were material to the disposition of the motion and included specific

citations to the complaint and to exhibits attached to the motion. NRCP 56(c). Although appellant opposed the summary judgment motion, as explained below, the district court properly concluded that she failed to demonstrate specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. NRCP 56(e).

First, although appellant alleged that respondent qualified as a debt collector under the Federal Debt Collection Practice Act (FDCPA) 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012) et seq., and NRS 649.370 (stating that violations of FDCPA are violations of Nevada law and give rise to independent state claims), the FDCPA excludes the servicing of mortgages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985). Additionally, respondent demonstrated that it was the successor holder of the promissory note based on its possession of the endorsed-in-blank note and its agreements with the beneficiary of the deed of trust. See Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 128 Nev. , 286 P.3d 249, 258, 260 (2012). Thus, as the note holder, respondent was collecting its own debt and servicing its own mortgage note, and the district court properly entered summary judgment. See Perry, 756 F.2d at 1208 (holding that the FDCPA defines a debt collector as a party collecting debts owed to another, which does not include a party attempting to collect an obligation it owns).

Second, although appellant asserted that respondent engaged in unfair lending practices, as the successor holder of the note, respondent did not make a loan to appellant, and could not be held liable for unfair lending practices under NRS 598D.100(1)(b). Thus, the district court properly entered summary judgment on that cause of action.

Third, appellant's claim for quiet title was properly resolved on summary judgment, as severance of the note and deed of trust is not

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(0) 1947A 2fatal to the security interest created by the deed of trust. 

### See Edelstein,



### 128 Nev. at , 

### 286 P.3d at 

### 260 (permitting severance and independent transfer of deeds of trusts and notes without impairing the ultimate enforceability of the instruments after reunification).

Finally, appellant's cause of action seeking a declaration that the notice of default was null and void was properly rejected as a matter of law. As noted in the order resolving appellant's related appeal arising from a district court order dismissing a petition for judicial review in a foreclosure mediation matter, respondent rescinded the underlying notice of default. 

### See Brunson v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, Docket No. 

### 56899 (Order Vacating Judgment and Remanding, November 

### 15, 2011). Thus, this cause of action is moot and judgment against appellant was therefore proper. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order.

It is so ORDERED.'

Hardesty 

## PC*4)1 Parraguirre

"We have considered appellant's other arguments on appeal and conclude that they lack merit, and thus, do not warrant reversal.

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OF NEVADA

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### cc: Hon. Steven P. Elliott, District Judge Terry J. Thomas Houser & Allison, APC Washoe District Court Clerk

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(0) 1947A 

### 4