Vacated , Dismissed as Moot , and Opinion filed August 8 , 2013

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 11

- 01002

- CV

CHRISTINE E. REULE , Appellant

V.
RLZ INVESTMENTS , Appellee

On Appeal from the Co unty Civil C our t at Law No

. 4

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1001350

O P I N I O N

Appellant Christine E. Reule appeals from the trial court‟s judgment awarding appellee RLZ Investments, Inc. immediate possession of Reule ‟s place of
residence. Reule principally contends that the trial court , a Ha rris County court at law, erred by proceeding to judgment in RLZ‟s forcible detainer action because a Harris County d istrict c ourt ‟s protective order barred RLZ from proceeding with
the county

- court

- at

- law action while a suit to determine title to the prop erty was2

pending in that district court

. D uring the pendency of this appeal, RLZ released
Reule from the f

inal j udgment from which Reule appeals

. We therefore vacate the trial court‟s judgment and dismiss the case

. Discussion RLZ brought a forcible detai ner action against Reule based o n its alleged acquisition of Reule‟s place of residence at a foreclosure sale. 1 On November 14, 2011, the trial court issued a final judgment award ing RLZ possession of the premises where Reule resided , but RLZ never took p ossession of the property

. Instead, RLZ has filed two documents with this court expressly releasing Reule from the judgment “until the end of time” and waiving any right to enforce the judgment. Because of this release, RLZ urges the case is moot . W e ag ree.

F or Reule to have standing at each stage of the litigation , a live controversy
must exist between the parties throughout the legal proceedings, including the appeal. See Williams v. Lara , 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001). “If the controversy no longer exists

— „the issues presented are no lon ger “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome ‟

— the case becomes
moot.” Id

. The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in which an actual controversy exists between the par ties. F ed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Nueces County , 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. 1994)

. In other words, if a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot and any opinion issued on the merits in the appeal would constitute an imp ermissible advisory opinion

. Thompson v. Ricardo , 269 S.W.3d 100, 10 3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2008 , no pet. ) (citing Tex. Const. art. II, § 1, et al .)

.

1 Re ule titled her responsive pleading Objection to Jurisdiction, Answer and Affirmative Defenses and Cross

- Complaint and Request for Jury Trial. Reule, however, did not raise any counter

- claims.3

Generally, i f we find a case to be moot on appeal, all previous orders and judgments must be se t aside and the case dismissed. Speer v. Presbyterian
Children ’ s Home & Serv. Agency , 847 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Tex. 1993) ; Guajardo v.
Alamo Lumber Co. , 159 Tex. 225, 226 , 317 S.W.2d 725 , 726 (1958) ; Freeman v.
Burrows , 141 Tex. 318, 319 , 171 S.W.2d 863 (1943) ; Thom pson , 269 S.W.3d at 10 4. RLZ has expressly released and waived its right to enforce the judgment from which Reule appeals. Consequently, a live controversy no longer exists
, and
the case is rendered moot

. See , e.g., Tierra Sol Joint Venture v. City of El Paso , 311 S.W.3d 492, 496

- 97 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2009, pet. denied) (holding appellee‟s release of appellant from portion of trial court‟s judgment rendered
issues r elating to that portion moot).

Texas courts have recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine
, under which an appellate court should still consider the merits of an appeal even if the immediate issues between the parties have become moot : (1) the capability of repetiti on yet evading review exception and (2) the collateral consequences

exc eption. State v. Lodge , 608 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. 1980). Neither exception applies under the circumstances of this case. The “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception is applied where the challenged act is of such short duration that the appe llant cannot obtain review before the issue becomes moot. Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Reynolds , 764 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ). That is not the case here and Reule does not suggest
otherwise

.
I n order to invoke the collateral consequences exception, Reule would have to show both that a concrete disadvantage resulted from the judgment and the disadvantage w ould persist even if the judgment were vacated and the case4

dismissed as moot. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio , 198 S.W.3d 782, 784, 790 (Tex. 2006). Reule complains that the judgment h urts her reputation and credit , but she fails to explain why this practical consequence w ould persist once the judgment is vacated. Neither exception therefore applies to

w arrant consideration of the substance of the appeal.

We vacate the trial court ‟s judgment and dis miss the case

. 2

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison Justice
Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Busby.

2 See Marshall , 198 S.W.3d at 784, 790 (vacating judgments and dismissing forcible detainer case as moot where tenant was no longer in possession of premises and lease had expired).