### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 15, 200 5 S es sio n



### STA TE OF TENNESS EE v. J AMES RIELS

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty

No. 03-06530 Chris Cr aft, Jud ge

No. W2004-02832-C CA-R 3-DD - F iled March 31, 2006

The a ppellant, J ames Riels, appe als his sentence s of death imposed by a Shelby CountyCriminal Court jury

. On September 18, 2003, a Shelby CountyGra nd J ury

char g ed the a

ppellant with one count of fir st deg ree felony murder f or the de ath of Mary

J ane Cruc hon, one count of first deg ree preme ditated murder for the death of Mary J ane Cruchon, one count of first deg ree felony murder for the death of

Fr anchion Pollack, onecount of fir st deg ree preme ditated murder for the de ath of Fr anchion Pollack, one count of e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

of F ranc hion Poll ack, one count of attempted espe cially

ag g ravated robb er yof Mary J ane Cruc hon, and one c ount of ag g ravated bu rg lary of the ha bit a tio n o f Ma

ry Jane Cruc ho n. On Au g us t 9, 20 04 , th e app e lla nt e nte re d g uil ty pleas to al l s ev en counts. The tria l court merg ed the f elony murder c onvictions with the preme ditated m urder convictions, resulting in two convictions for f irst deg ree murder. A jury was impaneled f

or the sente ncing phase, and on Aug ust 13, 2004, the jury imposed the dea th penalty for the murder

of ea ch victim. I n the dea th of Mary J ane Cruc hon, the jury

unanim o u s l y

found the prese nce of three statutory ag g ravating circ umstances. I n the death of F ranc hion Poll ack, the jury unanimously found the prese nce of four statutory ag g ravating circ umstances. The jury fu rt her determined that the ag g ravating c ircumstance s outweig hed any mitigating circ umstances. The trial court a pproved the sentenc ing verdic t. I n a separ ate sentenc ing he aring , the trial court imposed an

e ff e c tiv e thi rt y -f

ive -y e ar s e nte nc e fo r the re ma ini ng no nc apit a l c on vic tio ns . T he app e lla nt a pp e a ls, presen ti ng fo r o ur

re vie w the fo llo wi ng iss ue s: ( 1) wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y ov e rr uli ng his mot ion to s up pr e ss, (2 ) w he the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y pe rm itt ing the State to c ro ss- e xami ne him reg arding the circumstances of the offe nses, (3) w hether the trial court erre d by

permitting the introduction of a post-m o rt em p h otogr aph of one of the victims, (4) whe ther the tria l court’s instruction that the appellant’ s prior offenses were offe nses whose statutory elements involved the

use of violence violated the United States Constit ution, (5) whethe r the trial c ourt’s instruction on vic tim imp a c t e vid e nc e c on sti tut e d a c oe rc ive jury ins truc tio n, a nd(6 ) w he the r T e nn e sse e ’s de a th penalty scheme is unconstitutional. Finding no e rror s requiring reve rsal, we aff irm the appe llant’s sentenc es of de ath.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Cr im ina l C our t a r e Affir m e d.-2-

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R

. and J.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

Tony N. B rayton, Garla nd Erg uden, and Robe rt W i l son J ones (on a ppeal) and L arry

Nanc e and L a To ny a B ur ro w ( a t tria l) , M e mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Jame s Ri e ls.

Paul G. Summers, A ttorney Gene ral and Reporte r; Michelle Chapma n McI ntire, Assistant Attorney Ge ne ra l; Wil lia m L . G ibb on s, Di stric t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; andGe ra ld H arris a ndMic he lle Park s, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

The a ppellant enter ed g uiltypleas to all four counts of first deg ree murder, and t he trial c ourt merg ed the c onvictions into t wo counts of f irst d egree murde r. Ther eaf ter, a jury was impane led, and the pe nalty

phase of the trial beg an, during which the jury imposed a sentenc e of de ath for e ach

m u r d e r c o n v i c t i o n

. T h e t r i a l c o u r tl a t e r o r d e r e d t h a t t h e s e t w o s e n t e n c e s b e s e r v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y. The a ppellant also pled g uiltyto the rema ining c har g e s o f e s p ecia lly

ag g ravated robbe ry

of F ranc hion Pollack, attempted espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry

of Mary J ane Cruc h on, and ag g ravated burg lary of the ha bitation of Mary

J ane Cruc hon. The a

p p el l ant does not challeng e the se ntence s imposed fo r the no nc apit a l c on vic tio ns in this app e a l.

A. Ev ide nc e a t th e Pe na lty Pha se

Nadi n e Cr

u c h o n te s ti f

ie d th a t in A p r il 2 0 0 3
, h e r f if ty

- n in e

- y e ar

- o ld s is te r , M ar yJ ane Cruchon, re sided at 3818 Shirlwood in the Hig h Point Ter rac e are a of Memphis. Eig hty -nine-y ear

old Fra nchion Pollack lived nex t door at 3810 Shirlwood. The two neig hbors were e x tremely close. Mary J ane Cruc hon was a

reg istered nur se and took care of her neig hbors when the y neede d help. Pol la c k li ve d a lon e , a ndCruc ho n w ou ld take he r to doc tor a pp oin tme nts a nd inv ite he r ove r t o e a t. When Poll ack f

ell and broke her shoulder , Cruchon bec ame e ven more of a c are taker to Poll ack.

Over Easter wee kend, Na dine Cruchon visited anothe r sister in New Orlea ns and re turned to M e mph is the Tu e sd a y e ve nin g a ft e r Ea ste r. Up on arrivi ng in M e mph is, Na din e he ardon the ra dio that there had bee n a shooting in the Hig h Point Terrac e ar ea. Conc erne d for he r sister and Fr anchion Pollack, Nadine went to the ir houses on Shirlwood a nd was met by newspa per r eporte rs-3-

and policeme n. The entrance s to the hom es we re r oped off by the police, a nd an off

icer informed Nadine that Pollack was at The Med in se rious condition. Nadine’ s sister was dead. N adine we nt to The Med a nd visited with P ollack, who wa s unconscious.

Na din e Cruc ho n te sti fi e d th a t her sis te r’ s death wa s dev a statin g to h e r a s w e ll a s to the re st of he r sib lin g s. She e xpla ine d th a t sh e ha d a br oth e r, Da vid , w ho liv e d in B art le tt, a ndtw o s ist e rs , on e i n N e w O r l e a n s a n d o n e i n S a n D i e g o

. N a d i n e s t a t e d t h a ts h e “ f e l tl i k e t h a t[s h e ] a c t ua lly

wa nte d to die [he r]s e lf .” She wa s very c los e to h e r s ist e r, a ndsh e ne ve r i ma g ine d th a t sh e “ wo uld have to g o throug h something like this.”

Offic er K enneth Calhoun of the Memphis Police Depa rtment testified that on April 22, 2003, he an d h is partner

responde d to a re port that someone wa s hurt in front of a home on Shirlwood. Whe n th e y

arrive d, Ste ve n M e a d, wh o ide nti fi e d hims e lf a s a han dy ma n wor kin g a t th e ho me , to ld them that he had disc overe d some people in the home. T h e o fficers we nt inside and found two fema les “laying dow n in blood.” Offic er Calhoun notice d that the ol der victim was sti ll alive and called f or eme rg ency

help.

Offic er G era ld Pa g e te s ti f

ied that he photog raphe d the crime scene . When he ar rived, Pollack had bee n remove d from the home. I n perf orming his duties, Offic er Pag e noticed that a television appea red to be missing from a television stand. He also saw bloodstains surrounding Cruchon’s body and bloodstains in a bathroom, the w est bedroom, the north bedroom, the foy er, and the living

ro om.

Memphis Poli ce O ffice r Timothy Sims testi fied that he was the c ase c oordinator f or the incidents occ urring on Shirlwood. As a re sult of his investigation, Of

fice r Sims talked with each employ ee of

the contracting company that had been working on Pollack’s residence. This included the app e lla nt.

On April 24, 2003, the a

ppellant arrived at the homicide office acc ompanied by his mother. Offic er Sims ob s erved that the appe llant appea red “ normal” a nd did not appear to be under

the inf lue nc e of a ny dr ug s o r a lc oh ol. Of

fi c e r S ims int e rv ie we d th e app e lla nt bu t di d n ot r e a d h im h is ri g hts be c a us e the app ella nt w a s n ot u nd e r a rr e st a t th a t ti me . D ur ing the int e rv ie w, Of fi c e r S ims learned that the a

ppellant had be en wor

king at Poll ack’ s home and had been there sever al times. The appellant r elated that he had be en wor king at the home on April 21 when his e quipment broke down. The a ppellant stated that he left the re sidence
, went home, chang ed clothes, picked up a fe male, we nt looking f or cr ack co ca i n e, an d t hen re turned to Pollack’s home la ter in the da y . The a ppellant’s statements made Offic er Sims suspicious. As a result, Off icer Sims asked f

or permission t o sear ch the appe llant’s home, and the a ppellant conse nted to the s ea rc h

. Of fice r Sims left the police dep ar tm e n t a n d w e n t to th e ap p e ll a n t’ s h o me , w h ic h h e s h ar e d w ith h is mo th e r

. T h e appe llant’s mother led Of

fice r Sims to a g arba g e can in the driveway that contained the clothing the appellant-4-

had bee n wea

ring on the eve ning of

April 21, 2003. Off

icer Sims saw what appeare d to be blood on the pair of b ro wn boot s, the pair of blue jeans, a nd the blue shirt containe d in the g arba g e ca n. Of fi c e r S ims re turne d to the po lic e de pa rt me nt a nda dv ise d th e app e lla nt o f h is rig hts

.

The a ppellant voluntar i l y

g ave a statement to offic ers in which he admitted killing the victims. The appellant state d that he knew both women bec ause he was wor kin g on Pollack’s

re sid e nc e

. On the e ve nin g of Mo nd a y , A pr il 2 1, 20 03 , th e app e lla nt r e turne d to Pol la c k’ s h ome in

a re d For d F- 150 pickup truck ow ned by his employ er, A llen J ohn s o n

. T h e ap p ell ant had a claw ha mme r i n th e truc k w ith him . T he app e lla nt d e sc ri be d th e e ve nts of Ap ri l 21 , 2 00 3, a s f

oll ow s:

I g ot there a

bout 8 : 0 0 a. m. Monday

morning and proce eded to unload my tools a nd work on the house. I worke d on the hous e all day until 4:00 p.m. About 10 :00 or 10 :30 , my

sp ray ri g br ok e do wn so I we nt t o lunch and we nt to look for a part for it . . . . I did not find the part. I

went bac k to the house and c ontinued to cl e a n up my e qu ipm e nt . . . an d the n lef t th e ho us e and proc eede d to my

boss’s house, Allen Johns on, wh e re I dr op pe d o ff

so me e qu ipm e nt.

I then proc eeded to drive ar ound looking f or someone who c ould di re ct m e to find some coc aine. I found someone a nd we boug ht some coca ine and we g ot high. We did that until I ran out of mone y , which

w a s ab o u t 6 :3 0 o r 7 :0 0 p

. m. I th e n d r o p p ed that person off and proce eded to drive ar ound to think up some way to ge t some more money

. I made my way over to Fran’ s house. I

went in Fran’ s house and tried to con them out of som e money . When they wouldn’t g ive me a ny

mon e y I g ot a g g ra va te d a ndwe nt o ut t o my truck a nd g ot the hammer. I we nt back in the house and w alked Ma

ry J ane into the ha l l way

and proce eded to hit her

in the head with the hammer. I continued beati n g h er with the hammer in the fa ce until she was not moving a ny more.

Then, I we n t in to the kitchen and g ot Fra n, walked h er i n t o the hallway and hit her in the he ad with the hammer until she fe ll to the gr o u n d

. And I hit her ag ain until she wouldn’t move.-5- I t h en searche d throug h the house for money wh e re I fo un d so me chang e a ndpu t it in m y po c ke t. Then I went next door to Mary

J an e’ s house whe re I first looked for

money and didn’t find any

. So I went back ove r to Fr an’s house and took her T V out of the house and put it in the bac k of my truck.

I then left a nd . . . picked up a fe m ale who could show me wher e to se ll the TV for some coc aine.

. . . I wa s p a id i n d op e fo r the TV

. . . . I pr oc e e de d to drive a round and g et hig h.

Whe n that wa s g on e I fo un d a no ther fema le that I kn e w . . . an d pic ke d h e r u p a nddr ov e aro un d to pr os titute . I pic ke d he r ba c k up a ft e r s he wo uldda te and we would g o g et some dope a nd ride a round and g et high. We dr ove around

. . . unti l ab o u t T uesday afte rnoon, about 2:00 or 2:30, or broke down at Amoco at Macon and Sy camor e View.

. . . She

c on tin ue d to wo rk to su pp ort ou r d ru g ha bit . We did that continuously

until about 8:00 or 9:00, Tuesday nig ht.

The a ppellant stated that the c law hammer was in a dumpster

behind the T.J. Max x store off Summer Avenue . The a

ppellant explained that he had “ conned” Cruchon and Pollack into “le tting [hi m] leave some tools there so that they would let me in the house.” He f urther e x plained that he used a ru s e invol ving pa inting er rors to g et Cruchon into the hallwa y and that he hit her

with the hammer se ven or e ight times. He then lured Pollack into the ha llway by telling her that Cruchon had had an a ccide nt. The appellant said he killed Cruchon’s dog with the hammer be cause the dog was “bar king rea l loud.” The a

ppellant stated that Cruc hon’s home wa s unlocked a nd that he sea rche d he r b e dr oo m, d re sse r d ra we rs , p ur se , a ndliv ing ro om.

Throug h the testimony

of Temiika Gipson, a

cler k fo r the Shelby

CountyCriminal Court Clerk’s Of

fice , the State introduce d the appellant’ s prior convictions into e vidence

. The c lerk’s f iles ind ic a te d th a t th e app e lla nt h a d b e e n c ha rg e d w ith a ndple d g uil ty in c a se nu mbe r 9 7- 09 21 5 to

a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y. G i p s o n r e a d t h e f o l l o w i n g i n d i c t m e n tt o t h e j u r y:

Th e g ra ndjur or s o f the Sta te of Te nn e sse e

. . . p re se nt tha t Jam e s C. Rie ls, on Ma y

12 , 1 99 7 in She lby

Cou nty , T e nn e sse e

. . . d id unlawfully , knowing ly and viol ently by use of a deadly wea pon, to--6- w i t ; a k n i f e , o b t a i n f r o m t h e p e r s o n o f L a u r a W h i t e , a s u mo f m o n e y, proper g oods and chattels of L aura Whit e, in violation of Tenne ssee code a nnotated 39-13- 402 . . . .

T h e ap p e l l a n th a d b e e n c h ar g e d w i t h a n d p l e d g u i l t y i n c a s e n u m b e r 9 7

- 0 9 2 1 6 t o a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y. G i p s o n r e a d t h e f

o l l o w i n g i n d i c t m e n tt o t h e j u r y:

Th e g ra ndjur or s o f the Sta te of Te nn e sse e

. . . pr e se nt that Jame s C. Rie ls, on Ap ri l 15 , 1 99 7 in S hel byCou nty , T e nn e sse e

. . . d id unlawfully
, knowing ly and violently by use of a deadly weapon, towit; a pistol, obt ain from t h e p erson of Marg ie Martinson, a sum of money , proper g oods and chattels of Marg ie Martinson, in violation of Tenne ssee c ode annotated 39-13-402 . . . .

T h e ap p ellant also had be en cha rg ed with and pled g uiltyin case number 97-09217 to a g g ravated

r o b b e r y. G i p s o n r e a d t h e f o l l o w i n g i n d i c t m e n tt o t h e j u r y:

Th e g ra nd jur or s of the Sta te of Te nn e sse e

. . . pre se nt tha t Jam e s C. Rie ls, on Mar ch 2 6, 19 95 in S he lby Cou nty , T e nn e sse e

. . . d id unlawfully , knowing ly

and violently

by use of a deadly

weapon, tow i t ; a s h o t g u n , o b t a i n f

r o m t h e p e r s o n o f J a m e s S o n , a s u mo f m o n e y, proper g oods and cha

ttels of James Son, i n violation of Tennesse e code a nnotated 39-13- 402 . . . .

Dr. O.C. Smith testi fied that in April 2003, he w as t he acting me dical examiner for Shelby Countyand per formed Cruc hon’s autopsy . Dr. Smith observed rece nt bruising to the victim’s left knee, uppe r shoulder a

rea , the bac k of her

hands, and her left chee k. Two of the vic tim’s finge rs on her right ha nd wer e fractur ed, indi cating that they had been crushed by some impacting object. Dr. Smit h commented that the injuries to the victim’s hands we re c onsistent with the defensive a ct of protec ting one’s head. He also noticed that there wer e “tea rs in the scalp or the fo re h ea d l eading down on either

side of the nose.” Dr. Smit h opined that these tear s “may have been pr oduced by the claw e nd of the ha mmer . . . it would mark the skin and g o into the bone and c ause f rac tures of the fac e.” T he wounds a lso indicated “se parate blows to the skin of the for ehea d. . . . [T] here wer e exte n s i v e fr ac t u res pr oduced in this are a, of the left brow.” A lace ration of the skin in this are a “re sulted in like dent, or a pressure mark on the t op surfa ce of the skull.” An oth e r b low sim ila rl y
cause d the skin to tear ope n and mar ked the skull with a small dent into the bone. Dr. S mith counted a total of fourteen blows, including five blows to the fr ont of the skull; two superficia l blows to the left che ek and te mp le ; th r e e b lo w s to th e r ig h t s id e o f th e s ku ll
, tw o ma rk in g th e b o n e a n d one tearing the scalp; and f

our blows to the top of the skull . One blow r esulted in a fa irly extensive fra cture and dama g ed the br ain.-7-

I n ex am i n i n g C ruchon’s body , Dr. Smith saw bruising to the tong ue, indicating that the ton g ue ma y

ha ve be e n tr app e d b e tw e e n th e te e th. He a lso no tic e d b loo d in the top of the thr oa t, indicating that blood f

rom the fac ial injuries enter ed the mouth a nd went down the w indpipe. Dr. Smit h stated that the blood that w ent down the windpipe went into the lungs, indica ting that Cruc hon continued to bre athe f

or some time af

ter the injuries wer e inflicted. The victim also swallowed about six ounces of

blood, which was discovere d in her stomach. He concluded, however
, that she did not live long e noug h to have any inflammatory response to the i njuries. Dr. S mith testi fied that he was unable to dete rmine the seque nce in whic h the wounds we re r ece ived.

As to the c a us e of

Cr uc ho n’ s d e a th, Dr . Sm ith ma de the fo llo wi ng re mark s:

Ob vio us ly

the mor e e xten siv e inj ur ie s, the fr a c tur e of the skull a ndto the bra in can c erta inly

cause death. But additionally
, by virtue of the

a mou nt o f e ne rg y

that a ha mmer ca n bri ng int o th e bo dy , e ve n if it doesn’t fr actur e the skull, the blow itself may cause some injury to the br a in wh ic h ma y no t kil l a s qu ic kly . B ut, if the br a in s tart s to sw e ll on [i ts] own, eve n in the absenc e of te aring or blee ding a bout the brain, bra in swell i n g ca n result in serious hea d injury and if it’s not tr e a te d it c a n re su lt in death. B ut, in thi s inst a nc e wi th the da ma g e to the bra in that was done, especia lly in the area of the left for ehea d, that damag e to the brain could certainly result in her de ath.

Dr. Smith a lso c onducted Pollack’s autopsy and found signific ant injuries to the back of her he a d. Th e vic tim ’s c e re be llu m, w hic h c on tr ols ba la nc e a ndc oo rd inatio n, ha d be e n da ma g e d. Th is da ma g e wa s th e re su lt of a se ve re blo w to a n are a be hin d the le ft e ar, c a us ing fr a g me nts of bo ne to enter the bra in. Dr. Smith opi ned that Pollack had r ece ived two blows to t h e h ea d
, which we re
c on sis te nt w ith be ing str

uc k wi th a ha mme r. Compa ri ng the wo un ds of the tw o v ic tim s, Dr . Sm ith

was able to conclude that the victims’ injuries were rec eived a t the same time, althoug h Pollack’s

wo u n d s we re in the he aling proce ss. Dr. Smith determined that the ca use of Pollack’ s death wa s “blunt trauma to the he ad and a g ain the manne r is homicide.”

On cr oss-examination, Dr. S mith concede d that he wa s unable to dete rmine the seque nce of the blows as to either victim a nd that it wa s possible the first blow to e ither could have rende red tha t victim unconscious. Dr. Smith stated that he could not determine if either vic tim was c onscious or unconscious during the bl ows. Notwithstanding, he stated that Cruchon did ha ve def ensive wounds t o h erh an d s , i n d i ca t i n g t h at s h e w as an t i ci p at i n g s o m et h i n g.

I n mi ti gati on , th e app e lla nt f ir st p re se nte d th e te sti mon y of Dr . M ur ray Smith, a sp e c ia lis t in addiction medi ci n e. Dr

. S m ith testified that he had be en wor king e x clusively

in the are a of addiction medicine sinc e 1990. Dr. Smit h qualified his spe cialization, noting that the ce rtification-8-

did not come from the Am er ican Me dical Associa tion (AMA) a s addiction medicine is not

rec og nized by

the AMA. R at her, his spec ialization was gr anted by the American B oard of Specialties throug h other pe rsons specia liz ing in a ddiction medicine.

Dr . Sm ith e xpla ine d th a t si xtee n pe rc e nt of the po pu la tio n, or on e ou t of e ve ry six pe rs on s, is b or n w ith a

br a in c he mis tr y

that c a us e s th e m to be c ome a dd ic te d. B a se d u pon th is br a in chemistry , the per son cannot c ontrol use o f t h e s u b s t ance , and “[t]hey become a slave to that substance.” The person with this brain chemistry cannot stop using the substance even thoug h the substance is c ausing trouble in the per son’s life.

I n the instant case , Dr. Smith reviewe d the appe llant’s prior hospital rec ords and inter viewed the appe llant about his childhood and che mical depe ndency

. Ba s ed upon his examination of the appellant, Dr . Smit h conclude d that “[the appellant] met all of t he diag nostic criteria for c hemical depende ncy .” The first che mical used by the appellant was nicotine. The a ppellant beg an smoking cig are ttes at ag e fifte en and “fr om that point on they beca me a focus of him ge tting and using them.” Dr . Sm ith sa id, “ At

a g e tw e nty

he ha d tha t sa me re a c tio n to his fi rs t us e of c ra c k c oc a ine . It be c a me the fo c us of his lif

e .” He state d th a t th e app e lla nt h a d to g e t mo ne y fo r c oc a ine a ndc omm itt e d s ome illega l activities to get t h e d ru g. He state d that when the a ppellant was not using chemica l substances, he was “ a ca lm, peace fu l human being .” Coca ine provided a source of ene rg y

and pleasure . Dr. Smith stated that the eff ects of smoking cra ck coc aine g o to the brain in a ma tter of seconds and last about fifteen or twenty minutes. During that time, the user f eels like “ Superman.” Whe n th e f

e e li n g s u b s id e s , th e u s e r

is le f t w ith th e f

e e li n g th a t h e h a s to r e p e a t th e d o s e , a n d “ the de s i r e t o r e p e a tt h a td o s e m e a n s t h a ta n y t h i n g t h a tg e t s i n t h e i r w a y o f g e t t i n g t h a td o s e i s the ir enemy .” Dr

. Smit h described cra ck coc aine a s “one of the most powerf

ully addictive substanc es we know.” He further

ackno wl ed ged that cra ck coc aine a ddiction is the most di fficult to treat. Dr. Smith r e late d th a t h e w a s a w ar e th a t th e ap p e ll a n t h a d s o u g h t t r e a tm e n t f

o r h is a d d ic ti o n in 1 9 9 6. Treatment proved unsucc essful on seve ral a ttempts, and the appe llant attempted suicide. The appellant wa s not treated for de pression at that time. The a ppellant informed D r. Smith t hat he wa s trea ted on three occa sions for his chemica l depende ncy to coca ine.

The a ppellant’s father, James Webber Riels, testified that he mar ried the a ppellant’s mother wh en h e w as a s en i o r i n h i gh s ch o o l

. S h er ryR i el s Gi b s o n , h i s ex -w i fe
, h a d g r a d u at ed fr o mh i gh school the pre vious y ear . The c ouple d i v o rc ed after one a nd one-ha lf y ear s of marriag e whe n the

app e lla nt w a s a

bo ut e ig hte e n mo nth s o ld. Mr

. Rie ls ha d c us tod y of the a pp e lla nt s ome we e ke nd s,
a lth ou g h n o re g ula

r sc he du le wa s e sta

bli sh e d. Mr . Ri e ls w a s e mpl oy e d b y the ra ilr oa d a t th e tim e and fr equently worke d out of t own. Two y ear s afte r t he divorc e, Mr. Riels re marrie d. He r eporte d that his new wife g ot along “okay ” with the appe llant. Howeve r, as the appellant g rew older, ther e
wa s “ a lot of arg uin g ” be tw e e n h is s e c on d w if e a ndthe app e lla nt.

Mr. Riels and his new wife had two childre n of their own. He took his family on vacation, including a trip to D isney World. The appellant was not inc luded on this trip because the appe llant’s-9-

mother felt that it would be too hard to take him out of school and bec ause Mr . Riels’ second wif e did not want to take the a ppellant with them. When he was a bout twent y

y ear s old, the appellant rela y ed his disappointment in not being include d in this vacation to his father.

Mr. Riels was aw are of his son’ s coca ine addiction and stated that the a ddiction “has made him a total differ ent per son.” He testified that the addiction had “prac tically ruined [ his son’s] li fe, as fa r as he ’s bee n in trouble and in and out of dr ug reha b.” Mr. R iels rela ted that he ha d been a war e of the a ppellant’s addic tion since the appe llant was ninetee n. He wa s also awa re tha t the appellant had soug ht help for his addic tion problem. Mr. Riels had taken his son t o two differ ent addiction trea tment center s, and the a ppellant’s mother ha d taken him to one or two c enter s.

On cr oss-examination, Mr. Riels admit ted that he ha d alway s supported the a ppellant financ ially

and emotionally . He alway s provided child support, he assisted the appe llant in ge tting addiction trea tment, a nd he employ ed his son whe n he nee ded a job. De spite this help, the appellant

c on tin ue d to make ba d lif

e de c isi on s. Mr . Rie ls sta te d tha t if the app e lla nt we re e xec ute d “[i]t w ou ld be stabbing me in the heart. That’s my son. I t w ould be like a part of me died. I still love him no matter what.”

Marta Riels, the a

ppellant’s stepmother, te stified that she and J ames W ebber Riels had bee n marrie d for one and one-ha lf y ear s. She stated that she had formed a strong bond with the appellant and that she love d him as if he wer e her own son. She stated that if the a ppellant wer e sent to prison, she would continue to v i s i t h i m an d write him letters. She opined tha t if the appe llant were sentenc ed to death, “[i] t would be deva stating. It would be like [losi ng ] a son.

The a ppellant’s aunt, Linda Gray , testified that she lived in H ot Spring s, Arka nsas, that the appellant wa s like a s o n t o h er, and that she had be en very supportive of him his entire life. She expressed her

love for the appellant a nd stated that she would c ontinue to support him if he were sent to prison. Gray

described the appe llant’s rela tionship wit h his f ather as distant until the appellant

wa s te n y e ars old . T od a y , th e fathe r a nd so n ha d a be tte r re la tio ns hip . G ray re la te d th a t Jam e s Ri e ls’ second w ife did not like the appe llant because he w as “the other c hild.”

Richard Gibson, the a

ppellant’s stepfather, testified tha t he married the appellant’ s mother wh e n th e app e lla nt w a s sev e n y e ars old

. Gi bs on de sc ri be d th e re la tio ns hip be tw e e n mo the r a ndc hil d as “[a] bond that’s unbelievable . They both sense when something’ s wrong with e ach other. He and his mom we re ve ry , v e ry , v e ry

c los e .” Gi bs on state d th a t th e app e lla nt e njo y e d a sim ila r r e la tio ns hip with J ames W ebber Riels. He state d that he had a lway s treate d the appe llant like his own son. The

app e lla nt w a s in c lud e d a s p art of the fa mil y

on a da ily ba sis a nd wa s inc lud e d in a ll f a mil y a c tiv iti e s. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a th e w o u l d b e v e r y d e e p l y a f f e c t e d i f t h e j u r y i m p o s e d t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y.-10-

Tere sa L eag ue, the a

ppellant’s aunt, testified that she lived with the appellant a nd his mother wh e n th e app e lla nt w a s y ou ng a ndthat th e app e lla nt g ot a lon g ve ry well with he r c hil dr e n. As a child, the appellant liked to pla y Batman and Superman. L eag ue stated tha t she reme mbere d when the appe llant beg an having problems. Throug hout his problems, t he entire family , including he rself,

rema i ned very

supportive. She stated that she love d the appe llant as a son and that she could not imag ine life without him.

Sherry Gibson, the appellant’s mother, t estified that she a nd the appe llant’s fathe r divorce d when the a

ppellant was two and one-ha lf y ear s old. She met her present husband in 1980, and they marrie d in 1989. During the time period b etwee n her divorc e fr om the appellant’ s father and her marria g e to Richard G ibson, the only male fig ure in the appellant’s life wa s his father. She sta ted that he visited with his father a bout seven or e ight times per y ear

.

Sh e rr y G ib s o n te s ti f

ie d th a t th e f

ir s t s ig n s o f th e ap p e ll a n t’ s a d d ic ti o n s u r f a c e d when the appellant wa s eig hteen or

nineteen y ear s old. At that time, she noticed that the a ppellant’s beha vior chang ed and tha t he would run out of m oney shortly afte r being paid. The a

ppellant told his father that he ha d a

pr ob le m wi th dr

ug s a nd that he wa nte d he lp. Th e app e lla nt a sk e d h is m oth e r f or he lp also, and both par ents assisted the appe llant in ge tting tre atment. Gibson stated that tre atment was

so ug ht f or he r s on on a t le a st three occas io ns . Sp e c if ic a lly , th e app e lla nt w e nt t o th e Me mph is Re c ov e ry Ce nte r, Ha

rb or Ho us e , a ndSereni ty Ho us e . Sh e state d th a t sh e a tte nd e d me e tin g s w ith he r s on a t H arb or

Ho us e an d th a t th e tr e a tme nt p ro g rams “ wo rk e d f or a wh ile .” She ha d trie d to

un de rs ta ndho w d ru g s c ou ld do min a te a pe rs on ’s lif e , bu t sh e c ou ld no t un de rs ta nd wh y the ur g e to use drug s returne d.

Th e app e lla nt’ s mo the r i de nti fi e d n ume ro us do c ume nts . Rec or ds fr om H arb or Ho us e ref lected a trea tment pe riod in June 1995 and the appellant’ s participa tion in a t we l v e- s tep

re ha bil itatio n p ro g ra m. T he app e lla nt’ s te nth g ra de re po rt c ard a nd a n En g lis h pa pe r d e sc ri bin g his expectations for hims elf were also introduced. Gibson identified num erous poems authored by the appellant, including one that was publi shed in a book. She re lated that her son not onlywrote poe try well but was a lso a talented a rtist and that she would continue to support him. I n try ing to de scribe the imp a c t of

a se nte nc e of

de a th, sh e state d, “ I ’m

pr a y ing that it

do e sn ’t make me die a t th e sa me time, because he is part of me and I don’t want to be w ithout him .”

The thirty -y ear -old appe llant testified as t he defense’ s final wit ness and acknowledg ed that he ha d a c c e pte d r e sp on sib ili ty fo r the c ri me s. He stat e d th a t w he n h e wa s y ou ng , h is r e la tio ns hip with his father w as “a

littl e distant.” He would occa sionally spend the wee kend with his fathe r and

so me tim e s w ou ld s pe nd a n e nti re we e k wi th his fathe r. Th e app e lla nt a ttribu te d the dis ta nc e in the ir rela tionship t o his father ’s sec ond wife a nd his children with her. This re lationship chang ed a f ew y ear s ag o, when f

ather and son attem p t ed t o es tablish a better r elationship with one another . The appellant state d that he loved his fa ther.-11-

The a ppellant testifi ed t h at his relationship with his father’ s second wif e wa s “[n] ot very g ood at all.” He fe lt that he was a ccuse d of thing s he did not do and that there wer e times when he

was not tr eate d the same as his half-brothe r and ha lf-sister. Spec ifically , the appe llant rec alled that he wa s e xclu de d f

ro m a tr ip t o Dis ne y Wor ld. He bla me d h is e xclu sio n o n h is s te pmo the r, a ndthe se fe e lin g s w e re tr a ns fe rr e d to his fathe r. He fe lt tha t hi s f a the r s ho uldha ve sto odup fo r h im. As to oth e r f a mil ia l r e la tio ns hip s, the app e lla nt t e sti fi e d th a t he wa s v e ry c los e to his Au nt T e re sa a ndhis Au nt Lind a . H e re c a lle d fo nd c hil dh oo d me morie s of the m a nd state d that he wa s ve ry c los e to h is mothe r. Th e app e lla nt t e sti fi e d th a t “ I fe e l like I ha ve a c on ne c tio n w ith he r tha t I do n’ t ha ve wi th any body else.”

The a ppellant re lated that his mothe r marrie d Richard Gibson, a nd they all lived toge ther. He state d that his stepfather had two sons. He de scribed the family as “a vera g e, norma l.” When the app e lla nt w a s f

if tee n y e ars old , h e be g a n s moking c ig are tte s. He la te r t ri e d o the r s ub sta nc e s, including a lcohol, marijuana
, an d co ca i n e. The appellant f reque ntly used coc aine a nd classified him se lf a s a n a dd ic t.

Re g ard ing his c oc a ine a dd ic tion, th e app e lla nt d e sc ri be d th e ph y sic a l sympt oms of his addiction, including g etting “ butterflies in [hi s] stomach” and vomiting befor e he knew he was g oing to ge t high. He stated that he w ould have ur g es whe re h e fe l t t h at he had to ha ve the c ocaine . He described having these urg es for the past ten y ear s. The appe llant stated that to stop these urg es, he sough t trea tment on three oc casions. He was in a thirty -day prog ram a t Harbor

House in 1995. Although he completed this prog ram, he beg an usi ng coca ine ag ain. The a ppellant ac knowledg ed h a v i n g t h r e e p r i o r

c o n v i c t i o n s f

o r a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y a n d o n e c o n v i c t i o n f o r f o r g e r y.

On cr oss-examination, the appellant testified that at the time of the crimes, he wa s under the influence of coc aine and vodka and “ wasn’t in my rig ht f rame of mind.” Notwithstanding, he was able to drive to Poll ack’ s home for the purpose of conning the victims out of some money . When his plan did not work, he we nt out to the truck, conc eale d the claw hammer in his pa nts, and retur ned to the house. The a

ppellant admitted that Crucho n wa s a bar rier to him g etting a ny

money from Pollack and that he and Cruchon g ot into an arg ument. During his a rg ument with Crucho n , the

app e lla nt h it h e r in the ba c k of the he a d with the ha mme r wh e n she wa s not loo kin g . Af te r s he fe ll to the floor, the a

ppellant continued to hit her w ith the ha mmer. Despite the victim’s moa ning, the appellant c ontinued to beat her . Wit hin a couple of hours of the crimes, the a ppellant was ha ving sexual int erc ourse with Ta mmy Stafford.

The a ppellant stated that he had used c ocaine and alc ohol toge ther pre viouslyand that he ha d been a war e, for

the most part, of how he would rea ct to their ef fec ts. He explained,

Alcohol pre tty

much it mak es y o u drunk and it make s y ou, when y ou drinkexcessive amounts of it, it may at times blur y our-12- vision, or y ou may

fee l too relaxed about things

. W h ereas coc aine bring s y ou up and make s y ou fee l like Superman at times. And when the two mix , the coc aine pr etty much outweig hs the alcohol, but it’s a fe eling that’s har d to expl ain when the two are mix ed.

The a ppellant admitted that his family was ve ry supportive and that he had a g ood job earning twe lve dollars per

hour and using his employ er’ s truck. He blamed the murders on his a ddiction to c ocaine and his desire for more of it. The appe llant expressed remorse to the victims’ families and state d, “I f I could take it all bac k, I

would.”

B. Jury

I nstructions

At the c on c lus ion of

pr oo f, bo th pa

rt ie s sti pu la te d that the a ve ra g e lif e e xpe c ta nc y

of a ma le in Te nn e sse e wa s se ve nty -n ine po int e ig ht thr e e y e ars

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt the n in str uc te d th e jury

a s to the fo llo wi ng statut ory

a g g ra va tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s:

As to M ary

Jane Cruc ho n, on ly [:]

( 1 ) The de fenda nt was p r e v io u s ly convicted of one, or more fe lon ie s oth e r tha n th e pr e se nt c ha rg e . T he statut ory

e le me nts of which involve the use of violenc e to the per son.

The state is re ly ing upon the cr ime of ag g ravated robbery which is a fe lony . The st at u t o ry elements of w hich involve the use of violenc e to the per son.

2 ) T h e murde r wa s espec ially heinous, atroc ious, or
crue l, in that it i nvo l v ed t orture, or serious phy sical abuse be y ond that nece ssary to produce death.

3 ) The murde r wa s knowing ly co m m i t t ed
, solicited, direc ted or aided by the def endant while the defe ndant ha d a su bs ta nti a l r ole in c omm itt ing , o r atte mpt ing to

c omm it, or

wa s f le e ing a ft e r h a vin g a

su bs ta nti a l r ole i n c o m m i t t i n g , o r a t t e m p t i n g t o c o m m i ta n y r o b b e r y.

A s t o F r a n c h i o n P o l l a c k
, o n l y:-13- (1) The defe ndant was prev i o u s l yco n v i ct ed o f o n e, or more fe lon i es other than the prese nt char g e. The statutory elements of which involve the u s e of violence to the pe rson.

The state i s rely ing upon the crime of ag g ravated robbery which is a fe lony . The s t at u tory elements of w hich involve the use of violenc e to the per son.

2 ) The murde r wa s espec ially h ei nous, atroc ious, or
crue l, in that it i nv o l v ed torture, or serious phy sical abuse be y ond that nece ssary to produce death.

3 ) The murd e rw a s k n o w in g ly c o mm it te d
, s o li c ited, direc ted or a ided by

the defendant while the def endant ha d a su bs ta nti a l r ole in co mmi tti ng , o r atte mpt ing to

c omm it, or

wa s f le e ing a ft e r h a vin g a

su bs ta nti a l r ole i n c o m m i t t i n g , o r

a t t e m p t i n g t o c o m m i ta n y r o b b e r y.

4) The victim of the murder was seventy y ear s of ag e, or older.

Th e c ou rt pr ov ide d th e fo llo wi ng de fi nition s:

Heinous mea ns g rossly

wicked or repr ehensible, a bominable, odious, vile.
At ro c iou s me a ns extre me ly e vil , o r c ru e l, m on str ou s, exceptionally

bad, abominable

. C ru el m ea n s d i s p o s ed t o i n fl i c t p ai n o r s u ff er i n g,
c a us ing su ff

e ri ng , p a inf

ul.
T orture me ans the infliction of seve re phy sical, or mental pain upon the victim while he or she rema ins alive, or

c on sc iou s.

Th e c ou rt the n p ro vid e d in str

uc tio ns on the fo llo wi ng mit ig a tin g fa c tor s:-14- 1) The murde r wa s committed whilethe def endant wa s under the influence of extreme mental, or emotional disturbance

. 2) The y outh or advanc ed ag e of the defe ndant at t he ti me of the crime. 3) Th e c apa c ity of the de fe nd a nt to app re c ia te the wr on g fu lne ss of his c on du c t, or to co nf

or m his co nd uc t to the re qu ir e me nts of the law , was sub s t anti ally impaired a s a re sult of int oxic a tio n, wh ic h w a s in su ff ic ie nt to es ta

bli sh a de fe ns e to the c ri me , b ut w hic h s ub sta nti a lly a ff e c te d h is j ud g me nt. 4) The defe ndant has a family [whose] members ha ve expressed lov e a ndsu pp ort. 5) The defe ndant’s family have expressed that they will likely be supportive of him during incar cer ation.
6 ) An y a bs e nc e of the defend ant ’s f ath er as he grew to adulthood. 7) The de fenda nt’s capa city to be produc tive. 8) The fa ct that a death sentence may have a signific ant impact

o n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f

t h e d e f e n d a n tw i t h h i s f

a m i l y. 9 ) The de fenda nt’s c o mp le tion of the eleve nth g rade at K i n g s b u r y. 10 ) Th a t the de fe nd a nt wa s g a inf ull y e mpl oy e d a t the tim e of his

arr est throug h Allen J ohnson, a contra ctor. 11) The de fenda nt’s continued addic tion to [ cra ck] coca ine. 12) The d ef

en d an t ’s p ea ce fu l an d ap p ro p ri at e b eh av ior, apart from the use of alc ohol and coc aine.
13 ) Th e fa c t that the de fe nd a nt did no t re c e iv e tr eat men t f or his depre ssion.
1 4 ) The de fe n d a n t’ s r e p e a te d a tt e mp ts to g e t help for his drug addiction. 15) The de fenda nt’s taking responsibilityfor his acts by admitting his g uil t to the c ha

rg e s. 16) Any other mitigating fac tor which was raised by the evidenc e produce d by

either the p ro s ecution, or de fense at the

s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g.

C. J ury ’s Ver dict-15-

F oll ow ing su bmi ssi on of

the ins tru c t i o n s , the jury

re tir e d a t 8: 40 a .m. to c on sid e r the ve rd ic ts. At 12 :15 p. m., the jury re turne d its ve rd ic ts, fi nd ing that th e Sta te ha d p ro ve n b e y on d a re a so na ble doubt the three aggra vating circ umstances c harg ed re g arding Cruchon’s murde r and the four

a g g ra va tin g c ir c um st a nc e s c ha rg e d r e g ard ing Pol la c k’ s mu rd e r. Th e jury fu rthe r f ou ndthat th e se
a g g ra va tin g c ir c umstan c e s o utw e ig he d a ny mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. I n acc ordanc e with their ve rdict, the jury imposed sentence s of dea th.

II. Ana lys is

A. Suppression of Statement to Police

Be fore trial, the appe llant filed a motion to suppress his s ta te me n t t o law enf

orce ment office rs and all evide nce se ized as a result of t he search of his home. I n support of t he mot ion, the appe llant

asserted that (1) he was arr ested without probable cause , and (2) the conse nt to searc h his home was not knowingly

made be causehe wa s under the inf luence of coc ai n e at the time. A hearing on the motion to s uppress wa s held on Dec ember 18, 20 0 3
, d u ring which the f ollowing pr oof wa s prese nted:

Serg eant James Fitzpatrick testified that on April 22
, 2 0 0 3
, h e went to a home at 3810 Shirlwood in the Highla nd/Walnut Grove area of Memphis. Upon arriving at the scene , he discovere d one homicide victim, Mary J ane Cruc hon, and one vic tim, Franc hion Poll ack, w ho was still alive. Pollack was tra nsported to The Me d for tre atment but later die d of her injuries. Serg eant Fitzpatrick ac knowledg ed that this was “a fairly violent a nd fairly

bloody homicide” a nd that a dog also had be en killed. Serg eant F itz patrick state d that there wer e no suspec ts. He obser ved, howe ver, that there wer e no sig ns of forc ible entry to the home and that the hous e was in the process of being

re mod e le d. Th e g e ne ra l c on tr a c tor wa s A lle n Joh ns on , a ndla w e nf or c e me nt b e g a n q ue sti on ing a ll of Johns on’s emp l o y ee s who had worked on the r esidenc e. Of fice r Timothy

Sims obtained the names of Johnson’s employ ees. L aw e nforc eme n t wa s awa re tha t the last vehicle se en at the

re sid e nc e wa s a

re d F or d F -1 50 pic ku p tr uc k w ith la dd e rs or

la dd e r r a c ks

.

Sergea n t Fi tzpatrick testified that on April 24, 2003, at appr ox imately 3:00 p.m., the appellant a nd his mother arrived at the Memphis Police D epartment Homicide Off ice. The appellant

was c alm and coopera tive, and S erg eant Fitzpatrick saw no indication that the appe llant was under the influenc e of a ny

drug s or alcohol. At that point, the appe llant was neither a suspect nor wa s he under a rre st, and he was not handcuf fed or shackle d. The a

ppellant provided Ser g eant F itz patrick with a n acc ount of his a ctivities on April 21, 2003, beg inning with his having go n e t o P ollack’s h o me

. H e r e late d th a t h e w o rk e d th e r e u n ti l a p ie c e o f e q u ip me n t b r o k e d o w n

. H e s p e n t th e n e xt ho ur s u ns uc c e ssf

ull y loo kin g fo r a re pla c e me nt pa rt , c le a nin g his e qu ipm e nt, a nd c omp le tin g so me work that he was direc ted to do by Cruchon. Th e app e lla nt the n lef t the re sid e nc e a nd we nt h ome to c ha ng e c lothe s. He re po rt e d th a t he re turne d to Pol la c k’ s h ome “ to l e a ve a la dd e r a ndthe n h e sa id-16-

to p ic k u p a

la dd e r, a ndult ima te ly

he le ft so me

. . . p a int

a t th e ho us e be fo re leavi ng a ndg oin g to find a friend.” The appellant state d that h e h ad l eft three g allons of paint nea r the pa tio door. Serg eant F itz patrick testified that this statement raised conce rn because the patio doors wer e open wh e n o ff ic e rs arrive d a t th e sc e ne , a ndthe re wa s n o p a int ob se rv e d a t th e ho us e

. Th is s ta te me nt, ho we ve r, didno t ele va te the app e lla nt to a susp e c t, “b ut it did rin g a be ll .

. . to l oo k a t hi m a lit tle closer.” The a

ppellant also conf

irmed to offic ers that he was i n p ossession of a re d For d F- 150 pickup, which wa s a work truc k owned by Allen J ohnson. The appe llant further rela ted that when he lef t Poll ack’ s house, he we nt to find an ac quaintance
, Tammy Stafford, to try to ge t some coca ine. Offic ers que stioned Stafford a bout 4:30 p

. m

. Her

acc ount of the eve nts on April 21 were inc on sis te nt w ith the app e lla nt’ s st a te me nt.

I n light of the information provided by Staf ford, law enfor ceme nt office rs aske d the appe llant if he would c onsent to a sear ch of his mother’s house, his plac e of r esidenc e. The appellant r eplied “that he ha d no problem with that, and he signe d the records of document g iving us c onsent to sear ch his . . . quarter s wit h i n his mom’s home.” The a ppellant did not have a ny questions about the consent to sea

rch form and signe d the form about 4:30 p.m. Off icer Sims and anothe r off

icer then

we nt t o th e app e lla nt’ s mo the r’ s h ome , w he re sh e sig ne d a c on se nt t o s e arc h th e e nti re pr e mis e s. Whil e the of

fice rs wer e conduc ting the se arc h, the appe llant rema ined i n an int ervie w room at the po lic e de pa

rt me nt. He wa s n ot h a nd c uf fe d, a ndSe rg e a nt F itzp a tr ic k s ta te d th a t he wo uld“ sti c k [hi s] head in f rom time to tim e.” He maintaine d that the appe llant was not a suspec t at t hat t ime and that other infor mation was being chec ked.

At 7:45 p.m., Offic er Sims notified Serg eant F itz patrick tha t he had f ound blood-spattere d work c lothes and work boots a t the ap p el l an t ’s residence. Ser g eant F itz patrick informed the

app e lla nt tha t he wa s un de r arr e st a nd sh a c kle d him

. Spe c if ic a lly , Se rg e a nt F itzp a tr ic k p ut a sh a c kle “on his ankle, sha ckled him to one of the chair s in the interview r oom.” The a ppellant did not reque st an attorney

and did not ask any

questions about his le g al rig hts. The appe llant was then lef t in the interview r oom.

The off icer s returne d from the appellant’s re sidence and consulted w ith Serg eant F itz patrick. The a ppellant was informed of the e vidence discovere d at his residenc e and was advised of his leg al rig hts. The appe l l an t i n dicated tha t he wante d to give a stateme nt. Office rs took him from the interview room to the g ener al Homicide Offic e, a transcriptionis t w as obtained, and t h e a p pellant sig ne d a n a dv ic e of

ri g hts fo rm

a t 8: 50 p. m. T he app e lla nt g a ve a se ve n- pa g e state me nt i mme diate ly there afte r, admitting his involvement in the crimes. He signe d and approve d the statement at 10:45 p. m.

Se rg e a nt F itzp a tr ic k d e sc ri be d th e app e lla nt a s “ so me wh a t remo rse ful” wh ile g ivi ng his confe ssion. The a

ppellant was not very talkative but responde d to questions. The appellant did not appea r to be unde r the inf

l u ence of coc aine. Ser g eant F itz patrick r emar ked that the a

ppellant appea red to be “quite fa miliar with the Advice of Rights.” At no time did the appe llant reque st an-17-

attorney . The a

ppellant neve r inquired as to his leg al rights and never indi cate d that he did not want to t al k t o t h e o ff

icer s. During the period betwee n 4:30 p.m. and 7:30 p.m., the appellant wa s basica lly left alone in the interview r oom. At some point, a n o t h er office r aske d if the appe llant wanted a ny thing to eat or drink. Serg eant Fitzpatrick admitted that the i nterview room was locke d and that the a

ppellant could not l eave the room without knocking on the door. Serg eant F itz patrick state d th a t th e app e lla nt n e ve r a sk e d to le a ve , b ut h e c ou ld not a ns we r w he the r the app e lla nt w ou ld ha ve fe lt tha t he wa s n ot f re e to l e a ve pr ior

to h is a c tua l arr e st at 7: 30 p. m.

Of fi c e r T imo thy

Sims te sti fi e d th a t he sp ok e wi th A lle n Joh ns on a ndthat John so n to ld h im the appe llant had been drivi ng a red pickup t ruck. Office rs knew that a re d pickup could have been the last vehicle seen at P o l l ac k ’s hom e. When the appe llant and his mother ca me to the police department, they

appea red ha ppy to help the police office rs with a nything they neede d in the case

. Ne i t h e r o f t h e m re q u es t ed a l aw y er , an d Of fi ce r S i m s o b s er v ed t h at t h e a p p el l an twa s s m i l i n g. Offic er Sims and S erg eant Fitzpatrick interviewe d the appe llant briefly “to find out if he ha d seen

a nythi ng un us ua l a t th e add res s o n Sh ir lw oo d. ” Of fi c e r S ims tol d th e app e lla nt tha t he wa nte d to see the clothes that the a

ppellant had be en we aring on the day of t he crimes, and the a

ppellant sig ned

a conse nt to searc h form. Of fice r Sims and ano t h er o ff i ce r went to the appellant’s home a nd inf or me d h is m oth e r tha t th e y we re loo kin g fo r the c lothe s w or n b y the app e lla nt o n T ue sd a y , A pr il 22. Ms. Gibson informed the off icer s that the appellant had “put some boots and some je ans in the g arba g e can.” Ms. Gibson we nt to a g arba g e ca n located in the driveway and re trieved a

“plastic ba g with some boots and a pair of jea ns, and inside she rippe d it open.” The items appea red to ha ve blo odon the m.

Of fi c e r S ims re turne d to the po lic e de pa rt me nt, tol d th e app e lla nt tha t he wa s u nd e r a rr e st, and re ad the a

ppellant an advice of rig hts form. He had the appe llant rea d the form ba ck to him, and the appe llant appea

red to understand his rights. Of fice r Sims and Serg eant F itz patrick inter viewed the app e lla nt, a ndthe app ell ant a dmi tte d to the c ri me s. Whil e the app e lla nt w a s g ivi ng his statement, the stateme nt was being typed. After his interview, the a

ppellant re viewed the written statement, made corr ections, and sig ned it. He never requeste d an attorney , appea red to ha ve a g ood

me mory , a nddidno t app e ar t o b e un de r the inf lue nc e of a ny dr ug s.

At the conc lusion of proof, the trial court made the foll owing finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law:

Okay . Well
, l o o k i n g at -- w e have three issues here . First two, I

thi nk , a re imm e diate ly

re so lva ble . T he

. . . D e fe ns e is t rying to suppress the written statement, the ar rest o f t h e defenda nt and any products fr om it, and the property that was seized at the house of the

m o t h ero r h i s h o u s e w h er e h e w as l i v i n g.-18- Find fr om the fac ts that the property at the house w as take n pursuant to a Consent To Sea rch sig ned by

him voluntarily
, a Consent To Searc h signe d by his mother vol untarily
, and also that she turned those ite m s o v er to the police as a lay person so that ther e ar e no -- t h i s w a s n o ta n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s e i z u r e [ o r ] s e ar c h o f h i s p r o p e r t y.

His arr est was only

made a fter pr obable c ause w as fo u nd wh e n O ff ic e r S ims fo un d th e su sp e c te d bloo dy c lothin g , a lon g wi th

every thing e ls e , c a ll ed Of

fice r F itz patrick a nd he plac ed the de fenda nt under a rre st. At that point t hey

had probable cause to arrest him and it w a s o nly

a t th a t po int

that he wa s sh a c kle d, a nk le sha c kle d to his chair

.

S o I f

i n d t h e arr e s tw a s l a w f

u l a n d n o tu n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

. It was not an unc onstitut ional seizure of his per son.

As far as t he st atement’ s conce rned the question is g oing to be whether or not Miranda was violated, whethe r or not he w as -- it was a custodial interr og ation prior to the time the state m en t was take n. His statement was not take n until he was rea d his rights and so there ’s not a problem with t he stateme nt itself unless it was a fr uit of a poison tree.

I n oth e r wo rd s un le ss the inf or ma tio n g ive n b y

the su sp e c t in his interview wa s g iv e nunconstitutionallyand which the n led to other inv e sti g ati on , tal kin g to the pr os titute , ta lki ng abo ut the c lothe s, seizing his property

which then made the seizure the f ruit of the poisonous tree a s it were.

L o o k ing at whether

or not he wa s in custody during the pre l i minary

interview I ’m just going to put a couple of case s on the

rec ord. . . . St at e vs . A nde r so n

. . . th e re levant in qu ir y in deter mining whe ther a n individual’s in c ustody

. . . is whether unde r the t otality of t he circumstance s a re asonable person in the suspec t’s position would consider h i m s el f . . . deprived of fr eedom of

mov e me nt t o a

de g re e a sso c ia te d w ith a

fo rm a l arr e st.

. . . .-19- And in this case the de fenda nt voluntarily went down to the station house with his mot her. Eve n if it were proved, a nd there is no proof that sh e fo rc e d h im t o g o to th e ho us e a s h is m oth e r, that st ill wo uld not be State ac tion.

But she broug ht him down t here
, he was not handcuf fed, the door wa s open, closed, ope n, closed a ll during th e d ay

. He ne ver
a sk e d to le a ve , w a s n e ve r h a nd c uf fe d u nti l a ft e r h e wa s f

or ma lly

arr ested.

The information tha t he g ave the police during this interview was . . . g ener al stuff, g ener al investig ative questions . . . .

Under those circ umstances the pr oof that I have here I don’t fi ndth at he wa s - - tha t he wo uldha ve fe lt tha t he wa s n ot f re e to leave

. . . .

[H] e wa s not in custody , and bec ause of that an y interview tha t the po lic e too k o f h im, a long wi th all the oth e r w itn e sse s, wa s n ot i n custodial interrog ation and t h e r e w a s n o th ing about that interview that

was unc onstitut ional so that any fruit from that interview would lea d to a M ir a n d iz e d c o n f

e s s io n w h ic h w o u ldb e f

ru it o f th e p o isonous tree

.

Th e app e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y ov e rr uli ng hi s mo ti on to s up pr e ss h is consent to sea

rch his home a nd his alleg ed stateme nt. I n support of his motion to suppress, he a rg ues that la w e nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs vio la te d h is c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts a g a ins t un re a so na ble se izur e a ndhis privileg e ag ainst self-incrimination.

Th is c a se inv olv e s a

re vie w o f the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd in gs of fa c t a ndc on c lus ion s o f l a w i n de ny ing a mot ion to s up pr e ss e vid e nc e . B e c a us e iss ues o f w he the r a de fe nd a nt w a s p la c e d in

c us tod y , in te rr og a te d, a nd vo lun tari ly g a ve a c on fe ssi on are pr ima ri ly iss ue s o f f

a c t, w e re vie w the se fac tual deter minations by the trial court acc ording to the standard set forth in State v

. Odom
, 928 S.W .2d 18 (Tenn. 1996) . State v. Walton
, 4 1 S.W .3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001) . Under the Odom standard, a n appellate court will not disturb the fac ts found by th e t ri al co u rt unless the evidenc e preponde rate s ag ainst the lower c ourt’s finding s. I d. (citing Odom
, 928 S.W .2d at 23). “ Questions about witness cr edibilityand ‘r esolution of conflicts in the evide nce a re ma tters entrusted to the trial judge .’” I d. (quoting Odom, 928 S.W .2d at 23). Moreove r, the “[t] estimony prese nted at trial may be conside red by

an appe llate court in deciding the propriety of t he trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppr ess.” State v. Perry
, 13 S.W. 3d 72 4, 73 7 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 9) . Not wi ths ta nd ing thi s-20-

defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s finding s of fa ct, our re view of a trial court’ s application of law to the fac ts is conducte d under a de novo st andar d of re view. Walton
, 41 S.W .3d at 81; State v. Crutcher
, 989 S.W .2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999) ; State v. Year g an , 958 S.W .2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997)

.

1. Custody

I n M ir a n d a

v

. A r iz ona, 3 8 4 U. S

. 4 36, 444, 86 S. Ct . 1602, 1612 (1966), the U nited States Supreme Court held that “ the prosec ution may not use statements, whe ther ex culpatory or inc ulp a tory , s te mmi ng fr om c us tod ia l int e rr og a tio n of the de fe nd a nt u nle ss i t de mon str a te s th e us e of pr oc e du ra l sa fe g ua

rd s e ff e c tiv e to s e cure th e priv ile g e a g a ins t se lf -i nc ri min a tio n. ” Th e se pr oc e du ra l sa fe g ua

rd s r e qu ir e that po lic e of fi c e rs mus t a dv ise a

de fe nd a nt o f h is or her ri g ht t o
re ma in sil e nt a nd of his or he r ri g ht to c ou ns e l be fo re the y ma y ini tiate c us tod ia l in te rr og a tio n. Sta te v. Sawy er, 156 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Tenn. 2005). I f these warnings are not give n, statements elicited fr om the ind ivi du a l ma y no t be a dmi tte d in the pr os e c uti on ’s c a se -i n- c hie f. Sta ns bu ry v. Ca lif or nia
, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S. C t. 1526, 1528 (1994). A wa iver of c onstitut ional rig hts must be made “v o l u n t ar ily , knowing ly , and intellige ntly .” Miranda
, 3 8 4 U. S

. at 4 4 4
, 8 6 S

. C t

. at 1 6 1 2

. In determining whe ther a d ef endant has validly

waived his Mira nda rig hts, courts must look to t he totalityof the c ircumstance s. State v. Middlebrooks
, 840 S.W .2d 317, 326 (Tenn. 1992)

.

Miranda w arning s are requir ed wh en a per son is subject to custodial interrog ation by law enfor ceme nt. See Miranda, 384 U .S. at 444, 86 S. C t. at 1612. “Custodial” means tha t the subject of questioning is in “custod y o r o t h er wi se deprived of his fre edom by the authorities in any signific ant way .” I d. at 478, 86 S. Ct. at 1630. Our supreme court has ex panded this def inition of custodial to mean “ whether , under the to t al ity of the c ircumstance s, a re asonable person in the suspect’s position would consider himself or herse lf deprive d of freedom of movement to a deg ree associate d with a forma l arre st.” State v. Ander son , 93 7 S.W. 2d 85 1, 85 5 (T e nn

. 19 96 ). Th is t e st is “objective f

rom the viewpoint of the suspe ct, and the una rt i cu l at ed
, s u bjective view of law enfor ceme nt officials that the individual be ing questioned is or is not a suspect does not bea r upon the qu e sti on .” I d. I n de te rm ini ng wh e the r a re a so na ble pe rs on wo uldc on sid e r h ims e lf or he rs e lf in custody , we r eview a

varie ty of fa ctors, including

the time and location of the interrog ation; the duration and cha rac ter of the que stioning; the office r’s tone of voice a nd g ener al demea nor; t h e su s p ec t ’s m et h o d o f tra n s p o rt at i o n t o t h e pl ac e o f q u e s t i o n i n g; th e n u mb e r

o f p o li c e o f f ic e r s p r e s e n t; a n y

li mi tati o n o n mo v e ment or other f

orm of restraint imposed on the suspect during the int e rr og a tio n; a ny in te ra c tio ns be tw e e n th e of fi c e r a nd the su sp e c t, including the words spoken by the office r to the suspect , an d t he suspect’s ve rbal o r n o n verba l responses; the e x tent to which the suspect is confr onted wit h the law e nforc ement off icer ’s suspicions of g uilt o r ev i d ence of g uilt; and finally , the extent to which the-21- suspect is made a war e that he or she is fre e to ref

rain fr om answering qu e sti on s o r t o e ndthe int e rv ie w at w ill

.

I d.

B e c a us e this was a mot ion to s up pr e ss, we mus t a c c re dit the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t. The tria l c o u r t a c c r e d it e d th e te s ti mo n y o f th e la w e n f o r c e me n t o f

f ic e r s , a n d th e e v id e n c e in the

rec ord does not pre ponderate otherw ise. When we apply the Anderson fac tors to the fa cts testified to at the su pp re ssi on he ari ng , we de te rm ine that the app e lla nt wa s not in cu sto dy un de r the tot a lit y of the circ umstances. The appellant’ s initi al pre sence at the Memphis Police Depa rtment Homicide Offic e on April 24 was for the purpose of gathe ring fac ts in the investigation of Cruc hon’s murder

an d P o l l ac k ’s as s au l t

. T h e po l i ce co n t ac t ed t h e ap p el l an t at ap p ro x i m at el y 1 0 : 0 0 a. m

. t h at m o rn i n g, but the appellant did not arrive at the police department until 3: 00 p.m. that after noon. The appellant’ s mother ac companied him to the police de partme n t, an d a lt houg h the appe llant was plac ed in an interview room, the re cord doe s not refle ct that he was deprived of his fre edom of a ction in any signific ant way

. Specifica lly , there is no indication that the appellant wa s preve nted from lea ving the interview room, and the appellant was left unattended in the room for larg e amounts of t ime. The interac tions between the office rs and the a ppellant wer e coope rative a nd cordia l. The off icer s testified that the appe llant was ca lm, cooperative, and smili ng and that the appe llant was not under

arr est at that time.

The testimony

at the suppre ssion hearing reve aled that the appellant beca me a suspec t when Offic er S i ms discovere d the appe llant’s bloody clothing. O ffice r Sims contacted Ser g eant Fitzpatrick, and F itz patrick immediate ly arr ested the a

ppellant. When O ffice r Sims returne d to the police depa

rtment, h e advis ed the a

ppellant of his Miranda

rig hts. The re cord r efle cts that the

app e lla nt d id n ot r e qu e st a la wy e r a ndmade i nc ri min a tin g state me nts a ft e r h e wa s a dv ise d o f h is rig hts and waive d th o s e ri ghts. W e conc lude the trial c ourt did not err by deny ing the appellant’ s motion to s uppress his statement.

2. Consent to Search

“ A w arr a ntl e ss s e arc h is pr e su me d u nr e a so na ble un de r b oththe fe de ra l andthe state constitutions, and evidenc e seized from the war rantless sea

rch is subjec t to suppression unless the Sta te de mon str a te s b y a pr e po nd e ra nc e of the e vid e nc e that th e se arc h w a s ‘ c on du c te d p ur su a nt t o
on e of the na

rr ow ly de fi ne d e xce pti on s to the wa rr a nt r e qu ir e me nt. ’” Sta te v. Che ari s , 995 S.W .2d 641, 643 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting State v. Simps on, 968 S.W .2d 776, 780 (Tenn. 1998) ). Two exceptions to the war rant re quirement include a sea rch inc ident to a

rre st and a sea

rch c onducted pursuant to conse nt. See Sc hn e c klo th v . B us ta mon te , 412 U.S . 218, 219, 93 S. Ct . 2041, 2043 (1973).-22-

“[T] o pas s c o n s ti tu ti o n a l m u s te r , c o n s e n t t o s e ar c h mu s t b e u n e q u iv o c a l, s p e c if ic
, intelligently

g iven, and uncontaminated by duress or c oerc ion.” State v. B rown , 836 S.W .2d 530, 54 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) . T he qu e sti on of wh eth er th e app e lla nt v olu nta ri ly c on se nte d to the se arc h is a qu e sti on of

fa c t w hic h f

oc us e s upo n the tot a lit y of the c ir c ums ta nc e s. Sc hn e c klo th
, 412 U.S. at 227, 9 3 S. Ct . at 2048. The pe rtinent question is whether the defe ndant’s ac t of consenting is “‘the product of a n essentially

fre e and unc onstrained c hoice.’ ” I d. at 225, 93 S. Ct. a t 2 0 47 (quoting Cul omb e v. Con ne c tic ut, 36 7 U .S. 56 8, 60 2, 81 S. Ct

. 18 60
, 18 79 (1 96 1) ). I f the de fe nd a nt’ s “ ‘w ill

was ove rborne and his ca

pacity for self-dete rmination critically impaired,’” due proc ess is offe nded. I d. a t 2 2 5

- 2 6
, 9 3 S. Ct

. a t 2 0 4 7 ( q u o ti n g Cu lo mb e , 3 6 7 U

. S. a t 6 0 2
, 8 1 S. Ct

. a t 1 8 7 9). The fo llo wi ng fa c tor s a

re us e d to e va luate the vo lun tari ne ss o f the c on se nt: (1 ) w he the r the de fe nd a nt i s in custody ; (2) the leng th of detentio n p ri o r t o t h e g iving of consent; (3) the pre sence of coe rcive police proc edure s; (4) the de fenda nt’s awa rene ss of the rig ht to refuse to consent; (5) the defe ndant’s ag e, educ ation, and intellige nce; ( 6) whe ther the de fenda nt understands his c onstitut ional rig hts; (7) the extent of the defe ndant’s prior experienc e with law e nforc ement; and ( 8) whe ther the de fenda nt

wa s i n j u re d
, i n t o x i ca t ed
, o r i n i l l h ea l t h

. S ee , e. g. , State v. Carter
, 16 S.W .3d 762, 769 (Tenn. 2000)

.

Kn ow le dg e of

the ri gh t to re fu se c on se nt h a s a lso be e n in c lud e d a s a fa c tor . Sc hn e c klo th
, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S. Ct . at 2048. Moreove r, the State must show “more than ac quiesce nce to a claim of law ful authority .” B umper v. North Carolina
, 391 U.S. 543, 549, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792 (1968). The burden of

proof r ests upon the State to show, by a pre pondera nce of the evidence, that the conse nt to a war

rantless sea

rch w as g iven fre ely

and voluntarily . I d. at 548; 88 S. Ct. at 1792. “The Fourth Amendment proscribes unreas o n ab l e sea rche s and seizures; it does not proscribe

v o lu n ta r y c o o p e r a ti o n

. ” F lo r ida v. B ostick
, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S. C t. 2382, 2389 (1991); Sc hn e c klo th
, 41 2 U .S. a t 24 3, 93 S. Ct . a t 20 56 (h old ing that “ the re is n oth ing c on sti tut ion a lly suspect in a pe rson’s voluntarily allowing a sea

rch” ).

Using the fa ctors applicable to the prese nt c ase, w e examine the totality of the c ircumstance s by first considering the appellant’ s persona l char acte ristics. The appe llant was twenty -eig ht y ear s old at the time of the c rimes. Whil e the rec ord is silent as to his intelligenc e, the r ecor d indicates that he h a d a n e le v e n th g r a d e e d u c a ti o n

. T h e o f f ic e r s te s ti f

ie d th a t th e ap p e ll a n t d id n o t ap p e ar to be intox icated or

under the influence of any substance and t hat t he appellant was c alm and coope rative. The re cord shows tha t the appellant had a prior history of ar rests at the time his conse nt was g iven. This fac t demonstrates a

presumptive fa miliaritywith the criminal justice sy stem.

The a ppellant also signe d the consent to se arc h form. The c onsent form provide d that the ap p e ll a n t w a s a d v is e d o f h is r ig h t to r e f u s e to c o n s e n t to th e s e ar c h

. T h e ap p e ll a n t’ s c o n sent was g iven to the sea

rch of his premises at “4659 Wicklow,” w here he lived with his mo t h er, Sher ry Gi bs on , a nd sh e a lso sig ne d a c on se nt t o s e arc h f

or m. T he c on se nt t o s e arc h f or m pr ov ide d th a t Ms

. Gibso n wa s ad v i s ed of her rig ht to refuse to consent to the sea rch. A t the residenc e, off icer s inf or me d M s. Gi bs on that the y we re loo kin g fo r the c lothin g wo rn by the app e lla nt o n T ue sd a y , A pr il 22. Ms. Gibson voluntarily went to the g arba g e can loc ated in the driveway , retrie ved a g arba g e bag from the g arba g e ca n, and g ave the bag and its contents to the officers. The appellant and his mother-23-

had a c ommon possessory interest in the prope rty

to be sea rche d, and either

could g rant va lid consent to searc h the prope rty . See State v. Ba rtram, 925 S.W .2d 227, 230-31 (Tenn. 1996). “‘ Voluntary

consen t r e q u ir e s s u f

f ic ie n t in te ll ig e n c e to ap p r e c iate th e a c t a s w e ll a s th e c o n s e q u e n c e o f the ac t

a g re e d to .’ ” (T hu rm a n v . St a te , 4 5 5 S. W. 2 d 1 7 7
, 1 8 0 ( 1 9 7 0 ) ( q u o ti n g 7 9 C. J. S. Se arc hes and Seizures § 62(b)). N othing in the r ecor d contra dicts the trial co u rt ’s finding that the appe llant

v o l u n t ar i l y g a v e c o n s e n t

. W e c o n c l u d e t h a t u n d e r t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , t h e ap p e l l a n t k n o w i n g l y, i n t e l l i g e n t l y, a n d v o l u n t ar i l y c o n s e n t e d t o t h e s e ar c h o f t h e p r e m i s e s a t 4 6 5 9 W i c k l o w

. S i m i l ar l y, the e v id e n c e d e mo n s tr a te s th a t Sh e rr y G ib s o n ’ s c o n s e n t a ls o w a s v o lu n ta r y

. F in a lly , no constitutional viol ation is appare nt from the fa ct t h at the appe llant’s mother, at a time when the appellant wa s still living at he r home, supplied police of fice rs with the appe llant’s clothing. N o
sear ch wa s involved
, an d t h e evidenc e supports a c onclusion that the mother’s c ooperation was

vo lun tary . T he c lothin g wa s lo c a te d in a g arb a g e c a n in the driv e way , a n a re a c le arl y un de r M s. Gi bs on ’s c on tr ol a ndno t w it hi n th e ex clu siv e c on tr ol o f the app e lla nt. Th e se arc h a ndthe fr uit s there of withstand constitutional scrutiny . The a ppellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

B. Cross-e x amination of the Appe llant

Be fo re t h e a p p el l an tt o o k t h e s t an d i n h i s o wn d ef

en s e, t h e tr i al co u rt m ad e s ev er al ru l i n gs reg arding hi s cross-e x amination. Specifica lly , the trial court ruled that if the a ppellant testified reg arding his drug addiction, then the State would be permitted to cross- examine him about the circ umstances of

the offe nses. The tria l court also stated tha t the State could cr oss-examine the appellant about the circumstances of the offenses if the appellant “g ot on the stand and started say ing

re sid ua l do ub t, o r I

re a lly did n’ t kn ow wh a t I wa s do ing .” Th e c ou rt sa id that “ ob vio us ly
, the state could then g et into it. Ijust want to make sure that’s clea r to eve ry body .”

During the appe llant’s t es t i m o n y , t h e f o l l o wi n g ex ch an ge o cc u rr ed b et we en t h e a p p el l an tand h i s a t t o r n e y:

Q. I s th e re a nythi ng that y ou wo uldlik e to s a y to the fa mil y and/or friends of Ms. Pollack and Ms. Cruchon?

A. Ye s.

Q. You may

say it at this t ime.

A. I ’d like to say that I ’m sorry for their loss. I didn’t mean for any of this to happen. I d i dn’t want to hurt any body . I f I

c ou ld t ake it a ll b a c k, I

wo uld . A nd I ’d li ke to s a y to the ir family members a nd their friend s t hat I am truly sorry for-24- wh a t I did . I f the re wa s e ve r a nythi ng that I c ou ld d o, I

wo uld d o it
, b u t I

d o n ’ t kn o w th a t th e r e is

. I w o u ldli k e to ap o lo g iz e for what I did. They didn’t deser ve any of this and there ’s no

e xcu se fo r w ha t I

did . T ha t’ s a ll I

ha ve to s a y

abo ut tha t.

[Defense ]: Nothing f

urther, Y our Honor.

The trial c ourt asked the attorney s to approa ch the bench and sta ted, “The statements that he made
, ‘I didn’t mean f

o r i t t o happen, I

didn’t want to hurt any

body ’, flies in the fa ce of fac ts in the confe ssion.” The defense arg ued that the appe llant simpl y had bee n expressing r emorse. H oweve r, the court a nnounced that the appellant had opened the door for the State to que stion him about the circ umstances of

the offe nses. The appellant’ s direct testimony resumed, a nd the appe llant testified about his d r

u g a d d ic ti on. On cr oss-examination, the St ate que stioned the appe llant ext ensively about his beating the victims and compelled the ap p el lant to phy sically demonstrate how be bent ove r Cruchon while he hit her with the hammer . The a ppellant complains that this cross-e x amination was

ex tre m el y p re j u d i ci al an d re q u i re s a n ew s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g.

I n State v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253, 266 (Tenn. 1994) , our supre me court addre ssed the scope of a de fenda nt’s cross-e x amination at a capital sentenc ing hear ing and announce d the following rule:

We thu s con c lud e that, onl y in the lim ite d s ph e re of a de a th p e na lty sentenc ing he aring , a ca pital d efendant’s testimony reg arding mitigating fac tors that are wholl y co l l ater al to the merits of the char g es ag ainst him does not operate as a complete wa iver of the pr ivi le g e a g a ins t se lf

-i nc ri min a tio n. Ac c or din g ly
, a de fe nd a nt ha s a rig ht to limited cross-e x amination if he or she wishes to testify about only collater al mitigating circ umstances at t h e p enalty phase of a capi ta l t r ia l. We r e it e r a te , h o w e v e r , th a t e v e n in s u c h s p e c ia l situati ons, a

de fe nd a nt m a y

be c omp le te ly

a ndtho ro ug hly

cross-e x amined about a l l t estimony g iven or fa irly

raised by

that defe ndant on direc t examination.

(Citations omitted.) We note t hat during t he first pa rt of the a ppellant’s dire ct testimony , he testified

on ly abo ut his pe rs on a l hi sto ry , p art ic ula rl y his str a ine d r e la tio ns hip wi th h is f a the r a ndhis c los e rela tionship wit h his mother. The a ppellant then expressed his re morse for the cr i m es , and the defe nse told the t rial court that it was finished questioning the appe llant. I t was only afte r the trial court a nnounced tha t the appellant ha d opened the door t o cross-e x amination by the S tate as to the circ umstances of

the offe nses that the appe llant testified about his drug addiction.-25-

We dis a g r e e w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s c o n c l u d i n g t h a tt h e ap p e l l a n to p e n e d t h e d o o r t o c r os sexamination about the c ircumstance s of the offe nses. I n our view, the appellant’ s statements wer e simplyhis attempt at ex pressing remorse to the victim’s families and friends about the c rimes he ha d alre ady admitted committing. More tr oubling, howeve r, is the trial court’s c alling the parties to the bench and sua sponte announc ing tha t the appellant ha d opened the door. At that time, the State had

no t arg ue d tha t the app e lla nt o pe ne d th e do or , a ndit m a y ha ve ne ve r r a ise d th e iss ue . I n a ny e ve nt, we be lieve the trial court’s improper conduct did not prejudice the appellant. Although the State’s

cross-e x amination of the a ppellant eli ci t ed graphic details about his beating the victims and compelled him to demonstrate how he bent o ver Cruc hon as he struc k her, the jury had hea rd the appellant’ s statement in which he de scribed beating the victims with the hammer. More over, the jury hear d g raphic testimonyfrom D r. O.C. Smith concerning the victims’ injuries and saw photographs of Cruchon and the c rime sce ne. I n light of this evidenc e, we conclude that the trial court’s r uling that the a

ppellant opene d the door to cross-e x amination about t he circumstance s of the offe nses was ha

rmless err or. See Te nn. R. Crim. P . 52(a) ; Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).

C. Ph oto g ra

ph of Vi c tim

Next, the appellant claims that the t rial court improperly admitted a photog raph of

Mary J ane Cruchon into evidenc e. The photogr aph, exhibit 9, s hows a bloodied Cruc hon ly ing in the ha llway with blood spatte r o n t h e wa l l s and her clothes. The photog raph w as take n from the a ng le of the victim’s fee t and s hows the l eng th of her body . Offic er Calhoun identifie d the photog raph during his de sc ri pti on of fi nd ing the vic tim s’ bo die s at the c ri me sc e ne

. Th e app e lla nt c omp la ins that th is ph oto g ra ph is n ot r e le va nt t o a ny c on te ste d is su e du ri ng the pe na lty ph a se . A lth ou g h th e Sta te

ar g u e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r tt h a tt h e p h o t o g r ap h w a s r e l e v a n tt o s h o w t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e v i c t i m ’ s b o d y, the appe llant contends that the photog raph w as unnec essary beca use off icer s testified as to the location of the vic tim’s body . Thus, even if rele vant , the photog raph w as more pr ejudicial than probative a nd was a n appeal t o t h e jury ’s emotions. The State conte nds that the photog raph w as pr op e rl y a dmi tte d insu pp ort of the he ino us , a tr oc iou s, or c ru e l a g g ra va tin g c ir c ums ta nc e . T he Sta te also responds that this issue is waived for failure to object at tria l. We conclude that the a ppellant is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.

The a dmission of phot og raphs is g ener ally within the di scre tion of t he trial court and, abse nt an abuse of that discre tion, will not result in the g rant of a new trial. See State v. Ba nks, 564 S.W .2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978) ; see a lso State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 602 (Tenn. 1999); Tenn. R. Evid. 401. Photogra phs should not be admitt ed sol ely to inflame the jury and prejudice the defe ndant. State v. Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 67 ( T en n

. 2005); Ba nks, 564 S.W .2d at 950-51. Additionally , the probative va lue of the photog raph must outweig h any unfair pr ejudicial ef fec t that it may

have upon the trier of fa ct. Fa

ulkner, 154 S.W.3d at 67; S tate v. Va nn , 97 6 S. W.2 d 9 3, 10 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; State v. Br aden
, 86 7 S. W.2 d 7 50 , 7 58 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 93 ); se e a lso Te nn

. R. Ev id . 403 . “ I n th is

re sp e c t, .

. . ph oto g ra

ph s o f a mur de r v ic tim

are pr e jud ic ia l by

the ir ve ry na tur e .” Sta te v. Th oma s, 158 S.W .3d 361, 394 (Tenn. 2005). “Howe ver, prejudicia l e vidence is not per se excluded; indeed, if this we re true, all evidenc e of a crime would be excluded at trial.” Faulkner, 154 S.W .3d at 67.-26-

I ns te a d, e vid e nc e that is “ un fa ir ly pr e jud ic ia l” is e xclu de d. I d. Ev ide nc e is u nf a ir ly pr e jud ic ia l if it has “[a]n undue tendency to sugg est a de cision on an improper basis, commonly , though not

nece ssarily , an emotional one.’ ” Ba nks, 564 S.W .2d at 951 (quoting Fe d. R. Evid. 403, Advisory Commi ttee Comment).

The a dmissibi lityof evide nce at a ca pital sentencing hearing is c ontr o lle d by Tenne ssee Code An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 04 (c ), wh ic h a llo ws th e admi ssi on of a ny e vid e nc e “ the c ou rt

de e ms rele vant to the punishment . . . reg ardle ss of its admissibi lityunder the rules of e vi d en ce.” See Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d at 67; Hall, 8 S.W.3d at 602. I n essenc e, sec tion 39-1 3 -204(c ) permits t he introduction of any evidenc e rele vant to se ntencing in a capital case , subject only “to a de fenda nt’s op po rtun ity to re bu t a ny he ars a y state me nts a nd to c on sti tut ion a l lim itatio ns .” Ha ll
, 8 S.W .3d at 602. Thus, any evidenc e re levant to the circumstance s of the murde r, the a g g ravating c ircumstance s relied upon by the State, or the mitig ating circ umstances is admiss ible if such evide nce ha s probative va lue in the determination of punishment. St ate v. Te ag ue, 897 S.W .2d 248, 250 (Tenn. 1995) . Section 39-13-204( c) doe s not require a complete disreg ard for the Rules of Evidence , howeve r. The trial

c ou rt ma y c on tin ue to u se the Rul e s of Evi de nc e to g uid e its de c isi on s re g ard ing the a dmi ssi bil ity of evide nce in c apital sentenc ing pr ocee dings. See State v. S i m s , 4 5 S

. W.3d 1, 14 (Tenn. 2001).

Turning to the instant case , we note that despite the appe llant’s claim to the contra ry , the

rec ord re veals that he did not objec t to the State’s admitting e x hibit 9 int o evidenc e. Our revie w of the sentenc ing he aring transcript shows that the following e x chang e occ urre d:

[S tate]: The next picture is a picture - - it’s a long shot

s h o w i n g t h e l o c a t i o n o f

M s

. C r u c h o n ’ s b o d y.

THE COURT: Are y ou objecting to this pi cture ?

[Defense ]: Well, there ar e -- show him t h e other long

sh ot.

[Sta te ]: I

do n’ t ha ve a no the r l on g sh ot.

[Defense ]: I

thought y ou had anothe r –

[S tate]: No.

. . . .-27- [Defense ]: Okay . My o b j ec t ion was with respe ct to the oth e r o ne that I

tho ug ht t

he y we re g oi ng to

u s e , w h i c h w a s c u m u l a t i v e

. It i s a l s o g r i s l y, bu t w e ’l l su bmi t it

to the Cou rt

.

B y fa ili ng to m ake a

c on te mpo ra ne ou s o bje c tio n, the app e lla nt h a s wa ive d the iss ue . Se e Te nn . R. App. P. 36(a).

I n any event, in holding that the photog raph w as admissible, the trial court stated, “I don’t f i n d t h a ti t ’ s g r i s l y. T h e r e i s s o m e b l o o d o n t h e p a n t s a n d i f yo u l o o k o n t h e w a l l s a n d t h e d o o r w a y, but I don’t find this, at all, g risly

. So I am g oing to a llow it.” We ha ve re viewed the photogr aph and ag ree that it was a dmissibl e. The State introduced e x hibit 9 in order to illust rate law enf orce ment office rs’ de scriptions of the crime scene

. The photogra ph was properly

admitted as being rele vant to b a c kg ro un d in fo rm a tio n b e c a us e it a c c ur a te ly de pic ts the na tur e a ndc ir c ums ta nc e s o f the c ri me s. See State v. Carte r, 114 S.W.3d 895, 903 (Tenn. 2003). The introduction of backg round informa tion reg arding th e n a tu r e a n d c ir c u ms ta n c e s o f th e c r im e is e s p e c ia ll y imp o r ta n t in c a s e s w h e r e the defe ndant pleads g uiltyand the jury does not have the bene fit of proof normally introduced during the g uilt phase of trial. I d. The parties a re “ entitled to offer

evidenc e re lating to the c ircumstance s of the c rime so that the sente ncing jury will ha ve esse ntial backg round informa tion ‘to ensure tha t the jury acts fr om a base of knowledg e in sentenc ing the defe ndant.’” State v. Adkins, 725 S.W .2d 660, 663 (Tenn. 1987) (quoting State v. Tea g ue, 680 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tenn. 1984)).

Ad dit ion a lly , b e c a us e the ph oto g ra ph de pic ts b loo d s pa tte r a ndsta ins , w e c on c lud e that it is releva nt to show the serious, phy sical abuse o f C ruchon unde r ag g ravating c ircumstance (i)(5)

. S ee T en n

. C o d e A n n

. § 3 9 -1 3 -2 0 4 (i )( 5 ); s ee , e. g. , Carter
, 114 S.W .3d at 903 (photog raphs de picting victims’ bodies at crime sc ene r eleva nt to prove “he inous, atrocious, or c ruel” ag g ravating

c ir c ums ta nc e ); Sta te v. Smith
, 893 S.W .2d 908, 924 (Tenn. 1994) (photog raph s depicting the victim’s body
, including one of the slash wound to the throa t, which was “ undeniably g ruesome,”

wer e re levant and a dmissibl e to prove that the killing wa s “espe cially heinous, atroc ious, or crue l”); S tate v . M c Ni sh
, 7 2 7 S. W. 2 d 4 9 0
, 4 9 5 ( T e n n

. 1 9 8 7 ) ( p h o to g r ap h s o f th e b o d y o f th e v ic ti m, w ho was be aten to death, were rele vant and a dmissibl e to show the he avy , repe ated, a nd vicious blows to the victim and to prove that the ki lling was “espe cially heinous, atroc ious, or cruel”)

. I n short, our supreme c ourt has re peate dly held that photog raphs r eleva nt to proving the (i )( 5 ) agg ravating circ um s t an ce ar e admissible in the penalty phase. See Sta te v. Mo rris
, 24 S.W .3d 788, 810-11 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; State v. Ha ll
, 97 6 S. W.2 d 1 21 , 1 62 (T e nn

. 19 98 ); Sta te v. Smith
, 868 S.W .2d 561, 579 (Tenn. 1993) ; State v. Mill er , 77 1 S. W.2 d 4 01 , 4 03 -0 4 ( Ten n. 19 89 ); Sta te v. Porte rf ie ld
, 746 S.W .2d 441, 449-50 (Te nn. 1988).

Finally
, we cannot c onclude that the photog raph w as unfa irly prejudicia l. The photog raph i s n o tgru es o m e o r s h o ck i n g an d co rr o b o ra t es t h e t es t i m o n y p re s en t ed at t h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g. Thus, even if

cumulative, it is admissibl e. Carte r, 114 S.W.3d at 90 4 ; M o rr i s , 24 S.W .3d at 811-28-

(appe ndix ) (photog raph not inadmissible mere ly beca use it is cumulative); State v. Van Tr an, 864 S.W .2d 465, 477 (Tenn. 1993) (photog raphs a dmissibl e despite introduc tion of videotape de picting

c ri me sc e ne ); Sta te v. B ro wn , 8 36 S.W. 2d53 0, 53 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) (p ho tog ra ph s a dmi ssi ble de sp ite oral testimony describing injuries). After revie w of the photogr aph and the applicable law, we cannot c onclude that the trial court a bused its discretion by

admitting the photog raph into evide nce.

D. Appre ndi/Ri ng Violation as to (i)(2) Ag g ravator

Be fore the sentenc ing he aring
, the S tate made known t hat i t would use the a ppellant’s thre e prior convic tions for ag g ravated robbe ry to establish the exis tence o f t he (i)( 2) ag g ravating circ umstance, tha t the appellant ha d p ri o r convic tions for one or mor e fe lonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person. S ee Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(i)( 2). During the pena lty p h ase, the State introduced the indictments a nd judgme nts, showing that the

app e lla nt h a d p led g uil ty

to thr e e c ou nts of

a g g ra va te d r ob be ry . A t th e c on c lus ion of the pe na lty phase, the trial court instructe d the jury wi t h re s p ec t t o both convictions of first deg ree murder a s fo llo ws :

The de fenda nt was previouslyconvicted of one, or more felonies other than the prese nt char g e. The statutory elements of w hich involve the use of violenc e to the per son. The state is re ly ing upon the crime of ag g ravated robbe ry which is a fe lony . The statutory elements of w hich involve the use of violence to the pe rson.

The a ppellant contends tha t the question of whethe r t h e p ri o r offenses involved the use of

v i o l e n c e t o t h e p e r s o n w a s a q u e s t i o n f

o r t h e j u r y t o r e s o l v e b e yo n d a r e a s o n ab l e d o u b t

. E s s e n t i a l l y, the appe llant complains that the proce dure se t f orth in Sims, 45 S.W .3d at 11-12, in which the trial court c onsiders the underly ing fac ts of the prior offe nses to determine whether the eleme nts of the

o f f e n s e s i n v o l v e dt h e u s e o f

v i o l e n c e t o t h e p e r s o n , v i o l a t e s t h e d i c t a t e s o f A p p r e n d i v

. N e w J e r s e y, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).

Our supr e me c o u r t r e

je c te d th is s a me ar g u me n t in St a te v

. Co le
, 1 5 5 S. W. 3 d 8 8 5
, 9 0 0 -05 (Tenn. 2005) , cert. d en i ed
,

_ _ _ U.S. ___, 126 S. C t. 47 (2005). I n doing so, our high c ourt acknow ledg ed that “A pprendi a nd its proge ny prec lude judg es from finding ‘additional fa cts,’ that incre ase a defe ndant’s sentenc e bey ond the ‘statutory maxi mum,’ which is define d as the maximum sentenc e a judg e may

impose ‘solely on the basis of the fac ts r efle cted in the jury verdic t or admitted by the def endant.’ ” I d. at 903 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004)) . The c ourt diffe ren t i ated the principles of Appr endi from the Sims proce dure, concluding t hat “[t] he Sims procedur e involves a le g al determination, and as such this proce dure does not transg ress the dic tates of Appr endi and its prog eny .” I d. at 904.-29-

I n explaining this conclusion, our supre me cour t stated,

The (i) (2) a g g ravating c ircumstance requ ires only that the statutory elements of the prior fe lony involve the use of violence to the pe rson. The S i ms procedur e authorizes trial judges me rely to examine the fa c ts, rec or d, a nde vid e nc e un de rl y ing the pr ior c on vic tio n to

asce rtain which “ statutory elements” serve d as the basis of the prior felony conviction. This is a leg al determination that ne ither re quires nor allows trial judg es to make f actua l findings as to whether the prior conviction involved violence . This leg al determination is analog ous to the pr e lim ina

ry qu e sti on s tria l ju dg e s oft en are c a lle d u po n to decide when de termining the admissibilit y of evide nce.

I d. (citation omitted). I n this reg ard, it has be en re cog nized that “certain aspec ts of the cha rac ter of prior convic tions are so ba sic as to be implicit in the fac t of a prior convi cti on.” United States v. Ho lli ng sw orth, 41 4 F .3 d 6 21 , 6 23 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) . “ [T]he vio le nt n a tur e of a pr e vio us of fe ns e ‘i s
no t a fa c t th a t pe rt a ins to the c omm iss ion of the of fe ns e fo r w hic h th e defe nd a nt i s p re se ntl y char g ed,’ but rather a

fac t that pertains to the pre viou s o ff en s e. ” I d. (quoting United States v. B ur g in, 38 8 F .3 d 1 77 , 1 86 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) ). Al tho ug h th e app e lla nt c ite s Sh e pa rdv. Un ite d St a te s, 54 4 U .S. 13 , 1 25 S. Ct . 1 25 4 ( 20 05 ), in s up po rt of his arg ume nt, that hold in g d oes n ot s wa y thi s court be cause the i ssue i n Shepard was not whether the t rial court could m ake f indings a bout prior convictions but r ather what source s the trial court could rely on to ma ke such finding s. Shepard, 544 U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct . at 1257 (holding that “a later c ourt determining the chara cter of an admitted [prior felony ] i s g ener ally limit ed to e x amining the statutory definition, char g ing doc ument, written ple a a g re e me nt, tr a ns c ri pt o f p le a c oll oq uy , a nda ny

e xp li cit fac tua l f

ind ing by the tr ia l ju dg e to which the defe n d an t assented”). Ac cording ly , the determination of whether the appe llant’s prior convictions for multiple counts of ag g ravated robbery wer e crimes involving violence to the person

wa s squa re ly wi thi n the pr ov inc e of the tr ia l cou rt , an d the app e lla nt is not e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is issue.

E. I nstruction on Victim I mpact Te stimony

Next, the appellant asserts tha t the trial court’s victim impac t instruc t i o n wa s an undue intrusion into the exclusive province of the jury . I n instructing the jury , the trial court provided the following instruction as to victim im pact e vidence :

Victim impact evidenc e. The p ro s ec u t i o n h as i n t ro d u ce d wh at is know n as victim impac t e vidence

. This e videnc e h as been introduced to show t h e financ ial, emotional, psy cholog ical, or phy sical ef

fec t s of the victim[’] s death on the me mbers of the

v i c t i m [ ’ ] s i m m e d i a t e f

a m i l y.-30- Yo u may con si der t hi s ev id ence i n d ete rm in in g an app rop riate punishment. Howeve r, y our consider ation must be limi ted to a rational inquiry into the culpability of the de fenda nt, not an emotional response to the evidenc e.

Victim impact evidenc e is n o t the same a s an ag g ravating

c ir c ums ta nc e . Pr oo f o f a n a dv e rs e impa c t on the vic tim ’s fa mil y is not proof of a n ag g ravating c ircumstance

.

I ntroduction to this vi ctim impact evidenc e in no way relieve s the state of its burde n to prove be y ond a re asonable doubt at least one ag g ravating c ircumstance which has been alleg ed. You m ay consider this victim impact evidenc e in determining the a ppropriate ness of the death pe nalty

only if y ou first find that t he ex istence of one or more
a g g ra va tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s h a s b e e n p ro ve n b e y on d a re a so na ble doubt, by evidenc e indepe ndent from the victim impac t e vidence and find t h at the ag g ravating c ircumstance or circ umstances f ound, outweig h the finding of one or more mitigating c ircumstance , or circ umstances be y ond a re asonable doubt.

The a ppellant contends that there is a reasonable probability that the i nstruction coer ced a finding by the jury that the a g g ra va tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s outw e ig he d the mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s bec a us e to find otherwise would require the jury to ignor e the e motional victim i mpact evidence presente d by the prosec ution.

Th e ins truc tio n p ro vid e d to the jury in the pr e se nt ca se wa s r e c omm e nd e d b y ou r s up re me court in State v. Ne sbit, 978 S .W.2d 872, 892 (Tenn. 1998), and was discussed and approve d by our
su pr e me c ou rt in Sta te v. Re id, 91 S.W. 3d 24 7, 28 2- 83 (T e nn . 200 2) . See a lso Cole, 155 S.W .3d at 914 (a ppendix) (approving the Nesbit victim i m p act instruction). In Reid, the supreme court specific ally

noted that any

contra diction arising betwee n the instruction and the statute inured to the benef it of the defe ndant. 91 S.W.3d at 283. Ac cording ly
, the appellant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

F. Constitutionalit y of Tenne ssee’ s Dea th Penalty Statutes

Th e app e lla nt r a ise s n ume ro us c ha lle nges to th e c on sti tut ion a lit y of Te nn e sse e ’s de a th penalty provisions. Upon review , we c onclude that the a ppellant’s spec ific complaints have been previously reje cted by

the cour ts of this state. I n light of this fa ct, we a cknowledg e that the a ppellant must raise these issues to pre serve them for r eview by a hig her c ourt. We briefly addre ss eac h

c ha lle ng e ma de by

app e lla nt.-31-

First, th e a

p p e ll ant asserts that Tennessee ’s death penalty statutes fail to meaning fully narr ow the c la ss o f d e a th e lig ibl e de fe nd a nts , th e re by re nd e ri ng Te nn e sse e de a th pe na lty statut ory sc he me
un c on sti tut ion a l. S pe c if ic a lly , h e arg ue s th a t th e statut ory a g g ra va tin g c ir cum st a nc e s se t f orth i n Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 04 (i )( 2) , ( i) (5 ), (i )(6 ), and(i )( 7) ha ve be e n s o b ro a dly interpre ted, whethe r vi ewe d singly or collectively
, that they fail to provide a

“mea ningf

ul basis” for

narr owing the population of those convicted of first deg ree murder to those e ligible f or the sente nce of death. We note that factor (i)(6) does not perta in to this case as this fac tor was not re lied upon by the State nor found by

the jury . Thus, any

individual c laim w ith r espec t to this fa ctor is without merit. See
, e.g ., State v. Hall, 958 S.W .2d 679, 715 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W .2d 75, 86 (Tenn. 1994) . Moreove r, the a pp ellant’s ar g ument has bee n reje cted by our supre me court

on numerous occ asions. See Va nn, 976 S.W .2d at 117-18 (appe ndix ); State v. Kee n, 926 S.W .2d 727, 742 (Tenn. 1994)

.

Se c on d, the app e lla nt a

rg ue s th a t the impos iti on of the de a th p e na lty

in this state is unconstitutional because the dea th se ntence is imposed capriciously and arbitra rily . Specifica lly , he

c on te nd s th a t unli mit e d disc re tio n is ves te d in the pr os e c uto r as to wh e the r or no t to se e k th e de a th penalty . Howeve r, this arg ument also has bee n reje cted. See S tate v. Hines, 919 S .W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn. 1995). The appellant also contends that the death penalty is imposed in a d i s crimi natory

manner based upon r ace , g eog raphy , and g ender

. Once ag ain, this a rg ument has been reje cted. See I d.; Cazes, 875 S.W .2d at 268; State v. Smit h, 857 S.W .2d 1, 23 (Tenn. 1993) . He a rg ues that requiring the jury

to ag ree unanimously to a li fe verdict violates Mills v. Mary land, 486 U.S. 367, 10 8 S. Ct. 18 60 (1 98 8) , an d McK oy v. No rth Car oli na , 494 U. S. 433 , 110 S. Ct. 122 7 (19 90 ). Th is arg ument has bee n reje cted. See Brimmer, 876 S.W .2d at 87; State v. Thompson, 768 S.W .2d 239, 250 (Tenn. 1989) . The ap p el lant also contends that ther e is a re asonable likelihood that jurors believe the y

must unanimouslyag ree as to the ex istence of mitigating circ umstances because of the failure to instruct the jury

on the meaning and func tion of miti g ating circ umstances. This arg ument also has bee n reje cted. See Thompson, 768 S.W .2d at 250-52.

Th ir d, the app e lla nt a sse rt s th a t th e app e llate re vie w p ro c e ss i n d e a th p e na lty c a se s is constitutionallyinadequate. Our supr eme c ou rt h as rejected this ar g ument also. See Cazes, 875 S.W .2d at 270-71; State v. Har ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 77 (Tenn. 1992). Moreove r, the supreme c ourt h as h el d th at “[ w] h i l e i m p o rt an tas an ad d i t i o n al s af egu ar d aga i n s tarb i t ra ryo r c ap ri ci o u s s en t en ci n g, compar ative proportionalityrevie w is not constituti onally re q u i re d .” State v. B land, 958 S.W.2d 651, 663 (Tenn. 1997)

.

G. Review Pursua nt to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 206(c)

Pursu ant to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 39-13- 206(c) (1), we are require d to review the application of the death pe nalty to determine w hether-32- (A) T he sente nce o f d eath wa s imposed in any arbitra ry fashion;

(B ) The e vidence supports the jury ’s findi n g o f statutory

a g g ra va tin g c ir c ums ta nc e or c ir c ums ta nc e s;

(C) The e vi d ence supports the jury ’s finding that the ag g ravating circumstance or circumstance s outweig h any mitigating circ umstances; and

(D ) T he se nte nc e of

de a th i s e xce ssi ve or

dis pr op ortio na te to the pena lty

imposed in simi lar c ases, c onsidering both the nature of the c ri me a ndthe de fe nd a nt.

1. Ar bit ra ri ne ss

Having thoroug hly

revie wed the rec ord, we find that the sentenc e of de ath was not imposed in any arbitra ry fashion.

2. Sufficienc y

of Statutory

Ag g ravating Circumstanc es F ound by J ury

a. Prior Violent F elony

– the (i)( 2) Circumstance

As stated pre viously , Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i) (2) pr ovides that in a capital case , a jury may sentenc e a defe ndant to de ath if the defe ndant was pr eviously convicted of a fe lony “whose statutory

elements involve the use of violence to the pe rson.” Althoug h not raised by e ith e r p ar ty , w e b e li e v e w e mu s t a d d r e s s w h e th e r th e tria l c o u r t p r o p e r ly d e te r mi n e d th a t the

app e lla nt’ s p ri or

fe lon y c on vic tio ns fo r a g g ra va te d r ob be ry we re c on vic tio ns that in vo lve d th e us e of violence to the person.

O u r s u p r e m e c o u r t h a s r e c o g n i z e d t h a ts o m e f e l o n y o f f e n s e s , i n c l u d i n g a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y, do not nece ssarily

involve the use of violenc e. State v. McK inney
, 74 S.W .3d 291, 3 0 6 (Tenn. 20 02 ). Spe c if

ic a lly , in Mc Ki nn e y , o ur

su pr e me c ou rt

a c kn ow le dg e d th a t, w hil e the larg e ma jority of ag g ravated robbe ries involve violence, the offe nse may also be committed w ith a n “article used or fa shioned to lead the vic tim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly wea pon.” I d. at 306 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402( a)( 1)). “ This statutory provision thus raises the question of whe ther an off ense of ag g ravated robbe ry

committed in this manner constitutes violence.” I d.-33-

I n Sims , the court approve d a proc edure in which the trial judg e, outside the pre sence of the jury , c on sid e rs the un de rl y ing fa c ts of the pr ior fe lon y to d e te rm ine wh e the r the e le me nts of tho se of fe ns e s in vo lve d th e us e of vio le nc e to the pe rs on . 45 S.W.3 d at 11- 12 . T he Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court has held that for

purposes of de termining whether a def endant ha s a co n v i cti on for a prior violent felony

invo l v i n g t h e use of

violence a g ainst a per son, for purpose s of ag g ravating

c i r c u m s t a n c e ( i ) ( 2 )
, “ t h e t r i a l j u d g e m u s t n e c e s s ar i l y e x a m i n e t h e f a c t s u n d e r l yi n g t h e p r i o r

f e l o n y” to determine w hether

it involved violence ag ainst a per son if that prior violent fe lony conviction may be committed “with or w ithout proof of violence .” I d. at 12. “I f the trial court de termines that the statutory elements of the prior offense involved the us e of violence, the State may introduce e vidence that the def

endant ha d previously

been c onvicted of the prior offen s es , ” an d the trial court “then would instruct the j ury that those convictions involved the use of violence to the pe rson.” State v. Powers
, 101 S.W .3d 383, 400-01 (Te nn. 2003).

The trial c ourt in this case did not follow the Sims proced u re b ec au s e no jury -out de te rm inatio n w a s ma de a s to wh e the r the e le me nts of the of fe ns e s invo lve d the us e of vio le nc e to the pe rs on . D ur ing the pe na lty ph a se and in supp ort of

thi s a g g ra va tin g c ir c ums ta nc e , th e Sta te i n t r o d u c e d t h e i n d i c t m e n t s c h ar g i n g t h e ap p e l l a n tw i t h t h r e e c o u n t s o f a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y. Acc ording to the indictments, the appellant “did unlawfully
, knowing ly
, and viol ently
, by use of a deadly wea

pon, to-wit: a knife , [a pistol , and a shotg un] obt ain . . . a sum of money ” fr om the person of ea ch victim. (Empha sis added.) N o testimonyrebutted the information provided in the ind ic tme nts , a ndthe pr oo f re ve a le d tha t th e app e lla nt e nte re d g uil ty ple a s to the c ha

rg e d o ff e ns e s. Thus, the under ly ing f

acts of the se off

enses we re pr ovided to the trial court.

The re cord r efle ct s t h at t he appe llant objected to the tria l court’s making the leg al determination as to whether the appellant’ s prior convictions involved the us e of violence a nd that the trial court stated, “[T] hat is a leg al conclusion that the J udg e must make .” This r uling a nd the tr ial cou rt ’s instr

uc tio n to the jury

re g ard ing the (i )( 2) fa c tor de mon str a te that th e tr ia l c ou rt did

conc l u d e that the offense s involved the use of violenc e to the per son, althoug h this determination was not made specific ally on the rec ord. Upon revie w, we conclude that the indictments char g ing the appe llant with ag g ravated robbe ry ref lect that the of

fense s involved the use of violenc e t o the person a nd that the trial court properly instructed the jury

as to the (i)( 2) ag g ravating c ircumstance

. The e vidence , there for e, s upports the jury ’s finding of the prior violent felony

ag g ravating circ umstance a s to eac h murder.

b. Heinous, Atroc ious, or Cruel – the (i)( 5) Circumstance

The a g g ravating c ircumstance in Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i) (5) a pplies wher e the “murde r was espec ially heinous, atroc ious, or crue l in that it involved torture or serious phy sical abuse bey ond that nece ssary to produce death.” “Tortur e” h as been de fined a s “the inf li c ti o n o f s e v e r e p h y s ic a l o r me n ta l p a in u p o n th e v ic ti m w h il e h e o r s h e r e ma ins alive and-34-

c on sc iou s. ” Sta te v. Willi a ms , 690 S.W .2d 517, 529 (Tenn. 1985). “Serious phy sical abuse bey ond that ne c e ssa

ry to p ro du c e de a th” ha s b e e n d e fi ne d a s f oll ow s:

The wor d “serious” alludes to a matter of deg ree

. The abuse must be phy sical, as oppose d to mental, and it must be “bey ond that” or more than what is “ne cessa

ry to produce death.” “Abuse ” is define d as an act that is “e x cessive” or which makes “imprope r use of a thing,” or which uses a thing “in a manner contrary to the natura l or leg al rules for its use.”

Odom
, 928 S.W .2d at 26 (quoting Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary 11 (6th ed. 1990)). Proof of either torture

or serious phy sical abuse b ey ond that nece ssary to produce death is suffic ient to support the ag g ravator.

i. Mary J ane Cruc hon

The fa cts in the instant case reve al that the appe llant lured Cruchon into the ha llway , wher e he inflicted blow a fter blow to he r hea d with a claw hammer. Dr. O.C. Smit h testified that Cruchon

rec eived a

pproxi mately

fourt ee n b l ows to the hea d. She also had bruising on various parts of her body as we ll as defe nsive wounds on her hands. The prese nce of

blood in her throat, in the ba ck of her mouth, in her lung s, and i n her stomac h indicated that the vic tim did not die immediately . The appellant state d that he first hit Cruchon in the ba ck of the head, a nd he admitted that he c ontinued to strike her a fter she fell to the floor. H e then pr ocee ded to hit the victim with the hammer, tea ring he r f a c e op e n. Th e app e lla nt t e stifi ed th at th e vic tim moa ne d d ur ing the a tta c k a ndthat he on ly stopped his assault when Cruc hon cea sed movement. F oren s ic e v id ence supports the conc lusion that the attac k did not immediately rende r Cruchon unconsc ious. See State v. Ba ne, 57 S.W.3d 411, 426 (Tenn. 2001)

.

Moreove r, the multiple blows to Cruchon’s hea d amounted to e x cessive, g ratuitous violence upon the victim. The evide nce supports a finding that Cruchon wa s subjected to serious, phy sical

ab u s e b e y o n d th a t n e c e s s ar y to p r o d u c e d e ath. See Hall
, 8 S.W .3d at 601; State v. Bive ns , 967 S.W. 2d82 1, 82 5 ( Te nn . Crim. App

. 19 96 ) (“ mul tip lic ity of the wo un ds be y on d th a t ne c e ssa ry to

cause death a nd the wanton infliction of g ratuitous vi olence ” supported a pplication of (i)( 5) ag g ravator). Af

ter c are ful revie w, we hold that the e vidence supp o rt s the application of the (i)(5) ag g ravator as to the murde r of Ma ry J ane Cruc hon.

ii. Fra nchion Pollack

Af te r b e a ti n g Cr

u c h o n , th e ap p e ll a n t r e tu r n e d to th e k it c h e n w h e re Pollack rema ined.-35-

Nothing in the r ecor d indicates that she a nticipated his attac k or th at s he over hear d his attack on Cruc ho n. Th e app e lla nt t oldPol la c k th a t Cr uc ho n h a d h a d a n a c c ide nt, a ndhe a ndPol la c k w e nt i nto the hallway
, wher e he struck the e ighty -nine-y ear -old in the bac k of the he ad twice with the hammer. Pollack did not die immediately from her head injurie s and wa s transporte d to The Med, whe re she

un de rw e nt s ur g e ry

. S he di ed sh ortly the re a ft e r f

ro m th e inj ur ie s to he r b ra in. Dr . O .C. Smith testified that one of the wounds to the back of P ollack’s he ad wa s “proba bly a seve re blow” and that the blo w w a s se ve re e no ug h to “ a c tua lly se pa rat e fragme nts of

the skull a ndthe n to pr op e l th os e fra g ments in to th e b r a in s u b s ta n c e

. ” B e c a u s e h e w a s u n ab le to d e te r mi n e th e o r d e r in w hich the blows were inflicted, the medic al examiner conc eded tha t Poll ack c ould have be en re ndere d unconscious by

the infliction of the first blow. Although the victim did not die immediately from the inj ur ie s, the re is n o fo re ns ic e vid e nc e to su pp ort a c on c lus ion that th e vic tim wa s n ot i mme diate ly

re nd e re d u nc on sc iou s. Ne ve rthe le ss, Of fi c e r C a lho un te sti fi ed that up on c he c kin g the vic tim s to de te rm ine wh e the r the y we re de c e a se d, he ob se rv e d Po lla c k b re a thi ng . H e sa id, “ I jus t ha pp e ne d to loo k d own , sh e brea th ed a ndsh e loo ke d a t me a ndI trie d to ta lk t o h e r t o g e t so me kin d o f s ome response from her

about what ha

ppened, a re y ou okay . She co uldn’t respond re ally .” Of fice r Calhoun believed tha t the victim was conscious.

I nitially , we note that we ca nnot conclude Pollack suffe red me ntal torture a s she sat in the kitchen w h i l e her frie nd was bruta lly killed in the hallway . The e vidence does not ref lect that Pollack had any

indication of the fate of he r friend. M o re o v er, the attack upon Pollack w as in no way as brutal a s the attac k upon C ru ch o n

. Pollack sustained two blows to the bac k of the he ad compar ed to the fourteen sustained by Cruchon. Notwithstan d i n g t he disparity in the number of blows inflicted, this fact alone does not rende r t he attack any less heinous, atroc ious, or cruel than that inflicted upon Cru ch on. Whil e two blows to the hea d may not, per se, c onstitut e torture or serious phy sical abuse under the (i)(5) ag g ravator, the blows can constitute torture, as in the prese nt

case , when the vic tim remains alive, conscious, and in pain as a r esult of the injuries. Evidenc e of

a se ve re blo w s us ta ine d b y a c on sc iou s vic tim ha s be e n he ld to be su ff ic ie nt to e sta

bli sh the he ino us , atroc ious, or cr u el ag g ravating c ircumstance . See State v. B arbe r, 753 S.W.2d 659, 669 (Tenn. 1988). Thus, it was within the jury ’s discretion to acc redit Off icer Calhoun’s testimony

and find that the vic tim wa s c on sc iou s a ndc apa

ble of fe e lin g e xtre me ph y sic a l pa in du ri ng the c ri me . Se e Sta te

v

. C ab b age , 57 1 S.W. 2d 83 2, 83 5 (T e nn

. 19 78 ). Con sid e ri ng the e vid e nc e in t he l ight most favor ab l e t o the State, a r ational trier of fac t could have f

ound that Pollack was c onscious and experience d serious phy sical pain during the crime. See Jac ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct . 2781, 2789 (1979). Ac cording ly , we c onclude that the e vi d en ce i s s u ff icient to support application of this ag g ravator with respe ct to the murder of F ranc hion Poll ack.

c. Murde r Committ ed Dur ing Per petra tion of Fe lony

– the (i)( 7) Circumstance

We conclude that the evidenc e supports the a pplication of th e (i )(7) ag g ravating

c ir c ums ta nc e , w hic h r e qu ir e s tha t “ [t]he mur de r w a s k no wi ng ly c omm itt e d .

. . by

the de fe nd a nt, while the def

endant ha d a substantial role in c ommitt ing or attempting to c ommit, or was flee ing afte r having a substantial role in c ommitt ing or attempting to c ommit, any first deg ree murder, a rson,-36-

r ap e , r o b b e r y, b u r g l ar y, [ o r ] t h e f t

. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 4 ( i ) ( 7 )

. A s d i s c u s s e d p r e v i o u s l y, the killings we re c ommitt ed during the appe llant’s attempt to ga in c ash or other va luables in order to purcha se cocaine. The evidence shows that the appe llant removed a television and some money from P oll a c k ’ s h o me

. T h is e v id e n c e is s u f f ic ie n t t o s u p p o r t th e ju r y ’ s f in d in g th a t th e ( i)(7)

a g g ra va tin g fa c tor

wa s p ro ve n b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.

d. Victim Over Seve nty

Yea rs Old – the (i)( 14) Circumstance

The a g g rava

ting c i rc u m s t an ce i n T en n es s ee C o d e A n n o t ated se ction 39-13-204( i)(14) a pplies wher e the victim was se venty y ear s old or older. Te stimony d u ri n g the pena lty phase of the trial

reve aled that Fr anchion Pol lack was eig hty -nine y ear s old at t he ti me of the c rimes. This testimony

was unc ontested and supports appl ication of the ( i)(14) a g g ravator with respe ct to the murder of Fr anchion Pollack.

3. Totality of Ag g ravating F actor s Applied

Wit h r e s p e c t to th e mu r d e r o f M ar y Ja n e Cr u c h o n , th e ju r y f

o u n d th e p r e s e n c e of three statutory ag g ravating c ircumstance s, i.e., the appellant has prior convictions for f elonies involving the use of violenc e to the p er s o n ; t h e murde r wa s espec ially heinous, atroc ious or crue l; and the murder w as committed by the appe llant w hile he had a substantial r ole in committi ng or attempting to commit a felony

. The appellant has three prior convictions for ag g ravated robbe ry , all involving the use of a wea

pon upon the victim. Thus, the evidenc e supporting the application of the ( i)(2) ag g ravating c ircumstance , as to ea ch victim, is overwhe lming. See T enn. Code Ann. § 39- 13- 204(i)(2) . The re cord a lso supports the jury ’s finding that the murder of MaryJ ane Cruc hon was espec ially heinous, atroc ious, or crue l in that it involved torture or serious phy sical abuse bey ond that

ne c e ssa ry to p ro du c e de a th, se e Te nn . Code An n. § 39- 13 -2 04 (i )( 5) , an d th a t th e mur de r i n th is c a se was knowing ly

committed by

th e ap p el l an t while he had a substantial role in committing or attempting to c ommit robbery
, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(7)

. We f urther hold that the evidenc e supports the jury ’s finding that the agg rava ting circumstance s outweig hed any mitigating

c ir c ums ta nc e s b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.

Wit h respe ct to the murder of Fr anchion Pollack, the jury found the pre sence of four statutory ag g ravating circ umstances, i.e., the appellant has prior convictions for f elonies involving the use of violence to the pe rson; the murder was e specia lly

heinous, atroc ious, or crue l; the murder wa s
c omm itt e d b y

the app e lla nt w hil e he ha d a subs ta nti a l rol e in co mmi tti ng or a tte mpt ing to c omm it a fe lony ; and the victim was seventy y ear s old or older. The appellant ha s three prior convictions for ag g ra v a te d r o b b e r y , a ll in v o lv in g th e u s e o f a w e ap o n u p o n th e v ic ti m. T h u s , th e e v id e nce supporting the application of the (i)(2) ag g ravating circ umstance is over whelming . See Te nn. Code An n. § 3 9- 13 -2 04 (i )( 2) . T he re c or d a lso su pp orts the jury ’s fi nd ing that th e mur de r w a s e sp e c ia lly heinous, atroc ious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious phy sical abuse bey ond that nece ssary-37-

to produce death, se e Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5)
, that the murder was knowing ly

committed by the appe llant while he had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit robbery , see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13- 204(i)( 7), and that the vi ctim was seventy y ear s of age or ol der, se e Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(14)

. We further hold that the evidence supports the jury ’s finding that the a g g ra va tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s o utw e ig he d a ny mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t.

4. Pr op ortio na lit y

This court is require d by Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 39-13- 206( c)( 1)(D) and under the mandate s of B land
, 95 8 S.W.2 d at 661 -7 4, to co ns ide r w he the r the app e lla nt’ s se nte nc e s o f d e a th

are disproportionate to the penalty imposed in simil ar cases. See State v. Godse y , 60 S.W .3d 759, 78 1- 82 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . T he c omp arativ e pr op ortio na lit y re vie w “i s desi g ne d to ide nti fy abe rr a nt, arbitra ry , or capricious sentenc ing.” State v. Stout
, 46 S.W. 3d 68 9, 70 6 (T e nn . 200 1)

. I t doe s th is by determining whether the death penalty in a g iven case is “ ‘disproportionate t o t h e p u n ishment impose d o n o t hers c onvicted of the same c rime.’” Bla nd
, 958 S.W .2d at 662 (quoting Pulley v. Ha rris
, 465 U.S. 37, 43, 104 S. Ct . 871, 876 (1984)) . I f a c ase is “‘ plainly lacking in circumstanc es
c on sis te nt w ith tho se i n ca se s w he re the de a th p e na lty ha s b e e n impo se d, ’ the n th e se nte nc e is disproportionate.” Stout, 46 S .W.3d at 706 (quoting B land, 958 S.W.2d at 668).

I n conducting our proportionalityrevie w, this court must compare the pre sent ca se wi th c ases involving similar def

endants a nd simil ar c ri m es

. See id. ; se e a lso Te rry v. Sta te , 46 S.W .3d 147, 163-64 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 1 )

. We s e le c t o n ly f r o m th o s e c a s e s in w h ic h a c ap it a l s e n te n c in g h e ar ing w as actua lly conducte d to determine w hether the s e n te n c e s h o u ld

b e li f e im p ris o n me nt, life imprisonment withou t t h e p o s sibili ty

of par ole, or de ath. See State v. Carruthe rs , 35 S.W .3d 516, 570 (Tenn. 20 00 ); se e a lso Godsey

, 60 S.W .3d at 783.

We beg in with the presumption that the sentenc e of death is proportionate with the c rime of first deg ree murder. See Terry , 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d a t 1 6 3 ( c i t i n g Ha ll
, 95 8 S. W.2 d a t 69 9) . T his presumption applies only if the sentenc ing pr oced u re s fo cus discre tion on the “‘“ particula rized nature of the c rime and the particula rized char acte ristics of the individual defe ndant.”’ ” I d. (quoting Mc Cle sk e y

v. Ke mp , 48 1 U .S. 27 9, 30 8, 10 7 S. Ct. 17 56
, 17 75 (1 98 7) (q uo tin g Gr e g g v. Ge or g ia
, 428 U.S. 153, 206, 96 S. C t. 2909, 2940-41 (1976)) ).

Apply ing this appr oach, in comparing this case to other case s in which the def

endants we re convicted of

the same or simil ar c rimes, this court looks “at the f acts a nd circ umstances of

the crime, the cha rac teristics of the defe ndant, and the a g g ravating a nd mitigating fac tors involved.” See id. at 164. R eg arding the circumstances of the crime itself, numerous factors a re c onsidered, inc luding the fo llo wi ng :-38- (1) the me ans of death; (2) the manner of death; (3) the motivation for the killing; (4) the place of dea t h ; (5) the vic tim’s ag e, phy sical condition, and ps y chological c ondition; (6) the absenc e or pr esenc e of provocation; (7) the absenc e or prese nce of preme ditation; (8) the absenc e or pr esenc e of justification; and (9) the injury to and ef fec t on non-dec edent victims.

St o ut , 46 S .W.3da t 70 6; s e e a lso Terry , 46 S.W .3d at 164. Contemplated within the revie w ar e numerous other

fac tors, including thedefe ndant’s “( 1) prior c riminal rec ord; (2 ) ag e, ra ce, a nd g e nd e r; (3 ) m e nta l, e mot ion a l, a ndph y sic a l c on dit ion ; ( 4) ro le in the mur de r; (5 ) c oo pe ratio n w ith authorities; (6) level o f re m orse; (7) knowledg e of the victim’s helplessness; and (8) potential for reha bilitation.” S t out

, 46 S.W .3d at 706; Terry , 46 S.W .3d at 164. I n completing our re view, we

rema in cog nizant of the fac t that “no two case s involve identical cir cumstance s.” Ter ry , 46 S.W .3d

a t 164. Th us , our fu nc tio n is not “to lim it our c omp ari so n to tho se c a se s w he re a de fe nd a nt’ s d e a th

se nte nc e ‘i s p e rf

e c tly sy mme tr ic a l,’ bu t on ly

to ‘i den tify

a ndto i nv a lid a te the abe rr a nt d e a th sentenc e.’” I d. (quoting Bla nd
, 958 S.W .2d at 665).

Turning to the instant case, the appellant has prior convictions for ag g ravated robbery . The death se ntence has bee n upheld base d on the sole ag g ravating circ umstance of a prior violent fe lony

co n v i ct i o n

. S ee , e. g. , McKinney
, 74 S.W. 3da t 29 1 ( pr ior

c on vic tio n f

or a g g ra va te d r ob be ry

a s a du lt and ag g ravated assault as juvenile); State v. Chalmers
, 28 S.W .3d 913 (Tenn. 2000) (prior

c on vic tio ns fo r atte mpt e d e sp e c ia lly a g g ra va te d r ob be ry

a nd a tte mpt e d fir st de g re e mur de r) ; State

v

. Ke o u gh
, 18 S.W .3d 175 (Tenn. 2000) (prior c onvictions for assault to commit voluntary

ma ns laug hte r an d man slaug hte r) ; State v. Smith
, 993 S.W .2d 6 (Tenn. 1999) (prior c onvictions for

r o b b e r y a n d f

i r s td e g r e e m u r d e r ) ; S t a t e v

. B o yd
, 959 S.W .2d 557 (Tenn. 1998) (prior c onviction for

se c on d d e g re e mur de r)

. Th e pr ior vio le nt fe lon y fa c tor is a n a g g ra va tin g c ir c ums ta nc e that th e c ou rt s of this state have described as “ ‘more qua litatively persua sive and objec tively reliable than others.’ ” McKinney

, 74 S.W. 3da t 31 3 ( qu oti ng Sta te v. Ho we ll
, 868 S.W .2d 238, 261 (Tenn. 1993) ).

The de ath sentenc e has a lso been uphe ld under fa cts simi lar to and unde r application of statutory ag g ravating c ircumstance s found in the instant case. State v. L eac h, 148 S.W .3d 42 (Tenn. 2004) (de fenda nt brutally beat, sta b b ed, and strang led two elder ly women, one vic tim was rape d; murd er s we re co m m i t t ed d u ri n g a r o b b er y at v i ct i m ’s h o m e; d ea t h s en t en ce u p h el d b as ed u pon (i)(2)
, (i)(5), (i)(7) , and (i)( 14) (only to one victim)); State v. Mann
, 959 S.W .2d 503 (Tenn. 1997) (d e fe nd a nt r ape d a ndmur de re d six ty -t wo -y e ar- oldwi do w d ur ing bu rg lary , d e a th s e nte nc e up he ld ba se d u po n ( i) (5 ) a nd(i )( 7) a g g ra va tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s) ; Stat e v. B us h
, 942 S.W .2d 489 (Tenn. 1997) (def endant murde red se venty -nine-y ear -old widow, de at h sentenc e upheld ba sed upon (i)( 5) and (i )( 6) a g g ra va tor s) ; Smi th
, 89 3 S.W.2 d at 908 (d e fe nd a nt ra pe d a ndmur de re d e lde rl y wi do w, de a th sentenc e upheld based upon (i)( 2), (i)( 5), and ( i)(7) a g g ravators); Cazes
, 875 S.W .2d at 253 (def endant r aped a nd murdere d elder ly woman, death sentence upheld based upon (i)(2) , (i)(5) , and (i)(7) ag g ravators); Ba

rber
, 753 S.W .2d at 659 (de fenda nt murdere d elder ly woman, death se ntence up he ld b a se d u po n ( i) (5 ) a nd(i )( 7) a g g ra va tors); Sta te v. Mc Ni sh
, 727 S.W .2d 490 (Tenn. 1987)W e n ot e t h at t h e r ec or d r ef l ec t s t h at t h e appe l l an t c ommi t t ed t h e cr i mes i n t h i s c as e wh i l e h e wa s on 1 parol e f or pr i or f

el ony offens es

. T enn es s ee R ul e of Cri mi nal P r ocedur e 32(c) ( 3)( A ) “ r equi r es t hat t he s ent enc e i mp ose d f or [ a f

el ony ] offens e c om mi t t ed whi l e on par ol e r un cons ecu t i vel y t o t he s ent enc e f or t he fel ony for w hi ch the o ff e n d e r w a s o n p a ro le .” H o g a n v. M ill s, 1 6 8 S .W .3 d 7 5 3 , 7 5 5 -5 6 (T e n n . 2 0 0 5 ); se e a lso T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -2 8 -1 2 3 (a ). T h is is t ru e “w h e the r th e ju d g m e n t ex p licitly so o rd e rs o r n o t.” T e n n . R . C rim . P . 3 2 (c )( 3 ).

-39- (def endant murde red se venty -two-y ear -ol d widow, death sentence upheld base d upon (i)(5) ag g ravator); State v. Har

bison
, 704 S.W .2d 314 (Tenn. 1986) (def endant murdered sixty -two-y ear

old woman, death sentenc e upheld based upon (i)(7) ag g ravator); and State v. Cone
, 665 S.W .2d 87 (Tenn. 1984) (def

endant murdered elderly couple, de ath sentenc e upheld ba sed upon (i)( 2), (i)( 5), and (i)(6) ag g ravators). Our revie w of these case s reve als that the sentenc es of de ath imposed upon the app e lla nt i s p ro po rt ion a te to the pe na lty imp os e d in sim ila

r c a se s.

III. Conclusi on

I n acc ordanc e with the mandate of Te nnessee Code Annotated section 39-13- 206(c) (1) a nd the principles a dopted in prior dec isions of the Tennesse e S upreme Court, we have considere d the entire r ecor d in this case and c onclude that the s entenc es of death were not imposed in any arbitra ry fashion, that the evidence supports the jury ’s finding of the statutory ag g ravating c ircumstance s, and that the evidenc e supports the jury ’s findi n g t h at the ag g ravating c ircumstance s outweig hed mitigating circ umstances bey ond a rea sonable doubt. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206( c)( 1)(A)

- (C). A c ompara tive proportion al i t y re view, conside ring both “the natur e of the crime a nd the defe ndant,” convinces us that the sentenc es of de ath ar e neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty i m posed in similar case s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206( c)( 1)(D) . Moreove r, we discern no e rror s that require a re versa l in this case and af firm the sente nces of

death imposed by

the j u r y. 1

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE