DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

MEHMET TATLICI, individually and as assignee of

BEDRIYE TATLICI, and as Administrator ad Litem of the

ESTATE OF MEHMET SALIH TATLICI,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

NURTEN TATLICI and UGUR TATLICI,

Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

No. 4D2022-0615

[November 8, 2023]

Appeal and cross-appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth 

Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Bradley G. Harper, Judge; L.T. Case 

No. 50-2009-CA-030873-XXXX-MB.

Robert J. Hauser of Sniffen & Spellman P.A., West Palm Beach, for 

appellant/cross-appellee.

Manuel Farach of Mrachek, Fitzgerald, Rose, Konopka, Thomas & 

Weiss, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellees/cross-appellants.

WARNER, J.

Appellant secured a default against appellees for liability on his 

complaint for conversion, fraudulent transfer, and contribution. Yet, prior 

to the start of the trial on damages, the court dismissed appellant’s claim 

for contribution1 and at the close of appellant’s case, the trial court 

directed a verdict for appellees on appellant’s claims for conversion. 

Appellant’s fraudulent transfer claims were submitted to the jury, which

returned a verdict for appellant.

Appellant appeals the dismissal of the contribution claim and the

directed verdict on the conversion claims. Appellees cross-appeal the

default judgment and the verdict on the fraudulent transfer. We reverse 

the directed verdict and the dismissal because appellant was entitled to 

rely on the default. We affirm as to the cross-appeal.

1 This claim is based on Turkish law and more fully discussed in the opinion.
2

This case involves protracted litigation after the death of a wealthy 

Turkish businessman. The dispute on appeal is between the deceased’s 

older son (from the deceased’s marriage to his former wife) opposing the 

deceased’s younger son (from the deceased’s marriage to his widow) and 

the widow. Under Turkish law, the sons each had a vested share of the 

estate. The former wife, now deceased, had claimed that she had unpaid 

alimony and assets owed to her from the divorce with the deceased some 

thirty years past, which rights she had assigned to the older son for this 

litigation.

The older son (appellant) was appointed administrator ad litem of the 

deceased’s estate in Florida to obtain money damages for the claimed 

conversion of assets by the younger son and the widow (appellees). 

Appellant, as his mother’s assignee, also sought to recover on his mother’s 

claims against appellees for the decedent’s transfers of Florida properties 

to appellees after the former wife received the divorce judgment. Appellant 

originally filed suit in 2009.

After multiple amendments, the complaint consisted of separate counts

against appellees for the fraudulent transfer of assets which they obtained 

after the former wife’s divorce judgment; separate counts against appellees

for conversion of assets taken from the decedent’s estate; and a single 

count for “Tenkiz Davasi,” a Turkish law cause of action for contributions

which the decedent made to Florida properties held in the widow’s name

against the widow. Appellees answered without asserting any challenge to

personal jurisdiction or the Florida forum.

After appellees violated several court orders and failed to comply with 

lesser sanctions, the trial court struck their pleadings and entered a 

default against them on liability. We reject appellees’ cross-appeal of the 

default and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

entering the default as a sanction, as appellees willfully and 

contumaciously disregarded the trial court’s multiple orders.

Based upon the default, the parties proceeded to trial on damages.2

Prior to the trial’s commencement, the court dismissed appellant’s count 

for “Tenkiz Davasi,” concluding that the Turkish law count did not state a 

civil cause of action under Florida law. Then, at trial, after appellant rested 

his damages case, appellees moved for a directed verdict on the remaining 

counts for conversion and fraudulent transfer. The court granted a 

2 By the time of trial, a different judge was presiding over the case than the judge

who had entered the default.
3

directed verdict on the conversion counts, concluding that appellant’s

allegations and proof did not show that the estate owned the property in 

question. The court allowed the fraudulent transfer counts to be reached

by the jury, which rendered a verdict for appellant and awarded 

$623,453.87 in damages. The court entered judgment, and appellant filed 

his appeal from the directed verdict on the conversion counts and from the 

dismissal on the “Tenkiz Davasi” contribution count. Appellees crossappealed the default as already discussed and the fraudulent transfer 

verdict.

The standard for reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed 

verdict is de novo. Meruelo v. Mark Andrew of Palm Beaches, Ltd., 12 So. 

3d 247, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Similarly, the standard of review on 

appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss is de novo. U.S. Project Mgmt., 

Inc. v. Parc Royale E. Dev., Inc., 861 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

Conversion

The trial court entered a default as a sanction against appellees as to 

all counts alleged in appellant’s complaint. The court also struck all of 

appellees’ pleadings and entered a judgment on liability. “When a default

is entered, the defaulting party admits all well-pled factual allegations of 

the complaint. Likewise, a default terminates the defending party’s right 

to further defend, except to contest the amount of unliquidated damages.” 

Kotlyar v. Metro. Cas. Ins. Co., 192 So. 3d 562, 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) 

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Phadael v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 83 So. 

3d 893, 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). “However, it is well established a default 

judgment for damages cannot be affirmed where the underlying complaint 

does not contain sufficient allegations to sustain the claim of damage.” 

Ellish v. Richard, 622 So. 2d 1154, 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); see also N. 

Am. Accident Ins. Co. v Moreland, 53 So. 635, 637 (Fla. 1910) (“A judgment 

by default properly entered against parties sui juris operates as an 

admission by the defendants of the truth of the definite and certain 

allegations and the fair inferences and conclusions of fact to be drawn from 

the allegations of the declaration. . . . Whether the admitted allegations 

state a cause of action is for the court to determine.”).

“Conversion is defined as ‘an act of dominion wrongfully asserted over, 

and inconsistent with, another’s possessory rights in personal property.’” 

Joseph v. Chanin, 940 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting 

Goodwin v. Alexatos, 584 So. 2d 1007, 1011 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)). The 

cause of action accrues when the property’s wrongful holder “refus[es] to 

surrender the possession of the subject personalty after demand for 
4

possession by one entitled thereto.” Id. at 487 (quoting Murrell v. Trio 

Towing Serv., Inc., 294 So. 2d 331, 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)).

Counts III and IV of appellant’s complaint alleged causes of action for 

conversion against appellees. Specifically, the complaint alleged that 

pursuant to Turkish law, assets belonging to appellees were estate assets, 

thus establishing appellant’s right to possession as the estate’s 

administrator. The complaint alleged that appellees had wrongfully 

withdrawn funds from several bank accounts and a business that 

belonged to the estate, and further alleged that appellees had refused to 

return the funds when appellant, as administrator ad litem, demanded the 

funds. These allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action for 

conversion, and were admitted as fact due to the default. Kotlyar, 192 So. 

3d at 565.3

This case is similar to DG Sports Agency, LLC v. First Round 

Management, LLC, 174 So. 3d 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), where the plaintiff 

had secured a clerk’s default on the defendant in a breach of contract case. 

Id. at 543. At the damages trial, the court directed a verdict on liability, 

finding that the plaintiff had breached the agreement first and questioning 

the contract’s validity. Id. at 544. On appeal, this court reversed, 

concluding that the trial court improperly ruled on issues of liability which 

the default had foreclosed. Id. at 545.

Just as in DG, the default in this case foreclosed appellees’ ability to 

defend themselves against appellant’s conversion counts. Because 

appellant’s pleading was sufficient to allege causes of action for conversion 

against appellees, the court erred in directing a verdict on those counts.

Claim of Contribution under Turkish Law

In his capacity as the estate’s administrator ad litem, appellant also 

made a claim against the widow for a money judgment based upon the 

Turkish law of “Tenkiz Davasi,” which was a claim for contribution.

According to the allegations of the complaint, under Articles 225 and 227 

of the Turkish Civil Code, after one spouse dies, both spouses’ shared 

property is liquidated with each spouse taking the value of his or her 

contributions to acquisition or improvements of the shared property. The

complaint alleged that decedent had not been reimbursed for his 

contributions, which included specific businesses and properties in 

Florida. Earlier in the proceedings, the widow had moved to dismiss this 

3 Appellant also claimed that appellees converted some real property, but that 

claim was withdrawn at trial.
5

claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court denied the 

motion to dismiss, although it questioned whether Turkey was a more 

appropriate forum for a cause of action. However, appellees never moved 

to dismiss the complaint based on forum non conveniens.

The widow filed another motion to dismiss the claim before trial. She 

argued that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a 

cause of action under Turkish property law. Appellant argued that the 

claim was properly brought here, because some of the property that was 

the subject of the claim was located in Florida.

The trial court dismissed the contribution claim, finding that Turkish 

Law did not create a Florida civil cause of action. We conclude this too 

was error.

Appellant filed suit as the administrator ad litem of the decedent’s 

estate for the purpose of filing claims on the estate’s behalf against the 

widow and second son. See § 733.308, Fla. Stat. (2012); Fla. Prob. R. 

5.120(a). When a court appoints an administrator ad litem, “[t]he 

appointee becomes solely responsible to the estate for the administration 

of that portion of its affairs entrusted to him by the court, and thus 

supplants in that regard the authority of the personal representative, who 

continues to be responsible for the administration of all other aspects of 

the estate’s business.” Woolf v. Reed, 389 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 

1980). Thus, as administrator ad litem, appellant had authority to file suit 

to recover monies owed to the estate, which was what appellant sought in 

the contribution claim—to recover the decedent’s contributions to certain 

Florida assets to which the estate was entitled under Turkish law. In 

essence, the claim is akin to a suit for an accounting of the monies the 

decedent paid for the purchase and upkeep of the properties.

That the contribution action is based upon the estate’s substantive 

right to such relief under Turkish law does not preclude its enforcement 

in an action for a money judgment in Florida. The right to contribution 

from the widow for assets acquired in her name is governed by the law of 

parties’ domicile when that right was acquired. See Quintana v. Ordono, 

195 So. 2d 577, 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) (one spouse’s interests “in 

movables acquired by the other during the marriage are determined by the 

law of the domicile of the parties when the movables are acquired”) 

(citation omitted), cert. discharged, 202 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1967); In re Estate 

of Nicole Santos, 648 So. 2d 277, 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (same).

Here, the estate seeks money to compensate it for the decedent’s 

contributions to property; it does not seek the property itself. In In re 
6

Siegel’s Estate, 350 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), we held that a note 

and mortgage were movables, and the law of the decedent holder’s domicile 

should apply to its disposition, because the note and mortgage did not 

create an estate in land. Id. at 91. Similarly here, the decedent’s right of 

contribution in the widow’s assets does not create an estate in land. 

Therefore, the assets are movables and, as such, are governed by the laws 

of Turkey, the domicile of both the decedent and his widow.

Thus, Turkish law applies to the claim for contribution. Application of 

Turkish law was admitted by the default, as was the estate’s right to seek 

contribution for the decedent’s payments in the acquisition and 

maintenance of the properties. Accordingly, the trial court erred in 

dismissing the claim.

Conclusion

Because we conclude that the complaint stated a cause of action for 

conversion, the trial court erred in entering a directed verdict on liability 

for appellees when a default on liability had been entered. The court also 

erred in dismissing appellant’s cause of action for contribution, as 

appellant was entitled to bring the action as an administrator ad litem 

seeking to recover monies due to the estate. For these claims, we reverse 

and remand for a new trial on damages. As to the issues on cross-appeal, 

we affirm.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

MAY and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.