Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-667 | August 18, 2020 Page 1 of 8

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Samuel J. Dayton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Victoria V. Arrowood,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 18, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-667

Appeal from the Shelby Superior 

Court

The Honorable David N. Riggins, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

73D02-1905-F6-252

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Victoria Arrowood (“Arrowood”) pleaded guilty in Shelby Superior Court to 

Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, and the court sentenced her to 

545 days in community corrections, to be served on home detention. The State 

subsequently filed a petition to revoke Arrowood’s placement in community 

corrections. Following a hearing on the State’s petition, the trial court revoked 

Arrowood’s placement in community corrections and ordered her to serve the 
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remainder of her sentence in incarceration. Arrowood appeals and presents one 

issue, which we restate as whether her counsel’s performance at the revocation 

hearing effectively denied her the right to counsel as guaranteed by Article 1, 

Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. Because the revocation of probation or 

placement in community corrections is civil, not criminal, in nature, Article 1, 

Section 13 is inapplicable. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Arrowood was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for a traffic infraction 

in Shelby County. During the traffic stop, law enforcement found her in 

possession of methamphetamine and two syringes.1 The State charged 

Arrowood on May 30, 2019 with Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a 

syringe and Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine. On June 12, 2019, 

Arrowood agreed to plead guilty to the charge of possession of 

methamphetamine in exchange for the State dismissing the other count. The 

trial court accepted the plea agreement on September 16, 2019, and sentenced 

Arrowood to 545 days in community corrections, to be served on home 

detention. 

[3] On January 27, 2020, the State filed a petition to revoke Arrowood’s placement 

in community corrections, alleging that she had violated the terms of her 

1 At the time of the traffic stop, Arrowood faced pending charges of possession of methamphetamine in 

nearby Henry County.
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placement by testing positive for methamphetamine, morphine, fentanyl, and 

cannabinoids. The trial court held a hearing on the State’s revocation petition 

on February 27, 2020. Arrowood failed to appear in person but was represented 

by counsel.2

[4] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked Arrowood’s placement 

in community corrections and ordered her to serve the balance of her sentence 

in incarceration. Arrowood now appeals. 

Standard of Review

[5] Arrowood argues that, pursuant to Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana 

Constitution, she had a right to the effective assistance of counsel at the 

revocation hearing. This is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. 

Neff, 117 N.E.3d 1263, 1267 (Ind. 2019) (noting that a question involving the 

meaning of the Indiana Constitution is a question of law that appellate courts 

review de novo). 

Discussion and Decision

[6] We first note that, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution, a probationer does not have a right to counsel at a probation 

revocation hearing. Jordan v. State, 60 N.E.3d 1062, 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)

2 After the hearing finished, Arrowood appeared in person at the trial court. She and the court engaged in a 

brief discussion, which revealed that Arrowood had telephoned the court and stated that her car had broken 

down. The court acknowledged this and stated that it had delayed the hearing by over a half hour but went 

ahead with the hearing when Arrowood did not appear after a reasonable delay. 
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(citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781–82 (1973)). By extension, this 

would also hold true in proceedings for revocation of placement in community 

corrections. See Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 n.6 (Ind. 1999) (holding that 

“appellate review procedures, due process requirements, and evidentiary rules 

for probation revocation and community corrections placement revocation 

hearings are the same.”). Recognizing this, Arrowood makes no argument that 

the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies at placement revocation 

hearings.

[7] Although a probationer has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a 

revocation hearing, Indiana Code § 35-38-2-3(f) provides that a probationer in a 

revocation hearing is entitled to representation by counsel. See Jordan, 60 

N.E.3d at 1068. In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at a 

revocation hearing, we apply a less-rigorous “due process” standard: “If counsel 

appeared and represented the petitioner in a procedurally fair setting which 

resulted in judgment of the court, it is not necessary to judge his performance by 

rigorous standards.” Id. (citing Childers v. State, 656 N.E.2d 514, 517 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1995), trans. denied; Baum v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1200, 1201 (Ind.1989)). 

[8] To avoid application of this less-rigorous standard, Arrowood argues the right 

to counsel guaranteed by Article 1, Section 13 applies at revocation hearings, 

noting that the Indiana Constitution provides a broader guarantee than the 

Sixth Amendment. She also argues that the two-part Strickland test should apply 

to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Article 1, Section 13 and 
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that, under this test, her revocation counsel was constitutionally ineffective.3

We are unpersuaded. 

[9] We agree with Arrowood that the right to counsel guaranteed by Article 1, 

Section 13 is broader than that provided by the Sixth Amendment. For 

example, the Sixth Amendment requires the assistance of counsel only at all 

critical stages of the prosecution. Barnett v. State, 83 N.E.3d 93, 104 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2017) (citing Hopper v. State, 957 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ind. 2011)), trans. 

denied. In contrast, Article 1, Section 13 applies to “every stage of [a criminal]

proceeding[].” Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 125 N.E.2d 773, 776 (1920). Thus, 

“Indiana’s constitutional right—contrary to the Sixth Amendment—can attach 

‘prior to the filing of formal charges against the defendant[.]’” Jewell v. State, 957 

N.E.2d 625, 634 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Hall v. State, 870 N.E.2d 449, 460 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied). But this does not mean that Article 1, Section 13

applies in revocation proceedings. 

[10] Indeed, the language of Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution

provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to 

be heard by himself and counsel[.]” (emphasis added). It is well settled that 

proceedings to revoke either probation or placement in community corrections 

are civil proceedings, not criminal prosecutions. See McQueen v. State, 862 

3 When addressing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under either the Sixth Amendment or Article 1, 

Section 13, our courts have applied the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

See, e.g., Shaw v. State, 898 N.E.2d 465, 467–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (applying Strickland test to claim of 

ineffective assistance brought under both the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13), trans. denied.
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N.E.2d 1237, 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 551) (noting 

civil nature of community correction revocation proceedings); Jordan, 60 

N.E.3d at 1068 (noting civil nature of probation revocation proceedings). Thus, 

“‘probationers do not receive the same constitutional rights that defendants 

receive at trial.’” Jordan, 60 N.E.3d at 1068 (quoting Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 

438, 440 (Ind. 2007)). Because revocation hearings are civil in nature, the right 

to counsel in criminal proceedings guaranteed by Article 1, Section 13 of the 

Indiana Constitution simply does not apply.

[11] We find support for our conclusion in Baum, 533 N.E.2d at 1201, in which our 

supreme court held that the right to counsel guaranteed by Article 1, Section 13

does not apply in post-conviction proceedings, which, like revocation 

proceedings, are civil in nature. We read Baum as holding that Article 1, 

Section 13 simply does not apply to non-criminal proceedings, whether they be 

post-conviction proceedings or revocation proceedings. 

[12] Arrowood, nevertheless claims that Article 1, Section 13 does provide a right to 

counsel at revocation hearings, citing Vicory v. State, 802 N.E.2d 426 (Ind. 

2004). In that case, our supreme court held that a probationer has a right to 

allocution at a probation revocation hearing. Id. at 429. Our supreme court’s 

decision in Vicory was, as the court later put it, “informed by Article 1, Section 

13 of the Indiana Constitution,” which guarantees the right to be heard “‘by 

himself and counsel.’” Biddinger v. State, 868 N.E.2d 407, 412 (Ind. 2007)

(quoting Ind. Const., art. 1, § 13). Essentially, Arrowood argues that, if the right 
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to allocution is extended to probation revocation proceedings, then so should 

the right to counsel.

[13] We do not read Vicory as holding that Article 1, Section 13 extends to 

revocation hearings. Had the Vicory court intended to make such a profound 

statement, we believe it would have done so clearly, not by mere implication. 

Indeed, the supreme court later noted that its holding in Vicory was merely 

“informed” by the right to be heard by oneself under Article 1, Section 13; it did 

not hold that the right to allocution was guaranteed by Article 1, Section 13. 

Biddinger, 868 N.E.2d at 412. It certainly did not hold that the right to counsel 

extended to revocation hearings. 

[14] Accordingly, we decline to hold that the right to counsel at all criminal 

prosecutions, as guaranteed by Article 1, Section 13, extends to revocation 

hearings, which are civil, not criminal, in nature. Instead, revocation 

proceedings, like post-conviction proceedings, are governed by principles of due 

process. See Baum, 533 N.E.2d at 1201 (“We therefore apply a lesser standard 

responsive more to the due course of law or due process of law principles which 

are at the heart of the civil post-conviction remedy.”); see also A.M. v. State, 134 

N.E.3d 361, 366–67 (Ind. 2019) (holding that Sixth Amendment Strickland

standard did not apply in juvenile disposition-modification hearings). 

Conclusion

[15] Under the more lenient due-process standard set forth in Jordan and Baum, it is 

apparent that Arrowood was not denied her right to counsel, as “counsel 
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appeared and represented the [probationer] in a procedurally fair setting which 

resulted in judgment of the court[.]” 60 N.E.3d at 1069 (quoting Childers, 656 

N.E.2d at 517) (citing Baum, 533 N.E.2d at 1201). 

[16] For all these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

[17] Affirmed. 

Bradford, C.J., and Najam, J., concur.