# Official Journal C 132/14 A

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
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| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 132 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6614 April 2023 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 132

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6614 April 2023

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| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | |
| | EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
  2022-2023 SESSIONSittings of 3 to 6 October 2022TEXTS ADOPTED | 1 |

Contents

page

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
  2022-2023 SESSIONSittings of 3 to 6 October 2022TEXTS ADOPTED

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

1

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| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| --- | --- |
| | RESOLUTIONS |
| | European Parliament |
| | Tuesday 4 October 2022 |
| 2023/C 132/01 | European Parliament resolution of 4 October 2022 on striving for a sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture: the way forward (2021/2189(INI)) | 2 |
| 2023/C 132/02 | European Parliament resolution of 4 October 2022 on the impact of new technologies on taxation: crypto and blockchain (2021/2201(INI)) | 15 |
| 2023/C 132/03 | European Parliament resolution of 4 October 2022 on AccessibleEU Centre in support of accessibility policies in the EU internal market (2022/2013(INI)) | 23 |
| | Wednesday 5 October 2022 |
| 2023/C 132/04 | European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2022 on the situation of Roma people living in settlements in the EU (2022/2662(RSP)) | 29 |
| 2023/C 132/05 | European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2022 on the EU strategic objectives for the 19th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), to be held in Panama from 14 to 25 November 2022 (2022/2681(RSP)) | 41 |
| 2023/C 132/06 | European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2022 on access to water as a human right — the external dimension (2021/2187(INI)) | 54 |
| 2023/C 132/07 | European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2022 on the EU’s response to the increase in energy prices in Europe (2022/2830(RSP)) | 65 |
| | Thursday 6 October 2022 |
| 2023/C 132/08 | European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the situation of human rights in Haiti in particular related to gang violence (2022/2856(RSP)) | 74 |
| 2023/C 132/09 | European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the Media freedom crackdown in Myanmar, notably the cases of Htet Htet Khine, Sithu Aung Myint and Nyein Nyein Aye (2022/2857(RSP)) | 79 |
| 2023/C 132/10 | European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the recent humanitarian and human rights situation in Tigray, Ethiopia, notably that of children (2022/2858(RSP)) | 84 |
| 2023/C 132/11 | European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the death of Mahsa Jina Amini and the repression of women’s rights protesters in Iran (2022/2849(RSP)) | 89 |
| 2023/C 132/12 | European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine (2022/2851(RSP)) | 94 |
| 2023/C 132/13 | European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the outcome of the Commission’s review of the 15-point action plan on trade and sustainable development (2022/2692(RSP)) | 99 |
| 2023/C 132/14 | European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on an EU approach for space traffic management — an EU contribution addressing a global challenge (2022/2641(RSP)) | 103 |
| 2023/C 132/15 | European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on momentum for the ocean: strengthening ocean governance and biodiversity (2022/2836(RSP)) | 106 |
| | RECOMMENDATIONS |
| | European Parliament |
| | Wednesday 5 October 2022 |
| 2023/C 132/16 | European Parliament recommendation of 5 October 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa (2021/2206(INI)) | 115 |

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Parliament

Tuesday 4 October 2022

2023/C 132/01

European Parliament resolution of 4 October 2022 on striving for a sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture: the way forward (2021/2189(INI))

2

2023/C 132/02

European Parliament resolution of 4 October 2022 on the impact of new technologies on taxation: crypto and blockchain (2021/2201(INI))

15

2023/C 132/03

European Parliament resolution of 4 October 2022 on AccessibleEU Centre in support of accessibility policies in the EU internal market (2022/2013(INI))

23

Wednesday 5 October 2022

2023/C 132/04

European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2022 on the situation of Roma people living in settlements in the EU (2022/2662(RSP))

29

2023/C 132/05

European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2022 on the EU strategic objectives for the 19th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), to be held in Panama from 14 to 25 November 2022 (2022/2681(RSP))

41

2023/C 132/06

European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2022 on access to water as a human right — the external dimension (2021/2187(INI))

54

2023/C 132/07

European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2022 on the EU’s response to the increase in energy prices in Europe (2022/2830(RSP))

65

Thursday 6 October 2022

2023/C 132/08

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the situation of human rights in Haiti in particular related to gang violence (2022/2856(RSP))

74

2023/C 132/09

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the Media freedom crackdown in Myanmar, notably the cases of Htet Htet Khine, Sithu Aung Myint and Nyein Nyein Aye (2022/2857(RSP))

79

2023/C 132/10

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the recent humanitarian and human rights situation in Tigray, Ethiopia, notably that of children (2022/2858(RSP))

84

2023/C 132/11

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the death of Mahsa Jina Amini and the repression of women’s rights protesters in Iran (2022/2849(RSP))

89

2023/C 132/12

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine (2022/2851(RSP))

94

2023/C 132/13

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the outcome of the Commission’s review of the 15-point action plan on trade and sustainable development (2022/2692(RSP))

99

2023/C 132/14

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on an EU approach for space traffic management — an EU contribution addressing a global challenge (2022/2641(RSP))

103

2023/C 132/15

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on momentum for the ocean: strengthening ocean governance and biodiversity (2022/2836(RSP))

106

RECOMMENDATIONS

European Parliament

Wednesday 5 October 2022

2023/C 132/16

European Parliament recommendation of 5 October 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa (2021/2206(INI))

115

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| | III   Preparatory acts |
| --- | --- |
| | European Parliament |
| | Tuesday 4 October 2022 |
| 2023/C 132/17 | P9_TA(2022)0332European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 establishing a European Centre for disease prevention and control (COM(2020)0726 — C9-0366/2020 — 2020/0320(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2020)0320Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 establishing a European centre for disease prevention and control | 130 |
| 2023/C 132/18 | P9_TA(2022)0333Serious cross-border threats to health ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross-border threats to health repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU (COM(2020)0727 — C9-0367/2020 — 2020/0322(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2020)0322Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU | 132 |
| 2023/C 132/19 | P9_TA(2022)0336Management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Area of Competence ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Area of Competence, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1936/2001, (EC) No 1984/2003 and (EC) No 520/2007 (COM(2021)0113 — C9-0095/2021 — 2021/0058(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0058Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Area of Competence, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1936/2001, (EC) No 1984/2003 and (EC) No 520/2007 | 133 |
| 2023/C 132/20 | P9_TA(2022)0337Flexible Assistance to Territories (FAST-CARE) ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 and Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) — CARE (COM(2022)0325 — C9-0218/2022 — 2022/0208(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2022)0208Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) — CARE | 134 |
| 2023/C 132/21 | P9_TA(2022)0338Radio Equipment Directive: common charger for electronic devices ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/53/EU on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment (COM(2021)0547 — C9-0366/2021 — 2021/0291(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0291Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/53/EU on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment | 135 |
| 2023/C 132/22 | P9_TA(2022)0340EU Customs Single Window ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Union Single Window Environment for Customs and amending Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 (COM(2020)0673 — C9-0338/2020 — 2020/0306(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2020)0306Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Union Single Window Environment for Customs and amending Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 | 136 |
| 2023/C 132/23 | P9_TA(2022)0341Statistics on agricultural input and output ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on statistics on agricultural input and output and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1165/2008, (EC) No 543/2009, (EC) No 1185/2009 and Council Directive 96/16/EC (COM(2021)0037 — C9-0009/2021 — 2021/0020(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0020Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on statistics on agricultural input and output, amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 617/2008 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1165/2008, (EC) No 543/2009 and (EC) No 1185/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 96/16/EC | 137 |
| 2023/C 132/24 | P9_TA(2022)0342Amending Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 of the European Parliament and of the Council on persistent organic pollutants (COM(2021)0656 — C9-0396/2021 — 2021/0340(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0340Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants | 139 |
| | Thursday 6 October 2022 |
| 2023/C 132/25 | P9_TA(2022)0348Slot utilisation rules at Union airports: temporary relief ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 6 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 as regards temporary relief from the slot utilisation rules at Community airports due to the COVID-19 pandemic (COM(2022)0334 — C9-0225/2022 — 2022/0214(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2022)0214Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 6 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 as regards temporary relief from the slot utilisation rules at Union airports due to an epidemiological situation or military aggression | 141 |

III   Preparatory acts

European Parliament

Tuesday 4 October 2022

2023/C 132/17

P9_TA(2022)0332European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 establishing a European Centre for disease prevention and control (COM(2020)0726 — C9-0366/2020 — 2020/0320(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2020)0320Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 establishing a European centre for disease prevention and control

130

2023/C 132/18

P9_TA(2022)0333Serious cross-border threats to health ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross-border threats to health repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU (COM(2020)0727 — C9-0367/2020 — 2020/0322(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2020)0322Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU

132

2023/C 132/19

P9_TA(2022)0336Management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Area of Competence ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Area of Competence, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1936/2001, (EC) No 1984/2003 and (EC) No 520/2007 (COM(2021)0113 — C9-0095/2021 — 2021/0058(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0058Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Area of Competence, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1936/2001, (EC) No 1984/2003 and (EC) No 520/2007

133

2023/C 132/20

P9_TA(2022)0337Flexible Assistance to Territories (FAST-CARE) ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 and Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) — CARE (COM(2022)0325 — C9-0218/2022 — 2022/0208(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2022)0208Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) — CARE

134

2023/C 132/21

P9_TA(2022)0338Radio Equipment Directive: common charger for electronic devices ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/53/EU on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment (COM(2021)0547 — C9-0366/2021 — 2021/0291(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0291Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/53/EU on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment

135

2023/C 132/22

P9_TA(2022)0340EU Customs Single Window ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Union Single Window Environment for Customs and amending Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 (COM(2020)0673 — C9-0338/2020 — 2020/0306(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2020)0306Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Union Single Window Environment for Customs and amending Regulation (EU) No 952/2013

136

2023/C 132/23

P9_TA(2022)0341Statistics on agricultural input and output ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on statistics on agricultural input and output and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1165/2008, (EC) No 543/2009, (EC) No 1185/2009 and Council Directive 96/16/EC (COM(2021)0037 — C9-0009/2021 — 2021/0020(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0020Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on statistics on agricultural input and output, amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 617/2008 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1165/2008, (EC) No 543/2009 and (EC) No 1185/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 96/16/EC

137

2023/C 132/24

P9_TA(2022)0342Amending Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 of the European Parliament and of the Council on persistent organic pollutants (COM(2021)0656 — C9-0396/2021 — 2021/0340(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0340Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants

139

Thursday 6 October 2022

2023/C 132/25

P9_TA(2022)0348Slot utilisation rules at Union airports: temporary relief ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 6 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 as regards temporary relief from the slot utilisation rules at Community airports due to the COVID-19 pandemic (COM(2022)0334 — C9-0225/2022 — 2022/0214(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2022)0214Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 6 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 as regards temporary relief from the slot utilisation rules at Union airports due to an epidemiological situation or military aggression

141

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| Key to symbols used






  - | Consultation procedure |
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| *** | Consent procedure |
| ***I | Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading |
| ***II | Ordinary legislative procedure: second reading |
| ***III | Ordinary legislative procedure: third reading |

Key to symbols used

*

Consultation procedure

***

Consent procedure

***I

Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading

***II

Ordinary legislative procedure: second reading

***III

Ordinary legislative procedure: third reading

(The type of procedure depends on the legal basis proposed by the draft act.)

Amendments by Parliament:

New text is highlighted in
  bold italics
  . Deletions are indicated using either the ▌symbol or strikeout. Replacements are indicated by highlighting the new text in
  bold italics
  and by deleting or striking out the text that has been replaced.

bold italics

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14.4.2023

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/1

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

2022-2023 SESSION

Sittings of 3 to 6 October 2022

TEXTS ADOPTED

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Parliament

Tuesday 4 October 2022

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/2

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P9_TA(2022)0334

Striving for a sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture: the way forward

European Parliament resolution of 4 October 2022 on striving for a sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture: the way forward (2021/2189(INI))

(2023/C 132/01)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 12 May 2021 on strategic guidelines for a more sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture for the period 2021 to 2030 (COM(2021)0236), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 12 May 2021 on strategic guidelines for a more sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture for the period 2021 to 2030 (COM(2021)0236),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 25 March 2021 on an action plan for the development of organic production (COM(2021)0141), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 25 March 2021 on an action plan for the development of organic production (COM(2021)0141),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020)0381), and to Parliament’s resolution of 20 October 2021 (1) thereon, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020)0381), and to Parliament’s resolution of 20 October 2021 (1) thereon,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380), and to Parliament’s resolution of 9 June 2021 (2) thereon, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380), and to Parliament’s resolution of 9 June 2021 (2) thereon,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640), and to Parliament’s resolution of 15 January 2020 (3) thereon, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640), and to Parliament’s resolution of 15 January 2020 (3) thereon,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC (4),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1004 (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1004 (5),

| — | having regard to Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework of maritime spatial planning (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework of maritime spatial planning (6),

| — | having regard to Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (7) (the ‘Birds Directive’), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (7) (the ‘Birds Directive’),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing (8),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations (9),

| — | having regard to Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes (10),

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 22 September 2021 on strategic guidelines for the sustainable development of EU aquaculture, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 22 September 2021 on strategic guidelines for the sustainable development of EU aquaculture,

| — | having regard to the draft opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 1-3 December 2021 on sustainable blue economy and aquaculture, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 1-3 December 2021 on sustainable blue economy and aquaculture,

| — | having regard to the Opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 17 December 2015 on the future of European aquaculture, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 17 December 2015 on the future of European aquaculture,

| — | having regard to the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) 2030 Strategy for sustainable fisheries and aquaculture in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) 2030 Strategy for sustainable fisheries and aquaculture in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea,

| — | having regard to the interim evaluation of the Open Method of Coordination for EU aquaculture (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the interim evaluation of the Open Method of Coordination for EU aquaculture (11),

| — | having regard to Special Eurobarometer 515 of 2021 on EU consumer habits regarding fishery and aquaculture products, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Special Eurobarometer 515 of 2021 on EU consumer habits regarding fishery and aquaculture products,

| — | having regard to the study requested by its Committee on Fisheries (PECH) on the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on EU fisheries and aquaculture, published on 7 July 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the study requested by its Committee on Fisheries (PECH) on the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on EU fisheries and aquaculture, published on 7 July 2021,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 June 2018 entitled ‘Towards a sustainable and competitive European aquaculture sector: current status and future challenges’ (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 June 2018 entitled ‘Towards a sustainable and competitive European aquaculture sector: current status and future challenges’ (12),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 4 December 2008 on the adoption of a European Cormorant Management Plan to minimise the increasing impact of cormorants on fish stocks, fishing and aquaculture (13), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 4 December 2008 on the adoption of a European Cormorant Management Plan to minimise the increasing impact of cormorants on fish stocks, fishing and aquaculture (13),

| — | having regard to Articles 3, 4, 38 and 43 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
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—

having regard to Articles 3, 4, 38 and 43 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0215/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0215/2022),

| A. | whereas the common fisheries policy states that aquaculture should contribute to the preservation of food production potential on a sustainable basis throughout the Union so as to guarantee long-term food security, including food supplies, growth and employment for Union citizens, and contribute to meeting the growing world demand for aquatic food; whereas the common fisheries policy should pay full regard to animal health, animal welfare, food and feed safety; whereas it is crucial to reduce the administrative burden and implement Union law in a more efficient manner that is more responsive to the needs of stakeholders; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the common fisheries policy states that aquaculture should contribute to the preservation of food production potential on a sustainable basis throughout the Union so as to guarantee long-term food security, including food supplies, growth and employment for Union citizens, and contribute to meeting the growing world demand for aquatic food; whereas the common fisheries policy should pay full regard to animal health, animal welfare, food and feed safety; whereas it is crucial to reduce the administrative burden and implement Union law in a more efficient manner that is more responsive to the needs of stakeholders;

| B. | whereas the shellfish and aquaculture sectors play an important and valuable role in the EU from an economic, social and environmental perspective, and help to improve the quality of life in coastal, interior and outermost regions of the EU; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the shellfish and aquaculture sectors play an important and valuable role in the EU from an economic, social and environmental perspective, and help to improve the quality of life in coastal, interior and outermost regions of the EU;

| C. | whereas the food security and livelihoods that these industries provide are crucial in many coastal, riverine, island, inland and lagoon regions; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the food security and livelihoods that these industries provide are crucial in many coastal, riverine, island, inland and lagoon regions;

| D. | whereas the European Green Deal, the biodiversity strategy and the farm to fork strategy aim to achieve a carbon neutral Europe by 2050 and make food systems fair, healthy and environmentally friendly across the Union; whereas aquaculture can provide healthy food with a smaller climate and environmental footprint than that of non-aquatic land-based farming; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the European Green Deal, the biodiversity strategy and the farm to fork strategy aim to achieve a carbon neutral Europe by 2050 and make food systems fair, healthy and environmentally friendly across the Union; whereas aquaculture can provide healthy food with a smaller climate and environmental footprint than that of non-aquatic land-based farming;

| E. | whereas the FAO Declaration for Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture acknowledges that aquaculture has been the fastest growing global food production industry over the last five decades, and that it is responsible for the doubling of global per capita fish consumption since 1960 and has increasingly provided food and livelihoods to a growing population; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the FAO Declaration for Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture acknowledges that aquaculture has been the fastest growing global food production industry over the last five decades, and that it is responsible for the doubling of global per capita fish consumption since 1960 and has increasingly provided food and livelihoods to a growing population;

| F. | whereas the EU strategic guidelines for a more sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture, the FAO Shanghai Declaration of September 2021 on aquaculture for food and sustainable development, and the 2021 Aquatic Animal Health Code of the World Organisation for Animal Health establish animal welfare objectives in aquaculture to support producers and consumers; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the EU strategic guidelines for a more sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture, the FAO Shanghai Declaration of September 2021 on aquaculture for food and sustainable development, and the 2021 Aquatic Animal Health Code of the World Organisation for Animal Health establish animal welfare objectives in aquaculture to support producers and consumers;

| G. | whereas EU aquaculture production accounts for just 1,15 % of global production, according to the most recent figures (2018) (14); |
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G.

whereas EU aquaculture production accounts for just 1,15 % of global production, according to the most recent figures (2018) (14);

| H. | whereas the establishment or expansion of an aquaculture farm in the EU requires various licences and authorisations and is generally a slow, complex procedure that sometimes lacks legal certainty and economic predictability; whereas this situation hinders the development of the sector, discouraging corporate investment and generating excessive costs for the sector, while promoting imports from third countries; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the establishment or expansion of an aquaculture farm in the EU requires various licences and authorisations and is generally a slow, complex procedure that sometimes lacks legal certainty and economic predictability; whereas this situation hinders the development of the sector, discouraging corporate investment and generating excessive costs for the sector, while promoting imports from third countries;

| I. | whereas the FAO 2020 report on the state of world fisheries and aquaculture indicates that globally, the proportion of women in the total aquaculture workforce (19 %) is larger than that in fisheries (12 %) and that overall, women play a crucial role throughout the fish and aquaculture value chain and provide labour relating to both general commercial practices and artisanal practices; whereas the aquaculture sector in general directly employs more than 74 000 people in the EU in more than 12 000 companies (15); |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the FAO 2020 report on the state of world fisheries and aquaculture indicates that globally, the proportion of women in the total aquaculture workforce (19 %) is larger than that in fisheries (12 %) and that overall, women play a crucial role throughout the fish and aquaculture value chain and provide labour relating to both general commercial practices and artisanal practices; whereas the aquaculture sector in general directly employs more than 74 000 people in the EU in more than 12 000 companies (15);

| J. | whereas one in every four seafood products consumed in Europe comes from aquaculture; whereas between 2018 and 2019, per capita apparent consumption of farmed products increased by 2 %; whereas considering that in 2019, the EU was 41,2 % self-sufficient in fish and seafood, only 10 % of EU seafood consumption comes from EU aquaculture, which accounts for less than 2 % of global production; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas one in every four seafood products consumed in Europe comes from aquaculture; whereas between 2018 and 2019, per capita apparent consumption of farmed products increased by 2 %; whereas considering that in 2019, the EU was 41,2 % self-sufficient in fish and seafood, only 10 % of EU seafood consumption comes from EU aquaculture, which accounts for less than 2 % of global production;

| K. | whereas almost 70 % of aquaculture production in the EU is concentrated in four Member States (Spain, France, Italy and Greece), with mussels, trout, seabream, oysters, seabass, carp and clams accounting for the vast majority of production; whereas there is still a lot of potential for further growth and diversification in terms of producing countries and species farmed; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas almost 70 % of aquaculture production in the EU is concentrated in four Member States (Spain, France, Italy and Greece), with mussels, trout, seabream, oysters, seabass, carp and clams accounting for the vast majority of production; whereas there is still a lot of potential for further growth and diversification in terms of producing countries and species farmed;

| L. | whereas although nearly two thirds of Europeans ate fishery or aquaculture products at home at least once a month in 2021, this is a downward trend compared to 2018; whereas consumers in 2021 were divided regarding their preference for wild or farmed products, with around a third preferring wild products, a third preferring farmed products and a similar proportion having no preference; |
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L.

whereas although nearly two thirds of Europeans ate fishery or aquaculture products at home at least once a month in 2021, this is a downward trend compared to 2018; whereas consumers in 2021 were divided regarding their preference for wild or farmed products, with around a third preferring wild products, a third preferring farmed products and a similar proportion having no preference;

| M. | whereas some initial estimates point to a 17 % reduction in sales volume and an 18 % reduction in total income, with a particularly harsh impact on the shellfish sector; |
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M.

whereas some initial estimates point to a 17 % reduction in sales volume and an 18 % reduction in total income, with a particularly harsh impact on the shellfish sector;

| N. | whereas EU shellfish production consists mainly of molluscs, specifically mussels, oysters and clams, and is generally a traditional, labour-intensive aquaculture activity carried out by family businesses, that is fully integrated into the local environment; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas EU shellfish production consists mainly of molluscs, specifically mussels, oysters and clams, and is generally a traditional, labour-intensive aquaculture activity carried out by family businesses, that is fully integrated into the local environment;

| O. | whereas the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean 2030 strategy for sustainable fisheries and aquaculture in the Mediterranean and Black Sea specifies that aquaculture production needs to meet demand, grow sustainably, capitalise on innovation, digitalisation and knowledge sharing and enhance its attractiveness for investment; whereas the strategy further states that monitoring and reducing the sector’s environmental footprint, dealing with climate change and pollution and securing animal health and welfare are crucial in achieving sustainability; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean 2030 strategy for sustainable fisheries and aquaculture in the Mediterranean and Black Sea specifies that aquaculture production needs to meet demand, grow sustainably, capitalise on innovation, digitalisation and knowledge sharing and enhance its attractiveness for investment; whereas the strategy further states that monitoring and reducing the sector’s environmental footprint, dealing with climate change and pollution and securing animal health and welfare are crucial in achieving sustainability;

| P. | whereas the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries’ 2020 economic report on the EU aquaculture sector indicates that almost 80 % of all aquaculture enterprises in the EU are microenterprises with fewer than 10 employees; |
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P.

whereas the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries’ 2020 economic report on the EU aquaculture sector indicates that almost 80 % of all aquaculture enterprises in the EU are microenterprises with fewer than 10 employees;

| Q. | whereas the interim evaluation of the Open Method of Coordination concluded that the Member States should make greater efforts to expand the EU’s aquaculture sector, enhancing its resilience and competitiveness, and guaranteeing, in particular, access to space and water, and a transparent and efficient regulatory and administrative framework; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas the interim evaluation of the Open Method of Coordination concluded that the Member States should make greater efforts to expand the EU’s aquaculture sector, enhancing its resilience and competitiveness, and guaranteeing, in particular, access to space and water, and a transparent and efficient regulatory and administrative framework;

| R. | whereas, despite the sector’s potential, the development of aquaculture in the outermost regions still lags seriously behind; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas, despite the sector’s potential, the development of aquaculture in the outermost regions still lags seriously behind;

| S. | whereas the European Market Observatory for fisheries and aquaculture’s fishmeal and fish oil report from September 2021 indicates that most fishmeal in aquaculture feed is consumed in Asia and that in 2019, 34 % of fishmeal was used in China, 35 % in other Asian countries, and 9 % of fishmeal was used in Europe; whereas 20 million tonnes of wild fish are captured yearly for non-human feed purposes; whereas there is increasing competition for fishmeal on the global animal feed markets between aquaculture and livestock producers; whereas higher feed prices increase the need for further development of alternative feed products as well as feed efficiency to ensure profitability for high-value aquaculture products; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas the European Market Observatory for fisheries and aquaculture’s fishmeal and fish oil report from September 2021 indicates that most fishmeal in aquaculture feed is consumed in Asia and that in 2019, 34 % of fishmeal was used in China, 35 % in other Asian countries, and 9 % of fishmeal was used in Europe; whereas 20 million tonnes of wild fish are captured yearly for non-human feed purposes; whereas there is increasing competition for fishmeal on the global animal feed markets between aquaculture and livestock producers; whereas higher feed prices increase the need for further development of alternative feed products as well as feed efficiency to ensure profitability for high-value aquaculture products;

| T. | whereas the FAO fisheries and aquaculture technical paper of 19 February 2019 entitled ‘A third assessment of global marine fisheries discards’ shows that discards amount to a total of 9,1 million tonnes, which represents 10,8 % of the annual average catch between 2010 and 2014; |
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T.

whereas the FAO fisheries and aquaculture technical paper of 19 February 2019 entitled ‘A third assessment of global marine fisheries discards’ shows that discards amount to a total of 9,1 million tonnes, which represents 10,8 % of the annual average catch between 2010 and 2014;

| U. | whereas the European Market Observatory for fisheries and aquaculture’s report of May 2017 on EU organic aquaculture from indicates that organic aquaculture production is increasing significantly in some Member States, while others are still in the early stages of developing this production method; |
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U.

whereas the European Market Observatory for fisheries and aquaculture’s report of May 2017 on EU organic aquaculture from indicates that organic aquaculture production is increasing significantly in some Member States, while others are still in the early stages of developing this production method;

| V. | whereas aquaculture is especially sensitive to extreme weather events in riverbeds and coastal areas that are increasingly occurring due to global warming, including droughts, floods, storms and waves, which cause severe damage to aquaculture infrastructures and the species cultivated; |
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V.

whereas aquaculture is especially sensitive to extreme weather events in riverbeds and coastal areas that are increasingly occurring due to global warming, including droughts, floods, storms and waves, which cause severe damage to aquaculture infrastructures and the species cultivated;

| W. | whereas Directive 2014/89/EU on maritime spatial planning calls for all coastal Member States to present national maritime spatial plans to the Commission ‘as soon as possible, and at the latest by 31 March 2021’; |
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W.

whereas Directive 2014/89/EU on maritime spatial planning calls for all coastal Member States to present national maritime spatial plans to the Commission ‘as soon as possible, and at the latest by 31 March 2021’;

| X. | whereas the outermost regions are particularly exposed to unstable climates and severe weather events, which may jeopardise the sector’s potential in those regions; |
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X.

whereas the outermost regions are particularly exposed to unstable climates and severe weather events, which may jeopardise the sector’s potential in those regions;

| Y. | whereas the population of cormorants has seen a massive increase; whereas this increase is causing serious damage to many marine sectors, including aquaculture; |
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Y.

whereas the population of cormorants has seen a massive increase; whereas this increase is causing serious damage to many marine sectors, including aquaculture;

| Z. | whereas in its resolution on the adoption of a European cormorant management plan to minimise the increasing impact of cormorants on fish stocks, fishing and aquaculture, adopted 13 years ago, Parliament proposed several possible actions to solve the problems that cormorants continue to pose; |
| --- | --- |

Z.

whereas in its resolution on the adoption of a European cormorant management plan to minimise the increasing impact of cormorants on fish stocks, fishing and aquaculture, adopted 13 years ago, Parliament proposed several possible actions to solve the problems that cormorants continue to pose;

| AA. | whereas its resolution entitled ‘Towards a sustainable and competitive European aquaculture sector: current status and future challenges’ highlights the importance, among many other actions, of minimising the increasing impact of cormorants on aquaculture; |
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AA.

whereas its resolution entitled ‘Towards a sustainable and competitive European aquaculture sector: current status and future challenges’ highlights the importance, among many other actions, of minimising the increasing impact of cormorants on aquaculture;

| AB. | whereas financial compensation is available to aquaculture and fisheries operators for losses deriving from cormorants’ interaction with fisheries; |
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AB.

whereas financial compensation is available to aquaculture and fisheries operators for losses deriving from cormorants’ interaction with fisheries;

| AC. | whereas the entire aquaculture sector in Europe will have to bear the burden of increasing electricity and gas costs, with an even worse outlook due to rising production costs and marketing uncertainty caused also by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis; |
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AC.

whereas the entire aquaculture sector in Europe will have to bear the burden of increasing electricity and gas costs, with an even worse outlook due to rising production costs and marketing uncertainty caused also by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis;

| AD. | whereas large fish and fish product producers in the EU neighbourhood area are planning by 2030 to double their aquaculture production compared to 2020 levels, which could ramp up the pressure on the EU’s production; |
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AD.

whereas large fish and fish product producers in the EU neighbourhood area are planning by 2030 to double their aquaculture production compared to 2020 levels, which could ramp up the pressure on the EU’s production;

| AE. | whereas not all Member States are giving sufficient consideration to the potential of aquaculture development or its potential socioeconomic and environmental effects; |
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AE.

whereas not all Member States are giving sufficient consideration to the potential of aquaculture development or its potential socioeconomic and environmental effects;

| AF. | whereas the annual consumption of fish products per capita in the EU varies very widely, from approximately 6 kg to approximately 60 kg; whereas demand for aquaculture products in the EU could therefore increase in the foreseeable future; |
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AF.

whereas the annual consumption of fish products per capita in the EU varies very widely, from approximately 6 kg to approximately 60 kg; whereas demand for aquaculture products in the EU could therefore increase in the foreseeable future;

| AG. | whereas many enterprises are finding it difficult to maintain their market share, both domestically and abroad; |
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AG.

whereas many enterprises are finding it difficult to maintain their market share, both domestically and abroad;

| AH. | whereas, according to the most recent data from Eurostat and the FAO, in 2019 around 76 % of the fish consumed in the EU was wild and 24 % was farmed; |
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AH.

whereas, according to the most recent data from Eurostat and the FAO, in 2019 around 76 % of the fish consumed in the EU was wild and 24 % was farmed;

| AI. | whereas there are only 62 products with protected geographical indication (PGI) registered in Class 1.7. — Fresh fish, molluscs, and crustaceans and products derived therefrom, out of a total of 1 382 PGI products; whereas protection procedures are under way for 14 other products; whereas the register of Traditional Specialities Guaranteed (TSG) foods contains just four products in that class; whereas some of the successful registrations have been for aquaculture products; |
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AI.

whereas there are only 62 products with protected geographical indication (PGI) registered in Class 1.7. — Fresh fish, molluscs, and crustaceans and products derived therefrom, out of a total of 1 382 PGI products; whereas protection procedures are under way for 14 other products; whereas the register of Traditional Specialities Guaranteed (TSG) foods contains just four products in that class; whereas some of the successful registrations have been for aquaculture products;

| AJ. | whereas the EU fisheries funds (the European Fisheries Fund (EFF), the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) and the European Maritime, fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF)) have provided financial support to the EU aquaculture sector; |
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AJ.

whereas the EU fisheries funds (the European Fisheries Fund (EFF), the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) and the European Maritime, fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF)) have provided financial support to the EU aquaculture sector;

| AK. | whereas escapees from aquaculture farms can cause genetic alterations in wild populations; |
| --- | --- |

AK.

whereas escapees from aquaculture farms can cause genetic alterations in wild populations;

Aquaculture’s contribution to the European Green Deal

| 1. | Welcomes the Commission communication on the strategic guidelines for a more sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture for the period 2021 to 2030; considers these guidelines comprehensive, sound and fit for the purpose of promoting sustainable and competitive EU aquaculture with a long-term focus on the sustainability of the aquaculture sector and on its contribution to the European Green Deal; regrets, however, the fact that they are much focused on environmental aspects and that they need more ambition to boost sustainable production and the development of a genuinely thriving and competitive EU aquaculture sector; considers that it is important to establish quantitative objectives for the growth of this sector in the framework of the guidelines, just as the biodiversity strategy, the farm to fork strategy and other Green Deal strategies set environmental targets; urges the Members States and the Aquaculture Advisory Council to implement the actions recommended in the guidelines; calls on the Commission to regularly monitor compliance with these recommendations and to keep Parliament informed; |
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1.

| 2. | Emphasises the importance of proper and coordinated implementation of the guidelines by Member States in order to achieve their objectives; points out the importance of the role of the Commission in assisting and coordinating the implementation among Member States to ensure a level playing field for EU aquaculture farmers; encourages the Commission to continuously follow the implementation of these guidelines and other legal acts affecting aquaculture such as the Regulation on organic production and labelling of organic products (16) and if appropriate to present amendments to this regulation, and potentially others, with a view to addressing hurdles hampering the realisation of EU objectives on organic production, such as those set out in the farm to fork strategy; |
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2.

| 3. | Highlights the potential of the aquaculture sector’s contributions to achieving the objectives of the European Green Deal, and highlights the need to ensure the long-term sustainability and resilience of the sector, notably in the light of the COVID-19 crisis; considers that the transition to a sustainable food system in Europe needs to take advantage of the untapped potential in the aquaculture sector as it can play an important and even bigger part in the circular economy and as a net contributor to the transformation of excess nutrients into high-quality protein; |
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3.

| 4. | Underlines that EU aquaculture meets high standards in terms of product quality and animal health, but that there is still margin for improvement in terms of diversification, competitiveness and environmental performance; notes that low-impact aquaculture (such as low-trophic, multitrophic and organic aquaculture), and environmental services from aquaculture can, if further developed, greatly contribute to the European Green Deal, to the farm-to-fork strategy and to a sustainable blue economy (17); |
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4.

| 5. | Points out that aquaculture is expected to contribute to food supply and food security by rebalancing the fish gap, since the EU imports 70 % of all the aquatic food it consumes and that causes an annual EUR 21 billion trade deficit (in 2019); considers that aquaculture has sizeable development and growth potential that needs to be enhanced while remaining within ecological limits, so that it can provide sustainable and quality food products, reduce our dependence on aquatic food imports and create more jobs and other socioeconomic opportunities, especially in coastal regions but also in rural areas; calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide a robust, reliable, predictable, streamlined and business-friendly legal framework, and making full use of the available financing resources of the EMFAF, as this is the funding instrument specifically dedicated to the objectives of EU fisheries and aquaculture management; urges Member States to earmark sufficient funding under the Recovery and Resilience Facility to support the innovation, sustainability and resilience of the EU aquaculture sector; |
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5.

| 6. | Underlines that aquaculture was developed as a social necessity to provide a constant supply of fresh aquatic food in seasons and regions where capture fisheries failed to deliver it, thus fulfilling one of the most important roles for society: the provision of healthy fresh food mainly for the local or regional market; stresses therefore that the expansion of aquaculture in Europe is strongly linked to traditional cultural practices, which are more or less specific to their own particular part of the continent; |
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6.

| 7. | Points out the importance of precise data and statistics for aquaculture products, especially in relation to consumption, imports and exports, in order to ensure that we are reaching the targets and objectives we are setting for the sector; calls for more data to be made available and accessible in this regard; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Points out that the external trade imbalance in aquatic products produced in the Union is unacceptable, both from an economic point of view, given the trade deficit that this entails, and from a social point of view, given the missed opportunities for employment; |
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8.

| 9. | Stresses that progress towards the objectives of the European Green Deal must be aligned with ensuring the food security of third countries; |
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9.

| 10. | Supports the establishment of the new EU aquaculture assistance mechanism as an innovative tool to aid the Commission, Member States, regional authorities, industry and other stakeholders to develop further guidance and consolidate best practices on different relevant areas; considers that all relevant stakeholders, including Parliament, should be involved in the creation of this mechanism, in particular all members of the Aquaculture Advisory Council, in accordance with Article 11 TEU that recognises participatory democracy as a fundamental democratic principle; calls for the creation of meaningful dialogue with civil society; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Stresses that the growth potential of the EU aquaculture sector needs to be developed in a sustainable manner, taking all three pillars of sustainability — economic, social and environmental — into consideration; points out the need to have an attractive and market-oriented sector, also for new fish farmers, with a legal framework for attracting business investments, creating and maintaining good working conditions, and protecting the environment by using sustainable feed sources and improving aquatic health, animal welfare and biosecurity, as well as reducing the use of antimicrobials in accordance with the best available scientific advice, encouraging responsible and prudent practices, in line with the farm to fork strategy; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Considers that the aquaculture sector is capable of providing a consistent contribution to ecosystem services for society, and that pond aquaculture, algae and shellfish farming can contribute to decarbonising the EU economy and mitigating climate change; stresses, however, that carbon sequestration by algae and shellfish farming is limited depending on the production method and use when the product is harvested; supports the proposed actions on climate change but highlights the need for a common methodology to measure the carbon footprint of individual aquaculture farms and requests an impact assessment for all the proposed measures including their impact on individual aquaculture sectors; calls on Member States to promote efficient short supply chains, where appropriate, with a view to contributing to the combat against climate change; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Believes that large-scale investment is required through mitigation and adaptation measures to prevent and reduce the impact of catastrophes and extreme weather events on the fishing and aquaculture sectors, with a view to strengthening productive and resilient aquatic ecosystems and maintaining benefits for consumers and animal welfare; |
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13.

| 14. | Points out that the implementation of the strategic guidelines should pay more attention to micro and small aquaculture enterprises and their specific needs; |
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14.

| 15. | Urges the Commission to support the establishment of vocational training courses for the aquaculture sector by providing technical and financial resources, in order to attract young people and allow fishermen to retrain, which will help to create jobs in coastal and island regions that are traditionally more dependent on fishing activities; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to facilitate, encourage and provide adequate support for environmentally friendly aquaculture, such as organic aquaculture, closed-system aquaculture, algae, shellfish, pond fish farming and integrated multi-trophic and aquaponic aquaculture systems; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Takes the view that support should be provided for developing aquaponic systems, which are closed production systems on land that combine aquaculture production with crop production, with the latter using the organic matter in the water, thereby reducing the effects of pollution caused by excess organic matter; |
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17.

| 18. | Considers that freshwater aquaculture is very important in many rural regions of Europe, and provides not only high-quality food and employment but also interesting ecosystem services; calls on the Commission to generalise the use of the term ‘aquatic food’ which is a more comprehensive and inclusive expression and does not leave freshwater farmers behind; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Points out that for freshwater aquaculture in particular, predators and drought also pose a challenge, reflected in the quantity, size and quality of farmed fish, and they ultimately have a negative impact on the profitability of the sector; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Reiterates the need for a food traceability system in the EU that enhances the sustainability of the aquaculture sector and responds to consumer demands by providing information on where, when, how and what fish or aquatic food has been farmed, primarily to improve food safety but also to enable checks throughout the chain of both EU products and imports from outside the EU and to combat fraud; believes that this system should involve all actors in the value chain, so that they can collaborate with one another using digital systems, artificial intelligence and other technological innovations; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Highlights the value that European consumers place on quality designations, including both designations of origin and protected geographical indications; calls on the Commission and the Member States to encourage their use in aquaculture products that offer the necessary qualities and meet the requirements laid down in the European Regulation on quality, for example the Mexillón de Galicia PDO; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Welcomes the Commission’s intention to support green business models, such as those based on carbon sequestration, in order to make supply chains more sustainable; stresses, in this regard, that certain aquaculture practices, such as mussel or oyster farming and pond polyculture, can be successful models for future emissions credit systems, in the context of EU climate legislation; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support this type of green business in the light of the strategy’s objectives; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Highlights the importance of applying evidence-based standards and interventions to improve fish welfare during keeping, transport and slaughter, including maintaining water quality within welfare and environment-relevant limits, as a way of reducing the prevalence and spread of diseases and further diminishing the need for the use of antibiotics, which in any case should be further reduced; calls for particular attention to be paid to feeding methods in order to control levels of organic matter, whether in open or closed circuits, with the aim of maintaining and improving good environmental practises; highlights the importance of continuing to improve farming methods in line with the most up-to-date scientific knowledge available in order to achieve animal welfare that contributes to better environmental results, resilience against climate change and the optimisation of resource use; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Reiterates that various recommendations on animal welfare do not apply to the fisheries and aquaculture sectors because of their nature; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Calls on the Member States to continue encouraging the promotion of algae farming and facilitate the use and development of algae as food and feed, including by enabling easier authorisation processes, without neglecting other aquaculture farmed species; highlights that there is untapped potential in algae farming for creating new jobs and providing ecosystem services and more environmentally friendly food and feed; considers that better managing algae populations could to a certain extent be an effective way, in addition to their farming, to help combat eutrophication and remove excess nitrogen and phosphorus from water, as well as excess carbon if the algae remain in the water and are left to deposit on the seafloor; welcomes the Commission’s intention to present a specific initiative to support algae consumption in the EU; points out that better protecting seaweed populations may provide ecosystem services, act as a carbon sink and contribute to improving biodiversity; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Welcomes the role of women in aquaculture value chains and urges accordingly that they be guaranteed decent working conditions and that the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value be respected; considers further that their visibility and representation in decision-making structures and processes should be enhanced; |
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26.

Main obstacles to aquaculture in the Union and possible solutions

| 27. | Urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that national plans for the sustainable development of aquaculture take into account the main barriers to the development of the potential of the sector and to recognise the need to allocate space to aquaculture through appropriate spatial planning; highlights the importance of a transparent and participative mechanism, in line with Directive 2014/89/EU on maritime spatial planning, for allocating space, including to existing and new fishing grounds and aquaculture farms and marine protected areas as well as fisheries restricted areas to all stakeholders in an equitable manner; regrets that some Member States have yet to present to the Commission their national maritime spatial plans, despite the deadline laid down in the directive, and urges them to present their plans as soon as possible; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Supports the aim of the Commission to initiate promotion campaigns to encourage consumption of EU aquaculture products and highlight EU aquaculture and to further support its sustainable development; highlights the need in this regard for comprehensive and easy-to-access consumer information including on healthy diets, environmental benefits and other sustainability parameters such as climate impact; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Considers that aquaculture production sites planned and established in open water should not coincide or conflict with fishing zones; considers, further, that the fisheries sector and its operators and representatives should be fully involved in this process; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Points out that EU aquaculture production remains highly concentrated in terms of both Member States and species farmed, so there is significant potential for diversification; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Points out that spatial planning is one of the key tools for creating the preconditions for the long-term development of aquaculture and should ensure suitable planning locations for aquaculture, taking into account other activities in the areas concerned; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Stresses that the development of aquaculture requires a solid, reliable, clear and administratively simple legal framework for the use of space and licences that provides confidence and security for investment in the sector; stresses that spatial planning should result in an effective and flexible plan that considers the ever-changing marine and freshwater environments within which aquaculture functions, and that overly restrictive zoning may deter investment and development; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Highlights the importance of legal certainty and investment predictability for the sustainable growth of the Union’s aquaculture sector; stresses that all of the measures adopted by the various public authorities in the Member States must help to simplify administrative deadlines and procedures, so that public administrations fulfil their requirements, resolve issues on time and avoid unnecessary delays in authorisation or licensing procedures; rejects retroactive action reducing the period of validity of licences or extensions, and calls on the Member States to safeguard the confidence and legitimate expectations of licence holders; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Points out that, in terms of licensing and planning, existing bureaucratic complexity and delays result in additional costs for potential investors; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure clear and transparent licensing procedures in order to encourage investors; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Stresses that the Open Method of Coordination should be further implemented to achieve coordination with national, regional and local public administrations that have competences in the aquaculture sector; considers this coordination very necessary for streamlining national legislation and providing guidance on the regulatory framework applicable to the sector; calls on the Commission to publish country-specific recommendations to provide the Member States with guidance concerning the development of EU aquaculture; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure better coordination as regards the EU’s shared competences, and coordination among national, regional and local authorities; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Stresses the importance of sustainable feed ingredients for aquaculture in the Union; considers that aquaculture can only fill the fish gap if all species farmed provide a net gain in fish protein, meaning that aquaculture does not remove more wild fish from the oceans and other bodies of water for feed requirements than it produces; highlights that globally, a large share of fish used to produce fishmeal and fish oil is caught in the exclusive economic zones of developing countries; stresses the need to promote ecologically sustainable marine proteins and oils to be used as feed in the form of by-products and trimmings, other proteins and innovative solutions, such as insect meal and microalgae, and the partial replacement of marine proteins and oils with non-marine alternatives that are sustainably produced; calls on the Commission and the Member States to invest in research and innovation in order to promote a transition to sustainable and new sources of protein and asks the Commission to assess whether any legislative changes are needed in this regard; calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote sustainable practices and increase the percentage of independently certified fishmeal and fish oil within feeds, with certification carried out by credible and independent environmental and social certification schemes that use low trophic index assessment criteria and the FAO code of conduct; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Acknowledges the fact that it is not currently possible to provide enough fishmeal and fish oil to aquaculture with just discards and by-products from the fishing industry, in part because of increasing demand on the fishmeal market; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure sustainable fishmeal and fish oil production and to jointly step up efforts on research and innovation to solve the problem of increased demand on the fishmeal market by developing sustainable alternatives; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Is concerned about the growing number of fishmeal and fish oil factories along the West African coast, managed mainly by Chinese companies whose unsustainable production is causing existential problems for regional and non-industrial fisheries, and calls on the Commission therefore to ensure that no feed from such production is used in aquaculture facilities within the EU; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Calls on the Commission to use digital systems and artificial intelligence to improve the traceability and sustainability of aquaculture products and to extend traceability to the feed used; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Calls on the Commission to acknowledge the importance of conducting EU-wide communication campaigns about sustainable EU aquaculture and the importance of production with funds under direct management in line with the objectives of the strategic guidelines; calls on the Member States and the Commission to include the organisation of information and communication campaigns in all operational programmes, in line with the objectives of the strategic guidelines, on specific subsectors of sustainable EU aquaculture; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Urges the Commission to promote programmes under the EU agricultural promotion policy through which aquaculture products can be promoted specifically and individually; stresses the importance of making use of the current review of the agricultural promotion policy to better position the promotion of sustainable aquaculture products and encourages the Commission to use the agricultural promotion policy to support sectors and operators that inherently contribute to, or lead the transition towards, achieving the objectives of the Green Deal; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Welcomes the quality of the work carried out by the European Market Observatory for fisheries and aquaculture (EUMOFA); calls on the Commission to give EUMOFA additional targeted funding to translate the Observatory’s reports into all EU official languages as they are often available in only one or no more than five official EU languages; believes that such information will help the aquaculture sector to obtain up-to-date and high-quality information to enhance its marketing performance; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Urges the Commission and the Member States to substantially increase funds for research and innovation in the aquaculture sector (both marine and freshwater), especially new knowledge fields such as the study of the microbiome or the scientific monitoring of aquaculture environmental services; calls on the Member States to provide or increase funding for research and development in the aquaculture sector, and enhance the transfer of scientific knowledge to the sector and other stakeholders; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Calls on the Member States and their administrations to ensure that the potential of the agricultural product and food quality schemes is used more widely for aquaculture products; recalls the possibility for setting up regional or national quality schemes, which can help producers to enhance their visibility and thus their marketing performance and income; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Underlines that knowledge and innovation (including the use of digital technology) are key to achieving the other objectives set for the EU aquaculture sector and that Horizon Europe, the EU framework programme for research and innovation, offers a significant opportunity to take a step forward in this area; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Urges the Commission to improve and collect information on the potential of the aquaculture sector in the outermost regions through viability studies and feedback, and to provide specific support for start-ups that want to work in this sector in those regions; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Expresses its strongest support for innovation and advances in the breeding of new aquaculture species; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Takes note of the fact that an innovative aquaculture sector also demands the development of appropriate skills achieved through the promotion of specialised curriculums and knowledge on aquaculture (e.g. specialised veterinary studies for fish and training on fish health for aquaculture operators), as well as life-long training for farmers on innovative approaches for the aquaculture sector; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Calls on the Commission to work further on levelling the playing field for EU aquaculture vis-a-vis third country producers through the revision of international trade agreements and the possible signing of new ones in the future, in relation to imports of products that do not have the same market access, environmental and social sustainability, or fish welfare standards as those produced in the EU, including by updating rules for the better implementation of aquatic food labelling; considers that, in specific cases such as caviar labelling, the legal framework on information for consumers should be revised; calls on the Commission to analyse, by means of an impact assessment, the inclusion of sustainable aquaculture sectors in the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism in order to create incentives for European industries and EU trade partners to decarbonise their industries in favour of implementing measures that will positively help to reduce greenhouse gases with the aim of reaching zero net emissions, and therefore supporting both EU and global climate policies towards greenhouse gas neutrality, and at the same time, without being discriminatory or constituting a disguised restriction on international trade; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Recalls the opportunities for the sector to step up trade in aquaculture products, especially in countries and regions where consumption of these products is low; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support scientific knowledge on fish welfare, promote best aquaculture practices on fish well-being and promote the creation of EU reference centres for fish welfare; stresses that good animal welfare practices are the best preventive step to reduce the need for medicines and to ensure fish health and welfare; encourages further use of technologies and innovation to address illnesses in a more targeted manner, reducing the amount of medicine needed; stresses the need to improve the availability of veterinary medicines, when needed for the aquaculture sector; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | Recommends that the Commission devise legislative proposals on the basis of the latest scientific knowledge on the needs of fish and other aquatic animals and on transport methods in order to minimise their suffering during transport; stresses that the new provisions should provide a detailed checklist for pre-transport planning and preparation, specific provisions concerning water quality parameters, density, handling during loading and unloading, and post-transport welfare controls; calls on the Commission to ensure that the guidelines it publishes are updated on the basis of the latest scientific evidence and are in line with Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 and calls for specific requirements for the commercial movement of fish; stresses, furthermore, that specific training and certification should be provided regarding fish transportation; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | Supports increasing the capacity of Copernicus and the European Marine Observation and Data Network to observe, model and forecast to better anticipate the effects of extreme weather events both on land and at sea, to which aquaculture facilities are especially sensitive; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | Stresses the importance of adequate training both for competent authorities and farmers on how to limit the environmental impact of aquaculture practises and ensure the respect of high animal welfare and health standards; |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | Calls on the Commission to prepare a proposal for an EU great cormorant management plan that could properly and definitively address the problem the aquaculture sector has been facing for many years, based on the best available scientific advice and experiences and practices already tested in Member States; urges that the plan be designed for the effective mitigation and control of their effect on aquaculture farms, with a view to reducing their economic, environmental and social impact on production and biodiversity; highlights that the plan should include a list of eligible measures on preventive coexistence solutions and adequate compensation for losses and measures, financed with EU or national funds; insists that financial support for tailor-made research aimed at finding and testing preventive measures is key, but also for allowing proper monitoring, including recording and analysing the effects of the measures undertaken; calls on the Member States to implement those measures on a local case-by-case basis and report to the Commission every year on the implementation of the plan, including the effectiveness of the measures chosen; calls on the Commission to evaluate the EU great cormorant management plan every five years and report to Parliament; urges the Commission to prepare, as an immediate action, a guidance document on how to apply derogations provided for in Article 9 of the Birds Directive, and to assess the need to modify the current legislation where preventive measures have proven insufficient and the financial and social impact does not allow for coexistence solutions, according to the best scientific advice; |
| --- | --- |

56.

| 57. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to simplify licensing procedures, and to make further efforts and provide the additional help necessary to enable users of the EMFAF to gain access to funding; |
| --- | --- |

57.

Organic aquaculture

| 58. | Welcomes the Commission communication on an action plan for the development of organic production and the 23 actions included in its annex; points out that organic aquaculture needs to play a key role in the planned growth of the aquaculture sector, given its ample untapped potential for development, in line with the transition to a sustainable food system in Europe, and which should be given assistance through the EMFAF; |
| --- | --- |

58.

| 59. | Agrees that organic aquaculture has potential, but emphasises the differences in organic aquaculture production across the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

59.

| 60. | Agrees with the objective of a significant increase in organic aquaculture by 2030 without setting any concrete percentage in this plan, given that this is a relatively new sector and its growth is not easy to predict; encourages Member States, however, to set targets, if appropriate, taking into account their knowledge of local- and regional specificities and market developments; points out that although EU organic aquaculture has experienced an increase in the farming of certain species and in certain countries in recent years (including salmon in Ireland and mussels in Denmark and Ireland), the demand for EU organic aquaculture is uncertain and, moreover, the economic performance of organic aquaculture is still not sufficient in some areas; |
| --- | --- |

60.

| 61. | Considers that sustainable aquaculture, in general, and organic aquaculture, in particular, will play a key role in meeting the EU’s ambition for a carbon neutral Europe by 2050 by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and contributing to climate change mitigation, while supplying additional benefits to the environment and biodiversity; |
| --- | --- |

61.

| 62. | Points out that sustainable aquaculture, in general, and organic aquaculture, in particular, can help meet consumer demands for diversified high-quality food produced in a way that respects the environment and ensures fish welfare, thereby filling the gap between demand and supply of fishery products in the EU, and relieving pressure on wild stocks; |
| --- | --- |

62.

| 63. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States, within the framework of national plans for the sustainable development of aquaculture, to analyse the main barriers to the development of organic aquaculture and propose appropriate measures; calls further on the Member States to include, based on an ex-ante impact assessment, an increase in organic aquaculture among the objectives of their reviewed multi-annual national strategic plans for aquaculture; considers that the EMFAF should be used to promote sustainable aquaculture practices, including organic production, and to provide support during the conversion period, which would level the playing field with respect to other organic farmers; |
| --- | --- |

63.

| 64. | Stresses the need for increased support for research and innovation on alternative sources of nutrients, treatments, breeding and animal welfare in aquaculture; considers it necessary to promote investments in adapted polyculture and multi-trophic aquaculture systems and to promote hatcheries and nursery activities for organic juveniles; welcomes the Open Method of Coordination for the exchange of best practices and innovation in organic aquaculture; |
| --- | --- |

64.

| 65. | Highlights that innovation, including different types of aquaculture, has developed since the Regulation on organic production and labelling of organic products was adopted; points out in this regard that certain provisions, such as those on reproduction, are ill equipped for the new innovative and sustainable aquaculture methods developed; urges the Commission to assess this Regulation accordingly and present the necessary amendments; |
| --- | --- |

65.

| 66. | Calls on the Commission to analyse how the rules for organic aquaculture are interpreted, implemented and monitored in each Member State; urges the Commission to publish guidelines for the Member States, certification bodies and fish farmers, aimed at reducing heterogeneity in the implementation of the organic regulation, based on the conclusions of that analysis; |
| --- | --- |

66.

| 67. | Urges the Commission to consider re-authorising the use of 30 % of the daily ration of fishmeal and fish oil from non-organic aquaculture trimmings, or trimmings of fish caught for human consumption that come from sustainable EU fishery products, for a transitional period of five years for all newcomers in the organic aquaculture sector, given its positive impact on the circular economy and as a necessary support measure in view of the low availability and high prices of organic feed; calls on the Commission to consider also the use of species (which may not naturally spawn in Europe) for which induced reproduction is performed using pituitary extracts, species which are used in polyculture practices in order to use other trophic niches of the culture environment, thus contributing to carbon sequestration, mitigating eutrophication, increasing overall pond productivity and reducing the nutrient load of fish farming; |
| --- | --- |

67.

| 68. | Highlights the need to level the playing field for EU organic farmers across the Union, as well as with imported organic products, by providing the same rules, support and harmonising treatments for diseases used in organic aquaculture and organic livestock farming; |
| --- | --- |

68.

| 69. | Recalls that Parliament’s resolution entitled ‘Towards a sustainable and competitive European aquaculture sector: current status and future challenges’ proposes 92 actions to unlock the potential of EU aquaculture through: simplifying administrative procedures; ensuring equity in interaction with other sectors; enhancing the competitiveness of EU aquaculture within and outside the Union’s borders; improving consumer information; ensuring animal welfare and the availability of veterinary products; pursuing better promotional campaigns and communication; supporting research and innovation; encouraging training and employment; increasing the sustainability of the EU’s aquaculture sector; ensuring adequate financing through the EMFF and other structural funds; and achieving a harmonious symbiosis with fisheries; urges the Commission to work closely with Member States to implement these actions; |
| --- | --- |

69.

| 70. | Points out that the conflict between extractive fishing and aquaculture makes no sense in the current context, in which demand for marine products is rising while the pressure on wild fish populations is gradually starting to decrease in the Union, and stresses that these two activities complement one another; |
| --- | --- |

70.

| 71. | Stresses that cooperation between aquaculture, on the one hand, and the canning and processing sector, on the other, can generate significant added value for aquaculture products if the cooperation is carried out in synergy and promotes both activities; |
| --- | --- |

71.

o

o o

| 72. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the common fisheries policy Advisory Councils. |
| --- | --- |

72.

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(1)  OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 2.

(2)  OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25.

(3)  OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 2.

(4)  OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 22.

(5)  OJ L 247, 13.7.2021, p. 1.

(6)  OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 135.

(7)  OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7.

(8)  OJ L 303, 18.11.2009, p. 1.

(9)  OJ L 3, 5.1.2005, p. 1.

(10)  OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 23.

(11)  European Commission, Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Study on an interim evaluation of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) for the sustainable development of EU aquaculture, 2019.

(12)  OJ C 28, 27.1.2020, p. 26.

(13)  OJ C 21 E, 28.1.2010, p. 11.

(14)  European Commission, Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, The EU fish market: 2020 edition, Publications Office, 2021.

(15)  Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) — The EU Aquaculture Sector — Economic report 2020 (STECF-20-12). EUR 28359 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2021.

(16)  Regulation (EU) 2018/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on organic production and labelling of organic products (OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 1).

(17)  Transforming the EU's Blue Economy for a Sustainable Future (2021) — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0240&from=EN

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| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/15 |
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14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/15

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P9_TA(2022)0335

Impact of new technologies on taxation: crypto and blockchain

European Parliament resolution of 4 October 2022 on the impact of new technologies on taxation: crypto and blockchain (2021/2201(INI))

(2023/C 132/02)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication on 15 July 2020 entitled ‘An action plan for fair and simple taxation supporting the recovery strategy’ (COM(2020)0312), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication on 15 July 2020 entitled ‘An action plan for fair and simple taxation supporting the recovery strategy’ (COM(2020)0312),

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal of 24 September 2020 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in crypto-assets (COM(2020)0593), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal of 24 September 2020 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in crypto-assets (COM(2020)0593),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 September 2020 on a digital finance strategy for the EU (COM(2020)0591), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 24 September 2020 on a digital finance strategy for the EU (COM(2020)0591),

| — | having regard to the report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of 12 October 2020 entitled ‘Taxing Virtual Currencies: An Overview of Tax Treatments and Emerging Tax Policy Issues’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of 12 October 2020 entitled ‘Taxing Virtual Currencies: An Overview of Tax Treatments and Emerging Tax Policy Issues’,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2021 entitled ‘Business Taxation for the 21st Century’ (COM(2021)0251), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2021 entitled ‘Business Taxation for the 21st Century’ (COM(2021)0251),

| — | having regard to the 2021 working paper on taxation and structural reforms by the Joint Research Centre of the Commission entitled ‘Cryptocurrencies: an empirical view from a tax perspective’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 2021 working paper on taxation and structural reforms by the Joint Research Centre of the Commission entitled ‘Cryptocurrencies: an empirical view from a tax perspective’,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal of 20 July 2021 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets (COM(2021)0422), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal of 20 July 2021 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets (COM(2021)0422),

| — | having regard to the World Bank’s working paper entitled ‘Crypto-Assets Activity around the World: Evolution and Macro-Financial Drivers’ published on 8 March 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the World Bank’s working paper entitled ‘Crypto-Assets Activity around the World: Evolution and Macro-Financial Drivers’ published on 8 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the public consultation document of the OECD released on 22 March 2022 entitled ‘Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework and Amendments to the Common Reporting Standard’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the public consultation document of the OECD released on 22 March 2022 entitled ‘Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework and Amendments to the Common Reporting Standard’,

| — | having regard to its study of 15 October 2018 entitled ‘VAT fraud: economic impact, challenges and policy issues’, its study of July 2018 entitled ‘Cryptocurrencies and blockchain — Legal context and implications for financial crime, money laundering and tax evasion’ and its study of 15 February 2018 entitled ‘Impact of Digitalisation on International Tax Matters’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its study of 15 October 2018 entitled ‘VAT fraud: economic impact, challenges and policy issues’, its study of July 2018 entitled ‘Cryptocurrencies and blockchain — Legal context and implications for financial crime, money laundering and tax evasion’ and its study of 15 February 2018 entitled ‘Impact of Digitalisation on International Tax Matters’,

| — | having regard to its study of 21 October 2021 entitled ‘Exploring the opportunities and challenges of new technologies for EU tax administration and policy’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its study of 21 October 2021 entitled ‘Exploring the opportunities and challenges of new technologies for EU tax administration and policy’,

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0204/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0204/2022),

| A. | whereas the use of new technologies in the EU single market and the digitalisation of tax administrations across Europe are transforming relations between taxpayers, namely citizens and companies, on the one hand, and national tax authorities on the other; whereas the EU could play a leading role in ensuring that the procedural and technical aspects of the digitalisation of tax administrations are coordinated to avoid barriers to the interoperability of national technical platforms; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the use of new technologies in the EU single market and the digitalisation of tax administrations across Europe are transforming relations between taxpayers, namely citizens and companies, on the one hand, and national tax authorities on the other; whereas the EU could play a leading role in ensuring that the procedural and technical aspects of the digitalisation of tax administrations are coordinated to avoid barriers to the interoperability of national technical platforms;

| B. | whereas the different characteristics of different types of crypto-assets and the boundaries between different kinds of crypto-assets might be relevant for determining their tax treatment; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the different characteristics of different types of crypto-assets and the boundaries between different kinds of crypto-assets might be relevant for determining their tax treatment;

| C. | whereas the market dynamic of crypto-assets shows that there is a need to create a clear, stable and transparent legal framework; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the market dynamic of crypto-assets shows that there is a need to create a clear, stable and transparent legal framework;

| D. | whereas tax authorities today face many challenges regarding effective tax enforcement and in particular cross-border cooperation, given the acceleration of digital transactions, the increasing mobility of taxpayers, the number of cross-border transactions and the internationalisation of economic operations and business models, as well as the risks of double taxation or complex aggressive tax schemes; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas tax authorities today face many challenges regarding effective tax enforcement and in particular cross-border cooperation, given the acceleration of digital transactions, the increasing mobility of taxpayers, the number of cross-border transactions and the internationalisation of economic operations and business models, as well as the risks of double taxation or complex aggressive tax schemes;

| E. | whereas tax authorities need to keep up with potential risks for the sustainability of tax systems and their ability to enforce national and European legal frameworks regarding taxation; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas tax authorities need to keep up with potential risks for the sustainability of tax systems and their ability to enforce national and European legal frameworks regarding taxation;

| F. | whereas new technological solutions, such as blockchain, can be used by tax administrations to better serve the needs of tax payers, to exchange information between jurisdictions, for various types of record-keeping, and to deter and/or address corruption, while such technologies can also be abused and serve as vehicles for illicit activities, with the criminal intent to avoid paying taxes; whereas the increased visibility of blockchain transactions, in particular, might facilitate tax administrations’ efforts to combat tax fraud; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas new technological solutions, such as blockchain, can be used by tax administrations to better serve the needs of tax payers, to exchange information between jurisdictions, for various types of record-keeping, and to deter and/or address corruption, while such technologies can also be abused and serve as vehicles for illicit activities, with the criminal intent to avoid paying taxes; whereas the increased visibility of blockchain transactions, in particular, might facilitate tax administrations’ efforts to combat tax fraud;

| G. | whereas several tax administrations across Europe are already taking important steps towards the digitalisation of processes, although to varying degrees, making tax compliance easier, faster and more effective; whereas the use of new technologies still varies considerably between Member States; whereas national tax administrations, in general, need a further push for more incentives and awareness-raising measures to realise the potential in the field of technological and digital transformation; whereas technology can help facilitate cooperation between different government bodies, namely on matters related to taxation; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas several tax administrations across Europe are already taking important steps towards the digitalisation of processes, although to varying degrees, making tax compliance easier, faster and more effective; whereas the use of new technologies still varies considerably between Member States; whereas national tax administrations, in general, need a further push for more incentives and awareness-raising measures to realise the potential in the field of technological and digital transformation; whereas technology can help facilitate cooperation between different government bodies, namely on matters related to taxation;

| H. | whereas the increasing use of crypto-assets is forcing tax administrations to adapt current tax practices within the single market; whereas within the crypto-assets market, the identification of tax-relevant activities is complex, as it relies less on traditional financial intermediaries, who typically provide information for tax purposes; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the increasing use of crypto-assets is forcing tax administrations to adapt current tax practices within the single market; whereas within the crypto-assets market, the identification of tax-relevant activities is complex, as it relies less on traditional financial intermediaries, who typically provide information for tax purposes;

| I. | whereas five of the 27 Member States have specific legal provisions on the taxation of crypto-assets; whereas 19 Member States have administrative guidance on the taxation of crypto-assets; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas five of the 27 Member States have specific legal provisions on the taxation of crypto-assets; whereas 19 Member States have administrative guidance on the taxation of crypto-assets;

| J. | whereas the OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS) has improved international tax transparency by requiring jurisdictions to obtain information on offshore assets held with financial institutions and automatically exchange that information with the jurisdictions of residence of taxpayers on an annual basis; whereas in most instances, however, crypto-assets will not fall within the scope of the CRS, which applies to traditional financial assets and fiat currencies; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS) has improved international tax transparency by requiring jurisdictions to obtain information on offshore assets held with financial institutions and automatically exchange that information with the jurisdictions of residence of taxpayers on an annual basis; whereas in most instances, however, crypto-assets will not fall within the scope of the CRS, which applies to traditional financial assets and fiat currencies;

| K. | whereas there is an international effort and commitment to better regulate the fair taxation of the digital economy; whereas crypto-assets could be exploited to undermine existing international tax transparency initiatives, as recognised by the OECD; whereas, in this context, it is crucial for the EU to take a leading role, in particular through close cooperation between Member States to tax crypto-assets in a fair and transparent way; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas there is an international effort and commitment to better regulate the fair taxation of the digital economy; whereas crypto-assets could be exploited to undermine existing international tax transparency initiatives, as recognised by the OECD; whereas, in this context, it is crucial for the EU to take a leading role, in particular through close cooperation between Member States to tax crypto-assets in a fair and transparent way;

| L. | whereas the global economy is changing and becoming progressively digitalised, and whereas the principles underpinning the current international tax framework are progressively being outdated and can no longer ensure that profits are taxed where the economic activities generating those profits are performed and where value is created; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the global economy is changing and becoming progressively digitalised, and whereas the principles underpinning the current international tax framework are progressively being outdated and can no longer ensure that profits are taxed where the economic activities generating those profits are performed and where value is created;

| M. | whereas there is no international instrument regarding the taxation of crypto-assets and there is a wide spectrum of approaches to this matter taken by different countries; whereas the EU must lead the way to more inclusive financial participation of citizens, both within and outside its borders, in the relevant international platforms; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas there is no international instrument regarding the taxation of crypto-assets and there is a wide spectrum of approaches to this matter taken by different countries; whereas the EU must lead the way to more inclusive financial participation of citizens, both within and outside its borders, in the relevant international platforms;

| N. | whereas the OECD identifies, in its 2020 report on the taxation of virtual currencies, a number of material points to address, namely the definition of taxable events, the forms of income that are associated with virtual currencies, and how taxation can be adjusted to the nature and dynamics of crypto-assets in order to capture profits in a fair and efficient manner, among other aspects; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the OECD identifies, in its 2020 report on the taxation of virtual currencies, a number of material points to address, namely the definition of taxable events, the forms of income that are associated with virtual currencies, and how taxation can be adjusted to the nature and dynamics of crypto-assets in order to capture profits in a fair and efficient manner, among other aspects;

| O. | whereas the Union has already taken important steps towards a clear definition of certain crypto-assets and crypto-asset service providers and, more broadly, towards establishing a suitable regulatory framework for crypto-assets — the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) Regulation; whereas this framework and these definitions will facilitate the fair and simple taxation of these assets; whereas definitions of such crypto-assets must be aligned with international standards, namely those developed by the OECD and the Financial Action Task Force; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas the Union has already taken important steps towards a clear definition of certain crypto-assets and crypto-asset service providers and, more broadly, towards establishing a suitable regulatory framework for crypto-assets — the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) Regulation; whereas this framework and these definitions will facilitate the fair and simple taxation of these assets; whereas definitions of such crypto-assets must be aligned with international standards, namely those developed by the OECD and the Financial Action Task Force;

| P. | whereas definitions of crypto-assets need to be uniform across the EU and aligned with international standards; whereas the same crypto-asset may be categorised as a ‘tax object’ in a number of different ways across the EU, resulting in different tax treatment; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas definitions of crypto-assets need to be uniform across the EU and aligned with international standards; whereas the same crypto-asset may be categorised as a ‘tax object’ in a number of different ways across the EU, resulting in different tax treatment;

| Q. | whereas certain fields of tax policy are a national competence and cooperation between Member States remains essential and necessary to respond to the challenges posed to the integrity of the single market and the sustainability of tax systems, inter alia the increasing use of crypto-assets; whereas a framework of 27 significantly different approaches to crypto-asset taxation could lead to significant obstacles to the fulfilment of the objectives of the digital single market; whereas there is therefore a clear case for coordination and cooperation at EU level; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas certain fields of tax policy are a national competence and cooperation between Member States remains essential and necessary to respond to the challenges posed to the integrity of the single market and the sustainability of tax systems, inter alia the increasing use of crypto-assets; whereas a framework of 27 significantly different approaches to crypto-asset taxation could lead to significant obstacles to the fulfilment of the objectives of the digital single market; whereas there is therefore a clear case for coordination and cooperation at EU level;

| R. | whereas the EU and its single market must ensure an innovation-friendly environment for companies (in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups) regarding new technologies in the area of financial services and crypto-assets; whereas this main goal requires a strong commitment from Member States with policies, namely on taxation, to ensure a stable, clear and secure regulatory framework for businesses to thrive and contribute to economic growth; whereas, finally, this effort requires strong commitment to safeguard citizens’ rights, as taxpayers and consumers of financial services; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas the EU and its single market must ensure an innovation-friendly environment for companies (in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups) regarding new technologies in the area of financial services and crypto-assets; whereas this main goal requires a strong commitment from Member States with policies, namely on taxation, to ensure a stable, clear and secure regulatory framework for businesses to thrive and contribute to economic growth; whereas, finally, this effort requires strong commitment to safeguard citizens’ rights, as taxpayers and consumers of financial services;

| S. | whereas clear guidelines are essential for a fair and efficient taxation system that, if efficiently implemented by the Member States, could achieve beneficial reforms through reducing administrative costs and time, lowering barriers to entry and ensuring certainty and stability, which are prerequisites for competitiveness, as well as for bridging gaps among companies, especially for SMEs; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas clear guidelines are essential for a fair and efficient taxation system that, if efficiently implemented by the Member States, could achieve beneficial reforms through reducing administrative costs and time, lowering barriers to entry and ensuring certainty and stability, which are prerequisites for competitiveness, as well as for bridging gaps among companies, especially for SMEs;

| T. | whereas crypto-assets are a fast moving environment and policymakers need to deliver on equal terms; whereas the tax policy and tax evasion implications still need to be looked at closely, as they form an important aspect of the overall regulatory framework; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas crypto-assets are a fast moving environment and policymakers need to deliver on equal terms; whereas the tax policy and tax evasion implications still need to be looked at closely, as they form an important aspect of the overall regulatory framework;

| U. | whereas Parliament has already underlined that ‘current international corporate tax rules are no longer suitable in the context of digitalisation and globalisation of the economy’, and that ‘developments in digitalisation and a stronger reliance on intangible assets and their increase in value chains create prospects and challenges in terms of traceability of economic operations and taxable events, including enabling of tax avoidance practices, especially when these operations are cross-border or take place outside the Union’ (1); |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas Parliament has already underlined that ‘current international corporate tax rules are no longer suitable in the context of digitalisation and globalisation of the economy’, and that ‘developments in digitalisation and a stronger reliance on intangible assets and their increase in value chains create prospects and challenges in terms of traceability of economic operations and taxable events, including enabling of tax avoidance practices, especially when these operations are cross-border or take place outside the Union’ (1);

| V. | whereas, unlike in traditional finance, the crypto world is sometimes organised in a decentralised way, making it more difficult to draw on intermediaries to assist tax authorities; whereas such intermediaries often serve as relevant information providers in traditional third-party tax reporting regimes; whereas on the intersection between the crypto sector and the traditional financial system, an intermediary such as an exchange is usually involved; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas, unlike in traditional finance, the crypto world is sometimes organised in a decentralised way, making it more difficult to draw on intermediaries to assist tax authorities; whereas such intermediaries often serve as relevant information providers in traditional third-party tax reporting regimes; whereas on the intersection between the crypto sector and the traditional financial system, an intermediary such as an exchange is usually involved;

The potential of new technologies such as blockchain to better serve taxpayers, deter corrupt practices, empower tax administrations and tackle tax fraud and evasion

| 1. | Considers that national tax administrations should be better equipped with the adequate resources to facilitate efficient tax collection, enforce rules, better serve taxpayers and ensure compliance; calls on the Member States to commit, in the light of the increased challenges of the digital transition, to making sufficient investments in human resources, including training, digital infrastructures and specialised personnel and equipment; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to explore in future legislative proposals how to ensure that the technology underpinning newly adopted legislation is intrinsically linked to the correct implementation of the legislation; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Points out that adapting the IT capacities of tax authorities through new emerging technologies, such as distributed ledger technologies like blockchain or artificial intelligence, promises to foster intelligent, effective and efficient tax and administrative procedures, deter and limit corruption, facilitate tax compliance by citizens and businesses, and increase the traceability and identification of taxable transactions and ownership of tangible and intangible assets in a globalised environment where cross-border transactions have increased, thus creating opportunities for better and more fairly designed tax systems to tax both mobile taxpayers and assets; asks the Commission to analyse and evaluate the effects on data protection and revenue of implementing a possible tax on personal data storage; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Stresses that emerging technologies such as distributed ledger technology and blockchain, through their unique features such as traceability and their capacity for storing immutable and reliable data, protecting that data’s integrity, could offer a new way to automate tax collection; believes that this would ensure that people pay what they owe, assure efficient tax compliance and facilitate the collection of tax revenues at the source of the different stages of the lifecycle of a product or service in a timely manner, while protecting the personal data of citizens and guaranteeing a high standard of data protection; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Highlights the need to identify the best ways to use technology to strengthen the analytical capacity of tax administrations (through better data analysis), to standardise data to facilitate tax compliance for SMEs and taxpayers (including through common reporting standards), and to ensure that taxation better reflects the business environment in the digital age and at the same time guarantees high levels of data protection; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Takes note of the launch of the EU Advanced International Administrative Cooperation Community (EU AIAC Community) and the valuable contribution of the Tax Administrations EU Summit (TADEUS) to the debate on the impact of new technologies on the work of national tax authorities; calls on the Commission, therefore, to involve these forums in the design of a special training programme for tax administration staff on the use of new technologies in the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion as well as to build on their role in the improvement of the interoperability of tax systems as regards the standardisation of data and automatic real-time data sharing in a cross-border context; recalls that such a programme must be integrated in the activity of the Fiscalis programme; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Highlights, however, that the use of blockchain, AI and other digital tools by tax administrations has its merits and risks, which must be properly mitigated, notably to prevent violations of privacy and biased and discriminatory treatment of taxpayers; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Highlights in particular the risks associated with data quality; notes in this regard that a permissioned blockchain, with restricted permissions granted to intermediaries, is crucial in the context of tax administrations and may help improve the integrity of the system as it allows tax information, among other data, to be shared in a secure environment; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls on the Commission to assess the ways in which different Member States tax crypto-assets and the different national policies regarding the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion in the field of crypto-assets, underlining best practices and potential loopholes, and taking advantage of cooperation platforms in the field of taxation, namely the Fiscalis programme; calls on the Commission, with the support of the Code of Conduct Group on business taxation, to tackle harmful tax practices in the area of crypto-assets in the EU; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Recognises that the impact of new technologies such as blockchain on tax matters can be viewed differently depending on whether the focus is on direct taxation (withholding tax, for example), indirect taxation (VAT or customs duties) or compliance; underlines the potential of distributed ledger technology to make the withholding tax system more efficient in each country, but also to facilitate seamless cross-border procedures and prevent fraudulent activity; advises the Commission to take into consideration the specific characteristics of each dimension; calls on the Commission to take account of existing digital solutions in the Member States and evaluate the opportunity to integrate blockchain-based solutions on information exchange platforms in order to promote real-time auditing and exchange of information while fully respecting EU data protection rules; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Invites the Commission to evaluate the creation of a new platform for training and best-practice sharing between national tax authorities in the field of combating tax fraud and tax evasion in the digital economy, notably through the use of crypto-assets; understands that this new platform could be integrated in current initiatives such the Fiscalis programme; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Invites the Commission to continue evaluating the operational impact and tax governance aspects of blockchain and other distributed ledger technologies, notably through the Fiscalis programme; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Recalls its proposal for a Commission initiative on a ‘standard for online reporting of data for (in the first instance) cross-border Union trade, preferably by using data from e-invoicing (or from an alternative, but keeping the principle that the data must be provided only once), including efficient and highly secure centralised/decentralised data processing for detection of fraud’ (2); |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Insists on its call on the Member States ‘to continue reforming tax authorities, to speed up digitalisation and to start implementing strategic approaches to support SMEs with tax compliance as well as to identify opportunities for burden reductions’ (3); |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Calls on the Commission to explore all the opportunities created by the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI) — a peer-to-peer network of interconnected nodes running blockchain-based services infrastructure — for national tax authorities, mainly in the area of VAT compliance, in full respect of the highest standards of data protection and privacy, with the aim of making multiple and innovative blockchain protocols available to them, and with the mission of assisting national tax administrations in their adaptation to the use of such technologies; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Recalls the importance of the European Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) and calls on the Commission to evaluate the added value of blockchain-based technologies in assuring a proper cross-border tax identity, with high standards of data protection and privacy safeguards; |
| --- | --- |

16.

Taxation challenges regarding crypto-assets

| 17. | Considers that crypto-assets must be subject to fair, transparent and effective taxation in order to guarantee fair competition and a level playing field between the tax treatment of assets and financial products and between financial services providers; understands that decisions on the taxation of crypto-assets lie with Member States, in accordance with the Treaties; invites authorities to consider a simplified tax treatment for occasional or small traders and small transactions; stands for an innovation-friendly environment in the digital single market, where entrepreneurs, SMEs and start-ups can thrive, generate growth, create jobs and contribute to economic recovery through tax revenues under an effective regulatory framework; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Notes that digital economy operators can engage in significant business activities in a Member State without establishing a physical presence there, and therefore taxes paid in one jurisdiction no longer reflect the value and profits created there; underlines, therefore, the need to adapt the concept of permanent establishment, namely with a clear definition of virtual permanent establishment, in line with international standards; recalls, therefore, the importance of an effective transposition of pillar one of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Acknowledges that the definition of the tax base for crypto-assets is one of the core issues for tax policy; notes that there is currently no internationally-agreed standard definition of crypto-assets and the types of assets that the term should include; understands the need for such a definition as a main priority in the European legislative framework in order to guarantee a leading position for the Union at international level; understands that the OECD, mandated by the G20, is working on a new global tax transparency framework to provide for the reporting and exchange of information with respect to crypto-assets; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Considers that it is necessary to have a clear, broadly accepted definition of crypto-assets for tax purposes; underlines that this definition should be aligned with that of the MiCA Regulation; insists on the need to guarantee systematic coherence between the several legal instruments that regulate or will regulate crypto assets (for example the MiCA Regulation, the Transfer of Funds Regulation (4), the Administrative Cooperation Directive (5) and other anti-money laundering-related initiatives) and, most importantly, to safeguard legal certainty and stability; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Points out that with crypto assets, there may be different options to define a relevant taxable event such as the creation of coins via mining, the exchange of crypto-assets into fiat currency or other crypto-assets, a hard fork or the staking of crypto-assets; notes that a coherent definition of a taxable event needs to be found in order to ensure a proper level of taxation, while avoiding instances of double taxation; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Calls on the Commission to present an assessment on the conversion of one type of crypto-asset into a different kind of crypto-asset and present options on defining the taxable event, bearing in mind the risk of increasing the number of taxable events considerably while creating significant valuation problems; calls on the Commission to check the option that the conversion of a crypto-asset into fiat currency might be a more appropriate choice for a taxable event, if gains have been made; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Notes that each country tends to use their own terminology when designing their national regulatory solutions to crypto-assets, which could cause legal uncertainty for citizens and companies, be a threat to the integrity of the EU single market as cross-border cooperation could be significantly impaired, inadvertently create loopholes providing opportunities for tax abuse and avoidance and be exploited to undermine existing international tax transparency standards such as the CRS; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Emphasises that the dynamic of the markets in crypto-assets (6) makes it urgent to have rules in place defining the type of taxation to be applied, the definition of the taxable event, the timing of when and where a taxable event occurs and its valuation; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Points out that the taxation of crypto-assets in cross-border situations is linked to several dimensions of tax policy such as income tax and VAT and that currently such dimensions are distributed between national and European competences, but that the benefits of a common European approach might be most marked in areas linked, among others, to administrative cooperation, exchange of information and corporate taxation; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Calls on the Commission to consider the dimension of crypto-assets, digitalisation and new technologies in all its planned and future legislative proposals on tax matters, in particular the upcoming proposal entitled ‘Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation’ (BEFIT); calls on the Member States, in this context, to be ambitious and lead the international debate; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Calls on the Member States to consider the specificities of the use of crypto-assets in their national tax reforms, and to consider implementing more effective systems that ensure lower compliance costs and administrative burdens, but that guarantee, at the same time, the fair, transparent, proportionate and effective taxation of crypto-assets; highlights that temporary and justified tax incentives may be appropriate for promoting technological innovation and development, particularly of the blockchain technology sector; highlights the key importance of common reporting standards for crypto-asset service providers as well as individuals and entities; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Calls on Member States to treat different types of crypto-assets in a manner that is consistent with the tax treatment of similar non-crypto assets; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Calls on the Member States to consider the EU policy objectives as enshrined in Article 3 of the Treaty of European Union, especially a highly competitive social market economy and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, in the framework of their legislative options regarding the tax treatment of crypto-assets; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Asks the Commission to evaluate whether the tax treatment of crypto-assets compared to the tax treatment of other assets is consistent and fair, especially regarding the VAT treatment of those assets; |
| --- | --- |

30.

Moving forward with the development of an effective regulatory/legal framework

| 31. | Points out that the crypto-asset landscape is global and that the tax treatment of crypto-assets requires a coordinated international approach; understands, in this regard, the need to further negotiate international instruments on the matter; considers that the OECD, which has already done substantial work on both taxation and the treatment of crypto-assets, could be a suitable forum in this regard, notably for the revision of the CRS; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Notes that the OECD has already commenced work on a new crypto-asset reporting framework; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Considers that the absence of an international agreement on the taxation of crypto-assets leaves the EU and its Member States without a foundation on which to build an intelligent and future-driven approach; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Calls on the Commission to present an assessment of major taxable events and forms of income associated with crypto-assets, focusing on the tax consequences of a number of key operations such as the issuance of crypto-assets, the exchange of crypto-assets for fiat currencies, goods or services, and bestowal via gift or inheritance, as well as loss or theft, etc.; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Asks the Commission to conduct an impact assessment on the best practices identified to fairly and effectively tax crypto-assets, respecting the set of EU competences in tax matters, to look into the role of crypto-asset services providers and to determine to what extent crypto-assets fit within the existing tax framework; takes the view that tax policy should be integrated within a sound regulatory framework for crypto-assets and that it should be coherent with other policy aspects including tax transparency and legal, financial and consumer protection requirements; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Recalls that a fully integrated EU single market requires a common approach on the taxation of crypto-assets, respecting competences defined by the Treaties; calls on the Council, therefore, in its Economic and Financial Affairs Council formation, to initiate a structured dialogue with Parliament on this matter; calls also on the president of the Eurogroup to put forward a debate on the taxation of crypto-assets with the finance ministers of the euro area; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Believes that it is necessary to amend the scope of the Administrative Cooperation Directive so that the exchange of information framework in the field of taxation includes crypto-assets and e-money; calls on the OECD to adopt without any further delay a new definition of a reporting standard for the exchange of information; considers that the revision of the Administrative cooperation Directive is a priority in the field of taxation; calls on the Commission to include in its future revision of the Directive, without any delay, the future OECD recommendations on crypto-asset reporting and revisions of the CRS as well as Parliament’s recommendations as laid out in its resolution on the implementation of the EU requirements for exchange of tax information (7); calls on the Council to swiftly adopt these proposed changes; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Stresses the importance of guaranteeing that a future revision of the Administrative Cooperation Directive will complement reporting obligations under other legal instruments, by helping authorities to automatically exchange data about crypto-assets and e-money so that they can assess income and revenue from investments and payments using crypto-assets and e-money; underlines the need to safeguard a systematic coherence that provides legal certainty to operators and technical guidance to national tax authorities; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Calls on the Commission and national public authorities to ensure that blockchain technology that is used to enforce rules or provide public services complies with fundamental rights, as well as standards related to cybersecurity and anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Encourages the Commission to take account of existing digital solutions, legal provisions and administrative guidance used in Member States in order to assess how to leverage blockchain and other distributed ledger technologies to prevent tax fraud and tax avoidance and to address corruption; supports the development of a European blockchain services infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Asks the Commission to evaluate how to support improved tax compliance, taking into account the fast moving values of crypto-assets and the lack of obvious translation into fiat currency in some cases, but also the challenge for tax administrations to obtain reliable and timely information on these transactions; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Considers that, insofar as the crypto sector is currently in transition and is not expected to stabilise in the near future, the need to assess the situation should not prevent the EU institutions from legislating on better supervision and better taxation of crypto-assets; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Points out the need for frequent review and adaptation of tax policy in order to be able to respond to the evolutions of the sector and to ensure that it remains relevant in the face of technological and market developments related to virtual currencies and other emerging asset types; |
| --- | --- |

43.

o

o o

| 44. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

44.

---

(1)  European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2022 with recommendations to the Commission on fair and simple taxation supporting the recovery strategy (EP follow-up to the July Commission’s Action Plan and its 25 initiatives in the area of VAT, business and individual taxation) (OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 211).

(2)  OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 211.

(3)  European Parliament resolution of 15 February 2022 on the impact of national tax reforms on the EU economy (OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 14).

(4)  Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information accompanying transfers of funds (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 1).

(5)  Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (OJ L 64, 11.3.2011, p. 1).

(6)  The economic size of the cryptocurrencies market was valued at EUR 2,2 trillion in May 2021, with a peak of EUR 2,5 trillion in October 2021 (Joint Research Centre of the Commission, 2021).

(7)  European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2021 on the implementation of the EU requirements for exchange of tax information: progress, lessons learnt and obstacles to overcome (OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 120).

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| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/23

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P9_TA(2022)0339

AccessibleEU Centre in support of accessibility policies in the EU internal market

European Parliament resolution of 4 October 2022 on AccessibleEU Centre in support of accessibility policies in the EU internal market (2022/2013(INI))

(2023/C 132/03)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union,

| — | having regard to Articles 19, 48, 67(4), 153, 165, 168 and 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 19, 48, 67(4), 153, 165, 168 and 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Articles 3, 21, 24, 26, 34, 35, 41 and 47 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Articles 3, 21, 24, 26, 34, 35, 41 and 47 thereof,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and its entry into force on 21 January 2011 in accordance with Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and its entry into force on 21 January 2011 in accordance with Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (1),

| — | having regard to the general comments on the CRPD, drawn up by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as the authoritative guidance on its implementation, and in particular general comment No. 2 on Article 9: Accessibility, adopted on 11 April 2014, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the general comments on the CRPD, drawn up by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as the authoritative guidance on its implementation, and in particular general comment No. 2 on Article 9: Accessibility, adopted on 11 April 2014,

| — | having regard to the Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member States and the Commission setting out internal arrangements for the implementation by and representation of the European Union relating to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member States and the Commission setting out internal arrangements for the implementation by and representation of the European Union relating to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2),

| — | having regard to the concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 2 October 2015 on the initial report of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 2 October 2015 on the initial report of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the European Ombudsman’s strategic inquiry into how the Commission monitors EU Funds used to promote the right of persons with disabilities and older persons in independent living, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Ombudsman’s strategic inquiry into how the Commission monitors EU Funds used to promote the right of persons with disabilities and older persons in independent living,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030’ (COM(2021)0101), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030’ (COM(2021)0101),

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426, ‘the anti-discrimination directive’) and Parliament’s position of 2 April 2009 thereon (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426, ‘the anti-discrimination directive’) and Parliament’s position of 2 April 2009 thereon (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 18 June 2020 on the European disability strategy post-2020 (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 18 June 2020 on the European disability strategy post-2020 (4),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/782 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/782 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations (5),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the accessibility requirements for products and services (6) (European Accessibility Act), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the accessibility requirements for products and services (6) (European Accessibility Act),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/2102 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on the accessibility of websites and mobile applications of public sector bodies (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/2102 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on the accessibility of websites and mobile applications of public sector bodies (7),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (8),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/612 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (recast) (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/612 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (recast) (9),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication entitled ‘2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade’ (COM(2021)0118), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication entitled ‘2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade’ (COM(2021)0118),

| — | having regard to Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (10),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication entitled ‘Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy — putting European transport on track for the future’ (COM(2020)0789), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication entitled ‘Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy — putting European transport on track for the future’ (COM(2020)0789),

| — | having regard to the New Consumer Agenda (COM(2020)0696), that has amongst its five priorities the specific needs of certain consumer groups, amongst them, persons with disabilities, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the New Consumer Agenda (COM(2020)0696), that has amongst its five priorities the specific needs of certain consumer groups, amongst them, persons with disabilities,

| — | having regard to Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (11) (Public Procurement Directive), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (11) (Public Procurement Directive),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (12),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2018/254 of 15 February 2018 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired, or otherwise Print Disabled (13), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2018/254 of 15 February 2018 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired, or otherwise Print Disabled (13),

| — | having regard to the accessibility standards resulting from Commission mandates 376, 554, 420 and 473, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the accessibility standards resulting from Commission mandates 376, 554, 420 and 473,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) No 181/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 concerning the rights of passengers in bus and coach transport and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (14), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 181/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 concerning the rights of passengers in bus and coach transport and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (14),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1177/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 concerning the rights of passengers when travelling by sea and inland waterway and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (15), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1177/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 concerning the rights of passengers when travelling by sea and inland waterway and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (15),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 concerning the rights of disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air (16), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 concerning the rights of disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air (16),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (17), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (17),

| — | having regard to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1300/2014 of 18 November 2014 on the technical specifications for interoperability relating to accessibility of the Union’s rail system for persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility (18), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1300/2014 of 18 November 2014 on the technical specifications for interoperability relating to accessibility of the Union’s rail system for persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility (18),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0209/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0209/2022),

| A. | whereas persons with disabilities have equal rights on an equal basis with others in all fields of life and have the inalienable rights to dignity, equal treatment, independent living, autonomy and full participation in society, which benefits all levels of society; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas persons with disabilities have equal rights on an equal basis with others in all fields of life and have the inalienable rights to dignity, equal treatment, independent living, autonomy and full participation in society, which benefits all levels of society;

| B. | whereas more than 87 million people in the Union have some form of disability, and whereas the ageing demographic trend in the Union must be taken into account; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas more than 87 million people in the Union have some form of disability, and whereas the ageing demographic trend in the Union must be taken into account;

| C. | whereas accessibility is an essential precondition for persons with disabilities to fully enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas according to Article 9 of the CRPD on accessibility, in order to enable persons with disabilities to live independently and participate fully in all aspects of life, state parties must take appropriate measures to ensure that they have access, on an equal basis with others, to the physical environment, to transportation, to information and communications, including information and communications technologies (ICT) and systems, and to other facilities and services open or provided to the public, both in urban and in rural areas; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas accessibility is an essential precondition for persons with disabilities to fully enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas according to Article 9 of the CRPD on accessibility, in order to enable persons with disabilities to live independently and participate fully in all aspects of life, state parties must take appropriate measures to ensure that they have access, on an equal basis with others, to the physical environment, to transportation, to information and communications, including information and communications technologies (ICT) and systems, and to other facilities and services open or provided to the public, both in urban and in rural areas;

| D. | whereas Member States must ensure that accessibility becomes mainstreamed at all levels, not only in public buildings and transport, but also in health and education, as well as increasing mobility for and the integration of people with disabilities; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas Member States must ensure that accessibility becomes mainstreamed at all levels, not only in public buildings and transport, but also in health and education, as well as increasing mobility for and the integration of people with disabilities;

| E. | whereas the CRPD defines ‘universal design’ as the design of products, environments, programmes and services to be usable by all people, to the greatest extent possible, without the need for adaptation or specialised design and without excluding assistive devices for particular groups of persons with disabilities; whereas accessibility is one of the CRPD’s general principles, and the EU and Member States are legally bound by the CRPD under Decision 2010/48/EC; whereas general comment No. 2 on the CRPD notes the obligation of state parties to adopt action plans and strategies to identify existing barriers to accessibility, set time frames with specific deadlines and provide both the human and material resources necessary to remove the barriers; whereas accessibility is crucial for persons with disabilities to enjoy the rights to privacy, non-discrimination, employment, inclusive education, political participation, and other rights enshrined in the CRPD; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the CRPD defines ‘universal design’ as the design of products, environments, programmes and services to be usable by all people, to the greatest extent possible, without the need for adaptation or specialised design and without excluding assistive devices for particular groups of persons with disabilities; whereas accessibility is one of the CRPD’s general principles, and the EU and Member States are legally bound by the CRPD under Decision 2010/48/EC; whereas general comment No. 2 on the CRPD notes the obligation of state parties to adopt action plans and strategies to identify existing barriers to accessibility, set time frames with specific deadlines and provide both the human and material resources necessary to remove the barriers; whereas accessibility is crucial for persons with disabilities to enjoy the rights to privacy, non-discrimination, employment, inclusive education, political participation, and other rights enshrined in the CRPD;

| F. | whereas local authorities play a crucial role in supporting Member States in the development of social policies, including policies on disability and accessibility, through the analysis of the needs on the ground and the implementation of specific measures; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas local authorities play a crucial role in supporting Member States in the development of social policies, including policies on disability and accessibility, through the analysis of the needs on the ground and the implementation of specific measures;

| G. | whereas ensuring high-quality and affordable assistive technologies will foster the full inclusion of persons with disabilities in society and benefit both persons with disabilities and the providers of these technologies, as well as society as a whole; whereas assistive technologies will help to reduce disparities among Member States and whereas these technologies can only work in accessible environments; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas ensuring high-quality and affordable assistive technologies will foster the full inclusion of persons with disabilities in society and benefit both persons with disabilities and the providers of these technologies, as well as society as a whole; whereas assistive technologies will help to reduce disparities among Member States and whereas these technologies can only work in accessible environments;

| H. | whereas higher levels of employment of people with disabilities, greater accessibility and greater inclusion of this group in the workforce have clear economic potential; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas higher levels of employment of people with disabilities, greater accessibility and greater inclusion of this group in the workforce have clear economic potential;

| I. | whereas the Union has established a comprehensive legal framework for accessibility in the internal market, notably with the adoption of specific accessibility legislation such as the European Accessibility Act, and including accessibility obligations in various pieces of sectoral legislation, including the EU funds regulations; whereas the European Accessibility Act, which will apply from 28 June 2025, will introduce significant new requirements in respect of accessibility for products and services; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the Union has established a comprehensive legal framework for accessibility in the internal market, notably with the adoption of specific accessibility legislation such as the European Accessibility Act, and including accessibility obligations in various pieces of sectoral legislation, including the EU funds regulations; whereas the European Accessibility Act, which will apply from 28 June 2025, will introduce significant new requirements in respect of accessibility for products and services;

| J. | whereas the actual implementation of policies related to disabilities will contribute positively to the competitiveness of the EU’s internal market and therefore represents an integral resource for the EU economy; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the actual implementation of policies related to disabilities will contribute positively to the competitiveness of the EU’s internal market and therefore represents an integral resource for the EU economy;

| K. | whereas the evaluation of the European disability strategy 2010-2020 showed that its contribution improved the situation in a number of areas, but also highlighted the fact that persons with disabilities still face considerable barriers to access to healthcare, education, transport, the built environment, ICT, employment and recreational activities, as well to participation in political life and other areas of life; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the evaluation of the European disability strategy 2010-2020 showed that its contribution improved the situation in a number of areas, but also highlighted the fact that persons with disabilities still face considerable barriers to access to healthcare, education, transport, the built environment, ICT, employment and recreational activities, as well to participation in political life and other areas of life;

1.

Welcomes the Commission communication entitled ‘Union of Equality: European Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030’ (the Strategy), whose aim is to ensure that all persons with disabilities in Europe are able to enjoy their rights, take part in society and in the economy under equal conditions and no longer be the subject of discrimination, addressing the considerable barriers highlighted in the evaluation of the European disability strategy 2010-2020;

2.

Welcomes the Commission’s initiative, announced in the Strategy, to establish the AccessibleEU Centre (the Centre); acknowledges that the Centre aims to increase the coherence of harmonised accessibility policies, to support their implementation, and to facilitate access to relevant knowledge and skills, promoting a culture of equal opportunities and full participation in society for persons with disabilities, including at professional level, in a collaborative space between public administrations, business representatives, disability civil society, accessibility experts and users;

3.

Notes that greater accessibility outcomes in society can only be achieved if the Centre follows the ‘universal design’ approach; emphasises the need to ensure that this comprehensive approach to accessibility is duly taken into account, in particular concerning the physical environment, transportation, information, communication, services, and the area of public procurement contracts and tenders; considers that this approach also implies effective participation of all stakeholders and rights-holders in their proceedings;

4.

Highlights that the EU has established a comprehensive legal framework for accessibility in the single market based on the mandate of the CRPD, which includes, inter alia, the European Accessibility Act, the Web Accessibility Directive, directives on audiovisual media services and electronic communications, and technical specifications for railway stations and vehicles; recalls that aspects of this framework have implementation deadlines in the future and encourages further efforts towards achieving early implementation; regrets the fact that, where already required, the implementation of such crucial legislation varies widely across Member States and, in general, has not yet been satisfactory, mostly due to the lack of qualified accessibility experts; stresses, therefore, the need to improve the overall knowledge of, as well as practical and theoretical expertise on accessibility policies among public administrations, economic operators and society in general, in order to help find suitable, sustainable and affordable solutions in each Member State and thus improve the implementation of existing and forthcoming accessibility requirements; stresses in this context that the Centre should act as an important resource to provide such knowledge and support to Member States in the implementation phase;

5.

Acknowledges the establishment of ad hoc working groups for the implementation of certain accessibility legislation; believes, however, that the absence of a coordination and cooperation framework between the EU, the Member States, in particular public authorities monitoring or enforcing accessibility laws, and the relevant stakeholders that support cross-cutting solutions, namely persons with disabilities through their representative organisations, accessibility professionals and the private sector, represents a further obstacle to the implementation of accessibility laws and to their harmonised enforcement across the EU;

6.

Calls on the Commission to ensure adequate resources, both in terms of funding and human resources, for the establishment and functioning of the Centre; calls on the Member States to ensure the resources needed for the implementation and enforcement of accessibility policies, including through EU funds; stresses that sufficient funding is imperative for the pursuit of effective public policies on accessibility, as well as for achieving progress on a wide range of topics such as raising awareness through communication actions, in particular towards organisations representing persons with disabilities, recognition of invisible disabilities and harmonisation of national disability cards or accessibility standards;

Structure

Structure

| 7. | Calls on the Commission to establish a secretariat and a forum to steer and lead the work of the Centre; underlines that the forum should guarantee the balanced participation of stakeholders from the public and private sectors and right-holders with suitable experience in the field of accessibility; stresses that gender balance should be ensured; underlines that the participation of organisations representing persons with disabilities must be ensured as an essential part of the Centre’s work, in order to ensure the highest possible level of transparency concerning its activities; believes that the Centre should publish an annual work programme and should include in the forum representatives among the Members of the European Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

7.

Calls on the Commission to establish a secretariat and a forum to steer and lead the work of the Centre; underlines that the forum should guarantee the balanced participation of stakeholders from the public and private sectors and right-holders with suitable experience in the field of accessibility; stresses that gender balance should be ensured; underlines that the participation of organisations representing persons with disabilities must be ensured as an essential part of the Centre’s work, in order to ensure the highest possible level of transparency concerning its activities; believes that the Centre should publish an annual work programme and should include in the forum representatives among the Members of the European Parliament;

| 8. | Highlights the specific challenges posed by particular domains of accessibility policies, such as built environment, public procurement, digital technologies, media and culture, transportation, emerging technologies and assistive technologies, and products and services open to the public; calls on the Commission to establish specialised sub-groups of experts for certain areas; is convinced that these groups should work closely with the Centre, the Member States, persons with disabilities and organisations representing persons with disabilities, in order to guarantee better assessment, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of accessibility-related legislation; |
| --- | --- |

8.

Highlights the specific challenges posed by particular domains of accessibility policies, such as built environment, public procurement, digital technologies, media and culture, transportation, emerging technologies and assistive technologies, and products and services open to the public; calls on the Commission to establish specialised sub-groups of experts for certain areas; is convinced that these groups should work closely with the Centre, the Member States, persons with disabilities and organisations representing persons with disabilities, in order to guarantee better assessment, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of accessibility-related legislation;

| 9. | Calls on the Member States to establish national accessibility hubs, which could comprise of contact points and mirror groups of experts to work hand in hand with the Centre on implementing, monitoring and enforcing accessibility legislation; is of the opinion that the national accessibility hubs should facilitate exchange and coordination among relevant stakeholders and rights-holders, including economic operators, organisations of persons with disabilities and national authorities responsible for accessibility and the implementation of sectoral legislation; is convinced that the subject matter experts of the Centre should provide guidance and training to all relevant stakeholders; believes that such groups could help to find accessibility solutions which take into account the national specificities; |
| --- | --- |

9.

Calls on the Member States to establish national accessibility hubs, which could comprise of contact points and mirror groups of experts to work hand in hand with the Centre on implementing, monitoring and enforcing accessibility legislation; is of the opinion that the national accessibility hubs should facilitate exchange and coordination among relevant stakeholders and rights-holders, including economic operators, organisations of persons with disabilities and national authorities responsible for accessibility and the implementation of sectoral legislation; is convinced that the subject matter experts of the Centre should provide guidance and training to all relevant stakeholders; believes that such groups could help to find accessibility solutions which take into account the national specificities;

Mandate

Mandate

| 10. | Believes that the Centre should function as a hub which provides relevant EU institutions and bodies and its Member States when implementing Union law with regular assistance and expertise relating to accessibility policies and technical requirements; believes that the Centre should establish and coordinate a cooperation framework that would bring together the relevant national and Union bodies with all user groups, in particular organisations representing persons with disabilities, civil society organisations, academia, companies and professionals from all areas of accessibility and consumer rights, in order to support harmonised implementation and enforcement across the EU, provide guidance and training, and to inspire policy developments and innovation at national and EU level, including through the identification and sharing of best practices across sectors, as well as through the creation of tools aiming to facilitate the implementation of Union law; believes moreover, that the Centre could enhance the collaboration between the above-mentioned bodies and organisations with highly innovative stakeholders, in order to promote the development of assistive technologies; considers that the Centre should also provide advice, including guidelines, to relevant EU institutions and bodies and its Member States on their internal accessibility policies and practises; |
| --- | --- |

10.

Believes that the Centre should function as a hub which provides relevant EU institutions and bodies and its Member States when implementing Union law with regular assistance and expertise relating to accessibility policies and technical requirements; believes that the Centre should establish and coordinate a cooperation framework that would bring together the relevant national and Union bodies with all user groups, in particular organisations representing persons with disabilities, civil society organisations, academia, companies and professionals from all areas of accessibility and consumer rights, in order to support harmonised implementation and enforcement across the EU, provide guidance and training, and to inspire policy developments and innovation at national and EU level, including through the identification and sharing of best practices across sectors, as well as through the creation of tools aiming to facilitate the implementation of Union law; believes moreover, that the Centre could enhance the collaboration between the above-mentioned bodies and organisations with highly innovative stakeholders, in order to promote the development of assistive technologies; considers that the Centre should also provide advice, including guidelines, to relevant EU institutions and bodies and its Member States on their internal accessibility policies and practises;

| 11. | Stresses the potential benefits of the Centre in supporting the Commission’s work, inter alia identifying and helping overcome gaps and inconsistencies in current legislation, providing policy recommendations for updating and developing accessibility laws, mainstreaming accessibility in all relevant policies under the responsibility of different Directorates-General of the Commission, including by identifying priority areas where accessibility should be improved, conducting projects that explore innovative ways to implement accessibility, assisting in drafting technical accessibility specifications, and helping EU agencies and bodies with accessibility-related matters; |
| --- | --- |

11.

Stresses the potential benefits of the Centre in supporting the Commission’s work, inter alia identifying and helping overcome gaps and inconsistencies in current legislation, providing policy recommendations for updating and developing accessibility laws, mainstreaming accessibility in all relevant policies under the responsibility of different Directorates-General of the Commission, including by identifying priority areas where accessibility should be improved, conducting projects that explore innovative ways to implement accessibility, assisting in drafting technical accessibility specifications, and helping EU agencies and bodies with accessibility-related matters;

| 12. | Is of the opinion that the Centre should generate valuable knowledge on accessibility through the use of research and studies, which it should provide to both the Commission and the Member States, and that it should collect and consolidate specialised and comparable information and fully accessible data, including feedback on the implementation of accessibility laws; highlights that these actions would help accessibility policies to be solidly based on users’ requirements and experiences; stresses that the Centre should help to address gaps in the collection of statistical data at national level on the situation of persons with disabilities and that cooperation with the relevant statistical bodies, in particular Eurostat, should be envisaged; |
| --- | --- |

12.

Is of the opinion that the Centre should generate valuable knowledge on accessibility through the use of research and studies, which it should provide to both the Commission and the Member States, and that it should collect and consolidate specialised and comparable information and fully accessible data, including feedback on the implementation of accessibility laws; highlights that these actions would help accessibility policies to be solidly based on users’ requirements and experiences; stresses that the Centre should help to address gaps in the collection of statistical data at national level on the situation of persons with disabilities and that cooperation with the relevant statistical bodies, in particular Eurostat, should be envisaged;

| 13. | Considers that the role of the Centre would be essential in providing the Commission and the Member States, stakeholders and right-holders with knowledge and support for the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of accessibility policies, including through training and guidance documents in all EU official languages and written in accessible, understandable and easy-to-read language; |
| --- | --- |

13.

Considers that the role of the Centre would be essential in providing the Commission and the Member States, stakeholders and right-holders with knowledge and support for the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of accessibility policies, including through training and guidance documents in all EU official languages and written in accessible, understandable and easy-to-read language;

| 14. | Stresses that the Centre should help to overcome inconsistencies between the CRPD and EU policies, and should thereby help Member States in achieving the primary goal of increasing employment levels among persons with disabilities; points out that this mainstreaming activity needs to involve the EU and the Member States also through close cooperation with organisations representing persons with disabilities and other civil society organisations, public authorities, and the private sector; |
| --- | --- |

14.

Stresses that the Centre should help to overcome inconsistencies between the CRPD and EU policies, and should thereby help Member States in achieving the primary goal of increasing employment levels among persons with disabilities; points out that this mainstreaming activity needs to involve the EU and the Member States also through close cooperation with organisations representing persons with disabilities and other civil society organisations, public authorities, and the private sector;

| 15. | Notes that implementing accessibility policies requires a high degree of technical expertise and is not sufficiently included in higher education programmes, thus contributing to a lack of qualified accessibility experts in the public and private sectors across domains; stresses that the Centre should support Member States in developing dedicated education programmes for accessibility-related matters and should provide training to professionals, EU and national public officials as well as relevant stakeholders and right-holders in order to increase awareness on these issues; |
| --- | --- |

15.

Notes that implementing accessibility policies requires a high degree of technical expertise and is not sufficiently included in higher education programmes, thus contributing to a lack of qualified accessibility experts in the public and private sectors across domains; stresses that the Centre should support Member States in developing dedicated education programmes for accessibility-related matters and should provide training to professionals, EU and national public officials as well as relevant stakeholders and right-holders in order to increase awareness on these issues;

| 16. | Regrets that the standardisation system does not adequately allow persons with disabilities and their representative organisations to participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders in the activities of European and national standardisation bodies when drafting accessibility standards; calls, therefore, for improved representation within the standardisation system and for balanced representation among designated experts, in order to guarantee a fair outcome of the Union’s accessibility legislation and standards; considers that the Centre should play a significant role in the standard-setting system and could provide expertise to the Commission when the Commission is participating in the work of the standardisation committees, including through the provision of advice from the standardisation experts of organisations representing persons with disabilities, and, where possible, assist the Commission in drafting technical specifications and requests for European standards and deliverables in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 (19), including through the involvement of all relevant stakeholders and right-holders; believes that the involvement of the Centre would bring clear benefits to persons with disabilities with regard to movement around the EU and would empower them to enjoy their right to work, live and travel freely; |
| --- | --- |

16.

Regrets that the standardisation system does not adequately allow persons with disabilities and their representative organisations to participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders in the activities of European and national standardisation bodies when drafting accessibility standards; calls, therefore, for improved representation within the standardisation system and for balanced representation among designated experts, in order to guarantee a fair outcome of the Union’s accessibility legislation and standards; considers that the Centre should play a significant role in the standard-setting system and could provide expertise to the Commission when the Commission is participating in the work of the standardisation committees, including through the provision of advice from the standardisation experts of organisations representing persons with disabilities, and, where possible, assist the Commission in drafting technical specifications and requests for European standards and deliverables in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 (19

| 17. | Calls on the Commission to conduct an assessment within five years of the creation of the Centre to evaluate its effectiveness and added value in enhancing accessibility policies within the EU; underlines that on the basis of this assessment, the Commission should take appropriate steps to update and improve the Centre, including evaluating the possibility of establishing an agency if the objectives listed in its mandate are not accomplished; calls on the Commission to monitor the work of the Centre and its achievements through yearly reports to be presented to Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

17.

Calls on the Commission to conduct an assessment within five years of the creation of the Centre to evaluate its effectiveness and added value in enhancing accessibility policies within the EU; underlines that on the basis of this assessment, the Commission should take appropriate steps to update and improve the Centre, including evaluating the possibility of establishing an agency if the objectives listed in its mandate are not accomplished; calls on the Commission to monitor the work of the Centre and its achievements through yearly reports to be presented to Parliament;

o

o o

| 18. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

18.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Member States.

---

(1)  OJ L 23, 27.1.2010, p. 35.

1

(2)  OJ C 340, 15.12.2010, p. 11.

2

(3)  OJ C 137 E, 27.5.2010, p. 68.

3

(4)  OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 8.

4

(5)  OJ L 172, 17.5.2021, p. 1.

5

(6)  OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 70.

6

(7)  OJ L 327, 2.12.2016, p. 1.

7

(8)  OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36.

8

(9)  OJ L 115, 13.4.2022, p. 1.

9

(10)  OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1.

10

(11)  OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65.

11

(12)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11.

12

(13)  OJ L 48, 21.2.2018, p. 1.

13

(14)  OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 1.

14

(15)  OJ L 334, 17.12.2010, p. 1.

15

(16)  OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, p. 1.

16

(17)  OJ L 46, 17.2.2004, p. 1.

17

(18)  OJ L 356, 12.12.2014, p. 110.

18

(19)  Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation (OJ L 316, 14.11.2012, p. 12).

19

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Wednesday 5 October 2022

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/29

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P9_TA(2022)0343

Situation of Roma people living in settlements in the EU

European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2022 on the situation of Roma people living in settlements in the EU (2022/2662(RSP))

(2023/C 132/04)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the European Social Charter, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Social Charter,

| — | having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe legal framework for minority protection, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, particularly on manifestly discriminatory practices of segregating Roma children in education, and the case law of the Court of Justice, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council of Europe legal framework for minority protection, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, particularly on manifestly discriminatory practices of segregating Roma children in education, and the case law of the Court of Justice,

| — | having regard to Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (1) (the Racial Equality Directive), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (1) (the Racial Equality Directive),

| — | having regard to Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (2),

| — | having regard to Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (3) (the Waste Framework Directive), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (3) (the Waste Framework Directive),

| — | having regard to Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law (4),

| — | having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,

| — | having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights and the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 on the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (COM(2021)0102), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights and the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 on the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (COM(2021)0102),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 18 February 2011 on an EU Strategy on Roma Inclusion (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 18 February 2011 on an EU Strategy on Roma Inclusion (5),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 10 December 2013 on gender aspects of the European Framework of National Roma Inclusion Strategies (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 10 December 2013 on gender aspects of the European Framework of National Roma Inclusion Strategies (6),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 February 2019 on the need for a strengthened post-2020 Strategic EU Framework for National Roma Inclusion Strategies and stepping up the fight against anti-Gypsyism (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 February 2019 on the need for a strengthened post-2020 Strategic EU Framework for National Roma Inclusion Strategies and stepping up the fight against anti-Gypsyism (7),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 18 June 2020 on the European Disability Strategy post-2020 (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 18 June 2020 on the European Disability Strategy post-2020 (8),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 entitled ‘The implementation of National Roma Integration Strategies: combating negative attitudes towards people with Romani background in Europe’ (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 entitled ‘The implementation of National Roma Integration Strategies: combating negative attitudes towards people with Romani background in Europe’ (9),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on access to decent and affordable housing for all (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on access to decent and affordable housing for all (10),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2021 on children’s rights in view of the EU Strategy on the rights of the child (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2021 on children’s rights in view of the EU Strategy on the rights of the child (11),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the EU’s protection of children and young people fleeing the war in Ukraine (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the EU’s protection of children and young people fleeing the war in Ukraine (12),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 4 December 2018 entitled ‘Report on the evaluation of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020’ (COM(2018)0785), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 4 December 2018 entitled ‘Report on the evaluation of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020’ (COM(2018)0785),

| — | having regard to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS II), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS II),

| — | having regard to the FRA monitoring framework for an EU Roma Strategic Framework for Equality, Inclusion and Participation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the FRA monitoring framework for an EU Roma Strategic Framework for Equality, Inclusion and Participation,

| — | having regard to the FRA bulletin of 29 September 2020 entitled ‘Coronavirus pandemic in the EU — Impact on Roma and Travellers’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the FRA bulletin of 29 September 2020 entitled ‘Coronavirus pandemic in the EU — Impact on Roma and Travellers’,

| — | having regard to the FEANTSA (European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless) statement of 26 October 2020 entitled ‘The Housing Situation for Roma in the EU Remains Difficult’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the FEANTSA (European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless) statement of 26 October 2020 entitled ‘The Housing Situation for Roma in the EU Remains Difficult’,

| — | having regard to the European Network on Statelessness briefing of 10 March 2022 entitled ‘Stateless people and people at risk of statelessness forcibly displaced from Ukraine’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Network on Statelessness briefing of 10 March 2022 entitled ‘Stateless people and people at risk of statelessness forcibly displaced from Ukraine’,

| — | having regard to the Unicef position paper of June 2012 entitled ‘The Right of Roma Children to Education’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Unicef position paper of June 2012 entitled ‘The Right of Roma Children to Education’,

| — | having regard to Special Report No 14/2016 of the European Court of Auditors of 28 June 2016 entitled ‘EU policy initiatives and financial support for Roma integration: significant progress made over the last decade, but additional efforts needed on the ground’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Special Report No 14/2016 of the European Court of Auditors of 28 June 2016 entitled ‘EU policy initiatives and financial support for Roma integration: significant progress made over the last decade, but additional efforts needed on the ground’,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 18 September 2020 entitled ‘A Union of equality: EU anti-racism Action Plan 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0565), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 18 September 2020 entitled ‘A Union of equality: EU anti-racism Action Plan 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0565),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 7 October 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation’ (COM(2020)0620), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 7 October 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation’ (COM(2020)0620),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 November 2020 entitled ‘Action plan on Integration and Inclusion’ (COM(2020)0758), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 24 November 2020 entitled ‘Action plan on Integration and Inclusion’ (COM(2020)0758),

| — | having regard to the Council recommendation of 12 March 2021 on Roma equality, inclusion and participation (13), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council recommendation of 12 March 2021 on Roma equality, inclusion and participation (13),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 March 2021 entitled ‘EU strategy on the rights of the child’ (COM(2021)0142), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 24 March 2021 entitled ‘EU strategy on the rights of the child’ (COM(2021)0142),

| — | having regard to Council Recommendation (EU) 2021/1004 of 14 June 2021 establishing a European Child Guarantee (14), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Recommendation (EU) 2021/1004 of 14 June 2021 establishing a European Child Guarantee (14),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0152), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0152),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030’ (COM(2021)0101), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030’ (COM(2021)0101),

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426),

| — | having regard to Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (15) (the Temporary Protection Directive), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (15) (the Temporary Protection Directive),

| — | having regard to the questions to the Council and to the Commission on the situation of Roma people living in settlements in the EU (O-000022/2022 — B9-0018/2022 and O-000023/2022 — B9-0019/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the questions to the Council and to the Commission on the situation of Roma people living in settlements in the EU (O-000022/2022 — B9-0018/2022 and O-000023/2022 — B9-0019/2022),

| — | having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs,

| A. | whereas EU values prevail in a society which respects diversity, pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and gender equality; whereas the Member States have a particular responsibility to guarantee these values for all, including Roma people; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas EU values prevail in a society which respects diversity, pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and gender equality; whereas the Member States have a particular responsibility to guarantee these values for all, including Roma people;

| B. | whereas ‘Roma’ is an umbrella term that encompasses a wide range of different people of Romani origin such as Roma, Sinti, Kale, Romanichels and Boyash/Rudari; whereas it also encompasses groups such as Ashkali, Egyptians, Yenish, Dom, Lom, Rom and Abdal, as well as traveller populations, including ethnic Travellers or those designated under the administrative term gens du voyage, and people who identify as Gypsies, Tsiganes or Tziganes, without denying their specificities; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas ‘Roma’ is an umbrella term that encompasses a wide range of different people of Romani origin such as Roma, Sinti, Kale, Romanichels and Boyash/Rudari; whereas it also encompasses groups such as Ashkali, Egyptians, Yenish, Dom, Lom, Rom and Abdal, as well as traveller populations, including ethnic Travellers or those designated under the administrative term gens du voyage, and people who identify as Gypsies, Tsiganes or Tziganes, without denying their specificities;

| C. | whereas Roma people are Europe’s largest ethnic minority; whereas an unacceptably high number of Roma people in Europe still live in poverty and are socially excluded, enduring extremely precarious, unsafe and overcrowded living conditions in segregated rural and urban areas; whereas the issue of Roma people living in settlements is not limited to one country and is therefore a European problem and needs to be addressed as such; whereas spatial segregation represents a key cause of and mutually reinforces unequal access to healthcare, early childcare and education, employment and basic services, including road access, water supplies, sanitation and sewage facilities, electricity and waste collection; whereas it not only has physical and economic consequences, but also psychological and sociological ones, both for individuals and communities; whereas intergenerational poverty in Roma settlements is of a socioeconomic nature, with serious ramifications for Roma people’s physical and mental health and well-being, life opportunities and enjoyment of their fundamental human rights; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas Roma people are Europe’s largest ethnic minority; whereas an unacceptably high number of Roma people in Europe still live in poverty and are socially excluded, enduring extremely precarious, unsafe and overcrowded living conditions in segregated rural and urban areas; whereas the issue of Roma people living in settlements is not limited to one country and is therefore a European problem and needs to be addressed as such; whereas spatial segregation represents a key cause of and mutually reinforces unequal access to healthcare, early childcare and education, employment and basic services, including road access, water supplies, sanitation and sewage facilities, electricity and waste collection; whereas it not only has physical and economic consequences, but also psychological and sociological ones, both for individuals and communities; whereas intergenerational poverty in Roma settlements is of a socioeconomic nature, with serious ramifications for Roma people’s physical and mental health and well-being, life opportunities and enjoyment of their fundamental human rights;

| D. | whereas Roma face higher rates of low work intensity, job insecurity and unemployment, and are often in atypical or precarious employment situations, hindering their access to unemployment schemes and pension entitlements; whereas Roma lack employment networks and suffer discrimination in access to employment and in the workplace, and are also concentrated in socio-economically disadvantaged regions; whereas the 6 million Roma people residing in the EU represent a significant and growing part of its population and have enormous potential, which it will only be possible to realise if their employment and social inclusion situations are improved; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas Roma face higher rates of low work intensity, job insecurity and unemployment, and are often in atypical or precarious employment situations, hindering their access to unemployment schemes and pension entitlements; whereas Roma lack employment networks and suffer discrimination in access to employment and in the workplace, and are also concentrated in socio-economically disadvantaged regions; whereas the 6 million Roma people residing in the EU represent a significant and growing part of its population and have enormous potential, which it will only be possible to realise if their employment and social inclusion situations are improved;

| E. | whereas according to the EU-MIDIS II, only one in four Roma aged 16 years or older reported being employed or self-employed as their main activity and whereas Roma women reported much lower employment rates than Roma men — 16 % compared with 34 %; whereas the situation of young people was particularly worrying with, on average, a Roma NEET (not in education, employment or training) rate of 63 % compared with the EU average of 12 %; whereas, for this age group, the results also showed a considerable gender gap, with 72 % of young Roma women being classed as NEET compared with 55 % of young Roma men; whereas this is in stark contrast with the rest of the population (35 %); whereas as many as 80 % of Roma people were reported as living below their country’s at-risk-of-poverty threshold; whereas every third Roma person lived in housing without tap water and 1 in 10 people lived in housing without electricity; whereas every third Roma child experienced one of their family members going to bed hungry at least once a month and almost half of Roma aged 6-24 did not attend school; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas according to the EU-MIDIS II, only one in four Roma aged 16 years or older reported being employed or self-employed as their main activity and whereas Roma women reported much lower employment rates than Roma men — 16 % compared with 34 %; whereas the situation of young people was particularly worrying with, on average, a Roma NEET (not in education, employment or training) rate of 63 % compared with the EU average of 12 %; whereas, for this age group, the results also showed a considerable gender gap, with 72 % of young Roma women being classed as NEET compared with 55 % of young Roma men; whereas this is in stark contrast with the rest of the population (35 %); whereas as many as 80 % of Roma people were reported as living below their country’s at-risk-of-poverty threshold; whereas every third Roma person lived in housing without tap water and 1 in 10 people lived in housing without electricity; whereas every third Roma child experienced one of their family members going to bed hungry at least once a month and almost half of Roma aged 6-24 did not attend school;

| F. | whereas the lack of significant policy measures or investment, limited availability and low quality of social housing, discrimination in the housing market and segregation keep the gap in accessing housing between Roma and non-Roma almost unchanged (16); |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the lack of significant policy measures or investment, limited availability and low quality of social housing, discrimination in the housing market and segregation keep the gap in accessing housing between Roma and non-Roma almost unchanged (16);

| G. | whereas Roma people living in settlements should have access to decent housing that is accessible, affordable, environmentally safe, healthy and desegregated; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas Roma people living in settlements should have access to decent housing that is accessible, affordable, environmentally safe, healthy and desegregated;

| H. | whereas deep-rooted structural and institutional anti-Gypsyism continues to exist at all levels of EU society and is a major barrier to Roma people fully enjoying their fundamental rights as EU citizens in all spheres of life, including employment, housing, education, healthcare, care, social protection and other key public services; whereas 41 % of Roma in the nine EU Member States surveyed for the EU-MIDIS II felt discriminated against because of their Roma background in at least one area of daily life, such as looking for work, work, housing, health and education; whereas the integration of Roma requires sensitivity to local contexts, to intra-Roma ethnic and socioeconomic diversity and social mobility barriers and to intersecting forms of discrimination, particularly with regard to gender, age and disability; whereas gender equality and the situation of Roma children and young people are two key areas of intervention for the social inclusion of Roma that are insufficiently addressed both at EU and national level; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas deep-rooted structural and institutional anti-Gypsyism continues to exist at all levels of EU society and is a major barrier to Roma people fully enjoying their fundamental rights as EU citizens in all spheres of life, including employment, housing, education, healthcare, care, social protection and other key public services; whereas 41 % of Roma in the nine EU Member States surveyed for the EU-MIDIS II felt discriminated against because of their Roma background in at least one area of daily life, such as looking for work, work, housing, health and education; whereas the integration of Roma requires sensitivity to local contexts, to intra-Roma ethnic and socioeconomic diversity and social mobility barriers and to intersecting forms of discrimination, particularly with regard to gender, age and disability; whereas gender equality and the situation of Roma children and young people are two key areas of intervention for the social inclusion of Roma that are insufficiently addressed both at EU and national level;

| I. | whereas the situation in Roma settlements is in violation of human and fundamental rights as enshrined in the EU Treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Social Charter, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as of the principles recognised in the European Pillar of Social Rights; whereas it is alarming that these rights are not being respected in practice with regard to Roma people living in settlements; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the situation in Roma settlements is in violation of human and fundamental rights as enshrined in the EU Treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Social Charter, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as of the principles recognised in the European Pillar of Social Rights; whereas it is alarming that these rights are not being respected in practice with regard to Roma people living in settlements;

| J. | whereas the vicious circle of intergenerational poverty in marginalised Roma settlements is a complex phenomenon that needs to be addressed horizontally across different interconnected policy areas, in a comprehensive manner and with the close cooperation of all relevant stakeholders; whereas effective solutions require full engagement at the EU, national, regional and local levels in cooperation with civil society initiatives, including charitable and church-based organisations, social partners and private actors, learning from best practices and innovative solutions across Member States and replicating them on a wider scale; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the vicious circle of intergenerational poverty in marginalised Roma settlements is a complex phenomenon that needs to be addressed horizontally across different interconnected policy areas, in a comprehensive manner and with the close cooperation of all relevant stakeholders; whereas effective solutions require full engagement at the EU, national, regional and local levels in cooperation with civil society initiatives, including charitable and church-based organisations, social partners and private actors, learning from best practices and innovative solutions across Member States and replicating them on a wider scale;

| K. | whereas many local and regional authorities and representatives of civil society have been actively working with Roma people living in settlements over time with proven and innovative approaches and projects, but often do not make use of available European structural and investment funds (ESIF) because the processes are highly burdensome and complex; whereas the most common barriers to access to ESIF identified are the absence of a partnership approach; late reimbursement of payment requests; payment of ESIF to the beneficiary based on a reimbursement system being the most frequent option, making the beneficiary dependent on own resources; lengthy and repeated public procurement checks; lack of consistency between the findings of the checks, resulting in beneficiaries being blamed for mistakes which can require the return of funding, thus risking the reallocation of resources from other areas or even insolvency; poor involvement and cooperation with beneficiaries by controllers from managing or intermediate authorities during the procurement process; and the setting of arbitrary limits and requirements for different aspects of projects; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas many local and regional authorities and representatives of civil society have been actively working with Roma people living in settlements over time with proven and innovative approaches and projects, but often do not make use of available European structural and investment funds (ESIF) because the processes are highly burdensome and complex; whereas the most common barriers to access to ESIF identified are the absence of a partnership approach; late reimbursement of payment requests; payment of ESIF to the beneficiary based on a reimbursement system being the most frequent option, making the beneficiary dependent on own resources; lengthy and repeated public procurement checks; lack of consistency between the findings of the checks, resulting in beneficiaries being blamed for mistakes which can require the return of funding, thus risking the reallocation of resources from other areas or even insolvency; poor involvement and cooperation with beneficiaries by controllers from managing or intermediate authorities during the procurement process; and the setting of arbitrary limits and requirements for different aspects of projects;

| L. | whereas Roma face disproportionate barriers in accessing health services, which are exacerbated by a lack of insurance or personal identification documents, discrimination by health professionals and segregation in healthcare facilities; whereas persisting health inequalities, including the specific impact of spatial segregation and overcrowded housing on health, puts Roma in a vulnerable position; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas Roma face disproportionate barriers in accessing health services, which are exacerbated by a lack of insurance or personal identification documents, discrimination by health professionals and segregation in healthcare facilities; whereas persisting health inequalities, including the specific impact of spatial segregation and overcrowded housing on health, puts Roma in a vulnerable position;

| M. | whereas all 27 Member States have committed to work towards ending homelessness by 2030 by signing the Lisbon Declaration of June 2020 and setting up the European Platform on Combating Homelessness, which aims to promote policies based on a person-centred, housing-led and integrated approach; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas all 27 Member States have committed to work towards ending homelessness by 2030 by signing the Lisbon Declaration of June 2020 and setting up the European Platform on Combating Homelessness, which aims to promote policies based on a person-centred, housing-led and integrated approach;

| N. | whereas the EU provides significant financial support for social inclusion measures, including for measures promoting the inclusion of Roma, especially the most deprived; whereas the Member States’ planning documents indicate that EUR 1,5 billion was earmarked for the socioeconomic integration of vulnerable groups of individuals during the 2014-2020 programming period (17); |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the EU provides significant financial support for social inclusion measures, including for measures promoting the inclusion of Roma, especially the most deprived; whereas the Member States’ planning documents indicate that EUR 1,5 billion was earmarked for the socioeconomic integration of vulnerable groups of individuals during the 2014-2020 programming period (17);

| O. | whereas there is a persisting gap between Roma and non-Roma populations at all levels of education; whereas in 2018, only 53 % of Roma children aged 4-6 participated in early childhood education according to the EU-MIDIS II; whereas there is widespread segregation of Roma students in schools despite the legal prohibition of such practices and their incompatibility with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights; whereas such educational segregation usually takes three different forms: attendance by disproportionate numbers of Roma children of ‘special’ schools for children with intellectual disabilities, segregated classes or sections for Roma pupils within ‘mixed’ schools and the prevalence of ‘ghetto schools’; whereas Roma children face additional obstacles to equal participation in education, including failure to cover the costs associated with education (including early childhood education and care), spatial segregation, lack of childcare facilities nearby or unequal or no access to online and/or distance learning; whereas poverty and lack of access to basic services has a considerable impact on children’s physical, mental and emotional development, and increases their chances of lagging behind in all aspects of their adult life; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas there is a persisting gap between Roma and non-Roma populations at all levels of education; whereas in 2018, only 53 % of Roma children aged 4-6 participated in early childhood education according to the EU-MIDIS II; whereas there is widespread segregation of Roma students in schools despite the legal prohibition of such practices and their incompatibility with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights; whereas such educational segregation usually takes three different forms: attendance by disproportionate numbers of Roma children of ‘special’ schools for children with intellectual disabilities, segregated classes or sections for Roma pupils within ‘mixed’ schools and the prevalence of ‘ghetto schools’; whereas Roma children face additional obstacles to equal participation in education, including failure to cover the costs associated with education (including early childhood education and care), spatial segregation, lack of childcare facilities nearby or unequal or no access to online and/or distance learning; whereas poverty and lack of access to basic services has a considerable impact on children’s physical, mental and emotional development, and increases their chances of lagging behind in all aspects of their adult life;

| P. | whereas low pre-school attendance is a principal determinant of premature dropout rates among Roma, which are further exacerbated by starting school late and irregular school attendance; whereas early dropouts occur mostly at the point of transition between school types; whereas secondary education participation is obstructed by factors such as travel, segregation in housing and ill-functioning guidance services; whereas educational gaps are further aggravated by the growing digital divide between Roma and non-Roma children; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas low pre-school attendance is a principal determinant of premature dropout rates among Roma, which are further exacerbated by starting school late and irregular school attendance; whereas early dropouts occur mostly at the point of transition between school types; whereas secondary education participation is obstructed by factors such as travel, segregation in housing and ill-functioning guidance services; whereas educational gaps are further aggravated by the growing digital divide between Roma and non-Roma children;

| Q. | whereas during the pandemic, Roma people faced higher risks of contracting COVID-19 owing to entrenched health and social inequalities and were disproportionately affected by measures taken to contain the virus; whereas the negative social and economic consequences of the pandemic have been particularly detrimental for the Roma population in the EU owing to high shares of Roma being involved in the informal economy and seasonal work and the lack of measures adapted to their specific situations in policies for mitigating the consequences of the health crisis; whereas the pandemic gave rise to public scapegoating and hate speech against Roma; whereas the health emergency has once again revealed a critical discrepancy between the scale of local-level needs and the capacity to address them and has highlighted the need for immediate and long-term policy measures, particularly in the areas of employment, education and housing (18); |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas during the pandemic, Roma people faced higher risks of contracting COVID-19 owing to entrenched health and social inequalities and were disproportionately affected by measures taken to contain the virus; whereas the negative social and economic consequences of the pandemic have been particularly detrimental for the Roma population in the EU owing to high shares of Roma being involved in the informal economy and seasonal work and the lack of measures adapted to their specific situations in policies for mitigating the consequences of the health crisis; whereas the pandemic gave rise to public scapegoating and hate speech against Roma; whereas the health emergency has once again revealed a critical discrepancy between the scale of local-level needs and the capacity to address them and has highlighted the need for immediate and long-term policy measures, particularly in the areas of employment, education and housing (18);

| R. | whereas equality data collection refers to the collection of all types of disaggregated data used to assess the comparative situation of specific groups at risk of discrimination, design public policies that contribute to promoting equality and assess their implementation, based on evidence and not mere assumptions; whereas the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of EU and national measures for the social inclusion of Roma have been impeded by the lack of comprehensive quality data disaggregated by ethnicity; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas equality data collection refers to the collection of all types of disaggregated data used to assess the comparative situation of specific groups at risk of discrimination, design public policies that contribute to promoting equality and assess their implementation, based on evidence and not mere assumptions; whereas the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of EU and national measures for the social inclusion of Roma have been impeded by the lack of comprehensive quality data disaggregated by ethnicity;

| S. | whereas many Roma people live in areas where they are disproportionally exposed to environmental degradation and pollution stemming from waste dumps and landfills or contaminated sites and deprived of access to basic environmental services and public utilities; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas many Roma people live in areas where they are disproportionally exposed to environmental degradation and pollution stemming from waste dumps and landfills or contaminated sites and deprived of access to basic environmental services and public utilities;

| T. | whereas Roma women are subjected to multiple and intersectional forms of discrimination based on a combination of their ethnicity, gender and social status as well as to gender-based violence, which was particularly visible during the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas equality between women and men must be ensured and fostered in all areas, including labour market participation, employment conditions, including wages, education and training, and career changes and progression; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas Roma women are subjected to multiple and intersectional forms of discrimination based on a combination of their ethnicity, gender and social status as well as to gender-based violence, which was particularly visible during the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas equality between women and men must be ensured and fostered in all areas, including labour market participation, employment conditions, including wages, education and training, and career changes and progression;

| U. | whereas approximately 10-20 % of the estimated 400 000 Roma people living in Ukraine are stateless or at risk of statelessness (19); whereas Roma refugees fleeing war in Ukraine without documentation confirming their Ukrainian citizenship or their residence status are in a particularly vulnerable situation; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas approximately 10-20 % of the estimated 400 000 Roma people living in Ukraine are stateless or at risk of statelessness (19); whereas Roma refugees fleeing war in Ukraine without documentation confirming their Ukrainian citizenship or their residence status are in a particularly vulnerable situation;

Need for action at national level

| 1. | Deplores the fact that there are still people in the EU without access to safe and decent housing, clean drinking water, electricity, sanitation, sewage and waste treatment facilities, education, employment, healthcare and care services; is deeply concerned by the substantial gap between the declarations and commitments on a strong social Europe and the reality on the ground, also in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic, which highlighted the lack of progress in improving access to basic infrastructure during the previous programming period; calls on the Commission and the Member States to urgently address the situation of Roma people living in settlements in a comprehensive and effective manner, with appropriate short- and long-term policies supported by sufficient EU and national funding, in order to ensure Roma in the EU and neighbouring countries are not left behind; highlights the fact that such catastrophic conditions, as well as the negative psychological and sociological impact of segregation, not only affect the people living within the settlements, but also impact the wider community; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Housing

| 2. | Stresses that access to decent desegregated housing is key to breaking the vicious circle of intergenerational poverty and social exclusion; notes that access to housing is a precondition for human dignity and is closely linked to the full enjoyment of human rights; acknowledges that the COVID-19 pandemic showed that poor housing conditions represent a systemic risk for the public health system, placing a disproportionate burden on Roma people, especially Roma women; reiterates its call on the Member States to prevent and tackle homelessness and address housing exclusion through long-term solutions such as adequate social housing, affordable rental housing programmes and targeted housing allowances that are part of integrated national strategies with a focus on housing-led and ‘housing first’ approaches guaranteeing citizens’ effective equal access to adequate desegregated housing and essential services without discrimination; calls on the Member States to implement the concept of ‘adequate housing’ for all, including Roma people, as defined by the UN (20); calls for priority to be given to desegregation approaches utilising or investing in integrated social housing, alongside funding of accessible quality social services and quality field social work involving the consultation and participation of members of the Roma community as a way for Roma to leave settlements; highlights the use of e-pay cards for receiving social welfare benefits accompanied by the necessary digital infrastructure as an additional tool for sound financial management for Roma people living in settlements, to ensure dignified living and the possibility to leverage such benefits to access financial resources, for example through microloans; calls on the Member States to urgently explore their possible use; stresses that e-pay cards can be one of the solutions to address socio-economic problems related to usury, substance abuse and gambling in the settlements; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Acknowledges that many Roma settlements are located in unsafe, risky and illegally occupied land, which presents a major obstacle to finding an effective way to improve Roma living conditions and is a barrier to EU investments; calls on the Member States to address the problem on a centralised, national level while working in close cooperation with local and regional authorities through the implementation of housing-related policies, including social housing and innovative policies; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Education

| 4. | Stresses the critical role of preschool education in success at further educational stages, in obtaining decent and quality employment and in breaking the cycle of disadvantage; notes the significant gap in preschool attendance between Roma and non-Roma children and the link between residential and educational segregation, which are key drivers of school dropout rates; calls on the Member States to adopt all necessary measures to reach the Barcelona objectives as soon as possible, with particular emphasis on measures promoting and facilitating pre-schooling for Roma children; also calls on the Commission to address the gaps in access to quality childcare between Roma and non-Roma children in the upcoming revision of the Barcelona objectives within the European care strategy package; calls on the Member States, furthermore, to guarantee effective and free access to kindergartens for all Roma children living in settlements to ensure their participation, in line with the European Child Guarantee; calls on the Member States to systematically monitor dropout risks and inequalities in access to education at all levels to allow for timely interventions, both in terms of pedagogical help and individual counselling, as well as extra-curricular activities for children and their parents; stresses that engaging Roma parents in a meaningful way would also help address the risk of children dropping out of school; calls on the Member States to put in place measures and schemes to motivate young Roma students who have completed statutory education periods to finish their secondary education, for example special allowances; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Deplores the persisting segregation of Roma children in special education and programmes outside mainstream educational systems, often stemming from misdiagnoses as disabilities based on the results of culturally and linguistically biased tests; underlines that standardised psychological testing utilised in some Member States should not be used as an eliminatory instrument to delay entry into regular school programmes; calls on the Member States to put in place mechanisms to review and, where necessary, reverse diagnostic decisions; regrets, furthermore, the persistent discrimination against and segregation of Roma children in several Member States within mainstream schools, including through segregated classes and floors, segregation within classes and segregated dining; highlights that segregated schooling is based on reduced curricula, which rarely enables Roma students to enter the general school system, higher education or subsequent employment; calls on the Member States to eradicate practices of continued segregation of Roma children, implement comprehensive desegregation strategies with clear targets and sufficient resources to implement them with clear and ambitious timetables, adopt inclusive learning methods, guarantee full access for Roma children to school-based activities and implement anti-discrimination campaigns in schools; calls on all Member States to prioritise the specific educational needs of Roma and vulnerable children, with a view to guaranteeing their right to participation, education and good learning outcomes, effectively reducing the educational gap between Roma and non-Roma and preventing segregation; highlights the importance of integrating Roma children into the official national curricula, including for vocational education and training; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Deplores the fact that Roma-majority schools have substandard funding, facilities and curricula; calls on the Member States to invest in pre- and in-service training for teachers to enhance their capacity to provide appropriate teaching for Roma children, especially focused on sensitivity to Roma culture and identity, non-discrimination as a human right and positive strategies for promoting tolerance and tackling discriminatory behaviour and anti-Gypsyism (21),which contributes to prejudice and ill-informed views on the capacity and willingness of Roma children to learn and leads to low academic expectations; calls on the Member States to allocate more financial resources for quality teaching assistants, ensuring the smooth integration of children from Roma settlements into mainstream education; calls on the Member States to introduce comprehensive age-appropriate sexuality and relationship education and education regarding responsible parenthood for young people in schools, also as a means of preventing underage pregnancies among Roma girls living in settlements, which further contributes to the vicious cycle of intergenerational poverty; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Stresses that lockdowns to contain COVID-19 further deepened existing inequalities in education in several Member States, leaving Roma children, especially those living in segregated Roma settlements, without access to online education owing to a lack of access to digital infrastructure, connectivity and digital teaching materials; calls on the Member States to ensure that EU emergency funds allocated for tackling COVID-19, such as those provided under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, specifically reflect the needs of Roma and vulnerable children and ensure quality, affordable services in Roma communities, including through specific indicators in the national recovery and resilience plans; calls on the Member States to pursue new avenues of inclusion and engagement of Roma children in digital education, including greater investments in improving the accessibility of digital infrastructure and digital literacy in order to prepare them for the digital era; calls on the Member States to support the education of Roma women and girls, with a particular emphasis on the importance of STEM, and tackle their school dropout rate; |
| --- | --- |

7.

Health and environment

| 8. | Is alarmed by higher infant mortality rates in Roma populations compared to non-Roma populations, especially of those living in settlements; emphasises that children in Roma settlements are being born into poverty and an environment that is not conducive to healthy physical and psychosocial development; calls on the Commission to monitor investment and implementation by Member States of the European Child Guarantee and the specific targets set in the national action plans for Roma children, notably regarding their particularly disadvantaged situation, which manifests itself in poor educational outcomes and school dropout rates; calls on the Member States to adopt necessary measures supported by significantly increased public investment for the swift and efficient implementation of the European Child Guarantee and strongly encourages the Member States to allocate more than the minimum 5 % of European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) resources under shared management to supporting activities under the guarantee; calls on the Member States to urgently take action to ensure that children in Roma settlements are supported by healthcare professionals from birth and start treatment if necessary, as well as to recognise psychological or physical abuse of children, with an obligation to notify the competent authorities of all such cases; recalls the over-representation of Roma children in care institutions and stresses the need for a child-centred approach that pays close attention to the rights and needs of the most vulnerable; calls on the Member States, to this end, to make early childhood intervention centres and community centres employing field social workers, pedagogical staff and health professionals, including Roma health and educational mediators and assistants, widely available and accessible; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support health awareness and healthy living conditions in deprived communities, in particular Roma settlements, through mobile medical screening stations and prevention activities; further stresses that gender equality in medical care organisations must be respected in accordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and that initiatives such as the establishment of a network of nurses and care homes, regular visits to paediatricians, adult general practitioners, family support services, home care and care services for older persons and other persons in need of care and support should be available and accessible; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Emphasises the environmental risks to the health and lives of Roma people living in settlements, as well as the wider community, caused by toxic waste surrounding their settlements; calls on the Member States to urgently address the situation in order to reduce the disproportionate exposure of Roma to such risks and to develop comprehensive waste management systems and infrastructure in line with the European Waste Framework Directive (22); calls on the Member States to develop strategies to raise awareness within the affected communities of the dangers caused by toxic waste and the lack of proper waste management in Roma settlements; stresses the role of the Commission in enforcing EU legislation in this regard; calls on the Commission and the Member States to make targeted use of the policy tools and resources for tackling energy crises and for ensuring a just green energy transition in order to ensure Roma communities have access to clean, affordable and secure energy, to prevent further deterioration of energy poverty and to improve the health of Roma people living in settlements; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Recalls that under the new binding EU standards for equality bodies, Member States should support these bodies’ increased litigation powers by giving them legal standing before the courts in individual and collective complaints and ex officio and should support their legally binding decision-making power, including in situations where there are multiple institutions comprising the national equality body, so that they are able to address, identify and sanction intersectional discrimination, which often affects Roma; is of the opinion that the Member States should ensure that these bodies’ mandates cover all forms of discrimination, including victimisation and hate speech; |
| --- | --- |

11.

Employment and social inclusion

| 12. | Notes that high rates of long-term unemployment in Roma settlements and the prevalence of Roma NEETs are compounded by the social exclusion and poverty faced by their inhabitants; calls on the Member States to invest in social enterprises and best practices with the aim of employing the long-term unemployed; calls on them to also invest in programmes for Roma NEETs such as vocational training, especially on digital skills and green jobs, including through the recovery programmes; believes that the Commission’s action plan for the social economy can support Member States’ efforts in this regard with guidance on taxation, access to State aid and social public procurement for social economy organisations; believes the forthcoming proposal for a Council recommendation on developing the social economy framework should ensure an intersectional approach targeting vulnerable groups, including Roma, and Roma women in particular, who face even bigger obstacles than Roma men in accessing the labour market; calls on the Member States, furthermore, to support quality and sustainable job creation, the regularisation of informal work and accessible bridges to employment for Roma workers such as public employment schemes, which can be a temporary solution for unemployment and an opportunity to requalify and do further training; recalls that many Roma people are long-term unemployed, which affects their entitlement to benefits and pensions; stresses the importance of national minimum income schemes combined with incentives to (re)integrate into the labour market in combating poverty and social exclusion; urges the Member States to support wage transparency and ethnic- and gender-neutral job evaluations, promote wages that provide for a decent standard of living and launch anti-discrimination and training campaigns to combat anti-Gypsyism and promote diversity in the workplace, targeting recruiters, employers and co-workers; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Notes that community centres play a key role in working with Roma people living in settlements; calls on the Member States to ensure that every Roma settlement has an adequately equipped community centre in order to provide space for educational activities, for example kindergartens, afterschool care facilities for schoolchildren, leisure activities for both children and adults and hygiene facilities, with the Roma community involved in the maintenance and running of the premises; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Calls on the Member States to make youth employment, especially of young Roma women, a priority in the implementation of their national Roma integration strategies; calls on the Member States to take full advantage of the reinforced Youth Guarantee to advance employment and social inclusion among young Roma people; points to the untapped potential of highly educated young Roma people as a driver of positive change in Roma communities and in tackling deeply rooted prejudice and stereotypes among the majority population; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Calls on the Member States to ensure proper involvement of social-legal protection bodies in children and social guardianship cases in marginalised Roma settlements in order to ensure that children receive the protection and care necessary for their well-being and development, while respecting their best interests; calls for further coordinated efforts and an appropriate framework of measures to be put in place to eliminate adverse phenomena in the settlements, such as usury, child sexual exploitation, substance abuse, gambling and labour exploitation; deplores the high rate of forced begging among Roma children and calls on the Member States who have not done so to put in place legislation that protects children and bans forced begging; underlines the need for police forces to recognise the specific conditions of Roma people and for the Member States to provide training for police forces to counter discrimination and criminalisation of Roma people, both internally and in the majority population; calls on the Member States to rigorously investigate incidents of police abuse to ensure there is no impunity for violence, intimidation measures and ill treatment against Roma individuals or communities and to address the inadequate access to justice for Roma; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Reiterates its call on the Commission to work with the Member States on a common methodology to collect and publish equality data disaggregated by ethnicity and different types of settlements, where recognised in national law, with full respect for privacy and fundamental rights standards, in order to assess the situation of Roma people and effectively evaluate progress in the implementation of measures under the EU Roma strategic framework for tackling the root causes of their social and economic exclusion; calls on the Commission, furthermore, to include specific targets for Roma employment in the Social Scoreboard; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote the strengthening of social dialogue and the collective representation of Roma workers as a means of facilitating their access to quality jobs with decent working conditions; calls on the Member States to improve their public work schemes in order to allow Roma people and other individuals in vulnerable situations to develop and improve relevant skills; |
| --- | --- |

17.

Use of EU and national funding

| 18. | Is concerned that in some Member States, the use of resources earmarked for Roma people has been low thus far, risking a significant loss of financial resources by the end of the current programming period; regrets that current systems and conditions set for drawing down ESIF in a number of Member States do not allow for their smooth and efficient absorption, often owing to bureaucratic and structural barriers in national systems; recalls, in this regard, the need to reduce administrative burden, promote the use of simplified cost options and provide further assistance and flexibility, including direct distribution of funds to regional and local policies and civil society programmes to make it easier for managing authorities and beneficiaries responding to the immediate needs of Roma people living in settlements in the EU to use them; calls on the Member States and the Commission to urgently increase funding for the European Child Guarantee with a dedicated budget of at least EUR 20 billion in order to combat the poverty that is affecting children and their families and to contribute to the goal of reducing poverty by at least 15 million by 2030 — including at least 5 million children across all the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Points to a lack of political will in some local authorities in the Member States who are reluctant to implement new projects to improve the living conditions of Roma people in settlements; calls on the Member States and their managing authorities to pay special attention to such local authorities and to implement strategies to motivate them to change their negative approach, including through possible conditionality mechanisms; stresses, in this regard, the need to ensure Roma political participation and representation at all levels and to tackle harmful negative stereotypes which fuel discriminatory attitudes and behaviours among the non-Roma population; further points to the existence of structural barriers in some Member States that hinder the implementation of projects by local authorities and civil society and urgently calls on those Member States to remove them and to offer clear support instruments to local authorities to help them engage in new projects focused on Roma people living in settlements and their wider community; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Notes that it often takes generations to achieve significant progress in socio-economic empowerment and Roma integration; calls on the Member States to urgently make full use of available funding instruments and resources at both national and EU level to create favourable conditions for the sustainable funding and implementation of continuous programmes and projects in an efficient, integrated, coordinated and flexible way and eliminate any obstacles, including direct and indirect forms of discrimination, that hinder the absorption of funding, in particular the ESF+, the European Regional Development Fund and the Recovery and Resilience Facility; calls on the Commission to support, monitor and evaluate the Member States’ actions in this regard through their national recovery and resilience plans, national Roma strategic frameworks, European Child Guarantee national action plans, the EU anti-racism action plan and European Semester country-specific recommendations; calls on the Commission and Member States, in particular, to ensure that EU measures and funding reach Roma people living in settlements and emphasises that targeted actions and initiatives should be primarily based on the bottom-up principle and come from the local level and municipalities that are closest to the communities in question, with financial and administrative assistance supported at the national or EU level; calls on the Member States, in this regard, to make better use of available financial resources for technical assistance and to ensure that direct technical assistance is widely provided to both administrators and specific applicants; urges the Commission to make sure that the identification of settlements and specific policies and measures to address their situations are incorporated in the 2021-2027 EU cohesion fund programmes and European Semester country-specific recommendations; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Calls for a comprehensive and in-depth impact and performance analysis by the European Court of Auditors of the use of ESIF, especially the ESF+ and the European Regional Development Fund, for the years since the EU strategy for Roma inclusion was established in 2011, with a particular focus on spending on Roma settlements and related social issues; |
| --- | --- |

21.

Need for action at EU level

| 22. | Highlights that current practices in some Member States with regard to Roma people living in settlements show evaluation of projects based on quantitative outputs alone is insufficient and can even be misleading as to the reality on the ground, as it means there is no information on the quality of projects’ progress; warns that as a consequence, this could lead to decisions that pose a threat to the sound financial management of the EU budget; calls, therefore, for a swift application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the EU budget in relation to the relevant Member States; notes that the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan, the European Child Guarantee and the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation for 2020-2030 constitute a credible benchmark for qualitative assessment; calls for particular attention to be given to intersectional discrimination and to addressing the rights and needs of the most vulnerable groups, especially people with disabilities, children and women, when carrying out qualitative assessments; believes it is essential that the Commission require concrete qualitative outcomes that better reflect the reality on the ground, in addition to quantitative outputs, when evaluating individual projects funded by the ESIF in marginalised Roma settlements; calls on the Commission, furthermore, to start monitoring and evaluating projects based first and foremost on its own observations from on-site visits in order to decrease its dependence on information from governments and media reports and strengthen oversight of the EU budget; further stresses, in this regard, the need to strengthen the FRA Roma division by recruiting Roma researchers; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Calls for the Commission and Parliament to carry out regular missions to examine the situation of Roma people living in settlements in different Member States, if possible periodically, in order to contribute to raising awareness among both policymakers and the public, to exchange information on the challenges Roma people face between Member States and relevant authorities, and to exchange best practices and coordination at the EU level; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Stresses that the Commission must robustly act as the guardian of the Treaties to ensure the full and correct implementation of EU law and to take appropriate and timely action where Member States fail to do so, particularly with regard to breaches of EU citizens’ rights, including those of Roma; notes that infringement procedures, such as the cases of educational segregation of Roma pupils, have not resulted in effective elimination of causes of discrimination; firmly believes that the Commission should do everything in its power to prevent violations of human rights and the fundamental values of the EU, starting with effective prevention of the use of EU funds for supporting discriminatory practices in the Member States; calls on the Commission, therefore, to establish an early warning mechanism for reporting risks of abuse or misuse of ESIF and other EU funds earmarked for addressing the situation of Roma people in marginalised settlements; is of the opinion that the lack of action and commitment of some Member States to solve the issue of Roma people living in settlements, as well as structural and bureaucratic barriers, could constitute a violation of the founding values of the EU as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, namely human dignity, equality and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities; calls on the Council and the Commission to investigate the situation of Roma living in marginalised settlements with a view to determining whether such settlements and their conditions pose a clear risk of a serious breach of the EU Treaties; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen the active engagement and meaningful participation of Roma — especially Roma women, young people and other under-represented groups — in the development, implementation and monitoring of public policies and of projects aimed towards them at the EU, national, regional and local levels so they can be actively involved in shaping the EU’s future and can contribute to changing perceptions in EU societies; believes that Roma participation and leadership should be a qualitative target under national Roma strategic frameworks; believes that support for elected Roma officials in municipal councils should be encouraged as an example of good practice for advancing social inclusion and the democratic participation of Roma; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Notes that significant parts of the Roma population struggle with poverty, social exclusion and limited access to employment or services such as education, healthcare and housing, also as a result of anti-Gypsyism and structural discrimination; calls on the Commission and the Member States to tackle anti-Gypsyism in all areas of society through effective legislative and policy measures, both in the Member States and in enlargement countries; calls on the Member States to mainstream the fight against racism and anti-Gypsyism in all of the European Pillar of Social Rights principles, as it is a key structural driver of Roma exclusion; highlights the need to end any form of structural and institutional anti-Gypsyism, segregation and discrimination in education, employment, health, housing and access to social protection and other services; considers that the fight against anti-Gypsyism is a horizontal issue and that it should be taken into account in all relevant areas of EU policy; calls on the Commission to strengthen the implementation of the Racial Equality Directive and on the Member States to develop and implement effective and ambitious national plans against racism and racial discrimination, with a focus on all forms of racism, including anti-Gypsyism, drawing inspiration from the common guiding principles adopted by the Commission; calls on the Member States to set clear and measurable objectives for the fight against discrimination and anti-Gypsy speech and crime, in line with Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating racism and xenophobia; calls on the Council, furthermore, to unblock negotiations on the horizontal anti-discrimination directive (23) as it is a prerequisite for achieving equality in the EU; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Emphasises the need to acknowledge the cultural and linguistic heritage of Roma people and encourages the Commission and the Member States to preserve and promote Roma culture and public awareness through programmes and the media at their respective levels, thus contributing to the diversity of the EU community; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Urges the Commission to step up its efforts to gradually eradicate marginalised Roma settlements across the EU by launching an EU action plan to eradicate Roma settlements by 2030, with the aim of reinforcing the use of existing policy and financial instruments; emphasises that this EU action plan should provide guidelines, establish priorities and concrete targets and envisage a component of transnational cooperation and exchange of positive practices between Member States; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Underlines that the issues of Roma people living in settlements are cross-sectoral and require the attention and coordinated involvement of several commissioners and directorates-general at EU level; calls, therefore, for the creation of the post of Commission coordinator for Roma inclusion and equality to comprehensively monitor progress across relevant policy instruments and to liaise directly with Roma people in order to relay the reality of their situations and concerns to the Commission’s Task Force on Equality, as well as, inter alia, to the national Roma contact points, the FRA, the EURoma network, the European Roma Platform and the High-Level Group on Non-discrimination, Equality and Diversity in order to create synergies and achieve Roma people’s equality, inclusion and participation in the EU; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Similarly calls for the establishment of a Parliament coordinator for Roma inclusion position, to be filled by one of the vice-presidents of Parliament, who would work to ensure that Roma issues are mainstreamed throughout Parliament’s relevant policy and legislative work; calls, at the same time, for the establishment of a Roma mainstreaming network to be chaired and coordinated by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and composed of a representative of each European Parliament Committee in order to complement and strengthen the work of the coordinator, producing a synergic effect in ensuring that the interconnected and complex issues facing the Roma community are addressed with a comprehensive, horizontal approach; believes that both Parliament’s coordinator and Roma mainstreaming network should work closely with its Intergroup on Anti-Racism and Diversity; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Points to the additional challenges and the need for strengthened cooperation between the Member States related to the free movement of people within the EU as well as the situation of Roma people fleeing the war in Ukraine; calls on the Member States to take effective measures against segregation of intra-EU Roma migrants and Roma refugees from Ukraine and protect them against unlawful expulsions and discrimination in access to essential services, especially in the fields of housing, education and employment; calls on the Member States to ensure that refugees, including Roma, are not profiled or discriminated against when applying for temporary protection under the Temporary Protection Directive and are not forced to apply for asylum, and also calls on them to engage civil society organisations in ensuring that in-kind assistance, free transportation and accommodation benefit everyone fleeing Ukraine equally; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to ensure registration of birth certificates for Roma children is properly enforced to put an end to childhood statelessness among Roma communities across the EU; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Takes note of the Council of Europe Strategic Action Plan for Roma and Traveller Inclusion (2020-2025); calls on the Commission and the Member States to further combine their efforts to foster equal opportunities, diversity and social inclusion and fight discrimination and anti-Gypsyism with those of the Council of Europe; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Points out that programmes and instruments such as Erasmus Plus and the Youth Guarantee give opportunities to young people from disadvantaged backgrounds and Roma people and their organisations; |
| --- | --- |

33.

o

o o

| 34. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

34.

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(1)  OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 22.

(2)  OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16.

(3)  OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3.

(4)  OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, p. 55.

(5)  OJ C 199 E, 7.7.2012, p. 112.

(6)  OJ C 468, 15.12.2016, p. 36.

(7)  OJ C 449, 23.12.2020, p. 2.

(8)  OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 8.

(9)  OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 104.

(10)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 145.

(11)  OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 146.

(12)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0120.

(13)  OJ C 93, 19.3.2021, p. 1.

(14)  OJ L 223, 22.6.2021, p. 14.

(15)  OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12.

(16)  FEANTSA statement entitled ‘The Housing Situation for Roma in the EU Remains Difficult’.

(17)  European Court of Auditors special report No 14/2016.

(18)  FRA bulletin entitled ‘Coronavirus pandemic in the EU — Impact on Roma and Travellers’.

(19)  European Network on Statelessness briefing entitled ‘Stateless people and people at risk of statelessness forcibly displaced from Ukraine’.

(20)  Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

(21)  Unicef position paper entitled ‘The Right of Roma Children to Education’.

(22)  Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3).

(23)  Commission proposal for a Council directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

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| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/41 |
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14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/41

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P9_TA(2022)0344

Key objectives for the CITES CoP19 meeting in Panama

European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2022 on the EU strategic objectives for the 19th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), to be held in Panama from 14 to 25 November 2022 (2022/2681(RSP))

(2023/C 132/05)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the 2019 global assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) on biodiversity and ecosystem services, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 2019 global assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) on biodiversity and ecosystem services,

| — | having regard to the 2020 report of the UN Environment Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization entitled ‘State of the World’s Forests 2020’, which underlines the key role of forests in providing a habitat for more than 80 % of the world’s terrestrial biodiversity, offering countless ecosystem services and ensuring a livelihood for many communities, including indigenous people, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 2020 report of the UN Environment Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization entitled ‘State of the World’s Forests 2020’, which underlines the key role of forests in providing a habitat for more than 80 % of the world’s terrestrial biodiversity, offering countless ecosystem services and ensuring a livelihood for many communities, including indigenous people,

| — | having regard to marine and coastal biodiversity, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to marine and coastal biodiversity,

| — | having regard to the forthcoming 19th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), to be held from 14 to 25 November 2022 in Panama (CoP19), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the forthcoming 19th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), to be held from 14 to 25 November 2022 in Panama (CoP19),

| — | having regard to UN General Assembly resolution 75/311 of 26 July 2021 on tackling illicit trafficking in wildlife, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN General Assembly resolution 75/311 of 26 July 2021 on tackling illicit trafficking in wildlife,

| — | having regard to CITES Resolution Conf. 12.10 (Rev.CoP15) on registration of operations that breed Appendix-I animal species in captivity for commercial purposes, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to CITES Resolution Conf. 12.10 (Rev.CoP15) on registration of operations that breed Appendix-I animal species in captivity for commercial purposes,

| — | having regard to CITES Decisions 18.226 and 18.227 on trade in Asian elephants (Elephas maximus), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to CITES Decisions 18.226 and 18.227 on trade in Asian elephants (Elephas maximus),

| — | having regard to CITES Decisions 18.81-18.85 on wildlife crime linked to the internet, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to CITES Decisions 18.81-18.85 on wildlife crime linked to the internet,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380), and to the European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2021 thereon (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380), and to the European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2021 thereon (1),

| — | having regard to the Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (2), which aims to promote the maintenance of biodiversity and forms the cornerstone of the EU’s nature conservation policy, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (2), which aims to promote the maintenance of biodiversity and forms the cornerstone of the EU’s nature conservation policy,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD, to be held from 7 to 19 December 2022 in Montreal, Canada, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD, to be held from 7 to 19 December 2022 in Montreal, Canada,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal for a directive of the European Parliament of the Council on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directive 2008/99/EC (COM(2021)0851), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal for a directive of the European Parliament of the Council on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directive 2008/99/EC (COM(2021)0851),

| — | having regard to the questions to the Council and to the Commission on key objectives for the Conference of the Parties to CITES in Panama from 14 to 25 November 2022 (O-000038/2022 — B9-0023/2022 and O-000039/2022 — B9-0024/2022), |
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—

having regard to the questions to the Council and to the Commission on key objectives for the Conference of the Parties to CITES in Panama from 14 to 25 November 2022 (O-000038/2022 — B9-0023/2022 and O-000039/2022 — B9-0024/2022),

| — | having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
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—

having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the unprecedented global decline in biodiversity, which is currently occurring at a rate tens to hundreds of times faster than the natural rate of species extinction, is the direct result of human activity and is threatening around 1 million animal and plant species with extinction; whereas available evidence suggests that it is not too late to halt and reverse current trends in biodiversity loss; |
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A.

whereas the unprecedented global decline in biodiversity, which is currently occurring at a rate tens to hundreds of times faster than the natural rate of species extinction, is the direct result of human activity and is threatening around 1 million animal and plant species with extinction; whereas available evidence suggests that it is not too late to halt and reverse current trends in biodiversity loss;

| B. | whereas biodiversity contributes positively to the health of the human population; whereas up to 80 % of medicines used by humans are of natural origin; |
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B.

whereas biodiversity contributes positively to the health of the human population; whereas up to 80 % of medicines used by humans are of natural origin;

| C. | whereas the oceans, which represent 95 % of the biosphere, are one of the most important carbon sinks, as they regulate the climate and absorb CO2 from the atmosphere; |
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C.

whereas the oceans, which represent 95 % of the biosphere, are one of the most important carbon sinks, as they regulate the climate and absorb CO2 from the atmosphere;

| D. | whereas it is important to protect marine and coastal biodiversity and tackle the threats posed to it by the unregulated or poorly regulated use of living marine resources; whereas it is also important to protect freshwater biodiversity, which is declining to a greater extent than marine and terrestrial ecosystems, with freshwater populations declining 83 % between 1970 and 2014; |
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D.

whereas it is important to protect marine and coastal biodiversity and tackle the threats posed to it by the unregulated or poorly regulated use of living marine resources; whereas it is also important to protect freshwater biodiversity, which is declining to a greater extent than marine and terrestrial ecosystems, with freshwater populations declining 83 % between 1970 and 2014;

| E. | whereas the vast majority of species subject to trade are not protected by CITES; whereas international trade in such species remains unregulated and contributes significantly to driving wild populations towards extinction; |
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E.

whereas the vast majority of species subject to trade are not protected by CITES; whereas international trade in such species remains unregulated and contributes significantly to driving wild populations towards extinction;

| F. | whereas CITES is the largest global wildlife conservation agreement, with 184 signatory parties, including the EU and its 27 Member States; whereas it recognises that wild fauna and flora in their many unique and varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the Earth that must be protected for generations to come; |
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F.

whereas CITES is the largest global wildlife conservation agreement, with 184 signatory parties, including the EU and its 27 Member States; whereas it recognises that wild fauna and flora in their many unique and varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the Earth that must be protected for generations to come;

| G. | whereas the aim of CITES is to ensure that international trade in wild animals and plants does not pose a threat to the survival of the species in the wild; |
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G.

whereas the aim of CITES is to ensure that international trade in wild animals and plants does not pose a threat to the survival of the species in the wild;

| H. | whereas both the illegal and legal trade in and the use of wildlife and the destruction of natural habitats contribute significantly to biodiversity decline, undermine global efforts in the fight against climate change and are both a cause and a consequence of corruption; |
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H.

whereas both the illegal and legal trade in and the use of wildlife and the destruction of natural habitats contribute significantly to biodiversity decline, undermine global efforts in the fight against climate change and are both a cause and a consequence of corruption;

| I. | whereas Appendix I of CITES includes all species threatened with extinction that are or may be affected by trade; whereas Appendix II includes all species that may become threatened with extinction unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation to avoid utilisation incompatible with their survival and unless trade in these species is brought under effective control; |
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I.

whereas Appendix I of CITES includes all species threatened with extinction that are or may be affected by trade; whereas Appendix II includes all species that may become threatened with extinction unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation to avoid utilisation incompatible with their survival and unless trade in these species is brought under effective control;

| J. | whereas wildlife trade increases contact between humans and wildlife and creates a potentially high risk that zoonoses will emerge and spread; whereas as 70 % of all emerging infectious diseases in humans are zoonotic, wildlife trade poses serious risks to the health of both animals and humans; whereas there is a need for better and more exhaustive control of the meat trade and the trade in live animals; whereas experts advise limiting zoonotic risks by addressing markets with live animals and by developing a ‘positive list’ of animal species that may be transported internationally, taking into account zoonotic risks and other considerations such as animal welfare, conservation status and population trends; |
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J.

whereas wildlife trade increases contact between humans and wildlife and creates a potentially high risk that zoonoses will emerge and spread; whereas as 70 % of all emerging infectious diseases in humans are zoonotic, wildlife trade poses serious risks to the health of both animals and humans; whereas there is a need for better and more exhaustive control of the meat trade and the trade in live animals; whereas experts advise limiting zoonotic risks by addressing markets with live animals and by developing a ‘positive list’ of animal species that may be transported internationally, taking into account zoonotic risks and other considerations such as animal welfare, conservation status and population trends;

| K. | whereas the cost of global strategies to prevent pandemics through reducing the illegal wildlife trade, avoiding land-use changes and increasing surveillance is estimated to be between USD 22 billion and USD 31 billion (3), only a small fraction of the cost incurred by a pandemic; |
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K.

whereas the cost of global strategies to prevent pandemics through reducing the illegal wildlife trade, avoiding land-use changes and increasing surveillance is estimated to be between USD 22 billion and USD 31 billion (3), only a small fraction of the cost incurred by a pandemic;

| L. | whereas 19 Member States have supported the Cypriot Government’s position paper on a new EU legislative framework for an EU-wide positive list of animals allowed as pets, which was presented at the Agriculture and Fisheries Council meeting of 24 May 2022; |
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L.

whereas 19 Member States have supported the Cypriot Government’s position paper on a new EU legislative framework for an EU-wide positive list of animals allowed as pets, which was presented at the Agriculture and Fisheries Council meeting of 24 May 2022;

| M. | whereas the EU is a major hub, transit point and destination for legally and illegally sourced specimens of wild fauna and flora, whether living or dead, body parts or products thereof; whereas in 2019, reported import transactions of CITES-protected wildlife into the EU accounted for 36 % of the total volume of imports; |
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M.

whereas the EU is a major hub, transit point and destination for legally and illegally sourced specimens of wild fauna and flora, whether living or dead, body parts or products thereof; whereas in 2019, reported import transactions of CITES-protected wildlife into the EU accounted for 36 % of the total volume of imports;

| N. | whereas between 2014 and 2018, the EU imported the second-most hunting trophies from CITES-listed wildlife species, following only the United States; whereas an increasing number of European countries are taking or considering steps to ban imports of hunting trophies; |
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N.

whereas between 2014 and 2018, the EU imported the second-most hunting trophies from CITES-listed wildlife species, following only the United States; whereas an increasing number of European countries are taking or considering steps to ban imports of hunting trophies;

| O. | whereas international trade in wild fauna and flora amounts to billions of euros each year and involves millions of such plants and wildlife; whereas wildlife trafficking has become the fourth largest black market, after the drug, people and arms markets; whereas wildlife trafficking offences are often not punished severely enough to act as a deterrent and whereas middle-to-high level actors are rarely prosecuted; |
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O.

whereas international trade in wild fauna and flora amounts to billions of euros each year and involves millions of such plants and wildlife; whereas wildlife trafficking has become the fourth largest black market, after the drug, people and arms markets; whereas wildlife trafficking offences are often not punished severely enough to act as a deterrent and whereas middle-to-high level actors are rarely prosecuted;

| P. | whereas the internet plays a key role in facilitating wildlife trafficking; |
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P.

whereas the internet plays a key role in facilitating wildlife trafficking;

| Q. | whereas increased efforts to improve transparency and the effective participation of civil society in decision-making are essential; |
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Q.

whereas increased efforts to improve transparency and the effective participation of civil society in decision-making are essential;

| R. | whereas the EU has a clear role to play to set up constructive collaborations and exchanges between governmental and non-governmental sanctuaries and rescue centres to secure long-term and species-appropriate solutions for seized wildlife; |
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R.

whereas the EU has a clear role to play to set up constructive collaborations and exchanges between governmental and non-governmental sanctuaries and rescue centres to secure long-term and species-appropriate solutions for seized wildlife;

| S. | whereas traditional medicines are among the main CITES-related commodity seizures reported by Member States; whereas the use of wild animals in traditional medicines damages biodiversity, especially when red-listed species are concerned; whereas demand for traditional medicines with animal ingredients is leading to increased illegal trade in wild animals; |
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S.

whereas traditional medicines are among the main CITES-related commodity seizures reported by Member States; whereas the use of wild animals in traditional medicines damages biodiversity, especially when red-listed species are concerned; whereas demand for traditional medicines with animal ingredients is leading to increased illegal trade in wild animals;

| T. | whereas pelagic shark populations have dropped by 71 % since 1970, more than 50 % of shark species are threatened or near threatened with extinction (4), and hunting them for trade in their body parts is one of the main causes of this decline; whereas 20 % of reef shark populations have been found to be functionally extinct; whereas in 2020, EU Member States were the source of over 45 % of all shark fin-related products imported into three major trading centres: Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan; |
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T.

whereas pelagic shark populations have dropped by 71 % since 1970, more than 50 % of shark species are threatened or near threatened with extinction (4), and hunting them for trade in their body parts is one of the main causes of this decline; whereas 20 % of reef shark populations have been found to be functionally extinct; whereas in 2020, EU Member States were the source of over 45 % of all shark fin-related products imported into three major trading centres: Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan;

| U. | whereas following population declines across Africa by more than 60 % for African savannah elephants (Loxodonta africana) and 86 % for African forest elephants (Loxodonta cyclotis) within three generations, in 2021, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) raised the threat level for the African savannah elephant from vulnerable to endangered and separately listed African forest elephants as critically endangered (5); |
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U.

whereas following population declines across Africa by more than 60 % for African savannah elephants (Loxodonta africana) and 86 % for African forest elephants (Loxodonta cyclotis) within three generations, in 2021, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) raised the threat level for the African savannah elephant from vulnerable to endangered and separately listed African forest elephants as critically endangered (5);

| V. | whereas poaching for the ivory trade is the main driver of population declines in African elephants; whereas the illegal ivory trade harms economic development, fosters organised crime, promotes corruption and fuels conflicts; whereas ivory trafficking has increased significantly following the introduction of legal sales; |
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V.

whereas poaching for the ivory trade is the main driver of population declines in African elephants; whereas the illegal ivory trade harms economic development, fosters organised crime, promotes corruption and fuels conflicts; whereas ivory trafficking has increased significantly following the introduction of legal sales;

| W. | whereas it is forbidden to trade wild tigers; whereas EU wildlife trade regulations nonetheless fail to prevent the trade of captive-bred tigers and their body parts, even though CITES Decision 14.69 on captive-bred and ranched specimens opposes the commercial breeding and trade in tigers for their parts; whereas Member States continue to import and export live tigers and tiger parts registered under the CITES code of commercial trade; |
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W.

whereas it is forbidden to trade wild tigers; whereas EU wildlife trade regulations nonetheless fail to prevent the trade of captive-bred tigers and their body parts, even though CITES Decision 14.69 on captive-bred and ranched specimens opposes the commercial breeding and trade in tigers for their parts; whereas Member States continue to import and export live tigers and tiger parts registered under the CITES code of commercial trade;

Introduction

| 1. | Underlines the clear need for a more precautionary approach to the protection of wildlife given the continued threat posed by the wildlife trade to individual animals, species, human and animal health and the environment; |
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1.

| 2. | Calls for increased alignment between CITES and the CBD, the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals and other biodiversity-related treaties and agreements to effectively achieve international commitments regarding biodiversity conservation; |
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2.

| 3. | Is concerned that the market for exotic pets and the range of affected species are growing both within the EU and internationally; |
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3.

| 4. | Stresses that the environmental footprint of the EU’s production and consumption should urgently be reduced in order to stay within planetary limits; |
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4.

| 5. | Underlines that the ecosystem services and resources that forests provide are essential to people around the world; calls for the EU and the Member States to push for the adoption of a CITES resolution on forests at CoP19 to ensure that CITES-listed tree species are properly protected and that any trade in them is only conducted when it is legal, sustainable and traceable; |
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5.

| 6. | Stresses that engaging women in wildlife conservation is a win-win for gender equality and environmental sustainability and allows more targeted and effective actions to fight against wildlife trafficking; calls on the Commission to partner with the CITES Secretariat to bring gender mainstreaming into CITES and to support gender-sensitive initiatives to influence and address criminal behaviours related to wildlife and wildlife conservation; considers that CITES enforcement, decision-making and implementation should promote gender equality and calls for the EU and the Member States to push for a gender action plan for CITES, which could be introduced through a resolution; |
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6.

Implementation, compliance and enforcement

| 7. | Highlights that the 2019 global assessment report of the IPBES on biodiversity and ecosystem services identifies a series of weaknesses in CITES, such as compliance, enforcement, the need for science-based quotas, funding, combating corruption and demand reduction; underlines that these weaknesses should be tackled in order to better implement the convention and urges all parties to work to address these issues thoroughly; |
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7.

| 8. | Regrets the inadequate enforcement of bans and restrictions on the trade in protected species due to a lack of capacity and resources dedicated by the parties; calls on all parties to step up their enforcement of the convention; |
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8.

| 9. | Expresses concern that the parties to CITES are not being held accountable for failing to effectively implement the provisions of the convention, including the requirement to base import and export permits on scientifically robust advice that such imports or exports will not be detrimental to the survival of the species (non-detriment findings); |
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9.

| 10. | Calls for the consistent and impartial application of the instruments provided for in CITES and the decisions taken under it to promote compliance with the convention, including the Compliance Assistance Programme; calls for the EU and all parties to develop measures to ensure adequate and timely compliance with the convention, including by dedicating the necessary resources to it and by adopting effective national legislation to implement decisions and resolutions adopted in the framework of the convention; calls for mutual cooperation between the parties and for the sharing of best practices; |
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10.

| 11. | Calls furthermore for the EU and its Member States to adopt strict measures, including dissuasive sanctions, in cases of non-compliance when it is found that a party is undermining the effectiveness of the convention and is not effectively stopping illegal or unsustainable exploitation and trade, and, as a last resort, to suspend trade with the offending party; |
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11.

| 12. | Calls on all parties to work to ensure protection for whistleblowers, journalists, wildlife rangers and environmental and human rights defenders, who play an essential part in protecting the environment and in putting a stop to the illegal wildlife trade; |
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12.

| 13. | Insists that transnational wildlife crime should be recognised by all parties as serious organised crime that should be reflected in the allocation of resources and entail the active involvement of specialised police and customs investigation agencies; |
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13.

| 14. | Underlines the key role of police and customs and urges all EU Member States to establish specialised units focusing on wildlife crime at the national level with mandates covering the whole territory of the state and not limited to certain regions or to any other territorial units; calls on the Member States to mandate that these specialised units actively engage in international cooperation and coordination; stresses that cooperation with the relevant authorities in the Member States on illegal wildlife trade issues could be further revised and strengthened through the EU Enforcement Group, which gathers law enforcement officers from all EU Member States, as well as the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), Eurojust, Interpol, the World Customs Organization and the CITES Secretariat; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen law enforcement training on the wildlife trade; |
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14.

| 15. | Highlights the need for a database of experts in biology and/or ecology, both to identify species and prosecute wildlife crimes, such as poaching, trafficking and illegal exploitation, and to provide law enforcement bodies at local, regional, national and international level with a better understanding of the phenomenon; |
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15.

| 16. | Stresses the benefits of a database of law enforcement management information systems in the fight against organised crime and the illegal wildlife trade; urges the Commission and the Member States to create an EU-wide database of court cases on environmental crimes, including wildlife crimes, and on the actions carried out in the field of environmental crimes by law enforcement bodies; believes that such a database should allow the centralised collection of data and increase the level of digitalisation and knowledge; notes that reviewing historical cases can be useful for authorities, agencies and organisations in the field; |
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16.

| 17. | Recalls its resolution of 9 June 2021 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’, which called on the Commission to facilitate capacity building, including knowledge transfers, technology sharing and skills training for beneficiary countries to implement CITES and other conventions and agreements essential to the protection of biodiversity under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe and the World Trade Organization’s Aid for Trade initiative; insists on the need to strengthen cooperation programmes with non-EU countries for the conservation of their native biodiversity, including inter-parliamentary dialogue, and to assist developing countries in implementing these programmes; |
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17.

| 18. | Regrets that the EU is not implementing the CITES recommendations set out in Resolution Conf. 12.10 (Rev.CoP15) on registration of operations that breed Appendix-I animal species in captivity for commercial purposes; is concerned that this creates loopholes and facilitates illegal trade; calls on Member States to fully implement this resolution and register all relevant breeding facilities for these species providing complete and accurate registration applications to both the Commission and the CITES Secretariat; urges the Commission and Member States to oppose any efforts to weaken the system for registration of captive-breeding operations for Appendix-I species; |
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18.

| 19. | Encourages and supports the implementation of modern and innovative methods to label and track CITES-listed species or derived products in order to allow the differentiation between captive-bred and wild-caught individuals and derivatives; |
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19.

Decision-making, transparency and reporting

| 20. | Welcomes the annual illegal trade reports as a significant step towards developing a better understanding of wildlife trafficking and urges the EU and all parties to submit them in a timely manner; highlights that these reports should include information on permits and certificates granted, quantities and types of specimens and names of species as included in Appendices I, II and III; |
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20.

| 21. | Urges all parties and the EU to ensure transparency in the CITES Secretariat’s non-sensitive activities and operations, including by making the annual illegal trade reports publicly available, and to guarantee that data is uploaded in a timely manner to the CITES trade database, including information on the commissioning of reports, the development of terms of reference and the selection of consultants; urges all parties to make further efforts to ensure that discrepancies in export and import permits are minimised; |
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21.

| 22. | Considers that more transparency in the commercial trade of Appendix-I species, including captive-bred animals, is key to fighting corruption and the illegal trade, trafficking and laundering of specimens; |
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22.

| 23. | Calls for better record-keeping for Appendix I, including on specimens bred and kept in captivity and on the development of risk indicators in relation to environmental, security and husbandry practices, such as greater detail on how records are kept, data is managed and reporting is done, how the stock/inventory system is run and how it is audited and secured in terms of transport, storage and disposal; |
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23.

| 24. | Reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States to lead efforts to end the commercial trade in endangered species and their parts and its call for the full and immediate ban at European level of the commercial trade, export or re-export of ivory within the EU and to destinations outside the EU, including ‘pre-convention’ ivory, while pointing out that limited exceptions should remain possible for scientific imports and exports and musical instruments legally acquired before 1975, and for trade in artefacts and antiques produced before 1947, provided that they are accompanied by a valid certificate; asks for similar restrictions for other endangered species, such as tigers and rhinos; calls for the implementation of such a ban without further delay; |
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24.

| 25. | Welcomes the amendments to Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 (6) and the revised guidance document on the EU regime governing trade in ivory and urges the Commission to strictly monitor the implementation of the revised regulation by the Member States; calls on the Commission and the Member States to transform these rules into legally binding legislation and to close any remaining loopholes; |
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25.

Funding

| 26. | Notes with concern that many CoP18 decisions remain unfunded; calls on all parties to guarantee sufficient funding for the proper implementation of the entire convention, including its enforcement; calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase financial and other support for the implementation of CITES decisions; |
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26.

| 27. | Highlights that the implementation of many of the CITES decisions is subject to the availability of external funding; calls for the EU and all parties to the convention to explore mechanisms for ensuring that external funding for CITES decisions is consistent with the priorities of their work programmes and that development support granted by the EU to recipient countries does not threaten the viability of wild species, biodiversity, natural habitats, ecosystems and the services they provide; |
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27.

| 28. | Expresses concern about the increasing workload of the CITES Secretariat, the Conferences of the Parties and the committees in relation to their available resources; calls for the EU to show leadership in addressing this issue; urges, inter alia, all parties to support the robust implementation of draft decisions and recommendations emerging from the CITES Standing Committee; |
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28.

CITES 2021-2030 strategic vision

| 29. | Welcomes the recognition of the interlinkages between CITES and the Sustainable Development Goals, the CBD and the IPBES’s findings; |
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29.

| 30. | Believes that the review of the CITES strategic vision should be addressed at CoP19, in the light of the CBD Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) to be adopted this year, to ensure that CITES contributes to the implementation of the GBF; |
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30.

| 31. | Urges the parties to achieve the aim of having only legal and ecologically sustainable trade in wild fauna and flora by 2025; emphasises that the goal should be to eliminate illegal trade in CITES-listed wildlife species, including captive-bred species, not only to reduce it; |
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31.

| 32. | Stresses that decisions adopted by CITES bodies should be based on scientific criteria aimed at the conservation of species, on the best available scientific information and on the precautionary principle; |
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32.

| 33. | Regrets the omission of the critical issue of animal welfare in the vision statement, calls on the Commission and the Member States and all other parties to address this omission; |
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33.

Strengthening the EU’s role in the global fight against wildlife trafficking

| 34. | Regrets the implementation gaps in the EU wildlife trade regulations, as they do not cover all critical species and do not provide the same level of protection for captive-bred animals; urges the Commission to review and expand the existing legislation regulating the wildlife trade to ensure that the import, trans-shipment, export, purchase, sale or transport of wild animals or plants that are taken, possessed, transported or sold in violation of the law of the country of origin or transit is prohibited; |
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34.

| 35. | Reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States to lead efforts to end the commercial trade in endangered species and their parts; stresses the importance of developing SMART (spatial monitoring and reporting tool) targets to this end; |
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35.

| 36. | Emphasises that there should be systemic inclusion of illegal wildlife trade and sustainable consumption in EU trade policy; reiterates its call to the Council to consider the CBD an essential element of free-trade agreements (FTAs) provided that mandatory mechanisms for reviewing national targets are agreed upon (7); asks the Council to also make CITES and the Paris Agreement essential components of FTAs, and to urge for their effective implementation; highlights the importance of the upcoming reform of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Regulation (8) in providing for effective implementation of multilateral conventions on climate and environmental aspects covered by the regulation, including the CBD; |
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36.

| 37. | Urges the Commission to adapt the European TRACES (Trade Control and Expert System) database in order to collect and make publicly available accurate information on the species, volume and origin of all marine ornamental fish in trade and thus monitor this currently unregulated and often unsustainable trade for which the EU is a major import market; |
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37.

| 38. | Reiterates its call for the EU Member States to establish a science-based EU-wide positive list of animals allowed as pets, under appropriate welfare conditions, without harm to populations in the wild and to European biodiversity; stresses, in this regard, the need for a Commission study to facilitate the adoption of this list, which should be based, among other inputs, on the existing experience of Member States and lessons learned; |
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38.

| 39. | Urges the Commission and the Member States to take immediate effective action in the framework of its commitments outlined in the EU biodiversity strategy to ban the import of hunting trophies derived from CITES-listed species; |
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39.

| 40. | Welcomes the EU’s efforts to provide development support to anti-wildlife trafficking efforts in developing countries; calls on the Commission to support the efforts of partner countries that are sources of wildlife and wildlife products, transit points, and/or destinations for sellers and buyers to develop viable economic alternatives for the livelihoods and sustainability of local communities; |
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40.

EU action plan against wildlife trafficking

| 41. | Welcomes the revision and continuation of the EU action plan against wildlife trafficking; calls on the Commission to publish an ambitious EU action plan without delay; |
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41.

| 42. | Stresses however, that the success of the future EU action plan against wildlife trafficking will largely depend on the allocation of resources; calls therefore on the EU and its Member States to earmark specific budgetary allocations for its implementation; |
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42.

| 43. | Is of the opinion that the action plan has not provided sufficient impetus to tackle the role of EU citizens in driving demand for illegal wildlife products both at home and in the EU’s neighbourhood and believes the EU action plan should be strengthened; calls on the Commission to implement evidence-based demand reduction initiatives in key consumer countries, including those within the EU; |
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43.

| 44. | Stresses that the EU action plan against wildlife trafficking should receive adequate funding, including assistance to non-EU countries and to wildlife rescue centres and sanctuaries; |
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44.

| 45. | Believes that the new EU action plan should pave the way for better law enforcement and inspection activities by relevant authorities across the Union, and towards improved data collection and data access, which will enable better trend assessments and risk analysis; calls on the Commission and Member States to allocate sufficient human and financial resources to implement the action plan, and to invest in capacity building and training of enforcement and judicial authorities; underlines that sharing and deepening relevant officials’ knowledge and raising public awareness must be made an integral part of the future plan; |
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45.

| 46. | Calls further on the Commission to create clear and implementable targets and actions as part of the action plan and to develop a clear monitoring and evaluation mechanism; |
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46.

| 47. | Considers it crucial that the action plan be fully in line with the biodiversity strategy for 2030, and ensure synergies with relevant EU legislation and the post-2020 global biodiversity framework; strongly believes that the action plan should identify and focus in particular on priority species and address the issue of nationally protected species illegally traded in the EU; |
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47.

| 48. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to tackle both online and offline trade in the revised EU action plan against wildlife trafficking, ensuring that wildlife cybercrime is given the same level of priority as other forms of cybercrime that threaten human health, the environment, the economy, security and education, inter alia, through communication, cooperation and coordination across the public and private sectors concerned; calls on the Commission to promptly evaluate how the Digital Services Act (9) could act as a tool to address the illegal online trade in animals and plants; |
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48.

| 49. | Notes that there is evidence that the legal trade in wild animals serves as cover for illegal trade activities, provides abundant laundering opportunities and complicates enforcement; calls on the EU to address both the legal and illegal trade in wild animals in the revision of the EU action plan against wildlife trafficking; |
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49.

| 50. | Stresses that the action plan should adopt a comprehensive approach from source to consumer; |
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50.

| 51. | Considers it important that the action plan involve and engage with the private sector to fight against illegal wildlife trafficking, and that sufficient public and private investments be made in research to increase our understanding of the wildlife trade; |
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51.

| 52. | Emphasises that the revised action plan should integrate human rights and gender, recognise the role of civil society organisations, include stakeholder consultations and ensure public participation; |
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52.

Organised crime, cybersecurity and confiscated animals

| 53. | Urges Member States, through their competent institutions, to build cross-border cooperation and coordination with various relevant international authorities and institutions in order to combat the involvement of organised criminal groups in the illegal trade in wildlife species; |
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53.

| 54. | Urges the Commission and the Member States to promote the preparation and adoption of an ambitious and effective protocol on environmental crime under the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, as referred to in the 2021-2025 EU strategy to tackle organised crime (10), which would include a provision obliging the parties to criminalise the import of and trade in wildlife that has been taken illegally from its country of origin; |
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54.

| 55. | Strongly welcomes the proposal for the revision of the Environmental Crime Directive (2008/99/EC) to include most forms of environmental crime offences such that they are punishable by harmonised, dissuasive, effective and proportionate sanctions or penalties; |
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55.

| 56. | Calls on the Commission to ensure coordination in the implementation of the Environmental Crime Directive, the EU wildlife trade regulations and the revised EU action plan against wildlife trafficking, making the most effective use of the tools offered under the different frameworks; |
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56.

| 57. | Calls for the inclusion of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and underwater noise pollution among the listed criminal offences in the revised Environmental Crime Directive; |
| --- | --- |

57.

| 58. | Regrets that animal welfare considerations are absent from the proposal; calls on the Commission to ensure that cruelty against animals is considered as an aggravating circumstance enabling increased penalties under the revised Environmental Crime Directive; |
| --- | --- |

58.

| 59. | Urges the Commission to adopt specific EU guidance to tackle wildlife cybercrime, ensuring harmonised policies in Member States and the collaboration between all relevant stakeholders; |
| --- | --- |

59.

| 60. | Urges the Member States to effectively and fully implement CITES Decisions 18.81-18.85 on wildlife crime linked to the internet, while making full use of Interpol’s guidelines entitled ‘Wildlife Crime Linked to the Internet — Practical Guidelines for Law Enforcement Practitioners’, developed to implement the relevant provisions of CITES Decision 17.93; |
| --- | --- |

60.

| 61. | Urges the EU to promote and support initiatives to significantly increase wildlife rescue and rehabilitation capacity through resources, funding, training and, importantly, the establishment of a network of competent and accredited rescue facilities and sanctuaries and national action plans for the management of confiscated live animals; |
| --- | --- |

61.

| 62. | Notes that lack of national rescue and sanctuary capacity may contribute to the lack of enforcement of relevant provisions related to the wildlife trade by a Member State and may result in measures inadequate to deter wildlife crime; considers that the revised Environmental Crime Directive could, for example, include rules for the management of the confiscated profits, including appropriate care of confiscated live animals; |
| --- | --- |

62.

| 63. | Underlines the importance of undertaking financial investigations and asset recovery procedures systematically; calls on the EU and its Member States to support measures aimed at seizing disruptive illicit financial flows and the proceeds of wildlife crime; |
| --- | --- |

63.

| 64. | Calls on Member States to implement and promote consistent and transparent reporting on all seized or confiscated live animals to CITES, Europol and the countries of origin; |
| --- | --- |

64.

One Health approach and role of CITES in reducing the risk of future zoonotic disease emergence associated with the international wildlife trade

| 65. | Recalls that according to IPBES, 70 % of emerging diseases and pandemics are of animal origin; expresses, not least in view of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, its deep concern about the increasingly frequent emergence and spread of zoonotic diseases that are transferred from animals to humans (anthropozoonoses), which is exacerbated by climate change, environmental degradation, land-use changes, deforestation, the destruction of and pressure on biodiversity and natural habitats, illegal trafficking of wild animals, and unsustainable food production and consumption patterns; underlines the need to improve knowledge about the links between disease emergence on the one hand and the legal and illegal wildlife trade, conservation and ecosystem degradation on the other; |
| --- | --- |

65.

| 66. | Points out that the risk of pandemics can be significantly lowered by reducing human activities that drive biodiversity loss and that the estimated cost of reducing the risk of pandemics is 100 times lower than the cost of responding to them; stresses that it is of the utmost importance to protect and restore wildlife habitats to prevent another pandemic of animal origin; urges all parties to step up their efforts; |
| --- | --- |

66.

| 67. | Urges the EU and all other parties to ensure the welfare of live animals in trade as well as those held in breeding facilities, recognising scientific evidence that poor welfare conditions in holding, transport and trade are linked to the outbreak and spread of diseases and thus threaten both animal and human health; stresses the benefit of an EU-wide positive list of animals allowed as pets in this regard; |
| --- | --- |

67.

| 68. | Calls on the Commission to use the regulatory dialogues provided for in FTAs to promote stringent EU sanitary, phytosanitary and animal welfare standards in order to minimise the risk of future epidemics and pandemics; calls further on the Commission to consider, if necessary, the adoption of a moratorium on imports of wild animals or other species from emerging infectious disease hotspots in order to address any safety concerns; |
| --- | --- |

68.

| 69. | Emphasises the important role that CITES should play in preventing future pandemics as the international wildlife trade regulator; |
| --- | --- |

69.

| 70. | Underlines the World Health Organization, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the United Nations Environment Programme guidance calling on national competent authorities to suspend the trade in live caught wild animals of mammalian species for food or breeding purposes and close sections of food markets selling live caught wild animals of mammalian species as an emergency measure unless demonstrable effective regulations and adequate risk assessment are in place and underlines the IPBES recommendations to remove live species in wildlife trade that are identified by expert review as being a high risk for the emergence of disease; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to support the global community in addressing the commercial trade and sale in markets of live wildlife for human consumption, particularly birds and mammals, with a view to phasing out this trade as a key step towards achieving the goal of preventing future pandemics of zoonotic origin; |
| --- | --- |

70.

| 71. | Underlines the important role of the Commission and Member States in coordinating and supporting the ‘One Health’ approach in the EU and advocating it at all international forums; calls for the urgent adoption of a new resolution that encourages parties to institutionalise a ‘One Health’ approach to wildlife use and trade, using the operational definition of One Health developed by the One Health High-Level Expert Panel, when implementing the convention and in their national laws, and to undertake appropriate risk analyses and prevention programmes with respect to animal, human and environmental health when considering applications for wildlife trade-related permits and certificates; |
| --- | --- |

71.

| 72. | Notes with concern that significant quantities of meat from domestic and wild animals are still smuggled into Member States by air passengers, posing risks to animal and human health and biodiversity; calls on the Commission to step up data collection on this issue with the Member States and to support and coordinate an EU response to illegal meat imports; |
| --- | --- |

72.

| 73. | Welcomes CITES’s intention to work with the OIE to develop a joint programme of work to collaboratively fill knowledge gaps and identify effective and practical solutions for reducing pathogen spill-over risks in wildlife supply chains; encourages CITES to continue strengthening active collaboration with other international organisations and conventions involved in zoonotic disease prevention taking a ‘One Health’ approach; |
| --- | --- |

73.

| 74. | Recalls the importance of indigenous peoples’ and local community engagement in relation to species conservation and the implementation of the convention; recognises the dependence of some communities on CITES-listed species for their livelihoods; regrets that a certain level of recognition of indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs) is lacking in CITES, contrary to CBD; considers that CITES meetings would benefit from greater representation of IPLCs and participation by them, and regrets the lack of progress made so far; urges the parties and the Secretariat to continue the work to define and implement effective mechanisms to ensure that IPLCs’ voices are heard; |
| --- | --- |

74.

| 75. | Calls on the World Health Organization to take a stance against the use of wild animals in medicines, in particular against the use of species classified as (near) threatened, vulnerable or endangered on the IUCN red list; |
| --- | --- |

75.

Amendments to the CITES appendices

| 76. | Expresses its strong support for the listing proposals submitted by the EU and its Member States to amend the appendices to CITES; |
| --- | --- |

76.

| 77. | Calls on the EU Member States to support proposals to CoP19 to list species or to move them from Appendix II to Appendix I that are put forward or supported by range countries; |
| --- | --- |

77.

| 78. | Calls on the EU Member States and all other parties to support proposals submitted to CoP19 to better protect reptiles, amphibians, birds, fish and mammals that are threatened by the international trade for the pet market, acknowledging that the market for exotic pets and the range of affected species are growing both within the EU and internationally; |
| --- | --- |

78.

| 79. | Calls for the EU and all parties to CITES to adhere to the precautionary principle with regard to species protection in all their formal positions on working documents and listing proposals, and to take full account, in particular, of the user-pays principle, the principle of preventive action, the principle of the best available scientific information and the ecosystem approach; |
| --- | --- |

79.

| 80. | Urges the EU to call for a revision of Resolution Conf. 9.21 (Rev. CoP18) on the interpretation and application of quotas for species included in Appendix I, to increase the frequency with which quotas of these species, which have the highest level of protection under the appendices, are reviewed, since the current timeframe of nine years (three intersessional periods) is too long; |
| --- | --- |

80.

| 81. | Supports the recommendations to strengthen the protection and conservation of species, including sharks and rays, marine turtles, seahorses, big cats, elephants, Tibetan antelope and saiga antelope; |
| --- | --- |

81.

| 82. | Urges the EU to support the establishment of a transparent and inclusive process for a further comprehensive, time-bound review of Resolution Conf. 10.21 on the transport of live specimens and the associated CITES guidance on non-air transport; calls for the constitution of a joint working group on the transport of animals and plants committee with a mandate to manage the regular review of the guidelines and to develop amendments to Resolution Conf. 10.21 (Rev. CoP16), to improve detailed transport requirements clarifying responsibilities for compliance, and to review their implementation by the parties; |
| --- | --- |

82.

| 83. | Calls on the EU and its Member States to support the adoption of a decision proposed by the Standing Committee to reconvene the CITES Rhinoceros Enforcement Task Force, highlighting the fact that poaching and illegal trade in rhinoceros horn remain major threats to the survival of African and Asian rhinoceroses; |
| --- | --- |

83.

Species-specific matters

Sharks and rays

| 84. | Underlines that sharks and rays play a key role in keeping ocean life healthy and that new research released since CITES CoP18 now shows that 37 % of shark and ray species are already threatened with extinction, which is the second-highest rate among all vertebrate groups after amphibians (11); highlights that one of the primary drivers of these declines is the international trade in their products and that the EU is a major exporter of, and trader in, shark parts and products; |
| --- | --- |

84.

| 85. | Regrets that to date only 25 % of species affected by the fin trade are listed in CITES Appendix II; urges the EU to ask the Secretariat, Standing Committee and CITES parties to further explore and address the worrying and critical mismatch identified in SC74 Doc. 67.2 between the catch and trade levels of CITES-listed shark species and to identify potential sources of underreporting or illegal trade in CITES-listed shark species; |
| --- | --- |

85.

| 86. | Welcomes, therefore, the Commission proposal for a Council decision which includes an Appendix II proposal that would bring the entire family of hammerhead sharks under the CITES regulation; |
| --- | --- |

86.

| 87. | Urges the EU, which plays a key role in global shark fisheries and trade, to support the proposal led by the host country of CoP19, Panama, to list requiem sharks (family Carcharhinidae) in Appendix II, with the rest of the family Carcharhinidae qualifying to be included as lookalike species due to the similarity in their appearance; |
| --- | --- |

87.

Big cats

| 88. | Recognises that some of the big cat species are among the most endangered CITES species, with populations continuing to decline to the point of recent national-level extinctions, and that the conservation of, and trade in, CITES big cat species has suffered from a lack of attention and financial support comparative to other CITES matters; |
| --- | --- |

88.

| 89. | Urges the EU to establish a big cat species conservation fund that would, inter alia, support the implementation of CITES big cat species-specific resolutions and decisions and the implementation of time-bound, country-specific recommendations and the CITES big cat task force outcomes and outputs; |
| --- | --- |

89.

| 90. | Urges further the EU to ensure that the CITES Secretariat takes a risk-based approach to the implementation of the CITES missions to countries with captive Asian big cat facilities of concern; |
| --- | --- |

90.

| 91. | Notes with great concern that all five species of the Panthera genus (tiger, lion, jaguar, leopard, and snow leopard) have an unfavourable conservation status varying from ‘near threatened’ to ‘endangered’ while their populations are decreasing; |
| --- | --- |

91.

| 92. | Urges all the parties to prohibit commercial trade, without exception, in the five species of the Panthera genus (tigers, lions, jaguars, leopards and snow leopards); calls, furthermore, on the Member States to prohibit captive breeding of these species by private entities, other than licensed zoos, as this can facilitate their illicit trade; |
| --- | --- |

92.

| 93. | Points out that the legal commercial trade in captive-bred species such as tigers and other big cats is highly detrimental as it stimulates demand, complicates enforcement, and provides abundant laundering opportunities; |
| --- | --- |

93.

| 94. | Calls for the closure of tiger farms and for an end of all commercial trade in captive-bred tigers and their parts; |
| --- | --- |

94.

| 95. | Calls on the Commission, the Member States and all CITES parties to ensure that the African lion is included in Appendix I to give it optimal protection status and calls for a crackdown on the illegal trade in the African lion, which is mainly with Asian countries; |
| --- | --- |

95.

Elephants

| 96. | Calls on the Commission to fully support and actively advocate the inclusion of all African elephant populations in Appendix I of CITES and to oppose moving any elephant populations from Appendix I to Appendix II; |
| --- | --- |

96.

| 97. | Calls on the Commission and Member States to support the development of a simple and unified legal framework on the trade in live African elephants caught in the wild, limiting exports to in situ conservation programmes or secure areas in the wild, within the species’ natural and historical range in Africa; |
| --- | --- |

97.

| 98. | Highlights the position of the African elephant range states belonging to the African Elephant Coalition and of the IUCN Species Survival Commission — African Elephant Specialist Group, which do not endorse the removal of African elephants from the wild for any captive use; |
| --- | --- |

98.

| 99. | Urges the EU to highlight the poor ongoing implementation of all provisions of CITES Decisions 18.226 and 18.227, and to strongly encourage all the parties to address these provisions in full, while being cognizant of commitments by several Asian elephant range states to implement more secure systems of registration, marking and tracing of live Asian elephants; |
| --- | --- |

99.

| 100. | Urges the closure of all remaining legal domestic ivory markets, such as that in Japan, as a matter of urgency and calls on the EU and all the parties to oppose any proposals seeking to remove restrictions on the trade in ivory; |
| --- | --- |

100.

| 101. | Calls on the Commission and Member States to require increased transparency and improved management of ivory stocks and stockpiles, and encourage their destruction; |
| --- | --- |

101.

| 102. | Calls on the EU to follow up its suggestion to the 74th meeting of the CITES Standing Committee and ensure inclusion in Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) reports, including the report to be submitted to CoP19, of an analysis of ivory seizures connected to each party with legal domestic markets for the commercial trade in ivory, and to request the CITES Secretariat to use information collected via the Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE), ETIS and the National Ivory Action Plan (NIAP) process to conduct an analysis of where the largest undeclared stockpiles are likely to exist; |
| --- | --- |

102.

| 103. | Urges the EU and its Member States to support recommending a review of the NIAP process to ensure it remains fit for purpose, and calls for further efforts by the parties concerned under the NIAP process on ivory stockpiles; |
| --- | --- |

103.

| 104. | Calls on the EU to ensure that the ETIS remains the robust mechanism and information source on trends in illegal ivory trade that it has proven to be for over two decades; |
| --- | --- |

104.

Other species

| 105. | Calls for the EU and all the parties to:






  — | support proposals to list the common hippopotamus, Hippopotamus amphibius, in Appendix I, given the ongoing concerns over population declines and trade in the species; |
| --- | --- | --- |

105.

—

support proposals to list the common hippopotamus, Hippopotamus amphibius, in Appendix I, given the ongoing concerns over population declines and trade in the species;

| — | support proposals to include additional turtle species in the CITES appendices, including those in the genera Kinosternon, Claudius and Staurotypus; |
| --- | --- |

—

support proposals to include additional turtle species in the CITES appendices, including those in the genera Kinosternon, Claudius and Staurotypus;

| — | support the proposal led by Costa Rica with support from other range states to list glass frogs (family Centrolenidae) on Appendix II of CITES to ensure that trade in these species is legal and sustainable; |
| --- | --- |

—

support the proposal led by Costa Rica with support from other range states to list glass frogs (family Centrolenidae) on Appendix II of CITES to ensure that trade in these species is legal and sustainable;

| — | urge Botswana to report on any activities it is implementing to address rhinoceros poaching and illegal trade under Resolution Conf. 9.14 (Rev.CoP17) on conservation of and trade in African and Asian rhinoceroses, given the serious concerns over the increase in rhinoceros poaching in Botswana since CoP18; |
| --- | --- |

—

urge Botswana to report on any activities it is implementing to address rhinoceros poaching and illegal trade under Resolution Conf. 9.14 (Rev.CoP17) on conservation of and trade in African and Asian rhinoceroses, given the serious concerns over the increase in rhinoceros poaching in Botswana since CoP18;

| — | advance decisions and/or amendments to Resolution Conf. 17.10 on conservation of and trade in pangolins to encourage those parties with domestic markets to take all measures to close those markets and to destroy their pangolin stockpiles; |
| --- | --- |

—

advance decisions and/or amendments to Resolution Conf. 17.10 on conservation of and trade in pangolins to encourage those parties with domestic markets to take all measures to close those markets and to destroy their pangolin stockpiles;

| — | advance decisions that hold Mexico to account for its failure to prevent illegal fishing and trade in Totoaba macdonaldi, an Appendix I listed species, which is driving the vaquita (Phocoena sinus) to extinction, including consideration of a suspension in the commercial trade of CITES-listed species consistent with Res. Conf. 14.3; |
| --- | --- |

—

advance decisions that hold Mexico to account for its failure to prevent illegal fishing and trade in Totoaba macdonaldi, an Appendix I listed species, which is driving the vaquita (Phocoena sinus) to extinction, including consideration of a suspension in the commercial trade of CITES-listed species consistent with Res. Conf. 14.3;

| 106. | Calls on Hong Kong and China to step up their border controls to stop imports of totoaba, mainly destined for China; |
| --- | --- |

106.

| 107. | Urges all the parties to prohibit the trade in totoaba completely; |
| --- | --- |

107.

o

o o

| 108. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and its Secretariat. |
| --- | --- |

108.

---

(1)  OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25.

(2)  OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7.

(3)  Food and Agriculture Organization, ‘The State of the World’s Forests 2022 — Forest pathways for green recovery and building inclusive, resilient and sustainable economies’, Rome, 2022.

(4)  International Fund for Animal Welfare, ‘Supply and demand: the EU’s role in the global shark trade’, 2022.

(5)  IUCN, ‘African elephant species now Endangered and Critically Endangered — IUCN Red List’, 25 March 2021.

(6)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 of 4 May 2006 laying down detailed rules concerning the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (OJ L 166, 19.6.2006, p. 1).

(7)  OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25.

(8)  Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 (OJ L 303, 31.10.2012, p. 1).

(9)  Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (COM(2020)0825).

(10)  Commission communication of 14 April 2021 on the EU strategy to tackle organised crime 2021-2025 (COM(2021)0170).

(11)  IUCN Species Survival Commission — Shark Specialist Group, ‘New Global Study Finds Unprecedented Shark and Ray Extinction Risk’, 6 September 2021.

---

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/54 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/54

---

P9_TA(2022)0346

Access to water as a human right — the external dimension

European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2022 on access to water as a human right — the external dimension (2021/2187(INI))

(2023/C 132/06)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010, which recognises the human right to clean drinking water and sanitation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010, which recognises the human right to clean drinking water and sanitation,

| — | having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 68/157 of 18 December 2013 entitled ‘The human right to safe drinking water and sanitation’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 68/157 of 18 December 2013 entitled ‘The human right to safe drinking water and sanitation’,

| — | having regard to UN Human Rights Council Resolution 45/8 of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘The human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN Human Rights Council Resolution 45/8 of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘The human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation’,

| — | having regard to UN Human Rights Council Resolution 48/13 of 8 October 2021 entitled ‘The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN Human Rights Council Resolution 48/13 of 8 October 2021 entitled ‘The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment’,

| — | having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 71/222 of 21 December 2016 entitled ‘International Decade for Action, “Water for Sustainable Development” 2018-2028’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 71/222 of 21 December 2016 entitled ‘International Decade for Action, “Water for Sustainable Development” 2018-2028’,

| — | having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 75/212 of 21 December 2020 on the United Nations Conference on the Midterm Comprehensive Review of the Implementation of the Objectives of the International Decade for Action, ‘Water for Sustainable Development’, 2018-2028 (UN 2023 Water Conference), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 75/212 of 21 December 2020 on the United Nations Conference on the Midterm Comprehensive Review of the Implementation of the Objectives of the International Decade for Action, ‘Water for Sustainable Development’, 2018-2028 (UN 2023 Water Conference),

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the General Comments of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the General Comments of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

| — | having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,

| — | having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights, as proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 17 November 2017, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights, as proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 17 November 2017,

| — | having regard to General Comment No 15 (2002) of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the right to water, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to General Comment No 15 (2002) of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the right to water,

| — | having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the International Labour Organization (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989 (No 169), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the International Labour Organization (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989 (No 169),

| — | having regard to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Water Convention), initially negotiated as a regional instrument and opened up in 2016 for accession to all UN Member States, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Water Convention), initially negotiated as a regional instrument and opened up in 2016 for accession to all UN Member States,

| — | having regard to the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Watercourses Convention), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Watercourses Convention),

| — | having regard to the 1999 UNECE-WHO Protocol to the Water Convention on Water and Health, which provides a framework to translate the human rights to water and sanitation into practice, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 1999 UNECE-WHO Protocol to the Water Convention on Water and Health, which provides a framework to translate the human rights to water and sanitation into practice,

| — | having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 6 on safe drinking water and sanitation, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 6 on safe drinking water and sanitation, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,

| — | having regard to the UN report of 19 March 2019 on the development of the world’s water resources entitled ‘Leaving no one behind’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN report of 19 March 2019 on the development of the world’s water resources entitled ‘Leaving no one behind’,

| — | having regard to the 2020 and 2021 ‘State of Food and Agriculture’ reports published by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 2020 and 2021 ‘State of Food and Agriculture’ reports published by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization,

| — | having regard to the report of 16 July 2021 by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation on risks and impacts of the commodification and financialisation of water on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, and to his report of 21 July 2020 on human rights and the privatisation of water and sanitation services, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of 16 July 2021 by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation on risks and impacts of the commodification and financialisation of water on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, and to his report of 21 July 2020 on human rights and the privatisation of water and sanitation services,

| — | having regard to the UN World Water Development Report 2021: Valuing Water, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN World Water Development Report 2021: Valuing Water,

| — | having regard to the EU Human Rights Guidelines of 17 June 2019 on Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Human Rights Guidelines of 17 June 2019 on Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation,

| — | having regard to Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (1) (Water Framework Directive), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (1) (Water Framework Directive),

| — | having regard to Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources (2),

| — | having regard to Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration (3),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption (4),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 19 March 2014 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Water and sanitation are a human right! Water is a public good, not a commodity!’ (COM(2014)0177), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 19 March 2014 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Water and sanitation are a human right! Water is a public good, not a commodity!’ (COM(2014)0177),

| — | having regard to Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law (5),

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018 on water diplomacy, of 17 June 2019 on the EU Human Rights Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation and of 19 November 2021 on water in the EU’s external action, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018 on water diplomacy, of 17 June 2019 on the EU Human Rights Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation and of 19 November 2021 on water in the EU’s external action,

| — | having regard to the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Right2Water’ and its resolution of 8 September 2015 on the follow-up to the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Right2Water’ and its resolution of 8 September 2015 on the follow-up to the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water (6),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives (7),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability (8),

| — | having regard to existing successful methods of cross-border cooperation such as exchanges of views between water and wastewater utilities in the Nordic countries dating back to the 1980s, the 1970 formation of a joint Nordic Association for Hydrology, the annual Nordic Water Advisers Meeting, the Nordic water forums and extensive Nordic cooperation regarding water management issues, |
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—

having regard to existing successful methods of cross-border cooperation such as exchanges of views between water and wastewater utilities in the Nordic countries dating back to the 1980s, the 1970 formation of a joint Nordic Association for Hydrology, the annual Nordic Water Advisers Meeting, the Nordic water forums and extensive Nordic cooperation regarding water management issues,

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Development, |
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—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Development,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0231/2022), |
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—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0231/2022),

| A. | whereas Resolution 64/292 of the UN General Assembly recognises ‘the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights’; whereas the absence of water is incompatible with life and both rights are interdependent and essential for a dignified life; whereas there can be no sustainable and universal access to clean water without functioning sanitation chains; whereas water and waterways also have a strong cultural, spiritual and religious dimension stemming from their fundamental role in society’s life; |
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A.

whereas Resolution 64/292 of the UN General Assembly recognises ‘the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights’; whereas the absence of water is incompatible with life and both rights are interdependent and essential for a dignified life; whereas there can be no sustainable and universal access to clean water without functioning sanitation chains; whereas water and waterways also have a strong cultural, spiritual and religious dimension stemming from their fundamental role in society’s life;

| B. | whereas Principle 20 of the European Pillar of Social Rights on access to essential services includes an explicit reference to the right of citizens to water and sanitation; |
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B.

whereas Principle 20 of the European Pillar of Social Rights on access to essential services includes an explicit reference to the right of citizens to water and sanitation;

| C. | whereas the denial of the human right to water has repercussions on enjoyment of the right to life and health, considering that contaminated water, the inadequate management of wastewater and poor sanitation are linked to the transmission of serious diseases and even death; whereas water and sanitation services are one of the cornerstones of public health; whereas diarrhoeal diseases are the fourth cause of death among children under five and a leading cause of chronic malnutrition; whereas access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene is indispensable for ensuring global resilience against pandemics and other infectious diseases, and to combat the emerging threat of antimicrobial resistance; |
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C.

whereas the denial of the human right to water has repercussions on enjoyment of the right to life and health, considering that contaminated water, the inadequate management of wastewater and poor sanitation are linked to the transmission of serious diseases and even death; whereas water and sanitation services are one of the cornerstones of public health; whereas diarrhoeal diseases are the fourth cause of death among children under five and a leading cause of chronic malnutrition; whereas access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene is indispensable for ensuring global resilience against pandemics and other infectious diseases, and to combat the emerging threat of antimicrobial resistance;

| D. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has hit the most vulnerable people the hardest and has once again highlighted the need for clean and sufficient water and sanitation globally; whereas availability and access to water supply, sanitation and hygiene services (WASH), including for vulnerable or marginalised people, is fundamental to fighting COVID-19; |
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D.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has hit the most vulnerable people the hardest and has once again highlighted the need for clean and sufficient water and sanitation globally; whereas availability and access to water supply, sanitation and hygiene services (WASH), including for vulnerable or marginalised people, is fundamental to fighting COVID-19;

| E. | whereas 80-90 % of wastewater in developing countries is discharged directly into rivers, lakes and seas, causing water-borne diseases and severely damaging the environment; whereas the lives of millions of impoverished persons depend on the good status of water sources, not only for the supply of drinking water but also for the production of food through agriculture, livestock rearing and fishing; |
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E.

whereas 80-90 % of wastewater in developing countries is discharged directly into rivers, lakes and seas, causing water-borne diseases and severely damaging the environment; whereas the lives of millions of impoverished persons depend on the good status of water sources, not only for the supply of drinking water but also for the production of food through agriculture, livestock rearing and fishing;

| F. | whereas the lack of respect for, protection of and compliance with the human right to water and sanitation often hinder the right to education; whereas children, and in many cases girls, have to walk an average distance of six kilometres every day to fetch water, which prevents them from attending school; whereas the opportunity costs of collecting water are high and have far-reaching effects as they shorten considerably the time available for other important activities; |
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F.

whereas the lack of respect for, protection of and compliance with the human right to water and sanitation often hinder the right to education; whereas children, and in many cases girls, have to walk an average distance of six kilometres every day to fetch water, which prevents them from attending school; whereas the opportunity costs of collecting water are high and have far-reaching effects as they shorten considerably the time available for other important activities;

| G. | whereas many children stop going to school because of illnesses related to unsafe water or poor hygiene practices; whereas one in three children does not have appropriate access to water and sanitation in schools; whereas the UN’s 2021 Sustainable Development Goals Report shows that globally, more than a fifth of primary schools lacked access to basic drinking water or single-sex toilets and more than a third lacked basic handwashing facilities; whereas many girls are also forced to drop out of school when they are unable to access gender-appropriate toilets and manage their menstruation in a dignified manner; |
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G.

whereas many children stop going to school because of illnesses related to unsafe water or poor hygiene practices; whereas one in three children does not have appropriate access to water and sanitation in schools; whereas the UN’s 2021 Sustainable Development Goals Report shows that globally, more than a fifth of primary schools lacked access to basic drinking water or single-sex toilets and more than a third lacked basic handwashing facilities; whereas many girls are also forced to drop out of school when they are unable to access gender-appropriate toilets and manage their menstruation in a dignified manner;

| H. | whereas children with disabilities also suffer difficulties in accessing education due to the lack of adapted toilets and sanitation facilities; whereas UNESCO reports that more than 90 % of all children with disabilities do not attend school, and girls with disabilities are far more likely to drop out of school than boys with disabilities; whereas drinking water is imperative for concentration during learning; |
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H.

whereas children with disabilities also suffer difficulties in accessing education due to the lack of adapted toilets and sanitation facilities; whereas UNESCO reports that more than 90 % of all children with disabilities do not attend school, and girls with disabilities are far more likely to drop out of school than boys with disabilities; whereas drinking water is imperative for concentration during learning;

| I. | whereas the disadvantages faced by many women and girls, people with certain disabilities and elderly people with regard to water, sanitation and hygiene manifest themselves in multiple ways that impact on their overall health, well-being and dignity, reproductive health, education, nutrition, security, and economic and political participation; whereas mainly mothers of children with disabilities are forced out of work life to manage their children’s toileting activities and in order to take care of their children’s home-schooling when schools lack accessible toilets; |
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I.

whereas the disadvantages faced by many women and girls, people with certain disabilities and elderly people with regard to water, sanitation and hygiene manifest themselves in multiple ways that impact on their overall health, well-being and dignity, reproductive health, education, nutrition, security, and economic and political participation; whereas mainly mothers of children with disabilities are forced out of work life to manage their children’s toileting activities and in order to take care of their children’s home-schooling when schools lack accessible toilets;

| J. | whereas in many countries of the Global South, women and girls are traditionally responsible for domestic water supply and these responsibilities make them more vulnerable to disease and violence; whereas women and girls are more at risk of being victims of attacks, sexual and gender-based violence, harassment and other threats to their security when they are collecting water for the household, when they visit sanitation facilities outside their homes; |
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J.

whereas in many countries of the Global South, women and girls are traditionally responsible for domestic water supply and these responsibilities make them more vulnerable to disease and violence; whereas women and girls are more at risk of being victims of attacks, sexual and gender-based violence, harassment and other threats to their security when they are collecting water for the household, when they visit sanitation facilities outside their homes;

| K. | whereas, as indicated in the EU Human Rights Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, the human right to water and sanitation encompasses the dimensions of availability, accessibility, acceptability, quality and affordability and the principles of the human rights-based approach (non-discrimination, accountability, transparency, participation, etc.); |
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K.

whereas, as indicated in the EU Human Rights Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, the human right to water and sanitation encompasses the dimensions of availability, accessibility, acceptability, quality and affordability and the principles of the human rights-based approach (non-discrimination, accountability, transparency, participation, etc.);

| L. | whereas the sixth UN SDG is to ensure that the entire world has universal and equitable access to safe drinking water and sanitation by 2030; whereas despite progress, this goal remains severely off-track and under-financed, according to the latest status report by UN-Water, and significant challenges remain both to its achievement and in addressing great inequalities between and within countries in access to basic water and sanitation services; |
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L.

whereas the sixth UN SDG is to ensure that the entire world has universal and equitable access to safe drinking water and sanitation by 2030; whereas despite progress, this goal remains severely off-track and under-financed, according to the latest status report by UN-Water, and significant challenges remain both to its achievement and in addressing great inequalities between and within countries in access to basic water and sanitation services;

| M. | whereas the UN’s 2021 Sustainable Development Goals Report shows that, in 2020, 2 billion people still lacked safely managed drinking water, 3,6 billion lacked safely managed sanitation, and 2,3 billion lacked basic hygiene provisions, and that 129 countries were not yet on track to having sustainably managed water resources for 2030; whereas access to water creates conditions propitious for economic development and these conditions will allow vulnerable people to gain financial independence; |
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M.

whereas the UN’s 2021 Sustainable Development Goals Report shows that, in 2020, 2 billion people still lacked safely managed drinking water, 3,6 billion lacked safely managed sanitation, and 2,3 billion lacked basic hygiene provisions, and that 129 countries were not yet on track to having sustainably managed water resources for 2030; whereas access to water creates conditions propitious for economic development and these conditions will allow vulnerable people to gain financial independence;

| N. | whereas achieving a universal safely managed water supply and sanitation would yield net benefits of between USD 37 billion and USD 86 billion per year between 2021 and 2040; |
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N.

whereas achieving a universal safely managed water supply and sanitation would yield net benefits of between USD 37 billion and USD 86 billion per year between 2021 and 2040;

| O. | whereas water is a limited resource; whereas per capita freshwater availability has drastically fallen over the past two decades; whereas an unbalanced distribution of population growth and depopulation of rural areas, agricultural intensification, the effects of climate change and environmental degradation, as well as certain unlawful and polluting practices in water use, are posing ever-greater water access problems in many regions and will cause even more access problems in the future; |
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O.

whereas water is a limited resource; whereas per capita freshwater availability has drastically fallen over the past two decades; whereas an unbalanced distribution of population growth and depopulation of rural areas, agricultural intensification, the effects of climate change and environmental degradation, as well as certain unlawful and polluting practices in water use, are posing ever-greater water access problems in many regions and will cause even more access problems in the future;

| P. | whereas much of the net growth in global population up to 2050 will occur in the cities of developing countries, thus increasing urban demands for water and food; whereas according to the UN World Water Development Report 2019, by 2050 we could be using 20-30 % more water than we do today, and whereas according to the World Bank, urban water demand is projected to increase by 50-70 % over the three next decades; |
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P.

whereas much of the net growth in global population up to 2050 will occur in the cities of developing countries, thus increasing urban demands for water and food; whereas according to the UN World Water Development Report 2019, by 2050 we could be using 20-30 % more water than we do today, and whereas according to the World Bank, urban water demand is projected to increase by 50-70 % over the three next decades;

| Q. | whereas 125 out of 154 developing countries have included freshwater resources and terrestrial and wetland ecosystems as the highest priority areas in their national climate adaptation plans, in line with SDG 13; |
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Q.

whereas 125 out of 154 developing countries have included freshwater resources and terrestrial and wetland ecosystems as the highest priority areas in their national climate adaptation plans, in line with SDG 13;

| R. | whereas global warming is a major cause of water scarcity; whereas the ongoing climate crisis, with increasing droughts, floods and torrential rains, is exacerbating inequalities in distribution of water; whereas about 90 % of all natural disasters are water-related and water accounts for 70 % of all deaths linked to natural disasters; whereas according to the World Meteorological Organization’s Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water Extremes (1970 — 2019), out of the top 10 disasters during this period, the hazards that led to the largest human losses during the period have been droughts, storms and floods; whereas, according to the OECD, nearly 20 % of the world’s population will be at risk from floods in 2050; |
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R.

whereas global warming is a major cause of water scarcity; whereas the ongoing climate crisis, with increasing droughts, floods and torrential rains, is exacerbating inequalities in distribution of water; whereas about 90 % of all natural disasters are water-related and water accounts for 70 % of all deaths linked to natural disasters; whereas according to the World Meteorological Organization’s Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water Extremes (1970 — 2019), out of the top 10 disasters during this period, the hazards that led to the largest human losses during the period have been droughts, storms and floods; whereas, according to the OECD, nearly 20 % of the world’s population will be at risk from floods in 2050;

| S. | whereas water stress, defined by the UN as the point at which the demand for water is higher than the quantity available or when its use is restricted by its low quality, could in some cases be a driver of induced displacement and migration; whereas, according to the UN’s water development reports, five of the world’s eleven regions, accounting for two thirds of the global population, are currently experiencing water stress; whereas, according to the UN’s 2020 Sustainable Development Goals Report, water scarcity could displace some 700 million people by 2030; |
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S.

whereas water stress, defined by the UN as the point at which the demand for water is higher than the quantity available or when its use is restricted by its low quality, could in some cases be a driver of induced displacement and migration; whereas, according to the UN’s water development reports, five of the world’s eleven regions, accounting for two thirds of the global population, are currently experiencing water stress; whereas, according to the UN’s 2020 Sustainable Development Goals Report, water scarcity could displace some 700 million people by 2030;

| T. | whereas deforestation, land grabbing and natural resource overexploitation and extraction activities, including by organised crime groups, have a considerable impact on the water level of rivers and lakes, alter the water cycle, and contribute towards the drying-up of rivers and lakes as well as the pollution of the exploited areas; |
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T.

whereas deforestation, land grabbing and natural resource overexploitation and extraction activities, including by organised crime groups, have a considerable impact on the water level of rivers and lakes, alter the water cycle, and contribute towards the drying-up of rivers and lakes as well as the pollution of the exploited areas;

| U. | whereas freshwater ecosystems, while covering less than 1 % of the earth’s surface, harbour more than 10 % of all species and delicate biodiversity; whereas around 70 % of the world’s fresh water is used for agriculture, while the remainder is divided between industrial use (19 %), mainly in the food, textile, energy, industrial, chemical, pharmaceutical, and mining sectors, and domestic use (11 %), including human consumption; |
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U.

whereas freshwater ecosystems, while covering less than 1 % of the earth’s surface, harbour more than 10 % of all species and delicate biodiversity; whereas around 70 % of the world’s fresh water is used for agriculture, while the remainder is divided between industrial use (19 %), mainly in the food, textile, energy, industrial, chemical, pharmaceutical, and mining sectors, and domestic use (11 %), including human consumption;

| V. | whereas healthy ecosystems enable the improvement of water quantity and quality, while increasing resilience to climate change; |
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V.

whereas healthy ecosystems enable the improvement of water quantity and quality, while increasing resilience to climate change;

| W. | whereas agriculture is the largest consumer of the world’s freshwater resources; whereas one third of arable land worldwide is used to feed livestock; whereas the FAO’s 2020 report entitled ‘The State of Food and Agriculture — Overcoming water challenges in agriculture’ suggests that food productivity and rural incomes can be significantly enhanced through investments in new irrigation systems or the adaptation and modernisation of existing ones, and that this should be combined with improved water management practices including improved agricultural practices; whereas land grabbing has negative implications for water availability and quality, dispossesses local communities of water sources and violates their human right to safe drinking water; |
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W.

whereas agriculture is the largest consumer of the world’s freshwater resources; whereas one third of arable land worldwide is used to feed livestock; whereas the FAO’s 2020 report entitled ‘The State of Food and Agriculture — Overcoming water challenges in agriculture’ suggests that food productivity and rural incomes can be significantly enhanced through investments in new irrigation systems or the adaptation and modernisation of existing ones, and that this should be combined with improved water management practices including improved agricultural practices; whereas land grabbing has negative implications for water availability and quality, dispossesses local communities of water sources and violates their human right to safe drinking water;

| X. | whereas the energy sector is currently responsible for 10 % of global water extraction and its water consumption is expected to rise by almost 60 % by 2040; |
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X.

whereas the energy sector is currently responsible for 10 % of global water extraction and its water consumption is expected to rise by almost 60 % by 2040;

| Y. | whereas certain abusive and in many cases illegal extractive industries have a considerable impact on surface and groundwater resources, pollution and the destruction of glaciers, forests, wetlands, rivers and other water sources vital for human consumption; |
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Y.

whereas certain abusive and in many cases illegal extractive industries have a considerable impact on surface and groundwater resources, pollution and the destruction of glaciers, forests, wetlands, rivers and other water sources vital for human consumption;

| Z. | whereas the textile industry counts among the sectors that consume the most water in the world, and whereas apparel and textiles are produced in some of the world’s most water-scarce regions; whereas this industry is ranked as the second-most polluting in the world and a large part of that pollution ends up in bodies of water; whereas the Commission plans to adopt, in the first quarter of 2022, the ‘EU strategy for sustainable textiles’, which sets out to help the EU to move towards a circular economy in which textile products are designed to last longer and be reusable, repairable, recyclable and energy efficient; |
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Z.

whereas the textile industry counts among the sectors that consume the most water in the world, and whereas apparel and textiles are produced in some of the world’s most water-scarce regions; whereas this industry is ranked as the second-most polluting in the world and a large part of that pollution ends up in bodies of water; whereas the Commission plans to adopt, in the first quarter of 2022, the ‘EU strategy for sustainable textiles’, which sets out to help the EU to move towards a circular economy in which textile products are designed to last longer and be reusable, repairable, recyclable and energy efficient;

| AA. | whereas the growing demand for water is causing water resources to be overexploited and water’s scarcity has made it a disputed resource; whereas, according to the UN, conflicts over water are expected in some 300 areas across the world by 2025; |
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AA.

whereas the growing demand for water is causing water resources to be overexploited and water’s scarcity has made it a disputed resource; whereas, according to the UN, conflicts over water are expected in some 300 areas across the world by 2025;

| AB. | whereas the preservation of water resources is under attack and damages to the quality of water have been made a criminal offence in many countries; whereas in recent years, environmental and water rights defenders have been subjected to an ever-increasing number of attacks including killings, kidnappings, torture, gender-based violence, threats, harassment, intimidation, smear campaigns, criminalisation, judicial harassment, forced eviction and displacement, and whereas there is an urgent need to support them proactively and protect their life and safety; whereas several finalists for the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought are under attack for their role in defending water and common goods; whereas the defenders of the waters of the Guapinol river were imprisoned for more than two years before their release; whereas Lolita Chávez has been in exile for four years for her defence of the territory against the activities of hydroelectricity companies in Iximulew (Guatemala); whereas Berta Cáceres was assassinated in 2016 for her defence of the Blanco and Gualcarque rivers, and those who ordered the crime have still not been convicted; |
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AB.

whereas the preservation of water resources is under attack and damages to the quality of water have been made a criminal offence in many countries; whereas in recent years, environmental and water rights defenders have been subjected to an ever-increasing number of attacks including killings, kidnappings, torture, gender-based violence, threats, harassment, intimidation, smear campaigns, criminalisation, judicial harassment, forced eviction and displacement, and whereas there is an urgent need to support them proactively and protect their life and safety; whereas several finalists for the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought are under attack for their role in defending water and common goods; whereas the defenders of the waters of the Guapinol river were imprisoned for more than two years before their release; whereas Lolita Chávez has been in exile for four years for her defence of the territory against the activities of hydroelectricity companies in Iximulew (Guatemala); whereas Berta Cáceres was assassinated in 2016 for her defence of the Blanco and Gualcarque rivers, and those who ordered the crime have still not been convicted;

| AC. | whereas, according to Global Witness, more than a third of the land and environmental defenders murdered worldwide between 2015 and 2019 belonged to indigenous communities, whose land and water management skills are crucial in combating the climate crisis and biodiversity loss; |
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AC.

whereas, according to Global Witness, more than a third of the land and environmental defenders murdered worldwide between 2015 and 2019 belonged to indigenous communities, whose land and water management skills are crucial in combating the climate crisis and biodiversity loss;

| AD. | whereas denying access to water and destroying water infrastructure have been used as an essential tactic by occupying powers to annex occupied territories and displace people from their lands; |
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AD.

whereas denying access to water and destroying water infrastructure have been used as an essential tactic by occupying powers to annex occupied territories and displace people from their lands;

| AE. | whereas the EU Water Framework Directive recognises that ‘water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such’; |
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AE.

whereas the EU Water Framework Directive recognises that ‘water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such’;

| AF. | whereas since 6 December 2020, water has been traded on the Wall Street commodities futures market; whereas, in the words of Pedro Arrojo, UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, ‘water has a set of vital values for our society that the market logic does not recognise and therefore, cannot manage adequately, let alone in a financial space so prone to speculation’; whereas, according to various UN experts, the application of a speculative approach to the management of goods that are essential for individuals’ lives and dignity infringes the human rights of people in situations of poverty, worsens gender inequality and increases the vulnerability of marginalised communities; |
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AF.

whereas since 6 December 2020, water has been traded on the Wall Street commodities futures market; whereas, in the words of Pedro Arrojo, UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, ‘water has a set of vital values for our society that the market logic does not recognise and therefore, cannot manage adequately, let alone in a financial space so prone to speculation’; whereas, according to various UN experts, the application of a speculative approach to the management of goods that are essential for individuals’ lives and dignity infringes the human rights of people in situations of poverty, worsens gender inequality and increases the vulnerability of marginalised communities;

| AG. | whereas governments have a duty to guarantee minimum essential levels of water and sanitation for all; whereas the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation of 16 July 2021 stresses that water should be considered as a public good and should be managed under an approach grounded on human rights, guaranteeing the right to water and sanitation and the sustainability of aquatic ecosystems; whereas water supply and sanitation are services of general interest, and revenues from the water management cycle should cover any related expenses and improvement costs, provided that the public interest is safeguarded; |
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AG.

whereas governments have a duty to guarantee minimum essential levels of water and sanitation for all; whereas the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation of 16 July 2021 stresses that water should be considered as a public good and should be managed under an approach grounded on human rights, guaranteeing the right to water and sanitation and the sustainability of aquatic ecosystems; whereas water supply and sanitation are services of general interest, and revenues from the water management cycle should cover any related expenses and improvement costs, provided that the public interest is safeguarded;

| AH. | whereas, as recognised by the EU Human Rights Guidelines on Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, states are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil these rights and third parties should strictly refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the rights to water and sanitation; |
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AH.

whereas, as recognised by the EU Human Rights Guidelines on Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, states are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil these rights and third parties should strictly refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the rights to water and sanitation;

| AI. | whereas workers who work in the sanitation chain face many risks, including health risks resulting from precarious working conditions; whereas they are often informal workers who are not protected by labour laws; whereas the enjoyment of the rights to water and sanitation should not come at the expense of the safety, dignity and well-being of sanitation workers; |
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AI.

whereas workers who work in the sanitation chain face many risks, including health risks resulting from precarious working conditions; whereas they are often informal workers who are not protected by labour laws; whereas the enjoyment of the rights to water and sanitation should not come at the expense of the safety, dignity and well-being of sanitation workers;

| 1. | Reaffirms the right to safe drinking water and sanitation as a human right, both rights being complementary; underlines that access to clean drinking water is indispensable to a healthy and dignified life and is essential for the development of human dignity; highlights the fact that the right to water is a fundamental precondition for the enjoyment of other rights, and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest, and common public and global goods; |
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1.

| 2. | Underlines that the adequate access to WASH facilities and the right to health and life are mutually dependent and are an essential prerequisite for public health and human development; underlines the need for clean water in the context of pandemics and calls for corresponding action and strategies and policies on the part of the Commission, the Member States and third countries so that adequate protection can be offered to everyone; |
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2.

| 3. | Underlines that enshrining the right to safe drinking water and sanitation as a human right was a crucial milestone on the road to greater social and environmental justice; affirms that progress could be improved by affording the sector higher political priority and ensuring better implementation and monitoring of policies, more efficient funding and accountability and public participation, especially among the most marginalised in society, in particular in developing countries; emphasises that assistance for providing safe drinking water and sanitation should be given high priority in the allocation of EU funds and in assistance programming; |
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3.

| 4. | Recalls the responsibility of states to promote and safeguard all human rights, which are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated and which must be promoted and applied in a fair, equitable and non-discriminatory manner; reiterates, therefore, that states must ensure universal, proper and affordable access to sufficient, quality and safe drinking water and improved access to water for sanitation and hygiene purposes; recalls that the right to water means that water supply services must be accessible for all; |
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4.

| 5. | Recalls that states that ratify a human rights treaty undertake to protect, respect and fulfil the commitments adopted in the international, national, regional and local framework for the protection of these rights; takes the view in this regard that the international community’s recognition of the right to water and sanitation must encompass protection and enforceability arrangements and, therefore, calls on the EU to promote protection mechanisms at international, regional and national level to ensure that upholding the right to water and sanitation is not optional for states but rather an enforceable right; calls on the EU and Member States to lead by example and to ratify the relevant conventions such as the Protocol on Water and Health and the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes; |
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5.

| 6. | Urges the EU and its Member States to promote the rights to safe drinking water and sanitation and their normative development in multilateral and regional forums, including by supporting the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation; stresses the importance of his work and that of his predecessors as well as the works under other UN human rights mechanisms related to the human rights to water and sanitation; |
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6.

| 7. | Underscores the importance of the EU Human Rights Guidelines on Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation and urges the EU institutions and the Member States, to implement them in and towards third countries and in multilateral forums; stresses the importance of training EU staff in this regard; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to regularly report to Parliament and its relevant (sub)committees on how they have applied these guidelines, providing specific examples of their activities and their impact; |
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7.

| 8. | Calls on EU delegations and Member States’ missions, as pointed out by the EU guidelines, to raise issues related to the rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, as well as the situation of human rights defenders and NGOs promoting these rights, in their bilateral dialogues with partner countries, notably in the framework of human rights and sectoral dialogues; |
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8.

| 9. | Stresses that progressing towards the recognition of the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, as laid out in Resolution 48/13 of the UN Human Rights Council on the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, is an enabling condition to reach safe drinking water and sanitation for all; in this regard welcomes the normative developments at international level in relation to environmental crimes, including ecocide; |
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9.

| 10. | Encourages developing countries to join and to strive for the full implementation of the two UN global water conventions, namely the UN Water Convention and the UN Watercourses Convention, as important tools to support water diplomacy, peace and conflict prevention through transboundary water cooperation; |
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10.

| 11. | Maintains that the full exercise of the right to water depends on the preservation of biodiversity and the climate, and therefore demands that water management should respond primarily to environmental — being a basic need for plants, animals and humans — and social interests including labour integration and increasing the incomes and safety conditions of people in poverty; |
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11.

| 12. | Stresses that improved water supply and sanitation, and better management of water resources, can boost countries’ sustainable economic growth and can contribute greatly to poverty reduction; |
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12.

| 13. | Underlines the need for anticipatory actions in the field of access to water and sanitation, and the need to have reliable and comparable indicators to measure progress or regression in access to water and sanitation; |
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13.

| 14. | Stresses that certain development models that favour vast projects and large-scale business activities undermine the availability and quality of water in all countries, increase competition for water and exacerbate other water-related conflicts; insists on the importance, in this context, of investment in sustainable drinking water solutions such as the restoring of aquatic ecosystems to a healthy state, the recycling of wastewater, the desalination of seawater in coastal areas, and improvements to sewage systems, irrigation and agricultural practices; |
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14.

| 15. | Underlines that the inefficient management of water resources and pollution caused by abusive industrial activities negatively affect the exercise of the human rights to water and sanitation; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls on the Commission to discourage practices that are a threat to the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation and to make those practices subject to environmental and human-rights impact assessments; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Recognises the important work undertaken by environmental rights defenders, and the need to support them proactively and protect their life and safety, in particular those safeguarding the right to water, and roundly condemns the crimes such as the killings, abductions, torture, sexual and gender-based violence, threats, harassment, intimidation, smear campaigns, criminalisation, judicial harassment, forced evictions and displacements carried out by numerous state and non-state perpetrators, including governments and multinational corporations; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Calls for the EU to support the crucial work done by environmental rights defenders and civil society organisations; urges the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to live up to the commitment undertaken in the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders and to monitor and raise individual cases of environmental human rights defenders (EHRDs), notably of the winners and finalists of the Sakharov Prize, who are being attacked for their roles in defending water and common goods; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Stresses that the safety and freedom of EHRDs to operate without violence and intimidation should be promoted; expects EU delegations to prioritise their support for EHRDs and to respond systematically and in a robust manner to any threats or attacks against them or their relatives and to report back to Parliament on actions taken on such cases; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase protection and prevention mechanisms for EHRDs; reiterates its call for a coordinated EU-wide scheme for issuing short-term visas for the temporary relocation of human rights defenders, notably those working to promote and protect environmental rights or indigenous rights, who are particularly under attack; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Calls on states to respect the right to social protest and the right to peaceful assembly, in particular in the context of opposition to projects that compromise the enjoyment of the human rights to drinking water and sanitation; calls on officials of EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies in this context, and as indicated by the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, to visit human rights defenders in custody or under house arrest and attend their trials as observers; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Recalls that indigenous people play an important role for the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity; asks the EU and its Member States to recognise and protect indigenous people’s rights to customary ownership and control of their lands and natural resources as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and ILO Convention No 169, and to comply with the principle of free, prior and informed consent; requests that the Member States which have not yet done so ratify ILO Convention No 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples; expresses particular concern at the significant impact of certain mega-projects, including infrastructure projects, extractive industries projects and energy production projects, on the human rights to water and sanitation, notably for indigenous peoples; insists on the importance of ensuring that genuine and comprehensive human rights impact assessments are carried out and that the affected population and civil society groups are consulted in good faith and that, when relevant, indigenous people have provided their free, prior and informed consent in relation to any mega-project; calls on state and non-state actors to avoid actions that jeopardise the rights of indigenous people, descendants of Africans and rural communities to the land, water, ecosystems and biodiversity and calls on the competent authorities to give them legal recognition of their titles, tenancies, rights and responsibilities; insists on the importance of holding open, inclusive and participative consultations in relation to major public decisions as regards water management; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Calls on the Commission to check carefully that the infrastructure and energy projects financed through the various development cooperation and external policy instruments, including the European Investment Bank, uphold and neither jeopardise human rights including the human right to water and sanitation, and the SDGs, nor contribute to the expulsion of indigenous peoples from their lands and territories; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Stresses the need for an increased focus on sustainable and resilient water and sanitation infrastructure to support communities through the implementation of disaster risk reduction measures and by making use of all of the necessary water risk mapping tools and early warning systems; calls on the Commission to support the Resilient Water Accelerator; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Condemns the fact that gender inequalities still exist in terms of exercising the human rights to drinking water and sanitation, and that the lack thereof leads to gender discrimination; also notes with concern that these have a devastating effect on women’s rights, in particular as a result of the specific needs of women and girls with regard to menstrual hygiene and health, making it difficult for women and girls to lead safe and healthy lives; highlights that affordable access to water and adequate sanitation and hygiene (WASH facilities) is an essential prerequisite for public health and human development, including the right to education for girls, and insists that the WASH sector in developing countries should be given high priority in EU development policy; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Calls for women and girls to be protected from physical threats and assaults, including sexual violence, when collecting household water and when accessing sanitation facilities outside their homes; calls for measures to be taken to reduce the time spent by women and girls in collecting household water, with the aim of addressing the adverse impact of deficient water and sanitation services on girls’ access to education; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Stresses that the EU and its Member States must, in close cooperation with the UN and the international community, work closely with recipients of foreign aid in order to eradicate global water poverty, while ensuring adequate sanitation for all; calls on all states to fulfil their commitments under CEDAW and in particular Article 14 thereof, which requires of states parties to ensure women from rural areas have the right to enjoy adequate living conditions, inter alia in relation to sanitation and water supply; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to apply a transformative and intersectional gender-sensitive approach to water resource management and water supply sanitation programmes, and to include policies accompanied by concrete action plans and adequate funding in accordance with the EU external funding instruments and the Gender Action Plan (GAP III), the EU’s agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action for 2021-2025; calls for leadership by women to be promoted and for their full, effective and equal participation in planning, decision-making and applying decisions on water and sanitation management; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Stresses that access to safe drinking water is one of the major current problems, especially since nearly 60 % of aquifer resources cross political territorial borders; recalls that, in its conclusions of 2018, the Council condemned the use of water as a weapon of war and considered that ‘in this context, destroying water infrastructures, polluting water or diverting watercourses in order to limit or prevent access to water could constitute violations of international law’; reminds that the intentional deprivation of water leading to the extermination of civilians is a crime against humanity according to Statute of the International Criminal Court and that it may also be considered a war crime, as any attack against or destruction of drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works is banned under the 1949 Geneva Conventions; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Is gravely concerned that violations of the right to water and sanitation in occupied territories aim to displace people from their lands and is worried about the denial of access to adequate water supply, resources and infrastructure; recalls that all peoples, including peoples under occupation, enjoy the sovereign right to control their natural wealth; calls on occupying powers to take immediate measures to guarantee access to and fair distribution of water to those living in occupied territories and, in particular, in line with the UN General Assembly Resolution 73/255 of 20 December 2018, to guarantee that those living in occupied territories have control over their water resources, including the management, extraction and distribution of water; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Calls for the EU to establish a political strategy to facilitate solutions in these areas and encourage the countries situated in the most important areas of conflict related to water to sign the Water Convention; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Is gravely concerned about the lack of access to water and sanitation in refugee camps; underlines that countries are obliged to safeguard the right to sanitary facilities and water for refugees; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Underlines that while water can at times act as a conflict indicator, it can also have a positive role in promoting peace and cooperation; supports the EU’s diplomatic engagement on transboundary water cooperation as a tool for peace, security and stability, and emphasises the importance of integrated water resource management and the need for greater complementarity between humanitarian, development and peace actions in order to address urgent needs and to intervene earlier to address root causes and prevent the onset of humanitarian water and sanitation crises; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Stresses that companies worldwide must ensure that their activities do not encroach on or abuse the enjoyment of the human right of access to safe drinking water in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the declarations, pacts and treaties of the United Nations that have included this right; calls, furthermore, for countries to aim at achieving the goals set under SDG 6 and to adopt legislation to ensure that companies do not hinder equal access to an adequate supply of water; urges the EU and its Member States to constructively participate in the work of the UN Intergovernmental Working Group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, with a view to establishing an international binding instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other companies in international human rights law; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Calls on the EU delegations and Member States’ missions in non-EU countries to be particularly vigilant in relation to companies, including those based in the EU, that could deny or undermine the enjoyment of the rights to water and sanitation; underlines that victims of such violations need to have access to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies as well as grievance mechanisms; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Emphasises that European companies, when operating in non-EU countries, must comply with the same legal obligations in respect of corporate reinforcement and due diligence that apply to their operations in the EU; highlights the importance of preventing, addressing and mitigating any adverse impacts on the human rights to water and adequate sanitation within mandatory diligence frameworks; calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider and study how to provide more information and ensure transparency for consumers on the sustainability impact of products on water resources, including in terms of water footprint; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Highlights the fact that, as several UN experts have stated, water is too often treated as a commodity without further social and cultural considerations, in breach of basic human rights, which contributes to increasing environmental degradation and exacerbating the vulnerability of the poorest and most marginalised in society, flying in the face of the SDGs; recalls that water supply and sanitation are services of general interest and not commodities — they are neither a luxury nor a consumer product and therefore must not be traded as such; underlines the finite nature of water and calls on the Commission and the Member States to take preventive action to combat global water scarcity and to support non-EU countries in measures to combat water scarcity; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Calls on states to take legal measures preventing water from being subject to financial speculation on futures markets and to promote an appropriate governance framework for water and sanitation services under a approach primarily grounded in human rights and common good considerations; calls on the EU and national governments to promote and support independent water regulatory bodies that can help enforce human rights standards; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Recalls that, as the EU Water Framework Directive recognises, water is not a mere commodity but a public good that is vital to human life and dignity; notes that water services are services of general interest and of special nature that fall, therefore, primarily within the public interest; recalls the importance for EU external policies and instruments such as trade and investment agreements and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, as well as the activities of European companies, of upholding the human right to drinking water and sanitation in the countries concerned; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Underlines that water is a common public good and that an adequate, continuous and high-quality supply of water must be guaranteed; calls on states and donors to strengthen their promotion of the provision of water and sanitation as essential public services for all, including through investments that enhance access to water and sanitation services and maintain existing infrastructures and the provision and use of services; considers that investing in the reinforcement of capacities and the governance of water systems, as well as in their operation and maintenance, is vital in order to create robust and sustainable water and sanitation services; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Calls on the EU to support third countries in their actions to guarantee universal and non-discriminatory access to water and sanitary facilities and to guarantee a minimum subsistence level of water supplies to households experiencing economic or social vulnerability; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Calls for the EU also to invest in the protection and restoration of natural ecosystems (including forests, floodplains, wetlands, etc.), which often provide more cost-effective and sustainable water management solutions than conventional infrastructure remedies in terms of water storage, water treatment, erosion control, and moderate and extreme weather events; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Urges states to adopt the model for the provision of water and sanitation that is best suited and to engage in a transparent and robust process to improve the effective enjoyment of the human rights to water and sanitation in their societies; calls on governments to increase public investments in sustainable water-related infrastructure and to safeguard water as an essential public good; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Points out the need to reconcile water usage with the application of emerging technologies for conservation, the reduction of water pollution and the recycling of wastewater in order to improve the way water is provided, treated and disposed of; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Calls for the EU to support sustainable water management in the agricultural sector, which mobilises over 70 % of water resources, through investing in sustainable irrigation and water storage systems, through optimising and reducing the use of fresh water in agriculture along the whole supply chain, through reducing food waste and through fostering agro-ecology by restoring the wetlands, as well as through reducing, where possible, the use of pesticides and fertilisers that pose a risk of water pollution, especially to groundwater; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Recalls that access to water is also an energy-use challenge both in terms of production and extraction; stresses, in this context, the importance of fostering better energy management, as well as reuse solutions for treated wastewater, in order to limit fresh water consumption by means of wastewater treatment; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Calls on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to disincentivise the imposition of conditions requiring governments to privatise water and sanitation services when providing grants, loans and technical assistance; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Calls on the Commission to ensure adequate financial support for capacity-development actions in the water domain, cooperating with existing international platforms and institutions; supports the Global Water Solidarity Platform launched by the UN Development Programme in order to engage local authorities in finding solutions to water challenges; welcomes the UN 2023 Water Conference as an opportunity to develop cross-sectoral approaches in order to achieve water-related targets and goals and to get SDG 6 back on track; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to encourage non-EU countries to grant stakeholders including civil society organisations and indigenous and local communities working to address breaches of the rights to water and sanitation, adequate resources and access to relevant information and to give them the ability to participate meaningfully in water-related decision-making processes, when appropriate, with a view to ensuring their engagement for informed and outcome-oriented contributions to water policy design and implementation; believes that in realising the human right to drinking water, it is vitally important to promote and strengthen networks of human rights experts, civil society organisations and community representatives at all levels and in that sense, calls on governments to design mechanisms for an inclusive system of water governance; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Calls for the EU to help third countries in respecting, fulfilling and promoting the rights of workers in the wastewater treatment industry, including their rights to dignity, safety and health and the right to organise themselves; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Underlines that people living in poverty, in particular women and girls, minorities and people with physical and/or mental disabilities, are hit hardest by a lack of access to safe and clean water and sanitation; stresses that inequalities in access to water and sanitation are often attributable to systemic inequalities or exclusion; calls on governments to monitor inequalities in access to water and sanitation and to take decisive actions such as to encourage investment in sanitation and supply systems, including public systems, promoting efficiency and the conservation of water, as a scarce resource; calls on them moreover to guarantee the absence of discrimination in access to water and sanitation services, as public goods, ensuring the provision thereof for all, in particular by affording priority to access for women, girls and vulnerable groups with a view to remedying systemic exclusion and discrimination; encourages the authorities to review their legislative, political and practical frameworks in the area of water through the lens of human rights principles and standards in order to help guide actions aimed at tackling obstacles to progress; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

51.

---

(1)  OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 375, 31.12.1991, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 372, 27.12.2006, p. 19.

(4)  OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1.

(5)  OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, p. 28.

(6)  OJ C 316, 22.9.2017, p. 99.

(7)  OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25.

(8)  OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 11.

---

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/65 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/65

---

P9_TA(2022)0347

The EU’s response to the increase in energy prices in Europe

European Parliament resolution of 5 October 2022 on the EU’s response to the increase in energy prices in Europe (2022/2830(RSP))

(2023/C 132/07)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (1),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency (2),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/844 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy performance of buildings and Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/844 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy performance of buildings and Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency (3),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (4),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (5),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply (6),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’) (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’) (7),

| — | having regard to Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (8),

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council regulation on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices (COM(2022)0473), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council regulation on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices (COM(2022)0473),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2022 on short-term market interventions and long-term improvements to the electricity market design — a course for action (COM(2022)0236), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2022 on short-term market interventions and long-term improvements to the electricity market design — a course for action (COM(2022)0236),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 13 October 2021 entitled ‘Tackling rising energy prices: a toolbox for action and support’ (COM(2021)0660), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 13 October 2021 entitled ‘Tackling rising energy prices: a toolbox for action and support’ (COM(2021)0660),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 8 March 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy’ (COM(2022)0108), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 8 March 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy’ (COM(2022)0108),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2022 on the REPowerEU Plan (COM(2022)0230), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2022 on the REPowerEU Plan (COM(2022)0230),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 23 March 2022 entitled ‘Temporary Crisis Framework for State Aid measures to support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia’ (C/2022/1890), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 23 March 2022 entitled ‘Temporary Crisis Framework for State Aid measures to support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia’ (C/2022/1890),

| — | having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights action plan, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights action plan,

| — | having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and in particular the 2015 Paris Agreement thereof, which entered into force on 4 November 2016, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and in particular the 2015 Paris Agreement thereof, which entered into force on 4 November 2016,

| — | having regard to the conclusions of the European Council summit of 24 and 25 March 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the conclusions of the European Council summit of 24 and 25 March 2022,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 October 2021 on the climate, energy and environmental State aid guidelines (CEEAG) (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 21 October 2021 on the climate, energy and environmental State aid guidelines (CEEAG) (9),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal (10),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on access to decent and affordable housing for all (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on access to decent and affordable housing for all (11),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 10 February 2021 on the New Circular Economy Action Plan (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 10 February 2021 on the New Circular Economy Action Plan (12),

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas Russia’s war of aggression is having a significant impact on the EU’s citizens and the economy, notably through a dramatic rise in energy and food prices, is causing immense suffering for the people of Ukraine and constitutes a direct attack on European values; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas Russia’s war of aggression is having a significant impact on the EU’s citizens and the economy, notably through a dramatic rise in energy and food prices, is causing immense suffering for the people of Ukraine and constitutes a direct attack on European values;

| B. | whereas the euro area inflation rate gradually reached 10 % in September 2022, with more than half of euro area countries suffering from double-digit rates and with some hitting as high as 24 % inflation; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the euro area inflation rate gradually reached 10 % in September 2022, with more than half of euro area countries suffering from double-digit rates and with some hitting as high as 24 % inflation;

| C. | whereas already in 2020, before the spiral of rising prices began, about 36 million Europeans were unable to keep their homes adequately warm; whereas more than 50 million households in the EU already experience energy poverty and whereas this major challenge will be further exacerbated by the current energy crisis, leading to possible delays in access to basic needs, care, education and healthcare, in particular for children and young people; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas already in 2020, before the spiral of rising prices began, about 36 million Europeans were unable to keep their homes adequately warm; whereas more than 50 million households in the EU already experience energy poverty and whereas this major challenge will be further exacerbated by the current energy crisis, leading to possible delays in access to basic needs, care, education and healthcare, in particular for children and young people;

| D. | whereas plants across a broad range of European industries such as steel, aluminium, fertilisers and the power industry itself have been forced to put workers on furlough and shut down production lines, as the high gas and power prices are causing businesses to sustain losses; whereas these closures have a domino effect on other industries hit by the supply shocks and could do long-term damage to Europe’s industrial base; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas plants across a broad range of European industries such as steel, aluminium, fertilisers and the power industry itself have been forced to put workers on furlough and shut down production lines, as the high gas and power prices are causing businesses to sustain losses; whereas these closures have a domino effect on other industries hit by the supply shocks and could do long-term damage to Europe’s industrial base;

| E. | whereas companies are suffering from increased production costs owing to higher raw material prices, constrained supply chains and increased transport and energy prices, combined with changing consumer behaviour; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas companies are suffering from increased production costs owing to higher raw material prices, constrained supply chains and increased transport and energy prices, combined with changing consumer behaviour;

| F. | whereas the soaring price of power has pushed up the margin requirements for electricity producers, which are hedging their sales on the futures market to unprecedented levels; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the soaring price of power has pushed up the margin requirements for electricity producers, which are hedging their sales on the futures market to unprecedented levels;

| G. | whereas the energy and digital transitions will substantially increase the demand for certain types of raw materials, while the EU is at the same time dependent on only a few countries and companies for its supply of those same materials; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the energy and digital transitions will substantially increase the demand for certain types of raw materials, while the EU is at the same time dependent on only a few countries and companies for its supply of those same materials;

| H. | whereas the COVID-19 crisis and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have led to disrupted supply and value chains, creating supply shortages and resulting in rising production costs; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the COVID-19 crisis and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have led to disrupted supply and value chains, creating supply shortages and resulting in rising production costs;

| I. | whereas the 20th principle of the European Pillar of Social Rights on access to essential services states that everyone has the right to access essential services of good quality, including water, sanitation, energy, transport, financial services and digital communications; whereas access to these services should be available; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the 20th principle of the European Pillar of Social Rights on access to essential services states that everyone has the right to access essential services of good quality, including water, sanitation, energy, transport, financial services and digital communications; whereas access to these services should be available;

| J. | whereas the EU framework on services of general economic interest should be updated to better protect vulnerable consumers from the current situation; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the EU framework on services of general economic interest should be updated to better protect vulnerable consumers from the current situation;

| K. | whereas in her State of the Union address on 14 September 2022, the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen stated that Russia is continuing to actively manipulate our energy market; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas in her State of the Union address on 14 September 2022, the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen stated that Russia is continuing to actively manipulate our energy market;

| L. | whereas spot gas prices recorded at the Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF), which had remained below 25 EUR/MWh in the last four years, have increased sharply since August 2021, in particular since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, reaching more than 200 EUR/MWh in mid-August 2022, where they have remained; whereas Russia’s actions are an example of an unprovoked attack on the EU gas market; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas spot gas prices recorded at the Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF), which had remained below 25 EUR/MWh in the last four years, have increased sharply since August 2021, in particular since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, reaching more than 200 EUR/MWh in mid-August 2022, where they have remained; whereas Russia’s actions are an example of an unprovoked attack on the EU gas market;

| M. | whereas the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has declared that while ‘open and well-functioning commodity derivatives markets play an essential role for price discovery’, due to the recent period of extreme stress, ‘measures to contain excessive volatility could be helpful in improving the overall functioning’ of those markets; whereas ESMA also pointed out that the framework of the second Market Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) already provides for ‘a set of volatility mechanisms (notably trading halts and price collars)’, while noting that ‘in the extreme circumstances that commodity derivatives markets (and energy markets in particular) have experienced over the past months, the number of times that trading halts have been triggered on the relevant EU trading venues seems to be very low’ (13); |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has declared that while ‘open and well-functioning commodity derivatives markets play an essential role for price discovery’, due to the recent period of extreme stress, ‘measures to contain excessive volatility could be helpful in improving the overall functioning’ of those markets; whereas ESMA also pointed out that the framework of the second Market Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) already provides for ‘a set of volatility mechanisms (notably trading halts and price collars)’, while noting that ‘in the extreme circumstances that commodity derivatives markets (and energy markets in particular) have experienced over the past months, the number of times that trading halts have been triggered on the relevant EU trading venues seems to be very low’ (13);

| N. | whereas in her State of the Union address on 14 September 2022, the Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that the Commission’s proposal will raise more than EUR 140 billion ‘for Member States to cushion the blow directly’; whereas several Member States have introduced temporary schemes for a tax on windfall profits; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas in her State of the Union address on 14 September 2022, the Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that the Commission’s proposal will raise more than EUR 140 billion ‘for Member States to cushion the blow directly’; whereas several Member States have introduced temporary schemes for a tax on windfall profits;

| O. | whereas Member States should be the main actors responsible for their own energy mix, for identifying the main issues faced by their citizens and economies, and for resolving them; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas Member States should be the main actors responsible for their own energy mix, for identifying the main issues faced by their citizens and economies, and for resolving them;

| P. | whereas the dramatic increase in electricity prices is putting pressure on households, numerous European citizens, in particular those at risk of poverty and those from vulnerable groups, non-governmental organisations, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and industry, and risks causing wider social and economic harm; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the dramatic increase in electricity prices is putting pressure on households, numerous European citizens, in particular those at risk of poverty and those from vulnerable groups, non-governmental organisations, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and industry, and risks causing wider social and economic harm;

| Q. | whereas the assessment by the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators of the EU Wholesale Electricity Market Design showed that cross-border trade delivered EUR 34 billion of benefits to consumers in 2021, while helping to smoothen price volatility, and that it enhances each Member State’s security of supply and resilience to price shocks; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas the assessment by the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators of the EU Wholesale Electricity Market Design showed that cross-border trade delivered EUR 34 billion of benefits to consumers in 2021, while helping to smoothen price volatility, and that it enhances each Member State’s security of supply and resilience to price shocks;

| R. | whereas saving and reducing energy constitutes an affordable, safe and clean option to reduce the EU’s reliance on fossil fuel imports from Russia; whereas EU Member States save only 0,8 % of final energy consumption; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas saving and reducing energy constitutes an affordable, safe and clean option to reduce the EU’s reliance on fossil fuel imports from Russia; whereas EU Member States save only 0,8 % of final energy consumption;

Introductory considerations

| 1. | Considers that the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine and the weaponisation of fossil energy supply has dramatically exacerbated existing instability in the energy market; deplores the fact that this situation has further increased energy prices and thus led to extremely high inflation, rising social inequalities, energy and mobility poverty, high food prices and a cost of living crisis, and that a significant risk of closure for businesses across different sectors and unemployment persists; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Is deeply concerned about high energy prices across the EU and calls on the Member States to immediately tackle the impact of this and of the associated inflation on household incomes, health and well-being, particularly for the most vulnerable people, as well as on businesses, including SMEs, and the economy in general; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Believes that exceptional times require exceptional emergency measures, where the EU needs to act together and in a united a fashion as ever; insists that all measures adopted at EU level to fight the energy prices crisis must be fully compatible with the Union’s climate goals in the long term, including the European Green Deal, and advance the EU’s open strategic autonomy; asks the Commission, in this respect, to analyse the cumulative impacts of EU and national emergency measures, ensuring that they are consistent with the Union’s objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; insists that all of the measures proposed should acknowledge the diversity of national circumstances and therefore grant the necessary flexibility for their implementation; calls for the Member States and economic actors to show greater solidarity in order to tackle this crisis fairly; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Reiterates its call from May 2022 for an immediate and full embargo on Russian imports of oil, coal, nuclear fuel and gas, and for Nord Stream 1 and 2 to be completely abandoned; |
| --- | --- |

4.

Impact on citizens and the economy

| 5. | Urges the Member States to ensure access to affordable and clean heating and electricity and to avoid people being obliged to choose between eating or heating; alerts Member States that consumers that cannot afford their rising energy bills should not be cut off and underlines the need to avoid home evictions for vulnerable households that are unable to pay their bills and rental costs; stresses the need to better protect consumers from the suspension or withdrawal of fixed-rate contracts by suppliers, and to prevent exorbitant pre-payments for gas and electricity by consumers; calls on the Commission to assess the need for stronger pre-contractual information requirements in the energy sector, in particular for distance sales; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Is deeply concerned about the impact of high energy prices on households and businesses and the discrepancies in the abilities of different Member States to support them, as evidenced in recent announcements; highlights the need for unprecedented solidarity among the Member States and for a common response, instead of divisive unilateral actions; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls on the Member States to urgently maintain and reinforce public, social and cultural services jeopardised by rising energy prices for an increasing number of people in need, including services managed by local authorities, such as social housing, public baths, education establishments and hospitals; recalls that local authorities have also been hit by the crisis and must be protected as well; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Calls on the Member States to put in place plans and strategies in the areas of housing, access to basic social needs, the protection of social infrastructure, critical healthcare services and financial assistance to SMEs; highlights that this support should be particularly targeted to those population groups in the most critical situation; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Stresses that households across the Member States face significant challenges such as the erosion of their purchasing power; highlights that many people in Europe were already in vulnerable situations before and warns that related inflation, in particular rising food and energy prices, may make the situation unbearable for low-income households, with the middle class being increasingly affected; calls on the Member States to consider exempting staple foods from VAT throughout the entire EU for the duration of the crisis, to facilitate access to essential goods and tackle food shortages and rising housing prices; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Underlines that the existing framework allows Member States to temporarily exempt households from, or apply a reduced rate of, tax on electricity, natural gas, coal and solid fuels; encourages Member States to make full use of the existing options to cut taxes on energy products; calls on the Commission to consider giving Member States space to introduce further temporary exemptions or reductions on excise duties and energy taxes to alleviate the burden on households and businesses; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls on the Member States and the Commission to inform citizens and businesses, in particular SMEs, on how they can prepare for the winter ahead and on how to improve energy efficiency and reduce their energy demand, including practical, effective and realistic saving tips around the cost of living and energy costs, as well as information on consumer rights; encourages the Member States to promote energy-saving devices for vulnerable households; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Asks the Member States to consider providing temporary support to vulnerable transport users in order to help absorb the increase in prices, including public transport vouchers; calls for the adoption of structural policies to further promote reliable and affordable public transportation networks and active modes of mobility, such as cycling or walking; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Calls on the Member States to address the impact of the energy crisis on the labour market by supporting workers who are temporarily in ‘technical unemployment’ because employers were forced to limit or suspend their activity, including solo self-employed workers, and by providing assistance to small businesses to retain staff and maintain their activities; recalls that short-time working arrangements proved their worth in the pandemic and should be implemented, with EU financial support where necessary, to avoid job losses; calls on the Commission and the Council to reinforce the European instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) to support short-time work schemes, workers’ income and workers that would be temporarily laid-off because of the increase in energy prices; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Calls on the Member States to support companies in the face of soaring prices, in consultation with the representatives of employers and employees in the sectors that are witnessing the greatest impact, and to implement anti-crisis measures including through social dialogue and collective bargaining; calls on the Commission to take the necessary measures to help energy-intensive industries, including offering due guarantees on environmental protection and on maintaining employment; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Stresses that social guarantees are key in the current crisis and urges the Member States and the Commission to involve trade unions to design and implement anti-crisis measures through social dialogue; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Recognises that the cumulative effect of high energy prices and disrupted supply chains may endanger European businesses and the jobs they provide; calls for the burden on businesses, particularly SMEs, to be eased immediately; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Underlines that the primary objective of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy is to maintain price stability, and thus ensure that inflation is low, stable and predictable; recalls that the ECB’s target inflation rate is 2 %; |
| --- | --- |

17.

Climate commitments, deployment of renewables, energy efficiency and infrastructure

| 18. | Recalls that the cheapest energy is that which we do not consume and that energy efficiency and energy-saving measures will not only help the EU in the short term, but will also help us to achieve the Union’s 2030 climate commitments contained in the Fit for 55 package and the RePowerEU initiative, such as the reduction of gas imports and consumption; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Believes that achieving the objectives of the European Green Deal will make our energy systems more efficient, more renewables-based, stronger in the face of crises and more resilient to external shocks, ensure stable and affordable energy and contribute to open strategic autonomy; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Calls on the Member States and the Commission to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy, as it is the best way to end dependency on natural gas and to meet the Union’s climate commitments; recalls the ongoing recasts of Directive (EU) 2018/2001 (RED III and RED IV), and is convinced that a quick completion of the legislative procedures will accelerate the roll-out of renewables across the EU; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Stresses that residential heating must be decarbonised through smart electrification and affordable, renewable-based district heating solutions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase support for building renovations, and to provide adequate funding for investments in energy efficiency measures, in particular for buildings with the poorest energy performance and the most vulnerable neighbourhoods; welcomes the decision of some Member States to ban the instalment of gas boilers in new buildings; stresses the importance and immediate benefits of rapidly deploying solar energy in buildings, nearby renewables, heat pumps as well as other fast and easy-to-install solutions; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Encourages the Commission and the Member States to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources, in particular by removing administrative barriers and simplifying and accelerating permitting processes, including for households; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Supports the idea, as part of REPowerEU, of auctioning allowances in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) as an exceptional measure to generate EUR 20 billion and thereby finance the infrastructure needed to make us less dependent on Russian gas and oil, including investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency; calls for this intervention to be sped up to mobilise the necessary revenues by the end of 2025; welcomes the fact that this could have the potential effect of mitigating ETS prices in the short term and thus electricity prices and energy costs for industry, while recognising that the ETS is not the main driver of the recent increase in energy prices; reiterates its own 2030 climate targets, with which this ETS intervention is fully in line; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Stresses that real-time electricity price signals can unlock more flexible demand, in turn reducing expensive and gas-intensive peak supply needs; calls on the Member States, therefore, to better manage the flexibility needs of EU power systems through enhanced grids, dispatchable low-emissions generation, and various large-scale and long-term energy storage technologies in order to reduce industrial electricity and gas demand in peak hours; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Calls on the Member States to fully transpose Directive (EU) 2018/2001, particularly in order to remove obstacles to the creation of energy communities; calls on the Member States to adopt further action for renewable self-consumption; calls on Member States to create the appropriate conditions for the development of at least one renewable energy community per municipality, so that citizens can produce, consume, store and resell their own renewable energy; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Calls for the ongoing legislative procedure on the Energy Efficiency Directive to be accelerated, as its provisions will help users to reduce their energy consumption and thus reduce their energy expenditure; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Underlines that the creation of a fully integrated single market for energy that provides for a truly resilient European energy network, including the construction of new interconnectors, as demonstrated by that connecting the Iberian Peninsula with France, and better trading platforms, would alleviate the price pressure on businesses and consumers in the short term, and establish energy independence and resilience in the long term; recognises that the reform of the EU’s internal energy market must be pursued more consistently, that overly high dependencies need to be avoided and that key infrastructure needs to remain in EU hands, thereby fostering open strategic autonomy; considers that all options must be on the table to keep energy affordable and to achieve climate neutrality; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Stresses that investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency and the necessary infrastructure, including targeted, well-defined cross-border projects with investments through NextGenerationEU and REPowerEU, help the EU to achieve energy sovereignty, open strategic autonomy and energy security; calls on the Commission and the Member States to accelerate such key infrastructure projects based on renewable energy and clean hydrogen by facilitating permitting process, while paying due regard to public participation and environmental impact assessment procedures; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Notes that some Member States are reconsidering their nuclear and coal phase-outs where power plants could contribute to the security of the EU’s energy supply and to keeping energy prices down; considers that the extension of the service time of the existing nuclear power plants should be done while ensuring their safe operation and the correct management and disposal of nuclear waste; highlights that the postponement of coal-based installations should be temporary, for just as long as the current crisis lasts, and should be accompanied by a concrete calendar for their substitution with other energy sources; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Recalls that about a quarter of the electricity and half of the low-carbon electricity in the EU is generated by nuclear energy; notes that while some Member States oppose nuclear energy, a number of Member States are preparing to build new nuclear power stations; reiterates that Member States remain fully responsible for deciding their energy mix and for designing options to ensure affordable, stable and clean energy for their citizens and businesses and for choosing the most appropriate pathway for the Member State to contribute to achieving the Union’s climate and energy targets, taking into account each Member State’s specific features and constraints; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Express its deepest concern about the recent act of sabotage on Nord Stream infrastructure, releasing 300 000 metric tonnes of one of the most powerful greenhouse gas into the atmosphere according to German estimates (14), which the UN Environment Programme says may be the biggest single methane release ever recorded; points to how the effects of this blast and methane leak will contribute to climate change and air pollution, undermining EU climate efforts, and further points to the harmful impact of the blasts and subsequent gas leaks on the marine environment; insists that the emissions released are accounted for; expresses concern also at the reports of unidentified drones detected near oil and gas platforms on the Norwegian continental shelf; draws attention to the fact that these incidents provoked a spike in gas prices on TTF markets and that the methane leaks caused ‘a climate and ecological disaster’; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Stresses that the intentional disruption of European energy infrastructure has the potential to significantly exacerbate the current energy crisis, including at a macro-regional level; urges the Member States and energy companies to immediately adopt measures to step up the security of their energy infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

32.

Emergency measures on the energy market

| 33. | Considers that companies that have benefited from windfall profits must help to mitigate the negative impacts of the crisis; takes note of the State of the Union address by President von der Leyen on 14 September 2022; welcomes in principle the (Commission’s proposal and subsequent) Council agreement to establish a temporary emergency cap on market revenues obtained from the generation and sale of electricity by using inframarginal generation technologies and to put in place a temporary solidarity contribution mechanism from the fossil fuel sector, which is benefiting from the current market situation; recalls, in this regard, its previous position expressed in its resolution of 19 May 2022 (15); regrets that the Commission proposed its plans in the form of a Council regulation, using Article 122 TFEU as the legal basis, instead of a legislative co-decision procedure; recalls that this instrument should only be used for emergency situations; confirms that Parliament stands ready to act swiftly on this pressing issue if called upon, as it requires full democratic legitimacy and accountability; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Calls on the Member States to swiftly implement these measures; considers that interventions in the energy market should be of a temporary and targeted nature and that fundamental market principles and the integrity of the single market must not be endangered; notes that the established mechanism could potentially lead to a disparity in revenues among the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Takes note of the fact that solidarity contributions are being proposed for companies in the crude oil, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors; notes with concern that some of the largest energy companies in the EU may not be subject to the contribution; calls on the Commission and the Council to design the solidarity contribution in such a way as to prevent tax avoidance; notes that Member States could strengthen the proposal further; calls on the Commission to assess an adequate profit margin in the light of the emergency situation and to take further steps towards introducing a tax on windfall profits for energy companies that have benefited excessively from the energy crisis; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Recalls that windfall profits do not correspond to any regular profits that large firms would have or could have expected to obtain under normal circumstances had unpredictable events, such as the pandemic and the war in Ukraine not taken place; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Stresses that the revenues of windfall profits should benefit consumers and businesses, in particular to support vulnerable households and SMEs including through price caps; underlines that this must go hand in hand with massive innovation and investments in renewable energies and energy efficiency and energy infrastructure, such as distribution grids, rather than incentivising households and companies to consume more subsidised energy; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Highlights the particular relevance, in the current context, of the public revenue that would be yielded from the implementation of the Pillar II Directive in the EU, which implements the OECD global tax deal on minimum effective corporate taxation; reiterates its call on the Council to swiftly adopt the Pillar II Directive so as to ensure that the agreement is effective by January 2023; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Welcomes the energy demand obligations and goals introduced by the proposed Council regulation to tackle the problems of high energy prices and security of energy supply; urges the Member States to ensure that the measures they chose to adopt to implement the above obligations must not pose additional burdens for vulnerable households and consumers, businesses, SMEs or those living in energy poverty; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Takes note of the Commission’s intention to discuss a reform of the electricity market design and is ready to carefully analyse any proposal; considers that any reform of the electricity market should be in line with the EU’s climate goals, notably the objective of achieving climate neutrality in the EU by 2050, and that electricity markets should send out the right price signal to invest in decarbonisation and allow citizens and industries to benefit from secure, affordable and clean energy, while addressing the disproportionate profits in the electricity market; calls on the Commission to analyse the possibility of decoupling electricity prices from the price of gas; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Calls on the Commission to analyse the need to put in place additional measures to address the crisis, including temporary wholesale and import price caps; calls on the Commission to propose, after a positive analysis, an appropriate price cap on gas imports from pipelines, primarily from Russia; encourages the Commission and the Council to upgrade the EU Energy Platform and transform it into a tool for the joint procurement of energy sources in order to strengthen the EU’s bargaining power and lower the cost of imports; welcomes the Commission’s decision to set up a task force to negotiate gas prices with third countries; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Welcomes the fact that the Commission, at the request of the Member States, is assessing possible solutions to provide needed liquidity for energy companies facing high margin calls on the futures markets for electricity and gas; |
| --- | --- |

42.

Speculation in the energy market

| 43. | Recalls that the disruptions in energy supply driven by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine have increased volatility and instability in the energy derivatives markets, and that this may have a cascade effect on the financial markets; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Calls for increased transparency and regulatory oversight of market-based and over-the-counter gas trading and on acquisition prices; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Welcomes the antitrust lawsuit initiated by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition against Gazprom for abuse of its dominant position, and urges the Commission to swiftly conclude the procedure and adopt the necessary decisions; stresses that the Commission must make use of all the available tools under competition law to tackle market distortions and unfair price manipulation in the energy markets; believes that when it comes to identifying violations of competition law in the area of electricity and gas, the Commission must also consider applying structural measures as remedies; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Notes that the Commission recognises (16) that Europe is experiencing manipulations of the gas market, which in turn have repercussions on electricity prices; calls for an end to speculation and manipulation in the gas market and calls for measures to be taken vis-à-vis the functioning of the TTF and the entities entitled to operate in the market; considers that these measures might include applying a trading halt mechanism in the TTF in the event of excessive price fluctuations and price collars, as suggested by ESMA, in order to decouple the indexation of contracts from the TTF hub; welcomes the Commission’s proposal to look into an alternative EU benchmark to the TTF for pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas; calls on the Commission, in particular its Directorate-General for Competition, and on ESMA, to closely monitor the European gas market for possible cases of market dominance or lack of transparency; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Calls on the relevant competent authority to investigate, report and address possible cases of market abuse or market manipulation in commodity markets in general and in the gas market in particular; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Calls on the Commission to look closely into the activities of financial players that contributed to the volatility in carbon price; urges the Commission to take action to eliminate the influence of speculative capital on the EU ETS allowances market; |
| --- | --- |

48.

o

o o

| 49. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

49.

---

(1)  OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 82.

(2)  OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 210.

(3)  OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 75.

(4)  OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 54.

(5)  OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 125.

(6)  OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1.

(7)  OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1.

(8)  OJ L 283, 31.10.2003, p. 51.

(9)  OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 163.

(10)  OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 2.

(11)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 145.

(12)  OJ C 465, 17.11.2021, p. 11.

(13)  Letter from the Executive Director of ESMA, Verena Ross, to the Director-General of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Financial Stability, John Berrigan, 22 September 2022.

(14)  German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety and Consumer Protection.

(15)  European Parliament resolution of 19 May 2022 on the social and economic consequences for the EU of the Russian war in Ukraine — reinforcing the EU’s capacity to act (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0219).

(16)  Statement by Commission President von der Leyen on energy, 7 September 2022.

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Thursday 6 October 2022

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/74 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/74

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P9_TA(2022)0349

The situation of human rights in Haiti in particular related to gang violence

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the situation of human rights in Haiti in particular related to gang violence (2022/2856(RSP))

(2023/C 132/08)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Haiti, notably that of 20 May 2021 on the situation in Haiti (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Haiti, notably that of 20 May 2021 on the situation in Haiti (1),

| — | having regard to the outcome of the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review of Haiti, adopted on 4 July 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the outcome of the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review of Haiti, adopted on 4 July 2022,

| — | having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2645 (2022) of 15 July 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2645 (2022) of 15 July 2022,

| — | having regard to the 2022 reports of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on Haiti, in particular the report of 23 September 2022 on the impact of social unrest on the humanitarian situation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 2022 reports of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on Haiti, in particular the report of 23 September 2022 on the impact of social unrest on the humanitarian situation,

| — | having regard to the address given by Foreign Minister Jean Victor Généus to the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the address given by Foreign Minister Jean Victor Généus to the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2022,

| — | having regard to the report of the UN Secretary-General of 15 February 2022 for the UN Integrated Office in Haiti, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the UN Secretary-General of 15 February 2022 for the UN Integrated Office in Haiti,

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966,

| — | having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

| — | having regard to the American Convention on Human Rights of 22 November 1969, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the American Convention on Human Rights of 22 November 1969,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, and its three optional protocols, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, and its three optional protocols,

| — | having regard to the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary of 6 September 1985, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary of 6 September 1985,

| — | having regard to the Universal Charter of the Judge of 17 November 1999 and the Statute of the Iberoamerican Judge of May 2001, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Charter of the Judge of 17 November 1999 and the Statute of the Iberoamerican Judge of May 2001,

| — | having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (2) (the Cotonou Agreement), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (2) (the Cotonou Agreement),

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 26 June 2012 on the joint EU-Caribbean partnership strategy (JOIN(2012)0018), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 26 June 2012 on the joint EU-Caribbean partnership strategy (JOIN(2012)0018),

| — | having regard to the Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part (3),

| — | having regard to the Constitution of the Republic of Haiti of 1987, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Constitution of the Republic of Haiti of 1987,

| — | having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the humanitarian situation in Haiti has continually deteriorated in recent years due to ongoing insecurity in the country; whereas since President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination in July 2021, gangs have drastically acquired more power, creating an omnipresent sense of insecurity for the Haitian population; whereas the increasing violence and escalating human rights abuses have affected 1,5 million people and have left an additional 19 000 people internally displaced and 1,1 million people in need of assistance; whereas this socio-political and economic crisis is converging with the general insecurity and gang crisis into a humanitarian catastrophe; whereas there has been a reported increase in violent measures used by official police forces; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the humanitarian situation in Haiti has continually deteriorated in recent years due to ongoing insecurity in the country; whereas since President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination in July 2021, gangs have drastically acquired more power, creating an omnipresent sense of insecurity for the Haitian population; whereas the increasing violence and escalating human rights abuses have affected 1,5 million people and have left an additional 19 000 people internally displaced and 1,1 million people in need of assistance; whereas this socio-political and economic crisis is converging with the general insecurity and gang crisis into a humanitarian catastrophe; whereas there has been a reported increase in violent measures used by official police forces;

| B. | whereas on 11 September 2022, the Haitian Government announced that it would reduce fuel subsidies by around USD 400 million in an effort to increase revenue for social programmes, which led to increased unrest and gang alliances seizing key infrastructure; whereas the country has been experiencing a shortage of petrol for months; whereas access to the Varreux oil terminal, where 70 % of stocks are concentrated, is in the hands of armed gangs; whereas almost 86 % of the electricity produced in the country is based on petroleum products; whereas hospitals and health centres have had to reduce or even cease their activities as a result of the shortage; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas on 11 September 2022, the Haitian Government announced that it would reduce fuel subsidies by around USD 400 million in an effort to increase revenue for social programmes, which led to increased unrest and gang alliances seizing key infrastructure; whereas the country has been experiencing a shortage of petrol for months; whereas access to the Varreux oil terminal, where 70 % of stocks are concentrated, is in the hands of armed gangs; whereas almost 86 % of the electricity produced in the country is based on petroleum products; whereas hospitals and health centres have had to reduce or even cease their activities as a result of the shortage;

| C. | whereas there are as many as 200 gangs in Haiti, including in Port-au-Prince, who control key ports and roads; whereas these gangs, some of whom have ties to state actors and alleged connections to politicians, threaten to destabilise the government with their greater resources and weaponry; whereas some Haitian politicians and business leaders have allegedly provided money and arms to gangs and other criminal groups in exchange for suppressing anti-government protests; whereas gangs have exerted power and control over territory, access to fuel and the delivery of humanitarian aid, challenging the authority of the Haitian national police and other state institutions and hindering the national police’s ability to combat drug trafficking and other crimes; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas there are as many as 200 gangs in Haiti, including in Port-au-Prince, who control key ports and roads; whereas these gangs, some of whom have ties to state actors and alleged connections to politicians, threaten to destabilise the government with their greater resources and weaponry; whereas some Haitian politicians and business leaders have allegedly provided money and arms to gangs and other criminal groups in exchange for suppressing anti-government protests; whereas gangs have exerted power and control over territory, access to fuel and the delivery of humanitarian aid, challenging the authority of the Haitian national police and other state institutions and hindering the national police’s ability to combat drug trafficking and other crimes;

| D. | whereas according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, between January and the end of June 2022, 934 murders, 684 injuries and 680 kidnappings took place across Port-au-Prince; whereas in July 2022, a wave of gang violence resulted in more than 470 killings, almost half of which centred on the Cité Soleil neighbourhood; whereas most of the victims were not directly involved in gangs, but were directly targeted by gang members; whereas there were several cases of repeated gang rapes committed against women and girls, confirming the systematic use of gender-based violence; whereas according to an August 2022 report by Haiti’s National Human Rights Defense Network, dozens of women and girls have been victims of campaigns of mass rape carried out by gangs in Port-au-Prince; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, between January and the end of June 2022, 934 murders, 684 injuries and 680 kidnappings took place across Port-au-Prince; whereas in July 2022, a wave of gang violence resulted in more than 470 killings, almost half of which centred on the Cité Soleil neighbourhood; whereas most of the victims were not directly involved in gangs, but were directly targeted by gang members; whereas there were several cases of repeated gang rapes committed against women and girls, confirming the systematic use of gender-based violence; whereas according to an August 2022 report by Haiti’s National Human Rights Defense Network, dozens of women and girls have been victims of campaigns of mass rape carried out by gangs in Port-au-Prince;

| E. | whereas gangs took control of the Palace of Justice on 10 June 2022; whereas the Palace of Justice had been largely inoperative since 2018 owing to security risks, thus hindering access to justice in the country; whereas case files containing critical evidence on multiple massacres committed by gangs since 2018 were stolen or destroyed, leaving no possibility of recovery; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas gangs took control of the Palace of Justice on 10 June 2022; whereas the Palace of Justice had been largely inoperative since 2018 owing to security risks, thus hindering access to justice in the country; whereas case files containing critical evidence on multiple massacres committed by gangs since 2018 were stolen or destroyed, leaving no possibility of recovery;

| F. | whereas Haiti’s highly volatile security situation jeopardises critical humanitarian operations on which vulnerable people rely; whereas the complete blockage of the road leading to the southern peninsula, which has been ongoing since 2021, has isolated 3,8 million people living in the southern departments of Port-au-Prince; whereas this situation has prevented UN agencies and humanitarian organisations from helping the population in these areas, while the UN estimates that 1,1 million people need assistance; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas Haiti’s highly volatile security situation jeopardises critical humanitarian operations on which vulnerable people rely; whereas the complete blockage of the road leading to the southern peninsula, which has been ongoing since 2021, has isolated 3,8 million people living in the southern departments of Port-au-Prince; whereas this situation has prevented UN agencies and humanitarian organisations from helping the population in these areas, while the UN estimates that 1,1 million people need assistance;

| G. | whereas gangs have deliberately targeted and plundered food aid stocks including on 15 September 2022, when a World Food Programme warehouse in Gonaïves, containing 1 400 metric tonnes of food intended to feed nearly 100 000 school children and the most vulnerable families, was looted; whereas in 2022, the UN and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have lost at least USD 6 million’s worth of supplies, which could have helped more than 410 000 people; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas gangs have deliberately targeted and plundered food aid stocks including on 15 September 2022, when a World Food Programme warehouse in Gonaïves, containing 1 400 metric tonnes of food intended to feed nearly 100 000 school children and the most vulnerable families, was looted; whereas in 2022, the UN and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have lost at least USD 6 million’s worth of supplies, which could have helped more than 410 000 people;

| H. | whereas according to the World Food Programme, 4,4 million Haitians, representing more than a third of the population, face food insecurity, and 217 000 children suffer from moderate to severe malnutrition; whereas Haiti is particularly vulnerable to global food and fuel market shocks because it imports 70 % of its cereals; whereas as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Haiti is already experiencing inflation of 26 %, making it difficult for families to afford food and other necessities or to sell crops at local markets; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas according to the World Food Programme, 4,4 million Haitians, representing more than a third of the population, face food insecurity, and 217 000 children suffer from moderate to severe malnutrition; whereas Haiti is particularly vulnerable to global food and fuel market shocks because it imports 70 % of its cereals; whereas as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Haiti is already experiencing inflation of 26 %, making it difficult for families to afford food and other necessities or to sell crops at local markets;

| I. | whereas journalists have been particularly targeted by violence; whereas on 11 September 2022, two journalists, Tayson Latigue and Frantzsen Charles, were shot dead in Cité Soleil and their bodies subsequently burned; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas journalists have been particularly targeted by violence; whereas on 11 September 2022, two journalists, Tayson Latigue and Frantzsen Charles, were shot dead in Cité Soleil and their bodies subsequently burned;

| J. | whereas as the human rights and humanitarian situations continue to deteriorate rapidly, Haitian asylum seekers have been left with limited access to international protection and face a range of human rights violations in host countries, including detention, unlawful pushbacks and extortion; whereas according to the International Organization for Migration, between 1 January and 26 February 2022, 25 765 people were expelled or deported back to Haiti from neighbouring countries; whereas several NGOs have warned that Haitian asylum seekers are being subjected to arbitrary detention and discriminatory and humiliating treatment; whereas the deportation and return of Haitian migrants is contributing to the deterioration in the humanitarian situation in the country; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas as the human rights and humanitarian situations continue to deteriorate rapidly, Haitian asylum seekers have been left with limited access to international protection and face a range of human rights violations in host countries, including detention, unlawful pushbacks and extortion; whereas according to the International Organization for Migration, between 1 January and 26 February 2022, 25 765 people were expelled or deported back to Haiti from neighbouring countries; whereas several NGOs have warned that Haitian asylum seekers are being subjected to arbitrary detention and discriminatory and humiliating treatment; whereas the deportation and return of Haitian migrants is contributing to the deterioration in the humanitarian situation in the country;

| K. | whereas owing to the worsening security, economic and social situation, the Haitian Government decided to postpone the start of the school year from 5 September to 3 October 2022, with the new school year still uncertain; whereas according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), half a million children in Port-au-Prince are reportedly out of school and 1 700 schools in the capital have had to close; whereas approximately half of Haitians aged 15 and above are illiterate, the country’s education system is highly unequal, the quality of the available education is low and the high fees charged for education exclude most children from low-income families; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas owing to the worsening security, economic and social situation, the Haitian Government decided to postpone the start of the school year from 5 September to 3 October 2022, with the new school year still uncertain; whereas according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), half a million children in Port-au-Prince are reportedly out of school and 1 700 schools in the capital have had to close; whereas approximately half of Haitians aged 15 and above are illiterate, the country’s education system is highly unequal, the quality of the available education is low and the high fees charged for education exclude most children from low-income families;

| L. | whereas the country’s most vulnerable communities face dramatic floods and soil erosion caused by a severe deforestation, leading to reduced agricultural productivity; whereas over a third of the population lacks access to clean water and two thirds have limited or no sanitation service; whereas more than half of the population live under the poverty line and many rely on subsistence farming; whereas the country is strongly dependent on external revenues; whereas Haiti is among the countries most affected by climate hazards over the past 20 years, according to the 2021 Global Climate Risk Index; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the country’s most vulnerable communities face dramatic floods and soil erosion caused by a severe deforestation, leading to reduced agricultural productivity; whereas over a third of the population lacks access to clean water and two thirds have limited or no sanitation service; whereas more than half of the population live under the poverty line and many rely on subsistence farming; whereas the country is strongly dependent on external revenues; whereas Haiti is among the countries most affected by climate hazards over the past 20 years, according to the 2021 Global Climate Risk Index;

| M. | whereas the security context heavily affects the objectives of EU engagement with Haiti, including rolling out a development agenda focusing on sustainable and transformative results on issues like education and food security, as well as the efforts of the Commission’s Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the security context heavily affects the objectives of EU engagement with Haiti, including rolling out a development agenda focusing on sustainable and transformative results on issues like education and food security, as well as the efforts of the Commission’s Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations;

| N. | whereas the Restavek system, a modern form of slavery, is still practised in Haiti; whereas under this system, children from impoverished homes — mostly girls — are sent by their parents to live and work for urban or semi-urban families; whereas these children may later become victims of street crime or sex trafficking by criminal gangs; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the Restavek system, a modern form of slavery, is still practised in Haiti; whereas under this system, children from impoverished homes — mostly girls — are sent by their parents to live and work for urban or semi-urban families; whereas these children may later become victims of street crime or sex trafficking by criminal gangs;

| O. | whereas the UN humanitarian response plan for Haiti, amounting to USD 373 million, has only been 14 % funded; whereas according to the UN, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance is estimated at around 1,5 million; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas the UN humanitarian response plan for Haiti, amounting to USD 373 million, has only been 14 % funded; whereas according to the UN, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance is estimated at around 1,5 million;

| P. | whereas Haiti is a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement, Article 96 of which stipulates that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential element of cooperation between African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the EU; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas Haiti is a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement, Article 96 of which stipulates that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential element of cooperation between African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the EU;

| 1. | Strongly condemns the acts of violence and destruction carried out by gangs in Haiti, and deplores the looting of food and aid supplies and attacks against humanitarian workers; denounces, in particular, the acts of violence carried out in the Cité Soleil district of Port-au-Prince in July 2022 and the continuing violence, which deprives citizens of their basic rights; firmly condemns sexual assault by gangs against women and girls and the use of minors in gang activities; recalls that women and girls require particular attention and help when it comes to access to healthcare and protection against sexual violence; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Underlines the need for the Haitian authorities to ensure better governance at all levels of the state and society, including the fight against corruption; stresses the critical importance of a working and credible judiciary; recalls that the Haitian authorities must address the root causes of gang violence, including by reforming the justice system and bringing those responsible to justice in fair trials; stresses that accountability is a matter of urgency and emphasises the importance of appropriate support and redress for victims and the importance of long-standing peace and stability; supports Special Representative Helen La Lime’s statement at the UN Security Council session on the UN Integrated Office in Haiti of 16 June 2022 outlining how to improve the security situation; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Calls for a law enforcement approach to gang issues by improving the management of illegal weapons together with socioeconomic projects and reintegration activities aimed at generating employment and revenue in the neighbourhoods most affected by gang violence; firmly insists that the Haitian authorities must bring those responsible to justice in fair trials and reiterates the need for law enforcement officers to abide by international norms and standards regarding the use of force when dealing with protests; recalls the constitutional right to peaceful demonstrations; underlines the need for the Haitian Government to address all possible dimensions of gang violence, including through social, health and education programmes, water and sanitation improvements and disaster relief and recovery efforts; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Demands an immediate cessation of gang violence and criminal activities; calls for the EU and its Member States to take appropriate measures, including asset freezes and travel bans, through the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, against those engaged in or supporting gang violence, criminal activities or human rights abuses, including corruption; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Highlights the importance of the main players in civil society, including churches, trade unions, youth and human rights organisations, peasant and women’s movements and NGOs; calls for the restoration of the power and legitimacy of public institutions, the resuscitation of the population’s confidence, an end to impunity and the organisation of free and transparent elections after two years; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Calls on all stakeholders in Haiti to establish a durable, time-bound and commonly accepted solution to the current political impasse to allow for inclusive, peaceful, free, fair and transparent legislative and presidential elections, in line with recognised international standards as soon as security conditions and logistical preparations allow; underlines that this must be Haitian-led, with the full and equal participation of women, young people, civil society and other relevant stakeholders, to return power to those freely chosen by the Haitian people, restore democratic institutions and put measures in place to respond to economic and social challenges; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Expresses grave concern about the situation of Haitian asylum seekers in the host countries to which they have fled; calls on the authorities from the host countries to put an end to all expulsions and deportations to Haiti as its human rights and humanitarian crises continue, to urgently provide Haitians with access to protection without discrimination, and to provide fair evaluations of refugee status in line with both the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Calls on the countries receiving Haitian asylum seekers to respect the criteria set out in international conventions regarding asylum and returns; recalls that returns to Haiti are extremely unsafe and will continue to pose risks to life for as long as the security conditions in Haiti have not improved; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Encourages the Commission and the EU Member States to continue their close collaboration with the UN Integrated Office in Haiti, the UN country team in Haiti, regional organisations and international financial institutions with a view to helping Haiti take responsibility to achieve long-term stability, sustainable development and economic self-sufficiency; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Encourages the Member States, international financial institutions and other entities to increase contributions to the basket fund for security assistance to Haiti in order to support coordinated international assistance; calls for the EU and its Member States to provide continued capacity-building, technical support and training for national customs, border control and other relevant authorities; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Urgently calls on the Haitian authorities and the international community to support programmes aimed at eliminating poverty and ensuring schooling and access to social services, especially in remote areas of the country; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Welcomes the EU’s allocation of EUR 17 million to support the most vulnerable in Haiti and other countries in the Caribbean; calls on the Commission to continue prioritising humanitarian aid to Haiti and to ensure that the provision of humanitarian aid to Haiti is efficiently linked to its development strategy and that it directly benefits the populations in need; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Insists that, in view of the serious food crisis, specific attention should be paid to emergency food aid, giving priority to the purchase of local food so that this aid does not contribute to the elimination of the country’s small-scale farmers and sustainable local farming methods; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Requests that the Commission systematically guarantee that all aid, including humanitarian aid, is effectively monitored in order to ensure that it is used for the specific projects for which it is intended; reiterates its request, as set out in its resolution of 20 May 2021, which has not yet been carried out, for an audit and report by the European Court of Auditors on the way in which EU funds are spent in Haiti; calls for an inquiry into the transparency and effectiveness of the aid distribution network; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, its Council of Ministers and its Joint Parliamentary Assembly with the EU, the institutions of the CARIFORUM, and the Government and Parliament of Haiti. |
| --- | --- |

15.

---

(1)  OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 161.

(2)  OJ L 317, 15.12.2000, p. 3.

(3)  OJ L 289, 30.10.2008, p. 3.

---

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/79 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/79

---

P9_TA(2022)0350

The Media freedom crackdown in Myanmar, notably the cases of Htet Htet Khine, Sithu Aung Myint and Nyein Nyein Aye

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the Media freedom crackdown in Myanmar, notably the cases of Htet Htet Khine, Sithu Aung Myint and Nyein Nyein Aye (2022/2857(RSP))

(2023/C 132/09)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Myanmar/Burma, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Myanmar/Burma,

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/243 of 21 February 2022 amending Decision 2013/184/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Myanmar/Burma, imposing a fourth round of sanctions in view of the continuing grave situation and of intensifying human rights violations in Myanmar/Burma (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/243 of 21 February 2022 amending Decision 2013/184/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Myanmar/Burma, imposing a fourth round of sanctions in view of the continuing grave situation and of intensifying human rights violations in Myanmar/Burma (1),

| — | having regard to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which enshrines the right of freedom of expression and information, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which enshrines the right of freedom of expression and information,

| — | having regard to the oral update of 26 September 2022 by UN Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Myanmar to the UN Human Rights Council, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the oral update of 26 September 2022 by UN Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Myanmar to the UN Human Rights Council,

| — | having regard to the statement of 29 September 2022 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service on the latest sentencing of State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of 29 September 2022 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service on the latest sentencing of State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,

| — | having regard of Section 505(a) of the Myanmar penal code, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard of Section 505(a) of the Myanmar penal code,

| — | having regard to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Five-Point Consensus of 24 April 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Five-Point Consensus of 24 April 2021,

| — | having regard to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 on freedom of opinion and expression, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 on freedom of opinion and expression,

| — | having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas on 1 February 2021 Myanmar’s military junta, known as the Tatmadaw, illegally took power and removed the legitimate authorities by force; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas on 1 February 2021 Myanmar’s military junta, known as the Tatmadaw, illegally took power and removed the legitimate authorities by force;

| B. | whereas in August 2021, the commander-in-chief of the military junta, Min Aung Hlaing, announced that he was appointing himself prime minister and that the state of emergency would be extended until August 2023; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas in August 2021, the commander-in-chief of the military junta, Min Aung Hlaing, announced that he was appointing himself prime minister and that the state of emergency would be extended until August 2023;

| C. | whereas the legitimate president, Win Myint, and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi have been detained since the military coup on a number of baseless and politically motivated charges, and have already been sentenced to several years in jail and in labour camps; whereas if convicted of all 11 charges against her, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi could be sentenced to a maximum of 102 years in prison; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the legitimate president, Win Myint, and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi have been detained since the military coup on a number of baseless and politically motivated charges, and have already been sentenced to several years in jail and in labour camps; whereas if convicted of all 11 charges against her, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi could be sentenced to a maximum of 102 years in prison;

| D. | whereas since the 1 February 2021 coup, more than 15 500 people have been arrested and more than 2 300 killed by the junta, including at least 188 children; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas since the 1 February 2021 coup, more than 15 500 people have been arrested and more than 2 300 killed by the junta, including at least 188 children;

| E. | whereas since the military coup, the military regime has continued to undermine media freedom and to violate the human rights of journalists in the country; whereas Myanmar is ranked 176th out of 180 countries in the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) 2022 World Press Freedom Index; whereas Myanmar’s military authorities are restricting access to social media, the internet and other independent sources of information; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas since the military coup, the military regime has continued to undermine media freedom and to violate the human rights of journalists in the country; whereas Myanmar is ranked 176th out of 180 countries in the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) 2022 World Press Freedom Index; whereas Myanmar’s military authorities are restricting access to social media, the internet and other independent sources of information;

| F. | whereas on 14 February 2021, the Tatmadaw introduced changes to the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code which have become the primary legal provisions used to charge journalists, student leaders, civil servants and others who oppose the military regime; whereas the newly introduced Section 505(a) of the Penal Code, which prohibits causing fear, spreading false news and agitating crimes against a government employee, all punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment, is being used by the military to bring criminal charges against journalists, among others; whereas the military courts in Myanmar are conducting trials behind closed doors; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas on 14 February 2021, the Tatmadaw introduced changes to the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code which have become the primary legal provisions used to charge journalists, student leaders, civil servants and others who oppose the military regime; whereas the newly introduced Section 505(a) of the Penal Code, which prohibits causing fear, spreading false news and agitating crimes against a government employee, all punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment, is being used by the military to bring criminal charges against journalists, among others; whereas the military courts in Myanmar are conducting trials behind closed doors;

| G. | whereas since the 2021 coup, the junta has banned or forced media outlets to leave Myanmar for reporting on the actions of the military; whereas many of the banned media outlets played a fundamental role in reporting the situation in Myanmar; whereas the people of Myanmar and those abroad rely heavily on these media; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas since the 2021 coup, the junta has banned or forced media outlets to leave Myanmar for reporting on the actions of the military; whereas many of the banned media outlets played a fundamental role in reporting the situation in Myanmar; whereas the people of Myanmar and those abroad rely heavily on these media;

| H. | whereas at least four journalists have been killed, including photographers Soe Naing and Aye Kyaw, both of whom died in detention after allegedly having been tortured, and local editor Pu Tuidim who was reported to have been summarily executed by the military after being used as a human shield; whereas there have been multiple reports of torture and abuses; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas at least four journalists have been killed, including photographers Soe Naing and Aye Kyaw, both of whom died in detention after allegedly having been tortured, and local editor Pu Tuidim who was reported to have been summarily executed by the military after being used as a human shield; whereas there have been multiple reports of torture and abuses;

| I. | whereas a wave of arrests of journalists followed the February 2021 coup; whereas at least 140 journalists have been arrested, 53 media workers are currently being held in Myanmar’s prisons and almost 25 journalists have been convicted since the military coup; whereas Myanmar has the world’s second largest number of journalists in prison; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas a wave of arrests of journalists followed the February 2021 coup; whereas at least 140 journalists have been arrested, 53 media workers are currently being held in Myanmar’s prisons and almost 25 journalists have been convicted since the military coup; whereas Myanmar has the world’s second largest number of journalists in prison;

| J. | whereas journalists Htet Htet Khine and Sithu Aung Myint were arrested in August 2021, six months after the coup; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas journalists Htet Htet Khine and Sithu Aung Myint were arrested in August 2021, six months after the coup;

| K. | whereas on 27 September 2022, freelance BBC Media Action reporter Htet Htet Khine was sentenced to three years in prison with hard labour; whereas Htet Htet Khine had already received her first three-year sentence with hard labour on 15 September 2022 for allegedly violating Section 505(a) of the Penal Code, which criminalises incitement and the dissemination of false news; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas on 27 September 2022, freelance BBC Media Action reporter Htet Htet Khine was sentenced to three years in prison with hard labour; whereas Htet Htet Khine had already received her first three-year sentence with hard labour on 15 September 2022 for allegedly violating Section 505(a) of the Penal Code, which criminalises incitement and the dissemination of false news;

| L. | whereas Sithu Aung Myint is still awaiting trial on charges of ‘incitement’ and ‘sedition’ for articles critical of Myanmar’s military, possibly facing a combined sentence of 23 years in prison; whereas Sithu Aung Myint’s health has been deteriorating and the prison authorities are denying him medical attention; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas Sithu Aung Myint is still awaiting trial on charges of ‘incitement’ and ‘sedition’ for articles critical of Myanmar’s military, possibly facing a combined sentence of 23 years in prison; whereas Sithu Aung Myint’s health has been deteriorating and the prison authorities are denying him medical attention;

| M. | whereas on 14 July 2022, Nyein Nyein Aye, a freelancer also known by the pseudonym of Mabel, was sentenced by a military court inside Yangon’s Insein prison; whereas Nyein Nyein Aye was sentenced to three years in prison on charges of ‘causing fear, spreading false news and agitating crimes against a government employee’ under Section 505(a) of the Penal Code; whereas Nyein Nyein Aye is the 24th journalist to receive a prison sentence since the coup in 2021; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas on 14 July 2022, Nyein Nyein Aye, a freelancer also known by the pseudonym of Mabel, was sentenced by a military court inside Yangon’s Insein prison; whereas Nyein Nyein Aye was sentenced to three years in prison on charges of ‘causing fear, spreading false news and agitating crimes against a government employee’ under Section 505(a) of the Penal Code; whereas Nyein Nyein Aye is the 24th journalist to receive a prison sentence since the coup in 2021;

| N. | whereas on 1 August 2022 freelancer Maung Maung Myo was sentenced to six years in prison on a terrorism charge for allegedly possessing pictures and interviews with members of the ‘People’s Defence Force’, an array of insurgent groups that are fighting Myanmar’s military government; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas on 1 August 2022 freelancer Maung Maung Myo was sentenced to six years in prison on a terrorism charge for allegedly possessing pictures and interviews with members of the ‘People’s Defence Force’, an array of insurgent groups that are fighting Myanmar’s military government;

| O. | whereas on 7 July 2022, a court sentenced Aung San Lin, a journalist for the Democratic Voice of Burma, to six years in prison with hard labour for incitement and the dissemination of ‘false news’ after publishing a report alleging that military forces had committed arson attacks on the homes of three supporters in Wetlet Township of the National League for Democracy, which had been overthrown by the coup; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas on 7 July 2022, a court sentenced Aung San Lin, a journalist for the Democratic Voice of Burma, to six years in prison with hard labour for incitement and the dissemination of ‘false news’ after publishing a report alleging that military forces had committed arson attacks on the homes of three supporters in Wetlet Township of the National League for Democracy, which had been overthrown by the coup;

| P. | whereas in July Myanmar’s military regime reactivated the death penalty to execute former Member of Parliament Phyo Zeya Thaw, prominent activist Kyaw Min Yu, widely known as ‘Ko Jimmy’, as well as Aung Thura Zaw and Hla Myo Aung; whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has strongly condemned ‘these politically motivated executions which represent yet another step towards the complete dismantling of the rule of law and a further blatant violation of human rights in Myanmar’; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas in July Myanmar’s military regime reactivated the death penalty to execute former Member of Parliament Phyo Zeya Thaw, prominent activist Kyaw Min Yu, widely known as ‘Ko Jimmy’, as well as Aung Thura Zaw and Hla Myo Aung; whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has strongly condemned ‘these politically motivated executions which represent yet another step towards the complete dismantling of the rule of law and a further blatant violation of human rights in Myanmar’;

| Q. | whereas the conditions of detention, where beatings and gender-based violence have been documented, represent a serious concern for the safety and well-being of those detained; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas the conditions of detention, where beatings and gender-based violence have been documented, represent a serious concern for the safety and well-being of those detained;

| R. | whereas the military is conducting a violent war against ethnic minorities, as well as killing a large number of civilians and forcing millions of people to flee to seek refuge; whereas military helicopters recently fired on a primary school in the Sagaing region, killing at least six adults and seven children; whereas according to a recent statement by the UN-appointed independent human rights expert Tom Andrews, conditions have ‘gone from bad to worse, to horrific for untold numbers of innocent people in Myanmar’; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas the military is conducting a violent war against ethnic minorities, as well as killing a large number of civilians and forcing millions of people to flee to seek refuge; whereas military helicopters recently fired on a primary school in the Sagaing region, killing at least six adults and seven children; whereas according to a recent statement by the UN-appointed independent human rights expert Tom Andrews, conditions have ‘gone from bad to worse, to horrific for untold numbers of innocent people in Myanmar’;

| S. | whereas the junta in Myanmar refuses to seriously investigate human rights violations against the Rohingya and hold their perpetrators to account; whereas the most senior military figures who supervised the attacks against the Rohingya remain in their posts; whereas the authorities refuse to cooperate with the UN mechanisms; whereas impunity is deeply entrenched in Myanmar’s political and legal system; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas the junta in Myanmar refuses to seriously investigate human rights violations against the Rohingya and hold their perpetrators to account; whereas the most senior military figures who supervised the attacks against the Rohingya remain in their posts; whereas the authorities refuse to cooperate with the UN mechanisms; whereas impunity is deeply entrenched in Myanmar’s political and legal system;

| T. | whereas Russia and China have made many political, military and economic efforts aimed at legitimising the junta; whereas Russia and Myanmar’s military junta have recently signed a roadmap for cooperation on peaceful use of nuclear energy for 2022-2023; whereas both Moscow and Beijing have ties to Myanmar’s armed forces, as the largest suppliers of arms to the country; whereas both countries have repeatedly blocked attempts to agree on UN Security Council declarations on the situation in Myanmar; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas Russia and China have made many political, military and economic efforts aimed at legitimising the junta; whereas Russia and Myanmar’s military junta have recently signed a roadmap for cooperation on peaceful use of nuclear energy for 2022-2023; whereas both Moscow and Beijing have ties to Myanmar’s armed forces, as the largest suppliers of arms to the country; whereas both countries have repeatedly blocked attempts to agree on UN Security Council declarations on the situation in Myanmar;

| U. | whereas on 24 April 2021 the military junta agreed with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders a Five-Point Consensus whose first step was an immediate end to violence in the country; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas on 24 April 2021 the military junta agreed with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders a Five-Point Consensus whose first step was an immediate end to violence in the country;

| 1. | Strongly condemns the military junta’s violent and illegitimate rule in Myanmar, and its attempts to erode the Myanmar people’s strong attachment to democracy, given that it is based on an unlawful coup against the civilian government, and has resulted in a particularly alarming humanitarian situation and human rights crisis in the country, characterised by widespread impunity; strongly condemns all types of persecution of independent journalists; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls for the immediate end to the unlawful state of emergency in the country, the restoration of the civilian government, the return to a path towards democracy and the swift opening of parliament with the participation of all its elected representatives; supports the efforts of the National Unity Government (NUG) to move towards a peaceful and democratic future; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Calls on the military junta to unconditionally release President Win Myint, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and all others who have been arrested on the strength of baseless accusations, to hand power over to the legitimate authorities, to respect the rule of law and media freedom, and to immediately put an end to the military attacks, air strikes and violence against Myanmar’s population; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Urges the military junta to drop all politically motivated charges against members of the press and media workers, and unconditionally release all journalists unjustly detained, including Htet Htet Khine, Sithu Aung Myint, Nyein Nyein Aye, Maung Maung Myo, Thurin Kyaw, Hanthar Nyein, Than Htike Aung, Ye Yint Tun, Tu Tu Tha, Soe Yarzar Tun and Aung San Lin; calls on the junta to provide the necessary medical care to Sithu Aung Myint whose state of health is a cause of great concern; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Condemns the repression of workers and the denial of the right to strike; condemns all companies and brands that were or are, directly or indirectly, providing support to the military and police oppressing and issuing arrest warrants against trade union leaders; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Urges the military junta to immediately end its abuses, including arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, sexual violence and other ill-treatment, as well as unfair trials against journalists and media workers; stresses that lawyers, human rights defenders and family members should be given effective access to visit people held in detention; highlights that any death in custody should be reported immediately to the person’s family, proper documentation provided, the body should be returned, and those responsible for abuses held to account; calls for independent international investigations into all allegations of torture and ill-treatment, and for those responsible to be held to account; stresses that any alleged information obtained as a result of torture and ill-treatment should never be admitted as evidence in judicial proceedings; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Insists that media freedom is vital to the effective functioning of free and democratic societies and is essential to the protection of all other human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas journalists need a safe environment in which to do their independent work; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Calls on the NUG to clearly express its position on the status of the Rohingya, notably on their right of citizenship and equal recognition as an ethnic group of Myanmar and the right to return to the country; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue supporting the work of human rights defenders in Myanmar; calls on the EU Delegation in Myanmar and the embassies of the Member States to closely monitor the cases of journalists who are currently detained and imprisoned, as well as of political leaders and others; encourages the representatives of the EU Delegation and the Member States in Myanmar to attend the trials of journalists, media workers, bloggers and human rights defenders in the country whenever access is permitted; asks the diplomatic missions and international donors to offer support and possible protection to human rights defenders and media workers at risk of persecution, including by providing safe haven at embassies, and by issuing emergency visas to those in need of protection; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Calls on the Commission to demonstrate that the Everything But Arms scheme does not in any benefit way the junta or otherwise to temporarily withdraw from this mechanism; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Asks the EU and its Member States to step up international aid, development projects or financial assistance to Myanmar/Burma and to ensure that this does not benefit the military and does not contribute to more human rights violations; calls for the provision of cross-border humanitarian aid and direct support to local civil society organisations, particularly ethnic organisations; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Welcomes the sanctions imposed by the Council against members of the Tatmadaw and their businesses; calls on the VP/HR, the Member States and the Commission to introduce additional targeted sanctions against those responsible for the most serious human rights violations in the country; calls on the Council to add the arms dealers Naing Htut Aung, Aung Hlaing Oo and Sit Taing Aung to the sanction list for their role in providing arms and equipment to the military regime; calls on the Commission to consider all necessary sanctions against the Myanmar regime; calls for the necessary steps to be taken to ensure that these sanctions do not adversely affect workers and the general population; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Is concerned by sanctions derogations that allow operators to pursue financial transactions with the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise; calls for better international coordination of sanctions, including coordination with regional partners; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Urges the Council to include the State Administrative Council (SAC) as an entity in addition to its individual members on the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures, in order to ensure that all entities under the control of the SAC are included within this designation and that financial flows from the European Union benefiting them are prohibited; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Stresses that local and multinational businesses operating in Myanmar/Burma must respect human rights and stop enabling the perpetrators of abuses; strongly urges, in this regard, EU-based businesses to ensure they have no ties with Myanmar/Burma’s security forces, their individual members, or entities owned or controlled by them, and that they are not contributing, directly or indirectly, to the military’s crackdown on democracy and human rights; calls on EU-based undertakings, including parent holdings and subsidiaries, to urgently suspend any relationships with companies linked to the military; calls for the Commission and the Member States to assess and adopt appropriate measures to identify, prevent, cease, mitigate and remedy the potential or actual human rights violations that businesses operating in the European Union cause, contribute to or are directly linked to in Myanmar in view of the current situation; calls on the Commission and the Member States to introduce enhanced and specific due diligence obligations for undertakings operating in high-risk areas in the proposed directive on corporate sustainability due diligence, including areas affected by conflicts and areas that are environmentally sensitive; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls on the Member States and associated countries to maintain the embargo on the direct and indirect supply, sale and transfer, including transit, shipment and brokering, of all weapons, munitions and other military, security and surveillance equipment and systems, as well as the provision of training, maintenance and other military and security assistance; highlights the need for further investigation of the situation by the International Criminal Court; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Urges the EU and its Member States to increase the pressure on the UN Security Council to negotiate a strong draft resolution instituting a comprehensive global arms embargo on Myanmar; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Encourages the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar to continue addressing the persecution of journalists and to take action to work towards ending this alarming trend; calls on the UN to include media freedom violations within the scope of its independent investigative mechanism for Myanmar and to promote any possible initiative to sanction the military regime and hold accountable those responsible for the appalling human right violations currently occurring in the country; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Calls for the EU and the Member States to explore all avenues for justice and accountability for the grave international crimes committed by the security forces, including crimes against humanity committed in the wake of the coup, as well as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and acts of genocide committed in Rakhine and other ethnic regions for decades, by supporting a Security Council referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Deplores the execution of opposition members and reiterates its strong condemnation of the death penalty; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Calls strongly on the military junta to repeal any legislation which might endanger media freedom and to end its obstruction of the right of people in Myanmar to freedom of expression, both online and offline, which includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Notes that the Five-Point Consensus has not led to any results and calls on ASEAN to acknowledge that Min Aung Hlaing’s junta is not a reliable partner; urges ASEAN and its members to negotiate a new agreement on the crisis in Myanmar with the NUG and to provide that new agreement with enforcement mechanisms, with a view to achieving a sustainable, democratic resolution of the crisis in the future; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Condemns Russia and China for giving their political, economic and military backing to Myanmar’s junta; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the acting President Duwa Lashi La and the National Unity Government of Myanmar, the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the State Counsellor of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the Council, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Member States of Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Secretary-General of Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. |
| --- | --- |

24.

---

(1)  OJ L 40, 21.2.2022, p. 28.

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| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/84 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/84

---

P9_TA(2022)0351

The recent humanitarian and human rights situation in Tigray, Ethiopia, notably that of children

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the recent humanitarian and human rights situation in Tigray, Ethiopia, notably that of children (2022/2858(RSP))

(2023/C 132/10)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Tigray and Ethiopia, and in particular those of 26 November 2020 (1) and 7 October 2021 (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Tigray and Ethiopia, and in particular those of 26 November 2020 (1) and 7 October 2021 (2),

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

| — | having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,

| — | having regard to the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 and its additional protocols of 1977 and 2005, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 and its additional protocols of 1977 and 2005,

| — | having regard to the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 and to its 1967 Protocol, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 and to its 1967 Protocol,

| — | having regard to the report of 3 November 2021 by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission/Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission report of 11 March 2022 on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Afar and Amhara regions of Ethiopia conducted between September and December 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of 3 November 2021 by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission/Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission report of 11 March 2022 on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Afar and Amhara regions of Ethiopia conducted between September and December 2021,

| — | having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 17 December 2021 establishing an international commission of human rights experts to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into the allegations of violations and abuses committed since 3 November 2020 by all parties to the conflict in Ethiopia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 17 December 2021 establishing an international commission of human rights experts to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into the allegations of violations and abuses committed since 3 November 2020 by all parties to the conflict in Ethiopia,

| — | having regard to the report of 19 September 2022 by the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of 19 September 2022 by the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia,

| — | having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC),

| — | having regard to the Cotonou Agreement, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Cotonou Agreement,

| — | having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas this 23-month conflict has triggered a human-made crisis and widespread and entirely preventable human suffering; whereas the humanitarian situation throughout Ethiopia remains dramatic due to the conflict, drought and large-scale internal displacements; whereas on 24 August 2022, Ethiopian federal war planes bombed a kindergarten in Mekelle, Tigray, resulting in child casualties; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas this 23-month conflict has triggered a human-made crisis and widespread and entirely preventable human suffering; whereas the humanitarian situation throughout Ethiopia remains dramatic due to the conflict, drought and large-scale internal displacements; whereas on 24 August 2022, Ethiopian federal war planes bombed a kindergarten in Mekelle, Tigray, resulting in child casualties;

| B. | whereas having declared a humanitarian truce in March 2022, the Ethiopian federal government partially lifted the humanitarian siege of Tigray but shortages of essential supplies, including food, medicine and fuel, persist; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas having declared a humanitarian truce in March 2022, the Ethiopian federal government partially lifted the humanitarian siege of Tigray but shortages of essential supplies, including food, medicine and fuel, persist;

| C. | whereas vulnerable groups, in particular women and children, are suffering the most from the ongoing conflict in Tigray and are in urgent need of protection; whereas the children of Tigray have seriously suffered the effects of famine, violence, lack of medical aid and education, family dislocation, forced transfers and constant trauma; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas vulnerable groups, in particular women and children, are suffering the most from the ongoing conflict in Tigray and are in urgent need of protection; whereas the children of Tigray have seriously suffered the effects of famine, violence, lack of medical aid and education, family dislocation, forced transfers and constant trauma;

| D. | whereas on 1 October 2022, the African Union (AU) invited both the government of Ethiopia and the authorities of Tigray for peace talks to be held in South Africa on 8 October 2022; whereas these peace talks are to be facilitated by the AU’s Special Representative Olusegun Obasanjo, with the support of the former President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and the former deputy President of South Africa, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuk; whereas on 5 October 2022 the government of Ethiopia accepted this invitation; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas on 1 October 2022, the African Union (AU) invited both the government of Ethiopia and the authorities of Tigray for peace talks to be held in South Africa on 8 October 2022; whereas these peace talks are to be facilitated by the AU’s Special Representative Olusegun Obasanjo, with the support of the former President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and the former deputy President of South Africa, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuk; whereas on 5 October 2022 the government of Ethiopia accepted this invitation;

| E. | whereas women and children are continually the targets of intended and unintended bombings, shootings, killings and other acts of violence in the war and ethnic violence being perpetrated by all sides of the conflict; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas women and children are continually the targets of intended and unintended bombings, shootings, killings and other acts of violence in the war and ethnic violence being perpetrated by all sides of the conflict;

| F. | whereas rape and other sexual violence against women and girls continue to be widely used by all the belligerents, in addition to death threats, the use of ethnic slurs and captivity for sexual slavery; whereas internally displaced refugee women and children are at a heightened risk of abduction and trafficking for sexual exploitation; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas rape and other sexual violence against women and girls continue to be widely used by all the belligerents, in addition to death threats, the use of ethnic slurs and captivity for sexual slavery; whereas internally displaced refugee women and children are at a heightened risk of abduction and trafficking for sexual exploitation;

| G. | whereas throughout the evolution of this conflict, the sole constant has been the many alleged gross violations of human rights, humanitarian law and refugee law perpetrated by all parties to the conflict; whereas nearly half a million Ethiopians have died as a result of violence and famine, and more than 1,6 million people have been displaced by this conflict; whereas since the beginning of the war, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been forcibly displaced, unlawfully killed or experienced sexual and gender-based violence, mass arbitrary detention, pillage, abduction and the denial of humanitarian assistance and basic services, looting of aid and the diversion of aid to soldiers; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas throughout the evolution of this conflict, the sole constant has been the many alleged gross violations of human rights, humanitarian law and refugee law perpetrated by all parties to the conflict; whereas nearly half a million Ethiopians have died as a result of violence and famine, and more than 1,6 million people have been displaced by this conflict; whereas since the beginning of the war, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been forcibly displaced, unlawfully killed or experienced sexual and gender-based violence, mass arbitrary detention, pillage, abduction and the denial of humanitarian assistance and basic services, looting of aid and the diversion of aid to soldiers;

| H. | whereas one out of three Tigrayan children under the age of five and half of all pregnant and breastfeeding women are malnourished; whereas some 20 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia, nearly three quarters of them women and children; whereas Ethiopia is experiencing the worst drought on record since 1981, leaving an estimated 7,4 million people facing grave food insecurity; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas one out of three Tigrayan children under the age of five and half of all pregnant and breastfeeding women are malnourished; whereas some 20 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia, nearly three quarters of them women and children; whereas Ethiopia is experiencing the worst drought on record since 1981, leaving an estimated 7,4 million people facing grave food insecurity;

| I. | whereas, the percentage of children in Tigray receiving routine vaccines has plummeted due to supply shortages caused by the blockade imposed by Ethiopian forces; whereas deadly diseases such as measles, tetanus and whooping cough are on the rise; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas, the percentage of children in Tigray receiving routine vaccines has plummeted due to supply shortages caused by the blockade imposed by Ethiopian forces; whereas deadly diseases such as measles, tetanus and whooping cough are on the rise;

| J. | whereas a total of 1,39 million children in Tigray are missing out on education because of Ethiopia’s civil war; whereas Tigray’s education sector has been permanently damaged by the number of deaths and the level of destruction within the school system; whereas 346 men and 1 798 women, totalling 2 164 persons, in the education sector have been killed, including students; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas a total of 1,39 million children in Tigray are missing out on education because of Ethiopia’s civil war; whereas Tigray’s education sector has been permanently damaged by the number of deaths and the level of destruction within the school system; whereas 346 men and 1 798 women, totalling 2 164 persons, in the education sector have been killed, including students;

| K. | whereas since the start of the conflict, humanitarian organisations’ access to conflict zones has systematically been hindered, in spite of the repeated calls by the international community and humanitarian organisations to ensure unimpeded, sustained and secure access for relevant stakeholders; whereas humanitarian workers are the targets of violence by all parties to the conflict; whereas at least 23 humanitarian workers have been killed since the conflict started; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas since the start of the conflict, humanitarian organisations’ access to conflict zones has systematically been hindered, in spite of the repeated calls by the international community and humanitarian organisations to ensure unimpeded, sustained and secure access for relevant stakeholders; whereas humanitarian workers are the targets of violence by all parties to the conflict; whereas at least 23 humanitarian workers have been killed since the conflict started;

| L. | whereas access to real-time information has been severely hindered by government-imposed restrictions, including cutting off communications and preventing reporting on events in Tigray, as well as in the Afar and Amhara regions, where the conflict has spread; whereas these communications blackouts and restrictions on physical access for independent observers to areas affected by the conflict have severely inhibited the documenting of human rights abuses; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas access to real-time information has been severely hindered by government-imposed restrictions, including cutting off communications and preventing reporting on events in Tigray, as well as in the Afar and Amhara regions, where the conflict has spread; whereas these communications blackouts and restrictions on physical access for independent observers to areas affected by the conflict have severely inhibited the documenting of human rights abuses;

| M. | whereas the UN International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia published a report on 19 September 2022 concluding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the parties to the conflict have committed war crimes and violations and abuses of human rights; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the UN International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia published a report on 19 September 2022 concluding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the parties to the conflict have committed war crimes and violations and abuses of human rights;

| N. | whereas Eritrea has played a very destructive role in this conflict and has contributed to escalating it by entering the conflict in Tigray; whereas media reports about a renewed incursion into northern Tigray have been circulating since late September 2022; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas Eritrea has played a very destructive role in this conflict and has contributed to escalating it by entering the conflict in Tigray; whereas media reports about a renewed incursion into northern Tigray have been circulating since late September 2022;

| O. | whereas, in September 2022, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Ethiopian Government indicated their commitment to an African Union-led peace process; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas, in September 2022, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Ethiopian Government indicated their commitment to an African Union-led peace process;

| 1. | Reiterates its urgent call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and ceasefire in Tigray and the neighbouring regions without preconditions; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls for immediate, full, safe and sustained humanitarian access to all those affected by the conflict in the region; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Greatly welcomes the AU’s invitation to peace talks in South Africa on 8 October 2022; encourages all parties to accept this invitation and enter these negotiations in good faith and a spirit of dialogue, reconciliation and peace; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Calls for an immediate return to constitutional order and for the establishment of a ceasefire monitoring mechanism; expresses its support for all diplomatic efforts to end the ongoing conflict within Ethiopia, in particular, through AU mediation; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Strongly condemns the deliberate targeting of civilians by all the warring parties and the reported recruitment of children by certain warring parties; recalls that deliberate attacks on civilians, the targeting of children and the recruitment and use of child soldiers constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Condemns the Eritrean forces’ invasion of Tigray; condemns the war crimes and human rights violations by Eritrean forces during the war in Ethiopia; urges the Eritrean government to withdraw its forces from Ethiopia with immediate and permanent effect and to ensure accountability for its war crimes; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls on all authorities in Ethiopia, in particular the federal government and the regional governments in Tigray, Amhara and Afar, to adhere to the highest human rights standards, to address as a priority the egregious war crimes committed against the most vulnerable, in particular children and women, and to protect its youth in line with the UNCRC; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Is dismayed by the reports of rape and crimes of sexual violence against children, women and men which have been perpetrated on a staggering scale by all the belligerents; is deeply concerned by and calls for immediate attention to reports of the killing and maiming of Tigrayan, Amhara and Afarian children on ethnic grounds, which constitute war crimes and ethnic cleansing; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Reiterates its call on forces on all sides to respect international human rights, international humanitarian and refugee law; calls on the Ethiopian federal government and Tigrayan regional government to ensure accountability for perpetrators of war crimes committed during the ongoing conflict; insists on the need for cooperation between local and international actors, in particular the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), in ensuring redress for survivors and victims of all forms of war crimes and crimes against humanity; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Calls for all girls and women in Ethiopia to have access to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR); urges the EU and the Member States to increase support for SRHR services and specifically contraception and access to safe abortion, with special attention on ensuring access in regions in Ethiopia affected by war and humanitarian disaster; calls on the Ethiopian government to fulfil its commitment to investigate the many serious cases of gender-based violence in the conflict committed by all warring parties; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Is concerned by the reports of an increase in child marriages and child labour, human trafficking and transactional sex as desperate means to survive in regions of Ethiopia affected by war and humanitarian disaster; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Calls for action against the abduction, trafficking and sexual exploitation of refugees and internally displaced persons in Tigray, Amhara, Afar and Eritrea, and for the provision of assistance and protection is provided to all victims, without discrimination on grounds of race or ethnicity, nationality, disability, age, gender or sexual orientation; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Urges the EU and its Member States to increase support for emergency rehabilitation centres for women and children, including children born of rape, which protect and rehabilitate survivors of gender-based violence, human trafficking and sexual exploitation; emphasises the importance of providing shelter, psychosocial services, and vocational training for survivors and calls for additional support for existing shelters; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Recalls that extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, acts of torture and ill-treatment, forced displacement, sexual and gender-based violence, rape and gang-rape, attacks on aid workers, attacks on civilian infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals, and destruction and looting of public and private property constitute war crimes under international law; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Calls on the Commission and Member States to support domestic accountability initiatives based only on clear, transparent, effective, and measurable benchmarks that ensure independent and impartial justice and accountability for victims and survivors; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Strongly condemns the use of starvation as a method of warfare; recalls that obstruction of the delivery of food and healthcare and denial of these services amount to crimes against humanity; recalls that humanitarian aid and assistance is based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Reiterates its call to fully re-establish basic public services such as electricity infrastructure, banking services, schools and hospitals as well as to immediately lift restrictions on telecommunications in Tigray; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Calls on national and regional authorities to ensure that internally displaced persons and refugees have the right to safely return to their homes or places of residence on a voluntary basis and to set up a fair, accessible and independent mechanism to provide compensation for losses or damage to housing, property and land; urges the EU and its Member States to assist and support the organisation and monitoring of returns; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Strongly condemns the fact that the state of emergency has led to ethnically motivated arrests, harassment, beatings and the targeting of journalists; calls for the immediate release of all journalists who remain in arbitrary detention and for freedom of expression and speech to be ensured; calls on the warring parties to ensure free access to the press and to allow journalists to carry out their work safely; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Expresses concern for the safety and well-being of independent humanitarian workers in the region; strongly condemns all attacks on humanitarian aid workers and critical infrastructure and the continuous seizures of UN humanitarian supplies; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Reiterates its call on the Ethiopian government to sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; stresses the need for an independent and impartial mechanism to address ongoing violations and accountability; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Calls on all the belligerent parties to immediately end hostilities and to reach a formal ceasefire agreement without preconditions; reiterates its call for a national dialogue that must be as inclusive, broad and transparent as possible, including representatives from civil society and opposition parties, in order to fulfil the goal of being a true catalyst for reconciliation; urges the EU and its Member States to fully engage with the peace process in order to ensure its credible progress; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Takes note of some positive developments in the country, such as the humanitarian truce of 24 March 2022 and the release of some political prisoners, increased humanitarian access during the truce, as well as, in particular, public declarations by the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan leadership committing to AU-led peace talks; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Welcomes the renewal of the mandate of Olusegun Obasanjo as the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa; expects further action following statements about the anticipated appointment of a trio of high-level AU mediators in order to prioritise an agreement on a permanent ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access to all areas and the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean forces, and to facilitate accountability and internal reconciliation; calls for these mediators to be appointed without delay; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to adopt measures to protect human rights and to adopt sanctions against perpetrators of human rights violations through the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Underlines that the situation of refugees in the region continues to deteriorate; calls in this sense for the EU and all its Member States to step up resettlement from the region, provide humanitarian visas to those at risk and facilitate family reunification; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure effective access to international protection in the EU and ensure the respect of the fundamental rights of persons seeking international protection in accordance with EU and international law; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Supports the Commission’s postponement of budget support disbursements to the Ethiopian government since December 2020; calls on the Commission to continue its life-saving support for the region aimed at civil society and independent humanitarian organisations, and to step up its efforts to ensure the safety of children; calls on the Commission to reconsider its limitation of budget support to implementing measures in order to allow the continued implementation of development projects outside the conflict zone; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Deeply regrets the fact that the UN Security Council (UNSC) has failed to address the situation in Ethiopia and the region in an effective manner; urges the EU and its Member States to call on the UNSC to hold regular public meetings on Ethiopia and the region and to take meaningful and decisive action to ensure unhindered humanitarian access, allow the protection of civilians, end and condemn grave violations of international law and ensure accountability for atrocities; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Recalls that in its resolution S-33/1 on the situation of human rights in Ethiopia, adopted on 17 December 2021, the UNHRC decided to establish an International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE); urges the EU and its Member States to support the allocation of adequate funding by the UN to the ICHREE and calls on the Ethiopian federal government to facilitate unfettered access for the ICHREE; calls on the UNHRC to renew the ICHREE’s mandate and to provide it with sufficient time, as well as the technical assistance and budgetary resources required, to carry out its mandate without limiting its temporal or geographic scope; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Recognises the findings of the UNHRC’s Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (A/HRC/51/46) of 19 September 2022, which documents incidents of war crimes; calls on the Commission to evaluate and utilise the conclusions and recommendations and on the Ethiopian authorities to recognise these results in an effort to restore human rights protection and work towards redress for victims of war crimes; calls further on all parties to the conflict to endorse the recommendations by the joint investigation by the UN Human Rights Officer and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Federal Government and House of Federation of Ethiopia, the Tigrayan authorities, the Government of the State of Eritrea, the governments of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union and its Member States, the Pan-African Parliament and the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. |
| --- | --- |

31.

---

(1)  OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 132.

(2)  OJ C 132, 24.3.2022, p. 205.

---

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/89 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/89

---

P9_TA(2022)0352

The death of Mahsa Amini and the repression of women's rights protesters in Iran

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the death of Mahsa Jina Amini and the repression of women’s rights protesters in Iran (2022/2849(RSP))

(2023/C 132/11)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Iran, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Iran,

| — | having regard the declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union of 25 September 2022 and the statement of the European External Action Service spokesperson of 19 September 2022 on the death of Mahsa Amini, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard the declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union of 25 September 2022 and the statement of the European External Action Service spokesperson of 19 September 2022 on the death of Mahsa Amini,

| — | having regard to the statement of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran of 22 September 2022, demanding accountability for the death of Mahsa Amini and calling for an end to violence against women, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran of 22 September 2022, demanding accountability for the death of Mahsa Amini and calling for an end to violence against women,

| — | having regard to the reports by UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran of 18 June 2022, 13 January 2022, and 11 January 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the reports by UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran of 18 June 2022, 13 January 2022, and 11 January 2021,

| — | having regard to report of the UN Secretary-General of 16 June 2022 on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to report of the UN Secretary-General of 16 June 2022 on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,

| — | having regard to the statement of UN Secretary-General António Guterres of 27 September 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of UN Secretary-General António Guterres of 27 September 2022,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR), and to Iran’s ratification thereof in June 1975, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR), and to Iran’s ratification thereof in June 1975,

| — | having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders,

| — | having regard to the EU guidelines of 8 December 2008 on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU guidelines of 8 December 2008 on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them,

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas on 13 September 2022, 22-year old Iranian Kurdish woman Mahsa Jina Amini was arrested in Tehran by Iran’s ‘morality’ police for an alleged failure to observe the mandatory veiling law; whereas according to eyewitnesses, ‘morality’ police pushed Mahsa Jina Amini into a police van and beat her during her transfer to Vozara detention centre in Tehran, where she shortly after fell into a coma and died on 16 September 2022, in a nearby hospital while in police custody; whereas the Iranian authorities have maintained that her death was from natural causes; whereas a proper investigation has not being conducted, and whereas the authorities have refused to provide the victim’s family with her medical records and autopsy report; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas on 13 September 2022, 22-year old Iranian Kurdish woman Mahsa Jina Amini was arrested in Tehran by Iran’s ‘morality’ police for an alleged failure to observe the mandatory veiling law; whereas according to eyewitnesses, ‘morality’ police pushed Mahsa Jina Amini into a police van and beat her during her transfer to Vozara detention centre in Tehran, where she shortly after fell into a coma and died on 16 September 2022, in a nearby hospital while in police custody; whereas the Iranian authorities have maintained that her death was from natural causes; whereas a proper investigation has not being conducted, and whereas the authorities have refused to provide the victim’s family with her medical records and autopsy report;

| B. | whereas, following the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini, nation-wide protests broke out in over 120 cities in almost all of Iran’s 31 provinces, involving hundreds of thousands of Iranian citizens representing all segments of society; whereas the protests were initiated by women demanding accountability for the death of Mahsa Jina Amini and calling for an end to violence and discrimination against women in Iran, in particular in the form of compulsory veiling; whereas women’s protests have inspired solidarity from men, sparking a pan-Iranian reform and protest movement; whereas students are protesting at numerous universities across the country, notably at Sharif university of Technology in Tehran, by boycotting their classes and demonstrating against repression; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas, following the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini, nation-wide protests broke out in over 120 cities in almost all of Iran’s 31 provinces, involving hundreds of thousands of Iranian citizens representing all segments of society; whereas the protests were initiated by women demanding accountability for the death of Mahsa Jina Amini and calling for an end to violence and discrimination against women in Iran, in particular in the form of compulsory veiling; whereas women’s protests have inspired solidarity from men, sparking a pan-Iranian reform and protest movement; whereas students are protesting at numerous universities across the country, notably at Sharif university of Technology in Tehran, by boycotting their classes and demonstrating against repression;

| C. | whereas the response of the Iranian security and police forces to the protests has been violent, indiscriminate and unrestrained, and has resulted in substantial loss of life as well as a large number of injuries; whereas the UN has confirmed that Iranian forces have being using live ammunition, birdshot, tear gas and metal pellets against the protesters; whereas, as of 2 October 2022, Iranian security forces had reportedly killed hundreds of peaceful protestors demonstrating against the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini, and injured and arrested hundreds more, among them human rights defenders, students, lawyers, civil society activists and more than 20 journalist, notably Niloofar Hamedi, the journalist who first reported on Mahsa Jina Amini’s arrest and hospitalisation; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the response of the Iranian security and police forces to the protests has been violent, indiscriminate and unrestrained, and has resulted in substantial loss of life as well as a large number of injuries; whereas the UN has confirmed that Iranian forces have being using live ammunition, birdshot, tear gas and metal pellets against the protesters; whereas, as of 2 October 2022, Iranian security forces had reportedly killed hundreds of peaceful protestors demonstrating against the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini, and injured and arrested hundreds more, among them human rights defenders, students, lawyers, civil society activists and more than 20 journalist, notably Niloofar Hamedi, the journalist who first reported on Mahsa Jina Amini’s arrest and hospitalisation;

| D. | whereas Amnesty International has documented the authorities’ plot to crush current protests by deploying the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij paramilitary force, the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran, riot police, and plain-clothes security agents; whereas evidence shows how the General Headquarters of Armed Forces issued an order to commanders in all provinces instructing them to confront peaceful protesters with widespread use of lethal force and firearms by security forces; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas Amnesty International has documented the authorities’ plot to crush current protests by deploying the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij paramilitary force, the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran, riot police, and plain-clothes security agents; whereas evidence shows how the General Headquarters of Armed Forces issued an order to commanders in all provinces instructing them to confront peaceful protesters with widespread use of lethal force and firearms by security forces;

| E. | whereas according to reports, numerous foreigners including EU nationals have been arrested in recent days for their alleged involvement in the protests; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas according to reports, numerous foreigners including EU nationals have been arrested in recent days for their alleged involvement in the protests;

| F. | whereas Iranian authorities are deliberately disrupting internet and mobile connections and severely restricting social media platforms to undermine the ability of Iranian citizens to access communication technologies in a secure and private manner and to organise peaceful assemblies; whereas there have been reports of SMS messages containing the words ‘Mahsa Amini’ in Farsi being blocked; whereas by disrupting and disconnecting the internet in large parts of Iran, the regime is trying to prevent the transmission and dissemination of news about and images of the protests as well as to prevent international and local organisations from documenting human rights violations; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas Iranian authorities are deliberately disrupting internet and mobile connections and severely restricting social media platforms to undermine the ability of Iranian citizens to access communication technologies in a secure and private manner and to organise peaceful assemblies; whereas there have been reports of SMS messages containing the words ‘Mahsa Amini’ in Farsi being blocked; whereas by disrupting and disconnecting the internet in large parts of Iran, the regime is trying to prevent the transmission and dissemination of news about and images of the protests as well as to prevent international and local organisations from documenting human rights violations;

| G. | whereas the Iranian Government introduced mandatory veiling in 1983; whereas the mandatory hijab has become a tool for the repression of women, depriving them of their freedom and rights in Iran; whereas women who are seen in public without a headscarf are frequently harassed, imprisoned, tortured, flogged and even killed for defying these repressive rules; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the Iranian Government introduced mandatory veiling in 1983; whereas the mandatory hijab has become a tool for the repression of women, depriving them of their freedom and rights in Iran; whereas women who are seen in public without a headscarf are frequently harassed, imprisoned, tortured, flogged and even killed for defying these repressive rules;

| H. | whereas the harassment of and violence against women and girls by the ‘morality’ police forces has increased since the beginning of President Ebrahim Raisi’s term in 2021; whereas the Government of Iran has pushed for legislation and draft legislation that encourages the repression of women; whereas the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini is part of a larger pattern of curtailing and rolling back the already heavily restricted rights of women in Iran, including through a new law passed in 2021 severely restricting women’s access to sexual and reproductive health rights, in direct violation of women’s human rights under international law; whereas the introduction of the ‘Hijab and Chastity Project’ would imply the use of surveillance cameras to monitor and fine unveiled women; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the harassment of and violence against women and girls by the ‘morality’ police forces has increased since the beginning of President Ebrahim Raisi’s term in 2021; whereas the Government of Iran has pushed for legislation and draft legislation that encourages the repression of women; whereas the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini is part of a larger pattern of curtailing and rolling back the already heavily restricted rights of women in Iran, including through a new law passed in 2021 severely restricting women’s access to sexual and reproductive health rights, in direct violation of women’s human rights under international law; whereas the introduction of the ‘Hijab and Chastity Project’ would imply the use of surveillance cameras to monitor and fine unveiled women;

| I. | whereas the human rights situation in Iran is increasingly deteriorating; whereas the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini is illustrative of the ongoing human rights crisis in Iran, perpetuated by the systemic impunity of the Iranian Government and its security apparatus, which has permitted widespread torture, as well as extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings; whereas more than 40 human rights defenders have been arrested since 18 September 2022, and women human rights defenders have been particularly and violently targeted as part of these arrests, assaults and raids by the Iranian forces; whereas Iranian LGBTQI rights defenders Zahra Sedighi Hamedani, age 31, and Elham Chubdar, age 24, were sentenced to death by the Revolutionary Court of Urmia on charges of ‘corruption on earth through the promotion of homosexuality’; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the human rights situation in Iran is increasingly deteriorating; whereas the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini is illustrative of the ongoing human rights crisis in Iran, perpetuated by the systemic impunity of the Iranian Government and its security apparatus, which has permitted widespread torture, as well as extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings; whereas more than 40 human rights defenders have been arrested since 18 September 2022, and women human rights defenders have been particularly and violently targeted as part of these arrests, assaults and raids by the Iranian forces; whereas Iranian LGBTQI rights defenders Zahra Sedighi Hamedani, age 31, and Elham Chubdar, age 24, were sentenced to death by the Revolutionary Court of Urmia on charges of ‘corruption on earth through the promotion of homosexuality’;

| J. | whereas the EU has adopted restrictive measures related to violations of human rights, including asset freezes and visa bans for individuals and entities responsible for grave human rights violations, and a ban on exports to Iran of equipment which might be used for internal repression and of equipment for monitoring telecommunications; whereas these measures we first put in place on 12 April 2011, are regularly updated and remain in place; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the EU has adopted restrictive measures related to violations of human rights, including asset freezes and visa bans for individuals and entities responsible for grave human rights violations, and a ban on exports to Iran of equipment which might be used for internal repression and of equipment for monitoring telecommunications; whereas these measures we first put in place on 12 April 2011, are regularly updated and remain in place;

| K. | whereas Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell, in his declaration of 25 September 2022, condemned the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini and the excessive use of force by Iranian security forces and announced that the EU would consider all the options at its disposal ahead of the next Foreign Affairs Council to address the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini and the way Iranian security forces have responded to the ensuing demonstrations; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell, in his declaration of 25 September 2022, condemned the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini and the excessive use of force by Iranian security forces and announced that the EU would consider all the options at its disposal ahead of the next Foreign Affairs Council to address the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini and the way Iranian security forces have responded to the ensuing demonstrations;

| 1. | Condemns in the strongest terms the death of Mahsa Jina Amini following her violent arrest, abuse and ill-treatment by Iran's ‘morality’ police; extends its condolences to her family and friends and to the families of all those killed during the recent protests in Iran; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Iranian Government to allow for an impartial and effective investigation of Mahsa Jina Amini’s tragic death and allegations of torture and ill-treatment by an independent competent authority; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Expresses its solidarity with the young Iranian women leading and participating in the protests despite the difficulties and personal repercussions they are facing; supports the peaceful protest movement across the country, protesting against Mahsa Jina Amini’s killing, the systemic and increasing oppression of women, and severe and mass violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Strongly supports the aspirations of the Iranian people who want to live in a free, stable, inclusive and democratic country that respects its national and international commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms; is deeply concerned about reports of the besiegement, arrests and shooting of large numbers of students locked inside Sharif University of Technology in Tehran on 2 October 2022, by the IRGC, Basij forces and police; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Acknowledges that the Iranian women’s movement goes beyond the defence of women’s rights and advocates for a secular state in Iran instead of a violent and reactionary theocracy; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Strongly condemns the widespread, intentional and disproportionate use of force by Iranian security forces against peaceful protestors and calls on the Iranian authorities to stop their continued, systematic and unacceptable violence against their own citizens; demands that the Iranian authorities allow for an evidence-based, swift, impartial and effective investigation into the killings of all protesters, including bringing those responsible to justice; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Demands that the Iranian authorities immediately and unconditionally release and drop all charges against anyone who is imprisoned solely for peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly in connection with the protests; stresses that fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and assembly must always be respected and calls on the Iranian authorities to live up to their international obligations, including under the ICCPR; urges the Iranian authorities to immediately release all EU nationals arrested and drop all charges against them; is highly concerned about the arrest of more than 20 journalists, notably Niloofar Hamedi, the journalist who first broke the news about Mahsa Jina Amini’s arrest and hospitalisation, and calls on the Iranian authorities to free them without delay; calls on Iran to respect the freedom of expression and belief of all people living in Iran, especially women and girls, who are notably repressed; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Condemns the Islamic Republic of Iran’s systemic discrimination against women and other vulnerable groups through laws and regulations that severely restrict their freedoms and rights, including the degrading compulsory veiling law and its abusive enforcement, severe restrictions on women’s sexual and reproductive health rights, and violations of women’s political, social, economic, cultural and personal rights; demands that the Iranian authorities swiftly repeal laws that impose compulsory veiling on women and girls, abolish the ‘morality’ police and end systemic discrimination against women in all fields of life; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Strongly condemns Iran’s practice of shutting down internet and mobile networks in the context of protests in the country, which prevents communication and the free flow of information for Iranian citizens; underscores that such actions are a clear violation of international law; welcomes the decision of the US to allow private companies to make their digital services available to the Iranian people amid the current protests; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Categorically rejects the accusations by Iranian officials and the state-controlled Iranian media pointing to the diplomatic representations of Germany and other European countries as the supposed instigators of the protests; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Reiterates its strong condemnation of the steadily deteriorating human rights situation in Iran, including and especially for persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, including Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs and non-Shi’a and non-Muslim religious minorities, including Baha'i and Christians; urges the Iranian authorities to respect ethnic and religious minorities’ fundamental rights and freedoms; calls on the Iranian authorities to eliminate all forms of discrimination; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Urges the Iranian Government to immediately and unconditionally release all human rights defenders who have been imprisoned for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression and belief; calls on the Iranian Supreme Court to overturn the sentences handed down against LGBTI human rights defenders Zahra Sedighi-Hamadani and Elham Choubdar, on the grounds of violations of the right to fair trials; asks the Iranian Government to cease its targeting of all human rights defenders in Iran and to guarantee in all circumstances that they are able to carry out their legitimate human rights activities without fear of reprisals and free from all restrictions, including judicial harassment; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Deplores the systematic use of torture in Iranian prisons and calls for the immediate cessation of all forms of torture and ill-treatment of all detainees; condemns the practice of denying detainees access to phone calls and family visits; expresses grave concerns about detainees’ inability to access legal representation during interrogations; calls on the Iranian Government to treat prisoners with the respect due to their inherent dignity and value as human beings; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Deeply regrets the lack of progress made in the cases regarding EU-Iranian dual nationals detained in Iran, including Ahmadreza Djalali, who has been sentenced to death on spurious espionage charges; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Strongly condemns the Iranian authorities’ increasing use of the death penalty in recent years and deplores the alarming escalation in the use of the death penalty against protesters, dissidents and members of minority groups; reiterates its call on the Government of Iran to introduce an immediate moratorium on the use of the death penalty as a step towards abolishing it, and to commute all death sentences; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Asks the Iranian authorities to allow visits of all Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council, and particularly to ensure that the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran is allowed to enter the country; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Calls on the UN, particularly its Human Rights Council, to launch without delay a comprehensive investigation into the events that have taken place in recent weeks, led by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran; asks the UN Human Rights Council to establish an international investigative and accountability mechanism for human rights violations perpetrated by the Iranian Government; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Asks the EU and its Member States to use all engagements with the Iranian authorities to demand an immediate end to the violent crackdown against protests and the unconditional release of all those arrested for exercising their right to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, call for an independent investigation into the deaths of Mahsa Jina Amini and dozens of protesters, urge the restoration of access to the internet and communication channels and encourage the abolition of compulsory veiling for women; calls on Member States to store, preserve and share available evidence, in line with the new rules of Eurojust, that may contribute to investigations, including cooperating with and supporting the work of the International Criminal Court; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Calls on the Foreign Affairs Council to add Iranian officials, including all those associated with the ‘morality’ police, who are found complicit in or responsible for the death of Mahsa Jina Amini and violence against protesters, to the EU’s list of individuals against whom restrictive measures in relation to serious human rights violations in Iran have been imposed; reiterates that sanctions against the IRGC leadership must not be lifted; welcomes the Council’s adoption of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime as an important instrument for the EU to sanction violators of human rights; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Calls for the EU, including the VP/HR, to continue raising human rights concerns with the Iranian authorities in bilateral and multilateral forums and to use all planned engagements with the Iranian authorities for that purpose, in particular in the context of the EU-Iran High Level Political Dialogue; reaffirms that respect for human rights is a core component in the development of EU-Iran relations; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Encourages strong coordination among EU embassies accredited in Tehran; urges all Member States with a diplomatic presence in Tehran to use the mechanisms envisaged in the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders to support and protect these individuals, in particular women’s rights defenders and EU-Iranian dual nationals, including through emergency grants under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, and the European Endowment for Democracy, as well as emergency visas, public statements, the monitoring of trials and prison visits; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Calls on the Commission to consider, under strict compliance with the principles of necessity and proportionality, allowing EU-based communications providers to offer tools, including videoconferencing, e-learning platforms, web maps and cloud services, to people in Iran, in order to ensure that they have access to the online tools and platforms they need to exercise their human rights; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Expresses concern at the continuous lobbying of European institutions by reactionary Islamist associations, which may amount to foreign interference in our democracies; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Office of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the family of Mahsa Jina Amini. |
| --- | --- |

24.

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| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/94 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/94

---

P9_TA(2022)0353

Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine (2022/2851(RSP))

(2023/C 132/12)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,

| — | having regard to the UN Charter, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Charter,

| — | having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975,

| — | having regard to the statements by the Members of the European Council and the G7 foreign ministers of 30 September 2022 on Ukraine, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statements by the Members of the European Council and the G7 foreign ministers of 30 September 2022 on Ukraine,

| — | having regard to the declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union of 28 September 2022 on the illegal sham ‘referendums’ by Russia in the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union of 28 September 2022 on the illegal sham ‘referendums’ by Russia in the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions,

| — | having regard to the press statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, of 28 September 2022 on a new package of restrictive measures against Russia and the message by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, of 30 September 2022 on Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian regions, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the press statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, of 28 September 2022 on a new package of restrictive measures against Russia and the message by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, of 30 September 2022 on Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian regions,

| — | having regard to the declarations by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union of 22 September 2022 on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and of 28 September 2022 on the leaks in the Nord Stream gas pipelines, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the declarations by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union of 22 September 2022 on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and of 28 September 2022 on the leaks in the Nord Stream gas pipelines,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas, in line with the UN Charter and the principles of international law, all states enjoy equal sovereignty and must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; whereas any annexation of a state’s territory by another state resulting from the threat or use of force constitutes a violation of the UN Charter and the principles of international law; whereas this principle was recently reaffirmed by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas, in line with the UN Charter and the principles of international law, all states enjoy equal sovereignty and must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; whereas any annexation of a state’s territory by another state resulting from the threat or use of force constitutes a violation of the UN Charter and the principles of international law; whereas this principle was recently reaffirmed by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres;

| B. | whereas the Russian Federation, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, bears special political responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world, but has persistently been violating the principles of the UN Charter through its aggressive actions against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and has been openly defying the international community by announcing its illegal acts in breach of the UN Charter while the UN General Assembly has been in session; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the Russian Federation, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, bears special political responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world, but has persistently been violating the principles of the UN Charter through its aggressive actions against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and has been openly defying the international community by announcing its illegal acts in breach of the UN Charter while the UN General Assembly has been in session;

| C. | whereas the Russian Federation has continued its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine over recent months; whereas a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive launched in early September 2022 led to Russia losing a significant part of the territories it had occupied in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region and other regions of eastern and southern Ukraine; whereas this liberation has led to the discovery of new evidence of the serious human rights violations and war crimes committed by Russian forces and their proxies, such as mass graves with more than 440 bodies in Izyum; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the Russian Federation has continued its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine over recent months; whereas a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive launched in early September 2022 led to Russia losing a significant part of the territories it had occupied in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region and other regions of eastern and southern Ukraine; whereas this liberation has led to the discovery of new evidence of the serious human rights violations and war crimes committed by Russian forces and their proxies, such as mass graves with more than 440 bodies in Izyum;

| D. | whereas thousands of civilians have already been murdered and many more tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced; whereas this inhumane conduct by the Russian forces and their proxies is in total disregard for international humanitarian law; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas thousands of civilians have already been murdered and many more tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced; whereas this inhumane conduct by the Russian forces and their proxies is in total disregard for international humanitarian law;

| E. | whereas the Russian forces have suffered the losses of tens of thousands of personnel, either killed in action or missing since the beginning of the invasion, and the destruction of their military hardware; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the Russian forces have suffered the losses of tens of thousands of personnel, either killed in action or missing since the beginning of the invasion, and the destruction of their military hardware;

| F. | whereas the international community continues to support Ukraine with modern equipment, ammunition, training and intelligence sharing, the latest being the US Congress recently passing a bill which will provide more than USD 12,3 billion in assistance; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the international community continues to support Ukraine with modern equipment, ammunition, training and intelligence sharing, the latest being the US Congress recently passing a bill which will provide more than USD 12,3 billion in assistance;

| G. | whereas according to Ukrainian officials, the Ukrainian army needs modern main battle tanks, more surface-to-air and surface-to surface systems, armoured personnel carriers as well as additional training centres and further contributions in the form of ammunition; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas according to Ukrainian officials, the Ukrainian army needs modern main battle tanks, more surface-to-air and surface-to surface systems, armoured personnel carriers as well as additional training centres and further contributions in the form of ammunition;

| H. | whereas from 9 to 11 September 2022, regional and local elections were held in Russia and also in the illegally annexed Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which the EU does not recognise; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas from 9 to 11 September 2022, regional and local elections were held in Russia and also in the illegally annexed Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which the EU does not recognise;

| I. | whereas hastily-organised sham ‘referendums’ took place between 23 and 27 September 2022 in the partly Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine in the oblasts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia and among forcibly deported Ukrainians in Russia, with the Russian authorities announcing pre-ordained and unrealistically high percentages of voter turnout and approval ratings for annexation by Russia; whereas the voting process included systemic abuses of human rights and intimidation, notably the presence of armed Russian soldiers; whereas the sham referendums mirrored the referendum organised by Russia in Crimea after it occupied the peninsula in early 2014; whereas Russia announced the formal illegal annexation of these territories on 30 September 2022, which was followed by unanimous approval by the State Duma and Federation Council; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas hastily-organised sham ‘referendums’ took place between 23 and 27 September 2022 in the partly Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine in the oblasts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia and among forcibly deported Ukrainians in Russia, with the Russian authorities announcing pre-ordained and unrealistically high percentages of voter turnout and approval ratings for annexation by Russia; whereas the voting process included systemic abuses of human rights and intimidation, notably the presence of armed Russian soldiers; whereas the sham referendums mirrored the referendum organised by Russia in Crimea after it occupied the peninsula in early 2014; whereas Russia announced the formal illegal annexation of these territories on 30 September 2022, which was followed by unanimous approval by the State Duma and Federation Council;

| J. | whereas on 21 September 2022, Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s first mobilisation since the Second World War; whereas according to media reports, the mobilisation involves between 300 000 and 1,2 million military reservists being called up to the armed forces; whereas contrary to the official announcement that the authorities would draft citizens who had recently served in the army and had combat experience, reports suggest that some people are also being drafted without having had any military experience, particularly from poorer and remote regions and ethnic minorities, and that people are being drafted as a repressive measure, such as in occupied Crimea, where over 1 500 Crimean Tartars are being called up; whereas there are also reports of forced mobilisation from the newly illegally annexed oblasts of Ukraine; whereas there are reports of new recruits being sent to the front almost immediately; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas on 21 September 2022, Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s first mobilisation since the Second World War; whereas according to media reports, the mobilisation involves between 300 000 and 1,2 million military reservists being called up to the armed forces; whereas contrary to the official announcement that the authorities would draft citizens who had recently served in the army and had combat experience, reports suggest that some people are also being drafted without having had any military experience, particularly from poorer and remote regions and ethnic minorities, and that people are being drafted as a repressive measure, such as in occupied Crimea, where over 1 500 Crimean Tartars are being called up; whereas there are also reports of forced mobilisation from the newly illegally annexed oblasts of Ukraine; whereas there are reports of new recruits being sent to the front almost immediately;

| K. | whereas the announcement of Russia’s mobilisation led to protests, with the Russian authorities arresting more than 2 400 demonstrators so far; whereas since the announcement of mobilisation, several hundreds of thousands of Russians have fled Russia in order to avoid the draft; whereas the Russian authorities have set up conscription centres at several border crossing points in order to serve call-up notices on the spot and discourage citizens from leaving the country; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the announcement of Russia’s mobilisation led to protests, with the Russian authorities arresting more than 2 400 demonstrators so far; whereas since the announcement of mobilisation, several hundreds of thousands of Russians have fled Russia in order to avoid the draft; whereas the Russian authorities have set up conscription centres at several border crossing points in order to serve call-up notices on the spot and discourage citizens from leaving the country;

| L. | whereas Russian forces continue to occupy the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP); whereas Ihor Murashov, the Director General of the ZNPP, was abducted by Russian forces on 30 September 2022 and later released; whereas the ZNPP is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe and its last reactor was powered down in early September 2022 due to fighting in and around the plant; whereas the risk of a nuclear catastrophe remains, however; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas Russian forces continue to occupy the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP); whereas Ihor Murashov, the Director General of the ZNPP, was abducted by Russian forces on 30 September 2022 and later released; whereas the ZNPP is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe and its last reactor was powered down in early September 2022 due to fighting in and around the plant; whereas the risk of a nuclear catastrophe remains, however;

| M. | whereas in a televised address on 21 September 2022, Vladimir Putin warned that if the territorial integrity of Russia was threatened, meaning the illegally annexed territories of Ukraine, it would ‘certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people’; whereas the words ‘all the means at our disposal’ are thinly veiled nuclear blackmail; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas in a televised address on 21 September 2022, Vladimir Putin warned that if the territorial integrity of Russia was threatened, meaning the illegally annexed territories of Ukraine, it would ‘certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people’; whereas the words ‘all the means at our disposal’ are thinly veiled nuclear blackmail;

| N. | whereas on 26 and 27 September 2022, a dramatic drop in pressure was observed in the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines due to leaks that were suspected to be the result of deliberate underwater explosions likely engineered by a state actor; whereas although the exact volume of methane escaping into the atmosphere is hard to measure, the amount is likely to be significant and will have a detrimental impact on the environment; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas on 26 and 27 September 2022, a dramatic drop in pressure was observed in the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines due to leaks that were suspected to be the result of deliberate underwater explosions likely engineered by a state actor; whereas although the exact volume of methane escaping into the atmosphere is hard to measure, the amount is likely to be significant and will have a detrimental impact on the environment;

| O. | whereas on 30 September 2022, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Ukraine had officially applied for membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas on 30 September 2022, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Ukraine had officially applied for membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO);

| 1. | Recalls the European Union’s steadfast support for Ukraine and its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders; condemns in the strongest possible terms the unjustified, unprovoked and illegal Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; recalls that Russia bears full responsibility for the war and that it must immediately stop the war and withdraw all its forces and proxy forces from all internationally recognised territories belonging to Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Commends the great courage of the Ukrainian people, who are enduring enormous sacrifices to defend their country and European values, such as freedom, dignity and democracy; recalls Ukraine’s legitimate right, in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter, to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression so as to regain full control of its entire territory within its internationally recognised borders; commends the bravery of the Ukrainian armed forces and their highly effective actions both in combat and from a moral standpoint, and recognises the significant contribution they are making to European security; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Calls on all countries and international organisations to unequivocally condemn Russia’s war of aggression and its attempts to acquire territory by force and through its sham referendums; calls for the EU and its Member States to actively engage with the many governments which have adopted a neutral position regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in order to build strong international opposition to any changes of Ukraine’s borders by force and in defence of international law; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Strongly condemns the massive and grave violations of human rights and war crimes committed by the Russian armed forces, its proxies and the occupation authorities installed by Russia in Ukraine; insists that the responsible government officials and military leaders and perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including genocide, must be held accountable; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Calls on the Member States and other countries supporting Ukraine to massively increase their military assistance, particularly in the areas where it is requested by the Ukrainian Government, in order to allow Ukraine to regain full control over its entire internationally recognised territory and successfully defend itself against any further aggression by Russia; calls for consideration to be given to the possibility of a lend-lease military assistance facility for Ukraine; calls on hesitant Member States, in particular, to provide their fair share of the military assistance needed to help shorten the war; recalls that hesitation among those who support Ukraine only prolongs the war and costs the lives of innocent Ukrainians; appeals to EU leaders to build lasting unity among Member States and like-minded countries to fully and unconditionally support Ukraine against the Russian war of aggression; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to coordinate weapons deliveries through the clearing house mechanism of the European External Action Service (EEAS), including an EU initiative for the delivery of advanced weapons systems such as Leopard tanks; calls on the Member States to immediately start training Ukrainian soldiers in this regard; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Unequivocally condemns as illegal and illegitimate the sham referendums conducted at gunpoint to annex the oblasts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia; recalls that the referendums were conducted in violation of the UN Charter and international law; rejects and does not recognise the fabricated results of the referendums and the subsequent incorporation of these territories into Russia; considers their results null and void; considers that the announced annexation constitutes a dangerous and irresponsible escalation and a blatant violation of international law and the UN Charter guaranteeing international peace, security, territorial integrity and the sovereignty of all states, which cannot and will not be left unanswered by the international community; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Denounces the Russian presidential decree of 29 September 2022 on the recognition of the ‘independence’ of the Ukrainian oblasts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, as well as the illegal treaties on integration into the Russian Federation signed on 30 September 2022; states its unwavering support for the EU’s policy of non-recognition over Russia’s illegal actions against Ukraine, including annexation, and therefore calls on the Council to adopt further severe sanctions in response to these acts; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Welcomes the Commission’s proposals for an eighth sanctions package against Russia; calls on all the Member States to approve the sanctions package swiftly, avoid any self-interested delays, and thoroughly implement the sanctions; calls for the sanctions to be expanded to new areas, including cutting off Gazprombank, Alfa Bank, Rosbank, Tinkoff Bank, Saint Petersburg Bank, the Russian Regional Development Bank and Far Eastern Bank from SWIFT, while also further strengthening sanctions against crypto assets and cryptocurrencies; calls on the EU institutions and the Member States to maintain EU unity and to increase the pressure on the Kremlin, including through further sanctions packages, including an export ban on any high-tech products and strategic goods and other sanctions aimed at strategically weakening the Russian economy and industrial base, in particular the military-industrial complex; supports the adoption of individual sanctions against persons and entities directly involved in the forced deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children and in the organisation and observation of the illegal sham referendums, as well as all members of Duma parties who hold offices in elected parliaments on all levels, including at regional and municipal levels; calls on the Member States to actively prevent, investigate and prosecute any circumvention of the sanctions; calls on the Commission and the co-legislators to work swiftly to complete the legal regime for the confiscation of assets frozen by the sanctions; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Reiterates its call for an immediate and full embargo on Russian imports of fossil fuels and uranium, and for the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines to be completely abandoned, in order to stop financing Putin’s war machine with EU money; calls for a further ban on the purchase, import and transport of titanium, aluminium, copper, nickel, palladium, rhodium, and raw and processed diamonds from Russia or through Russia to the EU, and on imports of iron and steel products originating in Russia or exported from Russia, including iron ore and semi-finished products, with the aim of reducing Russia’s revenues; calls for Russia’s access to basic industrial resources, technologies and services to be minimised, especially those needed by the military industry of the aggressor state; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Warns Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s regime against abetting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including in its mobilisation efforts and in hosting conscripts on its soil; calls on the Commission and the Council to include Belarus in the new wave of sanctions linked to mobilisation; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Condemns the mobilisation in Russia, and calls for an immediate end to involuntary conscription; condemns the measures compelling residents of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine to serve in Russia’s armed or auxiliary forces, which is forbidden under the Fourth Geneva Convention; strongly appeals to all Russian people to avoid being dragged into this war, which violates international law and was therefore condemned by a large majority of countries, was only waged to assert a non-democratic kleptocratic regime in Russia, and will ultimately destroy the Russian economy and the Russian people’s prospects for a safe and prosperous future; urges the Member States to issue humanitarian visas to Russian citizens in need of protection, such as those subjected to political persecution; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Commission’s guidelines on general visa issuance in relation to Russian applicants and controls of Russian citizens at the external borders, in full compliance with EU and international law, and to ensure that every asylum application by inter alia dissidents, deserters, draft dodgers and activists is dealt with on an individual basis, taking into account the security concerns of the host Member State and acting in accordance with the EU asylum acquis; calls on the Council and the Commission to closely monitor the situation in relation to Russian visas; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to increase support for countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, which are receiving substantial numbers of Russian citizens, in particular Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, in order to maintain stability in these regions; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Denounces the Russian presidential decree of 5 October 2022 designating the Zaporizhzhia NPP ‘federal property’ and instructing the Russian government to take over its control; demands the immediate withdrawal of Russian military personnel from and around the ZNPP and the creation of a demilitarised zone around it; recalls that the fighting around the plant might lead to a major disaster of unimaginable consequences; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Condemns the recent Russian threats to use nuclear weapons as irresponsible and dangerous; calls on the Member States and international partners to prepare a quick and decisive response should Russia conduct a nuclear strike on Ukraine; calls on Russia to immediately cease its threats of a nuclear escalation, given the global consequences of any nuclear catastrophe for human life and the environment for decades to come; recalls that any attempt by Russia to present attacks on occupied territories as an attack on Russia and thus as grounds for a nuclear attack is illegal and baseless and will not deter the European Union from providing further assistance to Ukraine in its self-defence; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to increase support for and cooperation with civil society and the free media in Ukraine and Russia; stresses that Ukraine’s resilience and capacity to resist the Russian war of aggression demands increased focus and support for humanitarian actors in Ukraine, including a specific focus on those supporting women; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to continue to provide temporary shelter in the EU for people fleeing the war, and to help with the issuance of temporary travel documents enabling Ukrainian citizens who are trapped in Russia without their identity or travel documents to leave the country if they wish to; condemns systematic attempts on the Russian side to slow down the entry of Ukrainian refugees to the EU on the Estonian and Latvian borders, which could soon lead to a major humanitarian crisis; calls on the Member States and their border control not to hinder such refugees from entering the EU; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Calls on the Commission to work on a comprehensive recovery package for Ukraine, which should be focused on the country’s immediate, medium- and long-term relief, reconstruction and recovery and further help to strengthen the growth of the economy, starting right away where appropriate; recalls that the recovery package should be jointly led by the EU, international financial institutions and like-minded partners; calls for the recovery package to be supported by the necessary EU budget capacity; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Expresses appreciation for the Russian citizens who condemn the war; condemns the arrest by the Russian authorities of thousands of peaceful protesters and calls for their immediate release; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to start reflecting on how to engage with Russia in the future and how to assist it with a successful transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic country that renounces revisionist and imperialistic policies; consider that a first step would be for the EU institutions to engage with Russian democratic leaders and civil society and mobilise support for their agenda for a democratic Russia; supports the creation of a democracy hub for Russia, hosted by the European Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Recalls that the underwater explosions of the Nord Stream pipelines took place as the new Baltic Pipe linking Norway with Poland via Denmark was inaugurated; believes that the underwater explosions of the Nord Stream pipelines are not a coincidence and that there is increasing speculation that it was the result of a coordinated and deliberate act by a state actor; believes that the explosions of the Nord Stream pipelines show how dangerous the policy of increasing dependence on Russian fossil fuels was and that the weaponisation of energy has been taken to a new level; calls on Member States to step up and treat as a priority the protection of critical European infrastructure, including off-shore pipelines and cables, and to increase its resilience against external attacks and further support the resilience of the EU’s partners in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans; calls on the Member States to conduct an investigation into the sabotaging of the Nord Stream gas pipelines; considers that the deliberate underwater explosions constitute an environmental attack on the EU; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to work with international bodies to collect evidence and to support the International Criminal Court’s investigation of the war crimes committed within the territory of Ukraine since 20 February 2014 onwards; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Calls for the establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, where Putin and all Russian civilian and military officials and their proxies responsible for masterminding, launching and conducting the war in Ukraine would be prosecuted; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Condemns Russia’s multi-layered strategy to introduce, amplify and spread false and distorted narratives and the neo-imperialistic ideology of Russkiy Mir around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to sanction the Russian entities, individuals and other proxies spreading Russian disinformation and to take additional measures to deal with Russia’s weaponisation of information; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Criminal Court, the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation, and the Belarusian authorities. |
| --- | --- |

25.

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| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/99 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/99

---

P9_TA(2022)0354

Outcome of the Commission’s review of the 15-point action plan on trade and sustainable development

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on the outcome of the Commission’s review of the 15-point action plan on trade and sustainable development (2022/2692(RSP))

(2023/C 132/13)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission non-paper of 26 February 2018 entitled ‘Feedback and way forward on improving the implementation and enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements’ (the 15-point action plan), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission non-paper of 26 February 2018 entitled ‘Feedback and way forward on improving the implementation and enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements’ (the 15-point action plan),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 22 June 2022 entitled: ‘The power of trade partnerships: together for green and just economic growth’ (COM(2022)0409) (TSD review communication), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 22 June 2022 entitled: ‘The power of trade partnerships: together for green and just economic growth’ (COM(2022)0409) (TSD review communication),

| — | having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,

| — | having regard to the core conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the core conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO),

| — | having regard to the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE Declaration), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE Declaration),

| — | having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, including the Paris Agreement of 2015, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, including the Paris Agreement of 2015,

| — | having regard to the assessment reports of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the assessment reports of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,

| — | having regard to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and its protocols, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and its protocols,

| — | having regard to the 1975 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 1975 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 23 February 2022 on decent work worldwide for a global just transition and a sustainable recovery (COM(2022)0066), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 23 February 2022 on decent work worldwide for a global just transition and a sustainable recovery (COM(2022)0066),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020)0381), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020)0381),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on the EU Trade Policy Review (1) and to the Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review — An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on the EU Trade Policy Review (1) and to the Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review — An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066),

| — | having regard to the question of the Committee on International Trade to the Commission of 16 January 2018 on trade and sustainable development chapters in EU trade agreements (O-000098/2017 — B8-0617/2017), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the question of the Committee on International Trade to the Commission of 16 January 2018 on trade and sustainable development chapters in EU trade agreements (O-000098/2017 — B8-0617/2017),

| — | having regard to the non-paper of 8 May 2020 from the Netherlands and France on trade, social economic effects and sustainable development, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the non-paper of 8 May 2020 from the Netherlands and France on trade, social economic effects and sustainable development,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter — annual report 2021 (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter — annual report 2021 (2),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 13 March 2018 on gender equality in EU trade agreements (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 13 March 2018 on gender equality in EU trade agreements (3),

| — | having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III, published on 25 November 2020 (JOIN(2020)0017), and to Parliament’s resolution of 10 March 2022 thereon (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III, published on 25 November 2020 (JOIN(2020)0017), and to Parliament’s resolution of 10 March 2022 thereon (4),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s annual reports on the implementation and enforcement of EU trade agreements, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s annual reports on the implementation and enforcement of EU trade agreements,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 20 October 2021 entitled ‘Next Generation Trade and Sustainable Development — Reviewing the 15-point action plan’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 20 October 2021 entitled ‘Next Generation Trade and Sustainable Development — Reviewing the 15-point action plan’,

| — | having regard to the non-paper of the European Economic and Social Committee of October 2021 entitled ‘Strengthening and Improving the Functioning of EU Trade Domestic Advisory Groups’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the non-paper of the European Economic and Social Committee of October 2021 entitled ‘Strengthening and Improving the Functioning of EU Trade Domestic Advisory Groups’,

| — | having regard to the ILO and Commission handbook on the assessment of labour provisions in trade and investment arrangements, published in 2017, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the ILO and Commission handbook on the assessment of labour provisions in trade and investment arrangements, published in 2017,

| — | having regard to the handbook on the implementation of the chapter on trade and sustainable development in the trade agreement between the EU and Ecuador, published in 2019, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the handbook on the implementation of the chapter on trade and sustainable development in the trade agreement between the EU and Ecuador, published in 2019,

| — | having regard to the report of May 2022 on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe, and in particular proposal 19(4) therein, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of May 2022 on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe, and in particular proposal 19(4) therein,

| — | having regard to the question to the Commission on the outcome of the Commission’s review of the 15-point action plan on trade and sustainable development (O-000029/2022 — B9-0021/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the question to the Commission on the outcome of the Commission’s review of the 15-point action plan on trade and sustainable development (O-000029/2022 — B9-0021/2022),

| — | having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on International Trade, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on International Trade,

| A. | whereas the EU is committed to an open and rules-based trading system that is fair, inclusive and sustainable; whereas EU trade policy is an important geo-economic tool; whereas a positive and proactive trade agenda is crucial for Europe’s economic prosperity, competitiveness, innovation and the creation of new high-quality jobs; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the EU is committed to an open and rules-based trading system that is fair, inclusive and sustainable; whereas EU trade policy is an important geo-economic tool; whereas a positive and proactive trade agenda is crucial for Europe’s economic prosperity, competitiveness, innovation and the creation of new high-quality jobs;

| B. | whereas the EU, being the world’s largest trading bloc, is in a unique position to cooperate and engage globally and bilaterally with partner countries to enhance the respect of international labour standards and environmental rules through its trade policy and trade agreements; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the EU, being the world’s largest trading bloc, is in a unique position to cooperate and engage globally and bilaterally with partner countries to enhance the respect of international labour standards and environmental rules through its trade policy and trade agreements;

| C. | whereas all modern EU trade agreements include trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters; whereas since 2018, the 15-point action plan has guided their implementation and enforcement; whereas Parliament has systematically called for improvement of the implementation and effective enforcement of the TSD chapters and for the possibility to use sanctions as a last resort; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas all modern EU trade agreements include trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters; whereas since 2018, the 15-point action plan has guided their implementation and enforcement; whereas Parliament has systematically called for improvement of the implementation and effective enforcement of the TSD chapters and for the possibility to use sanctions as a last resort;

| D. | whereas in June 2021, the Commission launched an in-depth review of the TSD 15-point action plan with the objective of strengthening the ability of trade agreements as a whole to champion sustainable trade in cooperation with trade partners; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas in June 2021, the Commission launched an in-depth review of the TSD 15-point action plan with the objective of strengthening the ability of trade agreements as a whole to champion sustainable trade in cooperation with trade partners;

| E. | whereas the EU, through its trade policy and external action, together with Parliament, through its legislative activity and parliamentary diplomacy, have consolidated the idea that the conditions in which goods and services are produced in terms of human rights, the environment, labour and social development are of the same relevance as the trade of those goods and services itself; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the EU, through its trade policy and external action, together with Parliament, through its legislative activity and parliamentary diplomacy, have consolidated the idea that the conditions in which goods and services are produced in terms of human rights, the environment, labour and social development are of the same relevance as the trade of those goods and services itself;

| 1. | Welcomes the publication of the outcome of the TSD review; highlights that a comprehensive review and stronger focus on implementation and enforcement of TSD chapters have been long-standing demands of Parliament; takes note that the Commission has identified scope for improvement in six policy priorities; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Takes notes with satisfaction of the Commission’s intention to reinforce TSD chapters as cooperative instruments and to make use of early gap analysis to identify country-based implementation priorities with the involvement of civil society; notes that the ILO, the UN Environment Programme and the Multilateral Environmental Agreements should be consulted when defining implementation gaps; considers detailed, time-bound implementation roadmaps a useful tool to achieve desired results; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Reiterates the need for a thorough scoping exercise prior to the launch of new FTA negotiations; calls on the Commission to include TSD chapter-relevant content in this scoping exercise; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Supports the Commission’s plan to streamline sustainability throughout FTAs in order to contribute to a carbon-neutral economy, and prioritise market access for environmental goods and services as well as access to raw materials and energy goods that are essential for the functioning of a carbon-neutral economy, provided they respect sustainable practices and do not harm human rights, labour rights and the environment in non-EU countries, and respect the UN principle of free, prior and informed consent; calls for comprehensive sustainable impact assessments to identify provisions beyond TSD chapters that open opportunities for or that may represent a challenge to achieving sustainability objectives; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Recalls that Parliament has called for the role of EU Delegations in monitoring the implementation of TSD commitments to be strengthened; calls for sufficient financial and human resources to be allocated to EU Delegations to that effect and for streamlined work across the Commission’s services to ensure adequate engagement on trade-related sustainability concerns, and for the coordination and conducting of capacity-building programmes with the aim of promoting sustainable development; calls on the Commission and the Member States to make the best use of the Team Europe approach to ensure coordination and coherence when engaging with partner countries on trade-related sustainability concerns; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Welcomes the creation of the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer (CTEO) function and the redesigned Single Entry Point as important steps to reinforce the implementation of TSD commitments, recalls the Commission’s commitment to give equal importance to alleged breaches of TSD provisions as to alleged breaches of market access commitments; notes that, to date, only one complaint relating to TSD infringements has been lodged through the Single Entry Point; underlines the importance of including clear and precise commitments in future TSD chapters; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Supports a stronger structured role for domestic advisory groups (DAGs) throughout all stages of the lifecycle of trade agreements and urges for them to be assigned a monitoring role concerning the concrete implementation of all matters impacting sustainability in FTAs, including oversight of implementation roadmaps; calls for sufficient financial resources and technical assistance to be allocated to DAGs to enable them to properly carry out their tasks; emphasises that Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) has committed to holding an annual debate with representatives of DAGs; considers closer exchange between Parliament’s monitoring groups and standing rapporteurs, on the one hand, and the DAGs, on the other, to be of significant value to both; calls for functioning DAGs also to be set up in partner countries and regions, in line with the recommendations of the European Economic and Social Committee and the opinions of EU DAGs; welcomes the fact that DAGs can also submit collective complaints and that an EU-based complainant can present the TSD-related concerns of an entity located in a partner country; calls on the Commission to ensure that civil society organisations, in addition to DAGs, are also able to submit collective complaints; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Stresses that further aligning TSD enforcement with the general state-to-state dispute settlement and extending the compliance stage to disputes under TSD chapters will result in better implementation and enforcement of the recommendations of the panel of experts reports; is of the view that the nationally determined contributions — as tangible commitments by the parties to the Paris Agreement — should be an essential factor in assessing whether any violation of the Paris Agreement has taken place; calls for arbitrators in charge of such disputes to have proven expertise in the relevant fields; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Stresses the importance of carrying out ex post assessments of the environmental and social impacts of all provisions of FTAs, and for a review of the effectiveness of TSD provisions; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Welcomes the fact that Parliament’s long-standing call to use trade sanctions as the recourse of last resort against instances of serious violations of TSD commitments, namely the ILO fundamental principles and rights at work, and of material breaches of the Paris Agreement, are included in the outcome document; hopes that conditions will be met at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in December 2022 to make the Convention enforceable as envisaged in the TSD review communication; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Notes that the Commission has not put forward a model TSD chapter, while acknowledging that all the elements of the TSD review communication must be developed in a tailored-made fashion depending on the trading partner in question; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Expects the principles of the outcome of the review of the TSD 15-point action plan to be reflected in all EU trade agreements under negotiation and future trade agreements submitted to Parliament for consent, as well as the modernisation of all FTAs in force, using the dedicated review clauses included in existing agreements or other appropriate procedures; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Considers the outcome of the TSD review an important step in ensuring that trade agreements fulfil the long-standing demands of Parliament and the expectations of civil society and citizens while guaranteeing that EU trade agreements remain negotiable and attractive for partners; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Remains committed to continuously stepping up parliamentary work in scrutinising TSD commitments and their implementation throughout the whole lifecycle of trade agreements, including through dedicated monitoring groups, specific parliamentary missions of the European Parliament and possible joint parliamentary monitoring committees with partner countries; asks the Commission to report periodically to Parliament, through the INTA Committee or the dedicated monitoring groups, on the progress achieved regarding TSD commitments and their implementation by partner countries; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Stresses that in order for economic opportunities created by trade agreements to benefit both women and men, gender needs to be mainstreamed in the whole process from sustainability impact assessment to implementation, including via dedicated gender chapters; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Reiterates that, as indicated in the Trade Policy Review, all future EU FTAs should include a chapter on sustainable food systems that is linked to the TSD chapter; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Stresses that the EU, as the world’s biggest trading bloc, needs to be ambitious in its World Trade Organization-compatible efforts when designing additional autonomous instruments to support global climate action, the fight against biodiversity loss and deforestation, improve animal welfare, establish rules on corporate sustainability, due diligence and forced labour, advance the circular economy and the green energy transition and ensure decent work worldwide, and encourage its trading partners to comply with them, using dialogue and tariff preferences; calls on the Commission to use TSD chapters to promote the ratification of the ILO Conventions included in the MNE Declaration; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Underlines that multilateral action is the best way to achieve the global transition to a carbon-neutral, inclusive and sustainable economy where the rights of workers are respected and urges the EU to step up its work to this effect at the multilateral level, notably within the World Trade Organization and by fostering closer collaboration with the ILO, UN Environment Programme and the Multilateral Environmental Agreements; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to Commission, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme and the Multilateral Environmental Agreements. |
| --- | --- |

19.

---

(1)  OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 155.

(2)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 191.

(3)  OJ C 162, 10.5.2019, p. 9.

(4)  OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 150.

---

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/103 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/103

---

P9_TA(2022)0355

An EU approach for Space Traffic management — an EU contribution addressing a global challenge

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on an EU approach for space traffic management — an EU contribution addressing a global challenge (2022/2641(RSP))

(2023/C 132/14)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 February 2022 entitled ‘An EU Approach for Space Traffic Management — An EU contribution addressing a global challenge’ (JOIN(2022)0004), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 February 2022 entitled ‘An EU Approach for Space Traffic Management — An EU contribution addressing a global challenge’ (JOIN(2022)0004),

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 11 November 2020 on orientations on the European contribution in establishing key principles for the global space economy, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 11 November 2020 on orientations on the European contribution in establishing key principles for the global space economy,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 22 February 2021 entitled ‘Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries’ (COM(2021)0070), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 22 February 2021 entitled ‘Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries’ (COM(2021)0070),

| — | having regard to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities of 20 June 2019, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities of 20 June 2019,

| — | having regard to the question to the Commission on space traffic management (O-000035/2022 — B9-0022/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the question to the Commission on space traffic management (O-000035/2022 — B9-0022/2022),

| — | having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy,

| A. | whereas space traffic management (STM) is of strategic importance for the Union and contributes to guaranteeing safe, secure and autonomous access to, return from and use of space, guaranteeing long-term sustainability of outer space and promoting and ensuring the continued competitiveness of the EU space industry; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas space traffic management (STM) is of strategic importance for the Union and contributes to guaranteeing safe, secure and autonomous access to, return from and use of space, guaranteeing long-term sustainability of outer space and promoting and ensuring the continued competitiveness of the EU space industry;

| B. | whereas in recent years, the number of space operations, satellites in orbit and debris have significantly increased; whereas this development has led to the exponential increase in risk for the safety of in-orbit space operations and the sustainability of outer space; whereas this potentially jeopardises the services provided by the components of the Union space programme; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas in recent years, the number of space operations, satellites in orbit and debris have significantly increased; whereas this development has led to the exponential increase in risk for the safety of in-orbit space operations and the sustainability of outer space; whereas this potentially jeopardises the services provided by the components of the Union space programme;

| C. | whereas new industrial trends have appeared, which has led to the emergence of more commercial approaches as regards the use of space, new non-public actors entering the space sector, planned and ongoing launches of so-called mega-constellations into low-earth orbit, and other commercial trends such as space mining; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas new industrial trends have appeared, which has led to the emergence of more commercial approaches as regards the use of space, new non-public actors entering the space sector, planned and ongoing launches of so-called mega-constellations into low-earth orbit, and other commercial trends such as space mining;

| D. | whereas a number of technologies provide reliable solutions with regard to space traffic, congestion and collision risks; whereas a number of EU innovations and private and public initiatives for debris identification and tracking have been developed; whereas spacecraft (automated) collision avoidance, space debris avoidance, space debris mitigation and remediation and space debris removal techniques are efficient tools that need an adequate regulatory and implementation framework; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas a number of technologies provide reliable solutions with regard to space traffic, congestion and collision risks; whereas a number of EU innovations and private and public initiatives for debris identification and tracking have been developed; whereas spacecraft (automated) collision avoidance, space debris avoidance, space debris mitigation and remediation and space debris removal techniques are efficient tools that need an adequate regulatory and implementation framework;

| E. | whereas the Union space programme includes a space situational awareness component, which contains a space surveillance and tracking (SST) sub-component that constitutes the operational pillar for STM; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the Union space programme includes a space situational awareness component, which contains a space surveillance and tracking (SST) sub-component that constitutes the operational pillar for STM;

| F. | whereas unlike other (transport) sectors, a comprehensive international regulatory framework with detailed rules and technical specifications for STM does not exist to the same extent and is limited to voluntary guidelines; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas unlike other (transport) sectors, a comprehensive international regulatory framework with detailed rules and technical specifications for STM does not exist to the same extent and is limited to voluntary guidelines;

| 1. | Welcomes the planned actions outlined in the joint communication entitled ‘An EU Approach for Space Traffic Management — An EU contribution addressing a global challenge’; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Welcomes the recent developments in the space sector, with new companies entering the market and the market uptake of the services provided by the various components of the Union space programme; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Underlines that the increase in space operations, the number of space actors and the unprecedented increase in satellite constellation size are quantitative aspects that present serious challenges that need to be addressed, notably through preventive measures and the development and deployment of advanced, automated techniques such as automated collision avoidance; highlights, in this regard, that artificial intelligence, high performance computing and machine learning constitute enabling technologies for required automation and tracking processes; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Points out that in order to properly manage space traffic, data based on quantitative metrics and measurement tools is needed and to this end an increase in the number and quality of sensors, robust data sharing and debris advances are also needed; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Stresses that the development of the space sector requires the EU to take a strategic and ambitious approach covering regulatory aspects, the international dimension and SST services; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Stresses the need to promote an internationally recognised definition of STM in order to ensure a common understanding of all parameters and thereby contribute to the safety of space operations in increasingly congested outer space; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Considers that in order to guarantee safe and secure space operations, a clear regulatory framework for space activities should serve as a basis for an EU-wide level playing field for space activities and a comprehensive framework for European binding legislation on space; calls on the Commission to develop a set of EU rules, standards, technical specifications and guidelines and to actively promote these rules at international level; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Underlines that security and safety need to be taken into account from the design stage, space launches and assets need to be based on sustainability by design, current best practices and guidelines are not being sufficiently used and fragmentation is not conducive to an efficient large-scale approach; underlines that these changes should be carefully and clearly drafted to support quick international uptake and prevent excessive administrative burdens on the space sector industry; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls on the Commission to take both civilian and defence/security needs into consideration, to evaluate the impact of STM development on European public and private stakeholders and to also consult interested stakeholders from outside the EU; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Calls on the Commission to reach out to third countries and international organisations, without prejudice to the Union’s autonomy; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls on the Commission to enhance the Union SST services with regard to collected data, re-entry and fragmentation analyses and to further develop the EU SST database, including detected, catalogued and predicted movements of space objects; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Stresses the need to support the development of improved SST capabilities and boost research and innovation in STM; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Underlines that space debris is an urgent problem and that space debris operations are needed; calls therefore on the Commission to further invest in research on and the deployment of debris reduction technologies by using all opportunities for EU funding of research and innovation activities via Horizon Europe, the Cassini–Huygens space-research mission, pilot projects, including synergy between and the blending of different EU programmes and national funds, and, to the extent possible, European Space Agency funds; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Calls on the Commission to make all political and diplomatic efforts, including engaging with the UN, to develop a comprehensive international approach for the application of common standards and rules and implementation of concrete STM solutions at global level; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Encourages the Commission to facilitate EU participation in the UN Rescue Agreement (1), Liability Convention (2) and Registration Convention (3); |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls on the Commission to propose STM legislation before 2024, including on system governance and the responsibilities of the proposed EU Agency for the Space Programme and, based on the mid-term review of the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework and the current Union space programme, STM integration in the next space programme; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

17.

---

(1)  Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1967.

(2)  Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 1971.

(3)  Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1974.

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| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/106 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/106

---

P9_TA(2022)0356

Momentum for the Ocean: strengthening Ocean Governance and Biodiversity

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on momentum for the ocean: strengthening ocean governance and biodiversity (2022/2836(RSP))

(2023/C 132/15)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal (1),

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2016 entitled ‘International ocean governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans’ (JOIN(2016)0049), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2016 entitled ‘International ocean governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans’ (JOIN(2016)0049),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2018 entitled ‘International ocean governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans in the context of the 2030 SDGs’ (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2018 entitled ‘International ocean governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans in the context of the 2030 SDGs’ (2),

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 24 June 2022 on the EU’s international ocean governance agenda — ‘Setting the course for a sustainable blue planet’ (JOIN(2022)0028), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 24 June 2022 on the EU’s international ocean governance agenda — ‘Setting the course for a sustainable blue planet’ (JOIN(2022)0028),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380), including its objective of establishing a coherent network of 30 % of marine protected areas in the EU by 2030, and to Parliament’s resolution of 9 June 2021 thereon (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380), including its objective of establishing a coherent network of 30 % of marine protected areas in the EU by 2030, and to Parliament’s resolution of 9 June 2021 thereon (3),

| — | having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive) (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive) (4),

| — | having regard to Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning (5) (Maritime Spatial Planning Directive), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning (5) (Maritime Spatial Planning Directive),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the impact on fisheries of marine litter (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the impact on fisheries of marine litter (6),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Toward a sustainable blue economy in the EU: the role of the fisheries and aquaculture sectors’ (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Toward a sustainable blue economy in the EU: the role of the fisheries and aquaculture sectors’ (7),

| — | having regard to its resolutions of 6 July 2016 on Japan’s decision to resume whaling in the 2015-2016 season (8) and of 12 September 2017 on whale hunting in Norway (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolutions of 6 July 2016 on Japan’s decision to resume whaling in the 2015-2016 season (8) and of 12 September 2017 on whale hunting in Norway (9),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s project under the Horizon Europe programme entitled ‘Mission Starfish 2030: Restore our Ocean and Waters’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s project under the Horizon Europe programme entitled ‘Mission Starfish 2030: Restore our Ocean and Waters’,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 10 October 2007 entitled ‘An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union’ (COM(2007)0575), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 10 October 2007 entitled ‘An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union’ (COM(2007)0575),

| — | having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States following the Post-Cotonou negotiations, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States following the Post-Cotonou negotiations,

| — | having regard to the ratification and entry into force of the Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea Convention, adopted in 2010, amending a previous instrument adopted in 1996, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the ratification and entry into force of the Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea Convention, adopted in 2010, amending a previous instrument adopted in 1996,

| — | having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution entitled ‘Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York on 25 September 2015, and in particular to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14 of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which encourages the conservation and sustainable exploitation of the oceans, seas and marine resources, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution entitled ‘Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York on 25 September 2015, and in particular to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14 of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which encourages the conservation and sustainable exploitation of the oceans, seas and marine resources,

| — | having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 2015 Paris Agreement, which entered into force on 4 November 2016, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 2015 Paris Agreement, which entered into force on 4 November 2016,

| — | having regard to the UNFCCC Glasgow Climate Pact, adopted on 13 November 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UNFCCC Glasgow Climate Pact, adopted on 13 November 2021,

| — | having regard to the Convention on Biological Diversity, which entered into force on 29 December 1993, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Convention on Biological Diversity, which entered into force on 29 December 1993,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982 and entered into force on 16 November 1994, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982 and entered into force on 16 November 1994,

| — | having regard to the mandate of the International Seabed Authority established under UNCLOS and to the 1994 Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the mandate of the International Seabed Authority established under UNCLOS and to the 1994 Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS,

| — | having regard to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special report of 24 September 2019 on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special report of 24 September 2019 on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate,

| — | having regard to the Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021-2030), as proclaimed by the UN, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021-2030), as proclaimed by the UN,

| — | having regard to the global assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of May 2019 on biodiversity and ecosystem services, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the global assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of May 2019 on biodiversity and ecosystem services,

| — | having regard to the One Ocean Summit held in Brest, France, from 9 to 11 February 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the One Ocean Summit held in Brest, France, from 9 to 11 February 2022,

| — | having regard to the resolution adopted by the UN Environment Assembly in Nairobi on 2 March 2022 entitled ‘End plastic pollution: towards an international legally binding instrument’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the resolution adopted by the UN Environment Assembly in Nairobi on 2 March 2022 entitled ‘End plastic pollution: towards an international legally binding instrument’,

| — | having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 24 December 2017 on an international legally binding instrument under UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 24 December 2017 on an international legally binding instrument under UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ),

| — | having regard to the High-Level UN Conference to Support the Implementation of SDG 14 (UN Ocean Conference), held in Lisbon from 27 June to 1 July 2022, and to the subsequent adoption of the Lisbon Declaration, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the High-Level UN Conference to Support the Implementation of SDG 14 (UN Ocean Conference), held in Lisbon from 27 June to 1 July 2022, and to the subsequent adoption of the Lisbon Declaration,

| — | having regard to the seventh high-level ‘Our Ocean’ Conference, co-hosted by the Republic of Palau and the United States on 13 and 14 April 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the seventh high-level ‘Our Ocean’ Conference, co-hosted by the Republic of Palau and the United States on 13 and 14 April 2022,

| — | having regard to the UN Biodiversity Conference (COP15) to be held in Montreal between 5 and 17 December 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Biodiversity Conference (COP15) to be held in Montreal between 5 and 17 December 2022,

| — | having regard to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on ending harmful fisheries subsidies adopted at the 12th Ministerial Conference of the WTO on 17 June 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on ending harmful fisheries subsidies adopted at the 12th Ministerial Conference of the WTO on 17 June 2022,

| — | having regard to the Bizerte Declaration adopted at the World Sea Forum in September 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Bizerte Declaration adopted at the World Sea Forum in September 2022,

| — | having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report No 20/2022 of 26 September 2022 entitled ‘EU action to combat illegal fishing — Control systems in place but weakened by uneven checks and sanctions by Member States’, |
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—

having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report No 20/2022 of 26 September 2022 entitled ‘EU action to combat illegal fishing — Control systems in place but weakened by uneven checks and sanctions by Member States’,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 19 November 2020 entitled ‘An EU Strategy to harness the potential of offshore renewable energy for a climate neutral future’ (COM(2020)0741), |
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—

having regard to the Commission communication of 19 November 2020 entitled ‘An EU Strategy to harness the potential of offshore renewable energy for a climate neutral future’ (COM(2020)0741),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2022 on a European strategy for offshore renewable energy (10), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2022 on a European strategy for offshore renewable energy (10),

| — | having regard to the Court of Auditors special report No 26/2020 of 26 November 2020 entitled ‘Marine environment: EU protection is wide but not deep’, |
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—

having regard to the Court of Auditors special report No 26/2020 of 26 November 2020 entitled ‘Marine environment: EU protection is wide but not deep’,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the establishment of Antarctic Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and the conservation of Southern Ocean biodiversity (11), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the establishment of Antarctic Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and the conservation of Southern Ocean biodiversity (11),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on the impact of the fishing sector of offshore windfarms and other renewable energy systems (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on the impact of the fishing sector of offshore windfarms and other renewable energy systems (12),

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the European Parliament has declared a climate and environmental emergency and has committed to urgently taking the concrete action needed to fight and contain this threat before it is too late; whereas biodiversity loss and climate change are interlinked and exacerbate each other, representing equal threats to life on our planet, and as such, should be urgently tackled together; |
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A.

whereas the European Parliament has declared a climate and environmental emergency and has committed to urgently taking the concrete action needed to fight and contain this threat before it is too late; whereas biodiversity loss and climate change are interlinked and exacerbate each other, representing equal threats to life on our planet, and as such, should be urgently tackled together;

| B. | whereas nature is deteriorating at a rate and scale unprecedented in human history; whereas one million species are estimated to be at risk of extinction worldwide; whereas only 23 % of species and 16 % of habitats under the EU nature directives have a favourable status; |
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B.

whereas nature is deteriorating at a rate and scale unprecedented in human history; whereas one million species are estimated to be at risk of extinction worldwide; whereas only 23 % of species and 16 % of habitats under the EU nature directives have a favourable status;

| C. | whereas the ocean covers 71 % of the earth’s surface, produces half of our oxygen, absorbs a third of CO2 emissions and 90 % of the excess heat in the climate system (13), and plays a unique and vital role as a climate regulator in the context of the climate crisis; |
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C.

whereas the ocean covers 71 % of the earth’s surface, produces half of our oxygen, absorbs a third of CO2 emissions and 90 % of the excess heat in the climate system (13), and plays a unique and vital role as a climate regulator in the context of the climate crisis;

| D. | whereas the world is going through a climate and environment crisis, which requires global responses that identify common challenges, synergies and areas of cooperation; |
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D.

whereas the world is going through a climate and environment crisis, which requires global responses that identify common challenges, synergies and areas of cooperation;

| E. | whereas the deep sea is believed to have the highest biodiversity on earth, containing some 250 000 known species and many more yet to be discovered, with at least two thirds of the world’s marine species still unidentified (14); |
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E.

whereas the deep sea is believed to have the highest biodiversity on earth, containing some 250 000 known species and many more yet to be discovered, with at least two thirds of the world’s marine species still unidentified (14);

| F. | whereas the EU and its Member States represent the world’s largest maritime area, taking into account the maritime areas of the overseas countries and territories; |
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F.

whereas the EU and its Member States represent the world’s largest maritime area, taking into account the maritime areas of the overseas countries and territories;

| G. | whereas the ocean also contributes to food security and health by providing a primary source of protein for more than 3 billion people, providing renewable energy and mineral resources, as well as creating jobs in coastal communities and acting as a vector of transport for our goods and facilitating our internet communications; |
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G.

whereas the ocean also contributes to food security and health by providing a primary source of protein for more than 3 billion people, providing renewable energy and mineral resources, as well as creating jobs in coastal communities and acting as a vector of transport for our goods and facilitating our internet communications;

| H. | whereas the ocean is currently under intense pressure from human activities, including overfishing and detrimental fishing techniques such as bottom-contacting fishing operations, pollution, industrial extractive activities and the climate crisis, leading to irreversible damage such as ocean warming, rising sea levels, acidification, deoxygenation, coastal erosion, marine pollution, the overexploitation of marine biodiversity, habitat loss and degradation and biomass reduction, which also have consequences on the health and safety of human and animal populations as well as on other organisms; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the ocean is currently under intense pressure from human activities, including overfishing and detrimental fishing techniques such as bottom-contacting fishing operations, pollution, industrial extractive activities and the climate crisis, leading to irreversible damage such as ocean warming, rising sea levels, acidification, deoxygenation, coastal erosion, marine pollution, the overexploitation of marine biodiversity, habitat loss and degradation and biomass reduction, which also have consequences on the health and safety of human and animal populations as well as on other organisms;

| I. | whereas according to the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, marine biodiversity is seriously endangered; whereas the European Environment Agency has issued warnings about the current state of degradation of the European marine environment and the need to rapidly restore our marine ecosystems by addressing the impact of human activities on the marine environment; whereas marine hotspots such as coral reefs, mangroves and seagrass beds are severely degraded and threatened by climate change and pollution; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas according to the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, marine biodiversity is seriously endangered; whereas the European Environment Agency has issued warnings about the current state of degradation of the European marine environment and the need to rapidly restore our marine ecosystems by addressing the impact of human activities on the marine environment; whereas marine hotspots such as coral reefs, mangroves and seagrass beds are severely degraded and threatened by climate change and pollution;

| J. | whereas failing to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement would have enormous environmental impacts and economic costs, including increasing the likelihood of reaching the tipping points at which temperature levels would begin to limit nature’s ability to absorb carbon in the ocean; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas failing to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement would have enormous environmental impacts and economic costs, including increasing the likelihood of reaching the tipping points at which temperature levels would begin to limit nature’s ability to absorb carbon in the ocean;

| K. | whereas whales enhance the productivity of ecosystems and play a significant role in capturing carbon from the atmosphere; whereas each great whale sequesters an average of 33 tonnes of CO2 during its lifetime; whereas according to calculations by the International Monetary Fund, if whales were allowed to return to their pre-whaling numbers, a significant increase in climate-positive phytoplankton would be generated, resulting in the additional capture of hundreds of millions of tonnes of CO2 per year equivalent to the sudden appearance of 2 billion trees (15); whereas the protection of whales should be a priority of international ocean governance; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas whales enhance the productivity of ecosystems and play a significant role in capturing carbon from the atmosphere; whereas each great whale sequesters an average of 33 tonnes of CO2 during its lifetime; whereas according to calculations by the International Monetary Fund, if whales were allowed to return to their pre-whaling numbers, a significant increase in climate-positive phytoplankton would be generated, resulting in the additional capture of hundreds of millions of tonnes of CO2 per year equivalent to the sudden appearance of 2 billion trees (15); whereas the protection of whales should be a priority of international ocean governance;

| L. | whereas the ocean should be recognised at an international level as a global common and should be protected in the light of its uniqueness and interconnectedness and the essential ecosystem services that it provides, on which current and future generations depend for their survival and well-being; |
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L.

whereas the ocean should be recognised at an international level as a global common and should be protected in the light of its uniqueness and interconnectedness and the essential ecosystem services that it provides, on which current and future generations depend for their survival and well-being;

| M. | whereas thanks to their geographical characteristics and specificities, the EU’s outermost regions and islands help the EU to benefit from the geostrategic, ecological, economic and cultural dimension of the ocean and give it responsibilities; whereas the outermost regions and islands are among the most affected by climate change in particular and in terms of sustainable development, in comparison to the rest of the EU and the rest of the developed world; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas thanks to their geographical characteristics and specificities, the EU’s outermost regions and islands help the EU to benefit from the geostrategic, ecological, economic and cultural dimension of the ocean and give it responsibilities; whereas the outermost regions and islands are among the most affected by climate change in particular and in terms of sustainable development, in comparison to the rest of the EU and the rest of the developed world;

| N. | whereas the European Environment Agency has defined ocean governance as ‘managing and using the world’s oceans and their resources in ways that keep them healthy, productive, safe, secure and resilient’ (16); |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the European Environment Agency has defined ocean governance as ‘managing and using the world’s oceans and their resources in ways that keep them healthy, productive, safe, secure and resilient’ (16);

| O. | whereas the EU’s blue economy provides 4,5 million direct jobs and encompasses all industries and sectors related to the ocean, seas and coasts, such as shipping, seagoing passenger transport, fisheries and energy generation, as well as ports, shipyards, coastal tourism and land-based aquaculture; whereas ocean-related economic issues are an important element of the European Green Deal package and recovery plan, and whereas the development of a sustainable blue economy, in respect of marine ecosystems, could greatly boost economic development as well as job creation, especially in coastal and island countries and regions and in the outermost regions (17); |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas the EU’s blue economy provides 4,5 million direct jobs and encompasses all industries and sectors related to the ocean, seas and coasts, such as shipping, seagoing passenger transport, fisheries and energy generation, as well as ports, shipyards, coastal tourism and land-based aquaculture; whereas ocean-related economic issues are an important element of the European Green Deal package and recovery plan, and whereas the development of a sustainable blue economy, in respect of marine ecosystems, could greatly boost economic development as well as job creation, especially in coastal and island countries and regions and in the outermost regions (17);

| P. | whereas at the One Ocean Summit held in Brest in February 2022, a global coalition for blue carbon was launched by France and Colombia and the high ambition coalition on BBNJ was also launched; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas at the One Ocean Summit held in Brest in February 2022, a global coalition for blue carbon was launched by France and Colombia and the high ambition coalition on BBNJ was also launched;

1.

Calls for the EU to stand as a leader in protecting the ocean, restoring marine ecosystems, and raising awareness about the essential role that the ocean plays in maintaining a liveable planet for humans and animals and the numerous benefits it brings to our societies; considers it important, in this context, to improve our relationship with the ocean; encourages the Commission to promote better integration of ocean conservation issues in other policy areas, including at upcoming climate and biodiversity conferences, notably COP15 and COP27;

2.

Expresses disappointment at the fact that the Treaty of the High Seas was ultimately not adopted at the Fifth Intergovernmental Conference, while acknowledging that progress has been made; considers it imperative to ensure the protection of biodiversity beyond national jurisdictions in order to protect, conserve and restore marine life and use our shared ocean resources fairly and sustainably; calls on the Commission and the Member States, as a matter of urgency, to resume negotiations on the Treaty of the High Seas without delay in order to adopt an ambitious approach to the negotiations on a BBNJ treaty that guarantees an international framework that is ambitious, effective and future-proof, which is essential to achieving the target of conserving at least 30 % of the ocean and seas globally;

3.

Stresses that the conference of the parties to the treaty should have full competences to adopt effective management plans and measures for the MPAs, and is firmly of the opinion that any kind of opt-out mechanisms would undermine marine protection efforts; further underlines that the treaty should also include a fair and equitable mechanism for accessing and sharing in the benefits of marine genetic resources, and provide adequate funding to support the core functions of the treaty, as well as financial, scientific and technical support for states that require it, through capacity-building and transfers of marine technology; calls on the Commission and the Member States to advocate for the inclusion of the notion of the ocean as a global common in the preamble of future declarations and international treaties, especially BBNJ;

4.

Underlines that the upcoming climate (COP27) and biodiversity (COP15) conferences will be crucial to ensure the centrality of oceans in the fight against climate change and the full achievement of the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity; recognises that the good health of our oceans and seas is crucial for maintaining their role in mitigating climate change and for staying within the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement; reiterates its call for the EU to push for an ambitious post-2020 global biodiversity framework at COP15 with targets to halt and reverse biodiversity loss, including through legally binding global restoration and protection targets of at least 30 % by 2030;

Improving EU and international ocean governance

Improving EU and international ocean governance

| 5. | Considers that combating the degradation of the ocean requires a considerable joint effort; calls for global, systemic, integrated and ambitious governance; |
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5.

Considers that combating the degradation of the ocean requires a considerable joint effort; calls for global, systemic, integrated and ambitious governance;

| 6. | Reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States to support an international moratorium on deep seabed mining (18); |
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6.

Reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States to support an international moratorium on deep seabed mining (18

| 7. | Highlights the importance of taking stock of the links between the land and the sea in European policies, including nitrogen and phosphorous leakage resulting from intensive agriculture as well as plastic pollution; underlines, moreover, the importance of ensuring that the One Health Approach is mainstreamed, recognising the links between human, animal and environmental health; |
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7.

Highlights the importance of taking stock of the links between the land and the sea in European policies, including nitrogen and phosphorous leakage resulting from intensive agriculture as well as plastic pollution; underlines, moreover, the importance of ensuring that the One Health Approach is mainstreamed, recognising the links between human, animal and environmental health;

| 8. | Reiterates its concern that sectoral support provided by sustainable fisheries partnership agreements often does not directly benefit local fisheries and coastal communities in third countries; reiterates its call on the Commission to ensure that such agreements are in line with the SDGs, the EU’s environmental obligations and the objectives of the EU common fisheries policy; urges the EU to increase the transparency, data collection (particularly on catches, vessel registrations and labour conditions) and reporting requirements in sustainable fisheries partnership agreements and to establish a centralised socio-economic database for all EU vessels, regardless of where they operate; |
| --- | --- |

8.

Reiterates its concern that sectoral support provided by sustainable fisheries partnership agreements often does not directly benefit local fisheries and coastal communities in third countries; reiterates its call on the Commission to ensure that such agreements are in line with the SDGs, the EU’s environmental obligations and the objectives of the EU common fisheries policy; urges the EU to increase the transparency, data collection (particularly on catches, vessel registrations and labour conditions) and reporting requirements in sustainable fisheries partnership agreements and to establish a centralised socio-economic database for all EU vessels, regardless of where they operate;

| 9. | Stresses the need to integrate at-sea labour and human rights considerations within the framework of global ocean governance; calls on the Commission to undertake targeted efforts to promote standards of decent work in the global fisheries industry, in recognition of the connection between labour and human rights abuses and unsustainable and destructive fishing practices, in particular illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; |
| --- | --- |

9.

Stresses the need to integrate at-sea labour and human rights considerations within the framework of global ocean governance; calls on the Commission to undertake targeted efforts to promote standards of decent work in the global fisheries industry, in recognition of the connection between labour and human rights abuses and unsustainable and destructive fishing practices, in particular illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing;

| 10. | Calls on the Council and its rotating presidencies to develop and implement a long-term strategic vision for maritime issues in order to make the EU a global leader in the sustainable development of our ocean, and particularly in protecting the ocean and its ecosystems in order to address the current environmental and climate crises; |
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10.

Calls on the Council and its rotating presidencies to develop and implement a long-term strategic vision for maritime issues in order to make the EU a global leader in the sustainable development of our ocean, and particularly in protecting the ocean and its ecosystems in order to address the current environmental and climate crises;

| 11. | Reiterates the principle of policy coherence for development, to which the EU and its Member States have committed and which aims to minimise contradictions and build synergies between different EU policies; highlights, in this regard, the key role of EU development policies, which should help partner countries attain the aforementioned common goals for the ocean and humanity; |
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11.

Reiterates the principle of policy coherence for development, to which the EU and its Member States have committed and which aims to minimise contradictions and build synergies between different EU policies; highlights, in this regard, the key role of EU development policies, which should help partner countries attain the aforementioned common goals for the ocean and humanity;

| 12. | Stresses the importance of protecting whale populations, from both a biodiversity and climate perspective; strongly supports the continuation of the global moratorium on commercial whaling as well as the ban on international trade of whale products; calls on Japan, Norway and Iceland to cease their whaling operations; calls for the EU to tackle life-threatening hazards that whales and other cetaceans are facing, including ship strikes, entanglement in fishing nets, waterborne plastic waste and noise pollution; |
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12.

Stresses the importance of protecting whale populations, from both a biodiversity and climate perspective; strongly supports the continuation of the global moratorium on commercial whaling as well as the ban on international trade of whale products; calls on Japan, Norway and Iceland to cease their whaling operations; calls for the EU to tackle life-threatening hazards that whales and other cetaceans are facing, including ship strikes, entanglement in fishing nets, waterborne plastic waste and noise pollution;

Ensuring preservation in the face of climate and environmental crises

Ensuring preservation in the face of climate and environmental crises

| 13. | Reiterates its position from the biodiversity strategy of its strong support for the EU targets of protecting at least 30 % of the EU’s marine areas and of strictly protecting at least 10 % of the EU’s marine areas; expects the new EU Nature Restoration Law to ensure the restoration of degraded marine ecosystems, considering that healthy marine ecosystems can protect and restore biodiversity and mitigate climate change, providing multiple ecosystem services; reiterates its call for a restoration target of at least 30 % of the EU’s land and seas, which goes beyond simple protection; |
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13.

Reiterates its position from the biodiversity strategy of its strong support for the EU targets of protecting at least 30 % of the EU’s marine areas and of strictly protecting at least 10 % of the EU’s marine areas; expects the new EU Nature Restoration Law to ensure the restoration of degraded marine ecosystems, considering that healthy marine ecosystems can protect and restore biodiversity and mitigate climate change, providing multiple ecosystem services; reiterates its call for a restoration target of at least 30 % of the EU’s land and seas, which goes beyond simple protection;

| 14. | Reiterates its full support for the establishment of two new MPAs covering over 3 million km2 in the Eastern Antarctic and the Weddell Sea (19); calls on the Commission and the Member States to significantly ramp up their efforts to achieve this; |
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14.

Reiterates its full support for the establishment of two new MPAs covering over 3 million km2

19

| 15. | Supports the EU’s application for observer status on the Arctic Council; calls for enhanced protection for the Arctic region, including a prohibition on oil exploration and, as soon as possible, on gas exploration; |
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15.

Supports the EU’s application for observer status on the Arctic Council; calls for enhanced protection for the Arctic region, including a prohibition on oil exploration and, as soon as possible, on gas exploration;

| 16. | Reiterates its support for the prohibition of all environmentally damaging extractive industrial activities such as mining and fossil fuel extraction in MPAs; reiterates its call for the EU to launch and fund scientific research programmes to map carbon-rich marine habitats in EU waters to serve as a basis for designating such areas as strictly protected MPAs in order to protect and restore marine carbon sinks in line with the UNFCCC, and to protect and restore ecosystems, in particular those on the seabed, in line with the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, protecting them from human activities that could disturb and release carbon into the water column, such as bottom-contacting fishing operations; |
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16.

Reiterates its support for the prohibition of all environmentally damaging extractive industrial activities such as mining and fossil fuel extraction in MPAs; reiterates its call for the EU to launch and fund scientific research programmes to map carbon-rich marine habitats in EU waters to serve as a basis for designating such areas as strictly protected MPAs in order to protect and restore marine carbon sinks in line with the UNFCCC, and to protect and restore ecosystems, in particular those on the seabed, in line with the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, protecting them from human activities that could disturb and release carbon into the water column, such as bottom-contacting fishing operations;

| 17. | Reiterates that fishing and aquaculture worldwide must be environmentally sustainable and managed in a way that is consistent with the objectives of achieving economic, social and employment benefits, and of contributing to the availability of food supplies; stresses that the collection of scientific and socio-economic data is fundamental to the sustainable management of fisheries; regrets that the recent Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1614 of 15 September 2022 was adopted with insufficient data and stakeholder consultation; urges the Commission to revise its decision in light of upcoming advice from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea to be published in November 2022 and once a socio-economic impact assessment is available; |
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17.

Reiterates that fishing and aquaculture worldwide must be environmentally sustainable and managed in a way that is consistent with the objectives of achieving economic, social and employment benefits, and of contributing to the availability of food supplies; stresses that the collection of scientific and socio-economic data is fundamental to the sustainable management of fisheries; regrets that the recent Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1614 of 15 September 2022 was adopted with insufficient data and stakeholder consultation; urges the Commission to revise its decision in light of upcoming advice from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea to be published in November 2022 and once a socio-economic impact assessment is available;

| 18. | Stresses the crucial need to streamline the integration of the coastal blue carbon ecosystems (mangroves, tidal salt marshes and seagrasses) in the European Green Deal and encourages the Commission to work further on the identification of robust, transparent and science-based methodologies for the proper accounting of carbon removals and emissions from those ecosystems in a manner that does no harm to other biodiversity objectives; |
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18.

Stresses the crucial need to streamline the integration of the coastal blue carbon ecosystems (mangroves, tidal salt marshes and seagrasses) in the European Green Deal and encourages the Commission to work further on the identification of robust, transparent and science-based methodologies for the proper accounting of carbon removals and emissions from those ecosystems in a manner that does no harm to other biodiversity objectives;

| 19. | Highlights that the outermost regions and islands are essential for tackling challenges related to the ocean and calls for the EU to enhance their role in finding solutions for adaptation to climate change, the protection of marine biodiversity and the transition towards a sustainable blue economy, including by promoting ecosystem-based solutions; calls for the EU to better associate the outermost regions in ocean strategies, including within the integrated maritime policy; |
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19.

Highlights that the outermost regions and islands are essential for tackling challenges related to the ocean and calls for the EU to enhance their role in finding solutions for adaptation to climate change, the protection of marine biodiversity and the transition towards a sustainable blue economy, including by promoting ecosystem-based solutions; calls for the EU to better associate the outermost regions in ocean strategies, including within the integrated maritime policy;

| 20. | Recalls the importance and urgency of reducing and avoiding marine litter, as plastic waste accounts for 80 % of all marine pollution, and plastics in the ocean are estimated to constitute around 75-199 million tonnes and may triple by 2040 without meaningful action, according to the UN Environment Programme (20); welcomes the ongoing work on negotiations towards a global treaty on plastic pollution and calls on the UN member states to reach an ambitious and effective agreement by no later than 2024; underlines the necessity to address plastic pollution by reducing waste at its source, cutting down on plastic use and consumption as a priority, and increasing circularity; further expresses its support for clean-up actions; points to the plastics economy and its exponential increase in production over recent decades; calls for a systemic approach in order to appropriately address plastic pollution in the environment, including microplastics; calls for international measures to end nuclear and military waste in the oceans and for practical solutions to limit their existing environmental and health impacts; |
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20.

Recalls the importance and urgency of reducing and avoiding marine litter, as plastic waste accounts for 80 % of all marine pollution, and plastics in the ocean are estimated to constitute around 75-199 million tonnes and may triple by 2040 without meaningful action, according to the UN Environment Programme (20

| 21. | Welcomes the recently adopted WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, which all parties should swiftly ratify, but regrets that an agreement was not reached to limit subsidies that increase overfishing and fleet overcapacity; calls on the Commission to further reach an agreement at the WTO without delay; underlines that fishing must be conducted in a sustainable way, ensuring that the negative impacts of fishing activities on the marine ecosystem are minimised and avoiding the degradation of the environment, which is one of the objectives of the common fisheries policy; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against overcapacity and overfishing, including prohibiting subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing; |
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21.

Welcomes the recently adopted WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, which all parties should swiftly ratify, but regrets that an agreement was not reached to limit subsidies that increase overfishing and fleet overcapacity; calls on the Commission to further reach an agreement at the WTO without delay; underlines that fishing must be conducted in a sustainable way, ensuring that the negative impacts of fishing activities on the marine ecosystem are minimised and avoiding the degradation of the environment, which is one of the objectives of the common fisheries policy; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against overcapacity and overfishing, including prohibiting subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing;

| 22. | Recalls that IUU fishing activities and overfishing represent a considerable threat to sustainable fishing and the resilience of marine ecosystems; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to follow a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to IUU fishing, but notes with concern the conclusion of the Court of Auditors special report No 20/2022 that the effectiveness of control systems in place to combat illegal fishing is reduced by the uneven application of checks and sanctions by Member States; calls on the Member States to improve the implementation of the EU IUU Regulation (21) and to follow up on the Court of Auditors’ recommendations and ensure dissuasive sanctions against illegal fishing; |
| --- | --- |

22.

Recalls that IUU fishing activities and overfishing represent a considerable threat to sustainable fishing and the resilience of marine ecosystems; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to follow a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to IUU fishing, but notes with concern the conclusion of the Court of Auditors special report No 20/2022 that the effectiveness of control systems in place to combat illegal fishing is reduced by the uneven application of checks and sanctions by Member States; calls on the Member States to improve the implementation of the EU IUU Regulation (21

| 23. | Is concerned, furthermore, about cases of IUU fishing outside EU waters; calls for a strong global system of deterrent sanctions and a multi-pronged approach to fighting IUU fishing; stresses the need to limit the use of flags of convenience and reflagging and to address trans-shipment at sea; calls on the Commission to effectively promote transparency on the beneficial ownership of corporate structures and calls for the EU, more broadly, to strengthen anti-corruption capacity-building by fostering cooperation between national agencies, increasing international cooperation, improving oversight of fishery agents in developing countries with support from the EU, and supporting regional monitoring, control and surveillance centres and task forces; |
| --- | --- |

23.

Is concerned, furthermore, about cases of IUU fishing outside EU waters; calls for a strong global system of deterrent sanctions and a multi-pronged approach to fighting IUU fishing; stresses the need to limit the use of flags of convenience and reflagging and to address trans-shipment at sea; calls on the Commission to effectively promote transparency on the beneficial ownership of corporate structures and calls for the EU, more broadly, to strengthen anti-corruption capacity-building by fostering cooperation between national agencies, increasing international cooperation, improving oversight of fishery agents in developing countries with support from the EU, and supporting regional monitoring, control and surveillance centres and task forces;

Promoting a sustainable blue economy

Promoting a sustainable blue economy

| 24. | Recognises that the good health of our oceans is essential for the long-term sustainability of many activities, from fisheries to tourism and research to shipping; welcomes the potential of a fully sustainable blue economy for sustainable development and job creation and stresses that it is essential to support these sectors to become more sustainable and in adapting to the new standards of the European Green Deal; |
| --- | --- |

24.

Recognises that the good health of our oceans is essential for the long-term sustainability of many activities, from fisheries to tourism and research to shipping; welcomes the potential of a fully sustainable blue economy for sustainable development and job creation and stresses that it is essential to support these sectors to become more sustainable and in adapting to the new standards of the European Green Deal;

| 25. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive, taking into account all maritime economic activities, including fisheries, offshore energy installations, maritime transport routes, traffic separation schemes, port development, tourism and aquaculture through an integrated and ecosystem-based approach ensuring the protection of marine ecosystems; reiterates that further efforts are needed for the coherent implementation of the directive, which calls on Member States to apply ‘an ecosystem-based approach’ in their planning, in order to set an example for the global introduction of maritime spatial planning; |
| --- | --- |

25.

Calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive, taking into account all maritime economic activities, including fisheries, offshore energy installations, maritime transport routes, traffic separation schemes, port development, tourism and aquaculture through an integrated and ecosystem-based approach ensuring the protection of marine ecosystems; reiterates that further efforts are needed for the coherent implementation of the directive, which calls on Member States to apply ‘an ecosystem-based approach’ in their planning, in order to set an example for the global introduction of maritime spatial planning;

| 26. | Recalls that in addition to CO2 and NO2, the decarbonisation of maritime transport should include methane emissions, given that methane is over 80 times more potent than CO2 over a 20-year period, making it the second most important greenhouse gas contributing to about a quarter of the global warming experienced today; |
| --- | --- |

26.

Recalls that in addition to CO2

2

2

| 27. | Points out that black carbon is both an air pollutant and short-lived climate forcer that forms along with particulate matter during combustion, with a significant warming effect, and the second-largest contributor to climate warming caused by ships; highlights the importance of protecting the Arctic, in particular, from shipping emissions and particulate matter, and recalls that in a joint communication of 13 October 2021, the EU undertook to ‘lead the drive for Zero Emission and Zero Pollution shipping in the Arctic Ocean, in line with our Green Deal objectives and the Fit for 55 package’ (22); calls for the EU to push internationally and work towards the adoption of concrete measures to achieve zero emission and zero pollution shipping in the Arctic; |
| --- | --- |

27.

Points out that black carbon is both an air pollutant and short-lived climate forcer that forms along with particulate matter during combustion, with a significant warming effect, and the second-largest contributor to climate warming caused by ships; highlights the importance of protecting the Arctic, in particular, from shipping emissions and particulate matter, and recalls that in a joint communication of 13 October 2021, the EU undertook to ‘lead the drive for Zero Emission and Zero Pollution shipping in the Arctic Ocean, in line with our Green Deal objectives and the Fit for 55 package’ (22

| 28. | Expresses concern at the underwater noise caused by maritime transport, piling and other marine activities, as well as about cetacean collisions with ships, which have a negative impact on marine ecosystems and the welfare of marine species; calls on the Commission to identify and propose measures to address these problems; |
| --- | --- |

28.

Expresses concern at the underwater noise caused by maritime transport, piling and other marine activities, as well as about cetacean collisions with ships, which have a negative impact on marine ecosystems and the welfare of marine species; calls on the Commission to identify and propose measures to address these problems;

| 29. | Stresses that the ocean is vulnerable to offshore drilling of fossil fuels; emphasises that the use of fossil fuels will further contribute to and accelerate climate change; is of the view that the EU must cooperate with international partners in order to achieve a just transition away from offshore drilling of fossil fuels; |
| --- | --- |

29.

Stresses that the ocean is vulnerable to offshore drilling of fossil fuels; emphasises that the use of fossil fuels will further contribute to and accelerate climate change; is of the view that the EU must cooperate with international partners in order to achieve a just transition away from offshore drilling of fossil fuels;

| 30. | Reiterates its positions on the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) Regulation (23) and the Emission Trading System Directive (24) for the establishment of an Ocean Fund to improve the energy efficiency of ships and support investment aimed at helping to decarbonise maritime transport, such as wind propulsion, including in short sea shipping and ports; |
| --- | --- |

30.

Reiterates its positions on the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) Regulation (23

24

| 31. | Stresses the need for the rapid deployment of sustainable offshore renewable energy projects, while taking into account their impact on ecosystems including migratory species and the environmental, social and economic consequences; stresses that Europe would benefit from building a strong home market for offshore renewable energy in order to further expand its technological leadership in this area and thus create new global export opportunities for European industry; |
| --- | --- |

31.

Stresses the need for the rapid deployment of sustainable offshore renewable energy projects, while taking into account their impact on ecosystems including migratory species and the environmental, social and economic consequences; stresses that Europe would benefit from building a strong home market for offshore renewable energy in order to further expand its technological leadership in this area and thus create new global export opportunities for European industry;

| 32. | Stresses that the EU should lead by example by adopting ambitious legal requirements for decarbonising maritime transport and making it more sustainable, while supporting and pushing for measures that are at least comparable in ambition in international forums such as the International Maritime Organization, enabling the maritime transport sector to phase out its greenhouse gas emissions globally and in line with the Paris Agreement; stresses that, in the event that the International Maritime Organization should adopt such measures, the Commission should examine their ambition and overall environmental integrity, including their general ambition in relation to targets under the Paris Agreement, the EU’s economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions reduction target for 2030 and the achievement of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; considers that, if deemed necessary, the Commission should make subsequent proposals to Parliament and the Council that preserve the environmental integrity and effectiveness of the EU’s climate action and recognise the EU’s sovereignty to regulate its share of emissions from international shipping voyages in line with the obligations of the Paris Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

32.

Stresses that the EU should lead by example by adopting ambitious legal requirements for decarbonising maritime transport and making it more sustainable, while supporting and pushing for measures that are at least comparable in ambition in international forums such as the International Maritime Organization, enabling the maritime transport sector to phase out its greenhouse gas emissions globally and in line with the Paris Agreement; stresses that, in the event that the International Maritime Organization should adopt such measures, the Commission should examine their ambition and overall environmental integrity, including their general ambition in relation to targets under the Paris Agreement, the EU’s economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions reduction target for 2030 and the achievement of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; considers that, if deemed necessary, the Commission should make subsequent proposals to Parliament and the Council that preserve the environmental integrity and effectiveness of the EU’s climate action and recognise the EU’s sovereignty to regulate its share of emissions from international shipping voyages in line with the obligations of the Paris Agreement;

| 33. | Welcomes the role of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs); urges the Commission, within the scope of negotiations for a convention on RFMOs, to ensure that the approved management and conservation measures are in line with the ambitions of, or more ambitious than, those established in the common fisheries policy, granting harmonised rules to EU fleet irrespective of the geographical area in which they operate and providing a level playing field for all fleets operating under these international conventions; calls on the Commission to encourage the creation of new RFMOs and to come forward with ambitious mandates to improve the protection of fish populations and the sustainable management of fisheries resources, to reduce discards and to improve the available data, compliance and transparency of decision-making; encourages a wider use of total allowable catches and quota mechanisms, in particular in the negotiations for a convention on RFMOs and in sustainable fisheries partnership agreements, in order to ensure effective global preservation of fisheries resources; |
| --- | --- |

33.

Welcomes the role of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs); urges the Commission, within the scope of negotiations for a convention on RFMOs, to ensure that the approved management and conservation measures are in line with the ambitions of, or more ambitious than, those established in the common fisheries policy, granting harmonised rules to EU fleet irrespective of the geographical area in which they operate and providing a level playing field for all fleets operating under these international conventions; calls on the Commission to encourage the creation of new RFMOs and to come forward with ambitious mandates to improve the protection of fish populations and the sustainable management of fisheries resources, to reduce discards and to improve the available data, compliance and transparency of decision-making; encourages a wider use of total allowable catches and quota mechanisms, in particular in the negotiations for a convention on RFMOs and in sustainable fisheries partnership agreements, in order to ensure effective global preservation of fisheries resources;

| 34. | Stresses the need to fully take into account the social needs linked to the transition of a sustainable blue economy; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support reskilling and upskilling of the existing workforce as well as attracting new people into the workforce with the requisite skillsets for sustainable economic practices; |
| --- | --- |

34.

Stresses the need to fully take into account the social needs linked to the transition of a sustainable blue economy; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support reskilling and upskilling of the existing workforce as well as attracting new people into the workforce with the requisite skillsets for sustainable economic practices;

| 35. | Calls on the Commission to carry out and build on existing socio-economic analyses on the challenges faced by fishing communities in the EU, with a view to identifying appropriate support measures and diversification to guarantee a fair and equitable transition; |
| --- | --- |

35.

Calls on the Commission to carry out and build on existing socio-economic analyses on the challenges faced by fishing communities in the EU, with a view to identifying appropriate support measures and diversification to guarantee a fair and equitable transition;

Raising awareness, promoting research and knowledge

Raising awareness, promoting research and knowledge

| 36. | Stresses the need to support research and innovation on ocean climate adaptation and marine renewable energies to make the EU a champion of green ships, fishing vessels, and ports; stresses that funding should be provided for deep-sea ecosystems and biodiversity; calls for strong action to tackle ship-source pollution and illegal waste discharge; calls for the EU to play a leading role in the establishment of green corridors and connections between green ports worldwide to strengthen and scale up the green transition in the maritime sector; calls for strong action to tackle ship-source pollution and illegal waste discharge; |
| --- | --- |

36.

Stresses the need to support research and innovation on ocean climate adaptation and marine renewable energies to make the EU a champion of green ships, fishing vessels, and ports; stresses that funding should be provided for deep-sea ecosystems and biodiversity; calls for strong action to tackle ship-source pollution and illegal waste discharge; calls for the EU to play a leading role in the establishment of green corridors and connections between green ports worldwide to strengthen and scale up the green transition in the maritime sector; calls for strong action to tackle ship-source pollution and illegal waste discharge;

| 37. | Considers that the development and production of sustainable marine fuels should be exponentially increased in the coming years, and that the EU and its Member States should invest in the research and production of sustainable maritime fuels, as they present both an environmental and an industrial opportunity; calls on the Commission to examine the possibility of creating an EU research centre for sustainable marine fuels and technologies that would help to coordinate the efforts of stakeholders involved in the development of sustainable marine fuels; |
| --- | --- |

37.

Considers that the development and production of sustainable marine fuels should be exponentially increased in the coming years, and that the EU and its Member States should invest in the research and production of sustainable maritime fuels, as they present both an environmental and an industrial opportunity; calls on the Commission to examine the possibility of creating an EU research centre for sustainable marine fuels and technologies that would help to coordinate the efforts of stakeholders involved in the development of sustainable marine fuels;

| 38. | Expresses its support for the Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development and the Commission’s ‘Mission Starfish 2030: Restore our Ocean and Waters’, which aims to accelerate knowledge and data collection and the regeneration of the ocean and to promote the cyclical vision of regenerating the ocean, seas and rivers through concrete and regional pilot projects; |
| --- | --- |

38.

Expresses its support for the Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development and the Commission’s ‘Mission Starfish 2030: Restore our Ocean and Waters’, which aims to accelerate knowledge and data collection and the regeneration of the ocean and to promote the cyclical vision of regenerating the ocean, seas and rivers through concrete and regional pilot projects;

| 39. | Recognises the need to involve scientific communities to coordinate efforts for a sustainable ocean future that facilitates new ways of producing and sharing knowledge; calls for the EU, therefore, to advocate for the creation of an International Panel for Ocean Sustainability based on the model of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in order to lay the foundations for future ocean governance and management; |
| --- | --- |

39.

Recognises the need to involve scientific communities to coordinate efforts for a sustainable ocean future that facilitates new ways of producing and sharing knowledge; calls for the EU, therefore, to advocate for the creation of an International Panel for Ocean Sustainability based on the model of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in order to lay the foundations for future ocean governance and management;

| 40. | Supports the efforts of the intergovernmental High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People under the leadership of Costa Rica, France and the United Kingdom; welcomes the Commission’s membership of this coalition; recalls the EU’s commitment to achieving the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and marine resources, as identified in SDG 14 of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; |
| --- | --- |

40.

Supports the efforts of the intergovernmental High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People under the leadership of Costa Rica, France and the United Kingdom; welcomes the Commission’s membership of this coalition; recalls the EU’s commitment to achieving the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and marine resources, as identified in SDG 14 of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development;

o

o o

| 41. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

41.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

---

(1)  OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 2.

1

(2)  OJ C 458, 19.12.2018, p. 9.

2

(3)  OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25.

3

(4)  OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19.

4

(5)  OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 135.

5

(6)  OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 14.

6

(7)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0135.

7

(8)  OJ C 101, 16.3.2018, p. 123.

8

(9)  OJ C 337, 20.9.2018, p. 30.

9

(10)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 66.

10

(11)  OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 214.

11

(12)  OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 88.

12

(13)  UN Climate Action, ‘The ocean — the world’s greatest ally against climate change’.

13

(14)  ‘Marine Biodiversity and Ecosystems Underpin a Healthy Planet and Social Well-Being’, UN Chronicle, Nos 1 & 2, Volume LIV — Our Ocean, Our World, May 2017.

14

UN Chronicle

Our Ocean, Our World

(15)  International Monetary Fund, ‘A strategy to protect whales can limit greenhouse gases and global warming’, December 2019.

15

(16)  European Environment Agency, ‘Ocean governance’, 5 May 2022.

16

(17)  As affirmed in Parliament’s resolution of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Toward a sustainable blue economy in the EU: the role of the fisheries and aquaculture sectors’.

17

(18)  See the Commission’s EU Blue Economy Report 2022, 3 May 2022.

18

(19)  As expressed in Parliament’s resolution of 8 July 2021 on the establishment of MPAs and the conservation of Southern Ocean biodiversity.

19

(20)  See the UN Environment Programme’s Coordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA), ‘Marine Litter and Plastic Pollution’, and the UN Environment Programme synthesis, From pollution to solution: a global assessment of marine litter and plastic pollution, 2021.

20

(21)  OJ L 286, 29.10.2008, p. 1.

21

(22)  Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign affairs and Security Policy of 13 October 2021 entitled ‘A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic’, p. 9 (JOIN(2021)0027).

22

(23)  Position of 16 September 2020 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2015/757 in order to take appropriate account of the global data collection system for ship fuel oil consumption data (OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 217).

23

(24)  OJ L 76, 19.3.2018, p. 3.

24

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RECOMMENDATIONS

European Parliament

Wednesday 5 October 2022

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/115 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/115

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P9_TA(2022)0345

The EU’s strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa

European Parliament recommendation of 5 October 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa (2021/2206(INI))

(2023/C 132/16)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 May 2021 entitled ‘The Horn of Africa: a geo-strategic priority for the EU’, and in particular paragraph 28 thereof regarding access to and respect for sexual and reproductive health and rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 May 2021 entitled ‘The Horn of Africa: a geo-strategic priority for the EU’, and in particular paragraph 28 thereof regarding access to and respect for sexual and reproductive health and rights,

| — | having regard to the final joint statement of 18 February 2022 of the sixth European Union-African Union Summit entitled ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the final joint statement of 18 February 2022 of the sixth European Union-African Union Summit entitled ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 25 June 2018 on the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 25 June 2018 on the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on EU-African security cooperation in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on EU-African security cooperation in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa (1),

| — | having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, adopted on 21 March 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, adopted on 21 March 2022,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on a new EU-Africa Strategy — a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on a new EU-Africa Strategy — a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development (2),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2021 on the situation in Somalia (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2021 on the situation in Somalia (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on the situation in Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on the situation in Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya (4),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2022 on the political crisis in Sudan (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2022 on the political crisis in Sudan (5),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on the situation in Ethiopia (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on the situation in Ethiopia (6),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the humanitarian situation in Tigray (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the humanitarian situation in Tigray (7),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 11 February 2021 on the political situation in Uganda (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 11 February 2021 on the political situation in Uganda (8),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2019 on the situation of LGBTI people in Uganda (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2019 on the situation of LGBTI people in Uganda (9),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2020 on Eritrea, notably the case of Dawit Isaak (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2020 on Eritrea, notably the case of Dawit Isaak (10),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2016 on the situation in Eritrea (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2016 on the situation in Eritrea (11),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 18 May 2017 on South Sudan (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 18 May 2017 on South Sudan (12),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 May 2016 on Djibouti (13), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 May 2016 on Djibouti (13),

| — | having regard to UN Security Council resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, 2242, 2467 and 2493 on women, peace and security, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN Security Council resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, 2242, 2467 and 2493 on women, peace and security,

| — | having regard to UN Security Council resolutions 2250, 2419 and 2535 on youth, peace and security, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN Security Council resolutions 2250, 2419 and 2535 on youth, peace and security,

| — | having regard to the resolutions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights of May 2014 on protection against violence and other human rights violations against persons on the basis of their real or imputed sexual orientation or gender identity and May 2017 on the situation of human rights defenders in Africa, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the resolutions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights of May 2014 on protection against violence and other human rights violations against persons on the basis of their real or imputed sexual orientation or gender identity and May 2017 on the situation of human rights defenders in Africa,

| — | having regard to the guidelines on freedom of association and assembly adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights during its 60th ordinary session in May 2017, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the guidelines on freedom of association and assembly adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights during its 60th ordinary session in May 2017,

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 March 2020 on the EU action plan on human rights and democracy for 2020-2024 (JOIN(2020)0005), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 March 2020 on the EU action plan on human rights and democracy for 2020-2024 (JOIN(2020)0005),

| — | having regard to the EU action plan on human rights and democracy for 2015-2019, and in particular action 22(b) thereof, which outlines the responsibility of the European External Action Service, the Commission, the Council and the Member States to develop and implement an EU policy on transitional justice, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU action plan on human rights and democracy for 2015-2019, and in particular action 22(b) thereof, which outlines the responsibility of the European External Action Service, the Commission, the Council and the Member States to develop and implement an EU policy on transitional justice,

| — | having regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction and the Convention on Cluster Munitions,

| — | having regard to the agreement signed at the third Regional Ministerial Forum on Migration in Nairobi, Kenya on 1 April 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the agreement signed at the third Regional Ministerial Forum on Migration in Nairobi, Kenya on 1 April 2022,

| — | having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2628 of 31 March 2022, which reconfigured the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2628 of 31 March 2022, which reconfigured the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS),

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989,

| — | having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,

| — | having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 25 September 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 25 September 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York,

| — | having regard to the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief of 1981, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief of 1981,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 February 2020 on an EU strategy to put an end to female genital mutilation around the world (14), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 February 2020 on an EU strategy to put an end to female genital mutilation around the world (14),

| — | having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

| — | having regard to the report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission/Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia of 3 November 2021 and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission report of 11 March 2022 on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Afar and Amhara regions of Ethiopia conducted between September and December 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission/Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia of 3 November 2021 and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission report of 11 March 2022 on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Afar and Amhara regions of Ethiopia conducted between September and December 2021,

| — | having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 17 December 2021 establishing an international commission of human rights experts to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into the allegations of violations and abuses committed since 3 November 2020 by all parties to the conflict in Ethiopia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 17 December 2021 establishing an international commission of human rights experts to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into the allegations of violations and abuses committed since 3 November 2020 by all parties to the conflict in Ethiopia,

| — | having regard to the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan of 12 September 2018, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan of 12 September 2018,

| — | having regard to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute background paper of December 2020 entitled ‘The European Union Training Mission in Somalia: an assessment’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute background paper of December 2020 entitled ‘The European Union Training Mission in Somalia: an assessment’,

| — | having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0207/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0207/2022),

| A. | whereas the Council conclusions of 10 May 2021 establish a new strategy for the Horn of Africa and give new impetus to the EU’s partnership with the region, which is of primary strategic relevance for the Union; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the Council conclusions of 10 May 2021 establish a new strategy for the Horn of Africa and give new impetus to the EU’s partnership with the region, which is of primary strategic relevance for the Union;

| B. | whereas the Horn of Africa is a strategically important region for the EU in political, economic and commercial terms, with which Europe has long-standing political and economic ties; whereas the Horn of Africa has the potential to grow in economic and political terms, but is facing a number of critical hurdles, including the COVID-19 crisis, the adverse impact of climate change, increasing water scarcity and food insecurity, desertification and deforestation, low resilience to natural disasters, population growth and urbanisation, combined with limited job creation and deep inequalities, a lack of proper infrastructure, instability and political challenges, among others; whereas democracy, good governance, accountability, the rule of law, human rights, gender equality and inclusive and participative societies are preconditions for peace and regional stability; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the Horn of Africa is a strategically important region for the EU in political, economic and commercial terms, with which Europe has long-standing political and economic ties; whereas the Horn of Africa has the potential to grow in economic and political terms, but is facing a number of critical hurdles, including the COVID-19 crisis, the adverse impact of climate change, increasing water scarcity and food insecurity, desertification and deforestation, low resilience to natural disasters, population growth and urbanisation, combined with limited job creation and deep inequalities, a lack of proper infrastructure, instability and political challenges, among others; whereas democracy, good governance, accountability, the rule of law, human rights, gender equality and inclusive and participative societies are preconditions for peace and regional stability;

| C. | whereas the countries of the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, South Sudan and Djibouti) face common risks and threats, including the immediate and long-term impacts of climate change, jihadist terrorism, ethnic tensions and problems of weak governance; whereas all countries in the region are characterised by persistent fragilities due to ongoing conflicts and grave human rights violations perpetrated by all parties to the conflict, including the enrolment of child soldiers, targeted attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and the practice of sexual violence against women and girls; whereas impunity for war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law remain the norm, while the pursuit of justice for victims has largely proved elusive; whereas in December 2021, the UN Human Rights Council established the UN Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia to investigate possible war crimes and other violations; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the countries of the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, South Sudan and Djibouti) face common risks and threats, including the immediate and long-term impacts of climate change, jihadist terrorism, ethnic tensions and problems of weak governance; whereas all countries in the region are characterised by persistent fragilities due to ongoing conflicts and grave human rights violations perpetrated by all parties to the conflict, including the enrolment of child soldiers, targeted attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and the practice of sexual violence against women and girls; whereas impunity for war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law remain the norm, while the pursuit of justice for victims has largely proved elusive; whereas in December 2021, the UN Human Rights Council established the UN Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia to investigate possible war crimes and other violations;

| D. | whereas the overall stability of the Horn of Africa has further deteriorated since the start of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region in November 2020, and is jeopardised by difficult political transitions ongoing in a number of countries; whereas the humanitarian situation across Ethiopia remains dramatic owing to conflict, drought and large-scale internal displacement; whereas a humanitarian truce was announced by the federal government on 24 March 2022 in order to facilitate the provision of aid to Tigray, which has been cut off by the conflict; whereas hostilities in the northern region of Ethiopia resumed on 24 August 2022; whereas despite remaining very brutal, the conflict in Ethiopia has now entered a different phase, given the public commitment to a negotiated solution under an African Union-led framework made by both parties to the conflict; whereas the construction and second filling phase of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam built on the upstream Nile by Ethiopia continues to cause tensions between Ethiopia and its neighbouring countries; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the overall stability of the Horn of Africa has further deteriorated since the start of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region in November 2020, and is jeopardised by difficult political transitions ongoing in a number of countries; whereas the humanitarian situation across Ethiopia remains dramatic owing to conflict, drought and large-scale internal displacement; whereas a humanitarian truce was announced by the federal government on 24 March 2022 in order to facilitate the provision of aid to Tigray, which has been cut off by the conflict; whereas hostilities in the northern region of Ethiopia resumed on 24 August 2022; whereas despite remaining very brutal, the conflict in Ethiopia has now entered a different phase, given the public commitment to a negotiated solution under an African Union-led framework made by both parties to the conflict; whereas the construction and second filling phase of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam built on the upstream Nile by Ethiopia continues to cause tensions between Ethiopia and its neighbouring countries;

| E. | whereas the EU is a major, long-standing and reliable partner for peace, security, sustainable development and humanitarian assistance in the region, and whereas due consideration must be given to this partnership for peace, security, democracy, sustainable development and humanitarian aid; whereas existing regional organisations and other initiatives such as the African Union and Combined Joint Task Force are also leading actors in addressing the Horn of Africa’s security concerns; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the EU is a major, long-standing and reliable partner for peace, security, sustainable development and humanitarian assistance in the region, and whereas due consideration must be given to this partnership for peace, security, democracy, sustainable development and humanitarian aid; whereas existing regional organisations and other initiatives such as the African Union and Combined Joint Task Force are also leading actors in addressing the Horn of Africa’s security concerns;

| F. | whereas the first China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference took place on 20 and 21 June 2022; whereas the Chinese Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, who was present at the meeting offered Beijing’s unconditional support for the resolution of conflicts in the region, while calling for the countries there to be independent from foreign interference; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the first China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference took place on 20 and 21 June 2022; whereas the Chinese Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, who was present at the meeting offered Beijing’s unconditional support for the resolution of conflicts in the region, while calling for the countries there to be independent from foreign interference;

| G. | whereas the humanitarian situation in South Sudan is deteriorating as a result of tensions and conflicts, local inter-communal violence and recurrent floods; whereas the UN estimated that Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya needed urgent humanitarian assistance of USD 4,4 billion in 2022 in order to reach 29,1 million people; whereas as of April 2022, only 5 % of those needs had been met by the international community; whereas the drought has already caused the deaths of some 3 million livestock animals across southern Ethiopia and in the arid regions in Kenya, and around 30 % of households’ herds have died in Somalia; whereas the locust invasion in East Africa is the worst in 25 years for Ethiopia and Somalia and the worst in 70 years for Kenya and poses a major threat to food security in the region; whereas about 568 000 children were admitted for severe acute malnutrition treatment in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia from January to June 2022, and around 6,5 million children are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition in these three countries; whereas the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group currently estimates that between 23 and 26 million people could face high levels of acute food insecurity by February 2023 due primarily to the drought in the region if the October to December rains fail; whereas experts have predicted that more frequent cross-border movements of locusts between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia will further exacerbate an already precarious food security situation; whereas the disastrous consequences of the war in Ukraine, with food, fuel and commodity prices having now reached unprecedented levels, are exacerbating the serious food crisis in the countries of the Horn of Africa; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the humanitarian situation in South Sudan is deteriorating as a result of tensions and conflicts, local inter-communal violence and recurrent floods; whereas the UN estimated that Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya needed urgent humanitarian assistance of USD 4,4 billion in 2022 in order to reach 29,1 million people; whereas as of April 2022, only 5 % of those needs had been met by the international community; whereas the drought has already caused the deaths of some 3 million livestock animals across southern Ethiopia and in the arid regions in Kenya, and around 30 % of households’ herds have died in Somalia; whereas the locust invasion in East Africa is the worst in 25 years for Ethiopia and Somalia and the worst in 70 years for Kenya and poses a major threat to food security in the region; whereas about 568 000 children were admitted for severe acute malnutrition treatment in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia from January to June 2022, and around 6,5 million children are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition in these three countries; whereas the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group currently estimates that between 23 and 26 million people could face high levels of acute food insecurity by February 2023 due primarily to the drought in the region if the October to December rains fail; whereas experts have predicted that more frequent cross-border movements of locusts between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia will further exacerbate an already precarious food security situation; whereas the disastrous consequences of the war in Ukraine, with food, fuel and commodity prices having now reached unprecedented levels, are exacerbating the serious food crisis in the countries of the Horn of Africa;

| H. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic left the region with health, socio-economic and political challenges by deepening poverty, increasing inequality and exacerbating structural and entrenched discrimination, with a devastating impact on human rights and civil liberties, particularly for minority groups and vulnerable people; whereas in this context some governments have used COVID-19 legislation to repress human rights; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic left the region with health, socio-economic and political challenges by deepening poverty, increasing inequality and exacerbating structural and entrenched discrimination, with a devastating impact on human rights and civil liberties, particularly for minority groups and vulnerable people; whereas in this context some governments have used COVID-19 legislation to repress human rights;

| I. | whereas the Horn of Africa remains a region of origin, transit and destination for major migration flows to other countries in the wider region as well as to the EU; whereas poverty and insecurity feed off each other and are two of the most important drivers of mass population displacement in the Horn of Africa, particularly among young people; whereas there are over 7,7 million migrant workers in East Africa and the Horn of Africa with Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda hosting the highest number of international migrants in search of better economic opportunities and better livelihoods; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the Horn of Africa remains a region of origin, transit and destination for major migration flows to other countries in the wider region as well as to the EU; whereas poverty and insecurity feed off each other and are two of the most important drivers of mass population displacement in the Horn of Africa, particularly among young people; whereas there are over 7,7 million migrant workers in East Africa and the Horn of Africa with Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda hosting the highest number of international migrants in search of better economic opportunities and better livelihoods;

| J. | whereas political tensions, conflicts, natural disasters and the consequences of climate change are at the root of the considerable refugee and displaced populations in most regions; whereas the humanitarian and security situation in camps for refugees and internally displaced persons remains precarious; whereas Kenya is home to the Dadaab refugee camp, one of the largest in the world, which hosts over 220 000 registered Somali refugees fleeing civil war and climate hardship; whereas tensions between Kenya and Somalia are on the rise over the management of the camp, while refugees continue to have to survive in difficult conditions, depending on the support of the UN for their livelihoods; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas political tensions, conflicts, natural disasters and the consequences of climate change are at the root of the considerable refugee and displaced populations in most regions; whereas the humanitarian and security situation in camps for refugees and internally displaced persons remains precarious; whereas Kenya is home to the Dadaab refugee camp, one of the largest in the world, which hosts over 220 000 registered Somali refugees fleeing civil war and climate hardship; whereas tensions between Kenya and Somalia are on the rise over the management of the camp, while refugees continue to have to survive in difficult conditions, depending on the support of the UN for their livelihoods;

| K. | whereas the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are turning into areas of increasing concern, where regional and international actors have considerable and often diverging economic and security interests at a global crossroads and choke point for commodities trading, with more than 12 % of global seaborne cargo and 40 % of Asia’s trade with Europe transiting through the Red Sea; whereas stability, maritime security and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are crucial for ensuring global energy flows and European energy security, as approximately 6,2 million barrels of crude oil and other petroleum products transit through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait every year (around 9 % of global seaborne shipments), 3,6 million of which are destined for Europe; whereas the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in the country will further increase the relevance of this trade route; whereas while pursuing the green and sustainable transitions of the European Green Deal, the short-term need to reduce dependency on Russia and diversify suppliers will make freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden even more crucial in geostrategic terms; whereas consideration must be given to the importance of the Red Sea region regarding stability in the Horn of Africa, its significance as a trade and connectivity axis and its concerns, which are shared by the EU, over stability and freedom of navigation; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are turning into areas of increasing concern, where regional and international actors have considerable and often diverging economic and security interests at a global crossroads and choke point for commodities trading, with more than 12 % of global seaborne cargo and 40 % of Asia’s trade with Europe transiting through the Red Sea; whereas stability, maritime security and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are crucial for ensuring global energy flows and European energy security, as approximately 6,2 million barrels of crude oil and other petroleum products transit through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait every year (around 9 % of global seaborne shipments), 3,6 million of which are destined for Europe; whereas the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in the country will further increase the relevance of this trade route; whereas while pursuing the green and sustainable transitions of the European Green Deal, the short-term need to reduce dependency on Russia and diversify suppliers will make freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden even more crucial in geostrategic terms; whereas consideration must be given to the importance of the Red Sea region regarding stability in the Horn of Africa, its significance as a trade and connectivity axis and its concerns, which are shared by the EU, over stability and freedom of navigation;

| L. | whereas the 11th ministerial meeting of the Horn of Africa initiative took place at the EU-AU Summit, with Team Europe members also attending for the very first time; whereas the initiative has mobilised over USD 4,5 billion from its three development partners: the EU, the African Development Bank and World Bank Group; whereas since 2019, the EU has supported 64 projects in the Horn of Africa under the EU Trust Fund, focusing mainly on greater economic and employment opportunities and improved governance and conflict prevention; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the 11th ministerial meeting of the Horn of Africa initiative took place at the EU-AU Summit, with Team Europe members also attending for the very first time; whereas the initiative has mobilised over USD 4,5 billion from its three development partners: the EU, the African Development Bank and World Bank Group; whereas since 2019, the EU has supported 64 projects in the Horn of Africa under the EU Trust Fund, focusing mainly on greater economic and employment opportunities and improved governance and conflict prevention;

| M. | whereas gender discrimination and other forms of inequality remain entrenched in many countries in the region, including gender-based violence and high levels of conflict-related sexual violence, limited access to sexual and reproductive health, early and forced marriages, the exclusion of pregnant girls from schools, and the practice of female genital mutilation, which remains a long-held custom in the countries of the Horn of Africa; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas gender discrimination and other forms of inequality remain entrenched in many countries in the region, including gender-based violence and high levels of conflict-related sexual violence, limited access to sexual and reproductive health, early and forced marriages, the exclusion of pregnant girls from schools, and the practice of female genital mutilation, which remains a long-held custom in the countries of the Horn of Africa;

| N. | whereas LGBTIQ people continue to face harassment, arrest, prosecution and gender-based violence and sometimes even risk being killed for their real or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity or expression and sex characteristics; whereas with the exception of Djibouti, consensual sexual acts between same-sex persons are criminalised in all countries of the Horn of Africa; whereas this criminalisation is used to legitimise discriminatory treatment towards LGBTIQ people and whereas repealing discriminatory criminal provisions is a necessary first step towards protecting LGBTIQ people from violence; whereas none of the countries in the Horn of Africa have legal provisions in place to legally recognise trans persons or protect intersex persons from intersex genital mutilation; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas LGBTIQ people continue to face harassment, arrest, prosecution and gender-based violence and sometimes even risk being killed for their real or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity or expression and sex characteristics; whereas with the exception of Djibouti, consensual sexual acts between same-sex persons are criminalised in all countries of the Horn of Africa; whereas this criminalisation is used to legitimise discriminatory treatment towards LGBTIQ people and whereas repealing discriminatory criminal provisions is a necessary first step towards protecting LGBTIQ people from violence; whereas none of the countries in the Horn of Africa have legal provisions in place to legally recognise trans persons or protect intersex persons from intersex genital mutilation;

| O. | whereas as of 1 April 2022, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), with the primary objective of handing over to the Somalian national army forces in 2024; whereas the tasks of the new mission include, inter alia, reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab, helping to strengthen the Somali joint security and police forces, ensuring the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somalia, and supporting the peace and reconciliation efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia and the member countries of the federation; whereas UN Security Council Resolution 2608 on piracy, which was the basis for the EU naval force Operation Atalanta, has not been renewed and, as a result, access to Somali territorial waters is restricted; whereas the security situation is fragile and giving cause for concern, with the terrorist group al-Shabaab remaining active; whereas elections were held 12 months behind schedule; whereas the country is facing increasing financial difficulties that are compromising its ability to pay; whereas EU financial aid has been suspended since September 2020 because of failure to complete the electoral process, although direct support for vulnerable populations is continuing; whereas according to humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the prices of wheat and oil have increased by 300 % in a number of regions in Somalia, which imports 90 % of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia; whereas according to the UN, over 38 % of Somalia’s population was suffering from severe food insecurity as of March 2022; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas as of 1 April 2022, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), with the primary objective of handing over to the Somalian national army forces in 2024; whereas the tasks of the new mission include, inter alia, reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab, helping to strengthen the Somali joint security and police forces, ensuring the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somalia, and supporting the peace and reconciliation efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia and the member countries of the federation; whereas UN Security Council Resolution 2608 on piracy, which was the basis for the EU naval force Operation Atalanta, has not been renewed and, as a result, access to Somali territorial waters is restricted; whereas the security situation is fragile and giving cause for concern, with the terrorist group al-Shabaab remaining active; whereas elections were held 12 months behind schedule; whereas the country is facing increasing financial difficulties that are compromising its ability to pay; whereas EU financial aid has been suspended since September 2020 because of failure to complete the electoral process, although direct support for vulnerable populations is continuing; whereas according to humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the prices of wheat and oil have increased by 300 % in a number of regions in Somalia, which imports 90 % of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia; whereas according to the UN, over 38 % of Somalia’s population was suffering from severe food insecurity as of March 2022;

| P. | whereas the failure to renew UN Security Council Resolution 2608 limits the access of Operation Atalanta to Somalian territorial waters; |
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P.

whereas the failure to renew UN Security Council Resolution 2608 limits the access of Operation Atalanta to Somalian territorial waters;

| Q. | whereas China has appointed a special envoy for Horn of Africa affairs; whereas China has increased its military and diplomatic presence in and economic cooperation with countries in the region; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas China has appointed a special envoy for Horn of Africa affairs; whereas China has increased its military and diplomatic presence in and economic cooperation with countries in the region;

| R. | whereas there has been a political stalemate in Sudan since the coup of 25 October 2021 and very difficult negotiations between civilians and the military; whereas the security situation in Darfur, which has seen renewed outbreaks of violence since November 2021, is very worrying; whereas Sudan faces a dire economic situation, coupled with the suspension of payments from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund pending a viable political solution and the establishment of a civilian government, as well as the suspension of financial aid from the Commission, although direct aid to the population has been maintained; whereas Russia’s planned military base will afford it strategic access to the Red Sea; |
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R.

whereas there has been a political stalemate in Sudan since the coup of 25 October 2021 and very difficult negotiations between civilians and the military; whereas the security situation in Darfur, which has seen renewed outbreaks of violence since November 2021, is very worrying; whereas Sudan faces a dire economic situation, coupled with the suspension of payments from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund pending a viable political solution and the establishment of a civilian government, as well as the suspension of financial aid from the Commission, although direct aid to the population has been maintained; whereas Russia’s planned military base will afford it strategic access to the Red Sea;

| S. | whereas over 10 years since South Sudan’s independence in 2011, the implementation of the peace agreement signed in 2018 has been delayed; whereas President Salva Kiir intends to hold general elections in 2023 in accordance with the deadline set out in the peace agreement; whereas the political and military fragmentation of the country, both between and within different political groups, military factions and ethnic groups, is giving cause for concern; |
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S.

whereas over 10 years since South Sudan’s independence in 2011, the implementation of the peace agreement signed in 2018 has been delayed; whereas President Salva Kiir intends to hold general elections in 2023 in accordance with the deadline set out in the peace agreement; whereas the political and military fragmentation of the country, both between and within different political groups, military factions and ethnic groups, is giving cause for concern;

| T. | whereas the political landscape in Kenya is deeply polarised; whereas general elections were held on 9 August 2022; whereas the country is struggling economically as a result of the global consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and accumulated debt; whereas Kenya could play a constructive role in regional peace and security; whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy visited Kenya twice this year, once on 10 September 2022, as part of a regional tour to Kenya, Mozambique and Somalia, and once on 29 January 2022 to formally launch the EU-Kenya strategic dialogue, for which the economy, trade and investment have been identified as the key priorities; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas the political landscape in Kenya is deeply polarised; whereas general elections were held on 9 August 2022; whereas the country is struggling economically as a result of the global consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and accumulated debt; whereas Kenya could play a constructive role in regional peace and security; whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy visited Kenya twice this year, once on 10 September 2022, as part of a regional tour to Kenya, Mozambique and Somalia, and once on 29 January 2022 to formally launch the EU-Kenya strategic dialogue, for which the economy, trade and investment have been identified as the key priorities;

| U. | whereas the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was re-elected for a sixth term following the elections held on 14 January 2021; whereas on 30 November 2021, a military operation was launched in Ituri and North Kivu in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in response to a series of attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces, a Daesh-affiliated armed terrorist group with roots in Uganda; |
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U.

whereas the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was re-elected for a sixth term following the elections held on 14 January 2021; whereas on 30 November 2021, a military operation was launched in Ituri and North Kivu in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in response to a series of attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces, a Daesh-affiliated armed terrorist group with roots in Uganda;

| V. | whereas President Isaias Afwerki of the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice has led Eritrea since its independence in 1993; whereas the democratisation process that began with the adoption of the Eritrean Constitution in 1997 has since stalled; whereas the Eritrean regime has clamped down on most fundamental freedoms and the human rights situation is giving cause for great concern; whereas Eritrea is one of the least developed countries (LDCs); whereas its two principal donors are the Global Fund and the European Commission, with the EU currently channelling EUR 20 million into a road improvement project in Eritrea through the Emergency Trust Fund, after having decommitted more than EUR 100 million in 2021 as a result of Eritrea’s involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia; |
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V.

whereas President Isaias Afwerki of the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice has led Eritrea since its independence in 1993; whereas the democratisation process that began with the adoption of the Eritrean Constitution in 1997 has since stalled; whereas the Eritrean regime has clamped down on most fundamental freedoms and the human rights situation is giving cause for great concern; whereas Eritrea is one of the least developed countries (LDCs); whereas its two principal donors are the Global Fund and the European Commission, with the EU currently channelling EUR 20 million into a road improvement project in Eritrea through the Emergency Trust Fund, after having decommitted more than EUR 100 million in 2021 as a result of Eritrea’s involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia;

| W. | whereas Djibouti is in an eminently strategic position on the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, one of the busiest maritime corridors in the world, which controls access to the Red Sea, thus facilitating a growth model centred on the development of infrastructure (ports and railways); whereas on 9 April 2021, the incumbent President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh won the elections for the fifth consecutive time; whereas Djibouti is at the epicentre of the crisis sweeping round from the Sahel to the Middle East and, while a stable country, its immediate environs are unstable; whereas consideration must be given to Djibouti’s significant military involvement with ATMIS in the fight against al-Shabaab Somali terrorists; |
| --- | --- |

W.

whereas Djibouti is in an eminently strategic position on the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, one of the busiest maritime corridors in the world, which controls access to the Red Sea, thus facilitating a growth model centred on the development of infrastructure (ports and railways); whereas on 9 April 2021, the incumbent President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh won the elections for the fifth consecutive time; whereas Djibouti is at the epicentre of the crisis sweeping round from the Sahel to the Middle East and, while a stable country, its immediate environs are unstable; whereas consideration must be given to Djibouti’s significant military involvement with ATMIS in the fight against al-Shabaab Somali terrorists;

1.   Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

The impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on the Horn of Africa

| (a) | undertake a comprehensive evaluation of previous EU strategies and commitments towards the Horn of Africa in order to identify lessons learned and to recalibrate the EU engagement in the region accordingly; recognise that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has worrying immediate and long-term consequences for the Horn of Africa, and that as a response, the EU must adjust its engagement with the region; respond to the fact that — as a consequence of Russia’s illegal action — the overall security situation in the region is negatively affected; address the fact that Russia has already well-established, multifaceted links and influence in the region, including through investments (both civilian and military) and the deployment of paramilitary groups such as the Wagner Group in Sudan, and recognise that these actions have the potential to further destabilise neighbouring areas; counter the Russian attempts to orchestrate misinformation and disinformation campaigns in the region aimed at fomenting anti-EU sentiment by setting up a comprehensive EU public communications strategy to counter and overcome Russian efforts, combined with concrete action and commitments that take into account the needs of the local population; condemn the spread of narratives justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as exemplified by the Sudanese General Hemetti’s statement of 23 February 2022, when he falsely claimed that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was to ‘protect’ Russia; scale up EU diplomatic, political, financial and humanitarian engagement with the AU, its regional components, and individual countries by putting in place concrete action which demonstrates the EU’s commitment to the region in order to foster local and regional approaches to prevent further regional instability, reduce their vulnerability to foreign influence, and address and respond to the negative consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; immediately deepen diplomatic engagement with the governments in the region to discuss and clarify the devastating short, medium and long-term impacts of the Russian objectives and operations in the region; acknowledge that the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the Russian naval blockade, disrupts supply chains and severely impacts the food security of the Horn of Africa, both in the short and medium term, as around 90 % of its wheat is imported from the Russian Federation and Ukraine; take account of the fact that at least 20 million people were already at risk of famine due to unprecedented drought in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia and the locust swarm crisis; significantly scale up EU support and assistance to the Horn of Africa to obviate the risk of famine or difficulties in accessing food; recognise the funding gaps for the region for the next six months, namely USD 437 million according to the World Food Programme and USD 130 million according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and do its utmost to help plug these gaps and go beyond the EUR 21,5 million in additional EU humanitarian aid already committed; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

undertake a comprehensive evaluation of previous EU strategies and commitments towards the Horn of Africa in order to identify lessons learned and to recalibrate the EU engagement in the region accordingly; recognise that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has worrying immediate and long-term consequences for the Horn of Africa, and that as a response, the EU must adjust its engagement with the region; respond to the fact that — as a consequence of Russia’s illegal action — the overall security situation in the region is negatively affected; address the fact that Russia has already well-established, multifaceted links and influence in the region, including through investments (both civilian and military) and the deployment of paramilitary groups such as the Wagner Group in Sudan, and recognise that these actions have the potential to further destabilise neighbouring areas; counter the Russian attempts to orchestrate misinformation and disinformation campaigns in the region aimed at fomenting anti-EU sentiment by setting up a comprehensive EU public communications strategy to counter and overcome Russian efforts, combined with concrete action and commitments that take into account the needs of the local population; condemn the spread of narratives justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as exemplified by the Sudanese General Hemetti’s statement of 23 February 2022, when he falsely claimed that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was to ‘protect’ Russia; scale up EU diplomatic, political, financial and humanitarian engagement with the AU, its regional components, and individual countries by putting in place concrete action which demonstrates the EU’s commitment to the region in order to foster local and regional approaches to prevent further regional instability, reduce their vulnerability to foreign influence, and address and respond to the negative consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; immediately deepen diplomatic engagement with the governments in the region to discuss and clarify the devastating short, medium and long-term impacts of the Russian objectives and operations in the region; acknowledge that the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the Russian naval blockade, disrupts supply chains and severely impacts the food security of the Horn of Africa, both in the short and medium term, as around 90 % of its wheat is imported from the Russian Federation and Ukraine; take account of the fact that at least 20 million people were already at risk of famine due to unprecedented drought in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia and the locust swarm crisis; significantly scale up EU support and assistance to the Horn of Africa to obviate the risk of famine or difficulties in accessing food; recognise the funding gaps for the region for the next six months, namely USD 437 million according to the World Food Programme and USD 130 million according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and do its utmost to help plug these gaps and go beyond the EUR 21,5 million in additional EU humanitarian aid already committed;

Guiding principles

| (b) | fully recognise the potential and the strategic relevance of the region, and develop a truly strategic vision for cooperation and engagement by continuously working to implement and adapt the Horn of Africa strategy in the light of recent developments in the region, giving new impetus to a mutually beneficial relationship based on coherent, timely and effective consultations and common values, interests and prospects; move from an obsolete donor recipient mentality to a partnership on an equal footing between the EU and the Horn of Africa countries in order to create the conditions for sustainable and peaceful development in the region; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

fully recognise the potential and the strategic relevance of the region, and develop a truly strategic vision for cooperation and engagement by continuously working to implement and adapt the Horn of Africa strategy in the light of recent developments in the region, giving new impetus to a mutually beneficial relationship based on coherent, timely and effective consultations and common values, interests and prospects; move from an obsolete donor recipient mentality to a partnership on an equal footing between the EU and the Horn of Africa countries in order to create the conditions for sustainable and peaceful development in the region;

| (c) | coordinate EU initiatives and support with African counterparts by favouring African ownership of the programmes, thus helping to find African solutions to African problems; adopt, in this regard, a conditionality approach, including on security issues, based on the more for more and less for less principle; note that development aid is sometimes used inefficiently and occasionally misused by governments of the recipient countries; facilitate the strengthening of a bottom-up approach, where local communities and civil society organisations can work to build their own capacities and prepare, coordinate and organise themselves better to become more resilient; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

coordinate EU initiatives and support with African counterparts by favouring African ownership of the programmes, thus helping to find African solutions to African problems; adopt, in this regard, a conditionality approach, including on security issues, based on the more for more and less for less principle; note that development aid is sometimes used inefficiently and occasionally misused by governments of the recipient countries; facilitate the strengthening of a bottom-up approach, where local communities and civil society organisations can work to build their own capacities and prepare, coordinate and organise themselves better to become more resilient;

| (d) | coordinate efforts in the region with the AU and its regional components, most notably the East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as with the UN and other like-minded international and regional organisations, financial institutions and individual countries; maintain support for ongoing missions in the area that help these efforts, including EU common security and defence policy missions, in order to contribute to a collective response designed to achieve stability and development; encourage the UK to coordinate with the EU in its efforts in the region; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

coordinate efforts in the region with the AU and its regional components, most notably the East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as with the UN and other like-minded international and regional organisations, financial institutions and individual countries; maintain support for ongoing missions in the area that help these efforts, including EU common security and defence policy missions, in order to contribute to a collective response designed to achieve stability and development; encourage the UK to coordinate with the EU in its efforts in the region;

| (e) | adopt a proactive, inclusive and cooperative approach based on constructive engagement with countries and actors present in the Horn of Africa, sharing EU best practices and experience in integrating matters relating to security, economic development and financial, social and cultural issues to foster effective cooperation across the region and in the maritime domain, while also acting as a facilitator of dialogue with all parties involved, in particular through the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

adopt a proactive, inclusive and cooperative approach based on constructive engagement with countries and actors present in the Horn of Africa, sharing EU best practices and experience in integrating matters relating to security, economic development and financial, social and cultural issues to foster effective cooperation across the region and in the maritime domain, while also acting as a facilitator of dialogue with all parties involved, in particular through the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa;

Regional peace and security

| (f) | recognise that insecurity and instability in the Horn of Africa represents a serious threat to the economic and social prospects of the whole of Africa, as well as to the EU’s and regional security concerns; contribute to regional security and stability with an integrated approach, fostering the link between humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peace through civilian conflict prevention, the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict resolution, mediation, capacity-building and reconciliation activities; mainstream youth inclusion and the full, equal and meaningful representation and active participation of women in peace and security issues, including through the support and implementation of the UN Agendas on Youth, Peace and Security and on Women, Peace and Security, formulating concrete short and medium-term commitments and identifying how this will be measured and reported objectively; support African-owned processes within the AU, IGAD and the East African Community, and address the root causes of conflicts, extremism and radicalisation such as extreme poverty and inequality, the consequences of climate change namely scarce resources such as arable land and water, and long-standing border disputes through political, financial, operational and logistical support; strengthen the EU-AU strategic partnership as regards conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping; strengthen the cooperation with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities in this regard; endorse the concept of human security as a complement to state security approaches which puts measures and institutions at the service of its people; support the necessary clearance of and tackle the contamination caused by landmines, cluster munitions and other explosives, which prevent social and economic development and have a disproportionate impact on children, women and marginalised groups; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

recognise that insecurity and instability in the Horn of Africa represents a serious threat to the economic and social prospects of the whole of Africa, as well as to the EU’s and regional security concerns; contribute to regional security and stability with an integrated approach, fostering the link between humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peace through civilian conflict prevention, the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict resolution, mediation, capacity-building and reconciliation activities; mainstream youth inclusion and the full, equal and meaningful representation and active participation of women in peace and security issues, including through the support and implementation of the UN Agendas on Youth, Peace and Security and on Women, Peace and Security, formulating concrete short and medium-term commitments and identifying how this will be measured and reported objectively; support African-owned processes within the AU, IGAD and the East African Community, and address the root causes of conflicts, extremism and radicalisation such as extreme poverty and inequality, the consequences of climate change namely scarce resources such as arable land and water, and long-standing border disputes through political, financial, operational and logistical support; strengthen the EU-AU strategic partnership as regards conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping; strengthen the cooperation with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities in this regard; endorse the concept of human security as a complement to state security approaches which puts measures and institutions at the service of its people; support the necessary clearance of and tackle the contamination caused by landmines, cluster munitions and other explosives, which prevent social and economic development and have a disproportionate impact on children, women and marginalised groups;

| (g) | address the possible insecurities and tensions arising from Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the sharing of Nile waters with Sudan and Egypt located downstream; call on the three countries to return to the negotiating table and work with them to find a diplomatically negotiated solution within the appropriate forums under the auspices of the AU and IGAD, taking into account Ethiopia’s interest in generating hydropower as well as the concerns of riparian states vis-à-vis water security, and overcoming the risks related to unilateral attitudes towards the use of shared environmental resources; take account of the fact that the effects of climate change pose a major challenge to the Horn of Africa and require the region to cooperate closely in the production of sustainable energy as well as resource sharing, and recognise that the European Green Deal offers important opportunities for cooperation; provide financial and technical assistance as well as share innovative technologies, best practices and lessons learned with our African partners in order to reap the benefits of the green transition and the water-food-energy nexus, and increase investment in the region’s transition, including integrated infrastructure such as transnational energy grids; |
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(g)

address the possible insecurities and tensions arising from Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the sharing of Nile waters with Sudan and Egypt located downstream; call on the three countries to return to the negotiating table and work with them to find a diplomatically negotiated solution within the appropriate forums under the auspices of the AU and IGAD, taking into account Ethiopia’s interest in generating hydropower as well as the concerns of riparian states vis-à-vis water security, and overcoming the risks related to unilateral attitudes towards the use of shared environmental resources; take account of the fact that the effects of climate change pose a major challenge to the Horn of Africa and require the region to cooperate closely in the production of sustainable energy as well as resource sharing, and recognise that the European Green Deal offers important opportunities for cooperation; provide financial and technical assistance as well as share innovative technologies, best practices and lessons learned with our African partners in order to reap the benefits of the green transition and the water-food-energy nexus, and increase investment in the region’s transition, including integrated infrastructure such as transnational energy grids;

| (h) | coordinate with international partners and organisations to provide timely and sufficient humanitarian aid and assistance to the countries affected by conflicts, extreme drought and other natural disasters and by the Russian aggression in Ukraine, which has contributed to soaring food and fuel costs and disrupted global supply chains; recognise the linkages between the climate crisis, peace and conflicts and the need for peace building and climate adaptation and mitigation efforts to address these, and address climate security as a core element of any comprehensive regional strategy; take the lead in convening the donor community for an exceptional pledging conference for the Horn of Africa in order to avoid the region being hit by hunger once again; |
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(h)

coordinate with international partners and organisations to provide timely and sufficient humanitarian aid and assistance to the countries affected by conflicts, extreme drought and other natural disasters and by the Russian aggression in Ukraine, which has contributed to soaring food and fuel costs and disrupted global supply chains; recognise the linkages between the climate crisis, peace and conflicts and the need for peace building and climate adaptation and mitigation efforts to address these, and address climate security as a core element of any comprehensive regional strategy; take the lead in convening the donor community for an exceptional pledging conference for the Horn of Africa in order to avoid the region being hit by hunger once again;

| (i) | acknowledge the positive impacts of the commitment shown by the EU and its international partners through missions and operations such as Operation Atalanta, the EU Capacity-Building Mission in Somalia and the EU Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security, both by preventing piracy attacks before they happen and reducing the success rate of those that do, and deplore the failure to renew UN Security Council Resolution 2608, which unfortunately limits the access of the operation to Somalian territorial waters; commend the positive results already achieved by the EU Capacity-Building Mission in Somalia in the area of civilian law enforcement, and ensure that the mission has the means and personnel it needs to be effective; call on the Member States to show adequate commitment to ATMIS and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, both in terms of personnel and means, in order to empower the Somali armed forces to enable them to take ownership of security in the country while fully complying with international humanitarian law and international human rights law; underline the need for the EU to confirm its position as a credible partner for Somalia, supporting ATMIS as a part of an integrated approach adopted in coordination with common security and defence policy missions in Somalia, the European Peace Facility (EPF), humanitarian aid operations and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument; |
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(i)

acknowledge the positive impacts of the commitment shown by the EU and its international partners through missions and operations such as Operation Atalanta, the EU Capacity-Building Mission in Somalia and the EU Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security, both by preventing piracy attacks before they happen and reducing the success rate of those that do, and deplore the failure to renew UN Security Council Resolution 2608, which unfortunately limits the access of the operation to Somalian territorial waters; commend the positive results already achieved by the EU Capacity-Building Mission in Somalia in the area of civilian law enforcement, and ensure that the mission has the means and personnel it needs to be effective; call on the Member States to show adequate commitment to ATMIS and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, both in terms of personnel and means, in order to empower the Somali armed forces to enable them to take ownership of security in the country while fully complying with international humanitarian law and international human rights law; underline the need for the EU to confirm its position as a credible partner for Somalia, supporting ATMIS as a part of an integrated approach adopted in coordination with common security and defence policy missions in Somalia, the European Peace Facility (EPF), humanitarian aid operations and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument;

| (j) | express concern about the persistent activity of radical militant Islamist terrorist groups operating across the Horn of Africa and in neighbouring countries, most notably al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and Daesh, which are highly adaptable and able to gain a lasting foothold among the population; call on the EU and its Member States to focus on the spread of jihadism in the region and provide tailored and effective assistance to the countries affected in countering both the immediate effects of this expansion and the complex root causes that lead to extremism, radicalisation, violence, terrorism and the susceptibility to recruitment; recognise that the relevance and capability to operate of terrorist organisations in the region are further strengthened by the permeability of national borders, and support national and regional efforts to increase border security; work in cooperation with individual countries and regional organisations, most notably the East African Community, IGAD and the Eastern Africa Standby Force, in order to adopt a regional approach to fighting terrorism and addressing its root causes; |
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(j)

express concern about the persistent activity of radical militant Islamist terrorist groups operating across the Horn of Africa and in neighbouring countries, most notably al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and Daesh, which are highly adaptable and able to gain a lasting foothold among the population; call on the EU and its Member States to focus on the spread of jihadism in the region and provide tailored and effective assistance to the countries affected in countering both the immediate effects of this expansion and the complex root causes that lead to extremism, radicalisation, violence, terrorism and the susceptibility to recruitment; recognise that the relevance and capability to operate of terrorist organisations in the region are further strengthened by the permeability of national borders, and support national and regional efforts to increase border security; work in cooperation with individual countries and regional organisations, most notably the East African Community, IGAD and the Eastern Africa Standby Force, in order to adopt a regional approach to fighting terrorism and addressing its root causes;

| (k) | provide tailored and request-driven support to the AU, its regional components and individual countries in their efforts to improve the conditions for security and stability; maintain the support provided via the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument’s policy of capacity-building in support of security and development and the EPF, in particular to Operation Atalanta and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, and ensure that it complies with the EU Common Position on Arms Exports and fully respects human rights and humanitarian law, obligations of ex ante risk assessment, permanent monitoring of the supply of military technology to third country actors and effective transparency provisions including the traceability and proper use of the material delivered to partners under the EPF, in order to help build an accountable, robust and reliable security sector; fully exploit the potential of the EPF in this regard and ensure continuity with the former African Peace Facility in terms of the quality and quantity of funding of African-led initiatives; ensure that all EPF financing commitments entered into with the Horn of Africa before Russia’s criminal invasion of Ukraine are fulfilled; ensure the funding of the civilian component of ATMIS; |
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(k)

provide tailored and request-driven support to the AU, its regional components and individual countries in their efforts to improve the conditions for security and stability; maintain the support provided via the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument’s policy of capacity-building in support of security and development and the EPF, in particular to Operation Atalanta and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, and ensure that it complies with the EU Common Position on Arms Exports and fully respects human rights and humanitarian law, obligations of ex ante risk assessment, permanent monitoring of the supply of military technology to third country actors and effective transparency provisions including the traceability and proper use of the material delivered to partners under the EPF, in order to help build an accountable, robust and reliable security sector; fully exploit the potential of the EPF in this regard and ensure continuity with the former African Peace Facility in terms of the quality and quantity of funding of African-led initiatives; ensure that all EPF financing commitments entered into with the Horn of Africa before Russia’s criminal invasion of Ukraine are fulfilled; ensure the funding of the civilian component of ATMIS;

Democracy, human rights and the rule of law

| (l) | fully support democratic transitions, the rule of law, state-building processes and an open political space that is suitably adapted to different local contexts; support strategies to foster inclusive reconciliation processes with the aim of establishing credible and representative institutions that provide for the participation of the various communities; engage in particular with Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan to scale up efforts to include under-represented communities and women in high-level politics and governing bodies and assist partner countries in addressing disaffection towards and a lack of trust in national authorities through confidence-building measures; stand ready to deploy, whenever necessary, EU election observation missions to support electoral processes before and during elections; recognise the potential of parliamentary diplomacy as a tool to foster dialogue and build a holistic partnership between the EU, the AU and individual countries; |
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(l)

fully support democratic transitions, the rule of law, state-building processes and an open political space that is suitably adapted to different local contexts; support strategies to foster inclusive reconciliation processes with the aim of establishing credible and representative institutions that provide for the participation of the various communities; engage in particular with Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan to scale up efforts to include under-represented communities and women in high-level politics and governing bodies and assist partner countries in addressing disaffection towards and a lack of trust in national authorities through confidence-building measures; stand ready to deploy, whenever necessary, EU election observation missions to support electoral processes before and during elections; recognise the potential of parliamentary diplomacy as a tool to foster dialogue and build a holistic partnership between the EU, the AU and individual countries;

| (m) | work in partnership with the EU’s African counterparts and increase cooperation with civil society to identify and address the main challenges and priorities in the region, including human dignity and rights, democratic and fundamental rights, rule of law challenges and mitigating the COVID-19 health crisis; call on national authorities to abide by the Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and to respect media freedom, including by ensuring that media outlets can operate independently; express concern about the persistent violence and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, expression and sex characteristics; call on the national authorities to repeal discriminatory provisions, including through a review of their criminal codes; enhance their support to human rights defenders in the region; show flexibility in making use of all of the tools at their disposal and fully implement the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, ensuring internal protection mechanisms are upheld and coordinating in granting visas to those seeking to leave the country; call on national authorities in the region to provide a working environment conducive to civil society, as well as specific legislative measures to recognise and protect human rights defenders and prevent their harassment and arbitrary detention; recognise the link between corruption and widespread violations of human rights and strengthen EU support to combat corruption in the region; scale up the delivery of life-saving and life-sustaining assistance to help people and communities impacted by the drought while working to enable communities to pursue self-reliance and build resilience against future shocks; call on governments across the region to ensure that humanitarian workers can access people in need of assistance; |
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(m)

work in partnership with the EU’s African counterparts and increase cooperation with civil society to identify and address the main challenges and priorities in the region, including human dignity and rights, democratic and fundamental rights, rule of law challenges and mitigating the COVID-19 health crisis; call on national authorities to abide by the Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and to respect media freedom, including by ensuring that media outlets can operate independently; express concern about the persistent violence and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, expression and sex characteristics; call on the national authorities to repeal discriminatory provisions, including through a review of their criminal codes; enhance their support to human rights defenders in the region; show flexibility in making use of all of the tools at their disposal and fully implement the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, ensuring internal protection mechanisms are upheld and coordinating in granting visas to those seeking to leave the country; call on national authorities in the region to provide a working environment conducive to civil society, as well as specific legislative measures to recognise and protect human rights defenders and prevent their harassment and arbitrary detention; recognise the link between corruption and widespread violations of human rights and strengthen EU support to combat corruption in the region; scale up the delivery of life-saving and life-sustaining assistance to help people and communities impacted by the drought while working to enable communities to pursue self-reliance and build resilience against future shocks; call on governments across the region to ensure that humanitarian workers can access people in need of assistance;

| (n) | mainstream transitional justice into its conflict management approach in the region; prioritise, as part of the EU’s support for transitional justice efforts, locally and nationally driven processes as well as local and regional experts; step up the EU’s engagement with partner countries and with international and regional organisations to support the fight against impunity and promote truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence; |
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(n)

mainstream transitional justice into its conflict management approach in the region; prioritise, as part of the EU’s support for transitional justice efforts, locally and nationally driven processes as well as local and regional experts; step up the EU’s engagement with partner countries and with international and regional organisations to support the fight against impunity and promote truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence;

| (o) | call on governments to take action to protect women’s and girls’ rights to equality, health, including sexual and reproductive health and rights and education, and to allow them to live free from gender-based violence and discrimination, ensuring a gender-sensitive approach in order to bridge the increasing gender gap during crises and conflicts; commend the progress made in improving access to healthcare in the region, such as in Kenya and Uganda, in particular access to life-saving HIV treatment and access to other sexual and reproductive health services, and strengthen the EU’s support for sexual and reproductive health and rights, which are indispensable for achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals and gender equality; streamline actions against female genital mutilation in all of the EU’s external activities, as reiterated in Parliament’s resolution of 12 February 2020, paying particular attention to the Horn of Africa, which has the highest prevalence of female genital mutilation in the world, including in its most severe forms; call on the national authorities in the Horn of Africa to implement laws to ban female genital mutilation and ensure those laws are respected; scale up initiatives to involve women in politics to encourage better policy-making and help put an end to female genital mutilation and forced marriage; |
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(o)

call on governments to take action to protect women’s and girls’ rights to equality, health, including sexual and reproductive health and rights and education, and to allow them to live free from gender-based violence and discrimination, ensuring a gender-sensitive approach in order to bridge the increasing gender gap during crises and conflicts; commend the progress made in improving access to healthcare in the region, such as in Kenya and Uganda, in particular access to life-saving HIV treatment and access to other sexual and reproductive health services, and strengthen the EU’s support for sexual and reproductive health and rights, which are indispensable for achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals and gender equality; streamline actions against female genital mutilation in all of the EU’s external activities, as reiterated in Parliament’s resolution of 12 February 2020, paying particular attention to the Horn of Africa, which has the highest prevalence of female genital mutilation in the world, including in its most severe forms; call on the national authorities in the Horn of Africa to implement laws to ban female genital mutilation and ensure those laws are respected; scale up initiatives to involve women in politics to encourage better policy-making and help put an end to female genital mutilation and forced marriage;

Sustainable and inclusive economic development — society

| (p) | take note of the region’s demographic development and recognise the role of young people and women in achieving sustainable economic development; strengthen EU support in the field of access to education and vocational training, and the upskilling and reskilling of the workforce, according to the needs of the labour market; insist that empowering and offering real prospects to the younger generations and women could bring multiple benefits to the whole region; support capacity-building for local vaccine manufacturing and assist in strengthening local health systems and supporting structural reforms in the health sector; urge national authorities to ensure universal access to healthcare based on the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment; take note that terrorism and jihadism play a major role in preventing economic growth in the whole of the Horn of Africa; take note of al-Shabaab’s economic presence in the Horn of Africa through charcoal smuggling and the extortion of farmers, businesses and aid organisations; provide technical support to empower the diaspora in Europe to step up business relations with the region, notably by allowing remittances to be sent through legal, transparent and trusted channels; |
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(p)

take note of the region’s demographic development and recognise the role of young people and women in achieving sustainable economic development; strengthen EU support in the field of access to education and vocational training, and the upskilling and reskilling of the workforce, according to the needs of the labour market; insist that empowering and offering real prospects to the younger generations and women could bring multiple benefits to the whole region; support capacity-building for local vaccine manufacturing and assist in strengthening local health systems and supporting structural reforms in the health sector; urge national authorities to ensure universal access to healthcare based on the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment; take note that terrorism and jihadism play a major role in preventing economic growth in the whole of the Horn of Africa; take note of al-Shabaab’s economic presence in the Horn of Africa through charcoal smuggling and the extortion of farmers, businesses and aid organisations; provide technical support to empower the diaspora in Europe to step up business relations with the region, notably by allowing remittances to be sent through legal, transparent and trusted channels;

| (q) | recognise that climate change seriously affects the Horn of Africa, with far-reaching consequences for the stability of the region; scale up common actions in the fight against climate change, in particular in mitigation, adaptation, resilience and disaster risk management; share the benefits of the European Green Deal, enshrined in the European Climate Law, with our partners and support them in adopting their own climate transition agendas by sharing best practices and aligning EU initiatives in this field with existing African initiatives; pay special attention to the human and food security implications of climate change and the need for the EU and its partners to conduct a climate-proof security and defence policy in line with the ambitions of the EU’s Climate Change and Defence Roadmap as part of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence; work together with African counterparts in adopting new and innovative ways to fully unleash the region’s potential, including by exchanging best practices and adopting new technologies for sustainable agriculture that would empower local entrepreneurship, with the ultimate aim of reducing the dependency on imports of food and agricultural products and stimulating inclusive and sustainable economic growth; support the calls of LDCs for the provision of specific financing for losses and damages associated with the adverse effects of climate change and support the reconstruction of the regions affected and their economic revival by adopting additional special measures for the funding of reconstruction and recovery; consider encouraging the Member States to further use targeted debt suspension, relief or cancellation on a case-by-case basis for the most vulnerable LDCs and small island developing states, with the specific purpose of contributing to the fight against climate change as part of a wider international framework; |
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(q)

recognise that climate change seriously affects the Horn of Africa, with far-reaching consequences for the stability of the region; scale up common actions in the fight against climate change, in particular in mitigation, adaptation, resilience and disaster risk management; share the benefits of the European Green Deal, enshrined in the European Climate Law, with our partners and support them in adopting their own climate transition agendas by sharing best practices and aligning EU initiatives in this field with existing African initiatives; pay special attention to the human and food security implications of climate change and the need for the EU and its partners to conduct a climate-proof security and defence policy in line with the ambitions of the EU’s Climate Change and Defence Roadmap as part of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence; work together with African counterparts in adopting new and innovative ways to fully unleash the region’s potential, including by exchanging best practices and adopting new technologies for sustainable agriculture that would empower local entrepreneurship, with the ultimate aim of reducing the dependency on imports of food and agricultural products and stimulating inclusive and sustainable economic growth; support the calls of LDCs for the provision of specific financing for losses and damages associated with the adverse effects of climate change and support the reconstruction of the regions affected and their economic revival by adopting additional special measures for the funding of reconstruction and recovery; consider encouraging the Member States to further use targeted debt suspension, relief or cancellation on a case-by-case basis for the most vulnerable LDCs and small island developing states, with the specific purpose of contributing to the fight against climate change as part of a wider international framework;

| (r) | promote coordination and work with the relevant Commission directorates-general in order to ensure that the revision of the EU’s trade policy brings about sustainable economic growth for the region, notably by making the trade and sustainable development chapters of free trade agreements fully enforceable; note that efforts are needed to prevent human rights infringements and environmental abuses by EU-based corporations operating in the Horn of Africa and ensure that the forthcoming Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive is fit for purpose and brings about actual progress in terms of human rights and the environment for local communities; take particular care to assess and prevent any violation linked to the EU’s own policies, projects and funding in the region, including by creating a complaints mechanism for individuals or groups whose rights may have been violated by EU activities in these countries; urge public financial institutions, including the European Investment Bank, together with the Commission, to make sure that EU investments are aligned with the international environmental and climate goals, in particular the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and are used to steer a just climate transition along the lines of the European Green Deal objectives; ensure that no investment in the region should finance sectors that fuel the climate crisis, primarily fossil fuel industries; |
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(r)

promote coordination and work with the relevant Commission directorates-general in order to ensure that the revision of the EU’s trade policy brings about sustainable economic growth for the region, notably by making the trade and sustainable development chapters of free trade agreements fully enforceable; note that efforts are needed to prevent human rights infringements and environmental abuses by EU-based corporations operating in the Horn of Africa and ensure that the forthcoming Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive is fit for purpose and brings about actual progress in terms of human rights and the environment for local communities; take particular care to assess and prevent any violation linked to the EU’s own policies, projects and funding in the region, including by creating a complaints mechanism for individuals or groups whose rights may have been violated by EU activities in these countries; urge public financial institutions, including the European Investment Bank, together with the Commission, to make sure that EU investments are aligned with the international environmental and climate goals, in particular the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and are used to steer a just climate transition along the lines of the European Green Deal objectives; ensure that no investment in the region should finance sectors that fuel the climate crisis, primarily fossil fuel industries;

| (s) | devote particular attention to widespread, locally-owned projects, especially in the most remote areas, that are less invasive from an environmental point of view but more effective in improving people’s lives, i.e. off-grid solar power systems, irrigation systems, water purification and sanitation systems, and ensure that EU investments in sustainable energy in Africa primarily benefit the local population with the objective of ending energy poverty; call on the EU to help farmers in the Horn of Africa to reduce their dependency on mineral fertilisers and find agronomic alternatives through its external and development policy to address the climate and environmental impacts of fertilisers; urge the Member States to work with the Commission to prioritise partnerships with domestic companies in LDCs that pursue sustainable and inclusive business models; |
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(s)

devote particular attention to widespread, locally-owned projects, especially in the most remote areas, that are less invasive from an environmental point of view but more effective in improving people’s lives, i.e. off-grid solar power systems, irrigation systems, water purification and sanitation systems, and ensure that EU investments in sustainable energy in Africa primarily benefit the local population with the objective of ending energy poverty; call on the EU to help farmers in the Horn of Africa to reduce their dependency on mineral fertilisers and find agronomic alternatives through its external and development policy to address the climate and environmental impacts of fertilisers; urge the Member States to work with the Commission to prioritise partnerships with domestic companies in LDCs that pursue sustainable and inclusive business models;

Migration

| (t) | point out that the Horn of Africa is home to some of the main countries of origin, transit and destination for significant migratory flows to other countries in the region as well as the EU; adopt an approach to cooperation on migration that is holistic, conflict-sensitive and context-specific and that puts humans first, in line with the Khartoum Process, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the work of the Regional Ministerial Forum on Migration for the East and Horn of Africa, taking into account the different drivers of migration in the region and the persistent vulnerabilities of migrants, upholding the rights of migrants and refugees and recognising the benefits of circular migration and regional mobility in the wider region; work with the EU’s partners to resume the activities of the Khartoum Process to reconfigure it in such a way that reflects the current reality and the various limitations on travel; develop a long-term partnership that focuses on safe, orderly and regular migration; find a sustainable solution with partner countries in the Horn of Africa to mitigate the consequences of migration towards European external borders; foster enhanced cooperation on border security and the fight against cross-border criminal activities, including human trafficking and illicit trade in weapons and cultural heritage; ensure that all migration cooperation and readmission agreements with the region strictly comply with international human rights and refugee law, in particular the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto; ensure that the financial resources mobilised through the EU Trust Funds focus on projects capable of addressing the root causes of migration in the long term; |
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(t)

point out that the Horn of Africa is home to some of the main countries of origin, transit and destination for significant migratory flows to other countries in the region as well as the EU; adopt an approach to cooperation on migration that is holistic, conflict-sensitive and context-specific and that puts humans first, in line with the Khartoum Process, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the work of the Regional Ministerial Forum on Migration for the East and Horn of Africa, taking into account the different drivers of migration in the region and the persistent vulnerabilities of migrants, upholding the rights of migrants and refugees and recognising the benefits of circular migration and regional mobility in the wider region; work with the EU’s partners to resume the activities of the Khartoum Process to reconfigure it in such a way that reflects the current reality and the various limitations on travel; develop a long-term partnership that focuses on safe, orderly and regular migration; find a sustainable solution with partner countries in the Horn of Africa to mitigate the consequences of migration towards European external borders; foster enhanced cooperation on border security and the fight against cross-border criminal activities, including human trafficking and illicit trade in weapons and cultural heritage; ensure that all migration cooperation and readmission agreements with the region strictly comply with international human rights and refugee law, in particular the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto; ensure that the financial resources mobilised through the EU Trust Funds focus on projects capable of addressing the root causes of migration in the long term;

| (u) | provide immediate assistance and long-term support to the countries hosting and assisting refugees in order to secure their protection; facilitate the resettlement of displaced persons and internally displaced persons; coordinate diplomatic efforts to call on the governments of countries in the region involved in ongoing conflicts to halt indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and to protect the civilian population, including taking all steps to ensure that refugees and internally displaced persons are protected and given full access to humanitarian aid, including food, water and shelter; provide support to countries in the region to mainstream efforts with a view to supporting the appropriate reforms to ensure better management of pastoral mobility and reduce economic vulnerability during crises such as droughts in order to better control the factors that contribute to tensions and conflicts involving pastoral communities; |
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(u)

provide immediate assistance and long-term support to the countries hosting and assisting refugees in order to secure their protection; facilitate the resettlement of displaced persons and internally displaced persons; coordinate diplomatic efforts to call on the governments of countries in the region involved in ongoing conflicts to halt indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and to protect the civilian population, including taking all steps to ensure that refugees and internally displaced persons are protected and given full access to humanitarian aid, including food, water and shelter; provide support to countries in the region to mainstream efforts with a view to supporting the appropriate reforms to ensure better management of pastoral mobility and reduce economic vulnerability during crises such as droughts in order to better control the factors that contribute to tensions and conflicts involving pastoral communities;

Regional integration

| (v) | adopt a Team Europe approach in the region, working with the AU, regional organisations and a wide spectrum of partners and actors, including from the private sector, in supporting African-owned initiatives; keep monitoring and supporting the Horn of Africa Initiative, in which the EU is a strategic partner, and its objective of crowding in capital to support connectivity and unlock opportunities in the region, creating jobs, mitigating emerging risks, strengthening resilience and paving the way for better neighbourly relations; |
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(v)

adopt a Team Europe approach in the region, working with the AU, regional organisations and a wide spectrum of partners and actors, including from the private sector, in supporting African-owned initiatives; keep monitoring and supporting the Horn of Africa Initiative, in which the EU is a strategic partner, and its objective of crowding in capital to support connectivity and unlock opportunities in the region, creating jobs, mitigating emerging risks, strengthening resilience and paving the way for better neighbourly relations;

| (w) | acknowledge that safe and efficient infrastructure is key to consistent, sustainable and fair development in the region; fully exploit the potential of new EU-sponsored initiatives aimed at enhancing regional integration and connectivity; increase consultation and coordination with African counterparts in the definition of specific projects to be developed in the Global Gateway framework, building on the positive outcomes of the sixth EU-AU Summit; properly illustrate the Global Gateway as a greener, fairer and more sustainable long-term plan, especially in comparison with the alternatives proposed by other actors; support countries in the region seeking to join the World Trade Organization and support the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area, and continue supporting and strengthening the AU, the East African Community and IGAD to promote economic cooperation, increase regional integration and foster stability and diplomacy; recognise that the prospects for stabilisation and sustainable development of the Horn of Africa are deeply interlinked with those of neighbouring regions; consider developing an EU strategy for the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden; |
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(w)

acknowledge that safe and efficient infrastructure is key to consistent, sustainable and fair development in the region; fully exploit the potential of new EU-sponsored initiatives aimed at enhancing regional integration and connectivity; increase consultation and coordination with African counterparts in the definition of specific projects to be developed in the Global Gateway framework, building on the positive outcomes of the sixth EU-AU Summit; properly illustrate the Global Gateway as a greener, fairer and more sustainable long-term plan, especially in comparison with the alternatives proposed by other actors; support countries in the region seeking to join the World Trade Organization and support the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area, and continue supporting and strengthening the AU, the East African Community and IGAD to promote economic cooperation, increase regional integration and foster stability and diplomacy; recognise that the prospects for stabilisation and sustainable development of the Horn of Africa are deeply interlinked with those of neighbouring regions; consider developing an EU strategy for the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden;

Influence of third actors

| (x) | underline their concern regarding the increasingly prevalent and multifaceted influences and rivalries of third parties that do not share the EU’s values and objectives in the region, including China and Russia, which are operating with ambitions to promote strictly bilateral interests; recognise that the increasing presence of these actors in the region, particularly in the economic, energy, security — including maritime security — and military spheres, also through propaganda and disinformation campaigns aimed at magnifying the role they are playing there, while undermining the actions of their competitors, including the EU, jeopardises regional peace, European efforts and assistance, and the EU’s role as a privileged partner; consider taking all the appropriate action to counter these interferences; promote the EU’s support through a holistic approach to the region, fostering economic cooperation and conflict prevention as opposed to the approach of third actors, which is aimed at exacerbating a fragmented environment and escalating geopolitical concerns; take stock of China’s consistent and multisectoral investments in the region, while assessing the consequences thereof, including the increased dependency of African states, and addressing China’s rising presence and influence; call on Turkish authorities to align with EU policies and to better coordinate efforts with EU initiatives, most notably the EU Training Mission in Somalia, in order to be more effective and achieve better outcomes in terms of security and stability, thereby ushering in a swift and genuine democratic transition; strengthen coordination with African counterparts in defining the priority areas to which EU investments should be devoted, and pledge sufficient resources to achieve this; take note of third parties’ military build-up in the region, most notably Russia’s advanced plans to construct a naval base in the Sudanese coast facing the Red Sea, and the Chinese inauguration of a military base in Djibouti in 2017; pay particular attention to the increasing activities of private security companies, such as the Russian-sponsored Wagner Group, which is operating in Sudan, hampering the democratic transition and exploiting domestic weaknesses at the expense of local populations, in order to avoid the similar negative repercussions witnessed in other regions, and work closely with the AU and the individual countries of the Horn of Africa to create and operationalise an efficient, accountable and reliable national security apparatus in each country; call on all EU Member States to ratify the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries; assess the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on EU influence in the region; |
| --- | --- |

(x)

underline their concern regarding the increasingly prevalent and multifaceted influences and rivalries of third parties that do not share the EU’s values and objectives in the region, including China and Russia, which are operating with ambitions to promote strictly bilateral interests; recognise that the increasing presence of these actors in the region, particularly in the economic, energy, security — including maritime security — and military spheres, also through propaganda and disinformation campaigns aimed at magnifying the role they are playing there, while undermining the actions of their competitors, including the EU, jeopardises regional peace, European efforts and assistance, and the EU’s role as a privileged partner; consider taking all the appropriate action to counter these interferences; promote the EU’s support through a holistic approach to the region, fostering economic cooperation and conflict prevention as opposed to the approach of third actors, which is aimed at exacerbating a fragmented environment and escalating geopolitical concerns; take stock of China’s consistent and multisectoral investments in the region, while assessing the consequences thereof, including the increased dependency of African states, and addressing China’s rising presence and influence; call on Turkish authorities to align with EU policies and to better coordinate efforts with EU initiatives, most notably the EU Training Mission in Somalia, in order to be more effective and achieve better outcomes in terms of security and stability, thereby ushering in a swift and genuine democratic transition; strengthen coordination with African counterparts in defining the priority areas to which EU investments should be devoted, and pledge sufficient resources to achieve this; take note of third parties’ military build-up in the region, most notably Russia’s advanced plans to construct a naval base in the Sudanese coast facing the Red Sea, and the Chinese inauguration of a military base in Djibouti in 2017; pay particular attention to the increasing activities of private security companies, such as the Russian-sponsored Wagner Group, which is operating in Sudan, hampering the democratic transition and exploiting domestic weaknesses at the expense of local populations, in order to avoid the similar negative repercussions witnessed in other regions, and work closely with the AU and the individual countries of the Horn of Africa to create and operationalise an efficient, accountable and reliable national security apparatus in each country; call on all EU Member States to ratify the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries; assess the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on EU influence in the region;

| (y) | reinforce strategic communications through effective and fact-based public information campaigns in order to be more present at a local level and inform about EU actions, objectives and sponsored initiatives in the region to increase the EU’s visibility and underline the objective of generating added value for local communities, sustainable development, peace and security and inclusive growth, while also countering disinformation and false narratives from third parties; mandate the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa to focus on regional activities and enhance the EU’s visibility, its presence and engagement with all countries in the region to foster closer relations; ensure greater transparency and visibility of the work of the EU Special Representative, ensuring that the EU Special Representative prioritises conflict resolution, human rights and democracy support in her engagement with her interlocutors from the region and engages proactively with civil society actors, human rights defenders and voices of dissent, which may be under threat or targeted by the local authorities; |
| --- | --- |

(y)

reinforce strategic communications through effective and fact-based public information campaigns in order to be more present at a local level and inform about EU actions, objectives and sponsored initiatives in the region to increase the EU’s visibility and underline the objective of generating added value for local communities, sustainable development, peace and security and inclusive growth, while also countering disinformation and false narratives from third parties; mandate the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa to focus on regional activities and enhance the EU’s visibility, its presence and engagement with all countries in the region to foster closer relations; ensure greater transparency and visibility of the work of the EU Special Representative, ensuring that the EU Special Representative prioritises conflict resolution, human rights and democracy support in her engagement with her interlocutors from the region and engages proactively with civil society actors, human rights defenders and voices of dissent, which may be under threat or targeted by the local authorities;

Country-specific issues

| (z) | in addressing the following specific issues relating to the countries of the Horn of Africa: |
| --- | --- |

(z)

in addressing the following specific issues relating to the countries of the Horn of Africa:

Djibouti

| (i) | recognise the geostrategic importance of Djibouti; take note of Djibouti’s positive contribution to peace, security and regional cooperation in the Horn of Africa, in particular in hosting the logistical platform of Operation Atalanta and the military presence of EU Member States; point out that construction projects in Djibouti are being largely funded by China with estimated infrastructural investment of USD 9,8 billion; express concern over the establishment of a Chinese naval base in Djibouti for long-range military projection and over China’s takeover of the strategic port of Doraleh and Djibouti’s rising public foreign debt, contracted through loans from China; engage with the country, which is at the crossroads of one of the most transited migration routes in the world, in assisting its efforts to host refugees from the region and the implementation of its global and regional commitments; share EU know-how and best practices in water management, as Djibouti is one of the world’s most arid countries experiencing extreme drought; express regret at the fact that no independent media has been authorised to broadcast from Djibouti; call for protection for the sources of the independent Djiboutian media, which have no choice but to broadcast and express themselves from abroad; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

recognise the geostrategic importance of Djibouti; take note of Djibouti’s positive contribution to peace, security and regional cooperation in the Horn of Africa, in particular in hosting the logistical platform of Operation Atalanta and the military presence of EU Member States; point out that construction projects in Djibouti are being largely funded by China with estimated infrastructural investment of USD 9,8 billion; express concern over the establishment of a Chinese naval base in Djibouti for long-range military projection and over China’s takeover of the strategic port of Doraleh and Djibouti’s rising public foreign debt, contracted through loans from China; engage with the country, which is at the crossroads of one of the most transited migration routes in the world, in assisting its efforts to host refugees from the region and the implementation of its global and regional commitments; share EU know-how and best practices in water management, as Djibouti is one of the world’s most arid countries experiencing extreme drought; express regret at the fact that no independent media has been authorised to broadcast from Djibouti; call for protection for the sources of the independent Djiboutian media, which have no choice but to broadcast and express themselves from abroad;

Eritrea

| (ii) | condemn the total alignment of Eritrea with the Russian narrative and propaganda, and express concern that Eritrea could become a platform for Russian influence in the Horn of Africa; call on Eritrean authorities to cease their military involvement in the Ethiopian civil conflict, while also facilitating a peace agreement between Ethiopian federal authorities and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front that would include the termination of the group’s missile attacks on Eritrean soil; call on Eritrean authorities to take concrete steps towards internal reconciliation and to release all political prisoners without condition, including the Swedish-Eritrean writer and journalist David Isaak, who has been detained since 2001; constantly monitor the internal situation, and consider a gradual and commensurate reduction of EU sanctions if tangible and objective improvements are made; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

condemn the total alignment of Eritrea with the Russian narrative and propaganda, and express concern that Eritrea could become a platform for Russian influence in the Horn of Africa; call on Eritrean authorities to cease their military involvement in the Ethiopian civil conflict, while also facilitating a peace agreement between Ethiopian federal authorities and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front that would include the termination of the group’s missile attacks on Eritrean soil; call on Eritrean authorities to take concrete steps towards internal reconciliation and to release all political prisoners without condition, including the Swedish-Eritrean writer and journalist David Isaak, who has been detained since 2001; constantly monitor the internal situation, and consider a gradual and commensurate reduction of EU sanctions if tangible and objective improvements are made;

Ethiopia

| (iii) | support all diplomatic efforts towards ending the ongoing conflict within Ethiopia, an important player in the Horn of Africa, both at a national level and, in particular, through the AU’s mediation track, which is going to announce a trio of high-level mediators, chaired by the High Representative for the Horn of Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo, in order to prioritise agreement on a permanent ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access to all areas and the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean forces, and to facilitate accountability and internal reconciliation; insist that the national dialogue must be as inclusive, broad and transparent as possible, including representatives from civil society and opposition parties, in order to fulfil the goal of being a true catalyst for reconciliation; coordinate support between the relevant national and international institutions and the Ethiopian Government in the resumption of health, education and other public facilities and services, including relief services to internally displaced persons and populations affected by conflict; take note of the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch report on crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in Western Tigray; welcome the establishment of an international commission of human rights experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) by the UN Human Rights Council to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into allegations of violations and abuses committed in Ethiopia since 3 November 2020 by all parties to the conflict, working as a complement to the Ethiopian Inter-Ministerial Taskforce (IMTF) on accountability and the findings of the Joint Investigation Team, published in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/Ethiopian Human Rights Commission report in November 2021; support transitional justice to hold the perpetrators of human rights violations accountable for the serious crimes they have committed in the context of the conflict in Ethiopia, in particular by supporting the role of all institutions involved, such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, the UN Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court; take note of some positive developments in the country, such as the humanitarian truce of 24 March 2022 and the release of some political prisoners, increased humanitarian access during the truce, and public declarations by the Ethiopian Government and Tigrayan leadership that they would commit to AU-led peace talks; carefully assess the developments in Ethiopia with a view to taking further measures if the situation deteriorates; at the same time, continue to call for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and the launch of peace talks without delay and explore the possible role of the EU in the mediation process; be ready to gradually reinstate budget support and EU assistance if certain conditions are met, inter alia the cessation of hostilities, full and unhindered humanitarian access across Ethiopia, including in the Tigray region, accountability for the crimes committed in the context of the conflict and the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from the country; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

support all diplomatic efforts towards ending the ongoing conflict within Ethiopia, an important player in the Horn of Africa, both at a national level and, in particular, through the AU’s mediation track, which is going to announce a trio of high-level mediators, chaired by the High Representative for the Horn of Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo, in order to prioritise agreement on a permanent ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access to all areas and the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean forces, and to facilitate accountability and internal reconciliation; insist that the national dialogue must be as inclusive, broad and transparent as possible, including representatives from civil society and opposition parties, in order to fulfil the goal of being a true catalyst for reconciliation; coordinate support between the relevant national and international institutions and the Ethiopian Government in the resumption of health, education and other public facilities and services, including relief services to internally displaced persons and populations affected by conflict; take note of the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch report on crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in Western Tigray; welcome the establishment of an international commission of human rights experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) by the UN Human Rights Council to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into allegations of violations and abuses committed in Ethiopia since 3 November 2020 by all parties to the conflict, working as a complement to the Ethiopian Inter-Ministerial Taskforce (IMTF) on accountability and the findings of the Joint Investigation Team, published in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/Ethiopian Human Rights Commission report in November 2021; support transitional justice to hold the perpetrators of human rights violations accountable for the serious crimes they have committed in the context of the conflict in Ethiopia, in particular by supporting the role of all institutions involved, such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, the UN Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court; take note of some positive developments in the country, such as the humanitarian truce of 24 March 2022 and the release of some political prisoners, increased humanitarian access during the truce, and public declarations by the Ethiopian Government and Tigrayan leadership that they would commit to AU-led peace talks; carefully assess the developments in Ethiopia with a view to taking further measures if the situation deteriorates; at the same time, continue to call for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and the launch of peace talks without delay and explore the possible role of the EU in the mediation process; be ready to gradually reinstate budget support and EU assistance if certain conditions are met, inter alia the cessation of hostilities, full and unhindered humanitarian access across Ethiopia, including in the Tigray region, accountability for the crimes committed in the context of the conflict and the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from the country;

Kenya

| (iv) | underline Kenya’s potential as a key actor in the Horn of Africa in political and economic terms for enhancing regional stability and playing a constructive role in achieving peace and security; support the commitment to a renewed strategic partnership with Kenya; deepen EU-Kenya relations by exploiting the full potential of the EU-Kenya Strategic Dialogue; welcome the decision to deploy an EU Election Observation Mission for the presidential elections in August 2022; commend the peaceful resolution of the electoral dispute following the presidential elections and note the responsible role that the Kenyan courts played in it; call on the Kenyan authorities to properly assess the upcoming final Electoral Observation Mission report and draw the necessary conclusions in order to further reform and improve the country’s electoral processes; commend Kenya’s efforts to collaborate on environmental challenges, welcoming in particular the approval by the UN Environment Assembly meeting in Nairobi in March 2022 of a resolution to end plastic pollution and forge an international legally binding agreement by 2024; |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

underline Kenya’s potential as a key actor in the Horn of Africa in political and economic terms for enhancing regional stability and playing a constructive role in achieving peace and security; support the commitment to a renewed strategic partnership with Kenya; deepen EU-Kenya relations by exploiting the full potential of the EU-Kenya Strategic Dialogue; welcome the decision to deploy an EU Election Observation Mission for the presidential elections in August 2022; commend the peaceful resolution of the electoral dispute following the presidential elections and note the responsible role that the Kenyan courts played in it; call on the Kenyan authorities to properly assess the upcoming final Electoral Observation Mission report and draw the necessary conclusions in order to further reform and improve the country’s electoral processes; commend Kenya’s efforts to collaborate on environmental challenges, welcoming in particular the approval by the UN Environment Assembly meeting in Nairobi in March 2022 of a resolution to end plastic pollution and forge an international legally binding agreement by 2024;

Somalia

| (v) | point out that the precarious security situation in Somalia is giving cause for great concern and, if not firmly contained, could become a major factor in destabilising the entire Horn of Africa and even areas further afield; welcome the conclusion of the Somalian presidential elections and the peaceful transfer of power; call on the newly elected president to form an inclusive cabinet and on the new government to make progress on critical national priorities, including addressing the dire humanitarian situation in the country; evaluate the resumption of support from Europe; welcome the benefits of EU involvement in Somalia; underline the obvious added value of advisory missions to command structures and thus encourage the involvement of European participants in EU Training Mission operations; fully support efforts by ATMIS to promote human rights in Somalia and peacekeeping efforts against al-Shabaab, which is threatening the security of democracy and the rule of law in the country; work together with AU and Somali institutions to revise the mandate of ATMIS, focusing on institution building, and providing sufficient financial support through the EPF; coordinate efforts with the AU and IGAD to stimulate a process of nation building within Somalia that puts civil society at its core; ensure that the revision of ATMIS is carried out in parallel with the gradual reinforcement of Somali armed forces and civilian security apparatus, which should become the final guarantors of security in the country; consult with the Somali authorities with the aim of identifying new forms of bilateral cooperation with the EU to strengthen Somalia’s capacity to guarantee maritime security and avoid any risk of piracy re-emerging within its territorial waters; support a thorough assessment of the performance of ATMIS troops in the light of efforts to prevent crimes perpetrated by regular armies in Somalia; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

point out that the precarious security situation in Somalia is giving cause for great concern and, if not firmly contained, could become a major factor in destabilising the entire Horn of Africa and even areas further afield; welcome the conclusion of the Somalian presidential elections and the peaceful transfer of power; call on the newly elected president to form an inclusive cabinet and on the new government to make progress on critical national priorities, including addressing the dire humanitarian situation in the country; evaluate the resumption of support from Europe; welcome the benefits of EU involvement in Somalia; underline the obvious added value of advisory missions to command structures and thus encourage the involvement of European participants in EU Training Mission operations; fully support efforts by ATMIS to promote human rights in Somalia and peacekeeping efforts against al-Shabaab, which is threatening the security of democracy and the rule of law in the country; work together with AU and Somali institutions to revise the mandate of ATMIS, focusing on institution building, and providing sufficient financial support through the EPF; coordinate efforts with the AU and IGAD to stimulate a process of nation building within Somalia that puts civil society at its core; ensure that the revision of ATMIS is carried out in parallel with the gradual reinforcement of Somali armed forces and civilian security apparatus, which should become the final guarantors of security in the country; consult with the Somali authorities with the aim of identifying new forms of bilateral cooperation with the EU to strengthen Somalia’s capacity to guarantee maritime security and avoid any risk of piracy re-emerging within its territorial waters; support a thorough assessment of the performance of ATMIS troops in the light of efforts to prevent crimes perpetrated by regular armies in Somalia;

South Sudan

| (vi) | take note of the extension of the mandate of the government for another two years, but underline its obligation to make progress on the implementation of the peace agreement and to prepare for free and fair elections; fully support the early implementation of the peace agreement in South Sudan through the main monitoring structures such as the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, working closely with the AU and IGAD; coordinate with and support other international and regional actors in South Sudan, such as the AU, IGAD, the UN and the Troika (the US, UK and Norway), to continue with robust engagement in pressuring the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity to keep implementing the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, in particular its pre-transitional tasks including women’s representation, as detailed in the agreement; |
| --- | --- |

(vi)

take note of the extension of the mandate of the government for another two years, but underline its obligation to make progress on the implementation of the peace agreement and to prepare for free and fair elections; fully support the early implementation of the peace agreement in South Sudan through the main monitoring structures such as the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, working closely with the AU and IGAD; coordinate with and support other international and regional actors in South Sudan, such as the AU, IGAD, the UN and the Troika (the US, UK and Norway), to continue with robust engagement in pressuring the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity to keep implementing the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, in particular its pre-transitional tasks including women’s representation, as detailed in the agreement;

Sudan

| (vii) | reiterate the condemnation of the military coup of October 2021 and the violence committed in the ensuing crackdown; coordinate with other actors in the region to put pressure on the military to establish a clear timetable for the reinstatement of civilian rule, leading to fair, open and transparent general elections as soon as possible; take note of the military’s declared intention to hand over power to the civilian authorities, and call for this transition to be implemented without any undue delay; call on the civilian political authorities to increase coordination and cooperation in order to present clear plans to ensure a peaceful transition; underline that a swift solution is needed, since any further delay would exacerbate the deterioration of the economy and the humanitarian situation throughout the country, and would aggravate the already immense challenges that the people of Sudan are facing; support civil society and activists on the ground and call for the liberation of detained peaceful activists and political prisoners; reiterate their firm support for the ongoing efforts of the Tripartite Mechanism to help reconcile the differences between the Sudanese parties and initiatives, facilitate the restoration of the transition to democracy and smooth its path towards civil and democratic transformation; emphasise that a transitional justice process needs to be launched in order to bring perpetrators of human right violations to justice and lay the groundwork for national reconciliation; enhance EU action on the ground in terms of humanitarian aid and direct support for the population, improving the living conditions of local communities, while also reducing exposure to Russian and Chinese influences; express deep concern over the planned establishment of a Russian naval base in Port Sudan, which would have negative repercussions for the peace and security of the Red Sea; |
| --- | --- |

(vii)

reiterate the condemnation of the military coup of October 2021 and the violence committed in the ensuing crackdown; coordinate with other actors in the region to put pressure on the military to establish a clear timetable for the reinstatement of civilian rule, leading to fair, open and transparent general elections as soon as possible; take note of the military’s declared intention to hand over power to the civilian authorities, and call for this transition to be implemented without any undue delay; call on the civilian political authorities to increase coordination and cooperation in order to present clear plans to ensure a peaceful transition; underline that a swift solution is needed, since any further delay would exacerbate the deterioration of the economy and the humanitarian situation throughout the country, and would aggravate the already immense challenges that the people of Sudan are facing; support civil society and activists on the ground and call for the liberation of detained peaceful activists and political prisoners; reiterate their firm support for the ongoing efforts of the Tripartite Mechanism to help reconcile the differences between the Sudanese parties and initiatives, facilitate the restoration of the transition to democracy and smooth its path towards civil and democratic transformation; emphasise that a transitional justice process needs to be launched in order to bring perpetrators of human right violations to justice and lay the groundwork for national reconciliation; enhance EU action on the ground in terms of humanitarian aid and direct support for the population, improving the living conditions of local communities, while also reducing exposure to Russian and Chinese influences; express deep concern over the planned establishment of a Russian naval base in Port Sudan, which would have negative repercussions for the peace and security of the Red Sea;

Uganda

| (viii) | recognise the important role played by Uganda in the mediation process that brought about the peace agreement in South Sudan; welcome the contribution of the Ugandan armed forces to ATMIS, and coordinate with the country with a view to the future of the mission; support the new parish model and other endeavours to fight poverty through a grassroots approach; express regret at the conditions under which the presidential elections of January 2021 were conducted and call on Ugandan national authorities to promote an open political space conducive to fair and transparent elections, while also refraining from limiting access to media and social media; underline the fact that the right to free and prior informed consent of indigenous people and local communities is enshrined in international law and call on the Ugandan national authorities to uphold all fundamental human rights on all occasions; express concern, in this regard, about the severe human rights violations reported in the East African Crude Oil Pipeline project as well as the associated risks of irreversible harm to the environment and climate; call on the EU to urgently adopt the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive in order to hold European companies accountable when their activities are linked to such violations; |
| --- | --- |

(viii)

recognise the important role played by Uganda in the mediation process that brought about the peace agreement in South Sudan; welcome the contribution of the Ugandan armed forces to ATMIS, and coordinate with the country with a view to the future of the mission; support the new parish model and other endeavours to fight poverty through a grassroots approach; express regret at the conditions under which the presidential elections of January 2021 were conducted and call on Ugandan national authorities to promote an open political space conducive to fair and transparent elections, while also refraining from limiting access to media and social media; underline the fact that the right to free and prior informed consent of indigenous people and local communities is enshrined in international law and call on the Ugandan national authorities to uphold all fundamental human rights on all occasions; express concern, in this regard, about the severe human rights violations reported in the East African Crude Oil Pipeline project as well as the associated risks of irreversible harm to the environment and climate; call on the EU to urgently adopt the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive in order to hold European companies accountable when their activities are linked to such violations;

2.   Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and, for information, to the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the UN.

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(1)  OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 24.

(2)  OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 80.

(3)  OJ C 224, 8.6.2022, p. 99.

(4)  OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 114.

(5)  OJ C 336, 2.9.2022, p. 14.

(6)  OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 132.

(7)  OJ C 132, 24.3.2022, p. 205.

(8)  OJ C 465, 17.11.2021, p. 154.

(9)  OJ C 202, 28.5.2021, p. 54.

(10)  OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 50.

(11)  OJ C 50, 9.2.2018, p. 57.

(12)  OJ C 307, 30.8.2018, p. 92.

(13)  OJ C 76, 28.2.2018, p. 35.

(14)  OJ C 294, 23.7.2021, p. 8.

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III Preparatory acts

European Parliament

Tuesday 4 October 2022

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/130 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/130

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P9_TA(2022)0332

European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 establishing a European Centre for disease prevention and control (COM(2020)0726 — C9-0366/2020 — 2020/0320(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 132/17)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2020)0726), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2020)0726),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 168(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0366/2020), |
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—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 168(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0366/2020),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the reasoned opinion submitted, within the framework of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, by the French Senate, asserting that the draft legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the reasoned opinion submitted, within the framework of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, by the French Senate, asserting that the draft legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 27 April 2021 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 27 April 2021 (1),

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 7 May 2021 (2), |
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—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 7 May 2021 (2),

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 8 December 2021 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 8 December 2021 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgets, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgets,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A9-0253/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A9-0253/2021),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out (3); |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
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2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

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(1)  OJ C 286, 16.7.2021, p. 109.

(2)  OJ C 300, 27.7.2021, p. 76.

(3)  This position replaces the amendments adopted on 14 September 2021 (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0376).

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P9_TC1-COD(2020)0320

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 establishing a European centre for disease prevention and control

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2370.)

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| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/132 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/132

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P9_TA(2022)0333

Serious cross-border threats to health ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross-border threats to health repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU (COM(2020)0727 — C9-0367/2020 — 2020/0322(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 132/18)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2020)0727), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2020)0727),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 168(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0367/2020), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 168(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0367/2020),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the reasoned opinion submitted, within the framework of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, by the French Senate, asserting that the draft legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the reasoned opinion submitted, within the framework of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, by the French Senate, asserting that the draft legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 27 April 2021 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 27 April 2021 (1),

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 7 May 2021 (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 7 May 2021 (2),

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 29 June 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 29 June 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A9-0247/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A9-0247/2021),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out (3); |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

(1)  OJ C 286, 16.7.2021, p. 109.

(2)  OJ C 300, 27.7.2021, p. 76.

(3)  This position replaces the amendments adopted on 14 September and 11 November 2021 (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0377 and P9_TA(2021)0449).

---

P9_TC1-COD(2020)0322

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2371.)

---

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/133 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/133

---

P9_TA(2022)0336

Management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Area of Competence ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Area of Competence, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1936/2001, (EC) No 1984/2003 and (EC) No 520/2007 (COM(2021)0113 — C9-0095/2021 — 2021/0058(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 132/19)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0113), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0113),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 43(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0095/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 43(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0095/2021),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 9 June 2021 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 9 June 2021 (1),

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 22 June 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 22 June 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0312/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0312/2021),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

(1)  OJ C 341, 24.8.2021, p. 106.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2021)0058

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Area of Competence, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1936/2001, (EC) No 1984/2003 and (EC) No 520/2007

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2343.)

---

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/134 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/134

---

P9_TA(2022)0337

Flexible Assistance to Territories (FAST-CARE) ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 and Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) — CARE (COM(2022)0325 — C9-0218/2022 — 2022/0208(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 132/20)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0325), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0325),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 177 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0218/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 177 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0218/2022),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 20 July 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 20 July 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A9-0232/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A9-0232/2022),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2022)0208

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) — CARE

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2039.)

---

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/135 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/135

---

P9_TA(2022)0338

Radio Equipment Directive: common charger for electronic devices ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/53/EU on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment (COM(2021)0547 — C9-0366/2021 — 2021/0291(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 132/21)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0547), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0547),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0366/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0366/2021),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 8 December 2021 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 8 December 2021 (1),

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 29 June 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 29 June 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rules 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0129/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0129/2022),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

(1)  OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 82.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2021)0291

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/53/EU on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Directive (EU) 2022/2380.)

---

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/136 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/136

---

P9_TA(2022)0340

EU Customs Single Window ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Union Single Window Environment for Customs and amending Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 (COM(2020)0673 — C9-0338/2020 — 2020/0306(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 132/22)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2020)0673), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2020)0673),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 33, 114 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0338/2020), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 33, 114 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0338/2020),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 24 March 2021 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 24 March 2021 (1),

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 15 June 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 15 June 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the letter from the Committee on International Trade, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letter from the Committee on International Trade,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0279/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A9-0279/2021),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

(1)  OJ C 220, 9.6.2021, p. 62.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2020)0306

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Union Single Window Environment for Customs and amending Regulation (EU) No 952/2013

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2399.)

---

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/137 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/137

---

P9_TA(2022)0341

Statistics on agricultural input and output ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on statistics on agricultural input and output and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1165/2008, (EC) No 543/2009, (EC) No 1185/2009 and Council Directive 96/16/EC (COM(2021)0037 — C9-0009/2021 — 2021/0020(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 132/23)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0037), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0037),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 338(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0009/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 338(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0009/2021),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 17 June 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 17 June 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (A9-0285/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (A9-0285/2021),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Approves the joint statement by Parliament and the Council annexed to this resolution, which will be published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Takes note of the statement by the Commission annexed to this resolution, which will be published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

5.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2021)0020

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on statistics on agricultural input and output, amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 617/2008 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1165/2008, (EC) No 543/2009 and (EC) No 1185/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 96/16/EC

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2379.)

---

ANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL IN RELATION TO REGULATION (EU) 2022/2379, AS REGARDS THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING IN ALL MEMBER STATES A REGISTER HELD BY NATIONAL COMPETENT AUTHORITIES ON THE USE OF PLANT PROTECTION PRODUCTS IN AGRICULTURE

As part of the European Green Deal, the Farm to Fork Strategy and the Biodiversity Strategy highlight the need for a transition to a sustainable food system, in particular by reducing the use and risk of pesticides by 50 % by 2030 and by increasing organic farming and biodiversity-rich landscape features on agricultural land.

Under Regulation (EU) 2022/2379 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1), the full collection of data on the use of plant protection products by professional users in an agricultural activity, that is a coverage of 95 % of the use in each Member State, can only be achieved when a legal requirement for professional users of plant protection products to transmit their records in electronic format to national competent authorities is applicable under Union law.

The European Parliament and the Council recognise the importance of introducing such a requirement into Union legislation and commit to working together to that end.

STATEMENT BY THE COMMISSION IN RELATION TO REGULATION (EU) 2022/2379, AS REGARDS ON-GOING WORK TO ENSURE THE AVAILABILITY IN ELECTRONIC FORMAT OF THE RECORDS TO BE KEPT BY PROFESSIONAL USERS OF PLANT PROTECTION PRODUCTS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 67(1) OF REGULATION (EC) NO 1107/2009

The European Green Deal and the Farm to Fork Strategy establish a reduction in the use and risk of chemical pesticides as a key objective for the Union. In order to ensure effective and impactful policies, robust and comprehensive data on the use of pesticides at farm level is crucial. The on-going work to ensure the availability in electronic format of the records kept by professional users of plant protection products is an important enabling factor to implementing the reporting obligations on pesticides that are part of Regulation (EU) 2022/2379 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) (SAIO).

Therefore, the Commission has prepared a draft Commission Implementing Regulation, on the basis of Article 67(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), as regards the content and format of the records of the use of plant protection products to be kept by professional users in accordance with Article 67(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009.

That Implementing Regulation would, if adopted as currently foreseen, regulate the record-keeping required under Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 in detail, including by identifying the elements to be recorded by the professional users, and by ensuring that those records will be available in electronic format from 1 January 2025 at the latest.

The draft of that Implementing Regulation is currently under discussion in the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed, Section Phytopharmaceuticals — Legislation. The Commission intends to seek the opinion of the committee pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) in the coming months.

The Commission intends to adopt that Implementing Regulation before the end of 2022.

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) 2022/2379 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 on statistics on agricultural input and output, amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 617/2008 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1165/2008, (EC) No 543/2009 and (EC) No 1185/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 96/16/EC (OJ L 315, 7.12.2022, p. 1).

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2022/2379 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 on statistics on agricultural input and output, amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 617/2008 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1165/2008, (EC) No 543/2009 and (EC) No 1185/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 96/16/EC (OJ L 315, 7.12.2022, p. 1).

(3)  Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1).

(4)  Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13).

---

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/139 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/139

---

P9_TA(2022)0342

Amending Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 of the European Parliament and of the Council on persistent organic pollutants (COM(2021)0656 — C9-0396/2021 — 2021/0340(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 132/24)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0656), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0656),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 192(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0396/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 192(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0396/2021),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 8 December 2021 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 8 December 2021 (1),

| — | after consulting the Committee of the Regions, |
| --- | --- |

—

after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 29 June 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 29 June 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A9-0092/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A9-0092/2022),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out (2); |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Takes note of the statement by the Commission annexed to this resolution; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

4.

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(1)  OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 197.

(2)  This position replaces the amendments adopted on 3 May 2022 (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0130).

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P9_TC1-COD(2021)0340

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 4 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2400.)

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ANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Commission statement

Commission statement on the occasion of the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/2400 (1)
  , on inclusion of waste code 17 05 04‘soil and stones other than those mentioned in 17 05 03’ in part 2 of Annex V of Regulation (EU) 2019/1021

The inclusion in part 2 of Annex V of the waste code for ‘soils and stones other than those mentioned in 170503’ should not be understood to favour disposal of soil as waste over remediation in view of preventing waste generation.

Where disposal offers the best environmental waste management option, the exceptional derogation from destructive treatment is subject to the requirements of Article 7(4) of the Regulation (EU) 2019/1021.

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(1)  Regulation (EU) 2022/2400 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 amending Annexes IV and V to Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants (OJ L 317, 9.12.2022, p. 24).

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Thursday 6 October 2022

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/141 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/141

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P9_TA(2022)0348

Slot utilisation rules at Union airports: temporary relief ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 6 October 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 as regards temporary relief from the slot utilisation rules at Community airports due to the COVID-19 pandemic (COM(2022)0334 — C9-0225/2022 — 2022/0214(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 132/25)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0334), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0334),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 91 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0225/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 91 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0225/2022),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 22 September 2022 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 22 September 2022 (1),

| — | after consulting the Committee of the Regions, |
| --- | --- |

—

after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

| — | having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure,

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

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(1)  Not yet published in the Official Journal.

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P9_TC1-COD(2022)0214

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 6 October 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 as regards temporary relief from the slot utilisation rules at Union airports due to an epidemiological situation or military aggression

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2038.)

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