1 Appellee Shay Voigt (“ Voigt” ) intervened as owner of the two units secured by the notes. F or conv en

ienc e, we w

il l re fer toVo ig

t, Cart er, and

Easley collectively as “ appellees” unless our discus sion requires us

to disting

uish the m. 

### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN

NO. 03-00-00664-CV
Ron Ch itse

y and He nry

E. Chi tsey, Appel

lan ts
v. Steven D. Carter; Rosal ie Easley C arter ; and Shay Voigt, Ap pellee s

FROM THE COUN TY COUR T AT LAW N O. 1 OF

TRAVI S COUNTY NO. 230,2 43, HONOR

ABLE ORLIN

DA NA RANJO, JUDGE P

RESIDIN G Appel la nts Ron Chi

tsey an d Henry E. Chi tsey (“ the Chi tseys” or “appella

nts”) sued appelle es Steven

D. Ca r t er ( “Ca r t er ”) an d R o sa lie Easl ey Carter (“Easle

y”) 1 on four def

aul ted real
estate lien not es se cur ingtwo co ndomi ni ums . Appel

le es countersued, alleging unjus t enr ichment a nd of f set. Appel

le es prev ail ed on

two of the

notes i n a partial sum mary j udgm en t. The tri

al court rendered su m mary j udg men t i n f av orof the Ch

i tsey s on a thi rd note. The fourth note was the subj ect
ma tt er of a ben ch trial . Foll

owing t he trial , the c ourt rendered j udgme nt that t he Ch

itsey s take not hingon

th ei r c l ai m s e n f orc i n g th e f our th note. The court al so found i n f avor of appel

le es o n t he ir cla ims of o ffset and unj ust enri chm ent and that the Chi

tseys’ dam

ages on the third n

ot e were satis fi

ed by t he o ffset s and unjust enr ichment credited t o t he appell ees. By se ve n p o int s o f e rr o r , t he Ch it se ys appe al th e tr i al cou rt’ s j udgm

en t. We wi l l

af f i rm th e j udgm

en t.2 We will r efer to the not es as follows:

(1) the “ $35, 000 Unit 207 Not e” ; (2) the “ $11, 500 Unit 207 Not e” ; (3) the “ modified $35, 000 Unit 208 Not e” ; and (4) the “ $11, 500 Unit 208 Not e. ” The modification to the $35, 000 Unit 208 Not e released Easley from liability. 2 BACKGROUND The Chits eys ar e t he ho lder s o f four re al est at e lien not es se cur ed bydeeds of tr ust f ort wo co ndo mini

um unit s (“U nit 2 07” and “U ni t 208”), 2 all of which we re exec ut ed byCar t er and E as ley. Car t er and Easl ey defaul ted in the pay me nt of al l f our not es. The Ch

itsey s subs equentl

y s ued Carter and E asley; ho weve r, t he trial court ruled that both of the n ot es securi

ng Un it 207 were ba

rred f rom en f orcem en t by l i m i tations. Ac co r din gly, t he t r ial c o ur t r en de r ed su mmar y jud gme nt in f av or of Ca r t er an d E as ley o n t ho se t wo no t es , t he cla ims w er e s ev er ed , an d t he jud gme nt wa s ma de fina l. The Chi tseys do not appeal

the judgm

ent on those two notes. The trial court al so conside

red a
sum mary j udg men t moti on on th e $ 11, 500 Un i t 208 Notean

d ru l ed i n f av or of t he Chit seys, awa rd ing them $21,395.20 i

n dam ages. Thi s j udgme

nt was not severed. At trial, the c our

t con si dere d ev i den ce

re ga rdi n g th e m odi f i ed $3 5,0 00 Un

i t 20 8 N ote and on th e a pp el l ee s’ cou n tercl ai m s of un j us t e nrichment and o ffset . T he co ur t fou nd t hat t he Ch it se ys f ai l ed to pre sent e

vi de nc e of de f aul t, du rati on of defau lt, acc elera t ion, or damag es o n t he modi fi ed $3 5,0 00 Un

i t 20 8 N ote. Ther ef

ore , the c our

t ru l ed th at th e Ch i tse y s w er e en

ti tl ed to
recover only on the $11,500 Uni

t 208 Not e and ren

dered judg ment t hat t hey ta ke no t hing o n t he
m odi f i ed $3 5,000 U

ni t 208 Note.3 W i th regard to their counterclai m, appel le es presen

ted evi dence that the C hi tsey s enj oyed excl usi ve use an

d possession of Uni

ts 207 and 208 f

or an eigh

t-year peri od from 1992 through 20 00 an d t ha t t he y had de r ive d r en t al p r o ce ed s fr o m t he un it s. T he Ch it se ys ju dic ially adm itted t o t he ir excl usiv e use and possess ion of

the uni ts and to rental proceeds and requested that t he t rial co ur t offset any

amou nt ow ed by Ca rt er and E asley by the amou nt of t he rental proceed s. Appel le es pr es en

ted ev i den ce of f ai r m ar ke t re n tal v al ue s f or th e r elevant eight -year per iod and doc um en tation re flect ing t he p ro ce ed s r ec eive d by t he C hit se ys fr o m 199 4 t hro ugh 1 999 . T he Ch i tsey s prov i ded n o controve

rtin g ev i den ce. The t r ial c o ur t r en de r ed jud gme nt fo rt he ap pe lle es o n their clai ms of un just
en rich men t. In addi tion, Carter and Easley

were awarded

j udgm en t f or of f set. Th e j udg

men t i n f av or of t he Chit seys o n t he $1 1, 500 Unit 208 No t e wa s o ffset in full by the jud gment in favor of t he appell ees. The Ch i

tse y s m ov ed f or a n ew trial, w h i ch th e tr i al cou rt d eni ed. They al so requested fi ndi ngs of fact an d concl usi ons of l

aw, which the trial

court fi le d.
DISCUSSI ON By t heir first and sev

en th poi nts of error, the Ch i tsey s arg ue th at the tri

al courterred in faili ng to render

judg ment in t heir favo r o n t he mod ifi ed $ 35, 000 Unit 208 No t e. Ess ent ially , t he Ch it se ys argue that t he y co nc lus ive ly establ is hed thei r clai m f or damages on the m

odif ie d $35,000 Un it 208 Note. The Ch

itsey s attempt to overcome, as a m atter of law, an

adverse f in din g on an i ssue f orwhi ch they had t he b ur de n o f pr o o f. We will s us t ain t he Ch it se ys’ leg al s uffic ien cy p o int o nly if (1) t her e is no ev id en ce t o su pp o r t t he find ing , an d ( 2) t he Ch it se ys’ co nt r ar y pr o po sit io n is establ is hed as a m

atter of law, consi derin

g the enti re record. A part y e stablis hesa pro position as a4

ma tt er of l aw i f re as on ab l e m

i n dswou l d n ot di f f er i n dr awi n g th e s am e c on cl usi on. Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co. , 767 S.W .2d 686 , 690 (Tex. 19 89); Stable Ener gy, L.P. v. Kac

hina Oil & Gas, Inc. , 52 S.W .3d 327 , 331 (Tex. A pp.—A usti n 20 01, n o pet.). The trial court ’s f in din gs of f act reflect that “[n]o evidence was presented as to date( s) of de f aul t; du ra ti on of de f aul t; not e ac celer at ion; o r d amage s.” The Chi tseys a rgue, however, that t he ir clai m was f or liquidated d amages, an d t ha t t he da mag es co uld be accuratel y c al cul ated based on their peti

tion and the

in strumen t in wri ting. W e di sagree. A liqu ida t ed cla im is a dem

and f or an amount that can b e accurately cal cul ated by the
cou rt, or unde r it s dire ct ion, fro m the fa ct ual allega t ions c ont ained in t he pa rt y’s plead ings and t he instr ument i

n w ri tin g. Freeman v. Leasing

Assocs. , 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Te x. Ci v. A pp. —H ous ton [1 4th Dist.] 1973, no writ). A trial cour t may as sess da

mag eswi thou t the pre senta ti on of evi dence when con si de ri ng a c l ai m f orl i qui dated d am ages . Hall v

. C-F Employees Credit Union , 536 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Te x. Ci

v. A pp. —Texa

rka na 197 6, n o w ri t)
. Ho we ve r , ev en a c laim t ha t “o bje ct ive ly appe ars to be l

iqui dated may

be cl assi fi ed a s u nliq uid at ed wh en t he pe t it io n fa ils t o alle ge sp ec ific f ac ts with regard to the written in strumen t as to the am

ounts paid, or the due dates, or the dates of de f aul t” to en ab l e the c ourt to m

ake a n a ccura te c al cul ati on of am oun t of prin ci pal and i nterest due
on the n otes. Id.; accord Irlbeck v. John Deere Co. , 714 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Tex. App.—Am aril lo 1986, wri t ref ’d n .r.e.). In this case, the Chi

tseys a ll eged i n thei r petition that Carterha d b ee n in d efa ult on t he modifi ed $3 5, 00 0 U nit 20 8 N ote “ si nc e a t l ea st O ctob er 1 0, 1 992 ” a nd cl ai med the total am oun t of unpa id pr incipal and i

n terest du e is $ 45 ,41 7.4 6. A ss um i n g th es e f ac ts are suf

fi ci ent to characterize5

t he note as a l

i qui dated c l ai m and are not merely co ncluso ry, t his char act er izat ion is de feat ed by t he Chi tseys’ prayer f

or reli ef, i n wh ic h they reque st t hat t he y b e allowed to apply rents and revenues f rom Unit s 20 7 and 208 t o t he ou t st anding inde bt edne ss o wed by Car t er and E asley. N ow her e in the pe ti ti on do t he Ch

itsey s alle ge specifi

c fac tual al le gations perm

ittin g the court to determi

ne th e
am oun ts of rents and rev

enues that sho uld be off

set against the Chitseys’ claim. Thus, t he ir c laim is
an unl i qui dated on e, an d the Ch i tsey s we re req ui red to pres en

t evi den ce of dam ages . The Chi tseys h ave f aile d to direct thi s Court t o evi dence of dam ages i n the record. SeeTex . R. Ap p. P. 3 8.1 (h ). In ste ad , th ey

arg uetha t ap pe l l ee s w ai

ve d thei r ri gh t to noti ceof
acc elera t ion, that t hi s i s dem onstrated t hrough thei

r own judi

ci al adm is si ons, and that

th ey f ai l ed to
ass ertl ack of

n oti ce of ac ce l erati

on as an af f i rm ati v e def ense . Th er ef ore , a cc ordi

n g to t he Chi

tseys, they were en titl ed to the f

ull am ount of the m odi f i ed $3 5,000 U

ni t 208 Note pl

us i ntere st. First , th e Ch i

tse y s prov i de n o su pp ort f or th ei r a ss er ti on th at l ack of n oti ce o f
ac ce l era ti on is an af fi rmati ve def ense. An af

fi rmative def

enseis one that wou ld defeat a plaintif f’s cla im even if all allegat ions in t he com pla i nt ar e t rue ; t he de fen se ac ce pt s t he ex ist en ce o f a p r ima fac ie case for purpo ses o f analy zi ng th e pl ea. SeeBLACK' S LAW DICTIONARY 430 (7th ed. 1999) ; see also Cooper v. Scott Irrigation Constr., Inc. , 838 S. W.2d 743, 74 7 (Tex. App.— El Paso 1992, no wri

t) (K oeh l er, J., di ss en

ti ng) (a f f i rm ati ve de f en se ac ce ptsex i stenc e of pri ma f aci e ca se); Bracton Corp. v. Evans Constr. Co. , 784 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex. App.—Housto n [14th Di st.] 1990,
no wr it ) ( affir mat ive de fen se de nie s p laint iff's r igh t t o jud gme nt ev en if pla int iff es t ab li shes ev ery al l egati on); W.R. Grace Co. v. Scotch Corp. , 753 S.W.2d 743, 746 ( T ex . Ap p. —A us t in 1 98 8, wr it deni ed) (l i m i tations pl ea doe s n ot rebut f actual proposi tions). By asse rt ing t hat t hey failed to re ceive noticeof accel

eration, the appe llees ha ve no t co nc ed ed t ha t t he Ch it se ys e st ab lishe d a pr ima fa cie3 The original $ 35, 0 00 Unit 208 Not e and the deed of trust securing the note included a

waiver of notice of intent to acceler ate, but did not waive notice of acceleration. However, the modified$35, 000 Unit

208 Note does not include a waiver of either notice of intentto acce lerate or of notice of acceleration. The modification agreement pur ported to modify both t he original note and the deed of trust: “ [T]he Note [ and] Deed of Tr ust are hereby modif ied .
. . . ” 6 ca se . T o t he co nt r ar y, n o t ice o f ac ce ler at io n is required because accordin g to the fac e of the note, it do es no t mat ur e u nt il

Septem be r 10 , 20 10, an

d the C hi tsey s a re n ot en ti tl ed to the f ul l am oun t of t he note u nless the note has bee n accelerated. Thus, in order to pro ve the dam ages they requested, the Chi tseys m ust establi

sh that the note was properly accelerated. The Ch itsey s respond that notice of

ac ce l era ti on waswai

ve d by the prov i si ons of the note. Howev er, the modifi

ed $35,000 Uni

t 208 Note do es not sup por t t he Chi tseys’ assertion. It p rovides:
4. If an y in stall

me nt of the above i

ndebtedness i s not paid at the tim e and pl ace sp eci fi ed, the enti

re amount of un

pai d prin ci pal and i nterest, less al

l pa yment s applie d to the in debtedness

shal l b e accelerated and shall be du e and payable a t t he el ec ti on of the hold

er hereof
. All part ies t o s aid indebt edne ss . . . do her eby waive pre sentm en t f orpayment , d emand, not ice o f non- payment , no t ice o f pro t est and protest . . . .
T his pr ovisio n do es no t clear ly and unequi vocally wai ve the ri ght to noticeof int ent to ac ce l era

te or not ice o f acce lerat ion. 3 See Shumw ay v. Horizon Credit Cor

p. , 801 S.W.2d 890, 894 (T ex. 199 1) . Abse nt waiver , t he Chi tseys were required to provide Easl ey and Carter

no t ice o f t he ir intent to ac ce l era

te a nd noti ceof ac ce l era ti on bef ore t he n ot e could m

ature. Ogden v. Gi bralter Savs. Ass’ n , 640 S.W.2d232, 233-34 (Tex. 1982). T here i s no evi dence i n the record that t he Ch it se ys provided eithe r o f the re quir ed no t ices. The Chits eys’ first and s event h po ints a re ove rr uled, as t he trial court was pro vided with no evidence of acceleration or of damages.4 The Chi ts ey s a

rgue tha t the t rial co urt f oun d the m odi fie d $3 5, 000

Unit 208 No te wa s “ valid. ” In the repor ter’s r ecord, the trial court does ind eed proclaim that the not

e is “ valid, ” but that it is offset in full by the appellees’ counter clai ms. Th e findings of fact, however, do not include a recitation declaring the note to be “ valid. ” Rather, they state that the note is i n default. The trial cour t’s comments are not evidence. Thus, we will refer to the trial cour t’s findings of fa ct in ad dre ss ing t he Ch it se ys ’ p oint of error. 7 By their s econd poin

t, t he Ch itsey s argue that thetri al c o ur t er r ed in d en ying t he ir
m oti on for new tria

l f oll owing the trial court ’s f in din g that t he m

odif ie d $35,000 Uni

t 208 Not e was in de f aul t. 4 The Ch

itsey s argue that by r en de r ing jud gme nt t ha t t he mo difie d n o t e w as in defau lt, t he tria l court was

obl i gated to awa

rd them the f ace am ount of the n ote pl us i ntere st as d

am ages . A trial court enj oys b

road di screti

on i n c onsi deri ng a motion f or new tria l
. Jackson v. Van W inkle , 660 S. W.2 d 80 7, 809 (T ex. 198 3) . We will not dist ur b t he co ur t ’s de cision a bsent
an ab us e of di scre tion
. Id. Altho ugh t he cou rt d ete rm i n ed th at th e m odi f i ed $3 5,0 00 Un

i t 20 8 N ote
was in d efa ult , it did no t rule that t he Chi tseys’ cla im fo rda mag es o n t he no t e w as a liq uid at ed cla im. T hu s, t he Ch it se ys were

n ev er th el es s req ui re d to pre se

n t ev i den ce of da mag es , w h i ch ac cordi n g to t he trial court ’s fi

ndi ngs of f act and t hi s Court ’s revi ew of the reco rd, t he Chi tse y s f ai l ed to do. Ther ef ore , w e ov

er ru l e th ei r s ec on d p oi

n t. Thi rd, the Ch i tsey s c om

pl ai n of the tri al cou rt’s g ran ti ng j udg men t i n f av or of appelle es on th

ei r cou nte rcl ai m ag ai ns t both Ron and Hen ry Chi tsey. According to t he Chi tseys, be cause the st yle of app ellees’ c ou nt er claim did not spe cifically include H enr y Chitse y’s name, he shoul d ha ve be en di sm i sse d f rom th e coun terclai m . Absent any

special ex ce pt io ns, we co nst rue ple ad ing s libe r ally inf av or of th e pl

eade r. Cox v. Union Oil Co. , 9 17 S .W. 2d 5 24, 525 (T ex. App.—Beaum ont 1996, no wr it )
. I n a dd it io n, rule 45 of the Tex

as R ul es of Ci vi l Procedu re provides : “A

ll ple adi ngs sh al l b e construed so as to do8

substantial

justice.” Tex. R. Civ . P. 4 5. A pleadi ng suff ici ently iden tifi es the part ies i

f taken as a whole , i t sets f orth the i r na mes a ny wh ere i n the pl eadi ng. Cox , 917 S.W.2d at 526. I n thi s case, app ellees r efer re d t o t he plaint iff s in the ca ption o f t he ir s ec o nd ame nd ed an sw er an d c o un t er cla im
as “Ro n Ch it se y et al. ” T he fi r st par agr aph o f the plead ing lists R on a nd He nry Chit sey as t he plai ntif fs. The C hit se

y s d i d n ot s pe ci al l y ex ce pt to th e a pp el l ee s’ pl eadi n gsi n th e tr i al cou rt. Li beral ly construin g the ple adi

ngsin fa vo ro f t he ap pe llee s, as we mus t , we ho ld that the tria l court did not er r in re fusing to dism iss Hen ry Chi tsey from the appellees’ count erclai m, and the Chi

tseys’ third poi nt is overruled. By t he i r fo ur t h po int, t he Chit seys mainta in that t he t rial co ur t er re d in gr ant ing judg ment in

fav or o f Carter o n his counter clai m of un just en r ich men t . S pe cif

ica lly, t he Ch it se ys argue that t he su mmary judgment re nder ed in favo r of the app el le es decl arin g the two Unit 207 Notes barred b y l i m i tati on s a l so r es ol v ed an y cl ai m s of un j us t en rich men t wi th reg ard to ren tal i nc ome f rom Un it 20 7, a

n d th erefore the unj ust enri chm ent cl ai m, as i t relates to Unit 207, was barred b y res j udi cata. We firs t no t e t ha t t he Ch it se ys fa iled t o as se r t r es jud ica t a b efo r e t he t r ial co ur t. Nevertheless, assum

in g without deci din

g that erro r was preserved, our reviewo f t he r ec o r d r ev ea ls that the counterclai

m f or unjust en

rich me nt was not addressed by

the summary judg ment. The
sum mary j udgm en t disp ose d of

th e iss ue of th e en f orc ea b i l i ty of the two not es secured b y U ni t 207. The trial court decl ared both notes unenf orceabl e becaus e they

were barred by

li mi tations. That judg ment wasthen

sev ered a nd s epara tel y docketed
. Altho ugh t he j udgme nt in cl uded a Mother Hub ba rd cla us e, it o nly d isp o se d o f t he cla ims and pa rt ies ad dr esse d by t he su mmary judgment
m oti on. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W .3d 191 , 2 05 (Tex. 2001) (“An order t hat9

adj udic ates only t he pla int iff’s cla ims agai nst the de f

endan t does n ot adj udicate a

coun ter-cl ai m . . .”). The appelle es’ countercl ai m f or unjust en

rich me nt was not an issue ra ised by t he su mmary judgment
m oti on. T hu s, it r ema ine d u nlit iga t ed un t il the trial court ’s f in al judgm ent, and was n

ot barred by

res judi cata. Any

defenses the Chitseys may have had regar ding the appe ll ees’ cla im f

or u nj ust enrichm ent should have been

asserted durin

g the trial . Thei

r fourth point i s overruled. By the i r nex t two poi nts , th e C hi

tsey s a rgue that c erta

i n of t he trial court ’s f in din gs of f act were con

tra di ctor y , i ts c on cl us i on s of l aw werei n cor re ct, an d i n suf f i ci en t ev i den ce ex i sts to supp ort the judgmen

t in f avor o f the appell

ees for the co unterclaim

of unj ust enr ichment. We attach to t he court 's f

in din gs of f act the same

wei ght that we att ach to a jury’s verdict upo n j ury questions. Lawyers Sur. Corp. v. Larson , 869 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex . App.—A usti n 19 94, wri

t deni ed). Wh

en
re viewing a f

i nd i ng f orfact ual su ffi

ciency, w e must co nsider and w eigh all the ev ide nc e a nd sho uld setaside the j udgme

nt only if the evi dence supportin

g the f ind in g is so weak or t he f in din g is so contrar y to the overwhel

m i ng weight of

the evi den ce a s to be c l earl

y wrong and un j ust. Cain v. Bain , 709 S. W.2d 175 , 17 6 (T ex. 1 986 ); Garza v. Alviar , 39 5 S. W .2d 821 , 82 3 (T ex . 19 65) . W e w i l l not subs t itu t e o ur judg ment fo r t hat of t he t r ier o f fac t mer ely beca use we r eac h a differe nt co nclusio n. Westech Eng’g, Inc. v. Clearwater C onstructor

s, Inc. , 83 5 S
. W. 2d 19 0, 19 6 ( T ex . Ap p. —A us t in 1992, n o wri t). The cha

ll enged f in din gs of f act provide: (15) The preponderanceof t he ev id en ce sh o we d t ha t t he P lain t iff, He nr y E
. Ch it se y, hasuse d, oc cup ied and coll ected rents and reven

ues f rom Uni t 208, Bl dg. B., Red Ri ver Nor th Con dom i n i um s, Tra v i s C oun ty , Tex as to t he exc lusion o f the form er own ers , De f en da nts , f rom 199 2 th roug h 1 996 , an

d to the e xc l

us i on of t he pr es en t o wn er , I nt er ve no r , fr o m 19 96 t o t he da t e o f t r ial.5 The r elevant pr ovision of the deed of

tru st provides: “ If Grantor defaults on the note or fails to perfor m any of Grantor ’s obligations, B eneficiary may:
. . . a. collect rents if the property is rented or r ent it and collect rents if it is vacant and apply the proceeds, less reas onable expenses, to the payment of the note. ” 10 (18) The pr epo nder ance of t he evide nce s how ed t hat t he Pla int iff, He nr y E
. Ch it se y, used, occupied, col le cted rents and reven ues, [from] Un

it 207, Bldg. B., Red Riv er Nor th Condo mi

ni ums, Tra v i s C o., T ex

as to the excl

usi on of the f

ormer owners, Defen

dants, from

1992 through 1996.
The Chi tseys a rgue that t he ab ove fi

ndi ngs of fact contradict the trial court ’s ear lier finding of no
ev i de nc e of da tesof de f aul t or of dur at ion o f defau lt bec aus e ac co rd ingto the term s of the de ed of tru st securi

ng the m odif ie d $35,000 Uni

t 208 Not e, ren

tal i nc ome m ay be us ed to of f set pa y men t of t he no t e o nly

if the debtor defaul

ts on the note. 5 Acco rd ing t o t he Chi tseys, b y a ll owing a ppel le es to off setpayment of t he no t e, t he t rial co ur t impli citly fou nd t hat t he ap pellees had d efault ed o n t he note i n 19 92 an d the durati on of def aul t was f rom 1 992 th

rough 1996. We rejec t t his arg ument . Fir st , t he Chit seys did no t pr ese nt t his arg ument t o t he trial
cou rt. Even i f the Ch

i tseys h ad presented evi

dence that the duration of de faul t was from 1992 th rough 19 96 , they

f ai l ed to pre sent e

vi de nc e of ac ce l era ti on of the note and of dam

ages. Wi thout t his ev id en ce , t he Ch it se ys ca nno t pr ev ail o n t he ir c laim to enf orce the modif

ie d $35,000 Uni

t 208 Note. The Chits eys also ar gue t hat t he t rial co ur t ’s co nclusio ns of law re gar ding t he amo unt of off setwere i nc orrect b eca

use there wasno ev

i den ce to sup port the m . A tri al cou rt’ s f i nd i ng s of facta re reviewabl

e for legal

suff ici ency of the eviden

ce by the same standard that is a pplied in
re viewing the le gal

suf fi ci ency of the ev i den ce to sup port a j ury

verdict. Anderson v. City of Seven Points , 806 S.W.2d791 , 7 94 ( Te x. 199 1) . We loo k at only t he evide nce t hat t ends t o s upp or t t he6 The Ch itsey s al so argue that any of

fs et awarded to appelle es sho uld have been limited t o r ent coll ected by the Chi tseys, as opposed t o fai

r market rental

value, acc or ding t o t he ex pre ss term s of t he deeds of

trust. Ho weve r, t he trial

court ’s concl

usi ons of l

aw refl ect that t he appel

le es prevai

le d on their unj ust enr ichment co un t er cla im. “ An a ct io n fo run jus t en r ich men t is ba se d u po n t he eq uit ab le pr inc iple t ha t a p er so n r ec eiv ing be ne fit s w hic h w er e u nju st f or him to retain ought to make resti tution .” Bransom v. Standard Hardw are, Inc. , 874 S.W.2d

91 9, 9 27 (Tex . A

pp .—F ort W

orth 1994, writ deni

ed). In this

case, the trial

court ’s j udgme

nt is supported by the the ory of unj ust en rich men t, as a n indepe ndent t heo ry o f rec ove ry, a nd do es no t dep end up o n t he ex pr es s t er ms of the deeds of trust. See id. 11 judg ment and d isreg ar d all evidenc e and inferenc es t o t he contrar y . Id. at 795 . We must affirm if any proba tiv e ev i den ce i n s upport of the tri al court’s j udgm en t exists. Id. Here, t he cou

rt con cl ude d that the f

ai r m ark et re nta l va l uef or Un i t 207f orthe pe riod of 1992 through 1996 was $21,400, and the f ai r market rental

val ue for Uni

t 208 f or th e p eri

od of 1992 t hr o ug h t he da t e o f t r ial w as $3 7, 37 5. T he Ch it se ys ar gue t hat app ellees p ro duc ed no evi dence that t hese am

ount s reflect t he actual rental proceeds der iv ed from the uni

ts. 6 In thei r sec onde d am

ended p eti

tion , t he Chi tseys a

dmi tt ed that they “

had the sole, exclus iveuse, po ssession, managem ent, and co ntro l of un

its 2 07 and 208 f

rom Decem

ber 1, 1992
un t il t he pr ese nt t ime,” a nd

tha t the y ha d “ l ea se d thes e p rem

i se s.” Th ey f urth er req ue ste d re nd i ti on of jud gme nt “p er mit t ing [ t he Ch it se ys] t o ap ply re nt s and re venue s fro m Units 2 07 a nd 20 8 t o t he
ou t st anding i

nde bted ne ss owe d by

[appe l l ees ].” The Ch

i tsey s, howe ve r, f

ailed t o p ro duc e any evi dence of the rental

proceeds t hey co llecte d o r o f any amount s t hey app lied t ow ar d pa yment o f the notes. On

t he ot her hand, appell

ees prod uced lease agreemen ts reflectin

g the Chitseys’ lease of Uni t 208 and the rent charged f rom 1 994 th

rough 1999. Moreover , appe l l ees produce d an

ex pert witness, Karen

Coff ee, who testifi

ed as to t he f

ai r market rental va l uef or Un i ts 2 07 a nd 208 f rom12

1989 through 2000. The Ch itsey s di d not pro vi

de any contro vertin

g evi dence. Thus , the evidence presented was legally

suf fi ci ent to supp ort the tri al co ur t ’s findings and co nclusio ns re gar ding t he
amou nt of o ffset and u njust enr ichment a war ded t o t he ap pellees . We ove rr ule t he Chit seys’ fifth and si xth poi nts of error. CONCLU SION Having overruled all

of the Chitsey

s’ poi nts of err or, w e a f f i rm the j udg men t of t he trial cou rt.

Mari ly n A boussie, Chief J

ustice Be f ore C hi ef Ju sti ceA bou ss i e, J us ti ce s Y ea

ke l an d Pa tters on Af fi rmed File d: Novem

ber 1, 2001 Do No t Publis

h