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MARIAN PIKULA v. DEPARTMENT OF

SOCIAL SERVICES

(SC 19533)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Robinson, Js.

Argued January 25—officially released May 10, 2016

J. Colin Heffernan, with whom, on the brief, was

John C. Heffernan, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Patrick B. Kwanashie, assistant attorney general,

with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney

general, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The plaintiff, Marian Pikula, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her

appeal from the decision of an administrative hearing

officer for the defendant, the Department of Social Services (department),1 denying her application for benefits under the state administered Medicaid program

(Medicaid)2 because her assets, in the form of a testamentary trust, exceeded prescribed Medicaid limits. We

conclude that the trial court should not have dismissed

the appeal on the ground that the hearing officer correctly determined that the trust was an asset available

to the plaintiff. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment

of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts, as found by the trial

court, are relevant to this appeal. ‘‘In 1989, John Pikula,

the plaintiff’s father, executed a will containing a testamentary trust for his two daughters: Dorothy McKee

and the plaintiff. When John Pikula died in 1991, the

trust became effective and the Probate Court appointed

a trustee.’’

The testamentary language creating the trust provided as follows: ‘‘A. Until [the plaintiff] shall die, the

[t]rustee shall pay to or spend on behalf of [the plaintiff]

as much of the net income derived from this trust fund

as the [t]rustee may deem advisable to provide properly

for [her] maintenance and support and may incorporate

any income not so distributed into the principal of the

fund at the option of the [t]rustee.

‘‘B. I hereby authorize and empower the [t]rustee in

his sole and absolute discretion at any time and from

time to time to disburse from the principal for any of

the trust estates created under this [will], even to the

point of completely exhausting the same, such amount

as he may deem advisable to provide adequately and

properly forthe support and maintenance of the current

income beneficiaries thereof, any expenses incurred

by reason of illness and disability. In determining the

amount of principal to be so disbursed, the [t]rustee

shall take into consideration any other income or property which such income beneficiary may have from

any other source, and the [t]rustee’s discretion shall be

conclusive as to the advisability of any such disbursement and the same shall not be questioned by anyone.

For all sums so distributed, the [t]rustee shall have

full acquittance.’’

In March, 2012, the plaintiff entered a long-term care

facility. At that time, she applied for financial and medical assistance under Medicaid. At the time she applied

for Medicaid benefits, the trust value was approximately $169,745.91.In May, 2013, the department denied

the plaintiff’s application for Medicaid benefits on the

ground that her assets, including the trust, exceeded

the relevant asset limits.
The plaintiff then requested a hearing to contest the

department’s decision. The hearing occurred in October, 2013. Thereafter, on December 20, 2013, the hearing

officer issued a decision upholding the department’s

denial of the plaintiff’s Medicaid benefits because the

trust was an asset that was available to her and, therefore, her assets exceeded the regulatory limits.

The plaintiff subsequently requested reconsideration

of the decision pursuant to General Statutes § 4-181a

(a) (1) (A). Her motion was denied. Pursuant to General

Statutes §§ 17b-61 and 4-183, the plaintiff appealed from

the hearing officer’s decision to the Superior Court.

In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that,

under the terms of the department’s policy manual and

applicable case law, the trust assets are not available

to the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that,

under the terms of the trust, the assets of the trust are

not available to her because she is not entitled to receive

trust principal and the trustee has sole and absolute

discretion regarding trust expenditures and his decisions cannot be challenged by anyone.3 The trial court

rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal,

concluding that the hearing officer properly determined

that the trust in this case was an available asset and that,

therefore, the plaintiff’s assets disqualified her from

Medicaid eligibility.

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment

of dismissal to the Appellate Court. Thereafter, we

transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General

Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the

trial court improperly upheld the hearing officer’s conclusion that the trust was an asset available to the

plaintiff as defined by relevant Medicaid regulations.

Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the testator

intended to create a discretionary, supplemental needs

trust, the assets of which should not be considered

available for Medicaid purposes. The department, however, contends that the testamentary language indicates

that the testator intended the trust to provide for the

plaintiff’s general support, in which case it would constitute an asset available to the plaintiff. We agree with

the plaintiff that the testator intended to create a discretionary, supplemental needs trust and, therefore, we

further agree that the trust corpus and income may not

be considered to be available to the plaintiff for the

purpose of determining eligibility for Medicaid benefits.

We begin by setting forth our applicable standard of

review. Resolution of this issue requires us to determine

whether the hearing officer properly construed the

terms of the trust instrument. ‘‘The construction of a

will presents a question of law . . . . Canaan National

Bank v. Peters, 217 Conn. 330, 335, 586 A.2d 562 (1991).

As we previously have stated . . . [c]onclusions of law
reached by the administrative agency must stand if the

court determines that they resulted from a correct application ofthe law to the facts found and could reasonably

and logically follow from such facts. . . . Board of

Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 266 Conn. 492, 504, [832 A.2d 660] (2003).’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.)Corcoran v. Dept. of

Social Services, 271 Conn. 679, 698, 859 A.2d 533 (2004).

Given the nature of the plaintiff’s claim, namely, that

the trial court improperly upheld the hearing officer’s

determination that the trust in the present case was a

general needs trust for the purpose of eligibility for

Medicaid benefits, ‘‘[o]ur analysis begins with an overview of the [M]edicaid program. The program, which

was established in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act and is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.([M]edicaid act), is a joint federal-state venture providing

financial assistance to persons whose income and

resources are inadequate to meet the costs of, among

other things, medically necessary nursing facility care.

. . . The federal government shares the costs of [M]edicaid with those states that elect to participate in the

program, and, in return, the states are required to comply with requirements imposed by the [M]edicaid act

and by the [S]ecretary of the Department of Health and

Human Services. . . . Specifically, participating states

are required to develop a plan, approved by the [S]ecretary of [H]ealth and [H]uman [S]ervices, containing reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for

and the extent of medical assistance to be provided.

. . .

‘‘Connecticut has elected to participate in the [M]edicaid program and has assigned to the department the

task of administering the program. . . . Pursuant to

General Statutes §§ 17b-262 and 17b-10, the department

has developed Connecticut’s state [M]edicaid plan and

has promulgated regulations that govern its administration. . . .

‘‘The [M]edicaid act requires that a state’s [M]edicaid

plan make medical assistance available to qualified individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) (10). The term medical

assistance means payment of part or all of the cost of

. . . care and services . . . [including] nursing facility

services . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (a); see Catanzano

v. Wing, 103 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 1996). Participating

states are required to provide coverage to certain

groups and are given the option to extend coverage to

various other groups. The line between mandatory and

optional coverage primarily is drawn in 42 U.S.C.

§ 1396a (a) (10) (A): mandatory coverage is specified

in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) (10) (A) (i); and optional coverage is set forth in subsection (a) (10) (A)(ii). In [M]edicaid parlance, individuals who qualify for [M]edicaid

benefits pursuant to those subsections are referred to

as the categorically needy because, in general, they are
eligible for financial assistance under Titles IV-A (Aid

to Families with Dependent Children) or XVI (Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled) of the Social Security Act.

‘‘Under the [M]edicaid act, states have an additional

option of providing medical assistance to the medically

needy—persons who . . . lack the ability to pay for

their medical expenses but do not qualify as categorically needy solely because their income exceeds the

income eligibility requirements of the applicable categorical assistance program. . . . The medically needy

become eligible for [M]edicaid, if the state elects to

cover them, by incurring medical expenses in an

amount sufficient to reduce their incomes below the

income eligibility level set by the state in its [M]edicaid

plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) (17) (in determining

eligibility, state must take costs . . . incurred for medical care into account); see also 42 C.F.R. § 435.301.

Only when they spend down the amount by which their

income exceeds that level, are [medically needy persons] in roughly the same position as [categorically

needy] persons . . . [because then] any further expenditures for medical expenses . . . would have to come

from funds required for basic necessities. Atkins v.

Rivera, [477 U.S. 154, 158, 106 S. Ct. 2456, 91 L. Ed.

2d 131 (1986)]. Connecticut has chosen to cover the

medically needy. . . .

‘‘The [M]edicaid act, furthermore, requires participating states to set reasonable standards for assessing an

individual’s income and resources in determining eligibility for, and the extent of, medical assistance under

the program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) (17) . . . . The

resources standard set forth in Connecticut’s state

[M]edicaid plan for categorically needy and medically

needy individuals is $1600. General Statutes §§ 17b-264

and 17b-80 (c); [Dept. of Social Services, Uniform Policy

Manual] § 4005.10 . . . . Consequently, a person who

has available resources; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) (17)

(B); in excess of $1600 is not eligible to receive benefits

under the Connecticut [M]edicaid program even though

the person’s medical expenses cause his or her income

to fall below the income eligibility standard. . . .

Ahern v. Thomas, 248 Conn. 708, 713–16, 733 A.2d 756

(1999).’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Palomba-Bourke v. Commissioner of Social

Services, 312 Conn. 196, 203–206, 92 A.3d 932 (2014).

This court has stated that, ‘‘[u]nder applicable federal

law, only assets actually available to a medical assistance recipient may be considered by the state in

determining eligibility for public assistance programs

such as [Medicaid]. . . . A state may not, in administering the eligibility requirements of its public assistance

program . . . presume the availability of assets not

actually available . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis

omitted.) Zeoli v. Commissioner of Social Services, 179
Conn. 83, 94, 425 A.2d 553 (1979). This principal ‘‘has

served primarily to prevent the [s]tates from conjuring

fictional sources of income and resources by imputing

financial support from persons who have no obligation

to furnish it or by overvaluing assets in a manner that

attributes nonexistent resources to recipients.’’ Heckler

v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 200, 105 S. Ct. 1138, 84 L. Ed.

2d 138 (1985).

To resolve the issue on appeal, we must determine

whether the assets in the testamentary trust were available to the plaintiff. ‘‘For the purposes of determining

eligibility for the Medicaid program, an available asset

is one that is actually available to the applicant or one

that the applicant has the legal right, authority or power

to obtain or to have applied for the applicant’s general

or medical support. If the terms of a trust provide for

the support of an applicant, the refusal of a trustee to

make a distribution from the trust does not render the

trust an unavailable asset.’’ General Statutes (Supp.

2016) § 17b-261 (c).4 For Medicaid purposes, general

support trusts are considered available because a beneficiary can compel distribution of the trust income. See

General Statutes § 52-321. In other words, the beneficiary has a ‘‘legal right . . . to obtain’’ the funds. See

General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 17b-261 (c).Conversely,

supplemental needs trusts, in which a trustee retains

unfettered discretion to withhold the income, are not

considered available to the beneficiary. Connecticut

Bank & Trust Co. v. Hurlbutt, 157 Conn. 315, 327, 254

A.2d 460 (1968) (spendthrift trust not open to alienation

or assignment by anyone until income paid over to

beneficiary); Bridgeport-City Trust Co. v. Beach, 119

Conn. 131, 141, 174 A. 308 (1934) (beneficiary may not

alienate or assign interest of spendthrift trust).

‘‘It is well settled that in the construction of a testamentary trust, the expressed intent of the testator must

control. This intent is to be determined from reading the

instrument as a whole in the light of the circumstances

surrounding the testator when the instrument was executed, including the condition of his estate, his relations

to his family and beneficiaries and their situation and

condition. Gimbel v. Bernard F. & Alva B. Gimbel

Foundation, Inc., 166 Conn. 21, 26, 347 A.2d 81 (1974).

Therefore, in determining whether the assets of a testamentary trust are available to a beneficiary, this court

considers whether the testator intended to create a

supplemental needs trust or a general support trust.

See Zeoli v. Commissioner of Social Services, supra,

179 Conn. 91–92.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Corcoran v. Dept. of Social Services, supra, 271

Conn. 700.

‘‘A trust which creates a fund for the benefit of

another, secures it against the beneficiary’s own

improvidence, and places it beyond the reach of his

creditors is a spendthrift trust. Carter v. Brownell, 95
Conn. 216, 223, 111 A. 182 [1920]. Section 52-321 . . .

provides that trust fund income is not subject to the

claims of creditors of the beneficiary if the trustee is

granted the power to accumulate or withhold trust

income orif the income has been expressly given forthe

support of the beneficiary or his family. See Cromwell v.

Converse, 108 Conn. 412, 424–25, 143 A. 416 [1928]

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Zeoli v. Commissioner of

Social Services, supra, 179 Conn. 88; see also

Restatement (Third), Trusts § 58 (2003) (‘‘[i]f the terms

of a trust provide that a beneficial interest shall not be

transferable by the beneficiary or subject to claims of

the beneficiary’s creditors, the restraint on voluntary

and involuntary alienation of the interest is valid’’).

Accordingly, to resolve the issue on appeal, we must

determine whether John Pikula intended to create a

supplemental needs trust or a general support trust. In

making this determination, we agree with both parties

and the trial court that prior case law from this court

provides the appropriate framework within which to

examine this issue. Specifically, Zeoli v. Commissioner

of Social Services, supra, 179 Conn. 83, and Corcoran

v. Dept. of Social Services, supra, 271 Conn. 679, guide

our analysis of this issue.

First, in Zeoli v. Commissioner of Social Services,

supra, 179 Conn. 84–88, this court concluded that the

testator intended to create a supplemental needs trust

for the plaintiffs, his two disabled daughters.5

In doing

so, this courtrecognized that ‘‘[t]o determine the discretionary powers provided, it is necessary to ascertain

the dispositive intention as expressed by the language

of the entire will in the light of the circumstances surrounding the testator when the instrument was executed, including the condition of his estate, his relations

to his family and beneficiaries and their situation and

condition.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 89;

see also Rosa v. Palmer, 177 Conn. 10, 13, 411 A.2d

12 (1978); Gimbel v. Bernard F. & Alva B. Gimbel

Foundation,Inc., supra, 166 Conn. 26; Colonial Bank &

Trust Co. v. Stevens, 164 Conn. 31, 37, 316 A.2d 768

(1972); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Lyman, 148

Conn. 273, 279, 170 A.2d 130 (1961). On the basis of

these principles, this court concluded that ‘‘the testator’s intent was to provide the trustee with sufficient

flexibility to use the funds under the trust solely for

supplemental support. Both the surrounding circumstances and the language of the will militate in favor

of this interpretation. The trust established by [the testator’s] will clearly recognizes the obvious incapacity of

his daughters to care for themselves. As the amount

held under trust, approximately one-half of his entire

estate, indicates, the [testator] was a person of modest

means. Presumably, the funds under the trust would

not provide for general support of his daughters in an

institution for much more than a few months. Moreover,

at the time of the will’s execution and at the time of
the testator’s death, the daughters were not receiving

medical assistance payments and the testator could not

know if and how soon such benefits would become

available.’’(Footnotes omitted.) Zeoli v. Commissioner

of Social Services, supra, 90.

This court further explained that ‘‘[t]he trust grants

the trustee in express terms the power both to discriminate totally against either of the beneficiaries by withholding all income and to disregard funds that might

be available to either of the beneficiaries. On the other

hand, in precatory language, the trust provides that the

trustee apply ‘the net income or principal of the trust

for the maintenance, support, education, health and

general welfare of those of my daughters who my

[t]rustee believes would benefit most from a share of

the income of this trust after considering the income

of the beneficiaries from other sources.’

‘‘In granting the trustee the ability to discriminate

against either of the beneficiaries as well as to consider

other sources of funds available to the beneficiaries,

the testator reveals an intent to provide for only the

supplementary support of his daughters. The combination of express and precatory terms in the will attempts

to grant the trustee flexibility to provide the support

that would benefit either of the beneficiaries the most,

that is, imposing on the trustee the legal duty to furnish

only supplementary support. If the testator had desired

to create a trust for general support, it would have been

simple to do so and no discriminatory provision would

have been necessary or desirable.’’ (Footnote omitted.)

Id., 90–91. On the basis of the terms of the trust, this

court concluded that the testator had intended to create

a supplemental needs trust and that those assets were

not available to the daughters for the purpose of

determining their eligibility for Medicaid benefits. Id.,

97.

In 2004, this court again confronted whether a trust

was available for the purpose of Medicaid eligibility in

Corcoran v. Dept. of Social Services, supra, 271 Conn.

679. In Corcoran, this court acknowledged that the testamentary language reflective of the testator’s intent in

Corcoran was markedly different than that used in

Zeoli. Id., 701. Specifically, this court explained that

‘‘[i]n Zeoli, the trust instrument was replete with references to the ‘absolute and uncontrolled discretion’

afforded the [trustee] in [his] decision-making process.

. . . In addition to the overt references to the unfettered discretion of the [trustee], the court in Zeoli

deemed the provision authorizing the trustee to discriminate among the beneficiaries when making distributions highly probative of the vast level of discretion the

testator intended to confer on the trustee.’’ (Citation

omitted.)Id. This courtthen compared the testamentary

language in Corcoran, explaining that ‘‘the testator

granted the trustees ‘sole discretion’ to make distribu-
tions and provided them with factors to consider when

making ‘discretionary distributions . . . .’ This language is not as strong as that used in Zeoli and suggests

that the testator in the present case intended to confer

a lesser amount of discretion.’’ (Footnote omitted.)

Id., 701–702.

This court furtherreasoned as follows: ‘‘The principal

distinction between Zeoli and [Corcoran], however, is

the manner in which the respective testators expressed

their intentions regarding the use of the trust funds. In

Zeoli, after establishing the trust, the testator provided

in his will that it [was his] fond hope that [his] trustee

pay or apply the net income or principal of the trust

for the maintenance, support, education, health and

general welfare of [the beneficiaries] . . . . [In Zeoli,

the] court interpreted this to mean that [t]he combination of express and precatory terms in the will attempts

to grant the trustee flexibility to provide the support

that would benefit either of the [daughters] the most,

that is, imposing on the trustee the legal duty to furnish

only supplementary support.’’ (Citation omitted;

emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 702. This court, however, found the testamentary

language in Corcoran to be distinguishable from that

in Zeoli. Id. In Corcoran, the testator created the trust

with the following language: ‘‘If [the plaintiff] is then

living, the trust established for her shall be retained by

my trustees to hold, manage, invest and reinvest said

share as a [t]rust [f]und, paying to or expending for the

benefit of [the plaintiff] so much of the net income and

principal of said [t]rust as the [t]rustees, in their sole

discretion, shall deem proper for her health, support in

reasonable comfort, best interests and welfare . . . .’’

(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 703. This court relied on the fact that the trustees

did not have absolute discretion, instead their sole discretion was ‘‘limited by the ascertainable standard of

the plaintiff’s ‘health, support in reasonable comfort,

best interests and welfare . . . .’ ’’ Id. On the basis of

these distinctions, this court concluded that the testamentary trust in Corcoran did not display the testamentary intent to provide only for the plaintiff’s

supplemental needs and, therefore, was a general needs

trust available to the plaintiff. Id.

These cases provide a framework for considering the

language of the trust in the present case. Specifically, in

Zeoli and Corcoran, this court identified and examined

several factors that are useful in determining whether a

particular testamentary trust is intended to be a general

needs trust or a supplemental needs trust—namely, the

amount and nature of the trustee’s discretion with

regards to trust income and principal, any limitations

or guiding principles within which the trustee must

operate, and the factual circumstances regarding the

establishment of the trust, including the amount of

the trust.
With these factors in mind, we examine the language

of the testamentary trust in the present case. The relevant portions of the testamentary trust in the present

case provides as follows: ‘‘I give, devise and bequeath

all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real,

personal and mixed, of whatever nature and wheresoever situated, including all property that I may acquire

or become entitled to after the execution of this will

to [the trustee] in trust, nevertheless . . . for the benefit of . . . [the plaintiff] . . . and [McKee] . . . . Said

[t]rustee shall hold, manage and control all of the aforesaid property as a trust estate with all of the rights and

powers subject to limitations herein enumerated for

the following uses and purposes:

‘‘A. Until [the plaintiff] shall die, the [t]rustee shall

pay to or spend on behalf of [the plaintiff] as much

of the net income derived from this trust fund as the

[t]rustee may deem advisable to provide properly for

[her] maintenance and support and may incorporate

any income not so distributed into the principal of the

fund at the option of the [t]rustee.

‘‘B. I hereby authorize and empower the [t]rustee in

his sole and absolute discretion at any time and from

time to time to disburse from the principal for any of

the trust estates created under this [will], even to the

point of completely exhausting the same, such amount

as he may deem advisable to provide adequately and

properly forthe support and maintenance of the current

income beneficiaries thereof, any expenses incurred

by reason of illness and disability. In determining the

amount of principal to be so disbursed, the [t]rustee

shall take into consideration any other income or property which such income beneficiary may have from

any other source, and the [t]rustee’s discretion shall be

conclusive as to the advisability of any such disbursement and the same shall not be questioned by anyone.

For all sums so distributed, the [t]rustee shall have

full acquittance.’’

First, the language set forth previously in this opinion

indicates that the trustee in the present case need only

use as much income from the trust ‘‘as the [t]rustee

may deem advisable’’ to the plaintiff. The testamentary

language further provides that any unused income may

be returned to the trust principal. Although the language

in the present case indicates that the trustee may use

the net income for the maintenance and support of the

plaintiff, the fact that the trustee is only required to use

as much income as he ‘‘may deem advisable’’ to provide

for such maintenance, indicates that the testator

intended for the trustee to have complete discretion in

determining what, if any, of the income was to be used

for the plaintiff’s maintenance. Furthermore, the fact

that the trust provides that any unused income may be

returned to the principal of the trust indicates that the

testator did not intend to provide for the general needs
of the plaintiff. The trust was only valued at approximately $169,745, therefore, it is unlikely that the income

of the trust would have been significant enough to provide for the plaintiff’s maintenance at the time the testator executed his will in 1989 or when the trust was

established in 1991.

Furthermore, the testamentary language in the present case provides that the trustee has ‘‘sole and absolute

discretion’’ to make disbursements from the principal

of the trust. The trust further provides that the trustee’s

discretion ‘‘shall be conclusive as to the advisability

of any such disbursement and the same shall not be

questioned by anyone.’’ Furthermore, the trust provides

a release from liability for the trustee regarding any

distributions of principal. On the basis of the foregoing,

it is clear that no person can compel the trustee to

disburse any principal to the plaintiff. We conclude that

the language regarding the discretion of the trustee in

the present case is analogous to the language providing

absolute and sole discretion to the trustee in Zeoli.

Next, we examine whether the trust in the present

case contains any limitations or guiding principles

within which the trustee must operate. In the present

case, the trust mentions ‘‘support’’ and ‘‘maintenance’’

in both the section providing for expenditure of the

income and the section addressing disbursement of

principal. Nevertheless, in each of these sections the

‘‘support’’ and ‘‘maintenance’’ language is followed or

preceded by language allowing the trustee broad discretion to do so only if he deems it advisable. Unlike the

language of the trust in Corcoran, nothing in the present

trust mentions a standard by which the trustee shall

make the expenditures or distribution. In Corcoran,

this court relied on language that the trustees shall

‘‘hold, manage, invest and reinvest said share as a [t]rust

[f]und, paying to or expending for the benefit of [the

plaintiff] so much of the net income and principal of

said [t]rust as the [t]rustees, in their sole discretion,

shall deem proper for her health, support in reasonable

comfort, best interests and welfare . . . .’’ (Emphasis

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Corcoran

v. Dept. of Social Services, supra, 271 Conn. 703. This

court reasoned that the language of the trust in Corcoran acted as a limitation on the discretion of the trustees

because it provided a standard within which the trustees must operate in making expenditures. Id.

On the other hand, the language of the trust in Zeoli,

provided that ‘‘[w]ithout in any way limiting the absolute discretion of my [t]rustee, it is my fond hope that

my trustee pay or apply the net income or principal of

the trust for the maintenance, support, education,

health and general welfare of those of my daughters

who my [t]rustee believes would benefit most from a

share of the income of this trust after considering the

income of the beneficiaries from other sources.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Zeoli v. Commissioner

of Social Services, supra, 179 Conn. 87 n.2. This court

concluded in Zeoli that ‘‘[t]he combination of express

and precatory terms in the will attempts to grant the

trustee flexibility to provide the support that would

benefit either of the beneficiaries the most, that is,

imposing on the trustee the legal duty to furnish only

supplementary support.’’ Id., 91. We conclude that the

language in the present case is more similar to that

language in Zeoli and provides that the trustee is

required to provide only supplemental support.

We next considerthe factual circumstances regarding

the establishment of the trust, including the amount of

the trust. In Zeoli, this court considered the fact that

the testator’s estate was a modest $9500 in 1975. Id.,

85. This court reasoned that, because the beneficiary

had a mental impairment that required institutionalization, the modest trust assets would be exhausted

quickly if it was treated as a general needs trust. Id., 90.

This court reasoned that these factual circumstances

weighed in favor of understanding that the testator did

not intend for the trust to be a general support trust.

Id. In Corcoran, however, this court concluded that the

testator intended to create a general support trust with

a significantly larger estate—approximately $854,307.

Corcoran v. Dept. of Social Services, supra, 271

Conn. 682.

In the present case, the testator had a relatively small

estate. Indeed, the trust assets in the present case consisted mainly of the plaintiff’s primary residence, the

testator’s home. In March, 2012, after the home was

sold, the trust assets totaled $169,745.91. Much like the

situation in Zeoli, the assets of the present trust would

be quickly exhausted if they were applied to the

expenses related to the plaintiff’s impairment for which

she has sought residential placement. Accordingly, we

conclude that the factual circumstances surrounding

the establishment of the trust in the present case further

bolster our conclusion that it is a supplemental

needs trust.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the

trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal

from the decision of the hearing officer determining

that the trust in the present case is a general support

trust and that, therefore, the assets are available to

the plaintiff. Instead, we conclude that the trust in the

present case is a supplemental needs trust and that,

therefore, the assets are not available to the plaintiff

for the purpose of determining eligibility for Medicaid benefits.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

to the trial court with direction to render judgment

sustaining the plaintiff’s appeal.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 We note that the Commissioner of Social Services acts on behalf of the
department. For the sake of simplicity, references in this opinion to the

department include the Commissioner of Social Services.

2

‘‘Medicaid is a federal program that provides health care funding for

needy persons through cost-sharing with states electing to participate in

the program.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Corcoran v. Dept. of

Social Services, 271 Conn. 679, 683 n.4, 859 A.2d 533 (2004).

3

In her complaint, the plaintiff also alleged that the hearing officer was

barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from determining that the trust

was a ‘‘general support trust’’ or that the assets were ‘‘available’’ to the

plaintiff because the Probate Court had previously decided that the trust

was a supplemental needs trust and that the plaintiff could not force the

trustee to make any distributions. The trial court determined that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar the hearing officer from determining

that the trust was a general needs trust for the purpose of determining the

plaintiff’s eligibility for Medicaid benefits. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts

that the trial court improperly determined that the hearing officer was not

collaterally estopped from determining that the trust was a general needs

trust. Because we conclude that the trial court improperly upheld the hearing

officer’s conclusion that the trust was a general needs trust and available

to the plaintiff, we need not reach the issue of collateral estoppel.

4 We note that § 17b-261 has been amended by our legislature since the

events underlying the present appeal. See, e.g., Public Acts 2015, No. 15-69,

§ 17. These amendments are not, however, relevant to the present appeal.

For the sake of simplicity, all references to § 17b-261 in this opinion are to

the version appearing in the 2016 supplement to the General Statutes.

5 The language of the trust in Zeoli provided as follows: ‘‘All of the rest,

residue and remainder of my property and estate, real, person or mixed, of

whatsoeverthe same may consist and wheresoeverthe same may be situated,

all of which is hereinafterreferred to as my residuary estate, shall be disposed

of as follows:

‘‘(a) I give, devise and bequeath one-half . . . of my residuary estate unto

my son . . . to be his absolutely and forever;

‘‘(b) I give, devise and bequeath one-half . . . of my residuary estate to

my [t]rustee hereinafter named in trust [nevertheless], to hold in a single

trust for and until the death of the survivor of my daughters, to invest and

reinvest the principal of such trust and to dispose of the net income and

principal thereof as follows:

‘‘To pay or apply so much of the net income or the principal of such trust

to or among either one or both of my daughters as shall be living from time

to time during the term of such trust, and in such proportions and amounts

as my [t]rustee shall determine in his absolute and uncontrolled discretion.

Such amounts of net income or principal may be paid or applied without

regard to equality of distribution and regardless of whether any one of my

daughters may be totally deprived of any benefit hereunder. My [t]rustee,

in exercising his absolute and uncontrolled discretion, shall not be required

to consider the amount of income from other sources of any beneficiary or

the amount of any beneficiary’s independent property or the extent to which

any beneficiary may be entitled to support by a parent or any other person.

The judgment of my [t]rustee as to the allocation of the net income or

principal of this trust among the beneficiaries shall be final and conclusive

upon all interested persons and upon making such payments or application

my [t]rustee shall be fully released and discharged from all further liability

or accountability therefor. My trustee shall not be required to distribute any

net income of such trust currently and may, in his absolute and uncontrolled

discretion, accumulate any part or all of the net income of such trust,

which such accumulated net income shall be available for distribution to

the beneficiaries as aforesaid.

‘‘Without in any way limiting the absolute discretion of my [t]rustee, it is

my fond hope that my trustee pay or apply the net income or principal of

the trust for the maintenance, support, education, health and general welfare

of those of my daughters who my [t]rustee believes would benefit most

from a share of the income of this trust after considering the income of the

beneficiaries from other sources.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zeoli

v. Commissioner of Social Services, supra, 179 Conn. 86–87 n.2.