J-S30011-22

2022 PA Super 211

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LEA BULLOCK

Appellant No. 357 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No: CP-46-CR-0001587-2019

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 9, 2022

Appellant, Lea Bullock, appeals from the December 15, 2021 sentence 

imposing concurrent terms of time served to 23 months of incarceration 

followed by one year of probation for three counts of endangering the welfare 

of a child (“EWOC”).1 We affirm. 

The record reveals that, on August 8, 2018, Appellant’s children, aged 

11, 7, and 6 years old, found Appellant passed out on the porch of their home. 

The children summoned police, and police arrived at the scene to find 

Appellant stumbling, having difficulty remaining conscious, and smelling of 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304. 
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PCP. They took her into custody after determining that she was unable to 

care for her children. 

The children, upon being placed with their grandparents, disclosed 

multiple instances of abuse at the hands of their mother. The Commonwealth 

eventually charged Appellant with aggravated assault, strangulation, unlawful 

restraint, false imprisonment, and three counts of EWOC. At the conclusion 

of a September 21, 2021 bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of 

three counts of EWOC and not guilty of the remaining offenses. The trial court 

imposed the sentence set forth above on December 15, 2021. The trial court 

denied Appellant’s timely post-sentence motion on January 6, 2022. This 

timely appeal followed. 

The only issue before us is whether the trial court erred in permitting 

the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of Appellant’s prior conviction for 

public drunkenness (see 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5505). Admissibility of evidence 

rests within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse absent a 

clear abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 862 A.2d 

647, 650 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 889 A.2d 88 (Pa. 2005). The

operative statute on this issue is 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5918: 

§ 5918. Examination of defendant as to other offenses

No person charged with any crime and called as a witness in his 

own behalf, shall be asked, or if asked, shall be required to 

answer, any question tending to show that he has committed, or 

been charged with, or been convicted of any offense other than 

the one wherewith he shall then be charged, or tending to show 

that he has been of bad character or reputation unless:
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(1) he shall have at such trial, personally or by counsel, 

asked questions of the witness for the prosecution with a 

view to establish his own good reputation or character, or 

has given evidence tending to prove his own good character 

or reputation; or

(2) he shall have testified at such trial against a codefendant, charged with the same offense.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5918. “Pennsylvania courts go cautiously when considering 

whether to admit evidence of prior convictions for purposes of impeaching the 

credibility of a defendant testifying in his own behalf.” Com. v. Hernandez, 

862 A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 889 A.2d 88 (Pa. 

2005). 

This Court considered § 5918 in Commonwealth v. Murphy, 182 A.3d 

1002 (Pa. Super. 2018), wherein the trial court permitted the Commonwealth 

to cross-examine the defendant on a prior conviction for possession of a 

controlled substance after the defendant opened the door during his direct 

examination. The defendant’s direct examination by defense counsel included 

the following exchange: 

Q. Do you use cocaine? 

A. No, sir. 

Q. Do you use heroin? 

A. No ,sir. 

Q. Do you use marijuana? 

A. No, sir. 
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Id. at 1007. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendant if he 

had ever used those drugs, and he said he had not. Id. Over defense 

counsel’s objection, the trial court then permitted the prosecutor to examine 

the defendant on his prior drug possession conviction. 

The defendant argued that he did not open the door on direct 

examination, as his direct examination testimony pertained only to his present

use of controlled substances. This Court disagreed, reasoning that the 

defendant, in denying that he used controlled substances, introduced evidence 

of his good character and opened the door to cross examination on that 

subject. Id. at 1008. Thus, the trial court did not err in permitting the 

prosecutor to examine the defendant on his prior convictions for possession 

of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Id. at 1008-09. 

In Hernandez, the prosecutor asked the defendant about his drug use, 

and the defendant claimed that addicts and “junkies” do not sell drugs, and 

that he never sold drugs since he became an addict: 

Q. Now, do any drug dealers [...] sell to support their habits? 

A. Almost all the addicts, what they do is they steal in stores, 

they steal cars they do anything to maintain their habit. 

Q. Including selling some drugs and using some, correct? 

A. Since I’ve been a junkie, I don’t sell drugs. I’m an 

addict. 

Q. You’ve been a junkie for 20 years? 

A. Yes. 
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Q. And you just indicated that since you’ve been a junkie, 

you’ve never sold drugs? 

A. Yes. 

Hernandez, 862 A.2d at 648 (emphasis added). At this point, the prosecutor 

sought to introduce the defendant’s prior drug dealing convictions. Id. 

Defense counsel objected that past occurrences were beyond the scope of the 

defendant’s direct examination, which dealt only with the defendant’s current 

activity. Id. at 648-49. This Court held that the defendant’s “unsolicited

testimony that he had never sold drugs constituted an assertion of good 

character that the prosecutor was entitled to contradict by reference to 

countervailing evidence of prior convictions.” Id. at 648 (emphasis added). 

We further elaborated that the defendant gave a specific response—“Since 

I’ve been a junkie, I don’t sell drugs.”—to a general question about addicts 

“selling some drugs and using some.” Id. at 651. 

The Hernandez Court cited Commonwealth v. Trignani, 483 A.2d 

862 (Pa. Super. 1984), in which the prosecutor asked, “You never shot 

Anthony Sanutti?”, and the defendant responded, “I never shot anybody in 

my life.” Id. at 541. The Trignani Court concluded that the defendant, in 

his response, introduced his character for nonviolence. Id. Thus, the 

Trignani Court concluded that the trial court did not err in permitting the 

introduction of the defendant’s prior conviction for an aggravated robbery in 

which a store clerk was shot. Id. 
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In light of the foregoing caselaw, we consider Appellant’s testimony in 

the instant matter. He said the following on direct examination: 

Q. Now, I’d like to move you ahead to August of 2018. You’ve 

heard testimony about what it is when the police came to your 

place. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did you use any PCP that day? 

A. No, sir; I don’t use drugs. 

Q. Were you drinking any alcoholic beverages that day? 

A. No, sir. 

N.T. Trial, 9/21/21,a t 172. Thus, defense counsel limited his questions to the 

day of the alleged crime. In response to the question about PCP, Appellant 

added, unsolicited, that she does not do drugs. But she made no unsolicited 

blanket assertion that she does not use alcohol. 

Defense counsel continued to ask Appellant to describe the events of 

that day of her arrest: 

Q. So how did you feel that evening? 

A. I felt terrible. I was disoriented. I didn’t know what was 

going on. I was hugging my daughter, saying what’s going on. 

All I remember is the police flashing bright fluorescent lights in my 

face, and then they just put me in the car. 

Q. Do you remember anything else about that evening? 

A. After that, I woke up, and I was in the county. They took 

me straight to the county. 

Q. Did you sit in Pottstown police at all? 
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A. At the Pottstown police station, they gave me a -- I’ve 

never been arrested, and that was the first time I ever went to 

jail. 

Id. at 173 (emphasis added). Thus, Appellant’s testimony included an 

unsolicited assertion that she had never been arrested. 

During Appellant’s cross-examination, the prosecutor followed up on 

Appellant’s prior drug and alcohol use: 

Q. I believe you also testified that you don’t use drugs. 

A. No, I don’t. 

Q. Have you ever? 

A. No, I haven’t. 

Q. What about alcohol? 

A. No, I don’t. 

Q. Are you sure? 

A. I’m sure. 

Id. at 190. 

At this point, the prosecutor began to ask Appellant about a prior public 

drunkenness conviction, and defense counsel objected. Counsel disputed 

whether Appellant testified that she does not presently use alcohol, or whether 

she meant to say that she never used alcohol. Id. at 191. Thus, the trial 

court asked several questions: 

[THE COURT]: Ms. Bullock, have you ever used alcohol? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

THE COURT: Ever? 
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THE WITNESS: No. 

Id. at 193. On this basis, the trial court overruled Appellant’s objection and 

permitted the Commonwealth to ask her about her prior public drunkenness 

conviction. 

This case is distinct from Murphy in one important respect. On direct 

examination, defense counsel asked Appellant if she had any alcoholic 

beverages that day, i.e., the day of the incident. Appellant’s answer, “No, 

sir,” did not imply that she never used alcohol. Instantly, therefore, we cannot 

conclude that Appellant, by an assertion of good character on direct 

examination, opened the door to being cross examined as to any prior use of 

alcohol. Rather, the open-ended question as to Appellant’s alcohol use –

“What about alcohol?” – came from the prosecutor on cross examination. The 

trial court followed up by asking Appellant if she ever used alcohol. After 

Appellant’s negative response, the trial court admitted evidence of the prior 

public drunkenness conviction. 

Thus we conclude that the trial court’s rationale for admitting the prior 

conviction was flawed, because in this case, unlike Murphy, Appellant’s claims 

about alcohol use were solicited during her cross examination. Nonetheless, 

we find no error, because Appellant’s prior conviction was admissible under 
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Hernandez.

2

 There, and in Trignani, the defendant made an unsolicited 

assertion of good character and the courts permitted evidence to contradict 

the assertion. Similarly in this case, Appellant claimed on direct examination 

that she had never been arrested. The admission of her prior conviction for 

public drunkenness was therefore admissible to contradict that assertion. For 

this reason, we find no error in the admission of her prior conviction for public 

drunkenness. 

Appellant did not address Murphy or Hernandez in her brief, and the 

cases she relies upon do not require a different result. For example, in 

Commonwealth v. Garcia, 712 A.2d 746, 749 (Pa. 1998), the 

Commonwealth cross-examined the defendant about several prior crimen falsi

convictions in New York even though he never placed his character in issue. 

Id. at 748. A jury found him guilty of first-degree murder. Id. at 747. The 

Supreme Court held that § 5918 “is clear that a defendant shall not be asked

about his prior crimes, except under limited circumstances, none of which 

apply here.” Id. at 749. Thus, the trial court committed prejudicial error in 

permitting examination about the defendant’s prior crimes. Id. 

Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Bunch, 311 A.2d 632 (Pa. 1973), the 

Supreme Court held under a predecessor to § 5918 that the trial court erred 

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2

 “It is settled that we may affirm a trial court’s evidentiary ruling on grounds 

other than those specified by the court itself, particularly where the additional 

reason is apparent from the record.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 903 A.2d 

1139, 1157 n.19 (Pa. 2006). 
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in permitting the prosecutor to examine the defendant about prior instances 

of carrying a weapon when the defendant never put his character in issue. 

Id. at 633. And the error was not harmless because the “ill-disguised purpose 

was not only to suggest a general disposition to violate the criminal statutes 

of this Commonwealth but more importantly to implant in the minds of the 

jury the concept of an individual [in] possession of a violent disposition quite 

capable of forming the state of mind required for a finding of murder in the 

first degree.” Id. Finally, in Commonwealth v. Barron, 264 A.2d 710, 712 

(Pa. 1970), the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor’s cross 

examination on the robbery defendant’s prior convictions—without the 

defendant having introduced evidence of his good character—was prejudicial 

error: “such cross-examination is specifically proscribed by statutory mandate 

with certain enumerated exceptions, none of which permit this type of crossexamination even if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming.” 

Inasmuch as Garcia, Bunch, and Barron did not involve the 

defendant’s assertion of good character, they are inapposite. Here, as in 

Hernandez, Appellant offered an unsolicited assertion of good character. And 

here, as in Hernandez, the trial court properly admitted evidence of a prior 

conviction in contradiction of Appellant’s assertion. Thus, the ill that § 5918 

and its statutory predecessor sought to prevent, while present in Garcia, 

Bunch, and Barron, is not present here. 
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Appellant also asserts that the trial court should not have permitted the 

prosecutor to examine Appellant about the circumstances of the prior arrest 

and conviction, because the introduction of a prior conviction as impeachment 

should be limited to the “name, time, and place of the crime and the 

punishment received.” Commonwealth v. Creary, 201 A.3d 749, 754 (Pa. 

Super. 2018). We conclude that any error in this regard was harmless. 

“Harmless error is present when the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so 

overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error is so insignificant by 

comparison that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not 

have contributed to the verdict.” Garcia, 712 A.2d at 749. Furthermore, any 

error in the inadmissibility of a prior conviction is harmless where the trial 

court, sitting as finder of fact, expressly states that it disregarded the prior 

record. Commonwealth v. Davis, 421 A.2d 179, 183 (Pa. 1980). That is 

precisely what occurred here:

The court found [Appellant] guilty of three (3) counts of 

EWOC based on the testimony of [the children] and Ofc. 

Maciejewski, all of whom as stated were credible. That testimony

[...] was more than sufficient to convict [Appellant]. As a result, 

[Appellant’s] denial of the use of alcohol and her prior conviction 

for public drunkenness had no impact on the Court’s ultimate 

finding of guilt. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/7/22, at 7-8. Because the trial court did not rely on the 

prior conviction in determining Appellant’s guilt, any error in the admission of 

its circumstances was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/9/2022