[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 17

- 12531 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No s . 2:16

- cv - 14258

- DMM ; 2:01

- cr - 14001

- DMM

- 1

CARLOS WILSON, Petitioner

- Appellant,

versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

- Appellee.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ (February 2, 2018) Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON , C ircuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 17-12531 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 1 of 42 Carlos Wilson appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. Wilson pleaded guilty in 2001 to one count of possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of crack cocai ne in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He received a career offender enhancement under § 4B1. 2(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which were mandatory at that time, based on prior Florida convictions for burglary and second degree murder

. He was sentenced to 235 months. In 2016 he filed this § 2255 motion, his first, on the ground that the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States , 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual cl ause as unconstitutionally vague , also invalidated the identically

- worded residu al clause in § 4B1.2(a) of the g uidelines. He acknowledged the Supreme Court’s holding in Beckles v. United States , 580 U.S. __ , 137 S. Ct. 886, 890 (2017), that the advisory guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges, but argued that Beckles does not apply here because he was sentenced when the guidelines were mandatory. The district court rejected that argument based on prior panel precedent and denied his motion. This is Wilson’s appeal. We have held that “[t]he Guidelines

— whether mandatory or advisory

— cannot be unconstitutionally vague because they do not establish the illegality of any conduct and are designed t o assist and limit the discretion of the sentencing

Case: 17-12531 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 2 of 43 judge.” In re Griffin , 823 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2016). That decision forecloses Wilson’s argument that § 4B1.2(a) is unconstitutionally vague in light
of Johnson

. See Smith v. GTE Corp. , 236 F.3d 1292, 1300 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[Under the] prior panel precedent rule of this Circuit, the holding of the first panel to address an issue is the law of this Circuit, thereby binding all subsequent panels unless and until the first panel’s holding is ov erruled by the Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court.”). H is argument that In re Griffin is not binding because it involved an application to file a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 fails because “our prior

- panel

- precedent rule applies with equal force as to prior panel decisions published in the context of applications to file second or successive petitions.” In re Lambrix , 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2015). 1 And his argument that Beck les undermines In re Griffin to the point of abrogation also fail s because , as he admits, Beckles did not address whether the mandatory g uidelines are subject to a vagueness challenge. See Beckles , 137 S. Ct. at 890 . Because Beckles is not directly on point, In re Griffin remains binding.
See United States v. Kaley , 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009) (“ In addition to

1 He argues that In re Lambrix is off point because it involved a second or successive application and as a result could not address whether published second or successive decisions are binding outside of that context. But we “could” and did address that issue . We held t hat published second or successive decisions are to be treated as normal prior panel precedent s without exception. See In re Lambrix , 776 F.3d at 794 (“[A] prior panel’s holding in a published three

- judge order issued under § 2244(b) is binding on all subsequent panel s unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc.”) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).

Case: 17-12531 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 3 of 44 being squarely on point, the doctrine of adherence to prior precedent also mandates that the intervening Supreme Court case actually ab rogate or directly conflict with, as opposed to merely weaken, the holding of the prior panel. ”). AFFIRMED. Case: 17-12531 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 4 of 4