MARK WHITE 

Attorney General 

The Attorney General of Texas 

September 11, 1980 

Honorable Hamp Atkinson, Chairman 

Committee on Pllblic Education 

House of Representatives 

Austin, Texas 

Opinion No. MW-239 

Re: Length of school term as the 

term is used in section 21.301, 

Education Code 

Dear Chairman Atkinson: 

You have requested our opinion regarding the meaning of “current 

term” as used in section 2L3Olfa) of the Education Code. That statute 

provides: 

The beard of trustees of eny school district may 

suspend from the privileges of the schools any pupil 

found guilty of incorrigible conduct, but such 

suspension shall mt extend beyond the current term 

of the schooL 

The State Board of Education has defined “school term” for accounting 

purposes as: 

that period of time a school district is scheduled 

to be in operation includw inservice trainii and 

classroom instruction. The period begins with the 

first day of scheduled inservice training as indicated 

in the school calendar and ends with the beginning of 

the sllbsequent school term. 

On August 7,1978, the Commissioner of Education rendered a decision which 

supports the application of the State Board’s definition to section 2L30l(a). 

In that case, Abbey v. Hardin-Jefferson Independent School Dist., Docket 

No. 77-R124, State Commissioner of Education, Algust 7, 1978, a student 

had~ been suspended in October, 1977, for the remainder of the school year. 

The student contended, inter alia, that such a suspension contravened the 

Education Code. The Commissioner, while holding that the particular 

suspension was improper, nevertheless stated: 

The ordinary and usual interpretation by this 

agency of the word “term”, in section 2L301, Texas 

Eucation Code, is school year. The word “term” does 

not refer to either a semester cr a quarter in that 

context. 3 at 4. 

p. 758 
Honorable Hamp Atkinson - Page Two (HIV-239) 

Aacordirgly, the Commissioner held that, under section 21.301, a school district was 

entitled to suspend a student “for the remainder of the school year.” g at 4. 

It is well established that an administrative construction of sn ambiguous statute 

should be followed tmleas it is clearly unreasonable. Calvert v. Kadane, 427 S.W. 2d 

605 (Tex. 1968); Thompson v. Calvert, 301 S.W. 2d 496 ‘(Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1957, no 

writ). Although the 66th Legislature, which convened five months subsequent to the 

Commissioner’s decision in Abbey, extensively amended section 21.301, it did not alter 

the Commissioner~s constructton of “current term.” As a result, we must conclude 

that, for purposes of section 21.301(a) of the Education Code, “current term” means the 

period beginning with the first day of scheduled inserviae training and ending with the 

first day of scheduled inservice training the following year. 

SUMMARY 

For purposes of section 2L3Ol(a) of the E&cation Code, 

“current term” means the period beginning with the first day of 

scheduled inserviaa trainii and ending with the fit day of 

scheduled inservice training the following year. 

2* 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General of Texas 

JOHN W. FAINTER, JR. 

First Assistant Attorney General 

Prapared by Rick Gilpin 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION CGMMHTEE 

C. Robert Heath, Chairman 

Jon Bible 

Susan Garrison 

Rick Gilpin 

Iris Jones 

Bruce Youngblood 

p. 759