Supreme Court of Florida

No. SC20-1500

____________

PAUL THOMAS KARTSONIS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

June 10, 2021

LAWSON, J.

Petitioner Paul Kartsonis seeks review of the decision of the 

First District Court of Appeal in Kartsonis v. State, 302 So. 3d 508 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2020), arguing that we have jurisdiction because of 

the decision’s “apparent conflict” with the Second District Court of 

Appeal’s decision in Gay v. State, 898 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2005), and because the decision expressly affects a class of 

constitutional or state officers, namely judges. We deny review on 

the latter basis without comment, see art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const., 
- 2 -

but briefly write to address Petitioner’s arguments regarding conflict 

with Gay and explain why we lack jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS

The Florida Constitution provides that this Court “[m]ay review 

any decision of a district court of appeal . . . that expressly and 

directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal 

or of the supreme court on the same question of law.” Art. V, § 

3(b)(3), Fla. Const. “Express and direct conflict” is a strict standard

that requires either the announcement of a conflicting rule of law or 

the application of a rule of law in a manner that results in a 

conflicting outcome despite “substantially the same controlling 

facts.” Nielson v. City of Sarasota, 117 So. 2d 731, 734 (Fla. 1960). 

Because the facts in the second situation “are of the upmost 

importance,” there can be no conflict on this basis when the cases 

are easily distinguishable. Mancini v. State, 312 So. 2d 732, 733

(Fla. 1975).

In the decision under review, the First District held that it was 

not error for a successor judge to deny Petitioner’s Florida Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) motion when the original sentencing 

judge is unavailable, rejecting the Petitioner’s suggestion below that 
- 3 -

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(c)(1), which governs the 

pronouncement of a new sentence by a successor judge in 

noncapital cases, should apply to all sentencing related matters. 

Kartsonis, 302 So. 3d at 508. In rejecting this suggestion, the First 

District distinguished Gay—the primary decision relied on by 

Petitioner below—on the grounds that “the defendant in Gay was 

resentenced by a different judge.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Petitioner does not disagree with the First District’s conclusion 

that Gay is distinguishable but nonetheless argues that we should 

exercise our discretion to grant jurisdiction because of “apparent 

conflict” with Gay. Nevertheless, where the district court decisions 

alleged to be in conflict are materially distinguishable, as they are 

here, we have no discretion to review because we lack jurisdiction. 

See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we deny the petition for 

review.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 

GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
- 4 -

NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 

– Class of Constitutional Officers/Direct Conflict of Decisions

First District - Case No. 1D19-1172

(Duval County)

Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, 

Florida,

for Petitioner

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, 

and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, 

Florida,

for Respondent