UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

PATRICK SAMIR ASFOUR, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 16-6231 

(D.C. No. 5:15-CR-00246-R-2) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Defendant Patrick Samir Asfour claims that he was denied his rights under the 

federal Speedy Trial Act. His problems began when he and a companion were driving 

their two vehicles on an interstate highway. A traffic stop by the Oklahoma Highway 

Patrol (OHP) led to the discovery of firearms and drugs in the companion’s vehicle. The 

two drivers were arrested and placed in county jail. A few days later an information was 

filed in state court charging them with eight violations of Oklahoma law. The state 

preliminary hearing was postponed or continued multiple times until finally, nine months 

 

*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of 

the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive 

value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 8, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

after the traffic stop, the two men were indicted in the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma. 

Under the Speedy Trial Act a federal arrestee must be charged by federal 

indictment or information within 30 days of arrest. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). Defendant 

moved in federal court to dismiss the indictment against him for failure to comply with 

that requirement, arguing that his true federal arrest occurred at the time of the traffic 

stop. He contended that the state arrest and confinement were merely a ruse to avoid the 

30-day requirement and give federal authorities extra time to pressure the drivers to 

cooperate with the prosecution. After an evidentiary hearing the district court denied the 

motion, ruling that Defendant had not shown a ruse. Defendant then entered into a plea 

bargain, agreeing to plead guilty to three counts of the indictment but reserving the right 

to appeal his motion to dismiss. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we hold 

that his appeal is without merit. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Defendant’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On January 30, 2015, Defendant and Ben Issa Saoud were driving on Interstate 40 in 

separate vehicles. Katelyn Worstell, a pregnant 18-year old woman, was riding with 

Defendant. When OHP Trooper Clint Painter attempted to pull Saoud over, Defendant’s 

vehicle struck Painter’s patrol car. The government contends that Defendant 

intentionally hit Painter’s vehicle to draw attention away from Saoud, as he was carrying 

more than 100 pounds of marijuana and two firearms. After all three vehicles came to a 
3 

stop, another OHP trooper arrived to assist Painter, and they discovered the drugs and 

guns in Saoud’s vehicle. Defendant, Saoud, and Worstell were arrested. 

Sam Ward, a special agent with the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 

and Explosives (ATF), and OHP Trooper Mark Dlugokinski, who had been assigned to a 

federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) task force, came to the scene to assist 

with the investigation. Although Defendant characterizes Dlugokinski as a federal 

officer, he testified otherwise and submitted an affidavit stating that his “parent agency” 

is OHP and that his primary investigative priority remains with OHP, though he 

coordinates with other agencies. R. Vol. 1 at 148. Ward testified that he became 

involved in the investigation because one of the firearms was a short-barreled rifle, 

possession of which violates federal law. 

On the day of the arrest, Ward and Dlugokinski interviewed the three suspects 

separately. Ward and Dlugokinski presented Defendant with an ATF Miranda-waiver 

form, which he signed. Three days later Dlugokinski and another OHP trooper 

interviewed Defendant, this time offering an OHP waiver form. During these interviews 

Defendant and Worstell were advised of the federal charges and sentences they could be 

facing; and on two occasions the other interviewer said that Dlugokinski was with the 

DEA. 

On February 4 the State of Oklahoma charged Defendant on eight counts, 

including assault and battery with a deadly weapon, illegal possession of firearms, 

trafficking in illegal drugs, and conspiracy to traffic in illegal drugs. There were 

significant delays in the preliminary hearing. All counsel agreed on February 25 to 
4 

postpone the hearing until March 13. On March 13, Defendant agreed to reschedule the 

hearing for April 10. On April 10 the prosecutor requested a continuance to assure the 

appearance of a witness, and the court granted a continuance to June 5, over Defendant’s 

objection. Some testimony was presented on June 5, but all parties agreed to continue the 

hearing until July 31. On that date, Defendant requested a continuance because of 

discovery issues and the court reset the hearing for October 9. The record before us is 

silent on what happened regarding the preliminary hearing scheduled for October 9. 

On November 18, Defendant was indicted in federal court. The state charges were 

dismissed a week later. On January 7, 2016, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment 

for failure to comply with the Speedy Trial Act. 

At the evidentiary hearing on the motion, Defendant argued that his state 

prosecution was instigated by the federal government to avoid the Speedy Trial Act’s 

requirements because it wanted to keep Defendant and Saoud in county jail for several 

months to put pressure on them to cooperate, as evidenced by the delay in the preliminary 

hearing. To support his claim, Defendant played audio recordings of Dlugokinski’s 

interviews with Defendant and Worstell in which other officers identify him as a DEA 

agent and the suspects are informed of potential federal charges and sentences. 

In response, Dlugokinski clarified during the hearing that although he had worked 

with a DEA task force since November 2011, he was an OHP trooper. He also explained 

that in the interviews he used the long potential federal sentences as leverage to 

encourage Defendant and Worstell to cooperate with the state investigation. And he 

testified that his investigation was building a state case, not a federal case, until shortly 
5 

before the federal charges were brought. As for the delay of the preliminary hearing, the 

government argued that Defendant agreed to most of the continuances and requested one 

himself. It said that there was no actual evidence of collusion between state and federal 

law enforcement to detain Defendant and Saoud in preparation for a federal prosecution. 

The district court denied Defendant’s motion, finding “no evidence . . . 

whatsoever” that the state prosecution was a ruse to hold Defendant for federal 

prosecution to circumvent the Act. R., Vol. 1 at 193–94. In particular, it found that the 

officers “were trying to use the potential of a federal prosecution as leverage to get 

people to cooperate in the state prosecution . . . .” Id. at 194. 

On February 23, Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of the indictment—a 

Travel Act crime of violence, see 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(2); possession of marijuana with 

intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and carrying a firearm during and in 

relation to a drug-trafficking crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). He was sentenced to 

190 months’ imprisonment. 

II. DISCUSSION 

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss 

for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. See United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 

461 (10th Cir. 2006). This standard of review encompasses de novo review of the district 

court’s compliance with the legal requirements of the Act and review for clear error of its 

factual findings. See id. 

The Act requires that “[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with 

the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which 
6 

such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). If the government fails to comply with this time limit, the charges 

in the complaint must be dismissed, with or without prejudice. See id. at § 3162(a)(1). 

The general rule is that “[a]n individual is ‘arrested’ under the Speedy Trial Act 

only when he is taken into custody after a federal arrest for the purpose of responding to a 

federal charge.” United States v. De La Pena-Juarez, 214 F.3d 594, 597 n.6 (5th Cir. 

2000). Some courts, however, have recognized a “ruse” exception to the general rule 

when a person is confined on grounds other than a federal criminal charge for the purpose 

of avoiding the requirements of the Act. Many of these cases involve confinement by 

immigration authorities. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 

451–52 (6th Cir. 2004) (assuming without deciding that ruse exception would apply in 

immigration context if there was collusion between immigration and criminalprosecution authorities, but facts did not support Speedy Trial Act violation); United 

States v. Dyer, 325 F.3d 464, 468 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing ruse exception in 

immigration context, but declining to decide whether to adopt it as facts did not 

demonstrate ruse); De La Pena-Juarez, 214 F.3d at 598; United States v. Pena-Carrillo, 

46 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 1995). A few have involved incarceration under state criminal 

authority. See United States v. Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The Speedy 

Trial Act would lose all force if federal criminal authorities could arrange with state 

authorities to have the state authorities detain a defendant until federal authorities are 

ready to file criminal charges. For this reason, Speedy Trial Act time periods may be 

triggered by state detentions that are merely a ruse to detain the defendant solely for the 
7 

purpose of bypassing the requirements of the Act.”); United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 

590, 596, 596 n.7 (4th Cir. 2005) (state arrest could fall under Speedy Trial Act if “the 

Government has knowledge that an individual is being held by state authorities solely to 

answer to federal charges”). At least one circuit, however, apparently refused to apply 

the exception in that context because of the independent sovereignty of the States. See 

United States v. Alvarado-Linares, 698 F. Appx. 969, 974 (11th Cir. 2017) (rejecting 

application of ruse exception to arrests or detentions under state law by state officials 

“[b]ecause state authorities at all times held sovereign discretion as to how they 

separately might handle their own prosecution or non-prosecution for state offenses”). 

This circuit has yet to rule on whether there is a ruse exception for state arrests, 

but we have adopted the ruse exception when the federal government civilly detains an 

individual to avoid Speedy Trial Act requirements. See United States v. PasillasCastanon, 525 F.3d 994, 997–98 (10th Cir. 2008) (alien held civilly by immigration 

authorities). In that circumstance we held that “[t]he ruse exception is not easily 

triggered.” Id. at 998. A defendant must “demonstrate[] that the primary or exclusive 

purpose of a civil detention was to hold the defendant for future criminal prosecution.” 

Id. Moreover, “[w]ithout evidence of wrongful collusion for [the purpose of holding a 

defendant for future prosecution], the exception does not apply. In short, if the detaining 

authorities have a lawful basis for their civil detention, a defendant is not entitled to 

invoke the exception.” Id. (footnote omitted). Further, the defendant must prove bad 

faith. See id. n.1. Assuming without deciding that we would adopt a ruse exception for 

state arrests, defendants would need to meet this heavy burden of demonstrating that “the 
8 

primary or exclusive purpose of [the state detention] was to hold the defendant for future 

[federal] prosecution” and that the state authorities did not have a “lawful basis for their 

[state] detention.” Id. 

The district court ruled that Defendant had not established the prerequisites for 

application of the ruse exception, and we hold that its ruling was not an abuse of 

discretion. Defendant contends that improper collusion between federal and state 

officials was demonstrated by evidence that (1) federal agents were involved in the 

investigation1

; (2) his state prosecution was delayed for a number of months; and (3) 

Defendant and Worstell were threatened with federal prosecution. We are not persuaded. 

Cooperation between state and federal law-enforcement officers is a commonplace 

that makes investigations more effective and efficient (the precise reason why a state 

trooper would be assigned to a DEA task force). Cooperative investigations may result in 

state prosecution or federal prosecution, depending on many considerations. Notably, 

Defendant presents no evidence of involvement by federal prosecutors before the federal 

indictment, although even evidence of such involvement would likely reflect just 

prosecutorial cooperation rather than federal use of the state criminal-justice system as a 

mere cat’s-paw. We have held that involvement of federal criminal law-enforcement 

officers in immigration proceedings did not in itself trigger the ruse exception. See 

 

1

 In his appellate brief, Defendant also relies on Ward’s testimony at the pretrial 

detention hearing that he started “piecing the case together” after first interviewing 

Worstell months before federal charges were brought. R., Vol. 1 at 76–78. But this 

evidence was not presented to the district court as part of Defendant’s argument that the 

ruse exception applied, so we need not address it. 
9 

Pasillas-Castanon, 525 F.3d at 999; see also Benitez, 34 F.3d at 1493–95 (even when 

state arrest was result of federal investigation and federal law-enforcement officers 

detained defendants until state-law enforcement officers arrived to arrest them, district 

court did not err in finding no ruse). In any event, Dlugokinski testified (and the district 

court could credit) that the investigation was aimed at state charges until shortly before 

Defendant’s federal indictment. See Benitez, 34 F.3d at 1495 (district court did not err in 

relying on state prosecutor’s testimony that State had intended to prosecute defendants if 

federal charges were not brought soon). 

Nor do the delays in the state prosecution suggest that the state prosecution was 

engineered by federal prosecutors. Of the nearly 10 months between Defendant’s arrest 

and his federal indictment, less than two months of the continuances were over 

Defendant’s objection, and more than two months (indeed, the final continuance) was at 

Defendant’s request. There was no evidence of intentional stalling for any improper 

purpose. The district court was hardly unreasonable in being unpersuaded that the delay 

smacked of federal interference. 

Finally, warnings about possible stiff federal sentences do not show that a decision 

had been made to pursue federal prosecution. Dlugokinski gave a perfectly plausible 

reason for telling the suspects of the federal charges and sentences that could be imposed. 

It is not unheard of for investigators to try to induce cooperation by making the risks of 

noncooperation look as severe as possible. The district court credited that reason, stating 

that the officers “were trying to use the potential of a federal prosecution as leverage to 

get people to cooperate in the state prosecution.” R., Vol. 1 at 193–94. See Pasillas-
10 

Castanon, 525 F.3d at 998 (“The mere fact that the detaining authorities are aware other 

potential criminal charges are available does not trigger the [ruse] exception.”).2 

In short, the district court properly ruled that Defendant had failed to show that 

“the primary or exclusive purpose of [the state detention] was to hold [Defendant] for 

future [federal] criminal prosecution.” Pasillas-Castanon, 525 F.3d at 998. Even if we 

were to adopt the ruse exception for state detention, Defendant would not be entitled to 

relief. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the judgment below. 

Entered for the Court 

Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge 

 

2

 The government also contends that Defendant failed to show that the state arrest was 

unlawful or in bad faith, which it argues are requirements for applying the ruse exception. 

The district court did not rely on either ground and we need not address them.