IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MARSHALL DIVISION

HEADWATER RESEARCH LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD and 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 2:23-CV-00103-JRG-RSP 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

SAMSUNG’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO STRIKE 

EXPERT REPORTS OF MR. ERIK DE LA IGLESIA (DKT. NO. 185) 

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EXHIBIT INDEX AND NOTES 

Exhibit Description 

11 Excerpts of Deposition Transcript of Seungho Song, taken September 27, 2024 

12 SAM-HW-2_00361078, Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (Android) 

* Emphasis added unless otherwise noted. 

Abbreviations/Definitions 

 Mr. DLI: Erik de la Iglesia 

 FCM: Firebase Cloud Messaging 

 FAC: First Amendment Complaint (Dkt. 31) 

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I. THE NEW THEORY THAT GOOGLE’S FCM SERVER INFRINGES THE ’192 

PATENT SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS UNTIMELY DISCLOSED 

Headwater admits it never responded to Samsung’s direct inquiry asking whether 

Headwater accused FCM of infringing the ’192 patent. Dkt. 185-6 (email between counsel); Dkt. 

207 (Opp.) at 1-5. This nonresponse belies its current argument that throughout this case it has 

clearly and continually accused FCM servers of infringing the ’192 patent. 

Headwater’s discussion of the motion to dismiss the FAC (Dkt. 207 at 1-3) is inapposite. 

The issues now are Headwater’s disclosures in its operative infringement contentions (not the FAC 

charts) and what servers Headwater identified as infringing the ’192 patent in those contentions. 

Moreover, Headwater’s characterization of the contentions’ cover pleading is misleading. In its 

opposition, Headwater contends it disclosed that Google’s FCM service comprise “servers” that 

are “leased, owned, supported and/or operated by Samsung.” Dkt. 207 at 3. Rather, Headwater 

actually disclosed that it accused “Samsung products which implement Samsung Knox, Tizen, 

and/or push messaging functionality (e.g., communicating with Google’s Firebase Cloud 

Messaging service...) of infringing each of the Asserted Claims of the ’192 patent: Servers leased, 

owned, supported, and/or operated by Samsung.....” Dkt. 185-3 at 8-11. Samsung does not lease, 

own, support, or operate Google FCM servers. Headwater’s contentions do not suggest it was 

accusing Google FCM servers. And again, Headwater could have readily eliminated any 

ambiguity by responding to Samsung’s direct inquiry whether it accused FCM servers of infringing 

the ’192 patent. Dkt. 185-6. Headwater never responded. 

II. THE NEW THEORIES OF A HEARTBEAT BEING THE “TRANSMISSION 

TRIGGER” OF ’117 PATENT CLAIM 17 AND OF “WEB OTA DOWNLOADS” 

BEING THE INFORMATION REQUIRED BY ’733 PATENT CLAIMS 3, 8, AND 

9 SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS UNTIMELY DISCLOSED 

For claim 17 of the ’117 patent, in its infringement contentions Headwater asserted 

 Dkt. 185-7 at 127-128. Now Mr. de la 

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Iglesia (“Mr. DLI”) asserts that “ .” Dkt. 185-1 ¶ 579. 

The activity of a heartbeat transmission is not a “time period of inactivity.” This new theory is 

untimely. 

’733 patent claims 3, 8, and 9 require “message content” comprising certain types of 

information. Headwater does not deny that its contentions failed to identify “data for a Web OTA 

(Over The Air) download” as being such information. Dkt. 207 at 6; Dkt 185-8 at 78-79 (cl. 3), 

85 (cl. 8), 85-86 (cl. 9). Nor does Headwater identify any disclosure in the claim 8 contentions 

(Dkt. 185-8 at 85) as arguably giving Samsung notice of the current Web OTA theory. Dkt. 207 

at 6 (discussing only claim 3 and 9 contentions). Moreover, Headwater’s argument that the 

contentions identify “push notifications” generally for claims 3 and 9 (id.) is inapposite because 

what matters for those claims is the type of message content within such notifications. 

III. MR. DE LA IGLESIA SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO TESTIFY HOW ’117 

PATENT DEPENDENT CLAIM 6 IS MET BECAUSE HIS REPORT FAILS TO 

ANALYZE THIS ISSUE 

Mr. DLI’s report contains no analysis of how the ’117 patent dependent claim 6 (requiring 

a device messaging agent to execute in a “secure execution environment”) is met. For this claim, 

his report cross-referenced his entire discussion of independent claim 1. Dkt. 185-1 ¶¶ 543-545. 

Counsel’s cherry picking of a single sentence discussing “lower” and “higher” level logic (Dkt. 

207 at 6-7) from the more than 300 paragraphs spanning over 150 pages that Mr. DLI crossreferenced does not salvage his opinion. His report still contains nothing tying counsel’s selected 

sentence to claim 6. Nor does it explain how “lower” and “higher” level logic relate to claim 6’s 

“secure execution environment” limitation. Mr. DLI failed to disclose any analysis of claim 6 and 

he should be precluded from opining on it. 

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IV. MR. DE LA IGLESIA LACKS ANY BASIS TO OPINE ON WHAT CAUSED 

NETWORK CONGESTION ON AT&T’S NETWORK 

Samsung does not challenge Mr. DLI’s ability to discuss what problems the alleged 

inventions purportedly address. Rather, Samsung seeks to preclude him from opining on what 

caused disruption of Cingular/AT&T’s cellular network in the late 2000s. Mr. DLI lacks any basis 

to offer such opinions because he has not analyzed any data from AT&T or anyone else related to 

this issue. Dkt. 185-1 ¶ 50; Dkt. 185-2 ¶ 61. Rather he impermissibly parrots the inventor’s 

causation opinions. 

V. POWER SAVINGS OPINIONS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED BECAUSE THEY DO 

NOT RELATE TO THE ALLEGED INVENTION’S BENEFITS AND ARE NOT 

BASED ON SOUND METHODOLOGY 

Mr. DLI’s power savings opinions (Dkt. 185-1 ¶¶ 1219-1262) should not be presented to 

the jury because they are irrelevant and prejudicial. Headwater contends the alleged invention’s 

purported contribution over the prior art (or non-infringing alternatives) is certain efficiency and 

security improvements to push systems, not the use of a push system instead of a poll-based 

system. Dkt. 186-4 (6/14/24 Raleigh Tr.) at 32:1-5; Dkt. 207 at 8. Nonetheless, Mr. DLI opines 

on the difference in power consumption between push and poll-based systems rather than isolating 

savings attributable to the alleged invention’s purported improvements. Dkt. 185-1 ¶¶ 1219-1262. 

As Mr. DLI’s opinion fails to address a relevant question, it should be excluded. 

Even if his opinion was relevant, it should be excluded because the methodology he used 

is unsound. He arbitrarily combines smartphone power savings data from 2010 with 2022 

smartphone usage patterns. He then applies that combination to all devices at issue: tablets, 

watches, and phones from 2017 to the present. Yet, neither he nor Headwater offer any basis for 

mixing these disparate data sets. Nor do they offer a basis to apply this arbitrarily combined data 

to all accused products. These unreliable power savings opinions should be excluded. 

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VI. OPINIONS ON SAMSUNG “MAKING, OFFERING FOR SALE, AND SELLING” 

THE CLAIMED SYSTEMS AND SERVERS ARE UNRELIABLE BECAUSE 

THEY ARE WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED 

Mr. DLI’s opinions about Samsung “selling” the system claimed by the ’117 patent must 

be struck because he fails to identify factual support that Samsung sells the server component of 

the claimed system. Similarly, he does not identify how any action by Samsung “makes” the entire 

system, as opposed to components thereof. And, despite Headwater’s feigned confusion (Dkt. 207 

at 14), Samsung also seeks to strike Mr. DLI’s opinions on the ’192 patent: “The Court should 

strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s Allegation that Samsung Infringes the ’117 and ’192 Patents by 

“Making,” “Offering,” “Selling”...”. Dkt. 185 at 11. Mr. DLI identifies no evidence to support 

his opinion that Samsung sells its or Google’s servers, as opposed to mobile devices. Nor does he 

offer any factual basis for his opinion that Samsung makes its servers in the U.S. or that Samsung 

makes Google’s servers. Opinions lacking factual support must be struck. 

VII. OPINIONS ABOUT IRRELEVANT GOOGLE-SAMSUNG CONTRACTS 

SHOULD BE EXCLUDED 

Mr. DLI’s opinions that certain Google-Samsung agreements show commercial success of 

the claimed invention (Dkt. 185-2 ¶¶ 737-739; Dkt. 194-01 (Suppl. Rpt.) ¶¶ 20-24) should be 

struck because he offers no nexus between those agreements and the purported invention. The 

 (Ex. 11 at 47:2-17, 85:2-

10), 

(id. at 28:17-25, 49:20-25, 84:12-23), 

 (id. at 49:1-19; 85:14-22); and 

(id.

at 64:1-5, 86:1-11). None relate to the accused push functionality FCM, let alone the alleged 

contribution of the purported invention to FCM. Moreover, the accused push functionality FCM 

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. Dkt. 186-12 at 83:2-24. Without a nexus, opinions 

that these agreements show commercial success are baseless and should be struck. 

 Separately, Mr. DLI opines that “

” Dkt. 185-1 ¶ 1277, see generally id. ¶¶ 1266-1277; Dkt. 185-2 ¶ 739. 

Headwater’s technical expert has no expertise to opine on 

 during the hypothetical negotiation. Tellingly, he ignores 

. See e.g., Ex. 12 § 11. Mr. DLI is simply unqualified to opine on 

Samsung’s contractual obligations to Google. 

 Finally, Mr. DLI relies extensively on the “

. Dkt. 185-1 

¶¶ 1183-1185, 1189, 1193, 1194, 1197, 1202, 1209, 1212, 1214. Injecting these complex 

agreements on an uncontested point is unhelpful to the jury. Moreover, Headwater offers no 

explanation of how the “ ” (Id. ¶¶ 1183-1185, 1212), presumably a 

reference to “ ” (Id. ¶¶ 1194, 1214), as opposed to the 

MADA, are even arguably relevant to analyzing whether Samsung directly infringes the asserted 

patents. Accordingly, opinions on these agreements should be struck. 

VIII. COMMERCIAL SUCCESS OPINIONS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED BECAUSE 

THERE IS NO NEXUS TO THE ALLEGED INVENTION 

Mr. DLI’s cross-reference to Dr. Groehn’s and Mr. Dell’s opinions (Dkt. 185-2 ¶ 736; Dkt. 

207 at 15) does not show the requisite nexus between the alleged invention and the commercial 

success of the accused products for the reasons discussed in Samsung’s motions to strike those 

opinions. Dkt. 181; Dkt. 186. And Mr. DLI offers no basis of his own. 

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Dated: November 12, 2024 Respectfully submitted, 

By: /s/ Katherine D. Prescott 

 Ruffin B. Cordell 

TX Bar No. 04820550 

Michael J. McKeon 

DC Bar No. 459780 

mckeon@fr.com 

Jared Hartzman 

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hartzman@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

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Vivian C. Keller (pro hac vice) 

GA Bar No. 651500 

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FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

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Telephone: (212) 765-5070 

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Melissa R. Smith 

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QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

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Telephone: (415) 875-6600 

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ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed 

electronically in compliance with Local Rule CV-5 on November 12, 2024. As of this date, all 

counsel of record had consented to electronic service and are being served with a copy of this 

document through the Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(a)(3)(A). 

/s/ Katherine D. Prescott 

Katherine D. Prescott 

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