### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE HEARD AT NASHVILLE JOHN PAUL SEALS v. STAT E OF TENNESSEE An Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamblen County No. 98-CR-001 James E. Beckner, Judge

No. E1998-00367-SC-R11-PC



### AND

VIKKI LYNN FRITTS SPELLMAN v . STATE OF TENNESSEE An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Tipton County No. 1957 Jon K. Blackwood, Judge

No. W1998-00849-SC-R11-PC

Decided June 20, 2000

FOR PUBLICATION
We granted review

in this consolidated appeal to determine whether mental incompetency tolls the one-year statute of limitations for

filing a post-conviction petition under either a savings provision or constitutional due process. T he trial court dismissed the petitions for being time-barred. The Courtof Criminal Appeals held that constitutional due process req uires that the stat

ute of limitations be tolled while a petitioner is mentally incompetent. We conclude that the statute of limitations is nottolled by asaving s provision but may be tolled by due proc

ess concerns whe

re a petitioner is denied a reason

able opportunity to

raise a claim in a meaningful time and manner. We affirm the judgment of the Cour

t of Criminal Appea

ls.1 In both cases, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the petitioners had

satisfied the threshold burden of raising the issue of mental incompetency as it relates to the statue of limitations. The court recognized that “conclusory allegations” are insufficient to meet the threshold in this regard. Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed
A NDERSON , C.J., delivered the opi nion of t he court, in which D ROWOTA , B IRCH , B ARKER , and H OLDER , JJ., joined.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General& Reporter, and Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and Ellen H. Pollack, AssistantAttorney Genera l, Peter M. Coughlan, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.
Marti L. Kaufman

, Memphis, Tenness

ee, for the appe

llees, John Paul Sea

ls and Vikki Lynn Fritts Spellman.

OPINION
We granted this consolidated appeal to d ecide whether under either the general savings statute set forth

in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106 (1980) or constitutional due process a petitioner’s mental incompetence will toll the one-year statute of limitations for filing a post-conviction action under the 1995 Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
Each of the appellees , John Paul Seals and Vikki Lynn Spellman, alleged in their separate post-conviction petitions that they were unable to br ing their post-conviction claims within one year from the entry of the trial courts’ judgments due to their mental incompetence. Each tr ial court dismissed the petition for being filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, concluding that under our decision in Watkins v. State , 903 S.W.2d 302 (Tenn. 1995), a p

etitioner’s menta

l incompetence to

lls the statute of lim

itations. 1
After reviewing the record and appl icable authority, we conclude that the savings provision in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106 does not toll the one-year statute of limitations but thatdue process may require tolling to e

nsure that a pet itioner has a meaningful opportunity to present claims in a reasonable

time and manner. Wetherefore affirm the judgment of the

Court of Criminal Ap

peals.-3- BACKGROUND John Paul Seals
John Paul Seals pled guilt y to first-degree

murder in

December of 1988, and

was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Seals later filed

a petition for a wr

it of habeas corp

us or in the altern

ative postconviction relief asserting that his guilty plea was not

voluntary and knowing and that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. The trial court treated the petition as one for post-conviction relief and dismissed it as time-barred in April of 1994.
A second post-conviction petition was later filed by “next

friend” on behalf of Seals. The petition allegedthat Sealshad been mentally incompetent since before his guilty plea and sentence and that mental incompetence tolls the statute of limitations. The trial court once again dismissed the petition for being time-barred.
The Court of Criminal Appeal s reversed and remanded after concluding that Seals had satisfied the threshold burden for asserting mental incompetence and that a hearing wasrequired for Seals and the State to present e vidence as it rel

ated to mental inco

mpetence and the

tolling of th

e statute of limitations. The c

ourt said that if

the trial court determined that the statute was tolled due to mental incompetence, it must consider the merits of the issues presented in the petition. Vikki Lynn Spellman
Vikki Lynn Spellman pled g uilty to first-degree mu

rder in April of 1988, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In June of 1989, Spellman filed her first petition for post-con viction rel ief alleging ineffecti

ve assistance of counsel. Spellman was appointed counsel after she filed her petition, but the petition was dismissed prior to the evidentiary hearing. Spellman, proceeding pro se , filed a second petition for post-conviction relief in December of 1997, all eging ineffec tive assistance of counsel at the time of her original guilty plea. She asserted that she withdrew her first petition because of her “psychological state” at the time and that she was in “no conditio

n to assist post-conviction c

ounsel in presenti

ng anything in a logic

al, orderly fashion to the Court.” She is currently residing in the Lois DeBerry Special Needs Facility. She stated in her petition that although she is still receiving treatment, she was able to file thi s s econd petition becaus e of her “pr esent, positive psychological health.” The trial court dismissed the petition in January of 1998, without a hearing after finding that the petition was time-barred.
The Courtof Criminal Appea ls determined that

Spellman had satisf

ied the threshold

burden of raising mental incompetence and remanded for a hearing to determine whether tolling of the statute of limitations was required. The State appealed in both cases.-4- ANALYSIS
We begin by reviewin

g the history of post

-convicti on s tatutes in Tennessee. In Case v. Nebraska , 381 U.S. 336, 85 S. Ct. 1486, 14 L. Ed. 2d 422 (1965), the United States Supreme Court recommended

that states enac

t procedures for

addressi ng all eged constitutional errors occurring during the conviction pro

cess tosupplement habea

s corpus remedie

s available

in federal court. The Tennessee legislature responded by creating the Post-Conviction Procedure Act in 1967. Burford v. State , 845 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Tenn. 1992).
Under the Act, relief w

as to be granted “when the conviction or sentence [wa]s void or voidable because of the abridgment in any way of any right guaranteed by the con stitution of [Tennessee] or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 40-30-105 (1990) (repealed 1995). Under the

original Act, ther

e was no statute of

limitations, and a pe

tition could

be filed “at any time after [a petitioner] ha[d] exhausted his appellate remedies and before the sentence ha[d] expired or

ha[d] been fully satisfied.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (1982) (repealed 1986). Statute of Limitations and the Savings Statute
In 1986, the legislatu

re enacted a thr

ee-year statut

e of limitations in which petitioners had to file their claim

s: [a] prisoner in

custody under sentence

of a court of this s

tate must petition fo

r postconviction relief under this chapter within three (3) years of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken or consideration of such petition shall be barred.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 102 (1990) (repe aled 1995). By its t

erms, the sta

tute provided for no exceptions and contained no specific provisions on tolling.
In Watkins , h owever, we addressed the issue of whether mental incompetence tolled the three-year period pursuant to a general savings provision, which stated:
If the p erson entitled to c ommence an actio

n is, at the time the c

ause of actio

n accrued . . . of unsound mind, such person . . . may commence the action, after

the removal of such disability, within the time of l imita tion for the particular cause of action, unless it exceed [sic] thre e (3) ye ars, and in that case within three (3) years from the removal of such disability.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106. We con cluded that post-c

onviction petitions i

n this context were

to be considered civil in nature, and we held that the savings statute applied to toll the three-y ear statute of limitations in cases where the petitioner was incompetent. Watkins , 903 S.W.2d at 305, 307.
Our holdi ng in Watkins with respect to the savings statute does not, however, end the analysis in this case. The legislature enacted the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1 995, which2 The 1995 Act contained only three exceptions to the one-year statue of

limitations: a petition filed within one year of a ruling establishing a new constitutional right given retroactive application; a petition based on new scientific evidence of actual innocence; and a petition file

d within one year o

f a judgment invalid

ating a conviction

that was used to enhance a sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(b)(1)-(3).
-5- repealed prior post-conviction statutes and contained sever al substantia l changes. It red

uced the time for filing a petition from three years to one year of the date of the highest state appellate court action, or, if there was no appeal, one year of the date of final judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a) (Supp. 1996). The 1995 Ac t included an anti-

tolling provision st

ating tha t “[t]he statute of limitations s hall not be tolled for any reason . . . .” Id

. 2 Moreover, following our decision i n Watkins , the legislature again amended the statute to add the following italicized language:
The statute

of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason, including any tolling or saving provision otherwis e available at la

w or equity. Time

is of the essence of the rightto file a petition for post-conviction relief or motion to reo pen established by this chapter, and the one-year limitations period is an element of the right to file such an action and is a condition upon its exercise.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202( a) (1997) (empha

sis added); 1996 Te

nn. Pub. Acts

ch. 995, §§ 1-3. Accordingly, as the pos t-conviction statute has evolved, the legislature has limited the time and opportunity to file petitions seeking relief. See Carter , 952 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1997).
A basic principle of statutory construction is to ascertain

and give effect to legislative intent without undulyrestricting or expanding the intended scope of a statute. Id. at 419; Owens v. State , 908 S. W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995). This principle requires the Court to examine the language of a statut e and, if un ambiguous, apply its ordinary and plain meaning. Parks v. Tennessee Mun. League Risk

Management Pool , 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1998); Riggs v. Burson , 941 S.W.2d 44, 54 (Tenn.), cert. denied , 522 U.S. 982, 118 S. Ct. 4 44, 139 L. Ed. 2d 3 80 (1997). If the legislative intent is expressed in a manner devoid of contradiction and ambiguity, there is no room for interpretation or construction, and courts are not at liberty to depart from the words of the statute. Statev. Pettus , 986 S.W.2d 540, 544 (Tenn. 1999); Hawks v. City of Westmoreland , 960 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tenn. 1997).
While the issue with which we are confronted is nearly identical to that in Watkins , we now face a different statute. In Watkins , the post-conviction procedures afforded an unconditional three years in which to file a petition pursuant to Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 40-30-102. The statute neither containedan anti-tolling provision nor includ ed the e numerated exceptions to the statute of limitations for later-aris

ing claims. Thus, we

concluded that the

savings statute did

apply to toll

the statute of limitatio

ns.
In contrast, we believe that the language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a) is unambiguous and that its meaning and intended effect are clear. The filing time for a petition for

post-conviction-6-

relief is one year

from the date of the final action. It is not to be tolled for any reason except th

ose enumerated

in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(b). The statute specifically states that the no savings provision is applic

able. According

ly, we hold that the statute of limitations is no longer tolled by the savings statute in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106.
Due Process
Our conclusion that the one-year statute of limitations for filing a p ost-conviction petition is not tolled by the savings provision does not end our analysis. We must also consider whether a petitioner’s mental incompeten ce requires tolli

ng the statute of lim

itati ons as a matter of constitutional due

process. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in part that “[n]o person shall

. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Cons titu tion provides that “[n]o state shall. . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Cont. amend. XIV. The correspondi

ng provisio n found i n the Tennessee C onstitution states th

at “no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or depri ved of his life , liberty or prope rty, but by the judgme

nt of his peers or the law of the land.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 8.
The language of the “due process” provisions in the United States Constitution differs from the “law of

the land” provision found in the Tennessee Constitution. Although the terms on occasion have been viewed as synonymous, Daugherty v. State , 393 S.W.2d 739, 74 3 (Tenn . 1965), the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation s of the United States C onstitution establish a minimum level of protection while this Court, as final arbiter of the Tennessee Constitution, is always free to extend greater protection to its citizens. Doe v. Norris , 751 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tenn. 1988).
We have previously recognized that a state has noduty to enact post-conviction procedures and that the opportunit

y to collaterally attack constitutional violations occurring in the conviction processis not a fundamental right during the conviction process. Burford , 845 S.W.2d at 207. We also have recognized that a state which does enact post-conviction pr

ocedures may se

t up reasonable procedural requirements, such as a statut e of limitations, and that a claim may be terminated “for failure to comply with areasonable procedural rule without violating due process rights.” Id. at 208.
“Due process is flexib

le and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents , 863 S.W.2d 45, 50 (Tenn. 1993) (citation omitted). The flexible nature of proce

dural due proce

ss requires an imp

recise definitio

n because due pr

ocess embodies the concept of fundamental fairness. State v. Barnett , 909 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1995); Statev. Hale , 840 S.W.2d 307, 313 (T enn. 1992). In de termining what pro

cedural protec

tions a particular situation demands, three factors must be c onsidered: (1) th

e private intere

st at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the f iscal and administr

ative burdens tha

t the additional or s

ubstitute-7-

procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976

); Phillips , 863 S.W.2d at 50.
In this case, the private interests at stake are the defendants’ opportunities to att ack the convictions and sentences of incarceration on the gro unds that the petitioners were deprived of constitutional rights during the c onviction process . The government’ s inte rest is avoiding the litigation of stale and groundless claims. Burford , 845 S.W.2d at 207. The legislative history of the po st- conviction statute of limitations reveals that the legislature was concerned about allowing prisoners to assert claims so l ong after their convictions that witnesses are no longer available or their memory of the eve nts are af fected. The legislature was also concerned with the cost of allowing the litigation of successive and often fruitless post-co nviction c laims, including the cost of transporting prisoners to hearings. Id.
A petitioner’s inte

rest in collatera

lly attacking a co

nviction is not a fun

damental right tha t deserves heighteneddue proce ss protection. However, before a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply with procedural requirements such as statutes of limitations, due process requires that a potential litigant be provided an opportunity for the “presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id. The test is “whether the time period provides an applicant a reasonable opportunity to have the claimed issue heard and determined.” Id.
In Burford , the petitioner contended that the fifty-ye ar persistent offender sentence imposed upon him for his 1985 ro bbery conviction was excessive because four of the previous robber y convictions used to enhance h is sentence wer

e se t aside bya trial court in 198 8. Burford’s postconviction claim, filed in 1990, arose after the expiration of the statute of limitations. We concluded that the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30 -102, on it face, provided a reasonable op portunity fo

r the presentatio

n of post-convicti

on claims, but th

at the applicationof the statute to Burford’s case violated due proc

ess because he d

id not have a reaso

nable opportunity to present his claim in a meaningful time and manner. Burford , 845 S.W.2d at 208.
We addressed these

due process c

onc erns in the Watkins decision, holding that “[e]ven in the absence of a sta

tute tolling the statute of limitations, application of the statute of limitations to the facts of this case would violate constitutional due process.” Watkins , 903 S. W. 2d at 305-06. In discussin g Burford , we concluded th at consideration

must be given to

the petitioner’s interest of having an opportunity to attack his conviction based on the deprivation of a constitutional right and the State’s legitimate interest in preventing the piecemeal litigation of stale and gro

undless claims. Id. at 306. We conclude

d that:
because a petitioner who was incompetent throughout the limitations period w

ould be denied the opportunity to challenge his conviction in a meani ngful mann er , the failure to tol l the li mitations period would deny such a petitioner a fair and reasonable

opportunity for the bringing of the [post-conviction] petition, and th us, would violate due p

rocess.-8-

Id. at 307 (emphasis added). In other words, “if the petitioner was men t ally incompetent, and thereforelegally incapable, he would be denied any opportunity to assert his constitutional rights in a post-conviction petition, unless the period o f limitatio ns w as suspended during his mental incompetence .” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, due process re q uir es that some reas

onable opportunity to assert those rights be afforded.
We recogni

ze that the Burford

inquiry has been clarified in some circumstances. I n Sands v. State , 903 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn. 1995), we said tha

t co nsideration must be given to whether the petitioner is raising a claim that has arisen after th e statute of l imitations has began to run, i.e., a “later-aris ing” claim. Id. at 301. As w e later e xp lained in Wright v. State , 987 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Tenn.), cert. denied , __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 8 1, 145 L. Ed. 2d 6 9 (1999), a court

must: (1) determine when the limitat ions period w ould normally have begun to run; (2) de termine whether the grounds for

relief actually

arose after the limitations period would normally have commenced; and (3) if the grounds are “later-arising,” determine if, under the facts of the ca se , a strict applicat

ion of the limitations

period would eff

ectively deny the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present the claim.
Id. at 28; see also Caldwell v. State , 917 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1996).
The “later-arising

claim” limitation in Sands reflects the co ncern that a peti

tioner who fails to assert an existing claim, that is, a claim that is not later-arising, in a timely fashion may not expect due proc ess r elief under Burford . This concern is n ot present in a ca

se where a petiti

oner fails to assert a claim within the statute of limitations due to mental incompetence as in Watkins

. Sig nif ica ntl y, Watkins makes no mention of Sands and does not li mit the due process analy sis in cases involving mental incompetency to later-arising g rounds.
The petitioner in Watkins , like the petitioners in the present case, raised issues challenging guilty pleas and the in effecti

ve assista nce of co unsel – iss

ues that w

ere not la ter-aris ing. We nonetheless

concluded that a petitioner who was mentally incompe tent could not be denied a reasonable

opportunity to raise these claims in a meaningful manner without violating due process. Thus, we concluded th

at the mental incompeten cy, if esta blished, tolled the

statute of limitatio

ns. We adhere to that holding in the present case.
Acco rdi ngly, we conclude t hat while the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-

202(a) does not vi

olate due proce

ss on its face, app

lication of the sta

tute must notdeny a petitioner a reasonable opportunity to raise a claim in a meaningful time and man ne r. Thus, a peti tioner who is m entally incompetent is denied an opportunity to raise a c laim in a meaningful manner unless the statute of limitations is tolled during the period of mental incompetence.-9- CONCLUSION
We have concluded t

hat the one-yea

r statute of limitations in post-conviction actions set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a) is not tolled due to mental incompetence under t he savin gs provision in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106. We have further concluded, however, under Watkins , that due process require

s tolling of the statu

te of limitations whe

re a petitioner is

denied the reaso

nable opportunity

to assert a claim in a meaningfu l tim e and manner due to mental incompetence. We thereforeagree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that because both Seals and Spellman met the threshold burden of raising

the issue of menta

l incompetence, t

he cases must

be remanded for further proceedings.
We affirm the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals. C osts of the appeals shall be assessed to the State of Tennessee.