F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT February15 , 2 008 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 07- 1086 2

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 05-01721 CV -W SD -1 SH ER YL L. HU FF, R. SCOTT HUFF, et a l., Pl ai nti ff s- Appe llants , ve rs us DEKALB COUNTY , GEORGIA, De fendant-Appellee,
D A V I D A. F O S TE R , i n d i v i du a l l y an do f f i c i a l l y i n h i s c ap a c i t y as F ir e Ch ie f of

the D eK al b C ounty

F ir e & R es cu e Se rv ic es ,

D ef en da nt.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ (F eb ru ar y 15 , 200 8) Be fo re T JO FL A T , A

N D E RS O N a nd C O X , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. COX , C ircuit Judg e:2

I. INTRODUCTION The prim ary

issue in th is case is w hether a group of param edics, w ho are
em plo y ed by ac ounty f ir e de partm en t and tra ine d inf ir e supp re ssi on, ha ve the

“ responsib ility

to engage in fire suppression ” under 29 U. S. C. § 203 (y ), and are
ac co rd ing ly

part ia lly e xe m pt f ro m the nor m al f orty -h our ove rt im e sc he dul e
es ta bli she d by

the F ai r L ab or

S tandard s A ct

( “ FL SA ”) , 29 U
. S. C. §§ 2 01 et seq . W e co nc lud e tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt pr ope rl y de te rm ine d th at

the param ed ic s have th e “ res po ns ib il it y

to en ga ge in fir e su pp res si on ” wit hi n t he m ean in g o f th e FLSA. II. FACTS Plaintiffs Sher

y l Huff , S cott Huff, Jackie Cr aig, T im othyGuinn, Mary Mart in, a nd D av id M ile s are param ed ic s c ur re ntl y or f orm er ly e m plo y ed by the De Ka lb Count y

(G eorgia) Fir e & Re scue Ser vices (“ DCF RS”)
. All Pla intiffs wer e
em ploy ed as dual-function or cross-trained Firef ighters/Param edics or Fire Me dic s, a nd w er e fu lly

tr ai ne d and c er

tif ie d inboth f

ir e supp re ssi on s kil ls and advanc ed li fe sup port. T he P la int if fs w er e pr ev iou sly

e m plo y ed a s param ed ic s by the E m er ge nc y

Me dic al S er

vic es Bure au( “ E MS B” ). O n N ove m be r 20, 200 1, the EMS B m erged w ith the Bureau of Fir e Se rvices to form the DC FRS. All D CFRS p a r a me d i c s , i n c l u d i n g t h e P l a i n t i f f s , w e r e i n i t i a l l y p r o v i d e do v e rt i meF or a dmi nis tr ativ e purp os e s, the DC F RS cha ra c te ri zes a ll e mpl oye e s o n th is w or k s c he du le 1 as “53.0 hour employ ees,” which repr esents the number of hours they would work e ach w eek if they wer e on a w eekly

work sche dule. 3 co m pe nsa tio n f

or w ork e xc ee din g f

orty hours pe r w ee k, w hic h w as c onsi ste nt w ith th ei r pa y sch edul e atth e EMSB
. De fendant David Foster (“ Foster”) becam e Chief of the DC FRS on January 2, 2003. H e encouraged param edics, including th e Plaintiffs, to rece ive National Pr of es sio na l Q ua lif

ic at ionI ( “N PQ I ”) f

ir ef igh tin g tr ai nin g, w hic h r ep re se nts a high er level of training than th e m inim um required to be a f

irefighter in G eorgia. (R.1 -2 8, St an le y -Ch as e Aff. ¶¶ 4 -5 .) All Pla in ti ffs rece iv edth e NPQ I certific ation. Plaintiffs Miles, Shery l Huff , and Scott Huff later r eceived N PQ II certific ation in adv anced fire fighting (w hich the DCFR S did not require), a higher le ve l o f tr ai ni ng th an NPQ I cert ifi cat io n. Be gin nin g onMay

24, 200 3, the D CF RS c la ssi fi ed the N PQ I P la int if

fs a s

“ Firef ighter/Param edics” and the NP Q I I Plaintiffs a s “ Fire M edics.” These new ti tl es carr ie d n ew job de sc rip ti on s, wh ic h i nc lu de d fi re s up pr es si on du ti es . On May 24, a ll param ed ic s, inc lud ing the P la int if fs , w er e as sig ne d to a212 hour, 28 day w ork sc he dul e, a nd w er e no l onge r pa id o ve rt im e fo r w ork e xc ee din g f orty hours per wee k. T hey

ty pically worked one 24-hour shift, followed by 48 hou rs off. 14

Both Firefighter/Param edics and Fire Me dics can be assigned to fire ap paratus es , w hic h in cl ude Re sc ue s, T ru ck s, S qua ds, L ad de rs , T ec hni ca l R es cu e T ru ck s, or

E ngi ne s. Re sc ue apparatus es a re sta ff ed by tw o F ir e & R es cu e pe rs onne l and m ay

inc lud e tw o F ir ef

igh te r/ Pa ram ed ic s, tw o F ir e Me dic s, one EMT/F ire fig ht er an d a Fir e Me di c o r Fi refi gh te r/P aram ed ic , or t wo E MT /F ir ef

igh te rs . A ll Fi re & Re sc ue pe rs onne l a t a f ir e sc en e ar e re qui re d to
w ear fi re pr ote ct ionge ar , c al le d “ tur n- out ” ge ar , w hic h in cl ude s pr ote ct ive cl oth ing , a ir

m as ks f or br eathi ng, f

ir ef igh tin g bo ots , a nd a

f ir e he lm et . At a fire scene, an incident comm ander assigns du ties to all personnel
av ai la ble
. A cc or din g to F ost er , a ll Fi re & Re sc ue pe rs onne l, inc lud ing a ll Pl ai nti ff s, ha ve the le ga l auth or ity a nd r es pons ibi lity

to en ga ge a t any

ti m e in the pr ev en tio n, c ontro l, a nd e xti ngui shm en t of af ir e. ( R. 1- 28, F ost er

A ff
. ¶ 20. ) I f the Plaintiffs fa il to follow orders from an incident comm ander at a fire scene, includi ng orders to engage in fire suppressio n, they would be subject to discipline. (R.1 -2 8, Fo st er Aff. ¶¶21 -2 2.) A ll Pl ai nti ff

s w er e as sig ne d to f

ir e sta tio ns. T he U nit

D isp at chCr ite ri a
ou tl in es what type o f fi re ap pa rat us res po nd s t o a sp eci fic ki nd of e m erg en cy cal l. T he r equis ite f

ir e ap paratus is obl iga te d to r es pond
.5 N PQ I P la int if

fs ( Fi re fi ght er

/P ar am ed ic s) Martin, Craig, and Guinn (“ the NP Q I Plaintiffs”) are

“ Fi re fi ght er

/P ar am ed ic s, ” an d th ey

ha ve P ar am ed ic a nd N PQ I c er tif ic at ion s. T he j ob d es cr ipt ion s of

F ir ef igh te r/ Param ed ic s in cl ude pe rf orm ing ba sic f

ir ef igh tin g
an d li fe r es cu e dut ie s, in ad dit ionto re spon din g to m ed ic al e m er ge nc ie s, dis as te rs , m ult i- ca sua lty

inc ide nts , a nd o the r ty

pe s of e m er ge nc ie s. ( R. 1- 28, S tanle y -C ha se A ff
. E x. L
. ) N PQ I -c er

tif ie d e m plo y ee s are r out ine ly

a ssi gne d to r es cu e ve hic le s, and while they

are regularly

dispatched to fire calls, they are not assig ned to fire
en gin es . R es cu e ve hic le s c ar ry f ir e- pr ote ct ive “ tur

n- out ” ge ar

f or f igh tin g f ir es , but no o the r fi re sup pr es sio n e qui pm en t. E ac h N PQ I P la int if f re ce ive d “ tur

n- out ” ge ar in 2003
. A cc or din g to te sti m ony

f ro m D CF RS F ir e Ca

pta ins , e m

plo y ee s w ithonl y NP Q I certification are not assigned fire suppression activities. N PQ I em ploy ees
cannot e nga ge in supp re ssi ng a

hou se f ir e, but a re auth or iz ed

to ex tin gui sh s m al l fires, such as a brush fire. Captain McK inley testified that NP Q I em

ploy ees can be r equir ed

to supp re ss an e xte ri or

str uc tur e fi re . Ca

pta in B ro oks te sti fi ed

that he has never assigned an NPQ I em ploy ee to extinguis h a fire
. The N PQ I Pla intiffs have never engaged in or been ordered to extinguis h, fight, or suppress a fire.6 N PQ I I Pl ai nti ff

s ( Fi re Me dic s) Sc ott a nd S he ry l H uf

f ar e cl as sif

ie d a s “ Fi re Me dic I II , ” an d th ey ha ve Param edic, NP Q I , and NPQ II certific ations. David Miles is a “ Fire M edic III (I) ” (or “ Interim ,” which m eans he is in training to becom e a F ire Medic I II) and has Param ed ic , N PQ I a nd N PQ I I ce rt if ic at ion
. W e re fe r co lle ct ive ly to the H uf

fs a nd Mi le s a s “ the N PQ I I Pl ai nti ff s. ” F ir e Me dic s are r es pons ibl e fo r fi re fi ght ing , ex tr ic at ion , li fe r es cu e, a nd p ro vid ing a dvanc ed e m er ge nc y

m ed ic al c ar e fo r the sic k and i nj ur ed
. T he y

a re r equir ed

to pe rf orm f ir ef igh tin g and “ to i m

pr ove know le dge a nd s kil l i n a ll ar ea s r el at ed to fi re f igh tin g and l if

e re sc ue . ” (R
. 1- 28, St an le y -C ha se A ff

. E x. M at 74 99. ) T he ir

j ob d es cr ipt ionind ic at es that the y a re to operate the apparatus to p erfor m fire control and su ppression , and ins pect fire hy drants and fire station equipm ent. ( R.1- 28, Stanley -Chase A ff. Ex. M at 7499.) Miles is usu ally

assigned to a re scue vehicle, but has been assig ned to a fire
en gin e a fe wti m es sin ce January 200 5. S he ry l H uf

f w as a ssi gne d to af

ir e en gin e at least four tim es betwe en August and Dece m ber 2005. T he Huff

s both testified by aff idavit th at “ [w ] henever I am assigned to a re scue unit, m y assigned du ties
ar e al m ost

e xc lus ive ly

m ed ic al c ar e dut ie s. ” (R
. 3- 43, E x. 3 ¶ 21; R. 3- 43, E x. 4 ¶ 22.) S cott Huff said that he had asked several tim es to be the supervisin g officer in a f ir e en gin e, but

his r eque sts w er e de nie d.W h i l e th i s a p p e a l w a s p e n d i n g , th e D e f e n d an t s f i l e d a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s S c o t tan d S h e r yl 2 Hu ff fr om thi s app e a l, sin c e the y did no t jo in i n th e Pla int if

fs ’ m oti on

fo r p art ia l summa

ry jud g me nt. The De fenda

nts’ motion for summary

judgme nt, which the district cour t gr anted, a sked for

judgme nt ag ainst all Plaintiffs, inc luding the Huffs. The ref ore, the Huffs a

re pr oper pa

rties to this appeal, a

nd the Def endants’ motion to dismiss the Huff s is DENI ED. 7 Be gin nin g aro und January 200 5, Mi le s ha s oc ca sio na lly be ena ssi gne d th e du ty to en ga ge in fir e su pp res si on . (R.2 -2 9, Ex . 15 ¶ 7.) III
. PRO CE DU RAL HI ST ORY The P laintiffs filed suit on J une 29, 2005 , a gainst DeK alb Countyand Chief Fo st er i n h is off

ic ia l capa ci ty, al le gi ng bo th FLSA an d Eq ua l Pr ot ect io n v io la ti on s. Sp ec if ic al ly , the P la int if

fs a lle ge that the D ef

en da nts vio la te d th e FL SAby f ai lin g to p ay the m ove rt im e ba se d onaf

orty -h our w orkw ee k. The P laintiffs filed a m otion for cla ss certifica tion, which the district court de nie d. T he D ef

en dants the n m ove d f

or sum m ar y j udgm en t ona ll cl ai m s. Mi le s, Martin, Craig, and Guinn m oved for partial sum m ary j udgm ent on their FLS A claim s. T he district court denied the Plaintiffs’ m otion for partial summ ary j udgm en t, gr an te d th e D ef en dants ’ m oti on f

or sum m ar y j udgm en t, dis m iss ed

a ll of the P la int if

fs ’ c la im s, a nd e nte re d j udgm en t i n f av or of the D ef en da nts on a ll
co unt s. 2The Plaintiffs do not argue on appe al that the district cour t er red in g rantingsummary 3 jud g me nt o n th e ir

Eq ua l Pr ote c tio n c la ims
. The Plaintiffs also ar g ue that the dis t ri ct co u rt improperly denied their

motion to s trike 4 aff idavit testimony , pursuant to Rul e 3 0 (b)( 6), fr om L orrie Stanley -Chase a nd Chief Foste r. Specifica lly , they contend that neither St anley -Chase nor Foster had per sonal knowledg e about the Plaintiffs’ actua l job duties, an issue about which they testified. They also argue that Stanley -Chase’ s te sti mony c on fl ic te d w ith te sti mony fr om F ir e Ca pta ins , a nd that F os te r’ s te sti mony

c on fl ic te d w ith Stanle y -C ha se ’s te sti mony . Adis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on re g ard ingstr iki ngte sti mony by a ff iant i s revie wed on an abuse of discre tion standard. Goulah v. Ford Motor Co. , 1 18 F .3 d 1 47 8, 14 83 (1 1th 8 T he P la int iff

s ap pe al bo th th e d is tri ctco ur t’s g ran t o f su m m ary jud gm en t i n fa vor of the D ef en dants a nd i ts d en ia l of

the ir m oti on f or part ia l su m

m ar y j udgm en t. 3 IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL AND CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES T he pr im ar

y iss ue on app ea l is whe the r the P la int if fs ha ve the “ re spon sib ili ty to
e n g a g e i n f

i r e s up p r e s s i o n ” u n d e r a n F L S A p a rt i a l e x e mp t i o n t o t h e n o rma l o v e rt i me schedule. T he Plaintiffs co n t end that the dist rict court er red in granting su m

m ary j udgm ent to DeK alb Countyon this issue (and shou ld have granted them summ ary j udgm en t i nst ea d) be ca use it ign or ed und isp ute d e vid en ce that the y w er e not responsib le for e ngagin g in fire suppression and devoted th eir time to em ergency
m edical duties—no t fi re fi g h t i ng. T hey also argue that 29 U. S. C. § 203 (y ), which pr ovi de d ane w de fi nit ion of “ em plo y ee in fi re pr ote ct iona ct ivi tie s, ” did not abr oga te the D ep ar tm en t of L ab or ’ s de fi nit ion
. T he D ef en da nts c ont en d th at

sum m ar y j udgm en t in the ir f av or w as pr ope r be ca

use the y m et the ir bur de n of

de m ons tra tin g th at

the Pl ai nt iff s h ada “ res po ns ib il it y

to en ga ge in fir e su pp res si on .” 4Cir. 1997). Upon revie w of the a rguments and the re cord, w e ca nnot say that the district court a

bused i t s d i s c r e t i o ni na l l o w i n gth i s t e s t i m o n y. 9 V. STANDARD OF REVIEW This court review s de novo a district cou rt’ s grant or denial of summ ary jud gm en t. H

oll om an v . M

ail-W el l C orp. , 443 F. 3d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006 ). Sum m ary j udgm en t i s ap pr opr ia te w he n the e vid en ce , vie w ed in the li ght

m ost f av or ab le to the
nonm ovin g party , pre sents no genuine iss ue of m aterial f act and com

pels judgm ent as
a m at te r of

law. Ce lot exCo rp. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U
. S. 317, 322 -2 3, 106 S
. Ct
. 254 8, 255 2 (1 98 6)
. VI. DISCUSS ION The F LS A provides: “ Exce pt as o therwise provid ed in this s ection, no em ploy er sha ll em plo y a ny of his e m plo y ee s . . . f

or aw orkw ee k lo nge r than f orty hours unl es s
suc h e m plo y ee r ec ei ve s c om

pe nsa tio n f

or his e m plo ym en t i n e xc es s of

the hours above spe ci fi ed a t a r at e not le ss than one an d one -h al f tim es the r eg ular rate a t w hic h he is
em plo y ed
. ” 29 U
. S. C. § 20 7( a) (1 ). T he F L SAsup pli es a n e xe m pti on t o th is d ef

au lt
ru le f or e m plo y ee s inf

ir e pr ote ct iona ct ivi tie s: N o publi c ag en cy

sha ll be de em ed to hav e vio la te d su bse ct ion( a) of

thi s section with respect to the em ploy m ent of any em

ploy ee in fire p r o t e c t i o n a c t i v i t i e s . . . i f

— ( 1 ) i n awo rkp e r i o d o f

2 8 c o n s e c u t i v e d a ys the em ploy ee r eceives for tours of duty which in the aggregate e xceed the les se r of ( A ) 21 6 ho ur s, or ( B ) t he a ve r a ge nu m be r of ho ur s (as10

de te rm ine d by

the S ec re tary pur suant to se ct ion 6( c) (3 ) of the F ai r L ab or Standards Am endm ents of 1974 ) in tours of duty of em ploy ees engaged in suc h ac tiv iti es in w ork pe ri ods of 28 co nse cu tiv e da y s . . . com pensation at a r ate not less than one and one-half tim es the regular rat e atwhi ch he is em

pl oyed. Id . § 207(k). For e m

ploy ees i n fire protec tion activit ies working in 28-day work p e r i o d s , t h e D e p a rt me n t o f L ab o r h a s p r o mu l g a t e d a r e g u l a t i o n p r o s c r i b i n g o v e rt i me pa ym en t fo r al l t im e wor k e d b e yo n d 21 2 h ou rs each 28 da y s. See 29 C.F.R. § 553. 230( c)
. H er e, a ll Pl ai nti ff s w orke d ona 28- da y , 212- hour w ork sc he dul e. T hus, whether the Plaintiffs fa ll within the § 20 7(k) exem ption depends on whether they
sa ti sf y th e d efi ni ti on of “ em

pl oyee wit hi n fi re p ro te ct io n a ct iv it ie s.” A
. Re gul at or

y D ef ini tio ns o f “ E m

plo y ee in Fi re P ro te ct ionA ct ivi tie s” Pr ior to 1999 , the F L SAdid

not pr ovi de astatut or

y de fi nit ionf

or “ em plo y ee in fi re pr ote ct iona ct ivi tie s. ” G uid an ce c am e fr om D ep ar tm en t of L ab or r eg ula tio ns: A s us ed in [§ 207 (k )] , the te rm

“ an y e m plo y ee . . . in fi re pr otection activities” ref

ers to any em ploy ee ( 1) who is em

ploy ed by an organized fi re de partm en t or f

ir e pr ote ct iondis tr ic t; (2 ) w ho h as be entr ai ne d to the extent required by

State statute or l ocal o rdinance; (3) w ho has the legal au tho ri ty an d res pons ibi lity to en ga ge in the pr ev en tio n, c ontro l or extin gu i sh m e nt

o f af i r e o f a ny t y pe ; a nd ( 4) w ho p e r f

or m s a c t ivities w hic h are req ui red f

or , a nd d ir ec tly

c onc er ne d w ith , the pr ev en tio n, co nt ro l o r ex ti ng ui sh m en t o f fi res . . . .11

29 C.F. R. § 553 .210. A noth er r egulation , known as the “ 80/2 0 Rule,” provided th at otherwise ex emp t em

ploy ees m ay

not be consid ered “ em

ploy ees engaged in fire p r o t e c t i o n a c t i v i t i e s ” i f

t h e y s p e n d m o r e t h a n t w e n t y p e r c e n to f t h e i r w o rk i n g t i me
en ga ge d i n n on -ex em

pt act iv it ie s (t ha t i s, ac ti vi ti es no t re la te d t o fi re s up pr es si on ). Id
. § 55 3. 212. B. Se ct ion203 (y )’ s N ewD ef ini tio n of

“ E m plo y ee in Fi re P ro te ct ion A ct ivi tie s” Be ca use of sig nif

ic an t conf usi on in th e ap pli catio n of thi s r eg ula tor

y de fi nit ion , in 1 999 Co ngr es s a dde d astatut or y de fi nit ion to “ cla ri fy

the ove rt im e ex em

pti on f or
em plo y ee s e nga ge d inf

i r e p r o t e c t i o na c t i v i t i e s . ” F a i r L a b o r St an da rd s A ct

A m en dm en t, Pu b. L
. N o. 106 -1 51, 113 S ta t. 173 1 ( 1999 ). T he ne wstatut or y de fi nit ionstate s:

“ E m plo y ee in fi re pr ote ct iona ct ivi tie s” m eans ane m plo y ee , inc lud ing a fire fighter, param edic, em ergency m edical technician, r escue w orker, am bulance personnel, or haza r do us m at e r i a l s w or

ke r who

— ( 1) is trained in f ir e supp re ssi on, ha s the le ga l auth or ity a nd r es pons ibi lity

to en ga ge in fire suppression, and is em ploy ed by

a fir e departm en t o f a m uni ci pa lit y , c ounty , f

ir e dis tr ic t, or

S ta te ; and ( 2) is en ga ge d inthe pr ev en tio n, c ontro l, a nd e xti ngui shm en t of f ir es or r es pons e to em er ge nc y

sit ua tio ns w he re lif

e, pr ope rty , or the en vir onm en t is at r isk
. 29 U. S. C. § 203 (y ).12

The Fifth Circuit held that § 203(y ) “provides a definitio n previous ly provided by § 553.210 and its sub sidiary regulation § 55 3.212. Both of these re g u l at ions are therefore now obso lete and without effe ct.” M cG av oc k v. Ci ty of W

ate r V all ey , M iss
. , 452 F.3d 423 , 428 (5th Cir. 2006 ). W e agre e. Section 203(y ) is a stream lined definitio n, sim pler than the definitio n contained in th e re gul at ion s, a nd i ts s ta te d purp ose w as to “ cl ar if y the ove rt im e ex em

pti on f or
em plo y ee s e nga ge d inf

ir e pr ote ct ion act iv it ie s. ” T he P la int if fs a rg ue that the
re gul at or y de fi nit ionof

“ em plo y ee in fi re pr ote ct iona ct ivi tie s, ” pa rt ic ularl y the 80/ 20 Ru le , sti ll ap pli es . W e dis ag re e. S ec tio n 20 3( y ) w oul d har dl y be ac lari fi catio n if Co ngr es s int en de d it

to pil e ont o a lr ea dy

c onf usi ng and c om

pli cate d r eg ula tio ns. O ur in te rp ret at io n o f § 2 03 (y ) as ha vi ng ab ro g a t e d th e reg ul at ory de fin it io ns ha s t wo
co nse que nc es in thi s c as e. F ir st, the P la int if fs ’ a rg um en t tha t t he 80/ 20 R ule sho uld ap ply to the m is w ith out m er it. Se co nd, our § 207( k) pr ec ed en t is of lim ite d va lue to us, sin ce it

a ll inv olv es appl ic at ionof the r eg ula tor

y de fi nit ion s. C. T he P la int if

fs a re “ E m

plo y ee [s ] in Fi re Pr ote ct ion A ct ivi tie s” W ith in the M e a n i n g o f

§ 2 0 3 ( y)

“ The burden is on the em ploy er to prove he has adopted a 7(k) w orkwee k
exem ption .” B ird

we ll v. Ci tyof G adsd

en , A la. , 970 F
. 2d 8 02, 805 ( 11th C ir
. 199 2) (c iti ng Co rni ng G las s W

ork s v. B re nnan , 417 U
. S. 188, 196- 97, 94 S. Ct
. 222 3, 222 9T h e Pl a inti f f s a s s e rt th at th e D e f

e n d an ts ’ ar g u me n t th at § 2 0 7 ( k ) a p p li e s to them is an 5 aff irmative def

ense that cannot be r aised at the summary judgme nt stag e whe n it was not first raised in the answe r. Prec edent supporting the proposition that FL SA e x emptions a re a ffirmative defe nses discuss exemptions enumer ated in 29 U .S.C. § 213, not§ 207(k). See, e.g., Corning Glass W orks , 417 U.S. at 196-97, 94 S. Ct. at 2229. Section 207(k) is actua lly a partial exemption, s ince it extends the pe rm iss ibl e no n- ov e rt ime wo rk we e k, ins te a d of doi ng awa y wi th i t e nti re ly . A s th e De fe nd ants point out, § 207(k) is part of the g ener al FL SA overtime rule itself ( and in the same section), a nd § 213 provides exemptions to t he rule . For these rea sons, the Def endants proper ly

raised the § 207(k) argument at the summary judgme nt sta g e and w ere not require d to do so in their answer
. See B rock v . City of Cinc inn ati , 236 F.3d 793, 809-10 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a def endant ne ed not plead § 207(k) in its answer). And, the Plaintiffs had a mple notice that this argument was be ing r aised.
13 (1974)). “ The def

endant m ust prov e applicability

of [a § 207(k)] exem

ption by ‘ clear
an daf fi rmat i v e e v i d en ce .’” Id. (quot ing Donovan v. U nited Video, I

nc. , 725 F. 2d 5 77, 581 (1 0thCi r. 198 4) ). D eK al b C ounty thu s ha s th e bur de n of

pr ovi ng, by

“ cl ear an d affir m ative evidence,” that the Pl ai n t i ff s are exem

pt und er § 207(k) by

showing that the y sa tis fy e ac h e le m en t of § 20 3( y )’ s de fi nit ionof “ em plo y ee in fi re pr ote ct ion act iv it ie s.” 5 U nde r § 20 3( y ), a n e m

plo y ee m ust m ee t f ive c ri te ri a to fa ll w ith in the § 20 7( k)
ex em pti on: ( 1) be tr ai ne d in fi re supp re ssi on; ( 2) ha ve the le ga l auth or ity to en ga ge in fi re sup pr es sio n; ( 3) ha ve the r es pons ibi lity to en ga ge in fir e supp re ssi on; ( 4) be
em plo y ed by af ir e de partm en t of

am uni ci pa lity , c ounty , fi re dis tr ic t, or St at e; an d ( 5) be e nga ge d e ith er (i ) in the pr ev en tio n, co ntr ol, an d ex tin gui shm en t of fi re s, or ( ii) in the r es pons e to e m er ge nc y sit ua tio ns whe re li fe , pr ope rty , or the e nvi ro nm en t i s a t r isk
.“Full- tim e , p art -t ime , a nd vo lunte e r f

ir e fi g hte rs . . . s ha ll s uc c e ssf ull y c omp le te a

ba sic 6 trainingcourse .” Ga . Code Ann. § 25-4- 9(a) (West Supp. 2007). Upon succe ssful completion of a basic tra ining c ourse, a

n i n d i v i dual bec omes a Ge org ia B asic F irefighter a nd is lawfully

qualified to fig ht fires. NPQ I

certification, which a ll the Plainti ffs have re ceive d, is an adva nced le vel of tr a ini ngin f

ir e su pp re ssi on and e xce e ds the min imum l eve l of tr a ini ngre qu ir e d f

or Ge or g ia fi re fi g hte rs . 14 It is undis puted th at all Plaintiffs are tra ined in fire suppression , have the legal 6
au tho ri ty to en ga ge in fi re supp re ssi on, ar e em plo y ed by a County

f ir e de pa rtm en t, a nd
re spon d to em er ge nc y sit

ua tio ns wh er e lif

e, pr ope rty , or the en vir onm en t i s a t r isk
. T he iss ue in thi s c as e, the re fo re , inv olv es the thi rd re qui re m en t: w he the r the P la int if fs ha ve the “ responsib ility

to engage in fire suppression .” If t h ey d o , they

fall w ithin the § 2 0 7 ( k ) e x e mp t i o n , a s d e f

i n e db y § 2 0 3 ( y) , a n d t h e y a r e n o te n t i t l e dt o t h e n o rmal f o rt yhour overtim e pay

schedule required by

the FL SA . T his is a questi on of sta t utory
co nstru ct ionw hic h th is c ourt ha s no t pr ev iou sly a ddr es se d. The N inth Circu i t d i scussed the m eaning of “ responsib ility ” in § 203(y ). Cl evel an d v . Cit

y o f L.A. , 42 0 F .3d 9 8 1 (9 th Cir . 20 05 ). Cl ev eland he ld tha t c ro sstr ai ne d f ir ef igh te r/ param ed ic s ha d no “ re spon sib ili ty ” to eng age i n f ir e supp re ssi on unde r § 20 3( y ) be ca

use the y ha d no r ea l ob lig at ion or du ty t o figh t f ir es , w er e not regularly dispatched to fire scenes, did not carr y firef ighti ng e quip m ent, a n d were
ex pe ct edto pe rfo rm

on ly m ed ic al ser vi ces . Id

. at 990
.15

Clev el and define s “ re s p o n s i b i l i t y” i n § 2 0 3 (y) i n fo l l o wi n g wa y: “ [F ]o r P l ai n t i ffs to have the ‘ responsib ility ’ to engage in fire suppression , they m ust ha v e s o m e re al oblig ation or dutyto do so
. If a fire occurs, it m

ust be t h ei r jo b t o d eal w ith it.” Id

. E ve n if w e ac ce pt Cl ev eland ’ s definition of “ responsib ility ,” De Ka lb C ount y has m et its burden of dem onstrating that the Plaintiffs have a “ responsib ility ” to engage in fire supp ression und er § 203(y ) since they have a r eal ob ligation or duty to engage in fire
su pp res si on . Cl ev eland

is distin guish able. All Plaintiffs are assign ed “ turn-out” gear, which inc lud es br eathi ng a

pparatus es . A lso , N PQ I I Pl ai nti ff s ha ve be ena ssi gne d to r ide in fire e ngin es. Although the vast m aj ority of the Plaintiffs’ tim e is devoted to m edical duties, all of their j ob descriptio ns includ e fire suppress i o n . Ther e is undis puted te sti m ony that a ll Pl ai nti ff

s are qua lif

ie d to en ga ge in fi re supp re ssi on and m ust do s o if ordered, wher eas the Cl ev eland pla int if fs ha d no suc h oblig at ion
. T he N inth C ir cu it said that the Cl ev eland pla int if fs “ m ay vol unt ee r to a ssi st fi re fi ght er s at a fir e sc en e, but if they do not volun teer, they

are not sub

j ect to disciplin e. ” Id

. a t 98 4.See, e .g., Lawrence v. City of Phila. , N o. 03 -C V- 40 09 , 2 00 6 WL 28 47 33 0 ( E. D. Pa . Se pt. 7 2 9 , 2 0 0 6) ( h o l d i n gth at§ 2 0 3 ( y ) a p p l i e s t o a

g r o u p o f f i r e s e r v i c e p ar am e d i c s w h o i n f

r e qu e ntl y e ng a g e d in

fi re su pp re ssi on wh e n d ir e c te d to do so ); Diaz v. City of Plantati on, Fla. , No. 05-60757, 2006 WL5056118 (S.D. Fla . Sept. 15, 2006) (holdingthat § 203(y ) does not apply

to a g roup of para medics and emer g ency

medical tec hnicians who we re not tra ined in firef ightingor authorized by city policy to enter a structure fire or

hazardous envir onment). 16 Som e district courts have consi dered the issue we address today
. T he district 7
co urt op in io n w ithf

ac ts m ost sim ilar to this c as e is G onza le z v . Ci tyof D ee rfi el

d B ea ch , F lor ida , wh er e t he Southern District of F lorida held that a cross-trained fir efi gh te r fel l wi th in th e de fin it io n of § 20 3( y ). 51 0 F . Sup p. 2 d 1 03 7, 1 04 1- 42 (S.D. Fl a. 2007 ). T ha t c as e, j ust li ke thi s on e, tur

ne d up on the “ re spon sib ili ty ” re qui re m en t,
an d th e co urt r es te d it s ho ldi ng on the f ac ts tha t the pla int if

f w as tr ai ne d to f

igh t f ir es , ha d “ tur n- out ” ge ar

w hic h he w or e at

f ir e sc en es , an d had the re spon sib ili ty to e nga ge in fir e su pp res si on when hi s s up eri or s o rd ered hi m to do so . Id

. at

104 1. The D efendants urge us to exam ine the legislati v e h i s t ory of § 203(y ), which the y cl ai m re ve al s Co ngr es s’ s in te nt t o e xe m pt e m plo y ee s si m ilar to the P la int if fs f ro m the f orty -h our w orkw ee k. “ [R ] ef

er en ce to le gis lativ e his tor y is ina ppr opr ia te w he n th e t ex t of the statute is unam bigu ous.” HU

D v . R ucker , 5 3 5 U
. S
. 1 2 5 , 1 3 2 , 122 S. Ct
. 1230 , 123 4 ( 2002 ) (c itatio n om itt ed ). “ T he be st e vid en ce of [ le gis la tiv e] pur

pose is the statutory text adopted byboth Houses of Cong ress and subm itted to th e P r e s i d e n t . Wh e r e t h a tc o n t a i n s ap h r a s e t h a t i s u n a mb i g u o u s
—t h a th a s ac l e a r l y17

ac ce pte d m eanin g in both le gis la tiv e an d j udi ci al pr ac tic e— w e do not pe rm it it to b e
ex pande d or

c ontra c t e d

b y th e s t at em en ts o f ind ivi dua l l eg isl at or s or c om m itt ee s duri ng the course of the enactm ent process.” W . V a. U niv. H osps ., Inc. v. Casey , 499 U
. S. 83, 98- 99, 111 S
. Ct
. 1138 , 1147 (1 991) (c itatio n om itt ed ). T he te rm “ re spon sib ili ty ” is n ot vague or unclear in § 203(y ), so the statute c annot be deem ed am bigu ous. So, review of le gis la tiv e his tor

y w oul d be ina

ppr opr ia te a nd w e the re fo re e xa m ine the c om m on
m eanin g of

the te rm “ re spon sib ili ty , ” gui de d by c an ons of

statut or y c onstru ct ion
. T he start ing poi nt o f sta tut ory co ns tru ct ionis to b eg in “ w iththe w or ds o f the statutory provisio n.” Harris v. G arner , 216 F. 3d 97 0, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). W he n e x a m i n i n g t h e w o r d s o f a s t a tu t e , “ [ i ] n t h e ab s e n c e o f a s t a tu t o ry d e f i nit ion of a term , we loo k to the com m on usage of words for their m eaning.” Co ns ol . Ban k, N.A.
v. U
. S. D ep ’t of Tr ea sur

y , 118 F. 3d 14 61, 146 4 (1 1th Cir. 1997). T he re be ing no sta tut or y de fi nit ion of “ re spon sib ili ty ” in § 203( y ), w e look to the c om m on m eanin g of tha t w or d. T he c om m on u sa ge of

the te rm “ re spon sib ili ty ” is “ a duty , obl iga tio n, or burden.” A m erican Her itage Dictionary of the E nglis h Language ( 4th ed. 2000 ). O ther dic t i o n a r i e s d e f

i n e “ r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ” a s “ [ a ] c h a r g e , t r u s t , o r du t y , f

o r w h i c h o n e is responsib le,” Oxford E nglis h Dictionary (2nd ed. 1989), and a “ m oral, legal, or m ental accountability ,” W ebster’ s Third N ewInternational Dictionary (1981).18

Courts sho uld read statutes as a “ co n s i s tent whole.” Burlison v. M cD onal d’s Co rp. , 455 F
. 3d 1 242, 124 7 ( 11th C ir
. 200 6)
. I n do ing so, thi s court m ust re spe ct

the

“ long standin g . . . general prin ci p l e th at courts m ust no t interpret one provisio n of a statute to render another provisio n m eaningless.” Id

. W it h t hi s pr in ci pl e in m in d, we pr oc ee d to a na ly ze the e nti re ty of § 20 3( y ) to d et er

m ine the appr opr ia te m eanin g of

“ re spon sib ili ty . ” Se ct ion203 (y ) sta te s:

“ E m plo y ee in fi re pr ote ct ion ac tiv iti es ” m eans an e m plo y ee , inc lud ing a fire fighter, param edic,
. . . who—(1) is trained in fire sup pression, has the le ga l auth or ity an d re spon sib ili ty to eng ag e in fir e supp re ssi on, a nd is e m plo y ed by af ir e de partm en t of

am uni ci pa lity , c ounty , f

ir e dis tr ic t, or St ate ; and ( 2) is en ga ge d inthe pr ev en tio n, c ontro l, a nd extingu ishm ent of fires or response to em ergency situation s where life, pr ope rty , or

the e nvi ro nm en t i s a t r isk
. T he Pl ai nti ff

s ar gue tha t the y do not fa ll w ith in the am bit of § 20 3( y ) be caus e
m any of them have never engaged in any ty pe of fire suppressio n. But, § 203(y ) does not r equir e ac tua l en ga ge m en t i n f ir e supp re ssi on, a s de m onstrate d by the dis j unc tiv e clause at the end of the statute: “ ‘ Em ploy ee in fire protection activities’ m eans an
em plo y ee . . . ( 2) [ w ho] is en ga ge d inthe pr ev en tio n, c ontro l, a nd e xti ngui shm en t of fires or response to em ergency situatio ns where life, property , or the environm ent is at ri sk. ” T he part ie s do not dis put e tha t the P la int if

fs are en ga ge d inthe “ re spon se to
em ergency

situation s where life, p ro perty , or the environm ent is at risk.” Since §The textual canon of s t atutory construction no sc itu r a so c iis (“a word is known by

the 8 company it keeps”) is particular ly helpful for

interpre ting the me aningof “ responsibility ” in § 203(y ). Unde r this max im, a word’s me aningmay be dete rmined by

ref ere nce to t h e re s t o f the statute. 19 203(y ) ph rases this requirem ent in the disjunctive, there is no statutory requirem ent that there be any le ve l of

a ct ua l e nga ge m en t i n f

ir e supp re ssi on. N ei the r doe s th e te rm

“ re spo ns ib ility ” by

it se lf r equir e an y

a ct ua l e nga ge m en t in f ire supp ression. “ Responsib ility to e ngage in fire supp ression ” mus t m ean
som ethin g othe r than “ is e nga ge d inthe pr ev en tio n, c ontro l, a nd e xting ui sh m en t of fires. ” Put another way , “ responsib ility ” does not im ply any actual engagem ent in fire 8 supp re ssi on, a nd e m

plo y ee s m ay ha ve a “ re spon sib ili ty to en ga ge in f ir e supp re ssi on”
w i t h o u te v e r

a c tu a l l y e n g a g i n g i n f

i r e s up p r e s s i o n t h e ms e l v e s . Th i s “ r e s p o n s i b i l i t y” i s af o rw a r d
- l o o k i n g , a f

f i rma t i v e du t y o r

o b l i g a t i o n t h a ta n e mp l o ye e may h a v e a ts o me poi nt i n th e fu tur e. Furthe r, if w e re ad “ re spon sib ili ty ” to r equir e ac tua l e nga ge m en t in fi re supp re ssi on, D eK al b Co unty co uld sim ply as sig n its pa ram ed ic s ( w ho a lr ea dy
m eet the other re qui rem ents of § 203 (y )) to perf orm fire supp ression activities
oc ca sio na lly , f

or th e sol e pur

pose of e xe m pti ng the m

f ro m the F L SAf

orty -h our
ove rt im e standard
. T his c onstru ct ionis co nsi ste nt w iththe a cc ep te d de fi nit ionof

“ responsib ility ,” which re fers to a duty —which one m ay

or m ay not e v er be called upon to per form
. The F ifth Circuit observed that em ergency m edical personnel trained20

as fire fighters and att a c he d to a fire depar tm ent m ay

be considered “ em

ploy ees engaged in f ir e pr ote ct iona ct ivi tie s e ve n th oughthe y m ay spe nd o ne hun dr ed pe rc en t of the ir tim e re spon ding to m edical em ergencies. ” McG avock , 45 2 F .3d at 4 27 . W e ag ree. A pr im ar y thr ust of the Pl ai nti ff

s’ ca se , how ev er , is tha t the y ha ve no re al duty or obligatio n to engage in fire suppressio n, and so they have no “ responsib ility .” They poi nt t o D CF RS int er

na l po lic y tha t doe s not al low N PQ I Pl ai nti ff s to en te r bui ldi ngs to e n g a g e i n f

i r e s up p r e s s i o n . B u t , o t h e r u n d i s p u t e de v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a tthe Pl ai nt iff s d o h av e th e “ res po ns ib il it y ” to en ga ge in fir e su pp res si on . It is undi sput ed

that a ll Pl ai nti ff

s have a dvanc ed

f ir ef igh tin g tra ini ng. I t i s a lso undi sputed th at the D CFRS has equipp ed them with “ turn-out” g ea r, s en ds them
re gul ar ly to fi re sc en es , an d re qui re s the m to be a va ila ble to as sis t w ithf

ir e supp re ssi on if the y a re ne ed ed
. E ve n th e N PQ I Pl ai nti ff s ar e au tho ri ze d un de r D CF RS pol ic y to
en ga ge in ex te ri or

fir e supp re ssi on, suc h a s br ush fi re s, a nd § 203 (y ) m ak es no distin ction be t we en structural fire s and exterior fire s. F urther, the DCF RS F ire Captains testified that if the Plaintiffs we re ordered to e ngage in fire suppression , they
m ust do so, or be subj ec t to disc ipl ine
. Whil e the inc ide nt c om m an de rs e vid en tly

do
no t , as a m atter of policy , order NP Q I -cer

tified em ploy ees to engage in fire
s up p r e s s i o n , t h i s d o e s n o t mea n t h a t t h e N P Q I P l a i n t i f f s d o n o th a v e a“ r e s p o n s i b i l i t y” t o en g ag e i n fi re s up p re s s i o n i f o rd er ed
. Fi n al l y, f i re s up p re s s i o n i s i n ea ch Pl ai n t i ff ’sTh e Pla int if fs a lso a sse rt

tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d in de nyingc la ss c e rt if

ic atio n, at le a st 9 with reg ard to the F L SA class ac tion. A distr i ct court’s decision not to cer tify a cla ss is reviewe d fo r a bu se of dis c re tio n and

wi ll b e a ff

ir me d e ve n if

thi s c ourt wo uld have ru le d d if

fe re ntl y in t he fi rs t instance. Cooper v. Southern Co. , 390 F.3d 695, 711- 12 (11th Cir. 2004). Since we aff irm the district court’s grant of summar

y judgme nt in favor of

the Def endants, we do not addre ss this i ssue. 21 j ob descriptio n. A l l Pl ai n t iffs theref ore have the “ responsib ility ” to engage in fire supp re ssi on w ith in the m ean ing of § 20 3( y ). Whil e the a ct ua l e xe rc ise of

thi s
re spon sib ili ty

m ay be c ont ing en t onthe part ic ular de m an ds o f a fi re sc en e, it doe s no t
m ak e the r es pons ibi lity

le ss r ea l. VII. CONCLUSION Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , w e fi nd tha t the P la int if fs ha ve the “ re spon sib ili ty to
en ga ge in fi re sup pr es sio n” und er § 20 3(y ) an d are thu s part ia lly e xe m pt f ro m the FL SA ’ s forty -hour overtim e schedule. 9 AFFIR MED.22

A N D E RS O N , J. , c onc ur

ri ng: I j oi n the opin ion for the court fully
. I m ake only this addit ional comm ent. I t doe s se em

to m e tha t the statut e is n ot una m big uous . T hus, if the re w er e a re as ona ble adm inistrative r egulation , to which a court would owe defere nce, I would defer ( even if the result w ere differe nt from that which w e re ach in this op inion ).