IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 329A19

Filed 17 July 2020

IN THE MATTER OF: K.L.T.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 8 May 

2019 by Judge Betty J. Brown in District Court, Guilford County. This matter was 

calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 June 2020 but determined on 

the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 

Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Health 

and Human Services.

Rosenwood, Rose & Litwak, PLLC, by Nancy S. Litwak, for appellee Guardian 

ad Litem.

David A. Perez for respondent-appellant mother.

DAVIS, Justice.

Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her 

parental rights in her son K.L.T. (Kirk),

1 who was born in March 2011. Although the 

trial court’s order also terminates the parental rights of Kirk’s father (respondentfather), he is not a party to this appeal. Based on our determination that the trial 

 

1 We use pseudonyms and initials throughout this opinion in order to protect the 

privacy of the juveniles referenced herein.
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-2-

court erred in concluding that grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother’s 

parental rights, we reverse.

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent-mother, who is legally blind, has five children. Kirk is her

youngest child and the sole offspring of her marriage to respondent-father, who was 

her third husband and whom she divorced in April 2018. Mr. L., respondent-mother’s 

second husband, is the father of her four eldest children, Jack, Brooke, Becky, and 

Justin. Jack and Brooke were no longer minors when these proceedings commenced, 

and Becky attained the age of majority in May 2017.

On 26 August 2016, the Guilford County Department of Health and Human 

Services (GCDHHS) obtained nonsecure custody of Becky, Justin, and Kirk and filed 

juvenile petitions alleging that they were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles.

The juvenile petition filed by GCDHHS regarding Kirk summarized the family’s 

“extensive” Child Protective Services (CPS) history in Orange County dating back to 

2004, which included “numerous substantiated neglect reports against [respondentfather] for inappropriate discipline of . . . [Becky] and [Justin]” and against 

respondent-mother “because she was complicit in [respondent-father’s] inappropriate 

discipline of her children.”

The juvenile petition first summarized three CPS reports made about the 

family in March and April of 2016, each of which was investigated and substantiated

by GCDHHS. These reports described the physical abuse of Brooke, Becky, Justin, 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-3-

and Kirk by respondent-father. One report alleged that respondent-father “beats 

four-year-old [Kirk] with items such as hangers, a broom, and a wooden back 

scratcher,” leaving visible bruises on the child. Another report alleged that 

respondent-father had physically and sexually assaulted respondent-mother’s 

cognitively-impaired adult daughter, Brooke. Respondent-father admitted to a

GCDHHS social worker in March of 2016 that he had engaged in oral sex with 

Brooke. When the social worker questioned respondent-mother about the incident, 

she acknowledged that respondent-father’s sexual abuse of Brooke was “wrong” but

also blamed Brooke for “sitting on [respondent-father’s] lap and moving around.”

The juvenile petition next recounted GCDHHS’s efforts to work with the family 

before taking the minor children into custody in 2016. For example, when respondentfather refused to leave the home, GCDHHS provided a hotel room for respondentmother and the children. In addition, the juvenile petition alleged that respondentmother had refused to seek a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) against 

respondent-father, violated her GCDHHS safety plan by allowing respondent-father 

to drive her to one of Becky’s medical appointments, and “coached [Becky] on what to 

say to the CPS Investigator.”

The juvenile petition also alleged that GCDHHS received a report that 

respondent-father had confined the family to a bedroom in the residence and 

demanded to know who had made the CPS reports. The episode was overheard by 

Brooke’s therapist, who was on speakerphone with Brooke as it happened. 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-4-

Respondent-mother initially denied the report during a family meeting with 

GCDHHS but later admitted she was “intimidated by [respondent-father] and did not 

tell the truth during the meeting.”

The juvenile petition further detailed an incident occurring at a Child and 

Family Team Meeting on 23 August 2016 in which respondent-father denied any 

abuse of the children and physically assaulted a social worker in the presence of 

Justin, Kirk, and respondent-mother. The juvenile petition accused respondentfather of abusing the children and of “perpetrat[ing] domestic violence against 

[respondent-mother], in particular by exerting power and control over her, isolating

her, and physically assaulting her.” Respondent-mother was depicted as contributing 

to an injurious home environment “due to [her] enabling of [respondent-father’s] 

behavior, her repeated refusal to leave him, and her failure to protect the children.”

After the children were taken into GCDHHS custody, respondent-mother 

entered into a case plan with GCDHHS on 3 October 2016, requiring her to address 

the issues of domestic violence, mental and emotional health, and parenting skills, 

and requiring her to maintain suitable housing. At a hearing on 19 October 2016, 

respondent-mother, respondent-father, and Mr. L. stipulated to facts consistent with 

the allegations contained in the juvenile petitions and consented to the children being

adjudicated as neglected and dependent juveniles. At the hearing, GCDHHS 

dismissed the allegations of abuse. By order entered 14 November 2016, the trial 

court adjudicated Becky, Justin, and Kirk to be neglected and dependent juveniles 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-5-

and ordered that the children remain in GCDHHS custody. The trial court awarded 

respondent-mother one hour per week of supervised visitation with each of the 

children and ordered her to comply with the requirements of her case plan.

In its adjudication and disposition order, the trial court noted that Kirk had 

been suspended from kindergarten for violent behavior and was hospitalized in 

September 2016 after “reporting that he was hearing voices.” At the time of the 

adjudication and disposition hearing on 19 October 2016, Kirk had begun traumabased therapy and was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and 

oppositional defiant disorder. The trial court found that Kirk “require[d] continued 

redirection and constant supervision” from his foster parents and that GCDHHS was 

“exploring a higher level of care for [Kirk] due to his placement and mental health 

needs.” In order to meet his need for a higher level of care, Kirk was moved to a new 

therapeutic foster home on 14 November 2016.

The trial court held seven permanency planning review hearings between 

14 December 2016 and 6 February 2019. During this interval, Becky aged out of 

juvenile court jurisdiction, and the court granted Mr. L. full custody of Justin and 

terminated its jurisdiction over him pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-911. In addition,

respondent-mother separated from respondent-father in October 2016 and obtained 

a divorce judgment on 2 April 2018. Respondent-mother also successfully sought a 

DVPO against respondent-father on 22 February 2017 and renewed the DVPO

through February 2021.
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-6-

With regard to Kirk, the trial court initially established a primary permanent 

plan of reunification with a concurrent secondary plan of adoption. After concluding 

that further reunification efforts with respondent-father would be futile, the trial 

court changed Kirk’s primary permanent plan to reunification with respondentmother on 29 August 2017. At the next permanency planning review hearing on 10 

January 2018, however, the trial court found that respondent-mother “has not made 

adequate progress within a reasonable period of time under [her case] plan.” The trial 

court changed Kirk’s primary permanent plan to adoption with a concurrent 

secondary plan of reunification with respondent-mother and ordered GCDHHS to 

initiate termination of parental rights proceedings as to both parents.

GCDHHS filed a petition seeking the termination of both respondents’ 

parental rights with regard to Kirk on 25 June 2018 on the grounds of neglect and 

dependency. The trial court held a hearing on 26 and 27 March 2019 and entered an

order terminating respondents’ parental rights on 8 May 2019. The trial court found 

that although respondent-mother had complied with the formal requirements of her 

case plan, a likelihood of future neglect existed due to: (1) her history of domestic 

violence and abusive partners; (2) her questionable new online relationship; (3) her 

failure to meaningfully engage in therapy; and (4) her failure to exercise control over 

her household environment. The trial court also concluded that termination of 

respondent-mother’s parental rights was proper based on the ground of dependency.
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-7-

Finally, the trial court determined that the termination of her parental rights was in 

Kirk’s best interests. Respondent-mother filed a notice of appeal.

Analysis

On appeal, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in finding the 

existence of grounds to terminate her parental rights to Kirk based on neglect and 

dependency. She further asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that it was

in Kirk’s best interests that her parental rights be terminated. See N.C.G.S. § 7B1110(a) (2019).

A proceeding to terminate parental rights is comprised of an adjudicatory 

phase and a dispositional phase. “We review a trial court’s adjudication under 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 ‘to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent 

and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” In re 

E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 392, 831 S.E.2d 49, 52 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 

N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984)). It is well established that “[f]indings of 

fact not challenged by respondent are deemed supported by competent evidence and 

are binding on appeal. Moreover, we review only those findings necessary to support 

the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s 

parental rights.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 58–59 (2019). We 

review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19, 832 

S.E.2d 692, 695 (2019). With regard to the dispositional phase, the trial court’s 

determination of whether termination of parental rights is in the juvenile’s best 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-8-

interests is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at

392, 831 S.E.2d at 52.

I. Adjudication of Neglect

Under subsection 7B-1111(a)(1), the trial court may terminate the parental 

rights of a parent if “[t]he parent has . . . neglected the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(1) (2019). The Juvenile Code defines “[n]eglected juvenile” as a minor child 

“whose parent . . . does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline . . . or who 

lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15)

(2019). In order to constitute actionable neglect, the conditions at issue must result 

in “some physical, mental, or emotional impairment of the juvenile or a substantial 

risk of such impairment.” In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 283, 582 S.E.2d 255, 258 (2003) 

(citations omitted).

“The petitioner seeking termination [under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)] bears the 

burden of showing by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that such neglect exists 

at the time of the termination proceeding.” In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 716, 319 

S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984). Our case law makes clear that “if the child has been separated 

from the parent for a long period of time [at the time of the termination hearing], 

there must be a showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future neglect by the 

parent.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016). “The 

determinative factors must be the best interests of the child and the fitness of the 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-9-

parent to care for the child at the time of the termination proceeding.” In re K.N., 373 

N.C. 274, 282, 837 S.E.2d 861, 867 (2020) (citation omitted).

The trial court found that Kirk was adjudicated to be neglected in 2016 and 

that there was a “strong likelihood of the repetition of neglect” if Kirk was returned 

to respondent-mother’s care due to her “inability to demonstrate an ability to correct 

the conditions that led to removal.” Specifically, the trial court found that respondentmother’s behavior indicated a likelihood of future neglect due to: (1) her history of 

domestic violence and abusive partners; (2) her questionable new online relationship; 

(3) her failure to meaningfully engage in therapy; and (4) her failure to exercise 

control over her household environment.

Respondent-mother concedes Kirk’s prior adjudication of neglect but 

challenges the trial court’s finding as to the likelihood of a repetition of neglect.

Respondent-mother also takes exception to many of the trial court’s evidentiary 

findings in support of the adjudication of neglect. We review her arguments in turn.

A. Findings of Fact

1. Completion of Case Plan

Respondent-mother first challenges the trial court’s finding that she did not 

fully comply with the requirements of her case plan. Respondent-mother’s 2016 case 

plan required her to address deficiencies in her parenting skills, housing and 

employment, mental and emotional health, and domestic violence issues. We agree 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-10-

with respondent-mother that the record demonstrates that she completed each of 

these requirements.

Specifically, she (1) successfully completed a twelve-session domestic violence 

support group on 30 January 2017; (2) obtained a psychological evaluation and 

parenting assessment on 3 November 2016 by a clinical psychologist, Michael A. 

McColloch, Ph.D., who did not recommend any additional treatment; (3) completed 

the Parent Assessment Training and Education (PATE) program; (4) completed 

outpatient therapy with Tabitha McGeachy at Peculiar Counseling & Consulting, 

PLLC, on 2 March 2017, accomplishing all treatment goals with no additional 

treatment recommended; (5) completed two courses of outpatient psychotherapy from 

May to September of 2017 and from May to November of 2018 with Joanna Hudson, 

LCSW, at Family Service of the Piedmont, Inc., who did not recommend any further 

therapy; (6) separated from respondent-father and obtained a judgment of divorce on 

2 April 2018; (7) obtained a DVPO against respondent-father on 22 February 2017 

and renewed the DVPO through February 2021; (8) maintained stable income 

through monthly disability benefits and part-time employment as a musician at her 

church; (9) moved into a three-bedroom townhouse appropriate for Kirk on 29 May 

2017; (10) consistently attended visitation, engaged in appropriate interactions with 

Kirk, complied with suggestions made by her visitation supervisor, and demonstrated

no significant defects in her parenting techniques; (11) attended Kirk’s school 

meetings and otherwise participated in shared parenting with his foster parents; and 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-11-

(12) remained current on her monthly child support obligation of $291.08, which 

began on 1 July 2018. Thus, the record shows respondent-mother’s compliance with 

each requirement set out in her case plan.

2. Domestic Violence and Personal Relationships

Respondent-mother next contests the trial court’s findings of fact regarding her 

tendency to fall victim to abusive and unsafe relationships. Specifically, she 

challenges findings of fact 31, 32, 37, and 42 in which, in part, the trial court voiced 

its concerns regarding a new online relationship into which she had recently entered. 

The trial court made the following findings regarding respondent-mother’s online 

relationship with a former high school classmate, Milton Leon Westray, who lived in 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:

31. . . . In December 2017, GCDHHS confirmed 

with the Mother that the Mother was in a new relationship. 

The Mother explained she was involved in an online 

relationship with a former high school classmate by the 

name of Milton Leon Westray. When GCDHHS researched 

Mr. Westray using the name, date of birth and place of 

birth provided by the Mother, GCDHHS received a report 

indicating that Milton Leon Westray was deceased. After 

receiving this information, the Mother conducted an 

independent search and obtained the same result. The 

Mother ultimately decided that the deceased was her 

classmate’s father. However, Mr. Westray and his father 

do not share the same birth date. The Mother could not 

account for this discrepancy and continues to pursue this 

online relationship.

32. The Mother cannot account for the 

discrepancy in birth dates because she has not demanded 

an explanation from Mr. Westray. The Mother’s actions are 

singularly focused on her romantic pursuits. She married 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-12-

her third husband [, respondent-father,] eighteen months 

after divorcing her second husband. She entered into th[e]

relationship [with Mr. Westray] prior to ending the

marriage with [respondent-father] and describes her 

current relationship as “developing.” Perhaps, the Mother 

has not questioned Mr. Westray because she would then be 

required to make a decision. The Mother is deserving of a 

logical and verifiable response. If such a response is not 

forthcoming, the Mother should end the relationship, 

period. The Mother does not appear motivated to forego 

romantic liaisons until her circumstances are stable.

. . . .

37. . . . The Mother has shown a selfish 

preoccupation with her romantic attachments even when 

those attachments are unhealthy and harmful to the 

Mother and her children. The Mother’s mindless 

attachments will in all likelihood subject [Kirk] to repeated 

harm and result in [his] eventual removal. . . .

. . . .

42. . . . Although the Mother initiated divorce 

proceedings, obtained a 50-B Domestic Violence Protective 

Order and renewed the protective order twice, the [c]ourt 

is concerned about the Mother’s involvement in yet another 

relationship since the juvenile’s removal in 2016 without 

addressing adverse issues from her prior relationships. The 

concerns and red flags raised in this new relationship 

causes the Court to question the Mother’s judgment. . . .

The trial court relied heavily on the existence of this online relationship as a 

basis for its determination that respondent-mother was likely to repeat her prior 

neglect of Kirk. Respondent-mother objects to these findings of fact, arguing that they 

are unsupported by the evidence of record, insofar as they (1) depict her response to 

the concerns raised by GCDHHS about Mr. Westray, and (2) extrapolate more 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-13-

broadly about her judgment and priorities. We agree with respondent-mother that 

key portions of the trial court’s findings of fact concerning Mr. Westray—and the 

inferences drawn by the trial court therefrom—are unsupported by the evidence.

Because of the great weight placed by the trial court on this relationship, we deem it 

appropriate to discuss this issue in some detail.

The evidence shows that, upon being informed of respondent-mother’s new 

online relationship, GCDHHS obtained from her the man’s full name, Milton Leon

Westray, and date of birth, which was in August 1966. Using this information, 

GCDHHS requested a nationwide criminal record check and received a report 

indicating that a Milton Westray, a/k/a, inter alia, “Westray, Milton L Jr.,” died on 

19 May 2012. We note, however, that the report lists two different dates of birth for 

the deceased Milton Westray: “08/XX/1966” and “03/1959.” Moreover, the report

purports to be based on information derived from credit reporting services, such as 

Experian, as well as e-mail and phone records and an obituary—rather than from

any official government source.

2

 

2 Despite GCDHHS’s repeated references during the termination hearing to a “death 

certificate,” there is no evidence suggesting that GCDHHS ever obtained the deceased 

Mr. Westray’s death certificate or any other official record to confirm its belief that 

respondent-mother had fallen victim to an online impostor. Aside from the results of the 

criminal record search, which are based on unofficial sources and list two different birthdates 

for the deceased Mr. Westray, the record contains only a two-line death notice for “Milton 

Westray” published on Philly.com. This notice makes no reference to the decedent’s date of 

birth or any other identifying information.
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-14-

When respondent-mother was presented with GCDHHS’ concerns, she

“conducted an independent search” into the death of Milton Westray but did not 

obtain the same result as GCDHHS. To the contrary, respondent-mother’s research 

led her to conclude that the Milton Westray who died in May 2012 was her friend’s 

father—Milton L. Westray, Sr. Her search revealed that although the two men “[had]

the same name,” they were two different individuals with different birthdates.

3

In addition, she testified that she did, in fact, confront her online correspondent

with GCDHHS’s concerns. In response, he provided her with copies of his driver’s 

license and birth certificate, and she provided these items to GCDHHS. Respondentmother also stated that she asked Mr. Westray to appear at the termination hearing 

in order to prove his identity but that he could not afford to travel to North Carolina. 

Her counsel also offered to have Mr. Westray testify by telephone from a local 

department of social services office in Philadelphia, but both GCDHHS and the 

guardian ad litem objected to the use of this procedure.

In addition to the lack of any official record that would have enabled the trial 

court to definitively conclude that respondent-mother’s online correspondent was an 

impostor, we are of the view that the larger inferences drawn by the trial court about 

 

3 The trial court was, of course, not required to accept respondent-mother’s testimony 

as credible. However, the termination order does not contain any indication that the trial 

court chose to disbelieve her testimony on this issue or as to the other issues relied upon by 

the trial court in concluding that termination was warranted. Instead, at times, the

termination order either ignores respondent-mother’s testimony altogether or fails to 

characterize it accurately.
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-15-

respondent-mother’s character, motivations, and judgment do not flow from the

evidence in the record. The record is devoid of any indication that respondentmother’s online communications with Mr. Westray posed any risk to Kirk.

Respondent-mother testified that Mr. Westray has not asked her to provide any 

financial or other private information, Mr. Westray has never tried to take advantage 

of her in any way, and that the two have no current plans to meet in person. GCDHHS 

lacks the authority to prohibit respondent-mother from engaging in social interaction 

in the absence of any legitimate basis for believing that such interaction was likely 

to cause harm to Kirk, and such evidence was absent here. Moreover, the evidence 

shows that respondent-mother did, in fact, take steps to address the concerns that 

GCDHHS had about Mr. Westray. Accordingly, we agree with respondent-mother 

that the evidence regarding this issue does not support the trial court’s conclusion 

that there was a likelihood of future neglect.

3. Mental and Emotional Health

Respondent-mother also challenges certain findings of fact by the trial court

related to the mental and emotional health component of her case plan. After 

acknowledging respondent-mother’s successful completion of an initial course of 

psychotherapy with Ms. Hudson in September 2017, the trial court found as follows:

29. The Mother returned to out-patient therapy 

with Ms. Hudson on May 5, 2018 and was discharged on 

November 4, 2018 after nine additional sessions. During 

these sessions, the Mother addressed parenting in the 

wake of domestic violence and verbalized her 

understanding of potential issues that might arise for her 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-16-

children due to their exposure to domestic violence. 

However, the Mother did not discuss with her therapist, 

Ms. Hudson, that at a prior hearing, in the underlying case, 

the Mother defended her beliefs about the culpability of her 

cognitively impaired daughter’s actions regarding the 

sexual assault by [respondent-father] and concluded her 

cognitively impaired daughter was partly responsible for 

the sexual assault. The Mother also failed to discuss her 

three failed marriages, two of which[ ] were with men who 

exhibited aggression and subjected the Mother and her 

children to physical and emotional abuse. The Mother 

married [respondent-father] just eighteen months after she 

divorced her second husband. The Mother’s involvement in 

her current relationship [with Mr. Westray] began prior to 

her divorce from [respondent-father]. The Mother’s choice 

in partners and hurried attachments are issues requiring 

in-depth therapy to avoid repeated mistakes.

(Emphases added.) Respondent-mother takes exception to the italicized portions of

this finding of fact.

In her report dated 16 October 2018, respondent-mother’s therapist,

Ms. Hudson, stated that “[i]t is my assessment that [respondent-mother] has engaged 

in meaningful conversations about the effect that domestic violence has had on her 

family, as well as the initial concern that she somehow held her then-teenage 

daughter responsible for the sexual abuse perpetrated by an adult in the home.”

Similarly, Ms. Hudson testified at the termination hearing as follows:

Q. . . . Did [respondent-mother] tell you that she 

had come to court and testified that originally she blamed 

her daughter as part of the reason why her husband, 

[respondent-father], sexually assaulted her daughter?

A. I don’t recall if I learned about that from her 

or from the [GCDHHS] referral or where I got that 

information.
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-17-

Q. Did you all talk about it?

A. That [it] was a concern, yes.

Q. And what did she say?

A. That she does not hold her daughter 

responsible for what happened to her.

Q. Did you ask her then why did she testify to 

that in court?

A. We did not discuss her testimony. We were 

just discussing [the] issue.

Respondent-mother testified that she believed with “99 percent” certainty she

had, in fact, discussed this issue in therapy with Ms. Hudson and she recalled

explaining to Ms. Hudson that she had been “scared at the time just by the nature of 

the type of person [respondent-father] was.” In any event, even if there was evidence 

to support the trial court’s findings of fact concerning whether respondent-mother 

and Ms. Hudson specifically discussed her prior testimony regarding the culpability 

of her daughter for the abuse committed by respondent-father, the undisputed 

testimony of both respondent-mother and Ms. Hudson demonstrates that they did

discuss the key underlying issue that respondent-mother’s daughter was not 

responsible for the sexual abuse.

Respondent-mother next contends that there is no evidence to support the trial 

court’s finding that her “choice in partners and hurried attachments are issues 

requiring in-depth therapy to avoid repeated mistakes.” We agree. To be sure, the
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-18-

evidence shows that respondent-mother has been divorced three times and that her 

two most recent husbands, Mr. L. and respondent-father, were abusive. However, 

none of the treatment professionals who worked with respondent-mother on the 

subjects of domestic violence, mental and emotional health, or parenting believed she 

needed additional treatment in order to avoid such abusive relationships in the 

future. Moreover, the evidence concerning respondent-mother’s actions since 

separating from respondent-father in October 2016 does not support a finding that 

she is in danger of repeating her past mistakes in tolerating domestic violence or 

abuse. To the contrary, the evidence showed that she took appropriate action by

divorcing respondent-father and obtaining a DVPO against him.

Respondent-mother also challenges the following finding of fact regarding her 

therapy:

42. . . . Although the Mother has participated in 

individual therapy, there is no clear, convincing evidence 

that the Mother has incorporated the knowledge or 

techniques obtained through therapy into her everyday 

life. It is concerning to this [c]ourt that Ms. Hudson, the 

therapist, indicated that there were pertinent issues that 

were not discussed during the course of the therapeutic 

relationship between the Mother and the therapist. The 

[c]ourt expressed its concern that if the therapist were not 

given a full, true and complete picture of the issues that led 

to the juvenile’s removal from the home, those issues and 

concerns were not addressed and still exist. . . .

Once again, we find merit in respondent-mother’s arguments. A faulty premise 

underlies the trial court’s finding that “there is no clear, convincing evidence” of 

respondent-mother’s successful integration of the lessons she learned during therapy 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-19-

into her daily life. Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f), it was GCDHHS’s burden—as 

petitioner—to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence the existence of facts 

establishing grounds for the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights 

under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a). It was not respondent-mother’s burden to prove that 

such grounds did not exist.

Moreover, evidence was presented that respondent-mother (1) divorced and 

ceased all contact with respondent-father; (2) relocated from an isolated rural area in 

Brown Summit, North Carolina, to the city of Greensboro, where she has ready access 

to transportation (via the city bus system); and (3) cultivated an additional social 

support network by joining the board of directors of a local disability rights 

organization. Respondent-mother also devoted many hours—with the assistance of 

Ms. Hudson—to developing a detailed safety plan for Kirk in anticipation of regaining 

custody of the child.

We discern no evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s assertion that 

respondent-mother’s progress in therapy was hindered by her failure to discuss with 

her therapist specific aspects of her CPS history or her past relationships in the 

precise manner referenced by the trial court. None of respondent-mother’s treatment 

providers believed she required additional therapy, and their testimony and reports

indicate that they addressed with her the issues that led to Kirk’s removal from her 

custody.

4. Parenting Skills
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-20-

Respondent-mother next challenges the trial court’s findings of fact concerning

her parenting skills. The trial court made the following findings of fact with regard 

to this issue:

30. Prior to a hearing in October 2018, GCDHHS 

informed the Mother that [respondent-father] had notified 

GCDHHS that he was going to attend the hearing. 

GCDHHS recommended to the Mother that she advise her 

daughter [, Brooke,] of [respondent-father’s] intentions and 

encourage the daughter to stay away since the daughter 

had been sexually assaulted by [respondent-father]. The 

Mother did not elect to act on the recommendation of 

[GCDHHS]. The Mother’s explanation as to why she did 

not act on [GCDHHS’s] recommendation caused the [c]ourt 

grave concerns as to the Mother’s ability to protect any 

juvenile.

. . . .

37. The Mother has not demonstrated the ability 

to care for the juvenile without GCDHHS’[s] involvement. 

The Mother has shown a selfish preoccupation with her 

romantic attachments even when those attachments are 

unhealthy and harmful to the Mother and her children. 

The Mother’s mindless attachments will in all likelihood 

subject the juvenile to repeated harm and result in the 

juvenile’s eventual removal. . . .

38. The juvenile has been in the custody of 

GCDHHS since August 26, 2016 and the Mother has only 

progressed to supervised visitation.

Respondent-mother challenges the trial court’s finding that she disregarded 

GCDHHS’s recommendation to discourage Brooke from attending the hearing in

October 2018, which respondent-father was expected to attend. Respondent-mother 

testified that she “told [Brooke and Becky] not to come” to the hearing, “but they 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-21-

insisted on coming.” Neither GCDHHS nor the guardian ad litem has identified any 

evidence in the record contradicting respondent-mother’s testimony on this issue, nor 

have we located any such evidence.

The record does support the trial court’s finding that respondent-mother was 

never allowed unsupervised visitation with Kirk during the pendency of this case.

But, as respondent-mother observes, she “could not force the trial court to give her 

unsupervised visits with her child” despite having complied with her case plan and 

having displayed appropriate parenting techniques in her supervised visitations with 

Kirk.

The record shows that the trial court temporarily suspended Kirk’s visitations 

with respondent-mother and his siblings in 2017 on the recommendation of Kirk’s 

therapist. The therapist sought to avoid Kirk’s “re-traumatization” through contact 

with his family members pending his adjustment to foster care. As acknowledged by 

the GCDHHS supervisor, the suspension of respondent-mother’s visitation with Kirk 

did not result from any inappropriate action by respondent-mother during the visits.

The record also includes a letter from Kirk’s therapist dated 9 January 2018 

recommending that Kirk’s supervised visits with respondent-mother and his siblings 

resume. Once again, there is no indication that this recommendation was based on 

concerns about respondent-mother’s parenting ability.

The record demonstrates that respondent-mother resolved all of the apparent 

risks posed to her minor children by divorcing and obtaining a DVPO against 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-22-

respondent-father, avoiding any subsequent abusive romantic relationships, 

completing therapy, obtaining suitable housing, cultivating greater independence 

and additional social support, and otherwise fully complying with her case plan. Dr. 

McColloch, who performed respondent-mother’s psychological evaluation and 

parenting assessment in November 2016, concluded that “it is appropriate to return 

the children to this mother in the near future—if [respondent-father] or another 

abuser is not in the home. The current interventions appear appropriate for this 

mother’s needs.” Respondent-mother’s March 2017 discharge summary from Peculiar 

Counseling & Consulting, PLLC, reported that she “has made tremendous progress” 

and “has met all [treatment] goals.” Ms. Hudson likewise reported that she did “not 

recommend[] any further treatment” for respondent-mother, that respondent-mother 

“has made a great deal of progress,” and that respondent-mother “presents as more 

confident, more knowledgeable about the issues that brought her children into foster 

care, and more prepared to resume full-time care of her youngest son.” Respondentmother’s treatment providers were thus consistent in their assessment of her positive 

response to treatment and her prospects for resuming a parental relationship with 

Kirk. 

5. Housing and Home Environment

Respondent-mother also contests several of the trial court’s findings of fact 

related to her housing and home environment. Although the trial court acknowledged

that the physical structure of respondent-mother’s three-bedroom townhouse 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-23-

“provides an appropriate environment for the juvenile[,]” the trial court’s findings of 

fact refer to several episodes reflecting respondent-mother’s alleged inability to 

maintain a suitable home environment for Kirk.

The trial court found that respondent-mother currently shared her residence 

with her adult daughters Brooke and Becky. The trial court then recounted a series 

of incidents arising from this living arrangement, stating as follows:

26. On December 18, 201[8], a GCDHHS social 

worker made an unannounced visit and noted the following 

concerns regarding the cleanliness of the home: 

overflowing trash can, kitchen sink full of dirty dishes, 

unkempt floors and grimy bathroom fixtures. The Mother 

utilizes a cleaning service that had just cleaned the home 

the day before on December 17, 2018. The GCDHHS social 

worker voiced concerns regarding the condition of the home 

since the service had just been at the home twenty-four 

hours prior. The social worker also expressed concerns that 

the other adult occupants of the home were not 

contributing to home maintenance. The Mother informed 

the social worker that her two adult daughters were only 

responsible for cleaning their individual rooms. The 

Mother was responsible for the other areas of the house.

. . . .

33. . . . The daughters brought dogs into the home 

against the Mother’s preference and her expressed dislike of 

dogs. The dogs eventually had to be given away because her 

daughters did not adequately care for the animals. It was 

reported that one of the daughters had allowed a boyfriend 

to move in. The Mother denies that the boyfriend resided 

there. Upon further research, GCDHHS was able to verify 

the boyfriend’s criminal record which was not favorable. 

Until the unannounced home visit [on 18 December 2018], 

the daughters were not required to assist in home 

maintenance and apparently were not required to clean 

behind themselves. The Mother has since discussed home 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-24-

maintenance with her daughters and has divided 

housekeeping tasks among the three of them.

34. Within the last few months, one of the 

daughters was attacked [at] the Mother’s residence by a 

neighbor for whom the daughter had babysat. 

Notwithstanding that the Mother is not currently permitted 

to have minor children in her home, the Mother did nothing 

to protect her daughter or stop the attack from occurring. 

The identity and behavior of occupants, potential 

occupants and visitors in the Mother’s home is pertinent 

and necessary to [e]nsure the safety of everyone in the 

household. It is essential that the Mother exercise dominion 

and authority over her household. Thus far, the Mother 

considers the needs and preferences of everyone else superior 

to her own. The Mother cannot maintain a safe, stable 

environment for the juvenile if she retains this conciliatory 

attitude. The Mother needs to know and understand who is 

in her home as well as the individual’s stated purpose there. 

The Mother cannot ensure and has not demonstrated that 

her home functions according to the Mother’s desires. Until 

the Mother is able to demonstrate that, the juvenile would 

be subject to danger and harm if the juvenile were returned 

to the Mother’s care.

(Emphases added). Respondent-mother takes issue with the italicized portions of 

these findings.

With regard to Brooke’s and Becky’s cleaning responsibilities in the home 

before the GCDHHS home visit on 18 December 2018, the evidence as to this issue

was that respondent-mother did, in fact, require her daughters to keep their own 

rooms clean. As to the presence of dogs in the home, respondent-mother points to 

evidence demonstrating that she mandated that Brooke and Becky keep the two dogs

caged and out of her way while she was downstairs. Moreover, when her daughters 

failed to take care of the dogs to her satisfaction, she required them to give the dogs 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-25-

away. Furthermore, it is not apparent from the trial court’s order how the presence 

of the dogs gave rise to a likelihood that Kirk would be neglected.

With regard to the findings of fact concerning Brooke’s boyfriend, respondentmother testified that the boyfriend never actually moved into the residence and was 

not allowed to visit after she learned of his criminal record. A report submitted by 

social worker Cynthia Johnson indicated that Brooke’s boyfriend was “living on and 

off at the home” during December 2017 and that respondent-mother initially “didn’t 

really have knowledge that he had been staying on and off in the home.” Respondentmother testified that she forbade him from visiting the home once she found out about 

his background. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that he continued to 

visit after she forbade him from doing so.

Respondent-mother also objects to finding of fact 34’s depiction of an incident 

in July 2018 during which Brooke was assaulted outside of respondent-mother’s

residence by the mother of a child that Brooke had been babysitting. The GCDHHS 

supervisor testified that the child’s mother came to the residence after the child told 

her that Brooke had struck her with a shoe. During the incident, the mother punched 

Brooke in the face and hit her with a shoe several times before being restrained by 

Becky. Respondent-mother subsequently reported the incident to GCDHHS, 

informing GCDHHS that she encouraged Brooke to file criminal charges but that 

Brooke refused.
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-26-

Respondent-mother testified she had been upstairs with her door open while 

Brooke was babysitting the child downstairs. She was unaware that the child’s 

mother had come to the residence until she “heard major commotion outside [her] 

window,” at which time she “went downstairs and outside.” By the time respondentmother reached the scene of the incident, the child’s mother was gone. We are unable 

to find any evidence in the record to support the trial court’s statement in finding of 

fact 34 that respondent-mother was not permitted to have minor children in her

home. Furthermore, it is unclear what respondent-mother could have done to prevent 

this incident from occurring.

The remainder of finding of fact 34 consists of a series of generalizations or

inferences drawn by the trial court. It is the province of the trial court when sitting 

as the fact-finder to assign weight to particular evidence and to draw reasonable 

inferences therefrom. In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843, 788 S.E.2d at 167–68. Such 

inferences, however, “cannot rest on conjecture or surmise. This is necessarily so 

because an inference is a permissible conclusion drawn by reason from a premise 

established by proof.” Sowers v. Marley, 235 N.C. 607, 609, 70 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1952)

(citations omitted). Accordingly, an appellate court may review the reasonableness of 

the inferences drawn by the trial court from the evidence.

We conclude that the majority of the trial court’s inferences in finding of fact 

34 are based merely on conjecture. The incidents described in the trial court’s findings 

of fact do not give rise to a reasonable inference that respondent-mother’s 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-27-

“conciliatory attitude” renders her unable to “maintain a safe, stable environment for 

[Kirk],” or that “[Kirk] would be subject to danger and harm if . . . returned to the 

Mother’s care.”

As for the cleanliness issues identified by the trial court, we do not believe that 

they are sufficiently indicative of respondent-mother’s inability to control her 

household as to support a conclusion that a likelihood of future neglect exists.

Although the GCDHHS social worker found respondent-mother’s residence cluttered 

and dirty on one occasion, the evidence also shows that respondent-mother promptly 

addressed the issue by assigning Brooke and Becky additional cleaning 

responsibilities. The trial court’s findings of fact show that respondent-mother was 

employing a cleaning service for her residence prior to this incident, and there is no 

evidence that the cleanliness of the home remained a problem at the time of the 

termination hearing in March 2019. Although the trial court noted that cleanliness 

concerns were the subject of several CPS reports filed about the family in Orange 

County between 2003 and 2012, no such concerns were raised in any of the CPS 

reports received by GCDHHS between 2014 and 2016. Moreover, a lack of cleanliness 

in the home was not a cause of Kirk’s adjudication as a neglected and dependent 

juvenile in 2016.

The remaining incidents cited in the trial court’s findings of fact do not support 

the larger inferences drawn by the trial court about respondent-mother’s ability to 

protect Kirk or provide him with a safe home environment. The findings of fact show 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-28-

that respondent-mother tried to accommodate Brooke’s and Becky’s desires to have 

dogs but then required the dogs to be given away when her daughters proved unable 

to care for them. Respondent-mother also barred Brooke’s boyfriend from the 

residence upon learning of his criminal history. Neither of these events is sufficient 

to support the trial court’s conclusion that respondent-mother is unwilling or unable 

to control her household so as to prevent harm to Kirk. Likewise, the attack on Brooke 

in 2018 was an isolated incident occurring eight months prior to the termination 

hearing. We see nothing inherently dangerous in respondent-mother’s decision to 

permit her adult daughter to babysit a nine-year-old girl. Nor does the record contain

any evidence that respondent-mother possessed any ability to predict or prevent the 

incident involving Brooke and the child’s mother.

B. Conclusions of Law/Ultimate Findings

The trial court made the following ultimate findings in support of its conclusion 

of law that “[g]rounds exist to terminate the parental rights of [respondent-mother] 

pursuant to N.C.G.S. §[ ]7B-1111(a)(1),” all of which are contested by respondentmother:

36. The Mother’s [CPS] history alone, which 

dates back to 2000, supports the likelihood of repeat[ed]

neglect. . . .

37. The Mother has not demonstrated the ability 

to care for the juvenile without GCDHHS’[s] involvement. 

The Mother has shown a selfish preoccupation with her 

romantic attachments even when those attachments are 

unhealthy and harmful to the Mother and her children. 

The Mother’s mindless attachments will in all likelihood 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-29-

subject the juvenile to repeated harm and result in the 

juvenile’s eventual removal. The juvenile has dealt with 

enough instability already in his young life.

. . . .

40. Based on the Mother’s . . . inability to 

demonstrate an ability to correct the conditions that led to 

removal the probability of repetition of neglect is high. . . . 

[T]he neglect continues to date and there is a strong 

likelihood of the repetition of neglect if the juvenile is 

returned to [the Mother].

We agree with respondent-mother that the findings of fact in the trial court’s 

termination order that are actually supported by evidence of record are insufficient 

to support the trial court’s ultimate finding that there was a likelihood of repetition 

of neglect. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in determining that grounds 

existed for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).

We note that the above-quoted portion of finding of fact 36 represents a 

misunderstanding of the applicable legal standard for establishing future neglect for 

purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). “Termination of parental rights for neglect may 

not be based solely on past conditions which no longer exist.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 

244, 248, 485 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1997). The trial court may not rely upon a parent’s 

history alone to find a likelihood of future neglect but “must also consider any 

evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the 

probability of a repetition of neglect. [One] determinative factor[ ] must be . . . the 

fitness of the parent to care for the child at the time of the termination proceeding.”

In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715, 319 S.E.2d at 232 (citation omitted). “If past neglect 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-30-

is shown, the trial court also must then consider evidence of changed circumstances.” 

In re M.A.W., 370 N.C. 149, 152, 804 S.E.2d 513, 516 (2017).

In past cases involving families with a history of domestic violence, this Court 

has determined that a continued likelihood of future neglect is present when the 

parent continues to participate in domestic violence, fails to truly engage with her

counseling or therapy requirements, or fails to break off the relationship with the 

abusive partner. For example, in In re D.L.W., we considered whether the trial court 

erred by terminating the parental rights of a mother on the basis of neglect where 

the family had a history of “significant domestic violence between the parents.” 368 

N.C. at 836–37, 788 S.E.2d at 164. After the initial neglect adjudication and the 

removal of the juveniles from the mother’s care, the mother’s case plan required her 

to participate in counseling and remedy the domestic violence issues that were 

endangering her children. Id. at 838, 788 S.E.2d at 164.

The Court ultimately held that a likelihood of future neglect existed because 

(1) the trial court “received police reports and heard testimony regarding [the 

mother’s] participation in multiple incidents involving domestic violence since the 

2013 adjudication and removal of the juveniles”; (2) the mother “had not articulated 

an understanding of what she learned in her domestic violence counseling sessions”;

and (3) the mother “continued in a relationship with the Respondent Father” despite 

the “ongoing domestic violence” between them. Id. at 843–44, 788 S.E.2d at 167–68; 

see also In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 334, 838 S.E.2d 396, 402 (2020) (finding a 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-31-

likelihood of future neglect based on the mother’s failure to complete all required 

therapy and counseling, as well as her decision to “maintain[ ] a relationship with 

[her partner] despite domestic violence incidents”).

In contrast to those cases, respondent-mother here has not been involved in 

any reported incidents of domestic violence since her separation from respondentfather. As discussed above, following the removal of Kirk from her care in 2016, 

respondent-mother moved out, separated from respondent-father, and ultimately 

divorced him in April 2018. She also obtained a DVPO against respondent-father on 

22 February 2017 and renewed the DVPO through February 2021. In addition, 

respondent-mother fully completed all of the therapy and counseling courses required 

by her case plan. Respondent-mother also devoted hours to writing up a detailed 

safety plan for Kirk in anticipation of regaining custody of him. In this safety plan, 

she acknowledged her role in failing to protect the children from the prior abuse by 

respondent-father and stated that she found her children “IN NO WAY responsible 

for what they experienced.” She articulately detailed the lessons she learned during

counseling, and her safety plan for Kirk included high levels of supervision and

structure, educational and extracurricular activities, and steps for avoiding “triggers” 

that may remind Kirk of prior trauma, including ensuring that respondent-father 

remains “blocked on all avenues” of potential contact with Kirk or other family

members. In addition, each of her care providers stated that respondent-mother had 

satisfactorily addressed all concerns about her ability to safely and effectively parent 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-32-

her children and required no further counseling.

The trial court’s finding of a likelihood of repetition of neglect in the future 

crosses the line separating a reasonable inference from mere speculation.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in concluding that respondent-mother’s 

parental rights should be terminated on the basis of neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(1).

II. Adjudication of Dependency

Respondent-mother also challenges the trial court’s adjudication of 

dependency under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) as an additional ground for termination.

Subsection 7B-1111(a)(6) authorizes the termination of parental rights in cases where

the parent is incapable of providing for the proper care and 

supervision of the juvenile, such that the juvenile is a 

dependent juvenile within the meaning of [N.C.]G.S. [§] 

7B-101, and that there is a reasonable probability that the 

incapability will continue for the foreseeable future. 

Incapability under this subdivision may be the result of 

substance abuse, intellectual disability, mental illness, 

organic brain syndrome, or any other cause or condition 

that renders the parent unable or unavailable to parent the 

juvenile and the parent lacks an appropriate alternative 

child care arrangement.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6); see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9). As the Court of Appeals has 

held, in order to sustain an adjudication of dependency, the trial court’s findings of 

fact must establish “both (1) the parent’s [in]ability to provide care or supervision, 

and (2) the [un]availability to the parent of alternative child care arrangements.” 

In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 427, 610 S.E.2d 403, 406 (2005).
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-33-

Respondent-mother contests the trial court’s ultimate conclusion of law in 

support of its adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6), which was based on the 

following findings of fact:

42. [The Mother] is incapable of providing a safe,

permanent home for the juvenile. Although the Mother has 

participated in individual therapy, there is no clear, 

convincing evidence that the Mother has incorporated the 

knowledge or techniques obtained through therapy into her 

everyday life. It is concerning to this [c]ourt that Ms. 

Hudson, the therapist, indicated that there were pertinent 

issues that were not discussed during the course of the 

therapeutic relationship between the Mother and the 

therapist. . . . Although the Mother initiated divorce 

proceedings, obtained a 50-B Domestic Violence Protective 

Order and renewed the protective order twice, the [c]ourt 

is concerned about the Mother’s involvement in yet another 

relationship [i.e., with Mr. Westray] since the juvenile’s 

removal in 2016 without addressing adverse issues from 

her prior relationships. The concerns and red flags raised 

in this new relationship causes the [c]ourt to question the 

Mother’s judgment. The Mother has not recommended 

anyone else to provide appropriate alternative care for the 

juvenile.

. . . .

46. Grounds exist to terminate the parental 

rights of [the Mother] pursuant to . . . [N.C.G.S.] §[ ]7B1111(a)(6) of the North Carolina General Statutes.

Based on our thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court

erred by determining that respondent-mother was incapable of providing a safe,

permanent home for Kirk. As set out above, the record shows that respondentmother—among other things—eliminated the threat posed to Kirk by respondentfather, confronted her own history of violent domestic relationships to the satisfaction 
IN RE K.L.T.

Opinion of the Court

-34-

of her multiple treatment providers, displayed appropriate parenting techniques 

during her visits with Kirk, and obtained a suitable residence with ready access to 

transportation and social support.

We are unable to agree with the trial court that the isolated incidents 

referenced in its termination order are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). Accordingly, based on our careful review of the record, we 

hold that the trial court erred by terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights on 

the ground of dependency.

4

Conclusion

For the reasons set out above, we reverse the trial court’s 8 May 2019 order 

terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights.

REVERSED.

 

4 Respondent-mother also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by 

determining that it is in Kirk’s best interests for her parental rights to be terminated. Having 

concluded that the trial court erred by finding the existence of grounds to terminate

respondent-mother’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), however, we need not 

address this issue. See In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 252, 485 S.E.2d 612, 617 (1997).