IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION 

COBBLESTONE WIRELESS, LLC,

Plaintiff, CASE NO. 2:23-cv-00382

v. (Lead Case)

CELLCO PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

WIRELESS, 

Defendants, 

NOKIA OF AMERICA CORPORATION 

Intervenor 

COBBLESTONE WIRELESS, LLC,

Plaintiff, CASE NO. 2:23-cv-00380

v. (Member Case)

AT&T MOBILITY LLC, AT&T SERVICES, 

INC., AND AT&T CORP., 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendants,

NOKIA OF AMERICA CORPORATION

Intervenor 

COBBLESTONE WIRELESS, LLC,

Plaintiff, CASE NO. 2:23-cv-00381

(Member Case)

v.

T-MOBILE USA, INC. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendants.

NOKIA OF AMERICA CORPORATION

Intervenor 

MOVANT-INTERVENOR NOKIA OF AMERICA

CORPORATION’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO INTERVENE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................. 3

III. ARGUMENT....................................................................................................... 4

A. NOKIA IS ENTITLED TO INTERVENE AS A MATTER OF 

RIGHT PURSUANT TO RULE 24(a)(2). .....................................................5

1. Nokia’s Motion to Intervene Is Timely. ...................................................5

2. Nokia Has a Significant Interest in the Property and Transactions at 

Issue in This Lawsuit. ...............................................................................7

3. Nokia’s Ability to Protect Its Interests Will Be Impaired if It Cannot 

Intervene. ..................................................................................................7

4. T-Mobile Cannot Adequately Represent Nokia’s Interests in 

Defending Against Cobblestone’s Infringement Allegations...................8

B. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, Nokia SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO 

INTERVENE PERMISSIVELY. ...................................................................9

IV. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................. 11

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Brumfield v. Dodd,

749 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2014) .........................................................................................4

Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc.,

296 U.S. 53 (1935).........................................................................................................2

City of Houston v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc.,

668 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 2012) .........................................................................................5

Codex Corp. v. Milgo Electronic Corp.,

553 F.2d 735, 737-38 USPQ 49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860, 54 L. 

Ed. 2d 133, 98 S. Ct. 185 (1977) ...................................................................................7

Edwards v. City of Houston,

78 F.3d 983 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) .......................................................................5, 6

Nokia Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc.,

No. 6:10-cv-473 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2012), Dkt. No. 205..............................................6

Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga.,

297 F.3d 416 (5th Cir. 2002) .........................................................................................8

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC,

No. 12-193-LPS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125280 (D. Del. Sept. 8, 2014) 

(Stark, J.)........................................................................................................................7

Kahn v. Gen. Motors Corp.,

889 F.2d 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1989)......................................................................................2

Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc.,

909 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1990)..................................................................................2, 7

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.,

732 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1984) .......................................................................................10

Newby v. Enron Corp.,

443 F.3d 416 (5th Cir. 2006) .........................................................................................9

SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co.,

310 U.S. 434 (1940).......................................................................................................9

Sierra Club v. Espy,

18 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir. 1994) .........................................................................................4

Case 2:23-cv-00382-JRG-RSP Document 54 Filed 12/22/23 Page 3 of 17 PageID #: 285
iii

Sierra Club v. Glickman,

82 F.3d 106 (5th Cir. 1996) .......................................................................................7, 8

Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc.,

619 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010)......................................................................................4

Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Arthur Collins, Inc.,

No. 3:04-cv-669 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2005), Dkt. No. 50 ..........................................6, 8

Team Worldwide Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

No. 2:17-cv-00235-JRG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201769 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 

2017) ..........................................................................................................................7, 8

Texas v. United States,

805 F.3d 653 (5th Cir. 2015) .............................................................................4, 5, 6, 8

TiVo Inc. v. AT & T Inc.,

No. 2:09-cv-259, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146363 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2010)

..............................................................................................................................6, 9, 10

U.S. Ethernet Innovations, LLC v. Acer, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150649, at 

*12................................................................................................................................10

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tex. Alcoholic Bev. Comm'n,

834 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2016) .........................................................................................6

RULES

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 ........................................................................... passim

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MOVANT-INTERVENOR NOKIA OF AMERICA CORPORAITON’S

UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, Nokia of America Corporation (“Nokia”) 

moves for leave to intervene in the above-titled action against T-Mobile as of right under Rule 

24(a)(2), or alternatively, with permission of the Court under Rule 24(b)(1)(B) to defend 

allegations of infringement with respect to its base stations that were provided to T-Mobile 

(“Nokia’s Motion” or “Motion”).

1

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Cobblestone Wireless, LLC (“Cobblestone”) sued T-Mobile USA, Inc. 

(“Defendant” or “T-Mobile”), one of Nokia’s customers, on August 25, 2023, asserting a single 

patent (the “Asserted Patent”) (Dkt. No. 1 (“Pl.’s Compl.”)).2 Nokia seeks to intervene so that the 

dispute between Nokia and Cobblestone may be efficiently disposed of in the pending proceeding. 

T-Mobile does not oppose this Motion and Cobblestone does not oppose Nokia’s intervention to 

defend allegations of infringement with respect to Nokia base stations.

In its complaint, Cobblestone alleges that T-Mobile infringes the Asserted Patent by

“mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] for sale, sell[ing], and/or import[ing] certain products and services, 

including cellular base stations, mobile products, and services that support 3GPP carrier 

aggregation” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 12).

1 In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c), a copy of Nokia’s proposed Answer 

in Intervention and Counterclaims is attached as Exhibit 1.

2 On the same day, Cobblestone brought other actions including against Cellco Partnership d/b/a 

Verizon Wireless., Case No. 2:23-cv-00382, and AT&T Mobility, Inc. et. al., Case No. 2:23-cv00380. Nokia is filing a motion to intervene to defend allegations of infringement with respect to 

its LTE/5G base stations in the Verizon and AT&T cases on the same grounds as this Motion.

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Nokia provides T-Mobile with certain types of network equipment, such as base stations, 

that allows T-Mobile to provide “mobile products, and services that support 3GPP carrier 

aggregation” that Cobblestone accused in its Complaint (id. ¶ 12). As a result, this case presents a 

justiciable controversy as to Nokia. As a designer, manufacturer, and seller of certain base stations 

that support the Defendant’s cellular networks, Nokia is in the best position to defend infringement 

claims directed to those products. “It is a simple fact of life that a manufacturer must protect its 

customers, either as a matter of contract, or good business, or in order to avoid the damaging 

impact of an adverse ruling against its products.” Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459, 1464 

(Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 296 U.S. 53, 55 (1935) 

(noting a manufacturer’s intervention in infringement action against a customer is “necessary for 

the protection of its interest”). The Federal Circuit recognizes the importance of customer suits, 

such as this one, yielding to suits raising the same claims against the product manufacturer. See, 

e.g., Katz, 909 F.2d at 1464 (upholding stay of patent infringement suit against customers, stating 

“in reality, the manufacturer is the true defendant in the customer suit”); Kahn v. Gen. Motors 

Corp., 889 F.2d 1078, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (explaining the “customer suit exception” exists 

because a manufacturer has a “presumed greater interest in defending its actions against charges 

of patent infringement”).

Accordingly, Nokia seeks to intervene because it sells equipment and technology to TMobile that T-Mobile uses, and Cobblestone has accused that use of infringement. As the designer, 

manufacturer, and distributor of accused equipment and technology, Nokia has a substantial 

interest in the litigation and is in the best position to defend against certain of Cobblestone’s claims

with respect to its base stations. Nokia’s Motion is timely, and no existing party will suffer 

prejudice if Nokia intervenes. Moreover, Nokia’s intervention to defend allegations of 

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infringement with respect to its base stations will not result in the case being delayed. Thus, Nokia

respectfully requests the Court’s permission to intervene to defend allegations of infringement with 

respect to Nokia base stations as a matter of right under Rule 24(a) or, alternatively, that the Court 

allow intervention under Rule 24(b).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff Appears to Accuse T-Mobile Network Equipment Supplied to T-Mobile by 

Nokia. Cobblestone accuses T-Mobile of infringing the Asserted Patent because of T-Mobile’s 

use of allegedly infringing cellular wireless networks and equipment (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 12). Nokia

supplies, among other things, equipment and technology incorporated by T-Mobile into these 

cellular networks. This network equipment and technology is required for T-Mobile’s cellular 

networks to function and allow T-Mobile’s customers to access the networks using their 

smartphones and other mobile equipment. In general, this network equipment and technology is 

interoperable with aspects of the technical standards promulgated by the 3rd Generation 

Partnership Project (“3GPP”). Nokia is a member of 3GPP, and participated in the development 

of the standards.

Nokia supplies several types of network equipment and technology to T-Mobile, and 

Nokia’s entry into the case will facilitate discovery related to this equipment. For example, for the 

Nokia-supplied equipment, the documents and other tangible evidence, including equipment 

specifications, likely reside with Nokia. The technical know-how and testimony for this equipment 

also likely resides with Nokia. As a result, Nokia’s entry into the case should streamline and 

simplify this litigation, especially as it relates to the Nokia-supplied network equipment and 

technology that supports T-Mobile’s cellular services, including Nokia Supplied Base Stations.

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In this case, Cobblestone identified T-Mobile’s cellular base stations as accused products.

Nokia provides base stations to T-Mobile, and thus, Nokia-supplied equipment, software and 

technology is integral to the resolution of this case. Nokia has a substantial interest in protecting 

its technology.

This Case Is at an Early Stage in the Litigation. Currently, no activity has occurred in 

this case that weighs against intervention. Cobblestone filed its complaint on August 25, 2023 

(Dkt. No. 1) and T-Mobile answered on November 3, 2023 (Dkt. No. 25)3. The Court has not yet 

set dates for the scheduling conference, Markman hearing or trial for this case. As shown, this case 

is at an early stage and intervention will cause no harm or delay to Cobblestone. 

III. ARGUMENT

There are two mechanisms by which a non-party may intervene and participate in an action: 

intervention as of right and permissive intervention. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) governs 

intervention by right, while Rule 24(b) governs intervention by permission. The issue of 

intervention is not unique to patent law, and therefore, the law of the regional circuit applies. 

Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reviewing a district court’s 

Rule 24 intervention decision under regional circuit law). Under Fifth Circuit law, intervention is 

permitted where “no one would be hurt, and the greater justice could be attained.” Texas v. United 

States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th 

Cir. 1994)). “Although the movant bears the burden of establishing its right to intervene, Rule 24

is to be liberally construed.” Id. at 656 (emphasis added) (quoting Brumfield v. Dodd, 749 F.3d 

339, 341 (5th Cir. 2014)). Nokia is entitled to intervene to defend against Cobblestone’s allegations 

3 This docket entry was only entered in lead case Cobblestone Wireless v. Cellco Partnership d/b/a 

Verizon Wirelesss, Case No. 2:23-cv-00382.

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of infringement with respect to Nokia’s base stations as a matter of right and, therefore, 

respectfully requests that the Court grant the present motion under Rule 24(a)(2), or in the 

alternative, permissively pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).

A. NOKIA IS ENTITLED TO INTERVENE AS A MATTER OF 

RIGHT PURSUANT TO RULE 24(a)(2).

Under Rule 24(a)(2), a movant must be permitted to intervene as a matter of right whenever 

four conditions are met:

(1) the application for intervention is timely;

(2) the applicant has an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject 

of the action;

(3) the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, 

impair or impede his ability to protect that interest; and,

(4) the applicant’s interest is inadequately represented by the existing parties to the suit.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); Texas, 805 F.3d at 657. This inquiry is “a flexible one,” which “must be 

measured by a practical rather than technical yardstick.” City of Houston v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 

668 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 999 (5th Cir. 

1996) (en banc)). Nokia meets the four requirements to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a).

1. Nokia’s Motion to Intervene Is Timely.

Timeliness is determined from all the facts and circumstances of a particular case, 

including the time from notice of the intervenor’s interest to the filing of the motion to intervene, 

the extent of prejudice to existing parties from the timing of the motion, the extent of prejudice to 

the movant if leave to intervene were denied, and other special circumstances (if any exist and 

apply). Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1000. Nokia’s Motion is timely filed.

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Cobblestone filed the original complaint in this case two months ago (on August 25, 2023). 

Nokia’s Motion to intervene is filed close in time to the commencement of this action and to the 

time that Nokia was on notice of its interests. See Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1000-01 (citing Fifth Circuit 

intervention cases finding that delays as long as five months or more are not unreasonable); Nokia

Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-cv-473 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2012), Dkt. No. 205 (granting Intel’s 

partially opposed motion to intervene filed five months after the scheduling conference took place 

and nearly one year into the case); Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Arthur Collins, Inc., No. 3:04-cv-669 (N.D. 

Tex. Jan. 28, 2005), Dkt. No. 50 (granting intervention by right where motion was filed before 

scheduling order was in place).

The timing of Nokia’s Motion has not prejudiced any existing parties.4 Neither Defendant 

T-Mobile nor Plaintiff Cobblestone opposes Nokia’s Motion. This non-opposition underscores the 

lack of prejudice to any party. Further, Cobblestone has no basis to claim prejudice because this 

proceeding is at an early stage and no significant event has taken place. Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1001 

(considering the stage of the proceeding under the timeliness inquiry); see also TiVo Inc. v. AT & 

T Inc., No. 2:09-cv-259, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146363, at *18 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2010) (finding 

no showing of “untimeliness” under Rule 24); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tex. Alcoholic Bev. 

Comm’n, 834 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Because the Association sought intervention before 

discovery progressed and because it did not seek to delay or reconsider phases of the litigation that 

had already concluded, the Association’s motion was timely”). The first factor thus weighs heavily 

4 Alleged prejudice stemming from the actual intervention by Nokia is different from the alleged 

prejudice stemming from the timing of the motion to intervene. The former alleged prejudice is 

irrelevant to the timing inquiry under Rule 24(a)(2). Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1002 (“This factor is 

concerned only with the prejudice caused by the applicants’ delay, not that prejudice which may 

result if intervention is allowed.”).

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in favor of allowing Nokia’s intervention to defend allegations of infringement with respect to 

Nokia base stations.

2. Nokia Has a Significant Interest in the Property and 

Transactions at Issue in This Lawsuit.

A party is entitled to intervene in an action when it has “a direct, substantial, legally 

protectable interest in the proceedings.” Texas, 805 F.3d at 657 (internal quotations omitted); see 

also Glickman, 256 F.3d at 376 (quoting cases). Nokia has such an interest in this action because 

Nokia manufactures, develops, and distributes key network equipment and/or software of the type 

that Cobblestone alleges infringe the patents asserted in this case when deployed and used in TMobile’s networks. As the developer, manufacturer and distributor of accused technology, Nokia

has an interest in defending its technology and in clarifying the intellectual property rights that 

apply to such technology. See, e.g., Team Worldwide Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:17-cv00235-JRG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201769, at *13 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2017) (finding an 

intervening manufacturer had an interest in “the ongoing sale and distribution of their products 

[which] is put at risk by [the Plaintiff’s] allegations of infringement.”); see Intellectual Ventures I 

LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 12-193-LPS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125280, at *13 (D. Del. 

Sept. 8, 2014) (Stark, J.) (“[In a patent infringement suit,] intervention is necessary to enable 

Intervenors to protect their interest in products which Intervenors manufacture for Defendants, an 

interest put at risk by the litigation as Plaintiffs accuse these products of infringement.”). Overall, 

Nokia’s interest in the issues to be litigated in this case—such as claim interpretation, validity, 

infringement, damages—is direct, substantial, and legally protectable.

3. Nokia’s Ability to Protect Its Interests Will Be Impaired if It 

Cannot Intervene.

Nokia would be severely prejudiced if intervention were denied. An adverse ruling of 

infringement could affect Nokia and its relationship with its customer T-Mobile. See Katz v. Lear 

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Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is a simple fact of life that a manufacturer 

must protect its customers, either as a matter of contract, or good business, or in order to avoid the 

damaging impact of an adverse ruling against its products.”) (quoting Codex Corp. v. Milgo 

Electronic Corp., 553 F.2d 735, 737-38 USPQ 49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860, 54 L. Ed. 

2d 133, 98 S. Ct. 185 (1977)). Further, an adverse ruling could potentially affect Nokia’s

reputation, its relationship with its other customers and its customer base. See Team Worldwide, 

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201769, at *13 (“[A]dverse rulings could impact each proposed 

intervenor’s relationships with other retail customers.”). Nokia must be allowed to eliminate the 

cloud of uncertainty that Cobblestone has cast over Nokia’s base station equipment, software and 

technology.

Moreover, an adverse decision could create precedent that could be used in other 

circumstances or proceedings against Nokia or its other customers. This potential “stare decisis 

effect of an adverse judgment constitutes a sufficient impairment to compel intervention.” Heaton 

v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga., 297 F.3d 416, 424 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sierra Club v. 

Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 109-10 (5th Cir. 1996). 

4. T-Mobile Cannot Adequately Represent Nokia’s Interests in 

Defending Against Cobblestone’s Infringement Allegations.

In the Fifth Circuit, a movant satisfies the requirement of showing inadequate 

representation if it demonstrates that the defense of the case by the existing parties may be 

inadequate to protect its interests. Texas, 805 F.3d at 661. The burden to satisfy this requirement 

has been described as “minimal,” but not so minimal as to eliminate it. Id.

Although T-Mobile also seeks to defeat Cobblestone’s allegations, Nokia has interests to 

defend allegations of infringement with respect to Nokia base stations above and beyond those that 

it shares with T-Mobile. See Heaton, 297 F.3d at 422, 425 (reversing a district court’s denial of a 

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motion to intervene and noting the intervenor had met its burden because “the [intervenor’s] 

interests and [the defendant’s interests] may diverge in the future, even though, at this moment 

they appear to share common ground”). For example, T-Mobile may be satisfied with indemnity 

rather than a finding of non-infringement. Sw. Bell Tel., L.P., No. 3:04-cv-00669, Dkt. No. 50 at 5 

(finding under the inadequate representation inquiry that manufacturer of cell phone equipment 

should be allowed to intervene because “[the original defendant], as a customer, may be satisfied 

with indemnity rather than a finding of noninfringement”). As a result, Nokia is motivated to 

defend its interests from Cobblestone’s claims with respect to Nokia base stations.

Nokia also possesses a broad and deep understanding of its equipment and technology. 

Accordingly, it is the most important source of information about its equipment and is likely the 

keeper of potentially key, relevant documents. It would be unfair to force T-Mobile to litigate the 

issues that Nokia best understands. Id. (finding under the inadequate representation inquiry that 

“the customer would not be the best source for providing the detailed information about the 

[intervenor-manufacturer’s] products”). Intervention promotes both fairness and judicial economy.

As a result, Nokia is best suited to defend its interests from Cobblestone’s claims with respect to 

Nokia base stations.

Because Nokia satisfies the Fifth Circuit’s four-part test for interventions of right under 

Rule 24(a), the Court should grant Nokia’s Motion as a matter of right.

B. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, NOKIA SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO 

INTERVENE PERMISSIVELY.

Nokia alternatively requests the permission of the Court to intervene under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 24(b), which permits a party to intervene if it “has a claim or defense that shares 

with the main action a common question of law or fact” and no undue delay or prejudice will 

result. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B); TiVo Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146363, at *18. Permissive 

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intervention presents a lower bar than intervention as a matter of right, and does not require that 

the intervenor even “have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of the litigation.” 

Newby v. Enron Corp., 443 F.3d 416, 423 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting SEC v. U.S. Realty & 

Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 459 (1940)).

For the same reasons noted above, permissive intervention for Nokia to defend allegations 

of infringement with respect to Nokia base stations is appropriate in this case. First, given that 

Cobblestone’s complaint appears to be directed at least in part to network equipment and 

technology that Nokia supplies to T-Mobile, Nokia’s defenses will involve common questions of 

law and fact. TiVo Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146363, at *18. As noted, the issues to be litigated 

in this case—such as claim interpretation, validity, infringement, and damages—are common 

questions as to all parties. See U.S. Ethernet Innovations, LLC v. Acer, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

150649, at *12 (granting permissive intervention where intervenor shared common questions of 

law and fact and similar defenses as named defendant). Thus, the threshold requirement of Rule 

24(b) is met.

Second, at this early stage in the litigation, there will be no prejudice to either T-Mobile or 

Cobblestone if Nokia is permitted to intervene to defend allegations of infringement with respect 

to Nokia products that support T-Mobile services. T-Mobile and Cobblestone do not oppose the 

motion, which underscores a lack of prejudice. Further, Nokia does not expect any delay to result 

from its intervention to defend allegations of infringement with respect to Nokia base stations. 

Accordingly, there will be no undue delay or prejudice.

Finally, permissive intervention is “wholly discretionary,” and in the present case, judicial 

economy weighs in favor of intervention. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line 

Co., 732 F.2d 452, 471 (5th Cir. 1984). Nokia likely possesses the relevant evidence about certain 

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of the accused equipment and technology it supplies to T-Mobile, including equipment

specifications and testimony. Nokia likely possesses the technical know-how. Further, intervention 

will allow Nokia and Cobblestone to resolve the disputes in the context of the pending proceedings. 

Thus, intervention will streamline and simplify the litigation by facilitating discovery and 

promoting accurate presentation of the evidence. It would be inefficient to force T-Mobile to 

litigate the issues that Nokia best understands.

Thus, to the extent intervention is not permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), Nokia

respectfully requests the Court’s permission to intervene under Rule 24(b).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Nokia respectfully requests that the Court permit Nokia to 

intervene to defend allegations of infringement with respect to Nokia base stations as a matter of 

right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), or in the alternative, permissively pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).

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Dated: December 22, 2023 Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ David S. Frist 

David S. Frist (GA Bar No. 205611) 

John D. Haynes (GA Bar No. 340599) 

Emily C. Welch (GA Bar No. 606071) 

Michael C. Deane (GA Bar No. 497195) 

Sloane S. Kyrazis (GA Bar No. 878240) 

ALSTON & BIRD LLP

1201 West Peachtree Street, Suite 4900

Atlanta, GA 30309 

Phone: (404) 881-7000 

Fax: (404) 881-7777 

Email: david.frist@alston.com 

john.haynes@alston.com 

emily.welch@alston.com 

michael.deane@alston.com

sloane.kyrazis@alston.com 

Ross R. Barton (NC Bar No. 37179) 

ALSTON & BIRD LLP

101 South Tryon Street 

Suite 4000 

Charlotte, NC 28280-4000 

Telephone: (704) 444-1000 

Facsimile: (704) 444-1111 

Email: ross.barton@alston.com 

Theodore Stevenson, III (TX Bar No. 19196650) 

ALSTON & BIRD LLP

2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2300 

Dallas TX 75201 

Phone: (214) 922-3400 

Fax: (214) 922-3899 

Email: ted.stevenson@alston.com 

Attorneys for Nokia of America Corporation

Case 2:23-cv-00382-JRG-RSP Document 54 Filed 12/22/23 Page 16 of 17 PageID #: 298
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing document was served on all parties 

who have appeared in this case on December 22, 2023, via the Court’s CM/ECF system. 

Dated: December 22, 2023 /s/ David S. Frist

David S. Frist (GA Bar No. 205611) 

ALSTON & BIRD LLP

1201 West Peachtree Street, Suite 4900

Atlanta, GA 30309 

Phone: (404) 881-7000 

Fax: (404) 881-7777 

Email: david.frist@alston.com 

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

The undersigned hereby certifies that pursuant to Local Rules CV-7(h) and (i), counsel for 

Intervenor Nokia conferred with counsel for Defendant T-Mobile, as well as with counsel for 

Plaintiff Cobblestone regarding this Motion and all counsel indicated that they do not oppose the 

relief sought herein. 

Dated: December 22, 2023 /s/ David S. Frist 

David S. Frist (GA Bar No. 205611) 

ALSTON & BIRD LLP

1201 West Peachtree Street, Suite 4900

Atlanta, GA 30309 

Phone: (404) 881-7000 

Fax: (404) 881-7777 

Email: david.frist@alston.com 

Case 2:23-cv-00382-JRG-RSP Document 54 Filed 12/22/23 Page 17 of 17 PageID #: 299