* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fe d. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defe ndant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary b ecause she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 10/9/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT D. NOLLEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-5226 (D.C. No. 94-C-91-W) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. SeeFed. R. App. P. 34 (f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Robert D. Nollen appeals from an order of the district court that affirms the decision of the Secretary of Health andHuman Services to deny him social security disability benefits. Plaintiff cla ims she has been disabled since February 26, 1990, due to injuries to his sinuses, back, neck, and upper extremities caused after a hot asphalt lugger explo ded near him. The administrative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits at s tep five of the five-part sequential process for determining disability. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)(discussing five-step p rocess). The ALJ determined that although plaintiff could not return to his pas t work as a roofer, he retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform l ight work limited by reduced range of motion in his neck, pain in his shoulders and hands, and hearing loss. Based on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded there were jobs plaintiff could perform within those limitations an d he was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's det ermination the final decision of the Secretary.-3-

We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 2 8 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the Secretary's decision to determine only whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Goatcher v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human S ervs. , 52 F.3d 288, 289 (10th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence “is such re levant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusi on.” Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(quotation and citation omi tted). Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or is mere conclusion. Musgrave v. Sullivan , 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment forthat of the Secretary. Kelley v. Chater , 62 F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1995). On appeal, plaintiff contends the ALJ: (1) imprope rly disregarded and mischaracterized evidence; (2) improperly discounte d plaintiff’s allegations of chronic pain; (3) improperly disregarded the findin gs of plaintiff’s consultative physicians; (4) failed to properly evaluate all of plaintiff’s nonexertional impairments; and (5) failed to demonstrate there ar e a significant number of jobs plaintiff can perform within his RFC. As far as we can tell from the record on appeal, pl aintiff did not raise his fifth issue in the district court. It is counsel’s responsibility to point out in the record where each issue was raised and ruled on. 1 0th Cir. R. 28.2(b). Because it1 The parties consented to disposition of this case b y the magistrate judge.

See28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3).

-4- appears this issue was not raised below, we will no t consider it on appeal. Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994). We have reviewed the arguments properly raised in l ight of the record on appeal, and are not persuaded by plaintiff’s claims of error. The magistrate judge 1 carefully addressed all of these arguments, and we affirm for substantially the same reasons as set forth in the magistrate jud ge’s order filed on August 25,
1995. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

2 Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge