United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted November 20, 2017*

Decided November 22, 2017 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 15-3822 

WILLIAM WARD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

KEVWE AKPORE, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 4:15-cv-04071 

Michael M. Mihm, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

William Ward, an Illinois prisoner, sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

for damages arising out of the denial of sentence credits that he believes he is entitled to 

receive for good behavior. The district court dismissed the complaint at screening, 

 

*

 The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not 

participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument 

because the appellant’s brief and the record adequately present the facts and legal 

arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. 

FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 15-3822 Page 2 

see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, concluding that Ward’s claim could not be addressed under 

§ 1983 because his exclusive remedy was through habeas corpus. We affirm. 

We start with some context. In Illinois, prisoners generally are entitled by statute 

to “day-for-day good-conduct credit against their sentences.” People v. Lopez-Bonilla, 

962 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (citing 730 ILCS § 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1)). But under 

Illinois’s “truth in sentencing” law, prisoners who were convicted for certain violent 

offenses are “excepted from the day-for-day credit provision and . . . receive no more 

than 4.5 days of credit for each month” of their incarceration, meaning that they must 

serve at least 85% of their sentences. Id. Among these offenses is aggravated battery 

with a firearm, Ward’s offense of conviction. See 730 ILCS § 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii). 

After serving over 10 years in prison, Ward sued the warden at the facility where 

he is housed, along with two other corrections officials. He contends that they wrongly 

denied his inmate grievances, in which he sought recalculation of his release date to 

account for the “four and a half days of good conduct credits” that he believes he is 

entitled to receive for each previous month of good behavior. In his complaint he seeks 

$20,000 in damages to compensate for those denials. Further, shortly after he filed his 

complaint, he moved to amend it in order to add claims for damages against two more 

defendants whom he says wrongly denied later grievances about the same issue. 

The district court screened Ward’s complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and dismissed it 

for failure to state a claim. Ward’s allegations, “if true, would result in a shorter 

duration of confinement,” the court explained, and therefore his “exclusive remedy is 

through a writ of habeas corpus and not under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” The district court also 

denied Ward’s motion to amend the complaint, finding that “[a]ny amendment to the 

Complaint would be futile.” 

 On appeal Ward generally contends that he stated claims for denial of due 

process and cruel and unusual punishment, and asks this court to “enter a court order 

to award him . . . 4.5 days of good conduct credits for each month” that he has not 

received any disciplinary write-ups. But as the district court concluded, Ward’s request 

is foreclosed by Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489–90 (1973). In that case, the 

Supreme Court explained that restoration of good-conduct credits is available only in 

habeas corpus, not under § 1983, because such a claim would result in “shortening the 

length of . . . actual confinement in prison.” Id. at 487. Neither this court nor the district 

court can “award” Ward any sentence credit. 
No. 15-3822 Page 3 

 Ward also contends that the district court erred in not awarding him damages for 

the denial of sentence credits. But a request for damages instead of an injunction does 

not remove a case from the exclusive domain of habeas corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477, 486–87, 489 (1994); Whitfield v. Howard, 852 F.3d 656, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2017). 

A prisoner seeking money damages for the very fact or duration of his confinement has 

no claim under § 1983 “unless and until the inmate obtains favorable termination of a 

state, or federal habeas, challenge to his conviction or sentence.” Nelson v. Campbell, 

541 U.S. 637, 646 (2004); see Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997). Although Ward 

asserts that he has “exhausted” his available state remedies, he has not successfully 

challenged the length of his sentence through a federal writ of habeas corpus, so his 

damages claim is barred. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; see also Clemente v. Allen, 120 F.3d 

703, 705 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that damages claim against federal prison officials, 

based on alleged miscalculation of sentence, was barred by Heck); Waletzki v. Keohane, 

13 F.3d 1079, 1080 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that habeas corpus was correct remedy for 

miscalculation of sentence). 

 For that reason we also approve of the district court’s decision to deny Ward 

leave to amend his complaint. Although a judge generally should give pro se litigants 

an opportunity to amend their complaints before dismissing them, a judge may deny 

leave to amend where any amendment clearly would be futile. Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 

809 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2015); see Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 

2015). Ward’s proposed amendment (naming two more defendants who denied his 

grievances) would not correct the problems his complaint faces under Preiser and Heck. 

We address a final matter. In dismissing this case, the district court assessed a 

strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Because Ward now has received three strikes for 

bringing an action or appeal that was dismissed on the ground that it is frivolous or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, he no longer may proceed in 

forma pauperis under § 1915(g). See also Ward v. Gaetz, 10-cv-00640 (S.D. Ill. March 18, 

2011) (dismissing action for failure to state a claim and noting a strike); Ward 

v. Zelezinski, 10-cv-07310 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2010) (same). 

AFFIRMED.