2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-27-2002

USA v. Faulks

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 02-1065

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Faulks" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 617.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/617
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 __________ 

 No. 02-1065 

 __________ 

 

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 v. 

 BARRY FAULKS, 

 Appellant 

 __________ 

 

 ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 D.C. Crim. No. 99-cr-00151 

 District Judge: The Honorable J. Curtis Joyner 

 __________ 

 

 Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 September 23, 2002 

 __________ 

 

 Before: BARRY, AMBRO, and COWEN, Circuit Judges 

 (Opinion Filed: September 27, 2002) 

 ____________ 

 OPINION 

 ____________ 

BARRY, Circuit Judge 

 Appellant Barry Faulks was charged in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 

District of Pennsylvania with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and 924(e). He filed a motion to suppress physical 

evidence, which the District Court denied. Faulks then pleaded guilty to the gun charge 

but reserved the right to appeal the District Court’s order denying his suppression motion. 

He now appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 and will affirm. 

 Faulks argues that the District Court wrongly denied his motion to suppress the 

gun seized from his person during a pat-down search because, he contends, the search 

was not supported by reasonable suspicion. We disagree. 

 On December 12, 1998, at approximately 1:39 a.m., Philadelphia police officers 

responded to a "priority one" radio call that a person with a gun was at a bar on 8th and 

Bristol Streets. The call described the person as a black male wearing a black hat, a dark 

blue jacket with white stripes, and light blue jeans. When the officers arrived at the 

scene, they observed an individual matching this description approximately one block 

away from the entrance to Mi Casa Bar. The individual had left the bar just prior to the 

police’s arrival. The officers stopped the individual and conducted a pat-down search. 

No gun was found. 

 Thereafter, the individual told the police officers that there was a heavyset, black 

male with a gun inside Mi Casa Bar. The allegedly armed man was dressed in a gray 

sweatshirt and seated at the end of the bar. The individual also told the officers that he 

believed that this man may have called the police on him. Based on this information, 

two officers entered Mi Casa Bar and saw Faulks sitting at the end of the bar and wearing 

a gray sweatshirt. The officers approached Faulks, and one proceeded to frisk him. A 
loaded, 9 mm., Ruger semiautomatic pistol was found tucked into Faulks’s waistband. 

After removing the weapon, the officers asked Faulks if he had a permit to carry the gun. 

He did not. Faulks was placed under arrest. 

 It is well established that a police officer may conduct a pat-down search for 

weapons when he or she reasonably suspects that "criminal activity may be afoot and that 

the persons with whom he [or she] is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous." 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Such suspicion may arise from the officer’s direct 

observations, id. at 27-28, or from an informant’s tip, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 

146-47 (1972). When a police officer’s suspicion is based on information supplied by an 

informant, the suspicion is reasonable provided the information exhibits sufficient indicia 

of reliability. Williams, 407 U.S. at 147; see also Florida v. J. L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 

(2000). 

 Here, the information given to Philadelphia police officers by the individual in 

their custody was sufficiently reliable to justify the officers’ suspicion that Faulks was 

armed and dangerous and had given a false report to the police. First, the individual gave 

his statement to the police officers within minutes after he left Mi Casa Bar and last saw 

Faulks. The temporal proximity of these events and the fact that the statement was based 

on what the individual himself had observed permitted the officers to conclude that there 

was a reasonable basis for the statement. Second, the individual told the officers that 

Faulks had a gun and that Faulks was inside the bar less than a block away. The potential 

for retaliation against the individual was clearly present, further supporting a finding of 

reliability. Third, the officers were immediately able to verify the accuracy of the 

individual’s statement by entering the bar. The possibility for such immediate 

accountability tends to discourage fabrications. Fourth, the individual spoke to the 

officers in person. We have observed that "a tip given face to face is more reliable than 

an anonymous telephone call" for it provides the police an opportunity to assess the 

informant’s credibility and to observe his demeanor. United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 

350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000). This factor also favors a finding of reliability. Fifth, and last, 

the individual gave his statement to police officers while being detained and before he 

knew he would be released. He had every reason to believe that he would have been held 

accountable had his statement been false. Given these considerations and the fact that the 

officers were at Mi Casa Bar late at night in response to an urgent call that a person was 

armed with a gun (and presumably about to commit a crime), the officers had ample 

reason to suspect that Faulks was armed with a gun and dangerous. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 

 Kindly file the foregoing Opinion. 

 /s/Maryane Trump Barry 

 Circuit Judge