DISMISS and Opinion Filed October 16, 2018 

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In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-00667-CR ANTONYO LAMARONEAL WRIGHT, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. MA17-11858-A



### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, F rancis, and Lang-Miers Opinion by Justice Francis Antonyo Lamaroneal Wright appeals his conviction for assault. On March 12, 2018, appellant entered into a plea agreement with the State which in cluded waiving his right to appeal. That same day, appellant pleaded nolo contendere. The trial co urt found appellant guilty, assessing punishment at 365 days confinement and a $200 fine, each probat ed for 18 months, and prepared and signed a certification of a ppellant’s right to appeal, stat ing this was a “plea-bargain case” and appellant had no right to appeal. Appellant then filed a motion for new trial. He alleged, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court held a hearing after wh ich it denied appellant’s motion. Appellant subsequently filed a tim ely notice of appeal. The cl erk’s record, filed June 8, 2018, contains the trial court’s Marc h 12th certification of appellan t’s right to appeal which states–2– appellant has no right to appeal. In light of this, we request ed jurisdictional letter briefs from the parties. In his letter brief to this Court, appellant argues that this C ourt has jurisdiction because, on June 25, 2018, the trial court pr epared and signed a second cer tification of appellant’s right to appeal which states appellant has the “right of appeal from the [trial court’s] denial of Defendant’s Motion for New Trial.” Although this document is not in a supp lemental clerk’s record, appellant attached a copy to hi s letter brief. In response, the State filed its jurisdictional brief stating t he appeal should be dismissed because (1) an order denying a motion for new trial is not an a ppealable order independent of the judgment of conviction, and (2) a ppellant waived his right to a ppeal under the plea agreement with the State, notwithstanding the trial court’s second certificati on of appellant’s right to appeal. After reviewing the letter briefs a nd the record, we conclude we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. A defendant in a criminal case has the right of appeal as set o ut in the code of criminal procedure and the rules of appellate procedure. See T EX
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. art. 44.02 (West 2018); T EX
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. P. 25.2(a). In criminal cases, unles s expressly authorized by sta tute, appellate courts only have jurisdiction to review a judgment of guilt or other appealable order. T EX
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. P. 25.2(a)(2); see T EX
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. P ROC . art. 44.02 (“A defendant in any criminal action has the right of appeal under the rules hereinafter prescribed....”); Abbott v. State , 271 S.W.3d 694, 696– 07 (Tex. Crim. App.2008) (standard for determining jurisdiction is not whether appeal is precluded by law but whether appeal is authorized by law). Rule 25.2 pro vides that in “a plea-bargain case— that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agr eed to by the defendant,” a defendant may appeal only “those matters that were raised by wr itten motion filed and ruled on before trial,” or “after getting the trial court’s permission t o appeal.” T EX
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. P. 25.2(a)(2).–3– The denial of a motion for new trial, regardless of the ground or grounds raised in the motion, may not be appealed in a plea bargained case without the trial cour t’s permission. T EX
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. P. 25.2(a)(2); see Estrada v. State , 149 S.W.3d 280, 285 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d). A trial court’s certification stating the trial court gave perm ission to appeal must be true and supported by the record. See Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610, 613–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005);
Waters v. State , 124 S.W.3d 825, 826 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet . ref'd). An appellate court is obligated to compare the trial court’s certi fication with the appellate record “to ascertain whether a certification is defective and act accordin gly.” Marsh v. State , 444 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A plea bargain is a preconvic tion agreement between the State and a defendant in which the defendant agrees to plead guilty o r nolo contendere in exchange for a concession by the State (e.g., a reduction in the charge, a p romise of sentencing leniency, or a promise of a recommendation from the prosecutor to the trial ju dge as to punishment). Ex parte
Cox , 482 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Under Texas appe llate rules, a defendant who enters into a plea bargain also waives his right to appeal. Id. at 117. Once a defendant and the State enter into a plea bargain, “only the [S]tate and the defe ndant may alter the terms of the agreement.” Moore v. State , 295 S.W.3d 329, 331–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The trial cou rt’s only role in the plea bargain process is to advise the defendan t whether it will accept or reject the plea bargain. Id . at 332. Here, the record shows appellant, who was represented by counse l, entered into a plea agreement with the State. Under its terms, appellant agreed to plead nolo contendere and “expressly, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently” gave up and waived his right to appeal in exchange for the State’s recommendation he receive probation fo r eighteen months. The plea agreement was signed by appellant, his trial counsel, the distr ict attorney, and the trial court. By–4– entering the plea agreement, both parties agreed to abide by it s terms, and the trial court’s only role was to advise appellant whether it would accept or reject the plea. See Moore , 295 S.W.3d at 332. On March 12, 2018, the trial court followed the plea barg ain agreement, found appellant guilty, and assessed punishment that conformed to the agreement . Furthermore, although the trial court held a hearing on the moti on for new tria l, our review of that record shows the State did not agree to alter the terms of the plea bargain agreement by allow ing appellant to appeal the ruling on the motion for new trial. Because the record supports the M arch 12, 2018 certification of appellant’s right to appeal, we conclude the trial court erred by preparing its June 25, 2018 certification to the contrary. Appellant waived his right to appeal. Therefore, his June 5th notice of appeal is ineffective to initiate the appellate process, and we lack jurisdiction ove r this appeal. See Lundgren v. State , 434 S.W.3d 594, 599, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (when appellant waives right to appeal as part of plea bargain agreement with S tate, subsequent notice of appe al filed by him fails to “initiate the appellate process” and deprives appellate court of jurisdiction over appeal). We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Do Not Publish T EX
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. P. 47.2(b) 180667F.U05 /Molly Francis/ MOLLY FRANCIS JUSTICE–5– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
ANTONYO LAMARONEAL WRIGHT, Appellant
No. 05-18-00667-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. MA17-11858-A. Opinion delivered by Justice Francis, Justices Bridges and Lang-Miers participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Judgment entered October 16, 2018.