UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4255

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TERRIO TYRELL JONES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge. 

(8:09-cr-00446-HFF-1)

Submitted: February 18, 2011 Decided: March 18, 2011

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James B. Loggins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United 

States Attorney, A. Lance Crick, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Terrio Tyrell Jones pled guilty to possession of 

crack, powder cocaine, MDMA (Ecstasy) and marijuana with intent 

to distribute on June 20, 2007 (Count One); possession of crack, 

powder cocaine, and MDMA with intent to distribute on 

December 23, 2006 (Count Two); possession of crack with intent 

to distribute on July 12, 2008 (Count Three); and possession of 

marijuana with intent to distribute on March 16, 2009 (Count 

Four). The district court sentenced him within the advisory 

guideline range to a term of 104 months imprisonment. Jones 

appeals his sentence, contending that the district court 

committed significant procedural error by failing to explain 

adequately why it rejected his argument for a lower sentence 

based on the sentencing disparity produced by the then-current 

crack/powder cocaine ratio. We affirm.

Jones argued at sentencing for a lower ratio based on 

legislation then pending in Congress,*

 * The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which was enacted on 

August 3, 2010, changed the ratio from 100:1 to 18:1. Pub. L. 

No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.

which he asserted had the 

attorney general’s support. The court observed that it had 

witnessed the bad effects of crack and that Jones had benefitted 

from the 2007 amendments which lowered the guidelines for crack 

offenses. The government noted that Jones’ charges all involved 
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significant amounts of narcotics, and that he had resisted 

arrest and tried to flee in three of the four charged incidents. 

The government argued that a sentence within the guideline range 

would reflect the seriousness of the offense, afford adequate 

deterrence and protect the public from further crimes by Jones. 

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). The 

district court explicitly adopted the government’s view of the 

§ 3553(a) factors when it imposed a sentence within the 

guideline range.

A sentence is reviewed for procedural and substantive 

reasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

We must first ensure that the district court did not commit any 

“significant procedural error,” such as failing to properly 

calculate the applicable guidelines range, failing to consider

the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately 

explain the sentence. Id. The district court “must place on 

the record an individualized assessment based on the particular 

facts of the case before it [which] . . . provide[s] a rationale 

tailored to the particular case at hand and adequate to permit 

meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 

325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks, footnote, 

and citation omitted). This is true even when the district 

court sentences a defendant within the applicable guidelines 

range. Id. At the same time, a sentence imposed within a 
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properly calculated guidelines range enjoys a presumption of 

reasonableness on appeal. United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 

218 (4th Cir. 2008); see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 

346-56 (2007) (upholding appellate presumption of reasonableness 

for within-guidelines sentence). Thus, an extensive explanation 

is not required as long as the appellate court is satisfied 

“‘that [the district court] has considered the parties’ 

arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own 

legal decisionmaking authority.’” United States v. Engle, 592 

F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir.) (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356), cert. 

denied, 131 S. Ct. 165 (2010). 

Although Jones did not object to the alleged 

inadequacy of the district court’s ruling at sentencing, he 

preserved the issue for appeal simply by requesting a belowguideline sentence. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 

577-78 (4th Cir. 2010). He maintains on appeal that the 

district court “failed to consider or explain why it rejected 

application of a lower crack/powder ratio” under § 3553(a). 

After review of the record, we are satisfied that the court 

adequately explained its rejection of Jones’ argument when it 

adopted the government’s position that a sentence within the 

guideline range best served the § 3553(a) factors in light of 

his repeated drug trafficking conduct, his resistance to law 

enforcement authorities, and his history of flight when 
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arrested. We conclude that the court rendered a sufficiently 

individualized assessment to permit appellate review of the 

sentence. To the extent that Jones contests the substantive 

reasonableness of his sentence, we exercise our discretion to 

“apply a presumption of reasonableness” to his within-guideline 

sentence. United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 268 (4th Cir.) 

(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, internal quotation marks 

omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 507 (2010).

Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by the 

district court. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED