08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

1 1 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS 2 F OR THE SE CO ND CI RC UI T

3 August Term, 2008 4 (Argued: May

29, 2009 Dec ided: August 4, 2010)

5 Docke t No. 08-1477-c v

6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 7 HOWARD HENRY, 8 Plaintif f-Appellant , 9 v

. 10 WYETH PHARMACEUTI CAL S, I NC., WAL TER WARDR OP, ANDREW SC HASCHL , and 11 MI CHAEL

MCDERMOTT, 12 Defendant- Appellee s 13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

14 Be fore : L EVAL , POOL ER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges

. 15 Plaintiff appea ls from the adve rse judg ment of the United States District Court for the 16 Southern District of Ne w York ( Conner, J. ), followinga jury verdic t in favor of

defe ndants on 17 discrimination and re taliation claims. The Court of Appe als (L eval, J .) af firms the judg ment 18 with respec t to plaintiff’s discrimination claims, but vacates and re mands for a new tria l on the 19 re ta liatio n c la ims

. 2008- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

2 1 Steven Anthony Morelli, L aw Of

fice of Steven A. 2 Morelli, P.C., C arle Place, NY(Eric S. Tilt on, on 3 the brief ), for Plaintif

f-Appellant

. 4 Michae l Delikat, Orr ick, Her ring ton & Sutcliffe 5 L L P, New Yor k, NY (James H. McQua de, on the 6 brief ), for Defendant-

Appellee s . 7 L EVAL , Circuit Judge : 8 Plaintiff Howar d Henr y appea ls from the adve rse judg ment of the United States District 9 Court for the Southern D istrict of NewYork (Conne r, J. ) in his suit aga inst his former employ er, 1 0 d ef

en d an tW y et hP h arm ac eu t i ca l s , I n c. (“ W y et h ”) , an d fo rm er s u p erv i s o rs at W y et h , fo l l o wi n g a 11 jury

verdic t for def

endants on his claims of r acia l discrimination and reta liation in viol ation of 12 Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) , et seq ., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the 13 New Y ork State Human Rig hts L aw, Exec. L aw § 290, et seq . Henr y contends that the district 14 court e rre d in gr anting two of def endants’ motions in limi ne; by improperly

instructing the jury 1 5 as t o h i s b urd en o f p ro o f; an d b y fa i l i n g t o p ro v i d e c o un s el wi tha w ri t t en co p y o f t h e j ury

ch ar ge 16 pr ior

to s umm a tio ns . We fi nd that any e rr or c omm itt e d b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt

wi th r e sp e c t to 17 Henr

y ’s discrimination claims was ha rmless, and thus af

firm the judg ment of the district cour t 18 insofar a s it relates to those cla ims. W e find, howe ver, that the district court instructed the jury 19 improperly

as to the fa cts Henr

y was re quired to prove to preva il on his retaliation claims. 20 Acc ording ly , we va cate the portion of the judg ment that relates to those claims, and re mand for a 21 ne w tri a l. 22 BACK GR OUND08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

3 1 I. The Und e r lyi ng C as e 2 Plaintiff-appe llant Howar d Henr y , an Af rica n-Amer ican male , beg an wor king f or 3 Americ an Cy anamid, Wy eth’s pre dece ssor, in 1992, as a tempor ary employ ee in its Pearl River 4 p h ar

m a c e u t i c a l m anu f

a c tur i n g f a c i l i ty. Th e fo llo wi ngy e ar, he ob ta ine d a fu ll- tim e po sit ion

a s a 5 Chemist. In 1998, Henr y was promoted to the position of Scientist I I , and in 2000, he wa s 6 pr omo te d a g a in, by de fe nd ant Wa lte r Wa

rd ro p, to P ro du c tio n E ng ine e r i n th e Con sume r H e a lth 7 Division. After his promotion to Production Engine er, H enry ’s upwar d prog ress stalled, f or 8 rea sons that form the basis of this dispute. 9 In Dec ember 2001, Henr

y applied for

the position of Project Eng ineer

. Hiring manag er 10 Kevin Costello selecte d Cara Musc olo, a white fe male, for the position. Cos tello stated that he 11 se le c te d M us c olo be c a us e , b a se d o n h is p ri or

e xpe ri e nc e wi th h e r, he be lie ve d th a t sh e wo uld 12 perf

orm well, and be cause she had sig nificant e x perie nce, inc luding supe rvisory experience , 13 which He nry

lacke d. Costello st ated that he was a lso conce rned that Henry , whom he had 14 previously

supervised, ha d difficulty multi-tasking. He nry

testified that he be lieved Muscolo wa s 15 qualified for

the position, and that he did not attribute the dec ision to racial discrimination at the 16 time it was made. 17 Henr

y rec eived a

y ear -end pe rfor

mance revie w from his super visor, Wardrop, in 2001. 18 Wy eth’s pra ctice w as to brea k perf ormanc e re views down into sever al categ ories and pr ovide 19 e mpl oy e e s w ithwr itt e n f e e db a c k a nd a “ ratin g ” (b e tw e e n a

low of “ on e ” and

a high o f “ fi ve ” ) i n 20 eac h cate g ory . Employ ees w ere also g iven composite ratings, whic h wer e intended to c onvey an 21 ov e ra ll i mpr e ssi on of the ir pe rf or manc e thr ou g ho ut t

he y e ar. He nr

y ha d r e c e ive d a

c omp os ite08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

4 1 ratingof “thre e” in a ll but one y ear prior to 2000, and in 2000, the f irst y ear in which Wardrop 2 r e v i e w e d

h i s p e r f o r m an c e , h e r e c e i v e d

a “ th r e e ” a g a i n . In 2 0 0 1 , h o w e v e r , W ar dr o p g av e H e n r y a 3 composite score of “f our,” a nd provided substantial pra ise in the explanatory portions of the 4 revie w. 5 In J uly

2002, Howar d applied for a promotion to Product Coordinator. He wa s 6 interviewe d for the position by Andre w Schasc hl, the hiring manag er, a nd Todd Dave nport, an 7 Afric an-A merica

n manag er. The position was awar ded to Chris DeF ecia ni, a white male. H enry 8 testified that DeF ecia ni was a “ shoe-in for

the position,” Trial Tr. 118, be cause DeF ecia ni had 9 “bac kfilled” for

the outg oing Produc t Coordinator—i.e., filled in while the Produc t Coordinator 10 was out of the of fice —and bec ause D eF ecia ni was close f

riends with Schasc hl. Henry testified 11 that, afte r De Fe ciani wa s hired, He nry told Schaschl he would like to bac kfill for De Fe ciani if the 12 opportunity

arose . He a lso testified that, at the time, he did not think the decision was a product 13 of

dis c ri min a tio n. F or

his pa rt , Sc ha sc hl t e sti fi e d th a t D e F e c iani w a s “ fa r a nd a bo ve ” the be st 14 candidate for the position, and that Henry lacke d the experienc e and tr aining to be competitive. 15 Trial Tr. 766- 67. 16 In October 2002, Henr

y ’s cousin, with whom he shar ed a c lose relationship, was 17 murdere d by

the “D.C. Sniper.” As a re sult, Henry took two months off from work unde r the 18 Family

Medica l L eave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. When he re turned to work, he was g iven 19 his 2002 y ear -end pe rfor mance revie w, on which he ag ain re ceive d an over all ratingof “f our.” 20 He nr

y te sti fi e d th a t at th a t po int , h e be g an p re ssi ngWar dr op fo r a dv ic e on ho w t o im

pr ov e his 21 ratin g to a

“ fi ve ” and

ho w t o o bta in p ro mot ion s.08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

5 1 Three months after H enry returne d to work, De Fe ciani we nt on ext ended me dical leave, 2 and his position became a vailable to “ba ckfill.” Thoug h Henr y had pre viously

expressed an 3 interest in bac kfilling the position, he testified that he did not reiterate that wish befor e Richar d 4 Morg an, a white male, wa s selecte d to fill in for DeF ecia ni. Some tim e later , Henr y confr onted 5 Schaschl, who ha d been r esponsible for c hoosing D eF ecia ni’s temporar

y repla ceme nt, and 6 expressed his displeasure that he had not be en sele cted. Scha schl testified that, eve n if Henr y 7 had made a timely reque st to be considere d for the position, he would have sele cted Morg an, 8 beca

use in order

to backf ill, an employ ee ne eded the skills t o “hit the g round running ,” and 9 Henr

y lacke d the trainingto step immediately into the role. Tria l Tr. 800. 10 Henr

y testified that his relationship with Wardrop re mained stronguntil S eptember 2003, 11 when he rec eived a written mid-y ear

perf ormanc e re view. Al tho ug h Wy e th e nc oura g e d a ll 12 manag ers to g ive employ ees mid-year revie ws, Henr

y had not pre viously

rec eived one from 13 Wardrop. On the re view, He nry rec eived the e quivalent of a “thre e” r ating , and Wardrop 14 pr ov ide d mo re e xten siv e c ri tic ism tha n h e ha d in

the pa st. In particula

r, Wardrop note d that 15 Henr

y had bec ome incre asing ly tardy with assignme nts; that he had excessive a bsence s; that he 16 had bee n spendingtoo much time linger ing in the inf irmary ; and that he ha d not been r esponsive 17 to p a g e s. War dr op te sti fi e d th a t, a s a re su lt o f t

he se pe rf or manc e iss ue s, he no lon g e r f e lt 18 comforta

ble g iving He nry

a rating that indicated he ha d “excee ded expectations.” H enry 19 vigor ously

disputed eac h of these c riticisms. He testified that he be lieved the pe rfor mance 20 revie w was a

response to his inqui ries into promotional opportunities, and prese nted evidenc e 21 that J oanne Rose, a n HR repr esentative at Wy eth, had instructe d Wardrop to include a note about08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

6 1 Henr

y ’s nurse’ s office visits on t he re view. 2 In November 2003, Henr

y applied for

the position of Process Eng ineer in the Vac cine 3 Division. The position was aw arde d to Ang el Montanez, a Hispanic male. Kirk Rokad, the 4 hiring manag er, sa id that he selec ted Montanez based on his super ior experience and educ ation. 5 At his de po sit ion , H e nr

y e xplic itl y

te sti fi e d th a t he did

no t be lie ve he wa s d e nie d th e Pr oc e ss 6 Eng ineer

position because of

his race

. 7 Ar ound

the same tim e , Wy e th’ s Pe arl Riv e r f a c ili ty un de rw e nt a

ma ssi ve c or

po rate 8 restruc turing known as the O rg anizational Cascade . A new c orporate org anizational char t was 9 c re a te d, and

a ll e mpl oy e e s w e re re a ssi g ne d f ro m th e top do wn , w ithe a c h ma na g e r p ic kin g his 10 direc t reports. As a result of the O rg anizational Cascade , Henr y was re assig ned to the position of 11 Pa c ka g ingSup e rv iso r, and to a ne w m ana g e r, De re k B ur t. Wa rd ro p te sti fi e d th a t he c ho se no t to 12 reta in Henry

in his group be cause he wa s permitted to choose only one Production Eng ineer , and 13 he sele cted Jean Colas, another Afric an-A merica

n male, who ha d consistently outperfor med 14 He nr

y . B e c a us e the a ssi g nme nt d id n ot a ff e c t H e nr y ’s sa lary or g ra de , Wy e th c on sid e re d it a 15 latera l move. Henr y , howeve r, consider ed it a demotion, bec ause the position required a lower 16 educational deg ree than his curr ent position and involved tasks that he believe d would not be as 17 re le va

nt f or futur e pr omo tio ns . 18 At

the me e tin g wh e re He nr

y re c e ive d n e ws of

his re a ssi g nme nt, he wa s a lso g ive n h is 19 y e ar- e nd

pe rf or manc e re vie w, on

wh ic h h e re c e ive d a

“ thr e e .” On

it, War dr op pr a ise d H e nr y in 20 many

are a s, but no te d th a t he wa s st ill fa ili ngto m e e t de a dli ne s o n a re g ula r b a sis

. Wardrop 2 1 co n cl u d edth atHe n ry wa s a “ S o l i d

P er fo rm er ” o v er al l b u two u l d “b en ef i tfr o mb et t er

re p o rt i n g,08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

7 1 attention to deadlines.” J .A. 511. Wardrop testified that he was a lso conce rned that Henry had 2 failed to make any prog ress on tra ining he had bee n asked to c omplete. Henr y testified that he 3 took strong e x ception to his review , beca use he be lieved that his perf ormanc e had r emained 4 consistent or had improve d over the y ear —and thus he e x pecte d to rec eive the sa me “f our” r ating 5 he had in the pa st. He also testified that he believed that the lower r ating would make it more 6 difficult for him to obtain promotions in the future, a nd that he believe d it was a dire ct re sult of 7 his pr e ssi ngmor e a g g re ssi ve ly fo r p ro mot ion s. 8 Followinghis y ear -end r eview, H enry met with a serie s of manag ers to complain a bout 9 his perfor

mance revie w and his re assig nment to Packag ing Super visor. He met with Wardrop on 10 J anuar

y 5, 2004. Unsatisfied with Wardrop’ s expl anation for his mediocre r eview, he 11 complained to Andr ew Scha schl on J anuar y 9, and thre e day s later, on Scha schl’s 12 rec ommendation, to J oanne Rose. Ros e te sti fi e d th a t sh e of fe re d to he lp H e nr

y fi nd a lte rn a te 13 place ment in the company if he did not wish to take the position in packa g ing, which offe r he 14 declined. On J anuar y 16, Henr y called Richa

rd Ga skins, the Pearl River fa cility ’s hea d of 15 div e rs ity . H e nr

y te sti fi e d th a t du

ri ngthe c a ll h e ra ise d th e iss ue of dis c ri min a tio n f

or the fi rs t 16 time. The two a lso discussed more g ener ally Henr y ’s unhappiness with his rea ssignment a nd 17 perf

ormanc e re view. 18 On J anuar y 22, 2004, Henr

y met with defe ndant Michae l McDer mott, who was the 19 manag ing dir ector for the Pea

rl River fa cility

and Schasc hl’s supervisor. B e sid e s p ic kin g his 20 ow n d ir e c t r e po rt s, Mc De rm ott ’s on ly inv olv e me nt w iththe Or g anizatio na l Ca sc a de ha d b e e n to 2 1 gi v e f

i n al ad m i n i s tra t i v e ap p ro v al t o al l as s i gn m en t s m ad e. He n ry t es t i fi edth at , at th e m ee t i n g,08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

8 1 he told McDe rmott, “I t’s g oing to be hard f or me to explain how Ig o from this level g oing down 2 to a pac kag ing supe rvisor as a n Afric an-A merica

n.” Tria l Tr. 181. Duringhis deposition, Henry 3 testified that McDe rmott replied, “I ’m all for dive rsity .” Tria l Tr. 429. Howe ver, at trial, he 4 te sti fi e d th a t Mc De rm ott re sp on de d, “ Ic an s e e y ou are ta lki nga

bo ut d ive rs ity

on c ampu s, but I 5 am not g oing to g et into that sill y discussion with y ou.” Tria l Tr. 181. McDe rmott testified that 6 he had not c alled diver sity “silly ,” and that he had not interpr eted He nry ’s comments as a n 7 alleg ation of discrimination bec ause the y wer e oblique and c asually made. 8 Finally , Henr y met with Peter B ige low, the hea d of manufa cturingand vac cine ope rations 9 at the Pear l River fac ility

. At the meeting , Henr y told Big elow that he be lieved he w as being 10 su

bje c te d to ra c ia l di sc ri min a tio n a nd that he wa s e xtre me ly

unha pp y a bo ut h is r e a ssi g nme nt t o 11 pa c ka g ing . In r e sp on se , B ig e low re vie we d H e nr

y ’s pr ior pe rf or manc e re vie ws , w hic h h e tol d 12 He nr

y he fo un d to be “ c le ar a

nd ob je c tiv e .” Tr ia l T r. 19 3. He a lso or de re d a n inve sti g a tio n into 13 Henr

y ’s complaints, which wa s conducte d over the course of a w eek by Eug ene Sac kett, an 14 outside investigator, and whic h found no evide nce of discrimination. Big elow also off ere d 15 Henr

y his choice of

the Packa g ing Super

visor position or a Senior Validation Specia list posi tion 16 in the Vac cines Division, for whic h Henr y had pre viously

interviewe d. Ultimately , Henr y was 17 g rante d a re prieve from his rea ssignment, a nd was pe rmitted to remain in his Production 18 Eng ineer

position. However, he testified that he wa s not satisfied with that result, beca use he 19 had hoped f

or a pr omotion. 20 Henr

y alleg ed that, in the wa

ke of his complaints, his work e nvironment cha ng ed, 21 notwithstanding the f act that he was pe rmitted to remain in his old positi on. Specifica lly , he08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

9 1 te sti fi e d th a t hi s n e w s up e rv iso r, An dr e w E sp e jo, “ wa nte d ti me lin e s f

or e ve ry thi ng ,” g ave him 2 a dd iti on a l dutie s, wr ote him up fo r a bs e nc e s H e nr

y ha d c le are d in

a dv anc e , a

nd “ sta rt e d to 3 develop a

paper trail.” Tr ial Tr. 196-99. I n essenc e, He nry

alleg es that this behavior w as par t of 4 a c ampa ig n to manu fa c tur e pr e te ns e s f or futur e a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio ns . 5 Also in J anuar y 2004, Henr

y applied for

the Staff Eng ineer

Iposition i n the Vac cines 6 Division. He wa s not selected f or the position. I t w e nt i ns te a d to Jame s Patc h, a wh ite ma le wi th 7 a Ph.D. in Chemical and B iologica l Eng ineer ing f rom Northwe stern Univer sity , afte r it was 8 turned down by

Be elin Cheang , an Asian f emale who held a Ph.D. in Chemical Eng ineer ing f rom 9 the Univer sity

of De lawar e. He nr

y po sse sse d n o d e g re e be y on d a ba c he lor ’s

. 10 In May

2004, J oe Vitanza, Espejo’ s supervisor, instructe d Espejo to maintain car eful 11 rec ords with respe ct to Henr y ’s “de velopment plan,” a nd to reviewit with R ose “so that we can 12 e ns ur e that it

is d on e in a c c or da

nc e wi th c ur

re nt p oli c ie s a

nd pr oc e dure s a

nd ho pe fu lly

ha s a 13 po sit ive outc ome .” Tr ia l T r. 11 42 -4 3. Tw o w e e ks late r, He nr y re ta ine d a

n atto rn e y , w ho se nt a 14 letter to Wy eth forma lly stating H enry ’s claims of discr imination. 15 On J une 28, Espejo g ave H enry his mid-y ear

perf ormanc e re view. Espejo f orwa rded the 16 perf

ormanc e re view to Rose, who testified that she ha d reque sted the re view bec ause the re w as 17 “a hig her le vel of c oncer n” surr ounding H enry ’s employ ment, stemming fr om Eug ene Sac kett’s 18 investigation. Trial Tr. 925. She testified that she “wouldn’t say there would be a hig her le vel of 19 conce rn” ow ing to the r ece ipt of the letter f rom Henr y ’s attorne y . Trial Tr. 926. 20 On September 24, 2004, Henr

y filed a f ormal cha rg e of discr imination with t he Ne w 21 York State Division of Human Rig hts and the U.S. Equal Employ ment Opportunity

Commi ssion08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

10 1 (“EE OC”). Rose testified that she be came awa re of the cha rg e at some point duringthe EEOC’s 2 investigation, but she did not specify when. 3 On

Oc tob e r 1 , H e nr

y a pp lie d f or a pr omo tio n to Ma

na g e r o f M anu fa c tur ingSup po rt

. 4 Henr

y was one of ten e mploy ees se lected to inter view for the position, out of twenty -six who 5 applied. Th e int e rv ie ws we re c on du c te d b y a pa ne l c on sis tin g of

Es pe jo, Mu sc olo , D e F e c iani, 6 and

B ur t. Henr y testified that he be lieved the position was aw arde d afte r a pa nel interview , 7 rathe r t

ha n thro ug h a

mor e ty pic a l a pp ointme nt p ro c e ss, be c a us e he wa s o ne of

the a pp lic ants

. 8 The position was aw arde d to Max Katz, a white male. Henr y testified that he be lieved he w as 9 mor e qu a lif

ie d th an K a tz be c a

us e he ha d b e e n w or

kin g in t he are a fo r f our ye ars , w he re a s K a tz 10 c ame fr om a

dif fe re nt d e pa

rtme nt. Whe n K a tz w a s p ro mot e d, he be c ame He nr y ’s imm e diate 11 supervisor, r eportingto Espejo. 12 He nr

y wa s o nc e a g a in g ive n a

y e ar- e nd pe rf or manc e re vie w i n 2 00 4, and on c e a g a in 13 rec eived a

“thre e.” The pe rfor

mance revie w g ener ally

attested to the fa ct that Henr y was 14 c omp e te nt at hi s jo b, but no te d th a t “ Se tti ngob je c tiv e s a nd c omm itm e nt d a te s a

nd me e tin g tho se 15 dates ne eds improvement.” J .A. 552. Espejo testified that He nry ’s tardine ss had begun causing 1 6 c o mp l i an c e p r o b l e m s f o r th e c o mp an y. Henr

y ref used to sign the appra isal beca use he did not 17 believe it provide d an ac curate picture of his work ove r the c ourse of the y ear . 18 On J une 21, 2005, the EEO C sent Henry a “r ight to sue” letter, a

nd sent a c opy

to Wy eth. 19 Wy eth’s copy

was dated re ceive d on J une 27. Meanwhile, on J une 24, Katz and Espejo informed 20 Henr

y he wa s beingplace d on a 30-da y “Perf ormanc e Improvement Plan” ( “PI P”), a de tailed 21 pla

n a lle g e dly

de signe d to he lp H e nr

y br inghis pe rf

or manc e in l ine wi th c omp any e xpe c tatio ns .08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

11 1 Katz testified that Rose assisted them duringthe initial planning stag es of the PI P, but that S tacy 2 Marr os o w a s th e pr ima ry HR re pr e se ntativ e re sp on sib le fo r t he PI P. Espejo testified that the plan 3 was intende d to addre ss Henry ’s fre quent abse nces a nd his habitual failure to meet dea dlines. 4 Katz and Espejo both testified that, at the time the PI P was cre ated, they wer e unaw are of any

of 5 Henr

y ’s complaints of discrimination. Henr y ref used to sign the PI P when he met with Katz on 6 J une 24; the mana g ers sig ned it on J une 29. Henr y succe ssfully

completed the PI P and was 7 remove d from it on J uly 25. Ho we ve r, he te sti fi e d th a t Ma rr os o to ld h im that it

re nd e re d h im 8 “unpromotable ” for one y ear . At trial, Rose disputed this chara cter ization, s aying that an 9 employ ee w as only “unpromotable ” duringthe time he or she was on a PI P. Shortly

afte r He nry 10 was take n off the pla n, he took a medic al leave of abse nce, a nd never returne d to work. 11 II. P roce dural Hi story 12 A. Co m pla int 13 On

Se pte mbe r 1 9, 20 05 , a ft e r h e be g an h is l e ave of a bs e nc e , H e nr

y c omm e nc e d th is 14 action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York, a lleg ing 15 violations of Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq .; 42 U.S.C. § 16 1981; and New

York State Executive L aw, Huma n Rights L aw § 290, et seq . by Wy eth in the 17 form of de nials of promotion, demotion, and reta liation. The c omplaint also alleg ed that thre e 18 name d in div idu a l de fe nd ants —Wa lte r Wa rd ro p, An dr e w Sc ha sc hl, and Mic ha e l Mc De rm ott

19 —aided a

nd abetted violations of Ne w York State H uman Rights L aw by participating in the 20 denials of pr omotion, demotion, and retaliation. On Dec ember 19, 2005, defe ndant Schasc hl 21 filed a motion to dismis s the complaint, as it applied to him, for insuffic iency of ser vice of08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

J udg e McMa

hon assumed the c ase f

ollowing Judge Casey ’s death in March 2007. 1 12 1 pr oc e ss. On Fe bruar y 8, 2006, the district court (Ca sey , J. ) g rante d the motion by stipulation and 2 order

. 3 B. Su m m ary Judgm ent P roce edings 4 Def

endants then f

iled a motion for summary judgme nt. On J uly

30, 2007, the district 5 court (Mc Mahon, J. ), g rante d the def endants’ motion in part. Henry v. W yeth Pharms., I

nc ., No. 1 6 05 Civ. 8106 (CM), 2007 W L2230096 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2007) (“

Henry I ”). The court 7 dismiss ed as time-ba rre d (a) Henr

y ’s Title VI Iclaims based on instanc es of a lleg ed 8 dis c ri min a tio n o c c ur ri ngbe fo re No ve mbe r 2 4, 20 03 and (b ) h is N YH RL

c la ims ba se d o n e ve nts 9 occur

ringbefor e September

20, 2002. Id. at *29. Th e c ourt a lso dis mis se d a ll o f H e nr y ’s c la ims 10 ba se d o n h is a

pp lic a tio ns fo r P ro c e ss E ng ine e r i n 2 00 3 a nd Sta ff En g ine e r I

in 2 00 4 b e c a

us e 11 He nr

y e xplic itl y

te sti fi e d th a t he did

no t be lie ve he wa s d e nie d th os e po sit ion s o n a c c ount o f h is 12 rac e. Id. at *32. Finally , the cour t dismi ssed the Title VI Iclaims ag ainst the rema ining 13 individual defenda nts, on the g round that individual defe ndants are not subject to liabilit y under 14 that statute. Id. at *30. 1 5 T h e c o urt , h o w e v e r , d e n i e d th e m o t i o nw i thr e s p e c tt o H e n r y ’ s r e m a i n i n g c l a i m s . It 1 6 fo un d

th atHe n ry

h adm eth i s b urd en o f e s t ab l i s h i n g prima facie case s of discrimination and 17 reta liation. Id. at *31. I t also determined that his response to def endants’ pr offe red non18 discriminatory

bases f or the c halleng ed employ ment decisions consisted of more than mere 19 conclusory

statements and should be c onsidered by a jury

. Id. 20 As a re sult of the district court’s ruling , Henr y proce eded w ith his non-tim e-ba rre d08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

Judg e Mc Maho n r e a ssi g ne d th e c a se to Wh ite Pla ins , N Y, wh e re it w a s tr ans fe rr e d to 2 J udg e Conner. See H

enry I , 2007 WL2230096, at *32.

13 1 discrimination claims based on nine e vents: (a) failure to promote him to the positi on of Project 2 Eng ineer

in Dece mber 2001; (b) failure to promote him to the positi on of Production Coordinator 3 in J uly

2002; (c) f

ailure to g ive him an interim appointment to the position of Production 4 Coordinator in April 2003; (d) his re ceipt of a n overa ll rating of “thre e” in his 2003 mid-y ear 5 perf

ormanc e re view; (e ) his rec eipt of an ove rall rating of “thre e” in his 2003 y ear -end 6 perf

ormanc e re view; (f) his assignme nt to the positi on of Packa g ing Super visor in the 7 Org anizational Cascade ; (g ) fa ilure to promote him to the position of Manag er Ma nufac turing 8 Support in November 2004; (h) his rece ipt of an over all ratingof “thre e” in his 2005 mid-y ear 9 pe rf

or manc e re vie w; and

(i ) h is p la c e me nt o n a

PI P inJune 20 05 . H e nr

y wa s a lso pe rm itt e d to 10 maintain claims based on a lleg ed ac ts of reta liation following his filing of an EE OC complaint 11 on September 24, 2004, na mely : (a) de nial of the Mana g er Ma nufac turing Support positi on; (b) 12 his placeme nt on a PI P; and (c) his 2005 mid-y ear perf ormanc e re view. 13 C. M ot ion s In Lim ine 14 The c ase w as set for trial on Fe bruar

y 4, 2008. Def

endants filed f

ive motions in l imine, 15 which we re not fully briefe d until J anuar

y 23, 2008. In light of the proxi mity of the trial date and 16 a re quest by

the par ties, the court ( Conner, J

.) ruled on the motions in expedited fashion on 2 17 J anuar

y 29, when it issued an or der in summary form g rantingfour of

the five motions. See 18 Henry

v. W yeth Pharms., I

nc. , No. 05 Civ. 8106 (WC C), 2008 WL 294443 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 19 2008) ( “Henry II ”). In its memorandum, the cour t did not address the pa

rties’ a rguments or08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

14 1 explain the basis for its decisions, noting instead the parties’ reque st that the court issue a 2 decision as soon a s possible so that they could ade quately

prepa re f or trial. Id. at *1. 3 Tw o o f t

he mot ion s in

lim ine g ra

nte d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

are a t is su e in t

his a pp e a l: 4 Mo tio n N o. 1, wh ic h c on c e rn e d e vid e nc e of ra c e -b a se d r e mark s a lle g e dly ma de by Wy e th 5 manag ers to other s at the Pear l River fac ility , and Motion No. 2, which c oncer ned testimony

by 6 other Wy eth employ ees that they also experience d rac ial discrimination. Id. 7 1. Motion in Li mine No. 1 8 On appe al, Henr y challeng es the district cour t’s g rant of de fenda

nts’ motion in l imine to 9 exclude evidenc e of f ive ra ce- related re marks alleg edly made by Wy eth manag ers to other 1 0 e mp l o ye e s a tth e P e ar l R i v e r f a c i l i ty. 11 Robert Bracc o’s remark s. Daisy Early , an Af

rica n-Amer ican f

ormer e mploy ee of

Wy eth, 12 asser

ted that, in response to her c omplaint that she was beingdenied shift cha ng es whe n simil ar 13 re qu e sts we re g ra nte d f or wh ite e mpl oy e e s, he r m ana g e r, Rob e rt B ra c c o, sa id, “ So s ue me . A ll 14 my

supervisors a

re bla ck so y ou can’ t prove discr imination,” and that, af ter B rac co bec ame ill, he 15 told two other employ ees, “ Daisy tried to put voodoo on me,” pointing out parts of his body 16 wher e Ea

rly had supposedly

inflicted the voodoo. J.A. 42. Bra cco did not par ticipate in any

of 17 the e mpl oy

me nt d e c isi on s at is su e in t his a pp e a l, b ut w a s invo lve d in the de c isi on

to p ro mot e 18 Henr

y to the position of Production Enginee r in 2000. 19 J

oeVi tanza ’s “ta r b ab

y ” re ma rk . N e wt on

Pa ul, a Ha iti an- Am e ri c an f

or me r Wye th 20 employ ee, te stified that in Febr uary 2004, he hea

rd Joe Vitanza, the Manag ing D irec tor of the 21 Con sume r H e a lthDi vis ion a t th e Pe arl Riv e r f

a c ili ty , r e fe r t o a

ma lf un c tio nin g a larm

sy ste m a s a08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

15 1 “tar

baby that Ijust can’t g et off my back.” J .A. 45. In their memora ndum in support of the 2 motion in l imine, defe ndants claimed that Vitanza would have testified that he under stood the 3 term to mean “ a diffic ult sit uation from which one has a ha rd time extricating himself.” S.A. 7. 4 Vitanza was the supe rvisor of Walter Wardr op and Andr ew Espe jo; he was thus two 5 le ve ls d ir e c tly

a bo ve He nr

y in t he c or po rate hie ra

rc hy . O n M ay

6, 20 04 , V ita

nza se nt a n e ma il t o 6 E s p e

j o d i r e c t i n g h i mt o “ c o n t i nu e w i thth e d e v e l o p m e n tp l an ” th a tE s p e j o h a d s e tu p f o r H e n r y, 7 and to “e nsure that it is well documente d, with clear ly define d g oals and time points.” J .A. 526. 8 He su g g e ste d th a t E sp e jo r e vie w i t w ithJoanne Ros e to “ e ns ur e tha t it is d on e in a c c or da

nc e wi th 9 curr ent policies and pr ocedur es, and hope fully , has a positive outcome.” Id. Henr y alleg es that 10 thi s d oc ume ntatio n w a s u se d to lay a fo un datio n f

or his pla c e me nt o n a

PI P. Vi tanza

a lso 11 appea

rs to have be en involved in the dec isions to reassig n Henr y to the Packag ing Super

visor 12 position and to allow him t o rema in in his P roduction Eng ineer role. 13 W

alter W ardrop’s remarks . Early

also asser

ted that she wa s stopped in the hallway one 14 mor

nin g by de fe nd ant Wa

rd ro p, wh o s a id, “ Da isy , w hat are y ou do inga t ho me ? Stic kin g pin s in 15 a doll? What have I ever done to y ou? ” J.A. 42. W hen Ea rly repor ted the incident to Micha el 16 Dave nport, the Centrum Production Coordinator, he alleg edly responde d, “I f you knew a ll of the 17 things that ha d g one wr ong that night, you would understand the statement.” Id. Early testified 18 that sh e wa s d ism ay e d th a t th e c omm e nt w a s se e min g ly a c c e pta ble to Wye th m ana g e me nt. 19 In addition, Paul testified that in the winter of 2004, he witnessed Wardrop moc k Manny 20 Rivera, a

Hispanic e mploy ee at Wy eth. Paul testified that Wardrop pulled down his pa nts so that 21 his waistband was a round his thighs, a

nd made g estures imitating Hispanic youth. Wardrop then08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

16 1 pointed to Rivera and sa id, “I s Manny the kind of guy

to wear his pants hang ing down like this? ” 2 J.A. 45 . Ward

ro p w a s H e nr

y ’s dir e c t su

pe rv iso r u

nti l th e Or g anizatio na l Ca sc a de , a nd is a 3 named de fenda

nt in this action. 4 2. Motion In Limine No. 2 5 The sec ond motion in l imine challeng ed on appe al was a motion to ex clude “ evidenc e of 6 the fa ilure of

Ne wt on Pa ul t o o bta in a

pr omo tio n . . . or

e vid e nc e of

ra c ia l di sc ri min a tio n a g a ins t 7 oth e r e mpl oy e e s o f d e fe nd ant Wye th P ha rm a c e uti c a ls b y

de c isi on make rs dif

fe re nt f ro m th os e 8 responsible for

prepa ringperf ormanc e re ports and/or makingrec ommendations or dec isions 9 relating to plaintiff’ s job assignme nts or promotions.” Henry II , 2008 WL 294443 at *1. 10 Plaintiff offer ed no proof as to the conte nt of the excluded evide nce. 11 D. Tr ialand J ur y I nst r uc ti ons 12 Henr

y also cha lleng es the district cour t’s handlingof the jury

instructions. The trial took 13 place from F ebrua ry 4 to Febr uary 15, 2008, when the jur

y returne d a ver dict for de fenda nts on 14 a ll c ounts . O n F e br ua ry 13 , th e c ourt

he ld a c on fe re nc e wi th c ouns e l to dis c us s th e pa rt ie s’ 15 proposed jury

instructions. I t informed the pa rties that it had taken the “esse ntial substance” of 16 the de fe nd ants ’ p ro po se d in str uc tio ns , b ut m a de so me e dit or ia l c ha ng e s a nd e lim inate d s ome 17 redunda

ncies. Tr ial Tr. 1425. Plaintiff’s counse l asked whe ther the pa rties would be “ aff

orded a 18 look-see at the char g e.” Id. at 1426. J udg e Conner r eplied, “O f cour se, you may ,” but adde d, “I 19 don’t have a copy to hand to y ou beca

use I ’ve ma de some a lmost i lleg ible handwr itten notes that 20 are in my

private Sanskr it.” Id. T h e p art i es , h o we v er , we re n ev er s h o wn th e d ra ft o f t h e c h ar ge 2 1 b e f

o r e i tw a s d e l i v e r e d

t o th e j ur y.08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

17 1 In its ini tial jury char g e, the district judg e laid out the fr amewor k for e mploy

ment 2 d i s c r i m i n a t i o nc a s e s e s t a b l i s h e d b y McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973), 3 and discussed the elements of the prima facie case of discrimination and re taliation. He dire cted 4 the jury

to follow the three -step burde n-shifting analy sis set out in Mc Do nn e ll D ou

gla s if it found 5 p l ai n t i ff

h adm eth i s b urd en o f e s t ab l i s h i n g a prima facie case . Plaintiff’s counsel then obje cted 6 to a statement by

the judg e that, in orde r to preva il on his di scrimination claims, Henr y was 7 require d to establish that the rationale advanc ed by Wy eth for e ach of

the cha lleng ed employ

ment 8 decisions was “ false,” rathe r than “ prete x tual.” The court a g ree d to instruct the jury that Henr y 9 ne e d o nly

pr ov e tha t th e pr of fe re d r e a so ns we re pr e te xtua l. 10 Def

ense c ounsel in turn objected to the c ourt’s cha rac terization of the ca

usation element 11 of a prima facie case of re taliation. He ar g ued that, in orde r to establish ca usation, Henry

neede d 12 to show that the individuals responsible for the adver se employ ment actions knewHenr

y was 13 eng ag ing in a

protec ted ac tivity . The c ourt ag ree d, and cla rified its understa

nding of the 1 4 c a

u s a t i o nr e qu i r e m e n ti na

s u p p l e m e n t a l i n s tr

u c t i o nt o th e j ur

y. 15 Af

te r t he jur y be g an d e lib e ratio ns , it

so ug ht c lari fi c a tio n o n o ne of the re ta liatio n c la ims

. 16 In r e sp on se , th e c ourt a g a in i ns tr

uc te d th e jur

y , o ve r t he ob je c tio ns of

He nr y ’s a tto rn e y , th a t in 17 or de r t o p re va il, He nr y wa s r e qu ir e d to sh owthat in div idu a l de c isi on -m ake rs ha d k no wn of his 18 EE OC c omp la int

. 19 The jury

returne d a ver dict in favor of defe ndants on all claims, and on Ma rch 7, 2008, 20 the cour

t entere d a judg ment closing the ca se. 21 DI SCU SSIO N08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

18 1 Henr

y alleg es that the district judg e made multipl e er rors with re spect to exclusion of 2 e vid e nc e and

ha nd lin g of jur y ins tr uc tio ns on

bo th h is r e ta liatio n a

nd dis c ri min a tio n c la ims

. 3 B e c a

us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

inc or re c tly ins tr uc te d th e jur

y re g ard ingthe fa c ts H e nr

y wa s r e qu ir e d to 4 prove to pre vail on his retaliation claims, we vacate the district cour t’s judgme nt on those claims. 5 We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o n th e dis c ri min a tio n c la ims , f ind ingany

e rr or re late d to tho se c la ims to 6 be ha

rm le ss. 7 I . Re ta l i a ti o n Cl a i ms 8 Henr

y first argues that the district judg e improper ly instructed the jury

as to Henr

y ’s 9 burden of

proof on his re taliation claims. We review the propriety of jury instructions de novo, 10 United States v. Ge orge , 386 F.3d 383, 397 ( 2d Cir. 2004), and will find er ror if “ the jury

was 11 misled about the corr ect leg al standar d or wa s otherwise ina dequate ly informed of

controlling 12 law.” Cri

gge r v . F ah ne sto c k &Co ., 443 F.3d 230, 235 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks 13 omitted). 1 4 A tth e c o n c l u s i o no f th e tr i a l , th e d i s tr i c tj u d g e i n s tr u c t e d th e j ur y: 15 In deter

mining a c laim of reta liation, y ou follow a three-step analy tical process . . . 16 . In step 1, the plaintiff m u s t establish a pr im a fa c ie c a s e b y p r o v i n g b y a 17 pr e po nd e ra nc e of the e vid e nc e e a c h o f t

he fo llo wi ngfo ur

e le me nts

. 18 The fir st e lement is that plaintiff eng ag ed in an a ctivity protec ted under

the 19 antidiscrimination statutes. . . . 20 The sec ond element that the plaintiff must prove in order to make out a prima 21 facie c a se is that th e e mpl oy e r w a s awa re of the pr ote c te d a c tiv ity , in oth e r w or ds , 22 awa

re that a complaint had be en made about alleg ed ra cial discriminat i o n . Idon’t 23 think there’s a ny disp u t e about the fac t that shortly afte r the EEO C complaint was 24 filed by

the plaintiff that the de fenda nt Wy eth and its res ponsible officia ls knew 25 a

bo ut i t. 26 Third, the employ er took a materia lly adver se action ag ainst the pl aintiff. . . 27

.08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

The de fenda

nts did not arg ue that such a showing was ne cessa

ry in order to mee t the 3

“ kn ow le dg e ” re qu ir e me nt; the y c on c e de d th a t g e ne ra l c or po rate kn ow le dg e wa s su ff ic ie nt. 19 1 F ourt h, tha t a c a us a l c onne c tio n e xiste d be tw e e n pla int if f’ s pr ote c te d a c tiv ity 2 and the a dverse action take n by the employ er. I think with respe ct to that fourth one, 3 there is considera ble dispute. And that’s whe re your deliber ation should be 4 c on c e ntr a te d. Pla int if f mus t pre se nt to y ou su ff

ic ie nt ev ide nc e to pe rm it a r e a so na ble 5 infere nce that the adver se employ ment action wa s taken in r etaliation for his filing 6 of a c omplaint of rac e discrimination. 7 Trial Tr. 1568- 69. 8 After

this inst ruction wa s rea d, defe ndants’ counse l contended that it was a disputed issue 9 whether

Espejo and Ka

tz, t he super

visors immediately

responsible for

the alleg edly

reta liatory 10 a c tio ns , h a d a

ny kn ow le dg e of

He nr y ’s c omp la int s a

nd that, “ a t le a st for the causal connec tion 11 eleme nt , there has to be a showing that the individuals who took the retaliator y action if it wasn’ t 12 imp os e d b y

c or po rate ha d k

no wl e dg e of

the pr ote c te d a c tiv ity .” Tr ia l T r. 15 89 -9 0 ( e mph a sis 13 a dd e d) . D e fe nd ants ’ c ouns e l r e qu e ste d a su pp le me nta l in str

uc tio n th a t, i n o rd e r f

or He nr y to 14 make out a prima facie case of re taliation, he nee ded to show that the individuals who made the 15 alleg edly

reta liatory

decisions (i.e., K atz and Espejo) ha d knowledg e of his eng ag ing in a 16 pr ote c te d a c tiv ity

. Pla int if f’ s c ouns e l argue d th a t H e nr y wa s n ot r e qu ir e d to de mon str a te 3 17 any

thing more than g ener al cor porate knowledg e, but the cour t g ave the jury

a supplementa l 18 ins tr

uc tio n th a t 19 the plaintiff, in orde r to establish that ca usation link, has to establish that the person 20 responsible for makingthe employ ment decision or a ction knew that the c omplaint 21 had bee n filed, the infor mal complaint within the company had been filed, and that 22 the ac tion was in re t al i at i o n for the making of that complaint or cha

rg e of r ace 23 discrimination. 24 Trial Tr. 1595.08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

20 1 Th e ne xt mor nin g , th e jur

y so ug ht c lari fi c a tio n o n th e su pp le me nta l in str

uc tio n a s it 2 applied to the PI P. Rega rdingthe ca

usal conne ction require ment, the cour t responded: 3 The person who m ade the decision or the pe rsons who made the dec ision to pl ace the 4 plaintiff on a perfor mance improvement pl an mus t have known that a complaint had 5 been f

iled, and that means that the individual must have known and must have acte d 6 to place him on the plan in r etaliation for h i s h av i n g filed the c omplaint of rac e 7 discrimination. 8 Trial Tr. 1617. A fter the instruction was re ad, He nry ’s attorne y rene wed his objec tion, ag ain on 9 the g round that nothing more than g ener al cor porate knowledg e wa s require d, but was over ruled 10 by

the dis tr ic t ju dg e , w ho e xpla ine d, “ Wel l, you c an’ t r e a lly

a c t w itha

c a us a l c onne c tio n unle ss 11 y ou

have un de rl yingkn ow le dg e . H owc an you pla c e so me bo dy

on an im pr ov e me nt p lan in 12 reta liation for filing the complaint if you didn’t know that the complaint had be en filed or 13 made? ” Tria l Tr. 1619-20. 14 We believe the c ourt err ed in this instruction. I n Gordon v. New Y ork City Bd. of Educ. , 15 23 2 F .3 d 1 11 , 1 16 (2 d Ci r. 20 00 ), we state d, “ Ne ith e r t his no r a ny oth e r c ir c uit

ha s e ve r h e ld t

hat, 16 to s a tis fy

the kn ow le dg e re qu ir e me nt, any thi ngmor e is n e c e ssa

ry tha n g e ne ra l c or

po ra te 17 knowledg e that the plaintiff ha s eng ag ed in a pr otected a ctivity .” We then re jected the argument 18 that in order to satisfy the ca usation require ment, a plaintiff must show that the par ticular 19 individuals who carr ied out an adve rse a ction knew of the protec ted ac tivity

. Id. at 117. Instead, 20 we indicated that a jury may 21 find reta liation even if the a g ent denies dire ct knowledge of a pla intiff’s protec ted 22 activities, for e x ample, so longas the jury finds that th e ci rcumstances evide nce 23 knowledg e of the p ro t ected activities or the jury conclude s that an ag ent is acting 24 e xplic itl y or imp lic it[ly] upo n th e or de rs of a supe ri or

wh o h a s th e re qu isi te 25 knowledg e.08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

21 1 Id

. Se e als o G or

ma n-Ba k os v . Co rn e ll Co -o

p E x te ns ion of S

c he ne c tad yCou nty , 252 F.3d 545, 2 55 4 ( 2d

Cir . 2 00 1) (n oti ngthat a

pla int if f c an e sta bli shc a us a tio n b y

sh ow ingpr ote c te d a c tiv ity 3 wa s c los e ly

fo llo we d in

tim e by a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n) ; Kessle r v . W estc he ste r Co un ty 4 De p’ t of So c . S e rv s. , 461 F.3d 199, 210 ( 2d Cir. 2006). 5 Gordon dir e c tly a dd re sse d th e sit

uatio n in wh ic h a c or po ra te a g e nt c arrie

s o ut an a dv e rs e 6 employ

ment action on the or

de rs , expli cit or implicit, of a superior with knowledg e that the 7 pla int if

f h a s e ng a g e d in

a pr ote c te d a c tiv ity . H ow e ve r, in o rd e r t o s ho w c a us a tio n in the se ns e 8 r e qu i r e d

b y Mc Do nn e ll D ou

gla s— that is, a ca

usal conne ction betwee n the protec ted ac tivity and 9 the adve rse e mploy ment action

— it is not nece ssary

that the supervisor who has knowledg e of the 10 plaintiff’s prote cted a ctivities have ordered the ag ent to impose the adve rse a ction. A ca usal 11 connec tion is sufficiently demonstrated if

the ag ent who dec ides to impose the adver se ac tion but 12 is ignora

nt of the plaintiff’s pr otected a ctivity acts pursua

nt to e nc ou rage me nt by

a super ior (who 13 has knowledg e) to disfavor the plaintiff. 14 B e c a

us e He nr y pr e se nte d e vid e nc e a t tr ia l su ff ic ie nt t o p e rm it a

jur y to f ind c a us a tio n in 15 this sense, the district court’ s err oneous instruction was not har mless. Cwe k

lin sk yv . M ob il 16 Chem. Co. , 364 F.3d 68, 73 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (“Unless ‘convinc ed that [an err oneous instruction] 1 7 d i d

n o ti n fl u en ce th e j ury ’s v er d i ct , ’ w e w i l l re v er s e a n d gra n ta n ew tri al

. ”) (q u o t i n g Gordon , 18 23 2 F .3 d at 11 6) ). He nr y ’s e vid e nc e of

re ta liatio n, wh ile no t ov e rwhe lmi ng , w a s su ff ic ie ntl y 19 strong that a jury could have returne d a ver dict in his favor, if pr operly instructed. F or instance , 20 Henr

y introduced e vidence that might have prompted a jury to believe that Espe

jo and Katz wer e 21 a c tin g un de r o rd e rs , o r at le a st e nc oura g e me nt, e xplic it o r i mpl ic it, fr om R os e to r e ta liate a g a ins t08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

22 1 Henr

y —namely , that Rose beca me awa re in January

2004 that Henr

y had made internal 2 c omp la int s o f d isc ri min a tio n; t hat in Ma y 20 04 , V ita

nza , E sp e jo’ s su pe rv iso r, ins tr

uc te d E sp e

jo 3 to reviewhis documentation of He nry ’s work w ith Rose; that R ose re quested a nd rec eived a

copy 4 of He nry ’s 2004 mid-y ear perf ormanc e re view fr om Espejo beca use there was a

“hig her le vel of 5 c on c e rn ,” Tr ia l T r. 92 5, ste mmi ngfr om E ug e ne Sa c ke tt’ s in te rn a l inve sti g a tio n ( tho ug h Ro se 6 de nie d th a t it

ste mme d f

ro m any awa re ne ss o f d isc ri min a tio n c ha rg e s in pa rt ic ula r) ; th a t Ro se 7 beca

me awa re of Henr y ’s EEOC complaint at some point when it wa s still beinginvestigated by 8 the Commis sio n; a nd that Ro se wa s in iti a lly

inv olv e d in

se tti ngup He nr

y ’s PI P. ( He nr

y a lso 9 argued that ca

usation could be infe rre d from the f act that r etaliatory

actions followed c lose on the 10 heels of his e ng ag ing in pr otected a ctivities.) 11 We need not find He nry ’s evidenc e of c ausation compe lling; to merit reve rsal, we need 12 only

find that the er

roneous jury

instruction may

have inf luence d the jury ’s ver dict. Gordon , 232 13 F.3d at 116. Henry has met that standar d, and ac cording ly we va cate the portion of the judg ment 14 that pe rt a ins to t

ho se c la ims

. 15 I I . Di s cr i mi n a ti o n Cl a i ms 16 Henr

y argues that the district cour t erre d with respec t to his di scrimination claims by (1) 17 g rantingdefe ndants’ motion in lim ine to exclude testimony reg ardingcer

tain rac ially

motivated 18 re mark s a lle g e dly ma de by de fe nd ant Wa

rd ro p a nd oth e r s up e rv iso rs ; ( 2) g ra nti ngde fe nd ants ’ 19 motion in l imine to exclude testimony by other Af rica n-Amer ican Wy eth employ ees r eg arding 20 their own subjec tive perc eptions of discrimination; (3) fa iling to provide c ounsel with a copy of 21 the jury

char g e prior to summations; (4) includingelements of the McD onnell Douglas burden-08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

23 1 sh if

tin g fr ame wo rk

in t he jur y c ha rg e ; and (5 ) i ns tr uc tin g the jur

y that H e nr y wa s r e qu ir e d to 2 pr ov e that Wy e th’ s p ro ff e re d ju sti fi c a tio ns fo r i ts e mpl oy me nt d e c isi on s w e re pr e te xtua l. 3 A. Mot ion In Limine No. 1 4 Henr

y alleg es that the district cour t erre d by g rantingdefe ndants’ motion to ex clude 5 testimony

relating to the r ace -base d rema rks alleg edly

made by Robert B rac co, Joe Vitanza, and 6 Walter Wardop. The c ourt ruled: 7 Plaintiff will not be permitted to introduce at the t rial of this ac tion evidence relating 8 to (1) the “ sue m e” rema rk alleg edly

made by Robert B rac co to Daisy

Early in the 9 spring of 2001; (2) the “voodoo” r emar ks alleg edly

made b y R o b er t Bra cco . . . a 10 short time later; (3) the “stickingpins” rema rk alleg edly

made by Walter Wardrop 11 to Daisy

Early duringthe same time pe riod; (4) the “tar baby ” remark made by J oe 12 Vitanza in Fe bruar y 2004; (5) the “pulled down pants” g esture a nd related re marks 13 alleg edly

made by Walter Wardrop in the winter of 2004. 14 Henry

II , 2008 WL294443 at *1. 15 A district court’s de cision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewe d for a buse of 16 discretion. Leopold v. Bacc arat, Inc. , 174 F.3d 261, 269 ( 2d Cir. 1999). Evidence should be 17 e xclu de d if

it i s ir re le va nt, F e d. R. E vid . 4 02 , o r, e ve n if re le va nt, if its pr ob a tiv e va lue is 18 substantially

outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice it pre sents. Fe d. R. Evid. 403. In 19 Tomassi v. Insignia Financial Group, Inc. , 478 F.3d 111 ( 2d Cir. 2007), we c larified the 20 approa ch district cour ts should take when c onsideringwhether isolated “stra

y rema rks” a re 21 pr ob a tiv e of

dis c ri min a tor

y int e nt: 22 [T]he mor e re mot e and ob liq ue the re mark s a

re in re latio n to the e mpl oy e r’ s a dv e rs e 23 action, the less they prove that the action was mot ivated by discrimination.

. . . The 24 more a

re m ar k evince s a discriminatory state of mind, and the c loser the r emar k’s 25 re latio n to the a lle g e dly dis c ri min a tor

y be havio r, the mor e pr ob a tiv e that r e mark wi ll 26 be.08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

24 1 Id. at 115 (interna l citation omitt ed). 2 The district cour ts in thi s circuit have develope d a standa rdized approa ch for

applying 3 these c oncepts to individual case s. I n deter mining whe ther a

rema rk is probative, the y

have 4 considere d four f

actor s: (1) who made the re mark (i.e ., a dec ision-maker, a supervisor, or

a low5 level co- worke r); (2) when the r emar k was made in relation to the employ ment decision at issue; 6 (3) the c ontent of the re mark (i.e ., whether a re asonable juror could view the re mark a s 7 dis c ri min a tor

y ); and (4 ) t he c on te xt in whic h th e re mark wa s ma de (i .e ., wh e the r i t w a s r e late d to 8 the dec ision-making pr ocess)

. See, e .g. , Adam v. G len Cove Sc h. , No. 06-c v-1200 (JFB) (ML O), 9 20 08 U. S. D ist . L EX I S 13 03 9 at *2 4 n .8 (E .D .N .Y . F e b. 21 , 2 00 8) ; McI nnis v. Town of W

eston , 1 0 3 7 5 F. S u

p p . 2 d 7 0 , 8 3 (D

. C o n n . 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Sc hr e ibe r v . W or ldc o, LLC , 324 F. Supp. 2d 512, 11 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)) . Whil e we caution that none of these fa ctors should be re g arde d as 12 dispositi ve, we think this fra mework w ill often provide a use ful approa ch to the admission or 13 e xclu sio n o f r e mark s n ot d ir e c tly re late d to the a dv e rs e a c tio n a g a ins t th e pla int if f, and e mpl oy it 14 here

. 15 1. Bracco’ s remarks 16 Br acc o alleg edly made thre e discriminatory comments: the “sue me ” re mark a nd the two 17 “voodoo” r emar

ks, all of which we re ma de to or a bout Daisy

Early . Thoug h Br acc o was senior 18 to Henry , and wa s involved in the decision to promote He nry to Production Engine er, it does not 19 appea

r that B rac co wa s involved in any of the de cisions that Henry alleg es we re discr iminatory

. 20 Additionally , the comments we re a lleg edly made year s befor e most of the eve nts at issue, and 21 we re unre late d to the de c isi on -m akin g pr oc e ss. Thus , a lth ou g h a re a so na ble jur or c ou ld c e rt a inl y08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

25 1 have c on sid e re d th e re mark s d isc ri min a tor y , th e y have little pr ob a tiv e va lue in t he c on te xt of

thi s 2 c a se . B e c a

us e te sti mony

re latin g to t

he re mark s w ou ld h ave be e n, a t be st, on ly marg ina lly 3 re le va

nt, we are c on fi de nt t

he dis tr ic t ju dg e a c te d w e ll w ith in h is d isc re tio n w he n h e e xclu de d it 4 under Rule 403. 5 2. Vi tanza ’s “ta r b ab y ” re ma rk 6 Vitanza was two leve ls above He nry in the corpor ate struc ture. He was thus Henr y ’s 7 supervisor, a lbeit not his m ost direct one. H enry alleg es that Vitanza wa s involved in at least one 8 discriminatory

action ag ainst him—his pl ace ment on the PI P—and that Vitanza instructed 9 Andre w Espejo to closely monitor Henry ’s per formanc e, to pave the way for f uture disciplinary 10 actions. Additionally , the “tar baby” re mark wa s alleg edly made a round the time that the 11 incidents g iving r ise to Henry ’s suit occurr ed. Howe ver, the rema rk wa s not related to the 12 decision-makingproce ss. Moreover , while a r easona ble juror mig ht have f

ound the re mark 13 offe nsive, it is less clear that a re asonable juror would have found it indicative of a 14 discriminatory

animus. Se e Tom as si , 478 F.3d at 116 (“The rele vance of discrimination-re lated 15 rema

rks does not depe nd on their off ensivene ss, but rather on the ir tendenc y to show that the 16 decision-make r wa s motivated by assumptions or attitudes relatingto the protec ted class.” ). 17 Thus, we c onclude that the r emar k had some, but not g reat, probative va lue. 18 In a dd iti on , a dmi ssi on of te sti mony

re g ard ing

the re mark

ha d th e po te nti a l to be un fa ir ly 19 prejudicia l to the employ er. “ Unfa ir prejudice ” is that which mig ht dispose a jury to rende r a 20 verdic t for re asons unre lated to the mer its of the case

. Le op old, 174 F.3d at 270. Vitanza’s 21 re mark

mig ht h ave su ff

ic ie ntl y of fe nd e d me mbe rs of

the jur y that th e y wo uld fe e l in c lin e d to ru le08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

26 1 ag ainst defe ndants, mere ly to punish W y eth for c ontinuing to employ him. The district court’s 2 decision to exclude testimony perta ining to the r emar

k in light of its low probative va lue and 3 prejudicia l nature w as either within the rang e of pe rmissible decisions or was in a ny event 4 harmless e rror . 5 3. W

ardrop’s remarks 6 W ar dr o p a l l e g e d l y m a d e tw o r a c e - b a s e d r e m ar k s : th e “ v o o d o o ” r e m ar

k t o D a i s y E ar l y, 7 and the “ low pants” re mark a nd g esture a

bout Manny

Rivera. Wardr op was He nry ’s direc t 8 supervisor a

nd a dec ision-maker in some of the eve nts at issue and is a def endant in this case

. 9 Whil e he a lleg edly made the “ voodoo” re mark y ear s befor e Wardrop pa rticipated in a

ny 10 challeng ed employ ment decision, he ma de the other around the time of the Org anizational 11 Cascade . The c ontent of ea ch re mark c ould have be en re asonably construed to be discriminatory 12 by

a juror. T hus, althoug h the comments we re not uttere d in a dec ision-making c ontext , they 13 could have had probative value. Though the jury might have found the e vidence of the 14 c omm e nts un

pe rs ua siv e or , e ve n if

be lie ve d, the ir

sig nif ic anc e lim ite d, the y

we re re le va

nt. 15 Under

the circ umstances, howe ver, if it wa s err or to exclude them, the er ror wa s 16 harmless. We find it unlikely that a juror w ould have be en per suaded to c hang e his vote on the 17 ba sis of

the e xclu de d te sti mony , in lig ht o f t he ov e rwhe lmi nge vid e nc e that Ward ro p w a s n ot s o 18 motivated. The only challeng ed ac tions to which W ardr op had any connec tion were Henr

y ’s 19 mid-y ear

and y ear -end pe rfor

mance revie ws in 2003, and his assig nment to a diffe rent 20 depar

tment following the Org anizational Cascade . Howeve r, Wardrop pr ovided detailed a nd 21 c onvin c inge xplanatio ns fo r t ho se a lle g e dly

a dv e rs e a c tio ns , b oth

a t th e tim e and

a t tr ia l.08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

27 1 Moreove r, there was substantial circ umstantial evidence that Wardrop did no t harbor a 2 dis c ri min a tor

y anim us : Ward op wa s p ri mari ly re sp on sib le fo r t

he ini tia l de c isi on

to p ro mot e 3 He nr

y to t he Pr od uc tio n E ng ine e r p os iti on , a nd he se le c te d H e nr

y fr om a n a lmo st e xclu siv e ly

a ll4 white field. Additionally , befor e beingassig ned to Wardrop, He nry had re ceive d only

one 5 composite ratingof “f our” on a perf ormanc e re view in his seven year s at Wy eth; Wardrop rated 6 him

a “ fo ur ” in t

wo c on se c uti ve y e ars . F ina lly , Jea n Co la s, wh om Wa

rd op op te d to re ta in i n 7 Henr

y ’s position following the Or g anizational Cascade , was a lso an Afr ican- Americ an, and ha d 8 r e c e i v e d

s u b s t an t i a l l y b e t t e r

p e r f o r m an c e r e v i e w s f

r o mW ar dr o p th anH e n r

y. 9 In light of this evidenc e, plus the consider able e vidence that Wardrop’s e mploy ment 10 decisions wer e not motivated by rac ial animus, we find it quite unlikely that admission of the 11 improperly

excluded evidenc e would have prompted the jury to rea ch a dif

fer ent re sult. 12 Acc ording ly , we c onclude that a ny err or in g rantingdefe ndants’ first motion in lim ine was 13 ha

rm le ss. 14 B. M ot ion In Li m ine No. 2 15 Henr

y also alleg es that the district cour t erre d by ref using to a dmit evidence of rac ial 16 dis c ri min a tio n a g a ins t ot he r Wye th e mpl oy e e s “ by de c isi on make rs dif

fe re nt f ro m th os e 17 responsible for

prepa ringperf ormanc e re ports and/or makingrec ommendations or dec isions 18 relating to plaintiff’ s job assignme nts or promotions.” Henry II , 2008 WL 294443 at *1. 19 Specifica lly , Henr y argues that the district cour t’s summary , blanket prohibition is contrary to the 20 later- decide d Sprint/Unit ed Manage ment Co. v. Me ndelsohn , 5 52 U. S. 3 79 (2 00 8) , w hic h h e ld 21 that evidenc e by

nonparties a lleg ing disc rimination at the hands of supe rvisors who played no08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

28 1 role in cha lleng ed employ ment decisions is “neither per se admissible nor per se inadmissible,” 2 id. a t 38 1, and

that di str ic t c ourt s mu st e ng a g e in a “ fa c t- int e ns ive , c on te xt-s pe c if ic inq uir y ” to 3 deter

mine whether

to exclude such evidenc e under Rule 403. Id. at 388. 4 We n e e d n ot a tte mpt to d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

e ng a g e d in

the ty pe of fa c t5 i n t e n s i v e i n qu i r

y r e qu i r e d

b y Mende lsohn . Even a ssuming the district judg e improper ly applied a 6 blanket exclusionary rule, ther e wa s no reve rsible er ror be cause plaintiff made no of fer of proof 7 as to the conte nt of the excluded evide nce. See F e d. R. E vid . 1 03 (a ). Whil e an o ff e r o f p ro of

is 8 not “an a

bsolute prer equisite in ever y appea l from the exclusion of evidenc e,” it is requir ed 9 wher e, as he re, “ the sig nificanc e of the excluded evidenc e is not obvious or where it is not clea r 10 what the testimony of the witness would have bee n or that he w as eve n qualified to g ive any 11 testimony

at all.” Fortunato v. Ford Motor Co. , 464 F.2d 962, 967 ( 2d Cir. 1972). Her e, 12 Henr

y ’s counse l went so far

as to re fus e to reve al the conte nt of the prof fer ed testimony , arguing 13 in his Memorandum of L aw in Opposition to Defe ndants’ Motion I n L imine: 1 4 De fe nd an t s h av e a b s o l u t e l y n o i d e a w h a tth e w i tn e s s e s th e y i d e n t i f i e d i nthe ir 15 me mor and um o f l aw w ill test if

y to. De fe nd ants are sim ply g ue ssi ngthat th os e 1 6 w i tn e s s e s m i g h t t e s t i f y a b o u t th e i r o w n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y e x p e r i e n c e s . . . . A c c o r d i n g l y, 17 e ve n if

thi s Co ur t w e re inc lin e d to g ra

nt D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on in limi ne numbe r 2, i t 18 should reser ve dec ision on the moti on until the time of trial, if the issue comes up at 19 all and De fenda nts make their objec tion, so that the Court may make a deter mination 20 then, af

ter having he ard the context, nex us, temporal proximi ty and cir cumstance s 2 1 s ur

r o un d i n g th e t e s t i m o n y. 22 Def

.’s Supplemental App. 39-40. 23 I t is not t he district cour t’s duty to attempt to ex trac t from a pa rty details about what 24 evidenc e he pla

ns to present. Nor

is the court oblig ed to wait until trial, and see what kind of08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

29 1 evidenc e he show s up with. Rather, whe n the opposing party has made a motion to ex clude 2 potential evidenc e, the bur den fa lls on the non-movant (her e, He nry ) to describe the conte nt of 3 the evidenc e and its re levanc e to the ca se. In light of H enry ’s re fusal to do so, the district court 4 could not have r easona bly admitted the evidenc e, eve n if it had eng ag ed in the most intensive 5 “conte x t-specif

ic” inquiry

possible. Accor dingly , even if we a ssume the district court a pplied an 6 incorre ct standar d when we ighingthe exclusion of the challeng ed testimony , we c annot conc lude 7 that the er

ror c ould have a ffe cted the outc ome of the c ase, a s is required to wa rra nt reve rsal. See 8 Fe d. R. Evid. 103. 9 C. F ail ur e to P r ov ide Jur y C har ge P r iorto Sum m at ion s 10 Henr

y next arg ues that the district cour t’s appar ently

inadver tent failure to provide a c opy 11 of the jury

char g e to counse l prior to summations entitl es him to a new tria l. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 12 state s: 13 The c ourt must (1) inform the parties of its proposed [jury ] i nstructions and propose d 14 a c tio n o n th e re qu e sts be fo re ins tr uc tin g the jur

y and be fo re fi na l jury

argume nts ; 15 [and] (2) must g ive the par ties an opportunity

to object on the re cord and out of the 16 jury ’s hea ringbefor e the instructions and a rguments are delivere d. 17 Under

the circ umstances, we need not take up the complex issue of the specif icity with which a 18 district court must describe its proposed jury instructions in order to comply with Rule 51, 19 beca

use He nry ’s counse l did not properly object to the district judg e’s f ailure to provide a copy 20 of

the ins tr uc tio ns . H is c a su a l r e qu e st t o h ave a “ loo k- se e ” a t th e m, whic h w a s n ot r e ne we d at a 21 time when a written copy was available, doe s not suffice. Se e Un ite d S tates v . Ci v e lli , 883 F.2d 22 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. de nied , 493 U.S. 966 (1989) (a proper objection “must direc t the08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

30 1 tr ia l c ourt ’s a tte nti on to t he c on te nti on

that is g oin g to b e ra ise d o n a pp e a l” ). Ha

vin g fa ile d to 2 object, He nry

must demonstrate that the district cour t’s actions constituted plain er ror, whic h he 3 cannot do. 4 The purpose of Rule 51 is to “allow both parties to mold their closingarguments to the 5 points of law that will be explained in the final jury char g e.” Gordon , 232 F.3d at 118 (citing 6 W ie de rsu m A sso cs. v . Na t’ l H om es Co ns t. C

or p ., 54 0 F .2 d 6 2, 65 -6 6 ( 2d Cir . 1 97 6) ); ac c or

d 7 United States v. J

ames , 998 F.2d 74, 79 ( 2d Cir. 1993), cert. de nied , 510 U.S. 958 (1993). He nry 8 identifies only

one wa y in which his summation would have diffe red ha d he known how the jury 9 would have be en cha rg ed: he sa

y s his counsel would have adjusted for the cour t’s err oneous 10 c a

us a tio n in str

uc tio n o n th e re ta liatio n c la ims by arguin g mor e vig or ou sly that E sp e jo a nd Katz 11 knew He nry

was e ng ag ing in a

protec ted ac tivity . Howeve r, bec ause that chang e would have had 12 no eff

ect on He nry ’s closingarguments with respec t to his di scrimination claims, he c annot 13 e sta

bli shthat th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e rr or , if it w a s e rr or , a ff

e c te d th e jur

y ’s ve rd ic t on

tho se c la ims

. 14 D. Inclusion of E lem ents of the Mc Do nne ll D oug

las Burden-Sh if

ting Fr am ework 15 Henr

y also contends that the district c ourt err ed by incorporating e lements of the thre e16 step McD onnell Douglas burden- shifting f rame work into its jury

char g e. B eca

use He nry

failed 17 to object to the inclusion of the Mc Do nn e ll D ou

gla s fr ame wo rk , w e re vie w i ts i nc lus ion fo r p la in 18 err or. See Shah v . Pan Am. W orld Servs., Inc

. , 1 48 F .3 d 8 4, 96 (2 d Ci r. 19 98 ); F e d. R. C iv. P. 19 51(d)( 2). 2 0 T h e d i s tr i c tj u d g e i n s tr u c t e d th e j ur y: 21 To establish a c laim of rac e discrimination ag ainst Wy eth .

. . plaintiff has the08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

31 1 burd e n to pr ov e by a pr e po nde ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that hi s r a c e or c olo r w a s a 2 motivating fa ctor in Wy eth’s employ ment decision or a ction . . . . 3 Th e de te rm inatio n o f a c la im o f d isc ri min a tio n invo lve s a thr e e -s te p p ro c e ss. 4 In the first st ep, in order to prove discrimination by failure to promote, plaintiff has 5 the initial burden to prove by a preponde ranc e of the cre dible evidenc e what is called 6 a prima facie case by proving two things by a prepondera nce of the evidence. One, 7 that he ap p l i ed fo r and was denied a promotion to a position for which he wa s 8 qualified; and two, that the denial of the promotion occurr ed under circ umst ance s 9 g iving r ise to an infer ence of discrimination. . . . 10 To pr ov e dis c ri min a tio n by an un fa vo ra ble pe rf or manc e e va luatio n, in th is 11 fi rs t st e p th e pla int if f m us t pr ov e by

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the c re dib le e vid e nc e that hi s 12 e va luatio n r e su lte d in an a dv e rs e c ha

ng e in t he te rm s and

c on dit io ns of

his 13 employ

ment, and that the c ircumstance s g ive rise to an inf ere nce of discrimination. 14 I f you

fi nd that pl a int if

f has f a ile d to pr ov e e ith e r o f t

he se e sse nti a l e le me nts wi th 15 reg ard to e ither to his promotion or unf avora ble per formanc e eva luation claims, y ou 16 need not de liberate any further . You will be i n eff ect returninga ver dict in favor of 17 the de fe nd ants on that pa rt ic ula r c la im. 1 8 H o w e v e r , i f yo uf i n d th a tb o tho f

th o s e e l e m e n t s h av e b e e np r o v e d b y a 19 preponde ranc e of the evidenc e with re spect to ei t h er plaintiff’s claim for 20 dis c ri min a tio n in fa ilure to pr omo te or his c la im of dis c ri min a tion b y un fav or a ble 21 pe rf

or manc e e va luatio ns , you

sh ou ld t he n procee d to the se c on d s te p, wh ic h is to 22 de te rm ine wh e the r Wye th h a s g ive n any le g iti mate , non dis c ri min a tor y re a so n for

its 23 decision or a ction. 24 Wy eth does not have to convince y ou that the reason i t advanc es is true, that 25 is , t hat it ’s the re a l re a so n fo r the de c isi on or a c tio n. I t me re ly ha s to su g g e st a 26 pla

us ibl e re a so n f

or it. So the so le iss ue a t th is s e c on d s ta g e of y our a na ly sis is 27 wh e the r Wye th h a s advan ced a le g iti mate , n on dis c ri min a tor y re a so n f

or its 28 employ

ment decision or a ction conce rning the plaintiff. 2 9 I f Wy e th s a ti s f ie s it s b ur d e n

b y p r e s e n ti n g e v id e n c e to show a 30 no nd isc ri min a tor y re a so n f or its e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n or de c isi on , y ou the n p ro c e e d to 31 the third step in the analy sis, which is to determine whe ther plaintiff ha s satisfied y ou 32 by

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the c re dib le e vid e nc e that the re a so n off e re d by Wy e th f or its 33 de c isi on

or a c tio n is on ly

a pr e te xt or

c ov e ru p f or wh a t w a s in

tr uth a ra c ia lly 34 discriminatory motive. Thus, plaintiff must e stablish both that the r eason a dvance d 35 by

Wy eth was f

alse, a nd that the discrimination was a motivating fa ctor in Wy eth’s 36 decision or a ction. 37 Now, in deter mining whe ther p l ai n tiff’s ra ce w as a motivatingfac tor in an 38 employ

ment decision or a ction, y ou should unde rstand that the plaintiff’s ra ce ne ed 39 not hav e b ee n the sole or e x clusive fa ctor motivating the employ er’ s decision or 40 action. The re ma y have be en many fac tors motivating a de cision. Plainti ff’ s status 41 in a prote c te d c la ss s uc h a s A fr ic an- Am e ri c an ma y be on e of

many fa c tor s. B ut i t08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

32 1 must be a motivating f actor , that is, a factor that sig nificantly influence d the dec ision. 2 Trial Tr. 1563- 66. 3 Th is c ha

rg e inc or po rate d e le me nts of

the burd e n- sh if

tin g fr ame wo rk

art ic ulate d in 4 McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973), under which 5 [T] he plaintiff be ars the initial burde n of establishing a prima fa cie c ase of 6 dis c ri min a tio n. I f t he pla int if

f d oe s so , the burd e n sh if

ts t o th e de fe nd ant t o a

rt ic ulate 7 “ so me le g iti mate , n on -d isc ri min a tor y re a so n” fo r i ts a c tio n. I f s uc h a re a so n is 8 provided, plaintiff ma y . . . preva il by

showing , [by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e,] 9 that the employ er’ s determination wa s in fact the r esult of ra cial discrimination. 10 Holcomb v . Iona College , 5 2 1 F. 3 d 1 3 0 , 1 3 8 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g McD onnell Douglas , 411 1 1 U

. S

. a t8 0 2 )

. W e h av e p r e v i o u s l y c a u t i o n e d th a t“ tr i a l j u d g e s s h o u l d

n o t‘ i mp o rt [ ] un c r i t i c a l l y’ 12 lang uag e used in the tra ditional . . . Mc Do nn e ll D ou

gla s fo rm ulatio n into j ur

y c ha rg e s b e c a us e 13 such languag e—deve loped by appellate courts for

use by judge s—is ‘at best irre levant, and at 14 worst misleadingto a jury .’” Renz v. G rey Adv ertising, Inc. , 135 F.3d 217, 223 ( 2d Cir. 1997) 1 5 (q u o t i n g Cab re ra v . J ak ab ov itz , 24 F.3d 372, 380 ( 2d Cir. 1994)). In Gordon , w e re ite ra te d th is 16 principle: 17 Th e jur

y the re fo re do e s n ot n e e d to be le c tur e d o n the c on c e pts that guid e a jud g e in 1 8 determi n in g w h e th e r a c a s e s h o u ld

g o to th e ju

r y . . . . [W] h e nth e d is tr ic t c o urt 19 included these conce pts as part of it s jury char g e by

using the McD onnell Douglas 2 0 f

r am e w o r k , i tc r e a t e d

a d i s t i n c tr i s k

o f c o n f u s i n g th e j ur

y. 21 232 F.3d at 118. 22 In this case, the r isk of confusingthe jury was not suffic iently

serious to war

rant re versa l 23 un de r t

he str ing e nt p la in e rr or

sta nd ard . We se e no re a so n to su sp e c t th at in c lus ion of thi s 24 su

pe rf luo us langua g e ob sc ur e d th e jur y ’s ult imate ta sk

—to de te rm ine wh e the r r a c e wa s a08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

33 1 mot ivatin g fa c tor

in a n a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n. Th e dis tr ic t ju dg e be g an a nd e nd e d h is 2 char g e with the cor rec t leg al standar d. Moreove r, the ve rdict shee t directe d the jury to the corr ect 3 question—whether Henr y had “pr oved by

a pre pondera

nce of the cr edible evide nce that his race 4 or color w as a motivatingfac tor in” ce rtain employ ment actions. J.A. 790. W e find it signif icant 5 that Henr

y does not eve n attempt to articulate a basis for his assertion that inclusion of the 6 fr ame wo rk

wa s p re jud ic ia l to his c a se , a

nd ins te a d me re ly

c ite s Gordon fo r t

he pr op os iti on

that it 7 is “at best irre levant, and a t worst misleading to a jury .” That falls far short of the showingof 8 prejudice require d to justi fy reve rsal on plain er

ror r eview. 9 E. Th e Court ’s Requirem ent That Henry P rove Wye th’s P roff ere d Reasons Were 10 “P ret extual ” 11 F ina lly , H e nr y argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d b y ins tr uc tin g the jur

y that, i n o rd e r t o 12 preva il, he must prove that Wy eth’s stated justifications for the adve rse e mploy ment decisions 13 we re pr e te xtua l. 14 As set forth a bove, the c ourt instructed the jury reg ardingthe McD onnell Douglas three

15 step burden- shifting pr ocess. It told the jury to determine: fir st, whether H enry had first satisfied 16 his burden to show a pr ima fac ie ca se of discr imination; s econd, whether Wy eth had “ advanc ed a 17 leg itimate nondiscriminatory rea son for its employ

ment decision”; a

nd third, if both parties had 18 satisfied their bur dens, whe ther He nry had prove n “by

a pre pondera

nce of the cr edible evide nce 19 that the re ason off ere d by Wy eth for its dec ision or action is only a pre text or cove rup for

what 20 was in truth a r acia lly discriminatory

motive.” Trial Tr . 1565-66. 21 After

the cha rg e wa s rea d, Henr

y ’s attorne y

objected to the r equire ment of showingthat08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

For example, Webster’s Third Ne w International Dictionary (1976 ed.) offe rs the 4 fo llo wi ngde fi nit ion s: “ Pr e te xt: a purp os e or

mot ive a lle g e d o r a

n a pp e ara nc e a ssume d in

or de r t o c loa k th e re a l in te nti on

or state of a ff a ir s. ” “ Pr e te nd :. . . 2 a : to make be lie ve ; f e ig n, sh am. b : to hold out, repre sent or asse rt false ly : . . . show hy pocritica lly

or dec eitfully .” 34 1 Wy eth’s stated r eason w as “f alse.” Henr

y argued that the e mploy er’ s stated re ason “doe sn’t have 2 to be a f

alse re ason,” a s opposed to a “pr etext.” Trial Tr. 1588. The judge responde d that he 3 didn’t think there wa s a sig nificant diff ere nce be tween the terms, but provided the jury with the 4 following supplemental instruction: 5 [P ]l aintiff is requir ed to show not only that t hat re ason adva

nced by the def endant 6 was a

prete x t or coverup for the improper e mploy ment action, but also that the re al 7 rea son for the e mploy ment action wa s rac e discrimination or re taliation. 8 Now, I ’m told that Isaid the plaintiff ha s to pr ove that the ar ticulated re ason 9 was fa lse. He doe sn’t have to pr ove that. I t may be a r eal r eason. B ut it h as to be 10 shown to be a mer e pre text , in other words, somethingother than the rea l rea son for 11 the employ ment action or de cision. 12 Tr ia l T r. 15 95 -9 6. He nr y ma de no fu

rt he r o bje c tio ns . 13 Although H enry , havingreque sted that the cour t char g e on “pr etext,” cannot be he ard on 14 thi s a

pp e a l to ob

je c t to the c ha

rg e , w e thi nk

it i s unw ise fo r a

c ourt to c ha rg e the jur

y that a 15 plaintiff must prove that the e mploy er’ s expl anation of a n adver se ac tion was a “ prete x t.” Such 16 an instruction has a likelihood of confusingthe jury and addinginappropriately to the plaintiff’s 17 burden. A t least some of the most prominent dictionary definitions of “pre text ” and of “pre tend,” 18 fr om whic h it

de ri ve s, inc lud e the int e nt t o d e c e ive

. A j ur y ins tr uc te d th a t th e pla int if

f m us t 4 19 pr ov e that th e e mpl oy e r’ s e xplanatio n is a “ pr e te xt” i s li ke ly

to u nd e rs tand tha t th e pla int if

f m us t 20 prove that the employ ee of fer ed the e x planation with a consc ious intention of deceivingby 21 conce aling its discrimination. This is especia lly so when, a s in the prese nt case , the cour t08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

We previously

addre ssed this point i n Fields v. New Y ork State Office of Me ntal 5 Retardation & Dev elopmental Disabilities , 115 F.3d 116 ( 2d Cir. 1997), wher e we wrote: Thoug h there are sentenc es in some o p i n i o n s t o the ef fec t that a Title VI Iplaintiff must prove “ both that the [defenda nt’s pro ffered] rea son was fa lse, and that discrimination was the re al re ason,” the s e d ec i sions do not require a finding of prete x t in addition to a finding of discrimination; they make the quite dif

fer ent point that a Title VI I plaintiff may not pr evail by establishing only

prete x t, but must prove, in addition, that a mot ivating rea son was discrimination. But thoug h a plaintiff may not preva il only

by showing that a prof

fer ed explanation is a pre text , it is not require d t o m ak e s u ch a showing. Since a plaintiff pr evails by showing that discrimination wa s a motivating fa ctor, it ca n invite the ju ry t o i gn o re the defe ndant’s prof fer ed leg itimate expl anation and c onclude that discr imination was a mot i v at i n g fac tor, whether or not the employ er’ s p roff ere d explanation was also in the employ er’ s mind. Id. at1 2 1 (q u o t i n g St. Mary’s , 509 U.S. at 515) (c itations omi tted). 35 1 associate s the word “ prete x t” with “cove rup.” 2 In provinga ca se under Title VI I , following the def endant’ s proffe r of a

justification, a 3 plaintiff nee d only show that the def

endant wa s in fact motivated at least in part by the prohibited 4 discriminatory

animus. Gordon , 232 F.3d at 117 (holding that defe ndant ca n preva il “by

proving 5 that a discriminatory motive, more likely

than not, motivated the def endants” (interna l quotation 6 marks omitted)). Se e als o A uli c ino v . Ne w York City De p’ t of Ho me le ss S e rv s. , 580 F.3d 73, 80 7 (2d Cir. 2009) (e x plaining that to prevail, plaintiff must prove “ that the def endant’ s employ

ment 8 decision wa s more likely than not based in whole or in part on discr imination” (internal quotation 9 mark s o mitte d) ); Jame s v. New Y

ork Racing Ass’n , 233 F.3d 149, 154 ( 2d Cir. 2000) (explaining 10 that de fe nd ant e nti tle d to pr e va il “ un le ss t he pla int if

f c a n p oint to e vid e nc e tha

t r e a so na bly 11 supports a findingof prohibited discrimination”) . A plaintiff has no oblig ation to prove that the 1 2 em p l o y er ’s i n n o ce n tex p l an at i o ni s d i s h o n es t , i n th e s en s e o f i n t en t i o n al l y fu rn i s h i n g a 13 justification known to be fa lse. The c rucia l element of a claim under

Title VI Iis discrimination, 508- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

Notwithstanding our

admonition in Fields , district courts in the interve ning year s have continued to instruct juries that pre text is, in effe ct, a r equire d element of plaintiff’s cla im which mus t be pr ov e d b y

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e . Pl a int if

f h a s no such burden ; in

a ll c a se s, plaintiff sustains his burden if he pr oves that an a dverse employ ment decision wa s motivated by discrimination, reg ardle ss of whethe r he is able to additionally show that the employ er’ s asserte d justification for the de cision was “pr etextual.” 36 1 n o td i s h o n e s ty. 2 We rec og nize that courts often spea k of the oblig ation on the plaintiff to prove that the 3 employ er’ s expl anation is a “ prete x t for discrimination.” We believe this is either a shorthand 4 fo r t

he mor e c omp le x co nc e pt t hat, r e g ard le ss o f whe the r t he e mpl oy e r’ s e xplanatio n a lso 5 furnished pa

rt of the r eason f

or the a dverse action, the a dverse action wa s motivated in part by 6 discrimination, or a misunderstandingof dicta in Supreme Court opinions. I n Texas De ptartment 7 of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Court stated in dicta that, “should the 8 defe ndant ca

rry [i ts] burden [of fur

nishing a non-discriminatory

rea son for its adver se ac tion] , the 9 plaintiff must then have a n opportunity

to prove by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that the 10 leg itimate rea sons offer ed by the def endant we re not its true re asons, but wer e a pr etext for 11 discrimination.” Id. at 253. The Court re visited this s tatement in St. Mary’s Honor Cente r v. 12 Hicks , 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The Court held in St. Mary’s that a fa ctfinder ’s re jection of a

n 13 e mpl oy e r’ s a sse rt e d ju sti fi c a tio n f or an a c tio n d id n ot, sta

nd inga lon e , e nti tle the pla int if f t o 14 judgme nt as a matter of law. The majority

and the dissentingjustices disag ree d over the proper 15 signific ance under the Burdine dictum of jury reje ction of the e mploy er’ s asserte d justification 16 for its ac tions. The dissenting justices c onstrued Burdine to mean that a pla intiff who disproved 17 the e mpl oy e r’ s a sse rt e d ju sti fi c a tio n w a s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw o n h is08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

37 1 discrimination claim. J ustice Scalia, writing f or the majority , responde d that “a r eason c annot be 2 pr ov e d to be a

‘p re te xt for discriminati on ’ unless it is shown both that the re ason wa s false, and 3 that discrimination was the re al re ason.” Id. at 515. 4 Puttin g a sid e the fa c t th a t in bo th c a se s th e re fe re nc e to “ pr e te xt” w a s d ic tum , w e thi nk it 5 clea

r that in neither c ase did the Supre me Court intend to impose on the plaintiff a re quirement of 6 pr ov ingint e nt t o d e c e ive . It se e ms c le ar f ro m th e dis c us sio n th a t w hat th e Court me ant b y its 7 ref ere nce to the f

alsity of the e mploy er’ s asserte d justification was not intent to dece ive, but 8 inacc urac y

or incompletene ss resulting f rom the fa ilure to include the f act of the discriminatory 9 motivation. I n context, it is amply clea r that the import of the state ments in both Burdine and St

. 10 Ma ry ’s wa s no t that plaintiff was r equire d to prove the e mploy er’ s stated justification was 11 asser

ted with intent to deceive or in bad fa ith. I t was rather that no plaintiff c ould preva il without 12 e sta

bli sh ing , b y

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e , th a t di sc ri min a tio n p lay e d a ro le in a n a dv e rs e 13 employ

ment decision. 14 To requir e a pla intiff to prove that the e mploy er a cted with consc ious intent to deceive a s 15 to i ts r e a so ns imp os e s a burd e n n ot e nv isi on e d b y the statut e . T he re are many c ir c ums tanc e s in 1 6 wh i ch a j ury

m ay j u s t i fi ab l y

fi n d a p ro h i b i t edd i s cr i m i n at o ry m o t i v at i o nn o twi th s t an d i n g a 17 differ ent explanation give n by the employ er in g ood faith without intent to deceive . One suc h 18 circ umstance e x ists where the adver se dec ision is m ade by two or more pe rsons, some of whom 19 are motivated by

discrimination, while others ar e motivated by other re asons, and the e mploy er’ s 20 innocent explanation emanates from those who ha d no discriminatory motivation and were 21 unawa

re of their collea g ues’ discr iminatory motivation. I n such ca ses, the explanation g iven by08- 1477- cv

H e n r y v . W y e th P h a r m a c e u tic a ls

Another suc h circ umstance ma y arise where the dec isionmaker is unawa re of his own 6 dis c ri min a tor

y mot ivatio n a

nd may be lie ve in g oo d f

a iththa t hi s d if fe re nt e xplanatio n h on e stl y acc ounts for the de cision, without aware ness of the e x tent to which his judgme nts are inf luence d b y i n g r a i n e d

d i s c r i m i n a t o r

y a t t i tu d e s w h i c hh av e b e e np r o v e d t o th e j ur y. Be cause our obser

vations do not form a pa

rt of our r easons f

or rulingin favor of

the 7 party winning judg ment, they

are dicta. 38 1 the e mpl oy e r w ill be ba se d o n in c omp le te inf or matio n, but no t an inte nt t o d e c e ive

. In s ho rt , 6 2 what the statute pr ohibits i s discrimination in employ ment. I t does not require proof in addition 3 of dec eitful misrepre sentation. 4 Pla int if

f i n th is c a se c ann ot b e he ard to c omp la in o f t

he c ourt ’s c ha

rg e on “ pr e te xt” 5 beca

use he r equeste d it. Accor dingly , our obser vations on the inappropr iate natur e of suc h a 6 c ha

rg e have no e ff

e c t on thi s a pp e a l. No ne the le ss, fo r t he futur e we c a

uti on dis tr ic t c ourt s to 7 7 avoid cha

rg ing jur ies to the eff

ect that a plaintiff must show that the employ er’ s stated re ason for 8 an adve rse a ction was a “pre text .” It is sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that discrimination 9 play ed a r ole in motivating the a dverse action take n ag ainst the plaintiff. 10 CO NC LU SION 11 Th e or de r o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

date d M arc h 7 , 2 00 8 is he re by AF F I RME D w ithre sp e c t to 12 Henr

y ’s discrimination claims, VACATED w ith respec t to his retaliation claims, and REM AN DE D f

or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s. 13