J-S12021-17

2017 PA Super 97

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.W., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: R.W., FATHER

No. 1715 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered September 30, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000206-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY OTT, J.: FILED APRIL 11, 2017

R.W. (“Father”) appeals from the September 30, 2016 order in the 

Court of Common Pleas of York County changing the placement goal to 

adoption with a concurrent goal of placement with a legal custodian with 

respect to his son, A.W. (“Child”), born in July of 2015.1 We reverse and 

remand in accordance with the following decision. 

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. On 

September 15, 2015, the trial court placed Child in the legal and protective 

custody of York County Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF” or “Agency”). 

CYF then placed Child in kinship foster care. Adjudication, 9/24/15, at 1. 

____________________________________________

1

In addition, the order changed the placement goal with respect to L.F. 

(“Mother”). Mother did not file a notice of appeal.
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On September 24, 2015, the court adjudicated Child dependent, and his 

placement goal was return to parent with a concurrent goal of adoption.

At the time of Child’s placement, Father was incarcerated. The order 

of adjudication required Father to comply with family service plan (“FSP”) 

goals including but, not limited to, securing stable employment, housing, 

and in-home services. Adjudication, 9/24/15, at 3. With respect to visits 

with Child, the order provided, “Father may request supervised visitation 

upon approval from SCI [State Correctional Institution] or upon his release 

[from prison] and return to York County.” Id. at 2. 

On December 17, 2015, a status review hearing2occurred before a 

dependency master, who found that Father remained incarcerated at SCI 

Coal Township, and, although he has had no telephone contact with CYF, he 

“telephones about once a week to speak with the child.” Order, 12/18/15, 

at 2. The court adopted the findings of the master by order dated December 

18, 2015.

On March 9, 2016, the trial court held a permanency review hearing, 

during which the CYF caseworker, Wanda Muhly, and Father testified via 

telephone from SCI Coal Township. Based on the testimony, the trial court 

found that Father has been moderately compliant with the permanency plan 

“in that [he] remains incarcerated at Coal Township SCI. He is eligible for 

____________________________________________

2 The trial court explained that a status review “is an expedited 

[p]ermanency [h]earing.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/16, at 1.
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parole in late April or early May, 2016. Father would like to be a resource 

for his son. He contacts the kinship parents once a week and writes letters 

to his son.” Order, 3/9/16, at 1. 

On April 25, 2016, Father was transferred to a halfway house in 

Harrisburg. Order, 6/9/16, at 2. Thereafter, on June 9, 2016, a status 

review hearing was held before the master, who found that Father “works 

with the Agency to arrange visits and with the Agency to arrange a home 

team. He opened with Catholic Charities yesterday.” Id. at 2. Further, the 

master found that Father is employed full-time at Old Country Buffet in 

Harrisburg, inter alia. The trial court adopted the master’s findings by order 

dated June 9, 2016.

The master held the next permanency review hearing on August 30, 

2016, and found that Father was released from the halfway house in 

Harrisburg five days earlier, on August 25, 2016, and that he had moved to 

the York area. Order, 8/30/16, at 1. The master concluded that Father was 

in minimal compliance with the permanency plan based on finding that 

“Father was assigned a Catholic Charities Team on June 8, 2016, but that he 

missed appointments, and the therapeutic portion of the team closed out 

unsuccessfully.” Id. Further, the master found that “[t]he GAL notes that 

Father had the opportunity to visit the Child, attend doctor’s appointments 

and call the Foster Parents regarding the welfare of the Child and did not.” 

Id. at 1-2. 
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However, the master recommended as follows on August 30, 2016.

Father states that he has a lot on his plate since being out of 

prison and he wants to have the opportunity to try to work 

towards reunification now that he is in the York area. [Catholic 

Charities] is willing to reopen if the Agency makes a referral. 

The Agency will make the referral for the team to reopen with 

Father. Should there be a delay in [Catholic Charities] starting, 

the Agency is to work with Father to arrange supervised 

visitation through the Agency.

Id. at 2. The trial court adopted the findings of the master by order dated 

August 31, 2016.

On September 30, 2016, the trial court held a status review hearing 

during which Brandon Ambrose, the CYF caseworker, testified.3 By order the 

same date, the court changed the goal to adoption with a concurrent goal of 

placement with a legal custodian. The court directed CYF “to start the 

termination of parental rights process in regards to both parents.” Order, 

9/30/16, at 2.

Father timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion on November 10, 2016.

Father presents the following issue for our review:

____________________________________________

3 CYF’s counsel stated during the subject proceedings that the trial court 

“requested this expedited hearing to evaluate where we stand in regard to 

this matter.” N.T., 9/30/16, at 3.
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1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in changing the 

dependent child’s permanency goal from reunification to 

adoption following a status review hearing where the record did 

not support such a goal change[?]

Father’s brief at 4 (footnote omitted).

We have explained our scope and standard of review in dependency 

cases as follows. 

[W]e must accept the facts as found by the trial court unless 

they are not supported by the record. Although bound by the 

facts, we are not bound by the trial court’s inferences, 

deductions, and conclusions therefrom; we must exercise our 

independent judgment in reviewing the court’s determination as 

opposed to the findings of fact, and must order whatever right 

and justice dictate. We review for abuse of discretion. Our 

scope of review, accordingly, is of the broadest possible nature. 

It is this Court’s responsibility to ensure that the record 

represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge 

has applied the appropriate legal principles to that record. 

Nevertheless, we accord great weight to the court’s fact-finding 

function because the court is in the best position to observe and 

rule on the credibility of the parties and witnesses.

In the Interest D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1225 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation 

omitted).

A goal change request is governed by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6301 et seq., which was amended in 1998 to conform to the federal 

Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”), 42 U.S.C. § 671 et seq. In re 

M.S., 980 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. Super. 2009). We have recognized that 

“[b]oth statutes are compatible pieces of legislation seeking to benefit the 

best interest of the child, not the parent. . . . ASFA promotes the 

reunification of foster care children with their natural parents when feasible. 
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. . . Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act focuses upon reunification of the family, 

which means that the unity of the family shall be preserved ‘whenever 

possible.’” Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(1)). As such, child welfare 

agencies are required to make reasonable efforts to return a foster child to 

his or her biological parent. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 

2006). When those efforts fail, the agency “must redirect its efforts toward 

placing the child in an adoptive home.” Id. (citation omitted). 

At permanency review hearings for dependent children removed from 

the parental home, a trial court must consider the following factors: 

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—

At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the 

following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of 

the placement.

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of 

compliance with the permanency plan developed for the 

child.

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the 

circumstances which necessitated the original placement.

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child.

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the 

child might be achieved.

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize 

the permanency plan in effect.

(6) Whether the child is safe.
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. . .

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of 

the last 22 months or the court has determined that 

aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable 

efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the 

child from the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to 

preserve and reunify the family need not be made or 

continue to be made, whether the county agency has filed 

or sought to join a petition to terminate parental rights 

and to identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified 

family to adopt the child unless:

(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best 

suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare of 

the child;

(ii) the county agency has documented a compelling 

reason for determining that filing a petition to 

terminate parental rights would not serve the needs 

and welfare of the child; or

(iii) the child’s family has not been provided with 

necessary services to achieve the safe return to the 

child’s parent, guardian or custodian within the time 

frames set forth in the permanency plan.

. . .

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(1)-(6), (9). “These statutory mandates clearly place 

the trial court’s focus on the best interests of the child.” In re S.B., 943 

A.2d 973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). We have stated that, 

“[s]afety, permanency, and well-being of the child must take precedence 

over all other considerations.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Moreover, “the burden is on the child welfare agency . . . to prove that a 

change in goal would be in the child’s best interest.” In re R.I.S., 36 A.3d 

567, 573 (Pa. 2011).
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Instantly, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated that it 

changed Child’s placement goal based on his “lack of a bond with the 

biological parents and the need for the child to have permanency.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 11/10/16, at 2 (citing N.T., 9/30/16, at 11). The court 

explained as follows, in part.

The child has only ever lived [with] his foster family, and 

therefore, they are the only family the child has known. The 

child was adjudicated dependent approximately a year prior to 

the change of goal to adoption on September 30, 2016. During 

that year, minimal progress was made towards the prior goal of 

reunification. Father was incarcerated, but is now living with his 

aunt; however, he does not have satisfactory housing for 

reunification. Father has not made any effort to engage in the 

child’s life since being released from prison; he has not visited, 

attended doctor’s appointments, or even called on the child’s 

birthday.

Id. at 2-3 (citations to record omitted). 

On appeal, Father argues that the trial court erred by failing to address 

all of the relevant factors set forth in Section 6351(f) before issuing the 

subject order. Specifically, Father asserts that the court “did not reference 

the timeframe set forth in the family service plan or otherwise determine the 

likely date by which the child’s reunification with [Father] might be achieved. 

Nor did the court determine whether or not CYF had made reasonable efforts 

to finalize the permanency plan that was in effect.” Father’s brief at 12. 

Further, Father argues that the record does not support the court’s findings 

with respect to (1) the lack of a bond between Father and Child and (2) that 
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Father “has not made any effort to engage in the child’s life since being 

released from prison” and/or “has not visited” Child. Id. at 13. 

CYF and the Guardian Ad Litem filed a joint appellee brief in which 

they assert that Father has made no progress in addressing the issues that 

caused Child’s placement, and that the goal change order is in Child’s best 

interest.4 For the reasons that follow, we disagree. 

By the time of the subject proceedings, Child was in placement for 

twelve and one-half months, and Father was released from prison during the 

last five of those months. Indeed, on April 25, 2016, Father was paroled to 

a halfway house in Harrisburg. On August 25, 2016, Father was released 

from the halfway house, and he immediately relocated to York County. 

Therefore, Father had been living in York County for approximately one 

month at the time of the September 30, 2016 hearing. 

The record reveals that Father had made progress with the 

permanency plan from the time of his release from prison through the status 

review hearing on June 9, 2016. At the permanency review on August 30, 

____________________________________________

4 We observe that, during the subject proceedings, CYF did not request a 

goal change. Rather, counsel for CYF stated as follows on the record in open 

court: “I think the father is no longer . . . shackled by his incarceration type 

issues. So, I think the next few months are exceedingly important for father 

to make some progress in regards to their reunification efforts or . . . the 

[A]gency is going to look at alternate goals.” N.T., 9/30/16, at 5. In 

contrast, the Guardian Ad Litem requested a goal change stating, “I do take 

more of a hard line on this case. . . . I don’t feel like my client is treated 

fairly in having to wait until father gets his act together when he already has 

had the opportunity to do so.” Id. at 10.
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2016, the court found, in part, that Father had missed appointments with 

the Catholic Charities team, “and the therapeutic portion of the team closed 

out unsuccessfully.” Order, 8/30/16, at 1. However, Father requested the 

opportunity to work towards reunification now that he has relocated to York 

County. As such, the August 30, 2016 order directed CYF to make “the 

referral for the [Catholic Charities] team to reopen with Father.” Id. at 2. 

Further, the order directed that “[s]hould there be a delay in [Catholic 

Charities] starting, the Agency is to work with Father to arrange supervised 

visitation through the Agency.” Id. 

At the subject hearing one month later, on September 30, 2016, the 

court found that Catholic Charities reopened with Father on September 22, 

2016, and that supervised visits with Child began on September 28, 2016. 

Order, 9/30/16, at 2; Attachment to 30-Day Expedited Status Review 

Hearing Order, 9/30/16. In addition, the court found that Father is 

employed full-time at Old Country Buffet. Order, 9/30/16, at 2. Thus, 

Father made progress in one month by reopening with Catholic Charities, 

having a supervised visit with Child, and working full-time. 

With respect to housing, Father’s counsel stated during the subject 

proceedings that Father resided with his aunt, which he stated was not 

appropriate for reunification with Child. N.T., 9/30/16, at 9. However, 

Father’s counsel stated, “I believe Catholic Charities is going to be assisting 

with search[ing] for appropriate housing.” Id. 
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In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated that, “while Father is 

making progress, the child cannot wait indefinitely on Father to become a 

resource.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/16, at 3. We deem the court’s 

conclusion unreasonable when Father was released from prison for five 

months before the subject proceedings; he relocated to York County upon 

his release from the halfway house one month before the hearing; and he 

was making progress in the permanency plan. Further, there is no record 

evidence that Child has any physical, emotional, or developmental special 

needs. Therefore, based on the totality of the evidence, we conclude that 

CYF failed to satisfy its burden of establishing that a change in goal would be 

in Child’s best interest. As such, we conclude that the court abused its 

discretion in changing Child’s placement goal. Accordingly, we reverse the 

order, and remand this matter to the trial court to issue an order 

establishing reunification with Father as Child’s placement goal with a 

concurrent goal of adoption. 

Order reversed. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this 

decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/11/2017