IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

HEADWATER RESEARCH LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD and 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:23-CV-00103-JRG-RSP

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

SAMSUNG’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OF NO POST-SUIT WILLFULNESS (DKT. NO. 172)

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 1 of 16 PageID #:

18969
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. STATEMENTS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACT (“UMF”).................................. 1

A. Samsung’s Uncontroverted UMFs Are Deemed Admitted .................................... 1

B. Samsung Responses to Headwater’s UMFs ........................................................... 2

II. ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................... 3

A. “Pre-Suit Conduct” is an Improper Reassertion of Pre-Suit Willfulness, 

which Headwater Dropped ..................................................................................... 3

B. “Post-Suit Conduct” Fails as a Matter of Law........................................................ 5

C. “Post-Suit Litigation Conduct” Is Attorney Argument Barred by this 

Court’s Standing MILs ........................................................................................... 8

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 2 of 16 PageID #:

18970
iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prod. Inc.

(876 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017))...............................................................................................5

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.

(543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).................................................................................................5

Cirba Inc. v. VMware, Inc.,

No. CV 19-742-GBW, 2023 WL 3151852 (D. Del. Apr. 18, 2023) .........................................5

Firtiva Corp. v. Funimation Global Grp., LLC,

No. 2:21-cv-111-JRG-RSP, ECF No. 163 (E.D. Tex. June 1, 2022) ........................................7

Mojo Mobility, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,

No. 2:22-CV-00398-JRG-RSP, 2024 WL 3355122 (E.D. Tex. June 4, 2024)..........................7

Provisur Techs., Inc. v. Weber, Inc.,

119 F.4th 948 (Fed. Cir. 2024) ..................................................................................................7

SB IP Holdings LLC v. Vivint, Inc.,

No. 4:20-cv-00886, 2023 WL 6799020 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2023)...........................................4

Other Authorities

L.R. CV-56(c)..............................................................................................................................1, 2

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 3 of 16 PageID #:

18971
1

Headwater’s response brief (Dkt. 213, “Response”) confirms that Samsung is entitled to 

summary judgment of no pre-suit willfulness. First, Headwater does not credibly dispute that it 

failed to raise or disclose post-suit willfulness issues during discovery. Instead, Headwater tries 

to improperly re-cast its pre-suit willfulness arguments―now dropped―to save its new post-suit 

willfulness allegations. It cannot do so. Second, Headwater’s reliance on Samsung’s alleged lack 

of remedial actions (i.e., failure to change its products or take a license) fails as a matter of law. 

Third, Headwater’s claim that Samsung’s “unreasonable” positions in this case can be 

circumstantial evidence of post-suit willfulness likewise fails, as such “evidence” is barred by this

Court’s standing MILs and thus unavailable at trial.

Ultimately, Headwater’s only basis for its post-suit willfulness claim is that Samsung 

decided to defend this lawsuit. This “evidence” alone cannot create a genuine dispute of material 

fact as to post-suit conduct. Summary judgment is proper. 

I. STATEMENTS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACT (“UMF”)

A. Samsung’s Uncontroverted UMFs Are Deemed Admitted 

Headwater does not properly respond to Samsung’s UMFs, and thusthey should be deemed

admitted. L.R. CV-56(c) states:

In resolving the motion for summary judgment, the court will assume that the facts 

as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the moving party are admitted 

to exist without controversy, except to the extent that such facts are controverted in 

the responsive brief filed in opposition to the motion, as supported by proper 

summary judgment evidence. The court will not scour the record in an attempt to 

unearth an undesignated genuine issue of material fact.

Samsung’s UMFs set forth nineteen numbered paragraphs across five sections. Dkt. 172 (“MSJ”), 

§III. Headwater’s Response does not controvert these UMFs, with proper summary judgment 

evidence or otherwise. The entirety of Headwater’s UMF “contravention” follows (Dkt. 213 § II):

Samsung’s “statement of undisputed [material] facts” (Mot. at 19) is full of 

unsupported attorney characterizations. Headwater doesn’t dispute the contents of 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 4 of 16 PageID #:

18972
2

its discovery responses, and the responses speak for themselves. Beyond that, 

Headwater disputes Samsung’s characterizations and inferences based on the 

responses (such as what they are allegedly “directed to”). Headwater also disputes 

Samsung’s characterizations of Headwater’s litigation positions. This includes 

Samsung’s argumentative headings, which are not enumerated as facts—because 

they are not.

For example, Samsung’s narrative about Headwater’s decision to drop pre-suit 

willfulness is unsupported and misleading. Leading up to the deadline to file 

dispositive motions, the parties discussed narrowing disputes and proposed a 

stipulation. As part of that discussion, Headwater voluntarily dropped pre-suit 

willfulness “to narrow issues and streamline the case for trial.” Dkt. 172-9 at 1. 

Headwater didn’t make any admissions about the evidence, nor suggest that its 

willfulness claim “lacked merit.” Nor did Samsung raise the issue of post-suit 

willful infringement until 10:44 pm the night before the motions deadline. Id.

Headwater’s generic statements that it generally “disputes” Samsung’s “narratives” fail to 

comply with the local rules. Headwater’s “contravention” and citations to evidence must be 

specific precisely to avoid Samsung or the Court needing to “scour the record” to determine 

whether the evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact. L.R. CV-56(c). As it stands, Samsung 

is unsure precisely which UMFs Headwater admits or denies and why/on what it relies for any 

denial. Per L.R. CV-56(c), Samsung’s UMFs should be deemed admitted. 

B. Samsung Responses to Headwater’s UMFs

HW UMF 1. Admitted. As Samsung said in its MSJ, the first willfulness factor―postsuit notice―is not at issue, as it is undisputed that: (1) Samsung did not have pre-suit notice of any 

Asserted Patent (i.e., no actual or constructive notice before the lawsuit), but (2) received notice 

via Headwater’s served Complaint. MSJ at Samsung UMFs 8-10; id. at 1, 6. Only the second 

willfulness factor―Samsung’s post-suit conduct (i.e., specific intent to infringe the Asserted 

Patents after Headwater’s March 2023 Complaint)―is at issue in Samsung’s MSJ. MSJ at 1, 6.

HW UMF 2. Admitted.

HW UMF 3. Headwater did not serve four supplemental responses to Samsung’s 

Interrogatory No. 11. See MSJ (Dkt. 172) at 2; id. at n.2; Ex. 1 (Dkt. 172-1). As to Headwater’s 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 5 of 16 PageID #:

18973
3

second (and final) supplemental response to Samsung Interrogatory No. 11 (served September 24, 

2024), admitted. 

HW UMF 4. Denied. Samsung fully and properly responded to Headwater’s 

Interrogatory No. 2. See Dkt. 174-6 at 23-24.

HW UMF 5. Samsung did not admit that it “has not made any changes to the Accused 

Products since the complaint in this case,” as Headwater claims. Resp. (Dkt. 213) at 3; see Dkt. 

210-9 at 11-12. Admitted that Samsung stated, in response to Headwater’ RFA 8, that Samsung’s 

“products are designed in a manner that does not infringe any claim of any valid Asserted Patent. 

To the extent this Request seeks an admission that Samsung has not changed the Accused Products 

due to any belief or concern that Samsung’s products might infringe the Asserted Patents, 

admitted, at least because the Accused Products do not infringe.” Dkt. 210-9 at 12.

HW UMF 6. Admitted that Samsung has not changed the Accused Products due to any 

belief or concern that Samsung’s products might infringe the Asserted Patents, at least because the 

Accused Products do not infringe. Id. Admitted that Samsung has not taken a license to the 

Asserted Patents. Following notice of the Asserted Patents (after Headwater served this Complaint

in 2023), Samsung has properly and reasonably defended itself against Headwater’s allegations in 

this case, including by asserting and developing its defenses that Samsung does not infringe any 

Asserted Patents and that the Asserted Patents are invalid. 

II. ARGUMENT

Headwater claims “three categories of affirmative evidence—(1) Samsung’s pre-suit 

conduct, (2) Samsung’s post-suit conduct, and (3) Samsung’s litigation conduct—support a factual 

finding of deliberate or intentional infringement.” Resp. (Dkt. 213) at 8. All fail. 

A. “Pre-Suit Conduct” is an Improper Reassertion of Pre-Suit Willfulness, which 

Headwater Dropped 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 6 of 16 PageID #:

18974
4

Headwater tries to use its pre-suit willfulness allegations―now dropped―to support its 

new post-suit willfulness claims. It cannot do so. Cf. SB IP Holdings LLC v. Vivint, Inc., No. 

4:20-cv-00886, 2023 WL 6799020, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2023) (“[Plaintiff] may not introduce 

evidence of [defendant’s] pre-suit conduct as evidence of its post-filing willful infringement, as 

pre-suit willful infringement is not before the Court.”).

Headwater maintained pre-suit willfulness throughout this case based on incorrect claims:

• Headwater claimed the ItsOn Technology practiced the Asserted Patents, which 

Headwater later admitted was wrong. Samsung UMFs 7, 8, 14.

• Headwater claimed the Asserted Patents were on the ItsOn marking website, which 

Headwater later admitted was wrong. Samsung UMFs 7, 9, 14.

• Headwater claimed Samsung had pre-suit knowledge of the Asserted Patents, which

Headwater later admitted was wrong. Samsung UMFs 3, 4, 7, 10, 14.

As detailed in the MSJ, Headwater’s entire willfulness case during this litigation has been 

pre-suit (Samsung UMFs 11-15), which Headwater then dropped the night before MSJs were due. 

Samsung UMF 18. Headwater’s Interrogatory 11 response (disclosing bases for its willfulness 

claims) never mentions or discloses bases for post-suit willfulness. Samsung UMFs 5-7, 16-17. 

Headwater―faced with the reality that it (1) had to drop pre-suit willfulness because it 

lacked support; but (2) had failed to disclose or pursue any alleged bases for post-suit 

willfulness―now claims that it should be able to swap its pre-suit narrative to support a post-suit 

argument. It cannot. Specifically, Headwater claims that Samsung’s “history” with ItsOn in 2013-

2016, including Dr. Raleigh allegedly directing Samsung to ItsOn’s patent marking website in 

2016―which did not list the Asserted Patents because ItsOn did not practice them1―can be used 

to infer Samsung did not reasonably investigate the Asserted Patents and thus had the intent to 

1 MSJ (Dkt. 172) at Samsung UMFs 8-10, 14.

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 7 of 16 PageID #:

18975
5

infringe after receiving notice of the Asserted Patents in 2023 (when Headwater served the 

Complaint). This argument belies common sense. No reasonable jury could infer that Samsung 

had some duty to investigate Headwater’s entire patent portfolio over the last decade, let alone 

that this alleged pre-suit activity shows deliberate and intentional post-suit infringement. Cf. Cirba 

Inc. v. VMware, Inc., No. CV 19-742-GBW, 2023 WL 3151852, at *3 (D. Del. Apr. 18, 2023) 

(evidence that is “insufficient to support pre-suit willfulness can[not] now support a cause of action 

for post-suit willfulness”).

Headwater offers no factual or legal support that it can recast its case as proposed.

2

 Rather, 

Headwater’s about-face should be seen for what it is: a transparent attempt to save its failure to 

disclose or pursue any alleged post-suit willfulness bases. Headwater should not be allowed to do 

so. If Headwater wanted to pursue pre-suit willfulness, it could have. It did not. 

B. “Post-Suit Conduct” Fails as a Matter of Law3

Headwater’s misplaced reliance on Arigna supports Samsung’s MSJ. Headwater says “[a] 

fact finder could consider Samsung’s failure to design around the Asserted Patents, or failure to 

take other remedial steps, and find that Samsung has sufficient intent to infringe.” Resp. (Dkt. 

213) at 6.4 Headwater relies on Arigna, arguing: “Samsung, like the defendant in Arigna, took no 

remedial actions after being served with the complaint” because “Samsung could have taken a 

2 Neither Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc. (543 F.3d 683, 700 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) nor Arctic 

Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prod. Inc. (876 F.3d 1350, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017)) so hold.

Broadcom did not, as Headwater says, “uphold[] [a] willfulness finding when, among other things, 

the defendant ‘failed to investigate.’” Resp. (Dkt. 213) at 6. Broadcom dealt with inducement; 

the willfulness verdict had already been thrown out by the district court due to a pre-Seagate jury 

instruction. 543 F.3d at 687, 697. And in Artic Cat “the district court found substantial evidence 

demonstrated that [defendant] knew about the patents before they issued.” 876 F.3d at 1371.

3 Headwater did not disclose these, or any alleged bases for post-suit willfulness in response 

to Interrogatory No. 11. See Ex. 1 (Dkt. 172-1); MSJ (Dkt. 172) at Samsung UMFs 5-17.

4 Headwater also generically cites to Broadcom (543 F.3d at 700). Resp. (Dkt. 213) at 6. But

Broadcom is an inducement opinion, as the willfulness verdict had already been thrown out by the 

district court due to a pre-Seagate jury instruction. 543 F.3d at 687, 697.

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 8 of 16 PageID #:

18976
6

license or changed its products,” but did not. Id. at 7. But, unlike this case, Arigna was not solely 

a post-suit willfulness case. As the plaintiff repeatedly stated in the opposition MSJ briefing, its 

willfulness case was based on admitted pre-suit knowledge in addition to post-suit conduct:

• “[B]ecause [defendant] admittedly had pre-suit knowledge of its infringement, the 

MSJ’s attempt to neatly divide and conquer Arigna’s claims into ‘pre-suit’ and ‘postsuit’ is not well-taken.” Arigna Opp. (Dkt. 206) at 4 (No. 2:22-cv-126-JRG-RSP (E.D. 

Tex. Aug. 31, 2022) (emphasis added)).

• “Particularly inapposite is [defendant’s] reliance on cases in which there was no presuit knowledge such that knowledge was first obtained through the filing of the 

complaint.” Id. 

• [Defendant] admittedly had pre-suit knowledge of its infringement of the [asserted 

patent], so cases concerning only post-suit knowledge are inapposite.” Sur-Reply (Dkt. 

256) at 2 (No. 2:22-cv-126-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2022) (emphasis added)).

• “[T]his is not a post-suit case.” Id. at 2, 3 (emphasis added).

Here, as explained above and in Samsung’s MSJ (including thorough UMF which Headwater did 

not contravene and thus are deemed admitted), it is undisputed that Samsung did not have presuit knowledge of the Asserted Patents. MSJ (Dkt. 172) at Samsung UMFs 8-10, 14. 

In the admitted absence of pre-suit knowledge, the only “evidence” Headwater offers from 

which a jury could allegedly infer deliberate or intentional post suit conduct is Samsung’s defense 

of this lawsuit. Resp. at 6-8 (arguing that after the Complaint, Samsung should have taken a license 

or changed it products, but instead continued to offer the accused products).5 As this Court has 

repeatedly held, no reasonable juror could conclude this limited post-suit conduct constitutes 

5 Headwater also improperly attempts to incorporate by reference “[t]he evidence, documents, 

and expert testimony discussed in Headwater’s opposition [to] induced infringement,” citing 

Section V.C. of its argument in Opposition to Samsung’s Motion for Partial Motion for Summary 

Judgment of Noninfringement for the ’117 and ’192 Patents. Resp. (Dkt. 213) at 8. Inducement 

and willful infringement are separate claims, necessitating separate MSJs. Any alleged “evidence, 

documents, and exert testimony” Headwater believes support its opposition to this MSJ on postsuit willfulness should be properly included in the UMFs, per the Court’s rules and FRCP. 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 9 of 16 PageID #:

18977
7

willful infringement. Firtiva Corp. v. Funimation Global Grp., LLC, No. 2:21-cv-111-JRG-RSP, 

ECF No. 163 at 3 (E.D. Tex. June 1, 2022) (“[Plaintiff] fails to provide evidence of any deliberate 

or intentional action and simply argues that jury could infer willfulness based on [defendant] 

continuing to offer the accused product . . . [N]o genuine dispute exists because no reasonable 

juror could find willfulness based on [plaintiff’s] evidence.”). See also Mojo Mobility, Inc. v. 

Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:22-CV-00398-JRG-RSP, 2024 WL 3355122, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 4, 

2024) (“[A] lack of remedial actions alone is insufficient to demonstrate post-suit willfulness”) 

(citing Arigna, 2022 WL 17978913, at *2; Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., 989 F.3d 964, 

988 (Fed. Cir. 2021); and Firtiva, 2:21-cv-111-JRG-RSP, Dkt. No. 163, at *2–3).

On this point―whether “evidence” is legally sufficient to infer deliberate or intentional 

conduct―Provisur speaks volumes. Provisur Techs., Inc. v. Weber, Inc., 119 F.4th 948 (Fed. Cir. 

2024). As laid out in the MSJ, there are two elements to willfulness: (1) knowledge of the asserted 

patents, and (2) intentional/deliberate infringement after this knowledge. E.g., Firtiva, 2:21-cv00111-JRG-RSP, Dkt. No. 163 at 3 (“Knowledge of the asserted patent and evidence of 

infringement is necessary, but not sufficient, for a finding of willfulness. Rather, willfulness 

requires deliberate or intentional infringement.”) (quotations omitted). Here, as in Provisur, 

knowledge of the Asserted Patents is not disputed. Provisur, 119 F.4th at 956 (“There is no dispute 

[defendant] knew of the asserted patents.”). Here, as in Provisur, the issue is what “evidence as a 

matter of law is [] enough to establish deliberate or intentional infringement.” Id. In Provisur, the 

Federal Circuit granted JMOL on this very point where defendant used a patent matrix to track the 

asserted patents and rate them for evaluation. Id. Here, Headwater offers only Samsung’s defense 

of this lawsuit as evidence of intentional/deliberate infringement. Read properly, Provisur

confirms, as this Court has held previously, that such evidence is legally insufficient. 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 10 of 16 PageID

#: 18978
8

C. “Post-Suit Litigation Conduct” Is Attorney Argument Barred by this Court’s 

Standing MILs6

Headwater’s claim that “Samsung’s post-suit litigation conduct—and repeated assertions 

of unsupported defenses—also support a finding of willfulness” (Resp. at 8) is without merit.

Headwater points to three allegedly unreasonable defensive positions advanced by 

Samsung as circumstantial evidence of post-suit conduct “worse than the defendant in Arigna:”

1. “During claim construction Samsung initially asserted” that certain terms were 

indefinite before ultimately dropping them; the “remaining five indefiniteness 

assertions were rejected;” after which Samsung “filed meritless objections that 

were promptly overruled by the District Judge.” Resp. (Dkt. 213) at 8. 

2. “Samsung’s standing defense lacks merit.” Id.

3. “Samsung refused to withdraw its ‘inequitable conduct / infectious 

unenforceability’” defense. Id.

be presented to the jury per the Court’s Standing MILs:

7

 

Court MIL No. 1: The parties shall be precluded from introducing evidence, 

testimony, or argument regarding pretrial proceedings or issues including but not 

limited to discovery disputes, dispositive motion practice, or dropped claims or 

defenses.

Court MIL No. 5: The parties shall be precluded from introducing evidence, 

testimony, or argument before the jury that relates only to equitable issues or 

defenses (i.e., evidence that does not also serve another evidentiary purpose 

relevant to jury issues). 

And if these three issues cannot be presented to the jury, then they cannot serve as the basis for 

any possible willfulness verdict.

6 Headwater did not disclose these alleged bases for post-suit willfulness in its response to 

Interrogatory No. 11. See Ex. 1 (Dkt. 172-1); MSJ (Dkt. 172) at Samsung UMFs 5-17.

7 Standing Order on Motions In Limine on Cases Involving Allegations of Patent Infringement 

and/or Breach of FRAND Obligations, as well as Declaratory Judgment Actions which Relate to 

the Same (entered August 11, 2023).

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 11 of 16 PageID

#: 18979
9

Dated: November 12, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/Thad C. Kodish

Ruffin B. Cordell

TX Bar No. 04820550

Michael J. McKeon

DC Bar No. 459780

mckeon@fr.com

Jared Hartzman 

DC Bar No. 1034255

hartzman@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

1000 Maine Avenue, SW, Ste 1000

Washington, D.C. 20024

Telephone: (202) 783-5070

Facsimile: (202) 783-2331

Thad C. Kodish

GA Bar No. 427603

tkodish@fr.com

Benjamin K. Thompson

GA Bar No. 633211 

bthompson@fr.com

Jonathan B. Bright

GA Bar No. 256953 

jbright@fr.com

Christopher O. Green

GA Bar No. 037617

cgreen@fr.com

Noah C. Graubart

GA Bar No. 141862

graubart@fr.com

Sara C. Fish

GA Bar No. 873853

sfish@fr.com

Katherine H. Reardon

NY Bar No. 5196910

reardon@fr.com

Nicholas A. Gallo 

GA Bar No. 546590

gallo@fr.com

Vivian C. Keller (pro hac vice)

GA Bar No. 651500

keller@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 12 of 16 PageID

#: 18980
10

1180 Peachtree St. NE, Fl. 21

Atlanta, GA 30309

Telephone: (404) 892-5005

Facsimile: (404) 892-5002

Leonard E. Davis

TX Bar No. 05521600

ldavis@fr.com

Andria Rae Crisler

TX Bar No. 24093792

crisler@fr.com

Thomas H. Reger II

Texas Bar No. 24032992

reger@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

1717 Main Street, Suite 5000

Dallas, TX 75201

Telephone: (214)747-5070

Facsimile: (214) 747-2091

John-Paul R. Fryckman (pro hac vice)

CA Bar No. 317591

John W. Thornburgh

CA Bar No. 154627

thornburgh@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

12860 El Camino Real, Ste. 400

San Diego, CA 92130

Telephone: (858) 678-5070

Facsimile: (858) 678-5099

Katherine D. Prescott (pro hac vice)

CA Bar No. 215496

prescott@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

500 Arguello Street

Suite 400

Redwood City, CA 94063

Telephone: (650) 839-5180

Facsimile: (650) 839-5071

Kyle J. Fleming (pro hac vice)

NY Bar No. 5855499

kfleming@fr.com

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

7 Times Square, 20th Floor,

New York, NY 10036

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 13 of 16 PageID

#: 18981
11

Telephone: (212) 765-5070

Facsimile: (212) 258-2291

Melissa R. Smith

State Bar No. 24001351

Melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com 

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP

303 South Washington Avenue

Marshall, Texas 75670

Telephone: (903) 934-8450

Facsimile: (903) 934-9257

Andrew Thompson (“Tom”) Gorham

State Bar No. 24012715

tom@gillamsmithlaw.com

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP

102 N. College, Suite 800

Tyler, Texas 75702

Telephone: (903) 934-8450

Facsimile: (903) 934-9257

Michael E. Jones 

State Bar No. 10929400 

mikejones@potterminton.com 

Shaun W. Hassett 

State Bar No. 24074372 

shaunhassett@potterminton.com 

POTTER MINTON, P.C. 

102 N. College Ave., Suite 900 

Tyler, Texas 75702 

Telephone: (903) 597-8311 

Facsimile: (903) 593-0846

Lance Lin Yang

CA. Bar No. 260705

Lanceyang@quinnemanuel.com

Kevin (Gyushik) Jang

CA Bar No. 337747

kevinjang@quinnemanuel.com

Sean S. Pak

CA Bar No. 219032

seanpak@quinnemanuel.com

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN, LLP

50 California Street, 22nd Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 14 of 16 PageID

#: 18982
12

Telephone: (415) 875-6600

Brady Huynh (admitted pro hac vice)

CA Bar No. 339441

bradyhuynh@quinnemanuel.com

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN, LLP

555 Twin Dolphin Drive, 5th Floor

Redwood Shores, CA 94065

Telephone: (650) 801-5000

Facsimile: (650) 801-5100

Jon Bentley Hyland

Texas Bar No. 24046131

jhyland@hilgersgraben.com

Grant K. Schmidt

Texas Bar No. 24084579

gschmidt@hilgersgraben.com

HILGERS GRABEN PLLC

7859 Walnut Hill Lane, Suite 335

Dallas, Texas 75230

Telephone: (972) 645-3097

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 15 of 16 PageID

#: 18983
13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed 

electronically in compliance with Local Rule CV-5 on November 12, 2024. As of this date, all 

counsel of record had consented to electronic service and are being served with a copy of this 

document through the Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(a)(3)(A).

/s/ Thad C. Kodish

Thad C. Kodish

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 251 Filed 11/20/24 Page 16 of 16 PageID

#: 18984