1

Filed 5/12/15 P. v. Gomez CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSE ANTONIO GOMEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

E059722

(Super.Ct.No. SWF1200847)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Timothy F. Freer, Judge. 

Affirmed with directions.

Jessica C. Butterick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, 

William M. Wood, and Meagan J. Beale, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

I

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Jose Antonio Gomez appeals from judgment entered following jury 

convictions for making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422;

1 count 1) and assault with a 

deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2). Defendant admitted a prison prior 

enhancement. (§ 667.5, subd.

2

(b).) The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term 

of four years eight months.

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support his criminal threat 

conviction, and the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on the lesser-included 

offense of attempted criminal threat. Defendant also argues permanent suspension of his 

driving privileges under Vehicle Code section 13351.1, violated his constitutional equal 

protection rights. We disagree and affirm the judgment but order the trial court to amend

its September 6, 2013 minute order and the abstract of judgment by deleting the 

language, “License is suspended for life. Surrender driver license to the Court for 

forwarding to DMV.” The trial court is also directed to insert a statement that defendant

was convicted of a felony violation of section 245 and the trial court found a vehicle 

constituted the deadly weapon or instrument used to commit the offense.

 

1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 On the People’s motion, the trial court dismissed count 3, misdemeanor reckless 

driving (Veh. Code, § 23103, subd. (a)).
3

II

FACTS

During the morning of March 5, 2012, just after the traffic light turned green, 

Aaron Jiron drove his company’s utility van around defendant’s pickup. Defendant’s 

pickup truck had been stopped at a red light at the intersection of Florida and Cawston. 

Both vehicles were headed eastbound on Florida Avenue. After Jiron passed defendant,

he moved back into defendant’s lane, in front of defendant’s truck. In response, 

defendant drove into the left-turn lane, passed Jiron, pulled back into Jiron’s lane in front 

of Jiron, and slammed on his brakes about 20 feet in front of Jiron. This forced Jiron to 

brake suddenly and nearly come to a full stop. After momentarily stopping, defendant 

proceeded driving forward, and Jiron followed behind, with defendant repeatedly 

applying his brakes.

In an attempt to get away from defendant, Jiron pulled into a shopping plaza,

stopping at a Carl’s Jr. Defendant made a U-turn into the Carl’s Jr. parking lot and pulled 

up beside Jiron’s van. Defendant stopped his truck in the exit driveway, in front of 

Jiron’s van. Jiron and his passenger, Adam Saxer, had already gotten outside the van. 

Jiron was concerned when he discovered defendant had followed him into the parking lot. 

Jiron said to defendant, “What the f---?” Defendant reached into the center console of his 

truck, pulled out something shiny, and said, “Do you want me to shoot you?” At first, 

Jiron could not recall exactly what defendant said because it happened so fast. Jiron 

retreated. 
4

Jiron testified he and Saxer were out of the van for six seconds. Jiron was scared 

for a minute or two because of defendant’s threat. Based on defendant’s words and 

actions, Jiron believed defendant had a gun, was threatening Jiron with it, and would act 

on his threat at that particular moment. Jiron said he was in fear for his life, but not for 

long; just for a minute or two. The entire time defendant was following defendant, Jiron 

believed defendant had a weapon but figured defendant was too cowardly to pull the 

trigger. Neither Jiron nor Saxer had a weapon and neither of them approached defendant 

or threatened him.

After defendant threatened Jiron, Jiron ran back to the van, jumped in, and took 

off. Defendant also drove off. In order to avoid interacting with defendant, Jiron drove 

around the stores before resuming his route. Jiron did not call 911 because defendant had 

left and Jiron thought the situation had been diffused.

As Jiron continued driving east on Florida Avenue, he saw a row of cars stopped 

or moving to the left just west of the intersection of Florida Avenue and Sanderson. Just 

beyond the intersection, defendant was creeping along slowly in his truck, in the righthand lane. Other cars were driving around him. After all of the cars in front of Jiron 

moved to the left and passed defendant, Jiron was left directly behind defendant. 

Defendant then accelerated his truck in reverse and charged toward Jiron’s van at a high 

rate of speed. Jiron described defendant’s driving as “Full-fledged pedal to the metal” 

with “[t]ires smok[ing] from him—him throwing it in reverse.” Defendant stopped less 

than a foot from Jiron’s van, barely avoiding slamming into the van, and then drove off
5

eastbound on Florida Avenue. Jiron panicked and screamed. He was scared. He thought 

defendant would crash into him. Saxer called 911. A recording of the call was played 

for the jury. Saxer reported defendant had a gun and had cut Jiron off as he and Jiron 

were driving. 

Jiron continued on his way to work, driving north on Kirby Street and east on 

Menlo Avenue. Although defendant was ahead, on the same route, Jiron denied he 

intentionally followed him, until Jiron turned onto Menlo Avenue. Up until then, Jiron 

was following his GPS. Jiron then decided to follow defendant because Jiron believed 

defendant was armed. Although Jiron did not fear defendant would shoot him, Jiron 

wanted defendant arrested. Along the way, defendant stopped his truck and threw a soda 

can at Jiron’s van.

At 10:22 a.m., Police Officer James Duncan responded to Saxer’s call reporting 

road rage with a gun. Meanwhile Sergeant Davis pulled over defendant and detained 

him. When Duncan arrived, he saw Davis conducting the traffic stop of defendant. 

Defendant was seated on the side of road and Jiron’s van was parked nearby on Menlo 

Avenue, near State Street. Duncan interviewed defendant, Jiron, and Saxer. Duncan 

testified that Jiron and Saxer were “visibly shaken. [¶] . . . [¶] They appeared nervous, 

kind of like wide-eyed, like a little in disbelief.” Defendant appeared indifferent. There 

were fresh skid marks on the street at Sanderson and Florida Avenue, consistent with 

Jiron’s statement. The officers did not find a gun in defendant’s possession or in his 

truck. Defendant was arrested.
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III

SUSTAINED FEAR

Defendant contends the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving defendant 

committed a criminal threat in violation of section 422, because there was insufficient 

evidence defendant’s threat caused Jiron reasonably to be in sustained fear for his own 

safety.

This court applies the substantial evidence standard of review when determining 

whether the evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction. (People v. 

Fierro (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1347.) Under that standard, the Court of Appeal

“‘“‘reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine 

whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a 

rational trier of fact could find [the elements of the crime] beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 

[Citations.] “‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the 

opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled 

with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.”’” [Citation.]’

[Citation.] . . . ‘Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently 

improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction. 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

In order to prove the crime of committing a criminal threat, in violation of section 

422, the prosecution must prove that “the threat actually caused the person threatened ‘to 

be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s 
7

safety.’” (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 228.) The term “sustained fear,” 

within the meaning of section 422, is defined as “a period of time that extends beyond 

what is momentary, fleeting, or transitory.” (People v. Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 

1149, 1156.) “The victim’s knowledge of defendant’s prior conduct is relevant in 

establishing that the victim was in a state of sustained fear.” (Ibid.)

In People v. Fierro, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, the court held that evidence 

defendant told the victim, “I will kill you . . . right now,” coupled with displaying a 

weapon to the victim, was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant’s threat 

caused sustained, reasonable fear, within the meaning of section 422. (Id. at pp. 1348-

1349.) In Fierro, the victim encountered the defendant at a gas station. The victim 

believed the defendant was blocking access to the pumps and asked the defendant to 

move his car. The defendant told the victim to ask in Spanish and walked into the store. 

The victim followed the defendant and asked him again to move his car. The defendant 

again told the victim to ask in Spanish. The victim cursed the defendant, returned to his 

car, and waited for the defendant to finish fueling. After he did so, there was additional 

hostile interaction between the defendant and victim. (Id. at pp. 1345-1346.) 

A second confrontation occurred in Fierro, shortly after the first, when the 

defendant got out of his car, approached the victim, and told the victim, “Do you want to 

fuck with me now?” (People v. Fierro, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1345.) The 

defendant stood about seven feet from the victim by the victim’s car and lifted his shirt to 

display a weapon tucked into his waistband. The victim believed the weapon was a gun. 
8

He testified he was “a little scared” the defendant would shoot him and his son. The

victim further testified that, while the defendant displayed the weapon, the victim was in 

fear for his and his son’s life. (Id. at p. 1346.) The defendant cursed at the victim and 

said, “I should kill you. I will kill you.” (Ibid.) Pointing at the victim’s son, the 

defendant said he ought to kill the son too. The defendant added he should kill the two of 

them right then. Then he told the victim and his son to leave. The victim testified that as 

he was driving away, he felt “scared to death during the whole ordeal.” About 15 

minutes later, while on the freeway, out of harm’s way, he called 911 and said he was 

“scared shitless.” (Ibid.) 

Based on the history between the defendant and victim during the two 

confrontations, the Fierro court concluded the threat actually caused sustained fear: 

“Facing what he thought was a gun and hearing words to the effect that he and his son 

were about to be killed, Mr. Ibarra was in sustained fear for his and his son’s life. The 

fear lasted not only through the minute or so that appellant stood there exposing his 

weapon, but for up to 15 minutes after Ibarra drove away.” (People v. Fierro, supra, 180 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1348.) The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the threat itself 

did not exceed 40 seconds and therefore there was no sustained fear. The court noted,

“This argument ignores human nature.” (Id. at p. 1349.) Although the threat did not last 

15 minutes, the fear continued for that period after the threat. (Ibid., fn. 6.)

In holding there was sufficient evidence of the element of sustained fear, the 

Fierro court concluded that a person who hears someone say, “‘I will kill you . . . right 
9

now,’” coupled with seeing a weapon, is quite justified in remaining scared for 15 

minutes. In addition, such fear of a defendant, who is armed, mobile, and at large, and 

who has threatened to kill the victim and his son, is more than sufficient to constitute 

“sustained” fear under section 422. (People v. Fierro, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1348.) The Fierro court added that, even if the court accepted the defendant’s argument

that sustained fear only lasted 40 seconds, until the threat ended, the Fierro court

believed “the minute during which Ibarra heard the threat and saw appellant’s weapon 

qualifies as ‘sustained’ under the statute. When one believes he is about to die, a minute 

is longer than ‘momentary, fleeting, or transitory.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1349.)

In People v. Culbert (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 184, the defendant was 

convicted of committing a criminal threat offense. The crime was committed 

when the defendant attempted to teach his 15-year-old stepson a lesson. The 

defendant held an unloaded firearm to the child’s head, told the child never to lie 

to him, and pulled the trigger three times. (Id. at p. 188.) The child testified he 

was very scared the defendant was going to “blow his head off.” (Ibid.) After the 

defendant lowered the gun, he hugged the child and told him, “‘let that be a 

lesson.’” A few minutes later the defendant said “‘that was just a warning, and I 

won’t really ever hurt you.’” (Ibid.) Evidence was introduced that the defendant 

had a prior section 422 conviction for threatening to kill his ex-wife because she 

would not allow him to have an unsupervised visit with their children. (Id. at p. 

189.) 
10

The defendant in Culbert argued there was insufficient evidence of sustained fear 

because the gun incident could not have lasted more than a split second and the child 

knew the gun was unloaded. Therefore any fear from the incident was instantly over. 

The Culbert court stated that this argument “misapprehends the nature of fear.” (People 

v. Culbert, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 190.) The court concluded there was substantial 

evidence of sustained fear, explaining, “Even if the encounter lasts only one minute, a 

person who is confronted with a firearm held by an angry perpetrator and who believes 

his or her death is imminent, suffers sustained fear.” (Id. at pp. 190-191.)

When concluding there was sufficient evidence of sustained fear, the Culbert court 

further considered the victim’s conduct during and after the criminal threat incident: 

“[T]he idea that H. did not experience sustained fear because he knew within a ‘split 

second’ that the firearm was unloaded is, at least in our opinion, preposterous. H. 

realized the firearm was unloaded only because he was still breathing after appellant 

stopped pulling the trigger. H. must have had a sense of relief when he saw that he had 

not been shot. Experiencing relief that one has survived is not the same thing, however, 

as having one’s fear evaporate. The jury could easily infer from the evidence of H’s 

conduct both during and after the incident that his fear was sustained, and not ‘instantly 

over.’” (People v. Culbert, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 191.)

As in Fierro and Culbert, in the instant case, the brief moment during which 

defendant threatened to shoot Jiron and displayed a shiny object, which Jiron and Saxer 

believed was a gun, qualifies as sustained fear under section 422. (People v. Fierro, 
11

supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.) In addition, defendant’s conduct before, during and 

after his threat to shoot Jiron, supports a finding of sustained fear that was more than 

“momentary, fleeting, or transitory,” while defendant pursued and harassed Jiron and 

Saxer. Defendant committed frightening acts of road rage directed toward Jiron, which 

conveyed an intent to terrorize Jiron and Saxer, and endanger their safety. (People v. 

Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156.) There was evidence Jiron and Saxer’s fear 

from defendant threatening to shoot them with a gun lasted one to two minutes. 

Although Jiron made statements minimizing his fear, his and Saxer’s sustained fear was 

still objectively evident after defendant was detained. Officer Duncan testified that, when 

he interviewed Jiron and Saxer, shortly after detaining defendant, they were “visibly 

shaken. [¶] . . . [¶] They appeared nervous, kind of like wide-eyed, like a little in 

disbelief.”

Defendant’s reliance on In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132 (Ricky 

T.), for the proposition Jiron did not have sustained fear, is misplaced. In Ricky T., 

in which the court held there was no showing of sustained fear, the criminal threat 

charge was based on the defendant student uttering intemperate, disrespectful 

remarks, including threatening to “get” a teacher. (Id. at p. 1140.) The defendant 

did not make any physical movements or gestures or threats to injure the teacher. 

The teacher responded by sending the student to the school office, and did not call 

the police. There was no prior history between the defendant and the teacher. In 

the instant case, on the other hand, there is evidence defendant threatened to shoot 
12

the victim with a gun, which under Fierro and Culbert, is sufficient to support a finding 

the victim sustained fear within the meaning of section 422.

IV

INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR

Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on the 

lesser included offense of attempted criminal threat. The People argue the trial court’s 

failure to instruct on the lesser included offense was invited error because defense 

counsel and defendant told the trial court defendant did not want the instruction. 

“Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces the 

commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed 

because of that error.” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 212.) 

“‘The obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses exists even when as a matter of 

trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its 

being given.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Eilers (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 288, 295, fn. 4.) 

Nonetheless, the trial court’s error in not giving instruction on a lesser included offense 

cannot be relied upon by defendants to justify a reversal because the commission of such 

error was “invited” by defendant. “The only effect of the defendant’s objection is to 

render that error ‘invited’ and therefore nonreversible.” (People v. Eilers, supra, 231 

Cal.App.3d at pp. 295-296; see Barton, at p. 198.) 

In the instant case, during a hearing on the jury instructions, the trial court stated 

that there was sufficient evidence to warrant giving an instruction on the lesser included 
13

offense of attempted criminal threat, based on Jiron’s testimony his fear from the threat 

was momentary. Defendant’s attorney informed the court defendant requested that the

instruction on the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threat not be given based 

on strategic reasons. Defendant also personally stated he agreed he did not want the 

instruction. The court agreed not to give the instruction but assured defendant that if he 

changed his mind and wanted it, the court would give it.

The following day, the court discussed the instructions with counsel and again 

raised the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threat. The prosecutor requested

instruction on the lesser included offense. The court agreed the instruction was supported 

by the evidence but refused to give it because defendant had objected to it, and 

specifically and intelligently waived the instruction for strategic reasons. Defense 

counsel affirmed that defendant did not want the instruction because his defense was that 

proof of the elements of the criminal threat crime had not been met at all. Also, the 

penalty for the lesser offense was not significantly less. (§§ 18, 422, 664, subd. (a).) The 

benefit of the possibility of being convicted of attempted criminal threat was outweighed 

by the potential benefit of attempting to convince the jury defendant had made no 

criminal threat at all. 

The trial court confirmed that defendant made a full and intelligent waiver of his 

right to have the instruction on the lesser included offense. Accordingly, the court

declined to give the instruction. Under such circumstances, any error in not instructing 
14

on attempted criminal threat was invited and therefore nonreversible on appeal. (People 

v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1265.)

Posttrial, the trial court noted it had reviewed the evidence relating to the lesser 

included offense of attempted criminal threat and concluded that, not only had defendant 

waived instruction on the lesser included offense, but, in addition, there was insufficient 

evidence to support such instruction. Defendant argues that, because the trial court 

rejected the instruction on the lesser included offense based on insufficiency of evidence, 

not because of invited error, defendant is not barred from raising the error on appeal. We 

disagree. The trial court’s consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

instruction and related comments were posttrial, after the court had already stated it was 

not giving the instruction because of defendant’s strategic request not to give it. The 

invited error doctrine applies and therefore bars defendant from raising the objection on 

appeal.

V

REVOCATION OF DRIVING PRIVILEGES

During the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to surrender his 

driver’s license to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and ordered defendant’s 

license suspended for life based on his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, a 

motor vehicle, under section 245, subdivision (a). The trial court stated: “[Defendant] 

cannot possess a firearm for the remainder of his life because of – of the conviction for 

the assault, using a motor vehicle. [¶] He is to surrender any driver’s license to the 
15

Department of Motor Vehicles and he is suspended for life. His license is suspended for 

life because of that conviction.” The sentencing minute order states: “License is 

suspended for life. [¶] Surrender driver license to the Court for forwarding to DMV. 

(Defendant has no driver license in his possession at this time.)” Defendant did not 

object to imposition of these sentencing terms. 

Defendant contends Vehicle Code section 13351.5 is unconstitutional because it 

violates defendant’s equal protection rights. Defendant requests this court therefore to 

direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to delete its order suspending his 

driver’s license for life. 

A. Defendant Did Not Forfeit His Constitutional Challenge

The People argue defendant forfeited his constitutional challenge to Vehicle Code

section 13351.5 because he did not raise his objection during sentencing in the trial court. 

Generally, a litigant cannot raise a new issue for the first time on appeal. But this general 

principle has its exceptions. “‘[I]ssues may be raised for the first time on appeal when 

they involve pure questions of law or constitutional issues.’” (Bonner v. City of Santa 

Ana (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1477; in accord, People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 

93, 118.)

Here, defendant did not challenge in the trial court the constitutionality of Vehicle 

Code section 13351.5. Nevertheless, his objection on appeal is not barred because it 

involves a pure question of law and a constitutional issue. In addition, this court may 

review the issue because defendant asserts the trial court imposed an unauthorized 
16

sentence by ordering a lifetime suspension of his driver’s license under Vehicle Code

section 13351.5. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354; People v. Linares (2003) 

105 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1199, fn. 2.) We therefore review de novo the issue of whether 

Vehicle Code section 13351.5 violates the equal protection clause under the state and 

federal Constitutions. (Alviso v. Sonoma County Sheriff’s Dept. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 

198, 204.)

B. Constitutionality of Vehicle Code Section 13351.5

Vehicle Code section 13351.5 requires lifetime revocation of the driver’s license 

of a person who has been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon under section 245,

by means of a vehicle. Vehicle Code section 13351.5 provides in relevant part: “(a) 

Upon receipt of a duly certified abstract of the record of any court showing that a person 

has been convicted of a felony for a violation of Section 245 of the Penal Code and that a 

vehicle was found by the court to constitute the deadly weapon or instrument used to 

commit that offense, the department immediately shall revoke the privilege of that person 

to drive a motor vehicle. [¶] (b) The department shall not reinstate a privilege revoked 

under subdivision (a) under any circumstances.”

Defendant argues Vehicle Code section 13351.5 violates his equal protection 

rights under the state and federal Constitutions because there is no rational basis for the 

automatic lifetime bar of defendant’s driver’s privileges. We reject defendant’s 

constitutional challenge. “‘The equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth 

Amendment and the California Constitution are substantially equivalent and analyzed in 
17

a similar fashion. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] We first ask whether the two classes are 

similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law in question, but are treated 

differently. [Citation.] If groups are similarly situated but treated differently, the state 

must then provide a rational justification for the disparity. [Citation.]” (People v. Lynch

(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 353, 358.)

Defendant argues that in enacting Vehicle Code section 13351.5, the Legislature

distinguished between two groups of people convicted of crimes involving motor 

vehicles. The first group includes those convicted under section 245 of felony assault 

with a deadly weapon, where the weapon is a vehicle. Their driver’s licenses are

automatically revoked under Vehicle Code section 13351.5. The second group, which 

defendant argues is similarly situated to the first group, consists of those convicted of 

equally or more dangerous vehicular crimes, who are not subject to a mandatory, lifetime 

revocation of their driver’s licenses. Defendant contends the challenged classification 

here, the first group, does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.

Assuming, without deciding, that violators of the two groups of vehicular crimes 

are sufficiently similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law in question (Veh. 

Code, § 13351.5), but are treated differently, we must determine whether there is a 

rational justification for the disparity in treatment of the two groups. We must consider 

whether there is a rational justification for imposing a lifetime driver’s license ban under 

Vehicle Code section 13351.5 on those in the first group who commit a section 245 
18

assault by means of a vehicle, and not imposing such a severe penalty on all others who 

commit vehicular crimes.

In determining whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state 

interest, this court must determine whether the classification is rationally related to a 

“‘realistically conceivable legislative purpose[].’” (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 

Cal.4th 1185, 1201.) “‘“‘[A] statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect 

lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal 

protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could 

provide a rational basis for the classification.’”’” (Id. at pp. 1200-1201.) “‘The rationale 

must be “plausible” [citation] and the factual basis for that rationale must be reasonably

conceivable [citation].’ [Citations.] While ‘it is irrelevant whether the perceived reason 

for the challenged distinction actually motivated the Legislature, equal protection “does 

require that a purpose may conceivably or ‘may reasonably have been the purpose and 

policy’ of the relevant governmental decisionmaker” [citation] and that “the relationship 

of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or 

irrational.” [Citation.] Thus, . . . we must undertake “‘“‘a serious and genuine judicial 

inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals’”’” 

[citation] by inquiring whether “‘the statutory classifications are rationally related to the 

“realistically conceivable legislative purpose[s]” [citation]’ . . . and . . . by declining to 

‘invent[] fictitious purposes that could not have been within the contemplation of the 
19

Legislature . . . .’” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Noyan (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 

657, 667-668; see People v. Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1201.)

Defendant asserts there is no legislative history of Vehicle Code section 13351.5

that sheds light on the rationale for the classification and no plausible reason for the 

classification. Defendant argues the classification is irrational in the statutory scheme 

because, in general, the type of driver’s license suspension or revocation imposed turns 

on the gravity of the offense, the risk the criminal behavior poses to the general public, 

and recidivism. The section 245 offense of assault with a deadly weapon, by means of a 

motor vehicle, is the only vehicular crime requiring the mandatory, lifetime revocation of 

a defendant’s driving privileges under Vehicle Code section 13351.5. 

While there may be no insightful legislative history, there is a plausible reason for

imposing the mandatory, lifetime revocation of a defendant’s driving privileges only on 

those who commit a section 245 assault by means of a vehicle. The second group of 

vehicular crimes do not require a finding the defendant intentionally used a vehicle as a 

means of harming another person. The second group of crimes includes violations of 

Vehicle Code sections 13351, subdivision (a)(1) (vehicular manslaughter); 13351, 

subdivision (a)(3) (causing death while fleeing from the police); and 13351, subdivision 

(a)(2), (3) or more convictions in one year for hit and run, reckless driving with injury, or 

vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.

This distinction between the two groups provides a plausible reason for the 

classification and different treatment under Vehicle Code section 13351.5. Driving is a 
20

privilege, not a right. (People v. Linares (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1199.) A serious, 

intentional abuse of the driving privilege by using a vehicle as a weapon constitutes a 

rational basis for permanently taking away the right to drive from those who intentionally 

use a vehicle to harm others. Vehicle Code section 13351.5 protects the public from 

those who pose a risk of committing assaults by means of a vehicle, based on their past 

history of committing such acts. Because there is a rational justification for the disparity

in permanently revoking the driver’s licenses of those who commit a section 245 assault 

by means of a vehicle, but not imposing such penalty as to all other vehicular offenses, 

we conclude Vehicle Code section 13351.5 is constitutional facially and as applied to 

defendant.

C. The Trial Court Lacked Authority to Suspend Defendant’s Driver’s License

Revocation of a defendant’s driver’s license under Vehicle Code section 13351.5 

is a mandatory administrative function. (In re Grayden N. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 598, 

604 (Grayden N.).) “Simply put, the . . . court is bound, under the statute, to report to the 

[DMV] the true finding [defendant] committed an assault with a deadly weapon in 

violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a), and the true finding the weapon . . . 

used was a vehicle.” (Ibid.) License revocation is a civil, not a criminal, sanction. 

(People v. Linares, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199.) It is the DMV, not the court, that

has the power administratively to suspend or revoke a driver’s license under Vehicle 

Code section 13351.5. (Grayden N., at p. 604; Larsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles 

(1995) 12 Cal.4th 278, 284 [the act of the DMV in suspending a driver’s license pursuant 
21

to Vehicle Code sections authorizing them to do so an administrative act in performing a 

mandatory function and the DMV, having received an abstract of judgment is simply 

required to suspend the defendant’s driving privilege]). The DMV’s suspension or 

revocation of defendant’s driving privilege under Vehicle Code section 13351.5 is 

substantively distinct from any punishment a court may impose as a result of a criminal 

conviction. In other words, the DMV’s lifetime revocation, imposed pursuant to Vehicle 

Code section 13351.5, is an administrative civil sanction that is independent of the trial 

court’s penal sanction. “In numerous instances under provisions of California law, a 

criminal conviction may give rise to a variety of collateral consequences.” (Larsen, at p. 

283.) This is one such case.

For license revocation or suspension under Vehicle Code section 13351.5 to occur, 

the DMV must receive a certified abstract of judgment, which shows not only that the 

defendant was convicted under section 245, but also that the trial court found defendant 

used a vehicle as “the deadly weapon or instrument” in committing the offense. (Veh. 

Code, § 13351.5, subd. (a).) Here, the court minute order and abstract of judgment do not 

show this. Thus, if the abstract of judgment were provided to the DMV, it would give the 

DMV no basis to suspend or revoke defendant’s license.

Furthermore, the Legislature plainly did not intend the trial court to suspend or 

revoke a driver’s license under Vehicle Code section 13351.5, as the court purported to

do here. Division 6 of the Vehicle Code, which deals with drivers’ licenses (Veh. Code, 

§ 12500 et seq.), contains a chapter covering suspension or revocation of licenses on all 
22

possible grounds (ch. 2; Veh. Code, §§ 13100 et seq.). This chapter consists mostly of 

two articles: article 2 (Suspension or Revocation by Court; Veh. Code, §§ 13200-13210) 

and article 3 (Suspension and Revocation by Department; Veh. Code, §§ 13350-13392).

We must presume that the Legislature put each suspension and revocation proceeding 

into one or the other article deliberately. Thus, where, as here, the Legislature has said 

the DMV is to suspend or revoke a license, we may not conclude that the Legislature 

really meant the court to do it or did not care who did it. “[T]he DMV, not the court, is 

empowered to revoke a driver’s license. [Citation.]” (People v. Linares, supra, 105 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1199.) The trial court, however, is empowered under Vehicle Code 

section 13351.5 to refer the matter to the DMV for suspension or revocation. 

Because only the DMV has the statutory authority to suspend or revoke

defendant’s license, and the trial court minute order and abstract of judgment do not 

include the findings required for the DMV to revoke or suspend defendant’s license 

under Vehicle Code section 13351.5, the trial court minute order and abstract of 

judgment must be modified to reflect the trial court’s finding that defendant used his 

vehicle as a deadly weapon to commit the section 245 offense. The court order 

suspending defendant’s driver’s license also must be stricken from the minute order and 

abstract of judgment, because the trial court does not have authority to suspend 

defendant’s driver’s license under Vehicle Code section 13351.5.
23

VI

DISPOSITION

The court is directed to modify its September 6, 2013 minute order and abstract of 

judgment as follows: (1) delete the statements “License is suspended for life. Surrender

driver license to the Court for forwarding to DMV,” and (2) insert a statement that 

defendant was convicted of a felony violation of section 245 and the trial court found a 

vehicle constituted the deadly weapon or instrument used to commit the offense. The 

trial court is further ordered to issue a modified abstract of judgment and to forward a 

certified copy to (1) the DMV, and (2) the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 

As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

McKINSTER

J.