IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUFKIN DIVISION

JOSEPH ANTHONY HANZICH IV,

 Plaintiff,

VS.

NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, SHERIFF 

JASON BRIDGES, BRYLEE GARZA, 

PRESTON JOHNSON, JACOB 

BRADSHAW, ALEXANDER RILEY, 

JUAN MERCADO, AND UNKNOWN 

JAILER, in their individual capacities

 Defendants.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:23-CV-00087

JUDGE MICHAEL J. TRUNCALE

ORDER ISSUING SANCTIONS

Before the Court is Defendants’ Emergency Motion for Discovery Sanctions and 

Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses. [Dkt. 28]. The Court held a hearing on this Motion on July 26, 

2023. [Dkt. 34]. While the Court denies Defendants’ Motion, it awards Defendants reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to the Court’s inherent sanctioning powers.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Joseph Anthony Hanzich IV, asserts claims against Nacogdoches County and 

several Nacogdoches County Jail jailers for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights, and for assault with a deadly weapon. [Dkt. 1 at 7–10]. His allegations stem from an incident

where multiple jailers restrained him while he was an inmate at the Nacogdoches County Jail in 

2021. Jail security cameras captured and recorded this incident.

Before receiving this footage through discovery, Plaintiff’s counsel, Paul Anderson, asked 

Defendants’ counsel, Lea Correa, at their Rule 26(f) Conference on June 28, 2023, whether 

Defendants would object to the public release of the footage. [Dkt. 44 at 15:21–16:5]. Ms. Correa 

Case 9:23-cv-00087-MJT Document 49 Filed 08/16/23 Page 1 of 10 PageID #: 620
2

answered in the affirmative, and told Mr. Anderson that Defendants would request a protective 

order in the parties’ Joint Conference Report. Id. Mr. Anderson promised Ms. Correa that he would 

not make the footage public until the Court decided whether to enter a protective order. Id. at 16:2–

5; 16:11–12. On July 10, 2023, Ms. Correa turned the footage over to Mr. Anderson in the 

Defendants’ initial disclosures, with the following statement typed under each statement:

Disclosed pursuant to the Parties’ agreement to enter into the Court’s Standard 

Protective Order protecting jail videos from disclosure to any person other than 

counsel of record, employees of counsel of record, consulting and retained expert 

witnesses, and the Court (under seal). This includes an agreement that the Jail 

videos disclosed in this case not be made public[ly] available on the internet or 

otherwise.

[Dkts. 28 at 4; 44 at 16:7–22].

The Court held a Rule 16 Case Management Conference (“CMC”) at 2:30 p.m. on July 18, 

2023. At the CMC, the Court discussed Defendants’ then-pending Motion for Protective Order 

[Dkt. 20]. The Court agreed that a protective order should be entered, out of concern that the public 

release of the footage could taint the jury pool. Mr. Anderson also agreed that the Court should 

enter a protective order. He assured the Court and Ms. Correa that he would not release the footage, 

and that, to his knowledge, the FBI was the only other person or entity in possession of the footage. 

The Court instructed Mr. Anderson and Ms. Correa to file an amended agreed protective order, 

and informed them that the Court would enter the order.

Around 4:00 p.m. that same day—less than an hour after the CMC concluded—an 

investigative and media consulting firm posted the footage on YouTube and Facebook, in a video 

titled “Brutality on Video.” The consulting firm posted the same video to its website the following 

morning. [Dkt. 37-5]. The video is captioned: “We have a jailhouse video THE COUNTY DOES 

NOT WANT YOU TO SEE.” Id. at 1. It opens with a narrator announcing: “This is security camera 

Case 9:23-cv-00087-MJT Document 49 Filed 08/16/23 Page 2 of 10 PageID #: 621
3

jail video Nacogdoches County did not want you to see. They asked a federal judge in Beaumont 

to seal it. Sorry, too late.” Id.

The Court first discovered that the footage had been released when Mr. Anderson called 

the Court’s chambers the morning after the CMC, before the Court had a chance to review and 

enter the parties Agreed Motion for Protective Order [Dkt. 23].1 He expressed that he had no clue 

how the consulting firm received the footage. Upon watching the consulting firm’s video, the 

Court discovered that it included not only the security footage, but also interviews of Mr. Hanzich

and Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson is seen in the video proclaiming: “[T]he public gets to see what 

an inmate at a jail does to deserve having four adults pound on him, handcuff him, lynch him, put 

him in a chair, and then inject him with a chemical.” Id.at 2. 

Mr. Anderson testified at the July 26th hearing that he believes it was his client, Mr. 

Hanzich, who leaked the footage to the consulting firm. [Dkt. 122:4–5]. Mr. Anderson gave Mr. 

Hanzich copies of the footage, in exchange for a signed waiver, which provided:

The law offices of Paul Anderson, PLLC are providing to client and Plaintiff Joseph 

Hanzich IV with a copy of Defendant’s Responses to Required Initial Disclosures. 

Joseph Hanzich is advised of the nature of the material he is in possession of and 

agrees to take full responsibility for its dissemination and distribution if he so 

chooses. Joseph Hanzich IV understands the distribution of any material related to 

his case may affect his litigation or be subject to complaints, including sanctions, 

gag orders or restrictions on future discovery. 

I have had an opportunity to discuss this waiver and release with my attorney and I 

am knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily releasing the Law Offices of Paul 

Anderson PLLC from any liability related to the release of any materials related to 

my case that he provides to me including video recordings and medical records.

[Dkt. 37-1] (typographical errors in original). The waiver is signed “Joseph Hanzich IV” and is 

dated July 11, 2023—the day after Defendants provided Mr. Anderson the footage. Id. When asked 

1 The Court entered the Agreed Protective Order at 9:47 a.m. on July 19, 2023—the morning after the CMC. [Dkt. 

25].

Case 9:23-cv-00087-MJT Document 49 Filed 08/16/23 Page 3 of 10 PageID #: 622
4

why he made Mr. Hanzich sign this waiver, Mr. Anderson stated: “Because I felt that my client as 

you -- without making a medical assessment, was unpredictable.” [Dkt. 44 at 19:16–17].

At the hearing, Mr. Anderson initially testified that he did not know how Mr. Hanzich met 

the consultant who made and released the video, nor how the consultant learned about Mr. 

Hanzich’s case. Id. at 28:1–23. He eventually admitted, however, that this testimony, given in open 

court under oath was not true: Mr. Hanzich first met the consultant at Mr. Anderson’s office in 

February, for an interview that Mr. Anderson had organized. Id. at 31:9–19. Mr. Anderson also 

testified that this was when the interview of him that is featured in the consultant’s video occurred:

THE COURT: Where was that -- that was taken in your law office? 

M[R]. ANDERSON: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: And they had, like, a camera? 

M[R]. ANDERSON: In my conference room. 

THE COURT: And they had somebody with a camera? 

M[R]. ANDERSON: Correct. 

THE COURT: Did they have special lighting? 

M[R]. ANDERSON: No special lighting. 

THE COURT: But it was a camera. So you knew you were in a room with a camera 

and microphone, correct? 

M[R]. ANDERSON: Correct. The clients were -- four of -- three of my clients --

THE COURT: But when you were interviewed? 

M[R]. ANDERSON: I was not interviewed. 

THE COURT: Yeah, you were. I’ve seen it. You’re on the video. 

M[R]. ANDERSON: Right. He kind of pulled -- I was sitting next to him doing --

you know -- monitoring. 

THE COURT: No. 

Case 9:23-cv-00087-MJT Document 49 Filed 08/16/23 Page 4 of 10 PageID #: 623
5

M[R]. ANDERSON: And that’s how I end up in it, but it was February. 

THE COURT: I didn’t ask you when, but I appreciate the information.

Id. at 149:12–150:12.

Mr. Anderson also divulged to the Court—apparently to convince the Court that he did not 

leak the footage—that he had a different scheme to release the video:

M[R]. ANDERSON: . . . Judge, from this lawyer’s perspective, I realized that video 

was never going to see the light of the day. My case strategy evolved into, well, I’m 

just going to raise all sorts of hell about the video so that if it’s never even admitted 

-- which likely we’ll never see – it’s the conduct going forth. . . . It’s the awareness 

of the fight. 

THE COURT: I’m trying to understand, Mr. Anderson. Are you saying you wanted 

to make an issue about the Court’s ruling issuing a protective order to keep the 

video from being released to the public? 

M[R]. ANDERSON: I think it would be more accurate to say that my intent was to 

get to a procedural place that I had a right to appeal or make –

THE COURT: My decision to issue a protective order? 

M[R]. ANDERSON: Right. I didn’t -- I'm not too – I’ll confess, Judge. I'm a rookie 

here. I wasn’t quite sure. Once you had ruled a -- on a protective order, I was 

honoring it. I just know I had asked for a hearing on it so that I could –

THE COURT: At the hearing -- assuming there would be one -- you would admit, 

I’m sure, as you have admitted here, that it was a joint request for protective order?

M[R]. ANDERSON: Right. 

THE COURT: So how could you appeal my granting a protective order that you 

had agreed to? 

M[R]. ANDERSON: Yeah. 

THE COURT: How do I get reversed on that? 

M[R]. ANDERSON: It was an agreed -- it was a joint – I’m sorry. . . . I was opposed 

in the protective order. . . . The -- I agreed to the protective order -- maybe 

illogically, I understand -- but I agreed to the protective order so that I could get the 

issue in front of you about the release of the video. I wanted to do it legally. I wanted 

to release the video lawfully through -- through -- okay -- a reversal. . . . 

Case 9:23-cv-00087-MJT Document 49 Filed 08/16/23 Page 5 of 10 PageID #: 624
6

THE COURT: So to make a spectacle of the Court’s ruling on a protective order –

. . . -- to try to get an opinion stating the Court made a mistake in entering an order 

that you agreed to. I'm trying to understand – . . . -- how that becomes an issue. 

M[R]. ANDERSON: It was never going to work in hindsight.

Id. at 122:24–125:3.

Ultimately, Mr. Anderson conceded that he violated his agreement with opposing counsel 

by giving his client the footage, and that his conduct warrants sanctions. [Dkt. 44 at 133:13–20; 

145:25–146:2]

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 37(b)(2) Sanctions

Defendants seek sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

[Dkt. 28]. Rule 37(b)(2) permits sanctions against a party that “fails to obey an order to provide or 

permit discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). While Rule 37(b)(2) can apply to violations of 

protective orders, see Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 490 (5th 

Cir. 2012) (“In our view, by prescribing the method and terms of the discovery of confidential 

material, the Protective Order was granted ‘to provide or permit discovery’ of confidential 

documents within the meaning of Rule 37(b).”), the Court did not enter the Agreed Protective 

Order until after the footage was leaked and released to the public. See [Dkt. 25]. Because Mr. 

Anderson and/or Mr. Hanzich did not violate a Court order, Rule 37(b)(2) does not apply, and the 

Court must deny Defendants’ motion. 

This conclusion should not be interpreted as minimizing the seriousness of the conduct 

raised by Defendants’ motion. The Court is deeply troubled by Mr. Anderson’s conduct. Rule 

37(b)(2) is simply the incorrect vehicle for sanctions under these circumstances. Instead, the Court 

sanctions Mr. Anderson under its inherent sanctioning power.

Case 9:23-cv-00087-MJT Document 49 Filed 08/16/23 Page 6 of 10 PageID #: 625
7

B. The Court’s Inherent Sanctioning Power

“When a party’s deplorable conduct is not effectively sanctionable pursuant to an existing 

rule or statute, it is appropriate for a district court to rely on its inherent power to impose 

sanctions.” Carroll v. Jaques Admiralty Law Firm, P.C., 110 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991)). “[A] court may assess attorney’s fees when 

a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers, 501 

U.S. at 45–46 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The imposition of sanctions in this instance 

transcends a court’s equitable power concerning relations between the parties and reaches a 

court’s inherent power to police itself . . . .” Id. “The award vindicates judicial authority without 

resort to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court and makes the prevailing party 

whole for expenses caused by his opponent’s obstinacy.” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 

(1978). “A court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it must 

comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists 

and in assessing fees.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50. “As long as a party receives an appropriate 

hearing, . . . the party may be sanctioned for abuses of process occurring beyond the courtroom . . 

. .” Id.at 57.

“An agreed protective order may be viewed as a contract, and once parties enter an 

agreed protective order they are bound to its terms.” Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 755 F.3d 802, 809 

(5th Cir. 2014) (Elrod, J., dissenting) (citing Orthoflex, Inc. v. ThermoTek, Inc., Nos. 3:11-CV0870-D, 3:10-CV-2618-D, 2013 WL 3095106, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 20, 2013) (Fitzwater, J.)). 

Mr. Anderson conceded that by turning the footage over to his client, he violated his agreement 

with Defendants’ counsel. While Mr. Hanzich had a right to view the footage, Mr. Anderson’s 

decision to provide him a copy of the footage reflects, at best, poor judgment. The waiver that he 

Case 9:23-cv-00087-MJT Document 49 Filed 08/16/23 Page 7 of 10 PageID #: 626
8

had Mr. Hanzich sign, however, demonstrates that this was not simply poor judgment: Mr. 

Anderson appreciated both the risk that Mr. Hanzich would release the footage, as well as the 

gravity of releasing it. See [Dkt. 37-1]. The Court finds that Mr. Anderson acted in bad faith when 

he gave Mr. Hanzich a copy of the footage, and that such conduct violated his agreement with 

Defendants’ counsel.

Mr. Anderson’s shameful conduct did not end there; how he handled this situation with the 

Court is equally troubling. Rule 3.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct is 

titled, “Candor Toward the Tribunal.”2 Tex. Disciplinary Rules Pro. Conduct. R. 3.03. In relevant 

part, Rule 3.03 provides: “A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material 

fact or law to a tribunal . . . .” Id. at 3.03(a)(1). The Court finds that Mr. Anderson knowingly, and 

in bad faith, made a false statement of material fact to the Court, in violation of Rule 3.03, when 

he testified that he knew neither how Mr. Hanzich met the consultant who made and released the 

video, nor how the consultant learned about Mr. Hanzich’s case. 

Finally, Mr. Anderson agreed to the Court entering a protective order, and swore in the 

CMC—albeit off the record—that he would not release the footage. He revealed at the hearing, 

however, that he secretly opposed the protective order all along; he agreed to it as part of a plot to 

get the Court reversed on appeal, so to bring even more attention to the footage. Mr. Anderson 

eventually conceded that this nonsensical plan “was never going to work in hindsight.” [Dkt. 44 

at 125:2–3]. Nonetheless, the Court is deeply disturbed by his premeditated plan to waste judicial 

resources to create a spectacle of the Court’s ruling, for the purpose of manufacturing the public’s 

2 The Eastern District of Texas has incorporated the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct in our Local 

Rules. See Local Rule AT-2(a) (“The standards of professional conduct adopted as part of the Rules Governing the 

State Bar of Texas shall serve as a guide governing the obligations and responsibilities of all attorneys appearing in 

this court. . . . Therefore, the attorney practicing in this court should be familiar with the duties and obligations imposed 

upon members of this bar by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, court decisions, statutes, and the 

usages customs and practices of this bar.”).

Case 9:23-cv-00087-MJT Document 49 Filed 08/16/23 Page 8 of 10 PageID #: 627
9

opinion of his case. “Such conduct degrades the legal profession and mocks the search for truth 

that is at the heart of the litigation process.” Carroll, 110 F.3d at 394. By agreeing to the protective 

order, Mr. Anderson took affirmative steps to carry out this plot. The Court finds that this conduct 

constitutes bad faith and a vexatious abuse of the judicial process.

Sanctioning Mr. Anderson by ordering him to compensate Defendants for their reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by his conduct is consistent with the mandates of due process. 

First, the Court held a hearing on this matter, which provided Mr. Anderson an opportunity to 

demonstrate why he should not be sanctioned. Indeed, at the hearing, Mr. Anderson agreed that he 

should be sanctioned, and that the Defendants’ expenses would constitute an acceptable sanction. 

See [Dkt. 44 at 145:25–146:2] (“[I]n conclusion, I take responsibility. With the idea of the 

sanctions, I will voluntarily pay these expenses.”). Additionally, this is the least severe sanction 

available, as “[i]t is difficult to conceive of a lesser sanction that would vindicate the dignity of

court proceedings and chasten [Mr. Anderson] against future misconduct.” See Carroll, 110 F.3d 

at 294.

III. CONCLUSION

It is therefore ORDERED that as a sanction for his conduct discussed herein, Paul 

Anderson must compensate Defendants $5,000 for their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 

incurred by such conduct, within 14 days of this Order.

It is further ORDERED that Defendants’ Emergency Motion for Discovery Sanctions and 

Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses [Dkt. 28] is DENIED.

The Court reserves the right to issue additional sanctions against Paul Anderson and Joseph 

Anthony Hanzich IV during course of this litigation, including at trial, if the Court finds that their 

Case 9:23-cv-00087-MJT Document 49 Filed 08/16/23 Page 9 of 10 PageID #: 628
10

conduct has substantially prejudiced Defendants. Further sanctions may include the Court’s refusal 

to admit the footage into evidence at trial.

Case 9:23-cv-00087-MJT Document 49 Filed 08/16/23 Page 10 of 10 PageID #: 629