IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-60840

FRANKLIN MIGUEL MIRANDA RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner

v.

LORETTA LYNCH, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A206 374 412

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and OWEN and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Franklin Miguel Miranda Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Honduras,

petitions this court to review the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(BIA) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Miranda Rodriguez 

asserts that he suffered past persecution due to his sexual orientation, and he 

fears that he will again suffer persecution if he is returned to Honduras. He 

argues that the BIA erred in concluding that persecution as a matter of law 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 8, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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could not be committed by a family member; in denying him due process 

because, while he was detained, he did not have access to evidence that 

supported his claim of a well-founded fear of persecution based upon changed 

country conditions; and in denying his motion to remand the case to the 

immigration judge (IJ) for consideration of additional evidence that supported 

his claim of a well-founded fear of future persecution. As Miranda Rodriguez 

fails to address the denial of his CAT claim, any challenge to the denial of that 

claim has been abandoned. See Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588, 593 n.10 (5th 

Cir. 2007). 

The Attorney General (AG) previously filed an unopposed motion to 

remand Miranda Rodriguez’s petition for review to the BIA, and a motions 

panel of this court denied the motion. The AG again moves to remand the 

petition for review to the BIA. But the AG does not concede or identify error 

in her motion to remand, and as described below we find none in our review. 

We review the BIA’s denial of Miranda Rodriguez’s motion to remand the 

case to the IJ for consideration of additional evidence “under a highly 

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” See Milat v. Holder, 755 F.3d 354, 

365 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1183 (2015). Here, there was no 

abuse of discretion because the additional evidence sought to be presented to 

the IJ could have been presented earlier and/or was largely cumulative to the 

evidence already considered by the IJ. See id.

We review the decision of the BIA, as well as the decision of the IJ to the 

extent that the IJ’s decision influenced the BIA. Zhu, 493 F.3d at 593-94. We 

“must affirm the decision if there is no error of law and if reasonable, 

substantial, and probative evidence on the record, considered as a whole, 

supports the decision’s factual findings.” Moin v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 415, 418 

(5th Cir. 2003). Under this standard, Miranda Rodriguez “must show that the 

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evidence is so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude against 

it.” Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1994); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

“[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of 

treatment our society regards as offensive.” Arif v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 677, 680 

(5th Cir. 2007). Miranda Rodriguez testified that his now-deceased uncle 

sexually abused him when he was nine years old and that his brother 

mistreated him at the age of 13 because of Miranda Rodriguez’s sexual 

orientation. Those incidents—while reprehensible—fall short of the required 

extreme conduct needed to compel a conclusion of past persecution. See 

Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming BIA’s finding of 

no past persecution because “while a reasonable factfinder could have found 

. . . incidents [of bombing, violence, and kidnapping] sufficient to establish past 

persecution, we do not find a factfinder would be compelled to do so” (emphasis 

original)).

Additionally, substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that 

Miranda Rodriguez could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of 

Honduras. See Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442, 445–46 (5th Cir. 2001)

(finding that applicable statutes and regulations do not require “the 

extraordinary act of granting asylum” when the asylum applicant “can relocate 

within his country upon return”). Specifically, Miranda Rodriguez’s testimony 

established that in 1990, when he was 13 years old, he moved from his 

hometown of Tegucigalpa to San Pedro Sula, and he lived in San Pedro Sula 

as an openly gay person until 2013 without suffering anything more significant 

than verbal harassment, name-calling, and discrimination due to his sexual 

orientation. Indeed, Miranda Rodriguez described his life in San Pedro Sula 

in 2013 as “peaceful.” He ultimately left San Pedro Sula not because he was 

persecuted for his homosexuality, but because two men targeted him as a small 

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business owner and threatened to kill him if he did not pay a “war tax.” 

Although Miranda Rodriguez is correct that parts of the United States 

Department of State Honduras 2013 Human Rights Report might support a 

finding that he could not safely relocate to another area of Honduras, the report 

does not, given the other noted evidence, compel such a finding. See LopezGomez, 263 F.3d at 445–46 (affirming BIA’s determination that petitioners 

could have relocated within Guatemala because it was supported by 

substantial evidence).

PETITION DENIED; REQUEST FOR REMAND DENIED.

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