AUG 1 1 2022
i A.apowri PREME COURT CLERK IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

No. 83545 

# FILED TYRONE KEITH ARMSTRONG, Appellant, vs. U.S. BANKNATIONALASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR STRUCTURED ASSEST SECURITIES CORPORATION MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-BC3; OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC; PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION;AND WESTERN PROGRESSIVE-NEVADA, INC., Res•ondents. ORDERAFFIRMING INPART,

REVERSING INPART,ANDREMANDING This is a pro se appeal from a district court order granting summaryjudgment in a quiet title action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;Mary Kay Holthus, Judge.1

Appellant filed the underlying action assertingclaims for quiet title, wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, and declaratory relief. The district court granted summary judgment for respondents on all of appellants' claims on the ground that they were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Appellant does not challenge on appeal the summaryjudgment as to the claims for wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, and declaratory relief. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's summary judgment insofar as it pertains to those claims. See Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3
'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(3), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A(2011) (recognizing that this court does not address issues that are not

raised in an openingbrief).

With respect to appellant's quiet title claim, the district court concluded that it was time-barred by NRS 11.080's five-year limitations period. In doing so, it reasoned that the five-year period was triggered in 2010 when respondents and their predecessors recorded a Notice ofDefault against appellant's property in relation to a deed oftrust that purportedly secured a loan for the property.

We agree with appellant that the district court erred in determining that the 2010 Notice of Default triggered the five-year limitationsperiod. See Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (reviewing de novo a district court's decision to grant summaryjudgment). We held in Berberich v. Bank ofAmerica, N.A., 136 Nev. 93, 97, 460 P.3d 440, 443 (2020), that "the limitations period [under NRS 11.080] is triggered when the plaintiffis ejected from the property or has had the validity or legality ofhis or her ownership or possession called into question." In doing so, we observed that "a notice of default issued on
a deed oftrust hasbeen found insufficient to dispute an owner'spossession because it does not call into question the validity of the owner's control of the property
... by asserting someone else was entitled to possess the property." Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Here, the district court appears to have reasoned that, despite Berberich, the 2010 Notice of Default called into question appellant's ownership of the property because appellant disputed the validity of the loan secured by the deed of trust. However, appellant remains the undisputed owner and possessor of the property; the dispute between appellant and respondents is simply whether the property is encumbered

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) I947A 0:600 2by a deed oftrust. Thus, we conclude that under Berberich, the 2010 Notice

of Default did not trigger NRS 11.080's five-year limitations period.2 Moreover, respondents and their predecessors recorded a Notice of Rescission in 2012 that rescinded the 2010 Notice of Default, and we recently reaffirmed that a Notice ofRescission effectively resetsthe statute of limitations that is triggered by recording a Notice of Default. See SFR Inus. Pool I, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 22, 507 P.3d 194, 198 (2022) (recognizing, albeit not in the context of NRS 11.080, that a Notice ofRescission resetsthe statuteoflimitations);Holt v. Reg'l Tr. Servs. Corp., 127 Nev. 886, 892, 266 P.3d 602, 606 (2011) ("A notice ofrescission renders moot disputes concerning the notice of default

. . . ."). Thus, even under respondents' and the district court's interpretation ofBerberich, any potential triggering effect that the 2010 Notice of Default had would have been negatedbythe 2012 NoticeofRescission. Whiletherecordin thiscase contains additional evidence that may support different triggering dates,
we address only the issues as they have been framed by the parties.3 See

2Respondents contend that under U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Thunder Properties, Inc., 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 3, 503 P.3d 299, 306 (2022), the limitations period was triggered when appellant took affirmative action to repudiate the lien. However, Thunder Properties did not address the triggering date for aproperty owner's quiet title action, and it is inapposite to appellant's quiet title claim here.

3To the extent that the district court relied on an isolated allegation inappellant'sprosecomplainttosupportitsconclusionthatthe2010 Notice ofDefaulttriggeredthelimitationsperiod, we declinetoaffirmonthisbasis, particularly when that allegation is inconsistent with Berberich and the facts of this case, as well as when it does not appear that appellant was seeking to gain an undue advantage by including that allegation in his complaint. Cf. Hansen v. Universal Health Servs. of Nev., Inc., 112 Nev.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVAD A (0) I947A 3Senjab v. Alhulaibi, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 64, 497 P.3d 618, 619 (2021) ("We

will not supply an argument on a party's behalfbut review only the issues the partiespresent."). Consistent with the foregoing, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.4

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA
101 1947A 0014, Parraguirre



### 1/4-5,:, 161Ai/D Sr.J. Silver Gibbo s

cc: Hon.Mary Kay Holthus, District Judge Tyrone Keith Armstrong Houser LLP Fox Rothschild, LLP/Las Vegas Eighth District Court Clerk

1245, 1247-48, 924 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1996) (noting this court's preference that casesbe decided on the merits).

4The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the decision ofthis matter under a general order ofassignment.

4