### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 17

- 2207

U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

,

v.

M ATTHEW E LDER , Defendant

- Appellant

.

____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the

So uthern District of Indiana

, Evansville Division.

No. 3:13

- cr

- 00017

- RLY

- CMM

- 8

— Richard L. Young

, Judge

.

____________________

A RGUED M AY 22

, 2018

— D ECIDED A UGUST 15, 2018

____________________

Before F LAUM and R IPPLE , Circuit Judges , and G ETTLEMAN , District Judge

. ∗

R I PPLE , Circuit Judge

. In 2015, Matthew Elder was convicted of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of meth-

∗ The Honorable Robert W. Gettleman of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.2 No. 17

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amphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 an d 846. At his first sentencing, the district court concluded that Mr. Elder was subject to a mandatory term of life imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(A) because he had two prior “felony drug offense” convictions. We remanded for resentencing because
we conclu ded that one of his prior convictions did not qualify as a felony drug offense as that term is defined by 21 U.S.C. § 802(44). We also directed the district court to decide whether his second prior conviction, from Arizona in 1999, qualified. United States v. Elder ( Elder I ), 840 F.3d 455, 462 n.2 (7th Cir. 2016).
At Mr. Elder’s second sentencing, the district court concluded that the second of Mr. Elder’s prior convictions qualified as a felony drug offense under § 841(b)(1)(A) and, accordingly, that Mr. E lder was subject to a m andatory minimum sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment. The district
court calculated Mr. Elder’s guidelines range to be 324 to 405 months’ imprisonment and sentenced Mr. Elder below the guidelines range to 260 months’ imprisonment. Mr. Elder now appeals his new sentence.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we agree with

Mr. Elder that the 1999 Arizona conviction is not a “felony drug offense” as defined by § 802(44). We therefore issue a
limited remand under United States v. Pa ladino , 401 F.3d 471,

483

– 84 (7th Cir. 2005), to permit the district court to determine whether this error was harmless.No. 17

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I

BACKGROUND

A.
In 2013, Mr. Elder and his father were charged, alongwith six other codefendants, with having conspired “to traffic large quantities of methamphetamine from Arizona to
southwest Indiana.” Elder I , 840 F.3d at 457. The six other codefendants pleaded guilty; Mr. Elder and his father pleaded not guilty and went to trial. Mr. Elder was found guilty of conspiring to distrib ute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.
At the time of his present conviction, Mr. Elder had two prior Arizona dru g convictions. In 1997, Mr. Elder was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of
Arizona Revised Statutes section 13

- 3415. We will refer to

Mr. Elder’s 1997 conviction as his “drug paraphernalia” conviction. In 1999, Mr. Elder pleaded g uilty to possession of equipment or chemicals for the manufacture of dangerousdrugs, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes section 13

- 3407(A)(3). We will refer to Mr. Elder’s 1999 conviction as his “dangerous drug” conviction. This conviction is
the fo cus of the present appeal. At the time that Mr. Elder pleaded guilty, 1 the statute supporting the “dangerous drug” conviction was structured in the following way:

1 The relevant Arizona statutes have since been amended. From this point forward in the opinion, unless otherwise stated, all refere nces to (continued ... )4 No. 17

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A. A person shall not knowingly ; 1. Possess or use a dangerous drug.

2. Possess a dangerous drug for sale.

3. Possess equipment or chemicals, or both, for the purpose of manufacturing a dangerous drug.

4. Manufacture a dangerous drug.

5. Administer a dangerous drug to another

person. 6. Obtain or procure the administration of a dangerous drug by fraud, decei t, misrepresentation or subterfuge.

7. Transport for sale, import into this state or offer to transport for sale or import into this state, sell, transfer or offer to sell or transfer a dangerous drug.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13

- 3407(A). Section 13

- 3407(A) therefo re criminalizes conduct related to “dangerous drug[s]” as a broad category, rather than any specific drugs.
“Dangerous drug” is further defined in Arizona Revised

Statutes section 13

- 3401(6). Section 13

- 3401(6) names broad categories of drugs (“hallucinog enic substances,” “stimulant[s],” “depressant[s],” and “anabolic steroids”) but thendefines only specific chemical compounds within those categories as “dangerous drugs.” Id. § 13

- 3401(6)(a) (hallucinogenic substances); id. § 13

- 3401(6)(b) (stimulants); i d.

( ... continue d)
the Arizona code are to the version of the code tha t was in effect at the

time Mr. Elder pleaded guilty.No. 17

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§ 13

- 3401(6)(c) (depressants); id. § 13

- 3401(6)(d) (anabolic steroids). For example, the “stimulant” category is broken down into twenty

- four specific chemical compounds that are“dangerous drugs,” including “amphetamine,” “methamphetamine,” and “phente rmine.” Id. § 13

- 3401(6)(b)(i), (xii), (xx).

B.

Prior to Mr. Elder’s original sentencing in this case, the Government filed a motion under 21 U.S.C. § 851, 2 indicat-

2 Section 851(a) provides:

(a) Information filed by United States Attorney

(1) No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part sh all be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney files an information with the court (and serves a copy of such information on the pers on or counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon.Upon a showing by the United States attorney that facts regarding prior convictions could not with due diligence be obtained prior to trial or before entry of a pl ea of guilty, the court may postpone the trial or the taking of the plea of guilty for a reasonable period for the purpose of obtaining such facts. Clerical mistakes in the information may beamended at any time prior to the pronouncement of sentence.

(2) An information may not be filed under this section ifthe increased punishment which may be imposed is imprisonment for a term in excess of three years unless the person either waived or was afforded prosecution by indictment for (continued ... )6 No. 17

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ing its intent to rely on the 1997 conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia and the 1999 dangerous drug convictionat sentencing as “felony drug offenses.” These two convictions would qualify Mr. Elder for a mandatory life sentence
under the three

- strikes rule of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
Section 841 provides that any person convicted u nder that section is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. It further provides for a mandatoryminimum sentence of either twenty years or life imprisonment for any person convicted under § 841 who has either one or two (or mor e) prior “felony drug offense” convictions, respectively. “Felony drug offense” is defined at 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) as “an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country t hat prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances.”

Mr. Elder filed a motion to dismiss the information filed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851; he argued that neither the drug

par aphernalia conviction nor the dangerous drug conviction was a “felony drug offense” because the convictions did not “relat[e] to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances,” as 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) defines “felony dr ug offense” for purposes of § 841. The dis-

( ... continue d)
the offense for which such increased punishment may be imposed.

21 U.S.C. § 851(a).No. 17

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trict court disagreed and believed that § 841(b)(1)(A) required the imposition of a life sentence.
In the first of his two appeals, Mr. Elder renewed the argument made to the district court that his 1999 dangerous drug conviction was not a felony drug offense. He also raised an argument, not made to the district court, that his 1997 drug paraphernalia conviction was not a felony drug offense because it was not punishable by more than one year, a point that all part ies and the district court had overlooked. Elder I , 840 F.3d at 461. The Government conceded that the drug paraphernalia conviction was not a felonydrug offense and, therefore, that the district court had improperly imposed a life sentence. We held that t he district court plainly erred in finding that Mr. Elder had committedtwo prior felony drug offenses and remanded for a full resentencing. In doing so, we addressed only the drug paraphernalia conviction and left the parties “free to address the signific ance of the 1999 conviction on remand.” Id. at 462 n.2.

C.

At Mr. Elder’s resentencing, the probation officer issued a revised presentence investigation report. She took the view that, even though Mr. Elder’s drug paraphernalia conviction no longer was c onsidered a felony drug offense, his sentencing range (324 to 405 months) had not changed. However,without the 1997 drug paraphernalia conviction, his statutory mandatory minimum dropped from life imprisonment to twenty years’ imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 84 1(b)(1)(A).
For his part, Mr. Elder filed a new motion to dismiss the § 851 information based on the 1999 dangerous drug convic-8 No. 17

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tion. First, he argued that the Government had failed to prove that the dangerous drug conviction was a felony drug
offense beca use it had not produced any evidence relating to
the conviction. 3 Second, he argued that Arizona’s definition of “dangerous drug” in section 13

- 3401 is broader than the categories of drugs enumerated in the definition of “felony drug offense” under § 802(4 4). Without a prior felony drug offense conviction that qualified under § 841(b)(1)(A),

Mr. Elder’s statutory minimum would drop to ten years’ imprisonment. See § 841(b)(1)(A).
The district court rejected Mr. Elder’s objection to the § 851 information, bu t it did not elaborate on its reasoningother than to say that it “adopt[ed] the findings and the reasoning in the conclusion” of its original June 2015 sentencing
order. 4 In the June 2015 proceeding, however, the district court had addressed only Mr. Elde r’s argument that his conviction did not “relate to” drugs referred to in the federal definition of felony drug offense, but did not reach

Mr. Elder’s more specific arguments: that the Government had not met its burden of producing any evidence related to the 1999 dangerous drug conviction; or, in the alternative, that Arizona’s definition of “dangerous drug” is broader than the list of drugs in § 802(44) and, therefore, that thedangerous drug conviction cannot serve as a predicate offense under § 841(b)(1 )(A).

3 Mr. Elder’s presentence report states that no information was available regarding the conviction.

4 R.561 at 10.No. 17

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The district court calculated a total offense level of 38 and a criminal history score of 8 (resulting in a criminal history category of IV). That calculation led the district court to a guidelines range of 324 to 405 months, the same range as the

o ne employed at Mr. Elder’s first sentencing. The district court noted that, given what it viewed as one prior felony drug offense conviction (for the 1999 Arizona conviction),
the “absolute minimum” sentence allowed was 240 months. 5 After considering the f actors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the
district court settled on a below

- guidelines sentence of 260 months’ imprisonment with ten years’ supervised release, remarking that it “didn’t think a guideline sentence was the appropriate sentence here.” 6

Counsel f or Mr. Elder mentioned that Mr. Elder might want to appeal his sentence based on the district court’streatment of the 1999 dangerous drug conviction. The district court informed Mr. Elder that his guidelines range would not change. However, the district c ourt said nothing about whether it would have imposed a different sentence if
Mr. Elder’s statutory range had been lower.

II

DISCUSSION

Mr. Elder now appeals his second sentence. He submits that the categorical approach of Taylor v. United States , 495

5 Id. at 45.

6 Id. at 46.10 No. 17

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U.S . 575 (1990), applies to the analysis of whether his 1999 dangerous drug Arizona conviction qualifies as a felony drug offense. Under that approach, he says, his conviction does not qualify because the Arizona statute criminalizes a broader category of dru gs than § 802(44) incorporates. Consequently, he should be subject to a statutory minimum of ten, not twenty, years’ imprisonment.
We agree with Mr. Elder that the district court applied the wrong statutory minimum from § 841(b)(1)(A). The district court s hould have applied Taylor ’s categorical approach to § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 802(44). See also Mathis v. United
States , 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). Mr. Elder’s 1999 dangerousdrug conviction cannot qualify as a felony drug offense under § 802(44) because Arizona’s definition of “dangerous drug” is broader than the list of drugs covered by § 802(44). This is true even if the Government could have proven thatthe 1999 conviction related to one of the drugs covered under § 802(44); under the categorical approach, the actual facts underlying Mr. Elder’s conviction are irrelevant.
We will explain our holding in three parts. First, we will explain why the categorical approach of Taylor , as opposed
to the circumstance

- specific approach of Nijhawan v. Holder

, 557 U.S. 29 ( 2009), must apply to our analysis of predicate offenses under § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 802(44). Second, we will explain why Mr. Elder’s 1999 dangerous drug convictiondoes not qualify as a felony drug offense under the categorical analysis. Finally, we will ad dress the appropriate remedy.No. 17

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A.
Section 841(b)(1)(A) provides for certain mandatory minimum sentences on the basis of prior convictions for felony drug offenses. A felony drug offense is defined by 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) to mean “an offense that is punish able by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the UnitedStates or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances.” Because § 802(44) defines felony drug offense in part by reference to state law, a mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(A) canbe predicated on prior convictions under state law. Determining whether a given state conviction qualifies as a felony drug offense under § 802(44), however, presents a complicated question, and it is a question of first impression for this

court. 7
The Supreme Court has developed two different approaches, applicable in different circumstances, for determining whether a given state conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under federal recidivism statutes. Sometimes the Court applies what it calls the “categorical” approach, com-

7 In Brock

- Miller v. United States , 887 F.3d 298 (7th Cir. 2018), we “reserve[d] for another day the question of whether the ... categorical approach applies to the term ‘felony drug offense’ for the purpose of” § 841. Id. at 307. There, however, the defendant’s prior conviction was not a felony drug offense un der any approach because the defendant’s
statute of conviction and her actual conduct related to prescription drugs.
Id. at 305. We noted that there was “little to no overlap between the controlled substances listed in the federal definition of ‘felony dru g offense’ and the prescription” drugs criminalized under the state statute. Id.12 No. 17

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paring the state statute of conviction to the federal statute in question and asking whether the two statutes are a categorical match. The categorical approach “focus[es] solely on whether the elements of the crime of conviction sufficiently match the elements of [the crime referenced in the federal statute], while ignoring the particular facts of the case.”
Mathis , 13 6 S. Ct. at 2248. In other circumstances, the Supreme Court applies what it calls the “circumstance

- specific approach.” In these cases, it looks to “the specific way inwhich an offender committed the crime on a specific occasion” to determine whether the prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under the federal statute at issue. Nijhawan , 557 U.S. at 34.
The Supreme Court has identified three factors that favor application of the categorical approach. See Mathis , 136 S. Ct.

at 2252

– 53. First, th e Court looks to the text of the federal recidivism statute at issue to determine whether it refers to a generic conviction or to the defendant’s actual conduct

. Id. at 2252. In this process the Court has considered the statute’s legislative history. See D escamps v. United States , 570 U.S. 254,

267

– 68 (2013); Taylor , 495 U.S. at 601. Second, the Court considers whether applying a circumstance

- specific approach
would raise “Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing courts’ making findings of fact that properly belong to juries.” Descamps , 570 U.S. at 267. Finally, the Court considers whether applying a circumstance

- specific approach would result in “practical difficulties and potential
unfairness” to defendants. Id. (quoting Taylor , 495 U.S. a t 601).
In determining whether § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 802(44) call for a categorical approach, we therefore must begin with theNo. 17

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text of the statutes. Section 841(b)(1)(A) requires an increasein the mandatory minimum sentence for any defendant convicted unde r § 841 “after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final.” “Felony drug offense” is defined by § 802(44) as “an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreig n country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances.” 8 Here, the question is whether the qualifier “relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depre ssant or stimulant substances” 9 refers to the statute of his conviction categorically or refers to the defendant’s conduct underlying hisprevious drug conviction. Several characteristics of the statutes’ texts and the structure of the overall statutory sc heme convince us that, in combination, § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 802(44) require a categorical approach.

First, § 841(b)(1)(A) refers to a defendant who has “a prior conviction for a felony drug offense,” not a defendant who
has committed a felony drug offense . § 841(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). This terminology supports the view that “Congress intended the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within cer-

8 Section 802(44) provides the “exclusive[]” definition of “felony drug offense” for purposes of applying § 841(b)(1)(A). Burgess v. United States

, 553 U.S. 124, 126 (2008); see also Brock

- Miller , 887 F.3d at 307.

9 Each of these named categories of drugs then is further defined in § 802. See, e.g. , § 802(9) (“depressant or stimulant substance”); § 802(16) (“marihuana”); § 802(17) (“narcotic drug”); § 802(41)(A) (“anabolic ste roid”).14 No. 17

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tain categories, and not to the facts underlying t he prior

conviction.” Taylor , 495 U.S. at 600 (statute requires categorical approach when it “refers to ‘a person who ... has three previous convictions’ for

— not a person who has committed

— three previous violent felonies or drug offenses” (alteration in orig inal)).

The structure of § 802(44) also supports this approach.The language “relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances” in § 802(44) modifies the phrase “any law of the United States
or of a State or foreign country.” Cf. Nijhawan , 557 U.S. at 38 (concluding that the circumstance

- specific approach applied when factual qualifier grammatically modified reference to defendant’s conduct as opposed to elements of the offense). Therefore, in determining whet her a defendant’s prior conviction is a felony drug offense under § 802(44), we must ask
whether the law of his conviction “prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances,” not whether
the defendant’s actual conduct related to one of those substances. The Supreme Court’s first factor therefore weighs in favor of the categorical approach.
Next, we turn to “the categorical approach’s Sixth Amendment underpinnings.” Descamps , 570 U .S. at 269. It iswell established that “[m]andatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime.” Alleyne v. United States , 570U.S. 99, 103 (2013). “Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 103. Applying the categorical approach to statutes that increase the penalty for a crime, like § 841(b)(1)(A), protects defendants’No. 17

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Sixth Amendment rights by ensuring that, in applying sentencing enhance ments, sentencing courts consider only those facts that necessarily were submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The sole and narrow exception to this rule

— that all facts that increase the penalty for a crime be found by a jury

— is
the fac t of a prior conviction. Id. at 111 n.1; see also Almendarez

- Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224 (1998). However, § 841(b)(1)(A) does not increase a defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence solely on the basis of a prior conviction. Instead, it applies a m andatory minimum sentence to defendants whose prior convictions meet certain criteria

—namely, that the conviction was for a prior felony drug offense as defined in § 802(44). Almendarez

- Torres applies to the fact of a conviction itself; it does not apply t o “a fact
about a prior conviction.” Shepard v. United States , 544 U.S.13, 25 (2005) (emphasis added). In applying a statute that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime, the sentencing court “cannot go beyond identifying the crime of

convict ion to explore the manner in which the defendant
committed that offense.” Mathis , 136 S. Ct. at 2252.
Allowing a sentencing court to determine, on the basis of its own factfinding, that a defendant’s prior conviction “relat[ed] to narcotic drugs, marihuana , anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances,” § 802(44), raises the very Sixth Amendment concerns against which the SupremeCourt repeatedly has warned in applying recidivism statutes. E.g.

, Descamps , 570 U.S. at 269 (“Accordingly, that finding would (at the least) raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns if it went beyond merely identifying a prior conviction.”). Rather, the sentencing court “can do no more, con-16 No. 17

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sistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, th e defendant was convicted of.”
Mathis , 136 S. Ct. at 2252. 10
Finally, we consider whether the categorical approach
“avoids unfairness to defendants.” Id. at 2253. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[s]tatements of ‘non

- elemental
fact’ in the records of prior convictions are prone to error precisely because their proof is unnecessary.” Id. (quoting Descamps , 570 U.S. at 270). “[A] defendant may have no incentive to contest what does not matter under the law[.] ... When that is true, a prosecutor’s or judge ’s mistake ... reflected in the record[] is likely to go uncorrected.” Id. ; see also Descamps , 570 U.S. at 270 (“And during plea hearings, the defendant may not wish to irk the prosecutor or court by squabbling about superfluous factual allegations.”). We ap-

10 We note that the Government never presented to the sentencing court evidence of the dangerous drug for which Mr. Elder was convicted in1999. Mr. Elder’s presentence report notes that no information was available about the 1999 conviction. Even on appeal, the Government states in
its brief that it did not have such evidence but “has reason to believe that
Elder’s 1999 conviction related to meth.” Gov’t Br. 18. Sometime after the Government submitted its brief in this court, it discovered in its r ecords a certified copy of the charging information from the 1999 dangerous drug conviction. The Government submitted a letter under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) to “inform the Court about the inaccuracy in its brief” and attempted to suppleme nt the record by attaching a copy of the charging information. App. R. 21 at 2.

Because we hold that the categorical approach applies to all enhancements under § 841(b)(1)(A), we will not examine the Government’s
newfound evidence to determine whether Mr. Elder was, in fact, charged with an offense related to methamphetamine.No. 17

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ply the categorical approach because its focus on elements

, rather than extraneous facts, means that any “inaccuracies”
in the record documents do “not come back to haunt the defendant many years down the road by triggering a lengthy mandatory sentence.” M athis , 136 S. Ct. at 2253.
Here, all three factors historically relied on by the Supreme Court to justify the categorical approach support its application to § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 802(44), and we adopt that approach. 11 The text of § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 802(44 )clearly requires a categorical approach by asking us to examine the defendant’s statute of conviction

— in other words, whether the defendant has a “conviction,” § 841(b)(1)(A), “under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country that proh ibits or restricts conduct relating to” certain substances, § 802(44). Moreover, any other approach would “raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns,” Descamps , 570 U.S. at 269, because it could allow the sentencing court to “go beyond identifying the crime o f conviction to explore the manner in which the defendant committed that offense,” Mathis , 136 S. Ct. at 2252. Finally, applying the categorical approach avoids unfairness to defendants by not placing the burden on defendants to challenge extraneous

11 Our conclusion that the categorical approach applies to § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 802(44) is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Ocampo

- Estrada , 873 F.3d 661 , 667 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that, in determining whether a state conviction qualifies “as a federal felony drug offense,” the court “look[s] to the statutory elements under whichthe offender was previously convicted, rather than the underlying conduct or facts giving rise to that conviction”).18 No. 17

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factua l inaccuracies in record documents not regarding elements of the offense.

B.
Next, we turn to the question whether, under the categorical approach, Mr. Elder’s 1999 Arizona dangerous drug conviction is a “felony drug offense” under § 802(44).

Under the categorical approach, we determine whetherthe state conviction can serve as a predicate offense by comparing the elements of the state statute of conviction to the
elements of the federal recidivism statute. Id. at 2248

– 49. “A state crime may qualify as a predicate conviction only if the elements of the state crime mirror, or are narrower than, the elements of the generic crime.” United States v. Zuniga

Galeana , 799 F.3d 801, 804 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). “If state law defines the offense more broadly than the [federal statute], the prior conviction doesn’t qualify as a [predicate
offense ] , even if the defendant’s conduct satisfies all of the elements of the [federal] offense.” United States v. Edwards

, 836 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in ori ginal).

Here, Arizona Revised Statutes section 13

- 3407 sweeps more broadly than the definition of felony drug offense in § 802(44) because the definition of “dangerous drugs” in section 13

- 3401 reaches at least two substances that are not included in § 80 2(44). Specifically, Arizona defines “[p]ropylhexedrine” and “[s]copolamine” as dangerous drugs, § 13

- 3401(6); neither is covered under the definitions in § 802(44). In short, Mr. Elder could have been convicted under § 13

- 3407 for a drug offense relating to a substance that is not covered under § 802(44). This mismatch rendersNo. 17

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the Arizona law categorically broader than § 802(44), and

Mr. Elder’s conviction under that statute therefore cannot serve as a predicate offense. 12
Because Mr. Elder’s 1999 dangerou s drug conviction cannot serve as a predicate offense under § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 802(44), the district court erred in concluding that Mr. Elder was subject to a mandatory twenty

- year minimum sentence for having a prior felony drug offense conviction.

The Government contends that even if the categorical approach applies, we are permitted to examine a limited
class of record documents under the so

- called “modified” categorical approach. The modified categorical approach applies “when a statute is ‘divisible, ’ meaning it ‘sets out one
or more elements of the offense in the alternative.’” Edwards

, 836 F.3d at 835 (quoting Descamps , 570 U.S. at 257). For example, a statute may criminalize “‘the lawful entry or the unlawful entry’ of a premises with intent to ste al, so as tocreate two different offenses, one more serious than the other.” Mathis , 136 S. Ct. at 2249. There, the “statute’s disjunctive phrasing renders [it] opaque” which crime the defendant was convicted of. Id. at 2253. The modified categorical

appr oach is a tool to “implement the categorical approach” and a “mechanism for making the [categorical approach’s]comparison when a statute lists multiple, alternative elements.” Descamps , 570 U.S. at 263

– 64.

12 Under the categorical approach, we are prohibited from examining

Mr. Elder’s conduct to determine whether his 1999 dangerous drug conviction related to a drug that is covered by § 802(44).20 No. 17

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If a statute truly is divisible, we may “consult a limited
class of documents ... to determine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.” Descamps , 570
U.S. at 257. 13 The documents we may consult are “charging papers, jury instructions, and any available plea agreements or ple a colloquies.” Edwards , 836 F.3d at 835 (citing Shepard

, 544 U.S. at 20).
As we have said, the modified categorical approach applies only to divisible statutes. “A statute that defines a single
offense with alternative means of satisfying a particular element is indivisible and therefore not subject to the modified categorical approach.” Id. (second emphasis added). For example, a criminal statute might “require[] use of a ‘deadly weapon’ as an element of a crime” and also further provide
“that the use of a ‘knife, gun, bat, or similar weapon’ would all qualify.” Mathis , 136 S. Ct. at 2249. The list of weapons“merely specifies diverse means of satisfying a single element of a single crime”

— it does not create a separate crime for each means by which the ele ment could be satisfied. Id. “Means ... are legally extraneous facts that ‘need neither be found by a jury nor admitted by a defendant.’” Edwards , 836 F.3d at 836 (quoting Mathis , 136 S. Ct. at 2248). In applying the “deadly weapons” statute, for instance, t he jury would

13 The modified cate gorical approach never gives a sentencing court license to consult the facts underlying the defendant’s prior conviction to determine whether it qualifies as a predicate offense. See Mathis v. United
States , 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2254 (2016) (“It is not to be r epurposed as a technique for discovering whether a defendant’s prior conviction, even though for a too

- broad crime, rested on facts (or otherwise said, involved means) that also could have satisfied the elements of a generic offense.”).No. 17

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need to find that the defendant used a deadly weapon but need not agree on which deadly weapon was used. Mathis

, 136 S. Ct. at 2249.
In determining whether a statute is divisible, we look first to whether there is “a decision by the state su preme court authoritatively construing the relevant statute” and establishing which facts are elements and which are means.
Edwards , 836 F.3d at 836. “Absent a controlling state

- courtdecision, the text and structure of the statute itself may provide the a nswer.” Id. Finally, “[f]ailing those ‘authoritativesources of state law,’ sentencing courts may look to ‘the record of a prior conviction itself’ for the limited purpose of distinguishing between elements and means.” Id. (quoting
Mathis , 136 S. Ct. at 22 56

– 57).

Here, Arizona Revised Statutes section 13

- 3407(A)(3) prohibits “[p]ossess[ing] equipment or chemicals, or both,for the purpose of manufacturing a dangerous drug.” “Dangerous drug” is defined elsewhere in the Arizona code. The question is whether section 13

- 3407(A)(3) is divisible such
that the type of dangerous drug is an element of the offense, as opposed to a means of committing the offense.
The parties have not invited our attention to (and we have not located ourselves) a decision of the Arizo na Supreme Court that instructs us that the type of dangerous drug is an element of Arizona Revised Statute s § 13

- 3407(A)(3). We are convinced, moreover, by the structure of
Arizona Revised Statutes section 13

- 3407(A)(3) and the definition of “dangerous dr ug,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13

- 3401(6), that
Arizona Revised Statutes section 13

- 3407(A)(3) is not divisible. Simply put, section 13

- 3407(A)(3) requires only that the
defendant “ [ p ] ossess equipment or chemicals, or both, for22 No. 17

- 2207

the purpose of manufacturing a dang erous drug .” § 13

- 3407(A)(3) (emphasis added). Dangerous drug is defined inan entirely different section of the Arizona code. The structural separation of the term “dangerous drug” from its definition makes its indivisibility clear. “Dangerous drug” is an
element o f a conviction under section 13

- 3407(A)(3); the type of dangerous drug is not.

Therefore, Arizona Revised Statutes section 13

- 3407(A)(3) is not divisible, and the modified categorical approach is not appropriate. We cannot examine the record doc uments thatthe Government has presented to determine the type of dangerous drug underlying Mr. Elder’s 1999 conviction.

C.

Because we have determined that the district court committed legal error in concluding that Mr. Elder was subject to a twenty

- year mandatory minimum sentence, we now address the appropriate remedy. The district court calculatedMr. Elder’s guidelines range to be 324 to 405 months’ imprisonment and sentenced Mr. Elder to 260 months’ imprisonment, a below

- guidelines sentence. The Gover nment contends that any error in applying § 802(44) was harmless and does not require resentencing.
“A finding of harmless error is only appropriate whenthe government has proved that the district court’s sentencing error did not affect the defendant’s su bstantial rights (here

— liberty).” United States v. Abbas , 560 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). “To prove harmless error, the government must be able to show that the [sentencing] error ‘did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.’” Id. (quot-No. 17

- 2207 23

ing United States v. Anderson , 517 F.3d 953, 965 (7th Cir. 2008)). For example, we have found harmless error when the sentencing court “expresse[s] [its] determination to impose the same sentence even if [it] had gotten the calculations wrong.” I d. at 667.

Here, it is not clear from the record whether the district court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the mandatory minimum. The district court noted that even
if Mr. Elder appealed his sentence, his guidelines range
would not cha nge. That is true. However, under our holding today, Mr. Elder’s statutory range has decreased significantly. Because Mr. Elder no longer has a prior conviction that qualifies as a felony drug offense under § 802(44), his mandatory minimum sentence is ten years, not twenty years. The
district court did not say that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the statutory range.
We conclude that “[t]he only practical way ... to determine whether ... the error was prejudicial” is “to ask the district judge.” Paladino , 401 F.3d at 483

– 84. We will “order a limited remand to permit the sentencing judge to determine whether he would (if required to resentence) reimpose his original sentence.” Id. at 484. If the district court confirms
that it would have im posed the same sentence regardless of the statutory range, we will “affirm the original sentence.”
Id. If, however, the district court “states ... that he would have imposed a different sentence[,] ... we will vacate the original sentence and remand for resent encing.” Id. Either way, the district court must “place on the record a decisionnot to resentence, with an appropriate explanation, or inform this court of its desire to resentence the defendant.” Id.24 No. 17

- 2207

(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Crosby , 3 97 F.3d 103, 120 (2d Cir. 2005)).

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in the foregoing opinion, we direct a limited remand of Mr. Elder’s sentence in accordance with the procedure set forth in Paladino , 401 F.3d at 484

– 85, while retaining appellate juri sdiction.

REMANDED