J-A09040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOEL S. REYES-ACOSTA 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 469 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 26, 2021,

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0007777-2019.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: JULY 26, 2023

Joel Reyes-Acosta appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after 

a jury found him guilty of indecent assault and harassment.1 We reverse and 

remand for a new trial based on the Commonwealth’s violation of Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

On October 2, 2019, Officer Thomas Wales of the Springettsbury 

Township Police Department filed a criminal complaint charging Reyes-Acosta 

based on an incident on September 13, 2019. The case proceeded to a jury 

trial on July 20 and 21, 2021. The trial court recounted the evidence:

The victim, [M.G.], worked as an assistant manager at 

Suburban Park Apartments where [Reyes-Acosta] lived. [M.G.] 

had to interact with [Reyes-Acosta] when he would bring in his 

rent checks. [Any time he saw her, Reyes-Acosta] would tell 

[M.G.] she was beautiful or comment about her height or outfit. 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(1) and 2709(a)(4).
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One time [Reyes-Acosta] stated she “looked tired and that he 

wanted to give [her] a massage and lick the oil off [her] body.”

[M.G.] stated [Reyes-Acosta] made her uncomfortable for 

months prior to the incident at hand. Approximately a week

before the incident in question, at a community event at the 

apartment complex, [Reyes-Acosta] pinned [M.G.] between a 

bush and her car stating, “he wanted to eat [her] pussy and eat 

[her] ass.” [M.G.] informed her manager, Stephanie Hartranft ..., 

who was not there but was able to send her daughter in to ensure 

[M.G.] was not alone. None of the incidents prior to September 

13, 2019, were reported to the police.

On September 13, 2019, the date of the incident leading to 

the charges in the instant case, [M.G.] ... was smoking outside her 

office when [Reyes-Acosta] sat down next to her, inquiring about 

how to remove himself from his lease. When the conversation 

was finished, [M.G.] went inside to the bathroom to throw her 

cigarette out like she normally would, and when she turned 

around, [Reyes-Acosta] “was standing there with his arms up on 

the door blocking [her] from coming back.” She hurriedly walked 

out but, in the hallway, [Reyes-Acosta] put his arms around her 

“waist and his hand on [her] butt and told [her] he wanted to eat 

[her] pussy and ass and tried to kiss [her].” To avoid [ReyesAcosta’s] open-mouth kiss, [M.G.] turned her head, so [ReyesAcosta] got saliva on her face instead of her lips.

[M.G.] “pushed [past] him” and got back to work while 

[Reyes-Acosta] made himself some coffee. [Reyes-Acosta] saw a 

check had fallen on the floor next to [M.G.], so [Reyes-Acosta] 

approached her and took his hand and rubbed it down [M.G.’s] 

back and down into her pants. [H]e started in between her 

shoulder blades and as he rubbed downward, she pushed herself 

back into her chair to stop his hand from going any further.

Once [Reyes-Acosta] left, [M.G.] notified Stephanie, a 

maintenance staff member, and the police about the incident. 

Approximately fifteen minutes after the incident, a tenant named 

Christine [Heinrich] had come to the office to hand out fliers, but 

stayed and comforted [M.G.] until police came. Although the 

police were called, Stephanie confirmed that [M.G.] did not give 

[Reyes-Acosta] a no trespass order for the leasing office.

On September 18, 2019, Officer Thomas Wales received an 

apology letter from Stephanie that was written by [Reyes-Acosta]. 

In the letter, [Reyes-Acosta] apologized for the 
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“misunderstanding” and thanked [M.G.] for “always telling me to 

take care of my family.”

Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/22, at 2–4.

The jury found Reyes-Acosta guilty of indecent assault and harassment. 

On October 26, 2021, the trial court sentenced Reyes-Acosta to serve 2 weeks 

to 23 months of incarceration concurrent with 12 months of probation and to 

pay $28,556.82 in restitution. Reyes-Acosta filed a post-sentence motion

claiming, inter alia, that the Commonwealth violated Brady by failing to 

provide until after sentencing a letter from the workers’ compensation insurer 

that paid benefits to M.G. related to this incident. The trial court heard and 

denied Reyes-Acosta’s post-sentence motion after a hearing on February 16, 

2022. Reyes-Acosta timely appealed. Reyes-Acosta and the trial court 

complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

Reyes-Acosta presents five issues for review:

A. Was the evidence insufficient to support the charges, where 

the Commonwealth did not establish that Mr. Reyes-Acosta had 

contact with the complainant’s intimate parts, and the 

Commonwealth’s evidence was wholly unreliable?

B. Did the lower court err and abuse its discretion in granting the 

Commonwealth’s motion in limine and admitting other acts 

evidence, where the court failed to conduct the balancing test 

that [Pa.R.E. 404(b)] requires, and the Commonwealth did not 

meet an exception to the rule against the admission of this type 

of evidence?

C. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in denying Mr. 

Reyes-Acosta’s post-sentence motion seeking a new trial based 

on a Brady violation, where the Commonwealth withheld the 

complainant’s worker’s compensation letter containing 

favorable and material information until Mr. Reyes-Acosta’s 

sentencing?
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D. Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence, where the 

complainant embellished her testimony and the only other 

witness admitted to “being forgetful?”

E. Did the trial court abuse its discretion at sentencing by failing 

to state on the record its reason for imposing a term of 

incarceration when the Sentencing Guidelines recommended a 

sentence as low as probation?

Reyes-Acosta’s Brief at 7–8.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Reyes-Acosta’s first issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence. His argument is twofold. First, he argues that M.G.’s cheek and 

pants-covered buttocks are not “sexual or intimate parts” of her body, which 

the Commonwealth had to prove that Reyes-Acosta touched for the offense of 

indecent assault. Second, he contends that the testimony of Heinrich and 

M.G. was so inherently unreliable that it was insufficient to prove either crime.

We employ a well-settled scope and standard of review:

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a 

question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the 

verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime 

charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the 

verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to 

human experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is 

insufficient as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency 

claim[,] the court is required to view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit 

of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 478 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000)). Testimony 

from a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction if it addresses every 
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element of the crime charged. Id. at 481; see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3106 

(“The testimony of a complainant need not be corroborated in prosecutions 

under [Chapter 31].”).

Section 3126 of the Crimes Code provides that “[a] person is guilty of 

indecent assault if the person has indecent contact with the complainant . . . 

and the person does so without the complainant’s consent.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3126(a)(1). “Indecent contact” is “[a]ny touching of the sexual or other 

intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual 

desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101. The “touching” is not required 

to involve skin-to-skin contact; it is enough to prove touching through a layer 

of clothing. Commonwealth v. Ricco, 650 A.2d 1084, 1086 (Pa. Super. 

1994). Further, “sexual or other intimate parts” includes any “body part that 

is personal and private, and which the person ordinarily allows to be touched 

only by people with whom the person has a close personal relationship, and 

one which is commonly associated with sexual relations or intimacy.”

Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298, 313–14 (Pa. 2022)2 (footnote 

omitted); accord Commonwealth v. Capo, 727 A.2d 1126, 1127 (Pa. 

Super. 1999) (holding evidence sufficient where a defendant tried to kiss a 

complainant’s mouth but reached only her face and neck and rubbed her 

shoulders, back, and stomach). 

____________________________________________

2 Gamby was decided September 29, 2022, after Reyes-Acosta filed his brief.
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Here, the evidence was sufficient to convict Reyes-Acosta of indecent 

assault. M.G. testified that Reyes-Acosta “put [his arms] around [her] waist 

and his hand on [her] butt and told [her] that he wanted ... to eat [her] pussy 

and eat [her] ass and tried to kiss [her]” on her mouth, getting saliva on her 

face. N.T., 7/21/21, at 104. The jury was free to believe this testimony, 

which established that Reyes-Acosta touched M.G.’s sexual or intimate parts. 

His statement about wanting to “eat” her “pussy” and “ass” supports the 

inference that he had the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.

Likewise, the testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses was not so 

inherently unreliable as to be insufficient to support Reyes-Acosta’s guilt. 

While Reyes-Acosta attacks Heinrich’s corroborating testimony based on her 

forgetfulness, corroboration is not required. Johnson, 180 A.3d at 481; 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3106. Although Reyes-Acosta asserts that M.G. had a motive to 

lie and had not reported the prior incident until she reported the later incident, 

he indicates no fundamental inconsistencies that render the Commonwealth’s 

evidence insufficient. Therefore, Reyes-Acosta’s sufficiency challenges fail.

B. Evidence of Reyes-Acosta’s Other Acts

Reyes-Acosta’s second issue challenges the ruling in limine3 which 

allowed the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that the week before 

____________________________________________

3 The Honorable Craig T. Trebilcock ruled on this matter by opinion dated May 

27, 2021. The Honorable Amber A. Kraft, who presided at trial, followed the 

ruling based on the coordinate jurisdiction rule. Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/22, 

at 11 (citing Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995)).
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September 13, 2019, Reyes-Acosta pinned M.G. between a bush and her car 

and told her that “he wanted to eat [her] pussy and eat [her] ass.” See N.T., 

7/21/21, at 106. The trial court ruled that this evidence was admissible under 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2). Reyes-Acosta argues that the 

Commonwealth failed to establish a permitted use under Rule 404(b)(2) and 

that the trial court failed to properly weigh the probative value and potential 

for unfair prejudice of the evidence. He submits that this error was not 

harmless.

“When ruling on a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion 

in limine, we apply an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of 

review.” Commonwealth v. Hutchison, 164 A.3d 494, 500 (Pa. 

Super. 2017). “An abuse of discretion may not be found merely 

because an appellate court might have reached a different 

conclusion.” Cardinale v. R.E. Gas Dev., LLC, 154 A.3d 1275, 

1286 (Pa. Super. 2017). “Instead, an abuse of discretion occurs 

only where the trial court has reached a conclusion that overrides 

or misapplies the law, or when the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or is the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill-will.” Id. Further, to the extent we are required to 

review the trial court’s conclusions of law, “our standard of review 

is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth 

v. Wilmer, 194 A.3d 564, 567 (Pa. 2018).

Commonwealth v. Cook, 231 A.3d 913, 919 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations 

altered).

“Relevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 358 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 612 (Pa. 2008)). “Evidence is 

relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to 

make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference 
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or presumption regarding a material fact.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (Pa. 2002)); see Pa.R.E. 401. Relevant 

evidence is generally admissible, except as provided by law. Pa.R.E. 402. As 

to the admissibility of a person’s other acts, Pennsylvania’s rule provides:

Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is 

not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that 

on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 

character.

(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another 

purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. 

In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative 

value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1), (2).

Here, the Commonwealth’s May 14, 2021 motion in limine asserted that 

Reyes-Acosta’s other act was admissible to prove Reyes-Acosta’s intent, to 

rebut an anticipated defense of mistake or accident, and to show the history 

of the case. In granting the motion, the court reasoned that the evidence was 

probative of motive and intent, established Reyes-Acosta’s sexual interest in 

M.G., and was res gestae evidence. Opinion and Order, 5/27/21, at 1–3. At 

trial, the court instructed the jury that the only purpose for which it could 

consider Reyes-Acosta’s other act was as evidence of his intent or motive. 

N.T., 7/21/21, at 213. We will confine our analysis to this theory of relevance.

The court properly found the evidence to be relevant. Reyes-Acosta’s 

intent and motive were both material facts in this case. To prove indecent 
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assault, the Commonwealth had to establish that Reyes-Acosta had the 

purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101 (defining 

“indecent contact”); see Gamby, 283 A.3d at 314 n.17 (interpreting this 

definition to require proof of a touch and a purpose). And motive, while not 

an element of a crime, is always relevant in criminal cases. Commonwealth 

v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 42 (Pa. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 

442 A.2d 236, 241 (Pa. 1982)). Reyes-Acosta’s prior act made it more 

probable that he intended to arouse or gratify sexual desire with M.G. on 

September 13, 2019, based on the similar location, conduct, and language, 

the close timing, and the same targeted person. Therefore, we agree with the 

trial court that the evidence was relevant as a matter of law.

Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the 

probative value of the evidence outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice. 

“Unfair prejudice” “means a tendency to suggest a decision on an improper 

basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the 

evidence impartially.” Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 249 A.3d 257, 272 (Pa. 

Super. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (Pa. 

2007)). The court reasoned that evidence with the same general location and 

manner as the charged crimes was probative and not unduly prejudicial. 

Opinion and Order, 5/27/21, at 2–3. Reyes-Acosta attacks the brevity of the 

court’s analysis and the lack of a hearing on the motion in limine. However, 

these do not show that the court abused its discretion in its weighing process. 

Rule 404(b) does not require the trial court to hold hearing before ruling in 
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limine. And the trial court had ample opportunity to review the case as 

submitted. The decision to allow this evidence was not manifestly 

unreasonable, not the result of bias, ill-will, or prejudice, and not a 

misapplication of the law. Therefore, no relief is due on Reyes-Acosta’s second 

issue.

C. Discovery

Reyes-Acosta’s third issue involves the Commonwealth’s failure to give

a letter dated July 27, 2020 to the defense before trial.

4

 The letter was 

addressed from the workers’ compensation insurer for M.G.’s employer to a 

victim/witness coordinator in the York County District Attorney’s Office. It 

reflects that M.G. made a workers’ compensation report on September 20, 

2019, and it lists her injury as “No Physical Injury - Mental Stress.” The letter

states that the insurer determined that M.G. was within the course and scope 

of her employment at the time of the incident on September 13, 2019; 

therefore, the insurer writes that it can make a full claim for benefits. The 

insurer asks that restitution be ordered in Reyes-Acosta’s criminal case for 

$28,556.82 that the insurer had paid on M.G.’s workers’ compensation claim, 

which includes $4773.91 for “Medical” and $23,782.91 for “Indemnity.”

The Commonwealth provided the letter to the defense on October 26, 

2021, the day of sentencing. At sentencing, the Commonwealth asked for 

____________________________________________

4 The letter appears in the certified record as an attachment to the 

Commonwealth’s amended response to Reyes-Acosta’s post-sentence motion. 
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restitution of $28,556.82 to the insurer, which the court then imposed as part 

of Reyes-Acosta’s sentence. In his post-sentence motion, Reyes-Acosta

claimed the failure to provide this letter prior to trial was a Brady violation. 

On appeal, Reyes-Acosta maintains that the Commonwealth’s failure to 

provide this letter before trial violated Brady. He contends that it was 

favorable and material to the defense because it could show that M.G. had a

financial incentive to fabricate her allegations, that is, a motive to lie. ReyesAcosta also suggests that this letter would have alerted trial counsel to the 

workers’ compensation case file, which could contain other material to 

impeach M.G.

The trial court reasoned, and the Commonwealth argues, that there was 

no Brady violation because the letter was neither exculpatory nor the basis 

for impeachment. Moreover, the Commonwealth endorses the trial court’s 

determination that evidence of the workers’ compensation case was not in the 

exclusive possession of the Commonwealth.

On a question of whether an alleged Brady violation warrants a new 

trial, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. 

Commonwealth v. Bagnall, 235 A.3d 1075, 1084 (Pa. 2020) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 131 A.3d 467, 472 (Pa. 2015)).

The law governing alleged Brady violations is well-settled. 

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the 

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 

accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 

faith or bad faith of the prosecution. The Supreme Court 

subsequently held that the duty to disclose such evidence is 
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applicable even if there has been no request by the accused, and 

that the duty may encompass impeachment evidence as well as 

directly exculpatory evidence. Furthermore, the prosecution’s 

Brady obligation extends to exculpatory evidence in the files of 

police agencies of the same government bringing the prosecution.

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 853–54 (Pa. 2005) (quotations, 

brackets, and citations omitted). “There are three components of a true 

Brady violation: [t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, 

either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence 

must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and 

prejudice must have ensued.” Commonwealth v. Maldonodo, 173 A.3d 

769, 774 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 

263, 281–82 (1999)).

The first component, favorability, includes evidence that is used only for 

impeachment purposes. Lambert, 884 A.2d at 845 (citing United States v. 

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676–77 (1985)). Thus, evidence is favorable if it 

shows that a prosecution witness had a motive to lie or give helpful testimony 

for a personal benefit. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 174 A.3d 

1050, 1057 (Pa. 2017).

The second component requires the defendant to prove “that evidence 

was withheld or suppressed by the prosecution.” Commonwealth v. 

Haskins, 60 A.3d 538, 547 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 451 (Pa. 2011)). We have explained:

The withheld evidence must have been in the exclusive control of 

the prosecution at the time of trial. No Brady violation occurs 

when the defendant knew, or with reasonable diligence, could 

have discovered the evidence in question. Similarly, no violation
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occurs when the evidence was available to the defense from a 

non-governmental source.

Id. (citing Paddy). If the parties had equal access to the information that 

was withheld, there is no violation. Bagnall, 235 A.3d at 1091 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Morris, 822 A.2d 684 (Pa. 2003)). However, a defendant 

may assume that the prosecution truthfully responds to discovery requests. 

Id. at 1092 (explaining that due diligence requires a reasonable effort to 

obtain the desired information).

The third component, materiality, means “a reasonable probability that, 

had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different,” such as when “the favorable evidence could 

reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to 

undermine confidence in the verdict.” Lambert, 884 A.2d at 854 (quoting 

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280, 290). However, evidence is not material simply 

because it would allow the defense “to engage in a fishing expedition” for 

other evidence that would be helpful. Maldonodo, 173 A.3d at 781.

Our research has not revealed, nor has Reyes-Acosta identified, any 

Pennsylvania case involving the prosecution’s failure to disclose before trial a 

letter seeking restitution for a workers’ compensation claim by the victim of a 

crime. However, we located a similar case from Florida, where a defendant 

was convicted of battering a bouncer in a fight at a bar. Deren v. State, 15 

So.3d 723, 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam). The bouncer pursued 

a workers’ compensation claim after the fight. Id. The bar’s insurer sent the 

prosecution a letter indicating that the insurer had paid the bouncer 
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$20,956.47 for medical bills and $2,946.84 for lost wages. Id. The 

prosecution withheld the letter until sentencing. The court observed on appeal 

that the bouncer would not have been entitled to compensation if he intended 

“to injure or kill ... another.” Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. § 440.09(3)). Therefore, 

the court determined that the letter could have shown that the bouncer had a 

financial motive to claim that the defendant was the initial aggressor. “This 

type of financial interest is a proper subject of cross examination.” Id. The 

Florida appellate court ruled that the failure to provide the letter before trial 

violated Brady. Id. at 723–24 (applying the Strickler test). 

We find the Florida case persuasive here based on the nearly identical 

facts. In both cases, the victim of an alleged crime at work pursued a workers’ 

compensation claim and received a significant amount of money. Both 

insurers sent letters to the prosecution asking for restitution. And both 

prosecutors’ offices withheld the letters until the day of sentencing.

Like the court in Deren, we apply the same three-element test to 

determine whether the prosecution’s failure to turn over the letter before trial 

violated Brady. Maldonodo, 173 A.3d at 774 (citing Strickler).

First, the July 27, 2020 letter was favorable to Reyes-Acosta as potential 

impeachment evidence.5 The letter reflected that M.G. received over 

$20,000.00 based on her workers’ compensation claim. This is a significant 

personal benefit, which could have motivated M.G. to fabricate or exaggerate 

____________________________________________

5 We avoid fishing for other favorable material from the workers’ compensation 

file, confining our analysis to the letter itself. Maldonodo, 173 A.3d at 781. 
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her narrative if the incident did not occur as she had reported. The letter is 

therefore favorable for Brady purposes. Johnson, supra.

Second, the Commonwealth withheld the letter until after trial. The 

workers’ compensation insurer sent the letter to a representative of the York 

County District Attorney’s Office. Absent indication that the insurer also gave 

the letter to Reyes-Acosta or his counsel, it is evident that the letter was within 

the Commonwealth’s exclusive possession and that Reyes-Acosta did not have 

equal access to it. As in the Florida case, the prosecution did not disclose the 

letter until the day of sentencing, when it asked the court to order ReyesAcosta to pay restitution of $28,556.82. Therefore, the letter was withheld 

by the prosecution. Haskins, supra.

Third, the letter was material. M.G.’s credibility was central to the jury 

verdict in this case. Reyes-Acosta did not have the letter at trial and was not 

able to cross-examine M.G. about the financial benefit she received as a result 

of the incident that she alleged. There is a reasonable probability that the 

outcome of the case could have been different if Reyes-Acosta had been 

provided the letter before trial and the jury knew that M.G. had received a 

financial benefit from pursuing a workers’ compensation case from the same 

incident. Lambert, 884 A.2d at 854. In this light, depriving the defense of 

the opportunity to cross-examine M.G. about this claim and apprise the jury 

of her possible motive to fabricate her allegations undermines confidence in 

the outcome of trial. Id., see Deren, 15 So.3d at 724. Because the 
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Commonwealth violated Brady, the trial court erred in denying ReyesAcosta’s post-sentence motion for a new trial.

In conclusion, the evidence was sufficient to convict Reyes-Acosta, and 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing evidence of the prior 

incidents. However, the Commonwealth violated its discovery obligations by 

withholding relevant impeachment evidence until after trial. Because we 

reverse and remand for a new trial, we need not address Reyes-Acosta’s 

remaining claims.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Convictions reversed. Case remanded 

for new trial. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/26/2023