Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1606-DR-1537 | February 14, 2017 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Aaron Westlake

Bradley Kim Thomas, II

Thomas Law Firm

Auburn, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Cory R. Swagger

Auburn, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Cassie L. Carnahan,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Jason M. Carnahan,

Appellee-Respondent.

February 14, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

17A03-1606-DR-1537

Appeal from the DeKalb Superior 

Court

The Honorable Monte L. Brown, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

17D02-1510-DR-187]

Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Petitioner, Cassie L. Carnahan (Wife), appeals the trial court’s 

division of marital property following the dissolution of her marriage to 

Appellee-Respondent, Jason M. Carnahan (Husband).

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

ISSUES

[3] Wife raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the entirety of 

certain disputed marital property to Husband; and

(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its valuation of certain 

marital property.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Husband and Wife were married on July 29, 2006. Their marriage produced 

two children: a daughter, born July 10, 2007; and a son, born December 15, 

2011. Husband is employed by KD Carnahan Farms Incorporated (Carnahan 

Farms), which is his family’s business. Wife is a paralegal.

[5] During their marriage, Husband and Wife lived rent-free in a house that is 

owned by Carnahan Farms. However, prior to the marriage, in May of 2003, 

Husband purchased a seventy-eight-acre tract of farmland in Butler, Dekalb 

County, Indiana (the Property), for $139,500. Although the parties planned to 

eventually build a home on the Property, they never did so. Rather, Husband 
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leased the Property’s acreage to Carnahan Farms for farming purposes. In lieu 

of a fixed amount of rent, Carnahan Farms, paid just enough to cover the 

Property’s mortgage, property taxes, and insurance.

[6] On October 5, 2015, Wife filed a petition to dissolve the parties’ nine-year 

marriage. On February 11, 2016, the parties filed a Partial Mediated Settlement 

Agreement with the trial court. Pursuant to the Partial Mediated Settlement 

Agreement, Husband and Wife resolved all issues relating to certain marital 

assets and debts (i.e., retirement accounts, vehicles, other personal property, 

credit card debt, and student loan obligations). The Partial Mediated 

Settlement Agreement also provided for the custody and support of the parties’

minor children. In particular, Husband and Wife agreed to share joint legal 

custody of the children, with Wife having primary physical custody. The 

parties agreed that Husband would exercise reasonable parenting time and that 

he would pay $110.00 per week in child support. The parties were unable to 

reach a mutual agreement regarding the Property in their Partial Mediated 

Settlement Agreement.

[7] On March 23, 2016, the trial court conducted a final hearing. The only matters

to be determined by the court were the valuation and division of the Property. 

On May 31, 2016, the trial court issued a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage. In 

its Decree, the trial court adopted the agreements reached by the parties in their 

Partial Mediated Settlement Agreement. As to the Property, the trial court 
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valued the Property at $254,000 based on an appraisal completed in February of 

20131 and awarded the Property entirely to Husband.

[8] Wife now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[9] Wife claims that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing and dividing the 

Property. The trial court issued specific findings of fact and conclusions 

thereon in support of its Decree of Dissolution. It does not appear in the record 

that either party requested such findings; as such, sua sponte findings “control 

only the issues they cover, and a general judgment will control as to the issues 

upon which there are no findings.” Estudillo v. Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 

1089-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). As to the issues upon which the trial court made 

specific findings, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: first, we consider 

whether the evidence supports the findings of fact; second, we determine 

whether the findings of fact support the conclusions thereon. Id. at 1090. We 

will uphold the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions thereon unless they 

are clearly erroneous. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). Clear error is “that which leaves 

us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Masters v. 

Masters, 43 N.E.3d 570, 575 (Ind. 2015).

 

1

 The trial court also found that, as of the date the petition for dissolution was filed, the balance of the 

mortgage on the Property was $122,140.44.
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I. Division of the Property

[10] We first address Wife’s claim that the trial court improperly awarded the 

Property solely to Husband. A trial court has broad discretion in dividing the 

marital estate, and we will reverse a trial court’s decision only for an abuse of 

discretion. O’Connell v. O’Connell, 889 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The 

“party challenging the trial court’s division of marital property must overcome a 

strong presumption that the trial court considered and complied with the 

applicable statute, and that presumption is one of the strongest presumptions 

applicable to our consideration on appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). On review, we will neither reweigh evidence nor assess the credibility 

of witnesses, and “we will consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial 

court’s disposition of the marital property.” Id.

[11] In dissolution proceedings, the trial court is required to divide the property of 

the parties “in a just and reasonable manner.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(b). This 

includes property that is 

(1) owned by either spouse before the marriage;

(2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right:

(A) after the marriage; and

(B) before final separation of the parties; or

(3) acquired by their joint efforts.
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I.C. § 31-15-7-4(a). Thus, in Indiana, the division of marital property is a twostep process. O’Connell, 889 N.E.2d at 10. First, the trial court must ascertain 

what property is to be included in the marital estate; second, the trial court must 

fashion a just and reasonable division of the marital estate. Id. The “one-pot” 

theory—i.e., that all property acquired before or during the marriage is to be 

included in the marital estate—ensures “that all assets are subject to the trial 

court’s power to divide and award. While the trial court may ultimately 

determine that a particular asset should be awarded solely to one spouse, it 

must first include the asset in its consideration of the marital estate to be 

divided.” Id. at 11 (quoting Hill v. Hill, 863 N.E.2d 456, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007)). 

[12] In determining how to divide a marital estate, the trial court “shall presume that 

an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and 

reasonable.” I.C. § 31-15-7-5 (emphasis added). However, this is a rebuttable 

presumption, and a party may present relevant evidence to establish that an 

equal division would not be just and reasonable. I.C. § 31-15-7-5. The trial 

court may consider evidence of the following factors in determining whether it 

would be appropriate to deviate from the presumption of an equal division:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the

property, regardless of whether the contribution was income 

producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each 

spouse:
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(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the 

disposition of the property is to become effective, including 

the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to 

dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court 

considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to 

the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

I.C. § 31-15-7-5. Where, as here, “the parties divide[d] between themselves a 

part of the marital estate and [left] the division of the balance to the discretion 

of the trial court, the trial court should assume that the property that the parties 

have already divided was divided justly and reasonably and shall divide the 

remainder of the assets and liabilities of the parties as if they were the entirety of 

the marital estate.” Nornes v. Nornes, 884 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

[13] In the present case, there is no dispute that the Property is marital property 

subject to the presumption of an equal division. However, the trial court found 

that Husband rebutted the presumption and awarded the Property to him in its 
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entirety. In support of its decision to deviate from the presumption of an equal 

division, the trial court made the following findings:

(a) That [Husband] purchased the [Property] in his name alone 

approximately [three] years prior to the parties’ marriage and 

was never transferred into their joint names;

(b) That all payments on the mortgage, taxes, and insurance 

associated with the subject real estate were paid entirely from 

the proceeds of the tenant that leased said [Property] from the 

date it was purchased through the date that the Petition for 

Dissolution of Marriage was filed;

(c) That the [c]ourt is unable to make an informed determination 

regarding the economic circumstances of each spouse at the 

time the disposition of the [P]roperty is to become effective 

for the reason that the provisions of the [m]arital [s]ettlement 

[a]greement were mediated and not specifically stated in the 

[Partial Mediated Settlement Agreement];

(d) That no evidence was presented to the [c]ourt that either party 

was responsible for the dissipation of property during the 

parties’ marriage; and

(e) That the only evidence submitted to the [c]ourt regarding 

[Husband’s] income is the Child Support Obligation 

Worksheet attached to the [Partial Mediated Settlement 

Agreement] reflecting a weekly gross income for [Husband] in 

the amount of $680.00 and a weekly gross income for [Wife] 

in the amount of $1,078.00 reflecting that [Wife] earns 

approximately 61% of the marital income and [Husband] 

earns approximately 39% of the marital income, [Wife] 

having a significantly greater income earning ability.
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(Appellant’s App. pp. 17-18). Thus, the trial court heavily relied on the fact that 

Husband purchased the Property prior to the marriage; the proceeds from 

leasing the Property covered all of the expenses associated therewith; and 

Wife’s earning ability exceeds that of Husband.

[14] Wife concedes that “[i]t is possible that there was sufficient evidence presented 

to allow the trial court to find that the presumption of an equal distribution was 

rebutted.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 12). Nevertheless, without specifically 

challenging any of the trial court’s findings, she insists that

[a]lthough some of the factors weighed in favor of Husband, 

including Husband’s premarital acquisition of the . . . Property 

and Wife’s somewhat greater income, the factors did not weigh 

so much in Husband’s favor so as to justify a [100%] to [0%] split 

in favor of Husband. Much of the equity in the . . . Property 

accrued during the marriage while Husband was actively 

employed by the tenant of the . . . Property [(i.e., Carnahan 

Farms)].[2]

 Although Wife’s income was higher than Husband’s 

at the time of the final hearing, the trial court should have also 

considered the economic situation of the parties. Notably, Wife 

was leaving the marriage as the primary custodian of two minor 

children without a residence she could depend on. There was 

also no evidence that Wife was leaving the marriage with 

substantial assets that would put her in a favorable economic 

situation. On the other hand, the evidence suggests that 

Husband was going to be able to continue to rely on rent free 

 

2

 Based on the trial court’s valuation of the Property at $254,000 and the outstanding mortgage balance of 

$122,140.44, Wife asserts that, at the time the parties separated, there was “no less than $131,859.56 in 

equity” in the Property. (Appellant’s Br. p. 13). Furthermore, the value of the Property increased from 

$185,000 at the time of purchase to $254,000 at the time of the dissolution.
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living in the marital residence that was provided by [Carnahan 

Farms].

(Appellant’s Br. pp. 17-18). In turn, Husband argues that it was well within the 

discretion of the trial court to award nothing to Wife.

[15] It is clear that the trial court considered the factors set forth in Indiana Code 

section 31-15-7-5 for deviating from the presumption of an equal division, and 

we agree that there is evidence to warrant a deviation from an equal split. In 

particular, Husband brought the Property into the marriage, and, thereafter, the 

Property neither directly benefitted the marital estate by producing extra 

income, nor diverted marital assets away from the family’s use as it was 

sustained by the rent paid thereon. Nevertheless, during the course of the 

marriage, the Property significantly increased in value. In fact, between 2003 

and 2013, the Property appreciated from a value of $185,000 to $254,000, 

during which time the mortgage steadily decreased.

[16] Furthermore, notwithstanding the trial court’s finding that there is little 

evidence of the parties’ economic circumstances, it is clear from the Partial 

Mediation Settlement Agreement and the final hearing that the Property is the 

only marital asset of any substantial value. The parties were married for more 

than nine years, during which both parties contributed financially. Although 

the trial court found as a reason for deviating from an equal division that Wife 

earned 61% of the income and has a greater income earning ability than 

Husband, the evidence also indicates that the parties lived rent-free throughout 

their marriage as a benefit of Husband’s employment. Wife was still living in 
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the house owned by Carnahan Farms at the time of the final hearing while 

Husband was temporarily housesitting for a neighbor, but Wife has pointed out 

that she and the children will have to find new living arrangements because the 

marital home belongs to Husband’s family/Carnahan Farms. Thus, she argues 

that Husband will be able to continue to reside in the marital home rent-free (in 

addition to owning the Property, which is effectively mortgage-free). The trial 

court has, essentially, awarded the entirety of the estate to Husband. See Nornes, 

884 N.E.2d at 889. While a deviation from the presumption of an equal 

division may be justified, we cannot agree that it was just and reasonable to 

completely exclude Wife from any share of the marital pot. Accordingly, we 

remand with instructions for the trial court to re-divide the Property between 

the parties in a just and reasonable manner.

II. Valuation of the Property

[17] Wife next challenges the trial court’s valuation of the Property. As with the 

division of marital property, we likewise review a trial court’s decision in

ascertaining the value of certain marital assets for an abuse of discretion. Balicki 

v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. “If the trial 

court’s chosen valuation is within the range of values supported by the 

evidence, the court does not abuse its discretion.” Id. On the other hand, “[a] 

trial court abuses its discretion when there is no evidence in the record 

supporting its decision to assign a particular value to a marital asset.” 

Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 917 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
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[18] During the final hearing, three appraisals of the Property’s value were admitted 

into evidence. The first, Exhibit 1, was completed in January of 2003—shortly 

before Husband purchased the Property—and estimated the value of the 

Property at $185,000. Exhibit 2 contains an appraisal that was completed in 

February of 2013, which estimates the Property’s value at $254,000. Finally, 

the third appraisal, Exhibit 3, was completed in February of 2016 and values 

the Property at $337,500. All three exhibits were submitted by Wife, and the 

two appraisals currently at issue—the February 2013 appraisal and the 

February 2016 appraisal—were completed by the same appraiser. In the 

Decree of Dissolution, the trial court stated that it 

disregarded the [February 2016] appraisal . . . for several reasons, 

including the fact that [the Property] was valued as of a date 

nearly [four] months after the date of final separation and for the 

reason that the cover letter to the report states that the report is 

based on a physical analysis of the property “having no 

improvements[.”] However, the report itself states that included 

in the appraisal is a bank barn and an attached flat barn with the 

pole barn (flat barn) included in the appraised value in the 

amount of $7,500.00, but does not reference the bank barn or its 

value.

(Appellant’s App. p. 16). Thus, the trial court concluded

[t]hat the only meaningful evidence concerning the value of said 

[Property] is [Wife’s] Exhibit 2, which values the real estate of 

February 1, 2013, in the amount of $254,000.00. Said appraisal, 

both in the report and on the addendum attached thereto, shows 

that no improvements are included in the valuation of said 

[Property] pursuant to the request of [Wife].
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(Appellant’s App. p. 16).

[19] Wife now contends that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the 

February 2013 appraisal because it establishes the value of the Property more 

than two-and-a-half years prior to the parties’ separation date. It is well 

established that a trial court has authority to “set any date between the date of 

filing the dissolution petition and the date of the final hearing as the date for 

marital property valuation.” Leonard v. Leonard, 877 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2007). Because the February 2016 appraisal was conducted within the 

appropriate timeframe, Wife asserts that the trial court should have valued the 

Property at $337,500. Husband, however, asserts that the trial court properly 

disregarded the February 2016 appraisal because it contained “too many 

inconsistencies.” (Appellee’s Br. p. 10).

[20] Our court has previously found an abuse of discretion where the trial court 

valued property based on a date that preceded the date of final separation (that 

is, the date the petition for dissolution was filed). See Trackwell v. Trackwell, 740 

N.E.2d 582, 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. dismissed. However, in Thompson,

811 N.E.2d at 898, 919, the trial court valued the marital residence at $387,000 

in accordance with the wife’s appraisal, which was procured approximately a 

year-and-a-half before the petition for dissolution was filed. In so doing, the 

trial court rejected the husband’s proffered appraisal, which was completed after 

the date of final separation. Id. at 919. In affirming the trial court’s valuation 

of the marital residence, we stated that its “decision to value the . . . marital 

residence at $387,000 was not necessarily an indication that it chose a date prior 
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to final separation to value the residence.” Id. Rather, we noted that the 

husband’s proffered valuation “was heavily contested at trial, and inferences 

from the evidence adduced at trial support[ed] the trial court’s chosen 

valuation.” Id. at 919-20.

[21] In the present case, the trial court found discrepancies in the February 2016 

appraisal regarding whether certain improvements on the Property were 

included in the valuation. It appears that while the appraiser noted in its cover 

letter that there were no improvements on the Property, it included the value of 

two barns in its final estimate (but only identified the specific contributing value 

of one of those barns). On the other hand, it appears that the February 2013 

appraisal, per Wife’s request, was based on the value of the land without 

consideration of the improvements thereon. Wife now contends that, in 

addition to the fact that the February 2016 appraisal is the appropriate evidence 

of valuation based on its date of completion, any improvements on the Property 

are part of the marital pot and should properly be included in the valuation.

[22] We reiterate that the weight and credibility of evidence are matters reserved to 

the discretion of the trial court, and, here, Wife submitted evidence with 

inconsistencies that led the trial court to doubt its reliability. Furthermore, we 

find that there is evidence from the February 2016 appraisal to support the trial 

court’s valuation of $254,000. In its report, the appraiser noted that “[a]lthough 

a single value conclusion [of $337,500] is provided within this report, the value 

of the [Property] could easily vary within the range indicated by the comparable 

sales.” (Appellant’s Exh. 3). The comparable sales provide a range of values 
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from $175,000 to $322,800. Thus, the trial court’s valuation of $254,000 based 

on the February 2013 appraisal also falls within the range of evidence supported 

by the February 2016 appraisal. As in Thompson, notwithstanding any reliance 

on an outdated appraisal, we affirm the trial court because there is other 

evidence to support such a valuation within the proper timeframe. See 

Thompson, 811 N.E.2d at 919-20.

CONCLUSION

[23] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by 

awarding the entirety of the disputed marital estate (i.e., the Property) to 

Husband, and we remand for the trial court to effectuate a division that is just 

and reasonable. We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in its valuation of the Property.

[24] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

[25] Crone, J. and Altice, J. concur