1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANTHONY HARDY, et al. and Members of the Class, on behalf of all others similarly situated Plaintiffs,

v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Defendant. Civil Action No. 09-cv-01062 (RLW)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Second Rene wed Motion for Class Certification (Dkt. No. 33). Upon consideration of the briefs and oral argument, the entire record, and for the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion is hereby GRANTED . For purposes of this ruling, the Court will assume that the reader is familiar with the C ourt’s previous Memorandum Opinion in this case and the factual assertions and arguments made by the parties. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Anthony Hardy and Donnell Monts, on beha lf of themselves and all others similarly situated (“Plaintiffs”), have filed a one-count Complaint agai nst the District of Columbia. (Dkt. No. 1). Plainti ffs allege that the District seized and forfeited cash from them without providing adequate notic e under D.C. Code § 48-905.02 (“th e D.C. Forfeiture Statute”) and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (Dkt. 1 at 2). Plaintiffs filed their first motion for clas s certification on September 8, 2009. (Dkt. No. 6). The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion without prejudice because the class was not sufficiently2 defined and Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden. The Cour t allowed discovery so that the Plaintiffs could “better flesh out w ho [their] class might include.” At a hearing on July 21, 2010, the parties repres ented that class discovery was complete. The District represented that th e class certification issues were “now teed up.” (Dkt. No. 21 at 7). Plaintiffs filed a second motion for cl ass certification on Au gust 30, 2010. In its Memorandum Opinion denying the second motion, th e Court cited numerous concerns with the proposed class definition. (Dkt. Nos. 31-32). Th e Court allowed Plainti ffs a third and final opportunity to address and potentially cu re those concerns. (Id. at 7-8). Plaintiffs have altered their class definiti on a third time and now seek to certify two classes: the “Failed Notice Cla ss” and the “Incarcerated Persons Class.” Plai ntiff Anthony Hardy seeks to represent the “Failed Notice Cl ass,” which includes individuals meeting the following criteria: (1) The person was arrested by an officer of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. (2) The MPD took cash from the person. (3) The person’s criminal case relati ng to the arrest was concluded on or after June 8, 2006, or if the person was released by the MPD without charge, the person wa s arrested on or after June 8, 2005. (4) The District kept (or keeps) the person’s cash (whether by storing, using, or depositing). (5) On or before October 28, 2009 , the District mailed an administrative forfeiture notice to the person, but the District did not receive back a signed mail receipt. (6) The District did not re-send a notice regarding the cash. (7) The District did not within one year of the conclusion of the person’s criminal case (or releas e without charge) file a civil forfeiture action. (Dkt. No. 33 at 1-2). Plaintiff Darnell Monts seeks to represen t the “Incarcerated Persons Class,” which includes individuals meeti ng the following criteria:3 (1) The person was arrested by an officer of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. (2) The MPD took cash from the person. (3) The person’s criminal case relati ng to the arrest was concluded on or after June 8, 2006, or if the person was released by the MPD without charge, the person wa s arrested on or after June 8, 2005. (4) The District kept (or keeps) the person’s cash (whether by storing, using, or depositing). (5) On or before October 28, 2009 , the District mailed an administrative forfeiture notice to the person. (6) At the time of mailing, the person was held by or in the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. (7) The District did not mail or deliv er an administrative forfeiture notice to the person at the place of incarceration. (8) The District did not within one year of the conclusion of the person’s criminal case (or releas e without charge) file a civil forfeiture action. (Dkt. No. 33 at 2). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs have met their burden under Rule 23 as to both proposed classes. ANALYSIS A. Rule 23(a) factors 1. Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1) requires Plaintiffs to establish that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” F ED
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. P. 23(a)(1). The Distri ct does not meaningfully refute the fact that Plaintiffs have establishe d numerosity. During discovery, Plaintiffs deposed Lt. Derek Gray, manager of the evidence control division of the Metropolit an Police Department (“MPD”). Gray, who the District de signated as its Rule 30(b)(6) witness, 1 testified that the

1 Lt. Gray was designated to testify on topi cs including: “The policies, customs, and practices for providing notice for ad ministrative forfeiture of cash or currency allegedly related to a violation of the Controlled Substances Act, including: a) The send ing of notice by certified mail; b) Publication; c) Notice to incarcerated persons; d) Policies, customs and practices for4 evidence control division is the division that send s out “notices relating to forfeiture proceedings of cash and other property.” (Dkt. No. 22-5 at 8; 30-31). According to Gray, the division received approximately 2,000 returned unsigned mail receipts from the 3,000 asset forfeiture notices that it sent out in 2009 alone. (Id. at 59-60) . Gray testified that, during the relevant time period, the division did not first check whether a person to whom notice was being sent was incarcerated. (Id. at 54-55). Gr ay also testified that, for the same time period, the division generally did not follow up on undelivered returned mail by looking for other addresses. (Id. at 56-57). Plaintiffs have established that, in 2009 alone, the class could include up to approximately 2,000 individuals. Given that both class definitions cover the years from 2005 to 2009, Plaintiffs have clearly me t their burden under Rule 23 to show that joinder is impracticable. See Cohen v. Chilcott, 522 F. Supp. 2d 105, 114 (D.D.C. 2007) (“Courts in this District have generally found that the numerosity requirement is satisfied and that joinder is impracticable where a proposed class has at least forty members.”); Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 347 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Mere conjecture, without more, is insufficient to establish numerosity, but plaintiffs do not have to provide an exact number of putative class members in order to satisfy the numerosity requirement.”). 2. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there are questions of law or fact common to the class. F ED
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. P. 23(a)(2). “To establish commonality under Ru le 23(a)(2), a plaintiff must identify at least one question common to a ll members of the class.” Ga rcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 528 (3d Cir.
following up on mailed notices returned undelive red (whether unsigned, unclaimed, or other reason).” (Dkt. No. 18; 4/8/10 Minute Order).5 2004)). “Significantly, ‘factua l variations among the class members will not defeat the commonality requirement, so long as a single aspect or feature of the claim is common to all proposed class members.’” Cohen, 522 F. Su pp. 2d at 114 (quoting B ynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27, 33 (D.D.C. 2003)). As Plaintiffs have demonstrated through cla ss discovery, their claims raise a number of common issues of fact and law. Indeed, as disc ussed in more detail below, those common issues predominate over any individual is sues. All putative plaintiffs are advanc ing the same legal theory based on the same set of facts and the same course of conduct by the District. They also claim to have been injured in the same way— by the deprivation of their property without due process. The questions common to the proposed classes include: 1) whet her the District had a custom, practice or policy of failing to check the in carceration status of a ny individual to whom a notice was being sent; 2) whether the District’s pr actice of failing to send notices to incarcerated persons at their place of incarceration violated plaintiffs’ due process rights; 3) whether the District had a custom, practice or policy of failing to conduct any follow up on returned undelivered notices; 4) whether the District’s practice of failing to conduct any follow up on undelivered mail receipts violated plaintiffs’ due process rights; and 5) whether the District’s failure to either return property or begin a forfeiture proceeding vi olated plaintiffs’ rights. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have met their burden to establish that these common questions of law and fact exist in this case. 3. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires a finding that “the clai ms or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” F ED
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. P. 23(a)(3). “The typicality requirement aims at ensuring that the class repr esentatives have suffered injuries in the same6 general fashion as absent class members.” C ohen, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (i nternal citations and quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff’s claim is “typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of co nduct that gives rise to a claim of another clas s member’s where his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” Stewart v. Rubin, 948 F. Supp. 1077, 1088 (D.D.C. 1996), aff’d, 124 F.3d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1997). There is no genuine dispute regarding the typica lity of the claims and defenses of Hardy and Monts vis-à-vis the two propos ed classes. Plaintiffs have shown through record evidence that they suffered injuries in the same general fashion as the putative class members—i.e., deprivation of their property wi thout adequate notice. Moreover, Hardy’s claims are typical of the “Failed Notice Class,” 2 and Monts is typical of the “In carcerated Persons Class.” Although the District argues in conclusory fashion that th e “variety and uniqueness of each purported class member’s claims” defeats the typicality requireme nt, the District offers no specific reasons why any of the absent class member’s claims ma y diverge from those of Hardy or Monts. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have met th eir burden to establish typicality.

2 The District has repeatedly argued that Hardy’s claims are not typical of the proposed class because Hardy supposedly received notice. The District argues that it “has provided proof that when it failed to get a recei pt for the registered letter se nt to Mr. Hardy it sought further information from the United States Postal Servi ce and was informed that the letter had indeed been delivered.” (Dkt. No. 25 at 7-8, n.5). Th e supposed “proof” on whic h the District relies, however, fails to establish in any way th at Hardy actually received notice. The notice allegedly sent to Hardy was da ted October 25, 2007, and was sent to an address in “Temple Hills, MD 20748-7147.” (Dkt. N o. 11-1 at 3). The Dist rict’s “proof” is a print out from the U.S. Postal Service’s web site reflecting that a letter with the same tracking number as Hardy’s certified le tter was delivered on July 28, 2008 in “Washington, D.C. 20020.” (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 4). The Distri ct has not produced any signed mail receipt for Hardy, and offers no explanation of: 1) why the letter was not deli vered until nine months after it was mailed; and 2) why the place of delivery (“Washington, D.C. 20020”) is different from the address on the notice (“Temple Hills, MD 2074 8-7147”). The Court simply cannot credit this supposed “proof,” particularly in the f ace of Hardy’s sworn statement that he did not receive any notice from the District of Columbia that it intended to forfe it his money. (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 1-2).7 4. Adequacy The final requirement of Rule 23( a) is that the “the representa tive parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” F ED
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. P. 23(a)(4). “Two criteria for determining the adequacy of representation are generally recognized: (1) the named representative must not have an tagonistic or conflicting intere sts with the unnamed members of the class, and (2) the representative must appear able to vigorously prosec ute the interests of the class through qualified counsel.” Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Nat’l Assoc. of Re gional Medical Programs, Inc. v. Matthews, 551 F.2d 340, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). There is no evidence that Plaintiffs’ intere sts are antagonistic or in some way conflict with the interests of the unnamed class members. The Court has closely reviewed the record, and discerns no reason why named Plaintiffs would not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Moreover, the Dist rict concedes the adequacy of pl aintiffs’ counsel to represent the putative class, and this Court has no reason to ques tion that assertion either. (Dkt. No. 37 at 18). Class counsel has vigorously pursued this motion for class certification, a ddressing and curing the Court’s concerns and moving for certificati on on three different occasions. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs and counsel have met the adequacy requirement. 5. Ascertainability Finally, with respect to the “Incarcerated Pe rsons Class,” the Court previously expressed some concern that it may not be administratively feasible for a prospective plaintiff to identify himself or herself as a member of the class. Pl aintiffs, however, have adequately addressed that concern in their renewed motion. First, Plaintiffs have revised the definition to limit the class to those who were incarcerated at the time the notices were sent, and those who were only8 incarcerated by the District. S ee “Incarcerated Persons Class,” ¶ 6 (“At the time of mailing, the person was held by or in the custody of the Distri ct of Columbia Departme nt of Corrections.”). Second, Plaintiffs have introduced evidence—which the District has not re butted—reflecting that the date of a person’s incarceration with the District is available on current databases. (Dkt. No. 33 at 12-13 and cited exhibits). As Plaintiffs po int out, a potential class member will be able to determine, with assistance from counsel and the court, whether he/she falls within the “Incarcerated Persons Class.” The District does not contest Plaintiffs’ argument that it is possible to determine administratively through the JACCS database whether a person was incarcerated by the District on a particular date. See Affidavit of Deborah Golden at Dkt. No. 33 at Ex. 27. Finally, the District does not contest Plaintiffs’ conten tion that it is administratively feasible to cross reference that information w ith the signed and unsigned mail receipts that the District retained. (Dkt. No. 33 at 16). As the Di strict conceded at oral argument on this Motion, it is possible to ascertain put ative class members for the “Incarcerated Persons Class” by checking the JACCS database in conjunction with the undeliver ed mail receipts. This is certainly objective data on which counsel can rely in determining the members of the class. The class is, therefore, now clearly defined.
B. Rule 23(b)(3) factors In addition to the requirements of subsection (a), the following factors must be met to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3): 3

3 In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek to certify the class either as a Rule 23(b)(2) class or as a hybrid 23(b)(2)/(b)(3) class. Because the classes will be certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court need not reach this request. In any event, the C ourt has already held that “[t]here is no reason to consider whether the action would be a hybrid because the only injunctive relief Plaintiffs point to—the “return of money”—is actua lly part of the claim for money damages.” (Dkt. No. 31 at 8). Moreover, it is clear that certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is inappropriate in this case after the Supreme Court’s decision in Walmart Stor es, Inc. v. Dukes. See 131 S.Ct. 2541, 25579 (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a cl ass action is superior to other available methods for fairly an d efficiently ad judicating the controversy. The matters pertin ent to these findings include: (A) the class members’ interest s in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirabil ity of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

F ED
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. P. 23(b)(3). Although there is no bright-line rule provi ding guidance on how to interpret Rule 23(b)(3), two prominent commentators have both not ed that the proper standard is a “pragmatic”
one. See 7AA C HARLES A LAN W RIGHT , A RTHUR R. M ILLER , M ARY K AY K ANE & R ICHARD L.
M ARCUS , F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 1778 at 121 (3d ed. 2005 ) (“hereinafter Wright & Miller”) (“[T]he proper standa rd under Rule 23(b)(3) is a pragmatic one, which is in keeping with the basic objectives of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action.”); 5 J AMES W M
. M OORE ET AL ., M OORE ’ S F EDERAL P RACTICE ¶ 23.45 (3d ed. 2007) (“[T]he Rule requires a pragmatic assessment of the entire action and all the issu es involved.”). More over, as the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 23 explain, “[s]ubdivisi on (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, e ffort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing pr ocedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.” F ED
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. P. 23(b)(3), advisory committee’s note. 1. Predominance
(2011) (holding that Rule 23(b)(2) calls for injunction as to all class members or to none of them and “does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages.”). Plaintiffs make no comp elling argument for the Court to revisit its prior decision.10 The first requirement is that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions a ffecting only individual members. This requirement “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesi ve to warrant adjudica tion by representation.” Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). After close examination of the two proposed classes, the Court is satisfied that both classe s meet this requirement. Through class discovery, Plaintiffs have esta blished by a preponderance of the evidence that, at least until approximately October 2009, the District had a custom or practice of: 1) failing to investigate whether the indivi dual to whom an administrative forfeiture notice was being sent was incarcerated at the time the notice was maile d; and 2) failing to perform any follow up on undelivered notices. The District had ample opportuni ty to engage in cla ss discovery and present evidence of its own to undermine or rebut evidence of this practice. It failed to do so. Indeed, the District does not even meaningfully contest Plaintiffs’ argument that this constituted a custom or practice. The District argues that this Court should not certify the “Failed Notice Class” under Rule 23(b)(3) because individual questions pred ominate over common questions. The District relies heavily on this Court’s February 28, 2012 Memorandum Opinion, in which the Court held that Plaintiffs’ previous class de finition (which failed to account fo r the change in the District’s policy as of October 2009) was in sufficient to meet the Rule 23( b)(3) requirements. The Court previously held that: Under Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006), upon which Plaintiffs rely, the individual i nquiry regarding the reasonableness of the District’s efforts to send notice will be fact intensive. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 234 (stating that when notice of tax sale came back came back undelivered, the state should have taken “additional reasonable steps to notify [the appellant], if practicable to do so” and also stating that if there were no “reasonable additional steps the government c ould have taken upon return of11 the unclaimed notice letter, it cannot be faulted for doing nothing.”) (emphasis added). The C ourt would, therefore, have to look into the facts of each case to determine whether it was “practicable” for the District to take any additional steps to provide notice to each plaintiff or whet her such steps would have been unreasonable or futile. Dkt. No. 31 at 4-5. As Plainti ffs point out, the new “Failed Noti ce Class” definition addresses the Court’s previous concerns about predominance. By limiti ng the class definition to those plaintiffs whose claims would ar ise prior to October 29, 2009, when the District generally neither checked to see if a notice re cipient was incarcer ated nor took any steps to follow up on undelivered notices, the new definitions “ensure[] (substantial if not comp lete) uniformity, and little or no individual factual inqui ries.” (Dkt. No. 33 at 4). The District’s argument—that the Court will be required to make individualized inquiries into each case to determine whether it was “practi cable” for the District to take any further steps with respect to any particular returned, undeliver ed notice—is without mer it. The District has presented no evidence that, for any particular notice that was mailed and returned unsigned during the relevant period, the Di strict actually followed up at the time and determined that it was impracticable to send any further notices. Although it is clear under Jones v. Flowers that the government cannot be faulted for doing nothing if there were no “reasonable additional steps the government could have taken,” this does not ex cuse the District from doing nothing at all. See Jones, 547 U.S. 220, 229-30 (2006) (stating that, when notice of tax sale was returned undelivered, “[d]eciding to take no further action is not what someone desirous of actually informing Jones would do . . . .”) (internal quota tion marks omitted). As the Supreme Court held in Jones, there were “several reasonable step s,” including resending the notice via regular mail, that the state could have taken wh en it learned that its notice went undelivered. See id. at 234-3912 (“It suffices for present purposes that we are confident that additional reasonable steps were available for Arkansas to employ be fore taking Jones’ property.”). Plaintiffs here have presented testimony from the District’s own witness that, prior to October 2009, the District took no steps to follow up on returned undelivered notices of forfeiture. The District has not presented an y evidence that, for any particular claimant, it followed up and determined that there were no a dditional reasonable steps it could have taken. Accordingly, despite ample opportunity to present such evidence, there is no indication that this Court would be required to undergo individualized inquiries. Even assuming the District has evidence that it did follow up on any particular u ndelivered notice, the District can come forward with that evidence without disr upting the class action. See 7AA Wright & Miller § 1778 (“. . . . when one or more of the central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important matters will have to be tried separately . . . .”). Relying on cases distinguishable from this one, the District also argues that certification is inappropriate for the “Failed Notice Class” because of the individu alized nature of any damages awards. See Dkt. No. 37 at 18-20. Thos e cases, however, were instances in which the damages would have required fact-i ntensive inquiries into each pl aintiff’s circumstances. See Daskalea v. Washington Humane Society, 275 F.R.D. 346, 379-81 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that nature of individualized damages inquiry coun seled against certifica tion under Rule 23(b)(3) where putative plaintiffs alleged that in severa l different instances, plaintiffs’ pets had been seized, detained and damaged under District law w ithout due process); Jane Does I through III v. District of Columbia, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72681, at *9-12 (finding that damages inquiry would require mini-trials where plaintiffs were patients with mental reta rdation that had been13 forced to undergo elective surgeries for which c onsent was unconstitutionally given on his or her behalf). The District argues th at this Court would be required to hold separate “‘mini-trials’ since damages would depend on the amount of cash each class member had when arrested and the amount forfeited.” (Dkt. No. 37 at 19). The District’s argument is without merit. As the court recognized in Jane Does I through III, “[i]f the calculation of the damage claims were a mechanical task, the presence of individuali zed claims would not be a barrier to class certification.” Jane Does, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72681, at *10. Here, the damages are fixed in that the District’s own records (the undelivered notices) reflect the monetary amount that each plaintiff lost. Even assuming interest were to apply to those sums, the calculation of damages claims in this case would clearly be a mechan ical task. In sum, having considered the relationship between the common a nd individual questions for the “Failed Notice Class,” the Court is satisfied that the co mmon questions predominate. Common questions also predominat e with respect to the “Incarcerated Persons Class.” In Small v. United States, 136 F.3d 1334, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1998), this Circuit held that where the government knows or can easily ascertain that a person is incarcerated, the government has an “obligation to send adequate notice” of forfeiture to him at the jail or prison. Id. at 1337. Thus, if an individual was incarcerated at the time that the District sent him/her a notice of administrative forfeiture and the District knew or should have known of his/her incarceration, a plaintiff may be able to make out a due process claim against the District. This Court rejected Plaintiffs’ previous cl ass definition because it failed to limit the proposed class to those who were incarcerated at the time that the Distri ct sent the notice of administrative forfeiture and also failed to limit the class to those incarcerated by the District of Columbia. The Court denied Pl aintiffs’ motion to grant class certification because it would be14 required to conduct an individual assessment of whether the District knew or should have known that each class member was incarcerated at the time that the District sent a forfeiture notice. Plaintiffs have cured those concerns with th eir most recent proposed class definition because they have limited the class to those individuals who were “held by” or “in the custody of” the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. Plaintiffs have also presented undisputed evidence that, during the relevant time period, the District was able to access an individual’s incarceration status thr ough a database system known as JACCS. (Dkt. No. 33 at Ex. 27). Beyond repeating its previous Memorandum Opinion back to this Court, the District wholly fails to specify with any particularity which indivi dual “fact intensive” inqui ries would predominate as to the newly-defined “Incarce rated Persons Class.” (Dkt. No. 37 at 11). Nor can this Court discern any. Having consider ed the relationship between the common and individual questions as to the “Incarcerated Persons Class,” this Court is satisfied that the common questions predominate. 2. Superiority In addition to finding predominance, this C ourt must also consider whether the class action is “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,” considering the factors set forth in Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). Having considered and weighed those factors, the Court finds that class action is a supe rior form of adjudicating this controversy. This is a case with a large numbe r of potential plaintiffs with relatively small individual dollar amounts at stake. 4 A class action would certain ly be more desirable than thousands of smaller suits against the District based on essentially the same operative facts and

4 Plaintiffs have submitted samples of undelivered notices during the relevant time period. The amounts seized from the potential claima nts ranged from $13 to $215. Moreover, Hardy and Monts allege that th e District seized $127.00 and $823.00 from them, respectively.15 legal theories. Such actions would require th e expenditure of unnecessa ry litigation costs and duplication of effort. Moreover, it is unlikely that pu tative plaintiffs with small claims could or would sue to recover those amounts individually . See Phillips Petroleum C o. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (“Class actions also may permit the pl aintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually . . . this lawsuit involves claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available.”). As one prominent treatise has no ted, “[w]hen the claims of class members are small, denial of a class action would effectively excl ude them from judicial re dress. . . .[t]he need to provide a forum for small claimants has, theref ore, assumed an important role in resolving the superiority issue.” 2 N EWBERG ON C LASS A CTIONS § 4:27 (4th ed.); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 616-17 (noting that Advisory Committee “had do minantly in mind vindication of the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective st rength to bring their opponents into court at all.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The District fails to make any meaningful argument why class action would not be a superior method of adjudicating th is case. The District only argues in a c onclusory manner that “the number of individual issues here appears to have risen to be coextensive with the number of members of the putative classe s.” (Dkt. No. 37 at 20). Given the high number of claims, the relativel y small amounts of damages per plaintiff, and the predominant common issues of law and f act, this Court finds that class action with respect to the two classes would be a superior method of adjudicating this controversy. A class action would, in short, achieve “ economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity16 of decision as to persons simila rly situated, without sa crificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.” F ED
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. P. 23(b)(3), advisory committee’s note. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Moti on to Certify Class is granted. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED. Date: August 22, 2012 Robert L. Wilkins United States District Judge