******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
ROGER EMERICK v. DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC HEALTH

(AC 35643)

DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Keller, Js.

Argued February 6—officially released May 13, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Schuman, J.)

Roger Emerick, self-represented, the appellant

(plaintiff).

Kerry Anne Colson, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The self-represented plaintiff, Roger

Emerick, appeals from the judgment of the trial court

dismissing his action seeking declaratory and injunctive

relief. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court

improperly concluded that he lacked standing and that

the case was moot. Relying on our recent decision in

Emerick v. Commissioner of Public Health, 147 Conn.

App. 292, 81 A.3d 1217 (2013), cert. denied, 311 Conn.

936, A.3d (2014), we conclude that the trial

court properly determined that the plaintiff lacked

standing and, therefore, properly dismissed the action.

On October 23, 2012, the plaintiff commenced the

present action pursuant to General Statutes § 4-175. In

the operative complaint, dated December 5, 2012, the

plaintiff alleged that the purpose of his declaratory judgment was the proper interpretation of the ‘‘Connecticut

Public Swimming Pool Regulations’’(regulations).1 Specifically, he claimed that the defendant, the Department

of Public Health (department), improperly had interpreted the regulations to preclude the town of Glastonbury

(town) from replacing or having a diving board at the

Glastonbury Grange Pool. In addition to the declaratory

judgment to determine the proper interpretation of the

regulations, the plaintiff also sought injunctive relief.

On January 10, 2013, the department moved to dismiss the action on the grounds of lack of standing and

mootness. On March 18, 2013, the court granted the

motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court concluded

that the plaintiff had failed to establish either classical

or statutory aggrievement and, therefore, lacked standing. It also determined that the case was moot. This

appeal followed.

On December 24, 2013, this court released its opinion

in Emerick v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra,

147 Conn. App. 292. In that case, the plaintiff had

appealed from the summary judgmentrendered in favor

of the town. Id., 293. The plaintiff had filed an action

against the town, the department and the Connecticut

Interlocal Risk Management Agency. Id., n.1. The plaintiff had alleged that ‘‘the town, pursuant to the instigation of the [department], wrongfully had removed a

diving board from a town swimming pool and replaced

it with a kiddie slide. He pleaded counts alleging negligence, recklessness and fraud, but did not seek monetary damages; rather, he sought a declaratory judgment

regarding the proper interpretation and application of

the [regulations].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 294. The trial court rendered summary judgment in

favor of the town on the basis of governmental immunity. Id., 293.

On appeal, this court determined that the plaintiff

had failed to demonstrate either classical or statutory

aggrievement. Id., 296. This court noted that ‘‘a com-
plaint brought pursuant to § 4-175 must set forth facts

to support an inference that a provision of the general

statutes, a regulation or a final decision, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or

privileges of the plaintiff.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 296–97. This court then concluded: ‘‘[T]he

plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish, if

proved, that he is statutorily aggrieved. . . . [T]he

plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish, if

proved, a specific, personal and legal interest in the

subject matter of the complaint that would satisfy the

requirements for classical aggrievement. Specifically,

the plaintiff has failed to allege facts that demonstrate

that he has an interest either in the now removed diving

board or in the interpretation of the regulations concerning diving boards that is distinguishable from the

interest of the general public. As our Supreme Court

explained . . . a party who [is] simply a member of

the general public who has not demonstrated how [he]

was harmed in a unique fashion by the conduct [he]

ha[s] challenged in a declaratory judgment action ha[s]

failed to establish a colorable claim of direct injury,

and accordingly lack[s] standing to maintain the action.

. . . [T]he plaintiff has not alleged his specific, personal

and legal interest necessary to invoke the jurisdiction

of the court in an action for a declaratory judgment.

Accordingly, he does not have standing to pursue this

action, and we conclude, therefore, that it must be dismissed.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 298.

In the present case, the plaintiff alleged that he was

injured by the improper interpretation and application

of the regulations that resulted in the ‘‘unnecessary’’

removal of the diving board at the Glastonbury Grange

Pool. As a remedy, the plaintiff sought declaratory and

injunctive relief. The plaintiff’s complaint, however,

failed to allege facts, if proved, sufficient to establish

statutory or classical aggrievement. See Emerick v.

Commissioner of Public Health, supra, 147 Conn. App.

298. Specifically, after a carefulreview of the complaint,

we see no allegation of the plaintiff’s specific, personal

and legal interest necessary to invoke the jurisdiction

of the trial court in an action for a declaratory judgment.

See id. The plaintiff did not demonstrate how he has

an interest, distinguishable from that of the general

public, in the interpretation of the regulations or the

removal of the diving board. This constitutes a failure

to establish a colorable claim of a direct injury,resulting

in a lack of standing to maintain this action. We conclude, therefore, that the court properly granted the

department’s motion to dismiss on the basis of lack

of standing.2

The judgment is affirmed.

1 This reference appears to apply to both § 19-13-B33b of the Regulations

of Connecticut State Agencies and the Swimming Pool Design Guide avail-
able from the Connecticut Department of Public Health.

2 As a result of this conclusion, we do not reach the issue of whether the

case also is moot. See Emerick v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra,

147 Conn. App. 299 n.4.