[Cite as Berardo v. Felderman-Swearingen, 2020-Ohio-4271.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

LUIGI BERARDO, 

 and 

TINA BERARDO, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 vs. 

DEVIN Q. FELDERMANSWEARINGEN, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

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APPEAL NO. C-200227 

TRIAL NO. A-1706896 

 

 O P I N I O N.

 

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause 

Remanded 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 31, 2020 

Dennis C. Mahoney and Amanda L Patton, for Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

Jamey T. Pregon, for Defendant-Appellee. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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MYERS, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Luigi and Tina Berardo appeal the judgment of the Hamilton County 

Court of Common Pleas denying their motion for a new trial. Because the trial court 

abused its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial with respect to Tina 

Berardo’s past noneconomic damages, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in part 

and remand for a new trial on that issue. 

I. Procedural History 

{¶2} The Berardos filed a complaint seeking damages for injuries they 

sustained in an accident when a car driven by Devin Q. Felderman-Swearingen 

collided with their car. Following a trial, the jury rendered verdicts in favor of both 

of the Berardos against Felderman-Swearingen. The jury awarded Luigi Berardo 

damages in the amount of $23,677: $19,677 for past economic damages (specifically 

past medical expenses) and $4,000 for past noneconomic damages (pain and 

suffering).1 The jury awarded $0 to Luigi Berardo for future noneconomic damages. 

The jury awarded Tina Berardo damages in the amount of $9,853, all of which was 

for past economic damages (specifically past medical expenses). The jury awarded 

Tina Berardo $0 for past noneconomic damages and $0 for future noneconomic 

damages. 

{¶3} The Berardos filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 

59(A)(4), (6), and (7). They asserted that the jury’s awards of $4,000 to Luigi 

Berardo and $0 to Tina Berardo for past noneconomic damages and the award of $0 

to Luigi Berardo for future noneconomic damages were inadequate, were not 

 

1 “Noneconomic loss” means “nonpecuniary harm that results from an injury or loss to person or 

property that is a subject of a tort action, including, but not limited to, pain and suffering, loss of 

society, consortium, companionship, care, assistance, attention, protection, advice, guidance, 

counsel, instruction, training or education, disfigurement, mental anguish, and any other 

intangible loss.” R.C. 2315.18. In this case, the only claimed noneconomic loss was for pain and 

suffering, so we use the terms “noneconomic” and “pain and suffering” interchangeably in this 

opinion. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

3 

supported by the evidence, and were contrary to law. The trial court denied the 

motion. 

{¶4} We dismissed the Berardos’ first appeal from that judgment for lack of 

jurisdiction. See Berardo v. Felderman-Swearingen, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C190515, 2020-Ohio-3098, ¶ 18. Thereafter, the trial court placed of record an order 

that entered judgment on the Berardos’ claims against Felderman-Swearingen and 

certified that, pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B), there is no just reason for delay. This appeal 

followed. 

II. Motion for a New Trial 

{¶5} In a single assignment of error, the Berardos argue that the trial court 

erred by denying their motion for a new trial. They argue that their motion for a new 

trial should have been granted on the grounds set forth in Civ.R.59(A)(4), (6), and 

(7). 

{¶6} Civ.R. 59(A) provides in relevant part: 

A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part 

of the issues upon any of the following grounds: 

* * * 

(4) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 

under the influence of passion or prejudice; 

* * * 

(6) The judgment is not sustained by the weight of the evidence[;] 

(7) The judgment is contrary to law[.] 

{¶7} The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a Civ.R. 59(A) 

motion for a new trial depends on the grounds for the motion. Harrison v. Horizon 

Women’s Healthcare, LLC, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28154, 2019-Ohio-3528, ¶ 11. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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We review a trial court’s decision granting or denying a motion for a new trial under 

Civ.R. 59(A)(4) and (6) for an abuse of discretion. See Weber v. Kinnen, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-100801, 2011-Ohio-6718, ¶ 13. When reviewing the grant or denial 

of a motion for a new trial based upon Civ.R. 59(A)(7), we must decide whether the 

trial court erred as a matter of law. Riedel v. Akron Gen. Health Sys., 2018-Ohio840, 97 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 13 (8th Dist). We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion 

brought under Civ.R. 59(A)(7) de novo. Hoke v. Miami Valley Hosp., 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 28462, 2020-Ohio-3387, ¶ 29. 

{¶8} The Berardos argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion 

for a new trial because the evidence of their pain and suffering was undisputed at 

trial, the defendant’s medical expert “agreed with [their] injuries,” and defense 

counsel in closing argument “conceded specific pain and suffering numbers to the 

jury.” They point to defense counsel’s suggestion to the jury of awards of $4,000 to 

$9,000 for past pain and suffering for Tina Berardo, and awards for Luigi Berardo of 

$15,000 to $20,000 for past pain and suffering, and $5,000 for future pain and 

suffering for him. The Berardos assert that the jury’s award of $4,000 to Luigi 

Berardo for past pain and suffering, without any award for his future pain and 

suffering, and the award of zero dollars for Tina Berardo’s past pain and suffering 

were inadequate, against the weight of the evidence, and contrary to law. 

A. Closing Arguments 

{¶9} We begin with the Berardos’ assertion that the suggestions of award 

amounts by defense counsel in closing argument amounted to concessions by the 

defense that the evidence of pain and suffering was undisputed. It is well established 

that closing arguments are not evidence upon which a jury can rely. Harrod v. USAA 

Ins. Co., 2019-Ohio-2748, 140 N.E.3d 184, ¶ 42 (2d Dist.). Although “[t]he 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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arguments or statements of counsel may be considered judicial admissions in certain 

instances,” Scatamacchio v. W. Res. Healthcare, 161 Ohio App.3d 230, 2005-Ohio2690, 829 N.E.2d 1247, ¶ 46 (7th Dist.), citing Hake v. George Wiedemann Brewing 

Co., 23 Ohio St.2d 65, 262 N.E.2d 703 (1970), counsel’s statements will not rise to 

the level of a judicial admission where “there is no indication that the statement was 

intended to dispense with formal proof of material facts for which witnesses would 

otherwise be called at trial.” Holeski v. Lawrence, 85 Ohio App.3d 824, 621 N.E.2d 

802 (11th Dist.1993). To constitute a judicial admission, counsel’s statements must 

be “distinct and unequivocal, and be, by intention, an act of waiver relating to the 

opponent’s proof of the fact, and not merely a statement of assertion or concession, 

made for some independent purpose.” Shepler v. Love, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-00-

022, 2001 WL 1104811, *3 (Sept. 14, 2001), quoting Carl & Gene Towing Serv., Inc. 

v. Shortway Lines, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-81-265, 1982 WL 6322, *2 (Mar. 26, 1982). 

{¶10} Here, defense counsel told the jury that its job was to decide the value 

of the Berardos’ claims and asked the jury to be reasonable in its awards. Defense 

counsel’s suggestion of potential amounts for pain-and-suffering awards did not 

constitute judicial admissions because there was no indication that the remarks were 

intended to waive the Berardos’ burden of proof with respect to damages. See 

Padden v. Herron, 11th Dist. Lake No. 97-L-23, 1998 WL 964545, *5 (Dec. 24, 1998); 

see also Phoenix Lighting Group LLC v. Genlyte Thomas Group LLC, 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 28082, 2018-Ohio-2393, ¶ 64, rev’d on other grounds, Slip Opinion 

No. 2020-Ohio-1056. We reject the Berardos’ assertion that the suggestions of 

award amounts by defense counsel in closing argument amounted to concessions by 

the defense that the evidence of pain and suffering was undisputed. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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B. Inadequate Damages Due to Passion or Prejudice 

{¶11} A court may grant a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(4) when the damages 

awarded (1) are either excessive or inadequate and (2) appear to have been given 

under the influence of passion or prejudice. Weber, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C100801, 2011-Ohio-6718, at ¶ 14. Both criteria must be met. “The amount of the 

verdict alone will not sustain a finding of passion or prejudice. There must be 

something contained in the record which the complaining party can point to that 

wrongfully inflamed the sensibilities of the jury.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting Shoemaker v. 

Crawford, 78 Ohio App.3d 53, 65, 603 N.E.2d 1114 (10th Dist.1991). 

{¶12} Here, the Berardos argue only the first component of the test under 

Civ.R. 59(A)(4): they assert that the jury’s award was inadequate because the 

“undisputed evidence” at trial showed that they experienced pain and suffering. 

(They reiterate this argument in relation to Civ.R. 59(A)(6) and (A)(7), as addressed 

below). However, they do not point to anything in the record, or even argue, that the 

jury’s award was the product of either passion or prejudice. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by denying the Berardos’ motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 

59(A)(4). 

C. Weight of the Evidence 

{¶13} A trial court may grant a new trial pursuant to Civ.R 59(A)(6) when a 

judgment is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The trial court must weigh 

the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, not “in the substantially unlimited 

sense” that a jury does, but “in the more restricted sense of whether it appears to the 

trial court that manifest injustice has been done and that the verdict is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence.” Lally v. Mukkada, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C100602, 2011-Ohio-3681, ¶ 6, quoting Rohde v. Farmer, 23 Ohio St.2d 82, 92, 262 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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N.E.2d 685 (1970), paragraph three of the syllabus. “[T]he relief should be granted 

only when the trial court is persuaded that there is insufficient credible evidence to 

sustain the verdict in light of the other evidence presented.” Green v. Bailey, 1st 

Dist. Hamilton No. C-070221, 2008-Ohio-3569, ¶ 13, citing Rohde at 92. 

{¶14} “There is a split among Ohio courts whether damage awards for 

medical bills for injuries, without any award for pain and suffering, are against the 

manifest weight of the evidence.” Dailey v. Masonbrink, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-15-

02, 2015-Ohio-2207, ¶ 21, quoting Uhlir v. State Farm Ins. Co., 164 Ohio App.3d 71, 

2005-Ohio-5545, 841 N.E.2d 344, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). Some courts have found that 

such awards are automatically against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.; 

Krauss v. Daniels, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-98-076, 1999 WL 435114, *3 (June 30, 

1999). 

{¶15} This court has held that where evidence of pain and suffering is 

disputed, a jury is not required to award damages for pain and suffering even when it 

awards damages for medical expenses. Weber, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100801, 

2011-Ohio-6718 (reversing the granting of a new-trial motion where jury awarded 

medical expenses, but only $10 for pain and suffering); Ross, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. 

C-030301, 2003-Ohio-7147 (affirming the denial of a Civ.R. 59(A)(6) new-trial 

motion where the jury awarded $50 for medical expenses, but nothing for pain and 

suffering). Other districts follow this approach. See Haller v. Daily, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 19420, 2003-Ohio-1941; Herceg v. Lifson, 4th Dist. Washington 

No. 18CA17, 2019-Ohio-4072; Lytle v. Pukys, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2014 CA 00115, 

2015-Ohio-1354; Burris v. Burnworth, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 06 JE 52, 2007-Ohio4619; Uhlir; Mensch v. Fisher, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2002-P-0055, 2003-Ohio-5701. 

{¶16} However, we have held that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(6) where the jury awarded damages for 

medical expenses but not for pain and suffering despite undisputed evidence that the 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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plaintiff experienced pain and suffering. See Whiteside v. Bennett, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-050605, 2006-Ohio-3600; Scott v. Condo, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C010123, 2002-Ohio-2148; Boldt v. Kramer, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-980235, 1999 

WL 299888 (May 14, 1999). Where there is uncontroverted evidence of pain and 

suffering, an award of medical expenses without an award for pain and suffering is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Johnson v. Burris, 5th Dist. 

Guernsey No. 14 CA 12, 2015-Ohio-260; Farkas v. Detar, 126 Ohio App.3d 795, 711 

N.E.2d 703 (9th Dist.1998); Cooper v. Moran, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-141, 2011-

Ohio-6847; Kubilis v. Owens, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-03-065, 2008-Ohio3728.

{¶17} We therefore must determine in this case whether there was disputed 

or undisputed evidence of pain and suffering. 

1. Luigi Berardo 

{¶18} On appeal, the Berardos assert that the jury’s award of $4,000 to Luigi 

Berardo for past pain and suffering and $0 for future pain and suffering was against 

the weight of the evidence. 

{¶19} At trial, the Berardos presented evidence that as a result of the 

December 2015 accident with Felderman-Swearingen, Mr. Berardo suffered a torn 

rotator cuff in his shoulder that required surgery and that he was treated by a 

chiropractor for back and neck sprain/strain. Mr. Berardo testified that for at least 

four months after the surgery, he was in such pain that he had to sleep in a recliner 

and had to rely on his wife for the simplest of tasks. He said that his constant 

shoulder pain went away over time and that within about six months, he was able to 

return to work and play golf several times a week. He testified that he operated a 

meat market and catering business where he worked 12-hour days and his duties 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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included lifting beef and produce, and sometimes a grill. In addition, Mr. Berardo 

testified that since the accident, he had traveled to Florida and to the Grand Canyon, 

and had taken two trips to Italy. 

{¶20} Mr. Berardo acknowledged that he neglected to tell his chiropractor, 

William Slater, D.C., that he had back problems prior to the accident. Mr. Berardo 

testified that Dr. Slater had not told him he would need chiropractic treatment in the 

future. 

{¶21} Dr. Slater testified that Mr. Berardo’s back and neck sprain/strain had 

been caused by the accident. He testified that whether the accident had caused new 

injuries or had aggravated preexisting degenerative conditions, his treatment of Mr. 

Berardo would have been the same. 

{¶22} Joseph Thomas, M.D., testified that he performed surgery to repair 

Mr. Berardo’s torn rotator cuff and that Mr. Berardo had recovered well by June 

2016. Dr. Thomas testified that Mr. Berardo had not given him an accurate history 

in that Mr. Berardo did not relay that he had a prior shoulder injury that he 

sustained in a December 2013 fall, two years before the accident in this case. Dr. 

Thomas noted that Mr. Berardo’s treatment for the prior shoulder injury had ended 

in August 2014. He testified that while the 2013 incident may have caused some 

injury to Mr. Berardo’s rotator cuff, the tear in the rotator cuff was causally related to 

the accident in this case. Dr. Thomas testified that he would not say within a 

reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mr. Berardo would suffer shoulder pain 

in the future as a result of the injury. 

{¶23} The defense medical expert, Thomas Bender, M.D., testified that he 

examined Mr. Berardo and reviewed his relevant medical records. In his opinion, 

Mr. Berardo’s rotator-cuff tear was causally related to the accident. He opined that 

Mr. Berardo had recovered well, such that he would need no further medical 

treatment for his shoulder. When asked about Mr. Berardo’s neck and back 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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strain/sprain, Dr. Bender testified that soft-tissue injuries typically resolve within 

four months of injury. 

{¶24} Having reviewed the record, we cannot say that the jury’s award of 

$4,000 for Mr. Berardo’s past pain and suffering and $0 for future pain and 

suffering was against the manifest weight of the evidence. With respect to past pain 

and suffering, the jury heard evidence that Mr. Berardo had recovered well from his 

injuries in the accident and that he had previously been treated for back and 

shoulder problems. With respect to future pain and suffering, the jury heard 

evidence that Mr. Berardo was playing golf, traveling, and working, and his surgeon 

could not give an opinion as to his future pain and suffering. The assessment of 

damages was for the jury, see Weber, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100801, 2011-Ohio6718, at ¶ 17, as was credibility of the witnesses. 

{¶25} We hold that there was sufficient credible evidence supporting the 

jury’s verdict as to Mr. Berardo and that, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying a new trial for inadequate damages under Civ.R. 59(A)(6) with 

respect to Mr. Berardo. 

2. Tina Berardo 

{¶26} The Berardos also assert that the jury’s award of $0 to Tina Berardo 

for past pain and suffering was against the weight of the evidence. 

{¶27} At trial, the Berardos presented evidence that the morning after the 

accident with Felderman-Swearingen, Mrs. Berardo had numbness in her neck, 

shoulder, arm, and hand. Mrs. Berardo testified that she was limping because she 

had bad bruising on one of her legs. She testified that she resisted getting medical 

care for almost two weeks, explaining, “I hate hospitals and I hate doctors. * * * I 

won’t go unless I can’t walk, can’t talk, can’t breathe.” 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶28} Mrs. Berardo went to Stephen Dailey, M.D., who diagnosed her with 

cervical sprain/strain and lumbosacral sprain/strain. An MRI of her left shoulder 

revealed some mild arthritis and some rotator cuff tendinosis. An MRI of Mrs. 

Berardo’s cervical spine revealed multilevel degenerative changing, including 

changes at the C6/C7 disc bulge. Dr. Dailey testified that Mrs. Berardo responded 

well to physical therapy and to injections in her shoulder. In his opinion, Mrs. 

Berardo’s injuries were causally related to the accident. With respect to her preexisting degenerative conditions, Dr. Dailey said it was possible that the accident 

accelerated the process, but he could not be sure. 

{¶29} Dr. Bender, the defense medical expert, examined Mrs. Berardo and 

reviewed her medical records. He described the symptoms that Mrs. Berardo 

presented to Dr. Dailey as “neck and radiating left arm pain, back and radiating left 

leg pain.” According to Dr. Bender, the MRI imaging revealed substantial preexisting degenerative changes that were unassociated with the accident. Dr. Bender 

testified that Mrs. Berardo sustained a spinal sprain/strain and a left shoulder 

sprain/strain that was casually related to the accident, that she required the medical 

treatment that she received, and that her pain symptoms went away. In Dr. Bender’s 

opinion, Mrs. Berardo “experienced a temporary subjectively increased amount of 

symptoms” that resolved. In other words, Mrs. Berardo experienced pain from 

which she recovered. 

{¶30} Because there was uncontroverted evidence that Mrs. Berardo 

experienced pain and suffering as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident, 

the jury’s award of medical expenses without any award for past pain and suffering 

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Whiteside, 1st Dist. Hamilton 

No. C-050605, 2006-Ohio-3600; Scott, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-010123, 2002-

Ohio-2148; Boldt, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-980235, 1999 WL 299888. Therefore, 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a new trial for 

inadequate damages under Civ.R. 59(A)(6) with respect to Mrs. Berardo. 

D. Contrary to Law 

{¶31} A trial court may grant a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(7) if the 

judgment is contrary to law. The Berardos argue that the judgment awarding low 

noneconomic damages to Mr. Berardo and zero noneconomic damages to Mrs. 

Berardo is contrary to the law, “which states that where a plaintiff is injured by the 

negligence of another then the plaintiff is to be compensated for said damages.” 

They cite no authority for this proposition. As we stated in Weber, “it does not follow 

that when evidence of pain and suffering is disputed, the jury must award some 

damages for pain and suffering, even when it awards damages for medical expenses.” 

Weber, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100801, 2011-Ohio-6718, at ¶ 24.

{¶32} We have already determined that the judgment was against the 

manifest weight of the evidence with respect to the jury’s $0 award to Mrs. Berardo 

for past pain and suffering, and that the judgment was not against the weight of the 

evidence with respect to Mr. Berardo. Accordingly, the judgment was not contrary to 

law under Civ.R. 59(A)(7). The sole assignment of error is sustained in part and 

overruled in part. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶33} Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying the motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(4) because the Berardos 

pointed to nothing in the record to show that the jury’s award was the product of 

passion or prejudice. We further hold that the trial court did not err by denying the 

motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(7) because its judgment was not contrary 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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to law. In addition, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(6) with respect to Mr. Berardo because 

sufficient credible evidence supported the jury’s verdict. However, we hold that the 

trial court abused its discretion by denying a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(6) with 

respect to Mrs. Berardo because, where there was uncontroverted evidence that she 

experienced pain and suffering as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident, 

the jury’s award of medical expenses without an award for pain and suffering was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Consequently, we reverse the trial 

court’s judgment in part and remand this cause for a new trial on the issue of 

damages with respect to Mrs. Berardo’s past pain and suffering. We affirm the 

judgment in all other respects. 

Judgment accordingly. 

BERGERON and WINKLER, JJ., concur. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.