******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
EVANGELOS STAMATOPOULOS v. ECS NORTH

AMERICA, LLC

(AC 38173)

Lavine, Sheldon and Flynn, Js.

Argued November 17, 2016—officially released April 4, 2017

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Middlesex, Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, judge trial referee.)

Robert T. Rimmer, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Thomas J. Farrell, for the appellee (defendant)
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Evangelos Stamatopoulos, appeals from the judgment of the trial court,

rendered after a bench trial, in favor of the defendant,

ECS North America, LLC, on both of the plaintiff’s

claims for conversion and replevin. He claims that the

court erroneously concluded that the defendant was a

good faith purchaser of the subject property for value

under the Uniform Commercial Code, General Statutes

§ 42a-1-101 et seq. We conclude, however, that this

claim is moot because there is an independent, unchallenged ground upon which we may affirm the court’s

judgment for the defendant on both counts of the complaint. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

Because we resolve this appeal on jurisdictional

grounds, we set forth only the facts and procedural

history germane to our discussion of that issue. In its

July 10, 2015 memorandum of decision, the court found

the following facts. As of 2009, a group of Ohio businesses1 were titleholders to a Tag-A-Long, a piece of

heavy machinery used for removing paint from bridges.

On December 21, 2009, the Ohio businesses executed

an assignment of title for the Tag-A-Long in favor of

Erie Painting and Maintenance, Inc. (Erie). Approximately six months later, on June 7, 2010, the Ohio businesses filed for bankruptcy. The plaintiff, interested in

purchasing the Ohio businesses’ assets, contacted their

principal creditor and reviewed that creditor’s inventories of their assets, one of which listed the Tag-A-Long

as an asset.

On June 13, 2011, the plaintiff purchased the Ohio

businesses’ assets for $270,000 pursuant to an asset

purchase agreement (agreement). Article I of the

agreement, however, entitled ‘‘Assets, Rights, and Liabilities,’’ contained an important caveat with respect to

the equipment covered by the agreement. It provided

that, although the plaintiff ‘‘shall purchase and acquire

. . . all of the assets used by [the Ohio businesses] in

connection with the [b]usiness,’’ the plaintiff ‘‘acknowledges that certain assets in these exhibits may be duplicative and the lists are not exhaustive of every piece

of equipment owned or possessed by [the Ohio businesses], and that certain pieces of equipment . . .

may have been disposed of prior to its bankruptcy

filings but are intended to be representative of [the

Ohio businesses’] good faith attempt to list all its holdings being transferred hereunder as ‘all equipment.’ ’’

(Emphasis added.)

On May 23, 2012, approximately two and one-half

years after it was assigned title to the Tag-A-Long, Erie

sold the Tag-A-Long to the defendant for $100,000. After

learning of the defendant’s claim to the Tag-A-Long, the

plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant
in January, 2014, alleging causes of action for conversion and replevin. Forming the basis for both of the

plaintiff’s claims was his allegation that he owned the

Tag-A-Long because it was among the assets he purchased from the Ohio businesses pursuant to the

2011 agreement.2

On July 10, 2015, following a bench trial, the court

found for the defendant on both counts of the complaint. The court’s decision was based upon two principal findings. First, the court emphasized that, to prevail

on either his conversion or replevin claim, the plaintiff

had to ‘‘[prove] his claim to ownership of the Tag-ALong by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .’’ The

court observed that the agreement upon which the

plaintiff’s claim to ownership was based ‘‘does not purport to sell all of the assets set forth in the schedules

attached to it. It only conveys to the plaintiff those

assets still owned by the [Ohio businesses] as of the

date of the bankruptcy filing.’’ Implicitly relying on the

2009 assignment of the Tag-A-Long to Erie, the court

found that ‘‘the plaintiff has not proven that the TagA-Long was owned by the [Ohio businesses] at the time

of the filing of bankruptcy in 2010.’’ Moreover, the court

found that the plaintiff ‘‘has not established his right

to ownership’’ under Ohio law. The court’s second principal finding was that the defendant proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it was a good faith

purchaser for value under the Uniform Commercial

Code. On the basis of that finding, the court concluded

that ‘‘[a]ny claims the plaintiff may have had to the TagA-Long as against third parties are extinguished and do

not survive or justify a claim of ownership against [the

defendant’s] superior title claim.’’ Accordingly, the

court rendered judgment for the defendant on both

counts of the complaint, and this appeal ensued.

In his main brief, the plaintiff does not challenge the

court’s finding that he failed to prove an ownership

interest in the Tag-A-Long; he claims only that the court

erred in finding that the defendant was a good faith

purchaserfor value.3 Conversion and replevin, however,

both require proof of an ownership or property interest

in the subject property. See Sullivan v. Thorndike, 104

Conn. App. 297, 308, 934 A.2d 827 (2007) (‘‘[a]n essential

element of . . . conversion is the requirement that the

party asserting such a claim have either a legal right

or possessory interest in the property at issue’’), cert.

denied, 285 Conn. 907, 908, 942 A.2d 415; Cornelio v.

Stamford Hospital, 246 Conn. 45, 49, 717 A.2d 140

(1998) (prima facie claim for replevin pursuant to General Statutes § 52-515 requires proof, inter alia, that

the plaintiff ‘‘has a property interest in the [property]’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, the court’s

unchallenged finding that the plaintiff failed to prove

an ownership interest in the Tag-A-Long is wholly dispositive of the plaintiff’s claims regardless of whether

the defendant was a good faith purchaser for value.4
‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be

determined as a threshold matter because it implicates

[a] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . In

determining mootness, the dispositive question is

whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff

or defendant in any way.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Horenian v. Washington,

128 Conn. App. 91, 97–98, 15 A.3d 1194 (2011). It follows

that ‘‘[w]here alternative grounds found by the

reviewing court and unchallenged on appeal would support the trial court’s judgment, independent of some

challenged ground, the challenged ground that forms

the basis of the appeal is moot because the court on

appeal could grant no practical relief to the complainant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 99. In the

present case, there is an independent, unchallenged

basis for the court’s judgment for the defendant on both

counts of the complaint, namely, that he failed to prove

that he owned the Tag-A-Long to warrant a judgment

of replevin or conversion. Therefore, we cannot afford

the plaintiff any practical relief with respect to his

remaining claim. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim is

moot and, there being no other claims of error properly

before us,5 we dismiss his appeal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

The appeal is dismissed.

1 The Ohio businesses consisted of All Seasons Contracting, Inc., All Seasons Contracting and Painting, Inc., and All Seasons Contracting and Landscaping, Inc. To avoid confusion, we refer to them collectively throughout

this opinion as the Ohio businesses.

2 The defendant filed an answer on April 20, 2015, denying the material

allegations of the plaintiff’s amended complaint and asserting three special

defenses, two of which are relevant—namely, that the plaintiff ‘‘never

acquired a good and legal Ohio certificate of title to the Tag-A-Long’’ as is

required under Ohio law, and that it was a good faith purchaser for value

under the Uniform Commercial Code by virtue of its acquisition of the TagA-Long from Erie in 2012.

3 The plaintiff challenges the court’s finding that he failed to prove an

ownership interest in the Tag-A-Long in his reply brief. It is well established,

however, that ‘‘arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief.

. . . Claims of error by an appellant must be raised in his original brief

. . . so that the issue as framed by him can be fully responded to by the

appellee in its brief, and so that we can have the full benefit of that written

argument. Although the function of the appellant’s reply brief is to respond

to the arguments and authority presented in the appellee’s brief, that function

does not include raising an entirely new claim of error.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant

Co., 232 Conn. 559, 593 n.26, 657 A.2d 212 (1995). Moreover, although the

plaintiff included this issue in his preliminary statement of issues, he did

not include it in the statement of issues section of his main brief and did

not provide any analysis or authority anywhere in his main brief to support

the claim that the court’s finding that he failed to establish his ownership

interest in the Tag-A-Long was improper. ‘‘We are not required to review

issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required

in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.

. . . Where a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter

receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion

or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Elm Street Builders, Inc. v. Enterprise

Park Condominium Assn., Inc., 63 Conn. App. 657, 659 n.2, 778 A.2d 237

(2001). For these reasons, the plaintiff’s claim that the court erroneously

found that he failed to prove that he owned the Tag-A-Long is not properly
before us, and we decline to consider it. We resolve the issue of justiciability

solely on the basis of the claims raised and adequately briefed in the plaintiff’s

main brief.

4 We note that the defendant’s assertion that it was a good faith purchaser

for value was raised as a special defense. Accordingly, the court’s ruling on

the issue was independent from its finding that the plaintiff failed to prove

the prima facie element of ownership. See Braffman v. Bank of America

Corp., 297 Conn. 501, 519, 998 A.2d 1169 (2010) (‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that [t]he

purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the

allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff

has no cause of action’’ [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted]).

5 See footnote 3 of this opinion.