United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-60344

Sedrick D. Russell, 

Petitioner—Appellee,

versus

J. Denmark, 

Respondent—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:14-cv-225

Before Clement, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge:

Sedrick Russell, Mississippi prisoner # 145868, was arrested on 

December 21, 2006.1

 Eight months later, he was indicted by a grand jury on 

charges of aggravated assault with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon. In January 2009, he was tried in state court, and a jury found 

him guilty on both counts. Sentenced as a habitual offender, he received two 

1 The record contains several different spellings of Russell’s first name, but he 

clarified in the district court that it is spelled “Sedrick.” The Mississippi Department of 

Corrections spells his first name “Cedric.”

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 18, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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concurrent life sentences without the possibility of parole. Russell 

unsuccessfully pursued post-conviction relief in state court. After exhausting 

state-court review, Russell filed a federal habeas petition, which the district 

court granted. The State now appeals that ruling.

In this appeal, we consider Russell’s federal habeas claims that his 

conviction violated his right to a speedy trial, and that his public defenders

provided ineffective assistance of counsel. While two state courts rejected 

these claims, the federal district court disagreed and held that relief was 

warranted. Because the district court “fail[ed] to accord required deference 

to the decision of a state court,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 92 (2011),

we reverse and render. 

I.

On the evening of December 19, 2006, Michael Porter visited his 

girlfriend Lawanda Hawkins’s home in Jackson, Mississippi. Hawkins’s 

cousin, Sedrick Russell, was also there. Sometime between 9:00 and 11:00 

p.m., Porter walked outside to retrieve a bottle of gin from his car. Russell, 

who had earlier been following Porter around the house, closely trailed him

as he went outside. While Porter leaned down to reach into his car for the 

liquor, he was shot twice from behind in the leg with a 9mm pistol. No one 

saw who shot Porter. But witnesses saw Russell walk out of the house “right 

behind” Porter. And earlier that evening, Porter had noticed a 9mm pistol 

in Russell’s pocket.

Russell denied that he shot Porter. Instead, Russell maintained that 

he had left the Hawkins home by the time Porter was shot, picked up by a

friend known only as “Ron Ron.” 

Two days after the shooting, Russell was arrested for the crime. At 

his initial appearance, the state circuit court appointed the Hinds County 

Public Defender’s Office to represent him. Russell was held without bail at 

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the Hinds County Detention Center. At his preliminary hearing in January

2007, public defender Beth Davis represented him.2 In August 2007, he was 

indicted by a grand jury on two charges: aggravated assault and possession 

of a firearm by a convicted felon. Months before, though, Russell had begun 

filing pro se motions asserting that his right to a speedy trial was being 

violated.

Davis appeared on Russell’s behalf only at his preliminary hearing. 

Sometime thereafter, Frank McWilliams, another Hinds County public 

defender, took over Russell’s case. McWilliams filed two boilerplate 

requests for discovery, appeared for Russell at his arraignment in November 

2007, and apparently later attempted to negotiate a plea agreement for 

Russell. There is no evidence in the record of any other actions taken by 

McWilliams on Russell’s behalf.

At his arraignment, Russell’s trial date wasset for March 24, 2008. In 

December 2007, Russell filed a pro se motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy 

trial. The state trial court denied the motion, finding that Russell’s 

scheduled trial date met state statutory requirements.3 Nevertheless, “[i]n 

view of” Russell’s motion, the court moved his trial date up to February 11, 

2008. Unsatisfied, Russell filed several more motions objecting to the delay.

2 Russell contends that he told Davis about “Ron Ron,” but she told him the 

conversation could wait until after the preliminary hearing.

3 Mississippi law requires that “all offenses for which indictments are presented to 

the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has 

been arraigned.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-1. The statute includes a good-cause 

exception that applies when “a continuance [is] duly granted by the court.” Id. Russell 

relied on this statutory 270-day requirement in his initial pro se motion. He does not 

reassert a state statutory speedy-trial claim here.

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Russell’s trial did not occur that February as scheduled.

4 Three days 

after the scheduled trial date, the court “relieved” the Hinds County Public 

Defender’s Office of representing Russell and appointed attorney Don 

Boykin to represent him.

5

 Russell and Boykin met two weeks later, and 

Boykin promptly filed several motions on Russell’s behalf. Boykin also 

informed prosecutors of Russell’s purported alibi witness “Ron Ron,” whom 

Boykin was attempting to locate. Despite Boykin’s appointment and 

subsequent efforts, Russell continued to file frequent pro se motions.

Not long after his appointment, Boykin requested a psychiatric exam

for Russell. He contended that an exam was needed before the case could 

proceed because of a letter Russell allegedly sent to Porter, “say[ing] some 

very strange things about hearing voices[.]” Russell objected to the exam, 

arguing that he “believe[d] that the reason for the psychiatric examination by 

court order [was] to justify denying [his] right to a speedy trial.” 

Nevertheless, the court granted the request, and the case was continued 

pending completion of the exam. In October 2008, Russell was examined 

and deemed competent to stand trial.

4 The trial court did not explain why Russell’s trial did not commence then. The 

prosecution later stated that Russell “chose not to go forward” because he “complained of 

[his] Public Defender.” Dan Boykin, Russell’s court-appointed lawyer at trial,represented

that “from the defense standpoint[,] neither the [public defender] nor Mr. Russell was 

prepared to go to trial at that time because he had not communicated with an attorney.” 

Boykin also asserted that the public defender had not notified Russell of the February 11 

date.

5 The record is unclear about why the court substituted Russell’s counsel. The 

court’s order itself said it was in response to a motion filed by the public defender’s office, 

which requested to withdraw due to a conflict between Russell and the office. No such 

motion appears in the record before us. Elsewhere, the prosecutor contended that 

Russell’s change in counsel occurred because “Russell was complaining of his public 

defender and demanding new counsel.”

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Russell’s trial commenced on January 27, 2009. Before the jury was 

brought into the courtroom, the trial court considered a motion from Boykin 

to set aside the court’s previous denial of Russell’s pro se speedy-trial claim. 

In this iteration, Boykin focused on Russell’s Sixth Amendment right to a 

speedy trial rather than the state statutory guarantee. Russell testified that 

the 14-month delay that occurred while he was represented by public 

defenders prejudiced his defense. He stated that he “lost contact of” his 

purported alibi witness during the delay because he was imprisoned and 

received no assistance from his lawyers in locating “Ron Ron.” The trial 

court denied the motion.

At trial, Russell testified on his own behalf, maintaining that “Ron 

Ron,” who has neversurfaced, picked him up from the Hawkins home before 

Porter was shot. Porter also testified at trial, as did Lawanda Hawkins, her 

sister Vicki, and three police officers. The jury found Russell guilty on both 

counts. Because he had four previous convictions,6 he was sentenced as a 

habitual offender to two life sentences without the possibility of parole.

Following sentencing, Russell—still represented by Boykin—filed a 

direct appeal. See Russell v. State, 79 So. 3d 529 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). 

Among other issues, Russell challenged the trial court’s denial of his 

counsel’s motion to set aside the denial of his pro se speedy trial motion. See 

id. at 534.

Evaluating that claim, the Mississippi Court of Appeals considered 

the speedy-trial factors articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 

First, it found that the length of delay was “presumptively prejudicial.” 79 

So. 3d at 537. As to the reasons for the delay, the court concluded that the 

6 Russell had been convicted of aggravated assault, possession of cocaine, 

possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

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first fourteen months weighed against the prosecution, while the next eleven 

months weighed against the defense, so this factor was “neutral.” Id. at 538. 

The court recognized that Russell had repeatedly asserted his right but 

determined that his assertion of prejudice “lack[ed] support.” Id. Weighing 

these factors, the court held that “[a]lthough the circuit judge did not fully 

articulate his calculations regarding defense delay in his findings, . . . the 

circuit court’s findings [were] supported by substantial evidence in the 

record.” Id. at 539. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that Russell’s 

speedy-trial claim was “without merit,” id., and affirmed Russell’s 

conviction, id. at 545.

Russell petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for a writ of 

certiorari. In his pro se petition, he again urged that his right to a speedy trial 

had been violated. The court denied his petition without comment. See

Russell v. State, 80 So. 3d 111 (Miss. 2012). 

Russell subsequently filed a pro se state petition for post-conviction

relief. In it, he raised his constitutional speedy-trial claim again, and he also 

asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.7

 He alleged that his 

public defenders had failed to contact him for over a year. He also alleged 

that Boykin had provided ineffective assistance at trial and on appeal. The 

Mississippi Supreme Court denied his petition. The court rejected his 

speedy-trial claim on res judicata grounds. And it held that his claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel “fail[ed] to meet both prongs of Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).” 

7 Russell also challenged the timing of the State’s motion to amend his indictment 

to allege that he was a habitual offender and the constitutionality of his prior conviction for 

possession of a firearm by a felon. He did not raise these issues in his federal habeas 

petition.

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Russell, still pro se, then filed the instant federal habeas application, 

reasserting both his speedy-trial and ineffective-assistance claims. The

magistrate judge recommended dismissal. Russell objected to the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation. The district court determined that “the 

issues [the application] presents are significant not just to Mr. Russell, but to 

the very functioning of a minimally-adequate criminal justice system.” 

Therefore, the district court appointed counsel to represent Russell.8

Russell’s counsel then filed an amended objection to the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation, arguing that Russell faced “a 

breakdown in the public defender system.” Relying on Vermont v. Brillon, 

556 U.S. 81, 86 (2009), Russell now urged that this breakdown required the 

delay in his underlying trial proceedings to weigh against the State, such that 

Russell’s right to a speedy trial was clearly violated. The amended objection 

devoted little more than a page to Russell’s ineffective-assistance claim, 

asserting only that the magistrate judge was wrong that Russell had failed to 

prove prejudice under Strickland.

The district court granted Russell’s application for habeas relief. 

Russell v. Denmark, 528 F. Supp. 3d 482, 509 (S.D. Miss. 2021). The court 

found that Russell had faced “a systemic ‘breakdown in the public defender 

system’” in Hinds County. Id. at 499 (quoting Brillon, 566 U.S. at 94). This 

finding was in turn the primary basis for the court’s determination that the 

Barker factors supported Russell’s speedy-trial claim. Id. at 505–06. 

Specifically, the court reasoned that the delay due to the appointment of

successive counsel leading up to trial was attributable to the “systemic 

breakdown” and should be charged against the State. Id. at 498–99. The 

8 The court appointed Alysson Mills, who has continued to represent Russell on 

appeal. Consistent with his previous history, Russell also filed pro se motions with the 

district court even after Mills was appointed to represent him.

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court concluded that the delay frustrated Russell’s ability to locate “Ron 

Ron” and that finding the alibi witness would have had a “high probability” 

of “alter[ing] the outcome of the trial on the aggravated assault charge.” Id.

at 502. It followed that the Mississippi Court of Appeals “was objectively 

unreasonable not to find that Russell was prejudiced” by the delay in his trial. 

Id. at 504. The district court limited its speedy-trial ruling to Russell’s 

aggravated-assault conviction; because “Ron Ron’s testimony likely ‘could 

not have altered the outcome of the trial’ on the felon in possession charge,” 

the court concluded that Russell “did not suffer actual prejudice on that 

charge.” Id. at 504 (citing Cowart v. Hargett, 16 F.3d 642, 648 (5th Cir. 

1994)). 

The district court also granted habeas relief on Russell’s ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim. Id. at 509. The court read Russell’s habeas

complaint as alleging a claim under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 

(1984), rather than Strickland. Id. at 508. Concluding that Russell faced a 

“complete denial of counsel” under Cronic while he was represented by the 

public defenders, the court held that “the Mississippi Supreme Court’s 

application of Strickland to this case [was] an erroneous and unreasonable 

application of the clearly established Supreme Court law set forth in Cronic.” 

Id. at 507. While the district court’s speedy-trial relief was limited only to 

one of Russell’s convictions, its holding on Russell’s ineffective-assistance

claim applied to both because “Cronic’s presumption of prejudice applies to 

both the aggravated assault and felon in possession charges.” Id. at 509.

The State timely appealed to this court. The district court stayed its 

ruling pending appeal. Id.

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II.

In an appeal from a district court’s grant of habeas relief, we review 

the court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. 

Hughes v. Vannoy, 7 F.4th 380, 386 (5th Cir. 2021). 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts review state court habeas decisions

deferentially. Id. AEDPA permits a federal court to grant habeas relief only 

where a state court “decision . . . was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d). This standard is “difficult 

to meet,” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102, because it requires that the state court’s 

decision be “so lacking in justification” that the error is “beyond any 

possibility for fairminded disagreement,” id. at 103. 

Deference applies even when the state court decides an issue without 

fully explaining its reasoning. See Schaetzle v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 440, 443 (5th 

Cir. 2003); accord Amos v. Thornton, 646 F.3d 199, 205 (5th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (“[D]eference due under section 2254(d)(1) is not diminished by the 

fact that the [state court] did not explain the reasons for its 

determination[.]”). This is “[b]ecause a federal habeas court only reviews 

the reasonableness of the state court’s ultimate decision,” “not the written 

opinion explaining that decision.” Schaetzle, 343 F.3d at 443 (quoting Neal 

v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam)). Thus, 

in reviewing a state court opinion, this court focuses on “the ultimate legal 

conclusion that the state court reached and not on whether the state court 

considered and discussed every angle of the evidence.” Neal, 286 F.3d at 

246.

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III.

First, we consider whether the district court erred in granting relief on 

Russell’s speedy-trial claim. It did. Rather than deferentially considering 

whether the state court decision was “so lacking in justification” as to merit 

habeas relief, Richter, 562 U.S. at 103, the district court effectively reviewed 

the claim de novo, contravening AEDPA. Accordingly, we reverse and render 

judgment in favor of the State.

A.

We begin with the well-established analytical framework. For a half 

century, courts have analyzed speedy-trial claims using the four Barker

factors: 

(1) the length of delay,

(2) the reason for the delay,

(3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to speedy trial, and 

(4) prejudice to the defendant.

407 U.S. at 529–34. 

In reviewing a state court’s application of the Barker factors to a 

particular case, the “always-substantial deference” we afford to state courts 

in federal habeas review “is at an apex.” Amos, 646 F.3d at 205. After all,

the Barker factors are “a broad, general standard whose application ‘to a 

specific case can demand a substantial element of judgment.’” Id. (citation 

omitted). Therefore, in habeas review of a state prisoner’s speedy-trial 

claim, federal courts must “give the widest of latitude to a state court’s 

conduct of its speedy-trial analysis.” Id. 

In applying that latitude, AEDPA limits habeas review to whether a 

state court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision” that warrants relief under 

AEDPA’s standard. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). A reviewing 

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federal court’s disagreement with the state court’s weighing of individual 

Barker factors is thus not itself groundsfor reversal. Goodrum v. Quarterman, 

547 F.3d 249, 265–66 (5th Cir. 2008). Rather, under AEDPA, we may 

disagree with “some of the state court’s preliminary conclusions” but will 

nonetheless deny relief so long as the state court’s ultimate decision—here, 

that the balance of the four Barker factors did not merit relief—is objectively 

reasonable and not contrary to law. Id.; see also id. at 255–56. 

As for which state court decision is our focus, “[u]nder AEDPA, ‘we 

review the last reasoned state court decision.’” Woodfox v. Cain, 772 F.3d 

358, 369 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “Using the ‘look through’ 

doctrine, we ‘ignore—and hence, look through—an unexplained state court 

denial and evaluate the last reasoned state court decision.’” Id. (citation 

omitted). In this case, that means we “look through” both the Mississippi 

Supreme Court’s res judicata denial of Russell’s speedy-trial habeas claim 

and its earlier, unexplained denial of certiorari in Russell’s direct appeal to 

train our sights, as the parties do, on the speedy-trial decision by the 

Mississippi Court of Appeals during Russell’s direct appeal. 

B. 

To be sure, the Mississippi Court of Appeals did not explicitly engage 

in a balancing of the Barker factors in deciding Russell’s direct appeal. See 

Russell v. State, 79 So. 3d at 538–39. But as mentioned, “AEDPA does not 

require state courts to explain their reasoning . . . before benefitting from 

deference.” Divers v. Cain, 698 F.3d 211, 216 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Richter, 

562 U.S. at 98). Yet the district court “appears to have treated [AEDPA’s] 

unreasonableness question as a test of its confidence in the result it would 

reach under de novo review[.]” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. In doing so, the 

district court’s “analysis overlook[ed] arguments that would otherwise 

justify the state court’s result,” id., and instead reweighed the Barker factors 

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afresh. This “lack of deference to the state court’s determination” 

constituted “an improper intervention in state criminal processes,” id. at 

104, such that the district court erred in granting Russell’s habeas application

on the speedy-trial issue.

1.

While our focus is on “the result of the state court’s balancing of the 

Barker factors[,] . . . we will conduct a limited review of the [Mississippi 

Court of Appeals]’s analysis of each Barker factor” as a way of “facilitat[ing] 

our evaluation of . . . the state court’s decision.” Goodrum, 547 F.3d at 257. 

The parties generally agree about Barker factors one and three, so we need 

not tarry on them. For factor one—the length of delay—the Mississippi 

Court of Appeals properly found that the 25-month delay in Russell’s case 

weighed against the State, though not heavily. Russell v. State, 79 So. 3d at 

537; see Goodrum, 547 F.3d at 257 (viewing a delay of one year or more as 

presumptively prejudicial); cf. Amos, 646 F.3d at 206–07 (requiring that the 

delay extend beyond two-and-a-half years to weigh heavily against the State). 

While the district court quibbled with aspects of the state court’s analysis on 

this issue, Russell, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 496, it did not disagree with the upshot, 

i.e., that the length of delay weighed against the State, id. at 496–97. Because

“a federal habeas court is authorized . . . to review only a state court’s 

‘decision,’” Schaetzle, 343 F.3d at 443, we need not dwell further on this 

factor. 

Similarly, on factorthree—the defendant’s assertion of the right—the

parties correctly agree that Russell’s “assertion of his speedy trial right 

receives strong evidentiary weight[.]” Amos, 646 F.3d at 207. The district 

court faulted the state court for failing to make an “express finding regarding 

this factor” and noted that our court has held under similar circumstances 

that the state court’s failure to assign a strong weight in defendant’s favor is 

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“contrary to clearly-established law.” Russell, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 500 

(quoting Goodrum, 547 F.3d at 249). True enough, but again, “our 

disagreement with some of the state court’s preliminary conclusions,” or, 

really, the lack of an express finding here, “does not provide grounds for 

reversal so long as we find the ultimate decision to be objectively reasonable”

and not contrary to law. Goodrum, 547 F.3d at 265–66 (emphasis added); see 

also id. at 255–56. Assuming arguendo that the Mississippi Court of Appeals 

erred by failing explicitly to weight this factor strongly in Russell’s favor, that 

error does not in itself fatally undermine the ultimate decision by the state 

court. 

2.

The parties, like the state and district courts, sharply diverge on the 

second Barker factor, the reason for the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. 

Courts look to the delay’s causes to determine which party bears fault for the 

delay, and how heavily: 

At one extreme, a deliberate delay to disadvantage the defense 

is weighted heavily against the state.[9]

 At the other end of the 

spectrum, delays explained by valid reasons or attributable to 

the conduct of the defendant weigh in favor of the state. 

Between these two extremes fall unexplained or negligent 

delays, which weigh against the state, but not heavily.

Goodrum, 547 F.3d at 258 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

9 Russell’s pro se federal habeas petition could be read to allege such a deliberate 

delay. The magistrate judge read his petition this way. She wrote, “Petitioner alleges that 

the state court wrongly attributed his change of counsel and mental evaluation to the 

defense when they were, in fact, attempts by the State, in conspiracy with his court 

appointed attorneys and the trial judge, to cover up his public defender’s failures and obtain 

an impermissible and unfair advantage against the defense.” Assuming arguendo that was 

Russell’s contention, the record provides no support for it.

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The state court “weigh[ed] this factor as neutral.” Russell v. State, 79 

So. 3d at 538. The court found that delay early in the case, while Russell was 

represented by public defenders, weighed against the State. Id. at 537. But 

later delays due to “withdrawal of the defendant’s attorney” and the mental 

evaluation Russell’s counsel requested weighed in the State’s favor. Id. at 

537–38. 

The district court agreed that the early delay weighed against the 

State. But it criticized the state court’s findings regarding later delays. 

Russell, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 498–99. 

We first consider the delay caused by defense counsel’s request for a

mental evaluation. The district court correctly noted that “the nearly sevenmonth delay caused by Russell’s mental evaluation” would “ordinarily not 

[be] assessed against the state.” Id. at 499. Nevertheless, the district court 

raised a concern: “[W]e have no record of why a mental examination was 

requested—or why one was granted.” Id. The court answered that concern 

with a hypothesis, that the evaluation may have been “the easiest way to get 

Russell’s case off the docket, or perhaps to keep him incarcerated for months 

more on end without the speedy trial clock running.” Id. After conjecturing

about “why the record is silent on such an important issue,” the district court 

“set[] aside how the mental evaluation delay is construed.” Id. Yet the 

district court’s hypothesizing crystallizes the court’s overarching error in 

this case: Rather than affording AEDPA deference to the state court, the 

district court substituted its own speculation about Russell’s request for a 

mental evaluation to question the state court’s weighing of this factor. 

To reiterate, AEDPA demands that reviewing federal courts 

“determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have 

supported, the state court’s decision,” and then “ask whether it is possible 

fairminded jurists could” find those arguments reasonable and consistent 

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with Supreme Court precedent. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. If so, end of 

analysis; the state court’s determination should be upheld. By contrast, the 

district court here theorized points that could undermine the state court’s 

decision and then contemplated whether “a neutral observer [w]ould be 

concerned[.]” 528 F. Supp. 3d at 499. This approach conflates “deference” 

with “de novo,” turning AEDPA’s framework on its head along the way. 

Besides, the court’s hypothesis does not hold water when tested 

against the record. The district court’s theory about why the state trial court 

ordered a mental evaluation minimizes the fact that Russell’s appointed 

counsel, Boykin,requested the evaluation—and later conceded that the delay 

“during the period of time that we were awaiting the evaluation . . . is not

attributable to the State.” It strains credulity to imagine that Russell’s 

counsel requested the evaluation to help the state court cover its speedy-trial 

errors, especially given Boykin’s zealous advocacy on Russell’s behalf on the 

speedy-trial issue. Regardless, a delay caused by defense counsel is usually 

charged against the defendant, Brillon, 556 U.S. at 91, just as the Mississippi 

Court of Appeals concluded. 

And the record provides ample justification for the evaluation. The 

state trial transcript describes a letter Russell wrote to Porter, the shooting 

victim, that included “some very strange things about hearing voices and 

from the Air Force and whatever.” The trial judge explicitly stated that this 

letter was “part of the reason for which [Russell] was sent for a mental 

examination.” Viewed through AEDPA’s deferential lens, the state court’s 

determination that the delay for Russell’s mental evaluation weighed against 

him was not unreasonable or contrary to law.

As for the delay due to Russell’s change in counsel, the district court 

found the state court’s assessment, charging the delay to Russell, to be 

“contrary to . . . Supreme Court precedent.” 528 F. Supp. 3d at 498. The 

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district court again misapplied the AEDPA standard of review. See 28 U.S.C 

§ 2254(d)(1) (requiring that a state court decision be “contrary to . . . clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States”). 

“A state-court decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established federal law 

only if it ‘arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] 

Court on a question of law or if’ it resolves ‘a case differently than [the 

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.’” Langley 

v. Prince, 926 F.3d 145, 155 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)) (alterations in original). To prevail, a 

defendant must point to “Supreme Court precedent that is ‘opposite to’ or 

‘materially indistinguishable’ from this case.” Id. at 155–56 (quoting 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). This is such a high bar that “in most AEDPA 

cases, the ‘contrary to’ prong does not apply.” Id. at 156.

The district court’s conclusion that the state court’s charging this

delay to Russell contravened Supreme Court precedent primarily rested on 

one line in Brillon: “Delay resulting from a systemic breakdown in the public 

defender system could be charged to the State.” 556 U.S. at 94 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted), quoted in Russell, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 497. As a 

threshold matter, we are not convinced that this one line clearly establishes a

“systemic breakdown” rule as expounded by the district court. Regardless, 

the district court otherwise failed to explain how Brillon is “‘opposite to’ or 

‘materially indistinguishable’ from this case.” Langley, 926 F.3d at 155 

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).10 If anything, to the extent this case is 

10 In fact, to justify relief for Russell, the district court actually distinguished

Russell’s case from Brillon’s (where relief was denied). Russell, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 498 

(describing how Russell is “[u]nlike Brillon”). Thus, the district court itself seemed to 

reject the conclusion that this case is materially indistinguishable from Brillon.

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“indistinguishable” from Brillon, it actually cuts against Russell: As his 

counsel conceded during oral argument, there is no “evidence in this record 

of a broad systemic breakdown.” Cf. Brillon, 556 U.S. at 94 (“[T]he 

Vermont Supreme Court made no determination, and nothing in the record 

suggests, that institutional problems caused any part of the delay in Brillon’s 

case.”) (citations and quotations omitted). Russell’s case alone cannot 

suffice to prove a systemic breakdown of the Hinds County public defender 

system. And without such evidence, we cannot conclude that the state 

court’s decision was contrary to Brillon’s observation that a “systemic 

breakdown” could weigh against a state. 

The district court secondarily reasoned that “[t]o the extent that the 

egregious lack of counsel was due to negligence,” the state court decision was 

also contrary to Barker because responsibility for negligence in providing 

counsel “must rest with the government rather than the defendant.” 528 F. 

Supp. 3d at 498 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). But the court did not 

explain how the state court’s ruling was legally “opposite to” or factually 

“materially indistinguishable” from Barker. See Langley, 926 F.3d at 156. 

“So here, as in most AEDPA cases, the ‘contrary to’ prong does not apply,” 

id., and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.

We recognize that the record is susceptible to different conclusions 

about why Russell received new counsel. See supra note 5. But under 

AEDPA, in the face of such ambiguity, we look to what arguments could 

support the state court’s determination that this factor weighed against 

Russell. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Had the district court done likewise, it 

would have readily found such support. On its face, the state trial court’s 

order relieved Russell’s public defenders after the defense so requested “on 

the grounds that a conflict of interest exist[ed] in this case between the 

Defendant and the office of the Hinds County Public Defender[.]” 

Elsewhere in the record, prosecutors asserted that Russell himself 

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“demand[ed] new counsel” in his numerous pro se motions “complaining 

of his public defender[.]” Whether counsel was substituted in response to 

the public defenders’ motion or Russell’s demands, or both, the resulting 

delay would properly weigh against Russell. See Brillon, 556 U.S. at 90–91

(citations, quotations, and brackets omitted) (“Because the attorney is the 

[defendant’s] agent . . . , delay caused by the defendant’s counsel is also 

charged against the defendant . . . whether counsel is privately retained or 

publicly assigned[.]”). We thus cannot conclude that the Mississippi Court 

of Appeals acted unreasonably or contrary to law in doing so.

3.

The parties also vigorously contest the fourth Barkerfactor, prejudice. 

The state court found no prejudice because Russell’s mere assertions of 

mental anxiety and a lost alibi witness (“Ron Ron”), without further 

evidence, were insufficient. Russell v. State, 79 So. 3d at 538. The district 

court determined that Russell’s assertions were sufficient to show prejudice 

as to his aggravated-assault charge, though not as to his felon-in-possession 

charge. Russell v. Denmark, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 504. We consider the 

competing conclusions and again conclude that the district court erred in 

failing to afford proper deference to the state court’s decision.

First, Russell’s anxiety. The state court rejected Russell’s alleged

mental anxiety as insufficient to show prejudice under Mississippi law. 79 

So. 3d at 538 (citing Jenkins v. State, 947 So. 2d 270, 277 (Miss. 2006)). The 

district court held that conclusion to be “flatly contrary to federal law.” 528 

F. Supp. 3d at 503 (citing Goodrum, 547 F.3d at 262–63). We disagree. 

Barker recognized “anxiety and concern of the accused as a type of 

cognizable harm that may result from a delayed trial[.]” Goodrum, 547 F.3d 

at 263. But a defendant must present more than “a minimal showing” of 

general anxiety to sustain a speedy-trial claim. Id.; see also United States v. 

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Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 213 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[B]ecause Frye offered no evidence 

beyond his own testimony that he suffered anxiety, Frye’s anxiety does not 

justify finding a speedy trial violation.”). Here, Russell offered nothing more 

than “generalized expressions of anxiety.” Goodrum, 547 F.3d at 263. 

Moreover, the fact that Russell faced not one, but two, life sentences was in 

itself likely to cause anxiety, making it “unlikely” that trial delay was the true 

cause of any mental anxiety. See id. 

Eliding these points, the district court concluded that the state court’s 

analysis of Russell’s alleged anxiety “disregard[ed] . . . evidence” of 

“oppressive pretrial incarceration and anxiety” in a way that was “contrary 

to longstanding federal law.” 528 F. Supp. 3d at 504. Rather than citing any 

Supreme Court case contrary to the state court’s decision though, the court 

cited two of its own opinions and a newspaper article to tie Russell’s alleged 

anxiety to his prolonged detention at “a troubled jail.” Id. at 503 (quoting 

Patterson v. Hinds Cnty., Miss., No. 3:13-CV-432-CWR-FKB, 2016 WL 

7177762, at *9 (S.D. Miss. June 10, 2016)); see also id. at n.24. In fact, our 

own search reveals no Supreme Court yardstick, based on “materially 

indistinguishable facts,” by which to conclude that the state court “arrive[d] 

at a conclusion opposite to that reached by” the Court. Langley, 926 F.3d at 

155–56 (emphasizing that “the ‘contrary to’ prong” of AEDPA is a 

demanding standard that in most cases “does not apply”). And to the extent 

that the district court’s disagreement with the state court’s view of the 

evidence drove its conclusion, AEDPA deference requires more than a 

resifting of the evidence: The state court’s decision must have been “based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (emphasis added); 

cf. Russell, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 503 n.24 (discussing evidence that was never

presented to the state court). Given the record before it, the state court’s 

rejection of Russell’s assertion that his anxiety showed prejudice was neither 

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an unreasonable view of the evidence—or lack thereof—nor contrary to 

federal law.

Next, “Ron Ron.” The state court rejected Russell’s alleged lost alibi 

witness as a basis for prejudice because it “lack[ed] support” in the record. 

79 So. 3d at 538. The court found Russell’s account of an alibi witness to be 

vague and unspecific, as Russell did not even know his last name. Id. The 

district court disagreed, pointing to “the record evidence” of Russell’s 

relationship with “Ron Ron” to conclude that the state court was 

“objectively unreasonable” for finding otherwise. 528 F. Supp. 3d at 501, 

504. But the only evidence of the witness’s existence came from Russell’s 

own testimony, and Russell gave varying explanations over time for how he 

lost track of “Ron Ron.” We have rejected similar prejudice claims relying 

only on vague, unspecific alibis. See Cowart v. Hargett, 16 F.3d 642, 648 (5th 

Cir. 1994) (viewing Cowart’s alleged exculpatory witness “known only as 

‘Peanuts’” “with disfavor” because “the allegation [was] not supported by 

the production of the witness who allegedly would have altered the outcome 

of the trial”). Thus, reasonable jurists could reject Russell’s unsupported, 

vague, and changing story about “Ron Ron,” as the state court did here.

But even if Russell’s allegations about “Ron Ron” were sufficiently 

concrete and substantiated, it was also reasonable for the state court to 

conclude that the witness’s purported testimony would not have changed the 

outcome at trial. Despite the district court’s assertion otherwise, 528 F. 

Supp. 3d at 502, Russell testified extensively during his trial about “Ron 

Ron.” So the jury had an opportunity to consider Russell’s alibi—and 

rejected it. Apparently, the jury found more persuasive the testimony of 

multiple witnesses who observed Russell immediately before Porter was shot. 

Assuming “Ron Ron” could have been located and might have testified, 

reasonable jurists could conclude that his testimony would not have changed 

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the jury’s verdict, but only “transformed [Russell’s] alibi from an incredibly 

tall tale to just a tall one.” Robinson v. Whitley, 2 F.3d 562, 571 (5th Cir. 1993).

Accordingly, the district court erred in holding that the state court was 

“objectively unreasonable not to find that Russell was prejudiced” in 

preparing his alibi defense. 528 F. Supp. 3d at 504.11 And the district court 

offered no clearly established law that the state court applied unreasonably. 

Cf. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 

(2009)) (“[I]t is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely 

established by [the Supreme] Court.”). Instead, the district court 

substituted its own view of the evidence and concluded, contra the state 

court, that “Ron Ron’s” testimony would have made a difference. 528 F. 

Supp. 3d at 502–03. Such is the stuff of de novo review, not of a deferential 

inquiry under AEDPA. 

IV.

A.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are ordinarily evaluated 

under Strickland v. Washington’s two-part test, which requires (1) that 

“counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) that “the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense.” 466 U.S. at 687; see also Childress v. 

Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1228 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The vast majority of [such] 

claims can be analyzed satisfactorily under the . . . test of Strickland.”). 

However, on the same day it decided Strickland, the Supreme Court created 

11 It is unclear whether the district court meant that the state court’s decision 

“involved an unreasonable application of” law, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” see id. § 2254(d)(2). Whichever, the 

district court was in error.

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a “a very limited exception to the application of Strickland’s two-part test”

in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Thomas v. Davis, 968 F.3d 

352, 355 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 

2002)). Cronic applies when “the circumstances leading to counsel’s 

ineffectiveness are so egregious that the defendant was in effect denied any 

meaningful assistance at all.” United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d 330, 364 (5th 

Cir. 2003) (citing Gochicoa v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2000)); see 

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002) (The “most obvious” time Cronic

applies is when a criminal defendant suffers “the complete denial of 

counsel.”). To sustain a Cronic claim, such denial of counsel must occur “at 

a critical stage” of a defendant’s proceedings. 466 U.S. at 659; see also Cone, 

535 U.S. at 695–96.

“[V]ery different results flow” from whether a defendant raises a 

Strickland or Cronic claim. Black v. Davis, 902 F.3d 541, 547 (5th Cir. 2018) 

(quoting Woodard v. Collins, 898 F.2d 1027, 1028 (5th Cir. 1990)). A

Strickland claim requires that the defendant prove prejudice, see 466 U.S. at 

687, but under Cronic, prejudice is presumed, see 466 U.S. at 659. And while 

setting aside a conviction under Strickland “is made on a case by case basis,” 

a successful Cronic claim “requires that [the] conviction be overturned[.]” 

Black, 902 F.3d at 547 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).

The parties dispute whether Russell pled his ineffective-assistance 

claim in the state courts under Strickland or Cronic. The reviewing courts 

disagreed as well—the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed his claim under 

Strickland, but the district court discerned a Cronic claim, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 

506–08. What Russell pled matters because AEDPA requires exhaustion, see

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), meaning “that a state prisoner who does not 

fairly present a claim to a state habeas court—specifying both the legal and 

factual basis for the claim—may not raise that claim in a subsequent federal 

proceeding,” Lucio v. Lumpkin, 987 F.3d 451, 464 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc) 

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(plurality). “Whether a federal habeas petitioner has exhausted state 

remedies is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Anderson v. Johnson, 338 

F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 

Put simply: The law “require[s] a state prisoner to present the state 

courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts.” Lucio, 987 F.3d 

at 464 (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971)). In assessing 

whether a claim has been exhausted, we look to its substance. Black, 902 F.3d 

at 546 (“[T]he substance of the relief sought by a pro se pleading 

controls[.]”) (alteration omitted). Strickland and Cronic claims are distinct

for exhaustion purposes. Id. (quoting Cone, 535 U.S. at 697) (“[T]he 

distinction between ‘the rule of Strickland and that of Cronic . . . is not of 

degree but of kind.’”). We thus look to Russell’s state habeas petition to 

ascertain whether he “assert[ed] that he received incompetent counsel,” a 

Strickland claim, “or none at all,” a Cronic claim. Id. at 546–47 (quoting 

Childress, 103 F.3d at 1230). And if Russell did not assert a Cronic claim in 

state court, the district court was not at liberty to grant habeas relief based on 

Cronic. See Nickleson v. Stephens, 803 F.3d 748, 752 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[N]o 

habeas application may be granted unless the applicant has exhausted 

available remedies in state court.”).

B.

Russell’s state post-conviction petition is not completely clear; it

mentions neither Strickland nor Cronic. To be sure, Russell’s chief

complaint—that he was “held in custody . . . without being contacted by an 

attorney until approximately (14) months after his arrest,”—could be read as 

alleging poor lawyer-client communication (under Strickland) or a complete 

denial of counsel (under Cronic). But Russell’s petition twice labeled his 

counsel’s performance “deficient.” Indeed, his petition challenged not only 

his public defenders’ performance, but also Boykin’s. And he specifically and 

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repeatedly alleged prejudice from the deficient performance. Even with the 

liberal construction afforded pro se filings, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520 (1972) (per curiam), we read Russell’s state petition as alleging a

Strickland claim, as the Mississippi Supreme Court did. 

And Russell exhausted this Strickland claim because he alleged the 

same claim in federal court. His pro se federal habeas application again

complained of “prejudice” due to the public defenders’ “deficient”

performance. Further, his amended objections to the magistrate judge’s 

report and recommendation, filed by counsel appointed by the district court, 

did not dispute the magistrate judge’s interpretation of his claim as arising 

under Strickland. Instead, counsel objected only that the magistrate judge

“incorrectly determined that Russell’s [public defenders’] deficient 

performance did not prejudice” him.

The district court’s divining a Cronic claim—when not even counsel 

the district court appointed for Russell did—is thus problematic, for several 

reasons. Foremost, the district court erred by granting relief for a Cronic

claim not raised in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Doing so 

contravened AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement and the underlying “policy 

of federal-state comity,” that state courts must have “an initial opportunity 

to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” 

Anderson, 338 F.3d at 386 (quoting Wilder v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 255, 260 (5th 

Cir. 2001)). Moreover, assuming the district court was correct in treating the 

claim as arising under Cronic, the court’s analysis strayed from the exacting 

limitations our precedent requires, erroneously concluding that Russell’s 

claim merited relief. Finally, by solely reviewing Russell’s claim under 

Cronic, the district court neglected to analyze Russell’s claim under the right

framework—Strickland’s. Had it done so, Strickland’s standard would have 

yielded a ready conclusion that the Mississippi Supreme Court was within its

AEDPA bounds to deny relief. We address each of these points in turn. 

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C.

To the extent that Russell’s state habeas claim arose under Strickland,

he failed to exhaust a denial-of-counsel claim, and the district court could not 

grant relief under Cronic. See, e.g., Lucio, 987 F.3d at 464; Nickleson, 803 F.3d 

at 752. That should have ended the court’s Cronic analysis, full stop. 

But even ignoring the hallmarks of a classic Strickland claim contained 

in Russell’s state and federal petitions and the explicit reliance on Strickland

in his amended objections to the magistrate’s report, his ineffectiveassistance claim fails under Cronic’s rubric. Preliminarily, because nothing 

in the record indicates that the state court evaluated Russell’s claim as a 

Cronic claim,12 AEDPA’s usual deferential standard of review would not 

apply; a reviewing federal court instead would “review such claims de 

novo[.]” Carty v. Thaler, 583 F.3d 244, 253 (5th Cir. 2009) (italics added) 

(“[T]he AEDPA-mandated deference to state-court decisions does not apply 

if the petitioner properly exhausted his claim by raising it in the state court, 

but the state court did not adjudicate that particular claim on the merits.”). 

Regardless of the standard of review,13 though, Russell’s claim fails. 

To analyze a claim under Cronic, this court, like the district court,

must determine whether a petitioner was effectively denied counsel, and if 

12 Nothing suggests that the state court rejected a Cronic claim here “without 

expressly addressing that claim,” so we do not “presume that the [Cronic] claim was 

adjudicated on the merits” by the state court for purposes of whether AEDPA deference 

applies. Thomas, 968 F.3d at 292 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Richter, 562 

U.S. at 99.

13 The district court did not discuss this issue. Nor did the parties brief whether 

AEDPA or de novo review applies to Russell’s claim, if viewed as one arising under Cronic. 

Even so, “[a] party cannot waive, concede, or abandon the applicable standard of review.” 

United States v. Vasquez, 899 F.3d 363, 380 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Escobar, 

866 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)). 

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so, whether that denial occurred at a critical stage of the proceedings. Cronic, 

466 U.S. at 659; see also Griffin, 324 F.3d at 364; United States v. Pleitez, 876 

F.3d 150, 157–58 (5th Cir. 2017). We cannot say that Russell was 

“effect[ively] denied any meaningful assistance at all.” Griffin, 324 F.3d at 

364 (quoting Gochicoa, 238 F.3d at 284). The public defenders who initially 

represented him made appearances at his preliminary hearing and 

arraignment; filed discovery motions on his behalf; and engaged in apparent 

plea bargaining. To be sure, these efforts appear perfunctory. And nothing 

in the record shows that Russell’s public defenders discharged their “duty to 

make reasonable investigations” in preparation for trial based on 

“information supplied by the defendant.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. But 

counsel’s actions, even if inadequate or ineffectual, do not amount to the

complete denial of counsel we have found to violate Cronic. Cf. Burdine v. 

Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (finding denial of 

counsel where lawyer slept through a significant portion of trial).14

Even assuming Russell was effectively denied counsel during the time 

the public defenders were counsel of record, that denial must have occurred

during a “critical stage” of his proceedings. The district court broadly 

concluded that “the period between the appointment of counsel and the start 

of trial is indeed a ‘critical stage’ for Sixth Amendment purposes.” 528 F. 

Supp. 3d at 506. Too broadly. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has 

14 In holding otherwise, the district court relied on a trio of Fifth Circuit cases to 

conclude that the public defenders “should have been preparing for Russell’s trial and 

securing the [alibi] witness.” Russell, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 508 (citing Bryant v. Scott, 28 F.3d 

1411, 1415 (5th Cir. 1994), Nealy v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1985), and 

Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1355 (5th Cir. 1981)). But those cases did not involve 

Cronic claims. Bryant and Nealy are explicitly Strickland cases. Washington is preStrickland and Cronic but contains no discussion of a Cronic-like denial of counsel. So while 

these three cases may establish that the public defenders’ representation of Russell was 

deficient, they do not establish that it was effectively nonexistent. 

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ever held that the entire pretrial period is a critical stage. Cf. Estelle v. Smith, 

451 U.S. 454 (1981) (psychiatric interview was a critical stage); United States 

v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (post-indictment line-up was a critical stage); 

White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam) (preliminary hearing was 

a critical stage); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (direct appeal was 

a critical stage); Pleitez, 876 F.3d at 158 (sentencing was a critical stage); 

Burdine, 262 F.3d at 338 (“guilt-innocence phase” of trial was a critical 

stage). And we decline to do so here. 

As these cases show, the Court has considered specific events as 

“critical stages”—a more granular approach than the blanket designation 

confected by the district court here. We must do likewise. Logically, if the 

district court’s conclusion is correct that the entire pretrial period constitutes 

a “critical stage” in the Cronic analysis, then the more specific pretrial 

milestones identified in Estelle (psychiatric interview), Wade (postindictment line-up), and White (preliminary hearing) would have been 

subsumed in an overarching “pretrial” stage. That they were not shows the 

overreach of the district court’s holding. Further, we only find a critical stage 

where a denial of counsel was “of such significance that it ma[de] the 

adversary process itself unreliable.” Burdine, 262 F.3d at 346 (quoting 

United States v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768, 771 (5th Cir. 2000)). The district court 

sidestepped this rigorous analysis in stretching the “critical stage” to cover 

the whole pretrial period. 

“The federal courts of appeal, including this one, have repeatedly 

emphasized that constructive denial of counsel as described in Cronic affords 

only a narrow exception to the requirement that prejudice be proved.” 

Childress, 103 F.3d at 1228–29; see also Haynes, 298 F.3d at 380 (“Cronic

created a very limited exception to the application of Strickland’s two-part 

test[.]”). Cronic requires an effective denial of counsel, not mere ineffective 

counsel. And it requires that the denial occurred during a specific, critical 

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stage of the proceedings. Even if we assume he alleged a Cronic claim, Russell 

has failed to show either predicate. 

D.

Finally, treating Russell’s claim as arising under Strickland, as the 

district court should have, it quickly collapses. Strickland’s two-prong test 

requires both deficient performance and resulting prejudice to the defendant. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Failure to prove either defeats the claim. Id. And 

in evaluating Strickland claims first decided in state habeas proceedings, 

AEDPA deference is heightened. “AEDPA review is ‘doubly deferential’ 

because counsel is ‘strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance 

and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 

judgment.’” Woods v. Etherton, 578 U.S. 113, 117 (2016) (per curiam) 

(internal citations omitted). “[D]oubly deferential” means that we “afford 

‘both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.’” Id.

(quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013)).

The Mississippi Supreme Court summarily rejected Russell’s claim 

because it “fail[ed] to meet both prongs of Strickland.” The court did not 

explain or otherwise specify whether Russell’s claim failed on prong one or 

prong two (or both). But even when a state court fails to “reveal[] which of 

the elements in a multipart claim it found insufficient,” the defendant’s 

“burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. Russell has not carried

this burden.

Even if we assume deficient performance by the public defenders who 

initially represented Russell (i.e., that Strickland’s first prong is met), Russell 

fails to demonstrate prejudice as a result of counsel’s lapses. To do so, a 

“defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

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different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Here, Russell makes the same 

prejudice argument as for his speedy-trial claim: that, without the deficient 

assistance of counsel, his alibi witness “Ron Ron” would have testified 

favorably at trial. But this argument fails for the same reasons it does as to 

Russell’s speedy-trial claim. See supra III.B.3.

Failure to prove either prong of Strickland is fatal to a defendant’s 

claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Russell thus cannot show that “there was 

no reasonable basis” for the Mississippi Supreme Court’s denial of relief. 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. Giving the state court “the benefit of the doubt,” 

Woods, 578 U.S. at 117, Russell’s ineffective-assistance claim lacks merit.

V.

“When Congress supplies a constitutionally valid rule of decision, 

federal courts must follow it.” Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1520 

(2022) (emphasis added). “In AEDPA, Congress announced such a rule.” 

Id. Congress “designed [AEDPA] to confirm that state courts are the 

principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.” 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. AEDPA’s deference to state court decisions means 

deference, not de novo. Federal habeas review is “not a substitute for ordinary 

error correction through appeal.” Id. at 102–03. “[I]f AEDPA makes 

winning habeas relief more difficult, it is because Congress adopted the law 

to do just that.” Davenport, 142 S. Ct. at 1526.

The Mississippi courts’ decisions in this case “required more 

deference than [they] received.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 113. Therefore, we 

REVERSE the judgment of the district court and RENDER judgment in 

favor of the State on Russell’s petition for federal habeas relief. 

REVERSED and RENDERED.

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