30976 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 98 / Friday, May 20, 2022 / Notices 

28Because the suspension of requirements under 

this notice applies throughout an academic term 

during which the suspension is in effect, DHS 

considers an F–1 nonimmigrant student who 

engages in a reduced course load or employment (or 

both) after this notice is effective to be engaging in 

a ‘‘full course of study,’’ see 8 CFR 214.2(f)(6), and 

eligible for employment authorization, through the 

end of any academic term for which such student 

is matriculated as of November 20, 2023, provided 

the student satisfies the minimum course load 

requirement in this notice. DHS also considers 

students who engage in online coursework pursuant 

to ICE coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID–19) 

guidance for nonimmigrant students to be in 

compliance with regulations while such guidance 

remains in effect. See ICE Guidance and Frequently 

Asked Questions on COVID–19, Nonimmigrant 

Students & SEVP-Certified Schools: Frequently 

Asked Questions, https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus 

(last visited May 2, 2022). 

Can a noncitizen who has been granted 

TPS apply for reinstatement of F–1 

nonimmigrant student status after the 

noncitizen’s F–1 nonimmigrant student 

status has lapsed? 

Yes. Regulations permit certain 

students who fall out of F–1 

nonimmigrant student status to apply 

for reinstatement. See 8 CFR 

214.2(f)(16). This provision might apply 

to students who worked on a TPSrelated EAD or dropped their course 

load before publication of this notice, 

and, therefore, fell out of student status. 

The students must satisfy the criteria set 

forth in the F–1 nonimmigrant student 

status reinstatement regulations. 

How long will this notice remain in 

effect? 

This notice grants temporary relief 

until November 20, 2023,28 to eligible 

F–1 nonimmigrant students. DHS will 

continue to monitor the current 

situation in Afghanistan. Should the 

special provisions authorized by this 

notice need modification or extension, 

DHS will announce such changes in the 

Federal Register. 

Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) 

An F–1 nonimmigrant student seeking 

off-campus employment authorization 

due to severe economic hardship 

resulting from the current situation in 

Afghanistan must demonstrate to the 

DSO that this employment is necessary 

to avoid severe economic hardship. A 

DSO who agrees that a nonimmigrant 

student should receive such 

employment authorization must 

recommend an application approval to 

USCIS by entering information in the 

remarks field of the student’s SEVIS 

record. The authority to collect this 

information is in the SEVIS collection of 

information currently approved by the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) under OMB Control Number 

1653–0038. 

This notice also allows an eligible F– 

1 nonimmigrant student to request 

employment authorization, work an 

increased number of hours while the 

academic institution is in session, and 

reduce their course load while 

continuing to maintain F–1 

nonimmigrant student status. 

To apply for employment 

authorization, certain F–1 

nonimmigrant students must complete 

and submit a currently approved Form 

I–765 according to the instructions on 

the form. OMB has previously approved 

the collection of information contained 

on the current Form I–765, consistent 

with the PRA (OMB Control No. 1615– 

0040). Although there will be a slight 

increase in the number of Form I–765 

filings because of this notice, the 

number of filings currently contained in 

the OMB annual inventory for Form I– 

765 is sufficient to cover the additional 

filings. Accordingly, there is no further 

action required under the PRA. 

Alejandro Mayorkas, 

Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security. 

[FR Doc. 2022–10886 Filed 5–19–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9111–28–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services 

[CIS No. 2709–21; DHS Docket No. USCIS– 

2022–0004] 

RIN 1615–ZB94 

Designation of Afghanistan for 

Temporary Protected Status 

AGENCY: U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (USCIS), 

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS). 

ACTION: Notice of Temporary Protected 

Status (TPS) designation. 

SUMMARY: Through this notice, the 

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) announces that the Secretary of 

Homeland Security (Secretary) is 

designating Afghanistan for Temporary 

Protected Status (TPS) for 18 months, 

effective May 20, 2022, through 

November 20, 2023. This designation 

allows eligible Afghan nationals (and 

individuals having no nationality who 

last habitually resided in Afghanistan) 

who have continuously resided in the 

United States since March 15, 2022, and 

who have been continuously physically 

present in the United States since May 

20, 2022 to apply for TPS. 

DATES:

Designation of Afghanistan for TPS: 

The 18-month designation of 

Afghanistan for TPS is effective on May 

20, 2022 and will remain in effect for 18 

months, through November 20, 2023. 

Registration: The registration period 

for eligible individuals to submit TPS 

applications begins May 20, 2022 and 

will remain in effect through November 

20, 2023. 

ADDRESSES: For further information on 

TPS, including guidance on the 

registration process and additional 

information on eligibility, please visit 

the USCIS TPS web page at uscis.gov/ 

tps. You can find specific information 

about Afghanistan’s TPS designation by 

selecting ‘‘Afghanistan’’ from the menu 

on the left side of the TPS web page. 

If you have additional questions about 

TPS, please visit uscis.gov/tools. Our 

online virtual assistant, Emma, can 

answer many of your questions and 

point you to additional information on 

our website. If you are unable to find 

your answers there, you may also call 

our USCIS Contact Center at 800–375– 

5283 (TTY 800–767–1833). 

Applicants seeking information about 

the status of their individual cases may 

check Case Status Online, available on 

the USCIS website at uscis.gov, or visit 

the USCIS Contact Center at uscis.gov/ 

contactcenter. 

Further information will also be 

available at local USCIS offices upon 

publication of this notice. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: You 

may contact Rena ́ Cutlip-Mason, Chief, 

Humanitarian Affairs Division, Office of 

Policy and Strategy, U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services, Department 

of Homeland Security, by mail at 5900 

Capital Gateway Drive, Camp Springs, 

MD 20746, or by phone at 800–375– 

5283. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Abbreviations 

BIA—Board of Immigration Appeals 

CFR—Code of Federal Regulations 

DHS—U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security 

DOS—U.S. Department of State 

EAD—Employment Authorization Document 

FNC—Final Nonconfirmation 

Form I–765—Application for Employment 

Authorization 

Form I–797—Notice of Action (Approval 

Notice) 

Form I–821—Application for Temporary 

Protected Status 

Form I–9—Employment Eligibility 

Verification 

Form I–912—Request for Fee Waiver 

Form I–94—Arrival/Departure Record 

FR—Federal Register 

Government—U.S. Government 

IER—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights 

Division, Immigrant and Employee Rights 

Section 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 98 / Friday, May 20, 2022 / Notices 30977 

1 In general, individuals must be given an initial 

registration period of no less than 180 days to 

register for TPS, but the Secretary has discretion to 

provide for a longer registration period. See 8 U.S.C. 

1254a(c)(1)(A)(iv). In keeping with the 

humanitarian purpose of TPS and advancing the 

goal of ensuring ‘‘the Federal Government 

eliminates . . . barriers that prevent immigrants 

from accessing government services available to 

them’’ under Executive Order 14012, Restoring 

Faith in Our Legal Immigration Systems and 

Strengthening Integration and Inclusion Efforts for 

New Americans, 86 FR 8277 (Feb. 5, 2021), the 

Secretary has recently exercised his discretion to 

provide for TPS initial registration periods that 

coincide with the full period of a TPS country’s 

initial designation or redesignation. See, e.g., 87 FR 

23211 (Apr. 19, 2022) (providing 18-mos. 

registration period under the new TPS designation 

of Ukraine); 87 FR 23202 (Apr. 19, 2022) (providing 

18-mos. registration period under the new TPS 

designation of Sudan); 86 FR 38744 (July 22, 2021) 

(providing 18-mos. registration period under the 

TPS redesignation of Somalia). For the same 

reasons, the Secretary is similarly exercising his 

discretion to provide applicants under this TPS 

designation of Afghanistan with an 18-month initial 

registration period. 

2The ‘‘continuous physical presence date’’ (CPP) 

is the effective date of the most recent TPS 

designation of the country, which is either the 

publication date of the designation announcement 

in the Federal Register or such later date as the 

Secretary may establish. The ‘‘continuous residence 

date’’ (CR) is any date established by the Secretary 

when a country is designated (or sometimes 

redesignated) for TPS. See INA section 244(b)(2)(A) 

(effective date of designation); 244(c)(1)(A)(i–ii) 

(discussing CR and CPP date requirements). 

3Afghanistan’s Collapsing Economy Heightens 

‘Risk of Extremism,’ UN Envoy Warns, Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 18, 2021, available at: 

https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-lyonsassets-humanitarian-crisis-hunger/31567075.html 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

4Nilofar Sakhi, The humanitarian and human 

security crises in Afghanistan, Middle East Institute 

(MEI), Oct. 12, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.mei.edu/publications/humanitarian-andhuman-security-crises-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 

8, 2022). 

5Afghanistan Conference 2022, UN Web TV, Mar. 

31, 2022, available at: https://media.un.org/en/ 

asset/k1p/k1puubpv5u (last visited Apr. 15, 2022). 

6Afghanistan Conference 2022, UN Web TV, Mar. 

31, 2022, available at: https://media.un.org/en/ 

asset/k1p/k1puubpv5u (last visited Apr. 15, 2022). 

7Carter Malkasian, The American War in 

Afghanistan, pp. 43 (Oxford University Press, 2021). 

8Carter Malkasian, The American War in 

Afghanistan, pp. 53–67 (Oxford University Press, 

2021). 

9 Inteqal: Transition to Afghan lead, NATO, 

updated Nov. 17, 2020, available at: https:// 

www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_87183.htm (last 

visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

10Afghanistan: Growing Challenges, International 

Crisis Group, Apr. 30, 2017, available at: https:// 

www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/ 

Continued 

IJ—Immigration Judge 

INA—Immigration and Nationality Act 

SAVE—USCIS Systematic Alien Verification 

for Entitlements Program 

Secretary—Secretary of Homeland Security 

TNC—Tentative Nonconfirmation 

TPS—Temporary Protected Status 

TTY—Text Telephone 

USCIS—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services 

U.S.C.—United States Code 

Purpose of This Action (TPS) 

Through this notice, DHS sets forth 

procedures necessary for eligible 

nationals of Afghanistan (or individuals 

having no nationality who last 

habitually resided in Afghanistan) to 

submit an initial registration application 

under the designation of Afghanistan for 

TPS and apply for an employment 

authorization document (EAD). Under 

the designation, individuals must 

submit an initial Afghanistan TPS 

application (Form I–821) and they may 

also submit an Application for 

Employment Authorization (Form I– 

765), during the 18-month initial 

registration period that runs from May 

20, 2022, through November 20, 2023.1

In addition to demonstrating continuous 

residence in the United States since 

March 15, 2022,2 and meeting other 

eligibility criteria, initial applicants for 

TPS under this designation must 

demonstrate that they have been 

continuously physically present in the 

United States since May 20, 2022, the 

effective date of this designation of 

Afghanistan, before USCIS may grant 

them TPS. DHS estimates that 

approximately 72,500 individuals are 

eligible to file applications for TPS 

under the designation of Afghanistan. 

What is Temporary Protected Status 

(TPS)? 

• TPS is a temporary immigration 

status granted to eligible nationals of a 

foreign state designated for TPS under 

the INA, or to eligible individuals 

without nationality who last habitually 

resided in the designated foreign state, 

regardless of their country of birth. 

• During the TPS designation period, 

TPS beneficiaries are eligible to remain 

in the United States, may not be 

removed, and are authorized to work so 

long as they continue to meet the 

requirements of TPS. They may apply 

for and receive EADs as evidence of 

employment authorization. 

• TPS beneficiaries may also apply 

for and be granted travel authorization 

as a matter of discretion. 

• To qualify for TPS, beneficiaries 

must meet the eligibility standards at 

INA section 244(c)(1)–(2), 8 U.S.C. 

1254a(c)(1)–(2). 

• When the Secretary terminates a 

foreign state’s TPS designation, 

beneficiaries return to one of the 

following: 

Æ The same immigration status or 

category that they maintained before 

TPS, if any (unless that status or 

category has since expired or 

terminated); or 

Æ Any other lawfully obtained 

immigration status or category they 

received while registered for TPS, as 

long as it is still valid beyond the date 

TPS terminates. 

Why was Afghanistan designated for 

TPS? 

DHS has reviewed conditions in 

Afghanistan. Based on this review, and 

after consulting with the Department of 

State (DOS), the Secretary has 

determined that an 18-month 

designation is warranted because of 

ongoing armed conflict and the 

extraordinary and temporary conditions 

described below. 

Overview 

In August 2021, the Taliban took over 

Kabul after waging a 20-year insurgency 

against the government of Afghanistan 

and U.S. and NATO forces. Armed 

conflict and insurgency continue 

throughout the country of Afghanistan.3

The Taliban is seen as both ill-equipped 

and unwilling to meet the country’s 

numerous challenges including the 

current security situation, economic 

collapse, a crumbling healthcare system, 

severe food insecurity, and respect for 

human rights.4 Afghanistan is 

undergoing a humanitarian disaster. The 

United Nations has called the current 

situation ‘‘unparalleled, with more than 

24.4 million people requiring 

humanitarian assistance to survive.’’ 5

‘‘Half the population [is] facing acute 

hunger, including 9 million people in 

emergency food insecurity—the highest 

number globally [with] [m]alnutrition 

on the rise, and livelihoods [that] have 

been destroyed.’’ 6

Armed Conflict and Security Situation 

The Taliban controlled most of 

Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, 

invoking Sharia law to remove women 

from public life, enforce strict moral 

codes, and exact draconian 

punishments for transgressions 

including dismemberment and public 

executions.7 In response to the Taliban 

harboring al-Qaida and Osama bin 

Laden after the attacks of September 11, 

2001,8 U.S. forces began airstrikes and 

a ground invasion that, by midNovember 2001, in concert with actions 

by remaining Mujahideen fighters under 

the Northern Alliance, drove the 

Taliban from most of Afghanistan. 

Following a transition of security 

responsibility from the NATO-led 

International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) to the Afghan National Defense 

and Security Forces (ANDSF),9 the 

Taliban expanded its presence across 

larger parts of the country 10 and by 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
30978 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 98 / Friday, May 20, 2022 / Notices 

afghanistan-growing-challenges (last visited Apr. 8, 

2022). 

11Special report on the strategic review of the 

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 

Report of the Secretary-General, A/72/312–S/2017/ 

696, UN Security Council, p. 3, Aug. 10, 2017, 

available at: https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/ 

default/files/special_report_on_the_strategic_

review_of_the_united_nations_assistance_mission_

in_afghanistan.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

12The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999–2021, 

Council on Foreign Relations, 2021, available at: 

https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan 

(last visited Apr. 12, 2022). 

13Thomas Gibbons-Neff, U.S. Leaves Its Last 

Afghan Base, Effectively Ending Operations, N.Y. 

Times, Jul. 4, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/world/asia/ 

afghanistan-bagram-us-withdrawal.html (last 

visited Apr. 8. 2022). 

14The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999–2021, 

Council on Foreign Relations, 2021, available at: 

https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan 

(last visited on Apr. 12, 2022). 

15The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999–2021, 

Council on Foreign Relations, 2021, available at: 

https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan 

(last visited Apr. 12, 2022). 

16Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed 

Conflict—Annual Report 2020, U.N. Assistance 

Mission in Afghanistan, Feb. 2021, available at: 

https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ 

afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_report_2020_

revs3.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Afghanistan: 

Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict—Midyear 

Update: 1 January to 30 June 2021, U.N. Assistance 

Mission in Afghanistan, Jul. 2021, available at: 

https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ 

unama_poc_midyear_report_2021_26_july.pdf (last 

visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

17 ‘‘No Forgiveness for People Like You’’ 

Executions and Enforced Disappearances in 

Afghanistan under the Taliban, Human Rights 

Watch, Nov. 30, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.hrw.org/report/2021/11/30/no-forgivenesspeople-you/executions-and-enforceddisappearances-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 15, 

2022). 

18See Afghanistan Security situation update, 

Country of Origin Information Report, European 

Asylum Support Office (EASO), Sept. 9, 2021, 

available at: https://coi.easo.europa.eu/ 

administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_

Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

19 10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2022, High risk 

of violence targeting civilians under Taliban rule, 

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 

(ACLED), Jan. 2022, available at: https:// 

acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/ 

afghanistan/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

20See Afghanistan Security situation update, 

Country of Origin Information Report, European 

Asylum Support Office (EASO), Sept. 9, 2021, 

available at: https://coi.easo.europa.eu/ 

administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_

Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

21Regional Overview: South Asia and 

Afghanistan 5–11 March 2022, ACLED, Mar. 2022, 

available at: https://acleddata.com/2022/03/16/ 

regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-5-11- 

march-2022 (last visited Apr. 8. 2022); Regional 

Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 19–25 

February, ACLED, Feb. 2022, available at: https:// 

acleddata.com/2022/03/03/regional-overviewsouth-asia-and-afghanistan-19-25-february-2022/ 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

22Regional Overview: South Asia and 

Afghanistan 26 February to 4 March 2022, ACLED, 

Mar. 2022, available at: https://acleddata.com/ 

2022/03/10/regional-overview-south-asia-andafghanistan-26-february-4-march-2022/ (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022); Regional Overview: South Asia and 

Afghanistan 5–11 February 2022, ACLED, Feb. 

2022, available at: https://acleddata.com/2022/02/ 

17/regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-5- 

11-february-2022/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

23Radio Azadi, Michael Scollon, Taliban Takes 

Revenge On Former Afghan Security Forces, Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Oct. 12, 2021, available 

at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-revengeafghan-security-forces/31505696.html (last visited 

Apr. 8. 2022). 24Afghanistan’s Collapsing Economy Heightens 

‘Risk of Extremism,’ UN Envoy Warns, Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 18, 2021, available at: 

https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-lyonsassets-humanitarian-crisis-hunger/31567075.html 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

25Abubakar Siddique, As Taliban Attempts to 

Transform from Insurgency to Government, Suicide 

Bombers Remain Key to Its Strategy, Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, November 4, 2021, available 

at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-suicidebombings-afghanistan/31546216.html (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022). 

26Abubakar Siddique & Abdul Hai Kakar, AlQaeda Could Flourish With New Strategy Under 

Taliban Rule, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 

Sept. 30, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.

rferl.org/a/afghanistan-al-qaeda-taliban/ 

31486256.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Driss ElBay, Afghanistan: The pledge binding al-Qaeda to 

the Taliban, BBC News, Sept. 7, 2021, available at: 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58473574 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

27Hardliners get key posts in new Taliban 

government, BBC News, Sept. 7, 2021, available at: 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58479750 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

28Hardliners get key posts in new Taliban 

government, BBC News, Sept. 7, 2021, available at: 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58479750 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

2017, the Islamic State in Iraq and the 

Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIS–K) 

emerged, adding ‘‘a new, dangerous 

dimension’’ to the situation.11

Beginning in 2019, the United States 

engaged with the Taliban to establish an 

agreement to withdraw troops, with 

various efforts over the next two years 

seeking assurances that the Taliban 

would meet counter-terrorism pledges 

and participate in intra-Afghan peace 

talks.12 In April 2021, President Biden 

announced a complete U.S. military 

withdrawal by September 11, 2021, and 

in early July 2021, U.S. troops began 

withdrawal operations, including from 

their largest base at Bagram.13 The 

Taliban began rapidly taking territory 

including regional urban centers, and 

beginning August 6, provincial 

capitals.14 The Taliban took over Kabul 

on August 15, and on August 30, 2021, 

the last U.S. forces departed 

Afghanistan.15

Before the withdrawal of U.S. and 

NATO troops, armed conflict had taken 

a high toll on Afghan civilians. The U.N. 

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 

(UNAMA) recorded 116,076 civilian 

deaths and injuries due to armed 

conflict from 2009 until June 2021 with 

record numbers of girls and women 

killed and injured, as well as record 

numbers of overall child casualties.16

Civilians face continuing risk of harm 

due to ground engagements between the 

Taliban and ISIS–K, as well as direct 

punitive targeting by Taliban fighters 

reportedly taking retaliatory action 

against people associated with the 

Ashraf Ghani administration 17 and 

sectarian attacks on the Shiite minority 

by ISIS–K.18 It is reported that ‘‘attacks 

on civilians made up 36 percent of all 

disorder events, indicating that civilians 

will continue to remain at heightened 

risk of violence under’’ the Taliban.19

i. Taliban 

Following the withdrawal of U.S. and 

NATO troops and collapse of the 

Afghan military, armed conflict 

continues in Afghanistan as the Taliban 

attempts to impose their rule across the 

country.20 Taliban forces have clashed 

with remaining resistance fighters in 

Panjshir Province 21 and unknown and 

little-known groups, including 

‘‘Anonymous Fighters’’ and ‘‘Turkistan 

Freedom Tigers,’’ have targeted Taliban 

forces, notably in Jowzjan and Takhar 

provinces.22

Despite their pledge not to do so, 

reports indicate that the Taliban are 

targeting old adversaries including 

former Afghan police and military 

personnel, increasing the potential for 

escalating armed conflict.23 General 

instability in the country, including 

instability caused by an economic crisis, 

increases the difficulty of establishing 

security and thwarting the rise of further 

extremism.24

The Taliban appear committed to 

maintaining its methods of warfare that 

have taken a heavy toll on civilians, 

including retaining a contingent of 

trained suicide bombers, as central to its 

combat and political strategy.25 Though 

the Taliban pledged to not allow alQaida to ‘‘threaten the security of the 

United States and its allies’’ from 

Afghan soil, veteran Taliban leaders 

with deep relationships with al-Qaida 

organizers have returned to positions of 

power, raising concern that the Taliban 

will once again create a safe space for 

global jihadists.26 The Taliban have 

announced the appointment to positions 

of power members of the Haqqani 

family, known for operating a brutal 

terrorist network during the Taliban 

insurgency,27 and veteran Taliban 

leaders with ties to al-Qaida.28

ii. Islamic State-Khorasan 

The threat of ISIS–K is growing, with 

increasing risk to civilians. The 

Department of State designated ISIS–K 

as a ‘‘foreign terrorist organization’’ in 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 98 / Friday, May 20, 2022 / Notices 30979 

29 Golnaz Esfandiari, Explainer: Who Are Islamic 

State-Khorasan and What Are They After?, Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Aug. 27, 2021, available 

at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/islamic-statekhorasan-expainer/31431763.html (last visited Apr. 

8, 2022). 

30 Golnaz Esfandiari, Explainer: Who Are Islamic 

State-Khorasan and What Are They After?, Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Aug. 27, 2021, available 

at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/islamic-statekhorasan-expainer/31431763.html (last visited Apr. 

8, 2022). 

31 Golnaz Esfandiari, Explainer: Who Are Islamic 

State-Khorasan and What Are They After?, Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Aug. 27, 2021, available 

at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/islamic-statekhorasan-expainer/31431763.html (last visited Apr. 

8, 2022). 

32 Golnaz Esfandiari, Explainer: Who Are Islamic 

State-Khorasan and What Are They After?, Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Aug. 27, 2021, available 

at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/islamic-statekhorasan-expainer/31431763.html (last visited Apr. 

8, 2022). 

33Afghanistan’s Collapsing Economy Heightens 

‘Risk Of Extremism,’ UN Envoy Warns, Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 18, 2021, available at: 

https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-lyonsassets-humanitarian-crisis-hunger/31567075.html 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

34Afghanistan’s Collapsing Economy Heightens 

‘Risk Of Extremism,’ UN Envoy Warns, Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 18, 2021, available at: 

https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-lyonsassets-humanitarian-crisis-hunger/31567075.html 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

35Regional Overview: South Asia and 

Afghanistan 30 October to 5 November 2021, 

ACLED, Nov. 2021, available at: https://acleddata.

com/2021/11/11/regional-overview-south-asia-andafghanistan-30-october-5-november-2021/ (last 

visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

36Statement on Continuation of Assassinations, 

Kidnappings, and Destruction of Vital 

Infrastructure, US Embassy in Afghanistan, Jan. 31, 

2021, available at: https://af.usembassy.gov/ 

statement-on-continuation-of-assassinationskidnappings-and-destruction-of-vitalinfrastructure/ (last visited May 3, 2022); SecretaryGeneral’s press encounter on Afghanistan, U.N. 

Secretary-General, Aug. 13, 2021, available at: 

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/secretarygeneral%E2%80%99s-press-encounter-afghanistan 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Sayed Salahuddin, 10 

killed in twin Kabul blasts, power supply disrupted 

across Afghanistan, Arab News, Jun. 2, 2021, 

available at: https://www.arabnews.com/node/ 

1869436/world (last visited May 3, 2022); Anisa 

Shaheed, Taliban Destroyed, Damaged 

Infrastructure in 116 Districts: IARCS, TOLOnews, 

Jul. 15, 2021, available at: https://tolonews.com/ 

afghanistan-173540 (last visited May 3, 2022); 

Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan 

Security Situation Update, European Asylum 

Support Office (EASO), Sep. 2021, available at: 

https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/ 

PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_

Security_situation_update.pdf (last visited May 3, 

2022). 

37Four Ways to Support Girls’ Access to 

Education in Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, 

Mar. 20, 2022, available at: https://www.hrw.org/ 

news/2022/03/20/four-ways-support-girls-accesseducation-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

38Ruchi Kumar, Taliban targeting Afghanistan’s 

crucial power, IT infrastructure, Al Jazeera, Jul. 15, 

2021, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 

2021/7/15/taliban-afghanistan-it-electricity-power 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

39Ruchi Kumar, Taliban targeting Afghanistan’s 

crucial power, IT infrastructure, Al Jazeera, Jul. 15, 

2021, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 

2021/7/15/taliban-afghanistan-it-electricity-power 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

40Ruchi Kumar, Taliban targeting Afghanistan’s 

crucial power, IT infrastructure, Al Jazeera, Jul. 15, 

2021, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 

2021/7/15/taliban-afghanistan-it-electricity-power 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Blasts cut power to 

millions in Afghanistan before Eid holiday, Al 

Jazeera, Apr. 30, 2022, available at: https:// 

www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/30/blasts-cutpower-to-millions-in-afghanistan-ahead-of-eid (last 

visited May 4, 2022). 

41Ruchi Kumar, Taliban targeting Afghanistan’s 

crucial power, IT infrastructure, Al Jazeera, Jul. 15, 

2021, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 

2021/7/15/taliban-afghanistan-it-electricity-power 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

42Anisa Shaheed, Taliban Destroyed, Damaged 

Infrastructure in 116 Districts: IARCS, TOLO News, 

Jul. 15, 2021, available at: https://tolonews.com/ 

afghanistan-173540 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

43Anisa Shaheed, Taliban Destroyed, Damaged 

Infrastructure in 116 Districts: IARCS, TOLO News, 

Jul. 15, 2021, available at: https://tolonews.com/ 

afghanistan-173540 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

44 Daniel Nasaw, U.S. Left Afghanistan Littered 

With Decaying Factories, Schools, Offices, Wall 

Street Journal, Sept. 6, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-left-afghanistan-litteredwith-decaying-factories-schools-offices11630933200 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

45Afghanistan, The United Nations Mine Action 

Service (UNMAS), Mar. 2022, available at: https:// 

www.unmas.org/en/programmes/afghanistan (last 

visited May 4, 2022). 

46Afghanistan, The United Nations Mine Action 

Service (UNMAS), Mar. 2022, available at: https:// 

www.unmas.org/en/programmes/afghanistan (last 

visited May 4, 2022). 

January 2016, and U.S. forces engaged 

in significant operations to reduce its 

numbers and to reclaim the small 

swaths of territory that it held.29 The 

Taliban have long engaged in efforts to 

eradicate the organization, and they 

continue to fight a renewed ISIS–K 

insurgency, frequently resulting in 

civilian casualties.30 ISIS–K claimed 

responsibility for the August 26, 2021, 

suicide attack outside Kabul airport, and 

has been behind some of the deadliest 

operations against Afghan civilians.31 A 

feature of ISIS–K’s attacks is large-scale 

IED and suicide bombings of Hazara 

Shia mosques and gatherings, which are 

dramatically increasing sectarian 

violence in Afghanistan.32

United Nations Special 

Representative for Afghanistan, Deborah 

Lyons, indicated that the Taliban have 

been unable to stem the expansion of 

ISIS–K, and that it now appears to be 

present in nearly all provinces.33 As of 

November 17, 2021, she stated that the 

number of attacks attributed to ISIS–K 

has increased significantly from 60 last 

year to 334 this year.34 The Armed 

Conflict Location & Event Data Project 

(ACLED), a non-profit data collection, 

analysis, and crisis mapping project, 

reports multiple recent attacks by ISIS– 

K during the months of October and 

November 2021, including engagements 

with the Taliban and targeting of 

civilians.35

iii. Destruction of Infrastructure 

Afghanistan faces significant 

challenges due to the destruction of 

vital infrastructure during armed 

conflict. There are numerous reports 

that the Taliban targeted power stations 

and distribution equipment, dug up 

roads and destroyed bridges, destroyed 

cell towers and communications 

infrastructure, and damaged schools, 

medical facilities, and government 

buildings during their insurgency.36 The 

education system is also at risk of 

complete collapse due to the economic 

crisis.37

During the Taliban insurgency in the 

first half of 2021, the ‘‘39 electricity 

pylons that bring imported power into 

Afghanistan [were] damaged.’’ 38 Power 

supply subsequently became ‘‘extremely 

erratic even in the capital Kabul,’’ with 

notable disruptions to Kunduz, Baghlan, 

Kabul, Nangarhar and Parwan 

provinces.39 ‘‘Millions of Afghans have 

become intimately familiar with regular 

power cuts and being forced to navigate 

daily tasks and chores with just a few 

hours of electricity supply.’’ 40

In July 2021, the Taliban reportedly 

frequently attacked power and 

communications infrastructure in their 

advance, blowing up fiber optics 

systems and destroying 

telecommunications antennas across the 

country, seriously affecting digital and 

mobile communication.41 The Taliban 

reportedly either torched or destroyed 

260 government buildings and assets in 

116 districts,42 leaving more than 13 

million people without access to public 

services and halting ‘‘hundreds of 

development projects such as the 

reconstruction of water supply 

networks, roads, retaining walls, the 

construction of schools, bridges, 

hospitals, stadiums, cold storage 

facilities, [and] drilling wells.’’ 43 The 

armed conflict left the Afghan 

countryside ‘‘littered with abandoned 

and decaying power plants, prisons, 

schools, factories, office buildings and 

military bases.’’ 44

iv. Danger From Explosive Remnants of 

War Including Landmines 

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) 

which failed to detonate, including 

landmines, pose a significant risk to 

civilians in Afghanistan, killing or 

injuring tens of thousands during the 

past three decades.45 These munitions 

‘‘from more recent armed clashes caused 

over 98 percent of the [ERW] casualties 

recorded in 2021,’’ of which more than 

79 percent were children.46 And ‘‘[d]ue 

to evolving conflict dynamics, 

Afghanistan’s humanitarian mine action 

needs are now as great as they have ever 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
30980 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 98 / Friday, May 20, 2022 / Notices 

47Afghanistan, The United Nations Mine Action 

Service (UNMAS), Mar. 2022, available at: https:// 

www.unmas.org/en/programmes/afghanistan (last 

visited May 4, 2022). 

48Clearing Afghanistan’s Landmines One Careful 

Step a Time, Voice of America (VOA) News, Nov. 

21, 2021, available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/ 

clearing-afghanistan-s-landmines-one-careful-stepa-time/6318080.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2022). 

49Najim Rahim & Mike Ives, Attack in 

Afghanistan Kills 10 From Charity That Clears Land 

Mines, N.Y. Times, Jun. 9, 2021, available at: 

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/09/world/asia/ 

afghanistan-land-mines-halo-trust.html (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022). 

50Clearing Afghanistan’s Landmines One Careful 

Step a Time, Voice of America (VOA) News, Nov. 

21, 2021, available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/ 

clearing-afghanistan-s-landmines-one-careful-stepa-time/6318080.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2022). 

51See Land, People, and the State in Afghanistan: 

2002–2012, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation 

Unit (AREU), Feb. 2013, available at: http://

www.refworld.org/docid/5136fbc72.html (last 

visited Apr. 8, 2022); Gulamaiz Sharifi, Abubakar 

Siddique, Afghan Hazaras Fear The Worst After 

Forced Taliban Evictions, Radio Free Europe/Radio 

Liberty, Oct. 6, 2021, available at: https://gandhara.

rferl.org/a/afghanistan-hazaras-taliban/

31496224.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

52Flash External Update: Afghanistan Situation 

#15, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), Mar. 15, 2022, available at: https://data2.

unhcr.org/en/documents/details/91524 (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022). 

53Afghanistan: Conflict Induced Displacements, 

U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 

Affairs (UNOCHA), Nov. 21, 2021, available at: 

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/ 

operations/afghanistan/idps (last visited Apr. 8, 

2022). 

54Afghanistan: Conflict Induced Displacements, 

U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 

Affairs (UNOCHA), Nov. 21, 2021, available at: 

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/ 

operations/afghanistan/idps (last visited Apr. 8, 

2022). 

55Emma Graham-Harrison, Taliban ‘forcibly 

evicting’ Hazaras and opponents in Afghanistan, 

The Guardian, Oct. 23, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/23/talibanforcibly-evicting-hazaras-and-opponents-inafghanistan (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

56Afghanistan Facing Famine, UN, World Bank, 

US Should Adjust Sanctions, Economic Policies, 

Human Rights Watch, Nov. 11, 2021, available at: 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/11/afghanistanfacing-famine (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

57Afghanistan: Economic Roots of the 

Humanitarian Crisis, Questions and Answers on 

Human Costs of Sanctions, Banking Restrictions, 

Human Rights Watch, Mar. 1, 2022, available at: 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/01/afghanistaneconomic-roots-humanitarian-crisis?gclid=

Cj0KCQjw5-WRBhCKARIsAAId9

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nGA5NmEA3iRz1L8BjF4aAkmGEALw_wcB#_Why_

did_the (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

58The World Bank in Afghanistan Overview, The 

World Bank, Oct. 8, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/ 

overview#1 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 59Taliban bans foreign currencies in Afghanistan, 

BBC News, Nov. 3, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.bbc.com/news/business-59129470 (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022). 60Afghanistan Facing Famine, UN, World Bank, 

US Should Adjust Sanctions, Economic Policies, 

Human Rights Watch, Nov. 11, 2021, available at: 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/11/afghanistanfacing-famine (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 61 Kate Clark, Killing the Goose that Laid the 

Golden Egg: Afghanistan’s economic distress post15 August, Afghanistan Analysts Network, Nov. 11, 

2021, available at: https://www.afghanistananalysts.org/en/reports/economy-developmentenvironment/killing-the-goose-that-laid-the-goldenegg-afghanistans-economic-distress-post-15-august/ 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 62Michelle Nichols, U.N. has millions in 

Afghanistan bank, but cannot use it, Reuters, Feb. 

3, 2022, available at: https://www.reuters.com/ 

world/asia-pacific/un-has-millions-afghanistanbank-cannot-use-it-2022-02-03/ (last visited May 4, 

2022). 63Michelle Nichols, U.N. has millions in 

Afghanistan bank, but cannot use it, Reuters, Feb. 

3, 2022, available at: https://www.reuters.com/ 

world/asia-pacific/un-has-millions-afghanistanbank-cannot-use-it-2022-02-03/ (last visited May 4, 

2022). 

64 In the grip of hunger: Only 5 percent of Afghan 

families have enough to eat, World Food 

Programme, Sept. 23, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.wfp.org/stories/grip-hunger-only-5-percentafghan-families-have-enough-eat (last visited Apr. 

8, 2022). 

been.’’ 47 The Taliban have reportedly 

agreed to permit the HALO Trust 

(Hazardous Area Life-Support 

Organization), a British-American 

charity in Afghanistan that has been 

clearing land mines for decades, to 

continue its work,48 yet in June 2021 

ISIS–K militants attacked HALO staff 

members, killing 10, suggesting that 

they continue to face substantial risk.49

In addition, the organization reports that 

new mines and explosive devices were 

laid and left behind in the battles 

leading up to the Taliban’s takeover of 

Kabul.50

v. Rising Internal Displacement 

Rising internal displacement 

emanates from the ongoing armed 

conflict and the unstable security 

situation in Afghanistan. Land pressures 

and related disputes have also been a 

challenge in Afghanistan, fueling 

displacements, and complicating the 

security and relocation options for 

internally displaced persons (IDPs).51

As of March 15, 2022, UNHCR reported 

there were approximately 3.4 million 

conflict-induced IDPs in Afghanistan— 

with 736,889 of those added in 2021.52

The United Nations Office for the 

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 

(UNOCHA) noted that these IDPs are 

from 33 out of the 34 provinces in 

Afghanistan, and 79 percent of those 

added in 2021 are women and 

children.53 UNOCHA further stated, 

‘‘[i]nadequate shelter, food insecurity, 

insufficient access to sanitation and 

health facilities, as well as a lack of 

protection, often result in precarious 

living conditions that jeopardizes the 

well-being and dignity of affected 

families.’’ 54 Reports reflect that the 

Taliban exacerbated the IDP problem by 

forcing thousands of people from their 

homes, including Hazaras as well as 

former government officials, and 

redistributing their property to Taliban 

supporters.55

Economic Collapse and Health 

Concerns 

i. Economic Impacts of Taliban 

Takeover 

Economic ramifications of the Taliban 

takeover in August 2021 include 

‘‘millions of dollars in lost income, 

spiking prices, a liquidity crisis, and 

shortages of cash.’’ 56 The cessation of 

purchasing power of the Afghan 

population as a result of the termination 

of international assistance once used to 

pay salaries has caused an ‘‘enormous 

number of Afghan households [to] 

immediately los[e] their primary sources 

of income. According to a World Food 

Program survey released in February 

2022, four out of five households 

reported no income or significantly 

reduced incomes in January 2022.’’ 57 In 

October 2021, the World Bank noted 

that ‘‘the sudden loss of public sector 

activity will have impacts throughout 

the economy, especially in the service 

and construction sectors (which account 

for 58 percent of GDP).’’ 58

In November 2021, the Taliban 

banned the use of foreign currency, 

which may ‘‘further disrupt an economy 

on the brink of collapse.’’ 59 Banking 

officials note that ‘‘most Afghan banks 

cannot cover withdrawals by private 

actors and aid organizations’’ and 

‘‘[e]ven when funds are transmitted 

electronically into banks, the lack of 

cash means that money is not physically 

available and therefore cannot flow into 

the country’s economy.’’ 60 When 

compared to the Taliban’s previous peak 

in the 1990s, ‘‘poverty this time can 

only be predicted to be worse and more 

keenly felt.’’ 61 As of February 2022, the 

UN Development Programme (UNDP) 

could not access its funds in the 

Afghanistan International Bank (AIB) for 

program implementation because the 

Taliban-run AIB cannot convert it to 

Afghani currency.62 Of the $4 billion 

worth of afghanis, in the economy, only 

$500 million worth was in circulation, 

‘‘hindering humanitarian operations in 

Afghanistan, where more than half the 

country’s 39 million people suffer 

extreme hunger and the economy, 

education and social services face 

collapse.’’ 63

ii. Access to Food, Potable Water, and 

Healthcare 

Rising prices, increasing 

unemployment, and a drop in the value 

of the local currency exacerbate food 

insecurity trends.64 The Executive 

Director of the World Food Programme 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 98 / Friday, May 20, 2022 / Notices 30981 

65 John Simpson, Afghans facing ‘hell on earth’ as 

winter looms, BBC News, Nov. 8, 2021, available at: 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59202880 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

66Federica Marsi, Medics overwhelmed as 

Afghanistan healthcare crumbles, Al Jazeera, Sept. 

28, 2021, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/ 

features/2021/9/28/medics-in-afghanistan-facetough-choices-as-healthcare-crumbles (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022). 

67Afghanistan’s healthcare system on brink of 

collapse, as hunger hits 95 per cent of families, UN 

News, Sept. 22, 2021, available at: https:// 

news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100652 (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022). 

68Afghanistan’s healthcare system on brink of 

collapse, as hunger hits 95 per cent of families, UN 

News, Sept. 22, 2021, available at: https:// 

news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100652 (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022). 

69Afghanistan Facing Famine, UN, World Bank, 

US Should Adjust Sanctions, Economic Policies, 

Human Rights Watch, Nov. 11, 2021, available at: 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/11/afghanistanfacing-famine (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

70Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

SIGAR—Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction, Oct. 30, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10- 

30qr.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

71 Global Warming and Afghanistan: Drought, 

hunger, and thirst expected to worsen, Afghanistan 

Analysts Network, Nov. 6, 2021, available at: 

https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/ 

economy-development-environment/globalwarming-and-afghanistan-drought-hunger-andthirst-expected-to-worsen/ (last visited Apr. 8, 

2022). 

72 ‘Shah Meer Baloch, ‘The challenge for us now 

is drought, not war’: Livelihoods of millions of 

Afghans at risk, The Guardian, Sept. 21, 2021, 

available at: https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2021/sep/21/drought-war-livelihoodsafghan-farmers-risk-taliban-security-forceskandahar (last visited on Apr. 8, 2022). 

73Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

SIGAR—Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction, Oct. 30, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10- 

30qr.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

74Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

SIGAR—Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction, Oct. 30, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10- 

30qr.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

75 Global Warming and Afghanistan: Drought, 

hunger, and thirst expected to worsen, Afghanistan 

Analysts Network, Nov. 6, 2021, available at: 

https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/ 

economy-development-environment/globalwarming-and-afghanistan-drought-hunger-andthirst-expected-to-worsen/ (last visited Apr. 8, 

2022). 

76 Global Warming and Afghanistan: Drought, 

hunger, and thirst expected to worsen, Afghanistan 

Analysts Network, Nov. 6, 2021, available at: 

https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/ 

economy-development-environment/globalwarming-and-afghanistan-drought-hunger-andthirst-expected-to-worsen/ (last visited Apr. 8, 

2022). 

77Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

SIGAR—Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction, p. 139, Oct. 30, 2021, available at: 

https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021- 

10-30qr.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

78Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

SIGAR—Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction, p. 139, Oct. 30, 2021, available at: 

https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021- 

10-30qr.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

79Afghanistan’s healthcare system on brink of 

collapse, as hunger hits 95 per cent of families, UN 

News, Sept. 22, 2021, available at: https:// 

news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100652 (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022). 

80Apoorva Mandavilli, Health Care in 

Afghanistan Is Crumbling, Aid Groups Warn, N.Y. 

Times, Sept. 12, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.nytimes.com/2021/09/12/health/afghanistanhealth-taliban.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

81Afghanistan’s Health Care System Is Collapsing 

Under Stress, N.Y. Times, Feb. 06, 2022, available 

at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/06/world/ 

asia/afghanistans-health-care-system.html (last 

visited May 3, 2022). 

82Country Policy and Information Note 

Afghanistan: Medical treatment and healthcare, UK 

Home Office, p. 10, Oct. 2021, available at: https:// 

www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2062549/AFG_CPIN_

Medical_and_healthcare.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 

2022) (citing Giving birth under the Taliban, BBC 

News, Sept. 20, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58585323). 

83Country Guidance: Afghanistan, Common 

analysis and guidance note, European Asylum 

Support Office (EASO), p. 65, Nov. 2021. available 

at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ 

Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last 

visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

84Afghanistan: Economic Roots of the 

Humanitarian Crisis, Questions and Answers on 

Human Costs of Sanctions, Banking Restrictions, 

Human Rights Watch, Mar. 1, 2022, available at: 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/01/afghanistaneconomic-roots-humanitarian-crisis?gclid=

Cj0KCQjw5-WRBhCKARIsAAId9Fnpi5weaK

quaERnky8T0Ry0t9FSOsR2mWY_nGA5NmEA3i

Rz1L8BjF4aAkmGEALw_wcB#_Why_did_the (last 

visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

85Crisis in Afghanistan: Unprecedented hunger 

after the conflict, International Rescue Committee, 

Jan. 7, 2022, available at: https://www.rescue.org/ 

article/crisis-afghanistan-unprecedented-hungerafter-conflict (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

86Alissa J. Rubin, Taliban Complete Interim 

Government, Still Without Women, N.Y. Times, 

Sept. 21, 2021, available at: https:// 

Continued 

(WFP) described the likelihood of 

widespread famine in Afghanistan as 

‘‘the worst humanitarian crisis on 

Earth.’’ 65 One in three Afghan nationals 

are acutely food insecure.66 For the first 

time, urban and rural areas now 

experience similar rates of food 

insecurity.67 According to recent WFP 

surveys, ‘‘only five percent of 

households in Afghanistan have enough 

to eat every day’’ and ‘‘half reported 

they had run out of food altogether at 

least once, in the past two weeks.’’ 68 As 

a result of current circumstances, some 

families are selling their children, 

especially girls, to obtain food.69

The Afghan government officially 

declared a drought on June 22, 2021.70

Considered ‘‘one of the worst droughts 

of the last two decades,’’ the resulting 

conditions ‘‘are particularly severe in 

the south, western, and northwestern 

parts of the country.’’ 71 Severe drought 

has impacted 7.3 million people across 

25 out of 34 provinces.72 The U.S. 

Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) 

reports that ‘‘drought conditions are 

likely to persist and even worsen into 

2022, further deteriorating food security 

among Afghans.’’ 73 The current drought 

also ‘‘inhibits hydroelectric production 

in Afghanistan,’’ exacerbating the 

country’s reliance on electricity imports 

that it can no longer afford.74 In 2021, 

‘‘reduced winter snowfall’’ and ‘‘below 

average spring rainfall in the west’’ 

contributed to ‘‘low river flows and 

insufficient water in existing reservoirs 

and dams.’’ 75 Some drinking water 

wells in Kabul went dry due to 

decreasing groundwater levels, and 

‘‘...the groundwater table (meaning the 

level of the water naturally stored 

underground) in Kabul city has dropped 

by 12 meters in 2021 alone.’’ 76

An insufficiently staffed healthcare 

system predated the Taliban takeover of 

Kabul.77 In 2018, Afghanistan ‘‘had a 

nationwide average of only 4.6 medical 

doctors, nurses, and midwives per 

10,000 people, far below the WHO 

threshold of 23 per 10,000 people,’’ 

indicating a critical shortage that was 

more pronounced in rural areas.78 By 

September 2021, the World Health 

Organization (WHO) asserted that the 

healthcare system was on the brink of 

collapse.79 The World Bank and other 

organizations froze approximately $600 

million in health care aid, leaving at risk 

the effective deployment of a variety of 

treatments, surgeries, immunizations, 

and procedures.80 While there have 

been recent dispersals of international 

aid, ‘‘including $308 million in relief 

authorized by the United States, they 

have not been enough to cover 1,200 

health facilities and 11,000 health 

workers.’’ 81

Declining staffing levels is a factor 

during the recent conflict as doctors, 

nurses, and midwives have ‘‘stopped 

working or fled the country’’ 82 and 

there have been reported incidents of 

insurgent groups targeting healthcare 

workers with threats, intimidation, 

abduction, and killings.83 Additionally, 

Taliban restrictions requiring that 

women be escorted to health 

appointments by male family members 

and bans on male healthcare 

professionals treating women are further 

compromising women’s access to health 

care.84 The International Rescue 

Committee has predicted that 90 percent 

of health clinics in Afghanistan will 

likely close in the near future as a result 

of the Taliban takeover and the freezing 

of international funding.85

Human Rights Abuses and Repression 

The Taliban exclude women, as well 

as non-Pashtuns with only a few 

exceptions,86 and have been described 


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30982 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 98 / Friday, May 20, 2022 / Notices 

www.nytimes.com/2021/09/21/world/asia/talibanwomen-government.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

87Nilofar Sakhi, The Humanitarian and Human 

Security Crises in Afghanistan, Middle East 

Institute (MEI), Oct. 12, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.mei.edu/publications/humanitarian-andhuman-security-crises-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 

8, 2022). 

88Country Guidance: Afghanistan—Common 

analysis and guidance note, European Asylum 

Support Office (EASO), p. 78, Nov. 2021, available 

at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ 

Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last 

visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

89Afghan Women and Girls: Status and 

Congressional Action, Congressional Research 

Service, p. 1, updated Aug. 18, 2021, available at: 

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/ 

IF11646 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

90Alissa J. Rubin, Threats and Fear Cause Afghan 

Women’s Protections to Vanish Overnight, N.Y. 

Times, Sept. 4, 2021, updated October 7, 2021, 

available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/04/ 

world/middleeast/afghanistan-women-sheltertaliban.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

91Afghan Women and Girls: Status and 

Congressional Action, Congressional Research 

Service, p. 1, updated Aug. 18, 2021, available at: 

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/ 

IF11646 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

92Afghanistan: Taliban ‘Vice’ Handbook Abusive, 

Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, Human 

Rights Watch, Oct. 29, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistantaliban-vice-handbook-abusive (last visited Apr. 8, 

2022); Haq Nawaz Khan, Ellen Francis, and Adam 

Taylor, The Taliban is bringing back its feared 

ministry of ‘vice’ and ‘virtue’, The Washington Post, 

Sept. 8, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/09/08/ 

afghan-vice-virtue-ministry/ (last visited Apr. 15, 

2022); Kathy Gannon, Taliban replace ministry for 

women with ‘virtue’ authorities, AP News, Sept. 18, 

2021, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.

com/world/2021/09/08/afghan-vice-virtue-ministry/ 

(last visited Apr. 15, 2022). 

93Afghanistan: Taliban ‘Vice’ Handbook Abusive, 

Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, Human 

Rights Watch, Oct. 29, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistantaliban-vice-handbook-abusive (last visited Apr. 8. 

2022). 

94Afghan Women and Girls: Status and 

Congressional Action, Congressional Research 

Service, p. 1, updated Aug. 18, 2021, available at: 

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/ 

IF11646 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

95Experts decry measures to ‘steadily erase’ 

Afghan women and girls from public life, United 

Nations News, Jan. 17, 2022, available at: https:// 

news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1109902 (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022). 

96Fereshta Abbasi, Afghan Women Fleeing 

Violence Lose Vital Protection, For Survivors of 

Abuse, Shelters Offered Lifeline, Human Rights 

Watch, Sept. 24, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/24/afghan-womenfleeing-violence-lose-vital-protection (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022). 

97Freedom of the World 2022, Afghanistan, 

Freedom House, Feb. 28, 2022, available at: https:// 

freedomhouse.org/country/afghanistan/freedomworld/2022 (last visited Apr. 8. 2022). 

98Marie McAuliffe, Struggling to Survive: 

Gender, Displacement, and Migration in TalibanControlled Afghanistan, Center for Strategic & 

International Studies, Feb. 23, 2022, https:// 

www.csis.org/analysis/struggling-survive-genderdisplacement-and-migration-taliban-controlledafghanistan (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

99Afghanistan: Taliban ‘Vice’ Handbook Abusive, 

Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, Human 

Rights Watch, Oct. 29, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistantaliban-vice-handbook-abusive (last visited Apr. 8. 

2022). 

100Afghanistan: Taliban ‘Vice’ Handbook 

Abusive, Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, 

Human Rights Watch, Oct. 29, 2021, available at: 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistantaliban-vice-handbook-abusive (last visited Apr. 8. 

2022). 101Country of Origin Information (COI) Brief 

Report, Afghanistan: Recent developments in the 

security situation, impact on civilians and targeted 

individuals, Ministry of Immigration and 

Integration, The Danish Immigration Service, p. 1, 

Sept. 2021, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/ 

file/local/2060188/Afghanistan_Targetedindiv_

FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

102Heather Barr, Afghan Women Watching the 

Walls Close In, Taliban Crushes Women’s Freedom 

of Movement and Other Rights, Human Rights 

Watch, Mar. 2, 2022, available at: https:// 

www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/02/afghan-womenwatching-walls-close (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

103Afghanistan: Taliban ‘Vice’ Handbook 

Abusive, Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, 

Human Rights Watch, Oct. 29, 2021, available at: 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistantaliban-vice-handbook-abusive (last visited Apr. 8. 

2022). 

104Country Guidance: Afghanistan, Common 

analysis and guidance note, European Asylum 

Support Office (EASO), p. 78, Nov. 2021, available 

at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ 

Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last 

visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

105Country of Origin Information (COI) Brief 

Report, Afghanistan: Recent developments in the 

security situation, impact on civilians and targeted 

individuals, Ministry of Immigration and 

Integration, The Danish Immigration Service, p. 1, 

Sept. 2021, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/ 

file/local/2060188/Afghanistan_Targetedindiv_

FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022) (citing Lynne 

O’Donnell, As Taliban Expand Control, Concerns 

About Forced Marriage and Sex Slavery Rise, 

Foreign Policy, Jul. 23, 2021, available at: https:// 

foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/23/afghanistan-talibanwomen-gender/; and Frud Bezhan & Mustafa 

Sarwar, Return To The ‘Dark Days’: Taliban 

Reimposes Repressive Laws On Women In Newly 

Captured Areas in Afghanistan, Radio Free Europe/ 

Radio Liberty, Jul. 14, 2021, available at: https:// 

gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-repression-afghanwomen/31358597.html). 

106Country Policy and Information Note 

Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban [Version 1.0], UK 

as highly totalitarian.87 The Taliban’s 

takeover presents significant concerns 

about the stability of human rights and 

safety for segments of the population. 

i. Women and Girls 

Despite substantial improvements in 

the social, political, and economic 

conditions for women and girls since 

2001, violence targeting women and 

girls remained pervasive in Afghanistan 

before the Taliban takeover.88 Even 

before the Taliban takeover of Kabul, 

‘‘discrimination, harassment, and 

violence against women’’ were 

‘‘endemic in government-controlled 

areas and in government ministries.’’ 89

Studies cited by the former Ministry of 

Women’s Affairs showed that greater 

than half of Afghan women reported 

physical abuse, and 17 percent reported 

sexual violence, with rampant 

underreporting.90 Since August 2021, 

the status of women and girls has 

become ‘‘increasingly precarious,’’ with 

reports of new restrictions placed on 

women.91 In September 2021, the 

Taliban announced the revival of the socalled Ministry for the Propagation of 

Virtue and Prevention of Vice,92 which 

when it previously existed, ‘‘became a 

notorious symbol of abuse, particularly 

against women and girls.’’ 93 These 

developments exist within a broader 

context of ‘‘traditional, restrictive views 

of gender roles and rights, including 

some views consistent with the 

Taliban’s former practices . . . 

especially in rural areas and among 

younger men.’’ 94

Since August 2021, specialized courts 

and prosecution units, ‘‘responsible for 

enforcing the 2009 Law on the 

Elimination of Violence Against 

Women, have been discontinued.’’ 95

Many legal professionals involved with 

women’s protections from sexual, 

domestic, and other violence went into 

hiding or fled the country, and most 

domestic violence shelters have 

closed.96 As shelters closed some 

survivors were reportedly sent to 

detention centers while individuals 

convicted of gender-based violence were 

released by the Taliban. 97

Afghan women are becoming 

‘‘socially invisible’’ in public life.98 The 

By-Law of the Commission for 

Preaching and Guidance, Recruitment 

and Propagation of Virtue and the 

Prevention of Vice, a manual used by 

the Taliban in a number of provinces 

since August 2021, and now across the 

country, place ‘‘tough restrictions on the 

conduct of women and girls.’’ 99 These 

authorities provide instruction on 

which family members qualify to be a 

mahram, or chaperone, for women and 

older girls, and commands women to 

wear a veil when in the presence of nonmahrams.100 In some parts of the 

country, women have been barred from 

leaving their home without a 

mahram 101 and have been attacked or 

blocked from receiving social services 

such as healthcare when leaving their 

home without a mahram.102 The 

manual also requires women to wear a 

hijab and veil in public.103 As 

punishments for non-conformity, the 

Taliban has carried out lashings and 

executions.104

Reports indicate that women were 

forced to marry Taliban fighters prior to 

the takeover of Kabul in 2021.105

Although the Taliban has denied the 

occurrence of forced marriage, local 

activists report the practice occurs, 

stating that women are being married as 

‘‘sexual slaves.’’ 106 A statement shared 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 98 / Friday, May 20, 2022 / Notices 30983 

Home Office, p. 33–34, Oct. 2021, available at: 

https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2061589/AFG_

CPIN_Fear_of_the_Taliban.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 

2022) (citing Taliban trying to force Afghan girls as 

young as 13 into marriage, The National, Aug. 3, 

2021, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/ 

asia/2021/08/03/taliban-trying-to-force-afghangirls-as-young-as-13-into-marriage/). 

107Country Policy and Information Note 

Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban [Version 1.0], UK 

Home Office, p. 33–34, Oct. 2021, available at: 

https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2061589/AFG_

CPIN_Fear_of_the_Taliban.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 

2022) (citing Taliban trying to force Afghan girls as 

young as 13 into marriage, The National, August 3, 

2021, available at: https://www.thenationalnews.

com/world/asia/2021/08/03/taliban-trying-to-forceafghan-girls-as-young-as-13-into-marriage/). 

108Fereshta Abbasi, Afghan Girls’ Education: ‘I 

Don’t Think I Have a Future,’ Closing Secondary 

Schools to Girls Causing Lasting Harm, Human 

Rights Watch, Oct. 31, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/31/afghan-girlseducation-i-dont-think-i-have-future (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022). 

109Ayaz Gul, All Public Universities in 

Afghanistan Open to Male, Female Students, Voice 

of America (VOA), Feb. 26, 2022, available at: 

https://www.voanews.com/a/all-public-universitiesin-afghanistan-open-to-male-female-students/ 

6461202.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2022); The 

Taliban closes Afghan girls’ schools hours after 

reopening, Al Jazeera, Mar. 23, 2022, available at: 

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/23/ 

taliban-orders-girls-schools-shut-hours-afterreopening (last visited May 3, 2022). 

110Christina Goldbaum, Taliban Allow Girls to 

Return to Some High Schools, but With Big Caveats, 

N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2021, updated Nov. 3, 2021, 

available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/27/ 

world/asia/afghan-girls-school-taliban.html?

searchResultPosition=8 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

111Marie McAuliffe, Struggling to Survive: 

Gender, Displacement, and Migration in TalibanControlled Afghanistan, Center for Strategic & 

International Studies, Feb. 23, 2022, available at: 

https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggling-survivegender-displacement-and-migration-talibancontrolled-afghanistan (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

112HRW Says Donors Should Link Afghan Aid to 

Taliban’s Observing Rights for Girls, Women, 

Gandahara Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Mar. 

21, 2022, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/ 

hrw-donors-afghan-aid-taliban-womens-rights/ 

31762920.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

113Afghanistan: Taliban Blocking Female Aid 

Workers, Human Rights Watch, Nov. 4, 2021, 

available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/04/ 

afghanistan-taliban-blocking-female-aid-workers 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

114Afghanistan: Taliban Blocking Female Aid 

Workers, Human Rights Watch, Nov. 4, 2021, 

available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/04/ 

afghanistan-taliban-blocking-female-aid-workers 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022. 

115 David Zucchino, Afghan Women Who Once 

Presided Over Abuse Cases Now Fear for Their 

Lives, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2021, updated Oct. 22, 

2021, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/ 

10/21/world/asia/afghan-judges-women-taliban.

html?searchResultPosition=5 (last visited Apr. 8, 

2022). 

116 David Zucchino, Afghan Women Who Once 

Presided Over Abuse Cases Now Fear for Their 

Lives, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2021, updated Oct. 22, 

2021, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/ 

10/21/world/asia/afghan-judges-women-taliban.

html?searchResultPosition=5 (last visited Apr. 8, 

2022). 

117 Yaroslav Trofimov, Afghan Women Protest 

Hard-Line Taliban Government, Face Violent 

Crackdown, The Wall Street Journal, Sep. 8, 2021, 

available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghanwomen-protest-talibans-all-male-government-faceviolent-crackdown-11631105098 (last visited May 3, 

2022), cited by: Taliban Government in 

Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress, 

Congressional Research Service, p. 20, Nov. 2, 2021, 

available at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/ 

product/pdf/R/R46955 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

118Regional Overview: South Asia and 

Afghanistan 30 October to 5 November 2021, 

ACLED, Nov. 2021, available at: https:// 

acleddata.com/2021/11/11/regional-overviewsouth-asia-and-afghanistan-30-october-5-november2021/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

119Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and 

Political History, p.26, (Princeton University Press, 

2010). 

120Afghanistan: Taliban responsible for brutal 

massacre of Hazara men—new investigation, 

Amnesty International, Aug. 19, 2021, available at: 

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/08/ 

afghanistan-taliban-responsible-for-brutalmassacre-of-hazara-men-new-investigation/ (last 

visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

121Pamela Constable, After Kabul school attack, 

Afghans fear a return to violence, The Washington 

Post, Apr. 20, 2022, available at: https:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/20/ 

afghanistan-school-attack-isis-hazara/ (last visited 

May 3, 2022). 

122 Gulamaiz Sharifi, Abubakar Siddique, Afghan 

Hazaras Fear The Worst After Forced Taliban 

Evictions, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Oct. 6, 

2021, available at: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/ 

afghanistan-hazaras-taliban/31496224.html (last 

visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

123Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority 

Shia, Hazaras, Former Civil Servants Targets of 

Collective Punishment, Land-Grabbing, Human 

Rights Watch, Oct. 22, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/22/afghanistantaliban-forcibly-evict-minority-shia (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022). 

124Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority 

Shia, Hazaras, Former Civil Servants Targets of 

Collective Punishment, Land-Grabbing, Human 

Rights Watch, Oct. 22, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/22/afghanistantaliban-forcibly-evict-minority-shia (last visited 

Apr. 8, 2022). 

on social media featuring Taliban 

insignia instructed religious leaders in 

Takhar and Badakhshan ‘‘to refer girls 

older than 15 and widows younger than 

45’’ to the ‘‘Mujahideen Cultural 

Commission’’ for marriage to Taliban 

fighters.107

The Taliban have banned girls from 

attending secondary school past the 

sixth grade,108 although the Taliban 

permitted women to attend universities 

in February 2022.109 Rules segregating 

teachers and classes according to gender 

‘‘exacerbated a severe teacher shortage 

and threaten to eliminate higher 

education opportunities for girls.’’ 110

Afghan women are unable to hold 

positions of authority in almost all 

spheres of public life.111 They have 

been ‘‘barred from paid employment, 

except as teachers for girls and healthcare workers.’’ 112 Women aid 

employees are allowed to work 

unconditionally in just three out of 34 

provinces.113 In the remaining 

provinces, ‘‘women aid workers face 

severe restrictions, such as requirements 

for a male family member to escort them 

while they do their jobs, making it 

difficult or impossible for them to do 

their job effectively.’’ 114 In the legal 

field, female lawyers and judges ‘‘have 

left the courts under Taliban pressure’’ 

and ‘‘live in a state of perpetual fear that 

they or their loved ones could be 

tracked down and killed.’’ 115 Although 

Taliban representatives claim that 

female lawyers and judges are protected 

by a general amnesty for all former 

government workers, these women fear 

retribution for their work.116

Women activists and former members 

of public life have been targeted with 

severe violence since the Taliban 

takeover of Kabul. Protests by women 

‘‘outraged by the . . . hard-line’’ nature 

of the Taliban’s so-called ‘‘caretaker 

government’’ have been met by violence 

from the Taliban fighters.117 According 

to ACLED, during the week of October 

30 to November 5, 2021, ‘‘the bodies of 

four women civil society activists were 

recovered in Balkh province, including 

a well-known women’s rights defender 

. . . [allegedly] killed by an organized 

network targeting civil society activists, 

who introduced themselves as 

representatives of a human rights 

organization.’’ 118

ii. Targeted Killings and Evictions of 

Hazaras 

Hazaras have been ‘‘historic victims of 

prejudice on religious and ethnic 

grounds.’’ 119 Though they made 

progress in achieving parity with other 

ethnic groups over the last two decades, 

Hazaras were particular targets of harm 

by the Taliban during the Taliban’s 

period of rule from 1996–2001. 

Recently, Taliban fighters massacred 

nine ethnic Hazara men after taking 

control of Ghazni province in July 

2021.120 Hazaras, an ethnic Shia 

minority, are also enduring a pattern of 

increasing sectarian attacks from ISIS– 

K, which over the last several years ‘‘has 

been blamed for dozens of bombings 

and gun attacks on mosques, shrines, 

schools . . . [as] the group views Shiites 

as apostates.’’ 121

Human Rights Watch and other 

sources have reported that the Taliban 

has begun forcibly evicting Hazaras 

from their homes, including 700 from 

the central province of Daikundi in late 

September 2021,122 hundreds of 

families from the southern Helmand 

province and northern Balkh 

province,123 and others from Daikundi, 

Uruzgan, and Kandahar provinces.124

Human Rights Watch stated that ISIS–K 

‘‘has repeatedly carried out devastating 

attacks that appear designed to spread 

terror and inflict maximum suffering 

particularly on Afghanistan’s Hazara 


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30984 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 98 / Friday, May 20, 2022 / Notices 

125Afghanistan: Surge in Islamic State Attacks on 

Shia, ISIS Affiliate’s Targeted Killings Amount to 

Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights Watch, 

Oct. 25, 2021, available at: https://www.hrw.org/ 

news/2021/10/25/afghanistan-surge-islamic-stateattacks-shia (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

126 Gibran Naiyyar Peshimam, For Afghan 

Hazaras, where to pray can be life and death choice, 

Reuters, Oct. 21, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghanhazaras-where-pray-can-be-life-death-choice-2021- 

10-21/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

127Afghanistan: Journalists tell of beatings by 

Taliban, BBC News, Sept. 9, 2021, available at: 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58500579 

(last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

128 Javier C. Herna ́ndez, Musicians Flee 

Afghanistan, Fearing Taliban Rule, N.Y. Times, 

Nov. 17, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/arts/music/ 

afghanistan-musicians-flee.html (last visited Apr. 8, 

2022); Afghanistan: Gunmen attack wedding to stop 

music being played, BBC News, Oct. 31, 2021, 

available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia59107046 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

129The Taliban Order Barbers Not To Shave 

Beards In Afghan Province Of Helmand, NPR, Sept. 

27, 2021, available at: https://www.npr.org/2021/09/ 

27/1041025238/the-taliban-order-barbers-not-toshave-beards-in-afghan-province-of-helmand (last 

visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

130Matthieu Aikins et al., As Taliban Crush 

Dissent, New Leaders Face Cascading Challenges, 

N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.nytimes.com/2021/09/08/world/asia/talibanprotests-pakistan.html?referringSource=

articleShare (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

131Afghanistan: Taliban wasting no time in 

stamping out human rights says new briefing, 

Amnesty International, Sept. 21, 2021, available at: 

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/09/ 

afghanistan-taliban-wasting-no-time-in-stampingout-human-rights-says-new-briefing/ (last visited 

May 4, 2022). 

132Public Displays of Corpses Signal Return of 

Hard-Line Afghan Taliban, Voice of America (VOA) 

News, Sept. 27, 2021, available at: https:// 

www.voanews.com/a/public-displays-of-corpsessignal-return-of-hard-line-afghan-taliban-/ 

6248297.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

133Taliban Official Says Strict Punishment And 

Executions Will Return, NPR, Sept. 24, 2021, 

available at: https://www.npr.org/2021/09/24/ 

1040339286/taliban-official-says-strict-punishmentand-executions-will-return (last Apr. 8, 2022); The 

Taliban’s Sharia is the Most Brutal of All, Foreign 

Policy, Oct.13, 2021, available at https:// 

foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/13/the-talibans-shariais-the-most-brutal-of-all/ (last visited May 4, 2022). 

134 ‘‘Disability Is Not Weakness,’’ Discrimination 

and Barriers Facing Women and Girls with 

Disabilities in Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, p. 

1, Apr. 2020, available at: https://www.hrw.org/ 

sites/default/files/report_pdf/afghanistan0420_

web_0.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

135Convention on the Rights of Persons with 

Disabilities, The United Nations Human Rights 

Office (OHCHR), Dec. 13, 2006, available at: https:// 

www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/ 

instruments/convention-rights-persons-disabilities 

(last visited May 4, 2022). 

136 ‘‘Disability Is Not Weakness,’’ Discrimination 

and Barriers Facing Women and Girls with 

Disabilities in Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, p. 

17, Apr. 2020, available at: https://www.hrw.org/ 

sites/default/files/report_pdf/afghanistan0420_

web_0.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

137Chris Fitzgerald, Humanitarian Crisis And 

Neglect In Afghanistan Puts People With 

Disabilities At Risk, The Organization for World 

Peace, Jan. 19, 2022, available at: https:// 

theowp.org/reports/humanitarian-crisis-andneglect-in-afghanistan-puts-people-withdisabilities-at-risk/ (last visited May 3, 2022). 

138Country Guidance: Afghanistan, Common 

analysis and guidance note, European Asylum 

Support Office (EASO), p. 88, Nov. 2021, available 

at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ 

Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last 

visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

139Country Guidance: Afghanistan, Common 

analysis and guidance note, European Asylum 

Support Office (EASO), p. 88, Nov. 2021, available 

at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ 

Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last 

visited Apr. 8, 2022). 

140 INA section 244(b)(1) ascribes this power to 

the Attorney General. Congress transferred this 

authority from the Attorney General to the Secretary 

of Homeland Security. See Homeland Security Act 

of 2002, Public Law 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135. The 

Secretary may designate a country (or part of a 

country) for TPS on the basis of ongoing armed 

conflict such that returning would pose a serious 

threat to the personal safety of the country’s 

nationals and habitual residents, environmental 

disaster (including an epidemic), or extraordinary 

and temporary conditions in the country that 

prevent the safe return of the country’s nationals. 

For environmental disaster-based designations, 

certain other statutory requirements must be met, 

including that the foreign government must request 

TPS. A designation based on extraordinary and 

temporary conditions cannot be made if the 

Secretary finds that allowing the country’s nationals 

to remain temporarily in the United States is 

contrary to the U.S. national interest. Id., at section 

244(b)(1). 

141This issue of judicial review is the subject of 

litigation. See, e.g., Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 

(9th Cir. 2020), petition for en banc rehearing filed 

Nov. 30, 2020 (No. 18–16981); Saget v. Trump, 375 

F. Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 

community.’’ 125 Reuters reported that 

‘‘[w]ith more than 400 Shi’ite mosques 

in Kabul alone, total security is 

impossible and no one knows where the 

next attack will come.’’ 126

iii. Restrictions and Risks in Cases of 

Nonconformity 

Optimism that the current Taliban 

may be more moderate than the Taliban 

was from 1996–2001 has faded, as they 

are reportedly targeting journalists,127

artists and musicians,128 barbers and 

those working in fashion,129 civil 

society participants and protestors.130

According to Amnesty International, 

these actions have created a climate of 

fear and intimidation that has caused 

many Afghan nationals to engage in selfcensoring, adopting conservative attire, 

and abandoning former employment 

and public life.131 For example, 

according to the chairperson of the 

Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 

Commission, those formerly employed 

as ‘‘[l]awyers, judges and prosecutors 

are mostly in hiding.’’ 132 The Taliban 

have announced that they will once 

again carry out executions and 

amputations of hands for criminal 

offenses, and have begun doing so.133

iv. Challenges for Individuals With 

Disabilities 

At least one in five households in 

Afghanistan includes an adult or child 

with a serious sensory, psychosocial, 

intellectual, or physical disability, 

making Afghanistan one of the largest 

per capita populations of individuals 

with disabilities in the world.134 Unlike 

many other marginalized populations, 

merely the removal of discrimination 

does not automatically enable equal 

participation in society; rather there are 

often necessary accommodations or 

remediations that must happen in 

physical, communications, or other 

infrastructures.135 Access to physical 

rehabilitation services is ‘‘. . . 

complicated by poverty, poor quality 

roads, and danger along the way due to 

armed conflict.’’ 136 After the Taliban 

takeover in 2021, any strides that 

Afghanistan had made in protecting the 

rights of the disabled through the 

signing and ratifying of conventions 

under the administrations of Hamid 

Karzai and Ashraf Ghani ‘‘have been 

virtually abandoned’’ as the withdrawal 

of foreign aid has ‘‘reduced both the 

funds to implement these programs and 

international commitments[,] and the 

Afghan leadership’s interest in carrying 

them out.’’ 137 The European Asylum 

Support Office (EASO) confirms the 

stigmatization of individuals with 

physical and mental disabilities, with 

‘‘women, displaced persons and 

returned migrants with mental health 

issues’’ being particularly vulnerable.138

EASO also notes the ‘‘lack of 

appropriate infrastructure and specialist 

care that covers the needs of people 

with disabilities.’’ 139

What authority does the Secretary have 

to designate Afghanistan for TPS? 

Section 244(b)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 

1254a(b)(1), authorizes the Secretary, 

after consultation with appropriate 

agencies of the U.S. Government, to 

designate a foreign state (or part thereof) 

for TPS if the Secretary determines that 

certain country conditions exist.140 The 

decision to designate any foreign state 

(or part thereof) is a discretionary 

decision, and there is no judicial review 

of any determination with respect to the 

designation, termination, or extension of 

a designation. See INA section 

244(b)(5)(A); 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(5)(A).141

The Secretary, in his or her discretion, 

may then grant TPS to eligible nationals 

of that foreign state (or individuals 

having no nationality who last 

habitually resided in the designated 

foreign state). See INA section 

244(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(a)(1)(A). 

At least 60 days before the expiration 

of a foreign state’s TPS designation or 

extension, the Secretary, after 

consultation with appropriate U.S. 


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142Find information about online filing at ‘‘Forms 

Available to File Online,’’ https://www.uscis.gov/ 

file-online/forms-available-to-file-online. 

143https://myaccount.uscis.gov/users/sign_up. 

Government agencies, must review the 

conditions in the foreign state 

designated for TPS to determine 

whether they continue to meet the 

conditions for the TPS designation. See 

INA section 244(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. 

1254a(b)(3)(A). If the Secretary 

determines that the foreign state 

continues to meet the conditions for 

TPS designation, the designation will be 

extended for an additional period of 6 

months or, in the Secretary’s discretion, 

12 or 18 months. See INA section 

244(b)(3)(A), (C), 8 U.S.C. 

1254a(b)(3)(A), (C). If the Secretary 

determines that the foreign state no 

longer meets the conditions for TPS 

designation, the Secretary must 

terminate the designation. See INA 

section 244(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. 

1254a(b)(3)(B). 

Notice of the Designation of 

Afghanistan for TPS 

By the authority vested in me as 

Secretary under INA section 244, 8 

U.S.C. 1254a, I have determined, after 

consultation with the appropriate U.S. 

Government agencies, the statutory 

conditions supporting Afghanistan’s 

designation for TPS on the basis of 

ongoing armed conflict and 

extraordinary and temporary conditions 

are met. See INA section 244(b)(1)(A) 

and (C), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(A) and (C). 

I estimate up to approximately 72,500 

individuals may be eligible for TPS 

under the designation of Afghanistan. 

On the basis of this determination, I am 

designating Afghanistan for TPS for 18 

months, from May 20, 2022 through 

November 20, 2023. See INA section 

244(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2); 8 U.S.C. 

1254a(b)(1)(C), and (b)(2). 

Alejandro N. Mayorkas, 

Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security. 

Eligibility and Employment 

Authorization for TPS 

Required Application Forms and 

Application Fees To Register for TPS 

To register for TPS based on the 

designation of Afghanistan, you must 

submit a Form I–821, Application for 

Temporary Protected Status, and pay 

the filing fee or request a fee waiver, 

which you may submit on Form I–912, 

Request for Fee Waiver. You may be 

required to pay the biometric services 

fee. If you can demonstrate an inability 

to pay the biometric services fee, you 

may request to have the fee waived. 

Please see additional information under 

the ‘‘Biometric Services Fee’’ section of 

this notice. 

TPS beneficiaries are authorized to 

work in the United States. You are not 

required to submit Form I–765 or have 

an EAD but see below for more 

information if you want to work in the 

United States. 

For more information on the 

application forms and fees for TPS, 

please visit the USCIS TPS web page at 

uscis.gov/tps. Fees for the Form I–821, 

the Form I–765, and biometric services 

are also described in 8 CFR 

103.7(b)(1)(i). 

How can TPS beneficiaries obtain an 

Employment Authorization Document 

(EAD)? 

Everyone must provide their 

employer with documentation showing 

that they have the legal right to work in 

the United States. TPS beneficiaries are 

eligible to obtain an EAD, which proves 

their legal right to work. TPS applicants 

who want to obtain an EAD must file 

the Form I–765, Application for 

Employment Authorization, and pay the 

fee or request a fee waiver, by 

submitting Form I–912, Request for Fee 

Waiver. TPS applicants may file this 

form along with their TPS application, 

or at a later date, provided their TPS 

application is still pending or has been 

approved. 

Refiling an Initial TPS Registration 

Application After Receiving a Denial of 

a Fee Waiver Request 

If you receive a denial of a fee waiver 

request, you must refile your Form I– 

821 for TPS along with the required fees 

during the registration period, which 

extends until November 20, 2023. You 

may also file for your EAD on Form I– 

765 with payment of the fee along with 

your TPS application or at any later date 

you decide you want to request an EAD 

during the registration period. 

Filing Information 

USCIS offers the option to applicants 

for TPS under Afghanistan’s designation 

to file Form 

I–821 and related requests for EADs 

online or by mail. When filing a TPS 

application, applicants can also request 

an EAD by submitting a completed 

Form I–765, Application for 

Employment Authorization, with their 

Form I–821. 

Online filing: Form I–821 and Form I– 

765 are available for concurrent filing 

online.142 To file these forms online, 

you must first create a USCIS online 

account.143

Mail filing: Mail your application for 

TPS to the proper address in Table 1. 

Table 1—Mailing Addresses 

Mail your completed Form I–821, 

Application for Temporary Protected 

Status, Form I–765, Application for 

Employment Authorization, and Form 

I–912, Request for Fee Waiver, if 

applicable, and supporting 

documentation to the proper address in 

Table 1. 

TABLE 1—MAILING ADDRESSES

If . . . Mail to . . . 

You are using the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and you live in Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.USCIS, Attn: TPS Afghanistan, P.O. Box 

20300, Phoenix, AZ 85036–0300. 

You are using FedEx, UPS, or DHL and you live in Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 

Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.

USCIS, Attn: TPS Afghanistan (Box 20300), 

1820 E. Skyharbor Circle S, Suite 100, 

Phoenix, AZ 85034–4850. 

You are using the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and live in Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, 

Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, 

Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 

Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin.

USCIS, Attn: TPS Afghanistan, P.O. Box 

805282, Chicago, IL 60680–5285. 


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TABLE 1—MAILING ADDRESSES—Continued 

If . . . Mail to . . . 

You are using FedEx, UPS, or DHL and live in Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, 

District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 

Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New 

Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin.

USCIS, Attn: TPS Afghanistan, (Box 805282), 

131 South Dearborn—3rd Floor, Chicago, IL 

60603–5517. 

If you were granted TPS by an 

immigration judge (IJ) or the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA) and you 

wish to request an EAD, please mail 

your Form I–765 application to the 

appropriate mailing address in Table 1. 

When you are requesting an EAD based 

on an IJ/BIA grant of TPS, please 

include a copy of the IJ or BIA order 

granting you TPS with your application. 

This will help us verify your grant of 

TPS and process your application. 

Supporting Documents 

The filing instructions on the Form I– 

821 list all the documents needed to 

establish eligibility for TPS. You may 

also find information on the acceptable 

documentation and other requirements 

for applying (i.e., registering) for TPS on 

the USCIS website at uscis.gov/tps 

under ‘‘Afghanistan.’’ 

Travel 

TPS beneficiaries may also apply for 

and be granted travel authorization as a 

matter of discretion. You must file for 

travel authorization if you wish to travel 

outside of the United States. If granted, 

travel authorization gives you 

permission to leave the United States 

and return during a specific period. To 

request travel authorization, you must 

file Form I–131, Application for Travel 

Document, available at www.uscis.gov/i131. You may file Form I–131 together 

with your Form I–821 or separately. 

When filing the Form I–131, you must: 

• Select Item Number 1.d. in Part 2 

on the Form I–131; and 

• Submit the fee for the Form I–131, 

or request a fee waiver, which you may 

submit on Form I–912, Request for Fee 

Waiver. 

If you are filing Form I–131 together 

with Form I–821, send your forms to the 

address listed in Table 1. If you are 

filing Form I–131 separately based on a 

pending or approved Form I–821, send 

your form to the address listed in Table 

2 and include a copy of Form I–797 for 

the approved or pending Form I–821. 

TABLE 2—MAILING ADDRESSES

If you are . . . Mail to . . . 

Filing Form I–131 together with a Form I–821, Application for Temporary Protected Status ........ The address provided in Table 1. 

Filing Form I–131 based on a pending or approved Form I–821, and you are using the U.S. 

Postal Service (USPS): You must include a copy of the receipt notice (Form I–797C) showing we accepted or approved your Form I–821.

USCIS, Attn: I–131 TPS, P.O. Box 660167, 

Dallas, TX 75266–0867. 

Filing Form I–131 based on a pending or approved Form I–821, and you are using FedEx, 

UPS, or DHL: You must include a copy of the receipt notice (Form I–797C) showing we accepted or approved your Form I–821.

USCIS, Attn: I–131 TPS, 2501 S. State Hwy. 

121 Business, Ste. 400, Lewisville, TX 

75067. 

Biometric Services Fee for TPS 

Biometrics (such as fingerprints) are 

required for all applicants 14 years of 

age and older. Those applicants must 

submit a biometric services fee. As 

previously stated, if you are unable to 

pay the biometric services fee, you may 

request a fee waiver, which you may 

submit on Form I–912, Request for Fee 

Waiver. For more information on the 

application forms and fees for TPS, 

please visit the USCIS TPS web page at 

uscis.gov/tps. If necessary, you may be 

required to visit an Application Support 

Center to have your biometrics 

captured. For additional information on 

the USCIS biometric screening process, 

please see the USCIS Customer Profile 

Management Service Privacy Impact 

Assessment, available at dhs.gov/ 

privacy. 

General Employment-Related 

Information for TPS Applicants and 

Their Employers 

How can I obtain information on the 

status of my TPS application and EAD 

request? 

To get case status information about 

your TPS application, as well as the 

status of your TPS-based EAD request, 

you can check Case Status Online at 

uscis.gov, or visit the USCIS Contact 

Center at uscis.gov/contactcenter. If 

your Form I–765 has been pending for 

more than 90 days, and you still need 

assistance, you may ask a question 

about your case online at egov.uscis.gov/ 

e-request/Intro.do or call the USCIS 

Contact Center at 800–375–5283 (TTY 

800–767–1833). 

When hired, what documentation may 

I show to my employer as evidence of 

identity and employment authorization 

when completing Form I–9? 

You can find the Lists of Acceptable 

Documents on the last page of Form I– 

9, Employment Eligibility Verification, 

as well as the Acceptable Documents 

web page at uscis.gov/i-9-central/ 

acceptable-documents. Employers must 

complete Form I–9 to verify the identity 

and employment authorization of all 

new employees. Within three days of 

hire, employees must present acceptable 

documents to their employers as 

evidence of identity and employment 

authorization to satisfy Form I–9 

requirements. 

You may present any document from 

List A (which provides evidence of both 

identity and employment authorization) 

or one document from List B (which 

provides evidence of your identity) 

together with one document from List C 

(which provides evidence of 

employment authorization), or you may 

present an acceptable receipt as 

described in the Form I–9 Instructions. 

Employers may not reject a document 

based on a future expiration date. You 

can find additional information about 

Form I–9 on the I–9 Central web page 


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at uscis.gov/I–9Central. An EAD is an 

acceptable document under List A. 

If I have an EAD based on another 

immigration status, can I obtain a new 

TPS-based EAD? 

Yes, if you are eligible for TPS, you 

can obtain a new TPS-based EAD, 

regardless of whether you have an EAD 

or work authorization based on another 

immigration status. If you want to 

obtain a new TPS-based EAD valid 

through November 20, 2023, then you 

must file Form I–765, Application for 

Employment Authorization, and pay the 

associated fee (unless USCIS grants your 

fee waiver request). 

Can my employer require that I provide 

any other documentation such as 

evidence of my status or proof of my 

Afghan citizenship or a Form I–797C 

showing that I registered for TPS for 

Form I–9 completion? 

No. When completing Form I–9, 

employers must accept any 

documentation you choose to present 

from the Form I–9 Lists of Acceptable 

Documents that reasonably appears to 

be genuine and that relates to you, or an 

acceptable List A, List B, or List C 

receipt. Employers need not reverify 

List B identity documents. Employers 

may not request proof of Afghan 

citizenship or proof of registration for 

TPS when completing Form I–9 for new 

hires or reverifying the employment 

authorization of current employees. 

Refer to the ‘‘Note to Employees’’ 

section of this Federal Register notice 

for important information about your 

rights if your employer rejects lawful 

documentation, requires additional 

documentation, or otherwise 

discriminates against you based on your 

citizenship or immigration status, or 

your national origin. 

Note to All Employers 

Employers are reminded that the laws 

requiring proper employment eligibility 

verification and prohibiting unfair 

immigration-related employment 

practices remain in full force. This 

Federal Register notice does not 

supersede or in any way limit 

applicable employment verification 

rules and policy guidance, including 

those rules setting forth reverification 

requirements. For general questions 

about the employment eligibility 

verification process, employers may call 

USCIS at 888–464–4218 (TTY 877–875– 

6028) or email USCIS at I-9Central@

uscis.dhs.gov. USCIS accepts calls and 

emails in English and many other 

languages. For questions about avoiding 

discrimination during the employment 

eligibility verification process (Form I– 

9 and E-Verify), employers may call the 

U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights 

Division, Immigrant and Employee 

Rights Section (IER) Employer Hotline 

at 800–255–8155 (TTY 800–237–2515). 

IER offers language interpretation in 

numerous languages. Employers may 

also email IER at IER@usdoj.gov. 

Note to Employees 

For general questions about the 

employment eligibility verification 

process, employees may call USCIS at 

888–897–7781 (TTY 877–875–6028) or 

email USCIS at I-9Central@

uscis.dhs.gov. USCIS accepts calls in 

English, Spanish and many other 

languages. Employees or job applicants 

may also call the IER Worker Hotline at 

800–255–7688 (TTY 800–237–2515) for 

information regarding employment 

discrimination based on citizenship, 

immigration status, or national origin, 

including discrimination related to 

Form I–9 and E-Verify. The IER Worker 

Hotline provides language interpretation 

in numerous languages. 

To comply with the law, employers 

must accept any document or 

combination of documents from the 

Lists of Acceptable Documents if the 

documentation reasonably appears to be 

genuine and to relate to the employee, 

or an acceptable List A, List B, or List 

C receipt as described in the Form I–9 

Instructions. Employers may not require 

extra or additional documentation 

beyond what is required for Form I–9 

completion. Further, employers 

participating in E-Verify who receive an 

E-Verify case result of ‘‘Tentative 

Nonconfirmation’’ (TNC) must promptly 

inform employees of the TNC and give 

such employees an opportunity to 

contest the TNC. A TNC case result 

means that the information entered into 

E-Verify from Form I–9 differs from 

records available to DHS. 

Employers may not terminate, 

suspend, delay training, withhold or 

lower pay, or take any adverse action 

against an employee because of a TNC 

while the case is still pending with EVerify. A Final Nonconfirmation (FNC) 

case result is received when E-Verify 

cannot confirm an employee’s 

employment eligibility. An employer 

may terminate employment based on a 

case result of FNC. Work-authorized 

employees who receive an FNC may call 

USCIS for assistance at 888–897–7781 

(TTY 877–875–6028). For more 

information about E-Verify-related 

discrimination or to report an employer 

for discrimination in the E-Verify 

process based on citizenship, 

immigration status, or national origin, 

contact IER’s Worker Hotline at 800– 

255–7688 (TTY 800–237–2515). 

Additional information about proper 

nondiscriminatory Form I–9 and EVerify procedures is available on the 

IER website at justice.gov/ier and the 

USCIS and E-Verify websites at 

uscis.gov/i-9-central and e-verify.gov. 

Note Regarding Federal, State, and 

Local Government Agencies (Such as 

Departments of Motor Vehicles) 

For Federal purposes, individuals 

approved for TPS may show their Form 

I–797, Notice of Action, indicating 

approval of their Form I–821 

application, or their A12 or C19 EAD to 

prove that they have TPS or a pending 

TPS application. However, while 

Federal Government agencies must 

follow the guidelines laid out by the 

Federal Government, state and local 

government agencies establish their own 

rules and guidelines when granting 

certain benefits. Each state may have 

different laws, requirements, and 

determinations about what documents 

you need to provide to prove eligibility 

for certain benefits. Whether you are 

applying for a Federal, state, or local 

government benefit, you may need to 

provide the government agency with 

documents that show you are covered 

under TPS or show you are authorized 

to work based on TPS. Examples of such 

documents are: 

• Your new EAD with a category code 

of A12 or C19 for TPS, regardless of 

your country of birth; 

• A copy of your Form I–94, Arrival/ 

Departure Record; or 

• Form I–797, the notice of approval, 

for your Form I–821, Application for 

Temporary Protected Status, if you 

received one from USCIS. 

Check with the government agency 

regarding which document(s) the agency 

will accept. 

Some benefit-granting agencies use 

the SAVE program to confirm the 

current immigration status of applicants 

for public benefits. SAVE can verify 

when an individual has TPS based on 

the documents above. In most cases, 

SAVE provides an automated electronic 

response to benefit-granting agencies 

within seconds, but occasionally 

verification can be delayed. You can 

check the status of your SAVE 

verification by using CaseCheck at 

uscis.gov/save/save-casecheck, then by 

clicking the ‘‘Check Your Case’’ button. 

CaseCheck is a free service that lets you 

follow the progress of your SAVE 

verification using your date of birth and 

SAVE verification case number or an 

immigration identifier number that you 

provided to the benefit-granting agency. 

If an agency has denied your application 

based solely or in part on a SAVE 

response, the agency must offer you the 


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30988 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 98 / Friday, May 20, 2022 / Notices 

opportunity to appeal the decision in 

accordance with the agency’s 

procedures. If the agency has received 

and acted on or will act on a SAVE 

verification and you do not believe the 

final SAVE response is correct, please 

see the SAVE Records: Fast Facts For 

Benefit Applicants sheet under SAVE 

Resources at https://www.uscis.gov/ 

save/save-resources for information 

about how to correct or update your 

immigration record. 

[FR Doc. 2022–10923 Filed 5–19–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9111–97–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Geological Survey 

[GR21EG51TJ50200; OMB Control Number 

1028–NEW] 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities; Submission to the Office of 

Management and Budget for Review 

and Approval: National Digital Trails 

Project—Trail Data Portal 

AGENCY: Geological Survey, Interior. 

ACTION: Notice of information collection; 

request for comment. 

SUMMARY: In accordance with the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA, 

44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the U.S. 

Geological Survey (USGS) is proposing 

a new information collection. 

DATES: Interested persons are invited to 

submit comments on or before June 21, 

2022. 

ADDRESSES: Written comments and 

recommendations for the proposed 

information collection should be sent 

within 30 days of publication of this 

notice to www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ 

PRAMain. Find this particular 

information collection by selecting 

‘‘Currently under 30-day Review—Open 

for Public Comments’’ or by using the 

search function. Comments may also be 

sent by mail to the U.S. Geological 

Survey, Information Collections Officer, 

12201 Sunrise Valley Drive, MS 159, 

Reston, VA 20192; or by email to gsinfo_collections@usgs.gov. Please 

reference OMB Control Number 1028– 

NEW in the subject line of your 

comments. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: To 

request additional information about 

this Information Collection Request 

(ICR), contact Tatyana DiMascio by 

email at tdimascio@usgs.gov, or by 

telephone at (303) 202–4206. You may 

also view the ICR at http://

www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain. 

Individuals in the United States who are 

deaf, deafblind, hard of hearing, or have 

a speech disability may dial 711 (TTY, 

TDD, or TeleBraille) to access 

telecommunications relay services. 

Individuals outside the United States 

should use the relay services offered 

within their country to make 

international calls to the point-ofcontact in the United States. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In 

accordance with the PRA and 5 CFR 

1320.8(d)(1), we provide the general 

public and other Federal agencies with 

an opportunity to comment on new, 

proposed, revised, and continuing 

collections of information. This helps us 

assess the impact of our information 

collection requirements and minimize 

the public’s reporting burden. It also 

helps the public understand our 

information collection requirements and 

provide the requested data in the 

desired format. 

A Federal Register notice with a 60- 

day public comment period soliciting 

comments on this collection of 

information was published on June 1, 

2021 (86 FR 29279). No comments were 

received. 

As part of our continuing effort to 

reduce paperwork and respondent 

burdens, we are again soliciting 

comments from the public and other 

Federal agencies on the proposed ICR 

that is described below. We are 

especially interested in public comment 

addressing the following: 

(1) Whether or not the collection of 

information is necessary for the proper 

performance of the functions of the 

agency, including whether or not the 

information will have practical utility; 

(2) The accuracy of our estimate of the 

burden for this collection of 

information, including the validity of 

the methodology and assumptions used; 

(3) Ways to enhance the quality, 

utility, and clarity of the information to 

be collected; and 

(4) How the agency might minimize 

the burden of the collection of 

information on those who are to 

respond, including through the use of 

appropriate automated, electronic, 

mechanical, or other technological 

collection techniques or other forms of 

information technology, e.g., permitting 

electronic submission of response. 

Comments that you submit in 

response to this notice are a matter of 

public record. Before including your 

address, phone number, email address, 

or other personally identifiable 

information (PII) in your comment, you 

should be aware that your entire 

comment—including your PII—may be 

made publicly available at any time. 

While you can ask us in your comment 

to withhold your PII from public review, 

we cannot guarantee that we will be 

able to do so. 

Abstract 

A major component of the Department 

of Interior’s vision is to ‘‘Increase access 

to outdoor recreation opportunities for 

all Americans so that our people can be 

healthier, more fully enjoy the 

wonderful features of their federal 

lands, and take advantage of hunting, 

fishing, and other outdoor recreation 

pursuits that are the roots of the 

conservation movement.’’ At the 

direction of DOI, the USGS is advancing 

that vision with the launch of the 

National Digital Trails (NDT) project. 

The two-year project consists of three 

major goals: 

1. Develop a web-based geospatial 

analysis tool, called Trail Routing 

Analysis and Information Linkage 

System (TRAILS), to assist Federal land 

managers in identifying and prioritizing 

candidate trails to be connected to 

existing trails and trail networks. 

2. Aid in the creation of a robust 

nationwide digital trails dataset 

including, at a minimum, trails on lands 

managed by key Federal agencies 

including the Bureau of Land 

Management, National Park Service, 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and U.S. 

Forest Service. 

3. Develop a mobile responsive 

application that will assist trail 

stewards, land management agencies, 

and members of the public in the 

maintenance of trails information. 

This information collection request 

focuses on Goal 2, the digital trails 

dataset. The Trail Data Portal will 

support development and maintenance 

of the robust USGS nationwide digital 

trails dataset (Goal 2). In turn, the 

dataset is a primary component of the 

TRAILS geospatial analysis tool (Goal 1) 

which provides DOI bureaus and trail 

managers a tool to improve trail 

connectivity throughout the Nation’s 

public lands. 

The Trail Data Portal will facilitate an 

efficient digital trails data submission 

process and communication between 

the USGS and data providers. 

Authoritative trail managers will be able 

to log in to submit their trails data, 

along with relevant information, for 

USGS review and integration into the 

USGS digital trails dataset. USGS staff 

will be able to log in to download the 

submitted data, perform preliminary 

assessment, and provide status updates 

for every trail data submission. No data 

edits or integration will take place 

within the Trail Data Portal. 

The following information will be 

collected for every authoritative data 

provider that submits trails data for 


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