This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1101

John R. Voita, Special Administrator of the Estate of Vivian P. Voita,

Appellant,

vs.

Thomas Parrish,

Respondent.

Filed March 9, 2015

Affirmed as modified

Larkin, Judge

Dakota County District Court

File No. 19HA-CV-14-361

John R. Voita, Amery, Wisconsin (pro se appellant)

Arthur L. Brown, Briggs and Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and 

Larkin, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

LARKIN, Judge

Pro se appellant, special administrator of a probate estate in Ramsey County 

District Court, challenges the dismissal of a lawsuit he filed against respondent in Dakota 
2

County District Court, seeking to recover funds allegedly diverted from the estate. 

Appellant argues that the Dakota County District Court erred by concluding that it did not 

have subject-matter jurisdiction and that appellant failed to state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted. We conclude that the Dakota County District Court did not err 

by declining to exercise jurisdiction. However, because the district court declined to 

exercise jurisdiction, it should not have reached the merits of appellant’s complaint and 

dismissed it with prejudice. We therefore affirm the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, 

but we modify the dismissal so that it is without prejudice. 

FACTS

Vivian P. Voita died on November 19, 2010. Appellant John R. Voita and 

respondent Thomas J. Parrish are named beneficiaries in decedent’s will. In December 

2011, Voita petitioned the probate division of the Ramsey County District Court (probate 

court) for formal probate of the will and appointment as personal representative of the

estate. In February 2012, the probate court appointed Voita as Special Administrator of 

the Estate of Vivian P. Voita. The probate court authorized Voita to research the 

existence of probate assets and to access decedent’s banking and financial records. 

After reviewing decedent’s financial records, Voita notified the probate court that 

$77,643.95 was missing from the estate. Voita alleged that decedent sold her home in 

March 2003 for approximately $161,000. In April 2003, the decedent and Parrish opened 

a joint account and deposited $115,000 in the account. On the day the account was 

opened, decedent and Parrish purchased a certificate of deposit in the amount of $45,000. 

In May 2003, Parrish purchased three $25,000 certificates of deposit solely in his name. 
3

In September 2012, Voita asked the probate court to order Parrish to turn over all of his 

financial records and tax returns from 2003 through 2010. 

In response, a probate court referee informed Voita, by letter dated September 28, 

2012, that “[u]nder the Minnesota Multi-Party Accounts Act, funds in a joint account go

to the survivor of the account absent evidence that it should go elsewhere.” The referee 

further informed Voita that “[o]nce these funds were put into joint ownership with 

Thomas Parrish, the money was no longer in a position to be part of the probate estate or 

to be distributed in accordance with the Will unless you can provide a legal basis and 

evidence that it should.” It does not appear that Voita took further action in the probate 

court. In this appeal, Voita states that “[t]he estate of [decedent] has never been settled as 

of this date, and can be made active at any time by [Voita].” 

In February 2014, Voita filed an action for conversion against Parrish in Dakota 

County District Court. The complaint alleged that Parrish had been decedent’s 

conservator and that he “converted to his own use, funds of Vivian P. Voita during her 

lifetime, in excess of $77,643.95,” as well as additional funds after her death. The 

complaint described the joint account and certificates of deposit, and alleged that there 

was no evidence that monies used to purchase the three certificates of deposit in May 

2003 were ever returned to the decedent. Parrish moved to dismiss the complaint on the 

grounds that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter and that Voita 

had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

In April 2014, the Dakota County District Court granted Parrish’s motion to 

dismiss. The district court ruled that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over 
4

matters included in the probate court file. The district court also ruled that Voita failed to 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted and dismissed his complaint with 

prejudice. This appeal follows. 

D E C I S I O N

Voita challenges the district court’s conclusions that it lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction and that he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. He 

asks this court to set aside the district court’s decision and order the district court to 

transfer jurisdiction to Ramsey County District Court or to dismiss the matter without 

prejudice. 

I.

“Subject-matter jurisdiction is ‘a court’s power to hear and determine cases of the 

general class or categor[ies] to which the proceedings in question belong.’” Bode v. 

Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 594 N.W.2d 257, 259 (Minn. App. 1999) (quoting Black’s 

Law Dictionary 1425 (6th ed. 1990)), aff’d, 612 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2000). The 

existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law which this court reviews de 

novo. Shaw v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 594 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Minn. App. 

1999), review denied (Minn. July 28, 1999). 

Probate courts have “been consolidated into district courts of general jurisdiction.” 

In re Estate of Janecek, 610 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Minn. 2000). “There is no district court 

which is not also a probate court, and no distinction between the courts.” In re Estate of 

Mathews, 558 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Mar. 20, 

1997); see also Minn. Stat. §§ 484.011 (“The district court shall also be a probate 
5

court.”), .86, subd. 1 (2014) (permitting district courts to create divisions, including 

probate divisions). 

A probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over actions “to determine how 

decedents’ estates subject to the laws of this state are to be administered, expended and 

distributed.” Minn. Stat. § 524.3-105 (2014). The probate court has concurrent 

jurisdiction of any other action in which the personal representative may be a party, 

including actions to determine title to property alleged to belong to the estate. Id. The 

probate court also has jurisdiction “over all problems that arise in resolving an estate 

except those issues excluded by statute.” In re Estate of Sangren, 504 N.W.2d 786, 789 

(Minn. App. 1993). 

Because Voita brought his conversion claim in his capacity as Special 

Administrator of the Estate of Vivian P. Voita to recover funds that allegedly belong to 

the estate, the probate court has jurisdiction over the claim. See Minn. Stat. § 524.3-105. 

But it does not follow that the Dakota County District Court lacked jurisdiction. Instead, 

the probate court and Dakota County District Court had concurrent jurisdiction. See 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 3 (stating that the district court has “original jurisdiction in all 

civil . . . cases”); Minn. Stat. § 524.3-105 (describing the probate court’s concurrent 

jurisdiction). We nonetheless conclude that the Dakota County District Court did not err 

by dismissing the conversion action on jurisdictional grounds.

“The first-filed rule provides that where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction, 

the first to acquire jurisdiction generally has priority to decide the case.” Medtronic, Inc. 
6

v. Advanced Bionics Corp., 630 N.W.2d 438, 448-49 (Minn. App. 2001). The rule is 

that:

Where two actions between the same parties, on the same 

subject, and to test the same rights, are brought in different 

courts having concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first 

acquires jurisdiction, its power being adequate to the 

administration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction and 

may dispose of the whole controversy, and no court of 

coordinate power is at liberty to interfere with its action. This 

rule rests upon comity and the necessity of avoiding conflict 

in the execution of judgments by independent courts . . . . 

State ex rel. Minn. Nat’l Bank of Duluth v. District Court, 195 Minn. 169, 173, 262 N.W. 

155, 157 (Minn. 1935) (quotation omitted). 

In deciding whether to defer to another court’s exercise of jurisdiction, “a district 

court considers judicial economy, comity between courts, and the cost to and the 

convenience of the litigants; and must assess the possibility of multiple determinations of 

the same dispute.” Medtronic, 630 N.W.2d at 449. The second court “should seek to 

determine which of the two actions will serve best the needs of the parties by providing a 

comprehensive solution of the general conflict.” Minn. Mut. Life. Ins. v. Anderson, 410 

N.W.2d 80, 82 (Minn. App. 1987) (quotation omitted). Application of the first-filed rule 

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Medtronic, 630 N.W.2d at 449.

In dismissing Voita’s conversion action for lack of jurisdiction, the district court 

reasoned that “[t]he claims in this matter are the same claims that were asserted in the 

probate matter.” We agree. In both the probate and district court proceedings, Voita 

alleged that $77,643.95 is missing from the probate estate and that the missing funds are 

related to decedent and Parrish’s joint account and Parrish’s certificates of deposit. 
7

Because the conversion and probate actions involve the same parties and claims, and the 

probate court exercised jurisdiction first, the Dakota County District Court did not abuse 

its discretion in deferring to the probate court’s exercise of jurisdiction. 

Voita argues that the Dakota County District Court erred in its jurisdictional ruling 

because the conversion action “had nothing to do with the estate of Vivian P. Voita, as 

relates to the Ramsey County Probate Court, nor was it authorized by any Ramsey 

County Court official, whether judge or referee.” The record refutes that argument. 

Voita filed the conversion action as the “Special Administrator of the Estate of Vivian P. 

Voita.” Moreover, Voita’s allegations in the probate proceeding are the same as his 

allegations in the conversion action. Lastly, Voita’s brief states that he used the 

conversion lawsuit “to ascertain the additional documents needed to go back to the 

Ramsey County Probate Court” and as a result, gained information that “will be used in 

the Ramsey County Probate Court to determine the actual assets of the decedent.” In 

sum, Voita’s argument that the probate and conversion cases are unrelated is without 

merit. 

Voita also argues that the Dakota County District Court should have transferred 

the conversion case to Ramsey County, instead of dismissing it. He does not cite 

authority to support that proposition. An assignment of error in a brief based on “mere 

assertion” and not supported by argument or authority is waived unless prejudicial error 

is obvious on mere inspection. State v. Modern Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 770, 772 

(Minn. App. 1997) (quoting Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 290 Minn. 

518, 519-20, 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1971)). Given Voita’s assertions that the probate 
8

estate “has never been settled,” that he can make it “active at any time,” and that he has 

obtained the information he needs to proceed in the probate action, we discern no obvious 

prejudicial error resulting from the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. 

In sum, Dakota County District Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to 

exercise jurisdiction over Voita’s conversion claim and dismissing the claim. 

II.

Even though the Dakota County District Court concluded that it lacked 

jurisdiction, it nonetheless ruled on the merits of Voita’s conversion claim under Minn. 

R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). Rule 12.02(e) allows a party to assert by motion the defense of 

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “A rule 12.02(e) motion 

raises the single question of whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can 

be granted.” Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 739 (Minn. 2000). 

Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12.02(e) operates as an adjudication on 

the merits and is with prejudice. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(c) (providing that unless the 

court specifies otherwise, any dismissal, except dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, forum 

non conveniens, or failure to join an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication on 

the merits); Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 243 Minn. 30, 32, 66 N.W.2d 5, 6 (Minn. 1954) 

(concluding that a dismissal under rule 12.02 is governed by rule 41.02(c) and is thus on 

the merits).

“If the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, it never reaches the merits 

of the case.” State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs v. Olson, 295 Minn. 379, 388, 206 N.W.2d 12, 
9

18 (Minn. 1973); see also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S. Ct. 773, 776 (1946)

(“[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not 

for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states a cause of action on 

which relief could be granted . . . must be decided after and not before the court has

assumed jurisdiction over the controversy.”). Because the district court declined to 

exercise jurisdiction, it should not have ruled on Parrish’s motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim. Thus, the resulting dismissal with prejudice constitutes error. We therefore 

modify the dismissal so that it is without prejudice.

Affirmed as modified.