IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-0658

Filed July 16, 2014

IN THE INTEREST OF J.C.,

Minor Child,

K.C., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Constance C. Cohen, 

Associate Juvenile Judge.

A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Amanda Demichelis of Demichelis Law Firm, P.C., Chariton, for appellant 

mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant 

Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Stephanie Brown, 

Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.

Mike Bandstra, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor 

child.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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DOYLE, J.

The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her fifth 

biological child, J.C., born in December 2012. She contends the State failed to 

prove two of the three statutory grounds for termination. She also contends 

termination was not in the child’s best interests and that the exceptions found in 

Iowa Code section 232.116(3) (2013) apply in this case and should preclude 

termination of her parental rights. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 

2014). Reviewing her claims de novo, see id., we affirm.

I. Analysis.

In determining whether parental rights should be terminated under chapter 

232, the juvenile court “follows a three-step analysis.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 

703, 706 (Iowa 2010). Step one requires the court to “determine if a ground for 

termination under section 232.116(1) has been established” by the State. Id. If 

the court finds grounds for termination, the court moves to the second step of the 

analysis: deciding if the grounds for termination should result in a termination of 

parental rights under the best-interest framework set out in section 232.116(2). 

Id. at 706-07. Even if the court finds “the statutory best-interest framework 

supports termination of parental rights,” the court must proceed to the third and 

final step: considering “if any statutory exceptions set out in section 232.116(3) 

should serve to preclude termination of parental rights.” Id. at 707.

A. Grounds for Termination.

The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to the 

grounds set forth in Iowa Code section 232.116(1) paragraphs (d), (g), and (l). 

On our de novo review, we need only find termination proper under one of those 
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grounds to affirm. Id. at 707; see also In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 1995). Here, the mother only challenges the grounds found under 

paragraphs (d) and (l), thus waiving error as to the ground found under 

paragraph (g). See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W .2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996) (stating 

“our review is confined to those propositions relied upon by the appellant for 

reversal on appeal”); Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (“Failure in the brief to state, 

to argue or to cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that 

issue.”). Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental 

rights under section 232.116(1) paragraph (g).

Nevertheless, even if we were to reach the general argument the mother 

makes, we would find that the district court was correct in terminating her 

parental rights under the unchallenged ground. Section 232.116(1) paragraph 

(g) authorizes termination if a court finds: (1) the child has been adjudicated in 

need of assistance, (2) the court has terminated parental rights to another child 

who is a member of the same family, (3) “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services 

which would correct the situation,” and (4) an additional period of rehabilitation 

would not correct the situation. Our courts have long held that a parent’s past 

performance “may be indicative of the quality of the future care that parent is 

capable of providing.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012).

Here, the mother is not a stranger to involvement with the Iowa 

Department of Human Services (Department). She has four older biological 

children to whom her parental rights were terminated as a result of her continued 
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drug abuse, her eldest child in 2000,

1

the next two eldest in 2007, and most 

recently, her fourth child in 2010. In each child’s case, the mother has been 

offered substantial services to reunite her with her children. As noted by the 

juvenile court in its 2007 termination order:

The [Department] has offered a plethora of services to this 

family designed to help reduce or eliminate the adjudicatory harms 

present in the home including substance abuse evaluations, 

substance abuse treatment, urine drug screens, in-home therapy, 

foster care, visitation, relative placement, and individual therapy as 

well as the oversight of [the Department] and the court for forty-six 

months in this case and two previous [child in need of assistance 

(CINA)] cases. Despite the offer and receipt of these services 

these parents are not in a position where they can have these 

children returned to their custody, and it is unlikely given their 

lengthy substance abuse histories that they will the and a place in 

the near future to resume the care and custody of their children. 

[The mother’s second eldest child] has been removed from his 

parents three times, [the mother’s third oldest child] twice. . . . This 

case is a prime example of the devastation that methamphetamine 

inflicts on families. The court has no doubt that these parents love 

and adore their children. However, the pull of methamphetamine 

has been so great as to lead the parents to neglect their parental 

duties and responsibilities and place them in a position where they 

are unable to meet the needs of their young children.

The mother was offered similar services in the case of her fourth child, even 

progressing to closing the CINA case regarding that child. However, she walked 

away from the child immediately after that case was closed, causing the CINA 

case to be re-opened and ultimately leading to the termination of her parental 

rights to that child.

The mother again came to the attention of the Department in December 

2012, following the birth of J.C. The mother was incarcerated at that time, and a 

CINA case was initiated by the Department. After the mother was paroled in May 

 

1 The mother consented voluntarily to the termination of her parental rights to this 

child.
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2013, she moved in with her husband and the child. She was again offered 

services for reunification, but by July 2013, the mother relapsed and was again 

using methamphetamine. The child was eventually placed in the care of the 

child’s maternal grandfather.

The State filed its petition for termination of her parental rights in 

November 2013, and a hearing on the matter was held in January 2014. The 

mother admitted the child could not live in her physical care at the time of that 

hearing, or in the immediate future, due to the policy of her drug treatment 

program, but she asked for additional time for reunification because the child 

could be placed with her in a few months when a spot opened up for her at 

another treatment facility. She testified she hoped everything would be different 

this time around, and she believed there was no harm in granting her additional 

time due to the child’s placement with the grandfather. However, she admitted 

that she had been through these treatment programs before, including her 

previous CINA case with her fourth child, where she successfully completed the 

program and progressed to closure of the CINA, only to relapse and require the 

case be re-opened, with the ultimate result being termination of her parental 

rights to that child.

Although we truly hope the mother is dedicated to seeing treatment 

through this time, her latest assurance that she is now interested in treatment is 

simply too little, too late for this child. She has had services off and on for 

fourteen years, and given the result in her 2010 case, the record clearly 

evidences the mother continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to 

services that would correct the situation, and an additional period of rehabilitation
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in this case would not correct the situation. We affirm the juvenile court’s 

determination that termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper under 

Iowa Code section 232.116(1) paragraph (g).

B. Best Interests.

Furthermore, the record reveals that termination is in the child’s best 

interests. “‘It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency 

after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by 

hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable 

home for the child.’” A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 777 (citation omitted). “A child’s safety 

and the need for a permanent home are now the primary concerns when 

determining a child’s best interests.” In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Iowa 

2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially). Those best interests are to be determined 

by looking at the child’s long-range as well as immediate interests. In re C.K., 

558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997). We are to consider what the future likely 

holds for the child if the child is returned to the child’s parent, In re J.K., 495 

N.W.2d 108, 110 (Iowa 1993), and the parent’s past performance gives insight 

for the determination of a child’s long-range best interests. A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 

777.

Here, given the mother’s extensive history of substance abuse and 

relapse, along with the termination of her parental rights to her four other 

children, demonstrates this child could not be placed in the mother’s care within a

reasonable period of time. The evidence at the hearing established that the child 

is in need of permanency, and the child should not have to wait any longer. In re 

A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987). “At some point, the rights and needs of 
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the children rise above the rights and needs of the parents.” In re J.L.W., 570 

N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997), overruled on other ground by P.L., 778 

N.W.2d at 39. A child should not be forced to endlessly suffer the parentless 

limbo of foster care. See In re J.P., 499 N.W.2d 334, 339 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). 

The child is doing well in the care of her grandfather and his wife, who “have 

demonstrated that they are ready, willing, and able to meet all of [the child’s] 

needs for safety, permanency, and wellbeing,” and the child deserves stability 

and permanency. Given the mother’s history and previous involvement with the 

Department, as well as the child’s need for permanency, we agree with the 

juvenile court that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s 

best interests as set forth under the factors in section 232.116(2).

C. Potential Grounds Not to Terminate.

Finally, giving consideration to whether any exception in section 

232.116(3) applies to make termination unnecessary, we agree with the juvenile 

court that none of the exceptions weigh heavily enough to reverse the 

termination. Although it is clear the mother loves her child, our consideration 

must center on whether the child will be disadvantaged by termination, and 

whether the disadvantage overcomes the mother’s inability to provide for the 

child’s needs. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 708. We agree with the juvenile court’s 

assessment that although there is a bond and an attachment between the mother 

and child, and the permanency plans are for relative placement, the mother

has significantly strained this relationship by the choices that she 

has made. These choices have resulted in at least six different 

placements in [this child’s] young life. [The child] has spent many

months of her short life outside of her mother’s care because her 

mother was incarcerated. When [the mother] had the opportunity to 
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parent [the child] for approximately five months, she failed to meet 

[the child’s] basic needs for safety and well-being. The bond and 

attachment with pre-adoptive family members is much stronger and 

healthier than [the mother’s] bond.

We agree with the juvenile court that the child’s best interests are served by 

severing her legal tie with the mother, and we therefore decline to invoke section 

232.116(3).

II. Conclusion.

Because we agree with the juvenile court the State proved the ground for 

termination, termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best 

interests, and none of the exceptions in section 232.116(3) weigh heavily enough 

to reverse the termination under the facts of this case, we affirm the juvenile 

court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.