IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-588

No. COA22-95

Filed 6 September 2022

Durham County, No. 17-CVS-004551

LENNARD BARTLETT, SR. ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF MARY 

SUSAN WHITE BARTLETT, Plaintiff,

v.

ESTATE OF JEFFREY L. BURKE; AIR METHODS CORPORATION; AIRBUS 

HELICOPTERS DEUTSCHLAND, GMBH; AIRBUS HELICOPTERS, INC.; 

SAFRAN HELICOPTER ENGINES; AND SAFRAN HELICOPTER ENGINES USA, 

INC., Defendants.

KASEY HOBSON HARRISON, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF KRISTOPHER 

RAY HARRISON, Plaintiff

 v. 

ESTATE OF JEFFREY L. BURKE; AIR METHODS CORPORATION; AIRBUS 

HELICOPTERS DEUTSCHLAND, GMBH; AIRBUS HELICOPTERS, INC.; 

SAFRAN HELICOPTER ENGINES; AND SAFRAN HELICOPTER ENGINES USA, 

INC., Defendants.

Appeal by defendants from orders entered 13 September 2021 by Judge David 

L. Hall in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 August 

2022.

Robb & Robb LLC, by Gary C. Robb, admitted pro hac vice, Anita Porte Robb,

admitted pro hac vice, and Brittany Sanders Robb, admitted pro hac vice, and 

Ward and Smith P.A. by Christopher S. Edwards for plaintiff-appellees 

Lennard Bartlett, Sr. Administrator of the Estate of Mary Susan White Bartlett 
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and Kasey Hobson Harrison, Executrix of the Estate of Kristopher Ray 

Harrison. 

Pangia Law Group, by Amanda C. Dure and Joseph L. Anderson, and Mast, 

Mast, Johnson, Wells & Trimyer, PA, by Charles D. Mast and Nichole G. Booker 

for cross claimant-appellee the Estate of Jeffrey L. Burke. 

Crouse Law Offices by James T. Crouse for plaintiff-intervenor-appellee Robert 

Sollinger. 

Ellis & Winters LLP, by Alex J. Hagan and Kelly Margolis Dagger, and Wilson 

Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP by Kathryn A. Grace and William J. 

Katt, admitted pro hac vice, for defendants-appellees Estate of Jeffrey L. Burke 

and Air Methods Corporation.

Moore & Van Allen PLLC, by Christopher D. Tomlinson and Anthony T. 

Lathrop, and Locke Lord LLP by Eric C. Strain, admitted pro hac vice, and 

Paul E. Stinson, admitted pro hac vice, for defendant-appellant Airbus 

Helicopters Deutschland GmbH. 

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by D. Martin Warf and William M. 

Starr, and Jackson Walker LLP, by Stuart B. Brown, Jr., admitted pro hac vice,

for defendant-appellant Safran Helicopter Engines. 

TYSON, Judge.

¶ 1 Safran Helicopter Engines (“SHE”) and Airbus Helicopters Deutschland 

GmbH (“AHD”) appeal from orders entered denying their motions to dismiss for lack 

of specific personal jurisdiction. We reverse and remand. 

I. Background 

¶ 2 At approximately 11:08 a.m. on 8 September 2017, a Eurocopter Deutschland 

GmbH model MBB-BK117 C2 helicopter (“Helicopter”) took off from the helipad at 
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Sentara Albemarle Regional Medical Center in Elizabeth City with a flight plan

bound for the helipad located at Duke University Hospital in Durham. The 

Helicopter’s manufacturer designated the unit as serial number 9474, and it was

assigned a Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) registration number of N146DU. 

Air Methods Corporation operated the Helicopter for the owner, Duke University 

Health Systems, Inc., specifically as a medevac flight for Duke Life Flight. 

¶ 3 The Helicopter pilot commenced a turn to the south at approximately 11:16 

a.m. A minute later, the Helicopter’s computer transmitted flight data stating the 

aircraft was flying at an altitude of 1,200 feet above mean sea level with a ground 

speed of 75 knots or 86.3 miles per hour. Witnesses on the ground later reported they

observed smoke trailing from behind the Helicopter while in flight. Witnesses also 

reported the Helicopter appeared to be hovering and not traveling forward. The 

Helicopter quickly descended and impacted a shallow turf drainage pathway about 

30 feet wide and 2,000 feet long located between two fields of eight-foot-tall grass on 

a wind turbine farm in Hertford. The Helicopter landed upright, but the cabin 

collapsed downward upon impact and was partially consumed by post-impact fire. 

¶ 4 Onboard the Helicopter was pilot-in-charge, Jeffrey L. Burke; two flight 

nurses: Kristopher R. Harrison and Crystal Sollinger; and patient, Mary Susan White 

Bartlett. All individuals aboard perished in the crash. Burke was employed by Air 

Methods Corporation and Harrison and Sollinger were employed by Duke University 
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Health Systems, Inc. 

¶ 5 The National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) investigated the crash. 

Examination of the Helicopter’s wreckage revealed the second engine’s rear turbine 

shaft bearing exhibited dislocation consistent with overheating and lack of 

lubrication, and the bearing roller pins were worn down to the surface of the bearing 

race. The FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (“SAIB”) SW-18-

04 alerting owners, operators, maintainers, and certified repair facilities of the MBBBK117 C2 helicopters of possible blockages of the engine oil drainage system. The 

SAIB SW-18-04 bulletin references an emergency landing by a MBB-BK117 C2 

helicopter in Sioux Falls, South Dakota on 26 January 2017 resulting in no fatalities 

and the 8 September 2017 crash of this Helicopter. The SAIB noted “block drain line 

may, under certain circumstances, present a risk for an engine fire and/or inflight 

shutdown of the affected engine.” SAIB SW-18-04 recommended operators of MBBBK117 C2 helicopters perform inspections of the bearing lines and drain collector at 

a maximum of 100 hours of time-in-service. 

¶ 6 The Helicopter at issue was equipped with two Arriel 1E2 jet turbine engines 

(the “Engines”) manufactured by Turbomeca S.A.S, which company was purchased 

by Safran SA in 2005 and rebranded as SHE in 2016. SHE is a wholly-owned 

subsidiary of Safran SA, a French public limited company, which is not a party to this 

action. SHE’s principal place of business is located in Paris, France, and it maintains 
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a place of business in Bordes, France, where it manufactured the Engines at issue. 

SHE sold and delivered the Engines to Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH located in 

Germany in December 2010. SHE sells and delivers Arriel engines to AHD in both 

France and Germany. 

¶ 7 Safran Helicopter Engines USA is a Delaware corporation with its principal 

place of business located in Grand Marie, Texas. Safran Helicopter Engines USA is 

a wholly-owned subsidiary of Safran USA, a Delaware corporation with its principal 

place of business located in Irving, Texas. Safran USA is also a wholly owned 

subsidiary of Safran S.A. Safran USA fulfills orders for engines, provides technical 

support to customers, and markets these services and products within the United 

States. 

¶ 8 Safran S.A. and Safran USA chartered Turbomeca Manufacturing, a Delaware 

Corporation, in July 2007. Turbomeca Manufacturing, Inc. was later renamed 

Turbomeca Manufacturing LLC. Turbomeca Manufacturing, Inc. manufactured 

helicopter engine components. Turbomeca Manufacturing, Inc. opened a

manufacturing facility in Monroe. Safran purchases engine components from

Turbomeca Manufacturing LLC for use in engines it manufactured in France. 

¶ 9 AHD is formerly known as Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH. Eurocopter 

Deutschland GmbH was renamed AHD in 2014. AHD is a company engaged in the 

design, manufacture, testing, inspection, assembly, labeling, advertising, sale, 
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promotion, and distribution of helicopters, with its principal place of business located 

in Germany. AHD sourced two helicopter components from companies located in 

North Carolina. 

¶ 10 Airbus Helicopters, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 

business in Texas. Airbus Helicopters, Inc. is the successor to American Eurocopter 

Corporation. In 2009, Eurocopter entered a Distribution and Service Center 

Agreement with American Eurocopter Corporation, which was assigned to successor 

entity Airbus Helicopters, Inc. 

¶ 11 The Distribution and Service Center Agreement defines their relationship and

granted American Eurocopter Corporation the exclusive right to sell new Eurocopter 

helicopters within the United States. American Eurocopter Corporation obligated 

itself to promote, market, and support products it purchased from Eurocopter for 

resale within the United States. 

¶ 12 In 2011, Eurocopter sold and delivered the Helicopter at issue to American 

Eurocopter Corporation. This transaction occurred in Germany. The purchase 

agreement is governed by German law. American Eurocopter Corporation was 

responsible for importing the Helicopter into the United States. The Helicopter was 

delivered in a standard configuration. 

¶ 13 American Eurocopter Corporation imported and sold the Helicopter to Duke 

University Health System, Inc. in Texas also in a standard configuration. American 
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Eurocopter Corporation agreed to provide Duke University Health System, Inc. as 

the Helicopter’s owner with technical publications, pilot training, and maintenance 

training. 

¶ 14 AHD was made aware Air Methods was operating the Helicopter as an EMS 

medevac Duke Life Flight on behalf of Duke University Health System, Inc. AHD 

was also made aware of approximately two dozen other similar helicopter operators 

in North Carolina. In 2017, Air Methods asked Airbus Helicopters, Inc. a technical 

question about the Helicopter that required Airbus Helicopters, Inc. to obtain 

information from AHD, which then responded to Air Methods. The subject of this 

inquiry is not at issue in the accident involving the Helicopter. 

¶ 15 Lennard Bartlett, Sr., in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Mary 

Susan White Bartlett, and Kasey Hobson Harrison, in her capacity as executrix of 

the estate of Kristopher Ray Harrison, each filed negligence and breach of warranty 

actions for wrongful death damages against the Estate of Jeffrey L. Burke; Air 

Methods Corporation; AHD; Airbus Helicopters, Inc.; SHE; and, Safran Helicopter 

Engines USA, Inc. on 11 December 2017. 

¶ 16 Dina Burke, as administrator of the Estate of Jeffrey L. Burke, filed 

crossclaims against SHE and AHD. 

¶ 17 Lennard Bartlett, Sr., in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Mary 

Susan White Bartlett (“Bartlett Action”), and Kasey Hobson Harrison, in her capacity 
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as executrix of the estate of Kristopher Ray Harrison (“Harrison Action”), each filed 

amended complaints. The Estate of Jeffrey L. Burke and Air Methods Corporation 

answered, asserted affirmative defenses, and cross-claimed for indemnity against 

SHE and AHD. 

¶ 18 SHE moved to dismiss the Bartlett and Harrison Actions on 15 June 2018. 

SHE also moved to dismiss the indemnity claims filed by the Estate of Jeffrey L. 

Burke and Air Methods Corporation. Both the Bartlett and Harrison Actions were 

consolidated by order on 14 August 2018. 

¶ 19 AHD moved to dismiss the Bartlett and Harrison Actions for lack of personal 

jurisdiction on 21 August 2018 and 11 September 2018, respectively. AHD moved to 

dismiss the crossclaim of the Estate of Jeffrey L. Burke on 6 May 2019. 

¶ 20 On 1 October 2018, Robert Sollinger, in his capacity as executor of the estate 

of Crystal Sollinger, moved to intervene and file a complaint, which was granted by 

order entered on 13 November 2018. SHE and AHD moved to dismiss the Sollinger 

action for lack of personal jurisdiction on 6 May 2019. The trial court entered orders

denying SHE’s and AHD’s motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) of the North 

Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and holding North Carolina had personal 

jurisdiction over SHE and AHD by orders entered 13 September 2021. SHE and AHD 

appeal. 

II. Jurisdiction 
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¶ 21 SHE and AHD correctly concede this appeal is interlocutory but assert their

substantial rights will be impacted without immediate review. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 7A-27(b)(3)(a) (2021). 

¶ 22 “Generally, there is no right of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders and 

judgments.” Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 

736 (1990). 

¶ 23 Our Supreme Court has held: 

A final judgment is one which disposes of the cause as to 

all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined 

between them in the trial court. An interlocutory order is 

one made during the pendency of an action, which does not 

dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the 

trial court in order to settle and determine the entire 

controversy. 

Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) (internal 

citations omitted). 

¶ 24 “This general prohibition against immediate [interlocutory] appeal exists 

because [t]here is no more effective way to procrastinate the administration of justice 

than that of bringing cases to an appellate court piecemeal through the medium of 

successive appeals from intermediate orders.” Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 269, 

643 S.E.2d 566, 568 (2007) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 

¶ 25 Our General Statutes recognize a limited right to an immediate appeal from 
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an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(b) (2021) (“Any interested party shall have the right of 

immediate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the court over the 

person or property of the defendant[.]”). The denial of a “motion[] to dismiss for lack 

of personal jurisdiction affect[s] a substantial right and [is] immediately appealable.” 

A.R. Haire, Inc. v. St. Denis, 176 N.C. App. 255, 257-58, 625 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2006) 

(citations omitted). 

¶ 26 This exception is narrow: “the right of immediate appeal of an adverse ruling 

as to jurisdiction over the person, under [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(b)], is limited to 

rulings on ‘minimum contacts’ questions, the subject matter of Rule 12(b)(2).” Love 

v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 581, 291 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1982). This appeal is properly 

before this Court. 

III. Issue 

¶ 27 SHE and AHD argue the trial court erred in asserting and holding it had 

acquired personal jurisdiction over them. 

IV. Personal Jurisdiction 

¶ 28 North Carolina applies a two-step analysis to determine whether a nonresident defendant is subject to in personam jurisdiction. See Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben 

Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986) (citation omitted). 

“First, jurisdiction must be authorized by our ‘long-arm’ statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
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75.4. Second, if the long-arm statute permits consideration of the action, exercise of 

jurisdiction must not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

to the U.S. Constitution.” Cambridge Homes of N.C. Ltd. P’ship v. Hyundai Constr., 

Inc., 194 N.C. App. 407, 411, 670 S.E.2d 290, 295 (2008) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

¶ 29 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits a state court’s power 

to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. See International Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 90 L. Ed. 95, 101 (1945). The Supreme Court of the 

United States recognizes “two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general (sometimes 

called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called case-linked) 

jurisdiction.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. __, __, 

209 L. Ed. 2d 225, 233 (2021) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 

Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 180 L. Ed. 2d 796, (2011)). 

¶ 30 “The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the 

defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which 

the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 

the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of” the forum state’s laws. 

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 542 (1985) 

(internal citation omitted). This “‘purposefully avails’ requirement ensures that a 

defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’
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‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts[.]” Id. (citation omitted). 

¶ 31 The basis of the suit must “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts 

with the forum.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 582 U.S. __, __, 

198 L. Ed. 2d 395, 403 (2017) (citation omitted); see Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at ___, 

209 L. Ed. 2d at 234 (citations omitted); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 

541 (citation omitted); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 

408, 414, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404, 411 (1984) (citations omitted); International Shoe, 326 

U.S. at 319, 90 L. Ed. at 104. 

A. Standard of Review 

¶ 32 “When jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff has the burden of proving that 

jurisdiction exists.” Stetser v. TAP Pharm. Prods., Inc., 162 N.C. App. 518, 520, 591 

S.E.2d 572, 574 (2004) (citation omitted). As noted above, “it is essential in each case 

that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 

and protections of its laws.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 542 

(citation omitted). 

¶ 33 “The standard of review [on appeal] of an order determining personal 

jurisdiction is whether the findings of fact by the trial court are supported by 

competent evidence in the record[.]” Bell v. Mozley, 216 N.C. App. 540, 543, 716 S.E.2d 

868, 871 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “We review de novo the issue 
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of whether the trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusion of law that the court 

has personal jurisdiction over a defendant.” Id. (citation omitted). 

B. Minimum Contacts

¶ 34 North Carolina’s Long Arm Statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 (2021), grants 

North Carolina’s courts specific personal jurisdiction “over defendant[s] to the extent 

allowed by due process.” Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 676 ,231 

S.E.2d 629, 631 (1977). The two-step inquiry from Tom Togs “collapses into the 

question of whether” the defendant moving to dismiss pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(2) “has the minimum contacts with North Carolina necessary to 

meet the requirements of due process.” Sherlock v. Sherlock, 143 N.C. App. 300, 303, 

545 S.E.2d 757, 760 (2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

1. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. 

¶ 35 The Supreme Court of the United States recently addressed the issue of a state 

court’s authority under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant in Ford Motor Co., 592

U.S. at __, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 232. In Ford, the action arose out of two separate 

automobile accidents occurring in Montana and Minnesota involving vehicles 

manufactured by Ford Motor Company. Id. Ford Motor Company is incorporated in 

Delaware and headquartered in Michigan. Id. at __, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 231. 

¶ 36 Ford Motor Company conceded “it does substantial business in” both states, 
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“that it actively seeks to serve the market for automobiles and related products” in 

both states, and “it ha[d] purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting

activities in both places.” Id. at __, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 235 (citation and quotation marks

omitted). Ford Motor Company maintained and argued a strict causal relationship

was required to be shown between the injury and conduct. 

¶ 37 Ford Motor Company asserted the required link had to “be causal in nature” 

and “jurisdiction attaches only if the defendant’s forum conduct gave rise to the 

plaintiff’s claims.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

¶ 38 The Supreme Court of the United States held: 

None of our precedents ha[ve] suggested that only a strict 

causal relationship between the defendant’s in-state 

activity and the litigation will do. As just noted, our most 

common formulation of the rule demands that the suit 

“arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the 

forum.” The first half of that standard asks about 

causation; but the back half, after the “or,” contemplates 

that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a 

causal showing. That does not mean anything goes. In the 

sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase “relate to” 

incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect 

defendants foreign to a forum. But again, we have never 

framed the specific jurisdiction inquiry as always requiring 

proof of causation—i.e., proof that the plaintiff’s claim 

came about because of the defendant’s in-state conduct.

Id. at __, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 235-36 (last emphasis supplied, citations omitted). 

¶ 39 The Supreme Court’s majority opinion drew the following example analyzing 

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 297, 62 L. ed. 2d 490 (1980): 
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[I]ndeed, this Court has stated that specific jurisdiction 

attaches in cases . . . when a company like Ford serves a 

market for a product in the forum State and the product 

malfunctions there. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court 

held that an Oklahoma court could not assert jurisdiction 

over a New York car dealer just because a car it sold later 

caught fire in Oklahoma. But in so doing, we contrasted 

the dealer’s position to that of two other defendants—Audi, 

the car’s manufacturer, and Volkswagen, the car’s 

nationwide importer (neither of which contested 

jurisdiction):

“[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or 

distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an 

isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the 

manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or 

indirectly, the market for its product in [several or all] 

other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit 

in one of those States if its allegedly defective 

merchandise has there been the source of injury to its 

owner or to others.” 

Or said another way, if Audi and Volkswagen’s business 

deliberately extended into Oklahoma (among other States), 

then Oklahoma’s courts could hold the companies 

accountable for a car’s catching fire there—even though the 

vehicle had been designed and made overseas and sold in 

New York. For, the Court explained, a company thus 

“purposefully avail[ing] itself” of the Oklahoma auto 

market “has clear notice” of its exposure in that State to 

suits arising from local accidents involving its cars. And 

the company could do something about that exposure: It 

could “act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by 

procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to 

customers, or, if the risks are [still] too great, severing its 

connection with the State.” 

Id. at __, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 236-37 (citations omitted). 

¶ 40 The Supreme Court concluded: “Ford had systematically served a market in 
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Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned 

and injured them in those States. So there is a strong ‘relationship among the 

defendant, the forum, and the litigation’—the ‘essential foundation’ of specific 

jurisdiction.” Id. at __, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 238 (citation omitted).

¶ 41 The majority’s opinion in Ford, does not explain how a large national,

ubiquitous company could not be subject to jurisdiction in all courts, however, it cites 

with approval and does not overrule its decision in Goodyear. In Goodyear, the 

Supreme Court of the United States found North Carolina could not hale Goodyear 

Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. into a North Carolina court, when the allegedly 

defective tire was manufactured in Turkey and purportedly malfunctioned in France. 

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 918, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 802. 

¶ 42 The majority’s opinion’s “assortment of nouns” in Ford does not establish outer 

limits for lower courts to follow when evaluating whether due process protections 

prohibit a court from establishing specific personal jurisdiction over a non-forum 

defendant. Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at __, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 245 (Gorsuch, J., 

concurring). Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence asserts the majority opinion’s holding

may affect lower court’s evaluation of specific personal jurisdiction after Ford: 

Where this leaves us is far from clear. For a case to “relate 

to” the defendant’s forum contacts, the majority says, it is 

enough if an “affiliation” or “relationship” or “connection”

exists between them. But what does this assortment of 

nouns mean? Loosed from any causation standard, we are 
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left to guess. The majority promises that its new test “does 

not mean anything goes,” but that hardly tells us what 

does. In some cases, the new test may prove more forgiving 

than the old causation rule. But it’s hard not to wonder 

whether it may also sometimes turn out to be more 

demanding. Unclear too is whether, in some cases like 

that, the majority would treat causation and “affiliation” as 

alternative routes to specific jurisdiction or whether it 

would deny jurisdiction outright. 

Id. (internal citations omitted).

¶ 43 This Court’s post-Ford opinions in Cohen v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 2021-NCCOA449, 279 N.C. App. 123, 864 S.E.2d 816 (2021) and Miller v. L.G. Chem, Ltd., 2022-

NCCOA-55, 281 N.C. App. 531, 868 S.E.2d 896 (2022) analyze prior specific personal 

jurisdiction precedents. Cohen and Miller are instructive and set precedential 

goalposts and boundary lines to determine whether sufficient or insufficient 

jurisdictional contacts are shown and proven. 

1. Cohen v. Cont’l Motors, Inc.

¶ 44 In Cohen, the plaintiffs’ aircraft starter adapter failed, causing a loss of oil 

pressure and ultimate failure of the aircraft’s engine. Cohen, 2021-NCCOA-449 at ¶

2, 279 N.C. App. at 125, 864 S.E.2d at 818. The plane crashed and both owners/pilots 

perished. Id. Continental Motors, Inc., the engine’s manufacturer, is domiciled in 

Delaware, made nearly 3,000 sales, earning almost $4 million from North Carolinabased consumers. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4, 279 N.C. App. at 125, 864 S.E.2d at 819. Continental 

Motors worked closely with fourteen paid North Carolina maintenance providers and
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paid subscribers from its electronic subscription account for manuals and technical 

support. Id. at ¶ 6, 279 N.C. App. at 126, 864 S.E.2d at 819.

2. Miller v. L.G. Chem, Ltd.

¶ 45 “LG Chem manufactures and sells lithium-ion batteries which are designed 

and sold solely to corporate and industrial businesses for inclusion in battery packs 

used for specified products” not for use in the vape devices for which they were 

inserted in the underlying action. Miller, 2022-NCCOA-55 at ¶ 23, 281 N.C. App. at 

537, 868 S.E.2d at 901. LG Chem never sold battery or battery components to North 

Carolina-based companies. Id. at ¶ 26, 281 N.C. App. at 538, 868 S.E.2d at 902. This 

Court held the defendants in Cohen could be haled into North Carolina’s courts, but

the defendants in Miller could not. 

C. Analysis 

¶ 46 This Court has held: “The mere fact that [a defendant] was ‘connected’ to the 

manufacture and distribution of [a product] is not sufficient to support a conclusion 

that [the defendant] purposefully availed itself of North Carolina jurisdiction by 

injecting its products into the stream of commerce.” Id. at ¶ 19, 281 N.C. App. at 536, 

868 S.E.2d at 901 (citation omitted). 

¶ 47 Our Supreme Court recently summarized the Supreme Court of the United 

States’ prerequisites for a forum to exercise personal jurisdiction under a stream of 

commerce theory in Mucha v. Wagner, 2021-NCSC-82, 378 N.C. 167, 861 S.E.2d 501 
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(2021): 

These cases have drawn a distinction between conduct 

targeted at states generally and conduct targeted at the 

specific forum state seeking to exercise jurisdiction over the 

defendant. Thus, the Court has held that a forum state 

may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who 

delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the 

expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in 

the forum State, but not over a defendant who directed 

marketing and sales efforts at the United States without 

engaging in conduct purposefully directed at the forum 

state. 

Id. at ¶ 15, 378 N.C. at 173, 861 S.E.2d at 507-08 (citations, alterations, and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

¶ 48 Neither Bartlett, Harrison, nor any of the plaintiffs make any arguments to 

“pierce the corporate veil” of AHD or SHE or assert either entity is an “alter ego” of 

the United States- based defendants to AHD and SHE. SHE has no relationship with 

Safran Helicopter Engines USA. AHD has no ownership interest in Airbus 

Helicopters, Inc. The parties’ relationship is governed by the distributor agreement. 

Neither Airbus SE nor Safran S.A., the corporate parents, of AHD and SHE are 

parties in this action. Glenn v. Wagner, 313 N.C. 450, 455, 329 S.E.2d 326, 330-31

(1985) (lays out elements and factors for a court to consider whether to pierce the 

corporate veil). See Acceptance Corp. v. Spencer, 268 N.C. 1, 8, 149 S.E.2d 570, 575 

(1966) (“[A] corporation which exercises actual control over another, operating the 

latter as a mere instrumentality or tool, is liable for the torts of the corporation thus 
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controlled. In such instances, the separate identities of parent and subsidiary or 

affiliated corporations may be disregarded.”) (citation omitted). 

¶ 49 A federal trial court has held the North Carolina court “would adopt the 

internal affairs doctrine and apply the law of the state of incorporation” in piercing 

the corporate veil. Dassault Falcon Jet Corp. v. Oberflex, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 345, 349 

(M.D.N.C. 1995). However, while not explaining why it used North Carolina law, this 

Court applied North Carolina law to pierce the corporate veil of a Florida corporation 

doing business in North Carolina to uphold personal jurisdiction in North Carolina. 

See Copley Triangle Assoc. v. Apparel America, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 263, 265, 385 S.E2d 

201, 203 (1989). The structural and governance integrity of the foreign corporate 

entities is unchallenged.

1. AHD

¶ 50 AHD argues the trial court erred by finding it “availed itself of the privilege of 

conducting business in North Carolina through its continuous and deliberate efforts 

to serve the market here, individually[,]” and that “AHD has continuously and 

deliberately served the North Carolina market with regard to the Subject Helicopter 

and similar models.” 

¶ 51 AHD challenges the following finding of fact: 

11. The sales and marketing services AHD sought and 

obtained for the North Carolina market are contacts with 

North Carolina for purposes of this Motion; 
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(emphasis supplied). 

¶ 52 “The labels ‘findings of fact’ and ‘conclusions of law’ employed by the trial court 

in a written order do not determine the nature of our review.” Westmoreland v. High 

Point Healthcare Inc., 218 N.C. App. 76, 79, 721 S.E.2d 712, 716 (2012) (citation 

omitted). “As a general rule, however, any determination requiring the exercise of 

judgment, or the application of legal principles, is more properly classified a 

conclusion of law. Any determination reached through logical reasoning from the 

evidentiary facts is more properly classified a finding of fact.” In re Helms, 127 N.C. 

App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). This “finding[] of fact” is properly characterized and reviewed as a

conclusion of law. 

¶ 53 AHD also challenges the following conclusions of law: 

3. Discovery taken in this action fairly demonstrates that 

at the time AHD manufactured the Subject Helicopter, it 

knew and intended that the craft would be sold and used 

in an international market, including the United States 

and potentially North Carolina; 

17. The facts found above demonstrate that AHD delivered 

the Subject Helicopter into the stream of commerce with the 

expectation it would be purchased and operated anywhere 

in the United States, specifically to include North Carolina; 

19. In applying controlling law, this Court makes its 

Conclusions based, without limitation, the facts found that 

AHD at all times relevant to this action had

a) an international scope of operations; 
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b) chose to sell the Subject Helicopter (and similar 

models) via a nation-wide (sic) exclusive distributor 

agreement with A[irbus] H[elicopters] I[nc.] that 

included North Carolina; 

c) made no attempt to limit sales to North Carolina; 

d) had actual knowledge that the Subject Helicopter was 

being used as a medical services helicopter in North 

Carolina for more than seven (7) years prior to the loss 

complained of; 

e) tracked ownership, operation, purpose and hours 

flown relating to the Subject Helicopter in part to derive 

benefit from future part sales and repairs; 

f) participated in sufficient marketing and sales activity 

within North Carolina; 

21. AHD had actual notice of potential exposure in the 

North Carolina courts arising from the sale and operation 

of the Subject Helicopter (and similar models) in North 

Carolina, and by providing ongoing guidance, instruction, 

and replacement parts for the continued operation of the 

Subject Helicopter in North Carolina, both individually 

and through its exclusive distributor A[irbus] H[elicopters] 

I[nc.]; 

(emphasis supplied). We will review these conclusions in our analysis of the 

underlying motion to dismiss. 

¶ 54 The product at issue is a MB-BK117 C2 helicopter and its engines. AHD sells 

and delivers the helicopter in Germany to Airbus Helicopters Inc., who in turn 

imports the helicopters into the United States. Once imported into the United States,

the helicopters are sold and delivered in Texas to the new owner or end user by Airbus 
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Helicopters, Inc., a wholly separate entity, and is not a party to this appeal. 

¶ 55 Ford Motor Company sold the various vehicles involved in each accident

directly to the public through an elaborate local dealer network. Ford Motor 

Company “advertised, sold, and serviced those two car models in both [forum] States 

for many years.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at __, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 238. Unlike in

Ford, AHD does not import nor operate a dealer network within the United States, 

and only sells and delivers the units in Germany directly to Airbus Helicopters Inc.,

an exclusive importer.

¶ 56 AHD does provide operator access to a website portal, Keycopter. The data 

and technical support provided by AHD includes technical publications, maintenance 

manuals, and technical instructions. AHD provides answers to technical questions 

regarding the ongoing care and maintenance of their helicopters through Keycopter. 

¶ 57 In Havey v. Valentine, 172 N.C. App. 812, 816-17, 616 S.E.2d 642, 647-48 

(2005), our Court adopted the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s

rule for determining whether an internet website can become the basis for the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction in the forum. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. 

Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002). ALS Scan, Inc. adopted the 

analysis from Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp 1119 

(W.D.Pa. 1997). 

¶ 58 In Havey, this Court held: 
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A State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial 

power over a person outside of the State when that person 

(1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with the 

manifested intent of engaging in business or other 

interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, 

in a person within the State, a potential cause of action 

cognizable in the State’s courts. Under this standard, a 

person who simply places information on the Internet does 

not subject himself to jurisdiction in each State into which 

the electronic signal is transmitted and received. Such 

passive Internet activity does not generally include 

directing electronic activity into the State with the 

manifested intent of engaging business or other 

interactions in the State thus creating in a person within 

the State a potential cause of action cognizable in courts 

located in the State. When a website is neither merely 

passive nor highly interactive, the exercise of jurisdiction is 

determined by examining the level of interactivity and 

commercial nature of the exchange of information that 

occurs.

Havey, 172 N.C. App. at 816-17, 616 S.E.2d at 647-48 (emphasis supplied) (internal 

citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). 

¶ 59 AHD’s website, Keycopter, is an interactive informational website. The 

website provides a technical library where subscribers can access instructions. 

Unlike the technical website present, in Cohen, the record does not disclose whether 

AHD charged a subscription for access or generated any revenue from any North 

Carolina customers’ access. At oral argument counsel for AHD stated the aircraft 

owner’s warranty card provided their access to Keycopter. Unlike the paid 

subscription service shown in Cohen, this Keycopter portal is not shown to contain a 
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commercial nature from paid subscriptions. “A passive [w]eb site that does little more 

than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for 

the exercise [of] personal jurisdiction.” ALS Scan, Inc., 293 F.3d at 714. 

¶ 60 When considering whether AHD’s alleged contacts “related to” North Carolina,

beyond mere “stream of commerce,” AHD has not “purposefully availed” itself of our 

forum, and these contacts are not sufficient to support the trial court’s assertion of 

specific personal jurisdiction. Havey, 172 N.C. App. at 817, 616 S.E.2d 648; N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 1-75.4. No evidence tends to show AHD marketed, sold, or delivered its 

products to North Carolina. Even if true, as the trial court’s “stream of commerce” 

“findings of fact” #2 and #3 assert, the mere manufacture and introduction of a 

product into the world’s “stream of commerce” without “purposeful availment” is 

insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in North Carolina. Burger King Corp., 

471 U.S. at 474-75, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 542; Mucha, 2021-NCSC-82 at ¶ 15, 378 N.C. at 

173, 861 S.E.2d at 507-08. The order of the trial court finding and concluding

personal jurisdiction exists in North Carolina over AHD is reversed. 

2. SHE

¶ 61 Here, the product at issue is SHE’s Arriel 1E2 engines, which powered the 

Helicopter. The engine is not a consumer product. It is manufactured, marketed, 

distributed, and sold solely as a component product for helicopters. Like in Miller, 

SHE has never sought nor served a market in North Carolina for standalone 
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helicopter engines. Miller, 2022-NCCOA-55 at ¶ 36, 281 N.C. App. at 540, 868 S.E.2d 

at 903. SHE never advertised, sold, or distributed any engines for sale to individual 

users or consumers in North Carolina. 

¶ 62 Beyond worldwide “stream of commerce” SHE also has not “purposefully

availed” itself of our forum. Havey, 172 N.C. App. at 817, 616 S.E.2d at 648; see N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4. These contacts are not sufficient to support the trial court’s 

assertion of specific personal jurisdiction in North Carolina. Id. The mere 

introduction of a product into the “stream of commerce” without “purposeful 

availment” is insufficient to establish jurisdiction. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 

474-75, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 542; Mucha, 2021-NCSC-82 at ¶ 15, 378 N.C. at 173, 861 

S.E.2d at 507-08; Miller, 2022-NCCOA-55 at ¶ 19, 281 N.C. App. at 536, 868 S.E.2d 

at 901 (citation omitted). The order of the trial court concluding personal jurisdiction 

exists over SHE in North Carolina is reversed. 

V. Conclusion 

¶ 63 Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have failed to show 

any of these activities by AHD or SHE sufficiently “arise out of or relate to the 

defendant’s contacts with the forum.” “In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the 

phrase ‘relate to’ incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants 

foreign to a forum.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at __, 209 L. Ed. 2d at 236.

¶ 64 As in Goodyear, a foreign entity cannot be haled into North Carolina’s courts 
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because of the presence of even an affiliated American company present in or doing 

business in the forum. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 918, 180 

L.Ed.2d at 802. 

¶ 65 This holding is limited to the foreign entity appellants, SHE and AHD, the only 

entities who appealed. Plaintiff has failed to prove a “causal connection,” “purposeful 

availment,” or activities in the forum “related to” the Defendants before us in order 

to establish personal jurisdiction between North Carolina and AHD and North 

Carolina and SHE. 

¶ 66 The trial court’s orders denying AHD’s and SHE’s Rule12(b)(2) motions are

reversed and this cause remanded for entry of dismissal of AHD and SHE. It is so 

ordered.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Judges COLLINS and GORE concur.