IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MARSHALL DIVISION

HEADWATER RESEARCH LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD and 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 2:23-CV-00103-JRG-RSP 

SAMSUNG’S MOTION TO STRIKE EXPERT REPORTS OF 

MR. ERIK DE LA IGLESIA 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 1

A. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s New Patent Infringement 

Theories Not Disclosed in Headwater’s Infringement Contentions ....................... 1

1. Mr. de la Iglesia’s New Theory that Google’s FCM Infringes 

the ’192 Patent Should be Stricken as Untimely Disclosed ........................ 1

2. Mr. de la Iglesia New ’117 Patent “Transmission Trigger” 

Infringement Theories Should be Excluded as Untimely Disclosed .......... 3

3. Mr. de la Iglesia’s New ’733 Patent Infringement Theories With 

Respect to Web OTA Downloads Should Be Excluded as 

Untimely Disclosed ..................................................................................... 4

4. Exclusion is the Appropriate Remedy ........................................................ 5

B. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s ’117 Patent Claim 6 

Infringement Theory As Conclusory and Unexplained .......................................... 6

C. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s Uncorroborated Allegation that the 

Asserted Patents “Solved” the Problem of Mobile Network Congestion ............... 7

D. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s Baseless and Unreliable 

Analysis of Purported Incremental Technical Benefits Over the Prior Art ............ 7

1. Mr. de la Iglesia’s Methodology ................................................................. 8

2. Mr. de la Iglesia Methodology is Unreliable ............................................ 10

E. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s Allegation that Samsung 

Infringes the ’117 or ’192 Patents By “Making,” “Offering,” “Selling,” 

or “Importing” ....................................................................................................... 11

F. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s Discussion of Commercial 

Contracts and Unrelated Case Proceedings .......................................................... 12

G. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s Allegations of Secondary 

Considerations of Non-obviousness Lacking Nexus to the Asserted Patents ....... 14

II. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 15

 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases Page(s) 

Anascape, Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 

No. 9:60-cv-0158, 2008 WL 7180756 (E.D. Tex. May 1, 2008) ..........................................1, 5 

Astro Tech., Inc. v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 

No. CIV.A. H-03-0745, 2005 WL 6061803 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2005) .................................13 

Barrett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 

95 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 1996) .......................................................................................................5 

Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 

631 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011)................................................................................................12 

Centrak, Inc. v. Sonitor Techs., Inc., 

915 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................12 

Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Rsch. Organisation v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 

809 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................8 

Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 

406 U.S. 518 (1972) ...........................................................................................................11, 12 

Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 

944 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................15 

Hutson v. Coviden Holding, Inc., 

No. 2:13-CV-895, 2015 WL 4040447 (S.D. Ohio June 30, 2015) ............................................7 

Loeffel Steel Prod., Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc., 

387 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ill. 2005) .........................................................................................7 

Lutron Elecs. Co., Inc. v. Crestron Elecs., Inc., 

970 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Utah 2013) ......................................................................................15 

Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 

254 F.R.D. 597 (N.D. Cal. 2008) .............................................................................................15

Specialty Earth Scis., LLC v. Carus Corp., 

No. 15-CV-06133, 2020 WL 7027441 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2020) ...........................................13 

U.S. v. O’Keefe, 

825 F.2d 314 (11th Cir. 1987) ...................................................................................................7 

Statutes 

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) ...................................................................................................................11, 12 

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Other Authorities 

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ........................................................................................................12 

Local Patent Rule 3-6(b) ..................................................................................................................2 

 

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EXHIBIT INDEX AND NOTES 

Exhibit Description 

1 Expert Report of Erik de la Iglesia, dated September 26, 2024 

2 Rebuttal Expert Report of Erik de la Iglesia, dated October 14, 2024 

3 Plaintiff Headwater Research LLC’s Disclosure of Asserted Claims and 

Infringement Contentions, dated September 28, 2023 

4 Exhibit C - U.S. Patent No. 9,615,192, dated September 28, 2023 

5 U.S. Patent No. 9,615,192 chart, dated December 15, 2023 

6 Email between counsel from February to May 2024 

7 U.S. Patent No. 9,198,117 chart, dated December 15, 2023 

8 U.S. Patent No. 8,406,733 chart, dated December 15, 2023 

9 Correspondence dated November 22, 2023 

10 SAMSUNG_PRIORART2_0007087 

* Emphasis added unless otherwise noted. 

** Form objections are omitted from deposition transcript quotations unless otherwise noted. 

*** In this brief, “Headwater” refers to Plaintiff and its purported predecessors.

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The Court should strike the untimely, irrelevant, and/or unreliable opinions of Headwater’s 

technical expert Mr. de la Iglesia described below. 

I. ARGUMENT 

A. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s New Patent Infringement Theories 

Not Disclosed in Headwater’s Infringement Contentions 

Headwater’s late disclosure of new infringement theories in its expert reports is unjustified 

and prejudicial. The Court should strike these untimely theories. Anascape, Ltd. v. Microsoft 

Corp., No. 9:60-cv-0158, 2008 WL 7180756, at *2-4 (E.D. Tex. May 1, 2008). 

1. Mr. de la Iglesia’s New Theory that Google’s FCM Infringes 

the ’192 Patent Should be Stricken as Untimely Disclosed

Headwater should not be allowed to accuse Google FCM push servers with respect to the 

’192 patent for the first time in Mr. de la Iglesia’s report. Accordingly, his FCM theory should be 

stricken: Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 976-979, 1017-1042, 1067-1089, 1100-1103, 1113-1121, 1131-1139. 

Headwater’s expert, Mr. de la Iglesia, presents two distinct theories as to what constitutes the 

claimed ’192 patent’s claimed “message link server.” First, he argues Firebase Cloud Messaging 

(“FCM”) system servers, which are owned by Google, constitute the claimed server. Ex. 1 ¶¶ 966-

982. Second, he argues Samsung Push Platform (“SPP”) servers, which are owned by Samsung, 

constitute the claimed server. Id. Headwater before never disclosed its FCM theory. 

Headwater’s initial infringement contentions, served September 28, 2023, obfuscated what 

was accused of infringement. The contentions’ cover pleading accused 

 as well as various Samsung phones, tablets, televisions, and 

wearables. Ex. 3 at 8-11. The contentions’ ’192 patent chart defined “Accused Devices” as 

 Ex. 4 at 1. In 

charting the ’192 patent independent claim, Headwater made no reference to FCM servers nor the 

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word Firebase. Ex. 4 at 1-60. The failure to mention FCM servers in the independent claims, 

given that it was well known that FCM servers are Google servers, made clear that Headwater was 

not accusing an FCM server as the “message link server.” 

After Samsung objected to the Headwater’s deficient infringement contentions, Headwater 

served supplemental infringement contentions on December 15, 2023 without seeking leave as 

required by LPR 3-6(b). For the ’192 patent, those contentions again identified the “Accused 

Devices” as only “ .” 

Ex. 5 (12/15/23 192 Chart) at 1. The new contentions included no website screenshots or evidence 

specific to Google’s FCM for the independent claims, but added stray mentions of “ 

” and “ ” with respect to independent claim 

limitations 1[a] and 1[b]. These new contentions continued to lack any allegation that FCM servers 

were the claimed “message link server,” nor did they refer to Firebase or FCM for any other claim 

1 limitations. Ex. 5 at 13, 21. If Headwater wanted to accuse FCM servers of being the “message 

link server,” it should have said so and, at a minimum, charted FCM servers as satisfying all 

limitations. 

Nevertheless, for certainty, Samsung asked Headwater about the stray FCM references in 

the amended contentions: Was Headwater accusing Google FCM servers of infringing the ’192 

patent or not? At a meet and confer in February, “

.’” Ex. 6 (Feb. 19, 2024 

email fr. Crisler) at 2. Headwater promised to later provide “

.” Id. It never did. On May 1, 2024, Samsung wrote 

Headwater to explain it understood “

.” Id. (May 1, 2024 

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email fr. Prescott) at 2. 

. Id. at 1. Nonetheless, Headwater’s expert, Mr. de la Iglesia, now 

accuses Samsung of infringing the ’192 patent through its alleged use of Google FCM servers. As 

the contentions did not accuse these servers, Mr. de la Iglesia should not be allowed to do so now. 

At a minimum, Mr. de la Iglesia’s new FCM theory introduces new theories for how 

limitations 1[c] and 1[d] (Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 1100-1103), 1[e] (id. ¶¶ 1113-1123), and 1[f] (id.

¶¶ 1131-1139) are met because Headwater’s amended infringement contentions never even 

with respect to these limitations. See Ex. 5 at 21-63. Nor 

did the contentions cite any of the publicly available Google FCM information now relied upon 

by Mr. de la Iglesia for these limitations. Id. Rather the contentions exclusively cited Samsung 

websites relating to Samsung’s SPP and Knox functionalities. Id. The novelty of Mr. de la 

Iglesia’s infringement theory is particularly striking with respect to limitation 1[e]. The 1[e] 

contentions mention, with respect to Samsung’s Tizen servers and Knox servers, “

” constitutes an example of the claimed 

message delivery trigger that is “an asynchronous event with time-critical messaging needs.” Id. 

at 52-53. Yet, Mr. de la Iglesia alleges 

each constitute a claimed “trigger.” Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶ 1113. Nowhere did the contentions 

reference let alone identify them as 

the claimed trigger. See Ex. 3. Such undisclosed theories should be excluded. 

2. Mr. de la Iglesia New ’117 Patent “Transmission Trigger” 

Infringement Theories Should be Excluded as Untimely Disclosed 

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Mr. de la Iglesia advances a new infringement theory that the accused SPP and FCM 

functionalities practice the ’117 patent claim 17’s “transmission trigger [that] is the expiration of 

a periodic timer” because “

.” See Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶ 579. Headwater’s contentions provided no 

narrative or evidence to suggest such a theory, and instead contended that 

.” Ex. 7 at 126-127. A period of inactivity (e.g., because 

a device is off or otherwise inactive) has nothing to do with heartbeat transmissions that are sent 

throughout the day to keep a connection to a push messaging server alive. 

3. Mr. de la Iglesia’s New ’733 Patent Infringement Theories 

With Respect to Web OTA Downloads Should Be Excluded as Untimely Disclosed 

Mr. de la Iglesia advances new infringement theories for the ’733 patent, claims 3 

(“wherein the message content comprises information associated with a service usage”), 8 

(“wherein the message content comprises information from a third party configured to provide 

control of a service or a billing for a service”), and 9 (“wherein the message content comprises an 

agent instruction, a setting value, an agent configuration, or a software update). For the first time, 

Headwater alleges that Samsung infringes these claims because 

.” See Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 869-872, 

886-890, 891-894. Nowhere do Headwater’s infringement contentions reference Web OTA 

downloads. See Ex. 8 at 78-79, 85-86. 

Samsung raised the deficiency of Headwater’s initial infringement contentions for these 

three claims on November 11, 2023, stating that Headwater’s contentions “

.” Ex. 9 at 9. 

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For claim 3, Samsung explained that “

.” Id. Similarly, Samsung explained, 

 Id. at 10. 

Headwater then supplemented its contentions on December 15, 2023. That supplement did not 

mention Web OTA downloads for any of claims 3, 7, and 9. Ex. 8 at 78-79, 85-86. Headwater 

should not now be allowed to accuse them now, and Mr. de la Iglesia’s theory based on Web OTA 

downloads should be stricken: Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 869-872, 886-890, 891-894. 

4. Exclusion is the Appropriate Remedy 

Headwater withheld the new infringement theories discussed above until Mr. de la Iglesia’s 

opening report, flouting P.R. 3-6’s requirement to seek leave to amend its contentions. Expert 

reports are not a vehicle for bypassing this Court’s rules. Anascape, 2008 WL 7180756 at *4.1

Even if Headwater had sought leave, it cannot justify its late disclosure. The functionality 

Headwater currently contends satisfies the asserted claims is publicly known. For example, as to 

’192 patent limitation 1[e], Mr. de la Iglesia’s infringement report relies on public Google Android 

developer documentation describing how push notifications are handled when a device is in Doze 

mode. See https://developer.android.com/training/monitoring-device-state/doze-standby (“If your 

users must see a notification right away, use an FCM high priority message.”); Ex. 1 ¶ 1121. 

Likewise, the new ’117 patent “transmission trigger” theory is based upon the well-known fact 

1

 The Fifth Circuit uses a four-factor test to exclude expert testimony based on undisclosed 

information: (1) the explanation, if any, for the party’s failure to provide discovery; (2) the 

prejudice to the opposing party of allowing the expert to testify; (3) the possibility of curing such 

prejudice by granting a continuance; and (4) the importance of the expert evidence. Barrett v. 

Atl. Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 1996). 

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that end-user devices use “heartbeats” to maintain connectivity to push notification systems. See 

Ex. 10 at 7098 (publicly available presentation cited by Op. Rpt. ¶ 1223). 

Headwater’s belated-disclosed theories unfairly prejudice Samsung. Samsung had no 

opportunity to investigate or conduct discovery on these theories, which substantially depart from 

Headwater’s contentions. With fact discovery closed, Samsung cannot seek discovery from thirdparty Google to learn more about FCM, nor can it seek admissions or interrogatory responses from 

Headwater about its understanding of these newly-accused features. Headwater’s unjustified 

failure to provide notice of these new theories deprived Samsung of the ability to create a full 

record on the design and operation of this newly accused technology, whether these features 

already existed in the prior art, as well as their alternatives and value. 

A continuance would not cure the prejudice of proceeding through fact discovery without 

notice of these new theories. As to their importance, exclusion will not prevent Headwater from 

advancing the theories it disclosed in its infringement contentions. If the new theories were 

important, Headwater could have moved to amend to explain its delay and the importance. It did 

not. Samsung thus respectfully requests that Mr. de la Iglesia’s new theories be stricken. 

B. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s ’117 Patent Claim 6 Infringement 

Theory As Conclusory and Unexplained 

The Court should strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s infringement allegation for claim 6 of the ’117 

patent as he provides no analysis as to how its limitations are practiced by the accused products. 

See Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 543-545. The entirety of his “opinion” is a “see above” cite. Id. Nowhere 

in his report, including in his cross-referenced “evidence cited for 1[a]-1[h],” does he identify what 

constitutes the claimed “secure execution environment”—much explain how a “device messaging 

agent” executes within this environment while “at least one of the applications executes outside of 

the environment.” Id. ¶¶ 207-514. Samsung should not be required to guess. 

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C. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s Uncorroborated Allegation that 

the Asserted Patents “Solved” the Problem of Mobile Network Congestion 

Mr. de la Iglesia’s opinions that 

that the Asserted Patents “solved” mobile network congestion (Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 40, 50; Ex. 2 

(Reb. Rpt.) ¶¶ 51, 61, 65) should be stricken. An expert cannot “under the guise of giving expert 

testimony . . . become the mouthpiece of the witnesses on whose statements or opinions the expert 

purports to base his opinion.” Loeffel Steel Prod., Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 794, 

808 (N.D. Ill. 2005); see also U.S. v. O’Keefe, 825 F.2d 314, 319 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Disguised as mobile technology background, Mr. de la Iglesia makes the bold, 

unsubstantiated claim that the Asserted Patents solved unspecified network issues, including issues 

in Cingular’s network caused by Apple’s introduction of the iPhone. Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶ 50 

); Ex. 2 (Reb. Rpt.) ¶ 61 (same). He does not present 

any evidence from Apple, any wireless carrier, or anyone other than that 

discusses these supposed connectivity issues or how they were solved, much less that they were 

solved using anything related to the asserted patents. See Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 40-50; Ex. 2 (Reb. 

Rpt.) ¶¶ 51-61, 65. And Mr. de la Iglesia performed no independent investigation or verification 

. Thus, the Court should not permit Mr. de la Iglesia to present this 

unsupported story to the jury under the guise of expert testimony. Hutson v. Coviden Holding, 

Inc., No. 2:13-CV-895, 2015 WL 4040447, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 30, 2015) (excluding testimony 

where expert merely “reviewed” someone else’s findings and never verified them). 

D. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s Baseless and Unreliable Analysis 

of Purported Incremental Technical Benefits Over the Prior Art 

Mr. de la Iglesia purports to quantify the “incremental improvement in battery capacity” 

that the Asserted Patents provide over the prior art, concluding “

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. Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 1219-1262, 1255, 1257. First, Mr. de la Iglesia fails “the essential 

requirement for reliability” because he attempts to evaluate the entire value of centralized push 

notifications—not the incremental value provided by Headwater’s patents over known centralized 

push server systems. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Rsch. Organisation v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 

F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Mr. de la Iglesia concedes that these asserted patents add narrow 

benefits over the existing push systems, yet he ignores this. See, e.g., Ex. 2 (Reb. Rpt.) ¶ 745 

(emphasizing “security” as allegedly distinguishing feature over central server prior art). Instead, 

he compares pulling to polling systems—a different message architecture—to inflate his results. 

Second, even his pull versus poll analysis is too speculative and unreliable. He essentially 

cobbles together a few statistics from unrelated documents without verifying or testing any 

accuracy thereof himself, fails to tailor his calculations to the relevant time period and devices, 

and ultimately improperly tests far more than only the limited incremental benefit allegedly 

provided by the asserted patents. Instead, Mr. de la Iglesia’s calculations effectively attempt to 

claim the benefit of known prior art centralized server systems as compared to even older prior art 

systems without any clear connection or limitation to only the improvement of the asserted patents. 

1. Mr. de la Iglesia’s Methodology 

As an initial matter, Mr. de la Iglesia contends that to provide sufficiently “ ” 

information to applications on a mobile device, the prior art required “

” between apps and their respective servers. Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 1229, 1221 

(alleging that “

”). He asserts that Headwater’s patents enabled 

” thus eliminating 

the need for an alleged “ ” of connections. Id. ¶ 1225. However, he fails to acknowledge 

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in designing these calculations that centralized push notification server systems were well known 

in the art, and did not represent the incremental benefit of the asserted patents distinct from the art. 

Mr. de la Iglesia then estimates the battery “ ” of allowing multiple applications to stay 

sufficiently “ ” under both the prior art and the “ ” approach. He claims that the 

prior art approach to supplying “ ” data was for each application to “ ” its respective 

application server repeatedly to check if any new data exists and if so, request it. He then assumes, 

based on a single presentation from 2010, . 

Id. ¶¶ 1223, 1239 (citing SAMSUNG_PRIORART2_0007087). He then assumes that each of the 

Accused Products, many of which are over a decade newer and more advanced than phones in 

2010, also . Id. ¶¶ 1254, 1257. 

Next, Mr. de la Iglesia switches to using survey data from 2022. Based on this data, he 

speculates that the average Samsung user “

.” Id. ¶ 1240 (citing SAM-HW-2_00343046). He arbitrarily 

states that . 

Id. ¶ 1235. Mixing the push notification data from 2022 with the from 

2010, he computes the alleged battery drain for (id. ¶ 1250) and 

(id. ¶ 1257). Mr. de la Iglesia makes no attempt to explain how either timeframe relates to 

Headwater’s survey evidence provided by its other expert, Dr. Groehn. 

Finally, using those computations and adjusting for the possibility that 

, he 

applies the computed battery drain to the battery capacity for various Galaxy smartphone products. 

(Id. ¶¶ 1254, 1257). This is the only time Mr. de la Iglesia attempts to consider the differences in 

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the hardware between the Accused Products. He never addresses any hardware differences 

between phones from 2010 and the Accused Products which span through the present. 

2. Mr. de la Iglesia Methodology is Unreliable 

Even assuming Mr. de la Igelsia’s approach properly compares the Asserted Patents to the 

prior art (which it does not), his methodology is unreliable for at least the following reasons. 

First, Mr. de la Iglesia provides no analysis to indicate that the 

was correct, accurate, or reliable in 2010 or the time of the hypothetical negotiation (e.g., 2013 or 

2015). He has no information on how that number was computed or to what device(s) it applies. 

Second, Mr. de la Iglesia has no basis to assume a Samsung user receives push notifications 

from based on his interpretation , or that 

. As anyone who has 

been annoyed by a push notification knows, simply because an application receives a push 

notification does not mean that an application needs to be constantly receiving data 

. Mr. de la Iglesia’s assumptions to the contrary are based on rampant speculation about 

how Samsung’s customers would use mobile devices at the time of the hypothetical negotiation. 

Third, Mr. de la Iglesia’s estimation of improved battery life cannot apply to all the 

Accused Products. His calculations are based only on smartphones that use cellular connectivity. 

See Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 1254, 1257 (reproducing battery capacities for smartphones). Yet the 

accused products include other products with meaningful differences. The accused tablets, for 

example, have much larger battery capacities than phones and are more likely to be nearby a power 

outlet such that battery improvement is likely irrelevant. Likewise, many accused products do not 

support cellular connectivity (such as wearables that must be “tethered” to a smartphone or Wi-Fi 

only tablets). While Mr. de la Iglesia admits “

,” (id. ¶ 1246), he fails to account for 

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such acknowledged differences. Thus, his assessment of alleged incremental improvement cannot 

apply to all accused products, as he purports to do. See id. ¶¶ 1219-1262, 1255, 1257. 

E. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s Allegation that Samsung Infringes 

the ’117 or ’192 Patents By “Making,” “Offering,” “Selling,” or “Importing” 

Mr. de la Iglesia makes vague references to Samsung directly infringing by “making, . . . 

offering for sale, and selling” the claimed “system” of the ’117 patent or the claimed “message 

link server” of the ’192 patent. Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 1176-1185, 1203, 1205. Although Mr. de la 

Iglesia’s theories are barely coherent, as he intermixes alleged evidence of each infringing act, 

none of them are valid under controlling law. 

The ’117 patent recites a “network system” comprising both “device messaging agents . . 

. executable on” mobile end-user devices and a “network message server.” See id. ¶ 1175. Yet 

Samsung does not make, sell, nor offer to sale any such “system.” Samsung sells mobile devices 

that can receive push notifications from servers. Samsung does not sell or offer the servers. Mr. 

de la Iglesia appears to offer theories that Samsung performs the requisite infringing acts because 

it “ (id. ¶ 1178), “ ,” 

(id.), and/or “ ” that allow Samsung devices to use FCM (id. ¶¶ 

1182, 1185). But selling only one component of an allegedly infringing system cannot qualify as 

infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).2

 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 

518, 532 (1972) (“[A] combination patent can be infringed only by combination.”). Mr. de la 

Iglesia’s “ ” theory is even less clear, but he states that “

” Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶ 1178. Mr. de la Iglesia’s boilerplate statement is 

2

 Headwater only pleads infringement based on § 271(a), (b), or (c). See Dkt. 31 (Headwater First 

Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 62, 64, 76, 79, 91, 94. 

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demonstrably wrong, based on his own infringement theory, however, as he contends that 

consumer devices—which are outside of Samsung’s control—“

.” Id. ¶ 555. The accused system cannot even come into existence 

until this step occurs, and thus, Samsung cannot be deemed to “make” it. See, e.g., Centillion Data 

Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“In order to ‘make’ 

the system under § 271(a), Qwest would need to combine all of the claim elements—this it does 

not do.”); see also Centrak, Inc. v. Sonitor Techs., Inc., 915 F.3d 1360, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 

The ’192 patent recites a “message link server” comprised of various elements. Headwater 

points to each of Google FCM and Samsung SPP servers as the claimed “server.” Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) 

¶¶ 966, 967, 967. Again, despite Mr. de la Iglesia’s vague suggestions to the contrary, Samsung 

does not sell the accused servers. Samsung obviously does not “make” Google servers. None of 

Samsung’s SPP servers are , and Headwater has never contested this 

fact. See id. ¶¶ 267, 966. Samsung thus cannot be liable for “making.” See Deepsouth Packing 

Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972). 

F. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s Discussion of Commercial 

Contracts and Unrelated Case Proceedings 

Mr. de la Iglesia is unqualified to opine on contracts between Google and Samsung, and 

the opinions he offers on them are irrelevant to the issues in the case and high prejudicial. 

Accordingly, they should be excluded. Mr. de la Iglesia lacks the requisite “knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education’” to opine on commercial contracts. Under Rule 702 and 

Daubert, an expert is precluded from testifying if he is not “qualified as an expert by knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education.” Mr. de la Iglesia interprets the rights and obligations 

under a complex set of contracts, the “MADA” and revenue sharing agreements, but he is not an 

expert on licensing, contracts, or damages-related issues. Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 6-15. His opinions 

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on contractual obligations are beyond the scope of his expertise and should be excluded. See, e.g., 

Specialty Earth Scis., LLC v. Carus Corp., No. 15-CV-06133, 2020 WL 7027441, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 

Nov. 30, 2020) (granting motion to exclude expert testimony, reasoning that “[j]ust because 

[expert] has expertise with respect to the science and technology underlying the Licensed Products 

does not mean that she has expertise in the marketing and sales of those products”); Astro Tech., 

Inc. v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., No. CIV.A. H-03-0745, 2005 WL 6061803, at *10 (S.D. Tex. 

Sept. 28, 2005) (excluding licensing opinions offered by expert in solid rock motor technology). 

Moreover, these agreements are irrelevant to this case. Mr. de la Iglesia improperly relies 

on them to show direct and indirect infringement (Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 1183-1185, 1189, 1193-

1194, 1197, 1202, 1209, 1212, 1214), lack of non-infringing alternatives (id. ¶¶ 1266-1277), and 

secondary considerations of nonobviousness. Ex. 2 (Reb. Rpt.) ¶¶ 737-739. 

As to infringement, Mr. de la Iglesia asserts that by “

.” See, e.g., Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶ 1185. He relies on these statements to allege 

direct infringement of the ’117 and ’733 patents (e.g. id. ¶¶ 1185, 1212) and indirect infringement 

of all asserted patents (e.g. id. ¶¶ 1189, 1209, 1214). Any rights conveyed by the contracts, 

however, are irrelevant to whether Samsung actually performs any act that constitutes direct 

infringement. Moreover, the MADA . And 

Mr. de la Iglesia does not contend otherwise. The contracts are likewise irrelevant to indirect 

infringement. Mr. de la Iglesia suggests that

.” See id. ¶¶ 1191, 1209, 1214. But, with 

respect to Google, Mr. de la Iglesia fails to explain how 

, especially when the accused 

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system the contracts. With respect to unidentified third parties, Mr. de la Iglesia cites no 

evidence establishing any possible third party direct infringers are even aware of the MADA. 

As to non-infringing alternatives, Mr. de la Iglesia asserts that 

.” Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 1266, 1277. Samsung-Google contracts are 

irrelevant to analysis of non-infringing alternatives. Mr. de la Iglesia does not (and is not qualified 

to) analyze whether Samsung or Google may have opted not to enter or renew any contractual 

agreements at the alleged time of the hypothetical negotiation. 

As to secondary consideration allegations, Mr. de la Iglesia cites to the Google-Samsung 

contracts as evidence of Samsung experiencing “

.” Ex. 2 (Reb. Rpt.) ¶¶ 737-739. But he 

identifies no nexus between those contracts and the alleged inventions. See Section G infra. 

The foregoing is merely camouflage for Mr. de la Iglesia to wave large dollar figures and 

irrelevant litigation in front of the jury. For example, Mr. de La Iglesia quotes 

. 

See Ex. 1 (Op. Rpt.) ¶¶ 1269-1274. Moreover, Mr. de La Iglesia offers the misleading statement 

that “

.” Ex. 2 (Reb. Rpt.) ¶¶ 738-739. Even if 

. Such irrelevant and highly prejudicial “opinions” should be excluded. 

G. The Court Should Strike Mr. de la Iglesia’s Allegations of Secondary 

Considerations of Non-obviousness Lacking Nexus to the Asserted Patents 

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Lacking any evidence of secondary considerations of non-obviousness connected to the

asserted patents, Mr. de la Iglesia relies on the success of the accused Android devices—no 

products developed by Headwater or ItsOn—as evidence of non-obviousness because they 

(allegedly) practice the Asserted Patents. Ex. 2 (Reb. Rpt.) ¶¶ 736-740. 

Assuming arguendo that Android devices infringe, Mr. de la Iglesias’s opinion that the 

success of the products comes from the three Asserted Patents is, on its face, unreliable. “To 

establish a nexus . . . an expert must be qualified to do more than state a product incorporates a 

claimed invention; the product is successful; therefore the invention must have caused the 

commercial success.” Lutron Elecs. Co., Inc. v. Crestron Elecs., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1239 

(D. Utah 2013). Mr. de la Iglesia makes no attempt to show that the Accused Products are 

coextensive with what is claimed to justify a presumption of secondary consideration. See Fox 

Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019). They are not. The accused 

Android devices are smartphones and tablets, capable of innumerable things having nothing to do 

with push notifications. Mr. de la Iglesia cannot simply claim that the products infringe, they are 

successful, “ergo [Headwater]’s inventions caused the products’ success.” Rambus Inc. v. Hynix 

Semiconductor Inc., 254 F.R.D. 597, 605 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Even the MADA and RSA agreements 

Mr. de la Iglesia cites 

 See Ex. 2 (Reb. Rpt.) ¶¶ 737-739. Likewise, there is no 

evidence that the success of the “ ” Mr. de la Iglesia references is in any 

way successful because of their alleged practice of the Asserted Patents rather than, for example, 

the marketing strategy itself (e.g., content of marketing, timing of marketing, etc.). 

II. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should strike the identified paragraphs of Mr. de la 

Iglesia’s expert reports. 

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Dated: October 26, 2024 Respectfully submitted, 

By: /s/ Jonathan B. Bright 

 Ruffin B. Cordell 

TX Bar No. 04820550 

Michael J. McKeon 

DC Bar No. 459780 

mckeon@fr.com 

Jared Hartzman 

DC Bar No. 1034255 

hartzman@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

1000 Maine Avenue, SW, Ste 1000 

Washington, D.C. 20024 

Telephone: (202) 783-5070 

Facsimile: (202) 783-2331 

Thad C. Kodish 

GA Bar No. 427603 

tkodish@fr.com 

Benjamin K. Thompson 

GA Bar No. 633211 

bthompson@fr.com 

Jonathan B. Bright 

GA Bar No. 256953 

jbright@fr.com 

Christopher O. Green 

GA Bar No. 037617 

cgreen@fr.com 

Noah C. Graubart 

GA Bar No. 141862 

graubart@fr.com 

Sara C. Fish 

GA Bar No. 873853 

sfish@fr.com 

Katherine H. Reardon 

NY Bar No. 5196910 

reardon@fr.com 

Nicholas A. Gallo 

GA Bar No. 546590 

gallo@fr.com 

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Vivian C. Keller (pro hac vice) 

GA Bar No. 651500 

keller@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

1180 Peachtree St. NE, Fl. 21 

Atlanta, GA 30309 

Telephone: (404) 892-5005 

Facsimile: (404) 892-5002 

Leonard E. Davis 

TX Bar No. 05521600 

ldavis@fr.com 

Andria Rae Crisler 

TX Bar No. 24093792 

crisler@fr.com 

Thomas H. Reger II 

Texas Bar No. 24032992 

reger@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

1717 Main Street, Suite 5000 

Dallas, TX 75201 

Telephone: (214)747-5070 

Facsimile: (214) 747-2091 

John-Paul R. Fryckman (pro hac vice) 

CA Bar No. 317591 

John W. Thornburgh 

CA Bar No. 154627 

thornburgh@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

12860 El Camino Real, Ste. 400 

San Diego, CA 92130 

Telephone: (858) 678-5070 

Facsimile: (858) 678-5099 

Katherine D. Prescott (pro hac vice) 

CA Bar No. 215496 

prescott@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

500 Arguello Street 

Suite 400 

Redwood City, CA 94063 

Telephone: (650) 839-5180 

Facsimile: (650) 839-5071 

Kyle J. Fleming (pro hac vice) 

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NY Bar No. 5855499 

kfleming@fr.com 

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 

7 Times Square, 20th Floor, 

New York, NY 10036 

Telephone: (212) 765-5070 

Facsimile: (212) 258-2291 

Melissa R. Smith 

State Bar No. 24001351 

Melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com 

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP 

303 South Washington Avenue 

Marshall, Texas 75670 

Telephone: (903) 934-8450 

Facsimile: (903) 934-9257 

Andrew Thompson (“Tom”) Gorham 

State Bar No. 24012715 

tom@gillamsmithlaw.com 

GILLAM & SMITH, LLP 

102 N. College, Suite 800 

Tyler, Texas 75702 

Telephone: (903) 934-8450 

Facsimile: (903) 934-9257 

Michael E. Jones 

State Bar No. 10929400 

mikejones@potterminton.com 

Shaun W. Hassett 

State Bar No. 24074372 

shaunhassett@potterminton.com 

POTTER MINTON, P.C. 

102 N. College Ave., Suite 900 

Tyler, Texas 75702 

Telephone: (903) 597-8311 

Facsimile: (903) 593-0846 

Lance Lin Yang 

CA. Bar No. 260705

Lanceyang@quinnemanuel.com 

Kevin (Gyushik) Jang 

CA Bar No. 337747 

kevinjang@quinnemanuel.com 

Sean S. Pak 

CA Bar No. 219032 

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seanpak@quinnemanuel.com 

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN, LLP

50 California Street, 22nd Floor 

San Francisco, CA 94111 

Telephone: (415) 875-6600 

Brady Huynh (admitted pro hac vice) 

CA Bar No. 339441 

bradyhuynh@quinnemanuel.com 

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN, LLP 

555 Twin Dolphin Drive, 5th Floor 

Redwood Shores, CA 94065 

Telephone: (650) 801-5000 

Facsimile: (650) 801-5100 

Jon Bentley Hyland 

Texas Bar No. 24046131 

jhyland@hilgersgraben.com 

Grant K. Schmidt 

Texas Bar No. 24084579 

gschmidt@hilgersgraben.com 

HILGERS GRABEN PLLC 

7859 Walnut Hill Lane, Suite 335 

Dallas, Texas 75230 

Telephone: (972) 645-3097 

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

 

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CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE 

The undersigned hereby certifies that counsel for Defendants have complied with the meet 

and confer requirement in Local Rule CV-7(h). This motion is opposed. The personal conference 

required by Local Rule CV-7(h) was conducted on October 23, 2024. The parties were unable to 

reach agreement as to Samsung’s requested relief. 

/s/ Jonathan B. Bright 

ht 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed 

electronically in compliance with Local Rule CV-5 on October 26, 2024. As of this date, all 

counsel of record had consented to electronic service and are being served with a copy of this 

document through the Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(a)(3)(A). 

/s/ Jonathan B. Bright 

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