OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

OROVER 8ELLERI 

. AWORH~ QarmAL 

Hon. Oeorgs & Sheppard 

Comptroller or Public Accounts 

Austin, Texas 

Dear sir: Opinion Ho. O-7020 

Rot Claesifloatlon or dlrorord 

dim ror inh8ri8anoe 

pUrpO8%?.. 

Tour roque8t ror opinion on th 

haa been given Oarsrul oonaldrration b 

The recta stated are, brlsrly, 

his firat rita, rho had threr o 

tins ago, and a oompl~to partlt 

munlty property at that time 

remarriad, and deoedant in h 

quest8 to the tormer nira. 

wife alaim that she rhould 88 A r0r inherltanae tax 

oites the roil 

Ler1le v* O’Hal 

Co, v, Riohard 

State, 61 SW 

ringrellor t. 

p&inent here, reads 

adopted ohild or -ohlllineal desomdaat ~of adopted 

of the decedent, or to the htw- 

) 

or the wire of a son, the tax 

per cent or any value in excess 

Thouiand Dollar8 ($25,000), 6to.O 

me fa0tO ia tlm CWalr 0886, 130 S3(2) 379, 

were these : urn. Hattie O'Hair, the party asssrtihg the 
86 

Hun. George Ii, Shrppard - P8gr 2 

right to ba plaoad ln OLaa A , 18 tha rurvlving wit8 (not 

hat- maarrird) or Will O'Ealr who dlrd in 1919. To 

them was born a aon, who was liv LT at thr tim8 or the trial. 

Will O*Hair was the. 8011 or H. J, and Mary O*Halr, who dlrd 

in 1936 and 1937, resprotivrlg, raoh teetatr, and eaoh leaving 

a brquest to hfr8. Hattie O%ir. 

be plaord 

be an 

Thr 00~8, in dbdding 6% thi8 8Umri~& Wire 8hOuld 

ti ah88 lib 88idl 

“The trend of deolrion and logislation ha8 

to givr 8 llboral oonstruotlon of and to.llberalizr the statute in the interest or thoar havlnR some 

1bRltlmatr oharaotsr of claim to tbr donor's bounty 

and thir regardleas or whether there be a legal kin: 

8hip by blood or marriage. 

” . . . 

*In thr generality or case8 - - and Ln OhtS8ifying for taxing purpose8 onlg~tha gsnez%lity can. be 

taken Into aooount - - ths oon8iderations whloh would 

motivate a rather - or loother-ln-law t0 provld8 ior 

the daughter-in-law would be at least aa cogent after 

aa before the death of the am. So aleo would br the 

conrideratiorQ3 motlvatlng lsglslatlvs olaselfloation 

in thL8 regard. The88 oonrldrration8.z are 10 obvious 

as aot to reqtilre rtatemsnt or elaboration. 

We think therefore ths~leglslativa intent to 

meka no di8tinOtiOIl between the wifa Of a living 

husband and bbs 8WViVill@ wife of a deceased husband 

oan ba drawn from tha artlolr without doing violence 

to it8 langu+sr.w 

"m8 8wXtS itmu US08 tho eXpmsSiOn Wir8 

i.n the 88m 0r widow or 8univing tire 0r th0 

dOOea8eb. And thi8 i8 JlOt an MOOPIBY)~ U%S Of WirO, 

rxorpt when, eontaxtually or otherwise, it is olear 

that it W68 intended to be used ln Ita atriot lexloal meaning. ” (Emphaslr addrd) 

It cannot ba questioned that the court errived at 

a most dsslrab1.a result, a reeult which had due regard for 

the rqultabla oonsideratlons of the cam. 
Y¶on, Oearge H. Sheppard - Page ) 

We 40 not is81 that ths oar4 or Awrioan Generel 

Xnruranoe aompeny v. Riohardron i8 in point. That war a 

workntsn~r oompen8atIon ease, and the question was whether 

the 8UrriViZlg -Rio Or the deoeased rather Or 8 deocra8.d 

employee, who war not the mother of the employee, and who, 

after the death Of the 8mploy88'8 rathar remarried, but 

Wall later divorced, wa8 the stepmother Of the employee within the meanlog of Seo. 6a or Art, 8306, as amended in 1923. 

l&e 1923 amendment to Art, 6306 pormltted the lnoluslon as 

benerloiarles thereunder "parent8 an4 8&epmOther, without 

regard to the question of dspon4enoy.” In the race or 8uoh 

speolrlc provfalon, the Oourt said: 

n Xe believe it was the legislative 

intent to ilici the 8tepmother in the sam category 

in every respeot as the mother In so rar as ooncerns 

the benefits of the Actr and that for this purpeaa 

the relation was no more sorer,84 by death or the 

rather in the one case than in the other. , . * 

Nor do we feel that StrlngfellOw v, State can arteot the question now before ~8, That was a murder oase 

wherein one or the ground8 0r the motion ror new trial 

ohallenged the oompCtenoy of one Hanks, a juror. Hank8 

an4 the 4404a8ad had married rirat 4OU8iJl8l the wire 0r 

deoeased ha4 die4 somr year8 prior to the trial, leaving 

tW0 SOlI a8 i8SUS. or th arrinal relatIonship, the Court 

8ald t 

*Exoept ior the iesue resultant or the 

marriage betwren deoeased an4 his wife, the death 

or aaid wire Would have tetinated the rslatlonship. Under the authoritier, it seeme that by 

rea8on of the lseuo the relationship Is extended 

beyond the death of the rpouee. Undsr the-saw, as 

it 18 underrtood in ttii8 8t4t4, m&8 and 4eceaae6, 

by ma8on 0r their wires being riret iou8lna. war0 

relate4 by arrlnltg. , , , The oontentlon by the 

stat. that the relationbhlp ceased on the death of 

the wife oi the decaarsd wocld be well taken in 

the l baenoe or issue ot the marriagei but as applied to this oase the Ineistmsnt is incorrect, 

beoaase or thr birth end 8LlrT1Ving or the children 
88 

Hon. Georgs B. Sheppard - Pace 4 

or the marriage. The proporltion that the relatlonehlp exist8 by reason Or the 188~s is 8upported by the weight of authority. * 

It oan be 8een reedlly that thr rule8 or arrinlty 

and Interest, leading to prejudioe or pOesIb prejudloe of 

a .Juror In a murder oa8e can heve but little bearing upcn 

the oonetruotlon of a taxi= statute, 4speOielly when the 

$aXing Etatut 18 as 8pbOtriO a8 18 ths one before 08. 

La8 ue ooneider the erfect of the divorce upon the 

relation or the deoedent and his first wife in the ease 

before us. It is said In 15 Tex. Jur. 560, sea. 93: 

*In Tsxas, a decree of dlvoroe la absolute 

from the date of its entry unless set aside or appealed rrom. It has the leRa1 8fraCt Of ooncluslvely eatabllehlng the rtatus of the partier, ae 8ingle 

i!!i%%’ 

operating, It has been 8-d 1 dt - 

the nurriaR8 r616tiOu.” (%~piaeir~i~d~~) s 

In Stuart v. Cole, 92 SX 1040, the oourt said that 

a deorae of divoroe “terminates the marriage relation.n 

Regarding the relative status of the father an4 

mother toward their ohll4ren after divorce, end the effect 

or 4Ivoroe upon the 8tatur of the wife, the Court in Gully 

v. Gully, 184 SW 555, 559, said: 

When a divorce takes place he (the father) 

la rtrlpped or this mpsrlor authority, the Wife Is 

ezmnoipate4 from her rubordination, and 

with .ell the rlRhtts or a rem8 s0le.~(2 

I.n Shook v. Shook, ‘145 SW 682, which was a disput8 between divorced parent& over rerponribility for rup- 

;;b;,0r ohll4ren, and the 8i3tU8 Of the parents, the Court 

“Arter thr rendition of the judgment for 

divorce, J. 0. Shook’8 8tatue wae tbat or an unmrrled man, the relation with his wife having been 

severed, and she then oonstituted no part of h$s 

iably. * 
89 

Hon. George H, Sheppard - Page 5 

The exlstenos of issue, vel non, has no bearlng 

whatever upon the finality of a deorre of dlvoroe. The 

dlvoroed wire thereattar is a rem4 sole, ir no part 0r 

the family oi the husband, ha8 no obligation to him, nor 

hss he any obligation to her. Both are 8Ingle person8 ior 

all purposes. The question8 0r 188ue, or llabillty ror 

support of tha 155~3, have no bearing on the case berom 

U8. 

Under these authorities, the divorced wife ia 

not a pareon “having come legitimate character of claim 

to the donor’s bounty”, and consequently there Is no 

occaslcn for a liberal construction of Article 7118, assuialng arguendo that there is room for construotlon Or 

the nzanlng 0r “wife” to attempt to’inclu5e the for:ner 

wife within the class~flcation thereln provided for. 

A divorced wife cannot be Inoludsd within the designation 

“wire** without doing violence to the language of the 

statute and to the legislative intent. It is the opinion 

of this department, therefom , that the divorced wife 

properly should be claslified as such ‘other personn 

referred to In Article 7l22, and that she is subject to 

the provisions thereor. 

Yours very truly, 

ATTORNZY CZNXRAL OF TEXAS 

By d&f& 

Arthur L. Moller 

Assistant