UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-5027

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CLEVELAND DEWAYNE EASTERLING,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., 

Chief District Judge. (1:02-cr-00383-JAB-1)

Submitted: April 27, 2012 Decided: June 5, 2012

Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Todd A. Smith, LAW OFFICE OF TODD ALLEN SMITH, Graham, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, 

Stephen T. Inman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, 

North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Cleveland Dewayne Easterling appeals the district 

court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing 

him to twenty-four months in prison. On appeal, he contends 

that the district court erred by refusing to hear evidence 

regarding whether his underlying conviction was still valid in 

light of United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) 

(en banc). We affirm.

We review a district court’s judgment revoking 

supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th 

Cir. 1992). Challenges to a district court’s authority or 

jurisdiction are matters of law reviewed de novo. United 

States v. Winfield, 665 F.3d 107, 109 (4th Cir. 2012); United 

States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 451 (4th Cir. 2011). 

Procedural sentencing claims and other specific claims of 

sentencing error raised for the first time on appeal are 

reviewed for plain error. United States v. Hargrove, 625 F.3d 

170, 184 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 292 (2011); 

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010).

To revoke supervised release, a district court need 

only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a 

preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006). 

We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised 
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release if it is within the prescribed statutory range and not 

plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 

439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether the sentence 

is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id. at 438. In 

this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential posture 

concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than 

reasonableness review for Guidelines sentences. United 

States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if 

we find the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable 

must we decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.

While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven 

policy statements and the statutory factors applicable to 

revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006), 

the court need not robotically tick through every subsection, 

and ultimately, the court has broad discretion to revoke the 

previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the 

statutory maximum. Id. at 656-57. Moreover, while a district 

court must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence, the 

court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a 

revocation sentence as when imposing a post-conviction sentence. 

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the 

district court did not err or abuse its discretion in revoking 

Easterling’s supervised release, and his sentence is reasonable. 
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The district court did not err in concluding that Easterling’s 

underlying conviction could not be attacked at the supervised 

release revocation hearing. See United States v. Warren, 335 

F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 2003). Easterling conceded the supervised 

release violation, and the district court reasonably concluded a 

twenty-four month prison sentence was appropriate.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED