Larry Daniel Bratt v. State of Maryland, No. 39, September Term, 2019. Opinion by 

Hotten, J. 

CRIMINAL LAW—SENTENCING—CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED—

CORRECTION TO COMMITMENT RECORD—MOTION TO CORRECT AN 

ILLEGAL SENTENCE 

The Court of Appeals held that the failure to award credit for time served against a sentence 

was not an illegality to which Rule 4-345 applies. Rather, Rule 4-345 applies to substantive

illegalities that exist in the sentence itself. Failure to award credit is a procedural defect 

that is not appropriately addressed by a motion to correct an illegal sentence because it has 

no impact on the substance of the sentence or whether the sentence is permitted by law. 

Accordingly, the Court held that Petitioner was not entitled to a hearing under Rule 4-345. 

Rule 4-351 is the appropriate vehicle to address the failure to award credit for time served 

because Rule 4-351 governs the maintenance of commitment records and dictates that the 

commitment record shall reflect any credit “allowed to the defendant by law.” Therefore, 

to achieve a correction or change of the commitment record mandated by Rule 4-351, the 

appropriate vehicle is a motion to amend the commitment record. 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 

Case No. 02-K-99-000032

Argued: January 6, 2020 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 39

September Term, 2019

__________________________________

LARRY DANIEL BRATT

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

__________________________________

Barbera, C.J.,

McDonald,

Watts,

Hotten,

Getty,

Booth,

Biran,

JJ.

__________________________________

Opinion by Hotten, J.

_________________________________

Filed: April 28, 2020
This appeal arises from a decision of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, 

granting a motion to correct an illegal sentence filed by Larry Daniel Bratt (“Petitioner”), 

after his earlier filed Petition for Credit had been granted and his commitment record 

adjusted to reflect credit for time served. The State appealed to the Court of Special 

Appeals, which reversed and held that although a Rule 4-3451 motion to correct an illegal 

sentence was an appropriate mechanism to request an adjustment to the commitment 

record, the alleged sentence illegality had been remedied by his prior Petition for Credit, 

which did not require a hearing. We granted certiorari to consider the following questions: 

1. Does the failure of a sentencing judge to award a defendant mandatory 

credit against the sentence for time served in custody prior to trial render 

 

1 RULE 4-345. SENTENCING—REVISORY POWER OF THE COURT

(a) Illegal Sentence. The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.

(b) Fraud, Mistake, or Irregularity. The court has revisory power over a 

sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity.

(c) Correction of Mistake in Announcement. The court may correct an 

evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence if the correction is made 

on the record before the defendant leaves the courtroom following the 

sentencing proceeding.

***

(f) Open Court Hearing. The court may modify, reduce, correct, or vacate 

a sentence only on the record in open court, after hearing from the defendant, 

the State, and from each victim or victim’s representative who requests an 

opportunity to be heard. The defendant may waive the right to be present at 

the hearing. No hearing shall be held on a motion to modify or reduce the 

sentence until the court determines that the notice requirements in subsection 

(e)(2) of this Rule have been satisfied. If the court grants the motion, the 

court ordinarily shall prepare and file or dictate into the record a statement 

setting forth the reasons on which the ruling is based.
2

the sentence illegal and subject to correction under Maryland Rule 4-

345(a)? 

2. What is the proper remedy to correct the illegality when a sentence does 

not reflect the proper credit?

Cross-petitioner/Respondent, the State, phrases its questions as follows: 

1. Is the claim that a sentencing court failed to comply with Md. Code Ann., 

Crim. Proc. § 6-218(e) properly raised in a Rule 4-345(a) motion when 

the court’s alleged failure to do so is a procedural flaw, i.e., not the result 

of a determination by the court that the defendant is not entitled to any or 

only partial credit for time that the defendant spent in pre-sentencing 

detention?[2]

2. Where the defendant alleges that the sentencing court failed to comply 

with Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-218, and there is no dispute that the 

defendant is entitled to the credit that he or she requests, must the 

defendant seek correction of the procedural flaw by filing a Rule 4-351[3]

 

2

 In its brief, the State consolidated its questions presented into a single question: 

When a defendant seeks correction of a commitment record, does that claim 

raise a procedural issue rather than a substantive claim, such that it is properly 

addressed as a motion to correct a commitment record, and not as a motion 

to correct an illegal sentence? 

3

 RULE 4-351. COMMITMENT RECORD

(a) Content. When a person is convicted of an offense and sentenced to 

imprisonment, the clerk shall deliver or transmit to the officer into whose 

custody the defendant has been placed a commitment record containing:

(1) The name and date of birth of the defendant;

(2) The docket reference of the action and the name of the sentencing judge;

(3) The offense and each count for which the defendant was sentenced;

(4) The sentence for each count, the date the sentence was imposed, the date 

from which the sentence runs, and any credit allowed to the defendant by 

law;

(continued . . .)
3

motion or may the defendant seek the same relief by filing a Rule 4-

345(a) motion?

We shall affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, but for different reasons 

explained infra.

BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial in August 1983, Petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court 

for Anne Arundel County of two counts of first-degree murder for the 1981 murders of 

John and Donna Carback.4 At sentencing, two consecutive life terms were imposed. The 

sentencing judge expressed the following: 

Well...the [jury] verdict speaks for itself and I’m not going to make any 

comment upon it. As to count one, the sentence and judgment of the [c]ourt 

is that you receive the maximum sentence provided by law which is life. As 

to count two, the sentence is the same, the maximum provided by law, life. 

Each of the sentences to be concurrent, I’m sorry, consecutive, one to the 

other. 

 

(. . . continued)

(5) A statement whether sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively 

and, if consecutively, when each term is to begin with reference to 

termination of the preceding term or to any other outstanding or unserved 

sentence;

(6) the details or a copy of any order or judgment of restitution; and

(7) the details or a copy of any request for victim notification.

***

(b) Effect of Error. An omission or error in the commitment record or other 

failure to comply with this Rule does not invalidate imprisonment after 

conviction.

4 For reasons that will become apparent, the facts of the underlying crime are 

irrelevant to our resolution of the issues presented. 
4

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed. Bratt 

v. State, 62 Md. App. 535, 490 A.2d 728, cert. denied, 304 Md. 95, 497 A.2d 818 (1985). 

Neither the trial judge nor defense counsel referenced any credit for time served against

Petitioner’s consecutive life terms, and Petitioner’s commitment record reflected the same. 

Because the commitment record issued did not indicate a start date, the consecutive life 

terms began on the date of sentencing, August 8, 1983. 

In 1992—nine years after Petitioner was sentenced—Petitioner sent a 

communication to the trial judge requesting credit for time served pre-trial, which included 

ten months in the Anne Arundel County Detention Center and three months in DeKalb 

County, Georgia.5 Petitioner also requested that the court modify his two life sentences 

from consecutive to concurrent terms of imprisonment. Both requests were denied. 

Approximately three years later on July 26, 1995, the Commitment Record Specialist from 

the Maryland Division of Corrections (“DOC”), Ava Gift, sent a letter to the court, which 

reflected that Petitioner had been in pre-trial custody at the Anne Arundel County 

Detention Center from October 26, 1982 until August 8, 1983. In the letter, Ms. Gift

informed the court that Petitioner was entitled to 48 days of “good conduct” credits. These 

“good conduct” credits were not the equivalent of pre-trial credit for time served. She also 

inquired whether Petitioner’s sentence should commence on the date of his detention in 

 

5 Petitioner was arrested on July 16, 1982 in DeKalb County, Georgia on unrelated 

charges. On August 17, 1982, an arrest warrant was issued for Petitioner, in relation to the 

murder of John and Donna Carback. Petitioner was held in custody in the DeKalb County 

jail from the date of his Georgia arrest until his transfer to Maryland on October 26, 1982. 

The charges stemming from the Georgia arrest were dismissed on November 10, 1982.
5

Anne Arundel County or the date of sentencing. There was no mention of the time 

Petitioner asserted he had served in Georgia prior to his detention in Anne Arundel County, 

nor was this time credited. 

On August 15, 1995, the court issued an amendment to the commitment record. The 

amendment reflected that Petitioner had earned “48 days credit,” but did not specify when 

the sentence was to commence. Ms. Gift sent a follow-up correspondence to the trial judge 

on August 24, 1995, inquiring whether the “sentence imposed on August 8, 1983 should 

effectively begin on October 26, 1982[.]” In response, the trial court issued a September 

8, 1995 order, noting that Petitioner was entitled to credit for time served, commencing 

from the date of incarceration at the Anne Arundel County Detention Center. As such, 

Petitioner was granted just 48 days of credit for good conduct and credit for time served in 

Anne Arundel County prior to the date of conviction. 

More than twenty years later, Petitioner filed the two motions underlying this 

appeal. On October 18, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Pre-Trial Incarceration Credit 

and Correction of Commitment Record (“Petition for Credit”) arguing that he was entitled 

to 102 total days of credit for the pre-trial time served in Georgia preceding his transfer to 

the Anne Arundel County Detention Center, and that the credit awarded to date only 

reflected time served pre-trial after his transfer to Maryland.6 Petitioner alleged that his 

 

6 Petitioner attached a “Proof of Incarceration” form and other documentation 

reflecting that he had been held in custody in Georgia from the date of his arrest until his 

transfer to Maryland. Petitioner did not provide this documentation with his prior request 

for credit for time served. 
6

sentence should have commenced on July 16, 1982, the date of his detention in Georgia, 

instead of October 26, 1982. In the Petition for Credit, Petitioner requested a hearing 

pursuant to Rule 4-345(f), which requires that, in the context of an illegal sentence, a 

“modif[ication], reduc[tion], correct[ion], or vacat[ion] of a sentence” be conducted “only 

on the record in open court, after hearing from the defendant, the State, and from each 

victim or victim’s representative who requests an opportunity to be heard.” Md. Rule 4-

345(f). 

The State did not challenge the relief sought in the Petition for Credit, but argued 

that Petitioner was not entitled to a hearing on the Petition. On November 3, 2017, 

Petitioner’s Petition for Credit was granted without a hearing. The court ordered the clerk

to amend the commitment record to reflect that Petitioner’s sentence began on July 16, 

1982. Accordingly, the clerk issued a new commitment record on November 6, 2017. 

Petitioner’s counsel then filed a Motion for Modification of Sentence (“Motion for 

Modification”), which the trial judge dismissed after determining the motion was 

“prematurely filed.” 

On January 30, 2018, Petitioner filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence 

(“Motion to Correct”). In his motion, he again argued that the original sentencing judge 

failed to apply the appropriate credits for time served, and “pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-

345(f) an illegal sentence can be corrected ‘. . . only on the record in open court.’” His 

primary concern was the failure of the court to hold a hearing on the matter in November 

2017. Petitioner alleged that the November 2017 amendment to his commitment record 

“was of no legal force or effect” in the absence of a hearing. According to Petitioner, 
7

because the amendment was “of no legal force or effect[,]” his original sentence without 

the appropriate credit for time served was still in effect and that sentence constituted an 

illegal sentence, needing correction. Petitioner also filed a Motion for Modification to be 

held sub curia, in the event the court disagreed that a hearing was required and denied the 

Motion to Correct. 

The trial court granted the request for a hearing and scheduled the matter for 

February 28, 2018. During the hearing, the State argued that the commitment record could 

be corrected under Maryland Rule 4-351, and that the failure to award credit did not 

constitute an illegal sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345. The State expressed concern 

that a judicial determination that the failure to award credit constitutes an illegal sentence 

would create “a cottage industry of searching for credit on all cases to bring people back 

for motions for modification.” Thereafter, the court amended the commitment record from 

the bench so that the imposed sentence began on July 16, 1982, but continued the case to 

May 3 and June 5, 2018 to allow both parties to prepare for further argument on the motion. 

On July 3, 2018, the Honorable Stacey McCormack issued a Memorandum Opinion 

and Order, finding that the original sentence was in fact illegal, and that the 2017 

amendment was insufficient to correct the illegal sentence as “a hearing in open court was 

required.” The judge wrote, 

[t]here is no question that Maryland Rule 4-345(a) specifically provides that 

a “[c]ourt may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” There is also no 

question in this case that the Defendant is entitled to 102 days of pretrial 

credit. The State conceded as much. Thus, the only question for this [c]ourt 

to decide is what section of the Maryland Rules apply in this case. As 

previously noted, the Defendant contends that [his] sentence, as is, 

constitutes an illegal sentence and that pursuant to Md. Rule 4-345(a) and (f) 
8

that illegal sentence (1) may be corrected at any time and (2) requires a 

hearing in open court. The State disagrees and contends that the sentence in 

this case is not the kind of illegal sentence contemplated by Md. Rule 4-345 

and that the error in this case can [be corrected] under Maryland Rule 4-351. 

The reason for the disagreement is simple. The law in Maryland is clear. If 

this [c]ourt were to find that Md. Rule 4-345 applies[,] then the Defendant is 

entitled to file a [Motion for] Modification of Sentence within 90 days of the 

imposition of the corrected sentence. If this [c]ourt were to find that Md. 

Rule 4-351 applies, the Defendant would not be permitted to file such a 

motion. 

According to the trial judge, Petitioner was “serving two consecutive life sentences PLUS 

102 days for two counts of first-degree murder when the maximum sentence allowed by 

law would be two consecutive life sentences.” (Emphasis in original). In open court, the 

judge vacated the original sentence and resentenced Petitioner to two consecutive life

terms—the first term commencing on July 16, 1982. The trial judge advised Petitioner 

that, as a result of her decision, he was entitled to file a Motion for Modification in the 

circuit court, but was required to do so within 90 days of the court’s decision, noting that 

the previously filed Motion for Modification was premature and would not be considered. 

Petitioner filed a new Motion for Modification on October 29, 2018 and that motion was 

held sub curia. On January 28, 2019, the clerk corrected the commitment record to reflect 

a “[s]entence start date of July 16, 1982 with 388 days credit for time served” in Georgia 

and Maryland prior to trial. The State timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, 

arguing that the failure to award credit for time served is not a substantive illegality that is 

properly addressed through a Rule 4-345 motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
9

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals

In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed. State v. Bratt, 241 

Md. App. 183, 209 A.3d 209 (2019). The Court found that an alleged denial of credit for 

time served may be addressed in a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 4-345(a) 

and (f). However, the Court noted that the 2017 amendment to the commitment record 

reflecting that Petitioner was incarcerated in July 1982 and was entitled to credit for time 

served was sufficient to correct any resulting sentence illegality. Id. at 198, 209 A.3d at 

218. Because of the amendment, “there was no illegality in either the term of his sentence 

or the amount of credit he had been afforded at the time he filed his 2018 Motion to 

Correct.” Id. at 198, 209 A.3d at 218. Therefore, the Court found that the trial judge erred 

by granting the 2018 Motion to Correct, striking the then-existing sentence, and imposing 

the same sentence with credit for time served. Id. 

Relying on Smith v. State, the Court reasoned that a motion to correct an illegal 

sentence would have been an appropriate mechanism for Petitioner to address the lack of 

credit for time served had the earlier Petition for Credit not resolved the issue, because the 

“failure to give proper credit for time served before conviction . . . results in a separate 

violation of a statutory requirement to provide [] credit against that term.” Id. at 190, 209 

A.3d at 213 n. 2 (citing Smith v. State, 31 Md. App. 310, 320, 356 A.2d 320, 325 (1976) 

(“[T]he 12-year term imposed was legal and the only aspect of the sentence that was illegal 

was the lack of credit for time served.”)). The Court found the State’s argument that the 

failure to award credit is a “procedural issue,” not a substantive illegality that is properly 

addressed through a Rule 4-345 motion, unpersuasive because the failure to award credit 
10

for time served is “a defect that [] increases the length of time an inmate is required to serve 

beyond what is permitted by the statute.” Id. at 193, 209 A.3d at 215. The Court reasoned

that the “increase” in the length of time served rendered the sentence illegal, and given the 

substantive illegality, the failure to award credit was the “proper subject of a motion to 

correct an illegal sentence.” Id. at 194, 209 A.3d at 216. 

In sum, the Court concluded that:

(1) Mr. Bratt’s sentence, since it was initially imposed in 1983, has been two 

life terms of imprisonment to be served consecutively, (2) Mr. Bratt’s 

statutory entitlement to credit for time served was recognized by the court in 

1995, (3) in November 2017, the court ordered that an amendment be made 

to the commitment record to correct an erroneous calculation of that credit 

that had apparently been based on incomplete information, (4) no hearing 

was required before that amendment, because the change could be 

accomplished pursuant to Rule 4-351(a), and (5) as a result of the 2017 

Amendment, there was no illegality in either the term of his sentence or the 

amount of credit he had been afforded at the time he filed his 2018 Motion 

to Correct.

Id. at 197–98, 209 A.3d at 218.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue of whether the failure to award credit against a sentence for time served 

constitutes an illegality is a question of law. State v. Crawley, 455 Md. 52, 66, 166 A.3d 

132, 140 (2017) (citing Meyer v. State, 445 Md. 648, 663, 128 A.3d 147, 156 (2015)) 

(“Whether a sentence is an illegal sentence under Maryland Rule 4–345(a) is a question of 

law[.]”). This Court reviews purely legal questions de novo—without deference to the 

decisions of the court(s) below. Id. 
11

We construe the meaning of Maryland Rules using the well-settled principles of 

statutory construction and interpretation. Bailey v. State, 464 Md. 685, 696, 212 A.3d 912, 

918 (2019) (citing Lee v. State, 332 Md. 654, 658, 632 A.2d 1183, 1185 (1993)). “We thus 

look to the plain meaning of the language employed in these rules and construe that 

language without forced or subtle interpretations designed to limit or extend its scope.” 

Lee, 332 Md. at 658, 632 A.2d at 1185 (internal citations omitted). When interpreting the 

Rules and clarifying an ambiguity in the language, we may look to external evidence, such 

as prior Maryland case law. See Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429, 701 A.2d 419, 422 

(1997) (interpreting prior Maryland case law to determine the meaning of the word 

“imposition” in the context of Maryland Rule 4-345(b)). 

DISCUSSION

The trial court erred in granting the motion to correct an illegal sentence, because 

it was not the appropriate mechanism for challenging the failure to award credit against a 

sentence. 

Petitioner contends that he was not given the full credit against his sentence for time 

spent in custody prior to his transfer to Maryland, and the 2017 amendment to his 

commitment record, resulting from his Petition for Credit, was “of no legal force or effect” 

because the presiding judge failed to hold a hearing on the motion before issuing the 

correction. He argues that the failure to apply credit for time served in another jurisdiction 

was a “sentence illegality” under Maryland Rule 4-345 that entitled him to a hearing under 

the same Rule and the failure to hold the hearing was “yet another illegality” subject to 

correction. 
12

The State maintains that Rule 4-345 is inapplicable to the case at bar. According to 

the State, Rule 4-345 is the appropriate mechanism to correct a substantive sentence 

illegality and the failure to award credit against a sentence is merely a procedural defect, 

having no bearing on whether the sentence imposed was legally permissible. The State 

also argues that the underlying credit discrepancy was not a substantive illegality, to which 

Rule 4-345 applies, because the failure to award credit for time served did not “inhere” in 

the sentence itself. The State contends that Rule 4-351 is the proper vehicle for the court 

to correct an issue with a commitment record in accordance with Maryland Code, Criminal 

Procedure Article (“Crim. Proc.”) § 6-218,

7 which governs entitlement to credit for time 

served in custody. We agree.

 

7 Crim. Proc. § 6-218 provides, in relevant part: 

Credits against definite or life sentence, or minimum and maximum terms of 

indeterminate sentence

(b)(1) A defendant who is convicted and sentenced shall receive credit 

against and a reduction of the term of a definite or life sentence, or the 

minimum and maximum terms of an indeterminate sentence, for all time 

spent in the custody of a correctional facility, hospital, facility for persons 

with mental disorders, or other unit because of:

(i) the charge for which the sentence is imposed; or

(ii) the conduct on which the charge is based.

(2) If a defendant is in custody because of a charge that results in a dismissal 

or acquittal, the time that would have been credited if a sentence had been 

imposed shall be credited against any sentence that is based on a charge for 

which a warrant or commitment was filed during that custody.

(continued . . .)
13

Credit for time served in the custody of a correctional facility is mandatory. Crim. 

Proc. § 6-218; see also Lawson v. State, 187 Md. App. 101, 107, 975 A.2d 357, 360 (2009) 

(“The [] plain meaning [of Section 6-218] is that, upon conviction, a defendant must be 

credited for time he has served in custody ‘because of’ that crime[.]”). It is undisputed that 

the Petitioner was entitled to credit for time served pre-trial, and that the failure to award 

such credit warranted correction. The parties also agree that Petitioner was in custody 

beginning on July 16, 1982, and accordingly, the correct start date for his sentence was

July 16, 1982. The disagreement concerns the appropriate mechanism through which a 

court may achieve a correction to the commitment record to reflect credit for time served—

a Rule 4-345 Motion to Correct or a motion to amend the commitment record pursuant to 

Rule 4-351. 

I. The failure to award credit does not render the sentence illegal, and 

therefore, a motion to correct an illegal sentence is not the proper 

mechanism for addressing the credit issue.

A. The failure to award credit for time served is a procedural deficiency that does 

impact the substance of the sentence. 

Maryland Rule 4-345 is a vehicle for sentence modifications where an illegal 

sentence has been imposed. An illegal sentence is one that is “not permitted by law.” State 

 

(. . . continued)

(3) In a case other than a case described in paragraph (2) of this subsection, 

the sentencing court may apply credit against a sentence for time spent in 

custody for another charge or crime.

The purpose of Section 6-218 is “to ensure that a defendant receive as much credit as 

possible for time spent in custody as is consistent with constitutional and practical 

considerations.” Fleeger v. State, 301 Md. 155, 165, 482 A.2d 490, 495 (1984). 
14

v. Wilkins, 393 Md. 269, 273, 900 A.2d 765, 767–68 (2006) (quoting Walczak v. State, 302 

Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949, 951 (1995)). Rule 4-345 applies in “those situations in which 

the illegality [of the sentence] inheres in the sentence itself; i.e., there either has been no 

conviction warranting any sentence for the particular offense or the sentence is not a 

permitted one for the conviction upon which it was imposed and, for either reason, is 

intrinsically and substantively unlawful.”

8

 Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 466, 918 A.2d 

506, 510 (2007). Judge Moylan elaborated on the notion of an illegal sentence in Corcoran 

v. State, 67 Md. App. 252, 507 A.2d 200 (1986), stating:

The notion of an “illegal sentence” within the contemplation of the 

Walczak[9] decision deals with substantive law, not procedural law. It has 

obvious reference to a sentence which is beyond the statutorily granted power 

of the judge to impose. It does not remotely suggest that a sentence, proper 

on its face, becomes an “illegal sentence” because of some arguable 

procedural flaw in the sentencing procedure. 

Corcoran, 67 Md. App. at 255, 507 A.2d at 202; see also Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 

289, 696 A.2d 443, 461 (1997) (“Not every procedural irregularity, even in a capital 

sentencing proceeding, results in [an illegal sentence.]”).10 

 

8 We have consistently stated that a sentence is inherently illegal when it exceeds 

the limits prescribed by a statute or rule. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 389 Md. 127, 133–34, 

883 A.2d 916, 919–20 (2005) (holding that a sentence is inherently illegal if “the sentence 

never should have been imposed[]”). 

9

In Walczak, this Court held that a condition of probation to pay restitution to an 

alleged victim, in connection with a crime that the defendant was ultimately not convicted 

of committing, was an illegal sentence because it exceeded the statutory authority to 

impose restitution. 302 Md. at 433, 488 A.2d at 954. 

10 The Supreme Court has also addressed procedural deficiencies in sentencing in 

Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S. Ct. 468 (1962). There, a trial judge did not afford

(continued . . .)
15

To that point, our case law distinguishes between “inherently” illegal sentences—

subject to correction at any time under Rule 4-345(a)—and “procedurally” illegal 

sentences—“subject to ordinary review and procedural limitations[.]” Bryant v. State, 436 

Md. 653, 663, 84 A.3d 125, 131 (2014); see also Carlini v. State, 215 Md. App. 415, 

419−20, 81 A.3d 560, 563 (2013); Tshiwala v. State, 424 Md. 612, 619, 37 A.3d 308, 312 

(2012). “An error committed by the trial court during the sentencing proceeding is not 

ordinarily cognizable under Rule 4-345(a) where the resulting sentence or sanction is itself 

lawful.” Wilkins, 393 Md. at 275, 900 A.2d at 769; see also Montgomery v. State, 405 Md. 

67, 74–75, 950 A.2d 77, 81–82 (2008). In determining whether a sentence is “illegal,” the 

focus is not whether a judge’s conduct is “per se illegal,” but whether the sentence itself is 

permitted by law. Id. at 284, 900 A.2d at 774. If a sentence is deemed illegal and subject 

to correction under Rule 4-345, it may be corrected at any time and even if: “(1) no 

objection was made when the sentence was imposed, (2) the defendant purported to consent 

to it, or (3) the sentence was not challenged in a timely-filed direct appeal.” Chaney, 397 

Md. at 466, 918 A.2d at 509. However, a motion to correct an illegal sentence may not be 

 

(. . . continued)

a defendant the opportunity to make a statement on his behalf during his sentencing 

hearing. Id. at 425, 82 S. Ct. at 469–70. The defendant argued that his sentence should 

have been vacated because the failure to apprise him of his right to make a statement before 

his sentence was imposed violated Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

Id., 82 S. Ct. at 470 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court treated his motion to vacate 

as a motion to correct an illegal sentence and held that the sentence was not illegal because 

“the punishment meted out was not in excess of that prescribed by the relevant statutes[]” 

and the terms of the sentence itself were not “legally or constitutionally invalid[.]” Id. at 

430, 82 S. Ct. at 472.
16

used as a belated attempt to obtain appellate review of the sentencing proceedings. Wilkins, 

393 Md. at 273, 900 A.2d at 768. 

In Wilkins, the Court considered whether the sentencing judge’s “failure to 

recognize his or her right to exercise discretion in the imposition of a sentence” renders the 

sentence illegal within the confines of Rule 4-345(a). Id. at 272, 900 A.2d at 767. In that 

case, the defendant, Ralph Edwards Wilkins, was convicted of first-degree murder and 

sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. At sentencing, Wilkins’s attorney argued that the trial 

court had discretion under Art. 27, Sections 641A11 and 64312 to impose a lesser sentence 

than life imprisonment for first-degree murder. Id. at 277, 900 A.2d at 770. The court 

 

11 Effective October 1, 2001, Art. 27, § 641A was repealed and re-enacted without 

substantive change as Md. Code, §§ 6–221 through 6–222(a) of the Criminal Procedure 

Article. 

12 Effective October 1, 2002, Art. 27, § 643 was repealed and re-enacted without 

substantive change as Md. Code, § 14–102 of the Criminal Law Article (“Crim. Law”). 

Crim. Law § 14–102 provides:

§ 14-102. Sentencing for crimes with minimum and maximum penalties

In general

(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, if a law sets a maximum and a 

minimum penalty for a crime, the court may impose instead of the minimum 

penalty a lesser penalty of the same character.

Exceptions

(b) This section does not affect:

(1) a maximum penalty fixed by law; or

(2) the punishment for any crime for which the statute provides one and only one 

penalty.
17

disagreed with the notion that it “could give something [other] than life imprisonment[.]” 

Id. at 277, 900 A.2d at 770. More than thirty years after his sentencing and direct appeal, 

Wilkins moved to correct his sentence as an illegal sentence. Id. at 271, 900 A.2d at 767. 

He argued that in failing to recognize his authority to suspend the life sentence, the trial 

judge “effectively converted Wilkins’s sentence into an illegal ‘mandatory’ life 

sentence[,]” which was subject to correction under Rule 4-345(a). Id. at 275, 900 A.2d at 

769. The trial court denied the motion. Id. at 272, 900 A.2d at 767. The Court of Special 

Appeals reversed, holding that the sentencing court’s “failure to recognize its right to 

consider suspending a portion of ... [a life] sentence renders the sentence illegal.” Id. at 

272, 900 A.2d at 767 (quoting Wilkins v. State, 162 Md. App. 512, 525, 875 A.2d 231, 239 

(2005)). This Court held that the allegation that the trial judge erred in failing to recognize 

his authority under Art. 27 did not “inhere in the sentence itself.” Id. at 274, 900 A.2d at 

769. It did not “inhere in the sentence” because the imposition of a life sentence for firstdegree murder was statutorily and constitutionally permissible under the law. Id. The 

Court further concluded that “[a] [Rule 4-345] motion to correct an illegal sentence [was] 

not an appropriate vehicle to address the question raised in this case[,]” because the alleged 

procedural defect in sentencing had no effect on the legality of the actual sentence imposed. 

Id. at 284, 900 A.2d at 775. 

Similar to Wilkins, the allegation that Petitioner was entitled to credit for time 

served, and that the trial judge failed to award credit when he issued the corresponding 

commitment record, is a defect in sentencing procedure that does not render the sentence 

itself inherently illegal. Although Crim. Proc. § 6–218 entitles Petitioner to credit for time 
18

served pre-trial, the allegation that the trial judge failed to award appropriate credit for time 

served is not an allegation that the substance of the sentence itself was unlawful. The 

defect is not substantive because there is no “obvious reference to a sentence which is 

beyond the statutorily granted power for the judge to impose.” Corcoran, 67 Md. App. at 

255, 507 A.2d at 202. In the instant case, the sentence did not go beyond what was 

permitted by law. Stated differently, the sentence of two consecutive life terms was neither

increased nor decreased beyond what is statutorily prescribed as a result of said failure to 

award credit. The credit for time served is functionally irrelevant to the legality of the 

sentence imposed, which was two consecutive life terms. Moreover, the pronounced 

sentence of two consecutive life terms for the crime charged comports with Crim. Law § 

2-201, which mandates a life sentence for all forms of first-degree murder. See Crim. Law 

§ 2–201(b). Because the “terms of the sentence itself [were not] legally or constitutionally 

invalid in any other respect[,]” the sentence imposed was not inherently illegal and Rule 4-

345 was not an appropriate mechanism for challenging the failure to award credit for time 

served. Hill, 368 U.S. at 430, 82 S. Ct. at 472. 

The circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals believed that failure to award the 

102 days of credit against his sentence meant that Petitioner was serving two consecutive 

life terms plus 102 days. However, the failure to award credit for time served does not 

increase the length of the sentence. The fact that this procedural flaw had the practical 

effect of extending the length of time that Petitioner spent in prison is unrelated to the

substance of the sentence imposed, because a subsequent change of the commitment record 

to reflect the appropriate credit would not disturb the sentence. The Court of Special 
19

Appeals relied on Smith v. State to reach the conclusion that the sentence was an illegal 

sentence subject to modification under Rule 4-345. 31 Md. App. at 310, 356 A.3d at 320. 

We do not find Smith convincing or instructive, because its characterization of what 

constitutes an illegal sentence contradicts our more recent decisions regarding the narrow 

scope of the Rule 4-345 motion. In Smith, the defendant was retried and convicted for 

murdering her husband.13 Id. at 310, 356 A.3d at 320. After trial, she was sentenced to 

twelve years of active incarceration. Credit was not given for time she spent incarcerated 

prior to the new trial. Id. at 312, 356 A.3d at 321. In imposing the sentence, the presiding 

judge stated: 

I concluded that the appropriate sentence to be imposed would be imposed 

as starting as of now, without regard to her previous incarceration, which 

has been a period of nineteen months. And the sentence is to be twelve years 

in the custody of the Department of Corrections. That sentence is to start as 

of today. So that in effect, the nineteen months that she had already served 

is eliminated. Half of her sentence from the twenty-four years, the first 

twelve years have already been taken care of by her nineteen months 

incarceration under this sentence, because this is a new sentence of twelve 

years starting today. 

Id. at 312–13, 356 A.2d at 321–22 (emphasis added). The judge later realized that he had 

made a mistake and the failure to award credit for the nineteen months Smith had already 

 

13 In Smith v. State (“Smith I”), 273 Md. 152, 328 A.2d 274 (1974), Smith was 

convicted of second-degree murder. She appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which 

affirmed her conviction. 20 Md. App. 254, 315 A.2d 76 (1974). “The Court [] reversed 

the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which, then, as directed, vacated its 

mandate[,]... reversed the judgment of the Criminal Court of Baltimore[,] and remanded 

the case for a new trial.” Smith, 31 Md. App. at 311–12, 356 A.2d at 320. Smith pleaded 

guilty and was sentenced accordingly. Id. 
20

served was “illegal.” Id. at 313, 356 A.2d at 322. Thereafter, the judge vacated the twelveyear sentence, replaced it with a fifteen-year sentence, and applied nineteen months’ credit 

for time served. Id. at 314, 356 A.2d at 322. The Court of Special Appeals held that the 

original twelve-year sentence was not an “illegal sentence” subject to modification per se, 

but the lack of credit for time served was, in and of itself, illegal. Id. at 320, 356 A.2d at 

325. 

Since the Court of Special Appeals decision in Smith, we have expounded on the 

distinction between procedural and substantive illegalities and expressly limited the 

application of Rule 4-345 to those situations resulting in a substantive illegality. Failure to 

follow proper sentencing procedure as mandated by Crim. Proc. § 6-218 does not render 

the substance of the sentence illegal. See Bryant, 436 Md. at 663, 84 A.3d at 131 (“[T]here 

is a critically dispositive difference between a procedurally illegal sentencing process and 

an inherently illegal sentence itself[.]”). The Court in Smith acknowledged as much, stating 

that the sentence itself was legal. Smith, 31 Md. App. at 320, 356 A.2d at 325.

Accordingly, we decline to extend the limitation of Rule 4-345 to include procedural 

defects such as the failure to award credit. 

B. The failure to hold a hearing on the 2017 Petition was not a separate substantive 

sentence illegality. 

Petitioner relies on our prior decision in Mateen v. Saar to argue that his sentence is 

“inherently illegal” because the trial judge failed to hold a hearing before correcting his 

sentence. 376 Md. 385, 397–98, 829 A.2d 1007, 1014 (2003). Mateen is inapposite. In 

Mateen, this Court held that Mateen was illegally sentenced to fifty years of imprisonment 
21

when the governing statute required that “[a] person found guilty of murder in the first 

degree shall be sentenced to either death or to imprisonment for life[.]”14 Id. at 397, 829 

A.2d at 1014. There was a discrepancy in whether the trial judge intended to sentence 

Mateen to life with all but fifty years suspended or a flat fifty-year term of imprisonment.

The Court determined that the trial judge illegally imposed the latter sentence.15 This Court 

reasoned that the applicable statute mandated a minimum sentence of life imprisonment 

and the imposition of “a straight 50-year sentence for first[-]degree murder was illegal.” 

Id. Mateen was therefore entitled to a hearing in open court to correct the resulting 

illegality and, in the absence of a hearing and notice to the defendant, any change to the 

commitment record to correct the illegal sentence was “of no legal force or effect.” Id. at 

406, 829 A.2d at 1019. In his case, the basis for holding that Mateen was entitled to a 

hearing was the illegality of the sentence. Id. at 399, 829 A.2d at 1015 (“Mateen’s sentence 

 

14 Mateen was originally sentenced to life imprisonment. Mateen, 376 Md. at 389, 829 

A.2d at 1009. Mateen filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he argued that 

trial judges had the discretion to impose a lesser sentence than life imprisonment for first 

degree murder and the failure of the trial judge to recognize that he could suspend the life 

sentence renders his sentence illegal. Id. at 390, 829 A.2d at 1009. The post-conviction 

court agreed with Mateen and he was resentenced accordingly. Id. The sentencing judge 

issued a commitment record that reflected the following sentence: “Prisoner is committed 

to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Correction commencing on 9-9-72 for a period 

of [f]ifty (50) years.” Id. at 390, 829 A.2d at 1010. The sentencing judge later clarified 

that he intended to sentence Mateen to life and suspend all but 50 years. Id. at 398, 829 

A.2d at 1014–15. This Court held that the docket entries and commitment record 

evidencing a 50-year sentence controlled and the new commitment order and the sentence 

change report were “of no legal force or effect.” Id. at 399, 829 A.2d at 1015.

15 “If there is doubt as to the penalty, then the law directs that [the] punishment must be 

construed to favor a milder penalty over a harsher one.” Id. at 397, 829 A.2d at 1013–14 

(citing Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371, 379–80, 564 A.2d 395, 399 (1989)).
22

[] was never corrected properly because there was never a hearing on the record or notice 

provided to the parties, as was required by Maryland Rule 744(c).”

16). The very statute 

under which Mateen was tried and convicted required a minimum punishment of a life 

sentence.

17 Id. at 397, 829 A.2d at 1014. By failing to impose the appropriate penalty—

and replacing it with a lesser punishment that was not permitted by law—the trial judge 

imposed an illegal sentence subject to correction. Id. Accordingly, this Court reversed and 

held the trial judge had imposed an illegal sentence that was subject to correction; however, 

the attempted correction was invalid in the absence of a hearing on the motion. 

Unlike Mateen, there was no such illegality in the sentence imposed, entitling 

Petitioner to a hearing. The terms or substance of his sentence never changed, and it had 

already been settled that Petitioner was entitled to credit for time served. The entitlement 

to a hearing that Petitioner seemingly regards as a separate substantive illegality is derived 

directly from the language of Rule 4-345 and the requirement that the trial court “modify, 

reduce, correct, or vacate a sentence only on the record in open court,” after hearing from 

the respective parties, applies only where the trial court is attempting to correct an illegal 

 

16 What is now Maryland Rule 4-345 then read:

A modification or reduction or striking of sentence shall be made on the 

record in open court after notice to the defendant and the State’s Attorney. 

A new sentence specifying the modification or reduction made shall be 

entered of record. 

Md. Rule 744(c).

17 A sentencing judge has the discretion to suspend all or part of a life sentence for first 

degree murder. State v. Wooten, 277 Md. 114, 116–18, 352 A.2d 829, 831 (1976). 
23

sentence. See Rule 4-345(f); see also Scott v. State, 379 Md. 170, 190–91, 840 A.2d. 715, 

727 (2004) (concluding that no hearing was required under Rule 4-345, where the court 

did not intend to modify, reduce, correct, or vacate the sentence). It does not apply where 

the trial judge needs to change the commitment record to reflect credit for time served. 

Thus, we find the argument that Rule 4-345 applies under these facts unavailing.

C. The language of the Rule does not contemplate the type of correction Petitioner 

sought. 

A change of the commitment record is also not a “modification”18 of an illegal 

sentence under Rule 4-345. In Lawson v. State, the Court of Special Appeals addressed 

the very issue of whether a correction to the commitment record constitutes a sentence 

modification under Rule 4-345. 187 Md. App. 101, 975 A.2d 356 (2009). There, the 

prosecution sought to correct the commitment record after it was determined that Lawson 

was improperly awarded more than seven months credit for time served, which conflicted 

with the terms of his existing plea agreement. Id. at 104, 975 A.2d at 358. The trial court 

granted the motion. Lawson subsequently filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, 

arguing that the removal of the awarded credit would result in an impermissible, illegal 

increase in his sentence under Rule 4-345. Id. at 104–05, 975 A.2d at 358–59. The Court 

of Special Appeals stated: 

Rule 4–345 applies to sentence modifications. The credit at issue here was 

never part of the sentence. Thus, correcting the commitment record to 

 

18 Rule 4-345 and the hearing requirement ordinarily apply only when the court seeks 

to “modify, reduce, correct, or vacate a sentence.” Scott, 379 Md. at 190–91, 840 A.2d at 

727 (emphasis in original). Where there has been no change to the pronounced sentence, 

and the trial judge intends only to correct the commitment record, Rule 4-345 does not 

apply. Id.
24

remove the credit was not a modification of the sentence, and Rule 4–345 did 

not apply. Moreover, the sentence was not increased by correcting the 

commitment record to remove the credit for time served because the credit 

had not been given, and was not required to be given, to begin with.

Id. at 110, 975 A.2d at 362 (emphasis added). 

Here, the credit error was separate and apart from the sentence imposed. See

Haskins v. State, 171 Md. App. 182, 188–89, 908 A.2d 750, 754 (2006) (noting that “a 

motion to correct an illegal sentence is entertained only where the alleged illegality was in 

the sentence itself or the sentence never should have been imposed[]” and a credit 

calculation error is not part of the sentence itself). Correcting the commitment record to 

add credit is not the type of modification contemplated by Rule 4-345.19 Rule 4-345 

governs sentence modifications—it is intended to modify those sentences that are, in and 

of themselves, illegal. In attempting to correct the failure to award the appropriate credit, 

nothing about the pronounced sentence changed. The sentence is unaffected by the 

procedural error because the credit at issue was “never part of the sentence” to begin with. 

Notwithstanding the failure to award credit, Petitioner was still subject to consecutive life 

 

19 We are aware that Maryland Rule 4-351 does not expressly authorize a motion to

correct a commitment record. Maryland Rule 4-351(b) provides that “[a]n omission or

error in the commitment record or other failure to comply with this Rule does not invalidate

imprisonment after conviction.” It is clear from the language in subsection (b) that an error

in the commitment record may be corrected after sentencing and that such an error does

not nullify the sentence. We would suggest that the Standing Committee on Rules of

Practice and Procedure consider revising Maryland Rule 4-351 to expressly set forth that

the commitment record may be corrected upon motion. Just as in this case, these motions

are currently being filed and ruled upon in trial courts.
25

terms for each count of first-degree murder. Accordingly, the court need not “modify” or 

otherwise correct the sentence itself to achieve the goal of awarding the required credit. 

II. Rule 4-351 is the appropriate mechanism for challenging the failure to 

award credit because Rule 4-351 governs the maintenance of commitment 

records.

Maryland Rule 4-351 is the appropriate vehicle for achieving a correction of the 

commitment record. Rule 4-351 dictates that the commitment record contain “the sentence 

for each count, the date the sentence was imposed, the date from which the sentence runs, 

and any credit allowed to the defendant by law.” Failure to include this information in the 

commitment record only warrants correction to the commitment record, not the 

pronounced sentence. The plain language of Rule 4-351(b) confirms as much, providing

that “the effect of an error or omission in the commitment record or other failure to comply 

with this Rule does not invalidate imprisonment after conviction.” In other words, this 

type of commitment record error or omission does not nullify the sentence or term of 

imprisonment imposed, which would ordinarily require resentencing or a hearing. Instead, 

the commitment record error or omission is addressed through a motion to amend the 

commitment record to reflect credit for time served. 

In Scott v. State, we stated that Rule 4-351 governs where the trial judge attempts to 

correct a commitment record error or otherwise amend the commitment record. 379 Md. 

at 190–91, 840 A. 2d at 727. The Court of Special Appeals reached a similar conclusion 

in Lawson, holding that Rule 4-351 was the appropriate mechanism to challenge the 

removal of credit for time served. 187 Md. App. at 109, 975 A.2d at 357 (“Rule 4-345 

applies only when the court intends to make changes to a pronounced sentence.”). In
26

Howsare, the Court of Special Appeals also found that an analogous credit calculation error 

“does not invalidate imprisonment after conviction or amount to an illegal sentence.” 

Howsare v. State, 185 Md. App. 369, 398, 970 A.2d 951, 968 (2009) (quoting Md. Rule 4-

351(b)). The defendant was entitled to credit for six years and 360 days against his twentyyear sentence as of May 9, 2008, but instead, his commitment record reflected the 

following: “[A]s of 6/20/08 the defendant is accorded credit for 6 years, 359 days against 

[his] 20-year sentence....” Id. at 398, 970 A.2d at 968. The Court reasoned that an error 

of this sort was not properly addressed through a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and 

instead, the “proper remedy is to file a [Maryland Rule 4-351(b)] motion to correct the 

commitment order.” Id. We reach a similar conclusion and hold that the failure to award 

credit for time served is an issue resolved by filing a motion pursuant to Rule 4-351. 

Here, the commitment record issued by the clerk did not include the date from which 

the sentence commenced, nor did the record reflect credit for time served. These 

procedural errors regarding the commitment record are contemplated by Rule 4-351, not 

Rule 4-345. To remedy the deficiencies in the commitment record, Petitioner properly 

filed a petition for pre-trial credit, which was granted on November 3, 2017. At that time, 

the clerk included a start date of July 16, 1982 and indicated that Petitioner had earned the 

requisite credits for time served pre-trial. Granting the Motion to Correct an Illegal 

Sentence when there was not a substantive sentence illegality would entitle Petitioner to a 

hearing under Rule 4-345(f) and allow Petitioner an additional opportunity to file a motion 

for modification of his sentence. We decline to extend the reach of Rule 4-345 to include 

this type of sentence calculation issue. The commitment record issue here bore no 
27

substantive impact on the sentence imposed and, because Petitioner is not entitled to a 

hearing under Rule 4-351, the failure to award credit for time served was adequately 

addressed through the 2017 Petition for Credit. Therefore, the amended commitment 

record was “of legal force or effect” and Petitioner’s sentence commenced on July 16, 

1982. 

CONCLUSION

The trial court failed to award credit for time served. The failure to award credit is 

a procedural error that is clearly subject to correction. However, the trial court did not 

impose an inherently illegal sentence because the failure to award credit is not an illegality 

that lies within the sentence itself. The failure to award credit for time served against an 

otherwise legal sentence is appropriately addressed through Rule 4-351. As such, we hold 

that, in the absence of a corresponding sentence illegality, Rule 4-345 does not apply. 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 

SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED. 

COSTS TO BE PAID BY 

PETITIONER LARRY DANIEL

BRATT.