alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEFFINANCIAL OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Kay L. Toolson, CEO ofMonaco Coach Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted pursuant  to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Monaco CoachCorporation on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended April 3, 2004fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in suchQuarterly Report of Monaco Coach Corporation on Form 10-Q fairly presents inall material respects the financial condition and results of  operations of Monaco Coach Corporation.

 

 
|   | By:    | /s/  Kay L. Toolson |   |
|--------|--------|--------------------------|--------|
|   |   | Kay  L. Toolson          |
|   |   | Chief  Executive Officer |

 

I, P. Martin Daley, CFOof Monaco Coach Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant  to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Monaco CoachCorporation on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended April 3, 2004fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in suchQuarterly Report of Monaco Coach Corporation on Form 10-Q fairly presents inall material respects the financial condition and results of  operations of Monaco Coach Corporation.

 

 
|   | By:    | /s/  P. Martin Daley |   |
|--------|--------|---------------------------|--------|
|   |   | P.  Martin Daley          |
|   |   | Chief  Financial Officer  |

 

Asigned original of these written statements required by Section 906 hasbeen provided to Monaco Coach Corporation and will be retained by Monaco CoachCorporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.

 

----
Kenneth E. FAIRLEY, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-1607.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 9, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 11--STATEMENT RE COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                     Three Months Ended    Nine Months Ended
                                                         September 30,         September 30,
                                                     -------------------   -------------------
(IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE AMOUNTS)               1997       1996       1997       1996
------------------------------------------------------------------------   -------------------
<S>                                                  <C>                   <C>                                   
Net income applicable to common shareholders         $  7,906   $  3,137   $ 13,283   $ 11,249
                                                     -------------------   -------------------
                                                     -------------------   -------------------

Average common shares outstanding                      23,256     17,506     19,675     17,495
                                  
Net effect of dilutive stock options                    1,067         --        509         --
                                                     -------------------   -------------------

Average common and common equivalent shares        
  outstanding                                          24,323     17,506     20,184     17,495
                                                     -------------------   -------------------
                                                     -------------------   -------------------

Net income per common and common equivalent
  share                                              $   0.33   $   0.18    $  0.66   $   0.64
                                                     -------------------   -------------------
                                                     -------------------   -------------------  
</TABLE>


There is no significant difference between primary and fully diluted earnings
per share.
Christopher Earl ODEN, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-6255.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 13, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
Lacoya WASHINGTON, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-6313.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 13, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

MONUMENT PEAK VENTURES, LLC,

 Plaintiff,

v.

BLU PRODUCTS, INC., 

 Defendant. 

§

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:23-CV-00169-JRG-RSP

ORDER

Before the Court is the Joint Motion to Stay Scheduling Conference filed by Plaintiff

Monument Peak Ventures, LLC and Defendant BLU Products, Inc. Dkt. No. 12. Having 

considered the motion, it is DENIED. Counsel are directed to appear at the July 20, 2023 

scheduling conference.
This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6
WILLIAM BIRKLEY , 7 Plaintiff-Appellant, 8
v. NO. 30,832 9 JEFFERY NORTHUP , 10 Defendant-Appellee. 11
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY 12 Sam B. Sanchez, District Judge 13 William Birkley 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 Pro se Appellant 16 Baker Law Office, LLC 17 Adam S. Baker 18 Taos, NM 19 for Appellee 20
MEMORANDUM OPINION 21 VIGIL, Judge. 222 Plaintiff appeals pro se from the district court’s September 14, 2010 “order 1 denying motion to vacate and reinstate” (order). (Emphasis omitted.) [RP 64] Our 2 notice proposed to dismiss and Plaintiff filed a timely memorandum in opposition. 3 We are unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments and therefore dismiss. 4 As set forth in our notice, subsequent to entry of the order and prior to the filing 5 of his notice of appeal, [RP 68] Plaintiff filed a September 23, 2010, “request for 6 specific findings of fact and conclusions of law” (request). (Emphasis omitted.) [RP 7 65] We view this request as tantamountto a motion for reconsideration. See 8 generally NMSA 1978, § 39-1-1 (1953). If the district court granted Plaintiff’s 9 requested conclusion that the case be reinstated, [RP 67] then it would be affording 10 Plaintiff relief from its order. Because the district court has not yet ruled on 11 Defendant’s post-judgment motion, we dismiss for lack of a final judgment. See 12 Dickens v. Laurel Healthcare, LLC, 2009-NMCA-122, ¶ 6, 147 N.M. 303, 222 P.3d 13 675 (holding that because resolution of th e post-judgment motion could alter, amend, 14 or moot the order that is challenged, the order is not final and the appeal is premature). 15
We note that upon our dismissal for lack of finality, the district court will have 16 jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s post-j udgment request. While Plaintiff expresses 17 frustration that this Court does not address the merits of his appeal, [MIO 1-4] 18Plaintiff’s act of filing the post-judgmen t motion precludes this Court from doing so. 1 Based on our notice and on the foregoing discussion, we dismiss for lack of 2 finality. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4

_______________________________ 5 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 6
WE CONCUR: 7

_________________________________ 8 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge 9
10

_________________________________ 11 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 12
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-Q
QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITY EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1999.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999             DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999             JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                           8,330                   8,330
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,679                   3,679
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (50)                    (50)
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                12,336                  12,336
<PP&E>                                         233,050                 233,050
<DEPRECIATION>                               (157,580)               (157,580)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 101,944                 101,944
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            9,963                   9,963
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                            87                      87
<OTHER-SE>                                      41,109                  41,109
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   101,944                 101,944
<SALES>                                          5,964                  10,905
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 6,460                  11,865
<CGS>                                                0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    5,187                  11,698
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       1
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 924                   1,859
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    428                 (1,526)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (55)                   (888)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0                       0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                       483                   (638)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.06                  (0.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.06                  (0.07)


</TABLE>
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19
- 7213

FRED L. JOHNSON , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. PRISON MEDICAL PROVIDER for VDOC; NIRAJ V. KELORE, Orthopedic; MOHAMMAD SUDDIQUI, Doctor; VINCENT GORE, Doctor , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond

. John A. Gibney, Jr. , District Judge. ( 3:17

- cv
- 00339

- JAG

- RCY )

Submitted : July 21, 2020 Decided: July 23, 2020

Before AGEE, DIAZ, and HARRIS , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Fred Lee Johnson, Appellant Pro Se. Matthew Devins Joss, HERBERT & SATTERWHITE PC, Richmond, Virginia; Grace Morse

- McNelis, SANDS ANDERSON, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURI AM:
Fred Lee Johnson appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (201 8 ) complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (201 8 ). * We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed i n forma pauperis, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Johnson v. Prison Med.
Provider , No. 3:17

- cv
- 00339

- JAG

- RCY (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2019)

. We deny Johnson’s motion for default judgment

. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

* Although the district court dismissed Johnson’s claims without prejudice, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC , 959 F.3d 605, 615 (4th Cir. 2020).
Gregory HILL, petitioner, v. James GAMMON, Superintendent, Moberly Correctional Center.

No. 18-6480.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 10, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
Van LE, petitioner, v. Debbie ALDRIDGE, Warden.

No. 18-5544.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 9, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.
Josephloc T. NGUYEN, petitioner, v. Kristjen M. NIELSEN, Secretary of Homeland Security.

No. 18-6321.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 3, 2018.

Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* denied. Petitioner allowed *621until December 26, 2018, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.
May 29, 1956

Honorable Tom Reavley Opinion No. S- 199 secretary ofstate - State ofTexas Re: Proper method for fixing franAustin, Texas chise tax liability ofa corporation dissolving within one year Dear Mr. **Reavley:** after incorporation.

Inyour Letter requesting the opinion of this office on the abovecaptioned question you state inpart as follows:

“Although under ordinary circumstances anew domestic corporation would not be required tofile afranchise tax return until the expiration of the first corporate year, itseems only logical that a corporation

. . . [submitting Articles of Dissolution within one year after incorporation] should’be required to immediately file a return inorder topresent this office abasis for computing the franchise tax to be paid topermit itto legally dissolve. The Texas Business Corporation Act prohibits the filing ofArticles of Dissolution unless thefranchise tax is paid, and **our** problem then is one of determining the period for which the tax should be exacted. “Article 7084.V.C.S. of Texas, as amended, requires the computation of the tax upon the stated capital, surplus and undivided profits, and certain bonds, notes and deben**tures** at $2 per $1.000 or afractional part thereof ($2.25 on and after **May** 1, 1956). but provides for a rditnimum tax of $25. This, of course, would be for one full year as further provided inthis Article.

‘With the foregoing facts before you, please advise this office Ifwe should collect the franchise tax as would be disclosed by the return demanded of the corporation for one full year: or. should the tax be apportioned inorder to exact the franchise tax only for theperiod from thedate of filing Articles of Incorporation to the date of submitting theArticles of Dissolution? Ifthe tax is tobe apportioned and the amount for only a portion of the year should be less than the minimum, shouid that amount be accepted, or should we demand the minimum tax of $257”*. ,.

Hon. Tom Reavley, page 2 (Opinion No. S-199)

You should collect thefranchise tax for afull year as disclosed by the return demanded ofadomestic corporation which submits Articles of Dissolution within its first corporate year. There are no provisions for apportionment offranchise taxes due by corporations in Title 122, Chapter Three, Vernon’s Civil Statutes, or elsewhere inour **statutes.**

SUMMARY

The proper method of collecting the franchise taw ofa private domestic corporation dissolving within one year after incorporation is tocollect the franchise tax for afull year as disclosed by thefranchise tax return demanded of the corporation. Yours very truly, APPROVED: We,.V. Geppert Taxation Division Mary K. Wall Reviewer J.Arthur Sandlin Reviewer JOHN BEN SHEPPERD Attorney General ofTexas

BY &&/$+&&A Henry tes Steen Assistant

L. W. Gray ,Special Reviewer Davis Grant First Assistant John Ben Sheppard Attorney General
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>         7
<MULTIPLIER>      1

<S>                                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                               DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                    MAR-31-2000
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                              9,080,678
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                                     0
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                                       0
<EQUITIES>                                        4,095,375
<MORTGAGE>                                                0
<REAL-ESTATE>                                             0
<TOTAL-INVEST>                                   13,758,032
<CASH>                                            1,839,606
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                                        0
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                            3,029,428
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   19,459,161
<POLICY-LOSSES>                                           0
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                                  83,280
<POLICY-OTHER>                                       12,254
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                               527,488
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                                           0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                     0
<PREFERRED>                                               0
<COMMON>                                            567,786
<OTHER-SE>                                       10,401,734
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     19,459,161
<PREMIUMS>                                          916,043
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                                 191,803
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                                  (27,095)
<OTHER-INCOME>                                      152,022
<BENEFITS>                                            2,342
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>                         120,840
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                                      0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      82,077
<INCOME-TAX>                                         89,839
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  (7,762)
<DISCONTINUED>                                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                           0
<CHANGES>                                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                                         (7,762)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          .000
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .000
<RESERVE-OPEN>                                    3,273,564
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                                 188,645
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                                         0
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                                        0
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                                          0
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                                   3,462,209
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                                   0


</TABLE>
Raymond A. WHITE, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-6845.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 8, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference and use of our report, dated
November 16, 2000, on the consolidated  financial statements of MFB Corp., which
is  incorporated  by reference in MFB Corp.'s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the
year ended  September 30, 2000, in MFB Corp.'s  Registration  Statements on Form
S-8 (Registration No. 33-84340 and Registration No. 333-47891).


                                               /s/ Crowe, Chizek and Company LLP
                                               ---------------------------------
                                               Crowe, Chizek and Company LLP


South Bend, Indiana
December 21, 2000
Percy HUTTON, petitioner, v. Tim SHOOP, Warden.

No. 17-8421.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 1, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-10923

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CARLOS SANCHEZ-SANTILLAN,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:10-CR-338-1

Before DAVIS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Carlos SanchezSantillan has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632

F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Sanchez-Santillan has not filed a response. We have

reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. 

We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous

issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 19, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 11-10923 Document: 00511891334 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/19/2012
No. 11-10923

is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the

APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

2

Case: 11-10923 Document: 00511891334 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/19/2012
In Re Alan GIORDANI, petitioner.

No. 18-1164.

Supreme Court of the United States

May 13, 2019.

Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied.