C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS
CHRI STOPHER BUCHANA N, Ap pe lla nt,
v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
. § § § § § § No . 0 8- 06 -0 02 03 -C R

Appea l from the 168th J udicial District Court of El Pa so County , T e xas (TC# 20050D01234)

O P I N I O N Christopher B uchana

n appea ls his conviction for murder . A jury found him g uilty

and assessed punishment of 28 year s’ conf inement. On appe al, Appellant a sserts in a sing le issue containingfour pa

rts that the evidenc e is insufficient a s a matter of law to sustain his conviction for murde r. We aff

irm the trial cour

t’s decision. In th e a ft e rn oo n o f F e br

ua ry 9, 20 05 , L isa

F inl e y inv ite d s ome fr ie nd s to he r h ou se in Northea st El Paso, Tex as. Appe llant Chris Bucha nan, Te rra

nce F err ar, a

nd Heather Ayon wer e amongthe people invited. Appe llant arrive d with a bottle of E & J brandy for e veryone to drink. After ever y one finished the bottle of E & J , Ms. Finley , Ms. Ay on, Mr. Fe rra r, and A ppellant decide d to go to a

bar. F irst, they

went to a ba

r ca lled Sist ers. Af

ter Sisters, they

went to a c lub called B ang kok and had mor e drinks. As B ang kok was c losing, Ms. F inley , Ms. Ay on, and Appellant lef

t and g ot into Ms. Ay on’s ca r. Mr. F err ar e x ited the bar a fe w moments later a

nd approa ched the side of the c ar where Appellant wa s sitti ng . He told Appellant that someone was inside “talkingshit.”-2-

Ap pe lla nt g ot o ut o f t

he c ar a nd we nt b a c k in sid e the ba

r w ithMr . F e rr ar. Th e y

c ame back to the c ar a

short time later; Mr. F err ar w as angry and cur sing. A

ppellant sug g ested that the tw o o f t he m sh ou ld f

ind so me on e to b e at up . A s th e y dr ov e awa

y fr om t he c lub , M r. F e rr ar t old Ms. Ay on to pull over; he g ot out of the ca r and star ted to chase a strang er. The strang er g ot
awa y , but a short time later the y found a home less man walkingthroug h a re staurant pa rkinglot on Dy er Stree t. Mr. Fe rra r and A ppellant attac ked the man, later identified a s Mr. Roud. Appellant struck Mr . Roud at least three times in his cheek, while Mr. F err ar kic ked and punc hed him. The men ig nored Mr . Roud’s pleas to stop. At one point, Appellant and Mr . Fe rra r beg an sto mpi ngMr . Ro ud ’s he a d, ba c k, and bo dy wh ile he wa s d own o n th e a sp ha lt. Mr . Ro ud los t
c on sc iou sn e ss a

nd late r d ie d at a

ho sp ita l. The sole issue pr esente d to the Court is whether the e vidence prese nted at trial wa s leg ally sufficie nt to sustain his conviction for mur der. This issue c ontains four pa rts reg arding the leg al theorie s included in the cour t’s char g e to the jury . Specifica lly , Appellant conte nds: (1) that the jury

improperly

convicted him under

the fe lony -murder

doctrine in violation of the merg er doc trine as e mbodied in Ga rre t v . S tate , 573 S.W .2d 543, 545 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); (2) that th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o e sta

bli sha sp e c if ic int e nt t o k ill ; ( 3) that th e e vid e nc e is ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a fi nd ingthat App e lla

nt a ssi ste d, pr omo te d, or

e nc oura g e d h is codef endant, Te rra

nce F err ar to c ommit an act clea rly dang erous to human life ; and (4) that there is n o p ro of

of any a g re e me nt o r o ve rt

a c t by Ap pe lla nt i n f ur the ra nc e of a n a lle g e d c on sp ir a c y

to
c omm it a n a ssa ult
. In part one of Appe llant’s sole issue, he a sserts that the State and tr ial court e mploy ed the felony - murder

doctrine. The State argues to the contra ry that the jury

was ne ver c harg ed on the-3-

felony -murder

doctrine, but ra

ther the c harg e tra cked the doctrine of transfe rre d intent under Se c tio n 6 .0 4( b) of

the Te xas P e na l Co de , whic h p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art : A p e rs on is n e ve rt he le ss c ri min a lly

re sp on sib le fo r c a

us inga re su lt i f t he on ly differ ence betwee n what ac tually occur red a nd what he de sired, conte mplated, or ri sk e d is that: (1) a diffe rent off

ense w as committed . . . . T EX .P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 6.04(b)( 1)(Ve rnon 2003). P ur s u an tt o th e T e x a s P e n a l C o d e , S e c t i o n1 9
. 0 2 ( b ) ( 3 ) , a p e r s o ni s g u i l ty o f

f e l o n ymur de r i f h e c omm its or

atte mpt s to c omm it a

fe lony , o the r t

ha n ma ns la ug hte r, and

in t he c ours e of and in fur

thera nce of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flig ht from the commission or attempt, he c ommits or attempts to commit an act c lear ly dang erous to human life that cause s the death of an individual. T EX .P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 19.02(b)( 3)(Ve rnon 2003). The re is no such languag e in the trial c ourt’s jury instructions. The trial cour t merely char g ed the jury

on the theories of

individual liabili ty , party liability , conspirac y

to commit murder, and tra nsfer red intent, under whic h, if all the ele ments were proved be y ond a re asonable doubt for any one of these theor ies, the jury

could find the Appe llant guilty for murde r. Ra bb an i v . S tate , 847 S.W .2d 555, 558 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), cert. de nied , 509 U.S. 926, 113 S.C t. 3047, 125 L .Ed.2d 731 (1993). We over

rule the f irst part of Appe llant’s issue. Parts two, three , and four challeng e the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence in support of Appellant’s c onviction. I n a leg al suffic iency revie w, we must consider all of the e vidence in a light most favor able to the ve rdict, and de termine whe ther a rea sonable minded juror

could have found the e ssential elements we re pr oven beyond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U. S. 3 07 , 3 18 -1 9, 99 S.Ct . 2 78 1, 61 L .E d. 2d 56 0 ( 19 79 ); Ho op e r v . S

tate , 214 S.W .3d 9, 13-4-

(T e x.Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ). We m us t g ive de fe re nc e to, “ ‘t

he re sp on sib ili ty

of the tr ie r o f f

a c t to fairly resolve a ll conflicts in testimony , to weig h the evidenc e, and to dr aw r easona ble infer ence s from basic fac ts to ult imate fa cts.’” Hooper , 214 S.W .3d at 13. Whe n a jur y re tur ns a g e ne ra l ve rd ic t and

the e vid e nc e is s uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a g uil ty finding under a

ny of the a lleg ations submitt ed, the ve rdict will be upheld. Swe ar inge n v . S tate , 101 S.W .3d 89, 95 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Thus, we a pply the leg al suffic iency

standard of revie w to eac h theory

submitt ed to the jury

in the court’s c harg e. Rabbani , 847 S.W .2d at 558. Sufficienc y

of the e vidence should be measur ed by the eleme nts of the offe nse as de fined by the hy pothetically

corr ect jury

char g e for

the ca se. Ma lik

v . S tate , 953 S.W .2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). This hy pothetical cha

rg e ac curately

setting out the la

w, authorized by

the indictment, does not unnece ssarily incre ase the State’s burde n of proof or unnec essar ily

restric t the State’s theor ies of liability , and ade quately descr ibes the par

ticular off ense f or which the defe ndant was trie d. Id
. In p art tw o o f A pp e lla nt’ s is su e , h e ur g e s th at th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tr ia l is le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o e sta

bli sha sp e c if ic int e nt t o k ill . Ape rs on c omm its mur de r i f ( 1) he int e nd s to
cause serious bodily

injury , and (2) commits an act c lear ly dang erous to human life , that (3)
cause s the death of an individual. T EX .P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 19.02(b)( 2). Intent to kill i s not require d to commit murder under Section 19.02(b)( 2). Ra mi re z v . S tate , 229 S.W .3d 725, 729 (T e x.Ap p. -- San A nto nio 20 07 , n o p e t.) . Rathe r, the re mus t be an inte nt t o c a us e se ri ou s b od ily injury to the individual whose death results from an a ct clea rly dang erous to human life
. Ramirez , 2 29 S.W. 3d

at 72 9. Se ri ou s b od ily

inj ur y is b od ily inj ur y that c re ate s a

su bs tanti a l r isk of death, or that ca

uses death, serious perma nent disfig ureme nt, or protra cted loss or impairment-5-

of the func tion of any

bodily member or

org an. Id . at 728. An ac t clear ly dang erous to human life is one that cr eate s a substantial risk of death. De pa uw v . S

tate , 658 S.W .2d 628, 634 (T e x.Ap p. -- Am ari llo 19 83 , p e t. r e f’ d) . T he te st f or de te rm ini ngwh e the r a

n a c t is c le arl y dang erous to human life is an objective one
. Lugo- Lugo v . S tate , 650 S.W .2d 72, 81 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983). We thus do not consider whether the def endant subjec tively

knew that his acts wer e cle arly

dang erous to human life ; rather , we f ocus on whe ther the a cts themselves
wer e cle arly

dang erous to human life
. Roge rs v . S tate , No. 05-92-00507- CR, 1994 W L121055,
at *3 (T e x.Ap p. -- Da lla s Apr . 4 , 1 99 4, no pe t.) (n ot d e signate d f or pu bli c atio n) . T o b e c le arl y dang erous to human life , the ac t committed need only threaten or risk a

resultingdeath. LugoLugo , 650 S.W .2d at 88. We are persua ded that the e vidence was suff icient to allow the jury

to find that Appellant
c omm itt e d a

n a c t c le arl y

da ng e ro us to h

uma n li fe . T he re c or d r e fl e c ts t hat he tol d M s. Ayon

to stop the car

so that he and Mr . Fe rra

r could attack Mr. Roud, and he punched a nd kicked Mr. Roud. W ithout question, Appellant made a c onscious decision to ca use ser ious bodily

injury
. Moreove r, cor

roborating f

orensic pa

thologist evidenc e re flec ted that Mr. Roud suffe red se vere mul tip le blu

nt f or c e tr a uma inj ur ie s to the he a d. Th e mos t c omm on c a us e of a br a in i nju

ry is tr a uma , a vio le nt m ov e me nt o f t

he br a in i ns ide the sk

ull . Ins tanc e s th at c an c a us e su c h tr a

uma include beingstruck on or a bout the head w ith an object, such a s a har d object, or a foot, fist, or hitting the hea d ag ainst a har d object or sur fac e. The fore nsic expert further testified that the p un ch es an d

k i ck s M r. R o u d

re ce i v edt o th e h ea d

an d b o dy fr o mAp p el l an twe re fo rc ef u l en o u gh to cause serious bodily

injury and death. The blunt forc e Mr. Roud suffe red to the he ad ca used
se ve re dama g e to t

he pa rt of his br a in t

hat c on tr oll e d h is b re athi ngand oth e r v ita l f

un c tio ns ,-6-

causinghim to become comatose and ultimately die. Gi ve n th e e vid e nc e of

Mr . Ro ud ’s inj ur ie s, we c on c lud e that a ra tio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have c oncluded that Appe llant intended and did ca use ser ious bodily

injury to Mr. Roud and was the re fo re , guil ty

of c omm itt ingan a c t c le arl y da ng e ro us to h

uma n li fe re su lti ngin d e ath. Thus , part two of A

ppellant’s sole issue is over ruled. Havingconsidere d all the evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the verdic t, and deter mining whe ther a

rea sonable minded juror

could have found the e ssential elements we re proven be y ond a re asonable doubt, we hold that the jury could have convicted A

ppellant for
mur de r b a se d o n th e jur

y c ha rg e of c omm itt ingan a c t c le arl y da ng e ro us to h

uma n li fe that r e su lts in d e ath. B e c a

us e the jur

y re tur ne d a g e ne ra l guil ty

ve rd ic t f or mur de r, the re is n o n e e d to addre ss the other theor ies of which the jury could have convicted A

ppellant for mur der. Rabbani , 847 S.W .2d at 558. We there fore overr ule I ssue One. We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

August 14, 2008 DAVI D WEL L I NGTONCHEW, C hief Just ice B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d C ar r , JJ. Carr, J., Not Participating (Do Not Publish)