### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00542- CV

Je an G r aha m , A ppe lla nt

v. Loui s T. Pir key, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN400163 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
J ean G raha

m sued L ouis Pirkey for damag es stemming f rom nuisance , trespass, a

nd the unlawful diversion of water onto he r proper ty
. Pirkey moved for summary judgm en t alleg ing that Gra ham’s cla ims were barre d by the s tatute of limit ations. The district cour t gr anted Pirkey ’s motion and dismi ssed all of Gr aham’ s claims. Be cause we hold that issues of materia l fac t exi st as to some of Graham’s claims, we af firm the summary

judgme nt in part and re verse and re mand in part for f urther pr ocee dings.
BACK GR OUND

Gra ham and Pirkey

are neig h b o rs whose homes are situated on adjac ent lakef ront tr a c ts. I n 1 99 0, John Ste e le , the pr e vio us ow ne r of Pir ke y ’s pr op e rt

y , g ra de d a

nd le ve le d p a rt

of hisThe inlet to the drainag e pipe consisted of an e ight inch diameter pipe that extended from 1 a small wall that partially surrounde d a sum p are a. L oomis conclude d that the dra inag e sy stem was de sig ne d to a llo w w a te r t o p oo l in the su mp a

re a wh ile it dr a ins int o the pip e wh ic h c ha nn e ls i t to t h e r e ar o f G r a h a m ’ s p r o p e rt y. 2 land to i ns ta ll a

po ol a nd a ne w d ri ve wa y . A t th e same tim e , th e re c or d in dic a tes th at Ste e le a lso installed a newdraina g e pipe that diver ted ra inwater

runoff to G raha

m’s proper

ty
. Pirkey acquir ed the pr op e rt

y in 1 99 1, sh or

tly a ft e r S te e le a dd ed th e se imp ro ve me nts . G ra ham in sis ts t

hat th e se
m o d i fi ca t i o n s al t er edt h e p re -e x i s t i n g dra i n age p at t ern fo r r ai n wa t er ru n o ff an d ca u s ed“l ar ge amounts of surfa ce w ater to be diverted” onto he r proper ty , damag ing he r dec k and er oding por tions of her backy ard. Gra ham complained t o Pirkey . I n response to Graha m’s complaints, Pirkey

asked To m H a ll, Ste e le ’s c on tr a c tor , to inve sti g a te wh e the r the e ro sio n on Gr a ham’ s p ro pe rt y wa s d ue to diverted runoff. In J uly

1993, Pirkey

sent a letter

to Graha m informing he r that Ha ll had inspected the propert i es an d wa s of the opinion that “the pr oblems with y our dec k have to do with poor construction and the erosion which occur red when L ake Travis flooded in late ’ 91 and ea rly ’92.” Howeve r, Pirkey

ag ree d to inquire as to w hether there was a fea sible solution for preve nting water f r o m f l o w i n g o n t o G r a h a m ’ s p r o p e rt y. Gra ham hired Thoma s L oomis, a profe ssional eng ineer and hy drolog ist, to perform a preliminary draina g e analy sis. I n April 1996, L oomis sent a letter to Gra ham in which he disc ussed his f indings. L oomis asserted that “ flows have been dive rted by y our neig hbor such that they now enter y our prope rty

in a location diffe ren t from where the y did prior to the construc tion . . . of a draina g e p i p e and inl et sy stem.” L oomis sugg ested that the “ footing s of the lower portion of 1I n September or October 1998, Gra

ham’s lower

deck be g an to cr ack a

nd the stairs wa shed 2 awa y . I n Marc h 1999, Gra ham sued Pirkey

in T ravis County

small claims court. In May 2000, 3 she filed a

separ ate law suit in t he county court at law. The small claims court suit was first abated and the n c on so lid a te d w iththe c ounty c ourt a t la w s uit in N ov e mbe r 2 00 0. Th e c on so lid a te d la ws uit was dismissed with pr ejudice for want of prosec ution in October 2003. The rec ord does not reve al if the re wa s any

se ttl e me nt p re c e din g the 20 03 dis mis sa l. 3 [Graham’s] backy ard de ck” ha ve bee n underc ut by the “er osive flows from surfa ce runoff supplied from the ne w pipe outflows.” 2

I n 2002, Pirkey

remove d the wall that cha nneled r ainwate r int o t h e s u m p are a surrounding the drainag e pipe added in 1990. Gra ham claims that the removal of the wa ll further altere d the direc tional flow of the diver ted wate r, cr eating a new runof f cha nnel that dumps water on the front of

her pr operty an d has now de stroy ed her front y ard f

ence and other

portions of her y ard. In J anuar

y 2004, Gra

ham s ued P irkey in district court for damag es stemming f

rom nuisance , trespass a nd the alleg ed unlawf

ul diversion of water
. Pirkey g ener ally denied Gr aham’ s alleg ations 3

and mov e d f or su mma ry jud g me nt, a sse rt ingthat a ll o f G ra ham’ s c la ims we re ba

rr e d b y the statut e of limitations. Based on the supreme court’s hol ding in Schneide r Nat’l Car riers, Inc. v . Bates , 147 S.W .3d 264 (Tex. 2004) , Pirkey argued that the runoff from eac h rainfa ll c onstitut es a p er m anent nuisance , that Gra

ham’s cause of action acc rued in 1990, and that the applica ble limitations period expired two y ear s later.

I n Schneide r

se ve ra l r e nte rs and

ho me ow ne r s , wh o h a d

r e sid e d n e a r t

he Ho us ton

Shi p Channel for

at least two y ear s, alleg ed that their pr operty was c onstantly

cover ed with dirt and sootThe supre me cour t noted that the limitations period for a private nuisance cl aim is two 4 y ear s. Schneide r Nat’l Car riers, Inc. v . Bates , 1 47 S.W. 3d 26 4, 27 0 ( Te x. 20 04 ); see also Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a ) (West Supp. 2005). 4 that e manate d fr om the de fe nd a nts ’ m a nu fa c tur ingop e ra tio ns . Schneide r , 147 S.W .3d at 268. The 4 residents’ a ffidavits indicate d that t h e o ffe nsive conditions were ong oing a nd fre quent. Id . The de fe nd ants mov e d f

or su mma ry jud g me nt o n li mit a tio ns a sse rt ingtha t th e re sid e nts ’ affid avits
es t ablished as a

matter of la

w that their c laims alleg ed per manent nuisanc es. Id
. a t 2 69. The supreme c ourt held:
I f a nu isa nc e oc c ur s se ve ra l ti me s in the y e a rs le a din g up to a tr ial and is lik e ly

to c on tin ue , ju ro rs wi ll g e ne ra lly

have e no ugh evi den c e of fr e qu e nc y

and dura tio n to rea sonably

evaluate its impact on nei gh b o ri ng proper ty values. In such ca ses, the nuisance should be treated as pe rmane nt, even if the exact dates, fr equenc y , or extent o f fut ure da

mag e re main unknown. Converse ly , a nuisanc e as to whic h any future impact re mains speculative at the time of trial must be dee med “tempor ary .”
Id . at 280. Apply ing this distinction to the residents’ claims, the s upreme court found that none of the re sid e nts ’ a ff

ida vit s a lle g e d “ c on dit ion s th a t w e re so sp or a dic or un pr e dic ta ble that a jur y wo uld have to guess their e ffe ct.” Id . at 291. Ther efor e, the supre me cour t held th at t he nuisanc es we re perma nent and that the r esidents’ c laims were barr ed by the statute of limitations. Id . at 291-93. I n response to Pirkey ’s motion for s ummary judgme nt, Gra ham claimed that Pirkey
su bs tanti a lly

c ha ng e d th e or ig ina l nu isa

nc e in 20 02 by

re mov ingthe wa ll that c ha nn e le d w a te r i nto the sump are a and, ultimately , into the draina g e pipe. Gra ham maintains that this act cre ated a newTh e a pp lic a bil ity of the dis c ov e ry

ru le wa s n ot p le d b e low

a nd is n ot a n is su e on a pp e a l. 5 5 and distinct nuisance
. The district cour t gr anted Pirkey ’s summary -judg ment motion and dismi ssed all of Gra ham’s cla ims. This appeal followed.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW Summary judgme nt is appropriate when ther e is no g enuine issue as t o any materia l fac t and judg ment should be g rante d i n fa v o r o f the movant as a matter of la

w. DiversicareGen. Pa rtn e r, In c . v . R ub io , 1 85 S.W. 3d 84 2, 84 6 ( Te x. 20 05 ); KPM G Pe at Ma rwi c k

v . H arris on Cou nty Hous. Fin. Corp. , 988 S.W .2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). When review ing a summary judgme nt, we take
a s tr ue a ll c omp e te nt e vid e nc e fa vo ra ble to the n on mov a nt a

nd we ind ulg e e ve ry

re a so na ble infere nce a

nd resolve a

ny doubts in the nonmovant’s favor
. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v . Grant , 73 S.W .3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002). A def endant moving for summary judgme nt on the aff

irmative defe nse of limitations has the burden to (1) conclusively prove when the c ause of action ac crue d and (2 ) n egate the discover

y rule, if it applies a

nd has bee n pleade d or otherw ise raise d. D i v e r sic ar e 5 Gen. Partner , 185 S.W .3d at 846; KPMG , 988 S.W .2d at 748. I f a movant establishes that the statute of limitations bars an ac tion, the nonmovant must t h en ad d u ce summary judgme nt proof raising a fa ct issue in avoidanc e of limitations. KPMG , 988 S.W .2d at 748.

DI SCU SSIO N On a p p e a l, G r a h a m c o n te n d s th a t t h e d is tr ic t c o urt e r

r e d in g r a n ti n g s ummary judgme nt for Pirkey

on the basis of limitations because (1) she raised a n issue of mater ial fac t6

re gar d i n g a s u

b s t an t i al ch an ge i n t h e n at u re o f t h e n u i s an ce , an d (2 ) h er ca u s e o f ac t i o n al l egi n g a violation of section 11.086 of the w ater code w as timely

filed.
Nuisan ce I n her f

irst issue, Graha

m contends that the di strict court erre d in gr anting summary judgme nt on the basis of limit ations beca use she raised an issue of materia l f act conce rning whether Pirkey cre ated a new nuisanc e by removing the wall in 2002. Gra ham insists t hat the statute of limit ations does not bar he r cla im for damag es stemming f rom the new nuisance beca use her suit was filed within two y ear s of the date the wall wa s removed.

A “nuisanc e” is a

condition that substantially interfe res with the use and enjoy ment of land by c a us ingun re a so na

ble dis c omf

or t or ann oy a nc e to p e rs on s o f o rd ina ry se ns ibi lit ie s. Schneide r , 147 S.W .3d at 269. The limitations period for a private nuisanc e cla im is t wo y ear s. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 1 6. 00 3 ( Wes t Su pp . 2 00 5) ; Schneide r , 147 S.W .3d at 270. As with many

other c ommon-law cla ims, the acc rual date of a common-law nuisanc e is not define d by
s t at u t e. Schneide r , 147 S.W .3d at 270. The a ccr ual of a nuisance claim depe nds on whether the nuisance alleg ed is “pe rmane nt” or “ temporar y .” Id . A per m an en t nuisance c laim acc rues whe n injury first occ urs or is discover ed; a tempor ary nuisance claim ac crue s anewupon eac h injury
. Id
. A c c r u a l o f li mi tati o n s is a

qu e s ti o n o f

la w for the court. Id . at 274-75. The Schneide r court acknow ledg ed that a distinct or substantially chang ed nuisanc e may acc rue at a later date than the orig inal nuisance
. Id . at 27 9. Th e c ourt a lso no te d th a t li mit a tio ns wo uld no t ba r a nu isan c e su it
asser ting a n entirely new and differ ent i njury to new property due to new f orce s. Id . “ Thus , a

n o ld nuisance does not excuse a ne w and diff ere nt one.” Id . at 280.7 Gra ham’s wr itten response to P irkey ’s m otion asser ted t hat the summary -judg ment
ev i d en ce ra i s ed an i s s u e o f m at er i al fa ct as t o wh et h er t h e re m o v al o f t h e wa l l ar o u n d t h e d ra i n age pipe and sump ar ea in 2002 substantially chang ed the nature of the orig inal nuisance and cr eate d a
new a nd distinct nuisance. In her a ffidavit, Gr aham state d:
After Fe bruar y 2002, the pipe heade r wall was remove d causing the third new stre et runoff flow. . . . This ne w runoff channe ling has destroy ed our fr ont y ard f ence and the backy ard porch walls and awning supports.
. . . The re moval of the pipe he ader wall ca used the water to now flow dir ectly over the pipe instead of a

way from it, once the pipe bec omes overw helmed with runoff
. I nstead of being forc ed bac k onto the street by this header

wall, the stree t r

unoff now flows over the pipe and throug h our front y ard f

ence and over

our y ard. As well, the remova l of the pipe heade r wall reduc ed the head pressure of the wate r e nte ri ngthe pip e re du c ingthe fl owthr ou g h th e pip e . . . . Th is w a ll r e mov a l no t on ly chang ed the f

low pattern outside of

the pi pe but also incre ased the outside flow as well with less water

running throug h the pipe.
I n addition, L oomis’s 1996 r eport indicates that the wall was de signe d to be a f unctional component of the dra inag e sy stem added in 1990.

I t is undisput ed that the diverted water c onstitut ed a r ecur ring perma

nent nuisance under the holding announce d in Schneide r . Id . And there is no dispute that the diversion of water beg an and w as discover ed in 1990. We ag ree with Pirkey that any damag es i n cu rre d beca

use of Steele’s installation of the draina g e pipe, g radingand leve ling in 1990 ar e bar red by limit ations. See id. at 270. Howe ver, taking G raha m’s summary -judg ment evidenc e as true and indulg ing e very infere nce in Gr aham’ s favor , we hold that Gr aham showe d there was a fac t question as to whether Pirkey ’s re moval of the wall in 2002 substantially chang ed the or igina l nuisance to such a n extent that a new a

nd distinct nuisance wa s cre ated. Id . at 2 79 -8 0; see also Southwestern Elec . Power Co. ,8

73 S.W .3d at 215. Consequently , Pirkey did not car ry his summary

judgme nt burden of e stablishing that all of Gra

ham’s claims are barr ed by the statute of limitations. DiversicareGen. Partner , 185 S.W. 3d a t 84 6. I f a

ne w n uis a nc e wa s c re a te d in

20 02 , G ra

ham’ s c la ims fo r tho se dama g e s w ou ld
no t be ba rr e d b y lim itatio ns . We hol d tha t the dis tr ic t court e rr e d in g ra nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt i n fa vo r o f P ir ke y a s to Gr a ham’ s c la ims ste mmi ngfr om t he 20 02 re mov a l of

the wa ll.

Se c ti on 1 1. 08 6 o f the wat e r c ode

I n her se cond issue, Gr aham c laims that the district court er red in g ranting summary judgme nt on her c laim that Pirkey violated sec tion 11.086 of the wate r code by unlawfully

diverting water onto her proper

ty
. Section 11.086 states: “No person may divert
. . . the natura l flow of surf ace water s in this state .
. . in a manner t hat damage s the property of another by the overflow of the w ater div e rt e d. ” Te x. Wat e r C od e Ann. § 11 .0 86 (a ) ( Wes t 20 00 ). B e c a us e se c tio n 1 1. 08 6 e sta

bli sh e s a statut or y c a us e of a c tio n, Gr a ham in sis ts that th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr on e ou sly

a pp lie d th e ru le
announce d in Schneide r , pert ai n i n g t o the ac crua l of a c ommon-law nuisance claim, to deter mine that her c ause of

action under

the wate r code was ba

rre d by the statute of limitations. Pir ke y ma int a ins tha

t G ra ham’ s wa te r c od e c la im w a s su bje c t to the tw o- y e a r s ta tut e of limit ations for damag es to land imposed by section 16.003(a ) of the c ivil practice s and re medies code. Sec tion 16.003(a) r equire s a per son to “bring suit for trespa ss for injury to the estate or

to the proper ty of anothe r . . . not later tha n two y ear s after

the day the ca use of a ction acc rues.” Tex. Ci v. Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 1 6. 00 3( a ) ( Wes t Su pp . 2 00 5) . Ac tio ns fo r dama g e to r e a l pr op e rt y mus t be broug ht within two y ear s of the injury
. Veliscol C hem. Corp. v. W

inogad , 956 S.W .2d 529, 5309

(Tex. 1997) (citing Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Co d e Ann. § 16.003). S imilarly , the Sc hn e ide r court
rec og nized that the limi tations period for a private nui s an ce cl aim is two y ear s. Schneide r , 147 S.W. 3d a t 27 0 ( c iti ngTe x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 1 6. 00 3). I n a dd iti on , th e F ourt e e nth Court of Appea ls has specific ally held that a two-y ear statute of limit ations applies to claims broug ht under se ction 11.086 of the water c ode. See A nders v. M allard & Mallard, Inc. , 817 S.W .2d 90, 95 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1991, no writ). We ag ree with Pirkey that a two-y ear

statute of limit ations applies to Gra ham’s water c ode cla ims. We have he ld that issues of materia l fac t exi st with reg ar d t o whether the 2002
remova l of the wall around the draina g e pipe and sump a rea cre ated a new nuisance
. Simi larly , there is a materia l fac t issu e as t o whether the re moval of the wa ll and the re sulting cha ng e in the direc tional flow of the diver ted water constituted a second violation of water c ode sec tion 11.086. Any statutory cause of ac tion for damag es pre dicated on the 1990 diversion of water is ba rre d by the statute of limit ations. Howeve r, beca use there are fac t issues reg arding whether the re moval of the
wa ll c on sti tut e d a

se c on d w a te r c od e vio la tio n tha t cr e a te d ne w da ma g e s, a nd be c a us e Gr a ham’ s su it was filed w ithin two y ear s from the date the wall was remove d, we hold that the district court er red in g ra nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt i n Pi rk e y ’s fa

vo r a s to the se c la ims on

the ba sis of

lim itatio ns . CO NC LU SION We affir m the district court’s summ ary judgme nt as t o Gra ham’s claims for damag es from nuisanc e, tre spass, or statutory diversion of water that wer e caused by the 1990 modifications to Pirkey ’s p r o p e rty
. H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e w e h o ld th a t is s u e s o f mate r ia l f a c t e xis t, w e r e v e r s e the summary judgme nt in part and remand for further proce eding s to deter mine whether

Pirkey cre ated10

a n ew n u i s an ce in 2002 that caused ne w and distinct damag es to Gra ham’s prope rty

and whe ther there was a

second violation of the w ater code.

Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P atterson a nd Pury ear Affir med in Part; Reverse d and Remande d in Part Filed: Jul y

21, 2006