STATE OF FLORIDA, 

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 

and ROSE THOMAS,

Petitioners,

v.

GARY L. CEASAR, JR.,

Respondent.

___________________________/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D15-2708

Opinion filed April 25, 2016.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari – Original Jurisdiction.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, William H. Branch, Assistant Attorney 

General, for Petitioner.

Gary L. Ceasar, Jr., pro se, Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The Florida Department of Revenue seeks certiorari review of an order 

directing respondent Gary L. Ceasar and a non-party, adult child, to submit to genetic 

testing. Mr. Ceasar did not respond to the show cause orders entered by this court 

directing him to respond to the Department’s petition. And now, upon consideration 

of the merits in the absence of a response, we grant the petition and quash the order 
2

compelling genetic testing, which shouldn’t have been entered in the absence of 

proceedings placing paternity in controversy. 

Mr. Ceasar moved for scientific paternity testing below, apparently as a step 

toward challenging a more than five-year-old paternity order establishing him as the 

father of a child. The paternity order also set a child support arrearage amount in 

favor of the child’s grandmother, Rose Thomas. Mr. Ceasar has known about the 

order for a while, asserting that thousands of dollars have been garnished from his 

wages by the Department (consistent with his $258/month obligation). Mr. Ceasar 

testified before the hearing officer below that the child could not be his because he 

was just 12 when the child was born. 

We have recognized that “no party to any family law proceeding is entitled to 

an order requiring another party to submit to genetic testing unless the proceedings 

place paternity ‘in controversy.’” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Corbitt v. Alletag,

156 So. 3d 1110, 1112–13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015); State, Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. 

Sharif v. Brown, 980 So. 2d 590, 591–92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); State, Dep’t of 

Revenue ex rel. Chambers v. Travis, 971 So. 2d 157, 162 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citing

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.360). And we have described how to place paternity in controversy 

in circumstances like this, as recently as in Florida Department of Revenue ex rel. 

Torres v. Spraggs, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D2358 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 15, 2015), stating:

Florida law provides a statutory framework for contesting the 

establishment of paternity for a child born out of wedlock and for 

disestablishing paternity or terminating child support obligations when 
3

the male is not the biological father of the child. The establishment of 

paternity for a child born out of wedlock “may be challenged in court 

only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, with the

burden of proof upon the challenger.” § 742.10(4), Fla. Stat. (2015). 

Alternatively, a male may disestablish paternity or terminate a child 

support obligation when the male is not the biological father of the 

child, upon meeting specific pleading and proof requirements in circuit 

court, which include attesting that newly discovered evidence relating 

to the paternity of the child has come to the petitioner's knowledge since 

the initial paternity determination or establishment of a child support 

obligation. § 742.18, Fla. Stat. (2015).

In this case, however, Mr. Ceasar has not pled a basis to disestablish paternity under 

either § 742.10(4) or § 742.18. And there were no pending paternity proceedings at 

the time the order was entered below. Instead, Mr. Ceasar filed a bare motion for 

genetic testing, essentially seeking discovery in a non-existent paternity 

action. See Travis, 971 So. 2d at 161–62.1 Because Mr. Caesar has not placed 

paternity in controversy, the order requiring genetic testing departed from clearly 

 1 There are jurisdictional and other problems associated with equating Mr. Ceasar’s 

motion with an action to disestablish paternity. For instance, he did not allege the 

specific things required by the statutes to plead an action to disestablish paternity. 

Also, the family law rules of procedure provide that “[a] support enforcement 

hearing officer does not have the authority to hear contested paternity cases,” see

Fla. Fam. L.R.P. 12.491(e). If paternity had been in controversy here, the hearing 

officer could not have addressed it. See State, Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Striggles v. 

Standifer, 990 So. 2d 659, 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). And the five-year period that 

Mr. Ceasar waited to question his paternity may present a res judicata problem. See,

e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Myrick, 706 So. 2d 104, 105 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (“Once 

paternity is established by court order, absent a showing of fraud upon the court, the 

issue of paternity is res judicata and a subsequent judge has no jurisdiction to order 

that the issue be relitigated.”); State, Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Donaldson v. Blocker,

988 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (vacating a paternity testing order where 

a five-year-old paternity order had not been properly challenged). 
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established legal principles.

2

For this reason, we GRANT the petition for writ of certiorari and QUASH the 

trial court’s order compelling genetic testing.

ROBERTS, CJ., MAKAR and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.

 2We note that the 21-year-old child whom the court ordered to submit to a DNA test 

was not a party below, nor apparently given notice of the proceedings. With paternity 

not in controversy, the adult child possesses his own legal rights related to the 

ordered testing, including notice. See § 760.40(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (“DNA analysis may 

be performed only with the informed consent of the person to be tested, and the 

results of such DNA analysis, whether held by a public or private entity, are the 

exclusive property of the person tested, are confidential, and may not be disclosed 

without the consent of the person tested.”). Cf. Chavez v. J & L Drywall & Travelers 

Ins. Co., 858 So. 2d 1266, 1268-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (recognizing that a 

compelled medical examination implicates the rights of the party being examined).