J-S54002-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF E.A.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: I.P.

No. 769 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered April 4, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 60-Adopt-2013

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J. FILED OCTOBER 22, 2014

I.P. (“Father”) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Franklin County involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his daughter, 

E.A.B., born in February 2012.1 After careful review, we affirm. 

K.B.J. (“Mother”) and Father were never married. A.F.J. (“Stepfather”) 

and Mother married in September 2013, when E.A.B. was about seven 

months old. 

Following E.A.B.’s birth, Father and Mother entered into a verbal 

arrangement whereby Father visited E.A.B. at Mother’s home; at that time, 

Mother was residing with her parents. Mother and Father established a 

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1 We note that Father’s brief twice refers to termination of Mother’s parental 

rights. This is clearly a typographical error. See Appellant’s Brief, at 6, 8. 
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schedule whereby Father could visit with E.A.B. three days each week for 

two hours in the morning.2 N.T. Termination Hearing, 4/4/2014, at 11-12.

On December 16, 2013, Stepfather filed a petition for involuntary 

termination of Father’s parental rights; Mother joined in the petition. The 

court held a hearing on April 4, 2014, after which the trial court entered a 

decree terminating Father’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(1). See

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) (parent by conduct continuing for period of at least six 

months immediately preceding filing of petition has either evidenced settled 

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to child or has refused or failed to 

perform parental duties).3

At the hearing, Mother testified that Father initially denied that the 

child was his, and that when he came to the hospital when E.A.B. was born 

he was intoxicated. Id. at 6, 9-10. Additionally, Mother testified that Father 

was consistently late for his visits with E.A.B., that he was hostile and angry 

at the visits, and that he did not focus on E.A.B. during the visits but instead 

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2 Mother’s father is an attorney; he suggested Father contact an attorney of 

his own in order to establish a formal custody agreement. 

3 Section 2511 does not require that the parent demonstrate both a settled 

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. Parental rights may be terminated pursuant to 

section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties. 

See Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 

1998).
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used the time to attempt to reconcile his relationship with her. Id. at 12-

14. Maternal Grandmother also testified as to Father’s visits with E.A.B.:

Q: —what was your impression how these visits between 

[Father] and [E.A.B.] were going? 

A: They were very hostile. I felt very strongly that the visits 

were more about [Mother] than they were about [E.A.B.]. They 

were more about trying to get her back than they were about 

[E.A.B.], so much to the point that I stated to her on several 

occasions that I sincerely wondered once she went back to work 

if he would ever come when she wasn’t there. He never stayed 

the full – well, he either showed up late for the two-hour visit –

it was regular to show up an hour-and-a-half late or he wouldn’t 

show up, or if his conversation didn’t go with [Mother] the way 

he wanted it to, he would leave within a half an hour. So it 

wasn’t about visiting with [E.A.B.], it was about [Mother]. 

Id. at 50-51. Maternal Grandmother also testified that Father always had 

her home and cell phone number, that there was never a time he could not 

reach her and that she never denied him access to her home for visiting with 

his daughter. Id. at 54. She also stated that Father’s last visit was in April 

2012, and that Mother went back to work that month. Id.

Mother testified that other than a pink teddy bear Father purchased 

before E.A.B. was born, Father never gave E.A.B. gifts or cards, nor did he 

purchase diapers, bottles or any type of supplies for her. Id. at 18-19. 

Mother did state, however, that Father paid $50 a week in support until April 

2012, which totaled $300. Id. at 19. Mother testified that Father last saw 

E.A.B. in April 2012, and that Father called her six months later, in October 

2012, to tell her he was moving to California. Id. at 15. 
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Mother also testified that Stepfather has been a father figure for E.A.B. 

since she was born, that they are extremely close, that he financially 

supports E.A.B., that E.A.B. calls him “Daddy,” and that Stepfather would 

like to adopt E.A.B. Id. at 21. Stepfather confirmed at the hearing that he 

had assumed financial responsibility for E.A.B., that if Father’s parental 

rights were terminated he would adopt E.A.B., and if Father’s rights were not 

terminated he would continue financial support for E.A.B. as her stepfather. 

Id. at 42. Stepfather testified that E.A.B. “is [his] daughter” and, “no 

matter what happens today, that’s not going to change.” Id. at 43. 

Maternal Grandmother also testified to the relationship between E.A.B. and 

Stepfather: “She lights up when he walks in the room. He takes care of 

her. . . . He’s Daddy.” Id. at 56. 

Paternal Grandfather also testified. He stated that he and his wife 

never prevented Father from visiting with E.A.B., and that his daughter 

never did either. Id. at 70. 

Mother acknowledged that she moved twice from her parents’ 

residence and did not tell Father, but explained that she did this because she 

was afraid of him. Id. at 31, 34. She also explained that since visits with 

E.A.B. took place at her parents’ home, there was no need for her to inform 

him of her new address. Id. 

Father also testified. He stated that he visited with E.A.B. until she 

was three months old. Id. at 78. He also stated that the reason he stopped 

visiting was that he was “running low on giving [Mother] weekly money,” 
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and “[Mother] wasn’t happy with that[,] and that she said, “You don’t have 

the money, you can’t see your daughter. Simple as that.” Id. at 78-79. He 

also stated that he was afraid if he showed up at maternal grandparents’ 

property, “they’d probably call the police.” Id. at 79. However, Father also 

testified that he felt comfortable with maternal grandfather and that 

maternal grandfather told him if he ever needed “to talk to him about 

anything about [E.A.B.] or anything I can just call.” Id. at 81-82. 

Father claims that the trial court erred in terminating his parental 

rights under section 2511(a)(1). He argues that Mother presented obstacles 

that impeded communication between Father and E.A.B. and, therefore, the 

evidence did not establish either that Father failed to perform parental duties 

or that he exhibited a settled purpose of relinquishing his parental rights. 

Father also argues the court did not have sufficient information to determine 

the bond between Father and E.A.B. and the effects of termination on that 

bond. Our review of the record belies Father’s claims. 

In reviewing an appeal from the termination of parental rights, we 

utilize the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires [that we] accept the findings of fact 

and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are 

supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 

2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or 

abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of 

discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court 
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might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision 

may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill will. 

As [was] discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying 

an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We 

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not 

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. 

Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite 

result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, 

an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial 

court and impose its own credibility determinations and 

judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as 

the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s 

legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse 

of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some internal

citations omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We 

have explained:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id., quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003). We have 

explained this Court’s review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
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to support the involuntary termination of a parent’s rights pursuant to 

section 2511(a)(1):

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the moving 

party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, 

sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the 

termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish 

parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform 

parental duties. . . . Section 2511 does not require that the 

parent demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform 

parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights may be terminated

pursuant to [s]ection 2511(a)(1) if the parent either 

demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to 

a child or fails to perform parental duties.

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the 

court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the postabandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

[s]ection 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). 

After our review of the record, we find that the court properly 

determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly showed that Father 

failed to perform his parental duties for at least six months prior to the filing 

of the petition. The court found Father’s testimony was not credible and his 

explanation for his conduct was not supported in the record. 

Father readily acknowledged that, other than the $300 he gave to 

Mother, he did not provide for E.A.B. after she was born. N.T. supra, at 89. 

He admitted he never bought clothes or toys or sent birthday or Christmas 
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presents, and that he never reached out to E.A.B. on her birthday. Id. 

Further, Father testified that he felt comfortable with maternal grandfather, 

but later stated, in an attempt to explain why he did not visit E.A.B., that he 

was not comfortable going to maternal grandfather’s residence. Id. at 81-

82, 90. Additionally, Father testified that although he told Mother he was 

planning to move to California, he never did move and has been living in 

Carlisle since 2000. Id. at 98. 

Appellees, Mother and Stepfather, have established by clear and 

convincing evidence that Father, for a period exceeding six months prior to 

the filing of the petition, has failed to perform his parental duties. He failed 

to support E.A.B., even while employed, and failed to visit her. In fact, 

Father had no contact with E.A.B. for almost eighteen months prior to the 

filing of the petition. The trial court did not find Father’s explanations for 

either of these failings credible, and in fact determined that there were no 

actual obstacles or limitations to his performance of parental duties that he 

did not have control over himself. 

This Court has held that parental duty requires affirmative 

performance, more than financial obligation, but a “continuing interest in the 

child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and association with 

the child.” In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462 (Pa. Super. 2003). There is 

nothing in the record before us to support a finding of genuine or continuing 

effort by Father. In sum, Father’s own lack of effort created the obstacle to 

his relationship with E.A.B. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1125 (Pa. 
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Super. 2010) (child’s life cannot be put on hold in hope that parent will 

summon ability to handle responsibilities of parenting). 

With respect to section 2511(b), the trial court found that given 

E.A.B.’s age and the lack of contact with Father for almost two years, there 

is no bond between Father and E.A.B. and that termination would not 

adversely affect her developmental, physical or emotional needs and 

welfare. Additionally, the court determined Stepfather was a stable 

influence on E.A.B. and was able and willing to provide for her 

developmental, physical and emotional needs. The court, therefore, 

concluded that termination of Father’s parental rights was in E.A.B.’s best 

interests. See In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005).

After a careful review of the trial court’s application of the law to the 

facts of this case, we find no reason to disturb the court’s conclusions. The 

court’s findings and credibility determinations are supported in the record. 

We further find that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion or error 

of law. See In re R.J.T., supra (we defer to trial judge so long as factual 

findings are supported by record and court’s legal conclusions are not result 

of error of law or abuse of discretion).4 

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4 The guardian ad litem for E.A.B. has also filed a brief adopting the trial 

court’s position that termination of Father’s parental rights is in E.A.B.’s best 

interests. 
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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/22/2014