2006 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-10-2006

Taliaferro v. Darby Twp Zoning Bd

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 05-2253

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 05-2253

 

LEE TALIAFERRO, SAMUEL ALEXANDER,

 BEATRICE MOORE, 

and BERNICE WILSON,

Appellants

v.

DARBY TOWNSHIP ZONING BOARD, JOHN

DOUGHERTY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A MEMBER

OF THE DARBY TOWNSHIP ZONING BOARD; JESSE

BYRD-ESTES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A MEMBER OF

THE DARBY TOWNSHIP ZONING BOARD; LAMONT

JACOBS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A MEMBER OF THE

DARBY TOWNSHIP ZONING BOARD; JOHN J.

O’NEILL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A MEMBER OF THE

DARBY TOWNSHIP ZONING BOARD; WILLIAM

RYAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A MEMBER OF THE

DARBY TOWNSHIP ZONING BOARD; DARBY

TOWNSHIP; DELAWARE COUNTY REDEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; MAUREEN

HEALY also known as MAUREEN DILUZIO; JOHN DOE;

DETECTIVE JOHN RYAN, MANAGER OF DARBY

TOWNSHIP, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MANAGER;

SECRETARY MEL MARTINEZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND

AS SECRETARY OF HUD; MILTON R. PRATT, JR.,

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF

HUD

Appellees

 
 The Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez, United States 1

District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by

designation.

2

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(No. 03-cv-3554)

District Judge: Hon. Gene E.K. Pratter

 

Argued March 9, 2006

Before: ROTH and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges, and

RODRIGUEZ, District Judge 1

(Opinion filed August 10, 2006 )

Robert J. Sugarman, Esquire (ARGUED)

Sugarman and Associates, P.C.

Robert Morris Bldg., 11th Flr.

100 North 17th Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellants

James J. Byrne, Jr., Esquire (ARGUED)

Kelly S. Sullivan, Esquire

Curran & Byrne, P.C.

606 East Baltimore Pike

P.O. Box 30

Media, PA 19063

Counsel for Appellees Township of Darby,

Darby Township Zoning Hearing Board,

John Dougherty, Jesse Byrd-Estes,

Lamont Jacobs, John J. O’Neill,

William Ryan, and John Ryan
3

Curtis P. Cheyney, III, Esquire (ARGUED)

Swartz Campbell LLC

1601 Market Street, 34th Flr.

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellees Delaware County

Redevelopment Authority

Lee J. Janiczek, Esquire (ARGUED)

Reilly, Janiczek & McDevitt, P.C.

The Widener Building

One South Penn Square

Suite 210, Mezzanine Level

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Counsel for Appellee Maureen Healy

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

RODRIGUEZ, District Judge:

On its face, this case presents the Court with the issue of

whether neighboring property owners who allege that their

property values will be diminished and their neighborhood

blighted by the construction of a storage facility have standing

to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The focus of this case is the

propriety of the Darby Township Zoning Hearing Board’s

(“Board”) decision to grant a variance, which permitted the

construction of a storage facility in a residential zone, and the

attendant State court decisions issued in the course of appeal.

With the exception of the claim that Appellants’ property values

will be damaged by the grant of the variance, we will affirm the

district court’s dismissal of the Amended Complaint because

Appellants have not alleged facts clearly demonstrating that they

are proper parties to invoke the exercise of the federal court’s

remedial powers. Insofar as Appellants Taliaferro and
4

Alexander have alleged injuries to their property values and

neighborhood arising from the approval of the variance,

however, we will reverse the district court’s dismissal.

I.

In 1960, Appellee Delaware County Redevelopment

Authority acquired by condemnation a nine-acre tract of land in

the Township of Darby (“Darby Township”). In furtherance of

a twenty-year Urban Renewal Plan, an Agreement was entered

into in 1967 by the Redevelopment Authority and a redeveloper,

RUPACA, Inc. The Agreement contained a covenant binding

the redeveloper and its successors and assigns until April 8,

1980, to devote the property to, and only to and in accordance

with, the uses specified in the Urban Renewal Plan, i.e., for

residential purposes. There was also a covenant, unlimited as to

duration, for non-discriminatory use of the property. (App., Vol.

II, 000218a.) 

The Property was sold in 1969 to First Urban

Redevelopers. First Urban subsequently sold the property to

Charles Rappa, who sold it to Appellee Maureen Healy in 2002.

No development had occurred between 1969 and 2002.

Although located in a partially commercial area, (App., Vol. II,

000063a), the Property was still zoned R-1 residential, so Healy

made a variance request to allow the construction of an 800-unit

self-storage facility. That request was supported by expert

testimony, which concluded that redevelopment to residential

use was not economically feasible. (App., Vol. II, 000050a,

000136a.) At the behest of Appellants Lee Taliaferro and

Samuel Alexander, the Delaware County Court of Common

Pleas remanded an original grant of the variance for additional

testimony and evidence, but after further hearings, the Board

granted the final request for a variance on May 8, 2003.

Appellants again appealed the decision to the Delaware County

Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the Board. Appellants

then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the

Court of Common Pleas decision. See Taliaferro v. Darby Twp.

Zoning Hearing Bd., 873 A.2d 807 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005),

reh’g denied, (June 1, 2005), and appeal denied, 887 A.2d 1243

(Pa. 2005).
The United States Department of Housing and Urban 2

Development and two of its officials were originally named in

the Complaint but are no longer involved in the case.

5

II.

In the meantime, the Complaint in this matter was filed

in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on June 9, 2003.

Plaintiffs Lee Taliaferro and Samuel Alexander are members of

the African-American community in Darby Township and

neighboring property owners to the land in question. Plaintiffs

Beatrice Moore and Bernice Wilson were residents whose land

was condemned pursuant to the Urban Renewal Project. Named

as Defendants were the Board and its members, Darby

Township and the Manager of Darby Township, the Delaware

County Redevelopment Authority, and Maureen Healy.2

An Amended Complaint alleged that Appellants brought

suit “as citizens and beneficiaries” of the Urban Renewal Plan

and subsequent Redevelopment Agreement, because they were

promised the benefits of residential redevelopment of the

property. Despite the Redevelopment Agreement, however,

Appellants alleged that “Darby Township, in order to perpetuate

the white majority in the Township, continuously discouraged

residential developments by various means, including without

limitation, demanding that the developer construct an

unnecessary bridge, refusing housing style modifications and

informal discouragement.” (App., Vol. II, 000147a.)

Appellants complained that the Delaware County

Redevelopment Authority failed to enforce the terms of the

Redevelopment Agreement. They accused the Appellees of

conspiring to inhibit and prevent the residential redevelopment

of the Property for the purpose of preventing the AfricanAmerican population in Darby Township from expanding and

gaining political control.

Count I of the Amended Complaint sought enforcement

of the Redevelopment Agreement, by way of an injunction in

order to prevent the use of the property for purposes other than
This count was dismissed as against Defendant Healy 3

on September 22, 2004.

6

the residential use specified in the Urban Renewal Plan and

Redevelopment Agreement. Count II alleged a claim under 42 3

U.S.C. §1983 for violation of Appellants’ rights of equal

protection, substantive and procedural due process, and

protection of property. Count III alleged a claim under 42

U.S.C. §1981 for intentional racial discrimination by Appellees

“preventing the growth of the community and introducing

improper uses into the community to decrease property values

and diminishing or curtailing the voting power of the

community,” as well as “by denying them contracts which were

required to protect and promote the [Appellant]s’ community

[and] by limiting the [Appellant]s’ rights as parties before the

Board.” (App., Vol. II, 000154a.) Count IV alleged conspiracy

under 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) and Count V alleged a violation of the

Fair Housing Act. Count VI, which attacked the Board’s

decision to grant the variance, was dismissed by Order of the

district court dated September 22, 2004.

III.

In response to Appellees’ motions to dismiss brought

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the district

court concluded that the Appellants lacked standing to bring the

claims asserted, and dismissed the Amended Complaint. 

Lee Taliaferro and Samuel Alexander, as members of the

African-American community in Darby Township and

neighboring property owners, alleged they were injured: (1) by

the racially discriminatory policies of the Appellees in curtailing

the voting and political power of the African-American

community, because the Appellees allegedly made a land use

decision granting a variance to allow the construction of an 800-

unit self-storage facility instead of the promised residential

redevelopment in order to limit the effect of the AfricanAmerican vote in Darby Township; (2) in that their property

values would be diminished and their neighborhood blighted by
7

the construction of an 800-unit self-storage facility; and (3)

because African-Americans have been denied equal treatment

under the law in government hearings and meetings in that, at a

hearing before the case was remanded by the State court, Board

members “discriminately, repeatedly shouted down the

protestants who were African-Americans and threatened to

expel them from the hearing,” (App., Vol. II, 000149a),

allegedly based on racial bias. The district court dismissed

Taliaferro’s and Alexander’s claims, and noted that these

Appellants had not alleged what, if any, benefit they would

receive if the Urban Renewal Plan were implemented. Thus,

they neither alleged nor demonstrated that they, as individuals,

suffered a concrete injury as a result of Appellees’ alleged

actions that would be redressed by the relief sought in this

action. 

Beatrice Moore and Bernice Wilson were residents who

were removed pursuant to the Urban Renewal Plan with the

alleged promise of an opportunity to return. The district court

dismissed their claims because they had not alleged they desired,

or would be eligible, to move into residences that might have

been constructed under the Urban Renewal Plan.

In summary, the lower court determined that Appellants

had not contended that they had been injured personally by

Appellees’ conduct. Accordingly, because none of the

Appellants would receive an actual benefit if the court granted

the requested injunction, it found that they lacked standing to

bring the Amended Complaint filed in this matter. See

Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., No. Civ. A. 03-3554,

2005 WL 696880, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2005) (“The relief

requested . . . would not confer a benefit to any of the parties, as

granting an injunction against commercial use of the Property in

light of the expired [U]rban [R]enewal [P]lan would not

necessarily lead to anything other than maintaining the Property

in its present fallow condition.”) Alternatively, the court found

that abstention, as articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37

(1971), was appropriate, Taliaferro, 2005 WL 696880, at *10,

and further, that the court lacked jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine, id. at *11.
8

IV.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal from a final

judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary

review over a district court's order dismissing a complaint for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Kaiser Group

Int’l Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 2005); Turicentro, S.A. v.

Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing

Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir.

2000)). In an appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1), “‘we review only whether the allegations on

the face of the complaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to

invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.’” Turicentro, 303

F.3d at 300 (quoting Licata v. U.S. Postal Serv., 33 F.3d 259,

260 (3d Cir. 1994)). “Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction

under Rule 12(b)(1) may be ‘facial’ or ‘factual.’ Facial attacks,

like this one, contest the sufficiency of the pleadings, and the

trial court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true.” Id.

at 300 n.4 (citing NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission

Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 341 n.7 (3d Cir. 2001)).

Similarly, our standard of review of a district court’s

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is

plenary. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005).

“[W]e are required to accept as true all allegations in the

complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

therefrom, [viewing] them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Id. “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted ‘if it

appears to a certainty that no relief could be granted under any

set of facts which could be proved.’” Id. at 351 (quoting D.P.

Enters., Inc. V. Bucks County Cmty., 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir.

1994)).

V.

Article III of the Constitution restricts the “judicial

power” of the United States to the resolution of cases and

controversies. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United

for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471

(1982). Subsumed within this restriction is the requirement that
9

a litigant have standing to challenge the action sought to be

adjudicated in the lawsuit. Id. Standing has constitutional and

prudential components, both of which must be satisfied before

a litigant may seek redress in the federal courts. Id.; Wheeler v.

Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 537 (3d Cir. 1994). Absent

Article III standing, a federal court does not have subject matter

jurisdiction to address a plaintiff’s claims, and they must be

dismissed. Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322

F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 2003).

The three elements necessary to satisfy the irreducible

constitutional minimum of standing are: 

(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact– an

invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)

concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent,

not conjectural or hypothetical;

(2) there must be a causal connection between the injury

and the conduct complained of; and

(3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative,

that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742-43 (1995). In other

words, “the plaintiff must show that he [or she] personally has

suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the

putatively illegal conduct of the defendant [and] [t]he injury

must be concrete and capable of being redressed by the court

should the plaintiff prevail on the merits.” Wheeler, 22 F.3d at

537-38 (quotations and citations omitted).

Thus, whether asserting first party standing or third party

standing, a plaintiff must state an injury in fact. Storino, 322

F.3d at 295. In Storino, we found a challenge by landowners to

a zoning ordinance that made the use of their property as a

boarding home into a legal nonconforming use insufficient to

confer first party standing. The landowners argued that they

would be injured in the future when the nonconforming use was

no longer accepted by the city, because they would have to apply
Litigants may bring an action on behalf of third parties 4

only in limited circumstances, when: (1) the litigant has

suffered an injury in fact, giving him a sufficiently concrete

interest in the outcome of the issue; (2) the litigant has a close

relation to the third party; and (3) there exists some hindrance

to the third party’s ability to protect his own interest. Powers

v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (citing Singleton v. Wulff,

428 U.S. 106, 111-16 (1976); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190

(1976)).

10

for a variance. Because the injury of future costs when applying

for a variance was prospective and conjectural, we found that

the landowners had not sufficiently alleged an injury in fact that

was particularized, actual, or imminent. Id. at 298. Therefore,

the landowners did not satisfy the constitutional requirements

for first party standing. Id. In addition, we found that the

landowners did not have third party standing to challenge the

ordinance on equal protection grounds for decreasing the

amount of low-to-moderate income housing available in the

area. Because the landowners did not suffer an injury in fact

themselves, they could not establish third party standing. Id. at

299. 

4

“[A] plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning

practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that

the challenged practices harm him, and that he personally would

benefit in a tangible way from the court’s intervention.” Warth

v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975). This Court has found

injury allegedly suffered by potential tenants of a low-income

housing project sufficient to confer standing to sue public

officials where the individuals already were public housing

tenants who would have suffered a particular injury if the

development was not built. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo,

564 F.2d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1977).

Further, we have found that a claim that a building

project would increase traffic, pollution, and noise in the area

residents’ neighborhood was sufficiently concrete and

particularized. Society Hill Towers Owners’ Assoc. v. Rendell,
11

210 F.3d 168, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). There, we held that a group

of residents of a particular neighborhood, Society Hill, in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, had standing to sue the Mayor of

Philadelphia, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,

and the Department of Housing and Urban Development

(“HUD”), challenging HUD’s approval of a grant to

Philadelphia to assist in funding development of a hotel and

parking garage in Society Hill. 210 F.3d at 168. Under the

Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et

seq., the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), 16

U.S.C. § 470f, and the National Environmental Policy Act

(“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321, the plaintiffs alleged that the

project that the City was funding would decrease their property

values. Id. at 176. Cautioning against “conflat[ing] issues of

standing and questions of proof,” id., we concluded that this was

a sufficiently concrete and particularized injury:

The Residents have alleged concrete and

particularized injury in the form of increased

traffic, pollution, and noise that will detrimentally

impact the ambiance of their historic

neighborhood and their ability to use and enjoy

the Penn's Landing waterfront. They assert that

the impact of the proposed project on their

neighborhood will decrease their property values.

There is no assertion that these claims are

disingenuous or that the Residents claim these

injuries merely to manufacture a jurisdictional

case or controversy that would not otherwise

exist. Moreover, the interest of the Residents is

anything but manufactured. It is as real as it is

fervent, and it is sufficient to give the Residents

standing to challenge the requested UDAG grant.

Id. at 176-77.

In addition to alleging actual and specific injury,

plaintiffs must demonstrate a causal connection to a defendant’s

alleged conduct. Warth, 422 U.S. at 493. In Warth, the

Supreme Court found that low-to-moderate income residents

lacked standing to assert that a neighboring town’s zoning
There is no indication in the record that any developer 5

was injured by a zoning decision blocking construction efforts

or took steps to appeal an adverse ruling.

12

regulations and zoning board’s actions discouraged the

construction of low-to-moderate income housing in that town.

The Court determined that the inability of the individuals to

reside in the neighboring town was a consequence of the

economics of the area housing market, rather than of the zoning

board’s acts. Id. at 506.

Finally, the injury alleged must be redressable by the

remedy sought. For example, in Rizzo, we found that granting

the relief sought would produce “at least a ‘substantial

probability’ that the [housing] project [would] materialize,

affording (plaintiffs) the housing opportunities (they) desire.”

564 F.2d at 139 (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.

Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977)).

VI.

In this case, accepting as true the material allegations of

the Amended Complaint, Appellants have failed to allege an

injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, or actual in order

to confer standing upon them in regard to a denial of equal

treatment as a result of the Appellees’ alleged conspiracy to

block the construction of residential housing on the Property.

Such a claim is generalized, and does not allege any actual

injury to the Appellants. Thus, to the extent Taliaferro and 5

Alexander have alleged that Appellees made land use decisions

in order to limit the effect of the African-American vote in

Darby Township, they have not asserted an actual injury that

would confer constitutional standing upon them. That is,

Appellants have not demonstrated that they, as individuals, have

suffered a concrete loss as the result of Appellees’ actions, even

if Appellees had acted to ensure that the Property would not be

used for low-to-moderate income residential housing. 

To the extent Taliaferro and Alexander have alleged
13

injuries to their property values and neighborhood arising from

the approval of the variance, however, we conclude that they

have alleged a constitutionally cognizable injury. This injury is

not conjectural; they contend that the construction of the storage

facility will lower their property values, reduce the aesthetics in

their community and create excess noise and traffic, including

heavy truck traffic on their residential streets. (App., Vol. II,

000140a-000161a.) As in Society Hill, these injuries are

sufficiently concrete and particularized. See also Sierra Club v.

Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (“Aesthetic and

environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are

important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the

fact that . . . interests are shared by the many rather than the few

does not make them less deserving of legal protection through

the judicial process.”). Although we have some doubts about

the genuineness of their claim in light of their primary emphasis

on the effect of the storage facility on their political rights, we

cannot say that this injury is so frivolous as to deprive these

neighboring property owners of standing. See Growth

Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pa., 983 F.2d 1277, 1281

(3d Cir. 1993) (observing that a district court has jurisdiction so

long as plaintiff has standing to make a non-frivolous claim). 

Taliaferro and Alexander also meet the causation and

redressability prongs of Article III standing. The injury alleged

would result directly from the construction of the proposed

storage facility and would be redressed if the variance were

denied. Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to decide

this claim of the neighboring property owners.

Beatrice Moore and Bernice Wilson were residents who

left the neighborhood in question pursuant to the urban renewal

project with the alleged promise of an opportunity to return.

They have not alleged, however, that they were ready, willing,

and able to move back to the area at this time, decades after

leaving in 1960. They also have not alleged that their land was

taken from them without compensation. (App., Vol. II,

000079a.) Therefore, Moore and Wilson have not suffered any

concrete injury; they have only an abstract interest in seeing the

Property developed. See Hous. Investors, Inc. v. City of
Further, any claim in the nature of a breach of contract 6

regarding the condemnation of these Appellants’ land surely

would be barred by the statute of limitations, rendering

appropriate dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Moreover, any claim that there was a breach of the

Redevelopment Agreement cannot be sustained because the

Appellants were not parties to the contract and because the

terms of the contract expired in 1980. Any argument that

Darby Township discouraged residential development of the

Property and the Redevelopment Authority acquiesced by

failing to enforce the terms of the Redevelopment Agreement

should have been raised long ago.

14

Clanton, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1294 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (finding

that a potential resident in proposed low-to-moderate income

housing development, which was not completed due to a zoning

decision, lacked standing to sue because he admitted he would

not move); Indep. Hous. Servs. of San Francisco v. Fillmore Ctr.

Assoc., 840 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (individual who

never alleged that she wanted to, sought to, could have, or

would have lived in the housing development if it were more

handicap accessible did not have standing to challenge alleged

failure of the development to comply with handicap access

laws). 

6

Finally, Appellants seek to assert a claim as members of

the African-American community allegedly injured by

Appellees’ policies of curtailing the voting and political power

of the African-American community. Essentially, they argue

that they should have standing to assert that the AfricanAmerican population is being minimized. But the remedy

sought is an injunction prohibiting the land in question from

being used for anything other than residential purposes. This

would not redress Appellants’ complaints of the Appellees’

failure to implement the Urban Renewal Plan. This Court

cannot direct the Appellees to implement the Urban Renewal

Plan, even if it had not expired over twenty-five years ago. As

the district court observed, an injunction preventing the storage

units from being built does nothing to put into place
15

construction of housing that would draw only African-American

residents. 

VII.

Having determined that the district court has jurisdiction

to decide the claim of the neighboring property owners because

it meets the constitutional standing requirements under Article

III, we also find that abstention would be not be appropriate

under either Younger or Rooker-Feldman. In general, federal

intervention in ongoing state proceedings is precluded in

accordance with the abstention theory articulated in Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). For the Younger doctrine to apply,

state court proceedings must be pending or ongoing, the state

proceedings must implicate an important state interest, and the

state proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity to raise

constitutional issues. Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of

Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

Here, Appellees’ decision has been reviewed extensively and

with finality by the state courts. See Taliaferro v. Darby Twp.

Zoning Hearing Bd., 873 A.2d 807 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005),

reh’g denied, (June 1, 2005), and appeal denied, 887 A.2d 1243

(Pa. 2005). Because there is no longer any state court action

pending or ongoing, resolution of the federal claims cannot

impermissibly interfere with such state proceedings, so

application of Younger is not appropriate. 

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a district court is

precluded from entertaining an action, that is, the federal court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction, if the relief requested

effectively would reverse a state court decision or void its

ruling. Whiteford v. Reed, 155 F.3d 671, 674 (3d Cir. 1998)

(citing FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas,

75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996)). As such, application of the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine is necessarily limited to “cases

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by

state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and

rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 
16

In explaining the jurisdictional bar, this Court has

described the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as precluding lower

federal court jurisdiction over claims that were actually litigated

or those “inextricably intertwined” with adjudication by a state

court. Parkview Assoc. P’ship v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d

321, 325 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Gulla v. North Strabane

Township, 146 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1998)). We have further

explained that “a federal action is inextricably intertwined with

a state adjudication, and thus barred in federal court under

Feldman, ‘[w]here federal relief can only be predicated upon a

conviction that the state court was wrong.’” Id. (quoting

Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1430 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J.,

concurring))). See also Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (“In

parallel litigation, a federal court may be bound to recognize the

claim- and issue-preclusive effects of a state-court judgment,”

but the federal court is divested of jurisdiction under RookerFeldman only where it is asked to redress injuries caused by an

unfavorable state-court judgment.). Importantly, if a plaintiff’s

claim in federal court is inextricably intertwined with a previous

state court adjudication, the district court lacks jurisdiction over

the claim even if it was not raised in the state court. Id. at 327.

We do not find, however, that the claims here were inextricably

intertwined with the claims adjudicated in the state system.

Moreover, this action was commenced after the Board decision,

but well before any state court judgment was reached, so the

district court could not have been invited to review and reject

such a judgment.

The state courts reviewed, for abuse of discretion, the

Board determination that granting the variance would not alter

the essential character of the neighborhood nor be detrimental

to the public welfare. Throughout the state court process,

determinations rested on the decision that because Healy

satisfied the criteria necessary to obtain a zoning variance, the

Board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. The

due process claims of Taliaferro and Alexander, that their

properties will be devalued in violation of their constitutional

rights, were not actually litigated in state court during the appeal

from the Board’s decision. Thus, the state courts did not
17

consider the claims of potential damage to property values and

the neighborhood that would arise from approval of the

variance. Even though such claims could have been raised

during the appeal process, we find that they are not inextricably

intertwined with the appellate review of the Board’s decision.

Federal relief on the property value claims would not necessarily

require a finding that the state court judgments were erroneous.

See Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411,

427 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that the “presence or absence of

property rights under state law is not dispositive of the question

whether a person has a property interest protected by substantive

due process”). That is, a decision in favor of Taliaferro and

Alexander on their due process claims would not mean that the

Board abused its discretion in deciding that there was substantial

evidence to show that Healy satisfied the criteria necessary to

obtain a zoning variance under Pennsylvania state law.

Therefore, the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over

those claims.

VIII.

The Court is mindful that this case has presented a

sensitive issue, with allegations of a policy of perpetuating a

white majority in local government, and resultant racial tensions.

We cannot allow those allegations to have us take on the

“abstract questions of wide public significance,” however,

especially those already addressed by governmental institutions

competent to provide redress. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500

(recognizing that “standing in no way depends on the merits of

the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal”). 

Thus, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of the

Amended Complaint insofar as Taliaferro and Alexander have

alleged that their property values will be damaged by the grant

of the variance because such a claim meets the constitutional

standing requirements under Article III and because abstention

would be not be appropriate. In all other respects, the judgment

of the district court is affirmed.