IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jason E. Williams, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1243 C.D. 2018

: Submitted: May 3, 2019

Pennsylvania Board :

of Probation and Parole, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: August 21, 2019

Petitioner Jason E. Williams (Williams) petitions for review of a final 

determination of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board), dated 

August 16, 2018. The Board denied Williams’ request for administrative relief, 

thereby rejecting his claim that the Board erred (1) by failing to hold a timely 

revocation hearing and (2) by failing to grant him credit for all his time served at 

liberty on parole. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Williams pled guilty to a violation of Section 3802(d)(3) of the Vehicle 

Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802(d)(3),1 pertaining to driving under the influence of 

 

1 Section 3802(d)(3) of the Vehicle Code makes it unlawful for an individual to “drive, 

operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle” when “[t]he individual is 
2

combined substances (DUI-Combined Substances), and the Court of Common Pleas 

of Philadelphia County sentenced him to a period of one to four years’ incarceration 

on October 30, 2014. Thereafter, on June 22, 2015, the Court of Common Pleas of 

Bucks County (Bucks C.C.P.), as a result of the DUI conviction, revoked Williams’ 

probation for a 2009 conviction for violating Section 13(a)(30) of The Controlled 

Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Drug Act),2relating to Possession with 

the Intent to Deliver (PWID), and sentenced him to a period of one to two years’ 

incarceration. (Certified Record (C.R.) at 1, 7.) The Department of Corrections 

aggregated these sentences, resulting in an original minimum sentence date of 

November 3, 2015, and an original maximum sentence date of November 1, 2018. 

(Id. at 1-2.) The Board granted Williams parole by Board Decision recorded on

February 9, 2016. (Id. at 4, 7.) He was released on parole on April 19, 2016. (Id.

at 7.) 

The Bristol Township Police Department arrested Williams for the 

offense of PWID on March 7, 2017. (Id. at 13.) The Bucks C.C.P. set Williams’ 

monetary bail on March 7, 2017, but Williams never posted bail. (Id. at 19, 72-73.) 

The Board issued a warrant to commit and detain Williams on March 13, 2017. (Id.

at 15.) The Board issued a notice of charges to inform Williams of his upcoming 

detention hearing before the Board. (Id. at 20.) Williams subsequently waived his 

 

under the combined influence of alcohol and a drug or combination of drugs to a degree which 

impairs the individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the 

movement of the vehicle.” 

2 Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). Section 13(a)(30) 

of the Drug Act prohibits “the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or 

deliver, a controlled substance by a person not registered under this act, or a practitioner not 

registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating, delivering or 

possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance,” unless otherwise authorized 

by the Drug Act. 
3

rights to representation by counsel and to a detention hearing on March 23, 2017. 

(Id. at 16.) By Board Decision recorded on April 27, 2017, the Board detained 

Williams pending disposition of his criminal charges. (Id. at 25.) 

On November 13, 2017, Williams pled guilty to PWID, and the Bucks

C.C.P. sentenced him to incarceration at the Bucks County Prison for a minimum 

sentence of 11 months, 29 days and a maximum sentence of 23 months, 29 days. 

(Id. at 33.) Williams began serving this sentence on that same date. (Id. at 33.) The 

Board received official verification of Williams’ new criminal conviction on 

December 15, 2017. (Id. at 38.) On February 14, 2018, the Board subsequently 

issued a notice of charges based upon Williams’ new criminal conviction, informing

Williams of his upcoming parole revocation hearing scheduled for

February 27, 2018. (Id. at 30.) A hearing examiner continued the hearing based 

upon Williams’ unavailability. (Id. at 35.) After serving his minimum sentence at 

Bucks County Prison, Williams transferred to the State Correctional Institution at 

Graterford (SCI-Graterford) on March 15, 2018. (Id. at 75, 81.)

Williams waived his right to a panel revocation hearing before the 

Board and, instead, requested that his revocation hearing be held before a hearing 

examiner. (Id. at 37.) A hearing examiner conducted the revocation hearing on 

April 9, 2018, during which Parole Agent Mahmoud (Agent) and Williams, 

represented by counsel, testified. (Id. at 36, 40.)

Agent testified that he received the official verification of Williams’

new criminal conviction on December 15, 2017. (Id. at 62.) Counsel objected to 

the timeliness of the revocation hearing because Agent offered no documentation 

supporting the allegation that agents received official verification of Williams’ new 

criminal conviction on December 15, 2017. (Id. at 39, 63.) The hearing examiner, 
4

appearing to accept December 15, 2017, as the date of official verification, overruled 

Counsel’s timeliness objection because the hearing examiner was conducting the 

hearing (on April 9, 2018) within 120 days of the date of the official verification of 

Williams’ new criminal conviction (December 15, 2017). (Id. at 61-63.) Williams 

testified that he acknowledged his new conviction of PWID and that he completed 

his minimum sentence at Bucks County Prison and returned to SCI-Graterford. (Id.

at 64-65.) 

By Board action recorded on April 25, 2018 (mailed May 1, 2018), the 

Board recommitted Williams as a convicted parole violator to serve 12 months’

backtime. (Id. at 82.) The Board denied Williams credit for the time spent at liberty 

on parole, citing the reason as “new conviction same/similar to original offense.” 

(Id. at 82-83.) The Board recalculated his maximum sentence date to be 

September 20, 2020. (Id. at 83.) 

Williams challenged the Board’s decision by filing an administrative 

remedies form on May 23, 2018, alleging: (1) the Board violated his Constitutional 

due process rights by denying him a timely revocation hearing; and (2) the Board 

erred by denying him credit for the entirety of his time spent at liberty on parole 

because he did not commit a crime of violence nor a crime requiring his registration 

as a sexual offender. (Id. at 84-85.) The Board affirmed its decision that it had held

a timely revocation hearing and that it had properly exercised its discretion to deny 

Williams credit for time served at liberty on parole. (Id. at 89.) With regard to the 

timeliness of the revocation hearing, the Board reasoned: 

The record reflects that you pled guilty to the new offenses 

on November 13, 2017[,] and you were returned to a state 

correctional institution (“SCI”) for the first time since your 

release on parole on March 15, 2018, after you were 

paroled from your Bucks County sentence. There is no 
5

indication that you waived your right to a panel hearing 

prior to your return to an SCI. Because you were confined 

outside the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Department of 

Corrections at the time of your conviction, the Board was 

required to hold the revocation hearing within 120 days of 

the date they received official verification of your return 

to an SCI. 37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1)(i). In this case, you were 

returned to an SCI on March 15, 2018, and the Board 

conducted the revocation hearing 25 days later on 

April 9, 2018. 

(Id. at 90.) In support of its decision to deny credit to Williams for the time he spent 

at liberty on parole, the Board reasoned: 

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pittman v. 

[Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 

159 A.3d 466 (Pa. 2017)], the Board must articulate the 

basis for its decision to grant . . . [or] deny a convicted 

parole violator credit for time spent at liberty on parole. 

The Board action mailed May 1, 2018, articulates that you 

were denied credit for the time you spent at liberty on 

parole because your new conviction was the same/similar 

to your original offense. This is a sufficient reason for 

denying credit for time spent at liberty on parole. 

Colon-Vega v. Pa. [Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth.,

No. 2496 C.D. 2015, filed August 29, 2016)].

(Id.)

On appeal to this Court,3 Williams argues that (1) the Board violated 

his Constitutional due process rights because it failed to hold his revocation hearing 

within the mandated 120-day period after receiving official verification of his return 

to a state correctional institution as required by Section 71.4(1)(i) of the Board’s 

regulations, 37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1)(i), and that (2) the Board abused its discretion by 

 

3 This Court’s standard of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights 

were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa. C.S. § 704.
6

denying him credit for all time spent at liberty on parole because the Board did not 

provide a sufficient contemporaneous statement to explain its decision to deny him

credit for his time spent at liberty on parole.

We first consider Williams’ claim that the Board erred in concluding 

that his April 9, 2018 revocation hearing was timely. Williams argues that his 

revocation hearing was untimely, as it occurred outside of the 120-day period to hold 

a revocation hearing as mandated by Section 71.4(1)(i) of the Board’s regulations.

4

 

Generally, the Board bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that it held a timely revocation hearing for an individual. Saunders v. Pa. Bd. of 

Prob. & Parole, 568 A.2d 1370, 1371 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 590 A.2d 760 

(Pa. 1990). Pursuant to Section 71.4 of the Board’s regulations, the Board must 

 

4

In his brief, Williams references facts that differ from those of record and predate the 

November 13, 2017 conviction that resulted in the revocation of parole at issue now before the 

Court. For instance, Williams argues in his brief that his “[p]anel revocation hearing [was] held 

on March 30, 2016.” (Petitioner’s Br. at 12.) Williams, however, did not have a panel revocation 

hearing on March 30, 2016; instead, he elected to proceed before a hearing examiner who 

conducted a hearing on April 9, 2018. (C.R. at 37.) We note that as of March 30, 2016, Williams 

was awaiting his release to parole following the Board’s Decision recorded on February 9, 2016;

his release occurred on April 19, 2016. (See id. at 4, 7.) Williams also states in his brief that his 

hearing was not timely as it was held beyond 120 days of his return to SCI-Graterford on 

November 3, 2015. (Petitioner’s Br. at 12.) We note that November 3, 2015, is the minimum 

sentence date for the sentences from which Williams was paroled by the Board Decision recorded 

on February 9, 2016, but he remained in the custody of the Department of Corrections until his 

release on parole on April 19, 2016. Following his 2017 conviction, Williams transferred to 

SCI-Graterford on March 15, 2018. (C.R. at 75, 81.) As such, March 15, 2018, is the relevant 

date for our analysis. Williams also references February 2, 2016, as the date on which the Board 

received “proof of [his] conviction,” which is impossible given that the relevant conviction did not 

occur until November 13, 2017. (Petitioner’s Br. at 12; C.R. at 29.) It is unclear the basis on 

which Williams advances these dates in his brief, and there is no evidence within the record before 

the Board that would support Williams’ factual allegations. 
7

abide by the following procedures before a parolee can be recommitted as a 

convicted parole violator: 

(1) A revocation hearing shall be held within 120 days 

from the date the Board received official verification[5] of 

the plea of guilty . . . except as follows:

(i) If a parolee is confined outside the jurisdiction of 

the Department of Corrections, such as . . . confine[d]

in a county correctional institution where the parolee 

has not waived the right to a revocation hearing[,] . . . 

the revocation hearing shall be held within 120 days

of the official verification of the return of the parolee 

to a State correctional facility.

(ii) A parolee who is confined in a county correctional 

institution and who has waived the right to a 

revocation hearing by a panel . . . shall be deemed to 

be within the jurisdiction of the Department of 

Corrections as of the date of the waiver. 

37 Pa. Code § 71.4 (emphasis added).

Section 71.4 of the Board’s regulations, therefore, explicitly sets forth 

the dates in which the clock begins to run against the Board in order for it to hold a 

timely revocation hearing for a parolee. Under Section 71.4(1)(i), time begins to run 

when the Board receives “official verification” that the parolee, who has been 

convicted on new criminal charges and has not waived his right to a revocation 

hearing, has returned to a state correctional institution and is, again, under the 

jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. 37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1)(i). Under 

Section 71.4(1)(ii), time begins to run on the date when a parolee, who has been 

convicted on new criminal charges and who is outside the jurisdiction of the 

 

5

“Official verification” is defined as an “[a]ctual receipt by a parolee’s supervising parole 

agent of a direct written communication from a court in which a parolee was convicted of a new 

criminal charge attesting that the parolee was so convicted.” 37 Pa. Code § 61.1 (definitions). 
8

Department of Corrections, waives his panel revocation hearing. 37 Pa. Code 

§ 71.4(1)(ii).6

In this case, Section 71.4(1)(i) of the Board’s regulations applies to 

Williams. Here, Williams received a new criminal conviction and sentence to be 

served at a county correctional institution, Bucks County Prison. Following the 

criminal proceedings, Williams remained at the county prison until the completion 

of his minimum sentence, and he only returned to a state correctional institution on 

March 15, 2018. Williams, therefore, remained outside the jurisdiction of the 

Department of Corrections until March 15, 2018. Pursuant to Section 71.4(1)(i), the 

Board had 120 days to hold a revocation hearing for Williams from the date of the 

official verification of his return to a state correctional institution. The Board held 

Williams’ revocation hearing on April 9, 2018. The Board, therefore, held the 

revocation hearing only twenty-five days after his return to the state correctional 

institution, which is well within the mandated 120-day requirement as set forth under 

Section 71.4(1)(i). Thus, the Board did not err in its conclusion that it held a timely 

revocation hearing for Williams on April 9, 2018.

We next consider whether the Board erred by denying Williams credit 

for all the time he spent at liberty while on parole. Williams essentially argues that 

the Board abused its discretion in denying him credit because the Board did not 

provide a sufficient contemporaneous statement to support its decision. In support 

of his argument, Williams alleges that his case is similar to Marshall v. Pennsylvania 

Board of Probation and Parole, 200 A.3d 643 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), because the 

 

6 Section 71.4(1)(ii) does not apply to Williams because there are no facts within the record 

before the Board to suggest that Williams had waived his panel revocation hearing prior to 

April 9, 2018, the actual date of his revocation hearing. (See C.R. at 37-45, 59-68.)
9

Board failed to consider the individual factual circumstances in his case when 

determining whether to grant him credit for time on parole. We disagree.

When determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “an abuse of discretion is not merely an 

error of judgment, but occurs only where the law is overridden or misapplied, or the 

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill will.” Zappala v. Brandolini Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 909 A.2d 1272, 1284 

(Pa. 2006); see also Moss v. SCI-Mahanoy Superintendent Pa. Bd. of Prob. & 

Parole, 194 A.3d 1130, 1133 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), appeal denied, ___ A.3d ___ 

(Pa., No. 824 MAL 2018, filed June 18, 2019). 

Section 6138(a)(2.1) of the Prisons and Parole Code, 61 Pa. C.S. 

§ 6138(a)(2.1), sets forth guidelines for the Board’s discretionary power in granting 

and denying credit for parole time and provides: 

The Board may, in its discretion, award credit to a parolee 

recommitted under paragraph (2)[7]for the time spent at 

liberty on parole, unless any of the following apply: 

(i) The crime committed during the period of 

parole . . . is a crime of violence . . . or a crime 

requiring registration [as a sexual offender].

(ii) The parolee was recommitted under 

[S]ection 6143 [of the Prisons and Parole Code, 61 Pa. 

C.S. § 6143,] (relating to early parole of inmates 

subject to Federal removal order).

 

7 Section 6138(a)(2) of Prisons and Parole Code, 61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)(2), provides, in 

part: “If the parolee’s recommitment is so ordered, the parolee shall be reentered to serve the 

remainder of the term which the parolee would have been compelled to serve had the parole not 

been granted and, except as provided under paragraph (2.1), shall be given no credit for the time 

at liberty on parole.” (Emphasis added.)
10

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that, pursuant to 

Section 6138(a)(2.1) of the Prisons and Parole Code, “the Board must provide a 

contemporaneous statement explaining its reason for denying a [convicted parole 

violator] credit for time spent at liberty on parole.” Pittman, 159 A.3d at 475. The

Supreme Court specified, however, that a “single[-]sentence explanation” given by 

the Board explaining its decision “is likely sufficient in most instances” to meet the 

Pittman standard. Id. at 475 n.12. Moreover, this Court has found several

single-sentence explanations given by the Board for its decision to deny a convicted 

parole violator credit for time spent at liberty on parole as sufficient to meet the

Pittman standard. See, e.g., Tres v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 

828 C.D. 2018, filed June 3, 2019) (holding Board’s stated reason “arrested for a 

firearms charge” satisfied Pittman standard);8 Bleach v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole

(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 794 C.D. 2017, filed May 31, 2019) (holding Board’s stated 

reason “[r]evoke street time due to second conviction (drugs) while on parole” 

satisfied Pittman standard); Lawrence v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 1132 C.D. 2018, filed April 12, 2019) (holding Board’s stated reason “new 

conviction same/similar to the original offense” satisfied Pittman standard); Smoak 

v. Talaber, 193 A.3d 1160, 1165 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (holding Board’s stated reason

of “unresolved drug and alcohol issues” satisfied Pittman standard).

This Court in Marshall, however, held that the Board’s one-sentence 

explanation for denying a convicted parole violator credit for time spent at liberty 

on parole failed to meet the Pittman standard. Marshall, 200 A.3d at 651-52. 

Marshall was originally sentenced and incarcerated for murder in the third degree 

 

8 Pursuant to Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code 

§ 69.414(a), an unreported panel decision issued by this Court after January 15, 2008, may be cited 

“for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent.”
11

and robbery. After being paroled, Marshall was arrested and convicted of a 

Delaware crime similar to the Pennsylvania crime of PWID. The Board denied 

Marshall credit for his time spent at liberty on parole, stating only “felony 

drug[-]related crimes.” Marshall, 200 A.3d at 647, 650. The Court held that the 

Board’s reason to deny Marshall credit failed to satisfy the required Pittman

standard, because “the Board’s articulated reason simply restates the conviction 

without an individual assessment of the facts surrounding Marshall’s parole 

revocation.” Id. at 651. The Court remanded the case to the Board and ordered the 

Board, “[a]t a minimum, . . . [to give a] statement of reasons [that] . . . accurately 

reflect[ed] the facts informing its decision.” Id. at 652. The focus of our decision 

in Marshall was the lack of explanation offered by the Board, as the Board did not 

explain why felony drug-related charges following parole from a murder conviction 

warranted a denial of discretionary credit for time spent at liberty on parole. 

Unlike in Marshall, the record now before the Court reveals that the 

Board provided Williams with a sufficient contemporaneous statement supporting 

its decision to deny him credit for the time served on parole to satisfy the Pittman

standard and, therefore, did not abuse its discretion. (C.R. at 82-83.) Here, the Board 

did not merely restate the offense for which Williams was most recently convicted. 

Rather, the Board clearly considered the individual circumstances surrounding 

Williams’ parole revocation, as the Board compared Williams’ original convictions 

and most recent conviction and determined that Williams’ “new conviction [was the] 

same/similar to [his] original offense.” (C.R. at 83.) This determination that, despite 

being granted parole, Williams was once again convicted of the “same” or “similar” 

offense as his earlier offenses is borne out by the record, which demonstrates that 

Williams was convicted of three drug-related offenses—PWID (for which he was 
12

twice convicted) and DUI-Combined Substances (for which he was once convicted). 

The Board, therefore, appropriately applied the Pittman standard by providing its 

rationale for its decision, and the rationale given is not “manifestly unreasonable, or 

the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Zappala, 909 A.2d at 1284. 

Moreover, this Court in Lawrence recently concluded that this same rationale offered 

by the Board was sufficient for purposes of Pittman where the convicted parole 

violator’s new conviction and original offense were both drug-related. See 

Lawrence, slip op. at 9. While our decision in Lawrence is not binding, it 

nevertheless bolsters our analysis in this matter. Based on the above analysis, we 

conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion by not crediting Williams for his

time spent at liberty on parole.

Accordingly, we affirm the final determination of the Board.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jason E. Williams, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1243 C.D. 2018

:

Pennsylvania Board :

of Probation and Parole, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21st day of August, 2019, the final determination of 

the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, dated August 16, 2018, is 

AFFIRMED.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge