This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2019 UT 62

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT 

OF SALT LAKE & SANDY,

Appellee,

v.

SHCH ALASKA TRUST, ANDREA A. OVESON,

ROCKY MOUNTAIN HOLDING TRUST,



Appellants.

No. 20171044

Filed October 16, 2019

On Direct Appeal

Fourth District, Heber

The Honorable Jennifer A. Brown

No. 130500126

Attorneys:

Shawn E. Draney, Scott H. Martin, Danica N. Cepernich, 

Salt Lake City, for appellee

Edwin C. Barnes, Perrin R. Love, Shannon K. Zollinger, 

Salt Lake City, Kay L. McIff, Richfield, for appellants

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court, in 

which ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE HIMONAS, JUSTICE 

PETERSEN, and JUDGE HAGEN joined.

Having recused himself, JUSTICE PEARCE does not participate herein; 

COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE DIANA HAGEN sat.

_____________________________________________________________



Jana Gunderson, Steven H. Ault, Connie Ault, and Max Zipline, 

LLC are also Appellants in this case.
METRO. WATER v. SHCH ALASKA

Opinion of the Court

2

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:

Introduction

¶1 The Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy 

(Metro) owns an easement across land owned by the SHCH Alaska 

Trust (Alaska).1 Under Utah’s easement case law, Metro’s status as 

an easement holder gives it a right to use Alaska’s property. And 

under that case law, neither Alaska nor Metro may unreasonably 

interfere with the other’s rights in the property. The district court 

found, however, that Metro’s status as a limited purpose local 

district of the State of Utah grants Metro additional authority—

authority beyond what is traditionally enjoyed by an easement 

holder—to impose restrictions on Alaska’s use of the property. In 

other words, the district court found that Metro has authority to 

impose land use restrictions on real property it does not own. We 

disagree.

¶2 Based on our interpretation of the relevant statutes, we hold 

that Metro’s authority over Alaska’s property does not extend 

beyond the authority it derives from its easement rights. 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment and remand the case to the district court for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

¶3 The district court also determined that Metro’s easement 

was 200 feet wide. This determination was based on a written 

description of the easement created by a civil engineer for the 

Federal Bureau of Reclamation in 1961. This too was error. Although 

the civil engineer’s written description may provide evidence of the 

scope of the easement, the court erred in concluding that it was 

dispositive. Accordingly, we also reverse the district court’s 

determination regarding the easement’s scope and remand for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Background

¶4 The dispute in this case arose after Alaska attempted to 

open a commercial zipline course on its property in Wasatch County. 

After applying for a conditional use permit from Wasatch County, 

_____________________________________________________________

1 SHCH Alaska Trust acquired the property in 2015, 

approximately three years after the dispute in this case arose. 

Because Alaska is the successor-in-interest to the litigation, we refer 

to all the appellants in this case as Alaska.
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Opinion of the Court

3

Alaska was informed by Metro that Metro had enacted regulations 

restricting Alaska’s use of Alaska’s property within the Salt Lake 

Aqueduct Corridor.

¶5 The Salt Lake Aqueduct Corridor is a forty-two mile area, 

stretching from the Deer Creek Reservoir to Salt Lake County, 

through which Metro operates a water pipeline. Although Metro 

owns some of the land within the Corridor, it has only easement 

rights for other portions of the Corridor. These easement rights allow 

Metro to enter onto the easement lands in order to operate and 

maintain the pipeline as needed. To protect Metro’s facilities and 

operations, Metro purported to enact regulations restricting certain 

uses of all land within the Corridor. Metro maintains that these 

restrictions apply to all land regardless of who owns that land.

¶6 Metro’s regulations prohibit fee owners from constructing 

buildings, structures, or other encumbrances, and from planting 

trees and vines, on their own land within the Corridor. Additionally, 

the regulations contain specifications regarding the types of fences 

allowed, as well as a list of items that cannot be stored on land 

within the Corridor. Finally, the regulations require fee owners to 

obtain licenses from Metro before conducting certain activities on the 

fee owners’ land. Pursuant to these regulations, Metro informed 

Alaska that Alaska was required to obtain a license before installing 

its commercial zipline course.

¶7 Although Alaska initially considered complying with 

Metro’s demands, it ultimately decided to proceed with its zipline

operation without obtaining Metro’s approval. Metro filed a 

complaint in the district court soon after, requesting a mandatory 

injunction requiring Alaska to comply with Metro’s regulations. 

Metro also requested, among other things, declaratory judgment 

regarding its property interests and regulatory authority in and over 

the property. Alaska responded with a counterclaim for declaratory 

judgment regarding its property interest.

¶8 Both parties subsequently filed motions for summary 

judgment. Alaska argued that Metro did not have an easement 

across Alaska’s property, and that, even if Metro did, Metro did not 

have authority, as an easement holder, to regulate Alaska’s use of 

that property. Metro, in contrast, argued it had regulatory authority, 

by statute, to regulate non-Metro property. After multiple hearings 

on these issues, the district court granted summary judgment in 

Metro’s favor. Title 17B of the Utah Code (Limited Purpose Local 

Districts Act or Act) governs the authority enjoyed by limited 

purpose local districts. The court found that, when “read together,” 
METRO. WATER v. SHCH ALASKA

Opinion of the Court

4

the provisions of the Act “confer upon [Metro] the authority to 

regulate private uses of its aqueduct corridors.” The court also found 

that Alaska, and Alaska’s predecessors in interest, had acquired the 

property subject to an easement 200 feet in width. The parties 

stipulated to a dismissal of the remaining claims in the case and 

Alaska appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 

section 78A-3-102(j).

Standard of Review

¶9 We are asked to review the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment. We review a grant of summary judgment for correctness, 

giving no deference to the district court, and we review the facts, and 

inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.2 As part of our review of the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment, we must review the court’s interpretation of 

a statute. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law we 

review for correctness.3

Analysis

¶10 Alaska raises two issues on appeal. First, it argues the 

district court erred in interpreting the provisions of Utah’s Limited 

Purpose Local Districts Act as authorizing Metro to enact legislation 

regulating Alaska’s use of Alaska’s property. Second, it argues the 

district court erred in determining that Alaska acquired the property 

at issue subject to Metro’s “200-foot” easement. Because no provision 

in the Act authorizes Metro to regulate Alaska’s use of Alaska’s 

property, Metro’s ability to restrict Alaska’s use of the property is 

limited to the ability to enforce the rights it derives from its 

easement. Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for a 

determination regarding Metro’s easement-based authority. And 

because the district court’s reliance on certain evidence regarding the 

scope of the easement was misplaced, we also remand for a new 

determination regarding the easement’s scope.

I. Metro Does Not Have Authority to Directly Regulate Alaska’s Use 

of Alaska’s Own Property

¶11 Alaska argues the district court’s summary judgment ruling 

was based on a misreading of the Limited Purpose Local Districts 

_____________________________________________________________

2 Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, ¶ 7, 48 P.3d 941.

3 Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. FPA W. Point, LLC, 2012 UT 79, ¶ 9, 304 

P.3d 810.
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Opinion of the Court

5

Act. The district court relied upon a number of provisions in the Act 

in determining that, when “[r]ead together,” the provisions of the 

Act “confer upon [Metro] the authority to regulate private uses of its 

aqueduct corridors,” even where a private party owns the land over 

which the Corridor passes. But the district court misinterpreted the 

provisions in the Act. Nothing in the Act grants Metro authority to 

enact legislation regulating the property rights of others. Instead, 

Metro’s authority to regulate property is restricted to property it 

owns, and, where that regulation intersects with the property rights 

of others, general property principles govern the parties’ respective 

property rights.

A. The plain language of the Limited Purpose Local Districts Act does not 

provide Metro with regulatory authority over the property

¶12 Under article XI, section 8 of the Utah Constitution, local 

districts may exercise only those powers provided by statute. So we 

must determine whether any provision in the Act confers authority 

on Metro to enact legislation regulating property it does not own.4

¶13 Before determining whether Metro has the regulatory 

authority it claims, we must define the nature of that authority. For 

this reason, we requested supplemental briefing from the parties 

regarding how the regulations at issue should be categorized. In 

their supplemental briefs, both parties agree the authority at issue 

here is legislative, rather than administrative, in nature. More 

specifically, Alaska categorizes the regulations as “land use 

regulations.” Metro, on the other hand, declines to characterize the 

nature of the regulations. Although Metro concedes the regulations 

govern uses of land, it argues “it is not necessary to put a specific 

_____________________________________________________________

4 See Basin Flying Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 531 P.2d 1303, 1305 

(Utah 1975) (“[I]t is well established that a regulatory body such as 

the Public Service Commission, which is created by and derives its 

powers and duties from statute, has no inherent regulatory powers, 

but only those which are expressly granted, or which are clearly 

implied as necessary to the discharge of the duties and 

responsibilities imposed upon it.”); see also Nadav Shoked, 

Quasi-Cities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1971, 1997–98 (2013) (defining a special 

district as a governmental entity lacking powers of regulation 

beyond its facilities, and explaining that regulatory powers “are 

antithetical to the special district as traditionally conceived in U.S. 

law”).
METRO. WATER v. SHCH ALASKA

Opinion of the Court

6

label on [the nature of] its Regulations.” In support, Metro points to 

a number of ordinances Salt Lake City has enacted governing land 

use in some way but that, according to Metro, do not fall within the 

category of a “land use regulation” as defined in the municipal land

use regulation act.5 But this argument fails because it overlooks a 

fundamental difference between the authority of Salt Lake City, a 

municipality, and Metro, a limited purpose local district.

¶14 As we explained above, under article XI, section 8, of the 

Utah Constitution, a limited purpose local district may exercise only 

those powers provided by statute. Under article XI, section 5, in 

contrast, a municipality is granted “the authority to exercise all 

powers relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt and enforce within 

its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations not in conflict 

with the general law.” Thus a municipal ordinance or regulation is 

constitutionally valid unless it conflicts with a law of the state. But a 

regulation of a local district is constitutionally valid only where the 

authority to enact the regulation has been specifically granted by 

statute. So even though it may not always be necessary to define the 

nature of a municipal regulation, we cannot rule on the validity of a 

local district’s regulation without first defining the nature of the 

authority necessary to enact it. 

¶15 The regulations at issue are properly characterized as land

use regulations. Through the regulations, Metro purports to govern 

how all land within the forty-two-mile Corridor may be used. The 

regulations prohibit the construction of buildings, structures, or 

other “encumbrances,” as well as the planting of trees and vines, 

within the Corridor. They also contain specifications regarding the 

types of fences allowed, as well as a list of items that cannot be 

stored on land within the Corridor. And the regulations require fee 

owners to obtain licenses from Metro before conducting certain 

activities on the fee owners’ land. Each of these restrictions “governs 

the use or development of land” and thus fits within the definition of 

a “land use regulation” provided in the city and county land use 

regulation acts.6 Accordingly, we must determine whether the 

_____________________________________________________________

5 See UTAH CODE § 10–9a–103 (defining “Land use regulation” as 

“a legislative decision enacted by ordinance, law, code, map, 

resolution, specification, fee, or rule that governs the use or 

development of land”).

6 Id.; id. § 17–27a–103.
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Opinion of the Court

7

Limited Purpose Local Districts Act grants Metro authority to enact 

land use regulations. We hold it does not.

¶16 When we interpret “the meaning of a statute we begin by 

analyzing the plain language.”7 “But we do not interpret the ‘plain 

meaning’ of a statutory term in isolation. Our task, instead, is to 

determine the meaning of the text given the relevant context of the 

statute (including, particularly, the structure and language of the 

statutory scheme).”8 “If the plain language is unambiguous then we 

need not look beyond it.”9 In this case, the district court erred in 

interpreting the Act because it based its interpretation of the Act on 

what it perceived to be the purpose of a few, isolated provisions, 

rather than on the meaning of a specific textual provision within the 

context of the Act as a whole.

¶17 In its summary judgment ruling, the district court cited four 

of the Act’s provisions in support of its determination that Metro 

had authority to regulate Alaska’s use of Alaska’s property.10 But the 

court did not support its assertion with analysis of the meaning of 

those provisions. Instead, it stated that when “read together” these 

provisions “confer upon [Metro] the authority to regulate private 

uses of its aqueduct corridors.” This was so, the court explained, 

because these provisions “reflect the understanding that in order for 

a local district, such as [Metro], to operate effectively, it must have 

the freedom to make its own rules and regulations and to establish 

some uniformity to what it does.”

¶18 On appeal, Metro defends the district court’s summary 

judgment ruling by citing five of the Act’s provisions (the four 

provisions cited by the district court plus one additional provision). 

But, like the district court, Metro fails to show that a specific 

provision grants it authority to regulate Alaska’s property. Instead, 

Metro argues that when “[t]aken together, these provisions clearly 

establish [its] authority to regulate . . . the terms on which it will and 

will not agree to allow private individuals to use [Metro’s] property, 

_____________________________________________________________

7 R & R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n,

2008 UT 80, ¶ 23, 199 P.3d 917.

8 Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 12, 248 P.3d 465.

9 R & R Indus. Park, 2008 UT 80, ¶ 23.

10 UTAH CODE §§ 17B-1-103(2)(q), -103(2)(t), -301(2)(i), 

and -301(2)(o).
METRO. WATER v. SHCH ALASKA

Opinion of the Court

8

including the fee owners of property over which [Metro] holds an 

easement.” But none of the cited provisions grant Metro such 

authority, either on their own or when read together. We examine 

each provision in turn.

1. Utah Code section 17B-1-103(2)(d)

¶19 The first provision cited by Metro is Utah Code section 

17B-1-103(2)(d), which grants Metro authority to “acquire or 

construct works, facilities, and improvements necessary or 

convenient to the full exercise of [Metro’s] powers, and operate, 

control, maintain, and use those works, facilities, and 

improvements.” Metro does not explain how section 103(2)(d) would 

authorize it to regulate Alaska’s property.11 And nothing in the 

language of this provision appears to provide such authority.

¶20 Section 103(2)(d) authorizes Metro to “operate, control, 

maintain, and use . . . works, facilities, and improvements” it has 

“acquire[d] or construct[ed].” But Alaska has not challenged Metro’s 

authority to use or maintain any “works, facilities, [or]

improvements” Metro has acquired. Instead, it has challenged 

Metro’s authority to regulate Alaska’s use of Alaska’s real property 

in a way that unlawfully expands Metro’s property interests. 

Because Alaska concedes that Metro has the right, through its 

easement, to enter the property as is necessary to “operate, control, 

maintain, and use” Metro’s pipeline, section 103(2)(d) is not at issue 

in this case.

2. Utah Code section 17B-1-103(2)(t)

¶21 Metro also argues that section 17B–1–103(2)(t) authorizes it 

to regulate Alaska’s use of Alaska’s property. Section 103(2)(t) states 

the following:

[U]pon the terms and for the consideration . . . [Metro 

may] agree:

(i)

(A) with another political subdivision of the state; 

or

_____________________________________________________________

11 The district court did not cite, and therefore did not rely on, 

this provision in its summary judgment ruling.
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Opinion of the Court

9

(B) with a public or private owner of property on 

which [Metro] has a right-of-way or adjacent to 

which [Metro] owns fee title to property; and

(ii) to allow the use of property:

(A) owned by [Metro]; or 

(B) on which [Metro] has a right-of-way.

The parties offer two, opposing interpretations of this provision: 

Alaska argues that it authorizes Metro to contract away its property 

rights or to contract for additional property rights; Metro argues that 

it gives Metro authority to permit (or to not permit) a fee owner to 

use his or her land if the land is burdened by a Metro-owned 

easement. We reject Metro’s argument because, when we consider 

the meaning of the term “right-of-way” in connection with the rest of 

the Act, only Alaska’s interpretation is reasonable.12

¶22 Metro appears to interpret the provision as though it 

changes the nature of the property rights Metro derives from its 

right-of-way across Alaska’s property. But this interpretation is 

unreasonable because it distorts the common law meaning of the 

term “right-of-way,” and, in this way, is inconsistent with other 

provisions in the Act.13

¶23 A right-of-way, or easement, is an “interest in land owned 

by another person, consisting in the right to use or control the 

_____________________________________________________________

12 See State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638, 647 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., 

dissenting) (“Where the language of a statute is subject to some 

doubt, reference to common-law principles may provide a valuable 

clue as to whether a particular situation is controlled by the 

statute.”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Jimenez, 2012 UT 41, 

284 P.3d 640; see also Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, ¶ 8, 61 P.3d 989 

(explaining that common-law principles are preempted by statute 

only where the common-law principles, associated with the subject 

matter of the statute, are expressly denied or where a statute’s plain 

language or structure and purpose demonstrate a legislative intent to 

preempt that area of the law).

13 See Durant, 674 P.2d at 647 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“As Lord 

Coke stated, ‘[t]o know what the common law was before the 

making of the statute is the very lock and key to set open the 

windows of the statute.’”).
METRO. WATER v. SHCH ALASKA

Opinion of the Court

10

land . . . for a specific limited purpose.”14 The land upon which the 

easement rests is referred to as the “servient estate,” and the land 

benefitting from the easement (the easement holder’s land) is called 

the “dominant estate.”15 So in this case, Alaska is the owner of the 

servient estate and Metro is the owner of the dominant estate. And, 

under common law easement principles, Metro’s status as an owner 

of the dominant estate does not give Metro authority to dictate the 

terms upon which Alaska, the owner of the servient estate, may use 

the property at issue.16

¶24 It is well-established “that the owner of the servient estate 

may use his property in any manner and for any purpose consistent 

with the rights of the owner of the dominant estate,” and although 

“the owner of the dominant estate may enjoy to the fullest extent the 

rights conferred by his easement, he may not alter its character so as 

to further burden or increase the restriction upon the servient 

estate.”17 In other words, under the parties’ existing property rights, 

Metro, as the dominant estate holder, has the right to use the 

easement across Alaska’s property to its fullest extent, but it does not 

have authority to prevent Alaska from using the property unless 

Alaska’s use unreasonably interferes with Metro’s easement right.18

So by reading section 103(2)(t) as authorizing Metro to prohibit 

Alaska from using the property, Metro suggests that the provision 

implicitly overrides the parties’ respective common law rights in the 

property.

¶25 Under Metro’s interpretation, Metro, the owner of the 

dominant estate, could dictate the terms upon which Alaska, the 

_____________________________________________________________

14 Easement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

15 Id. (emphases omitted).

16 Id. (“Unlike a lease or license, an easement may last forever, but 

it does not give the holder the right to possess, take from, improve, 

or sell the land.”).

17 McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978).

18 See N. Union Canal Co. v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 180 (Utah 1976) 

(explaining that the land owner over which a canal easement passed 

did not need to obtain permission from the canal easement holder 

before placing a fence across the property as long as the fence did 

not “unreasonably restrict or interfere with the proper use of the 

plaintiff’s easement”).
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Opinion of the Court

11

owner of the servient estate, could use the property. In fact, Metro 

argues that the provision would authorize Metro to prohibit the fee 

owner from using the property at all. So, in effect, this interpretation 

of the statute would transform Metro into a fee owner of the 

property and reduce Alaska, the fee owner, to a potential easement 

holder. Thus Metro’s interpretation of section 103(2)(t) is inconsistent 

with common law principles regarding easement rights.19

Accordingly, it is unreasonable. 

¶26 Additionally, by overriding common law principles 

regarding the parties’ property rights, Metro’s interpretation of the 

provision is inconsistent with other portions of section 103(2). Other 

provisions in section 103(2) make it clear that Metro’s authority is 

subject to the property rights of others. For example, sections 

103(2)(a) and (b) authorize Metro to “acquire, by any lawful means,” 

real property or an interest in real property. And section 103(2)(h) 

authorizes Metro to use the state’s eminent domain power to acquire 

necessary property rights. So these provisions require Metro to 

acquire property interests (and the consequent ability to fully control 

those property interests) in a way that respects the traditional 

property rights of others: “by any lawful means” (presumably 

through purchase or license) or by using the state’s eminent domain 

power.

¶27 So the provisions in section 103 dealing specifically with a 

local district’s ability to obtain control over real property suggest 

that local districts cannot simply disregard the property rights of 

others. In other words, the other provisions in section 103 suggest 

that Metro, as a local district, cannot exercise control over Alaska’s 

real property in a way that would go beyond Metro’s property rights

or would unlawfully infringe on Alaska’s property rights. And for 

this reason it would be unreasonable to interpret section 103(2)(t), 

without more explicit language, as though it gave Metro, as the 

_____________________________________________________________

19 See OLP, L.L.C. v. Burningham, 2009 UT 75, ¶ 16, 225 P.3d 177 

(“Traditionally, the legislature may change the common law only 

explicitly.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Anderson v. 

Bell, 2010 UT 47, ¶¶ 16–17, 234 P.3d 1147 (interpreting a statute in 

light of common law principles), superseded on other grounds by 

statute, UTAH CODE § 20A-9-502, as recognized in Bryner v. Cardon 

Outreach, LLC, 2018 UT 52, ¶ 9, 428 P.3d 1096.
METRO. WATER v. SHCH ALASKA

Opinion of the Court

12

easement holder, authority to dictate how Alaska, the fee holder, 

may use its property.20

¶28 In contrast to Metro’s proposed interpretation, Alaska’s 

interpretation is consistent with common-law easement principles. 

Under Alaska’s interpretation, the provision authorizes Metro to 

negotiate with other parties regarding the parties’ and Metro’s 

existing property rights. So, for example, it would authorize Metro to 

enter into a contract with another political subdivision whereby the 

other political subdivision agrees to pay Metro in order to use 

Metro’s easement across private land. And, relevant to Metro’s 

property interest in this case, it would also authorize Metro to enter 

into a contract with a person who owns property encumbered by a 

Metro easement to allow that person to use the encumbered 

property in a way that would violate Metro’s property interest 

absent the agreement. But it would not authorize Metro to lease, sell, 

or license property interests it does not own, nor to dictate how a 

private property owner may use his or her property rights. This 

interpretation, unlike Metro’s proposed interpretation, is consistent 

with traditional property principles regarding the nature of the 

respective parties’ existing property rights.

¶29 Because it is unreasonable to interpret section 103(2)(t) as 

granting Metro authority to dictate how fee owners of property may 

use, or not use, their property, we hold that the only reasonable 

interpretation of section 103(2)(t) is that it merely authorizes Metro 

to negotiate agreements regarding Metro’s property interests. 

Accordingly, section 103(2)(t) does not grant Metro authority to 

prohibit Alaska from using Alaska’s property.21

_____________________________________________________________

20 See Heber Light & Power Co. v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2010 UT 

27, ¶ 17, 231 P.3d 1203 (“When a specific power is conferred by 

statute upon a . . . commission with limited powers, the powers are 

limited to such as are specifically mentioned. Accordingly, to ensure 

that the administrative powers of the [Commission] are not 

overextended, any reasonable doubt of the existence of any power 

must be resolved against the exercise thereof.” (alterations in 

original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

21 Not only do these other provisions suggest it would be 

unreasonable to interpret section 103(2)(t) as though it upended 

traditional common law principles, the provisions also suggest that 

section 103(2)(t) does not speak to Metro’s authority over real 

(Continued)
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Opinion of the Court

13

3. Utah Code section 17B-1-103(2)(q)

¶30 Next, Metro and the district court cite section 

17B-1-103(2)(q), which states that Metro may “perform any act or 

exercise any power reasonably necessary for the efficient operation 

of the local district in carrying out its purposes.” Once again, Metro 

does not specifically address the meaning of this provision. Instead, 

Metro argues that its regulation of private property throughout the 

Corridor is authorized by section 103 generally because the 

regulation of all private property within the Corridor is vital to 

Metro’s purposes. But we do not interpret section 103(2)(q) as 

granting Metro the regulatory authority it seeks, because, when 

section 103(2)(q) is read in the context of other statutory provisions, 

it is not reasonably interpreted as authorizing Metro to enact 

legislation regulating property it does not own. 

¶31 An interpretation of section 103(2)(q) that grants local 

districts the authority to regulate property the local districts do not 

own is unreasonable when compared to the land use statutes 

applicable to cities and counties. The Municipal Land Use, 

Development, and Management Act and the County Land Use, 

Development, and Management Act authorize cities and counties, 

respectively, to enact land use regulations. Both acts establish 

comprehensive statutory schemes that carefully define, and limit, the 

city’s and county’s authority to enact land use legislation. 

¶32 For example, the acts require cities and counties to establish 

planning commissions for the purpose of preparing and adopting 

land use regulations.22 And they require the planning commissions

to provide notice to the public, hold public hearings, and consider 

written objections to proposed land use regulations before the 

commissions recommend a proposed land use regulation be 

enacted.23 The acts also impose a number of specific limitations on 

 

property it does not own. “[W]here two statutes treat the same 

subject matter, and one statute is general while the other is specific, 

the specific provision controls.” State v. Bagshaw, 836 P.2d 1384, 1386 

(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (alteration in original). Because sections 

103(2)(a)–(b) and 103(2)(h) specifically address the manner in which 

Metro may obtain control over the real property it does not own, 

those provisions control the manner in which Metro may obtain 

control of the property of others.

22 UTAH CODE § 10–9a–502; id. § 17–27a–502.

23 Id. § 10–9a–502; id. § 17–27a–502.
METRO. WATER v. SHCH ALASKA

Opinion of the Court

14

the types of land use regulations cities and counties may enact.24

And they require cities and counties to establish “one or more appeal 

authorities” to hear and decide challenges to land use regulations 

and decisions.25 The effect of these provisions is to prevent cities and 

counties from imposing land use regulations on private landowners 

before the city or county has carefully considered the issues 

presented and provided landowners ample opportunity to 

participate in the legislative process.

¶33 Additionally, other provisions of the land use regulation 

acts make it clear that the legislature did not intend to grant this 

regulatory authority to other political subdivisions of the state. The 

acts limit the authority to enact land use regulations to the 

“legislative bod[ies]” of the city or county.26 And the acts specifically 

subject all political subdivisions, including local districts, to the 

requirements of “any applicable land use ordinance” when “using 

any area, land, or building situated within that [city or county].”27

Thus the acts identify the legislative bodies of cities and counties as 

the only political entities with authority to promulgate land use 

regulations, and they specifically state that local districts are subject 

to that authority.

¶34 This reading of the land use acts for cities and counties is 

echoed in the Limited Purpose Local Districts Act. For example, 

Utah Code section 17B–1–119 states that “local district[s] shall 

comply with [applicable city and county land use statutes] if a land 

use authority consults with or allows the local district to participate in 

any way in a land use authority’s land use development review or 

approval process.”28 By differentiating between “local district[s]” 

and “land use authorit[ies],” this statute implies that local districts 

_____________________________________________________________

24 See generally id. § 10–9a–501 et seq.; id. § 17–27a–501 et seq.

25 Id. § 10–9a–701; id. § 17–27a–701.

26 Id. § 10–9a–501; id. § 17–27a–501. Significantly, the Act does not 

define the governing body of local districts as a “legislative body.” 

Id. § 17B–1–201 (defining the “governing body” of “a county or 

municipality” as “the legislative body of the county or municipality” 

and the “governing body” of a “local district” as “the board of 

trustees of the local district”).

27 Id. § 10–9a–305; see also id. § 17–27a–305.

28 Id. § 17B-1-119 (emphases added).
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Opinion of the Court

15

are not land use authorities. And we read the phrase “if a land use 

authority consults with or allows the local district to participate in 

any way,” as limiting a local district’s role in the “land use 

development review or approval process” to consulting with the 

land use authority, or to participating to the extent allowed by the 

land use authority. Thus this statute suggests that local districts do 

not have independent authority to establish land use regulations.29

¶35 Because the city and county land use regulation acts clearly 

limit the authority to enact land use regulations over private 

property to the legislative bodies of cities and counties, and section 

17B–1–119 of the Limited Purpose Local Districts Act limits local 

districts’ role in the creation of land use regulations to consulting 

with the legislative body responsible for such regulations, it would 

be unreasonable to read section 103(2)(q) as though it conferred 

independent land-use regulatory authority on local districts.

¶36 Finally, a reading of section 103(2)(q) that authorizes 

regulatory authority over land use would be unreasonably broad 

because it would render most of section 103 and the Act superfluous. 

For example, because section 103 establishes specific grants of power 

for “limited purpose local districts,” were we to read 

section 103(2)(q) to encompass all acts and powers without 

restriction, we would make the remainder of section 103 

unnecessary. The same is true as to the rest of the Act.

¶37 The Act establishes clear distinctions among the various 

types of local districts, and it confers specific, limited, and varying 

powers on those districts.30 So by interpreting section 103(2)(q) as 

conferring every type of authority upon all local districts, we would 

_____________________________________________________________

29 See also id. § 17B-1-202(4)(a) (“[A] local district may not be 

created to provide and may not after its creation provide to an area 

the same service that may already be provided to that area by 

another political subdivision, unless the other political subdivision 

gives its written consent.”).

30 See generally id. § 17B-2a-101 et seq. Significantly, only one type 

of local district is specifically granted authority to provide certain 

“municipal services,” including “planning and zoning” services. Id.

§ 17B-2a-1101 et seq. (establishing municipal service districts). But 

that type of local district may only be created by a county in 

unincorporated areas of the county. Id. § 17B-2a-1103.
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Opinion of the Court

16

effectively abolish the careful distinctions the Act establishes 

between the various types of local districts.31

¶38 In sum, it is unreasonable to interpret section 103(2)(q) as 

authorizing local districts to enact land use regulations because 

(1) the legislature has enacted comprehensive statutory schemes 

governing the exercise of the land use power, and these statutory 

schemes explicitly prohibit non-legislative bodies from using the 

power; (2) section 17B–1–119 limits local districts’ role in land use

decision-making to consulting with “land use authorit[ies]”; and 

(3) such a broad interpretation of section 103(2)(q) would render 

most of section 103 and the Act superfluous.32

_____________________________________________________________

31 So instead of reading section 103(2)(q) as granting every type of 

authority upon all local districts, we read it as merely a catch-all 

provision guaranteeing local districts the additional, but incidental, 

authority to perform any of the functions specifically authorized by 

section 103. As Alaska points out in its supplemental brief, 

section 103(2)(q) specifically ties any authority it confers to the 

“efficient operations” of the local district. So before a local district 

may invoke authority under section 103(2)(q), it must also invoke 

another provision in section 103 that authorizes the specific 

“operation” the local district seeks to make more efficient. In this 

case, the only relevant provisions in section 103 would require Metro 

to acquire control over Alaska’s land through some method 

recognized by law.

32 The unreasonableness of Metro’s interpretation of 

section 103(2)(q) is highlighted when we apply it to other local 

districts. Because the geographical boundaries of multiple local 

districts often overlap, Metro’s interpretation of the provision could 

lead to multiple local districts enacting conflicting land use 

regulations over the same property. We do not find this to be a 

reasonable interpretation of the Act as a whole, and it is even more 

unreasonable when we consider the statutory provisions related to 

the land use authority of cities and counties. Under our 

interpretation of the statutory scheme, we find that the legislature 

intended to grant the authority to enact land use regulations only to 

cities and counties. So where a local district needs a land use 

regulation to be enacted, it must seek out the legislative body of the 

relevant city or county and, pursuant to Utah Code 

section 17B-1-119, work with that legislative body to enact it.
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Opinion of the Court

17

4. Utah Code section 17B-1-301(2)(i)

¶39 Metro also relies upon Utah Code section 17B-1-301(2)(i), 

which authorizes the board of trustees of local districts to “adopt and 

enforce rules and regulations for the orderly operation of the local 

district or for carrying out the district’s purposes.” Metro’s reliance 

on this provision suggests that Metro reads it as granting Metro

general regulatory power over property Metro does not own. But 

this interpretation is unreasonable when considered in context of the 

Act’s structure.

¶40 Section 103 of the Act provides the “status and powers” of 

local districts. Section 301, on the other hand, provides the “duties 

and powers” of the board of trustees. In other words, section 103 

establishes the authority of Metro, and section 301 establishes the 

authority of the board of trustees to control Metro. As the governing 

body of Metro, the board of trustees cannot exercise authority Metro 

has not been granted. Rather, it may exercise, consistent with 

section 301’s provisions, only the authority specifically granted to 

Metro in section 103 or elsewhere in the Act. Thus none of section 

301’s provisions may be read as extending the board of trustees’ 

“power” beyond what is provided Metro in other portions of the 

Act.

¶41 In fact, when we consider the other provisions of 

section 301, it is clear that section 301’s purpose is to grant the board 

of trustees authority regarding the internal operations of the local 

district. For example, subsections 301(2)(a), (b), (c), (h), (k), (l), and 

(m) grant authority to the board of trustees to perform various 

administrative responsibilities, such as the authority to “fix the times 

of meetings,” “select and use an official district seal,” “enter into 

contracts,” and to use and manage district property. And subsections 

301(2)(d), (e), (f), (j), and (n) grant the board of trustees various kinds 

of authority over the local district’s employees and other personnel. 

So none of the other provisions in section 301 grant the board of 

trustees authority beyond what has been granted to the local district 

in section 103 or elsewhere in the Act. Instead, they either empower 

the board to exercise the authority already granted to the local 

district or they grant the board of trustees power over the local 

district’s internal operations.

¶42 With the purpose of section 301 in mind, section 301(2)(i)’s 

language—“adopt and enforce rules and regulations for the orderly 

operation of the local district or for carrying out the district’s 

purposes”—is reasonably interpreted only as authorizing the board 

of trustees to adopt internal rules and regulations governing Metro’s 
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Opinion of the Court

18

operations and personnel, as well as Metro’s use of Metro’s property 

rights.33 Accordingly, section 301(2)(i) does not grant Metro 

authority to control property rights it does not own.

5. Utah Code section 17B-1-301(2)(o)

¶43 Finally, Metro cites Utah Code section 17B-1-301(2)(o), 

which states that the board of trustees may “exercise all powers and 

perform all functions in the operation of the local district and its 

properties as are ordinarily exercised by the governing body of a 

political subdivision of the state and as are necessary to accomplish 

the purposes of the district.”34 This provision would support Metro’s 

position only if we interpreted it as granting Metro authority to 

exercise all powers and perform all functions ordinarily exercised by 

other political subdivisions. But that is not what the provision says, 

and such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the structure 

of the Act.

¶44 As discussed above, section 301 establishes the board of 

trustees’ authority over its local district. And that authority is 

necessarily limited to the authority specifically granted to the local 

district by statute. We do not read section 301(2)(o) as abolishing this 

limitation. Section 301(2)(o) specifically grants the “board of 

trustees” the same authority over their local districts that other 

“governing bodies” have over their respective “political 

subdivisions.” Because section 301 deals with the authority of the 

board of trustees, and not with the authority of Metro, it is 

unreasonable to interpret section 301(2)(o) as granting Metro

authority beyond what section 103 established. Instead, we read the 

provision as granting the board of trustees full authority to operate 

Metro and to exercise Metro’s section 103 powers.

¶45 Additionally, section 301(2)(o) should not be interpreted to 

grant Metro “all powers” exercised by other political subdivisions 

because such a reading would erase the clear distinctions the Act 

establishes among the various types of local districts. The Act 

establishes various types of limited purpose local districts, and each 

_____________________________________________________________

33 See also Shoked, supra n.4 at 1998 (defining a special district as a 

governmental entity lacking powers of regulation beyond its 

facilities, and explaining that regulatory powers “are antithetical to 

the special district as traditionally conceived in U.S. law”).

34 UTAH CODE § 17B-1-301(2)(o) (emphasis added).
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Opinion of the Court

19

is granted specific, limited powers. So were we to interpret 

section 301(2)(o) as granting Metro the same authority exercised by 

every other type of political subdivision, including by other types of 

local districts, the distinctions established by the Act would become 

meaningless.

¶46 Because interpreting section 301(2)(o) as authorizing Metro 

to enact land use regulations over land it does not own would be 

inconsistent with the structure of the Act, and would render the 

distinctions between the various types of local districts meaningless, 

we decline to do so. Accordingly, we hold that section 301(2)(o) does 

not grant Metro the authority it seeks in this case.

¶47 In sum, none of the provisions Metro cites authorizes it to 

regulate Alaska’s use of Alaska’s own property. Because Metro may 

exercise only those powers and functions provided by statute, we 

hold that Metro, through its board of trustees, may regulate only its 

own use of its property interests. And those uses are valid only to 

the extent they do not unlawfully infringe on the property rights of 

others. In other words, Metro’s authority to control or use Alaska’s 

property is limited to the common law authority Metro derives from 

its easement rights.

B. We remand this case to determine whether Alaska has unreasonably 

interfered with Metro’s easement rights

¶48 Because Metro does not have statutory authority to enact 

regulations governing Alaska’s use of Alaska’s property rights, the 

district court erred in upholding Metro’s regulations on statutory 

grounds. But Metro retains an easement right in the property. And 

this right prevents Alaska from unreasonably interfering with 

Metro’s easement.

¶49 Under Utah’s property law, an easement holder has the 

right to use its easement (the scope of which defines the extent of the 

permitted use) in a way that does not unreasonably interfere with 

the property rights of the owner of the land.35 And the owner of the 

land has the right to continue using its land so long as it does not 

_____________________________________________________________

35 Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 158 

(Utah 1946) (“It is elementary that the use of an easement must be as 

reasonable and as little burdensome to the servient estate as the 

nature of the easement and its purpose will permit.” (emphasis 

omitted)).
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Opinion of the Court

20

unreasonably interfere with the easement holder’s use of its 

easement.36 Whether one party’s conduct interferes with the right of 

the other is a factual question, the answer to which depends on the 

particular circumstances of the parties and the nature of the 

easement.37

¶50 So even though Metro does not have authority to enact 

regulations aimed at protecting its easement rights,38 it may, 

pursuant to its easement rights, seek to impose certain restrictions 

upon Alaska to prevent Alaska from unreasonably interfering with 

Metro’s easement. Whether such restrictions are appropriate in this 

case presents a fact-heavy question that should be considered on 

remand. Because we reverse the district court’s summary judgment 

regarding Metro’s statutory authority, Metro may, on remand, 

pursue whatever procedural avenues that may be available for 

protecting its easement rights.

II. We Remand for a Reconsideration of the Easement’s Scope

¶51 Alaska also argues the district court erred in determining 

the scope of Metro’s easement (Easement) across Alaska’s land 

(Property). The district court made that determination based upon 

an assumption that a description of the Easement prepared by a civil 

engineer for the Federal Bureau of Reclamation was controlling. 

Although the engineer’s description of the Easement may be helpful 

or persuasive in determining the scope of the Easement, we hold that 

the district court erred in treating that description as dispositive. 

Instead, the court should have made a factual determination 

_____________________________________________________________

36 McBride, 581 P.2d at 997 (“It is also generally accepted that the 

owner of the servient estate may use his property in any manner and 

for any purpose consistent with the rights of the owner of the 

dominant estate.”).

37 Big Cottonwood, 174 P.2d at 159 (“What is a reasonable manner 

for [the exercise of the easement holder’s rights] is a question of fact 

to be decided after considering [a number of situation-specific 

factors].”).

38 See N. Union Canal Co., 550 P.2d at 180 (explaining that the land 

owner over which a canal easement passed did not need to obtain 

permission from the canal easement holder before placing a fence 

across the property as long as the fence did not “unreasonably 

restrict or interfere with the proper use of the plaintiff’s easement”).
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Opinion of the Court

21

regarding the scope of the Easement as described in the Property’s 

original land patent (the document that created the Easement).

¶52 To give context to our conclusion that the district court erred 

regarding the scope of the Easement, we briefly review the history of 

the Easement, from its creation to the present day. Under what is 

commonly referred to as the “1890’s Act” or the “Canal Act of 1890,” 

Congress reserved a “right of way . . . for ditches or canals 

constructed by the authority of the United States” in all lands then 

owned by the United States west of the one hundredth meridian.39

The Easement in this case was created under the 1890’s Act.

¶53 In 1907, the United States conveyed the Property at issue in 

this case to the State of Utah. Then, in accordance with the terms of 

the 1890’s Act, the State of Utah conveyed the Property to Utah 

Power and Light (UP&L). The patent conveying the Property to 

UP&L stated that the Property was conveyed “subject to all rights of 

ways for ditches, tunnels, and telephone transmission lines that may 

have been constructed by authority of the United States.” Thus 

UP&L received the Property subject to the United States’ Easement.

¶54 UP&L retained title to the Property for the next eighty-five 

years. But during this time, between 1939 and 1951, the United States 

(through the Federal Bureau of Reclamation) exercised its right 

under the Easement to build a pipeline across the Property. In 1961, 

approximately ten years after the United States finished construction 

on the pipeline, a civil engineer for the Federal Bureau of 

Reclamation drafted a written description of the scope of the 

Easement across the Property, which was incorrectly recorded in 

Utah County.

¶55 Then, in 1993, UP&L’s successor, PacifiCorp, sold the 

Property to Blake Roney. Roughly thirteen years after Mr. Roney 

obtained title to the Property, the United States transferred its 

interest in the Easement across the Property to Metro, which Metro 

recorded. Fifteen days later, Mr. Roney transferred title to the 

Property to Alaska’s predecessor-in-interest.

¶56 Below, Alaska argued that Mr. Roney obtained title (in 1993) 

without notice that the Property was encumbered by the Easement. 

_____________________________________________________________

39 43 U.S.C. § 945. The one hundredth meridian bisects, from 

south to north, the following states: Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, 

Nebraska, South Dakota, and North Dakota.
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Opinion of the Court

22

But the district court disagreed, concluding that Mr. Roney accepted 

the Property subject to the Easement. Additionally, the court 

determined that the scope of the Easement was controlled by the 

terms of the Federal Bureau of Reclamation’s 1961 written 

description of the easement. Although the court correctly 

determined that Alaska took the Property subject to the Easement, 

the court erred in concluding that the Bureau of Reclamation’s 

description of the Easement was controlling as to the Easement’s 

scope. 

¶57 “[A]n easement is a transfer of an interest in real property,” 

and the legal instrument that creates the easement defines the 

obligations and rights that come with it.40 As discussed above, the 

Easement in this case was created under the 1890’s Act and through 

the State’s patent to UP&L. And the text of the 1890’s Act and the 

patent do not expressly provide the dimensions of the Easement. 

Easements created under the 1890’s Act are reserved “in perpetuity 

with no width or other limitations.”41 In other words, an 1890’s Act 

easement “is as extensive as need be for its purposes.”42

¶58 But even though an 1890’s Act easement allows the 

easement holder to access the land to the extent needed for its 

_____________________________________________________________

40 Wellberg Invs., LLC v. Greener Hills Subdivision, 2014 UT App

222, ¶ 6, 336 P.3d 61 (“To interpret easements, we apply the same 

rules of construction used in interpreting contracts. Accordingly, we 

first look to the plain language of the Easement Agreement to 

discern the parties’ intent in creating the Easement . . . .” (citations 

omitted)).

41 Weatherwax v. Yellowstone Cty., 75 P.3d 788, 790 (Mont. 2003); see 

also Green v. Wilhite, 93 P. 971, 973 (Idaho 1908) (explaining that 

“members of Congress, both those favoring and those opposing the 

[1890’s Act], believed and understood that it would have the effect of 

reserving a perpetual easement and right of way to the government 

for ditches and canals that might thereafter be constructed by 

authority of the government over lands which should be entered and 

patented subsequent to the passage of the act”); Unicorn Drilling, Inc. 

v. Heart Mountain Irrigation Dist., 3 P.3d 857, 860 (Wyo. 2000) (“[T]he 

United States has a perpetual easement over the private owner’s 

land for construction, maintenance, and operation of the canal.”).

42 Weatherwax, 75 P.3d at 790.
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Opinion of the Court

23

purposes, the easement right is not exclusive of the rights of others.43

This means that “landowners and third parties with the landowners’ 

permission may use the [easement] if their use is not inconsistent 

with the operation and maintenance of the [easement].”44 So 

easements created under the 1890’s Act are flexible in scope—being 

as extensive as needed to fulfill the purposes of the easement—while 

imposing as little burden as reasonably possible on the owner of the 

property over which the easement runs.

¶59 Easements, such as the Easement in this case, that “do[] not 

specifically fix the location [or] width of the easement” are 

commonly referred to as “floating” or “roving” easements.45 When 

presented with a dispute regarding the scope of a floating easement, 

courts must determine the “extent or width of the easement . . . by 

the purposes of the grant and the requirements for a safe, proper, 

reasonable and convenient enjoyment thereof.”46 This requires courts 

to balance the competing interests in the land, with the goal of 

providing “the maximum advantage and . . . the minimum 

disadvantage [to] both parties.”47

¶60 In striking this balance, courts should be mindful of the 

following principle:

Whenever there is ownership of property subject to an 

easement there is a dichotomy of interests, both of 

which must be respected and kept in balance. On the 

one hand, it is to be realized that the owner of the fee 

title, because of his general ownership, should have the 

use and enjoyment of his property to the highest 

degree possible, not inconsistent with the easement. On 

the other, the owner of the easement should likewise 

have the right to use and enjoy his easement to the 

_____________________________________________________________

43 Unicorn Drilling, 3 P.3d at 861 (explaining that the local 

district’s “right-of-way [was] not exclusive”).

44 Id.

45 Salt Lake City v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 253 P.2d 365, 368 (Utah 

1953).

46 Id.

47 N. Union Canal Co. v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 180 (Utah 1976).
METRO. WATER v. SHCH ALASKA

Opinion of the Court

24

fullest extent possible not inconsistent with the rights 

of the fee owner.48

¶61 So in determining the scope of the Easement in this case, the 

district court should have sought to balance Metro’s interest in the 

Easement with Alaska’s interest in the Property. Then, it should have 

determined the best way to maximize the advantages, and to 

minimize the disadvantages, to both parties. But the court failed to 

do this. Instead, the court accepted the Federal Bureau of 

Reclamation’s written description of the Easement as dispositive of 

the scope of the easement. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to 

the district court for a reconsideration, consistent with the legal 

principles set out in this opinion, of the Easement’s scope.

Conclusion

¶62 Because no provision in the Act authorizes Metro to regulate 

Alaska’s use of Alaska’s property, we hold that the district court 

incorrectly interpreted the Act. Accordingly, we reverse the district 

court’s regulatory-authority determination and remand for 

proceedings consistent with the principles set out in this opinion. 

And, because the district court erred in treating some evidence 

regarding the scope of the easement at issue as dispositive, we 

reverse the court’s determination regarding the easement’s scope.

_____________________________________________________________

48 Id. at 179 (footnotes omitted).