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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

JOHN DOE, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

 October 27, 2015 

 9:15 a.m. 

v No. 322150 

Ingham Circuit Court 

WENDALL A. RACETTE, LC No. 12-001289-NI 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and MURRAY and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s ruling granting defendant’s motion for 

summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (claim barred by the statute of limitations) in this 

action involving various torts stemming from alleged incidents of sexual abuse. We affirm. 

 In December of 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, claiming assault and 

battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and false imprisonment. He alleged 

that, starting in 1995 when he was just five years old, his parents brought him to defendant’s 

dentistry practice for dental services. He alleged that, during the next five years, defendant 

subjected him to various forms of sexual abuse, which he did not disclose because defendant 

threatened to kill him and rape his sisters if his told anyone about the abuse.1

 In response, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), 

arguing that plaintiff’s claims were time-barred because plaintiff waited more than 12 years after 

the alleged abuse to file a lawsuit. Plaintiff conceded that the applicable limitations periods had 

expired. See MCL 600.5805(2) (claims for false imprisonment and assault and battery are 

governed by a two-year limitations period); MCL 600.5805(10) (claims for IIED are governed 

by a three-year limitations period); and MCL 600.5851(1) (if a claim accrues when a plaintiff is 

a minor the limitations period is extended for one year after the disability is removed). 

Nevertheless plaintiff argued that defendant should be equitably estopped from raising the statute 

 

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 Plaintiff disclosed the abuse to the police in December of 2010. In 2012, defendant was 

convicted of five counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first-degree, MCL 750.520b(1)(a), and 

ten counts of criminal sexual conduct in the second-degree, MCL 750.520c(1)(a). On appeal, 

this Court reversed his convictions and remanded for a new trial. People v Racette, unpublished 

opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued September 1, 2015 (Docket No. 314895). 
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of limitations as a defense because his threats to kill him and harm his sisters prevented him from 

bringing his claim within the limitations period. The trial court, however, found that the 

applicable limitations period had elapsed and that equitable estoppel did not apply. This appeal 

follows. 

 A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 

2.116(C)(7) is reviewed de novo to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Doe v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Archdiocese of Detroit, 264 Mich App 632, 

638; 692 NW2d 398 (2004). “If a party supports a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) by 

submitting affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence, those materials 

must be considered” unless their substance and content is inadmissible as evidence. Pusakulich 

v City of Ironwood, 247 Mich App 80, 82; 635 NW2d 323 (2001), citing MCR 2.116(G)(5). 

“[T]he contents of the complaint are accepted as true unless contradicted by documentation 

submitted by the movant.” Pusakulich, 247 Mich App at 82. 

 Equitable estoppel is a judicially created “exception to the general rule which provides 

that statutes of limitation run without interruption.” Lothian v City of Detroit, 414 Mich 160, 

176; 324 NW2d 9 (1982). “It is essentially a doctrine of waiver that extends the applicable 

period for filing a lawsuit by precluding the defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a 

bar.” Cincinnati Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 454 Mich 263, 270; 562 NW2d 648 (1997). 

“[A]bsent intentional or negligent conduct designed to induce a plaintiff to refrain from bringing 

a timely action,” Michigan courts have been “reluctant to recognize an estoppel.” Id. (emphasis 

in original). Such equitable power “has traditionally been reserved for ‘unusual circumstances’ 

such as fraud or mutual mistake” because a “court’s equitable power is not an unrestricted 

license for the court to engage in wholesale policymaking.” Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 

Mich 562, 590; 702 NW2d 539 (2005). In the past, we have typically applied equitable estoppel 

in cases where the defendant induced the plaintiff to believe the limitations period would not be 

enforced. See McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 480 Mich 191, 204-205; 747 NW2d 811 

(2008) (holding that in order to invoke the equitable estoppel doctrine, the plaintiff must 

generally establish that “(1) defendant’s acts or representations induced plaintiff to believe that 

the limitations period clause would not be enforced, (2) plaintiff justifiably relied on this belief, 

and (3) she was prejudiced as a result of her reliance on her belief that the clause would not be 

enforced.”). In this case, defendant correctly points out that there is nothing on the record 

indicating that his alleged threat to kill plaintiff and harm his sisters induced plaintiff to believe 

the limitations period would not be enforced. However, there are no Michigan cases addressing 

whether a threat of murder can be grounds for invoking the equitable estoppel doctrine. Thus, it 

is an issue of first impression whether a defendant can be equitably estopped from raising the 

statute of limitations as a bar in cases where the plaintiff failed to file suit within the limitations 

period because of the defendant’s threats to kill the plaintiff and harm his family if he disclosed 

instances of sexual abuse. 

 In this case, the trial court held that equitable estoppel could not be extended to this 

situation because the purpose of defendant’s alleged threats were not clearly designed to induce 

plaintiff from bringing his claim within the limitations period. We disagree. If a defendant 

threatens to murder a victim should he or she disclose instances of sexual abuse, the threat 

necessarily encompasses all forms of disclosure, including disclosure in the form of a timely 

filed lawsuit. In such circumstances, the defendant’s conduct is clearly intentionally designed to 
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induce the plaintiff to refrain from taking any action in opposition of the defendant, including 

“bringing action within the period fixed by statute.” Lothian, 414 Mich at 177 (quotation 

omitted); see also Cincinnati Ins Co, 454 Mich at 270. Accordingly, a threat to murder a 

plaintiff and harm his family should he or she disclose instances of sexual abuse can establish the 

first element of equitable estoppel. 

 However, in addition to showing the existence of a threat, plaintiff must show that he or 

she acted within a reasonable time to bring suit after the coercive effect of the threat had ended. 

See McDonald, 480 Mich at 205 (holding that equitable estoppel did not apply when there was 

“no evidence that plaintiff relied on anything defendant did or said” when she delayed bringing 

suit within the limitations period); see also Lothian, 414 Mich at 177 (holding that equitable 

estoppel did not apply where the plaintiff’s failure to bring suit within the limitations period was 

not because of the defendant’s actions). In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff disclosed the 

abuse to the police in December of 2010, when he was almost 21 years old. In February of 2011, 

he testified at the preliminary examination in defendant’s criminal case. In November of 2011, 

he testified at defendant’s first trial, which ended in a hung jury. In August of 2012, he testified 

at defendant’s second trial, which ended with his conviction on multiple counts of criminal 

sexual conduct in the first- and second-degree. However, it was not until December of 2012—

about two years after he first disclosed the abuse to the police—that defendant opted to file the 

present suit. 

 While plaintiff’s failure to bring suit during the pre-disclosure period may have been the 

result of the fear engendered by defendant’s threats, the undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff 

continued to delay filing suit well after the grounds for such fear had ended with the disclosure to 

the police. Alternatively put, plaintiff’s disclosure to the police in December 2010 demonstrates 

that his fears no longer constrained him to remain silent and so estoppel based upon that fear 

cannot have remained effective until December 2012. Following his public disclosure, plaintiff 

“had a primary obligation to secure prompt resolution of his claim in the courts.” Lothian, 414 

Mich at 179. His failure to do so precludes application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro