IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-40944

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee

v.

DANIEL BUSTAMANTE,

Defendant–Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:11-CR-243-1

Before KING, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant–Appellant Daniel Bustamante entered a conditional guilty plea

to attempting to export a firearm from the United States to Mexico. He reserved

his right to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress the

firearm found in his truck. Bustamante alleges that the police violated the

Fourth Amendment by stopping his truck without reasonable suspicion. We

determine that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Bustamante’s truck,

and therefore affirm. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 11, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 11-40944

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Around 3:00 PM on January 18, 2011, the Laredo Police Department

(“LPD”) Communications Division received a tip from a male telephone caller

who refused to identify himself. The tipster stated that a bald, heavy-set man

with tattoos on his arms was planning to transport assault rifles to “Los Zetas”1

in Mexico in a blue pickup truck with license plate number AW7-8923. The

truck would cross into Mexico via a ranch located off Pico Road. The tipster

further stated that the truck was currently located at the intersection of San

Eduardo Avenue and Garza Street. Although the tipster refused to identify

himself, his cell phone number was collected by the Communications Division.

LPD Officer Roberto Garcia heard the tip broadcast over the radio from his

office. He called dispatch to confirm the license plate number, and also received

from dispatch the tipster’s cell phone number. The license plate check revealed

that the blue truck was registered to Bustamante; a criminal check on

Bustamante revealed that he had previously been identified as a member of the

Mexican Mafia prison gang and had been stopped once while driving the same

blue truck. Garcia called the tipster, who repeated the tip. He then transmitted

the results of the licence plate and criminal checks to the LPD officers who were

looking for the truck near the areas identified by the tipster. Another LPD

officer reported over the radio that he knew that the Bustamante family owned

a ranch off Pico Road. The LPD officers could not locate the truck. Garcia called

the tipster a second time, was told by the tipster that the truck had moved to

San Dario Street, and Garcia himself traveled to that location. Still, he could not

locate the truck. He called the tipster a third time; it was now about 4:00 PM. 

During this call, the tipster stated that he personally knew Bustamante and

another individual, Javi, who involved in the weapons transport, and that he

Los Zetas are a Mexican drug cartel. The Reach of Mexico’s Drug Cartels, N.Y. Times, 1

Sept. 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/03/22/us/BORDER.html.

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No. 11-40944

was present when the weapons were loaded into the truck; he further stated that

he would try to find the truck, which had been relocated until darkness fell, and

would call Garcia with an update. 

Garcia went home around 5:00 PM, when his shift ended. About 6:00 PM,

he received a call from the tipster. In this phone call, the tipster stated that the

truck was parked next to a red truck in front of Javi’s house on Benavidez Street

near the intersection with San Eduardo Avenue and Bustamante was waiting

until darkness to bring the weapons to the ranch off Pico Road. Garcia called

one of his supervisors to inform him of the tipster’s information and to see if a

plain-clothes officer could be sent to that location. He then relayed the

information over the radio to dispatch and LPD units near Benavidez/San

Eduardo. A plain clothes officer confirmed that the blue truck was parked next

to a red truck at the location given by the tipster. LPD Lieutenant Montemayor

advised over the radio not to approach the truck or the residence. A BOLO (“be

on the lookout”) report for the blue truck was broadcast over the radio; the

BOLO included Bustamante’s name, the license plate number, that the truck

was transporting weapons, and that it was headed for Pico Road. 

LPD Officer Victor Barroso, whose normal patrol district included Pico

Road, heard the BOLO over the radio and parked his police car just south of Pico

Road to watch for Bustamante’s truck. Because the BOLO advised that there

were likely weapons in the truck and that the driver of the truck was a member

of the Mexican Mafia, Barroso intended—if he saw the truck—to make a “felony

stop.” About 7:00 PM, a few minutes after parking his car, Barroso saw the blue 2

truck. He pulled behind the truck, confirmed the license plate number over the

radio, and requested backup. “Seconds later,” a police car driven by LPD Officer

Gerardo Jalomo arrived and Barroso initiated the stop. Bustamante

A felony stop preserves officer safety by requiring a backup patrol car to be on the 2

scene before the stop is initiated; further, the officers approach the car with weapons drawn. 

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immediately pulled over the truck. Barroso approached the driver’s side of the

truck with his 12-gauge shotgun drawn and instructed Bustamante not to move. 

Montemayor had arrived at the scene by this time and removed Bustamante

from his truck, handcuffed him, and placed him in Jalomo’s car. Barroso looked

in the back of the truck and found a green rifle case on the backseat, containing

two assault rifles. Bustamante was then placed under arrest. 

Bustamante moved to suppress the evidence found in the truck, arguing

that Barroso pulled over the truck without reasonable suspicion in violation of

the Fourth Amendment. Garcia, Barroso, Jalomo, and an ATF agent testified

at the suppression hearing. In a written order, the district court denied

Bustamante’s motion. Bustamante entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving

the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress; he timely

appealed. 

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “When the district court denies a motion to

suppress, we review factual findings for clear error and conclusions of law de

novo.” United States v. Gray, 669 F.3d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal

quotation marks omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prevailing party. Id. “Whether specific facts give rise to reasonable

suspicion is a question of law that we review de novo.” Jimenez v. Wood Cnty.,

Tex., 621 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2010). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Reasonable Suspicion Standard

“An investigative vehicle stop is permissible under Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1 (1968),] only when the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by

articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Martinez,

486 F.3d 855, 861 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

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Government bears the burden of proving reasonable suspicion. United States v.

Gomez, 623 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 2010). Whether an informant’s tip provides

reasonable suspicion depends on various factors: (1) the credibility and

reliability of the informant; (2) the specificity of the information contained in the

tip or report; (3) the extent to which the information in the tip or report can be

verified by officers in the field; and (4) whether the tip or report concerns active

or recent activity, or has instead gone stale. Martinez, 486 F.3d at 861 (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

The Supreme Court has evinced a strong distrust of anonymous tips

because the police cannot assess the tipster’s reputation, nor can the police hold

anonymous tipsters responsible if their allegations turn out to be fabricated. Id.

at 862 (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000)). Nonetheless, “‘there are

situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits sufficient

indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory

stop.’” Id. at 863 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327 (1990)); see also

Gomez, 623 F.3d at 269 (“If a tip is provided by an anonymous informant, such

that the informant’s credibility and reliability cannot be determined, the

Government must establish reasonable suspicion based on the remaining

factors.”). We have stated before that “where instant caller identification allows

the police to trace the identity of an anonymous telephone informant, the ready

ability to identify the caller increases the reliability of such tips.” Gomez, 623

F.3d at 269 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the “collective-knowledge

doctrine” the officer initiating the investigatory stop need not have personal

knowledge of the facts which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion, provided the

initiating officer acted in reliance upon information from other officers with such

personal knowledge. See United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 759–60

(5th Cir. 1999).

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B. Barroso had Reasonable Suspicion

Barroso had reasonable suspicion because the tipster provided specific,

timely, and predictive information that was verified by officers in the field. 

Although the tipster here was anonymous—in that he refused to give his

name—his credibility and reliability were enhanced by the LPD’s collection of

his phone number and the tipster’s subsequent phone calls with Garcia, see

Gomez, 623 F.3d at 269, as well as the tipster’s explanation that he knew about

the weapons because he personally knew Bustamante and was present when the

weapons were loaded into the truck, see J.L., 529 U.S. at 271. To be sure, the

tipster twice gave Garcia information about the truck’s location that could not

be verified, but the tipster ultimately updated Garcia on the correct location of

the truck. In addition to the truck’s location, the tipster also provided other

specifics about the truck, such as its color, license plate number, and driver. 

Many of these specifics were verified by officers in the field while the truck was

parked on Benavidez Street. Moreover, the tipster correctly predicted that the

truck would depart Benavidez Street in the direction of Pico Road not long after

nightfall. We therefore agree with the district court that the tip provided the

sort of specific, timely, predictive, and up-to-date information that gives rise to

reasonable suspicion. See Martinez, 486 F.3d at 861. Finally, we reject

Bustamante’s argument that Barroso himself needed to have personal

knowledge of the facts that gave rise to reasonable suspicion; it was sufficient

that Barroso stopped Bustamante’s truck in reliance on the BOLO which was

itself supported by Garcia’s reasonable suspicion. See Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d

at 759. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order denying

Bustamante’s motion to suppress. 

AFFIRMED.

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