### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Marc h 1, 200 5 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . NORRIS RAY

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty Nos. 02-02917, 02-02918, 02- 04286 Joseph B. Dail ey, Judge

No. W2004-01247-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Jun e 27, 2005

Following a jury

trial, Def en dant, Norris Ray , was c onvicted of one count of unlaw ful possession of a handg un; one count of f irst deg ree felony

murder; and o n e co u n t of espe cially ag g ravated kidnapping . Def

endant wa s sentence d to life with the possibili ty of paro l e o n the fe lony

murder conviction. The tria l court sentenc ed De fendant as a Rang e I I , multipl e off ender , to forty

y ear s for the espe cially

ag g ravated kidnapping conviction and as a Rang e I I , multipl e offender , to four y ear s for t h e felonypossession of a ha ndg un conviction. The tria l court orde red D efe ndant’s sente nces to b e se rved con sec uti ve ly fo r an e ff

e c tiv e se nte nc e of

lif e plu s f orty -f ou r y e ars . O n a

pp e a l, Def endant a rg ues (1) that the evidenc e is insufficient to identify him as the perpe trat o r of the of fe ns e s; ( 2) that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y no t a llo wi ng the imp e a c hme nt o f the te sti mon y of the vic tim of e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d kidn app ing wi th e vid e nc e of the vic tim ’s mis de me a no r dru g c on vic tio ns ; and (3) that the trial court erre d in determining the leng th of Def endant’ s sentence s and in imposing
consec utive sentenc ing. A fter a thoroug h revie w of the r ecor d, we affirm the judgme nts of the trial
c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Trial Court Affi rm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J., de liv e re d the op ini on of the c ou rt , in wh ic h J.C. M C L IN , J ., joined. J ames Curwood Witt , J r., J., concurring in result only

. Marty B. Mc Afe e, Memphis, Tenne ssee ( on appea l); Robert Wil son J ones, District Public Defe nder;
a ndWilli a m John so n, As sis ta nt Pub lic De fe nd e r, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e (at tria l) , for the app e lla nt, N o rr i s R a y.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Da vid H. F ind le y , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Willi a m L . G ibb on s, Di stric t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Ro be rt

Cart e r, As sis ta nt D ist

ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; and Paul Hag erma n, Assistant Distri ct Att orney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION

I. Bac kgr ound

Kevin Wiseman and his brother , J esse W indom, owned a car lot in Memphis. Mr. Wi ndom called his brothe r ar ound 6:00 p.m. on August 7, 2001, a fter the business was close d, and aske d Mr. W i s eman to mee t him at the car lot so he could g et a se t of ca r key s from Mr. Wiseman. Mr. Wis eman testified that Mr. Windom was driving a 2001 black L exus. Mr. Wiseman arrived at the
car lot and parke d on the stree t. Mr. Windom backe d the L exus i nto the car lot’s fenc ed par

king
are a. A white Dodg e Stratus with three Afric an-A merican males in it pulled up to the c ar lot. One of the men g ot out of the ca r and be g an talking to Mr. Windom . The man w aved his hand for the second ma n to ge t out of the ca r. The se cond man a

pproac hed Mr. W iseman wit h a handg un. The third man re m ai n ed i n the Dodg e. He stuck a shotg un out of the ca r’s window a nd told Mr. Wis eman he would shoot him if Mr. Wis eman attempted to f lee. The first man pulled up his shirt to s ho w M r. Wind om that he wa s a rm ed. Mr. Wise ma n late r i de nti fi e d D e fe nd a nt f ro m a ph oto li neu p as th e fi rst man who app roac hed Mr. W in do m, and Defen dan t’ s co -de fe nd ant, Na ko mis Jone s, as the man w ho approa ched Mr . Wis eman.

T h e m e n d e m a n d e d t h e k e ys t o t h e b u s i n e s s o f f i c e

. M r

. W i s e m a n t o l d D e f e n d a n tt h e k e ys wer e in his car , but Defe ndant g ot into the L exus instead and started the eng ine. Mr. Jones pushed Mr. Wiseman toward the L exus, and tol d him to g et i nto the t runk. Mr. Wiseman g ot into the trunk, and the c ar s t ar t ed moving. Mr. Wiseman he ard one of the men a sk his brother whe re the money wa s, a ndhis br oth e r r e sp on de d that the po lic e ha d take n a ll the mon e y

. Th e man ke pt re pe a tin g his demand, a nd Mr. Windom kept say ing that he did not have any money . After

driving for f

ive to ten minutes, Mr. Wi seman he ard a g unshot, and his brother sa id “oh.”

Mr. Wis eman then hea

rd one of the men say

that he saw the police. The L exus sped up and made numer ous turns. The ca r stopped, and Mr . Wis eman he ard the car ’s doors open and close. He waited a bout ten or fifte en minutes and then beg an pounding on t he roof of the trunk. Mr. Wiseman didno t kn ow that th e L e xus ha d a n e me rg e nc y re le a se bu tto n in sid e the trun k, bu t he a c c ide ntl y hit the button with his arm. The trunk popped open, and Mr. Wiseman g ot out of the trunk. No one w as aro un d, a ndMr . Wis e ma n d id n ot s e e the Do dg e Str a tus

.
M r

. Wi s e man s a id th a t th e c ar h a d s to p p e d a t th e So u th w o o d A p ar tm e n ts w h ic h w e r e n e xt door to the F lairwood Ap artments. He called Mr . Windom on his cell phone but did not g et an
answe r. Mr. Wiseman caug ht a ride w ith a friend ba ck to his business. Be fore they rea ched the car lot, howeve r, Mr. Wis eman saw another friend at the intersec tion of Wi ncheste r and Tsc hulahoma. The friend told Mr. Wis eman that Mr. Windom had bee n shot and was in an ambulance at the Mapco g as station at the interse ction. Mr. Wiseman said that his ordeal laste d about one hour

.-3-

On cr oss-examination, Mr. W iseman said that he was in the ca r’s trunk be tween f

ifteen a nd thirty minutes. Mr. Wis eman said that Def endant was at the driver’ s side door when Mr. J ones put him in the trun k so he a ssu me d De fe nd a nt w a s d ri vin g the L e xus. Mr . Wis e ma n s a id that th e on ly
vo ic e he c ou ld i de nti fy

wh ile he wa s in the trun k w a s h is b ro the r’ s.
Gary Clax ton, a Memphis police off icer , was off

-duty on Aug ust 7, 2001. He wa s driving west on Winchester in a

Nissan Maxim a when a black L exus and a white Dodg e Stratus enter ed the road f rom an a partment c omplex and nea rly struck his ca

r. Off icer Clax ton said that the Dodg e wa s following the L exus, and both car s wer e being driven err atically

. All three c ars e ntere d the left turn lane at the intersec tion of Winchester and Tschulahoma. The L exus was first in line, followed by the Maxim a and the n the Dodg e. A man jumped out of the re ar pa sseng er seat of the L exus and ran toward a Mapco g as station. Offic er Claxton said the man looked “pa nicked.”

The L exus m ade a u -t u rn and drove into the ga s station. The light turne d g ree n, and the Dodg e nea

rly hit Of fice r Clax ton’s car

ag ain. Off

icer Clax ton let the Dodg e pass him and r ecor ded the c ar’ s li c e ns e plate nu mbe r. He c a lle d the dis patc he r to re po rt the inc ide nt. Of fi c e r C la xton s a id that he attempted to follow the Dodge and L exus, but he did not see the c ars a g ain af ter they drove
away from the Ma

pco. When he returne d to the g as station, O ffice r Clax ton said that the man who had jumped out of t he L exus was ly ing on the ground. I t was later determined that the Dodg e Stratus
wa s r e g ist e re d to Cha nd ra Jone s.
Chand ra Jone s c on fi rm e d th a t sh e ow ne d th e Do dg e . Sh e sa id that sh e loane d th e car to De fe nd a nt o n A ug us t 7, 20 01 , be tw e e n 4:3 0 p. m. a nd5:0 0 p .m. Ab ou t 6: 45 p. m., sh e c a lle d h e r c e ll phone which w as in the Dodge , and a man named “ Geno” answe red. D efe ndant later testified that “Ge no’s” na me was Eug ene Picke ns. Mr. P i ck en s told Ms. J ones that De fendant was in the bathr oo m.

Ms. J ones said that De fendant r et u rn ed t o h er apartment a fter she was a sleep. The police called some time after

midnight and a sked Ms. J ones to ste p out of her a partment. Ms. Jones went
ou tsi de , a nd the po lic e too k h e r t o a te le ph on e bo othso that sh e c ou ld c a ll D e fe nd a nt anda sk him to come out of the a

partment. Ms. Jones said that she did not see Def endant a rre s t ed b ec au s e the police would not take he r bac k home.

Ki m H ug he s st a te d th a t sh e liv e s at th e F la ir wo odAp art me nts . O n the e ve nin g of Au g us t 7, 2001, her daug hter and four other littl e g irls w ere play ing outside he r apa rtment. A man, whom Ms. Hu g he s late r ide nti fi e d as Nako mis Jone s, app ro a c he d h e r a pa rt me nt a ro un d 6 :30 or

6:4 5 p .m. and aske d the little girls if he could use the te lephone. Ms. Hug hes came to the front door , and Mr. J ones told her that he had car trouble. Ms. Hug hes t old Mr. J ones to come to the ba ck door, and she handed him her cordle ss te lephone throug h the door. Ms. H ug hes said that Mr. J ones kept dialing a couple of numbers a nd then hang ing up. Asecond ma n, whom Ms. Hug hes l at er i d en t i fi ed as De fe nd a nt, wa lke d u p f

ro m be hin d th e apa

rt me nt b uil din g . M r. J on es a sk e d h im f or “ br oth e r’ s” telephone numbe r. Mr. Jones stil l did not dial the telephone cor rec tly , and De fendant took the telephone f

rom him and place d the ca ll. Someone answered, and Def endant sa id, “Geno, c ome and-4-

g et us.” De fendant asked Ms. Hug hes for the name of t he apartment complex

. Def endant r eturne d the te le ph on e to M s. Hu g he s, a ndthe tw o me n le ft

.
Mr. J ones, howev er , returne d to her a partment less than a

minute later, a nd Ms. Hug hes called 911. The police did not respond to he r 911 call. Ms. H ug hes saw a report of the shooting on the eve ning ne ws and c alled Crime Stoppers.

Of fi c e r P r e n ti s s Jo lly

wi th the Me mph is Po lic e De pa rt me nt r e sp on de d to the dis patc he r’ s c a ll about shots fi re d at t he interse ction of Winchester and Tschulahoma. T he victim had bee n tr a ns po rt e d to the ho sp ita l by the tim e he arrive d. Th e inv e sti g a tin g of fi c e rs re c e ive d n oti c e wh ile they wer e at the Ma

pco st ation that the vi ctim had died. Of fice r Jol ly interviewe d Mr. Wiseman and Offic er Claxton. He went to Chandra J ones’ a partment an d fo u n d the white Dodg e Stratus in the complex’s parking lot. Office r Jol ly called Ms. J ones on the tele phone and a sked her to come out of the a partment in an e ffort to a void a confr ontation w ith De fendant. Office r Jol ly took Ms. J ones to a telephone booth down the stre et

. M s . J ones ca lled Def endant, but he w ould not answer the phone. Ms. J ones then c alled De fendant on Office r Claxt on’s ce ll phone, and De fendant answer ed. Def endant a nd Ms. J ones talked for a few minutes, and Def endant ag ree d to c ome out of the house. Of fi c e r C la xton s a id the y

we re able to t ake De fe nd a nt i nto c us tod y wi tho ut i nc ide nt.

On c ro ss- e xami nation, Of fi c e r C la xton s a id that he ha d in te rv ie we d D a na Porte r. He a lso had hea rd the na me “Ge no” mentioned in connec tion with the shooting, but he did not find anything linking him to the crime.

Mr. J ones’ pa lm print was found on the outside re ar door panel on the passeng er side of the Do d ge S tra t u s

. De fe n d an t ’s fi n g e r p r i n twa s fo u n d o n t h e d ri v er ’s s i d e w i n d o w o f t h e D o d ge Str a tus . T wo of

Mr . Win do m’ s f

ing e rp ri nts we re fo un d o n th e L e xus.

Dr. Tom Dee ring , the interim medica l examiner for Shelby County , stated that the c ause of Mr. Windom’s death was a g unshot wound to the abdomen. The bullet seve red the rig ht iliac arte ry and rig ht common iliac vein causing se vere internal he morrhag ing.

De fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d inhis ow n b e ha lf

. He sa id that he wa s a t Ms. Jone s’ a pa rt me nt on Au g us t 7, 2001 until around noon. Def endant then w ent ne x t d o o r t o h i s mother’s house and spent the
a ft e rn oo n c ari ng fo r h e r be c aus e sh e ha d re c e ntl y ha d su rg e ry

. Ar ou nd 4:0 0 p. m., he re turne d to M s. J o n es ’ a p ar t m en tan d t o l d h er h e ne ed ed t o gets o m e f re s h ai r. De fe n d an td ro v e M s

. J o n es ’ D o d ge Str a tus to M r. Pic ke ns ’ a

pa rt me nt a ro un d 4 :15 p. m. D e fe nd a nt s a id that Ms . Jon e s’ ke pt c a lli ng him asking him to return her

car . Defendant’s br other, Marvin, came ove r to Mr. Pickens’ a partment
abo ut thirty

min ute s a ft e r D e fe nd a nt a rrive d. De fe nd a nt lef

t th e Do dg e Str a tus a t Mr . Pi c ke ns ’ apartment complex, and Defendant and his brother w ent to another brother’ s house wher e De fendant
me t D aph ne L ov e . D e fe nd a nt and Ms. L ov e dr ov e to D y e rs bu rg aro un d 5 :00 p. m a ndre turne d to Me mph is at 10 :00 p. m. De fe nd a nt we nt ba c k to Mr. Pic ke ns ’ ap art me nt co mpl e x a nd fo un d th a t Ms

. J ones had not re trieved he r ca r. Mr. Pickens’ g irlfriend g ave D efe ndant the key s to the Dodg e, and he dr ov e to M s. Jone s’ apa rt me nt.-5-

Def endant sa id that he answere d the t elephone when the police called Ms. Jones’ apa rtment in the early

morni n g h o u rs o f Au gu st 8, 2001. He said the police asked to spea k to Ms. J ones beca use her car had been involved in a hit a nd run acc ident. Def endant hung up the telephone , and the police c alled bac k. Finally , Def endant g ave the telephone to Ms. Jones who went outside.

On cr oss-examination, Defendant said t h at h e h ad bee n sentenc ed to fiftee n y ear s on eac h of two prior burg lary convictions. He said that he had seen Mr. Windom in the neig hborhood but didno t kn ow him . D e fe nd a nt s a id that he sp ok e wi th s e ve ra l pe op le in D y e rs bu rg , in c lud ing his brother, A nthony , and Ms. L ove’s mother . Def endant sa id that Mr. Pickens was cu rre ntly in the Shelby Countyjail. Defe ndant said that his br other had attended his trial during the State’s proof, bu t th e tr ia l c ou rt

wo uld n ot all ow hi s bro the r t o te sti fy . D e fe nd a nt s a id that a ll o f h is f a mil y me mbe rs we re c ur

re ntl y in C hic a g o atte nd ing his g rand mothe r’ s f un e ra l.

II. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence
Def endant a rg ues that the e vidence was insufficient to identify him as t he perpetrator of the crimes be y ond a re asonable doubt. There was no phy sical evidence ty ing him to the offe nses, and Def endant c ontends that the ey e-w itness testim o ny was not cr edible. Mr. Wiseman did not know Def endant, and only

had about thirty

seconds to identify

Def endant a s one of the thr ee me n in the Dodg e Stratus. Def

endant submits that Ms

. Hu gh es also spent ve ry littl e time in Def

endant’ s pr e se nc e , a nd , in a ny e ve nt, the re wa s n o e vid e nc e lin kin g the of fe ns e s o f the tw o me n w ho us e d M s. Hug hes’ tele phone.

Once a jury

finds a def

endant g uilty , his or her p resumption of innoce nce is re moved and repla ced with a presumption of g uilt. State v. Black , 815 S.W .2d 166, 175 (Tenn. 1991). The jury is presumed to have resolved all conflicts and draw n any rea sonable infere nces in f avor of the State. S t ate v. She

ffield, 6 7 6 S. W. 2 d 5 4 2 , 5 4 7 ( T e n n

. 1 9 8 4 )

. Q u e s ti o n s c o n c e r n in g th e c r e d ibilityof witnesses, the weig ht and value to be given the evidenc e, and a ll factua l issues raised by the evidenc e ar e r e s o lv e d b y th e trie r o f f a c t a n d n ot this court. State v. Bland , 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997).

When a defenda nt challeng es t he sufficiency of t he convicting evidence , we must revie w the evidenc e in the lig ht most favor able to the prosecution in determining whether a rational trier of fa ct could have found all the e ssential elements of the crime bey o n d a re asonable doubt. Jack son v. Vi rg ini a , 443 U.S.307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L

. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). The defe ndant has the burden of overc oming this presumption, and the State is entitled to the strong est leg itimate vie w of the evidenc e along with all rea sonable infe renc es which may be dra wn from that e vidence

. Id .; Sta te
v . Tu gg le , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)

.
De fe n d an t’s challeng es primarily question the cre dibilit y

of the State’s w itnesses. The State’s proof show ed that Mr. Wiseman identified De fe n d an t as one of the three g unmen who
acc osted him and Mr. Windom at the brothers’ place of business around 6:00 p.m on August 7, 2001. Mr. Wiseman said that Def endant wa s standing at the driver’ s door of the L exus when Mr. J ones-6-

forc ed him into the t runk. He heard an arg ument over money , and then a gunshot. Offic er Claxton said that Mr. Windom ex ited the L exus in front of a Mapco g as station. Mr. Windom collapsed at the g a s st a tio n a nd

die d a ft e r h e wa s tr a ns po rt e d to the ho sp ita l. Mr . Wis e ma n s a id that he wa s in the ca r trunk betwe en fifte en and thirty minutes before he esc aped wh en the ca r stopped at a n apartment complex l ocate d next door to t he F lairwood Apartments. Ms. Hug hes, a r esident of the Flair wood Apartments, identified Defenda nt as one of t he men who used her te lephone be tween 6:30 p.m. and 6:45 p.m. on Aug ust 7, 2001, to call a friend to pick them up.

Def endant’ s challeng e to the suff iciency of the e vidence mere ly

attacks the cre dibilit y

of the State’s witnesses. It is well-est ab l ished that questions reg arding the cr edibilityof witnesses, the weig ht and value of

the evidenc e, and any

fac tual issues raised by the evidenc e are resolved by the trier of fac t. State v. Dav idson , 121 S.W .3d 600, 614 (T en n

. 2 0 0 3). B y its verdict, the jury obviouslycre dited the testimony of the State’s witnesses and reje cted De fendant’s version of w hat
oc c ur re d o n th e day of the sh oo tin g

. B a se d on the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d, a re a so na ble tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld fi ndbe y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th a t D e fe nd a nt wa s o ne of the pe rp e tr a tor s o f the c ha rg e d o ff e ns e s. Def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

III. Exclus ion of

Im peachm ent Evidence

Def endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in not allowi n g t h e defense to que stion Mr. Wis eman about his misdemeanor drug convictions in or der to impea ch his credibility and to show evidenc e of bia s. See Te nn . R. Ev id. 60 9; State v. Sayle s , 49 S.W .3d 275, 279 (Tenn. 2001)

. Def endant c oncede s that he did not join with counsel for the co- defe ndant to seek a dmissibi lityof the evidenc e at trial but a

rg ues that the trial court’s err or may be revie wed a s plain err or. See Tenn. R. Crim. P . 52(b).
During Mr. Wiseman’s cross- examination, the co-def endant’ s counsel soug ht to introduc e e vid e nc e that Mr . Wis e ma n h a d b e e n c ha rg e d w ith fe lon y

dr ug of fe ns e s p ri or

to D e fe nd a nt’ s tria l. The char g ed offe nses wer e subseque ntly reduc ed to misdemeanor

char g es during plea ne g otiations that wer e conducted after Defe ndant was arr ested for the current offenses. The trial c ourt found that there was no e vidence that the di strict attorney g ener al’s office in any way settled Mr. Wiseman’s drug char g es in exchang e for his testimonyat Def

endant’ s trial. Following a leng thy hearing out of the pre sence of the jury , t h e t ri al court permitted the co- defe ndant’s counse l to ask whether Mr. Wise man ha d b e e n p ro mis e d a nythi ng by the dis tr ic t a tto rn e y

g e ne ra l’ s o ff

ic e in e xch a ng e fo r h is testimony

. The trial court also conclude d that the co- defe ndant’s counse l could ask Mr. Wiseman about his prior misdemeanor theft convic tion, but not the fac ts surrounding the offe nse. Ac cording to the rec ord, De fendant’s counsel did not verba lly parti ci p at e in the hea

ring conce rning the admissibili ty

of the e vidence

. Rul e 36 (a ) o f the Te nn ess ee Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e du re pr ov ide s th a t “ [n]othin g in this rule shall be con s t rued a s requiring relief to be g rante d to a party

responsible for

an er ror or who failed to take whateve r ac tion wa s rea sonably available to pr event or nullify the harmful eff

ect of the
err or.” Apanel of this Court has previously held that an objection by a co-de fendant doe s not relieve-7-

the other de fendant of the obl igation to enter a c ontemporane ous objection in order to preserve an issue for a n appeal on his behalf. Sta te v . S te v e Br ad for d , N o

. 0 3 C0 1

- 9 6 0 7

- CR

- 0 0 2 7 8 , 1 9 9 8 WL 24417, at *6 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, J an. 20, 1998), no perm. to appeal filed . Def endant’ s failu re to a lso re qu e st that th e e vid e nc e be a dmi ssi ble c on sti tut e s a wa ive r o f the iss ue on app e a l.

Nor do we believe that this issue rises to the leve l of plain err or. I ssues that rise to the leve l of plain e rr or

lie wi thi n th e so un d d isc re tio n o f the app e llate c ou rt a ndma y be c on sid e re d: ( 1) to p re v en t n ee dless litigation; (2) to pre vent injury to the interests of the public; a nd (3) to pre vent prejudice to the judicial proce ss, pr event manifest injusti ce, or to do substantial justice. See Tenn. R. A pp . P. 13 (b ); Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 5 2( b) ; State v. Adk isson , 8 99 S.W. 2d62 6, 63 8- 39 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1994). In Adkisson , this Court st ated that “the following fac tors should be consider ed by an app ellate c ou rt

wh e n d e te rm ini ng wh e the r an e rr or c on sti tut e s ‘ plain e rr or :’ (a ) the re c or d mu st clea rly establish what occurre d in the t rial court; (b) a c lear and unequivoc al rule of

law must have been br eac hed; (c ) a substantial rig ht of the ac cused must have been a dverse ly aff ecte d; (d) the
acc used did not waive the issue for tac tical re asons; and (e ) consider ation of the e rror is ‘nece ssary to do substantial just ice.” Id . at 641-42.

Consideration of all of the fac tors is not necessary when it is clea

r fr om the rec ord that at least one of

the fa ctors ca n n ot be established. Sta te v . S mi th , 24 S.W .3d 274, 283 (Tenn. 2000)

. Af te r a re vie w of the re c or d, we are un able to c on c lud e that De fe nd a nt did no t waive the iss ue a s a matter of ta ctical strateg y . Def endant did not of

fer any arg ument in support of the admissibili ty of evidenc e conc erning Mr. Wiseman’s prior mi sdemea nor convictions during the l eng thy hearing on the issue, nor did he r aise or attempt to raise any issues concern i n g M r. W i seman’s prior misdemeanor dr

ug con v i cti ons or the cir cumstance s surrounding his prior theft convic tion during his cross-e x amination of Mr. Wiseman. B ased on our revie w of the record, we cannot conclude that De fe nd a nt’ s de c isi on to re ma in sil e nt wa s no t a ma tte r of ta c tic a l c ho ic e or str a te g y . “‘[ A] pa rt y cannot, e ither in a c ivil or criminal case , sit by an d n o t o b j ect to testi mony , take his cha nce of acquittal or conviction on testimony deeme d incompetent, and then a sk a re versa l for such te stimony in [ the re viewing court.]’” Id

. at2 8 3 (q u o t i n g Mc Ke nz ie v . S tat e , 3 Tenn. Crim. App. 362, 368, 462 S.W .2d 243, 246 (1970)) . Def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue. IV. Sentencing Issu es
Def endant c halleng es both the leng th of his sentence s and t he imposition of consecutive sentenc ing. A t the sentenc in g h ea ri ng for De fendant’s convictions of espe cially ag g ravated kidnapping and unlawf

ul possession of a handgun, the State relied on the evidenc e pre sented at trial and De fenda

nt’s pre- sent en ce re p o rt

. Ac co rd i n g t o t h e p re -s en t en ce re p o rt , De fe n d an twa s co n v i ct ed of tw o c ou nts of

se c on d d e g re e bu rg lary

in 1 98 8 a nd se nte nc e d to fif te e n y e ars on e a c h co un t, w ith the s e n te n c e s to b e s e r v e d c o n c u rr e n tl y

. D e f e n d a n t’ s o th e r

p r io r c o n v ic ti o n s , a ll c o mm itte d p rior to 1989, include convictions for third deg ree burg lary , rec eiving stolen property over $100, r ece iving stolen property

under $100, sex ual battery , petit larc eny , and two misdemea nor convic tions. Base d on Def endant’ s criminal history , the trial court sentence d him as a R ang e I I , multipl e off ender , for all offe nses. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-106. It appea rs that the trial co u rt conc luded that-8-

Def endant ha d four prior Class C felony convictions althoug h t h e re cord indicates that only the second de g ree burg lary offe nses are considere d Class C felonies for se ntencing purposes. See id. § 40-35-118. None theless, a de fendant is a “multiple offende r” if he or she ha s at l east two prior felony convictions within the conviction class, a highe r cla ss, or within the next two lower felony classes. Id . § 40 -3 5- 10 6( a )( 1) . D e fe nd a nt w a s c on vic te d o f e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d r ob be ry , a

Cla ss A fe l o n y , an d unlawful possession of a handg un, a Class E fe lony . Thus, Def endant’ s two prior second de g ree burg lary

convictions which are considered Class C felonies for sentenc ing pur poses are su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

his c la ssi fi c a tio n a s a

mul tip le of

fe nd e r f or bo th c on vic tio ns

.
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d that tw o e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s w e re app lic able in c on sid e ri ng the le ng th of both of De fendant’s sentenc es. The trial court found that Defe ndant has a previous history

of criminal convic tions in additi on to those nece ssary to establish the appropriate rang e. See id . § 40- 35-114(2) . I n addition, the trial court found that Defe ndant had tre ated or allowed the vic tim to be treated with extreme crue lty by confining him in the trunk of a car wher e he c ould hear

his brother’s shooting. See id . § 40-35-114( 6).

The trial c ourt also found tha t consec utive sentenc ing w as appr opriate ba sed on the extensiveness of Def

endant’ s criminal history

and his status as a da ng erous of fende r. Id . §§ 40-35- 115(b)( 2) and ( 4). The trial court’s ba sed its classification of Defe ndant as a dang erous of

fende r on the circ umstances surrounding the offe nses. The trial c ourt consider ed most troubling the “ brazen nature ” of the offe nse which wa s co m m itted in day light on a public stre et, and the me thodical
me tho d b y

wh ic h th e tw o me n w e re abd uc te d a ndMr . Win do m w a s sh ot.

When a def

endant c halleng es the leng th, r ang e, or manner of service of a se ntence , this Court conducts a de novo revie w with a pre sumption t hat the dete rminations made by the trial court are
corr ect. Id. § 40-35-401( d). This presumption is “conditioned upon the affirmative showing in t he
rec or d th a t th e tria l c o u r t c o n s id e r e d th e s e n te n c in g p r in c ip le s a n d a ll r e le v a n t f a c ts and circ umstances.” S t a t e v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . “I f the trial c ourt applies ina p p r o p r iate f

a c to r s o r o th e r w is e f

a il s to f o ll o w th e 1 9 8 9 Se n te n c in g A c t, th e p r e s u mption of
corr ectne ss falls.” State v. Shelton , 8 54 S.W. 2d 11 6, 12 3 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 92 ). Ou r r e vie w i n the ca se sub judice is de novo with a presumption of corr ectne ss be cause the trial co u rt compl ied wi th the pu rp os e s, princ ipl e s a ndpr oc e du re s o f the 19 89 Se nte nc ing Ac t.

The Sentenc ing Commi ssion Comments provide that the burden is on the defe ndant to show the imp ro prie ty

of the se nte nc e

. Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 40 -3 5- 40 1, Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts

. O u r r e v ie w r e q u ir e s a n a n a ly s is o f ( 1 ) th e e v id e n c e , if

a n y , r e c e iv e d a t th e tria l an d s e ntencing hearing; ( 2) the pre -sentenc e re p o rt ; (3 ) t he princ iples of sentenc ing and arg uments of counse l relative to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and char acte ristics of the offe nse; (5) any mitigating or enhancing fac tors; (6) any statements made by

the def endant in his own beha lf; and (7) the defe ndant’s potential for r ehabilitation or treatment. Id

. §§ 40 -3 5- 10 2, -1 03 , a nd-2 10 ; Sta te v . S mi th , 735 S.W .2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

.-9-

A multiple offende r i s sentenc ed withi n the applicable Rang e I I , or betwe en twenty -five and forty y ear s for a Class A fe lony , and betwe en two and f our y ear s for a

Class E felony

. Id . §§ 40-35- 106(c) and 40-35- 112(b)( 1) and ( 5). I n calc ulating the sentenc e for a Class A fe lony conviction, the presumptive sentenc e is the midpoint of the rang e, or thirty -two and one -half y ear s, if there are no enha n ce m ent or mi tigating f actor s. Id. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (c ). I n c a lc ulatin g the se nte nc e fo r a Cla ss E felony conviction, the pre sumptive sentence is the minim um of the ra ng e, or two y ear s, if there are no enhanc ement or mit igating f actor s. Id

. I f there are enhanc ement but no mitigating fac tors, the trial court may set the sentenc e above the m inimum of t he rang e, but s till wit hin the rang e. Id. § 40-35- 201(d). I f both enha ncing and m i t i gat i n g fac tors are prese nt, the trial court must start at the minimum of the rang e, enhance the sentenc e within the ra n ge as ap p ropriate for the e nhancing fac tors, and then r educe the sentenc e as a ppropriate for the mitig ating fact o rs. Id. § 40-35-210( e). I f there are mitigating but no e nhance ment fac tors prese nt, then the trial court may set the sentenc e either at the minimum of t he sentencing rang e, or below the midpoi nt. Ba sed on the pre sence of two enhanc ement fa ctors, the trial court sentenc ed Def endant to f

orty y ear s for the Class A f

elony and fo ur y e ars fo r the Cla ss Efe lon y , o r at th e top of Ra ng e I I fo r b othof

fe ns e s.

A. L eng th of Sentence

Def endant doe s not challeng e the a pplication of enhanc ement fac tor (2) based on his prior convictions in e x cess of those nece ssary to e levate him to multipl e offe nder status. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115( 2). De fendant arg ues, howe ver, that the rec ord does not support a finding that he
ac te d w ith e xc e p ti o n a l c ru e lty to w ar d M r

. Wi s e man , th e v ic ti m o f th e e s p e c ia ll y

a g g rava ted kidnapp in g o f

f e n s e

. D e f

e n d a n t c o n te n d s th a t h e ar in g th e th r e a ts le v ie d a g a in s t h is b r o th e r and “being place d in some discomfort” is insufficie nt to establish the applicability of this enhanc ing fac tor.

Gene rally , in order to support a pplication of enhance ment fac tor (6), the fac ts must s upport a “f inding of crue lty under the statute ‘over

and above ’ what is r equire d to sustain a conviction for [t he] offense .” Sta te v . A rn e tt , 49 S.W .3d 250, 258-259 (Tenn. 2001) (c itations omi tted). The trial court must state what actions of the de fendant, bey ond the conduc t n ec es s ary to establish the elements of the offe nse, constituted “exceptional cr uelty .” Sta te v . P oo le , 945 S.W .2d 93, 98 (Tenn. 1 9 9 7 ) ( q u o t i n g S ta t e v
. Go od win , 909 S.W .2d 35, 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) ). The trial court based its finding s on the fac t that the victim was force d into the t ruck of the car at g unpoint, driven
aro un d f or a n e xten de d p e ri odof

tim e on a

ho t A ug us t a ft e rno on, s ub je c te d to the so un ds of

his brother’ s shooting, a nd abandone d in an appa rently empty parking are a. We ca nnot conclude that the trial court erre d in apply ing e nhance ment fac tor (6) in de termining the leng th of Def en d ant’s sentenc e for

espec ially

ag g ravated kidnapping

. See State v . Mario Pende rgrass, No. M1999-02532- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 2 WL

5 1 7 1 3 3 , a t * 1 8 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. , a t N a s h v il le , A p r

. 5 , 2 0 0 2 ) , pe rm . to appeal denied (Tenn. O ct. 7, 2002).

Def endant arg ues t hat the application of the enha nceme nt fac tors based upon f actor s which
we re no t su bmi tte d to a

jury vio la te s th e princ ipl e s se t f orth i n Blakely v. W

ashington , 542 U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct . 2531 (2004). Our Supreme Court, howe ver, ha s rec ently conclude d that Tenne ssee’ s-10-

sentenc ing sc heme doe s not violate a def endant’ s Six th A mendment rig hts as addre ssed in Bl ake ly

. State v. Edwin Gomez and Jonathan S. Londono, ___ S.W .3d ___, No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD, 20 05 WL 85 68 48 , at *22 (T e nn . Apr . 15, 20 05 ). De fe nd a nt i s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n h is Bl ake ly challeng e.
Wit h the p r e s e n c e o f

tw o e n h a n c e me n t f

a c to r s , a n d th e o b v io u s ly s ig n if ic a n t w e ig ht attributed to these f

actor s by the trial cou rt , t h e re cord supports the imposi tion of a forty -y ear sentenc e for

Def endant’ s espec ially

ag g ravated kidnapping conviction and f our y ear s for his fe lony possession of a ha ndg un conviction.

B. Consec utive Sentencing

The trial c ourt order ed De fendant’s sentenc es to be serve d consec utively to e ach other a nd to his li fe se ntence for f irst deg ree felony

murder ba sed on its findings t h at Defenda nt had an extensive criminal hi story , and that he was a dang erous of fende r. De fendant arg ues that the e vidence does not support the trial court’s finding s as to the extensiveness of his criminal history or his status as a dang erous of

fende r. Def

endant c ontends that consec utive sentenc ing is not nec essary to protect the public and is not the least sever e sentenc e nece ssary beca use, by virtue of his life se ntence alone, Def endant will be ove r ninety y ear s old when he is elig ible for pa role.

When a def

endant is convicted of multipl e crimes, the t rial court, in its discretion, may order the se nte nc e s to ru n c on se c uti ve ly if it f ind s b y a pr e po nd e ranc e of the e vid e nc e that a de fe nd a nt f a lls into one of seve n cate g ories. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115. I n this instance , the trial court found that Def endant wa s “an of

fende r whose rec ord of criminal activity is e x tensive,” and a “ dang erous offe nder w h o s e behavior indicate s litt le or no re g ard f or human life.” Id . §§ 40-35-115( b)(2) and (4). I f t he trial court determines t hat consecutive sentencing is appropriate based on the dang erous offe nder c ateg ory , the court must m ake two a dditional findings. Sta te v . I mf e ld , 70 S.W .3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 2002) . First, the tria l court m u s t fi nd that an extended sente nce is ne cessa ry to protect the public from further c riminal conduct by Def endant, a nd, second, it must find c onsecutive se ntencing to be re asonab l yrelated to the seve rity of the off

enses. State v. W

ilkerson , 905 S.W .2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995)

. Although suc h specific fac tual finding s are unnece ssary for the other categ ories enume rate d in T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 40 -3 5- 11 5( b) , the imp os iti on of c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s is a lso g uid e d b y

the g e ne ra l se ntencin g princ ipl e s th a t th e le ng th o f a se nte nc e be ‘j us tly

de se rv e d in
re la tio n to the se ri ou sn e ss o f the of fe ns e ’ and‘n o g re a te r tha n that dese rv e d f or the of fe ns e committed.’” Im

fe ld , 70 S.W .3d at 708 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-102(1) and -1 0 3 (2 )); State v. Lane , 3 S.W .3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999)

. We d isa g re e wi th D e fe nd a nt’ s c on te nti on that th e tr ia l c ou rt “ g ro ssly ov ers ta te [d]” his criminal history . Def

endant was forty

y ear s old at the time of sentenc ing. D efe ndant has be en committing fe lony

offe nses since he was twenty y ear s old. A re view of his criminal hist ory indicates that Def endant ha s been una

ble to ref rain fr om committing offenses for any leng th of time when not-11-

inc arc e rate d, a ndhis of

fe ns e s h a ve grown in s e ve ri ty ov e r the y e ars . In 1 98 3, he ple d g uil ty to recei v i n g s t o l en prope rty under $100 a nd petit larce ny . He wa s sentence d to one y ear for e ach
o f f e n s e

. In 1 9 8 4 , D e f

e n d a n tw a s s e n t e n c e d t o t h r e e y e ar s f o r a t h i r d d e g r e e b u r g l ar y o f f e n s e

. In 1 9 8 5 , h e w a s s e n t e n c e d t o o n e ye ar f o r r e c e i v i n g s t o l e n p r o p e r t y i n e x c e s s o f $ 1 0 0 , f o l l o w e d b y a thr e e -y e ar s e nte nc e in 19 86 for a thi rdde g re e bu rg lary

c on vic tio n. I n 1 98 8, he wa s se nte nc e d to
concur rent fif teen y ear sentenc es for

two second de g ree burg lary convictions . During 1989, Def endant also committed and was convicted of sexual battery and sente nced to thre e y ear s. Ba sed on the re cord, w e conc lude that the evidenc e does not pr eponder ate ag ainst the trial court’s f inding that Def endant “ is an offe nder w hose re cord of criminal ac tivityis ex tensive.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115( b)(2)

. Def endant a rg ues that he is not a da ng erous of fende r with littl e re g ar d fo r human life beca use the victim, Mr. Wiseman, was not harmed during the kidnapping . The e vidence , howeve r, sh ow e d th a t D e fe nd a nt andhis c o- de fe ndant loc ke d M r. Wise ma n in sid e the trun k o f a c ar i n Aug ust, and they abandone d the car wit h Mr. W iseman st ill inside the t runk in a plac e whe re no one wa s p re se nt t o h e ar his c ri e s f or he lp. Th e fa c t th a t Mr . Wis e ma n e sc ape d u nh arm e d is a ttribu ta ble more to his acci d ental ac tivation of the trunk’s eme rg ency rele ase button than a ny

assistance on De fe nd a nt’ s p art

.
De fe nd a nt arg ue s that c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing is n ot n e c e ssa ry be c a us e he wi ll b e ov e r n ine ty y ear s old when he is elig ible for r elea se for his life sentenc e. T h e u n d erlying principle behind
consec utive sentenc ing, how ever , is not whether the leng th of the sentenc e is log ical base d on the ag e of the defe ndant at sente ncing , but whether a def endant should “e scape the fu l l i m pact of punishment for one of

[hi s] offenses.” State v. Robinson, 93 0 S.W .2d 78, 85 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)(De fendant rec eived consec utive life sentenc es for two f irst-deg ree murder c onvictions). See als o State v . A rn e tt , 49 S.W .3d 250, 264-265 (Tenn. 2001) (De fendant ordere d to serve se ntence s for espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping and ag g rava t ed ra pe conse cutively ); Lane , 3 S.W .3d at 463 (De fendant ordered t o s er v e sente nces f or convic tions of statutory rape and off

icial misconduct
c on se c uti ve ly .) “ Th e po we r o f a tr ia l ju dg e to i mpo se c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s e ns ur e s th a t de fe nd a nts committing s epar ate and distinct viol ations of the law r ece ive sepa rate and distinct punishments.” Robinson , 930 S.W .2d at 85.

The circumstance s surrounding the commi ssion of t he offenses indicate t hat Defenda nt has littl e re g ard f

or human life and had no hesitancy about committing a crime wher e the risk to human lif e wa s h ig h. Th e vio le nc e of the se of fe ns e s su pp ort a

fi nd ing that con fi ne me nt i s n e c e ssa ry to protec t society

from De fendant’s conduct, a nd consec utive sentenc ing is re asonably related t o the
severity of the off enses. Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35- 102(1) a nd -103(1) (A).

Ba sed upon the for ego i n g and the r ecor d as a w hole, we c onclude that the imposition of
c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing fo r D e fe nd a nt’ s con vi c tio ns fo r f ir st d e g re e fe lon y

mur de r, e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated kidnapping and unlawf ul p o s s es s ion of a ha ndg un is appropriate. Def endant is not entitled to relief on this issue.-12- CO NC LU SION

F oll ow ing a

tho ro ug h r e vie w o f the re c or d, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE