J-A05045-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MANUEL M. ROSE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1982 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 21, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0008926-2013

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED MAY 20, 2024

Manuel M. Rose (“Rose”) appeals pro se from the order dismissing his 

first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We 

affirm. 

This Court previously summarized the relevant factual and procedural 

history as follows:

At approximately 4:00 a.m. on May 21, 2013, Ralph 

Sheridan [(“Sheridan”)] was asleep on the couch of the first floor 

of Georgette Walton’s [(“Walton”)] home at 3132 Tasker Street, 

Philadelphia, where he was renting a room. While Sheridan was 

sleeping, Rose forced his way into the home through the window 

by the couch. Once inside the house, Rose approached Sheridan 

and sat on top of him. As Sheridan awoke, he became aware that 

Rose was pushing the covers over his face and had placed a silver 

firearm against his head behind his left ear. Rose demanded that 

Sheridan give him all his “F-in money.” N.T. Trial, 4/8/14, at 20.

Sheridan pulled the covers away from his face and immediately 

recognized Rose, whom he knew as “Moe” since Sheridan was 

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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friends with Rose’s brother, Mack. An altercation between 

Sheridan and Rose followed, in which Sheridan grabbed for the 

gun and threw Rose off of him. Rose attempted to hit Sheridan 

with the gun, but Sheridan pushed Rose and ran out of the house.

During the fight, Rose told Sheridan he would kill him if he called 

the police.

Sheridan ran to his next door neighbor’s house and was 

allowed inside. His neighbor, Lawrence Smith [(“Smith”)], 

listened while Sheridan told him what had happened. While they 

were talking, Sheridan looked out Smith’s window and saw Rose 

running up the street towards an alley. Smith also looked out his 

window and saw Walton’s Cadillac being driven away by a man 

with a bald head. Smith told the police later that evening that he 

was 70% sure that the man he saw in the car was Rose.

Smith called Walton on the phone; she had remained asleep 

upstairs and did not know her house had been burglarized. She 

walked to her stairs and saw that her windows and front door were 

open. Immediately thereafter, at approximately 4:25 a.m., 

Walton sat on the steps and called 911 because she was too afraid 

to go downstairs. While she was on the 911 call, Walton looked 

outside through the open front door and confirmed that her 2006 

Cadillac was missing. It was later learned that Sheridan’s keys 

for the Cadillac were also missing from the house. When he fled 

from the house, Sheridan had left his set of the keys on the table 

near the couch where Rose had threatened him.

After she called the police, Walton spoke with Sheridan 

about what had happened. According to Walton, Sheridan told 

her that Rose broke in through the window, opened the door to 

let another individual, named Frizz, into the house, attacked Rose 

and then fled the scene. Walton then got dressed, walked 

downstairs to make sure nobody was in the house, and shut the 

door and the window where Rose had entered the house. When 

Walton closed the window, she noticed that the screen to the 

window was up and that the blinds to the windows had become 

disheveled.

After arriving on scene shortly thereafter, a police officer 

transported Walton and Sheridan to the police station where they 

were interviewed. Walton was interviewed by Detective Darnell 

Hobbs and Sheridan was interviewed by Detective John Frei. . . . 

Detective Frei interviewed Sheridan for approximately an hour . . 
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. [and] noticed that he was visibly shaken and nervous throughout 

the interview. Detective Frei showed [a] photo array prepared by 

Detective Hobbs to Sheridan; [and] he unequivocally identified 

Rose as the burglar. . . .

The next day, Walton received a phone call . . . notifying her 

that her car was . . . abandoned and parked on the street, with 

the keys inside. . . . Detective Hobbs lifted three fingerprints from 

the outside of the car. Fingerprint examiner Andrea Williams later 

concluded to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the 

fingerprint lifted from the passenger side front door of the car 

matched Rose’s fingerprints. Sometime thereafter, Rose turned 

himself into the police and was arrested.

Prior to trial, Rose’s preliminary hearing was scheduled on 

three separate occasions. Sheridan failed to appear at the first 

scheduled preliminary hearing because he had moved and failed 

to receive notice of the hearing. For the second preliminary 

hearing, however, Sheridan was notified but failed to appear 

because he was scared he would be harmed. Sheridan later 

testified at the third preliminary hearing. After the third 

preliminary hearing, Rose made a number of prison calls 

revealing, among other things, that he had worked with others to 

prevent Sheridan from testifying at the preliminary hearing and 

trial. Rose also admitted to his knowledge of and involvement in 

the burglary. At trial, the jury was provided with an agreed-upon 

transcript of the prison phone calls . . ..

Also at trial, the prosecutor broke the sequestration order 

that was in place for the witnesses of the incident. Specifically, 

Assistant District Attorney ([“]ADA[”]) Kevin Harden informed 

Sheridan that Walton had testified that two people had been 

present during the burglary, when Sheridan had always indicated 

to police that Rose was acting alone. Walton’s testimony occurred 

on a Friday; ADA Harden immediately initiated an investigation of 

the second person, whom Walton knew as “Frizz,” over the 

weekend. Through this investigation, Frizz was identified as 

[“]Dawu,[”] a person mentioned in some of the prison phone calls 

Rose had made.

ADA Harden disclosed his violation of the sequestration 

order the following Monday. Rose moved for a mistrial, which the 

court denied. Instead, the court permitted Rose’s counsel to have 

an overnight period of investigation regarding the revelation that 
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Frizz was present during the burglary. Defense counsel 

interviewed Sheridan during the investigation period, and 

Sheridan indicated that he had not wanted to reveal Frizz’s 

identity because he was afraid for his life and did not want to 

testify against him. When trial resumed, Sheridan changed his 

testimony from his previous accounts of the burglary to indicate 

that two people, Rose and Frizz, had actually been present. In 

Sheridan’s version of events, Frizz had not entered Walton’s 

residence, but had been outside and had recovered the gun from 

Rose when he fled the scene.

On April 16, 2014, the jury convicted Rose of burglary and 

simple assault. The court sentenced Rose on August 14, 2014, to 

25 to 50 years’ imprisonment because his burglary conviction had 

a 25-year mandatory minimum as a “third strike” conviction for a 

crime of violence. See 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9714. [This Court 

affirmed the judgment of sentence and our Supreme Court denied 

allowance of appeal.]

Commonwealth v. Rose, 172 A.3d 1121, 1124-26 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal 

denied, 186 A.3d 369 (Pa. 2018). Rose petitioned our Supreme Court for 

reconsideration, which was denied on August 1, 2018. See Order, 8/1/18, at 

1. 

On September 16, 2019, Rose filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.

2

 The 

PCRA court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition raising ten

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2 After our Supreme Court denied reconsideration, Rose had ninety days in 

which to file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See

U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13. As Rose opted not to do so, his judgment of sentence 

became final on October 30, 2018. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (providing 

that a judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, 

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the 

United State Supreme Court, or upon the expiration of time for seeking such 

review). Rose had one year from that date, or until October 30, 2019, to file 

a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (providing that any 

petition shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final). 

Thus, Rose’s petition, filed on September 16, 2019, was timely filed.
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claims, including claims that Rose’s sentence for burglary was illegal and that 

trial and appellate counsel had been ineffective. Rose thereafter filed a first 

supplemental memorandum of law to the amended petition. Rose then filed 

a second supplemental memorandum of law to the amended petition wherein 

he raised an additional claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

convictions. 

The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition. 

Rose filed a response in opposition to the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss. 

The PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a 

hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. In response, Rose filed a fourth 

supplemental response in which he discussed four claims of infectiveness by 

trial counsel, as well as a due process violation. Rose then filed a fifth 

supplemental response wherein he discussed several more due process

violations, a Brady3 violation, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. Rose filed a sixth supplemental response in which he 

discussed a hearsay violation and several instances of ineffectiveness by trial 

counsel. Rose filed a seventh supplemental response in which he noted that 

the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice did not address Rose’s various due process 

issues. Rose filed a second sixth supplemental response in which he expanded 

____________________________________________

3 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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on a prior discussion of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. On July 12, 2022, the 

PCRA court entered an order dismissing the petition. 

Rose filed a counseled timely notice of appeal. The PCRA court directed 

Rose to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In response, counsel filed a concise statement. Rose 

thereafter filed a pro se concise statement.4 

In this Court, Rose filed two petitions to proceed pro se. This Court 

remanded the matter to the PCRA court for a hearing pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998), to determine whether 

Rose’s waiver of counsel for purposes of this appeal was knowing, intelligent, 

and voluntary. After conducting a Grazier hearing, the PCRA court granted 

Rose’s request to proceed pro se in this appeal.5 At the Grazier hearing, Rose 

requested leave to file an amended pro se concise statement, which request 

was granted. Rose thereafter filed a pro se amended concise statement in 

which he raised eleven issues. The PCRA court authored a Rule 1925(a) 

opinion in which it determined that several of the issues raised in Rose’s pro 

se amended concise statement were waived either because they were not 

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4 As Rose was represented by counsel, this filing was a legal nullity. See 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding 

that, because hybrid representation is not permitted in this Commonwealth, 

our courts will not accept a pro se filing while an appellant is represented by 

counsel; indeed, a pro se filing has no legal effect and, therefore, is a legal 

nullity).

5 The PCRA court also granted counsel leave to withdraw from representation. 
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raised in the counseled amended petition, or they were raised for the first time 

in the pro se amended concise statement. 

Rose raises the following issues for our review:

1. DID THE P.C.R.A. COURT ERR AND ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 

FAILING TO REVIEW . . . ROSE’S CLAIM THAT HIS 14TH

AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED WHERE

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICINT OF A MATTER OF LAW TO 

SUSTAIN . . . ROSE’S CONVICTION BEYOND A REASONABLE

DOUBT?

2. WAS TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT

OBJECTING TO THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF . . . WALTON 

WHERE [SHE] HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE 

ALLEGED INCIDENT THAT SHE TESTIFIEDT ABOUT?

3. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY

ALLOWING THE COMMONWEALTH TO PLACE A SPECIAL 

VERDICT QUESTION ON THE VERDICT FORM ASKING THE JURY 

TO DETERMINE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT [ROSE]

POSSESSED A FIREARM THAT PLACED VICTIM IN FEAR OF

SERIOUS BODILY INJURY OR DEATH, WHICH DEFINED THE

OFFENSE OF BURGLARY TO AN AGGRAVATED CRIME WHERE 

NO STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION EXISTED VIOLATING 

ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES, [570 U.S. 99 (2013)]?

4. WAS . . . P.C.R.A. COUNSEL . . . INEFFECTIVE BY FILING 

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES OF NEW ARGUMENTS RESPONSE 

[sic] TO THE COURT’S RULE 907 NOTICE OF DISMISSAL 

WITHOUT FULFILLING THE REQUIREMENT OF PA.R.CRIM.P. 

905(A) SEEKING TO LEAVE OF THE COURT TO AMEND . . .

ROSE’S P.C.R.A. PETITION WHERE . . . ISSUES WERE DEEMED 

WAIVED BY THE P.C.R.A. COURT?

Rose’s Brief at 4-6 (capitalization in original).

Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is wellsettled:

We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. 
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This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the 

evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it 

is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This 

Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the 

record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the 

factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those 

findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we

afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the

petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de

novo and our scope of review plenary.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

In his first issue, Rose challenges the PCRA court’s dismissal of his

petition without reviewing his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his conviction for simple assault. Initially, we note that Rose’s first 

issue was not raised before the PCRA court in his counseled amended petition. 

See Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 470, 494 (Pa. 2014) (holding that

claims not raised in a PCRA petition cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal and are indisputably waived); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing 

that issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for 

this first time on appeal). More importantly, however, Rose’s sufficiency 

challenge presents a claim which is not cognizable under the PCRA. See 

Commonwealth v. Price, 876 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2005) (rejecting a 

sufficiency claim raised on PCRA appeal because such a claim is not cognizable 

under the PCRA). Accordingly, Rose’s first issue merits no relief. 

In his second issue, Rose challenges the PCRA court’s dismissal of his 

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the hearsay 
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testimony recounted by Walton at trial. Our standard of review of an 

ineffectiveness claim is well-settled:

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

PCRA petitioner must satisfy the performance and prejudice test

set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 . . . (1984). . . . Accordingly,

to prove that counsel was ineffective, the petitioner must

demonstrate: (1) that the underlying claim has arguable merit;

(2) that no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure

to act; and (3) that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of

counsel’s error. To prove that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a

reasonable basis, a petitioner must prove that an alternative not

chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than

the course actually pursued. Regarding the prejudice prong, a

petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability

that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different

but for counsel’s action or inaction. Counsel is presumed to be

effective; accordingly, to succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness the

petitioner must advance sufficient evidence to overcome this

presumption.

We need not analyze the prongs of an ineffectiveness claim

in any particular order. Rather, we may discuss first any prong

that an appellant cannot satisfy under the prevailing law and the

applicable facts and circumstances of the case. Finally, counsel

cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (some 

citations and quotation marks omitted).

Hearsay is an out of court statement introduced for the truth of the

matter asserted. See Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 255 A.3d 452, 458

(Pa. 2021). While hearsay statements are generally inadmissible, a party may

present otherwise inadmissible hearsay under the excited utterance exception

provided by Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803, which defines an excited

utterance as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made 
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while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” Pa.R.E. 

803(2). This Court has explained:

The declaration need not be strictly contemporaneous with

the existing cause, nor is there a definite and fixed time limit. 

Rather, each case must be judged on its own facts, and a lapse of

time of several hours has not negated the characterization of a

statement as an “excited utterance.” The crucial question,

regardless of the time lapse, is whether, at the time the statement

is made, the nervous excitement continues to dominate while the

reflective processes remain in abeyance.

Commonwealth v. Gore, 396 A.2d 1302, 1305 (Pa. Super. 1978) (citations

omitted).

Rose contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object 

to Walton’s testimony regarding what Sheridan told her about the burglary, 

including that it was Rose who committed the burglary. Rose maintains that 

Walton’s testimony regarding Sheridan’s statements to her constituted 

inadmissible hearsay which was not subject to any hearsay exception. 

Although Rose concedes that Walton’s testimony was admitted by the trial 

court under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, he claims 

that “the Commonwealth cannot say when this utterance occurred.” Rose’s 

Brief at 21. Rose argues that, because the hearsay testimony was offered for 

the truth of the matter asserted, it identified him as the perpetrator of the 

burglary. Rose asserts that his trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing 

to object to the hearsay testimony, and he suffered prejudice as a result of 

counsel’s failure. 
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The PCRA court considered Rose’s second issue and determined that it 

lacked merit. The court reasoned:

Here, [Rose’s] claim that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to raise a hearsay objection is meritless because the 

statements at issue are admissible as excited utterances, a 

hearsay exception. 

The testimony offered by . . . Walton as to the statements 

of . . . Sheridan would be admissible under the excited utterance 

exception, as . . . Sheridan was under the stress of having just 

experienced the burglary. The applicability of the excited 

utterance exception to hearsay is not based on a set time interval. 

* * * *

In the testimony at issue, . . . Walton is recalling what . . .

Sheridan said to her during a phone call. Though it is not exactly 

clear when the phone call occurred, it was the same night as the 

burglary. Even after the phone call, the record reflects that . . .

Sheridan was still under the stress and excitement from the event. 

Indeed, when . . . Walton first saw . . . Sheridan after the phone 

call, she described . . . Sheridan as “disheveled, scared to death. 

Like he almost died, because like he was in total shock.” Based 

on this testimony from . . . Walton, undoubtedly, . . . Sheridan 

was experiencing great stress after the burglary. Therefore, . . .

Walton’s testimony regarding . . . Sheridan’s phone call is 

admissible as an exited utterance and counsel cannot be 

ineffective for failing to object to a meritless claim. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/27/23, at 11-12 (citations and unnecessary 

capitalization omitted).

Based on our review, we conclude that the PCRA court’s determinations 

are supported by the record and free from legal error. Sheridan’s statements 

to Walton during their phone conversation related to a startling event; namely, 

a burglary and assault wherein Sheridan, who had been asleep in his 

residence, was attacked by a man with a firearm. Even if the statement was 
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made to Sheridan sometime after the burglary, the record reflects that it was 

nonetheless made while Sheridan was still under the stress caused by the 

burglary and assault. Indeed, Walton observed that, when she encountered 

Sheridan after the phone call, he appeared “scared to death,” as if he was “in 

total shock.” N.T., 4/4/14, at 53; see also Rose, 172 A.3d at 1125 (indicating 

that, after Sheridan called Walton, Detective Frei interviewed Sheridan for 

approximately an hour and noticed that he was visibly shaken and nervous 

throughout the interview). Thus, the record supports the PCRA court’s 

determination that Sheridan’s statements to Walton were made while he was 

under the stress of the burglary and assault and were therefore admissible 

under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

6

 Thus, as trial 

counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim, 

Rose’s second issue merits no relief.

In his third issue, Rose challenges the legality of his sentence based on

the trial court’s use of a special verdict form. Rose’s amended petition

included a challenge to the trial court’s use of a special verdict form in the

____________________________________________

6 The PCRA court additionally determined that, even if Walton’s testimony did 

not fall under the excited utterance exception, trial counsel’s failure to object 

to the testimony constituted a harmless error because Sheridan’s independent 

trial testimony contained the same information, albeit in much greater detail. 

See PCRA Court Opinion, 3/27/23, at 13-14. Our review of the record 

confirms that Sheridan independently identified Rose as the burglar and his 

attacker. See N.T., 4/8/14, at 19-52. 
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wake of Alleyne;

7 however, the amended petition challenged only the first

question on the verdict form—pertaining to whether a person was present at

the time of the burglary. See Amended Petition, 3/25/21, at 3-12. Rose did

not raise any challenge pertaining to the second question on the special verdict

form—pertaining to whether he visibly possessed a firearm at the time of the

burglary. See id. Although illegal sentencing issues cannot be waived, they 

still must be presented in a timely-filed PCRA petition. See Commonwealth

v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2013). While Rose failed to raise

any legality of sentencing challenge to the second question on the special

verdict form in his amended petition, it is not subject to waiver because this

Court has jurisdiction to consider it based on the timeliness of the petition. 

See Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en

banc) (holding that “a court may entertain a challenge to the legality of the

sentence so long as the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim. In the PCRA

context, jurisdiction is tied to the filing of a timely PCRA petition”); see also

Commonwealth v. Moore, 247 A.3d 990, 997 (Pa. 2021) (holding that a 

claim that a petitioner is serving an illegal sentence exceeding the lawful 

maximum, including an Alleyne challenge, is cognizable under the PCRA). 

____________________________________________

7 Pursuant to Alleyne, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime is an 

element that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103. 
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Accordingly, as Rose’s PCRA petition was timely filed, we may address the 

issue. 

A sentencing court is required to impose a minimum prison sentence of 

at least twenty-five years where a defendant has been convicted of two or 

more “crimes of violence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2). The term “crime of 

violence” is defined in the statute as including, inter alia, rape, sexual assault, 

and certain types of burglaries. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(g). A burglary 

committed pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1) is considered a crime of 

violence. See id. 

Notably, under the Crimes Code, there are different types of burglary. 

See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)-(4). In all types of burglary, a person commits 

the offense if, with the intent to commit a crime therein, the person enters a

building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion 

thereof. See id. The variations of the crime of burglary depend on whether:

a person is present; the structure has been adapted for overnight 

accommodations; or the person committing the burglary also commits,

attempts, or threatens to commit a bodily injury crime. See id. 

Pursuant to section 3502(a)(1), a person commits the offense of 

burglary if, with the intent to commit a crime therein the person: 

(i) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured

or occupied portion thereof, that is adapted for overnight

accommodations in which at the time of the offense any

person is present and the person commits, attempts or

threatens to commit a bodily injury crime therein; [or]
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(ii) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured

or occupied portion thereof that is adapted for overnight

accommodations in which at the time of the offense any person is

present[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1) (emphasis added). None of the remaining types of 

burglary involve the commission, attempt, or threat to commit a bodily injury 

crime, and certain of the other types of burglary do not involve the presence 

of any person during the crime. See id. § 3502(a)(2)-(4).

Rose contends that the trial court’s use of the special verdict form to 

satisfy the criteria of Alleyne for imposing a mandatory minimum sentence 

was impermissible. Rose claims that the Commonwealth used the affirmative 

answers to the questions as if the jury rendered a guilty verdict. Rose points 

out that, when charging the jury, the trial court did not instruct the jury that 

it needed to find that a person was present beyond a reasonable doubt. 

According to Rose, a mandatory penalty under section 9714 was inappropriate 

because the jury was not instructed on an element necessary to aggravate 

the offense. Rose points to the trial court’s instruction to the jurors that, if 

they found Rose guilty of burglary, they needed to answer the additional 

question of whether they found beyond a reasonable doubt that Rose visibly 

possessed a firearm which placed Sheridan in reasonable fear of death or 

serious bodily injury by having the jury foreperson circle “yes” or “no” on the 

verdict form. Rose posits that “[a]n open[-]ended multiple choice question 

does not meet the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rose’s Brief 
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at 28. Rose maintains that this question created a new aggravated offense 

where there is no statutory authority. 

The PCRA court addressed Rose’s third issue and determined that it 

lacked merit. The court reasoned:

. . . Here, this court issued a bifurcated instruction for the 

charge of burglary to the jury. This court stated:

Then the next charge listed is burglary on the lefthand side. On the right-hand side, the foreperson 

would record the verdict [for burglary as] guilty or not 

guilty. If the verdict is guilty, then there are two 

questions to answer . . . The first question listed is: If 

guilty do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a 

person was present at the time of burglary? . . . The 

next question the jury is to answer, again if find the 

jury finds the defendant guilty of burglary . . . Do you 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant visibly 

possessed a firearm or a replica of a firearm that 

placed the victim in reasonable fear of death or 

serious bodily injury during the commission of the 

robbery? 

N.T. [4/11/]14, at 219-[]20. . . .

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/27/23, at 15-16 (quotation marks and unnecessary 

capitalization omitted).

Based on our review, we conclude that the trial court’s use of a special 

verdict form did not implicate Alleyne or render Rose’s sentence illegal. Given 

that the two questions posed on the special verdict sheet involved statutory 

elements of the crime of burglary and were intended to determine the precise

type of burglary that Rose committed under section 3502(a), they did not
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implicate Alleyne or operate to create a new or enhanced crime.8 The 

presence of a person in a burglarized structure and the attempt or threat to 

commit a bodily injury crime are simply elements of the crime of burglary 

itself, and are not facts which would increase the penalty for burglary once 

convicted. Thus, the trial court’s use of the special verdict form to determine

the type of burglary committed by Rose did not implicate Alleyne.

Moreover, Alleyne was not implicated by section 9714 because the

increased penalties provided by that statute are based on prior convictions. 

See Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 784-85 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(holding Alleyne is not implicated by section 9714 because its ruling did not

overturn established precedent that prior convictions are sentencing factors

and not elements of offenses, and section 9714 increases mandatory

minimum sentences based on prior convictions). Accordingly, Rose’s third

issue merits no relief.

In his fourth issue, Rose presents a new claim raised for the first time 

on appeal that PCRA counsel was ineffective. Pursuant to Commonwealth 

v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), a defendant may raise claims of 

ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel for the first time during an appeal from 

____________________________________________

8 The criminal complaint charged Rose with burglary as a first-degree felony 

under section 3502, which implicated subsections 3502(a)(1)(i), (ii), and (3). 

See Criminal Complaint, 5/21/13, at 1. Moreover, Rose was on notice that

the Commonwealth would seek to prove the presence of another person

because the criminal complaint specifically alleged that Walton was present at 

the time of the burglary. See id. 
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the dismissal of a timely filed first PCRA petition where the PCRA counsel in 

question represented the defendant until the appeal. See id. at 401-05. The

Bradley Court recognized that, in such cases, remand may sometimes be

necessary:

In some instances, the record before the appellate court will

be sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised

ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate

court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further

development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such

claims as an initial matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to

advance a request for remand, a petition would be required to

provide more than mere boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness; however, where there are material facts at issue

concerning claims challenging counsel’s stewardship and relief is

not plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand should be

afforded.

Id. at 402 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, appellate courts

have the ability to grant or deny relief on straightforward claims, as well as

the power to remand to the PCRA court for the development of the record.

See id. at 403.

Here, Rose adequately raised and preserved his claims regarding the 

ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel by raising those claims at the first 

opportunity to do so; specifically, in his brief filed with this Court in this appeal. 

For this reason, we conclude that Rose raised these claims at the first

opportunity to do so, and that, pursuant to Bradley, they have not been 

waived.

Rose claims that PCRA counsel was ineffective for filing multiple 

responses to the Rule 907 notice in which he identified new issues without 
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seeking leave to amend the petition to include those issues. For purposes of

review, issues not included in an original PCRA petition or a court-approved

amended PCRA petition are deemed waived. See Commonwealth v.

Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding that issues not raised

in a PCRA petition cannot be considered on appeal). The purpose behind a

Rule 907 notice is to allow a petitioner an opportunity to seek leave to amend

his petition and correct any material defects. See Commonwealth v.

Williams, 782 A.2d 517, 526 (Pa. 2001). A response to a Rule 907 notice is

not itself a petition, and the law still requires leave of court to submit an

amended petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A); see also Commonwealth v.

Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that, when a

petitioner has not sought permission to amend a petition to raise new claims,

the PCRA court is not required to address the issues raised in response to a

Rule 907 notice). 

Rose claims that PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to seek leave 

to amend the petition resulted in the waiver of the following issues:

A. WAS TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT INVESTIGATING 

THE CRIME, INTERVIEWING THE WITNESSES, AND ADVISING 

[ROSE] NO [sic] TO TESTIFY BECAUSE THE COMMONWEALTH 

DID NOT PROVE THEIR CASE?

B. WAS TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT MOTIONING THE 

COURT TO DETERMINE IF [ROSE’S] PRIOR CONVICTIONS 

WERE CRIMES OF VIOLENCE ACCORDING TO § 9714 “VIOLENT 

CRIME STATUTE” WHERE COMMONWEALTH NEVER 

PROSECUTED [ROSE] UNDER THIS STATUE [sic]?
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C. WAS APPELLANT [sic] COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO 

RAISE ON APPEAL PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WHERE THE 

PROSECUOTR [sic] TESTIFIED THAT [ROSE] HAD A CRIMINAL 

NUMBER WHEN REFERENCING A POLICE PHOTO WHICH HAD 

BEEN PUBLISHED TO THE JURY AND PLACING IN THE MIND OF 

THE JUROR’S [sic] THAT . . . ROSE HAD PRIOR CRIMINAL 

ACTIVITY VIOLATING FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 

RIGHTS?

D. WAS IT PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WHEN THE

PROSECUTOR WITHHELD EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE WHICH

WOULD HAVE SHOWN THAT SOMEONE ELSE OTHER THAT [sic] 

. . . ROSE COMMITTED THE CRIME AND MISREPRESENTED THE 

FACTS TO THE COURT TO COVER THIS FACT UP VIOLATING 

FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

E. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 

NOT ORDERING AN EVIDENTIATY [sic] HEARING FOR 

INEFFECTIVENESS OF TRIAL COUNSEL FOR NOT

CHALLENGING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE WHERE 

APPELLANT [sic] ATTORNEY WAS FROM THE SAME PUBLIC 

DEFENDER’S OFFICE AND COULD NOT RAISE THE ISSUE ON 

APPEAL, [ROSE] HAS A RIGHT TO CONFLICT FREE COUNSEL 

AND THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY FOR THIS 

CLAIM TO BE RAISED[.]

F. WAS APPELLANT [sic] COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT 

RAISING THE TRIAL COURT’S ERROR AND ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION BY GIVING A CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT 

INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY AND ADMITTING DEATH THREAT 

TESTIMONY THAT WAS INADMISSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL AND 

NO EVIDENCE WAS PRODUCED THAT CONNECTED THESE 

THREATS TO . . . ROSE?

G. WAS TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT OBJECTING TO 

THE IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS MADE BY THE 

PROSECUTOR IN HIS OPENING ARGUMENT THAT . . . ROSE 

WAS A “ROBBING PEOPLE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD[”] AND 

THAT [HE] WAS A “BULLY” WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 

PRESENTED TO SUBSTANTIATE THESE CLAIMS WHICH WERE 

PREJUDICIAL AND PLACED IN THE MINDS OF THE JURY THAT 

. . . ROSE WAS A KNOWN CRIMINAL?
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Rose’s Brief at 5-6 (capitalization in original, issues reordered for ease of 

disposition).

Initially, we observe that issues A and B were not raised in any

counseled response to the Rule 907 notice. Thus, these two issues were not 

waived due to PCRA counsel’s failure to seek leave to amend the petition. 

Rather, they were deemed waived by the PCRA court because they were raised 

for the first time in Rose’s pro se amended concise statement. See PCRA 

Court Opinion, 3/27/23, at 14-15, 17; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 

Accordingly, Rose’s claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in issues A and B 

merit no relief.

With respect to issue C, Rose claims that PCRA counsel was ineffective 

for failing to seek leave to amend the petition to include a claim that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s introduction of 

photographs of Rose which informed the jury of his prior arrests. Our review 

of the amended petition reveals that PCRA counsel raised this issue in the 

amended petition. See Amended Petition, 3/25/21, at 23-24. Moreover, the 

PCRA court expressly stated in its Rule 907 notice that counsel had raised

“broad claims that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing 

to object to the admission of [Rose’s] photograph at trial.” Rule 907 Notice, 

2/16/22, at unnumbered 2, 5. Thus, as PCRA counsel included the issue in 

the amended petition, he cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to seek leave 
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to amend the petition to add a claim already included therein. Accordingly, 

Rose’s claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at issue C merits no relief.

With respect to issues D through G, these issues were not raised in the 

amended petition and were instead raised for the first time by PCRA counsel 

in his various responses to the Rule 907 notice. As explained above, to prevail

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must

demonstrate: (1) that the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) that no

reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3) that

the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error. See Johnson, 

139 A.3d at 1272. Regarding the prejudice prong, a petitioner must

demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the

proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s action or inaction. 

See id. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to seek leave to

amend Rose’s petition to add a meritless claim. See id.

In issue D, Rose claims that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to 

seek leave to amend the petition to include a claim of prosecutorial misconduct 

based on Rose’s belief that the Commonwealth knew in advance of Watson’s 

testimony that Frizz was present during the burglary and assault. Notably, a

claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not cognizable under the PCRA. See

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 174 (Pa. 2018) (holding that

petitioner’s PCRA claim regarding the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct was 

waived because it took place during trial and therefore could have been, but 
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was not, raised at trial): see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) (providing that 

to be eligible for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must plead and prove that 

his claim has not been previously litigated or waived); Id. § 9544(b) 

(providing that “an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but 

failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a 

prior state postconviction proceeding”). Accordingly, PCRA counsel cannot be 

regarded as ineffective for failing to seek leave to add a claim which is not 

cognizable under the PCRA. See Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272. Accordingly,

Rose’s claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in issue D merits no relief. 

In issues E through F, Rose claims that PCRA counsel was ineffective for

failing to seek leave to amend the petition to add claims of ineffectiveness by

trial counsel and appellate counsel. Where a petitioner alleges multiple layers

of ineffectiveness, he is required to plead and prove, by a preponderance of

the evidence, each of the three prongs of ineffectiveness relevant to each

layer of representation. See Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989,

1004 n.11 (Pa. 2022). Specifically, our Supreme Court has explained:

To be eligible for relief on [layered claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel, a petitioner] must plead and prove that: (1)

trial counsel was ineffective for a certain action or failure to act;

and (2) [subsequent] counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. As to each relevant layer of

representation, [a petitioner] must meet all three prongs

of the . . . test for ineffectiveness. A failure to satisfy any of

the three prongs of the . . . test requires rejection of a claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which, in turn, requires

rejection of a layered claim of ineffective assistance of

[subsequent] counsel.
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Thus, if the petitioner cannot prove the underlying claim of

trial counsel ineffectiveness, then petitioner’s derivative claim of

[subsequent] counsel ineffectiveness of necessity must fail, and it

is not necessary for the court to address the other two prongs of

the . . . test [i.e., the reasonable basis and prejudice prongs] as

applied to [subsequent] counsel.

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1128 (Pa. 2011) (citations

omitted and formatting altered, emphasis added).

In his appellate brief, Rose alleges multiple layers of ineffectiveness,

concluding that PCRA counsel was ineffective for not raising a claim of

ineffectiveness by trial or appellate counsel in issues E through G. However,

whereas Rose endeavors to make out an ineffectiveness claim for trial or

appellate counsel in these three claims, he failed to plead or prove, let alone

discuss, the three prongs of the ineffectiveness test with respect to PCRA

counsel. As Rose failed to present any argument as to the reasonable basis

and prejudice prongs regarding PCRA counsel’s stewardship for these claims,

his layered ineffectiveness claims fail because he has not developed his

assertions of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness beyond bald allegations. See

Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402; see also Parrish, 273 A.3d at 1004 n.11. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Rose failed to plead a sufficient layered claim 

of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, and furthermore failed to show that a 

remand is necessary for further review of his undeveloped claims. See

Parrish, 273 A.3d at 1002.

Therefore, as Rose is not entitled to relief on any of his claims, we affirm 

the order dismissing his petition.
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Order affirmed.

Date: 5/20/2024