30276 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 96 / Wednesday, May 18, 2022 / Notices 

embarrassed by some of my errors, and 

I take full responsibility. I regret these.’’ 

Id. The meaning of this portion of 

Applicant’s testimony is far from clear. 

First, it is impossible to determine to 

which question Applicant was 

responding ‘‘yes’’ given that the 

transcript shows that he was asked two 

different questions. Id. Second, 

Applicant stated that he is 

‘‘embarrassed’’ by ‘‘some’’ of his 

‘‘errors.’’ Id. Again, it is impossible to 

determine which of Applicant’s ‘‘errors’’ 

embarrass him because Applicant 

neither explained what he considers his 

‘‘errors’’ to be nor stated which subset 

of his ‘‘errors’’ embarrass him. Id. Third, 

Applicant’s testimony is not clear about 

what the subject of his taking ‘‘full 

responsibility’’ is. 

Further, in the context of his issuing 

controlled substance prescriptions with 

neither federal nor state authority, 

Applicant’s attempt to minimize his 

wrongdoing by distinguishing between 

‘‘narcotics’’ and the Schedule IV and 

Schedule V prescriptions he issued is 

troubling because the distinction is 

legally irrelevant. Tr. 390 (Applicant’s 

testimony that ‘‘it doesn’t seem 

unreasonable’’ for him to have been 

surprised that he had written ‘‘a [B]elviq 

or lower’’ when he had been thinking 

about ‘‘narcotics’’). The law does not 

distinguish among controlled 

substances’ schedules. It is unlawful to 

issue a prescription for any controlled 

substance without the requisite federal 

and state authority. 21 CFR 1306.03. In 

sum, the record evidence does not 

support my concluding that Applicant 

unequivocally accepts responsibility for 

issuing eleven controlled substance 

prescriptions when he did not have 

federal and state authority to do so. See 

also supra, section II.D. None of 

Applicant’s record evidence, including 

his testimony, convinces me that I can 

entrust him with a DEA registration by 

granting DEA registration application 

No. W18015986C. 

Also during his testimony, 

Applicant’s counsel asked him ‘‘with 

respect to the New Jersey consent order 

of temporary suspension’’ whether he 

‘‘accept[s] that . . . [he] is bound by that 

suspension.’’ Tr. 528. Applicant’s 

answer was ‘‘[y]es, absolutely. I was 

concerned by . . . comments [of 

Government counsel]. I accept 

responsibility; I’m an adult, and I want 

to do better.’’ Id. Again, I am not able 

to conclude from this testimony that 

Applicant accepts unequivocal 

responsibility and, if he does, for what. 

I also note that Applicant ‘‘denie[d] any 

and all wrongdoing’’ in the final 

Consent Order, thus indicating that he 

did not accept unequivocal 

responsibility for his NJMB-founded 

controlled substance-related violations. 

GX 4, at 2; see also supra, section II.D. 

In sum, Applicant did not 

unequivocally accept responsibility and 

has not convinced me that he can be 

entrusted with the registration he 

applied for in DEA registration 

application No. W18015986C. See also 

infra. 

The interests of specific and general 

deterrence weigh in favor of denial of 

Applicant’s DEA registration 

application No. W18015986C. Applicant 

issued eleven controlled substance 

prescriptions when he had neither 

federal nor state authority to do so, a 

violation at the core of the CSA. While 

Applicant is to be recognized for taking 

controlled substance-related and 

documentation/recordkeeping-related 

courses, his testimony in this 

proceeding has not convinced me that 

his future controlled substance 

prescribing, documentation, and 

recordkeeping will comply with legal 

requirements. 

Further, given the egregious nature of 

Applicant’s violations, including that he 

unlawfully wrote eleven controlled 

substance prescriptions for six different 

Schedule IV and Schedule V controlled 

substances, a sanction less than denial 

of Applicant’s DEA registration 

application No. W18015986C would 

send a message to the current and 

prospective registrant community that 

compliance with the law, including 

compliance with core controlledsubstance legal principles, is not a 

condition precedent to receiving and 

maintaining a DEA registration. 

Accordingly, I shall order the sanction 

the Government requested, as contained 

in the Order below. 

Order 

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the 

authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 

823(f), I hereby deny DEA registration 

application No. W18015986C submitted 

by Eric David Thomas, M.D. I further 

hereby deny any other pending 

application(s) of Eric David Thomas, 

M.D., for registration in Montana. This 

Order is effective June 17, 2022. 

Anne Milgram, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2022–10591 Filed 5–17–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 21–19] 

Michael T. Harris, M.D.; Decision and 

Order 

On May 20, 2021, a former Assistant 

Administrator, Diversion Control 

Division, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (hereinafter, DEA or 

Government) issued an Order to Show 

Cause (hereinafter, OSC), seeking to 

revoke the DEA Certificate of 

Registration, Control No. FH1510709, of 

Michael T. Harris, M.D. (hereinafter, 

Respondent) and deny any pending 

applications for renewal or modification 

of such registration, or for additional 

registrations, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(4). OSC, at 1. The Government 

alleges that Respondent’s continued 

registration is inconsistent with the 

public interest, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 

823(f). Id. 

A hearing was held before an 

Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter, 

ALJ) on October 12, 2021. The ALJ 

issued Recommended Rulings, Findings 

of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 

Decision of the Administrative Law 

Judge (hereinafter, Recommended 

Decision or RD), which recommended 

that I revoke Respondent’s registration 

and deny his pending application for 

renewal. RD, at 39. Respondent filed 

Exceptions to the RD on January 7, 

2021, and the Government filed its 

Response on January 28, 2022. 

I. Findings of Fact 

A. Witness Credibility 

The Government presented its case 

through the testimony of two witnesses, 

a DEA Diversion Investigator 

(hereinafter, DI), Tr. 16–58, 200–01, and 

Dr. L, a former colleague of Respondent, 

Tr. 60–80. The ALJ gave the DI and Dr. 

L’s testimonies full weight and credit. 

RD, at 7, 9. I adopt her summary of their 

testimonies and credibility 

determinations. Id. at 5–9. 

Respondent presented his case 

through two witnesses, Dr. R., who 

medically monitored Respondent’s drug 

rehabilitation, Tr. 80–144, and 

Respondent, Tr. 144–190. The ALJ gave 

little weight to Dr. R’s testimony— 

finding that Dr. R was a ‘‘combative and, 

at times, condescending witness,’’ who 

had a vested interest in Respondent 

retaining his DEA registration. RD, at 

13–14. I agree with the ALJ’s findings 

and adopt her credibility determination 

for Dr. R’s testimony. Id. 

I also agree with the ALJ’s credibility 

findings regarding Respondent’s 


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1Neither the Government nor Respondent 

introduced evidence of any action by the 

appropriate state entity. There is also no evidence 

on the record that Respondent has a criminal 

conviction related to controlled substances. 

Continued 

testimony. The ALJ found that 

Respondent presented as generally 

credible to the extent he recounted his 

efforts at rehabilitation from his 

substance abuse disorder. RD, at 18. But, 

as the ALJ pointed out, Respondent’s 

testimony was noteworthy for what it 

lacked—there was virtually no 

acknowledgement of the fraud 

Respondent committed or the numerous 

people he manipulated and harmed 

during the fraud. Id. at 18–19. The ALJ 

found, as a result, that ‘‘Respondent’s 

testimony sounded rehearsed and his 

demeanor and body language in 

testifying was nonchalant. His 

testimony and demeanor sent the 

message that, while he had a substance 

abuse problem, he had successfully 

engaged in a rehabilitation program and 

that should be an end to the inquiry.’’ 

Id. at 19. 

B. Respondent’s Fraudulent 

Prescriptions and Criminal Indictment 

Respondent is a Florida physician 

who holds a DEA registration to handle 

controlled substances in Schedules II–V. 

Stip. 6. From November 2015 through 

July 2016, Respondent issued twentyfour prescriptions for controlled 

substances using the DEA registration 

number of Dr. L. Tr. 27, GX 2. 

Respondent admitted that he did not 

have authorization or permission from 

Dr. L to issue the prescriptions using Dr. 

L’s DEA registration number. Tr. 27, 65– 

72, 149. Respondent obtained the 

prescriptions, some signed and some 

unsigned, from a lockbox at their joint 

practice. Tr. 26, 149, 153–54. 

Respondent used the prescriptions, 

forging Dr. L’s signature when 

necessary, to issue controlled substance 

prescriptions to himself and three 

family members. Id. Respondent filled 

the prescriptions for his personal use. 

Tr. 30, 191–92. Respondent deliberately 

filled prescriptions 30 days apart, 

rotated the names he used on the 

prescriptions, and rotated which 

pharmacy he would use in an effort to 

avoid detection. Tr. 88. 

Dr. L first learned of Respondent’s 

misuse of his prescription pad in 

August 2016. Tr. 74. Dr. L sent a letter 

to the Florida Board of Medicine stating 

that prescriptions were written under 

his name without his consent and 

confronted Respondent. Tr. 74–75. 

On October 15, 2019, Respondent was 

indicted in the Northern District of 

Florida on one count of fraudulent 

acquisition of controlled substances in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3) and 

(d)(1) and one count of unlawful use of 

another’s DEA registration in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7) and (b)(3)(A). 

Stip. 12. As of the date of the hearing 

for this matter, Respondent was 

participating in a pretrial diversion 

program scheduled to end December 25, 

2021. Tr. 178. 

The DI twice asked Respondent to 

voluntarily surrender his DEA 

registration, once after an interview 

with Respondent in April of 2017 and 

once after Respondent’s criminal 

indictment. Respondent declined both 

times. Tr. 31, 56–7. 

C. Respondent’s Rehabilitation 

After Respondent was confronted by 

Dr. L about the fraudulent prescriptions, 

Respondent’s wife, in conjunction with 

Dr. L, called the Florida Department of 

Health who referred them directly to the 

Professional Resources Network 

(hereinafter, PRN), which has a contract 

with the Florida Department of Health 

to ‘‘monitor physicians and nurses and 

other licensed practitioners in different 

fields for impairment issues.’’ Tr. 83, 

100, 157, 159, 186. Respondent began a 

rehabilitation program on August 27, 

2016, which he reports included 

inpatient detoxification, inpatient 

therapy, and constant monitoring. Tr. 

157–58, 162–64. According to 

Respondent, he was discharged 

pursuant to a PRN monitoring contract, 

under which he had a PRN social 

worker or ‘‘case manager’’ to whom he 

reported regularly; weekly PRN 

meetings for impaired professionals; a 

licensed psychologist to ensure 

compliance; mandatory Alcoholics 

Anonymous (AA) meetings; meetings 

with an addictionologist (Dr. R); 

marriage counseling; and random, but 

regular, drug testing. Tr. 169. He must 

also regularly check in with his case 

manager and his practice manager 

(another physician who reviews his 

prescriptions and submits quarterly 

reports to PRN). Tr. 172, 195. 

Respondent’s PRN contract was 

scheduled to terminate on December 19, 

2021. Tr. 168, 197. Once the contract 

ended, Respondent would no longer be 

required to participate in therapy or be 

subject to drug testing and practice 

monitoring. Tr. 197–98. When asked if 

he was planning on stopping all 

counseling and treatment at the 

expiration of the contract, Respondent 

replied that ‘‘there are several options 

that we considered, and that’s 

something I would discuss with my 

wife’’ but did definitively testify that he 

would return to AA meetings. Tr. 183– 

84 

II. Discussion 

Section 304(a) of the Controlled 

Substances Act (hereinafter, CSA) 

provides that ‘‘[a] registration . . . to 

. . . dispense a controlled substance 

. . . may be suspended or revoked by 

the Attorney General upon a finding 

that the registrant . . . has committed 

such acts as would render [its] 

registration under section 823 of this 

title inconsistent with the public 

interest as determined under such 

section.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a). In the case of 

a practitioner, the CSA requires the 

Agency consider the following factors in 

determining whether Respondent’s 

registration would be inconsistent with 

the public interest: 

(1) The recommendation of the appropriate 

State licensing board or professional 

disciplinary authority. 

(2) The [registrant’s] experience in 

dispensing, or conducting research with 

respect to controlled substances. 

(3) The [registrant’s] conviction record 

under Federal or State laws relating to the 

manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 

controlled substances. 

(4) Compliance with applicable State, 

Federal, or local laws relating to controlled 

substances. 

(5) Such other conduct which may threaten 

the public health and safety. 

21 U.S.C. 823(f). The DEA considers 

these public interest factors separately. 

Robert A. Leslie, M.D., 68 FR 15227, 

15230 (2003). Each factor is weighed on 

a case-by-case basis. Morall v. Drug Enf’t 

Admin., 412 F.3d 165, 173–74 (D.C. Cir. 

2005). Any one factor, or combination of 

factors, may be decisive. David H. Gillis, 

M.D., 58 FR 37507, 37508 (1993). 

The Government has the burden of 

proving that the requirements for 

revocation of a DEA registration in 21 

U.S.C. 824(a) are satisfied. 21 CFR 

1301.44(e). When the Government has 

met its prima facie case, the burden 

then shifts to the Respondent to show 

that revoking the registration would not 

be appropriate, given the totality of the 

facts and circumstances on the record. 

Med. Shoppe-Jonesborough, 73 FR 364, 

387 (2008). Having reviewed the record 

and the ALJ’s Recommended Decision, 

I agree with the ALJ that the 

Government has proven by substantial 

evidence that Respondent committed 

acts which render his continued 

registration inconsistent with the public 

interest. 

While I have considered all of the 

public interest factors, the Government’s 

case seeks the revocation of 

Respondent’s registration based 

primarily on conduct most aptly 

considered under Public Interest Factors 

2 and 4.1 2 Factors 2 and 4 are often 


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Accordingly, I find that Factors 1 and 3 do not 

weigh for or against revocation. See, e.g., Ajay S. 

Ahuja, M.D., 84 FR 5479, 5490 (2019); Dewey C. 

MacKay, M.D., 75 FR 49956, 49973 (2010), pet. for 

rev. denied, MacKay v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 664 F.3d 

808, 822 (10th Cir. 2011). 

2Respondent filed an exception to the ALJ’s 

finding that Factor 5 weighed neither for nor against 

Respondent. Exceptions, at 12–13. He argues the 

ALJ should have found that Factor 5 weighed in 

Respondent’s favor because ‘‘Respondent 

voluntarily accepted treatment [for his substance 

abuse disorder] and has remained steadfast in his 

commitment to completing his rehabilitation.’’ Id. 

Factor 5 analysis focuses on a registrant’s conduct 

that may threaten the public health and safety and 

that was not considered under the other public 

interest factors. 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(5). Respondent 

does not cite to any precedent for his argument that 

Factor 5 should weigh in favor of a registrant with 

a substance abuse disorder if that registrant has 

completed rehabilitation. I, therefore, reject 

Respondent’s exception. I will further consider 

Respondent’s rehabilitation in the Sanction section, 

as the ALJ did, as part of my determination of 

whether Respondent can be entrusted with a 

registration. 

analyzed together. See, e.g., Fred 

Samimi, M.D., 79 FR 18698, 18709 

(2014). Under Factor 2, the DEA 

analyzes a registrant’s ‘‘experience in 

dispensing . . . controlled substances.’’ 

21 U.S.C. 823(f)(2). Factor 2 analysis 

focuses on a registrant’s acts that are 

inconsistent with the public interest, 

rather than on a registrant’s neutral or 

positive acts and experience. Randall L. 

Wolff, M.D., 77 FR 5106, 5121 n.25 

(2012) (explaining that ‘‘every registrant 

can undoubtedly point to an extensive 

body of legitimate prescribing over the 

course of [the registrant’s] professional 

career’’). Similarly, under Factor 4, the 

DEA analyzes a registrant’s compliance 

with federal and state controlled 

substance laws. 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(4). 

Factor 4 analysis focuses on violations 

of state and federal laws and 

regulations. Volkman v. DEA, 567 F.3d 

215, 223–24 (6th Cir. 2009). 

Respondent clearly violated both 

federal and state law when he issued 

fraudulent prescriptions using Dr. L’s 

DEA registration number and, in some 

instances, with Dr. L’s forged signature. 

First, Respondent issued prescriptions 

for his own personal use to feed his 

addiction, not for a legitimate medical 

use. This violates 21 U.S.C. 844(a), 

which provides that: ‘‘[i]t shall be 

unlawful for any person knowingly or 

intentionally to possess a controlled 

substance unless such substance was 

obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid 

prescription or order, from a 

practitioner, while acting in the course 

of his professional practice.’’ 

Respondent’s actions also violate 

Florida law, which provides, consistent 

with the federal law, that 

[a] person may not be in actual or 

constructive possession of a controlled 

substance unless such controlled substance 

was lawfully obtained from a practitioner or 

pursuant to a valid prescription or order of 

a practitioner while acting in the course of 

his or her professional practice or to be in 

actual or constructive possession of a 

controlled substance except as otherwise 

authorized by this chapter. 

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 893.13(6)(a). 

Second, Respondent violated federal 

and state law when he used Dr. L’s DEA 

registration number to issue fraudulent 

prescriptions. It ‘‘shall be unlawful for 

any person knowingly or intentionally 

. . . to use for the purpose of acquiring 

or obtaining a controlled substance, a 

registration number which is . . . 

issued to another person.’’ 21 U.S.C. 

843(a)(2). Moreover, it ‘‘shall be 

unlawful for any person knowingly or 

intentionally . . . to acquire or obtain 

possession of a controlled substance by 

misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, 

deception, or subterfuge.’’ Id. at (a)(3). 

Again, Florida law has a similar 

provision. Fla. Stat. Ann. 

§ 893.13(7)(a)(9) (making it unlawful to 

‘‘acquire or obtain, or attempt to acquire 

or obtain, possession of a controlled 

substance by misrepresentation, fraud, 

forgery, deception, or subterfuge.’’). 

Accordingly, Factors 2 and 4 weigh in 

favor of revocation. 

III. Sanction 

Where, as here, the Government has 

met its prima facie burden of showing 

that a respondent’s continued 

registration is inconsistent with the 

public interest due to his violations 

pertaining to controlled substances, the 

burden shifts to the respondent to show 

why he can be entrusted with the 

responsibility carried by his registration. 

Garret Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR 

18882, 18910 (2018) (citing Samuel S. 

Jackson, 72 FR 23848, 23853 (2007)). 

DEA cases have repeatedly found that 

when a registrant has committed acts 

inconsistent with the public interest, 

‘‘the Respondent is required not only to 

accept responsibility for [the 

established] misconduct, but also to 

demonstrate what corrective measures 

[have been] undertaken to prevent the 

reoccurrence of similar acts.’’ Holiday 

CVS LLC dba CVS Pharmacy Nos 219 

and 5195, 77 FR 62316, 62339 (2012) 

(internal quotations omitted). The issue 

of trust is necessarily a fact-dependent 

determination based on the 

circumstances presented by the 

individual respondent; therefore, the 

Agency looks at factors, such as the 

acceptance of responsibility and the 

credibility of that acceptance as it 

relates to the probability of repeat 

violations or behavior and the nature of 

the misconduct that forms the basis for 

sanction, while also considering the 

Agency’s interest in deterring similar 

acts. See Arvinder Singh, M.D., 81 FR 

8247, 8248 (2016). 

I find, as the ALJ did, that Respondent 

has not unequivocally accepted 

responsibility for his misconduct. To 

begin, Respondent’s testimony and 

overarching case strategy makes clear 

that he believes entering a rehabilitation 

program constitutes acceptance of 

responsibility. Tr. 175 (Q: ‘‘Did you take 

responsibility for your actions,’’ A: 

‘‘Yes, I thought I had already showed 

that by going to rehab at that time.’’). 

While rehabilitation is an essential prerequisite for trusting a person with a 

substance use disorder with a 

registration, it does not address all of 

the misconduct here—the calculated 

fraud which involved a coherent 

strategy of deception achieved through 

the manipulation of multiple people 

and ended only because Respondent 

was caught. Cf. Noah David, P.A., 87 FR 

21665, 21173–74 (2022) (Registrant 

manipulated relationships and engaged 

in intentional deceit to unlawfully 

obtain controlled substances). 

Respondent was conspicuously silent 

on this aspect of the case, providing 

minimal details about the fraud, 

minimizing the scope of his misconduct 

by characterizing the fraud as ‘‘improper 

prescribing,’’ and primarily ignoring 

that he manipulated a series of people, 

stole pre-signed prescriptions, and 

forged Dr. L’s signature. RD, at 30. 

Respondent also violated his entrusted 

position as a DEA registrant by using his 

knowledge of the regulatory system to 

avoid detection, e.g., rotating the names 

on the prescriptions, rotating the 

pharmacies where he filled the 

prescriptions, and waiting thirty days 

before refilling a prescription. Id. at 30, 

36. 

Second, Respondent’s decision to 

seek rehabilitation was not entirely 

voluntary; he did so only after he knew 

Dr. L had reported him to authorities. 

Respondent’s attempt to characterize his 

rehabilitation efforts as voluntary 

further suggest that he has not truly 

accepted responsibility for his conduct, 

but is merely seeking to portray himself 

in the most favorable light in these 

proceedings. Id. at 30. 

When a registrant fails to make the 

threshold showing of acceptance of 

responsibility, the Agency need not 

address the registrant’s remedial 

measures. Ahuja, 84 FR at 5498 n.33; 

Daniel A. Glick, D.D.S., 80 FR 74800, 

74801, 74810 (2015); see also Jones 

Total Health Care Pharmacy, LLC, SND 

Healthcare, LLC, 881 F.3d 823, 833 

(11th Cir. 2018) (upholding DEA’s 

refusal to consider pharmacy’s remedial 

measures given lack of acceptance). But 


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3Respondent argues the ALJ did not give proper 

weight to his handling of controlled substances 

during the five years between the fraudulent 

prescriptions and the OSC. Exceptions, at 20–21. I 

agree with the ALJ that, while the record does not 

contain any evidence that Respondent has issued 

fraudulent prescriptions or tested positive for drugs 

since 2016 (an assertion for which he has provided 

no documentary support), I cannot conclude 

Respondent has learned from his mistakes and can 

be entrusted with a new registration because of his 

failure to acknowledge his fraud and the impact it 

had on those he manipulated and placed in legal 

jeopardy. RD, at 34. 

4 In his Exceptions, Respondent re-raises nine 

DEA cases he previously cited in his posthearing 

brief and cites to three additional cases, which, he 

argues, demonstrate revocation in this matter is 

improper. Exceptions, at 24–27. I disagree. As noted 

in the RD, clear Agency precedent requires full 

acceptance of responsibility, and Respondent has 

failed to demonstrate such acceptance. See RD, at 

38–39 (collecting cases). Imposing a sanction of 

revocation in this matter is consistent with recent 

agency decisions that have revoked registrations in 

matters where a registrant unlawfully obtained 

controlled substances for personal use and failed to 

accept full responsibility. See, e.g. David Mwebe, 

M.D., 85 FR 51065, 51068 (2020) (revoking 

registration based on fraudulent issuance of 

prescriptions for personal use); David W. Bailey, 

M.D., 81 FR 6045, 6047 (2016) (revoking registration 

of physician who issued controlled prescriptions in 

his wife’s name for personal use). For example, in 

Erica Grant, M.D., the Agency revoked the 

registration of a registrant with a substance abuse 

disorder because, while she had accepted 

responsibility for her unlawful use of controlled 

substances, her acceptance of responsibility did not 

cover all of the Agency’s charges against her. 86 FR 

40641, 40650 (2021); see also, Robert Wayne 

Locklear, M.D., 86 FR 33738, 33747–48 (2021). 

even if I were to consider Respondent’s 

remedial measures, they would not 

affect my ultimate decision in this 

matter. While I give Respondent credit 

for the rehabilitation he has pursued so 

far, it is significant that Respondent has 

never sustained his sobriety outside the 

context of a regulated drug program and 

has provided no documentary evidence 

corroborating his sobriety and remedial 

measures. I find it troubling that as of 

the date of the administrative hearing, 

he had no set plans for further treatment 

or other remedial measures once his 

PRN contract expired. Respondent’s 

remedial measures also dealt only with 

his drug addiction, and he provided no 

evidence of remedial measures with 

respect to his fraudulent scheme aside 

from taking general, required courses on 

proper prescribing. Tr. 193–94. Thus, 

Respondent’s remedial measures are 

inadequate given his lack of 

corroborating evidence of the measures 

he has already undertaken, his 

nonexistent plan for the future, and his 

failure to show any remedial measures 

related to his fraud.3

In addition to acceptance of 

responsibility, the Agency looks to the 

egregiousness and extent of the 

misconduct, Garrett Howard Smith, 

M.D., 83 FR at 18910 (collecting cases), 

and gives consideration to both specific 

and general deterrence when 

determining an appropriate sanction. 

Daniel A. Glick, D.D.S., 80 FR 74800, 

74810 (2015). Here, Respondent’s fraud 

was egregious—he perpetrated a 

calculated, sophisticated scheme, 

manipulating those who trusted him, 

and using his knowledge as a DEA 

registrant to evade detection. See Jana 

Marjenhoff, D.O., 80 FR 29067, 29095 

(2015). As for general deterrence, failing 

to impose a significant sanction against 

Respondent would send the wrong 

message to other registrants that the 

Agency does not take fraud seriously— 

especially a fraudulent scheme in which 

a registrant uses his knowledge of the 

controlled system of distribution to 

defeat it. Such a message would be 

inconsistent with past Agency 

precedent and the goals of the CSA. Id. 

As for specific deterrence, the 

‘‘Agency also looks to the nature of the 

crime in determining the likelihood of 

recidivism and the need for deterrence.’’ 

Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 FR 46968, 49973 

(2019). The Agency has previously 

found that criminal convictions and 

sanctions by state licensing authorities 

can sufficiently deter physicians from 

engaging in misconduct, making the 

revocation of a registration unnecessary 

to achieve specific deterrence. Kansky J. 

Delisma, M.D., 85 FR 23845, 23854 

(2020). Here, Respondent has not been 

criminally convicted and there is no 

evidence in the record that he has faced 

any sanctions by the state licensing 

authority. As a result, the interest of 

specific deterrence clearly favors the 

sanction of revocation. 

As discussed above, to avoid sanction 

when grounds for revocation exist, a 

respondent must convince the 

Administrator that he can be entrusted 

with a registration. I find that 

Respondent has not met this burden.4

Accordingly, I shall order the sanctions 

the Government requested, as contained 

in the Order below. 

Order 

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the 

authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 

824(a) and 21 U.S.C. 823(f), I hereby 

revoke DEA Certificate of Registration 

No. FH1510709 issued to Michael T. 

Harris, M.D. Pursuant to 28 CFR 

0.100(b) and the authority vested in me 

by 21 U.S.C. 823(f), I further hereby 

deny any pending application to renew 

or modify this registration, as well as 

any other pending applications of 

Michael T. Harris, M.D. This Order is 

effective June 17, 2022. 

Anne Milgram, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2022–10598 Filed 5–17–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS 

ADMINISTRATION 

[NARA–2022–041] 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities: Submission for OMB 

Review; Comment Request 

AGENCY: National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: We have submitted a request 

to the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for approval to continue to use 

a currently approved information 

collection. This information collection, 

OMB 3095–0037, covers requests for 

civilian service records from former 

Federal civilian employees or other 

authorized individuals—for information 

from, or copies of, documents in Official 

Personnel Files (OPF) or Employee 

Medical Files (EMF). We invite you to 

comment on this proposed information 

collection. 

DATES: OMB must receive written 

comments on or before June 17, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: Send any comments and 

recommendations on the proposed 

information collection in writing to 

www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain. 

You can find this particular information 

collection by selecting ‘‘Currently under 

30-day Review—Open for Public 

Comments’’ or by using the search 

function. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Tamee Fechhelm, Paperwork Reduction 

Act Officer, by email at 

tamee.fechhelm@nara.gov or by 

telephone at 301.837.1694 with any 

requests for additional information. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant 

to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(Pub. L. 104–13), we invite the public 

and other Federal agencies to comment 

on proposed information collections. 

We published a notice of proposed 

collection for this information collection 

on March 8, 2022 (87 FR 13011) and we 

received no comments. We are therefore 

submitting the described information 

collection to OMB for approval. 

If you have comments or suggestions, 

they should address one or more of the 

following points: (a) Whether the 

proposed information collection is 

necessary for NARA to properly perform 


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