IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

TEXARKANA DIVISION 

ALEXANDRA DAVIS, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

JERRAL W. JONES, DALLAS COWBOYS 

FOOTBALL CLUB, LTD., JAMES 

WILKINSON, TRAILRUNNER 

INTERNATIONAL, LLC, and DONALD 

JACK, JR. 

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION No. 5:23-cv-00032-RWS 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

ORAL HEARING REQUESTED 

DEFENDANTS’ JERRAL W. JONES, DALLAS COWBOYS FOOTBALL CLUB, LTD., 

JAMES WILKINSON, TRAILRUNNER INTERNATIONAL, LLC AND DONALD 

JACK, JR. MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12 (b)(6) AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT 

THEREOF 

Respectfully submitted by: 

 FOLSOM ADR PLLC JACKSON WALKER LLP 

 David Folsom 

State Bar No. 07210800 

david@folsomadr.com 

6002-B Summerfield Dr. 

Texarkana, TX 75503 

(903) 277-7303 

 Charles L. Babcock 

State Bar No. 01479500 

cbabcock@jw.com 

Nancy W. Hamilton 

State Bar No. 11587925 

nhamilton@jw.com 

1401 McKinney Street 

Suite 1900 

Houston, TX 77010 

(713) 752-4210 

(713) 752-4221 - Fax 

David T. Moran 

State Bar No. 

14419400 

dmoran@jw.com 

Edwin Buffmire 

State Bar No. 

24078283 

ebuffmire@jw.com 

Cody Martinez 

State Bar No. 

24102146 

cmartinez@jw.com 

2323 Ross Avenue 

Suite 600 

Dallas, TX 75201 

(214) 953-6000 

(214) 953-5822 – Fax 

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 

JERRAL W. JONES, DALLAS COWBOYS FOOTBALL CLUB, LTD., JAMES 

WILKINSON, TRAILRUNNER INTERNATIONAL, LLC AND DONALD JACK, JR. 

Case 5:23-cv-00032-RWS Document 12 Filed 05/26/23 Page 1 of 39 PageID #: 45
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................... i

I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1

II. GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF DISMISSAL ......................................................................5

III. ISSUES TO BE DECIDED .................................................................................................6

IV. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS ........................................................................7

V. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD ..............................................................................12

VI. ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................13

A. ONE OR MORE ELEMENTS OF PLAINTIFF’S DEFAMATION 

CLAIMS ARE NEGATED AS A MATTER OF LAW ........................................13

1. The Plea .....................................................................................................15

2. The Preservation Letter ..............................................................................21

3. The Jack Affidavit ......................................................................................22

4. Jack’s Purported Comments to ESPN ........................................................23

5. Wilkinson’s Purported Comments to ESPN ..............................................24

B. PUBLIC FIGURE AND ACTUAL MALICE .......................................................26

C. NO CONSPIRACY WHEN NO UNDERLYING CLAIM ...................................28

D. THE PRINCIPAL CAN NOT BE RESPONSIBLE WHEN THE AGENT 

IS IMMUNE ..........................................................................................................28

E. THE CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO 

COMPLY WITH THE DMA ................................................................................28

F. THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED ....................30

VII. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................30

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page i 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 Page(s) 

Cases 

Matter of 3 Star Props., L.L.C., 

6 F.4th 595 (5th Cir. 2021) ......................................................................................................28 

Agar Corp. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 

580 S.W.3d 136 (Tex. 2019) ....................................................................................................28 

Agate v. IMG Worldwide, Inc., 

No. B243636, 2013 WL 6087414 (Cal. App. Nov. 20, 2013) (unpublished)..........................25 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) .......................................................13 

Atkinson v. Netflix, Inc., 

No. 5:21-CV-00079, 2022 WL 2899275 (E.D. Tex. May 18, 2022) .......................................13 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) .................................................12, 13 

Biro v. Condé Nast, 

963 F. Supp. 2d 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d 807 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2015) ..............................27 

Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, 

681 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................................13 

Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 

467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015) ....................................................................................................22 

D Magazine Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal, 

529 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. 2017) ....................................................................................................13 

Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 

554 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. 2018) ..............................................................................6, 11, 13, 15, 17 

E.G.E. By Next Friend Kayla Ellenwood v. Leon, 

205 N.E.3d 232 (Ind. 2023) .......................................................................................................1 

Fasi v. Gannett, Co., 

930 F. Supp. 1403 (D. Haw. 1995) ..........................................................................................19 

G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 

347 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. 2011) ....................................................................................................28 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page ii 

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 

418 U.S. 323 (1974) ...........................................................................................................26, 30 

Gonzalez v. Kay, 

577 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2009) ...................................................................................................13 

Green Belt Co-op Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler, 

398 U.S. 6 (1970) .....................................................................................................................19 

Hancock v. Variyam, 

400 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2013) ......................................................................................................30 

Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD LLC, 

631 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. 2021) ......................................................................................................28 

Hogan v. Winder, 

762 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2014) .........................................................................................19, 20 

Hogan v. Zoanni, 

627 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. 2021) ....................................................................................................29 

James v. Brown, 

637 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1982) ....................................................................................................21 

Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 

788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1985) .................................................................................................15 

Lilith Fund for Reprod. Equity v. Dickson, 

662 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. 2023) ....................................................................................6, 14, 15, 21 

In re Lipsky, 

460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) ....................................................................................................14 

Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 

594 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................13 

Masson v. New Yorker Mag. Inc., 

501 U.S. 496 (1991) .................................................................................................................14 

McIlvain v. Jacobs, 

794 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1990) ......................................................................................................17 

McNamee v. Clemens, 

762 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) .....................................................................................25 

Miller v. Transamerican Press, 

621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), mod. on reh, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. 

den., 450 U.S. 1041 (1981) ......................................................................................................14

Case 5:23-cv-00032-RWS Document 12 Filed 05/26/23 Page 4 of 39 PageID #: 48
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page iii 

Musser v. Smith Protective Servs., Inc., 

723 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. 1987) ....................................................................................................17 

Nationwide Bi-Weekly Admin., Inc. v. Belo Corp., 

512 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 2007) ...................................................................................................22 

Neely v Wilson, 

418 S.W.3d 52 (Tex. 2013) ......................................................................................................17 

New York Times v Sullivan, 

376 U.S. 254 (1964) .................................................................................................................26 

Novecon Ltd. v. Bulgarian-Am. Enter. Fund, 

190 F.3d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................20 

Remick v. Manfredy, 

238 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2001).....................................................................................................20 

Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 

464 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2015) ....................................................................................................22 

St. Amant v. Thompson, 

390 U.S. 727 (1968) ...........................................................................................................14, 26 

Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enters., Inc., 

818 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1987) ...................................................................................6, 14, 26, 27 

Turner v. Wells, 

879 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir, 2018) ...............................................................................................27 

Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 

938 F.3d 724 (5th Cir. 2019) .............................................................................................6, 7, 8 

WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 

978 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. 1998) ....................................................................................................21 

WickFire, L.L.C. v. Woodruff, 

989 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2021) ...................................................................................................28 

Statutes 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Section 16.002(a), ..........................................................................22 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Section 73.051 et seq., ...........................................5, 6, 7, 12, 28, 29 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Section 73.054 ...............................................................................28 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Section 73.055 ...................................................................28, 29, 30 

Case 5:23-cv-00032-RWS Document 12 Filed 05/26/23 Page 5 of 39 PageID #: 49
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page iv 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Section 73.058 ...............................................................................29 

Other Authorities 

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ..........................................................................................1 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ....................................................................................................................13 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)........................................................................................................7, 12, 19 

https://www.thesaurus.com/browse/blackmail ........................................................................19, 20 

Texas Const., art. I, § 8 ..................................................................................................................13 

U.S. Const., amend. I .........................................................................................................13, 15, 19 

Case 5:23-cv-00032-RWS Document 12 Filed 05/26/23 Page 6 of 39 PageID #: 50
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page 1 

TO THE HONORABLE COURT: 

Jerral W. Jones (“Jones”), Dallas Cowboys Football Club Ltd. (“Cowboys”), James 

Wilkinson (“Wilkinson”), Trailrunner International LLC (“Trailrunner”) and Donald Jack, Jr. 

(“Jack”) (collectively “Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff Alexandra Davis’ (“Plaintiff” or 

“Davis”) Complaint (“Complaint” or “Dkt. 1”) for failure to state a claim (“Motion”) as follows: 

I. INTRODUCTION 

1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants called her an “extortionist” and a “shakedown 

artist” thereby defaming her because, Davis says, she never “sought any financial compensation” 

from Jones.1

 As we shall see, this is demonstrably (and conceded by her to be) untrue but, in any 

event, irrelevant because, as her Complaint admits, she sought something of value, to which she 

had no right, by threatening Jones with exposure of private embarrassing facts unless he complied 

with her demands. 

2. First, even if she didn’t seek money (which she did), extortion can be, and often is, 

about “money or anything of value”.2 At the very least Plaintiff demanded, as the Complaint 

alleges, that Jones “submit to genetic testing in private”3 in order “to avoid potential publicity that 

the filing of a paternity lawsuit could attract.”4

 “Genetic Testing” is apparently of “value” to 

Plaintiff who is interested in proving that Jones is her father even though she contractually 

relinquished the right to establish his parentage in exchange for over a million dollars. 

 

1

 Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 26, 33, 55-73, pp. 6, 8, 14-19. All page cites are to the ECF page. 

2 See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (Bryan Gardner Ed.)(“Black’s”) defines “extort” as “To gain by wrongful 

methods; to obtain in an unlawful manner; to exact wrongfully by threat or intimidation”. An earlier edition of Black’s 

(5th edition) defines extortion as obtaining “money or other valuable thing”. See also E.G.E. By Next Friend Kayla 

Ellenwood v. Leon, 205 N.E.3d 232 (Ind. 2023) (unpublished) (“We find that the trial court used the term “extortion” 

to mean that Mother was trying to extract Father’s consent to the adoption using disingenuous promises [allowing him 

to see the child if he consented to the adoption] ... We therefore do not find the trial court’s use of this word (extortion) 

erroneous.”). 

3

 Dkt. 1 ¶ 29, p. 7. 

4 Id. at ¶ 26, p. 6. 

Case 5:23-cv-00032-RWS Document 12 Filed 05/26/23 Page 7 of 39 PageID #: 51
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page 2 

3. Second, Plaintiff admits she did seek money when she demanded that Jones pay 

her $20 million, writing that “if I get that I will be out of his (Jones’) life”.5

 Furthermore, in the 

first of three lawsuits she filed against Jones, Davis demanded monetary attorney’s fees and “other 

and further relief” including the right to continue to receive money under her agreements with 

Jones even as she breached them. In the second lawsuit she sought monetary “attorney’s fees, 

expenses, costs and interest [and] general relief [and] all other relief” and in this case she seeks 

damages.6 So she has concededly sought both non-monetary and monetary “compensation” from 

Jones, that is, money and/or something of value, in a variety of ways over a lengthy period of 

time (the additional $20 million demand was in 2017)7

 in exchange for getting “out of his life” and 

not exposing him to “potential publicity”. 

4. The alleged defamations (“Complained of Statements”) are, according to Plaintiff, 

found in five publications (“Publications”): (i) a Plea to the Jurisdiction and Answer Subject 

Thereto Original Answer (“Plea”)8 which Jones filed in response to the first of Davis’ three 

lawsuits against him (“First Davis Lawsuit”); (ii) an Affidavit by Jack filed in response to the next 

Davis lawsuit (“Second Davis Lawsuit”)9; (iii) a letter from counsel for a third party witness 

(Jones) to counsel in a divorce case, where Plaintiff was not a party and not copied, asking that 

specified documents be preserved (“Preservation Letter”)10; and (iv and v) comments allegedly 

made by Defendants Jack and Wilkinson and subsequently published by ESPN in two separate 

 

5

 Ex. 1(A), APP 004. 

6 See Ex. 2(3), APP 079; Ex. 7, APP 155. 

7

 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 43 p. 11; Ex. 1 APP 001; Ex. 1(A), APP 004. 

8

 Ex. 4, APP 123-133. 

9

 Ex. 2(1), APP 026-031. 

10 Ex. 10, APP 294-295. 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page 3 

written articles, one on March 30, 2022 (“First ESPN Article”)11 and the other on March 31, 2022 

(“Second ESPN Article”).12

5. This dispute dates to Davis’ childhood when, starting in 1998, Jones began 

financially supporting her through various agreements (collectively “The Agreements” also 

referred to in the Complaint as the “Settlement Agreements”) executed by her mother (“Cynthia” 

or “Mrs. Spencer”) as “sole legal guardian” and “parent” and “on behalf of [Plaintiff]”13 and 

payments administered by Jack, an attorney for Jones, with whom Davis later (in 2017) claimed 

to have a “special relationship”, referring to him as a “father figure” and describing him as “a solid 

and reliable person”.14 

6. Over the years, Jones provided more than a million dollars in ongoing monthly 

support15 to Davis in exchange for two things: 1) the agreement that Davis and Cynthia would not 

“make any future disclosures or statement regarding Mother’s belief that [Jones] is father of 

[Plaintiff]”16 and 2) that the Agreements, which released all claims regarding Davis’ parentage, 

“may forever be treated as a complete defense and bar to any action that Mother or [Plaintiff] may 

commence, bring, or institute against [Jones] in any way related to [Plaintiff]”.17

7. The First Davis Lawsuit, filed in violation of those provisions, “related to” Plaintiff 

who sought a judicial declaration that she was not bound by the Agreements.18 It was publicly filed 

and accompanied by a press statement from Plaintiff’s lawyers19 thus materially breaching both of 

 

11 Ex. 11, APP 296-297. 

12 Ex. 12, APP 298-300. 

13 Ex. 2(2), APP 032. 

14 Ex. 1(A), APP 002, 004. 

15 Ex. 2(1), APP 029. 

16 Ex. 2(2) ¶ 5, APP 035. 

17 Id. ¶¶ 4-5, APP 034-035. 

18 Ex. 2(3) ¶¶ 21-28, APP 078-079. 

19 Ex. 3A “Davis’ lawyers, Andrew A. Bergman and Jay K. Gray of Dallas [said] in a statement released to ESPN [on 

or about March 9, 2022]”, APP 121. 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page 4 

Plaintiff’s promises (Confidentiality and a “bar to any action...in any way related to [Davis]”). 

The Second Davis Lawsuit (attempting to obtain a parentage order that Jones is her father by 

forcing him to take a paternity test) did as well. Jones has separately counterclaimed in this case 

to recover damages for those breaches.20

8. The “monthly support payments” ended on Davis’ twenty-first birthday, December 

16, 201721 although additional lump sum payments were to be made when Plaintiff “attained the 

ages of 24 (2020), 26 (2022) and 28 (2024)”.22 Recognizing that “it is a month away from my 21st

[birthday]”23 and the end of the monthly support payments, Davis sought a new monetary deal with 

Jones at a dinner with Jack.24 “The agreement I want,” she explained in a letter (“Plaintiff’s 

Letter”), which she both read and gave to Jack, “is a separation agreement [and] what I want is 

what I think is fair. I already have a figure in mind and if I get that I will be out of his [Jones’] life 

... I will never reach out asking for money again. I will not speak about who he is”.25 After hearing 

Davis recite the letter, Jack asked how much money Davis thought was “fair”. She quoted, “an 

additional $20 million”.26 Jones “never agreed to that request”.27

9. Then in early 2022 (after the December 2020 lump sum payment had been made) 

Plaintiff demanded that Jones take a paternity test even though, as Plaintiff admits, “Defendant 

 

20 Plaintiff claimed in the First Davis Lawsuit that the Agreements were not binding because they were entered into 

when she was a minor. But, whether or not that position is supported by the law (it is not), Davis ratified/affirmed the 

Agreements by accepting more than a hundred payments in benefits under them after she reached the age of majority. 

Davis never took action to timely disaffirm the Agreements. Indeed, the First Davis Lawsuit acknowledged that she 

might be bound by the Agreements but sought a judicial declaration that she was not. Rather than wait for and abide 

by a decision, Davis non-suited the case shortly before Jones’ Plea was to be ruled upon. See Exs. 4, 6, APP 123-133. 

APP 148-152. 

21 Ex. 2(2a) ¶ 2(M) (“the twentieth Trust Year shall end on December 16, 2017”.), APP 045. 

22 Ex. 2(2), APP 033; Ex. 2(2b), APP 054. 

23 Ex. 1(A), APP 004; Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 43-44 pp. 11-12. 

24 Ex. 2(1) ¶¶ 19-20, APP 030; Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 43-44 pp. 11-12. 

25 Ex. 1(A), APP 004. 

26 Ex. 2(1) ¶ 19, APP 030. 

27 Id. 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page 5 

Jones unequivocally and adamantly stated ... to Cynthia (shortly after Plaintiff was born) ... that 

he never was going to take a paternity test”28 and the Agreements expressly bar a paternity action 

and released claims “in any way related to [Davis’] paternity”.29 

10. In 2017 the coin of the realm was money; in 2022 it was so she could breach the 

Agreements and still receive her money and then it was for a paternity test and money in the form 

of attorney’s fees, costs, and interest, “general relief” and “other relief”30. This case, the third one 

(“Third Davis Lawsuit”), also seeks money in the form of damages including punitive damages. 

II. GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF DISMISSAL 

11. The grounds presented by this Motion all involve questions of law under wellestablished Texas and federal precedent that dictate dismissal for failure to state a claim because 

(i) the reasonable reader would not attribute the alleged defamatory meaning Plaintiff attaches to 

the Complained of Statements when each Publication containing Complained of Language 

(viewed separately) is taken as a whole; (ii) based on the undisputed facts the Complained of 

Statements are either literally or substantially true statements of fact (i.e., not materially false) 

whether one disregards or not protected opinion, hyperbole or rhetoric which are not actionable; 

(iii) there is no plausible pleading of Constitutional “actual malice” which is the fault standard31

since Plaintiff is a public figure; (iv) the Plea, Jack Affidavit and Preservation Letter are all 

absolutely privileged under the judicial proceedings privilege; (v) the Plea and Preservation Letter 

were prepared by Jones’ agent attorneys who are absolutely immune from suit and when there is 

no liability for the agent there is none for the principal; (vi) there can be no conspiracy claim in 

the absence of an actionable underlying cause of action; (vii) the action is barred by the Texas 

 

28 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 13 p. 3. 

29 Ex. 2(2) ¶¶ 4-5, APP 034-035. 

30 Ex. 7, APP 155. 

31 Even if the fault standard is negligence there is no plausible pleading of that either. 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page 6 

Defamation Mitigation Act (“DMA”) and (viii) punitive damages are barred under either (a) the 

DMA or (b) for failure to plausibly plead any entitlement to punitive damages or (c) for failure to 

plausibly plead “actual malice”. 

III. ISSUES TO BE DECIDED 

12. Whether the Complained of Statements have defamatory meaning (an essential 

element) as measured by a reader or listener of ordinary intelligence32 when considering the 

entirety of each separate Publication, a question of law.

13. Whether the Complained of Statements in the Publications are false statements of 

fact (an essential element) whether or not they are protected opinion, rhetoric or hyperbole, a 

question of law.33

14. Whether, as a limited purpose public figure (a question of law), Plaintiff has 

plausibly alleged facts of Constitutional “actual malice” (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 

of the truth, that is, that the Defendants in fact entertained serious doubt about the truth of the 

complained of statements), an essential element of her claim and, even if not a public figure, 

whether there is a plausible pleading of negligence.34

15. Whether the Plea, Preservation Letter and Jack Affidavit are absolutely privileged 

under the Judicial Proceedings Privilege.

16. Whether the principal can be liable for the Plea and Preservation Letter when his 

agents are absolutely immune from suit regarding the Plea and the Preservation Letter.

 

32 See Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 624-25, 629-30 (Tex. 2018) (“Tatum”) (“In a defamation 

case, the threshold question is whether the words used ‘are reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning’. In answering 

the question the inquiry is objective not subjective [and] “[M]eaning is a question of law.” (Citations omitted)). 

33 See Lilith Fund for Reprod. Equity v. Dickson, 662 S.W.3d 355, 363, 367 (Tex. 2023) (“Lilith Fund”) (“Whether 

an alleged defamatory statement constitutes an opinion rather than a verifiable falsity is a question of law.”). 

34 See Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enters., Inc., 818 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Whether an individual is a public 

figure is a matter of law for the court to decide.”); Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724,735, 745 (5th

Cir. 2019) (“[W]e agree with the district court that the deficiency of Appellants’ “actual malice” allegations provides 

an independent, standalone basis for dismissal of Walker’s defamation claims.”). 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page 7 

17. Whether the Preservation Letter (“Letter”) is, on its face, “Of and Concerning” 

Plaintiff (an essential element), “Defamatory” (another element), contains materially false 

statement of fact(s) (element) and is, in any event, absolutely privileged or barred by the one-year 

statute of limitations.

18. Whether Plaintiff’s failure to make a timely or sufficient demand for correction, 

clarification or retraction requires dismissal under the DMA, Section 73.051 et seq., Tex. Civ. 

Prac. & Rem. Code.

19. Whether Plaintiff states a conspiracy claim in the absence of an underlying cause 

of action.

20. Whether Plaintiff is precluded as a matter of law from recovering punitive damages 

under the DMA or, alternatively, in the absence of any pleading showing eligibility for punitive 

damages or a plausible pleading of facts of “actual malice”. 

IV. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 

21. The undisputed facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint and documents attached 

to the Motion which are referenced in the Complaint and are central to Plaintiff’s claims 

(“Attachments”).35 Defendants accept Plaintiff’s allegations solely for the purpose of this Motion 

even though many will be disputed if the case continues. The uncontested material facts are as 

follows: 

22. Davis was born on December 16, 1996.36

 

35 The attachments are properly considered in deciding the Motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Walker v. 

Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 735 (“When a defendant attaches documents to its motion that are referred to in 

the complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claims, the court may also properly consider those documents. In so 

attaching, the defendant merely assists the plaintiff in establishing the basis of the suit and the court in making the 

elementary determination whether a claim has been stated [under Rule 12(b)(6)]”). 

36 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 8 p. 2. 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page 8 

23. At that time her mother, Cynthia “Cindy” Davis Spencer, was married but 

“[s]hortly after Plaintiff was born, [Mrs. Spencer] and her husband began divorce proceedings in 

Arkansas”.37

24. The Spencers were granted a divorce in June 1998.38

25. While the divorce was pending Mrs. Spencer informed Jones that her husband had 

taken a paternity test which showed that [Mr. Spencer] was not Plaintiff’s father.39

26. Mrs. Spencer claims she knew “that Jones was Plaintiff’s biological father.”40

27. Jones then, according to Mrs. Spencer, “immediately set out to negotiate an 

agreement with Cynthia that would exchange money for silence.”41

28. To facilitate the negotiations of a “hush money deal” he sought the help of his “long 

time Arkansas friend and lawyer, defendant Jack.”42

29. “A ‘hush money’ deal was struck” which in “essence” provided for ongoing 

monthly support “... conditioned on Cynthia and Plaintiff remaining silent” about the claim that 

Jones was Plaintiff’s father.43

30. The so-called hush money deal was memorialized in two written documents (“The 

Settlement Documents” also referred to as “The Agreements”).44 The Settlement Documents, in 

 

37 Id. at ¶¶ 8, 11 pp. 2-3. 

38 Id. at ¶ 12 p. 3. 

39 Id. at ¶ 13 p. 3. 

40 Id.

41 Id. at ¶ 15 p. 4. 

42 Id.

43 Id. at ¶ 16 p. 4. 

44 Id. at ¶ 18 p. 4. See Ex. 2 to this Motion, which attaches as Exhibit 2(1) the Affidavit (“Jack Affidavit”) filed in the 

Second Davis Lawsuit which attaches the Settlement Documents as Exhibits (2), (2a) and (2b), and Exhibit 1(A), the 

Plaintiff’s Letter APP 032-071, APP 002-004. These documents may be considered because they are extensively 

referenced in the Complaint and are central to the Plaintiff’s claims and, in fact, are one of the five allegedly 

defamatory publications. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 42 p. 11. As such, it may be considered by the Court. See Walker, 938 F.3d at 

735. 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page 9 

addition to providing for confidentiality also barred “Plaintiff from ever seeking a legal 

adjudication that Defendant Jones was her father”.45

31. After reaching the age of majority on December 16, 2014 Plaintiff demanded and 

accepted over a million dollars from Jones consisting of 140 separate payments under the 

Agreements and “numerous other payments” outside the Agreements.46

32. But not all of Plaintiff’s monetary demands were met. A month before her twentyfirst birthday “at a dinner” with Jack, Plaintiff “read to [him]” a letter (“Plaintiff’s Letter”) “written 

... by Plaintiff as a therapeutic exercise at the direction of her therapist”.47 “In truth and in fact,” 

Plaintiff alleges, “the therapy assisted letter was a plea by a shunned daughter to her father”.48

Plaintiff’s Letter is attached to the Jack Declaration as (Ex. 1(A)). 

33. Plaintiff’s Letter states that “I want us to have an agreement” which would pay 

Plaintiff “what I think is fair. I already have a figure in mind ... ”. Plaintiff wrote that if she was 

paid her figure she promised “if I get that I will be out of his life. I will sign something that says I 

will never reach out asking for money again. I will not speak about who he is.”49

34. Plaintiff’s Letter is in her own handwriting and was written by her as an adult, 

almost three years after Davis reached the age of majority (18).50 At some point, after she received 

her 2020 payment and the $20 million demand was ignored, “Plaintiff decided to seek legal 

guidance as to her rights for the first time as they related to Defendant Jones’ parentage, and the 

so-called Settlement Documents.”51

 

45 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 18 p. 4 

46 Ex. 2(1) ¶ 17, APP 029-030. 

47 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 43 p. 11. 

48 Id. at ¶ 44 p. 11. 

49 Ex. 1(A), APP 003-004. 

50 Ex. 2(1) at ¶19, APP 030. 

51 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 22 p. 5. 

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35. On January 5, 2022 her attorney Andrew A. Bergman (“Bergman”) sent a letter to 

Jones stating that his firm “has been retained to represent [Plaintiff] in establishing parentage of 

you as her biological and legal father ... [and if] you have no interest in cooperating...we will 

proceed with the legal process.”52

36. Plaintiff alleges that she sought Jones’ “participation without the necessity of filing 

a lawsuit to avoid potential publicity that the filing of a paternity lawsuit could attract”.53 The 

lawsuit was a “last resort”, she alleged, unless “Defendant Jones just agreed to submit to genetic 

testing in private.”54

37. On March 1, 2022, “after not receiving any contact from Defendant Jones’ counsel” 

Bergman “reached out to [Jones’] counsel and forwarded a copy of the lawsuit Plaintiff intended 

to file.”55

38. When no agreement was reached, Bergman filed the First Davis Lawsuit in the 

public record (in violation of the Agreements). It sought a declaration that “[Davis] is not bound 

by” the Settlement Agreement which permitted the trusts they established to be terminated if 

[Plaintiff] or any person on behalf of [Plaintiff] “brings or commences any kind of legal proceeding 

to establish paternity of the Child”. It further sought a declaration that the Settlement Agreement 

provisions that required her confidentiality were unenforceable56 and demanded attorney's fees, 

costs and “any other and further relief ... to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled.”57

 

52 Dkt. 1-2 p. 1. 

53 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 26 p. 6. 

54 Id. at ¶ 29 p. 7. 

55 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 27 p. 7. 

56 See Ex. 2(3) attached hereto and incorporated herein (Certified Copy of Plaintiff’s Original Petition in Alexandra 

Davis v. Jerald W. Jones, No. DC-22-02476 (Dallas Co. Dist. Ct., Texas). One of the allegedly defamatory 

publications (the “Plea”) responded to this Petition. See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 34-35 Id. at ¶¶ 21-28, APP 078-079. 

57 Id. at ¶ 29, APP 079. 

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39. An article about Plaintiff’s publicly filed lawsuit was “immediately published” by 

the Dallas Morning News and “after the [Morning News] published its story, the Lawsuit 

immediately attracted local, national and international attention.”58 Plaintiff’s counsel also issued 

a statement to the press which was published, in part, by ESPN.59 Plaintiff herself issued a written 

statement to WFAA-TV, a Dallas television station.60 

40. Jones’ lawyers countered the lawsuit with a Plea to the Jurisdiction and Answer 

subject thereto (“Plea”).61 Plaintiff responded (“Response”).62 But shortly before the Plea was to 

be decided, Plaintiff nonsuited the First Davis Lawsuit and it was dismissed by the Court without 

prejudice.63

41. Then, Davis immediately filed a second suit against Jones in Dallas County Family 

District Court (“Second Davis Lawsuit”) this time to “adjudicate parentage” and seeking “general 

relief” and monetary “attorney’s fees.”64 Jack’s affidavit was filed in support of Jones’ motion for 

summary judgment in that case.65 The summary judgment was denied and the lawsuit is still 

pending. 

42. “Around this same time” Jones’ daughter (Charlotte) was going through a 

contentious divorce with her husband, Shy Anderson, [and] on March 10, 2022 one of Jones’ 

 

58 Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 31-32 p. 8. The Dallas Morning News article is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 3 

APP 114-120. A national publication subsequently published an article which noted that “lawyers for [Davis] released 

a statement Thursday”. This article (from ESPN) is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 3A, APP 121-

122.

59 See Ex. 3A, APP 121. 

60 See Ex. 9(P), APP 287-293. 

61 See Ex. 4 [Plea] attached hereto and incorporated herein APP 123-133. 

62 See Ex. 5 [Plaintiff’s Response to the Plea] attached hereto and incorporated herein APP 134-147. 

63 See Ex. 6 [Plaintiff’s Motion for Non-Suit and Order Granting] attached hereto and incorporated herein APP 148-

152. 

64 See Ex. 7 [Petition to Adjudicate Parentage] attached hereto and incorporated herein APP 153-162. 

65 See Ex. 2 [Motion for Summary Judgment] attached hereto and incorporated herein (APP 005-113)and Ex. 8 [Davis’ 

Response to Jones’ Motion for Summary Judgment] (APP 163-193) attached hereto and incorporated herein. 

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lawyers (Babcock) “wrote so-called document [p]reservation [l]etter to Shy Anderson’s 

[counsel]”66, (“Preservation Letter”). 

43. Plaintiff sues for defamation regarding three written publications (the Plea, the Jack 

Affidavit, and the Preservation Letter) and oral statements purportedly made by Defendants Jack 

and Wilkinson to ESPN which published The First ESPN Article on March 30, 202267 and The 

Second ESPN Article on March 31, 2022.68

44. Plaintiff does not plead that she served Defendants with a request for correction, 

clarification or retraction of the allegedly Complained of Statements in the Publications as required 

by the DMA. She could not so plead in good faith because no such request was ever made. 

45. This lawsuit was filed more than one year after the Document Preservation Letter. 

For purposes of the DMA (which requires a request to be served before limitations run in order to 

be timely) no demand for clarification, correction or retraction was made before the expiration of 

the statute of limitations for the other publications. Limitations ran for all the Publications shortly 

after this suit was filed. 

V. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD 

46. The motion to dismiss standard for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6), is, of course, familiar to the Court and is as follows: 

Each claim must include enough factual allegations “to raise a right 

to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 55, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). A Rule 

12(b)(6) motion allows a party to move for dismissal of an action 

when the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all well-

 

66 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 37 p. 9. This letter is one of the allegedly defamatory publications and is attached hereto and incorporated 

herein as Ex. 10, APP 294-295. 

67 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 39. [The First ESPN Article] attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 12, APP 296-297. 

68 Id. at ¶ 58 (e) through (l). The Second ESPN Article is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 12, APP 

298-300. 

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pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint and view those facts in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, 681 

F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012). The court may consider “the 

complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any 

documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the 

claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), 

L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). The 

court must then determine whether the complaint states a claim for 

relief that is plausible on its face. 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gonzalez v. Kay, 

577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). “But 

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more 

than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – 

but it has not ‘show(n)’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Accordingly, “[t]o 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570). 

Atkinson v. Netflix, Inc., No. 5:21-CV-00079, 2022 WL 2899275, at *6 (E.D. Tex. May 18, 2022) 

(Schroeder, J.). 

VI. ARGUMENT 

A. ONE OR MORE ELEMENTS OF PLAINTIFF’S DEFAMATION CLAIMS 

ARE NEGATED AS A MATTER OF LAW 

47. Both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 

8 of the Texas Constitution “robustly protect freedom of speech”69 and “impose substantive limits 

on defamation law”.70 As the Texas Supreme Court has explained, “to avoid the threat to free 

speech that unrestrained defamation liability poses, the U.S. Constitution imposes a special duty 

on judges whenever it is claimed that a particular communication is defamatory”.71

 

69 D Magazine Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429, 431 (Tex. 2017). 

70 Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 624 (Tex. 2018) (“Tatum”). 

71 Tatum, 554 S.W.3d at 624. 

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48. As a result of these protections the trial judge is charged in the first instance with 

determining, as a matter of law: 1) whether the speech is protected opinion, rhetoric or hyperbole, 

2) whether it is defamatory and 3) whether the Plaintiff is a public figure which would require 

pleading and proof by clear and convincing evidence of Constitutional “actual malice”. 

Constitutional actual malice is defined by the United States Supreme Court as knowledge of falsity 

by the person responsible for the publication or reckless disregard for the truth that is, the speaker 

in fact entertained serious doubt about the truth of the statement.72 “Whether an individual is a 

public figure is a matter of law for the court to decide”73 and “[i]n a defamation case, the question 

of public figure is pervasive and it should be answered as soon as possible.”74 As in Miller the 

public figure question is easily resolved on the undisputed record based, primarily, on Plaintiff’s 

admitted conduct and her own allegations. 

49. Under Texas law, as informed by the Constitutions, to prevail on a claim of 

defamation a plaintiff must allege and prove: “(1) the publication of a false statement of fact to a 

third party, (2) that was defamatory concerning the plaintiff, (3) with the requisite degree of fault 

[negligence for private figures and “actual malice” for public figures and public officials], and (4) 

damages, in some cases”.75 The allegedly false statement of fact must be material.76

50. “Whether an alleged defamatory statement constitutes an opinion rather than a 

verifiable falsity is a question of law”.77 The publication is viewed from “the perspective of a 

reasonable person’s perception of the entirety of the communication [and] not from isolated 

 

72 See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (“St. Amant”). 

73 See Trotter v Jack Anderson Enter., Inc. 818 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1987). 

74 See Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721,724 (5th Cir. 1980), mod. on reh, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980), 

cert. den., 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). 

75 See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 593 (Tex. 2015). 

76 See Masson v. New Yorker Mag. Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991). 

77 See Lilith Fund for Reprod. Equity v. Dickson, 662 S.W.3d 355, 363, 367 (Tex. 2023). 

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statements.”78 “In considering the entire communication, a reasonable person is also cognizant of 

the speaker’s method and style of dissemination.”79 As Judge Richard Arnold wrote for the en 

banc Eighth Circuit upholding the dismissal of a defamation claim: “Because the disputed 

statement in this case is imprecise, unverifiable, presented in a forum where spirited writing is 

expected, and involves criticism of the motive and intentions of a public official [public figure 

here] we affirm the holding of the District Court that it is opinion protected by the First 

Amendment.”80

51. In deciding the threshold matter of defamatory meaning (a question of law) the 

Court first determines “whether the meaning the plaintiff alleges is reasonably capable of arising 

from the text of which the plaintiff complains. The second step is to answer whether the meaning—

if it is reasonably capable of arising from the text—is reasonably capable of defaming the 

plaintiff.”81

52. We discuss each of the Complained of Statements in the Publications below:

1. The Plea 

53. As the Complaint states, the Plea was “the filing of his [Jones’] initial response to 

the [First Davis] Lawsuit”82 which sought a declaration that Davis was not bound to the 

Agreements regarding confidentiality or her parentage83. The Plea is a nine page pleading 

challenging the Court’s jurisdiction.84 The Plea’s two paragraph Introduction, which contains the 

 

78 Id.

79 Id. at 364. 80 Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1305 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

81 Tatum, 554 S.W.3d at 625. 

82 Dkt. 1 ¶ 34 p. 8. 

83 Ex. 2(3), APP 072-082. 

84 Ex. 4 at p. 1, APP 123. 

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allegedly defamatory language, responds to some of Davis’ allegations employing the same 

rhetoric from paragraph nine of Plaintiff’s Petition (i.e., “let’s make a deal”).85 

54. The first paragraph states: 

Plaintiff, a twenty-five-year-old woman currently employed by a 

United States Congressman [Representative Ronny Jackson] in 

Washington D.C., claims that Defendant [Jones] is her 

unacknowledged father. But before making these allegations 

[Plaintiff] delivered a draft of her lawsuit to Defendant and, to 

borrow her phrase, asked whether he would like to ‘make a deal’ to 

‘assure that he would not be publicly or privately identified and/or 

declared as Plaintiff’s father’.86 (Pet. ¶ 9) When Defendant declined 

to pay, this lawsuit followed. 

55. As Plaintiff’s Complaint concedes there is nothing either literally or materially false 

about this paragraph. The Plaintiff is, as the Plea alleged, indisputably a 25-year-old (now 26) 

woman working in Washington, D.C. for a Congressman.87

56. Davis certainly claims that Jones is her unacknowledged father (“Jones ... has 

declined ... requests to establish a relationship with [Davis] who he knows to be his daughter.”)88

and her lawyer delivered a draft of a potential lawsuit to Jones “Plaintiff’s counsel reached out to 

Defendant Jones’ counsel and forwarded a copy of the lawsuit that Plaintiff intended to file if 

Defendant Jones would not agree ....”89 and demanded that Jones agree to her demands to avoid 

publicity (“Plaintiff sought Defendant Jones’ participation without the necessity of filing a lawsuit 

to avoid potential publicity that the filing of a paternity lawsuit could attract.”).90 

 

85 Id. At pp. 1-2, APP 123-124. 

86 The “make a deal” phrase and the following quote comes directly out of the Plaintiff’s Original Petition to which 

the Plea responded. See Ex. 2(3) ¶ 9 p. 3, APP 074. 

87 Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 20, 21 pp. 1, 5. 

88 Dkt. 1 ¶ 19 p. 5. 

89 Dkt. 1 ¶ 27 p. 7. 

90 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 26 p. 6. 

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57. There is also no dispute that Jones “declined to pay” including the demand for 

attorney’s fees and other relief in the First Davis Lawsuit (which the Plea addressed) and the 

$20,000,000 demand in 2017 (“Defendant Jones was not agreeable to resolving these issues 

without litigation”)91 or that the First Davis Lawsuit “followed” (“Disappointed and disheartened 

Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action”).92 Furthermore, this paragraph expressly quoted 

language taken directly from Plaintiff’s Original Petition and cited where it could be found (Pet. ¶ 

9).93 

58. So the facts in paragraph one of the Plea are either literally or substantially true (not 

materially false).94 Substantial truth can be determined as a matter of law if the underlying facts 

are undisputed as here.95

59. And certainly, no reasonable reader would conclude that the statements are 

defamatory of Plaintiff.96 

60. The second paragraph of the Plea reads as follows: 

Plaintiff’s ‘let’s make a deal’ overtures were made at the same time 

Defendant [Jones] and the Dallas Cowboys were the targets of 

multiple extortion attempts. The potential source(s) of these 

attempted extortions, including without limitation the Plaintiff 

[Alexandra Davis] and her agents, will be the subject of other 

litigation which has been filed or will be filed shortly. She is not 

entitled to the relief she requests, and the Court does not have 

jurisdiction to grant it. For the reasons set out below this case should 

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, all relief 

should be denied. 

 

91 Id. at ¶ 30 p. 7. 

92 Id. 93 The Complaint omits this citation back to the Original Petition when setting out the paragraph which are in the 

Complaint. See Dkt.1 at ¶ 35 p. 9. 

94 See Neely v Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 64 (Tex. 2013) (A fact need not be literally true—substantial truth is sufficient 

if it would not affect the mind of an ordinary reader or listener any differently). 

95 See McIlvain v. Jacobs, 794 S.W.2d 14, 15-16 (Tex. 1990). 

96 See Tatum 554 S.W.3d at 629-630; Musser v. Smith Protective Servs., Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex. 1987). 

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61. Plaintiff’s Complaint acknowledges that “[a]round the same time” Jones’ daughter 

Charlotte Jones Anderson was going through a contentious divorce with her husband, Shy 

Anderson.97 Davis also acknowledges that the Preservation Letter was sent to Anderson’s counsel 

demanding documents be preserved while Jones’ counsel conducted an investigation regarding 

multiple attempted extortions. The private Preservation Letter did not accuse Anderson of working 

with others to extort money from the Jones family nor was any such accusation made against 

Davis.98 It is fair to say, however, (as does Davis) that “[a]round the same time”99 as her overtures, 

Jones and the Dallas Cowboys believed they were the targets of multiple monetary extortion 

attempts100 and that, as the Preservation Letter indicated, there was a reasonable chance of 

litigation.101 

62. But as the Plea states the “potential sources” will be the subject of other litigation. 

Plaintiff does not challenge the remainder of the paragraph but it must be considered for context 

because the paragraph, indeed the Plea as a whole, was responding to the allegations Plaintiff 

publicly made and must be viewed in that light. 

63. The use of the phrase “extortion” was merely an opinion subject to future 

confirmation as to both the “potential sources” of the threats and their contours which would be 

explored in “other litigation” which was “to be instituted”. No reasonable reader could view 

these two paragraphs as defamatory of Plaintiff and certainly not when the Plea is taken as a whole, 

which the settled law requires. The Plea is a legal pleading responding to a lawsuit Davis herself 

 

97 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 37 p. 9. 

98 Ex. 10. Rather, the letter advised that Jackson Walker had been retained by Jones “to investigate whether [Jones] 

has potential claims against you [Anderson] and others for conversion (extortion) and other torts and to determine 

whether a conspiracy exists among yourself and others including, without limitation, certain of your lawyers.” APP 

294. 

99 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 37 p. 9. 

100 Ex. 10 at p. 1, APP 294. 

101 Id. 

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filed. It states the Defendant’s legal position in a court of law, and the reasonable reader knows 

that its resolution will await a judicial decision in some “other” court. 

64. As to the use of the term “extortion”, many cases, including from the United States 

Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals, hold that this is an opinion-derived word especially 

when the facts are accurately set forth. Plaintiff and her lawyers did try to obtain something in 

exchange for keeping her bargained for promise about Davis’ parentage (agree to a parentage test 

or suffer, as Plaintiff pleads, the “potential publicity that the filing of a paternity lawsuit could 

attract”.)102 Whether that is extortion is a matter of opinion, rhetoric or hyperbole which are all 

protected speech and thus not actionable as defamation.103 The Hogan case is instructive.104 

65. In affirming the District Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of defamation claims 

similar to Plaintiff’s here, the Tenth Circuit in Hogan wrote: “[A]ccusations of extortion are a 

familiar rhetorical device.105 We all know the colloquial or hyperbolic use of the term. Although 

the term has a derogatory meaning when used either way, we cannot assume that the term always 

refers to a crime or similarly heinous conduct. Like with other words, context matters.”106 

66. Hogan followed a line of United States Supreme Court cases which protect opinion, 

rhetoric and hyperbole. In Green Belt Co-op Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13 (1970) the Court 

reversed, on First Amendment grounds, defamation liability regarding the word “blackmail” (a 

synonym for “extortion”)107 which was stated in a meeting and then subsequently published by the 

 

102 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 26 p. 6. 

103 See Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1108 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Hogan”). 

104 See also Fasi v. Gannett, Co., 930 F. Supp. 1403, 1410 (D. Haw. 1995) (use of language like “Blackmail 

Incorporated” and “Frank ‘The Extortionist’ Fasi” is “rhetorical hyperbole” and “imaginative expression”). 

105 Plaintiff is no stranger to rhetoric, hyperbolic and opinionated pleadings. After all, for example, she repeatedly 

refers to the Agreements as “hush money” even though they also supported her lifestyle for 25 years. 

106 Id.

107 https://www.thesaurus.com/browse/blackmail (Thesaurus.com, Synonyms: 29 Synonyms & Antonyms for 

BLACKMAIL).

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media. “[W]e hold,” the unanimous Court (with one concurrence) wrote, “that as a matter of 

constitutional law, the word ‘blackmail’ in these circumstances was not slander when spoken, and 

not libel when reported in the Greenbelt News Review.”108

67. The same result was reached by the D.C. Circuit in Novecon Ltd. v. Bulgarian-Am. 

Enter. Fund, 190 F.3d 556, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding it unlikely that a reader would interpret 

the use of “extortion” in the context of a reference to a civil lawsuit “as literally charging [the 

plaintiff] with a crime.”) In Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2001), the Third 

Circuit held that use of the term “extort” was not actionable. In both Remick and Novecon, the fact 

that the phrase was used in an adversary setting with lawyers was important. So too here the 

reasonable reader would only believe that the Plea was part of the thrust and parry of litigation.109 

68. So the defamation based upon the Plea fails for lack of defamatory meaning, and 

the absence of a false statement of fact. Rather it is merely protected opinion, rhetoric or hyperbole. 

But even if the phrase, as used, can (somehow) have a defamatory meaning, it is either literally or 

substantially true. Davis demanded $20,000,000 in exchange for getting “out of his life [and] never 

reach out asking for money again”.110 She undisputedly demanded that Jones agree to a paternity 

test and pay monetary attorney’s fees (when she had released any such claim) or else face publicity 

about something Plaintiff and her mother agreed not to publicize. And, of course, she was after the 

trust money when she filed the declaratory judgment action attempting to obtain judicial blessing 

for her breach of the Agreements without jeopardizing the trust payments and sought monetary 

attorney’s fees and further relief. 

 

108 Id.

109 See Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1107 (“no reasonable reader would take the statement ... at face value because the context 

makes clear that the reason for Hogan’s termination is the subject of an ongoing, obviously nasty, employment 

dispute.”). 

110 Ex. 1(A), APP 004. 

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69. In the very unlikely event that the Court reaches the “actual malice” element, as a 

limited purpose public figure, Plaintiff must plausibly plead that the Defendants either knew the 

complained of statements were false or in fact entertained serious doubt as to the truth. Plaintiff 

has not even attempted to make those allegations as we demonstrate below. 

70. Finally, the Plea is absolutely privileged under the judicial proceedings privilege.111 

2. The Preservation Letter 

71. “[A] statement must concern the plaintiff to be defamatory.”112 And the 

Preservation Letter did not. It was not directed to Davis (nor sent to her), but rather to the counsel 

for Jones’ then son-in-law, Shy Anderson. It made no accusations at all, and certainly none as to 

Davis, but instead stated that the Jackson Walker law firm on behalf of Jones was investigating 

whether their client had “potential claims against you and others for conversion (extortion)”.113 It 

is elementary that to be defamatory the statement must be of and concerning the plaintiff.114 The 

Preservation Letter listed ten preservation topics, only one of which referenced Plaintiff and 

merely asked for preservation of all “communications with Alexandra Davis or her current or 

former employer”.115 The letter cannot be reasonably be read as accusing Davis or her former 

employer (President Trump) or current employer (United States Congressman Ronny Jackson of 

Amarillo) of extortion because it is not “of and concerning” her and only asked Anderson to 

preserve communications relating to her and many others. For the same reasons that the Plea is not 

 

111 See James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1982) (“Communications in the due course of a judicial 

proceeding will not serve as the basis of a civil action for libel or slander, regardless of the negligence or malice with 

which they are made.”). 

112 See Lilith, 662 S.W.3d at 367. 

113 See Ex. 10, APP 294. 

114 See WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998) (“McLemore”). 

115 Ex. 10, APP 295. 

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defamatory or, in the alternative, true or substantially true, and where there is no allegation of 

actual malice the claim regarding the Preservation Letter should be dismissed. 

72. Further the Preservation Letter is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff 

alleges that on March 10, 2022 counsel for Defendant Jones wrote a so-called “Preservation Letter” 

to Shy Anderson’s divorce attorney. This lawsuit, (“Third Davis Lawsuit”), was filed on March 

27, 2023, more than one year after the Preservation Letter. It is thus barred by the statute of 

limitations which, for defamation, is one year.116

73. The Preservation Letter is also absolutely privileged under the judicial proceedings 

privilege because, as the letter recited, “[Y]ou and your counsel can reasonably anticipate litigation 

even though our investigation is not yet complete”.117 The privilege applies to documents prepared 

“in serious contemplation” of litigation.118 The Preservation Letter on its face so states here. 

3. The Jack Affidavit 

74. Plaintiff barely mentions the Jack Affidavit in her Complaint referring to it only in 

a laundry list of allegedly “false statements” cited in paragraphs 58(f) and 67(f). But the Jack 

Affidavit recites only the detailed history of hundreds of payments to Plaintiff and does not make 

any defamatory statements, never mentioning the words “extortion” or “shake down”. The 

Complaint does not plausibly allege any defamatory meaning or falsity (both essential elements) 

which could be derived from the Jack Affidavit, and for each of the same reasons that the Plea and 

Preservation Letter are not actionable, so too the claims based on the Jack Affidavit should be 

dismissed. In other words, it is absolutely privileged, has no defamatory meaning, is true or 

 

116 See Section 16.002(a), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code; Nationwide Bi-Weekly Admin., Inc. v. Belo Corp., 512 F.3d 

137, 141-42 (5th Cir. 2007). 

117 See Ex. 10 at 1, APP 294. 

118 See Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. 2015); Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 485 

n.12 (Tex. 2015). 

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substantially true (not materially false), and the purported statements were made without actual 

malice and there is no plausible pleading to suggest they were. 

4. Jack’s Purported Comments to ESPN 

(A) The First ESPN Article 

75. The First ESPN article does not quote or even mention Jack but rather publishes 

Davis’ lawyer’s attacks on and disparaging comments about Jones.119

(B) The Second ESPN Article 

76. The Second ESPN article reports that Jack made several statements and quoted him 

regarding the history of payments to Davis over the years. Taken separately, or when viewing the 

article as a whole, there is no defamatory meaning which can reasonably be attributed to Jack’s 

alleged comments. He does not use the words extortion or shakedown at all and the closest he 

comes to disagreeing with Plaintiff’s contention that “she is not seeking money” is his recitation 

of the acknowledged Dallas restaurant meeting “several years ago” where he got what the ESPN 

reporter characterized as a “far different impression” when Davis asked for $20 million from Jones.

77. Plaintiff does not contest that the meeting occurred (in fact the Complaint confirms 

it) or that Davis read the letter to Jack (the Complaint admits that too). That Jack got a “different 

impression” from the theory Plaintiff now advances is not defamatory especially given the 

undisputed facts. His belief that she was asking for money in exchange for getting “out of [Jones’] 

life” and never “asking for money again” is simply not actionable defamation.

 

119 Ex 11, APP 296-297. Davis’ lawyers called Jones “malicious”, “distasteful”, “stoop[ing] so low” and a man with 

“many scandals”. 

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5. Wilkinson’s Purported Comments to ESPN 

78. As we said, the First ESPN article consists mainly of Plaintiff’s lawyers attacking 

Jones who, the article reported, “has declined to publicly discuss the allegations.”120 Wilkinson 

issued a statement which ESPN repeated as follows: 

This whole saga and series of recent attacks amounts to nothing 

more than an amateurish coordination among various parties to try 

to shake down the Jones family for money. Their own filing 

references the divorce case so it’s clear for all to see what is really 

going on here.121 

79. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s Complaint references the divorce action and not only 

references but sues upon the Preservation Letter which accurately recited that Jones and his family 

had retained a law firm to investigate “potential claims” against Shy Anderson (party to the divorce 

action) and (unnamed) others. Based upon these true facts, the Wilkinson statement is not 

defamatory because in commenting it is a protected opinion and utilizes rhetoric and hyperbole. 

80. The Second ESPN article quotes Wilkinson as saying the dinner with Jack and 

Plaintiff was “three or four years ago” and that the Plaintiff’s Letter establishes that she demanded 

more money from Jones. Whether it supports the allegation or not is a matter of opinion. The 

material facts are not in doubt. Plaintiff’s Letter was written and demanded additional money the 

Plaintiff, an adult, had no legal right to receive in exchange for continued confidentiality Then her 

lawyer threatened a publicly embarrassing lawsuit if Jones did not submit to a paternity test and 

pay Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. Wilkinson then is quoted as saying: 

This clearly demonstrates that money has always been the ultimate 

goal here. And sadly this is just one part of a more broad calculated 

and concerted effort that has been going on for some time by 

multiple people with various different agendas.122

 

120 Ex. 11, APP 297. 

121 Id. at p. 1, APP 296. 

122 Ex. 12, APP 298-300. 

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81. Whether the undisputed facts demonstrate that the ultimate goal was money is a 

matter of opinion. But, in any event, the $20 million demand was made and Wilkinson’s factual 

statement is true. For these reasons it is not actionable. 

82. Finally, Wilkinson is quoted as saying: 

The facts clearly show that millions of dollars have been paid and 

on top of that, a $20 million shakedown attempt was made. I think 

this speaks for itself as to motives. 

83. The phrase “shakedown” like the word “extortion” is rhetoric and hyperbole and 

not stating a fact.123 The Court in McNamee v. Clemens, 762 F. Supp. 2d 584, 603-04 (E.D.N.Y. 

2011) made that very point, holding that statements that plaintiff wanted to shake down the 

defendant “sound in opinion not fact [and] are hyperbolic [and] are ‘loose’ statements that don’t 

reasonably convey the specificity that would suggest that [defendant] or his agents were seriously 

accusing [plaintiff] of committing the crime of extortion.” 

84. The undisputed fact (supported by Jack’s testimony under oath and confirmed by 

Plaintiff’s Complaint here) is that Davis did demand an additional $20,000,000 when she was not 

legally entitled to any additional funds and the reasonable reader would not view Wilkinson’s 

characterization as asserting a statement of fact although they might agree with his opinion. 

85. Finally, Wilkinson is quoted as saying: 

Now they’ve changed their story yet again. First it wasn’t about 

money. Now it’s about money. And now they are on three sides of 

a two-sided issue. They are all over the map here. Pick a story and 

stick with it. This is clownish. 

 

123 See Agate v. IMG Worldwide, Inc., No. B243636, 2013 WL 6087414, at *7 (Cal. App. Nov. 20, 2013) 

(unpublished) (defendant called plaintiff a “shakedown artist” and an “extortionist” but in dismissing a defamation 

claim the court held that plaintiff “failed to establish that the challenged statements are provable factual assertions 

rather than rhetorical hyperbole or vigorous epithets.”). 

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86. This comment is not about Plaintiff but her lawyers and therefore not “of and 

concerning” her (an element). In any event it is pure opinion and rhetoric which the reasonable 

reader would discern given that Wilkinson is a “spokesperson” for Jones. 

B. PUBLIC FIGURE AND ACTUAL MALICE 

87. In 1964 the United States Supreme Court decided the seminal case of New York 

Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964), which established the “actual malice” federal rule 

for public officials in a libel case and was followed by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 

324, 339-48, 351 (1974), which applied the actual malice element to a public figure plaintiff. 

Pleading and proof of actual malice is an essential element of a defamation case involving public 

figures. The term means that the person making the defamatory statement does so with either (1) 

knowledge of the falsity or (2) reckless disregard of the truth that is, the speaker in fact entertains 

serious doubt about the truth.124 

88. Gertz defined two types of public figures: (1) the all-purpose public figure who 

achieves such fame and notoriety that she is a public figure for all purposes and (2) the limited 

purpose public figure.125 Plaintiff is a public figure of the second type and in deciding this question 

of law, the Fifth Circuit applies a three-part test: (1) the controversy at issue must be public both 

in the sense that people are discussing it and people other than the immediate participants in the 

controversy are likely to feel the impact of the resolution; (2) the plaintiff must have more than a 

trivial or tangential role in the controversy; and (3) the alleged defamation must be germane to the 

plaintiff’s participation in the controversy.126 

 

124 See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S., at 731.

125 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. 

126 See Trotter, 818 F.2d at 433-34. 

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89. Plaintiff easily satisfies these elements. Davis alone thrust herself into the public 

limelight by breaching her agreement with Jones and publicly filing the First Davis Lawsuit which, 

according to her Complaint, “attracted local, national and international attention” and revealed the 

controversy.127 Davis, through her lawyers, further injected Davis into the controversy by 

immediately writing a statement “released to ESPN”128, an additional breach of the Agreements. 

90. Plaintiff admits that the controversy extends beyond the immediate participants 

when she pleads that “[t]he [Defendant] Dallas Cowboys franchise is estimated to be perhaps the 

most valuable sports franchise in the world and certainly the NFL. [The] Cowboys publicity profile 

and associations extend gigantically to the corporate world and include corporate and charitable 

partnerships. Jones’ influence also extends into politics”.129 Plaintiff charges that the comments 

will have an effect in “the political arena” and that her Congressman employer has “received 

defamatory communications referring to Plaintiff as an “extortionist”.130

91. Plaintiff plays more than a trivial or tangential role in the controversy (the second 

Trotter element) and the alleged defamation relates to her role in the controversy (the third Trotter

element). As a result, she is a public figure and the actual malice standard applies. As Davis does 

not even try to plausibly demonstrate “actual malice”, this additional element fails as a matter of 

law. 

 

127 Dkt. 1 at ¶ 32 p. 8. 

128 Ex. 3A, APP 121-122. 

129 Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 77-78 pp. 20-21. 

130 Id at ¶¶ 78-79 p. 21. See also Ex. 9 [Public Figure Exhibit] (APP 194-293) which collects many of the news articles 

and posts relating to the public nature of the controversy and the Plaintiff’s role in it. See Turner v. Wells, 879 F.3d 

1254, 1272 n.5 (11th Cir, 2018) (“In determining [Plaintiff’s] public figure status, we take judicial notice of the 

existence of videos produced or articles written about [Plaintiff] that were filed by Defendants”); Biro v. Condé Nast, 

963 F. Supp. 2d 255, 271 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d 807 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2015) and aff’d, 622 Fed. App’x 67 (2d 

Cir.2015) (“The Court can take judicial notice of the existence of articles written by and about [Plaintiff], though not 

for the truth of the matter asserted in the documents themselves. Courts in this Circuit have employed judicial notice 

in making determinations about whether plaintiffs are public figures at the motion to dismiss stage.”). 

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C. NO CONSPIRACY WHEN NO UNDERLYING CLAIM 

92. Plaintiff asserts a conspiracy claim but there can be no actionable conspiracy where 

there is no underlying tort.131 

D. THE PRINCIPAL CAN NOT BE RESPONSIBLE WHEN THE AGENT IS 

IMMUNE 

93. Jones’ attorneys prepared the Plea and the Preservation Letter and are immune from 

suit.132 When the agents are not liable neither is the principal.133 

E. THE CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY 

WITH THE DMA 

94. The DMA134 applies to “all publications” regarding a claim “arising out of harm to 

personal reputation caused by the false content of a publication” [Section 73.054(a) (b)]. The DMA 

states that “A person may maintain an action for defamation only if: (1) the person has made a 

timely and sufficient request for a correction or retraction from defendant.” Section 73.055(a)(1). 

The Act states further that: “A request for a correction, clarification, or retraction is timely if made 

during the period of limitation for commencement of an action for defamation.” Section 73.055(b). 

To be sure the Act has an abatement feature when a demand (any demand) has been made prior to 

the expiration of limitations. But the majority of the Texas Supreme Court agreed that under the 

 

131 See Agar Corp. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 140–41 (Tex. 2019) (“We have repeatedly called 

civil conspiracy a ‘derivative tort,’ meaning that it depends on some underlying tort or other illegal act. Our use of the 

word ‘derivative’ in this context means a civil conspiracy claim is connected to the underlying tort and survives or 

fails alongside it.” (citations omitted)); Matter of 3 Star Props., L.L.C., 6 F.4th 595, 609 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Under Texas 

law, civil conspiracy is not an independent tort but rather a ‘derivative’ one that ‘depends on some underlying tort or 

other illegal act.’” (quoting Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 141–42 (Tex. 2019)); 

WickFire, L.L.C. v. Woodruff, 989 F.3d 343, 358 (5th Cir. 2021) (reversing judgment on a civil conspiracy claim 

because each of the underlying tort claims failed).

132 See Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD LLC, 631 S.W.3d 65, 67, 78 (Tex. 2021). 

133 See G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 295–98 (Tex. 2011) (a principal cannot be held liable for the 

actions of its agent when the agent did not commit a tort). 

134 All references are to Chapter 73 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. 

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text of the statute “an action may be maintained only if a demand is made within limitations”. Here 

there has been no demand whatsoever prior to limitations expiring.135

95. The Plaintiff does not plead that she has complied with the essential statutory 

requirements to maintain an action for defamation nor could she in good faith because no such 

demand (which must be in writing, signed by Plaintiff or her lawyer, state with particularity the 

statement alleged to be false, allege the defamatory meaning of the statement and specify the 

circumstances if it arises from something other than the express language of the publication). 

Section 73.055(d). No such demand was ever “served” on (or sent in any manner to) the alleged 

publishers Defendants Jones, Cowboys, Wilkinson, Trailrunner and Jack. Nor does her Complaint 

suffice as a demand as a matter of law.136

96. In this case a timely request cannot be made because the one year limitations period 

has expired for all of the Publications. Defendants therefore give notice to Plaintiff and the Court 

that they intend to challenge the sufficiency (because no request was made in compliance with the 

statute) or timeliness of a request for a correction, clarification or retraction (because it has not 

been made and to do so now would be futile as limitations has expired). This notice is provided 

pursuant to section 73.058(c) of the DMA.

97. “If the court agrees that the Request was insufficient or untimely then under Section 

73.055(a) the plaintiff cannot “maintain the action” and it must be dismissed.”137

 

135 See Hogan v. Zoanni, 627 S.W.3d 163, 179, 185, 190 (Tex. 2021) (Hecht, C.J. Dissenting) (“The Court is evenly 

divided on the meaning of maintain only if. The concurrence agrees with my analysis that noncompliance requires 

dismissal.”). 

136 See Id. at 179 (“The Texas legislature ... chose to omit the [model act’s] provision that expressly allows the 

Plaintiff’s pleading to constitute a [r]equest.”) (Boyd, J., concurring). 

137 See Id. at 185 (Boyd, J. concurring). 

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F. THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED 

98. The DMA requires a compliant request be made within 90 days of the publication 

or else the Plaintiff forfeits the right to punitive damages. DMA Section 73.055(c) (“If not later 

than the 90th day after receiving knowledge of the publication the person does not request a 

correction, clarification or retraction the person may not recover exemplary damages.”) No such 

request was made and Plaintiff does not plead any such statutory compliance and, accordingly, 

Plaintiff may not recover punitive damages. 

99. Furthermore, to recover punitive damages the Plaintiff must allege a factual basis 

for them, which is absent here, and in a defamation case the Plaintiff must plausibly plead and 

prove “actual malice”.138 No such pleading has been made in this case and any such attempt would 

be futile. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

100. Even though Jones has disputed from the beginning that he is Plaintiff’s father he 

provided for her through childhood and well into adulthood. He kept his promises. He sought in 

return only confidentiality and an agreement that no paternity action be filed. Plaintiff agreed to 

and abided by these contractual limitations while accepting millions of dollars (even after 

achieving the age of majority); that is until the money was about to run out. After demanding 

$20,000,000 and a judicial order that would require the last two payments to be made even as she 

breached the agreement, and after she sought monetary attorney’s fees and after she demanded the 

very thing that Jones did not want and said he would never do (a paternity test) she brought not 

one but three lawsuits. When Jones defended himself in the litigation that Plaintiff herself 

brought, she now twists his words into defamation for which she wants, how did we guess, money. 

 

138 See, Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at 334; Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 66-67 (Tex. 2013). 

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Her claims should be dismissed. And Davis should, perhaps, reflect on lessons learned while she 

was educated at SMU in Dallas (at Jones’ expense). She claims that the Agreements that supported 

her in style all her life were a “hush money deal”. However she characterizes it, in Texas, a deal is 

still a deal. Jones lived up to his promises. Plaintiff has not honored hers. 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page 1 

Respectfully submitted, 

 FOLSOM ADR PLLC JACKSON WALKER LLP 

 /s/:David Folsom /s/:Charles L. Babcock 

 David Folsom 

State Bar No. 07210800 

david@folsomadr.com 

6002-B Summerfield Dr. 

Texarkana, TX 75503 

(903) 277-7303 

 Charles L. Babcock 

State Bar No. 01479500 

cbabcock@jw.com 

Nancy W. Hamilton 

State Bar No. 11587925 

nhamilton@jw.com 

1401 McKinney Street 

Suite 1900 

Houston, TX 77010 

(713) 752-4210 

(713) 752-4221 - Fax 

David T. Moran 

State Bar No. 14419400 

dmoran@jw.com 

Edwin Buffmire 

State Bar No. 24078283 

ebuffmire@jw.com 

Cody Martinez 

State Bar No. 24102146 

cmartinez@jw.com 

2323 Ross Avenue 

Suite 600 

Dallas, TX 75201 

(214) 953-6000 

(214) 953-5822 – Fax 

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS JERRAL W. JONES, DALLAS COWBOYS FOOTBALL 

CLUB, LTD., JAMES WILKINSON, TRAILRUNNER INTERNATIONAL, LLC AND 

DONALD JACK, JR. 

 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Page 2 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On May 26th, 2023, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with the 

clerk of the court of the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Texas, using the electronic case 

filing system of the court. I hereby certify that I will serve all counsel and/or pro se parties of 

record electronically or by another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2). 

/s/ Charles L. Babcock 

Charles L. Babcock 

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