[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 17-15237

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:17-cr-60127-BB-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 versus

ANTHONY GARFIELD COX, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(August 9, 2018)

Before WILSON, JORDAN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Anthony Garfield Cox appeals his conviction, entered after a guilty plea, for 

conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, a controlled substance while on 

board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of the 

Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 

70506(b). Cox brings two issues on appeal, which we address in turn. After 

review,1 we affirm the district court. 

I. DISCUSSION

A. Constitutionality of the MDLEA

Cox first asserts the MDLEA is unconstitutional because his prosecution for 

drug trafficking on the high seas without any connection to the United States 

exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers under the Felonies Clause and violates his 

due process rights. Cox also contends the MDLEA is unconstitutional because it 

prevents the jury from considering the court’s jurisdiction and is therefore a 

violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial. However, Cox 

concedes his arguments are foreclosed by binding precedent. See United States v. 

Vega–Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating under the prior 

precedent rule, we are bound by our prior decisions unless and until they are 

overruled by the Supreme Court or this Court en banc). 

 1

 We review de novo whether a statute is constitutional. United States v. Campbell, 743 

F.3d 802, 805 (11th Cir. 2014). We also review de novo a district court’s interpretation and 

application of statutory provisions with respect to whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. 

United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1114 (11th Cir. 2002). 

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The district court did not err in denying Cox’s motion to dismiss the 

indictment because the MDLEA is facially constitutional, see, e.g., United States v. 

Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 809–12 (11th Cir. 2014) (upholding the MDLEA as a 

valid exercise of Congress’s authority), and it is constitutional as applied to Cox 

because prosecution under the MDLEA without a jurisdictional nexus does not 

violate due process, see, e.g., United States v. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1186 

(11th Cir. 2016) (explaining the MDLEA does not have a nexus requirement and 

this does not violate due process). The district court also did not err by making a 

pretrial jurisdictional determination under the MDLEA because Congress 

specifically removed it as an element to be proven to a jury and jurisdictional 

issues under the MDLEA may be resolved by the district court without violating 

the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to due process and a jury trial. 

See United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1111-12 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding 

Congress was entitled to remove the particular jurisdictional question from the jury

and therefore, neither the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, nor the Sixth 

Amendment right to a jury require the MDLEA’s jurisdictional requirement be an 

element of the offense). 

B. Vessel without Nationality

Cox contends the Government failed to conclusively prove an element of his 

conviction—that the vessel qualifies as a “vessel without nationality” to make it 

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subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under the MDLEA. He asserts the 

certificate of the Secretary of State’s designee for registry of the vessel was only 

conclusive proof of Jamaica’s response, not of the statelessness of the vessel, and 

was therefore insufficient to establish the vessel was without nationality and to 

establish jurisdiction. However, Cox concedes once again this argument is 

precluded under binding precedent. 

A vessel without nationality is subject to the United States’ jurisdiction 

under the MDLEA. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A). A vessel is without nationality 

when “the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and for which 

the claimed nation of registry” either denies the claim or “does not affirmatively 

and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality.” Id. § 70502(d)(1). 

The response of the claimed nation of registration “is prove[n] conclusively by 

certification of the Secretary of State or the Secretary’s designee.” Id.

§ 70502(d)(2). 

The district court did not err in finding that the vessel was within the 

jurisdiction of the United States and denying Cox’s motion to dismiss the 

indictment. Cox and his codefendants claimed that the vessel was of Jamaican 

registry. The United States submitted a certificate of Commander DelRosso of the 

Coast Guard certifying that the Government of Jamaica responded it did not have 

records of the vessel in its registry. Commander DelRosso was a designee of the 

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Secretary of State, and his certification was conclusive proof of jurisdiction and 

sufficient to stand alone. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(2); see also Campbell, 743 F.3d at 

809 (holding the certification—there, a statement by a United States Coast Guard 

Commander explaining his exchange with the country of alleged registration—was 

sufficient and conclusive proof that the vessel was within the jurisdiction of the 

United States, under the MDLEA). 

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm Cox’s conviction.

AFFIRMED.

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