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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v. QUINTEZ TALLEY Appellant : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1980 EDA 2019 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 10 , 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

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- CR

- 000 3711

- 20 09 BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE , J., and COLINS, J. CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 2020 The Majority, like the PCRA court correctly notes that the general rule, affirmed recently by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Williams , 196 A.3d 1021, 1029

- 30 (Pa. 2018) , is that a criminal defendant who elects to represent himself cannot seek collateral relief upon a claim that his standby counsel rendered ineffective assistance

. However, our Supreme Court has rejected the notion that all claims regarding counsel’s performance are waived when the previously

- waived right to counsel is subsequently reasserted. See Commonwealth v. Bryant , 855 A.2d 726, 737 (Pa. 2004) (deeming claims of ineffective waived as to the part of the trial when the defendant was representing himself, but reviewing the merits of claims related to counsel’s performance after the defendant requested that standby counsel take over)

. While Bryan t involved an express abandonment of the right to self

representation mid

- trial, the Court cited with approval cases from otherJ

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jurisdictions that indicate that such waiver may be implicit. Id . (“[ S ] ee . . . Williams v. Bartlett , 44 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir.19 94) (‘Once asserted

. . . the right to self

- representation may be waived through conduct indicating that one is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned one ’ s request altogether.’) Raulerson v. Wainwright , 732 F.2d 803, 809 (11th Cir. [1984] ) (defendant

w aived self

- representation right by proceeding with assigned counsel)[.]”). From my review of th e certified record, it is clear that Appellant abandoned his request to proceed pro se . The transcripts themselves indicate that two attorneys appeared each day of the trial as counsel for Appellant, not as standby counsel. See N.T. Trial, 6/6/12, at 1 (listing under “appearances” John Konchak, Esquire, and Robert Listenbee, Esquire, as coun sel for Appellant); N.T. Trial, 6/ 7 /12, at 1 (same) ; N.T. Trial, 6/8/12, at 1 (same). More import ant ly, a t the outset of trial, counsel advised the court that Attorney Koncha k would open and examine most of the witnesses, and Attorney Listenbee might question some witnesses , but Appellant himself would not be questioning any witnesses. See N.T. Trial, 6/6/12, at 5

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. Appellant did not make a single objection or argument , or question any witness es . His participation at trial was limited to tha t typically seen when a defendant has counsel: he entered his plea and answered when his counsel colloquied him about testifying in his own defense. See N.T. Trial, 6/6/12, at 6

- 7; N.T. Trial, 6/8/12, at 53

- 54. Accordingly , I cannot agree with theJ

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Majori ty’s decision to deem Appellant’s claims waived due to his initial assertion of his right to self

- representation. Nonetheless, I agree that Appellant is entitled to no relief from this Court. As noted by both the PCRA court and the Commonwealth, Appellant’s claim lacks merit because Appellant had several mental health evaluations and offered no evidence that a mental health defense at trial had arguable merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 12/16/19, at 4; Commonwealth’s brief at 6

- 7. I would affirm th e PCRA court’s order on that basis. See , e.g. , Commonwealth v. Thompson , 199 A.3d 889, 892 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2018) (“ We may affirm the PCRA cour t’ s decision on any basis.” (cleaned up)). Therefore , I respectfully concur.