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106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1838

To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan, and for other

purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 18, 1999

Mr. DELAY (for himself, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. DEUTSCH, Mr.

ROHRABACHER, Mr. WU, Mr. COX, Mr. JEFFERSON, Mr. DIAZ-BALART,

Mrs. LOWEY, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. BURTON of

Indiana, Mr. COOK, and Mr. WELDON of Florida) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period

to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee

concerned

A BILL

To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan,

and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Security En5 hancement Act’’.

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

7 Congress makes the following findings:
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1 (1) Since 1949, the close relationship between

2 the United States and Taiwan has been of enormous

3 benefit to both societies.

4 (2) In recent years, Taiwan has undergone a

5 major political transformation, and Taiwan is today

6 a true multiparty democracy with a political system

7 separate from and totally unlike that of the People’s

8 Republic of China.

9 (3) The economy of Taiwan is based upon free

10 market principles and is separate and distinct from

11 the People’s Republic of China.

12 (4) Although on January 1, 1979, the United

13 States Government withdrew diplomatic recognition

14 of the government on Taiwan as the legitimate gov15 ernment of China, neither at that time nor since has

16 the United States Government adopted a formal po17 sition as to the ultimate status of Taiwan other than

18 to state that status must be decided by peaceful

19 means. Any determination of the ultimate status of

20 Taiwan must have the express consent of the people

21 on Taiwan.

22 (5) The government on Taiwan no longer

23 claims to be the sole legitimate government of all of

24 China.
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1 (6) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–

2 8) states that—

3 (A) peace and stability in the Taiwan

4 Strait area are in the political, security, and

5 economic interests of the United States and are

6 of international concern;

7 (B) the decision of the United States to es8 tablish diplomatic relations with the People’s

9 Republic of China rests upon the expectation

10 that the future of Taiwan will be determined by

11 peaceful means;

12 (C) the United States would consider any

13 effort to determine the future of Taiwan by

14 other than peaceful means, including boycotts

15 or embargoes, a threat to the peace and secu16 rity of the Western Pacific region and of grave

17 concern to the United States;

18 (D) the United States will maintain the ca19 pacity to resist any form of coercion that jeop20 ardizes the security, or the social or the eco21 nomic system, of the people on Taiwan; and

22 (E) the preservation and enhancement of

23 the human rights of all the people on Taiwan

24 are objectives of the United States.
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1 (7) On the basis of these provisions, the Taiwan

2 Relations Act establishes on the part of the United

3 States a continuing connection with and concern for

4 Taiwan, its people, and their ability to maintain

5 themselves free of coercion and free of the use of

6 force against them. The maintenance by Taiwan of

7 forces adequate for defense and deterrence is in the

8 interest of the United States in that it helps to

9 maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait area.

10 (8) Since 1954, when the United States and

11 Taiwan signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, the

12 United States and Taiwan have maintained a de13 fense and security relationship that has contributed

14 greatly to freedom, peace, and stability in Taiwan

15 and the East Asia and Pacific regions.

16 (9) The United States and Taiwan no longer

17 conduct joint training missions, have no direct mili18 tary lines of communication, and have only limited

19 military-to-military contacts. This lack of commu20 nication and interoperation between the United

21 States and Taiwan hinders planning for the defense

22 of Taiwan and could prove detrimental in the event

23 of future aggression against Taiwan.

24 (10) Since 1979, the United States has contin25 ued to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan in accord-
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1 ance with the Taiwan Relations Act, and such sales

2 have helped Taiwan maintain its autonomy and free3 dom in the face of persistent hostility from the Peo4 ple’s Republic of China. However, pressures to delay,

5 deny, and reduce arms sales to Taiwan have been

6 prevalent since the signing of the August 17, 1982,

7 communique with the People’s Republic of China.

8 Over time, such delays, denials, and reductions could

9 prevent Taiwan from maintaining a sufficient capa10 bility for self-defense.

11 (11) As has been affirmed on several occasions

12 by the executive branch of Government, the provi13 sions of the Taiwan Relations Act take legal prece14 dence over any communique with the People’s Re15 public of China.

16 (12) The People’s Republic of China has con17 sistently refused to renounce the use of force against

18 Taiwan and has repeatedly threatened force against

19 Taiwan, including implied threats by unnamed Peo20 ple’s Republic of China officials on January 10,

21 1999, who warned Taiwan not to participate in the

22 development of theater missile defense capabilities

23 with the United States.

24 (13) The missile firings by the People’s Repub25 lic of China near Taiwan in August 1995 and March
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1 1996 clearly demonstrate the willingness of the Peo2 ple’s Republic of China to use forceful tactics to

3 limit the freedom of the people on Taiwan.

4 (14) As most nations in East Asia reduce mili5 tary spending, the People’s Republic of China con6 tinues a major and comprehensive military buildup.

7 (15)(A) This military buildup includes the de8 velopment of advanced ballistic and cruise missiles

9 that will incorporate precision guidance capability

10 and the construction of new imaging, radar, naviga11 tion, and electronic intelligence satellites that will

12 help target and guide ballistic and cruise missiles.

13 (B) According to the Department of Defense

14 report entitled ‘‘The Security Situation in the Tai15 wan Strait’’, submitted to Congress in February

16 1999, the size of the missile force of the People’s

17 Republic of China is expected to grow substantially

18 and, by 2005, the People’s Republic of China will

19 possess an ‘‘overwhelming advantage’’ in offensive

20 missiles vis-a-vis Taiwan.

21 (C) The Department of Defense has also noted

22 that the People’s Republic of China may already

23 possess the capability to damage satellite optical sen24 sors with lasers, is researching advanced anti-sat25 ellite lasers that could blind United States intel-
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1 ligence satellites, and is procuring radio frequency

2 weapons that disable electronic equipment.

3 (D) These missile and anti-satellite capabilities

4 pose a grave threat to Taiwan.

5 (16) This military buildup also includes the

6 construction or procurement from abroad of ad7 vanced naval systems, including Russian Kilo sub8 marines that are difficult to detect, Russian tech9 nology to assist the development of new nuclear-pow10 ered attack submarines, Russian Sovremenny class

11 destroyers armed with supersonic SS–N–22 Sunburn

12 anti-ship missiles, a new long-range, all-weather

13 naval attack aircraft called the JH–7, and new in14 digenous land-attack cruise missiles that could be

15 launched from submarines, ships, and naval attack

16 aircraft. These naval capabilities pose a grave threat

17 of blockade to Taiwan.

18 (17) This military buildup also includes the im19 provement of air combat capabilities by procuring

20 and co-producing hundreds of Russian Sukhoi Su–

21 27 fighters, seeking to purchase Russian Su–30 all22 weather attack aircraft, arming these aircraft with

23 advanced air-to-air missiles such as the Russian R–

24 77 missile and other precision guided munitions,

25 constructing the indigenously designed J–10 fighter,
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1 and seeking advanced airborne warning and control

2 systems from abroad. These capabilities pose a grave

3 airborne threat to Taiwan.

4 (18) Because of the introduction of advanced

5 submarines into the Taiwan Strait area by the Peo6 ple’s Republic of China and the increasing capability

7 of the People’s Republic of China to blockade Tai8 wan, Taiwan needs to acquire diesel-powered sub9 marines in order to maintain a capability to counter

10 a blockade, to conduct antisubmarine warfare train11 ing, and for other purposes.

12 (19) Because of the democratic form of govern13 ment on Taiwan and the historically nonaggressive

14 foreign policy of Taiwan, it is highly unlikely that

15 Taiwan would use submarines in an offensive man16 ner.

17 (20) The current defense relationship between

18 the United States and Taiwan is deficient in terms

19 of its capacity over the long term to counter and

20 deter potential aggression against Taiwan by the

21 People’s Republic of China.

22 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

23 (a) TRAINING OF TAIWAN MILITARY OFFICERS.—It

24 is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense and

25 the Secretaries of the military departments should make
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1 every effort to reserve additional positions for Taiwan

2 military officers at the National Defense University and

3 other professional military education schools specified in

4 section 2162(d) of title 10, United States Code, and for

5 prospective Taiwan military officers at the United States

6 Military Academy, the United States Naval Academy, and

7 the Air Force Academy.

8 (b) FOREIGN MILITARY SALES.—It is the sense of

9 Congress that the Secretary of State should, when consid10 ering foreign military sales to Taiwan—

11 (1) take into account the special status of Tai12 wan; and

13 (2) make every effort to ensure that Taiwan

14 has full and timely access to price and availability

15 data for defense articles and defense services.

16 SEC. 4. DETERMINATIONS OF DEFENSE NEEDS OF TAIWAN.

17 (a) INCREASE IN TECHNICAL STAFF OF THE AMER18 ICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN.—Upon the request of the

19 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the President shall

20 use funds available to the Department of Defense under

21 the Arms Export Control Act for the assignment or detail

22 of additional technical staff to the American Institute in

23 Taiwan.

24 (b) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Beginning 60 days after the

25 next round of arms talks between the United States and
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1 Taiwan, and annually thereafter, the President shall sub2 mit a report to Congress—

3 (1) detailing each of Taiwan’s requests for pur4 chase of defense articles and defense services during

5 the one-year period ending on the date of the report;

6 (2) describing the defense needs asserted by

7 Taiwan as justification for those requests; and

8 (3) describing any decision to reject, postpone,

9 or modify any such request that was made during

10 the one-year period ending on the date of the report,

11 the level at which the final decision was made, and

12 a justification for the decision.

13 SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.

14 (a) MAINTENANCE OF SUFFICIENT SELF-DEFENSE

15 CAPABILITIES OF TAIWAN.—Congress finds that any de16 termination of the nature or quantity of defense articles

17 or defense services to be made available to Taiwan that

18 is made on any basis other than the defense needs of Tai19 wan, whether pursuant to the August 17, 1982, Commu20 nique signed with the People’s Republic of China, or any

21 similar executive agreement, order, or policy would violate

22 the intent of Congress in the enactment of section 3(b)

23 of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(b)).

24 (b) PLAN REGARDING COMBINED TRAINING AND

25 PERSONNEL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.—
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1 (1) DEVELOPMENT.—The Secretary of Defense,

2 in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall de3 velop a plan for the enhancement of programs and

4 arrangements for operational training and exchanges

5 of personnel between the Armed Forces of the

6 United States and the armed forces of Taiwan for

7 work in threat analysis, doctrine, force planning,

8 operational methods, and other areas. The plan shall

9 provide for exchanges of officers up to and including

10 general and flag officers in the grade of O–10.

11 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after

12 the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of

13 Defense shall submit a report to Congress, in classi14 fied or unclassified form, containing the plan re15 quired under paragraph (1).

16 (3) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 210

17 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the

18 Secretary of Defense shall implement the plan re19 quired under paragraph (1).

20 (c) COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES

21 AND TAIWAN MILITARY COMMANDS.—Not later than 180

22 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary

23 of Defense shall establish secure direct communications

24 between the United States Pacific military command and

25 the Taiwan military command.
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1 (d) MISSILE DEFENSE EQUIPMENT.—Subject to sub2 section (h), the President is authorized to make available

3 for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, theater missile de4 fense equipment and related items, including—

5 (1) ground-based and naval-based missile de6 fense systems; and

7 (2) reconnaissance and communications sys8 tems, as may be necessary to target and cue missile

9 defense systems sold to Taiwan.

10 (e) SATELLITE EARLY WARNING DATA.—Subject to

11 subsection (h), the President is authorized to make avail12 able for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, satellite early

13 warning data.

14 (f) AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT.—Subject to sub15 section (h), the President is authorized to make available

16 for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, modern air-defense

17 equipment, including the following:

18 (1) AIM–120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles.

19 (2) Additional advanced fighters and airborne

20 warning and control systems (AWACS).

21 (3) Equipment to better defend airfields from

22 air and missile attack.

23 (4) Communications infrastructure that enables

24 coordinated joint-force air defense of Taiwan.
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1 (g) NAVAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS.—Subject to sub2 section (h), the President is authorized to make available

3 for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, defensive systems

4 that counter the development by the People’s Republic of

5 China of new naval capabilities, including defense systems

6 such as—

7 (1) diesel-powered submarines;

8 (2) anti-submarine systems, including airborne

9 systems, capable of detecting new Kilo and advanced

10 Chinese nuclear submarines;

11 (3) naval anti-missile systems, including Aegis

12 destroyers, capable of defeating foreign supersonic

13 anti-ship missiles; and

14 (4) communications systems that better enable

15 Taiwan to conduct joint-force naval defense oper16 ations.

17 (h) RELATION TO ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—

18 Nothing in this section supersedes or modifies the applica19 tion of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act to the

20 sale of any defense article or defense service under this

21 section.

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