IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TYLER DIVISION

ESAW LAMPKIN §

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23cv108

CHIEF PD OFFICER JASON PERRINI, §

et al.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se when he was an inmate of the Henderson County Jail, filed this 

lawsuit alleging various violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was referred 

to the undersigned for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the 

disposition of the case. 

I. Relevant Background and Allegations

Plaintiff originally sought to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). (Dkt. #2.) Following the 

Court’s observation that Plaintiff’s history of meritless litigation barred him from proceeding IFP 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (Dkt. #8), and an extension of time to pay the fee (Dkt. #17), 

Plaintiff paid the full filing fee to proceed with this case. 

The Court then found that Plaintiff’s original complaint was deficient in several respects, 

including being in excess of the applicable page limit for pleadings and attempting to join unrelated 

claims in a single action. (Dkt. #23.) Accordingly, on May 26, 2023, the Court gave Plaintiff thirty 

days from receipt of the order in which to file an amended complaint. (Id.) 

Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on July 17, 2023. (Dkt. #30.) Upon initial review, the 

Court found that Plaintiff continued to assert unrelated claims improperly in a single pleading. The 

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Court therefore severed two sets of claims from this lawsuit, which are proceeding separately from 

this case. (Dkt. #33.) The only claims remaining for consideration in this action are Plaintiff’s 

claims against Officer Bateman for an illegal stop and search that led to his arrest on September 5, 

2021, which Plaintiff asserts was the result of racial profiling, and his related claims against Sheriff 

Hillhouse and Jason Perrini for failure to properly train or “correct” Bateman. (Dkt. #33 at 5–7, 

10, 15.) Plaintiff alleges that Bateman’s actions caused his illegal detention without probable 

cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 6–7, 16.)

Plaintiff appears to have ignored the Court’s admonition about the need to include “details 

that are critical to [his claims’] present cognizability, including whether the criminal charges 

resulting from his arrest are still pending or how they concluded.” (Dkt. #23 at 3.) But publicly 

available records of the 392nd District Court in the matter of State of Texas v. Esaw Lampkin, Case 

No. CR21-1099-173, establish that Plaintiff pleaded guilty on June 6, 2023, to the charge of 

unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (attempted). See Register of Actions, available at 

https://portal-txhenderson.tylertech.cloud/PublicAccess/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=699906 (last 

visited Oct. 17, 2023).

II. Legal Standards and Preliminary Screening

At the time he files this lawsuit, Plaintiff was an inmate seeking redress from an officer or 

employee of a governmental entity. His pleading is thus subject to preliminary screening pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), which requires sua sponte dismissal of a complaint if the Court finds it 

frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Samford v. Dretke, 562 

F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit has held that a complaint lacks an arguable basis 

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in fact when “the facts alleged are fantastic or delusional scenarios or the legal theory upon which 

a complaint relies is indisputably meritless.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 

(5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, during the initial screening 

under section 1915A, a court may determine that a prisoner’s complaint is frivolous if it rests upon 

delusional scenarios or baseless facts—and dismiss the complaint. See Henry v. Kerr County, 

Texas, 2016 WL 2344231 *3 (W.D. Tex. May 2, 2016) (“A court may dismiss a claim as factually 

frivolous only if the facts alleged are clearly baseless, fanciful, fantastic, delusional, or otherwise 

rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, regardless of whether there are judicially 

noticeable facts available to contradict them.”) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 

(1992)). 

Moreover, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted where it does 

not allege sufficient facts which, taken as true, state a claim which is plausible on its face and thus 

does not raise a right to relief above the speculative level. See Montoya v. FedEx Ground 

Packaging Sys. Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim has factual plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows 

the court to draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See 

Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2010); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard is not akin to a probability standard; rather, 

the plausibility standard requires more than the mere possibility that the defendant has acted 

unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (emphasis supplied). 

All well-pleaded facts are taken as true, but the district court need not accept as true 

conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions. See Whatley v. Coffin, 

496 F. App’x 414 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citing Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 

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(5th Cir. 2005)). Crucially, while the federal pleading rules do not require “detailed factual 

allegations,” the rule does “demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading offering “labels and conclusions” or a 

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice, nor does a complaint 

which provides only naked assertions that are devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. 

III. Discussion and Analysis 

Aside from the myriad other problems with Plaintiff’s pleading, it is clear that his claims

arising from his stop and search directly challenge the validity of his criminal conviction and are, 

therefore, not cognizable in a Section 1983 action. In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78–82 

(2005), the Supreme Court reviewed Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and its progeny. It 

explained that, under Heck, “a state prisoner’s section 1983 action is barred (absent prior 

invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the 

prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in 

that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Id. at 81–

82. The Dotson Court emphasized that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for state prisoners 

who “seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement—either directly through an injunction 

compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies 

the unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Id. at 81. 

Courts in the Fifth Circuit have routinely found that Heck bars claims for racial profiling 

when a plaintiff asserts such a claim to challenge the probable cause of a search or seizure. See 

Agnew v. Abe Factor and Campbell, No. 4:17-cv-527, 2019 WL 2995908, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 

9, 2019) (collecting cases and finding the plaintiff's claims that he was arrested without probable 

cause and his equal protection rights were violated by racial profiling were barred by Heck, as a 

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favorable ruling “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions in the state criminal 

cases”); Santos v. Welty, No. 5:20-cv-205, 2021 WL 1799828, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2021), 

report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1792130 (N.D. Tex. May 5, 2021) (collecting 

cases and concluding that “Heck bars [the plaintiff's] remaining claims against [the defendants], 

i.e., those for unlawful search and seizure due to an alleged lack of probable cause, forged search 

warrant signatures, racial profiling, and fabrication of evidence”); Foster v. Lazalde, No. EP-18-

cv-49, 2018 WL 1251923, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2018) (collecting cases).

Here, Plaintiff expressly connects his racial profiling claim to a lack of probable cause and 

consequent illegality of his detention. But those allegations inherently conflict with the 

acknowledgment, intrinsic in Plaintiff’s guilty plea and conviction, that adequate evidence existed 

to convict him. Plaintiff’s claims are thus barred by Heck as long as his conviction stands.

Ordinarily, dismissal of a claim as barred by Heck and Dotson is without prejudice to a 

plaintiff’s ability to re-file his Section 1983 claim if and when he succeeds in having his conviction 

overturned or invalidated through proper means. See Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th 

Cir. 1996) (“Because these dismissals do not put a defendant to the task of preparing for trial 

unnecessarily, or inflict other undue prejudice, they do not preclude a later claim meeting the 

preconditions for suit. A preferred order of dismissal would read: Plaintiffs claims are dismissed 

with prejudice to their being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met.”)

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s claim is barred by Heck and must be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim on that basis. See Colvin v. LeBlanc, 2 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021)

(“We have routinely characterized a Heck dismissal as one for failure to state a claim[.]”).

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RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed as barred by Heck, 

and thus for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1). This dismissal should be without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to refile his lawsuit 

if and when he succeeds in overturning his criminal conviction through state remedies or federal 

habeas proceedings.

Within fourteen (14) days after receipt of the Magistrate Judge’s Report, any party may 

serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations contained in the Report.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and 

recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen days after being served with a copy 

shall bar that party from de novo review by the district judge of those findings, conclusions and 

recommendations and, except on grounds of plain error, from appellate review of unobjected-to 

factual findings and legal conclusions accepted and adopted by the district court. Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 17th day of October, 2023.

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