IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

HEADWATER RESEARCH LLC

Plaintiff,

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD and 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:23-CV-00103-JRG-RSP

SAMSUNG’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

SAMSUNG’S OVERVIEW OF THE ASSERTED PATENTS ........................................ 2

RESPONSE TO HEADWATER’S “OVERVIEW OF ASSERTED PATENTS”............. 3

LEGAL STANDARD......................................................................................................... 4

LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART ................................................................ 5

ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................... 6

A. ’733 Patent Claim Terms........................................................................................ 6

1. “device agents” (Claims 1, 19, 26, 30) ....................................................... 6

a. The Phrase “Device Agents” Is Indefinite ...................................... 6

b. Combining the Individual Meanings of “Device” and “Agent” 

Does Not Render “Device Agents” Definite .................................. 8

c. The Specification Fails to Guide the Meaning of the Term............ 9

d. Headwater’s Attorney Argument Does Not Undermine Dr. 

Turnbull’s Expert Opinion............................................................ 13

2. “wherein the particular device agent is configured to assist in 

presenting a notification through the user interface, the notification 

based on the message content” (Claim 19)............................................... 16

B. ’117 Patent Claim Terms...................................................................................... 19

1. “device messaging agents” (Claims 1, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, and 18)........... 19

C. ’192 Patent Claim Terms...................................................................................... 22

1. “software components” (Claims 1, 4, and 15).......................................... 22

2. “wherein one of the message delivery triggers is the receipt of a 

particular network element message from one of the network 

elements” (Claim 13)................................................................................ 25

CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 26

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

Align Tech., Inc. v. 3Shape,

No. CV 17-1648-LPS, 2021 WL 2320139 (D. Del. June 7, 2021)............................................6

Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,

932 F. Supp. 2d 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2013)...................................................................................12

Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP,

616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010)............................................................................................9, 21

Cap. Sec. Sys., Inc. v. NCR Corp.,

725 F. App’x 952 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................7

Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,

156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..................................................................................................5

Datanet LLC v. Dropbox, Inc.,

No. 622-CV-001142-OLG-DTG, 2023 WL 7545234 

(W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2023)........................................................................................................5

Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,

936 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................17

Infinity Computer Prod., Inc. v. Oki Data Americas, Inc.,

987 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2021)..................................................................................................7

Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,

21 F.4th 801 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ....................................................................................................2

Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,

766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014)........................................................................................4, 5, 18

IQASR LLC v. Wendt Corp.,

825 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................................................7

Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp.,

383 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..................................................................................................6

Joao Control & Monitoring Sys., LLC v. Protect Am., Inc.,

No. 1-14-CV-134-LY, 2015 WL 4937464 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2015)....................................7

Kinik Co. v. ITC,

362 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................24

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 96 Filed 06/13/24 Page 3 of 34 PageID #: 4642
iii

Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States,

835 F.3d 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................17

Mantissa Corp. v. First Fin. Corp.,

No. 2022-1963, 2024 WL 607717 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 2024) ..............................................7, 20

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,

517 U.S. 370 (1996).................................................................................................................12

Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,

572 U.S. 898 (2014).............................................................................................................4, 12

Network Com., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,

422 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................................6, 12

Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd.,

457 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..................................................................................................4

Phillips v. AWH Corp.,

415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..........................................................................................13, 24

Semcon IP Inc. v. Louis Vuitton N. Am., Inc.,

No. 2:19-CV-00122-JRG, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87492 

(E.D. Tex. May 19, 2020)..........................................................................................................5

SimpleAir, Inc. v. Sony Ericsson Mobile Commc’ns. AB,

820 F.3d 419 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................23

Sonix Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Publ’ns. Int’l., Ltd.,

844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................17

Target Corp. v. Proxicom Wireless, LLC,

IPR2020-00904, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 10, 2020)................................................................2

Tehrani v. Polar Electro, Inc., No. SACV 051113 DOC FFMX,

2007 WL 3052717 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Tehrani v. Polar 

Electro, 301 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2008)...............................................................................6

Translogic Tech., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd.,

No. CV 99-407 PA, 2004 WL 3203958 (D. Or. Dec. 7, 2004) ...............................................13

Statutes

35 U.S.C. § 112............................................................................................................................4, 9

35 U.S.C. § 311(b)...........................................................................................................................2

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INTRODUCTION

Defendant Samsung responds to Plaintiff Headwater’s opening claim construction brief 

addressing the asserted ’733, ’117, and ’192 Patents.

1

 See Dkt. No. 94 (hereinafter “Opening 

Brief”). The patents’ common specification discloses alleged improvements in network backend 

technology applicable to wireless carriers and the like. But over time, Headwater morphed its 

claims through continuation practice until they bore little resemblance to these disclosed concepts

to target mobile device and server technology. This practice injected ambiguity into the ultimately 

issued claim terms, which prevents a POSITA from being reasonably certain about how to interpret 

the identified claim terms and phrases considering the claims, specification, and file history. 

While Headwater attempts to discredit Dr. Turnbull’s declaration2as conclusory, it is worth 

noting that Samsung is the only party that submitted expert testimony to establish how a POSITA

would have interpreted the claims. Headwater submitted no expert declaration to support its brief.

Regarding Headwater’s allegations of “indiscriminate indefiniteness assertions,” Samsung 

notes that, to streamline the disputes before this Court, it withdrew all but seven challenged terms 

over a month before Headwater filed its claim construction brief. See Dkt. No. 91. While 

challenging seven terms is reasonable given the excessive number of claims asserted,

3 Samsung 

further streamlines the dispute by withdrawing two additional claim terms: the “at least one of the 

devices having a network stack . . .” term of Claim 13 of the ’117 Patent and the “wherein one of 

the message delivery triggers . . .” term of Claim 11 of the ’192 Patent.

1 See Dkt. No. 94-2 (U.S. Patent No. 8,406,733); Dkt. No. 94-3 (U.S. Patent No. 9,198,117); Dkt. 

No. 94-4 (U.S. Patent No. 9,615,192).

2

See Dkt. No. 94-7 (“Turnbull Decl.”).

3 Headwater did not identify any terms for construction, suggesting that it has not meaningfully 

engaged in identifying disputed issues for the Court to resolve at an early stage.

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The Court should likewise disregard Headwater’s criticism that Samsung submitted 

“inconsistent positions in IPRs.” Because an IPR petition can be based “only on a ground that 

could be raised under section 102 or 103,” a petitioner cannot challenge a claim as indefinite. See

35 U.S.C. § 311(b). Courts and the Patent Office both recognize that a claim may be both indefinite

and, simultaneously, invalid for lack of novelty over the prior art. See Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm 

Inc., 21 F.4th 801, 813 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“The indefiniteness of a limitation [] precludes a 

patentability determination only when the indefiniteness renders it logically impossible for the 

Board to reach such a decision.”); Target Corp. v. Proxicom Wireless, LLC, IPR2020-00904, Paper 

11 at 12 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 10, 2020) (“Petitioner’s alternative pleading before a district court is 

common practice, especially where it concerns issues outside the scope of inter partes review.”)4.

SAMSUNG’S OVERVIEW OF THE ASSERTED PATENTS

As discussed in Headwater’s opening brief, the asserted patents share a common 

specification, claim priority to 20095, and, at a high level, relate to communications involving 

mobile devices and servers.

The patents’ common specification focuses on a “flattened network architecture” that 

allegedly would solve the problem of “growing digital networking demand.” See Dkt. No. 94-2 at 

5:62-6:28, 12:25-30. In this architecture, “complex data path network processing” ordinarily 

handled by edge or core network equipment “are moved into the device.” Id. at 11:21-35. Doing 

4 Available at https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1535781/downloaddocuments?artifactId=bguzNDEgO5jlKgp7xCpXpm2vFUwK0rhjnOaaeixCoQ2QemtDVVwlfA

0. 

5 Headwater’s statement that each patent claims priority to “the same February 2009 patent 

application” is an oversimplification. Each patent claims priority to four provisional applications 

filed during January and February of 2009 and to a nonprovisional application (U.S. App. No. 

12/380,780) filed March 2, 2009. See Dkt. No. 94-2; Dkt. No. 94-3; Dkt. No. 94-4. 

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so allegedly “reduces the need for complex data path protocol interaction between the base station 

and network infrastructure.” Id. at 12:30-32.

The specification discloses that this flattened architecture can be implemented using a 

“virtual network overlay” that includes “a device service processor, a network service controller 

and a control plane communication link.” Id. at 11:21-24. As shown in Figure 16, the service 

processor’s “service control device link” and the service controller’s “service control server link”

communicate through a “service control link” that carries control plane communications. See id.

at 68:19-37 (describing this link as providing “an efficient and flexible control plane 

communication link”). These control plane communications are used to “manage various aspects 

of device based network service policy implementation.” Id. at 11:21-24.

Through continuation practice, Headwater repeatedly re-wrote claims stemming from this 

specification in an attempt to shed these core concepts and capture any generic functionality 

involving device-side applications that communicate with server-side applications through a 

central server in the middle. It did so by crafting new terminology generally not employed by the 

specification. The ’117 and ’192 Patent claim terms bear especially little resemblance to the 

language employed by the specification. Despite spanning over 160 columns, the specification 

does not include recited terms like “device messaging agents,” “secure Internet data connection,” 

“network message server,” “application identifier,” “message link server,” “device link agent,” or 

“message delivery trigger.”

RESPONSE TO HEADWATER’S “OVERVIEW OF ASSERTED PATENTS”

Although not vital to the present claim construction disputes, Samsung notes here two 

corrections to Headwater’s section entitled “Overview of Asserted Patents.” See Opening Brief at 

2-3. First, the ’117 Patent is not “directed to ‘mobile-end user devices’” as Headwater asserts. 

Instead, each claim is directed to a network system comprising (1) “a plurality of device messaging 

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agents” executable on mobile end-user devices and (2) a “network message server.” See, e.g., Dkt. 

No. 94-3, Claim 1. In other words, a single mobile end-user device, by itself, is not within the 

scope of the claims. 

Second, while Samsung agrees that the ’192 Patent is directed to a “message link server,” 

that patent does not claim “send[ing] messages” to components on end-user devices. Instead, the 

patent’s independent claims involve receiving “network element messages from a plurality of 

network elements,” buffering content from those messages, and then supplying messages 

“comprising the buffered content” to a “transport services stack,” which is part of the message link 

server itself. See Dkt. No. 94-4 at Claims 1, 15. Although the independent claims characterize the 

“supplying” step for the purpose of “delivery on the secure message link maintained between the 

message link server and a device link agent,” they do not claim delivering the message to those 

device link agents. See id. Only one dependent claim—claim 3—requires transporting messages 

to an end-user device’s “device link agent.” See id. at Claim 3.

LEGAL STANDARD

A patent claim is “invalid for indefiniteness if its language, when read in light of the 

specification and the prosecution history, ‘fail[s] to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled 

in the art about the scope of the invention.’” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 

1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901

(2014)). Merely being able to ascribe “some meaning” to a patent’s claims is insufficient to satisfy 

the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 911 (2014). Further, courts 

“should not rewrite claims to preserve validity.” Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 

1292 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

“[W]hen a subjective term is used in a claim, the court must determine whether the patent’s 

specification supplies some standard for measuring the scope of the term [and that] standard must 

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provide objective boundaries for those of skill in the art.” Semcon IP Inc. v. Louis Vuitton N. Am., 

Inc., No. 2:19-CV-00122-JRG, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87492, at *13-14 (E.D. Tex. May 19, 2020) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Where no such boundaries are present, the claims are 

indefinite. Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1371 (“The claims, when read in light of the 

specification and the prosecution history, must provide objective boundaries for those of skill in 

the art.”). “Although the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed 

claim language, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not 

generally be read into the claims.” Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 

(Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. 

Cir. 1988)). Nor is a mere parroting of the subjective claim language in the specification sufficient 

to provide a POSITA with objective boundaries. See Datanet LLC v. Dropbox, Inc., No. 622-CV001142-OLG-DTG, 2023 WL 7545234, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2023) (“[T]he Court agrees 

with Dropbox that the passages Datanet cites either essentially repeat the claim language or simply 

recite that an impact should have ‘little or no perceptible impact on system performance’ . . . . 

[These passages fail to] provide a POSITA guidance to determine what is a . . . ‘substantially 

imperceptible impact’ [as claimed].”) (citations omitted).

LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART

Samsung submits that a POSITA “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in 

computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field; and (2) 3-5 years of experience in 

services and application implementation in communication networks. Additional graduate 

education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” See Turnbull Decl. at ¶ 

30. Headwater proffered no proposed definition for a POSITA in its briefing. Samsung reserves 

the right to address any definition offered by Headwater in its reply brief. 

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ARGUMENT

A. ’733 Patent Claim Terms

1. “device agents” (Claims 1, 19, 26, 30)

Headwater’s Proposed Construction Samsung’s Proposed Construction

Not indefinite; plain and ordinary meaning Indefinite 

a. The Phrase “Device Agents” Is Indefinite 

A POSITA would not have been able to ascertain the meaning of the term “device agent” 

in the ’733 Patent with reasonable certainty. “Device agent” has no commonly understood 

meaning in the art. Turnbull Decl. at ¶ 44. Headwater’s own extrinsic evidence shows that even 

in the limited instances where authors use “device agent,” the term takes on different meanings 

depending on the needs and whims of the author. Indeed, each of Headwater’s extrinsic evidence 

uses “device agents” in ways that contradict Headwater’s belated construction that “device agent” 

is an agent in a device. 

Headwater argues that the words “device” and “agent” should be separately treated such 

that if the Court finds definitive meaning in each of these words, then “device agent” must also be 

definite. Opening Brief at 4. This argument fails.

6

 Courts routinely find phrases to be indefinite 

6 Court’s generally reject improper attempts to broaden phrases by considering the meanings of 

individual words. See, e.g., Network Com., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 422 F.3d 1353, 1359-60 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005) (rejecting the patentee’s attempt “to combine individual dictionary definitions of 

‘download’ and ‘component’” as improper because it would be too broad); Irdeto Access, Inc. v.

Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (refusing to define “group key” by 

using dictionary definitions for “group” and “key”); see also Tehrani v. Polar Electro, Inc., No. 

SACV 051113 DOC FFMX, 2007 WL 3052717, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2007), aff’d sub nom. 

Tehrani v. Polar Electro, 301 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[S]imply combining the definitions 

of ‘cardiac’ and ‘function’ results in a broad, vague definition that is untenable in light of the 

specification.”); Align Tech., Inc. v. 3Shape, No. CV 17-1648-LPS, 2021 WL 2320139, at *12 (D. 

Del. June 7, 2021) (“Shape’s approach of construction by combining ordinary dictionary 

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despite individual words having accepted industry meaning. See, e.g., Mantissa Corp. v. First Fin. 

Corp., No. 2022-1963, 2024 WL 607717, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 2024) (holding “transaction 

partner” indefinite); Infinity Computer Prod., Inc. v. Oki Data Americas, Inc., 987 F.3d 1053, 1062 

(Fed. Cir. 2021) (holding “passive link” indefinite); IQASR LLC v. Wendt Corp., 825 F. App’x 

900, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding “magnetic fuzz” indefinite); Cap. Sec. Sys., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 

725 F. App’x 952, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding “transactional operator” indefinite). 

Indeed, various “agent” terms such as “intelligent agent,” “software agent,” and “mobile 

agent” have been found indefinite by another court in this circuit. See Joao Control & Monitoring 

Sys., LLC v. Protect Am., Inc., No. 1-14-CV-134-LY, 2015 WL 4937464, at *7–8 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 

18, 2015). That the individual terms such as “intelligent,” “software,” “mobile,” and “agent” were 

known did not save these terms from being found indefinite. See id. The same conclusion should 

apply to the term “device agent” because adding the term “device” does not confer any meaningful 

bounds to an “agent.” In fact, unlike terms such as “software agents” and “mobile agents”—which 

at least connote a software—the ’733 Patent describes that agents may be implemented in 

hardware, software, or both, rendering the term “device agent” even more indefinite than those in 

Joao Control. See Dkt. No. 94-2 at 42:51-54.

The ’733 Patent does not provide any guidance to save “device agent” from indefiniteness. 

Claim 1 includes limitations that dance around the “device agent” but fails to illuminate what a 

“device agent” actually is. Claim 1 recites that a plurality of device agents are “communicatively 

coupled to the service control device link agent through an agent communication bus,” that each 

device agent is “identifiable by an associated device agent identifier,” and that a “particular” device 

definitions of ‘focal’ and ‘plane’ is generally disfavored and, more importantly, is not how a POSA 

would understand the term at issue here.”).

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agent receives message content delivered by a “service control device link agent.” Dkt. No. 94-2, 

Claim 1. These generic operations do not inform the boundaries of a “device agent”: they leave 

open the question of whether a “device agent” adopts the meaning of an “agent” and, if so, how 

the prefix “device” modifies its meaning. Turnbull Decl. at ¶ 35. 

The patent specification is similarly not helpful. The specification uses the term “device 

agent” only a few times, describing its generic function or indicating that a device agent is 

software. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 94-2 at 15:58-60 (“[T]he service processor 115 includes various 

components, such as device agents, that perform service policy implementation or management 

functions.”); id. at 11:65-66 (“the device agent software”), 160:7-8, 162:34-35, 162:47-48. At 

best, a POSITA would glean from these disclosures that a device agent performs functions related 

to service and management, but these abstract disclosures do not meaningfully delineate the 

bounds of a device agent. Turnbull Decl. at ¶ 36. 

b. Combining the Individual Meanings of “Device” and “Agent” 

Does Not Render “Device Agents” Definite 

Even if one were to take the individual meanings of “device” and “agent”—as Headwater 

argues—doing so does not save “device agent” from indefiniteness. In the context of a computer 

network, an “agent” means software that performs certain functions on behalf of another element. 

Turnbull Decl. at ¶ 33; see, e.g., Ex. A (Newton’s Telecom Dictionary, 24th ed. (2008)) at 95 

(defining “agent” as “software that runs on a client computer for use by administrative software 

running on a server”); Ex. B (Dictionary of Science and Technology, 2nd ed. (2007)) at 20 

(defining “agent” as “a program or piece of software that runs on a workstation in a network, 

sending performance and statistical information about the workstation to a central network 

management console”); Ex. C (Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms, 10th ed. (2009)) at 15 

(defining “agent” as software that “performs a service for someone,” such as an agent “run[ning] 

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on a client computer to keep the server informed of its needs”). A “device agent,” on the other 

hand, is not known in the art, and it is unclear how adding the prefix “device” affects its scope 

relative to the term “agent.” Turnbull Decl. at ¶ 34. Indeed, it is even unclear whether “agent” in 

the phrase “device agent” should be given its ordinarily understood meaning (software that 

performs certain functions on behalf of another element).

Headwater belatedly argues that “device agents” are simply agents inside a device. Dkt.

No. 94 at 4, 6. But that is not the only way to combine these two words. For example, device 

agent might also mean an agent for a device (which would also be too generic to satisfy Section 

112) that could include an agent not on the device but performs certain functions on behalf of said 

device. Nothing in the individual words require an interpretation of device agent to reside in the 

device, which undercuts Headwater’s allegation that the combination of “device” and “agent” 

definitively means “agent inside a device.” 

Moreover, by construing “device agent” to simply be an agent in a device, Headwater’s 

construction renders “device” meaningless because the claim structure already makes plain that a 

“device agent” is something comprised in a device. Dkt. No. 94 at 5; see Dkt. No. 94-2, Claim 1 

(an “end-user device” comprising “a plurality of device agents”). The prefix “device” would be 

rendered extraneous if all that the “device agent” term meant was an agent in a device. Becton, 

Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Claims 

must be interpreted with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim.”).

c. The Specification Fails to Guide the Meaning of the Term

The patent specification further blurs the defining characteristics of “agent” as used in the 

patent. Figure 16 identifies several black boxes connected to an “Agent Communication Bus.” 

Yet some of these boxes are labeled agents (e.g., billing agent 1695 and access control integrity 

agent 1694) while other are not (e.g. user interface 1697 and modem driver 1640): 

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’733 Patent at Fig. 16

Headwater’s own interpretation of “device agent” highlights the ambiguity of the term in 

the ’733 Patent. Headwater’s broad construction, as reflected in its infringement allegations, 

interprets “device agents” to include “applications.” See, e.g., Ex. D at 14 (asserting that the 

accused functionalities “comprise multiple device agents (e.g., operating system software and/or 

applications)...”) (emphasis added); see id. at 17 (same). Headwater alleges that the applications 

on the accused mobile phones downloaded from application stores are device agents. Such an 

interpretation, however, directly contradicts the little guidance given in the specification in Figure 

16 above, namely that applications or apps are different from “agents” that are inside a device. 

Figure 16 depicts “agents” (yellow) distinct from the “applications” or “apps” (blue). See also 

Dkt. No. 94-2 at 52:5-9 (“As shown in FIG. 16, the application interface agent 1693 is in 

communication with various applications, including a TCP application 1604, an IP application 

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1605, and a voice application 1602.”); see also id. at 56:52-53 (same); Turnbull Decl. at ¶¶ 38-40. 

The figures show that “device agents”—whatever they may be—cannot be the apps or 

applications.

Similarly, Figure 29 illustrates various “agents” (yellow) separately from the “apps” (blue):

’733 Patent at Fig. 29

Indeed, voice apps and other applications already existed by the time of the alleged 

invention, and the named inventor of the ’733 Patent undoubtedly knew applications existed in 

mobile phones because several examples are identified in the specification. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 94-

2 at 8:47-50 (identifying mobile application systems like “BREW® (Binary Runtime Environment 

for Wireless from Qualcomm® Inc.), Symbian OS (from Symbian Software Ltd) and Apple 

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iPhone 3G App Store (from Apple Inc.)”). Yet the ’733 Patent never discloses any applications 

as “agents,” much less “device agents.” The ’733 Patent even criticizes mobile phone applications 

because this approach “requires a large amount of unnecessary custom interface development and 

stifles open market creativity for HTTP, WAP or portal/widget based shopping destinations and 

experiences.” Id. at 8:50-52. The “agents” highlighted in yellow above are allegedly new 

inventions that the inventor “moved into the device” (id. at 11:29-35) to enable what the patent 

calls a “flattened network architecture” (id. at 11:56-58).

Patent applicants like Headwater “face powerful incentives to inject ambiguity into their 

claims” and “defer clarity at all costs,” so the law provides a “meaningful definiteness check” 

against those abuses. Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 910 (quotation omitted). This is a textbook case where 

the definiteness check should be applied. Headwater has exploited the inherent ambiguity of 

“device agent” to broaden the claims for infringement. In doing, Headwater eviscerates any 

meaningful bounds on the term beyond mere software on a device. “[A] patent must describe the 

exact scope of an invention and its manufacture . . . to apprise the public of what is still open to 

them.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996). Here, Headwater’s 

application of the claims for infringement is irreconcilable with the ’733 Patent’s specification, 

and thus renders the claims indefinite. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 932 F. Supp. 2d 

1076, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[T]he test for infringement certainly bears on the test for 

indefiniteness, since the ultimate inquiry for indefiniteness is whether a person having ordinary 

skill in the art could tell what is claimed—and therefore, what infringes.”).

The Federal Circuit has rejected broad interpretations of phrases based on their individual 

words when doing so would contradict the specification. See, e.g., Network Com., Inc. v. Microsoft 

Corp., 422 F.3d 1353, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting the patentee’s construction for 

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13

“download component” that “combine[d] individual dictionary definitions of ‘download’ and 

‘component.’) (“Under that construction, any part of a system involved in the transfer of data from 

one computer to another would be a download component. This is not a tenable theory in light of 

the specification.”). At a minimum, even if the Court finds that “device agent” is not indefinite, 

the Court should reject Headwater’s broad construction and construe the claims to exclude 

applications. 

d. Headwater’s Attorney Argument Does Not Undermine Dr. 

Turnbull’s Expert Opinion

Having failed to submit an expert declaration of its own, Headwater resorts to attacking 

Dr. Turnbull’s opinions with attorney argument. It is not incumbent on Dr. Turnbull to find every 

use of “device agent” in the extrinsic record and dispute its relevance. See Translogic Tech., Inc. 

v. Hitachi, Ltd., No. CV 99-407 PA, 2004 WL 3203958, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 7, 2004) (finding expert 

opinion sound over objection that the expert failed to take into account information the other side 

thought was crucial and the expert thought was irrelevant). Headwater identifies three pieces of 

extrinsic evidence7 but makes no attempt to identify any definitive definition of “device agent” in 

the extrinsic evidence. Simply because another author uses “device agent” in a different context 

7 Only one reference—U.S. 2006/0218395—predates the alleged January 2009 priority date. See 

Dkt. No. 94-2 at Related U.S. Application Data; Dkt. No. 94-10. But Headwater failed to disclose 

the ’395 Application in their April 29, 2024 disclosure of extrinsic evidence so the reference should 

be disregarded. Dkt. 91-1 at 1-2. The other references came after this date and thus have no 

relevance to how a POSITA might have understood “device agent” at the time of the alleged 

invention. See Dkt. No. 94-11 (published 2023), Dkt. Nos. 94-12, 94-13 (effectively filed 2010). 

The Court should thus also disregard the other references as irrelevant. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 

415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We have made clear, moreover, that the ordinary and 

customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary 

skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the 

patent application.”) (emphasis added).

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in an unrelated document does not make “device agent” definite here. Headwater cites no case 

law that shows otherwise. 

Not only does Headwater’s extrinsic evidence fail to redeem the ambiguity of “device 

agent” in the ’733 Patent, Headwater’s extrinsic evidence teaches against Headwater’s proposed 

construction for “device agents” that would include applications.

’395 Patent Application titled “Device Agent.” First, Headwater does not claim that the 

’733 Patent adopts the definition of “device agent” from the ’395 Application. Headwater merely 

points to the title of the application without explaining whether the ’395 Application supports 

Headwater’s construction of “device agents.” It does not. 

The ’395 Patent Application actually contradicts Headwater’s proposal that includes an

application as a type of “device agent.” Figure 

2 of the ’395 Application (to the right) shows 

that Device Agent 204 is separate and distinct

from the Application 202. Figure 2 stands in 

stark contrast to Headwater’s interpretation of 

“device agents” in its infringement contentions 

to include applications. To the extent the Court 

gives any weight to the ’395 Application, the 

’395 Application supports Samsung’s position 

that “device agent” in the ’733 Patent cannot 

include applications. 

Samsung’s EMM Guide. The EMM Guide also treats “device agents” and applications 

as separate and distinct. It discusses these two concepts in completely different sections to describe 

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different things. For example, the EMM Guide discusses “downloading an application from the 

App Store” in the “Downloading Applications” section on page 98. Ex. F at HW103-00082117. 

Device agents are only mentioned on pages 2 and 159 in the EMM server module section and 

Installation Environment File section, respectively. Dkt. No. 94-11; Ex. F at HW103-0082178. 

To the extent the Court gives any weight to the EMM Guide, it also supports Samsung’s position 

that “device agent” in the ’733 Patent cannot include applications. 

While Headwater claims this document shows that Samsung’s documentation uses “device 

agents” to mean “agents that are on a device,” nowhere does Headwater actually point to any such 

definition nor establish that the EMM Guide uses “device agent” in the same way as the ’733 

Patent. Indeed, the EMM Guide does not refer to all device agents as being inside and instead 

refers to a “Push Device Agent” as “Push external components.” Ex. F (Samsung EMM Guide) at 

p. 159. 

U.S. Patent No. 9,800,708. Like Headwater’s other extrinsic evidence, the ’708 Patent 

also distinguishes between a “device agent” and an application. The ’708 Patent shows “device 

agent 110” in Figure 1 (below) as separate from “interactive service application 140,” phone 

service application 120,” and “phone application 220.” The ’708 Patent states that “device agent 

110” “manages a connection between computer 100 and the execution data received from the 

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phone service application 120, 

and delivers the execution data 

to a phone agent 210 in the 

mobile terminal 200 in 

interaction with the phone agent 

210 in the mobile terminal 200.” 

Dkt. No. 94-12 at 

7:24-29. To the extent the Court gives any weight to the ’708 Patent, it also supports Samsung’s 

position that “device agent” in the ’733 Patent cannot include applications. 

Moreover, the ’708 Patent identifies the “device agent” as inside a “computer.” If the ’708 

Patent supported Headwater’s reasoning that “device” simply indicated the location of the agent, 

the ’708 Patent would have called the “device agent” the “computer agent.” The fact that it does 

not suggests that appending a word like “device” to “agent,” depending on the context, could mean 

more than just putting the agent in the device. 

Accordingly, the Court should find that the term “device agent” is indefinite, or at least be 

construed to exclude applications.

2. “wherein the particular device agent is configured to assist in

presenting a notification through the user interface, the notification

based on the message content” (Claim 19)

Headwater’s Proposed Construction Samsung’s Proposed Construction

Not indefinite; plain and ordinary meaning Indefinite 

A POSITA would not have been able to ascertain the meaning of the term “wherein the 

particular device agent is configured to assist in presenting a notification through the user interface, 

the notification based on the message content” with reasonable certainty. 

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First, this term contains “device agent,” for which, as discussed above with respect to 

Claims 1 and 30, a POSITA would not be able to reasonably ascertain the meaning. Second, and 

for similar reasons, a POSITA would not be reasonably certain how to determine whether a “device 

agent” is “configured to” (functionality without definite boundaries) “assist in” presenting a 

notification. In general, presenting a notification through a user interface was a well-known 

functionality that long predates the asserted patents. Turnbull Decl. at ¶ 42. However, it is not 

clear how a POSITA would have determined whether a particular component “is configured to 

assist” in that presentation. Id. Whether something “assists” is a subjective term of degree—one 

can argue any component of a device is configured to assist any other component of that same 

device, and how a “device agent” is “configured to assist in presenting a notification through the 

user interface” could mean something different to a POSITA based on their particular experiences 

or opinions. See Sonix Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Publ’ns. Int’l., Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 

(stating subjective claim terms are those that “turn[] on a person’s tastes or opinion.”). For 

example, if a given component stores or processes information that is ultimately displayed through 

a user interface, does it necessarily “assist” in that presentation? What level of involvement is 

required for software to cross over from merely handling a notification to being deemed to be 

“configured to assist” in its presentation? In many cases, a POSITA would be unable to determine

the criteria for being “configured to assist” in presenting the claimed notification. Indeed, such 

terms with relative definitions have been determined to be terms of degree. See Guangdong Alison 

Hi-Tech. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 936 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding “lofty ... 

batting” to be a term of degree); Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States, 835 F.3d 1388, 1395-

96 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that “reduced area of contact” is a term of degree because it 

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“necessarily calls for a comparison against some baseline,” and noting that “[t]erms of degree are 

problematic if their baseline is unclear to those of ordinary skill in the art”).

Because the claim recites a term of degree, it is critical that the claims or specification 

provide objective boundaries to rescue the claim itself from indefiniteness. See Interval Licensing 

LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d at 1373 (finding indefiniteness due to “facially subjective claim 

language without an objective boundary”). The ’733 Patent, however, fails to inform where these 

objective boundaries must be drawn. Claim 19 is the only claim—out of thirty claims—in the 

’733 Patent to discuss the “presenting” of a notification, and it provides no clarity about what being 

“configured to assist” means. Further, despite its extensive 194-page-long specification, the ’733 

Patent provides no passages that speak to a “device agent” being “configured to assist” in the 

process of presenting a notification. See generally Dkt. No. 94-2; see also id. at 72:19-23 (at best, 

noting that the device itself can issue a “user interface message” without discussing any device 

agents). Headwater has not even identified any relevant excerpts from the specification to inform 

the meaning of this claim limitation. The claims and specification thus provide no objective 

boundaries as to the meaning of being “configured to assist” in presenting a notification.

Headwater then attempts to circumvent the proper legal inquiry by ignoring portions of the 

claim limitation and misquoting Dr. Turnbull. First, Headwater’s argument that “assist” itself has 

a readily ascertainable meaning fails to recognize that the claim requires a “device agent” that is 

“configured to assist” in presenting a notification—the fact that a POSITA may be able to articulate 

the meaning of “assist” alone does not detract from the fact that a POSITA would be unable to 

articulate what it means for a “device agent” to be “configured to assist” in presenting a 

notification. See Opening Brief at 9. Second, Headwater takes Dr. Turnbull’s testimony out of 

context. See id. In his deposition, Dr. Turnbull merely noted that with all the source code, a 

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POSITA had a higher chance of being able to figure out whether a component assists in that 

process or not. See Dkt. No. 94-8 (hereinafter, “Turnbull Dep. Tr.”) at 88:23-89:9. But that is not 

the analysis for determining whether a claim term is indefinite. The indefiniteness inquiry does 

not ask whether a POSITA, having all applicable source code available to him or her, is able to 

determine the metes and bounds of the claim as applied to that code. Instead, a claim is indefinite 

when the claims and the specification fail to provide objective boundaries for the claim, as 

explained above. Accordingly, this claim term is indefinite.

Accordingly, a POSITA would not have ascertained with reasonable certainty the scope of 

the limitation of Claim 19.

B. ’117 Patent Claim Terms

1. “device messaging agents” (Claims 1, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, and 18)

Headwater’s Proposed Construction Samsung’s Proposed Construction

Not indefinite; plain and ordinary meaning Indefinite 

As discussed above, a POSITA would not be reasonably certain about the scope of “device 

agent” in the ’733 Patent (see supra § IV(A)(1)). The addition of “messaging” in the ’117 Patent’s 

“device messaging agent” does not render this term any more definite. If anything, it confirms the 

amorphous and malleable nature of the “device . . . agents” term in general.

Like “device agent,” “device messaging agent” is not known in the art. See Turnbull Decl. 

at ¶ 44. The ’117 Patent, however, provides even less guidance as to what constitutes a “device 

messaging agent.” Its claims use “device messaging agent” in a manner inconsistent with the way 

the ’733 Patent uses the similar term “device agent”—compounding the ambiguity of both terms. 

Whereas the ’733 Patent’s “device agent” functions as the intended destination of messages 

originating from the network (see supra § VI(A)(1)(a) (discussing generic properties of “device 

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20

agents”)), the ’117 Patent’s “device messaging agent” serves a different function—it functions as 

an intermediary that receives “Internet data messages” from a “network message server” and 

forwards them to their intended destination (a “software process”). Neither patent explains this 

seemingly arbitrary substitution of made-up terms. See also Turnbull Decl. at ¶ 44. And the 

specification does not reference a “device messaging agent” even once (outside of the Abstract, 

amended long after the priority date), rendering this term especially suspect. See Mantissa Corp.,

2024 WL 607717, at *3 (finding term “transaction partner” indefinite at least in part because 

“transaction partner” did not appear in specification). 

The file history of a related patent confirms the arbitrary nature of “device messaging 

agent.” The term was first introduced during the prosecution of U.S. App. No. 14/667,353 (which 

shares the same parent as the application for the ’117 Patent and was prosecuted in the same 

timeframe before the same examiner). Ex. E at SAM-HW-2_00215894. In response to the 

Examiner’s § 112(b) rejection of “device messaging agent” as “not clear from the descriptive 

portion of the specification in juxtaposition to the drawings,” (id. at SAM-HW-2_00216136),

Headwater cobbled together a theory that the newly claimed “device messaging agent” was a 

broader version of the disclosed “service control device link” not limited to “just service control,” 

based on the catchall caveat that “the division of functionality between agents is a design choice.”

Id. at SAM-HW-2_00216549-50. However, expanding “device messaging agent” to not be limited 

to “service control” divorces the term from the only defining characteristic that the specification 

ascribes to “device agents”—that they be involved in “service policy” or “management” functions. 

See Dkt. No. 94-3 at 11:35-40, 15:58-60; see also § VI(A)(1)(a) (discussing corresponding 

passages in the ’733 Patent). This expansion causes confusion about whether “device messaging 

agents” are in fact a species of “device agents” or something else entirely. 

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Headwater’s brief does not resolve these problems. Headwater primarily contends that the 

claim structure “provides a POSITA with reasonable certainty as to claim scope” because it 

confirms “device messaging agents” are “executable on a ... mobile end-user device” and “receive 

the Internet data messages.” Opening Brief at 10. As with the ’733 Patent’s “device agents,” 

however, the fact that the claim already requires that “device messaging agents” are “executable 

on a . . . mobile end-user device” would render the prefix “device” extraneous if all it meant was 

that “device messaging agents” must be on a device. See Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco 

Healthcare Grp., LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Likewise, the prefix “messaging” 

would also be rendered extraneous if all it meant was that “device messaging agents” receive 

messages. While Headwater also briefly references the Abstract as reciting the phrase four times, 

the Abstract is irrelevant to understanding how a POSITA could interpret the disputed term at the 

time of the alleged invention. Opening Brief at 10-11. The Abstract was not part of the original 

patent application, but instead was drafted years later as a preliminary amendment when the 

application for the ’117 Patent was filed. Just as importantly, the Abstract merely restates the 

claim language, shedding no additional light on the claim’s meaning:

Abstract Independent Claim 1

“Each of several mobile end-user devices 

contains a device messaging agent that securely 

communicates with a network message server 

over a wireless network.”

“a plurality of device messaging agents, each 

executable on a respective one of a plurality of 

mobile end-user devices configured to 

exchange Internet data via a data connection 

to a wireless network; and”

“each secure Internet data connection between 

the network message server and a respective 

one of the mobile end-user devices via a 

device data connection to a wireless network”

“The network message server delivers 

messages to the device messaging agent on 

behalf of a plurality of network application 

servers.”

“the network message server configured to 

receive, from each of a plurality of network 

application servers, multiple requests to 

transmit application data,”

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“the network message server to transmit each 

of the generated Internet data messages to the 

device messaging agent located on the device 

indicated in the corresponding request,”

“The network message server securely passes 

the data and an application identifier to the 

device messaging agent on the appropriate 

mobile end-user device.”

“the network message server to generate 

corresponding Internet data messages based 

on the requests, each such message containing 

at least one application identifier for an 

indicated application and application data 

corresponding to one of the requests, and”

“the network message server to transmit each 

of the generated Internet data messages to the 

device messaging agent located on the device 

indicated in the corresponding request,”

“The device messaging agent maps the 

application identifier to a software process 

corresponding to the application, ....”

“each device messaging agent, when 

executing, ... to, for each received message, 

map the application identifier in the message 

to a software process corresponding to the 

application identifier,”

Accordingly, the Court should find that the term “device messaging agent” as used in the 

’117 Patent is indefinite.

C. ’192 Patent Claim Terms

1. “software components” (Claims 1, 4, and 15)

Headwater’s Proposed Construction Samsung’s Proposed Construction

Not indefinite; plain and ordinary meaning Indefinite 

Although “software components” ordinarily would be a relatively straightforward—albeit 

exceptionally generic—phrase, the ’192 Patent makes the meaning of “software components” 

unclear in light of its disclosures regarding “device agents.” Turnbull Decl. at ¶ 49.

The patent primarily uses “software components” to refer to something completely distinct 

from “device agents.” Claim 1 recites “wireless end-user devices comprising multiple software 

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23

components authorized to receive and process data from secure message link messages received 

via a device link agent on that device.” Dkt. No. 94-4 at 167:12-16. This language indicates that 

“software components” and “device agents” are distinct, assuming that “device link agents”8are 

examples of “device agents.” See Turnbull Decl. at ¶¶ 50-51; see also SimpleAir, Inc. v. Sony 

Ericsson Mobile Commc’ns. AB, 820 F.3d 419, 431 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Different claim terms are 

presumed to have different meanings.”) (citing Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Texas. Sys. v. BENQ 

Am. Corp., 533 F.3d. 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Certain specification portions likewise use 

“software components” to refer to elements that, for whatever reason, do not qualify as agents. 

See supra § VI(A)(1)(a) (identifying components within the device that do not qualify as agents, 

such as apps, modem firewall, and modem driver); see Dkt. No. 94-4 at Fig. 16; id. at 43:31-37 

(“[T]he session bus can be further protected by storing all software (e.g., software components, 

applications and/or agents) in secure memory”); id. at 92:21-23 (referencing “various agents, 

components, and/or functions implemented in software and/or hardware.”).

If “software components” refers to all software functionalities that do not qualify as “device 

agents,” it necessarily follows that “software components” is indefinite. As discussed above, a 

POSITA would not be reasonably certain about what would constitute a “device agent.” See supra 

§ VI(A)(1). For the same reasons, a POSITA would not be reasonably certain about what would 

not constitute a “device agent”—i.e., “software components.” In other words, if “software 

components” encompasses everything that a device agent is not, and the bounds of “device agents” 

are indeterminate, then the bounds of “software components” are also indeterminate.

8

“Device link agent” is not used in the patent outside of the Abstract and the claims.

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On the other hand, certain specification portions suggest that “device agents” can be 

implemented as “software components.” See Turnbull Decl. at ¶ 52. For example, the patent states 

that “all or substantially all of the service processor 115 functionality,” which encompasses 

“agents” as shown by Fig. 16, can be “implemented and stored in software that can be performed 

on (e.g., executed by) various components in device.” Dkt. No. 94-4 at 28:23-26 (emphasis 

added); id. at Fig. 16 (depicting both agents and non-agents as residing within service processor 

115). Other passages suggest synonymity. See e.g., id. at 69:54-56 (referencing “the device agents 

(e.g., service processor agents/components)”); id. at 45:56-60 (referencing “restrictions on which 

device components or agents the agents will conduct communications with so that only agents that 

need to communicate with one another can do so”).

The term “software components” is thus indefinite for two independent reasons. First, a 

POSITA would not be reasonably certain whether the term is intended to be mutually exclusive, 

encompassing, or synonymous with “device agents.” Second, assuming that the term is intended 

to be mutually exclusive of “device agents,” its metes and bounds are just as indefinite as “device 

agents.” 

Headwater’s position that “software components” and “device link agents” “are not exactly 

the same thing” fails to explain away these ambiguities. Opening Brief at 13. While the claim, 

read in isolation, supports that position, Headwater fails to account for specification passages that 

use “software components” to refer to non-agent software running on the device, as discussed 

above. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Claims “must be read in 

view of the specification, of which they are a part.”) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, 

Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)); Kinik Co. v. ITC, 362 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 96 Filed 06/13/24 Page 28 of 34 PageID #: 4667
25

2004) (“The words of patent claims have the meaning and scope with which they are used in the 

specification and the prosecution history.”). 

Accordingly, the term “software components” is indefinite. 

2. “wherein one of the message delivery triggers is the receipt of a

particular network element message from one of the network elements”

(Claim 13)

Headwater’s Proposed Construction Samsung’s Proposed Construction

Not indefinite; plain and ordinary meaning Indefinite 

This claim limitation is indefinite because a POSITA would not have understood what 

constitutes a “particular network element message.” See Turnbull Decl. at ¶¶ 56-58. 

Adopting the common dictionary definition of “particular” as being “one unit or element 

among others” fails to give a POSITA reasonable guidance as to the scope of this term, contrary 

to Headwater’s argument. Opening Brief at 14-15. As Dr. Turnbull testified, a “particular network 

element message” is one that is “not any network element message, it’s a particular type of one or 

a particular one.” Turnbull Dep. Tr. 18:23-25. The claim, however, fails to explain what causes

a given network element message to be a “particular network element message.” Is a message 

“particular” because it contains certain content, or because it arrives at a particular time or in a 

particular manner, as determined by circumstances beyond its control? See Turnbull Decl. at ¶ 56. 

There are many possibilities as to what can make a “network element message” “particular.” 

Indeed, every network element message is “particular” (i.e., one among others) in the sense that 

the claim contemplates receiving multiple network element messages.

The patent sheds no light on this issue. Neither the independent nor dependent claims 

provide any context for what constitutes a “particular” message that would trigger the message 

link server’s logic to supply messages intended for delivery to a device. Nor does the specification 

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26

clarify this term. It states that numerous events can cause “service control server link 1638” to 

transmit (something) such as a “waiting until a certain amount of service usage or traffic usage has 

occurred, responding to a service agent message, [or] responding to a service agent request, 

initiated by one or more servers.” Dkt. No. 94-4 at 70:2-13. This passage only injects more 

ambiguity. Does a message become “particular” once a threshold of “usage” of other messages 

has occurred? Alternatively, if a “service agent” message or request constitutes a “particular 

message,” how would a POSITA identify whether a given message qualifies as being related to 

“service agent” and what other sorts of messages qualify as “particular” given that Claim 13 is not 

limited to “service agent messages”? The patent does not explain. Accordingly, this claim term 

is indefinite.

CONCLUSION

For at least the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court construe

the disputed claims as indefinite. 

Dated: June 13, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/Jonathan B. Bright

Ruffin B. Cordell

TX Bar No. 04820550

Michael J. McKeon

DC Bar No. 459780

mckeon@fr.com

Jared Hartzman (pro hac vice forthcoming)

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GA Bar No. 427603

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POTTER MINTON, P.C. 

102 N. College Ave., Suite 900 

Tyler, Texas 75702 

Tel: (903) 597-8311 

Fax: (903) 593-0846

Lance Lin Yang

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 96 Filed 06/13/24 Page 32 of 34 PageID #: 4671
29

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN, LLP – LA

Los Angeles, CA 90017 USA

213/443-3000 Fax: 213/443-3100

Email: Lanceyang@quinnemanuel.com

Jon Bentley Hyland

Texas Bar No. 24046131

jhyland@hilgersgraben.com

Grant K. Schmidt

Texas Bar No. 24084579

gschmidt@hilgersgraben.com

HILGERS GRABEN PLLC

7859 Walnut Hill Lane, Suite 335

Dallas, Texas 75230

Telephone: (972) 645-3097

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to electronic 

service are being served on June 13, 2024, with a copy of this document via the Court’s CM/ECF.

/s/Jonathan B. Bright

Jonathan B. Bright

Case 2:23-cv-00103-JRG-RSP Document 96 Filed 06/13/24 Page 34 of 34 PageID #: 4673