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Cite as 312 Neb. 909

Central States Development, LLC, and 

Saint James Apartment Partners, LLC, 

appellants, v. Elizabeth Friedgut 

and DLA Piper, LLP, appellees.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed November 18, 2022. No. S-21-818.

1. Motions to Dismiss: Jurisdiction: Pleadings: Evidence. When a trial 

court relies solely on pleadings and supporting affidavits in ruling on a 

motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff need 

only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction to survive the motion. 

However, if the court holds an evidentiary hearing on the issue or 

decides the matter after trial, then the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.

2. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. An appellate court examines the question of whether the nonmoving party has established a prima facie case 

of personal jurisdiction de novo.

3. Motions to Dismiss: Appeal and Error. In reviewing the grant of a 

motion to dismiss, an appellate court must look at the facts in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all factual conflicts 

in favor of that party.

4. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Personal jurisdiction is the power of 

a tribunal to subject and bind a particular entity to its decisions.

5. Due Process: Jurisdiction: States. Before a court can exercise personal 

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the court must determine, 

first, whether the long-arm statute is satisfied and, second, whether 

minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum state for 

personal jurisdiction over the defendant without offending due process.

6. Jurisdiction: States: Legislature: Intent. It was the intention of the 

Legislature to provide for the broadest allowable jurisdiction over nonresidents under Nebraska’s long-arm statute.

7. Due Process: Jurisdiction: States. When a state construes its longarm statute to confer jurisdiction to the fullest extent constitutionally 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

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permitted, the inquiry collapses into the single question of whether 

jurisdiction comports with due process.

8. Jurisdiction: States. To constitute sufficient minimum contacts, a 

defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state must be such 

that he or she should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.

9. ____: ____. A court exercises two types of personal jurisdiction depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case: general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction.

10. Jurisdiction. General personal jurisdiction arises where a defendant’s 

affiliations with a state are so continuous and systematic as to render the 

defendant essentially at home in the forum state.

11. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Specific personal jurisdiction 

requires that a claim arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts 

with the forum.

12. ____: ____. For specific personal jurisdiction, there must be a substantial connection between the defendant’s contacts with the forum state 

and the operative facts of the litigation.

13. ____: ____. Specific personal jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of 

issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.

14. Jurisdiction: States: Contracts. The existence of a contract with a 

party in a forum state does not, in and of itself, provide the necessary 

contacts for personal jurisdiction.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Marlon 

A. Polk, Judge. Affirmed.

Richard P. McGowan, of McGowan Law Firm, P.C., L.L.O., 

for appellants.

Joseph S. Daly and Mary M. Schott, of Evans & Dixon, 

L.L.C., and Martin J. O’Hara, of Much Shelist, P.C., pro hac 

vice, for appellees.

Heavican, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and 

Freudenberg, JJ.

Funke, J.

INTRODUCTION

Central States Development, LLC (Central States), and Saint 

James Apartment Partners (SJ Apartment) appeal the dismissal 
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Cite as 312 Neb. 909

of their complaint against Elizabeth Friedgut and the law firm 

of DLA Piper, LLP.

Friedgut, as an employee of DLA Piper, represented Central 

States and SJ Apartment in a dispute with the U.S. Department 

of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Central States 

and SJ Apartment sued Friedgut and DLA Piper in connection 

with that representation, alleging legal malpractice. The district 

court found Friedgut and DLA Piper did not have the requisite 

minimum contacts with Nebraska for the court to have personal 

jurisdiction. Central States and SJ Apartment appeal. For the 

reasons set forth herein, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Central States is a limited liability company operating in 

Nebraska and elsewhere. Its activities include developing and 

managing low- and moderate-income housing. Central States 

owns and operates apartment complexes that contract with 

HUD. HUD provides funds to Central States through “Housing 

Assistance Payment” (HAP) contracts that amount to all or a 

significant portion of a tenant’s rent. Resultingly, a specific 

complex’s primary source of revenue can consist of these payments by HUD rather than payments by tenants.

SJ Apartment is a Nebraska limited liability company. At 

all relevant times, Central States was the managing member 

of SJ Apartment and John Foley was the sole manager of 

Central States. Foley created SJ Apartment to acquire and 

develop an Omaha, Nebraska, apartment complex known as St. 

James Manor.

The prior owner of St. James Manor operated the complex 

in connection with a HAP contract. Central States and SJ 

Apartment applied for and were awarded tax credits from the 

Nebraska Investment Finance Authority to buy and develop 

St. James Manor. As part of the project, the prior owner 

assigned its interest in its HAP contracts for the property to 

SJ Apartment.

Foley solicited Friedgut’s legal representation in order to 

obtain HUD’s approval of the HAP assignment. Friedgut’s 
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practice focused on federal law, and she had experience working as legal counsel at HUD and with HAP contracts. Central 

States had a preexisting relationship with Friedgut insofar as 

it had initially retained her after its Missouri-based mortgage 

lender recommended it seek her services on an issue involving 

another property. Foley initially contacted Friedgut for assist

ance with a HUD-related issue involving a property in Iowa. 

He did so by calling her office in Chicago, Illinois.

Friedgut is a resident of Illinois and a former employee of 

DLA Piper’s office in Chicago, Illinois. Central States and SJ 

Apartment’s allegations concern Friedgut’s representation of 

them while she was an employee of DLA Piper. Friedgut has 

never been licensed to practice law in Nebraska, has never been 

admitted pro hac vice in Nebraska, and has never appeared in 

any Nebraska court. Friedgut stated in her affidavit that she 

represented Central States and SJ Apartment without setting 

foot in Nebraska in relation to them or St. James Manor.

The director of operations for the office of general counsel 

at DLA Piper stated in his affidavit that DLA Piper was organized in Maryland and that its principal place of business is 

in Maryland. It does not have a Nebraska office, nor does it 

own or lease property in Nebraska, have a registered agent in 

Nebraska, have any employees or partners living in Nebraska, 

or have any attorneys with an active license to practice law in 

Nebraska. DLA Piper has a website that is generally accessible 

but that is not directed at Nebraska or Nebraska residents.

HUD is a federal agency, and HAP is a federal program. 

Friedgut communicated with Foley regarding HUD issues 

involving properties in Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, and Colorado. 

She communicated with HUD on Foley’s behalf in connection with St. James Manor and other properties outside of 

Nebraska. Her affidavit provides that she communicated with 

HUD exclusively through HUD’s regional office in Kansas 

City, Kansas, and headquarters in Washington, D.C. Friedgut 

has no recollection of communicating with HUD’s local 

office in Omaha on behalf of Central States or SJ Apartment. 
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The Kansas City office was her primary point of contact with 

HUD. Friedgut was not involved in Central States and SJ 

Apartment’s acquisition of St. James Manor or the award of 

tax credits by the Nebraska Investment Finance Authority. 

She maintains that her involvement relating to each of Central 

States’ properties was specific to issues with HUD. Foley did, 

at some point, have Nebraska counsel, and Friedgut’s affidavit 

provides that Foley “increasingly relied on his Nebraska counsel” in 2019.

Friedgut and DLA Piper regularly billed Central States and 

SJ Apartment for Friedgut’s services by mailing invoices to 

Foley in Omaha, and Foley made payments on those invoices. 

Foley’s affidavit provides that Friedgut communicated with 

him orally and in writing, participating in “dozens” of phone 

calls with him while he was in Omaha. Friedgut also participated in phone calls with other Nebraska-based parties in her 

representation of Central States and SJ Apartment, including 

the property manager and employees of St. James Manor, the 

prior owner of St. James Manor, and other counsel. She did not 

interact with Nebraska state officials or tenants of St. James 

Manor. Friedgut and DLA Piper never sent Foley an engagement letter or written services agreement, suggested a need for 

independent counsel, or otherwise expressly disavowed personal jurisdiction in Nebraska.

Friedgut was representing Central States and SJ Apartment 

when HUD indicated that it would not approve the prior 

owner’s assignment of its HAP contract. Central States and 

SJ Apartment allege that HUD’s unwillingness to approve the 

HAP assignment was “arbitrary and capricious,” “completely 

irrational,” and “contrary to HUD policy goals.” Despite that, 

Central States and SJ Apartment allege that Friedgut did not 

seek reconsideration of the decision, a further meeting, or any 

appeal; when Foley asked about appeal, Friedgut responded 

she was unaware of any such process even though an appeal 

process was available; and no timely appeal was brought. 

Central States and SJ Apartment further allege that because 
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the HAP assignment was not approved, SJ Apartment was 

unable to receive any meaningful rental income through HUD 

payments or otherwise and filed for bankruptcy protection; 

SJ Apartment sued HUD through Nebraska counsel and convinced HUD to retroactively approve the HAP assignment; 

and by that time, retroactive approval was futile because SJ 

Apartment had already lost St. James Manor to foreclosure in 

bankruptcy proceedings.

In December 2020, Central States and SJ Apartment filed a 

complaint in the district court for Douglas County, Nebraska, 

against Friedgut and DLA Piper alleging legal malpractice. 

Friedgut and DLA Piper subsequently moved to dismiss, arguing a lack of personal jurisdiction over themselves in the State 

of Nebraska.

The district court held a hearing to address the jurisdictional 

issue, and evidence was received. At the hearing, Friedgut and 

DLA Piper emphasized that Friedgut did not initiate or solicit 

contact with Foley to commence the parties’ relationship. 

Friedgut and DLA Piper argued that Friedgut’s representation 

of Central States and SJ Apartment exclusively concerned federal law and HUD. Friedgut and DLA Piper maintained that 

the location of St. James Manor was not determinative.

At the hearing, the district court compared the case to 

Yeransian v. Willkie Farr 1 in explaining its conclusion that 

Friedgut and DLA Piper “[had] not purposefully availed themselves to the jurisdiction of Nebraska and would not expect 

to be haled into court [in the state].” The district court found 

it important that Foley initially reached out to Friedgut in 

Chicago to solicit her services.

The district court dismissed Central States and SJ 

Apartment’s complaint on September 13, 2021. This appeal 

followed. Before the Court of Appeals addressed the appeal, 

we moved it to our docket. 2

1 Yeransian v. Willkie Farr, 305 Neb. 693, 942 N.W.2d 226 (2020).

2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Central States and SJ Apartment assign, restated, that the 

district court erred in finding that the court lacked personal 

jurisdiction over Friedgut and DLA Piper.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] When a trial court relies solely on pleadings and supporting affidavits in ruling on a motion to dismiss for want 

of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff need only make a prima 

facie showing of jurisdiction to survive the motion. 3 However, 

if the court holds an evidentiary hearing on the issue or decides 

the matter after trial, then the plaintiff bears the burden of 

demonstrating personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of 

the evidence. 4

[2,3] An appellate court examines the question of whether 

the nonmoving party has established a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction de novo. 5 In reviewing the grant of a motion 

to dismiss, an appellate court must look at the facts in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all factual 

conflicts in favor of that party. 6

ANALYSIS

[4,5] Because the district court’s hearing was on the issue 

of personal jurisdiction and the evidence received was limited 

to affidavits with accompanying exhibits, we review de novo 

the legal question of whether a prima facie case of personal 

jurisdiction has been established. 7 Personal jurisdiction is the 

power of a tribunal to subject and bind a particular entity to 

its decisions. 8 The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment 

to the U.S. Constitution bars a court from exercising personal 

3 RFD-TV v. WildOpenWest Finance, 288 Neb. 318, 849 N.W.2d 107 (2014).

4 Id.

5 Yeransian, supra note 1.

6 RFD-TV, supra note 3.

7 See id.

8 See Yeransian, supra note 1.
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jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, served with process 

outside the state, unless that defendant has sufficient ties to the 

forum state. 9 Thus, before a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the court must determine, 

first, whether the state’s long-arm statute is satisfied and, second, whether minimum contacts exist between the defendant 

and the forum state for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant without offending due process. 10 When 

contested, the burden of proving a forum court has personal 

jurisdiction falls on the plaintiffs. 11

[6,7] Nebraska’s long-arm statute extends its courts’ jurisdiction over a person who falls into one of the categories 

enumerated under the statute or who has “any other contact 

with or maintains any other relation to this state to afford a 

basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with 

the Constitution of the United States.” 12 It was the intention of 

the Legislature to provide for the broadest allowable jurisdiction over nonresidents under Nebraska’s long-arm statute. 13

When, like here, a state construes its long-arm statute to 

confer jurisdiction to the fullest extent constitutionally permitted, the inquiry collapses into the single question of whether 

jurisdiction comports with due process. 14 Therefore, the issue 

is whether Friedgut and DLA Piper had sufficient minimum 

contacts with Nebraska so that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice. 15

9 Hand Cut Steaks Acquisitions v. Lone Star Steakhouse, 298 Neb. 705, 905 

N.W.2d 644 (2018).

10 Yeransian, supra note 1.

11 See Nimmer v. Giga Entertainment Media, 298 Neb. 630, 905 N.W.2d 523 

(2018).

12 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-536 (Reissue 2016).

13 Yeransian, supra note 1.

14 Id.

15 See id.
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Minimum Contacts

[8-11] To constitute sufficient minimum contacts, a defend

ant’s conduct and connection with the forum state must be 

such that he or she should reasonably anticipate being haled 

into court there. 16 In other words, a Nebraska court’s ability 

to impose liability should be predictable to the parties before 

the court based on their own actions. 17 A court exercises two 

types of personal jurisdiction depending upon the facts and 

circumstances of the case: general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. 18 General personal jurisdiction arises 

where a defendant’s affiliations with a state are so continuous 

and systematic as to render the defendant essentially at home 

in the forum state. 19 Specific personal jurisdiction, by contrast, 

requires that a claim arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. 20 Friedgut and DLA Piper do not appear to 

have “continuous and systematic” connections with Nebraska; 

nor are they “essentially at home” in the state. Rather, Central 

States and SJ Apartment maintain that the district court had specific personal jurisdiction over Friedgut and DLA Piper.

Specific Personal Jurisdiction

[12,13] Where a defendant’s contacts with the forum state 

are insufficient to exercise general personal jurisdiction, specific personal jurisdiction is available if the claim arises out 

of or sufficiently relates to the defendant’s contacts with 

the forum in a way that creates a substantial connection 

between the defendant’s connections to the forum state and the 

16 Id.

17 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 

S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980) (“[t]he Due Process Clause . . . gives a 

degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants 

to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to 

where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit”).

18 Yeransian, supra note 1.

19 Id.

20 Id.
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operative facts of the litigation. 21 Naturally, then, specific personal jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving 

from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes 

jurisdiction. 22 Purposeful availment is essential to any finding 

of personal jurisdiction. 23 Accordingly, here, we must consider 

the quality and type of Friedgut’s and DLA Piper’s activities 

and determine whether their actions create substantial connections with Nebraska, resulting in their purposeful availment of 

Nebraska’s benefits, protections, and laws.

[14] Central States and SJ Apartment correctly argue that 

physical presence in the forum state is not always necessary 

to establish personal jurisdiction. In Williams v. Gould, Inc., 24

we explained: “Despite lack of physical presence in the state 

where a contract is to be performed, a nonresident defendant, 

who purposefully directs activities toward a forum state’s residents, through such contract, may be constitutionally subjected 

to suit in the state where the contract is to be performed.” 

Pointing to Williams, Central States and SJ Apartment contend that Friedgut and DLA Piper purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of conducting activity in Nebraska by 

entering into an attorney-client relationship with “Nebraska 

entities” for which they billed their services. 25 However, the 

existence of a contract with a party in a forum state does not, 

in and of itself, provide the necessary contacts for personal 

jurisdiction. 26

In Williams, an out-of-state physician contacted a lead refinery and proposed terms for a contract engaging his serv

ices as a long-term consultant regarding lead poisoning. 27 We 

21 See id.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Williams v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 862, 879, 443 N.W.2d 577, 588 (1989).

25 Brief for appellant at 11.

26 Yeransian, supra note 1.

27 See Williams, supra note 24.
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concluded that under the facts and circumstances, a Nebraska 

court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over the physician was appropriate. 28 In examining similar cases from other 

jurisdictions, we found that it was the defendant’s purposeful 

act of soliciting patients from the forum state which provided 

the necessary foreseeability of being haled into court in the 

forum state and allowed personal jurisdiction to attach. 29 We 

emphasized, however, that the residence and activities of a 

physician’s patient cannot, unilaterally, supply the minimum 

contacts necessary for due process. 30

Here, the parties agree that Foley reached out to Friedgut 

at her Chicago office after a third party recommended her. 

Friedgut represented Nebraska entities, but she did not solicit 

Nebraska residents or entities as clients. Neither, in this case, 

did DLA Piper. The district court noted this point when distinguishing the case from Williams.

[In] determining whether our courts have jurisdiction over 

a plaintiff’s current or former out-of-state attorney, and insofar as it informs our “purposeful availment” analysis, we may 

consider which party’s actions effectively initiated an attorneyclient relationship. 31 Pointedly, a Nebraska-based client will 

not provide a sufficient basis for specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident attorney absent the solicitation of 

Nebraska-based clients or something else linking the attorney 

to the state. 32

Outside of Nebraska, “case law overflows on the point 

that providing out-of-state legal representation is not enough 

28 See id.

29 See id.

30 See id.

31 Cf. Williams, supra note 24, 232 Neb. at 881, 443 N.W.2d at 589 (“when 

a health care provider, such as a physician or hospital, purposefully directs 

activities toward a resident of the forum state, the provider is subject 

to the personal jurisdiction of courts in the state where the health care 

recipient resides”).

32 See Yeransian, supra note 1.
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to subject an out-of-state lawyer or law firm to the personal 

jurisdiction of the state in which a client resides.” 33 Other 

jurisdictions generally support the proposition that a nonresident attorney providing expertise specific to federal law or 

another state’s law is not subject to a state’s jurisdiction solely 

based on a client’s or third party’s residency and activities in 

the forum state. 34 As noted by Friedgut and DLA Piper, the 

plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and 

the forum. 35 Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must 

form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the 

basis for its jurisdiction over the defendant. 36

In a case factually similar to the matter before us, the 

Indiana Supreme Court rejected an argument that specific personal jurisdiction should attach. 37 In Boyer v. Smith, employers 

brought claims, including malicious prosecution and abuse of 

process, against a Kentucky-based attorney. 38 The employers’ 

33 Cape v. von Maur, 932 F. Supp. 124, 128 (D. Md. 1996) (citing Sher v. 

Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990); Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds,

823 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1987); Kowalski v. Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & 

Murphy, 787 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1986); and Mayes v. Leipziger, 674 F.2d 178 

(2d Cir. 1982)).

34 See, e.g., Companion Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Palermo, 723 F.3d 557 

(5th Cir. 2013); Boyer v. Smith, 42 N.E.3d 505 (Ind. 2015); Fulbright & 

Jaworski v. Eighth Jud. Dist., 131 Nev. 30, 342 P.3d 997 (2015); Cerberus 

Partners v. Gadsby & Hannah, LLP, 836 A.2d 1113 (R.I. 2003). See, also, 

Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381 (1st Cir. 1995); Porter v. Berall, 142 F. 

Supp. 2d 1145 (W.D. Mo. 2001), affirmed 293 F.3d 1073 (8th Cir. 2002); 

Ex parte Dill, Dill, Carr, Stonbraker, 866 So. 2d 519 (Ala. 2003).

35 See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 188 L. Ed. 2d 12 

(2014).

36 See id. See, also, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 

U.S. 408, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984) (unilateral activity 

of another person not appropriate consideration in determining whether 

defendant has sufficient contacts with forum to justify assertion of 

jurisdiction).

37 See Boyer, supra note 34.

38 See id.
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suit was filed in Indiana and related to the attorney’s representation of a former employee in a federal employment discrimination lawsuit. 39 In the underlying matter, the attorney 

had requested and received a notice of right to sue from the 

Indianapolis, Indiana, office of the U.S. Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a federal agency, after her 

client’s pro se claim was transferred from the Ohio EEOC 

office. 40 The attorney then filed the lawsuit in a Kentucky 

federal district court. 41 The employers argued that the attorney 

had subjected herself to Indiana jurisdiction by communicating 

with the Indiana EEOC, corresponding with and sending documents to the employers’ Indiana attorney, and representing her 

client at a deposition in Indiana. 42 But the Indiana Supreme 

Court disagreed, finding the attorney’s contacts with Indiana 

far too minimal to warrant specific personal jurisdiction. 43 In 

so holding, the Indiana Supreme Court noted that the attorney had never practiced law in Indiana, had never sought or 

obtained a license to practice law in Indiana, and was not soliciting business in Indiana. 44

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals conducted a comparable analysis in Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds.

 45 In 

Austad Co., a South Dakota business sued a New York-based 

law firm, alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary 

duty. 46 The claim was based on the firm’s representation of 

39 See id.

40 See id.

41 See id. See, also, Boyer v. Smith, 24 N.E.3d 435 (Ind. App. 2014), vacated

37 N.E.3d 960 (Ind. 2015), and affirmed in part and in part vacated 42 

N.E.3d 505 (Ind. 2015).

42 Id.

43 Id.

44 Id.

45 Austad Co., supra note 33.

46 Id.
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the business in patent litigation in Maryland. 47 The firm’s 

contacts with South Dakota included numerous phone calls 

into the state, monthly bills mailed into the state, checks paid 

by a South Dakota bank, and a 3-day visit to South Dakota by 

agents of the firm to inspect documents. 48 The Eighth Circuit 

found these contacts insufficient to establish that the firm 

purposefully availed itself of the benefits of South Dakota 

law. 49 In affirming the district court’s dismissal of the claim, 

the Eighth Circuit noted, among other factors, that the firm 

did not maintain an office, advertise, or solicit business in 

South Dakota. 50

Central States and SJ Apartment emphasize that St. James 

Manor is in Nebraska and that “the damage to the Nebraska 

clients occurred in Nebraska, when they lost their Nebraska 

development project to foreclosure in Nebraska.” 51 This same 

“effects of misconduct” approach has been rejected by other 

courts. 52 Further, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in Walden 53:

[A]n injury is jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it 

shows that the defendant has formed a contact with the 

forum State. The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether 

the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a 

meaningful way.

47 Id.

48 Id.

49 Id.

50 Id.

51 Brief for appellant at 11.

52 See, e.g., Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381 (1st Cir. 1995) (legal 

malpractice); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Malmo, 939 F.2d 535 (8th 

Cir. 1991) (legal malpractice); Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 

1972) (medical malpractice); Poole v. Sasson, 122 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. 

Pa. 2000) (accountant malpractice); State ex rel. Sperandio v. Clymer, 581 

S.W.2d 377 (Mo. 1979) (medical malpractice).

53 Walden, supra note 35, 571 U.S. at 290.
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We are not persuaded that the location of St. James Manor 

provided Friedgut and DLA Piper with a meaningful connection to Nebraska when the legal benefit their clients sought was 

a contract with a federal agency and through a federal program, 

under which St. James Manor could just as well have been in 

another state. We are also not persuaded that the Nebraskaspecific injuries alleged by Central States and SJ Apartment, 

including the loss of St. James Manor, provided Friedgut and 

DLA Piper a meaningful connection to Nebraska.

Central States and SJ Apartment have not met their burden 

of demonstrating that a Nebraska court can constitutionally 

exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Friedgut and DLA 

Piper. The facts show that Foley reached out to Friedgut at 

her Chicago office, hoping she could help Central States and 

SJ Apartment navigate a dispute with a federal agency and 

facilitate approval of a contract through a federal program. 

Further, Friedgut performed all of her work from Illinois, she 

was never licensed to practice law in Nebraska, she never traveled to Nebraska for the case, she never filed suit in Nebraska, 

and she never provided in-court representation in Nebraska. 

Additionally, neither Friedgut nor DLA Piper had offices in 

Nebraska or ever advertised in or solicited any business from 

Nebraska. This informs a finding that Friedgut and DLA Piper 

did not purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of transacting business in Nebraska. Further, it appears that Friedgut’s 

representation was specific to HUD and federal law; as such, 

we are unconvinced that she and DLA Piper reasonably anticipated being haled into a Nebraska court in connection with 

this representation.

Central States and SJ Apartment further argue that Friedgut 

and DLA Piper should have anticipated being haled into a 

Nebraska court because, as a sophisticated attorney and an 

international law firm, they could easily have provided Central 

States and SJ Apartment with an engagement letter expressly 

disavowing Nebraska jurisdiction. We are not persuaded that 

the sophistication of legal professionals contorts the applicable 
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analysis in such a way, and we are unwilling to impose the 

high standard suggested.

Finally, Foley’s affidavit maintains that Friedgut’s representation of Central States and SJ Apartment “went beyond mere 

HUD matters.” Without more, however, conclusory statements 

such as these provide an insufficient basis for an exercise of 

specific personal jurisdiction. Due process requires more than 

the attenuated contacts before us. 54

CONCLUSION

The district court did not err in dismissing Central States 

and SJ Apartment’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Affirmed.

Miller-Lerman, J., participating on briefs.

54 See Walden, supra note 35.