NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 22-2901

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DAVID WEAVER,

 Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 3:15-cr-00039)

District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

September 18, 2023

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BEFORE: RESTREPO, McKEE and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Filed: October 2, 2023)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge

David Weaver, a 49-year-old inmate serving a sentence with a projected release date

in April 2024, appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying his second motion for 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The District Court found that 

Weaver presented no extraordinary circumstances for release and, even if he had, the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553 sentencing factors weighed against granting him an early release. Because 

we conclude the Court’s ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion, we will affirm. 

I. Facts and Procedural History

David Weaver and an accomplice committed a series of armed bank robberies. In 

2016, Weaver pled guilty to four counts of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), and 

one count of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The District Court imposed a 121-

month prison term, which is scheduled to end April 27, 2024.1

In October 2020, Weaver filed his first motion for compassionate release, alleging

that his medical conditions posed a risk of harm if he contracted the COVID-19 virus. The 

District Court found that Weaver’s hypertension presented an extraordinary circumstance 

for relief as required under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), but that the § 3553(a) sentencing factors 

weighed in favor of denying compassionate relief. Weaver did not appeal the denial of his 

motion.

Weaver filed his second motion for compassionate relief in August 2022. This time 

Weaver alleged that he had contracted COVID in January 2021 and was experiencing long1 See Find an Inmate, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc// (last 

visited Sept. 14, 2023).
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term symptoms. He also maintained that his other medical conditions were worsening, and 

that he was not receiving adequate medical care in prison. Weaver further asserted that he 

had already served almost all of his sentence. The District Court again denied relief, 

reasoning that Weaver, who has been fully vaccinated since February 2022, provided no 

extraordinary circumstances for release and, in any event, the § 3553(a) factors still 

weighed against his early release. 

Weaver appealed pro se to this Court and filed two motions for the appointment of

counsel, along with his informal brief in support of his appeal. Upon consideration of the 

standard for appointment of counsel set forth in Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-57 (3d 

Cir. 1993), this Court denied the motions for appointment of counsel. We therefore address 

the issues raised in Weaver’s informal brief.

II. Analysis

We have jurisdiction to review the denial of compassionate release under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We review the District Court’s order for an abuse of discretion, meaning “we will 

not disturb [its] decision unless there is a definite and firm conviction that [it] committed a 

clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant 

factors.” United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020) (second alteration 

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The compassionate-release provision states that a district court “may reduce the 

term of imprisonment” and “impose a term of probation or supervised release” if it finds 

that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 

3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before granting compassionate release, a district court must consider 
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“the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” § 

3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors include, inter alia, “the nature and circumstances of the 

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(1), and the need for 

the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and 

to provide just punishment for the offense,” § 3553(a)(2)(A).

We cannot find that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Weaver’s 

motion. The Court determined Weaver’s concerns over COVID-19 did not justify his 

release because he is now vaccinated, which it found provides “significant protection”

against the virus causing either serious illness or death. United States v. David Weaver, 

Crim. A. No. 15-0039, Order (M.D. Pa. filed Sept. 27, 2022) (ECF 131) (citation omitted). 

On appeal, Weaver alleges the District Court erred by not considering that his conditions 

now include “long symptoms” from COVID, which he contracted in January 2021. 

Appellant Br. 2.2

 But the Court did not err in finding that the threat of COVID reaching

and spreading among the inmate population again does not provide an extraordinary and 

compelling reason to grant compassionate release. See United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 

594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[T]he mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility 

that it may spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate 

release . . . .”).3

2 Weaver claims he filed a motion for compassionate release in part because he does not 

receive his seizure medications on time, but he does not state that such a claim is the basis 

of his appeal or that the District Court erred in assessing his access to medical treatment.

3 FCC Oakdale complex, the prison complex where Weaver is incarcerated, reported that

over 60% of the inmate population is fully inoculated and there are no open COVID 
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The District Court further concluded that, even if extraordinary and compelling 

reasons to grant compassionate release existed, such reasons would be outweighed by the 

relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors. In so doing, the District Court referred to its order 

denying Weaver’s first motion for compassionate relief, which noted that Weaver’s crime 

of conviction consisted of committing “multiple armed robberies” where he “threatened 

individuals with a firearm.” United States v. David Weaver, Crim. A. No. 15-0039, Order 

(M.D. Pa. filed Dec. 29, 2020) (ECF 119). The District Court also cited Weaver’s lengthy 

criminal history and the fact that he was on probation when he committed the armed bank 

robberies. Id. Given these findings, the District Court’s ruling that the § 3553(a) factors 

weighed against an early release did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Finally, Weaver argues the District Court erred by failing to consider that he 

completed “90 percent” of his sentence. Appellant Br. 2. It is true that releasing Weaver 

now would not result in a substantial reduction of his sentence. But we cannot conclude 

that the District Court acted unreasonably in denying him compassionate release on this 

basis. The District Court weighed the § 3553(a) factors and ruled to uphold Weaver’s

current sentence. Such a finding did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See United 

States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2021) (“The duration of a lawfully 

imposed sentence does not create an extraordinary or compelling circumstance.”). 

cases. See Inmate Covid-19 Data, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 

https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_covid19.jsp (last visited Sept. 13, 

2023). 
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III. Conclusion

For these reasons, we will affirm the denial of the motion for compassionate release.