J-S38041- 14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

KATHLEEN BANG WHAN CHUNG AND MYONG JA JHANG, Appellants

v.

KYUNG SOON KIM AND SOOK HEE KIM, Appellees : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : : : : : : : : : No. 2128 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Order Entered June 14, 2013, In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County,

Civil Division, at No. 2011-33371.

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES and SHOGAN, JJ

. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 04, 2014

Pro se Appellants, Kathleen Bang Whan Chung and Myong Ja J hang, appeal from the order denying their motion for specia l injunctions, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injun ction in this matter brought against Appellees, Kyung Soon Kim and Sook H ee Kim. 1 We affirm. The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this

cas e as follows:

This matter arises out of a dispute on the financing a nd governance of the Global Mission Theological School (“GMT S”) in Elkins Park, PA. [Appellants] claim to have been me mbers of

1 We note that while the denial of a preliminary inj unction is not a final order, it is, nevertheless, an interlocutory order appe alable as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4). Accordingly, this app eal is properly before this Court.J-S38041- 14

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GMTS’ Board of Directors and officers of the school, which i s incorporated as a non-profit corporation. [Appellants] further claim to have together loaned large sums of money to [Appellees,] GMTS’ president and fellow board member, Kyung Soon Kim, and his wife Sook Hee Kim . . . . [Appell ants] claim, [Appellees] have misappropriated the loaned money and have not paid [Appellants] back as promised. [Appellants] filed an underlying claim for money dama ges but also a motion seeking a preliminary injunction ag ainst [Appellees]. [Appellants] sought to have [Appellees] (1) turn over to [Appellants] all GMTS bank accounts, funds, an d student tuition money; (2) provide [Appellants] with a full accounting of tuition receipts and expenses incurred by [Appellees] on behalf of GMTS; (3) turn over to [Appellants] all GMTS compu ter system identifications and passwords; and (4) stay away fr om GMTS facilities. Hearings were held in this matter on four separate dates, and, on June 14, 2013, this Court deni ed [Appellants’] motion for a preliminary injunction. [ Appellants] now appeal from that denial. [Appellants’] claims are not clear, and the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearings was inconclusive. Furthermore, there is no immediate irrep arable harm to [Appellants] as a result of actions taken by [A ppellees] in and through an entity which [Appellants] never own ed or had any controlling interest. Accordingly, a preliminary i njunction was not warranted. Trial Court Opinion, 9/25/13, at 1- 2. Subsequently, on December 18, 2013, during the pende ncy of this appeal and after their appellate brief was due to be filed, pro se Appellants filed a “Motion for Stay” with this Court alleging tha t they “filed a similar

case with federal court in the Eastern District of Pen nsylvania on October 31, 2013.” Motion for Stay, 1 2/18/13, at 1. In their motion to stay, Appellants alleged that (1) the federal court had pendent jurisd iction, and (2) thatJ-S38041- 14

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perjury and fraud transpired in the lower court. Id . In conclusion, Appellants requested that this Court hold the decision i n th is matter “until the federal court makes a ruling regarding pendent ju risdiction.” Id

. In their response dated January 14, 2014, and filed on January 16, 2014, Appellees pointed out that, “[a]ccording to the Superior Court Briefing Schedule for this appeal, the Appellants were required to file their brief in support of their appeal on November 12, 2013. The A ppellants failed to file their Brief on the due date, and, almost two months later, still have not filed a brief.” Appellees’ Response, 1/16/14, at 1. Appellees offered the following conclusion, “[T]he Motion for Stay is moot, and the Appe llants[’] appeal should be, if it is not already so, dismissed with prej udice.” Id

. Also on January 14, 2014, this Court issued a per curiam order that denied Ap pellants’ motion to stay and extended the period in which they could file their appellate brief. 2 Order, 1/14/14, at 1. Appellants filed their brief with this Court on February 11, 2014. 3

2 The complete text of this Court’s per curiam order of January 14, 2014, provides as follows:

Appellants’ motion for stay, is DENIED . Appellants have not successfully demonstrated the satisfaction of the requirements for issuance of a stay as set forth in Pa. Public Utility Cmm’n v. Process Gas Consumers Group , 467 A.2d 805 (Pa. 1983), i.e. (1) they are likely to prevail on the merits of this appeal; (2) without the requested relief, they w ill suffer irreparable injury; (3) the issuance of a stay will no tJ-S38041- 14

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Appellants purport to raise the following issues for ou r review: 1. When there is a federal claim which is closely relate d to a state law claim, does the federal court have pendent ju risdiction over the state claim to encourage both “economy in liti gation” and “fairness” by eliminating the need for separate fede ral and state trials hearing essentially the same facts yet pote ntially reaching opposite conclusions? 2. Are Appellants entitled to a Stay of state court p roceedings due to pendent jurisdiction in federal claims? Appellants’ Brief at 4.

substantially harm other interested parties; and (4) th e issuance of a stay will not adversely affect the public interest. Appellants’ brief and reproduced record were due to be filed on or before November 12, 2013. See Pa.R.A.P. 1972 (unless otherwise ordered by the appellate court, a mot ion under this rule shall not relieve any party of the duty of filing his or her briefs and reproduced records within the time otherwise prescribed therefor). Accordingly, appellants are dir ected to file their brief and reproduced record within 30 days of th e date of this order. No further extensions will be granted.

3 On March 11, 2014, Appellees filed a “motion to quash or dismiss appeal.” On April 1, 2014, Appellants filed their pro se “brief in opposition to motion to squash [sic] or dismiss appeal . . . .” On April 1 4, 2014, this Court entered a per curiam order that deferred disposition on Appellees’ motion t o quash or dismiss until review by a merits panel. The fu ll text of our order dated April 14, 2014, provides as follows: Disposition of [A]ppellees’ motion to quash or dismiss this appeal, is hereby deferred to the panel that will de cide the merits of this appeal. Appellee’s [sic] brief shall be f iled within 30 days of the date of this order. For the reasons set forth in this memorandum, we deny Appellees’ mo tion to quash as moot.J-S38041- 14

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Initially, we observe that appellate briefs must mat erially conform to the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvani a Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. Chapter 21. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2111 provides specific guidelines regarding the content o f an appellant’s brief. In addition, Pa.R.A.P. 2114 through 2119 spe cify in greater detail the material to be included in briefs on appeal. More specifically, Pa.R.A.P. 2116 addresses the statemen t of questions involved and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Rule 2116. Statement of Questions Involved (a) General rule. The statement of the questions involved must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement will be deemed to include ever y subsidiary question fairly comprised therein. No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby

. . . . Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (emphasis added). Furthermore, we have long stated that our Court’s review is limited to addressing only the order that Appellants designated in their notice of appeal, which in this case is the order of June 14, 2013. See Commonwealth v. Hottinger , 537 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. Super. 1987) (observing that the appellant could address no other issues in the appeal except those pertaining to the orde r on appeal). We recognize that Appellants are acting pro se . However, their status

as pro se litigants does not relieve them of their responsibili ty to conform toJ-S38041- 14

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the applicable rules. See Laird v. Ely & Bernard , 528 A.2d 1379 (Pa. Super. 1987) (quashing pro se appeal where defects in the appellant’s pro

se brief were so substantial that meaningful review was not possible). In First Union Mortgage Corp. v. Frempong , 744 A.2d 327 (Pa. Super. 1999), we stated the following:

While this court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, we note that appellant is not entitled to any particular advantag e because he lacks legal training. As our supreme court has explained, “any layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his lack of expertise and legal training will prove his undoing.”

O’Neill v. Ch ecker Motors Corp. , . . . 567 A.2d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citations omitted). Appellant has chosen to proceed pro se and he cannot expect our court to act as his attorney. See Commonwealth v. Sanford , . . . 445 A.2d 149, 150 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“We decline to become appellant ’s counsel. When issues are not properly raised and devel oped in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to pr esent specific issues for review, a court will not consider the merits thereof.”). First Union Mortgage Corp. , 744 A.2d at 337- 338. Our review of the certified record before us on appea l reflects that Appellants have initiated this appeal from the trial court order dated June 14, 2013, which denied Appellants’ motion for special injunction, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injun ction. However, a careful review of Appellants’ statement of questions i nvolved reveals that none of the issues presented in their Rule 2116 stateme nt of questionsJ-S38041- 14

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involved addresses the order dated June 14, 2013, from which this appeal lies. Appellants’ Brief at 4. Any issue not raised i n the statement of questions is waived. Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). As such, Appell ants have waived any challenge to the trial court’s determination that is the subject of this appeal. Hottinger , 537 A.2d at 2. Thus, because there are no issues before us pertaining to the order properly on appeal , we are constrained to affirm the order of the court of common pleas. Motion to quash denied. Order affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 9/4/2014