Filed 8/4/22 In re A.M. CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT 

In re A.M., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

______________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

R.D. et al., 

 Defendants and Appellants.

B316350 

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP02631A

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.

 Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant R.D.

Caitlin Christian, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant S.M.
2

 Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

A father and mother appeal the juvenile court’s order 

terminating their parental rights over their young daughter. We 

affirm. Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.

I

In April 2019, when the child was five months old, the Los 

Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 

filed a petition alleging the child was at risk of harm in her 

parents’ care due to their unresolved mental and emotional 

problems. The mother had faced similar allegations in an earlier 

dependency case and had lost parental rights to her older 

daughter in 2011. 

Someone in the child’s pediatrician’s office made the child 

welfare referral. The office was concerned the child may have 

serious medical conditions (including spina bifida and cerebral 

palsy) but the mother was in denial, was not following up on 

medical referrals, and was not feeding and caring for the child 

properly. 

The parents initially refused to bring the child to be 

detained. Eventually, the Department placed the child with 

foster mother T.N. after two other foster placements fell through. 

The juvenile court ordered monitored visitation and 

sustained the petition. The court later ordered reunification 

services for the father but not the mother. 

Visitation was generally twice a week. This changed 

briefly to daily video and phone visits at the outset of the COVID-
3

19 pandemic, but in-person visits resumed in early June 2020. 

Generally, during these visits, the father was more affectionate 

and attentive to the child than the mother, who appeared more 

interested in photographing and recording the child and who 

would bring items that were choking hazards. One report noted 

the child responded to the father with cooing and smiled often. 

Several reports noted the father deferred to and depended on the 

mother during these visits. 

In February 2020, an “Early Intervention Infant Teacher” 

reported the relationship between the child and her parents was 

“very loving” but concluded the parents lacked the skills and 

competence to parent properly and were unreceptive to support 

and even combative. 

The child received Regional Center services, including 

physical therapy and occupational therapy. She had multiple 

developmental delays, including in the area of communication. 

At 16 months, she had a developmental age of 9 months. 

The mother and father completed psychological 

evaluations. The evaluator concluded the mother had a psychotic 

disorder. The father’s symptoms were consistent with bipolar 

disorder, and he presented with cognitive delay and limited 

insight. Before this evaluation, the father had been diagnosed 

with schizophrenia and depression, and he had been hospitalized. 

Both parents had a poor prognosis for independent and safe 

parenting without mental health intervention. 

The father attended therapy for a while but then stopped. 

Both parents had refused to take medication. The parents also 

declined neurological testing and blood tests to rule out certain 

causes for their daughter’s developmental delays. They were in 

denial regarding her delays. 
4

By October 2020, the Department was recommending 

termination of the father’s reunification services. Although he 

generally was compliant with his case plan, the Department was 

concerned about his lack of insight, his lack of boundaries and 

“co-dependency” with the mother, his lack of protective capacity, 

and his inability to care for the child independently. The parents 

did not intend to separate, and the father opposed separate visits. 

The child’s counsel felt the father was choosing the mother over 

the child. At a combined review hearing, the juvenile court found 

it would be dangerous to return the child to parental custody and 

terminated services. 

The Department recommended adoption by the family that 

had adopted the child’s older sister. This family lived in Nevada. 

The recommendation upset the parents, and they urged adoption 

by the foster mother so the child could remain close and they 

could continue visiting her. 

Ahead of the section 366.26 hearing, a social worker 

reported the child was making strides developmentally and “tries 

to speak all the time.” The Department also reported on multiple 

occasions that, while the child was “well loved” by her parents, 

she “does not show any significant attachment to her parents 

outside of them being people she is brought to interact with” 

twice a week or weekly. 

The court continued the section 366.26 hearing while the 

child transitioned to Nevada to live with the potential adoptive 

family. A last minute information showed the transition had 

been smooth; the child was integrating positively with this family 

and had “quickly grown attached to her two adoptive big sisters.” 

In November 2021, the juvenile court held the section 

366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan. The 
5

father testified briefly at the hearing. He described the frequency 

and circumstances of his visits with his daughter and then 

described what typically happened during these visits:

“We would try to play some soccer, learn about shapes, how 

to put shapes away, kind of figure that—what type of toys that 

we would have, that she didn’t really want to play with us, so we 

would just kind of go over some Peppa Pig books, try to read her 

some English phonics, and then try to play on the kids gym, 

right, the slide and kind of watch her go up and around. 

“And she enjoyed that very much. She was very good at it.

Yeah, we would also try to paint, construction paper or coloring 

books. We would kind of hang out, play with her, understanding 

how she likes to color, hopefully that she would be able to speak 

about it, to let us know how she finds anything. 

“We were learning for the beginning of English or letters, 

and coloring books, what can she know about, photos, so she can 

keep it in the line, or if not, she’s going to try her best to just 

scribble. She found it very fun.” 

The father talked about the occupational therapist’s work 

with the child and answered some questions by the court and the 

mother’s counsel. He said he needed the mother at the visits so 

they could “kind of learn about each other” and bond with their 

daughter. 

The mother did not testify but appeared to say things to the 

father during his testimony. The court warned she needed to 

stop telling him what to say. 

The father’s counsel argued the parental-benefit exception 

to adoption applied and the father “stands in the role of a parent 

to the best of his abilities.” The mother’s counsel argued the 

mother too “has played a parental role.” In response, the child’s
6

counsel argued, “I think Father’s testimony was very clear that 

what they are to my client is basically a playmate” and that 

“there were times where my client didn’t even want to play with 

them.” This lawyer also emphasized the child’s young age and 

the short time she had lived with her parents. Both the child’s 

counsel and the Department noted the parents had not 

progressed beyond monitored visitation and requested the court 

terminate parental rights. 

The juvenile court considered the entire contents of the 

court file and specifically noted the section 366.26 report dated 

March 4, 2021. It found the child to be adoptable. Regarding the 

parental-benefit exception, the court found the parents had 

maintained regular and consistent visitation and contact. But it 

also found the parents “ha[d] not established a bond with the 

child[,]” it would not be detrimental to the child to sever the 

relationship, and the benefits of adoption outweighed any benefit 

of their relationship. The court remarked that, to some extent, 

the consistent visitation “has confirmed a parental role and 

relationship. [¶] They at times have worked with the 

occupational therapist, and the occupational therapist has been 

there. In addition, the parents have participated in some 

developmental activities of the child. [¶] But at the same time, 

these visits have been a couple hours once or twice a week 

monitored. And even with there being some developmental and 

parental aspects to it, in large part, it has also really been a 

playmate and that type of relationship.” 

The court terminated parental rights and chose adoption as 

the permanent plan. 

The father appealed and asks us to remand the matter for 

the juvenile court to “reconsider the evidence presented at the 
7

section 366.26 hearing under the correct legal standards” of In re 

Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). The mother also 

appealed and joined in the father’s brief. She independently 

contends if we reverse the order terminating the father’s parental 

rights, we must reverse as to her rights too. We therefore 

consider the father’s arguments.

II

The father argues the juvenile court erred in finding the 

parental-benefit exception did not apply because it considered an 

improper factor (whether the parents had a parental role), failed 

to conduct a proper analysis focused on the family’s bond from 

the child’s perspective, and based its decision on an inadequate 

record. None of these contentions has merit. 

A

We survey the law.

At the permanency planning hearing, the focus is on the 

best interests of the child, and the default option is adoption. 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631–632.) Only in exceptional 

circumstances, laid out in the statute, is it appropriate for the 

juvenile court to select a different plan. (Id. at pp. 630–631.) 

The parents invoked the parental-benefit exception, section 

366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i). This limited exception recognizes that, 

despite the child being outside the parents’ custody, their bond 

might be so strong that the harm to the child from severing it 

outweighs the benefits of adoption. (See Caden C., supra, 11 

Cal.5th at pp. 631, 633–634.) For this exception, parents must 

establish: (1) they visited the child regularly; (2) there is a 

“substantial, positive, emotional attachment” between them and 

the child; and (3) terminating this attachment would be 

detrimental to the child. (Id. at p. 636; see also id. at p. 631.)
8

We review the juvenile court’s findings on the first two 

prongs for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 639–640.) The third prong requires determining whether any 

harm the child would suffer from losing the parental bond would 

outweigh the benefits of adoption. (Id. at p. 640.) The juvenile 

court must undertake a careful inquiry to untangle the burdens 

and benefits of the proposed action. (Id. at pp. 633–634.) We 

review this determination for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 

640.) In sum, our review is deferential.

B

We reject the father’s claim the Department’s reporting 

was inadequate. 

The child was under three years old and could not make a 

meaningful statement during the entire period of reporting due to 

her age and communication delays. Nevertheless, the section 

366.26 report (and others) appropriately described the parentchild interactions and discussed “the amount of and nature of” 

the parents’ contact with the child. (§ 366.22, subd. (c)(1)(B).) 

The report incorporated information from earlier reports, 

including the infant teacher’s February 2020 comment about the 

parents’ “very loving” relationship with their child. It noted the 

parents’ visitation had been consistent, twice a week at a local 

park, and monitored by the child’s foster parent, a social worker, 

and the infant teacher. The visits were about an hour each. The 

report described the visits: how the parents would bring many 

items, some of which were age-inappropriate, and the child would 

show “limited to no interest” in most of the items; how the mother 

would treat her daughter more like a doll than a child and was 

focused on changing her outfits and taking photographs and 

videos of her but was otherwise disengaged and disconnected 
9

from the child. The report contrasted the father, who “does make 

more effort to play at their child’s level, but will periodically blow 

up at the monitor to defend the mother’s behavior when the 

mother is being corrected and/or redirected by the monitor and/or 

instructor.” The father would try to play with the child and the 

items she cared about and try to apply what he was taught, 

including reading to the child and practicing exercises to improve 

the child’s motor skills. But he also had difficulty understanding 

the child’s behavior, heavily relied on the mother “deciding, 

acting, and speaking for them,” and deferred to her wishes about 

how to interact with the child. The report notes the parents 

“genuinely enjoy seeing” the child and “do express appropriate 

affection” with her, including kissing and holding her. But it also 

states, with our emphasis: “The minor is willing to have her 

parents around her during in-person monitored visits usually 

twice a week at the public park, but has become more comfortable 

to express to them through crying or fussing when she does not 

want them doing something with her. The minor does not show 

any significant attachment to her parents.” 

The case plan update incorporated into the section 366.26 

report notes the child was less comfortable with the parents than 

with her foster parent. Regarding the mother, this update covers 

much of the same ground as the section 366.26 report. It notes 

the mother opposed the Regional Center’s instructions and made 

the child uncomfortable with all the dress up. Regarding the 

father, the update says he “does enjoy his visits with [the child]

though he is frustrated that his visits have never been liberalized 

to unmonitored and has been verbally aggressive in defending 

the mother when the mother is being corrected, redirected, or 

given instruction. He is willing to get [to the child’s] level and 
10

play with the things the child does show interest in.” “Father 

consistently visits with [the child], but continues to defer 

parenting to the mother who is more likely to place the minor at 

risk of harm from swallowing small beads to losing balance and 

falling down and injuring herself while seated. He tries more of 

what he is shown to stimulate his daughter’s development and 

interest when compared to the mother.” He “remains unwilling 

to separate himself from the mother to demonstrate his 

protective capacity.” 

This reporting satisfied the statute. (See § 366.22, subd. 

(c)(1).)

We end this section by noting neither parent complained of 

inadequate reporting before this appeal. (See In re M.M. (July 

12, 2022, B315997) __ Cal.App.5th __, __ [2022 WL 2679301 at 

*3] [mother forfeited challenge to adequacy of adoption 

assessment where she never objected on this basis at the juvenile 

court]; In re Mary C. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 793, 801 [parents 

forfeited claim of deficient report by failing to assert it in the 

juvenile court].) And while the father testified, neither parent 

submitted additional evidence or requested a bonding study. In 

the juvenile court, then, the parents apparently believed the 

Department’s reports were sufficient.

C

The parents had an insubstantial bond with the child. 

At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, the child had just 

turned three. She had spent most of her life in foster care and 

only the first five or so months of her life with her parents. The 

child received Regional Center services and was largely 

nonverbal as of the hearing. She could not “make a meaningful 

statement” about her feelings for her parents. The section 366.26 
11

report shows the child would tolerate her parents during their 

monitored visits and would play with them, but she was at times 

uninterested and any attachment they had by this point was not 

“significant.” (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [listing 

factors for the second prong of the parental-benefit exception]; see 

also In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1316 [no 

beneficial parental relationship where mother’s supervised 

interactions with child, although frequent and loving, “amounted 

to little more than playdates for him with a loving adult” and 

there was no evidence the child looked forward to visits, 

benefitted from them, or had difficulty separating from his 

mother].) 

This case is unlike In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 

855–858 (J.D.), cited by the father, where there was considerable 

evidence the mother and her child had a substantial and positive 

emotional attachment. The father’s other main case, In re B.D.

(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1229 & fn. 4 (B.D.) is similarly 

distinguishable. (Id. at p. 1229 [“our review of the record 

suggests that the parents presented evidence to support a finding 

that they had a beneficial relationship with their children”].)

D

The record also shows the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in balancing the harms and benefits of adoption. 

Indeed, the record does not show the child would be harmed by 

the loss of the largely playmate relationship she had with her 

parents. On the other hand, the child was joining her half sister 

in a loving adoptive home with adoptive parents who were 

motivated to care for her and to provide the services she needed, 

and the reports of the child’s life there were positive. The 

juvenile court’s decision on this third prong certainly was not 
12

arbitrary, capricious, or absurd. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 

at p. 641.)

E

We reject the father’s claim the trial court considered 

impermissible factors in ruling on the parental-benefit exception. 

The father says the trial court impermissibly considered 

whether the parents’ role was parental. The reporter’s transcript 

shows the trial court simply was responding to the parties’ 

arguments about the parents and their relationship with their 

child. Whether this relationship was one akin to playmates is 

relevant in assessing the strength of their bond and whether 

severing it would harm the child. (See J.D., supra, 70 

Cal.App.5th. at pp. 864–865 [a relationship involving a 

substantial, positive, emotional attachment is “surely more 

significant than that of a ‘mere friend or playmate’ ”]; B.D., 

supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230 [“an emotional attachment is 

one where the child views the parent as more than a mere friend 

or playmate”].) 

Caden C. does not prohibit such considerations. (See J.D., 

supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 864 [“Caden C. did not address 

whether, to satisfy the second element, the nature of a parent’s 

relationship must be ‘parental’ ”].)

Context makes clear the juvenile court was responding to 

the parties. The court sought to determine the existence and 

nature of any bond between the parents and the child, as well as 

any impact of losing this relationship. The court applied the law 

thoughtfully and correctly.

The court was not required to make a statement of its 

findings or reasons. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156, 
13

1161.) The father’s frequent criticism of the court’s brevity is 

unfounded. 

DISPOSITION

We affirm.

WILEY, J.

We concur: 

GRIMES, Acting P. J. 

HARUTUNIAN, J.*

* Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.