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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

TYLER DIVISION 

ASHLEY HAMBY, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

JAMES WILSON, et al., 

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 6:23-cv-249-JDK 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

Before the Court is Defendant J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.’s motion to dismiss 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Docket No. 35.1 For the reasons 

explained below, the Court GRANTS the motion. 

I.

For purposes of this order, the Court accepts as true Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded 

facts in their Second Amended Complaint. Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, M.A., 781 

F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986).

This case arises from a December 11, 2021 tractor-trailer accident in Panola 

County, Texas. Defendant James Wilson was driving a tractor-trailer as an employee 

1 Defendant J.B. Hunt filed its motion as a standalone four-page docket entry (Docket No. 35). It then 

filed a separate seven-page brief supporting its argument to dismiss Plaintiffs’ direct negligence 

claims (Docket No. 36) and yet another twelve-page brief supporting its argument to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ negligent broker claims (Docket No. 37). The Court reminds the parties that Local Rule 

CV-7(c) requires that a motion and any briefing be contained in a single document. Further, Local

Rule CV-7(a)(2) limits non-case-dispositive motions to fifteen total pages. As per the Court’s Order

Governing Proceedings (Docket No. 10), counsel are instructed to review the most recent versions of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Texas.

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of Defendants Euro Express, LLC and Damir Arnaut. Docket No. 28 ¶¶ 14–17. 

Wilson rear-ended a passenger truck, resulting in the vehicle’s complete destruction 

and the deaths of driver Kaleb Hamby and passenger Gabriel Webb. Id. ¶ 30. 

Defendant J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. was either retained as the motor carrier to 

transport the load Wilson was hauling during the collision, id. ¶ 61, or, alternatively, 

it brokered the load involved, id. ¶ 67. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Great 

Hauler, Inc. brokered the load being hauled during the accident. Id. ¶ 72. 

Plaintiffs bring negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence causes of 

action against Defendants James Wilson, Euro Express, and Damir Arnaut; 

negligence and gross negligence causes of action against Defendant J.B. Hunt; and a 

negligence cause of action against Defendant Great Hauler. Id. at 5–13. 

Defendant J.B. Hunt now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ gross negligence, 

negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent training, and 

negligent supervision claims because Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint fails 

to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. J.B. Hunt also 

moves to dismiss the claims of negligent brokering, selection, and monitoring of a 

motor carrier as preempted by the Federal Aviation Authorization Administration 

Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 14501, et seq. (the “FAAAA”).

II.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a complaint to include “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim 

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will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is 

not akin to a ‘probability requirement’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility 

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

A complaint that fails to state a claim may be dismissed under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are “viewed with 

disfavor and are rarely granted.” Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 

(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 

(5th Cir. 2005)). A claim cannot be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless the plaintiff 

“would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible theory that [it] 

could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Muhammad v. Dallas 

Cty. Cmty. Supervision & Corrs. Dep’t, 479 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Jones 

v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept “all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as 

true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Raj v. La. State 

Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 330 (5th Cir. 2013). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

III.

The Court first addresses J.B. Hunt’s argument that the Second 

Amended Complaint fails to plead facts sufficient to support the gross negligence, 

negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent training, and 

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negligent supervision claims against J.B. Hunt. Docket No. 36. In their 

response, Plaintiffs essentially agree and concede that their direct negligence 

claims against J.B. Hunt are deficient. Docket No. 43 at 11. Accordingly, the Court 

grants the motion to dismiss these claims against J.B. Hunt. 

Plaintiffs, however, also seek leave to amend their complaint to cure the 

identified deficiencies. Id. at 11–12. The deadline to move for leave to amend 

pleadings was December 8, 2023. Docket No. 16 at 4. Plaintiffs asked to amend their 

complaint on February 13, 2024. Docket No. 43. Defendant J.B. Hunt did not 

respond to this request. 

When a party seeks to amend its pleadings after the deadline in the 

Court’s scheduling order, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) governs. Fahim v. 

Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2008). Rule 16(b)(4) 

allows that a “schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the 

judge’s consent.” In determining whether a party has shown good cause, the Court 

considers four factors: “(1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for 

leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential prejudice in 

allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such 

prejudice.” Fahim, 551 F.3d at 348 (quoting S&W Enters., LLC v. Southtrust Bank 

of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003)). The Court considers the four 

factors “holistically” instead of “mechanically count[ing] the number of factors 

that favor each side.” E.E.O.C. v. Serv. Temps, Inc., 2009 WL 3294863, at *3 

(N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2009). 

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Once the moving party demonstrates good cause under Rule 16(b), the Court 

considers the motion for leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), which provides that 

courts “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Whether to 

grant leave to amend pleadings under Rule 15 is “within the discretion” of the district 

court. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971). 

Plaintiffs seek leave to amend only under Rule 15(a)(2) and do not address 

Rule 16(b). Docket No. 42 at 12–13. Further, Plaintiffs have not attached a proposed 

amended complaint, as Local Rule CV-7(k) requires for a motion for leave to amend 

a complaint. Further, Defendants did not respond to this request, so the Court 

is unclear on Defendants’ position on the matter. Accordingly, the Court denies 

Plaintiffs’ request without prejudice. Plaintiffs may seek leave to amend their 

complaint through an appropriate motion fully addressing the governing factors 

under Rules 16(b) and 15(a)(2) and providing a copy of their proposed amended 

complaint. 

IV.

Defendant J.B. Hunt also seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims of negligent

brokering, including negligent selection of a motor carrier and negligent monitoring 

of a motor carrier, as preempted by the FAAAA. Docket No. 37. The FAAAA’s 

preemption clause provides that a state:

may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the 

force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor 

carrier . . . or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with 

respect to the transportation of property. 

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). 

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J.B. Hunt argues that the preemption clause should be broadly construed to

bar Plaintiff’s negligent brokering claims because these common-law claims are 

“related” to the “service” of brokering “the transportation of property.” Docket No. 37 

at 4–9. J.B. Hunt further argues that § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s “safety exception” does not 

save a negligent brokering claim from preemption. This provision of the FAAAA 

carves out an exception to the preemption clause, explaining that preemption “shall 

not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor 

vehicles.” J.B. Hunt contends that a negligent brokering claim is not an exercise of 

the state’s safety and regulatory authority and is not “with respect to motor 

vehicles,” as the exception requires. Id. at 10–12. 

Plaintiffs oppose dismissal for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs’ Second 

Amended Complaint leaves open whether J.B. Hunt was the broker or the motor 

carrier for the load involved in the accident. Docket No. 43 at 4–5. And, Plaintiffs 

note, J.B. Hunt’s preemption argument applies only to a broker, not a motor 

carrier. This fact question, Plaintiff asserts, renders dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) 

inappropriate. Id. at 4. Second, even if J.B. Hunt acted as the broker, Plaintiffs

contend that their negligence claim is exempt from preemption under the safety 

exception. Id. at 5–11. 

The Fifth Circuit has not addressed FAAAA preemption of state law tort 

claims. But other courts have generally taken three different approaches to 

the question. See Bertram v. Progressive Se. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 2955740, at *2 

(W.D. La. July 14, 2021). 

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First, some courts have found that § 14501’s express preemption language does 

not apply to state tort claims because negligent hiring or brokering claims are not 

sufficiently “related to” the “price, route, or service” of a broker. E.g., Meek v. Toor, 

2024 WL 943931, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2024) (“The Court is not convinced by the 

rationale that hiring and oversight of transportation companies is so central to the 

services of freight brokers that negligent hiring claims would significantly impact the 

services of a freight broker.”); Scott v. Milosevic, 372 F. Supp. 3d 758, 769 (N.D. Iowa 

2019) (holding that “the FAAAA does not preempt personal injury claims” against a 

broker); Mann v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 2017 WL 3191516, at *7 (W.D. Va. 

July 27, 2017) (explaining that “a negligent hiring claim as an avenue for imposing 

liability for an accident does not have anything more than a ‘tenuous, remote, or 

peripheral’ connection to the ‘price, route, or service’ of a broker”). 

Second, some courts have found that although § 14501’s express preemption 

language does apply to state tort claims, such claims are saved from preemption by 

the safety regulatory exception. E.g., Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 

F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020); Lopez v. Amazon Logistics, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 3d 505,

512–16 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (“The Court thus finds Plaintiffs’ negligent-hiring claim falls 

within the scope of the safety regulation exception.”); Johnson v. Herbert, 2023 WL 

9503459, at *6–7 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2023) (“[T]he Court holds that the exception 

under Section 14501(c)(2)(A) applies to Johnson’s negligent hiring claim and thus 

that the FAAAA does not preempt her cause of action.”). 

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Third, some courts have determined that § 14501’s express preemption applies 

to state tort claims and that the safety exception does not save them from preemption. 

Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., 74 F.4th 453, 464 (7th Cir. 2023) (“We thus conclude 

that Ye’s negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz does not fall within the scope of 

§ 14501(c)(2)’s safety exception. The claim is preempted and therefore properly

dismissed by the district court.”); Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 

F.4th 1261, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Aspen’s negligence claims are not ‘with respect to

motor vehicles’ under the FAAAA’s safety exception. They are thus barred by its 

express preemption provision.”); Gillum v. High Standard, LLC, 2020 WL 444371, 

at *5–6, 7 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2020). 

As explained below, the Court finds the reasoning of this third group most 

persuasive because they most clearly honor the statutory text. The Court thus 

concludes that § 14501’s express language preempts a negligent brokering claim and 

that the safety exception does not save the claim from preemption. 

A.

The Court first considers whether a negligent brokering claim falls within the 

FAAAA’s express preemption provision. 

Congress can indicate its preemptive intent either expressly, through a 

statute’s plain language, or impliedly, through its “structure and purpose.” Union 

Pac. R.R. Co. v. City of Palestine, 41 F.4th 696, 704 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Altria 

Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008)). When a statute includes an express 

preemption clause—as here—“the court does not indulge ‘any presumption against 

preemption but instead focus[es] on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily 

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contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.’” Young Conservatives of 

Tex. Found. v. Smatresk, 73 F.4th 304, 311 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Puerto Rico v. 

Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 579 U.S. 115, 125 (2016)). 

As noted above, the FAAAA’s preemption clause prohibits a state from 

enacting or enforcing “a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and 

effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with 

respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). 

The first question is thus whether a common law negligence claim is “a law, 

regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law.” It is. Because “a

common-law rule clearly has ‘the force and effect of law,’” such rules “fall comfortably 

within the language” of preemption provisions like the FAAAA’s. Northwest, Inc. v. 

Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 281–82 (2014); see also Ye, 74 F.4th at 459; Aspen Am. Ins., 

65 F.4th at 1266; Lopez, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 512. 

The second question is whether a negligent brokering claim is “related to a 

price, route, or service” of a broker. “[T]he key phrase ‘related to’ expresses a ‘broad 

pre-emptive purpose.’” Northwest, 572 U.S. at 280 (considering preemption under 

the Airline Deregulation Act); see also Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 

251, 260 (2013) (interpreting the FAAAA’s preemption clause). But “‘related to’ does 

not mean the sky is the limit.” Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 U.S. at 261. And 

§ 14501(c)(1) “does not preempt state laws affecting carrier prices, routes, and

services in only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral . . . manner.” Id. (quoting Rowe v. 

N.H. Motor Transport A’ssn, 552 U.S. 364, 371 (2008)) (internal quotations omitted). 

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Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations supporting their negligent brokering claim go 

directly to the services of a broker. A broker’s service is “selling, providing, or 

arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. 

§ 13102(2) (defining “broker”). In other words, selecting a motor carrier to transport

a load is the essential service of the broker. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint 

alleges that J.B. Hunt “had a duty to select a competent motor carrier” and “had an 

ongoing duty to monitor Euro Express to ensure it was a competent motor carrier” to 

transport the load involved in the accident leading to this case. Docket No. 28 

¶¶ 69, 70. And Plaintiffs’ negligent brokering claim stems from J.B. Hunt’s alleged 

breach of that duty. Id. ¶ 71. Thus, the negligent brokering claim is fundamentally 

“related to” the broker’s service of selecting a competent motor carrier. Ye, 74 F.4th 

at 459; Aspen Am. Ins., 65 F.4th at 1267–68; Miller, 976 F.3d at 1024–25; Gillum, 

2020 WL 444371, at *4 (finding that Texas negligence claims against a freight broker 

“relate to” the broker’s services). 

Because Plaintiffs’ negligent brokering claim is “a law, regulation, or other 

provision having the force and effect of law” that is “related to a price, route, or 

service” of a broker, the plain language of the FAAAA expressly preempts Plaintiffs’ 

claim here unless it falls within one of the statute’s exceptions. 

B.

Plaintiffs argue that their negligent brokering claim is not preempted due to 

the safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A). Docket No. 43 at 5–11. The Court disagrees. 

See, e.g., Ye, 74 F.4th at 460–65; Aspen Am. Ins., 65 F.4th at 1268–72. 

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Under § 14501(c)(2)(A), the FAAAA’s preemption clause “shall not restrict the 

safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” To meet this 

exception, a common law negligence claim must be (1) within a state’s “safety 

regulatory authority” and (2) “with respect to motor vehicles.” Because the Court 

concludes that a negligent brokering claim is not “with respect to motor vehicles,” it 

need not consider the first half of the exception. See Aspen Am. Ins., 65 F.4th at 1273 

(Jordan, J., concurring). 

“By limiting the safety exception to apply to state laws ‘with respect to motor 

vehicles,’ Congress narrowed the scope of the exception to those laws concerning a 

‘vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer . . . used on a highway in 

transportation.’” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(16) (defining “motor vehicle”). Ye, 74 F.4th 

at 460. This narrow exception requires a direct link between the state law in question 

and motor vehicle safety. Id.; Aspen Am. Ins., 65 F.4th at 1271. And there is no direct 

link between Plaintiffs’ negligent brokering claim and motor vehicle safety. 

In its thorough analysis of the statute, the Ye court found a clear delineation 

between brokers and motor vehicle safety. Id. at 460–64. For example, after 

implementing the broad preemptive provision of § 14501(c)(1), Congress carved out 

specific exceptions for state laws for motor vehicle safety, cargo loads, motor carrier 

insurance, transportation of household goods, and two truck operations. Id. at 461 

(citing § 14501(c)(2)). But despite specifically mentioning brokers in § 14501(c)(1), 

Congress conspicuously failed to mention brokers in any of the preemption 

exceptions. The Ye court also points out that while § 14501(b)(1) preempts state laws 

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“relating to intrastate rates, intrastate routes, or intrastate services of any freight 

forwarder or broker,” Congress omitted a safety exception for brokers in § 14501(b) 

paralleling that of § 14501(c)(2). Id.; see also Aspen Am. Ins., 65 F.4th at 1271–72 

(similarly holding that the safety exception applies only to state laws that have a 

direct relationship to motor vehicles based on the Supreme Court’s finding that a 

similar phrase in § 14501(c)(1) “massively limits” the scope of preemption and 

because allowing an indirect relationship would render portions of § 14501(c)(2)(A) 

non-operative or redundant). 

The Court thus concludes that the safety exception excepts from preemption 

only state laws or regulations that have a direct relationship to motor vehicle safety. 

And a negligent hiring or brokering claim is not directly related to motor vehicle 

safety. Indeed, in their negligent brokering claim, Plaintiffs allege that J.B. Hunt 

breached its duty by failing to select a competent motor carrier. Docket 

No. 28 ¶¶ 67–71. But this section of the complaint “does not purport to enforce any 

standard or regulation on the ownership, maintenance, or operation of” a motor 

vehicle as defined by 49 U.S.C. § 13102(16). See Aspen Am. Ins., 65 F.4th at 1272. 

And the “attenuated connection” between the broker and the safety of the motor 

vehicles operated by the motor carrier “is simply too remote for the safety exception” 

to apply to a negligent brokering claim. Miller, 976 F.3d at 1031 (Fernandez, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

C.

As mentioned, Plaintiffs argue that the complaint leaves open whether J.B. 

Hunt was the broker or motor carrier for the load at issue, and that the Court should 

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therefore deny J.B. Hunt’s motion to dismiss the negligent brokering claim at this 

stage of the case. See Docket No. 43 at 4–5. The Court disagrees. If J.B. Hunt was 

the broker, then the claim should be dismissed as preempted, as discussed above. If, 

on the other hand, J.B. Hunt was the motor carrier, then the claim should be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim. Either way, dismissal of the negligent brokering 

claim is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6). 

V.

For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS Defendant J.B. Hunt’s 

motion to dismiss (Docket No. 35) Plaintiffs’ gross negligence, negligent entrustment, 

negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent training, and negligent supervision 

claims against J.B. Hunt. Plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint as to these 

claims is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiffs may seek leave to amend their 

complaint through an appropriate motion. 

Further, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ negligent brokering claim is 

preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) and is not excepted from preemption by the 

safety exception clause of § 14501(c)(2)(A). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Defendant J.B. Hunt’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 35) Plaintiffs’ negligent 

brokering claim. 

So ORDERED and SIGNED this day of

___________________________________

JEREMY D. KERNODLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21st May, 2024.

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