Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1604-CT-831 | December 27, 2016 Page 1 of 19

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

John D. Papageorge

Jeffrey D. Stemerick

Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Brad M. Gordon

Grotefeld, Hoffman, Schleiter, 

Gordon, Ochoa, & Evinger, LLP

Chicago, Illinois

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Watts Water Technologies, Inc.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 

a/s/o Richard Lucka,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 27, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A04-1604-CT-831

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Diane Kavadias 

Schneider, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45D11-1507-CT-125

Brown, Judge.
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[1] Watts Water Technologies, Inc. (“Watts”) appeals the trial court’s order 

denying its motion to compel arbitration. Watts raises three issues which we 

consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred in denying its motion. 

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Watts and State Farm Fire & Casualty, Co. (“State Farm”) were signatories to 

a Property Subrogation Arbitration Agreement (the “Arbitration Agreement”), 

which provided in part:

By signing this Agreement, the company accepts and binds itself 

to the following:

Article First

Compulsory Provisions

Signatory companies must forego litigation and submit any 

personal, commercial, or self-insured property subrogation claims 

to Arbitration Forums, Inc. (herein after referred to as AF).

* * * * *

Article Fourth

Non-Compulsory Provisions

The parties may, with written consent, submit a claim:

(a) that exceeds this forum’s monetary limit

(b) where a non-signatory wants to participate.

Once a company gives written consent, all Articles and Rules of this 

forum are applicable, and the company may not revoke its consent.

* * * * *
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Article Fifth

AF’s Function and Authority

AF, representing the signatory companies, is authorized to:

(a) make appropriate Rules and Regulations for the presentation and 

determination of controversies under this Agreement;

(b) determine the location, and the means by which, arbitration 

cases are heard;

(c) determine qualification criteria and provide for the selection and 

appointment of arbitrators;

(d) establish fees;

(e) invite other insurance carriers, noninsurers, or self-insureds to 

participate in this arbitration program, and compel the 

withdrawal of any signatory for failure to conform to the 

Agreement or the Rules issued thereunder.

* * * * *

Article Sixth

Withdrawals

Any signatory company may withdraw from this Agreement by 

notice in writing to AF. Such withdrawal will become effective 

sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice except as to cases then 

pending before arbitration panels. The effective date of 

withdrawal as to such pending cases shall be upon final 

compliance with the finding of the arbitration panel on those 

cases.

Appellant’s Appendix at 41-42. 

[3] In November 2014, Arbitration Forums gave notice to the parties that it 

intended to amend the Arbitration Agreement. The notification stated:

Effective January 1, 2015, the following changes to AF’s 

Property Program will be implemented:
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A new exclusion to Article Second of the Property Subrogation 

Arbitration Agreement to read:

• “No company shall be required, without its written consent, to 

arbitrate any claim or suit if: (i) it is a product liability claim 

arising from an alleged defective product.”

* * * * *

While the use of the Property Program to resolve disputes 

involving product liability claims arising from an alleged 

defective product will no longer be compulsory as of January 1, 

2015, cases filed prior to January 1, 2015, will remain in 

arbitration’s jurisdiction and will be processed to hearing.

Id. at 74. 

[4] Effective January 1, 2015, the amended Arbitration Agreement (the “Amended 

Arbitration Agreement”) provided:

Article Second

Exclusions

No company shall be required, without its written consent, to 

arbitrate any claim or suit if:

* * * * *

(i) it is a product liability claim arising from an alleged defective 

product.

Id. at 72.
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[5] On July 23, 2015, State Farm a/s/o Richard Lucka filed a complaint against 

Watts alleging that Lucka purchased a water heater with a Watts brand 

connector and that the connector failed on November 30, 2014, causing water 

damage to Lucka’s home and property. The complaint alleged: Count I, 

“Products Liability – Defective Manufacturing;” Count II, “Products Liability –

Defective Design;” Count III, “Products Liability – Negligent Manufacturing;” 

Count IV, “Negligent Design;” and Count V, “Breach of Implied 

Merchantability.” Id. at 11-13 (capitalization removed). State Farm alleged 

that it was subrogated to the rights of the insured, Lucka, to the extent of its 

payments to or for Lucka. On October 28, 2015, State Farm filed an amended 

complaint correcting the address where the incident occurred. 

[6] On December 17, 2015, Watts filed a Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, 

to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration. On March 22, 2016, the court 

denied Watts’s motion. Specifically, the order states:

Findings of Facts

1. [State Farm] filed a claim against [Watts] for, among other 

things, a product liability claim.

2. This cause of action stems from a defective Watts water heater 

connector that failed resulting in water damage on November 30, 

2014 to the home of Richard Lucka, State Farm insured.

3. The water damaged Mr. Lucka’s home and property resulting 

in State Farm paying $27,805.00 under his insurance policy.
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4. An engineer inspected the Watts water heater connector and 

determined it was defective on January 7, 2015.

5. State Farm did not make a final payment to Mr. Lucka until 

January 29, 2015.

6. State Farm and Watts are members of Arbitration Forums, 

Inc. (hereinafter referred to as AF).

7. AF has the ability to []make appropriate Rules and 

Regulations for the presentation and determination of 

controversies under an agreement with AF.

8. AF exercised their right and changed the articles of their 

Property Subrogation Arbitration Agreement that added the 

exclusion and now reads, “No company shall be required, 

without its written consent, to arbitrate any claim or suit if: (i) it 

is a product liability claim arising from an alleged defective 

product.”

9. This new exclusion was effective as of January 1, 2015.

Conclusions of Law

10. The determination of whether an enforceable agreement to 

arbitrate exists is a matter of contract interpretation, and most 

importantly, a matter of the parties’ intent. Precision Homes of 

Indiana, Inc. v. Pickford, 844 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)[, 

trans. denied].

11. State law governs the initial question of whether the parties 

entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate. Mislenkov v. Accurate 

Metal Detinning, Inc., 743 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
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12. A court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only 

where the court is satisfied that both parties agreed to arbitrate 

that dispute. Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, et 

al., 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).

13. “An agreement to arbitrate is a matter of contract: ‘it is a 

way to resolve those disputes – but only those disputes – that the 

parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.” Chiron Corp. v. 

Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000).

14. State Farm and Watts were both members of AF and gave 

AF the ability to make rules and regulations as AF saw fit.

15. AF wrote a notification about a new policy was [sic] sent in 

November of 2014. The new exclusion was to be effective 

January 1, 2015.

16. The notification draws the attention of the parties to 

understand that, “While the use of the Property Program to 

resolve disputes involving product liability claims arising from an 

alleged defective product will no longer be compulsory as of 

January 1, 2015, cased [sic] filed prior to January 1, 2015, will 

remain in arbitration’s jurisdiction and will be processed to 

hearing.” 

17. This statement by AF makes the filing date the triggering 

event for the new policy not the date of the injury.

18. As a part of the AF agreement, participants had a way to 

withdraw from the services of AF.

19. Neither, State Farm nor Watts withdrew from the AF 

agreement. By not withdrawing from participating in AF, State 

Farm and Watts subjected themselves to the new exclusion.
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Id. at 7-9.

Discussion

[7] The issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Watts’s motion to compel 

arbitration.1

 Watts argues that neither the Amended Arbitration Agreement 

nor Arbitration Forums’ notice terminated its right to arbitrate State Farm’s 

property subrogation claim that accrued prior to January 1, 2015. Watts asserts 

that Arbitration Forums is a nonparty to the Arbitration Agreement and that its 

“take on the subject is simply not relevant to the intent of Watts or State Farm.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 16. Watts contends that this Court should avoid an 

interpretation of the Arbitration Agreement that would render State Farm’s 

agreement to arbitrate illusory. It argues that State Farm is collaterally 

estopped from relitigating the issue of whether the Arbitration Agreement in 

effect when its claim accrued governs the arbitrability of the claim. Watts also 

asserts that State Farm did not allege a product liability claim subject to the 

product liability exclusion. 

[8] State Farm argues that Arbitration Forums, pursuant to the rule-making 

authority expressly granted to it by Watts, clearly made the date of filing

determinative. State Farm contends that by carving out an exception for only 

claims which had been filed prior to January 1, 2015, the only reasonable 

 

1 On July 25, 2016, Watts filed a motion to strike material not in the record. Specifically, it argued that the 

Declaration of Timothy McKernan, which State Farm included in its Addendum, was not filed in the trial court 

and is not part of the record on appeal. By separate order, we grant Watts’s motion to strike.
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construction of Arbitration Forums’ amendment is that the exclusion would 

apply to all other unfiled claims, notwithstanding whether a party could have 

filed a claim in 2014 or earlier. It argues that to extend the Amended 

Arbitration Agreement to include product defect cases filed in 2015 would 

contradict the plain language of the rule and the intentions of Arbitration 

Forums and the signatories it represented as expressed in that language. It 

further contends that Watts’s argument that Arbitration Forums’ own rule is 

extrinsic evidence is mistaken because the Arbitration Agreement expressly 

authorized all rules and regulations issued by Arbitration Forums. State Farm 

also argues that Watts has no vested right to arbitration of any matter until a 

claim is formally filed and that Watts had only a contingent right to arbitrate 

claims based on the parties’ mutual status as signatories. It states that the 

Amended Arbitration Agreement is not illusory because a disputed claim filed 

prior to a revision of the rules must be arbitrated with Arbitration Forums, and

that it alleged a product liability claim subject to the product liability exclusion. 

[9] Our standard of review in this case is de novo. Showboat Marina Casino P’ship v. 

Tonn & Blank Constr., 790 N.E.2d 595, 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing 

Mislenkov v. Accurate Metal Detinning, Inc., 743 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2001)). It is well settled that Indiana recognizes a strong policy favoring 

enforcement of arbitration agreements. Homes By Pate, Inc. v. DeHaan, 713 

N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Nevertheless, arbitration is a matter of 

contract, and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration unless the party 

has agreed to do so. Id.
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[10] Under Indiana contract law, the party seeking to compel arbitration has the 

burden of demonstrating the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement. 

Showboat Marina Casino P’ship, 790 N.E.2d at 597-598 (citing Wilson Fertilizer & 

Grain, Inc. v. ADM Milling Co., 654 N.E.2d 848, 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. 

denied). In determining whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate a particular 

dispute, the court “will decide whether the dispute, on its face, is covered by the 

language of the arbitration provision.” St. John Sanitary Dist. v. Town of 

Schererville, 621 N.E.2d N.E.2d 1160, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). When 

determining whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate a dispute, we also 

apply ordinary contract principles governed by state law. Showboat Marina 

Casino P’ship, 790 N.E.2d at 598 (citing Mislenkov, 743 N.E.2d at 289 (citing St. 

John Sanitary Dist., 621 N.E.2d 1160 at 1162)). “In addition, ‘[w]hen construing 

arbitration agreements, every doubt is to be resolved in favor of arbitration,’ and 

the ‘parties are bound to arbitrate all matters, not explicitly excluded, that 

reasonably fit within the language used.’” Id. (quoting Mislenkov, 743 N.E.2d at 

289 (citing St. John Sanitary Dist., 621 N.E.2d at 1162)). However, parties are 

only bound to arbitrate those issues that by clear language they have agreed to 

arbitrate; arbitration agreements will not be extended by construction or 

implication. Id. 

[11] Whether the parties agreed to arbitrate any disputes is a matter of contract 

interpretation, and most importantly, a matter of the parties’ intent. MPACT 

Const. Grp., LLC v. Superior Concrete Constructors, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 901, 906 (Ind. 

2004). “Courts in Indiana have long recognized the freedom of parties to enter 
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into contracts and have presumed that contracts represent the freely bargained 

agreement of the parties.” Id. (quoting Trimble v. Ameritech Publ’g, Inc., 700 

N.E.2d 1128, 1129 (Ind. 1998)). Consequently, imposing on parties a policy 

favoring arbitration before determining whether they agreed to arbitrate could 

frustrate the parties’ intent and their freedom to contract. Id. “The Supreme 

Court has made this clear – ‘arbitration is a matter of contract and a party 

cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed 

so to submit.’” Id. (quoting AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 

U.S. 643, 648, 106 S. Ct. 1415 (1986)).

[12] To the extent Watts asserts that Arbitration Forums’ notice regarding the 

amendment is extrinsic or that Arbitration Forums did not have the authority to 

amend the Arbitration Agreement to provide for the product liability exclusion, 

we disagree. Watts agreed to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, and 

Article Fifth of the Arbitration Agreement stated that Arbitration Forums, 

“representing the signatory companies, is authorized to . . . make appropriate 

Rules and Regulations for the presentation and determination of controversies 

under this Agreement . . . .” Appellant’s Appendix at 42. We conclude that the 

notice and amendment fall within Arbitration Forums’ authority.

[13] As for Watts’s argument that the language of the amendment did not remove 

the requirement of arbitration from State Farm’s claim, we observe that the 

notice from Arbitration Forums regarding the amendment states: “While the 

use of the Property Program to resolve disputes involving product liability 

claims arising from an alleged defective product will no longer be compulsory 
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as of January 1, 2015, cases filed prior to January 1, 2015, will remain in 

arbitration’s jurisdiction and will be processed to hearing.” Id. at 74 (emphasis 

added). Further, the Amended Arbitration Agreement, which was effective 

January 1, 2015, provided that “[n]o company shall be required, without its 

written consent, to arbitrate any claim or suit if . . . it is a product liability claim 

arising from an alleged defective product.” Id. at 72 (emphasis added). We 

cannot say that the language in the notice or amendment is ambiguous. The 

notice and Amended Arbitration Agreement indicate that the filing date of a 

claim or suit determines whether compulsory arbitration applies to the claim or 

suit. State Farm filed its complaint against Watts on July 23, 2015. 

Accordingly, it is not subject to compulsory arbitration. See State Farm Fire & 

Cas. Co. v. Watts Regulator Co. (filed September 29, 2016), Ill. App. Ct. No. 2-16-

0275, slip op. at 7 (addressing an event in which Cecilia Montero’s home 

sustained water damage on September 7, 2013, the Arbitration Agreement, and 

the November 2014 notice regarding the amendment effective January 1, 2015, 

and holding that “[t]he amendment clearly states that cases filed prior to 

January 1, 2015, will remain subject to compulsory arbitration. Necessarily, if 

a claim was filed on or after January 1, 2015, the only reading of the 

amendment is that the claim does not remain subject to the agreement. Here, 

Montero’s claim was filed on April 15, 2015, and, therefore, it is not subject to 

compulsory arbitration through Arbitration Forums”).

[14] Watts cites Homes by Pate, Inc. v. DeHaan, 713 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), 

Chesterfield Mgmt., Inc. v. Cook, 655 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), reh’g denied, 
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trans. denied, and Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, 430 U.S. 243 (1977), for the 

assertion that State Farm’s duty to arbitrate survived the amendment. The 

arbitration provisions addressed in those cases did not include language 

providing an entity with the authority to “make appropriate Rules and 

Regulations for the presentation and determination of controversies under this 

Agreement,” language to which the parties in this case expressly agreed upon.

Appellant’s Appendix at 42, 73. Nor do those cases involve such an entity 

providing for a property liability exclusion similar to the language in the notice 

and Amended Arbitration Agreement. See Homes by Pate, Inc., 713 N.E.2d at 

305-306, 309 (addressing a residential building contract and two-year warranty 

which required arbitration with respect to disputes as to whether particular 

repairs were covered by the warranty and holding that a logical reading of the 

warranty led to the conclusion that, so long as a defect occurred within the twoyear period of warranty coverage, any dispute concerning that coverage must be 

arbitrated); Chesterfield Mgmt. Inc., 655 N.E.2d at 102 (addressing an arbitration 

provision in a lease and observing that the lease’s arbitration clause provided in 

part that “[a]ny dispute under any of the paragraphs of this Lease shall be 

settled by arbitration”); Nolde Bros., Inc., 430 U.S. at 244, 252-254, 97 S. Ct. at 

1068, 1072-1073 (addressing whether a party to a collective-bargaining contract 

may be required to arbitrate a contractual dispute over severance pay pursuant 

to an arbitration clause of that agreement even though the dispute, although 

governed by the contract, arose after its termination, noting that the parties 

drafted their broad arbitration clause against a backdrop of well-established 

federal labor policy favoring arbitration, and holding “even though the parties 
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could have so provided, there is nothing in the arbitration clause that expressly 

excludes from its operation a dispute which arises under the contract, but which 

is based on events that occur after its termination. The contract’s silence, of 

course, does not establish the parties’ intent to resolve post-termination 

grievances by arbitration. But in the absence of some contrary indication, there 

are strong reasons to conclude that the parties did not intend their arbitration 

duties to terminate automatically with the contract”).

[15] With respect to Watts’s argument that State Farm’s duty to arbitrate is illusory, 

we observe that Watts does not argue that Arbitration Forums’ duty under the 

Amended Arbitration Agreement is illusory. Article Sixth of the Agreement 

allows any signatory to withdraw from the Agreement by notice in writing to 

Arbitration Forums. In addition, other categories of damage to property 

remain subject to compulsory arbitration under the Amended Arbitration 

Agreement. The Amended Agreement and the notice require that State Farm 

arbitrate certain claims asserted before January 1, 2015. The fact that product 

liability claims are not subject to compulsory arbitration under the Amended 

Agreement does not render the agreement illusory. See Watts Regulator Co. (filed 

September 29, 2016), Ill. App. Ct. No. 2-16-0275, slip op. at 8 (rejecting Watts’s 

argument that State Farm could avoid their obligations to arbitrate). 

[16] As for Watts’s assertion that State Farm is collaterally estopped from 

relitigating the issue of whether the Arbitration Agreement in effect when its 

claim accrued governs the arbitrability of the claim, we note that issue 

preclusion, or collateral estoppel, bars subsequent relitigation of the same fact 
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or issue where that fact or issue was necessarily adjudicated in a former lawsuit 

and that same fact or issue is presented in a subsequent suit. Nat’l Wine & 

Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 976 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 2012) (citing 

Hayworth v. Schilli Leasing, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 165, 167 (Ind. 1996)), reh’g denied, 

cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2780 (2013). Where, as here, a defendant seeks to 

prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim that the plaintiff has previously 

litigated and lost, the use has been termed “defensive” collateral estoppel. Small 

v. Centocor, Inc., 731 N.E.2d 22, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh’g denied, trans. 

denied. There are three requirements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to 

apply: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) 

identity of the issues; and (3) the party to be estopped was a party or the privity 

of a party in the prior action. Nat’l Wine & Spirits, 976 N.E.2d at 704. 

Furthermore, two additional considerations are relevant in deciding whether 

the defensive use of collateral estoppel is appropriate: “whether the party 

against whom the judgment is pled had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 

issue, and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances to 

permit the use of collateral estoppel.” Id. (quoting Small, 731 N.E.2d at 28).

[17] The parties cite to various trial court orders from multiple states. Some are in 

favor of Watts, and others favor State Farm. Specifically, Watts cites to trial 

court orders from Tennessee, Georgia, Nevada, and Utah. State Farm cites to 

trial court orders from Georgia, Massachusetts, and Minnesota. As these 

orders and decisions produce different results, and under the circumstances
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presented, we cannot say it would be fair to permit the use of collateral estoppel

by Watts.

[18] We next turn to Watts’s argument that State Farm did not allege a product 

liability claim subject to the product liability exclusion. Watts cites to the 

Indiana Products Liability Act, Ind. Code §§ 34-20, and asserts that State 

Farm’s claims do not constitute product liability claims because State Farm did 

not allege “physical harm” or “sudden, major damage” to Lucka’s property or 

home. Appellant’s Brief at 24-25. Watts asserts that State Farm’s complaint 

alleging that the damage happened “[o]n or about” November 30, 2014,

suggests gradually evolving damage and not the physical harm necessary for

product liability claims. Id. (quoting Appellant’s Appendix at 18). Watts also 

argues that the complaint does not allege the nature of any defect in Watts’s 

connector or the nature of the risk the defect presented. Watts also asserts that 

a broad interpretation of the product liability exclusion would swallow the 

general rule requiring arbitration. 

[19] State Farm argues that nowhere is a signatory required to comply with any 

particular state’s pleading standard to meet the exception and that whether or 

not the claim is subject to dismissal under Indiana state law has no bearing 

upon the interpretation of the arbitration agreements. State Farm also argues 

that Watts failed to raise any of the alleged pleading deficiencies to the trial 

court and has waived this issue. In reply, Watts contends that the trial court 

expressly ruled that State Farm’s claim was a product liability claim and that it 

did not waive the argument. 
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[20] Even assuming that Watts did not waive this issue and that an examination of 

Indiana statutory law regarding products liability is necessary, we cannot say 

that reversal is warranted. Ind. Code § 34-20-1-1 governs the applicability of 

the article addressing product liability actions and provides:

This article governs all actions that are:

(1) brought by a user or consumer;

(2) against a manufacturer or seller; and

(3) for physical harm caused by a product;

regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which 

the action is brought.

Ind. Code § 34-6-2-105 provides that “‘[p]hysical harm’, for purposes of IC 34-

20, means bodily injury, death, loss of services, and rights arising from any such 

injuries, as well as sudden, major damage to property,” and “[t]he term does 

not include gradually evolving damage to property or economic losses from 

such damage.”

[21] Ind. Code § 34-20-2-1 is titled “Grounds,” and addresses the grounds for a 

product liability action as follows:

Except as provided in section 3 of this chapter, a person who 

sells, leases, or otherwise puts into the stream of commerce any 

product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to any 

user or consumer or to the user’s or consumer’s property is 

subject to liability for physical harm caused by that product to the 

user or consumer or to the user’s or consumer’s property if:
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(1) that user or consumer is in the class of persons that the 

seller should reasonably foresee as being subject to the 

harm caused by the defective condition;

(2) the seller is engaged in the business of selling the 

product; and

(3) the product is expected to and does reach the user or 

consumer without substantial alteration in the condition in 

which the product is sold by the person sought to be held 

liable under this article.

[22] State Farm alleged: Count I, “Products Liability – Defective Manufacturing;” 

Count II, “Products Liability – Defective Design;” Count III, “Products 

Liability – Negligent Manufacturing;” and Count IV, “Negligent Design.” 

Appellant’s Appendix at 18-20. State Farm’s amended complaint also alleged 

that Watts manufactured the connector and/or its components, that the 

connector failed causing water damage resulting in damages to Lucka’s 

property, that damages of $27,805 were incurred, and that the connector and/or 

its components were defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time it left 

Watts. We cannot say that State Farm’s claims did not fall within the exclusion 

in the Amended Arbitration Agreement which stated: “No company shall be 

required, without its written consent, to arbitrate any claim or suit if . . . it is a 

product liability claim arising from an alleged defective product.” Appellant’s 

Appendix at 72.
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Conclusion

[23] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Watts’s 

motion to compel arbitration.

[24] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.