recant a report of abuse, or minimize the abusive behavior. The witness 

testified that she had never met Brizzolara or the victim, and she was not 

asked about, nor did she offer, an opinion of the victim's credibility or 

Brizzolara's guilt. The witness did not testify to matters precluded by 

NRS 48.061(2) or to prior bad acts, and the testimony was highly 

probative, and the probative value was not substantially outweighed by 

unfair prejudice. Furthermore, Brizzolara conceded at trial that the 

witness was a domestic violence expert. We conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the testimony of the State's 

expert witness on domestic violence. See Perez v. State, 129 Nev. , 

313 P.3d 862, 866-70 (2013). 

Second, Brizzolara contends that the prosecutor engaged in 

numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct by asking the victim 

whether other witnesses were liars. The State argues that it was not 

asking the victim to comment on the veracity of other witnesses but rather 

was attempting to demonstrate that the victim either lied to police or was 

lying on the stand when her trial testimony differed significantly from 

earlier reports. Brizzolara failed to object to these questions, and we 

review for plain error. Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 

477 (2008) (stating that reversal is only warranted when "the defendant 

demonstrates that the error affected his or her substantial rights, by 

causing 'actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice" (quoting Green v. 

State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003))). We have held that a 

witness may not give his or her opinion as to the veracity of the statement 

of another. See DeChant v. State, 116 Nev. 918, 924, 10 P.3d 108, 112 

(2000). However, to the extent that the State asked the victim to comment 

on the veracity of other witnesses, specifically her father and responding 

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officers, we conclude that none of the incidents, either considered 

individually or collectively, amount to plain error because Brizzolara has 

not shown that these instances prejudiced him or affected his substantial 

rights. With regard to the one instance where the prosecutor appeared to 

ask the victim whether a statement by Brizzolara was a lie, we conclude 

that Brizzolara has failed to establish plain error as the prosecutor 

voluntarily continued with his questioning without receiving an answer. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor's questioning of the victim 

did not constitute plain error. 

Third, Brizzolara contends that the prosecutor committed 

prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument by improperly shifting 

the burden of proof During closing argument, the State argued that there 

was not significant testimony about the sliding glass door, that there was 

a question of whether the door was functional, and that, when considering 

the facts collectively, the sliding glass door did not matter. Brizzolara 

claims that, by arguing about the sliding glass door, the prosecutor 

implied that Brizzolara had an obligation to present evidence that the door 

was functional. 1Brizzolara objected to this line of argument, and we 

review for harmless error. Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. at 1190, 196 P.3d at 

477. We conclude that the State's arguments did not shift the burden of 

proof, as the State properly remarked on the state of the evidence as 

presented to the jury, and therefore did not constitute misconduct. See 

'To the extent that Brizzolara argues the prosecutor made 

statements unsupported by evidence, this claim was not preserved, and we 

conclude that Brizzolara has failed to demonstrate that the statements 

about whether the door was functional prejudiced him or affected his 

substantial rights. See Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1190, 196 P.3d at 477. 

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:4,ffMr777,4„ 
Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 81, 17 P.3d 397, 415 (2001) ("[T]he 

prosecutor may comment on a defendant's failure to substantiate a 

claim."). 

Fourth, Brizzolara contends that the district court erred by 

allowing the jurors to ask questions of the witnesses, as this allowed the 

jury to take on a prosecutorial role and reduced the State's obligation to 

prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. This court has held that 

the practice of jury-questioning "can significantly enhance the truthseeking function of the trial process" and that allowing jury-questioning 

"is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Flores v. 

State, 114 Nev. 910, 913, 965 P.2d 901, 902 (1998). Brizzolara does not 

argue that the district court failed to comply with established safeguards 

pertaining to juror questions. See id. Rather, he claims that the practice 

of jury-questioning as a whole is error. We disagree and continue to 

adhere to our reasoning and holding in Flores. Therefore, the district 

court did not err in allowing the jurors to ask questions. 

Fifth, Brizzolara contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by instructing the jury on the definition of "prolonged physical 

pain" as the phrase has an established meaning that is ordinarily 

understood. "The district court has broad discretion to settle jury 

instructions, and this court reviews the district court's decision for an 

abuse of that discretion or judicial error." See Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 

744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). This court has previously concluded 

that "the phrase 'prolonged physical pain' has a well-settled and ordinarily 

understandable meaning" and that the phrase is not unconstitutionally 

vague. Collins v. State, 125 Nev. 60, 65, 125 P.3d 90, 93 (2009). The 

instruction given in this case was a near verbatim reproduction of the 

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definition outlined in Collins to demonstrate that the phrase has an 

established and ordinarily understood meaning. Id. at 64-65, 125 P.3d at 

92-93. We conclude that, while the definition was unnecessary, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by giving the instruction. 

Sixth, Brizzolara contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by instructing the jury that it was inevitable the State would 

prove his guilt. The instruction stated, in part, that "Nile defendant is 

presumed innocent until the contrary is proved," and Brizzolara argues 

that the word "unless" should have replaced "until." This court has 

rejected this argument, concluding that the use of the word "until" in a 

reasonable doubt instruction did not dilute the presumption of innocence, 

especially when the jury instruction was "read as a whole." Blake v. State, 

121 Nev. 779, 799, 121 P.3d 567, 580 (2005). We decline Brizzolara's 

invitation to deviate from this holding and conclude that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion by giving the instruction. See Crawford, 121 

Nev. at 748, 121 P.3d at 585. 

Seventh, Brizzolara contends that cumulative error requires 

reversal of his convictions. "The cumulative effect of errors may violate a 

defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial even though errors are 

harmless individually." Hernandez v. State, 118 Nev. 513, 535, 50 P.3d 

1100, 1115 (2002). When assessing a cumulative-error claim, we consider 

"(1) whether the issue of guilt is close, (2) the quantity and character of the 

error, and (3) the gravity of the crime charged." Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 

1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 854-55 (2000). Considering these factors, we conclude 

that any errors considered cumulatively were not of sufficient consequence 

to warrant reversal of Brizzolara's convictions. 

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ez_k_s_s.-s6r ; J. 

Parraguirre 

Having considered Brizzolara's arguments and concluded that 

no relief is warranted, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

R °du ty' J. 

Pickering 

Saitta 

cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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