S ELENA E. M OLINA

M ASTER IN C HANCERY C OURT OF C HANCERY OF THE S TATE OF D ELAWARE
L EONARD L. W ILLIAMS J USTICE C ENTER 500 N ORTH K ING S TREET , S UITE 11400 W ILMINGTON , DE 19801
- 3734 Final Report: Ju ly 29 , 2022 Date Submitted: April 19 , 2022 Ross C. Karsnitz, Esq uire David C. Hutt, Esq uire Morris James Wilson Halbrook & Bayard LLP 107 W. Market Street Georgetown, DE 19947 Paul G. Enterline, Esquire Paul G. Enterline, Attorney at Law 1 13 S. Race St reet Georgetown, DE 19947

Dean A. Campbell, Esq uire The Law Office of Dean A. Campbell, LLC 110 W. Pine Street Georgetown, DE 19947 Jessie R. Benavides, Esquire Parkowski, Guerke & Swayze, P.A 116 W. Water Street Dover, DE 1990 3 Richard E. Berl, Jr. , Esquire Hudson, Jones, Jaywork & Fisher, LLC 34382 C arpenter’s Way, Suite 3 Lewes, DE 19958
Re: Warren , et al. v. Williamson , et al. C.A. No. 20 18

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Dear Counsel: Pending before me is a contested motion to intervene in a partition action. There is no dispute that the moving parties have an interest in the property at issue

. The only dispute is timeliness

— whether the moving parties sat on their rights and waited too long to move to intervene. I f ind they did not. Although the motion comes years into this litigation, it is not untimely under the totality of theC.A. No. 20 18

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July 29, 2022 Page 2 of 11
circumstances. I recommend the motion be granted and the moving parties be joined as respondents. This is my final report.
I. BACKGROUND 1 This dispute concerns property owned by the late Addie Hester Revell (the “Decedent”), who passed on January 20, 1988. 2 The Decedent was survived by her four children, Vivian Leifert, Nina Warren, Jewel Preston Revel, and Hugh Revell (together, the “Revell Heirs”) and passed intestate, without a will

. 3 Thus, the Decedent’s real property of approximately 50 acres of land in Sussex County (the “Property”) passed in equal shares to the Revell Heirs. 4 Since the Decedent’s death, the Re vell Heirs have taken steps to subdivide the Property and separate their joint interests. The first division was in 1999, when a

one
- acre parcel, labeled “ Parcel 6.04, ” was taken from the whole and devised to Nina Warren and Judy Timmons. 5 Then in 2007, the Revell Heirs, or some subset
of the m , hired Coast Survey, Inc. to subdivide the P roperty further into what is now

1 The facts in this report are taken from the parties’ pleadings, specifically the petition, the answers, the counterclaim, and the answer to the counterclaim. See Docket Items (“D.I”) 1, 15, 16, 19. It has also been represented that as far back as the 19 40s, the family involved in this action has spelled their last name two different ways, Revel and Revell. D.I. 1 n. 1. I endeavor to use each individual’s preferred spelling of their last name , despite my typical preference for internal consistency in my reports. 2 D.I. 1 ¶ 12. 3 Id. ¶ 1 3

. 4 Id. ¶ 15. The Property now consists of six Sussex County tax parcels, referred to as “the East Parcel,” “Parcel 6.00,” “Parcel 6.01,” “Parcel 6.02,” “Parcel 6.03,” and “Parcel 6.04.” Id. 5 Id. ¶ 17.C.A. No. 20 18

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July 29, 2022 Page 3 of 11 known as “ Parcel 6.00, ” “ Parcel 6.01, ” “ Parcel 6.02, ” and “ Parcel 6.03 , ” leaving a portion undivided (the “East Parcel”)

. 6 Coast Survey, Inc. prepared a subdivision plot, dividing the Property accordingly

. 7 But, in dispute, is whether the Revell Heirs agreed that the four divided parcels (excluding the East Parcel) would e ach be conveyed to one of the Revell Heirs (the “2007 Agreement”)

. 8 The Revell Heirs took steps toward completing the 2007 Agreement , to the extent it was ever reached, but it was never fully consummated. It appears, only
Parc el 6.01 was conveyed as co ntemplated

— it was deeded to Nina Warren and Judy Timmons on March 24, 2007. 9 And, although an attorney prepared deeds for the remaining parcels, disputes arose, and the deeds were never signed

. 10 This limbo period lasted for several years. In the interim, still without final resolution on the remaining parcels, two of the Revell Heirs passed. Hugh Revell
died intestate on June 17, 2009, survived by his wife and five children (the “Hugh Heirs”). 11 Jewel Preston Revel died on July 9, 2017, survived by two heirs, Ricky Preston Revel and Ruby Revel Williamson. 12 Jewel Preston Revel also had two

6 Id. ¶ 19. The answer contends that Coast Survey, Inc. may have been hired by only one of the Revell Heirs. D. I. 15 ¶ 19. 7 D.I. 1 ¶ 21. 8 The Petitioners pled the existence of the 2007 Agreement. Id. ¶ ¶ 23

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. The Respondents deny that the 2007 Agreement was ever reached. D.I. 15 ¶ 25. 9 D.I. 1 ¶ 27. 10 Id. ¶ 29. 11 Id. ¶ 13. 12 Id. ¶ 14.C.A. No. 20 18

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July 29, 2022 Page 4 of 11 children, Star Ann VanVorst and Ray Revel, who predeceased him. 13 Jackson VanVorst and James VanVorst (to gether, the “Intervenors”) are the heirs of Star Ann
VanVorst. 14 The parties in this case are the Decedent’s descendants. The Decedent’s surviving children, Vivian Leifert and Nina Warren, initiated this action, joined by Ms. Warren’s granddaughter Trac y Legates and Jewel Preston Revel’s son, Rick y Preston Revel (the “Petitioners”). 15 Th rough their petition filed nearly four (4) years ago, the Petitioners seek to enforce the 2007 Agreement and partition the remaining
East Parcel by sale

. Therein n amed as respondents are Ruby Revel Williamson , the other heir of Jewel Preston Revel, and the Hugh Heirs (the “Respondents”). The Respondents contes t the existence of the 2007 Agreement and seek partition of the Property in kind

. 16

13 Id. n. 2. 14 Although designated as heirs of Star Ann VanVorst’s estate , it appears the Intervenors were excluded from inheriting an interest Jewel Preston Revel’s estate because Star Ann VanVorst predeceased her father and his will, it appears, excluded pre

- deceased heirs

. Id. The Intervenors indicated that they would challenge this provision of Jewel Preston Revel’s will, but no such challenge was ever filed. Id. 15 A suggestion of death was filed on May 17, 2022 , for Nina War ren, who died on April 21, 2022

. D. I. 42. Tracy Legates is Ms. Warren’s intestate heir and is already amongst the Petitioners. Id. 16 D.I. 15 ¶ 48. On November 29, 2018, the R espondents , other than Ms. Williamson, filed an answer and counterclaim, seeking an accounting for funds in an account established by the Revel l Heirs for income generated by the Property. D.I. 15. The Petitioners filed an answer to the counterclaim on De cember 17, 2018. D.I. 19. Ms. Williamson filed her own answer on November 30, 2018, which did not contain any counterclaims. D.I. 16.C.A. No. 20 18

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July 29, 2022 Page 5 of 11 Originally assigned to Master Griffin, th is action was scheduled for trial in December 2019, but the parties agreed to settled the matter at mediation. 17 T he parties executed a settlement agreement on November 21, 2019 (the “Settlement Agreement”). 18 The Settlement Agreement called for a portion of the Property to be sold and for the net proceeds to be distributed amongst the parties. 19 This litigation was then stayed, pending performance of the Settlement Agreement. 20 For the next year and a half, the docket remained quiet. On May 28, 2021, Master Griffin requested a status report from counsel. 21 Counsel for the Petitioners responded on June 8, 2021, informing Master Griffin that before closing on the contemplated sale a title issue arose. 22 Counsel sent another letter on January 6, 2022, identifying the Intervenors as parties potentially having an interest in the Property , because they are the great

- grandchildren of the Decedent and their direct
ascendants have all passed

. 23

17 D.I. 18. 18 D.I. 24. 19 Id. 20 D.I. 26. 21 D.I. 27. 22 D.I. 28. Counsel stated that Ruby Revel Williamson would make a filin g with the Court to help resolve the title issue, but no such filing was ever made. Id. 23 D.I. 29. Counsel for the Petitioners requested that the Intervenors’ counsel advise him of the Intervenors position by January 20, 2022. Id.C.A. No. 20 18

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July 29, 2022 Page 6 of 11
O n January 26, 2022, Ms. Williamson, on e of the Respondents, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to join the Intervenors as indispensable parties. 24 The Intervenors moved to intervene shortly thereafter on February 28, 2022 (the “Motion”). 25 The next day, Ms. Williamson withdrew her motion t o dismiss, and this action was reassigned to me

. 26 I am now called upon to address the Motion. The Petitioners have no objection and agree that the Intervenors should be joined as additional respondents. 27 But Ms. Williamson opposes the Motion

. 28 Des pite her previous motion asserting that this case could not be justly adjudicated without the Intervenors, Ms.
Williamson argues the Intervenors should not be permitted to join as respondents because the Motion was untimely and intervention would be prejudicial to the original parties and Ms. Williamson, particularly

. 29 The Motion was fully briefed on April 19, 2022, and taken under advisement

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II. ANALYSIS Under Court of Chancery Rule 24 (a):

24 D.I. 30. 25 D.I. 32. 26 D.I. 33

- 34. Interested parties Carrie Lingo and Michael M. Padgett, the would

- be purchasers of a portion of the Property , also moved to intervene. D.I. 38. The motion was unopposed and granted on June 1, 2022. D.I. 43

- 44. 27 D.I. 35. 28 D.I. 36. 29 Id. 30 D .I. 39.C.A. No. 20 18

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July 29, 2022 Page 7 of 11 Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) When a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated th at the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant ’ s ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant ’ s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. The Intervenors claim an interest in the Property a nd, despite Ms. Williamson’s characterization of that interest as “speculative,” there has been no challenge to the right of the Intervenors to seek intervention. Rather, the only opposition is whether the M otion was a “timely application.” In determinin g whether a motion to intervene is timely, I must consider four factors in the totality
of the circumstances: (1) the length of time the movant knew or reasonably should have known of her interest before she petitioned to intervene; (2) prejudice to the e xisting parties due to failure to petition for intervention earlier; (3) the prejudice the movant would suffer if not allowed to intervene; and (4) the existence of unusual circumstances weighing either for or against intervention. 31 I find these factors s upport intervention. Ms. Williamson argues that the Intervenors knew of and sat on their rights for over three years . She further argues that permitting the Intervenors to join the action now will invalidate the Settlement Agreement and work a restart of this long

pending litigation. I disagree. Initially, I find that the Intervenors did not sit on their

31 Shawe v. Elting , 2015 WL 5167835, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 2, 2015)

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July 29, 2022 Page 8 of 11 rights for an unreasonable amount of time. When this action was filed in 2018, the
Intervenors were under the impression that their disinher itance from Jewel Preston Revel’s will precluded their interest in the Property, although they were exploring challenging such will. For whatever reason, the Intervenors did not move forward with that will challenge. It was not until the fall or winter o f 2021, when they were informed of their potential rights by the counsel for prospective purchasers of a portion of the Property , that the Intervenors began to appreciate that they may have an interest in the Property under Delaware’s anti

- lapse statute, 1 2 Del. C. § 2313

. 32 Although the Intervenors do not provide a precise date for when they were made aware of their interest, the Motion was filed in February of 2022, about three

four months after the period of “fall or winter of 2021.” Further, the Motion was filed just over one mon th after the date by which the Petitioners’ counsel requested

32 D.I. 39 ¶ 6. This argument reminds me of one for equitable tolling, where one assert that they reasonably relied on a fiduciary and their delay in asserting their rights should be excused until inquiry notice. See In re Restated Revocable Tr. of Lawrence F. Conlin , 2014 WL 242655, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 2014) (“Under the doctrine of equitable tolling, the statute of limitations is tolled when the plaintiff ‘reasonably relies on the competence and good faith of a fiduciary.’”) (citation omitted). Cf. In re Dean Witter P’ship Litig. , 1998 WL 442456, at * 6 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1998), aff’ d , 725 A.2d 441 (Del. 1999) (“Under the theory of equitable tolling, the statute of limitations i s tolled for claims of wrongful self

- dealing, even in the absence of actual fraudulent concealment, where a plaintiff reasonably relies on the competence and good faith of a fiduciary. Underlying this doctrine is the idea that ‘even an attentive and dilige nt [investor] relying, in complete propriety, upon the good faith of [fiduciaries] may be completely i gnorant of transactions that . . . constitute self

- interested acts injurious to the [Partnership].’ This doctrine tolls the limitations period until an in vestor knew or had reason to know of the facts constituting the wrong.”) (citations omitted , alterations in original ).C.A. No. 20 18

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July 29, 2022 Page 9 of 11 that the Intervenors clarify their position. Neither of these time periods are
unreasonable or grounds to find the Motion is untimely. 33 Turning to the second factor, prejudice to the existing parties, Ms. Williamson asserts that she will be prejudiced because her share of the Property will be reduced, and that intervention would void the Settlement Agreement. The Intervenors respond that they do not seek to disrupt the Settlement Agreement, rather they wish to receive their proper share under the Settlement Agreement. Although their involvement may well reduce Ms. Williamson’s share, the prejudice to the Intervenors in being excluded from this action (the third factor) outweighs that to Ms. Williamson. Absent intervention, the Intervenors may be denied their proportionate share of the Property. Lastly, the fourth factor concerns the existence of unusual circumstances weighing for or agains t intervention. This action has been pending since 2018, but has largely sat dormant as the parties worked to settle their disputes and consummate the Settlement Agreement. Unfortunately, the Settlement Agreement cannot be
consummated without the involve ment of the Intervenors. The party opposing intervention, Ms. Williamson, acknowledged as much in her motion to dismiss,

33 See Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Moonmouth Co. S.A. , 2015 WL 778846, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2015) (“The cases finding untimeliness o r expressing serious concern about unwarranted delay involved delays of between five and twelve months.”).C.A. No. 20 18

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July 29, 2022 Page 10 of 11 where she argued the Intervenors were necessary and indispensable parties. There Ms. Williamson sought to dismiss this action and inv alidate the Settlement Agreement in the Intervenors’ absence. Then, when the Intervenors sought to join this action, Ms. Williamson argued she would be prejudiced by intervention, arguing
the Intervenor s would work an invalidation of the Settlement Agreem ent. This is an unusual and rapid change of position. And Ms. Williamson’s timeliness arguments fail to acknowledge that, either way, the Property cannot be partitioned without the
Intervenors’ involvement. The totality of the circumstances support inte rvention.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, I find that the Motion was timely and should be granted. Timeliness requires more than a simplistic look at the date an action is commenced versus the date intervention is sought. Context is important and, here,
context makes clear that (1) the Intervenors did not unnecessarily delay in asserting
their newly discovered interest, (2) the potential prejudice to the Intervenors outweighs that of the objecting party, and (3) the totality of the ci rcumstances surrounding the request weigh in favor of intervention. This is my final report and exceptions may be filed under Court of Chancery
Rule 144

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July 29, 2022 Page 11 of 11
R espectfully submitted,
/s/ Selena E. Molina Master in Chancery