### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 088 -CV

M ar sha Da wn We iss , A ppe lla nt

v. Davis Tucker; Luf

thefe, LLC d/ b/a North by Northwest , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF 261S T COUNTY , TRAVIS JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-07- 0039 72 , HO NORAB LE SUZ ANNE COVINGTO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

NO. 03-08-00089- CV

M ar sha Da wn We iss , A ppe lla nt

v. P inn acle Constr uction of Austin, T exas; Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF 261ST CO UNTY, TRAVIS JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-07- 0039 73, H ONO RAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Marsha Da

wn Weiss sued appellee s Pinnacle Construction of Austin, Texas (“Pinnac le”) and Davis Tucke r and Lufthefe , L L C d/b/a North by Northwe st (collec tively , the “re staurant owne rs”) for pe rsonal injuries Weiss sustained when she was struc k by a fa lling li ght2

fix ture in the “North by Northwe st” restaur ant in Austin. I n these c onsolidated appe als, we c onsider whether the trial court err ed in granting summary judgme nt f or appellee s Pinnacle and the restaur ant
owner s. I n two issues, Weiss cla ims that the summary judgme nts should be r ever sed bec ause she
ra ise d g e nu ine iss ue s o f m a te ri a l fa c t c on c e rn ing wh e the r P inn a c le , th e g e ne ra l c on tr a c tor , a c tua lly installed or controlled the installation of t h e l i gh t fix ture that c aused he r injuries and whether the restaur ant owner s exe rc i s ed control over the independe nt contrac tors who desig ned, built, and ins ta lle d th e fi xtur e . We wi ll a ff ir m th e summa

ry jud g me nts
. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND Weiss was a patron at the North by Northwe st r estaura nt when a custom-built light fi xtur e fe ll f

ro m th e diningro om c e ili ngon to h e r h e a d a nd sh ou lde rs , c a

us inghe r s e ve re inj ur ie s. The lig ht fix ture, which weig hed one hundred pounds, had be en suspende d from the c eiling using
a ce iling fa

n mounting kit rate d for a maxi mum load of forty pounds. I t is undisputed that the light fi xtur e fe ll b e c a

us e the mou

nti ngbr a c ke t f

a ile d to su

pp or t it s w e ig ht. Wei ss b ro ug ht s e ve ra l c la ims a g a ins t th e re sta ur ant o wn e rs un de r p re mis e s- de fe c t,
ne g lig e nt- hir ing , a

nd pr od uc ts- lia bil ity the or ie s, c la imi ngthat the res ta ur ant o wn e rs fa ile d to (1) e x erc ise ordinar

y car e to re duce or

eliminate the risk of ha rm posed by

the light f

ix ture, (2) pr operly

inspect the premises in order to discover the light fix ture’s unsafe condition, (3) employ a compe tent contra ctor to desig n, build, and install the light fixt ure, a nd(4) pr oduce, de sign, a nd
manu fa c tur e a

sa fe r a lte rn a tiv e to t

he de fe c tiv e lig ht f

ixtur e . Sh e a lso br ou g ht n e g lig e nc e c la ims ag ainst Pinnacle, the g ener al contra ctor; F rank F ox , who desig ned and c onstructed the lig ht fix ture; and Tra cy Wil liams ( “Willi ams”) d/b/a Williams Electric Company (“WEC”), the e lectric ian who3

she alleg ed had “ participated in assembling and installing” the light fix ture. In addition, Weiss sued the projec t a

rchitec t, Patr ick Ousey , d/b/a FAB Arc hitecture , for br eac h of his profe ssional duty of
car e, and F anTe c, Inc., the c ompany that produce d the mou n t i n g b ra cket use d to hangthe light f i x tur e , un d e r

a p r o d u c t s - l i a b i l i ty th e o r

y. Pinnacle and the restaur ant owner s both f iled motions for traditional and no-e vidence summary judgme nt. Pinnacle moved for summary judgme nt on the g rounds that it did not desig n, fabr icate, or

install the light fixt ure a

nd that there was no e vidence that it owed or brea ched a ny leg al duty to Weiss. In their traditional summary -judg ment motion, the restaura nt owners a

rgued that they did not have a r ight to contr ol and did not exercise contr ol over t h e d es i gn of the fa iled mounting brac ket or the installation of the lig ht fix ture. The y further argued that Weiss could not prove that the y ha d n oti c e of

the de fe c t or that the y ha d fa ile d to e xer c ise re a so na ble c are to e lim inate the ri sk posed by the bra cket. In their no-evidence motion, the restaura nt owners a sserted that Weiss had no evidenc e to support any

of the e lements of her

premises-liability

claim. After a hear ing, the trial court g rante d Pinnacle’s and the restaur ant owner s’ motions fo r summ ar

y j u d g m e n tan d

s e v e r e d W e i s s ’ s c l a i m s a g a i n s tth o s e d e f e n d an t s . T h e s e a

p p e a ls followed.
STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW We reviewthe trial cour

t’s summary -judg ment ruling s de novo. ValenceOperating Co. v . D or

se tt , 1 6 4 S
. W
. 3 d

6 5 6 , 6 6 1 ( T e x. 2 0 05 ); Prov ide nt L ife&Ac c ide nt I ns . Co . v . Kn ott , 128 S.W .3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). We will aff irm the s ummary judgme nt if any g round pre sented4

to the trial court is meritorious. See P icke tt v. Texas Mut. Ins. Co. , 239 S.W
. 3 d 8 2 6, 840 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.).

Whe n, a s h e re , a

pa rt y mov e s f or summa ry jud g me nt u

nd e r b oth ru le 16 6a (c ) a

nd ru le 166a(i), w e first re view the tria l court’s s u m m ary judgme nt under the standa rds of rule 166a(i). Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 1 35 S.W. 3d 59 8, 60 0 ( Te x. 20 04 ). Un de r r ule 16 6a (i ), a

mov ant m

us t
a sse rt that, a ft e r a de qu a te tim e fo r dis c ov e ry , the re is no e vid e nc e of on e or mor e e sse nti a l e le me nts of a c la im o r d e fe ns e on

wh ic h a n a dv e rs e pa

rt y wou ld have the burd e n o f p ro of a t tr ia l. Te x . R. Civ . P. 16 6a (i ); se e Fo rt W or th O ste op ath ic Ho sp ., In c . v . R e ese , 148 S.W .3d 94, 99 (Tex
. 2 0 0 4 ). To def

eat a rule 166a (i) summary -judg ment motion, the nonmovant must produce summary -judg ment evidenc e ra ising a gen u i n e is sue of mate rial fa ct. Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(i); Ford Motor Co. , 135 S.W .3d at 600. A gen u i n e i s sue of mate rial fa ct exist s if the nonmovant pr od uc e s mor e tha

n a sc int ill a of e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh ingthe e xiste nc e of

the c ha lle ng e d e le me nt. Ford Motor Co. , 135 S.W .3d at 600. More tha n a s ci n t i l l a o f s upporting evidenc e exists i f the
e vid e nc e wo uld

a llo w r e a so na

ble and fa ir -m in ded pe op le to d if fe r i n th e ir

c on c lus ion s. King Ranc h, Inc. v. C

h a p man , 118 S.W .3d 742, 750-51 (Te x . 2003). “L ess than a sc intill a of evidenc e exists w h en the e vidence is ‘so weak as to do no more than c reate a mer e surmise or suspicion’ of a f

act.” Id. (q u o t i n g Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc. , 6 5 0 S
. W
. 2 d 6 1 , 6 3 ( T e x . 1 9 8 3 ) )
. If the non-movant fa ils to produce more than a scintil la of evidenc e under that burden, then there is no need to a naly ze whether

the movant’s proof

satisfied t h e rule 166a(c ) burde n. Ford Motor Co. , 135 S.W .3d at 600.5 DI SCU SSIO N
Pi nnac le ’s Summ ar

y Jud gment In her first issue, Weiss ar g ues that the trial court err ed in grantingPinnacle’s motions for summary

judgme nt beca

use there is a g enuine issue of mat er i al fa ct as t o whether Pinnacle or W E C i n s t a l l e d

th e l i g h tf

i x tur e . In s o ar g u i n g , W e i s s r e l i e s o nW i l l i am s ’ s d e p o s i t i o nt e s t i m o n y, wher ein he state d that he knew that WEC di d n o t install t he custom lig ht fix tures bec ause the installation of custom fix tures wa s not within t he scope of his work or inc luded within his bid for the projec t. Wi lliams also testified reg arding a dispute betwee n his on- site elec trician, J oe B urlew, and Pinnacle ove r WEC’s refusa l to inst all t h e custom fix tures bec ause the fix tures we re not “code -compliant.” Williams testi fied, “ And then I g et involved and go out and se ttle it and tell them we’ re not g oing to do it.” Asked if he knew who ultimately installed the custom light fixture in the
ma in d ini ngro om, Willi ams a ns we re d, “ No , I

do no t.” Ac c or din g t o W eis s, the on ly re a so na ble infere nce that can be drawn from Willi ams’s testimony is that Pi nnacle must have installed the lig ht fi xtur e s b e c a

us e Pinna c le , a s th e g e ne ra l c on tr a c tor , w a s r e sp on sib le fo r a ll a sp e c ts o f t he pr oje c t, inc lud ing the e le c tr ic a l wo rk
. In su pp or t of thi s c la im, Wei ss p oints t o th e a ff ida vit of the arc hit e c t, Patrick Ousey , who aver

red that Pinnacle, “the g ener al contra ctor, wa s to provide the re mainder of th e d es i gnwo rko nth e p ro j ec t , i n cl u d i n g th e m ec h an i ca l , e l e c t r i ca l an d p l u mb i n g d es i gn eng ineer ing” and that the r estaura nt owners ha d ag ree d to deliver the c ustom li g ht fi x t u res to the g ener al contra ctor for

installation. Pinna c le re sp on ds that w hil e Willi ams’ s te sti mony m i ght b e s o m e e v i d e n c e that W

EC did no t insta ll the lig ht fi xtur e , the re c or d is wh oll y de vo id o f a

ny e vid e nc e that Pi nn ac leinstalled6

it or controlled whoeve r did. Pinnacle fur ther urg es that Ousey ’s statements ar e “c onclusory” and incompetent beca

use they wer e not ba sed on his persona l knowledg e, and a re the ref ore not prope r summary -judg ment proof. Acc ording ly , Pinnacle argues that its no-e vidence motion for summary judgme nt should be aff

irmed on the basis that there was no evidence that it either owe d or bre ache d
a duty to We iss and , th e re fo re , n o e vidence th a t Pinna c le pr oximate ly c a us e d We iss ’s inj ur ie s. We ag ree . The lawis well settled that a g ener al contra ctor such a s Pinnacle has no duty to ensure t h at its independent contra ctors per form wor k in a safe manner . S

e e F if th Clu b , I n c . v . Ramirez , 19 6 S. W.3 d 7 88 , 7 91 (T e x. 20 06 ); Lee Lew is Constr., Inc. v . Harrison , 70 S.W . 3d 778, 783 (T e x. 20 01 ); Redinger v . Living, Inc. , 689 S.W .2d 415, 4 1 8 (T ex . 1985). Ther efor e, an e mploy er cannot be held vicar iously liable for the actions of a n independe nt contrac tor un l es s the employ er reta ins some control over the manner in which that c o n t ra ct o r perf orms the work that cause s the d am age. Ramirez , 1 96 S.W. 3d a t 79 1; see Re s tate me n t ( Se c o n d ) o f T o rts § 4 1 4 ( 1 9 7 7 )
. F o r the g ener al contra ctor to be vic ariously liable, hi s control must rise to the level of direc ting how the work is to be perf

ormed o r direc ting the sa fety of the pe rfor

mance . Ramirez , 196 S.W .3d at 791; Redinger , 689 S.W .2d at 418. A rig ht o f control requires more than “a g ener al rig ht to order the work stopped or

resumed, to inspec t its progr ess or t o re ce i v e repor ts, to make sug g estions or
rec ommendations which nee d not nece ssarily be followe d, o r

to p r e s c r ib e a lt e r a

ti o n s a n d d e v iations.” K o ch Re f. Co. v. Chapa , 1 1 S. W. 3 d 1 5 3 , 1 5 5 ( T e x. 1 9 9 9 )
. “ T h e r e mu s t b e s u c h a r e te n tion of a rig ht of supervision that the contr actor is not entirely

fre e to do the wor

k in his own way .” Id.7 In order to overc ome Pinnacle’ s no-evidenc e motion, W e is s h a d to p r o d u c e mor e than a scintilla of evide nce that Pinnacle either installed the light fixture or exerc ised sufficie nt control over its installation, thereby g iving r ise to a lega l duty

to Weiss. W eiss did not produce a ny evidenc e that Pinna c le a c tua lly

pe rf or me d th e ins ta llatio n o f t

he lig ht fi xtur e that c a

us e d he r i nju

ri e s. No r d id sh e br ingfo rw ard

any e vid e nc e that Pinna c le e xer c ise d a rig ht of c on tr ol ove r wh oe ve r d id i ns ta ll the fixt ure, le t alone show that Pinnacle actua lly eng ag ed another elec trical contra ctor to per form the ins ta llatio n. Wei ss’ s b are a sse rt ion that, up on WEC’ s re fu sa l to ins ta ll the fi xtur e s, Pinna c le wo uld have ha d to hire someone e lse to do the work, and would have ne cessa rily controlled that pe rson’s perf orman ce i s m er e conjecture ; it is not evidence that Pinnacle exerc ised the leve l of control sufficie nt to g ive rise to a duty on the basis of vica

rious liability
. See McMillin v. State Farm Lloyds , 180 S.W .3d 183, 207 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (“‘ [A] vital fac t may not be established by piling infe renc e upon infe renc e.’” ) (quotingSc hl umb e rge r W e ll S urv e y ing Cor p. v . No rte

xOi l &Gas Corp. , 435 S.W .2d 854, 858 (Tex. 1968)). B eca use Weiss has not shown that the trial cour t
err ed in g rantingPinnacle’s 166a (i) motion, we over rule he r first issue.
The Re sta ura nt O wne rs’

Summ ar y Jud gment In Weiss’s second issue, she a rgu es that summary judgme nt should not have bee n g rante d in favor of

the re staurant o wn er s beca use she r aised a

g enuine issue of

materia l fac t
conce rningwhether

the re staurant owne rs controlled whoever installed the light fixture. Mu c h li ke a g e ne ra l c on tr a c tor , “ an ow ne r or oc c up ie r of land do e s n ot o we any

duty to ensure that an independe nt contrac tor perf orms his work i n a saf

e manne r.” Ho e c hs t- Ce lan ese Corp. v. Mende

z , 9 6 7 S
. W
. 2 d 3 5 4 , 3 5 6 (T ex . 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Abalos v. Oil Dev . Co. , 544 S.W .2d 627,8

63 1 ( Te x. 19 76 )) ; see W

illiams v. Olivo , 952 S.W .2d 523, 527 (Tex. 1997). “How ever , a duty may arise where the employ er r etains ‘some c ontrol over the ma nner in whic h the independe nt contra ctor’s w ork is perf

ormed.’” Mende

z , 967 S.W .2d at 356 (q u o t i n g Redinger , 6 8 9 S
. W
. 2d at 418). Ye t even where such a duty does arise, it is “commensurate with the control” that the owner reta ins over the independe nt contrac tor’s work. Ge ne ra l E le c . Co . v . M or itz , 257 S.W .3d 211, 214 (Tex. 2008). Thus, it is not enough to show that t h e defenda nt controlled one a spect of the independe nt contract o r’ s ac t i v ities if the injury arose from anothe r. Id. Th e re fo re , in or de r t o withstand the resta

urant owne rs’ no-e vidence summary judgme nt, Weiss had to produce more than a scintilla of evide nce that the restaur ant owner s controlled the a cti v i t y from which he r injury indisputably

arose —the installation of the light f ix ture. She fa iled to meet this burden. Ev e n when

c on sid e re d in

the lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to We iss , a

nd re so lvi nga ll infere nces in he r favor, the evidenc e shows only that the re staurant owne rs exercised c ontrol over the desig n and fa

brication of the light fix tures. Weiss’s e vidence on this point consists of Ousey ’s
a ff ida vit , w he re in h e state d th a t th e re sta ur ant o wn e rs ma de the de c isi on to u se c us tom

lig hts , contac ted Fox to assist i n the desig n and asse m bly of the lig hts, approved the lightingdesig n and fix ture prototy

pe, author ized production of the li g ht fix tures base d on the prototy pe, and pr ovided the fa br ic a te d li g hts to the g e ne ra l c on tr a c tor fo r i ns ta llatio n. As the re sta ur ant o wn e rs po int

out, t his evidenc e would be c loser to supporting Wei s s ’s cl ai m s ag ainst them if, rathe r than the mounting brac ket, the lig ht fix ture itself had failed; it did not. Be cause Weiss produce d no evidenc e that the restaur ant owners had any control over the actual installation of t he fix ture, the trial court did not err in gr anting the re staurant owne rs’ motion for summary judgme nt under rule 166a(i).9 CO NC LU SION Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d We iss ’s issues on

a pp e a l, w e a ff

ir m th e summa

ry jud g me nts in fa vo r o f t he a pp e lle e s.

J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: Mar ch 27, 2009