### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Ma y 2, 200 6 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . TORREZ TALLE Y, JEVO N BRYANT, AND KEITH E Z ELL

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 01-08322-34 Jose ph B . Dailey, Judge

No. W2003-02237-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled October 16, 2006

Pursuant to multi ple indictments, Defe ndants J evon B ry ant, Ke i t h E z el l and Torr ez Talley wer e char g ed with fourte en counts of e specia lly ag g rava ted kidnapping and five counts of ag g ravated
ro bb e ry . D e fe nd a nt B ry a nt w a s a lso char ged wi th o ne c ou nt o f f e lon in p os se ssi on of

a fi re arm
. Following a trial, the jury found De fenda nts Bry ant and Ez ell g uilty on all counts. The jury found Def endant Ta lley

g uiltyof ten c ounts of espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping and four counts of ag g ravated robbe ry . There afte r, the trial court sentenc ed Def endant Bry ant to an ef

fec tive sentenc e of 364 y ear s, Defe ndant Ezell to an ef fective sentenc e of 198 y ear s, and De fenda nt Talley to an eff ective se ntence of 140 y ear s. On appe al, the followin g i s s u es ar e presented f or re view: (1) whether the trial court properly

denied a motion to suppress phy sical evidence; (2) whether the trial
c ou rt pr op e rl y de nie d a mot ion fo r m ist

ri a l du ri ng jury

se le c tio n; ( 3) wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y found purpose ful discrimination b y t h e defe ndants in their exercise of pere mptory

challeng es; (4) whether t h e t ri al court erre d by failing to require the state prose cutor to ele ct fa cts supporting Def endant B ry ant’s convic ti o n fo r felonious possession of a handg un; (5) whe ther the tria l court
err ed in allowing t he prose cutor to re habilitate the cr edibilityof state witnesse s; (6) whe ther the tria l court e rre d in refusi n g t o g rant a mistrial or provide cur ative instruction following an improper state me nt m a de by

a state wi tne ss; (7 ) w he the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in a llo wi ng the prose cut or to bring in Defe ndant Ezell’s twin brother to reha bilitate a state witness’ pr etrial misidentification; (8) whether the t rial court err ed in ref

using to g rant a mistrial in response to the i mproper remar ks made by the pr os e c uto r d uring c los ing arg ume nt; (9 ) w het her th e tria l c ou rt e rr e d b y re fu sin g to p e rm it
c ou ns e l to re vie w the jury ins truc tio ns prior to c ha rg ing the jury ; (1 0) wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y instructed the jury

on rea sonable doubt; (11) w hether the trial court properly

instructed the jury

on the def endant’ s rig ht not to testify ; (12) whether the trial court erre d by ref using to instruct the jury on false imprisonment as a lesser- included off

ense of es p ec i all y

ag g ravated kidnapping ; and (13) wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in sen te nc ing the de fe nd a nts

. B e c a us e we c on c lud e that no re ve rs ibl e erro r ex i s t s , we aff

irm the judg ments of the trial c ourt. Howe ver, the rec ord re flec ts that the defe ndants’ espe cially

ag g ravated kidnapping convictions wer e not pr operly merg ed. There fore , we re ma ndfo r m e rg e r ande ntry of c or re c te d ju dg me nts a s to tho se c on vic tio ns
.In o rd er to d i f fere nti ate b etwe en t he victi m s i n thi s ca se, we refer t o t he m b y t he i r f i rst na m es. 1

-2- Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed in Par t; Re m ande d forM e r ge rand E nt r y o f Co r r e c te d Judg m e nt
J.C. M C L IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Marvin E. Ba llin, Memphis, Tenne ssee, for the appellant, Torre z Ta lley ; William Ma ssey and L orna S. McClusky , Memphis, Tennessee, for the appe llant, J evon B ry ant; and James Hale, Assistant Pub lic De fe nd e r, fo r the app e lla nt, Ke ith Eze ll.

Paul G. Sum me rs , At torne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; J. Ros s Dy e r, As sis ta nt Att orn eyGen e ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Jennifer N ichols and Ray L epone, A ssistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION

F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND

Th e de fe nd a nts ’ c on vic tio ns in this c a se orig inate fr om the co mm is sio n o f e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated kidnapping and agg ravated robbery offe nses aga inst victim s Kimberly Hanc ock, Omar Coleman, Divin Wright, Oliver Wrig ht, J erome C ar penter , Tony ell Somerville, and Jodeci Somerville. 1 The proof prese nted at trial ref

lects that Kimberly

Hanc ock wa s at her home on J anuary 11, 20 0 1 , w h e n s h e r e c e i v e d a p h o n e c a l l f r o m a f r i e n d r e q u e s t i n g s h e c o m e b y a n d p ic k u p s ome c lothe s. Af

te r r e c e ivi ng the c a ll, sh e a sk e d D ivi n Wr ig ht ( he r boy frie nd ), a ndOm ar C ole ma n to acc ompany

her. The g roup took Omar’ s white For d Foc us. Upon arrival at the house, Kimber ly and Divin went inside t o p i ck up the clothes while O mar wa ited outside in the car . I nside the house, Kimberly saw De fenda nt Talley , Thadde us Br o wn , J ohn Wil liams, and J arvis Willi ams. As Ki mbe rl y pr oc e e de d u ps ta ir s, John Willi a ms g ra bb e d h e r b y

the ne c k a ndthr e w h e r d ow n th e sta ir s. He then pic ked her

up from the f

loor, place d her on the couch, and proc eede d to question her about he r b oy frie nd ’s br oth e r, Ol ive r Wrig ht, wh om John Williams be lie ve d orc he str a te d a bre ak- in of his home. Divin was a lso force d to sit on t he couc h and questioned a bout the brea

k-in. The g roup of men including Def

endant Ta lley

threatened to kill Kimberly and Divin if they did not tell them what they wanted to know. D ivin was also told to remove his clothes. At t his tim e, Kimber ly saw that De fe nd a nt T a lle y

a ndthe Willi a ms’ br oth e rs ha d g un s.
After Kimberly

and Divin wer e questioned f or a fe w m inutes, Thaddeus B rown a nd Def endant Ta lley

went outside. Ac cording to Omar Coleman, he was a pproac hed by

three arme d
me n a ndbr ou g ht i nto the ho us e un de r the pr e te ns e that he wa s u nd e r a rr e st. He wa s th e n f

or c e d to-3-

take of f his clothes, and his chec kbook, cre dit car ds, and drivers license w ere taken. At this time, Def endant B ry ant ar

rived a t the house armed with two g uns. Upo n ar ri v al , Def endant B ry ant br a nd ish e d h is g un s a nde xcla ime d, “ I wa nt the bit c h w ho se t it

up .” Jar vis Willi a ms t oldKi mbe rl y that she was g oing to help find Oliver Wrig ht. J arvis Willi ams and De fenda nt Bry ant then for ced Ki mbe rl y int o a bla c k F or d Pr ob e a ndleft. Aft er J arvis Willi a ms a ndDe fe nd a nt B ry a nt l e ft wi th Kimberly , Def

endant Ezell enter ed the house wielding a shotg un. Def endants Ezell and Ta lley

then pr oc e e de d to be a t D ivi n w ith the ir fi sts a ndg un s.
After Oliver Wrig ht was located, J arvis W i l l iams called him on the phone and aske d if he
wo uldpic k h im u p a ndtake him to A uto Z on e to g e t a batte ry . O liv e r a g re e d. Th e re a ft e r, Jar vis Wil liams and Def

endant B ry ant met up with T haddeus Br own and Def endant Ezell. At this ti me, Kimberly was moved to the back s ea t o f a purple Dodg e I ntrepid. De fenda nt Ezell also sat in t he ba c ks e a t, a

rm e d w ith a

sh otg un . L a te r, Ol ive r a rrive d in a

Do dg e Ne on a c c omp a nie d b y Jer ome Carpente r, Tony ell Somerville (Oliver’ s g irlfriend) , and Jodeci Somerville ( Tony ell’s seve n-y ear
old so n). W he n O liv e r andc omp a ny arrive d, Ol ive r g ot o ut o f the c ar. I mme diate ly , D e fe nd a nts Bry ant and Ezell, arme d with g uns, walked to O liver’s car and told him “[d] on’t move. You nig g ers g onna die tonig ht.”

Both Oliver

and Jerome wer e for ced to take off their clothes. De fenda nt Bry ant hi t Oliver in the head w ith a g un afte r Oliver a sked what wa s g oing on. O liver wa s forc ed into the trunk of the I ntrepid, and Jerome wa s forc ed into the trunk of the N eon. I n an attempt to g et out of th e trunk, Oliver put his leg out. Whi le his leg was ha ng ing out, D efe ndant Bry ant closed the trunk on Oliver’s leg , brea king it. With Defenda nt Ezell driving the Ne o n , t he g roup left the a rea and drove to a differ ent area of town. Her e, De fenda nt Ezell t ook Tony ell Somerville’s jewe lry , cash, a nd purse. Def endant Ezell then orde red Tony ell and her son, J odeci, out of the Neon. Be fore Tony ell left the
car , howeve r, De fenda nt Ezell t old her to handove r her identificat i o n. After

Tony ell complied, Def endant Ezell told her that “w e’ve g ot y our I D, we have y our addr ess, we know wher e y ou live,
we kn ow wh a t y ou loo k li ke. I f we get c a ug ht, if weg o to ja il, if

y ou c a ll the po lic e , w e ’l l c ome back and kill y ou and y our son.” In th e meantime, Jerome was taken out of the N eon’s trunk a nd place d in the I n t re p i d ’s t runk wit h Oliver. A short time later, Kimberly was droppe d off ne ar he r mother’s house. B efor e being rele ased, she was thre atene d with death if she c alled the police

. Howeve r, both Kimberly

and Tony ell called the police af ter be ing r elea sed.

Me a nw hil e , th e de fe nd a nts re turne d to the ho us e wi th Jer ome a ndOl ive r. Th e de fe nd a nts , a lon g wi th the oth e r a ssaila nts , p la c e d O liv e r an d Div in in the mid dle of the fl oo r andbe a t th e m w ith t h e i r f i s t s a n d g u n s
. D e f

e n d a n tE z e l l a l s o s tru c k

O m ar i n t h e b a c k

o f t h e h e a d w i t h h i s s h o t g u n
. In addition to being be aten, Oliver was burne d with cig are ttes and Divin was burned af ter be ing tossed headf irst into a fireplac e. The defe ndants then poured bleac h on Oliver, Divin, Omar , and Jerome. The defenda nts informed these men that they would be take n to Missi ssippi and killed; whereupon, the def endants for ced the men once ag ain into the trunks of their vehicles and starte d driving toward Mis sis sip pi. Ho we ve r, sh ortly a ft e r l e a vin g the ho us e , p oli c e of fi c e rs ini tiate d pu rs uit , wh ic h le d to the re le a se of

the fo ur me n f ro m th e c on fi ne s o f the trun ks a ndthe e ve ntu a l arr e st o f the de fe nd a nts

.-4- AN AL YSI S

I. M ot ion to Suppr e ss
On app e a l, D e fe nd a nt B ry a nt a rg ue s th a t th e tr ial co urt e rr e d in de nying his mot ion to suppress a gun found in his possession following his arr est. He arg ues that the g un should have be en suppressed be cause it was discover ed following an unlawf ul warr antless ar

rest.
The a ppellate standa

rd of r eview for a trial court’s conclusions of l aw and application of la w to f acts on a motion to suppress evidenc e is a de novo revie w. See State v. W alton , 41 S.W .3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001) . Notably , howeve r, the trial court’s findings of fa ct ar e pre sumed corr ect unless the evidenc e contained in the rec ord pre ponderates ag ainst them. See State v. Daniel , 12 S.W .3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000) . “Que stions of credibility of the witnesses, the weig ht and value of the e vidence , and re solution of c onflicts in the evidenc e ar e matter s entrusted to the trial judg e as the trier of fac t.” State v. Lawrence , 1 5 4 S

. W

. 3 d 7 1 , 7 5 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 5 ) ( q u o t i n g State v. Odom , 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996) ). More over, the preva iling party is entitled t o t h e s t ro n g est leg itimate view of the evidenc e and a ll r easona

ble and leg itimate inf

ere nces that may

be dra wn from that e vidence

. Sta te v. Hick s , 55 S.W .3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted).

Both the state and federa l constitutions protect individuals from unrea sonable sea rche s and seizures. See U.S. Const. am en d. I V; Tenn. Const. art. I , § 7. There fore , a sea rch or seizure
c on du c te d w ith ou t a

wa rr a nt i s p re su me d u nreaso na ble a nda ny

e vid e nc e dis c ov e re d s ub je c t to suppression. See Coo lid

ge v . New H

am ps hire , 4 03 U. S. 4 43 , 4 54 -5 5 ( 19 71 ); State v. Bridges , 963 S.W .2d 487, 490 (Tenn. 1997) . Howeve r, the e vidence will not be suppressed if the state prove s that the war rantless sea

rch or seizure was c onducted pursuant to one of the narr owly define d exceptions to the war rant re quirement. Sta te v . B ine tte , 33 S.W .3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000). One of these na rrow exceptions occurs w hen a police office r conduc ts a sear ch incident to a lawf ul arre st. See State v

. W a t kins , 8 2 7 S. W. 2 d 2 9 3 , 2 9 5 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 2 )

. Pu r s u a n t to T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d section 40 -7 -1 03 (a ), a po lic e of

fi c e r ma y make a wa

rr a ntl e ss arr e st w he n h e or sh e ha s p ro ba

ble c a us e to believe that the person to be ar rested ha s committed or is committ ing a felony

. See Sta te v . Le wis , 36 S.W .3d 88, 97 -98 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) . Whether proba ble cause exists depends on w hether the facts and circumstance s and reliable i nformation known to the office r at the time of a rre st were “suff icient to war

rant a pru d ent [person] in believing that the [individual] had committed or wa s committing an of

fense .” Bridges , 963 S.W .2d at 491 (quotin g Bec k v . O hio , 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964))

. I n d en y i n g De fe n d an tBr y an t ’s m o t i o n t o s u p p re s s , t h e t rial cour t made the f

ollow i n g fi n d i n gs of fa c t:
The off

icer was informed. He was awa re of the crime that had take n place the nig ht befor e – wa s informed of suspects to look for and ve hicles to look for, a nd one of the vehicle[s] was a vehicle that was n o t j u st a black F ord Probe but I counted se ven-5-

particula ri ze d f a c ts th at w e r e involved in this description that matche d the desc ription that led the off

icer to fee l compelled to pull the car over. The y ear of the c ar. The manuf

actur er, F ord The ty pe of c ar, Probe

. The c olor, black. Chr ome ri ms. Ve ry da rk -t int e d w ind ow s. And being in this particular ne ighbor hood

. . . T akin g a ll o f the se fa c ts tog e the r, I thi nk the re wa s su ff ic ie nt c a us e to p ull the ca r over
. And t hen once M r. Bry ant was taken out of t he car, thi ng s flowed f rom there

.

. . .

A re view of the re cord in this case supports the trial court’s ruling . The re cord r efle cts that the day afte r the oc curr ence of the kidnapping and robbe ry offe nses, the police w ere in searc h of the suspects. These police off icer s were g iven information about the s u s p ec t s fr om the victims. The information g iven to the investigating office rs named De fenda nt Bry ant as a suspect. I n addition, the investig ating office rs wer e told to look for a “ 94/95 Ford Probe , black with chr ome rims, [and] dark- tinted windows.” These police office rs wer e also g iven locations wher e the suspects might be found. While investigating one of the se locations, a black F ord Probe with chr ome rims and darktinted windows drove by . Observing that the Ford Probe m atche d the description g iven, t he police office rs stopped the ve hicle. Onc e the ve hicle was stopped, Def endant Bry ant’s identit y

as a suspe ct was c onfirmed a nd he wa s arr ested. Upon a rre st, the office rs conducte d a sear ch of the Probe and dis c ov e re d a

g un in the ba c ks e a t. As pr e vio us ly no te d, a po lic e of fi c e r m a y c on du c t a

wa rr a ntl e ss arr est and subseque nt searc h incident to the ar rest if ther e exists probable cause to be lieve that the individual arre sted has committed a felony

. Her e the evidenc e does not pr eponder ate a g ainst the trial court’s f inding that police had proba ble cause to arres t De fe n d ant B ry ant. Acc ording ly , the trial
c ou rt pr op e rl y de nie d th e de fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss, a ndthe iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

II. Mistrial: VoirDire

De fe nd a nts B ry a nt, Eze ll, a ndTa lle y arg ue that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in den y ing the ir re qu e st for a mistrial based upon statements made by one o f t h e p ro s p ective jurors during voir dire. Specifica lly , they

arg ue that the juror ’s statements re g arding the kidnapping and murde r of his sisterin- la w e vo ke d s y mpathy

in the ve nir e pa ne l th e re by pr e ve nti ng a n impa

rt ia l ve rd ic t. During voir dire, a

prospec tive juro r re l at ed t hat his sister-in-law ha d been kidna pped and murdere d in 1985. Providing some detail, t his prospec tive juror mentioned the fac t that his sis ter-in--6-

law had be en shot and plac ed in the trunk of a car wher e she ble d to death

. T h e juror f urther
re ma rk e d th a t th e c ri min a ls we re c on vic te d but g ive n pro batio n. Up on he ari ng the se c ir c ums ta nc e s, the trial court excused the juror fr om serving on the jury

. After the prospec tive juror had be en excused, the de fenda nts requeste d a mistrial. The trial court de nied the re quest stating,

I don’t think that’s n ec es s ar y
. I think I can g ive a c urative instruc tion . . . we’ re just beg inning voir dire, so eve ry body will have an opportunityto addre ss the jurors and make sure that they rende r t heir verdict s olely on the proof that’s prese nted in court this week. We will hea r a va riety of thing s in voir dire. I g uess, to one deg ree or anothe r, they

have the potential for creating the very problem that y ou’re
conce rned with; and I just think that the appropriate curative instructions can cove r that.
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

the n in fo rm e d th e de fe nd a nts that in str uc tio ns wo uld be g ive n la te r in e ff ort to a vo id draw ing attenti on to the prospec tive juror’s r emar ks. At the end of the day , the court ga ve the following instruction to the remaining members of the venire : [A]s I ind ic a te d e arl ie r in m y re mark s, on c e y ou ’r e se le c te d to se rv e on thi s jury

. . . [y our] decision m ust be based solely on the proof that y ou hear in court fr om this witness stand to my

rig ht and the exhibits that are introduced [throug h] wit nesses a nd on the la w that I ’l l pro vid e y ou wi th at the e ndof the tr ia l. A ndy ou r d e c isi on is not to be based on anything that y ou may hear in the newspa pers, a ny thing y ou may have e x perie nced or

seen or hear d in the past; or, for that matter, anything that the lawy ers sa y
. . . . The only evidenc e on which y ou base y our ver dict . . . is the proof that comes in fr om this wi t n es s s tand to my rig ht throug h sworn testimony and by way of exhibit s that also might be introduc ed. Upon review, we note t hat t he decision of whe ther or not to g rant a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Sta t e v. Mc Kinney , 929 S.W .2d 404, 405 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 96 ). Th e pu rp os e of

a mis tr ia l is to c or

re c t th e da ma g e do ne to the jud ic ia l pr oc e ss w he n s ome event ha s occur

red w hich would pre clude a n impartial verdic t. See Ar no ld v . S tat e , 563 S.W .2d 792, 79 4 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 77 ). No rm a lly , a mis tr ial sh ou ld be decla

re d o nly if the re is a ma nif e st nece ssity for suc h action. Id

. A manifest nece ssity exis ts when “no f easible a lternative to ha lting t h e p roce eding s” exists

. State v. Knight , 6 1 6 S. W. 2 d 5 9 3 , 5 9 6 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 1 9 8 1 )

. The defe ndant bea

rs the burde n of establishing a manife st nece ssity

. State v. Seay , 945 S.W .2d 755, 764 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) . This court will not disturb the tr i al co u rt ’s d ec i sion unless there is an abuse of discretion. State v. Adk ins , 786 S.W .2d 642, 644 (Tenn. 1990)

. I n the i nstant case , the record reflec ts that the prospec tive juror wa s discrete ly dismiss ed for
cause and his statements we re not e mphasized. The reco rd fu rt h er refle cts that the trial court provided c urative instruc tion reminding the venire of t heir duty to be fa ir and impartial a nd rea ch a-7-

verdi c t b a s e d s o le ly o n th e e v id e n c e
. I n a d d it io n , th e r e c o r d r e f le c ts th a t b o th th e p r o s e c u tor and de fe ns e c ou ns e l impr e sse d u po n th e jury the pr e su mpt ion of inn oc e nc e a ff or de d to th e de fe nd a nts a nd the fa c t that the state ha d th e bu rd e n o f p ro vin g a ll e le me nts of e a c h o ff e ns e be y on d a

re a so na ble d o u b t. I n contra st, other than spec ulation reg arding the ef fec t, if any , the prospec tive juror’s statements had on the me mbers of the venire , the def endant s h av e n o t s hown that the prospe ctive juror’s state ments unduly influence d the venire so as to require a mistrial. There fore , we c onclude that th e tr ia l c ou rt

did no t abu se its dis c re tio n in de nying the de fe nd a nts ’ re qu e st fo r a mis tr ia l. T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.
III. Pe rem ptory Challenges

D e f e n d a n ts B ry a n t an d T a ll e y ar g u e th a t th e tr

ia l c o u r t i mp r o p e r ly

ap p li ed Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986) in determining the de fenda nts could not ex erc ise t h eir pe remptory strikes ag ainst certain prospec tive jurors. The defenda nts also complain that the ove rall tenor of the tr ia l c ou rt ’s a c tio ns in i ts Batson ruling demonstrated disparate tr eatment of the def endants re lative to the prosec ution.

“ Pe re mpt ory c ha lle ng e s, a lon g wi th c ha lle ng e s fo r ‘c a us e ,’ are the princ ipa l to ols that e na ble litigants t o remove unfavor able juror s during the jury selec tion process.” United States v. Annigoni , 96 F .3 d 113 2, 11 37 (9 th Cir . 199 6)

. “ Th e c e ntr a l fun c tio n of the ri g ht of pe re mpt ory

c ha lle ng e is to enable a

litigant to re move a c erta in number of potential jurors wh o are not challeng eable for
cause , but in whom the liti g ant per ceive s bias or hostility .” Id

. “ T h e f u n c t i o n o f

t h e [ p e r e m p t o r y] challeng e is not only

to eliminate ex tremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jur or s bef

or e wh om the y try the c a se wi ll de c ide on the ba sis of the e vid e nc e pla c e d b e fo re the m, and not otherw ise.” Swain v. Alabama , 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), ov e rru le d on ot her gr ou nd s, Batson , 4 76 U. S. 7 9; se e als o S tat e v . S pr att , 31 S.W .3d 587, 598 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)

. Ho we ve r, un de r the Eq ua l Prot e c tio n Cl a us e of the F ou rt e e nthAm e nd me nt, ne ith e r the state prosec utor nor the de fenda nt may exercise a

pere mptory

challeng e to re move a pr ospective juror solely on the basis of ra ce. Batson , 4 76 U. S. at 89 -9 0; se e als o Georgia v. M cCollum , 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992); Sp ra tt , 31 S.W .3d at 596 (noting that th e p rosecutor may lodge a “r ever se Batson ” obj ec t i o n t o t h e d efe ndant’s cha lleng e of juror s on the basis of ra ce) . I n Batson v. Kentuck y , the United S tates S upreme Court established a three -step process for evaluating alleg ed discrimination in j ury se le c tio n. F ir st, the op po ne nt o f the pe re mpt ory c ha lle ng e mus t e sta

bli sh a prima fa c ie c a se of purpose ful discrimination “by showing that the totality of the re levant fa cts g ives rise to an infere nce of

discriminatory

purpose.” Batson , 4 76 U. S. at 93 -9 4; se e als o J oh ns on v . Ca lif

or nia , 545 U. S. 1 62 , 1 25 S

. Ct

. 24 10 , 24 16 (2 00 5) . Se c on d, if the tr ia l c ou rt

de te rm ine s th a t a

prima fa c ia sh ow ing ha s b e e n ma de , the bu rd e n s hif ts t o th e pr op on e nt o f the pe re mpt ory c ha lle ng e to a

rt ic ulate a rac e-ne utral explanation f or the challeng e. Batson , 476 U.S. at 97-98. The r ace -neutra l explanation need not be pe rsuasive or even plausible. Purkett v. E lem , 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). Unless purposef

ul discrimination is i nhere nt in the expl anation, the rea son offe red will be deeme d
r a c e n e u tr a l. Se e id . Finally , if the propone nt provides a r ace -neutra l expl anation, the tria l court must then determine, f

rom all the circumstances, w hether the explanation is a pretext and whetherW e no t e t hat t he p erem p t o ry chal l enge f o rms us ed were not i ncl ud ed i n t he reco rd. Ins t ead , t he p art i es ar gue 2 this issu e b a se d up o n the trial tra n sc rip t. -8- the opponent of the pere mptory challeng e esta

blished purposeful discrimination. See B atson , 476 U. S. at 98 ; se e als o Mil le r-El v. Dre tke , 545 U.S. 231, 125 S. C t. 2317, 2325 (2005). I f the trial court de termines that the pr offe red r eason is m erely prete x tual and that a r acia l motive is i n fac t behind the challeng e, the juror may not be excluded. See State v . Hugueley, 185 S.W .3d 356, 369 (T e nn . 2 00 6) ; W

oodson v. Porter Brown Limestone Co., Inc. , 916 S.W .2d 896, 903 (Tenn. 1996)

. D e t e r m i n a t i o n o f

d i s c r i m i n a t o r y i n t e n to r

l a c k t h e r e o f t u r n s l ar g e l y o n t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f c r e d i b i l i t y, o f which the attorney ’s demeanor is often the be st evidence

. Sta te v . S mi th , 8 9 3 S.W.2d 908, 914 (Tenn. 1994)

. When determining the exis tence of a Batson violation, the trial court must meticulouslyand
c are fu lly art ic ulate sp e c if ic re a so ns fo r ea c h fin din g on the re c or d, “ i.e ., wh e the r a pr ima fa c ie c a se has bee n established; whether a neutra l explanation has been g iven; and whether the totalit y of the circ umstances support a

finding of purpose ful discrimination.” W oodson , 916 S.W .2d at 906. On
app e a l, the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s a re to b e a c c or de d g re a t de fe re nc e a nd no t se t a sid e un le ss c le arl y err oneous.” Id

. The re cord indicates that during t h e thi rd day of voir dire , defe nse counse l for De fenda nt Talley complained that the prosec utor had used six of its nine challeng es to e x cuse A frican Americ an jurors. I n response , the trial court pointed out that the prosec utor had challeng ed Cauc asians and

2 stated that there had been no threshold s howing of purpose ful discrimination. Shortlythere afte r, the prosec utor complained tha t the defe nse had c ollectively violated Batson by

striking “ thirteen or fo urte e n” Cauc a sia n ju ro rs . In r e sp on se , th e tr ial cou rt dete rm ine d th a t th e de fe ns e ha d a c tua lly exercised peremptory challeng es ag ainst twelve Cauc asians and two A frican Americ ans “out of the six teen or eig hteen that they ’ve use d.” The trial court then denied the prosec utor’s “re quest to ge t into a Batson-type explanation of why the [defense ] challeng es [were ] being used.”

Th e cou rt th en r e c e sse d f or lun c h. Af

te r l un c h, c ou ns e l f

or De fe nd a nt T a lle y

pe re mpt or ily challeng ed Juror L amb, while counse l for De fenda nt Ezell challe ng ed Juror Morg an. B oth jurors
wer e excused. During another round of challeng es, counsel for De fenda nt Bry ant cha lleng ed Juror J ackson a nd she was excused. At this time, the prosec utor reque sted a benc h confe renc e. During this bench conf

ere nce, the trial court called for a rec ess and made the f ollowing obse rvations outside t h e p r e s e n c e o f

t h e j u r y: [Ea rl ie r] I ma de th e ob ser vation – w hic h is the la st t ime I ’l l ma ke thi s observation – that I

didn’t perc eive ther e to be a ny Batson problem . . . based on w hat had tra nspired thus far ; and then quickly – promptly – appar ently that was a

g ree n lig ht b e c a u s e t h e n M r
. L a m b w a s c h a l l e n g e d , M r
. M o r g a n w a s c h a l l e n g e d , Ms. Jac ks on wa s c ha lle ng e d. I me a n, ri g ht do wn the lin e wi th ha rd ly a ny he sit a tio n a t a ll, thes e cha lleng es start flowing in, and I just thi nk the def

ense ha s now exercised-9-

twenty -one of

twen ty

- f o ur possible cha lleng es – three ag ainst Afric an Americans a nd
e ig hte e n a g a ins t Cauc a sia ns , b y my c ou nt.
Wit hout waiting for the trial court’s ruling on the i ssue, counsel for Defe ndant Talley interjec ted that he struck Juror L amb bec ause of his educational backg round. Talley ’s counse l a dded that he thoug ht this juror would be more inc lined to convict. Upon these rema rks, t he court asked De fenda nt Ezell’s counsel for

his reason f

or striking J uror Morg an. Ezell’s counsel r esponded that he was not comforta ble with the juror’s response reg arding application of the presumption of innoce nce. T he court then a sked counse l for De fenda nt Bry ant his rea son for e x cusing J uror J ac k s o n
. Bry ant’s counsel stated that he cha lleng ed Juror J ackson due to her lack of jury experience and the f

act that she watche d the television show “L aw & Orde r,” which counsel believed was a “ prosec utionoriented show.”

I n r e sp on se , th e tr ia l cou rt re je c te d the re a so ns be hin d e a c h o f the se pe re mpt ory c ha lle ng e s, fi n d i ng them to be “totally err oneous” a nd “mea ningle ss.” The c ourt then obser ved that Jurors L amb and Morg an had alre ady left the c ourthouse and the ref ore c ould not be re- seate d. Howeve r, the court ordere d J uror Jackson to be re -seated. C o u n s el for De fenda nt Bry ant then moved f or a mistrial, ag ain ar g uing that the p ro s ec u t o r wa s also in violation of Batson by her e x erc ise of nine pere mptory

challeng es ag ainst prosp ec t i v e African American juror s. The trial c ourt denied the motion, finding no prima f acia showing of purposeful discrimination by the prosec utor. The c ourt noted that while the prosec utor had used nine of twelve pere mptory challeng es to exclude African Americ ans fr om the jury , the defe nse collectively had exerc ised eig hteen of twenty -one c halleng es to e xclu de Cauc a sia ns fr om the jury . T he tr ia l cou rt state d tha t “th e de fe ns e is twi c e a s c ulp able , if y ou wi ll, in the B a tso n s e ns e .” Th e c ou rt fu rthe r f ou ndthat a ft e r i t ma de the ru lin g that no pr ima fa c ia c a se of dis c ri min a tio n ha d be e n ma de by e ith e r p art y , th e de fe ns e imm e diate ly e xer c ise d th e ir pere mptory

challeng es to exclude three Cauca sian jurors. The court noted, how ever , that the prosec utor did not “seize on that opport u n ity to start excusing Af

rica n Americ ans” a nd did not excuse any one in the past four rounds. As such, the trial court found that there was “no pa rallel. . . betwee n the manner

in which the per empt o ries we re e x erc ised by the two sides of c ounsel table.”

Sub se qu e ntl y , d e fe ns e c ou ns e l f or De fe nd a nt B ry a nt att emp te d to dis mis s Jur or B art le tt. Outside of the ve nire’s pr esenc e, B ry ant’s counse l stated t h at he desire d the dismissal of J uror Ba rtlett beca use she watche d “L aw & Orde r,” she did not have jury experience , and her

demea nor s u gges t ed t h at s h e w as n o tre ce p t i v e t o t h e d ef en s e. T h e t ri al co u rt re s p o n d ed , s t at i n g t h e f o l l o wi n g:
I have determined that there has bee n a thre shold showing of discriminatory
us e of pe re mpt ory c ha lle ng e s by the de fe ns e
. Th e re fo re , y ou we re corr ect in
a ssu min g that I

wo uldha ve re qu ir e d t he art icul a tio n o f r a c e -n e utr a l r e a so ns to challeng e Ms. B artlett. The thr ee r easons that y ou have a dvance d, ag ain .

. . I don’t fi ndthe m to be va lid , r a c e -n e utr a l re a so ns . T he fa c t th a t [a jur or ] watc he s a particula r TV show that many

others on the jury

raised the ir hands to – includi ng sever al African Ame rica ns – does n o t gi v e right to cha lleng ing he r unless y ou’re wi lli ng a nd

pr e pa re d to c ha lle ng e Af

ri c a n A me ri c a ns fo r the sa me re a so ns
.“ A n ‘ i nference’ i s general l y unde rs t o o d t o be a ‘ co ncl usi o n reached by consi d eri ng other f act s and de d uci ng 3

a l ogi cal cons equen ce f r om t hem. ” J o h n so n v . C a lif o rn ia , 545 U

. S. 162, 125 S. Ct

. 2410, 2415 n

. 4 ( 2005) ( quo t i ng B la c k ’s L a w D ic tio n a ry 7 8 1 (7 th e d . 1 9 9 9 ).
-10-

. . . . Ms. Ba rtlet t , l i ke Ms. J ackson, ha s answer ed all of the questions appropriately . She’s bee n very responsive, very attentive. She’s indicated a de sire and willingne ss to serve on this ca se. I see absolutely no rea son why she, as a c itiz en, should not be allowed to se rve on this jury absent some valid rac e-ne utral rea son that can be articula ted as to her that would not also be applicable to most – or many other jurors. And a g ain, I

don’t find these three [reasons] that we re a dvance d to be valid,
rac e-ne utral re asons . . . and I ’ll deny y our re quest to excuse her.

As a thr e sh oldma tte r, we mus t no te that app e llate re vie w of thi s iss ue is fr us tr a te d, in p art , beca use t he trial court failed to meticulously follow the Batson pr oc e du re s a ndc le arl y art ic ulate its finding s and conc lusions on the recor d. Howeve r, g iven the high defe renc e we are to a ccor d the trial
c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s th a t are pr e se nt i n th e re c or d, we c a nn ot s a y that th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in its application of Batson

. Af te r r e vie w o f the re c or d av a ila ble to us, we are pe rs ua de d tha t the tr ia l cou rt fo un d p ri ma fac ia evidenc e of discrimination bythe defense. Although the rec ord contains confusing colloquy
on thi s po int , it app e ars that du ri ng the jury se le c tio n pr oc e ss, the tr ia l c ou rt fo un d th a t th e de fe ns e repe atedly

exercised pe remptory

strikes ag ainst Caucasia ns and had collectively exercised e ighte en challeng es out of twenty -one a gainst this racial g roup. Notably , a prima f acia case of purpose ful discrimination may

be esta blished solely

o n evidenc e re lating to the e x erc ise of per emptory challeng es so long as the evidenc e g ives rise to an infer ence of discriminatory purpose. See B atson , 476 U.S. at 96-97. Whil e a pattern of strikes ag ainst a particular racia l g roup i s not require d to prove discrimination, it certainly is significa nt because it may g ive rise to the infere nce of discrimination. Se e id . at 97. 3
Next, the recor d ref

lects that the trial court rejecte d the reasons proff ere d by the def ense, a nd
c o n c lu d e d th a t th e d e f

e n s e w a s c o ll e c ti v e ly e xc lu d in g p r o s p e c ti v e ju r o r s o n th e b a s is of ra ce. Addre ssing one of the de fense attorney ’s proff ere d rea sons for ex cluding two prospec tive jurors (they watche d L aw & Orde r), the trial cour t observed that the rea son for e x cluding these prospe ctive jurors applied equally

to African Americ ans whom the de fense did not challeng e for the same r eason. See, e .g. , Miller-El , 125 S. Ct . at 23 25 (n oti ng if pr of fe re d r e a so n f

or e xclu din g a

jur or app lie s ju st a s w e ll t o a n o the rw ise -s imi lar j ur or of a dif fe re nt r a c e no t e xclu de d, that is e vid e nc e te nd ing to prove pur poseful discrimination). The ref ore, it appe a

r s th at w hile the def

ense attorney s offe red r ace
neutra l rea s o n s, the court, a fter obse rving firsthand the de meanor of the de fense attorney s and prospec tive jurors, the ra cial com p osition of the venire, a nd the circ umstances involved in the pere mptory

challeng es, determined that purposef ul discrimination occurr ed. The rule in Batson provides an opportunityto give a re ason for striking a juror but “it re quires the judg e to assess the-11-

plausibilit y of that rea son in light of all evide nce w ith a bearing on it.” Id

. a t 2 3 3 1

. A c c o r d i n g l y, afte r examining the available fac ts pr esent in the re cord, w e see no clea r indication that the trial c ourt err oneously

applied Batson to de ny

the de fe ns e us e of

tw o p e re mpt ory

c ha lle ng e s. Th e de fe nd a nts are not entitled to relief on this issue.
IV. Election of Of

fenses

Def endant B ry ant ar g ues that the trial court err ed in f ailing to r equire the prosec ution to elect betwee n s ee k ing a

conviction for f

elonious possession of a handg un on J anuary 11, 2001, or on J anuary 12, 2001. I n support of his arg ument, the defendant point s to place s in the t rial re cord w here the victims testify

that Def endant B ry ant had two big g uns on the 11th, and one pla ce in the r ecor d wher e a police office r testified that upon the arrest of De fenda nt Bry ant on the 12th, he r emoved a g un from a c ar D efe ndant B ry ant was driving. Up on re vie w, we no te that “ the pr os e c uti on mus t e le c t th e fa c ts u po n w hic h it is r e ly ing to establish the cha

rg ed off ens e i f evidence is introduce d at trial indicating that the def endant ha s committed multi ple off

en s es aga i n st the victim.” State v. Johnson , 53 S.W .3d 628, 630 (Tenn. 20 01 ). Whe n th e pr oo f s ho ws the c omm iss ion of mul tip le a c ts w ith mul tip le res ult s, the re su lts be ing se pa

rate c ri min a l off

e ns e s, a ndthe re are ins uf fi c ie nt c ou nts in the c ha

rg ing ins trume nt t o acc ommodate all of the offe nses s hown, t he usual prec aution to assure jury unanimity

is to require the elec tion of offe nses. Se e Bu rli so n v . S tat e , 5 01 S.W. 2d80 1, 80 4 ( Te nn . 1 97 3) ; State v. Clabo , 905 S.W .2d 197, 205 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . The e lection re quirement “ safe gu ar d s the de fe nd a nt’ s st a te c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht to a un a nim ou s jury ve rd ic t by e ns uring that ju ro rs de lib e rate and re nder a v er d i ct b ased on the same evide nce.” Johnson , 53 S.W .3d at 631. I n addition, the elec tion requireme nt enables a defe ndant t o p re p ar e for a spec ific cha rg e, prote cts a de fenda nt a g a ins t do ub le je op ard y , e na ble s the tr ia l c ou rt

to r e vie w the we ig ht o f the e vid e nc e in i ts c apa c ity as thirteenth juror , an d enables the appe llate court to review the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence

. State v. Kendrick , 3 8 S. W.3 d 5 66 , 5 68 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . B e c a us e the e le c tio n r e qu ir eme nt i s “funda mental, i mmediately touching the constitutional rights of an acc used,” a n elec tion of offe nses is mandated whe ther or not the de fenda nt reque sts an elec tion. Burlison , 501 S.W .2d at 804. Fa ilure of the state to e lect off enses whe n the proof r equir es an elec tion is considered a n err or of
c on sti tut ion a l ma g nitud e a ndwi ll r e su lt i n r e ve rs a l of the c on vic tio n, abs e nt the e rr or be ing ha rm le ss bey ond a re asonable doubt. See State v . Shelton , 851 S.W .2d 134, 137-38 (Te nn. 1993).

I n our view, Defe ndant Bry ant’s arg ument reg arding elec tion of offenses is misplaced a nd without merit. Here , the re cord r efle cts that th e p ro s ecution charg ed De fenda nt Bry ant with one count of felon in posse ssion of a handg un on J anuary 11, 2001, and prese nted proof at trial pertinent to this charg e. The testim ony from the va

rious victims indi cate that Def endant B ry ant possessed two g uns the nig ht of J anuary 11, 2001. Also, the prosec uto r’s c losing a rg ument includes a state ment to the j u ry t h at De fe ndant B ry ant had a previous fe lony

conviction and “ on J anuary 11, 2001, he
came to that location with two pistol s. All of our victims [ testified] consistent with him having two firea rms.” I n addition, the trial co urt instructed the jury when r endering the ir verdic t to inquire-12-

wh e the r De fe nd a nt B ry a nt is “ g uil ty of c on vic te d fe lon in po sse ssi on of a ha nd g un a s charged in the indictment .” Although the defe ndant cites one instance w here a police of fice r testified a

bout seizi ng a g un from the ve hicle De fenda nt Bry ant was driving on J anuary 12th, we do not view this testimony as evidenc e of a

second of

fense involving a f

elon in possession of a fir earm. See, e .g. , Sta te v . Ca y le W ay ne Ha rri s , No. M2004-00049-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 2255488, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug . 23, 2005) (noting that wher e the of fense is testified to with particularity , minor ref ere nces to other

instances of

offe nses ar e harmless in the context of the elec tion requireme nt); State v. W

illiam Darryn Busby , No. M 2 0 0 4 -0 0 9 25-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 711904, at *7 (Te nn. Cr im. Ap p. , at N a sh vil le , M ar. 29 , 2 00 5) ; State v. Darrell Dodson , M1998 -0 0 0 6 7 -C CA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 378347, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 14, 2000). I nstead, the police office r’s testimonywas simply

corr oborative of

the victims’ testimony that Def endant Br y ant was in illega l possession of a fir earm on J anuary 11th. Howeve r, eve n if the police of fice r’s testimony

nece ssitated
a n e le c tio n o f o ff

e ns e s, it is c le ar f

ro m th e re c or d th a t a ny

e rr or wa s h arm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na ble doubt. As illust rate d above, the indictment was ti me-spec ific and the prosec utor’s ca se-in-c hief a nd closing arg ument focuse d on the offe nse cha rg ed in the indictment. Ther efor e, the jury was in no dang er of

rende ri n g a patc hwork ve rdict. See State v. Anthony Allen , No. W2004-01085-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL1606350, at *14 (Te nn. Crim. App. , at J ac k s o n, J uly 8, 200 5 ) (n oting the dir ection of pr oof and de signation of offe nse in closing arg ument serve d as
e lecti on of off

e ns e ); State v. Mic hael J. M cCann , N o
. M 2 0 0 0

- 2 9 9 0

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 1 WL 1246383, at *5 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 17, 2001) (holding that summation of offense s du ri ng pr os e c uto r’ s c los ing arg ume nt m a y e ff e c tiv e lyse rv e a s a n e le c tio n o f o ff e ns e s) ; State v. W ill iam De ar ry , No. 03C01-9612-CC-00462, 1998 WL 47946, at *13 (T en n. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Fe b. 6, 1998). De fenda nt Bry ant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
V. Rehabilitation of

Witnesses

De f e n d a n tB r y a n tar g u e s t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u r te rr e d b y p e r m i t t i n g t h e s t a t e p r o s e c u t o r t o u se a tra nscript to improperly

bolster t he credibility of wit nesses, Divin Wright and Tony ell Somerville.

Ordinarily , extrinsi c evide nce of a prior c onsistent statement is not admissible to bolster the
cre dibilit y

of a w itness. See Sta te v . M ar tin , 964 S.W. 2d 56 4, 56 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; State v. Hodge , 989 S.W. 2d71 7, 72 5 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 98 ); State v. Braggs , 604 S.W .2d 883, 885 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 80 ) ( no tin g that prior

state me nts of

wi tnes se s w he the r c on sis te nt o r i nc on sis te nt c on sti tut e inadmissible hearsay

evidenc e if off

ere d for the tr

uth of the matter a sserted) . Howeve r, a prior consistent statement m ay be admissi ble when a witness is impeache d throug h the i ntroduction of a prior inconsistent statement that sug g ests that the witness’ testimony was e ither fa

brica ted or ba sed upon faulty

rec ollection. State v. Me eks , 867 S.W .2d 361, 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) . Also, a p r io r c o n s is te n t s tate me n t may b e a d mi s s ib le w h e n a w it n e s s ’ p r io r s tate me n t i s u s e d o u t o f c o n te xt to cross-e x amine the witness. See State v . Boyd , 797 S.W .2d 589, 593-94 (Te nn. 1990). B efor e a prior consistent stateme nt may be admissible, “the w itness’ testimony must have bee n as s ai l ed or-13-

attacke d to the ex tent that the witness’ testimony needs r ehabilitating .” Hodge , 989 S.W .2d at 725.

A. Divin W

right

The re cord r efle cts that Divin Wright t estified that Def endant J evon Bry ant pul led out two g un s a ndpo int e d th e m at his h e a d. Th e re c or d a lso re fl e c ts that du ri ng his tr ia l te sti mon y Di vin
re fe rr e d to De fe nd a nt B ry a nt as “ Re d Von .” Sub se qu e ntl y , de fe ns e c ou ns e l c ro ss- e xami ne d D ivi n about a statement he made at a preliminary hearing w here he said that De fenda nt Bry ant had “ pulled out two knives.” At this time, the following discussion took place :
Divin: I

didn’t say

anything a

bout a knife. H ow could I g et a knife and a g un mix ed up.

Def ense: That’s what I

was a sking y ou. How could y ou g et a knife and a g un mix ed up?

Di vin : I did n’ t.
Th e re a ft e r, on re -d ir e c t, the pr os e c uto r a sk e d D ivi n th e fo llo wi ng abo ut h is p ri or state me nt:

Prosecutor: Now, [defense c ounsel] asked y ou how come y ou said . . . that J evon B ry ant

pu lle d o ut t wo kn ive s. No w, didy ou sa y that?

Di vin : No , I

ne ve r s a id t wo kn ive s; I

sa id t wo nin e s.
Pr os e c uto r: Tw o n ine s. An d in the pr e lim ina ry he ari ng , y ou sta ndup a t th e be nc h w ith
a tape re c or de r, ri g ht?

Di vin : Rig ht.

Prosecutor: There ’s not a court reporte r . . . in those pre liminary hearing, is ther e?

Di vin : N o, ma ’am.
I n addition, the prosec utor noted that the pre liminary hearing tr anscript recor ded Divin ca lling Def endant B ry ant “Red B arn.” The prose cutor a sked Divin if he had eve r ca lled Def endant B ry ant “Red B arn.” Divin responded that he was positive that he did not ca ll Bry ant “Red B arn.”

The de fense objected

. I n re s p onse, the trial c ourt overr uled the objec tion and stated the fo llo wi ng : Two knives is what [defe nse counse l] was a l luding to in the unsig ned preliminary

hearing tr anscript. And then the . . . re habilitation – whatever y ou want-14-

to call it – was made on redire ct sug g esting that it was ac tually two nines that was
sa id i ns te a d o f t wo kn ive s.

. . . . An d to il lu s tr a te h o w e a s il y th o s e ty p e s o f mi s ta

k e s c a n b e ma d e in a preliminary

hearing tr ancript [ sic] where the re is no o fficial court re porter w hen nothing is eve r sig ned . . . [the prosec utor] was further asking hi m ab out a point . . . wher e he a lluded, on the transc ript to Red Ba rn as oppose d to Red Von . . . .

. . . . But the p o i n t of the matter is, [the prosec utor] is perf ectly entitled, on redire ct, t o rebut that or clarify that [i nconsistent statement] in any leg itimate manner that she has at her disposal. And to sug g est that there ar e o t h er s i milar types of confusio n s – Red Ba

rn vs. Red Von – c ry staliz es the ty pe of c onfusion that occur s wh e n y ou ha ve the se un of fi c ia l/ u ns ig ne d tr a ns c ri pts ty pe d u p b y so me se c re tary

in some offic e [list ening ] t o some scratchy tape that wa s made down in g ener al sessions
c ou r tt w o m o n t h s e ar l i e r
. . . . I tw a s a v e r y s i g n i f i c a n tp o i n tt h a ty o u [de fe ns e counsel ] wer e making , in y our cr oss examination, reg arding two knives. And the
ma nn e r i n w hic h y ou ma de that po int in f ro nt o f the jury ma de it a

pp e ar a s th ou g h it
was a very signific ant point. . . . Up on re vie w, we dis c e rn no e rr or . H e re , th e de fe ns e , o n c ro ss- e xami natio n, a tta c ke d D ivi n Wright’s c redibilit y b yinsinuating he had pre viouslytestified that Def endant B ry ant possessed knives, not g uns. Howeve r, contrary to Defe ndant B ry ant’s ar g ument, the prosec utor did not introduce a

p ri o r co n s istent statement to rebut this impeachment. Instead, throug h redire ct examination o f

D iv in , th e p r o s e c u to r

r e b u tt e d th e att a c k

b y d e n o ti n g th e f

a c t th a t th e tr a n s c r ipt contained possible ty

pog raphic al er

rors in D ivin’s f

ormer testimony ; thus, soliciting an explanation sup p o r ti n g th e w it n e s s ’ d e n ia l o f th e a ll e g e d in c o n s is te n t s tate me n t. T h e s c o p e o f r e d ir e ct examination is within the trial court’s discr etion and will not b e re v er s ed absent a n abuse of that d i s cr eti on. Sta te v . B ar

na rd , 8 9 9 S. W. 2 d 6 1 7 , 6 2 4 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 1 9 9 4 )

. I n o u r v ie w , the pu rp os e of re dir e c t exam inatio n is to c lari fy the te sti mon y of a wi tne ss andto r e ha

bil itate a wi tne ss wh o s e credibilit y

has bee n impeache d. See, e .g. , Sta te v . Ch e ar is , 9 9 5 S. W. 2 d 6 4 1 , 6 4 5 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); Mee ks , 8 6 7 S. W. 2 d at 375. See also Neil P. Cohen et al., Tenne ssee L aw of Ev ide nc e , § 6. 11 [6] (5 th e d. 20 05 ). Ac c or din g ly , we c on c lud e that the tr ia l c ou rt did no t abu se its discretion by

allowing the prosec utor to reha bilitate Divin on redirec t examination.

B. Ton y e ll S om e rv ill e
T h e rec ord re flec ts that defense counsel, throug h cross-e x amination, highlig hted seve ral
v ar i an ce s b et we en T o n y el l S o m er v i l l e’ s p ri o r s t at em en tt o p o l i ce an d h ert ri al t es t i m o n y
. T h ro u gh this li ne of que stioning, the de fense aptly called into question Tony ell’s credibility

. On re direc t, the pr os e c uto r atte mpt e d to re ha bil itate by ha vin g To ny e ll re a d alo ud he r en tir e tw o- pa g e state me nt t o-15-

police. T h e d ef

en se objec ted. I n response , the trial court overrule d the objection and sta ted the fo llo wi ng :
Cle arl y , o n d ir e c t e xami natio n, the state c a nn ot h a ve the ir wi tne ss .
. . re a d f

ro m th e ir prior consistent statement. We all ag ree to that. But if that prior sta tement was use d for impea chment purpose s o n cr o s s examination, then there is some latitude g iven on redire ct to come ba ck and r ehabilitate

. The only question is how much
re ha bil itatio n is app ro pria te in this ins ta nc e
. I n [th is] c a se
. . . th e wi tne ss’ c re dib ili ty is at st ake

. . . . I thi nk that, a s a ma tte r of fu nd a me nta l fair ne ss, the state ou g ht t o be abl e to ha ve [To ny e ll] r e a d w hat th e a ns we r w a s so it c a n a ll b e vie we d in [its] proper context. . . . Upon re view, we discern no e rror
. We note that “a direc t c ontradiction is not nece ssary for
a state me nt t o b e inc on sis te nt, a nd it is suf fi c ie nt if the inc on sis te nc y ha s a re a so na ble te nd e nc y

to di s cr edit the witness’ testimony .” Sta te v . H all , 976 S.W .2d 121, 150 (Tenn. 1998) (Appe ndix ). Her e, the de fense used portions of Tony ell’s prior state ment to attack he r cr edibility . “Where specific questions and answe rs taken out of conte x t d o n o t co n vey

the true pic ture of the prior statement alleg ed to be inconsistent, it is unfair to permit refer ence t o i s o l at ed, unex plained response s by

the witness and ther e is no err or in all o wi ng the statements to be plac ed in context.” Boyd , 797 S.W .2d at 594. Acc ording ly , the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the witness’ statements to be pla ced in c ontext

. VI . M ist r ial : I m pr ope rWit ne ss S ta te m e nt
Def endant B ry ant ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed in denying his motion for mis trial afte r a police off icer interjec ted his persona l opinion as to the guilt of the de fenda nt. At trial, Police Off

icer Eric Ke lly

testified to events surr ounding the stop and arr est of Def endant B ry ant. While testify ing to thes e ev en t s , Offic er K elly responde d to the following qu e sti on s:
Pr os e c uto r: Di d y ou e ve r a rr e st Je vo n B ry a nt o r .
. . de ta in h im?

Offic er K elly : Yes, sir, he w as deta ined.

Prosecutor: And wher e wa s he take n?

Of fi c e r K e lly : A t the mom e nt that we re a lize d – tha t a ft e r s pe akin g wi th h im that he had be en involved – possibly involved in a

particula r crime –

At t h i s t i m e, d ef

en s e c o u n s el o b

j ec t ed

. T h e t ri al co u rtre s p o n d ed wi t h t h e f o l l o wi n g:-16-

He r ephra sed h is a n s w e r a n d s a id

– w h e n w e th o u g h t h e w a s p o s s ib ly in v o lv e d – befor e he r ephra sed it, it was objectionable, but he rephr ased it, so let’s move on. Obviously , he thought [Defenda nt B ry ant] wa s involved if he arr ested the g uy . That’s no big sur prise. . . .

Th e c ou rt the n d e nie d D e fe nd a nt B ry a nt’ s mo tio n f or a mis tr ial, bu t no te d th a t th e de fe ns e c ou ld “g et bac k into it on cross” if they so desired. As previously

noted, the dec ision of whether or not to g rant a

mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. McKinney , 929 S.W .2d at 405. The purpose of a mistrial is to corr ect the damag e done to the judicia l proce ss when some e vent has oc curr ed which w ould pr eclude an impartial verdic t. Ar

no ld , 563 S.W .2d at 794. This court will not disturb the trial court’s de cision unless there is an abuse of discretion. Adkins , 7 86 S.W. 2da t 64 4; State v. W illiams , 9 2 9 S.W .2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) . When determining whether a mistrial is nece ssary afte r improper testimonyis presente d to the jury , this c ourt has considere d the following non-exclusive fac tors: (1) whether the improper te stimonywas e licited by the state, (2) whether the trial court g ave a curative instruction; and (3) the re lative streng th or wea kness of the state ’s proof. See State v. Larry Holmes , No. W2004-01576-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1656830, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, July15, 2005), p erm. a

p p
. d en ied ( T e n n
. D e c. 19, 2005); State v. Paul Hay es , No. W2001-02637-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL31746693, at *4 (Te nn
. C ri m
. Ap p., at J ackson, D ec. 6, 2002), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. May

27, 2003). Upon re view, we discern no reve rsible err or nec essitating a mistrial. Cont rary

to Defe ndant Bry ant’s asse rtions, Office r Ke lly ’s statement – “we rea liz ed that – af ter spea king w ith him t hat he had been in v o lv e d –p o s s ib ly in v o lv e d in a

p ar ti c u la r c r im e ” –is n o t an o v e rr e a c h in g , e g r e g io us s t at em en tab o u tDe fe n d an tBr y an t ’s gu i l t

. R at h er , th i s s t at em en tam o u n t s t o n o m o re t h an a b en i gn explanation as to why

Offic er K elly

arr ested De fenda nt Bry ant as a suspect. We note t hat Off icer Kelly corr ecte d his own st at em en t ; thereby , corr ecting any scintilla of possible prejudice inhere nt in the state me nt. As su c h, no c ur a tiv e ins truc tio n w a s n e c e ssa ry . F ina lly , w e no te that pri or to Offic er K elly ’s testimony , sever al witnesses, including the vi ctims in the case, te stified that De fe nd a nt B ry a nt w a s in vo lve d in the c ri me s fo r wh ic h he wa s o n tria l. Ind e e d, the re c or d r e fl e c ts that the state pre sented strong evidenc e of D efe ndant B ry ant’s guilt. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that De fe nd a nt B ry a nt f

a ile d to e sta

bli sh that th e tr ia l c ou rt

abu se d it s d iscreti on wh e n it de nie d h is reque st for a mistrial. This issue is entirely without merit.

VI I. Ide nt ific at ion of D e fend ant Ez e ll

De fe nd a nt K e ith Ezell arg ue s th a t th e tria l c ou rt e rr e d in a llo wi ng the state pr os e c uto r t o bring his twin brother into the courtr oom in o rd er to e x plain Oliver Wrig ht’s initial pretrial misidentification. I n making his arg u m en t , the def endant state s that “there appea rs to be no published authority

on this question, ” b u t respectfully urg es this court to determine the in-court comparison overly

sug g estive and f

undamentally

unfair.-17-

I n the instant case , the record reflec ts that Oliver Wright identified D efe ndant Keith Ezell inc ou rt a s a pa rt ic ipant in the c ha

rg e d c ri min a l a c tiv ity . In d oin g so , O liv e r r e fe rr e d to De fe nd a nt E zel l
as “T wi n
. ” On c ross-examination, Oliver ac knowledg ed that he ide ntified the wrong person, Kenne th Ezell, at hi s initial interview with police at the hos pital. On redirect e x amination, Oliver
e xpla ine d th a t th e ph oto g ra ph ic arr a y sh ow n to him

a t th e ho sp ita l c on ta ine d a p ic tur e of Ke nn e th Ezell, but not Keith. As a result, he selected Kenneth’s photogra ph believing it to be a photog raph of Ke ith. At this time, the trial court, ove r the de fense objection, allowed the pro s ecutor to bring Kenne th Ezell i nto the courtroom; whe reupon, O liver reiter ated that Keith Ezell, known to him as

“ T w i n , ” w a s t h e i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e c h ar g e d c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y.
To be g in, we no te that D e fe nd a nt E zel l ha s f a ile d to c ite a ny

auth ority for his arg ume nt. “I ssues which a

re not supported by arg ument, citation to a uthorities, or appropriate re fer ence s to the
re c or d wi ll be tr e a te d a s wa ive d in thi s c ou rt .” Te nn
. Ct. Cr im. App . R . 1 0(b ); see also Te nn . R. App. P. 27(a)( 7). Howe ver, notwithstanding waiver , the def endant is not entitled to relief on the merits of this issue.

Be cause Def

endant Ezell did not articulate a specific evidentiary basis for his objec tion, we perc eive the issue as one that touches upon the scope of redire ct examination. W e ther efor e re view for a buse of discr etion. S e e B a r n ar d , 8 9 9 S

. W

. 2d at 624. As pre viouslynoted, the purpose of
re dir e c t e xami natio n is to c lari fy the te sti mo ny of a

wi tne ss andto r e ha

bil itate a wi tne ss w ho se cre dibilit y has been impea ched. A s with the admission of any evidenc e, testimony

elicited during
r e d ir e c t is g o v e r n e d b y e v id e n ti ar y ru le s o f r e le v a n ce. S ee, e.g. , Tenn. R. Evid. 401 & 403. There fore , trial courts shoul d be mi ndful of the ne ed to limit credibilitybolstering evidenc e to that which they

determine will not undulyprejudice the opponent of suc h evidenc e.
I n th is c a se , O liv e r’ s c re dib ili ty wa s impe a c he d. B y

imp e a c hin g Ol ive r’ s c re dibil ity
conce rning his earlier

misidentification, D ef

en d an t Ezell’s counsel opene d the door to the pr e se ntm e nt o f D e fe nd a nt E zel l’ s tw in br oth e r a ndsu bs e qu e nt e xami natio n d e sig ne d to re ha bil itate Ol ive r’ s c re dib ili ty . T his app ro a c h w a s r e le va nt to O liv e r’ s p ri or mis ide nti fi c a tio n. I n a dd iti on , in
case s where the identification of a def endant is at issue, we have determined that the trial court has discretion to allow a jury to view c ertain aspects of a defe ndant’s phy sical appe ara nce, suc h as t at t o o s or sca

rs. See Sta te v . A le

jan dro R iv e ra , N o
. E 2 0 0 2

- 0 0 4 9 1

- C C A

- R 3

- C D , 2 0 0 3 WL 22 84 31 70 , a t *2 0 (T e nn
. Cr im. Ap p. , a t Kn oxvil le , De c . 1 , 2 00 3) ; se e als o State v. He nderson , 623 S.W .2d 638, 641 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). As such, g iven the cir cumstance s, we de termine that a ny po ssi ble pr e

jud ic e c a us e d b y

the pr e se ntm e nt o f D e fe nd a nt E zel l’ s tw in b ro the r d id n ot s ub sta nti a lly outweig h its relevanc e. See Tenn. R. Evid. 403. Acc ording ly , we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discre tion in allowing the state to reha bilitate Oliver’s c redibility with respec t to his i nitial misidentification of Def

endant Ezell.

VIII. P rosec utorial Misconduct

Def endant B ry ant ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed whe n it denied his motion for mistrial based up on imp ro pe r c los ing arg ume nts by the state pr os e c uto r. Th e de fe nd a nt c ite s si x spe c if ic c omm e ntsW e no te tha t t h e sta te is c o rr e c t tha t the d e fen se faile d to c o n te m p o ra n e o u sly o b je c t to tw o o f the p ro se c u to r’s 4

com ment s all ege d t o be prej udi ci al

. H owever , gi ven t he f act t hat t hes e t wo com ment s wer e of t he s ame ch ar act er as tho se o b je c te d to a n d w e re m a d e b y the p ro se c u to r im m e d ia te ly f o llo w ing a n o v e rr u le d o b je c tio n b y the d e fen se , t h is
c o u rt, in the inte re st o f ju stice , w ill re v ie w a ll six c o m m e n ts. -18- a lle g e d to be inf

la mmatory

a nd imp ro pe r. Th e state c ou nte rs that sin c e the de fe nd a nt n e ve r p ro pe rl y re g ist e re d a

c on temp ora ne ou s o bje c tio n to tw o o f the pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nts , h e ha s w a ive d h is
c la im o f e rr or

fo r the se pa

rt ic ula r c omm e nts

. Th e sta

te fu rthe r c on te nd s the pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nts 4
wer e either

proper or did not prejudice the jury ’s ver dict.

The complained of comments made by the prosec utor during rebuttal c losing a rg ument are a s f oll ow s:
I submit the rea son y ou’re here . . . is because those thre e men a nd their . . . codef endants . .

. set about t o terrorize another g roup of people, and they did it. And those people – three of which a re sitting right he re – a

re br oken. The y

[are] broken to d a y b y w h a t h ap p e n e d e ig h te e n mo n th s a g o
. So, i n t h a t sense, y ou won. Y ou didn’t get to finish, but

you won
. . . . So you won. They’re scared

.

. . . . As I was saying, the only bad thing that will happe n in this courtroom today is if robbers and kidnapers are set free. And on behalf of the State of Tennessee, I submit that w ould be a travesty.

Y ou c an ’t , li k e Hu mp ty Du mp ty , p ut i t ba c k tog e the r fo r th e m. Y

ou c an ’t fix i t for any of them bec ause you c an’t wipe their slate clean. Y o u c a n’t take the
me mory that w ill liv e wi th tho se pe op le ou t of the ir min ds . B ut w hat y ou c a n d o is lift the fac ts that y ou have, and with t h e l aw that [ the court] is going to rea d y ou, app ly the la w to tho se fa c ts, c on su lt w ith on e a no the r, a ndfi ndthe de fe nd a nts g uil ty as cha rg ed. Now, by law . . . [t he court] has to give you what’s called le sser-i n cl u d ed offenses

. . . .

. . . . Aga i n –an d I

ap o l o gi z e –as I

wa s s ay i n g, “B y

l aw t h e j u d g e h a s t o ch ar ge y ou with these lesser -included of fense s
. An d y ou will hear the lesser- included offe nses of espec ially -ag g ravated kidnaping [si c] a re ag g ravated kidnaping [si c] and-19-

kid na pin g [sic ]. Y ou wi ll h e ar the le sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e of a g g ra vate d ro bb e ry

is
r o b b e r y.

. . . . And those instructions will be included in the cha rg e.
L e t ’ s l o o k

a tt h e d e f e n d a n t s i n d i v i d u a l l y.

. . . . An d [def e ns e c ou ns e l] ha s spe nt a lot of tim e ta lki ng abo ut . . . Mr . B ry a nt[’ s]

. . . tatto os on his arm s .
. . we ll , No.1, in January, 2001, the ev iden ce was, from
eve rybody, that they were all wearing coats.

. . . . On J anuary

11th, hatred, ve ngeance , and evil cam e calling , and ther e ar e seven lives who are chang ed fore ver, including Omar, Oliver, and Divin. You we re selec ted to sit on this jury

. . . beca use of the f

aith we ha ve in y our individual abilities to do this j ob. And as a n assistan t D. A. , when y ou g et to know people like y our victims, it ’s hard to turn a ca se over to y ou. But that’s pa

rt of our job too. . . . You have e very

scra p of information that y ou need. D o the rig ht thing in this case. (Emphasis adde d for c larification purposes).

I t has long been r ecog nized that closing a rg ument is a valuable privi leg e that shoul d not be unduly restric ted. See State v. Bane , 5 7 S

. W

. 3 d 4 1 1 , 4 2 5 (T en n
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Bigbee , 885 S.W .2d 797, 809 (Tenn. 1994) ). Howe ver, c losing a rgu m en t “must be temper ate, pr edicated on evidenc e introduce d during the trial, re levant to the issues being tried, and not other wise improper under the fac ts or law.” S ta te v
. Middlebrooks , 995 S.W .2d 550, 557 (Tenn. 1999) . Notably , the
sc op e of c los ing arg ume nt i s su bje c t to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s dis c re tio n a ndwi ll n ot b e re ve rs e d a bs e nt a cl ea r s howing of abuse of discre tion. Se e Sta te v . Ca uth e rn , 9 6 7 S. W. 2 d 7 2 6 , 7 3 7 ( T e n n
. 1998); Sm ith v . S tat e , 527 S.W .2d 737, 739 (Tenn. 1975)

. Th e pr os e c uto r p la y s a uniq ue a nd sig nif ic a nt ro le in our

c ri min a l ju sti c e sy ste m. A s a ptl y stated: [The prosecutor ] i s in a pec uliar and ve ry d ef i n i t e s ense the serva nt of the law, the tw of olda im o f w hic h is that g uil t no t e sc ape or inn oc e nc e su ff

e r. He may

pr os e c ute with earnestness and vigor – indeed he should do so. But, while [t he prosecutor] may strike ha rdblo ws , h e is n ot at li be rt y to s tr ikefo ul o ne s. I t is a s mu ch his du ty to re fr a in f ro m impr op e r me tho ds c a lc ulate d to pro du c e a wr on g fu l con vic tio n as i t is-20-

to use ever y

le g it im a teme a n s to b r in g ab o u t a ju s t o n e
. I t i s f

a ir to s a y th a t the
aver ag e jury , in a g reater or less deg ree , has confidence that these oblig ations, which so plainly

rest upon the pr osecu ting attorney , will be faithfully observe d. Consequently , improper sug g est ions, insinuations , and, espe cially , assertions of persona l know ledg e are apt to c arry much weig ht a g ainst the acc us ed wh en t hey should properly

car ry none. Berger v . United States , 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1 93 5) ; se e als o J ud ge v . S tat e , 539 S.W .2d 340, 344-45 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976)

. Whil e not exhaustive, we ha ve pre viousl y re co gn ized five are as of misconduc t in closing
arg ume nt:
1. I t is u n p ro fe s s ional conduct f or the prose cutor intentionally to misst ate the evidenc e or mislead the jury as to the infer ence s it may draw

. 2. I t is unprofessional conduc t for the pr osec u t o r t o express his [ or her ] personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimonyor evide nce or the g uilt of the de fe nd a nt. 3. The prose cutor should not use ar g umen t s calc ulated to inflame the passions or prejudice s of the jury

. 4. Th e pr os e c uto r sh ou ld re fr a in fr om arg ume nt wh ic h wo uld div e rt the jury fr om i ts duty to decide the case on the evidenc e, by injecting issues broade r than the g uilt or innocenc e of the acc used under the controlling law, or by making predic tions of the conseque nces of

the jury ’s ver dict. 5. I t is un pr of

e ssi on a l c on du c t fo r a

pr os e c uto r t o in te nti on a lly re fe r t o o r a

rg ue fa c ts outside the rec ord unless the fa cts are matters of c ommon public knowledg e.
Sta te v . G olt

z , 111 S.W .3d 1, 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (citatio n s o m i t t ed ). When determining wh e th e r th e p r o s e c u to r ’ s mi s c o n d u c t c o n s ti tu te s r e v e r s ib le e rr o r , th is c o u r t c o n s id e r s w h e ther the conduct wa s so improper or the arg ument so inflammatory that i t p rejudicia lly

aff ecte d the jury ’s verdic t. See Middlebrooks, 995 S.W .2d at 559 ; G olt z , 111 S.W .3d at 5. I n measuring the pre judicial aff ect of an improper

arg ument, this court considers the followin g fa ctors: “(1) the fa cts and circ umstances of the c ase; (2) any curative measure s undertake n by the court and the prose cutor; (3) the intent of the prose cution; ( 4) the cumulative e ffe ct of the imprope r conduc t and any other e rror s in th e r e c o r d ; an d ( 5 ) th e r e lati v e s tr e n g tho r w e ak n e s s o f

th e c a s e .” Go ltz , 111 S.W .3d at 5-6.

We b e g in o ur

re vie w b y

a dd re ssi ng the pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nt on l e sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e s. Her e, Defenda nt Bry ant complains that the prosecutor’s comments demea ned the sig nificanc e of the fac t that the law required jury instruction on lesser- included offenses. The rec ord re flec ts that the trial court in over

ruling the def

endant’ s o b

j ection found that the prosec utor’s comment a mounted to nothing more than a c orre ct s tatement of the l aw. We ag ree
. L ooking at the rec ord, we find that the pr os e c uto r’ s r e mark s se rv e d o nly to e mph a size the tr ia l c ou rt ’s c ha rg e to the jury

a ndfe ll w ith in the ra ng e of pe rmissible arg ument. As such, we discern no e rror
.-21-

Next, Defenda nt Bry ant complains that the prosecutor blatantly arg ued a f

act not in evidenc e by as s er t i n g h e was we aring a coat the night the c rimes took place . I n an ef fort to place the prosec utor’s comment in conte x t, we note that prior to the prosec utor’s re buttal arg ument, counsel for De fenda nt Bry ant ar g ued that the victims lacke d cre dibilit y in their identification of Defe ndant Bry ant stating , “what are the odds that six people would look at t his man right here and be asked .

. . to describe hi m, and not talk about t attoos? ” Then, during rebuttal arg ument, the prosec utor made the comment that the de fenda nts, including Defe n d an t Bry ant, wer e we aring coats whe n they committed the crimes. Although the rec ord does not support the pr osecutor’ s comment, we a re not c onvinced that this co m m en t was so er

roneous a s to require reve rsal. F irst, the prosec utor’s comment doe s not appea r to be de libe ra t e. T h e record r efle cts that the prose cutor be lieved ther e wa s testimonythat Def endant B ry ant wore a coat. Second, the re cord indicates the prose cut o r’ s comment was immediately

objected to, a nd althoug h t h e d ef en dant’s objec tion was overr uled, the prose cutor attempted to cur e this e arlier comment by acknow ledg ing to the jury that they wer e to dec ide whethe r or no t th e wi tne sse s p ro pe rl y ide nti fi e d D e fe nd a nt B ry a nt d e sp ite the ir failu re to me nti on his ta tto os
. Third, i n its char g e, the trial court reminded t he jury that statements and arg uments of counse l were
no t e vid e nc e a ndc ou ld be dis re g ard e d if no t su pp orte d b y

the e vid e nc e . F ou rth, the re c or d r e fl e c ts that ma ny if no t a ll of the vic tim s ide nti fi e d De fe nd a nt B ry a nt in c ou rt a s on e of the ass ail ants. Acc ording ly , the prosec utor’s comment, a lbeit error , does not rise to the level of r ever sible err or.
We next addre ss the prosec utor’s rema ining comments alleg ed to ha ve prejudice d the jury ’s
v e r d i c t

. H e r e , D e f

e n d a n tB r y a n tar g u e s t h a tt h e p r o s e c u t o r ’ s c o m m e n t s w e r e g r o s s l y i m p r o p e r
. In particula r, De fenda nt Bry ant points out that during r ebutta l a r g u me n t, th ep r osecutor, a fter r eiterating that the victims were terrorized, directly ad d ressed the defe ndants, stating, “ y ou won. They ’re
scar ed.” T here afte r, the prose cutor de clar ed to the jury that it would be a trave sty to let these robbe rs and kidnappe rs g o fre e. The prosec utor then urg ed the jury to f ind the defe ndants g uilty

. Then late r, the prosec utor personifie d the defe ndants as “hatr ed, veng eanc e, and evil” and ag ain appe aled to the jury ’s passions by

say ing “ it’s hard to turn a c ase over to y ou” so “[d] o the right thing in thi s case .” De fe nd a nt B ry a nt a lso po int s o ut that no c ur a tiv e me a su re s w e re un de rt ake n b y the tr ia l c ou rt

. L ooking at the re cord, it is evident that the pr osecutor’ s comments wer e improper in that they
wer e desig ned to inflame the passions and pre judices of the jury . I t is well settled that a prose cutor should refr ain from a

rg ument desig ned to inflame the jury and should restric t his or her c ommentary to matters in ev idence or issues at trial. See State v . Thomas , 158 S.W .3d 361, 413 (Tenn. 2005)

. I n a dd iti on , a

“ pr os e c uto r sh ou ld re fr a in fr om arg ume nt wh ic h wo ulddiv e rt the jury fr om i ts d uty to decide the case on the evidenc e . . . by making predic tions of the co n s eq u en ce s o f the jury ’s
v erdic t.” Go ltz , 1 1 1 S

. W

. 3 d a t 6

. M o r e o v e r , a p r o s e c u t o r s h o u l d r e f r a i n f r o m u s i n g e p i t h e t s to char acte rize a def

endant. Thomas , 1 58 S.W. 3da t 41 4; C a u the rn , 9 6 7 S

. W .2d at 737. Such arg uments ref

lect a clear

disreg ard f

or long standing prec edent. See Middlebrooks , 995 S.W .2d at 55 9; Sp ar k s v . S tat e , 563 S.W .2d 564, 569 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)

.-22-

Nonethele ss, we cannot say that the prosec utor’s comments we re so imprope r that they prejudice d the jury ’s verdic t. F irst, the comments at issue we re only a portion of the pr osecutor’ s oth e rw ise app ro priate su mmatio n o f the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tri a l. Sec on d, a lth ou g h n o im me diate cura tive me a su re s w e re take n b y the tr ia l c ou rt , th e c ou rt dida dmo nis h th e jury

in i ts c ha

rg e to dis re g arda ny

state me nts a ndarg ume nts of c ou ns e l no t su pp orte d by the e vid e nc e a ndto r e nd e r a fa ir
a ndimp art ia l ve rd ic t. F ina lly , th e e vid e nc e of the de fe nd a nt’ s g uil t pr e se nte d a t tr ia l w a s su bs ta nti a l. There fore , g iven these c ircumstance s, we c onclude that the prosecutor’s im proper comments do not
war rant re versa l. See Thomas , 158 S.W .3d at 414 (holding that the prosec utor’s re peate d personific atio n of def

endants a s “g ree d and evil” w as unsee mly but did not undermine the fu nd a me nta l fa ir ne ss of the tr ia l) ; Middlebrooks , 995 S.W .2d at 559-60 (holding that prosec utor’s ina pp ro pria te re mark s d id n ot a ff e c t th e ve rd ic t to th ep r e

jud ic e of de fe nd a nt) ; Cau the rn , 967 S.W .2d at 7 3 7 (h o l d i n g t h at t h e p ro s ec u t o r’ s re p ea t ed re fe re n ce s t o t h e d ef en d an t as “t h e e v i l o n e, ” t h o u gh imp ro pe r, didno t a ff

e c t th e ve rd ic t to pr e

jud ic e the de fe nd a nt) . A c c or din g ly , D e fe nd a nt B ry a nt i s not entitled to relief on this issue. IX. Jury Instructions: Advanced Review

De fe nd a nt B ry a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in not all ow ing his c ou ns e l su ff ic ie nt t ime to revie w t he jury char g e. Whil e Defenda nt Bry ant concedes that no prece dent re quires that the tria l court g ive advanc ed notice of the proposed jury instructions, he submits t hat a be tter pra ctice is for
a trial court to pr ovide a written copy of the proposed instructions prior to c harg ing the jury in order that counsel mig ht unde rtake meaning ful revie w of the instructions a nd make timely objections or specia l reque sts where appropriate.

Rul e 30 of

the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e du re pr ov ide s in re le va nt p art that:
At the close of

the evidence o r at such ea rlier time during the trial as the c ourt rea sonably

direc ts, any

party may file written r equests that the court instruct the jury
on the la w a s set for th in the re qu e sts . A t th e sa me tim e c op ie s o f s uc h r e qu e sts sh a ll b e fu rn ish e d to a dv e rs ary c ou ns e l. T he c ou rt

sh a ll i nf orm c ou ns e l of

its proposed a ction upon the re quests, and any other portion of the instructions
conce rning which inquiries ar e made , prior to their a rg uments to the jury . The c ourt may , in its di scre tion, entertain re quests for inst ructions at any time befor e the jury
re tir e s to c on sid e r i ts v e rd ic t.

. . . Af te r the jud g e ha s instru c te d the jury , the pa rt ie s sha ll be g ive n o pp ortun ity to o b j ec t , o u t o f hea

ring of the jury , to the content of a n instruction give n or to the failure to give a re quested instruction, but failure to make objec tion shall not prejudice the rig ht of a party to a ssign the basis of the objection as err or in support of a mot ion fo r a

ne w t ri a l.W e no te , ho w e v e r, tha t t h e A d v iso ry C o m m issio n C o m m e n ts to R u le 3 0 sta te s tha t “[t]h is ru le ge n e ra lly 5

ass ures t hat co unsel wi l l know what t he charge wi l l co nt ai n b ef o re m aki ng t he summ at i o n argum ent t o t he jur y
. ” In o ur vi ew, t he co m m ent s sugges t t hat t he b et t er p ract i ce i s fo r t he t ri al co urt t o al l o w t he p art i es t o revi ew t he p rop o sed jury ins tru c tio n s p rio r to c lo sin g a rg u m e n t. -23- I n th e in s tan t c a s e , th e r e c o r d s h o w s th a t a t th e c o mp le ti o n o f th e e v id e n c e , th e tria l court reque sted the parties submit any specia l reque sts in writing. Discuss i o n t h en en sued as to what lesser- included off

enses would be char g ed. During this discus s i o n , the def ense a sked if the c ourt could supply a copy of its propose d jury instructions. The c ourt responde d that its inst ructions wer e not in complete form, but that the instructions would not include “ anything out of the ordinary .” The next day , the court and the parties discussed at l eng th their specia l reque sts and questions reg arding pr op os e d ju ry

ins truc tio ns
. Upon review, we note t hat R ule 30 does not require that the tria l court g ive the parties a copy of its proposed jury

instructions in advance

. Rather, Rul e 30 onlyrequire s that the court inform the 5 parties of its proposed ac tion on the submit ted spec ial reque sts and portions of the i nstructions that
are inquired by

the parties. See State v. Mc Kinney , 605 S.W .2d 842, 847 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)

. We also note t hat R ule 30 allows the parties to object after the trial court has instruc ted the jury , and prese rves the pa

rties’ rig ht to raise er

rors in their motion for a

new trial . We further

note that the proposed jury

instructions were discussed at leng th in this case . I t is not o u r ro l e t o cre ate ne w pr oc e du ra l po lic y

c on tr ary to e xistin g pr e c e de nt. Ra the r, we are to r e vie w the re c or d f or e rr or s in adher ence to prec edent. Ac cording ly , we disce rn no er ror a nd the issue is without merit.

X. Jur y I nst r uc ti ons : R e as ona ble Do ubt

Th e de fe nd a nts arg ue that the tr ia l cou rt imp ro pe rl y

ins truc te d th e jury

re g ard ing re a so na

ble doubt.

I n criminal ca ses, a de fenda nt has a right t o a correc t and complete char g e of the law. Sta te v. Garrison , 40 S.W .3d 426, 432 (Tenn. 2000) . The failure to do so deprive s the defe ndant of the constitutional right to a jury trial and subjec ts the err oneous jury instruction to harmless err or analy sis. Id . at 433-34. In evaluating c laims of err or in the jury char g e, this court must review the char g e in its entirety

and re ad it as a w hole. State v. Leach , 148 S.W .3d 42, 58 (Tenn. 2004) . A jury ins truc tio n is c on sid e re d “ pr e jud ic ia lly e rr on e ou s if

it f a ils to f a ir ly su bmi t th e legal is su e s o r i f i t misleads the jury

as to the applica

ble law.” State v. Hodge s , 944 S.W .2d 346, 352 (Tenn. 1997)

. The de f e n d a n ts c o n te n d th a t th e r e a s o n ab le d o u b t p o r ti o n o f th e ju r y in s tr u c ti o n was prejudicia lly

err oneous for

two rea sons. First, the def endants a rg ue that the tria l court er red w hen it mis rea d the def

inition of reasonable doubt. I n its written i nstructions, the t rial court’s definition
o f r ea s o n ab l e d o u b ti n cl u d ed t h e f o l l o wi n g:
A re asonable doubt is just that – a doubt that i s re as onable a fter an examination of all the fac ts of this c ase. I f y ou find the State has not prove n every-24-

element, be y ond a re asonable doubt, then y ou sh ou ld f i n d t h e d e f

e n d a n tn o tg u i l t y.
Ho we v er , wh en re ad i n g t h e i n s tru ct i o n s t o t h e j u ry , t h e t ri al co u rt s t at ed t h e f o l l o wi n g:
A reasonable doubt is just t hat – a doubt that is rea sonable a fter an examination [ of]
a ll o f the fac ts i n th e c a se . I f y ou fi ndthe state ha s n ot p ro ve n e ve ry e le me nt, bey ond a re asonable doubt, then y ou can find the def endants not g uilty

. The de fenda nts contend that the trial c ourt lowere d the state’s bur den of pr oof by stating the signific antly

less emphatic phr ase “can find” instead of the proper imperative phrase “should find.” The de fenda nts arg ue that this err or is one of c onstitut ional mag nitude.

W h i l e t h e d ef

en d an t s ’ a rgu m en to n t h i s i s s u e is co m m en d ab l e in t h at i t re fl ec t s k n o wl ed ge and commitment to Eng lish g rammar and construction, it is not il lustrative of pre judicial err or. He re the re c or d c le arl y

re fl e c ts that th e jury

wa s in str

uc te d o n e a c h char ged of fe ns e a ndwa s to ld numerous times that the state must prove all the essential e lements of ea ch cha rg ed off ense be y ond
a re a so na ble do ub t. I n ad dit ion , the jury wa s instru c te d nume ro us tim e s tha t the y ha d a du ty to a c qu it if they had re asonable doubt as to the defe ndants g uilt on each of fense char g ed. F urthermor e, the
re c or d r e fl e c ts that th e jury wa s p ro vid e d a

c op y of the i ns truc tio ns c on ta ini ng the ph ra se “ sh ou ld find,” a nd the trial court encour ag ed the juror s to r e-r ead “any or all of it.” Thus, in our view, the tr ia l cou rt ’s ve rb a l mista

ke in the re a din g of thi rt y -f ive pa g e s o f j ury

ins truc tio n d oe s n ot c on sti tut e e rr or le t a lon e c on sti tut ion a l e rr or . A c c or din g ly , th e iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t. Second, the de fenda nts arg ue that the trial court e rre d by not including the la ng uag e “mor al
certainty ” and “ inabilityto let t he mind rest ea silyas to the ce rtainty of g uilt” in its instruction on
rea sonable doubt. The de fenda n t s as sert that whe n the trial court refuse d to instruct the jury on re a so na ble do ub t a s se t f

orth i n T e nn e sse e Pa tte rn Jury I ns truc tio n 2 .0 3, the c ou rt vio la te d th e ir constitutional right to a c orre ct and c omplete cha rg e of the law.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

g a ve the fo llo wi ng ins truc tio n r e g ard ing re a so na ble do ub t:
A re as o n ab le doubt is a doubt based upon r eason a nd common sense a fter
car eful a nd impartial consideration of all of the e vidence in the case . I t is not
ne c e ssa ry that th e de fe nd a nt’ s g uil t be pr ov e d be y on d a ll p os sib le do ub t, a s a bs olu te certainty of g uilt is not demanded by the law to convic t of any criminal cha

rg e.
A re asonable doubt is just that -- a doubt that is reasona ble af ter a n examination all [ sic] of t h e fa ct s in the case

. I f y ou find the state ha s not proven
every element, b ey o n d a re asonable doubt, then y ou can f ind the defe ndants not g uilty

. Upon re view, we n o t e that “the Constit ution neither prohibits trial courts fr om defining
rea sonable doubt nor r equire s them to do so as a matter of course .” Victor v. Nebraska , 511 U.S. 1,-25-

5 (1994). Furthermore, “ so long a s the court instructs the jury on the nec essity

that the def

endant’ s g uilt be proved bey ond a re asonable doubt, the Constit ution does not require that any particula r form of words be used in a dvising the jury of the g overnme nt’s burden of proof.” Id. (citations omitted);
se e als o Sta te v . W

e st , 844 S.W .2d 144, 151 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that “[t] hereis no require ment lim iti ng a tr ia l c ou rt

to the us e of

‘p a tte rn ins truc tio ns ’” ). We f urthe r n ote that w e ha ve pr e vio us ly fo un d n o er

ro r in the tr ia l cou rt ’s re fu sa l to inc lud e the “ mor a l ce rt a int y ” la ng ua g e in i ts r e a so na ble do u b t i n s t ruction. See State v. Chett Allen W alker , N o
. E 2 0 0 2

- 0 3 0 9 3

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 3 WL 22 25 81 81 , at *9 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. , at K no xvill e , O c t. 2 , 2 00 3) ; Sta te v . Le roy Ne v ils , No. M20 0 2 -0 0 411-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 1787294, at *7 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 4, 20 03 ); State v. Derek D enton , No . 0 2C0 1- 94 09 -C R- 00 18 6, 19 96 WL 43 23 38 , at *8 -9 (T e nn . Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug . 2, 1996). Ther efor e, it is our opinion that this instruction, taken as a whole,
c or re c tly c on ve y e d to the jury

the c on c e pt of re a so na

ble do ub t a nd did no t vi olate the de fe nd a nts ’ constitutional rights. See Victor , 5 11 U. S. at 5; Pe tty joh n v . S tat e , 885 S.W .2d 364, 365 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ) (c on c lud ing that the c ou rt ’s ins truc tio n on re a so na ble do ub t wh e n v ie we d in fu ll context “sufficiently

described the deg ree of doubt nece ssary for acquittal and the deg ree of proof
ne c e ssa ry fo r c on vic tio n. ” ). Ac c or din g ly , th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t. XI. Jury Instructions: Defendant’s Right Not To Testify

Def endant B ry ant also ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed in instruct ing the jury as to the defe ndant’s rig ht not to testi fy . Specifica lly , Def enda n t Br y an t s ubmits t hat the trial c ourt err ed when it denied his re quest to ch an ge t h e wor d “fa ilure” to “ elec tion” in the portion of the jury instruction addre ssing a

defe ndant’s rig ht not to testi fy

. Upon re view of this issue, we disc ern no e rror . The re cord r efle cts that the trial court re ad t o t h e j u r y t h e f

o l l o w i n g i n s tru c t i o n r e g ar d i n g a d e f e n d a n t ’ s r i g h tn o tt o t e s t i f y: A defendant is not require d to take the witness stand in his own beha lf, and his failure to do so cannot be considere d for a ny purpose a g ainst him, nor can a ny infere nce be draw n from such failure of t he defenda nt to take the stand in his own behalf

. After the jury was dismiss ed to de liberate , but be fore the written instructions w ere delivere d to the j u r y r o o m , t h e d e f

e n d a n t r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h e tr i a l c o u r t c h a n g e t h e l a n g u a g e f r o m “ f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f

y” to “elec t not to testi fy ” in ac corda nce w ith Tennessee Pattern JuryI nstruction 43.03. The trial c ourt ag ree d to have the instruc tion re-ty ped per the defe ndant’s reque st but informed the def endant that it would not re-re ad this instruction to the jury . The de fenda nt ag ree d that re- rea ding this instruction would not be nec essary
. Her e, the tria l court, upon the de fenda nt’s requ es t , co rre cted this portion of the written instructions before sending them to the jury

. As such, any perc eived e rror

in this portion of the jury instructions was cur ed by the court’s corr ective a ction. Moreove r, we have pr eviousl y fo u nd the afor ementioned portion of the jury instructions origina lly

rea d to the jury

t o b e appropriate whe n-26-

viewed in context with t he entire jury instruction. See Sta te v . D av is , 656 S.W .2d 406, 410 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983), judgment vac ated and reinstated , 1991 WL 155718 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) ; Sta te v . Kee le , 6 4 4 S

. W

. 2 d 4 3 5 , 4 3 8 (T en n
. C ri m
. Ap p
. 1 9 8 2 ) ( ci t i n g Y e lto n v . S tat e , 365 S.W .2d 877 (1963)) . We conclude the same in this case . Consequently , this iss ue is without merit.

XI I. Jur y I nst r uc ti ons : L e sse r -I nc lude d Offe nse
De fe nd ant B ry a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in re fu sin g to i ns truc t th e jury on fa lse imprisonment as a lesser -included of fense of espe cially

ag g ravated kidnapping

. I n th e ins ta nt c a se , th e re c or d r e fl e c ts t hat th e def e nd a nt p ro pe rl y

re qu e ste d f

a lse imprisonment as a lesser- included offe nse of espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping . Howeve r, the trial
co u rt d en i ed t h e de fe n d an t ’s re q u es t an d i n s tru ct ed t h e ju ry o n aggr av at ed ki d n ap p i n g, k i d n ap p i n g, and fa cilitation of a fe lony as the lesse r-include d offe nses of e specia lly ag g ravated kidnapping , the char g ed off

ense.
Acc ording to State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453 (Tenn. 1999), an offe ns e i s co n s i dere d lesser- included of a

g reater off

ense if:
(a) all of its statutory

elements a

re inc luded within the s t at u t ory elements of the offe nse cha

rg ed; or (b ) i t f a ils to m e e t th e de fi nit ion in p art (a ) o nly in the re sp e c t that it conta ins a statutory element or

elements e stablishing ( 1 ) a d i f f e r e n tm e n t a l s t a t e i n d i c a t i n g a l e s s e r k i n d o f c u l p ab i l i t y; and/or (2 ) a le ss s e ri ou s h arm

or ri sk of ha rm to the sa me pe rs on , p ro pe rt y or public intere st. . . .
Id . at 466-67. Whether instruc tion on a lesser- included off ense should be g iven hinge s upon whether the trial court, viewing the evidenc e most favor ably to the exis tence of the lesse r-include d offe nse, conclude s that (1) evidence exis ts that rea sonable mi nds could accept the lesser- included off ense, and (2) that the evidenc e “is leg ally sufficie nt to support a co n v i ct i on for the le sser-inc luded offe nse.” Id. at 469. The failure to instruct the jury on lesser- included off

enses r equire s a re versa l unless the re viewing court de termines that the e rror was ha rmless bey ond a re asonable doubt. See Sta te v . E ly , 48 S.W .3d 710, 727 (Tenn. 2001). Upon re view, this court must determine “ (1) whe ther
a n o ff e ns e is a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e ; (2 ) wh e the r t

he e vid e nc e su pp orts a

le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e instruction; and (3) whe ther a n instructional err or i s harmless.” State v. Allen , 69 S.W .3d 181, 187 (Tenn. 2002) . I n making this determination, this c ourt must “ conduct a thoroug h examination of the
rec ord, including the evidenc e pre sented at trial, the defe ndant' s theory of def ense, and the ver dict returne d by

the jury .” Id . at 191.

Pursuant to Tennesse e statute, the of fense of espe cially

ag g ravated kidnapping incorporates by ref ere nce and is de fined by the offe nse of false imprisonment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-305.-27-

As such, we have he ld that false imprisonment is a lesser- included offe nse of e specia lly ag g ravated kidnapping

. See, e .g., State v. Ge rald L. Shi rley , No. E2002-03096-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 34506,
a t *2 0 ( Te nn. Crim. Ap p. , at K no xvill e , Jan . 7 , 2 00 4) ; State v. Newsome , No. W2002-01306-CCA -R 3 -C D, 2 003 WL 23100597, *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, D ec. 30, 20 03 ); State v. Ev angeline Co mb s & Joseph D . Combs , Nos. E2000-02801-CCA-R3-CD, E2000-2800-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31118329, *60 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knox ville, Sept. 25, 20 02 ). I n r e vie wi ng the re c or d, we de te rm ine that su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e e xiste d to a llo w r e a so na ble minds to ac cept the lesser- included offe nse of false imprisonment. Ac cording ly , we c onclude that the trial court erre d.

Ha vin g c on c lud e d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt erred by fai lin g to i ns truc t th e jury on fa lse imprisonment, our final inquiry is whether that error

is harmless bey ond a re asonable doubt. Allen , 69 S.W. 3da t 19 1; El

y , 48 S.W .3d at 727. The err or may be harmless when the jury , by finding the de fe nd a nt g uil ty of the hig he st o ff e ns e to the e xclu sio n o f the imm e diate ly le sse r o ff e ns e , n e c e ssa

ri ly reje cted al l o t h er le sser-inc luded offe nses. State v. W illiams , 977 S.W .2d 101, 106 (Tenn. 1998)

. I n this case, the jury

convict ed Def

endant B ry ant of e specia lly ag g ravated kidnapping to the exclusion of the lesser- included offe nses of ag g ravated kidnapping , kidnapping , an d facilitation. Ac c or din g ly , w e c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s failu re to c ha rg e fa lse imp ri so nme nt w a s h arm le ss bey ond a re asonable doubt. The def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.
XI II. Se nt e nc ing

I n th e ins ta nt c a se , D e fe nda nt B ry a nt w a s c on vic te d o f f ou rt e e n c ou nts of

e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated kidnapping , four c ounts of ag g ravated robbery , and one count of felon in posse ssion of a handg un. He wa s sentence d to forty y ear s for e ach of

his especia lly

ag g ravated kidnapping
c on vic tio ns , tw e nty

y e ars fo r ea c h of his fo ur a g g ra vate d rob be ry c on vic tio ns , an d fou r y e ars fo r h is conviction for felon in possession of a handg un. The trial court order ed seve n of De fenda nt Bry ant’s espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping convictions to be ser ved consecuti vely to his convictions for ag g ravated robbe ry

and fe lon in possession of a handg un. As a re sult, Defendant Bry ant re ceive d a total ef fec tive sentenc e of 364 y ear s. Defe ndant Ezell was convic t ed o f fo u rt een c ounts of
e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d kidn app ing a ndfo ur c ou nts of ag g ra vate d r ob be ry . H e wa s se nte nc e d to twenty -two y ear s for e ach of his especia lly

ag g ravated kidnapping convictions and eleven y ear s for
eac h of his f

our ag g ravated robbe ry

convictions. The tria l court orde red se ven of D efe ndant Ezell’s espec ially ag g ravat ed kidnapping convic tions to be served c onsecutively to his convictions for
a g g ra vate d r ob be ry . A s a re su lt, De fe nd a nt E zel l r e c e ive d a t ot a l e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of

19 8 y e ars
. De fe nd a nt T a lle y

wa s c on vic te d of te n c ou nts of e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d kid na pp ing a nd fo ur

c ou nts of agg r a v a te d r o b b e r y
. H e w a s s e n te n c e d to tw e n ty y e ar s f o r e a c h o f h is e s p e c ia ll y

a g g r a v ated kidnapping convictions and ten y ear s for eac h of his f our ag g ravated robbery

convictions. The tria l court orde red f

ive of De fenda nt Talley ’s especially ag g ravated kidnapping convictions to be ser ved
consec utively

to his convictions for ag g ravated robbery
. As a result, Def endant Ta lly

rec eived a

total eff ective se ntence of 140 y ear s.In B la k e ly , t he U ni t ed St at es S upr eme C our t hel d t hat a t r i al cour t coul d onl y i ncr eas e a defendan t ’ s s ent enc e 6 b e yo n d a sta tuto rily d e fine d m a x im u m w ith fac ts fo u n d b y a ju ry, fac ts a d m itt e d b y the d e fen d a n t, o r w ith a d e fen d a n t’s p a st c o n v ic tio n s. Id. a t 3 0 3 -0 4

.

T he r ecor d re vea l s t hat t he t r i al co ur t rel i ed on t hr ee f act ors i n det er mi ni ng t hat cons ecu t i ve s ent enc i ng was 7

war r ant ed i n D ef

endan t B y ant ’ s and E zel l ’ s cas e – D ef endan t s B r y ant an d E zel l wer e dan ger ous offender s an d had an
e x te n siv e c rim ina l h isto ry; D e fen d a n t B rya n t wa s a p ro fes sio n a l cr im ina l. See T en n
. Code An n
. § 40- 35- 115( b) ( 1) , ( 2) and (4).

-28- Be fore a trial c ourt sentenc es a c onvicted def endant, it must c o n s i d er : (1) the evidence
rec eived at the trial and th e s entencing he aring ; (2) the pr esente nce r eport; (3) the principles of sentenc ing; ( 4) the a

rg uments of counse l relative to sente ncing alternatives; (5) the natur e and char acte ristics of the criminal conduct i nvolved; (6) any mitigating or enhance ment fac tors; (7) any statements made by

the def endant in his or her own behalf; and (8) the defendant' s potential or lac k of po tentia l f

or re ha bil itatio n o r t

re a tme nt. Te nn . Co de An n. §§ 40 -3 5- 10 3, -2 10 ; Sta te v . I mf e ld , 70 S.W. 3d69 8, 70 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) . T o f a c ili ta te app e llate re vie w, the tr ia l cou rt is a lso re qu ir e d to place on the re cord its re asons for imposing the specific sentenc e, including the identification of the mitigating and enhanceme nt fac tors found, the spec ific fa ct s supporting e ach e nhance ment fac tor fo un d, a ndthe me tho d b y wh ic h th e mit ig a tin g a nde nh a nc eme nt fa c tor s h a ve be e n e va luate d in determining the se ntence

. Id . at 704-05. Appell at e re view of a

challeng ed sente nce is a de novo re view of the rec ord with a pr e su mpt ion that th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio ns are c or re c t. Te nn
. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ). Th is presumption of cor

rec tness is conditioned upon the af firmative showing in the rec ord that the trial court considere d the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances. State v. Pe ttus , 98 6 S. W.2 d 5 40 , 5 43 -4 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . H ow e ve r, if the re c or d s ho ws that th e tr ial cou rt f a ile d to consider the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umsta n ce s, then revie w of the challeng ed sentenc e is purely de novo without the pre sumption of corre ctness. State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991)

. On ap p ea l , the def endant ha s the burden of showing that the sentenc e imposed b y the trial court is im proper . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) , Sentencing C o mmissi on Comments. W e will uphold the sentenc e imposed by the trial court if (1) sente nce complies with our sentenc ing statutes, and (2) the t rial court’s finding s are adequately supported by th e r e c o r d. See State v . A rn e tt , 4 9 S. W.3 d 2 50 , 2 57 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( f).

De fe nd an ts B ry an t an d E

ze ll

I n their final issue, Defe ndants Bry ant and Ezell cite Blakely v. W ashington , 542 U.S. 296 (2 00 4) to a

rgue that the tr ia l c ou rt ’s imp os iti on of c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s v iol a te d th e ir Sixth 6 Amendment rig ht to a jury trial bec ause the court made finding s of fa ct without the intervention of a jury

. Whil e the defe ndants acknow ledg e that the Tenne ssee Supre me Court in State v. Gome z , 163

7 S.W. 3d63 2 (T e nn . 2 00 5) he ld that th e Te nn e sse e se nte nc ing sc he me do e s n ot v iol a te the SixthSi n ce t h e def en dan t ’ s s en t en ci n g , T en n es s ee ’ s s en t en ci n g s ch eme h as be en ame n ded. Amen dmen t s i n cl u de 8
t he renumb eri ng of enhancem ent fact o rs , om i ss i o n of l anguage desi gnat i ng a p res um p t i ve m i ni m um s ent ence, and t he ind ic a tio n tha t t h e a p p lica tio n o f en h a n c e m e n t f a c to rs is ad v iso ry n o t m a n d a to ry. See T en n
. Code An n
. §§ 40- 35- 114,

- 2 1 0

. W hile w e r e fere nc e the a m en d ed en ha nc em en t f ac t o r num b ers, any sub st an t i ve ch an ge s refl ec t ed i n these
a m e n d m e n ts d o no t ap p ly t o the d e fen d a n t’s ap p e a l.

-29- A m e n d m e n tr i g h tt o a

j u r y tr i a l a s i n t e rp r e t e d b y Bl ake ly , th e de fe nd a nts su bmi t th a t ou r s up re me court did not resolve the pre cise issue of w hether consec utive sentenc ing violate s their constitutional rig ht to a jury trial. They arg ue that consec utive sentenc ing controls the over all “leng th of time the offe n d e r is to b e d e p r iv e d o f

h is f r e e d o m b y

p h y s ic a l c o n f

in e me n t, ” a n d a s s u c h , c o n secutive sentenc ing violate s their Six th A mendment rig ht to have a jury determine bey ond a re asonable doubt the fa cts nec essary

to increa se their se ntence s. The defe ndants also advanc e an alternative arg ument that Gomezwas incor

rec tly decide d in order to pr eser ve this issue for fe dera l review

. Upo n re vie w, we no te that Gomezis binding authority

. Gomezc le ar ly h o ld s th a t our sentenc ing sc heme is non-mandatory ; the ref ore, it does not does not violate the Six th Amendment rig ht to a jury

trial. 163 S.W .3d at 658-62. I n our vi ew, our supreme c ourt’s rationale under ly ing its holdi ng in Gomezencompa sses and thus controls the i s s ue of w hether consec utive sentenc ing of fe nd s Blakely ’s p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t s e n t e n c e e n h a n c e m e n t d e r i v e d f r o m f a c t s n o t a u t h o r i z e d b y a jury verdic t or ad m i t t ed b y

the def endant. See id. a t 66 1. We a lso no te that w e ha ve pr e vio us ly fo un d th a t Bl ake ly does not aff ect a trial court’ s consec utive sentenc ing de terminations. See, e .g., State v. Anthony Allen , N o. W20 04 -0 10 85 -C CA -R 3- CD , 2 00 5 W L 16 0635 0, a t *7 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. , a t Jac ks on , July 8, 20 05 ); Sta te v . E ar ic e Ro be rts , N o
. W2 0 0 3

- 0 2 6 6 8

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 4 WL 27 15 31 6, a t *1 2 (T e nn
. Cr im. Ap p. , a t Jac ks on , N ov . 2 3, 20 04 ); State v. Lawrence W arren Pierce , No. M2003-01924-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2533794, at * 13 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 9, 20 04 ). Ac c or din g ly , th e iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t. Defendant Talley

I n h is f ina l is su e , De fe nd a nt Ta lle y c ha lle ng e s bo th the le ng th a nd ma nn e r of se rv ic e of his sentenc e. The defe ndant first submits that the trial court improperly considere d enhanc ement fa ctors (1 ), (4 ), a nd (5 ), a nd imp ro pe rl y de c lin e d to c on sid e r m iti g a tio n e vid e nc e wh e n s e nte nc ing him to twenty y ear s for e ach of

his especia lly

ag g ravated kidnapping convictions and ten y ear s for e ach of his ag g ravated robbe ry

convictions. Especia lly

ag g ravated kidnapping is a Class A felony . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-305( b)(1)

. The sente ncing rang e for

a Rang e I offe nder who commits a Class A felony

is fifteen to twe nty -five y ear s. Id. § 40-35-112( a)( 1). Ag g ravated robbe ry is a Cl as s B f

elony

. Id. § 39-13-402( b). The sentenc ing r ang e for

a Rang e I offe nder w ho commits a C lass B felony is eig ht to twelve y ear s. Id. § 4 0- 35 -1 12 (a )( 2) . A pp lic able to De fe nd a nt Ta lle y ’s c a se , the pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e fo r a C la ss A felony is the midpoint in the rang e while the pr esumptive sentenc e for a Class B f

elony is the minimum in the rang e. Id. § 40-35-210( c) ( 2003). Procedur ally , the trial court starts w ith the 8 presumptive sente nce, inc rea sing the sentenc e within the ra ng e as a ppropriate based upon the-30-

e xiste nc e of

e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor s a ndthe n r e du c ing the se ntence wi thi n th e rang e a s a pp ro pr ia te based upon the exis tence of mitigating f actor s. Id. § 4 0 -35-210(d)-(e ) (2003) . The we ight to be aff orded an exis ting fac tor is le ft to the trial court’s discr etion so long a s the court c omplies with the statutory sentenc ing g uidelines and its finding s are adequately s u p p o rt ed by

the re cord. See Sta te v. Souder , 105 S.W .3d 602, 606 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002)

. I n imp os ing the de fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e s, the tr ia l c ou rt fo un d a pp lic able e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor s: (1 ), the de fe nd a nt ha s a pre vio us his tory of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns or

c ri min a l be ha vio r; (4 ), the vic tim of the off ense w as particularly vulnera ble because of ag e or phy sical or mental disabilit y ; and (5), the def endant tre ated, or

allowed the vic tim to be treated, w ith ex ceptional c rueltyduring the commi s sion of the offe nse. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 14 (1 ), (4 ), (5 ). Th e tr ia l c ou rt a lso
c on sid e re d mi tig a tin g e vid e nc e : name ly , th a t th e de fe nd a nt’ s f a mil y wa s sup po rt ive of

him

. Howeve r, the trial c ourt found that the mitigation ev i d en ce car ried little weig ht when “w eig hed ag ainst the horre ndous fac ts of this case.” Upon re view, we discern no e rror in the court’s a

pplication of enha nceme nt f actor (1) a nd (5 ). Ac c or din g to the pr e se nte nc e re po rt , De fe nd a nt Ta lle y ha d tw o c on vic tio ns fo r s imp le a ssa ult , on e c on vic tio n for vio la tin g a pr ote c tio n o rd e r, a ndfo ur c on vic tio ns fo r dru g po sse ssi on . H e a lso admitted that he smoked marijuana until he was loc ked up. T h er ef o re, the court’s a

pplication of enha n ce m ent fa ctor (1) was a ppropriate . L ikewise, e nhance ment was a ppropriate under ( 5), the defe ndant treated or allowed a victim to be tre ated with exceptional cr uelty during the commission of the off ense. The evidenc e at tria l established that Def endant Ta lley

participa ted in activity

wher e some of the victims we re beate n, burned with fire a nd bleac h, then stuffe d in car trunks to be killed in Missi ssippi.

Howeve r, the trial court’s application of enhanc ement fa ctor (4) is problematic. I n apply ing t h i s fa ct o r, t h e c o u rt n o t ed t h e f o l l o wi n g: [F]or the recor d, in the event it wasn’ t adequately described at the tim e of trial bec ause the jury was present, [ Mr. Divi n Wright] is a thi n man who walks, has g re a t di ff ic ult y wa lki ng a s a

re su lt o f an in

jury su sta ine d, I be lie ve , b ut I c a n’ t st a te that f or c e rt a in. I t may

be dis e a se re la te d. B ut, wh a te ve r the c a us e he ha s e xtre me difficulty walking , he has e x treme diff iculty mai ntaining his ba lance . He ne eds
as s istance e ither by

cane or by

holding on to the r ail in front of the jury box or on the e dg e of the ta

ble a s he wa lks by , or ha vin g so me on e e lse ho ld him by the arm
. He is no t a

no rm a lly he a lth y str on g y ou ng ma n. An d, his ph y sic a l di sa bil ity , in My [sic ] jud g me nt, c le arl y

ma de him

pa rt ic ula rl y vu lne ra ble to the ty

pe of nig htm are to which he w as subjecte d on the nig ht that this occurre d.

The trial c ourt’s application of this fa ctor is pr oblematic bec ause the court a pplied this factor based upon its per sonal observations of the victim without adequate pr oof in the re cord supportive
o f i t s o b s e r v a t i o n s
. A f

t e r r e v i e w i n g t h o u s a n d s o f p a g e s o f r e c o r d , w e f o u n d l i t t l e e v i d e n c e , i f

a n y,Acc ording to our supreme court, “ the vulnera bilityenhanc ement re lates more to the natural 9 phy sical and me ntal limit ations of the victim than mere ly to the victim’s a g e. . . . The fac tor ca n be used . . . if the ci rc u m s tance s show that the victim, because of his ag e or phy sical or menta l condition was in fac t ‘particula rly vulnera ble,’ i.e., inc apable of re sisting, summoning he lp, or testify ing a g ainst the perpe trator.” State v. Adams , 864 S.W .2d 31, 35 (Tenn. 1993) (interna l citations omitt ed).
-31- establishing that Div i n W ri gh t was a particula rly vulnera ble victim. As such, this court, as the

9 revie wing court, is fa ced w ith a dilemma. On one ha nd, the trial court’s observations and assessment that the victim was “pa

rticularly vulnera ble” is to be a ccor ded def

ere nce beca

use the court is the trier of fac t at the sentenc ing hearing, and the c ourt had the opportunityto observe the victim firsthand. On the oth e r h a nd , it

is the state wh o b ears the b ur de n o f p ro vin g that a vic tim is p art ic ula

rl y vulnera ble, and the trial court’s f indings of f

act a re to be adequately supported by the re cord. See State v. Adams , 8 64 S.W. 2da t 35 ; se e als o Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(g ).

To resolve this dil emma, we find this c o u rt ’s o p i nion in State v. Raines , 882 S.W .2d 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) to be instructive. I n Raines , th i s court de alt with a similar situation and determined that the sentenc ing c ourt was not permitted to predicate its finding of vulnera bilityupon its pa st o bs e rv a tio ns of

the vic tim

be c a us e su c h a c tio n v iol a te d th e ru le s o f e vid e nc e app lic able to sentenc ing hearings. Id. at 385. Acc ording ly , without adequate proof c orrobor ating the trial court’s observati o n s an d assessment of the victim’s vulnerabilities in the instant case, w e cannot but conclude that enhanc ement fa ctor (4) was improperly applied to the def

endant’ s sentence . To conclude otherwise is to hold that a trial court may base its de termination of sentenc e enhanceme nt solely on its own judicia l notice of a particula r fac t. This, of course , would rende r appe llate re view of ce rtain sentencing issues meaning less and fall contra ry to provisions set forth in our se ntencing statutes. Notwithstanding our

determination reg arding i m p ro per a pplication of enha nceme nt fac tor (4), we conclude that Def

endant Ta lley was a

ppropriate ly

sentenc ed. As pre viouslynoted, the re cord
re f le c ts th e tria l c o u r t p r o p e r ly ap p li e d e n h a n c e me n t f a c to r s ( 1 ) a n d ( 5 )

. A d d it io n a ll y , the re cord ind ic a te s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y c on sid e re d the mit ig a tio n e vid e nc e bu t a ssi g ne d it lit tle we ig ht. Acc ording ly , the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenc ed the de fenda nt to the presum p t i v e m i n i m u ms en t en ce o f t we n t y y ea rs fo r h i s es p ec i al l y

aggr av at ed kidnapping convic tions and ten y ear s for his ag g ravated robbe ry convictions.

Def endant Talley next submits that the t rial court err ed in orde ring him to serve his sentenc es co n s ec u t i v el y
. C i t i n g State v. W ilkerson , 905 S.W .2d 933 (Tenn. 1995), the defendant a sserts that the tr ia l c ou rt

faile d to fi nd that c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing wa s ne c e ssa ry to pr ote c t the pu bli c a g a ins t fu rthe r c ri min a l c on du c t a nd re a so na bly re la te d to the se ve ri ty of the of fe ns e s. De fe nd a nt T a lle y

a lso
asserts that the trial court e rre d by not considering his amenability to reha bilitation.

I n o rd e ri ng the c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s, th e tr ial c ou rt fo un d th a t th e de fe nd a nt w a s a da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r andno t a me na

ble to r e ha

bil itatio n. Th e c ou rt

ma de the fo llo wi ng state me nts :-32-

[I ]f there we re a ny

proof in this rec ord to sug g est that Mr. Talle y [was] the type of ind ivi du a l th a t ha d ma de a n e ff ort ove r the y e ars to r e ha

bil itate him se lf

or pr og re ss in life, [defense c ounsel’s] arg ument would have more m erit .

. . . But, . . . [l] ooking at the pre-sente nce r eport Mr. Ta lley was e x pelled fr om school in the tenth g rade for disciplinary rea sons. He has virtually no work hist ory . He a dmits t o having smoked eig ht blunts a day

on a daily basis and the only rea son he quit was he w as locke d up . . . . The proof

that wasn’t put bef

ore the jury

but was part of t h e st atements that
wer e redac ted was that he was announcing to Omar Coleman that this is a Gang ster Di sc ipl e
. . . a

rr e st[. ] [T]his is n ot an indi vid ua l w ho loo ks lik e he wa s o n a pa th toward g etting his PHD in social work. This was a n individual who was not doing a lot to contribute to this community

. . . . [T] here are lots of progr ams . . . within the prison sy stem that he can avail himself of i f he so inclines. But, c onvincing me rig ht now that he is a g reat candidate for r ehabilitation is a harde r sell. . . . As I indicated
earlier, . . . [Talley ] was an absolute a nd total willing participant in the events that took place. From the very beg inning he was pa

rt and parc el o f al l t h e ac tion. . . . And, to re- rea d this definition of dang erous o ff en d er , as a pe rson whose be havior ind ic a te s li ttl e or

no re g ardfo r h uman li fe , n o h e sit a tio n abo ut c omm itt ing a c ri me in w hich the risk to human life is hig h. Whil e it’s true that he doesn’t f it under any of the other

cate g ories, he clea

rly and absolutely fits under this cate g ory
. . . . He ha d
no re g ardfo r the liv e s o f t ho se fo ur me n [who ] we re stu ff

e d into the trun ks of

tho se two car s, absolutely

no reg ar d fo r t h e lives of those me n who wer e beaten and tortur e d a ndwh os e blo od wa s sti ll o n th e c arp e t, a s r e fl e c te d in tho se ph oto g ra ph s. An d, he is a s mu c h a

da ng e ro us off

e nd e r .
. . a s a ny on e e lse [inv olv e d] in the se e ve nts

. . . . [T]o s ug g e st that he’ s not a da ng e ro us of fe nd e r .
. . do e s a

dis se rv ic e to what ea ch of the se victims was subjecte d to.

A trial court may impose consec utive sentenc ing upon a determination by

a pre pondera nce of the e vidence that one or more of the c riteria se t forth in T en n essee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-115( b) exists . There fore , pursuant to t his code sec tion, a trial court may impose consec utive
se nte nc ing if

it d e te rm ine s th a t th e “ de fe nd a nt i s a da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r w ho se be ha vio r i nd ic a te s li ttl e or no reg ard for hum an li fe, and no hesitation about commi tting a c rime in which the risk to human lif e is h ig h. ” Te nn . Code An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 15 (b )( 4) . I f the tr ia l c ou rt c on c lud e s th a t th e de fe nd a nt i s a dang erous of

fende r under

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-115(b)( 4), it must also find that th e c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing re a so na bly re la te s to the se ve ri ty

of the of fe ns e c omm itt e d a ndis
nece ssary to protect the public f

rom furthe r criminal conduct by the def endant. W

ilkerson , 9 05 S.W .2d at 939. Additionally , the trial court should consider g ener al sentenc ing principles including whether or not the def

endant is ame nable to re habilitation. See T e n n
. C o d e A n n
. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 3

. It is within t he sound discre tion of the trial court whether or not to impose consecutive or concur rent sentenc es. See State v . Adams , 973 S.W .2d 224, 230-31 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1997).

Whil e the trial court did not ex pressly rec ite the W

ilkerson fac tors, the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive se ntence s is supported by the re co rd . The re cord r efle cts that Def endant Talley participated in the brutal be ating an d b urning of the kidnappe d victims. I n our view, the-33-

violent conduct in which the de fenda nt participate d supports t h e trial court’ s finding that the defe n d an t qualified as a

dang erous of

fende r and w as not amena ble to reha

bilitation. Given the
v i olence Def

endant Ta lley

eng ag ed in when c ommitt ing the offe nses of e specia lly ag g ravated kidnapping and ag g ravated robbe ry , it is clear that c onsecutive se ntence s are nece ssary to protect the pub l i c an d reasonably

relate to the seve rity

of these multiple violent offe nses. Acc ording ly , the defe ndant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
Merge r of Kidnappi ng Convictions

Whil e only

noted i n fo o t n o te form, the de fenda nts request that their e specia lly ag g ravated kidnapping convictions be mer g ed as the rec ord clear l y ref lects that these c onvictions were based upon alternative theories of espec ially

ag g ravated kidnapping . Upon re view, we ag ree . Her e, the ind ic tme nts c le arl y

ind ic a te that the state c ha rg e d th e de fe nd a nts wi th f ou rt e e n c ou nts of

e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated kidnapping based on two a lternative the ories: that the defe ndants used a de adly wea pon t o e i t h e r ( 1 ) k n o w i n g l y

r e m o v e t h e s e v e n v i c t i m s , o r ( 2 ) k n o w i n g l y

c o n f i n e t h e s e v e n v i c t i m s
. In addit i on, the trial transc ript ref lects the prose cutor’s intent to prose cute the e specia lly ag g ravated kidnapping offe nses under these two alternative theories. The rec ord ref lects that the jury

found the defe ndants g uiltyunder both a lternative the ories of e specia lly ag g ravated kidnapping

. I t is we ll se ttl e d that th e c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht a g a ins t do ub le je op ard y pr ote c ts a g a ins t mu lti ple punishments for the same offe nse. See North Carolina v. Pearce , 39 5 U. S. 71 1, 71 7 ( 19 69 ); Sta te v. Phillips , 924 S.W .2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1996). When a jury convicts under alternative theories, “ a merg er a nd imposit ion of a sing le judg ment of convic tion protects ag ainst doub l e j eo p ar dy and pr e se rv e s th e va lid ity

of the jury ve rd ic ts fo r fu tur e a vo idanc e of pr ob le ms r e la te d to un ne c e ssa ri ly dismiss ed cha

rg es or c onvictions.” State v. Addison , 973 S.W .2d 260, 267 (Tenn. Crim. App.1997) (i nte rn a l qu otatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o S tat e v . H owa rd , 30 S.W .3d 271, 274 n.4 (Tenn. 2000) . Her e, the re c or d r e fl e c ts that th e tr ia l c ou rt inc or re c tly inc lud e d the sam e of

fe ns e c ou nts fo r e sp e c ia lly
a g g ra vate d kidn app ing in the jud g me nts of c on vic tio n; w he re a s, the c ou rt sh ou ld ha ve me rg e d th e se same off ense c ounts into a single judg ment of conviction. Notwithstanding this oversig ht, the trial court prope rly

omitted the same off

ense c ounts when imposing c onsecu t i v e sente nces. H oweve r, in order to a void any

future c onfusi o n , we r emand this ca se bac k to the trial court to ame nd the judgme nts to reflec t the merg er of the same of

fense counts in the espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping indictments: Nos. 01-08323, 01-08324, 01-08325, 01-08326, 01-08327, 01-08328, 01-08329. Our
rema nd does not aff

ect Defe ndant Talley ’s acquittal as t o indictment Nos. 01-08323 and 01- 08324, neither w ill thi s remand a ffe ct the def endants’ total e ffe ctive sente nce.
CO NC LU SION

B a se d u p o n t h e f

o r e g o i n g r e v i e w , w e a f

f i r mt h e d e f

e n d a n t s ’ c o n v i c t i o n s a n d s e n t e n c e s. Howeve r, the case is rema nded for corr ection in t he judg ments of conviction to re flec t the merg er of the same offe nse counts found in the indictments pre viouslyaddre ssed in this opini on.-34- ___________________________________ J .C. McL I N, J UDGE