IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUFKIN DIVISION

LUCINDA CHOULES, ON BEHALF OF 

ELIZABETH IRVING ARNOLD,

Plaintiff,

v. 

JENNIFER CHOULES OGLE and PAMELA 

CHOUSLES,

Defendants.

NO. 9:23-CV-00055-MJT-ZJH

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DISMISSING CASE 

This case is assigned to the Honorable Michael J. Truncale, United States District Judge, 

and is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial management. 

Pending before the court is pro se Plaintiff Lucinda Choules’s (hereinafter, “Lucinda”) Motion for 

Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. No. 2; see 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

After reviewing Lucinda’s application to proceed in forma pauperis solely on the basis of 

financial status, the court finds that Lucinda meets the indigence requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

However, pursuant to the court’s own motion, the undersigned recommends that the court dismiss 

the case sua sponte because Lucinda has failed to establish this court has subject-matter 

jurisdiction to entertain this case.

Because Lucinda is proceeding pro se, her pleadings are held to “less stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and, as such, must be liberally construed. Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Perez v. United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194-95 (5th Cir. 2002). 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

The present action arises out of an underlying analogous probate dispute in the Superior 

Court of California, County of Riverside, Probate Division. Doc. No. 1 at 2. The basis for this 

dispute began in September 2019, when Lucinda alleges that her sister, Pamela Choules

(hereinafter, “Pamela”), abducted their mother, Elizabeth Irving Arnold, from Lucinda’s home in 

Texas. Id. at 4. At that time, Pamela allegedly represented to Lucinda that she would escort their 

mother to an Alzheimer’s specialist, however, instead, moved their mother closer to Pamela’s 

family in Tennessee. Id. From there, Pamela allegedly “tricked” their mom into entering an 

assisted-living facility in Perris, California. Id. at 5. Since this alleged abduction, Lucinda

maintains that Pamela severely mistreated their mother during her stay in Pamela’s custody, and 

therefore, requests the court “bring her [mom] back home to [Texas] to live with [Lucinda].” Id.

at 6.

On March 4, 2022, Lucinda filed her Petition for Appointment of Conservator of Elizabeth 

Irving Arnold and a subsequent Petition for Appointment of Temporary Conservator, in the Probate 

Division of the Riverside, California Superior Court (“California Probate Court” or “Probate 

Court”). Matter of Elizabeth Irving Arnold, Case No. PRRI2200395 (Cal. Sup. Ct, Riverside Prob. 

Ct. Mar. 4, 2022). On March 16, 2022, the California Probate Court held a hearing on Lucinda’s

conservatorship petition, with Pamela present. Id., Mar. 16, 2022 Hr’g. At that time, the Probate 

Court denied Lucinda’s Petition for Appointment of Temporary Conservator. Id.

On May 19, 2022, Lucinda’s other sister, Jennifer Choules Ogle (hereinafter, “Jennifer”), 

and Pamela filed their joint Objection to Lucinda Choules’s Petition for Conservatorship of the 

Person of Elizabeth Irving Arnold. Id., May 19, 2022 Min. Entry. On June 16, 2022, Lucinda 

filed her second Petition for Appointment of Temporary Conservator (“Second Petition”), and on 

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June 17, 2022, Lucinda filed an Emergency Ex Parte Petition to Remove Elizabeth Irving Arnold 

From Care Facility (“Emergency Petition”). Id., June 16, 2022 & June 17, 2022 Min. Entries. On 

June 22, 2022, the Probate Court held a hearing on Lucinda’s Second Petition and denied her 

Emergency Petition after holding a hearing with Pamela and Jennifer present. Id., June 22, 2022 

Hr’g & Min. Entries. On November 3, 2022, Pamela and Jennifer filed their joint Objection to 

Lucinda’s Petition for Appointment of Temporary Conservator. Id., Nov. 3, 2022 Min. Entry. 

On March 22, 2023, the California Probate Court held a hearing and ruled on all pending 

petitions for the appointment of Elizabeth Arnold’s conservator. Id., Mar. 22, 2023 Hr’g & Min. 

Entries; Doc. No. 4. At this hearing, the Probate Court denied Lucinda’s petition, and granted

conservatorship rights over Elizabeth Arnold’s person and estate to Pamela and Jennifer. Id. On 

March 20, 2023, Lucinda filed her instant Complaint (Doc. No. 1) against her sisters Pamela and 

Jennifer, requesting this court grant her conservatorship rights over her mother.

II. Discussion

“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized 

by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies 

outside this limited jurisdiction, . . . and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party 

asserting jurisdiction”—here, the plaintiff. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (internal citations omitted). 

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain “cases 

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 

before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection 

of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 

“Thus, a losing party may not seek what amounts to appellate review of a final state court judgment 

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in a federal district court.” Del-Ray Battery Co. v. Douglas Battery Co., 635 F.3d 725, 729 (5th 

Cir. 2011); see also Uresti v. Berchelmann, 545 F. App’x 271, 272 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Under the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, ‘federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, lack appellate 

jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts.’”) (quoting Weekly v. Morrow,

204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000)). “‘[T]he doctrine usually applies only when a plaintiff explicitly 

attacks the validity of a state court’s judgment, though it can also apply if the plaintiff’s federal 

claims are also inextricably intertwined with a state judgment that the federal court is in essence 

being called upon to review the state court decision.’” Id. (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Guy, 682 

F.3d 381, 390–91 (5th Cir. 2012).

Thus, the court must recommend dismissing Lucinda’s lawsuit for two main reasons. First, 

Lucinda has not pleaded any cause of action against her sisters Pamela and Jennifer. Therefore, 

the court cannot discern whether Lucinda has attempted to invoke this court’s diversity jurisdiction

or federal question jurisdiction since Lucinda has not raised any legal theories or statutory 

violations. See generally Compl., Doc. No. 1. Instead, Lucinda has only represented that her 

requested relief is for the court “to help [her] rescue [her] mom and bring her back home to [Texas] 

to live with [Lucinda] as a free person,” and requests the court send U.S. Marshals to meet with 

her “to collect evidence in this case.” Id. at 6. Not only has Lucinda failed to plead any authority 

conferring this court to direct the U.S. Marshals to fulfill this request, but Lucinda has not pleaded 

any legal basis, statute, or theory for this requested relief, such that the court cannot discern 

whether this case is within the proper scope of its jurisdiction.

Second, even if Lucinda can properly invoke either diversity or federal question 

jurisdiction, the court expressly lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the 

conservatorship proceedings that have taken place in the California Probate Court. In Uresti, the 

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Fifth Circuit confronted a similar case to the present matter, where Alan Uresti brought a lawsuit 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “regarding his civil rights violations [which] arose directly from state 

court rulings in the conservatorship actions concerning his sons.” 545 F. App’x at 272. There, the 

Fifth Circuit held that his federal “civil rights claims arose from and are so inextricably intertwined 

with the state judgments that the federal court is essentially being called upon to review the state 

court decisions.” Id. at 272–73 (citation omitted). Therefore, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district 

court’s dismissal of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 273.

Similarly, in Moore v. Whitman, the Fifth Circuit once again reviewed a matter brought by 

a “state-court loser” in a conservatorship proceeding. 742 F. App’x 829 (5th Cir. 2018). In Moore, 

the Texas Department of Protective and Family Services removed a four-month-old child, ALH, 

from the custody of his biological parents, and placed him in foster care with the Hoods. Id. at 

830. Moore, ALH’s biological paternal aunt, also sought custody of ALH and filed a suit for 

modification of ALH’s managing conservatorship in Texas state court. Id. at 830–31. The state 

court held an eight-day trial and a jury concluded that the Hoods were better suited to become the 

sole managing conservators of ALH. Id. at 831. Moore brought a civil rights action in federal

district court thereafter, seeking an injunction prohibiting the Hoods from adopting ALH. Id.

There, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that the court lacked jurisdiction, concluding that: “Moore 

sought in her amended complaint injunctive relief halting ALH’s adoption—which the state-court 

allowed to proceed in favor of the Hoods—while Moore continued to pursue custody.[] This relief 

would have required the district court to modify the state appellate court’s judgment, which it 

cannot do.[]” Id. at 832 (internal footnotes omitted).

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As such, for the same reasons set forth in Uresti and Moore, this court lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction to entertain Lucinda’s action. Moore, 742 F. App’x at 832; Uresti, 545 F. App’x at 

273. On March 16, 2022, the California Probate Court denied Lucinda’s Petition for Appointment 

of Temporary Conservator, and on June 22, 2022, the Probate Court denied Lucinda’s Second 

Petition for Appointment of Temporary Conservator and Emergency Ex Parte Petition to Remove 

Elizabeth Irving Arnold From Care Facility. Mar. 16, 2022 Hr’g, June 16, 2022–June 17, 2022 

Min. Entries, Matter of Elizabeth Irving Arnold, Case No. PRRI2200395 (Cal. Sup. Ct, Riverside 

Prob. Ct.). Lucinda cannot seek what is essentially appellate review of these state court orders, 

and this court lacks authority to modify or nullify these state court decisions. Moore, 742 F. App’x

at 832; Uresti, 545 F. App’x at 272.

Furthermore, Lucinda also requests review of the Probate Court’s March 22, 2023, decision

denying Lucinda’s Petition for Appointment of Temporary Conservator, and granting

conservatorship rights of Elizabeth Arnold to Pamela and Jennifer. Id., Mar. 22, 2023 Hr’g & 

Min. Entries; Doc. No. 4. Indeed, Lucinda’s most recent filing admits that “[m]y sisters Pamela 

Choules and Jennifer Ogle were awarded Conservatorship of my mom Elizabeth Irving Arnold[.]” 

Doc. No. 4 at 1. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars any review of this matter.

Moreover, to the extent that this doctrine does not apply because Lucinda brought the 

instant matter two days before the California court’s decision, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic 

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to “state-court 

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced[,] [ ] inviting district court 

review and rejection of those judgments”), the court still lacks jurisdiction as federal courts cannot 

enjoin state court proceedings under the Anti-Injunction Act. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 866 

F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 2017); Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (“A court of the United States 

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may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by 

Act of Congress[.]”); Vines v. Univ. of La. at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The 

Anti-Injunction Act generally prohibits federal courts from interfering with proceedings in state 

court.”) (citation omitted). Furthermore, if any of the three (3) exceptions to the Anti-Injunction 

Act applies, Lucinda has failed to plead as such. Vines, 398 F.3d at 704. Thus, the court lacks the 

requisite subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain Lucinda’s case. The court should therefore 

dismiss this action with prejudice.

III. Recommendation

Plaintiff Lucinda Choules’ Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted. 

Choules’ Complaint (Doc. No. 1) should be dismissed with prejudice for failing to establish that 

the court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the case.

IV. Objections

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), each party to this action has the right to file 

objections to this Report and Recommendation. Objections to this Report must (1) be in writing, 

(2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, (3) be 

served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report, and (4) be 

no more than eight (8) pages in length. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); 

E.D. TEX. CIV. R. CV-72(c). A party who objects to this Report is entitled to a de novo

determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and recommendations 

to which a specific objection is timely made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3).

A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law contained in this Report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy 

of this Report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District 

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Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and (2) appellate review, except on grounds 

of plain error, of any such findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States 

District Judge. See Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988); Douglass v. United 

Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 

_________________________

Zack Hawthorn

United States Magistrate Judge SIGNED this 8th day of August, 2023.

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