SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1325 

CA 11-00240 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, FAHEY, CARNI, AND SCONIERS, JJ. 

 

NORTHERN TRUST, NA, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 

ESTATE OF RICHARD SARKIS, DECEASED, 

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PATRICIA A. DELLEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

MICHAEL J. CROSBY, HONEOYE FALLS, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

RICHARD G. VOGT, P.C., ROCHESTER (LINDA J. VOGT OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme

Court, Monroe County (Evelyn Frazee, J.), entered September 13, 2010. 

The order and judgment, among other things, adjudged that plaintiff is

entitled to receive all the proceeds from the sale of 3900 East Avenue

in the City of Rochester. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order and judgment so appealed from

is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order and judgment entered

following a nonjury trial that, inter alia, awarded plaintiff, as

administrator of the estate of Richard Sarkis (decedent), the proceeds

from the sale of 3900 East Avenue in Rochester (hereafter, property). 

When decedent and defendant became engaged, he gave her a diamond ring

and amended the contract that he had executed to purchase the property

by adding defendant as an additional purchaser. The deed to the

property listed decedent and defendant as “joint tenants with right of

survivorship.” Decedent subsequently ended the engagement and

commenced this action pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 80-b for the

return of the ring and to have defendant’s name removed from the deed. 

Defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in permitting

plaintiff to continue the instant action because the property became

solely hers when decedent died. We reject that contention. The court

properly concluded that an action pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 80-b

raises issues regarding the title and ownership interest in real

property that survive the death of a party (see generally Von Bing v

Mangione, 309 AD2d 1038, 1041; Clapper v Kohls, 169 AD2d 860; Pass v

Spirt, 35 AD2d 858, lv denied 27 NY2d 490). Unlike a pending

partition action (see generally Goetz v Slobey, 76 AD3d 954) or a

pending divorce action (see generally Kahn v Kahn, 43 NY2d 203, 207),
-2- 1325 

CA 11-00240 

a section 80-b action for the return of real property is not

extinguished upon the death of the party who commenced the action,

even where, as here, the subject property is held as joint tenants

with right of survivorship. 

We reject defendant’s further contention that the court erred in

awarding the proceeds from the sale of the property to plaintiff. “On

a bench trial, the decision of the fact-finding court should not be

disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court’s

conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the

evidence, especially when the findings of fact rest in large measure

on considerations relating to the credibility of witnesses” (Claridge

Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544, 544-545; see Thoreson v Penthouse

Intl., 80 NY2d 490, 495, rearg denied 81 NY2d 835; Treat v Wegmans

Food Mkts., Inc., 46 AD3d 1403, 1404). In order to recover property

pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 80-b, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

he or she gave the property as a gift in “sole consideration . . .

[of] a contemplated marriage which has not occurred . . . .” The

Court of Appeals has interpreted “ ‘consideration’ ” to mean “motive

or reason” (Gaden v Gaden, 29 NY2d 80, 86). Here, the court’s

conclusion that the property was given solely in consideration of

marriage is supported by the record and is based on a “ ‘fair

interpretation of the evidence’ ” (Treat, 46 AD3d at 1404). 

We have reviewed defendant’s remaining contentions and conclude

that they are without merit. 

Entered: December 30, 2011 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court