IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

Unification Technologies LLC, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

Phison Electronics Corporation, 

 Defendant. 

Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Lead Case

Unification Technologies LLC, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

Silicon Motion Inc., 

 Defendant. 

Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-00267-JRG-RSP

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PLAINTIFF UNIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES LLC’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION 

TO DEFENDANT SILICON MOTION, INC.’S RULE 12 MOTION TO DISMISS 

PLAINTIFF’S PRE-SUIT WILLFULNESS AND INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS 

AND STRIKE CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 237
i

Table of Contents

I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1

II. Relation to Phison’s Motion ................................................................................................ 1

III. Relevant Factual Background.............................................................................................. 2

IV. Legal Standards.................................................................................................................... 3

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)................................................................................ 3

B. Willful Infringement.............................................................................................................. 4

C. Indirect Infringement ............................................................................................................. 4

D. Motion to Strike Under Rule 12(f)......................................................................................... 5

V. Argument................................................................................................................................. 6

A. UTL Properly Plead Pre-Suit Willfulness and Indirect Infringement. .................................. 6

B. UTL’s Pleading of the Supreme Court’s Description of Conduct Warranting Enhanced 

Damages Should Not Be Stricken.......................................................................................... 7

VI. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 9

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 238
ii

Table of Contents

Cases

Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 

306 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1962)....................................................................................................... 5

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544 (2007).................................................................................................................... 3

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 

201 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1953)................................................................................................... 5, 9

Corydoras Tech., LLC v. Apple Inc., 

2:16-CV-00538-JRG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194959 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2016 ..................... 4

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 

563 U.S. 754 (2011)................................................................................................................... 5

Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 

No. 2:21-CV-00213-JRG, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101114 (E.D. Tex. June 6, 2022)................ 9

Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 

579 U.S. 93 (2016).................................................................................................................. 4, 8

In re Gitto Global Corp., 

422 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) ........................................................................................................... 9

Lone Star Fund V (U.S.) L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 

594 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010)....................................................................................................... 4

Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 

565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009)....................................................................................................... 4

Malibu Boats, LLC v. MasterCraft Boat Co., LLC, 

No. 3:16-CV-82-TAV-HBG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183202 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 28, 2016) ....... 4

Merrill Mfg. Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 

553 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2021) ....................................................................................... 4

Plano Encryption Techs., LLC v. Alkami Tech., Inc., 

No. 2:16-cv-1032-JRG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221765 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 2017).................. 4

Script Sec. Sols. L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 

170 F. Supp. 3d 928 (E.D. Tex. 2016) ........................................................................................ 3

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 3 of 14 PageID #: 239
iii

SEC v. Blackburn, 

No. 15-2451, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127562 (E.D. La. Sep. 23, 2015) ................................ 5, 8

Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 

428 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2005)....................................................................................................... 4

Thompson v. City of Waco, 

 764 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2014)...................................................................................................... 3, 6

United States v. Coney, 

 689 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2012).......................................................................................................... 9

Statutes

35 U.S.C § 284 .................................................................................................................................. 1

Other Authorities

5C FED. PRAC. & PROC. (“Wright and Miller”) § 1382 (3d ed. Supp. 2015).................................... 5

Rules

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)....................................................................................................................... 3

FED. R. CIV. P 12(b)(6)............................................................................................................. passim

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).................................................................................................................. 1, 5, 9

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 4 of 14 PageID #: 240
1

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Unification Technologies LLC (“UTL”) provided Defendant Silicon Motion Inc.

(“SMI” or “Defendant”) with notice of SMI’s infringement before it filed this case. Based in part 

on this pre-suit knowledge, UTL asserted willfulness and indirect infringement claims, and 

alleged that SMI’s conduct is in accord with the Supreme Court’s description of conduct 

justifying enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C § 284. Through its Motion,1 SMI asks the Court to 

dismiss UTL’s pre-suit willfulness and indirect infringement claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and 

strike language quoted from the Supreme Court under Rule 12(f). SMI asserts incorrectly that it 

received notice of UTL’s patents the same day suit was filed (though it does not argue the notice 

was after suit was filed) and contends that the enhanced damages language is redundant, 

immaterial, and scandalous. 

As explained more fully below, neither of SMI’s arguments meet the high bar for 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) or striking under Rule 12(f). SMI’s Motion should be denied 

because: (a) SMI received notice sufficient to support willfulness and indirect infringement 

claims before suit was filed; and (b) the disputed language in UTL’s Complaint2 properly 

apprised SMI of UTL’s claim for enhanced damages.

II. Relation to Phison’s Motion

The Court consolidated UTL’s case against SMI with the Lead Case involving Phison 

Electronics Corporation (“Phison”) for all pretrial issues and purposes. See Dkt. 16. On August 

23, 2023, Phison filed a Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Pre-Suit Willfulness Claims and 

Strike Certain Allegations. See Dkt. 17. The following day SMI filed the instant Motion copying 

1 “Motion” refers to SMI’s Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Pre-Suit Willfulness Claims 

and Strike Certain Allegations filed at Dkt. 18.

2 “Complaint” refers to Plaintiff’s Complaint for Patent Infringement filed at Dkt. 1 in Civil 

Action No. 2:23-cv-00267-JRG-RSP. 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 5 of 14 PageID #: 241
2

Phison’s motion nearly verbatim, including Phison’s citation to case law without reporter or 

pinpoint pages (see, e.g., Motion at 4 (NXP) and 5 (Blackburn)).3 SMI, however, extended 

Phison’s argument regarding the date of notice of the Asserted Patents to UTL’s indirect 

infringement claims (see, e.g., Motion at 1, 4, 6). To address this additional argument and clearly 

delineate between the similar but separate facts for each Defendant, UTL files this separate 

response, but apprises the Court that the substantive arguments are essentially the same and that 

UTL has endeavored to present them in essentially the same order to avoid duplication of effort.

III. Relevant Factual Background

On May 30, 2023, UTL sent correspondence to SMI “identifying the Asserted Patents as 

being infringed by exemplary SMI products, and further included claim charts demonstrating 

how the identified products infringe the Asserted Patents.” Complaint at ¶ 35. The FedEx 

tracking information SMI submitted with its Motion confirms that the package with the letter 

was picked up May 30, 2023. See Dkt. 18, Ex. A at 1. 

Nevertheless, SMI asserts that “the letter was not received at SMI’s offices in Taiwan 

until June 2, 2023, the day that UTL filed its Complaint.” Motion at 3. This is misleading. SMI’s 

assertion ignores the fact that Taiwan and Texas (where the Complaint was filed and the letter 

was sent from) reside in different time zones separated by the International Date Line. The 

FedEx tracking information SMI submitted as Exhibit A to the Motion tracks each event in its

local time. This tracking information indicates that the package was received by FedEx in 

Garland, TX on May 30, 2023, at 2:29PM in Texas and delivered in Chu Nan Tsen, Taiwan on 

3 Also, although SMI did translate the paragraph numbers from the Phison Complaint to its own 

Complaint in the second numbered paragraph on page 1 of the Motion (referring to the 

“statement repeated in each of paragraphs 36, 61-62, 84-85, 105-06, 126-27, 128 of the 

Complaint”), the disputed statement in fact only appears in paragraphs 62, 84, 105, and 126. See 

Complaint at ¶¶ 62, 84, 105, and 126.

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 6 of 14 PageID #: 242
3

June 2, 2023, at 11:04AM in Taiwan. See Dkt. 18, Ex. A. SMI uses these dates to claim that it 

received notice on the same day UTL filed suit. This is incorrect. 

When the FedEx tracking data is set to use the “Origin” time zone (Central) for all 

events, it is clear that SMI received notice prior to suit being filed. Ex. 1, FedEx tracking. SMI 

received the notice letter on June 1, 2023 at 10:04 PM Central. Id. Thereafter, on June 2, 2023, at 

1:36PM Central, UTL sent an electronic copy of this correspondence to SMI’s email listed at 

https://www.siliconmotion.com/legal as well as an email for a senior manager in SMI’s legal 

department. Ex. 2.

4 UTL then filed the Complaint on June 2, 2023, at 3:16 PM Central. Ex. 3, 

ECF notice for Complaint. The time of this filing in Taiwan was June 3, 2023, at 4:16AM.

IV. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint include “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 

12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a complaint that fails to meet this standard. FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(6). To survive dismissal at the pleading stage, a complaint must state “enough facts such 

that the claim to relief is plausible on its face.” Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 502 

(5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court must 

accept well-pleaded facts as true and view all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.

“The court may consider ‘the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any 

documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the 

complaint.’” Script Sec. Sols. L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d 928, 935 (E.D. Tex. 

2016) (quoting Lone Star Fund V (U.S.) L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 

4 SMI’s Motion does not address this additional notice.

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 7 of 14 PageID #: 243
4

2010)). In the Fifth Circuit, motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “are viewed with disfavor 

and are rarely granted.” Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2005)). 

B. Willful Infringement

“A claim for willful infringement must allege that infringement was ‘intentional or 

knowing.’” Plano Encryption Techs., LLC v. Alkami Tech., Inc., Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-1032-

JRG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221765, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 2017) (quoting Halo Elecs., Inc. 

v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1926 (2016)). “A plaintiff’s plausible allegations 

concerning knowledge of the patents-in-suit may be sufficient and this court has so held in prior 

cases.” Id. (citations omitted). Defendant does not cite, and UTL is unaware of, any case setting 

forth a duration requirement for pre-suit knowledge to support a claim for willful infringement. 

Indeed, courts have held that claims for willful infringement may be appropriate even where suit 

was brought on the day the patent issued. See, e.g., Malibu Boats, LLC v. MasterCraft Boat Co., 

LLC, No. 3:16-CV-82-TAV-HBG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183202, at *15 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 28, 

2016). Moreover, “post-complaint knowledge has been found to be sufficient under Halo to 

assert a claim of willfulness.” Plano Encryption Techs., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221765, at *5

(citation omitted); see also Merrill Mfg. Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 553 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1306 

(N.D. Ga. 2021) (noting that “most courts” hold that post-filing conduct may support a claim for 

willful infringement).

C. Indirect Infringement

To plead indirect infringement, a plaintiff must plead that an accused infringer had

knowledge of the patents-in-suit. See Corydoras Tech., LLC v. Apple Inc., 2:16-CV-00538-JRG,

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194959, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2016) (“[A] patentee cannot recover 

on claims of indirect infringement for acts occurring prior to the accused infringer having 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 8 of 14 PageID #: 244
5

knowledge of the asserted patents.”) (citing Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 

754, 763-65 (2011)). Defendant has cited no case law, and UTL has found none, requiring a presuit claim for indirect infringement to plead knowledge within any particular timeframe other 

than prior to filing suit.

D. Motion to Strike Under Rule 12(f)

Rule 12(f) provides that “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or 

any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). The action 

of striking a pleading “is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes 

of justice.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 

1953) (citations omitted). For this reason, a motion to strike should be granted “only when the 

pleading to be stricken has no possible relation to the controversy.” Id. In addition, “[a] disputed 

question of fact cannot be decided on motion to strike.” Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 306 

F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962). And, “courts generally are not willing to determine disputed and 

substantial questions of law upon a motion to strike” “when there is no showing of prejudicial 

harm to the moving party.” Id.

Defendant includes a block quote from an E.D. Louisiana case articulating (based on 

Wright & Miller) what may constitute “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous 

matter” under Rule 12(f). See Motion at 5 (quoting, without reporter or pinpoint cite, SEC v. 

Blackburn, No. 15-2451, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127562, at *6-7 (E.D. La. Sep. 23, 2015)). 

Defendant’s block quote omits the last sentence of the Louisiana court’s paragraph noting that: 

“Any doubt about whether the challenged material is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.” Blackburn, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 127562, at *7 (citing 5C FED. PRAC. & PROC. (“Wright and Miller”) § 1382 (3d ed. Supp. 

2015)).

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 9 of 14 PageID #: 245
6

V. Argument

A. UTL Properly Plead Pre-Suit Willfulness and Indirect Infringement.

UTL sent SMI multiple notices prior to filing suit. See supra Section III. These notices

identified the Asserted Patents as being infringed by exemplary SMI products and included claim 

charts demonstrating how the identified products infringe the Asserted Patents. Id. UTL pleaded

the same. See Complaint at ¶ 35; see also ¶¶ 62, 84, 105, 126 (pleading willfulness for 

continuing infringing conduct despite knowledge of each patent) and ¶¶ 61, 83, 104, 125 

(pleading knowledge as part of indirect infringement claims). Nothing more is required at this 

stage to maintain UTL’s willfulness or indirect infringement claims.

SMI does not dispute that UTL sent a letter, that the letter identified the Asserted Patents 

as being infringed, or that the letter included claim charts for the Asserted Patents. See Motion at 

3. Instead, SMI argues that “UTL’s Complaint lacks factual allegations showing that SMI knew 

of UTL’s patents prior to UTL’s commencement of litigation.” Motion at 1. But that is not true. 

UTL’s Complaint includes the requisite allegations. See Complaint at ¶ 35. SMI also asserts that 

“the letter [from UTL] was not received at SMI offices in Taiwan until June 2, 2023, the day 

UTL filed its Complaint.” Motion at 3. But, that is not true either. As explained above, SMI 

received the letter the day before UTL filed its Complaint. See supra Section III.

SMI’s Motion does not argue that it received notice after suit was filed. Instead, SMI 

argues that “SMI was made aware of the Asserted Patents contemporaneously with this suit, and 

not before,” and “SMI’s knowledge of the Asserted Patents began on the same date as this 

action.” Motion at 6. Given that SMI received the notice letter before UTL filed suit, SMI’s

allegations amount to, at most, factual disputes that must be resolved in UTL’s favor. See 

Thompson, 764 F.3d at 502.

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 10 of 14 PageID #: 246
7

The timing of SMI’s awareness of the Asserted Patents is particularly inappropriate for 

resolution on a motion to dismiss. The facts are what they are, and they and will be developed 

through discovery.5 SMI’s infringement (direct and indirect), its willfulness, and the precise 

timing of its infringement and willfulness should be addressed in the normal course of this case. 

SMI’s request to dismiss pre-suit willfulness and indirect infringement at the pleadings stage is 

inappropriate on these facts. For at least these reasons, SMI motion to dismiss UTL’s pre-suit 

willfulness and indirect infringement claims under Rule 12(b)(6) should be denied.

B. UTL’s Pleading of the Supreme Court’s Description of Conduct Warranting 

Enhanced Damages Should Not Be Stricken.

UTL’s Complaint includes one paragraph for each Asserted Patent providing SMI with 

notice that UTL contends enhanced damages under Section 284 are warranted in this case. See 

Complaint at ¶¶ 62, 84, 105, and 126. Each such paragraph provides:

On information and belief, despite having knowledge of the [asserted] Patent and 

knowledge that it is directly and/or indirectly infringing one or more claims of the 

[asserted] Patent, SMI has nevertheless continued its infringing conduct and 

disregarded an objectively high likelihood of infringement. SMI’s infringing 

activities relative to the [asserted] Patent have been, and continue to be, willful, 

wanton, malicious, in bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, 

characteristic of a pirate, and an egregious case of misconduct beyond typical 

infringement such that UTL is entitled to enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 

284 up to three times the amount found or assessed. 

Id. SMI asks the Court to strike the portion asserting that SMI’s infringing activities have been 

“wanton, malicious, in bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, characteristic of a 

pirate, and an egregious case of misconduct beyond typical infringement.” Motion at 1, 6-7.

5 For example, UTL believes that SMI received notice of the Asserted Patents in connection with 

discovery requests in Unification Technologies LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., 6:20-cv-500 (W.D. 

Tex. 2020) that caused or should have caused it to investigate the Asserted Patents. See Dkt. 97, 

Unification Technologies LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc (W.D. Tex.) (Case No. 6:20-cv-500).

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 11 of 14 PageID #: 247
8

SMI acknowledges that the disputed language “alludes to behavior that might warrant 

enhanced damages” from the Supreme Court’s decision in Halo. Motion at 7 n.2. In fact, UTL’s 

pleadings do not allude to, but quote, the Supreme Court’s description of “[t]he sort of conduct 

warranting enhanced damages.” Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S. 93, 103 (2016). 

UTL properly plead this language from the Supreme Court to put SMI on notice of its 

contentions regarding enhanced damages in this case. SMI fails to show that this language 

should be stricken.

UTL’s pleading the Supreme Court’s description of conduct warranting enhanced 

damages is not redundant or immaterial. SMI acknowledges that “‘[r]edundant’ matter consists 

of allegations that constitute ‘a needless repetition of other averments in the pleading’” and 

“‘[i]mmaterial’ matter is that which ‘has no essential or important relationship to the claim for 

relief or the defenses being pleaded.’” Motion at 5 (quoting Blackburn, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

127562, at *6). The disputed language is not redundant to invoking Section 284 as it includes the 

Supreme Court’s explication of the conduct justifying enhanced damages under that section. See 

Halo, 579 U.S. at 103-04. The language is also distinct from merely invoking willfulness. Nor is 

the language immaterial as pleading a request for enhanced damages bears a direct and important 

relationship to UTL’s claims—i.e., that it contends enhanced damages are warranted. 

SMI does not argue the disputed language is impertinent, nor does SMI meet the standard 

for striking “scandalous” material that it articulates. See Motion at 5 (quoting Blackburn, 2015 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127562, at *6) and Motion at 8-9. Reciting the Supreme Court’s standard for 

enhanced damages can neither “improperly cast[] a derogatory light on someone” nor “state[]

anything in repulsive language that detracts from the dignity of the court.” See Blackburn, 2015 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127562, at *6-7 (emphasis added). That this pleading offends SMI’s 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 12 of 14 PageID #: 248
9

sensibilities is likewise not justification for striking it as “scandalous” under Rule 12(f). See 

United States v. Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 380 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing In re Gitto Global Corp., 422 

F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that a pleading is not “scandalous” under Rule 12(f) merely 

because “the matter offends the sensibilities of the objecting party if the challenged allegations 

describe acts or events that are relevant to the action[;] [a]s a result, courts have permitted 

allegations to remain in the pleadings when they supported and were relevant to a claim for 

punitive damages”)). 

SMI has not shown that the disputed language meets any of the standards for being 

stricken under Rule 12(f). Moreover, a “motion to strike should be granted only when the 

pleading to be stri[c]ken has no possible relation to the controversy.” Brown & Williamson, 201 

F.2d 819, 822 (emphasis added). UTL properly puts SMI on notice that it contends enhanced 

damages are warranted in this case in accordance with the Supreme Court’s description of the 

type of conduct that would justify such enhanced damages. SMI is not prejudiced by receiving 

such notice. Cf. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. 2:21-CV00213-JRG, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101114, at *14 (E.D. Tex. June 6, 2022) (“the Court finds 

that IP Bridge is not prejudiced by receiving notice of Nokia’s contentions that Defendants have 

not willfully infringed, that IP Bridge’s damages are limited by statute, or that FRAND rates may 

apply to the Asserted Patents.”). If SMI disagrees with the characterizations of its infringing 

conduct, the appropriate course would seem to be denying these allegations in its Answer and 

endeavoring to prove its case rather than striking the disputed language from UTL’s Complaint. 

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, UTL respectfully requests that the Court deny Silicon Motion, 

Inc.’s Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Pre-Suit Willfulness and Indirect Infringement 

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 13 of 14 PageID #: 249
10 

Claims and Strike Certain Allegations and grant any further relief the Court deems just and 

appropriate. 

Dated: September 6, 2023 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David T. DeZern

Edward R. Nelson III

State Bar No. 00797142 

Robert A. Delafield II

State Bar No. 24065137 

Nelson Bumgardner Conroy PC

3131 West 7th Street, Suite 300 

Fort Worth, Texas 76107 

Tel: (817) 377-9111 

ed@nelbum.com 

 bobby@nelbum.com 

Jonathan H. Rastegar 

State Bar No. 24064043 

David T. DeZern

State Bar No. 24059677 

Nelson Bumgardner Conroy PC

2727 N. Harwood St., Suite 250 

Dallas, TX 75201 

Tel: (817) 377-9111 

jon@nelbum.com 

david@nelbum.com 

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Unification Technologies LLC 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that all counsel of record who have consented to electronic service are 

being served with a copy of this document via the Court’s CM/ECF system on September 6, 2023. 

 /s/ David T. DeZern

Case 2:23-cv-00266-JRG-RSP Document 23 Filed 09/06/23 Page 14 of 14 PageID #: 250