alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Dwayne BARRETT, aka Sealed Defendant 3, aka Tall Man, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-6985.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 28, 2019.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* and petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for further consideration in light of *United States v. Davis,* 588 U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 2319, --- L.E.2d ---- (2019).
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21

- 6305

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. ROBERT LOGAN GORMAN, a/k/a Robert Gorman , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia , at Charleston

. Joseph R. Goodwin , District Judge. ( 2:19

- cr - 00131

- 1 )

Submitted : June 2, 2021 Decided: June 15, 2021

Before MOTZ, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Robert Logan Gorman, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Robert Logan Gorman appeals the district court’s order denying his renewed request for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115

- 391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. On appeal,
we confine our review to the issues raised in the informal brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Gorman’s informal brief argues only that the district court erred in concluding that he di d not exhaust his administrative remedies before pursuing his renewed motion. Despite its findings on exhaustion , the court proceede d to consider the merits of Gorman’s motion, denying relief after concluding that he did not demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons justify ing compassionate release. Because Gorman’s informal brief does not challenge th e district court’s disposi tive ruling , he has forfeited appellate review of the
district court’s order. See Jackson v. Lightsey , 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in that brief.”) . Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We grant Gorman’s request for leave to file his informal brief o ut of time. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
Derrick Lamont BOOTH, petitioner, v. Wendy KELLEY, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction.

No. 18-6793.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2019.

Petition for rehearing denied.
Michael HERROLD, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-9127.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 17, 2019.

*2713Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular

cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes

needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined

that this opinion should not be published. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-50039

Summary Calendar

ARTHUR X. CARSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE-PAROLE DIVISION,

ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(CA 94 A 205)

June 29, 1995

Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Arthur X. Carson, a Texas state prisoner, appeals pro se the

district court's dismissal with prejudice of his civil rights suit

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm for the following

reasons:

First, Carson canno t bring his § 1983 action complaining of

parole proceeding s because the action he challenges has not been1 McGrew v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158,

160-61 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).

3 See Colvin v. Estelle , 506 F.2d 747, 748 (5th Cir. 1975).

4 Carson v. Kent , No. 93-5462 (5th Cir. May 25, 1994)

(unpublished). In that opinion, we noted that Carson had filed

at least eight other suits in this Court in the past three years. invalidated by a state court or "called into question by a federal

court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254." 1

The defendants demonstrated that the parole board denied Carson's

release on parole for legitimate reas ons and Carson has asserted

bare conclusions and no facts which would give rise to an inference

of retaliation.

Second, to the extent that Carson seeks injunctive relief for

the alleged retaliation against him in his parole proceedings, he

is seeking habeas relief and has failed to exhaust his state

remedies. 2 However, modifying the district court's judgment to be

without prejudice would constitute a "waste of judicial resources" 3

because Carson has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact

exists regarding his retaliation claims.

Third, the district court's averment that it had undertaken de

novo review of the entire record is sufficient to indicate that it

conducted such a review. Finally, we have previously warned Carson

that "future frivolous, unmeritorious litigation will subject him

to sanctions." 4 We now find that Carson's appeal is frivolous and

impose sanctions in the amount of $50 against him and prohibit him

from filing any action or appeal in any court in this circuit until

he has satisfied the sanction.AFFIRMED. Sanctions imposed.
Duane MONTGOMERY, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-5869.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 29, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
Ronald Wayne CLARK, petitioner, v. FLORIDA.

No. 17-9492.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 1, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida denied.
Robert G. THORNTON, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES, et al.

No. 18-1360.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 24, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied.
Exhibit







Exhibit 10.2



FIRST AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
This FIRST AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (“First Amendment”) is effective this 7th day of March, 2019 by and between Brixmor Property Group, Inc. (the “Company”) and Mark Horgan (“Executive”). 
WHEREAS, Executive and the Company entered into an Employment Agreement dated May 11, 2016 (the “Employment Agreement”);
WHEREAS, Executive and the Company desire Executive’s continued employment with the Company under certain amended terms and conditions as set forth herein; and
WHEREAS, the parties now desire to amend the Employment Agreement accordingly.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises above, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1.Section 1 of the Employment Agreement is hereby amended such that the Employment Term (as defined in the Employment Agreement) shall now end on May 20, 2022. 


2.Except as otherwise provided herein, all other provisions of the Employment Agreement shall remain in effect.


3.This Amendment and the Employment Agreement (other than as amended above) constitute the entire agreement between the parties on the subject of Executive’s employment with the Company.


4.This Amendment shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York, without regard to conflicts of laws principles thereof.


5.This Amendment may be signed in counterparts, each of which shall be an original, with the same effect as if the signatures thereto and hereto were upon the same instrument.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment.
Brixmor Property Group, Inc.
/s/ James M. Taylor_________________
By: James M. Taylor
Title: Chief Executive Officer and President
EXECUTIVE
/s/ Mark Horgan____________________
Mark Horgan
Donald HUG, petitioner, v. T.J. CONLEY, Warden.

No. 18-7852.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia denied.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



### September 22, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r 

### 135742(51) Marilyn Kell y Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, 

### AGRIS PAVLOVSKIS, J ustices 

### Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 135742 COA: 275236 Ingham CC: 05-000523-NZ CITY OF EAST LANSING, and EAST LANSING CITY CLERK, Defendants-Appellees.

________________ _________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for rec onsideration of this Court’s June 25, 2008 order is considered, and it is DENIED, beca use it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

d0915 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 22, 2008

Clerk
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 October 3, 2019

p0926

Order 

Clerk

October 3, 2019

157897 & (13)(18)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 157897

COA: 342283

Wayne CC: 84-478796

JOHNNY FELIX HAILEY,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 17, 2018 order 

of the Court of Appeals and the motions to remand and for miscellaneous relief are 

considered. We DIRECT the Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney to answer the 

application for leave to appeal and the motions within 28 days after the date of this order. 

The application for leave to appeal and the motions remain pending.
ALEXANDRA DAVIS’ TRIAL WITNESS LIST 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

ALEXANDRA DAVIS,

Plaintiff/ Counter-Defendant,

VS.

JERRAL W. JONES, DALLAS COWBOYS 

FOOTBALL CLUB, LTD., JAMES 

WILKINSON, TRAILRUNNER 

INTERNATIONAL, LLC, and DONALD JACK, 

JR.

Defendants,

VS.

CYNTHIA DAVIS-SPENCER

Third-Party Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:23-CV-00032-RWS

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

ALEXANDRA DAVIS’ TRIAL WITNESS LIST

Counter-Defendant Alexandra Davis, by and through her designated attorneys, pursuant to

the Court’s Docket Control Order entered in this case, files this Trial Witness List for 

identification and categorization of trial witnesses.

At this time, Plaintiff identifies the following witnesses for trial:

WITNESS, employer, topic of testimony

WILL 

CALL

MAY 

CALL

MAY, BUT 

PROBABLY 

WILL NOT 

CALL

1.

Alexandra Davis, US Government, Defendant 

Breach of Contract

yes

2. Jerral Jones, Self, Plaintiff, Breach of Contract yes

3. Cynthia Davis, Grand Homes, Defendant, Breach 

of Contract 

yes

4.

Shy Anderson, unknown, breach of contract by 

Jerry Jones

yes

5.

Charolette Jones, Dallas Cowboys, Breach of 

Contract by Jones

yes

Case 5:23-cv-00032-RWS Document 87 Filed 04/30/24 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 1523
ALEXANDRA DAVIS’ TRIAL WITNESS LIST 2

6.

Stephen Jones, Dallas Cowboys, breach of 

contract by Jones

yes

7. Jerry Jones, Jr, Dallas Cowboys, Breach of 

contract by Jones

yes

8. Eugenia Jones, None, Breach of contract by Jones yes

9. DeAynni Hatley, unknown, breach of contract by 

Jones

yes

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Matt Keil /s/ Jay K. Gray

KEIL LAW FIRM, PLLC BERGMANGRAY LLP

Matt Keil Jay K. Gray

State Bar No. 11181750 State Bar No. 08324050

Erin Keil Andrew A. Bergman

State Bar No. 24120462 State Bar No. 02196300

Hailee Amox 4514 Travis Street

State Bar No. 24085176 Travis Walk, Suite 300

406 Walnut Street Dallas, Texas 75205

Texarkana, Arkansas 71854 214-528-2444 

870-772-4113 214-599-0602 [fax]

870-773-2967 [fax] gray@bergmangray.com

mkeil@kglawfirm.com bergman@bergmangray.com

ekeil@kglaqwfirm.com LEAD COUNSEL 

hamox@kglawfirm.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF ALEXANDRA DAVIS

Case 5:23-cv-00032-RWS Document 87 Filed 04/30/24 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 1524
ALEXANDRA DAVIS’ TRIAL WITNESS LIST 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On April 30, 2024, this document was transmitted electronically via electronic mail to all 

counsel of record in the case at their electronic mail addresses provided on the electronic case 

filing system of the Court. 

/s/ Jay K. Gray________ __

Jay K. Gray 

Case 5:23-cv-00032-RWS Document 87 Filed 04/30/24 Page 3 of 3 PageID #: 1525
Cotty O'LEARY, petitioner, v. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, et al.

No. 17-1435.

Supreme Court of the United States

Aug. 6, 2018.

Petition for rehearing denied.
Exhibit 10.9

AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO CONTENT AGREEMENT

THIS AMENDMENT No. 1 ("Amendment") is made and effective as of March 1, 2004 (the "Effective Date") pursuant to Section 9.4 of the Content
Agreement dated as of November 1, 2002 (the "Agreement") between HCAInformation Technology & Services, Inc., a Tennessee corporation with an address of 2555 Park
Plaza, Nashville, TN 37203 ("Licensee") and HealthGate Data Corp., a Delaware corporation with an address of 25 Corporate Drive, Burlington, MA 01803 ("HealthGate").

Licensee
and HealthGate hereby agree as follows:



---







IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, duly authorized representatives of the parties have executed this Amendment No. 1 under seal as of and effective the date first written above:

|HealthGate Data Corp. |                                                    | HCAInformation Technology & Services, Inc.
|--------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------
|By:                   | /s/ Veronica Zsolcsak                              |                                            
|Name:                 | Veronica Zsolcsak                                  |                                            
|Title:                | Chief Financial Officer                            |                                            
|Address:              | 25 Corporate Drive
Burlington, Massachusetts 01803 |                                            
|email:                | veronicaz@healthgate.com                           |                                            
|Phone:                | 781.685.4016                                       |                                            
|Fax:                  | 781.685.4040                                       |                                            

2

---



SCHEDULE A-1: Newsletters

3

---



QuickLinks
1 The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 04-1419

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Missouri. Robert Gerard Horn, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: October 1, 2004 Filed: October 12, 2004

___________ Before RILEY, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Following our remand in United States v. Horn , 76 Fed. Appx. 747 (8th Cir. Aug. 26, 2003) (unpublished per curiam), the district court 1 determined that when Robert Gerard Horn signed a document agreeing to modifications to the conditions of his supervised release, his waiver of his right to a pre-modification hearing with the assistance of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Horn appeals again, and, having reviewed the record, which includes the hearing testimony of two probation officers who were present when Horn signed the waiver, we find no error-2- in the district court’s conclusion. SeeUnited States v. Stocks , 104 F.3d 308, 312 (9th Cir.) (standard of review), cert. denied , 522 U.S. 904 (1997). Although the district court found that Horn had waived his hearing rights, the court nevertheless afforded Horn a hearing with the assistance of counsel and a chance to oppose the new conditions. Given the testimony of Horn’s psychological counselor at the hearing that the new conditions were necessary to protect the community and were needed for Horn’s rehabilitation, we conclude the district did not abuse its discretion in adopting the proposed modifications. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (after considering designated factors, district court may “modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release . . . pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”); United States v. Davies , 380 F.3d 329, 332 (8th Cir. 2004) (standard of review; district courts enjoy broad discretion in imposition or modification of conditions for terms of supervised release). Horn’s remaining contentions on appeal are meritless. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)(1) (requirements for modification of supervised release conditions).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________
Fernando VALDEZ-CEJAS, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-6103.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 29, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed June 19, 2024.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-0098

Lower Tribunal Nos. 23-01722, 23-01723, 23-01724

________________

Mario E. Vazquez,

Appellant,

vs.

B & R Supermarket Inc., et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the State of Florida, Reemployment Assistance 

Appeals Commission. 

Mario E. Vazquez, in proper person.

Katie E. Sabo, Appellate Counsel (Tallahassee), for appellee 

Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission.

Before EMAS, SCALES, and LINDSEY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.
2

Affirmed. See Ryals v. State, Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 722 

So. 2d 845, 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“[W]here a claimant does not challenge 

the sufficiency of the [referee’s] findings, but only offers a different version of 

the facts, there is no legal error.”).
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

RODNEY SANCHEZ LOPEZ,

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 Appellee. 

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-14-00070-CR

Appeal from

143rd District Court

of Reeves County, Texas

(TC # 13-08-07799-CRR)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rodney Sanchez Lopez attempts to appeal his conviction of possession with intent to 

deliver more than four grams but less than 200 grams of cocaine. Finding that Appellant has not 

timely filed his notice of appeal or a motion for extension of time, we dismiss the appeal for 

want of jurisdiction.

A timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. Olivo v. State, 

918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). The record before us reflects that sentence was 

imposed in open court on January 7, 2014. Appellant did not file a motion for new trial. 

Therefore, his notice of appeal was due to be filed on February 6, 2014, thirty days after the date 

sentence was imposed in open court. See TEX.R.APP.P. 26.2(a)(1). Appellant filed his notice of 

appeal one day late, on February 7, 2014. Pursuant to Rule 26.3, a court of appeals may grant an 
- 2 -

extension of time to file notice of appeal if the notice is filed within fifteen days after the last day 

allowed and, within the same period, a motion is filed in the court of appeals reasonably 

explaining the need for the extension of time. TEX.R.APP. P. 26.3; Olivo, 918 S.W.2d at 522. 

Appellant did not file a motion requesting an extension of time pursuant to Rule 26.3. Because 

Appellant did not timely file his notice of appeal, he failed to perfect this appeal. 

Appellant has filed a motion to dismiss his appeal pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P. 42.2, but the 

motion is not in compliance with the requirements of that rule. Given that we lack jurisdiction of 

the appeal, we deny Appellant’s motion to dismiss as moot and dismiss the appeal for want of 

jurisdiction.

August 6, 2014

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)
Martin Paul DE-LA-ROSA, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-9245.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 17, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
Michael Allyn KENNEDY, petitioner, v. TEXAS.

No. 18-5457.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 9, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas denied.
UNITED STATES, petitioner, v. Andre Ralph HAYMOND.

No. 17-1672.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 26, 2018.

Motion of respondent for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* granted. Petition for writ of certiorari granted.
JIAN-YUN DONG, aka John Dong, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-5766.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 1, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
Sylvester EKWUNIFE, petitioner, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, et al.

No. 18M168.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 17, 2019.

Motion for leave to file a petition for writ of certiorari with supplemental appendix under seal granted.
Zenaido RENTERIA, Jr., petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-1052.

Supreme Court of the United States

June 17, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
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                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Postal Service

# AGENCY:

                        Postal ServiceTM.                    

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the Postal Regulatory Commission to add a domestic shipping services contract to the list of Negotiated Service Agreements in the Mail Classification Schedule's Competitive Products List.

# DATES:

*Date of required notice:*                         May 18, 2022.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Sean Robinson, 202-268-8405.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The United States Postal Service® hereby gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642 and 3632(b)(3), on May 11, 2022, it filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission a                     *USPS Request to Add Priority Mail Contract 742 to Competitive Product List.*                     Documents are available at                     *www.prc.gov,*                     Docket Nos. MC2022-59, CP2022-64.                

Sean Robinson,

Attorney, Corporate and Postal Business Law.

[FR Doc. 2022-10657 Filed 5-17-22; 8:45 am]

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