19-4349

Pennington v. D’Ippolito

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order 

filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 

City of New York, on the 5th day of April, two thousand twenty-one.

PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK,

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

STEVEN J. MENASHI,

Circuit Judges.

____________________________________________

DALE PENNINGTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 19-4349

PIERO D’IPPOLITO and CICINELLI & D’IPPOLITO, CPA’s, P.C.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________________________________
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For Plaintiff-Appellant: PATRICK J. MCHUGH, MHR Lewis (US) LLC, 

Stamford, Connecticut (Patrick A. 

Klingman, Klingman Law, LLC, Hartford,

Connecticut, on the brief).

For Defendants-Appellees: JAMES F. CREIGHTON, Dorf & Nelson LLP, 

White Plains, New York.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York (Seibel, J.).

Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Dale Pennington appeals the district court’s decision entering summary 

judgment in favor of Piero D’Ippolito and Cicinelli & D’Ippolito, CPA’s, P.C., on 

Pennington’s claims for professional negligence, aiding and abetting common-law 

fraud, and aiding and abetting a violation of Connecticut’s Unfair Trade Practices 

Act (CUTPA). 1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, 

procedural history, and arguments on appeal.

1 The district court also entered summary judgment for D’Ippolito on other claims, but 

Pennington appeals its judgment only with respect to these claims.
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BACKGROUND

Pennington owned a 25 percent share in Sisemen, LLC. Sisemen’s only asset 

was a piece of commercial rental property in Norwalk, Connecticut. Unbeknownst 

to Pennington, his business partner—Kurt Wittek, who owned a 75 percent share 

in Sisemen—caused Sisemen to take out a $9.4 million loan from 365 Cherry, LLC 

in 2007 and to pledge Sisemen’s property as security. Each installment of the loan 

passed to Wittek after flowing through Sisemen’s bank account. Sisemen defaulted 

on the loan, and 365 Cherry foreclosed on Sisemen’s property in 2011. This left 

Sisemen devoid of assets and Pennington’s interest in it valueless.2

During this time, D’Ippolito served as Sisemen’s accountant and knew that 

funds were flowing from 365 Cherry to Wittek through Sisemen’s account.

D’Ippolito, however, did not account for these transactions on Sisemen’s financial 

records. He also did not inform Pennington of these transfers.

Based on these events, Pennington sued D’Ippolito, bringing claims of 

(1) professional negligence; (2) negligence; (3) breach of fiduciary duties; 

2 Pennington brought an arbitration action against Wittek in 2015. The arbitrator ruled 

in Pennington’s favor and awarded him $1.1 million. Pennington has failed in his 

attempts to collect this award from Wittek.
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(4) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties; (5) fraud; (6) aiding and abetting 

fraud; (7) unfair trade practices under CUTPA; (8) aiding and abetting unfair trade 

practices under CUTPA; and (9) deceptive acts and practices under New York 

General Obligation Law.

D’Ippolito moved for summary judgment on all counts. The district court 

granted D’Ippolito’s motion in full. Pennington v. D'Ippolito, 425 F. Supp. 3d 222 

(S.D.N.Y. 2019). Pennington timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgement de novo, 

viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d 

34, 35 (2d Cir. 1996). 

I

Though the movant bears a heavy burden on a summary judgment motion, 

the non-movant is not always without a burden. Once the movant has 

“demonstrat[ed] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact ... the onus shifts 

to the party resisting summary judgment to present evidence sufficient to satisfy 

every element of the claim. The non-moving party is required to ‘go beyond the 
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pleadings’ and ‘designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial.’” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). The rule setting out the procedure for summary 

judgment practice specifies that “[a] party ... must support [its] assertion” that “a 

fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed ... by citing to particular parts of materials 

in the record ... or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or 

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible 

evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “If a party fails to properly 

support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion 

of fact ... the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion 

[and] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—

including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to 

it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Additionally, in ruling on a summary judgment motion 

“[t]he court need consider only the cited materials” in the parties’ submissions. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

D’Ippolito argued before the district court that he was entitled to summary 

judgment on the professional negligence claim because Pennington did not show 

that D’Ippolito’s alleged accounting malpractice caused any injuries. Specifically, 
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D’Ippolito contended that the alleged malpractice occurred after Wittek took out 

the loan and Pennington did not explain how he could have prevented the damage 

caused by Wittek’s actions even if D’Ippolito had alerted Pennington to the 

existence of the loan directly or by noting it in Sisemen’s financial records. 

D’Ippolito also cited a decision from our court indicating that in a scenario such as

this one, a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the alleged negligence proximately 

cased its injuries. See Paladini v. Capossela, Cohen, LLC, 515 F. App'x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 

2013) (affirming a district court’s decision to dismiss an accounting malpractice 

claim because the alleged “wrongful acts ... occurred after [the] companies 

undertook the loans and made the distributions” that directly caused the plaintiff’s 

injuries). D’Ippolito thus satisfied his burden to make out a prima facie case for 

summary judgment.

The burden then shifted to Pennington to “support [his] assertion” that the 

issue of D’Ippolito’s causation of his injuries was “genuinely disputed ... by citing 

to particular parts of materials in the record ... or showing that the materials 

[D’Ippolito] cited d[id] not establish the absence ... of a genuine dispute” 

regarding causation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Nat'l Wrecking Co. v. Spangler, 

Jennings, Spangler & Dougherty, 782 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]o withstand a 
7

motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must inform the 

trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should not be 

entered.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pennington did not meet that 

burden. He addressed the causation issue only by stating, without citation or 

explanation, that “there is ample evidence in the record to demonstrate Mr. 

Pennington suffered monetary harm proximately caused by the calculated acts 

and omissions (active concealment) of Mr. D’Ippolito.” Memorandum in 

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 15, Pennington, 425 F. Supp. 3d 

222 (No. 18-CV-5799), ECF No. 44. These conclusory averments are insufficient to 

place a matter in genuine dispute, and the district court was therefore entitled to 

“consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

While the district court nevertheless “dug into the record” to find evidence 

that would demonstrate a genuine dispute on the causation issue, it did not 

succeed in making Pennington’s argument for him. Pennington, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 

230-31. Pennington’s loss at summary judgment, therefore, may be attributed to 

his failure to “connect [D’Ippolito’s] actions to any specific damages” or to 

“suggest[] how he would have been able to rescue his investment” in Sisemen 

absent D’Ippolito’s alleged malpractice. Id.
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Pennington stresses that proximate cause is ordinarily a jury question and 

that it is a proper basis for summary judgment only in certain circumstances. See

Benitez v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 73 N.Y.2d 650, 659, 541 N.E.2d 29, 34 (1989) (“[I]issues 

of proximate cause are generally fact matters to be resolved by a jury.”). That may 

be true, but D’Ippolito’s motion for summary judgment made out a sufficient case 

for summary judgment, and it was therefore Pennington’s responsibility to rebut 

it. Because he did not, the district court was free to enter summary judgment for 

D’Ippolito on this claim. See Paladini, 515 F. App'x at 65 (“[A] district court can 

dismiss an action based on proximate cause at the pleading stage.”).

On appeal, Pennington presents a detailed argument explaining how 

D’Ippolito’s alleged accounting malpractice caused him to suffer monetary harm.

This argument, however, comes too late. Pennington failed adequately to oppose 

summary judgement on his professional negligence claim before the district court, 

and the district court properly entered judgment on that claim in D’Ippolito’s 

favor. We therefore affirm that decision.

II

After the district court dismissed Pennington’s common-law fraud claim as

duplicative of his professional negligence claim, it further dismissed his aiding 
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and abetting fraud claim because “aiding and abetting claims ‘require the 

existence of a primary violation.’” Pennington, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 231-32 (quoting 

Weshnak v. Bank of Am., N.A., 451 F. App'x 61, 62 (2d Cir. 2012)). This reasoning 

was erroneous. Pennington alleged a primary fraud other than D’Ippolito’s 

alleged accounting malpractice—namely, Wittek’s scheme to take out the loan and

enrich himself at Sisemen’s and Pennington’s expense. When viewed in this light, 

Pennington’s aiding and abetting fraud claim was not necessarily duplicative of 

his professional negligence claim. 3 Nevertheless, “[w]e may ... affirm the 

judgment of the district court on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to 

permit conclusions of law, including grounds upon which the district court did 

not rely.” Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 268 (2d Cir. 2003). We do so here.

“To establish liability for aiding and abetting fraud [under New York law4], 

[a] plaintiff[] must show (1) the existence of a fraud; (2) the defendant’s knowledge 

3 See White of Lake George Inc. v. Bell, 251 A.D.2d 777, 778 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1998) 

(holding that fraud claims duplicate professional negligence claims when the plaintiff 

alleges only that a professional endeavored to “conceal[] or fail[ed] to disclose [his] own 

malpractice” but that ”a fraud claim [that] is asserted in connection with charges of 

professional malpractice ... is sustainable ... [if] it is premised upon one or more 

affirmative, intentional misrepresentations").

4 Because D’Ippolito was licensed in New York and based his business there, the case 

below proceeded under the assumption, unchallenged by either party, that New York 
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of the fraud; and (3) that the defendant provided substantial assistance to advance 

the fraud’s commission.” Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273, 292 (2d Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). To satisfy the knowledge prong, 

a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had actual knowledge of the 

underlying fraud. Oster v. Kirschner, 77 A.D.3d 51, 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 

2010). Constructive knowledge does not suffice. 

D’Ippolito, here and before the district court, argues that Pennington cannot 

plausibly demonstrate that he had actual knowledge of Wittek’s alleged fraud. We 

agree. The record lacks evidence that either ties D’Ippolito to Wittek’s decision to 

take out the loan or directly shows that D’Ippolito knew that the money passing 

through Sisemen’s account from 365 Cherry to Wittek was encumbering Sisemen 

without Pennington’s knowledge. Pennington responds that a jury could 

reasonably conclude that D’Ippolito actually knew of Wittek’s scheme and 

knowingly rendered him substantial assistance based on D’Ippolito’s knowledge 

that funds were flowing through Sisemen’s account from 365 Cherry to Wittek and 

D’Ippolito’s failure to report those transactions on Sisemen’s financial records. 

law applies to Pennington’s common law claims. See Pennington, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 228 

n.5.
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“[A] party,” however, may not “rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the 

true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Knight v. 

U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Wieland v. C. A. Swanson & 

Sons, 223 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir. 1955) (“The party who bears the burden of proof is 

not entitled to submit alternative possibilities to a jury for speculative choice 

among them when the record supplies no evidentiary basis for choice by logical 

inference”) (applying New Jersey law). Pennington’s theory of D’Ippolito’s 

knowledge is too speculative to make out a genuine dispute on this issue. See 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (“[A] plaintiff must present 

affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary 

judgment.”); see also Victory v. Pataki, 814 F.3d 47, 68-69 (2d Cir. 2016). Therefore, 

we affirm the district court’s decision to grant D’Ippolito summary judgment on 

Pennington’s claim for aiding and abetting fraud.

III

The court also dismissed Pennington’s aiding and abetting CUTPA claim 

based on flawed reasoning. It merely analyzed whether D’Ippolito’s conduct

violated CUTPA, concluded that his conduct did not, and dismissed both of 

Pennington’s “CUTPA claims.” Pennington, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 232-33. Pennington, 
12

however, alleged that D’Ippolito aided and abetted Wittek’s conduct with respect 

to the loan, which itself allegedly violated CUTPA.5

Again, however, “[w]e may ... affirm the judgment of the district court on 

any basis for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, 

including grounds upon which the district court did not rely.” Pollara, 344 F.3d at 

268. For the same reasons discussed above with respect to Pennington’s aiding and 

abetting fraud claim, the record cannot support a claim against D’Ippolito for 

aiding and abetting Wittek’s scheme.6 Therefore, we affirm the district court’s 

decision to grant D’Ippolito summary judgment on Pennington’s claim for aiding 

and abetting a CUTPA violation. 

5 The district court also erred in holding that, to maintain a CUTPA action, a plaintiff’s 

claim “must demonstrate some nexus with the public interest and not involve a purely 

private dispute.” Pennington, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 232 (quoting Fortini v. New Eng. Log 

Homes, Inc., 492 A.2d 545, 548 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985)). However, “[t]his public interest 

requirement for a private action under CUTPA was eliminated by an amendment to 

General Statutes § 42-110g(a) that became effective on June 8, 1984,” and therefore should 

not have been applied in this case. Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 541 A.2d 472, 473 n.2 (Conn. 

1988).

6 Apparently, no Connecticut appellate court has explicitly recognized a claim for aiding 

and abetting a CUTPA violation, though a number of Connecticut lower courts have done 

so. See In re Trilegiant Corp., 11 F. Supp. 3d 132, 142-43 (D. Conn. 2014) (collecting cases). 

In his briefing before the district court and before this court, Pennington argues that we 

should apply the same standards to this claim as we do to his aiding and abetting fraud 

claims. Therefore, we proceed under that assumption. 
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* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court