IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUFKIN DIVISION

JOHN ARRENDONDO §

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:23cv131

POLK COUNTY JAIL §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff John Arrendondo, an inmate formerly confined at the Polk County Jail, proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The above-styled action was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to the United States Magistrate Judge

for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of the case.

Factual Background

Plaintiff states he was attacked by another inmate on May 19, 2023 while he was confined

at the Polk County Jail. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant allowed his assailant into the jail with

a homemade weapon commonly known as a shank.

Analysis

Jural Authority

Plaintiff has named the Polk County Jail as the Defendant in this action. A plaintiff may not

bring a civil rights claim against a servient political agency or department unless such agency or

department enjoys a separate and distinct legal existence. See Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep’t, 939

F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1991). The capacity of an entity to sue or to be sued is “determined by the

law of the state where the district court is located.” FED.R.CIV. P. 17(b). Unless the political entity

that created the department has taken “explicit steps to grant the servient agency with jural

authority,” the department lacks the capacity to sue or to be sued. Darby, 939 F.2d at 313; Howe

v. Polunsky Unit, No. 9:08cv142, 2010 WL5640804 at *9 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2010), R&R adopted,

No. 9:08cv142, 2011 WL 245566 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2011) (holding the PolunskyUnit of the TDCJ

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has no independent legal existence and cannot be sued in its own name); Pantoja v. Dallas County

Jail, No. 3:01cv1620, 2001 WL 1343437 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2001) (concluding neither the Dallas

County Jail, nor its medical staff and medical department are separate legal entities subject to suit).

The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the unit or department has the capacity to be

sued. Darby, 939 F.2d at 314. Plaintiff, however, has failed to allege or demonstrate that the

Defendant in this action is a separate legal entity having jural authority with the capacity to be sued. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed as frivolous and for failing to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. Alternatively, Plaintiff’s complaint, interpreted liberally, is construed

as a claim against Polk County, Texas. For the reasons set forth below, however, Plaintiff’s claims

are without merit even if asserted against Polk County.

Municipal Liability

Plaintiff named the Polk County Jail as the Defendant in this lawsuit. Liberally construing

Plaintiff’s complaint to assert a cause of action against Polk County, Plaintiff’s claims should be

dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

In order to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege he was

deprived of a constitutionally or federally protected right, privilege or immunity by a person acting

under color of state law. Traditionally, municipalities, such as Polk County, were not considered to

be “persons” acting under color of state law. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). However,

in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held

that municipalities could be held liable for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief in § 1983

proceedings so long as the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes an

official municipal policy. Such a policy may include “a persistent, widespread practice of city

officials or employees, which, although not authorized byofficiallyadopted and promulgated policy,

is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” 

Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984). However, “[i]solated violations are

not the persistent, often repeated constant violations that constitute custom and policy” as required

2

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for municipal Section 1983 liability. Bennett v. City of Sidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n.3 (5th Cir. 1984),

cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985). 

A governmental unit cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees solely on a theory of

respondeat superior. Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010). A municipality

can be found liable under Section 1983 only for a deprivation of a federally protected constitutional

or statutory right that is inflicted pursuant to “official policy or custom.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is absent of any allegation that the actions complained of were taken 

pursuant to official policy. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Polk County should be 

dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.

Recommendation

Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. 

Objections

Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of the magistrate judge’s report, any

party may serve and file written objections to the findings of facts, conclusions of law and

recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C).

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings of facts, conclusions of law and

recommendations contained within this report within fourteen days after service shall bar an

aggrieved party from the entitlement of de novo review by the district court of the proposed findings,

conclusions and recommendations and from appellate review of factual findings and legal

conclusions accepted by the district court except on grounds of plain error. Douglass v. United

Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R.

CIV. P. 72.

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___________________________________

Christine L Stetson

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SIGNED this the 29th day of July, 2024.

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