IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MARSHALL DIVISION 

UNIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

PHISON ELECTRONICS 

CORPORATION, 

Defendant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

C.A. No. 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP 

(LEAD CASE) 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

UNIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SILICON MOTION, INC., 

Defendant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

C.A. No. 2:23-cv-00267-JRG-RSP 

(MEMBER CASE) 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

 

DEFENDANT SILICON MOTION, INC.’S 

RULE 12 MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S PRE-SUIT WILLFULNESS AND 

INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS AND STRIKE CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 180
i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 2

A. The Complaint ........................................................................................................ 2

1. UTL’s allegations regarding SMI’s knowledge of the Asserted Patents ..... 2

2. UTL’s assertion of egregious conduct by SMI ............................................ 2

B. UTL’s Letter Identifying the Asserted Patents ........................................................ 3

III. LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 3

A. Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) ................................................................ 3

B. Willful And Indirect Infringement .......................................................................... 3

C. Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike..................................................................................... 4

IV. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 6

A. Unification’s Complaint Fails to Plausibly Allege a Claim for Pre-Suit Willful and 

Indirect Infringement .............................................................................................. 6

B. Unification’s Complaint Contains Redundant, Immaterial, and Scandalous Matter 

Within the Meaning of Rule 12(f) ........................................................................... 6

1. UTL’s accusation is redundant and immaterial ........................................... 7

2. UTL’s accusation is scandalous .................................................................. 8

3. UTL’s accusation has no possible relation to the controversy .................... 8

4. Striking UTL’s accusation will not cause prejudice .................................... 9

V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 9

 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 181
ii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

CASES 

Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Escambia Cnty., Fla., 

306 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1962) ............................................................................................5, 6 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544 (2007) .............................................................................................................4 

Corydoras Tech., LLC v. Apple Inc., 

No. 2:16-CV-00538-JRG, 2016 WL 9242435 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2016)...........................4 

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 

201 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1953) ........................................................................................5, 6, 9 

Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., 

946 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................................................4 

Florance v. Buchmeyer, 

500 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Tex. 2007) .................................................................................5 

FTC v. Think All Pub. LLC, 

564 F.Supp.2d 663 (E.D. Tex. 2008) ....................................................................................5 

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 

563 U.S. 754 (2011)..............................................................................................4 

Halo Elecs, Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 

136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) .....................................................................................................4, 8 

Jefferson Parish Consol. Garbage Dist. No. 1 v. Waste Mgmt. of La., 

No. 09–6270 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 2010) .................................................................................5 

Lone Star Fund V (U.S.) L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 

594 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010)) ...............................................................................................4 

NXP USA Inc. v. MediaTek Inc., 

No. 2:21-cv-00318 (E.D. Tex. March 15, 2022) ..................................................................4 

Plano Encryption Techs., LLC v. Alkami Tech., Inc., 

No. 2:16-cv-1032, 2017 WL 8727249, (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2017) .................................4, 7 

Script Sec. Solns. L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 

170 F.Supp.3d 928 (E.D. Tex. 2016) ....................................................................................4 

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Blackburn, 

No. 15-2451 (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 2015) ................................................................................5 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 182
iii 

Turner v. Pleasant, 

663 F.3d 770 (5th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................4 

United States v. Coney, 

689 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................6 

STATUTES AND RULES 

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(c) ..................................................................................................................6 

35 U.S.C. § 284 ...........................................................................................................3, 4, 7, 8 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ...........................................................................................................................3 

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) .....................................................................................................................3 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ................................................................................................................1, 3 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) ............................................................................................................1, 5, 7, 10 

 Local Rule CV-7(a)(1) ....................................................................................................................1 

OTHER AUTHORITIES 

5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382 (3d ED. 

2004) ................................................................................................................................................6 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 183
1 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(f), Silicon Motion, Inc.’s (“SMI”) moves to 

dismiss Plaintiff Unification Technologies LLC’s (“UTL’s” or “Plaintiff’s”) pre-suit willfulness 

and indirect infringement claims in this action, and to strike UTL’s insufficient, immaterial, and 

scandalous accusations that SMI’s actions are “wanton, malicious, in bad-faith, deliberate, 

consciously wrongful, flagrant, characteristic of a pirate, and an egregious case of misconduct 

beyond typical infringement.” UTL’s Complaint lacks factual allegations showing that SMI knew 

of UTL’s patents prior to UTL’s commencement of litigation, and UTL’s conclusory accusations 

regarding SMI’s supposedly egregious behavior – which are unnecessary to state a claim for 

willfulness and lack any underlying factual support – should be stricken from the pleading. SMI 

submits this concise motion, in accordance with Local Rule CV-7(a)(1), with two issues to be 

decided by the Court: 

(1) Whether Plaintiff UTL’s Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for pre-suit 

willful and indirect infringement for each of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,575,902 (the “’902 Patent”), 

11,061,825 (the “’825 Patent”), 11,573,909 (the “’909 Patent”), and 11,640,359 (the “’359 Patent”) 

(collectively, the “Asserted Patents” or “Patents-In-Suit”); and 

(2) Whether Plaintiff UTL’s statement repeated in each of paragraphs 36, 61-62, 84-

85, 105-06, 126-27, 128 of the Complaint (each a willful infringement allegation) describing SMI’s 

actions as “wanton, malicious, in bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, 

characteristic of a pirate, and an egregious case of misconduct beyond typical infringement” is 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(f). 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 184
2 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

A. The Complaint 

UTL filed this suit on June 2, 2023, accusing SMI of direct infringement, inducement of 

infringement and willful infringement of the four Asserted Patents. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 23-25, 37-127 

(Dkt No. 1). In its description of the parties, UTL describes itself as a Texas Limited Liability 

Company with its principal place of business in Frisco, Texas. Id. ¶ 1. UTL does not disclose its 

own business but describes SMI as a Taiwanese corporation and a “leading manufacturer, designer 

and seller of semiconductors, microcontrollers, and SoC products in the United States and the 

world.” Id. at ¶ 2. UTL further alleges that SMI and its subsidiary conduct business activities in 

the United States in places such as Texas and California. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 7-13. 

1. UTL’s allegations regarding SMI’s knowledge of the Asserted Patents 

Under a boldface, underlined and all-capital heading, “DEFENDANT’S PRE-SUIT 

KNOWLEDGE OF ITS INFRINGEMENT,” UTL states that it “sent a letter to SMI prior to filing 

this Complaint identifying the Asserted Patents as being infringed by exemplary SMI products, 

and further includ[ing] claim charts demonstrating how the identified products infringe the 

Asserted Patents.” Id. ¶ 35. In each count of its Complaint, UTL adds that SMI knew of the 

Asserted Patents at a minimum, “since being served with this Complaint,” and then repeats that 

“SMI also has knowledge of the [ ] Patent since receiving detailed correspondence from UTL prior 

to the filing of the Complaint, alerting SMI to its infringements.” Id. ¶¶ 61, 83, 104, 125. 

2. UTL’s assertion of egregious conduct by SMI 

UTL also alleges in each count that “SMI’s infringing activities relative to the [ ] Patent 

have been, and continue to be, willful, wanton, malicious, in bad-faith, deliberate, consciously 

wrongful, flagrant, characteristic of a pirate, and an egregious case of misconduct beyond typical 

infringement such that UTL is entitled to enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 up to three 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 185
3 

times the amount found or assessed.” Id. ¶¶ 62, 84, 105, 126. UTL does not identify in its 

Complaint what of SMI’s alleged conduct it considers to be egregious. 

B. UTL’s Letter Identifying the Asserted Patents 

In a letter dated May 30, 2023, UTL, through its counsel, described the Asserted Patents in 

a message addressed to SMI. The letter enclosed claim charts regarding the Asserted Patents and 

invited SMI to discuss the portfolio. However, the letter was not received at SMI’s offices in 

Taiwan until June 2, 2023, the day UTL filed its Complaint. Ex. A, FedEx Tracking Information. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 

12(b)(6) permits dismissal of claims that fail to meet this standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate “if the complaint fails to plead ‘enough facts to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). When considering the motion, 

“[t]he court may consider ‘the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any 

documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the 

complaint.’” Script Sec. Solns. L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 170 F.Supp.3d 928 (E.D. Tex. 2016) 

(citing Lone Star Fund V (U.S.) L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010)). 

B. Willful And Indirect Infringement 

To plead willful infringement under § 284, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant 

intentionally or knowingly infringed the asserted patents. Plano Encryption Techs., LLC v. Alkami 

Tech., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-1032, 2017 WL 8727249, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2017) (citing Halo, 

136 S. Ct. at 1926). No more than this is necessary at the pleading stage, because intentional or 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 186
4 

knowing infringement is all the concept of ‘willfulness’ requires a jury to find. NXP USA Inc. v. 

MediaTek Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00318 (E.D. Tex. March 15, 2022) (citing Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian 

Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., 946 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020)). The question of whether an accused 

infringer’s conduct rises to the level of egregious behavior is not appropriate for jury consideration 

and is addressed by the court once an affirmative finding of willfulness has been made. Eko 

Brands, 946 F.3d at 1378. Thus, whether an accused infringer’s conduct is “egregious behavior” 

is committed to the discretion of the district court. Id. 

To plead indirect infringement, a plaintiff must plead that an accused infringer had 

knowledge of the patents-in-suit. See Corydoras Tech., LLC v. Apple Inc., 2:16-CV-00538-JRG, 

2016 WL 9242435, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2016) (“[A] patentee cannot recover on claims of 

indirect infringement for acts occurring prior to the accused infringer having knowledge of the 

asserted patents.”) (citing Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 763-65 (2011)). 

C. Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike 

Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading, the court may strike from a 

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Courts have used their discretion to strike material no longer having relevance 

to issues before the court, Jefferson Parish Consol. Garbage Dist. No. 1 v. Waste Mgmt. of La., 

No. 09–6270 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 2010) (striking declaratory claim for relief because conditions 

under which relief was sought did not occur, and issue was moot), or that adds nothing to factual 

allegations, claims or defenses already before the court, FTC v. Think All Pub. LLC, 564 F.Supp.2d 

663, 665-66 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (striking affirmative defenses that were merely “restatements of 

denials of certain allegations that were made elsewhere in the Defendants’ Answer”). Regarding 

whether the challenged matter is redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous: 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 187
5 

“It is normally apparent on the face of the pleading whether the challenged matter 

is objectionable under Rule 12(f). ‘Redundant’ matter consists of allegations that 

constitute ‘a needless repetition of other averments in the pleading.’ 5C Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382 (3d ed. 

2004). ‘Immaterial’ matter is that which ‘has no essential or important relationship 

to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded,’ such as superfluous historical 

allegations, ‘or a statement of unnecessary particulars in connection with and 

descriptive of that which is material.’ Id. Furthermore, ‘impertinent’ matter consists 

of statements that ‘do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.’ 

Id. Lastly, ‘scandalous’ matter is that which ‘improperly casts a derogatory light on 

someone,’ Id., or ‘states anything in repulsive language that detracts from the 

dignity of the court.’ Florance v. Buchmeyer, 500 F. Supp. 2d 618, 645 (N.D. Tex. 

2007).” 

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Blackburn, No. 15-2451 (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 2015). 

In the Fifth Circuit, “motion[s] to strike should be granted only when the pleading to be 

stricken has no possible relation to the controversy.” Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of 

Escambia Cnty., Fla., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962) (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco 

Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953)); accord United States v. Coney, 689 F.3d 

365, 379 (5th Cir. 2012). In its holding setting forth the foregoing rule, the Sixth Circuit in Brown

noted the danger of removing relevant factual allegations from a dispute, stating: 

Partly because of the practical difficulty of deciding cases without a factual record 

it is well established that the action of striking a pleading should be sparingly used 

by the courts. It is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the 

purposes of justice. The motion to strike should be granted only when the pleading 

to be stricken has no possible relation to the controversy. 

201 F.2d at 822 (citations omitted). The appeals court then reversed the ruling below and instructed 

the district court to reinstate the factual allegations removed from the answer, because the 

allegations related to valid issues of fact and law that might be raised at trial. Id. at 823. Consistent 

with this reasoning in Brown, the Fifth Circuit has reversed the striking of factual allegations that 

form an alternative basis for a party’s position in a dispute, Coney, 689 F.3d at 1379 (“Here, the 

disputed statements were material and pertinent to the underlying controversy because filing a 

fraudulent tax return is an alternative basis for nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 188
6 

523(a)(1)(C)”) or that describe an injury suffered by parties to a dispute, Augustus, 306 F.2d at 868 

(“[A]ppellants call attention to the averment of the complaint that, ‘the plaintiffs, and members of 

their class, are injured by the policy . . . .’ The appellants argue that the district court erred in 

assuming that the Negro pupils could not be injured by that policy. . . . [W]e do not think that a 

matter of such importance should be decided on motion to strike.”). 

IV. ARGUMENT 

A. Unification’s Complaint Fails to Plausibly Allege a Claim for Pre-Suit Willful 

and Indirect Infringement 

UTL’s own Complaint shows that SMI was made aware of the Asserted Patents 

contemporaneously with this suit, and not before. Beneath a boldface, underlined and all-capital 

heading entitled “DEFENDANT’S PRE-SUIT KNOWLEDGE OF ITS INFRINGEMENT,” UTL 

announces that its basis for alleging SMI’s pre-suit knowledge is the letter it sent SMI prior to 

filing the Complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 35-36. But, as shown above, SMI didn’t receive the letter until 

June 2, the day UTL filed this suit. Ex. A. Accepting the allegations in UTL’s Complaint as true, 

UTL’s reliance on this letter establishes that SMI’s knowledge of the Asserted Patents began on 

the same date as this action. 

A claim for willful and/or indirect infringement requires that intentional or knowing 

infringement be alleged, Plano Encryption Techs., 2017 WL 8727249, at *2, and UTL’s Complaint 

lacks factual allegations suggesting that SMI possessed such knowledge prior to suit. UTL alleges 

the contrary, in fact, and thus UTL has pleaded its way out of a pre-suit willfulness and/or indirect 

infringement claim. 

B. Unification’s Complaint Contains Redundant, Immaterial, and Scandalous 

Matter Within the Meaning of Rule 12(f) 

UTL’s Complaint contains the conclusory statement that SMI’s alleged infringement for 

each of the Asserted Patents is not only willful, but “wanton, malicious, in bad-faith, deliberate, 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 189
7 

consciously wrongful, flagrant, characteristic of a pirate, and an egregious case of misconduct 

beyond typical infringement” (Compl. ¶¶ 62, 84, 105, 126), an accusation that adds nothing to the 

controversy, and should be stricken under Rule 12(f). 

1. UTL’s accusation is redundant and immaterial 

UTL’s accusation is redundant and immaterial because UTL has separately invoked 35 

U.S.C. § 284, alleging that SMI had (1) knowledge of the Asserted Patents and (2) committed 

underlying acts of direct infringement and inducement of infringement in a (3) ‘willful’ manner, 

(Compl. ¶¶ 62-63, 84-85, 105-106, 126-27) and the accusation raises no claim for relief or factual 

allegation on its own. To the extent UTL intended its accusation to comprise its willfulness claim, 

it is duplicative of the separate allegations establishing that willfulness claim1, and is therefore 

redundant. To the extent that UTL’s accusation is meant to direct the Court in its determination 

regarding willful infringement, the accusation is unsupported by any facts and is therefore 

immaterial. For while it alludes to behavior that might warrant enhanced damages,2

 the accusation 

is unsupported by any allegation in UTL’s Complaint that might distinguish the alleged acts of 

infringement from typical, “garden-variety”3

 infringement. And because there is no such support 

1

 As stated supra at section IV.A, SMI disputes whether UTL has successfully pled a claim for presuit willful and indirect infringement. Though SMI does not challenge UTL’s claims for post-suit 

willful infringement, direct infringement, or inducement of infringement in this motion, it reserves 

the right to do so in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). 

2

 “The sort of conduct warranting enhanced damages has been variously described in our cases as 

willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—

characteristic of a pirate.” Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932 (citation omitted). 

3 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935 (noting the careful policy balance that would be disrupted if enhanced 

damages were awarded in such cases). 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 190
8 

for the accusation of egregious behavior, UTL’s accusation amounts to an unfounded assertion – 

just the bare conclusion UTL wants the Court to make on its willfulness claim.4

2. UTL’s accusation is scandalous 

Though UTL’s accusation is redundant and immaterial, it does impugn SMI’s business 

reputation, and is therefore scandalous. UTL’s Complaint describes SMI as a “leading 

manufacturer, designer and seller of semiconductors, microcontrollers, and SoC products in the 

United States and the world.” Compl. ¶ 2. Portions of the paragraphs in UTL’s pleading further 

describe SMI’s and its subsidiary’s activities in places across the United States such as Texas and 

California. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 7-13.5

 Rather than even suggesting questionable behavior, these descriptions 

are a nod to SMI’s dedication over the last twenty-plus years to providing valuable and reliable 

products and services to its customers. UTL’s wholly unsupported accusation about egregious 

behavior by SMI adversely affects its relationships with its customers but serves no useful purpose 

in this suit or anywhere else. Accordingly, this scandalous accusation should be stricken from the 

pleading. 

3. UTL’s accusation has no possible relation to the controversy 

UTL’s conclusory accusation is just that and nothing more. By itself it raises no issue of 

fact or law to be decided, and therefore has no possible relation to the controversy. See Brown, 201 

4

 The Supreme Court has further stated that egregious behavior is not even a guarantee of enhanced 

damages for willful infringement. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933-34 (“[N]one of this is to say that 

enhanced damages must follow a finding of egregious misconduct. As with any exercise of 

discretion, courts should continue to take into account the particular circumstances of each case in 

deciding whether to award damages, and in what amount. Section 284 permits district courts to 

exercise their discretion in a manner free from the inelastic constraints of the Seagate test”). 

5

 SMI reserves its right to dispute or deny portions of these paragraphs, and in no way intends any 

statement in this motion as a wholesale admission of the allegations of any paragraph in the 

Complaint. SMI will specify the particular allegations admitted or denied in these paragraphs in 

its Answer. 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 191
9 

F.2d at 823 (holding that the Brown defendants had raised such issues in the allegations that had 

been removed, and thus the material should not have been stricken). 

4. Striking UTL’s accusation will not cause prejudice 

Should UTL find some basis to allege this accusation during discovery (it will not), UTL 

will have ample opportunity to assert it in a motion for summary judgment or at trial for the Court’s 

review. No delay will result from striking this accusation, as UTL’s claim for willful infringement 

is separate and will be unaffected, and UTL’s accusation does not relate to any question for the 

jury. UTL’s accusation should not be allowed to remain in the Complaint untethered to any factual 

allegation and based on future facts that may or may not exist (they do not). 

V. CONCLUSION 

For all of the foregoing reasons, SMI respectfully requests that the Court GRANT this 

Motion and find that: 

(1) Plaintiff UTL’s Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for pre-suit willful and 

indirect infringement for each of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,575,902, 11,061,825, 11,573,909, and 

11,640,359; and 

(2) Plaintiff UTL’s statement repeated in each of paragraphs 62, 84, 105, 126 of the 

Complaint describing SMI’s actions as “wanton, malicious, in bad-faith, deliberate, consciously 

wrongful, flagrant, characteristic of a pirate, and an egregious case of misconduct beyond typical 

infringement” is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter within the meaning of 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) and is stricken from the pleading. 

 

Dated: August 24, 2023 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Michael R. Rueckheim 

Michael R. Rueckheim 

State Bar No. 24081129 

MRueckheim@winston.com 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 192
10 

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 

255 Shoreline Drive, Suite 520 

Redwood City, CA 94065 

Telephone: (650) 858-6500 

Facsimile: (650) 858-6559 

Ya-Chiao Chang 

State Bar No. 24070992 

YChang@winston.com 

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 

28th Floor Jin Mao Building 

88 Century Avenue 

Shanghai 200121 

China 

Telephone: +86 (21) 2208-2600 

Facsimile: +86 (21) 5298-5262 

Vivek V. Krishnan (Pro Hac Vice to be 

submitted) 

VKrishnan@winston.com 

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 

35 W. Wacker Drive 

Chicago, IL 60601 

Telephone: (312) 558-5700 

Facsimile: (312) 558-5700 

Evan D. Lewis (Pro Hac Vice to be 

submitted) 

EDlewis@winston.com 

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 

800 Capitol Street, Suite 2400 

Houston, TX 77002 

Telephone: (713) 651-2600 

Facsimile: (713) 651-2700 

SILICON MOTION, INC.

 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 193
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned hereby certifies that on August 24, 2023, a true and correct copy of the 

attached document was electronically filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, 

which sends notifications of such filing to all counsel of record who have consented to accept 

service by electronic means. 

/s/ Michael R. Rueckheim 

 Michael R. Rueckheim 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 18 Filed 08/24/23 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 194