J-S01001-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.S.P., a Minor, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: M.P., Father, : No. 1805 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order entered May 12, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court Division, No(s): 51-FN-002952-2012; 

CP-51-AP-0000043-2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: Q.C.P., a Minor, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: M.P., Father, : No. 1806 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order entered May 12, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court Division, No(s): 51-FN-002952-2012; 

CP-51-AP-0000044-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JANUARY 28, 2016

M.P. (“Father”) appeals from the Order granting the Petition filed by 

the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) involuntarily 

terminating his parental rights to his minor female children, Q.C.P. and 

M.S.P. (collectively, “Children”), twins born in December 2008, pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and changing Children’s
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permanency goal to adoption.1 We affirm.

The trial court aptly summarized the factual and procedural history of 

this case, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 8/13/15, at 1-6.

Relevantly, Father was convicted of Involuntary Deviate Sexual 

Intercourse in 1980 and was in prison until December 2003. Upon his 

release, Father was required to register as a Megan’s Law Offender for 10 

years. Father spent 5 years in jail, beginning in September 2009, as a result 

of his failure to register as a Megan’s Law Offender. Consequently, Father 

was in prison for a majority of Children’s lives.

Children were adjudicated dependent on November 26, 2012, after 

Mother texted a neighbor to indicate that she had relapsed from drug 

treatment, and instructed the neighbor to contact DHS.2 DHS obtained an 

Order of Protective Custody, and thereafter, Children remained under the 

care of DHS.

Children were placed in a pre-adoptive home in September 2014. On 

January 20, 2015, DHS filed an Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights 

(“ITPR”) Petition against Father under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), 

 

1 The Order terminated the parental rights of both Father and C.D. 

(“Mother”). Trial Court Opinion, 8/13/15, at 1 n.1. Mother does not appeal 

from the Order.

2

Previously, in September 2011, Mother called in a General Protective 

Services report on herself after an all-day drug binge during which she left 

Children unsupervised and without food or water. Mother subsequently 

completed both inpatient and outpatient drug treatment programs.
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(8) and (b). The Petition also changed Children’s permanency goal to 

adoption. The trial court conducted hearings on February 2, 2015, and April 

28, 2015. On May 12, 2015, the trial court terminated Father’s parental 

rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and changed 

Children’s permanency goal to adoption. Father filed a timely Notice of 

Appeal and a Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) Concise 

Statement.

On appeal, Father raises the following questions for our review: 

I. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in terminating [Father’s] parental 

rights under Pa.C.S.[A. §] 2511?

II. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in finding that termination of 

parental rights best served [C]hildren’s developmental, physical 

and emotional needs under [subsection] (b)?

III. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in changing [C]hildren’s goal to 

adoption?

Father’s Brief at vi. 

We review an appeal from the termination of parental rights in 

accordance with the following standard:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our 

scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence 

presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will 

reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked 

competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s 

decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
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Termination of parental rights is controlled by section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The burden is upon the petitioner 

“to prove by clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for 

seeking the termination of parental rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 

273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). “[C]lear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the 

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of 

the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Further, the “trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and 

resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. 

Super. 2004). If the competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, 

“we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In 

re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003).

Satisfaction of any one subsection of Section 2511(a), along with 

consideration of Section 2511(b), is sufficient for the involuntary termination 

of parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). In this case, we will review the trial court’s decision to terminate 

Father’s parental rights based upon Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which state 

the following: 
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§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination.

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

Parental rights may be terminated pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1) if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to perform 

parental duties. ... [P]arental duty is best understood in relation 

to the needs of a child. ... [T]his court has held that the parental 

obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative 

performance. This affirmative duty ... requires a continuing 

interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain 

communication and association with the child.

In the Interest of J.T., 983 A.2d 771, 776-77 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 
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In regard to incarceration and the preservation of parental rights, we 

have stated the following: 

[I]ncarceration of a parent does not, in itself, provide sufficient 

grounds for termination of parental rights; however, an 

incarcerated parent’s responsibilities are not tolled during [her] 

incarceration. ... [P]arental duty requires that the parent not 

yield to every problem, but must act affirmatively, with good 

faith interest and effort, to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of [her] ability, even in difficult circumstances.

In the Interest of C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citations 

omitted); see also In re S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012). Further,

[a] parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in 

resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parentchild relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting 

for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her 

physical and emotional needs.

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).

In his first claim, Father asserts that the trial court erred in granting 

the ITPR Petition because DHS did not satisfy, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that his parental rights should be terminated under Section 

2511(a). Father’s Brief at 6. As to the requirements of subsection (a)(1), 

Father argues that the trial court relied almost entirely on his incarceration 

as evidence of a settled intent to relinquish parental claim and failure to 

perform parental duties. Id. at 7-8. Father claims that he has made 

efforts to be reunified with Children by sending cards, calling Children while 

in placement, and communicating with DHS workers about Children. Id. at 
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8-9. Father also asserts that he has participated in the Family Service Plans 

by enrolling in a parenting class. Id. at 8.

The trial court appropriately applied Section 2511(a)(1) to this case, 

and we adopt its Opinion as to that subsection for the purposes of this 

appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/13/15, at 7-9; see also In re B., N.M., 

856 A.2d 847, 858 (Pa. Super. 2004) (concluding that father showed a 

settled purpose of relinquishing his parental rights where he sat idle for most 

of child’s life while mother performed all parental duties, and that father’s 

wish to not have his “parental rights terminated was insufficient to protect 

those rights without acting affirmatively to foster a parental relationship with 

[c]hild during his incarceration.”).

In his second claim, Father contends that the trial court erred in 

determining that termination served Children’s best interests under Section 

2511(b). Father’s Brief at 13. Father argues that the social worker’s 

testimony regarding Children’s relationship with Father did not rise to the 

level of clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 13-14. Father claims that “it 

is hard to believe” that Children are completely bonded with the foster 

mother after living with her for less than a year. Id. at 14. Further, Father 

asserts that adoption in not in Children’s best interests because he is now 

ready, willing, and able to care for them. Id.

The trial court set forth the relevant law regarding Section 2511(b), 

and determined that it was in Children’s best interest to terminate Father’s 
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parental rights. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/13/15, at 12-13; see also In re 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013) (stating that “courts considering 

termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive 

home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”). Upon our 

review, the trial court appropriately applied Section 2511(b) to this case, 

and we adopt its Opinion for the purposes of this appeal. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 8/13/15, at 12-13.

In his third claim, Father asserts that the trial court erred in changing 

Children’s permanency goal to adoption. Father’s Brief at 14. Father argues 

that if the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights, it also erred in 

determining that DHS should not continue to provide Father with services. 

Id. at 15.

When we review a trial court’s order to change the 

placement goal for a dependent child to adoption, our standard 

is abuse of discretion. In order to conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion, we must determine that the court’s 

judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not 

apply the law, or that the court’s action was a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record. We are bound 

by the trial court’s findings of fact that have support in the 

record. The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with 

the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses and 

resolving any conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these 

responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence. When the trial court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we will affirm even if the record 

could also support the opposite result.

In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822-23 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted).
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In a change of goal proceeding, the trial court must focus 

on the child and determine the goal in the child’s best 

interest. . . . As a practical and legal matter, an order by the 

juvenile court changing the child’s placement goal from 

reunification to adoption ends any dispute that may exist 

between [DHS] and the parent as to the adequacy of [DHS’s] 

services aimed at reuniting the parent with [his] children and, of 

course, at to whether [DHS] had selected the most appropriate 

goal for this family. By allowing [DHS] to change its goal to 

adoption, the trial court has decided that [DHS] has provided 

adequate services to the parent but that [he] is nonetheless 

incapable of caring for the child and that, therefore, adoption is 

now the favored disposition. In other words, the trial court order 

is the decision that allows [DHS] to give up on the parent.

In the Interest of A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 339 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citations 

omitted). “Matters of custody and placement for a dependent child must be 

decided under the standard of the child’s best interests, not those of his or 

her parents.” In re N.C., 909 A.2d at 823 (emphasis in original).

Upon our review, we conclude that there is adequate support in the 

record for the trial court’s decision to change Children’s permanency goal to 

adoption. Having already determined that it is in Children’s best interests to 

terminate Father’s parental rights, we must also agree that it is in Children’s 

best interests to change their permanency goal to adoption.

Based upon the foregoing, the trial court did not err in granting the 

ITPR Petition and changing Children’s permanency goal to adoption.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/28/2016

 
Circulated 01/15/2016 03:56 PM