UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5064

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER LAMAR JACKSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge. 

(7:07-cr-00711-HFF-4; 7:09-cv-70020-HFF)

Submitted: February 16, 2012 Decided: March 1, 2012

Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Marc Gregory Hall, HALL & CHO, P.C., Rockville, Maryland, for 

Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, E. Jean 

Howard, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Christopher Lamar Jackson appeals his conviction and 

192-month sentence following his guilty plea to conspiracy to 

possess with intent to distribute and distribution of five 

kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty kilograms or more of 

crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). On 

appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious 

grounds for appeal but questioning whether the district court’s 

sentence was proper. Jackson filed pro se supplemental briefs

raising additional issues. 

Pursuant to our review under Anders, we directed the 

parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the adequacy of

the district court’s explanation for the sentence and the 

standard of review to be applied on appeal. In the supplemental 

brief, Jackson’s counsel asserts the district court failed to 

provide an adequate explanation for the chosen sentence. The 

Government asserts that the appellate waiver provision in the

plea agreement bars any claim of sentencing error. We affirm in 

part and dismiss in part. 

We review a defendant’s waiver of appellate rights de 

novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 

2005). “A defendant may waive his right to appeal if that 

waiver is the result of a knowing and intelligent decision to 
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forgo the right to appeal.” United States v. Amaya-Portillo, 

423 F.3d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). To determine whether the waiver is knowing and 

intelligent, we look to “the totality of the circumstances, 

including the experience and conduct of the accused, as well as 

the accused’s educational background and familiarity with the 

terms of the plea agreement.” United States v. General, 278 

F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We will enforce a valid waiver so long as “the issue 

being appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” Blick, 408 

F.3d at 168. 

In the plea agreement, Jackson agreed to “waive[] the 

right to contest either the conviction or the sentence in any 

direct appeal or other post-conviction action,” excepting only 

claims of ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct 

from the scope of the waiver. Neither counsel nor Jackson

asserts any error in the plea colloquy or challenges the 

validity of the appellate waiver.*

 Our review of the record 

leads us to conclude that Jackson’s waiver was knowing and 

intelligent. 

 * Although Jackson asserts the Government breached the plea 

agreement by improperly using information he shared under a 

cooperation agreement to enhance his sentence, we conclude that 

his claim is not supported by the record.
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Turning to the scope of the waiver, we conclude that 

the issue raised in the Anders briefs and the sentencing issues 

raised in the pro se supplemental briefs fall within the scope 

of the appellate waiver provision. Because Jackson’s sentencing 

claims are barred by the appellate waiver provision, we dismiss 

this portion of the appeal. 

The waiver provision does not, however, bar the 

ineffective assistance claim Jackson raises in his pro se 

supplemental briefs. “A defendant can raise the claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel . . . on direct appeal if and 

only if it conclusively appears from the record that his counsel 

did not provide effective assistance. . . .” United States v. 

Martinez, 136 F.3d 972, 979 (4th Cir. 1998). We conclude that 

the record does not conclusively demonstrate that counsel was 

ineffective. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 

694 (1984) (providing elements of ineffective assistance claim).

Thus, we decline to consider Jackson’s ineffective assistance 

claim on direct appeal.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record and have found no unwaived and potentially meritorious 

issues for review. We therefore affirm Jackson’s conviction and 

dismiss the appeal of his sentence. This court requires that 

counsel inform Jackson, in writing, of his right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If 
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Jackson requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in 

this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s 

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Jackson. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

conclusions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART