J-S37029-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SCOTT M. MCCORD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1326 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 7, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County

Criminal Division at No. CP-64-CR-0000172-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JANUARY 11, 2022

Scott M. McCord (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after he pled nolo contendere to corruption of minors.1 We affirm. 

At the nolo contendere hearing, the Commonwealth recited the following 

facts:

[B]etween September 2019 and January 2020 [Appellant], 

a 36 year old man, cultivated a relationship with R.S., his 14 year 

old next door neighbor in Wayne County, Pennsylvania. 

On a near daily basis [Appellant] had extensive phone 

contact, social media contact, text messaging, and in person 

meetings with the minor child and her two close friends, C.R. and 

H.W., also teenagers. 

[Appellant] regularly referred to the children as his 

girlfriends and their in person meetings as dates. Eventually 

[Appellant] and R.S. began exchanging inappropriate pictures. 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i).
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Investigators discovered well over 50 self taken photographs of 

[Appellant] on the juvenile’s phone, including pictures of himself 

in the shower and on his bed. [Appellant] also requested and 

received suggestive photographs of the children in various states 

of undress. 

Throughout their contact [Appellant] engaged R.S. in 

sexually explicit conversations including discussing sexual 

fantasies that involved her two friends. 

N.T., 3/24/21, at 11-12. 

Appellant was charged with one count each of statutory sexual assault, 

unlawful contact with a minor, criminal use of a communication facility, and 

two counts of corruption of minors.2 On March 24, 2021, Appellant pled nolo 

contendere to one count of corruption of minors, and the remaining charges 

were nolle prossed. On May 7, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 6

- 23 months of incarceration, followed by 3 years of probation.

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion challenging the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence and the location of his incarceration; he 

also requested credit for time served. Post-Sentence Motion, 5/14/21. 

Following a hearing, the court granted Appellant’s request for credit for time 

served, but otherwise denied relief. Order, 6/7/21, at 1. Appellant timely 

appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.3 

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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3122.1(b), 6318(a)(1), 7512(a), and 6301(a)(1). 

3 The trial court stated the “reasons for our decision for the matters 

complained of by [] Appellant are contained in the Order [docketed] June [7], 

2021.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Statement, 7/27/21, at 1. 
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Appellant presents a single issue for review: 

Did the sentencing court abuse its discretion in sentencing 

[Appellant] in the aggravated range without adequate reasons and 

without giving appropriate consideration to any mitigating factors?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.4

Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. “The 

right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not 

absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

“An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction 

when challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Id. We conduct 

this four-part test to determine whether:

(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the 

time of sentencing or in a post-sentence motion; (2) the appellant 

filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth a concise 

statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises a 

substantial question for our review. 

Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). “A defendant presents a substantial question when he sets forth a 

plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing 

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In his concise statement, Appellant raised an additional claim challenging 

the location of his incarceration. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 7/19/21, 

at 2. We do not address the claim because Appellant did not include it in his 

brief. See Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 310 n.19 (Pa. 2011)

(refusing to address claim raised with trial court but subsequently abandoned 

in appellate brief).
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code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” 

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations 

omitted).

Instantly, Appellant complied with the first three prongs of the test by 

raising his claim in a timely post-sentence motion, filing a timely notice of 

appeal, and including in his brief a Rule 2119(f) concise statement. See

Appellant’s Brief at 16-18.

In addition, Appellant raises a substantial question in arguing the trial 

court “imposed an aggravated-range sentence without stating on the record 

and guideline form adequate reasons” for the sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 

18; Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(“[A]n allegation that the court failed to state adequate reasons on the record 

for imposing an aggravated-range sentence . . . raises a substantial question 

for our review.”) (citations omitted). Appellant also raises a substantial 

question in arguing the court “imposed an aggravated-range sentence without 

considering mitigating circumstances.” Appellant’s Brief at 18;

Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1183-84 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

Preliminarily, we recognize that:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge. The standard employed when reviewing the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing is very narrow. We may 

reverse only if the sentencing court abused its discretion or 

committed an error of law. A sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an 

abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 
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that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised 

its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. We must accord 

the sentencing court’s decision great weight because it was in the 

best position to review the defendant’s character, defiance or 

indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime.

Commonwealth v. Nevels, 203 A.3d 229, 247 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation 

omitted). 

Appellant argues that while the trial court “does point to several things 

that ‘stuck out’ to it before it imposed its sentence on [Appellant], the court 

never specifically states the reason why it abandoned the recommendation of 

both probation and the Commonwealth to sentence [Appellant] in the 

aggravated range.” Appellant’s Brief at 21. Appellant further asserts that the 

court “virtually ignores all of the various mitigating factors present in this 

case.” Id. at 23. 

Conversely, the Commonwealth states the trial court “made on-therecord findings as to the reasons behind its imposition of sentence within the 

aggravated range,” and because the court “had the benefit of a Pre-Sentence 

Investigation [(PSI) report], the law presumes [it] was aware of the relevant 

information regarding the appellant’s environment and had weighed those 

considerations along with any mitigating factors.” Commonwealth Brief at 4-

5. We agree with the Commonwealth.

When a trial court imposes an aggravated range sentence, “it shall state 

the reasons on the record.” 204 Pa. Code § 303.13. “In every case in which 

the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, modifies a 
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sentence, resentences a person following revocation of probation or 

resentences following remand, the court shall make as a part of the record, 

and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason 

or reasons for the sentence imposed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). We have 

explained: 

The court is not required to parrot the words of the Sentencing 

Code, stating every factor that must be considered under Section 

9721(b). However, the record as a whole must reflect due 

consideration by the court of the statutory considerations 

enunciated in that section. 

Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 145-46 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citations omitted).

Further: 

In imposing sentence, the trial court is required to consider the 

particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the 

defendant. The trial court should refer to the defendant’s prior 

criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for 

rehabilitation. However, where the sentencing judge had the 

benefit of a presentence investigation report, it will be

presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant 

information regarding the defendant’s character and 

weighed those considerations along with mitigating 

statutory factors. Additionally, the sentencing court must state 

its reasons for the sentence on the record. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9721(b). The sentencing judge can satisfy the requirement 

that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on the record 

by indicating that he or she has been informed by the presentencing report; thus properly considering and weighing all 

relevant factors.

Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 767-68 (Pa. Super. 2006)) (citing

Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 154 (Pa. Super. 2004)) (citations 

omitted, emphasis added).
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Here, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated it had “reviewed 

the entire [PSI] report.” N.T., 5/7/21, at 30. The court then commented at 

length, stating it

has listened to the statements made by defense counsel as well 

as [Appellant] as well as the Commonwealth, and [] as well as [an 

individual] on behalf of all of the victims. 

A couple things stuck out ... as I worked my way through this 

particular report, first off is how – what a devastating impact this 

had on these young girls. And there is no way you can erase that, 

and this is a time when they quite frankly should have been 

enjoying their youth, enjoying their innocence, and to a large 

degree you participated in taking that away from them. Although 

there is only one count here, you did agree to accept responsibility 

for three different girls, which to the [c]ourt is very compelling in 

terms of the fact that you received a plea for one count despite 

having three victims. So you received a substantial bargain from 

that negotiated resolution. 

As [the Commonwealth] noted, and I noted as well as soon as I 

read it because I do look for some type of remorse when I read 

these particular statements, and you did suggest you had remorse 

here today as well, however your statement to my Probation 

Officer started off that there is confusion and misunderstanding in 

this offense, which quite frankly the [c]ourt is having a hard time, 

from my perspective, understanding. And maybe that is the 

misunderstanding. I think if there is any confusion or 

misunderstanding it is on your end, not on the Commonwealth’s 

end or this [c]ourt’s end. Your conduct was reprehensible. In 

terms of what the [c]ourt has seen, I certainly have not seen a 

pile of text messages, but in terms of what I have seen and what 

was placed on the record at your plea, some of these particular 

conversations – I cannot imagine an adult speaking to a child that 

way. Quite frankly, I am not sure I can imagine another adult 

speaking to another adult that way, yet you exposed these 

children to that type of communication. 

You suggest that you were filling a father role, and I highlighted 

that as well, because again, in my search for some type of remorse 

I see – what I see instead is some type of justification in your 

mind to demonstrate that you were not doing something wrong. 
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Being a father of two girls I cannot understand what you thought 

you were doing if you were being a father in that situation. You 

admit to talking to this 14 year old child about sex. I cannot, in 

any circumstance, understand how a stranger, without some type 

of parental involvement of her parents, would take it upon 

themselves to talk to that child about sex, especially in the manner 

that you took – undertook with this child. You also indicate you 

liked taking funny selfie pictures, and I do recall at the [] plea 

proceeding there was a reference to at least one where you took 

a picture of yourself in the shower. The [c]ourt does not find that 

to be funny in any way, and sending – adult man showering 

sending it to a minor child, even if it did not expose your genitalia, 

quite frankly, demonstrates not that you were not acting as a 

father but that you were acting to a large degree as a predator. 

You then conclude your statement by suggesting that some lines 

were crossed, which suggests in your mind that you maintained 

appropriate behavior in some degree and simply crossed in others. 

From the [c]ourt’s perspective there is nothing here that stayed 

within the lines of acceptable, responsible adult behavior. So I 

then look to see what you had done, because quite frankly the 

statement suggested – did not indicate any type of real 

understanding for your offense, so I did look, and I looked at your 

counseling record in South Carolina, and I also looked at my presentence report when you moved to South Carolina. You moved 

to South Carolina in February of 2020 so I expected to see some 

pretty extensive counseling as you attempted to deal with 

whatever caused this particular behavior. Instead, I received a 

letter dated April of 2021 which was 14 months after you move[d] 

to South Carolina, indicating that you had done a total of three 

sessions of counseling in those 14 months, which again, from the 

[c]ourt’s perspective, does not suggest any level of remorse or 

any indication that you recognize you have a problem. If 

anything, it suggests that you were hurry[ing] up getting some 

counseling done before you came to this sentencing proceeding 

so you could suggest to the [c]ourt that you were addressing the 

problem. 

So, with all of that said, the [c]ourt finds that you have not 

demonstrated any real level of remorse for this. I find the 

behavior to be morally reprehensible, legally reprehensible, and 

that your justifications for them are likewise reprehensible, and 

the fact that we do have three underage victims here as well as 

your lack of any type of real acceptance of responsibility and your 

attempt to justify your conduct as acting as a father [figure,] the 
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[c]ourt will abandon the recommendation that has been made by 

both the Probation Department as well as the Commonwealth, and 

sentence you in the aggravated range[.]

Id. at 30-34.

We discern no error. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the “transcript 

of the sentencing proceeding ... demonstrates that the court articulated a 

number of reasons for utilizing the aggravated range of the sentencing 

guidelines.” Order, 6/7/21, at 1 n.1; N.T., 5/7/21, at 30-34. Specifically, the

court imposed an aggravated-range sentence based upon Appellant 

victimizing “3 different underage victims,” failing “to meaningfully accept 

responsibility for his conduct when he made statements in the pre-sentence 

interview,” and attempting “to justify his sexually grooming behavior by 

suggesting that he was acting in a father-like role.” See id. (citing N.T., 

5/7/21, at 33). Further, because it reviewed the PSI report, we “presume that 

the court properly weighed the mitigating factors present in the case.” 

Fowler, 893 A.2d at 766. Accordingly, no relief is due.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/11/2022