AUG 1 1 2022 

i A. apowri 

PREME COURT 

CLERK 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

No. 83545 

FILED 

TYRONE KEITH ARMSTRONG, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

AS TRUSTEE FOR STRUCTURED 

ASSEST SECURITIES CORPORATION 

MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH 

CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-BC3; 

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC; PHH 

MORTGAGE CORPORATION; AND 

WESTERN PROGRESSIVE-NEVADA, 

INC., 

Res • ondents. 

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, 

REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING 

This is a pro se appeal from a district court order granting 

summary judgment in a quiet title action. Eighth Judicial District Court, 

Clark County; Mary Kay Holthus, Judge.1

Appellant filed the underlying action asserting claims for quiet 

title, wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, and declaratory relief. The 

district court granted summary judgment for respondents on all of 

appellants' claims on the ground that they were time-barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations. Appellant does not challenge on appeal 

the summary judgment as to the claims for wrongful foreclosure, slander of 

title, and declaratory relief. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 

summary judgment insofar as it pertains to those claims. See Powell v. 

Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(3), we have determined that oral argument 

is not warranted. 

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(2011) (recognizing that this court does not address issues that are not 

raised in an opening brief). 

With respect to appellant's quiet title claim, the district court 

concluded that it was time-barred by NRS 11.080's five-year limitations 

period. In doing so, it reasoned that the five-year period was triggered in 

2010 when respondents and their predecessors recorded a Notice of Default 

against appellant's property in relation to a deed of trust that purportedly 

secured a loan for the property. 

We agree with appellant that the district court erred in 

determining that the 2010 Notice of Default triggered the five-year 

limitations period. See Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 

1026, 1029 (2005) (reviewing de novo a district court's decision to grant 

summary judgment). We held in Berberich v. Bank of America, N.A., 136 

Nev. 93, 97, 460 P.3d 440, 443 (2020), that "the limitations period [under 

NRS 11.080] is triggered when the plaintiff is ejected from the property or 

has had the validity or legality of his or her ownership or possession called 

into question." In doing so, we observed that "a notice of default issued on 

a deed of trust has been found insufficient to dispute an owner's possession 

because it does not call into question the validity of the owner's control of 

the property ... by asserting someone else was entitled to possess the 

property." Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

Here, the district court appears to have reasoned that, despite 

Berberich, the 2010 Notice of Default called into question appellant's 

ownership of the property because appellant disputed the validity of the 

loan secured by the deed of trust. However, appellant remains the 

undisputed owner and possessor of the property; the dispute between 

appellant and respondents is simply whether the property is encumbered 

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by a deed of trust. Thus, we conclude that under Berberich, the 2010 Notice 

of Default did not trigger NRS 11.080's five-year limitations period.2

Moreover, respondents and their predecessors recorded a Notice of 

Rescission in 2012 that rescinded the 2010 Notice of Default, and we 

recently reaffirmed that a Notice of Rescission effectively resets the statute 

of limitations that is triggered by recording a Notice of Default. See SFR 

Inus. Pool I, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 22, 507 P.3d 194, 

198 (2022) (recognizing, albeit not in the context of NRS 11.080, that a 

Notice of Rescission resets the statute of limitations); Holt v. Reg'l Tr. Servs. 

Corp., 127 Nev. 886, 892, 266 P.3d 602, 606 (2011) ("A notice of rescission 

renders moot disputes concerning the notice of default . . . ."). Thus, even 

under respondents' and the district court's interpretation of Berberich, any 

potential triggering effect that the 2010 Notice of Default had would have 

been negated by the 2012 Notice of Rescission. While the record in this case 

contains additional evidence that may support different triggering dates, 

we address only the issues as they have been framed by the parties.3 See 

2Respondents contend that under U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Thunder 

Properties, Inc., 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 3, 503 P.3d 299, 306 (2022), the 

limitations period was triggered when appellant took affirmative action to 

repudiate the lien. However, Thunder Properties did not address the 

triggering date for a property owner's quiet title action, and it is inapposite 

to appellant's quiet title claim here. 

3To the extent that the district court relied on an isolated allegation 

in appellant's pro se complaint to support its conclusion that the 2010 Notice 

of Default triggered the limitations period, we decline to affirm on this basis, 

particularly when that allegation is inconsistent with Berberich and the 

facts of this case, as well as when it does not appear that appellant was 

seeking to gain an undue advantage by including that allegation in his 

complaint. Cf. Hansen v. Universal Health Servs. of Nev., Inc., 112 Nev. 

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Senjab v. Alhulaibi, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 64, 497 P.3d 618, 619 (2021) ("We 

will not supply an argument on a party's behalf but review only the issues 

the parties present."). Consistent with the foregoing, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN 

PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the 

district court for proceedings consistent with this order.4

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101 1947A 0014, 

Parraguirre 

1/4-5,:, 161Ai/D Sr.J. 

Silver Gibbo s 

cc: Hon. Mary Kay Holthus, District Judge 

Tyrone Keith Armstrong 

Houser LLP 

Fox Rothschild, LLP/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

1245, 1247-48, 924 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1996) (noting this court's preference 

that cases be decided on the merits). 

4The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

4