IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

HEADWATER RESEARCH LLC

Plaintiff,

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD and 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, 

INC.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:23-CV-00103-RSP

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO HEADWATER RESEARCH LLC’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NO INVALIDITY BASED ON THE MOTOROLA E815

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF EXHIBITS ................................................................................................................. iv

I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1

II. THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE E815 INVALIDATES THE 

‘733 PATENT......................................................................................................................1

A. The E815 Supported Transport of Application Data. ..............................................1

B. The E815 Received an Application Identifier and Had a Plurality of 

Device Agents..........................................................................................................4

C. The E815 Discloses an “Agent Communication Bus” ............................................6

III. SAMSUNG IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM RAISING AN INVALIDITY 

DEFENSE BASED ON THE E815.....................................................................................6

IV. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................................14

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,

No. 213CV01015JRGRSP, 2017 WL 2526231 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017)..............................8

Cimline, Inc. v. Crafco, Inc.,

413 F. App’x 240, 246 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ....................................................................................3

Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp.,

No. 12-cv-2533, 2016 WL 4734389 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016) .................................................9

Fiber Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Applied Optical Sys., Inc., No. 2:06-CV-473, 2009 WL 

3571350, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2009)..................................................................................3

Gen. Access Sols., Ltd. v. Sprint Spectrum L.P.,

No. 2:20-CV-00007-RWS, 2020 WL 12572917 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2020) ..............................9

General Access Solutions, Ltd. v. Sprint Spectrum LLC,

No. 2:20-CV-00007-RWS, 2021 WL 5154085, at *4 (E.D. Tex. July 21, 

2021) ......................................................................................................................................7, 9

Intell. Ventures II LLC v. Kemper Corp.,

No. 6:16-CV-0081, 2016 WL 7634422 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2016)............................................7

King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc.,

616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010)........................................................................................7

Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB,

344 F.3d 1205, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2003)........................................................................................3

Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc.,

271 F. Supp. 3d 990 (E.D. Wis. 2017).......................................................................................9

Star Envirotech, Inc. v. Redline Detection, LLC,

No. SACV1201861JGBDFMX, 2015 WL 4744394, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 

2015) ..........................................................................................................................................7

Tolan v. Cotton,

572 U.S. 650 (2014)...................................................................................................................5

Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Schrader Int'l, Inc.,

432 F. Supp. 3d 448 (D. Del. 2020)...........................................................................................9

Wyers v. Master Lock Co.,

616 F.3d 1231, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2010)........................................................................................3

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Term

Defendants or 

Samsung Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung Electronics America, Inc.

Plaintiff or 

Headwater Headwater Research LLC 

‘733 patent U.S. Patent No. 8,406,733

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TABLE OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit Description

1

Excerpts of the Opening Expert Report of Ian Foster, Ph.D. (September 26, 

2024)

2 Excerpts of SAM-HW-2_00365211

3 Samsung’s July 1, 2024 Letter, IPR2024-00341, 1044

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I. INTRODUCTION

The record evidence raises sufficient factual disputes as to whether the Motorola E815

phone renders obvious the asserted claims of the ‘733 patent to preclude summary judgment. 

Headwater argues that Samsung cannot show the E815 discloses certain limitations of the ‘733 

patent because the feature of the MMS standard, TS-23.140, that Samsung relies on is optional. 

But Headwater ignores all evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could find that the 

E815 clearly and convincingly had the feature at issue, namely the ability to transport applicationspecific data. 

Headwater’s argument that Samsung is estopped from asserting an E815-based invalidity 

theory also lacks merit. Headwater argues that the E815 theory is merely a “Trojan horse” for the 

same TS-23.140 ground that Samsung raised in the IPR. Not so. In this litigation, Samsung relies 

on the physical components of the E815—which were not cited during IPR—above and beyond 

the disclosures of TS-23.140 to demonstrate invalidity of the ‘733 patent. The disclosures of the 

E815 that Samsung uses in this litigation are unique to the operation of the E815, not found in TS23.140, and could not have been raised for PTAB consideration. Because Samsung could not have 

used the E815 as prior art in the IPR, Samsung is not estopped from presenting it for its invalidity 

defenses in this litigation.

II. THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE E815 INVALIDATES THE 

‘733 PATENT.

A. The E815 Supported Transport of Application Data.

Headwater asserts that, because the ability to transport application-specific data was only 

an “optional” feature of the MMS standard, TS-23.140, Samsung cannot show that the E815 used 

this particular feature. According to Headwater, Samsung also cannot show, for this reason, that 

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the E815 discloses the “service control device link agent” and “a plurality of device agents” 

elements of limitation 1[b]. 

Contrary to Headwater’s assertion, ample evidence exists to support a finding that the E815 

included the relevant feature of MMS, namely the ability to transport application-specific data. 

The 3GPP member companies, which included Motorola, released TS-23.140 during the summer 

of 2005. See Dkt. 179-3 (version dated 2005-3); Ex. 2 at 223 (“[The E815] was introduced in the 

summer of 2005.”). At the time of the development of TS-23.140, there was a “demand for 

transporting data between wireless applications in mobile communications,” and MMS emerged 

as a “promising messaging system” to meet that demand. Dkt. 179-5 at 143. The prominence of 

the capability to transport application data via MMS is also evident in the fact that, although it was 

optional on the device side, it was a recommended feature on the server side. See Dkt. 179-3 at 21 

(“The MMS Relay/Server should provide additional functionalities such as ... transport of 

application data.”) (emphasis added); see also Dkt. 179-6 at 36 (describing that, in 3GPP parlance, 

“should” indicates a recommended implementation). Against this backdrop, Motorola released 

the E815 after the feature-at-issue was already a part of the MMS standard, and Motorola designed 

the E815 to include support for MMS and allowed users to “download applications” and access 

“data service.” Ex. 2 at 223 (emphasis added). There is thus sufficient evidence supporting that 

the E815, as a mobile device that operated with user-downloaded applications, utilized MMS to 

transport application data. 

Headwater does not dispute that the E815 would have needed ways to transport data to a 

specific application. As the Mostafa prior art1explains, if the E815 did not have the capability to 

1 Dr. Foster cites the Mostafa reference to provide corroborating information about the 

requirements of TS-23.140. E.g., Ex. 1, ¶¶ 148, 295.

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transport application data, it would have caused a “compatibility problem.” See Dkt. 179-5 at 148 

(“Due to the compatibility problem described above, it is a risk to deliver application data, 

requiring specific treatment, to an MMS UA that does neither know nor understand the 

requirement.”). In the record, the only way to accomplish this is by using the feature-at-issue in 

MMS, and Headwater has failed to identify any other alternative. 

Additionally, at minimum, the record supports a finding that it would have been obvious 

for the E815 to support transport of application data. “KSR and our later cases establish that the 

legal determination of obviousness may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense, 

in lieu of expert testimony.” Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 

Given that the E815 allowed downloading of applications, supported access to data, supported 

MMS, and was released after the introduction of TS-23.140, a reasonable jury could find a 

motivation to modify the E815 such that it employs MMS, and any alleged optional features, to 

transport application data. Contrary to Headwater’s assertion, whether or not Dr. Foster “allege[d] 

motivation to modify the E815 to do so” does not preclude a finding of obviousness. See Cimline, 

Inc. v. Crafco, Inc., 413 F. App’x 240, 246 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“By extension, expert reports—even 

credible experts reports—are not required when the underlying factual considerations are resolved 

by resort to common sense.”); Fiber Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Applied Optical Sys., Inc., No. 2:06-CV-473, 

2009 WL 3571350, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2009) (denying summary judgment of nonobviousness where the movant failed to establish that the complexity of the invention required 

expert testimony regarding obviousness). 

To the extent there is a question about whether or not there were alternative ways in which 

the applications in the E815 received data, the question should be resolved by the jury. See Med. 

Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 

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(reversing summary judgment of no invalidity because, when there is an ambiguity, “the issue of 

exactly what the reference teaches is something that should have been resolved by the jury”).

Accordingly, there is at least a factual dispute as to whether the E815 supported the 

transport of application data as part of its MMS capability, precluding summary judgment.

B. The E815 Received an Application Identifier and Had a Plurality of Device 

Agents.

The E815 discloses an “agent identifier”—namely, the application identifier, also referred 

to as Applic-ID—and a “plurality of device agents.” 

Contrary to Headwater’s argument, an application identifier (the claimed “agent 

identifier”) was required to be included in incoming MMS messages for devices with capability 

to transport application data via MMS. Describing the feature at issue (i.e., “7.1.18 Support for 

transporting Application Data”), TS-230.14 requires that the “application identifier of the 

destination application shall be present in an abstract message....” Dkt. 179-3 at 55 (emphasis 

added)); see also id. at 55-56 (if the recipient MMS User Agent supports transport of application 

data, “the MMS Relay/Server ... shall pass on the destination application identifier ...” (emphasis 

added)). And as Headwater admits, “shall” in 3GPP parlance indicates a required implementation. 

Dkt. 179 at 4; Dkt. 179-6 at 36. Thus, the MMS messages received by the device must include 

the application identifier (i.e., the “agent identifier”) if a device supports transport of application 

data, which was the case for the E815 as discussed in Section II.A above. 

To make its argument, Headwater takes out of context a description of “Applic-ID” that 

appears in Table 12. Table 12 of TS-23.140 indicates that “Applic-ID” is optional for an 

exemplary message called MM1_retrieve.RES. But this Table merely discloses that “Applic-ID” 

is optional insofar as support for transport of application data is optional. Table 12 does not negate 

the fact that “Applic-ID” is required for devices that support transport of application data, like the 

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E815. No contrary reading makes sense, especially when viewed in the context of the disclosure 

described above (i.e., that an application identifier, or Applic-ID, is required for devices supporting 

transport of application data). This interpretation is also consistent with the description that 

immediately precedes Table 12, which shows that—unlike the optional elements such as “ReplyApplic-ID” or “Aux-Applic-Info”—the “Applic-ID” element must be present in the message: 

Dkt. 179-3 at 71. To the extent any question remains as to whether a person of ordinary skill in 

the art would find the Applic-ID field was optional (even for a device that supports transport of 

application data), the jury should decide the question, and any ambiguity should be resolved in 

Samsung’s favor at this stage. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014) (“[A]ll justifiable 

inferences are to be drawn in his favor” (quotation omitted)). And, as discussed above, even if the 

functionality is optional, it would still be obvious in light of E815 and MMS given that Applic-ID 

was used for application data transport. Accordingly, Headwater’s motion should be denied. 

Headwater’s argument that Dr. Foster failed to show the presence of a “plurality of device 

agents” is also unavailing. Headwater argues that “Dr. Foster has not established that any 

applications were registered with the MMS User Agent on the E815 device” or “that there would 

be any valid destination application IDs in the E815.” Dkt. 179 at 6 (emphasis in original). But 

the record evidence demonstrates that the E815 allowed users to “download applications” (Ex. 2 

at 223) and, as Dr. Foster opines, downloaded applications may register with the MMS User Agent 

so that application data can be transported to the “device agents.” Dkt. 179-3 at 54. Dr. Foster also 

explained, by reference to an exemplary “chess application” discussed in TS-230.14, how the 

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MMS User Agent would use the application identifier to direct a message to a device agent. Ex. 

1, ¶ 296; Dkt. 179-3 at 55. 

Accordingly, there is sufficient record based on which a jury can find that the E815 had an 

“agent identifier” and a “plurality of device agents.” 

C. The E815 Discloses an “Agent Communication Bus”

There is sufficient evidence in the record that the E815 discloses an “agent communication 

bus.” As Dr. Foster opined, the MMS User Agent routes a message to the destination applications 

such as the chess application through an “interface,” which constitutes an “agent communication 

bus.” Ex. 1, ¶¶ 296-297. 

Headwater argues that this theory is deficient, relying on a statement in TS-23.140 that 

“Details of these applications... or how an MMS User Agent... would interface with them are 

outside the scope of this specification.’” Dkt. 179 at 7 (quoting Dkt. 179-3 at 54). But the asserted 

claims do not require these additional details that Headwater complains are missing. The claims 

simply recite that the “plurality of device agents” are “coupled to the service control device link 

agent through an agent communication bus” and do not otherwise have any limitations concerning 

the structure or operation of the “agent communication bus.” Headwater does not appear to dispute 

that an interface that couples the MMS User Agent to applications exists in TS-23.140, which is 

all that is required to meet the “agent communication bus” limitation. 

III. SAMSUNG IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM RAISING AN INVALIDITY DEFENSE 

BASED ON THE E815.

Samsung is not estopped from raising an invalidity defense based on the E815. 

“[R]egardless of any estoppel, defendants have considerable latitude in using prior art systems (for 

example, software) embodying the same patents or printed publications placed before the PTO in 

IPR proceedings. This ability to raise such prior art systems in a subsequent district court litigation 

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is always present.” Intell. Ventures II LLC v. Kemper Corp., No. 6:16-CV-0081, 2016 WL 

7634422, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2016) (quotation omitted). Headwater claims that Samsung’s 

stipulation precludes Samsung from arguing a “TS-23.140-based theory cloaked as an ‘E815’-

based theory.” Dkt. 179 at 8. But Headwater neglects to mention that Samsung made clear that 

it reserves the right to assert system art not eligible for PTAB consideration, including “Devices 

... supporting MMS technology.” Ex. 3 at 1, 4 (emphasis added). 

The E815 could not have been raised in the IPR because it is a physical device ineligible 

for PTAB consideration. Samsung explicitly relies on the physical components of the E815 that 

were not relied on during the IPR. Samsung also relies on the availability of applications on the 

E815 and users’ ability to download them on the device, which likewise are features not eligible 

for consideration in the IPR. Ex. 2 at 223. Headwater cannot reasonably dispute that the E815

could not have been raised in IPR, and thus Samsung is not estopped from presenting it in this 

litigation. 

Courts have declined to apply estoppel where the system is not cumulative of a printed 

publication. In General Access Solutions, Ltd. v. Sprint Spectrum LLC, for example, this District 

held that IPR estoppel does not apply where the system “is not described by the printed publication 

[plaintiff] equates it to from the IPR.” No. 2:20-CV-00007-RWS, 2021 WL 5154085, at *4 (E.D. 

Tex. July 21, 2021). Anticipation must be shown on an element by element basis. See King 

Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, estoppel does not 

apply when “the physical machine itself discloses features claimed in the [patent at issue] that are 

not included in the instruction manual, and it is therefore a superior and separate reference.” Star 

Envirotech, Inc. v. Redline Detection, LLC, No. SACV1201861JGBDFMX, 2015 WL 4744394, 

at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2015). Dr. Foster relies on specific hardware in the E815 that is not 

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specified in TS-23.140. Here, Dr. Foster relies on the physical device, the Motorola E815, to show 

that it is an “end-user device,.” as recited by the preamble of claim 1. Ex. 1, ¶ 283. Dr. Foster also 

opines that, for the “modem for enabling communication with a network system” element of 

limitation 1[a], the E815 was “a digital dual band phone supporting both the 800 MHz CDMA and 

1900 MHz PCS bands,” and for the device “to access the network systems such as CDMA, it had 

to be equipped with a modem, a component that modulates and demodulates signals so that data 

can be sent and received wirelessly.” Id., ¶ 285. Further, for the “memory configured to store an 

encryption key” element of limitation 1[c], Dr. Foster opined that the E815 had 40 megabytes of 

memory. Id., ¶ 302. In sum, Dr. Foster’s limitation-by-limitation analysis of the E815 

demonstrates that the E815 is not described by and is separate from TS-230.14 and could not have 

been raised in IPR.

Headwater incorrectly assumes that Samsung “relies exclusively on descriptions of the 

MMS specification, TS-23.140.” Id. As discussed above, Samsung relies on the physical device 

itself, the E815, as a separate piece of prior art that discloses additional limitations. Samsung also 

relies on the operation of the E815, namely the ability to download applications, which is 

unquestionably a disclosure unique to the E815. Ex. 2 at 223. Moreover, as demonstrated above, 

the operation of the E815, and the combination of the E815 with the MMS standard, directly 

responds to Headwater claims that certain MMS features are optional. Accordingly, Headwater’s 

argument specifically demonstrates an additional reason why Samsung is not relying exclusively 

on the MMS specification. 

Headwater’s cases are also distinguishable. In Biscotti, the Court did not address the 

applicability of estoppel in a situation where, such as here, the proposed system reference is not 

cumulative of the printed publication. See Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 

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213CV01015JRGRSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *8 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017). In General Access 

Solutions, the Court reserved judgment on estoppel and clarified that “[w]hen a party asserts a 

prior art system and relies exclusively on printed subject matter that it could have raised in IPR, it 

is not asserting a system at all.” Gen. Access Sols., Ltd. v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., No. 2:20-CV00007-RWS, 2020 WL 12572917, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2020) (emphasis added). Indeed, when 

the plaintiff later moved for summary judgment on the same issue, the Court found IPR estoppel 

does not apply because, like in the instant case, the system reference was “not described by the 

printed publication” from the IPR. Gen. Access Sols., Ltd., 2021 WL 5154085, at *4. 

Headwater’s reliance on out-of-circuit authority is likewise misplaced. In Milwaukee 

Electric and Wasica Finance, the courts found that the defendants did not actually rely on the 

system reference. See Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1032 

(E.D. Wis. 2017) (“Snap-On cannot skirt [estoppel] by purporting to rely on a device without 

actually relying on the device itself”); Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Schrader Int'l, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 

448, 454 (D. Del. 2020) (agreeing with the plaintiff that, in moving from a printed publication in 

an IPR proceeding to a physical product in litigation, the defendant “merely swaps evidentiary 

proofs”). In Clearlamp, the defendant attempted to “combine the product’s datasheet, and not the 

product itself, with the prior art used during inter partes review.” Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp., 

No. 12-cv-2533, 2016 WL 4734389, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016). By contrast, here, the 

proposed reference is the E815 device itself, with its physical components such as its modem and 

memory and capability to download applications. These evidentiary proofs are unique to the E815 

and ineligible for PTAB consideration.

Because the E815-based invalidity theory was not and could not have been raised in the 

IPR, Samsung is not estopped from asserting the E815 as a prior art reference in this litigation.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny summary judgment of no invalidity based 

on the Motorola E815. 

Dated: November 4, 2024 Respectfully submitted, 

By: /s/ Kevin Jang 

Ruffin B. Cordell

TX Bar No. 04820550

Michael J. McKeon

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Telephone: (972) 645-3097

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that counsel of record who to have consented to electronic service are being

served on November 4, 2024 with a copy of this document via the Court’s CM/ECF system.

/s/ Kevin Jang

Kevin Jang

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 208 Filed 11/04/24 Page 19 of 19 PageID #:

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