2024 IL App (4th) 240719-U 

NO. 4-24-0719 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re D.B, A Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois, 

Petitioner-Appellee,

v. 

Amy P., 

Respondent-Appellant). 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Lee County 

No. 23JA37 

Honorable 

Theresa M. Friel-Draper, 

Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Lannerd and Vancil concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in finding respondent unfit and determining the biological 

father was willing and able to care for the minor.

¶ 2 Respondent Amy P. appeals from the trial court’s dispositional judgment where the 

court declined to make the minor a ward of the court; found respondent unfit; found the minor’s 

father Jeremy B. fit, willing, and able to care for the minor; and closed the case. On appeal, 

respondent argues the court’s decisions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In November 2023, the State filed a four-count petition for adjudication of wardship 

of D.B. (born 2012) and his stepsisters, alleging the minors were abused (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(i), 

(v) (West 2022)) and neglected (id. § 2-3(1)(b)) in that respondent intentionally inflicted physical 

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

August 30, 2024 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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harm upon them and used excessive corporal punishment. The petition further alleged that the 

minors lived in an injurious environment where D.B. and his stepsisters were abused by respondent 

and D.B.’s stepfather was aware of the abuse and allowed it. The stepsisters, their biological 

mother, and the stepfather are not parties to this appeal. The trial court held a shelter care hearing 

and granted temporary custody of the minors to the Illinois Department of Children and Family 

Services (DCFS). The court found Jeremy B. to be D.B.’s father and scheduled an adjudicatory 

hearing on February 26, 2024.

¶ 5 Prior to the adjudicatory hearing, respondent stipulated to count two of the petition 

that alleged D.B. was abused (id. § 2-3(2)(v)). The stipulation stated that D.B.’s stepsister went to 

the school nurse complaining of an injury to her head from respondent pulling her hair “hard” 

because she was not getting ready for school fast enough. Subsequent forensic interviews with 

D.B. and his stepsisters revealed “abuse at the hands of [respondent], including hair pulling, 

covering up mouths with hands where they could not breathe, whopping [sic] with a studded belt 

in an uncontrolled manner, putting the children’s hands in burning water, and holding up against 

a wall by their neck with feet not touching the floor,” in addition to emotional and verbal abuse.

The Lee County Sheriff’s Department interviewed respondent, and she admitted to grabbing the 

children by their hair, striking them with her hands as punishment, and striking them with a belt. 

She was charged with five counts of domestic battery as the result of the county sheriff’s 

investigation. In exchange for the stipulation, the State dismissed the remaining counts in the 

petition and agreed that the stipulation could not be used against respondent in the prosecution of 

the domestic battery counts. In February 2024, the trial court accepted the stipulation and found 

that the State had proven the allegations in the petition based on the facts in the stipulation. 
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¶ 6 At a subsequent dispositional hearing, reports were filed with the court and 

caseworker Allison Holcomb testified as the only witness. Holcomb testified that respondent was

cooperative with DCFS and had been engaged in psychiatric care prior to the start of the case. 

Respondent had completed all required assessments, except for drug and alcohol, and had been 

referred to providers for the remaining services, but none had been completed at that time. 

Respondent had attended all scheduled visits with D.B., except for one that was canceled by DCFS 

and subsequently rescheduled. Respondent was generally “loving and appropriate” during 

visitation with the minor.

¶ 7 Jeremy B. was also cooperative with DCFS and completed an integrated 

assessment. No services were recommended prior to Jeremy B. being found fit, able, and willing

to care for D.B., but DCFS did recommend that he engage in services to facilitate the relationship 

with the minor. Jeremy B. and D.B. had been having telephonic visits following D.B.’s removal 

from respondent’s home. D.B. had last seen his father in June 2023, when he, along with his 

brother, spent a month during the summer in Wisconsin at his father’s home. At times, D.B. had 

been hesitant to participate in the phone calls and went “back and forth” on whether he wanted to 

live with Jeremy B. Since the father lived in Wisconsin, no one from DCFS had visited the home, 

and it was unknown whether he had engaged in the recommended services. The father was 

employed, and he reported that he had stable living arrangements and that other children lived in 

his home, including D.B.’s older brother. Jeremy B. expressed a desire for D.B. to be placed with 

him. D.B. had been moved twice to different placements since he was placed into care, and the

caseworker supported D.B. being placed with Jeremy B. 

¶ 8 During closing arguments, both the State and the guardian ad litem (GAL) 

recommended that D.B. be placed with his father and the case as to him be closed. Respondent 
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objected to D.B. being placed with Jeremy B. and requested that the trial court reserve its ruling 

on Jeremy B.’s fitness and make D.B. a ward of the court pending further investigation. 

Specifically, counsel argued there was “no evidence of [Jeremy B.’s] willingness” to care for D.B.

¶ 9 The trial court found respondent was unfit and unable to parent D.B. and also 

declined to make the minor a ward of the court. The court found Jeremy B. fit, able, and willing to 

parent the minor and placed custody and guardianship of D.B. with him, vacating the prior 

temporary custody and guardianship order. The court then closed the case. 

¶ 10 This appeal followed. 

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding that (1) she was 

unfit and (2) Jeremy B. was able and willing to care for D.B. 

¶ 13 At the dispositional hearing, the trial court determines whether it is in the best 

interest of the minor and the public to make the minor a ward of the court and whether the parents 

are unfit, unwilling, or unable to care for the minor. In re M.M., 2016 IL 119932, ¶ 18; In re A.P., 

2012 IL 113875, ¶ 21; 705 ILCS 405/2-22(1) (West 2022). The party requesting the dispositional 

finding of unfitness must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent is unable to care 

for, protect, train, or discipline the child. In re L.W., 2021 IL App (5th) 200311, ¶ 33. The best 

interest of the child is the trial court’s overriding concern in fashioning a dispositional order. In re 

M.P., 408 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 1073 (2011). A trial court’s dispositional order will not be disturbed 

on appeal unless its findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence or it abused its 

discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order. In re A.S., 2014 IL App (3d) 

130163, ¶ 21. A court’s finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite 

conclusion is clearly evident. In re Al. S., 2017 IL App (4th) 160737, ¶ 41. We afford great 
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deference to the court’s dispositional findings, as “it is in a better position to observe the witnesses, 

assess credibility, and weigh the evidence.” Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial 

court’s ruling is fanciful, unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would adopt its view.” In re 

Dal. D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 31. 

¶ 14 In this case, the trial court’s finding that respondent was unfit was not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent points to the fact that she had cooperated with DCFS, 

engaged in counseling, and completed the assessments necessary to receive referrals for services. 

While her cooperation is commendable, respondent was engaged in counseling when the actions 

that formed the basis of this case occurred. The facts contained in the record detailing, among other 

things, the abuse respondent inflicted upon the minors in this matter supports the court’s finding 

that she was not fit to care for D.B. On this record, a conclusion contrary to that of the court below 

is not clearly evident. Al. S., 2017 IL App (4th) 160737, ¶ 41. 

¶ 15 Respondent also argues that the trial court erred in finding that Jeremy B. was 

willing and able to care for the minor. To be clear, Jeremy B. is not alleged to have inflicted any 

of the abuse or neglect alleged in this case. Instead, respondent relies on the absence of evidence 

that Jeremy B. was willing and able to care for the minor, rather than evidence of record to the 

contrary. However, as mentioned above, the burden of proof that a parent is not fit, able, or willing 

to care for a minor is on the party seeking such a ruling. 

¶ 16 Here, Jeremy B. cooperated with DCFS and expressed a desire and willingness for 

D.B. to live with him and D.B.’s older brother. He participated in telephonic visitation, and the 

integrated assessment he completed did not require him to complete services in order to become 

fit. Respondent points to the recommended services and the testimony that it was unknown whether 

Jeremy B. had completed those services in arguing that the court’s ruling was premature where 
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Jeremy B. could not “render mental and emotional support,” and therefore the minor’s “mental 

health and emotional needs were put at risk of endangerment.” This argument is insufficient to 

carry respondent’s burden, as the caseworker testified that those services were not required in order 

for Jeremy B. to care for D.B. Moreover, the caseworker, the State, and the GAL recommended 

that the minor be placed with his father. 

¶ 17 Respondent further argues that at a minimum, the trial court should have reserved 

its ruling on Jeremy B.’s fitness until a more thorough investigation could occur. However, 

Jeremy B. was not the focus of the case and was presumed fit, willing, and able to care for D.B. 

absent sufficient evidence to the contrary. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979). There 

is no evidence respondent points to rebutting that presumption. Rather, her argument relies on the 

supposition that not enough of an investigation was undertaken to ensure the fitness of the 

nonoffending parent, which is insufficient. See M.M., 2016 IL 119932, ¶ 26 (“[S]o long as a parent 

[is fit], there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the 

family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the 

rearing of that parent’s children.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). While the trial court 

undoubtedly had the ability to reserve its ruling regarding Jeremy B. and continue the dispositional 

hearing (705 ILCS 405/2-22(4) (West 2022)), we are unable to find that failing to do so was an 

abuse of discretion (Al. S., 2017 IL App (4th) 160737, ¶ 41). 

¶ 18 Accordingly, the trial court’s determination that respondent was unfit was not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the court did not abuse its discretion in its selection 

of a dispositional order. 

¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 
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¶ 21 Affirmed.