COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Annunziata and 

 Senior Judge Coleman 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

CHARLES MICHAEL VELIKY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1871-01-2 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 MARCH 12, 2002 

SARA T. VELIKY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY 

James A. Luke, Judge 

 Thomas O. Bondurant, Jr., for appellant. 

 H. Benjamin Vincent (Vincent Law Firm, P.C., 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Charles Michael Veliky (husband) appeals a March 19, 2001 

final decree granting Sara T. Veliky (wife) a divorce a vinculo

matrimonii on the ground that the parties had lived separate and 

apart for more than one year. He contends that the trial court 

erred in (1) allowing wife and a witness to invoke the privilege 

against self-incrimination and in awarding her spousal support, 

(2) finding that an apartment complex, purchased prior to 

marriage by husband and his mother, was marital property, and 

(3) ruling that a tour business was marital property, where the 

tour business was a partnership and therefore not "marital 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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property." Because we find the issues were not properly 

preserved, we affirm. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 The evidence established that on June 23, 1997, wife served 

husband with a bill of complaint seeking a divorce a vinculo

matrimonii on the ground that they had lived separate and apart 

for more than one year. Husband filed an answer and cross bill 

of complaint on the ground of adultery. 

 By decree dated March 16, 1998, the case was referred to 

Chancellor Thomas H. Rose, Jr. (the commissioner) to determine, 

inter alia: the cause of the separation of the parties, the 

marital property of the parties and the value thereof, the 

separate property of the parties, to whom the divorce should be 

granted and for what reason, an award of spousal support, if 

any, and how the marital property of the parties should be 

equitably distributed. 

 The commissioner took evidence on the assigned issues on 

July 29, 1998 and September 11, 1998. In response to questions 

about an alleged sexual relationship, wife and Jeff Stephenson, 

a witness, invoked their Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 

privilege. Husband objected, and the commissioner overruled his 

objection. After the conclusion of the evidentiary hearings 

before the commissioner, husband requested the trial court to 
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compel the answers.1 By letter dated January 14, 1999, the trial 

court upheld the commissioner's ruling. No specific objection 

to this letter ruling is reflected in the record. 

 On November 30, 1999, the commissioner filed his report. 

Husband filed eleven "exceptions" with his objections to each 

being only that the findings were "contrary to the law and the 

evidence." There was no specific objection to either the 

commissioner's or the court's ruling on wife's and Stephenson's 

invocation of their Fifth Amendment rights. Further, the 

transcript reflects no specific objection to wife's interest in 

the apartment complex. 

 Husband requested the trial court to rule on only "three 

areas of disagreement" with the commissioner's report.2 

"Inquiry 10" concerned the role of fault and the award of $400 a 

month spousal support to wife; "Inquiry 12" concerned husband's 

claim that an apartment house was his separate property; and 

"Inquiry 5" concerned the valuation of "store inventory." No 

other exceptions were presented or argued to the trial court. 

By letter dated September 26, 2000, the trial court ruled on the 

three issues presented. In his brief for appeal, appellant 

1

 The record does not reflect how the request was made, 

whether the trial court heard argument on the issue or whether 

it was submitted only on the argument made to the commissioner. 

2

 We note that the record does not reflect how this request 

was made; however, the trial judge ruled on three designated 

areas. 
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states that the issues he raises on appeal were preserved at 

appendix page 173. However, this page reflects a blanket 

objection to the final decree of divorce, stating only that it 

is "seen and objected to for the reasons stated in the record, 

in the briefs and the pleadings." 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 "On appellate review, a divorce decree is presumed correct 

and will not be overturned if supported by substantial, 

competent, and credible evidence." Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 19 Va. 

App. 77, 83, 448 S.E.2d 666, 670 (1994). "A commissioner's 

findings of fact which have been accepted by the trial court are 

presumed to be correct when reviewed on appeal and are to be 

given great weight by this Court. The findings will not be 

reversed on appeal unless plainly wrong." Barker v. Barker, 27 

Va. App. 519, 531, 500 S.E.2d 240, 245-46 (1998) (internal 

citations omitted). "Because of the presumption of correctness, 

the trial judge ordinarily must sustain the commissioner's 

report unless the trial judge concludes that it is not supported 

by the evidence." Brown v. Brown, 11 Va. App. 231, 236, 397 

S.E.2d 545, 548 (1990) (citing Morris v. United Virginia Bank, 

237 Va. 331, 337-38, 377 S.E.2d 611, 614-15 (1989)). 

 As a preliminary matter, husband concedes that his third 

issue on appeal, that the tour business was a partnership and 

therefore not marital property, was not presented to the trial 

judge as one of his three specified exceptions. We hold that 
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any exceptions to the commissioner's report which were not 

presented to the trial court for ruling are waived. Thus, our 

consideration of this issue is barred. The record does not 

reflect any reason to invoke the good cause or ends of justice 

exceptions. See Rule 5A:18. 

III. FIFTH AMENDMENT 

 Additionally, husband failed to preserve his objection to 

the witness' Fifth Amendment claim of privilege against 

self-incrimination. The trial court ruled on the issue in its 

January 14, 1999 letter, but no objection was noted to this 

ruling or specifically preserved by the blanket objection to the 

final decree. 

No ruling of the trial court . . . will be 

considered as a basis for reversal unless 

the objection was stated together with the 

grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, 

except for good cause shown or to enable the 

Court of Appeals to attain the ends of 

justice. A mere statement that the judgment 

or award is contrary to the law and the 

evidence is not sufficient to constitute a 

question to be ruled upon on appeal. 

Rule 5A:18. "We will not search the record for errors in order 

to interpret the [husband's] contention and correct deficiencies 

in a brief." Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 

S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). 

IV. APARTMENT COMPLEX 

 Lastly, husband argues that the trial court erred in 

affirming the commissioner's determination that the apartment 
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complex, purchased by husband and his mother, was partly marital 

property. In its September 26, 2000 letter, the trial court 

addressed the apartment house as "Inquiry 12" and sustained the 

commissioner's recommendation that wife be awarded a twenty-five 

percent interest therein after tracing out the initial 

contribution of husband and his mother, because of her part in 

negotiating the purchase from her uncle and her work on the 

property during the marriage. No specific objection was made to 

this ruling before the commissioner, nor does the transcript 

reflect any objection or argument on this issue. Moreover, the 

record does not reflect any reason to invoke the good cause or 

ends of justice exceptions. See Rule 5A:18. For the foregoing 

reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Affirmed.