MARK WHITE Attorney General 

# The Attorney General of Texas September 11, 1980

Honorable Hamp Atkinson, Chairman Committee on Pllblic Education Houseof Representatives Austin, Texas Opinion No. MW-239 Re: Length of school term as the term is used in section 21.301, Education Code Dear ChairmanAtkinson: You have requested our opinion regarding the meaning of “current term” as used in section 2L3Olfa) of the Education Code. That statute provides: The beard of trustees of eny school district may

suspend from the privileges of the schools any pupil found guilty of incorrigible conduct, but such suspensionshall mt extend beyond the current term of the schooL The State Board of Education has defined “school term” for accounting purposesas: that period of time a school district is scheduled

to be in operation includw inservice trainii and classroom instruction. The period begins with the first day of scheduled inservice training as indicated in the school calendar and ends with the beginningof the sllbsequent

school term. On August 7,1978, the Commissioner of Educationrendered a decision which supports the application of the State Board’s definition to section 2L30l(a). In that case, Abbey v. Hardin-Jefferson IndependentSchool Dist., Docket No. 77-R124, State Commissioner of Education, Algust 7, 1978, a student had~ been suspendedin October, 1977, for the remainder of the school year. The student contended, inter alia, that such a suspension contravened the Education Code. The Commissioner, while holding that the particular suspension

was improper, nevertheless stated: The ordinary and usual interpretation by this agency of the word “term”, in section 2L301,Texas Eucation Code, is school year. The word “term” does not refer to either a semester cr a quarter in that context. 3 at 4.

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Aacordirgly, the Commissioner held that, under section 21.301,a school district was entitled to suspenda student “for the remainder of the school year. ” g at 4. It is well established that an administrativeconstruction of sn ambiguousstatute should be followed tmleasit is clearly unreasonable. Calvert v. Kadane, 427 S.W. 2d 605 (Tex. 1968);Thompson v. Calvert, 301S.W. 2d 496 ‘ (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1957, no writ). Although the 66th Legislature, which convened five months subsequent to the Commissioner’s decision in Abbey, extensively amended section 21.301, it did not alter the Commissioner~sconstructton of “current term. ” As a result, we must conclude that, for purposes of section 21.301(a) of the Education Code, “current term” meansthe period beginning with the first day of scheduled inserviae training and ending with the first day of scheduled inservice trainingthe following year. SUMMARY For purposes of section 2L3Ol(a) of the E&cation Code,

“current term” meansthe period beginning with the first day of scheduled inserviaa trainii and ending with the fit day of scheduled inservice trainingthe following year.

2* MARK WHITE Attorney General of Texas

JOHNW. FAINTER,JR. First Assistant Attorney General Praparedby Rick Gilpin Assistant Attorney General APPROVED: OPINIONCGMMHTEE C. Robert Heath, Chairman Jon Bible SusanGarrison Rick Gilpin Iris Jones Bruce Youngblood

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