## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

A Plus Janitor ial Co. v. Group F ox, Inc. , 2013 IL App (1st) 120245

Appellate Court Caption A P L US J AN I TORIAL COMPANY, I NC., n/k/a A + J anitorial and Supply
, Inc., an I l l i nois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GROUP FOX
, I NC., an I llinois Corporation, and WOJ CI ECH RUSI N, an Individual, Defe ndants-Appe llees.

District & N o. First District, Six th Division Docke t No. 1-12-0245

Filed Marc h 29, 2013

Held (Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t o

f the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The dismiss al of a dissolved c orporation’s c omplaint alleg ing brea ch of contra ct, bre ach of an employ ment agree ment and tortious interfe renc e with an employ

ment agree ment was upheld, notwithstanding the fac t that the trial court based its decision on plaintiff’s lack of standing
, since the dismiss al wa s p ro p er as a matter of law and was upheld on the basis of exis ting pr ece dent that a dissolved corpor ation lacks the ca pacity to sue for c laims arisingafte r the dissolution.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 11-L -3501; the Hon. Daniel J. P ierc e, Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Lucas M. Fuksa and Nathaniel T. Cutler, both of Fu k sa Khorshid L L C, of Chicag o, for a

ppellant.

Stephen A. Gorman, of L aw Offic es of Stephen A. Gorman, of Chicag o, for a ppellee Group F ox , Inc.

Anthony DeB lasio and David M. Gower
, both of DeBl asio & Donnell L L C, of Oak B rook, for

appellee Wojciech Rusin.

Panel J USTI CE REYES delivered the judgment of the c ourt, with opinion. Presiding J ustice L ampkin and J ustice Gordon concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Fo l l o wi n g the dismiss al of its complaint with prejudice
, plaintiff A Plus J an i t o ri al Company (A Plus) now appea ls the decision of the trial co u rt

. The trial court g rante d the motions to dismis s o f t h e defe ndants, Group Fox, Inc. (Group Fox), and Wojciech Rusin (Rusin), pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-619 (West 2010)). The trial court found that A Plus lacke d standing as a dissolved corpor ation pursuing claims that acc rued postdissol ution. On appea l, A Plus argues even though its claims acc rued postdissol ution, it still has standing to pursue t he claims beca use the rig hts to the claims exis ted prior to the dissoluti on. For the rea sons that follow, we aff irm the decision of the trial court.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 This case involves the alleg ed brea ch of two contra cts: (1) a m ai n t en ance agree ment betwee n A Plus and Group Fox, Inc.; and (2) an employ ment agree ment betwee n A Plus and Wojciech Rusin. A Plus was an I llinois corpor ation eng ag ed in the b u s i n ess of providing profe ssional clea

nin g s er v ices. Group Fox is an I llinois corpor ation eng ag ed in rea l estate proper ty manag ement. Rusin is a former employ ee of A Plus who was subsequently hired by Group F ox in 2009. ¶ 4 Effe ctive Dec ember 1, 2004, A Plus ente red into a maintenanc e agree ment with Group Fox to perform c leaningservice s for a building located in Oak B rook, I llinois . Pursuant to

a provision in the contra ct, the maintenanc e agree ment “automatica lly extended and

rene wed” ever

y two y ear s on Dec ember 1. Either party
, howeve r, could prevent automatic

rene wal of the maintenanc e ag ree ment by providing written notice to the other party 30 day s

-2-prior to the Dec ember 1 rene wal date. The maintenanc e agree ment also provided that Group

Fox “ may at no time dur ing or for one y ear afte r termination of this Agree ment hire, re tain or employ

*** any individual that is or has been e mploy ed by [A P lus] .” ¶ 5 On J uly 5, 2005, A Plus enter ed into a written employ ment agree ment with Rusin. In the employ ment ag ree ment, Rusin agree d not to apply to or be hired by a “company (which is contra cted with A Plus J anitorial for clea ning service ) to perf

orm the job instead of A Plus.” Pursuant to this employ

ment agree ment, Rusin perf ormed clea

ning service s as an employ ee of A Plus at the Oak B rook prope rty manag ed by

Group F ox

. ¶ 6 Effe ctive Marc h 8, 2008, A Plus voluntarily dissolved a s a corpor ation afte r filing a rticles of dissoluti on with the I llinois Secre tary of State. Nine months afte r A Plus’s dissoluti on, the maintenanc e ag ree ment’s Dec ember 1, 2008 rene wal date passed without ei ther party providing 30 day s’ written notice of termination. Subsequently
, in or about J une 2009, Group Fox terminated the maintenanc e agree ment with A Plus and then employ ed Rusin to perf orm clea ning a nd janitorial servic es.

¶ 7 I . Ver ified Complaint ¶ 8 On Ap ri l 4, 2011, A Plus filed its “Ve rified Complaint at L aw” in the circ uit cou rt o f Cook County
, naming Gro up Fox and Rusin as defe ndants. The complaint set forth three counts. Count I alleg ed Group Fox brea ched its contra ct with A Plus when it terminated the maintenanc e ag ree ment and employ ed Rusin in J une 2009. Count I I alleg ed Rusin brea ched his employ

ment agree ment with A Plus by undertaking employ ment with Group Fox. Count I I I alleg ed Group Fox tortiously interfe red with the employ ment agree ment betwee n A Plus and Rusin.

¶ 9 I I . Group F ox ’s and Rusin’s Motions to Dism iss and Joi nt Motion for Reconsidera tion ¶ 10 On J une 24, 2011, Rusin filed a combined mot ion to dismiss count I Iof t he complaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-615, 2- 619(a) (2), (9) (West 2010)). Three day s later, Group Fox simil arly filed a motion to dismiss 1
counts I an d I I I of t he complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of t he C ode of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-619(a) (2), (9) (West 2010)). Both motions challeng ed A Plus’s standing and capa city to sue as an aff

irmative matter, arguing that as a dissolved entity
, A Plus could not bringclaims wher e the a lleg ed bre ache s occur red postdissolution. ¶ 11 The trial court ini tially denied these motions in an or d er d ated September 12, 2011. In the September 12 o rd er , t h e trial court relied on an aff idavit from the president of A Plus attesting that A Plus had merg ed with A+ J anitorial & Supply
, Inc. (A+ ), prior to the

We not e tha t Rusi n fa il ed to la bel eac h m oti on as re qui re d by sec ti on 2- 619. 1 of the Code 1 of Civil Pro cedure

. See 735 I LCS 5/2

- 619. 1 (W est 2010 ). Nonet hel ess , a m oti on tha t is inc orr ect ly des ignat ed wil l st il l be dee m ed pro per if the non-m ovant has not bee n pre j udi ced

. Kovi li c v. Cit

y of Chic ago , 351 I ll

. App. 3d 139, 143 (20 04)

. We do not fi nd any pre j udi ce has re sul te d fr om thi s error

.
-3-dissoluti on of A Plus in Marc h 2008. The trial court rea soned that under section 11.50 of the

Business Corporation Act of 1983 (805 I L CS 5/11.50 (We s t 2010)), “the surviving corpor ation from a merg er has all the rig hts and power ” previously belong ing to the nonsurviving corpor ations. Acc ording ly
, the trial court found that the actions could still be broug ht ag ainst Group Fox and Rusin beca use A Plus’s appar ent merg er with A+ prior to the Marc h 2008 dissoluti on raised a g enuine issue of materia l fac t s u fficie nt to prec lude dismiss al. ¶ 12 S ub s eq u en t l y , Gr o up Fo x an d Ru s i n fi l ed “Defe n d an t s ’ J o i n t M o t i o n fo r Reconsider ation” and rea sserted their arg uments for dismiss al under section 2-619. In their joint motion, Group Fox and Rusin attache d as exhibi ts the rec ords of the I llinois Secre tary of State to de monstrate no merg er ever took pla ce betwee n A Plus and A+. Relying on this

new information, the trial court g rante d the joint motion and dismiss ed A Plus’s c omplaint with prejudice pursuant to section 2-619. In its order g ranting dismiss al, the trial court found that “A Plus did not leg ally merg e with A+” and there fore rema ined “a dissolved corpor ation prior to any alleg ed brea ches for which it seeks re l i ef

. ” Acc ording to the trial court, as a dissolved corpor ation, “[A P l u s ] could not be party to the automatic rene wal” of the maintenanc e ag ree ment in Dec ember 2008. Thus, the trial court found t h at A Plus lacke d standingto maintain the claims pled ag ainst Group F ox and Rusin in its complaint. 2

¶ 13 ANALYSI S ¶ 14 A section 2 -6 1 9 m otion to dismiss admits the leg al sufficie ncy of the complaint, but

asser ts aff irmative matter to otherwise defe at the claim. Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville
, 2012 I L 113148, ¶ 31. In considering a section 2-619 motion to dismiss
, a court revie ws all pleading s and supporting documents in a light most favor able to the nonmoving party

. Van Mete r v. Darien Park Di s t r i ct , 2 07 I ll. 2d 359, 367-68 (2003). The court must then consider whether the exist ence of a g enuine issue of materia l f

act prec ludes dismiss al
or, absent such an issue of fac t, whether t h e as s erte d aff irmative matter makes dismiss al prop er as a matter of law. Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exc hange, Inc. v. Hodge
, 156 I ll. 2d 112, 116-17 (1993). A court’s dispositi on of a section 2-619 moti o n i s re v i ewed de novo

. Van Mete r , 207 I ll. 2d at 368. De nov o consideration means we review independent of the trial court’ s judgme nt. Arthur v. Catour , 216 I ll. 2d 72, 78 (2005). ¶ 15 T h e t ri al court decide d this case as an issue of standing and the parties have similar l y
ar gu ed t h i s case on appea l. This case , howeve r, does not prese nt an is sue of standing

. S ee Pielet v. Pielet
, 2012 I L 112064, ¶ 47 (“This case prese n ts no issue as to standing ***.”). Acc ording ly
, the proper vehicle for dismiss al in this case is section 2-619(a )(2) –that is, the lack of “leg al ca p ac ity to sue or *** be sued.” 735 I L CS 5/2-619(a) (2) (West 2010). The “leg al capa city to sue or be sued” g ener ally ref ers to the status of the party , e.g. , incompetent, infant ( Patterson Heating & Air Conditi oning Corp. v. Durable Construction Co.
, 3 I ll. App. 3d 444, 446 (1972))
, or unincorporated association ( American Fede r ation of Technical

I n i ts wri tt en o rde r, t he t ri al cou rtdi d no t s pec if y under whi ch s ubs ect ion of 2- 619 it was 2 grant ing di smissa l.

-4-Engineers, Local 144 v. La Jeune sse , 63 I ll. 2d 263, 266 (1976))

. In contra st, “[t] he doctrine of standing require s that a party , either in an individual or repr esentative capa city
, have a rea l interest in the action broug ht a nd in its out come.” In re Estate of W ellman
, 174 I ll. 2d 335, 344 (1996). L ack of standing repr esents “ ‘af firmative matter’ that is pr operly raised under section 2-619(a )(9) .” Glisson v. City of Marion
, 188 I ll. 2d 211, 220 (1999). Nonetheles s, “[w]here t h e dismiss al was proper as a matter of law, we may aff irm the circ uit court’s decision on any basis appea ring in the rec ord.” Rodriguez v. Illinois Prisoner Rev iew Board
, 376 I ll. App. 3d 429, 433 (2007). Ac cording ly , we may aff irm under se ction 2-619(a )(2)

. ¶ 16 On appea l, A Plus has abandone d the asser tion t h at i t m er ged wi t h A+ prior to its dissoluti on. I n s t ead, A Plus argues its corpor ate dissoluti on does not bar the filing of its claims ag ainst Group Fox and Rusin. A Plus relies exclusively on Piel et v. Pielet
, 407 I ll. App. 3d 474 (2d Dist. 2010) ( Pielet I ), aff’d in part & rev’d in part , 2012 I L 112064, for the proposition that cause s of action based on rig hts exis ting prior to dissoluti on may acc rue afte r corpor ate dissoluti on. There fore
, acc ording to A Plus, beca use the obliga t i o n s u nder the maintenanc e ag ree ment and employ ment agree ment exis ted predissolution, it still may bring its lawsuit despite the fac t that the cause s of ac tion accr ued postdissoluti on. ¶ 17 In Pielet I

, plaintiff sued defe ndant for brea ch o f a 1 9 8 6 co nsulting agree ment afte r pay ments made to plaintiff under the agree ment prema turely cea sed in 1998. Pielet I
, 407 I ll. App. 3d at 475. Def

endant, howeve r, had dissolved as a corpor ation in 1994, four y ear s prior to the alleg ed brea ch in 1998. Id. at 476. At issue, there fore
, was whether plaintiff could still

sue d e f e n d a nt wh e n th e c laims acc rued afte r defe ndant’s 1994 dissoluti on, but the obliga tions had existed since 1986. Id. at 491-92. ¶ 18 To decide this question, the Second District of this court interpre ted section 12.80 of the Business Corporation Act of 1983 ( 805 I L CS 5/ 12.80 (West 2010)). Pielet I
, 407 I ll. App. 3d at 492-97. Sec tion 12.80 reads: “The dissoluti on of a corp o ra t i o n *** shall not take away nor i mpair any civil reme dy available to or ag ainst such corpor ation, its d i re ct ors, or share holders, for any rig ht or claim exis ting, or any liability incurre d, prior to such dissoluti on if action or other proce edingthere on is commence d within five y ear s afte r the date of such dissolution.” 805 I L CS 5/ 12.80 (West 2010). Acc ording to the court, the l anguag e o f section 12.80 prese rving “any right ‘or’ claim ‘or’ any liability incurre d prior to dissoluti on compels the infere nce that the leg islature intended those terms to be viewed in the alternative.” Pielet I
, 407 I ll. App. 3d at 492. Thus, the court conclude d the leg islature intended “to prese rve corpor ate obligations of three distinct ty pes: ‘cla ims,’ ‘ rig hts,’ and ‘liabilities.’ ” Id. at 493. Moreove r, section 12.80 prese rved all three distinct corpor ate obligations reg ardle ss of w h et h er the cause of action was initiated by or ag ainst a dissolved corpor ation. See id. at 4 9 5 -9 6 (n oting that dissolved corpor ation’s exis ting debts and obli g ations extend into the five-y ear survival period and “a corporation

or its c reditors may

asser t claims reg ardingthose debts and obligations during the survival period” (empha sis added))

. ¶ 19 The Second District rec og nized that other I llinois Appellate Court decisions interpre ted section 12.80 to allow “a party to asser t a cause of action ag ainst a dissolved corpor ation only

-5-if the cause of action acc rued b ef o re t he dissoluti on.” Id. at 493 (citing Beals v. Superior W elding Co.
, 273 I ll. App. 3d 655 (1995), and Blankenship v. Demm ler Manufacturing Co.
, 89 I ll. App. 3d 569 (1980))

. Nonethele ss, the court distinguished these case s on the basis that “this case involves [t he] a ssertion of a ‘right’ or ‘liability ’ exis ting prior to dissolution, not a ‘cause of action’ e x isting prior to *** dissolution.” Id. Acc ording ly , the cour t conclude d that so long as the “right” or “liability ” underly ing the claim exis ted prior to dissoluti on, the claim could still be broug ht even if the claim itself ac crue d postdissol ution. Id. at 497. ¶ 20 Subsequent to the parties’ brief i n g in this matter, however, the I llinois Supreme Court

reve rsed the decision in Pielet I on this issue. Pielet v. Pielet
, 2012 I L 112064, ¶ 59 ( Pielet II ). F irst, the court in Pielet II found that the interpr etation of section 12.80 in Pielet I was at odds with those of other I llinois Appellate Court districts and t h e Norther n District of I llinois

. Id. ¶ 32. The court then t horoug hly discussed the fede ral decision, In re JohnsManville/ A s b es tosis Cases
, 516 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. I ll. 1981), and adopted its rea soning. 3 Pielet II
, 2012 I L 112064, ¶¶ 34-39. The court noted that t h e l anguag e “right or claim exis ting” had b ee n added to an older version of the law, which previously only prese rved claims aga i n st a dissolved corpor ation. Id. ¶ 36. There fore
, acc ording to the court, this languag e had the eff

ect of additionally prese rving actions by a dissolved corpor ation. Id. ¶ 37 (citing In re Johns-M

anville/Asbestosis Cases
, 516 F. Supp. at 377). This languag e did not, howeve r, distinguish the exis ting need for any cause o f action to actua lly acc rue prior to dissoluti on. Id. ¶ 21 To be cer

tai n , t h e fa ct s of Pielet and the fac ts of this case are not entirely analog ous. P ielet involved claims ag ainst a dissolved corpor ation. This case involves clai m s b y a dissolved corpor ation. Reg ardle ss, this distinction does not aff ect the outcome here

. As the decision in Pielet II and the previously exis ting line of prec edent indicate, any rig hts, claims,

or liabiliti es prese rved by section 12.80 still must be raised in a cause of action that actua lly

acc rued predissolution. Indeed, prior to the decision in Pielet I
, this had alway s been the law in I llinois

. See H

e n d e r s o n

- S m it h & A ssociates, Inc. v. Nahamani Family Servic e Center, Inc.
, 323 I ll. App. 3d 15, 22 (2001) (“[plaintiff] could not avail itself of the corpor ate survival statute bec ause its ca

use of a ction did not accr ue until after it was dissolved” ( emphasis in orig inal)); Blankenship v. Demm ler Manufacturing Co.
, 89 I ll. App. 3d 569, 574 (1980) (“the rationale underlying this survival statute supports our decision that there is no basi s for allowing a cause of action which acc rues afte r dissoluti on”); Amman Food & Liquor, Inc. v. Heritage Insurance Co.
, 65 I ll. App. 3d 140, 147-49 (1978) (plaintiff could commence the suit a s a dissolved c orpora tion in orde r to stop the runningof the statute of limit ations, but plaintiff cou l d not “maintain” the suit unless reinstated as a corpor ation); see also Korte Trucking Co. v. Broadway Ford Truck Sales, Inc.
, 877 S.W .2d 218, 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (“a dissolved corpor ation does not have the capa city to sue for claims arising afte r di s s o l u t ion”) (applying I llinois law). In light of the I llinois Supreme Court’s decision in

T he cou rt in In re Joh ns- Ma nvi ll e / Asbe st osi s Case s int erpre te d a pri or cod if ic at ion of 3

sec ti on 12

. 8 0
, sec ti on 94 of the Busi nes s Corp ora ti on Act (I ll

. Rev. Sta t. 1979
, ch. 32, ¶ 157. 94)

. Exce pt for a sho rt er sur viv al per iod of two years , the te xt of sec ti on 94 is ide nti cal to sec ti on 12.8 0. Com par e I ll . Rev. Sta t. 1 979, ch. 32, ¶ 157.94 , wit h 80 5 I LCS 5/ 12.8 0 ( We st201 0).

-6-Pielet II and the exis ting line of prec edent, the trial court prop er l y dismiss ed this case

pursuant to sec tion 2-619.

¶ 22 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 23 For

the fore g oing r easons we aff irm the dec ision of the circ uit court of Cook County

.

¶ 24 Affir

med.

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