IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUFKIN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs. 

VERNON TAYLOR,

Defendant.

No. 9:23-CR-00007-MAC

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

On May 5, 2023, the Defendant, Vernon Taylor, was indicted in the Eastern District of 

Texas for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Possession with Intent to Distribute 100 grams or 

more of phencyclidine (PCP) (actual), a Schedule II controlled substance.) Pending before the 

court is Taylor’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. #19).1 The Government filed a response to the 

Defendant’s motion (Doc. #21), and the undersigned magistrate judge heard testimony and oral 

argument on September 26, 2023. The undersigned recommends denying Taylor’s Motion to 

Suppress because the traffic stop was lawful and the detention was not unnecessarily delayed.

I. Relevant Facts

During the hearing, Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Corey Seymore testified 

to the facts and circumstances of Taylor’s traffic stop, detention, and arrest and the Government 

introduced body camera footage (and transcript) of the stop.

2

 Trooper Seymore explained that in 

the early morning hours of September 21, 2022, he was travelling northbound on Highway 59 in 

1 This motion is referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for review, hearing if necessary, 

and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law. United States v. Raddatz, 447 

U.S. 667, 681-84 (1980); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and E.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CR-59(a). 

2 The transcript and video footage were admitted into evidence as Government’s Exhibit 1, 2A, and 2B 

without Taylor’s objection.

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Nacogdoches County when he encountered Taylor, who was driving southbound in a Dodge 

Nitro SUV with only one functioning headlight.3 Trooper Seymore performed a U-turn and 

initiated the stop. As he approached the vehicle, he noticed that the license plate light was out,

the license plate was obscured by an illegal cover, and that a passenger was not wearing a 

seatbelt. There were three occupants in the vehicle—Taylor and two female passengers. April 

Lee was seated in the front passenger seat and Tricia Paris was in the rear seat. When 

approaching the vehicle, he also observed there was no luggage in the cargo compartment of the 

SUV.

Trooper Seymore conversed with Taylor through his window regarding the reason for the 

stop. During this exchange, he observed multiple rubber bands hanging from the gear shift. He

testified that rubber bands can sometimes be used for bulk currency, which can be associated 

with criminal activity. Trooper Seymore asked Taylor to exit the vehicle so he could show him 

the license plate violations. While the pair were standing behind the vehicle, Trooper Seymore 

asked Taylor for details on his travel, including his destination and reasons for travel. Taylor 

advised that he was travelling to St. Louis from Houston, where he had been visiting his little 

brother and cousin for a week. Taylor informed Trooper Seymore that the other passengers had 

accompanied him for the entire week in Houston. 

The transcript of the stop indicates that Trooper Seymore asked Taylor if there was 

anything illegal in the vehicle and Taylor responded, “No, no, no, no, no.” Next, Trooper 

Seymore told Taylor, “No? Okay. Alright. Well, give me just a few minutes. It’s gonna be a 

warning on your headlight, your license plate light, and your license plate cover.” 

Next, Trooper Seymore returned to his patrol car and called dispatch for a background 

check on the car’s occupants. He learned that Taylor was on supervised release where the 

3 Having a defective headlight is a violation of Texas Transportation Code § 547.3215.

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original conviction was conspiracy to distribute PCP. Upon learning this information, Trooper 

Seymore returned to Taylor and asked for permission to search his vehicle. Taylor does not 

dispute that he gave valid consent to the search of his vehicle. Trooper Seymore also received 

consent from Lee to search her wallet and from Paris to search her backpack located on the back

seat of the vehicle.4 

II. Defendant’s Motion and the Government’s Response

The thrust of Taylor’s motion is that although Trooper Seymore was justified in stopping 

the car and detaining him for a brief period of time after the stop, the detention eventually 

became unreasonable. Specifically, he argues that once Trooper Seymore informed Taylor that 

he would only be issued a warning,

all evidence necessary to prosecute that offense has been obtained. No further 

evidence of the offenses of [d]efective head lamp, defective license plate lamp 

and unauthorized cover on license plate was going to be found either on the 

person of the offender or in any compartment of the car. By requesting a criminal 

history check, Trooper Seymore prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonable 

required to complete the stop’s mission and because Trooper Seymore did not 

request the criminal history check out of concern for his safety[,] the check did 

not fall within the mission of the traffic stop.

(Doc. # 19, p. 3.)

The Government responds that stopping Taylor’s vehicle was justified at its inception, as 

Taylor violated certain provisions of the Texas Transportation Code. (Doc. # 21, p. 9.) During 

the traffic stop, Trooper “Seymore developed reasonable suspicion that Taylor was engaged in 

criminal activity beyond the traffic violations[, which] allowed for the continued detention of 

Taylor and the passengers as [Trooper] Seymore worked to confirm or dispel his suspicion.” 

(Id.)

4 A search of Paris’ backpack revealed THC gummies.

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III. Legal Standard

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. 

Traffic stops are considered seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. 

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Because traffic stops are considered more similar to 

investigative detentions than formal arrests, the legality of traffic stops for Fourth Amendment 

purposes is analyzed under the standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry

requires that courts apply a two-step “reasonable suspicion” inquiry to: 1) determine whether the 

officer’s action was justified at its inception, and 2) determine whether the search or seizure was 

reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. United 

States v. Zamora, 661 F.3d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 2011). Where there is no warrant, the government 

bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged search 

and/or seizure was valid. United States v. Waldrop, 404 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2005). 

For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have objective reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Martinez, 486 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 

2007). In making a reasonable suspicion inquiry, a court “must look at the ‘totality of the 

circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and 

objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273

(2002). Reasonable suspicion exists when the officer can point to specific and articulable facts 

which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the search 

and seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2002). 

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In the alternative, the officer must have probable cause5that the motorist has committed a 

traffic violation. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996). However, the legal 

justification for the stop must be objectively grounded. United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 

282, 288 (5th Cir. 1999). If the supposed traffic violation that formed the basis for a stop was in 

fact not a violation of state law, there is no objective basis for probable cause justifying the stop. 

United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998). “Probable cause exists when the 

totality of facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest 

are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed, or was in the 

process of committing, an offense.” United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 1999).

IV. Discussion

Here, the parties do not dispute that the first prong of the Terry test is satisfied. Trooper 

Seymore testified that he initiated a traffic stop when he observed Taylor’s vehicle had a 

defective headlight in violation of Texas Transportation Code § 547.3215. Accordingly, the issue 

before the court focuses on the second prong of the Terry analysis—whether Trooper Seymore’s 

actions, after the legitimate stop, “‘were reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the 

stop, or to dispelling his reasonable suspicion developed during the stop.’” United States v. 

Conley, No. 22-10923, 2023 WL 5938185, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 2023) citing United States v. 

Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

Regarding the second prong of the Terry analysis, the general rule is that the “detention 

must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, 

5 There is some inconsistency in case law whether there must be reasonable suspicion or probable cause that 

a traffic violation occurred. However, the Fifth Circuit has stated that both of these standards result in the same 

requirement—an officer must have an objective basis that the alleged traffic violation forming the reason for the 

stop was based on a legitimate violation of state law. See United States v. Raney, 633 F.3d 385, 390-392 (5th Cir. 

2011) (“Because an officer’s reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred requires the same objective basis 

as probable cause for a traffic stop, i.e., that a traffic law was actually violated, we need not undertake a separate 

analysis”.) See also Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014) (Officers need only “a particularized and 

objective basis” for suspecting the person was breaking the law.)

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unless further reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, emerges.” Brigham, 382 F.3d

at 507. Courts will examine whether an officer “diligently pursued a means of investigation that 

was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicion quickly, during which time it was necessary to 

detain the defendant.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). In the course of 

effectuating the stop, a police officer may permissibly examine the driver’s license and 

registration and run a computer check on them to investigate whether the driver has any 

outstanding warrants and if the vehicle is stolen. Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507-08. An officer may 

also ask the driver about the purpose and itinerary of his trip. Id. at 508. The officer’s questions 

do not need to be related to the purpose of the traffic stop, since “[d]etention, not questioning, is 

the evil at which Terry’s second prong is aimed.” Id. An officer may also permissibly identify a 

passenger and run computer checks on the passenger’s driver’s license and background. See 

United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 351 (5th Cir. 2010) opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 622 

F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010), referencing Brigham, 382 F.3d at 509. Although an officer’s inquiry 

may be wide-ranging, once all relevant computer checks have come back clean, there is no more 

reasonable suspicion, and, as a general matter, continued questioning thereafter 

unconstitutionally prolongs the detention. Brigham, 382 F.3d at 510; see also Santiago, 310 F.3d

at 342; United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Dortch, 199 

F.3d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1999), corrected on denial of reh’g, 203 F.3d 883 (5th Cir. 2000). 

However, there is a recognized exception to this rule if additional reasonable suspicion 

arises in the course of the stop and before the initial purpose of the stop has been fulfilled. In 

that instance, the detention may continue until the new reasonable suspicion has been dispelled 

or confirmed. See Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507; United States v. Grant, 349 F.3d 192, 196 (5th Cir. 

2003). “Reasonable suspicion exists when the detaining officer can point to specific and 

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articulable facts that, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 

warrant the . . . seizure.” United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2006). Reviewing 

courts making reasonable suspicion determinations “must look at the totality of the 

circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective 

basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. In evaluating whether or not an 

officer’s suspicion is reasonable, “due weight must be given . . . to the specific reasonable 

inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Terry, 392 U.S. 

at 27. “Although an officer’s reliance on a mere hunch is insufficient to justify a stop, the 

likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls 

considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 

274. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has abrogated the requirement that an officer must have a 

“particularized suspicion” of a specific crime when developing a reasonable suspicion. Pack, 612 

F.3d at 355, citing Brigham, 382 F.3d at 517.

In this case, Trooper Seymore testified that the following facts raised additional

reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity apart from Taylor’s traffic violation: 1. the 

presence of rubber bands around the gear shift; 2. lack of luggage despite week-long travel plans;

and 3. the fact that Taylor was on supervised release for prior criminal charges (drug trafficking). 

Armed with this knowledge, Trooper Seymore requested Taylor’s consent to search his vehicle

less than fourteen minutes into the stop.

6

 The search resulted in the discovery of one 64-ounce 

bottle and one 12-ounce bottle containing a total of 179.17 grams of PCP (Actual). (Doc. # 21, 

p. 4.) 

6 Taylor does not dispute that he consented to the search of his vehicle. Furthermore, during the search,

Trooper Seymore’s reasonable suspicion was confirmed when Taylor’s passengers gave contradictory statements 

regarding their travel plans.

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A. Rubber bands

Trooper Seymore testified that Taylor had unsecured rubber bands hanging from the gear 

shift of his vehicle, which aided his suspicion that criminal activity was afoot because rubber 

bands can be related to bulk currency. Government’s Exhibit 3G is a photograph that shows 3 

large rubber bands hanging on the right-side of Taylor’s steering wheel. Some courts have 

determined that rubber bands, among other factors, can contribute to reasonable suspicion to 

delay a stop. United States v. Goins, No. 4:20-CR-380, 2021 WL 37697, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 5, 

2021) (30 small, loose rubber bands and nervous behavior create reasonable suspicion to extend 

a traffic stop and allow for canine search). 

Here, Taylor had only three unsecured rubber bands hanging from his steering wheel.7 

Their existence in Taylor’s vehicle—without more—probably does not justify reasonable 

suspicion to prolong the traffic stop. See United States v. Hernandez, 470 F. Supp. 3d 114, 130 

(D.N.H. 2019) (holding that two unopened bags of rubber bands in rental car are not, as a lone 

factor, sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity). However,

officers are allowed to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make deductions 

about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person. 

United States v. Grant, 349 F.3d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1227 (2004). 

Because the officer’s suspicion is based on a totality of circumstances, the undersigned finds that 

Trooper Seymore was justified in relying on the rubber bands as a contributing factor for 

reasonable suspicion.

7 While the photo is not entirely clear, it seems there are three intact rubber bands and one broken band 

hanging from the gear shift.

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B. Lack of Luggage

Reasonable suspicion can also arise from the officer’s observation that there is very little 

luggage in the automobile given the stated purpose of the trip, or if the defendant provides 

inconsistent travel plans. See United States v. Garcia, 883 F.3d 570, 572 (5th Cir. 2018) (dicta) 

(insufficient luggage for a trip can be one of several factors to consider in determining whether 

officer had legitimate reasonable suspicion to extend stop); United States v. Schmidt, No. 5:14-

CR-391-DAE, 2014 WL 4784238, at *7 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (same); United States v. Wisniewski,

358 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1092 (D. Utah 2005), aff’d, 192 F. App’x 749 (10th Cir. 2006) (same).8

Here, as Trooper Seymore returned to his patrol car to conduct background checks, he 

remarked into his body camera, “There’s not enough luggage in there for one of ‘em to be gone 

for a week. Let along all three.” The undersigned recognizes that a total lack of luggage is 

inconsistent with Taylor’s statement that he travelled to Houston for a week with two other 

passengers. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that this factor also contributes to reasonable 

suspicion.

C. Taylor’s Criminal History

A driver’s criminal history should not serve as the sole basis for reasonable suspicion. See

United States v. Labrador-Peraza, 563 F. Supp. 3d 563, 574 (W.D. La. 2021); United States v. 

Alvarado, 989 F. Supp. 2d 505, 519 (S.D. Miss. 2013). However, criminal history, in 

combination with other factors, can contribute to reasonable suspicion. United States v. Conley, 

No. 22-10923, 2023 WL 5938185, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 2023); United States v. Gonzalez, 328 

F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing factors for reasonable suspicion to extend stop).

8

If the amount of luggage is reasonably consistent with the defendant’s itinerary, that factor should not be 

suspicious. United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2000) (two pieces of luggage for two people on a 

purported weekend road trip to Las Vegas is not at all suspicious).

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Taylor’s criminal background was revealed to Trooper Seymore approximately 12 1⁄2 

minutes into the stop and showed that he had a prior conviction for conspiracy to distribute PCP. 

Therefore, Trooper Seymore’s reliance on Taylor’s criminal history as a factor of reasonable 

suspicion was proper. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d. at 758 (5th Cir. 2003) (listing prior arrest for drug 

trafficking as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion).

V. Recommendation

The issue before the court is whether Trooper Seymore had reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity to prolong Taylor’s traffic stop. Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 

addressed this issue in a case with similar facts. In United States v. Conley, the defendant 

appealed the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. United States v. Conley, No. 22-

10923, 2023 WL 5938185, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 2023). Conley, like Taylor, was stopped 

based on a legitimate, uncontested traffic violation that he claims resulted in an unconstitutional 

delay of the stop. In considering the second Terry prong, the Fifth Circuit considered specific 

facts that contributed to reasonable suspicion to delay Conley’s detention: Conley was driving a 

vehicle registered to someone else, on supervised release for felon in possession of a firearm, and 

present in an area known for drug trafficking and prostitution. Id. at *1. The Court recognized 

that the officer’s reasonable suspicion further piqued when he observed gang tattoos and when 

Conley could not present a valid driver’s license. Ultimately, the Court concluded:

the court did not err in concluding the Officer developed reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity apart from Conley’s traffic violation. Certainly, [t]he police must 

diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their 

suspicions quickly. But, the Officer met that requirement because less than five 

minutes passed between when he informed Conley of the reason he was stopped 

and Conley’s consent to search the vehicle.

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Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted). Like the Court in Conley, the undersigned finds that the 

detention did not violate the second prong of Terry because Trooper Seymore developed 

reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity based on articulable factors. As the Fifth 

Circuit has explained,

[a]n officer’s subsequent actions are not reasonably related in scope to the 

circumstances that caused him to stop the vehicle if he detains its occupants 

beyond the time needed to investigate the circumstances that caused the stop, 

unless he develops reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity in the 

meantime. If the officer develops reasonable suspicion of additional criminal 

activity during his investigation of the circumstances that originally caused the 

stop, he may further detain its occupants for a reasonable time while 

appropriately attempting to dispel this reasonable suspicion.

Pack, 612 F.3d at 350 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see Santiago, 310 F.3d at

341–42 (“Once a computer check is completed and the officer either issues a citation or 

determines that no citation should be issued, the detention should end and the driver should be 

free to leave.”); United States v. Valdez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[O]nce an officer’s 

suspicions have been verified or dispelled the detention must end unless there is additional[,] 

articulable reasonable suspicion.”) “[I]f additional reasonable suspicion arises in the course of 

the stop and before the initial purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, then the detention may 

continue until the new reasonable suspicion has been dispelled or confirmed.” Lopez–

Moreno, 420 F.3d at 431.

The evidence shows that prior to asking Taylor for consent to search the vehicle, Trooper 

Seymore observed sufficient articulable facts to establish reasonable suspicion that Taylor was 

engaged in criminal conduct that justified his continued detention. Accordingly, the undersigned 

recommends denying the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.

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IV. Objections

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), each party to this action has the right to file 

objections to this Report and Recommendation. Objections to this Report must (1) be in writing, 

(2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, (3) be 

served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report, and (4) 

be no more than eight (8) pages in length. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CRIM. P.

59(b)(2); E.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CR-59(c). A party who objects to this Report is entitled to a de 

novo determination by the United States district judge of those proposed findings and 

recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED.

R. CRIM. P. 59(b)(3). 

A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy 

of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States district 

judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–

77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such 

findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States district judge, see Douglass 

v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

_________________________

Zack Hawthorn

United States Magistrate Judge SIGNED this 19th day of October, 2023.

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