This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-0736

Jeffery R. Schultz,

Respondent,

vs.

Scott A. Mende, et al.,

defendants and third party plaintiffs,

Respondents,

vs.

City of Madison Lake,

third party defendant,

Appellant.

Filed December 8, 2014

Affirmed

Reilly, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court

File No. 07-CV-11-4056

Karl O. Friedrichs, Friedrichs Law Office, P.A., Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent 

Jeffrey R. Schultz)

Keith L. Deike, Perry A. Berg, Patton, Hoversten & Berg, P.A., Waseca, Minnesota (for 

respondents Scott A. Mende, et al.)

George C. Hoff, Shelley M. Ryan, Hoff, Barry & Kozar, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota 

(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and 

Reilly, Judge. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

REILLY, Judge

Appellant-city challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 

of respondent-landowners, determining that the city’s zoning ordinance did not prohibit 

the use of a recreational vehicle on the landowner’s property. Because we conclude that 

the district court did not err in its interpretation of the city’s ordinance regarding 

respondents’ use of the property, we affirm.

FACTS

In July 2007, respondents Scott and Patricia Mende (the Mendes) applied for a 

Conditional Use Permit (CUP) to construct a boat house “to secure [the] boat [and] 

fishing supplies” on their property located at 791 Main Street, Madison Lake, Minnesota 

(property). The city council for appellant City of Madison Lake (city) approved the 

application and issued a CUP allowing for the construction of a boat house “with the 

condition that at the time of sale conditional use will be reviewed.” The permit also 

required the Mendes to “comply in all respects with the ordinances of the City of 

Madison Lake.”

In April 2008, the city discovered that the Mendes were advertising the property 

for sale. The city sent the Mendes a letter clarifying that the property was uninhabitable 

and could only be used as explicitly provided for in the CUP. The letter continued:

Under our accessory use section of the ordinance, the 

building shall not contain a water supply or sewage treatment 

facilities and is limited solely for watercraft storage, including 

storage for related boating and water orientated sporting 

equipment. Chapter 5, Subd. 4(b)(1)(D) provides that 
3

boathouses cannot be used as a dwelling and do not contain 

sanitary facilities.

In spring 2008, respondent Jeffery R. Schultz (Schultz) purchased the property 

from the Mendes under the belief that he could park a recreational vehicle (RV) or 

camper on the property to sleep in while using the boat house. The city informed Schultz 

that “[s]ince the conditional use was granted solely for a boat house and not for any type 

of residential use, parking a recreational vehicle on this property is a violation of the 

conditional use permit and an illegal use.” In February 2009, the city reiterated its 

position that using an RV on the property is “inconsistent with the conditional use 

permit” and “must be denied.” In August 2009, Schultz sought to amend the CUP to 

allow for the use of an RV on the property. The city denied the application. 

Schultz thereafter initiated a tort action against the Mendes, alleging that they 

misrepresented the use of the property by suggesting that he could park an RV on the 

property to sleep in overnight and install bathroom facilities in the boat house. Schultz 

alleged that the Mendes did not notify him of the ordinances or the CUP at the time of 

sale. The Mendes filed a third-party complaint against the city, asserting that the city’s 

position on the use of Schultz’s lot was unconstitutional and unenforceable and seeking a 

declaratory ruling that it was permissible to use an RV on the property. The district court 

granted the Mendes’s motion for dispositive relief and concluded that Schultz’s 

recreational use of the RV is “clearly accessory and incidental to the primary purpose of 

the property, which is recreation.” The district court determined that the city’s zoning 
4

ordinance did not preclude the use of an RV on the property and that the Mendes were 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The city appeals. 

D E C I S I O N

Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material 

fact and a party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. On 

appeal from a grant of summary judgment, questions of law are reviewed de novo, City of 

Elko v. Abed, 677 N.W.2d 455, 460 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. June 29, 

2004), and the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom 

summary judgment was granted, State Farm Fire & Cas. v. Aquila Inc., 718 N.W.2d 879, 

883 (Minn. 2006). Here, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the issue 

presented to this court is solely a legal question regarding the interpretation of the city’s 

ordinance regulating land use. The application of local ordinances to undisputed facts is 

a legal conclusion which we review de novo. City of Morris v. Sax Invs., Inc., 749 

N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2008). 

The city appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of 

the Mendes, arguing that the district court erred by engaging in judicial construction and 

ignoring the plain language of the relevant zoning ordinance. We apply the rules of 

statutory construction to municipal ordinances and resolutions. Eagan Econ. Dev. Auth. 

v. U-Haul Co. of Minn., 787 N.W.2d 523, 535 (Minn. 2010). Statutory interpretation is a 

question of law subject to de novo review. Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 

820 N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn. 2012). 
5

The object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of 

the legislative body. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2012). The “touchstone” for statutory 

interpretation is the plain meaning of the language itself. ILHC of Eagan, LLC v. Cnty. of 

Dakota, 693 N.W.2d 412, 419 (Minn. 2005). Words and phrases are construed according 

to their common and approved usage. Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2012). However, where a 

word or phrase has acquired a special meaning or is otherwise statutorily defined, we will 

construe that word “according to such special meaning or [its] definition.” Id. The 

principles of construction for interpreting and applying a zoning ordinance are as follows: 

First, courts generally strive to construe a term 

according to its plain and ordinary meaning. 

Second, zoning ordinances should be construed strictly 

against the city and in favor of the property owner. 

[Third,] A zoning ordinance must always be 

considered in light of its underlying policy.

SLS P’ship v. City of Apple Valley, 511 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn. 1994) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Frank’s Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608-

09 (Minn. 1980)). 

The city enacted Zoning Ordinance #216 to establish regulations governing the 

development and use of structures and land within the city. Chapter 2 sets forth the 

definition of words and terms used within the ordinance. A “building” is defined as 

“[a]ny structure used or intended for supporting or sheltering any use or occupancy.” In 

turn, a “structure” is defined as anything which is “built, constructed or erected.” “Use” 

is defined as: 
6

The purpose or activity for which the land or building 

thereon is designated, arranged or intended or for which it is 

occupied, utilized or maintained and shall include the 

performance of such activity as defined by the performance 

standards of this Ordinance.

Chapter 5, subdivision 6 of the ordinance delineates certain performance 

standards, including minimum lot sizes and widths, setbacks, maximum building heights, 

and additional requirements. The property is located in an R-1 residential district, which 

provides for “low-density, single family residences and directly related complimentary 

uses.” Pursuant to the performance standards, however, the property does not meet the 

minimum lot size and width requirements to support a single-family residence. 

The city argues that Schultz impermissibly used the RV as a temporary dwelling 

unit in violation of the ordinance’s General District Provisions. The underlying purpose 

of the General District Provisions is to “establish general development standards to assure 

compatible land uses to prevent blight and deterioration and to enhance the health, safety 

and general welfare of the City.” The General District Provisions prohibit an individual 

from dwelling or residing in an “accessory building.” An “accessory building” is defined 

as “[a] use incidental to and on the same lot as a principal use.” 

The city characterizes the RV as both an “accessory building” and a “structure,”

and argues that Schultz is precluded from using it as an overnight dwelling. The district 

court rejected the city’s argument, finding that the ordinance’s definition of “accessory 

building” was ambiguous and concluding that an accessory building is limited to “brickand-mortar, immovable, permanent structure[s] built on the property.” Accordingly, the
7

district court concluded that an RV is not an accessory building within the meaning of the 

ordinance. 

On appeal, the city argues that the district court erred by disregarding the plain 

language of the ordinance and substituting its own definition. When interpreting an 

ordinance, we look first to whether the language, on its face, is clear or ambiguous.

Motokazie! Inc. v. Rice Cnty., 824 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn. App. 2012). If the language 

of the ordinance is clear and unambiguous, statutory construction is “neither necessary 

nor permitted” and the court must apply the ordinance’s plain meaning. Am. Tower, L.P. 

v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001). In matters of statutory 

construction, a statute is only ambiguous when the language is subject to more than one 

reasonable interpretation. Motokazie! Inc., 824 N.W.2d at 344. If the text of the law is 

ambiguous, a court may look to the canons of statutory construction to determine its 

meaning. Cnty. of Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 705 (Minn. 2013). 

The district court determined that an “accessory building” is defined “somewhat 

ambiguously” as a “use incidental and on the same lot as a principal use.” The district 

court stated that the city’s definition provided “little guidance as to what a building 

actually is under the zoning code.” Likewise, the district court determined that the 

definition of the word “building” was “somewhat ambiguous.” The district court 

reasoned that if an RV qualified as a “building,” as the city contends, then:

[I]t would seem that any object with structure that is being 

used or intended for any use or occupancy (e.g.: a picnic 

table, a grill, a tent, a car, etc.) would be considered a 

structure, in which case any item intended for either use or 

occupancy would constitute a building. But this cannot be the 
8

meaning of [the definition of the word “building”]. It would 

be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the word 

“building”, and make no sense. 

We agree with the district court’s analysis. When reviewing an ordinance, “[i]t is 

the duty of courts to construe statutes and ordinances to avoid absurd restrictions or 

results.” Smith v. Barry, 219 Minn. 182, 187, 17 N.W.2d 324, 327 (1944); see also In re 

Khan, 804 N.W.2d 132, 141 (Minn. App. 2011). The city’s zoning ordinance defines a

“structure” as “[a]nything which is built, constructed or erected,” including “[a]n edifice 

or building of any kind or any piece of work artificially built up and/or composed of parts 

joined together in some definite manner whether temporary or permanent in character.” 

To cast the definition of “structure” as widely as the city suggests would seem to 

incorporate items like picnic tables, tents, cars, or umbrellas, and would clearly produce 

an absurd result. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2012) (providing that a court, in ascertaining 

the intent of a lawmaking body, may presume that it “does not intend a result that is 

absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.”). 

Moreover, the definition section of the zoning ordinance separately defines a 

“recreational vehicle” as “[a] vehicular portable structure used for amusement, vacation 

or recreational activities,” and includes travel trailers, boat and utility trailers, motor 

homes, and camping trailers. The canons of statutory construction provide that “[e]very 

law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” Amaral v. St.

Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16). Thus, 

no phrase or sentence should be deemed “superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Id. 

Injecting “recreational vehicle” into the definition of “structure,” without regard for the 
9

definition of “recreational vehicle” contained elsewhere in the chapter, would render the 

latter superfluous and void. 

The parties disagree over the principal use of the property. The ordinance defines 

“principal use” as “[t]he main use of land or buildings as distinguished from subordinate 

or accessory uses.” The city claims that the principal use of the property is the boat

house itself. Respondents argue that the principal use of the property is recreational. The 

district court agreed with respondents’ interpretation and determined that the ordinary use 

of the lakeshore property consisted of “recreational activities such as boating, fishing, 

picnicking [and] camping.” The district court reasoned that the ordinance could not be 

construed so narrowly as to prohibit recreational use of the property “simply by virtue of 

the fact that a boat house has been built thereon.” We find no error in the district court’s 

determination that the principal use of the property is recreational. 

Next, we turn to the question of accessory uses of the property. An “accessory 

use” is “[a] use incidental to and on the same lot as a principal use.” Chapter 5, 

subdivision 3 is entitled “Accessory Uses” and enumerates the permitted accessory uses 

in the R-1 residential district, which are in addition to the General District Provisions. 

Chapter 5 provides an extensive list of permitted accessory uses in the R-1 residential 

district, including private garages, parking spaces and carports, RVs, home occupations,

swimming pools, tennis courts and other recreational facilities, the keeping of animals,

ice-fishing facilities, piers, docks and related storage, fences, lodging rooms, tool houses, 

sheds and similar noncommercial storage buildings, water-oriented accessory structures, 
10

and “[u]ses determined by Planning Commission to be similar to those listed in this 

Subdivision.” 

Under a plain reading of this subdivision, boat houses and RVs are both expressly 

recognized as permitted accessory uses in the R-1 residential zoning district. Subdivision 

3 allows for RV-use so long as the RV displays “current licenses” and is in “operable 

condition.” Boat houses are also permissible, provided they are not “designed or used for 

human habitation” and do not “contain water supply or sewage treatment facilities.” 

Similarly, the subdivision provides for storage facilities “used solely for the purpose of 

ice-fishing” provided said facilities “display current licenses and are not used as 

independent living/sleeping quarters.” 

Giving effect to the plain language of the zoning ordinance, it is clear that an RV 

is a permitted accessory use of the property. Under the ordinance, an accessory use must 

be “incidental to” the principal use. The ordinance does not define “incidental use,” but 

“incidental” is commonly recognized to mean “[s]ubordinate to something of greater 

importance.” Black’s Law Dictionary 830 (9th ed. 2009). The city argues that Schultz’s 

use of the RV must be incidental and subordinate to the principal use of the boat house as 

a storage facility for the boat and equipment. By way of example, the city argues that it 

would be appropriate to use the RV for storage provided it was not used to provide 

sleeping or sanitation facilities. The city’s interpretation is strained. As listed above, 

subdivision 3 specifically lists ice-fishing facilities as a permitted accessory use, 

“provid[ed] said facilities . . . are not used as independent living/sleeping quarters.” If 

the city had intended to limit RV use to passive storage and not for use as independent 
11

living/sleeping quarters, it could have included language to that effect within the 

definition contained in subdivision 3. The fact that it chose not to do so reinforces our 

determination that RV use is not strictly limited to storage. See Underwood Grain Co. v. 

Harthun, 563 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 1997) (“It is a principle of statutory 

construction that the expression of one thing means the exclusion of others . . . .”). 

Because the zoning ordinance is ambiguous and the city’s interpretation leads to an 

absurd result, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 

Mendes and against the city. 

Affirmed.