Vacated, Dismissed as Moot, and Opinion filed August 8, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-11-01002-CV

CHRISTINE E. REULE, Appellant

V.

RLZ INVESTMENTS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1001350

O P I N I O N

Appellant Christine E. Reule appeals from the trial court‟s judgment

awarding appellee RLZ Investments, Inc. immediate possession of Reule‟s place of 

residence. Reule principally contends that the trial court, a Harris County court at 

law, erred by proceeding to judgment in RLZ‟s forcible detainer action because a 

Harris County district court‟s protective order barred RLZ from proceeding with 

the county-court-at-law action while a suit to determine title to the property was
2

pending in that district court. During the pendency of this appeal, RLZ released 

Reule from the final judgment from which Reule appeals. We therefore vacate the 

trial court‟s judgment and dismiss the case.

Discussion

RLZ brought a forcible detainer action against Reule based on its alleged 

acquisition of Reule‟s place of residence at a foreclosure sale.1 On November 14, 

2011, the trial court issued a final judgment awarding RLZ possession of the 

premises where Reule resided, but RLZ never took possession of the property. 

Instead, RLZ has filed two documents with this court expressly releasing Reule 

from the judgment “until the end of time” and waiving any right to enforce the 

judgment. Because of this release, RLZ urges the case is moot. We agree.

For Reule to have standing at each stage of the litigation, a live controversy 

must exist between the parties throughout the legal proceedings, including the 

appeal. See Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001). “If the 

controversy no longer exists—„the issues presented are no longer “live” or the 

parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome‟ — the case becomes 

moot.” Id. The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in which an 

actual controversy exists between the parties. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Nueces 

County, 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. 1994). In other words, if a judgment cannot 

have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot and any opinion 

issued on the merits in the appeal would constitute an impermissible advisory 

opinion. Thompson v. Ricardo, 269 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (citing Tex. Const. art. II, § 1, et al.).

 

1 Reule titled her responsive pleading Objection to Jurisdiction, Answer and Affirmative 

Defenses and Cross-Complaint and Request for Jury Trial. Reule, however, did not raise any 

counter-claims.
3

Generally, if we find a case to be moot on appeal, all previous orders and 

judgments must be set aside and the case dismissed. Speer v. Presbyterian 

Children’s Home & Serv. Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Tex. 1993); Guajardo v. 

Alamo Lumber Co., 159 Tex. 225, 226, 317 S.W.2d 725, 726 (1958); Freeman v. 

Burrows, 141 Tex. 318, 319, 171 S.W.2d 863 (1943); Thompson, 269 S.W.3d at

104.

RLZ has expressly released and waived its right to enforce the judgment 

from which Reule appeals. Consequently, a live controversy no longer exists, and 

the case is rendered moot. See, e.g., Tierra Sol Joint Venture v. City of El Paso, 

311 S.W.3d 492, 496-97 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied) (holding 

appellee‟s release of appellant from portion of trial court‟s judgment rendered 

issues relating to that portion moot).

Texas courts have recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine, 

under which an appellate court should still consider the merits of an appeal even if 

the immediate issues between the parties have become moot: (1) the capability of 

repetition yet evading review exception and (2) the collateral consequences 

exception. State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. 1980). Neither exception 

applies under the circumstances of this case. The “capable of repetition yet 

evading review” exception is applied where the challenged act is of such short 

duration that the appellant cannot obtain review before the issue becomes moot. 

Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Reynolds, 764 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 1988, no writ). That is not the case here and Reule does not suggest 

otherwise.

In order to invoke the collateral consequences exception, Reule would have 

to show both that a concrete disadvantage resulted from the judgment and the 

disadvantage would persist even if the judgment were vacated and the case 
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dismissed as moot. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 

S.W.3d 782, 784, 790 (Tex. 2006). Reule complains that the judgment hurts her 

reputation and credit, but she fails to explain why this practical consequence would 

persist once the judgment is vacated. Neither exception therefore applies to 

warrant consideration of the substance of the appeal.

We vacate the trial court‟s judgment and dismiss the case.

2

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Busby.

 

2

See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 784, 790 (vacating judgments and dismissing forcible 

detainer case as moot where tenant was no longer in possession of premises and lease had 

expired).