alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

TYLER DIVISION 

JAY WILLIAMS, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

MARY WRIGHT, 

 Defendant. 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

Case No. 6:23-cv-224-JDK-KNM 

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Jay Williams, proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights lawsuit under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge K. Nicole 

Mitchell pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. 

On June 13, 2023, Judge Mitchell issued a Report and Recommendation 

recommending that the Court dismiss this case without prejudice for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted and, alternatively, for failure to prosecute 

or to obey a Court order. Docket No. 5. Plaintiff filed a letter that the Court will 

construe as an objection to the Report. Docket No. 7. 

Where a party timely objects to the Report and Recommendation, the Court 

reviews the objected-to findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge de novo. 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In conducting a de novo review, the Court examines the entire 

record and makes an independent assessment under the law. Douglass v. United 

Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded on other 

Case 6:23-cv-00224-JDK-KNM Document 9 Filed 09/07/23 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 19
2 

grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from 

ten to fourteen days). 

The Report recommended dismissal for failure to prosecute or to obey a Court 

order because Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint and failed to pay the 

statutory filing fee, as ordered by the Magistrate Judge. See Docket Nos. 2, 3. The 

Report recommended dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted because Plaintiff’s complaint names Mary Wright as the sole defendant in 

this case, but contains no allegations concerning Mary Wright. See Docket No. 1. 

Plaintiff’s letter—construed as objections—does not address these issues. The Court 

therefore OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections. 

Having conducted a de novo review of the record in this case and the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report, the Court has determined that the Report of the 

Magistrate Judge is correct, and Plaintiff’s objections are without merit. Accordingly, 

the Court hereby ADOPTS the Report of the Magistrate Judge (Docket No. 5) as the 

opinion of the District Court. Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for failure to 

prosecute or to obey an order of the Court. 

Further, the Court notifies Plaintiff that the continued filing of frivolous or 

vexatious pleadings, documents, or letters could result in the imposition of sanctions, 

monetary or otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 

So ORDERED and SIGNED this day of

___________________________________

JEREMY D. KERNODLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7th September, 2023.

Case 6:23-cv-00224-JDK-KNM Document 9 Filed 09/07/23 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 20
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2064 Introduced in House (IH)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2064

         To suspend temporarily the duty on instant print film.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 8, 1999

  Mr. Neal of Massachusetts introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
         To suspend temporarily the duty on instant print film.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DUTY.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:
      

``     9902.37.02      Instant print film  Free         No change         No change         On or before 12/
                        in rolls                                                             31/2004          ''
                        (provided for in                                                                       .
                        subheading
                        3702.20.0000)....

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section applies 
with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
JOSHUA EDMOND WILLIAMS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-0579

_____________________________/

Opinion filed September 15, 2016.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Walton County.

Thomas R. Santurri, Judge.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public 

Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant; Joshua Edmond Williams, pro se, Appellant. 

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

RAY, KELSEY, and WINOKUR, JJ., CONCUR.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1880

Filed August 30, 2023

ELVIN MARQUETTE FARRIS,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Steven J. 

Andreasen, Judge.

A postconviction applicant appeals the summary disposition of his 

challenge to a traffic violation. AFFIRMED. 

Pamela Wingert of Wingert Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
2

TABOR, Judge.

The Sioux City police ticketed Elvin Farris for driving while his license was 

suspended. When he did not appear for trial on this simple misdemeanor charge, 

the district court relied upon his signature bond on the ticket to enter a conviction. 

Farris applied for postconviction relief (PCR), noting his attorney withdrew the 

morning of trial and did not advise that Farris was “expected in court that day.” The 

State moved for summary judgment.1 The court granted the State’s motion, finding 

no genuine issue of material fact that would entitle Farris to relief.

Farris appeals that summary disposition, claiming trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by not advising him of the consequences for failing to appear 

for trial. He also asserts that counsel’s “abandonment of [him] prejudiced his ability 

to present his case to the judge.”

We generally review the summary dismissal of a PCR application for the 

correction of legal error. Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Iowa 2018). But 

when the basis for relief is ineffective assistance of counsel, we review the ruling

de novo. Id. 

In finding the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the district 

court declared that Farris “was required to appear with or without counsel.” The 

court pointed out that no continuance had been granted. And Farris did not allege 

that his attorney informed him that the trial would be continued or that he did not 

need to appear. On this record, the court decided: “[N]o reasonable fact finder 

1 Summary judgment principles apply to motions for disposition of a PCR 

application without a trial on the merits. Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 560 

(Iowa 2002); compare Iowa Code § 822.6(3) (2021). 
3

could conclude that [Farris] was denied effective assistance of counsel because 

no reasonable fact finder could conclude that [he] suffered any prejudice as a result 

of the actions or inactions of [his trial attorney].”

Because the district court’s opinion identifies and considers all of the issues 

that Farris presented, and we approve of the analysis in its summary judgment 

ruling, we affirm by memorandum opinion. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(1)(d). In our 

view, a full opinion would not enhance existing law. Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(1)(e). 

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       2,117,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                6,314,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 4,658,000
<INVENTORY>                                     51,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,524,000
<PP&E>                                       1,207,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                 665,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               9,566,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       13,681,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        33,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 (4,538,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 9,566,000
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,729,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,830,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,183,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               375,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             264,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (923,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (923,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (923,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.28)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.28)
        

</TABLE>
Peyton John Wesley HOPSON, petitioner, v. STARK COUNTY, OHIO, et al.

No. 18-6645.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 14, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
Oscar Kenneth MORENO, petitioner, v. Alana BUTLER.

No. 18-6438.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 7, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two denied.
American Dream Entertainment, Inc.
                 (f/k/a Federal Affordable Housing Corporation)

                  Computation of Income (Loss) Per Common Share
                                   (Unaudited)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>


                                                   For the Three Months Ended                      For the Nine Months Ended
                                              February 29,           February 28,            February 29,           February 28,
                                           -----------------------------------------      -----------------------------------------
                                                 2000                   1999                    2000                   1999
                                           ------------------     ------------------      ------------------    -------------------

<S>                                   <C>                  <C>                       <C>                       <C>
Shares  outstanding:                           17,320,000                493,500              17,320,000                493,500
Weighted average shares outstanding            17,320,000                493,500              17,762,418                493,500
Net income (loss)                     $          (230,169)  $            (37,223)    $          (494,102)        $      (35,324)

Net income (loss) per common share    $             (0.01)  $              (0.08)    $             (0.03)        $        (0.07)


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Trimeris, Inc. (the Company) for the quarterly period ending September 30, 2004 as
filed with Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert R. Bonczek, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ ROBERT R. BONCZEK  
|Robert R. Bonczek      
|Chief Financial Officer



November 9, 2004



The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.



A signed original of this written statement required by § 906 has been provided to Trimeris, Inc. and will be retained by Trimeris, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.



39
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                       3,327,965
<SECURITIES>                                   107,667
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,351,923
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (41,866)
<INVENTORY>                                  1,921,103
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             6,950,962
<PP&E>                                       1,764,706
<DEPRECIATION>                               (325,957)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,619,200
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,479,398
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         5,056
<OTHER-SE>                                   7,134,746
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,619,200
<SALES>                                      6,805,473
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,805,473
<CGS>                                        4,216,104
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,449,878
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             (127,499)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,509
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                480,585
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (230,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            710,685
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   710,585
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .35
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .35


</TABLE>
## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No s . 06
- 13
- 00153
- CR & 06
- 13
- 00154
- CR GABRIEL LOUIS MENDOZA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 283rd District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court No s . F12
- 55612
- T & F12
- 55613
- T

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.2 

### O R D E R Gabriel Louis Mendoza appeals convictions of robbery in our cause numbers 06

- 13
- 0015 3
- CR and 06
- 13
- 001 54
- CR. The clerk’s record s that ha ve been filed in this Court do not include certified bill s of costs. As a result, the State has moved this Court for an order requiring the Dallas County District Clerk to supplement the records in each of these cases with certified bills of costs
. “[A]n officer of the court shall certify and sign a bill of costs stating the costs that have been accrued and send the bill of costs to the court to which the action o r proceeding is . . . appealed.” T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . A NN . art. 103.006 (West 2006). Costs may not be collected from the person charged with the costs until a written bill containing the items of cost is produced and signed by the officer who charged th e cost or the officer who is entitled to receive payment for the cost. T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . A NN . art. 103.001 (West 2006). We point out that all that is required by the Rules is a request by letter from an appellate court or any party to require a district clerk to prepare, certify, and file in the appellate court a supplement containing the omitted item. See T EX . R. A PP . P . 34.5(c)(1). However, it appears that the procedure used by the Dallas Court of Appeals requires us in these transfer cases to instead formally order the clerk to supplement the record in each of these matters with the appropriate certified bill of costs. See Franklin v. State , 402 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2013, no pet.); see also T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . A NN . a rt . 103.006 (“shall certify” costs). Under the authority of Rule 34.5(c)(1) of the Texas Rule s of Appellate Procedu re, we order the Dallas County District Clerk to prepare and electronically file, within ten days of the date of this3 order, supplemental records containing a detailed itemization of the costs assessed in our cause numbers 06

- 13
- 0015 3
- CR and 06
- 13
- 001 54
- CR . See T EX . R. A PP . P. 34.5(c)(1). IT IS SO ORDERED. BY THE COURT Date: January 2 8 , 2014
United States District Court

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

MARCO OMIAGBOPHILIPS

V.

DIGITAL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23CV240

JUDGE MAZZANT/JUDGE JOHNSON

MEMORANDUM ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Came on for consideration the report of the United States Magistrate Judge in this action, 

this matter having been heretofore referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. 

On February 8, 2024, the Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendation (the “Report”)

(Dkt. #18) that Defendant Digital Federal Credit Union’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (the “Motion to Dismiss”) 

(Dkt. #10) should be granted. The Magistrate Judge further recommended that Plaintiff be given 

leave to file an amended complaint. On February 15, 2024, Plaintiff Marco OmiagboPhilips filed 

an amended complaint (the “Second Amended Complaint”) (Dkt. #20), wherein he referenced the 

Report as grounds permitting such amendment (Dkt. #20 at p. 1).

Having received the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge, and no timely objections 

being filed, the Court is of the opinion that the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge 

are correct and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s report as the findings and conclusions of the Court.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #10) is 

GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Case 4:23-cv-00240-ALM-KPJ Document 21 Filed 03/01/24 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 119
2

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend his complaint. 

As Plaintiff has already done so, the Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. #20) is deemed the live 

pleading in this matter.

Case 4:23-cv-00240-ALM-KPJ Document 21 Filed 03/01/24 Page 2 of 2 PageID #: 120
Exhibit
10.4


 


FIRST
AMENDMENT TO THE


BANK FIRST NATIONAL AMENDED AND RESTATED


NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN


MASTER PLAN DOCUMENT


 


WHEREAS,
Bank First National Corporation (the “Corporation”) adopted the Bank First National Amended and Restated Nonqualified
Deferred Compensation Plan, (the “Plan”) to provide deferred compensation benefits to eligible individuals;


 


WHEREAS,
pursuant to Section 9.1 of the Plan the Corporation, by action of its Board of Directors, may amend at any time any provision
of the Plan;


 


WHEREAS,
the Corporation desires to amend Section 7.1 of the Plan to provide that all benefits payable under the Plan shall be paid
in stock of the Corporation;


 


NOW,
THEREFORE, it is agreed the Plan is hereby amended as follows:


 


1.           Article
1, Definitions, shall be and hereby is amended to add the following effective March 1, 2017:


 


“Qualifying
Employer Securities. Common stock of an Employer with a combination of voting power and dividend rights equal to the class
of common stock with the highest dividend rights and that class of common stock with the greatest voting power or non-callable
preferred stock of an Employer if convertible at any time into common stock as previously described at a reasonable conversion
price.”


 


2.           Article
7, Section 7.1 shall be, and hereby is, amended to read as follows effective March 1, 2017:


 


“Source
of Payments. All payments made under the Plan shall be made in Qualifying Employer Securities.”


 


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the foregoing amendment to the Plan is hereby executed on behalf of Bank First National Corporation by its
undersigned representative, this 24th day of February, 2017.


 


	 	BANK FIRST NATIONAL CORPORATION
	 	 
	 	By:	/s/ Michael B. Molepske
	 	 	 
	 	Title:	Chief Executive Officer
Marisa N. PAVAN, et al., petitioners, v. Nathaniel SMITH.

No. 17-1393.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 1, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas denied.
Victor Anthony CHARLES, petitioner, v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.

No. 18M172.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 17, 2019.

Motion to direct the Clerk to file a petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.