This opinion is subject to revision before publication

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ARMED FORCES

_______________

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Vashaun M. BLANKS, Senior Airman

United States Air Force, Appellant

No. 17-0404

Crim. App. No. 38891

Argued January 24, 2018—Decided February 28, 2018

Military Judge: Donald R. Eller Jr.

For Appellant: Major Allen S. Abrams (argued); Brian L. 

Mizer, Esq. (on brief); Captain Patrick A. Clary.

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel G. Matt Osborn (argued); 

Colonel Katherine E. Oler and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph

J. Kubler (on brief); Mary Ellen Payne, Esq.

Judge OHLSON delivered the opinion of the Court, in 

which Chief Judge STUCKY, Judges RYAN and 

SPARKS, and Senior Judge EFFRON, joined.

_______________

Judge OHLSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Contrary to Appellant’s pleas, a general court-martial 

with enlisted representation convicted Appellant of one 

specification of negligent dereliction of duty in violation of 

Article 92(3), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 

10 U.S.C. § 892(3) (2012).1 Appellant’s adjudged and 

approved sentence consisted of a bad-conduct discharge, 

confinement for thirty days, forfeiture of $1,546.00 pay per 

 1 Appellant also was convicted contrary to his pleas of one 

specification of making a false official statement, one specification 

of larceny of military property, and one specification of obstruction 

of justice in violation of Articles 107, 121, and 134, UCMJ, 

10 U.S.C. §§ 907, 921, 934 (2012). Pursuant to his pleas, Appellant 

was convicted of three specifications of making a false official 

statement in violation of Article 107, UCMJ. The court-martial 

acquitted Appellant of one Article 107, UCMJ, specification of 

making a false official statement and one Article 121, UCMJ, specification of larceny of military property.
United States v. Blanks, No. 17-0404/AF

Opinion of the Court

2

month for two months, and a reduction to the lowest enlisted 

grade. The United States Air Force Court of Criminal 

Appeals affirmed the findings and sentence. United States v. 

Blanks, No. ACM 38891, 2017 CCA LEXIS 186, at *41, 

2017 WL 1325170, at *15 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 

2017) (unpublished). We granted review of the following 

issue:

In light of this Court’s decision in United States v. 

Haverty, 76 M.J. 199 (C.A.A.F. 2017), did the military judge err when he instructed the members 

Appellant could be convicted of negligent dereliction of duty.

United States v. Blanks, 76 M.J. 473 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (order

granting review).

We hold that the military judge did not err when he instructed the members that Appellant could be convicted of 

negligent dereliction of duty. Since the inception of the 

UCMJ, military law has recognized the offense of negligent 

dereliction of duty. See United States v. Grow, 3 C.M.A. 77, 

86–87, 11 C.M.R. 77, 86–87 (1953); Manual for CourtsMartial, United States para. 171c (1951 ed.) (MCM). Further, we have continued to repeatedly recognize that negligence is an appropriate mens rea for certain dereliction offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 36 M.J. 415, 416

(C.M.A. 1993); United States v. Powell, 32 M.J. 117, 120–21

(C.M.A. 1991); United States v. Dellarosa, 30 M.J. 255, 259 

(C.M.A. 1990); United States v. Kelchner, 16 C.M.A. 27, 28–

29, 36 C.M.R. 183, 184–85 (1966). Because Appellant has not

presented any persuasive reasons for this Court to overrule 

our prior decisions, there is no basis for us to disturb our 

precedent. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the lower 

court.

I.

The Government charged Appellant with willful dereliction of duty for failing to provide adequate financial support 

to his dependent spouse. Prior to the panel’s deliberations on 

findings, the military judge instructed the members on both

willful dereliction of duty and the lesser included offense of 

negligent dereliction of duty. The military judge distinguished the greater offense from the lesser included offense 
United States v. Blanks, No. 17-0404/AF

Opinion of the Court

3

by noting that for willful dereliction of duty, the members 

had to determine “beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused . . . was willfully derelict in the performance” of his 

duties,2 and that for negligent dereliction of duties, the 

members had to find “beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

accused . . . was negligent in the performance of those duties.”3 (Emphasis added.) The members convicted Appellant 

of the lesser included offense of negligent dereliction of duty.

II.

Appellant challenges the military judge’s negligent dereliction of duty instruction on the basis that negligence is not

an authorized level of mens rea for the Article 92(3), UCMJ, 

dereliction of duty offense. Because he did not object to this

aspect of the military judge’s negligent dereliction of duty 

instruction, we review the instruction for plain error. United 

States v. Haverty, 76 M.J. 199, 208 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

Under the UCMJ, a servicemember who “is derelict in 

the performance of his duties[,] shall be punished as a courtmartial may direct.” Article 92(3), UCMJ. Although the 

statute does not explicitly identify a mens rea for this offense, we have long interpreted Article 92(3), UCMJ, as authorizing the military to punish a servicemember for negligent dereliction of duty. See Lawson, 36 M.J. at 416; Powell, 

32 M.J. at 120; Dellarosa, 30 M.J. at 259; Kelchner, 

16 C.M.A. at 28–29, 36 C.M.R. at 184–85; Grow, 3 C.M.A. at

86–87, 11 C.M.R. at 86–87.

In light of this long line of precedent, the military judge 

did not err, plainly or otherwise, by instructing the members 

on the negligent dereliction of duty offense. Appellant 

acknowledges our prior decisions, but he requests that we 

overrule this precedent. We decline his invitation to do so.

 2 The military judge informed the members: “ ‘Willfully’ means 

intentionally. It refers to the doing of an act, and purposely, 

specifically intending the natural and probable consequences of 

the act.”

3 The military judge defined negligently to mean “an act or 

failure to act by a person under a duty to use due care which 

demonstrates a lack of care which a reasonably prudent person 

would have used under the same or similar circumstances.”
United States v. Blanks, No. 17-0404/AF

Opinion of the Court

4

“[W]hen this court considers a request to overrule a prior 

decision of the court, we analyze the matter under the doctrine of stare decisis.” United States v. Quick, 74 M.J. 332, 

335 (C.A.A.F. 2015). This doctrine provides that “adherence 

to precedent is the preferred course because it promotes the 

evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 

process.” United States v. Sills, 56 M.J. 239, 241 (C.A.A.F. 

2002) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). Stare

decisis is “‘most compelling’ where courts undertake statutory construction” as is the case here. United States v. Rorie, 

58 M.J. 399, 406 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (quoting Hilton v. South 

Carolina Public Ry. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 205 (1991)). 

However, this doctrine “is not an inexorable command.” 

United States v. Falcon, 65 M.J. 386, 390 (C.A.A.F. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. 

at 828). We consider the following factors in evaluating the 

application of stare decisis: “whether the prior decision is 

unworkable or poorly reasoned; any intervening events; the 

reasonable expectations of servicemembers; and the risk of 

undermining public confidence in the law.” Quick, 74 M.J. at 

336 (footnote omitted). A party must present a “special justification” for us to overrule prior precedent. Kimble v. Marvel 

Ent., LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).

Examining this case through the prism of stare decisis, 

Appellant has failed to provide sufficient justification to disturb this Court’s negligent dereliction of duty precedent.

First, in Haverty, we explained that “if a court determines 

that Congress intended, either expressly or impliedly, to 

have a particular mens rea requirement apply to a certain 

criminal statute, then the court must construe that statute 

accordingly.” 76 M.J. at 204. Here, prior decisions of this 

Court have determined the congressional intent regarding 

the mens rea requirement for certain dereliction offenses. 

Specifically, our Court precedent says that, “at the very 

least, . . . Congress intended to establish a simple-negligence 

standard” for dereliction of duty. Lawson, 36 M.J. at 421. 

Thus, consistent with Haverty, we have determined that 

negligence is an appropriate mens rea for dereliction of duty.
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Opinion of the Court

5

Second, although Appellant challenges the underpinnings of our conclusion that Congress intended for a negligence mens rea to apply to dereliction of duty, we are unpersuaded that his challenges should cause us to depart from 

stare decisis. Our prior decisions cited the MCM’s discussion 

of the negligent dereliction of duty offense. See, e.g., Lawson, 

36 M.J. at 419; Grow, 3 C.M.A. at 86–87, 11 C.M.R. at 86–

87. Although the MCM is not binding, we have noted that 

the 1951 MCM “is itself persuasive in ascertaining what 

Congress intended at the time” of the UCMJ’s enactment.

United States v. Clardy, 13 M.J. 308, 315 (C.M.A. 1982). We 

have further recognized that the MCM “explains [the dereliction of duty] offense as it is generally recognized in military law.” Powell, 32 M.J. at 120. We therefore conclude that 

our recognition of a negligent dereliction of duty offense is

not unreasonable or clearly wrong.

Third, while free to do so, Congress has not acted to 

amend the dereliction of duty statute even though both the 

MCM and this Court’s case law have recognized since 1951 

that negligence is an appropriate mens rea in certain circumstances.4 See Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 82–

83 (2007) (stating that “long congressional acquiescence has 

enhanced even the usual precedential force we accord to our 

interpretations of statutes” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Fourth, dereliction of duty is a uniquely military offense

“specifically intended by Congress to ensure the proper performance of duty within the military service.” Lawson, 

36 M.J. at 422. Servicemembers’ military duties relate to 

“activities which are reasonably necessary to safeguard and 

protect the morale, discipline and usefulness of the members 

of a command and are directly connected with the maintenance of good order in the services.” United States v. Martin, 

1 C.M.A. 674, 676, 5 C.M.R. 102, 104 (1952). Thus, the dereliction of duty offense promotes good order and discipline in 

the military. In light of the military nature of the offense 

 4 See Grow, 3 C.M.A. at 86–87, 11 C.M.R. at 86–87; MCM para. 171c.
United States v. Blanks, No. 17-0404/AF

Opinion of the Court

6

and its limited authorized punishment,5 a negligence mens 

rea standard is appropriate for certain dereliction offenses.

Fifth and finally, overruling our precedent would have 

repercussions within the military justice system. Military 

law maintains obedience and discipline to ensure that

servicemembers are ready to perform their mission. See

Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974); see also Schlesinger 

v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975) (“To prepare for and 

perform its vital role [to fight or be ready to fight], the military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline 

without counterpart in civilian life.”). A negligent dereliction 

of duty offense provides commanders with one means to assure that the objectives of the military mission are achieved

by holding servicemembers accountable for performance of 

their military duties whether by court-martial or nonjudicial 

punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (2012). 

Overruling our precedent would undermine an important

facet of the commander’s ability to enforce accountability of

military members’ responsibility to perform their duties.

Upon consideration of these five factors, we conclude that 

Appellant has not demonstrated any justification for this 

Court to overrule our prior negligent dereliction of duty decisions. Instead, these cases have “effectively become part of 

the statutory scheme.” Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409.6

III.

For the reasons set forth above, the military judge did 

not plainly err by providing the members with a negligent 

dereliction of duty instruction. Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal 

Appeals.

 5 The President’s authorized maximum punishment for negligent dereliction of duty is forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month 

for three months and confinement for three months. MCM pt. IV, 

para. 16.e.(3)(A) (2012 ed.).

6 Of course, Congress may revise Article 92(3), UCMJ, if it disagrees with this precedent. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (noting 

that once a court engages in statutory interpretation, it is up to 

Congress “for acceptance or not as that branch elects”).