F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT July 18, 20 06 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK

Honora ble J ane A . Restani, Chief J udg e, United States Court of International Trade , * sitti ngby desig nation . [PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ __ N os. 04– 1534 1 & 04- 1556 1

____ ____ ____ __ D.C. Dock etNo. 0 4- 20 00 4– CV– MGC THAIS CARDOSO ALMEIDA, Pl ai nti ff –Appe llant, ve rs us AMAZON.COM, INC., De fendant–Appellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeals fr om

the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J ul y 18 , 200 6) Before TJO FL AT and HU LL , C ircuit Judg es, and REST AN I , Judge. * RE ST AN I, Judge:2

Thais Cardoso Alm eida brought this action agains t Am azon.com , I nc. (“ A m az on” ) fo r dis play ing he r im ag e on i ts w eb sit es in furthe ranc e of it s sa le of the boo k A nj os P ro ibi dos. A lm ei daa sse rt ed c la im s a ga ins t A m az on p ur suant t o Fl a. S ta t. § 54 0. 08 ( W es t 20 06) , f or c ivi l the ft

pur suant t o F la . S ta t. § 77 2. 11 (West 2 00 6) , andun de r Fl or id a’s co m m on law d oc tri ne of i nv as io n o f pr iv acy. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d sum m ar y j udgm ent i n f

av or of A m az on a s to a ll of A lm ei da ’ s c la im s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt he ld tha t A lm ei da ’ s r igh t of pub lic ity c la im under § 540 .08 and com

m on law is preem

pted by the Com m unication s Dec ency Ac t of 1996 (“ CDA ”), 47 U. S. C. § 230 (2000), and is otherwise unavailable under Fl or ida ’ s st at

uto ry f ir st- sa le doc tr ine . A s to A lm ei da ’ s c ivi l the ft c la im , the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld tha t A lm ei daf ai le d to e sta

bli sh A m az on’ s in te nt t o m isappropriate Alm eida’ s im age. W e af firm the district court’ s grant of summ ary j udgm en t, a lth oughw ithr es pe ct to A lm ei da ’ s r igh t of

pub lic ity c la im , w e do s o on di ffer en t g ro un ds . BACKGRO UND T his c as e inv olv es A m az on. co m , an in te rn et r et ai le r, and i ts d isp lay

of boo k co ve r im ag es in furthe ranc e of it s in te rn et

boo k sa le s. A t i ssu e he re is a phot ogr ap h of

the pla int if

f A lm ei datake n w he n sh e w as te n y ears old and dis play ed on the c ove r an d in sid e the se co nd e dit ionof the pho tog ra

phi c book3

A nj os P ro ibi dos, or

“ Fo rb idd enA nge ls. ” I n e sse nc e, A lm ei dac la im s th at A m az on shou ld n ot d isp lay

he r im ag e to p ro m ote the sa le of A nj os P ro ibi dos be ca

use she di d n ot co ns en t an d d idno t re cei ve jus t co m pe ns at io n fo r th e u se of h er i m ag e. In199 1, f as hio n ph oto gr ap he r Fa

bio Ca br al r eque ste d pe rm iss ionf ro m A lm ei da ’ s m oth er

to phot ogr ap h he r daught er f or an art ist ic pho to e xhi bit , and s he sig ne d an auth or iz at ionf orm that pr ovi de d: T he le ga l r ep re se ntativ e fo r the pho tog ra phe d m ino r both lis te d be lowauth or iz es f

re e fr om r es tr ic tio ns the use of

the phot ogr ap hic im ag e pr oduc ed by the pho tog ra

phe r, F ab io G . M. Ca br al , in ane xhi bit ione nti tle d “ 18 G ir ls Unde r 18 Ye ars” and in th e photog raphic book “ PO RT PH OL ICS BO O K ” N o. 3 of

the sam e tit le a s th e ex hib iti on f or use during th e vernissage and launch at the “ COL LE CT ORS ” phot ogr ap hic ga lle ry . T he auth or iz at ione xte nds to the inv itatio n, the pos te r an d pr int ed pr om oti ona l m at er ia l f

or the ex hib iti on and l aunc h of

the boo k. A lm ei da ’ s im ag e w as dis play ed a t C ab ra l’ s tw o- day

e xhi bit , a t whic h th e fi rs t ed iti on o f A nj os P ro ibi dos w as of fe re d f or sa le , dis play ing bla ck

and whit e phot ogr ap hs o f gir ls b etw ee n th e ag es of te n and s ev en te en , inc lud ing a phot ograph of Alm eida inside the bo ok. T wo hundred copies of the boo k wer e sol d be fo re the auth or iti es in Sa o P au lo s ei ze d th e re m ai nin g c opi es . C ab ra l and the boo k’ s pu

bli she r, I tam ar at i G ra fi ca , w er e pr ose cu te d f or pr oduc ing aw ork of ch il d p orno gr ap hy, andbo th were ac qu it te d.4

In200 0, O phe lia

E dit ion s pu

bli she d ase co nd e dit ionof A nj os P ro ibi dos, w hic h is the sam e in a ll re spe ct s, e xc ep t tha t A lm ei da ’ s pi ct ur e is n owon the book ’ s c ove r, the re is a ne wintro duc tio n, and a f ewne wpic tur es of

oth er gir ls ap p ea r i n s i d e t h e b o o k . Th e s ec o n ded i t i o nwa s o ff er edfo r s al e o nAm az o n ’s web si te . G en er al ly , A m az on i s r ec ogni ze d a s ale ad ing int er ne t r et ai le r w itha particular f

ocus on o nline bo ok sales. It off ers its custom ers a se archable product da ta ba se , or de r pla ce m en t c ap ab ili ty , and d el ive ry se rv ic es thr oughaw or ld- w ide dis tr ibu tio n sy ste m . I n a ddi tio n, A m az on e nte rs a gr ee m en ts w ithw eb ope rator s to lin k po te nti al c ust om er s to A m az on’ s w eb sit es in ex ch an ge f or ape rc en ta ge of

the sales price. It is custom ary busin ess practice for A m azon to provid e a product de ta il pa ge that di spl ay s th e co ve r of e ac h bo ok o ff

er ed f or sa le , a s w el l a s te xt de sc rib in g t he bo ok . In200 2, A lm ei dadis co ve re d th at he r pic tur e w as be ing dis play ed on A m az on. co m

w eb sit es in furthe ranc e of the sa le of

the se co nd e dit ionof

A nj os Proibidos . Am azon’ s product detail page dis play ed the second editio n cover phot ogr ap h of

A lm ei daand a

quo te a ttr ibu te d to ate n- y ear old A lm ei da : “ I re al ly liked Fabio. H e’ s super-cool. I never fe lt any sham e in m aking th e photos .” O n M ar ch6, 200 3, A lm ei da ’ s a tto rn ey se nt a le tte r to A m az on r eque sti ng5

statutory dam ages, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 540.08, for its unauthorized use of her im ag e. O n M ar ch11, 200 3, A m az on r es pond ed by le tte r say ing that i t w oul d vol unt ar ily

r em ove the li sti ng f

or A nj os P ro ibi dos fr om

it s w eb sit es . T he li sti ng wit h Al m ei da ’s im ag e was in factrem ov edpro m pt ly from Am azo n’s web si te s. Moreover, there is no indication that Am azon had knowledge or shou ld have had knowledge that the boo k cover display ed an im age that the author and pub lisher we re not authorized to use. O n July7, 2003, A lm eida’ s attorney sent a civil theft de m an d le tte r to A m az on p ur suant t o F la . S ta t. § 77 2. 011, to w hic h A m az on ap pare ntl y

did not r es pond . O n N ove m

be r 14, 200 3, A lm ei daf

ile d su it in M iam i- D ad e Co unty , F lor ida as se rt ing c la im s un de r: ( 1) the r igh t of pub lic ity statut e, F la . S ta t. § 54 0. 08; ( 2) the ci vil the ft statut e, F la . S ta t. § 77 2. 11; and ( 3) the F lor ida c om m on l awinv as ionof pr iva cy doc tr ine . O n January

2, 200 4, A m az on i nvok ed div er sity j ur isd ic tio n and rem oved the case to federa l district court. O n July30, 2004, the district court gr an te d Am azo n's m ot io n fo r su m m ary jud gm en t as to all of Al m ei da ’s cla im s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt he ld tha t A lm ei dam ay not r ec ove r unde r se ct ion540 . 08 be cau se th e su bjec t m at te r of he r cl ai m

ha s b een pre em

pt edby the CDA. A ssum ing arg ue ndo that the CD Adoe s no t pr ee m pt the sub j ec t m atte r of A lm ei da ’ s se ct ion540 . 08 c la im , the dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed that A lm ei daF l o r i d a c o m m o nl awr e c o g n i z e s f o ur b r an c h e s o f

th e t o rto f

i n v a s i o no f

p r i v a c y: 1 appropr iation, intrusion, publi c disclosure of private fac ts, and false light in the public eye. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg , 863 So. 2d 156, 162 (Fla. 2003) . Appar ently , Almeida’s invasion of privac y

claim fa lls under the misappropr iation of proper ty arm of the invasion of privac y doctrine. See Compl. ¶ 142 (stating that she is entitled to “compensator y damag es [to] c omp e ns ate he r f

or the un a uth or ize d u se of

he r i ma g e , s uc h s um t o in c lud e the tot a l g ro ss re v en u es re ce i v edb y

AM AZO N t h ro u ghth e u n au th o ri z edu s e o f s u ch i m age ”) . Al th o u gh se c tio n 5 40 .0 8 n owc od if ie s th e c omm on

law r ig ht a g a ins t mi sa

pp ro pr iatio n, the statut e pe rm its a party to proce ed under

available common law invasion of pr ivacy theories. See § 540.08(6) (s tatin gthat “ [t]he re me die s p ro vid e d f or in t his se c tio n s ha ll b e in a dd iti on to a nd no t in limit ation of the re medies and r ights of a ny person unde r the c ommon law ag ainst the invasion of her or his privacy”). Although A lmeida cha lleng es the district cour t’s g rant of summar

y judgme nt as to her common law misappropr iation claim, she appe ars to agree with the district court that her c omm on law m isa pp ro pr iatio n c la im i s su

bs tanti a lly

ide nti c a l to he r s tatut or

y ri g ht o f p ub lic ity claim and should be r esolved on the same basis. See B y rd v. Hustler Ma g azine, Inc., 433 So. 2d 59 3, 59 5 ( F la . D ist . Ct . App . 1 98 3) . A s th e statut or y and c omm on law c la ims are su

bs tanti a lly ide nti c a l and

the pa rt ie s p ro vid e min ima l br ie fi nga s to the c omm on law m isa pp ro pr iatio n c la im, we do not addr ess this claim separ ately from Almeida’ s statutory rig ht of publicity

claim. 6 consented to Cabral’ s use of her im age, and, there fore, section 540 .08(3)(b) bars ap pli catio n of

the statut e. F urthe r, the dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ed A m az on’ s in va sio n of pr iva cy c la im on the sam e ba sis a s th e statut or y r igh t of pub lic ity c la im . A s to

1 A lm ei da ’ s c ivi l the ft

c la im , the dis tr ic t c ourt de te rm ine d th at A lm ei daf

ai le d to e s t ab l i s h Ama z o n ’s f

e l o n i o u s i n t e n tb y c l e ar

an dc o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e . F i n a l l y, the district court awarded Am azon attorney ’ s fees based on Alm eida’ s civil theft c l a i m. On appeal to this court, A lm eida challenges the district court’ s decision as to the CDAon a num

ber of grounds. First, Alm eida argues that the district court erre d b y rai si ng th e CDA su a sp on te when Am azo n was req ui redto rai se th e CDA7

as an aff irm ative defense. Sec ond, Alm eida asserts that the right of publicityis an int el le ct ua l pr ope rty

r igh t and the CD Adoe s no t a ppl y to ca use s of a ct ion pr ed ic at ed

on “ any lawpe rt ai nin g to int el le ct ua l pr ope rty . ” T hir d, A lm ei da contends that the CDAdoes not imm unize Am azon because it is not an

“ in fo rm at io n c on te nt pro vi de r” as th atterm is de fin edby the CDA. As to the m erits of A lm eida’ s right of pub licity claim , A lm eida argues that she ne ve r co nse nte d to the use of he r im ag e in the se co nd e dit ionof A nj os Pr oib ido s, so the f

ir st- sa le doc tr ine doe s no t a ppl y . F ina lly , w ithr es pe ct to the district court’ s civil theft determ ination , A lm eida argues that the district court er re d by f ai lin g to a llo wf

or m eanin gf

ul d isc ove ry

a s to A m az on’ s in te nt, by aw ar din g a tto rn ey ’ s f

ee s ba se d onf

ind ing that the c la im

la ck ed a“ subs tanti al ba sis in law or in f

act, ” and by

entering a fe e aw ard based on its in cam era review w ith out an e xpl an at iona s to the a m ount of f ee s. DISC US SION A. Right of P ublicity 1. Preemptio n by the CDA Fi rs t, w e ad dr es s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus ionthat the CD Apr ee m pts the subj ec t m atte r of

A lm ei da ’ s r igh t of

pub lic ity c la im . S ubse ct ion230 (c ) of the CD Apr ovi de s:Section 230(f) (2) de fines “inter active c omputer ser vice” as “a

ny information servic e, 2 sy ste m, o r a c c e ss s of

tw are pr ov ide r t

hat pr ov ide s o r e na

ble s c omp ute r a c c e ss b y

mul tip le us e rs to a computer

serve r, includingspecific ally a ser vice or sy stem that provides ac cess to the Interne t and su c h s y ste ms o pe rate d o r s e rv ic e s o ff e re d b y lib ra ri e s o r e du c atio na l in sti tut ion s. ” 47 U. S.C. § 2 30 (f )( 2) . Se c tio n 2 30 (f

)( 3) de fi ne s “ inf

or matio n c onte nt p ro vid e r” a s “ any pe rs on or e nti ty that is responsible, in whole or in pa rt, for the cre ation or deve lopment of information provided throug h the Interne t or any other intera ctive computer service .” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)( 3). Almeida does not dispute that Amazon is an “intera ctive computer service ,” but she doe s argue that Amazon is not entit led to immunit y beca use it is an “information content provider.” 8 (c ) Pr ote ct ionf

or “ G ood Sam ar itan” blo ck ing and s cr ee nin g of offensive m aterial (1) T reatm ent of publis her or speaker No provider or user of an interactive com puter service sha ll be tr eate d a s th e publ ish er or spe ak er of any inf orm at ionpr ovi de d by

anothe r inf

orm at ionc ont en t provider. ( 2 ) C i v i l l i ab i l i ty No provider or user of an interactive com puter service sha ll be he ld l ia

ble on a cc ount

of —( A ) any

a ct ion vol unt ar ily

take n ingoo d f

ai th t o r es tr ic t a cc es s to or availability

of m aterial that the provider or user c o n s i d e r s t o b e o b s c e n e , l e w d , l a s c i v i o u s , f i l th y, ex ce ssi ve ly

vio le nt, hara ssi ng, or

oth er w ise obj ec tio nable , w he the r or not suc h m at er ia l i s co nst itu tio na lly

pr ote ct ed ; or

( B) any a ct iontake n to en ab le or m ak e av ai la

ble to inf orm at ionc ont ent pr ovi de rs or

oth er s th e te ch nic al m eans t o r es tr ic t a cc es s to m aterial descr ibed in paragraph (1). 47 U . S. C. § 23 0( c) . T he CD Apr ee m pts state lawthat i s c ontrary to thi s 2 subs ec tio n. S ee 47 U . S. C. § 23 0( e) (3 ) (“ N o c au se of

a ct ionm ay

be br ough t and no l ia bil ity m ay be im pose d un de r any

S ta te or loc al lawthat i s in co nsi ste nt w ithThe languag e of se ction 230(c) (2) is cle arly inconsistent with state law that make s 3 interac tive service providers liable based on the ir eff orts to scree n content. We note that the ma jor ity of c ir c uit s a lso re a d s ub se c tio n ( c )( 1) , th ou g h p hr a se d a s a de fi nit ion , to blo c k c ivi l liability when inter active se rvice providers r efr ain from f ilteringor ce nsoringthe information on their sites. See B atzel v. Smi th, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2003); Gr een v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 470–71 ( 3d Cir. 2003); Be n Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F .3d 980, 985–86 (10th Cir. 2000); Z era n, 129 F.3d at 330. In contra st, the Seventh Circuit determined that the CDA is not necessa rily inconsistent with state laws that cr eate liability for inter active se rvice providers that refr ain from f ilteringor censor ing c ontent. See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F .3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003). We note, howeve r, that the Seve nth Circuit’s rationale ma y be consistent with Cong ress’ a pproac h in the Dig ital Mill ennium Copy rig ht Act of 1998 (“ DMCA”), in whic h it gr anted c opy rig ht infring ement immunity

to “innocent” service providers who can pr ove that they do not have actua l or construc tive knowledg e of the copy rig ht infring ement. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1) ( 2000); see Per fec t 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L L C, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2004) , 340 F . Supp. 2d at 1087 (statingthat the “pur pose of the D MCA is to relieve interne t service providers of the duty of patrollingthe Interne t for copy rig ht infring ements that ar e not immediately appar ent or of which they

have no a ctual knowledg e”) . In the pre sent ca se, there is no issue of actua l or construc tive knowledg e bec ause the F lor ida ri g ht o f p ub lic ity

do e s n ot i mpo se up on

int e ra c tiv e se rv ic e pr ov ide rs an o bli g atio n to filter or c ensor c ontent. Moreove r, as a fac tual matter, ther e is no indication that Amazon had knowledg e of the alleg edly misappropriate d imag e and it re sponded promptly to Almeida’s notice by removingAnjos Proibidos from its websites. 9 this section .” ) The m aj ority

of feder al circ uits have int erprete d the CDAto establish broad

“ fe de ra l i m

m uni ty to any c au se of a ct ionthat w oul d m ak e se rv ic e pr ovi de rs li ab le f o r i n f o rma t i o n o r i g i n a t i n g w i th ath i r d - p arty u s e r o f th e s e rv i c e . ” Z e r anv . A m. Online, Inc. , 129 F. 3d 32 7, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). In this case, the district court 3 ad opt ed thi s a ppr oa ch , but

e ve n th is b ro ad

statut or y im m uni ty doe s no t a

ppl y w ith out li m itatio n. S ee 47 U . S. C. § 23 0( e) (1 ) (p ro vid ing that “ [n ] oth ing in thi s section shall b e construed to im pair the enforce m ent of . . . any . . . Feder al10

cr im ina l st at

ute ”) ; 47 U . S. C. § 23 0( e) (2 ) (p ro vid ing that “ [n ] oth ing in thi s se ct ion shall be construed to lim it or expand any lawpertaining to in tellectual property ”); 47 U. S. C. § 230 (e)( 3) (providing that “ [n] othin g in thi s section shall b e construed to p re ve nt any

S ta te f ro m e nf or ci ng any

S ta te lawthat i s c onsi ste nt w iththi s se ct ion ”) ; 47 U . S. C. § 23 0( e) (4 ) (p ro vid ing that “ [n ] oth ing in thi s se ct ionsha ll be construed to li m it the application of the E lectronic Com m unication s Privacy

Ac t of 1986 . . . or any

sim ilar State law ”). H ere, the district court did no t consider w he the r im

m uni zi ng A m az on f

ro m li ab ili ty und er the r igh t of

pub lic ity w oul d li m itan y law p ert ai ni ng to in te ll ectua l p ro pe rty. Whe the r the CD Aim

m uni ze s an in te ra ct ive se rv ic e pr ovi de r fr om astate law right of pub licity

claim is an issue of first im

pression for this Cou rt. Few fe de ra l c ourts h av e co nsi de re d th e ef fe ct of § 23 0( e) (2 ) on the CD A ’ s gr an t of im m unity , a lthou gh it is clear that “ any lawpertaining to in tellectual property ” at le as t r ef er s to the thr ee tr ad iti ona l f orm s of int el le ct ua l pr ope rty : c opy

ri ght , pa te nt, an d tr ad em ar

k. S ee A lli son v. V int ag e Sp orts P la que s, 136 F . 3d 1 443, 144 8 ( 11th Cir. 1998 ) (stating that the three principal form s of intellectual property are co py ri ght , pa te nt, and tra de m ar k) . T hus, f

ed er al dis tr ic t c ourts h av e he ld tha t § 230( e) (2 ) unam

big uous ly pr ec lud es appl y ing the CD Ato im m uni ze int er ac tiv e se rv ic e pr ovi de rs f

ro m tr ad em ar k c la im s. S ee F or d M oto r Co . v.11

G re at dom ai ns. co m , I nc . , 60 U . S. P. Q . 2D 144 6 ( E . D . Mi ch . 200 1) ( co nstru ing § 230( e) (2 ) to p re cl ude appl ic at ionof CD Aim m uni ty to cl ai m s ba se d onthe violatio n of feder al tradem ark law s); Gucc i Am ., Inc. v. H all & A ssocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 , 413 (S. D. N. Y. 2001 ) (r ecognizing th at im m unizing tradem ark in fri ng em en t cl ai m s wo ul d l im itlaws pe rta in in g t o i nt el le ctua l p ro pe rty). A lm ei dac ont en ds tha t the CD Adoe s no t pr ee m pt s ec tio n 54 0. 08 b ec au se it is a qui nte sse nti al r igh t of

pub lic ity c la im , and the r igh t of

pub lic ity is a w ide ly re co gni ze d in te lle ct

ua l pr ope rty

r igh t. S ee E T W

Co rp . v. Jir ehP ubl ’ g, I nc . , 332 F. 3d 91 5, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that “ [t] he right of publ icity is an intellectual pr ope rty r igh t of r ec en t or igi n w hic h ha s be ende fi ne d a s th e inh er en t r igh t of ev er y hum anbe ing to co ntr ol the c om m er ci al use of

his or ide nti ty ”) ; A lli son, 136 F. 3d at 144 8 (concludin g that the comm on law right of publicity is an intellectual p r o p e rty ri g h tf

o r p u r p o s e s o f th e f i r s t - s a l e d o c tr i n e ) ; J . Th o mas M c C arth y, Me lvi lle B. N im

m er & the Ri ght s of

P ubl ic ity : AT ri but e, 34 U . C. L . A . L . Re v. 1703 , 171 2 ( 1987 ) (s ta tin g th at the r igh t of

pub lic ity ha s “ m at ur ed int o a distin ctive legal category occupy ing an im

portant place in the law of intellectual property ”); Bla ck’ s Law D ictionary 813 (7th ed. 1999 ) (def

ining intellectual pr ope rty a s f oll ow s: “ Ac at eg or

y of int an gib le r igh ts p ro te ct ing c om m er ci al ly va lua ble pr oduc ts o f the hum anint el le ct . T he c at eg or y c om pr ise s pr im ar ily12

tr ad em ar k, c opy ri ght , and p at en t r igh ts, but a lso inc lud es tr ad e- se cr et r igh ts, publ icity rights, m oral rights, and rights against un fair c om petition .” ). Furthe r, A lm ei daarg ue s th at § 23 0( e) (2 ) ex te nds to a ll int el le ct ua l pr ope rty ri ght s, e ve n no n- tr ad iti ona l st at e- lawint el le ct ua l pr ope rty

r igh ts. S ee P er fe ct

10, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 1108–1 109 (hol ding that based on § 2 30(e)(2) the C DAdoes no t ap pl y to Cal ifo rn ia ’s st atut ory

an d c omm on law ri gh t o f pu bl ic it y cla im s) . In de ed , c ourts h av e he ld tha t i nte lle ct ua l pr ope rty

is not astatic c onc ep t f

or purpos es of the CD A. G ucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 414 (noting that “ nowhere does Section 230 state that the laws to which it ref ers ar e . . . lim ited to the int ellectual pr ope rty law s a s th ey

e xis te d [ w he n e na ct ed ] ”) . A lm ei dac ont en ds tha t e xte ndi ng the m eanin g of

§ 23 0( e) (2 ) m ak es se nse be ca use the pur

pose se rv ed

by pub lic ity ri ght s is sim ilar to tha t of tr ad iti ona l i nte lle ct

ua l pr ope rty

r igh ts. S ee Z ac ch ini v. Sc ri p p s -H o wa rdBr o ad . C o ., 4 3 3 U.S . 5 6 2 , 5 7 3 (1 9 7 7 ) ( ex p l ai n i n g th at th e S t at e’s int er es t i n pr ovi din g ar igh t of pub lic ity is “ cl ose ly

ana log ous to the goa ls o f patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the indiv idual to reap the rew ard of hi s en de av or s an d h av in g l it tl e to do wit h p ro te ct in g fe el in gs or r ep ut at io n” ). A m az on r es pond s th at

e ve n if the r igh t of

pub lic ity pr ote ct s aty

pe of int el le ct ua l pr ope rty

r igh t, Co ngr es s di d no t i nte nd f or § 23 0( e) (2 ) to a

ppl y to publ ic ity r igh ts. F ir st, A m az on arg ue s th at Co ngr es s di d no t i nte nd b y the CD AtoI t is also appare nt, however , that the rig ht of publicity does not fit neatly

into the 4 cate g ory of tort-ba sed lawsuits from whic h Congr ess soug ht to imm unize interactive se rvice 13 pr ote ct state -l awc la im s. S ee 47 U . S. C. § 23 0( e) (3 ) (“ N o c au se of

a ct ionm ay

be br ough t and n o li ab ili ty

m ay be im pose d un de r any

S ta te or loc al lawthat i s inc onsi ste nt w iththi s se ct ion . ”) ; bu t se e Pe rf ec t 10 , 340 F . S upp. a t 11 07–1 109 (holdin g that § 23 0(e)( 2) applies to California’ s wr ongful u se of re gistered m ark law , Ca l. Bu s. & Pr of

. Co de § 14 335, and C al if or nia ’ s r igh t of

pub lic ity law , Ca l. Ci v. Co de § 3 34 4) . Se co nd, A m az on arg ue s th at A lm ei da ’ s r igh t of

pub lic ity a ct ionis a tortbased suit, and Congress didnot int end to lim it the CDA ’ s im m unitywith re spect t o t o rt -b as eds u i t s . Amaz o n p o i n t s t o th e S i x th Ci rc u i t ’s d es cr i p t i o no f t h e C DA’s pu rp os e in Zeran ,

Co ngr es s r ec ogni ze d th e thr eat tha t t ort- ba se d law sui ts p ose to free do m of s pe ech in th e n ew an d b ur ge on in g In te rn etm ed iu m . T he im posi tio n of

tor t l ia bil ity on s er vic e pr ovi de rs f

or the co m m uni catio ns o f oth er s r ep re se nte d, f or Co ngr es s, sim

ply an ot he r fo rm

of i nt ru si ve go ve rn m en t re gu la ti on of s pe ech . Section 230 was enacted, in part, to m aintain the robus t nature of Internet c omm

unication and, ac cordingly , to keep go ve rn m en t i nt erfe ren ce i n t he m ed iu m to a m in im

um . Z er an , 129 F . 3d at 33 0; s ee E T W Co rp . , 332 F . 3d at 92 8 ( “ T he r igh t of pub lic ity is a cr eatur e of

state lawand i ts v iol at iongiv es r ise to a ca use of a ct ionf or the com m ercia l tort of unfair com petition .” ). 4providers, i.e ., dissemination of damag ing inf ormation via the interne t. See Z era n, 129 F.3d at 328 (involving ne g lige nce a ction ag ainst AOL alleg ing unr easona

ble delay in removing de fa mator y c onte nt) ; B e n E zra , 2 06 F .3 d at 98 3 ( inv olv ingde fa matio n a nd ne g lig e nc e c la ims ag ainst AOL ); Blumentha l v. Drudg e, 992 F . Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C. 1998) (involvingdefa mation c la im) ; se e a lso Gu c c i, 1 35 F . Su pp . 2 d at 41 7 ( statin gthat th e le g isl ativ e his tor y re fl e c ts o nly that se c tio n 2 30 (c ) “ immun ize s I SPs f ro m de fa matio n a nd oth e r, no n- int e lle c tua l pr op e rt y , s tate law cla ims arising f

rom third-par

ty content”) . 14 T hus, w hil e the re appe ar s to be no d isp ute that the r igh t of pub lic ity is a ty pe of int el le ct ua l pr ope rty

r igh t, A lm ei daarg ue s th at it is not c le ar f ro m the statute that “ any

lawpertaining to in tellectual property ” includes claim s based uponstate int el le ct

ua l pr ope rty

r igh ts. Mo re ove r, ne ith er party poi nts to any legislative his tory

indicating Congress’ intent as to the effect of § 230(e)(2). See Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 414 n.11 (stating that section 230's legislativ e history

“pr ov id es no clu es as t o t he m ean in g o f [s ect io n 2 30 (e)( 2) ]”). Whil e w e ag re e w ithA lm ei dathat the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d have a ddr es se d § 230(e)(2) befor e invoki ng the CDA ’ s grant of im m unity , w e believe that re gard le ss o f the answ er

to thi s qu es tio n, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t ne ed to ad dr es s the difficult issues of appli cation of the CDAunder the facts of this case. In Gu cc i , t h e c o u rtd es cr i b edth e i n i t i al § 2 3 0 (e )( 2 ) i s s u e a s , “ wh et h erPl ai n t i ff ’s com plaint would withstanda m otion to dism iss even in th e absence of § 230 .” Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 412; Ford Motor Co., 60 U. S. P. Q. 2D 1446 (stating th at a m oti on t o di sm iss af

ed er al tr ad em ar

k c la im a ga ins t a se rv ic e pr ovi de r “ m

ust15

tur n onw he the r Pl ai nti ff

s’ Co m pla int suc ce ssf ull y state s ac la im

f or vio la tio n of the tradem ark law s without regard to the CDA ”). In this case, we ask whether an int er ne t r et ai le r, suc h a s A m az on, c oul d be he ld l ia ble und er F lor ida ’ s r igh t of p ub l i ci ty s t at u t e f

o r d i s p l ayi n g a b o o k ’s co v eri m ag e i nfu rt h er an ce o f t h e b o o k ’s sa le . As we ex pl ai n b el ow, Al m ei da ’s rig ht of p ub li ci ty clai m ba se d o n F la . Sta t. § 540.08 would n ot withstand a m otion to dism iss un der the law . Ther efore, it wa s unne ce ssary

f or the dis tr ic t c ourt t o de te rm ine w he the r the CD Apr ee m pts Al m ei d a’s s t at e l aw ri g h to f p ub l i ci ty cl ai m , a n dwe d o n o tre ac h an y o f A l m ei d a’s ch al le ng es to th e d is tri ctco ur t’s ap pl ic at io n o f th e CDA h ere. 2. A pp lic at ion of

S ec ti on 540 . 08 Alm eida alleges that A m azon display ed her im age on its websites in order to p ro m ote A nj os P ro ibi dos, w ith out he r co nse nt o r j ust

c om pe nsatio n, in vio la tio n of F la . S ta t. § 54 0. 08. S ec tio n 54 0. 08 r ea ds i n pe rt ine nt p ar t: N o pe rs on s ha ll publ ish , pr int , dis play , or oth er w ise pub lic ly use f or pur pose s of tr ad e or f or any c om m er ci al or

a dve rt isi ng pur pose the nam e, portr ai t, pho tog ra ph, or oth er li ke ne ss o f any na tur al pe rs on w ith out

the e xpr es s wri tte n or

or al c onse nt t o su ch us e . . . . Fl a. S ta t. § 54 0. 08( 1) . T he statut e doe s no t a ppl y to: (a ) T he pub lic at ion , pr int ing , dis play , or use of the nam e or li ke ne ss of any pe rs on in an y ne wsp ap er, m ag azi ne , bo ok , news broadcast or t elecast, or o ther n ew s m edium or publication as part16 of any bon a fi de ne w s r ep ort or pr es en ta tio n havin g a curr en t and le git im at e publ ic int er es t and whe re suc h nam e or lik en es s is n ot use d f or a dve rt isi ng p ur

pose s; (b ) T he use of

suc h nam e, portr ai t, pho tog ra ph, or oth er li ke ne ss in conne ct ion w iththe r es al e or dis tr ibu tio n of

li te rary , m

usi ca l, or art ist ic pr oduc tio ns or oth er ar tic le s of m er ch an dis e or

pr ope rty wher e s u ch person has consent ed to use of her or his nam e, portr ai t, pho tog rap h, or

li ke ne ss o n or

in co nne ct ionw iththe ini tia l sa le or

dis tr ibu tio n th er eo f; or (c ) A ny phot ogr ap h of a per son sol el y as a m em be r of the pub lic an d whe re suc h pe rs on i s no t nam ed or oth er w ise ide nti fi ed

in or in c onne ct ionw iththe use of suc h ph oto gr ap h. Fl a. St at . § 5 40 .08 (3 ). Inthe pr es en t c as e, the dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed that A lm ei dac onse nte d to the use of her photog raph in the first edition of Anj os Proibido s. T hus, it held that se ct ion540 . 08( 3) (b ) bars the statut e’ s a ppl ic at ionto the sub se que nt u se of Alm eida’ s im age in the second editio n. A lm eida responds th at she only consented to the use of

he r im ag e fo r the f

ir st e dit ionof

A nj os P ro ibi dos. A s A lm ei dadid not c onse nt t o th e use of

he r im ag e in c onne ct ionw iththe sa le of the se co nd ed iti on, she arg ue s th at

se ct ion540 . 08( 3) (b ) doe s no t a ppl y . W e ag re e w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt tha t A lm ei daha s no r ec ove ry und er se ct ion540 . 08, a lth oughw e do no t re ach th e is su e o f whe th er s ect io n 5 40 .08 (3 )(b ) ap pl ie s t o t he fact s o f th is cas e. In ste ad , w e hol d th at

it is cl ear fr om

A lm ei da ’ s c om

pla int that A m az on d id n ot u se Alm eida’ s im age for tr ade, com m ercia l, or a dvertising purposes as tho se term s areUnder the statutory

rig ht of publicity , an individual may bringan ac tion to enjoin the 5 unauthorized use and to r ecove r dama g es for loss or injury

sustained bec ause of

the unauthorized publication, including a

rea sonable royalty

and punitive damag es. F la. Stat. § 540.08(2). 17 us edin th e st atut e. T he F lor ida

le gis la tur e en ac te d se ct ion540 . 08 i n or de r to e xpand the re m ed ie s ava ila

ble und er the c om m on l awr igh t a ga ins t m isa ppr opr ia tio n. C ourts

5 have int er pr et ed the statut e’ s c om

m er ci al pur

pose r equir em en t t o r equir e that a de fe ndant’ s un au tho ri ze d us e “ dir ec tly pr om ote ” a pr oduc t or

se rv ic e. S ee T yne v. T im e W ar

ne r E ntm ’ t C o. , L . P. , 901 S o. 2d 8 02, 808 ( Fl a. 200 5) ( statin g th at “ [t ] he pur pose of se ct ion540 . 08 i s to pr ev en t the use of ape rs on’ s nam e or

li ke ne ss t o dir ec tly pr om ote apr oduc t or

se rv ic e be ca

use of the w ay that the use a sso ci at es the pe rs on’ s nam e or

pe rs ona lity

w ithsom ethin g e lse ”) ; L of t v. F ull er , 408 S o. 2d 619, 622 –23 (F la . D ist . Ct . App. 198 1) ( expla ini ng tha t “ Se ct ion540 . 08, by pr ohi bit ing the use of

one ’ s nam e or

li ke ne ss f

or tr ad e, c om

m er ci al or

a dve rt isi ng pur pose s, is de sig ne d to pr ev en t the una uth or iz ed use of anam e to d ir ec tly pr om ote the pr oduc t or

se rv ic e of

the pub lis he r” ). Appl y ing thi s st an dard , c ourts have held that the use of an im age in a publication is not for a “ com m ercia l pu rp os e” u nd er s ect io n 5 40 .08 m erel y be cau se th e p ub li cat io n i s o ffer edforsal e. Va lentine v. C. B.S ., Inc. , 698 F. 2d 43 0, 433 (11th Cir. 1983); Loft, 408 So. 2d at 622.18

The instant section 540 .08 action is brough t against Am azon, an internet book se lle r that pr ovi de s se rv ic es sim ilar to a tr ad iti ona l bo okse lle r. A m az on pr ovi de s it s on lin e cu sto m er s w ithase ar ch ab le boo k data ba se w ithli nks to pr oduc t de ta il pa ge s f

or e ac h bo ok i n it s data

ba se . E ac h pr oduc t de ta il pa ge pr ovi de s th e book ’ s c ove r im ag e, the pub lis he r’ s de sc ri pti on o f the boo k, and i n m any instances editorial and custo m er c ontent. From the product detail page, cu sto m er s m ay

li nk t o an or de r pla ce m en t pa ge , w he re the y m ay c om ple te the ir purchase and specify

the shipp ing m ethod. In this m anner, Am azon’ s role as an int er ne t bo okse lle r cl ose ly

para lle ls tha t of

atr ad iti ona l bo okse lle r. B ec au se int er ne t c ust om er s are una

ble to br ow se thr oughshe lve s of boo ks and o bse rv e the actual book cover pho tos and pu blish er c ontent, Am azon replicates the booksto re experience by

providin g its custo m ers w ith on line cover im ages and publ isher bo okde sc rip ti on s. Alm eida argues that all content provided b y internet retailer s on product de ta il pa ge s is dis play ed

f or ac om m er ci al pur

pose a s th at

te rm is use d inse ct ion 540. 08. A lm ei dac ont en ds tha t i nte rn et r et ai le rs use pr oduc t de ta il pa ge c ont en t fo r the pur

pose of pr om oti ng: ( 1) the sa le s of part ic ular pr oduc ts, ( 2) the sa le s of unr el at ed pr oduc ts, and ( 3) the r et ai le r’ s br an d id en tity . F ina lly , a cc or din g to A lm ei da , a ll pr ior

c as es have he ld tha t i nte rn et r et ai le rs are li ab le und er se ct ion19

540. 08 f or the una uth or iz ed use of im ag es to pr om ote the ir

pr oduc ts. S ee G ri tz ke v. M. R. A . H old ing , L L C, 200 3 U . S. D ist . L E X IS 930 7, a t *4 ( N . D . F la . 200 3) (c onc lud ing that pl ai nti ff state d ac la im

und er se ct ion540 . 08 b y

a lle gin g th at

the pr oduc er /se lle r of aG ir ls G one W ild

vid eo ta pe m ad e the pla int if

f the f oc us o f the vid eo ta pe ’ s a dve rt ise m en ts, and p ro m ine ntl y dis play ed

the pla int if

f on the videotape’s pac kage, in advertisem ents, and on the defendant’ s web site); B osley v. W ildw et T . co m , 310 F . S upp. 2d 9 14, 923 ( N . D . O hio 200 4) ( gr an tin g in j unc tiv e re lie f ag ai nst

pr oduc er s/s el le rs of

aw et t- shi rt c ont es t vi de ota

pe ba se d up on the factual f indin g that defendant prom inentlydisplay ed the plaintiff’ s nam e, im age, an d li ke ne ss o n th e co ve r of the de fe ndants ’ vid eo , and tha t su cha dve rt ise m en ts we re not m erely

“ incidental to th e prom otion ” of these products). W e disagree with A lm eida’ s broad interpretation of section 54 0.08's liability for internet retailer s, and w e disting uish th e case s she cites in sup port of the propos ition that al l c ont en t onpr oduc t de ta il pa ge s is pr ovi de d f or ac om m er ci al pur

pose w ith in the m eanin g of

se ct ion540 . 08. First, the defendants in Gritzke and Bosley m ade the editorial choice to includ e the plaintiffs’ im ages in the videot ape, and to m ake the plaintiffs the focus of their advertisem ents, by prom inentlydisplay ing th e plaintiffs on th e v id eo tape pa ck ag e, in ad ve rti se m en ts , andon de fen da nt s’ webs it es .20

Se co nd, in ea chc as e, the pla int if fs a lle ge d th at

de fe ndants ’ m ar

ke tin g ef fo rt s w er e ai m ed

a t e m pha siz ing the r ole of

pla int if fs . P ar tic ularl y , in B o s l e y, t h e p l a i n t i f

f wa s al o c a l n e w s an c h o rw o man an dr e g i o n a l c e l e b r i ty, w hic h f ac t the vid eo pr oduc er s a lle ge dly e xpl oit ed

by m ar ke tin g th e vid eo ta pe w ithan e m

pha sis on the appe ar an ce of the “ nake d anc hor wom an .” Bo sl ey , 31 0 F . Sup p. 2 d a t 9 17 . Inc ontra st, A m az on d oe s no t m ak e ed ito ri al c hoi ce s a s to the boo k co ve r im ag es it

dis play s onit s w eb sit e. T ha t c hoi ce w as m ad e by the publ isher Ophelia E ditio ns. Moreover, Alm eida does not allege that A m az on’ s di spl ay

of he r im ag e em

pha siz ed he r ro le in Ca

br al ’ s ph oto ex hib it, or

that i t c anbe dis tin gui she d f ro m A m az on’ s c ust om ar

y dis play of bo okco ve r im ag es . Rathe r, w e fi nd tha t, a s am atte r of bus ine ss p ra ct ic e, A m az on’ s us e of boo k c ove r im ag es c los el y sim ulate s ac ust om er ’ s e xpe ri en ce br ow sin g book c ove rs in a tr ad iti ona l bo ok s tor e. T hus, it is cl ear that A m az on’ s us e of boo k c ove r im ag es is not an e ndor se m en t or

pr om oti on o f any

pr oduc t or se rv ic e, but

is m er el y inc ide nta l t o, and c ust om ar y f or , the bus ine ss o f int er ne t bo ok s al es . S ee V inc i v. A m . Can C o. , 591 N . E . 2d 7 93, 794 ( O hio Ct. App. 1990 ) (holding th at the m ention o f O lym pic athletes’ nam es wa s21

inc ide nta l t o th e pr om oti on o f D ixi e Cu ps, and thus not

avio la tio n of O hio ’ s c om

m on l awr igh t of

appr opr ia tio n, be ca

use the use w as pur el y inf orm at ion al and the re w as no i m pli catio n th at

the a thl et es use d, sup porte d, orpro m ot edth e p ro du ct ); R es ta te m en t (S eco nd ) of Tort s § 65 2C cmt. d (1 977) ( statin g th at

the m er e inc ide nta l us e of ape rs on’ s nam e or

li ke ne ss i s no t ac ti on ab le un de r th e ri gh t o f pu bl ic it y ). U nde r the a lle ga tio ns o f A lm ei da ’ s c om pla int , w e dis ce rnno s et

of fa ct s by w hic h an in te rn et

r et ai le r suc h a s A m az on, w hic h f unc tio ns a s th e int er ne t e qui va le nt t o atr ad iti ona l bo okse lle r, w oul d be li ab le f or dis play ing co nte nt tha t i s in ci de nta l t o bo ok s al es , suc h a s pr ovi din g c ust om er s w ith ac ce s s t o a b o o k ’s co v eri m ag e a n da p ub l i s h er ’s d es cr i p t i o no f t h e b o o k ’s content. A ccordingly , w e af firm the district court’ s grant of summ ary j udgm en t a s to A m az on’ s r igh t of pub lic ity c la im , but

w e do s o onthe gr ound that A m az on d id n ot u se A lm ei da ’ s im ag e fo r the pur pose of dir ec tly pr om ot in g apro du ctor s erv ic e in vi ol at io n o f se ct io n 5 40 .08 . B. Civil The ft 1. Fe lonious Intent T o m ai nta in a

c au se of a ct ionund er

the c ivi l the ft

statut e, A lm ei dam

ust s h o w b y “ cl ea r a n dco n v i n ci n g ev i d en ce ” a ni n ju ry ca u s edb y th e d ef

en d an t ’s22

violatio n of one or m ore of the provisions of the crim inal theft laws f oundin Fla. St at . §§ 8 12. 012- 037 (W es t 20 06) . F la . S ta t. § 77 2. 11; se e Pa lm er v. G ott a H av e It G olf Collectibles, Inc. , 106 F. Supp. 2d 1289 , 1303 (S. D. Fla. 2000 ) (stating that

“ a cause of action for civil theft ‘ derives from two statutory

sources: the crim inal se ct ionse tti ng f

orth the e le m en ts o f the ft , and the c ivi l se ct iongr an tin g pr ivate part ie s ac au se of

a ct ionf or avio la tio n of

the c ri m ina l se ct ion ’ ”) ( quot ing A m es v. Pro vi de nt Life & Acci de nt Ins . Co., 9 42 F. Sup p. 5 51 , 56 0 (S .D. Fla. 1 99 4) ). A lm ei dac la im s th at

she c anpr ove by

c le ar and c onvi nc ing e vid en ce that A m az on vio la te d se ct ion812 . 014( 1) , w hic h pr ovi de s:

(1 ) Ape rs on c om

m its the ft if he or she kno w ing ly

obt ai ns o r uses, or endeavors to obtain or to us e, the property of another w i th i n t e n tt o , e i th e r

t e mp o r ar i l y o r

p e rman e n t l y: (a ) D ep ri ve the oth er

pe rs on o f a ri ght

to the pr ope rty

or ab e n e f i tf r o m th e p r o p e rty. (b ) Appr opr ia te the pr ope rty to his or he r ow n us e or

to the use of any pe rs on n ot e nti tle d to the use of the pr op ert y . Fl a. St at . § 8 12 .01 4( 1) . Inor de r to e sta

bli sh a vio la tio n of

se ct ion812 . 014( 1) , A lm ei dam ust sho w th atAm azo n “ kn owi ng ly obt ai ne d o r us ed , or e nd eav or edto ob ta in or t o u se ,” A lm ei da ’ s pr ope rty

w iththe “ fe lon iou s in te nt” to “ ap pr opr ia te the pr ope rty to [A m az on’ s] ow n us e or

to the use of

any pe rs on n ot e nti tle d to the use of the23

pr ope rty . ” P al m er , 106 F . S upp. 2d at 13 03; se e A m es , 942 F . S upp. a t 56 0 (h old ing that the pla int if

f m ust sho w“ fe lon iou s in te nt” to co m m it the ft in or de r to es ta bli sh a vio la tio n of

se ct ion812 . 014( 1) ). T ha t i s, “ [t ] he ft is a spe ci fi c int en t cr im e, r equir ing a ct

ua l kn ow le dge on the part of the de fe ndant. ” H ea ly

v. S un Trus t Se rv . Cor

p., 5 69 So . 2d45 8, 4 60 (Fl a. Dis t. Ct . App . 19 90 ). Inthe ins tant c as e, the dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d sum m ar y j udgm en t f

or A m az on on A lm ei da ’ s c la im , f

ind ing no c le ar

and c onvi nc ing e vid en ce to supp ort the ne ce ssary f el oni ous int en t onthe part of A m az on. A lm ei daarg ue s th at she ha s a pr ope rty int er es t i n th e phot ogr ap hic im ag e on the c ove r of A nj os P ro ibi dos, and that A m az on i nte nti ona lly m isa ppr opr ia te d th at

im ag e. A lm ei dac ont en ds tha t the district court sho uld have allowed Alm eida an opportun ity for additional disco very prior to granting Am azon’ s m otion for sum m ary j udgm ent on the grou nd that Am azo n d idno t ac t wi th fel on io us in te nt . W e co nc lud e that A lm ei daha s f ai le d to pr es en t any

e vid en ce that A m az on m isappropriated any

of her property

with fe lonio us intent . Ther e is no evidence that Am azon used Alm eida’ s im age w ith actual knowledge that its u se wa s unauth or iz ed . Mo re ove r, w e dis ag re e w ithA lm ei dathat the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by not pr ovi din g A lm ei daw ithan op portun ity f or a ddi tio na l di sc ove ry

on the iss ue ofIn the instant case , the district court provide d Almeida with a f ull opportunity

for 6 dis c ov e ry a s to Am a zon ’s int e nt. Whe n A ma zonfi le d it s mo tio n f or summa ry jud g me nt, Almeida could have moved the c ourt for a continuance in order to c onduct additional discover y pursuant to Rule 56(f) . See Ha ll v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1259 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004) (notingthat a par

ty may reque st discovery

by specific ally

demonstrating“how postponement of a r

uling on the motion will enable him, by discovery

. . . to rebut the movant’s showingof the a

bsence of a g enuine issue of fac t”). Instead, Almeida cross-move d the district c ourt fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, ind ic atin ghe r p os iti on that th e re c or d w a s su ff

ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh her c laims. Moreover , we note that the district court has wide discretion in dec iding whe ther a party is entitled to an opportunity for discove ry , see H arbe rt Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 12 80 (1 1th

Cir . 1 99 8) , a

nd in t his c a se we se e no ind ic atio n th at a dd iti on a l di sc ov e ry wo uld enable Almeida to establish Amazon’s intent to misappropriate he r imag e. 24 A m az on’ s in te nt. 6 A cc or din gly , w e af

fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n de ny ing A lm ei da ’ s c ivi l th eftcla im

on su m m ary jud gm en t. 2. At torney’s F ees N ex t, the c ourt r ev ie w s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s aw ar d of a tto rn ey ’ s f

ee s to Am azon on the civil th eft cla im . Section 772.11 of the civil theft statute prov ides that “ [t] he defendant is entitled to recover rea sonable attorney ’ s fees and court co sts . . . upo n af

ind ing that the c la im an t r ai se d ac la im that w as w ith out subs tantial fact or le gal supp ort.” Fla. Stat. § 772.11; see Ciaram ello v. D ’ Am bra, 6 1 3 So . 2 d1 3 2 4 , 1 3 2 5 (F l a. Di s t . C t . Ap p . 1 9 9 1 ) ( i n t er p re t i n g th e l eg i s l at u re ’s intent in wording section 772 .11 “ to discou rage c ivil theft claim s lacking either legal or fac tual subs tance by setting a less string ent standard for a f ee aw ard than [a ] ba d f ai th s tandard ”) . A lm ei daarg ue s th at he r ci vil the ft

c la im doe s no t l ac k a25

subs tanti al ba sis in fa ct , and tha t the c ourt e rr ed by e nte ri ng a

f ee aw ar d ba se d on in c am er a re vie wand w ith out any r ea soni ng t o j ust if

y the a m ount . W e conclude that the district court didnot comm it clear error in finding that Alm eida’ s civil theft claim lacked substanti al fac tual or legal suppo rt. The record la ck s any e vid en ce sho w ing A m az on’ s f el oni ous int en t t o m isa

ppr opr ia te A lm ei da ’ s pr ope rty . Mo re ove r, w e not e that e ve n th oughthe tr ia l c ourt di d no t clear ly articulate its m ethod for calculating attorney ’ s fees, the district court conducted an in cam era reviewof A m azon’ s un-redacted billing st atem ents, which re sul te d inam ode st aw ar d of $3, 500 in atto rn ey ’ s f

ee s. S ee A CL Uv. Barn es , 168 F. 3d 42 3, 428 (11th Cir. 1999) (im ply ing th at where no specific obj ections are m ade, the court m ay

rely on affidavits and its own kno wledge to determ ine a re as ona ble aw ar d of

a tto rn ey ’ s f

ee s) . W ithno e vid en ce ind ic at ing that this calculation is un reasonable, we will not rem and the case m erely for the district co ur t t o a rti cu la te it s b as is forth is award . CON CLU SION Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , w e A FF IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of A m az on and aw ar d of

a tto rn ey ’ s f

ee s.