IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-1104

Filed June 7, 2017

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

PATRICIA PRANSCHKE,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monona County, Patrick H. Tott, 

Judge.

Patricia Pranschke appeals her convictions of first-degree harassment and 

assault on a police officer, arguing her trial counsel was ineffective and 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support her first-degree 

harassment conviction. AFFIRMED.

Priscilla E. Forsyth, Sioux City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
2

DOYLE, Judge.

Patricia Pranschke appeals her convictions of first-degree harassment and

assault on a police officer after she tussled with a law-enforcement officer who 

entered her home without knocking, without her consent, and without a search 

warrant. She argues her trial counsel was ineffective in several respects, 

including failing to appeal her conviction of interference with official acts. She 

also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her first-degreeharassment conviction. Upon our review, we affirm her convictions.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Viewing the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s guilty 

verdicts, State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 172-73 (Iowa 2013), the jury could 

have found the following facts. Terri Andersen is Patricia Pranschke’s adult 

daughter. In April 2015, a warrant was issued for Andersen’s arrest. The 

warrant related to a traffic violation issued to Andersen for driving on a 

suspended license.

On October 25, 2015, Monona County Deputy Sheriff Robert Maule was 

on duty and in full uniform. Driving in a marked Monona County Sheriff’s Office 

Tahoe, the deputy was out searching for individuals that had outstanding arrest 

warrants, including Andersen. Deputy Maule had a copy of Andersen’s photo 

from a previous booking so he could identify her. The deputy was informed by 

dispatch that Andersen “would be living or with her mom in Castana, and that 
3

that would be the first place they would go look” for Andersen.1 The deputy was 

given Pranschke’s address and drove to her home.

As he was pulling into Pranschke’s driveway, Deputy Maule observed 

Andersen standing in the driveway. When Andersen saw the deputy, “she 

immediately started running toward the house.” The deputy parked, got out of 

his vehicle, and yelled for Andersen to stop. Andersen did not; instead, she went

inside Pranschke’s house, closing the door behind her. Deputy Maule ran after 

Andersen and entered the house without knocking or announcing himself.

Andersen ran into a bedroom, and the deputy attempted to follow 

Andersen but was stopped by Pranschke. Pranschke “immediately” told the 

deputy to “get the f**k out of [her] house.” The deputy “tried to explain to her that 

[he] saw [Andersen] run inside and she had an active warrant.” Pranschke was 

standing in the middle of the hallway, and when Deputy Maule “tried to go by, 

she stopped [him] and then did a quick shove to [him].” The deputy told 

Pranschke that “if she placed her hands on [him] again she would be going to 

jail.” The deputy tried to move around Pranschke, but Pranschke hit his arm 

down. Deputy Maule asked Pranschke to step aside, but she did not.

Pranschke then called 9-1-1, seeking assistance with her demand that the 

deputy leave her home. While on the phone, Deputy Maule informed Pranschke

he had a warrant to arrest Andersen, who had just run into Pranschke’s house. 

The 9-1-1 operator also told Pranschke that Deputy Maule had an arrest warrant 

for Andersen and that he would leave as soon as she produced Andersen. The 

 

1 The minutes of testimony indicate Deputy Maule “received a tip that 

[Andersen] . . . could be at [Pranschke’s] house.” Deputy Maule’s report says he “was 

informed Andersen could be at [Pranschke’s] house.”
4

operator told Pranschke another officer was coming to her home. The operator 

hung up on Pranschke following Pranschke’s use of vulgar language.

Thereafter, the deputy continued his attempts “to explain the situation” to 

Pranschke “and why [he] was there. . . . That [Andersen] had a warrant.” 

Pranschke told Deputy Maule, “Fine, I’m going to get my gun and shoot you.” 

The deputy took this as a threat. Pranschke then “turned to the right and started 

walking toward the bedroom,” and the deputy thought Pranschke was actually 

“going to get a gun and shoot [him].” To stop Pranschke, Deputy Maule “grabbed 

[Pranschke] by the . . . arms when she was walking away from [him], just right 

above the elbows.” He told Pranschke “she was going to be under arrest” and to 

“[p]ut her hands behind her back.” Pranschke “started flailing, throwing 

elbows . . . back toward [him],” hitting him in the chest. Deputy Maule pinned 

Pranschke up against her washing machine, asked her to stop resisting, and 

handcuffed her. At that point, Andersen “came [walking] out of the bedroom,” 

and the deputy grabbed Andersen by the arm. Deputy Maule let go of Pranschke 

to put handcuffs on Andersen while Pranschke yelled at him. The deputy took 

both women outside. Pranschke asked Deputy Maule why she was going to jail, 

and he told her “it was reference to you can’t threaten to shoot me,” and 

Pranschke responded that she “was joking about that.” It was no joke to the 

deputy.

Iowa State Patrol Sergeant Michael Kober was dispatched to Pranschke’s 

residence to assist Deputy Maule. When Sergeant Kober arrived, he saw the 

deputy on Pranschke’s patio with Pranschke and Andersen. Pranschke was 

“very irate” and “very argumentative” towards Deputy Maule. Sergeant Kober 
5

escorted Pranschke to his patrol car and listened to Pranschke “scream that she 

wanted charges filed on Deputy Maule for assault and that she wanted him 

removed from the residence.”

The sergeant read Pranschke her Miranda rights and transported 

Pranschke to the county jail. On the way, Pranschke asked “what she was being 

arrested for,” and Sergeant Kober told her he “wasn’t sure, that Deputy Maule 

was taking care of those charges.” The sergeant told Pranschke “Deputy Maule 

had said she said that she should get a gun and shoot him. She said she did not 

say that.” Pranschke told Sergeant Kober that she told the deputy she “could 

shoot [the deputy] if [she] wanted to. [She has] a gun. [She has] a weapons 

permit. She didn’t say she should shoot him. She said she could shoot him.” 

Pranschke “then . . . made another statement that she had a weapons permit and 

legally owned a gun.”

The same day, Deputy Maule filed three criminal complaints against 

Pranschke, alleging she committed: (1) first-degree harassment, an aggravated 

misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.7(2) (2015); (2) assault on 

persons engaged in certain occupations, a serious misdemeanor, in violation of 

section 708.3A(4); and (3) interference with official acts, a simple misdemeanor, 

in violation of section 719.1(1)(b). Because the latter alleged offense was a 

simple misdemeanor and not an indictable offense, it was assigned a separate 

case number, SMSM108130; the other two offenses were assigned as counts 

one and two of AGCR016141. See Iowa Code § 801.4(8) (“‘Indictable offense’

means an offense other than a simple misdemeanor.”); Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.6(1) 

(“Two or more indictable public offenses which arise from the same transaction 
6

or occurrence . . . shall be alleged and prosecuted as separate counts in a single 

complaint, information or indictment . . . .”). The parties agreed SMSM108130 

would be tried to the court contemporaneously with the jury trial in AGCR016141.

Deputy Maule and Sergeant Kober testified at Pranschke’s July 2016 trial

as set forth above. Pranschke also testified, giving a different account of events. 

Pranschke testified she had been babysitting her six-month-old great-grandson 

and had just laid him down to sleep in her bedroom when she came out of her 

room, “passed that opening that comes from the door and [Deputy] Maule swung 

the door open and came in and [she] stood there and [she] went whoa. And he 

stopped.” She testified that she did not even know Andersen was in her house

but admitted he told her that Andersen had just run into her house. Contrary to 

Deputy Maule’s testimony, Pranschke testified that she asked him to show her a 

warrant, and “he continually shook his head at [her].” She denied pushing him or 

threatening him with a gun, though she admitted she may have said, while talking 

to herself aloud, that she had a gun permit. She testified the deputy immediately 

asked her, “[D]id you say you were going to get a gun and shoot me?” She 

testified she replied, “[W]here did that come from?” and “[N]o, . . . that’s not what 

I said.” She also denied saying anything to Sergeant Kober thereafter about her 

gun or gun permit.

The jury found Pranschke guilty of both indictable offenses. On June 13, 

2016, Pranschke’s trial counsel filed a motion for a new trial and in arrest of 

judgment, challenging the weight of the evidence to support her convictions in 

AGCR016141. A hearing on the motion was set the same day as sentencing. 

That day, before taking up the motion, the court stated it had prepared and would 
7

be filing its ruling in SMSM108130 finding Pranschke guilty of interference with 

official acts. The court then heard counsels’ arguments on Pranschke’s motion. 

Pranschke’s counsel was asked if he had anything he wanted “to add in addition 

[to] those two motions or any evidence [he’d] like to offer.” Pranschke’s counsel 

answered in the negative. The court subsequently denied Pranschke’s motion 

and proceeded to sentence her on all three convictions.

On June 27, 2016, Pranschke’s trial counsel filed a notice of appeal. The 

notice only referenced Pranschke’s convictions in AGCR016141. No filing 

seeking discretionary review of her conviction in SMSM108130 was made. 

However, Pranschke’s application for appointment of appellate counsel, filed the 

same day, stated she sought counsel in case number 

“AGCR016141/SMSM108130.”

Pranschke now appeals. She contends her trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance, and she also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support her conviction of first-degree harassment.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

On appeal, Pranschke asserts her trial counsel was ineffective in three 

respects: (1) failing “to move to suppress evidence or dismiss the charges based 

on Deputy Maule’s entry into [her] home without consent, exigency or a search 

warrant,” (2) “failing to present and argue a defense of property justification for 

any contact with Deputy Maule after his illegal entry into her home,” and 

(3) “failing to file a notice of appeal” in SMSM108130. Our review of her 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is de novo. See State v. Harris, 891 

N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 2017). Although claims of ineffective assistance of 
8

counsel are usually addressed in postconviction-relief proceedings, they can be 

considered on direct appeal if the record is adequate. See id. at 186.

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 

must prove “by a preponderance of evidence that ‘(1) his trial counsel failed to 

perform an essential duty, and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice.’” Id. at 185 

(citation omitted). If Pranschke cannot establish both elements, her claim fails; 

thus, if we find one element lacking, we need not address the other element. 

See State v. Schlitter, 881 N.W.2d 380, 388 (Iowa 2016); State v. Lopez, 872 

N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2015). The burden is on the defendant “to present facts 

establishing inadequate representation.” King v. State, 797 N.W.2d 565, 571 

(Iowa 2011). “Trial counsel is not ineffective in failing to urge an issue that has 

no merit.” Harris, 891 N.W.2d at 186.

A. Failure to Seek Discretionary Review of SMSM108130.

Taking this issue out of order, we must first determine if we can even 

address this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in this appeal. See Lloyd v. 

State, 251 N.W.2d 551, 558 (Iowa 1977) (“It is elementary that the court’s first 

duty is to determine its jurisdiction to entertain and decide a case on its merits.”). 

It is undisputed that Pranschke intended to appeal her interference-with-officialacts conviction in SMSM108130. It also appears it is not disputed that trial 

counsel did not seek discretionary review in SMSM108130.

2

 See, e.g., Iowa 

Code §§ 814.1 (defining “appeal” and “discretionary review”), 814.6(1)(a) 

(excluding the absolute right of appeal in simple misdemeanor cases), 

 

2

It also does not appear that Pranschke ever attempted to seek a delayed application 

for discretionary review of the issue after the fact.
9

814.6(2)(d) (granting appeal of simple misdemeanors upon appellate court’s 

discretion); Iowa R. App. P. 6.106 (explaining how to apply for discretionary 

review).

The Iowa Supreme Court has explicitly stated that failing “to appeal on 

time is a jurisdictional defect,” and an appellate court “has a duty to determine its 

own jurisdiction and to refuse, on its own motion, to entertain an appeal not 

authorized by rule.” Jensen v. State, 312 N.W.2d 581, 582 (Iowa 1981); see also 

Nuzum v. State, 300 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa 1981). But, the supreme court has 

also, “in certain criminal cases, granted a right of delayed appeal . . . where it 

appears that state action or other circumstances beyond appellant’s control have 

frustrated an intention to appeal.” Swanson v. State, 406 N.W.2d 792, 792-93 

(Iowa 1987) (footnote omitted). A panel of this court concluded we did not have 

jurisdiction to address a claim related to a conviction that was not properly 

appealed where the appellant appealed only one of his two convictions and the 

supreme court had already rejected his motion for a delayed appeal concerning 

the conviction that was not appealed. See State v. Whitehorn, No. 14-1210, 

2015 WL 6509736, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2015).

Here, Pranschke’s counsel did not file an application for discretionary 

review though it is undisputed that Pranschke wanted to appeal her conviction in 

SMSM108130 along with her other two convictions. Appellate counsel did not 

seek approval from the Iowa Supreme Court for a delayed appeal. 

Consequently, we have no jurisdiction to decide the matter.
10

B. Failure to Move to Suppress Evidence or Dismiss Charges.

We next consider whether a motion to suppress evidence or to dismiss 

charges against Pranschke would have been meritorious had it been raised by 

her trial counsel. Pranschke argues trial counsel should have sought such a 

ruling because the deputy’s entry into her home was illegal—i.e., without her 

consent, without exigent circumstances, and without a search warrant. In 

response, the State essentially concedes Deputy Maule’s entry was not legal, 

acknowledging that Andersen did not live with Pranschke, the deputy did not 

have an arrest warrant or search warrant related to Pranschke or Pranschke’s 

home, and Pranschke did not consent to the deputy’s entry into her home.3 The 

State certainly does not assert that Pranschke did not have a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in her home. Rather, the State challenges the remedy, 

questioning “whether or not Pranschke’s acts or actions in interfering or 

obstructing the deputy in his efforts to execute an arrest warrant for [Andersen], 

and in physically assaulting him qualifies as ‘evidence’ that would fall under the 

‘fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree’ doctrine.” 

“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution assures ‘[the] 

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures.’” State v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 

522 (Iowa 2004) (citation omitted). “Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution is 

 

3 The State argues exigent circumstances existed as the deputy was in “hot pursuit” of 

Andersen at the time he entered Pranschke’s house. “Hot pursuit describes the situation 

when the police are pursuing a suspect who is in the process of fleeing from a recently 

committed crime.” State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 109 (Iowa 2001). This was no 

“hot pursuit.” At best, the circumstances here appear to be more of a “warm pursuit,” but 

we need not decide whether an exigency existed in view of our conclusion that the 

exclusionary rule does not apply.
11

the ‘nearly identical [provision] to the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution.’”4 State v. Brown, 890 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Iowa 2017) (citation 

omitted). “To protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures, the 

Fourth Amendment requires that the government must obtain a warrant before it 

may search or enter an area in which a person has a reasonable expectation of 

privacy.” State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Iowa 2001).

To “deter lawless police conduct and to protect the integrity of the judicial 

system,” evidence that is “discovered as a result of illegal government activity” 

will generally be excluded. State v. McGrane, 733 N.W.2d 671, 680-81 (Iowa 

2007). This principle, known as the exclusionary rule, may also prevent the 

“introduction of derivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is the 

product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect 

result of the unlawful search.” Id. But, the “fact that a Fourth Amendment 

violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not 

necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” Herring v. United States, 

555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009). “In other words, exclusion may not be premised on 

the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a ‘but-for’ cause of obtaining 

evidence.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006). Rather, exclusion is 

a judicial remedy employed as a last resort “to deter deliberate, reckless, or 

grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic 

negligence.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 140, 144; see also Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 

 

4 Pranschke has not asked us, nor have we found a basis, to distinguish the protection 

afforded by the Iowa Constitution from that afforded by the Federal Constitution under 

the facts of this case. Therefore, our analysis of the search issue will apply equally to 

both the state and federal constitutional grounds raised by Pranschke. See State v. 

Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 553 (Iowa 2006).
12

2056, 2061 (2016) (“But the significant costs of this rule have led us to deem it 

‘applicable only . . . where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social 

costs.’” (citations omitted)). Consequently, exceptions to the exclusionary rule

have formed over time “involv[ing] the causal relationship between the 

unconstitutional act and the discovery of evidence.” Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061

(discussing exceptions to the rule); see also Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591-93 

(discussing evolution of exceptions to the rule).

One exception—the attenuation doctrine—“permits use of certain 

evidence when circumstances independent of the initial illegality have so 

attenuated the causal connection as to purge the taint of the unlawful police 

action.” Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 111-12; see also Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061 

(explaining the attenuation doctrine allows certain evidence to be admitted if “the 

connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote 

or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest 

protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be 

served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’” (citation omitted)); State v. 

Seager, 571 N.W.2d 204, 211 (Iowa 1997) (discussing the “independent source” 

and “inevitable discovery” exceptions essentially as extensions of the attenuation 

doctrine because both exceptions apply to situations where “it is possible to 

remove the taint of a prior illegality”).

Another exception that has been adopted in many other jurisdictions, 

generally as an extension of the attenuation doctrine, is the “new-crime

exception,” explained as follows:
13

On occasion, when the police conduct an illegal arrest or an 

illegal search, this will prompt the person arrested or subjected to 

the search to react by committing some criminal offense. He might 

attack the arresting or searching officer, flee from that officer, 

attempt to bribe him, threaten the officer with harm should he testify 

against him, attempt to destroy evidence, or make some criminal 

misrepresentation in an effort to bring the incident to a close. In 

such cases, courts are confronted with the question of whether 

evidence of this new crime (or other evidence discovered after it) 

must be suppressed as a fruit of the prior illegal arrest or search.

. . . .

In cases where the response has been a physical attack (or 

threat of same) upon the officer making the illegal arrest or search, 

courts have again held that the evidence of this new crime . . . is 

admissible.

. . . .

[I]t is sometimes said by way of explanation that the attack

upon the officer was a “free and independent action.” But . . . the 

better basis of distinction is that no exploitation of the prior illegality 

is involved and that the rationale of the exclusionary rule does not 

justify its extension to this extreme.

. . . .

It is possible, however, that the nature of a particular Fourth 

Amendment violation will be such that defensive action by the 

victim can fairly be characterized as a response to exploitation, in 

which case a different result would be called for.

6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.4(j), Westlaw (5th ed. updated Oct. 

2016) (footnotes omitted); see also, e.g., State v. Brocuglio, 826 A.2d 145, 151-

52 (Conn. 2003) (adopting the new-crime exception, finding “a new crime 

committed in response to an unlawful police entry into one’s residence is 

attenuated sufficiently to break the chain of causation from the unlawful entry,” 

and setting forth numerous citations); C.P. v. State, 39 N.E.3d 1174, 1180-82 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (adopting “new-crime” exception, holding that 

“notwithstanding a strong causal connection in fact between an illegal search or 

seizure by law enforcement and a defendant’s response, if the defendant’s 

response is itself a new and distinct crime, then evidence of the new crime is 
14

admissible notwithstanding the prior illegality,” and listing numerous jurisdictions 

that have adopted the “new-crime” exception to the exclusionary rule.); State v. 

Panarello, 949 A.2d 732, 736 (N.H. 2008) (same); State v. Herrerra, 48 A.3d 

1009, 1024 (N.J. 2012) (discussing the new-crime exception and citing 

jurisdictions that have adopted the exception, but ultimately finding its adoption 

unnecessary to reach its conclusion that, regardless of the legality of the law 

enforcement official’s stop, the exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence of 

defendants’ attempt to murder the officer after the stop).

The Iowa Supreme Court has expressly approved and adopted the Eighth 

Circuit’s acceptance of what is essentially the new-crime exception:

As an additional justification for Dawdy’s arrest, the 

government notes that several courts consider resistance to even 

an illegal arrest to be grounds for a second, legitimate arrest. . . . 

[W]e now hold that a defendant’s response to even an invalid arrest 

or . . . stop may constitute independent grounds for arrest.

. . . Probable cause for arrest or for search and seizure 

exists where the circumstances are “sufficient in themselves to 

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that criminal 

activity is in progress or has occurred. . . . The struggle that 

ensued when the state trooper attempted to handcuff Dawdy, 

though quickly suppressed, would provide a reasonable police 

officer with probable cause for an arrest under Iowa law. See [Iowa 

Code § 804.12 (1994)] (stating that a person is not authorized to 

use force to resist an arrest . . . even if the person believes that the 

arrest is unlawful or the arrest is in fact unlawful). . . . Thus, 

assuming arguendo that [the officer’s] initial stop and arrest of 

Dawdy were invalid, Dawdy’s resistance provided independent 

grounds for his arrest . . . .

State v. Dawdy, 533 N.W.2d 551, 555-56 (Iowa 1995) (quoting United States v. 

Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1430-31 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 872

(1995)); see also Smith v. State, 542 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Iowa 1996) (“For 

example, one may be guilty of the crime of resisting arrest even if the initial arrest 
15

is illegal.”). Given the court’s recognition of the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in 

Dawdy, along with the considerable number of authorities that have expressly 

adopted the new-crime exception, we find it appropriate to apply the exception to 

the facts of this case. Thus, even if Deputy Maule’s entry into Pranschke’s home 

was unlawful, her actions after he entered her home—particularly in light of the 

facts that he was in uniform and explained why he was in her home—constitute 

new crimes for which the exclusionary rule does not apply.5 As a result, a motion 

to suppress challenging the admission of evidence of Pranschke’s subsequent 

actions would have been futile. Consequently, her trial counsel had no duty to 

file the motion and was not ineffective in AGCR016141 as a matter of law in this 

respect. See Harris, 891 N.W.2d at 186.

C. Failure to Present Justification Defense.

Pranschke also argues her trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting 

a justification defense. Iowa Code section 704.4 allows a person to use 

“reasonable force to prevent or terminate criminal interference with the person’s 

 

5 Nevertheless, we do not sanction unlawful entry into the homes of private citizens by 

law enforcement officials, particularly where—as in this case—(1) the underlying arrest 

warrant was for a minor, nonviolent crime that had been outstanding for months and 

Deputy Maule knew Andersen did not live at the residence and (2) numerous other 

options were available to the deputy before charging into Pranschke’s home. Among 

those options, Iowa, like many states, has a “knock and announce” law that is designed 

to protect “human life and limb, because an unannounced entry may provoke violence in 

supposed self-defense by the surprised resident.” Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594; see also 

Iowa Code § 804.15 (codifying the knock-and-announce rule); State v. Kubit, 627 

N.W.2d 914, 918 (Iowa 2001) (discussing section 804.15), abrogated on other grounds 

by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001). The rule also

protects those elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a 

sudden entrance. It gives residents the “opportunity to prepare 

themselves for” the entry of the police. “The brief interlude between 

announcement and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that an 

individual has to pull on clothes or get out of bed.” In other words, it 

assures the opportunity to collect oneself before answering the door.

Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594 (citations omitted).
16

possession or other right in property.” But, Iowa Code section 804.12 provides,

“A person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest, either of the person’s 

self, or another which the person knows is being made . . . by a peace 

officer . . . even if the person believes that the arrest is unlawful or the arrest is in 

fact unlawful.” Without deciding whether section 704.4 even applies under the 

circumstances presented, we believe section 804.12 trumps section 704.4 here. 

Consequently, Pranschke’s trial counsel had no duty to present a justification 

defense, and her counsel was not ineffective as a matter of law. 

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Finally, we address Pranschke’s claim that there was insufficient evidence 

to support her first-degree harassment conviction. “We review sufficiency-of-theevidence challenges for correction of errors at law.” Schlitter, 881 N.W.2d at

388. A jury’s guilty verdict will be upheld unless it lacks substantial evidence to 

support it. See State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 704 (Iowa 2016); State v.

Hickman, 576 N.W.2d 364, 366 (Iowa 1998). “Evidence is considered substantial 

if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it can convince a rational 

jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Reed, 875 N.W.2d 

at 704-05 (citation omitted). In making this determination, we do not review just 

the inculpatory evidence; rather, all of the record evidence must be considered, 

“including any reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the 

evidence.” Id. at 705 (citation omitted). But, we recognize that the jury was free 

to reject or credit certain evidence. See id.

“A person commits harassment when the person, purposefully and without 

legitimate purpose, has personal contact with another person, with the intent to 
17

threaten, intimidate, or alarm that other person.” Iowa Code § 708.7(1)(b). The 

“statute requires that at the time the defendant purposefully has personal contact 

with another, he or she also has the ‘specific intent to threaten, intimidate, or 

alarm’ them.” In re D.S., 856 N.W.2d 348, 352-53 (Iowa 2014) (citations 

omitted). The crime is raised to the highest degree “when the person commits 

harassment involving a threat to commit a forcible felony.” Iowa Code

§ 708.7(2).

Pranschke argues there was insufficient evidence to prove she had 

illegitimate “purposeful personal contact” with Deputy Maule. She contends that 

she had a legitimate purpose for her contact and threats to the deputy—his illegal 

entry into her home. Viewing the evidence in the light in the most favorable to 

the State, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the conviction. The 

deputy’s testimony was that Pranschke smacked his arm, elbowed him in the 

chest, verbally threatened him, and then proceeded to walk away, which the 

deputy took as her going for her weapon. Additionally, pursuant to section 

804.12, even if the arrest is unlawful, a “person is not authorized to use force to 

resist an arrest, either of the person’s self, or another which the person knows is 

being made . . . by a peace officer . . . .” The jury was free to reject Pranschke’s 

version of events and accept the two officers’ account that Pranschke struck 

Deputy Maule and threatened to shoot him. Clearly, a rational jury could be 

convinced Pranschke was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based upon this 

record.
18

IV. Conclusion.

We conclude a motion to suppress based upon the deputy’s unlawful entry 

into Pranschke’s home would not have been successful, and therefore 

Pranschke’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file such a motion. We 

also conclude Pranschke’s trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to present a 

justification defense. Finally, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the State, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support Pranschke’s firstdegree-harassment conviction. Accordingly, we affirm her convictions.

AFFIRMED.