IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

HEADWATER RESEARCH LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD and 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:23-CV-00103-JRG-RSP

SAMSUNG’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 

INVALIDITY FOR LACK OF WRITTEN DESCRIPTION BASED ON 35 U.S.C. § 112

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES ................................................................................................ 1

III. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ................................................. 1

IV. LEGAL STANDARD......................................................................................................... 5

V. ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................... 6

A. Claim 1 of the ’117 patent requires “map[ping]” an “application identifier”

to a “software process.” ......................................................................................... 6

B. The ’117 patent specification lacks written description support for the 

“map[ping]” limitation............................................................................................ 7

VI. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 15

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

A. Research Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Troy,

659 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................7

Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc.,

567 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................5

Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,

598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................5

Capon v. Eshhar,

418 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................................5, 12

Flash-Control, LLC v. Intel Corp.,

No. 2020-2141, 2021 WL 2944592 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2021).............................................5, 14

Impact Engine, Inc. v. Google LLC,

No. 2022-2291, 2024 WL 3287126 (Fed. Cir. July 3, 2024).....................................................5

In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig.,

639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................8

Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc.,

230 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2000)................................................................................................12

Quake v. Lo,

928 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................5

Realtime Data, LLC v. Morgan Stanley,

554 F. App’x 923 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (unpublished).................................................................7, 8

Rivera v. Intl. Trade Comm’n,

857 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017)............................................................................................6, 14

Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc.,

665 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................12

Trans Video Elecs., Ltd. v. Sony Elecs., Inc.,

822 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2011).....................................................................................8

In re Wright,

866 F.2d 422 (Fed.Cir.1989)....................................................................................................12

Statutes

35 U.S.C. § 112....................................................................................................................1, 4, 7, 8

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EXHIBIT INDEX AND NOTES

Exhibit Description

A U.S. Patent 9,198,117

B Excerpts from Plaintiff Headwater Research LLC’s Fifth (Sixth) Supplemental 

Objections and Responses to Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories (Nos. 1-

14), dated September 24, 2024

C Excerpts from the U.S. Patent 9,198,117 File History

D Excerpts from the Expert Report of Erik de la Iglesia, dated September 26, 

2024

E Excerpts from the Opening Expert Report of Ian Foster, Ph.D., dated September 

26, 2024

F Excerpts from the Deposition of Gregory Raleigh, taken Sept. 10, 2024

G Excerpts from the July 11, 2024 Hearing Transcript

* Emphasis added unless otherwise noted. 

** Form objections are omitted from deposition transcript quotations unless otherwise noted. 

*** In this brief, “Headwater” refers to Plaintiff and its purported predecessors. 

Abbreviations/Definitions

• Headwater: Headwater Research LLC

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I. INTRODUCTION

The asserted ’117 patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 because its specification fails 

to convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that the inventor possessed the claimed 

invention, specifically with respect to the claim requirement to “map the application identifier in 

the message to a software process corresponding to the application identifier.” The fundamental 

bargain underlying the patent system is that in exchange for an exclusive right to a claimed 

invention, an inventor must describe and define that invention in the patent’s written description 

in a manner demonstrating the inventor actually possessed the invention. Here, the ’117 patent is 

a descendant in a line of applications and claims priority to applications filed six years prior to its 

filing date. And despite having no meaningful changes in its written description disclosure from 

those parent applications, the ’117 patent—in a clear case of inventor overreach attempting to 

cover later-developed products—impermissibly introduces claims with undisclosed new matter. 

Inventor overreach of this type is the very problem the written description requirement serves to 

protect against. Because no disputes of material fact exist and the specification fails to provide 

written description support, Samsung is entitled to summary judgment of invalidity. 

II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Whether the claims of the ’117 patent are invalid for lacking written description support.

III. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

1. On March 24, 2015, Headwater filed Application No. 14/667,516, which matured 

into U.S. Patent No. 9,198,117 (“the ’117 patent”). Ex. A (’117 Pat.).

2. Headwater contends the ’117 patent is entitled to claim priority to Provisional 

Application No. 61/206,354 (filed on January 28, 2009), Provisional Application No. 61/206,944

(filed on February 4, 2009), Provisional Application No. 61/207,393 (filed on February 10, 2009), 

and/or Provisional Application No. 61/207,739 (filed on February 13, 2009). Ex. B at 12.

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3. The provisional applications to which Headwater contends the ’117 patent is 

entitled to claim priority do not contain any relevant, unique written description support beyond 

what is provided in the four corners of the ’117 patent specification. See id. at 12 (“Each of the 

claims of the asserted claims of the Asserted Patents are supported by adequate written description 

in those applications.”).

4. The originally filed application for the ’117 patent contained only one claim which 

was thereafter cancelled. Ex. C at HW103-00001312. The now-issued claims were introduced 

later via amendment during prosecution. Id. at HW103-00001429-32. The originally filed abstract 

was similarly replaced later via amendment. Id. at HW103-00001313, HW103-00001428. 

5. Headwater asserts claims 1, 4, 6, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, and 18 from the ’117 patent.

Claim 1 is the only independent claim of the patent. See generally Ex. A.

6. Headwater contends “[t]he inventions claimed in the ’117 Patent are directed to 

secure communications[.]” Ex. D ¶ 52.

7. Claim 1 of the ’117 patent requires “each device messaging agent, when executing,

. . . to, for each received message, map the application identifier in the message to a software 

process corresponding to the application identifier[.]” Ex. A at claim 1.

8. The patent specification (outside of the claims and abstract) never uses the phrase 

“software process.” See generally id. The phrase “software process” was added to the claims and 

abstract via amendment to the application leading to the ’117 patent only after the original 

application was filed. Ex. C at HW103-00001429-32, HW103-00001428.

9. The patent specification (outside of the claims and abstract) never uses the word 

“map” and uses the words “mapped” or “mapping” only 5 times, each instance shown below:

• “Traffic inspection can be accomplished in several ways, including, for example, 

implementing a T-buffer at each socket connection and feeding the side traffic into 

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a traffic flow analyzer, which in combination with a mapping of application to 

socket provides much of the information listed above.” Ex. A at 53:53-58.

• “After obtaining one or more of the network apparatus settings, a mapping (e.g., an 

association) of the network apparatus settings to the appropriate device 100 (service 

processor 115) settings can be determined to advantageously support the service 

usage monitoring, service usage control, service usage billing or service usage

verification objectives being addressed.” Id. at 79:2-8.

• “For example, service usage limits contained in the billing system 123 service plan 

can be either directly mapped to usage limit settings on the device service processor 

115 (e.g., service usage stops when the limit is hit or the user is notified or the user 

is billed), or the usage limits can be mapped to a number of service profiles the user 

may select from (e.g., as discussed herein, the user can select from options 

involving various actual usage versus usage limit notification policies and/or 

service usage control, limitations or throttling policies).” Id. at 79:12-21.

• “Accordingly, the association between service profile and/or service policy that is 

implemented on the device 100 (e.g., service processor 115) and the service profile 

and/or policy usage limits recorded in network apparatus can be associated with 

one another by one or more of the following: (A) implementing a function to read 

from the network database (e.g., the billing 123 data base, AAA 121 data base, 

service controller 122 data base, etc.) and mapping the network profiles and/or 

policies to device 100 (e.g., service processor 115) profiles and/or policies; (B) 

implementing a function that simultaneously sets the device profile and/or policy 

and the network equipment profile and/or policy recorded in the appropriate data 

base records; and (C) implementing a function that reads the profile and/or policy 

on the device 100 (e.g., service processor 115) or the service controller 122 and 

then sets the network equipment profile and/or policy recorded in the appropriate 

data base records.” Id. at 80:47-63.

10. None of the above-identified passages describe specifically the “map[ping]” of an 

“application identifier” to a “software process corresponding to the application identifier.” See 

Ex. E ¶ 1136.

11. According to Dr. Raleigh, sole named inventor of the ’117 patent and Headwater 

CEO, the concept of mapping an application identifier to a software process, as used in the context 

of claim 1 of the ’117 patent, was “absolutely not” known in the field:

Q. Was the concept of mapping an application identifier in a message to a software 

process something that was known in the field before you filed this patent?

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A. That’s an important limitation in this claim.

Q. And was it known?

A. All by itself I don’t know. We don’t look at things that way.

Q. Whether you previously had looked at it that way or not do you know if it was 

known?

A. . . . In this context it was not. In the context of this entire claim to my best 

knowledge no, absolutely not.

Ex. F at 244:14-245:18 (objections omitted).

12. Samsung served an interrogatory on Headwater seeking, inter alia, “...the identity 

of each patent application to which any Asserted Patent claims priority and on an element-byelement basis, how each patent application provides §112 support for such claims of priority.” Ex. 

B at 11. Headwater did not cite any specific portion of any application or patent specification as 

constituting written description support in response to this interrogatory. id. at 12.

13. Samsung’s technical expert opined that the ’117 patent lacked written support for 

“map[ping] the application identifier in the message to a software process corresponding to the 

application identifier.” Ex. E ¶¶ 1127–39.

14. Headwater represented to the Court that it is not equating agents and applications:

THE COURT: Well Mr. Wang, are you reading ‘device agent’ to cover what is 

ordinarily understood as an application . . . ?

MR. WANG: I don’t believe we are, Your Honor. 

Ex. G at 33:12-23.

15. The Court’s claim construction order recognized that “device agents” and “apps” 

“clearly have different meanings.” Dkt. 118 at 13. 

16. Nevertheless, the ’117 patent also has no specific disclosure of mapping a “device 

agent” to a “software process.”

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IV. LEGAL STANDARD

“The ‘written description’ requirement implements the principle that a patent must describe 

the technology that is sought to be patented; the requirement serves both to satisfy the inventor’s 

obligation to disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the patent is based, and to 

demonstrate that the patentee was in possession of the invention that is claimed.” Capon v. Eshhar, 

418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). As the Federal Circuit has recently explained, “possession 

of the invention” is shown “by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations.” Impact 

Engine, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 2022-2291, 2024 WL 3287126, at *9 (Fed. Cir. July 3, 2024) 

(emphasis in original). In other words, “[t]he written description requirement is satisfied if the 

inventor conveys with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, 

he or she was in possession of the invention, and demonstrates that by disclosure in the 

specification of the patent.” Quake v. Lo, 928 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Functionally, 

“[t]he written description doctrine prohibits new matter from entering into claim amendments, 

particularly during the continuation process,” Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 

1366, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and acts as a check against the inventor overreaching, see, e.g., 

Capon, 418 F.3d at 1357 (“[T]he requirement serves both to satisfy the inventor’s obligation to 

disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the patent is based, and to demonstrate that the 

patentee was in possession of the invention that is claimed.”). 

“While the written description requirement does not require that the specification recite the 

claimed invention in any particular way, pointing to an ‘amalgam of disclosures’ from which an 

artisan could have created the claimed invention does not satisfy this requirement.” Flash-Control, 

LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 2020-2141, 2021 WL 2944592, at *3 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2021)

(unreported). In practice, the written description analysis is confined to an “objective inquiry” into 

the “four corners” of the specification. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 

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1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). While the knowledge of a POSITA “may be used to inform what is actually 

in the specification,” it may “not [] teach limitations that are not in the specification, even if those 

limitations would be rendered obvious by the disclosure in the specification.” Rivera v. Intl. Trade 

Comm’n, 857 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 

V. ARGUMENT

A. Claim 1 of the ’117 patent requires “map[ping]” an “application identifier” to 

a “software process.” 

Claim 1 of the ’117 patent, shown below, requires “map[ping] the application identifier in 

the message to a software process corresponding to the application identifier.” Ex. A at claim 1.

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Id. Claim 1 is generally directed to a “network system” for secure communications that comprises

“device messaging agents” on devices and a network message server, wherein the network 

message server receives messages from other servers (i.e., network application servers) that are 

intended for transmission to the device and thereafter transmits those messages to the device

messaging agent. Id. Each message transmitted from the message server to device contains an 

application identifier and application data. Id. After the messages are received at the device 

messaging agent, the agent must, for each received message, “map the application identifier in the 

message to a software process corresponding to the application identifier.” Id. 

B. The ’117 patent specification lacks written description support for the 

“map[ping]” limitation

The ’117 patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for lack of written description because it

claims undisclosed subject matter: the requirement that “for each received message, map the 

application identifier in the message to a software process corresponding to the application 

identifier[.]” Id. Indeed, the specification contains no trace of this “mapping” concept, which 

appears solely in claim 1.

The Federal Circuit has found claims invalid for lack of written description where a 

limitation appears only in the claims with no corresponding specification description. See 

Realtime Data, LLC v. Morgan Stanley, 554 F. App’x 923, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (unpublished) 

(“[T]he term ‘content dependent data decompression’ only appears in the claims themselves, 

which contain limited language and no descriptive content and hence fail to show that Realtime 

invented or had possession of content-based or content-dependent data decompression.”); see also 

A. Research Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Troy, 659 F.3d 1345, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding claims directed 

to a handguard assembly for a firearm only supported at a single point, the barrel nut, were invalid 

for lack of a written description because the specification only described handguards supported at 

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both the barrel nut and receiver sleeve or at only the receiver sleeve). In Realtime, the Federal 

Circuit upheld the district court’s finding of invalidity under § 112 based on the patents’ failure to 

“contain any definition” of “content dependent data decompression” and only mention of the claim 

term being in the claims themselves. Realtime, 554 F. App’x at 936–37. Here, as in Realtime, the 

specification does not disclose or describe any “map[ping] the application identifier in the message 

to a software process corresponding to the application identifier” and the only mention of such a

requirement is in claim 1. Ex. A at claim 1. Similarly, claim 1 of the ’117 patent contains “limited 

language” and offers no “descriptive content” sufficient to demonstrate that the ’117 patent 

inventor had possession of the invention as claimed. Realtime, 554 F. App’x at 937. 

Headwater may try to obfuscate the specification’s written description deficiencies by 

pointing to the ’117 patent’s passing references to the general concept of “mapping,” but a

thorough inspection of the 163-column patent specification shows those references have nothing 

to do with the claimed “map[ping]” of an “application identifier” to a “corresponding software 

process.” Ex. E ¶ 1136; In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1319 

(Fed. Cir. 2011) (upholding district court’s finding that the “specification fails to describe the step 

of ‘visually displaying customer number data’ because the only descriptions of visual display in 

the specification involve information that was not entered by customers”); see also Trans Video 

Elecs., Ltd. v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2011), subsequent 

determination, 278 F.R.D. 505 (N.D. Cal. 2011), aff'd, 475 F. App’x 334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In 

evaluating whether the written description requirement has been satisfied, a court does not simply 

look to see whether the specification contains descriptions of the individual elements of the claim. 

Rather, a court must look to see whether there is a written description for the entirety of the claimed 

invention.”).

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First, the patent discloses “a mapping of application to socket” for purposes of “[t]raffic 

inspection.” See Ex. A at 53:53-58. Headwater concedes this “mapping” disclosure is “different 

from what is in the claims.” Ex. F at 245:19-249:9 (“I’ve also told you I think this is -- it discusses 

implementing a T-buffer at each socket connection and feeding the side traffic into a traffic flow 

analyzer which in combination with a mapping of application to socket provides much of the 

information listed above. That is a different aspect than what’s in this claim.”). Indeed, this 

unrelated disclosure concerns mapping an “application,” not an “application identifier,” to a 

network “socket,” which is not a “software process corresponding to the application identifier.” 

Ex. E ¶ 1136 (“Also, the patent’s disclosure of ‘mapping of application to socket’ does not pertain 

to the ‘map[ping]’ recited in the asserted claims. . . . Such a disclosure is wholly unrelated to 

mapping an application identifier to a software process, as the claim recites.” (internal citation 

omitted)). A network socket is, instead, a connection used to facilitate network communications.

See Ex. A at 94:6-9 (“The session layer resides above the transport layer, which is shown as a 

socket assignment and session management (e.g., basic TCP setup, TLS/SSL) layer.”). Further, 

the specification explains that the type of “[t]raffic inspection” described in this excerpt, while 

involving network communications, is not for “secure communications”—i.e. Headwater’s stated 

purpose of the asserted claims—but is instead for “service usage monitoring.” Compare id. at 

53:46-58 (“In some embodiments, some or all of the service usage monitoring occurs at the 

application layer. In some embodiments, the service monitor agent 1696 implements traffic 

inspection points between the applications and the networking stack application interface, such as 

the sockets API.”) with Ex. D ¶ 52 (“The inventions claimed in the ’117 Patent are directed to 

secure communications[.]”). 

Second, the patent references another type of mapping that is unrelated to the claimed 

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mapping: “a mapping (e.g., an association) of the network apparatus settings to the appropriate 

device 100 (service processor 115) settings can be determined to advantageously support the 

service usage monitoring, service usage control, service usage billing or service usage verification 

objectives being addressed.” Ex. A at 79:2-8. This disclosed “mapping” is far afield from the 

claimed mapping of an “application identifier” to a “software process corresponding to the 

application identifier” because it is instead a mapping between network settings—not an 

application identifier—to device settings—not a software process—for purposes entirely unrelated 

to secure communications, the purported crux of the ’117 patent. See Ex. E ¶ 1136 (“This 

disclosure of mapping merely concerns relating network apparatus settings to a device, not a 

mapping of an application identifier to a software process (which is what the claims recite).”).

Third, the patent discloses that “service usage limits” may be “mapped to usage limit 

settings on the device service processor” or “to a number of service profiles.” Ex. A at 79:12-21. 

Dr. Raleigh admitted this disclosure does not support the claimed “map[ping]” limitation. Indeed, 

when asked during his 30(b)(6) deposition whether this disclosure related to claim 1’s recited 

“map[ping],” Dr. Raleigh stated “I’m not sure this [disclosure] is the best place to support this.” 

Ex. F at 249:22-250:17. Indeed, this is not mapping an application identifier to a software process

corresponding to the application identifier because (1) service usage limits are entirely unrelated 

to application identifiers; (2) neither usage limit settings nor service profiles constitute a software 

process corresponding to the application identifier; and (3) the disclosed mapping is in the context 

of limiting, billing for, and/or throttling network usage, which has nothing to do with the purported 

invention of the patent, i.e. “secure communications.” Compare Ex. A at 79:15-21 (explaining 

that mapping service usage limits to usage limit settings allows for the “service usage [to] stop[]

when the limit is hit or the user [to be] notified or the user [to be] billed” and mapping to service 

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profiles allows for “usage limit notification policies and/or service usage control, limitations or 

throttling policies”) with Ex. D ¶ 52 (“The inventions claimed in the ’117 Patent are directed to 

secure communications . . . .”). 

Fourth, the patent discloses “mapping the network profiles and/or policies to device 100 

(e.g., service processor 115) profiles and/or policies[.]” Ex. A at 80:47-63. Similarly, this 

disclosure is unrelated entirely to mapping an application identifier to a software process

corresponding to that identifier. For starters, “network profiles and/or policies” are not application 

identifiers because they are used to control network access, not identify applications. Ex. E ¶ 1136; 

see also Ex. A at 163:15-17 (explaining that “network policies can require re-authorization every 

time a end point device attempts access”). Next, “device . . . profiles and/or policies” are not 

software processes corresponding to the application identifier but instead are device-wide settings

such as “user privacy preferences/settings.” Ex. A at 76:17-21 (explaining that a user may 

“configure the device policy for user privacy preferences/settings so that, for example, sensitive 

information (e.g., geo-location data, website history) is not communicated to the network without 

the user’s approval”); see also Ex. E ¶ 1136 (“Second, ‘device . . . profiles and/or policies’ would 

not be understood by a POSITA to be a ‘software process’ let alone one ‘corresponding to [an] 

application identifier.’”). Further, the specification shows that such mapping is not for “secure 

communications” but instead “for a simplified but coordinated response to monitoring, controlling 

and billing for service usage . . . .” Compare Ex. A at 80:47-81:3 with Ex. D ¶ 52 (“The inventions 

claimed in the ’117 Patent are directed to secure communications . . . .”).

Another indication that the patent specification lacks sufficient disclosure of “mapping” an 

application identifier to a “software process” is the fact that the specification (outside of the 

amended claims and abstract) never once uses the phrase “software process” in any context, much 

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less in a way that would indicate the inventor was in possession of the claimed subject matter. See

generally Ex. A; see Capon, 418 F.3d at 1357 (“[T]he requirement serves both to satisfy the 

inventor’s obligation to disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the patent is based, and 

to demonstrate that the patentee was in possession of the invention that is claimed.”). 

Further dooming the ’117 patent is the fact both the claims and Abstract were introduced 

via amendment. Ex. C at HW103-00001429-32, HW103-00001428. Because “amended claims 

define the invention, . . . support for the invention must be found in the specification as filed, and 

[] the amended claims c[an]not be used to provide that support.” Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding 

Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also In re Wright, 866 F.2d 422, 424 (Fed.Cir.1989) 

(“When the scope of a claim has been changed by amendment in such a way as to justify an 

assertion that it is directed to a different invention than was the original claim, it is proper to inquire 

whether the newly claimed subject matter was described in the patent application when filed as the 

invention of the applicant. That is the essence of the so-called ‘description requirement’ of § 112, 

first paragraph.”). Thus, Headwater may not point to either of the claims or Abstract as offering 

written description support because neither is part of the original specification. 

While “in some instances, a patentee can rely on information that is ‘well-known in the art’

to satisfy written description,” this is not such an instance. Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic 

Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Headwater cannot credibly argue it believes the 

claimed mapping was sufficiently well-known in the art to avoid sufficient corresponding written 

description disclosure, because ’117 inventor and Headwater executive, Dr. Raleigh, a POSITA 

himself, testified the claimed mapping was “an important limitation” and “absolutely not” wellknown. Ex. F at 244:14-245:18.

Nor can Headwater salvage the ’117 patent by equating the claimed “application” to an

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“agent” (e.g., by claiming that an “application identifier” or “application ID” is the same as an 

“agent identifier” and is disclosed in the specification as being “map[ped]” to a “software 

process”). For starters, the patent does not disclose “mapping” an “agent identifier” to a software 

process and Headwater has never argued to the contrary. Second, both Headwater and this Court 

recognize that “device agents” and “apps” have different meanings. See Ex. G at 33:12-23; Dkt. 

118 at 3. This is because the specification consistently distinguishes between applications, which 

are general-purpose applications on a device, and agents, which are used for facilitating the 

communication of messages. See, e.g., Ex. A at 103:48-51 (“[T]he application interface agent 

1693 is in communication with various applications, including a TCP application 1604, an IP 

application 1605, and a voice application 1602”); see also id. at 37:59-38:8; 38:65-19; Ex. E ¶ 

1137 (“The patent’s written description deficiencies cannot be remedied by equating ‘applications’

to ‘agents.’ The patent consistently distinguishes between those two distinct concepts, describing 

agents as software dedicated to implementing ‘service control’ and ‘applications’ as merely being 

general-purpose applications.”). Figures in the specification also highlight the distinction between 

applications and agents:

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Ex. A at Fig. 16 (annotated); see also id. at Figs. 30-37. 

Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that the specification separately disclosed an

“application identifier” and “software process[es] corresponding to the application identifier” in 

addition to its unrelated disclosures of “map[ping],”—which it does not—the patent still lacks 

written description support because the specification never combines these disparate concepts. 

Indeed, “[a] patent owner cannot show written description support by picking and choosing claim 

elements from different embodiments that are never linked together in the specification.” FlashControl, 2021 WL 2944592, at *4. In upholding the district court’s determination that no 

reasonable juror could find written description, the Flash-Control court explained “[t]he written 

description requirement is not met when, as here, the specification provides at best disparate 

disclosures that an artisan might have been able to combine in order to make the claimed 

invention.” Id.; see also Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1322 (“The specification here does not teach a 

container with an integrated filter, and so, does not provide written description support for such a 

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container, even if that type of container might be rendered obvious by the specification.”). Thus, 

even if Headwater were able to point the Court to distinct disclosures of “mapping,” an 

“application identifier,” and a “software process corresponding to the application identifier,”1such 

disclosures would not satisfy the written description requirement. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

Headwater introduced the claimed concept of “map[ping]” an “application identifier” to a 

“corresponding software process” many years after the filing of the alleged priority applications—

in a transparent attempt to cover later-developed technology which it did not invent. The written 

description requirement exists, in part, to police such malfeasance. 

Samsung respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion for summary judgment of 

invalidity. 

1 Notably, Headwater failed to point Samsung to any specific disclosures constituting written 

description support in its interrogatory responses. 

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Dated: October 25, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Benjamin K. Thompson

Ruffin B. Cordell

TX Bar No. 04820550

Michael J. McKeon

DC Bar No. 459780

mckeon@fr.com

Jared Hartzman 

DC Bar No. 1034255

hartzman@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

1000 Maine Avenue, SW, Ste 1000

Washington, D.C. 20024

Telephone: (202) 783-5070

Facsimile: (202) 783-2331

Thad C. Kodish

GA Bar No. 427603

tkodish@fr.com

Benjamin K. Thompson

GA Bar No. 633211 

bthompson@fr.com

Jonathan B. Bright

GA Bar No. 256953 

jbright@fr.com

Christopher O. Green

GA Bar No. 037617

cgreen@fr.com

Noah C. Graubart

GA Bar No. 141862

graubart@fr.com

Sara C. Fish

GA Bar No. 873853

sfish@fr.com

Katherine H. Reardon

NY Bar No. 5196910

reardon@fr.com

Nicholas A. Gallo 

GA Bar No. 546590

gallo@fr.com

Vivian C. Keller (pro hac vice)

GA Bar No. 651500

keller@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

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1180 Peachtree St. NE, Fl. 21

Atlanta, GA 30309

Telephone: (404) 892-5005

Facsimile: (404) 892-5002

Leonard E. Davis

TX Bar No. 05521600

ldavis@fr.com

Andria Rae Crisler

TX Bar No. 24093792

crisler@fr.com

Thomas H. Reger II

Texas Bar No. 24032992

reger@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

1717 Main Street, Suite 5000

Dallas, TX 75201

Telephone: (214)747-5070

Facsimile: (214) 747-2091

John-Paul R. Fryckman (pro hac vice)

CA Bar No. 317591

John W. Thornburgh

CA Bar No. 154627

thornburgh@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

12860 El Camino Real, Ste. 400

San Diego, CA 92130

Telephone: (858) 678-5070

Facsimile: (858) 678-5099

Katherine D. Prescott (pro hac vice)

CA Bar No. 215496

prescott@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

500 Arguello Street

Suite 400

Redwood City, CA 94063

Telephone: (650) 839-5180

Facsimile: (650) 839-5071

Kyle J. Fleming (pro hac vice)

NY Bar No. 5855499

kfleming@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

7 Times Square, 20th Floor,

New York, NY 10036

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Telephone: (212) 765-5070

Facsimile: (212) 258-2291

Melissa R. Smith

State Bar No. 24001351

Melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com 

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP

303 South Washington Avenue

Marshall, Texas 75670

Telephone: (903) 934-8450

Facsimile: (903) 934-9257

Andrew Thompson (“Tom”) Gorham

State Bar No. 24012715

tom@gillamsmithlaw.com

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP

102 N. College, Suite 800

Tyler, Texas 75702

Telephone: (903) 934-8450

Facsimile: (903) 934-9257

Michael E. Jones 

State Bar No. 10929400 

mikejones@potterminton.com 

Shaun W. Hassett 

State Bar No. 24074372 

shaunhassett@potterminton.com 

POTTER MINTON, P.C. 

102 N. College Ave., Suite 900 

Tyler, Texas 75702 

Telephone: (903) 597-8311 

Facsimile: (903) 593-0846

Lance Lin Yang

CA. Bar No. 260705

Lanceyang@quinnemanuel.com

Kevin (Gyushik) Jang

CA Bar No. 337747

kevinjang@quinnemanuel.com

Sean S. Pak

CA Bar No. 219032

seanpak@quinnemanuel.com

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN, LLP

50 California Street, 22nd Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111

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Telephone: (415) 875-6600

Brady Huynh (admitted pro hac vice)

CA Bar No. 339441

bradyhuynh@quinnemanuel.com

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN, LLP

555 Twin Dolphin Drive, 5th Floor

Redwood Shores, CA 94065

Telephone: (650) 801-5000

Facsimile: (650) 801-5100

Jon Bentley Hyland

Texas Bar No. 24046131

jhyland@hilgersgraben.com

Grant K. Schmidt

Texas Bar No. 24084579

gschmidt@hilgersgraben.com

HILGERS GRABEN PLLC

7859 Walnut Hill Lane, Suite 335

Dallas, Texas 75230

Telephone: (972) 645-3097

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed 

electronically in compliance with Local Rule CV-5 on October 25, 2024. As of this date, all 

counsel of record had consented to electronic service and are being served with a copy of this 

document through the Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(a)(3)(A).

/s/ Benjamin K. Thompson

Benjamin K. Thompson

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