F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

T ER ES I TA C HI NG and B ROO KE J OS EPH , Plain tif

fs- Ap pe lla nts ,

v.
A L EJ ANDR O M AYOR K AS , Direc tor, U.S. Cit izenship & I mmigration Se rv ic e s; R OB I N B AR R E TT , F ie ld Offic e Dire ctor, USCI S San F ra nc isc o O ff

ic e ; J AN E T A. N AP OL I TANO , Se c re tary , U .S. D e p art m e n to f

H o m e l an d

S e c ur i ty; E RI C H. H OL DER , J R ., Attorney Ge ne ra l, Defendants-A ppellees

. No. 11-17041

D.C. No. 4:10-cv-03520- S BA
OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he No rt he rn Di str ic t of

Ca lif or nia Saundra B . Armstrong , District J udg e, Presiding

Argued and Submitted Ap ri l 17 , 2 01 3— San F ra

nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia Filed August 7, 2013C HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS

2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. B e fo re : Ma

ry M. Sc hr oe de r, Sid

ne y R. T ho ma s, and B arr y G. Silv e rm an, Cir c uit

Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e Thomas

SUMMAR

Y *

Im m igration The pa nel af firmed in par

t and re verse d in part the district court’s summary

judgme nt in favor of

the g overnme nt in the action brought by

Tere sita Ching an d h er husba nd Br ooke J oseph cha lleng ing the United Stat es Citi zenship and I mmig r a ti o nSe r

v ic e ’ s d e n ia l o f

Jo s e p h ’ s F o r

m I

- 1 30 immediate re lative visa petition. The pa nel conc luded that plaintiffs had a protec ted proper t y interest in the adjudication of J oseph’s I -130 petition, and held t hat their F ifth Amendment proc edura l due proce ss rig hts w ere violated beca use they wer e not g iven the opportunity

to cross-e x amine Ching ’s first husband reg arding his statement that his marria g e to Ching wa s fra udulent. The panel he ld, however , that statutory protec tions in removal proce eding s do not apply

to I -130 vi sa petitions and that there is no statutory

rig ht of cross- examinati o n in I -130 adjudications, and thus f

ound that plaintiffs’ rig hts under the Administrative Procedur e Ac t were not violated.C HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS 3
CO UN SEL
Sarah B . Castello (argued) a nd Robert B . J obe, L aw Of fice of Ro b e rt B

. Jo b e , S anF r an c i s c o , C a l i f o r n i a , f o r P l a i n t if fs

Ap pe lla nts

. Il a C

. D e i s s ( ar g u e d ) , A s s i s t an tU n i t e d S t a t e s A t t o r

n e y; Melinda Ha ag , United States Attorney ; a nd J oann Swanson, Chief, Civil Division, United St ates Attorne y s’ Off ice, San F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia , f or De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s.

OP IN ION THOMAS, Circuit J udg e:
Te r e s i t a C h i n g an d

h e r hu s b an d , B r o o k e Jo s e p h , c la im that their proc edura l due proc ess rights and their rig hts under t h e Administrative Proce dure A ct (“ APA”) w ere violated duringthe adjudication of J oseph’s I -130 visa petition f or an immediate re lative. Under the circ umstances of this case , we conclude that their rig hts under the APA wer e not violated, but th e ir pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss r ig ht s were. We a ff ir m in pa rt and re ve rs e in p art

. I
Tere sita Chin g, a native of China and citizen of the Phili ppines, lawfully

enter ed the United States on N ovember 5, 2 0 0 4 a s a

n o n immi g r an t v is it o r
. Ch in g c la im s th a t s he
came to the United States intending to stay for one month, but then beg an datingElden F ong , a U.S. citizen, whom she met on a datingwebsite. Ching and F o n g marrie d on J anuar y 7, 2005, and F ong filed an I -130 vi s a p et ition on her beha lf.C HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS

4 Eventually , Ms. Ching withdrew the I -485 a pplication for perma nent re sidence and informe d USCI S that she no longe r wi sh e d to pr oc e e d a s a

be ne fi c iary of

F on g ’s pe tit ion

be c a us e she planne d to divorce F ong , and USCI S denied the petition for abandonment. A y ear later, on Dece mber 27, 2007, F ong and Ching divorce d.
On J anuar y 27, 2008, Ching married he r cur rent husband, Br ooke J oseph, also a U.S. citizen, and Joseph filed an I -130 p e t i t i o no n C h i n g ’ s b e h a l f

. A f t e r t h e i r i n t e r v i e w a ta U S C IS office , USCI S issued a Notice of I ntent to Den y , which pr ov ide d in

re le va nt p art :
USCI S officer s conducte d a si t e visit at Mr. Fong ’s place of re s i d en ce, a nd he wa s intervie we d in

re g ard s to his marr ia g e to [C hing]. During that interview, Mr. Fong confe ssed and pr ovided a swor n s t atement admitting the f

ol l o wing : “My

name is Elden F on g and Te re sit a Chi ngwe re marr ie d in Oakland on J anuar

y 7, 2005 in Oakland, CA. Tere sita and I

nev er had sex. Tere sita and I
never lived toge ther. $32,000 was offe red a nd $1 4, 00 0 w a s p a id i n c a sh/insta llm e nts

. Tere sita and I

did not marry

for love. Iregret in full marrying T ere sita.”
Th e s i x sentenc es quoted a bove compose the entire ty of Fong ’s statement. Chi ng was not informe d of the circ umstances unde r which F ong was visi ted or his statement was take n.
Jose phand Chi ngre sp on de d to F on g ’s ve ry te rs e statement in the notice of inten t t o d eny

with a three -pag e,C HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS 5

single -spac ed, 21-pa

ragraph swor

n decla rat i on from Ching de sc ri bin g in e xcr

uc iatin g de ta il he r i nti mate re latio ns hip with Fong . Refuting Fong ’s asse rtion that the couple ne ver consummated the ma

rriag e, C hing stated that they had sex for the fi rs t ti me on

the ir we dd ingnight. She the n p ro c e e de d to descr ibe i n v i vid detail how the two would slee p in on
wee kends, have sex, and share intimate c onversation s
. She descr ibed his unde rwe ar and rec ounted some of thei r pi llow t al k

. S h e a l s o we n to nt o ex p l ai nwh y th e m ar r i age de te ri or a te d a

nd e ve ntu a lly

e nd e d in div or c e . In a dd iti on , to corr oborate her c laim of a bona fide marria g e, she fur nished photogr aphs of the c ou p l e, joint utili ty bills, an apartment l e a s e , an d

a l e t t e r F o n g h a d

p r e v i o u s l y

w r i t t e nt o U S C IS stating that he and Ching“truly loved ea ch other .”
On November

5, 2009, USCI S denied J oseph’s I -130, stating that “the be n efic iary ’s first marr iag e wa s not entere d int o [in ] g oo d f

a ith , but wa s a sh am, e nte re d int o fo r the so le purpose of

evadingimmigration laws.” Though it revie wed th e evidence Joseph had submitted, USCI S found the evidenc e submitted by

J oseph to be “ self ser

ving.”
J os eph appe aled to the B I A, which “ ag ree [d] that the
re co rds u p p o rt s a fi n d i n g th at th e b en ef i ci ary ’s p ri o r m arri age was e ntere d into f

or the purpose of evadingthe immigration laws.” The BIA explained that “we have c o n s i d ere d the
argume nts and

e vid e nc e pr e se nted b y the p e tit ion e r b oth in response to the notice of intent to deny and on appe al, and we
mus ta g r e e th a tth e s e d o n o to v e r c o m e th e d e t a i l e d a f f i d a vit of the be ne fi c iary ’s pr ior sp ou se , whi c h wa s g ive n a g a ins t hi s own intere st.”
On August 11 , 2 01 0, Jose phand Chi ngfi le d th e ir complaint in district court, claiming that US C I S actedC HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS

6
arbitra rily and ca priciously in violation of the APA and the Due Proc ess Clause of the U.S. Const i t ution by denying Jo s e p h ’ s I

- 1 3 0 p e ti ti o n w it h o u t a f f o r d in g th e m the
o p p o rtun i ty

t o c r o s s - e xam i n e F o n g r e g ar d i n g h i s s t a t e me nt. Both parties filed motions for summary judgme nt, a nd the district court g rante d the Government’s m otion for summary judgme nt and denied the Plaintiffs’ cross-motion.
The district cour

t he ld that the re is no statutory rig ht to an
a dju dic a tor

y he ari ng , th a t th e op po rt un ity to r e sp on d in
wr iti ng to F on g ’s state me nt w a s su ff ic ie nt f or du e pr oc e ss, and that the re wa s no pr ote c te d lib e rt y or pr op e rt

y int e re st i n the adjudication of J oseph’s I -130 petition. Finally , the district court held that “ [e] ven if Plaintiffs had demonstrated that th e y have a pr ote c te d p ro pe rt

y or lib e rt y in an I -1 30 vis a petition–which they

have not–they

have f ailed to show prejudice .”
I I
The district cour

t corre ctly

held that there is no statutory rig ht o f c ro ss- e xami natio n in I -1 30 vis a

a dju dic a tio ns
. J oseph and Chingclaim that U.S. Citi zenship and I mmigration Se rv i ces ( “USCI S”) ac ted ar bitrarily and capr iciously and viol ated Section 240(b) of the Immigration and Nationality

Act (“ I NA”) , 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) , in denying J oseph’s I -130 petition without aff ordingJ oseph and Ching an opportun i t y

to cross-e x amine F ong reg ardinghis sworn statement. J o s ep h an d Ching re ly on I NA § 240(b) , which pr ov ide s th a t du

ri ngre mov a l pro c e e din g s, “ the a lie n s ha ll have a rea sonable opportunity to examine the evidence ag ainst the alien, to pre sent evidenc e on the a lien ’s own behalf , and to cr oss-examine witnesses pre sented by the Gover nment . . . .” 8 U.S .C. § 1229a(b)( 4)(B ). They argueC HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS 7

that once a

benef iciary of a visa pe titio n i s i n remova l proce eding s, the I -130 petitioner is statutorily entitled to the
same du e pr oc e ss r ig hts a s an a lie n in re mov a l pr oc e e din g s, and that it is a rb itr ary and cap ri c iou s to de ny tho se pr ote c tio ns
. Howeve r, visa petitions are distinct from remo v al proce eding s. S

ee E l b ez v. I.N.S. , 7 67 F .2 d 1 31 3, 13 14 (9 th Cir. 1985) (“ An

y d e te rmination reg ardingI NS conduct during a visa pe tition proceedingis collatera l to a deportation order

. . . .”). The statutory protec tions provided in removal pr oc e e di ng s d o n ot a

pp ly to a dju dic a tio ns of

I -1 30 vis a pe tit ion s.
To the extent that the Plaintiffs claim that USCI S violated I NA § 240(b) , which applies only to remova l proce eding s, the dis tr ic t c ourt

la c ke d ju

ri sd ic tio n to c on sid e r t

hat c la im beca use a pe tition for r eview with the court of a ppeals is the “sole a nd exclusive means for judicia l reviewo f an or der of
re mov a l . .

. .” 8 U. S.C. § 1 25 2( a )( 5) . F ur the rm or e , b e c a

us e Chi ng ’s re mov a l pr oc e e din g s are c ur rent ly pe nd ing , th e re is no ag ency

action for

this Court t o revie w.
The district cour

t properly g rante d summary

judgme nt on thi s c la im.

III
Pla int if fs a lso argue tha

t th e de nia l of J os e ph ’s I -1 30 vis a pe tit ion vio late d th e ir

F if th A me nd

me nt D ue Pr oc e ss r ig hts be c a us e the y we re no t a ff

or de d the op po rt

un ity to cro ss e x am i n e C h i n g’s fi rs thu s b an d , E l d en Fo n g, o r t h e U S C IS office r who took F ong ’s statement. We agree
.C HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS

8
A
The Due Process Clause of the Fif th Amendme nt p r ovides th a t n o p e r s o ns h a l l “ b e d e p r i v e d o f l i f e , l i b e rty, o r

p r o p e rty, without due proce ss of law.” U. S . Const. amend. V. “A t h re s hold require ment to a substantive or proc edura l due proc es s claim is the plaintiff’s showingof a liber ty or proper ty inte re s t p ro t ec t ed b y t he Constituti on.” W e dges/Le dges of Cal ., In c . v . Ci ty of Pho e nix , 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs contend that their interest in the I -130 visa petition is such an int ere st beca use the a pproval of th e p e t i t i o ni s n o n d i s c r e t i o n ar y.

“ To have a pr op e rt

y int e re st in a be ne fi t, a pe rs on c le arl y must have more tha

n an abstra ct nee d or desi re for it. He
mus t ha ve mor e tha

n a un ilate ra l e xpe c tatio n of it. He mus t, instead, have a leg itimate claim o f entit lement to it.” Bd. of Re ge nts of S

tate Col ls. v . R oth , 408 U.S

. 564, 577 (1972). S u p r e m e C o urt “ c a s e s r e c o g n i z e th a t a b e n e f i t is n ot a protec ted entitlement if g overnme nt officials may g rant or deny it in their discretion.” Town of Castle Roc k v. G onzales , 54 5 U .S. 74 8, 75 6 ( 20 05 ). I ns te a d, “ [a] r easo nab le expectat i o n of entitlement is deter mined larg ely

by the lang uag e of the statute and the e x tent to which the entitlement is c ouched in mandatory

terms.” W

edges/Ledge

s , 24 F.3d at 62 (interna l quotation marks omitted).
Where a p et i t i o n er o f an i m m ed i at e re lative petition proves that his marr iag e mee ts the require ments for the approva l of an I -130, he is entitled, as a matter of r ight, to the approva l of his petition. S ection 204(b) of the I NA provide s that “Af ter a n investigation of the fa cts in eac h case , . . . theC HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS 9

T he IN A i ni t i al l y grant ed t hi s aut ho ri t y t o t he A t t o rney G e neral , but 1 wi t h t he 2 0 0 3 creat i o n o f t he D ep art m ent o f H o m el and Se curi t y (“ D H S” ), this r e sp o n sib ility n o w b e lo n g s to the S e c re ta ry o f D H S

. See 6 U

. S. C. § 27 1 (b)(1) (delegat i ng aut ho ri t y t o t he Se cret ary ). [S ecr etar y of Homela

nd Security

(“Sec ret ary”) ] sh all , if he

1 deter mines that the fac ts state d in the petition are true and that the alien in beha lf of whom the pe tition i s made is an immediate re lative[,]

. . . approve thepetition

. . . .” 8 U .S. C. § 1 15 4( b) (e mph a se s a dd e d)

. Th e de c isi on of wh e the r t o ap p rove an I -130 visa petition is a nondiscre tionary one be c a us e “ de te rm inati on s th a t ‘ re qu ir e a pp lic a tio n o f l aw t o fac tual deter

minations’ are nondiscretionar y .” Hernande

z v. As hc ro ft , 3 45 F.3d 824, 833- 34 (9th Cir. 2003) (interna l
a lte ratio n o mitte d) ; see also Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder , 702 F.3d 504, 525–26 n

. 16 (9th Cir. 2012) (e n banc) (contrasting I

NA § 204(b) ’s languag e with discre tionary
a u th o r i ty e l s e w h e r e i nth e I

N A ) ; S pence r Enters., Inc. v

. United States , 345 F.3d 683, 691 ( 9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that I NA § 204(b) ’s instruction that the Attorney Gene ral

“ sh a ll .

. . a

pp ro ve the pe tit ion ” su g g e sts that th e pr ov isi on is nondiscretionar

y ).

B u s t amante v. M

ukasey , 531 F.3d 1059 ( 9th Cir. 2008), buttresses this conclusion. Ther e, a U .S. citiz en wife challeng ed a c onsular off icial’s denia l of a v i sa petition for her husba nd, and the Court dete rm i n ed that “the de nial of a vis a imp lic a te s the c on sti tut ion a l ri g hts of Am e ri c an c iti zen s” beca use B ustamante “ has a protected liber ty interest in her
marr ia g e that g ive s r ise to a ri g ht to c on sti tut ion a lly

a de qu a te pr oc e dure s in

the a dju dic a tio n o f h er hu sb and ’s vis a application.” 531 F .3d at 1061, 1062.C HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS

10
Th e g ov e rnme nt c on te nd s th a t w he n a n e xcept ion

to elig ibilit y exis ts, the rig ht to obtain the I -130 vi sa no long er e xists , an d th e pr oc e ss i s n o lo ng e r n on dis c re tio na ry . T his
argum e nt c on fu se s th e qu e sti on of wh e the r t

he re is a pr ote c te d inte re st i n a ben e fi t withthe qu e sti on of e lig ibi lity fo r that be ne fi t. Vi rt

ua lly no g ov e rnme nt b e ne fi t is ava ila ble to individuals without a require ment that cer tai n conditions
are met. The Supreme Court expl ained that “the welfar e r e c ip ie n ts in Go ldb e rg

v . Ke lly [397 U.S . 254 (1970)] had a claim of e ntitlement to welfare pay ments that was g rounded in the statute defining elig ibilit y for them. The rec ipients had not y et s h o wn that they

wer e, in fa ct, within the statutory terms of e ligibility . But we held t h at they had a r ight to a hear ing at whi ch they

might attempt to do so.” Ro th , 408 U.S. at 577.
Th e g o v e r

n me n t a ls o c o n te n d s th a t t h e p e r mi t d e nial means that t h er e was no e ligibility in the first instance a

nd, there fore , no due proc ess rig ht attachedto the proce dure. Howeve r, “‘ [a] first principle of Ang lo-Americ an jur isp ru de nc e , . . . ba sic to t he c on c e pti on of du e pr oc e ss i n the proc edura l sense’ is ‘that the en d s do not justi fy the means.’” Pi lls bu ry Co. v . F .T. C. , 354 F.2d 952, 964 ( 5th Cir. 1966) (quotingDoug las, W e The Judge

s , 354 (Dou b l eday 1956)). It is pr o ce s s that the proce dural due proce ss rig ht protec ts, not the outcome.

In sum, grant of an I -130 petition f or immediat e r elative status is a nondiscretionar y d ecision. I mmediate re lative status fo r a

n a lie n spo us e is a rig ht to w hic h c iti zen a pp lic ants are entitled as longas the pe titioner and spouse be nefic iary
m e e t th e s t a tu t o r

y an d r e g u l at o r y r e qu i r e m e n t s f

o r e l i g i b i l i ty. This protecte d in t er est is entitled to the protections of dueC HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS 11

proce ss. The dist rict court err ed in hol ding that there w as no pr ote c te d inte re st.
B
Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a lte rnati vely

de te rm ine d th a t, e ve n if the re we re a

pr ote c te d li be rt

y or pr op e rt y int e re st, the c la ims failed be cause the Plaintiffs failed to sho w p rejudice . The qu e sti on of

wh e the r a

pla int if f m us t de mon str a te pr e

jud ic e in the context of an I -130 visa petition is not set t l ed . The g overnme nt asser ts that a prejudice showing is require d, ci t i n g Pa dil la v . A sh c ro

ft , 334 F.3d 921, 924–2 5 (9th Cir. 20 03 ). B ut Pa dil la and its prog eny involve d ep o rt ation or
re mov a l pr oc e e din g s, and the g ov e rnme nt h a s b e e n una ble to cite a c ase in support of its position in the visa cont ex t

. As we discusse d ear lier in reje cting Ching’s A PA claim, visa and
remova l pr ocee dings, and the rig hts that attach to e ach, a re differ ent. Howe ver, w e nee d not resolve that que stion, beca use the Plaintiffs demonstrate d sufficie nt prejudice

. Fong ’s sig ned stateme nt was ac cepte d as true w ithout aff ordingthe Plaintiffs the opportunity for c ross-e xa

mi n a ti on, and in the fa ce of

contra dictory

documents and a ffidavits. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[i] n almost every setting whe r e im p o rta n t d e c is io n s tu

r no nqu e s ti o n s o f

f a c t, due proce ss r equire s an opportuni t y t o co n fr o n t and
cross-e x amine adve rse witnesse s.” Ke lly , 397 U.S. at 269. An opportunity to confr ont and cr oss examine “‘is even mor e important where the evidenc e consists of the tes t i m o n y of ind ivi du a ls who se me mor y mig ht b e fa

ult y or wh o, in f

a c t, mi gh t be per

jurers or persons motivated by malice, vi n d i ct i v en es s , i n t o l er an ce , p re j u d i ce , o r j ea l o u s y .’” Id. at 270 (q u o t i n g Gree ne v. M

cElroy , 360 U.S. 474, 496–97 ( 1959)).C HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS

12
Th e pr e

jud ic e “ stan dar d d oe s n ot d e mand a bs olute cer tainty ; rather

prejudice is shown if the violation po te nti all y aff ects the outco m e of the proce eding s. We may infer prejudice even a

bsent any alleg ations as to what the pe titioner or his witnesses mig ht have sa id . . . .” Zolotukhin v. Gonzales , 417 F.3d 1073, 1077 ( 9 t h Cir. 2005) (interna l quotation marks, citation, and a lteration omitted). Ther efor e, the Pl aint iffs’ “ showing is sufficient to establish pre judice.” Amponsah v. Holde r , 709 F.3d 1318, 1327 ( 9th Cir. 2013).
C
Ha vin g c on c lud e d th a t pl a int if fs ha d a pro te c te d p ro pe rt

y inte rest and ha d established suff icient pre judice, we must then deter mine whether

additional proce ss was due. I n doin g so, we re c og nize tha

t “ ‘d ue pr oc e ss, ’ un lik e so me le g a l r ule s, is
no t a t e c h n i c a l c o n c e p t i o n w i th a f i xe d c o n t e n t un r e l a t e d to time, ‘place and cir cumstance s.’” Mat hews v. Eldridge , 4 2 4 U. S

. 3 1 9 , 3 3 4 (1 9 7 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Cafeteria W orkers v

. McElroy , 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961))

. As the Supreme Court has instructed, “ due proc ess is flex i ble and c alls for such proce dural prote ctions as the par ticular situation demands.” Id. (q u o t i n g Morrissey v . Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 481 ( 1972)). B e c a us e of its inh e re nt d if

fe re nc e s f ro m the jud ic ia l pr oc e ss, a dmi nis tr a tiv e pr oc e e din g s in pa rtic ula r m us t be c are fu lly
a sse sse d to de te rm ine wh a t pr oc e ss i s due g ive n the sp e c if ic circ umstances involved. And we must do so on a ca se by
c a se ba sis

. The prope r ana ly sis to determine whe ther a dditional proce s s wa s due in this case is provide d in Ma the ws . There , the Sup re me Court

ide nti fi e d th e fa c tor s to be c on sid e re d in deter mining whe ther a dditional due proce ss is required:C HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS 13

[I ]dentification of the spec ific dictate s of due proce ss ge nera lly

require s consideration of thr e e dis tin c t fa c tor s: F ir st, the pr ivate int e re st that will be aff

ecte d by the offic ial action; second, the risk of an e rrone ous deprivation of such intere st through the proce dures use d, and the probable value, if a

ny , of additional or
s u b s t i tu t e p r o c e d

ur a l s a f e g u ar d s ; an d

f i n a l l y, the Gover

nment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrati v e burde ns that the additional or
su bs tit ute pr oc e dura l r e qu ir e me nt w ou ld
e nta il.
Ma the ws , 424 U.S. at 335.
1
Th e fi rs t Ma the ws fa c tor

is a n a sse ssm ent of

the pr ivate interest that will be af

fec ted by the offic ial action. Here, Pla int if fs e xpla in t

hat “ [w]itho ut a

n I -13 0 app ro va l, M s. Ching fa ces imminent remova l from the Unit ed S tates, thus undoubt edly

causingimmense hardship to her self and he r husband.” Th e ri ght to marry and to enjoy

marria g e ar e un qu e sti on a

bly lib e rt y int e re sts pr ote c te d b y

the Du e Pr oc e ss Cl a use. S ee, e .g. , Mey er v. Nebrask a , 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ( holding that pr otected liber ty interests include “ the ri gh t o f the individual . . . to marry , establish a home a nd bringup children” ). The r ight to li v e wi t h and not be separ ated f

rom one’s immediate family is “a rig ht that ranks high a mong the interests of the individual” and that cannot be taken a way wi thout procedur al due pr ocess. Landon v. Pl as encia , 4 59 U. S. 2 1, 34 -3 5 ( 19 82 ). Th e re fo re , th e fi rs t Ma the ws fa ct o r f

av o rs J o s ep han d

C h i n g.C HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS

14
2
The sec ond Ma the ws fac tor we consider is the risk of an
err oneous deprivation of such intere st through the proce dures used and the probative va lue of a d ditional procedur al safe g uards. In this case , the risk of an err oneous findingthat
a p r io r ma r r ia g e w a s f

r a u d u le n t is h igh in c a s e s w h e r e ane xs p o u s e i s re l i edu

p o nfo r e v i d en ce th at th e pr ev i o u s m arri age wa s f ra ud ule nt. He re , f

or e xamp le , U SCI S of

fi c e rs went to Fong ’s ho m e and solicited f rom him his si x -sentenc e statement; the B I A conc luded on the basis of this “de tailed” statement alone that the prior mar riag e wa s fra

udulent. An
un e xp ect e d v isi t f

ro m g ov e rnme nt o ff

ic e rs c an b e qu ite intimi dating , particula

rly if the officials point out that having filed a fr audulent I -130 petition could result in a $250,000 f in e an d im

p r is o n me n t f

o r u p to f ive y ear s. See8 U .S. C. § 1325(c) . The B I A eve n noted that Fong made his statement “against h is o wn

int e re st, ” tho ug h th a t st a te me nt i s unsupported by

the re cord. The Supreme Court has explained that “[i] n almost every
se tti ngwh e re imp or

tant d e c isi ons tur

n o n q ue sti on s o f f

a c t, due proc ess re quires an oppor tunity to confront a

nd
cross-e x amine adve rse witnesse s.” Go ldb e rg , 397 U.S. at 269. An opportunity to confr ont and cr oss examine “‘is even more important whe re the evidenc e consists of the testimony of ind ivi du a ls who se me mor y mig ht b e fa

ult y or wh o, in f

a c t, might be pe rjurer s or p er sons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intoleranc e, pre judice, or jeal o usy .’” Id. at 2 6 9 -7 0 (q u o t i n g Gree ne v. M cElroy , 360 U.S. 474, 496–97 (1959)) . Many

ex-s p o uses could be motivated by “malice , vindictiveness, . . . or jea lousy .” The se nef arious motivations
are even more likely if the marria g e (and subsequent divorc e)
wer e bona f

ide.C HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS 15

Th e ri sk of e rr on e ous de pr ivatio n is pa rt ic ula rl y high in
a ca se such a s this, where the v i s a p eti tioner has substantial evidenc e that the f

irst marriag e wa s bona fide. Ching prese nted extensive details of her marria g e to Fong , including descr iptions of inti mate conve rsations, and e vidence of her lif e wi th F on g , in c ludin g b il ls a nd a le a se . Wh e n th e re is such compe lling evide nce to rebut the prior spouse’s cla im of marria g e fraud, ther e is a hig h risk of er roneous de privation when the a g ency

relies e x clusively

on written evide nce. As to the probativ e value of additional proc edura l safe g uards, F ong could have elabor ated on his fr audulent marria g e to Ching a

nd ex plained under

what conditions he wrote the statement that h e and Ching “did not marry for love.” Plaintiffs also explain they would attempt to find out about any incentives F ong was off

ere d befor e he sig ned the statement, and w oul dwant to know how longhe wa s int e rv ie we d, by

wh om h e wa s inte rv ie we d, and wha t, i f any thing, he benef

itted from his statement. These questions
are far from speculative, and g iven t hat t he BI A was w illing to r e je c t Pl a inti f

f s ’ e v id e n c e o n th e s o le b a s is o f F o n g ’ s s ixsentenc e “de tailed af

fidavit,” the r isk of er roneous deprivation and the likely probative va lue of a dditional pr oc e ss are bo th g re at. T his fa c tor str on g ly fa vo rs Pla int if

fs

. 3
In asse ssi ngthe fi na l Ma the ws fac tor, we c onsider the Gover nment’s intere st, includ i n g the func tion involved and the fisca l and administrative burde ns that the addit i o nal or substitut e proc edura l require ment would entail. Clearly , the go v ern m en th as a s u

b s t an t i al i n t er es ti np re v en t i n g m arri age fr a ud and in a

vo idi nge rr on e ou sly

pr ov idi ngbe ne fi ts. “ Th os e wh o e ng a g e in [marr ia g e fr a ud ] unf a ir ly c ut i n f ro nt o f t ho seC HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS

16
aliens lawf

ully waiting in line to emigr ate here . This kind of marria g e fr aud under

mines the sovere ign pow er of the United States to control who may be allowed resident status.” Az izi v. Thornburgh , 908 F.2d 1130, 1141 (2d Cir. 1 9 90) (C ard amon e , J., dis se nti ng ). On the oth e r h and , th e re is a signific ant public intere st in allowing those who a re le g iti mate ly

marr ie d to re c e ive the be ne fi ts i nte nd e d f or the m.
Th e a dd iti on a l pr oc e dure s w ou ld e nta il the min ima l c os t to t he g ov e rnme nt o f h old ingan a dd iti on a l he aring in thi s c a se , an d “[f

]ina nc ia l cos t alo ne is not

a c on tr oll ingwe ig ht i n deter mining whe ther due proce ss require s a pa rt i cular proce dural saf

eguard pr ior to some administrative dec ision.” Ma the ws , 4 24 U. S. a t 34 8. Ad dit ion a lly , be c a us e the pr oc e ss soug ht by

Plaintiffs i s g uara

nteed to aliens in re moval proce eding s, there a

re no pr act ical proble ms with such a require ment. See I

NA § 240(b) , 8 U. S

. C. § 1229a(b)( 4) (“[T]he alien s hall have a rea sonable opportunity

to examine the evidenc e ag ainst the alien, to pre s en t ev i dence on the alien’s own behalf, and to cross-e x amine witnesses presente d by the Gover

nment.”). The ref

ore, w e conc lude that “t he fiscal a nd administrative burde ns that the addit i o n al or
su bs tit ute pr oc e dura l re qu ir e me nt w ou ld e nta il” are re lativ e ly slight. Se e Ma the ws , 424 U.S. at 335.
4 Upon consider ing all three fac tors, the extreme weig ht of the first two fa ctors lea ds us to c o n cl u d e t hat the proc ess by which Joseph’s I -1 3 0 petition was denied w as inade quate. There wer e two witnesses to the Fong -Ching marria g e: Fong and Chin g. I n t h i s case , it is not possible to determine that Fong ’s statement is true a nd that Chi ng ’s is false solely by
rea ding them. In addition, Ching pre sented substantial and–atC HI NG V

. M AYOR K AS 17

thi s st a g e –unc on te ste d d oc ume nta ry e vid e nc e to c or

ro bo ra te her c laim that the m arr iag e wa s bona fide. T here fore , under the spec ific circ umstances of this c ase, due proc ess re quired a hea ringwith an opportuni ty for Chingto confront the witnesses ag ainst her.
Th e re fore, we mus t r e ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt wi th ins tr uc tio ns to r e mand

the c a se to t

he a g e nc y fo r t he purp os e o f h o l d i n g an ev i d en t i ary

h ea ri n g.
I V
I n s u m, th e d is tr ic t c o urt p r o p e r ly g r an te d s u mmary judgme nt on the APA claims. I t er re d in gr anting summary jud g me nt o n th e pr oc e dura l du e pr oces s cla im. We r e ve rs e th e district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt as to the due proce ss claim, and direc t it to r emand the case to the ag ency s o th atth e a gen cy

m ay h o l d an ev i d en t i ary

h ea ri n g.
Cos ts on ap pe a l sha ll be awa rd e d to Pla int if

fs -A pp e lla nts

. AF F IRM ED IN P AR T; RE VE RSE D IN P AR T; RE M AN DE D W ITH IN STR UC TIO NS.