Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Whitfield, 2018 IL App (4th) 150948

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

WESLEY LAWRENCE WHITFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-15-0948

Filed June 8, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County, No. 14-CF-1090; the 

Hon. James R. Coryell, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Michael Gomez, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Jay Scott, State’s Attorney, of Decatur (Patrick Delfino, David J. 

Robinson, and Erin Wilson Laegeler, of State’s Attorneys Appellate 

Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justices Steigmann and DeArmond concurred in the judgment and 

opinion. 
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Wesley Lawrence Whitfield, was convicted of 

aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(2) (West 2012)) and sentenced to four 

years in prison. He appeals, arguing (1) portions of his videotaped interrogation were 

improperly admitted at his trial and played for the jury and (2) the State improperly impeached 

a defense witness. We affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 In September 2014, the State charged defendant with two counts of aggravated battery of a 

child (id.). It alleged defendant caused bodily harm to his two children, N.W. and S.W., by 

repeatedly striking N.W. (count I) and repeatedly striking and burning S.W. (count II). In 

January 2015, defendant waived his right to counsel and began representing himself. 

¶ 4 The record reflects defendant filed several pretrial motions, including two motions 

addressing his bond. In January 2015, he filed a motion for bond reduction or a recognizance 

bond. At a hearing that same month, defendant’s father, Luther Whitfield, testified on 

defendant’s behalf. Luther agreed he received a call in September 2014 regarding defendant’s 

“case.” He learned defendant had been charged and the amount of his bond. The State declined 

any cross-examination, and following defendant’s testimony on his own behalf, the trial court 

granted the motion and lowered defendant’s bond. 

¶ 5 In June 2015, defendant filed a motion for a recognizance bond. In July 2015, the trial court 

conducted a hearing on that motion and other pretrial motions filed by defendant, including a 

motion to suppress evidence. Relative to the motion for a recognizance bond, Luther, again, 

testified on defendant’s behalf. He stated defendant’s children had been in a car accident 

approximately a week before the date of the alleged offenses and defendant’s arrest. According 

to Luther, the accident resulted in N.W. receiving medical care. Luther suggested the charges 

against defendant were based on injuries the children likely sustained in the automobile 

accident. Further, he testified he attempted to obtain medical records related to the accident for 

defendant but was unable to do so. Ultimately, the court denied defendant’s motion. 

¶ 6 In August 2015, defendant’s jury trial was conducted. The record reflects the matter 

proceeded to trial on only count I, charging defendant with the aggravated battery of N.W. 

Count II, setting forth the charges related to S.W., was dismissed on the State’s motion. 

¶ 7 At trial, Laura Cole testified she was the maternal grandmother of N.W. and S.W. Her 

daughter Nicole was the children’s mother and had been in a relationship with defendant. On 

October 4, 2011, the day N.W. was born, Nicole passed away. Thereafter, defendant was the 

primary caregiver for both children. At the time of the alleged offense, N.W. was two years 

old. 

¶ 8 In September 2014, Laura resided in Wisconsin but traveled to Decatur, Illinois, with her 

daughter Markeena Cole to meet with defendant and visit S.W. and N.W. Laura testified she 

and Markeena arrived at defendant’s home at around 5 p.m. or 6 p.m. on September 3, 2014. 

She visited with her grandchildren and asked defendant if the children could stay the night with 

her at her hotel. Initially, defendant refused; however, at the encouragement of a friend, he 

allowed Laura and Markeena to take the children. Laura recalled that, although the weather 
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was sunny and the temperature was 85 or 90 degrees, N.W. was dressed in a long-sleeved shirt 

and jeans. 

¶ 9 After leaving defendant’s house, Laura, Markeena, and the children visited Thelma 

Lawson’s home, which Laura described as “the kids’ cousin[’s] house.” While at Lawson’s 

home, Laura heard S.W. say “ ‘[d]addy whip [N.W.] like this’ ” and saw S.W. demonstrate 

“how [N.W.] got a whipping.” Laura then raised N.W.’s shirt and saw “the welts and 

everything on him.” She showed what she discovered to Markeena and Lawson. 

¶ 10 Ultimately, Laura took N.W. to the hospital. She testified the police and the Illinois 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) were called, and S.W. and N.W. were 

taken into protective custody. In October 2014, Laura relocated to Decatur “for [her] 

grandkids.” At the time of trial, both children were in her care. 

¶ 11 During her testimony Laura viewed photographs, which she testified depicted the 

appearance of N.W.’s injuries on September 3, 2014. She denied that any of the injuries shown 

in the photographs occurred between the time she picked N.W. up from defendant’s house and 

when she took N.W. to the hospital. 

¶ 12 On cross-examination, Laura acknowledged that she had tried to gain custody of S.W. and 

N.W. in the past. Further, she agreed that, prior to her arrival in Decatur, defendant told her 

during a telephone conversation that the children had recently been in a car accident. Also, 

Laura acknowledged that, after discovering N.W.’s injuries at approximately 8:30 p.m., she 

went to her hotel before taking N.W. to the hospital. 

¶ 13 Markeena testified similarly to Laura, stating she and her mother traveled from Wisconsin 

to Decatur on September 3, 2014, to visit S.W. and N.W.; defendant reluctantly allowed them 

to have the children overnight; and they initially took the children to Lawson’s home. While at 

Lawson’s home, Laura showed Markeena injuries on N.W. Markeena testified N.W. had been 

wearing a long-sleeved shirt and long pants although it was “[b]urning hot” outside and close 

to 90 degrees. 

¶ 14 After noticing N.W.’s injuries, Markeena, Laura, and the children went to a hotel and “kind 

of sat down and decided what would be the best thing to do about the situation.” Markeena 

concluded that the children should not be returned to defendant and that they needed to “get 

some help.” She stated they then took the children to the hospital. Markeena denied that N.W. 

was injured while in her and Laura’s care. On cross-examination, she acknowledged that Laura 

had tried to gain custody of the children in the past. 

¶ 15 Dr. Edward Leon testified he was an emergency room physician in Decatur and treated 

N.W. at the hospital in the early morning hours of September 4, 2014. According to Dr. Leon, 

he observed injuries on primarily the left side of N.W.’s body—specifically, on N.W.’s arm, 

back, buttocks, and left leg. He stated the injuries consisted of bruising and what appeared to 

be “belt marks.” Dr. Leon estimated that the injuries were inflicted “within a few days” and 

opined they were “consistent with being whipped with a cord or a belt.” 

¶ 16 On cross-examination, Dr. Leon testified he first examined N.W. around 12:30 a.m. He 

recalled that the children’s grandmother was present and was concerned about child abuse. Dr. 

Leon testified he was not aware that the children had been in a car accident approximately a 

week prior to their hospital visit. On re-direct, Dr. Leon testified the injuries depicted in a 

photograph of N.W.’s left arm did not appear to be consistent with a car accident. On 
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re-cross-examination, he opined the injuries depicted in the same photograph appeared to have 

been inflicted “within days” rather than within the course of several hours. 

¶ 17 City of Decatur police officer Jason Danner testified he went to Decatur Memorial Hospital 

on September 4, 2014, in response to a report of child abuse. Upon his arrival, he spoke with 

Laura and made contact with N.W. Danner stated he observed injuries to N.W., which he 

described as follows: “[N.W.] had welts up and—or looped-shaped welts all up and down his 

arms, his legs. He had bruising and scars on his back and abrasion—an old abrasion on the side 

of his hip.” Danner identified photographs he took of N.W.’s injuries at the hospital. He 

testified the photographs fairly and accurately depicted how N.W.’s injuries appeared on 

September 4, 2014. Ultimately, the photographs, contained in People’s exhibit Nos. 2 through 

19, were admitted into evidence. 

¶ 18 Danner further testified that on September 5, 2014, defendant was taken into custody. At 

police headquarters, he made contact with defendant and read him the Miranda warnings 

(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). Defendant indicated he understood his rights, and 

he agreed to speak with Danner. According to Danner, defendant asserted that he did not “beat 

his kids; he only spank[ed] them.” 

¶ 19 On cross-examination, Danner explained differences in some of the photographs that 

depicted the same area of N.W.’s body as the result of different camera angles and different 

lighting. Further, he testified he was not aware that the children had been in a car accident in 

the week before the events at issue and defendant did not inform him of a car accident at the 

time of their interview. 

¶ 20 Police officer Josh Whitney testified he responded to Decatur Memorial Hospital on 

September 4, 2014, and was advised by Danner that defendant was suspected of causing injury 

to N.W. Whitney contacted defendant by telephone and told him to come to the hospital. He 

testified he explained to defendant that the police needed to talk to him about his children. 

According to Whitney, defendant stated he would be there but never showed up. Police officer 

Tyler Nottingham testified he arrested defendant on September 5, 2014. 

¶ 21 Police officer Kyle Daniels testified he interviewed defendant on September 5, 2014. 

Initially, he reminded defendant of the Miranda warnings, and defendant agreed to speak to 

him without having an attorney present. Daniels testified he recorded his interview and 

informed defendant that he was being recorded. The hour-long audio and video recording was 

then played for the jury. Daniels agreed that the recording was complete and accurate “except 

for certain edits that were made to remove dead time and to remove discussion of another 

incident.” Further, he testified that approximately halfway through the interview, he and 

defendant were joined by Eric Ethel, a juvenile detective who was training Daniels. 

¶ 22 In the recorded interview, defendant acknowledged that he disciplined and spanked his 

children. Specifically, he admitted spanking N.W. with a thin, leather belt that was folded over. 

Defendant reported that N.W. would move or be “squirming” around during a spanking, which 

caused defendant to strike areas other than N.W.’s buttocks, including N.W.’s arm, hand, and 

the inside of his leg. Defendant admitted that his spanking of N.W. with the belt caused “welts” 

on N.W. and the “circular marks” that appeared on N.W.’s body, particularly N.W.’s left arm. 

Defendant agreed that “most” of the injuries to N.W. depicted in photographs shown to him by 

the officers were from being spanked. Further, he acknowledged that the marks on N.W. 

“looked bad” and not “right.” He stated he did not mean to “break [N.W.’s] skin” when 

spanking him. Defendant also admitted that he went “overboard,” that he “made a mistake,” 
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and that he could use “counseling” on how to discipline his children. Finally, defendant 

acknowledged that the injuries depicted in the photographs of N.W. occurred at “different 

times.” 

¶ 23 The record reflects defendant did not object to the recording being played for the jury. 

However, the last several minutes of the recording showed him alone in the interview room 

praying. Defendant did raise an objection to that portion of the video being played, which the 

trial court overruled. 

¶ 24 When cross-examining Daniels, defendant asked to play portions of the video recording 

again; however, the State objected and the trial court sustained its objection. On 

cross-examination, Daniels further agreed that defendant reported to him that the children had 

been in a car accident prior to the events at issue. He stated he investigated the accident and 

learned from a traffic accident report that S.W. “was listed with no injury and [N.W.] was non 

incapacitating injury.” Daniels stated he did not investigate further into the traffic accident 

because none of N.W.’s injuries “were consistent with a traffic accident.”

¶ 25 At the conclusion of Daniels’s testimony, the State moved to admit its exhibits, including 

the recording, into evidence. Defendant objected to the recording on the basis that the State 

“was trying to speculate that [he] made a confession to intentionally harm [his] son,” which 

defendant asserted was not true. He also objected to the recording on the bases that the end of 

the recording showed him praying while alone in the interview room and because Daniels did 

not inform him that he was being recorded. The trial court allowed the recording into evidence 

over defendant’s objections. 

¶ 26 Next, defendant presented evidence on his own behalf. He first called his sister, Latasha 

Whitfield, as a witness. Latasha testified defendant had cared for his children since birth. She 

denied witnessing defendant “beat” or be “abusive” to his children. 

¶ 27 Latasha further testified that on August 21, 2014, she was in a car accident with S.W. and 

N.W. She stated the driver’s side of her vehicle was “T-boned” by a sport utility vehicle 

“truck.” “[I]t knocked [her] so hard [that she] ben[t] the gear shift” and was rendered 

unconscious. According to Latasha, the children were “shooken up” and “knocked” around by 

the force of the accident. She testified everyone was hurt, but she did not experience pain until 

approximately one week after the accident. N.W. was behind the driver’s seat and thrown out 

of his car seat. He was placed in a neck brace and taken to the hospital by ambulance. 

¶ 28 On cross-examination, Latasha acknowledged having a felony conviction for aggravated 

robbery. Additionally, she testified she observed “some blood on [N.W.’s] mouth” following 

the car accident. Otherwise, she did not check his body for injury. Latasha testified that 

immediately following the accident she was being “checked” and had to stay at the accident 

scene while N.W. was taken away in an ambulance. When shown the photographs of N.W. 

contained in People’s exhibit Nos. 2 through 19, Latasha could not identify any of the injuries 

depicted in the photographs as being sustained in the car accident. 

¶ 29 Defendant’s father, Luther, was next called to testify. Luther stated he was aware of the 

August 21, 2014, car accident. He described it as a “major accident” and stated N.W. was 

thrown from the left to the right side of the car. Luther rode with N.W. in the ambulance to the 

hospital. He stated N.W. was placed in a neck brace and had “marks and scratches all on the 

left side of his arm” and “a red mark on his back.” Luther testified that injuries to N.W. 

depicted in People’s exhibit Nos. 2 through 19 were from the car accident. However, when 

shown People’s exhibit No. 15, depicting injuries on N.W.’s back, Luther testified he did not 
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observe N.W. “in that bad of a shape.” More specifically, he testified he saw N.W. on the day 

that Laura took him for an overnight visit and did not observe the back injuries depicted in 

People’s exhibit No. 15 at that time. Luther testified he was familiar with Laura and was aware 

that she previously tried to obtain custody of S.W. and N.W. on three separate occasions. 

Luther further testified that neither the police nor DCFS questioned him about the August 21, 

2014, car accident. 

¶ 30 On cross-examination, Luther acknowledged having a felony conviction for unlawful 

restraint, for which he served two years’ probation. He testified he did not go to the police 

department with information that N.W.’s injuries were caused by the car accident because he 

“figured that the court would [find] out that [defendant] wasn’t a child abuser” and the charges 

would be dropped. The following colloquy then occurred between Luther and the State: 

“Q. Have you ever approached anyone in an attempt to give them this information 

that you’ve testified here today—to today for the first time? 

 A. Yes. They had bond court I had—I had told you and the judge here about it, yes. 

 Q. You told me? 

 A. You and the judge, about the car accident. Matter of fact, that was about a couple 

of weeks ago. I was in court, he called me up here to testify because I was trying to get 

him bond. You remember you trying to get bond on the motion that he tried to suppress 

some evidence. 

Q. You’re saying a couple of weeks you testified in court that—

A. That they was in a car accident. Y’all didn’t ask me nothing about that. You—I 

told you I testified that they was in a car accident.”

Luther specified that his testimony was during a hearing on defendant’s “last motion” and 

involved “a motion to suppress some evidence.” 

¶ 31 Following Luther’s testimony and outside the presence of the jury, the State asserted its 

intention to present, on rebuttal, a certified copy of the transcript of a bond hearing during 

which Luther testified for defendant. The State asserted that contrary to Luther’s testimony at 

trial, he made no mention of the car accident or “it causing injuries to the child.” Defendant 

objected on the basis that the State had a transcript of the wrong hearing and that Luther had 

been referring to a more recent bond hearing that also involved a motion to suppress by 

defendant. The trial court stated “that’s something we’ll deal with when it comes up.” 

¶ 32 Dwayne Jones next testified on defendant’s behalf. He stated he was engaged to Shayla 

Cooper, defendant’s sister. Jones also was aware of the car accident that occurred on August 

21, 2014, and observed the accident scene. He stated the side of Latasha’s car was totaled, 

glass was in the car, and the car seat was “tossed around.” Jones next went to the hospital and 

saw N.W. who was wearing a hospital gown. He observed “a little cut or bruise on [N.W.’s 

left] arm,” as well as “a couple of bruises [that] looked like scratches from maybe glass or 

something on [N.W.’s] back.” Jones also testified that he was familiar with Laura and was 

aware that she had tried to “take [defendant’s] kids from [him] in the past.” 

¶ 33 On cross-examination, Jones stated that following the accident N.W. had “a scratch or a 

slight cut from the glass” on his left arm, which he stated was approximately two inches long. 

Jones also observed “a couple of bruises” and a “little scratch” on N.W.’s upper back. Jones 

stated he did not observe blood coming out of N.W.’s mouth. 
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¶ 34 Shayla Cooper, defendant’s sister, testified she was aware that Laura had made multiple 

attempts to obtain custody of defendant’s children. Cooper also stated that she went to the 

hospital following the August 21, 2014, car accident. She recalled seeing N.W. wearing a neck 

brace. On cross-examination, Cooper testified that N.W.’s back did not look the same after the 

car accident as it did in the photograph in People’s exhibit No. 15. Further, she denied noticing 

“any other injuries to [N.W.’s] body on the day of the car accident.” 

¶ 35 Thomas Copeland testified he was a pastor and had known defendant approximately six 

years. He gave defendant a ride to the hospital following the August 21, 2014, car accident. 

Copeland also observed the car that Latasha and the children had been riding in and described 

it as “totaled on the driver’s side.” 

¶ 36 Barbara Whitfield testified she was defendant’s mother. She was familiar with Laura and 

recalled that she tried to gain custody of defendant’s children on several occasions. Barbara 

saw the aftermath of the car accident and described significant damage to the driver’s side of 

Latasha’s vehicle. 

¶ 37 At the conclusion of defendant’s evidence, the State presented police officer Craig Lundy 

as a rebuttal witness. Lundy testified he was a crash reconstructionist with the Decatur Police 

Department’s fatal accident investigation team. He investigated the August 21, 2014, accident 

involving defendant’s sister and children. Lundy described the accident as a single-contact 

crash. N.W. was riding in the vehicle that was struck and was positioned near the point of 

impact—the driver’s side back door. However, Lundy noted there were “no visible injuries” 

and that “[n]o one was bleeding.” He stated N.W. was taken to the hospital “to check on his 

condition as he was at the locus point of the contact.” 

¶ 38 The State also sought to admit the transcript of a January 2015 bond hearing during which 

Luther testified. Again, defendant objected on the basis that the State was presenting a 

transcript of a different hearing, stating his most recent bond hearing and the one during which 

Luther testified about the car accident, occurred in March 2015. The trial court allowed the 

transcript into evidence over defendant’s objection, stating to defendant that “[i]f you want to 

get a transcript [of the more recent bond hearing], you can put on surrebuttal.” 

¶ 39 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of the charged offense. In 

September 2015, defendant filed several posttrial motions raising various claims of error not at 

issue on appeal and arguing he was denied a fair trial. In October 2015, the trial court 

conducted a hearing and denied defendant’s motions. In November 2015, the court sentenced 

defendant to four years in prison. 

¶ 40 This appeal followed. 

¶ 41 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 42 A. Interrogation Video 

¶ 43 On appeal, defendant first argues he was denied a fair trial because certain portions of his 

interrogation video were played for the jury and admitted into evidence at trial. He maintains 

the video contained inadmissible hearsay assertions from the investigating officers, improper 

opinions and commentary from the officers on his credibility and eventual defenses, and 

improper opinions from the officers on the strength of the State’s evidence. Defendant 

contends the challenged statements from the officers were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. 
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¶ 44 Initially, defendant acknowledges that he has forfeited this issue by failing to raise it with 

the trial court. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (1988) 

(holding that to preserve an issue for appellate review, a defendant must both make a trial 

objection and raise the issue in a written posttrial motion). However, he argues that inclusion of 

the officers’ statements in the interrogation video amounted to plain error and this court should 

excuse his forfeiture. 

¶ 45 Under the plain-error doctrine, a defendant’s procedural default may be excused 

“(1) when a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that 

the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of 

the seriousness of the error, or (2) when a clear or obvious error occurred and that error 

is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the 

integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48, 89 N.E.3d 675. 

“The initial analytical step under either prong of the plain error doctrine is determining 

whether there was a clear or obvious error at trial.” Id. ¶ 49. 

¶ 46 Whether evidence is relevant and admissible at trial is within the trial court’s discretion. 

People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 101, 939 N.E.2d 238, 254 (2010). On review, “[a] decision to 

admit evidence *** will not be overturned unless it is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable.” Id.

¶ 47 Hearsay is not involved where a challenged statement “is admissible not for its truth, but 

for its effect on the listener.” People v. Britz, 112 Ill. 2d 314, 320, 493 N.E.2d 575, 578 (1986). 

In other words, “[a]n out-of-court statement offered to prove its effect on a listener’s mind or to 

show why the listener subsequently acted as he did is not hearsay and is admissible.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) People v. Sorrels, 389 Ill. App. 3d 547, 553, 906 N.E.2d 788, 793 

(2009). However, even relevant evidence may be excluded where its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. People v. Walker, 211 Ill. 2d 317, 337-38, 

812 N.E. 2d 339, 351 (2004). 

¶ 48 In determining whether or which questions or statements by a police officer during an 

interrogation of the defendant are admissible, a trial court should consider (1) whether the 

officer’s questions or statements would be helpful to the jury so as to place the defendant’s 

responses (or lack thereof) into context and (2) assuming the first criteria is satisfied, whether 

the prejudicial effect of the officer’s questions or statements substantially outweighs their 

probative value. We note that this analysis is mostly consistent with the analysis suggested by 

our sister districts in People v. Theis, 2011 IL App (2d) 091080, ¶ 33, 963 N.E.2d 378, and 

People v. Hardimon, 2017 IL App (3d) 120772, ¶ 35, 77 N.E.3d 1184. In those cases, the 

Second and Third Districts indicated that statements of an investigating officer during a police 

interview or interrogation of the defendant are admissible when they are “necessary” to show 

the effect of the statement on the defendant or to explain the defendant’s subsequent actions. 

Theis, 2011 IL App (2d) 091080, ¶ 33 (“[A]n out-of-court statement that is necessary to show 

its effect on the listener’s mind or explain the listener’s subsequent actions is not hearsay.” 

(Emphasis added.)); Hardimon, 2017 IL App (3d) 120772, ¶ 35 (“Generally, statements made 

by an investigating officer during an interview with the suspected defendant are admissible if 

they are necessary to demonstrate the effect of the statement on the defendant or to explain the 

defendant’s response.” (Emphasis added.)). However, to the extent that Theis and Hardimon

impose a higher degree of probativeness regarding an officer’s statements or questions through 

their use of the word “necessary,” we respectfully disagree. We find that questions and 
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statements by police officers during a defendant’s interrogation may still possess 

probativeness where they are simply “helpful,” although perhaps not essential or “necessary,” 

to a jury’s understanding of the defendant’s responses or silence. 

¶ 49 In this instance, the challenged statements were not hearsay, as they were not offered for 

the truth of the matters asserted. Rather, they were helpful to the jury in that they provided 

context for what occurred during the police interrogation and were useful in explaining 

defendant’s statements and admissions. Defendant concedes that statements he made during 

his videotaped interrogation were relevant and admissible. Without the officers’ statements 

and questions, the meaning and significance of defendant’s answers, comments, behaviors—or 

even, at times, his silence—would be difficult to discern. 

¶ 50 We note defendant cites several examples of the investigating officers’ statements, which 

he maintains were improper and not helpful in providing context for his statements. We 

disagree. Defendant notes that Daniels commented on photographs of N.W. that showed 

“welts *** with scabs” that had “actually bled.” This line of questioning from Daniels initially 

elicited a statement from defendant that N.W. had scratched himself; however, defendant 

ultimately described spanking N.W. with a “folded belt” and stated that maybe he used the 

“wrong type of belt.” After defendant suggested N.W.’s injuries may have been created or 

enhanced by makeup, Daniels responded that the photos were taken at the hospital and 

“[d]efinitely not makeup.” Defendant then agreed that the photographs “looked bad” and 

“looked like abuse.” 

¶ 51 Defendant next points to statements and questioning by the officers regarding whether 

defendant minimized his conduct and used an extension cord to discipline N.W. During that 

portion of the interrogation, defendant described spanking N.W., estimated how many “missed 

shots” landed on N.W.’s arm, stated he “made a mistake” and needed “counseling” on how to 

discipline, stated he used a blue belt made of “thin leather” when spanking N.W., stated he 

“maybe popped [N.W.] a little too hard,” and demonstrated how he used a belt to “pop” N.W. 

Finally, during the portion of the interrogation in which defendant asserts Daniels 

“summarized” what eventually became the State’s case, defendant agreed that the marks on 

N.W. were caused by “the belt” rather than something else. 

¶ 52 Ultimately, the record does not support defendant’s assertion on appeal that he “barely 

responded to the officers’ aforementioned comments.” Rather, he made statements indicating 

he was responsible for N.W.’s injuries and contradicting the defenses he presented at trial. As 

discussed, the officers’ statements helped to demonstrate the effect their questioning had on 

defendant and to explain his subsequent statements. 

¶ 53 To support his position that the officers’ interrogation statements were irrelevant and 

unduly prejudicial, defendant relies heavily on the Third District’s decision in Hardimon. 

However, we find that case is factually distinguishable. 

¶ 54 In Hardimon, the defendant argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 

motion to redact a video recording of the defendant’s police interview. Id. ¶ 32. Specifically, 

the defendant maintained “that the final two-thirds of the video recording should have been 

redacted because it was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative.” Id. The appellate court 

agreed with the defendant’s argument. Id. ¶ 37. 

¶ 55 In so holding, the Third District described the first one-third of the defendant’s interview 

with detectives as being “arguably relevant,” in that it consisted of a conversation between the 

defendant and the detectives about the defendant’s whereabouts and knowledge of the alleged 
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offense—a shooting at a club. Id. ¶¶ 36-38. However, the court noted that the interview then 

shifted “from a conversational tone to accusations” and that, during the remaining two-thirds 

of the recording, the defendant adamantly and consistently denied the accusations against him. 

Id. ¶ 36. Despite the defendant’s denials, the detectives “goaded” the defendant into confessing 

by suggesting he would receive more lenient treatment if he took responsibility, commenting 

that the evidence weighed heavily against the defendant and the prosecution could easily 

prevail at trial, commenting on possible media attention the defendant would receive, assuring 

the defendant they were not lying, indicating the defendant’s failure to implicate himself 

would prevent him from seeing his son, and stating the defendant was going to jail for first 

degree murder. Id. The court concluded as follows: 

“[The] comments from the interviewing officers served only to impermissibly 

bolster the State’s case and inflame the passions of the jury. Because the defendant was 

adamant that he was not involved in the shooting and did not change his version of 

events throughout the interview, the final two-thirds of the interview had no probative 

value. Rather, this portion of the video was highly prejudicial and, at times, removed 

the finding of guilt from the province of the jury as the detectives conclusively stated 

that the defendant was guilty of murder.” Id. ¶ 37. 

¶ 56 Defendant likens his case to Hardimon by arguing he made no relevant statements or 

admissions after approximately the 18-minute mark of the interrogation video and, as a result, 

“the remaining 35 minutes or so” of the interrogation held no relevance or probative value. We 

disagree and find the record belies this assertion. Certainly, the initial portion of the 

interrogation video contains relevant admissions by defendant. However, thereafter, defendant 

continued to make relevant statements, implicating himself in the crime and contradicting the 

defenses he made at trial. Significantly, the interrogation video shows defendant admitted that 

he might have gone “overboard” in his discipline (24:54), admitted he caused the “circular 

marks” on N.W. with the “end of the belt” (29:17), estimated how many “missed shots” struck 

N.W.’s left arm (33:49), admitted he made a “mistake” (35:15), admitted that he spanked N.W. 

with a blue belt made of “thin leather” (35:40), stated he might have “popped” N.W. “too hard” 

(37:40), admitted “most” of the marks on N.W. were from “being spanked” (39:50), described 

how N.W. received welts on the inside of his leg (41:10), and admitted that the injuries to N.W. 

were inflicted at “different times” (44:30). 

¶ 57 In Hardimon, the officers’ statements amounted to persistent accusations in the face of the 

defendant’s equally persistent denials. The statements, therefore, held no probative value and 

were not helpful to the trier of fact. Unlike in Hardimon, defendant in this case, continued to 

make incriminating statements that held probative value. As a result, Hardimon is not 

dispositive of the issue presented here and does not warrant a finding that the final “35 minutes 

or so” of the interrogation video should have been excluded from the evidence. 

¶ 58 As indicated, defendant also argues that the officers’ videotaped statements constituted 

improper lay witness opinions on defendant’s credibility and the strength of the State’s case. 

However, our supreme court has held that statements of past opinions, rather than present ones, 

do not constitute improper lay opinion testimony. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d at 101; see also People v. 

Moore, 2012 IL App (1st) 100857, ¶ 52, 964 N.E.2d 1276 (holding that where an officer’s 

statement “is not a current comment on the defendant’s credibility [citation], the police 

accusations may be seen as a standard interrogation tactic, rather than an improper opinion on 

[the defendant’s] credibility”). In this instance, the officers’ statements—recorded on the 
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interrogation video—were not testimony. Moreover, defendant has failed to point to any 

statements of present opinion from the investigating officers. 

¶ 59 Under our analysis as set forth above, because the officers’ statements and questions 

during defendant’s interrogation were helpful to the jury so as to place defendant’s statements 

(and his silence) into context and because their probative value outweighed their prejudicial 

effect, we find they were properly admitted. 

¶ 60 Finally, we note that, here, defendant argues only first-prong plain error. In such cases, “a 

reviewing court must decide whether the defendant has shown that the evidence was so closely 

balanced the error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice.” Sebby, 2017 IL 

119445, ¶ 51. In this instance, even if we were to find that clear and obvious error occurred, 

defendant cannot otherwise establish first-prong plain error. In other words, the evidence at 

defendant’s trial was not closely balanced; rather, the State presented substantial evidence of 

his guilt. 

¶ 61 As stated, defendant acknowledges that his own statements in the interrogation video were 

properly admitted against him. During the interrogation, defendant admitted spanking 

two-year-old N.W. with a blue belt made of “thin leather” on his bare buttocks. N.W. 

“squirmed” or moved around during spankings, which caused defendant to strike N.W.’s arm, 

hand, and legs. Defendant admitted that his spankings caused “welts” and “circular marks” on 

N.W.’s body. When shown photographs of the marks on N.W., defendant admitted that 

spanking caused “most” of the marks. He also acknowledged that the marks or injuries 

occurred at “different times,” that he went “overboard” in his discipline, and that N.W.’s 

injuries “looked bad.” 

¶ 62 The State also presented several photographs depicting N.W.’s injuries, including 

photographs of his arm, back, and legs. The photographs showed welts or circular marks on 

N.W.’s body, some of which appeared to have bled and were scabbed over. Dr. Leon testified 

N.W.’s injuries consisted of bruising and what appeared to be “belt marks.” He estimated the 

injuries were inflicted “within a few days” and opined they were “consistent with being 

whipped with a cord or a belt.” 

¶ 63 Although defendant attempted to show that N.W.’s injuries were the result of a car 

accident, caused by Laura, or the result of reasonable discipline, his videotaped statements 

contradicted those arguments. Further, testimony from defendant’s own witnesses regarding 

N.W.’s car accident injuries varied greatly. The only real support for defendant’s argument 

that N.W.’s injuries were the result of the car accident came from defendant’s father, Luther. 

However, Luther’s testimony was contradicted by defendant’s other witnesses who either 

observed no injuries to N.W. after the car accident or only minor injuries that were not 

consistent with the photographic evidence. Additionally, Lundy, the officer who investigated 

the car accident, also contradicted Luther’s testimony, indicating N.W. had “no visible 

injuries” following the accident. 

¶ 64 Contrary to defendant’s assertions, evidence of his guilt was strong and not closely 

balanced. As a result, he cannot establish that the error he alleges in the admission of the 

officers’ statements “alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice,” and he has failed to 

demonstrate plain error. 
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¶ 65 B. The State’s Impeachment of a Defense Witness

¶ 66 On appeal, defendant also argues the State improperly impeached Luther and, as a result, 

misled the jury about Luther’s prior statement. However, defendant also failed to preserve this 

issue for appellate review. Again, he maintains that this court may excuse his forfeiture 

because the alleged error was clear or obvious and the evidence was closely balanced. For the 

reasons discussed above, the evidence presented was not closely balanced. Rather, the State 

presented substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt. Therefore, even if we assume that a clear 

or obvious error occurred with respect to the State’s impeachment of Luther, defendant cannot 

demonstrate first-prong plain error. 

¶ 67 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 68 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. As part of our judgment, we 

award the State its $75 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal. 

¶ 69 Affirmed.