Affirmed and Majority and Concurring Opinion s filed October 26 , 2021
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 19

- 00531

- CV

JON VAN NGUYEN , A ppellant

v. A LABAMA THAO PHAM , A ppellee

On Appeal from the 507th District Court

Harris C ounty, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2016

- 64020

M A J O R I T Y O P I N I O N

Jon Van Nguyen appeals the trial court ’ s final decree dissolving his marriage to Alabama Thao Pham

. Nguyen raises ten issues in this appeal, challenging the trial court ’ s determination and divis io n of the community estate and adoption of an alleged agreement between the parties as to child conservatorship, support, and

access , among other concerns. We affirm.2 Background
This case was tried to the bench. The court considered issues related to th e

o n e ch ild of the marriage on March 21, 2018 and the property issues on March 14, 2019. In its final decree , the court granted the divorce on the grounds of insupportability and Nguyen ’ s cruelty

. T he court named Pham the child ’ s sole ma nagin g co nservator wi t h the right to designate the primary residence with a geograph ic restriction to the S tate of Texas. The court neither name d Nguyen a conservator of the child nor grant ed him
any rights of possession or access

. Ch il d support was to be paid directly fro m Nguyen ’ s social security disability benefits

. Pham was required to maintain health and dental insurance for the child , and each party was 50 percent responsible for uninsured healthcare expenses.

In making a just and r ight division of the mar ital estate, t he trial court awarded Pham the real property located at 9347 Carmalee Street ; the personal effects in her possession or control ; cash and accounts in her possession, control, and sole name ; a 2 003 Acura ; and a cash p a yment from Nguyen of $52 ,000 , among o t her things. To Nguyen, the court awarded the real property at 9 3 35 Carmalee Street ; the personal effects in h is possession or control ; cash and accounts in h is possession, control, and sole name ; a 2001 Toyota ; and a 2 0 08 Toyota , among other t hings. The c o u rt charged each party with payin g the liabilities they personally incurred since August 13, 2016 , as well as any taxes pertaining to property they were awarded . The court also charged Nguyen with paying any debt assoc iated with 9347 Carmalee Street , whic h was awa rded to Pham

. The trial court held that Nguyen committed fraud on the community when he transferred ownership o f 9347 Carmalee to his son from a former marriage, and3

the court considered that fraud in its divis ion of the community prop erty . The co u r t also ordered Nguyen to pay $10,000 of Pham ’ s attorney ’ s fees. Lastly, t he court

o rdered that all relief requested in this case and not exp ressly granted i n the decree

was denied

. In its findings of fact , the trial court determined that Pha m and Nguyen w ere informally married on or about January 1, 2009 . The court also found that on March 21, 201 8, Pham and Nguyen entered a stipulated agreement whi ch addressed the issues related to child custody

. Under the agreement, Pham was to be named sol e managing c o n servator with a geographical restriction to Texas and Nguyen was not to be named a conservator or have any access to the child.
As consid eration s influe ncing the division of property, the court listed th e fault in the failure of the marriage , the conser v a torship of the child, the nature of the property, and actu al and constructi ve fraud. Th e court stated that during the marriage, Nguyen transferred f unds from joint accounts on three occasions in the amounts of $50,02 5, 40,275, and 44,335.94 b ut failed to o vercome the presumption that these funds were community property

. The court also found that Nguyen failed to prove his reimbursement claim r elated to pay ment s for Pham ’ s education during the marriage. Lastly, the court found that Pham incurre d $17,000 i n a ttorney ’ s fees and that Nguyen had incurred $26,897 in attorney ’ s fees.
In it s conclusions of law, the trial court held that both properties on C armalee were community property , as were the funds Nguyen had transferred during the marriage . The court a ls o c onclud ed that Pham ’ s attorney ’ s fees wer e reasonable and necessary.
Discussion

In ten issues, Nguyen contends that the trial court erred in (1) fa iling t o file4

findings of fa ct and conclusions of law 1 ; ( 2 ) not making a finding o n the date of the marri ag e ; (3) ho ld ing that the real property located at 9335 Carmalee Street w as community property; (4) ordering Nguyen to make a cash payment of $52,000 t o Pham ; ( 5 ) not making a finding on Nguyen’s reimbursement claim reg arding payment f

or Pham ’ s education d ur i n g the marriage ; ( 6 ) awarding 9347 Carmalee Street to Pham due to fraudulent transfer ; ( 7 ) not making a finding regarding Nguyen ’ s claim that Pham fraudule ntly opened and made char ges on two credit card s; ( 8 ) ordering Nguyen to pay $10,000 of Pham ’ s att or n e y ’s fees ; (9) ordering an arbitrary or unreasonable division of community property ; and ( 10 ) adopting an alleged agreement as to issues concerning the chi ld

. I. Findings of Fact Nguyen ’ s first, second, fifth, and seventh issues complain that the tri a l c o u r t failed to enter findings of fact

. Although this was correct when Nguyen filed his initial briefing in this case, the trial court su bsequently filed f in dings of fact and conclusions of law on November 8, 2019. When a party makes a proper and timely r eq u e s t for findings of fact and conclusions of law and the trial court fails to comply, harm is presumed unless the record affirmatively s hows that the compla ining party suffered no injury. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296; Watts v. Oliver , 396 S.W.3d 124, 130 (Tex

. A p p

. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). In assessing whether the requesting party was harmed, courts consider if the failure to file f indings prevented th e party from properly presenting the case on appeal. Slater v. Slater , No. 14

- 13

- 00693

- CV, 2014 WL 6 6 7 7 603, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 25, 2014 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) . If a party is harmed by the trial court ’ s failure to make request ed findings , the pro per remedy is

1 As will be discussed below, th e trial court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of l aw after Nguy en filed his initial brief. Nguyen subsequently filed a repl y brief

.5

to abate the appeal and direct the trial court to file the findings of fact and

conc lus i o ns of law pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.4(b). E.g. , Busch v. Hudson & Keyse, LLC , 312 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tex. App.

— H ouston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Here, the trial court ultimately filed findings of fact and conclusions o f law wit hou t the necessity of an abat ement . Although , as mentioned , the findings were filed after Nguyen filed his initial briefing, he subsequent ly filed a re ply bri ef and thus had an opportunity to address the findings, and we will consider those
argume nts in th is o p inion to the extent he has made them

. Nguyen argues , however , that we should disregard the late

- filed findings and reverse and remand t h is case for a new trial due to the trial court ’ s failure to timely file findings. Nguyen cites Stefek v. H elvey , 60 1 S

. W .2d 168, 170

– 71 (Tex. Civ. App.

— Corpus Christi 1980 , writ ref ’ d n.r. e. ) , in which the court disregarded findings and conclusions filed 80 days late , deem ing it a gross viol ation of the filing dates . Nguyen cites no support for his assertion t hat the d ela y requires reversal and remand. Stefek is distinguishable in part because in that case, the appellant had not met the deadlines for reque sting findings, wh ich does not appear to be the case here. See id .; see also Robles v. Robles , 965 S .W.2d 6 05, 610 ( Tex

. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1998 , pet. denied ) (distinguishing Stefek on this basis)

. In the absenc e of findings, the Stefek court explain ed that it would a ffirm the trial
court ’ s judgment on any legal theory that wa s supported by the evidence , and indee d t h e court did just that. 601 S.W.2d at 171. As stated, when a party is harmed by the trial court ’ s failure to make requested findings , the proper remedy is to abate the appeal and direct the trial court to file the findings

. See Busch , 312 S.W.3 d at 298

. H e r e , the appropriate remedy has already occurred: the trial court filed the past due findings

.6

Accordingly, we overrule Nguyen ’ s first , second, fifth, an d s eventh issues , which were expressly based on the trial court ’ s failure to make findings. 2

II. 9335 C a r m alee Street In his third issue, Nguyen contends that the trial court erred in ho ld ing that the real property located at 9335 Carmalee Street w as comm uni ty property

. Specific ally, Nguyen challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evi den ce to

su p p o rt the finding. A. Governing Law Community property consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage. Se e Tex. Fam. Code § 3.002; Barnett v. Barnett , 67 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. 2001 ) ; Stavinoha v . Stavinoh a , 1 26 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004 , no pet. )

. T he Family Code defines separate property as property owned by a spouse before marriage or acquired during the marriage by gift, devise, descent, or as a recovery for personal injuries s u st ained during the marriage. See Tex. Fam. Code § 3.001. Property possessed by either spouse on dissolution of the marriage is presumed to be community prop erty, and to overcome this presumption, a party must establish by clear and convincing e vidence th a t t he disputed property is separate property. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003 ; Zagorski v. Zagorski , 116 S.W.3d 309, 314 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2003 , pet. de nied ) ; see also Tex. Con st. art. XVI, § 15;

2 To the extent Nguyen intended in his fift h a nd seventh issues to argue that the tri a l court faile d to find , res pectively, that Nguyen was entitl ed to a reimbursement for th e payment of Pham ’ s educational expenses during the marriage and that Pham fraudulen tly opened and made char ges on two credit c a rd s , these assertions are inadequately briefed. Nguyen does not cit e any relevant authority on these issues or provide any analy sis suppo rtin g such assertion s

. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring that appellat e briefs “must contain a clear and concis e a rgu ment for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to aut horities and to the record”) ; see also In re S.A.H. , 420 S.W. 3d 911, 9 29 ( Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (declining to craft appel lant ’ s argument for him)

.7

Stavinoha , 126 S.W.3d at 607 (“ ‘Clear and co nvinci n g ’ evid ence means the

measure o r d e gree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction or belief as to the truth of the allegations sought to be establis hed.” ). The sp ouse claiming the separate nature of property must trace a n d clea rly identify the propert y cl aimed to be separate. Barras v. Barras , 396 S.W.3d 154, 163

– 64 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013 , pet. denied )

. Such t racing requires establishing the separate or igin of the property through evidence showing the time

a n d mean s by which the spouse ob tain ed possession of the property. Graves v. Tomlinson , 329 S.W.3d 128, 139 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) . As a ge neral rule, the clear a nd convincing standard is not satisfied by testimony that pr operty p ossess ed at the time the marri age is dissolved is separate property when such testimony is contradicted or unsupported by documentary evidence tracing the asserted s eparate nature of the p roperty. Id

. Any doubt as to the character of property shoul d be r e s olved in favor of the communit y es tate. Id

. When examining a legal

- sufficiency challenge, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge e very re asonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S. W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005 ) . W e credit favorable evidence if a reasonable fact finder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not. Id . at 827. Because Nguyen challenges the legal sufficiency of an adverse findi ng on a n issue on which he ha d the bur den of proof, he is entitled to reversal if the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Burns v. Burns , 434 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2014 , no pet. ) (citi ng Ste r n er v. Marathon Oil Co. , 767 S. W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989) ).
In a factua l

- sufficiency challenge, we consider and weigh all the evidence, both supporting and contradicting the finding. Mar. Ov erseas Corp. v. Ellis , 9718

S.W.2d 402, 406

– 07 (Tex. 1998). W e will s et asi de a finding for factual ins ufficiency only if it is so contrar y to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Id . at 407.
B. Analysis
In his briefin g, Nguyen asserts that 9335 Carmalee is his separate propert y beca u s e it w as awarded to him in his pri or divorce . Nguyen, however, do es not cite to any evidence directly supporting this assertion , such as the divorce decree from the prior proceeding or eve n his own testimony. To the contrary, in his testimony, Nguy en ack n o wledge d that 9335 Carmalee was not mentioned in the prior decree; he first suggested that he and his wife were ord ered to “ split ” the property but then said that they had or ally agre ed to split the property at the time of the divorce. He further sa id tha t the pr operty was a lso in the n ame of his son from a prior marriage, Davisson Nguyen , at the time of the prior divorce. In her testimony , Pham explained t hat Nguyen was living at 9335 Carma lee when she began dating him in 2008, but he transferred th e prop e r ty to Davisson prior to divorc ing his prior wife in December 2008. According to Pham, Davisson then transferred the property back to Nguyen a fter Pham and Nguyen were informally married. 3 This test imony supports the conclusion that 9335 Carmalee

wa s comm u n ity pr operty because it was ac quir ed and possessed by Nguyen during the marriage. Although he provides no analysis of them, Nguyen does cite a series of deeds that were admitted as exhibit s at trial. These deeds , however, raise more questions than they p r o vide a nswers. The first deed p urpo rts to convey interest in the property from Davisson to Nguyen. Davisson ’ s signature is dated February 24,

3 Although it i s n ot entirely clear, Nguyen appeared to a dmit in his testimony to tra nsferring 9335 Car malee to Daviss on so th at his first wife would not h ave any rights to it.9

2008 , and Nguyen ’ s signatu re is dated February 1 0, 2008, but the deed was not file stamped until around 1 6 months l a ter on June 16, 2009. This dee d co ntains a notary stamp and notary ’ s signature to acknowledg e a signature by Nguyen ’ s

ex
- wife , but no such signature from the ex

- wife appears on the deed , nor w as there

a ny reason for such signature

. The second deed p u r ports to con vey interest from Nguyen ’ s ex
- wife to Ngu yen. Both of their s i gnatures on this deed are dated December 12, 2008 . The deed states that the int ent is for Nguyen and Davisson to own the property “ to gether , ” although the prior deed in which Dav i s s o n conveyed h is interest to Ng uyen was signed befo re t his one. Two of the n otary signatures on this deed do not appear to match the same notar y ’ s signature on the first deed. This deed contains a file stamp o f Janu ary 1, 2009, which was five and a half m o n t hs before th e first deed was filed

. The third dee d Ng uyen cites purports to transfer Pham ’ s interest in 93 47 Carmalee to Nguyen. The signatures are dated October 21, 2014, but Pham denied signing the deed or ever conveying the property to Nguyen.
Altho u g h Nguyen does not expressly argue on appeal that th ese deeds constituted clear and convincing evidence that 9335 Carmalee was his separate property, we note that the deeds do not clearly trace and establish th e property as Nguyen ’ s separate proper ty

. See B a r ras , 396 S.W .3d at 163

– 64 ; Gr aves , 329 S.W.3d at 139

. The trial court ’ s finding that this property was community property i s supported by lega lly and fa ct ually sufficient evidence. We overrule Nguyen ’ s third issue.
III. The C ash Payment
In issue four, N g u yen contend s the trial court erred in ordering hi m to make a cash payment of $52,000 to Pham

. The court made this order as part of its division of the marital estate. Nguyen asserts that the evidence is lega lly and factually insufficient to support the o r d er because t he evidence establishes that the10

mone y wa s Nguyen ’ s separate property. Apart from citations, however, Nguyen does not offer any argument or analysis supporting his assertion. Both parties treat this order as tied to the court ’ s findings th a t N guyen transf erred funds from one account to anoth er o n three occasions in the amounts of $50,025, 40,275, and 44,335.94 but failed to overcome the presumption that these funds were comm unity property

. 4 Nguye n appears to assert on appeal that he did

ove r c o m e th e presum ption. As set fort h above, t he spouse cl a iming property is his separate property must trace and clearly identify the property

. See Barras , 396 S.W.3d at 163

– 64 ; Graves , 329 S.W.3d at 139

. Pham t estified that the couple ha d bank accounts th a t t hey used thr oughout the marriage but after she le ft t h e marital home, Nguyen made several transfers from those accounts to accounts that Pham could n ot access. She stated that the total amount he transferred was about $135,000. Pham also offered into e vi d e n ce a bank st atement showing one tra nsfer from the cou ple ’ s checking account of $50,025.11 , and she offered a demonstrative chart showing all the alleged transfers. She said that Nguyen has not provided he r with any information regarding where the mon e y went. On cro ss
- examination, Pham stated that in 2 010 and 2011, the couple ’ s money came from Social Security Disability Insurance payments Nguyen received, Pham ’ s employment, and leftover money from a Pell Grant that she had rece ived. In h i s testimony, Ng uyen acknowled ged that he made transfers out of the joint accounts , said tha t it was money he had saved for his son ’ s education , although he did not specify which son, and said that it was his family ’ s money but did not specify wh ether he m e a n t his family with Pham. Ngu yen said that he does not know how much money he had in th e ba nk at the t ime of trial.

4 We discuss the community presumption and the standa rds for legal and factual sufficiency rev i e w in section II.A. above.11

Nguyen does not cite to evidence establishing and tracing th ese transferred funds as separate property ; therefore , he has not ov ercome the p r esumption tha t the funds we re community property. See Barras , 396 S.W.3d at 163

– 64 ; G r ave s , 329 S.W.3d at 139 . Accordingly, we overrule his fourth issue.

IV. The Fraudulent Transfer of 9347 Carmalee In his sixth issue, Nguyen asserts the cour t erred in a w a rding the pr operty at 9347 Carmalee Street to Pham based on a finding of fraudulent tran sfer

. Nguyen challenges the legal and factual suffi ciency of the evidence to support that award and asser t s that Pham ’ s notarized signature on a deed conv eying the p r o perty to Davi sson, Nguyen ’ s s on, should prevail over Pham ’ s testimony that she did no t si gn or know about the deed. We begin by noting that Nguyen appears to mis construe the trial court ’ s rulings on this issue. The trial court did not directly award 934 7 C armalee to Ph am due to fra u dulent transfer. The court awarded 9347 Carmalee to Pham

— a nd 9 335 Carm alee to Nguyen

— as part of the just and right division of the marital estate. The trial court did , however, take the fraud into consideration, amon g other fa c t o rs, in determ ining the just and right property div ision. We will therefore construe N guye n ’ s sixth issue as challenging whether the trial court p roperly did so in this

case. See generally Chu v. Hong , 249 S.W.3d 441, 444

– 45 (Tex. 2008) ( “ [ W ] as te, fraudu l e n t transfer, o r oth er damage to community property are claims belonging to the communi ty i tself, so they must be included in the trial court ’ s just

- and

- right division of community property upon divorce. ” ). Trial cou rts have wide discretion in m aking a ju s t and right div ision

. Schluet er v. Schlueter , 975 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex. 1998)

. Legal an d fa ctual sufficiency are relevant factors, rather than independent bases for reversal, in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Tran v. Nguyen , 48 0 S .W.3d 119, 13 1 (Tex. App.

— H ouston [14th12

Dist.] 2015 , no pet. ) . A trial court does not abu se its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative nature to support the decision. Id

. Nguyen ’ s argument boils down t o his asserti on that Ph a m ’ s purported

n o t arized signa ture on the deed conveying the property to Davisson should
out weigh Pham ’ s testimony that she did not sign the deed or even know abo ut it. Nguyen cites cases out of the Dallas Cour t of Appeals in which the court expl ained that “ a certificate of acknowledgm ent is prima facie evidence that the grantor appeared befo re t he notary and executed the deed in question for the purposes and consideration therein express ed [and] ‘ [c] lear and unmistakable proof that either the gra ntor did n o t appear before the notary or that the notary practiced some fraud or imposition upon t he g rantor is necessary to overco me the validity of a certificate of acknowledgment

. ’ ” Morris v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 334 S.W.3d 838, 843 (Tex. App.

—

Dallas 2011, no p e t

. ) ( q u o t i n g B ell v. Sharif

– Munir

– Davidson Dev. Corp. , 7 3 8 S

. W

. 2 d 3 2 6 , 3 3 0 ( T e x
. A p p

. — D a l l a s 1 9 8 7 , w r i t d e n i e d ) )

. In this case, t here is significantly more evidence than just P ham ’ s testimony indicating she did not sign the deed. The deed in qu estion pu r p o r ted to transf er 9347 Carmal ee to Davisson for $10. Pham ’ s purpo rted signature on the deed is basically ju st a scribble and clearly does n ot match her signature on several other documents in evidence that she acknowledged signing , including her driver ’ s lic ense and affi davits . Althou gh a handwriting expert may have been helpful in anal yzing the signatures, the trial court could certainly take notice of such an obvious difference. See , e.g. , Berry v. Espinoza , No. 14

- 18

- 01 060

- CV, 2020 WL 742477, at *1 ( T e x. App.

— Houston [ 14th Dist.] Fe b. 13, 2020 , no pet. ) (me m. o p. ) ( “ [E] xpert proof is not necessary in civ il cases to establish a forgery

. ” ) ; see also Morris , 334 S.W.3d

. at 848 ( noting in assessing sufficiency of the evidence regarding genuineness of signatur es , that t ria l judge examined th e documen ts at13

issue and stated on the record that one signature ap pear ed to be genuine and one appeared to have been forged ). 5
Additi onally, the trial judge could h ave reasonably interpreted Nguyen ’ s testimony as an admi s s ion that he had previously transferred 933 5 Carmalee to Davi sson so that his prior wife would not hav e an y rights to it in a very similar scheme as to what is alleged regarding 9347 Carmalee and Pham. We also note that Pham ’ s counsel represented to the c o u rt that a ttempts were made to bring both D a visson and the notary to trial to testify but b oth success full y resisted those efforts. In light of this evidence, the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that Pham ’ s signature on the deed wa s n ot genuine despi te the notary ’ s stamp and that N guyen fraudulently transferred the property to Davisson . The court also did not abuse its d isc r etion in considering such fraud in making a just and right division of the co mmunity property. See Chu , 249 S.W.3d at 444

– 45 ; Tra n , 480 S.W.3d at 131 ; cf. Pulido v. Gonzalez , No. 01

- 12

- 00100

- CV, 2013 W L 4680415, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2013 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) ( ho lding alleged signator y ’ s testi mony that she did not sign deed, did not in tend to convey her prope rty to appellee , and never told appellee otherwise was sufficient to overcome prima facie evidence of certificate of acknowledgement on deed )

. Accor d i n gly , we overrule Nguyen ’ s sixth is sue.
V. Attorney ’ s Fees
I n i ssue eight , Nguyen contends the tria l co u rt erred in ordering him to pay $10,000 of Pham ’ s attorney’s fees

. Nguyen , howe ver, does not provide any ci tation

5 Contrary to the concern expressed in the concurren ce , we do not describe the purported signature on the deed as part of a de novo factfinding but do so merely to explain how the trial judge as factfinder in this case reasonably could have viewed that evidence. See Berry , 2020 WL 742477, at *1 ; Morris , 334 S.W.3d

. at 848

.14

to relevant portions of the recor d o r t o authority in support of this issue and makes only a conclusory argument. Thi s issue is therefore ina d equately briefed , and we overrule it. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring that a ppellate briefs “must contain a clear and concise argument for t h e con tentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”) ; see also In re S.A.H

. , 4 2 0 S.W. 3d 911, 929 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (declining to craf t appellant ’ s argument for him)

. VI. Just and Right Division

In i s s ue nine, Ngu yen asserts the trial court ’ s di vi sion of the community
estate wa s arbitrary and unreason able

. This issue is wholly predicated on Nguyen ’ s preceding assertions of error, particu larly regarding fra u dulent transfer and 9347 Carmalee and the al l e g ed mischaracterization of Nguyen ’ s separate property funds as community property. Because we have conclude d the r e is n o merit in each of the se preceding arguments, we find no merit in this argument and overrule issue nine. VII. Agreement o n Ch ild Issues Lastly, i n his ten th issue, Nguyen contends th e court erred in adopting the alleged agreement on issues rela ted to t he c hild. As ex plained above, among other things, the agreement and the cou r t ’ s orders neither named Nguyen a conservator

o f t he child nor granted him any rig hts of possession or access to the child

. Nguyen specifically chal lenges the legal and fac tual suf fici ency of the evidence to support the trial court ’ s finding that the agre ement was in the best interest of the child , and h e as serts that English is not his first language and he did n ot understand the
agree ment.

“ The best interest of the child s hall alw ays be the primary consideration of15

the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access
to t h e ch ild. ” Tex. Fam. Code § 153.00 2 . A trial court is given wi de latitude in determining the best interests of a minor child

. See Gi lles pie v. Gillespie , 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982) ; Barndt v. Barndt , No . 03

- 17

- 00796

- CV, 2019 WL 1746995, at *4 (Tex. A p p

. — Au stin Apr. 19, 2019 , no pet. ) (mem. op. )

. A trial court ab uses it s discretion when it acts without reference to guiding rules or pri nciples, that is, when its decision i s arbitrary or unreasonable. Barnd t , 2019 WL 1746995, at *4 (citing Low v. Henry , 2 2 1 S. W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007) )

. A trial court does not abuse its discretion so long as ther e is some evidence of substantiv e and pr obat ive character to support the trial court ’ s decision. Id . (citing Butnar u v. Ford Motor Co. , 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2 0 0 2 ) )

. At the trial of the child iss ues in this case, the partie s announced to the court that they had reached an agreement af ter abou t 11 hours in mediation. Both parties then testified that they accepted the agreement and that it was in the best interest of
t h e chi ld , and they urged the court t o adopt the agreement as the court ’ s order

. Nguyen also testified that he understood his obligatio n to hand over his monthly social security benefits to Pha m as child suppor t.
When the trial judge requested additio n a l ev idence that the agreement was in the child ’ s best interest , Pham testifi ed that the child made allegations of sexual abus e against Ngu yen that had been referred to the district attorney ’ s office after child pr otective services (CPS) found reason to b e l i eve the allegations. She said the child “ made out cries to a number of people , ” the allegations had remained

c onsistent over time , and CPS had investigated her to el i minate the possibility of coaching

. Pham explai ned that there had already been no cont ac t b etw een the father and child for almost a year. She also said that s he believed the child ’ s allegations and t here would be ha rm to the chi ld i f the court did not approve the16

agreement. Nguyen does not cite any evi dence indicating that the agreement was n o t in the best interest of the child or th at he did not understand the agreement due to a language barrier or otherwise. The ev idence suppor ts t he tria l court ’ s finding that the agreement was in the best interest of the child. See Barndt , 2019 WL 1746995,

a t *4

. Accordingly, we overrule Nguyen ’ s t enth issue.
Conclusio n
Havin g overruled each of Nguyen ’ s appellate issues, w e affirm t he trial

cou rt ’ s final decree

.

/s/ Frances Bo urliot Justice

Pan el consists o f J ust ices Wise, Bourliot, and Spain (Spain, J., concurring).