AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed January 27, 2020 

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In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-01118-CR JEROME JORDAN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1675605-J 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Evans Opinion by Justice Reichek Jerome Jordan appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery. B ringing two issues, appellant contends the trial court erred by submitting a jury c harge that did not require a unanimous verdict and the judgment should be reformed to reflect the corr ect offense for which he was convicted. We agree the judgment should be reformed as appella nt requests. We disagree, however, that the court’s charg e was erroneous. Accordingly, w e reform the judgment to reflect the correct offense and, as modified, we affirm. Factual Background In early 2016, appellant was a passenger on a Greyhound bus bei ng driven by Brandon Patterson. Both Patterson and a ppellant lived in Dallas and th ey discussed getting together to smoke marijuana. The two men sent text messages to each other for several weeks until Patterson–2– sent appellant a message on April 20, 2016 asking if they could meet. Appellant sent Patterson his address. Patterson drove to appellant’s apartment complex and appellant invited him inside. Appellant suggested they go get some “weed” and Patterson respo nded that he only had $20 with him. Appellant asked “Why would you come over here with only $ 20 and we were talking about getting high?” At that point, appellant went into his bathroom and came out wi th an assault rifle. Appellant pointed the gun at Patterson and told him to hand ove r his phone and keys, take off his shoes, and get on the ground. Appellant said, “I know you’re n ot gonna make me kill you over some money.” When Patterson refused to get on the ground, appe llant shot him in the leg. Once Patterson was laying on the floor, appellant began circlin g around, ranting about money. He then picked up some cables and Patterson thought app ellant was going to use the cables to tie him up. When appellant placed the gun against the wall, Patterson crawled towards it and he and appellant grabbed the gun at the same time. As they str uggled over control of the gun, it discharged. Appellant shouted tha t his brother was in the othe r room and Patterson had forced him to shoot through the wall. A ppellant then stabbed Patterso n in the chest with a knife Patterson had earlier seen lying on a nearby table. Patterson testified he remembered being stabbed twice. Patterson heard someone come to the apartment door, bang on the outside, and ask if everything was okay. Patterson yelled back that appellant was trying to kill him and asked the person to call the police. Appellant became more upset and tri ed to stab Patterson in the neck, but the knife either “folded” or broke. Appellant then fled the ap artment. Police found appellant the next day in a truck parked in th e apartment complex parking lot . Patterson’s wallet was recovered from the truck. Appellant was arrested and indicted for aggrav ated robbery. The indictment alleged that appellant use d and exhibited both a gun and a knif e during the course of the offense.–3– Appellant was tried before a jury. After the evidence was presented, the trial court submitted a jury charge to which appellant did not object. The abstract portion of the charge instructed the jury that “[a] pe rson commits the offense of rob bery if, in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain and maintain control of propert y of another, he intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodil y injury or deat h.” It further instructed that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated r obbery if the person committing robbery uses or exhibits a deadly weapon.” “Deadly weapon” was defined as “a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made , or adapted for the purpose of causing death or serious bodily injury, or anything that in the manner of its use or intended u se is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” The app lication portion of the charge read as follows: Now, if you find from the evide nce beyond a reas onable doubt th at on or about the 20 th day of April, 2016, in Dallas County, Texas, the defendant, JE ROME JORDAN, did then and there intentionally or knowingly, while in the course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maint ain control of said property, threaten or place BRAND ON PATTERSON in fear of immine nt bodily injury or death, and the defendant used or exhibited a deadly w eapon, to-wit: a firearm, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery as charged in the indictment. Alternatively, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonabl e doubt that on or about the 20th day of April, 2016, in Dallas County, Texas, the defendant, JEROME JORDAN, did then and there intentionally or knowingly, w hile in the course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtai n or maintain control of said property, threaten or place BRANDON PATTERSON in fear o f imminent bodily injury or death, and the defendant used or exhibited a d eadly weapon, towit: a knife, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggrav ated robbery as charged in the indictment. The jury was instructed that its verdict was required to be by a unanimous vote of all members and the verdict form returned by the jury stated it unanimously fou nd appellant guilty of aggravated robbery. Appellant brou ght this appeal.–4– Analysis I. Unanimity of Verdict In his first issue, appellant c ontends the jury charge erroneou sly allowed the jury to convict him without requiring it to agr ee unanimously on all essential elements of the offense. Appellant argues the jury was required to make a unanimous decision regar ding the type of deadly weapon used and submission of different theories of the offense in the disjunctive allowed for an impermissible non-unanimous verdict. We note that appellant do es not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporti ng a finding on either weapon. It has long been held that, when the State alleges differing methods of committing an offense in the conjunctive, it is proper for the jury to be cha rged in the disjunctive. See Kitchens
v. State , 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). Furthe r, where alternative methods of committing the same offense are submitted to the jur y in the disjunctive, it is appropriate for the jur y to return a genera l verdict if the evi dence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the theories submitted. Id . There is no requirement that the jury reach an agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict. Id . Although the jury must unanimously agree that the defendant committed one specific cri me, the jury need not find unanimously that the defendant committed the crime in one speci fic manner or using the same specific means. Landrian v. State , 268 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Russell v. State , No. 05-17-00124-CR, 2018 WL 525559, at *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Ja n. 24, 2018, pet. ref’d) (jury need only agree unanimously as to fact that appellant committed murder, not as to specific manner and means of how appellant committed murder). The element of the offense at issue here is the jury’s finding that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon. As stated above, appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that a knife and/or gun was used in the offen se. Nor does he dispute that both–5– were deadly weapons under the facts of this case. Because the element of the offense on which the jury had to agree was only that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, and both weapons alleged by the State qualified as such, there was no need for t he jury to unanimously agree on which weapon was used. See Landrian , 268 S.W.3d at 535; see also Ruiz v. State , No 03-97- 00051-CR, 1998 WL 644299, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 17, 199 8, pet. ref’d) (proper to submit in disjunctive the nature of the deadly weapon used or e xhibited during commission of offense). We conclude the court’ s charge on the issue was prop er. We overrule appellant’s first issue. II. Judgment Modification In his second issue, appellant requests this Court modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect the correct offense for which he was convicted. The State agre es. Appellant was tried and convicted for the offense of aggravated robbery. The judgment, however, states appellant was convicted for the offense of “AGGRAVATED ASSALT [sic] WITH A DE ADLY WEAPON – TO WIT: A FIREARM/KNIFE.” We have the power to modify a judgme nt to speak the truth when we have the necessary information to do so. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State , 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc); Asberry v. State , 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Because the record affirm atively shows appellant was convicted for aggravated robbery, we modify the trial court’s j udgment by striking the word “ASSALT” from the space provided fo r “Offense for which Defenda nt Convicted” and replace it with the word “ROBBERY.”–6– As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Do Not Publish T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b) 181118F.U05 /Amanda L. Reichek/ AMANDA L. REICHEK JUSTICE–7– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JEROME JORDAN, Appellant

No. 05-18-01118-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1675605-J. Opinion delivered by Justice Reichek. Justices Molberg and E vans participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of t his date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows: The word "ASSALT" in the space p rovided for "Offense for which Defendant Convicted” is STRUCK and REPLACED with the word "ROBBERY." As REFORMED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered January 27, 2020