COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 20, 2019

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2019AP1098 Cir. Ct. No. 2018TP26

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT II

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO E.W.P., A PERSON UNDER 

THE AGE OF 18:

V.A.,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

M.W.P.,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Kenosha County: 

DAVID P. WILK, Judge. Affirmed. 
No. 2019AP1098

2

¶1 GUNDRUM, J.1 M.W.P., E.W.P.’s biological father, appeals from 

an order of the circuit court terminating his parental rights to E.W.P. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

Background

¶2 V.A., E.W.P.’s mother, filed a petition to terminate M.W.P.’s 

parental rights to E.W.P. on the grounds of abandonment and failure to assume 

parental responsibility. M.W.P. entered a no contest admission on the 

abandonment ground, and the matter proceeded to the second phase of the 

termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings—the disposition phase—during 

which the circuit court considered whether it was in the best interests of E.W.P. to 

terminate M.W.P.’s parental rights. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court 

determined that it was. M.W.P. appeals.

Discussion

¶3 M.W.P. raises two issues on appeal. He asserts the circuit court 

erred in not dismissing V.A.’s petition to terminate his parental rights “after 

V.A.’s husband [M.A.] confronted the guardian ad litem during disposition 

[proceedings] and told him that he would have blood on his hands.” M.W.P. also 

contends the court erred by giving insufficient weight “to [this] misconduct of 

V.A.’s husband” and to the recommendation of the guardian ad litem (GAL) that

M.W.P.’s parental rights should not be terminated. He fails to persuade on either 

issue.

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2017-18). 

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 2019AP1098

3

¶4 In determining whether to terminate parental rights, a circuit court 

must decide whether termination is in the child’s best interests. See WIS. STAT.

§ 48.427; Dane Cty. DHS v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, ¶59, 346 Wis. 2d 396, 828 

N.W.2d 198 (“[T]he best interests of the child” is the “domina[nt]” and 

“paramount consideration” in the disposition phase of a termination proceeding.

(citation omitted)). To make this decision, the circuit court considers, but is not 

limited to, the following factors:

 (a) The likelihood of the child’s adoption after 

termination.

 (b) The age and health of the child, both at the time 

of the disposition and, if applicable, at the time the 

child was removed from the home.

 (c) Whether the child has substantial relationships 

with the parent or other family members, and whether it 

would be harmful to the child to sever these 

relationships.

 (d) The wishes of the child.

 (e) The duration of the separation of the parent from 

the child.

 (f) Whether the child will be able to enter into a 

more stable and permanent family relationship as a 

result of the termination, taking into account the 

conditions of the child’s current placement, the 

likelihood of future placements and the results of prior 

placements.

WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3). We will affirm the court’s decision to terminate parental 

rights unless the court erroneously exercised its discretion. See State v. 

Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶27, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475. 
No. 2019AP1098

4

Decision to Terminate M.W.P.’s Parental Rights to E.W.P.

¶5 Here, the circuit court considered each of these factors, and after 

weighing the evidence presented, determined that termination of M.W.P.’s 

parental rights was in E.W.P.’s best interests. As the evidence supported the 

court’s decision, the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion.

¶6 With regard to the likelihood of E.W.P.’s adoption after termination

of M.W.P.’s parental rights—the first statutory factor—evidence presented at the 

disposition hearing indicates V.A. is married to M.A.; M.A. treats E.W.P. as if 

E.W.P. is his son; M.A. is willing to adopt E.W.P. and E.W.P. wants M.A. to 

adopt him; and E.W.P. considers his sister A.P., V.A., M.A., and M.A.’s two 

children as his family. In consideration of this first statutory factor, the circuit 

court found it was likely E.W.P. would be adopted if M.W.P.’s parental rights 

were terminated. As shown, this finding is supported by evidence presented at the 

hearing.

¶7 Regarding the age and health of the child, the circuit court found that 

E.W.P. was eight, almost nine, years old at the time of the disposition hearing, and 

his health did not present an impediment to adoption.

¶8 The circuit court also considered whether E.W.P. had a substantial 

relationship with M.W.P. or M.W.P’s family members and whether it would be 

harmful to E.W.P. to sever any such relationship. On this factor, the court found 

that it was “undisputed that [E.W.P.] does not currently have substantial 

relationships” with M.W.P. or M.W.P.’s family members. This finding is 

supported by the evidence as M.W.P. admitted at the hearing that he did not have a 

substantial relationship with E.W.P., and V.A. and M.W.P. both testified that it 

had been several years since M.W.P.’s parents last saw E.W.P. Additionally, a
No. 2019AP1098

5

social worker testified that she interviewed E.W.P., and E.W.P. did not say 

anything about M.W.P.’s relatives and did not appear to have a substantial 

relationship with M.W.P. or M.W.P.’s family members. At the time of the 

disposition hearing, M.W.P. had been incarcerated for the prior four and one-half 

years of E.W.P.’s life, was expected to remain incarcerated until March 2021, and

had not had any form of contact with E.W.P. since 2016.

¶9 As to the wishes of the child, the circuit court found that E.W.P. 

“understands the distinction between his real siblings and siblings. He wants his 

siblings, as he understands them, to be his real siblings. He wants the person who 

he identifies as Dad to be his real dad. Those are actions evidencing his wishes.” 

This finding is supported by the testimony at the disposition hearing as the social 

worker and/or V.A. indicated that E.W.P. expressed he did not want to associate 

with M.W.P. when M.W.P. gets released from prison, he considers M.A. as his 

father, and he wants M.A. to adopt him.

¶10 With regard to the “duration of separation of the parent from the 

child,” the circuit court found that M.W.P. had been separated from E.W.P. for 

approximately three years, about one-third of E.W.P.’s life. The court further 

found that M.W.P. had been largely removed from E.W.P.’s life since M.W.P.’s 

incarceration. Evidence presented at the hearing supports these uncontested

findings.

¶11 On the question of whether E.W.P. would “be able to enter into a 

more stable and permanent family relationship as a result of the termination,” the 

circuit court found that if M.W.P.’s relationship with E.W.P. was “sever[ed],” 

M.A. could adopt E.W.P. and “the benefits of an adoption and the stability that 

would come from that outweigh any harm that would befall the child from 
No. 2019AP1098

6

severing of [the] insubstantial relationships” E.W.P. had with M.W.P. and his 

family members. The totality of the evidence presented, some of which is detailed 

above, supports the court’s determination in this regard. 

¶12 All this said, in the end, M.W.P. does not argue on appeal that any of 

these findings by the court are unsupported by the evidence. Instead, he argues as 

follows.

Failure to Dismiss Petition Due to Conduct of V.A.’s Husband

¶13 On the second day of the dispositional hearing, the GAL informed 

the circuit court that after the first day of the hearing the GAL was walking past 

V.A. and M.A. in the courthouse when M.A. approached the GAL and told the 

GAL he had “blood on [his] hands.”

2

 M.A. then “continued telling [the GAL] 

more verbal stuff.” The GAL “practically ignored” M.A. and informed counsel 

for both parties about this incident. The court asked the GAL on the second day if 

he could continue in his role as GAL, to which the GAL indicated he could. 

Counsel for M.W.P. asked the court to dismiss the petition to terminate M.W.P.’s 

parental rights because of this incident. The court denied the motion to dismiss.

¶14 M.W.P. contends on appeal that the circuit court erroneously 

exercised its discretion by not dismissing V.A.’s petition to terminate the parental 

rights of M.W.P. because M.A. effectively intimidated the GAL with M.A.’s

statement to the GAL that the GAL would have “blood on [his] hands.” M.W.P. is 

correct that we review for an erroneous exercise of discretion the court’s decision 

 

2

 At the hearing, counsel for M.W.P. told the court that the GAL “has let it be known 

that he is predisposed to denying the request for termination in this case, and that was well 

known” to V.A. and M.A. 
No. 2019AP1098

7

to grant or deny a motion to dismiss as a sanction, see Schultz v. Sykes, 2001 WI 

App 255, ¶8, 248 Wis. 2d 746, 638 N.W.2d 604 (“[I]t is well settled that we 

review a circuit court’s decision to impose sanctions, as well as the particular 

sanction it chooses, for an erroneous exercise of discretion.”), but his argument 

goes nowhere.

¶15 For legal support, M.W.P. relies solely upon Schultz, in which we 

approved of the circuit court’s dismissal of Schultz’s lawsuit based upon Schultz’s 

attempt to suborn perjury. Id., ¶14. In that case, we recognized that our supreme 

court has identified dismissal as “a harsh sanction” and that the court “has held 

that dismissal is proper only when the plaintiff has acted in bad faith or has 

engaged in egregious misconduct.” Id., ¶9 (emphasis added).

¶16 The conduct of which M.W.P. complains was conduct by M.A., not 

V.A. V.A., not M.A., is the petitioner and thus the party/“plaintiff” in this case. 

M.W.P. has identified no case in which our courts have approved of the “harsh 

sanction” of dismissal where the alleged wrongdoing was committed by a 

nonparty just because the nonparty may desire the same outcome as the 

plaintiff/petitioner. Furthermore, M.W.P. has not directed us to any evidence in 

the record, and we have not been able to find any, indicating V.A. engaged in any 

bad faith or egregious misconduct whatsoever, or that she even encouraged or in 

any way supported M.A.’s conduct of which M.W.P. complains. Thus, M.W.P. 

has provided us with no basis upon which to conclude the circuit court erred in 

declining to dismiss V.A.’s petition because of M.A.’s conduct.
No. 2019AP1098

8

Failure to Give Sufficient Weight to M.A.’s Misconduct and the GAL’s 

Recommendation

¶17 M.W.P. also asserts the circuit court erred by giving insufficient 

weight to the “misconduct” of M.A. and to the recommendation of the GAL with 

regard to terminating M.W.P.’s parental rights. The court did not err.

¶18 On this point, M.W.P. merely invites us to reweigh the evidence 

presented to the circuit court. He cites heavily to the recommendation of the GAL 

because the GAL indicated it is in the best interests of E.W.P. to not terminate 

M.W.P.’s parental rights. M.W.P. conclusorily asserts the court should have given 

more weight to the GAL’s recommendation and “the uncertainties about M.A. as 

an adoptive parent as exhibited by his litigation behavior.” However, the weight 

given to presented evidence is left largely to the fact finder, here the circuit court. 

See Jacobson v. American Tool Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 384, 390, 588 N.W.2d 67 (Ct.

App. 1998) (court of appeals “will accept the circuit court’s determination as to

weight and credibility” of the evidence). The court considered the appropriate 

statutory factors, as well as the GAL’s recommendation and M.A.’s “misconduct,”

and thereafter made a rational decision. To prevail on appeal, M.W.P. must 

demonstrate how the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion, not just that 

M.W.P. prefers a different result and views the evidence differently than the 

court.3 See Gaethke v. Pozder, 2017 WI App 38, ¶36, 376 Wis. 2d 448, 899 

N.W.2d 381 (It is an appellant’s burden to demonstrate that the circuit court 

 

3

 M.W.P. appears to make several “mini-arguments” throughout his appellate briefing. 

To the extent he makes such arguments, we are unpersuaded and do not address them as they are 

insufficiently developed and M.W.P. does not support them with legal authority. See State v. 

Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that “[w]e may 

decline to review issues inadequately briefed” and “[a]rguments unsupported by references to 

legal authority will not be considered”). 
No. 2019AP1098

9

erred.). M.W.P. fails to demonstrate that the court erroneously exercised its 

discretion.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)4.