In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3290

Dennis R. Bay,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Cassens Transport Company,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Illinois, East St. Louis Division.

No. 98-433-WDS--William D. Stiehl, Judge.

Argued February 14, 2000--Decided May 11, 2000

 Before Bauer, Flaum, and Evans, Circuit Judges.

 Flaum, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Dennis

R. Bay appeals the district court’s decision

granting summary judgment to Cassens Transport

Company ("Cassens") on Bay’s employment

discrimination claims under the Americans with

Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et

seq., and the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"),

Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 213.010 et seq. Bay alleges

that the district court erred in concluding that

he was required to exhaust his administrative

remedies before pursuing judicial relief. For the

reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of

the district court.

I. Facts

 Cassens is engaged in the business of

transporting new vehicles from assembly plants to

automobile dealerships in the United States and

Canada. Dennis R. Bay was first employed by

Cassens as a long-haul truck driver in June 1987.

 On May 21, 1997, Bay experienced chest pains

and dizziness while driving and sought treatment

at Franklin County Hospital in Benton, Illinois.

While at the hospital Bay underwent initial

testing, but he was released on the condition

that he seek further medical consultation. On May

23, 1997, Bay again experienced chest pains. Bay

was then admitted to Missouri Baptist Medical
Center where he was diagnosed with profound sinus

bradycardia with near syncope (loss of

consciousness) and near fainting. Bay underwent

surgery to implant a pacemaker to correct this

problem on May 27, 1997, and remained on a

medical leave of absence from work.

 At the end of June 1997, Cassens instructed Bay

to report to Healthline, an organization with

which Cassens has an ongoing relationship to

perform Department of Transportation ("DOT")

physicals, for a return-to-work DOT

recertification examination. When Bay informed

Healthline of the medical condition that resulted

in his leave, Healthline told him that it would

have to review his medical records before

determining his physical qualifications to return

to work. After a review of these records, Dr.

Cheryl L. Patterson, a physician at Healthline,

informed Cassens that she believed Bay was

permanently disqualified from driving under DOT

safety regulations.

 Bay disputed Healthline’s disqualification

determination and, pursuant to the collective

bargaining agreement between Cassens and Bay’s

union, Bay was sent to an impartial physician to

resolve the dispute. After examining Bay, Dr.

Gerald A. Wolff, a cardiologist, stated that Bay

appeared to fall into a category of pacemaker

recipients who could return to commercial

driving. However, Dr. Wolff would not state

definitively that Bay was qualified to drive

under DOT regulations, and he suggested that Bay

seek a waiver from DOT. The regulations do not

provide for waivers for cardiac conditions.

 On October 22, 1997, Bay’s union filed a

grievance on Bay’s behalf requesting that he be

reinstated based on the union’s belief that Dr.

Wolff had found Bay DOT-qualified. Cassens denied

Bay’s grievance, and the union pursued the

collectively-bargained grievance procedure.

Ultimately, an arbitration panel ruled that Dr.

Wolff had not provided a definite determination

of Bay’s qualifications to return to work. The

panel then ordered the parties to select another

doctor to perform a DOT examination.

 The parties selected Dr. Stephen Pieper to

perform the DOT examination, and Dr. Pieper found

Bay qualified under applicable DOT regulations.

The arbitration panel then ordered Cassens to

reinstate Bay, but found that Cassens had been

under no obligation to return Bay to work until

a third-party doctor definitively found Bay

qualified to resume driving. Consequently, the

Board only awarded back pay for the company’s

three-day delay in reinstating Bay after Dr.

Pieper’s certification. Bay was returned to work

on March 9, 1998. 
 On January 6, 1998, Bay filed a charge of

discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Missouri

Human Rights Commission ("MHRC"), alleging that

Cassens violated the ADA and the MHRA when it

refused to allow him to return to work. The EEOC

issued a dismissal and notice of right to sue

letter on March 27, 1998, and the MHRC issued a

right to sue letter on June 8, 1998.

 Bay then filed suit in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of

Illinois, alleging that Cassens had violated his

rights under the ADA and the MHRA. Cassens moved

for summary judgment, and the district court

granted that motion on the ground that Bay had

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Bay now appeals this grant of summary judgment,

arguing that neither the ADA nor the MHRA require

a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies

before filing suit.

II. Analysis

 We review the district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo. See Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp.,

170 F.3d 734, 742 (7th Cir. 1999). In order to

overcome summary judgment, Bay must show specific

facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for

trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Shermer v.

Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 171 F.3d 475, 477 (7th

Cir. 1999) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317 (1986)). In determining whether a

genuine issue of material fact exists, we

construe all facts in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of that party. See Senner v.

Northcentral Technical C., 113 F.3d 750, 754 (7th

Cir. 1997). "A genuine issue for trial exists

only when a reasonable jury could find for the

party opposing the motion based on the record as

a whole." Roger v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 21

F.3d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1994). In considering the

district court’s decision on appeal, we may

affirm on a ground other than that relied on by

the district court so long as it is adequately

supported in the record and the law. See Divane

v. Krull Electric Co., Inc., 200 F.3d 1020, 1026

(7th Cir. 1999).

 The ADA provides that "no covered entity shall

discriminate against a qualified individual with

a disability because of the disability of such

individual in regard to job application

procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge

of employees, employee compensation, job

training, and other terms, conditions, and

privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. sec.

12112(a). A "qualified individual with a
disability" is defined as "an individual with a

disability who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential

functions of the employment position that such

individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. sec.

12111(8). A disability is then defined as: "(A)

a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major

life activities of such individual; (B) a record

of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as

having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. sec.

12102(2).

 In attempting to establish that Cassens violated

the ADA through its refusal to allow him to

return to work as a commercial truck driver, Bay

relies on the "regarded as" prong of the ADA’s

disability definition. 42 U.S.C. sec.

12102(2)(C). Bay can demonstrate that he falls

within the "regarded as" definition of a

disability by showing that: "(1) a covered entity

mistakenly believes that a person has a physical

impairment that substantially limits one or more

major life activities, or (2) a covered entity

mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting

impairment substantially limits one or more major

life activities." Sutton v. United Air Lines,

Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2149-50 (1999). In this

case, Bay contends that his rights under the ADA

were violated when Cassens refused to allow him

to return to work because it mistakenly believed

the profound sinus bradycardia with near syncope

and near fainting he suffered before implantation

of the pacemaker substantially limited him in the

major life activity of working (in this case,

driving a truck).

 Although the district court granted Cassens

summary judgment on Bay’s ADA claim based on

Bay’s failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies, we first consider the threshold

question of whether Bay has raised a genuine

issue of material fact as to all the elements of

an ADA claim. In this regard, much of Cassens’s

response to Bay’s ADA claim focuses on Bay’s

failure to pass a recertification examination

prior to the physical conducted by Dr. Pieper on

March 6, 1998. First, Cassens contends that

because DOT certification is a legitimate

requirement for Bay’s job as a commercial truck

driver, Bay was not an "otherwise qualified"

individual within the meaning of the ADA until he

was recertified. Second, Cassens contends that

because Bay did not produce any evidence that it

refused to reinstate him because it regarded him

as disabled, but rather only demonstrated that

Cassens relied on Bay’s lack of certification in

making its decision, Bay cannot demonstrate that

Cassens regarded Bay as disabled. Under both of

these theories, Cassens asserts that its reliance

on DOT regulations requiring commercial truck
drivers to obtain certification precludes

liability under the ADA as long as Cassens

actually relied on those regulations in refusing

to reinstate Bay.

 It is well-established that a plaintiff has the

burden of proving that he is "qualified" to

perform the essential functions of the job he

holds or seeks, with or without reasonable

accommodation./1 See Best v. Shell Oil Co., 107

F.3d 544, 547-48 (7th Cir. 1997); Weiler v.

Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir.

1996); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793,

797 (7th Cir. 1995). Our inquiry into whether Bay

was qualified to resume his duties as a

commercial truck driver involves a two-step

analysis. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers,

Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1996). We first

consider whether "the individual satisfies the

prerequisites for the position, such as

possessing the appropriate educational

background, employment experience, skills,

licenses, etc." 29 C.F.R. app. sec. 1630.2(m). If

the individual possesses the appropriate

prerequisites for the position, we then consider

"whether or not the individual can perform the

essential functions of the position held or

desired, with or without reasonable

accommodation." Id. Whether or not an individual

meets the definition of a qualified individual

with a disability is to be determined as of the

time the employment decision was made. See

Weiler, 101 F.3d at 524.

 Cassens argues that Bay cannot sustain his

burden to show he was qualified to return to work

as a commercial truck driver because, at the time

Bay sought reinstatement, he did not possess the

DOT certification that was required in order for

him to work in that position. Under the ADA, an

employer can apply "qualification standards" that

deny a job to an individual with a disability as

long as those standards are "job-related and

consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C.

sec. 12113(a); 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.15(b)(1).

Moreover, an employer may have a defense to a

charge of discrimination if an action is

"required or necessitated by another Federal law

or regulation." 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.15(e). Under

applicable DOT regulations, Cassens was not

allowed to permit Bay to resume driving until he

produced a copy of a doctor’s certificate

indicating he was physically qualified to drive,

49 C.F.R. sec. 391.11(a); 49 C.F.R. sec.

391.41(a), and nothing in the ADA purports to

change that obligation, see Thoms v. ABF Freight

Sys., Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 1119, 1127 (E.D.Wis.

1998) ("The ADA does not override health and

safety requirements established under other

Federal laws.") (quoting EEOC Technical
Assistance Manual at IV-16). In light of these

DOT standards, we agree that Bay’s failure to

obtain DOT certification is fatal to his ADA

claim.

 Bay argues that Dr. Patterson’s refusal to

state that he was physically qualified to drive,

and his consequent inability to gain the

necessary certification, does not indicate that

he was not "otherwise qualified" to drive a

commercial vehicle under the terms of the ADA. In

essence, Bay contends that a company may not rely

on the results of a recertification examination

if that examination incorrectly applies the

relevant DOT standards. However, under the

circumstances presented in this case, we will not

look behind Bay’s initial inability to attain

certification and second-guess the medical

determination of Dr. Patterson. See Murphy v.

UPS, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 2138 (1999) ("Had a

physician examined petitioner and, in light of

his medical history, declined to issue a

temporary DOT certification, we would not secondguess that decision."); Campbell v. Federal

Express Corp., 918 F.Supp. 912, 918 (D.Md. 1996)

(stating that an employer is "entitled to rely on

medical determinations made by its medical

professionals"). At the point Dr. Patterson

refused to recertify Bay, Cassens was not only

entitled to rely on that judgment, but was

legally required to refuse Bay’s request to

return to driving a commercial motor vehicle

until he presented the proper certification. See

Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S.Ct. 2162,

2171 (1999) (stating that employers have an

"unconditional obligation to follow the [DOT]

regulation[s] and [a] consequent right to do

so").

 It was not until Dr. Pieper determined that Bay

was qualified to drive pursuant to DOT standards

that he was "otherwise qualified" under the ADA.

See Prado v. Continental Air Trans. Co., 982

F.Supp. 1304, 1307 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (stating that

"to become a ’qualified individual’ under the

ADA, . . . drivers must be DOT certified or be

able to obtain DOT certification" by passing "the

requisite physical examination"). Significantly,

this is the point at which Cassens allowed Bay to

resume driving. Whether a certification dispute

is resolved through administrative procedures, or

through a private collective bargaining process,

it is only when a dispute is resolved in favor of

the employee that an employer is obligated to

return the employee to work. Until that point,

Cassens was entitled to rely on Bay’s failure to

obtain certification in refusing to allow him to

resume his employment as a commercial truck

driver, and Cassens may assert Bay’s lack of

certification as a valid defense to Bay’s ADA
claim./2 See 42 U.S.C. sec. 12113(a); 29 C.F.R.

sec. 1630.15(e); Albertsons, 119 S.Ct. at 2171 &

n.16.; Rice v. Genova Products, Inc., 978 F.Supp.

813, 822 (N.D.Ind. 1997) ("[I]t is wellestablished in the case law, the ADA itself, and

the legislative history of the Act that reliance

on a federal requirement or regulation

constitutes a defense to an ADA claim . . . .").

 Although we decline to look behind Bay’s lack

of certification on the facts presented here, we

emphasize that this holding does not preclude

courts from examining the medical basis for a

certification decision in all circumstances. In

cases where the doctor’s disqualification

decision is based on a condition not covered by

DOT regulations, see, e.g., EEOC v. Texas Bus

Lines, 923 F.Supp. 965 (S.D.Tex. 1996), or where

the plaintiff’s lack of certification is used as

a pretext for discrimination, see Silk v. City of

Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 799 (7th Cir. 1999)

(applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

test to disparate treatment claims under the

ADA), or if an employer is working in collusion

with a medical professional to deny

certification, a plaintiff’s lack of

certification may not be decisive./3 However, in

this case there is no evidence that Cassens acted

in any way to prevent Bay from being recertified

or that Cassens acted in bad faith, nor is there

any indication that Cassens’s reliance on Dr.

Patterson’s medical determination was

unreasonable./4 We therefore find that Bay was

not "otherwise qualified" under the ADA because

he lacked the necessary DOT certification.

Because Bay failed to make out an element of his

ADA claim, the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on Bay’s employment discrimination

claims was proper. See Weiler, 101 F.3d at 523.

Accordingly, we need not address the other issues

presented by this case, including the

administrative exhaustion ground relied on by the

district court./5

III. Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision

of the district court.

/1 Although the remainder of the opinion will

analyze Bay’s claim in the context of the ADA,

the same framework applies to his MHRA claim as

well. See Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Products, Inc.,

165 F.3d 1212, 1216 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that

in order to establish a claim under the MHRA, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that he was "qualified

to perform the essential functions of [the] job

with or without reasonable accommodation").
/2 Bay argues that allowing Cassens to assert its

reliance on Bay’s lack of certification as a

defense, without a showing that Bay did not

actually meet DOT qualification standards, would

permit a company to use its own doctor to shield

itself from liability under the ADA. We disagree.

First, as noted below, a company may not be able

to escape liability in situations where a

plaintiff can demonstrate that the company’s

reliance on its doctor’s medical determination

was unreasonable or in bad faith. Second, in

cases where a company does act reasonably and in

good faith, an employee can resort to

administrative procedures for resolving medical

disputes under 49 U.S.C. sec. 391.47 (providing

for application to the Director of the Office of

Motor Carrier Research Standards for the

resolution of disputes). In other words, while an

employee may not be able to subject an employer

who acts reasonably and in good faith to

liability under the ADA, that employee may still

enforce his right to return to work under an

alternative regulatory scheme.

/3 We do not intend this to be an exhaustive list of

the situations in which a court might disregard

an employer’s reliance on a medical

determination. This list is only to emphasize

that our holding is limited to cases where an

employer’s reliance on the determination of a

medical professional is reasonable and in good

faith.

/4 Bay seems to contend that Cassens was not

entitled to rely on the judgment of Dr. Patterson

because she worked for Healthline, an

organization with which Cassens had an ongoing

relationship. Although we do not reject the idea

that a court could second-guess a medical

determination when a significant conflict of

interest exists, this case does not rise to that

level. A mere ongoing relationship between a

company and a health organization does not

demonstrate a conflict of interest, nor is there

any evidence in the record that Dr. Patterson’s

evaluation was biased. Medical judgments are

subjective and may vary from doctor to doctor,

and a company is "entitled to rely on the

determinations made by its medical

professionals," Campbell, 918 F.Supp. at 918, as

long as that reliance is reasonable and in good

faith.

/5 Although we do not decide the applicability of

administrative exhaustion to ADA cases like the

instant one, we recognize that such a requirement

might be appropriate. The DOT has set up a

procedure for the resolution of disputes over

medical determinations under 49 C.F.R. sec.

391.47, and that procedure provides a means by
which employees may challenge a certification

decision without resort to the courts. Where

these kinds of administrative procedures are

available, a plaintiff is generally required to

exhaust these avenues for relief. See Reiter v.

Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 269 (1993).