Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-50993

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ERIC NATHAN IVEY

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:06-CR-30

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and GARZA and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

After an explosion at his home, Eric Ivey (“Ivey”) pled guilty to attempting

to manufacture methamphetamine and was sentenced to 72 months

imprisonment. He appeals the imposition of a 15-level sentencing enhancement

for creating a substantial risk of harm to human life. Because the district court

properly applied the enhancement, we affirm. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 8, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-50993

 One witness reported seeing an unidentified white male and female flee the house. 1

It is unclear whether this female was Melissa Ivey, but it does not affect this appeal.

The government has made no argument that these unidentified individuals were

innocent bystanders, and in his brief, Ivey acknowledges that they were accomplices.

2

On June 3, 2005, Ivey severely burned himself in an explosion in his home

in Waco, Texas, while attempting to manufacture methamphetamine. Witnesses

observed Melissa Ivey, who assisted her husband with methamphetamine

manufacturing, and two of Ivey’s other accomplices fleeing the house. 1

Investigation uncovered that methamphetamine manufacturing caused the

explosion, and Ivey was arrested.

In May 2008, Ivey pled guilty to attempting to manufacture

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. Based on the drug

quantity, Ivey’s offense level was 12, but the district court applied a sentencing

enhancement for creating a substantial risk of harm to human life, which raised

the offense level to 27. USSG § 2D1.1(b)(10)(C)(ii). After a two-level reduction

for acceptance of responsibility, the guidelines range was 100 to 125 months.

The district court treated the guidelines as advisory and imposed a 72-month

sentence.

Ivey appeals the 15-level “risk of harm” enhancement, arguing that his

actions created a substantial risk of harm only to himself and his accomplices,

who were not the intended beneficiaries of the enhancement.

This court reviews a district court’s interpretation of the sentencing

guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v.

Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008). A mixed question of law

and fact, such as the existence of a risk of harm to human life, receives de novo

review. United States v. Davidson, 409 F.3d 304, 310 (6th Cir. 2005). The

government bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

a sentencing enhancement applies. United States v. Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 519,
No. 08-50993

3

524 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Herrera-Solorzano, 114 F.3d 48, 50

(5th Cir. 1997)).

The sentencing enhancement applied by the district court directs:

[If] the offense involved the manufacture of amphetamine or

methamphetamine and the offense created a substantial risk of

harm to (I) human life . . . , increase by 3 levels. If the resulting

offense level is less than level 27, increase to level 27. 

USSG § 2D1.1(b)(10)(C)(ii). The comments provide additional guidance on its

application:

(A) Factors to Consider.—In determining, for purposes of subsection

(b)(10)(C)(ii) or (D), whether the offense created a substantial risk

of harm to human life or the environment, the court shall include

consideration of the following factors: 

(i) The quantity of any chemicals or hazardous or toxic substances

found at the laboratory, and the manner in which the chemicals or

substances were stored.

(ii) The manner in which hazardous or toxic substances were

disposed, and the likelihood of release into the environment of

hazardous or toxic substances. 

(iii) The duration of the offense, and the extent of the manufacturing

operation. 

(iv) The location of the laboratory (e.g., whether the laboratory is

located in a residential neighborhood or a remote area) and the

number of human lives placed at substantial risk of harm. 

USSG § 2D1.1 cmt. 20.

It is undisputed that the explosion and fire posed a substantial risk of

harm to Melissa Ivey. Ivey argues that “human life” for purposes of the

enhancement does not include accomplices—he did not place his wife at risk

because she voluntarily accepted these dangers by participating in his

methamphetamine manufacturing operation. Ivey describes this enhancement

as adopted to protect the innocent from the dangers of methamphetamine labs

and asserts that participants in the offense should not receive the same
No. 08-50993

4

protection. The government responds that the plain language refers to “human

life,” without excluding co-conspirators.

Ivey’s discussion of statutory purpose and Congressional intent cannot

overcome the text. Where the Guidelines exempt co-conspirators from risk-ofharm analysis, they do so explicitly. See USSG § 2K1.4(a)(2) (“. . . if the offense

created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to any person other

than a participant in the offense . . .”); USSG § 3C1.2 cmt. 4 (“‘Another person’

includes any person, except a participant in the offense who willingly

participated in the flight.”). Section 2D1.1 does not restrict its application to

non-participants and can thus apply where participants in the manufacturing,

such as Melissa Ivey, have been placed at risk. 

 The Seventh Circuit has included co-conspirators in its § 2D1.1 risk-ofharm analysis: 

First, there were several people at a risk of some type of harm,

namely Chamness, the police officers who arrived on the scene, the

staff of the laboratory who cleaned up the site, the owner of the

trailer who called police, and Chamness’s cohorts, which includes

those who fled and those who were apprehended. We further find

these lives were placed at a substantial risk of harm. . . . Given their

close proximity within the trailer and their proximity to the actual

gassing operation, the individuals were placed at a substantial risk

of harm, namely serious injuries from an explosion or a fire.

United States v. Chamness, 435 F.3d 724, 729 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).

This conclusion is consistent with the Second Circuit’s decision in United

States v. Thorn, 317 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2003), which analyzed a provision

enhancing the sentence for a Clean Air Act violation if the offense resulted in a

substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 117. Like Ivey,

the defendant argued that only co-conspirators were endangered. Id. at 118.

Relying on the absence of a textual exception, the Second Circuit held,

“§ 2Q1.2(b)(2) is not limited to situations in which the offense conduct created
No. 08-50993

5

a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons other than

participants in the offense.” Id.

Furthermore, under circumstances very similar to those at hand,

defendants have been convicted of endangering human life while illegally

manufacturing a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 858: “Whoever, while

manufacturing a controlled substance . . . creates a substantial risk of harm to

human life shall be fined . . . , or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”

See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 323 F.3d 603, 606 (8th Cir. 2003) (involving

a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 858 following the death of a fellow

methamphetamine manufacturer in an explosion).

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the § 2D1.1(b)(10)(C) enhancement

for substantial risk of harm to human life applies where the defendant created

a substantial risk of harm to a fellow participant’s life. Accordingly, the district

court properly applied the enhancement here.

AFFIRMED.