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[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1838 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  2d Session

                               H. R. 1838

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan, and for other 
                               purposes.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
106th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 1838

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Security Enhancement Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Congress finds the following:
            (1) Since 1949, the close relationship between the United 
        States and Taiwan has been of enormous benefit to both 
        societies.
            (2) In recent years, Taiwan has undergone a major political 
        transformation, and Taiwan is today a true multiparty democracy 
        with a political system separate from and totally unlike that 
        of the People's Republic of China.
            (3) The economy of Taiwan is based upon free market 
        principles and is separate and distinct from the People's 
        Republic of China.
            (4) Although on January 1, 1979, the United States 
        Government withdrew diplomatic recognition of the government on 
        Taiwan as the legitimate government of China, neither at that 
        time nor since has the United States Government adopted a 
        formal position as to the ultimate status of Taiwan other than 
        to state that status must be decided by peaceful means. Any 
        determination of the ultimate status of Taiwan must have the 
        express consent of the people on Taiwan.
            (5) The People's Republic of China refuses to renounce the 
        use of force against democratic Taiwan.
            (6) The Taiwan Relations Act has been instrumental in 
        maintaining peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait 
        and the Western Pacific since its enactment in 1979.
            (7) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) states 
        that--
                    (A) peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area 
                are in the political, security, and economic interests 
                of the United States and are of international concern;
                    (B) the decision of the United States to establish 
                diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of 
                China rests upon the expectation that the future of 
                Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
                    (C) the United States would consider any effort to 
                determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful 
                means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the 
                peace and security of the Western Pacific region and of 
                grave concern to the United States;
                    (D) the United States will maintain the capacity to 
                resist any form of coercion that jeopardizes the 
                security, or the social or economic system, of the 
                people of Taiwan; and
                    (E) the preservation and enhancement of the human 
                rights of all people on Taiwan are objectives of the 
                United States.
            (8) The Taiwan Relations Act establishes on the part of the 
        United States a continuing connection with and concern for 
        Taiwan and its people. Continued adherence to the Act will help 
        Taiwan to maintain its democracy free of coercion and to 
        safeguard its people from the use of force against them. 
        Furthermore, the maintenance by Taiwan of forces adequate for 
        its defense is in the interest of the United States in that it 
        helps to maintain peace in the Western Pacific region.
            (9) The military modernization and weapons procurement 
        efforts by the People's Republic of China, as documented in the 
        February 1, 1999, report by the Secretary of Defense on ``The 
        Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait'', could threaten 
        cross-Strait stability and United States interests in the Asia-
        Pacific region.
            (10) The Taiwan Relations Act provides explicit guarantees 
        that the United States will make available defense articles and 
        services necessary in such quantity as may be necessary to 
        enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
            (11) The Taiwan Relations Act requires timely reviews by 
        United States military authorities of Taiwan's defense needs in 
        connection with recommendations to the President and the 
        Congress.
            (12) Congress and the President are committed by the Taiwan 
        Relations Act to determine the nature and quantity of Taiwan's 
        legitimate self-defense needs.
            (13) It is the policy of the United States to reject any 
        attempt to curb the provision by the United States of defense 
        articles and services legitimately needed for Taiwan's self-
        defense.
            (14) In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the 
        United States has, since 1979, sold defensive weapons to 
        Taiwan, and such sales have helped Taiwan maintain its autonomy 
        and freedom. The Congress supports the continued provision of 
        additional defense articles and defense services in accordance 
        with the Taiwan Relations Act.
            (15) It is in the national interest of the United States to 
        eliminate ambiguity and convey with clarity continued United 
        States support for Taiwan, its people, and their ability to 
        maintain their democracy free from coercion and their society 
        free from the use of force against them. Lack of clarity could 
        lead to unnecessary misunderstandings or confrontations between 
        the United States and the People's Republic of China, with 
        grave consequences for the security of the Western Pacific 
        region.
            (16) A possible consequence of such ambiguity and lack of 
        clarity was the People's Republic of China's decision to 
        conduct military exercises and live fire missile tests in the 
        Taiwan Strait in March 1996, necessitating House Concurrent 
        Resolution 148, approved by the House of Representatives by a 
        vote of 369-14 on March 19, 1996, and by the Senate by a vote 
        of 97-0 on March 21, 1996, which stated that ``the United 
        States, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act and the 
        constitutional process of the United States, and consistent 
        with its friendship with and commitment to the democratic 
        government and people of Taiwan, should assist in defending 
        them against invasion, missile attack, or blockade by the 
        People's Republic of China.''. Immediately following 
        Congressional passage of House Concurrent Resolution 148, the 
        United States deployed on an emergency basis two aircraft 
        carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait, after which the 
        People's Republic of China ceased further planned military 
        exercises.
            (17) An earlier consequence of such ambiguity and lack of 
        clarity was the expressed surprise by the People's Republic of 
        China that Congress and the American people fully supported 
        President Lee Teng-hui's private visit to his alma mater, 
        Cornell University, necessitating House Concurrent Resolution 
        53, approved by the House of Representatives by a vote of 390-0 
        on May 2, 1995, and by the Senate by a vote of 97-1 on May 9, 
        1995, which stated such support explicitly.

SEC. 3. TRAINING OF MILITARY OFFICERS AND SALE OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND 
              SERVICES TO TAIWAN.

    (a) Training of Taiwan Military Officers.--The Secretary of Defense 
and the Secretaries of the military departments shall make every effort 
to reserve additional positions for Taiwan military officers at the 
National Defense University and other professional military education 
schools specified in section 2162(d) of title 10, United States Code, 
and for prospective Taiwan military officers at the United States 
Military Academy, the United States Naval Academy, and the Air Force 
Academy.
    (b) Foreign Military Sales.--The Secretary of State shall, when 
considering foreign military sales to Taiwan--
            (1) take into account the special status of Taiwan, 
        including the defense needs of Taiwan in response to the 
        military modernization and weapons procurement efforts by the 
        People's Republic of China; and
            (2) make every effort to ensure that Taiwan has full and 
        timely access to price and availability data for defense 
        articles and defense services.

SEC. 4. DETERMINATIONS OF DEFENSE NEEDS OF TAIWAN.

    (a) Increase in Technical Staff of the American Institute in 
Taiwan.--Upon the request of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 
the President shall use funds available to the Department of Defense 
under the Arms Export Control Act for the employment of additional 
technical staff at the American Institute in Taiwan.
    (b) Annual Reports.--Beginning 60 days after the next round of arms 
talks between the United States and Taiwan, and annually thereafter, 
the President shall submit a report to Congress, in classified and 
unclassified form--
            (1) detailing each of Taiwan's requests for purchase of 
        defense articles and defense services during the one-year 
        period ending on the date of the report;
            (2) describing the defense needs asserted by Taiwan as 
        justification for those requests; and
            (3) describing the decision-making process used to reject, 
        postpone, or modify any such request.

SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.

    (a) Maintenance of Sufficient Self-Defense Capabilities of 
Taiwan.--Congress finds that any determination of the nature or 
quantity of defense articles or defense services to be made available 
to Taiwan that is made on any basis other than section 3(b) of the 
Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(b)), whether such alternative 
basis is the August 17, 1982, communique signed with the People's 
Republic of China, or any similar executive agreement, order, or 
policy, would violate the intent of Congress in the enactment of such 
Act.
    (b) Combined Training and Personnel Exchange Programs.--Not later 
than 210 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
Defense shall implement a plan for the enhancement of programs and 
arrangements for operational training and exchanges of senior officers 
between the Armed Forces of the United States and the armed forces of 
Taiwan for work in threat analysis, doctrine, force planning, 
operational methods, and other areas. At least 30 days prior to such 
implementation, the Secretary of Defense shall submit the plan to 
Congress, in classified and unclassified form.
    (c) Report Regarding Maintenance of Sufficient Self-Defense 
Capabilities.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall 
submit to the Congress, in classified and unclassified form, an annual 
report on the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. Such report 
shall include an analysis of the military forces facing Taiwan from the 
People's Republic of China, evaluating recent additions to the 
offensive military capability of the People's Republic of China. The 
report shall include, but not be limited to, an analysis of the surface 
and subsurface naval threats, the ballistic missile threat, the air 
threat, and the threat to the military and civilian communications 
links in Taiwan. The report shall include a review of the steps taken 
by the armed forces of Taiwan to address its security situation.
    (d) Communications Between United States and Taiwan Military 
Commands.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall certify to the Committee on 
International Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that direct secure 
communications exist between the armed forces of the United States and 
the armed forces of Taiwan.
    (e) Relation to Arms Export Control Act.--Nothing in this section 
supersedes or modifies the application of section 36 of the Arms Export 
Control Act to the sale of any defense article or defense service under 
this section.

SEC. 6. REPORT REGARDING THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO RESPOND IN 
              ASIA-PACIFIC CONTINGENCIES THAT INCLUDE TAIWAN.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and updated as appropriate, the Secretary of 
Defense shall prepare and submit to the chairmen and ranking minority 
members of the Committee on International Relations and the Committee 
on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a 
report in classified and unclassified form on the ability of the United 
States to successfully respond to a major contingency in the Asia-
Pacific region where United States interests on Taiwan are at risk.
    (b) Contents.--The report described in subsection (a) shall 
include--
            (1) a description of planning on the national, operational, 
        and tactical levels to respond to, prosecute, and achieve 
        United States strategic objectives with respect to a major 
        contingency described in subsection (a); and
            (2) a description of the confidence level of the Secretary 
        of Defense in United States military capabilities to 
        successfully respond to such a contingency.
    (c) Preparation of Report.--In preparing the report under 
subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall use the resources and 
expertise of the relevant unified commands, military departments, the 
combat support agencies, and the defense components of the intelligence 
community, as required, and other such entities within the Department 
of Defense as the Secretary considers necessary.

            Passed the House of Representatives February 1, 2000.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
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