MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jennifer L. Koethe

LaPorte, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Angela Sanchez

Deputy Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ann Casildo,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 2, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

46A03-1603-CR-532

Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit 

Court.

The Honorable Thomas J. Alevizos, 

Judge.

Cause No. 46C01-1402-FC-78

Darden, Senior Judge

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1603-CR-532 November 2, 2016 Page 1 of 6
Statement of the Case

[1] Ann Casildo pleaded guilty to forgery as a Class C felony.1 She was sentenced 

to six years’ imprisonment with no time suspended. She appeals the sentence. 

We affirm. 

Issues

[2] The issues Casildo raises for our review are whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in sentencing her; and, whether her six-year sentence is inappropriate 

in light of the nature of her offense and her character. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 18, 2013, Victor Moyar reported to the police that several of his credit 

cards had been fraudulently used, that approximately $32,000.00 had been 

charged to his credit cards without his permission, and that a line of credit had 

been established without his permission. Moyar suspected Casildo, his 

daughter, of the unauthorized activity. Moyar also reported that he believed 

Casildo had, without his permission, removed money from his bank account 

and deposited the money into her bank account.

[4] Detective Scott Boswell interviewed Casildo regarding the use of Moyar’s credit 

cards and the money that had been removed from his bank account. Casildo 

admitted that she used Moyar’s credit cards, but claimed she had his permission 

1 Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(b)(1) (2006).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1603-CR-532 November 2, 2016 Page 2 of 6

 
to do so. She also admitted that she filled out three checks totaling $5,500.00, 

signed Moyar’s name to the checks, and deposited the funds into her bank 

account.

[5] On February 20, 2014, Casildo was charged with forgery as a Class C felony, 

two counts of fraud, as Class D felonies, and identity deception as a Class D 

felony. Under a plea agreement, Casildo pleaded guilty to the forgery charge 

and the State agreed to dismiss all of the other charges.

[6] The presumptive sentence for a Class C felony is four years, with not more than 

four years added for aggravating circumstances, and not more than two years 

subtracted for mitigating circumstances. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2005). At 

sentencing, the trial court found that aggravating circumstances outweighed the 

mitigating circumstances and sentenced Casildo to six years executed, with no 

time suspended. Casildo appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Abuse of Discretion

[7] Casildo argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the six-year 

sentence because the court gave “little weight” to Casildo’s mitigating 

circumstances of mental illness and substance abuse. Appellant’s Br. p. 6. 

Sentencing is generally left to the discretion of the trial court, and we will only 

reverse a trial court’s sentencing decision based on an abuse of that discretion. 

Losch v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1012, 1014 (Ind. 2005). The trial court has discretion 

to determine whether a presumptive sentence will be increased or decreased 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1603-CR-532 November 2, 2016 Page 3 of 6
because of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Klein v. State, 698 N.E.2d 

296, 300 (Ind. 1998). 

[8] Regarding Casildo’s argument, it is well established that appellate courts no 

longer review for an abuse of discretion the weight or lack thereof a trial court 

attributes to particular mitigating circumstances. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). No 

error occurred here.

II. Inappropriateness

[9] Casildo next argues that her six-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and her character. We may revise a sentence if it is 

“inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). Casildo bears the burden of persuading us 

that her sentence is inappropriate. Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind.

2007). 

[10] Looking at the nature of Casildo’s offense, we are not persuaded. Casildo took 

advantage and violated the trust of her father, who was over sixty years old at 

the time the crimes were committed. Without his permission, she used his 

credit cards in excess of seventy times and charged thousands of dollars to his 

credit cards, and forged his signature several times on checks so that she could 

remove over $5,000.00 from his bank account and deposit the funds into her 

bank account. According to her father’s victim impact statement, Casildo

betrayed his trust to such a degree that he felt he could no longer trust anyone 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1603-CR-532 November 2, 2016 Page 4 of 6
again. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the nature of Casildo’s offense 

does not render her six-year sentence inappropriate.

[11] Casildo also has not shown her sentence to be inappropriate in light of her 

character. When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is 

the defendant’s criminal history. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2013). The significance of criminal history varies based on the gravity, 

nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense. Id.

[12] Casildo has a criminal history that began in 1997 and continues to the present, 

including: six convictions for misdemeanor driving while license suspended 

(1997-2000); Class D felony fraud and theft (1999); misdemeanor disorderly 

conduct (2002); Class D felony neglect of a dependent (2002); misdemeanor 

operating a vehicle with alcohol concentration equivalent to .15 or more (2003); 

Class D felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator (2003); Class C 

felony welfare fraud (2005); misdemeanor operating a vehicle with alcohol 

concentration equivalent to .15 or more, and operating a vehicle while 

intoxicated in a manner that endangers a person (2008); misdemeanor 

operating a vehicle with alcohol concentration equivalent to at least .08 but less 

than .15, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated (2011); and Class C felony 

forgery (2013). Two of Casildo’s prior felony convictions for credit card and 

welfare fraud damages were in excess of $35,000.00. She failed to appear for 

court on numerous occasions. She was placed on probation, which was later

revoked. She also was placed in community correction and on electronic 

monitoring, but violated both programs.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1603-CR-532 November 2, 2016 Page 5 of 6
[13] Under these facts and circumstances herein, we cannot conclude that Casildo’s 

six-year sentence for Class C felony forgery is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and her character.

Conclusion

[14] For the reasons stated, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

sentencing Casildo, and Casildo’s sentence is not inappropriate given the nature 

of the offense and her character.

[15] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1603-CR-532 November 2, 2016 Page 6 of 6