Affirmed; Opinion Filed June 11, 2014.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-13-00004-CR

JAQUALYN LABRUN JACKSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F11-41279-J

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Lang-Miers, Myers, and Lewis 

Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers

Appellant Jaqualyn Labrun Jackson was indicted for the offense of capital murder. After 

he pleaded not guilty, a jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of murder and 

assessed his punishment at eighteen years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. In four issues, 

appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting testimony and exhibits, that this Court 

should reform the judgment to delete the fine, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the 

trial court’s assessment of court costs. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue 

this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm.
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ADMISSION OF PREVIOUS TESTIMONY

In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his 

testimony from the trial of his co-defendant Ladarell Barber.

Background

The indictment against appellant alleged that appellant intentionally caused the death of 

Zane Crockett by shooting Crockett with a firearm while in the course of committing and 

attempting to commit robbery of Crockett. During appellant’s trial, the trial court admitted 

appellant’s testimony from his co-defendant Barber’s trial and portions of that testimony were 

read to the jury.

Prior to admission of the testimony and at the beginning of trial outside of the presence of 

the jury, the State expressed that it intended “to offer his statements as [a] statement by a party 

opponent, which is not hearsay, in our case in chief.” Appellant objected that the testimony was 

not authenticated and was hearsay. The State responded that rule of evidence “802 [sic] clearly 

states that prior statements by a witness by a party opponent is not hearsay.” The trial court 

concluded that, if the State could lay the proper predicate, “we’ll proceed with it.”

During a subsequent sub rosa hearing, appellant argued that admission of his previous 

testimony “does not fit with any exception to hearsay, when his Fifth Amendment privilege is 

not being honored.”1

 The State responded that the testimony was “specifically excluded under 

the rules of hearsay.” The State also argued that “[t]his is a statement made against the 

defendant’s . . . interests.” The State contended that “this is a statement made in a judicial 

proceeding under oath, and Rule 802 [sic] clearly states that a statement . . . made in such matter, 

where it is an assertion of fact adopted . . . by a part [sic] by a defendant, it is not hearsay.”

 1 Appellant does not raise a Fifth Amendment argument on appeal.
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The trial court concluded that “[t]his is the statement that was made by the defendant in 

another proceeding” and “the defendant was on the stand and the Court presided over that trial, 

and it was clear that he understood that he had a right not to testify, and he had an attorney 

present and that he could talk to an attorney if he chose to, that he did not have to take the stand.” 

The court ruled that it would allow the State to use it in its case in chief. After further arguments 

by appellant, the court stated: “Your client made the statement. It’s a statement against interest 

and the Court is allowing it in.”2

During another sub rosa hearing, the court stated that the “Court believes this is an 

exception under Rule 804.”3

 The State later offered a portion of the testimony to show that 

appellant’s previous testimony was a statement against interest. That portion read: 

Q. Jaqualyn, you knew you were in a lot of trouble for just being involved 

in this, didn’t you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And, in fact, you’re in a lot of trouble for your involvement in this and 

you understand that you’re going to the penitentiary?

A. Yes, sir.

Subsequently in open court, the State offered a self-authenticating, certified copy of the 

transcript of the previous proceeding for record purposes and, as a separate exhibit, the portions 

of the transcript that the State intended to offer. The court stated that appellant’s running 

objection had already been overruled and appellant did not need to assert it again. Appellant also 

objected on the grounds that the testimony was hearsay and hearsay within hearsay, that the 

 2 The court granted appellant a running objection.

3 During the sub rosa hearings, appellant submitted various objections—in addition to his Fifth Amendment objection—to the admission of 

his testimony from the prior proceeding: (1) under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004), on the grounds that the testimony was 

testimonial and appellant was available, (2) because testimony by a witness concerning the testimony “would be hearsay within hearsay[,]” 

(3) because it was a violation of appellant’s presumption of innocence, and (4) because appellant had not pled guilty or been convicted and, as a 

result, it was impermissible to call a witness to testify to what he said at the co-defendant’s trial. Appellant also argued that admission of the 

previous testimony was a violation of due process and of article 1, sections 9 and 10 of the Texas Constitution. Appellant does not raise these 

arguments on appeal.
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document was not self-authenticating, and that no predicate had been laid. The trial court 

overruled these objections and admitted both exhibits.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. McCarty 

v. State, 257 S.W.3d 238, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We will uphold a trial court’s decision to 

admit evidence when it is reasonably supported by the record and correct under any theory of 

law applicable to the case. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or 

hearing, that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). Hearsay 

statements are not admissible except as provided by statute, the rules of evidence, or a rule 

prescribed pursuant to statutory authority. TEX. R. EVID. 802. However, a statement is not 

hearsay if it is offered against a party and is the party’s own statement. TEX. R. EVID.

801(e)(2)(A); see Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“Rule 

801(e)(2)(A) plainly and unequivocally states that a criminal defendant’s own statements, when 

being offered against him, are not hearsay.”). The logic behind qualifying a party’s own 

statements as not hearsay and as admissible is “that a party is estopped from challenging the 

fundamental reliability or trustworthiness of his own statements.” Trevino, 991 S.W.2d at 853. 

In addition, party admissions—unlike statements against interest—need not be against the 

interest of the party to be admissible but need only to be offered as evidence against the party. 

Id.

In addition, a hearsay statement is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if the 

statement is a statement against interest that exposes the declarant to criminal liability and that is 

corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the statement. See TEX.

R. EVID. 803(24). Another exception allows admission of former testimony (1) by a declarant 
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that is unavailable as a witness (2) that was given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a 

different proceeding (3) if the party against whom the testimony is offered had an opportunity 

and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. See TEX.

R. EVID. 804(b)(1).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting his testimony from his codefendant’s trial because the testimony did not qualify as statements against interest. See TEX. R.

EVID. 803(24). Appellant contends that, although appellant objected to admission of the 

testimony on numerous grounds, the court “ultimately admitted it as a statement against 

interest.” Appellant bases his position on the court’s statement: “It’s a statement against interest 

and the Court is allowing it in.” Appellant contends that the statement was not sufficiently 

against appellant’s interest to qualify as a statement against interest under rule of evidence 

803(24) because the statement did not subject him to criminal liability and merely shifted the 

blame to his co-defendant Barber. See id. Appellant also argues that, because the admitted 

testimony was the only evidence that clearly placed him at the scene of the crime with his codefendant and that described appellant’s conduct at the time of the offense, it cannot be shown 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous admission of the testimony did not contribute to his 

conviction. Appellant contends that, as a result, he is entitled to a new trial.

The State argues that the court did not err by admitting appellant’s prior testimony 

because it was not hearsay as it qualified as a statement by a party opponent. Citing Prystash v. 

State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), the State notes that this Court must uphold 

evidentiary rulings on appeal if the trial court’s admission of the testimony was correct on any 

theory of law applicable to the case. The State contends that, as a result, it is not necessary for 
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this Court to reach appellant’s argument that the testimony does not fall under an exception to 

the hearsay rule.

The State also argues that, if this Court finds that appellant’s former testimony was 

hearsay, the testimony was nevertheless admissible as a statement against interest because 

appellant admitted to being a party to the offense and acknowledged that he would go to prison 

as a result, and the testimony exposed appellant to criminal liability. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(24). 

The State contends that the testimony included both self-inculpatory and “blame-sharing” 

statements and that evidence corroborated the trustworthiness of the statements. In addition, the 

State argues that the trial court did not err when it ruled that the testimony was also admissible 

under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule. See TEX. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). The 

State contends that (1) appellant was unavailable as a witness because he invoked his Fifth 

Amendment privilege not to testify, (2) the testimony was given by appellant as a witness at 

another hearing of the same or different proceeding, and (3) appellant had the opportunity to 

develop appellant’s testimony.

In addition, the State contends that no harm resulted from admission of appellant’s 

former testimony because corroborating evidence linked appellant to the scene and the murder 

and there was no reference to the fact that appellant testified in the trial of his co-defendant or to 

the nature of the previous proceeding.

Analysis

Appellant complains of admission of his own statements. Under rule 801(e)(2)(A), his 

statements from the previous trial that were offered against him are not hearsay. TEX. R. EVID.

801(e)(2)(A); see Bell v. State, 877 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, pet. ref’d) (stating 

that rule that exempts an admission by a party opponent from the hearsay definition is based “on 

a notion that a party should not be allowed to exclude his own statement on the ground that what 
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he said was untrustworthy”). Consequently, the exception to the hearsay rule for statements 

against interest does not govern the admissibility of appellant’s previous testimony. See Johnson 

v. State, 263 S.W.3d 405, 423 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. ref’d); Bell, 877 S.W.2d at 24 n.2. 

And appellant’s statements are not barred by the hearsay rule. See Johnson, 263 S.W.3d at 423. 

As a result, we overrule appellant’s first issue. See Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 857 (concluding 

appellate court will uphold a trial court’s decision to admit evidence when reasonably supported 

by the record and correct under any applicable theory of law).

ADMISSION OF EXHIBITS

In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting two exhibits 

because there was no evidence linking appellant to the conviction indicated in the exhibits.

Background

At the punishment phase of trial, the State offered State’s exhibits 43 and 44 as selfauthenticating and certified documents. State’s exhibit 43 was a judgment adjudicating guilt 

entered on June 14, 2010 against Jaqualyn Labrun Jackson for a robbery that occurred on 

February 10, 2009 for which the defendant was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. State’s 

exhibit 44 was a judgment of conviction by the court entered on February 14, 2011 against 

Jaqualyn Labrun Jackson for the same robbery that suspended the defendant’s sentence of 

confinement and placed the defendant on community supervision for ten years. A handwritten 

notation at the top of exhibit 44 reads “Shock Probation.”4

 Appellant objected that the 

documents were not “a final connection to” appellant. The court overruled appellant’s objection, 

ruled that the exhibits were self-authenticating, certified documents, and admitted the exhibits.

 4 In addition, the State offered exhibit 42, which was an order of deferred adjudication entered on March 26, 2009 for a robbery that 

occurred on February 10, 2009. Appellant did not object to admission of State’s exhibit 42.
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Standard of Review and Applicable Law

As stated above, we review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of 

discretion and will uphold a trial court’s decision to admit evidence when it is reasonably 

supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. McCarty, 

257 S.W.3d at 239; Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 857.

In order to establish that a defendant has been convicted of a previous offense, the State 

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists and (2) the defendant is 

linked to the conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07(3)(a)(1) (West Supp. 2013). There is no specific 

document or mode of proof required to prove these two elements. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921. 

Rather, the State may use “[a]ny type of evidence, documentary or testimonial” to make its 

proof. Id. at 922. The trier of fact looks at the totality of the admitted evidence to determine if 

these two elements are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 923.

With respect to the first prong of Flowers, rule of evidence 902(4) allows admission of 

certified copies of public records without extrinsic evidence of authenticity. TEX. R. EVID.

902(4); see Benton v. State, 336 S.W.3d 355, 357 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) 

(concluding juvenile court documents concerning previous judgments were self-authenticating 

under rule of evidence 902(4)). But to satisfy the second prong of Flowers, “it is incumbent on 

the State to go forward and show by independent evidence that the defendant is the person so 

previously convicted.” Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant argues that the trial court improperly admitted State’s exhibits 43 and 44 

because the State did not present any evidence linking appellant to the conviction reflected in the 

exhibits. Appellant cites Littles v. State for the proposition that providing only evidence of 
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certified copies of the sentence and judgment is not sufficient to link a defendant to the 

conviction. 726 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Appellant quotes Littles to describe one 

“popular” method for establishing that the defendant on trial is the same person as the one 

previously convicted: introducing certified copies of the judgment and sentence and the record of 

the Texas Department of Corrections or county jail that includes fingerprints, and expert witness 

testimony identifying those prints as belonging to the accused. See id. Appellant contends that, 

although the State offered a certified copy of the judgments and sentences that included one 

thumbprint attached to exhibit 43, no expert witness identified the print as identical to appellant’s 

print and the State did not offer any other evidence connecting appellant to the conviction. 

Appellant acknowledges that a probation officer testified about what was reflected in the exhibits 

and explained deferred and shock probation, but claims that the officer never identified appellant 

as the same person as the person named in the documents. In addition, appellant maintains that 

appellant was harmed by admission of the exhibits because, without them, there would have been 

no evidence of prior criminal history and the jury may have been more lenient. Appellant argues 

that, consequently, he is entitled to a new punishment hearing.

The State argues that the trial court’s ruling admitting exhibits 43 and 44 was not an 

abuse of discretion. Citing rule of evidence 902(4), the State contends that the certified copies of 

the documents in State’s exhibits 43 and 44 were self-authenticating and admissible for purposes 

of proving the prior conviction. See TEX. R. EVID. 902(4) (self-authentication of certified copies 

of public records). The State argues that, although appellant contends that the trial court erred in 

admitting the exhibits, appellant’s argument focuses on the sufficiency of the evidence to prove 

the prior conviction. The State cites Beck for the proposition that admission of the judgments as 

self-authenticating documents is distinct from proving the link between the prior conviction and 

the defendant. 719 S.W.2d at 210 (stating that certified copies of a judgment and sentence and 
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authenticated records of penal institutions are admissible but not normally sufficient standing 

alone to prove prior convictions and the State must “go forward” and show by independent 

evidence that the defendant was the person previously convicted).

The State maintains that, in addition to the self-authenticating prior judgments, it offered 

sufficient evidence to link appellant to the judgments. The State argues that this evidence 

included (1) testimony by a probation officer in which the officer affirmed that “this defendant”

was placed on a five-year term of deferred probation in 2009, had his probation revoked in 2010, 

and was given a second opportunity on probation and sentenced to ten years’ community 

supervision, (2) appellant’s full name on both State’s exhibits 43 and 44, the indictment, the jury 

charge, and the verdict form at the punishment phase, (3) the same state identification number on 

the judgments in State’s exhibits 43 and 44, and (4) testimony by appellant’s brother that he was 

aware that appellant was on probation in 2009, had violated his probation a year later, was 

sentenced to ten years’ community supervision, received shock probation, and committed the 

offense in this case after he was released from prison.

Analysis

Appellant’s argument that the “trial court erred in admitting State Exhibit Nos. 43 and 44 

since there was no evidence linking Jackson to the conviction” conflates the two prongs of 

Flowers. Under Flowers, in order for the State to establish that appellant had been convicted of 

the prior offense, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction 

existed and (2) the defendant was linked to that conviction. See 220 S.W.3d at 921. Under rule 

of evidence 902(4), State’s exhibit 43 comprising a judgment adjudicating guilt and State’s 

exhibit 44 comprising a judgment of conviction by the court and associated documents 

concerning community supervision were admissible as certified copies of public records without 

extrinsic evidence of authenticity. See TEX. R. EVID. 902(4).
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The substance of appellant’s argument centers on the second prong of Flowers: that 

State’s exhibits 43 and 44 were not sufficient evidence to link appellant to the conviction 

reflected in those exhibits. See 220 S.W.3d at 921; Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 210 (stating certified 

copies of judgment, sentence, and penal institution records are admissible but “not normally 

sufficient standing alone to prove the prior convictions”). Although appellant contends that the 

State did not present any evidence linking appellant to the conviction, we conclude that the State 

did meet its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was “the person so 

previously convicted.” Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 210. The State presented testimony of John Priolo, 

the probation officer assigned to the trial court. Priolo testified that (1) State’s exhibit 43 showed 

that “probation was revoked” for “this defendant” a “year after being placed on probation” and 

that he was sentenced to ten years in prison and (2) State’s exhibit 44 reflected that “this 

defendant was given a second opportunity on probation” when he was brought back from the 

penitentiary and placed on shock probation.

The State also presented testimony by appellant’s brother, Craig Sessions. Sessions 

testified that he knew that appellant was placed on deferred adjudication for robbery in February 

2009,5 that “basically a year later” appellant “violated that probation[,]” and that “[h]e was 

sentenced to prison for ten years,” “[h]e got to see what prison is like for six months,” and then 

received “another shot at probation.” Sessions also testified that he was aware that “after getting 

that second break, he committed this offense[.]”

In addition, the name reflected in the judgments in State’s exhibits 43 and 44—Jaqualyn 

Labrun Jackson—mirrors appellant’s name as it appears in the indictment, jury charges, verdict 

forms, and judgment in this cause. See Benton v. State, 336 S.W.3d at 359 (concluding that 

while “the name alone is not the sole evidence connecting Benton to the prior convictions, it is 

 5 State’s exhibit 42 reflected that appellant was placed on deferred adjudication in March 2009.
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quite unlikely that another by the name of Courtney Antoine Benton was convicted in Harris 

County, Texas, within the time frames listed in those prior convictions”). Considering the 

totality of the evidence, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to satisfy its 

burden to link appellant to the prior conviction.

We reject appellant’s second issue.

FINE

In his third issue, appellant argues that this Court should reform the judgment to delete 

the $10,000 fine reflected in the judgment.

Background

When the jury returned its punishment verdict, the following exchange took place: 

THE COURT: Were you-all able to reach a verdict?

PRESIDING JUROR: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Would you have your client stand, please?

The verdict form reads as follows: We, the jury having found the 

defendant, Jaqualyn Labrun Jackson, guilty of the offense of murder, as included 

in the indictment, assess his punishment at 18 years confinement in the 

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a fine of 

$10,000.

Is that, in fact, your verdict?

PRESIDING JUROR: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: If this is, in fact, your individual verdicts, I need you to 

raise your right hand if this is, in fact, your verdict.

(Jurors respond.)

THE COURT: Okay. Let the jury—let the record reflect that there were 

12 hands that were raised.
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The trial court asked the State and the defense if they had anything further, and both 

responded that they did not. The court then released the jury. With the defendant present, the 

court proceeded: 

THE COURT: You may be seated.

Ms. Clark, is there any reason under law why your client should not be at 

this time sentenced?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. It is the order, judgment and decree of this Court 

that the defendant be taken by the Sheriff of Dallas County and by her safely held, 

until he can be turned over to the authorized receiving agent, for the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division, to serve out his sentence of 

18 years confinement, in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional 

Division.

Okay. Make sure that your client files his certification of his right to 

appeal and, also, his appeal, if he so chooses.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, your Honor.

The judgment reflected a sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.

Applicable Law

A defendant’s sentence must be pronounced orally in the defendant’s presence. TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.03, § 1(a) (West Supp. 2013); Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 

500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The judgment, including the assessed sentence, is the “written 

declaration and embodiment of that oral pronouncement.” Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 500; see TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.01, § 1 (West Supp. 2013). When the oral pronouncement of a 

sentence and the sentence in the written judgment conflict, the oral pronouncement controls. 

Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 500; Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)

(holding “when there is a variation between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written 

memorialization of the sentence, the oral pronouncement controls”). But not every variation 

between the oral pronouncement and the judgment will necessarily invoke this rule. Aguilar v. 
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State, 202 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d). Rather, “if there is a 

conflicting variation, the oral pronouncement will control.” Id. Where the variation “does not 

create a conflict sufficient to invoke the rule of Coffey and its progeny[,]” “the jury’s punishment 

verdict, the court’s pronouncement, and the written judgment should be read together in an effort 

to resolve the ambiguity.” Id.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant argues that, because the judge did not assess a fine when he orally pronounced 

appellant’s sentence, the written judgment is incorrect and this Court should reform the judgment 

to delete the fine. The State concedes that the trial court did not assess the $10,000 fine in 

appellant’s presence, but argues that—because the trial court’s oral pronouncement is 

ambiguous—the proper remedy is for this Court to read the jury’s punishment verdict, the 

court’s oral pronouncement, and the written judgment together. The State contends that, because 

the court imposed the sentence “immediately after” the jury rendered its punishment verdict that

included the term of imprisonment and a $10,000 fine and because the written judgment reflects 

the assessed fine, “it can be presumed that the trial court intended to sentence Appellant in 

accordance with the jury’s verdict[.]”

Analysis

Directly before the court pronounced appellant’s sentence, the court read the jury’s 

verdict form aloud, in which the jury assessed appellant’s punishment at eighteen years’ 

imprisonment and a $10,000 fine and asked the jurors to raise their hands to confirm that this 

reflected their individual verdicts. The judge then stated for the record that all twelve jurors

raised their hands. After confirming that neither the State nor the defense had anything else to 

present, dismissing the jury, and inquiring whether there was any legal reason why appellant 

should not be sentenced, the court immediately stated that appellant would be taken by the 
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appropriate authorities “to serve out his sentence of 18 years confinement[.]” The trial judge 

clearly intended to sentence appellant according to the jury’s verdict. The written judgment is 

consistent with the jury’s verdict. “[T]he context of the oral pronouncement makes clear that all 

understood the pronouncement to be what was ultimately incorporated into the written order.” 

Hill v. State, 213 S.W.3d 533, 536 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.). We read the jury’s 

verdict, the oral pronouncement, and the written judgment together to include the fine in the 

judgment. See Aguilar, 202 S.W.3d at 843.

We overrule appellant’s third issue.

COURT COSTS

In his fourth issue, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial 

court’s order for appellant to pay $244 in court costs because the record does not contain a bill of 

costs. The record before us, however, does contain the bill of costs. And this Court has 

previously addressed and rejected the same argument appellant raises. See Johnson v. State, 423 

S.W.3d 385, 391–96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Coronel v. State, 416 S.W.3d 550, 555–56 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2013, pet. ref’d). We overrule appellant’s fourth issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

130004F.U05

/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/

ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

JAQUALYN LABRUN JACKSON, 

Appellant

No. 05-13-00004-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court 

No. 3, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F11-41279-J.

Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers, 

Justices Myers and Lewis participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 11th day of June, 2014.

/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/

ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS

JUSTICE