[J-76-2022]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

JOSE L. VELLON,

Appellant

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 

BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING,

Appellee

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No. 39 MAP 2022

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court dated 

September 10, 2021 at No. 117 CD 

2020 Affirming the Order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of York 

County, Civil Division, dated 

December 30, 2019 at No. 2017-SU003297

SUBMITTED: October 14, 2022

OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE DECIDED: April 19, 2023

In this appeal, we are tasked with interpreting Section 3806 of Pennsylvania’s 

Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806.1 Specifically, the Court is asked to consider whether

1 This statute states as follows:

(a) General rule.--Except as set forth in subsection (b), the 

term “prior offense” as used in this chapter shall mean any 

conviction for which judgment of sentence has been imposed, 

adjudication of delinquency, juvenile consent decree, 

acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or other 

form of preliminary disposition before the sentencing on the 

present violation for any of the following:

(1) an offense under section 3802 (relating to driving under 

influence of alcohol or controlled substance);

(2) an offense under former section 3731;

(...continued)
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the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that, in drafting this statute, the General 

Assembly intended to mandate that, when a defendant is sentenced for two driving-underthe-influence (“DUI”) offenses on the same day, both offenses must be considered prior 

offenses to each other with each warranting civil recidivist collateral consequences, 

despite the facts that the defendant committed the DUI violations at distinct points in time 

and had never previously been convicted of DUI. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(b)(3) (“If the 

defendant is sentenced for two or more offenses in the same day, the offenses shall be 

considered prior offenses within the meaning of this subsection.”). For the reasons that 

(3) an offense substantially similar to an offense under 

paragraph (1) or (2) in another jurisdiction; or

(4) any combination of the offenses set forth in paragraph 

(1), (2) or (3).

(b) Timing.--

(1) For purposes of sections 1553(d.2) (relating to 

occupational limited license), 1556 (relating to ignition 

interlock limited license), 3803 (relating to grading), 3804 

(relating to penalties) and 3805 (relating to ignition 

interlock), the prior offense must have occurred:

(i) within 10 years prior to the date of the offense for 

which the defendant is being sentenced; or

(ii) on or after the date of the offense for which the 

defendant is being sentenced.

(2) The court shall calculate the number of prior offenses, 

if any, at the time of sentencing.

(3) If the defendant is sentenced for two or more offenses 

in the same day, the offenses shall be considered prior 

offenses within the meaning of this subsection.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3806.
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follow, we respectfully disagree with the Commonwealth Court and, therefore, reverse 

that court’s order.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The facts underlying this appeal are undisputed. On March 25, 2016, Appellant 

Jose L. Vellon (“Vellon”) was arrested for DUI of alcohol pursuant to Subsection 

3802(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) (general impairment) (“First 

DUI”).2 A violation of this statute constitutes an “ungraded misdemeanor.” See 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3803(a)(1) (providing that an individual who violates Subsection 3802(a) “and 

has no more than one prior offense commits a misdemeanor for which the individual may 

be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than six months and to pay a fine 

under section 3804 (relating to penalties)”). On November 22, 2016, Vellon was accepted 

into the Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition (“ARD”) Program.3 

2 This statute provides as follows:

(a) General impairment.--

(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual 

physical control of the movement of a vehicle after 

imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the 

individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, 

operating or being in actual physical control of the 

movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).

3 As this Court recently explained,

ARD is a pretrial disposition of certain cases, governed 

primarily by Chapter 3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, which suspends formal criminal proceedings 

before conviction and provides the accused with 

certain rehabilitative conditions, the completion of which 

results in the dismissal of the pending criminal charges and a 

clean record for the defendant.

J.F. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 245 A.3d 658, 661-62 (Pa. 2021).
[J-76-2022] - 4

On December 23, 2016, police charged Vellon with another DUI, alleging that he 

violated Subsection 3802(c) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c) (highest rate of 

alcohol) (“Second DUI”).4 As a result of the Second DUI, on June 22, 2016, the trial court 

entered an order removing Vellon from ARD for the First DUI.

Vellon pleaded guilty to the First and Second DUIs. On October 19, 2017, he was

sentenced on both DUI violations. As to the First DUI, Vellon was sentenced to six 

months of probation, thirty days of alcohol monitoring, plus fines and costs. In addition, 

the sentencing order for the First DUI notes that there was “no suspension.” Regarding 

the Second DUI, the court sentenced Vellon to five years of intermediate punishment with 

thirty days of credit for inpatient treatment, sixty days of house arrest with alcohol 

monitoring, plus fines and costs. The sentencing order for this DUI violation indicates 

that Vellon surrendered his driver’s license. Importantly, Vellon had not been convicted 

of DUI prior to these two convictions. 

Subsequently, Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of 

Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (“PennDOT”) informed Vellon that it would be 

suspending his driving privileges as a collateral consequence of his DUI convictions 

pursuant to Section 3804 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804. Relevant to this 

appeal, that statute provides the following license suspension directions: 

4 Subsection 3802(c) states as follows:

(c) Highest rate of alcohol.--An individual may not drive, 

operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a 

vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that 

the alcohol concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is 

0.16% or higher within two hours after the individual has 

driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the 

movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c).
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(i) Except as provided for in subparagraph (iii), 12 

months for an ungraded misdemeanor or misdemeanor 

of the second degree under this chapter.

(ii) 18 months for a misdemeanor of the first degree or 

felony of the second or third degree under this chapter.

(iii) There shall be no suspension for an ungraded 

misdemeanor under section 3802(a) where the person 

is subject to the penalties provided in subsection (a) and 

the person has no prior offense.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e)(2).

For the First DUI, PennDOT advised Vellon that, pursuant to Subsection 

3804(e)(2)(i) of the Vehicle Code, his license would be suspended for one year, effective 

April 19, 2019. Concerning the Second DUI, PennDOT reported that, pursuant to 

Subsection 3804(e)(2)(ii) of the Vehicle Code, Vellon’s driving privileges would be 

suspended for eighteen months, effective October 19, 2017.5 Vellon filed a summary 

appeal in the court of common pleas challenging his license suspension solely for the 

First DUI.

The trial court held a hearing on March 1, 2018. At that hearing, Vellon argued 

that PennDOT erroneously suspended his license for the First DUI. Because the First 

DUI resulted in a conviction for an ungraded misdemeanor under Subsection 3802(a) and 

Vellon had no prior DUI violations, he contended that, pursuant to Subsection 

3806(e)(2)(iii) of the Vehicle Code, PennDOT should not have suspended his driver’s 

license for the First DUI. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(e)(2)(iii) (“There shall be no suspension 

for an ungraded misdemeanor under section 3802(a) where the person is subject to the 

5 Vellon received this license suspension for the Second DUI because it was graded as 

a misdemeanor of the first degree, considering that the First DUI qualified as a “prior 

offense.” See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3803(b)(4) (“An individual ... who violates section 3802(c) or 

(d) and who has one prior offense commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.”); id.

§ 3804(e)(2)(ii) (explaining that a person who commits an offense under Section 3802 

shall have his driving privileges suspended for 18 months for, inter alia, a misdemeanor 

of the first degree).
[J-76-2022] - 6

penalties provided in subsection (a) and the person has no prior offense.”). PennDOT 

took the position that it properly suspended Vellon’s driver’s license for twelve months for 

the First DUI pursuant to Subsection 3804(e)(2)(i) because Vellon was sentenced to two 

DUI offenses on the same day, rendering both his First and Second DUIs “prior offenses” 

according to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(b)(3), which states that “[i]f the defendant is sentenced 

for two or more offenses in the same day, the offenses shall be considered prior offenses 

within the meaning of this subsection.” Apparently agreeing with PennDOT, the trial court 

entered an order dismissing Vellon’s appeal. 

Vellon then asked the trial court to reconsider its order. The court granted this 

request and later entertained further argument on the validity of PennDOT’s suspension 

of Vellon’s license for the First DUI. Thereafter, the court again concluded that PennDOT 

properly suspended Vellon’s driving privileges. The court opined that Subsection 

3806(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code “clearly allows two or more offenses sentenced on the 

same day to be considered prior offenses of each other.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/30/2019, 

at 7. The court bolstered this conclusion by suggesting that, “if the legislature had not 

intended this interpretation, it would have stated that ‘the offense for which defendant is 

sentenced first shall be a prior offense within the meaning of this subsection’ or words to 

similar effect.” Id. Vellon appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the trial 

court’s order in a published opinion. Vellon v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver 

Licensing, 263 A.3d 679 (Pa. Commw. 2021).

In the Commonwealth Court, Vellon argued, in relevant part, as follows: 

[T]he trial court erred in concluding that the definition of “prior 

offense” set forth in Section 3806(a) of the Vehicle Code 

includes a conviction for which judgment of sentence has not 

been imposed before the sentencing on the present offense—

i.e., that Section 3806(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code somehow 

permits [Vellon’s] Second DUI to be a prior offense of his First 

DUI such that [PennDOT] could suspend [Vellon’s] operating 
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privilege for one year under Section 3804(e) of the Vehicle 

Code[.]

Id. at 681-82.

In reviewing the relevant portions of the Vehicle Code, the Commonwealth Court 

observed that, “to qualify for the exception to the operating privilege suspension set forth 

in Section 3804(e)(2)(iii), an individual must: (1) be convicted for an ungraded 

misdemeanor under Section 3802(a); (2) be subject to the penalties in Section 3804(a) 

(relating to first-time DUI offenses); and (3) have no prior offense.” Id. at 682. The 

intermediate court then noted the parties’ agreement that Vellon’s First DUI met 

conditions (1) and (2). Thus, the court opined, “Whether [Vellon] meets the requirements 

of the exception set forth in Section 3804(e)(2)(iii) ... hinges on whether he has a prior 

offense as that term is defined in Section 3806 of the Vehicle Code.” Id. at 682-83. The 

court then attempted to construe the Vehicle Code utilizing the well-settled tenets of 

statutory construction. Id. at 684-85. 

In so doing, the Commonwealth Court first addressed Vellon’s contention that “the 

definition of ‘prior offense’ in Section 3806(a) of the Vehicle Code applies to Section 

3806(b)(3) such that it does not permit a finding that [Vellon’s] Second DUI is a prior 

offense of his First DUI.” Id. at 685. Vellon further argued that “the exclusionary language 

in Section 3806(a)—i.e., ‘except as set forth in subsection (b)’—does not exempt Section 

3806(b)(3) from the definition of ‘prior offense’ in Section 3806(a).” Id. The court noted 

that Vellon supported his position by relying on this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 

Mock, 219 A.3d 1155 (Pa. 2019), and the Commonwealth Court’s opinion in Diveglia v. 

Department of Transportation, 220 A.3d 1167 (Pa. Commw. 2019).

The Commonwealth Court explained that, in Mock, this Court “considered whether 

the timeline for the ten-year lookback provision under Section 3806(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle 

Code begins running at the occurrence date or the conviction date of a prior offense.” Id. 
[J-76-2022] - 8

According to the intermediate court, “[i]n holding that the conviction date is the proper 

marker for running the clock on a prior offense, the Supreme Court concluded that the 

exclusionary language in Section 3806(a) does not modify the essential definition of prior 

offense as applied to Section 3806(b).” Id. Instead, the court stated, the Mock Court 

concluded that “Section 3806(b) simply applies time limits to the broad definition of ‘prior 

offense’ in Section 3806(a)--i.e., ‘any conviction’ becomes ‘a conviction’ within the 

enumerated time constraints.” 6 Id.

The Commonwealth Court agreed with Vellon that Mock and its own precedent 

“unequivocally establish that the definition of ‘prior offense’ as set forth in Section 3806(a) 

of the Vehicle Code applies to Section 3806(b) of the Vehicle Code, and that Section 

3806(a)’s exclusionary language does not permit Section 3806(b)(3) to operate 

independently of the general definition of ‘prior offense.’” Id. The court, however, posited 

that it was required to further analyze the Vehicle Code because this precedent was not 

dispositive as to the correct operation of Section 3806(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code.” Id.

6 The Commonwealth Court also discussed its opinion in Diveglia. Kathryn Diveglia 

(“Diveglia”) was arrested for two DUI of alcohol violations nearly seven months apart. The 

trial court sentenced her for the second-in-time violation months before it sentenced her 

for her first-in-time violation. When PennDOT was notified of Diveglia’s conviction for the 

first-in-time DUI, it “concluded that the conviction for the second DUI constituted a prior 

offense pursuant to Section 3806 of the Vehicle Code, and [PennDOT] suspended [her] 

operating privilege for twelve months pursuant to Section 3804(e)(2)(i).” Id. at 685-86. 

When the matter reached the Commonwealth Court, the court was asked to determine 

“whether the second DUI could be a prior offense of the first DUI simply because the 

licensee received the conviction for the second DUI prior to the conviction on the first 

DUI.” Vellon, 263 A.3d at 686. 

The Commonwealth Court in Diveglia held that the second-in-time DUI qualified as a prior 

offense to the first-in-time DUI. In so doing, the intermediate court “emphasized that the 

plain language of Section 3806 considers any conviction for which judgment of sentence 

has been imposed to be a prior offense, regardless of the date of occurrence of the 

violation itself.” Id. Consequently, the court ruled that Diveglia’s second-in-time DUI 

conviction constituted a prior offense for purposes of her first-in-time DUI conviction.
[J-76-2022] - 9

The Commonwealth Court rejected Vellon’s argument that Subsection 3806(b)(3) 

requires that the lookback and “on or after date” rules of Subsection 3806(b)(1)(i) and (ii) 

apply in a circumstance where an individual is sentenced to two or more offenses on the 

same day, and that the language “within the meaning of this subsection” in Subsection 

3806(b)(3) limits its operation only to Subsection 3806(b)(1)(i)-(ii). Id. In so doing, the 

Commonwealth Court primarily relied upon the principle of statutory interpretation that 

requires a court to construe a statute, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions. Id. at 

687 (citing, inter alia, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a)). Applying that axiom, the intermediate court 

opined that Vellon’s interpretation of the Vehicle Code would render Subsection 

3806(b)(3) meaningless. More specifically, the court stated that “[t]here is nothing in 

Section 3806(b)(1)(i)-(ii) or elsewhere in Section 3806 to suggest that, absent the 

language in Section 3806(b)(3), the rules in Section 3806(b)(1)(i)-(ii) would not apply to 

two or more offenses sentenced on the same day. Rather, it is plain from the text of 

Section 3806(b)(1)(i)-(ii) that they would.” Id. at 686-87 (emphasis in original). 

Instead, the Commonwealth Court interpreted “Section 3806(b)(3) of the Vehicle 

Code as contemplating the possibility that when two or more offenses are sentenced on 

the same day[,] none would be a prior offense of the others.” Id. at 687. In the court’s 

view, “Section 3806(b)(3) ... remedies this issue by providing that ‘the offenses shall be 

considered prior offenses within the meaning of this subsection.’” Id. The court

contended that this prevents the licensee from having no prior offense when sentenced

for multiple offenses on the same day and that such sentences have no order of priority. 

Id. For these reasons, the court concluded that PennDOT properly suspended Vellon’s 

driving privileges for the First DUI and, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s order.7

7 The Commonwealth Court also rejected Vellon’s contention that PennDOT exceeded 

its statutory authority by determining that the Second DUI constituted a prior offense for 

purposes of his First DUI where the sentencing court did not treat it as such. Vellon did 

not request allowance of appeal on this issue, and thus, it is not before us.
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Vellon filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which we granted to consider the 

following issue, as phrased by Vellon:

Whether the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania erred in 

affirming the Court of Common Pleas denial of the statutory 

appeal of suspension of operating privileges based on a 

finding that 75 Pa.C.S. [§] 3806(b)(3) requires that each 

pending multiple driving under the influence offense for which 

sentencing occurs on the same day be considered a “prior 

offense” for all other offenses, without regard to whether 

sentence has yet been imposed, as provided for in the general 

definition of “prior offense” under 75 Pa.C.S [§] 3806(a)?

Vellon v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 274 A.3d 1226 (Pa. 2022) (per 

curiam).

II. Arguments of the Parties

In his brief to this Court, Vellon explains that, pursuant to Subsection 3804(e)(2)(iii) 

of the Vehicle Code, PennDOT should not suspend the driving privileges of a person 

convicted of DUI if the following three criteria are present: (1) the licensee must be 

convicted of violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) as an ungraded misdemeanor; (2) the 

licensee must be subject to the penalties contained in 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(a); and (3) the 

licensee must not have a “prior offense” as that term is defined in 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806. 

Vellon’s Brief at 12-13.

Vellon notes that the first and second criteria are not in dispute in this matter. 

Agreeing with the Commonwealth Court, he posits that the sole issue in this appeal is 

“whether a prior offense within the meaning of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806 of the Vehicle Code 

existed at the time [he] was sentenced [for] the March 25, 2016, offense (first offense in 

time).” Id. at 13. In this regard, Vellon emphasizes that, contrary to PennDOT’s position 

below, the Commonwealth Court held that, pursuant to this Court’s decision in Mock, the 

general definition of “prior offense” under Subsection 3806(a) applies to that term in 

Subsection 3806(b). Id. at 16. 
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Despite this recognition, Vellon asserts that the Commonwealth Court 

subsequently interpreted Subsection 3806(b)(3) “to mean that when two or more offenses 

are sentenced on the same day, each would be a prior offense of the other.” Id. at 17. 

Vellon maintains that this interpretation ignores that a “prior offense” requires a previous 

conviction “for which judgment of sentence has been imposed before the 

sentencing on the present violation.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

Next, Vellon takes issue with the Commonwealth Court’s contemplation that his 

interpretation of “prior offense” could result in a licensee having no prior offenses when 

he is sentenced for multiple DUI violations on the same day. Citing to Commonwealth v. 

Haag, 981 A.2d 902 (Pa. 2009) (holding that a defendant that committed a DUI violation 

at 11:40 p.m. and another DUI violation an hour and one-half later could not be sentenced 

as a recidivist under a previous version of the Vehicle Code where he was sentenced for 

both violations at the same sentencing hearing), Vellon explains that the Legislature 

amended Section 3806 to include, inter alia, subsection (b)(3) to close loopholes in the 

statutory scheme. Without grappling with the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that 

Subsections 3806(b)(i)-(ii) close the loophole, Vellon argues that the Legislature added 

subsection (b)(3) “to preclude a defendant from eluding a determination of there being a 

prior offense for multiple DUIs, for which both a first and second DUI offense, in time, are 

disposed of at the same time.” Id. at 19.

Vellon posits that absurd results flow from the Commonwealth Court’s 

interpretation of Subsection 3806(b)(3). “The second offense DUI, for which the 

defendant has not been sentenced, to be counted as a first offense DUI for sentencing 

on the first offense DUI, was not the intent of the [L]egislature.” Id. Vellon states that 

Subsection 3806(b)(3) could, but does not, state: “If the defendant is sentenced for two 
[J-76-2022] - 12

or more offenses in the same day, both offenses are considered prior offenses for one 

another.” Id. 

Instead, Vellon contends that Subsection 3806(a) provides a clear definition of 

“prior offense” that allows a DUI violation to qualify as a “prior offense” only for convictions 

“for which judgment of sentence has been imposed before the sentencing on the present 

violation.” Id. at 19-20. Here, when the trial court sentenced Vellon in open court for the 

First DUI, he had not been sentenced for the Second DUI. Accordingly, in Vellon’s view, 

the Second DUI does not fit within Subsection 3806(a)’s general definition of “prior 

offense[,]” which must be read into subsection (b) pursuant to Mock, and therefore, the 

Second DUI cannot operate as a “prior offense” under Subsection 3806(b)(3). 

Vellon concedes that PennDOT appropriately suspended his license for the 

Second DUI, as it correctly utilized his First DUI in categorizing him as a repeat offender 

for purposes of the Second DUI. Thus, he believes that he “did not elude any prior 

conviction based on his being sentenced for both DUI offenses on the same date[,]” 

fulfilling the legislative intent of Subsection 3806(b)(3). Id. at 21. For these reasons, 

Vellon asks this Court to reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court.

In response, PennDOT insists that the Commonwealth Court correctly interpreted 

the Vehicle Code in this matter. It highlights that the Legislature amended Section 3806 

in 2016 to add Subsection 3806(b)(3). However, contrary to Vellon’s position (and in 

contravention of Mock), PennDOT posits that, “[i]n accordance with the exception to 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3806(a) ‘set forth’ in 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(b), the ‘[t]iming’ of both of Vellon’s DUI 

convictions was such that each is considered a ‘prior offense’ of the other, because ‘the 

defendant [was] sentenced for two or more offenses in the same day.’” Id. at 17 (quoting 

75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(b)(3)). PennDOT insists that, in crafting this language, the Legislature 

clearly intended that the exception to license suspension contained in 75 Pa.C.S.
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§ 3804(e)(2)(iii) is unavailable to anyone, like Vellon, who is sentenced for more than one 

violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802 in the same day. 

While PennDOT agrees with Vellon that the Legislature does not promulgate laws 

with the intention of creating absurd results, it points out that courts cannot interpret 

statutes in a manner that renders them meaningless. In PennDOT’s view, “Vellon’s 

arguments, if accepted, would effectively read 75 Pa.C.S § 3806(b)(3) completely out of 

the statute, which a court may not do.” Id. at 22 (referring to, inter alia, 1 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1922(2) (providing that, when a court attempts to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, 

it should presume that “the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective 

and certain”)).

In closing, PennDOT “acknowledges that there may be instances where a criminal 

trial court will find that [a d]efendant did not have a ‘prior offense’ in accordance with 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3806, but [PennDOT’s] records show that [Vellon] did have a ‘prior offense.’” 

Id. at 23. Thus, PennDOT maintains that it properly suspended Vellon’s driving privileges 

for his First DUI. For these reasons, PennDOT urges this Court to affirm the order of the 

Commonwealth Court.

III. Analysis

The answer to the sole issue in this appeal requires the Court to interpret Section 

3806 of the Vehicle Code. “Issues of statutory interpretation present this Court with 

questions of law; accordingly, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review 

is plenary.” Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Andrew Seder/The Times Leader, 139 A.3d 165, 

172 (Pa. 2016). The task of interpreting a statute is guided by the Statutory Construction 

Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991.

Pursuant to that Act, “[t]he object of all statutory interpretation and construction of 

statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. 
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§ 1921(a). When the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of 

the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Id. § 1921(b). 

When, however, the words of a statute are not explicit, a court may discern the General 

Assembly’s intent by examining considerations outside of the words of the statute. Id. 

§ 1921(c). In addition, when construing a statute, we must, if possible, give effect to all 

of its provisions. Id. § 1921(a). 

The Statutory Construction Act also instructs that, in ascertaining the intention of 

the General Assembly in enacting a statute, several presumptions may be used. Id.

§ 1922. Among those presumptions is that “the General Assembly intends the entire 

statute to be effective and certain.” Id. § 1922(2). We also may presume that the General 

Assembly does not intend absurd or unreasonable results. Id. § 1922(1). As this Court 

wisely stated over sixty years ago, to avoid such results, we “must read [statutes] in the 

light of reason and common sense.” Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788, 789 (Pa. 1959). 

Lastly, we may presume that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the 

Constitution of the United States or this Commonwealth. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3).

This case is not our first interpretation of the current version of Section 3806 of the 

Vehicle Code. In Mock, we determined that it was the intent of the General Assembly 

that the definition of “prior offense” contained in Subsection 3806(a) is incorporated into 

the use of that term in Subsection 3806(b), especially where such interpretation gives 

effect to both subsections. Mock, 219 A.3d at 1164. Here, we deal again with the 

interplay between the two subsections; this time with the specific interpretative guidance 

adopted in Mock.

With Mock and the rules of statutory construction as the backdrop, we reject the 

Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Subsection 3806(b)(3). At its core, that court’s

holding ignores Mock’s instruction that the general definition of “prior offense” contained 
[J-76-2022] - 15

in Subsection 3806(a) is imbedded in the timing provisions of Subsection 3806(b). By 

concluding that Subsection 3806(b)(3) requires that sentences for two or more offenses 

entered on the same day must be treated as prior offenses as to each other, the 

Commonwealth Court eliminated the requirement that prior offenses only have relevance 

in light of sentencing on a present violation. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(a). Under the 

Commonwealth Court’s holding, when two sentences are imposed on the same day, there 

is no present violation; instead, there are two or more prior offenses. This interpretation 

not only contravenes Mock but leads to the absurd and unreasonable result that the 

happenstance of the timing of the entry of the judgments of sentence can substantively 

control the severity of collateral consequences of violations of law. 

We look first to the unreasonableness of the Commonwealth Court’s holding. If

the trial court had sentenced Vellon for the First DUI on a day prior to when it adjudicated

the Second DUI, then, pursuant to Subsection 3806(a)’s general definition of “prior 

offense,” Vellon would not have had a prior offense for purposes of the First DUI. He, 

however, would have had a prior offense for purposes of the Second DUI when he was 

sentenced for that violation on a later day. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(a) (stating that “the 

term ‘prior offense’ as used in this chapter shall mean any conviction for which judgment 

of sentence has been imposed ... before the sentencing on the present violation”) 

(emphasis added). Thus, under these circumstances, Vellon would have received only 

one recidivist license suspension for the Second DUI. 

If the trial court would have sentenced Vellon for the Second DUI on a day prior to 

when it sentenced him for the First DUI, then Vellon still would have received only one 

recidivist license suspension. This is so because he would have been convicted and 

sentenced on the Second DUI before he was convicted and sentenced on “the present 

violation,” i.e., the First DUI. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(a) (stating that “the term ‘prior 
[J-76-2022] - 16

offense’ as used in this chapter shall mean any conviction for which judgment of sentence 

has been imposed ... before the sentencing on the present violation”) (emphasis 

added). 

The interpretation of Subsection 3806(b)(3) adopted by the Commonwealth Court

leads to the unreasonable and absurd result that, when a defendant has no previous DUI 

violations and is sentenced for two DUI violations on different days, he is subject to one 

recidivist license suspension. Yet, when a defendant has no previous DUI violations and 

is sentenced for two DUI violations on the same day, he is subject to two recidivist license 

suspensions. Thus, under the Commonwealth Court’s holding, the mere happenstance

of the timing of sentencing based upon a court’s schedule, availability of counsel, 

inclement weather or a host of other idiosyncratic occurrences that result in the entry of 

multiple sentences on the same day also results in the imposition of increased collateral 

consequences that would not have occurred but for such fortuities.

8

Moreover, Subsection 3806(b)(3) is amendable to an interpretation that is not only 

reasonable but required in light of Mock and its placement in the scheme of the entirety 

of Subsection 3806(b). Subsection 3806(a) defines “prior offense as any conviction for 

which a judgment of sentence has been imposed ... before the sentence on the present 

violation[.]” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(a). The clear import of this section is that prior offenses 

are relevant only in the context of sentencing on a new, present violation. Mock instructs 

that this definition is incorporated into Subsection 3806(b) where it uses the term “prior 

8 Not only is this an absurd and unreasonable result, such arbitrariness in the law may 

raise substantive due process concerns. See Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver 

Licensing v. Middaugh, 244 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2021) (holding that a driver’s license 

suspension that is unreasonably delayed through no fault of the licensee is susceptible 

to a conclusion that the suspension deprived the individual of substantive due process 

protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution). 

See also Peck v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 278 P.3d 439, 445 n.2 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012)

(“In regards to a license suspension, substantive due process means the reason for 

depriving a driver of a license cannot be arbitrary.”).
[J-76-2022] - 17

offense.” As a result, the timing directive in Subsection 3806(b)(3) must be read to apply 

to penalties imposed after the same day imposition of multiple sentences.9 Thus, for 

purposes of a conviction subsequent to the multiple same day sentences, all of the same 

day sentences are “prior offenses” despite the contemporaneous entry date. 

This interpretation of Subsection 3806(b)(3) is supported by a chronological 

reading of the timing provisions in subsection (b). Subsections 3806(b)(2) and (3) 

instruct: 

(2) The court shall calculate the number of prior offenses, 

if any, at the time of sentencing.

(3) If the defendant is sentenced for two or more offenses 

in the same day, the offenses shall be considered prior 

offenses within the meaning of this subsection.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(b)(2) and (3).

Read together, these subsections require the sentencing court to calculate the 

number of prior offenses at the time of sentencing (on the present violation) and that, in 

making this calculation, sentences entered on the same day for two or more offenses to 

which Section 3806 applies shall be considered prior offenses for the purpose of the 

applicable penalties on the present violation. This interpretation evidences the 

Legislature’s intention to preclude a volume discount on multiple same day sentences by 

making clear that the two or more offenses shall be prior offenses when making the 

calculation under Subsection 3806(b)(2). Thus, Subsection 3806(b)(3) makes clear that 

9 Pursuant to Mock’s subsection (a) incorporation requirement, Subsection 3806(b)(3) 

reads: If the defendant is sentenced to two or more offenses in the same day, the 

offenses shall be considered “convictions for which judgment of sentence have been 

imposed before the sentencing on the present violation” within the meaning of this 

subsection.
[J-76-2022] - 18

when two or more judgments of sentence are entered on the same day, that timing does 

not impact the calculation of each of the sentences as a prior offense at the time of 

sentencing on the present violation.

The object of our interpretation of Subsection 3806(b)(3) is to ascertain and 

effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Our conclusion that Subsection 

3806(b)(3) applies to the calculation of prior offenses after the same day imposition of 

multiple sentences gives effect to all of the relevant provisions of Section 3806, avoids 

absurd and unreasonable results and comports with the presumption that the General 

Assembly does not intend to violate the state or federal Constitutions. Moreover, it 

employs the interpretation of Section 3806 recently articulated in Mock.

Our interpretation of Subsection 3806(b)(3) makes clear that it has no application 

to the circumstances present in this case. Because the Commonwealth Court held to the 

contrary, we reverse that court’s order. 

Chief Justice Todd and Justice Wecht join the opinion.

Justice Mundy files a concurring opinion in which Justice Dougherty joins.

Justice Brobson did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.