NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JULIAN D., Appellant,

v.

MCKENZI W., M.D., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 19-0365 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. V1300SV201880013

The Honorable Debra R. Phelan, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Robert D. Rosanelli

Counsel for Appellant

The Shaw Law Group, PLLC, Prescott

By Bryan C. Shaw

Counsel for Appellee McKenzi W.

FILED 3-17-2020
JULIAN D. v. MCKENZI W., M.D.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Julian D. (father) appeals the superior court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to M, his biological child. Because 

reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s order, the termination of 

parental rights is affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In August 2018, McKenzi W. (mother) moved to terminate 

father’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533 on several grounds including: 

(1) abandonment, and (2) neglect or willful abuse by exposing M to a 

significant amount of domestic violence against mother.

¶3 Father has a long history of domestic violence against Mother.

The history is well documented by law enforcement, witness accounts, 

medical reports, and Arizona courts. Father also has a history of violating 

protective orders mother secured against him.

¶4 During their relationship, father committed no less than eight 

acts of domestic violence against mother in which he was cited, charged, or 

arrested. Many of these acts occurred either while mother was pregnant or 

within the first 14 months of M’s life.

¶5 In May 2017, while mother was nine-months pregnant with 

M, father threatened to kill mother, threw her to the ground, and punched 

her in the face, giving her a black eye. M was born a month later. Mother 

and father continued their relationship for another five months.

¶6 Father’s acts of domestic violence continued. In December 

2017, father struck mother across the face, bruising her, and rupturing her 

eardrum. Mother ended the relationship with father at that point. In May 

2018, father and his then-girlfriend ambushed and beat up mother. The 

attack occurred in full view of M.
JULIAN D. v. MCKENZI W., M.D.

Decision of the Court

3

¶7 Father’s acts of domestic violence continued to escalate. In 

August 2018, while holding M, father hit mother several times, pushed her 

into a wall, and choked her. A friend intervened and wrestled M from 

father. Mother took M and started running away. Before mother could get 

into a car to leave, father tackled her, threw her to the ground, and caused 

her to land on M. Mother broke free, got to her car, and locked M inside.

Father hit mother five more times, causing her eye to swell shut. Mother 

managed to get into the car and lock father out. Unable to reach mother, 

father continued his attack on the car and broke the windshield. During this 

incident, M was a little over one year old.

¶8 Father was charged with several crimes for the August 2018

confrontation, including assault and criminal damage. He was incarcerated 

for six months. Mother secured an order of protection because of the 

assault. This confrontation was the last time father had any contact with M.

¶9 After his release, father said he engaged in many services 

geared toward parenting, anger management, and sobriety. He said he 

completed a parenting 101 class and partially completed a domestic 

violence program. Father said his incarceration changed him. He said he 

gained insight into himself, child development, and the impact of domestic 

violence.

¶10 After hearing father’s testimony, the superior court did not 

find him credible. As to father’s domestic violence history, the superior 

court found he has not accepted responsibility and instead blamed the 

victim for triggering the abuse.

¶11 The superior court also recognized father did not provide for 

M. From M’s birth until father was incarcerated, father had only a nominal 

relationship with M. Since father’s incarceration, he has provided no 

support for and has had no contact with M.

¶12 The superior court held a contested severance trial on August 

15, 2019, and issued its ruling on October 7, 2019.

¶13 The superior court found mother did not prove the grounds 

of mental illness, mental deficiency, or a history of chronic abuse of 

dangerous drugs, controlled substances, or alcohol. However, the superior 

court found by clear and convincing evidence mother proved the statutory 

grounds of (1) abandonment, and (2) neglect and abuse. The superior court 

also found mother proved by a preponderance of the evidence terminating 

father’s parental rights was in M’s best interests.
JULIAN D. v. MCKENZI W., M.D.

Decision of the Court

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¶14 Father timely appealed. Father does not challenge the 

superior court’s findings regarding any grounds for termination. Father 

only appeals the superior court’s best-interests findings. This court has 

jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235 and 12-120.21(A)(1).

ANALYSIS

¶15 The superior court may sever a parent’s rights if clear and 

convincing evidence establishes at least one statutory ground. See A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B); see also Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 

12 (2000). Here, the superior court found mother proved two grounds for 

termination by clear and convincing evidence.

¶16 The superior court then must determine if the parties seeking 

termination proved by a preponderance of the evidence the termination is 

in the child’s best interest. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41

(2005). Here, mother had to show either “the child will benefit from 

termination of the relationship or that the child would be harmed by 

continuation of the parental relationship.” See Mario G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 227 Ariz. 282, 288, ¶ 26 (App. 2011) (quoting James S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 351, 356, ¶ 18 (App. 1998)); Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. 

Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 6 (App. 2004) (referencing the child deriving 

an affirmative benefit from termination or incurring a detriment by 

continuing the relationship).

¶17 When reasonable evidence supports severance, a child’s 

“interest in stability and security” is the superior court’s main concern. See 

Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 15 (2016). Once the superior court 

finds the existence of a statutory ground for termination, the superior court 

may “presume that the interests of the parent and child diverge.” Alma S. 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 12 (2018). In “most cases, 

the presence of a statutory ground will have a negative effect on the 

children.” Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-6831, 155 Ariz. 556, 559 (App. 

1988).

¶18 In analyzing best interests, the superior court “focuses 

primarily upon the interests of the child, as distinct from those of the 

parent.” Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 287, ¶ 37 (2005). This assessment must balance 

the child’s rights against those of the unfit parent. “At this stage, the child’s 

interest in obtaining a loving, stable home, or at the very least avoiding a 

potentially harmful relationship with a parent, deserves at least as much 

weight as that accorded [to] the interest of the unfit parent in maintaining 

parental rights.” Id.
JULIAN D. v. MCKENZI W., M.D.

Decision of the Court

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¶19 Because the superior court “is in the best position to weigh 

the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and 

resolve disputed facts,” this court will affirm an order terminating parental 

rights if reasonable evidence supports the order. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (citations omitted).

¶20 Here, reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s bestinterests findings. Father had a limited relationship with M from the time 

M was born to the time father was incarcerated. Father has not had a

relationship with M since his incarceration. He has not provided financially 

for M and took no affirmative steps to protect his parental rights.

¶21 In addition, father engaged in numerous significant acts of 

domestic violence against mother, many in M’s presence. Father’s history 

demonstrates a conscious disregard for M’s mental health, safety, and 

security.

¶22 The superior court found father was not credible when he 

said he changed. The superior court further expressed concern because 

father did not accept responsibility for his actions and engaged in victim 

blaming. The superior court emphasized its concern “given the extensive 

domestic violence education/counseling services in which [father] has been 

engaged.”

¶23 Terminating father’s parental relationship with M would 

benefit M because father will not have the opportunity to continue exposing 

M to the ill effects, both direct and indirect, of domestic violence. It also 

allows M to move forward without concern father will seek to intervene in 

M’s life after having no relationship with M for so long.

¶24 In short, reasonable evidence establishes (1) severing father’s 

parental relationship would be beneficial to M and (2) preserving the 

parental relationship would be detrimental to M. 
JULIAN D. v. MCKENZI W., M.D.

Decision of the Court

6

CONCLUSION

¶25 Because reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s 

order, this court affirms the termination of father’s parental rights to M.