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VERNON J. LEFTRIDGE, JR. v. KENISHA WIGGINS

(AC 35726)

DiPentima, C. J., and Beach and Mullins, Js.

Argued March 2—officially released May 12, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

London, Shluger, J. [appeals from family support

magistrate, motion to recuse]; Carbonneau, J. [motion

to appoint guardian ad litem].)

Vernon J. Leftridge, Jr., self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Sean O. Kehoe, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The self-represented plaintiff, Vernon J. Leftridge, Jr., filed an appeal1 and seven amended

appeals from orders and decisions of family support

magistrates and judges of the Superior Court related

to an increase in his child support obligation. Prior to

oral argument, we dismissed all but three of his appeals.

With regard to these remaining appeals, we conclude

that the plaintiff failed to address those issues in his

brief and therefore has abandoned them. As a result,

we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We previously set forth the following facts and procedural history of this case. ‘‘On May 19, 2005, the court,

Swienton, J., awarded the parties joint custody of their

minor son and ordered the plaintiff to pay $50 per week

to the defendant, Kenisha Wiggins, as child support. On

May 28, 2010, the state of Connecticut, support enforcement services, filed a motion to modify on behalf of

the defendant, seeking an increase in the plaintiff’s child

support obligation. The record reflects a return of service indicating that this motion to modify was served

on the plaintiff by abode service at 49 Spring Street,

apartment A-2, Hartford, Connecticut, on May 25, 2010.

The notice to the plaintiff, along with the order for

hearing and summons, likewise indicates that it was

served on the plaintiff at the same address, care of

Sylvontae Bishop. On July 13, 2010, the family support

magistrate, Richard G. Adams, ruling on the state’s

motion to modify, ordered an increase in the plaintiff’s

child support obligation to $150 per week. On August

24, 2010, the plaintiff filed a motion to modify. On

August 26, 2010, the plaintiff filed an ‘immediate motion

to immediately vacate’ the support order entered by

the family support magistrate. The plaintiff argued, in

part, that he had not been served with a copy of the

motion to modify and did not receive notice of the July

13, 2010 court date.

‘‘The family support magistrate held a hearing on

the matter on August 27, 2010. The defendant, Theresa

Drew, the support enforcement officer, and David Gage,

the deputy chief clerk of the court, were present at this

hearing. The plaintiff was not present. Gage stated at

the hearing that when the plaintiff came to the clerk’s

office to see the state’s motion to modify, it was not in

the file. Gage also stated that subsequent notice of the

motion, which was mailed to the plaintiff at the Spring

Street address, was returned to support enforcement

services as undeliverable. Drew, on behalf of the state,

explicitly stated that she did not contest the fact that

the plaintiff had not been served with the state’s motion

to modify. On this basis, the family support magistrate

indicated that the plaintiff’s motion to vacate, which

he was treating as a motion to open, was granted ‘on

the ground that proper jurisdiction was never obtained.’

The family support magistrate accordingly reinstated
the original support order of $50 per week.

‘‘Before the hearing adjourned, Drew indicated on

the record that support enforcement services would reserve the plaintiff properly with the motion to modify,

either by using his post office box or by serving him

in person at one of the parties’ upcoming court dates.

The family support magistrate indicated that the motion

to modify would be scheduled at the same time as all

other outstanding motions in the case, including the

plaintiff’s motion to modify. The record reflects that

the court clerk then placed the plaintiff’s motion to

modify and the state’s motion to modify back on the

docket to be heard on the same day. A hearing was

scheduled to take place before the trial court, Shluger,

J., on September 27, 2010.

‘‘On that date, the defendant appeared at the hearing.

Neither the plaintiff nor a representative from support

enforcement services was present. After making a finding of notice as to the plaintiff, the court ordered, inter

alia, an increase in the plaintiff’s child support obligation to $150 per week, retroactive to May 28, 2010, the

date of filing of the state’s motion to modify.

‘‘The plaintiff next filed a series of motions challenging the September 27, 2010 orders. In these motions

the plaintiff claimed that he had not been served with

notice of the September 27, 2010 hearing. On February

14, 2011, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing

on the plaintiff’s motions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court indicated that it found the plaintiff’s testimony ‘completely not credible’ with regard to notice

and denied the plaintiff’s motions.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) Leftridge v. Wiggins, 136 Conn. App. 238, 240–43,

44 A.3d 217 (2012).

The plaintiff filed an appeal, claiming that the support

orders issued on September 27, 2010, violated his due

process rights because he had not been served with

the motion to modify and did not have a meaningful

opportunity to be heard. Id., 243. In our opinion issued

on June 12, 2012, we agreed with the plaintiff. We

reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded

the case with direction to vacate the support orders

entered by the court on September 27, 2010. Id., 246.

On July 25, 2012, the state moved to open the judgment and to reinstate the support orders. It alleged

that the plaintiff had represented to the family support

magistrates, the Superior Court and the Appellate Court

that he had not received proper abode service at 49

Spring Street, apartment A-2, Hartford, for the motion

to modify the child support obligation, while simultaneously representing to the housing court, in a separate

action, his desire to maintain the use and the occupancy

of that address. The state further alleged that the plaintiff, at the time he claimed not to reside at that address,

received housing court notices at 49 Spring Street,
apartment A-2, Hartford. The state, therefore, moved

to open the August 27, 2010 magistrate order on the

basis of fraud or mistake and to reinstate the support

payment of $150 per week. The family support magistrate, Harris T. Lifshitz, denied this motion on August

9, 2012.In denying the state’s motion, Magistrate Lifshitz

concluded that the plaintiff had not been served properly, but also made additional findings regarding the

merits of the state’s case.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-231 (n) and Practice Book § 25a-29, the state appealed from the decision

of Magistrate Lifshitz to the Superior Court. On October

9, 2012, Judge Shluger held a hearing and, in accordance

with an agreement of the parties, rendered judgment

that the plaintiff had been served improperly with the

state’s motion to open the judgment and vacated the

remaining findings by Magistrate Lifshitz. That same

day, the state served the plaintiff in hand with its motion

to open the August 27, 2010 judgment on the basis of

fraud or mistake and to reinstate the support payment

of $150 per week. Later that month, the plaintiff moved

‘‘to recuse and disqualify’’ Judge Shluger, alleging an

impropriety and an appearance of impropriety.2

On April 15, 2013, the family support magistrate, Sandra Sosnoff Baird, issued a memorandum of decision3

finding that the plaintiff fraudulently had misrepresented his address to the detriment of the defendant.4

Accordingly, Magistrate Sosnoff Baird opened the

August 27, 2010 judgment and ordered a new trial. On

April 25, 2013, the plaintiff filed an appeal of this decision in the Superior Court.5 On May 13, 2013, Judge

Shluger continued the matter until June 10, 2013, and

noted that if the plaintiff failed to attend that proceeding, his appeal would be denied. On May 21, 2013, Magistrate Sosnoff Baird issued an order continuing a hearing

until June 25, 2013, and the plaintiff filed an appeal of

that continuance in the Superior Court on May 28, 2013.

On June 10, 2013, Judge Shluger denied the plaintiff’s

appeals for failure to prosecute.

On July 2, 2013, Magistrate Sosnoff Baird issued a

memorandum of decision increasing the plaintiff’s

weekly child support from $50 per week to $150 per

week based on the child support guidelines. This order

was made retroactive to May 25, 2010. The plaintiff also

was ordered to pay $30 per week on his child support

arrearage resulting from the retroactive modification.

The plaintiff filed two appeals from these orders in the

Superior Court; the first on July 10, 2013, and the second

on July 15, 2013.

On July 8, 2013, Judge Shluger denied the plaintiff’s

October, 2012 motion to recuse and disqualify himself.

The plaintiff later filed a motion to vacate the increased

child support and the arrearage order. He also filed a

motion requesting that the court appoint the Children

Law Center of Connecticut to represent the minor child
in this case.

On January 13, 2014, the court, Carbonneau, J.,

appointed a guardian ad litem for the minor son and

ordered the parties to pay the fees equally. The plaintiff

filed an appeal to this court from the appointment of

the guardian ad litem for the minor child that same day.

Our detailed recitation of the procedural history of

this case following our 2012 opinion is not exhaustive;

instead, it provides only the details relevant to the matters pending before this court. The plaintiff filed his

appeal on May 14, 2013, followed by seven amended

appeals. On April 16, 2014, this court, acting on its own

motion, dismissed the original appeal, and the first,

fourth, fifth and seventh amended appeals.6 The second,

third and sixth amended appeals remain.

In his second amended appeal, the plaintiff claims

that Judge Shluger improperly denied his appeals of

Magistrate Sosnoff Baird’s April 15, 2013 memorandum

of decision and her May 21, 2013 continuance. In his

third amended appeal, the plaintiff claims that his

motion to recuse and disqualify Judge Shluger was

denied improperly.7

In his sixth amended appeal, the

plaintiff claims that Judge Carbonneau improperly

appointed a guardian ad litem for the minor son. The

plaintiff, however, has failed to brief these issues adequately. Specifically, his brief does not discuss the

denial of the appeals from Magistrate Sosnoff Baird,

the denial of the motion to recuse and disqualify Judge

Shluger, or the July 13, 2014 appointment of a guardian

ad litem. Moreover, the plaintiff did not present any

argument as to why these orders were improper.8

‘‘We

repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to

review issues that have been improperly presented to

this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis,

rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order

to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue

properly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Saint

Bernard School of Montville, Inc. v. Bank of America,

312 Conn. 811, 829, 95 A.3d 1063 (2014). The plaintiff,

therefore, is not entitled to review of these claims on

the merits. We will not speculate or presume error on

the part of the trial court on the basis of a brief devoid

of any analysis of these claims. See, e.g., Clelford v.

Bristol, 150 Conn. App. 229, 233, 90 A.3d 998 (2014).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

with respect to his second, third and sixth amended

appeals.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff initially filed this appeal in the Supreme Court, which transferred the matter to this court.

2 On January 28, 2013, the plaintiff filed another motion to recuse Judge

Shluger. This motion remains pending.

3 Magistrate Sosnoff Baird filed a corrected memorandum of decision on

April 17, 2013.

4

In her memorandum of decision, Magistrate Sosnoff Baird noted that
the plaintiff did not appear at the hearing on the defendant’s motion to

open. She also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the plaintiff

had resided at 49 Spring Street, apartment A-2, Hartford, on May 25, 2010.

In reaching the conclusion that the plaintiff had perpetrated a fraud against

the defendant, Magistrate Sosnoff Baird stated: ‘‘Based upon the foregoing,

this court finds that the plaintiff made a representation on August 27, 2010,

that he knew was untrue, which he made with the intent of inducing reliance

on the part of the defendant, to her detriment, when the court reduced the

child support from $150 weekly to $50 weekly.’’ Finally, she rejected any

equitable defense, such as laches or the clean hands doctrine.

5 Specifically, the plaintiff set forth the following as the reasons for his

appeal: ‘‘The magistrate lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner custodial parent/father Vernon J. Leftridge, Jr., and [its] decision is erroneous

and based on defense fraud. Rulings defective as the petitioner custodial

father wasn’t present on August 27, 2010 (AC33154). The magistrate abused

her discretion & was barred pursuant to res judicata doctrine. See Connecticut Appellate Court June 12, 2012, A.C. 33154 decision terminated in favor

of the plaintiff. Decision is bias & same transaction as A.C. 33154.’’

6 We also prohibited the plaintiff from filing any further appeals or

amended appeals in this matter without filing a motion for permission to

file an appeal or amended appeal with the Appellate Court clerk’s office.

7 We are mindful that ‘‘[a]lthough denial of a motion to disqualify [a trial

court judge] is, in and of itself, an interlocutory order . . . denial of such

a motion is appealable in conjunction with the appeal of a final order such

as an order of contempt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford

Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Tucker, 192 Conn. 1, 7–8, 469 A.2d 778

(1984); see also Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc. v. Gurski, 49

Conn. App. 731, 734, 715 A.2d 819 (review of interlocutory ruling must await

appeal from final judgment), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 920, 772 A.2d 809 (1998).

8

‘‘Although we are solicitous of [self-represented] litigants, the rules of

practice cannot be ignored completely.’’ Bove v. Bove, 128 Conn. App. 811,

817, 20 A.3d 31, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 904, 23 A.3d 1244 (2011); see also

Tonghini v. Tonghini, 152 Conn. App. 231, 240, 98 A.3d 93 (2014); Nowacki

v. Nowacki, 129 Conn. App. 157, 163 n.4, 20 A.3d 702 (2011).