NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 22-1007

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THOMAS MOORE,

Appellant

v.

MORIROSA LAMAS, Warden at SCI Rockview; KENNY GRANLUND, Unit 

Manager; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; PERKS; HALL; 

FISHER; LYNN EATON

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 3:12-cv-00223)

District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

October 18, 2022

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., MATEY and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: January 24, 2023)

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OPINION∗

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∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

MATEY, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Moore appeals the dismissal of his claims against two prison employees.

Seeing no error, we will affirm. 

I.

Thomas Moore was incarcerated in the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution 

at Rockview (“SCI-Rockview”) where, Moore alleges, he was assaulted by employees. 

After Moore reported the abuse, he was moved to the restricted housing unit (“RHU”)

where, Moore states, corrections officials continued their abuse. Moore alleges that SCIRockview’s Superintendent (“Lamas”) and another official (“Eaton”) covered-up the 

alleged misconduct.

At every turn, Moore filed grievances with the prison. His claims against two staff 

members, Lamas and Eaton, were rejected each time and Moore did not appeal those 

decisions through the prison’s grievance process.

Dissatisfied with the prison’s response, Moore filed a complaint against several 

prison employees, including Lamas and Eaton. Because Moore did not appeal the denial 

of his prison grievances, the District Court dismissed his claims against Lamas and Eaton1

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Moore now appeals that decision.2

1 Other claims against different defendants proceeded to trial where a jury returned 

a verdict in Defendants’ favor.

2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 

1343, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the District 

Court’s determination that Moore failed to exhaust administrative remedies, Robinson v. 

Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 2016), and we accept its factual 

findings unless clearly erroneous, Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013).
3

II.

A. Failure to Exhaust

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall 

be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner confined 

in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion requires an inmate to follow 

the applicable procedural rules in the prison’s grievance process. See Jones v. Bock, 549 

U.S. 199, 218 (2007).

The “available” qualifier in the PLRA holds real weight: An inmate must exhaust 

“those, but only those, grievance procedures that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief 

for the action complained of.’” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (emphasis added) 

(quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)). An administrative remedy is 

unavailable, and exhaustion not required, where 1) prison officials are “unable or 

consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates,” 2) the administrative 

process is so opaque and confusing that “no ordinary prisoner can make sense of what it 

demands,” or 3) prison officials “thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance 

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo, accepting 

the non-moving party’s factual allegations as true and considering those facts in the light 

most favorable to that party. Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 342 (3d Cir. 2022).
4

process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 643-44.

1. Availability

Inmates at SCI-Rockview had two channels for reporting mistreatment of the kind 

Moore alleges: DC-ADM 804 and DC-ADM 001. DC-ADM 804 provides a general, 

though rigorous, mechanism for inmate grievances. An inmate’s submission of a written 

grievance is reviewed and results in an Initial Review Response or Rejection explaining 

the disposition of the inmate’s grievance.

3 Upon receipt of either response, an inmate has 

fifteen days to file an appeal with the Facility Manager. DC-ADM 804, § 2.A. Upon the 

Facility Manager’s resolution of that appeal, the inmate may file for Final Review by the 

Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). DC-ADM 804, § 2.B.

DC-ADM 001 is designed specifically for allegations of abuse and is much more 

flexible. An inmate may 1) report abuse orally or in writing to any staff member, 2) file a 

grievance according to DC-ADM 804’s strictures, or 3) send a written report to the Office 

of Special Investigations and Intelligence (“OSII”).

4 Once an inmate has reported abuse 

under DC-ADM 001, an investigation is conducted by the Security Office and the 

complainant must be notified in writing of the investigation’s outcome. DC-ADM 001 

§ 1.C. If the outcome is not satisfactory, the inmate must then go through the same appeals 

process described above for DC-ADM 804. DC-ADM 001 § 1.B. Both DC-ADM 001 and 

3 DC-ADM 804, Inmate Grievance System Procedures Manual, §§ 1.A and 1.B

(2010), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/policyclearinghouse/Documents/PA% 20-

%20Grievance%20Pol’y.pdf.

4 DC-ADM 001, Inmate Abuse Procedures Manual, § 1 (2022), https://www.

cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/001%20Inmate%20Abuse.pdf.
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804 require an inmate who is dissatisfied with the results of an initial investigation to appeal 

for Final Review by SOIGA before the matter can be brought to an Article III court.

Moore did not appeal the decisions rejecting his grievances. And while SCIRockview agrees the appeals processes is “a little confusing,” App. 431, “[t]he procedures 

need not be sufficiently plain as to preclude any reasonable mistake or debate with respect 

to their meaning.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 644 (internal quotations omitted). The processes,

though far from transparent, are not so opaque that an ordinary prisoner cannot make sense 

of what is required to make an appeal under DC ADM 001 and 804.

Nor did prison officials “thwart [Moore] from taking advantage of a grievance 

process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 644.

While the District Court expressed frustration with some of the prison’s actions, it found 

no evidence that prison staff interfered with Moore’s ability to appeal. The District Court’s

dismissal of these claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was therefore

proper. 5

B. Failure to Investigate and Spoliation Claims

1. Failure to Investigate

“To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that a person (or persons), 

acting under color of law, deprived him of a constitutional right.” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 

133, 138 (3d Cir. 2020). Because “Government officials may not be held liable for the 

5 Our conclusion is not an endorsement of the prison’s grievance process. Many of 

Moore’s filings were met with delay and inaction. And the tedious nature of the grievance 

system helps turn these matters into federal cases. 
6

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior,” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009), “a plaintiff must plead that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 

Constitution.” Id. “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal 

direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Tice, 948 F.3d at 138 (quoting Evancho 

v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2015)).

Even viewing all facts alleged in the light most favorable to Moore, there is no 

showing that Lamas and Eaton had personal involvement in the failure to investigate 

Moore’s grievances, either through direction or acquiescence. To the contrary, the only 

relevant personal involvement shown here is Lamas’s delivery to Moore, at his request, of 

forms to initiate a private criminal complaint rather than report his allegationsthrough other 

means. As a result, the District Court correctly dismissed Moore’s failure to investigate 

claim against Lamas and Eaton.

2. Spoliation

“Spoliation occurs where: the evidence was in the party’s control; the evidence is 

relevant to the claims or defenses in the case; there has been actual suppression or 

withholding of evidence; and, the duty to preserve the evidence was reasonably foreseeable 

to the party.” Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 73 (3d Cir. 2012). “[A] finding 

of bad faith is pivotal to a spoliation determination” because “[w]ithholding requires 

intent.” Id. at 79.

While Moore has shown—and it was admitted below—that his allegation of abuse 

was not investigated in a “timely and thorough manner,” App. 88, there is no showing that 
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the slow pace was meant to prevent Moore’s discovery and use of inculpatory evidence. 

Further, neither Lamas nor Eaton contributed to this investigation, so any suppressed 

evidence was never in their control.

In short, Appellant has not shown the control necessary or the type of intentional 

destruction of evidence that would warrant summary judgment. See Bull, 665 F.3d at 73, 

79 (requiring bad faith and control). The District Court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s 

claim that Appellees covered up his abuse through spoliation of evidence.

III.

For these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.