[Cite as Prokos v. Hines, 2014-Ohio-1415.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ATHENS COUNTY 

LAISA PROKOS, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case Nos. 10CA51 

 : 10CA57 

 vs. : 

 : 

PAM HINES, ET AL., : DECISION AND JUDGMENT

 : ENTRY

 Defendants-Appellees. : 

 : Released: 03/28/14 

_____________________________________________________________ 

 : 

LAISA PROKOS, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 : 

 vs. : 

 : 

DEMETRIOS PROKOS, ET AL., : 

 : 

 Defendants-Appellees, : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

NICKOS PROKOS, ET AL., : 

 : 

 Defendants-Appellants. : 

_____________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES:

L. Jackson Henniger, L. Jackson Henniger & Assoc., Logan, Ohio, for 

Appellants Barry M. Kucik, Barry M. Kucik, Trustee of the Kucik 

Revocable Living Trust, and Barry M. Kucik, P.A., a Florida Profit 

Corporation. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 2

John P. Lavelle and Robert R. Rittenhouse, Lavelle and Associates, Athens, 

Ohio, for Appellee Demetrios Prokos. 

Jeffrey L. Finley, Eachus & Finley Law Offices, Gallipolis, Ohio, Fiduciary 

for the Estate of Laisa Prokos. 

_____________________________________________________________ 

 

McFarland, J. 

{¶1} In appellate case number 10CA51, Defendant Nickos Prokos 

and Defendants Barry M. Kucik, Barry M. Kucik, Trustee of the Kucik 

Revocable Living Trust, and Barry M. Kucik, P.A., a Florida Profit 

Corporation (“Appellants”) appeal the October 7, 2010 journal entry of the 

Athens County Common Pleas Court adopting the settlement agreement 

between the estate of Laisa Prokos and Demetrios Prokos. In appellate case 

number 10CA57, Appellants further appeal various judgment entries of the 

Athens County Common Pleas Court, attached to the notice of appeal as 

Exhibits A-1 through A-6, and captioned as follows: 

A-1-Judgment entry on post trial motions dated November 22, 2010; 

A-2-Journal entry adopting settlement agreement between Estate of 

Laisa Prokos and Demetrios Prokos dated October 7, 2010; 

A-3-Journal entry regarding defendants’ claims of jury irregularity 

dated September 23, 2010; 

A-4-Journal entry on proposed settlement dated September 23, 2010; 

A-5-Journal entry regarding pre-trial motions dated September 23, 

2010; and, 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 3

A-6-Judgment entry dated May 27, 2010. 

{¶2} Upon review of the record, we find no error in the trial court’s 

judgment. As such, we overrule all of the assignments of error presented by 

Appellants. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

{¶3} These consolidated lawsuits technically arose subsequent to the 

January 2004 filing of a mechanic’s lien by Demetrios Prokos against rental 

properties located in Athens, Ohio, and owned, at one time, by his parents, 

Vasilios and Laisa Prokos. The consolidated actions culminated in a sixweek jury trial in the Athens County Court of Common Pleas in 2010. 

Based upon the facts adduced in evidence and the jury’s verdict, it would 

appear that Laisa Prokos was a victim of her younger son Nickos Prokos’ 

incessant scheming to obtain money to support an ostentatious lifestyle. It 

also appears that Laisa Prokos was the victim of Florida attorney, Barry 

Kucik, who aided and enabled Nickos to receive large and unverifiable 

amounts of money while purporting to transfer ownership of Laisa’s 

properties to himself. The underlying backdrop to this litigation is poignant 

and lengthy. 

{¶4} Vasilios and Laisa Prokos (hereinafter “Vasilios and Laisa”) 

were Greek immigrants who arrived in Athens County, Ohio in 1974. The 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 4

Prokoses had three children: Demetrios Prokos (hereinafter”Demetrios”), 

Pam Hines (hereinafter “Pam”), and Nickos Prokos (hereinafter “Nickos”). 

Vasilios and Laisa opened a sandwich shop, Souvlakis, and purchased 

various properties and rental properties (hereinafter “the properties”) in 

Athens. The properties subject of these proceedings were located at 9 W. 

State Street; 186 W. Washington Street; 208 W. Washington Street1

; 6 

Brown Street; 48 Moore Street; 120 N. Congress Street; and 45 Mound 

Street. In their later years, Vasilios and Laisa spent time between homes in 

Athens, Ohio and Florida. Nickos also resided separately in Florida. Pam, 

Demetrios, and Pam’s daughters Natalie (Williams) Bowles, (hereinafter 

“Natalie”) and Tracy Hines (“Tracy”), resided in Athens. Vasilios relied on 

Demetrios to manage his rental properties in Ohio. Demetrios testified 

beginning in 1996, he had an agreement with his father to manage the rental 

properties and be compensated. Vasilios died October 11, 2003. Laisa 

remained in Florida with Nickos, who moved in with her. 

{¶5} After his father’s death in 2003, Nickos assisted in his mother’s 

business affairs. Laisa’s contact and relationships with Demetrios, Pam, 

Natalie, and Tracy deteriorated. Meanwhile, Laisa was surrounded by 

 

1

 The 208 W. Washington Street property was also referred to during trial as 208 1⁄2 W. Washington Street. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 5

Nickos, her Greek-speaking friends Alieke Mandros (“Alieke”) and Thomas 

Mandros, and Barry Kucik. Alieke often acted as an interpreter for Laisa. 

{¶6} The testimony at trial revealed that at the time of her husband’s 

death and her own declining health, Laisa was approximately 70-years-old, 

had a third-grade education received in Greece during WWII, vision 

problems, and spoke only broken English. She had never obtained a driver’s 

license. Laisa also had multiple health problems including diabetes, heart 

conditions, and scleroderma of the lungs. She used a wheelchair at times. 

During this time period, it appears Laisa may have believed she was in dire 

financial circumstances. 

 {¶7} The evidence at trial revealed that within two weeks of Vasilios’ 

death, Laisa began changing her estate plans, from those made earlier in 

2001. Alieke assisted Laisa, in a wheelchair, to Barry Kucik’s office. Laisa 

eventually executed three different sets of estate planning documents. The 

first set (November 2003) disinherited Pam and Demetrios. The second set 

(December 2003) disinherited her grandchildren. The third set (April 2004) 

disinherited everyone but Nickos.2

 In the event of Nickos’ predecease, Laisa 

 

2

 Although the record revealed Laisa had been at odds with Demetrios, Pam, and Natalie at times, there was 

no evidence of any discord with Tracy, or reason for disinheriting Tracy. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 6

directed half of her estate go to Alieke and half be distributed to the Greek 

church.3

{¶8} Nickos sought control of the Athens rental properties. Natalie 

testified she had become concerned that Laisa was not getting business 

documents properly translated to her. Natalie testified her grandmother had 

a good mind, but Natalie thought she was being controlled. Natalie and her 

children visited Laisa over Thanksgiving weekend 2003 to check on her. As 

Natalie was leaving for Ohio on December 1, 2003, Nickos routed her to 

Barry Kucik’s office to sign documents. Natalie testified the documents 

were laid out on a table, already notarized. Despite feeling somewhat 

uncomfortable about signing, Natalie did so. 4

{¶9} Demetrios relinquished management and control of the 

properties in December 2003. He had suspicions about Nickos’ handling of 

his mother’s business affairs and properties. On January 16, 2004, 

Demetrios recorded a mechanic’s lien on the properties. In the affidavit for 

mechanic’s lien, Demetrios avowed he was owed the sum of $333,880.00 

for labor, work, and materials furnished from June 1, 1995 to December 31, 

2003. He also filed an affidavit of facts relating to title, describing the 

 

3

 A fourth set of estate planning documents was executed by Laisa in November 2004. These were 

prepared by a Greek-speaking Florida attorney, Attorney Tsmoutales. There was no evidence in the record 

to indicate any collusion between Attorney Tsmoutales and Nickos or Barry Kucik. 

4

 Via these documents, Natalie was given a limited power of attorney to assist in managing the Ohio rental 

properties. Nickos was given a power of attorney to receive information on behalf of Laisa. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 7

contract he alleged to have made with his father and the terms of the 

contract. Essentially, Demetrios claimed to have a contractual right of first 

refusal and option to purchase his parents’ properties.5

 Demetrios was never 

able to produce a written contract. 

{¶10} Immediately after the mechanic’s lien was filed, Attorney Barry 

Kucik encouraged Laisa to file suit against Demetrios and Pam. William 

Biddlestone, Laisa’s Ohio lawyer, filed the underlying actions which were 

later consolidated.6

 The claims against Demetrios related to the mechanic’s 

lien. Demetrios and Pam then filed claims against Nickos alleging fraud and 

intentional interference with expectancy of inheritance. In May 2005, 

Demetrios filed a counterclaim for foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien against 

Laisa. He sought judgment for the value of the mechanic’s lien and a decree 

of foreclosure of the real estate subject to the lien. 

{¶11} In May 2005, Laisa traveled to Ohio to testify at a hearing 

about Vasilios’ estate.7

 The testimony at trial characterized those traveling 

 

5

 The mechanic’s lien and affidavit of facts relating to title also included two properties not subject of these 

proceedings. Demetrios subsequently filed documents to correct parcel numbers listed on the mechanic’s 

lien and affidavit of facts. 

6

 The lawsuits were captioned: Laisa Prokos v. Pam Hines, et al., Athens County Common Pleas Court 

case number 04-CI-078 and Laisa Prokos, v. Demetrios Prokos, et al., Athens County Common Pleas 

Court case number 04-CI-103. 

7

 There had been some dispute as to whether the estate should have been administered in Ohio or Florida. 

Natalie had been named fiduciary of her grandfather’s estate. After Natalie returned from the 

Thanksgiving 2003 trip to Florida, she sent several requests to Barry Kucik requesting the return of her 

grandfather’s will. She also received a letter from Kucik directing her to resign as fiduciary. The 

testimony at trial showed Kucik engaged in “obstructionist” actions in his involvement with Vasilios’ estate 

administration. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 8

with her as an “entourage”: Nickos, Alieke, Barry Kucik, and Steve 

Savvides (a security officer). The group flew from Florida to Columbus, 

Ohio, and then drove to Athens in multiple vehicles. Demetrios and Natalie 

testified the “entourage” was simply a way of further isolating Laisa from 

the rest of her family. Natalie and Demetrios testified Laisa had been 

blocked from receiving their calls.8

 They both testified on the day of the 

court hearing, when Natalie and her children presented Laisa with flowers, 

Nickos grabbed them from her hands and threw them into the trash in front 

of everyone. 

{¶12} Concerning the alleged fraudulent conveyance of Laisa’s 

property, at issue in the 2010 trial, the testimony and exhibits revealed 

Laisa’s 7 rental properties were conveyed to the Kucik Defendants via two 

separate real estate transactions. The first transaction involved a contract for 

sale and purchase between Laisa and Barry Kucik for three properties: 186 

W. Washington Street, 208 W. Washington Street, and 9 W. State Street 

(Souvlakis). Laisa signed a contract prepared by Kucik on June 16, 2004. 

She also signed warranty deeds. Kucik paid somewhere between 

$193,000.00 and $213,000.00 total for the three properties. Allegedly 

pursuant to Laisa’s instructions, Kucik did not record the deeds. Both Barry 

 

8

 Natalie testified that Mother’s Day 2004 gifts sent to Laisa were returned unopened. Demetrios testified 

he went to visit his mother 7-8 times after his father died and was denied access. Both Demetrios and 

Natalie received letters directing them to refrain from contact with Laisa, drafted by Barry Kucik. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 9

Kucik and Nickos testified Laisa was afraid for Demetrios to find out about 

the sale. 

{¶13} The second real estate transaction disposed of Laisa’s 

remaining 4 rental properties: 6 Brown Street, 48 Moore Street, 45 Mound 

Street, and 120 N. Congress Street. The agreement for this sale was dated 

June 15, 2005. On this date, Laisa was hospitalized due to her lung 

condition. Nickos signed as grantor pursuant to his unrecorded power of 

attorney. Nickos testified he discussed the transaction with her and she was 

happy. She knew he was signing on her behalf. One hundred thousand 

dollars was paid directly to Nickos on June 21, 2005, pursuant to another 

document Laisa signed and Kucik drafted, directing that this money be paid 

directly to Nickos if received after her demise. 

{¶14} Regarding Nickos’ execution of the final deeds, Joann Alcott, 

an employee of Sun Trust Bank, near Kucik’s law office, testified via 

deposition at trial. Barry Kucik was her customer. Ms. Alcott testified in 

the past she had met Laisa and it was obvious Laisa was not physically able 

to care for her business affairs, although she could converse. Ms. Alcott 

recalled Laisa was not with Nickos when he brought the quitclaim deeds to 

be notarized on June 29, 2005. Nickos signed the deeds as Laisa’s power of 

attorney. He did not explain why he was doing so, but Ms. Alcott saw no 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 10

“red flags.” Ms. Alcott testified she did not ask about Laisa, but she had no 

reason to believe Laisa was physically or mentally incapacitated at the time. 

Ms. Alcott was forced to admit error on her part when she was directed to 

the “acknowledgement” section of the deed, which indicated Laisa was in 

her presence. Ms. Alcott also testified that Barry Kucik may have been 

present with Nickos on the 29th. Laisa died on June 29, 2005. 

{¶15} Nickos testified he did not know his mother was near death. 

Despite medical records which indicated otherwise, Nickos denied being 

informed that her medical conditions were progressive or that hospice had 

been recommended. He denied attempting to effectuate the second real 

estate transaction knowing she was near death. Nickos testified he saw 

Laisa around 3:00 p.m. at the hospital and she was perfectly fine. Nickos 

left the hospital to deliver the deeds to Barry Kucik. Kucik also testified he 

saw Laisa twice during her last hospitalization and had no idea her death was 

imminent. 

{¶16} Nickos gave conflicting testimony at trial as to the delivery of 

the quitclaim deeds, testifying one day he handed the deeds to a receptionist 

and testifying the very next day he placed them on a shelf in Kucik’s law 

office. Nickos received the $100,000.00 directly. Kucik testified he 

provided money to Nickos through the fall of 2005. He did not know how 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 11

much money went to Laisa or Nickos for the second real estate deal. The 

quitclaim deeds were not recorded until July 2005. The deeds had multiple 

mistakes which Nickos corrected on his typewriter. 

{¶17} According to Barry Kucik, Laisa thought she’d soon be “out on 

the street” because of Demetrios’ mechanic’s lien. She was desperate for 

money and Kucik offered to help. Kucik never obtained an appraisal, a title 

search, or an inspection of the properties. Nickos testified he explained their 

financial situation to his mother and she believed the sales were “like a land 

contract.” Nickos testified Laisa was competent and understood. According 

to Nickos, Laisa had no reservation about Barry Kucik and “because he was 

an attorney, she trusted him even more.” 

{¶18} Sometime after Laisa died, Barry Kucik, individually and as 

Trustee of the Kucik Revocable Living Trust recorded multiple deeds in the 

Athens County Recorder’s Office. These deeds purported to convey to the 

Kucik Defendants Laisa’s rental properties. Because Barry Kucik paid 

Nickos directly, none of this money from the second real estate deal went to 

her Estate. 

{¶19} Laisa’s estate was eventually opened in Ohio. It was insolvent. 

Although there was evidence that Vasilios may have had a $250,000.00 life 

insurance policy, no such money was received by Laisa or made part of her 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 12

estate. Prior to her death, Laisa had given $49,000.00 to Barry Kucik to 

forward to William Biddlestone, to purchase another Ohio property on 

Laisa’s behalf. The money had been held in Kucik’s client trust account and 

was forwarded to Biddlestone for deposit in his client trust account. After 

Laisa’s death, Biddlestone returned this money to Barry Kucik instead of 

forwarding it to her estate, the estate fiduciary, or the appropriate court. 

Kucik placed the $49,000.00 in his private account and it never became part 

of Laisa’s estate. There was also evidence that Laisa sold property owned in 

Greece and received approximately $25,000.00 cash sometime during the 

last year of her life. This money was not paid to Laisa’s estate or her 

fiduciary. The evidence also demonstrated that approximately $7,100.00 

had been paid for rent on Souvlakis restaurant, shortly before Laisa died. 

Approximately $5,000.00 of this money was forwarded to Nickos by 

Attorney Biddlestone and was also never made part of the Estate. 

{¶20} Attorney Biddlestone gave lengthy testimony at trial. He and 

his wife oversaw Laisa’s Ohio rentals beginning in March 2004. In 

September 2004, he and his wife traveled to Florida to meet Laisa and 

discuss the lawsuits he had filed on her behalf. Biddlestone testified Laisa 

seemed engaged with her friends. She was in a wheelchair mostly, 

surrounded by friends and caregivers. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 13

{¶21} Attorney Biddlestone testified he was never asked to review 

any of the agreements between Laisa and Barry Kucik. He testified he had 

some concerns about her relationship with Kucik. He opined Kucik was too 

financially involved with his client. Biddlestone believed Laisa needed 

independent, Greek-speaking counsel in Florida. 

{¶22} Due to the glaring irregularities with regard to the transfer of 

Laisa’s properties to the Kucik Defendants, these defendants were joined in 

the lawsuits. In June 2007, Demetrios amended his Complaint against 

Nickos and the Kucik Defendants, setting forth claims for fraudulent 

conveyances and fraud. The Estate of Laisa Prokos also amended its 

Complaint to include claims against Nickos and the Kucik Defendants for 

fraud and conversion. The Estate sought compensatory damages, punitive 

damages, and an order rescinding the fraudulent conveyances. 

{¶23} The Kucik Defendants filed counterclaims against Demetrios. 

The parties engaged in motion practice. Eventually, Appellants’ 

counterclaims against Demetrios were dismissed via summary judgment. 

{¶24} On September 21, 2009, by agreement of all parties, the trial 

court issued a journal entry trifurcating the claims and scheduling three 

trials. It was agreed the first trial would concern the allegations of fraud, 

intentional interference with expectancy of inheritance, and the Estate’s tort 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 14

claims. The second trial would deal solely with Demetrios’ mechanic’s lien 

claims. The third trial was to resolve the remaining tort and contract claims. 

{¶25} The first trial began on March 31, 2010. The jury heard six 

weeks of testimony. In closing, counsel for Demetrios argued the claims for 

fraud, interference with inheritance, and fraudulent transfer had been proven. 

Counsel pointed out the various inconsistencies in Nickos and Barry Kucik’s 

testimony and with the documentary evidence. Counsel questioned “Who 

was looking out for this woman?” Counsel suggested when Laisa presented 

to Kucik’s office, scared about her finances and fearing displacement from 

her residential home, Barry Kucik, as an attorney, financial planner, and 

CPA had a duty to review the rents, mortgages, her finances, and advise her 

accordingly. Counsel also argued the deeds were never legally delivered 

before Laisa’s death. 

{¶26} Counsel for the Estate also pointed out the inconsistencies in 

the testimony. Counsel pointed out that Barry Kucik had admitted 

committing fraud upon Nickos’ prior counsel, Attorney Scyld Anderson.9

 

Counsel argued not only were the deals kept secret from Demetrios and the 

rest of the world, but the deals were also kept secret from Laisa. Counsel 

requested the properties and $49,000.00 be returned to the Estate. 

 

9

 This deceptive conduct will be discussed infra. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 15

{¶27} Counsel for the Kucik Defendants argued Kucik’s conduct was 

confusing, but that Laisa was not mistreated, helpless, or incapable of 

making her own decisions. Counsel argued Kucik had poor judgment and 

poor draftsmanship of the relevant documents and deeds, but he was being 

“vilified” for attempting to help Laisa. Counsel argued the value of the 

rentals had been destroyed by their poor condition, heavy mortgages, and 

Demetrios’ mechanic’s lien, and that Laisa had received reasonable value. 

{¶28} Counsel for Nickos argued Demetrios had no right to expect to 

inherit from Laisa after the way he had terrorized her.10 Nickos’ counsel 

directed the jury to pay attention to the video showing Laisa had executed 

documents and expressed her desire to disinherit Demetrios and others. 

{¶29} The jury deliberated three days, reaching a verdict on May 14, 

2010. The jury found in favor of the Estate of Laisa Prokos on the fraud and 

conversion claims, and against Nickos and the Kucik Defendants. The 

Estate was awarded $350,000.00 in compensatory damages against Nickos 

and a $750,000.00 award for punitive damages. The Estate was awarded 

$49,000.00 in compensatory damages against the Kucik Defendants. It was 

also awarded $300,000.00 in punitive damages. 

 

10 Nickos testified Demetrios had terrorized his parents before Vasilios’ death in 2003, waving a gun and 

insisting they transfer the properties to him. Nickos also testified Demetrios upset Laisa by thwarting her 

wishes as to Vasilios’ burial. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 16

{¶30} The jury also found in favor of Demetrios on his fraud and 

fraudulent conveyance claims, and against Nickos and the Kucik 

Defendants. The jury also found in favor of Demetrios on the intentional 

interference with expectancy of inheritance claim against Nickos, but found 

in favor of the Kucik Defendants as to this claim. The jury awarded 

Demetrios $200,000.00 in compensatory damages against Nickos and 

$500,000.00 in punitive damages. Demetrios was also awarded $5,000.00 in 

compensatory damages against the Kucik Defendants on the fraud and 

fraudulent conveyance claims. 

{¶31} On May 27, 2010, the trial judge issued a judgment entry which 

voided the deeds which conveyed Laisa’s interest in the Athens properties to 

the Kucik Defendants and ordered the property returned to her Estate. 

Thereafter, Demetrios and the Estate reached a settlement regarding the 

mechanic’s lien. The settlement was subsequently approved by both the 

Athens County Probate Court and the Athens County Court of Common 

Pleas. The second phase of trial was then rendered unnecessary and was 

cancelled. 

{¶32} The trial court also issued a judgment entry on post-trial 

motions on November 22, 2010. The entry ordered the objections of Nickos 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 17

and the Kucik Defendants be overruled and it upheld the jury verdict. 

Demetrios and the Estate’s attorney were also awarded attorney fees. 

{¶33} Nickos and the Kucik Defendants filed timely notices of appeal 

and the appeals were consolidated herein. Subsequently, Demetrios, Nickos 

and the Estate reached a settlement and the third phase of trial did not occur. 

Nickos has since died. Where relevant, additional facts adduced at trial will 

be set forth more fully below. 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR11

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED THE 

KUCIK DEFEDANTS’ AND NICKOS PROKOS’ MOTIONS FOR 

JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT FOR ALL OF 

THE REASONS ASSERTED IN THIS BRIEF REGARDING THE 

LAW AND FACTS, BUT ESPECIALLY BY REASON OF THE 

TRIAL COURT LACKING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 

OVER (i) ALL CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST KUCIK 

DEFENDANTS AND (ii) ALL CLAIMS OF FIDUCIARY 

AGAINST DEMETRIOS PROKOS. 

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEMETRIOS 

PROKOS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE CLAIM OF 

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE TO THE JURY WITHOUT 

PROOF OF THE VALIDITY OF CLAIMANT’S CLAIM, AND IN 

INSTRUCTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE CLAIM. 

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS EVIDENTIARY 

RULINGS THAT NEITHER PARTY COULD ADDUCE 

EVIDENCE BEYOND SOME MINIMAL AMOUNT TO PROVE 

 

11 The assignments of error have been re-numbered as they were not properly numbered in Appellants’, 

brief. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 18

OR DISPROVE THE VALIDITY OF THE MECHANIC’S LIENS. 

THE EVIDENTIARY RULINGS WERE MADE DURING THE 

TESTIMONY OF DEMETRIOS PROKOS AND DURING THE 

PRESENTATION OF THE KUCIK DEFENDANTS AND NICKOS 

PROKOS CASES. THE KUCIK DEFENDANTS EXHIBITS IN 

REGARD THERETO WERE PROFFERED. 

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TRIFURCATING THE TRIAL 

INTO THREE PHASES, THE “PERSONAL CLAIMS” OF 

DEMETRIOS AND OTHERS, EXCEPT NICKOS PROKOS FOR 

PHASE 3, THE MECHANIC’S LIENS FOR PHASE 2, AND ALL 

OTHER CLAIMS, BASICALLY CONSISTING OF FRAUD 

CLAIMS, FRAUDULENT TRANSFER CLAIMS, FIRESTONE 

CLAIM, FOR PHASE 1. 

VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE 

KUCIK DEFENDANTS, AND ANY JURY FINDING IS TAINTED 

THEREBY, IN SUBMITTED CLAIMS TO THE JURY THAT 

INCLUDED THE CLAIM OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. 

VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AND PERMITTING 

THE JURY TO CONSIDER INCONSISTENT REMEDIES, IN 

THAT THE PREVAILING PARTIES SHOULD NOT BE 

PERMITTED TO GAIN TITLE TO THE SUBJECT REAL 

PROPERTIES FREE AND CLEAR OF MORTGAGES THAT HAD 

BEEN PAID BY THE KUCIK DEFENDANTS OR ONE OF THEM. 

VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE THAT 

CLAIMING PARTIES SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ELECT 

REMEDIES. THE PREVAILING PARTIES SHOULD NOT HAVE 

BOTH THE PROPERTIES AND DAMAGES. 

IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE ESTATE 

FIDUCIARY JEFFREY FINLEY TO PROCEED IN TRIAL 

WITHOUT PROSECUTING THE ORIGINAL CLAIMS OF THE 

DECEDENT LAISA PROKOS AGAINST DEMETRIOS PROKOS, 

ET AL., AS SHE ORIGINALLY CLAIMED, THEREBY GIVING 

THE JURY THE FALSE IMPRESSION THAT THE CLAIMS OF 

DEMETRIOS PROKOS WERE MERITORIOUS WHEN 

ORIGINALLY LAISA PROKOS HAD ELECTED TO HAVE 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 19

THEM DETERMINED AS LACKING IN MERIT AND IN FACT 

HAD MADE CLAIMS AGAINST HIM. THIS ERROR WAS TO 

THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF THE KUCIK 

DEFENDANTS. 

X. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE ESTATE 

FIDUCIARY JEFFREY FINLEY TO PROCEED IN TRIAL AS IF 

HE HAD NOT DENIED THE VALIDITY OF THE MECHANIC’S 

LIENS CLAIMS OF THE PLAINTIFF DEMETRIOS PROKOS IN 

HIS PLEADINGS, WHICH HE HAD, THEREBY GIVING THE 

JURY THE FALSE IMPRESSION THAT THE ESTATE WAS IN 

AGREEMENT WITH THE CLAIMS OF DEMETRIOS PROKOS 

AS WELL AS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE VALIDITY OF THE 

MECHANIC’S LIENS. 

XI. THE JURY FAILED TO GIVE PROPER WEIGHT TO THE 

PROPERLY TRANSLATED VIDEO OF THE DECEDENT LAISA 

PROKOS. 

XII. THE JURY FAILED TO GIVE PROPER WEIGHT TO THE 

OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF THE UNINFLUENCED 

WISHES OF THE DECEDENT LAISA PROKOS IN MAKING 

NEW WILLS WITH AN ATTORNEY WHOSE ETHICS AND 

PARTIALITY ONLY TO HIS CLIENT WHICH WERE NEVER 

PROVEN WANTING IN ANY WAY, THEREBY GIVING THE 

FALSE IMPRESSION TO THE JURY THAT THE DECEDENT 

WAS SUBJECT TO THE UNDUE INFLUENCE OF KUCIK 

DEFENDANTS AND DEFENDANT NICKOS PROKOS. 

XIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING AN AWARD OF 

ATTORNEY FEES TO DEMETRIOS PROKOS AGAINST KUCIK 

DEFENDANTS BECAUSE HE DID NOT RECEIVE AN AWARD 

OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST THEM. 

XIV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECIDE BY 

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, INDEPENDENTLY OF 

THE JURY,(WHICH ONLY MADE DECISIONS BY A 

PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE), THAT THE 

TRANSFERS OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES HAD BEEN 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 20

NULLIFIED, FOR ANY REASON OR BY REASON OF THE 

JURY’S INTERROGATORIES. 

XV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD AN 

EQUITABLE LIEN TO KUCIK DEFENDANTS FOR THE MONEY 

PAID BY THEM FOR THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES AND 

FOR SATISFACTION OF THE MORTAGES OF THEM. 

XVI. THE TRIAL COURT IN JUDGMENT ENTRY, FILED 

NOVEMBER 22, 2010, ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT KUCIK 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 

NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND A NEW TRIAL, 

AND REMITTER FOR THE REASONS STATED IN THEIR 

MOTION THEREFOR, WHICH PRIMARILY ARE AS FOLLOWS: 

 A. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND THE EVIDENCE DO NOT 

SUPPORT THE COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AWARDED TO 

THE ESTATE ($49,000) AND DEMETRIOS PROKOS ($5,000); 

 

 B. ASSUMING THE COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AWARD 

ARE VACATED, THEN BY STATUTE AND RELEVANT CASE 

LAW, THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD MUST BE VACATED; 

 C. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE SUCH THAT THE TRIAL 

JUDGE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE STATUTES 

IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS; 

 D. ALL OF THE GROUNDS ASSERTED IN THE MOTIONS FOR 

DIRECTED VERDICT MADE AT TRIAL; AND, 

 E. OTHER GROUNDS AS SET FORTH IN CIVIL RULES 50 AND 

59 OR APPLICABLE STATUES. 

XVII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE KUCIK 

DEFENDANTS COULD NOT ADDUCE EVIDENCE OF THE 

FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN VASIOLIOS PROKOS, 

FATHER OF DEMETRIOS PROKOS, AS EVIDENCE BY 

HUNDREDS OF PERSONAL AND BUSINESS CHECKS, 

(PROFFERED EXHIBIT ___), REGARDING THE LACK OF 

EVIDENCE SUPPORTING DEMETRIOS PROKOS’ BASIS FOR 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 21

THE MECHANICS LIENS THAT HE FILED, WHICH IF THEY 

HAD COME INTO EVIDENCE WOULD HAVE PROVED 

DEMETRIOS PROKOS MECHANICS LIEN CLAIMS 

BASELESS;THEREBY PRECLUDING RECOVERY UNDER THE 

 FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE CLAIM. 

XVIII.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS JOURNAL ENTRY ON 

PROPOSED SETTLEMENT, FILED SEPTEMBER 23, 2010, IN 

FINDING OR ASSUMING THE VALIDITY OF THE 

MECHANIC’S LIENS IN APPROVING A SETTLEMENT, POST 

TRIAL, AND IN NOT HAVING A FACTUAL BASIS IN ITS OWN 

COURT FOR SO ORDERING. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW OF CIVIL JUDGMENTS 

{¶34} In reviewing a trial court’s judgment, it is well established that 

every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and 

findings of fact. Shemo v. Mayfields Hts., 88 Ohio St. 3d 7, 722 N.E.2d 

1018 (2000); Seasons Coal Co., v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St. 3d 77, 461 N.E.2d 

1273 (1984). 

I. Assignment of Error One - Did the Athens County Court of Common 

Pleas, General Division, have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of 

the parties herein?12

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶35} The existence of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a 

question of law that we review de novo. Tewksbury v. Tewksbury, 4th Dist. 

 

12 At the outset, we note Appellants’ assignment of error one also indicates, in addition to the primary 

argument that the common pleas court’s general division did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the 

claims herein, that the trial court erred by overruling the Kucik Defendants and Nickos Prokos motions for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for the reasons contained in the brief. Pursuant to Grimes v. 

Grimes, 975 N.E.2d 496, 2012-Ohio-3562, (4th Dist. 2012), we remark that though appellate courts have 

the option to address two or more assignments of error at once, the parties do not. Grimes at 15, Fn 4. We 

have declined to address this portion of assignment of error one, also, pursuant to App.R. 16(A)(7). 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 22

Pike No. 07CA771, 2008-Ohio-4600, ¶ 15, citing State ex rel. ACCSEA v. 

Balch, 4th Dist. Athens No. 06CA26, 2007- Ohio-7168, ¶ 22; YazdaniIsfehani v. Yazdani-Isfehani, Athens No. 06CA6, 2006-Ohio-7105, ¶20, 

citing State v. Moore, 4th Dist. Highland No. 03CA18, 2004-Ohio-3977, ¶8, 

and Burns v. Daily, 114 Ohio App.3d 693, 701, 683 N.E. 2d 1164 (1996). 

Therefore, we do not grant any deference to the trial court’s conclusion, 

Tewksbury, supra, citing Balch at ¶22. 

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶36} Appellants argue the Athens County Court of Common Pleas, 

General Division, had no jurisdiction over the claims against them asserted 

by the Estate of Laisa Prokos and Demetrios Prokos. Appellants’ arguments 

against jurisdiction of the Athens County Common Pleas Court, general 

division, can be summarized as follows: 

1) The claims regarding Laisa’s inter vivos transfers to 

Appellants were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 

probate court based on the law contained in Grimes v. 

Grimes, 975 N.E.2d 496, 2012-Ohio-3562 (4th Dist. 

2012); Johnson v. Johnson, 4th Dist. Vinton No. 

98CA519, 1999 WL 527753; and Spitzer v. Jackson, 96 

Ohio App. 3d 313, 644 N.E.2d 1122 (2nd Dist.1994) 

2) The common pleas court had no jurisdiction over 

Demetrios and Natalie’s intentional interference with 

expectancy (Firestone) claims; 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 23

3) The Estate’s claim for declaratory relief against 

Demetrios, i.e. (the mechanic’s liens) was not ripe for 

adjudication because Appellants were record owners; 

4) The common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to 

entertain the Firestone damage claims of Demetrios and 

Natalie; and, 

5) Florida, not Ohio, had jurisdiction over the Estate’s 

tort claims, resulting in violation of Appellants’ rights to 

due process. 

{¶37} We disagree with Appellants’ arguments. 

{¶38} “The power to define the jurisdiction of the courts of common 

pleas rests in the General Assembly and * * *such courts may exercise only 

such jurisdiction as is expressly granted to them by the legislature.” Dumas,

quoting Seventh Urban Inc. v. Univ. Circle Property Dev., Inc., 67 Ohio St. 

2d 19, 22, 423 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (1981). “The court of common pleas is a 

court of general jurisdiction. It embraces all matters at law and in equity that 

are not denied to it.* * *The probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction; it 

can exercise just such powers as are conferred on it by statute and the 

constitution of the state.” Dumas v. Estate of Dumas, 68 Ohio St. 3d 405, 

1994-Ohio-312,627 N.E.2d 978, citing Saxton v. Seiberling, 48 Ohio St. 

554, 558-559, 29 N.E.179, 180 (1891). 

{¶39} In Dumas v. Estate of Dumas, supra, a widow filed a complaint 

alleging two causes of action, for fraudulent conveyance of assets and for 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 24

fraud. She did not contest the validity of her husband’s will or challenge the 

estate inventory, but alleged he fraudulently transferred assets to an inter 

vivos trust with the intent to deprive her of her rights under Ohio law. The 

Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether the general division of the Court 

of Common Pleas rather than the probate division had jurisdiction over the 

action, and held that the general division did have jurisdiction. In doing so, 

the Dumas court observed that Dumas’ complaint alleged two causes of 

action, one for fraudulent conveyance of assets and one for fraud. The court 

noted although the outcome of its decision might affect the administration of 

the Dumas’ probate estate, the primary aim of the complaint was the 

recovery of monetary damages for alleged fraud. The court therefore held 

that the issues raised in the complaint were solely within the jurisdiction of 

the general division of the court of common pleas. 

{¶40} The Dumas court followed the reasoning set forth in Schucker 

v. Metcalf, 22 Ohio St.3d 33, 35, 488 N.E.2d 210, 213 (1986) and which 

held pursuant to R.C. 2101.24, “the probate division has no jurisdiction over 

claims for money damages arising from allegations of fraud.”13 Despite 

 

13 Since Schucker, the Supreme Court of Ohio has embraced a broader view of the probate court’s 

jurisdiction. In State ex rel. Lewis v. Moser, 72 Ohio St. 3d 25, 28-29, 647 N.E.2d 155 (1995), the Court 

adopted the view that: (1) claims for breach of fiduciary duty, which inexorably implicate control over the 

conduct of fiduciaries, are within the jurisdiction of the probate court by virtue of R.D. 2101.24(A)(1)(c) 

and (e); and (2) the probate court’s plenary jurisdiction at law and in equity under R.C. 2101.24(C) 

authorizes any relief required to fully adjudicate the subject matter within the probate court’s exclusive 

jurisdiction.” Keith v. Bringardner, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-666, 2008-Ohio-950, ¶ 10. In Keith, the 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 25

Schucker’s narrower view, in the case at bar, we find the common pleas 

court, general division, appropriately exercised subject matter jurisdiction 

over the claims tried herein. 

{¶41} As a preliminary consideration, we point out, pursuant to R.C. 

2311.21, Laisa’s death did not result in an abatement of her pending claims. 

R.C. 2311.21 provides that “...[N]o action or proceeding pending in any 

court shall abate by the death of either or both of the parties thereto, except 

actions for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, for a nuisance, or against a 

judge of a county court for misconduct in office, which shall abate by the 

death of either party.” Laisa’s Estate continued the lawsuits in the proper 

forum in which they had been filed. 

{¶42} We also note the cases were initiated by Laisa Prokos and were 

pending at the time of her death. A mechanic’s lien had been filed against 

her Ohio properties and was recorded in the Athens County Recorder’s 

Office. She filed the cases in the Athens common pleas court because the 

real estate, subject of the suits, was located in Athens County, Ohio. Laisa 

disputed Demetrios’ claims as a creditor by initiating the lawsuits. Also at 

 

appellate court noted all appellant’s claims revolved around appellee’s conduct as guardians during his 

guardianship. Id. at 13. As such, appellant’s claims “[touched] the guardianship” and were within the 

exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. Id. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that 

the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding appellant’s claim for money damages. Id. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 26

the time of her death, Laisa owned $49,000.00 in funds held in her Ohio 

attorney’s client trust account. 

A. Did the probate court have exclusive jurisdiction?

{¶43} Appellants’ first argument that the probate court had exclusive 

jurisdiction of the claims is simply not persuasive. The exclusive 

jurisdiction of the probate division is set forth in R.C. 2101.24 as follows: 

“(A)(1)(a) To take the proof of will and to admit to 

record authenticated copies of wills executed, proved, 

and allowed in the courts of any other state, territory, or 

country...; 

(b) To grant and revoke letters testamentary and of 

administration; 

(c) To direct and control the conduct and settle the 

accounts of executors and administrators and order the 

distribution of estates; 

(d) To appoint the attorney general to serve as the 

administrator of an estate...; 

(e) To appoint and remove guardians, conservators, and 

testamentary trustees, direct and control their conduct, 

and settle their accounts; 

(f) To grant marriage licenses; 

(g) To make inquests respecting persons mentally 

impaired...; 

(h) To qualify assignees, appoint and qualify trustees 

and commissioners of insolvents, control their conduct, 

and settle their accounts; 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 27

(i) To authorize the sale of lands, equitable estates, or 

interests in lands or equitable estates...; 

(j) To authorize the completion of real property contracts 

on petition of executors and administrators; 

(k) To construe wills; 

(l) To render declaratory judgments, including but not 

limited to, those rendered pursuant to section 2107.084 of 

the Revised Code; 

(m) To direct and control the conduct of fiduciaries and 

settle their accounts. 

(n) To authorize the sale or lease of any estate created by 

will if the estate is held in trust, on petition by the trustee; 

(o) To terminate a testamentary trust in any case in 

which a court of equity may do so; 

(p) To hear and determine actions to contest the validity 

of wills; 

(q) To make a determination of the presumption of death 

of missing persons...; 

(r) To hear and determine an action commenced pursuant 

to section 3107.41 of the Revised Code...; 

(s) To act for and issue orders regarding wards...; 

(t) To hear and determine actions against sureties on 

bonds of sureties appointed by the probate court; 

(u) To hear and determine actions involving informed 

consent for medication of persons hospitalized pursuant 

to section 51.22.141 or 5122.15 of the Revised Code; 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 28

(v) To hear and determine actions relation to durable 

power of attorney for health care...; 

(w) To hear and determine actions commenced by 

objecting individuals, in accordance with section 2133.05 

of the Revised Code; 

(x) To hear and determine complaints that pertain to the 

use or continuation or the withholding or withdrawal, of 

life-sustaining treatment...; 

(y) To hear and determine applications that pertain to the 

withholding or withdrawal of nutrition or hydration...; 

(z) To hear and determine applications of attending 

physicians in accordance with division (B) of section i n 

2133.15 of the Revised Code; 

(aa) To hear and determine actions relative to the use or 

continuation of comfort care in connection with certain 

principals under durable powers of attorney for 

healthcare...; 

(bb) To hear and determine applications for an order 

relieving an estate from administration under section 

2113.03 of the Revised Code; 

(cc) To hear and determine applications for an order 

granting a summary release from administration under 

section 2113.031 of the Revised Code; 

(dd) To hear and determine actions relating to the 

exercise of the right of disposition, in accordance with 

section 2108.90 of the Revised Code; 

(ee) To hear and determine actions relating to the 

disinterment and re-interment of human remains...; 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 29

(ff) To hear and determine petitions for an order for 

treatment of a person suffering from alcohol and other 

drug abuse...; 

{¶44} Appellants cite Grimes, supra; Johnson v. Johnson, 4th Dist. 

Vinton No. 98CA519, 1999 WL 527753; and Spitzer v. Jackson in support 

of their position. However, Dumas and Schucker are still good law. And the 

cases cited by Appellants are easily distinguished from the underlying facts 

herein. 

{¶45} In Grimes v. Grimes, supra, the case concerned three 

declaratory judgment actions, not tort actions, and did not contain a prayer 

for monetary relief. The claims were brought by an executor of an estate 

against the decedent’s son. The claims were first filed in the general 

division of the common pleas court, but later voluntarily dismissed and refiled in the probate division. The executor sought a declaration from the 

court that the subject properties were being held by the son in a constructive 

trust for the estate. On appeal, we held the executor’s declaratory judgment 

claims were related to the administration of the decedent’s estate and 

therefore, the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the 

fact that the case against Appellants concerned tort claims and asked for 

monetary relief distinguishes it from Grimes, a declaratory judgment action 

relating to the administration of an estate. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 30

{¶46} Johnson v. Johnson, 1999 WL 527753, is also not persuasive. 

In Johnson, appellant asserted the probate court did not have jurisdiction to 

recover assets wrongfully withheld from an estate even if withheld on the 

basis of fraud. We commented: “that claim confuses the distinction between 

the tort of fraud and other claims based on fraudulent conduct.” We noted 

the claim was not for monetary damages but rather for the return of 

substantial assets to the estate. Johnson cited Dumas, above, reiterating that 

the probate court would have no jurisdiction to hear a tort fraud claim. 

Because Johnson focused on recovery of estate assets and did not involve a 

claim for monetary damages, we find it distinguishable from the case at bar. 

{¶47} In our consideration of Johnson, we cited Spitzer v. Jackson, 96 

Ohio App. 3d 31, 644 N.E.2d 1122, (2nd Dist.1994), a case directly on point 

with Johnson. The Spitzer court also cited the law in Dumas, ultimately 

holding a cause of action for damages from fraud is not within the 

jurisdiction of a probate court. Spitzer is distinguishable from the facts 

herein because it was a case of return of wrongfully withheld assets, not a 

“damages for fraud” case. 

{¶48} Appellants also direct us to Tewksbury v. Tewksbury, 4th Dist. 

Pike No. 07CA771, 2008-Ohio-4600, which is also not persuasive. There, an 

estate administrator filed a complaint in the probate division of the common 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 31

pleas court against a decedent’s son alleging concealment or embezzlement 

of estate assets. The relevant statute which the administrator brought suit 

under was R.C. 2109.50. We cited Wozniak v. Wozniak, 90 Ohio App.3d 

400, 407, 629 N.E.2d 500 (1993), which noted R.C. 2109.50 focuses on the 

ownership of an asset and whether possession of the asset is being 

impermissibly concealed or withheld from the estate, as well as Rudloff v. 

Efstathiadis, 11th Dist.Trumbull No. 2002-T-119, 2003-Ohio-6686, which 

also concluded a probate court had jurisdiction over an action brought 

pursuant to R.C. 2109.50. In Tewksbury, we concluded the probate court 

possessed jurisdiction to resolve title issues and determine whether assets 

belonged to the estate. Notably, Tewksbury contained no fraud claim or 

prayer for damages. 

{¶49} Appellants’ reliance on the above-cited cases is misplaced. 

And, a review of R.C. 2101.24(A) lists all matters within the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the probate court. Appellants have cited nothing to convince 

us that Appellees’ fraud claims in tort, requesting compensatory and punitive 

damages, along with rescission of the deeds to the fraudulently conveyed 

properties were somehow within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate 

court and not properly within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Athens 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 32

County Common Pleas Court, General Division. We find no merit to 

Appellants’ argument herein. 

B. Did the probate court have jurisdiction over the intentional 

interference with expectancy claims?

{¶50} Appellants further argue the common pleas court, general 

division, had no jurisdiction over Demetrios’ and Natalie’s intentional 

interference with expectancy claims. However, we would note the jury did 

not find for Demetrios on these claims, but found in favor of the Kucik 

Defendants, as reflected by the court’s May 27, 2010 judgment entry. 

Furthermore, the jury instructions which were given on Day 29 of trial do 

not indicate Natalie’s claim for intentional interference with expectancy was 

submitted to the jury. These arguments are moot and this court need not 

consider them. 

C. Was the Estate’s claim for declaratory relief ripe for adjudication?

{¶51} Appellants also argued the Estate’s claim for relief against 

Demetrios for the mechanic’s lien, was not ripe for adjudication because 

Appellants were the record owners of the real estate. However, the first trial 

determined the Estate was the rightful owner of the property at issue. Once 

the properties were returned to the rightful ownership of the Estate, 

Demetrios and the Estate settled the claims regarding the mechanic’s lien. 

The settlement was necessarily approved by the Probate Court and the 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 33

common pleas court. At the time of the settlement, the claims regarding the 

mechanic’s lien were ripe and could be settled because the Estate had been 

adjudicated owner of the properties. 

D. Did the probate court have jurisdiction over the Firestone damage 

claims?

{¶52} Appellants also argued the general division of the common 

pleas court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Firestone damage claims of 

Demetrios and Natalie. The Ohio Supreme Court has held “[o]ne who by 

fraud, duress, or other tortious means, intentionally prevents another from 

inheriting from a third person an inheritance or gift that he would have 

otherwise received is subject to liability to the other for the loss of the 

inheritance or gift.” Firestone v. Galbreath, 67 Ohio St. 3d 87, 88, 616 N.E. 

2d 202 (1993), citing Restatement of the 2d Law, Torts (1993)58, Section 

774B; see, also Hammond v. Perry, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 12CA27, 2013-

Ohio-3683, ¶ 29. As previously noted in Section B above, Natalie did not 

go forward with her claims. The jury did not find in favor of Demetrios. 

This argument is also moot.14

E. Did Florida, not Ohio, have jurisdiction over the Estate’s tort 

claims?

 

14 Appellees’ brief pointed out repeatedly that it appeared Appellants “lazily cut and paste[d]” arguments 

from prior filings in lieu of making arguments. We regret to comment but it does appear that is the case. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 34

{¶53} Appellants’ final argument is that the Estate should have been 

filed in Florida instead of Ohio, and that the tort claims should have been 

filed in Florida instead of Ohio. As a result, they claim due process 

violations. However, R.C. 2107.11, provides: 

 “(A) A will shall be admitted to probate: 

(1) In the county in this state in which the testator was domiciled at 

the time of the testator’s death; 

(2) In any county of this state where any real property or personal 

property of the testator is located if, at the time of the testator’s death, 

the testator was not domiciled in this state, and provided that the will 

has not previously been admitted to probate in this state or in the state 

of the testator’s domicile; 

(3) In the county of the state in which a probate court renders a 

judgment declaring that the will was valid and in which the will was 

filed with the probate court. 

(B) For the purposes of division (A)(2) of this section, intangible 

personal property is located in the place where the instrument 

evidencing a debt, obligation, stock, or chose in action is located or if 

there is no instrument of that nature, where the debtor resides.” 

{¶54} Appellants’ contention has no merit. At the time of Laisa’s 

death in June 2005, she was the record owner of rental properties located in 

Athens County, Ohio, had a chose in action located in Ohio, and had filed 

lawsuits in Ohio. Her Estate continued her original claims. She was also the 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 35

owner of $49,000 being held in her Ohio attorney’s trust account. For these 

reasons, it was proper to open her estate in Athens County.15 

{¶55} As discussed above, the general division of the common pleas 

court in Athens County had jurisdiction over the matter. The Estate sought a 

monetary judgment on its tort claims. Appellants argue somehow their due 

process rights were violated but fail to “connect the dots.” We find no such 

violation. For the above reasons, we find the Athens County Court of 

Common Pleas, General Division, had subject matter jurisdiction over the 

claims of Demetrios and the Estate. Appellant’s first assignment of error is 

overruled. 

II. Combined Assignments of Error Two, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, 

Sixteen, Seventeen, and Eighteen.

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶56} App.R. 16(A)(7) requires an appellant’s brief to contain an 

argument with citations to authorities. McDonald v. McDonald, 4th Dist. 

Highland No. 12CA1, 2013-Ohio-470, ¶ 20. As this court recently 

emphasized in State v. Pippen, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 11CA3412, 2012-Ohio4692, ¶ 65: 

“ ‘If an argument exists that can support [an] assignment of 

error, it is not this court’s duty to root it out.’” Thomas v. 

 

15 Appellees also point out the additional causes of action asserted by the Estate against the Kucik 

Defendants were compulsory claims necessarily asserted for complete adjudication of the original action 

pursuant to Civ. R. 19(A). 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 36

Harmon, 4th Dist. No. 08CA17, 2009-Ohio-3299, at ¶14, 

quoting State v. Carman, 8th Dist. No. 90512, 2008-Ohio-4368, 

at ¶ 31. “It is not the function of this court to construct a 

foundation for [an appellant’s] claims; failure to comply with 

the rules governing practice in the appellate courts is a tactic 

which is ordinarily fatal.” Cantanzarite v. Boswell, 9th Dist. 

No. 24184, 2009-Ohio-1211, at ¶ 16, quoting Kremer v. Cox,

114 Ohio App. 3d 41, 60, 682 N.E.2d 1006 (1996). Therefore, 

“[w]e may disregard any assignment of error that fails to 

present any citations to case law or statutes in support of its 

assertions.” Fry v. Holzer Clinic, Inc., 4th Dist. Gallia No. 

07CA4, 2008-Ohio-2194, at ¶ 12. See, also, App.R. 12(A)(2); 

Albright v. Albright, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 06CA35, 2007-

Ohio-3709, ¶ 16. 

{¶57} Under this combined consideration of assigned errors two, 

eleven, twelve, thirteen, sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen we have mostly 

paraphrased the errors set forth by Appellants in their brief. In McDonald, 

supra, we found no need to consider deficient assignments of error in the 

interests of justice. Regarding assigned errors two, eleven, twelve, thirteen, 

sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen in the case at bar, we are of the same 

opinion.16

A. Assignment of Error Two- The trial court erred in granting 

Demetrios Prokos’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

{¶58} Appellees point out Appellants have failed to identify the 

referenced motion for summary judgment and explain how the trial court 

 

16 We would note Appellants’ brief appears to argue only assigned errors one (subject matter jurisdiction); 

three (validity of Demetrios’ claim); four (evidentiary rulings); five (trifurcation); and seven and eight 

(election of remedies). The brief ends after Appellants argue errors seven and eight. Appellants’ reply brief 

also indicates a reliance on their prior filings in the trial court proceedings since they are “part of the record 

on appeal,” instead of actually setting forth their arguments directly to this court. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 37

erred in granting the motion.17 In other words, Appellants have failed to 

separately argue this assigned error in their brief. We agree that Appellants 

have waived assignment of error two and accordingly, overrule it. 

B. Assignment of Error Eleven-The jury failed to give proper weight 

to the properly translated video of the decedent Laisa Prokos.

{¶59} Again, we note Appellants fail to argue in their brief this 

assigned error. Appellants do not identify where the error occurred, explain 

why they believe proper weight was not given to the video, nor otherwise 

explain how this affected the outcome of the trial. Appellants do not cite to 

the record regarding their arguments under this assigned error. As such, we 

find Appellants have waived their arguments herein and accordingly, we 

overrule assignment of error eleven. 

C. Assignment of Error Twelve-The jury failed to give proper weight 

to the overwhelming evidence of the uninfluenced wishes of the 

decedent Laisa Prokos, thereby giving the false impression to the jury 

that the decedent was subject to the undue influence of the Kucik 

Defendants and defendant Nickos Prokos.

{¶60} Again, Appellants have not followed App.R. 16(A)(7) by 

failing to argue this assigned error separately in their brief. Therefore, it is 

waived and assignment of error twelve is hereby overruled. 

 

17 Demetrios and Pam filed a motion for summary judgment against Nickos on February 7, 2006. 

Demetrios, Pam and Natalie filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the Kucik Defendants on 

June 9, 2006. Demetrios filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on the claims of Nickos on August 

22, 2008. Demetrios filed a motion for summary judgment against the Estate and counterclaims for 

foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien on September 10, 2008. Demetrios filed a renewed motion for partial 

summary judgment on November 6, 2008. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 38

D. Assignment of Error Thirteen-The trial court erred in granting an 

award of attorney fees to Demetrios Prokos against Kucik defendants 

because he did not receive an award of punitive damages against 

them. 

{¶61} Again, Appellants’ brief fails to makes any argument under this 

assigned error. Appellants do not cite to the record, nor do they provide any 

case law or statutory authority. Appellants have waived their argument and 

assignment of error thirteen is also overruled. 

E. Assignment of Error Sixteen.

{¶62} We again find Appellants have waived their arguments under 

this assignment of error. To demonstrate how Appellants seem to expect 

this court to understand and interpret their arguments, despite Appellants’ 

failure to cite to the record and explain their arguments, we set forth fully the 

assigned error as presented by Appellants: 

 THE TRIAL COURT IN JUDGMENT ENTRY FILED 

NOVEMBER 22, 2010, ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 

KUCIK DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 

NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND A NEW TRIAL 

AND REMITTER FOR THE REASONS STATED IN THEIR 

MOTION THEREFOR, WHICH PRIMARILY ARE AS 

FOLLOWS: 

A. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND THE EVIDENCE DO 

NOT SUPPORT THE COMPENSATORY DAMAGES 

AWARDED TO THE ESTATE($49,000) AND DEMETRIOS 

PROKOS ($5,000); 

B. ASSUMING THE COMPENSATORY DAMAGE AWARDS 

ARE VACATED, THEN BY STATUTE AND RELEVANT 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 39

CASE LAW, THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD MUST BE 

VACATED; 

C. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE SUCH THAT THE 

TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE 

STATUTES IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS; 

D. ALL OF THE GROUNDS ASSERTED IN THE MOTIONS 

FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE AT TRIAL; AND, 

E. OTHER GROUNDS AS SET FORTH IN CIVIL RULES 50 

AND 59 OR APPLICABLE STATUTES. 

{¶63} Appellants have combined multiple and potentially complex 

arguments under a single assignment of error. In Grimes, supra, at ¶ 15, 

fn.4, this court noted “[t]hough appellate courts have the option to address 

two or more assignments of error at once, the parties do not. See, also, 

Powell v. Vanlandingham, 4th Dist. Washington No. 10CA24, 2011-Ohio3208, ¶ 24; Keffer v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 4th Dist. Vinton No. 06CA652, 

2007-Ohio-3984, ¶ 8, fn.2. Parties must comply with the Ohio Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. Grimes, at ¶ 15, fn.4. If not, App.R. 12(A)(2) permits 

us to disregard those assignments of error that are not separately argued. Id. 

Appellants’ extremely vague references to “all of the grounds asserted in the 

motions for directed verdict made at trial” and “other grounds as set forth in 

Civil Rules 50 and 59 or applicable statues” are clearly not compliant under 

App.R. 16(A)(7). 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 40

{¶64} Within this assignment of error, Appellants’ brief argument 

about the propriety of the jury instructions is also vague. As we discuss 

below in Section III, Appellants assert the argument in assignment of error 

three that it was error to submit Demetrios’ claim for fraudulent transfer to 

the jury because Demetrios did not meet the burden of proof that he was a 

“creditor” within the meaning of R.C. 1336.01. However, Appellants did 

not make any arguments about the jury instructions under assigned error 

three. Within this assignment of error, Appellants again do not make 

specific arguments or direct us to the transcript. We decline to address 

Appellants’ assertion that the jury instructions did not comply with 

applicable law. 

F. Assignment of Error Seventeen-The trial court erred in ruling that 

the Kucik Defendants could not adduce evidence of the financial 

transactions between Vasilios Prokos, regarding the lack of evidence 

supporting Demetrios Prokos’ basis for the mechanic’s liens.

{¶65} Appellants have again failed to separately argue this assignment 

of error in their brief. Appellants fail to identify in the record where this 

alleged error occurred and fail to identify in setting forth the assignment of 

error which exhibit was proffered. See Appellants’ assignment of error 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 41

seventeen, set forth fully on page 20 above. Pursuant to App. R. 16(A)(7), 

we may disregard this assignment of error.18

{¶66} Accordingly, Appellants have waived argument under 

assignment of error seventeen, and it is hereby overruled. 

G. Assignment of Error Eighteen-The trial court erred in its journal 

entry on proposed settlement, filed September 23, 2010, in finding or 

assuming the validity of the mechanic’s liens.

{¶67} Similar to our view set forth under assignment of error 

seventeen, Appellants failed to separately argue this assignment of error. 

They cite no case law or statutory authority relating to this assignment of 

error. And, the assignment of error relates to the validity of the mechanic’s 

liens. 19 Appellants failed to abide by the applicable appellate rule and 

agreed to trifurcation of the mechanic’s liens issues. Appellants have 

waived their right to argue the issue raised under this assignment of error 

and accordingly, error eighteen is also overruled. 

III. Assignment of Error Three - Was Demetrios a “creditor” within the 

meaning of the fraudulent conveyance statute?

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

 

18 Furthermore, we find Appellants waived this argument by agreeing to the trifurcation and postponing the 

issue of mechanics liens to the second phase of trial. Ostensibly, evidence of financial transactions 

between father and son would be evidence going to the issue of the validity of the mechanics liens. We 

discuss the trifurcation issue fully in Section 4 below. 

19We reiterate, Appellants agreed to trifurcation of the mechanic’s liens’ issue. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 42

{¶68} Appellant argues the trial court erred in submitting the claim of 

fraudulent conveyance to the jury without proof of the validity of the 

claimant’s claim, and in instructing the jury to consider the claim. Appellee 

has responded that Demetrios met his burden of proof in establishing that he 

was a creditor for purposes of the fraudulent conveyance statute. We agree 

with Appellee.20

{¶69} R.C. 1336.04, Transfer made or obligation incurred as 

fraudulent to a creditor, defines a fraudulent conveyance as follows: 

“(A) A transfer made or an obligation incurred by a debtor is 

fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the claim of the creditor 

arose before or within a reasonable time, not to exceed four 

years after, the transfer was made, or the obligation was 

incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the 

obligation in either of the following ways: 

(1) With actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of 

the debtor; 

(2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in 

exchange for the transfer or obligation, and if either of the 

following applies: 

(a) The debtor was engaged or was about to engage in a 

business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the 

debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or 

transaction; 

 

20Additionally, we note although Appellants state within this assignment of error (as well as in assignments 

of error 6 and 16), that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to consider Demetrios’ claim, Appellants 

do not make this argument, but for a vague statements on pages 76 and 78 of their brief, respectively: 

“Defendant Demetrios Prokos cannot state a claim for fraudulent conveyance under the UFTA, and no jury 

instruction should be given based on that act” and “[t]he jury instructions should have been modified in 

conformity with the foregoing argument.” We will address Appellants’ vague contentions about the jury 

instructions in our discussion of assignment of error 16 below. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 43

(b) The debtor intended to incur, or believed or reasonably 

should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond 

the debtor’s ability to pay as they became due. 

(B) In determining the actual intent under division (A)(1) of 

this section, consideration may be given to all relevant factors, 

including, but not limited to, the following: 

(1) Whether the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 

(2) Whether the debtor retained possession or control of the 

property transferred after the transfer; 

(3) Whether the transfer or obligation was disclosed or 

concealed; 

(4) Whether before the transfer was made or the obligation was 

incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; 

(5) Whether the transfer was of substantially all of the assets of 

the debtor; 

(6) Whether the debtor absconded; 

(7) Whether the debtor removed or concealed assets; 

(8) Whether the value of the consideration received by the 

debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset 

transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; 

(9) Whether the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent 

shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was 

incurred; 

(10) Whether the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly 

after a substantial debt was incurred; 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 44

(11) Whether the debtor transferred the essential assets of the 

business to a lienholder who transferred the assets to an insider 

of the debtor.” 

{¶70} R.C. 1336.01 sets forth the Ohio Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 

Act definitions. “Claim” is defined as “a right to payment, whether or not 

the right is reduced to a judgment, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed, 

contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, 

secured, or unsecured.” R.C. 1336.01(C). “Creditor” is defined as “a person 

who has a claim.” R.C. 1336.01(D). 

{¶71} The issue of whether or not an individual possessing a cause of 

action in tort was a “creditor” within the meaning of R.C. 1336.01, with the 

right to question an alleged fraudulent conveyance was addressed in Stein v. 

Brown, 18 Ohio St. 3d 305, 480 N.E.2d 1121 (1985).21 The Stein court 

answered the question affirmatively, noting that its conclusion was “clearly 

warranted by the language of the statute which includes unmature, 

unliquidated, or contingent claims.” See, also, 37 American Jurisprudence 

2d (1968) 818-819, Fraudulent Conveyances, Section 145; Annotation 73 

A.L.R.2d 749.Cf. (1968). Pennell v. Walker, 68 Ohio App. 533, 36 N.E.2d 

150 (1941). Black’s Law Dictionary provides similar definitions for the 

terms “creditor” and “claim.” (7th Ed.Rev. 1999), 240, 4375; Sowers v. 

 

21 When Stein was decided, the definitions contained in R.C. 1336.01 listed “Creditor” at 1336.01(C). 

“Creditor” is now defined and listed at R.C. 1336.01(D). The content of the definition of creditor did not 

change. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 45

Luginbill, 175 Ohio App.3d 745, 2008-Ohio-1486, 889 N.E.2d 172. Also, 

see generally, Phillips v. Phillips, 4th Dist. Vinton No. 96CA503, 1997 WL 

188780 (Apr.15, 1997). As we begin our analysis, we are mindful of the 

standard of review, previously set forth regarding the weight of the evidence. 

{¶72} Appellants argue Demetrios failed to establish that he was a 

“creditor” as defined under the fraudulent transfer act. Clearly, Appellants 

ignore the fact that one possessing a “cause of action” in tort is a “creditor” 

within the meaning of the fraudulent conveyance statute and pursuant to the 

law set forth in Stein. Under the definitions set forth above, Demetrios was 

a “creditor,” a person with a claim. R.C. 1336.01(D). “Claim” is defined as 

a “right to payment,” whether or not it is “reduced to judgment” or 

“disputed,” which is particularly relevant under these facts.22 Demetrios 

testified as to his claim and the basis for it during trial. 

{¶73} The trial transcript reflects Demetrios’ testimony that he began 

managing the rentals full-time in 1995 or 1996 until December 2003. On 

cross-examination, Demetrios testified he had an agreement with his father 

regarding his management of the properties, and his investment in them. He 

also testified his mother was aware of the agreement. Demetrios was forced 

to admit she had denied the existence of any agreement prior to her death. 

 

22 R.C. 1336.01(C). 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 46

{¶74} The jury heard the following testimony on direct examination 

of Demetrios, regarding the mechanic’s lien and affidavit of title: 

“Q: * * * In January you filed a mechanic’s lien, is that 

correct? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And you also filed an affidavit of facts related to realty, 

correct? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Now why did you file this mechanic’s lien. 

A: Um, we heard through the grapevine, let’s say, that um, 

the properties were ready to be sold, um uh to Mr. Larry 

Conrath. Um, and uh at an extreme low price. Uh over 

the years that I was managing the properties, I have put a 

lot of money in them. Um, and uh, uh and I was 

expecting that I would get this money back. Um, also had 

uh, uh, I was expecting that my parents had the kids, I 

would get my part. Um and uh I did have to protect my 

investment uh and to protect my mom from losing her 

um, equity on the properties that they were, had worked 

so hard over their lives to accumulate.” 

{¶75} On cross-examination, Demetrios also testified as follows how 

he had “calculated” or arrived at the number amount of the mechanic’s liens: 

“Q. Now you’ve talked about an agreement with your father I 

believe to manage his properties. And back in my office, 

which is really R.J. Shostak’s office. He’s got tuns(sic) 

of paper associated with expenses that you, you know, 

documents you produced. Um, in reading your 

depositions my understanding was those documents 

relate not only to the properties at issue in this case, but 

also all your properties, don’t they? 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 47

A: Yes. 

Q. Okay, it’s hard to distinguish between the two? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And in the end, you said, and I think Mr. Finley was the 

one who asked you this in, in a deposition, you said, I’m 

not relying on those documents. 

A: I don’t know if I said that. 

Q: I, I can find it, but uh, in any event the, but, really you are 

relying on an agreement for two maintenance men full 

time over a period of time, aren’t you? 

A: Correct. 

Q: And, and uh, but you don’t have a written agreement to 

that effect? 

A: No. 

Q: And at least you haven’t been able to find one, and its’ 

been five years? 

A: Correct 

Q: Okay, I’m sorry. Um so what was the rate you used to 

determine the amount of the mechanic’s lien? 

A: The, well we used to people, two maintenance men, and um and 

uh with the overhead, we had figured it out that it would be at 

the cost of ten dollars and seventy cents an hour. That is with 

their, with overhead. 

Q: Forty hours a week? 

A: Forty hours a week. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 48

Q: Fifty-two weeks a year? 

A: Yes. 

Q: For it think it comes out to seven or eight years? 

A: Seven and a half years if I remember right. 

Q: And what’s the basis for the agreement? 

A: That’s how we agreed on it. 

Q: And you made that agreement with your father you said? 

A: Yes.” 

{¶76} A jury sitting as the trier of fact is free to believe all, part or 

none of the testimony of any witness who appears before it. State v. Grube, 

987 N.E.2d 287, 2013-Ohio-692, ¶ 31; see State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 

328, 335, 713 N.E.2d 1 (4th Dist. 1998); State v. Nichols, 85 Ohio App.3d 

65, 76, 619 N.E.2d 80 (4th Dist. 1993). A jury is in the best position to view 

the witnesses and to observe witness demeanor, gestures and voice 

inflections, and to use those observations to weigh credibility. Grube at 31; 

see also Myers v. Garson, 66 Ohio St.3d 610, 615, 614 N.E.2d 742 (1993); 

Seasons Coal Co.v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 

1273(1984). Appellate courts should not generally second-guess juries on 

matters of weight and credibility. Grube at ¶ 31; see also State v. Vance, 4th 

Dist No. 03CA27, 2004-Ohio-5370, ¶10. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 49

{¶77} The trial judge and the jury heard the testimony of various 

witnesses over the course of the 31-day trial. The jury heard and observed 

Demetrios as he testified about his business relationship with his father, his 

management of his parents’ rental properties, and his claim for 

reimbursement for time spent and money invested in his parents’ properties. 

{¶78} The jury also heard much testimony which characterized 

Demetrios as a mean and greedy character. Nickos testified that tension with 

Demetrios dated back to their childhoods. He also testified that Demetrios 

“ripped him off” on a business venture. He testified Demetrios owed him 

$200,000.00. He testified their parents had revoked Demetrios’ power of 

attorney in 2001 because Demetrios had too much control over the 

properties and was commingling the rents with his own accounts. 

{¶79} Pam’s testimony also painted an unflattering portrayal of 

Demetrios. Pam testified Demetrios’ relationship with their mother was not 

good. Pam testified her mother did not trust Demetrios. Pam testified that 

Demetrios yelled at their parents, demanding that they sign the rental 

properties over to him. Importantly, Pam testified there was no financial 

arrangement which she was aware of, that Demetrios would be reimbursed 

for caring for the properties. Yet during re-cross examination, Pam 

acknowledged previously testifying in a June 2007 deposition that 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 50

Demetrios had a claim for money owed him, due to taking care of their 

father’s properties. 

{¶80} The jury not only heard Barry Kucik, Pam, Natalie, and Nickos 

testify, but also observed their demeanor and assessed their credibility. After 

hearing all this testimony, the trial court evaluated the witnesses’ testimony 

and decided the creditor issue was a question of fact for the jury. Similarly, 

the jury determined the credibility of the witnesses and returned a verdict in 

favor of Demetrios on his claims of fraud and fraudulent transfer. Both the 

trial judge and the jury were in the better position to view the witnesses and 

assess their credibility. We will refrain from second-guessing their judgment 

as to Demetrios’ truthfulness as he testified about his agreement with his 

father and the basis for his claim. We agree with Appellee, Demetrios, that 

he met his required burden of proof in establishing he was a creditor for 

purposes of the fraudulent conveyance statute. Accordingly, we overrule 

assignment of error three. 

IV. Combined Assignments of Error Four, Five, and Nine - Have 

Appellants waived their arguments hereunder by agreeing to trifurcate the 

issues presented at trial?

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶81} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision on 

bifurcation issues under the abuse of discretion standard of review. Harris 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 51

v. Huff, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2008-T-0090, 2010-Ohio-3678, ¶ 36, citing 

Spencer v. Lakeview School Dist., 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2005-T0083, 

2006-Ohio-3429, ¶ 17 (Citation omitted.). This is because the trial court is 

in the best position to decide whether bifurcating issues is appropriate. Id. 

An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s “‘ failure to exercise sound, 

reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” Harris, supra, quoting State v. 

Beechler, 2nd Dist. Clark No. 09CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, quoting Black’s 

Law Dictionary (8 Ed.Rev. 2004) 11. 

{¶82} However, in Gall v. Gall, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 47889, 1984 

WL 3564, the appellate court considered appellant’s assignment of error 

complaining that the referee erred in bifurcating issues for trial without the 

parties’ consent. The appellate court, however, noted that both parties had 

consented to a bifurcated hearing. Having done so, the court concluded, 

appellant could not raise on appeal errors which were waived at trial. See, 

e.g., Blausey v. Stein, 61 Ohio St. 2d 264, 400 N.E.2d 408 (1980). 

Furthermore, “[t]he doctrine of invited error estops an appellant, in either a 

civil or criminal case, from attacking a judgment for errors the appellant 

induced the court to commit. Under that principle, a party cannot complain 

of any action taken or ruling made by the court in accordance with the 

party’s own suggestion or request.” State v. Kennedy, 2nd Dist. Champaign 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 52

No. 2011-CA-3, 2011-Ohio-4291, ¶ 37, quoting Royse v. Dayton, 195 Ohio 

App.3d 81, 2011-Ohio-3509, 958 N.E.2d 994, ¶ 11, citing State v. Woodruff,

10 Ohio App. 3d 326, 462 N.E.2d 457 (2nd Dist. 1983). See, also Davis v. 

Remy, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 05CA16, 2006-Ohio-5030. Similarly, we find 

Appellants have waived the arguments under these assignments of error by 

agreeing to trifurcate the trial. In an effort to make Appellant’s assignments 

of error more succinct, they have been paraphrased. We will address each 

argument only briefly, beginning with assignment of error five for ease of 

analysis. 

A. Assignment of Error Five - The trial court erred in trifurcating the trial 

into three phases: (1) the fraud claims, etc.; (2) the mechanics lien; and (3) 

all other “personal claims.”

{¶83} The parties’ agreement to trifurcate the issues presented for trial 

is well-documented in two pertinent court entries. On July 24, 2009, a 

Journal Entry memorialized the discussion about trifurcation, noting that the 

parties were directed to consider trifurcation and be “prepared to state their 

positions with reasoning at the next status conference.” On September 21, 

2009, the Court issued the following Entry, stating in pertinent part: 

“The parties agreed to trifurcate the trial. The first trial will 

concern the claims surrounding the allegedly fraudulent 

conveyances of the seven real estate parcels from Laisa Prokos 

(and Nickos Prokos as attorney-in-fact) to the Kucik 

Defendants. Additionally, the Firestone allegations and fraud 

allegations of Demetrios Prokos against the Kucik Defendants 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 53

and Nickos Prokos will be heard during the trial along with all 

remaining tort claims that the Estate of Laisa Prokos have 

against both the Kucik Defendants and Nickos Prokos. All 

parties would participate in this trial.... 

 The second trial will concern Demetrios Prokos’ 

mechanics lien claim against the owner of the seven real estate 

parcels as determined in the first trial.... 

 The third trial will concern the remaining tort and 

contract claims of Demetrios Prokos, Nickos Prokos, and 

Natalie Bowles....” 

{¶84} Finally, the trial transcript references the agreement to trifurcate 

at Volume 762, page 153. A discussion was held amongst counsel and the 

court as follows: 

“BY THE JUDGE: * * *In the middle of this thing I got 

to thinking well we should have had the mechanic’s liens as 

part of this. Nobody wanted it part of it. Nobody said Judge 

now let’s have the mechanic’s liens as part of it. Nobody said 

that. Now I wish I had done that. So I think, go ahead, I’ll let 

you finish. 

BY MR. HENNIGER: Okay. I understand what you’re 

saying. And I think we made an agreement to that. And to a 

certain extent that binds us.” 

And at page 156: 

“BY THE JUDGE: The mechanic’s liens. Nobody 

objected. We all agreed that the mechanics liens would be 

addressed later on. You’re not going to get beyond the shield 

of the mechanics lien. The mechanics lien is what it is. The 

validity of it is going to be addressed at Prokos two.” 

And at page 157: 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 54

“BY MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Okay. And I realize 

that I must be bound by my predecessor’s, whatever he did. 

But I did file a motion to have the two trials consolidated for 

just this reason. And it apparently was too late.” 

{¶85} The issue of trifurcation was also discussed on day 26 of trial, 

as set forth as follows at Volume 776, page 167: 

“BY ATTORNEY HENNIGER: You have to demonstrate 

the validity of the lien. Since we’re in this box, so to speak of 

having trifurcated the trial and, and evidentiary rulings that the 

Court made and I’m not quarreling with any of that. I, it’s just 

where we are. And so, um they agreed to it.” 

{¶86} It is undisputed the parties agreed to a trifurcation. Appellants 

have waived any argument in this regard. Appellants’ assignment of error 

five is therefore overruled. 

B. Assignment of Error Four - The trial court erred in making its evidentiary 

rulings that neither party could adduce evidence beyond some minimal 

amount to prove or disprove the validity of the mechanic’s liens.

{¶87} With regard to the evidentiary rulings, Appellants have failed to 

cite to the record where the rulings were made. Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2), 

appellate courts may disregard an assignment presented for review if the 

party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which the 

assignment of error is based.23 As indicated above, the trial court referred to 

 

23 Our review of the record indicates a discussion amongst the court, counsel, and parties on Day 12 of trial 

of a proffer of evidence of expense sheets proffered by Attorney Hollingsworth. The trial court 

acknowledged Attorney Hollingsworth had become involved in the case somewhat recently while denying 

the exhibit due to its being “late discovery.” There was again a lengthy discussion of “evidentiary rulings” 

on Day 17 involving mortgage payments and impeachment of Demetrios. The transcript reflects another 

sidebar discussion with counsel and proffer of exhibits on behalf of the Kucik Defendants on Day 20 in 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 55

the agreement to trifurcate. Appellants’ argument must fail because they 

have failed to reference the evidentiary rulings in the record and further, 

because they agreed to trifurcation of this issues. As such, they have waived 

any argument as to this error and assignment of error four is also overruled. 

C. Assignment of Error Nine - The trial court erred to the substantial 

prejudice of Appellants in permitting the estate fiduciary to proceed in trial 

without prosecuting the original claims of the decedent against Demetrios, 

thereby giving the jury the false impression that the claims of Demetrios 

were meritorious.

{¶88} With regard to the trial court’s allowing the fiduciary to 

proceed in trial without prosecuting the original claims of the decedent 

against Demetrios, we note once again, Appellants agreed to trifurcation. 

Under the agreement, the validity of the mechanic’s liens would be 

determined at the second trial. Laisa had originally contested the 

mechanic’s liens and the Estate continued her claim. Demetrios had 

counter-claimed for foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien. Appellants were 

well-aware going into the first trial only the fraud and other claims in tort 

 

which the transcript also reflects the exhibits were not allowed as evidence, again due to being “late 

discovery.” On Day 22 of trial, the record reflects an objection as to Nickos’ testimony “summarizing two 

years’ of banking activity” as hearsay. The trial court sustained the objection and ordered the testimony 

stricken from the record. On Day 23, another objection was made regarding a line of questioning about 

health expenses as improper hearsay. The trial court sustained the objection based upon the fact there had 

been no discovery of health expenses. Although it was not this court’s duty to “root out” these occurrences 

in the record, the trial transcript reflects these and other instances of “evidentiary rulings” of which 

Appellants may be complaining. Appellants completely fail to identify or argue the purportedly erroneous 

evidentiary rulings. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 56

would be at issue. Again, Appellants have waived this argument and the 

ninth assignment of error is also overruled. 

V. Assignment of Error Six – The trial court erred to the prejudice of the 

Kucik Defendants, and any jury finding is tainted thereby, in submitting 

claims to the jury that included the claim of fraudulent conveyance.

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶89} The giving of jury instructions is within the sound discretion of 

the trial court and will not be disturbed upon appeal absent an abuse of 

discretion. Miller v. Andrews, 5th Dist. Richland No. 12CA44, 2013-Ohio2490, ¶ 26; State v. Martens, 90 Ohio App.3d 338, 629 N.E.2d 462 (3rd Dist. 

1993). In order to find an abuse of discretion, we must determine that the 

trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable and not 

merely an error of law or judgment. Miller, supra, citing Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). Jury instructions 

must be reviewed as a whole. Miller, supra; State v. Coleman, 37 Ohio 

St.3d 286, 525 N.E.2d 792 (1988). Whether the jury instructions correctly 

state the law is a question of law, which we review de novo. Miller, supra; 

Murphy v. Carollton Mfg. Co., 61 Ohio St. 3d 585, 575 N.E.2d 828 (1991). 

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶90} The trial court has the duty to instruct the jury on the applicable 

law on all issues raised by the pleadings and evidence, and it must give jury 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 57

instructions that correctly and completely state the law. Miller, supra at ¶ 

25; Pallini v. Dankowski, 17 Ohio St.2d 51, 53, 245 N.E.2d 353 (1969); 

Marshall v. Gibson, 19 Ohio St.3d 10, 12, 482 N.E.2d 583 (1985); Murphy 

v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 61 Ohio St.3d at 591; Groob v. Keybank, 108 Ohio 

St.3d 348, 2006-Ohio-1189, 843 N.E.2d 1170, ¶ 32. A jury charge should 

be “a plain, distinct and unambiguous statement of the law as applicable to 

the case before the jury the proof of fact adduced.” Miller, supra, quoting 

Marshall at 12, citing Parmlee v. Adolph, 28 Ohio St. 10 (1875), paragraph 

two of the syllabus. Further, “[a] charge ought not only be correct, but it 

should also be adapted to the case and so explicit as not to be misunderstood 

or misconstrued by the jury.” Id., citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Reed, 33 Ohio St. 

283, 295 (1877). 

{¶91} The trial court gave the following instruction to the jury on Day 

29 of trial: 

“Demetrios Prokos alleges that Nickos Prokos and the Kucik 

Defendants have fraudulently transferred or conveyed Laisa 

Prokos’ assets to Nickos Prokos and the Kucik Defendants in 

order to put those assets beyond the reach of the claims of 

Demetrios Prokos. One (I). definition: assets means property of 

the Debtor but does not include property to the extent that it is 

encumbered by a valid lien. Debtor means a person who is 

liable on a claim. Creditor means a person that has a claim. 

Insider means a relative of the Debtor of a general partner of the 

Debtor, a partnership in which the Debtor is a general partner, a 

general partner in a partnership. Claim is a right to payment 

whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 58

unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 

undisputed, legal, equitable, secure or insecure. Transfer means 

any direct or indirect absolute or conditional, involuntary or 

involuntarily method of disposing or parting with an asset or an 

interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, 

lease, in creation of a lien, or other encumbrance. Insolvent 

means that the sum of the debts of the Debtor is greater than all 

the assets of the Debtor at a fair valuation. A Debtor is 

presumed insolvent if the Debtor is not paying debts as they 

become due.” 

{¶92} The trial court further instructed: 

“Two (II), fraudulent transfer: there are several tests for finding 

whether or not a fraudulent transfer to avoid a claim has taken 

place. If you find that Nickos Prokos and the Kucik Defendants 

have violated any of these tests, you must find that Nickos 

Prokos and the Kucik Defendants have committed a fraudulent 

transfer to avoid a claim. Based upon the definitions I have 

given you, an individual commits a fraudulent transfer as to a 

claim when: one (1) the individual made a transfer or incurred 

an obligation. Two (2), the individual did not receive a 

reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or 

obligation. Three (3), the individual is insolvent at the time or 

became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation and or 

the claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation 

was incurred.” 

{¶93} The trial court also gave this instruction: 

“An individual also commits a fraudulent transfer as to a claim 

when: one (1), the individual made a transfer or incurred an 

obligation. The transfer was made to or the obligation incurred 

with respect to an Insider or a pre-existing debt. Two (2), the 

individual was insolvent at the time. Three (3), the Insider had 

reasonable cause to believe that the individual was insolvent 

and the creditors claim arose before the transfer was made or 

the obligation was incurred. A Debtor commits a fraudulent 

transfer when either before or after a creditor’s claim arose, the 

Debtor made a transfer or incurred an obligation in either of the 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 59

following ways: one (1), with actual intent to hinder, delay, or 

to defraud any creditor of the Debtor, or without receiving a 

reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or 

obligation and if either of the following applies: “a” (a), Debtor 

was engaged in or about to engage in a business or transaction 

of which the remaining assets of the Debtor were unreasonably 

small in relation to the business or transaction, or “b” (b), the 

Debtor intended to incur or believe or reasonably should have 

believed that he would incur debts beyond his ability to pay as 

they became due.” 

 

{¶94} Appellants again allege that Appellees did not establish that 

Demetrios was a creditor within the meaning of the fraudulent conveyance 

statute. Appellants also generally argue that (1) fair consideration was paid 

by the Kucik Defendants for the Ohio properties; (2) the conveyance did not 

leave the Estate insolvent; and (3) that the real estate was not as “asset” as 

defined by the statute. We note at the outset that once again, Appellants fail 

to cite to specific instances in the record to support their contentions and fail 

to argue how they were prejudiced by the allegedly erroneous instructions. 

We also decline to address Appellant’s first argument as we have previously 

disposed of it under assignment of error three, wherein we found Demetrios 

did meet his burden of proof to establish he was a “creditor,” pursuant to 

case law and the definition contained in R.C. 1336.01. We will address 

Appellants’ remaining arguments under this assignment of error. 

A. Was Laisa paid fair consideration for her properties?
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 60

{¶95} As to Appellant’s second assertion, that fair consideration was 

paid by the Kucik Defendants for the Ohio properties, they fail to point to 

any testimony which we could find persuasive. What the testimony does 

demonstrate is that there were two separate and secret real estate deals 

between Barry Kucik and Laisa to purchase her rental properties. The 

properties were heavily mortgaged as the mortgage payments had fallen 

behind after Vasilios’ death in 2003. Demetrios had filed his mechanic’s lien 

in January 2004. William and Michelle Biddlestone both testified that the 

properties were in deplorable condition when they took over management in 

March 2004. 

{¶96} Barry Kucik testified the purchase price for the whole deal was 

$575,000.00. Barry Kucik’s testimony evidences payment of somewhere 

between $193,000.00 and $213,000.00 for the first three properties that were 

the subject of the first real estate deal. The evidence at trial also 

demonstrated Kucik paid $100,000.00 directly to Nickos after Laisa’s death 

for the remaining 4 properties.24 

 

24 Kucik’s testimony is confusing and contradictory. At one part of the transcript, he testified 

$193,000.00 went to Laisa and Nick for the first deal. He later admitted he did not know how 

much went to them for the second deal. In fact, Kucik admitted the money was paid to different 

persons and different entities for the purchase of Laisa’s property. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 61

{¶97} Kucik also admitted on cross-examination that he provided his 

money “behind the scenes.” He did not really know where the money went 

that he paid. In trial testimony, Kucik later admitted Nick was getting the 

money and he [Kucik] was getting the deeds. He gave the checks to Nick 

because Laisa kept saying “Go through Nick.” Kucik opined Laisa got the 

best value for her properties, given her particular circumstances. 

{¶98} Appellants also presented the testimony of two expert witnesses 

at trial, Sheldon Patrick Estep and William Preston Parker, licensed real 

estate appraisers. Both gentlemen testified as to the various formulas and 

approaches to preparing real estate appraisals. 

{¶100} Parker testified he appraised Laisa’s residential rentals at West 

Washington Street, Brown Street, Mound Street, and Moore Avenue in 

2008. He was asked to do the appraisal by Barry Kucik’s prior counsel in 

these proceedings, R.J. Shostak. All the information Parker received as to 

the physical condition and the management of the rentals was received from 

Attorney Shostak and Attorney Biddlestone. He received none of his 

information from independent sources. Parker testified he never inspected 

the rentals during the years Demetrios was manager. He testified as to a 

June 2005 value for the rentals though he was never inside them at the time. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 62

Parker’s appraisal as to a total value of $447,000.00 is broken down as 

follows: 

186 W. Washington Street (April 20, 2005) $70,000.00 

208 1⁄2 W. Washington Street (April 20, 2005) $75,000.00 

45 Mound Street (June 2005) $90,000.00 

48 Moore Street (June 2005) $95,000.00 

6 Brown Street (June 2005) $88,000.00 

120 N. Congress Street (June 2005) $ 95,000.00 

{¶101} Sheldon Patrick Estep prepared an appraisal for the 

commercial rental, Souvlakis,25 located at 9 W. State Street. Estep’s 

appraisal was performed in March 2009. Using the various appraisal 

formulas, Estep appraised the April 2005 value of 9 W. State Street to be 

somewhere between $476,000.00 and $569,000.00. Estep testified, similarly 

to Parker’s testimony, that he was not advised of the condition of the 

property when Demetrios managed it and he was not advised there was a 

period of time in March 2004 when no one was managing the property. 

Parker had no idea of a 2003 or 2004 value of the property. Parker testified 

he had not been inside the property for over 20 years, except for the 2009 

appraisal. He understood he was doing the appraisal for trust accounting 

 

25 The 9 W. State Street property was comprised of Souvlakis, a tanning business, and 4 apartments. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 63

purposes and his only information on the properties was from the people 

who hired him to appraise. 

{¶102} It appears the properties were given 2005 values by appraisers 

hired on behalf of Appellants in a range of $923,000.00- $1,016.000.00 for 

all 7 properties. A local realtor, Larry Conrath, testified he had offered to 

buy the properties at “fire sale prices.” Conrath had offered $750,000.00 

and gave his own estimate as to their value at $905,000.00. Demetrios never 

obtained a formal appraisal. He opined the properties were worth 

$2,000.000.00 

{¶103} After Conrath declined, Nickos and Laisa could not find 

another buyer due to Demetrios’ filing of the mechanic’s liens.26 Kucik 

indicated he was interested. Kucik offered to give them a loan for equity, 

subject to the liens, and would give them an opportunity to buy back when 

they were able to refinance and extinguish the liens. Throughout the trial, 

Appellants’ characterized the transactions as “a land contract, “creative 

financing,” and “an untraditional way to buy property.” 

{¶104} Kucik explained the “plusses and minuses” to Laisa. Nickos 

testified she was competent and understood. Nick specifically testified his 

 

26 Demetrios’ lien was in the amount of $333,880.00. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 64

mother had no reservations about Kucik. In fact, because he was an 

attorney, she “trusted him even more.” 

{¶105} In conclusion, the evidence adduced at trial does little to 

convince us that fair consideration was paid to Laisa for her 7 rental 

properties. The true value of the properties was never affirmatively 

established at trial. They were sold for a total of approximately 

$313,000.00. The first 3 properties were conveyed during the time when 

Laisa was isolated from her family, except for Nickos. The remaining 4 

properties were conveyed via power of attorney on the day of her death. It is 

debatable as to how much of the money ever touched Laisa’s hands. For the 

foregoing reasons, we find no merit to Appellant’s argument that there was 

evidence of sufficient consideration paid to Laisa and therefore, the jury 

instruction on fraudulent transfer/conveyance was erroneous. 

B. Was Laisa’s Estate left insolvent by the real estate transactions?

{¶106} Next, Appellants assert that the conveyances did not leave 

Laisa’s estate insolvent. Interestingly, the trial transcript was replete with 

instances where Nickos testified that both parents and especially, Laisa, had 

financial problems and feared she was about to lose her residential home 

near the end of her life. The testimony showed that even after Laisa’s death, 

Kucik paid money directly to Nickos, instead of to the Estate. Cash money 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 65

Laisa received for the sale of her property in Greece, transported by Alieke 

from Greece in two payments, was not made part of Laisa’s estate assets. 

Nickos admitted on cross-examination he had never given money to Natalie 

or the estate. Nickos was questioned about an alleged receipt of a 

$250,000.00 check for life insurance after Vasilios died. Nickos testified 

there was no evidence his mother ever received that money. The last rental 

payment for Souvlakis, $7,100.00, was not made part of Laisa’s estate. Jeff 

Finley, the Estate fiduciary appointed in May 2007, clearly testified that 

Laisa’s estate had no assets in Ohio. Appellants fail to cite exhibits or 

testimony in the record which would otherwise indicate the estate was 

solvent. Their argument herein is not persuasive. 

C. Were Laisa’s properties “assets” within the meaning of the 

fraudulent conveyance statute?

{¶107} Finally, Appellants argue that the properties conveyed were 

not “assets” within the meaning of the fraudulent conveyance statute due to 

Demetrios’ recording of the liens. Appellants cite R.C. 1336.01(B) which 

provides that an “asset” is the property of a debtor, but does not include 

property “to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien.” R.C. 

1336.01(B)(1). 

{¶108} This litigation began as a result of the mechanic’s lien, which 

Laisa vehemently disputed. Demetrios recorded the liens in January 2004. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 66

Barry Kucik recorded the deeds in July 2005. The Estate continued to pursue 

Laisa’s claims against Demetrios and the validity of the liens. Nickos, Pam, 

and Barry Kucik all testified at trial that they did not think that Demetrios’ 

claim and the mechanic’s liens had any merit. Indeed, the issue of the 

mechanic’s liens was reserved for the second phase of trifurcation by the 

agreement of the parties. At the time the deeds were recorded by Barry 

Kucik, the liens had not been judicially determined to be valid and the 

properties Kucik claimed to have purchased were still assets of the Estate. 

Appellants’ argument hereunder is also not persuasive. 

{¶109} For the above reasons, we find the trial court did not err or 

abuse its discretion in its submission of the jury instructions on fraudulent 

transfer/conveyance. Assignment of error six is also overruled. 

VI. Combined Assignments of Error Seven, Eight, and Fifteen-Election of 

Remedies and Equitable Award

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AND PERMITTING THE 

JURY TO CONSIDER INCONSISTENT REMEDIES, IN THAT THE 

PREVAILING PARTIES SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO GAIN 

TITLE TO THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES FREE AND CLEAR OF 

MORTGAGES THAT HAD BEEN PAID BY THE KUCIK 

DEFENDANTS OR ONE OF THEM. 

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE THAT 

CLAIMING PARTIES SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ELECT REMEDIES. 

THE PREVAILING PARTIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH THE 

PROPERTIES AND DAMAGES. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 67

C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD AN 

EQUITABLE LIEN TO THE KUCIK DEFENDANTS FOR THE MONEY 

PAID BY THEM FOR THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES AND FOR 

SATISFACTION OF THE MORTGAGES OF THEM. 

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

 

 A. Did Appellees receive an unfair double-recovery?

{¶110} Because the arguments are related, we consider these 

assignments of error jointly. We begin, however, with consideration of 

assignment of error eight, Appellants’ argument that the trial court should 

have required Appellees to elect a remedy. Appellants argue it is unfair and 

amounts to a double recovery for Appellees to have had the properties 

restored to the Estate, along with compensatory and punitive damage 

awards. 

{¶111} The doctrine of election of remedies states that the election of 

one remedial right bars pursuit of another when one right is inconsistent with 

the other and the election is made with “knowledge and intention and 

purpose to elect.” Saunders v. Holzer Hospital Foundation, 4th Dist. Gallia 

No. 08CA11, 2009-Ohio-2112, ¶ 19, quoting Stowers v. Baron, 65 Ohio 

App.2d 283, 285, 418 N.E.2d 404 (6th Dist. 1979), citing Frederickson v. 

Nye, 110 Ohio St. 459, 144 N.E. 299 (1924). 

“Traditionally, one purpose of the doctrine of election of 

remedies is to prevent double recovery and preclude a litigant 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 68

from pursuing a remedy that, in a previous action, he rejected in 

favor of an alternative an inconsistent remedy. Another 

purpose is to prevent needless experimentation with the 

remedies afforded by law. The prerequisites to application of 

the doctrine are: (1) the existence of two or more remedies; (2) 

the inconsistency of such remedies; and (3) a choice of one of 

them.” Saunders, supra, at ¶ 19, quoting Davis v. Rockwell 

Internatl. Corp. (N.D. Ohio 1984), 596 F. Supp 780, 787 

(citations omitted.) 

This Court has recognized that the doctrine of election of remedies is 

considered a “‘harsh and technical rule of procedure that is not favored in 

Ohio.’” Saunders, supra, at ¶ 20, quoting Mac Tools, Inc. v. Administrator, 

Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA89-05-010 

(Dec. 4, 1989), quoting Davis, supra, at 787. Simply put, “An election must 

be made because it is inconsistent to rescind [a] contract yet retain the 

benefits of it.” Jeffrey Mining Products, L.P. v. Left Fork Mining Company,

143 Ohio App.3d 708, 758 N.E.2d 1173 (8th Dist. 2001). 

{¶112} In Bennice v. Bennice, 82 Ohio App.3d 594, 598, 612 N.E.2d 

1256 (6th Dist. 1992), the appellate court held: 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 69

“A suit for damages for fraud is inconsistent with rescission 

when such suit is founded on an affirmance of the contract. 

Nye, supra, at paragraph one of the syllabus; Annotation (1939) 

120 A.L.R. 1154, 1155-1156. In turn, a suit for damages is 

founded on an affirmance of the contract ‘only if, and in so far 

as, the damages sought to be recovered consist of the loss of the 

benefit of the bargain * * *.’ Annotation, 120 A.L.R. at 1156; 

37 American Jurisprudence 2d (1968) 527, Fraud and Deceit, 

Section 389. In such a case, the denial of damages after 

rescission is proper because, in view of the rescission, there are 

no damages. Annotation, 120 A.L.R. at 1158; 37 American 

Jurisprudence 2d, supra. The defrauded party may, however, 

recover damages other than the loss of the bargain, 

notwithstanding rescission. Yeoman v. Lasley, 40 Ohio St. 190, 

(1993), paragraph five of the syllabus; Szatmary v. Miller, 6 

Ohio Law Abs. 693 (App. 1928); Jones v. Draper, 4 Ohio C.C. 

(N.S. 105, 119-120 (1903), 16 Ohio C.D. 785; Annotation, 120 

A.L.R. at 1159-1165; 37 American Jurisprudence 2d, supra.” 

{¶113} The Twelfth District Court of Appeals reiterated this principal 

in Turner v. Paradise, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA93-12-098, 1995 WL 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 70

321725 at *2, stating “A party may seek to have a transaction voided and at 

the same time seek damages caused by the fraudulent transaction.” In this 

matter, we agree with Appellee that the rescission of the fraudulently 

conveyed deeds, along with the compensatory and punitive damages awards, 

were not inconsistent. 

{¶114} To begin, the trial court noted in its judgment entry on posttrial motions (November 22, 2010) that the Kucik Defendants and Nickos, in 

arguing that the prevailing parties should not have been permitted to gain 

title to the subject real properties free and clear of mortgages that were paid 

by them and also should not have been permitted to have damages in 

addition to the properties, cited no authority for their position. Appellants 

again point to no authority and again fail to direct us to the place in the 

transcript where they complain error occurred. We observe the trial court 

gave the following instructions on damages to the jury: 

“Four (4) damages: damages include the value of the asset 

transferred or the amount necessary to satisfy the claim of the 

Creditor, whichever is less. In addition, a person injured by a 

fraudulent transfer is entitled to such damages as will fairly 

compensate him for the wrong suffered. That is, the damages 

sustained by a reason of the fraud or deceit which have 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 71

naturally and proximately resulted from the Nickos Prokos and 

the Kucik Defendants conduct. Such damages may include any 

damages proven by the evidence which the circumstances may 

require.” 

The trial court further instructed that the Estate and Demetrios requested the 

properties transferred to the Kucik defendants be returned to the Estate. The 

trial court also gave jury instructions as to compensatory damages, lost 

profits, punitive damages, and attorney fees. 

{¶115} The jury returned a verdict finding in favor of the Estate that 

the Appellants committed fraud. The jury awarded the Estate $49,000.00 in 

compensatory damages and $300,000.00 in punitive damages against 

Appellants on its claims for conversion and fraud. The jury also found in 

favor of Demetrios’ claims for fraud and fraudulent transfers and awarded 

$5,000.00 on his claims for fraudulent transfers to avoid a creditor. The trial 

court’s entry of May 27, 2010, further ordered that based upon the jury’s 

findings of fraud, undue influence, lack of delivery, lack of capacity and 

self-dealing under the power of attorney granted to Nickos, that the deeds to 

the properties at issue were void and cancelled. The trial court directed that 

title to the properties be restored to the ownership of Laisa. We are not 

convinced these awards amount to a double-recovery. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 72

{¶116} We do not know exactly how the jury determined these 

awards. Based on the evidence it heard, Kucik paid approximately 

$313,000.00 for Laisa’s 7 rental properties. The jury also heard evidence 

that the $49,000.00 which began as Laisa’s money in Kucik’s trust account 

traveled to Ohio to Attorney Biddlestone’s trust account where it remained 

on her death. The $49,000.00 was then routed to Kucik’s personal account 

after she died. The jury also learned that a $7,100.00 rental payment for 

Souvlakis was not made part of her Estate upon her death, and was 

distributed to Nickos after her death. Fraud was determined to have 

occurred and fair consideration was not paid for the properties. The 

$49,000.00 award was compensatory. The jury may have concluded the 

$5,000.00 award was a lost rental profit belonging to Laisa’s Estate. We do 

not agree with Appellants that Appellees received an unfair double-recovery 

because Demetrios and the Estate received monetary damages and the 

properties were returned to the Estate. 

B. Should Appellees have received the properties free and clear 

of the mortgages? 

C. Should Appellants have been awarded an equitable lien for 

the money allegedly paid in satisfaction of the mortgages?

{¶117} Turning to Appellants’ next arguments under assignments of 

error seven and fifteen, that they were entitled to an equitable award, it has 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 73

long been the rule in Ohio that one seeking equity must come to the court 

with clean hands. Bradford v. Reid, 126 Ohio App.3d 448, 710 N.E.2d 761 

(1st Dist. 1998). This maxim denies all relief to one, no matter how wellfounded his claim may otherwise be, if, “in granting the relief which he 

seeks, the court would be required, by implication even, to affirm the 

validity of an unlawful agreement or give its approval to the inequitable 

conduct on his part.” Reid at 454, quoting Kinner v. Lake Shore & Michigan 

S. Ry. Co., 69 Ohio St. 339, 344, 69 N.E. 614, (1904). “The inequitable 

conduct contemplated by the maxim must be ‘reprehensible conduct with 

respect to the subject matter of his suit.’” Reid at 454, quoting Kinner at 

paragraph one of the syllabus. See, also, Heskett Ins. Agency Inc., v. 

Braunlin, 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3234, 2011-Ohio-6100, ¶ 18. 

{¶118} Appellants also argue the Estate should not be permitted to 

gain title to the subject real properties free and clear of the mortgages that 

had been paid by the Kucik Defendants, and further, that the trial court erred 

in failing to award an equitable lien to the Kucik Defendants for the money 

paid by them for the properties and for the satisfaction of the mortgages. We 

would first reiterate that as to the money paid for the properties, again, the 

jury found Appellants committed fraud in obtaining the properties. The 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 74

clean-hands doctrine would bar them from receiving an equitable lien to 

reimburse them for money paid in obtaining the properties fraudulently. 

{¶119} As to the alleged mortgage payments, only Barry Kucik 

testified that he had made mortgage payments. Kucik was forced to admit 

there is no documentation showing that he tried to assume the mortgages. 

Kucik testified he paid the mortgages and cured all defaults except on the 

property located at 9 W. State Street, yet he provided no documentation of 

payments made. The jury evaluated Kucik’s testimony and credibility and 

apparently found it to be lacking. The jury also apparently found no reliable 

evidence that the mortgage payments were made. Appellants’ brief points to 

no documentary evidence in the record to demonstrate payments were made. 

It would not be equitable to provide Appellants any credit for payments not 

proven to have been made. 

{¶120} We have already discussed the case law on “credibility of the 

witnesses” and an appellate court’s deference to the trial court’s 

determinations. We rarely make further comment because ordinarily, 

witnesses’ demeanor and credibility do not “come alive” while reading the 

literal words of a trial transcript. This case is different. At times, Nickos and 

Barry Kucik gave bizarre testimony. To assist in understanding the jury’s 

verdict, we examine it more closely at this juncture. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 75

{¶121} Barry Kucik’s testimony at trial revealed: (1) his credentials 

were in question, (2) his ability to recall and testify to events was debatable; 

(3) his interactions with his client Laisa and the details of the real estate 

deals were suspect; (4) his perceptions as to his role as Laisa’s advisor 

fluctuated, conveniently; and (5) his veracity was shown to be lacking. 

Kucik testified several days during the course of the 31-day trial and the jury 

received an overabundance of information to consider during their 

deliberations. 

{¶122} Kucik admitted his letterhead indicated between the years 

2003-2009 that he was a CPA, when in fact, he had not been a CPA since 

December 2003. Kucik claimed he was not made aware of this until 2009. 

Kucik admitted he had a disciplinary issue in Florida, relating to his 

advertising. He shifted the blame for this to his secretary, who according to 

him, set up his website and then overlooked his requests to change it. 

{¶123} Kucik testified he had liver problems, blood problems, and 

blamed numerous health-related issues for his sloppy work and “poor 

decision-making.” He also blamed an unverified health condition he 

described as “dyslexia of the brain” for his failure to recall events or testify 

accurately. Kucik testified this condition caused him to have difficulty 

concentrating, difficulty focusing, and caused his mind to “get mushy in the 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 76

afternoon.” Yet, he indicated he still successfully practices law. Kucik 

admitted he was “sloppy” with documents he prepared because he was 

nervous and under stress. However, he further opined “[s]loppy doesn’t 

mean you’re a crook.” Kucik even testified he was “joking around” in a 

prior deposition.27

{¶124} The testimony Kucik gave concerning his relationship with 

Laisa was also suspect. Kucik attempted to portray himself as a victim of 

poor decision-making and getting too personally involved with a client. 

Kucik clearly indicated he was able to observe Laisa’s competence and was 

comfortable she understood the documents she signed. He actually testified 

she was “pretty sharp.” He also testified he saw Nickos take good care of 

his mother. Kucik testified in purchasing the properties subject to the 

mechanics liens, he was taking a risk, but he felt a moral obligation to help 

Laisa. Her situation was “dark.” He must have also felt some obligation to 

“help” Nickos and William Biddlestone as the testimony demonstrates he 

inexplicably paid both of them $5,000.00 a piece after Laisa’s death. He 

testified the $5,000.00 to Nickos was a gift, to help pay for Laisa’s funeral, 

and did not relate to the real estate deals. He also testified he, apparently out 

of the goodness of his heart, continued to loan Nickos money through the 

 

27 Kucik also testified he relied on his wife a lot in his law practice because she was a great writer. The 

testimony indicated Mrs. Kucik was a high school graduate. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 77

fall of 2005. He was evasive as to whatever reason he had for paying 

Biddlestone $5,000.00. 

{¶125} Yet Kucik also testified the purchase price for the whole deal 

was $575,000.00 and his testimony indicates Laisa received around 

$313,000.00 for 7 rental properties in an over-crowded college town. He 

provided money “behind the scenes.” He testified he did not record the 

deeds because his “clients” wanted the deal kept secret and in particular, 

Laisa, was afraid that Demetrios would do something. Kucik testified that 

Nickos got the money and he [Kucik] got the deeds. He even drafted a 

contract in which Laisa directed that the last $100,000.00 be paid to Nickos 

even after her demise. 

{¶126} Incredibly, Kucik testified that Laisa, (despite her age, lack of 

education, and lack of sophistication and familiarity with civil litigation), 

contacted him requesting to make the video to “state how she felt.” 

Moreover, despite the fact that litigation was on-going, he failed to notify 

anyone that the video was being made. Kucik admitted that on the video, no 

one read the documents word-for-word to the interpreter nor did the 

interpreter read them word-for-word to Laisa. He further admitted the 

documents Laisa signed were not held up on the video, no one read them 

aloud, and thus, we do not know what she signed. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 78

{¶127} Kucik’s role as Laisa’s attorney or advisor was not clear. 

Kucik testified he was not using his attorney or CPA skills when he prepared 

the agreement. He was “just a friend.” The testimony showed he never sent 

any of the documents Laisa signed to her Ohio attorney for review and 

advice. Kucik testified he explained the deals to “them” (apparently Laisa 

and Nickos) and advised them he was not their attorney. He testified the 

documents might have been confusing, but “they” understood. This 

evidence would contradict earlier testimony that he was Laisa’s attorney 

only, not Nickos’. The trial transcript also reflects Kucik’s evasiveness when 

questioned as to whether or not he was in a position of trust with Laisa. He 

testified he did a lot of work for her, but did not think she viewed him as her 

lawyer. He was also evasive as to whether Laisa had waived counsel. The 

record reflects no waiver of counsel on file. 

{¶128} Most telling was Kucik’s admission that he and Nickos had 

been deceptive, misleading, and had, in essence committed a fraud on 

Nickos’ prior attorney, Scyld Anderson. Kucik testified Anderson was 

working on a formal agreement and sent Nickos a letter advising him not to 

sign the deeds until the agreement was completed. In a prior 2007 

deposition, Kucik testified Anderson prepared the agreement and sent it to 

Nickos who forwarded it to Kucik. Kucik signed the agreement and Nickos 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 79

sent it to Anderson. However, Kucik did not want to sign the agreement and 

he and Nickos tore up the original agreement, while allowing Anderson to 

believe they considered it valid and enforceable. Kucik explained that he 

did not want Nickos to lose his attorney and that was his purpose for 

misleading Anderson. Kucik even apologized to the jury for his action in 

the matter. 

{¶129} Kucik also denied receiving keys to the properties that the 

evidence indicated he did receive. When cross-examined as to why he did 

not truthfully complete, under penalty of perjury, the conveyance forms in 

the Athens County Auditor’s office, thereby shortchanging the State of Ohio 

on fees collected, he explained he did not know all the mortgage information 

when filling out the forms and did so “to the best of his knowledge.” Kucik 

placed Laisa’s $49,000.00 in his own personal account. The evidence 

further demonstrated he tried to dupe an insurance company by giving them 

sketchy details about his ownership of the property. Sandy Whitmore of 

Reed-Bauer Insurance Agency testified Kucik told her Laisa was the owner 

of a policy insuring 9 W. State Street. Kucik signed a policy application as 

“Barry Kucik, Trustee” yet the company thought they were re-writing the 

policy for Laisa. Kucik faxed the company an unrecorded warranty deed. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 80

When the company found out Kucik claimed an interest, the policy was 

cancelled. 

{¶130} The evidence also suggested that Barry Kucik was closely 

aligned with Nickos. Nickos’ cell phone records indicated many calls 

between Nickos and Kucik. Nickos attempted to portray himself as the 

“only son” or “golden son,” devoted caretaker, now with his own health 

issues, who sacrificed his personal life and was unable to hold down a job 

due to caring for his parents. At the time of trial, Nickos had had his 

pancreas removed. He had been in a coma and on life-support prior. He 

took 32 pills a day for depression and other health issues. He testified his 

medications affected his ability to recall and testify. The evidence adduced 

from his testimony likely led the jury to conclude that Nickos was spoiled, 

untrustworthy, irresponsible, domineering, and flamboyant. Nickos testified 

about his relationship with his parents and other family, the real estate deals 

with Kucik, and his personal life. 

{¶131} Nickos testified he had tension with Demetrios from 

childhood. He testified Demetrios had “ripped him off,” owed him 

$200,000.00, and they had not spoken since 1998. His testimony portrayed 

Demetrios as a villain who terrorized his mother about the rental properties 

after his father’s death and would not let the parents be buried together. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 81

Nickos testified he helped his parents because they were always short of 

money. He described his mother was strong-willed, extremely sharp, and 

she “wore the pants in the family.” After Vasilios died, he assisted his 

mother and was privy to her accounts. He reviewed statements, wrote 

checks, transferred money, paid for household expenses and made mortgage 

payments. He testified to paying for utilities, condominium dues, meals, 

cars, caregivers, and his mother’s Sam’s Club expenses. Despite this 

testimony, there was no documentary evidence presented that showed 

Nickos had paid any of his parents’ bills with his own money. And also, 

despite his testimony as to his care and involvement with his parents, Nickos 

admitted he did not know what happened to the cars his father had owned in 

Florida at the time of his death. 

{¶132} The testimony indicated Nickos had always lived a “cushy” 

life, thanks to the assistance of his parents and Pam. He had been in the 

mortgage business at one time, however he claimed he did not know the 

difference between a quitclaim deed and a warranty deed. Nickos filed 

bankruptcy in 2001, yet he was forced to admit he had never reported the 

$200,000.00 debt allegedly owed by Demetrios, to the bankruptcy court. 

Nickos also testified he had been in the car business and that lots of his 

clients were local professional football players. Nickos had 6 cell phones 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 82

which he explained were necessary for his mother, her friends, and 

caregivers. Yet he also had them a year after she died.28 

{¶133} Nickos testified they found Kucik on the internet and thought 

he looked like a good attorney.29 Nickos did not know about Kucik’s CPA 

licensing problems until during the trial. He testified to knowing Kucik was 

forgetful and had dyslexia of the brain or mouth, but he did not know at the 

time he allowed Kucik to represent his mother. Nickos testified he thought 

the transactions with Kucik were fair, and Kucik was not taking advantage 

of his mother. 

{¶134} Regarding the second real estate deal, Nickos testified his 

mother wanted Kucik to pay him the last $100,000.00 for all the years of his 

caring for them and “not going on with his life.” He also testified she 

wanted the deal kept secret. Nickos’ testimony showed the day Laisa died, 

he left the deeds in Kucik’s office, and in one version of his story, left them 

under the door. The deeds were later returned to Nickos, due to multiple 

mistakes. Nickos did not recall prior testimony about changing the deeds by 

using his typewriter. However, he may have done so. Nickos testified he 

had typed information onto car titles in the past and it was “no big deal.” 

 

28 The evidence also showed he paid Thomas Mandros’ ( Alieke’s husband’s) cell phone bill. He also 

testified at one point that Thomas Mandros had recommended Kucik. 

29 The evidence also indicated Kathy Kucik and Laisa visited the same doctor’s office for approximately 3 

years prior to Laisa’s death. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 83

{¶135} Nickos explained away some of the discrepancies in his 

testimony by stating that some of his testimony had been over 4 years prior 

to trial and he was on a lot of anti-depressants. Nickos testified he was 

doing his best to answer truthfully. Nickos denied sequestering his mother 

from the rest of her family. However, despite medical records which 

indicated otherwise, Nickos denied knowing his mother was near death on 

the day he transferred her last 4 properties to Kucik using the power of 

attorney she had given him. Nickos incorrectly testified as to the last year he 

had filed taxes. He admitted he had not notified the IRS of the real estate 

deals. And he was shown to be lying when he testified he paid his mother’s 

funeral bill and then admitted on cross-examination he had paid only a 

portion of the bill. 

{¶136} Nickos admitted he had been investigated by the FBI. He 

testified he had a “weave” like the famous actors have, which required 

expensive maintenance twice a month. After his parents died, he became a 

priest via a website course. He testified he needed to “find himself” after his 

parents died. He testified to working in a homeless ministry in Florida. 

{¶137} As such, we find no merit to Appellants’ arguments that the 

trial court erred by permitting the court to consider inconsistent remedies, 

returning the properties to the Estate, or failing to award an equitable lien to 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 84

Appellants for money paid to purchase the properties or pay the mortgages. 

Appellants did not come to the transactions with Laisa with clean hands. 

Accordingly, we overrule assignments of error seven, eight, and fifteen. 

VII. Assignment of Error Ten – The trial court erred in permitting the estate 

fiduciary Jeff Finley to proceed in trial as if he had not denied the validity of 

the mechanic’s liens claims of the plaintiff Demetrios Prokos in his 

pleadings, which he had, thereby giving the jury the false impression that the 

estate was in agreement with the claims of Demetrios Prokos as well as in 

agreement with the validity of the mechanic’s liens.

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶138} Appellants essentially argue it was error for Jeff Finley, the 

fiduciary, to proceed in trial as if he had not previously denied the validity of 

the mechanics’ lien. This assignment of error has no merit for several 

reasons. First, Appellants fail to cite testimony to support their assertion that 

Jeff Finley’s testimony misled the jury, as required by App.R. 12(A)(2). 

Second, as required by App.R. 16(A)(7), Appellants fail to cite any case law 

or other statutory authority to support their argument. Finally, Appellants 

have completely mischaracterized Finley’s testimony. 

{¶139} Despite Appellant’s failure to cite to testimony, a review of 

the trial transcript demonstrates Finley testified he was the fiduciary of Laisa 

Prokos’ estate, appointed in May 2007. As fiduciary, one of his objectives 

was to get the properties at issue returned to the Estate. Finley testified he is 

on opposing sides from the other parties on some issues, but not all. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 85

Importantly, he testified Laisa originally opposed the mechanic’s liens and 

had sued Demetrios. Finley had filed claims on behalf of the estate to have 

the mechanics’ liens declared invalid. He made it clear he was prosecuting 

the action to set aside the liens. Therefore, he was opposing Demetrios’ 

claims because he opposed the liens. He also reiterated in his testimony the 

liens had to be proven. There can be nothing misleading about this 

testimony, and we cannot see it gave the jury a false impression that the 

Estate was aligned with Demetrios or otherwise prejudiced the Kucik 

Defendants. For the foregoing reasons, we find this assignment of error to 

be without merit and it is, likewise, overruled. 

VIII. Assignment of Error Fourteen – The trial court erred in failing to 

decide by clear and convincing evidence, independently of the jury, (which 

only made decisions by a preponderance of the evidence), that the transfers 

of the subject real properties had been nullified, for any reason or by reason 

of the jury’s interrogatories.

{¶140} When reviewing judgments granting equitable relief, we must 

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Muskingum Valley v. 

Tonti, 4th Dist. Washington No. 95 CA 31, 1997 WL 214798. In State v. 

West, 66 Ohio St.3d 508, 513, 613 N.E.2d 622 (1993) (Moyer, C.J., 

concurring in judgment only), Chief Justice Moyer explained the nature of 

equity jurisdiction and the reasoning behind the application of the abuse of 

discretion standard of review in equity cases as follows: 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 86

“Decisions requiring equitable balancing should not be based 

solely on the cold appellate record. Trial judges are far more 

able than appellate courts to fairly balance equities. That, of 

course, is why we generally use an ‘abuse of discretion’ 

standard in reviewing decisions on equitable claims and 

defenses in the trial courts. See, e.g., Joseph J. Freed & Assoc., 

Inc., v. Cassinelli Apparel Corp, 23 Ohio St. 3d 94, 491 N.E.2d 

1109 (1986). While we are able to judge whether a trial court 

abused its discretion in making an equitable judgment, we are 

not in place to make those judgments ourselves.” 

We have discussed the “clean hands doctrine” at length above. 

On this doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has also stated: 

“* * *The governing principle is ‘that whenever a party who, as 

actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain 

some remedy, has violated conscience or good faith, or other 

equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the 

court will be shut against him in limine; the court will refuse to 

interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award 

him any remedy.’ * * * ‘he who asks [for] relief must have 

acted in good faith. The equitable powers of this court can 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 87

never be exercised on behalf of one who has acted fraudulently

* * *.’” Yoder v. Yoder, 3rd Dist. Wyandot No. 16-03-14, 

2004-Ohio-2475,¶ 13; quoting Keystone Driller Co. v. General 

Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-245, 54 S. Ct. 146, (emphasis 

added, citations omitted.). 

{¶141} Appellants argue the trial court erred in failing to decide by 

clear and convincing evidence, that the transfer of the properties had been 

nullified. Appellants apparently argue the trial court abused its discretion in 

making its decision to rescind the deeds for any reason or by reason of the 

jury’s interrogatories. We cannot agree. 

{¶142} The Estate and Demetrios sought monetary damages and 

equitable relief by way of rescission of the deeds. On the equitable claims, 

the jury answered interrogatories. The trial judge had discretion and 

authority to render the equitable relief it did in its May 27, 2010 judgment 

entry. The jury answered interrogatories and the trial court’s entry sets forth 

these findings in its entry as follows: 

“Four interrogatories were further answer(sic) by the Jury. In 

the first and second interrogatories, the Jury concluded that on 

April 20, 2005, that Laisa Prokos did not have an intention to 

make the Warranty Deeds for the Athens, Ohio properties (208 

W. Washington Street, 9 W. State Street and 186 W. 

Washington Street) immediately operative to transfer the legal 

title, ownership or and the right of possession of the subject 

property to Barry Kucik and Kathy Kucik as Trustees of the 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 88

Kucik Revocable Living Trust dated March 21, 2005. The Jury 

further found, in connection with the same purported 

conveyance, that Laisa Prokos did not have an intention to 

presently, immediately, and unconditionally transfer title to the 

real estate described in the Warranty Deeds. Additionally, the 

Jury found there was no relinquishment of ownership, dominion 

and control over the properties by Laisa Prokos, no acceptance 

by Barry Kucik, as Trustee of the Kucik Trust, and there was 

failure of a mutual intention of both parties to immediately 

transfer title. The Jury concluded that this was due to fraud and 

undue influence committed by Barry Kucik, either individually 

or as Trustee of the Kucik Trust; fraud and undue influence 

committed by Nickos Prokos; and due to Laisa Prokos’ lack of 

capacity. 

 In the third interrogatory, the Jury concluded that on June 

29, 2005, that Laisa Prokos, by and through her attorney-in-fact 

Nickos Prokos, did not have an intention to make the QuitClaim Deeds for the properties located at 6 Brown Avenue, 120 

N. Congress Street, 48 Moore Avenue, and 45 Brown Avenue 

immediately operative to transfer the legal title, ownership of 

and the right of possession of the subject property to Barry 

Kucik. The Jury further found, in connection with the same 

purported conveyances, that Laisa Prokos, by and through her 

attorney-in-fact Nickos Prokos, did not have an intention to 

presently, immediately, and unconditionally transfer title to the 

real estate described in the Quit-Claim Deeds. Additionally, the 

Jury found that there was no relinquishment of ownership, 

dominion and control over the properties by Laisa Prokos, no 

accept ace by Barry Kucik, and there was no mutual intention 

of both parties to immediately transfer title. The Jury 

concluded that this was due to fraud and undue influence 

committed by Barry Kucik; fraud and undue influence 

committee by Nickos Prokos; due to Laisa Prokos’ lack of 

capacity and that Nickos Prokos had engaged in no-authorized 

self-dealing under the Power of Attorney.” 

{¶143} In this case, after six weeks of testimony and the review of 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 89

hundreds of exhibits, the trial court concluded fraud had occurred. And, 

there is competent, credible evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The trial 

judge also heard this evidence and reviewed the jury’s answers to 

interrogatories. Based upon the evidence, Appellants did not come to the 

table with “clean hands.” We do not find the trial judge abused his 

discretion in making an equitable award of rescission of the deeds to the 

Estate of Laisa Prokos. As such, Appellant’s assignment of error is without 

merit and is accordingly, overruled. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶144} Based on our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of 

the trial court. As such, we hereby overrule all of Appellants’ assignments 

of error. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Athens App. Nos. 10CA51 and 10CA57 90

JUDGMENT ENTRY

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the 

Appellees recover of Appellants costs herein. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing 

the Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

 Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of 

the date of this entry. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Harsha, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion. 

Hoover, J: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion as to Assignments of Error I, 

 III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XIV, XV; Concurs in Judgment 

Only as to Assignments of Error II, XI, XII, XIII, XVI, XVII, 

and XVIII. 

 

 For the Court, 

 BY: ________________________________ 

 Matthew W. McFarland, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from 

the date of filing with the clerk.