alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```
  
 
VIX FUTURES - CBOE FUTURES EXCHANGE                                  Code-1170E1
OPTION AND FUTURES COMBINED POSITIONS AS OF 02/07/12          |
--------------------------------------------------------------| NONREPORTABLE
      NON-COMMERCIAL      |   COMMERCIAL    |      TOTAL      |   POSITIONS
--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------
  Long  | Short  |Spreads |  Long  | Short  |  Long  | Short  |  Long  | Short
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
($1000 X INDEX)                                      OPEN INTEREST:      191,134
COMMITMENTS
  37,035   55,511   31,653   99,796   85,841  168,484  173,005   22,650   18,129

CHANGES FROM 01/31/12 (CHANGE IN OPEN INTEREST:     19,780)
   7,755    7,955    1,114   10,728   12,693   19,597   21,762      183   -1,982

PERCENT OF OPEN INTEREST FOR EACH CATEGORY OF TRADER
    19.4     29.0     16.6     52.2     44.9     88.1     90.5     11.9      9.5

NUMBER OF TRADERS IN EACH CATEGORY (TOTAL TRADERS:       96)
      33       28       32       28       23       77       70
```

----

Updated February 10, 2012
Raul ARCILA, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-5957.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 15, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

RILEY J. KUHN,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CREDITFORHOMELOANS.COM, LLC, 

 Defendant.

 Case No. 4:23-cv-00308-ALM

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

Plaintiff, RILEY J. KUHN, by and through the undersigned, having filed with this Court 

his Motion for Clerk’s Entry of Default and the Court having reviewed same, hereby ORDERES:

1. An Entry of Default shall be entered against the Defendant, Creditforhomeloans.com, 

LLC.

Case 4:23-cv-00308-ALM Document 5-2 Filed 05/10/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 22
Jocelyn FAURISMA, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-6360.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 19, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

November 29, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 128771 Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 128771 COA: 251651 Genesee CC: 03-011745-FH RONALD WAYNE MESHELL, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, th e application for leave to appeal the April 7, 2005 judgment of the Court of Appeals is cons idered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

d1121 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 29, 2005

Clerk
VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, et al., appellants, v. GOLDEN BETHUNE-HILL, et al.

No. 18-281.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 13, 2018.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Further consideration of the question of jurisdiction is postponed to the hearing of the case on the merits. In addition to the questions presented by the jurisdictional statement, the parties are directed to fully *482brief the following question: Whether appellants have standing to bring this appeal.
Andre Almond DENNISON, petitioner, v. ARIZONA.

No. 18-7529.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 25, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division One denied.
```
 
 
WHEAT - MINNEAPOLIS GRAIN EXCHANGE                                   Code-001626
FUTURES ONLY POSITIONS AS OF 09/11/12                         |
--------------------------------------------------------------| NONREPORTABLE
      NON-COMMERCIAL      |   COMMERCIAL    |      TOTAL      |   POSITIONS
--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------
  LONG  | SHORT  |SPREADS |  LONG  | SHORT  |  LONG  | SHORT  |  LONG  | SHORT
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(CONTRACTS OF 5,000 BUSHELS)                         OPEN INTEREST:       39,312
COMMITMENTS
   8,564    1,009      710   22,041   28,744   31,315   30,463    7,997    8,849

CHANGES FROM 09/04/12 (CHANGE IN OPEN INTEREST:       -697)
    -730        1      -54      570      180     -214      127     -483     -824

PERCENT OF OPEN INTEREST FOR EACH CATEGORY OF TRADERS
    21.8      2.6      1.8     56.1     73.1     79.7     77.5     20.3     22.5

NUMBER OF TRADERS IN EACH CATEGORY (TOTAL TRADERS:       51)
      14        3        5       28       20       44       27
```

----

Updated September 14, 2012
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, November 09, 2016. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, November 09, 2016 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A17D0149. STEPHEN G. USSERY v. THE STATE. Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: 2012FE0060
MARTINS BEACH 1, LLC, et al., petitioners, v. SURFRIDER FOUNDATION.

No. 17-1198.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 1, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District denied.
Telemetrix Inc. S-8 Exhibit 4.2 HTML



Exhibit 4.2  
            
            
    
 Relevant Portions of Bylaws
Aaron J. SCHOCK v. UNITED STATES

No. 18-406

Supreme Court of the United States.

Decided February 19, 2019

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Statement of Justice SOTOMAYOR respecting the denial of certiorari.

Petitioner Aaron Schock, a former Congressman from Illinois, asks us to decide whether he may immediately appeal, as a collateral order, the denial of his motion to dismiss part of a criminal indictment against him for running afoul of the Constitution's Rulemaking Clause. See Art. I, § 5. He argues that certain charges against him would require the District Court for the Central District of Illinois to interpret internal rules adopted by the House of Representatives to govern its own Members, and thus would violate separation-of-powers doctrine. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that denials of such Rulemaking Clause challenges are not collateral orders subject to immediate appeal, 891 F.3d 334 (2018), in disagreement with at least one other Court of Appeals, see *United States v. Rostenkowski* , 59 F.3d 1291, 1297 (C.A.D.C. 1995). Although this question does not arise frequently-presumably because criminal charges against Members of Congress are rare-the sensitive separation-of-powers questions that such prosecutions raise ought to be handled uniformly.

It is not clear, however, that this case cleanly presents the question whether such orders are, as a general matter, immediately appealable. The District Court here denied the motion to dismiss on Rulemaking Clause grounds only provisionally, stating that it would revisit the matter "if at any time it becomes apparent that the prosecution will rely upon evidence that requires the interpretation of House Rules." 2017 WL 4780614, *7, and n. 6 (C.D. Ill., Oct. 23, 2017). Indeed, the District Court dismissed the only count of the indictment that did, in its view, necessarily turn on an interpretation of the House Rules. *Id.,* at *8-*11. As a result, the District Court's order may have been insufficiently *675"conclusive" to support collateral-order appellate jurisdiction, whether or not such jurisdiction would otherwise have been proper. See *Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n* , 514 U.S. 35, 42, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995). The Court of Appeals did not address that alternative ground for affirmance, the presence of which might complicate our review.

I therefore concur in the Court's decision to deny certiorari. I do so on the understanding, however, that Schock remains free to reassert his Rulemaking Clause challenge in the District Court should subsequent developments warrant.*

*

In its briefing to the Court of Appeals, the Government argued that the House regulations were, in fact, " 'necessary' " and "important" to prove other charges still pending. Brief for Appellee in No. 17-3277 (CA7), p. 55. Those representations may be pertinent to the District Court's further consideration of Schock's arguments.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A24A1213. SIMPLY THE BEST GRADING, LLC v. WHITE ANCHOR

EQUESTRIAN, LLC.

Simply the Best Grading, LLC filed an action in magistrate court against White

Anchor Equestrian to collect for work performed, and White Anchor counterclaimed

for $35,000 to repair Simply’swork. The magistrate court entered judgment in favor

of Simply, and did not consider White Anchor’s counterclaim.

1 White Anchor

appealed to the superior court. Following a bench trial, the superior court awarded

$3,500 to Simply, but also awarded $27,560 toWhite Anchor on its counterclaim, and

Simply filed this appeal. We lack jurisdiction.

Because the superior court’s order disposes of a de novo appeal from a

magistrate court decision, Simply was required to follow the discretionary appeal

procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); cf. Handler v. Hulsey, 199 Ga. App. 751, 751

(406 SE2d 225) (1991) (appeal from magistrate court to state court). This is true even

in cases, such as this one, in which the appeal was expanded in superior court to

include matters not considered initially in the magistrate court. Bullock v. Sand, 260

Ga. App. 874, 875 (581 SE2d 333) (2003); see Handler, 199 Ga. App. at 752-753

(where issues raised in counterclaim were directly related to the issues raised in

magistrate court, they were properly considered part of the de novo proceeding, such

that application was required).

1

See OCGA § 15-10-2 (a) (5) (providing that magistrate court has jurisdiction

over civil claims that do not exceed $15,000).

April 12, 2024
“Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

Smoak v. Dept. of Human Resources, 221 Ga. App. 257, 257 (471 SE2d 60) (1996).

Simply’s failure to follow the discretionary appeal procedure deprives us of

jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED. See Bullock, 260 Ga.App.

at 875; Handler, 199 Ga. App. at 752-753.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

04/12/2024
NO. 07-05-0393-CR IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL B DECEMBER 21 , 2006

______________________________ BARBARA STONE, APPELL ANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, A PPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE 140 TH DISTRIC T COURT O F LUBBOCK COUNTY; NO. 2004-407187; H ONORABLE JIM BOB DARNELL, JUDGE

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
CONCURR ING OPINION
I concur that th e Court’s opinion properly applies the Court of Criminal Appe als case law that binds us, and so join in the Court’sopinion, but I write to express my concern o ver the adequacy of the Bric k factors in cases like this one. Brick involved a consensual search of a residence tha t followed an assertedly unlawful arrest made at another location. Brick v. State , 738 S.W.2d 676, 677 (Tex.Cr im.App. 1987). The attenuation iss ue in Brown
v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), concerned an i ncriminating1 Gri maldo v. State , No. 07-04-02 46-CR, 2006 WL 563027 (Tex.App.–A mar ill o

March 8, 2006, no pet.)

2 In its suppl emental brief, the State a rgue s Reasor v. St ate , 12 S.W.3d 813 (Tex.Cri m.App. 2000), providesa standard for anal ysis of theattenuation iss ue, noting that itdealt with a consensual search follo wing an unlaw ful pro tecti ve sw

eep of th e same premises. Despite it

s “taint” language, it is not clear that t he opinion in Reasor was intended to address an at tenuation issue, since it giv es the issue the same “ short shri ft” the cou rt criticiz ed in Brick

. See Reasor , 12 S.W.3d at 819 (“[a]ny ta int from the ill egal sweep was sufficien tly attenuated when appell ant voluntar ily cons ented to the searc h of his residence”); Brick , 738 S.W.2d at 678 (quoting similar language from court ofappeals opinion). 2 statement

given a t the police stati on after an unlaw ful arrest. H ere, like i n Grimal do , 1 the relationship between the evidence the State in troduced at trial and the unlawful police conduct is much m ore direct. 2 Here , poli ce receive d conse nt to s earch the sam e apartm e nt that, we have conclud ed, they had j ust forcibly and unlawfull y entered. The physical evidence the police found is the same evidence whose destruction they said t hey sought to pre vent by th eir s udden en try into t he apar tment. It see ms to methat the Brick factors are inadequate to evaluate fully whether denying the State the use of th e evidence obtained under such circumstances fits the purpos es of the exclusi onary rul e. See, e.g., Brown , 422 U.S. at

609 (Powel l, J., concurring) ( “The point at which the taint can be said to have diss ipated should berelated, in the absence of other con trolling circumstances, to the nature of that tai nt.”).

James T. Campbell Justice
Publish.
II

★(Star Print)

Calendar No. 719

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H.R. 1959

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 28, 2000

Received

JULY 21, 2000

Read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works

JULY 26, 2000

Reported by Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, without amendment

AN ACT

To designate the Federal building located at 643 East Durango Boulevard in San Antonio, Texas, as the ‘‘Adrian

A. Spears Judicial Training Center’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

4 The Federal building located at 643 East Durango

5 Boulevard in San Antonio, Texas, shall be known and des6 ignated as the ‘‘Adrian A. Spears Judicial Training Cen7 ter’’.
2

HR 1959 RS1S

1 SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

2 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document,

3 paper, or other record of the United States to the Federal

4 building referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be

5 a reference to the ‘‘Adrian A. Spears Judicial Training

6 Center’’.

Calendar No. 719

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 1959

AN ACT

To designate the Federal building located at 643

East Durango Boulevard in San Antonio, Texas,as the ‘‘Adrian A. Spears Judicial TrainingCenter’’.

JULY 26, 2000

Reported without amendment
```
 
 
IN DELIVERY MONTH EUA - GREEN EXCHANGE                               Code-006GEC
OPTION AND FUTURES COMBINED POSITIONS AS OF 06/19/12          |
--------------------------------------------------------------| NONREPORTABLE
      NON-COMMERCIAL      |   COMMERCIAL    |      TOTAL      |   POSITIONS
--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------
  Long  | Short  |Spreads |  Long  | Short  |  Long  | Short  |  Long  | Short
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(CONTRACTS OF 1000 EUA)                              OPEN INTEREST:       77,118
COMMITMENTS
  16,554      353    5,252   55,312   71,513   77,118   77,118        0        0

CHANGES FROM 06/12/12 (CHANGE IN OPEN INTEREST:       -578)
    -335        0      202     -445     -780     -578     -578        0        0

PERCENT OF OPEN INTEREST FOR EACH CATEGORY OF TRADER
    21.5      0.5      6.8     71.7     92.7    100.0    100.0      0.0      0.0

NUMBER OF TRADERS IN EACH CATEGORY (TOTAL TRADERS:       20)
       4        4        4        9       11       14       18
```

----

Updated June 22, 2012
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

HEADWATER RESEARCH LLC,

 Plaintiff,

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, 

INC.,

 Defendants.

 Case No. 2:23-CV-00103-JRG-RSP

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Headwater Research LLC’s and Defendants Samsung 

Electronics Co., Ltd.’s and Samsung Electronics America, Inc.’s Joint Motion for Extension of 

Time to File Proposed Docket Control Order, Discovery Order, and Protective Order. 

After consideration of the same, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion should be and 

hereby is GRANTED. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the deadline for the Parties to file their 

Proposed Docket Control Order, Discovery Order, and Protective Order is extended up to and 

including October 26, 2023. 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 52-1 Filed 10/19/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 1862
Aaron LAROSE, petitioner, v. MISSOURI.

No. 17-8756.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 1, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
MacMILLAN-PIPER, INC., petitioner, v. WASHINGTON STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT.

No. 18-469.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 3, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1 denied.
James Gabriel SMITH, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-6401.

Supreme Court of the United States

Dec. 3, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
Exhibit 12.2
  CERTIFICATION
 I, Eran Gilad, certify that:
  1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F/A of Silicom Ltd.;
 
 2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
 
 3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
 4. The Company’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15(d)-15(f)) for the Company and have:
  (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiary, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
 (b) designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;
  (c) evaluated the effectiveness of the Company’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
  (d) disclosed in this report any change in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Company’s internal control over financial reporting; and;
 
   5. The Company’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Company’s auditors and the audit committee of Company’s board of directors:
  (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Company’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; an
  (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting.
 
 Date: November 23, 2010
 /S/ Eran Gilad

Eran Gilad, Chief Financial Officer
EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT AMENDMENT


 


THIS
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT AMENDMENT (this “Amendment”) is entered into effective as of January 1, 2019 (the “Effective
Date”), between Rhino GP LLC (“Employer”) and Brian Aug (“Employee”).


 


W
I T N E S S E T H


 


WHEREAS,
Employee is currently employed by Employer pursuant to an Employment Agreement dated November 21, 2016 (as amended, the “Prior
Agreement”).


 


WHEREAS,
Employer and Employee now desire to amend the Prior Agreement, and have executed this Amendment to evidence the terms of their
agreement.


 


NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained, the parties agree as follows:


 


1.
The first sentence of Section 1 of the Prior Agreement is hereby deleted and replaced in its entirety with the following language:


 


“The
Employer hereby shall employ Employee as its Vice President of Sales continuing from the Effective Date until December 31, 2019,
unless sooner terminated as herein provided or extended by mutual agreement of the parties (the “Employment Term”),
with such duties customary to such position as Employer may reasonably designate during the Employment Term.”


 


2.
Section 2 of the Prior Agreement is hereby deleted and replaced
in its entirety with the following language:


 


“Compensation.
For Employee’s services hereunder during the Employment Term, Employer shall pay to Employee a salary at a rate of $220,000
per year (“Base Salary”), payable periodically in accordance with Employer’s usual executive payroll payment
procedures, subject to periodic review for possible increase.”


 


3.
As partial consideration for Employee entering into this Amendment,
Employer agrees that, on or before October 1, 2019, Employer shall notify Employee whether it intends to extend the Employment
Term for 2020, and shall provide Employee with the applicable agreement or amendment, if any.


 


4.
All other terms and conditions in the Prior Agreement shall remain unchanged except to the extent specifically modified herein.


 


[SIGNATURE
PAGE TO FOLLOW]


 




    	1



    	 



    




 


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed and delivered this Amendment as of the day and year first above written.


 


	 	EMPLOYER:
	 	 	 
	 	Rhino GP LLC
	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/
    Richard A. Boone
	 	 	 
	 	EMPLOYEE:
	 	 
	 	 	/s/
    Brian Aug
	 	 	Brian
    Aug


 




    	2