1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

TEXARKANA DIVISION 

ALEXANDRA DAVIS, 

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, 

vs. 

JERRAL W. JONES, DALLAS COWBOYS 

FOOTBALL CLUB, LTD., JAMES 

WILKINSON, TRAILRUNNER 

INTERNATIONAL, LLC, and DONALD 

JACK, JR., 

Defendants/Cross-Plaintiff,

vs. 

CYNTHIA DAVIS-SPENCER, 

 Third-Party Defendant. 

CIVIL ACTION No. 5:23-cv-00032-RWS 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

JERRAL W. JONES’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO LISA DUFFEE’S AMENDED 

MOTION TO QUASH AND AMENDED REQUEST FOR PROTECTION 

Counter-Plaintiff Jerral W. Jones files this Response in Opposition to Lisa Duffee’s 

Amended Motion to Quash and Amended Request for Protection, as follows: 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Lisa Duffee, an attorney representing Shy Anderson in divorce proceedings against Jones’s 

daughter, admits that she possesses relevant communications with Counter-Defendant Alexandra 

Davis and Third-Party Defendant Cynthia Davis-Spencer (collectively, “Defendants”). These 

communications relate to the confidential settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) that 

Defendants indisputably breached, in part, by providing that agreement to Anderson and his 

lawyers. Yet Duffee now asserts that she need not comply with a subpoena from this Court because 

Defendants asked Duffee to represent them in their efforts to obtain money from Jones. 

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But Duffee’s attempts to conjure an attorney-client relationship with Defendants is 

insupportable. To begin with, despite holding the privilege, Defendants never objected to Duffee’s 

subpoena. Quite the contrary, Defendants identified Duffee as someone possessing relevant 

evidence. (See Ex. 6, App. 36; Ex. 7, App. 46) Further, Defendants did not treat their 

communications with Duffee as privileged, as evidenced by Davis-Spencer informing Anderson, 

a third party, that Duffee told Davis she could get a “great payday” if she “threaten[ed]” a paternity 

lawsuit: 

(Ex. 1, App. 5)1

 Duffee also vastly understates her involvement in matters relevant to this lawsuit. 

In fact, Defendants’ had a symbiotic relationship with Duffee and Anderson, with each using their 

respective lawsuits to exert leverage on Jones. 

For example, in June 2021, Davis-Spencer sent Davis’s 23andMe login information to 

Anderson so he could access Davis’s “dna profile.”2

 (Id., App. 2) Later that month, Davis-Spencer 

told Anderson “I really want you to win this battle so I’m trying to do my small part to help you.” 

(Id., App. 3) Further, in August 2021, Anderson told Davis-Spencer that he would “reach out to 

 

1

 As this Court is aware, Davis took Duffee’s advice and “threatened legal action [against Jones] if there was no 

response to her” parentage demand. Dkt. 75 at 13. 

2

 23andMe is a genetic testing company that provides customers information about their genetic data. 

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[Davis].” (Id., App. 4) Davis-Spencer then told Anderson that Davis “want[ed] to speak to 

[Anderson]” and “was going to call [him].”3 (Id., App. 6) 

Duffee was aware of—and involved in—this coordination. Indeed, Davis-Spencer 

admitted conversing with Duffee regarding Davis’s lawsuits. (See Ex. 2, App. 7) Duffee also 

communicated with Davis through Davis’ attorney, Andrew Bergman. Specifically, in March 

2022, Jones’s attorney sent a letter to Anderson c/o Duffee noting Jones’s intent to investigate 

“potential claims . . . for conversion (extortion) and other torts,” and requesting that he preserve 

communications concerning Defendants. (Ex. 4, App. 20) Mere minutes after receiving the letter, 

Duffee forwarded it to Davis through Bergman. (Ex. 3, App. 18–19) Thereafter, using Davis’s 

attorneys as intermediaries, Duffee continued coordinating with Davis by sending sealed pleadings 

and other correspondence from the Jones/Anderson divorce proceedings. (See Ex. 3, App. 8–19) 

 Despite being aware of her and Anderson’s interactions with Defendants, Duffee now 

resists discovery of their communications. Jones, however, is entitled to discover the full breadth 

and facts surrounding Defendants’ breaches of the Settlement Agreement. Because Duffee has 

evidence of those facts—e.g., communications involving Defendants (and their agents) concerning 

their multiple breaches—her Motion seeking to conceal that evidence should be denied. 

II. JONES’S ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE 

On April 1, 2024, Jones served Duffee with subpoenas requesting that she (1) produce 

communications with Defendants (including their respective agents), and (2) appear for an oral 

deposition.4 See Dkts. 79-1, 79-2. The document subpoena required compliance by April 8, 2024. 

 

3

 These messages confirming Defendants’ disclosure of confidential information to Anderson contradict their 

representations to this Court denying same. Compare Dkt. 13 at 7 (alleging in paragraphs 31 and 39 that Davis and 

Davis-Spencer, respectively, disclosed confidential information to third parties) with Dkt. 21 at 4 (denying paragraph 

31) and Dkt. 23 at 4 (denying paragraph 39). 

4

 As Duffee acknowledges, the parties agreed to postpone Duffee’s deposition. See Dkt. 79-5 at 1. 

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Dkt. 79-1 at 1. On that date, Duffee requested a “short extension” of the document production 

deadline, which Jones agreed to extend to April 11, 2024. (Ex. 5, App. 26–27) On the afternoon 

of April 11th, Duffee requested four more days “to complete an initial privilege log,” threatening 

court intervention if Jones did not “respond immediately.” (Id., App. 25) Less than two hours later, 

and without personally conferring, Duffee filed her first motion to quash wherein she represented 

that “[c]ounsel could not agree to additional interim relief,” and that she “had to file” the motion.5

Dkt. 76 at 3. 

As Duffee was filing, Jones offered a one-day extension explaining that the compromise 

proposal was based on Duffee’s refusal to produce non-privileged documents by the agreed upon 

date or to explain the need for another extension. (Ex. 5, App. 25) Jones requested additional 

information regarding the volume of the production to consider further extensions. (Id.) The 

following day, the Court denied Duffee’s initial motion to quash without prejudice citing a lack of 

clarity, among other deficiencies. See Dkt. 77. 

Thereafter, Duffee did not respond to Jones’s requests for additional information, provide 

any insight into the volume of the production, or explain her need for another extension. Instead, 

on April 16, 2024, Duffee sent Jones a draft of her amended motion to quash and gave Jones a 

two-hour window to conference regarding the motion. See (Ex. 5, App. 24) During the meet-andconfer, Jones’s counsel explained the relevance of the communications. See supra Part I. 

Additionally, Duffee’s counsel represented that he created a privilege log (an admission that 

Duffee possesses relevant—albeit allegedly privileged—communications), but refused to produce 

it. (Ex. 5, App. 23–24) The Motion was then filed. On April 17, 2024, Jones again attempted to 

 

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 Duffee’s failure to confer violated this Court’s “Standing Order Regarding ‘Meet and Confer’ Obligations Relating 

to Discovery Disputes,” which requires parties to “fully comply with the substantive and procedural conference 

requirements of Local Rule CV-7(h). 

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confer in an effort to avoid burdening the Court, or at minimum narrow the dispute by sending 

written questions about the scope and basis of Duffee’s privilege claims.6 (See Ex. 5, App. 22) On 

Two days later, as Jones was finalizing this filing, Duffee responded. (See Ex. 8, App. 51) Therein 

she reasserted vague privilege claims, produced a single voicemail from a reporter, and refused to 

propose any compromise that would avoid Court involvement. (Id.) 

II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 

A. The subpoena seeks relevant documents. 

 Duffee’s communications with Defendants are indisputably relevant to Jones’s breach of 

contract claims. As this Court is aware, Jones, Davis, and Davis-Spencer executed a confidential 

settlement agreement in 1998 to resolve a paternity dispute (the “Settlement Agreement”). See 

Dkt. 13 at 3. Jones’s claims are founded on Defendants’ violations of their confidentiality 

obligations, namely their sending of confidential information concerning the Settlement 

Agreement to various third parties. See id. at 7–8, 10–12. 

 Although Jones already explained to Duffee the relevance of her communications (see Ex. 

5, App. 23–24), Duffee now feigns ignorance. See Dkt. 79 at 3 (claiming Jones failed to “connect” 

the requested discovery to his claims). But as the foregoing demonstrates, Defendants’ sharing of 

confidential information with Anderson and Duffee is undisputable. See supra Part I. Therefore, 

Duffee’s communications with Defendants (including their agents) are plainly relevant to Jones’s 

breach of contract claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 

 

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 How, after all, would communications between Davis’s counsel and Anderson’s counsel be privileged, as Duffee 

claimed during the meet-and-confer? 

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B. Duffee’s invocation of the attorney-client privilege fails. 

Duffee wrongly presumes that she can withhold evidence simply because she is an attorney 

and believes that, at some point, Defendants sought her representation in their efforts to get money 

from Jones.7 See Dkt. 79 at 2. But this is irrelevant, as Duffee admits she “declined” representation. 

Id. Where “no attorney-client relationship exist[s],” the “attorney client privilege does not 

attach[].”8 Tech Pharmacy Servs., LLC v. Alixa Rx LLC, No. 4:15-CV-766, 2017 WL 3521727, at 

*3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2017). Tellingly, Defendants have never claimed any privilege over their 

communications with Duffee. See Apex Mun. Fund v. N-Grp. Sec., 841 F. Supp. 1423, 1429–30 

(S.D. Tex. 1993) (“the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client”). Instead, they disclosed 

Duffee as a person “having knowledge of relevant facts.” See Ex. 6, App. 36; Ex. 7, App. 46. 

Even if an attorney-client relationship existed between Duffee and Defendants, Duffee 

failed to properly invoke the attorney-client privilege. As the party asserting the privilege, Duffee 

had the “burden of demonstrating [its] applicability.” Hodges, Grant & Kaufmann v. United States, 

768 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir. 1985). That is, Duffee was required to prove that the information 

requested was a confidential communication made to an attorney for the purpose of receiving legal 

advice or assistance in a legal proceeding. See United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 974 (5th 

Cir. 1997). 

Duffee, however, fails to reference a single specific communication with Davis or DavisSpencer, much less explain how any privilege applies to that communication. See Sedtal v. 

 

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 Duffee similarly argues that she is entitled to protection from deposition as a “former opposing counsel.” Dkt. 79 at 

3. But Duffy is not—nor has she ever been—opposing counsel in this case, rendering her reliance on Samurai Global, 

which concerned depositions of opposing counsel, misplaced. Furthermore, her conclusory request for protection 

based solely on her status as an attorney is devoid of “a particular and specific demonstration of facts,” and thus 

inadequate to establish entitlement to a protective order. See In re Terra Int’l, 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998). 

8

 In support of her assertion that the attorney-client privilege “attaches to communications even though the attorney is 

not subsequently hired,” Duffee cites In re Levien, No. 03-18-00079-CV, 2018 WL 2170825 (Tex. App.—Austin May 

11, 2018, orig. proceeding). Dkt. 79 at 3 n.2. Levien, however, applied New York—not Texas—privilege law. 

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Genuine Parts Co., No. CIV.A. 1:08-CV-413-T, 2009 WL 2216593, at *8 (E.D. Tex. July 23, 

2009) (failure to identify any specific document as privileged precludes invocation of the attorneyclient privilege). As the Fifth Circuit has held, such blanket assertions of the attorney-client 

privilege are inadequate. See Taylor Lohmeyer L. Firm P.L.L.C. v. United States, 957 F.3d 505, 

510 (5th Cir. 2020) (“the attorney-client privilege may not be tossed as a blanket over an 

undifferentiated group of documents” and must instead be “specifically asserted with respect to 

particular documents”). 

Even if an attorney-client relationship existed and Duffee properly asserted privilege, 

discovery would still be proper because Davis-Spencer waived any privilege as to her 

communications with Duffee concerning Davis’s legal efforts against Jones. Briefly, the attorneyclient privilege protects confidential communications between the attorney and her client for the 

purpose of obtaining legal advice. AdvoCare Int’l, LLC v. Smith, No. 4:22-CV-900-SDJ, 2023 WL 

8622980, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2023). “Disclosure of privileged communications to a third 

party,” however, “generally eliminates the confidentiality and serves to waive the privilege.” SB 

IP Holdings LLC v. Vivint Smart Home, Inc., No. 4:20-CV-00886, 2022 WL 19977100, at *3 (E.D. 

Tex. Aug. 18, 2022). Thus, the party invoking the privilege “must prove that waiver did not occur.” 

First Am. CoreLogic, Inc. v. Fiserv, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-132-TJW, 2010 WL 4975566, at *3 (E.D. 

Tex. Dec. 2, 2010). 

As explained, Davis-Spencer conveyed Duffee’s advice—i.e., that Davis would receive a 

“great payday” if she “threaten[ed]” Jones with a paternity action—to Anderson, a third party. See 

Ex. 1, App. 5. This disclosure waived privileged as to any statements made between Duffee and 

Davis-Spencer regarding Davis’s legal efforts against Jones. See In re Pequeno, 126 F. App’x 158, 

164 (5th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that the holder of the privilege “waives the privilege when they 

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disclose the substance of the privileged communication,” and holding that client’s disclosure of 

the “substance of his conversations” with counsel “waived whatever privileged he may have held 

over his statements”). 

C. Duffee must provide her privilege log. 

Duffee’s request that she be excused “from having to produce a privilege log,” Dkt. 79 at 

4, is insupportable. “If [a party] claims that any responsive documents are privileged,” as Duffee 

does here, that party “must file a privilege log in accordance with Rule 26(b)(5).” Dortch v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 4:18-CV-00452, 2020 WL 1289431, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2020) 

(emphasis added); see also G.K. v. D.M., No. CV 21-2242, 2024 WL 1198349, at *6 (E.D. La. 

Mar. 20, 2024) (Rule 26(b)(5)’s “use of the word ‘must’ indicates that production of a privilege 

log . . . is mandatory”). This Court has thus held that a party’s “failure to distinguish withheld or 

privileged documents on a privilege log . . . [is] an improper discovery tactic.” Whitehead v. United 

Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 1:20-CV-420, 2022 WL 2920415, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May 16, 2022), 

adopted by, 2022 WL 2918889 (E.D. Tex. July 22, 2022). 

Duffee cannot assert privilege as a basis to withhold evidence, while simultaneously 

refusing to provide information that would allow Jones to vet that privilege. Her request that the 

Court permit her to do so should be rejected. 

D. Duffee failed to show compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable or 

oppressive. 

As the party seeking to quash or modify a subpoena, Duffee was required to meet “the 

heavy burden of establishing that compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable and 

oppressive.” Hussey v. State Farm Lloyds Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 591, 596 (E.D. Tex. 2003). Duffee, 

however, fails to even acknowledge this burden and instead merely offers contrived arguments. 

For example, she complains that searching her emails for “every reference to someone named 

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Alexandra, Cynthia or Davis pulls up thousands of emails to review for privilege.” Dkt. 79 at 4. 

Yet Duffee appears to be burdening herself. She could easily narrow the number of hits by 

searching for Defendants’ (and their agents’) email addresses, rather than searching for broach 

terms like “Alexandra,” “Cynthia,” or “Davis.” Regardless, Duffee’s representation during the 

meet-and-confer that she had a privilege log obviates any alleged burden that she now claims. (See 

Ex. 5, App. 23–24) 

At bottom, Duffee’s minimal burden (if any) is vastly outweighed by Jones’s need for all 

evidence relating to how and when Duffee received confidential information in breach of the 

Settlement Agreement. Indeed, despite the evidence that Defendants communicated with Duffee 

regarding relevant matters, neither has produced a single communication with Duffee. Further, as 

the Court is aware, highly relevant evidence is missing or was deleted from Defendants’ devices.9

Thus, for significant swaths of breach evidence, Duffee may be the only source of that evidence. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, Counter-Plaintiff Jerral W. Jones respectfully requests that 

Lisa Duffee’s Amended Motion to Quash and Amended Request for Protection be denied, that she 

be ordered to produce all communications involving or concerning Defendants and their agents 

relating to Jones or the Settlement Agreement, and for such other and further relief, at law or in 

equity, to which he is justly entitled. 

 

 

9

 The parties are currently working to recover communications that were deleted from Defendants’ devices or 

otherwise uncover facts related to the deletion. Defendants have agreed to have their phones forensically imaged. 

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FOLSOM ADR PLLC 

/s/ David Folsom 

David Folsom 

State Bar No. 07210800 

david@folsomadr.com 

6002-B Summerfield Dr. 

Texarkana, TX 75503 

(903) 277-7303 

JACKSON WALKER LLP 

/s/Charles L. Babcock 

Charles L. Babcock 

State Bar No. 01479500 

cbabcock@jw.com 

Nancy W. Hamilton 

State Bar No. 11587925 

nhamilton@jw.com 

1401 McKinney Street 

Suite 1900 

Houston, TX 77010 

(713) 752-4210 

(713) 752-4221 - Fax 

David T. Moran 

State Bar No. 14419400 

dmoran@jw.com 

Edwin Buffmire 

State Bar No. 24078283 

ebuffmire@jw.com 

Cody Martinez 

State Bar No. 24102146 

cmartinez@jw.com 

2323 Ross Avenue 

Suite 600 

Dallas, TX 75201 

(214) 953-6000 

(214) 953-5822 – Fax 

ATTORNEYS FOR COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JERRAL W. JONES

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On April 19, 2024, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with the clerk of the 

court of the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Texas, using the electronic case filing system 

of the court. I hereby certify that I will serve all counsel and/or pro se parties of record 

electronically or by another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2). 

/s/ Edwin Buffmire 

Edwin Buffmire 

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