Filed 8/28/20 In re M.P. CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBL I SHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re M

. P

. , et al

. , Person s Coming Under the Juvenile Cou rt Law. B 304442

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M

. G

. ,
Defendant and Appellant. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 17LJJP00167 )

APPEAL from findings and order s of t he Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Steven E. Ipson

, Judge Pro Tempore

. Affirmed.
Julie E. Braden

, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickh am, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy , Assistant County Counsel, and Jes sica S. Mitchell , Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Responden t.2 The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over minors M .P.
and I.P . after finding the ir parents have a history of domestic
violence. The court removed the children from their father’s

c ustody and released them to their mother. On appeal, the
children’s mother contends there is insufficient evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND M.G. ( Mother ) and Manuel P . (Father) have two chil dren together, M .P

. and I.P. In August 2019 , Mother called the police and reported an incident of domestic violence with Father. At the time, she was eight months pregnant with I.P. Mother told the responding police officers s he and Father
had been i n a relationship for four years, and they had lived together “on and off” during that time. They were not currently living together, and Mother had an emergency protective order against Father. Mother, however, agreed to let Father stay at
her home for a few hours because he was having issues at his
home. Two

- year

- old M .P. was with his maternal grandmother
and was not home at the time. At some point, Mother told Father to leave, which led to an argument. Father placed both his hands on Mother’s chest and pushed her. Mother fell backwards and hit her head against a door frame. Fearing for her safety, she ran out of the house and drove down the street, where she called the police. According to Mother, there had been prior incidents when Father pushed her
and thr e w items at her. The police arrested Father for domestic battery and violation of a protective order. Mother refused an emergency protective order against him.3 During the subsequent DCFS investigation, Mother repeatedly denied that she and F ather had ever had any sort of physical altercation. According to Mother, she called the police because she was mad at Father, and she fabricated the story that he pushed her to ensure the police responded. Mother said her decision to call the police was “childish.” It was also “childish” to obtain a protective order against Father, which she had tried to
have dissolved. Mother said Father “knows how to walk away,” is “sweet” to her, and is good with their children.
Mother has a long and significant child welfare history with DCFS and the juvenile court . Between 2011 and 2019, the court sustained multiple petitions related to her three other children, which included numerous allegations that she had an unresolved history of domestic violence with the ir father. Mother did not complete her court

- ordered programs and failed to reunify
with the children , who were in the process of being permanently placed with relatives and a foster parent

. Father denied to DCFS that he pushed Mother or that they
had a n abusive relationship . He claimed he and Mother got into an argument and she left when he started yelling. Father told DCFS he and Mother were “good parents” and “can sort this out.” Father was convicted of spousal battery in 2014. At the
time of the August 2019 incident, he was on parole for a different
offense

. His parole was subsequently revoked, and he served 60 days in jail . He was released with the condition that he have no
contact with Mother. According to Father’s parole officer

, Mother pr eviously
obtained a restraining order against Father, but it had expired. Father was also subject to a domestic violence restraining order that precluded him from having contact with a different woman

.4 DCFS filed a petition asserting M.P. and I.P. are persons described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j). 1 T he petition alleged Father’s violent conduct, and in particular the August 2019 domestic violence incident with Mother, placed the children at risk of

ser ious physical harm, damage, and danger. In response to DCFS’s intervention, both Father and
Mother enrolled in domestic violence courses. Although she had completed similar classes in the past, Mother said this time she was “taking it seriously” and le arning a lot. DCFS described Mother as receptive and willing to participate in services to address its concerns about the children’s safety. On February 20, 2020, t he juvenile court sustained the domestic violence allegations in the petition and found the children to be persons described by section 300, subdivision (b).
It dismissed the counts under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (j). The court declared the children dependents, removed them from Father’s custody, and ordered them released to Mother

. Mother timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Findings Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b). We disagree

. “ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings . . . , we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code , unless otherwise specifi ed.5

draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the
fin dings . . . of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” ( In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)
Under sect ion 300, subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a child when the child “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness” as a result of the failure of his or her paren t to “adequately supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) It is well established that exposure to domestic violence may serve as the basis of a jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (See In re R.C. (2012) 210
Cal.A pp.4th 930, 941; In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 576 , disapproved of on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th

989 .) “ Although ‘ the question under section 300 is whether
circumstanc es at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the
defined risk of harm ’ [citation], the court may nevertheless consider past events when determining whether a child presently needs the juvenile court ’ s protection. [Citations.] A parent ’ s past conduc t is a good predictor of future behavior .” ( In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 , italics omitted .) Here, there is sufficient evidence to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)

. The record shows that in August 2019

, Father for cefully pushed Mother into a doorframe following a verbal argument. The violence was severe enough
that Mother fled her home in fear before calling the police.
She also reported this was not the first time Father was violent
with her , as he had previousl y pushed her and thrown items at6

her. 2 Although there is no evidence that M .P. was present during any of this violence, Mother was eight months pregnant with I.P. during the August 2019 incident. Father’s violence against Mother, therefore, directly plac ed the unborn child at substantial risk of serious injury. (See In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 674 [domestic violence exposed unborn child to risk of serious injury].) There is also ample evidence from which the juvenile court
could conclud e it is likely M .P. and I.P. will be exposed to future
incidents of domestic violence. Although both parents participated in domestic violence program s , there is nothing in the record showing they gained meaningful insights into the risks
such violence po ses to their children or how to adequately protect
them from it in the future. Indeed, as of the jurisdiction hearing, both parents continued to deny that Father had ever used violence against Mother. The court could have reasonably concluded that, until Mother and Father acknowledge and
address Father’s past domestic violence , it is likely to recur. (See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.”].) Mother’s history of abusive relationshi ps provides further support for such a conclusion. Mother’s three other children were
removed from her custody in part because of domestic violence

, and she failed to reunify with them. Despite this, she maintained a relationship with Father, even after he was physically violent
with her . The violence was apparently severe enough tha t

2 The juvenile court found Father’s denial and Mother’s
recanta tion of these allegations not credible. We defer to the juvenile court’s findings on th ese issue s . (See In re R.T. , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 633 .)7

Mother obtained a restraining order against him. Nonetheless, she subsequently allowed him into her home while she was pregnant with I.P. Then, w hen Father used violence against her yet again, she refused a temporary protective order and repeatedly denied the incident even occurred. A lthough it appears Mother and Father had not had contact since the August

2019 incident, there is nothing in the record indicating either
in tended to end their relationship. From this, the juvenile court could have reasonably concluded Mother and Father w ould likely continue their abusive relationship, thereby placing the children
at substantial risk of serious harm. We reject Mother ’s sugg est ion that there wa s no reason to believe the domestic violence would continue given a condition of Father’s parole required he stay away from her. Mother
overlooks t hat Father previously violated the terms of his parole when he violently pushed her in A ugust 2019

. Given this history

, the juvenile court could have reasonably concluded the parole condition alone was not sufficient to protect the children.
II. The Juvenile Court Made the Requisite Findings to Assert Jurisdiction Over the Children
For the first time in her reply brief, Mother alternatively contends jurisdiction was improper because the court failed to
find the children were “at substantial risk” of harm. I nstead, at the jurisdiction hearing, it simply noted they were “at risk” of
harm

. Mother’s argument is untimely, and we may disregard it
on that basis

. (See In re Luke H. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1082,
1090 .) It also lacks merit. I mmediately after noting the children
were “ at risk,” the court found they were persons described by

sec tion 300, subdivision (b) . As relevant here, that subdivision requires “a substantial risk that the child will suffer [] serious8

physical harm or illness.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) We presume the

court was aware of this requirement when it made its finding

. In re Israel T. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 47 ( Israel T .) , is distinguishable. In that case, the juvenile court struck language
in a petition stating the children were at “ ‘ substantial ’ ” risk of harm, noting it did so to “ ‘ invite reversal at the Court o f Appeal. ’ ” ( Id . at p. 50.) The court then stated t he parents did

not pose “ ‘ any kind of risk to the children. ’ ” ( Ibid .) Here, the juvenile court did not strike any language in the petition related
to the section 300

, subdivision (b)(1) allegations; nor did it make any statements analogous to those made by the court in Israel T

. Instead, it is clear from the entire record that the court made the requisite findings to assert jurisdiction over the children

. DISPOSITION
The findings and orders are af firmed.

BIGELOW, P. J.
We concur:

GRIMES, J.

STRATTON, J.