****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************SAMUEL KEARSE v. PRISCILLA B. TAYLOR ET AL. (AC 38031)
Lavine, Alvord and Sheldon, Js. Argued April 13—officially released May 31, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Hon. John C. Flanagan, judge trial referee.)
Robert M. Singer, for the appellants (defendants). Jeremy C. Virgil, with whom, on the brief, was Michael S. Samsel, for the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion PER CURIAM. The defendants, Priscilla B. Taylor and John Nicolas Tieman, temporary administrator of the estate of Paul Bradley Taylor, Jr.,1 appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion to open a default judgment rendered after a hearing in damages. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly deniedtheirmotionasuntimelybecausethecourtfailed to send them notice that a default judgment had been rendered against them. We reverse thejudgment ofthe trial court and remandthe case forfurtherproceedings.
The record reveals the following relevant factual and procedural history. On January 17, 2007, the plaintiff suffered severe burn injuries while a tenant at the New Haven apartment building owned by the defendants. OnDecember 1, 2008, he commencedthepresentaction against the defendants, alleging that he was relighting

a gas stove for purposes of generating heat for his dwelling when his clothing caught fire. He alleged that the defendants were liable for the injuries he sustained because they knewthe apartmentbuilding was not adequately heated and they failed to maintain and repair the premises. On December 19, 2008, Attorney Patricia A. Cofrancesco filed an appearance on behalf of the defendants. On July 29, 2009, Attorney Howard A. Lawrence filed an appearance on behalf of the defendants in lieu of Attorney Cofrancesco’s appearance. While the action was pending, the plaintiff filed an application for a prejudgment remedy against Priscilla Taylor, which was granted by the court, A. Robinson, J., on January 24, 2012, in the amount of $2 million.2 OnMarch 20, 2012, theplaintifffiled amotionto default the defendants for failure to disclose assets to satisfy the prejudgment remedy and for failure to plead. Judge Robinson granted the plaintiff’s motion, absent objection, on April 16, 2012. On July 27, 2012, apparently unbeknownst to the parties or the plaintiff’s counsel, Lawrence was placed on inactive status3 for an indefinite period by the court, Silbert, J., in Disciplinary Counsel v. Lawrence, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, Docket No. CV-12-6028710-S (2012). In that order, the court appointed ‘‘Attorney Michael Moskowitz

. . . as Trustee to inventory Mr. Lawrence’s files and protect the interests of Mr. Lawrence and of his clients.’’
On September 20, 2012, which was approximately twomonths afterLawrencehadbeenplaced oninactive status, theplaintifffiledamotionforthe courtto render

a judgment on the default entered on April 16, 2012, and a request for a hearing in damages. The plaintiff certified that he sent a copy ofthat motion and request to Lawrence. Nonoticewas senttotheindividual defendants. Judge Robinsongrantedthe motionforjudgment

on the default on October 22, 2012. A court-generatednotice of the ruling was sent to all counsel of record. At that time, the court file showed Lawrence as the defendants’ attorneyofrecord eventhoughhe hadbeen placed on inactive status. Accordingly, notice was sent to Lawrence.
A hearing in damages was scheduled for November 28, 2012. OnNovember27, 2012, theplaintifffiledexhibits for the hearing, including the plaintiff’s affidavit, photographs of the plaintiff at the hospital and during recovery, a medical bill summary, and 369 pages of medical records. At the outset of the hearing in damages, the court, Hon. John C. Flanagan, judge trial referee, expressly acknowledged the absence of Lawrence and the defendants. In response, the court clerk informed the court that Lawrence’s juris number was inactive. The courtthen stated: ‘‘Well, Ihappento know from a collateral issue that his right to practice was suspended by Judge Silbert. He did not disbar him, but he simplysuspendedhisrighttopracticelawuntilsome medical issues have been resolved.

. . . Oh, and incidentally, also I learnedthat anotherindividualhadbeen appointed trustee.’’ The court asked the clerk whether Lawrence had ever withdrawn his appearance for the defendants, and the clerk responded ‘‘no.’’ The court noted that there was no evidence in the file that Lawrence had referred this matter to any other attorney to represent the defendants. The court then stated that it had concerns: ‘‘The lawyer [Lawrence] did appear in the case and the lawyer has never filed a motion to withdraw his appearance, so he is still the counsel of record and it disturbs me alittle bit that the defendants

are notpresentlyhere to defendthe matterin anyway.’’ Nevertheless, because the defendants had been defaulted, so that liability was not an issue, the court decided to proceed with the hearing in damages.4 ‘‘On the otherhand, Idohavetheinformationwhichconsists primarily of representations by the attorney representing the plaintiff, so it would seem to me, that fact coupled with the historical series of events with respect to the liability portion of the case would leave me to believe that it’s an order of the court at this time to make a finding with respect to the amount of money thatwouldrepresentafair,justandreasonablecompensation for the injuries and losses the plaintiff has sustained.’’ The court thereafter referred to the medical bills and the ‘‘emotional impact’’ of the injuries on the plaintiff, and rendered ajudgment in favor ofthe plaintiff in the amount of $2,841,914.84.5 On the ‘‘order’’ reflectingthe November28, 2012judgment afterahearingindamages, itwasnotedthatcounselfortheplaintiff had been present at the time the judgment was rendered, that a court-generated notice of the judgment had been issued on December 3, 2012, to all counsel of record, and that a ‘‘copy of [the] judgment [was] mailed to Mike Moscowitz (sic), trustee, on 12/3/12.’’6On March 27, 2015, the defendants’ current counsel filed an appearance on behalf ofthe defendants in lieu ofLawrence’sJuly, 2009appearance. Onthatsamedate, the defendants filed amotionto openthe November28, 2012 default judgment. In that motion, the defendants claimed that they never received notice that the judgment had been rendered and that they had a good and valid defense to the action. With respect to their defense, the defendants claimed that ‘‘the ambulance report and hospital records submitted to the court indicate that the plaintiff set himself on fire thereby attempting suicide, causing his own injuries.’’7 In support of their motion, the defendants filed a memorandum of law and attached copies ofvarious pages from the medical reports. The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants’ motion, arguing that the motion was untimely because it had not been filed within four months of the date that they received notice of the defaultjudgment. In support ofhis objection, the plaintifffiled his attorney’s affidavit, copies ofpleadings and court orders in the file, and copies of documents filed in the bankruptcy court in connection with a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition filed by Priscilla Taylor in 2013. Thereafter, both parties filed supplemental replies to support their respective positions.
On April 28, 2015, the defendants filed a request for oral argumentandthe opportunitytopresenttestimony with respectto theirmotionto openthejudgment. That request was denied, no hearing was held, and Judge Flanagan issued his ruling on May 21, 2015, denying the defendants’ motion to open the judgment without explanation. The defendants filed an appeal from the court’sjudgment on June 5, 2015, which they amended

on June 8, 2015, to correct the name of the defendant fromPatriciaTaylorto PriscillaTaylor. OnJune 9, 2015, the defendants filed an additional appeal formthat, this time, showed the payment ofan entry fee and the court clerk’s signature and date.
On June 29, 2015, the court issued a memorandum of decision that provided the reasons for its denial of the defendants’ motionto openthejudgment. The court noted that the notice ofthe defaultjudgment had been sent to Moskowitz, the trustee for Lawrence, and that the defendants’ motion was not filed within the four month period required by Practice Book § 17-43.8 The defendantsfiledamotionforarticulationwiththiscourt
on July 6, 2015, requesting that the trial court clarify the last paragraph in its memorandum of decision. The trial court scheduled the motion for argument on July 29, 2015. By memorandum of decision dated July 31, 2015, the trial courtprovidedthe following articulation: ‘‘The court heard oral arguments onJuly29, 2015. Judgment entered on November 28, 2012. The original attorney’s right to practice law was suspended. Attorney Moscowitz (sic) was appointed trustee for AttorneyLawrence. Copy ofJudgment was mailed to Mike Moscowitz (sic), Trustee on December3, 2012 (see attached order). No notice was sent to the defendants.’’
Onappeal, the defendantsclaimthatthe court’smemoranda of decision indicate that the court improperly consideredthenotice senttoMoskowitztobetherequisite notice of the default judgment to the defendants and, therefore, improperly determined that the defendants’ motion to open the judgment was untimely because it was not filed within the four month period required by Practice Book § 17-43.9 Specifically, the defendants argue that Lawrence, being on inactive status, was no longerrepresentingthem andthat Moskowitz, although the trustee for Lawrence, never filed an appearance on behalf of the defendants and did not represent them.10 The defendants claim that they were unrepresented since July 27, 2012, andthat no notice of the defaultjudgmenthadbeensenttothemindividually. Accordingly, it is their position that the four month deadline for filing a motion to open the judgment

never commenced.
We begin with the legal principles that guide our analysis ofthe defendants’ claim. While courts have an inherentpowerto open, correct and modifyjudgments, the duration ofthis power is restricted by rule ofpractice. Practice Book § 17-43.11 In deciding whether a motionto openajudgmentistimely, acourtmust determine whether it was filed within four months of the date that the notice of the default judgment was sent to the party in default. See Johnson v. Atlantic Health Services, P.C., 83 Conn. App. 268, 276, 849 A.2d 853 (2004). ‘‘A ruling on a timely filed motion to open is within the trial court’s discretion, and appellate review is limited to whether the court has acted unreasonably

or in abuse of its discretion.

. . . Whether a party has been given notice is a question offact

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) Batory v. Bajor, 22 Conn. App. 4, 8–9, 575 A.2d 1042, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 812, 576 A.2d 541 (1990). Accordingly, in the present case, we review the trial court’s finding that notice properly was given to the defendants underthe clearly erroneous standard of review. Id., 9.
‘‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is
no evidence in the record to support it

. . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court onthe entire evidence is left withthe definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Noroton Properties, LLCv.Lawendy, 154 Conn. App. 367, 378, 107A.3d 980 (2014). Inthepresentcase, the courtconcludedthat the motion to open was not timely filed because more than four months had passed since the date that notice ofthe defaultjudgment had been sent to Moskowitz, as trustee for Lawrence. This finding is clearly erroneous because Lawrence was not able to practice law whilehe was placed on inactive status, Moskowitz had not filed an appearance on behalf of the defendants and

was not representing them, and no notice ofthe default judgment was sent by the court to the individual defendants. The defendants were unrepresented at the time the default judgment was rendered, yet they were not sent notice that they were liable for a $2.8 millionjudgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Notice ofthejudgment mustbe sentto the defaulting party in order to determine the date that commences the four month period within which that party may file

a motion to open the judgment. ‘‘[T]he right to move to open and vacate ajudgment assumes that the party who is to exercise the right be given the opportunity to know that there is ajudgment to open.

. . . Where the defendants have not received notice of the default judgment

. . . the time within which they may move to set aside the judgment is extended by the delay in notification.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Atlantic Health Services, P. C., supra, 83 Conn. App. 276–77.
The plaintiff argues that the trial court could have determined that the defendants received actual notice ofthe defaultjudgment through the various documents filed in Priscilla Taylor’s federal bankruptcy proceedings. He claims that the dates on those bankruptcy documents clearly demonstrate that the defendants

were made aware of the default judgment more than four months prior to the filing of the motion to open, thereby making the motion untimely. That argument
was made before the trial court and copies ofthe documents were submitted to the court. The defendants responded that none ofthe referenced documents provided them with the requisite notice, and theyprovided

reasons for discounting the plaintiff’s argument. Even though the parties briefed the issue of the bankruptcy court filings, the trial court made no mention whatsoever ofthose documents in its June 29, 2015 memorandum of decision or in its July 31, 2015 articulation. There are no factual findings by the trial court with respecttotheplaintiff’s claim. The onlyfactual determination made by the court was that notice ofthe default judgment had been sent to Moskowitz as the trustee for Lawrence on December 3, 2012. For the reasons previously discussed, notice to Moskowitz was insufficient notice to the individual defendants.
The issue ofwhether the defendants received notice of the rendering of the default judgment, and, if so, when they received that notice, is a question offact for the factfinder. ‘‘It is well settled that we do not find facts.’’ Bria v. Ventana Corp., 58 Conn. App. 461, 466, 755 A.2d 239 (2000); see also Multilingual Consultant Associates, LLC v. Ngoh, 163 Conn. App. 725, 737, A.3d (2016). We, therefore, cannot make that determination.The only basis provided for the trial court’s conclusion that the defendants’ motion to open the judgment

was untimely was its factual finding that notice had been given to the defendants because it had been sent to Moskowitz on December 3, 2012; that determination

was clearly erroneous. In order to reach the merits of the defendants’ claims in their motion, the factfinder must first determine at an evidentiary hearing whether the defendants received notice ofthe defaultjudgment and, if so, on what date they received such notice. The court would then determine whether their motion was timelyfiled. Ifthe court determinesthatthe defendants’ motionto openthejudgmentwasuntimely, thenitmust deny that motion. If, however, the court concludes that the defendants’ motion to open was timely filed, then it must reach the merits ofthe defendants’ motion. See Noethev. Noethe, 18 Conn. App. 589, 596, 559 A.2d 1149 (1989). Accordingly, we conclude that this matter must be remanded to the trial court for that purpose. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1 This action initially was commenced against Priscilla B. Taylor and her husband, Paul Bradley Taylor, Jr., who died in February, 2009. The plaintiff thereafter moved to substitute the temporary administrator of his estate in place ofthe deceased. The court, Silbert, J., grantedthe motionto substitute the temporary administrator as a party defendant on January 20, 2011.

2 The court’s ordernotedthatPriscillaTaylordidnot appearatthe hearing

on the application for the prejudgment remedy.

3 Practice Book § 2-56 provides in relevantpart: ‘‘During the time an order placing an attorney on inactive status is in effect, such attorney shall be precluded from practicing law.

. . .’’

4 Practice Book § 17-34 (a) provides: ‘‘In any hearing in damages upon default, the defendant shall not be permitted to offer evidence to contradict any allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint, except such as relate to the amount of damages, unless notice has been given to the plaintiff of the intention to contradict such allegations and ofthe subject matter which the defendant intends to contradict, nor shall the defendant be permitted to denythe right oftheplaintiffto maintainsuchaction, norshallthe defendant be permitted to prove any matter ofdefense, unless written notice has been given to the plaintiff of the intention to deny such right or to prove such matter of defense.’’

5 In the plaintiff’s affidavit filed with the court for its consideration at the hearing in damages, the plaintiffaverred that his medical bills through April 27, 2007, totaled $841,914.84. The court added $2 million to that amount, for atotal award of$2,841,914.84. In his affidavit, the plaintiffhad requested compensation in the amount of $50 million as fair, just and reasonable damages.

6 At oral argument before this court, the parties’ counsel were of the impression that the court knew Moskowitz had been appointed the trustee for Lawrence’s files and that the court ordered notice of the judgment to be mailed to Moskowitz during the hearing in damages. The transcript of November28, 2012, however, reflectsthatthe courtwas aware that atrustee had been appointed, but there was no mention of Moskowitz’ name or an orderofthe courttomailacopyofthejudgmenttoMoskowitz. Nevertheless, the order itself does provide that a copy of the judgment was mailed to Moskowitz on December 3, 2012.

7 In the medical records submitted by the plaintiff to the court for the hearingin damages, there are severalpages withnotationsthattheplaintiff’s injuries were self-inflicted. For example, in the ambulance trip report is the statementthattheplaintiffdousedhimselfwith kerosene andignitedhimself

on fire. On the ambulance report transfer form, under the history ofpresent illness, is the statement that the plaintiff had self-inflicted burns caused by dousing himself with kerosene and then lighting himself on fire. That form further indicates that the plaintiff was depressed over the recent loss of asibling. Similar notations appear on the Yale-New Haven Hospital progress notes and the Bridgeport Hospital operative report and discharge summary. Months later, it appears that the plaintiff reported to some of his health

care providers that the incident was accidental in nature, although other providers continued to characterize the incident as an attempted suicide.

8 The court’s June 29, 2015 memorandum ofdecision states in its entirety: ‘‘The instant case which has been pending since 2008 came to the attention of several judges over the years before it was assigned to this court as a hearing in damages on November 28, 2012. ‘‘Following an evidential hearing judgment in favor of the plaintiff was entered on said date. The instant motion to open thejudgment was not filed until March 27, 2015 which was untimely as it was well beyond the four month limitation articulated in Connecticut Practice Book 17-43. ‘‘The thrust of the defendants’ reason for failure to comply with the four month time limitation is they lacked notice of the judgment. ‘‘According to the clerk notice of the judgment was sent to Attorney Moskowitz, trustee for Attorney Lawrence, on December 3, 2012 whereas noted above the motion to open judgment was far beyond time prescribed by the Connecticut Practice Book. ‘‘Motion to open judgment is denied.’’

9 Practice Book § 17-43 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Anyjudgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit may be set aside within four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent, and the case reinstated on the docket on such terms in respect to costs as the judicial authority deems reasonable, upon the written motion ofanyparty orperson prejudicedthereby, showingreasonable cause, orthatagoodcause ofaction

or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of such judgment or the passage of such decree, and that the plaintiff or the defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting or appearing to make the same.

. . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

10 It is undisputed that Moskowitz never filed an appearance on behalf

on the defendants in this action.

11 Practice Book § 17-43, formerly Practice Book § 377, which sets forth the rule for opening judgments on default, was amended on June 21, 1996, to take effect October 1, 1996. Prior to that amendment, Practice Book (1978) § 377 provided in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny judgment rendered

. . . upon a default or nonsuit may be set aside within four months succeeding the date on which it was rendered

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 17-43 now provides that ‘‘[a]nyjudgment rendered

. . . upon a default or nonsuit may be set aside within four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) See Johnson v. Atlantic Health Services, P.C., 83 Conn. App. 268, 275 n.3, 849 A.2d 853 (2004).