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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

December 30, 2014 

V No. 317324 

Wayne Circuit Court 

DALE FREEMAN, LC No. 13-000447-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and SAAD and HOEKSTRA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 A jury convicted defendant of violating MCL 750.316(1)(b), MCL 750.110a(2), MCL 

750.413, and MCL 750.529. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 On December 7, 2011, defendant and his half-brother, Mercedes Flemister, embarked on 

a crime spree in Detroit. First, they stole a minivan. They then robbed a woman, at gunpoint, at 

a gas station. Finally, while looking for other victims, they saw a lone man walking down the 

street to work. Defendant and Flemister abducted the man and forced him to take them to his 

home. After arriving at his house, Flemister went inside with the victim, while defendant 

remained in the stolen car.1 In the course of the robbery, Flemister shot and killed the victim. 

 The prosecution subsequently charged defendant with first-degree felony murder, MCL 

750.316(1)(b), first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), unlawfully driving away an 

automobile, MCL 750.413, and two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529.2

 Among other 

things, defendant argued that he was merely present at the crime scenes and did not aid or abet 

Flemister in committing the offenses—an argument that the jury did not find credible. 

 

1

 Gunshot wounds from an altercation rendered defendant paraplegic, but obviously, did not 

impair his zeal for criminal activity. 

2

 Flemister was also accused of the above offenses, and was tried together with defendant. 
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 At trial, over defendant’s objections, multiple witnesses testified to past robberies 

committed by defendant that involved the use of vehicles and firearms. Prior to hearing 

testimony on defendant’s other crimes, the trial court instructed the jury to “be very careful only 

to consider” the evidence of other crimes, “for certain purposes” such as the “plan, system, or 

characteristic scheme [defendant] had used before.” The court further stated: 

You must not consider this evidence for any other purpose. For example, you 

must not decide that it shows that the defendants are bad people or that they are 

likely to commit crimes. 

You must not convict the defendant here just because you think that he is guilty of 

other bad conduct. All of the evidence must convince you beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendants committed the alleged crimes here, or you must find 

them not guilty. 

 The jury convicted defendant of the charges mentioned above, and the trial court 

sentenced him to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the felony-murder conviction, 60 to 

100 years each for the robbery convictions, 10 to 20 years for home invasion conviction, and 

three to five years for the driving away conviction. 

 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it: (1) admitted evidence of 

other crimes committed by defendant in violation of MRE 404(b); and (2) sentenced him for his 

armed robbery conviction outside of the sentencing guidelines without explaining its departure. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 A trial court’s decision on whether to admit evidence of other bad acts is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. People v Kahley, 277 Mich App 182, 184; 744 NW2d 194 (2007). “A trial 

court abuses its discretion when it fails to select a principled outcome from a range of reasonable 

and principled outcomes.” Id. 

The proper application of the statutory sentencing guidelines is a question of law that is 

reviewed de novo. People v Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 436; 636 NW2d 127 (2001). However, 

defendant did not make a motion for resentencing in the trial court, or ask our Court to remand 

the issue, and it is accordingly unpreserved. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 

NW2d 130 (1999). Unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. 

Id. at 763. Where plain error is shown, the reviewing court should reverse only when the 

defendant is actually innocent or the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.

III. ANALYSIS 

A. MRE 404(B) 

 MRE 404(b) mandates that: 
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(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, 

or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the 

conduct at issue in the case. 

 Accordingly, evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if it is: (1) offered to prove 

“something other than a character or propensity theory”3

; (2) relevant; and (3) its probative value 

is not “substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under MRE 403.” People v Knox, 469 Mich 

502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). 

 Relevant evidence is evidence that makes “a material fact at issue more probable or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 387; 582 

NW2d 785 (1998). Relevant evidence may be excluded if “its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . .” MRE 403 (emphasis added). “In [the] 

context [of MRE 403], prejudice means more than simply damage to the opponent’s cause. A 

party’s case is always damaged by evidence that the facts are contrary to his contentions, but that 

cannot be grounds for exclusion.” People v Vasher, 449 Mich 494, 501; 537 NW2d 168 (1995). 

“Rule 403 determinations are best left to a contemporaneous assessment of the presentation, 

credibility, and effect of testimony by the trial judge.” People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 462; 

751 NW2d 408 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Here, three witnesses testified as to other robberies defendant either committed or in 

which he was involved. The prosecution offered the testimony to show a “scheme, plan, or 

system” defendant used to rob his victims, and the testimony demonstrated that defendant did 

indeed have a “scheme, plan, or system” for his robberies, which he executed in the charged 

offenses. The incidents described in the testimony, which occurred both before and after 

defendant was rendered paraplegic, variously involved: (1) use of a motor vehicle to initiate an 

altercation that led to a robbery; (2) use of a motor vehicle to escape from a robbery; (3) 

firearms; (4) the threat of violence; (5) the actual use of violence; and (6) the presence of both 

defendant and Flemister. 

 This testimony was certainly relevant, because it tended to make “a material fact at 

issue”—whether defendant aided and abetted two armed robberies, one of which resulted in 

murder—“more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Crawford, 

458 Mich at 387. Nor was its probative value “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

 

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 Examples of valid uses of other acts evidence include other acts that show proof of “intent, 

preparation, scheme, plan, or system.” MRE 404(b). Evidence of “similar misconduct” is 

properly admissible because it “is logically relevant to show that the charged act occurred where 

the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to support an 

inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or system.” People v Sabin 

(After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 63; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). 
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prejudice . . .” MRE 403 (emphasis added). The fact that the witness testimony undermined 

defendant’s argument that he did not aid or abet the robberies does not make it “unfair”—it 

merely tended to show “that the facts [were] contrary to his contentions.” Vasher, 449 Mich at 

501. 

 In any event, as noted, the trial court handled the witness testimony with an abundance of 

caution, and issued a thorough preliminary instruction to the jury. “It is well established that 

jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 

NW2d 229 (1998). The instructions provided here mitigated any tendency of the other bad-acts 

evidence to cause defendant unfair prejudice. 

 Accordingly, the trial court properly admitted the witness testimony on defendant’s other 

crimes under MRE 404(b), and his arguments to the contrary have no merit. 

B. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 

 MCL 750.529 codifies the crime of armed robbery, and provides: 

A person who engages in conduct proscribed under [MCL 750.530] and who in 

the course of engaging in that conduct, possesses a dangerous weapon or an 

article used or fashioned in a manner to lead any person present to reasonably 

believe the article is a dangerous weapon, or who represents orally or otherwise 

that he or she is in possession of a dangerous weapon, is guilty of a felony

punishable by imprisonment for life or for any term of years. [Emphasis added.] 

 A criminal that commits first degree murder must serve a mandatory life sentence and is 

forever ineligible for parole,4

 and such mandatory, non-parolable life sentences are not governed 

by the sentencing guidelines. MCL 769.34(5). 

 Here, defendant unconvincingly argues that his sentence of 60 to 100 years for each of 

the armed robbery convictions under MCL 750.529 exceeded the recommended range under the 

sentencing guidelines, and demands that he be resentenced within the guidelines, or with an 

explanation of the reasons for the departure.5

 Defendant’s argument is based on the incorrect 

presumption that the sentencing guidelines apply to his sentence.6

 

4

 MCL 750.316(1). A limited exception exists if the criminal committed the murder before his 

eighteenth birthday. See MCL 769.25. 

5

 As noted, defendant did not object to his sentencing at the appropriate time, which renders this 

issue unpreserved. Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764. 

6

 Defendant offers no support for this presumption. “An appellant may not merely announce his 

position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims.” Houghton 

ex rel Johnson v Keller, 256 Mich App 336, 339; 662 NW2d 854 (2003). 
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 Because defendant must serve life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for his 

first-degree murder conviction, a concurrent lesser sentence will have no bearing on his actual 

term of incarceration. The sentence for murder has thus rendered defendant’s other sentences, 

including those for armed robbery, moot. See People v Rutherford, 208 Mich App 198, 204; 526 

NW2d 620 (1994). Because defendant cannot show that any error in this regard seriously 

affected his substantial rights, we decline to give this unpreserved issue further consideration. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Henry William Saad 

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra