UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

CRYSTAL BOND, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CHRISTINE WORMUTH, Secretary, U.S. 

Department of the Army, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 22-5019 

(D.C. No. 4:20-CV-00594-GKF-SH) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, KELLY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Crystal Bond appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) on her employment discrimination 

claims under the Rehabilitation Act, Title VII, and 5 U.S.C. § 2302. Although the court 

determined that Ms. Bond failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, it dismissed 

these claims on the merits. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm 

*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 14, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and remand to the 

district court to dismiss these claims without prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual History 

In early 2018, Ms. Bond, a cartographer with the Army Corps, was diagnosed 

with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Beginning in March 2018, she 

submitted successive applications for unpaid leave under the Family Medical Leave 

Act (“FMLA”). With each application, Ms. Bond attached documentation from her 

counselor, Lisa Cragar, who explained that Ms. Bond’s PTSD prevented her from 

returning to work.1

 Ms. Bond’s supervisor, Dan Hernandez, granted each application 

until Ms. Bond had used the 12 weeks permitted under the FMLA. He informed Ms. 

Bond that she would “be expected to return to work” after that period. Suppl. App., 

Vol. I at 189. 

During May and June, Ms. Bond made oral requests to telework. Mr. 

Hernandez denied these requests. While absent from work, Ms. Bond applied for 

Social Security disability income and workers’ compensation. The Social Security 

Administration (“SSA”) eventually denied Ms. Bond’s application, explaining that 

1

 In Ms. Bond’s first FMLA application, Ms. Cragar certified that Ms. Bond 

“needs a minimum of 4 weeks off work to process her grief and trauma.” App., Vol. 

I at 51-54. In her second FMLA application, Ms. Cragar stated that Ms. Bond had 

“shown some worsening symptoms of grief, panic, and anxiety” and recommended 

that she “continue work leave for a minimum of another 6 months then re-evaluate 

progress at that time.” Suppl. App., Vol. I at 184-87. 

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her condition was not severe enough to keep her from doing “simple, routine work.” 

Id. at 201. In her submission to the Office of Workers’ Compensation in the 

Department of Labor, Ms. Bond included Ms. Cragar’s work capacity evaluation, 

which reported that Ms. Bond could work “0” hours a week and that “alternative 

work locations would not improve [Ms. Bond’s] ability to perform work duties.” Id. 

at 204. 

On May 25, 2018, Ms. Bond’s FMLA leave expired, but she did not return to 

work or respond to Mr. Hernandez’s inquiries.2

 In September, she wrote a letter to 

Mr. Hernandez stating that “based on my medical condition, symptoms, diagnosis, 

medications and prognosis, for me to return to the Cartographer Position at [the 

Army Corps] is not physically or psychologically possible, for the foreseeable 

future.” Id. at 199-200. She requested workers’ compensation and immediate 

disability retirement. She attached the letter from the SSA denying her request for 

disability benefits. 

2

 Mr. Hernandez repeatedly attempted to contact Ms. Bond but received no 

response. In June, he notified her that she had not given him a “medical provider’s 

prognosis” nor “any information indicating whether your condition has improved or 

resolved” and warned that “[u]nless you provide me medical documentation 

regarding your availability to return to work, there appears to be no foreseeable end 

to your absence.” Suppl. App., Vol. I at 192-94. In September, Mr. Hernandez sent 

another notification informing Ms. Bond that she had been in absent without leave 

(“AWOL”) status for 448 hours and warning that if she did not “return to work on a 

full-time and regular basis, disciplinary action may be taken, up to and including 

removal from federal service.” Id. at 198. 

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Mr. Hernandez, understanding the SSA determination to confirm that Ms. 

Bond could work, requested “a statement from your medical provider indicating your 

ability to return to work, the likely timeframe of doing so, the type of work you are 

capable of performing, and whether an accommodation may be appropriate.” Id. 

at 206-07. He attached the Department of Labor reasonable accommodation form. 

Ms. Bond responded that she could not “return to any of my past work, or, my former 

career,” but that she “could probably work something low stress, 

simple/routine/repetitive, local, with no commute” and suggested “stuffing envelopes 

from the safety of my own home.” Id. at 209. She reiterated that “I am not able to 

fulfill th[e] responsibilities” of a cartographer. Id. 

When Ms. Bond returned the reasonable accommodation form, she wrote, “I 

don’t know what my options are” in the space provided to request an 

accommodation. Id. at 215. Ms. Cragar submitted a medical evaluation stating she 

could not “see or identify any accommodations that could be made to [Ms. Bond’s] 

current job position that could allow her to complete the mental tasks needed for the 

job.” Id. at 216. 

In January 2019, the Army Corps sent Ms. Bond a Notice of Proposed 

Removal for excessive absence and absence without leave. Ms. Bond did not appeal 

the notice and confirmed that she was “unable to work.” Id. at 224-25. Her removal 

from the Army Corps became effective on March 15, 2019. She was given mailed 

notice that her health benefits would expire in 31 days. 

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Months later, Ms. Bond contacted Duane Braxton, a human resources 

representative for the Army Corps, about her lapsed medical insurance. On 

October 25, 2019, Mr. Braxton sent an email to Ms. Bond explaining that her 

insurance had lapsed because she had not elected coverage after being removed from 

service. Ms. Bond responded to that email on November 7, 2019, and received no 

further response. 

B. Procedural History 

On December 12, 2019, Ms. Bond contacted the EEOC of Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

alleging she had experienced discrimination.3

 The Tulsa District Office dismissed 

Ms. Bond’s formal EEO Complaint for untimely contact with an EEO counselor 

under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(2). Ms. Bond appealed to the EEOC Office of 

Federal Operations, which affirmed the dismissal for untimely EEO Counselor 

contact and issued a right-to-sue letter. In its decision, the EEOC noted that although 

Ms. Bond claimed her inability to read her removal notice until November 2019 was 

the reason for her delayed contact, its investigation concluded that she “was able to 

think, read, and communicate clearly during this period.” Suppl. App., Vol II at 444. 

Ms. Bond sued the Secretary of the Army as the head of the Army Corps on 

November 23, 2020. She filed an amended complaint the next day, asserting 

3

 The parties dispute whether the record shows Ms. Bond initiated contact with 

the EEOC in December 2019 or February 2020. As the district court did, we draw all 

reasonable inferences in Ms. Bond’s favor on summary judgment review and use the 

earlier date—December 12, 2019—as the date of first contact. 

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violations of (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 

et. seq.; (2) 5 U.S.C. § 2302 for prohibited personnel practices; (3) the Rehabilitation 

Act, 29 U.S.C § 791; (4) Title VII for unlawful discrimination based on sex or 

gender; and (5) 29 U.S.C. § 1140 for interference with protected rights. The Army 

Corps moved to dismiss, and the district court dismissed the ADA and 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1140 claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). At summary judgment, the district court dismissed the 

remainder of Ms. Bond’s claims. It held that she had failed to exhaust her 

administrative remedies and that her claims failed on the merits. The court entered 

judgment dismissing “the action. . . on the merits.” App., Vol. III at 263. 

II. DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Ms. Bond asserts the district court erred in granting the Army 

Corps’ motion for summary judgment.4

 Ms. Bond does not adequately challenge the 

district court’s holding that she did not exhaust her administrative remedies, and even 

had she adequately addressed this issue, she failed to initiate the administrative 

process in a timely manner. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to the Army Corps on this ground. 

4

 Ms. Bond has not appealed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal order. 

Thus, her claims under the ADA and 29 U.S.C. § 1140 are not at issue. 

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A. Standard of Review 

“We review summary judgment determinations de novo, applying the same 

standard as the district court.” Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc., 740 F.3d 530, 538 

(10th Cir. 2014). “We view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and draw all reasonable inferences in his or her favor.” Osborne v. Baxter 

Healthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260, 1266 (10th Cir. 2015). “The court shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Cir. 

P. 56(a). 

“The issue whether a plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies is a 

legal question that we also review de novo.” Dossa v. Wynne, 529 F.3d 911, 913 

(10th Cir. 2008). 

B. Legal Background 

The Rehabilitation Act requires federal employers to “provide reasonable 

accommodations to disabled employees.” Sanchez v. Vilsack, 695 F.3d 1174, 1177 

(10th Cir. 2012); see 29 U.S.C. § 794.5

 Title VII prohibits an employer from 

“discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, 

5

 The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the ADA definition of “disability” as “a 

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 

activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)). The Army 

Corps does not dispute, for purposes of this appeal, that Ms. Bond is disabled within 

the meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Aplee. Br. at 18. 

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conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 

Both the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII require a claimant to “comply with 

specific administrative complaint procedures in order to exhaust their administrative 

remedies” before bringing a discrimination claim in federal court. Hickey v. 

Brennan, 969 F.3d 1113, 1118 (10th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted); see also Green 

v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 550 (2016). Federal employees must “initiate contact” 

with an EEO counselor “within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be 

discriminatory.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Although the “regulatory exhaustion 

requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite,” it is a “claims-processing rule that 

the employer may raise as an affirmative defense.” Hickey, 969 F.3d at 1118. This 

defense is “subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling,” see Lincoln v. BNSF 

Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1183 (10th Cir. 2018), but a “court must enforce this 

exhaustion requirement if the employer properly raises it,” Hickey, 969 F.3d at 1118. 

Section 2302 of Title 5 prohibits the federal government from implementing 

personnel practices that discriminate against employees on the basis of protected 

statuses. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1). When a personnel action is sufficiently serious, like 

removal or demotion, and the employee alleges the action constituted discrimination 

prohibited by another federal statute, the employee’s claim is considered a “mixed 

case.” See Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 44 (2012). A federal employee with a 

mixed case has the choice to initiate a complaint either with (1) the agency’s EEO 

office or (2) the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”). See 29 C.F.R. 

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§ 1614.302(b). Because an employee may not pursue a mixed case in two forums, 

“[w]hichever is filed first shall be considered an election to proceed in that forum” 

and the employee must exhaust administrative remedies consistent with the forum’s 

timeliness constraints. See Jones v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 111 F. Supp. 3d 25, 31 

(D.D.C. 2015) (quotations omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.302(c)(1), 

1614.105(a)(1).

C. Analysis 

The Army Corps asserted failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense. Dist. 

Ct. Doc. 11 at 7-13. The district court found that Ms. Bond did not exhaust her 

administrative remedies because she failed to contact the EEOC within 45 days of a 

qualifying act of discrimination.6

 We affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment for the Army Corps on this ground. 

Waiver 

Ms. Bond has not adequately appealed the district court’s determination that 

she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Although she states in the “issues 

presented” section of her opening brief that her contact with the EEOC was timely, 

see Aplt. Br. at 10, she does not develop this argument. In her “statement of the 

case” section, she identifies November 7, 2019—the date she sent her final email to 

6

 Ms. Bond brought her mixed case under 5 U.S.C. § 2302 to the EEOC rather 

than the MSPB. In choosing that forum, she is bound to the EEOC’s 45-day 

limitations period for all her claims. See Jones, 111 F. Supp. 3d at 31 (“A plaintiff 

may file a mixed-case complaint with his agency’s EEO office or with MSPB, but not 

both.”). 

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Mr. Braxton—as the “most recent adverse action by the Agency,” but she proffers no 

authority to support her theory that an email she sent can constitute discrimination on 

the part of her employer. Aplt. Br. at 20. 

The Army Corps contends that Ms. Bond has “arguably abandon[ed]” her 

exhaustion argument. Aplee. Br. at 23 n.4. We agree. Her omission of an 

exhaustion argument in her opening brief waives the issue. See Utah Env’t Cong. v. 

Bosworth, 439 F.3d 1184, 1194 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (“An issue mentioned in a brief 

on appeal, but not addressed, is waived.”). Because “issues designated for review are 

lost if they are not actually argued in the party’s brief,” Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. 

Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted), she must do more than 

merely list exhaustion as an issue on appeal. She did not do more, so she has waived the 

issue of whether her contact with the EEOC was timely. 

Failure to Contact an EEO Counselor Within 45 Days 

Even if Ms. Bond had presented an adequate exhaustion argument, we hold, like 

the district court, that her contact with the EEOC was untimely. Ms. Bond cannot 

identify “an adverse employment action” such as “firing” or a “decision causing a 

significant change in benefits” that occurred within 45 days of her contact with the 

EEOC. See Hiatt v. Colo. Seminary, 858 F.3d 1307, 1316 (10th Cir. 2017) 

(quotations and alterations omitted). 

The only event within 45 days of Ms. Bond’s contact with the EEOC on 

December 12, 2019, was the November 7, 2019 email she sent to Mr. Braxton 

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inquiring about her health insurance. But this email was not a qualifying adverse 

employment action. 

First, Ms. Bond’s lapse in medical insurance was not an independent 

discriminatory act but a consequence of her termination,7

 and a challenge on 

December 12, 2019, to Ms. Bond’s March 15, 2019 termination of employment 

would have been untimely. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) 

(quotations omitted) (The “proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not 

upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.”). 

Second, Ms. Bond’s own email on November 7, 2019, cannot constitute an 

“adverse employment action” or a “decision causing a significant change in benefits” 

because it was her act, not the Army Corps’. Hiatt, 858 F.3d at 1316. As the district 

court explained, “the relevant action is that of the employer, not the employee.” 

Suppl. App., Vol. II at 514. 

Because Ms. Bond fails to identify any adverse employment action within 45 

days of her contact with the EEOC, the district court correctly determined that she 

failed to properly exhaust her administrative remedies, warranting dismissal of her 

claims. 

Nor is Ms. Bond entitled to equitable tolling based on her argument that her 

“continuing symptoms affected her ability to timely receive her mail and to make 

timely responses.” Aplt. Br. at 21. Equitable tolling applies when an employee is 

7

 As noted above, when Ms. Bond was fired on March 15, 2019, she was given 

notice that her medical insurance would expire 31 days later. 

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“lulled into inaction by her past employer” or “actively misled,” not when the 

employee simply “failed to exercise due diligence in preserving h[er] legal rights.” 

Moneoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 957-58 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). 

Nothing in the record suggests that Ms. Bond was “actively misled” or otherwise 

prevented from making timely contact with the EEOC. On the contrary, Ms. Bond 

pursued disability retirement and workers’ compensation benefits, and she applied for 

Social Security benefits while her symptoms persisted. After her termination and 

before contacting the EEOC, she corresponded with Mr. Braxton. The district court 

concluded that estoppel was inappropriate because Ms. Bond was “capable of 

pursuing [her] own claim.” Suppl. App., Vol. II at 516 (quoting Biester v. Midwest 

Health Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1264, 1269 (10th Cir. 1996)). We agree. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We affirm summary judgment for the Army Corps on the ground that Ms. 

Bond failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. In addition to addressing the 

exhaustion issue, the district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of 

the Army Corps by determining that Ms. Bond’s claims lacked merit. “Because we 

express no opinion on the merits of [the Army Corps’] motion for summary 

judgment” and address only the exhaustion issue, and because “dismissal based on a 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be without prejudice,” Smith v. 

Cheyenne Ret. Invs. L.P., 904 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted),8

8

 Although exhaustion is no longer a jurisdictional requirement, we still 

dismiss unexhausted claims without prejudice. See Smith, 904 F.3d at 1166; see also 

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we remand to the district court with instructions to revise its summary judgment 

order to dismiss Ms. Bond’s claims at issue here without prejudice and to revise the 

judgment accordingly. 

Entered for the Court 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

Joritz v. Univ. of Kan., No. 20-3234, 2022 WL 817968, at *3 (10th Cir. Mar. 18, 

2022) (“A dismissal [for failure to exhaust] is ordinarily without prejudice,” and this 

is “true whether or not the failure to exhaust is considered jurisdictional.”); Cirocco 

v. McMahon, 768 F. App’x 854, 855 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e affirm the district 

court’s decision that [plaintiff] failed to exhaust her administrative remedies but 

remand with instructions. . . to dismiss the case without prejudice based on the 

affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, rather than for lack 

of subject-matter jurisdiction.”).

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