If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

BRONSON HEALTH CARE GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

FOR PUBLICATION

November 7, 2019

9:00 a.m.

v No. 345332

Kalamazoo Circuit Court

STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY

INSURANCE COMPANY and STATE 

AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

LC No. 2017-000582-NF

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and BORRELLO and BOONSTRA, JJ.

BOONSTRA, J.

Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of 

defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Victor Caballero (Victor) was involved in an automobile accident while driving a motor 

vehicle insured under a Personal Auto Policy (the Policy) issued by State Auto1 to Maria 

Caballero (Maria), Victor’s wife. Victor sustained injuries and was treated by plaintiff; he 

assigned to plaintiff his right to seek payment of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under 

 1 The Policy bears a caption of STATE AUTO® Insurance Companies, and identifies the State 

Auto Insurance Companies are including, among others, State Auto Property & Casualty 

Insurance Company and State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company. The Policy’s 

declarations page identifies the company providing coverage under the Policy as “State 

Automobile Mutual.” For simplicity, and consistently with the parties’ treatment of the issue, we 

will refer to the insurer under the Policy, and collectively to the named defendants, as “State 

Auto.”
-2-

the Michigan no-fault insurance act (the no-fault act);

2 plaintiff in turn sought to recover them 

from State Auto. State Auto denied coverage on the ground that Victor was an excluded 

operator under the Policy. Plaintiff brought suit, asserting that Victor had a statutory right to 

receive PIP benefits and that plaintiff, by assignment, had a right to recover those benefits for the 

services it provided to Victor. State Auto moved for summary disposition under 

MCR 2.116(C)(10), contending that, as an excluded operator, Victor (and therefore plaintiff by 

assignment) was not entitled to recover PIP benefits from State Auto. Plaintiff argued that it was 

entitled to recover PIP benefits from State Auto because the Policy’s applicable Named Driver 

Exclusion Endorsement (the Endorsement) did not specify that PIP benefits would not apply (if 

Victor operated a covered motor vehicle); it instead only stated that certain other types of 

benefits would not apply. The trial court concluded that the language of the Policy as a whole 

reflected an intent to exclude PIP benefits when Victor, an excluded driver, was driving a 

covered vehicle. It therefore granted State Auto’s motion. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. 

Zaher v Miotke, 300 Mich App 132, 139; 832 NW2d 266 (2013).

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a plaintiff’s 

claim. Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no 

genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), 

this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant 

documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a 

trial. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of 

reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which 

reasonable minds might differ. [Id. at 139-140 (quotation marks and citations 

omitted).]

We review de novo as a question of law the interpretation of statutes. McCormick v 

Carrier, 487 Mich 180, 233; 795 NW2d 517 (2010). We also review de novo the construction 

and interpretation of an insurance contract. Lewis v Farmers Ins Exch, 315 Mich App 202, 209; 

888 NW2d 916 (2016).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of State 

Auto because, based on the plain and unambiguous language of the Endorsement, it did not 

 2 The no-fault act was enacted by 1972 PA 294, which added a chapter to the insurance code of 

1956, MCL 500.100 et seq. The no-fault act is found in chapter 31 of the insurance code, 

MCL 500.3101 et seq.
-3-

apply to PIP benefits. However, we disagree with plaintiff’s framing of the issue. Moreover, we 

conclude, after appropriately framing the issue, that the trial court properly granted summary 

disposition in favor of State Auto, although our reasoning differs somewhat from that of the trial 

court.

3

Although plaintiff argues that the issue before us is purely one of contract interpretation, 

we conclude that where, as here, the benefits in question are mandated by statute, the issue is 

actually one of statutory interpretation. “The no-fault act mandates certain minimal coverage,” 

although “a policy of insurance may provide broader coverage than that mandated under the 

statute or may provide supplemental coverage for benefits not required by the no-fault act.” See 

Rednour v Hasting Mut Ins Co, 245 Mich App 419, 422; 628 NW2d 116 (2001), rev’d on other 

grounds 468 Mich 241 (2003). For non-mandated coverage, “ it is the insurance policy as a 

contractual agreement between the parties that governs the coverage, rather than the statutory 

provisions of the no-fault act.” Id. However, for mandated coverage, it is the no-fault act itself 

that governs the coverage. Id. See also, Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 241 Mich App 159, 

164-167; 614 NW2d 689 (2000).

PIP benefits are mandated by the no-fault act, and a claimant’s entitlement to PIP benefits 

is therefore based in statute, not in contract. See, e.g., MCL 500.3105(2) (“[p]ersonal protection 

benefits are due under this chapter without regard to fault”); MCL 500.3105(1) (“[u]nder 

personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury 

arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor 

vehicle”); Cruz, 241 Mich App at 164-167 (“The no-fault act mandates that insurers ‘pay 

benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use 

of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.’ ”) (quoting MCL 500.3105(1)). “Because [PIP] benefits 

are mandated by the no-fault statute, the statute is the ‘rule-book’ for deciding the issues in 

questions regarding awarding those benefits.” Id., (citation omitted). Therefore, “our task is to 

interpret the statute and not the policy. Where insurance policy coverage is directed by the nofault act and the language in the policy is intended to be consistent with that act,4 the language 

should be interpreted in a consistent fashion, which can only be accomplished by interpreting the 

statute, rather than individual policies.” Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co, 442 Mich 520, 

530; 502 NW2d 310 (1993).

Because of the statutorily-mandated nature of PIP benefits, the no-fault act requires an 

insurer, in order to issue a policy consistent with the no-fault act, to provide PIP benefits to a 

“named insured” and to his or her spouse and household relatives. See MCL 500.3114(1); see 

 3 We may affirm the trial court when it reached the right result, even if we differ on the 

reasoning underlying that result. See Bruise v City of Pontiac, 282 Mich App 646, 652 n 3; 766 

NW2d 311 (2009).

4 As noted, it is permissible for an insurance policy to provide for broader coverage than is 

required by statute, in which case the policy may be enforced as written. See Rohlman v 

Hawkeye-Security Ins Co, 442 Mich 520, 530 n 10; 502 NW2d 310 (1993) (citing 12A Couch, 

Insurance, 2d (rev ed), § 45.699, p 336).
-4-

also Dobbelaere v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 275 Mich App 527, 532; 740 NW2d 503 (2007). But 

MCL 500.3113(d) provides in relevant part that a “person is not entitled to be paid personal 

protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident . . . the 

person was operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle as to which he or she was named as an 

excluded operator as allowed under section 3009(2).” MCL 500.3009(2)5 provides:

If authorized by the insured, automobile liability or motor vehicle liability 

coverage may be excluded when a vehicle is operated by a named person. An 

exclusion under this subsection is not valid unless the following notice is on the 

face of the policy or the declaration page or certificate of the policy and on the 

certificate of insurance:

Warning—when a named excluded person operates a vehicle all liability coverage 

is void—no one is insured. Owners of the vehicle and others legally responsible 

for the acts of the named excluded person remain fully personally liable.

The no-fault act thus provides a mechanism by which a person may be statutorily excluded from 

entitlement to PIP benefits notwithstanding that he or she may otherwise have been entitled to 

them. Therefore, the issue before us is whether Victor was properly named as an excluded 

operator under MCL 500.3009(2)—if so, he was statutorily barred from receiving PIP benefits 

by MCL 500.3113(d).

When Maria purchased the policy from State Auto, she signed 4 endorsements, each

entitled Named Driver Exclusion Endorsement, one for each of four persons who were identified 

on those endorsements as a “Person Excluded.”6 One of those persons was Victor. The 

endorsements became part of the Policy. The Endorsement applicable to Victor reads as follows:

 5 MCL 500.3009(2) is part of the insurance code, but it predates and is not part of the no-fault 

act.

6 Named driver exclusion endorsements “are intended to reduce premiums, and the excluded 

drivers are generally the highest risk drivers.” Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v 

Commissioner of Insurance, 86 Mich App 473, 479; 272 NW2d 689 (1979). Presumably, Maria 

received a reduced policy premium as a result of listing Victor and the other three excluded 

drivers in the endorsements.
-5-

The Endorsement thus clearly identifies “Victor Caballero” as a “Person Excluded.” In 

addition, the declarations page of the Policy7 contains the full language of the warning required 

by MCL 500.3009(2), and further states that “A NAMED EXCLUDED DRIVER IS NOT 

ENTITLED TO BE PAID PERSONAL PROTECTION BENEFITS FOR ACCIDENTAL 

BODILY INJURY” if the named excluded driver was driving that car at the time of the accident. 

And the Certificate of No-Fault Insurance issued to Maria again reiterates that Victor is an 

excluded driver and that he would not be entitled to PIP benefits if he was driving the vehicle at 

 7 The declarations page is part of the Policy. See e.g., Dancey v Travelers Prop Cas Co, 288 

Mich App 1, 8; 792 NW2d 372 (2010) (“The policy application, declarations page of [the] 

policy, and the policy itself construed together constitute the contract. . . . An insurance contract 

should be read as a whole, with meaning given to all terms.”) (citation omitted).
-6-

the time of an accident, and also contains the warning language of MCL 500.3009(2).8 In sum, 

the Policy, read as a whole, and related documents clearly and unambiguously name Victor as an 

excluded operator and comply with MCL 500.3009(2).9

Plaintiff nonetheless contends that Victor was entitled to PIP benefits. Plaintiff’s

argument is premised on the fact that the Endorsement did not specifically list PIP benefits as 

among the benefits that would not apply when an otherwise covered motor vehicle was operated 

by an excluded operator; rather, it only identified “Liability, Uninsured Motorists, and Physical 

Damage” as benefits that would not apply when the vehicle was operated by an excluded 

operator. In other words, plaintiff’s position at bottom is that State Auto is liable for PIP benefits 

because it failed to exclude them in the Endorsement. But this position runs afoul of the fact that 

PIP benefits are not contract-based, but are instead statutorily mandated.

Because PIP benefits are not a creature of contract but instead are statutorily mandated,

Rednour, 245 Mich App at 422, they are not subject to contractual exclusion. See e.g., Citizens 

Ins Co of America v Federated Mut Ins Co, 448 Mich 225, 229-231, 238; 531 NW2d 138 (1995). 

Therefore, a contractual exclusion of PIP benefits would have been unenforceable, as it would 

have resulted in a policy that provided more restrictive coverage than is mandated by the no-fault 

act, and thus would have been contrary to the mandates of the act. Id. at 238 (holding that “the 

policy [excluding mandated benefits] is invalid as violative of the no-fault act”). See also 

Rohlman, 442 Mich at 530 n 10, quoting 12A Couch, Insurance, 2d (rev ed), § 45.697, p 334 n 3 

(“A compulsory insurance statute in effect declares a minimum standard which must be 

observed, and a policy cannot be written with a more restrictive coverage. The statute is 

manifestly superior to and controls the policy, and its provisions supersede any conflicting 

provisions of the policy.) (emphasis added); see also Farmers Ins Exch v Kurzmann, 257 Mich 

App 412, 418; 668 NW2d 199 (2003) (noting that “[a]n insurer is free to define or limit the 

scope of coverage as long as the policy language . . . is not in contravention of public policy” and 

that the exclusion of benefits mandated by the no-fault act renders such an exclusion void).

 8 As noted, and like the statutes in question, the documents use various terminology seemingly 

interchangeably. The Endorsement is entitled Named Driver Exclusion Endorsement, refers to a 

“named excluded driver,” and identifies Victor as the “Person Excluded” and “Named Person.” 

The declaration page and certificate of no-fault insurance alternatively refer to a “named 

excluded person [who] “operates a vehicle” and to a “named excluded driver,” and identify 

Victor as “excluded” under the “driver exclusion endorsement” or if driving the insured vehicle. 

Plaintiff appears to concede that the various language is designed to name Victor as an “excluded 

operator” under MCL 500.3113(d) and MCL 500.3009(2). Plaintiff’s argument instead is that, 

by its terms, the Endorsement did not apply to PIP benefits.

9 Consistent with MCL 500.3009(2), the declarations page of the Policy and the Certificate of 

No-Fault Insurance clearly state that “[o]wners of the vehicle and others legally responsible for 

the acts of the named excluded person remain fully personally liable.” As those recitations 

reflect, plaintiff is therefore not without recourse.
-7-

Indeed, and directly contrary to plaintiff’s position that a contractual exclusion of PIP 

benefits was required (in order for State Auto to avoid liability for PIP benefits), a contractual 

exclusion of PIP benefits would instead have been improper, as it would have been in derogation 

of the mandates of the no-fault act. Simply put, PIP benefits are statutory and thus not subject to 

a contractual exclusion. As relates to PIP benefits, therefore, the import of the Endorsement was 

not in the listing of inapplicable coverages (relating to the operation of a vehicle by an excluded 

operator), but rather in the identification of Victor as an excluded operator. Accordingly, the 

exclusionary effect of MCL 500.3009(2) was not dependent on the inclusion within the 

Endorsement of language specifically excluding PIP benefits, and the fact that the Endorsement 

did not include language specifically excluding PIP benefits is immaterial, because as a matter of 

statutory law, see MCL 500.3113(d); MCL 500.3009(2), Victor was not entitled to PIP 

benefits.10

As we have previously observed, a validly-excluded-driver’s “act of driving the insured 

vehicle at the time of the accident render[s] the vehicle uninsured;” no further reference to the 

Policy is required because at the time of the accident “there was no personal liability or property 

damage ‘security’ required by MCL 500.3101 in effect.” Bronson Methodist Hosp v Mich 

Assigned Claims Facility, 298 Mich App 192, 198; 826 NW2d 197 (2012); see also 

Frankenmuth Ins Co v Poll, 311 Mich App 442, 447; 875 NW2d 250 (2015) (noting that when a

validly-excluded-driver drove the vehicle in question, “the insurance policy was void, and 

therefore the security required by MCL 500.3101 was not in effect at the time of the accident

(i.e., no one was insured),” and the defendant insurer was not “the insurer of the vehicle involved 

in the accident” at the time the accident occurred) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

For all of these reasons, we conclude that Victor was properly named as an excluded 

operator and that he was therefore statutorily barred from receiving PIP benefits. Accordingly, 

the trial court properly granted State Auto’s motion for summary disposition because, when 

viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding 

Victor’s entitlement to PIP benefits. See Miotke, 300 Mich App at 139-140; MCR 2.116(C)(10).

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello

 10 In part because the Endorsement could not properly have excluded PIP benefits, we also reject 

plaintiff’s contention that the Policy was ambiguous as between the declarations page (which 

clearly stated that Victor was not entitled to PIP benefits) and the Endorsement (which, as noted, 

did not specifically refer to PIP benefits).