alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 206 Introduced in House (IH)]

  1st Session
                                H. R. 206

   To provide for greater access to child care services for Federal 
                               employees.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 6, 1999

  Mrs. Morella (for herself, Mr. Davis of Virginia, Ms. DeLauro, Mr. 
  Wynn, Ms. Norton, Ms. Lee, Mr. Sanders, Mr. Horn, Mr. DeFazio, Mr. 
Frost, Mr. Gilman, Mrs. Kelly, Mrs. Maloney of New York, Mr. Towns, Mr. 
    Cummings, Mr. Forbes, Mr. Moran of Virginia, and Mr. Baldacci) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                           Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To provide for greater access to child care services for Federal 
                               employees.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CHILD CARE SERVICES FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.

    (a) In General.--An Executive agency which provides or proposes to 
provide child care services for Federal employees may use appropriated 
funds (otherwise available to such agency for salaries) to provide 
child care, in a Federal or leased facility, or through contract, for 
civilian employees of such agency.
    (b) Affordability.--Amounts so provided with respect to any such 
facility or contractor shall be applied to improve the affordability of 
child care for lower income Federal employees using or seeking to use 
the child care services offered by such facility or contractor.
    (c) Regulations.--The Office of Personnel Management shall, within 
180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, issue regulations 
necessary to carry out this section.
    (d) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term ``Executive 
agency'' has the meaning given such term by section 105 of title 5, 
United States Code, but does not include the General Accounting Office.
                                 <all>
```
FOURTH ESTATE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION, petitioner, v. WALL-STREET.COM, LLC, et al.

No. 17-571.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 26, 2018.

Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as *amicus curiae* and for divided argument granted.
B/E AEROSPACE, INC., petitioner, v. C&D ZODIAC, INC.

No. 17-1252.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 1, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied.
**Exhibit 32.2**

**Certification of CFO Pursuant to**

**18 U.S.C. Section 1350,**

**As Adopted Pursuant to**

**Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

In connection with the report of Wild Oats Markets, Inc. (the"Company") on Form 10-Q for the three months period ended March 27, 2004 asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the"Report"), Edward F. Dunlap, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, herebycertifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of his knowledge, that:

|  | (1)The Report fully complies with the    requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 
(2)The information contained in the Report fairly    presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of    the Company.
 

 

 
/s/ Edward F. DunlapEdward F. DunlapChief Financial OfficerMay 6, 2004
 

This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposesof Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 hasbeen provided to Wild Oats Markets, Inc. and will be retained by Wild Oats Markets, Inc.and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. |
|--|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Theodore H. FRANK, et al., petitioners, v. Paloma GAOS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarity Situated, et al.

No. 17-961.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 6, 2018.

The parties and the Solicitor General are directed to file supplemental briefs addressing whether any named plaintiff has standing such that the federal courts have Article III jurisdiction over this dispute. The briefs, not to exceed 6,000 words, are to be filed simultaneously with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 2 p.m., Friday, November 30, 2018. Reply briefs, not to exceed 3,000 words, are to be filed simultaneously with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 2 p.m., Friday, December 21, 2018.
SECOND AMENDMENT TO
				EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

		THIS AGREEMENT made on the 12th day of February, 1999, by
and between Kentucky Electric Steel, Inc. (the "Company"), and Charles
C. Hanebuth (the "Executive").

					WITNESSETH :

	WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive executed an Employment
Agreement effective as of June 7, 1994 (the "Agreement"); and

	WHEREAS, the parties desire to amend the Agreement to change the
definition of the term "Change of Control":

	NOW, THEREFORE, the Agreement is amended as follows:

	1. Paragraph  III.B.3 is revised to read as follows:

	3.	The term "Change of Control" shall mean (i) the
consummation of (A) any consolidation or merger of the Company in which
the Company is not the continuing or surviving corporation or pursuant
to which shares of the Company's Common Stock would be converted into
cash, securities or other property, other than a merger of the Company
in which the holders of the Company's Common Stock immediately prior to
the merger have substantially the same proportionate ownership of
common stock of the surviving corporation immediately after the merger,
or (B) any sale, lease, exchange or transfer (in one transaction or a
series of related transactions) of all or substantially all the assets
of the Company, or (ii) the approval by the shareholders of the Company
of any plan or proposal for the liquidation or dissolution of the
Company, other than in connection with a bankruptcy or reorganization
proceeding of the Company under applicable federal or state bankruptcy
laws, or (iii) any "person" (as such term is used in Sections 13(d) and
14(d)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
"Exchange Act"), other than the Company or a subsidiary thereof or any
employee benefit plan sponsored by the Company or a subsidiary thereof,
becoming the beneficial owner (within the meaning of Rule 13d-3 under
the Exchange Act) of securities of the Company representing 25% or more
of the combined voting power of the Company's then outstanding
securities ordinarily (and apart from rights accruing in special
circumstances) having the right to vote in the election of directors,
as a result of a tender or exchange offer, open market purchases,
privately-negotiated purchases or otherwise, or (iv) at any time during
a period of two (2) consecutive years, individuals who at the beginning
of such period constituted the Board of Directors of the Company
ceasing for any reason to constitute at least a majority thereof,
unless the election or the nomination for election by the Company's
shareholders of each new director during such two-year period was
approved by a vote of at least two-thirds of the directors then still
in office who were directors at the beginning of such two-year period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this Amendment on this 12th
day of February, 1999.

					KENTUCKY ELECTRIC STEEL, INC.

				    By: /s/  William J. Jessie

	              	        /s/  Charles C. Hanebuth

/s/  William H. Gerak
WITNESS
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.1


                        Consent of Independent Auditors

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 Nos. 33-77302, 33-83606, 33-77304, 33-93324, 333-06847, 333-06845,
333-67771, 333-67773, 333-67777 and 333-38308) pertaining to the eBT
International, Inc. 1993 Stock Purchase Plan, 1993 Stock Incentive Plan, 401(k)
Plan, 1996 Non-employee Director Plan and 1996 Stock Incentive Plan and in the
Registration Statements (Form S-3 Nos. 333-12695 and 333-69259) of eBT
International, Inc. and in the related Prospectus of our report dated March 2,
2001, except for Note 16, as to which the date is April 23, 2001, with respect
to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of eBT International, Inc.
included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended January 31, 2001.

                                                               ERNST & YOUNG LLP

Boston, Massachusetts
April 24, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 19-0167

FILED

STATE OF MONTANA, DEC 2 2 2020

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

ALAN TODD RUFF,

Defendant and Appellant.

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of Supreme Court

Start. nt Montana

ORDER

Counsel for the Appellant Alan Todd Ruff filed a rnotion and brief asking to be

allowed to withdraw from this appeal on grounds that counsel has been unable to find any

nonfrivolous issues to raise on appeal, pursuant to § 46-8-103(2), MCA, and Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). Ruff responded to counsel's brief and

objected to counsel's motion.

The Court has now independently examined the record pursuant to § 46-8-103(2),

MCA, and Anders. We conclude a nonfrivolous issue exists as to whether the District

Court imposed an illegal sentence by imposing certain probation conditions that lack a

nexus with the underlying offense or to the offender.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that counsel's motion to be allowed to withdraw is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellant's opening brief shall be due within

thirty days of the date of this Order.

The Clerk is directed to provide copies of this Order to all counsel of record and to

the appellant personally.

Q.)

DATED this zz --day of December, 2020.

Chief Justice

12/22/2020

Case Number: DA 19-0167
(-W,,__, 

(g31 /0 211.,_ 

?"."—ib ‘Justices f

2
Turner, et al v Corrigan, et al

Order Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUFKIN DIVISION

PHILLIP TURNER AND §

JAMES WHITE §

§

VS. §

§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:23-CV-0065

CITY OF CORRIGAN, OFFICER 

ALBERT L. RICHARD, OFFICER

FITZPATRICK D. FOSTER, 

OFFICER TRACY M. BROWN AND

OFFICER JONATHAN D. 

REYNOLDS

§

§

§

§

§

§

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

On this day came on to be heard Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss of Defendants

and the Court, after reviewing said motion, as well as any response thereto, finds that said 

motion should be and hereby is GRANTED in all things. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss of 

Defendants is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Request for Trial & Jury Demand is 

DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Exhibit
      32.4


Certification
      of Chief Accounting Officer





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**


**(18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350)**








In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Century Casinos, Inc. (the “Company”) on
      Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned certifies
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:








|(1) | The
              Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
              of
              the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
              and
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




|(2) | The
              information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
              aspects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
              Company.
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------









Date:
      May
      9, 2007








/s/
      Ray Sienko


Ray
      Sienko


Chief
      Accounting Officer
Manuel Enrique CAMACHO, petitioner, v. Wendy KELLEY, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.

No. 18-6081.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 5, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 11-10923 Conference Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. CARLOS SANCHEZ-SANTILLAN, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:10-CR-338-1
Before DAVIS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Carlos SanchezSantillan has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brie f i n a c c ordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Sanchez-Santillan has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D June 19 , 20 12 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 , the cour t hasd ete rm inedt hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-10923 Document: 00511891334 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/19/2012No. 11-10923

is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See5 T H C I R
. R. 42.2.

2 Case: 11-10923 Document: 00511891334 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/19/2012
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK>     0000911147
<NAME>     Century Casinos Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>     1000
<CURRENCY>     U.S. Dollars

<S>                                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                            6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                       DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                          JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                            JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                         1
<CASH>                                        3523
<SECURITIES>                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  889
<ALLOWANCES>                                     0
<INVENTORY>                                     69
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              5099
<PP&E>                                       33525
<DEPRECIATION>                                7393
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               43514
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         3368
<BONDS>                                      16878
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0
<PREFERRED>                                      0
<COMMON>                                       144
<OTHER-SE>                                   21926
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 43514
<SALES>                                          0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             12046
<CGS>                                            0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 4778
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              5613
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             595
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               2516
<INCOME-TAX>                                  1172
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           1375
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                                  1375
<EPS-BASIC>                                  .10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .09


</TABLE>
(110 So. 768)

No. 27929.

#### STATE of Louisiana v. CARSON CARBON CO.

(Nov. 29, 1926.)

Appeal from Fourth Judicial District Court,. Parish of Morehouse; Percy Bandel, Judge.

Hudson, Potts, Bernstein & Sholars, of' Monroe, for appellant.

Percy Saint, Atty. Gen., Percy T. Ogden, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David I. Garrett, Dist. Atty.r of Monroe (E. R. Sehowalter, Asst. Atty. Gen,,, of counsel), for the State.

O’NIELL, G. J.

The defendant has appealed: from a conviction and sentence for the offense of taking more gas from a well during a period! of seven consecutive days than the maximum production allowed to be taken, in violation of the second paragraph of the fourth section of Act 252 of 1924, p. 657. The accusation, specifically, was that the defendant took 2,279,000-cubic feet of gas from the well "during the seven days, when the maximum production allowed was 1,456,000 cubic feet. It is conceded that,, as the defendant wás allowed by the proviso in the third- section of the act to take 1,000,000-cubic feet of gas a day, the conviction and sentence are illegal, and must be annulled, under authority of State v. Thrift Oil & Gas Co. (No. *59527684) ante, p. 165, 110 So. 188, on rehearing, and State v. Consumers’ Gas Co. (No. 27819) ante, p. 200, 110 So. 200.

The conviction and sentence are annulled, and it is ordered that the defendant be discharged.

LAND, J.,

'dissents, for reasons assigned in dissenting opinion in State v. Thrift Oil & Gas Company on rehearing.

BRUNOT. J., dissents.

THOMPSON, J., takes no part
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ELKE MAGDALENA LESSO,

Debtor,

FUCHS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Appellant,

v.

ELKE MAGDALENA LESSO,

Appellee.

No. 13-60077

BAP No. 12-1515

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Montali, Markell and Taylor, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 4, 2015

Pasadena, California

Before: FISHER, BYBEE and BEA, Circuit Judges.

Fuchs & Associates (Fuchs) appeals the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s

(BAP) decision affirming the bankruptcy court’s order approving the sale of two

properties owned by Elke Lesso and her former husband, Piotr Andrzejewski, free

FILED

JUN 25 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 *This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
and clear of all liens, claims and interest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 158(d). We “independently review[] the bankruptcy court’s rulings on appeal

from the BAP,” and we affirm. In re Mantle, 153 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1998).

1. The bankruptcy court properly concluded Fuchs’ claims against the

properties were subject to bona fide disputes. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(4). Fuchs’

$625,000 charging lien against Lesso for alleged unpaid attorney’s fees was

invalidated by the arbitration award, which has been confirmed by the California

Court of Appeal. Fuchs’ $375,000 judgment lien against Andrzejewski was

invalidated by the California Superior Court, which concluded Fuchs was “not a

bona fide judgment creditor and . . . not entitled to a Writ of Execution for

$375,000 against . . . Andrzejewski.”

The $375,000 judgment Fuchs seeks to enforce against Andrzejewski was

awarded to Lesso under California Family Code §§ 2030 & 2032 to ensure she had

access to legal representation to maintain or defend the dissolution proceeding. 

Because Lesso does not owe Fuchs any money, Fuchs has no claim to her

judgment against Andrzejewski. See Marquette v. State Bar of Cal., 44 Cal. 3d

253, 265 (1988). 

2. We reject Fuchs’ argument that the bankruptcy court improperly

invalidated the $375,000 judgment contrary to principles of res judicata, collateral

2
estoppel and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The bankruptcy court did not

determine the validity of the $375,000 judgment. It simply applied the superior

court’s order, which invalidated Fuchs’ judgment lien. We also reject Fuchs’

argument that Lesso is judicially estopped from disputing the judgment lien

because she previously acknowledged in the superior court that it was valid. The

evidence shows only that Lesso consented to Fuchs’ attempts, while representing

her, to obtain the $375,000 from Andrzejewski on her behalf. 

AFFIRMED. 

3
Arthur BROWN, Jr., petitioner, v. TEXAS.

No. 17-7929.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 15, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1995
<CASH>                                             233
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                          10,789
<DEPRECIATION>                                     517
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  11,826
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                         10,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                       1,680<F2>
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    11,826
<SALES>                                            972
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,023
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   859
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 250
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (56)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (56)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (56)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0<F3>
<FN>
<F1>UNCLASSIFIED BALANCE SHEET USED
<F2>EQUITY IS PARTNERS' CAPITAL
<F3>ENTITY IS A PARTNERSHIP
</FN>
        

</TABLE>