UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

HEADWATER RESEARCH LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. and

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PLAINTIFF HEADWATER’S SUR-REPLY IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY FOR LACK OF WRITTEN 

DESCRIPTION BASED ON 35 U.S.C. § 112 [ECF NO. 178]

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I. INTRODUCTION

Samsung improperly shifts the burden to Headwater to prove the ’117 patent satisfies the 

written description requirement. Because the ’117 patent is presumed valid, however, it is 

Samsung that bears the burden of proving that invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.

Yet Samsung’s reply focuses on attacking Headwater’s evidence, including Mr. DLI’s expert 

testimony and specification cites, but offers no affirmative evidence that the specification as 

whole—rather than just a handful of snippets containing the term “map”—would not convey to a 

POSITA that Dr. Raleigh possessed the claimed invention. Samsung instead relies on attorney 

argument about Mr. DLI’s expert opinions and what the cited disclosures purportedly disclose. 

Samsung’s improper burden-shifting and attorney argument cannot support summary judgment, 

particularly given Federal Circuit precedent that written description is a question of fact that must 

be assessed from the perspective of a POSITA. Samsung’s motion should be denied.

II. SAMSUNG OFFERS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SPECIFICATION AS 

WHOLE LACKS WRITTEN DESCRIPTION SUPPORT FOR THE 

MAPPING LIMITATION

Headwater’s opposition showed that Samsung’s motion largely relies on unsupported

attorney argument. Dkt. 214 at 1. And where Samsung relies on expert testimony, it does so to 

support two arguments that fail as a matter of law—i.e., that passages containing the term “map” 

do not describe the mapping limitation, and that “device agents” and “applications” are mutually 

exclusive. Id. The first argument fails because the question is whether the specification as whole 

(not just selective passages that use the term “map”) reasonably conveys to a POSITA that 

Dr. Raleigh possessed the claimed invention. Allergan U.S. v. MSN Labs. Private Ltd., 111 F.4th 

1358, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“As the ‘hallmark’ of written description, the disclosure must be 

considered as a whole, as the person of ordinary skill in the art would read it, to determine if it 

reasonably conveys possession.”) (citing Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 

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1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)). And Samsung cites no expert testimony that the specification as 

a whole lacks written description support for the mapping limitation. See Dkt. 178 at 7-14; 

Dkt. 229 at 1-3. The second argument fails because, as the Court correctly found (and as Samsung 

now concedes), there can be overlap between “device agents” and “applications.” See Dkt. 118 

at 17; Dkt. 229 at 1.

Thus, even setting aside Mr. DLI’s rebuttal testimony, Samsung’s “evidence” is 

insufficient to prove that the mapping limitation lacks written description support. The motion 

should be denied on this basis alone.

III. SAMSUNG MISCHARACTERIZES MR. DLI’S OPINIONS AND 

IGNORES DISCLOSURES REGARDING AGENT IDENTIFIERS BASED 

ON THE FLAWED ASSUMPTION THAT AN AGENT CANNOT BE PART 

OF AN APPLICATION

In any event, Mr. DLI’s rebuttal opinions create a triable issue of fact on the “mapping” 

limitation, including based on disclosures of mapping messages to agents and disclosures of agents 

mapping messages to other agents or other applications. As shown by “Disputed” Fact #11, 

Headwater’s expert opines that the specification shows the inventor had possession of the entire 

device agent mapping limitation. Dkt. 214 at 4; Dkt. 229 at 1. Samsung’s Reply asserts that Mr. 

DLI’s testimony only addresses the “application identifier” term in isolation. Dkt. 229 at 2. This 

is wrong and disputed. Dkt. 214 at 4 (Fact #11). Mr. DLI provides extensive analysis showing a 

POSITA would have understood from the specification that Dr. Raleigh possessed the claimed 

invention—including “a device agent to map the application identifier to the corresponding 

application and forward the application data via secure interprocess communication service.” 

See Dkt. 214-2 at ¶ 697. Further, Mr. de la Iglesia is clearly addressing the “mapping” limitation—

he is rebutting the opinions expressed in Samsung’s opening report by Dr. Foster on the “mapping” 

limitation. Id. ¶ 695-698, rebutting Dkt. 176-2 (“Foster Rpt.”) ¶ 1127-1139. 

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Finally admitting in its Reply that Mr. DLI does address the “mapping” limitation, 

Samsung resorts to a characterization of his analysis as “conclusory.” Dkt. 229 at 2. In fact, Mr. 

DLI presents in ¶ 697 a detailed analysis of the specification that clearly addresses the “mapping” 

function of the “device agent” using the “application identifier." For example, he explains, with 

reference to Figure 16 and the accompanying text, that the specification discloses “a plurality of 

device agents that can deliver data to end-user applications” and to do so, they can use “an agent 

serial number and/or a security key look up” that identifies the target agent/application. Dkt. 214-

2 at ¶ 697; see also id. ¶ 698 (an agent identifier can also identify an application where, e.g., 

“there is a 1:1 correspondence between an agent and an application.”), ¶ 697 (“Figures 38-40 and 

the accompanying text disclose the ‘application ID tag’ 

used to deliver the application data to the corresponding 

application.”), ¶ 702 (“[A] POSITA in 2009 would be 

familiar with the concept of an ‘application identifier’ 

and its use in structuring network communications.”). As 

one example of the “device agent to map the application identifier,” Mr. DLI highlights the 

“application interface agent 1693” of Figures 16 and 38-40. Id. ¶697, citing Figures 16, 38-40 and 

accompanying text; ’117 Patent, 103:44-51 (“[Discussing Figures 38-40....] As shown in FIG. 16, 

the application interface agent 1693 is in communication with various applications, including a 

TCP application 1604, an IP application 1605, and a voice application 1602”). Mr. DLI opines that

the “application interface agent 1693” of Figures 16 and 38-40 is disclosed to use an “application 

ID tag” to map to the correct application / software process and deliver the application data to the 

corresponding application / software process. Id. ¶697. 

Samsung’s Reply Brief does not meaningfully respond to these opinions. Samsung also 

1692 

Voice App • 

1602 

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withdraws its previous argument that the written description question turns on disclosures of 

particular words like “software process” in the same sentence as particular words like “map” or 

“application.” Dkt. 229 at 4. However, Samsung persists in its effort to sow doubt by reference to 

the “software process” claim term not appearing verbatim in the specification. Id. Yet Samsung’s 

expert, Dr. Foster, agrees with Mr. DLI that a POSITA understands the specification’s disclosures

of end-user applications as a claimed “software process.” Foster Rpt. ¶ 490 (“[S]oftware 

applications ... are examples of ‘software processes.’”). Mr. DLI’s testimony thus demonstrates 

how the “device agent” maps the application identifier to a target software process (application) 

so that application data can be sent to that software process. And this testimony, which is expressly 

about the “mapping” function of the “device agent,” is about the entire claim limitation and is not 

limited to the “application identifier” claim term in isolation. See Dkt. 214-2 ¶ 696-698; see also 

id. ¶ 91 (“When a message is received, the messaging agent maps the application identifier to a 

corresponding software process on the device, such as the application for which the data is 

intended, sends the data to that specific process.”); Dkt. 214 at 7-11.

Samsung’s motion also fails given Mr. DLI’s opinion that the “agent serial number” and 

“agent identifier” used in the agent communication bus to map to the corresponding device agents 

provides another basis for written description support, as set forth in Headwater’s Disputed Fact 

#11. Dkt. 214 at 4. Dr. Foster acknowledges that the specification “discloses a ‘service controller’ 

using a ‘service control link’ to distribute messages over an ‘agent communication bus’ to certain 

agents within a mobile device’s service processor.” Foster Rpt. ¶ 1131. But he disregards these 

disclosures based on the flawed assumption that agents and applications are mutually exclusive. 

Foster Rpt. ¶ 1131 (“Headwater’s claims ... require passing messages to applications—not agents. 

But nowhere does the patent describe applications as examples of agents, and in fact, the patent 

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consistently distinguishes between applications and the ‘agents’ that are used for service control.”). 

As the Court correctly found, however, applications can include device agents. See Dkt. 118 at 11.

And as Mr. DLI explains, an “agent identifier” can identify an “application,” such that the 

specification’s disclosures of the “agent communication bus” are directly relevant to show 

possession of the disputed limitation. Dkt. 214-2 ¶¶ 697-699. 

Samsung also complains Headwater cites portions of the specification that Mr. DLI did not 

rely on. Dkt. 229 at 2. But Mr. DLI relied on not only the figures but also the accompanying text 

describing those figures. See, e.g., id. ¶ 697 (“Figures 38-40 and the accompanying text disclose 

the ‘application ID tag’ used to deliver the application data to the corresponding application”;

“Figs. 16-20 and accompanying text”; “Fig. 26E and accompanying text”).

Samsung also contends that the cited portions of the specification “still do not provide 

written description support for the mapping limitation.” Dkt. 229 at 3. But this contention rests 

entirely on attorney argument which cannot satisfy Samsung’s burden to prove invalidity by clear 

and convincing evidence. Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (“Unsubstantiated attorney argument regarding the meaning of technical evidence is no 

substitute for competent, substantiated expert testimony ... and cannot, support [the moving 

party’s] burden on summary judgment.”). At most, Samsung's arguments raise genuine disputes 

of material fact regarding written description support. And again, it is not Headwater’s burden to 

prove validity, it is Samsung’s burden to prove invalidity.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above and in Headwater’s opposition, Samsung’s motion should be denied

in its entirety.

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Dated: November 20, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Marc Fenster

Marc Fenster

CA State Bar No. 181067

mfenster@raklaw.com

Reza Mirzaie

CA State Bar No. 246953

rmirzaie@raklaw.com

Brian Ledahl

CA State Bar No. 186579

bledahl@raklaw.com

Ben Wang

CA State Bar No. 228712

bwang@raklaw.com

Adam Hoffman

CA State Bar No. 218740

Email: ahoffman@raklaw.com

Dale Chang

CA State Bar No. 248657

dchang@raklaw.com

Paul Kroeger

CA State Bar No. 229074

pkroeger@raklaw.com

Neil A. Rubin

CA State Bar No. 250761

nrubin@raklaw.com

Kristopher Davis

CA State Bar No. 329627

kdavis@raklaw.com

James S. Tsuei

CA State Bar No. 285530

jtsuei@raklaw.com

Philip Wang

CA State Bar No. 262239

pwang@raklaw.com

Amy Hayden

CA State Bar No. 287026

ahayden@raklaw.com

James Milkey

CA State Bar No. 281283

Email: jmilkey@raklaw.com

Jason M. Wietholter

CA State Bar No. 337139

jwietholter@raklaw.com

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James Pickens

CA State Bar No. 307474

Email: jpickens@raklaw.com

Qi (Peter) Tong

TX State Bar No. 24119042 

Email: ptong@raklaw.com

RUSS AUGUST & KABAT

12424 Wilshire Blvd. 12th Fl.

Los Angeles, CA 90025

Telephone: 310-826-7474

Andrea L. Fair

TX State Bar No. 24078488 

MILLER FAIR HENRY PLLC 

1507 Bill Owens Parkway

Longview, Texas 75604 

Telephone: 903-757-6400 

andrea@millerfairhenry.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF, 

HEADWATER RESEARCH LLC

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 20, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing document 

with the Clerk of the Court for the Eastern District of Texas using the ECF System and served 

Samsung via electronic mail.

/s/ Marc Fenster

Marc Fenster

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION TO FILE UNDER SEAL 

I hereby certify that the foregoing document is authorized to be filed under seal pursuant 

to the Protective Order entered in this case. 

/s/ Marc Fenster

Marc Fenster

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