[Cite as Easley v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2009-Ohio-7047.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Third Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us

DAVID EASLEY 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION 

 Defendant 

Case No. 2008-01634 

Judge Clark B. Weaver Sr. 

Magistrate Steven A. Larson 

MAGISTRATE DECISION

{¶ 1} Plaintiff brought this action alleging that defendant’s corrections officers 

assaulted him; that other employees lost his personal property; that he was subjected to 

patient abuse and neglect at the hands of defendant’s mental health staff; that the Rules 

Infraction Board (RIB) violated his right of due process; and that he was not provided 

with proper nourishment. The issues of liability and damages were bifurcated and the 

case proceeded to trial before a magistrate on the issue of liability. 

{¶ 2} At all times relevant, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody and control of 

defendant at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) pursuant to R.C. 5120.16. 

In Counts One through Four of his complaint, plaintiff alleges that on several occasions, 

SOCF employees assaulted him. 

{¶ 3} The Ohio Administrative Code sets forth the circumstances under which 

force may be lawfully utilized by prison officials and employees in controlling inmates. 

Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-01(C) provides, in relevant part: 
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{¶ 4} “(2) Less-than-deadly force. There are six general circumstances in 

which a staff member may use force against an inmate or third person. A staff member 

may use less-than-deadly force against an inmate in the following circumstances: 

{¶ 5} “(a) Self-defense from physical attack or threat of physical harm; 

{¶ 6} “(b) Defense of another from physical attack or threat of physical attack; 

{¶ 7} “(c) When necessary to control or subdue an inmate who refuses to obey 

prison rules, regulations or orders; 

{¶ 8} “(d) When necessary to stop an inmate from destroying property or 

engaging in a riot or other disturbance; 

{¶ 9} “(e) Prevention of an escape or apprehension of an escapee; or 

{¶ 10} “(f) Controlling or subduing an inmate in order to stop or prevent selfinflicted harm.” 

{¶ 11} The court has recognized that “corrections officers have a privilege to use 

force upon inmates under certain conditions. * * * Obviously ‘the use of force is a reality 

of prison life’ and the precise degree of force required to respond to a given situation 

requires an exercise of discretion by the corrections officer.” Mason v. Ohio Dept. of 

Rehab. & Corr. (1990), 62 Ohio Misc.2d 96, 101-102. (Internal citations omitted.) 

{¶ 12} Plaintiff testified that two of the alleged assaults occurred on January 18, 

2008. According to plaintiff, the first incident occurred during the morning of January 

18, 2008, when Corrections Officer (CO) Prater ordered him to exit the shower so that 

he could be escorted to a segregation unit. Plaintiff did not comply with Prater’s order 

and instead insisted that he needed mental health treatment. Plaintiff testified that 

Prater sprayed him with mace without provocation while other COs observed the 

confrontation. Plaintiff contends that he was subsequently placed in a cell and that he 

was denied the opportunity to shower after having been maced. However, during crossexamination, plaintiff testified that he was taken to the institution clinic and examined by 

a nurse immediately after he was maced. 
Case No. 2008-01634 - 3 - MAGISTRATE DECISION

{¶ 13} Defendant presented incident reports that were filed by COs Prater and 

Haywood which state that plaintiff had threatened to spit tobacco at Prater during a 

search of the shower. Plaintiff acknowledged that he threw tobacco and that Haywood 

was present during the incident. During cross-examination, plaintiff explained that he 

did not comply with Prater’s orders because he did not consider them to be direct 

orders. 

{¶ 14} With regard to the second incident, plaintiff testified that during the night of 

January 18, 2008, he was placed in a “suicide cell” that contained a torn mattress. 

Plaintiff testified that he objected to being placed in a cell with torn bedding because 

“someone could kill themselves.” According to plaintiff, CO Burks opened the door to 

his cell, maced him, and subsequently issued a conduct report charging plaintiff with 

attempting to swallow bedding material in an effort to kill himself. Plaintiff testified that 

Burks lied about the suicide attempt to justify his use of mace on plaintiff. 

{¶ 15} Plaintiff alleges that the third incident occurred in November 2007 after he 

became involved in a fight with another inmate. Plaintiff testified that Lieutenant Fields 

responded to a “man down” alarm and separated the inmates. According to plaintiff, he 

complied with Fields’ orders. However, plaintiff testified that Fields sprayed him with 

mace for allegedly resisting being placed in handcuffs. 

{¶ 16} The fourth incident, which also took place in November 2007, involved an 

altercation that occurred in the shower during a “shakedown.” Plaintiff testified that a 

CO had discovered that a razor blade was missing whereupon plaintiff was searched by 

CO Shannon Bear. Plaintiff stated that Bear became angry and sprayed mace on him 

during the altercation. 

{¶ 17} Each of the four incidents was referred to a Use of Force Committee for 

investigation. The committee members interviewed plaintiff and the COs involved in the 

incidents, and issued a report for each incident. (Defendant’s Exhibits H, Q, DD, and 

KK.) The reviewing committees concluded that the force used by defendant’s 

employees was neither excessive nor inappropriate. Edwin Voorhees Jr., SOCF’s 
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warden, reviewed the committee reports and concurred with the findings of the 

committees. 

{¶ 18} Plaintiff’s own testimony undermined his credibility regarding the 

allegations that defendant’s employees used excessive force against him. With regard 

to the first incident, plaintiff insisted that he told Prater that he needed mental health 

treatment and he admitted that he had refused to comply with Prater’s orders. 

According to plaintiff, he had been placed on suicide watch at the time of the second 

incident, and he did not deny that he had attempted to eat the bedding material. 

Regarding the November 2007 incidents, plaintiff admitted that he had entered the cell 

of the other inmate who was involved in the fight and that plaintiff was given an order to 

stop fighting before he was sprayed with mace. Plaintiff admitted that during the 

shakedown that precipitated the fourth incident, he “had words” with the CO just before 

he was sprayed with mace. In light of these admissions, the court finds plaintiff’s 

testimony that defendant’s employees used mace without provocation was less than 

credible. 

{¶ 19} Based upon the foregoing, the court concludes that the staff involved in 

the incidents of January 18, 2008, and November 2007, used appropriate force at all 

times. 

{¶ 20} In Count Five of his complaint, plaintiff asserts that employees of 

defendant are responsible for the loss of personal property, including personal papers 

and a tape player that were confiscated from him. Plaintiff testified that he was 

informed that he could not possess the confiscated items while he was housed in the 

segregation (J-2) unit and that the tape player was contraband. Plaintiff acknowledged 

that CO Ward packed up his property and completed an inventory of the items on 

defendant’s inmate property record. (Defendant’s Exhibit LL.) 

{¶ 21} “When prison authorities obtain possession of an inmate’s property, a 

bailment relationship arises between the correctional facility and the inmate. By virtue 
Case No. 2008-01634 - 5 - MAGISTRATE DECISION

of this relationship, [defendant] must exercise ordinary care in handling and storing 

appellant’s property.” (Additional citations omitted.) Triplett v. S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 

Franklin App. No. 06AP-1296, 2007-Ohio-2526, ¶7. However, “[defendant] does not 

have the liability of an insurer (i.e., is not liable without fault) with respect to inmate 

property, but it does have the duty to make reasonable attempts to protect such 

property.” Id. Furthermore, to establish that defendant is liable for the loss of an 

inmate’s property, “plaintiff must produce evidence which furnishes a reasonable basis 

for sustaining his claim. If his evidence furnishes a basis for only a guess, among 

different possibilities, as to any essential issue in the case, he fails to sustain the burden 

as to such issue.” Freeman v. S. Ohio Corr. Facility, Ct. Cl. No. 2006-06949, 2007-

Ohio-1758, ¶14, citing Landon v. Lee Motors, Inc. (1954), 161 Ohio St. 82. 

{¶ 22} Plaintiff testified that his property was packed in a box prior to his transfer 

to a segregation unit. Plaintiff acknowledged that he has not yet received his property 

and the court finds that plaintiff has not shown that the conditions of his confinement 

have changed such that he is entitled to possess the property. Accordingly, plaintiff has 

failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his property was lost or stolen. 

{¶ 23} In Count Six, plaintiff alleges both that defendant’s mental health policies 

subjected him to patient abuse and neglect at the hands of defendant’s mental health 

staff and that the RIB violated his right of due process during a disciplinary hearing. 

Defendant asserts that implementation of the policies involves a high degree of official 

discretion and, therefore, that defendant and its employees are immune from liability. 

{¶ 24} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[t]he language in R.C. 2743.02 

that ‘the state’ shall ‘have its liability determined * * * in accordance with the same rules 

of law applicable to suits between private parties * * *’ means that the state cannot be 

sued for its legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or planning 

function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the 

exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.” Reynolds v. State (1984), 

14 Ohio St.3d 68, 70; Van Hoene v. State (1985), 20 Ohio App.3d 363, 364. 
Case No. 2008-01634 - 6 - MAGISTRATE DECISION

Additionally, “[p]rison regulations * * * are primarily designed to guide correctional 

officials in prison administration rather than to confer rights on inmates.” State ex rel 

Larkins v. Wilkinson, 79 Ohio St.3d 477, 479, 1997-Ohio-139. Accordingly, plaintiff’s 

claims based upon alleged violations of internal DRC policies must fail. 

{¶ 25} Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff alleges claims based upon the 

denial of his civil and constitutional rights by the RIB, it is well-settled that such claims 

are not actionable in the Court of Claims. See Thompson v. Southern State Community 

College (June 15, 1989), Franklin App. No. 89AP-114; Burkey v. Southern Ohio Corr. 

Facility (1988), 38 Ohio App.3d 170. 

{¶ 26} In Count Seven, plaintiff alleges that defendant has failed to provide 

nutritious meals such that he has been “under fed.” 

{¶ 27} Inmate complaints regarding the conditions of confinement are treated as 

claims arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983. State ex rel. Carter v. Schotten, 70 Ohio St.3d 89, 

91, 1994-Ohio-37. It is well-settled that such claims are not actionable in the Court of 

Claims. See Thompson, supra, Burkey, supra. 

{¶ 28} Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that plaintiff’s claim which is 

premised upon the alleged violation of his constitutional rights be dismissed and that 

judgment be rendered in favor of defendant on the remaining claims. 

A party may file written objections to the magistrate’s decision within 14 days of 

the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision during that 

14-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files objections, 

any other party may also file objections not later than ten days after the first objections 

are filed. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual 

finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or 

conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically 

objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion within 14 days of the filing of the 

decision, as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).
Case No. 2008-01634 - 7 - MAGISTRATE DECISION

 _____________________________________ 

 STEVEN A. LARSON 

 Magistrate 

cc: 

 

Jennifer A. Adair 

Assistant Attorney General 

150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor 

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130 

Magistrate Steven A. Larson 

David Easley, #306-400 

P.O. Box 45699 

Lucasville, Ohio 45699 

AMR/cmd

Filed December 10, 2009 

To S.C. reporter January 5, 2010