Filed 8/28/20 In re M.P. CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re M.P., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B304442

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 17LJJP00167)

APPEAL from findings and orders of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Steven E. Ipson, Judge Pro Tempore. 

Affirmed.

Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant 

County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy County Counsel, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over minors M.P. 

and I.P. after finding their parents have a history of domestic 

violence. The court removed the children from their father’s 

custody and released them to their mother. On appeal, the 

children’s mother contends there is insufficient evidence 

supporting the jurisdictional findings. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

M.G. (Mother) and Manuel P. (Father) have two children 

together, M.P. and I.P. In August 2019, Mother called the police 

and reported an incident of domestic violence with Father. At the 

time, she was eight months pregnant with I.P. 

Mother told the responding police officers she and Father 

had been in a relationship for four years, and they had lived 

together “on and off” during that time. They were not currently 

living together, and Mother had an emergency protective order 

against Father. Mother, however, agreed to let Father stay at 

her home for a few hours because he was having issues at his 

home. Two-year-old M.P. was with his maternal grandmother 

and was not home at the time. 

At some point, Mother told Father to leave, which led to an 

argument. Father placed both his hands on Mother’s chest and 

pushed her. Mother fell backwards and hit her head against a 

door frame. Fearing for her safety, she ran out of the house and 

drove down the street, where she called the police. According to 

Mother, there had been prior incidents when Father pushed her 

and threw items at her. 

The police arrested Father for domestic battery and 

violation of a protective order. Mother refused an emergency 

protective order against him. 
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During the subsequent DCFS investigation, Mother 

repeatedly denied that she and Father had ever had any sort of 

physical altercation. According to Mother, she called the police 

because she was mad at Father, and she fabricated the story that 

he pushed her to ensure the police responded. Mother said her 

decision to call the police was “childish.” It was also “childish” to 

obtain a protective order against Father, which she had tried to 

have dissolved. Mother said Father “knows how to walk away,” 

is “sweet” to her, and is good with their children. 

Mother has a long and significant child welfare history

with DCFS and the juvenile court. Between 2011 and 2019, the

court sustained multiple petitions related to her three other

children, which included numerous allegations that she had an 

unresolved history of domestic violence with their father. Mother 

did not complete her court-ordered programs and failed to reunify 

with the children, who were in the process of being permanently 

placed with relatives and a foster parent.

Father denied to DCFS that he pushed Mother or that they 

had an abusive relationship. He claimed he and Mother got into 

an argument and she left when he started yelling. Father told 

DCFS he and Mother were “good parents” and “can sort this out.” 

Father was convicted of spousal battery in 2014. At the 

time of the August 2019 incident, he was on parole for a different 

offense. His parole was subsequently revoked, and he served 60 

days in jail. He was released with the condition that he have no 

contact with Mother. 

According to Father’s parole officer, Mother previously 

obtained a restraining order against Father, but it had expired. 

Father was also subject to a domestic violence restraining order 

that precluded him from having contact with a different woman. 
4

DCFS filed a petition asserting M.P. and I.P. are persons 

described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 

subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j).1 The petition alleged Father’s 

violent conduct, and in particular the August 2019 domestic 

violence incident with Mother, placed the children at risk of 

serious physical harm, damage, and danger. 

In response to DCFS’s intervention, both Father and 

Mother enrolled in domestic violence courses. Although she had 

completed similar classes in the past, Mother said this time she 

was “taking it seriously” and learning a lot. DCFS described 

Mother as receptive and willing to participate in services to 

address its concerns about the children’s safety. 

On February 20, 2020, the juvenile court sustained the 

domestic violence allegations in the petition and found the 

children to be persons described by section 300, subdivision (b). 

It dismissed the counts under section 300, subdivisions (a) and 

(j). The court declared the children dependents, removed them 

from Father’s custody, and ordered them released to Mother. 

Mother timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional 

Findings 

Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support 

the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under section 300, 

subdivision (b). We disagree. 

“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings . . . , we look to 

see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, 

supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code, unless otherwise specified. 
5

draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the 

findings . . . of the dependency court; we review the record in the 

light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note 

that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial 

court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)

Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court 

may exercise jurisdiction over a child when the child “has 

suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, 

serious physical harm or illness” as a result of the failure of his or 

her parent to “adequately supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300, 

subd. (b)(1).) It is well established that exposure to domestic 

violence may serve as the basis of a jurisdictional finding under 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (See In re R.C. (2012) 210 

Cal.App.4th 930, 941; In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 

717; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 576, disapproved of 

on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 

989.) “Although ‘the question under section 300 is whether 

circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the 

defined risk of harm’ [citation], the court may nevertheless 

consider past events when determining whether a child presently 

needs the juvenile court’s protection. [Citations.] A parent’s past 

conduct is a good predictor of future behavior.” (In re T.V. (2013) 

217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133, italics omitted.) 

Here, there is sufficient evidence to support jurisdiction

under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The record shows that in 

August 2019, Father forcefully pushed Mother into a doorframe 

following a verbal argument. The violence was severe enough 

that Mother fled her home in fear before calling the police.

She also reported this was not the first time Father was violent 

with her, as he had previously pushed her and thrown items at 
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her.2 Although there is no evidence that M.P. was present during 

any of this violence, Mother was eight months pregnant with I.P. 

during the August 2019 incident. Father’s violence against 

Mother, therefore, directly placed the unborn child at substantial 

risk of serious injury. (See In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 

663, 674 [domestic violence exposed unborn child to risk of 

serious injury].) 

There is also ample evidence from which the juvenile court 

could conclude it is likely M.P. and I.P. will be exposed to future 

incidents of domestic violence. Although both parents

participated in domestic violence programs, there is nothing in 

the record showing they gained meaningful insights into the risks

such violence poses to their children or how to adequately protect 

them from it in the future. Indeed, as of the jurisdiction hearing, 

both parents continued to deny that Father had ever used 

violence against Mother. The court could have reasonably 

concluded that, until Mother and Father acknowledge and 

address Father’s past domestic violence, it is likely to recur. 

(See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One 

cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.”].) 

Mother’s history of abusive relationships provides further 

support for such a conclusion. Mother’s three other children were 

removed from her custody in part because of domestic violence, 

and she failed to reunify with them. Despite this, she maintained 

a relationship with Father, even after he was physically violent

with her. The violence was apparently severe enough that 

2 The juvenile court found Father’s denial and Mother’s 

recantation of these allegations not credible. We defer to the 

juvenile court’s findings on these issues. (See In re R.T., supra,

3 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
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Mother obtained a restraining order against him. Nonetheless, 

she subsequently allowed him into her home while she was 

pregnant with I.P. Then, when Father used violence against her 

yet again, she refused a temporary protective order and 

repeatedly denied the incident even occurred. Although it 

appears Mother and Father had not had contact since the August 

2019 incident, there is nothing in the record indicating either 

intended to end their relationship. From this, the juvenile court 

could have reasonably concluded Mother and Father would likely 

continue their abusive relationship, thereby placing the children 

at substantial risk of serious harm. 

We reject Mother’s suggestion that there was no reason to 

believe the domestic violence would continue given a condition of 

Father’s parole required he stay away from her. Mother

overlooks that Father previously violated the terms of his parole 

when he violently pushed her in August 2019. Given this history, 

the juvenile court could have reasonably concluded the parole 

condition alone was not sufficient to protect the children. 

II. The Juvenile Court Made the Requisite Findings to 

Assert Jurisdiction Over the Children 

For the first time in her reply brief, Mother alternatively 

contends jurisdiction was improper because the court failed to 

find the children were “at substantial risk” of harm. Instead, at 

the jurisdiction hearing, it simply noted they were “at risk” of 

harm. Mother’s argument is untimely, and we may disregard it 

on that basis. (See In re Luke H. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1082, 

1090.) It also lacks merit. Immediately after noting the children 

were “at risk,” the court found they were persons described by 

section 300, subdivision (b). As relevant here, that subdivision 

requires “a substantial risk that the child will suffer[] serious 
8

physical harm or illness.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) We presume the 

court was aware of this requirement when it made its finding. 

In re Israel T. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 47 (Israel T.), is 

distinguishable. In that case, the juvenile court struck language 

in a petition stating the children were at “ ‘substantial’ ” risk of 

harm, noting it did so to “ ‘invite reversal at the Court of 

Appeal.’ ” (Id. at p. 50.) The court then stated the parents did 

not pose “ ‘any kind of risk to the children.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, the 

juvenile court did not strike any language in the petition related 

to the section 300, subdivision (b)(1) allegations; nor did it make 

any statements analogous to those made by the court in Israel T. 

Instead, it is clear from the entire record that the court made the 

requisite findings to assert jurisdiction over the children. 

DISPOSITION

The findings and orders are affirmed. 

BIGELOW, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J. 

STRATTON, J.