IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MARSHALL DIVISION

HEADWATER RESEARCH LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD and 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 2:23-CV-00103-JRG-RSP 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

SAMSUNG’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION 

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NONINFRINGEMENT 

FOR THE ’117 AND ’192 PATENTS (DKT. NO. 187) 

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EXHIBIT INDEX AND NOTES 

Exhibit Description 

E Excerpts of the Supplemental Rebuttal Expert Report of Ian Foster, Ph.D. 

Regarding the ’733, ’117, ’192 Patents, dated November 6, 2024 

* Emphasis added unless otherwise noted. 

Abbreviations/Definitions 

FCM: Firebase Cloud Messaging 

HW: Headwater 

SMP: Samsung Messaging Platform 

SPP: Samsung Push Platform 

MSJ: Motion for Summary Judgment 

DLI: Mr. de la Iglesia, Headwater’s expert

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I. HEADWATER CONTINUES TO FAIL TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF DIRECT 

INFRINGEMENT FOR ITS ’117 THEORIES1

HW admits that the “plurality of device messaging agents” is one of the “proper subjects 

for the ‘control’ inquiry.’” Dkt. 210 at 7. Yet, it continues to fail to show that Samsung “use[s]” 

the “plurality of device messaging agents.”2 First, HW’s assertion that Samsung controls each 

“device messaging agent” because Samsung allegedly “controls what the targeted device does 

upon receiving the message” (id. at 10) ignores the contrary evidence. Indeed, HW’s argument 

that Samsung “ , 

, translates to 

control of the “device messaging agents” (id. at 10-11) requires an impossible leap of logic. Any 

control Samsung might have over the transmission of messages has no bearing on the FCM3 push 

client’s ability to receive such messages. Second, contrary to HW’s assertion (id. at 10), that 

 does not mean the FCM push client is 

able to “receive the Internet data messages” as required by Claim 1. Device activation, connection, 

and push notification enablement (performed by the user) are each necessary prerequisites for the 

FCM push client to “receive the Internet data messages.” Dkt. 187 at 9-10; see also Info. Images, 

LLC v. PGA Tour, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 3d 549, 567-68 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2023) (end-users put the 

accused system into service “by initiating ... a demand for service that causes back-end 

components, like the ‘production module’ to act out their intended purpose”). Here, it is 

undisputed that without end-users’ active configuration of the device for receiving FCM messages, 

1

 To the extent that HW accuses FCM push servers for any of its infringement theories, Samsung 

does not concede, and HW has not shown, that Samsung controls Google’s push servers. 

2

 Responsive to HW’s discussion of SMP, Samsung does not concede that SMP fulfills the 

“network application server” requirements. See Ex. E (Foster Supp. Rebuttal Rpt.) ¶¶ 18-25. 

3

 HW disputes the figure in UMF No. 2 as being incomplete. Dkt. 210 at 3. 

 and is accurate, even if more detail could be added. Dkt. 187 at 2. 

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the “device messaging agent” cannot “receive the Internet data messages,” per the claim. This is 

likewise true of the SPP push client. Thus, summary judgment is warranted on this issue. 

II. HEADWATER CONTINUES TO FAIL TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF DIRECT 

INFRINGEMENT FOR ITS ’192 FCM THEORY 

For the “message link server” to be “used” by Samsung, Samsung must “control ... and 

benefit from each claimed component.” Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 

F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017). HW’s assertion that Samsung “uses” the “message link server” 

because SMP messages are sent using FCM push servers (Dkt. 210 at 14) trivializes the 

requirement that the “message link server” only “supply ... messages” “upon determining that one 

of the message delivery triggers has occurred” using the “message buffer system[’s]” “logic.” 

Samsung does not control when a “message delivery trigger[]” occurs. Rather, the “message 

delivery triggers” depend on the end-user device connecting/reconnecting to the FCM push server 

or requesting delivery of stored and undelivered messages. Dkt. 187 at 11. Thus, it is undisputed 

that the end-user, not Samsung, controls whether the message delivery trigger has occurred such 

that messages should be supplied, and Samsung is entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

III. SAMSUNG CANNOT BE LIABLE FOR POST-SUIT INDUCED INFRINGEMENT 

OF THE ’117 AND ’192 PATENTS BECAUSE HEADWATER FAILS TO SHOW 

THAT SAMSUNG HAD SPECIFIC INTENT TO INFRINGE 

HW’s contention that Samsung continued to operate/use the SPP/FCM servers to send push 

messages and (Dkt. 210 at 16-17) does not rise to the level of 

demonstrating “specific intent,” which is required for a showing of induced infringement. Specific 

intent “must be proven by evidence of affirmative acts undertaken by defendant to encourage or 

otherwise promote infringement,” which is distinguishable from mere “know[ledge] that 

[defendant’s] products are used for infringement.” Tierra Intelectual Borinquen, Inc. v. ASUS 

Comp. Int’l, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-38-JRG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28249, at *16-17 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 

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3, 2014); see also DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006). These 

affirmative acts constitute a high bar—specific intent is not evidenced even if an “accused inducer 

merely intends to cause others to perform certain acts which are ultimately found to infringe,” or 

if plaintiff provided “[g]eneric allegations that [defendants] provide instructional materials along 

with accused products, without more. . . .” Stragent, LLC v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 6:16-cv446-RWS-KNM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156084, at *22-23 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017) (internal 

citations omitted). HW’s citation to Stoller is inapposite. Stoller involved the denial of plaintiff’s

MSJ where defendant continued supplying ingredients used to make the infringing product per 

contractual obligations because the Court could not conclude specific intent from those actions. 

Stoller Enters. v. Fine Agrochemicahls Ltd., 705 F. Supp. 3d 774, 795 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2023). 

HW’s claim that Samsung’s actions meet this exacting standard is thus unsupported. 

IV. SAMSUNG CANNOT BE LIABLE FOR POST-SUIT CONTRIBUTORY 

INFRINGEMENT OF THE ’192 PATENT 

DLI did not present contributory infringement for the ’192 Patent. HW’s bald reliance on 

one line in its expert report (“

” (Dkt. 210 at UMF No. 18)) is insufficient 

as a matter of law. This boilerplate language does not explain how the contributory infringement 

arguments for the ’117 Patent apply to the ’192 Patent. Because infringement is analyzed on a 

claim-by-claim and element-by-element basis, contributory infringement arguments for one patent 

cannot be wholesale imported to another patent. DLI’s report acknowledges this reality for 

induced infringement, separately explaining his arguments for each of the ’117 and ’192 Patents. 

Dkt. 211-4 ¶¶ 1188-1202, 1208-1211. He failed to engage in the same necessary analysis for 

contributory infringement. HW’s barebones cross-reference to arguments that apply to a different 

patent demands summary judgment of no contributory infringement as to the ’192 Patent. 

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Dated: November 12, 2024 Respectfully submitted, 

By: /s/Katherine D. Prescott 

 Ruffin B. Cordell 

TX Bar No. 04820550 

Michael J. McKeon 

DC Bar No. 459780 

mckeon@fr.com 

Jared Hartzman 

DC Bar No. 1034255 

hartzman@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

1000 Maine Avenue, SW, Ste 1000 

Washington, D.C. 20024 

Telephone: (202) 783-5070 

Facsimile: (202) 783-2331 

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GA Bar No. 427603 

tkodish@fr.com 

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GA Bar No. 633211 

bthompson@fr.com 

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GA Bar No. 256953 

jbright@fr.com 

Christopher O. Green 

GA Bar No. 037617 

cgreen@fr.com 

Noah C. Graubart 

GA Bar No. 141862 

graubart@fr.com 

Sara C. Fish 

GA Bar No. 873853 

sfish@fr.com 

Katherine H. Reardon 

NY Bar No. 5196910 

reardon@fr.com 

Nicholas A. Gallo 

GA Bar No. 546590 

gallo@fr.com 

Vivian C. Keller (pro hac vice) 

GA Bar No. 651500 

keller@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

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1180 Peachtree St. NE, Fl. 21 

Atlanta, GA 30309 

Telephone: (404) 892-5005 

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Leonard E. Davis 

TX Bar No. 05521600 

ldavis@fr.com 

Andria Rae Crisler 

TX Bar No. 24093792 

crisler@fr.com 

Thomas H. Reger II 

Texas Bar No. 24032992 

reger@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

1717 Main Street, Suite 5000 

Dallas, TX 75201 

Telephone: (214)747-5070 

Facsimile: (214) 747-2091 

John-Paul R. Fryckman (pro hac vice) 

CA Bar No. 317591 

John W. Thornburgh 

CA Bar No. 154627 

thornburgh@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

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San Diego, CA 92130 

Telephone: (858) 678-5070 

Facsimile: (858) 678-5099 

Katherine D. Prescott (pro hac vice) 

CA Bar No. 215496 

prescott@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

500 Arguello Street 

Suite 400 

Redwood City, CA 94063 

Telephone: (650) 839-5180 

Facsimile: (650) 839-5071 

Kyle J. Fleming (pro hac vice) 

NY Bar No. 5855499 

kfleming@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

7 Times Square, 20th Floor, 

New York, NY 10036 

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Telephone: (212) 765-5070 

Facsimile: (212) 258-2291 

Melissa R. Smith 

State Bar No. 24001351 

Melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com 

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP 

303 South Washington Avenue 

Marshall, Texas 75670 

Telephone: (903) 934-8450 

Facsimile: (903) 934-9257 

Andrew Thompson (“Tom”) Gorham 

State Bar No. 24012715 

tom@gillamsmithlaw.com 

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP 

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Telephone: (903) 934-8450 

Facsimile: (903) 934-9257 

Michael E. Jones 

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Shaun W. Hassett 

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POTTER MINTON, P.C. 

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Tyler, Texas 75702 

Telephone: (903) 597-8311 

Facsimile: (903) 593-0846 

Lance Lin Yang 

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Lanceyang@quinnemanuel.com 

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Sean S. Pak 

CA Bar No. 219032 

seanpak@quinnemanuel.com 

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN, LLP

50 California Street, 22nd Floor 

San Francisco, CA 94111 

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Telephone: (415) 875-6600 

Brady Huynh (admitted pro hac vice) 

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QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN, LLP 

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HILGERS GRABEN PLLC 

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Dallas, Texas 75230 

Telephone: (972) 645-3097 

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed 

electronically in compliance with Local Rule CV-5 on November 12, 2024. As of this date, all 

counsel of record had consented to electronic service and are being served with a copy of this 

document through the Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(a)(3)(A). 

/s/ Katerine D. Prescott 

Katherine D. Prescott 

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