COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Lemons and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DAMON D. DAVIS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2300-97-2 JUDGE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 FEBRUARY 9, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG 

James F. D'Alton, Jr., Judge 

 Mary Katherine Martin, Senior Assistant 

Public Defender (John H. Cobb, Jr., Public 

Defender, on brief), for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Damon D. Davis appeals his conviction for attempted robbery 

alleging that he was not prosecuted in a timely manner pursuant 

to the speedy trial provisions of Code § 19.2-243. We disagree 

and affirm his conviction. 

 On October 10, 1995, taxi driver John E. Jones was shot 

during an attempted robbery in his cab. On July 8, 1996, a 

preliminary hearing was held in the General District Court of the 

City of Petersburg, and the court found probable cause that 

Damon D. Davis, appellant, committed felonies related to the 

incident. On July 18, 1996, the grand jury returned indictments 

charging Davis with attempted robbery, use of a firearm while 

committing robbery, malicious wounding, and conspiracy to commit 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 
 -2- 

robbery. A trial was set in the circuit court for September 10, 

1996. 

 Both Davis and the Commonwealth agree that the nine-month 

provision of Code § 19.2-243 is applicable to this case, by which 

the Commonwealth is required to try the accused within 273 days 

of a finding of probable cause. Davis was tried for these 

offenses on September 17, 1997, 436 days after the probable cause 

hearing. Among other things, the provisions of the speedy trial 

act do not apply to periods where the defendant has absconded or 

to periods where the case is continued on motion of the 

defendant, upon joint motion, or upon motion of the Commonwealth 

without objection from the defendant. See Code § 19.2-243. 

 The first trial date was set for September 10, 1996, 

sixty-four days after the date of the probable cause hearing. 

This period constitutes the delay inherent in the orderly process 

of fixing a trial date and will be counted against the 

Commonwealth. From September 10 to December 19, 1996, Davis 

absconded from justice, was arrested, and upon apprehension, on 

his motion, new counsel was appointed to represent him. These 

eighty-nine days are not counted against the Commonwealth. From 

December 20, 1996 to September 17, 1997, multiple joint motions 

to continue were made, or motions were made by the Commonwealth, 

in which Davis either joined or the record does not show an 

objection. These 283 days are not counted against the 

Commonwealth. 
 -3- 

 Upon review of the record we hold that the only delay 

properly attributable to the Commonwealth is sixty-four days. 

The trial court correctly concluded that Davis was tried within 

the nine-month provision of Code § 19.2-243. Because no 

violation of his right to a speedy trial occurred, we affirm his 

conviction. 

 

Affirmed.