J-A10041-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WAYNE E. BRANT JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1240 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 24, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-29-CR-0000236-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WAYNE EUGENE BRANT, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1241 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 24, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-29-CR-0000251-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED AUGUST 30, 2022

Appellant, Wayne Eugene Brant Jr., appeals nunc pro tunc from the

judgment of sentence entered in the Fulton County Court of Common Pleas, 

following his jury trial convictions for conspiracy, theft by unlawful taking—

movable property, receiving stolen property, persons not to possess firearms,
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and firearms not to be carried without a license.

1

 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with various offenses at two separate 

dockets in relation to a series of reported thefts that occurred in 

McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania on the morning of September 27, 2018. On 

December 17, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a notice of joinder. A jury trial 

for both dockets commenced on August 8, 2019.

Tyler Elmes, a McConnellsburg resident, testified that around 6:00 a.m. 

on September 27th, he discovered his credit cards and 9mm Smith and Wesson 

pistol missing from his truck. L.D. Chip Keebaugh, another local resident, 

testified that around 8:00 a.m. on the same day, he discovered that his 9mm 

Ruger pistol, his TNW 9mm rifle, credit cards, laptops, a black tactical bag and 

other various items were missing from his car. Jeremy Woolford testified that 

around 6:15 a.m. the same day, he saw a man wearing a bright colored shirt 

standing very close to his car who fled when he saw Mr. Woolford approaching. 

Upon checking his car, Mr. Woolford realized that his wallet was missing.

Naomi Westberry testified that on the same morning at around 5:30 a.m., she 

saw a man wearing a dark hoodie rummaging inside her car. The individual 

fled on foot as soon as Ms. Westberry approached the vehicle; the individual

appeared to be carrying a black bag.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 3921(a), 3925(a), 6105(a)(1), and 6106(a)(1), 

respectively.
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State Trooper Salvatore Scavone testified that at approximately 6:00

a.m. on September 27, 2018, he responded to a call from Ms. Westberry 

regarding a vehicle theft. Ms. Westberry relayed that the individual was a 

white male wearing a dark blue shirt, and her husband reported seeing an 

individual in a bright orange shirt in the area. While canvasing the 

neighborhood, Trooper Scavone observed Appellant and Brandon Horton pull 

into a laundromat in a Jeep. Appellant was wearing a bright orange shirt and

Mr. Horton was in a dark hoodie, matching the physical descriptions provided 

by Ms. Westberry and her husband. Upon approaching the vehicle, Trooper

Scavone observed a loaded Smith and Wesson gun magazine on the 

passenger side floor, where Appellant had been sitting. 

Mr. Horton allowed Trooper Scavone to search the vehicle. From the 

search, police recovered the stolen Smith and Wesson gun from the glovebox

in front of where Appellant had been sitting. Additionally, police found another 

Smith and Wesson pistol magazine as well as Ruger pistol rounds in the Jeep. 

Trooper Scavone also reported seeing a blue long-sleeved shirt and yellow 

shirt in the backseat. Upon searching Appellant, police found credit cards 

belonging to various victims in Appellant’s pockets. Appellant claimed he had 

not stolen these items and had found all of them along the side of the road.

After he was arrested, Appellant stated that Mr. Horton gave him the credit 

cards and the gun. Appellant denied participating in any theft. 

State Trooper Jeffrey Hahn testified that he located other stolen items 
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nearby alongside the road, including the Ruger pistol and the TNW rifle in a 

black tactical bag lying abandoned on the same street Mr. Woolford reported 

seeing an individual flee from his car. He testified further that a total of nine

separate incidents of theft from motor vehicles were reported on the morning 

of September 27th in the area immediately surrounding the location where the 

black tactical bag was found.

Appellant testified that he agreed to accompany Mr. Horton to 

McConnellsburg to visit Mr. Horton’s girlfriend and they arrived in 

McConnellsburg sometime after 3:00 a.m. on September 27, 2018. After 

being unable to locate Mr. Horton’s girlfriend, the pair realized that there was 

not enough gas in the car to return home and neither party had money to pay 

for gas. At approximately 4:00 a.m., Mr. Horton left Appellant in the car 

claiming that “he would figure something out.” After waiting for 20 minutes, 

Appellant walked to Sheetz to attempt to panhandle money. Appellant 

acquired $10.00 from a woman at Sheetz and got lost trying to find his way 

back to the Jeep. At approximately 5:30 a.m. Appellant returned to the car 

and Mr. Horton returned 10 minutes later. Mr. Horton did not tell Appellant 

where he went but informed Appellant that he acquired money for gas. Mr. 

Horton then handed Appellant several credit cards and asked Appellant to 

check if they were any good. Immediately after, Mr. Horton pulled into a 

laundromat and Trooper Scavone approached them. Appellant stated that he 

did not know that the credit cards were stolen and was unaware of the other
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stolen items found in the car. 

State Trooper Cody Hollibaugh testified that the Sheetz that Appellant 

claimed to be at had approximately eight or more security cameras covering 

all angles of the inside and outside of the store. Trooper Hollibough testified 

that he carefully reviewed all footage from 1:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. on 

September 27th and Appellant did not appear in any of the footage from inside 

or outside the store. Additionally, when he was arrested, Appellant did not 

have $10.00 on his person. 

On August 9, 2019, the jury found Appellant guilty of multiple counts of 

conspiracy, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, persons not to 

possess firearms, and carrying firearms without a license. On September 24, 

2019, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of 216 to 432 

months’ imprisonment. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on 

October 4, 2019, which was denied by operation of law on February 10, 2020. 

Following reinstatement of Appellant’s direct appeal rights, Appellant 

timely filed a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc at each underlying docket number 

on September 23, 2021. On October 5, 2021, the court ordered Appellant to 

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal,

and Appellant timely complied on November 4, 2021. This Court consolidated 

the appeals sua sponte on November 4, 2021.

Appellant presents the following 11 issues for our review:

1) Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence 

to convict Appellant of Count 3, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903 
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conspiracy— theft by unlawful taking—movable property 

when the evidence fails to establish that Appellant agreed 

with another to exercise control over a Smith and Wesson 

9mm pistol found in co-defendant’s vehicle?

2) Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence 

to convict Appellant of Count 1, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a) theft 

by unlawful taking—movable property when the evidence 

fails to establish that Appellant exercised control over a 

black Ruger LC9 9mm pistol, TNW Firearms 9mm rifle or any 

of the property belonging to L.D. Chip Keebaugh found in a 

bag at 630 Lincoln Way East?

3) Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence 

to convict Appellant of Count 1, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a) theft 

by unlawful taking—movable property when the evidence 

fails to establish that Appellant exercised control over a 

Smith and Wesson 9mm pistol found in co-defendant’s 

vehicle and that the evidence failed to establish that if the 

Appellant did exercise control over the firearm that it was 

with the intent to deprive the victim of his property?

4) Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence 

to convict Appellant of Count 2, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a)

receiving stolen property when the evidence fails to 

establish that Appellant was in possession of a black Ruger 

LC9 9mm pistol, TNW Firearms 9mm rifle or any of the 

property belonging to L.D. Chip Keebaugh found in a bag at 

630 Lincoln Way East?

5) Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence 

to convict Appellant of Count 2, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a) 

receiving stolen property when the evidence fails to 

establish that Appellant was in possession of the Smith and 

Wesson 9mm pistol found in co-defendant’s vehicle?

6) Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence 

to convict Appellant of Count 3, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1)

possession of firearm prohibited when the evidence fails to 

establish that Appellant possessed, used or exercised 

control over a Smith and Wesson 9mm pistol found in codefendant’s vehicle?

7) Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence 
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to convict Appellant of Count 4, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1)

possession of firearm prohibited when the evidence fails to 

establish that Appellant possessed, used or exercised

control over a black Ruger LC9 9mm pistol found in a bag at 

630 Lincoln Way East?

8) Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence 

to convict Appellant of Count 5, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1)

possession of firearm prohibited when the evidence fails to 

establish that Appellant possessed, used or exercised

control over TNW Firearms 9mm rifle found in a bag at 630 

Lincoln Way East?

9) Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence 

to convict Appellant of Count 6, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1)

firearms not to be carried without a license when the 

evidence fails to establish that Appellant carried a firearm in 

a vehicle or concealed on or about his person?

10) Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient 

evidence to convict Appellant of Count 7, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6106(a)(1) firearms not to be carried without a license when 

the evidence fails to establish that Appellant carried a 

firearm in a vehicle or concealed on or about his person?

11) Whether the trial court’s imposition of consecutive, 

rather than concurrent, sentences is unduly harsh, 

considering the nature of the crimes and the length of 

imprisonment?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4-7) (reordered for purpose of disposition).

In his first ten issues combined, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of 

the evidence to sustain his convictions. Appellant argues the Commonwealth 

failed to present evidence that Appellant entered into an agreement with Mr. 

Horton to commit any crimes. Appellant asserts there was no evidence that 

Appellant participated in planning the thefts or even had knowledge the thefts 

would occur. Additionally, Appellant contends there was no direct evidence 
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linking Appellant to the discarded black tactical bag containing stolen items, 

including the Ruger pistol and TNW rifle. Appellant emphasizes that Ms. 

Westberry testified that an individual matching Mr. Horton’s description was 

rummaging in her car and carrying the black bag which was later recovered. 

Appellant maintains there is no evidence in the record establishing that at any 

time Appellant possessed the black bag and its contents, or even knew of its 

existence. 

Further, Appellant contends that the mere fact that the Smith and 

Wesson gun was found in the glovebox in front of Appellant is not enough to 

establish that he possessed it. Appellant claims police recovered the firearm 

in Mr. Horton’s car and there is no evidence that Appellant removed the item 

from the victim’s vehicle. Additionally, Appellant maintains the 

Commonwealth presented no evidence that Appellant exercised control over 

any of the stolen guns. Appellant concludes the Commonwealth presented 

insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions, and this Court should reverse 

his convictions and vacate the judgment of sentence. We disagree.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency 

claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the 

benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the

verdict when it establishes each material element of the 

crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the 

Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical 

certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be 
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resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of 

fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. 

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that 

the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a 

crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where 

the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. 

Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that 

of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, 

accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s 

crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s 

convictions will be upheld. 

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super. 

2013)). 

The Crimes Code defines the offense of criminal conspiracy as follows:

§ 903. Criminal conspiracy

(a) Definition of conspiracy.―A person is guilty of 

conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a 

crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its 

commission he: 

(1) agrees with such other person or persons 

that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct 

which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation 

to commit such crime; or 

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in 

the planning or commission of such crime or of an 

attempt or solicitation to commit such crime. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a). 

“To sustain a conviction for criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth 
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must establish that the defendant (1) entered into an agreement to commit 

or aid in an unlawful act with another person or persons, (2) with a shared 

criminal intent and (3) an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 

Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 42 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). 

The essence of a criminal conspiracy is a common 

understanding, no matter how it came into being, that a 

particular criminal objective be accomplished. Therefore, a 

conviction for conspiracy requires proof of the existence of 

a shared criminal intent. An explicit or formal agreement to 

commit crimes can seldom, if ever, be proved and it need 

not be, for proof of a criminal partnership is almost 

invariably extracted from the circumstances that attend its 

activities. Thus, a conspiracy may be inferred where it is 

demonstrated that the relation, conduct, or circumstances 

of the parties, and the overt acts of the co-conspirators 

sufficiently prove the formation of a criminal confederation. 

The conduct of the parties and the circumstances 

surrounding their conduct may create a web of evidence 

linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

Id. at 42-43. “Once the trier of fact finds that there was an agreement and 

the defendant intentionally entered into the agreement, that defendant may 

be liable for the overt acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy 

regardless of which co-conspirator committed the act.” Commonwealth v. 

Barnes, 871 A.2d 812, 820 (Pa.Super. 2005). 

The Crimes Code defines theft by unlawful taking as follows:

§ 3921. Theft by unlawful taking or disposition

(a) Movable property.―A person is guilty of theft if he 

unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, 

movable property of another with intent to deprive him 
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thereof.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a). “Movable property” is: 

Property the location of which can be changed, including 

things growing on, affixed to, or found in land, and 

documents although the rights represented thereby have no 

physical location. “Immovable property” is all other 

property. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3901. “Deprivation” occurs if a person: (1) “withhold[s] 

property of another permanently;” or (2) “dispose[s] of the property so as to 

make it unlikely that the owner will recover it.” Id.

The Crimes Code defines receiving stolen property as follows:

§ 3925. Receiving stolen property

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of theft if he 

intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable 

property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or 

believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the 

property is received, retained, or disposed with the intent to 

restore it to the owner.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a). 

Based upon the statute, this Court has identified the following elements

for receiving stolen property: “(1) intentionally acquiring possession of the 

movable property of another; (2) with knowledge or belief that it was probably 

stolen; and 3) the intent to deprive permanently.” Commonwealth v. 

Robinson, 128 A.3d 261, 265 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc) (internal citations 

omitted). As to whether a person knows an item is stolen, “[t]he mere 

possession of stolen property is insufficient to prove guilty knowledge, and the 

Commonwealth must introduce other evidence, which can be either 
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circumstantial or direct, that demonstrates that the defendant knew or had 

reason to believe that the property was stolen.” Id. at 268 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Foreman, 797 A.2d 1005, 1012 (Pa.Super. 2002)). 

Circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge may include, 

inter alia, the place or manner of possession, alterations to 

the property indicative of theft, the defendant’s conduct or 

statements at the time of arrest (including attempts to flee 

apprehension), a false explanation for the possession, the 

location of the theft in comparison to where the defendant 

gained possession, the value of the property compared to 

the price paid for it, or any other evidence connecting the 

defendant to the crime. 

Robinson, supra at 268. See also Commonwealth v. Gomez, 224 A.3d 

1095 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 236 A.3d 1053 (2020). 

The Uniform Firearms Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, 

control, sell or transfer firearms

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense 

enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this 

Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or 

whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall 

not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture 

or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer 

or manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth. 

§ 6106. Firearms not to be carried without a license

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who 

carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries 

a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his 

place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid 

and lawfully issued license under this chapter commits a 
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felony of the third degree.

18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1); 6106(a)(1).

“When contraband is not found on the defendant’s person, the 

Commonwealth must establish constructive possession....” Commonwealth 

v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 121 (Pa.Super. 2005). 

Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic 

construct to deal with the realities of criminal law 

enforcement. Constructive possession is an inference 

arising from a set of facts that possession of the 

contraband was more likely than not. We have 

defined constructive possession as “conscious 

dominion.” We subsequently defined “conscious 

dominion” as the “power to control the contraband 

and the intent to exercise that control.” To aid 

application, we have held that constructive possession 

may be established by the totality of the 

circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 426, 430 (Pa.Super. 

2012) (quotation omitted). “The Commonwealth may 

sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence, and we must evaluate the entire trial record and 

consider all evidence received against the defendant.” Id.

(citation omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 133 A.3d 759, 767-68 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal 

denied, 636 Pa. 675, 145 A.3d 725 (2016).

Instantly, the trial court determined there was sufficient circumstantial 

evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict of criminal conspiracy. Appellant 

testified that he and Mr. Horton had agreed to drive to McConnellsburg 

together in the early morning of September 27, 2018. They were together for 

a prolonged period in the same area and time frame when the thefts occurred. 
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Additionally, multiple witnesses testified to seeing men matching the physical 

descriptions of Appellant and Mr. Horton stealing items from vehicles in the 

nearby area. Appellant and Mr. Horton were together when police stopped 

them and found stolen goods in their possession. When initially questioned, 

Appellant told police that he found the stolen items along the side of the road. 

Additionally, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant did not 

appear in the surveillance footage at the local Sheetz where he claimed to 

have been when Mr. Horton committed the thefts without his knowledge. 

Taken together in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the 

verdict winner, these facts were sufficient for the jury to find that Appellant 

and Mr. Horton agreed and planned to commit vehicle theft in the 

McConnellsburg area and stole items from multiple cars in furtherance of their

plan. See Sebolka, supra; Melvin, supra. Accordingly, sufficient evidence 

supported Appellant’s conspiracy conviction. See id.; 18 Pa.C.S.A. 903.

Regarding Appellant’s theft by unlawful taking and receiving stolen

property convictions for the Smith and Wesson gun found in the glovebox, the 

court explained:

Tyler Elmes testified his gun, wallet, and credit cards were 

stolen early in the morning on September 27, 2018. When 

the police approached [Appellant], they found a gun in the 

glove box in front of where [Appellant] was sitting. Credit 

cards were found in [Appellant’s] pockets. Tyler Elmes 

positively identified the gun and two of the cards as ones 

stolen from him.

[Appellant] testified he had no idea the items were stolen. 

He initially claimed he had found these items on the 
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roadside. He later claimed Horton gave him the items after 

being gone for several hours. [...] A magazine for the 

[Smith and Wesson] pistol was on the floor of the car 

underneath [Appellant]. Despite claiming he was at the 

local Sheetz for some time, [Appellant] did not appear on 

video surveillance of the area. [Appellant] has prior 

convictions for crimen falsi. The jury was free to disbelieve 

[Appellant’s] version of events and had ample reason to do 

so.

The gun and the credit cards were movable property 

belonging to Tyler Elmes. [Appellant] had the credit cards 

in his pocket. He either took those cards himself or Horton, 

his co-conspirator, gave them to him. [Appellant] concealed 

how he acquired these cards, evidencing consciousness of 

guilt.

The [Smith and Wesson] pistol was in the glove box in front

of [Appellant]. The magazine of the pistol was beneath 

[Appellant’s] feet. Either [Appellant] or his co-conspirator 

Horton put the pistol there. [Appellant] and Horton were 

driving away with the pistol and credit cards, clearly 

evidencing a lack of intent to return them.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed May 19, 2020, at 11-12) (internal citations omitted). 

The record supports the court’s findings. Viewed in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, there was sufficient evidence for 

the jury to find that Appellant or Mr. Horton took items from Mr. Elmes’ vehicle

with the intent to deprive him of it. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3901; Sebolka, 

supra. There was also sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that 

Appellant knew the items in the car and the credit cards in his pocket were 

stolen. See Robinson, supra. Additionally, regardless of whether it was 

Appellant or Mr. Horton that stole Mr. Elmes’ property, there was sufficient 

evidence for the jury to find Appellant guilty of both theft offenses where 
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Appellant was part of the conspiracy. See Barnes, supra.

Regarding the theft convictions related to the stolen tactical bag 

containing Mr. Keebaugh’s Ruger pistol and TNW rifle, the court determined 

there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict. The 

record supports the court’s determination. Mr. Keebaugh testified that a black 

tactical bag with a Ruger pistol and TNW rifle was taken from his car in the

early morning of September 27, 2018. Appellant testified that he and Mr. 

Horton were in the same area during the same time period. Ms. Westberry 

testified to seeing a man matching Mr. Horton’s description, wearing a dark 

hoodie, carrying a black bag while stealing from her van at approximately the 

same time. Her husband also reported seeing a man in a bright orange shirt 

in the area. Police confirmed that Appellant was wearing an orange shirt and

Mr. Horton was wearing a dark hoodie. 

Additionally, officers located the black bag in some bushes on the same 

street Mr. Woolford reported seeing an individual flee from his car. Further,

police found ammunition for the Ruger pistol in the Jeep Appellant was in prior 

to his arrest. Taken together, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to 

conclude that Appellant or Mr. Horton took Mr. Keebaugh’s black tactical bag

with the intent to deprive him of it. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3901; Sebolka, 

supra. Given Appellant’s status as a co-conspirator, the evidence was 

sufficient to convict Appellant of the theft charges for the guns and property 

found in the black bag. See Barnes, supra. 
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Regarding Appellant’s firearms convictions, our review of the record 

supports the court’s determination that there was sufficient evidence to 

sustain the verdicts. It is uncontroverted that Appellant has a prior conviction 

which prohibits him from possessing a firearm and Appellant did not have a 

valid license to carry a firearm on the date in question. Mr. Elmes’ Smith and 

Wesson pistol was found in the glovebox in front of Appellant and the 

accompanying magazine was lying beneath Appellant’s feet. Additionally, 

credit cards belonging to Mr. Elmes which were stolen at the same time as the 

gun were found on Appellant’s person. Based on the totality of the 

circumstances, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that 

Appellant exercised constructive possession over the Smith and Wesson pistol. 

See Roberts, supra.

Similarly, although the Ruger pistol and TNW rifle were not found in the 

Jeep Appellant was in when he was arrested, police found ammunition for the 

Ruger pistol in the Jeep. Taken together with all the circumstantial evidence 

that Appellant participated in a series of thefts in the immediate area, there 

was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Appellant stole the guns 

in the bag and hid them in the bushes where they were later found. See id. 

Accordingly, we find no error in the court’s determination that there was 

sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Appellant constructively 

possessed the firearms to sustain Appellant’s convictions for the firearms 

offenses. See Sebolka, supra.
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In his eleventh issue, Appellant argues his aggregate sentence of 216 

to 413 months’ incarceration is excessive and unduly harsh considering the 

gravity of the offenses and Appellant’s age. Appellant asserts that the

offenses he was found guilty of were nonviolent and the impact on the victims 

was not so great as to demand such a harsh sentence. Appellant contends 

the length of his sentence far exceeds the time necessary to protect the public 

and address Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. Appellant concludes the court’s 

imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences for the firearms 

offenses made the length of his aggregate sentence unreasonable and we 

should vacate the judgment of sentence. We disagree.

A challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not 

automatically reviewable as a matter of right. Commonwealth v. Hunter, 

768 A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super. 2001), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 695, 796 A.2d 979 

(2001). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved 

at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify

sentence, see [Pa.R.Crim.P. 720]; (3) whether appellant’s 

brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether 

there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed 

from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (internal citations omitted).

What constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-
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by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825 (Pa.Super. 2007). A 

substantial question exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable 

argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent 

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the 

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth 

v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa.Super. 2000) (internal citation omitted). In 

other words, an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement must sufficiently articulate 

the manner in which the sentence violates either a specific provision of the 

sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular 

fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process. Commonwealth v. 

Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002).

This Court has stated:

Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to 

impose [a] sentence concurrently or consecutively to other 

sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences 

already imposed. Any challenge to the exercise of this 

discretion does not raise a substantial question. In fact, this 

Court has recognized the imposition of consecutive, rather 

than concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial question 

in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where the 

aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature 

of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 621 Pa. 692, 77 A.3d 1258 (2013) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted).

Further,

“[T]his Court has held on numerous occasions that a claim 
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of inadequate consideration of mitigating factors [generally] 

does not raise a substantial question for our review.” 

Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa.Super. 

2013) (internal citation omitted).

However, “prior decisions from this Court involving whether 

a substantial question has been raised by claims that the 

sentencing court ‘failed to consider’ or ‘failed to adequately 

consider’ sentencing factors has been less than a model of 

clarity and consistency.” Commonwealth v. Seagraves, 

103 A.3d 839, 842 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citing

[Commonwealth v. Dodge, 957 A.2d 1198 (Pa.Super. 

2008), appeal denied, 602 Pa. 662, 980 A.2d 605 (2009)]). 

In Commonwealth v. Dodge, this Court determined an 

appellant’s claim that the sentencing court “disregarded 

rehabilitation and the nature and circumstances of the 

offense in handing down its sentence” presented a 

substantial question. Dodge, supra at 1273.

This Court has also held that “an excessive sentence claim—

in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to 

consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.” 

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa.Super. 

2014), appeal denied, [629] Pa. [636], 105 A.3d 736 (2014) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 

(Pa.Super. 2005)).

Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769-70 (Pa.Super. 2015).

Instantly, Appellant filed timely notices of appeal nunc pro tunc. 

Appellant preserved his sentencing challenge in a timely filed post-sentence 

motion and in a Rule 2119(f) statement. See Evans, supra. To the extent 

Appellant’s claim that his sentence was excessive and the court disregarded 

his rehabilitative needs raises a substantial question, we will address the 

appeal on the merits. See Caldwell, supra; Raven, supra; Dodge, supra.

We observe that:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 
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sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this 

context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an 

error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by 

reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored 

or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly 

unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa.Super. 2006). 

Pursuant to Section 9721(b), “the court shall follow the general principle 

that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with 

the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the 

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative 

needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). “[T]he court shall make as 

part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a 

statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed.” Id. 

“When imposing a sentence, a court is required to consider 

the particular circumstances of the offense and the 

character of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 

804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 

671, 868 A.2d 1198 (2005), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1148, 

125 S.Ct. 2984, 162 L.Ed.2d 902 (2005). “In particular, the 

court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, 

his age, personal characteristics and his potential for 

rehabilitation.” Id. Where the sentencing court had the 

benefit of a pre-sentence investigation [(“PSI”)], we can 

assume the sentencing court “was aware of relevant 

information regarding the defendant’s character and 

weighed those considerations along with mitigating 

statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 

88, 101-02, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988). See also 

Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 368 (Pa.Super. 

2005) (stating if sentencing court has benefit of PSI, law 

expects court was aware of relevant information regarding 

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations 
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along with any mitigating factors). Further, where a 

sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, 

Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under 

the Sentencing Code. See Commonwealth v. CruzCenteno, [668 A.2d 536 (Pa.Super. 1995)], appeal denied, 

544 Pa. 653, 676 A.2d 1195 (1996) (stating combination of 

PSI and standard range sentence, absent more, cannot be 

considered excessive or unreasonable).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.Super. 2010).

Here, the trial court had the benefit of a PSI report and was aware of 

Appellant’s circumstances, age, and personal history. Prior to sentencing, the

court noted that it considered the relevant sentencing guidelines, the PSI 

report, Appellant’s and his mother’s statement, and the arguments of counsel. 

In imposing its sentence, the court cited Appellant’s prior record score of four

based on an extensive criminal history, including drug offenses, simple 

assault, theft, and firearms offenses. Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the 

court did not disregard his young age. Rather, the court found that Appellant’s 

excessive and repetitive criminal history despite only being 25 years old

necessitated the imposition of a heavier sentence for rehabilitative purposes.

Further, the court noted that Appellant’s and his mother’s statements at 

sentencing evidenced a failure to take full responsibility and accountability for 

his actions. Our review of the record confirms the court considered all relevant 

factors when fashioning Appellant’s sentence. Under these circumstances, we 

see no reason to disrupt the court’s sentencing rationale. See Shugars, 

supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/30/2022