J-A01002-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.A.R.J., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.J., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2161 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 21, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001266-2016, 

FID: 51-FN-001981-2014

BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 26, 2019

Appellant, M.J. (“Mother”), appeals from the decree entered on June 21, 

2018, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to her daughter, K.A.R.J. (“Child”), born in 

January of 2011.1 Upon careful review, we affirm.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court thoroughly set forth the 

factual and procedural history of this case, which the record evidence 

supports. As such, we adopt the court’s findings herein. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 9/19/18, at 1-5.

By way of background, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”) became involved with this family in April of 2014, upon receiving a 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, C.A., and of 

any unknown father, by decree dated May 31, 2017. Trial Court Opinion, 

9/19/18, at 2, n. 3. Father is not involved in the instant appeal.
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report alleging that Mother was unable to provide for Child and her older 

brother, C.J., who is not a subject of this appeal. Id. at 1. Specifically, the 

report alleged that Mother had been unemployed since 2012; Mother’s home 

was in foreclosure; the water service in Mother’s home had been 

disconnected; there was limited food in the home; and Mother was suffering 

from depression. Id. DHS substantiated the report, and the Community 

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) implemented in-home services. Id. 

On September 22, 2014, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent. 

Id. at 2. Child remained in Mother’s physical custody with DHS supervision. 

Id. The CUA established Single Case Plan (“SCP”) objectives for Mother which

included maintaining housing; obtaining employment; participating in 

parenting classes; obtaining a parenting capacity evaluation; participating in 

mental health services; attending supervised visits with Child; and 

maintaining contact with the CUA. N.T., 6/21/18, at 20-21. 

On September 21, 2015, the trial court placed Child in the physical 

custody of DHS. Trial Court Opinion, 9/19/18, at 3. Thereafter, permanency 

review hearings occurred at regular intervals, and the trial court found at each 

hearing that Mother was minimally compliant with her SCP objectives. Id. at 

3-4. 

On December 22, 2016, DHS filed petitions for the involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child and C.J., her older brother. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/19/18, at 4. Following a hearing, by decree dated May 
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31, 2017, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child and C.J.,

2

and Mother filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal with respect to Child only. Id. at 1, n. 2. By order 

dated January 25, 2018, this Court reversed the decree and remanded the 

case.3 

Thereafter, on February 9, 2018, upon request of the Child Advocate, 

Judge Younge issued an order finding that aggravated circumstances existed 

as to Mother, due to the termination of her parental rights to C.J., and no 

efforts were to be made to reunify Mother and Child. Trial Court Opinion, 

9/19/18, at 4. 

On remand, on March 2, 2018, DHS filed an amended petition for the 

involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). While the termination hearing was pending, 

a permanency review hearing was held before Judge Younge on April 26, 

2018, which resulted in an order permitting visitation between Child and 

Mother if “therapeutically recommended and at Child’s discretion.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 9/19/18, at 4. 

____________________________________________

2 The Honorable Lyris Younge presided over the termination proceeding. She 

remained the assigned judge in the underlying matter through April 26, 2018. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/19/18, at 4, n. 5. 

3 This Court issued its order as a result of the motion filed by the Child 

Advocate and DHS, in lieu of appellee briefs, to remand the case for a new 

involuntary termination hearing.
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The termination hearing on the amended petition occurred on June 21, 

2018,4 during which DHS presented the testimony of Carol Robinson, the CUA 

caseworker assigned to this family since February 3, 2017, and William F. 

Russell, Ph.D., who performed a parenting capacity evaluation. Mother 

testified on her own behalf.5 

Ms. Robinson testified that Child, then age seven, had been in four 

separate foster care placements since her removal from Mother in September 

of 2015. N.T., 6/21/18, at 14. Child had been in her current kinship treatment

care placement since May of 2017, and, on June 11, 2018, she told Ms. 

Robinson she would like to stay there long-term. Id. at 14, 76. At the time 

of the hearing, Child had been in weekly mental health therapy for more than 

two years, and Ms. Robinson testified that Child’s mental health has stabilized. 

Id. at 18-19, 75. 

____________________________________________

4 The Honorable Joseph Fernandes presided over the subject proceeding. 

5 During the involuntary termination proceeding, a Child Advocate represented 

Child’s legal interests, and a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) represented her best 

interests. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018) (citing In re Adoption 

of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017)) (stating that, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2313(a), a child who is the subject of a contested involuntary termination 

proceeding has a statutory right to counsel who discerns and advocates for 

his or her legal interests, which our Supreme Court has defined as the child’s 

preferred outcome). At the conclusion of the testimonial evidence, the Child 

Advocate and the GAL argued on the record and in open court for the 

involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights. N.T., 6/21/18, at 127-

132.
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With respect to Mother’s SCP goals, Ms. Robinson testified that, “In 

essence, [Mother] completed employment,[6] housing,

[7]

financial counseling, 

and parent education.” N.T., 6/21/18, at 21. However, Mother did not satisfy 

her objectives regarding visitation and mental health. Id. at 21-22, 25-27, 

64-65.

By decree dated and entered on June 21, 2018, the trial court 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(1), (8), and (b). Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on 

September 19, 2018. 

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in terminating [Mother’s] 

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1), the evidence 

having been insufficient to establish Mother had evidenced a 

settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim, or having refused 

or failed to perform parental duties[?]

2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that 

[Mother] had refused or failed to perform parental duties, caused 

____________________________________________

6 Ms. Robinson testified that Mother has been employed full-time since April 

of 2016. N.T., 6/21/18, at 29. 

7 Mother entered into a lease for an apartment in February of 2018. Id. at 

33. Ms. Robinson visited the apartment on June 20, 2018, the day before the 

subject proceeding, at which time she questioned whether Mother “really 

live[d] there.” Id. at 39, 74. She described observing Mother’s unmade bed 

with unpacked bedding in the bedroom. Id. at 34-36.
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Child to be without essential parental care, that conditions having 

led to placement had continued to exist, or finally that any of the 

above could not have been remedied[?]

3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the minor child, under 23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(b)[?]

Mother’s brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).8

We review this appeal according to an abuse of discretion standard, as

follows.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

____________________________________________

8 Mother’s counsel asserted during oral argument before this Court that the 

trial court erred or abused its discretion in permitting the Child Advocate to 

state Child’s preferred outcome of this matter. However, Mother neither

raised this issue in her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, 

nor set it forth or suggested it in the statement of questions involved in her 

brief. See Krebs v. United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 

776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating, “We will not ordinarily consider any issue 

if it has not been set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief's statement 

of questions involved, Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), and any issue not raised in a 

statement of matters complained of on appeal is deemed waived.”) (citation 

omitted). 

 In her concise statement, Mother asserts that the court erred in not allowing 

Child to testify during the termination hearing and in permitting the CUA 

caseworker to testify regarding Child’s out-of-court declarations. Because 

Mother does not set forth these issues or suggest them in the statement of 

questions involved in her brief, they are also waived on appeal. See Krebs, 

supra; Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated 

in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”) 
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the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

Instantly, we conclude that the certified record supports the decree 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provides as follows.

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

. . .
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(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b); see also In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc) (stating that we need only agree with the trial court 

as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in 

order to affirm).9 

With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party must produce 

clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months 

prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental 

duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted).

It is well-established that “Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child 

and refusal or failure to perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights 

____________________________________________

9 Based on this disposition, to the extent Mother argues in her second issue 

that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating her parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8), we need not review that issue.
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may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either 

demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or

fails to perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 

A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). In addition, 

[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given case 

and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. 

The court must examine the individual circumstances of each case 

and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing 

termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the 

evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination. 

In re N.M.B., 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

Our Supreme Court has explained that parental duty “is best understood 

in relation to the needs of a child.” In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 

1977). 

A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These 

needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive 

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this Court has held 

that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance. This affirmative duty encompasses 

more than a financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in 

the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and 

association with the child. Because a child needs more than a 

benefactor, parental duty requires that a parent ‘exert himself to 

take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.’

Id. (citations omitted).

We have stated that the court must next consider “the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct” and “the post-abandonment contact 

between parent and child” before moving on to analyze Section 2511(b). In 

re Z.S.W., supra (quoting In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., supra at 92).
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With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has stated, “[i]ntangibles

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into 

the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court “must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the 

effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation omitted). 

However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the 

parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of 

any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the 

particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citation omitted). 

In this appeal, Mother argues that DHS did not meet its evidentiary

burden under Section 2511(a)(1). Mother asserts that she was consistent 

with her supervised visitation with Child for six months immediately preceding 

the filing of the first termination petition on December 22, 2016. Mother then 

argues that, to the extent she failed to visit with Child from January 25, 2018, 

when this Court reversed the May 31, 2017 decree and remanded the case, 

to March 2, 2018, when DHS filed an amended termination petition, it was 

less than the requisite six-month time-period. The testimonial evidence belies 

Mother’s claim. 

Ms. Robinson testified that, from November of 2015, soon after the court 

removed Child from Mother, through the first termination proceeding on May 
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31, 2017, Mother attended 50 out of 82 weekly one-hour supervised visits 

with Child. N.T., 6/21/18, at 64-65. In addition, Ms. Robinson testified that 

she offered Mother additional visits at unspecified times, but Mother declined 

them. Id. at 69-70. Further, she observed that Mother had limited interaction 

with Child during the visits, and that Mother was consistently “on the phone 

during visits.” Id. at 40-42. She testified that Mother never brought dinner 

or snacks to the visits, which occurred from 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. Id. at 

41. Mother’s last supervised visit with Child was on May 30, 2017, and it 

lasted for one-half hour because Mother had to leave for an appointment. Id.

at 68. Mother never attempted to reschedule that visitation so that she could 

spend a full one-hour visit. Id. at 69. Moreover, DHS never increased her 

visits or permitted them to be unsupervised, and Mother never requested that 

it do so. Id. at 65. Based on the foregoing, we disagree with Mother that she 

satisfactorily met her FSP goal regarding visitation at the time of the first 

termination hearing. 

Thereafter, from the time of the first hearing on May 31, 2017, through 

the second hearing on June 21, 2018, the testimonial evidence reveals that 

Mother never visited with Child; asked how Child is; asked about Child’s 

therapeutic needs; asked to attend Child’s medical appointments and school 

conferences; sent cards or gifts to Child; or contacted Child by telephone. Id.

at 42-43, 72-73.
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Mother asserts that she was not afforded supervised visits after the 

issuance of the May 31, 2017 decree up through the April 26, 2018 

permanency order, discussed above, which permitted visits upon a therapist’s 

recommendation and at Child’s discretion. Mother asserts that the record 

does not include a therapeutic recommendation for visits. Mother’s counsel 

stated on the record during the subject hearing that he filed a subpoena for 

documents from the therapist, who we presume was Child’s therapist, but the 

therapist had not yet complied. N.T., 6/21/18, at 46. However, Mother does 

not assert, and the record does not demonstrate, that she requested from 

Child’s therapist a recommendation for supervised visitation to resume. In 

addition, Ms. Robinson testified that she would have offered Mother an 

unspecified number of additional visits after the May 31, 2017 termination 

decree, but “she did not want any additional visits.” Id. at 70. Further, Ms. 

Robinson testified that Mother never contacted her at the CUA after the first 

termination hearing. Id. at 29-30, 74.

Ms. Robinson testified that, in April of 2018, subsequent to the abovementioned permanency order, Child telephoned Mother and spoke to her for 

two hours. Id. at 43. Child telephoned Mother more than once after that,

but Mother did not answer or return her calls. Id. at 44, 50. On June 20, 

2018, when Ms. Robinson visited Mother to assess her apartment, Mother 

stated that her attorney advised her not to speak to Child because there was 
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a no-contact order.10 Id. at 45. However, counsel for DHS and the Child 

Advocate stated on the record and in open court that a no-contact order did 

not exist in this case. Id. at 46. In addition, Ms. Robinson testified that 

Mother did not contact the CUA after Child placed the telephone calls to inquire 

whether Mother may speak to Child. Id. at 51. Ms. Robinson stated that, if 

Mother had inquired about this, she would have told her, “it’s not a problem.” 

Id.

Based on the foregoing, as well as the totality of the record evidence, 

we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1). The record demonstrates that Mother refused or failed to perform 

her parental duties from September of 2014, when Child was adjudicated, 

through the subject proceedings. Mother has maintained no more than a mere 

passive interest in Child during this significant time period in Child’s life, and

she did not exert herself to take or maintain a place of importance in Child’s 

life even after this Court reversed the May 31, 2017 decree and remanded the 

case. Therefore, Mother’s first issue fails.

With respect to Section 2511(b), Mother asserts that there is no 

evidence regarding the bond, if any, between Child and Mother. In the 

alternative, she asserts that there is no evidence of what bond “could possibly 

____________________________________________

10 Mother’s counsel confirmed on the record in open court that he advised 

Mother not to have any contact with Child “because it would be . . . 

contravening the order.” N.T., 6/21/18, at 46, 48.
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have been rekindled if physical contact were to be allowed to have occurred.” 

Mother’s brief at 20. We disagree.

In analyzing the decree pursuant to Section 2511(b), the following case 

law is relevant.

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. 

In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 533-536 (Pa. Super. 2008). The 

mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the 

termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’ parental 

rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond 

against parents’ inability to serve needs of child). Rather, the 

orphans’ court must examine the status of the bond to determine 

whether its termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and

beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 

397 (Pa. Super. 2003). As we explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d 

473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010),

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should 

also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, 

security, and stability the child might have with the foster 

parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court 

should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond 

can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated, “[c]ommon sense dictates 

that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children 

are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster 

parents.” In re T.S.M., supra at 268. The Court directed that, in weighing 

the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the 
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ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. Court 

observed, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an 

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . . 

the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

Instantly, the trial court concluded that Child, then age seven, “does not 

have a healthy, necessary, or beneficial parent-child bond with Mother.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 9/13/18, at 14. The court found that Child’s relationship with 

Mother is like that of an aunt and niece. Id. Ms. Robinsons’ testimony

supports the court’s findings. See N.T., 6/21/18, at 74-75. 

On cross-examination by the GAL, Ms. Robinson testified:

Q. And when you’ve spoken to [Child] as recently as the spring, 

since the April order about visits was entered this year, and you’ve 

asked about visiting with her mother, what has she indicated to 

you?

A. She wouldn’t mind seeing her mom, but, . . . just for a visit, 

but she’s coming back home.

Q. And when she says coming back home, what does that mean?

A. She was referring to her foster home.

Id. at 75-76. Indeed, Child has informed Ms. Robinson that she prefers to 

stay long-term with her kinship parents. Id.

Ms. Robinson further testified: 

Q. At one point recently when you asked [Child] about seeing her 

mother again, she mentioned that she’d like to see her in order to 

play with her phone?

A. Yes.
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Q. And why is that, do you believe?

A. She’s a kid. They like to play on the phone with video games 

and . . . stuff.

Id. at 70.

Ms. Robinson testified that, based on her monthly observations of Child 

in the kinship home, where she has resided since May of 2017, Child shares a 

parent-child bond with her kinship parents.

11 Id. at 53-54, 77. The kinship 

parents meet Child’s developmental, physical, emotional, and special mental 

health needs. Id. at 76. Child’s mental health has stabilized, although she 

still receives weekly therapy. Id. at 18, 75. Ms. Robinson testified that Child 

will not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights are terminated. Id.

at 75. Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial 

court in concluding that Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs 

and welfare necessitate the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental 

rights. Accordingly, we affirm the decree pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) 

and (b).

Decree affirmed.

Judge Stabile joins this memorandum. Judge McLaughlin files a 

concurring memorandum statement. 

____________________________________________

11 The certified record does not specify the particular family relationship of the 

kinship parents and Child.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/26/19