), our Circuit has long allowed 

nonparties subject to a restrictive order to appeal that order 

under the collateral order doctrine. Often, where a gag order 

restricts speech about a case, the nonparties challenging the 

order are members of the press. For example, in In re 

Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, we considered 

nonparty reporters’ appeal of a protective order over discovery 

materials under the collateral order doctrine, because the

reporters’ claims were “separable from, and collateral to, the 

rights of the parties to the underlying proceeding.” 773 F.2d 

1325, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985). We explained that the order was 

a final, reviewable order as to the reporters because they 

asserted that it irreparably damaged their “right to [receive] the 

unprivileged information during trial, when it had greater news 

value,” and because “appellate consideration of the reporters’ 

claims would not disrupt the trial[.]” Id.; see also Cable News 

Network, Inc. v. United States, 824 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
14

(per curiam) (considering an appeal brought by nonparty news 

organization and reversing a district court’s decision to close 

the courtroom during the voir dire portion of a criminal 

proceeding); United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 422 (5th 

Cir. 2000) (“[T]his Court and other Courts of Appeals have 

repeatedly held, in both civil and criminal trials, that gag orders 

imposed on members of the press are appealable under the 

collateral order doctrine.” (collecting cases)). 

For purposes of collateral-order appellate jurisdiction, we 

see no distinction between an appeal brought by nonparty

relatives of a party who wish to speak publicly about a case and 

nonparty reporters who wish to receive information about a 

case. In both instances, the alleged injury is to First 

Amendment rights during the pendency of a case. And an 

aggrieved nonparty with Article III standing can appeal an 

order that affects her interests. See In re Sealed Case (Med. 

Records), 381 F.3d 1205, 1211 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The 

Supreme Court has never restricted the right to appeal to named 

parties to a litigation, and if the decree affects a third party’s 

interests, he is often allowed to appeal.” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

In short, we hold that mandamus is not available for 

Stone’s family members, because they may move the District 

Court to reconsider or modify the conditions of release and, if 

unsuccessful, appeal the denial of that motion.3 As we 

3 Because they filed their petition more than fourteen days after the 

entry of the July 17, 2019 order, we cannot construe Stone’s family 

members’ motion as a notice of appeal. See FED. R. APP. P.

4(b)(1)(A). We therefore do not decide whether they could have 

directly appealed the conditional release orders without first 

presenting their objections to the District Court. Suffice it to say that 

they have an adequate alternative remedy: a motion for 

reconsideration and, if necessary, an appeal of the denial of that 
15

explained in United States v. Hubbard, “[t]he means by which 

third parties have sought to assert their interests 

in criminal cases have been manifold,” but generally “[i]t is the 

trial court and not this court that should engage in the initial 

consideration of the interests at stake[.]” 650 F.2d 293, 309-10

(D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Even assuming mandamus relief is available 

to non-parties in a criminal proceeding, we think the inevitable 

delay in seeking a writ and the narrow circumstances under 

which it will be granted render it inadequate to redress the type 

of injury here alleged and mandate the identification of some 

other means by which a non-party’s interest may timely be 

presented to the district court whose actions are alleged to 

affect that interest.”); see also United States v. Barry, No. 90-

3149, 1990 WL 104925, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1990) 

(remanding an appeal by nonparties of an order banning them 

from attending a criminal trial and holding that they did not 

motion. See In re GTE Serv. Corp., 762 F.2d 1024, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 

1985) (denying writ of mandamus “because the petitioners had a 

clearly adequate remedy in that they could have petitioned for review 

of the [agency’s] order . . . and could then have moved for a stay of 

that order”); Cole v. U.S. Dist. Court For Dist. of Idaho, 366 F.3d 

813, 815 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause mandamus is an extraordinary 

remedy and petitioners did not take advantage of an available remedy 

by seeking review of the magistrate judge’s decision before the 

district court, we deny the petition.”); In re Ramirez, 605 F. App’x 

361, 363 (5th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the circuit court had 

previously denied a mandamus petitioner’s petition “because a 

motion for reconsideration was still pending with the district court, 

meaning that an alternative means for relief was still available”); In 

re Ingris, 601 F. App’x 71, 75 (3d Cir. 2015) (denying mandamus 

petition seeking to correct an alleged docketing error because 

“recourse [could] be had either by writing a letter to the Clerk of the 

District Court seeking reconsideration of the decision, or by 

appealing the decision of the Clerk to a United States District Judge

. . . in accordance with whatever local rules or internal operating 

procedures might apply”). 
16

need to “seek to intervene in the criminal proceeding in order 

to note an appeal,” and that “the most appropriate course” was 

“to require [them] to present their First and Fifth Amendment 

claims to the district court in the first instance”); Republic of 

Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 

2002) (“We are particularly disinclined to issue the writ before 

the district court has acted[.]”). Though the availability of a 

motion to reconsider will not preclude mandamus jurisdiction 

where a petitioner shows that such a motion would be futile, 

see In re BigCommerce, Inc., 890 F.3d 978, 982 (Fed. Cir. 

2018), Stone’s family members give us no reason to believe 

that the District Court would not fairly consider their 

objections. Because Stone’s family members fail to meet their 

burden to establish the lack of any adequate alternative remedy, 

we lack jurisdiction over their mandamus petition. See Am. 

Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 189. 

III.

Consistent with the foregoing, we dismiss the mandamus

petition and deny the motion to intervene as moot. 

So ordered.