J-A06041-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RYAN MATTHEW WOLF 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 11 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 10, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No: 

CP-07-CR-0000972-2019

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: JULY 19, 2022

Appellant, Ryan Matthew Wolf, appeals from the aggregate judgment of 

sentence of 88 to 244 months of confinement, which was imposed after his 

jury trial conviction for conspiracy, three counts of burglary of a building not 

adapted for overnight accommodation or occupied at the time of the burglary, 

three counts of theft by unlawful taking, three counts of receiving stolen 

property (RSP), one count of possession of an instrument of crime (PIC), and 

eight counts of criminal mischief.1 We affirm. 

The trial court made the following findings of facts in its suppression 

ruling: 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903(a)(1), 3502(a)(4), 3921(a), 3925(a), 907(a), and 

3304(a)(5), respectively. 
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As a result of the rash of burglaries in the City of Altoona, 

Detective Derrick Tardive testified that Corporal Shope assigned 

certain officers to conduct surveillance on different bars. On 

October 21, 2018, Detective Derrick Tardive was working third 

shift, as a patrolman, and was assigned to look for suspicious 

conduct in the area of the Black and Gold Tavern. At 

approximately 6:00 a.m. on October 21, 2018, Detective Tardive 

was sitting in an unmarked car on 5th Avenue at the intersection 

of 5th Avenue and 30th Street approximately a block from the Black 

and Gold Tavern. The Black and Gold Tavern is located at 2927 

6

th Avenue and sits on 30th Street. On October 21, 2018 at 

approximately 6:00 a.m. Detective Tardive observed a black Kia 

Sorrento drive slowly past him on 5th Avenue. The vehicle then 

came around the block and remained at the stop sign at the 

intersection of 30th Street and 5th Avenue facing the location of 

the Black and Gold Tavern for a long period of time without a valid 

traffic reason as there was no other traffic going through the 

intersection. The black Kia Sorrento then proceeded further into 

the intersection towards the Black and Gold Tavern and stopped 

in the middle of the intersection facing the bar for an extended 

period of time. The vehicle then turned and suddenly drove away 

and the Detective testified it was his impression that the 

occupants of the Kia Sorrento may have spotted him in the 

unmarked vehicle. The detective testified that it was dark and 

there was no other traffic around at the time the Kia Sorrento was 

driving in the area of the Black and Gold Tavern. Detective 

Tardive testified that he initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle as a 

result of what he determined to be suspicious activity. 

The Commonwealth stipulated at the hearing held on February 25, 

2020 that there was no vehicle code violation and that there was 

a Terry stop for reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was 

afoot. The driver of the vehicle was identified as Taylor Wunder. 

Detective Tardive read Ms. Wunder her Miranda rights and then

questioned Ms. Wunder on what she was doing and where she was 

going. He testified that Ms. Wunder stated they had come from a 

friend’s house and the passengers were giving her directions and 

she was not sure where she was going. The front seat passenger 

was Jordan Ramsey and the back seat passenger was the instant 

[Appellant]. At the time of the investigatory stop, all three 

individuals were removed from the vehicle, questioned about the 

burglaries and all three denied knowledge of the burglaries. 

Detective Tardive observed in plain sight on the floor of the rear 

of the vehicle the following: a black pry bar; an electric drill with 
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a large drill bit, a pair of black gloves, bolt cutters and the long 

wooden handle of another tool sticking out from under a blanket. 

The male occupants of the vehicle were dressed in dark clothing. 

[Appellant] was wearing a baseball style hat and he had a winter 

face mask stuffed up underneath the cap. [Appellant] was 

wearing a lighter colored shirt under a dark hoodie. Detective 

Tardive terminated the stop and did not make any arrests.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 6/5/20, at 7-9.

Subsequent to the traffic stop, a search warrant was submitted 

regarding the driver of the vehicle, Taylor Wunder. After subsequent 

investigation, Appellant was charged by criminal complaint on November 21, 

2018 with four counts of burglary of a building not adapted for overnight 

accommodation or occupied at the time of the burglary, nine counts of criminal 

conspiracy, four counts of theft unlawful taking, four counts of RSP, nine 

counts of criminal mischief, nine counts of possession of an instrument of 

crime, and five counts of attempted burglary.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress the traffic stop based on a lack of 

reasonable suspicion. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. 

Order, 6/5/20. Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on August 11, 2020 and on 

August 13, 2020 the jury found Appellant guilty of the charges indicated in 

the first paragraph of this memorandum. The trial court sentenced Appellant 

on November 10, 2020. Order, 11/10/20. 
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On December 28, 2020, Appellant filed this timely notice of appeal.2 

Appellant presents the following issues for our review. 

1. Whether the Suppression Court erred in not suppressing the 

observations of the police at the unlawful traffic stop of Taylor 

Wunder’s vehicle and further at suppressing the search warrant 

of Taylor Wunder’s vehicle and home based on the above 

unlawful traffic stop? 

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] request 

to suppress the testimony of Taylor Wunder because the 

written statement of Taylor Wunder made to police at the 

district attorney’s office prior to trial was not provided to 

defense counsel prior to or at trial [and] only an audio tape of 

the statement was provided the day before the commencement 

of trial? 

3. Whether the Sentencing Court abused its discretion in imposing 

sentence of 88 to 224 months incarceration when the sentence 

in Court disregarded [Appellant] was suffering from drug and 

alcohol issues at the time of his offenses, these were property 

crimes and the sentence was not consistent with protection of 

the public, the gravity of the offenses as it relates to impact on 

the life of the victims and community, and the rehabilitative 

needs of the [Appellant] so rendering the sentence excessive 

and unduly harsh? 

Appellant’s Brief, at 6-7 (suggested answers omitted). 

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth did not establish reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity warranting a stop of the vehicle because the 

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2 The trial court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement within 

21 days of the date of the order. Order, 12/24/20. Appellant timely filed his 

Rule 1925(b) statement along with a request to file an amended Rule 1925(b) 

statement. Rule 1925(b) statement, 1/14/21. The trial court granted 

Appellant’s request to file an amended Rule 1925(b) statement, due February 

12, 2021. Order, 2/3/21. Appellant filed a timely amended Rule 1925(b) 

statement on February 12, 2021. It appears that Appellant intended, and the 

trial court considered, his amended Rule 1925(b) statement to be 

supplemental to his original statement. See TCO at 3-5. 
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vehicle stop was a hunch by the Detective to go on a fishing expedition, 

questioning the occupants and looking inside the vehicle. Appellant’s Brief, at 

17. 

The standard and scope of review for a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are supported 

by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those 

facts are correct. When reviewing the rulings of a suppression 

court, this Court considers only the evidence of the prosecution 

and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. 

When the record supports the findings of the suppression court, 

we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal 

conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

Initially, we note

[t]he Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the State by way of 

the Fourteenth Amendment . . . guarantees “the right of the 

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Time and again, 

this Court has observed that searches and seizures “‘conducted 

outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 

magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and 

well delineated exceptions.’” . . . One such exception was 

recognized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which held that

“where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him 

reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal 

activity may be afoot” the officer may briefly stop the suspicious 

person and make “reasonable inquiries” aimed at confirming or 

dispelling his suspicions.

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 655 A.2d 557, 560 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citations 

and brackets omitted). “The determination of whether an officer had 
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reasonable suspicion that criminality was afoot so as to justify an investigatory 

detention is an objective one, which must be considered in light of the totality 

of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 96 (Pa. 

2011).

[I]n light of all the circumstances, a police officer’s reasonable and 

articulable belief that criminal activity is afoot must be linked with 

his observation of suspicious or irregular behavior of the particular 

defendant stopped.

Wilson, 655 A.2d at 561.

[T]o demonstrate reasonable suspicion, an officer “must be able

to point to specific and articulable facts and reasonable inferences

drawn from those facts in light of the officer's experience.” . . .

Thus, in order to establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must

articulate specific facts in addition to inferences based on those

facts, to support his belief that criminal activity was afoot.

Holmes, 14 A.3d at 96–97 (citation omitted). “Traffic stops based on

a reasonable suspicion: either of criminal activity or a violation of the

Motor Vehicle Code under the authority of Section 6308(b) must serve a

stated investigatory purpose.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 

1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

Terry requires reasonable suspicion, and its purpose is to allow

immediate investigation through temporarily maintaining 

the status quo. If reasonable suspicion exists, but a stop cannot

further the purpose behind allowing the stop, the “investigative”

goal as it were, it cannot be a valid stop.

Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 114–15 (Pa. 2008).
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The trial court’s findings of facts are supported by the record. Detective 

Tardive testified that he was in an unmarked car parked on 5th Avenue at the 

intersection of 5

th Avenue and 30th Street, approximately a half block from the 

Black and Gold Tavern, which was closed at the time. N.T., 2/25/20, at 22. 

At approximately 6:00 a.m. he observed the vehicle in which Appellant was a 

passenger pass his car and then “come back around the block.” Id., at 23, 

24, 27. He clarified that the car “had already driven past the bar . . . past me 

through that intersection, came around the block and then I had recognized it 

from already seeing it.” Id., at 32-33. Detective Tardive stated the car then 

stopped “for a long period of time at a stop sign,” at the intersection of 5th

Avenue and 30th Street, facing north on 30th Street, “which had a direct line 

of sight to see the bar,” and agreed that the car had a clear vantage point to 

the entrances and exits of the Black and Gold Tavern. Id., at 23, 32. 

Detective Tardive then observed the vehicle as it “crept further into the 

intersection towards the bar, so facing the bar and stopped and sat in the 

middle of the intersection for, again, an extended period of time.” Id., at 23. 

He did not recall exactly how long the car was stopped in the middle of the 

intersection, but stated it was “a long, very long period of time.” Id., at 24. 

He testified that there were “no other vehicles out at this point,” id., at 24,

and it was “very dark” outside. Id., at 23. Detective Tardive stated that he 

saw no reason for the vehicle to stop, there were “no other vehicles out at this 

point,” and “there’s no reason to stop for pedestrians walking through”

because he did not observe any pedestrian traffic. Id., at 24, 29-30. 
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Additionally, he stated that the area contains “mostly residences.” Id. He

testified that “if there were multiple vehicles around [the vehicle’s behavior] 

would have been an issue.” Id., at 32. After stopping in the intersection, he 

stated that “they suddenly took a turn and went past me.” Id., at 23. 

Detective Tardive testified that he made the traffic stop in order to 

“identify the people and make sure that they weren’t doing anything illegal,” 

based on the “suspicious activity” that he described above. Id., at 24, 30. 

He stated that he was concerned about the bar. Id., at 33. He identified 

Appellant as a passenger in the backseat of the car. Id., at 26. Detective 

Tardive testified that he observed “multiple [] tools such as pry bars, a drill 

with a large drill bit on it, gloves and some other things that were covered up 

by a blanket. It appeared to be a long wooden object from what I recall.” 

Id., at 26. He stated that he read the driver, Taylor Wunder, her Miranda

rights and asked her “what she was doing and where she was going,” and she 

stated that “other passengers were giving her directions and she was not sure 

where she was going.” Id., at 24-25. He testified that he “had [Appellant] 

step out” of the vehicle. Id., at 34. Detective Tardive stated that did not 

arrest any of the occupants and he reported his findings back to Corporal 

Swope and then later to Sargeant Worley. Id., at 27. 

The trial court concluded that

[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances including his training, 

experience, observations and reasonable inferences therefrom, 

Detective Tardive had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 

was afoot when he stopped the vehicle in which Defendant was a 

passenger. The vehicle stop, conducted by Detective Tardive, was 
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legally appropriate and the information obtained as a result of the 

investigative stop may be used in the trial of [Appellant]. 

TCO, 6/5/20, at 11. 

It is well settled that to justify their decision to stop and briefly 

detain appellant, the police need not establish their suspicions to 

a level of certainty, a preponderance, or even a fair probability. 

The suspect’s expectation of privacy is not sufficiently infringed by 

the minimal intrusion attendant to an investigatory stop as to 

require any more than a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 

was afoot. Though not tantamount to a “hunch,” the requisite 

quantum of suspicion necessary to conduct an investigatory stop 

is a level “obviously less demanding than for probable cause.”

Commonwealth v. Fink, 700 A.2d 447, 449 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citation 

omitted).

[T]he totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry 

to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal 

conduct. Rather, “even a combination of innocent facts, when 

taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police 

officer.”

Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation 

omitted). 

We find that the trial court’s legal conclusion is correct. Detective 

Tardive had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in question. He pointed 

to specific, articulable facts as to why he did so. In addition to the facts he 

articulated, Detective Tardive was aware that there were eight other 

burglaries of bars in the area and he was assigned to a special detail based on 

the rash of burglaries of bars in the area. The facts, in light of his five years’ 

experience as a patrolman, led him to draw the reasonable inference that 
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criminal activity was afoot in the vehicle in question. See Commonwealth

v. Green, No. 172 MDA 2019, 2020 WL 241534, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 

15, 2020) (unpublished memorandum)3 (under the totality of circumstances, 

officer’s knowledge and experience concerning the reputation of the trail 

parking lot after hours and his observation of the two vehicles parked sideby-side in the unlit lot after hours without any obvious signs of park 

recreational equipment, establish that officer had specific and articulable 

reasonable facts that led him to suspect that criminal activity was afoot); see 

also Commonwealth v. Brame, 239 A.3d 1119, 1132 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(officer articulated reasonable suspicion to stop appellant where he articulated 

the following: from ten to fifteen feet away he viewed appellant’s car parked 

in the parking lot of an apartment building, a distance from the entrance, 

observed a second vehicle pull into the parking space directly next to 

appellant's vehicle, observed appellant throw a knotted plastic bag out of his

passenger side window into the other vehicle through the driver’s side window

and then observed the female driver throw loosely balled-up United States

currency into appellant’s vehicle and then immediately drove out of the 

parking lot); c.f. Commonwealth v. Rohrbach, 267 A.3d 525, 528-29 (Pa. 

Super. 2021) (officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop appellant’s car 

____________________________________________

3 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of the 

Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for 

their persuasive value). 
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parked in parking lot based on general complaint by gym owner that the lot 

was used for drug use where officer did not articulate anything specific about 

appellant’s vehicle); Commonwealth v. Ayala, 791 A.2d 1202, 1211 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop appellant where he 

did not articulate any individualized or particularized suspicion that appellant 

was involved in criminal activity). 

We further note that the testimony shows that Detective Tardive asked 

the occupants to exit the vehicle and ultimately released them without arrest. 

We find that he acted within the scope of an investigatory detention. 

Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142, 150 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“Out of 

concern for officer safety, Pennsylvania search and seizure jurisprudence also 

permits certain limited intrusions upon the liberty of passengers in lawfully 

detained vehicles. Hence, officers may order passengers to remain in a car 

for the duration of a lawful stop. . . . [And] police officers may compel 

passengers to exit a lawfully stopped vehicle.”). Here, the stop was based on 

reasonable suspicion, and Appellant’s argument that Detective Tardive’s 

observations of both Appellant’s presence and the burglary tools in the rear of 

the vehicle must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree fails. 

Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s 

request to preclude his co-defendant’s testimony implicating Appellant in 

additional burglaries based on discovery violations. Appellant’s co-defendant, 

Taylor Wunder, gave an initial statement to the police in 2018 implicating 

Appellant in five burglaries. Prior to trial, Ms. Wunder made an additional 
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statement to police at the district attorney’s office implicating Appellant in 8 

burglaries. According to Appellant, the audio tape of the additional statement 

was provided to Appellant’s counsel the day before the commencement of 

trial. Appellant’s Brief, at 20. First, Appellant first argues that the failure of 

the Commonwealth to provide a written copy of Taylor Wunder’s statement 

was a violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 573. Id., at 21.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573 states, in pertinent part, 

(2) Discretionary With the Court.

(a) In all court cases, except as otherwise provided in Rules 230 

(Disclosure of Testimony Before Investigating Grand Jury) and 

556.10 (Secrecy; Disclosure), if the defendant files a motion for 

pretrial discovery, the court may order the Commonwealth to 

allow the defendant’s attorney to inspect and copy or photograph 

any of the following requested items, upon a showing that they 

are material to the preparation of the defense, and that the 

request is reasonable:

. . . 

(iii) all written and recorded statements, and substantially 

verbatim oral statements, made by co-defendants, and by 

co-conspirators or accomplices, whether such individuals 

have been charged or not

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573 (2)(a)(iii). Appellant did not raise this discovery violation

with the trial court. Therefore, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues 

not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time 

on appeal.”). 

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

preclude Taylor Wunder’s statement due to its belated disclosure. “[W]here 
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disclosure is discretionary with the court, error will not be found where an 

appellant does not assert specific examples of possible prejudice before the 

lower court.” Commonwealth v. Rineer, 456 A.2d 591, 593 (Pa. Super. 

1983) (citation omitted). 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated, 

prior to the commencement of the jury trial on August 11, 2020, 

defense counsel raised what appears to be a late discovery 

allegation about an audio recording of a proffer from Taylor 

Wunder. The defense asserts that the audio tape proffer of Taylor 

Wunder included Ms. Wunder implicating the Defendant in more 

crimes than what was initially presented in her previous 

statements and discovery. The Commonwealth asserts that they 

had provided the details of Taylor Wunder’s testimony to the 

defense in prior conversations. As a result of the late receipt of 

the audio tape, defense counsel requested that the Court exclude 

the testimony of Taylor Wunder. 

This Court engaged in a back and forth with defense counsel on 

the record. Defense counsel acknowledged that they did in fact 

have the audio tape in their possession on the morning of trial and 

had an opportunity to listen to the recording. When defense 

counsel indicated that they were prejudiced due to the late receipt 

of the audio tape, this Court inquired as to the nature of the 

prejudice. The defense acknowledged that their strategy would 

not change as a result of the audio recording. The defense initially 

indicated that the prejudice existed because they would no longer 

have the benefit of accepting a plea agreement that had expired. 

This Court questioned defense counsel as to whether or not 

[Appellant] would now be willing to accept the plea offer that was 

made prior to jury selection and the defense confirmed that the 

defendant would not be willing to do so. 

In light of the above, this Court indicated that we didn’t see any 

prejudice to [Appellant] as a result of the late receipt of the audio 

tape. [Appellant] was aware that Taylor Wunder was going to be 

a Commonwealth witness. The Court also sought and received 

assurance from the Commonwealth that they would not call Taylor 

Wunder as [a] witness on the first day of trial so as to give the 

defense counsel additional time to prepare for the cross-
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examination of Taylor Wunder. This Court felt that the defense 

receiving the audio tape prior to trial and having the additional 

evening was sufficient to allow the defense counsel to have more 

time to prepare for cross-examination, especially in light of the 

fact that it was not a surprise that the witness was going to be 

testifying against the Defendant. This court believes that we 

handled the matter appropriately and we stand by our decision. 

TCO, 2/17/21, at 7-8.

Upon review of the record, we find that Appellant’s argument lacks merit 

because he failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the late receipt 

of the statement. Rineer, 456 A.2d at 593. Upon questioning by the trial 

court, Counsel stated that his defense of Appellant would not change. N.T., 

8/11/20, at 4. He also agreed with the trial court that delaying Ms. Wunder’s 

testimony by a day would assist him in preparing for her cross-examination. 

Id., at 3-4. Lastly, Counsel stated that his client would not accept the plea at 

trial. Id., at 3-8. The trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s request to 

preclude the testimony of Ms. Wunder.

Lastly, Appellant argues that the sentencing court abused its discretion 

in imposing a harsh and excessive sentence. Appellant’s issue is a challenge 

to the discretionary aspects of his sentences and is therefore not appealable 

as of right. Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 

2018); Commonwealth v. Bynum-Hamilton, 135 A.3d 179, 184 (Pa. 

Super. 2016). 

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right. Prior to reaching the 

merits of a discretionary sentencing issue[, w]e conduct a fourpart analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a 

timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether 
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the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to 

reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; 

(3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); 

and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence 

appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 489 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(quotation marks and some citations omitted). Appellant filed a timely notice 

of appeal and properly preserved this issue in a post-sentence motion and 

included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief. Appellant’s Brief, at 25. 

Next, we turn to whether Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement raised a 

substantial question that the sentence is not appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code.

Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about 

the appropriateness of sentence is a question to be evaluated on 

a case-by-case basis.

. . . 

We have found that a substantial question exists “when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing 

judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the 

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” . . . 

“[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of questions presented

and the prefatory [Rule] 2119(f) statement to determine whether

a substantial question exists.”

Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 467–68 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citations omitted) (brackets in original).

Appellant asserts in his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement,

the imposition of the eighty-eight (88) to two hundred twentyfour (224) month sentence which involved consecutive sentences 
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on each offense, each at the top of the standard range, was 

excessive and unduly harsh considering [Appellant] committed 

these property crimes where no one was hurt or threatened, only 

to get money to buy drugs and satisfy his addiction. 

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 22 A.3d 1263 (Pa. Super. 2013). The 

aggregate sentence misapprehended the nature and 

circumstances of the offenses of which [Appellant] was convicted 

in contravention of 42 Pa.C.S. Section 9781(d)(1) so the sentence 

was not commensurate with the offenses, rendering it 

unreasonable and contrary to the fundamental norms of the 

Sentencing Code. 

Appellant’s Brief, at 25. In his Statement of Questions, presented to this 

Court, Appellant argues that the trial court disregarded the facts that he was 

suffering from drug and alcohol issues at the time of his offenses, no one was 

injured, these were property crimes and the sentence was, therefore, 

inconsistent with protection of the public, the gravity of the offenses as it 

relates to impact on the life of the victims and community, and the 

rehabilitative needs of the Defendant, so rendering the sentence excessive 

and unduly harsh. Appellant’s Brief, at 7. See Radecki, 180 A.3d at 468

(this Court should not look beyond 2119(f) statement and statement of 

question presented to determine if substantial question presented).

Here, Appellant raises an excessive sentence claim based, not solely on 

the consecutive nature of the charges, but because the trial court disregarded 

his rehabilitative needs and that the sentence was disproportionate to the 

crimes. A claim that a sentence within statutory limits is excessive is generally 

not sufficient to raise a substantial question, absent a claim that the sentence 

violates a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or that the sentencing 

court did not consider the sentencing guidelines or factors concerning the 
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crimes and the defendant that a sentencing court is to consider under the 

Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656, 662 (Pa. 

Super. 2015); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 47 A.3d 155, 159 (Pa. Super. 

2012); Commonwealth v. Titus, 816 A.2d 251, 255–56 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

We find that Appellant has raised a substantial question for our review. See 

Zeigler, 112 A.3d at 662; Fisher, 47 A.3d at 159; Titus, 816 A.2d at 255–

56. We turn to the merits of Appellant’s discretionary sentence issue. 

We are guided by the following. “The appellate court shall vacate the 

sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it 

finds . . . the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but 

the case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would 

be clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781 (c)(2). “In all other cases, the 

appellate court shall affirm the sentence imposed by the sentencing court.” 

Id. We note, 

[w]here the sentencing court had the benefit of a [PSI], we 

can assume the sentencing court was aware of the relevant 

information regarding the defendant’s character and 

weighed those considerations along with mitigating 

statutory factors. Further, where a sentence is within the 

standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views 

the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Radecki, 180 A.3d at 471 (citation omitted).

The sentences are within the statutory limits. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104 

(sentence of imprisonment for misdemeanor); 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103 (sentence 

of imprisonment for felony). The guidelines are as follows: for conspiracy to 
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commit burglary, graded as a second degree felony, the standard range is 12-

18 months’ incarceration, the mitigated range is 9 months, and the 

aggravated range is 21 months; for PIC, graded as a first degree 

misdemeanor, the standard range is 6 to 16 months’ incarceration, the

mitigated range is 3 months, and the aggravated range is 19 months; for 

burglary, graded as a second degree felony, the standard range is 12 to 18 

months’ incarceration, the mitigated range is 9 months, and the aggravated 

range is 21 months. See Guideline Sentence Forms; N.T. Sentencing, 

11/10/20, at 6-7, 14. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 18-48 months’ 

incarceration for conspiracy, 18-48 months’ incarceration each on the three 

counts of burglary, and 16-32 months’ incarceration for PIC. Each of these 

sentences was at the high end of the standard range under the guidelines. 

See Guideline Sentence Forms. The trial court ordered the sentences to run 

consecutively. The trial court imposed fines, costs and restitution at two 

counts of criminal mischief graded as third degree felonies, one count of 

criminal mischief graded as a second degree misdemeanor, and five summary 

criminal mischief charges. 

At Appellant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court heard testimony from 

a witness representing the small business owners who were burgled, N.T.

Sentencing, 11/10/20, at 7-8, from Appellant’s Aunt, id., at 14-16, and from 

Appellant. Id., at 16-17. The trial court received the PSI. Id., at 1-3. 

The trial court stated, 
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[T]he Court had the opportunity to preside over the trial of this 

case and we have – so as a result of that we are aware of the 

specific crimes that are at issue here and the impact that those 

crimes have had on the Altoona community and specifically the 

victims in the case. We also note that the presentence 

investigation was reviewed by the Court and carefully considered 

in all of its aspects, factors in that presentence investigation that 

weigh in favor of the defendant but also facts that weigh against 

the defendant. Specifically, the presentence investigation does 

include some victim information and victim comments as part of 

the presentence investigation, which the Court has considered. 

We do think that crimes of this nature tend to impact victims 

substantially and the court believes that that’s an important factor 

for consideration in sentencing. We also note that the nature of 

these particular crimes in the fairly brief period of time that they 

occurred within the city of Altoona also placed the business owners 

with a lot of anxiety and the community in general anxiety 

because of the nature of the crimes and there [sic] effect on the 

business community. So we think that these are important 

considerations for the Court to take into account. 

We also acknowledge, however, that [Appellant] does have minor 

children. It’s important to take into consideration [Appellant’s]

family into any sentencing proceeding and we also note that while 

[Appellant] does have a lengthy criminal history, it appears that a 

review of the presentence investigation does not indicate that he 

had served any lengthy periods of time in state prison prior to 

these offenses. That’s not to say that he didn’t spend time in state 

prison because he did for it looks like drug offenses but none of 

the magnitude that a sentence like this would cause. So the Court 

believes that we have considered all of the facts in the case and 

we believe that the sentence that we are going to implement in 

this case is fair and reasonable but also takes into account the 

impact that we believe that the crime has had on the community 

and on these victims. 

Id., at 18-19. 

We do not find that Appellant’s case involves circumstances “where the 

application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9781(c)(2). The trial court adequately considered the rehabilitative needs of 
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Appellant, as it “carefully considered” the PSI. N.T. Sentencing, 11/10/20, at 

18. Additionally, we find the sentence is consistent with the protection of the 

public and the gravity of the offenses as it relates to impact on the life of the 

victims and community. Appellant was sentenced within the standard range 

of the sentencing guidelines to each charge for which he received a sentence. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in running some of the sentences 

consecutively where, as here, the resulting total aggregate sentence is not 

extremely lengthy for the criminal conduct at issue, the crimes for which 

consecutive sentences were imposed arose out of separate conduct, and there 

is no basis for a claim that the sentencing court failed to consider mitigating 

factors. Radecki, 180 A.3d at 470-71; Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 

127, 133-34 (Pa. Super. 2014). The choice between consecutive and 

concurrent sentences is solely within the discretion of the trial court. See, 

Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 153-54 (Pa. Super. 2004). We 

therefore conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in imposing 

consecutive sentences after reviewing the record, including any mitigating 

factors, and the PSI. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/19/2022