RENDERED: APRIL 26, 2018 TO BE PUBLISHED

2017-SC-000580-MR
MIKI THOMPSON, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF KARA VANCE AND DARBY JANE VANCE, BY AND THROUGH HER GUARDIAN MIKI THOMPSON APPELLANTS



## v. ON APPEAL FROM COURT OFAPPEALS CASE NO. 2017-CA-001118 PIKE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 13-CI-01349
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN (JUDGE, PIKE CIRCUIT COURT) AND APPELLEE

TIMOTHY R. LAVENDER, D.O. AND PIKEVILLE DERMATOLOGY & COSMETIC CENTER,PSC REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON AFFIRMING The Court ofAppeals denied Miki Thompson's petition for a writ prohibiting the trial courtfrom enforcing discovery orders entered for inspection and discovery in a wrongful death and negligence action pendingin the Pike Circuit Court. The Court ofAppeals declined to issue the writ because Thompson failed to showirreparable injurywithout the writ orthe existence of facts sufficient tojustifyissuance ofa writ under the special-case exception. Accordingly, we affirm the result reached bythe Court ofAppeals.I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. KaraVance committed suicide byhanging. Miki Thompson, Administratrix ofthe Estate ofKaraVance, and DarbyJane Vance, by and through her guardian, Miki Thompson, suedTimothy Lavender, D.O., and Pikeville Dermatology and Cosmetic Center, P.S.C., claimingthat Lavender's negligent prescribing ofthe acne medicine, Accutane, causedVance's suicide. Tho:i:npsoi:l resisted Lavender and Pikeville Dermatology's requests for
. pretrial inspection ofVance's cellphone, computer, and social media account. The trial court entered three separate·orders allowing inspection, which provided (1) inspection by a third-party specialist ofLavender and Pikeville Dermatology's choosing, (2) the information subject to inspection would be limited to a time limit ofone yearbefore Vance's suicide, and (3) a protective orderlimiting the use ofinformation gleaned from theinspections. In the writ action that followed, the Court ofAppeals declined to issue a writ prohibiting the trjal court from enforcing these orders. II. ANALYSIS. A writ is an extraordinary remedy thatwe applywith great caution. When ruling on a writ petition, we must first determine whether issuance ofa writ is an available .remedy. Only ifa writ is available will we then look to the merits ofthe petition to review the trial court's decision. The decision to issue a writ is entirelywithin this Court's discretion. 1 We have recognized two specific situations**wher~** this type ofreliefis appropriate:

i Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2004) (citations omitted). 

### 2[U]pon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside ofitsjurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting oris about to act erroneously, although within itsjurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedyby appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injurywill result ifpetition is not granted.2 ·

.As the Court ofAppeals noted, Thompson asserted the trial court proceed.ed erroneouslywithin itsjurisdiction. Thompson argues that the trial court's computer-inspection orderfails to limit the parameter oftopics to be searched, is overbroadwith respect to the time period to be inspected and fails to provide an opportunityfor review byThompson's counsel orfor Thompson to request an in-camera review ofthe potentiallycaptured materials before delivery to Lavender and Pikeville Dermatology. Thompson also asserts that that the discovery order for Vance's Facebook account is inappropriate and makes other general objections. We agree with theCourt ofAppeals that complyingwith the trial court's orders will not lead to an irreparable injuryfor Thompson, so we must decline to exercise our supervisorypower to interrupt the trial court.'s orderlyprocess.3 Thompson's assertion that our holding in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dickinson requires the trialjudge to specify the relation ofthe premises to be inspected as it relates to personalpropertyis meritless.4 We believe the relevancy ofthe

2 Id. at 10. 3 National Gypsum Company v. Corns, 736 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Ky. 1987).
4 Wal-MartStores, Inc. v. Dickinson, 29 S.W.3d 796 (Ky. 2000). 3requested discovery is self-evidentbecauseThompson has placedVance's mental state at issue byfiling this claim. 

### A. The Computer-Inspection Order Is Not Erroneous. As the Court ofAppeals rightly acknowledged, an expedition for the discovery ofirrelevant information may lead to a special-cases circumstance.s _/
. But that is not the case today. Civil Rule 26.02 provides "[p]arties may obtain

.discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject

matterinvolved in the pending action
... It is not ground for objection that the information soughtwill be inadmissible at trial ifthe discovery sought appears to be reasonably calculated

## to lead to the discovery ofadmissible evidence."6 And we construe discovery rules liberally.7 We find no reason to prohibit the inspection of**Vance'~** GOmputer. Thompson has not asserted that the computer contains any privileged information. And coroner's testimony indicated that the wayVance killed herselfsuggested advanced understanding and planning. It is not unreasonable to believe thatVance may have used her computer orphone to 

### • research the suicide method. We note that the· trial court provided sufficieri.t protective orders to protect against malicious use or dissemination of information captured. Accordingly, we find no error.

s Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 811 (Ky. 2004). 6 Kentucky Civil Rule 26.02. 1 See Primm v. Issac 127 S.W.3d 630**(~y.** 2004). 4

### B. A One-Year Time Perio·d to Capture or Search is Not Overbroad! Thompson asserts that the period ofdiscovery for one-yearpriorto Vance's suicide is overbroad. Thompson makes this argument citing no case law and does so in one paragraph. Thompson would have this Courtlimit the discovery to the 39 days ofmedical treatment, but for us to do so would circumventthe full and open discovery process that our rules allow. The record suggests thatVance had unstable personal relationships and mental health
concerns before beingprescribedAccutane. Limiting discovery to 39 days of medical treatmentwould be improper. The trial court's decision to allow discovery for one yearbefore Vance's suicide was not improper. 

### C. Thompson is not En,titled to Review Captured Information Before

·Producing it to Lavender and Pikeville Dermatology.· The trial court order requires simultaneous sharing ofinformation discovered via inspection ofthe computer, cell phone, and social media account. Thompson argues that she should be able to screen the information and create an objection long before the information is shared with Lavender and Pikeville Dermatology. ButThompson cites no case law or civil rule that would require the procedure she requests. And we are not aware ofany civil rules or case law to support her assertion. As the Court ofAppeals noted, r Thompson has been in possession ofthese materials since before the beginning oflitigation and has had ample opportunityto do her owninspection. We find
no error in the trial court's order.

5D. The Trial Court's Social Media Order does not Satisfy the Requirements for a Writ. Thompson argues that the trial court's order granting Lavender and Pikeville Dermatologybroad authority to review Vance's social media accounts satisfies the requirements for the issuance ofa writ. We disagree. As the Court ofAppeals noted, Thompson makes no claim ofprivilege to Vance's social media accounts. The argument appears to be that most ofthe information obtained will simplybe irrelevant. Even ifThompson is ultimately correct, this does not warrant the issuance ofa writ. As discussed earlier, Kentucky Rule ofCivil Procedure (CR) 26.02 is a rule that is to be read liberally. To ensure a fair trial, one ofthe tenets ofour current civil-justice system is that both parties must have access to evidence or information leading to evidence, allowing a full case to be brought to trial. The discovery orderprovides appropriate restraint as it pertains to irrelevant information. Not only did the trial court limit the discovery period to one year but also provided a protective order, ensuring all information is properly guarded. The protective order requires all information obtained be treated as "strictly confidential" and lists eleven separate restrictions on how the information collected may be used. In accordance with prior cases, we are confident that the trial court's protective orderwill sufficientlyprevent any inappropriate use ofirrelevant information obtained.a

s SeeEdwards v. Hickman, 237 S.W.3d 183 (Ky. 2007). 6III. CONCLUSION. We find that the trial court committed no error in its discovery orders. Further, after assessing the string of"general objections" byThompson, we find that they are without merit. We affirm the Court ofAppeals' denial ofthe writ. All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FORAPPELLANTS: Herman Michael Lucas Carter & Lucas
Honorable Eddy Coleman, Judge Pike Circuit Court COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST: TIMOTHY R. LAVENDER, D.O. AND PIKEVILLE DERMATOLOGY & COSMETIC CENTER: Clayton Lee Robinson Nicholas Edwards Robinson & Havens, PSC

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