NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0512n.06 No. 09-1763 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. DEVARON H OL L AND, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On Appeal from the United States Di strict Court for the Ea stern District of Michig an

B e fo re : B OG GS, SI L ER, and MO OR E, Cir c uit

Judg e s. BOGG S, Circuit Judge. Def endant Deva

ron Holland a

ppeals the district c ourt’s denia l of

a se nte nc e re du c tio n p ur su ant t o 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 82 (c )( 2) . We a ff ir m. I. BACKG ROUND I n 2 0 0 2 , H o ll an d p le a d e d g u il ty to o n e c o u n t o f c o n s p ir a c y to d is tr ib u te c r a c k coca ine, resulting in his eig hteenth criminal conviction. Although Holland was caug ht by Detroit pol ice of fi c e rs wi th o ve r 4 00 g ra ms o f c ra c k c oc a ine in h is r e sid e nc e , h is p lea agreement he ld h im

acc ountable for only 142.1 g rams. Holland wa s sentence d to 157 months of imprisonm ent, which

wa s to wa rd the low e r e nd

of the Un ite d St a te s Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s r ang e of 15 1- 18 8 mo nth s. There afte r, in Novembe r 2007, the United St at es S entencing Commission amended the Gu ide lin e s to re du c e the se nte nc ing dis pa ri ty be tw e e n cr a c k- c oc a ine and po wd e r- c oc a ine of

fe ns e s. See U.S.S.G. Supp. App. C , Am d t
. 706 (ef fec tive Nov. 1, 2007). In ear ly 2008, the Sentencing Commi ssion declar ed this amendm en t t o be re troac tive. See U.S.S.G. Supp. App. C, Amdt. 713No. 09-1763

United States v. Holland

- 2 - (ef fec tive Mar. 3, 2008) . Rely ing on the se ame ndments, in April 2009, Holland filed a motion for reduc ed sente nce pur suant to § 3582(c) (2). Anticipating the g overnme nt’s objections, he a rg ued that “he ha [d] alre ady been held acc ountable for his past [ criminal] recor d” whe n his init ial Guidelines

c a lc ulatio n w a s p e rf

or me d, and that th e le ng th o f h is r e c or d o ve rr e pr e se nte d h is d angero us ne ss “bec ause [his] criminal re cord [did] not consist of any violent crimes.” I n response , the g overnme nt co n ce d ed Holland’s eligibility for a sentenc e re duction but argued ag ainst any

reduc tion because “the usua l § 3553(a) f actor s . . . mili t at e aga i nst a sentenc e
re du c tio n. ” I n p artic ula

r, the g ov e rnme nt p oin te d to Ho lla nd ’s e xten siv e c ri min a l hi sto ry ; “ his unwillingness to re form his c onduct despite repe ated convictions and pe riods of inca rce ration”; the “dang er [he] posed to the community ”; and the f act that his sentenc e “g ross[ly ] understate[d] ” the seriousness of his off

ense, a s it reflec ted only a fraction of the t otal drugquantity with which Holland

was a ssociated. The re cord be fore the district court include d a “[U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.10 Repor t” pre pare d by

the g overnme n t i n co nnection with the § 3582(c )(2) proce eding , as we ll as Holland’s pre -sentenc e
re po rt . T he § 1 B 1. 10 Re po rt no te d th a t H oll a

nd ha d b e e n invo lve d in

six di sc ipl ina

ry inc id e nts while incar cer ated ( including “ Assaulting Without Serious I njury ” and two instanc es of “ Fig hting Wit h Another Per son”), a nd that h i s “i nstitut ional adjustment [was] rate d as ave rag e.” T he pre

sentenc e re port indicated that Holland had a “ positive childhood with a stable upbring ing” ; that none of his imm e diate fa

mil y me mbe rs ha d a

ny c ri min a l histo ry , men ta l hea lth , or sub sta nc e a bu se iss ue s; and that he w as g ener ally in good phy sical and me ntal health.No. 09-1763

United States v. Holland

Moreove r, this argument appear s i rr el ev ant to Holland’s appe al in the first plac e. The 1 dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s c le arl y not un de r t

he imp re ssi on

that th e Gu ide lin e s mandated the denial of a - 3 - The district cour

t denied Holland’ s motion vi a summary order with o u t a hear ing. I

n the order , the cour

t corr ectly deter

mined Holland’s amended Guideline r ang e, then state d that Holland’s motion was denied “for the rea sons se t f orth in the g overnme nt’s brief.” Holland timely appea led. II. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A di strict court “has t he dis cre tion to deny a section 3582(c)( 2) motion, even if [a] retroac tive amendment has lowere d the g uideline ra ng e.” Un ite d S

tates v . U rse ry , 1 0 9 F

. 3 d 1 1 2 9 , 11 37 (6 th Cir. 1997). Acc ording ly , a district cour t’s decision to do so is re viewed only for a buse of discr etion. Un ite d S tat es v . Cu rry , 606 F.3d 323, 327 (6th Cir. 2010). A district court a buses its discretion when it “relies on c lear ly

err oneous finding s of fa ct, improperly applies the law , or uses an err oneous leg al standard.” United States v. Munoz , 6 0 5 F. 3 d 3 5 9 , 3 6 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 1 0 ) ( qu o t i n g United Stat es v. W ashington , 584 F.3d 693, 695 ( 6th Cir. 2009)). III . D ISC USS ION The bulk of Ho l l an d ’s b ri ef on a ppeal is devote d to his arg ument that the Guidelines “ are advisory rathe r than mandatory in rese ntencing s conducte d under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a s they are in i nit ia l se nte nc ingpr oc e e din g s. ” Ap pe lla nt’ s B r. a t 3. Ho we ve r, a s H oll and late r c on c e de d in

his motion waiving or al ar g ument, this propositi on is now square ly fore closed by the Supreme Court’s

rec ent dec ision in D il lo n v . U nited States , 130 S. Ct . 2683 (2010), whic h held that the judicial alterations to the SentencingReform Ac t that were enunciated in United States v. Book er , 54 3 U .S. 22 0 ( 20 05 ), do no t a

pp ly in § 35 82 (c )( 2) pr oc e e din g s. 1No. 09-1763

United States v. Holland

s e n te n c e r e d

u c ti o n , a s in d ic a te d b y th e a me n d e d G u id e li n e s c a lc u lati o nin it s s u mm ar

y o r d e r . We fail to see w hat the district cour t’s conclusion had to do with whe ther the G uidelines wer e binding o r a dv i s o r y. - 4 - H o l l an d a l s o ar g u e s t h a tt h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtm a d e ane r r o r o f l aw b e c a u s e i t“ c o mp l e t e [ l y] fail[ed to] . . . consider[] th e mandatory § 3553[(a)] factors” in rea ching its decision. Appellant’s Br . at 17. As Holland notes, § 3582(c) (2) states that wher e a r etroa ctive Guidelines a mendment has

occur red, “the court may reduc e [ a defenda nt’s] term of imprisonment, afte r considering the fa ctors

s e t f o rth in s e c ti o n3 5 5 3(a) to th e e

x te nt t ha t th e yar e ap pli c ab le , if such a r eduction is consistent with applicable policy

statements issued by

the SentencingCommi ssion.” (empha sis added). Ho lla nd is s imp ly mis take n w he n h e argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt “ c omp le te [ly ] fa il[e d]” to consider the § 3553(a) fac tors “to the extent that they are applicable .” The distr ict court’s or der incorpora ted by ref ere nce “the rea sons stated in the g overnme nt’s brief,” which included H olland’s criminal history , see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) ; his dang erousne ss to the public, see id. § 3553(a) (2)( C); and the se riousness of his offe nse, see id. § 3553(a) (2)( A). The rec ord d o es not sugg est that any other “ applicable ” § 3553(a ) fa ctors we ighe d in Holland’s favor. To the extent Holland argues that the district cour t committed lega l error

by incorporating the g overnme nt’s brief by ref ere nce, r ather

th an expli citly

analy zing ea ch of the § 3553(a) fac tors

on the re c or d, his argume nt m us t be re je c te d. A proc e e din g purs ua nt t o § 35 82 (c )( 2) is “ no t a plenar y rese ntencingproce eding ,” Dillon , 130 S. Ct . at 2691, and suc h proce eding s theref ore do not require the same deg ree of proce dural formality as plenar y sentenc ings. Se e Cur

ry , 606 F.3d at 330- 31. I n fac t, in Cur

ry , w e re c e ntl y

re je c te d a sim ila r ( if no t ide nti c a l) argume nt, re a so nin g a s f oll ow s:No. 09-1763

United States v. Holland

- 5 - [T] he district co u rt d i d not conduct a he aringon Curry ’s motion, and did not expressly consider a ll the § 3553 fac tors that might have been r eleva nt. Curry argues that the district court a

bused its discretion in denying the motion without either specific ally

artic u l ating the re asons for doingso or identifying f actor s in Curry ’s pa rt ic ula r r e c or d th a t ju sti fi e d th e de nia l. T he on ly c a se Cur ry c ite s in su

pp or t of his argument
. . . is [an Eleventh Circuit c ase which] doe s not advanc e Curry ’s ca use, as it s imp ly he ld t hat w hil e a

dis tr ic t c ourt

“ ‘m us t c on sid

e r the fa ctors listed in § 3553(a) ’ when deter

mining whether to r educe a defe ndant’s orig inal sentenc e . . . [,] the district court is not require d to a rticulate the applicability of eac h fac tor, ‘as long a s th e re c or d a s a

wh ole de mon strates th at the p e rt ine nt f a c tor s w e re take n in to acc ount by

the district court.’ ” I n [another appe al of a

§ 3582(c) (2) de nial], t he Eleve nth Circuit found . . . that the district court’s orde r, thoug h sh ort, was “ based on the rec ord as a whole” a

nd “e nu n ci at ed s u ff

i ci en t re as o n s fo r i t s o rd er d en yi n g re s en t en ci n g. ” T h er e, al t h o u gh the dis tr ic t c ourt

ha d n ot s pe c if

ic a lly we ig he d the § 3 55 3( a ) f a c tor s, the El e ve nth Circuit held that the lower court ha d not abused its discret i o n an d had provide d sufficie nt rea sons for its decision to deny rese ntencing , “[e]specially consideringthat the district court’s final order spec ifically re ferenc ed the Gove rnment’s Opposition , which in turn cited spe cific e lements that we re rele vant to the nec essar y section 3553(a) inquiry

and that we re suppor

ted by the re cord . . . .” The same principles apply here

. I b id. (interna l citations omit ted) (se cond empha sis added). Those same princ iples which we endorse d in Curry apply

here also. L a stl y , w e la c k ju

ri sd ic tio n to c on sid e r H oll and ’s argume nt t hat hi s unr e duced

se nte nc e is “g reater than ne cessa

ry . . . to c omply with the purposes . . . of sec tion 3553(a)[].” Appellant’s B r.
a t 16 ; see Un ite d S

tates v . B owe rs , No. 08-5595, -- - F .3d ---, s l i p o p . at 1 7 -18 (6th C ir. Aug . 12, 2010) (holding that we lac k jurisdicti o n t o hear arguments that a district court’ s § 3582(c) (2) deter mination was substantively unrea sonable unde r Bo ok e r and its prog eny

). CO NC LU SION Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of Ho lla nd ’s mot ion

fo r r e du c e d s e nte nc e is AF F IRM ED

.No. 09-1763

United States v. Holland

- 6 - KA REN NELSO N MOORE , Circuit Ju dge, dissentin g. Unlike the majority , Iconclude that the district

c o u r t’ s te r se explanation for de nying H olland’s motion for a se ntence reduc tion under 18 U. S.C. § 3 58 2( c )( 2) do e s n ot evi de nc e su ff ic ie nt c on sid e ratio n o f t

he re le va nt f a c tor s se t f

or th in 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a ). Th e re fo re , I re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt. I n a § 3 58 2( c )( 2) pr oc e e din g , th e dis tr ic t c ourt is r e qu ir e d to “ c on sid e r[] the fa c tor s se t f or th in [ §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are ap p l i ca b l e.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) . Fur thermore , “the [di strict] court must satis fy the appellate cour t that [ it] has consider ed the pa rties’ a rg uments and has

a rea soned basis for e x erc ising [its] own leg al dec ision-making a uthority .” United States v. Arc her , 36 2 F. Ap p’ x 49 1, 49 6 (6t

h Cir. 20 10 ) (unp ub lis he d d e c isi on ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s and br a c ke ts omi tte d) ; se e als o U

n ite d S ta te s v . Marion , 5 90 F .3 d 4 75 , 4 77 (7 th C ir . 2 00 9) (e xpla ini ngthat, i n a § 3582(c )(2) proce eding , a district c ourt must provide “[s] ome statement of [its] rea soning” so that the appellate court is “ able to me aning fully revie w [t he district c ourt’s] decision”). He re, the district court’s s u m m ar y

adoption of the Gove rnment’s re sponse is simply insufficient. Althoug h the Go ve rnme nt’ s me mor and um d id a dd

re ss, in o ne pa

ra g ra ph , s ome of the § 355 3( a ) fa c tor s, the re is

no indication as t o whether the district court c onducted its own indepe ndent re view of the se fa ctors

or mere ly relied upon the arguments prese nted in a ter se, summary filing that was by

its very nature one-sided. Un ite d S tates v . Cu rry , 606 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2010), is not to the contrar y . I n Cur ry , the panel r elied, in par

t, upon the fac t that there ha d alre ady been two prior sente ncing hear ings dur ing which the d i strict court ha d analy zed the rele vant § 3553(a ) fa ctors, one of which occ urre d afte r United States v. Book

er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Cur ry , 606 F.3d at 331. Her e, by contra st, Holland’sNo. 09-1763

United States v. Holland

- 7 - only prior sente ncing hear ing oc curr ed we ll before Booke r , and as a result, t he dis trict court ha d not previously

weig hed any

of the § 3553(a ) fa ctors, re sulting in a rec ord that was less develope d than it was in Cur

ry . Fur thermore , in Cur ry , t h e d i strict judge who denied the § 3582(c) (2) motion

e xpre ssl y a c kn ow le dg e d h a vin g re vie we d th e re c or d a nd havin g c on sid e re d th e § 3 55 3(a ) f a c tor s,
so me thi ngthe dis tr ic t ju dg e he re ne ve r d id. To the de g re e that Cur ry sug g ests that, absent a

prior po st- Bo ok

e r sentenc ing hear ing, a di strict court’s me re inc orporation of a Gove rnment’s sente ncing memorandum satisfies the court’s oblig ation to consider the § 3553( a) f actor s, this is mere dicta. Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.