### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary24, 200 6 a t K noxv ill e
DEA NN A WH ITMA N v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Warre n Coun ty Nos. F -8907, F -8908, F -8909 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

No. M2005- 01321-CCA -R3-P C - F iled March 3, 2006

Th e pe tit ion e r, De a nn a

Whit ma n, ple a de d g uil ty to f ou r c ou nts of

se lli ng a sc he du le I I

dr ug wi thi n 1 , 0 0 0 fe eto f a s ch o o l , fo r wh i ch s h e re ce i v ed an ef fe ct i v e 1 6 -y ea r s en t en ce t o b e s er v ed as a R an ge I offe nder at 100 perc ent. T h e p et i t ioner soug ht post-conviction relief alleg ing that she rec eived ineffe ctive assist ance of counsel and therefor e unknowingly pleade d g uilty to the instant crimes. At the conc lusion of an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the pe tition findi ng that the petitioner ha d rec eived e ffe ctive re prese ntation and had e ntere d her ple as knowing ly . Ag g rieve d of thi s ruli ng , th e pe tit ion e r n ow app e a ls, a nd a ft e r a tho ro ug h re vie w of there c or d a ndapp lic able la w, we a ff

irm th e jud g me nt o f the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., joined.

Trac y Caten, McMinnville, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, Deanna Whit man.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tt orney Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Sop hia S. L e e , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Clement Dale Potter; District Attorne y Genera l ; an d L arry

Bry ant, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION Pursuant to her plea

ag ree ment, the petit ioner pleaded guilty to four counts of selling
as c h e d u l e I I

d ru g w i t h i n 1 , 0 0 0 f

e e to f a s c h o o l f o r w h i c h s h e r e c e i v e d f

o u r e i g h t

- y e ar

se nte nc e s, eac h of which r equire s 100 perc ent servic e. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a ), (c )(1) (2003) (p ro sc ri bin g se lli ng c oc a inea s a Cla ss C fe lon y ); id

. § 39-17-432( b) (providing that a violation of Code section 39-17- 417 occur ring within 1,000 f

ee t of a sc hool is punishable one classific ation

“ hig he r tha n is pr ov ide d in[se c tio n] 39 -1 7- 41 7( b) -( i) fo r s uc h v iol a tion” ); id . § 39-17-432( c) (p ro vid ing that a

de fe nd a nt

s e n t e n c e d fo r v iol a tin g Cod e se c tio ns 39 -1 7- 41 7 a nd 39 -1 7- 43 2( b) “ sh a ll be re quired to serve at lea st the minim um s en t en ce for such de fendant’s appropriate rang e ofA pp ar ent l y , t he pet i t i oner ’ s o f fens es wo ul d hav e b een Cl as s C f el oni es pur s uan t t o T enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed 1

s ec t i on 39- 17- 417( c) ( 2) ( A) ( 2003) ha d t h ey not bee n commi t t ed wi t h i n a s ch ool z on e, a n d a ppar en t l y T en n es s ee Code A nn o t ated sec t i o n 3 9

- 1 7

- 4 3 2 (b ) wa s ap p l i ed t o i nc rea se the c o nv i cti o n o f fen ses to C l ass B f

elo nies.
-2- sentenc e. Any

sentenc e re duction cre dits . .

. shall not ope rate to pe rmit or allow . . . re lease . . . prior to f ull se rv ic e of

su c h mi nimum s e nte nc e ” ); id

. § § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 1 (b )( 2 ) & -1 1 2 (a )( 2 ) ( es t ab l i s h i n g R an ge I sentenc ing f

or Class B f

elonies at 8 to 12 y ear s). The trial c ourt order ed the pe titioner to serve 1 three sentenc es conc urre ntly and to servethat eff

ective eig ht-y ear sentenc e consecutively to her fina l eig ht-y ear sentenc e, re ndering a total ef fec tive six teen- y ear

sentenc e.
At he r po st- c on vic tio n e vid e nti ary he ari ng , th e pe tit ion e r, wh o w a s th e so le wi tne ss, testified that her

appointed counse l met with her several times prior to her acc eptanc e of the state’s plea of fer . Howeve r, the pe titioner testified that counsel a dvised her that she would rec eive as much “g ood time cre dit” as the Te nnessee De p artment of Correc tions (TDOC) would allow. The pe tit ion e r u nd e rs too d th is t o me a n th a t sh e wo uldre c e ive16 day s of c re dit e a c h mon th, wh ic h w ou ld eff ectively reduc e h er s en tence to eig ht y ear s. Howeve r, once incar cer ated, the pe titioner learne d that be c aus e he r s e nte nc e s re qu ir e 10 0 pe rc e nt se rv ic e du e to the natur e of he r c on vic tio n o ff

e ns e s, she can only

rec eive 15 pe rce nt “g ood time cre d i t

. ” According ly , the petitioner c omplained that counsel did not ac curately advise he r of the nature of he r ag reed upon eff ective se ntence and t h e r e f o r e t h a ts h e d i d n o te n t e r

h e r g u i l t y p l e a s k n o w i n g l y, i n t e l l i g e n t l y, a n d v o l u n t ar i l y.
At the conclusion of the post-conviction hearing, the court found that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that she rec eived inef fec ti v e as sistance of

counsel a nd that at best, the petitioner had demonstrated that she had misint erpr eted counsel’s advice that she would re ceive as much “g ood time c redit” as the TDOC would allow. The court further noted that the transcript of the petitioner’s ple a submission hearing i n d icates that she was a dvised of the f ull-service
r e q u i r e m e n to f

h e r s e n t e n c e s b e f

o r e p l e a d i n g g u i l t y. On appe al, the petitioner a rg ues that her

trial and post-c on v i ction hearing c ounsel failed to a

ppropriate ly

challeng e the voluntariness of her gu i l t y p l ea s by

failing to present discrepancies in her

judgme nt forms for review and resolution. S pecif ically , the petitioner notes that her judg ment forms cla ssify her a s a standar d offe nder w ith a 30 perc ent re lease elig ibilit y date, and y et she wa s order ed to serve100 perc ent of he r sentenc es. The state re sponds that the petitioner
re c e ive d e ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l be c aus e he r c ou ns e l a c c ur a te ly a dv ise d h e r as to the te rm s of her eff ective se ntence and that the petitioner knowing ly and voluntarily enter ed her g uiltypleas as evide nced by

her post-c onviction hearing testimony

. The state further arg ues that the pe titioner’s appea l should be dismis sed for failure to prepa

re an adequate appe llate re cord.
On appe al, the lower

court’s f indings o f f act a re r eviewe d de novo with a pr esumption of c or re c tne ss that may

on ly be ov e rc omeif

thee vid e nc e pr e po nd e rates a g a ins t th os e fi nd ing s. Fi e lds v . S tate , 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001). “Claims of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel are considere d mix ed questions of law and fact and a re subjec t to de novo revie w.” Se rra no v . S tate , 13 3 S. W.3 d 5 99 , 6 03 (T e nn . 2 00 4) ; see State v . Burns , 6 S.W. 3d 45 3, 46 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . In p os t--3-

conviction proc eeding s, the petitioner has the burden of proving by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e the claims raised. Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2003).

When a petitioner c halleng es the e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, he or s h e has the b u r d e n o f e s t ab l i s h i n g ( 1 ) d e f

i c i e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d ( 2 ) p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t i n g f

r o mt h a td e f

i c i e n c y. Stric kl and v. W

ashington , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 6 86 , 1 04 S. Ct . 2 05 2, 20 64 (1 98 4) ; Ba x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). Def icient repr esentation occurs whe n counsel’s se rvice s fall below the rang e of competenc e demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s. Ba nk sto n v . S tate , 815 S.W .2d 213, 215 (T en n

. C rim. App. 1991). Prejudice is the rea sonable likelihood that, but for de ficient repr esentation, the outcome of the pr ocee dings w ould have be en diffe rent. Ov e rto n v . S tate , 874 S.W .2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994)

.

When it is alleg ed that the inef fec tive assistance of counsel re sulted in a g uiltyplea, the burde n is upon the defe ndant to establish the pre judice prong of Strickland by proving that “ther e is a rea sonable proba

bilitythat, but for counse l’s err ors, [she] would not h ave pleaded g uiltyand would have insist ed on g oing to tria l.” Hi ll v . Lo c k ha rt , 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985). On re view, ther e is a strong presumption of satisfac tory repr esentation. Ba rr v . S tate , 910 S.W .2d 462, 464 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . I f pre judice is absent, ther e is no nee d to examine alleg ations of def icient per formanc e. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct . at 2069.
Due pr ocess de mands that a g uiltypl ea b e en tere d voluntarily , knowing ly , and
u n d e r s tan d in g ly

. S ee B o yk in v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 242-44, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711-13 (1969). A plea is involuntary

if the ac cused is incompete nt o r “only if it is the product of ‘ig noranc e, incomprehe nsion, coerc ion, terror , inducements, [or] subt le or blata nt threats.’” Blankenship v. Sta te , 8 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d 8 9 7 , 9 0 4 (T en n

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( q u o t i n g Boy k in , 395 U.S. at 242-43, 89 S. Ct . at 1712). A def endant’ s testimonyat a plea hearing that his or her plea is voluntary

is a “formidable bar

rier i n a n y s u b s e q u e n tc o l l a t e r a l p r o c e e d i n g s ” b e c au s e “ [ s ] o l e m n d e c l ar a t i o n s i n o p e n c o u rtc arr y a strong presumption of verity .” Blackle dge v. A llison , 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S. Ct . 1621, 1629 (1977).

We f irst note that the crux of the petitioner’s appellate arg ument, that h er t ri al and post-conviction counse l were ineffe ctive b y fa iling to hig hlight the discr epanc ies betwe en the p et i t i o n e r ’s s en t en ce as re fl ec t ed i n h erj u d gm en tfo rm s an d t h e s en t en ce s h e i s cu rr en t l y s er v i n g, has been raised for the first time on appea l. We f urther note that althoug h eac h of the pe titioner’s fo ur jud g me nt f

orms i nd ic a te that th e pe tit ion e r is a st andar d o ff e nd e r w itha

30 pe rc e nt r e le a se elig ibilit y date, e ach form also includes a notation that the petit ioner’s se ntence is “[t] o be served at 100 % p u r s u a n t to T

. C. A

. 3 9

- 1 7

- 4 3 2

. ” T h e r e f o r e , a lth o u g h th e ju d g me n t f o r ms s h o u ld in c lu de a chec ke d “ s c h o o l z o n e ” b o x u n d e r th e r e le a s e e li g ib il ity

c a te g o r y , w e f

in d th a t th e in f

o r mation contained on the judgme nt forms is suf ficient to pr operly instruct the TDOC re g arding the nature of thepe tit ion e r’ s impo se d s e nte nc e s. See Tenn. R. Crim. P . 36 (mereclerical er rors in judg ments may be cor rec ted by court orde r).
At her post-c onviction petition hearing, the petitioner claimed that her tria l counsel provided inef

fec tive assistance by

failing to properly

advise he r of he r release elig ibilit y dates. Trial-4-

counsel did not testify

at the post-convic tion he aring , and the pe titioner testified that counsel a dvised he r that sh e wo uldre c e ive a s muc h “ g oo d tim e c re dit ” a s TD OC a llo we d, wh ic h s he un de rs too d to be 16 day s per month. She was surprised and upset when she learned that TDOC would only allow her “ g ood time cre dit” to reduc e her sentenc e by 15 perc ent. On this basis, the petitioner ar g ues that her g uiltypleas we re not knowing ly and intellige ntly

enter ed.

Howeve r, the pe titioner has fa iled to include a transcript o f h er ple a submission hearing in the r ecor d befor e us, there by prec luding our review of the voluntarine ss of her ple as and ultimately her claim of inef fec tive assistance of trial counse l. See Tenn. R. App. P . 24(b) ( instructing that the appe llan t b ea rs the burde n of pre paring an ade quate r ecor d for a ppellate r eview)

. F urthe rm or e , re lying e xclu siv e ly on thepo st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng in w hic h th e pe tit ion e r w a s th e so le witness, we h o l d that the petitioner ha s not rebutted the strong presumption of compe tent
re p re s en t at ion. Se e Ba rr , 9 1 0 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 6 4

. S h e d i d n o t t e s t i f y t h a t c o u n s e l p r o v i d e d h e r w ith
err oneous information about her relea se eligibility date; rather, she testified that she misunderstood counsel’s a dvice.

When questioned

b y th ea s s is ta

n t dis trict attorney

g ener al, the petitioner a dmitted that befor e ac cepting her ple as, the trial court informed her that she would be r equire d to serve 100 perc ent of he r ef

fec tive sentenc e and that she responde d neg atively when asked by the court if she had any questions about her r elea se elig ibilit y

.
I n sum, we hold that the petitioner ha s failed to prove by cl ea r and c onvincing
e vid e nc e that sh e re c e ive d ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l or

that sh e un kn ow ing ly

ple a de d g uil ty to the instant crimes. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-110(f ).

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE