1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TYLER DIVISION

JAY WILLIAMS, C/O RICHARD 

BROWN;

Plaintiff,

v. 

BOTIE HILLHOUSE,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23-CV-00212-JCB

JAY WILLIAMS, C/O CHARLES 

WILLIAMS;

Plaintiff,

v. 

NANCY PERRYMAN,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23-CV-00214-JCB

JAY WILLIAMS, C/O CHARLES 

WILLIAMS;

Plaintiff,

v. 

BOTIE HILLHOUSE,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23-CV-00215-JDK

Case 6:23-cv-00236-JDK-JDL Document 4 Filed 05/12/23 Page 1 of 13 PageID #: 9
2

JAY WILLIAMS, C/O HAILIE 

WILLIAMS;

Plaintiff,

v. 

BOTIE HILLHOUSE,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23-CV-00216-JDK

JAY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. 

G. SHINE,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23-CV-00219-JCB

JAY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. 

RACHEL WATTS,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23-CV-00220-JDK

Case 6:23-cv-00236-JDK-JDL Document 4 Filed 05/12/23 Page 2 of 13 PageID #:

10
3

JAY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. 

CODY BARNETT,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23-CV-00222-JCB

JAY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. 

PRESTON JORDAN,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23-CV-00223-JDK

JAY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. 

BOTIE HILLHOUSE,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23-CV-00230-JDK

Case 6:23-cv-00236-JDK-JDL Document 4 Filed 05/12/23 Page 3 of 13 PageID #:

11
4

JAY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. 

CLINT DAVIS,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23-CV-00236-JDK

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Jay Williams is an inmate currently incarcerated in the Henderson County Jail. On 

May 1, 2023, proceeding pro se, he filed twenty civil actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

various governmental officers and employees, including the above-captioned civil actions. See

Case Nos. 6:23-cv-211, 6:23-cv-212, 6:23-cv-213, 6:23-cv-214, 6:23-cv-215, 6:23-cv-216, 6:23-

cv-217, 6:23-cv-218, 6:23-cv-219, 6:23-cv-220, 6:23-cv-221, 6:23-cv-222, 6:23-cv-223, 6:23-cv224, 6:23-cv-225, 6:23-cv-226, 6:23-cv-227, 6:23-cv-228, 6:23-cv-229, 6:23-cv-230. 

Additionally, Plaintiff had previously filed a § 1983 case on March 27, 2023 (Case No. 6:23-cv151), as well as a later filed action on May 4, 2023 (Case No. 6:23-cv-236). In all, Plaintiff has 

twenty-two civil rights actions pending before this court. He has not paid the filing fee or submitted 

a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in any of the pending cases. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court shall review, before docketing if feasible or in any event 

as soon as practicable after docketing, any complaint in a civil action wherein a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer, or employee of a governmental entity. During its 

review, the court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof 

if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Section 1915A applies regardless of whether the plaintiff has paid a 

Case 6:23-cv-00236-JDK-JDL Document 4 Filed 05/12/23 Page 4 of 13 PageID #:

12
5

filing fee or is proceeding IFP. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The plain 

language of [§ 1915A] . . . indicates that it applies to any suit by a prisoner regardless of whether 

that prisoner is or is not proceeding IFP.”).

A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Samford v. Dretke, 562 

F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit has held that a complaint lacks an arguable basis 

in fact when “the facts alleged are fantastic or delusional scenarios or the legal theory upon which 

a complaint relies is indisputably meritless.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 

(5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, during the initial screening 

under section 1915A, a court may determine that a prisoner’s complaint is frivolous if it rests upon 

delusional scenarios or baseless facts—and dismiss the complaint. See Henry v. Kerr County, 

Texas, 2016 WL 2344231 *3 (W.D. Tex. May 2, 2016) (“A court may dismiss a claim as factually 

frivolous only if the facts alleged are clearly baseless, fanciful, fantastic, delusional, or otherwise 

rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, regardless of whether there are judicially 

noticeable facts available to contradict them.”) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 

(1992)). 

Moreover, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted where it does 

not allege sufficient facts which, taken as true, state a claim which is plausible on its face and thus 

does not raise a right to relief above the speculative level. See Montoya v. FedEx Ground 

Packaging Sys. Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim has factual plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows 

the court to draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See 

Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2010); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard is not akin to a probability standard; rather, 

Case 6:23-cv-00236-JDK-JDL Document 4 Filed 05/12/23 Page 5 of 13 PageID #:

13
6

the plausibility standard requires more than the mere possibility that the defendant has acted 

unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (emphasis supplied). 

All well-pleaded facts are taken as true, but the district court need not accept as true 

conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions. See Whatley v. Coffin, 

496 F. App’x 414 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citing Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 

(5th Cir. 2005)). Crucially, while the federal pleading rules do not require “detailed factual 

allegations,” the rule does “demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading offering “labels and conclusions” or a 

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice, nor does a complaint 

which provides only naked assertions that are devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. 

DISCUSSION

I. Cases Against Botie Hillhouse (Case Nos. 6:23-cv-212, 6:23-cv-215, 6:23-cv-216, 

6:23-cv-230)

Plaintiff has brought four of the above-captioned cases against Henderson County Sheriff 

Botie Hillhouse. See Case Nos. 6:23-cv-212, 6:23-cv-215, 6:23-cv-216, 6:23-cv-230. As an initial 

matter, three of the cases, 6:23-cv-212, 6:23-cv-215, 6:23-cv-216, are brought by Mr. Williams on 

behalf of other individuals—Richard Brown, Charles Williams, and Hailie Williams. Mr. Williams, 

as a non-attorney proceeding pro se, cannot bring claims on behalf of Richard Brown, Charles 

Williams, and Hailie Williams. Appearances in federal court are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1654, 

which only permits parties to “plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” Thus, 

while an individual may proceed pro se in civil actions in federal court, those not licensed to 

practice law may not represent the legal interests of others. Id.; see also Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 

511, 514 (5th Cir. 1978). Mr. Williams cannot engage in the unauthorized practice of law by 

bringing claims on behalf of other individuals. Moreover, Mr. Williams has not pleaded any 

Case 6:23-cv-00236-JDK-JDL Document 4 Filed 05/12/23 Page 6 of 13 PageID #:

14
7

allegations to establish “next friend” status on behalf these individuals and “individuals not 

licensed to practice law by the state may not use the ‘next friend’ device as an artifice for the 

unauthorized practice of law.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514. Thus, the court finds that the filing of these 

actions on behalf of other individuals is frivolous under § 1915A(b)(1). 

Furthermore, in each of these cases, citing the Bible and other inapplicable sources of 

authority, the allegations merely demand “immediate release from false imprisonment.” See Case 

Nos. 6:23-cv-212 (Doc. No. 1, at 2), 6:23-cv-215 (Doc. No. 1, at 2), 6:23-cv-216 (Doc. No. 1, at 

2), 6:23-cv-230 (Doc. No. 1, at 2). Plaintiff has already asserted his claims for false imprisonment 

on behalf of himself and others against Defendant Botie Hillhouse in his previously filed, and 

currently pending case, case number 6:23-cv-151. See Case No. 6:23-cv-151 (Doc. No. 1). As 

such, Plaintiff’s repetitive filing of the same threadbare claims is malicious. See Pittman v. Moore, 

980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that under § 1915(d) it was “‘malicious’ for a pauper 

to file a lawsuit that duplicates allegations of another pending federal lawsuit by the same 

plaintiff.”); see also Rhine v. Schmidt, 517 F. App’x 274 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that a complaint 

that was duplicative of a previously filed claim in another case was malicious under § 1915A(b)(1)

and should have been dismissed without prejudice); Scroggins v. Winn Corr. Ctr., 693 F. App’x 

343, 344 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[a] prisoner’s civil rights action is subject to dismissal as malicious if it 

repeats virtually identical claims based on a common series of occurrences.”). 

In sum, Plaintiff’s pro se cases brought on behalf of other individuals, case numbers 6:23-

cv-212, 6:23-cv-215, 6:23-cv-216, should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to § 

1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff’s duplicative filing of claims for false imprisonment against Defendant 

Botie Hillhouse in case number 6:23-cv-230 should be dismissed without prejudice to the 

Case 6:23-cv-00236-JDK-JDL Document 4 Filed 05/12/23 Page 7 of 13 PageID #:

15
8

prosecution of Plaintiff’s previously filed action, 6:23-cv-151, as this filing is malicious under § 

1915A(b)(1). 

II. Case Against Nancy Perryman (Case No. 6:23-cv-214) 

Plaintiff alleges the same allegations regarding “immediate release for false imprisonment” 

against Nancy Perryman in case number 6:23-cv-214. (Doc. No. 1, at 2.) Plaintiff seeks $3,000,000 

per offense. Id. Again, as an initial matter, the claims are brought by Mr. Williams on behalf of 

another individual—Charles Williams. Mr. Williams, as a non-attorney proceeding pro se, cannot 

bring claims on behalf of Charles Williams. As discussed above, appearances in federal court are 

governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which only permits parties to “plead and conduct their own cases 

personally or by counsel.” Mr. Williams cannot engage in the unauthorized practice of law by 

bringing claims on behalf of another individual. Moreover, Mr. Williams has not pleaded any 

allegations to establish “next friend” status on behalf Charles Williams and “individuals not 

licensed to practice law by the state may not use the ‘next friend’ device as an artifice for the 

unauthorized practice of law.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514 (5th Cir. 1978). For this reason, the filing of 

this action on behalf of another individual renders it frivolous under § 1915A(b)(1).

Further, as a judge in Henderson County Court of Law, the claims against Nancy Perryman 

are subject to judicial immunity. Judges generally have absolute immunity for judicial actions 

taken within the scope of their jurisdiction, meaning that judicial officers are generally immune 

from suits for money damages. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Mireles v. Waco, 

502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991) (per curiam); Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 221–22 (5th Cir. 

2009). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against Nancy Perryman in case number 6:23-cv-214 

should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1). 

III. Case Against Clint Davis (Case No. 6:23-cv-236)

Case 6:23-cv-00236-JDK-JDL Document 4 Filed 05/12/23 Page 8 of 13 PageID #:

16
9

Plaintiff has additionally brought a case against Henderson County attorney, Clint Davis, 

for failure to prosecute the alleged fraudulent foreclosure of Plaintiff’s property. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Plaintiff requests that all of his family be immediately released from false imprisonment, that his 

credit and reputation be restored, and requests $3,000,000 in monetary damages. Id. at 3. 

Any claims for failure to prosecute against Clint Davis are barred because “[a] prosecutor 

is absolutely immune from suit for any acts taken within the scope of his prosecutorial role.” See 

Harrell v. Rosenthal, No. 08-20120, 2008 WL 4649067, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 2008). State 

prosecutors are absolutely immune for their actions intimately associated with the judicial process, 

including their actions in deciding whether to prosecute. See Bibb v. Montgomery Cnty. Sheriff, 

Civ. A. No. H-13-3736, 2014 WL 3828232, at *8 (S.D. Tex. July 30, 2014) (“[A] prosecutor is 

entitled to absolute immunity for his action in commencing a prosecution and all actions during 

the course and scope of the prosecution, even against charges that he acted ‘maliciously, wantonly, 

or negligently.’” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976)). Here, even liberally 

construing Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff fails to allege specific facts to overcome prosecutorial 

immunity. Moreover, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to have anyone investigated or 

prosecuted. Oliver v. Collins, 914 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Contrary to Oliver’s contention, 

he does not have a constitutional right to have someone criminally prosecuted.”); Van Meter v. 

Warder, No. 3-06-CV-0431-L, 2006 WL 8436927, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 2006), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. 3:06-CV-0431-L, 2006 WL 8436928 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2006) 

(“[T]he court sua sponte notes that a private citizen has no right to have someone criminally 

prosecuted or investigated.”). As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in case number 6:23-cv236 for purposes of § 1915A(b)(1), and this case should be dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. Remaining Cases (Case Nos. 6:23-cv-219, 6:23-cv-220, 6:23-cv-222, 6:23-cv-223) 

Case 6:23-cv-00236-JDK-JDL Document 4 Filed 05/12/23 Page 9 of 13 PageID #:

17
10

Plaintiff’s remaining four cases before the undersigned are against Defendants G. Shine, 

Rachel Watts, Cody Barnett, and Preston Jordan. (Case Nos. 6:23-cv-219, 6:23-cv-220, 6:23-cv222, 6:23-cv-223). Plaintiff’s allegations fail to identify who these individuals are with respect to 

his alleged claims. Moreover, the allegations are identical to those he brings against Botie 

Hillhouse and Nancy Perryman. He seeks “immediate release from false imprisonment.” See Case 

Nos. 6:23-cv-219 (Doc. No. 1, at 2), 6:23-cv-220 (Doc. No. 1, at 2), 6:23-cv-222 (Doc. No. 1, at 

2), 6:23-cv-223 (Doc. No. 1, at 2). These threadbare allegations fail to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. 

In order to state a plausible claim for relief, a pleading must contain (1) “a short and plain 

statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” (2) “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and (3) “a demand for the relief sought.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Plaintiff has not pleaded a single fact in his complaints, as required under the 

second prong of Rule 8. Setting forth a laundry list of “acts” and other extraneous sources, without 

any information to explain how Plaintiff was injured as a result of an alleged violation of those 

“acts,” is insufficient to set forth a claim for relief. Plaintiff must meet the Rule 8 requirements, 

and he must do so with particularity, providing sufficient facts supporting his allegations. See 

Twombly, 550 U.S at 545 (interpreting Rule 8); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684–85 (applying 

Twombly generally to civil actions pleaded under Rule 8). Allegations that are implausible and 

unsupported by facts or evidence are insufficient to state a claim. Id. Plaintiff must include enough 

information to support each request for relief so that the named Defendants can understand the 

claims that are being brought against them and how they allegedly caused Plaintiff’s harm. 

Plaintiff has failed to do so here as he has failed to allege a constitutional violation or a basis for 

which these unknown defendants could be sued pursuant to § 1983. See Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 

Case 6:23-cv-00236-JDK-JDL Document 4 Filed 05/12/23 Page 10 of 13 PageID #:

18
11

527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[t]o establish a cause of action under § 1983, [] a party must [] show 

that the defendant, while acting under color of law, deprived him of a right secured by the 

Constitution and laws of the United States”) (internal quotations omitted).1 As such, Plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim in case numbers 6:23-cv-219, 6:23-cv-220, 6:23-cv-222, and 6:23-cv-223, 

and the claims should be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 

Having conducted screening pursuant to § 1915A, the court finds that each of the abovecaptioned actions should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Although a court 

should allow a pro se plaintiff every reasonable opportunity to amend his pleadings, Bazrowx v. 

Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998), Section 1915A does not require that a plaintiff be given 

notice of an impending dismissal. Moreover, giving a plaintiff an opportunity to amend is not 

necessary if he has pleaded his “best case,” such that an amended claim would remain frivolous. 

See Norman v. Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals, 582 F. App’x 430, 431 (Mem) (5th Cir. 2014) 

(unpublished); Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Cockerham v. 

Jackson, No. CV SA-17-CA-463-DAE, 2017 WL 8794288, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 13, 2017)

(finding that a show cause order advising the plaintiff of the deficiency of his allegations and giving 

the plaintiff an opportunity to amend would be pointless given the frivolous nature of the 

allegations). 

Given that Plaintiff has asserted the same threadbare legal conclusions in twenty different 

cases filed before this court in one single day, the court has serious doubts as to Plaintiff’s desire 

or ability to assert a plausible claim in any of these actions. Plaintiff’s repeated filing of frivolous 

1 To the extent Plaintiff intended to allege a common law claim for false imprisonment under Texas law, such a claim 

would require a showing of: (1) willful detention, (2) without consent, and (3) without authority of law. Sears, Roebuck 

& Co. v. Castillo, 693 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. 1985). Such a claim has not been adequately pleaded. Moreover, without 

a constitutional violation alleged, the court should decline to exercise supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over 

such a claim upon dismissal of any federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (providing that a district court may 

decline supplemental jurisdiction over other claims when it has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction).

Case 6:23-cv-00236-JDK-JDL Document 4 Filed 05/12/23 Page 11 of 13 PageID #:

19
12

actions is an abuse of the judicial process. The court foresees no scenario in which going through 

twenty deficiency orders would be anything other than pointless given the nature of Plaintiff’s 

allegations and his abusive filings. See Cockerham, 2017 WL 8794288, at *2. Plaintiff has only 

since continued his pattern of behavior by filing additional frivolous actions. See Case No. 6:23-

cv-236 (discussed above). As such, these actions are ripe for dismissal. The dismissal of each of 

the above-captioned cases shall count as a qualifying dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 

Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996) abrogated in part on other grounds by 

Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 534–41 (2015).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, the court RECOMMENDS that case numbers 6:23-cv212, 6:23-cv-214, 6:23-cv-215, 6:23-cv-216, and 6:23-cv-236 should be dismissed with prejudice 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) as set forth herein. The court RECOMMENDS that case 

numbers 6:23-cv-219, 6:23-cv-220, 6:23-cv-222, 6:23-cv-223, and 6:23-cv-230 should be 

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) as set forth herein. The court 

further RECOMMENDS that the dismissal of each of the above-captioned cases shall count as a 

qualifying dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Adepegba, 103 F.3d 383. 

Within fourteen (14) days after receipt of the Magistrate Judge’s Report, any party may 

serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations contained in the Report. A 

party’s failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and recommendations 

contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that 

party from de novo review by the district judge of those findings, conclusions and 

recommendations and, except on grounds of plain error, from appellate review of unobjected-to 

Case 6:23-cv-00236-JDK-JDL Document 4 Filed 05/12/23 Page 12 of 13 PageID #:

20
13

factual findings and legal conclusions accepted and adopted by the district court. Douglass v. 

United States Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 12th day of May, 2023.

Case 6:23-cv-00236-JDK-JDL Document 4 Filed 05/12/23 Page 13 of 13 PageID #:

21