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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 40570

JEREMY TODD HILL,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

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2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 426

Filed: March 24, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge. 

Judgment summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LANSING, Judge

Jeremy Todd Hill filed a petition for post-conviction relief after the statute of limitations 

had run. In the district court, he asserted that his late filing should be excused under the principle 

of equitable tolling. He argued that the untimeliness of his petition was caused by the 

inadequacy of the legal resources available to him while in jail and prison and that these 

inadequacies amounted to a denial of his right to access the courts. The district court held that 

the statute of limitations was not equitably tolled because prison resources were adequate. As an 

alternative basis for its ruling, the district court found that even if the resources were inadequate, 

any inadequacy was not the cause of Hill’s late filing. On this basis, the district court dismissed 

Hill’s post-conviction action. Hill appeals and continues to assert his argument that the statute of 

limitations for his petition should be equitably tolled. 
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I.

BACKGROUND

Hill was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of Idaho Code § 37-

2732B(a)(4). On March 28, 2011, he was sentenced to a fixed term of six years and six months 

of imprisonment. No direct appeal was filed. 

On July 17, 2012, Hill filed a petition for post-conviction relief. He raised two claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel and a claim that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. 

Along with his petition, he filed a motion requesting the appointment of counsel and a 

memorandum of law. 

The court, sua sponte, filed a notice of its intent to dismiss the post-conviction action 

because it was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The notice explained that the 

statute of limitations required that Hill’s petition be filed within a period of one year and fortytwo days of his judgment of conviction, a period that expired in May 2011. Hill responded, 

pro se, by arguing that he was entitled to equitable tolling because he had been held without 

access to legal materials. He asserted he was held in the county jail for several weeks, that he 

was transferred to the Reception and Diagnostic Unit (RDU) when he first arrived in prison, and 

that he was placed in Unit 8 or “the hole” for weeks. He claimed he was denied access to legal 

resources in each of these locations. Furthermore, he asserted that even when held in other areas 

of the prison, the resources available were deficient. He claimed that the prison paralegals 

refused to offer legal advice and that the law library did not contain any case law. In response to 

Hill’s pro se filing, the court appointed counsel for Hill and directed the State to respond to Hill’s 

briefing.

The court ordered a bifurcated evidentiary hearing. At the first hearing, the parties were 

permitted to present evidence relating to equitable tolling. The second hearing was planned to 

address the merits of Hill’s petition, but never occurred as the court decided the case on 

timeliness grounds. 

At the hearing, Hill testified that he was denied access to legal materials in the county 

jail, the RDU, and while in “the hole,” i.e., segregation. He also testified he could not recall 

receiving any written information regarding legal resources, but did admit that he may have 

signed a document indicating he went to an orientation at which he received a packet of written 

material. Hill and another inmate also testified regarding the legal resources made available to 
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them in prison.1 They generally described the prison paralegals as unhelpful. They averred that 

the prison’s legal resource center can only be used to make copies, mail documents, or get 

documents notarized. They also testified that an inmate must have specific knowledge of the 

precise materials he needs in order to get any particular resource from the prison law library. 

Finally, they said that the library at the prison does not contain the case law reporters that publish 

the decisions of this Court, the Idaho Supreme Court, and the relevant federal courts. 

Conversely, the State presented evidence showing that Hill had attended an orientation 

meeting where he was given a packet of materials that notified him of the appropriate statute of 

limitations for a post-conviction action and described the general nature of such an action. The 

State also placed in evidence a packet containing additional materials regarding post-conviction 

actions, which Hill ultimately received according to the State’s evidence. Prison staff testified 

that prisoners in the RDU and “the hole” have access to legal materials. The State also presented 

evidence that Hill had access to legal materials while in the RDU. 

After the hearing, the court issued a written decision dismissing Hill’s post-conviction 

action. It concluded that Hill was not credible when he claimed to have been denied legal 

materials in the RDU and in “the hole.” Instead, it credited a witness for the State who testified 

that legal materials were made available to Hill. The court concluded that these legal materials 

were sufficient to advise him of the nature of a post-conviction action and the applicable statute 

of limitations. It also concluded that Hill was not prejudiced by any deficiency in the resources 

made available to him. Rather than concluding that Hill was prejudiced by actions of the State, 

the district court concluded that Hill’s delay in filing his petition while in State custody was 

solely attributed to him. Therefore, even assuming that Hill was denied access to the courts 

while in county jail and was entitled to equitable tolling for that time, his petition would still be 

untimely and subject to dismissal. 

 

1 Also in the record is an offender concern form wherein Hill asked where he should look 

to find information applicable to a post-conviction claim and “to find out what a post-conviction 

is.” The import of this document is unclear as it was dated September 18, 2012, and Hill had 

filed his post-conviction petition over two months earlier, on July 17, 2012. Moreover, the 

exhibit appears to be missing critical context as the response indicates that the concern form is 

duplicative, and we have no record of the contents of Hill’s prior request or the paralegal’s prior 

response. For these reasons, we do not assume that the paralegal’s response was necessarily 

deficient. It is entirely possible that the paralegal’s prior response adequately addressed Hill’s 

concern and his new request was entirely duplicative.
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On appeal, Hill argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he was denied 

access to the courts. He claims that the materials he received were insufficient to alert him to the 

nature of the claim he should file and the appropriate statute of limitations. He also argues, more 

generally, that the resources available in the prison are constitutionally insufficient, that the 

paralegals are insufficient because they cannot provide legal advice, and the prison libraries are 

insufficient because they do not contain case reporters. For all these reasons, he requests that we 

reverse the decision of the district court.

II.

ANALYSIS

In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner must prove the 

allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 

801 P.2d 1216 (1990). When reviewing a decision denying post-conviction relief after an 

evidentiary hearing, an appellate court will not disturb the lower court’s factual findings unless 

they are clearly erroneous.2

 I.R.C.P. 52(a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 

(Ct. App. 1990). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and 

the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the 

district court. Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988). We 

exercise free review of the district court’s application of the relevant law to the facts. Nellsch v. 

State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). 

The statute of limitation for post-conviction actions provides that a petition for postconviction relief may be filed at any time within one year from the expiration of the time for 

appeal or from the determination of appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following 

an appeal, whichever is later. I.C. § 19-4902(a). The appeal referenced in that section means the 

appeal in the underlying criminal case. Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 628, 836 P.2d 1088, 

 

2 Hill argues that the standard of review for summary dismissals should be applied to this 

appeal. We disagree. The district court held what it described as a bifurcated evidentiary 

hearing. The first portion of that hearing focused on the statute of limitations and the access to 

the courts issue. The second portion of the hearing would have focused on the merits of Hill’s 

claim. The plan to hold a second hearing was obviated by the district court’s decision regarding 

the access to the courts issue. Below, the parties submitted evidence and adduced testimony on 

the issues relevant to this appeal. Accordingly, the standard of review applicable to decisions 

rendered after an evidentiary hearing is appropriately applied to this case. 
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1089 (Ct. App. 1982). The failure to file a timely petition is a basis for dismissal of the petition. 

Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003). 

Equitable tolling may excuse the untimely filing of a petition for post-conviction relief.

“Equitable tolling in a post-conviction action has been recognized by Idaho appellate courts in 

two circumstances--where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility without legal 

representation or access to Idaho legal materials, and where mental disease and/or psychotropic 

medication prevented the petitioner from timely pursuing challenges to the conviction.” Leer v. 

State, 148 Idaho 112, 115, 218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009) (internal citations omitted). 

“The bar for equitable tolling for post-conviction actions is high.” Id. (quoting Chico-Rodriguez 

v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005)). “American courts generally 

have applied equitable tolling only in rare and exceptional circumstances beyond the petitioner’s 

control that prevented him or her from filing a timely petition.” Leer, 148 Idaho at 115, 218 P.3d 

at 1176.

In Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 535, 944 P.2d 127, 132 (Ct. App. 1997), this Court 

discussed the connection between equitable tolling and the constitutional requirement that 

prisoners be afforded access to the courts. Under the federal constitution, prisoners must be

provided adequate access to courts so that they may challenge unlawful convictions and 

vindicate constitutional rights. Id. We have interpreted the guarantee in Art. I, § 18, of the Idaho 

Constitution, that “courts of justice shall be open to every person,” to similarly require the State 

to provide prisoners access to the courts. Martinez, 130 Idaho at 536, 944 P.2d at 133. 

Moreover, we held that both the United States and Idaho Constitutions require that the State take 

affirmative steps to provide inmates aid in accessing courts. Id. These requirements are set forth 

in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). That decision states that the government may meet its 

obligations by “providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from 

persons trained in the law.” Id. at 828. Alternatively, the Court encouraged “local 

experimentation,” noting that “a legal access program need not include any particular element we 

have discussed.” Id. at 832. 

However, to show an access to the courts violation, a prisoner must do more than show 

that the resources available to him are deficient. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). 

“[P]rison law libraries and legal assistance programs are not ends in themselves . . . . Bounds did 

not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 
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351. Therefore, a prisoner asserting an access to the courts claim cannot complain that the

“prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. 

Instead, “an inmate must show that the alleged inadequacies of a prison’s library facilities or 

legal assistance program caused him ‘actual injury’--that is, actual prejudice with respect to 

contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a 

claim.” Id. (internal marks omitted). 

Taken together, Martinez, Bounds, and Lewis stand for the position that a party asserting 

an access to the courts claim must make two factual showings. First, he must show that the 

resources provided by the State are inadequate. Second he must show that he suffered an “actual 

injury.” 

Hill contends that he has provided sufficient evidence to meet both prongs of the test set 

forth in Lewis--he claims he has shown the inadequacy of the resources the State provided and 

his “actual injury.” Hill attempted to show that the resources made available in the jail were 

inadequate because they amounted to neither adequate law libraries nor adequate legal 

assistance. Hill contends that the lack of case law reporters at the jail library would render the 

law library deficient. The alternative of the State providing access to prison paralegals did not 

amount to adequate assistance, he asserts, because they are unable or unwilling to provide any 

legal advice. As to his “actual injury” or prejudice, Hill claims that he “had no way of knowing 

that he had to file a post-conviction petition in order to raise the legal challenges he wished to 

make.” He contends that because he did not know which action to file, “he did not know the 

time constraints set by the relevant statutes of limitations.” 

The district court held that Hill failed to show he was denied access to the courts because 

the resources offered were sufficient in that the State offered meaningful assistance in 

completing post-conviction petitions. It also held that Hill failed to show any actual injury. On 

appeal, this Court need not and does not decide if the resources the State provides to inmates are 

generally adequate. Because we can affirm the judgment of the district court on narrow grounds,

“actual injury,” we need not reach the broader constitutional issue. 

The district court concluded that Hill did not show prejudice on the factual record 

adduced at the evidentiary hearing. There is obviously no transcript of the orientation Hill 

attended when he was first placed in State custody, but the district court could reasonably infer 

the substance of that orientation from the testimony of prison staff and from later events. First, 
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an exhibit indicates that Hill signed in to attend a briefing performed by jail legal staff. Second, 

the prison paralegal responsible for overseeing the legal portion of the orientation testified 

regarding the usual practice at these orientations. He testified that during orientation briefings, 

inmates are given a packet that describes what resources the paralegal can provide to an inmate. 

As relevant here, the packet indicates that materials related to post-conviction actions are made 

available to prisoners. Third, the record contains an activity log. The first entry, dated April 15, 

2011, indicates that Hill requested and received forms from the paralegal pertaining to Idaho 

Criminal Rule 35. From these three factors, the court could reasonably infer that Hill attended 

the orientation, that he received the packet stating what legal materials were available, and that 

he read the packet or otherwise made use of the information contained therein. From these facts, 

the court also reasonably inferred that Hill was provided the materials necessary to know when 

his petition for post-conviction relief should be filed. 

Moreover, it is plain from the record that Hill received the same informational packet a 

second time. After filing his Rule 35 motion, Hill again requested the aid of the paralegal. It is 

not clear what Hill requested, but the paralegal responded by sending Hill the orientation packet 

describing what materials were available and stating the statute of limitations for post-conviction 

actions. 

Relying upon this evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, the 

district court rejected many of Hill’s factual claims. It rejected the claim that no legal resources 

were available while Hill was in the RDU. Indeed, the record shows that Hill requested and 

received legal materials while in that unit. The court also concluded that Hill’s testimony that he 

was denied legal documents while in administrative segregation was not credible. Because we 

conclude that these findings are not clearly erroneous, we will not disturb them on appeal. 

Russell, 118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656. 

As stated in Lewis, a prisoner may demonstrate that he was denied access to the courts by 

showing that the resources made available left him unable “to meet a filing deadline or to present 

a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348. The packet given to Hill at orientation contained three 

relevant pieces of information. First, the packet described, albeit generally, the purpose of a 

post-conviction action. It explained that such a petition “is a means to attain a relief for the 

individual who believes he/she is incarcerated in violation of the Constitution of the United 

States or the Constitution or the laws of the State of Idaho.” Second, it also set forth the statute 
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of limitations that applies to a post-conviction action. Finally, it unambiguously indicated what 

steps a prisoner should take if he wants to learn more: a prisoner who wanted “more detailed 

information” should “consult the instruction section” of the specific packet made available for 

each of the “qualified legal claims.”

The post-conviction packet, which was also submitted as an exhibit in this case, contains 

even more detail. As is most relevant here, the form states the deadline for filing a postconviction action. It also contains a list of statutes and rules relevant to bringing a postconviction action. For example, the packet lists the permissible grounds for a post-conviction 

action as set forth in I.C. § 19-4901 and also common claims for relief set forth in laymen’s 

terms. Moreover, the packet contains a list of helpful notes regarding discovery, the distinction 

between a direct appeal and a post-conviction action, and information regarding affidavits. 

Finally, the post-conviction packet contains pre-printed forms on which a prisoner may 

handwrite his petition. 

We conclude that the initial packet provided Hill with information sufficient to inform 

him that a petition for post-conviction relief might be an appropriate means of raising his claims. 

It also informed him that there was a deadline. However, instead of making use of these prison 

resources, Hill may have failed to request the post-conviction packet until after the statute of 

limitations had run. 

If Hill had requested and read the post-conviction packet, he would have been informed 

that the claims he wished to bring were properly brought through a post-conviction action. In his 

petition, Hill raised three claims for relief. He claimed his attorney was ineffective when he 

failed to object to immediate sentencing and when he failed to file an appeal. He also claimed 

that his guilty plea should be set aside because it was not knowing and voluntary. The postconviction packet lists common grounds for post-conviction relief. Included on the list are 

claims that one’s plea was invalid and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on 

appeal. All of the substantive claims Hill pursued were explicitly discussed in the postconviction packet. 

For all of these reasons, we, like the district court, conclude that Hill’s failure to timely 

file his petition was caused by his own inaction. The prison informed Hill of the general nature 

of the causes of action he might pursue and that the clock was running. It made clear that more 

resources were available if Hill asked. Hill apparently did not ask until it was too late. We 
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conclude that Hill’s claim is implicitly predicated on the assertion that the resources offered by 

the State, if used, are inadequate. But, here, where Hill failed to use the resources as a 

reasonable person would, he cannot show that the inadequacy, if any, of the resources provided 

caused his injury. In our view, Hill has sought relief where the United States Supreme Court has 

held that none is available; he has asserted a claim for relief essentially arguing that the resources 

the State offered are “subpar in some theoretical sense.” Therefore, we conclude that Hill has 

failed to show that the district court erred. 

III.

CONCLUSION

Hill claims that he was denied access to the courts and is, therefore, entitled to equitable 

tolling. We need not and do not decide whether the resources made available in Idaho prisons 

are sufficient for all purposes. Instead, we conclude the district court was correct in finding that 

Hill’s failure to timely file was his own doing. Therefore, he was not prejudiced and is not 

entitled to equitable tolling. For these reasons, the judgment of the district court dismissing 

Hill’s post-conviction relief action is affirmed. 

Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge GRATTON CONCUR.