UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TIMOTHY ROTE, : 

 : 

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 19-01299 (RC)

 : 

 v. : Re Document No.: 13 

 : 

COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT : 

AND DISABILITY OF THE JUDICIAL : 

CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, : 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF : 

JUSTICE, OREGON JUDICIAL : 

DEPARTMENT, OREGON STATE BAR, : 

OREGON STATE BAR PROFESSIONAL : 

LIABILITY FUND, COLORADO JUDICIAL : 

DEPARTMENT, THE HON. ROBERT : 

KUGLER, ARBITRATOR WILLIAM B. : 

CROW, THE HON. PAUL PAPAK, : 

THE HON. ELIZABETH WEISHAUPL, THE : 

HON. ROBERT HERNDON, THE HON. : 

JAMES EGAN, BILLY WILLIAMS (in his : 

official capacity as U.S. Attorney and chief law : 

official in Oregon), CAROL BERNICK (in her : 

official capacity as CEO of the OSBPLF), : 

THE HON. SUSIE NORBY AND JOHN : 

DOES (1-5) : 

 : 

Defendants. : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 

I. INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiff, Timothy Rote, has brought a complaint against Defendants Committee on 

Judicial Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States, United States 

Department of Justice, Oregon Judicial Department, Oregon State Bar, Oregon State Bar 

Professional Liability Fund, Colorado Judicial Department, the Hon. Robert Kugler, Arbitrator 
2 

William B. Crow, the Hon. Paul Papak, the Hon. Elizabeth Weishaupl, the Hon. Robert Herndon, 

the Hon. James Egan, Billy Williams, Carol Bernick, the Hon. Susie L. Norby, and John Does 

(1-5). The Complaint, which seeks damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, alleges:

violations of Mr. Rote’s First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983; a conspiracy to violate his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and, violations of his rights 

conferred by Article I, §§ 8, 10, and 20 of the Oregon Constitution. Federal Defendants, 

Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States 

(“Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability”), United States Department of Justice, the 

Honorable Robert B. Kugler, the Honorable Paul J. Papak, and Billy J. Williams, have moved, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), to transfer this case to the District of Oregon. Mr. Rote opposes 

this motion on the grounds that private and public interest factors weigh against transferring this 

case. For the reasons discussed below, because both the public and private interests favor 

transfer to the District of Oregon, the Court grants the Defendants’ motion to transfer the case. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Timothy Rote is a resident of Oregon. Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 1. Defendants Committee 

on Judicial Conduct and Disability and Department of Justice are United States entities. Id. ¶¶ 

5–6. Defendants Oregon Judicial Department and Oregon State Bar are Oregon state 

government entities. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Defendant Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund is an 

entity functioning under the Oregon State Bar. Id. ¶ 9. Defendant William B. Crow, at the 

relevant time period of the allegation, was an arbitrator in Oregon and Chair of the Disciplinary 

Board of the Oregon State Bar Association. Id. ¶ 12. Defendant the Hon. Paul J. Papak is a 

federal magistrate judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. Id. ¶ 13. 

Defendant the Hon. Robert Herndon is the Chief Judge of the Clackamas County Circuit Court 
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of Oregon. Id. ¶ 15. Defendant the Hon. James C. Egan is the Chief Judge of the Oregon Court 

of Appeals. Id. ¶ 16. Defendant Billy J. Williams is the United States Attorney for the District 

of Oregon. Id. ¶ 17. Defendant the Hon. Susie. L. Norby is a judge on the Clackamas County 

Circuit Court of Oregon. Id. ¶ 18. Defendant Carol Bernick is the Chief Executive Officer of 

the Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund. Id. ¶ 19. Defendant Colorado Judicial 

Department is a Colorado state government entity. Id. ¶ 10. Defendant the Hon. Elizabeth A. 

Weishaupl is a district court judge for the 18th Judicial District of Colorado located in Arapahoe 

County, Colorado. Id. ¶ 14. Defendant the Hon. Robert B. Kugler is a U.S. District Court Judge 

for the District of New Jersey. Id. ¶ 11. 

Mr. Rote alleges twenty-eight “acts” committed by various defendants in this action that 

form the basis for his claims. See id. These “acts” relate to judicial proceedings before the Hon. 

Robert E. Jones in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon in 2001 regarding a business 

dispute, id. ¶¶ 20–24; a complaint that Mr. Rote’s former employee filed with the Oregon 

Department of Justice and the Lane County District Attorney in 2003, id. ¶¶ 26–35; judicial 

proceedings before the Hon. Robert Kugler in a U.S. District Court in New Jersey in 2004, also 

relating to Mr. Rote’s former employee, id. ¶¶ 36–39; criminal contempt of court hearings in 

New Jersey stemming from the 2014 New Jersey litigation, id. ¶¶ 40–44; arbitration proceedings 

in Oregon beginning in 2006 involving the same employee who initiated the New Jersey 

litigation, id. ¶¶ 46–54; ethics complaints filed with the Oregon State Bar Association, id. ¶¶ 55–

56; judicial proceedings before Federal Magistrate Judge Paul J. Papak in the U.S. District Court 

for the District of Oregon in 2012 regarding a motion to vacate the award resulting from the 

2006 arbitration, id. ¶¶ 57–60; judicial proceedings before Judge Papak in 2017 regarding a 

motion to set aside the arbitration judgment, id. ¶¶ 61–62; judicial proceedings before the Hon. 
4 

Elizabeth Weishaupl in Colorado from 2009 through 2014 regarding a business dispute between 

Mr. Rote’s company and another entity, id. ¶¶ 63–66; judicial proceedings before the Hon. 

Marco Hernandez in the U.S. District Court in Oregon regarding a dispute between Mr. Rote and 

a former employee, id. ¶¶ 67–73, 86–87, 91–92, 94–99; judicial proceedings before the Hon. 

Robert Herndon in Clackamas County, Oregon in 2016 regarding a defamation claim, id. ¶¶ 74–

79, 83; an appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals resulting from the 2016 Clackamas County 

proceedings, id. ¶¶ 79–80, 84–85; an ethics complaint filed with the Oregon State Bar regarding 

an alleged violation of certain provisions of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct, id. ¶ 82; 

judicial proceedings in Clackamas County, Oregon in 2018 regarding Mr. Rote’s claims of 

defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, id. ¶¶ 88, 93; judicial proceedings 

before the Hon. Susie L. Norby in Oregon regarding a “Motion to Set Aside the Judgment for 

legal fees in the Clackamas anti-SLAPP Motion,” id. ¶ 90; and, unspecified litigation before the 

Hon. Marco Hernandez in the U.S. District Court in Oregon, id. ¶ 100. 

 Count I of the Complaint alleges that Defendants violated Mr. Rote’s First Amendment 

rights and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. ¶¶ 101–111. Count II of the Complaint 

alleges that Defendants violated Mr. Rote’s due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. ¶¶ 112–124. Count III of the 

Complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleges Defendants conspired to violate Mr. Rote’s 

civil rights. Id. ¶¶ 125–139. Count IV seeks declaratory and equitable relief pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 2201. Id. ¶¶ 140–144. Mr. Rote requests an award in excess of $10 million in 
5 

economic damages and $50 million in noneconomic damages, in addition to equitable relief, 

punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and litigation expenses. Id. at 29–30. 

III. ANALYSIS

Federal Defendants have moved, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), to transfer this case to 

the District of Oregon. Federal Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer, ECF No. 13. The question before the 

Court, therefore, is whether the circumstances of this case warrant transfer. Because both the 

public and private interests favor transfer to the District of Oregon, the Court finds that transfer 

is appropriate and grants the Defendants’ motion. 

A. Legal Standard 

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court 

may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been 

brought....” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) vests “discretion in the district court to 

adjudicate motions to transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of 

convenience and fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (internal 

citations omitted). The burden is on the moving party to establish that transfer under § 1404(a) is 

proper. Montgomery v. STG Int'l, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2008). 

Accordingly, the defendant must make two showings to justify transfer. First, the 

defendant must establish that the plaintiff originally could have brought the action in the 

proposed transferee district. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964). Second, the 

defendant must demonstrate that considerations of convenience and the interest of justice weigh 

in favor of transfer to that district. Trout Unlimited v. Dep't of Agric., 944 F. Supp. 13, 16 

(D.D.C. 1996). In evaluating a motion to transfer, a court may weigh several private- and 

public-interest factors. Sheffer v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 873 F. Supp. 2d 371, 375 (D.D.C. 
6 

2012) (citing Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 16). The private-interest considerations include: 

(1) the plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) the defendant's preferred forum; (3) the location where the 

claim arose; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) ease 

of access to sources of proof. Sheffer, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 375; Montgomery, 532 F. Supp. 2d 29, 

32 (D.D.C. 2008). “Public-interest considerations include: (1) the transferee's familiarity with 

the governing law; (2) the relative congestion of the courts of the transferor and potential 

transferee; and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at home.” Onyeneho v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2006); see also Airport Working Group of Orange 

County, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 226 F. Supp. 2d 227, 229 (D.D.C. 2002). “If the balance of 

private and public interests favors a transfer of venue, then a court may order a 

transfer.” Sheffer, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 375 (citing Montgomery, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 32). 

B. The Court Grants the Motion to Transfer Venue to the District of Oregon

Because this case may have been brought in the District of Oregon, and that district is the 

more convenient forum considering both the public and private interests at stake, the Court finds 

that this case should be transferred. 

1. The District of Oregon is a Proper Venue 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the moving party must first establish that the plaintiff could 

have brought the suit in the transferee forum. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “A civil action in which a 

defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof ... may ... be 

brought in any judicial district in which (A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial 

part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property 
7 

that is the subject of the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is 

involved in the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). 

Here, nearly all the Defendants have a substantial connection to Oregon.1 All of the 

named Defendant judges are officers or employees of either the state of Oregon or the District of 

Oregon, except the Hon. Robert B. Kugler and the Hon. Elizabeth A. Weishaupl. Compl. ¶¶ 

11−18. Additionally, Defendants Billy J. Williams and Carol Bernick both hold office in 

Oregon, id. ¶¶ 17−19, and Defendants Oregon Judicial Department, Oregon State Bar, and

Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund are all Oregon-based government entities, id. ¶¶ 

7−9. Moreover—independent of the above analysis—venue is proper in the District of Oregon 

because most of the civil proceedings that form the basis for this action took place in Oregon, see 

id., and Mr. Rote resides in Oregon, id. ¶ 4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). Therefore, the District of 

Oregon is a proper venue.2

 

2. The District of Oregon is the More Convenient Forum 

Having decided that the District of Oregon is a venue where this case could have been 

brought, the Court must now consider whether the “particular circumstances” of this case 

warrant a transfer to said district. Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 925−26 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 

In order to do this, the Court must address the public and private interests of transferring this 

 1 Due to the Complaint’s lack of specification with respect to state of residence, the Court 

will default to analyzing where the non-entity Defendants are employed or hold office. 

2

 Although the District of Oregon may not have personal jurisdiction over all the 

disparately located sets of defendants (e.g., Colorado and New Jersey), it is likely no court may 

have personal jurisdiction over all of them. Certainly, the District of Oregon would possess 

personal jurisdiction over the greatest number of defendants. 
8 

case to the District of Oregon. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 30. As set forth below, both the public 

and private interests favor transfer to Oregon. 

a. Public Interest Factors

“Courts in this district have consistently found that the public interest favors allowing 

[courts in] the state in which the alleged wrongful conduct took place to resolve conflicts arising 

from acts committed entirely in that state.” Spaeth v. Michigan State Univ. Coll. Of Law, 845 F. 

Supp. 2d 48, 59 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Levin v. Majestik Surface Corp., 654 F. Supp. 2d 12, 16 

(D.D.C. 2009). Accordingly, courts may refer to the following considerations to evaluate the 

public interest of transferring a case: “(1) the transferee’s familiarity with the governing laws, (2) 

the relative congestion of each court, and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at 

home.” Montgomery, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 34 (citing Liban v. Churchey Group II, L.L.C., 305 F. 

Supp. 2d 136, 143 (D.D.C. 2004)). 

Because the Complaint implicates Oregon state laws and rules, the first public interest 

factor favors a transfer to the District of Oregon. Specifically, the Complaint alleges violations 

of Article I, §§ 8, 10, and 20 of the Oregon Constitution, Compl. ¶¶ 1, 102, and many of the 

allegations are grounded in local laws and rules, see, e.g., id. ¶ 82 (alleging the Oregon State Bar 

“aided and abetted” efforts to deny Mr. Rote’s due process rights by not acting against supposed 

violations of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct); id. ¶ 83 (averring that the Hon. Robert 

Herndon ignored Oregon law by not considering certain evidence on appeal); id. ¶ 55 (“[e]thics 

complaints were filed with the Oregon State Bar association” for various alleged ethical 

violations). As Mr. Rote points out, both Districts are equally competent to deal with federal 

law, Pl.’s Response in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer (“Opp’n”) at 6, ECF No.16 (citing 

Akiachak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 502 F. Supp. 2d 64, 68 (D.D.C. 2007), and so 
9 

the District of Oregon’s greater familiarity with the remaining issues—namely those dealing with 

the Oregon Constitution, as well as Oregon laws and rules—weighs heavily in favor of transfer.3 

See McClamrock v. Eli Lilly & Co., 267 F. Supp. 2d 33, 41 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding the action 

would require application of substantive North Carolina law, which favors transferring to North 

Carolina because North Carolina courts have the greatest familiarity with local law); Trout 

Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 19 (transfer to the District Court of Colorado was warranted because

the action, “in part, involve[d] the interpretation of Colorado law,” despite also involving federal 

statutes and regulations). 

Next, an examination of the relative congestion of the respective calendars of the District 

of Oregon and the District of Columbia favors transfer. The Court will analyze this factor by 

examining the districts’ median times from filing to disposition or trial. Sheffer, 873 F. Supp. 2d 

at 380. The Statistical Tables for the United States Judiciary demonstrate that civil cases are 

resolved more quickly in Oregon—the median time from filing to trial is 27.4 months in the 

District of Oregon compared to 51.9 months in the District of Columbia.4

 Defs.’ Mem. In 

Support of Defs.’ Mot. To Transfer (“Defs.’ Mem. Supp.”) at 5, ECF No. 13-1. Mr. Rote fails to 

address this argument in his response, see Opp’n, and so the Court will treat this factor as 

conceded. See Buggs v. Powell, 293 F. Supp. 2d 135, 141 (D.D.C. 2003) (“It is understood in 

this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only 

 3

 Mr. Rote argues under this factor that his decision to file in this District is owed 

substantial deference and thus weighs against transfer. See Opp’n at 6–7. This argument is not 

relevant in determining whether the transferee forum’s familiarity with the governing laws 

weighs in favor of transfer, and thus will not be analyzed under this factor. 

4 These statistics can be accessed at https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/statisticaltables-federal-judiciary-december-2018 (Table C-5). 
10 

certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff 

failed to address as conceded”). 

Finally, the District of Oregon’s interest in deciding this case at home strongly outweighs 

the District of Columbia’s tenuous interest in this case. As previously set forth, a vast majority 

of the parties—including Mr. Rote—either reside or are based in Oregon. See Compl. ¶¶ 4–19. 

Indeed, very few of the Defendants have any connection to the District of Columbia. See id. 

Further, as argued, almost all the litigation giving rise to this action took place in Oregon—none 

took place in the District of Columbia. See id. Surely, the District of Columbia’s interest in this 

case is far outweighed by the District of Oregon’s interest in adjudicating a matter substantially 

arising out of litigation taking place in Oregon and involving Oregon judges, Oregon government 

entities, and an Oregon Plaintiff. See, e.g., McClamrock, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (“North 

Carolina's interests are considerable since the injury . . . occurred in that state to one of its 

residents, the doctors that prescribed the drug and have treated and continue to treat plaintiff 

reside there, and the drug that allegedly caused the injury was marketed, sold, and prescribed 

there.”). 

Mr. Rote’s argument that the final public interest factor weighs against transfer due to 

this case’s national implications is unavailing. Mr. Rote makes three arguments to support his 

claim that his case is nationally significant: the case involves “federal and state judges engaged 

in a multi-jurisdictional effort to deny plaintiff due process,” “the core issue in the case is based 

upon the . . . administration of Judicial Conduct within the Federal Districts” that allows for 

“retaliation for free speech ... in the form of due process violations,” and “the reach of the 

federal government’s [sic] to compromise State Judges implicates Federal and State 

Constitutional guarantees.” Opp’n at 8. However, Mr. Rote’s first argument—and most of his 
11 

Complaint—only pertains to himself, which hardly makes this case national in scope. See

Abusadeh v. Chertoff, No. 06-2014 (CKK), 2007 WL 2111036, at *6 (D.D.C. July 23, 2007) 

(finding no national significance in a case that did not assert a general challenge to policy but 

rather focused solely on the plaintiff’s interests). Furthermore, all of Mr. Rote’s claims arise out 

of proceedings that took place in Oregon, New Jersey, and Colorado, and thus alleging specific 

defects in these three jurisdictions does not create an issue that is national in scope. See Compl. 

Moreover, all of Mr. Rote’s arguments implicate Constitutional rights, and this Court surely 

cannot entertain the idea that all Constitutional claims are “national interests” that can only be 

properly adjudicated in the District of Columbia. On the contrary, all federal courts are 

competent to address federal issues. See Oceana, Inc. v. Pritzker, 58 F. Supp. 3d 2, 7 (D.D.C. 

2013) (citation omitted). The constitutional issues raised, therefore, have no influence in 

determining whether transfer is appropriate. See id. However, even if the Court were to accept 

that Mr. Rote raises issues of national significance, it is unclear why the District of Oregon 

would be unable to adequately address these issues. Because of Oregon’s strong local interest in 

deciding this case—compounded by the Oregon laws, rules, and constitution implicated here—

the Court is unpersuaded that the tenuous possibility that this case raises issues of national 

significance provides enough cause to deny transfer to the District of Oregon. 

For the foregoing reasons, all three public interest factors weigh in favor of transferring 

this case to the District of Oregon. 

b. Private Interest Factors

Having found that the public interests favor transfer to Oregon, the Court must now 

assess the private interests at stake. The private-interest factors which should be considered 

include: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the defendant’s choice of forum; (3) whether the 
12 

claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; 

and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof. Montgomery, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 32−33 (citing 

Akiachak Native Cmty., 502 F. Supp. 2d at 67). These factors weigh in favor of transferring this 

suit to the District of Oregon. 

First, the deference usually provided to the plaintiff’s choice of forum is lessened because 

the District of Columbia is not Mr. Rote’s home forum, Compl. ¶ 4, and there is little to no 

factual connection between this case and the District of Columbia. See M&N Plastics, Inc. v. 

Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23−24 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that while a plaintiff’s choice of 

forum is a factor that weighs against transfer, “this general rule gives way when that choice is not 

their ‘home forum’[,] and ‘where there is an insubstantial factual nexus between the case and the 

plaintiff’s chosen forum, deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum is . . . weakened.’”) 

(quoting Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 856 F. Supp. 2d 186, 192 

(D.D.C. 2012)). Mr. Rote cites out of Circuit authority to argue that because his choice of forum 

is both “legitimate and rational,” his choice should be afforded deference. Opp’n at 4 (citing 

TSMC Tech., Inc. v. Zond, LLC, 2015 WL 328334 at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 26, 2015)). Mr. Rote’s 

sole argument for why this forum is “legitimate and rational” hinges on the District of Columbia 

having “personal jurisdiction over Defendants Judicial Committee and United States Department 

of Justice because each is an ‘inhabitant’ of the District of Columbia.” Opp’n at 4 (emphasis 

omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 22). As an initial matter, the Complaint does not contain any factual 

allegations against either of these defendants, so relying on these two defendants to argue that 

this District should retain jurisdiction is hardly legitimate or rational. Moreover, as Defendants 

point out, any judicial district in which the Department of Justice has an office—including the 

District of Oregon—could be said to have personal jurisdiction over the Department of Justice. 
13 

Reply in Further Support of the Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer (“Reply Further Supp. Defs.’ Mot.”) at 7, 

ECF No. 17 (citing Bryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. Civ. A. No. 07-0101, 2001 WL 2892967, 

at *2 (N.D.W.Va. Sept. 28, 2007) (citation omitted)). Therefore, Mr. Rote’s choice of forum is 

entitled to less deference because it is not his home forum, nor does it have a sufficient factual 

connection to the case. See M&N Plastics, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d at 23−24. And the fact that this 

Court may have personal jurisdiction over two defendants does not make this choice of forum 

sufficiently “legitimate and rational” to overcome these shortcomings. 

Second, the Defendants’ choice of forum weighs in favor of transferring. Defendants’ 

choice of forum is the District of Oregon—where most of the Defendants reside or are based, 

and where most of the events giving rise to this action occurred. See Compl. As Defendants 

argue, “where the action is ‘inextricably linked to [the defendant’s chosen forum], plaintiff’s 

choice of forum cannot be given anything like the same consideration given in cases where the 

chosen forum has a true connection with the matter.’” Reply Further Supp. Defs.’ Mot. at 7 

(quoting Franklin v. S. Ry. Co., 523 F. Supp. 521, 524 (D.D.C. 1981)). Thus, Defendants’ 

choice of forum outweighs Plaintiff’s choice in this case. 

In evaluating the next consideration—where the claims arose—courts in this district 

examine “where most of the significant events giving rise to the claims occurred.” Treppel v. 

Reason, 793 F. Supp. 2d 429, 433 (D.D.C. 2011). Plaintiff does not contest that most of the 

events giving rise to this action took place in Oregon, with the rest taking place in New Jersey 

and Colorado. See Compl; Opp’n. Indeed, as Defendants argue, of the twenty-eight “acts” that 

form the basis for this action, twenty-five occurred in Oregon, two occurred in New Jersey, and 

one occurred in Colorado. See Compl. at 6−20; Reply Further Supp. Defs.’ Mot. at 4. The 
14 

Complaint does not allege that any events giving rise to this action took place in the District of 

Columbia. See Compl. 

Defendants correctly point out that the only connection this case has to the District of 

Columbia is the headquarters of the Department of Justice and Committee on Judicial Conduct 

and Disability. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. at 6; Compl. Importantly, the Complaint does not 

contain any factual allegations against these Defendants. See Compl. Therefore, Mr. Rote fails 

to allege any “specific involvement or meaningful role by any [agency] personnel in 

Washington” beyond a “general advisory capacity,” which is required to establish “meaningful 

ties to the District of Columbia.” W. Watersheds Project v. Pool, 942 F. Supp. 2d 93, 98−99 

(D.D.C. 2013) (citations omitted). Indeed, Mr. Rote would be hard pressed to rely on these two 

defendants to establish that his claims arose in the District of Columbia. 

In addition, Mr. Rote relies on Gulf Restoration Network v. Jewell, 87 F. Supp. 3d 303 

(D.D.C. 2013), to argue that because the decisions to “retaliate against the plaintiff were made in 

New Jersey, Colorado, Oregon and the District of Columbia,” this factor should not weigh in 

favor of transferring to the District of Oregon. Opp’n at 4. However, the Complaint does not 

allege that any decisions to retaliate against Mr. Rote were made in the District of Columbia, see

Compl., let alone establish sufficiently significant ties between the District of Columbia and the 

decision-making process that the Court may consider the decision-making process to be 

“diffuse,” Gulf Restoration Network, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 313−14. Therefore, the third factor 

weighs in favor of transferring. 

Fourth, the convenience of the parties weighs in favor of transfer. As was previously 

established, most of the Defendants—and Mr. Rote—have significant ties to or reside in the 

District of Oregon, see Compl. ¶¶ 4–19, all of which would find it more convenient to litigate in 
15 

the District of Oregon. See, e.g., Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 18 (convenience of the parties 

supported transfer to Colorado because two out of three plaintiffs, as well as the defendants most 

involved in the matter, are located in Colorado). Mr. Rote argues that because this District is the 

Federal Defendants’ “home forum,” they “cannot reasonably claim to be inconvenienced by 

litigating in this district.” Opp’n at 5 (quoting Oceana, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d at 7). While Federal 

Defendants concede that the District of Columbia is the home forum for Defendants Department 

of Justice and Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, see Reply Further Supp. Defs.’ 

Mot. at 5, they point out that Federal Defendants Paul J. Papak and Billy J. Williams both reside 

in Oregon, id. at 6; Compl, ¶¶ 13, 17. Importantly, Department of Justice also has an office in 

Oregon, which would assuage any inconvenience concerns.5

 See Reply Further Supp. Defs.’ 

Mot. at 6. Regardless, the inconvenience of two defendants would not outweigh the convenience 

of most of the parties for the purposes of this factor. See Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 18. 

Clearly, most of the parties would find the District of Oregon to be a far more convenient forum 

compared to this District, and so this factor favors transfer. 

Finally, the fifth and sixth factors—the convenience of the witnesses and the ease of 

access to sources of proof—weigh in favor of transferring to the District of Oregon. Mr. Rote 

argues that these two factors do no warrant consideration because live testimony will likely be 

limited. See Opp’n at 5. To support this proposition, Mr. Rote cites to cases arising under the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), where there is a review of an “administrative record and 

 5

 The Court does not afford much weight to the “home forum” of Defendant Committee 

on Judicial Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States because, as 

previously noted, the Complaint does not include any factual allegations against this party. The 

same may be said for Defendant Department of Justice, but this point is moot considering that 

the Department of Justice has a presence in Oregon. Regardless, these two parties are in the 

minority, and the rest of the more substantively involved parties could not reasonably claim that 

this District is their “home forum.” 
16 

live testimony is unlikely.” Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Kempthorne, Nos. 07-2111(EGS), 07-

2112 (EGS), 2008 WL 1862298 at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2008). However, as Defendants argue, 

this case can be easily distinguished from the APA cases because the Complaint makes no 

reference to the APA. See Reply Further Supp. Mot. at 6 (comparing Compl. with Greater 

Yellowstone Coal. v Bosworth, 180 F. Supp. 2d 124, 128 (D.D.C. 2001)). Moreover, it is hard to 

imagine how Mr. Rote, if his claims survive beyond the dispositive motion stage, will be able to 

prove his case—which involves a litany of allegations of violations of his constitutional rights by 

a series of judges and public officials—without testimony and other sources of proof. See

McClamrock, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 39 (“How plaintiff realistically believes he will be able to prove 

these elements of damages without the testimony of the health care professionals who have 

treated him . . . is beyond this Court's comprehension.”). Therefore, these factors warrant 

transfer as well. 

Given that most of the events giving rise to this action took place in Oregon, see Compl, 

it is likely that most of the witnesses and sources of proof will be in Oregon. Indeed, Mr. Rote 

admits that there are “certainly more witnesses in Oregon than elsewhere.” Opp’n at 5. Mr. 

Rote points out that witnesses from New Jersey and Colorado comprise a significant portion of 

the witnesses in this action, but this still does not provide reason for this District—housing no 

witnesses or sources of proof—to retain this matter. Id. Mr. Rote further argues that the Oregon 

witnesses “will be easily compromised by what is a retaliatory culture among the Oregon 

Judiciary,” and thus would be more honest in an alternative forum. Id. As an initial matter, the 

Complaint never alleges any institutional witness tampering, intimidation, or retaliation such that 

Mr. Rote’s witnesses will be unable to tell the truth in the District of Oregon. See Compl. 

Moreover, assuming arguendo that no Oregon District Court judge can hear Mr. Rote’s claims, 
17 

the remedy is for a visiting judge from outside of Oregon to preside over the case, not to keep the 

case in an inappropriate venue, which does not maintain personal jurisdiction over most, if any, 

of the defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 292. Therefore, these two convenience factors weigh in 

favor of transfer. 

For the foregoing reasons, all six private interest factors weigh in favor of transferring 

this case to the District of Oregon.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motion to transfer this case to the 

District of Oregon. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and 

contemporaneously issued. 

Dated: November 6, 2019 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

United States District Judge