1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### CUN N INGHAM v . CAL IF O R N IA CERTIORARI TO THE COU R T OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA 

### , FIRST APPEL LATE DISTRI CT No. 05–6 55 1. Ar g u ed Oc tober11, 200 6— D e c i ded Jan uar y 22, 20 07 Pet i t i oner Cunningha m wa s t r ied a n d convict e d of con t inuous s e xua l

abu se of a c h i l du n d er14. U n derCa lifornia ’ s det e rmin a t e s e nt encing law (DSL), th at offense is p unishable byo n e of three precise terms of impris onment : alower t e rm s e nt ence of 6 yea r s , amiddle t e rm s e n ten c e of 12 y e ar s, oranu p perter msen t en c eof 16 y e ars. Th e D S L ob liged t h e t r ia l j u dge t os e nt ence Cunni ngha m t o t h e 1 2

- yea rmiddle t e rm unles s t h e j u dge found one or more addit i ona l“ c ircums t a nces in ag g r av ation .” Cou r tRu les a d opted to im pl emen t th e D S L defin e“c ir

c u m stan c e s inag gr av ation” as fac t s th at ju stifyth e u pperter m . Those facts, the Rules provide, mu st be e s tabli s h e d by a pr epon der

a nce of t h e evidence. Ba s e d on apos t -t ria ls e nt encing hea r ing, t h e ju dg e fou n dbya pr epon deran c eof th e ev iden c e sixag grav atin gfac t s, including the particular vul n erabilit y of the victim, andone mitigat

ing fa ct , t h a tCunningha m ha d no reco rdof prior c r imina lconduct

. Con c l u d in gthat th e ag g r avator s ou tw eigh ed th e sole mitig a tor , th e j u dge s e nt enc e d Cunningha m t o t h e upper t e rm of 1 6 yea r s . The Califor n i a Co u r tof Appeal affir m ed. The State Su pr eme Cou r tde

nied review, b u tin adecis i on pub lis hed n i ne da ys ea rlier, People v. Black, 35 Cal 4th12 30, 113 P. 3d 53 4, th at c o u r th e ld th at th e D S L s urvived S i xt hAmendmentins p ect i on. Held: The DS L, b ypla c ings e nt ence-elev a t i ng fa ct finding wit h in t h e

judge’s province, violates a defendant ’s r i gh t to tr ial byju r ysafe

gua r ded b yt h e S i xt h a n d Fourt eent h Amendment s . Pp. 8

– 2 2

.

(a) In Apprendi v. N ew Jerse y , th is Cou r theld th at, u n d erth e Six t h Amendment , a n y fa ct(ot her t h a naprior convict i on) t h a texpos e s a defendant to a sentence in e x cess of the re levant statuto r y maximum mu st be fou n dbya ju r y , n o t a ju dg e, an d estab lish e d b e y o n da r e a son able dou b t, n o t mer e lybya pr epon deran c eof th e eviden c e . Se e2 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA Sy llabu s 530 U. S. 46 6, 49 0. Th e Co u r th a s appl ie d th e r u l e of Appren dito facts subjectin ga defendantto the death penalty, Ring v. Arizona , 536 U. S. 584, 602, 609, fac t s per m itti n ga sen t en c ein ex c e ss of th e “ s ta nda r d ra nge” underWa s h ingt on’s S e nt encingReform Act(Re

form Act), Blak elyv. Was h i n gton , 542 U. S. 296, 304–3 05, an d fac t s tr ig g e r i nga sen t en c er a nge elev ationun derth e th en -man dator y Federa l S e nt encing Guidelines , United S t atesv. Booker , 543 U. S. 220, 24 3– 24 4. Blakelyan d Bookerbearmost c l oselyonth e qu estion presented here.

The maximum penalty for Blakel y’s offense, unde r Washington’s Reform Act, was ten year s’ impris onme nt, but if no facts beyond those reflected in the jury’s verdic t w e r efou n dbyth e tr ial ju dg e, Bla k ely could notreceiveas e nt ence ab o veas t a n da rd ra nge of 4 9 t o 5 3 mont hs

. Bla k ely wa s sent enced t o9 0 mont hs , more t h a nt h ree y e ar s abov e th e stan dar dr a n g e, based onth e ju dg e’s findin gof delib

era t ecruelt y. Applying Apprend i, t h is Courtheld t h e s e nt ence un c o n s titu tion al. Th e State i n Blakelyendeavored to distinguish Ap

prend i , cont e n ding t h a tBla k ely’s s e nt ence wa s wit h in t h e j u dge’s disc r e tionbas ed solelyonth e g u ilty v e r dic t. Th e Cour t dismi ssed th at ar g u men t
. Blakelyc o u l d n o t h av e beensen t en c e d abov e th e stan dar dr a n g e absen t ana ddition al f a c t
. Con s equ e n t ly , th at fac t w a s su bjec t t o th e Six t hAmen d men t ’s j u r y -tr i al gu aran tee. It did n o t mattert h at Blakely ’ s sen t en c e , thou ghou tside th e stan dar d ra nge, wa s wit h in t h e 1 0

- yea rma ximum. Beca us e t h e j u dge could nothave impos e d a s e nt ence out s ide t h e s t a n da rd range wit h out fin d in ganaddition al f a c t , t h e top of th atr a n g e—53 mon t h s , n o t 10 y e ar s—w a s th e r e lev a n tstatu tor ymax i mu m. Th e Cou r talso r e jec t ed th e Sta t e ’s ar g u men t s th at Apprendiw a s sat i sfied bec a u s e th e Reform Act d i d not s p ecify an excl usive catalog of fact s on which a ju dg e migh t base a dep a r t u r efr om th e stan dar dr a n g e, an d bec a u s e it u l tim atelyl eft th e dec i sionw h e th eror n o t to depar tto th e ju dg e’s dis cret i on.

Booker wa s sent enced und er t h e Federal S e nt encing Guidelines

. Th e fac t s fou nd byth e ju r y y i elded a ba se G u i delin es r a n g e of 210 to 262 mon t h s ’ i m pr ison men t , a r a n g e th e judg e c o u l d n o t ex c e ed w i th

ou t u n d er takin gaddition al fac t fin d in g. T h e judge did s o , making a fin d in gth at b oosted Bookerin to a higher Guidelines ra nge. This Courtheld Booker’s s e nt enc e impermiss i ble under t h e S i xt h Amend

ment
. The r ewa s “ n o dis t inct ion of con s t i t u tiona ls i g n ifica nce b e t w een t h e Fed e ra l S e nt encin gGuidelines a n d t h e Wa s h ingt on pro c e du r e s at i ssu e in [Blakely]. ” 543 U. S., at 2 33. Bo thw e r e“man d ator y a n d impos e[d] b i nding req u irement s on a ll s e nt encing j u dges .” Ibid

. All Memb ers of t h e Courta g reed, howeve r, t h a t t h e Guidelines would notimplicat e the S i xt h Amendmentif t h ey were a dvis o ry . Ibid. F a c -3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s in gth e r e medial qu estion , t h e Cou r tc o n c lu ded th atr e n d er in gth e Guidelines a d vis o ry ca me c l os es t t o wha t Congres s would have in

ten d ed h a d it kn ow n th at th e G u i delin es w e r e v u ln er able to a Six t h Amendmentcha llenge. U n der t h e a dvis o ry Guideline s s y s t em de

s crib e d in Booker, j u dges wo uld no longe r b econfined t ot h e s e nt enc in gr a n g e dic tated byth e G u i delin es, bu tw o u l d be ob li g e d to “t ake a ccount” of t h a tra nge a l ong wit ht h e s e ntencing goa l s enumera t e d in the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA). Id., at259, 264. Inplac e of th e SRA provisio n governing appell ate review of s e nt ences under t h e man d ator yG u i delin es sc h e me, th e Cou r tin stal led a “r ea s o n ablen ess ” standard of review. Id., at 261. Pp. 8–15.

(b ) In a ll materia lres p ect s , Ca lifornia ’ s DS L res e mb les t h e s e n tencing systems invalid ate d in Blakelyan d Book er. Following t h e rea s oning in t h os e ca s e s , t h e middle t e rm pres crib e d under Ca lifornia la w, nott h e upper t e rm, is t h e releva nt s t at ut ory maximum. Be

c a u s e ag g r av atin gfac t s th a tau th or ize th e u pperter ma r e fou n dby the judge, and need on lyb eestablish e d bya pr epon der a n c e of th e evidence, the DSL violates the rule of App ren di

.

Wh ile “th at sh ou ld be th e en d of th e matte r , ” Blakely, 542 U. S., at 313, in People v. Black, t h e Ca liforniaS u preme Courtins i s t ed t h at the DSL survives inspection under our p r ecedents. The Blackcourt r e ason ed th at , giv e nth e ample di sc r e tio naffor d ed tr ial ju dg es to ident i fy a ggrav a t i ng fa ct s wa rra nt ing a nuppert e rms e nt ence, t h e DSL did “not represent a legislativ e effort to shift the proof of par

ticular facts from elements o f a crime (to be pr ov ed to a ju r y) to sen

ten c i n gfac t ors (to be dec i ded bya ju dg e),”35 Cal. 4th , at 125 5–1 25 6 , 113 P. 3d, at 543 –5 44. Th i s Cou r tc a u t i o n e d in Blake ly, howeve r, t h a tb r oa d discret i on t odeci de wha tfa ct s ma y s u pporta nenha nced s e nt ence, or t o det e rmine whet h er a ne nha nced s e nt ence is wa r ra nt ed in apa rt icula rca s e , does no t sh iel da sen t en c i n gsy stem fr om the force of this Court’s decisions. The Blackcourta l s o urged t h at t h e DS L is no tca us e forcon c ernb e ca us e i treducedt h e pena lt ies for mos tcrimes over t h e p r ior i n det e rmina t e s e nt encing s c h e me; b e ca us e the system is f a ir to defendants; and becau s e the DSL re quires statu

t o ry s e nt ence enha ncement s (a s dist inguis hed from a ggrav a t o rs ) t o b e cha rged in t h e indict menta n d proved to aj ury b e yon darea s on able dou b t. T h e Black c o u r t ’s ex amin ation , insh or t, sati sfied i tth a t Califor n i a’s se n t en c i n gsy stem does n o t i m plic ate sig n i f ic an tlyth e conce rns und erlying t h e S i xt h Amendment ’s j ury-t ria lgua r a n t e e. This Court ’s decis i ons , however, leav e no r oom for s uch a nexa m ina

tion

. Askin g w h e th era defen d an t’s basic ju r y -tr i al r i gh tis pr eserv e d, t h ough s o me f a ct s es s e ntia l t o punis h menta r e res e rved for det e rmi

n ationbyth e ju dg e, is th e v e r yi n qu ir y Appren di’ s b r i ght -line rule wa s des i gned t o exclude

.4 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA Sy llabu s Ultim ately , th e Blackcourtrelied on a neq ua t i on of Ca lifornia ’ s D S L to th e po st- Bookerfede r al sy ste m . Th at at temp tedc o mpar ison is unavailing. The BookerC o urtheld t h e Federa lGuidelines incom

pati ble w i thth e Six t hAmen d men tbec a u s e th eyw e r e “man da tor y a n d impos e[d] b i nding req u irement s on a ll s e nt encing j u dges ,” 5 43 U. S., at 2 33. To r e medyth e c o n s titu tion al in fir m i t y , th e Cou r tex c i sed pr ov isio n s th at r e n d er ed th e sy ste mman d a t or y , leav in gth e Guidelines in pla c e as a dvisory only. The DS L, however , does notre semble th e ad v i sor ysy stem th e Cou r tin Bookerhad inview. Under California’s sy stem, judges are not freet oe x ercis et h eir “ d is cret i on t o s e lecta s p ecific s e nt ence wit h in adefined ra nge.” Ibid

. Ca lifornia ’ s Legis l a t ure has a d opt e d s e ntencing t r ia ds , t hree fixed s e nt ences wit h no ra nges b e tween t h em. Cunningha m’s s e nt encing j u dge ha d no disc r e tionto s e lec ta sen t en c ew i th ina r a n g e of 6 to 1 6y e ar s, bu t h a d to impo se 12 y e ar s, n o th in g less an d n o th in gmor e , un less th e ju dg e found fa ct s a l lowing as e nt ence of 6or 1 6yea r s . Fa ct finding t oele

v ate a sen t en c e fr om12 to 16 y e ar s, th i s Cou r t ’s dec i sion s mak e plain , fall s w i th inth e pr ov in c eof th e ju r yemploy in g a bey o n d -a reasonable-do u bt st andard, not the bailiw ick of a judge determining where t h epre p ondera nce of t h e evidencelies

.

The Black c o ur t atte mpted t or e sc u eth e DSL’s ju dic i a lf a c t fin d in g au th or itybyty pin git a r e ason ablen es s c o n s tr ain t , equ iv a len tto th e c o n s tr ain toper ativ e inth e post- Boo k erfederal system. Reasonable

nes s , however , is not t h e t o uchs t o ne of S i xt h Amendmenta n a l ys is

. The reasonablene ss r e qu ir emen t Bookeran tic i pate d forth e feder al system operates withinth e c o n s titu tion a lc o n s tr ain t s delin eatedin th is Cou r t ’s p r ec eden t, n o t as a su b s ti tu t e forth ose c o n s tr ain t s. Be

c a u s e th e D S L alloc ate s to ju dg es sole au th or ityto fin dfac t s per m it

tin gth e impositionof anu pperter msen t en c e , th e sy s t em v i olate s t h e S i xt h Amendment

. Booker’s remedyfor t h e Fede r a l Guidelines , in s h ort , is notarecipe for renderin g t h is Court ’s S i xt h Amendmen t ca s e la w t oot h l es s . Furt herelab o ra tion here on t h e fed era lrea s on ab l eness s t a n da rd is neit her neces s a ry n o r proper. T h e Courtha s g r an ted r e v i ewintw o c a ses—to be ar g u ed an d dec i ded laterth i s Ter m—r aisin gqu estion s tr ai n e d onth at matter
. Claib o rnev. Uni t ed States , No. 06–56 18; Ritav. United States , No. 06–57 54. Pp. 15–21.

(c) As t ot h e adj u s t ment of Ca lifornia ’ s s e nt encing s y s t em in light of th e Cou r t ’s r u lin g , “[t]h e ball . . . lie s in [Californ i a’s] court.” Booker , 543 U. S., at 265. Se v e r a l State s h av emodified t h eirsy stem s in the wake of Appren diand Blakelyto r e taindeter m i n ate sen t en c ing, by calling upon the jury to findany fa ct necessary t othe imposi

t i on of a neleva t e d s e nt enc e . Ot her S tat es have chosen t opermit ju dg es g e n u i nely“to ex er c i se br oad di sc r e tion. . . w i th i na st atu tor y ra nge,” w h ich , “ e very one a g rees ,” en cou n t e rs no S i xt h Amendment5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s sh oal. Id ., at 233. Cal i for n i a mayfol lowt h e path s t a ke nbyits sis t er Sta t es oroth e r w i se alterits sy ste m , so lon gas it observ es Six t h Amen d men tli mita tion s dec l ar ed inth is Cou r t ’s dec i sion s. Pp. 21–22. Revers ed in p a rta n d rema nded.

G IN SB U R G , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS , C. J., and S TEVENS , S CALIA , S OUTER , andT HOMAS , JJ., joined. K EN

NEDY , J., filed a dissent ing opinion, in which B REYER , J., join ed. ALITO , J., filed a dis s enting opinion, in which K ENNEDY an d B REY E R , JJ., join ed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–6 55 1 

### JOHN CU NNINGHAM, PETITIONE R v. C ALIFORNI A ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COU R T OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA 

### , FIRST APPELLATE DIST RICT [Jan u a r y22, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### G IN S B UR G

### delivered the opinion of th e Court. California’s determinate sentenci ng law (DSL) assigns to the trial judge, not to the jury, authorit yto find t h e facts that e x pose a defendant to an elevated “upper term ” sentence. The facts s o found are neither inherent in the jury’s verdi ct nor embraced by th e defendan t’s plea, an d they need only be est ablishe d by a preponderance of the evidence, n o t beyond a reasonabl e doubt. T h e question presented is whether the DSL, by placing sentenceelevating factfinding within the judge’ s province, violates a defendant’s ri ght to trial by jury safegu arded by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold t hat it does. As this Cou rt’s de cisions instruct, t h e Federal Constitu

tion’s jury-trial guarantee proscribes a senten cing scheme that allows a judge to impose asentence above the statu

tory ma ximum based on a fact, other than a prior convic

tion, not found by ajury or adm i tted by th e defendant. Apprendiv. New Je rs ey , 530 U. S. 466 (2000); Ring v. Arizona , 536 U. S. 584 (2002); Bla k elyv. Wa s h ington , 54 2 U. S. 296 (2004); United S t ates v. Booker , 5 43 U. S. 22 0 (2005). “[T]he relevant ‘sta tutory maximum,’ ” this Cour t has clarified, “is not the maximum sentence a judge m a y2 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### impose after finding additio nal facts, but the maximum he may impose witho u t an y additional findings.” Blakely , 54 2 U. S., at 303–304 (emp hasis inori ginal). In petitioner’s case, the jury’s verdi c talone limited the per m issible sen

tence to 12 years. Additional factfinding by the tri al judge, however, yielded an upper term sentence of 16 years. Th e California Cou rt of Appeal a ffirmed th e harsher sen t ence. We reverse that disposition because the four-year elevation ba sed on judicial factfinding denied petitioner his right to a jury t r ial. I A Petitioner John Cunningham was tried and co nvicted of continuous sexual abuse of a chil d under th e age of 14

. Under the DSL, that offense is p unishable b yimprison

ment for a lower term sentence of 6 years, a middle term sentence of 12 years, or an upper term sen t ence of 16 years. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §288.5(a) (Wes t 1999) (here

inafter Penal Code). As further explained bel o w, see infra , at 4–7, the DSL obliged the trial judge to sentence Cun

ningham to the 12-year middle term unless the judge found one or more addi tional facts in aggrava t ion. Base d on a post-trial sentenci ng hearing, the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence six aggravating circum

stances, among them, the particular vulnerability of Cun

ningham’s victim, an d Cunningham’s violent conduct, which indic a ted a serious danger to the community. Tr. of Sentencing (Aug. 1, 2 003), App. 22. 1 

### In mitigation, the judge found one fact: Cunningham had no record of prior criminal conduct. Ibid

. Concluding that th e aggrava t ors

——————

1 The particular vulnerabilit y of the vi cti mi s li stedinCal. Rule of Court 4.421(a)(3) (Criminal Case s) (W e s t 2006) (hereinafter Rule), as a fac t“r elat i n gto th e cr i m e.” Violen tc o n d uc t in dic atin ga ser i ou s dan g erto soc i etyis liste d inRu le 4.421(b) (1) as a fac t“ r elatin gto th e defendant.”3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### outweighed the sole mitigator, th e judge sentenced Cun

ningham to the upper term of 16 years. Id ., at 23. A panel of the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and senten ce; one ju dge dissented in part, urging that this Court’ s precedent precluded the judgedetermined four-year increase in Cunningham’s sentence. No. A103501 (Apr. 1 8 , 2005), App. 43–48; id ., at 48–50 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting i npart). 2 

### T h e California Supreme Court denied review. No. S13397 1 (June 29, 2005) (en banc), id ., at 52. In a reasoned deci

sion publis hed nine days earlier, that court co nsidered the question h e re presented and heldthat the DSL survive d Sixth Amendment inspection. Peoplev. Bla c k , 35 Cal. 4th 1238, 113 P. 3d 534 (June 20, 2005 ). B Enacted in1977, the DSL replaced an indeterminate sentencing regime in force in California for some 60 years. See id. , at 1246, 113 P. 3d, at 537; Cassou & Taugh e r, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game, 9 Pac. L. J. 5, 6–22 (1978) (hereinafter Cassou & Taugher). Under the prior re gim e , courts imposed openended priso n terms (often oneyear to lif e), an d the parol e board—the Adult Authority—determined the amount of time a felon would ultimately spend in prison. Black , 3 5 Cal. 4th, at 1246, 1256 , 113 P. 3d, at 537, 54 4; In re Rob

-

——————

2 In a ddit i on t o a S i xt h Amen d mentcha llen g e, Cunnin gha m disput ed th e su bstan c eof fiv eof th e sixfin d in g s made byth e tr ial ju dg e. Th e appell ate pan e l affir med th e tr ial ju dg e’s v u ln er able v ictim an d v iolen t conductfindin gs , b u trej e ct ed t h e finding t h a tCunningha m ab u s e d a positionof tr u s t (bec au se th at fin d in gov er lapped w i th th e v u ln er able vict im finding). The pa nel did no t decide whet h er t h e j u dge’s ot her findings were warranted, concluding that s he properly relied on at least tw o ag g r av atin gfac t s inim posin gth e u pperter m, an d th at i tw a s n o t “reasonably p r obable” tha ta differ ent sentence would have been imposedab se n tan yimpr op erfin din g s . App. 43 –4 6; id ., at 51 (M ay4, 2005, order m odifying opinio n a n d den y ingrehea r in g).4 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### erts , 36 Cal

. 4th 575, 588, n. 6, 115 P. 3d 1121, 1129, n. 6 (2005); Cassou & Taugher 5–9. Incontrast, the DSL fixe d the terms of imprison ment for most offenses , and elimi

nated the possibil i ty of early release on parol e . See Penal Code §3000 et seq . (W est Supp. 2 006); 3 B. Witkin & N. Epstein, California Criminal Law §610, p. 809 (3d ed. 2000); Brief for Respon dent 7. 3 

### Through the DSL, Califor

nia’s lawmakers aimed to pr omote uniformand propor

tionate punishment. Penal Code §1170(a)( 1 ); Black , 35 Cal. 4th, at 1246, 113 P. 3d, at 537. For most offenses, inc l uding Cun n ingham’s, the DSL regime is i m plemented in the f o llowing manner. Th e statute defining the offense prescribes three p r ecise terms of imprisonment—a lower, middle, and upper term sen

tence. E.g. , Penal Code §288.5(a) (West 1999) (a person convicted of continuou s sexual ab use of a ch ild “shall b e punished by imprisonment in th e state prison for a te rm of 6, 12, or 16years”). See als o Black , 35 Cal. 4th, at 1247, 113 P. 3d, a t538. Pen a l Code §11 70(b) (WestSupp. 2006) controls the trial judge’s choice; it provides that “the court shall order imposition of the midd le term, unl ess there are circumstan c es in agg r avation or mitigation of the crim e .” “[C]ircums t ances in ag grava t ion or mitigatio n” are to b e determined by the co urt after c o nsideration of several items: the trial record; the pr obation officer’s repor t ; statements in aggra v ation or mitigation submitted by th e parties, the victim, or t h e victim’s family; “and any furth er evidence introduced at t h e sentencing hearing.” Ibid

. The DSL di rected the State’s Judi c ial Council 4

### to adopt

——————

3 Murder andcertain other grave offe nses still carry le ngthy indeter

min ate ter m s w i thth e pos s i b ili tyof early release on par o le. Brief for Respondent 7, n. 2. See, e.g . , Pen al Code §190 (Wes t Su p p . 2006).

4 The J u dicia l Council includ es t h e chief j u s t ice a n d a n other j u s t ice of the California Supreme Co urt, three jud g es sitting on the Courts of Appea l , t e n judges from t h e S u perior Court s , a n d ot her nonv ot ing member s. C a l

. Con s t., Ar t. 6, §6(a) (We s t Su pp. 200 6). Th e Califor n i a5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Rules guiding the sentencing judg e’s decision whether to “[i]mpose the lower or upper pri s on term.” Penal Code §1170.3(a)( 2 ) (West 20 04). 5 

### Restating §1170(b), the Coun

cil’s Rules provide that “[t]he middle term shall be selected unless impo sition of theupper orlower term is justified by circumstan c es in ag grava t ion or mitigation.” Rule 4.420(a). “Circumstan c es in aggravation,” a s crisply de

fined by the Judicial Council, means “ factswhich justify the imposition of the upper priso nterm.” Rule 4.405(d) (emphasis added). Facts aggravati n g an offen s e, the Rules instruct, “s hall be est ablished bya preponderance of t h e evidence,” Rule 4.420(b), 6

### and must be “stated orally on the record.” Rule 4.420(e). The Rules provide a nonexhaustive list of a ggra v atin g circumstan c es, including “[f]acts relating to the crime, ” Rule 4.421( a), 7

### “[f]acts relating to the defendant,” Rule 4.421(b), 8

### and “[a]ny oth e r facts sta t utorily declared to be circumstan c es in aggravation,” Rule 4.421(c)

. Beyond t h e enumerated circumsta nces, “the j u dge is fre e to consider any ‘additio nal criteria reaso nablyrelated to the decision being made.’ ” Black , 35 Cal. 4th , at 1247, 113 P. 3d, at 538 (quoting Rule 4.408(a)). “A fa ct that is a nelement of

—————— Con s titu t i ong r an ts th e Cou n c il au th or ity , inter alia , “to adopt r u l es for courta d minis t ra t i on, pra c t i ce a n d pro c edure, a n d perform ot he r funct ions pres crib e d b ys t a t ut e.” Art

. 6 , § 6 (d).

5 Th e Ru les w e r eamen ded onJan u a r y1, 200 7. Th ose amen dmen t s ma de t e chnica l cha nges , n o ne of t h em ma t e rial t o the cons t i t u t i ona l question before us. We ref e r in th is opi n ion to the p r ior text of the Rules , upon w h ich t h epa rt ies and principal authorities rely.

6 Th e ju dg e must pr ov ide a s tate men tof r e ason s fora se n t en c e on ly when aloweror upper t e r ms e nt ence is impos e d. Rules 4

. 40 6 (b), 4.420(e).

7 E.g. , Ru le 4.4 21(a)( 1 ) (“[T]h e fac tth at . . . [t]h e c r i me inv o lv ed gr eat violence, grea tb o dily ha rm, t hrea tof grea tb o dily ha rm, or ot her a c t s dis c los i ng ahigh degr ee of cr uelt y, vicio u s n es s , or ca llous nes s . ” )

. 8 E.g. , Ru le 4.421(b)( 1 ) (“[T]h e fac tth at . . . [t]h e defen dan th a s en ga ged in violentcondu c twh ich indic ates a ser i ou s dan g erto soc i ety
. ”).6 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the crime,” however, “shall not be used to impose the upper term.” Rule 4.420(d). In sum, California’s DSL, and the rules governing it s application, direct th e sentencing court to start with the middle term, and to move from that term only when the court itself finds and places on the record fact s—whetherrelated to the offense or the of

fender—beyond the ele m ents of the charged offense. J USTICE 

### ALI T O 

### maintains, however, that a circumstance in aggra v ation need n o t be a fact at all. In his view, a policy judgment, or even a judge’ s “subjective belief” re garding the appropriate sentence, qualifies a s an aggra vating cir c u mstance. Post , at 11 –12 (dissen t ing opinion). California’s Rules, how e ver, consta ntly refer t o “facts.” A s just noted, the Rules define “cir c umstances in aggrava

tion” as “ facts which j u stify the imposition of the upper prison term.” Rule 4.405(d) (emphasis a dded). 9

### An d “circumstan c es in aggravation,” th e Rules un ambiguously declare, “shall be established by a preponderance of th e evidence,” Rule 4.420(b), a clear factfinding directive to which there is no exception. See Peoplev. Hall , 8 Cal. 4th 950, 957, 883 P. 2d 974, 978 (1994) (“Selection of the uppe r term is jus t ified only i f circumsta nces in aggravation are established by a prepon derance of evidence . . . .” (empha

sis added)).

While the Rules list “[g]eneral objectives of sentencing,” Rule 4.410( a), nowhere are these objectives cast as “cir

cumstances in aggra v a t ion” that a l one authorize an upper term sentence. The Rules also st ate that “[t]he enumera

tion . . . of some criteria fo r the making of discretionar y sentencing decisions does not prohibit the application of

——————

9 See also, e.g. , Rule 4.42 0(b) (“Selection of t h e upper termis jus t ifie d on lyif, aftera c o n s ider ationof all th e r e le v a n t facts , t h ecircums t a nce s inag g r av ationou tw eighthe c i r c u m stan c e s inmitig ati on .” (emph asis added)); Ru le 4.420(e) (c ou r tmu st pr ov ide “a c o n c i se statemen tof th e u l tima te facts t h a tt h e courtdeemed t o cons t i t u t ecircums t a nces in ag g r av ationor mitig ation” ( e mph a si s add e d)).7 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### additional criteria reasonably rela ted to the decision b e in g made.” Rule 4.408(a). California courts have not read this language to unmoor “circumstance s in aggravation” from any factfinding anchor. In linewith the Rule s, the Calif ornia Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to circumstances in aggrava t ion as facts. See, e.g. , Black , 35 Cal. 4th, at 1256, 1 13 P. 3d, at 544 (“The Legislature did not identify all of th e particular factsthat could justify the upper term.” (emphasis added)); People v. Wiley , 9 Ca l. 4th 580, 587, 889 P. 2d 541, 54 5 (1995) (“[T]rial courts are assigned the tas kof decidin g whether to impose an upper or lower term of imprison

ment based upon their determination wheth e r there are circumstan c es in aggravation or mitigation of the crime, a dete rminati o n that in v a riably r e q u ires num e rous fac t ua l findings .” (emphasis a dded and internal quotation marks omitted)). It is unsurprising, then, t hat State’s counsel, at oral argument, acknowledged that he knew of no case in which a California trial ju dge had gone beyond the middle term based not on any fact the judge found, but s o lely on the basis of a p o licy judgm e nt or subjective belief. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4 9–50. Notably, th e Penal Code permits elevation of a sentence above the upper term based on specified st atutory en

hancements relating to the defendant’s criminal history o r circumstan c es of the crime. See, e.g. , Penal Code §667 et seq . (West Supp. 2006); §12022 et seq. See a l so Black , 35 Cal. 4th, at 1257, 113 P. 3d, at 54 5. Unlike aggra v ating circumstan c es, statutory enhancements must be charged in the indictment, a n d the un derlying fa cts must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Penal Co de §1170.1(e); Black , 35 Cal. 4th, at 1257, 113 P. 3d, at 545. A fact un derlying an e nhancement cannot do double duty; it cannot b e used to impose an upper term s e ntence and, on top of t hat, an en hanced term. Penal Code §1170 (b).8 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Where per m itted by statute, however, a judge may use a fact qualifying as an enhancer to impose an upper term rather thanan enhanced sentence. Ibid

. ;Rule 4.420(c). II This Court has repea t edly held that, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a def e ndant to a greater potential sentence must b e found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonab le doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence. While this rule is rooted in longstanding common-law practice, it s explicit statement in our decisions is recent. In Jones v. UnitedS t a t es , 526 U. S. 227 (19 99), we examined the Sixth Amendment’s h i storical and doctrinal foundations, and recognized that judicial factfinding operating to in

crease a defendant’s otherwise maximum punishment posed a grave constitutional question. Id ., at 239–25 2. While the Court constr ued the statute at issue to avoid th e question, th e Jonesopi n ion presaged our decis i on, som e 1 5 months later, in Apprendiv. Ne w Je rsey , 5 30 U. S. 46 6 (2000). Charles Ap prendi was convicted of possession of a fire

arm for an unlawful purpose, a second-degree offen s e under New Jersey law punishable by five to ten years’ imprisonment. Id ., at 468. A separate “hate crime” stat

ute authorized an “extended term” of imprisonment: Ten to twenty years could be impose d if the trialjudge foun d, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “ ‘[t]he defendant in committing the cri me acted w i th a pu rpose to intimi

date an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religio n, sexual orientation or ethnicity.’ ” Id ., at 468–469 (quoting N. J. Stat. An n. §2C:44–3(e) (West Supp. 1999–20 00)). The j u dge in Ap

prendi’ s case so found, and therefore sentenced the defen

dant to 12 years’ imprisonment. This Court held that the Sixth Amendment pros cribed the enhanced sentence. 5309 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### U. S., at 471. Other than a priorconviction, see Almen

darez-To rre sv. Unit ed St at es , 5 23 U. S. 2 24, 239–247 (1998), we held in Apprendi , “an yfact tha t increases the penalty for a crime bey o nd the prescribed statutory maxi

mum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 53 0 U. S., a t 490. See a l so Harri sv. United S t a t es , 536 U. S. 545, 557–566 (200 2) (plurality opinion) (“ Apprendis a id that any fact extending the de

fendant’s sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the jury’ s verdict would have been considered an element of an aggravated cri me—and thus the domain of the jury—b y th ose who framed the Bill of Rights.”). We have si nce reaffirmed the rule of Appren di , applying it to facts subjecting a defendan t to the death penalty, Ring v. Arizona , 536 U. S. 584, 602, 609 (2002), facts permitting a sentence in excess of the “stan d ard ran g e” under Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act, Blakelyv. Washin gton , 542 U. S. 296, 304– 305 (2004), and facts triggerin g a sentence range elevation under the thenmandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines, United Sta t es v. Booker , 543 U. S. 220, 243–244 (2005). Blakelyan d Bookerbear most clos el y on the qu estion prese n ted in this case. Ralph How a rd Blakelywas convicted of second-degree kidnapping with a firearm, a clas s B fel o ny under Was h

ington law. Blak ely , 542 U. S., at 298–299. While the overall statutory maxi mum for aclass B fel o ny was ten years, the State’ s SentencingReform Act ( R eform Act) added an important q ualification: If no facts beyond those reflected in the jury ’s v e rdict were found by th e trial judg e, a defendant could not receive a sen t ence above a “standard range” of 49 to 53 months. Id ., at 299–300. The Reform Act permit t e d but did not require a judge to exceed that standard ra nge if she found “ ‘subs tantial and compelling reasons justifying an e x ceptional sentence.’ ” Ibid . (quot

ing Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §9.94A.120(2) (2000)). The10 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Reform Act set out a nonexhaustive list of aggra v ating facts on which such a sentence el evation could be based

. It also clarified that a fact ta ken into account in fixing th e standard range— i.e. , any fact fo und by the jury—c ould under no circumsta nces count in the determination whether to impose an exceptional sentence. 542 U. S., a t 299–300. Blakely wa s sentenced to 90 months’ imprison

ment, more than three years above the standard range, based on the trial judge’s finding that he had acted with deliberate cruelty. Id ., at 300. Applying th e rule of Ap prendi , this Court held Blakely’s sentence unconstitutional. The State in Blakelyha d endeavored to distinguish Apprendion the ground that “[u]nder th e Washington guidelines, an exceptional sen

tence is wit h in the court’s disc retion as a result of a guilty verdict.” B r ief for Respondent in Blakelyv. Washin gton , O.T. 2003, No. 02–1632, p. 15. We rejected that argume nt. The judge could not have sentenced Blake l y above the standard range without finding the additional fact of deliberate cruelty. Consequently, that fact was subject to the SixthAmendment’s jury-trial guarantee. 542 U. S., at 304–314. It did not matter, we explained, that Blakely’s sentence, though outside the stan dard range, was within the 10-year maximum for class B felonies: “Our p r ecedents make clear . . . that the ‘statutor y maximum’ for Appren dipurposes is the maximum sentence a j u dge may impose solely on the bas i s of the facts r e flec t ed in th e ju ry verdi c t o radmitted by the de

fendant

. . . . In otherwords, the relevant ‘statutor y maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional fa cts, but the maxi

mum he may impose withoutan y additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s ver

dict alone does not al low, the jury has not found all the facts ‘w hich the la w ma kes essential to the pun

-11 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### ishment,’

. . . and the j u dge exceeds his proper author

ity.” Id ., a t303 (emphasis in original) (quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure §87, p. 55 (2d ed. 1872)). Because the judge inBlakely’s case couldnot have imposed a sentence outside the standard range without finding anadditional fact, the top of th at range— 53 months, and not 10 years—was the relevant statutory maximum. 542 U. S., at 304. The State had additionally argued in Blakelythat Ap

prendi ’s rul e was satisfied because Washington’s Reform Act did notspecify an exclusive catalog of potential fact s on which a judge might base a departure from the stan

dard range. This Court rejected that ar gum e nt as well. “Whether the judge’s authority to impose an enhanced sentence depends on finding a specified fact

. . . one of several specified facts . . . or an yaggrava t ing fact (as here),” we observed, “it remain s the case that the jury’s verdict alon e does not authorize the sentence.” 542 U. S., at 305 (em p hasis in original). Further, we held it irrele

vant that the Reform Ac t ultim a tely left t h e decision whether or not to depart to the judge’s discretion: “Whether the judicially determined facts re quirea sen tence enha ncement or merely allow it,” we noted, “the verdict alone does not authorize the sentence.” Ibid ., n. 8 (emphasis i noriginal). Freddie Bo oker was co nvicted of p o ssession with intent to distribute crack coc a ine and w a s sentenced under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The facts found by Booker’s jury yielded a base Guidel ines range of 210 to 26 2 months’ imprisonment, a range the judge coul d not exceed without un dertaking a dditional factfinding. Booker , 543 U. S., at 2 27, 233–234. The ju dge did so, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker possessed a n amount of drugs inexcess of the amount determined by the jury ’s verdict. T hat findingboosted Booker into a12 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### higher Guidelines range. Book e rwas sentenced at the bottom of the higher range, to 360 months in prison. Id ., at 227. In an opini o n written by J USTIC E 

### S TEVE NS 

### fora f i v e Member majority, the Court held Booker’s sentence im

permissible under the Sixth Amendment. In the major

ity’s ju dgm e nt, there was “no dis t inction of constitutional significance between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington procedures at issue in [Blakely] .” Id ., at 233. B o th systems were “mandatory a n d impose[ d] binding requirements on all sent encing judges.” Ibid

. 10 

### J USTICE 

### S T EVEN S 

### ’ opinion for the Court, it bears empha

sis, next expressed a view on which there was no dis

agreement among the Justices. He ack n owledged that the Federal Guidelines would not imp licate the S i xth Amend

ment were they advisory: “If the Guidelines as currently w r it ten could be read as merelyadvisory provis ions that recommended, rather thanrequired, the selection of particular sen

tences in response to differing sets of facts, t h eir use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment. We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in i m posing a sentence within a statutory range. Indeed, everyone agrees that the constitutional issues pres ented by [this case] would have been avoided entirely if Congress had omitted

——————

10 Ca lifornia ’ s D S L, we not e in t h is cont ex t , res e mbles pre- Booker federa ls e nt encing i nt h e s a me wa ys Wa shingt on’s s e nt encings y s t em did: Th e keyCalifor n i a Pen a l Code pr ov isi o nstate s th a t th e sen t en c i n g court“ shall orderimpos i t i on of t h e middle t e rm” ab s e nt“circums t a nces inag g r av ationormitig a tion of th e c r i me,” §11 70(b) (em ph asis added), an d an ymov e to th e u pperorlow e rter m mu st be ju s t ifi e d by“a c o n c i se statement of the ultimat efacts ” on whic ht h e depa rt ure res t s , Rule 4.420(e) (emp h asis added). Bu t see post , at 7 (ALITO , J., dissenting) (cha ra ct erizin g Ca lifornia ’ s DS L a s indis t inguis hab l e fro mpos t

- Boo k er s e nt encing).13 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### from the [federal Sentenci ng Reform Act] th e provi

sions that make the Guidelines binding on district judges . . . . For when a trial judge exercises his dis

cretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant h a s no right to a jury determina

tion of the f a cts that the judge deems relevant. “The Guidelines as written, however, are not advi

sory; they are mandatory and binding on all judges.” Ibid . (citations omitted)

. In an opini o n written by J USTI CE 

### B REYER 

### , a l so garner ing a five- M ember majority, th e Court fa ced the remedi al question, which turned on an as sessment of legislative intent: What alteration would Congress have intended had it k n own that the Guidelines were vulnerable to aSixth Amendment challenge? Three choices were apparent: th e Court could invalidate in its entir e ty the Sen t encing Re

form Act of 1984 (SRA), the law co mprehensively delineat

ing the federal sentencing syst em; or it could preserve the SRA, and the mandatory Guide lines regime the SRA established, by atta ching a ju ry-trial requirement to any fact increasing a defe ndant’s bas e Guidelines range; fi

nally, the Court could render the Guidelines advisory by severing two provisions of the SRA, 18 U. S. C. §3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) (2000 ed. and Supp. IV). 543 U. S., at 246 – 249. 11 

### Recognizing tha t“reasonable minds c an, and do,

——————

11 Title 1 8U. S. C. §355 3(b)( 1 ) man d a t ed t h e imposi tionof aG u i de

lines s e nt ence unles s t h e dis t rictcourtfo und “ a na ggrav a t i ng or mit i

g atin gc i r c u m stan c e of a kin d , orto a deg r ee, n o t adequ a telytakenin to cons idera t i on b yt h e S e nt en cing Commiss ion in formula t ing t h e guide

lines.” Sectio n 3742(e) d i rected th e court of appe als to d e termine, inter alia , whet h e rt h e dis t rictcou r tco rre c t ly a pplied the G u idelines , §3742(e)(2), and, if the sentence imposedfell outside the applicable Guidelines ra nge, whet h e rth e s e nt encin g j u dge ha d pro v ided awrit t e n sta t emen t of r e ason s, w h e th er§3553(b) a n d th e fac t s o f th e c a se w a r ra nt ed t h e depa rt ure, a n d whet h er t h e d e gree of depa rt ure wa s rea s on able, §3742(e)( 3).14 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### differ” on t h e remedial question, the majorit yconclude d that the ad visory Guid elines solut i on came closest to the congressional mark. Id ., at 248–258. Under the system described in J USTICE 

### B RE YER 

### ’s o p in

ion for the Court in Bo oker , judges would no l o nger be tied to the sent encing rang e indicated in the Guidelines. But they would be obliged to “take a cco unt of” tha trange along with the sentencing goals Congress enumerated in the SRA at 18 U. S. C. §3553(a). 5 43 U. S., at 259, 264. 12 

### Having severed §3742( e), the provision of the SRA govern ing appella te review of sentences under the mandatory Guidelines scheme, see supra , at 1 3 , and n. 1 1 , the Court installed, as consistent with the Act and th e sound ad

ministration of justice, a “reasonableness” standard of review. 54 3 U. S., at 261. Without attempting an elabo

rate discus sion of that standard, J USTICE 

### B RE YE R 

### ’s re m e dial opinion for the Court observed: “Section 3553(a) re

mains in effect, and set s forth num erous factor s that guide sentencing. Those fa ctors in tu rn will guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in determining whethera sentence is reasonable.” Ibid

. 13

### T h e Court emphasized

——————

12 Section 3553( a) instructs sentencing judges to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and th e history and ch aracteristics o f the defendant,” “the kinds o f sente nces available,” an d the Guidelines an d polic ystatemen t s is su ed byth e Un ited State s Sen t e n c i n gCommis

sion

. §3553( a)(1), (3)–(5). Av oidan c eof un w a r r a n t ed sen t en c i n g dispar i t ies, a n d th e n eed to pr ov ide r e stitu t ion , ar e also li sted a s c o n c e r n s to wh ic hth e ju dg e sh ou ld r e spond. §3553(a)( 6 )–(7).

Ina fu r t h e ren u m er ation , §355 3(a) c a ll s forth e imposit i onof “a sen

ten c e su ffic i ent, bu t n o t g r ea terth ann e c e ssar y” to “r efle c tth e ser i ou s ness of the offense,” “promote respect for the law,” “provide just pun

ishment for the offense,” “afford ad equate deterrence to criminal conduct ,” “ p ro t e ctt h e pub l ic from furt her crimes of t h e defenda n t , ” a n d “provide the d efendant with needed educational or vocational training , medical care, or other correctiona l treatment inthe most effectiv e man n e r . ” §3553(a)( 2 ).

13 While this ca se does not ca ll forelab or ati onof th e r e as on ablen es s checkon fede r a ls e nt encingpos t

- Booker , w en o te th at th e Cou r th a s15 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the provisional character of the Bo okerremed y . Reco gniz

ing that a u thority to speak “ t he last wor d” resides in Congress, the Court said: “The ball now lies in Congress’ c o urt. The National Legislature is equipped to devis e and inst all, l o ng term, the sentencing system, c o mpatible with the Constitution, that Con gress ju dge s best for the federal system of justice.” Id. , at 265. We turn now to the ins t ant case inlight of bot hparts of the Court’s Bookeropinion, and our earlier decisions in point. III Under California’s DSL, an upper term sentence may be imposed on ly when the trial judge finds an aggra v ating circumstan c e. See supra , a t 4–5. Anelement of the charged offense, es sen t ial to a jury’s determination of guilt, or admitted in adefendant’s guilty plea, does not qualify as such a circumstance. See supr a , at 5–6. In

stead, aggravating circumstances depend onfacts foun d discretely a n d solely by the judge. In accord w i th Blakely , therefore, the middle term prescribed in Calif ornia’ s stat

-

—————— g r an ted r e v i ewintw o c a ses r a isin gqu estion s tr ain e d onth at matte r : Claib o rnev. United States , No. 06–56 18 (c er t. g r an ted, Nov

. 3, 2006) ; an d Ritav. Un i t e d S t a t es , No. 06–5 754 ( c er t. g r an ted, Nov

. 3, 2006). In Claib o rne , the Court will c o nsider whetherit is consis tent with the adv i sor yc a st of th e G u i delin es sy stem post- Bookerto r e qu ir e tha t ext r a o rdina r ycircums t a nces at t e nd a s e nt ence va ryi n g s u b s ta nt ia lly from the Guid e lines. Ritaincludes t h e q u es t i on whet h er is itcons ist e nt wit h Bookerto ac c o r da pr esu m ptionof r e ason ablen es s to aw i th in

Guidelines s e nt ence.

In t h is rega rd, we not e J US TI CE ALITO ’s v i ewth at C a lifor n i a’s D S L i s essen t i a llyth e same a s pos t

- Bookerfedera l s e nt encing. Post , at 1–1 0. To main tain th at posi tion , h i s dissen tpr ev iew s , w i th ou t ben efit of b r iefing or a r gu ment , how “ r ea s o nablenes s review,” pos t

- Booker , works

. Post , at 13 –15. It i s n e ith e r n e c e ssar yn o r pr opern o wto joinis su e w i th J US TI CE ALIT O onth is matter

.16 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### utes, not th e upper term, is the relevant statutory ma xi

mum. 542 U. S., at 303 (“[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendipurposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on theb asis of th e f a cts r e fle cte din the jur y verdict or admitted by the defend ant .” (empha sis in origi

nal)). Because circumstances in aggra v ation are found by the judge, not the ju ry, and need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonabl e doubt, see supra , at 5, the DSL vio l ates Apprendi ’s brightline rule: Excep tfora prior co nviction, “a ny fact th at increases the penalty for a crime beyond th e prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U. S., at 490. While “[t]hat should be the end of the matter,” Blak ely , 542 U. S., at 313, in Peoplev. Bla c k , the California Su

preme Court held other w ise. In that court’s vi ew, the DS L survived examination under our precedent intact. See 35 Cal. 4th, at 1254–1261 , 113 P. 3d, at 543–548

. The Black court a c kn owledged that California’s syste m appears on surface inspection to be in tension with th e rule of Ap

prendi

. Bu t in “operation and effect,” the court said, the DSL “simpl y authorize [s] a sentencing court to engage in the type of factfinding that traditi onally has been incident to the judge’s selection of an appropriate sentence within a statutorily prescribed sentencingrange.” 35 Cal. 4th, at 1254, 113 P. 3d, at 543. Therefore, the court conclude d, “the upper term is the ‘statu tory maximum’ and a trial court’s im p o sition of an upper t e rm sentence does not violate a defendant’s right to a jury trial under the princi

ples set for t h in Apprendi , Blakely , and Booker .” Ibid

. But see id ., at 1270, 113 P. 3d, at 554 (Kennard, J., con

curring an d dissenting) (“Nothin g in the high court’s majority opinions in A pprendi , Bl akely , and Bookersug gests that the constitutionality of a state’s sentencing scheme tur n s on whet her, in the words of t h e majority here, it involves the type of factfinding ‘that traditionally17 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### has been p e rformed by a judge.’ ” (q uoting id ., at 1253, 11 3 P. 3d, at 542)). The Blackcourt’s conc lusion thatthe upper term, an d not the mi ddle term, qualifies as the releva nt statu t or y maximum, rested on s e veral considerations. First, the court reasoned that, given th e ample discretion afforded trial judges to identifyaggra v atin g facts war r anting an upper term sentence, the DSL “does not represent a legislative effort to shift the proof of particular facts from ele m ents of a crime (to be proved t o a jury) to sentencing factors (to be de

cided by a judge). . . . Instead, it afforded the sentenc

ing judge th e discretion to decide, with the gu idance of rules and statutes, wh ether the facts of the case and the history of the defendant justify the higher sen

tence. Such a system does not diminish the tradi

tional power of the jury .” Id ., at 1256, 113 P. 3d, at 544 (footnote omitted). We cautioned in Blakely , however, that broaddiscretio n to decide what facts m a y support an enhanced sentence, or to determine whether an enhanced sentence is warrante d in any particular case, does no t shield a sentencing syste m from the force of our decisions. If the jury’s verdict alone does not au thorize the sentence, if, instead, the judge must find an additional fact to impo se the longer term, the Sixt h Amendment requirem e nt is not satisfied. Blakely , 54 2 U. S., at 30 5, and n. 8. The Blackcourt also ur ged that th e DSL is not cause for concern because it reduced the penalties for most crimes over the pr ior indeterminate sentencing reg i me. 35 Cal. 4th, at 1256–1258, 11 3 P. 3d, at 544–545. But see id ., at 1271–1272, 113 P. 3d, at 555 (Ken nard, J., concurring an d dissenting) (“This asp e ct of our sentencing law does n o t differ significantly from the Washington sentencin g scheme [the high court invalidated in Blakely .] ” ); sup ra , at18 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### 10. Furth e rmore, California’s system is n o t unfair to defendants, for they “cannot reasonably expect a gua r an tee that the upper term will not be imposed” givenjudges’ broad discretion to impose an upper term sentence or to keep their punishment at the middle term. 35 Cal. 4th, at 1258–1259, 113 P. 3d, at 545–546. The Black court addi

tionally noted that the DSL requires statutory enhance

ments (as d i stinguished from aggravators)—e. g. , the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, infliction of great bodily injury, Penal Code §§12022, 12022.7–.8(West 200 0 and Supp. 2006)—to be charged in the indi ctment and proved to ajury beyon da reasonable doubt. 35 Cal. 4th, at 1257, 113 P. 3d, at 545. The Black court’s e x a m ination of the DSL, in short, satisfied itthat California’s sentencing system does no t implicate si gnificantly the co ncerns underlying the Sixth Amendment’s jur y -tria lguarantee. Our decisions, how

ever, leave no room f o r such an examination. Asking whether a defendant’s basic jury

- trial right i s preserved , though some facts essential to punishment are reserved for determi nation by the judge, we have said, is the very inquiry Apprendi ’s “b right-line rule” was designed to exclude. See Blakely , 542 U. S., at 307–308. But se e Black , 35 Cal. 4th, a t1260, 11 3 P. 3d, at 547 (stati ng, remarkably , that “[ t]he high court precedents do not dra w a bright line”). 14 

### Ultimately, the Blackcourt relied on an equation of California’s DSL s y stem to the post- Bookerfederal system.

——————

14 J US TI CE K ENNEDY urges adis t inct ion b e tween fa ct s concer n ing t h e offense, whe re Apprendi would apply, and facts concerni ng the offende r, where itwo ul d not

. Post , a t1–2 (di ssen t i n gopin ion)

. Appren diitself, howeve r, leav es no room fo rt h e b i furca t e d a pproa ch J US TI CE K ENNED Y pr oposes. See 530 U. S., at 490 (“[A]ny fa ctt h a tincrea s es t h e pena lty fora c r i me bey o n dth e pr escr ibed st atu tor ymax i mu m m u st be su b m it

ted to aju r y , an d pr ov ed bey o n da r e ason ab le dou bt.” (e mph a si s added)).19 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### “The level of discretion available to a California judge in selecting which of the three available terms to impose,” the court s aid, “appea r s compara ble to the level of discre

tion that the high court has chosen to permit federal judges in p o st- Bookersentencing.” 35 Cal. 4th, at 126 1, 113 P. 3d, at 548. T h e same equation drives J USTIC E 

### ALITO 

### ’s dissent. See post , at 1 (“Th e Californiasentencin g law . . . is i n distinguishable in an y constituti onally signi f i

cant respec t from the advisory Gui d elines scheme that the Court approved in [Booker] .”). The attempted comparison is u navailing. As earlier explained, see supra , at 12–13, this Court in Bookerhel d the Federal SentencingGuidelines incompatible with the Sixth Amendment because the Guidelines w e re “manda

tory and i m posed bin d ing requirements on all sentenci ng judges.” 54 3 U. S., at 2 33. “[M]erely advisory provisions,” recommending but not requiring “ t he selection of particu

lar sentences in response to differing sets of facts,” a ll Members of the Court agreed , “would not implicate th e Sixth Ame n dment.” Ibid

. To remedy the constitutional infirmity fo und in Bo oker , the Court’s ma jority ex cised provisions that rendered th e system mandatory, leaving the Guidelines in place as advisory only. Id ., at 245–246. See also supra , at 13– 14. California’s DSLdoes not resemble the advisory syste m the BookerCourt had in view. Under California’s system, judges are not free to exercisetheir “discretio nto select a specific sentence withi na defined range.” Booker , 543 U. S., at 2 33. California’s Legislature has adopted sen

tencing tri ads, three fixed sentences with no ranges be

tween them. Cunningham’s sentencing judge had no discretion to select a sentence within a rang e of 6 to 16 years. H erinstruction was to select 12 years, nothing less and nothing more, unless s he found facts allowing the imposition of a senten ce of 6 or 1 6 years. Factfinding to elevate a sentence from 12 to 16 ye ars, our decisions make20 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### plain, falls within the province of the jury employing a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, not the b a iliwick of a judge determining where the pre p onderance of the evi

dence lies. Nevertheless, the Blackcourt att e mpted to rescue the DSL’s judicial factfinding autho rit yby typingit simply a reasonableness constraint, e quivalent to the constraint operative in the federal system post- Booker

. See 35 Cal. 4th, at 1261, 113 P. 3d, at 548 (“Because an aggra v atin g factor unde rCalifornia law mayinclude any factor th at the judge reasonably d eems rel e vant, the [DSL’s] require

ment that an upper term senten ce be impos e d only if a n aggra v atingfactor exi s ts is comparable to Booker’s r e quirement that a federa l judge’ s sentencing de cision not be unreasonab le.”). Reasonableness, however, i s not, as th e Blackcour t would h a ve it, the touchstone of Sixth Amendment analysis. The reas onableness requirement Bookeranti c ipated for the fe deral system operates wi thi n the SixthA m endment constraints delineated in our prece

dent, not as a substitute fo r those constraints. Because the DSL al locates to judges sole authority t o find facts permitting the imposit i on of an upper term sentence, the system viol ates the Si xth Amendment. It i s comforting, but beside the point, that California’s system requires judge-determined DSL senten ces to be reasonabl e. Booker’s re medy for t h e Federal Guidelines, in short, is not a recipe for rendering ou r Six t h Amendment case la w toothless. 15

——————

15 J US TI CE ALIT O , howeve r, wo uld do j u s t t h a t
. His opinion rea d s t h e remedia lportion of t h e Cou r t ’ s opinion in Bookerto ov erride Blakely , an d to r e n d er ac ademicth e en tir efir s t par tof Bookeritself. Post , at 1 3

– 1 5

. There would have b een no ma j o rit yin Bookerfor the revision of Blakelyes sa yed in his dis s ent
. Grou n ded in anot i on of how federa l reasonableness review op er ates inpr ac tic e , J US TI CE ALI TO “necessarily anticipate s” aquestion thatw ill be aired later this Term in Ritaand Claib o rne . Se e supra , at 14, n . 13. Wh ile w edo n o t for ec ast th e Cou r t ’s21 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### To summarize: Contrary to the Blackcourt’s holding, our decisions from Apprendito Bookerpoint to the middle term specified in California’s statu t es, not the upper term, as the relevant statu t ory maxim u m. Beca use the DS L authorizes the judge, not the jury, to find the facts permit

ting an upp e r term sentence, the system cann ot withstan d measureme n t against our Sixth Amendment precedent. 16 

### IV As to the a d justment of Ca lifornia’s sentencing system in light of our decision, “[t]he ball

. . . lies in [ C alifornia’s] court.” Booker , 543 U. S., at 265; cf. supra , at 15. We n o te that several States have modifie dtheir systems in the wake of Apprendiand Blakelyto retain determinate sen

tencing. They have done so by calling upon the jury— either at trial or in a separate sentencing proceeding—to find any fact necessary to the imposition of an elevated sentence. 17 

### As earlier noted, California already employs

—————— r e spon ses in t h ose c a ses, w e affir m t h e cont inuing vit a lit y of our prior dec i sion s inpoin t.

16 Respondent and its amiciar g u e th at w h a tev e rth is Cour t makes of Ca lifornia ’ s s e nt encingla w, t h e Blackcour t ’ s “ c ons t ruct ion” of t h a tlaw as c o n s isten t w i thth e Six t hAmen d men tis au th or itat iv e. Br ief for Respon den t6, 18, 33; Br ief forHaw a ii et al. as Amici Curiae17, 29. We disagree. The Blackco urtdid notmodify Ca liforniala w s oas t o a lign itwit hthis Court ’s S i x t h Amendmen tprecedent

. S e e 3 5 Ca l. 4t h, at 1 2 7 3 , 11 3 P

. 3d, at 55 5– 55 6 (Ken n a r d , J., c o n c u r r i n ga n d dissen t in g)

. Ra t h er, it cons t rued t h is Court ’s decis i ons in a nendeav or t orender t h em cons is t e ntwit hCa liforniala w. T h e Blackc o ur t’s in ter p r e tatio n of feder al c o nstitu t i on al l a wplain l ydoes n o t qu alify forth is Cou r t ’s deference.

17 State s th a th a v e so a l ter e d t h eirsy stems a r e Alask a , Ar i z on a, K a n s a s , Minnes o ta , Nort h Ca rolina , Oregon, a n d Wa s h ingt on. Alas ka S tat
. §§12.55.1 55(f), 12.55.1 25(c) (200 4); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–702. 01 (West Su pp. 200 6); K a n . Stat. An n . §§21–4 71 6(b), 21 –47 18(b) (2 00 5 Su pp.); M i nn . Sta t . §244.1 0 , su bd. 5 ( 200 5 Su pp.); N.C. Gen

. Stat. An n . §15A –13 40.1 6 ( a1) (Lex is 20 05); 20 05 O r e . Sess. Law s , c h

. 463, §§3(1), 4(1); Wash . R e v . Code §§9.94A.5 35, 9.9 4A .537 ( 200 6). Th e Color a do Su pr eme Cou r th a s adopte d th is appr oa c has anin t e r i m solu tion

.22 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### juries in th is manner to de termine statutory sentencin g enhancements. See supra , at 7, 18. Other States have chosen to permit judge s genui nely “to exercis e broad dis

cretion . . . within a statutory ra nge,” 18

### which , “everyone agrees,” encounters no Sixth Amendment sho a l. Booker , 543 U. S., at 233. California may follow the paths take n by its sister States or o t herwisealter its system, so long as the State o b serves Sixth Amendment limitations declared in this Court’s decisions. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed in part, and th e case is re

manded for further pro c eedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so orde red.

—————— Lopez v. Peop le , 113 P. 3d 713, 7 16 (Col o. 2005) (enb a n c )

. See also Stemen& Wil h elm, Fin d in g th e Ju r y : State Legislat iv eRespon ses to Blakelyv. Was h ingto n , 18 Fed. Sen t en c i n g Rptr . 7 (O c t . 2 005) ( m ajor i t y of affected States have retained de terminate sentencing systems).

18 See In d. Code An n . §35– 50

– 2–1.3( a) (We s t20 06); Ten n . Code An n . §40– 35 –21 0(c ) (2005 Su pp.)._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) K ENNEDY , J., di ssenting 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–6 55 1 

### JOHN CU NNINGHAM, PETITIONE R v. C ALIFORNI A ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COU R T OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA 

### , FIRST APPELLATE DIST RICT [Jan u a r y22, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### K ENNEDY 

### , wi th whom J USTICE 

### B RE YE R

### joins, dissenting. The dissent ing opinion by J USTICE 

### ALITO 

### , which I join in full, well explains why the Court continues in a wrong an d unfortunate direction i nthe cases following Apprendiv. New Je rsey , 530 U. S. 4 66 (2000). See, e.g., United States v. Booker , 543 U. S. 220, 326–334 (2005) (B REYER 

### , J., dissenting in part); Bla k elyv. Was h ington , 542 U. S. 296 , 314–324 (2 004) (O’Con nor, J., diss enting); id., at 326–328 (K ENN E DY 

### , J., dissenting); see also Apprend i , supra, at 523–554 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Jonesv. Uni t e dS t at es , 526 U. S. 227, 264–27 2 (1999) (K ENNEDY 

### , J., dissenting). The discussion in his d i ssenting opinion is fu lly sufficient to show wh y, in my re spectful vie w , the Court’s anal ysis and holding are mistak en. It does seem a ppropriate to add this brief, further comment. In my view the Appren diline of cases remains incorrect

. Yet there may be a principled rationale per m itting tho s e cases to con trol within the cen tral sphere of th eir concern, while reducing the c o llateral, widespread harm to t h e criminal justice system and the corrections process now resulting from the Co urt’ s wooden, unyieldi n g insisten ce on expanding the Apprendidoctri ne far beyond its neces

sary boundaries. The Court cou l d distinguish between sentencing enhancements based on the nature of the offense, where the Apprendi prin ciple would apply, an d2 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA K ENNEDY , J., di ssenting 

### sentencing enhancements based on the nature of the offender, where it would not. California attempted to make this initial distin ction. Compare Cal. Rule of Cour t 4.421(a) (Criminal Cases) (West 20 06) (listing aggra v ating “[f]acts rela ting to the crime”), with Rule 4.421(b) (listing aggra v ating “[f]acts rel a ting to the defendant”). The Court should not foreclose its efforts. California, as the C o urt notes, experimen t ed earlier with an indeterminate sentencing system. Ante , at 3. The State repos e d vast po wer and di scretion in a nonjudicial agency to s e t a release date for convicted f e lons. That system, it seems, would have been untouched by Ap prend i

. When the State sought to reform its system, it might have chosen to give its judg es the authority to s e ntence to a maximum but to depart down w a rd for unexplained rea

sons. That too, by cons iderable irony, would be untouched by App rend i

. Instead, California sought to u s e a system based on guided discretion. Apprendi , the Court holds today, forec l oses this option. As dissenting opinions have suggested befor e , the Con

stitution ought not to be inte rpr e ted to stri ke down al l aspects of sentencing systems th at grant ju dicial discre

tion with some legislative directi on and control. Judg e s and legislat ors must h a ve the capacity to dev e lop consis

tent standa r ds, standa r ds that in dividual juries empan

eled for onl ya short time cannot elaborate i nany perma nent way. See, e.g., Bl akely , 542 U. S., at 31 4 (opinion of O’Connor, J.); id., at 326–327 (opinion of K ENNEDY 

### , J.) (explaining that “[s]e n tencing guidelines a r e a prim e example of [the] collaborative proc ess” between courts an d legislatures ). Judges a n d sentencing officials have a broa d view and long-term co mmitment to correctio nal systems. Juries do not. Judicialofficers an d cor r ections profession

als, under the guidan ce and con trol of the legislature, should be encouraged to participate in anong o ing manner to improve the various sentencing schemes in our country
.3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) K ENNEDY , J., di ssenting 

### This system of guideddiscre tion would be permitted to a large extent if the Court confined the Apprendirule to sentencing enhancements based on the nature of the offense. These would include, for example, the fact that a weapon was used; viol ence was employed; a stated amount of drugs or other contraband was involved; or the crim e was motiva ted by the v i ctim’s race, gender, or other statu s protected b ystatute. Juries could consider t h ese matters without ser i ous disruption because these factors often are part of the statutory definition of an aggravated crime in any event and because the evid ence to su pport these enhancements is likely to be a cen tral part of the prosecu

tion’s case. On the othe r hand, judi cial determination is appropriate with re gardto factors exhibited by the defen d ant. Thes e would include, for example, prior convictions; cooperation or noncoop eration with law enfo rcement; remorse or t h e lack of it; or other aspects of the defendant’s history bear

ing upon hi s backgrou n d and contribution to the commu

nity. This is so even if the relevant facts were to be found by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence. Thes e are facts that should b e taken into account at sentencing but have little if any significance for whethe r the defen

dant committed the crime. See Berman & Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 37, 55–57 (2006). The line between offense and offender would not always be clear, but in most instances the nature of the offense i s defined in a manner that ensures the problem of catego

ries would not be diffic u lt. App ren disuffers from a similar line-drawing problem between facts that m u st be consid

ered by the jury and other considerations that a judge ca n take into ac count. The main part of the Apprendiholding could be retained with f a r less systemic disrup tion. It is t o be regrette d that the Court’ s de cision today appears to foreclose co nsideration of this approach or other reason

-4 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA K ENNEDY , J., di ssenting 

### able efforts to develop systems of guided discretion within the general constraint t hat Appren di imposes._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) ALITO , J., dissenting 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–6 55 1 

### JOHN CU NNINGHAM, PETITIONE R v. C ALIFORNI A ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COU R T OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA 

### , FIRST APPELLATE DIST RICT [Jan u a r y22, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### ALITO 

### , with whom J USTICE 

### K EN NEDY 

### and J USTICE 

### B RE YE R

### join, dissenting. The California sentencing law th at the Court st rike s down toda y is indisti n guishabl e in any constitutionally significant respect fro m the advisory Guidelines scheme that the Court approve din United States v. Booker , 543 U. S. 220 (2005). Both sentenci ng schemes grant tria l judges considerable dis cretion in s e ntencing; both subject the exercise of that discreti on to appellat e review for “reasonableness”; and both—the California law explicitl y , and the federal scheme implicitly—require a sentenci ng judge to find some factor to justify a sentence above the minimum that could b e imposed based solely on the jury’s verdict. Because this Court has held uneq u ivocally that the post- Booker federal sentencin gsystem satisfies the requiremen t s of the Sixth Amendment, the same should be true with regard to the California system. I therefore respectfullydissent. I In Apprend i v. New Je rsey , 530 U. S. 466 (2000), and the cases that have follow e d in its wake, the Court has hel d that under certain circumstance s a criminal defendant possesses t h e Sixth Amendment right to ha ve a jury fi nd facts that result in an increased sentence. The Court, however, h a s never su ggested that all factualfindings th at2 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA ALITO , J., dissenting 

### affect a defendant’s sentence must be made b ya jury. On the contrar y , in Apprendi and lat e r cases, the Court has consistently stated tha twhen a tr ial court m a kes a fully discretionary sentencing deci sion (such as asentencing decision un der the pre-Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 federal sentencing system), the Sixth Amendment permits the court to base the sentence on its own factu al findings. See id., at 481; Blakel yv. Washin gton , 542 U. S. 296, 305 (2004); Booker , supra, at 233; see also Harris v. United Sta t es , 536 U. S. 545, 558 (2002). 1 

### Applying this rule, t h e Booker Court unanimously agreed that judicial fa ctfinding u n der a purely advisory guidelines system wou l d likewise comport with the Si xt h Amendment. Writingfor the fi ve Justices who stru c k down the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines s y s tem, J USTIC E 

### S TEVE NS 

### stated: “If the Guidelines as currently w r it ten could be read as merelyadvisory provis ions that recommended, rather thanrequired, the selection of particular sen

-

——————

1 The Court ’s recognit ion of t h is is ha rdly s urpris i ng s i nce, a s J u dge McConnell ha s point e d out , “f ully dis cret i ona r y s e nt enci ng . . . wa s t h e s y s t em [t ha t wa s ] in pla c e when t h e S i xt h Amendment wa s a d opt e d” an d th at “pr e v a iled inth e feder al c o u r t s fr om th e Fou n d in g u n t il enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 .

. . without anyone ev ersug g e stin ga c o n f lic t w i thth e Six t hA m en dmen t.” M c Con n e ll, The Booker M e ss, 83 D e n v erU. L. Rev

. 665, 679 (20 06). In deed, th e or igi

na l federa lcrimina l s t at ut e ena c t e d b ythe Firs tCongres s s e tfort h indeterminate sentencing ranges fo r a variety of offenses, leaving the determinationof the pre c ise sentence tothe judge’s di scretion. See, e.g . , Ac t of Apr

. 30, 179 0, c h

. 9, §2, 1 S t a t . 112 (c r i me of mispr i siono f t r ea s o n punishab l e b yimpris onmentnot exceeding s e ven yea r s a n d fin e n o t ex c eedin g$1,00 0); §6, id., a t113 (crime of mis p ris i on of a felony punishable by imprisonment no t ex c e edin gth r e e y e ar s an d fin e n o t ex c eeding $500); §15, id., at 115– 11 6 (c r i me of fa lsify i n gfeder al records punis h ab l e b y impris onmentno texceeding s e ve n yea r s , fine not ex c eedin g$5,000, an d w h i ppin gn o t ex c e edin g39 str i pes) ; see g e n e r a lly Little & Chen, The Lost Hi story of Appre ndi an d th e Bla k e l yPetitio n forReh e ar in g, 17 Fed. Sen t en c i n gRep. 69 (200 4).3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) ALITO , J., dissenting 

### tences in response to differing sets of facts, t h eir use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment. We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in i m posing a sentence within a statutory range.
. . . For when a trial judge e x ercises his discretion to select a specific sentence with in a de

fined range, the defendant has n o right to ajury de

termination of the fac t s thatthe judge deems rele

vant.” Boo k er , sup ra, at 233

. 2 

### In a similar vein, the remedial portion of the Court’s opinion in Booker , wri tten by J U S TICE 

### B RE YER 

### , held that the Sixth Amendment permits a s y stem of advisory guide

lines withreasonabl eness review. 3 

### J USTICE 

### B REYER 

### ’s opinion avoided a blanket invalidation of the Guidelines by excising the provision of the Sentencing Reform Act, 1 8 U. S. C. §3 553(b)(1) (2000 ed., Su pp. IV), th at required a sentencing judge to impose a sent ence within the applica

ble Guideli n es range. See Booker , 543 U. S., at 259. A s J USTICE 

### B RE YE R

### explained, “the existence of §3553(b)(1) i s a necessary condition of the constitutional violation. Tha t is to say, w i thout this provision .

. . the statu t e falls out

side the sco p e of Apprendi ’s requirement.” Ibi d

. Under the post- Bookerfederal sentencing system, “[t]he

——————

2 The fo ur J u s t ices whowouldhave upheld th e co ns t i t u t i ona lit y of t h e ma nda t o ry Federa l S e nt encing G u idelines s y s t em did not , of cours e , disag r ee w i thth is b a sicpo in t. In deed, th eyw e r eof th e v i ewth at
“ [h]is t o ry does nots u pport a ‘rightt oj ury t r ia l’ in res p ec tt o s e nt encing facts.” Booker , 543 U. S., at 328 (B RE Y E R , J., dissenting in part).

3 While the dissenters from the reme dia lport ion of t h e Court ’s opin

ion disa greed wit hJ US TI CE B REYER ’ s sev e r ablity an aly s is, th eydidn o t s u gges tt h a tthe res u lt ing “ a dvis o ry Guidelines ” st ruct ure wa s unco n s t it utiona l. Ra t h er, t h ey recognized—a s J US TI CE S TEVE NS explained i n his port ion of t h e Court ’s opinion—t h a t“ [ i]f t h e Guidelines as current l y writ t e n could b e rea d a s merely a dvis o ry provis ions t h atrecommended, ra t h er t h a nr e q u ired, t h e s e lect ion of pa rt icula rs e nt ences in res p ons e to differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment.” Id., at 233.4 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA ALITO , J., dissenting 

### district cou rts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” Id., at 264. In addition, sentencing courts mus tta ke acco unt of the general sentencing goa l s set forth by Congress , including avoiding unwarran t e d sentencing disparities , providing restitution to victims, reflecting the serio u sn ess of the offense, prom oting respect for the law, providing just punishment, affording adequate deterrence, protecting t h e pub lic, a n d effectively providin g the defendant withneeded educati o nal or voca tional train

ing and medical care. See id., at 260 (citing 18 U. S. C. §3553(a) (2 000 ed. and Supp. IV)). It is signifi c ant that Booker , while rendering the Guide

lines advisory, did n o t reinstitute the pre-Guidelines federal sentencing sys t em, underwhich “we ll-established doctrine ba r[red] review of the exercise of sentencing discretion” within the broad se ntencing range s imposed b y the criminal statutes. Dorszynski v. United Sta t es , 418 U. S. 424, 443 (1974). Rather, Bookerconditioned a dis

trictcourt ’ s sentencing discre tion on appellate review fo r “reasonableness” in l i ght of the Guidelin es and the §3553(a) factors. See Booker, supra, at 2 61 (“Sectio n 3553(a) remains in ef fect, and sets forth nu merous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as th ey have in the past, indeterminin g whether a sentence is u n reasonabl e”). Although the Booker Court did not spell out in detail how sentencing judges are to proce e d under th e new advi

sory Guidel ines regime, it seems clear thatthis regim e permits—a n d, indeed, requires—sentencing judges to make factu al findings and to base their sentences on those findings. The federal criminal statutes generally set ou t wide sentencing range s , and thus in each ca se a s e nten c ing judge m u st use some criteria in selecting the sentence to be imposed. In doing this, federal judges h a ve generally made and relied uponfactual determinations about th e5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) ALITO , J., dissenting 

### nature of the offens e and the offender—and it is impos s i

ble to imagine how federal judges could reas onably carry out their sentencing re sponsibiliti e s without making such factual determinations. Under the mandatory Federal SentencingGuidelines regime, these factual determi nations were r e latively for

mal and precise. (For example, atrial judge under that regime might have found based on a post-trial proceeding that a drug offense i n volved six k ilograms of cocaine or that the loss caused by a mail fraud offense was $2.5 million.) B ycontrast, under the pre-Sentencing Reform Act federal system, the factualdeterminations were often relatively informal and imprecise. (A trial judge migh t have concluded from the presen tence report that anof

fense involv ed “a large quantity of drugs” or that a mail fraud sche me caused “a great loss.”) Un der both systems, however, t h e judges made fa ctu al determinations ab out the nature of the offense and the offender and determined the sentence according l y. And as the Courts of Appeals have unanimously concluded, the post- Bookerfederal sentencing regime also permit s tri al judges to make such factual findings and to rely on tho s e findings in selecting the sentences that are appropriate in particular cases. 4 

### Under the post- Bookersystem, if a defendant believes

——————

4 Ev er y Cou r tof Appeals to a ddr ess th e iss u e h a s h e ld that a di str i c t courts e nt enci ng pos t

- Booke rmayr e lyonfac t s fou n dbyth e ju dg e by a preponderance of the evide nce. See United State s v. Kilby , 44 3 F. 3d 113 5, 114 1 (CA9 20 06); United S t ate s v. Cooper , 437 F. 3d 324, 33 0 (CA3 20 06); Un ite d States v. Vau ghn , 430 F. 3d 51 8 , 525–5 26 (C A2 200 5); United States v. Mo rris , 429 F. 3 d65, 72 (CA 42 0 0 5 ); United States v. Price , 418 F. 3d 7 7 1 , 78 8 (C A7 2 005); United States v. Magal

lanez , 408 F. 3d 672, 684–6 8 5 (CA10 2 0 0 5 ) ; Unit ed S t ate s v. Pi rani , 406 F. 3d 543, 55 1 , n . 4 (CA8 20 05) (enban c ) ; United S t ates v. Ya gar , 404 F. 3d 967, 972 (CA6 200 5); United States v. Mare s , 402 F. 3d 511, 519 , an d n

. 6 (CA5 200 5); United States v. D uncan , 400 F. 3d 129 7, 13 0 4– 130 5 (CA 11 2 005); United States v. An to nak o poulos , 399 F. 3d 6 8 , 7 4 (CA1 2 005).6 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA ALITO , J., dissenting 

### that his or her sentence was basedon an erroneous factual determination, it seems clear that the defendant may challenge that finding on appeal

. As noted, the postBooker system permits a defendant to obtai n appellate review of the reasonabl eness of a s e ntence, an d a sentenc e that the sentencing co urt jus t ifies solely on the basis of an erroneous f i nding of fact can hardly be regarded as rea

sonable. Thus, under the post- Bo okersyste m , there will be cases—and, in all l ikelihood, agood many cases—in which the question whether a defendant will be required to serve a g r eater or le sser sentence depends on whether a court of appeals sustains a findi ng of fact made by the sentencing judge. A simple example il lustrates this p o int. Suppose that a defendant is found guil ty of 10 cou nts of mail fraud in that the defendant made 10 mailings in furth erance of a scheme to defraud. See 18 U. S. C. §1341 (2000 ed., Supp. IV). Under the mail fraud statute, the district court would have discre tion to sentence the defendant to any sentence ran gin g fro mprob atio nup to 2 00 years of im prisonmen t (2 0 years on each count). Suppose th at the sentencing judge imposes the maximum sentence allowed by statute—2 00 years of imprisonment—without i d entifying a single fact about the offense or th e offender a s a justifica t ion for this lengthy sentence. Surely that wo uld be an u n reasonabl e sentence that could not be sustained on appeal. Suppose, alternatively, thatthe sentencing court finds that the mail fraud sch e me causeda l o ss of $1 mill ion an d that the victims were elderly people of lim ited means, an d suppose that the court, based on these findings, imposes a sentence of 10 years of imprisonment. If the defenda nt challenges the senten ce on appeal on the ground that these findi ngs are er roneous, th e questi o n whether the defendant will be requ ired to serve 10 years or some l e ss er sentence may well depend on the validity of the distric t court’s findi n gs of fact.7 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) ALITO , J., dissenting 

### Booker , then, approved a senten cing system that (1 ) requires a sentencing judge to “c onsult” and “take into account” l e gislatively define d sentencing factors a n d guidelines; (2) subjects a sentencing judge’ s exercise of sentencing discretion to a ppellate review for “reasonable

ness”; and (3) requires sentencing judges to make factual findings in order to support the exercise of this discretion. II The California sentencing law th at the Court st rike s down today is not mea n ingfullydifferent from the federal scheme upheld in Book er . As an initia l matter, the Californialaw gives a judge a t least as much sentencing disc retion as does the post

Bookerfederal scheme. California’s system of sentencin g triads and separate “enhancements” 5

### was enacted t o achieve sentences “in proportion to the seriousness of the offense a s d e termined by the Legislature to b e imposedby the courtw i th specified discretion .” Cal. Pen a l Code An n. §1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 2006). Th is “specified discretion” is quite broad. Unde r the sta t u t e, a sentencing court“shall order imposition of the middle term” of the baseterm t r iad, “unless there are circu m stances in aggravatio n or mitigation of the crime.” §1170 (b). While t h e court ma y not rely on any fact that is an essential el ement of th e crime or of a proven enhancement, the “sentencing judge retains considerable discretion to identify aggra v ating factors.” Peop le v. Bl ack , 35 Cal. 4th 1238, 1247, 113 P. 3d 534, 538 (2005). In exercising its sentencing discretion, a California court can look to any of th e 16 sp ecific aggrava t ing circum

stances, see Cal. Rule of Court (Criminal Cases) 4.421 (West 2006), or 15 sp ecific mitigating circum s tances, see

——————

5 Th ese en h a ncemen t s, w h i c hadd addit i on a ly e ar s on to the base-tr i ad ter mselec t ed byth e c o ur t, seeante , at 7–8 , mu st be plea ded an d pr ov ed to a ju r ybey o n da r e ason abl e dou bt. Th ey ar e n o t at iss u e inth is c a se.8 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA ALITO , J., dissenting 

### Rule 4.423, itemized i nthe Calif ornia Rules of Court. A California trial court can also consider the “[g]eneral objectives of sentenci ng,” including protecting society, punishing the defendant, encouraging the defendant to lead a law-abiding life and deterring the defendant from committing future offenses, de terring others fr om criminal conduct b ydemonstrating its co nsequences, preventin g the defendant from committing new crimes by means of incarceratio n , securingrestitution for c r ime victims, an d achieving u n iformity in sentencing. 6 

### Rule 4.410(a). And i f a California trial court finds that i t s sentencing authorit y is unduly r e stricted bythese factors, which t h e California Supreme C o urt has recognized “a re largely t h e articula

tion of considerations sentencing judges have always used in mak i ng these decisi ons,” Peopl e v. Hernandez , 46 Cal. 3d 194, 205 , 757 P. 2d 1013, 1019, (1988) (in bank), over

ruled on other grounds, Peoplev. King , 5 Ca l. 4th 59, 7 8 , n. 5, 851 P. 2d 27, 39, n. 5 (1993) (in banc), aCalifornia sentencing judge is als o authorized to consid er any “addi

tional criteria reasonably re lated to the decision being made.” Rule 4.408(a); see als o Black , supra, at 1256, 113 P. 3d, at 544 (“The Legislature did not identify all of the particular f a cts that co uld justify t h e upper term”). 7

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6 These factors are similar to the fe dera l s e nt encing polic ies s e tfort h in18 U. S. C. §355 3(a) (20 0 0 ed. an d Su pp. IV), w h i c hdirec t s a c o u r tto cons ider, a m ong ot hert h ing s , t h e needto promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate dete r rencet ocrimi na l condu c ta n d t oprot ectt h e pub lic.

7 As the California Supreme Court explained in Black , “ I n a d opt i ng t h e s e nt encin grules , t h eJ u dicia lCounc il cons idered an d r ejec t ed pr oposals th a tth e r u l es pro vide an exclusiv e list of sen

ten c i n gc r i ter i a an d th atth e c r i ter i a be ass i g n ed spec i f icw e igh t s, on th e g r ou n dthat th e Legi sla t u r ein ten d ed to giv eth e sen t en c i n gju dge discretion in s e lecting among the lo wer, middle, a n d upper t e rms . The reporton whi ch t h e J u dici a lCouncil a c ted in a d opt i n gt h e rules e x pla i ns t h at‘a n ex clus ive lis t i ng would b eincons is t e ntwit ht h e s t a t u tor yman d ate to adop t “r u l e s pr ov idin gc r i ter i a forth e c o n s ider ationo f9 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) ALITO , J., dissenting 

### In short, under California law, the “ ‘circum s tances’ the sentencing judge may lookto in a ggravation or in mitiga

tion of the crime include .

. . ‘pra c t ically ever ything whic h has a legitimate bearing’ on the matter in issue.” People v. Gueva ra , 8 8Cal. App. 3d 86, 93, 151 Cal. Rptr. 511, 51 6 (1979); see also Rule 4.410(b) (“The sentencing judge should be guided by statutor y statements of policy, t h e criteria in t h ese rules, and the fac t s and cir c u m stances of the case”). Indeed, as one Califor nia court has explaine d, sentencing discretion may even be guided by a “judge’s subjective determination of .

. . theappropriate aggregate sentence” based on his “experiences with prior cases and the record in the defendant’s case.” People v. Stev ens , 205 Cal. App. 3d 1452, 14 57, 253 Cal

. Rptr. 173, 177 (1988)

. “A jud g e’s subjective belief regar d ing the length of th e sentence to be impos e d is not improper as long as it i s channeled by the guided discretion outlined i nthe myriad of statutorysentencing criteria.” Ibid. The California scheme—like the federal “advisory Guidelines”—does require that thi s discretion be exercised reasonably

. Indeed, the Californ i a Supreme Court, au

thoritatively construin g the California statute, 8

### has ex

-

—————— th e tr ial ju dg e ” [§11 70.3] sin c e th is lan g u a g edoes n o t pu r p or t to limit the discretion afforded the court ineach of the five enumerated sen

tencing decisions, but calls for crit eria which will assi s tthe courts in t h e exercis e of t h a tdis cret i on.’ (J udicia l Council of Ca l., Advis o ry Com. Rep., S e nt encing Rules a n d S e nt encing Report ing S y s t em (1 97 7 ) p. 6

. ) ‘An yattemp t t oimpo se aw e igh t in gsy stem ontr ia l c o u r t s . . . w o u l d b e a ninfringementon t h e s e ntencing powe r of t h e court .’ ( Id., p. 8.) ‘The su bst a n t iv e law , an d sec t ion1170(a)( 1 ), giv edisc r e ti onto th e tr i a l court ; t h e r u l e s ca n gu ide, b u tca nnot c o mpel, t h e ex ercis e of t h a t dis cret i on. ’ (Id., p. 11.)” 35 Cal. 4th , a t 1 256, n

. 11, 11 3 P. 3d, a t 54 4, n . 11.

8 The Courtco r r ect l y not e s t h a twe need notdefer t o t h e Ca lifornia S u preme Cour t ’ s cons t ruct ion of federa lla w, incl uding it s j u dgmenta s t owhet h er C a liforniala w is cons is t e nt wit hour S i xth Amendment j uris p rudence. S ee ante, a t21, n

. 16. Bu t th e Calif or n i a Su pr eme Cou r t ’s ex positionof Califor n i a lawis au t h or itativ ean d bin d in gonthi s10 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA ALITO , J., dissenting 

### plained that §1170(b)’s “requirement that an aggra v ating factor existis merely a requirement that th e decision t o impose the upper term be reasona ble .” Bla c k , 35 Cal. 4th, at 1255, 11 3 P. 3d, a t 544 (emphasis in original); see also id., at 1257–1258, 113 P. 3d, at 54 5 (“ The j u ry ’ s v e rdic t of guilty on an offense a u thorizes the judge to sentence a defendant to any of the three terms specified by statute as the potential punishments for tha toffense, as long as th e judge exercises hi s or her discretion in a rea s onable ma n ner that is consistent with the requirement s and guide

lines contai ned in statutes and court rules”). Even whena court imposes the “presumptive ” middle term, its decision is reviewable for abuse of dis cretion—that is, its decision to sentence at the “standard” term must be reasonable. See Peoplev. Ca ttaneo , 217 Cal. App. 3d 1577 , 1587–1588, 266 Cal. Rptr. 710, 716 (1990). Moreover, the California system, lik e the post- Booker federal regime, recognizes that a sentencing judge must have the a b ility to look at allt h e relevant facts—eve n those outside the trial record and jury verdic t—in exercis

ing his or her discreti on. “The j u dicial fact finding tha t occurs du ring tha tselection proc ess is the same type of judicial factfinding th at tradi tionally has been a part of the sentencing process.” Bla c k , su pra, at 125 8, 113 P. 3 d , at 545. III Despite these simi lariti es between the California system and the “advisory Guidelines” sche me approve din Booker ,
—————— Court

. S ee, e.g . , Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U. S. 684, 691 (197 5) (“[S]t at e c o u r t s ar e th e u l timate ex p o sitor s of st at e law[an d] w e ar e bou n dby t h eir cons t ruc t i ons exceptin ext r eme cir cums t a nces ” ); Wainwri ght v. Goode , 464 U. S. 78, 84 ( 1983) (per curi am) (“[T]he views of the State’s h i gh est c o ur t w i thr e spec t to sta t e law ar e bin d in g onth e feder a l court s ” ); Ring v. Arizona , 5 36 U. S. 584, 603 (2 002) (r ec og n i zin gth e ArizonaS u preme Court ’s c o ns t ruct ion of Arizonas e ntencing la w a s au th or itativ e).11 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) ALITO , J., dissenting 

### the Court nevertheless holds that the California regime runs afoul o f the Sixth Amendment. The Court reasons as follows: (1) California requires that some aggravating fa ct, apart from the elem en ts of the off e nse found by the jury, must support an upperterm sentence; (2) Bla k elydefined the “statuto ry maximu m” to be “t he maximum sentence a judge may i m pose solely on the ba sis of th e fa cts refl e c t ed in thejury v erdic t orad mitted by th e def e ndant ,” 542 U. S., at 303 (emphasis inoriginal); an d therefore (3) the Ca li

fornia regime violates “ Apprendi’ s bright-line rule,” id., at 308, that “any fact th at increases the penal ty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be sub

mitted to ajury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi , 5 30 U. S., at 490. This argum e nt is flawed. For one thing, it is not at all clear that a California court must find some c a se-specific, adjudicativ e “fact” (as oppose d t o identifying a relevan t policy consideration) before impos i ng an upper term se n tence. Wh at a California sentenc i ng court must find is a “ circum s tan c[e] in aggrava t ion ,” Cal. Penal Code Ann

. §1170(b) (emphasis added), which, California’s Court Rules make clear, ca n include any “criteri a reasonably related to the decision being made.” Rule 4.408(a). California courts are thus empowered to ta ke into ac

count the full panoply of factual and policy considerations that have traditionally been co nsi d ered by judges operat

ing under fully discretionary s e ntencing regimes—the constitutionality of whi c h the Cou rt has repe atedly reaf

firmed. California lawexplicitly authorizes a sentencing court to ta ke into acc o unt, fo r example, broa d sentencing objectives like punishment, deterrence, restitution, and uniformity, see Rule 4.410, and even a judge’s “subjective belief” a s t o the appro p riateness of the s e ntence, se e Ste

vens , su pra, at 1457, 25 3 Cal. Rptr., at 177, as long as the12 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA ALITO , J., dissenting 

### final result is reasonabl e. 9 

### Policy considerations like these have always been outside the pro vince of the jury and do not implicate the Sixth Amendm ent concerns expressed in Apprendi

. In short, the requirement that a Californi a court fin d some “circumstanc[e] in aggra v ati o n” before i m posing an upper term sentence is not th e same as arequi rement tha t it find an a ggra v ating fact

. And if a Californi a sentencing court need not find a f a ct be yond those “reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant,” Bl akely, supra, at 303 (emphasis deleted), then Apprendi’ s “bright-line rule” plainl y does not apply. 10 

### But even if the California law di d require that a sen

-

——————

9 Th e State of Califor n i a ac kn ow ledg ed inits br ief th at “[t]h ec o u r t ca n rely on e s s e nt ia lly a n y rea s on pla c ing t h e defenda n t ’ s pa rt icula r offense outside the mean when select ing”which term of the triad to impos e . Brief for Res p ondent32

. As Ca lifornia ’ s couns e la c knowledged a tora la r gument , acon c er n for det e rre nce in lightof a n upt i ck in c r ime in apa rt icula rcommunit y , for e x a m ple, could b ea“ c ircums t a nce in ag g r av ation” su ppor t in gimpositionof anu pperter msen t en c eun der California law , even though that co ncern is not base don judge-found, c a se-spec i ficfac t s. See Tr . of O r a l Ar g. 32–40.

10 Itis t rue t h a tCa lifornia ’ s Court Rules als oit emize more conc ret e aggravating ci rcumstances that they labe l “[f]acts relating to the c r ime” and “[f]acts relating to the defendant.” See Cal. Rules of Court (Crimi

n a l Cases) 4.4 21 an d 4.423 (W est 20 06). Bu t th ese lists ar e n o t exh a us tiv e , an d th ey do n o t impaira c o u r t ’s abili tyto take in to ac c o u n tmor e genera l s e nt e ncingobj e ct ives in decidingwhet h e rt o s e nt ence adefe n da ntt o t h e u pper t e rm. The Rules ’ provis ion t h at“ [ c]ircums t a nces in ag g r av ationan d mitig a t i onsh all be est ab lish e d byapr epon der a n c eof th e ev iden c e ,”Ru le 4.4 20(b ) , is c l ear l y mean t to c o v e rth e ty pes of crime- and defendant-specific adjudic ativ efacts se t forth in the Rule s immedi ately f o llowing; there is nothin gt osu g g e st th atth is pr ov isio n excludes co ns idera t i on of more ge nera l s e nt encingobj e ct ives t h a ta r e notconducive t os uch t r ia l-type proof. As t h e Rules explicit ly recogniz e, these different categories of sentenci ng co nsiderations are not mutually ex c l u s iv e. See Ru le 4.410(b) (“Th e sen t en c i n gju dg e sh ou ld be gu ided bystatu tor ystate men t s of polic y , th e c r i ter i a inth ese r u l es, an d the fa ct s a n d circu ms ta nces of t h e ca s e ” )

.13 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) ALITO , J., dissenting 

### tencing court find some aggrav a t ing “fact” before imposi n g an upper t e rm sentence, that wo uld not ma ke this cas e constitutionally distinguishable fr om Booker

. As previ

ously explained, the “ advisory Guidelines,” bounded b y reasonableness review, effectively (albeit l e ss explicit ly) impose the same requirement on federal judg es. Booker’ s reasonableness review necessarily supposes that some sentences will be unreasonabl e i n the absence of addi

tional facts justifying t h em. (Recall the prior hypothetica l case in which it was po sited that t h e district c o urt imposed a sentence of 200 year s of impris onment formail fraud without citing a single aggravatin g fact about the offens e or the offender.) Thus, although the post- Booker Guid e lines are l abeled “advisory,” rea sonablen ess review im

poses a veryreal constraint on a j u dge’s abili ty to sentence across the full statutory range without findi n g some ag grava t ing f a ct. 11 

### The Court downplays the significance of Bookerreason ableness re view on the ground that Booker -style “reason

ableness .

. . operates within the Sixth Amendment co n -

——————

11 Th e Cour t believ e s th at inor der to r e achth is c o nc lu s ion , I mu st “previe[w] .

. . how ‘reasonableness revie w ,’ post- Booker , works ,” ante , a t15 , n. 1 3 , a n d perha ps even prej ud ge t h is Court ’s fort hcoming dec ision s in Ri ta an d Claiborne , ante , at 20, n

. 15. B u t mypoin t i s much more modes t
. We need notma p a l l t h e murky c o nt ours of t h e post- Boo k erla nds c a p e in order t o concl ude t h a trea s onab lenes s review must mean something

. If reason ab len e ss r e v iewis mor e th anju st an emptyex er c ise, th er e in ev itablyw ill be some sen t en c e s th at, absen t an y judge-found aggravating fact, will be unreasonable. One need not embrace any presumption of reason able n ess orun r e a s on ablen es s t o a cceptt h is s i mple point

. If t h is is t h e cas e—a nd I ca n n ots e e how it is not , given t h e Court ’s endors emen t o f r e ason ablen ess r e v iewi n Booker —then there is no meaningful Sixth Amend ment difference b e t w een Ca lifornia ’ s s e nt encing s y s t em and t h e pos t

- Book er"adv isor y Guidelines ." Under b o t h , a s e nt encing j u d g e opera t i ng u n der a rea s on ab l eness cons tra i ntmustfin dfa ct s b e yond t h e j ury’s verdictin order to ju stifyth e im positionof a tl e ast some sen t en c e s at th e h ighen d of the s t at ut ory ra ng e.14 CUNNINGHAM v. CALIFORNIA ALITO , J., dissenting 

### straints delineated in our precedent, not as a substitute for those constraints.” Ante, at 20 (emphasis in original). But this begs the question, which concerns the scope of those “Sixt hAmendm ent constra ints.” Tha tquestion is answered by the Court’s remedial holding in Book er , which necessarily stands for th e propositi o n that it is consistent with the Sixth Amen d m ent for the imposition of an enhanced sentence to be condit ioned ona factual find

ing made by a sentencing judge an d not by a jury. The Court relies heavily on Blakely’ s admoni tion that “the ‘sta tut o ry maxim u m’ for A p

prendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts refle cted in the jury ver d ict or admitted by the defendan t
. ” 542 U. S., at 303 (emphasis in original). But the Courtf a ils to recognize how this statem ent must b e understood in the wak e of Booker

. For each statutory offense, there must be a sentence that repres ents the least on erous sentence that can be regarded as reasonable in light of the bare statutory ele

ments found by the jur y . To retur nto our prior example of a mail frau d offense, there must be some sentence that represents the least onerous sentence that would be ap

propriate in a case in which the statutory elements of mail fraud are s a tisfied but in which the offense and the of

fender are as little deservin g of punishment as can be imagined. (Whether this sent ence is the statutory mini

mum (prob a tion, see 18 U. S. C. §1341 (2000 ed., Supp. IV)) or the minimum under the advisory Guidelines (als o probation, see United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2 B1.1 and Sentencing Table (Nov. 2006)) is irrelevant for present purposes; what is rel e vant is that there must be someminimum reasonab le sentenc e .) This sentence is “the maximum sentence” that could rea

sonably be imposed “solely on the basis of the facts re flected in t h e jury ver d ict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely , su pra, at 303 (emphasis deleted).15 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) ALITO , J., dissenting 

### Booker’ s reasonablen ess review necessarily anticipates that the imposition of sentences ab ove this le vel may be conditioned upon findi n gs of fact made by a j u dge and not by the jury. Bookerheld that a system of “advisory Guide

lines” with reasonableness revi ew is consistent withthe Sixth Ame n dment, and the same analysis s h ould govern California’s “requirement that the decision to impose the upper term be reasonable .” Black , 3 5 Cal. 4th, at 1255, 11 3 P. 3d, at 544 (emphasi s in original). That th e Californi a requiremen tis explici t , while t h e federalaggrava t in g factor requi rement is (at least for n o w) implicit, should not be constitutionally dispositive. Unless the Court is pr epared to overrule the remedial decision in Booker , th e California sentencing scheme at issue in this case should be held to be consistent with th e Sixth Amendment. I would therefore affirm the decision of the Calif ornia Court of Appeal.