THIRD DIVISION                                             October 30, 1996No. 1-95-1434W. ROBERT BLAIR,          Plaintiff-Appellant,               v.BENJAMIN S. MACKOFF, Presiding Judge of theDomestic Relations of the Circuit Court of CookCounty, Illinois, RICHARD BERLAND, Judge ofthe Domestic Relations Division of the CircuitCourt of Cook County, Illinois, and PATRICIA G.BLAIR,          Defendants-Appellees.�))))))))))))))�Appeal from theCircuit Court ofCook County.HonorableLester Foreman,Judge Presiding.�     PRESIDING JUSTICE TULLY delivered the opinion of the court:     Plaintiff, W. Robert Blair, appeals from an order of the circuit court of CookCounty granting the motion to dismiss of defendants, Benjamin S. Mackoff, PresidingJudge of the Domestic Relations of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, andRichard Berland, Judge of the Domestic Relations Division of the Circuit Court ofCook County, Illinois, pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure(735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1994)).  Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuantto section 6 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, � 6) andSupreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301).     For the reasons which follow, we affirm.                            FACTUAL BACKGROUND     In 1990, Patricia Blair (hereinafter Patricia) filed a petition for dissolution of marriage against plaintiff in the circuit court of Cook County.  The case was assignedto Judge Robert Berland.  In the fall of 1991, Patricia was granted a voluntarydismissal.     In 1993, Patricia again filed a dissolution of marriage action against Robert. The case was randomly assigned to Calendar B, Judge Aubrey Kaplan, pursuant toCircuit Court of Cook County General Order 15.3, which provides that each case filedin the circuit court's Domestic Relations Division shall be assigned by the clerk of thecircuit court to a calendar by random electronic process.  Each judge in the DomesticRelations Division is assigned to a team and to a calendar within each team.  Eachjudge who works with preliminary matters is assigned to a lettered calendar, andeach trial judge is assigned to a numbered calendar.     After the initial assignment of the Blair matter, the case was reassigned toJudge Berland, pursuant to Domestic Relations Division General Order 90-D-2, whichprovides that "cases between the same parties refiled in the Domestic RelationsDivision shall be transferred to the same preliminary [lettered] and/or trial[numbered] calendar on which the prior case was last pending regardless of theidentity of allegations contained in the petition or the relief sought."  General Order90-D-2 took effect on June 12, 1990.     Abe's Log Cabin, Ltd., of which plaintiff owned a 51% controlling interest, hadbecome involved in the litigation and filed a motion to substitute Judge Berland,which was heard on January 13, 1995.  On that day Judge Berland granted themotion and assigned the case to the clerk of the circuit court for random electronicassignment to a preliminary calendar other than Calendar E.  Prior to the time thatJudge Berland assigned the case to the clerk, he ruled on a number of motions in thecase, including plaintiff's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,which he denied.     The case was then randomly assigned to Team A, Judge Sheldon Gardner. Thereafter plaintiff filed a motion to substitute Judge Gardner as a matter of right. Judge Gardner granted the motion and transferred the case to the presiding judgefor reassignment.  The case was then randomly assigned to Team C, Judge PhilipBronstein.  Judge Bronstein heard plaintiff's motion to reconsider Judge Berland'searlier denial of plaintiff's motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matterjurisdiction.  Judge Bronstein found Illinois courts did have jurisdiction.     Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider Judge Bronstein's order thatIllinois has subject matter jurisdiction.  Plaintiff argued that he had become aresident of the Dominican Republic and that Patricia was a resident of Indiana. Plaintiff also argued that there was nothing for the court to adjudicate as he hadpreviously obtained a divorce from Patricia in the Dominican Republic.  All of thejudges dealing with this issue found that the Dominican decree lacked integrity andrefused to afford it comity.     Judge Bronstein conducted hearings during the months of February and Marchof 1995 on Patricia's motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminaryinjunction to prevent plaintiff from withdrawing all assets from the jurisdiction.  InMarch 1995, after a hearing, Judge Bronstein granted Patricia's motion for apreliminary injunction.  At the hearing on Patricia's motion, plaintiff filed a motionto stay further proceedings, based on the instant litigation.  Judge Bronstein deniedplaintiff's motion for stay.     On December 9, 1994, plaintiff filed his complaint in the circuit court in thisaction against defendants.  In his complaint, plaintiff asserted that General Order 90-D-2 was void because it contradicted other circuit court rules and because JudgeMackoff lacked the authority to issue it.  Plaintiff sought a declaration that thegeneral order was void and an injunction requiring Judge Mackoff to return thedivorce case to Judge Kaplan and enjoining Judge Berland from taking any furtheraction therein.     Judge Foreman denied plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order. Judges Mackoff and Berland filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1994)), whichthe trial court granted.  The instant appeal followed.                        ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW     On appeal, the issues are: (1) whether Domestic Relations Division GeneralOrder 90-D-2 was properly promulgated; and (2) whether Domestic Relations DivisionGeneral Order 90-D-2 violates our State's constitutionally mandated separation ofpowers of the three branches of Illinois government.                                  OPINION     As a preliminary matter we address a motion to dismiss this action as mootfiled in this court by defendants.  Specifically, defendants urge that this action ismoot because this court can no longer grant plaintiff any effectual relief.  Defendantscite the fact that the relief which plaintiff sought in his complaint in this action, theenjoining of Judge Berland from taking any further action in the divorce case and therequiring of Judge Mackoff to return the case to Judge Kaplan, can no longer begranted as the dissolution of marriage action has been settled between the Blairs anda judgment entered therein.     In HealthChicago, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 252 Ill. App. 3d 608, 610 (1993),the mootness doctrine was stated as follows:          "It is a well-recognized principle of law that a reviewing          court will decide only actual controversies in which the          interests or rights of the parties to the litigation can be          granted effectual relief.  [Citation.]  An appeal becomes          moot when a court can no longer effect the relief originally          sought by an appellant or when the substantial question          involved in the trial court no longer exists.  [Citation.]           When a case is rendered moot, a court's decision on the          merits cannot afford either party relief and any decision          thus reached is merely an advisory opinion."           HealthChicago, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 610.See also Dixon v. Chicago & Northwestern Transportation Co., 151 Ill. 2d 108 (1992). "Illinois courts do not issue advisory opinions and should not indulge in the practiceof rendering opinions simply for the sake of creating precedents to govern futurecases."  People v. Halasz, 244 Ill. App. 3d 284, 285-86 (1993).     However, Illinois courts have recognized an exception to the mootness doctrinewhen a case has an issue of substantial impact on the public interest.  Madison v.Nagel, 91 Ill. 2d 231, (1982).  "Among the criteria considered in determining theexistence of the requisite degree of public interest are the public or private nature ofthe question presented, the desirability of an authoritative determination for thefuture guidance of public officers, and the likelihood of future recurrence of thequestion."  People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 622 (1952).     We conclude that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine isapplicable to the case sub judice in that the three criteria of Labrenz are met.   Theissue of the constitutionality of General Order 90-D-2 is public in nature because itconcerns a question of whether our constitutionally mandated separation of powersin State government is being violated by the circuit court of Cook County.  Ourresolution of the constitutional issue in this case will have an impact uponmatrimonial litigants as well as clarify and further define the powers of the judiciary. An authoritative determination of the constitutional issue is desirable for the futureguidance of the courts as well as government and private attorneys.  Finally, this isa recurrent situation.  Thus, given the importance of the issues presented in thiscase, the public interest would not be served by passing on it.  That said, we nowturn to the substantive issues of the case.     We note that our review of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss is de novo.  SeeKedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112 (1993).     Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in not finding that GeneralOrder 90-D-2 was promulgated without authority and therefore void.  Specifically,plaintiff asserts that the general order is in conflict with General Order 15.3 and alsoCircuit Court of Cook County Rule 13.3(b)(i) which provides that "original petitionsshall be assigned at random to a team of judges.  Each team shall be identified by analphabetical designation and shall hear all matters pertaining to that case.  Thecalendar of the preliminary judge shall bear the alphabetical designation of theteam."  According to plaintiff, as General Order 90-D-2 contradicts General Order15.3 and Rule 13.3(b)(i), it is void.  We disagree.     General administrative and supervisory authority over all Illinois courts isvested in the supreme court of Illinois and shall be exercised with its rules.  Ill.Const. 1970, art. VI, � 16.  In addition, our 1970 Constitution provides that "[s]ubjectto the authority of the Supreme Court, the Chief Judge [of a Judicial Circuit] shallhave general administrative authority over his court, including authority to providefor divisions, general or specialized, and for appropriate times and places of holdingcourt."  Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, � 7(c).  Section 1-104 of the Code of Civil Procedurealso provides that, subject to the Supreme Court Rules, circuit courts may make rulesregulating their dockets, calendars and business.  735 ILCS 5/1-104 (West 1994).  Inaccord with this is Supreme Court Rule 21(b) which provides that: "[t]he chief judgeof each circuit may enter general orders in the exercise of his general administrativeauthority, including orders providing for assignment of judges, general or specializeddivision, and times and places of holding court."  134 Ill. 2d R. 21(b).  "Rule 21(b),adopted pursuant to section 7(c) of article VI of our constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.VI, sec. 7(c)), *** confers power on each chief judge to enter general orders for theassignment of judges, free from any express legislative limitations."  People v. Joseph,113 Ill. 2d 36, 46 (1986).     It is plaintiff's contention that Rule 21(b) merely permits assignment of judgesto specific calendars and divisions and does not allow for the assignment of individualcases.  We note that plaintiff cited no authority for this proposition and our researchfound nothing to support this position.  Rather, we believe this argument iscontradicted by the relevant caselaw.     In People v. Hattery, 183 Ill. App. 3d 785 (1989), this court found that theauthority of the presiding judge of the Criminal Division of the circuit court of CookCounty to assign a particular case flowed directly from the relevant provisions of the1970 Illinois Constitution, Supreme Court Rules, and a general order of the circuitcourt giving presiding judges general administrative powers, including the power toassign cases.  Furthermore, the Hattery court held that a "presiding judge maypersonally assign judges to individual cases, or may use, at his discretion,administrative tools such as computers to facilitate efficient court administration." Hattery, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 801.  This was true even where, as was the case inHattery, the customary way to assign a case was by random computer assignment.     Similarly, in People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36 (1986),  our supreme court foundthat a judge designated by the chief judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit had theauthority under the 1970 Illinois Constitution and Supreme Court Rule 21(b) (94 Ill.2d R. 21(b)) to assign a post-conviction petition to a particular judge.     Thus, contrary to plaintiff's unsupported argument, the determination of whichjudge will hear a particular case constitutes a wholly administrative, rather thansubstantive matter.  Accordingly, under the well-established principle that judicialpower includes the administration of the courts (People v. Felella, 131 Ill. 2d 525(1989)), this court has recognized that the judiciary possesses the constitutionalauthority to promulgate procedural rules to facilitate the discharge of its duties. Davidson v. Davidson, 243 Ill. App. 3d 537 (1993).  The power to assign judges is oneof the exclusive powers granted to the judiciary (People v. Dixon, 160 Ill. App. 3d 65(1989)) and a chief judge's administrative authority to use it is subject only to theauthority of the Illinois Supreme Court.  Hattery, 183 Ill. App. 3d 785.     In light of the foregoing, we find that the chief judge of the circuit court ofCook County had and, consequently, Judge Mackoff, as the chief judge's dulyauthorized delegate, had the administrative power under our 1970 Constitution andRule 21(b) to promulgate General Order 90-D-2 and that such power was properlyexercised with respect to General Order 90-D-2.  See Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36; Hattery,183 Ill. App. 3d 785.     Furthermore, we reject plaintiff's contention that General Order 90-D-2 is inconflict with General Order 15.3 and Circuit Court of Cook County Rule 13.3(b)(i)which provide for the random assignment of original actions.  General Order 15.3 andCircuit Court of Cook County Rule 13.3(b)(i) are completely silent on the handling ofrefiled petitions such as is the case here.  Moreover, we believe General Order 90-D-2is a necessary and altogether proper measure to prevent the type of forum shoppingin matrimonial litigation that was evident from the record in the case sub judice.     Still to be considered is plaintiff's contention that General Order 90-D-2 is inviolation of our 1970 Constitution's mandate that "[t]he legislative, executive, andjudicial branches are separate.  No branch shall exercise powers properly belongingto another."  Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, � 1.  Specifically, plaintiff argues that GeneralOrder 90-D-2 is in conflict with sections 2-1001 and 2-1009 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1001, 2-1009 (West 1994)).  This contention is completelywithout merit.     First, we fail to perceive how General Order 90-D-2 is in conflict with section2-1001, which provides for the substitution of judges.  This argument is underminedby the facts of this very case.  In no way was plaintiff impeded in exercising, throughhimself or his surrogate corporation, his rights under section 2-1001.  Second, weagain cannot see how General Order 90-D-2 is in conflict with section 2-1009 whichprovides for voluntary dismissals.  A reassignment under General Order 90-D-2 doesnot impede a litigant's ability to have a case dismissed without prejudice.  Therefore,nothing in the order conflicts with the General Assembly's mandates in the Code ofCivil Procedure or acts as an improper exercise of its legislative powers by thejudiciary.     For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County isaffirmed.     CERDA and GALLAGHER, JJ., concur.