In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 98-2708, 98-3053

WILLIAM CEFALU and TYRONE CEFALU,

Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees,

v.

VILLAGE OF ELK GROVE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 94 C 1990--Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Magistrate Judge./*

Argued February 23, 1999--Decided April 13, 2000

 Before COFFEY, RIPPLE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

 ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Cooler heads regrettably

did not prevail on the afternoon that Tyrone

Cefalu arrived at his parents’ printing business

and found Elk Grove Village police officer Eric

Perkins parked in the drive, filling out reports

and monitoring traffic on the adjoining roadway.

Cefalu in rather harsh terms told Perkins to

leave, Perkins balked, and within moments six

police officers were on the scene attempting to

restore order to the chaos that had erupted.

Perkins left the premises with a lacerated hand,

having had the front door to the Cefalus’

business slammed shut on it. Tyrone and his

father William left with their own hands in

cuffs, accused of battery and resisting arrest.

After the Cefalus were acquitted on those

charges, they filed suit against Elk Grove

Village, Perkins, and several other police

officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, and the

case proceeded to trial. Judge Pallmeyer entered

judgment as a matter of law in favor of the

defendants on the charge that they conspired to

cover up evidence of violating the Cefalus’ civil

rights, and a jury absolved the defendants of

false arrest, excessive force, battery, and

malicious prosecution. The Cefalus appeal from

both the entry of judgment as a matter of law and

the adverse verdict on the false arrest charge,

and they also challenge certain rulings that the

district court made over the course of the trial.
The defendants cross-appeal from the denial of

costs for the preparation of various computer

displays. We affirm the judgment in favor of the

defendants and remand the matter of costs for

further consideration.

I.

 Because the jury found in favor of the

defendants, our summary of the facts reflects a

view of the evidence that is favorable to them.

See, e.g., Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment

Co., 151 F.3d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 1998).

 Early in the afternoon of February 19, 1993,

after picking up some take-out for lunch, Tyrone

Cefalu ("Tyrone") returned to work at his

family’s Elk Grove Village business, Logan

Printing ("Logan"). As he drove up to the

property, Tyrone saw a village police cruiser

parked in the driveway. Officer Eric Perkins,

employed with the village for sixteen months, was

seated behind the wheel. Perkins had just

finished responding to an armed robbery call and

had backed his cruiser into the driveway in order

to complete some paperwork and monitor traffic on

the adjacent street as he neared the end of his

shift. According to the village, its police

officers commonly did this in the industrial park

where Logan Printing was located, and it had

never before heard a complaint. Business owners,

in fact, appreciated the visible police presence

on their properties.

 Tyrone did not welcome Perkins’ presence,

however. A short retaining wall divided Logan’s

driveway. One half of the driveway, leading to

the loading dock, descended several feet below

grade level. The other half of the drive led to

parking in the rear of the building; and the

presence of Perkins’ cruiser on that side of the

drive blocked access to the parking lot. Tyrone

drove his vehicle onto the loading-dock half of

the drive and pulled up along side of Perkins’

car. "What are you doing here?" Tyrone asked

Perkins--in what Perkins described as an

insulting and combative tone. When Perkins

answered that he was, among other things,

watching traffic, Tyrone remarked that he did not

want Perkins to "run radar" while on the

premises. Perkins indicated that he was not using

radar but that in any event he was entitled to

employ it so long as there was traffic on the

public road. Nonplused, Tyrone told Perkins to

"get off"of his property. Perkins declined.

 Tyrone stepped out of his vehicle, his lunch

and drink in hand, and slammed the car door shut.

For a few moments, he stood next to Perkins’ car,

shouting obscenities. He demanded that Perkins
"get the f*** off [his] property" and, pointing

his finger at the police officer, called him a

"f***ing punk." In the face of Tyrone’s outrage,

Perkins was now concerned about the prospect of

interrogation, and possibly discipline, from his

superiors. He radioed his supervisor, Sergeant

Dion Zinnel, that he was dealing with "an irate

business owner." Other officers who heard the

radio call could discern someone shouting in the

background. Zinnel said he would join Perkins at

the scene. Perkins exited the cruiser and joined

Tyrone on the front sidewalk, hoping to calm him

down.

 Tyrone began to move away from the squad car.

Perkins told him to come back, but Tyrone kept

walking. After returning to the car for a moment

to respond to a follow-up call from Zinnel,

Perkins caught up with Tyrone in front of the

business. Tyrone continued to yell at Perkins,

threatening to call the village manager.

 At Logan’s front door, something of a tug-ofwar ensued. After Tyrone opened the door with a

key, he repeated his demand that Perkins get off

the property, stepped inside, and let the door

(which had an automatic closing mechanism) begin

to shut behind him. Perkins planted his right

heel and side in the doorway, keeping the door

open. He urged Tyrone to calm down. "We don’t

need this," Perkins told him. Unmoved, Tyrone

tried to pull the door closed. Perkins stopped

the door with his hand. As Perkins told the

story, Tyrone glanced at Perkins’ hand and then

yanked the door shut on it, lacerating Perkins’

finger and thumb.

 Thoughts of calming Tyrone down evaporated;

Perkins now resolved to arrest him for battery.

Having grabbed the door before it locked shut,

Perkins now took a step inside the building,

grasped Tyrone’s arm, and announced that he was

under arrest for disorderly conduct/1 as well as

battery. Tyrone tried to shake his arm free of

Perkins’ grip. At this point, William Cefalu

entered the fray, rising from behind a counter

and shouting at Perkins to let Tyrone go and get

off the property. Finding himself outnumbered,

Perkins retreated from the building and called

for backup.

 When reinforcements arrived, Perkins knocked at

the front door with a colleague, Officer Edwin

Medina. William cracked open the front door and

told them to depart, but the officers seized the

opportunity to reenter the building, informing

William that they were there to arrest Tyrone.

William attempted to block Medina’s path,

prompting Perkins to declare that William would

be arrested as well. When William refused to
place his hands behind his back per Perkins’

order, the two officers pushed William onto a

bench and struggled to handcuff him. Hearing the

commotion, Tyrone emerged from a back office and

shouted at the officers, "Let go of him!"

Tensions were so high at this point that Medina

drew his gun and ordered Tyrone to "Freeze!"

Tyrone instead picked up a telephone and

attempted to call the village manager. Perkins

tried--unsuccessfully--to take the telephone away

and cuff him. By now, Zinnel and another officer

had arrived on the scene, and they helped to

subdue and handcuff Tyrone.

 Perkins left the premises in the company of

paramedics so that his hand could be attended to,

while the Cefalus were taken to the Elk Grove

police station for processing. William himself

was treated by paramedics for a cut on his hand,

and was later taken to the hospital with elevated

blood pressure. By the plaintiffs’ account,

William had turned quite red during the scuffle

at Logan Printing, and whereas the defendants

acknowledge that his blood pressure was

determined to be "slightly" elevated, the

plaintiffs insist that it shot off the charts,

leaving him with permanent damage to his heart

muscle.

 Following this incident, the village received

complaints from both Tyrone and his wife, and the

village board of trustees, recognizing the

possibility that litigation might be in the

offing, ordered an investigation. The village

attorney spoke with the chief and deputy chief of

police about the matter, and he obtained a copy

of the police report for the board’s review.

Further investigation was suspended while the

criminal case against the Cefalus was pending;

and the board was kept apprised of the status of

the criminal case. Ultimately, the village

attorney made no effort to look into the incident

independently; he simply relied on the police

chief and deputy chief for their second-hand

accounts of what occurred. Nor did he take any

notes, prepare a written report, or create any

other form of written documentation of the

results of his inquiry.

 Several days after the Cefalus were arrested,

Sergeant Zinnel and Lieutenant Steven

Ingebrigtsen (watch commander at the time Perkins

arrested the Cefalus) met with Perkins to review

the incident. The senior officers agreed that

Perkins could have handled his initial encounter

with Tyrone better than he had and they so

admonished Perkins. "[W]e all said he could have

put the car in drive and drove away,"

Ingebrigtsen testified. Ingebrigtsen considered

this mild oral reprimand to be all the discipline
that was necessary. In his view, Perkins had not

violated any departmental policy; he was simply

an inexperienced officer who exercised poor

judgment. Ingebrigtsen did not investigate the

incident beyond speaking with Zinnel and Perkins.

"I was satisfied with the information they

supplied me," he testified. "I didn’t need more."

Like the village attorney, Ingebrigtsen made no

written report summarizing his inquiry. In fact,

it appears that none of the various personnel

within the village bureaucracy who looked into

this matter created any notes, memoranda, or

correspondence reflecting what they found.

 Meanwhile, William and Tyrone Cefalu were

exonerated on the charges that they had committed

battery and resisted arrest. At the conclusion of

the State’s case, Cook County Circuit Court Judge

Brendan McCooey dismissed the charges. The judge

noted that even if Perkins, in the first

instance, had a legitimate reason to follow

Tyrone up the front walk and to enter the Logan

building, by the time Cefalu had stepped inside

the front door and attempted to close it, Perkins

had been told several times that he was not

welcome on the premises. Perkins had no warrant

that would justify his entry without the owner’s

consent, and no exigent circumstances supported

a warrantless intrusion. Within that context, he

found the evidence insufficient to show that

either the senior or junior Cefalu had the intent

to commit a battery on the police officers or to

resist arrest. "The State failed to prove its

case beyond a reasonable doubt, even set forth a

prima facie case, in my opinion."

 The Cefalus later filed this action against Elk

Grove Village, Perkins, and six other police

officers. Pursuant to section 1983, they asserted

claims of excessive force, false arrest,

malicious prosecution, and conspiracy. A direct

claim against the village was made pursuant to

Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of City of

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036

(1978). The complaint also included pendant state

claims of battery, unlawful detention, malicious

prosecution, conspiracy, wilful and wanton

misconduct, excessive force, and false arrest. R.

65. Judge Holderman granted summary judgment in

favor of the village on the Monell claim and

dismissed one of the individual defendants from

the case. Cefalu v. Village of Elk Grove, No. 94

C 1990, 1996 WL 392158 (N.D. Ill. July 11). He

concluded that disputes of material fact required

a trial on the other claims as to which the

defendants sought summary judgment, however. With

respect to the section 1983 conspiracy claim,

Judge Holderman wrote:

[T]here is sufficient circumstantial evidence
from which a jury may reasonably infer that

defendants conspired to violate plaintiffs’

constitutional rights. There is evidence that

defendants met and discussed the circumstances of

the February 19, 1993 incident after the alleged

constitutional violations occurred. The acts that

defendants allegedly undertook in furtherance of

this alleged conspiracy include the allegedly

false charges brought against plaintiffs,

defendants’ failure to investigate the complaints

made by plaintiffs, and defendants Perkins’ and

Medina’s testimony at the criminal trial in

support of the allegedly false charges. 

Id., at *6 (footnote omitted). The case proceeded

to trial on the federal claims for false arrest

(Tyrone), malicious prosecution (Tyrone),

excessive force, and conspiracy, and the state

claims for false arrest (Tyrone), battery, and

malicious prosecution. At the conclusion of the

plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, Judge Pallmeyer

entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of

the defendants on the claim that they had

conspired to violate the plaintiffs’ civil

rights. R. 294-2 at 24; see Fed. R. Civ. P.

50(a)(1). The remainder of the case was submitted

to the jury, which found in favor of the

defendants on all counts. R. 237, 238. The

Cefalus subsequently filed a motion for a new

trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a),

which Judge Pallmeyer denied in a written

opinion. Cefalu v. Village of Elk Grove, No. 94

C 1990, 1998 WL 325191 (N.D. Ill. June 9).

II.

A.

 The Cefalus contend that Judge Pallmeyer erred

when she entered judgment as a matter of law in

favor of the defendants on the section 1983

conspiracy claim. Judgment as a matter of law is

appropriate when "a party has been fully heard on

an issue and there is no legally sufficient

evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find

for that party on that issue." Fed. R. Civ. P.

50(a)(1). Our review of such a judgment is de

novo. E.g., Lane v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 184

F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1999). In the course of

this review, we must interpret the facts in the

light most favorable to plaintiffs, against whom

judgment as a matter of law was entered. Id. 

 As it was articulated at trial, the Cefalus’

conspiracy claim posited that the defendants had

conspired to cover up their own wrongdoing vis a

vis the Cefalus’ arrest. The First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution guarantee the

right to seek legal relief for asserted injuries

that have a reasonable basis in fact and in law.
See Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461

U.S. 731, 741, 103 S. Ct. 2161, 2169 (1983);

Vasquez v. Hernandez, 60 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir.

1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1156, 116 S. Ct.

1545 (1996).

A corollary of this right is that efforts by

state actors to impede an individual’s access to

courts or administrative agencies may provide the

basis for a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C.

sec. 1983. Judicial access must be "adequate,

effective, and meaningful," Bounds v. Smith, 430

U.S. 817, 822, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 1495, 52 L.Ed.2d

72 (1977), and therefore, when police officers

conceal or obscure important facts about a crime

from its victims rendering hollow the right to

seek redress, constitutional rights are

undoubtedly abridged. Bell [v. City of

Milwaukee], 746 F.2d [1205] at 1261 [(7th Cir.

1984)]; see also Stone v. City of Chicago, 738

F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708

F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983).

Vasquez, 60 F.3d at 328; see also Thompson v.

Boggs, 33 F.3d 847, 852-53 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 514 U.S. 1063, 115 S. Ct. 1692 (1995).

Judge Pallmeyer entered the directed finding on

this claim primarily on the strength of Vasquez.

There we concluded (over a dissent) that an

attempt to cover up police wrongdoing which

succeeded only briefly in hiding the facts from

the plaintiffs, and which ultimately neither

prevented the plaintiffs from pursuing relief nor

reduced the value of their claim, was not

actionable under section 1983. 60 F.3d at 329;

see also Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d

1510, 1523-24 (7th Cir. 1990).

 At the outset, the Cefalus suggest that the law

of the case doctrine/2 obligated Judge Pallmeyer

to submit their conspiracy claim to the jury, but

that argument is wholly without merit. The

premise for the argument is the court’s previous

summary judgment ruling: Judge Holderman

concluded that there were disputed issues of

material fact with respect to the conspiracy

claim, the reasoning goes, and so Judge Pallmeyer

was bound to submit the claim to the jury. Yet,

as the defendants point out, what Judge Holderman

determined at the summary judgment stage was that

the evidence sufficed to establish the general

elements of conspiracy--a meeting of the minds,

overt actions taken in furtherance of the

agreement, and so on. He did not address--because

it was not raised--the particular theory

underlying the cover-up claim, and whether it was

viable under the controlling case law.

Consequently, there was no law of the case on

this aspect of the conspiracy claim.
 For two reasons, we believe that Judge

Pallmeyer was correct to enter a judgment as a

matter of law in favor of the defendants on this

claim. First, because the jury exonerated the

defendants of any substantive constitutional

violation, the conspiracy claim necessarily

falters under this circuit’s precedents. Second,

the cover-up efforts that the Cefalus describe

could not, given the facts of the case, have kept

the Cefalus from seeking legal redress.

 In exonerating the defendants of the false

arrest and malicious prosecution charges, the

jury concluded that the defendants did not

violate the Cefalus’ constitutional rights. We

have said that "there is no constitutional

violation in conspiring to cover-up an action

which does not itself violate the Constitution."

Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 1996).

The jury’s conclusion that the Cefalus suffered

no constitutional injury thus forecloses relief

on the conspiracy claim. Id.; Goldschmidt v.

Patchett, 686 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1982); see

also Andree v. Ashland County, 818 F.2d 1306,

1311-12 (7th Cir. 1987); Reichenberger v.

Pritchard, 660 F.2d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 1981).

 Moreover, this was not a case in which the

plaintiffs lacked the knowledge of the facts

necessary to seek redress for their asserted

injuries. The key circumstances underlying their

claims for wrongful arrest and malicious

prosecution were those surrounding their arrests.

Those circumstances have from the start been

known to the Cefalus, as they were face-to-face

participants with the police in the entire chain

of events that culminated in their arrest. Cf.

Vasquez, 60 F.3d 325 (plaintiff injured by stray

bullet of unknown origin that penetrated the

walls of her home); Bell, 746 F.2d 1205

(plaintiff’s son shot and killed by police

officer in absence of witnesses other than

officer and his partner, both of whom falsely

claimed that victim had wielded a knife and

declared himself to be a hold-up man). Therefore,

even to the extent the evidence suggests that the

defendants resolved not to conduct a meaningful

investigation, for fear it would hurt them later

when the Cefalus filed suit, a jury could not

find for the plaintiffs on the cover-up claim

because the facts that they needed to recover for

their asserted injuries have always been known to

them. See Thompson, 33 F.3d at 852-53; see also

Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259,

1263-64 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1047, 118 S. Ct. 690 (1998); Foster v. City of

Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 429-30 (5th Cir.

1994).

 For this same reason, we find no merit to the
Cefalus’ follow-up contention that Judge

Pallmeyer unduly restricted their attempts to

flesh out the village’s efforts to evade

liability. The judge sustained defense objections

to a variety of questions intended to show that

the village treated Perkins with extraordinary

lenity; that it explored the possibility of

dropping the charges against William in exchange

for Tyrone’s agreement to plead guilty; that it

had a practice of not dropping charges once an

arrest had been effectuated; that the village, in

effect, turned a blind eye to the merits of the

charges against the Cefalus; and that village

officials were keenly aware at all times that a

conviction of one or both Cefalus would insulate

them from liability. We may assume that further

inquiry along these lines might have shown that

the village was more concerned about damage

control than it was about justice. Yet, even with

the benefit of discovery, the plaintiffs can

identify no information that the defendants

suppressed or withheld, or any action that they

took, that hampered the Cefalus from resorting to

court to vindicate their constitutional rights.

It is that type of evidence which their cover-up

claim called for, and absent a showing that their

questions would have elicited evidence that was

relevant in this regard, the judge acted

appropriately in terminating inquiry.

B.

 The jury found in favor of Perkins on the claim

that he falsely arrested Tyrone, but the Cefalus

believe that the verdict cannot be reconciled

with the evidence and that the judge should

therefore have granted their motion for a new

trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Only when a verdict

is contrary to the manifest weight of the

evidence should a motion for a new trial

challenging the jury’s assessment of the facts

carry the day. E.g., Riemer v. Illinois Dep’t of

Transp., 148 F.3d 800, 806 (7th Cir. 1998);

Robinson v. Burlington N. R. Co., 131 F.3d 648,

656 (7th Cir. 1997). Moreover, "[t]he district

court, having seen the presentation of the

evidence and observed the course of the trial, is

in a unique position to rule on a new trial

motion." Valbert v. Pass, 866 F.2d 237, 239 (7th

Cir. 1989). Our own review of the lower court’s

assessment is therefore "narrowly circumscribed."

Id., quoting Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582

F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1978). Only if the

district judge has abused her discretion will we

disturb her decision to deny a new trial. E.g.,

Lowe v. Consolidated Freightways of Delaware,

Inc., 177 F.3d 640, 641 (7th Cir. 1999), cert.

denied, 120 S. Ct. 818 (2000); Riemer, 148 F.3d

at 806. "As long as there is a reasonable basis

in the record to support it, we will not overturn

a jury’s verdict." Robinson, 131 F.3d at 656.
 The plaintiffs’ attack on the verdict focuses

upon the issue of trespass. Illinois law provides

that one who intrudes upon another’s property

after receiving notice from an "owner or

occupant" that he is forbidden to enter (or

required to depart) is guilty of a misdemeanor.

720 ILCS 5/21-3(a); e.g., People v. Kraft, 660

N.E.2d 114, 117 (Ill. App. 1995). Illinois law

further provides that "[a] person is justified in

the use of force against another when and to the

extent that he reasonably believes that such

conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such

other’s trespass . . . ." 720 ILCS 5/7-3. In the

Cefalus’ view, Perkins was a trespasser. The

officer had no authority or permission to be on

their property; and by the time the contretemps

at the doorway commenced, Tyrone had in fact

demanded repeatedly that he leave. Perkins

claimed not to be sure whether Tyrone had the

legal authority to eject him. Yet, he conceded

that once he saw the junior Cefalu open the front

door to the building with his key (and with his

lunch in hand), it was clear that Tyrone at the

very least had a right to be on the premises, if

not as an owner (as Tyrone claimed to be), then

as an employee. Plaintiff’s Ex. 3 at 56-57. At

that point, the plaintiffs argue, Perkins was

obliged to leave, and Tyrone, in turn had a right

to use force to evict him. Perkins therefore

lacked the requisite probable cause to arrest

Tyrone--i.e., an objectively reasonable belief

that Tyrone had committed a crime when he shut

the door on Perkins’ hand. See generally, e.g.,

Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir.

1998).

 We agree with Judge Pallmeyer, however, that

the jury could reasonably have viewed the

situation differently. Assuming that Perkins

indeed did commit trespass, the Illinois statute

permitted Tyrone to use force only "to the extent

that he reasonably believe[d]" such force was

necessary to terminate the trespass. 720 ILCS

5/7-3 (emphasis ours). The jury, examining the

facts that confronted Perkins through the eyes of

a reasonable police officer, might have

determined that it was unreasonable for Tyrone to

think it necessary to slam a door shut on

Perkins’ hand. All Perkins was doing at that

point was attempting to keep the door open so

that he could continue his efforts to talk Tyrone

into a calmer state. If, as the Cefalus argue and

we have assumed, Perkins was committing criminal

trespass, then he of course had no business

remaining on the property at all in the face of

Tyrone’s demands that he leave. But Perkins posed

no threat to Tyrone, and beyond holding the door

open so that he could speak with Tyrone, Perkins

evidenced no plans to intrude farther into the

building. Under the circumstances, however
annoying Perkins’ continued presence may have

been to Tyrone, the jury might well have thought

that a reasonable police officer could deem it

beyond the pale for Tyrone to close the door on

his hand without at least warning him first. See

People v. Hicks, 676 N.E.2d 725, 729 (Ill. App.

1997), rev’d on other grounds, 693 N.E.2d 373

(Ill. 1998); People v. Epps, 453 N.E.2d 816, 818-

19 (Ill. App. 1983); People v. Vaughn, 451 N.E.2d

898, 902 (Ill. App. 1983). The unreasonable use

of force would in turn have supplied a reasonable

officer with a basis to arrest Tyrone for

battery, which in Illinois occurs when a person

"intentionally or knowingly without legal

justification" causes bodily harm to another or

touches him in an "insulting or provoking"

manner. 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a); see also 720 ILCS

5/12-4(b)(6) (aggravated battery occurs when one

commits battery on a person he knows to be a

peace officer, while the officer is engaged in

execution of his official duties)./3

C.

 The Illinois criminal trespass statute indicates

that it is an "owner or occupant" of the property

who is authorized to order an unwelcome visitor

to depart. See 720 ILCS 5/21-3(a). As we have

noted, Perkins testified that he was unsure

whether Tyrone was, in fact, an "owner" or

"occupant" who could rightfully order him to

leave, and the reasonableness of his doubt was a

hotly contested issue at trial. On that issue,

the jury was instructed that it could consider

"whether it was reasonable for Officer Perkins to

believe that the phrase ’owner or occupant,’ as

used in the statute, was limited to legal owners,

tenants or lessees of real property." R. 236,

Instruction No. 37. The Cefalus contend that it

was clear error for the court to give this

instruction, because it invited the jury to focus

on Perkins’ understanding of the statute rather

than the facts that were known to him, the latter

being key to the probable cause analysis. See

Richardson v. Bonds, 860 F.2d 1427, 1430-31 (7th

Cir. 1988) ("While an arresting officer’s

subjective knowledge of facts sufficient to

constitute probable cause is central to

evaluation of the propriety of an arrest, we do

not believe that the officer’s view of the legal

basis for the arrest is important.") (emphasis in

original); see also, e.g., Calusinski v. Kruger,

24 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 1994); Biddle v.

Martin, 992 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1993).

 The Cefalus consented to this instruction below,

however, and in so doing waived review of its

propriety. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides

that "[n]o party may assign as error the giving

or the failure to give an instruction unless that
party objects thereto before the jury retires to

consider its verdict, stating distinctly the

matter objected to and the grounds of the

objection." At the instruction conference, the

Cefalus’ counsel expressly agreed that the

reasonableness of Perkins’ belief as to whether

Tyrone would qualify as an "owner or occupant"

was, "[a]t a minimum," a jury question. R. 294-2

at 223. Counsel also gave his consent to the form

of the instruction that the court proposed. R.

294-2 at 255-56. Under these circumstances,

appellate review is foreclosed to the Cefalus.

See O.K. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Martin Marietta

Techs., Inc., 36 F.3d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1994);

see also United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912,

924 (7th Cir.) (applying identical terms of Fed.

R. Crim. P. 30), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 999, 117 S.

Ct. 495 (1996), and cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1020,

117 S. Ct. 536 (1996)./4

D.

 Finally, the Cefalus argue briefly that the

district court erroneously precluded them from

placing the text of the criminal trespass and

related statutes before the jury. Alerting the

jury to the content of those statutes was

necessary, they maintain, because throughout the

trial the defendants had improperly suggested

(principally through objections to the questions

plaintiffs’ counsel put to Perkins and other

witnesses) that a mere employee of the property

owner (like Tyrone) did not have the authority to

eject a trespasser. Confronting the witnesses

with the actual text of the statute was therefore

necessary, in their view, to counter the

misimpression. The district court, of course,

enjoys broad discretion on evidentiary matters,

and our review is commensurately deferential.

E.g., United States v. Van Dreel, 155 F.3d 902,

905 (7th Cir. 1998).

 We discern no error on Judge Pallmeyer’s part,

however. Whether Tyrone qualified as an "owner or

occupant" was a question of law to be addressed

in the jury instructions. The Cefalus’ sole

objection to the adequacy of the jury

instructions was one that they waived, as we have

explained above. As an evidentiary matter, use of

the statutory text in questioning the witnesses

would only be relevant insofar as the text was

somehow vital to eliciting pertinent testimony.

However, the Cefalus make no argument that the

judge’s rulings in this respect somehow kept them

from introducing relevant evidence.

III.

 After prevailing at trial, the defendants moved

to recover their costs pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(d). Among other expenses, they

sought reimbursement in excess of $27,000 for the

cost of a computerized, multi-media system they

employed to present their exhibits to the jury.

The plaintiffs used a similar methodology, and as

Judge Pallmeyer noted, the defendants had elected

to do the same in order "to keep the playing

field even." Cefalu v. Village of Elk Grove, No.

94 C 1990, 1998 WL 409690, at *11 (N.D. Ill. July

15). The defendants argued that the multi-media

system was compensable as a means of

"exemplification," see 28 U.S.C. sec. 1920(4),

but the judge rejected this rationale. "Costs for

exemplification are permitted only for expenses

associated with the physical preparation of

exhibits," she observed. 1998 WL 409690, at

*11./5 "[A]lthough the multi-media presentation

no doubt facilitated the presentation of various

exhibits to the jury, it played no role

whatsoever in the production of the exhibits used

at trial." Id. (emphasis in original).

 In stating that "costs other than attorneys’

fees shall be allowed as of course to the

prevailing party unless the court otherwise

directs," Rule 54(d)(1) establishes a presumption

in favor of a cost award. To be compensable,

however, a particular expense must fall into one

of the categories of costs statutorily authorized

for reimbursement. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.

Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42, 107 S. Ct.

2494, 2497 (1987); Barber v. Ruth, 7 F.3d 636,

644 (7th Cir. 1993). Fees associated with

"exemplification" so qualify, sec. 1920(4),

although the statute does not define the term. In

the narrowest legal sense, "exemplification"

refers to "[a]n official transcript of a public

record, authenticated as a true copy for use as

evidence." Black’s Law Dictionary 593 (7th ed. 1999).

More commonly, it signifies the act of

illustration by example, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate

Dictionary 406 (10th ed. 1993), a connotation broad

enough to include a wide variety of exhibits and

demonstrative aids. Our own cases embrace the

more expansive definition of "exemplification."

In EEOC v. Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1,

620 F.2d 1220, 1227 (7th Cir. 1980), we said that

the term "is ordinarily construed as permitting

an award of the reasonable expense of preparing

maps, charts, graphs, photographs, motion

pictures, photostats, and kindred materials . .

. ," quoting 6 Moore’s Federal Practice para. 54.77[6]

at 1739 (2d ed.). And more recently in Haroco,

Inc. v. American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of

Chicago, 38 F.3d 1429, 1441 (7th Cir. 1994), we

sustained an award of exemplification costs that

included, among other things, the expense of

graphics services employed in preparing exhibits

for a successful summary judgment motion. See

generally 10 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure sec. 2677, at 453-58 (1998).

 In this case, the judge drew a line between the

physical preparation of a trial exhibit, which

would be compensable as exemplification, and the

means chosen to present that exhibit to the jury,

which she believed would not be. We appreciate

the convenience of that line, and there is a

certain logic to it. Here, for example, the

multi-media services for which the defendants

seek compensation were auxiliary in the sense

that these services did not involve the creation

of diagrams, charts, or graphs, but merely the

packaging and display of pre-existing documents

and other exhibits. To that extent, the use of a

multi-media presentation may have less to do with

conveying information to judge and jury than it

does with an effort to wow them. No doubt the

statute does not obligate the losing party to pay

for the victor’s "glitz," as Judge Leinenweber

has observed. BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading

Co., No. 86 C 5602, 1992 WL 229473, at *3 (N.D.

Ill. Sept. 11).

 But in view of the illustrative purpose of

exemplification, we are not convinced that the

line between producing an exhibit and presenting

that exhibit to the court is the most appropriate

one to draw. Enlarging a crucial document, for

example, may be the only practical means of

permitting a witness to point out the forensic

features of that document. Imagine, for example,

the jurors and the judge poring over individual,

unenlarged copies of the document with bifocals

and magnifying glasses as they try to keep pace

with an expert’s testimony identifying for them

the unique whorls of a fingerprint or swirls of

a signature. Yet, the enlargement is simply a

bigger version of evidence that already exists;

in effect, it serves only to present that

evidence in a more effective manner. In a like

vein, a witness may require the use of a

transparency so that she can explain or highlight

the pertinent aspects of a chart she has

prepared. That transparency would be worthless

without the overhead projector needed to display

it to the judge and jury; but the projector plays

no role in the production of the exhibit, it is

simply the means of presentation. Allowing fees

for the cost of preparing the transparency but

not for renting the projector would in this sense

be a highly formalistic distinction, as each is

key to the illustrative function of the exhibit.

 So long as the means of presentation furthers

the illustrative purpose of an exhibit, we

believe it is potentially compensable as

exemplification. This approach allows appropriate

room for the more sophisticated types of multimedia presentations made possible by
technological advances. Given the costs

associated with some of these presentations, this

is an area that Congress may wish to revisit and

supply further guidance. But we find no limits

inherent in the term "exemplification" that would

permit a court to award costs for the more

familiar means of illustration--models, charts,

graphs, and the like--but preclude it from

compensating a party for an animated

reconstruction of an accident, for example, or

other types of computer-based, multimedia

displays.

 Of course, even when a particular item

qualifies as exemplification, a court must still

determine whether it was "necessarily obtained

for use in the case." sec. 1920(4). The district

judge is uniquely suited to make that assessment,

and we will not disturb her judgment in this

respect absent a clear abuse of discretion. See

Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926,

945 (7th Cir. 1997); Illinois v. Sangamo Constr.

Co., 657 F.2d 855, 867 (7th Cir. 1981). Among the

factors that the judge might consider in

evaluating the necessity of a particular type of

exemplification is whether the nature and context

of the information being presented genuinely

called for the means of illustration that the

party employed. In other words, was the

exemplification vital to the presentation of the

information, or was it merely a convenience or,

worse, an extravagance? See, e.g., McDowell v.

Safeway Stores, Inc., 758 F.2d 1293, 1294 (8th

Cir. 1985) (per curiam). Exemplification that was

not reasonably necessary to the presentation of

one’s case to the court does not qualify for

reimbursement under section 1920(4)./6 See

McIlveen v. Stone Container Corp., 910 F.2d 1581,

1584 (7th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Kenosha

Unified School Dist. No. 1, 620 F.2d at 1227-28.

 Moreover, a finding that the exemplification was

"necessarily obtained for use in the case" does

not definitively resolve the question of

reimbursement either. Rule 54(d) makes quite

clear that although there is a presumption in

favor of a cost award to the prevailing party,

the district court retains the discretion to

direct otherwise. Crawford Fitting Co., 482 U.S.

at 441-42, 107 S. Ct. at 2497. In all cases,

therefore, the court retains the equitable

authority to deny compensation to a prevailing

party for costs that are compensable under the

statute. Ibid.; see also SCA Servs., Inc. v.

Lucky Stores, 599 F.2d 178, 180 (7th Cir. 1979);

but see Weeks, 126 F.3d at 945 ("the court must

award costs unless it states good reasons for

denying them").

 In this case, Judge Pallmeyer denied the award
of costs for the multi-media presentation based

solely on her determination that such costs

resulted from the presentation of exhibits rather

than the physical preparation of them. As the

foregoing discussion indicates, we believe that

prevailing parties can, under appropriate

circumstances, be reimbursed for the cost of

computer generated, multi-media presentations

even to the degree that such presentations are

used not to produce exhibits but rather to

display them to the court. Consequently, we

cannot sustain the denial of costs for the reason

Judge Pallmeyer articulated. It may be that the

judge would have reached the same conclusion on

other grounds--she might conclude that the multimedia system that the defendants employed was not

reasonably necessary or that equitable

considerations otherwise militate against part or

all of the costs the defendants have sought for

this system. She did not reach these

considerations, however, and it is not our place

to predict how she would resolve them. We will

therefore remand the matter of costs for further

consideration.

IV.

 We affirm the judgment in favor of the

defendants. The denial of costs to the defendants

for use of the computerized, multi-media system

is vacated and remanded for further consideration

consistent with this opinion. Costs to the

defendants.

/* Judge Pallmeyer presided over the trial of this

case with the consent of the parties. Subsequent

to the completion of the trial, the United States

Senate confirmed her appointment to serve as a

District Judge.

/1 Perkins thought--incorrectly, he was later

informed--that directing profanity at a police

officer constituted disorderly conduct.

/2 See generally Christianson v. Colt Indus.

Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815-17, 108 S. Ct.

2166, 2177-78 (1988); Arizona v. California, 460

U.S. 605, 618-19, 103 S. Ct. 1382, 1391 (1983);

Best v. Shell Oil Co., 107 F.3d 544, 546 (7th

Cir. 1997).

/3 Because the jury could have concluded that

Perkins might reasonably have believed he had

probable cause to arrest Tyrone for battery, we

need not consider whether Perkins’ belief that

Tyrone had also engaged in disorderly conduct was

also reasonable.
/4 We acknowledge that due to a medical emergency in

his family, the plaintiffs’ lead counsel was

absent from the jury instruction conference.

Nonetheless, the plaintiffs were represented at

the conference by his co-counsel. Furthermore,

the Cefalus’ lead counsel received a final set of

the instructions on the morning of closing

argument and was present when the jury was later

charged. Consequently, he had ample opportunity

to object before the jury retired to deliberate,

as Rule 51 requires. His failure to do so

confirms that appellate review is foreclosed, as

we have been unwilling to extend the plain error

doctrine to civil jury instructions given the

unequivocal terms of the rule. See, e.g., Carter

v. Chicago Police Officers, 165 F.3d 1071, 1077

(7th Cir. 1998), citing Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d

1356, 1361-62 (7th Cir. 1988); Knox v. Indiana,

93 F.3d 1327, 1333 (7th Cir. 1996).

/5 The court cited two cases for the proposition

that recovery under section 1920(4) is limited to

the expense of physically preparing exhibits:

Zuill v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366, 1371 (9th Cir.

1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1090, 117 S. Ct.

763 (1997), and In re Air Crash Disaster at John

F. Kennedy Int’l Airport, 687 F.2d 626, 631 (2d

Cir. 1982). The line that these cases draw,

however, is one between the cost of conducting

the research and analysis eventually reflected in

the exhibit, and the cost of actually preparing

the exhibit itself. The latter expense is deemed

compensable while the former is not. See, e.g.,

Zuill, 80 F.3d at 1371 ("Fees for exemplification

and copying ’are permitted only for the physical

preparation and duplication of documents, not the

intellectual effort involved in their

production.’"), quoting Romero v. City of Pomona,

883 F.2d 1418, 1428 (9th Cir. 1989).

Consequently, these cases do not address the

precise question presented here.

/6 For parties who are concerned about the prospect

of reimbursement for costly exemplification, we

take the opportunity to repeat that the issue may

be raised in advance of trial pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(4) and (c)(16). See Wahl

v. Carrier Mfg. Co., 511 F.2d 209, 217 (7th Cir.

1975); see also 3 Business and Commercial Litigation in

Federal Courts sec. 47.5(a), at 813-14 (Robert L.

Haig ed.) (West Group & ABA 1998); 10 Charles

Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure sec.

2677, at 458 (1998).