COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

March 8, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2020AP1197-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2017CM282

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

DENNIS C. STRONG, JR.,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Outagamie County: MITCHELL J. METROPULOS, Judge. Reversed and cause 

remanded for further proceedings. 

¶1 GILL, J.1 Dennis Strong, Jr., appeals a judgment, entered following 

a jury trial, convicting him of two counts of battery, as a repeater, and one count of 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2019-20). All 

references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2020AP1197-CR

2

disorderly conduct, also as a repeater. At trial, Strong attempted to question the 

alleged victim, Tara,2about a prior false report that she had made to the police in a 

different case. However, Tara denied making a false report. At that point, 

pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 906.08(2), Strong should have been permitted to use an 

audio recording of Tara’s testimony in a prior proceeding, during which Tara 

admitted to making a false report to the police, to impeach her trial testimony that 

she did not make a false report. Strong was unable to do so, however, because the 

circuit court had already ruled, prior to trial, that the audio recording was 

irrelevant and could not be introduced at trial.

¶2 We agree with Strong that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 

discretion by preventing him from introducing the audio recording of Tara’s prior 

testimony at trial. After Tara falsely testified that she had not previously made a 

false report to the police, Strong should have been able to confront Tara with the 

audio recording in an attempt to force her to admit that she had, in fact, made a 

false report. The audio recording could be used for that purpose under WIS. STAT.

§ 906.08(2)—a statute the court failed to apply in its pretrial ruling. As such, the 

court erred by preventing Strong from using the audio recording at trial. 

Moreover, the State has failed to establish that the court’s error with respect to the 

audio recording was harmless. We therefore reverse Strong’s judgment of 

conviction and remand for a new trial.3

 

2

 Pursuant to the policy underlying WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86(4), we refer to the victim 

using a pseudonym.

3

 Strong also argues on appeal that he is entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice 

because the State improperly introduced other-acts evidence and elicited testimony from a 

detective that impermissibly vouched for the victim’s credibility. Strong further argues that the 

State made improper comments during its closing argument, which amounted to plain error.

(continued)
No. 2020AP1197-CR

3

BACKGROUND

¶3 The charges against Strong arose after police were dispatched to 

Tara’s residence on March 21, 2017, following a 911 call made by Tara’s son. 

When the officers arrived at Tara’s residence, she reported that Strong had been 

acting strange and had started “flicking her in the face and head without her 

consent.” Tara also told the officers that Strong “grabbed her around the neck 

without her consent” and “hit her in the face or head,” causing her pain.

¶4 Based on Tara’s allegations, Strong was charged with two counts of 

misdemeanor battery and one count of disorderly conduct, each with a repeater 

enhancer. Strong entered not-guilty pleas to all counts, and the matter was 

scheduled for a jury trial.

¶5 Strong, who was self-represented, filed a motion before trial seeking 

to compel the State to produce a police report regarding an incident that took place 

on November 19, 2016. During a hearing in July 2017, the State agreed to provide 

Strong with a redacted version of the police report. The report states that on 

November 19, 2016, Tara’s friend, Crystal Denton, told the police that she had 

been attacked by three individuals outside a bar. Denton stated that Tara “was 

present at the time and could confirm [that one of the individuals] was involved.” 

 

Because we reverse on the grounds that the circuit court erroneously excluded the audio 

recording in which Tara admitted making a false report to the police, we need not address 

Strong’s remaining arguments. See Turner v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 256, ¶1 n.1, 268 Wis. 2d 

628, 673 N.W.2d 716 (court of appeals need not address all issues raised by the parties if one is 

dispositive); see also Patrick Fur Farm, Inc. v. United Vaccines, Inc., 2005 WI App 190, ¶8 n.1, 

286 Wis. 2d 774, 703 N.W.2d 707 (court of appeals decides cases on the narrowest possible 

grounds).
No. 2020AP1197-CR

4

Tara later told the police, however, that “she was not present and [Denton] had 

asked her to lie to police on her behalf.”

¶6 During a pretrial hearing in December 2017, Strong sought 

permission to introduce an audio recording of Tara’s testimony during revocation 

proceedings against Strong in a different case. In her testimony during the 

revocation proceedings, Tara admitted that she had initially made a false report to 

the police regarding the November 19, 2016 incident. Specifically, Tara testified 

that: (1) Denton had handed her a phone; (2) she did not know that there was an 

officer on the phone; (3) she was put into a situation in which she felt pressured; 

(4) Denton was standing next to her mouthing what she should say; (5) she gave 

the officer a statement based on what Denton was telling her; and (6) she 

immediately called the officer back and told the officer that her previous statement 

was not true and that she was not present during the November 19 incident.

¶7 Strong argued that evidence regarding Tara’s prior false report to the 

police was admissible because it related to Tara’s “truthfulness.” The circuit court 

rejected Strong’s argument, concluding the audio recording of Tara’s prior 

testimony was inadmissible because the false report did not involve Strong and 

any evidence regarding the false report was therefore irrelevant.4

¶8 At Strong’s jury trial, Tara testified that she and Strong had been 

friends for over nine years. She stated that on March 21, 2017, she had invited 

Strong and her cousin to her residence, but Strong later arrived at her residence 

 

4

 The circuit court also ruled that Denton and Nathan Williams, another individual 

involved in the November 19, 2016 incident, would not be permitted to testify at trial. Strong 

does not specifically challenge those rulings on appeal, and we therefore do not address them 

further.
No. 2020AP1197-CR

5

alone. Initially, Strong “seemed fine,” and he and Tara sat in the kitchen talking 

and drinking.

¶9 While everything appeared to be “normal” at first, Tara testified that 

at some point Strong “just seemed to snap” and started “flicking” her temples. 

According to Tara, Strong “looked angry” and “progressively kept getting more 

and more aggressive.” Tara testified that Strong pulled her hair and pushed her

head against a wall, at one point putting his hand around her throat to hold her up 

against the wall. Strong “kept saying over and over again, ‘What are you going to 

do for redemption from the streets?’”

¶10 Tara testified that she then went inside a bathroom with her

three-year-old daughter and locked the door so that Strong could not get inside. 

However, after Strong’s voice became calm again, Tara let him into the bathroom. 

Once inside, Strong had an “instant personality change” and went “right back to 

being angry” and flicking Tara’s temples. Tara testified that Strong also hit her 

face with an open hand and continued repeatedly asking her, “What are you going 

to do to earn redemption from the streets?” Tara then took her three-year-old 

daughter upstairs, where her other children were located. At Tara’s request, her 

teenage son called 911.

¶11 On cross-examination, Strong attempted to ask Tara about her false 

report regarding the November 19, 2016 incident, and the following exchange 

occurred:

Q. Wasn’t there a point, though, that you had said that 

you had called the police back and said that 

everything you said was not true?

A. No.
No. 2020AP1197-CR

6

Q. What was that that you had said that you called the 

police back and said everything was not true? I 

thought that was—

A. Never, I never said that.

Q. Was that you that had said that or [Denton]? I’m 

not sure.

¶12 At that point, the State objected, without providing any grounds for 

its objection, and Tara interjected, “That’s a totally different case.” The circuit 

court sustained the State’s objection, explaining that Strong was not permitted to 

“state any other person’s testimony.” Strong then asked the court for “permission 

to impeach” Tara, and the court responded, “Ask a question, and we’ll see if it’s 

relevant.” The court also instructed the jury to “disregard Mr. Strong’s last 

question.” Strong attempted to ask the court for “guidance,” but the court refused 

to provide any guidance and instead directed Strong to ask his next question. 

Strong then changed topics and questioned Tara about the March 21, 2017 

incident that formed the basis for the charges against him.

¶13 In addition to Tara’s testimony, the State presented testimony at trial 

from: the dispatcher who answered the 911 call from Tara’s teenage son; the son 

who made the 911 call; two officers who responded to the 911 call; and Tara’s 

teenage daughter. Critically, none of these witnesses were able to directly 

corroborate Tara’s testimony that Strong had flicked her temples, pulled her hair, 

pushed her head against a wall, put his hand around her throat, or hit her face. 

While Tara’s teenage son and daughter were present in the home during the time 

period in question, neither of them testified that they witnessed any of the alleged 

physical contact between Strong and Tara. In fact, Tara’s daughter expressly 

testified that she did not see Strong pull Tara’s hair, push Tara up against a wall, 

or “flick” Tara.
No. 2020AP1197-CR

7

¶14 The jury ultimately found Strong guilty of all three of the charges

against him. After the circuit court imposed sentence, Strong—now represented 

by counsel—filed a postconviction motion seeking a new trial on various grounds. 

As relevant to this appeal, Strong argued that the court had erroneously exercised 

its discretion by preventing him from introducing evidence that Tara had “lied to 

police in the recent past.” Strong argued that evidence was relevant to Tara’s 

credibility and was admissible under WIS. STAT. § 906.08(2).

¶15 Following a nonevidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied Strong’s 

motion for a new trial. During its oral ruling, the court explained that it had 

excluded the evidence regarding Tara’s false report to the police because it was 

“extrinsic evidence, not relevant evidence,” which Strong was trying to introduce 

to attack Tara’s credibility. The court reasoned:

The statute that defense counsel cites, [WIS. STAT.]

§ 906.08(2), talks about specific instances of conduct with 

regards to a witness’s character for truthfulness, and then 

goes on to say that if there are instances that are not remote 

in time, the court has discretion to allow that in. There’s no 

real guidance in the statute as to what “remote in time”

would be. In the Court’s opinion, a five months earlier 

incident that really is not relevant to what the trial was 

about, one specific incident, this really doesn’t go towards 

a witness’s character for truthfulness, I don’t believe there 

are going to be any witnesses coming forth saying that the 

victim has a reputation for untruthfulness, my 

understanding is [Strong] just wanted the specific instance 

in, and I found it to be irrelevant, and I still would find it to 

be irrelevant, even considering [§] 906.08(2).

¶16 Although the circuit court denied Strong’s motion for a new trial, it 

granted his alternative motion for resentencing. The court subsequently held a 

resentencing hearing, during which it imposed consecutive and concurrent 

sentences totaling two years’ initial confinement and two years’ extended 

supervision. Strong now appeals.
No. 2020AP1197-CR

8

DISCUSSION

¶17 A circuit court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed 

for an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, ¶20, 360 

Wis. 2d 576, 851 N.W.2d 434. A court erroneously exercises its discretion if it 

applies an improper legal standard or makes a decision not reasonably supported 

by the facts of record. Id. 

¶18 Strong argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 

discretion by failing to apply the correct legal standard when determining the 

admissibility of the audio recording in which Tara admitted making a false report 

to the police about the November 19, 2016 incident. We agree. When addressing 

the admissibility of that evidence before trial, the court reasoned that Tara’s false 

report about the prior incident was not relevant because the prior incident did not 

involve Strong. As Strong correctly notes, however, the admissibility of evidence 

regarding Tara’s false report is governed by WIS. STAT. § 906.08(2), which

provides:

Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the 

purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’s character 

for truthfulness, other than a conviction of a crime or an 

adjudication of delinquency as provided in [WIS. STAT.

§] 906.09, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They 

may, however, subject to [WIS. STAT. §] 972.11(2), if 

probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and not remote 

in time, be inquired into on cross-examination of the 

witness or on cross-examination of a witness who testifies 

to his or her character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.

¶19 Under WIS. STAT. § 906.08(2), Strong was permitted to 

cross-examine Tara regarding her prior false report for the purpose of attacking 
No. 2020AP1197-CR

9

her character for truthfulness.5 Evidence regarding the false report was probative 

of Tara’s untruthfulness, as required by § 906.08(2), because it showed that Tara

had previously lied to the police.6 

 

5

 Citing State v. Eugenio, 219 Wis. 2d 391, 404, 579 N.W.2d 642 (1998), the State 

argues that “allegations of a single instance of falsehood cannot imply a character for 

untruthfulness.” This citation is inapt because Eugenio addressed the admissibility of evidence 

under WIS. STAT. § 906.08(1), which pertains to opinion and reputation evidence of a witness’s 

character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. This case, in contrast, involves the admissibility of 

evidence under § 906.08(2), which expressly provides that “[s]pecific instances of the conduct of 

a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’s character for 

truthfulness ... [may] be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness.”

6

 We note that it makes no difference, for purposes of our analysis, that Tara never 

specifically testified as to her own character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. WISCONSIN STAT.

§ 906.08(2) provides that specific instances of a witness’s conduct, if probative of truthfulness or 

untruthfulness and not remote in time, may be inquired into: (1) “on cross-examination of the 

witness”—i.e., on cross-examination of the same witness involved in the specific instance of 

conduct; or (2) “on cross-examination of a witness who testifies to his or her character for 

truthfulness or untruthfulness”—i.e., on cross-examination of a witness who testifies regarding 

the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of a different witness involved in the specific 

instance of conduct.

The following example is instructive:

The specific instances of conduct may be those of the witness 

testifying or those of the “subject witness” where the 

cross-examination is of a character witness. For instance, 

assume [witness] A testifies that in her opinion witness B is a 

truthful person. On cross-examination, witness A may be asked 

about specific incidents in her own life which are pertinent to her 

character for truthfulness. The cross-examiner may also ask A 

about her knowledge of specific instances of lying etc. by 

witness B in order to test the probative value of A’s opinion 

about B’s veracity.

7 DANIEL D. BLINKA, WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES: WISCONSIN EVIDENCE § 608.2 (4th ed. 

2021). Thus, although Tara did not specifically testify as to her own character for truthfulness or 

untruthfulness, WIS. STAT. § 906.08(2) permitted Strong to cross-examine her regarding her prior 

false report to the police because the false report was probative of Tara’s untruthfulness and, as 

discussed below, was not remote in time.
No. 2020AP1197-CR

10

¶20 Moreover, the false report was not remote in time as it occurred in 

November 2016, a mere four months before Tara reported the events underlying 

the charges in this case. During its oral ruling on Strong’s postconviction motion, 

the circuit court noted that WIS. STAT. § 906.08(2) provides “no real guidance” as 

to the meaning of the phrase “remote in time.” The court then suggested that 

Tara’s false report was too remote in time to be admissible under § 906.08(2) 

because it occurred “five months” before Tara reported the events at issue in this 

case. We do not agree that the time lapse in this case, which was actually just over 

four months, rendered Tara’s prior false report “remote in time” under 

§ 906.08(2). We have not located any case law holding that a delay as short as 

four months was “remote in time” under that statute. See, e.g., State v. 

Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 159, 170, 344 N.W.2d 95 (1984) (concluding incidents 

that occurred “over a year” after the charged conduct were remote in time under 

§ 906.08(2)); State v. Missouri, 2006 WI App 74, ¶¶2, 5, 7, 21, 291 Wis. 2d 466, 

714 N.W.2d 595 (concluding two incidents that occurred approximately six 

months and approximately two weeks, respectively, before the relevant conduct 

were not remote in time for purposes of § 906.08(2)).

¶21 The circuit court also concluded that evidence pertaining to Tara’s 

prior false report was not relevant because the November 19, 2016 incident did not 

involve Strong. Nothing in WIS. STAT. § 906.08(2) provides that specific 

instances of conduct are relevant to attack the witness’s character for truthfulness 

only when the witness’s prior untruthful conduct involved the same individuals or 

underlying factual circumstances as the witness’s trial testimony. Moreover, 

under WIS. STAT. § 904.01, evidence is relevant when it has “any tendency to 

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 

action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” 
No. 2020AP1197-CR

11

Evidence that Tara was willing to lie to the police about a physical altercation in 

November 2016 has a tendency to make it more probable that Tara lied to the 

police when she reported Strong’s alleged conduct in March 2017. The evidence 

therefore relates to Tara’s credibility, and our supreme court has recognized that 

“[a] witness’s credibility is always ‘consequential’ within the meaning of WIS.

STAT. § 904.01.” See State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, ¶34, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 

N.W.2d 399 (citation omitted).

¶22 The State contends that reversal is not warranted because, despite the 

circuit court’s pretrial ruling excluding the audio recording, the court permitted 

Strong to ask Tara about the false report on cross-examination at trial. The State 

notes that WIS. STAT. § 906.08(2) states “[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a 

witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’s character for 

truthfulness ... may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.” (Emphasis added.) The 

State therefore suggests that after Strong asked Tara whether she had previously 

made a false report to the police, and after she denied doing so, Strong was 

required to “take [Tara’s] answer” and could not introduce “extrinsic evidence”—

i.e., the audio recording—to show that she actually had made a false report.

¶23 The State’s argument misapprehends the meaning of the term 

“extrinsic evidence,” as it is used in WIS. STAT. § 906.08(2).

Inquiry into specific instances [of conduct under 

§ 906.08(2)] is limited to cross-examination. Extrinsic 

evidence of the conduct is not permitted; the 

cross-examiner must take the witness’s answer. This does 

not preclude the impeaching party from confronting the 

witness with a prior statement or document ... referring to 

the specific instance in an attempt to get the witness to 

“back down” and admit the impeaching fact. If the witness 

finally relents and admits the fact, it is proven through the 

witness’s testimony, not “extrinsic” evidence.
No. 2020AP1197-CR

12

7 DANIEL D. BLINKA, WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES: WISCONSIN EVIDENCE 

§ 608.2 (4th ed. 2021) (hereinafter, “WISCONSIN EVIDENCE”) (emphasis added; 

footnotes omitted). Accordingly, our supreme court has characterized “extrinsic 

evidence” as “testimony obtained by calling additional witnesses, as opposed to

evidence obtained by the cross-examination of a witness.” Sonnenberg, 117 

Wis. 2d at 168 (emphasis added).

¶24 Pursuant to these authorities, the audio recording of Tara’s prior 

testimony admitting that she had made a false report to the police did not 

constitute “extrinsic evidence” under WIS. STAT. § 906.08(2). As such, when Tara 

denied on cross-examination that she had made a false report, Strong should have 

been permitted to use the audio recording to “attempt to get [Tara] to ‘back down’

and admit the impeaching fact.” See WISCONSIN EVIDENCE § 608.2. Strong could 

not do so, however, because the circuit court had already ruled, prior to trial, that 

Strong would not be allowed to introduce the audio recording. As explained 

above, we conclude the court erroneously exercised its discretion in that regard. 

Again, once Tara denied on cross-examination that she had previously made a 

false report to the police, Strong should have been permitted to confront Tara with 

the audio recording in attempt to secure her admission that she had, in fact, made a 

false report.

7

 

7

 We acknowledge that after Tara denied on cross-examination that she had made a false 

report to the police, Strong did not specifically argue that he should be allowed to use the audio 

recording to impeach Tara’s testimony in that regard. However, the circuit court had already 

ruled, prior to trial, that the audio recording was inadmissible. Under these circumstances, we 

cannot fault Strong—a pro se litigant—for failing to again raise the issue during Tara’s 

cross-examination. Moreover, we observe that the State does not develop any argument on 

appeal that Strong forfeited his argument regarding the audio recording by failing to adequately 

preserve that issue during his trial.
No. 2020AP1197-CR

13

¶25 Even if evidence is admissible under WIS. STAT. § 906.08(2), it may 

nevertheless be excluded if the circuit court determines that its probative value “is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 

or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” McClelland v. State, 84 

Wis. 2d 145, 156-57, 267 N.W.2d 843 (1978) (quoting WIS. STAT. § 904.03). In 

this case, the circuit court did not address whether the probative value of the audio 

recording was substantially outweighed by any of the considerations listed above. 

If a circuit court fails to adequately explain its reasoning in support of a 

discretionary decision, we may independently review the record to determine 

whether it provides a basis for the court’s exercise of discretion. State v. Sullivan, 

216 Wis. 2d 768, 781, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).

¶26 Here, the record does not support a determination that the probative 

value of the audio recording was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice or by any of the other considerations set forth in WIS. STAT. § 904.03. 

The recording’s probative value was significant. In the recording, Tara admitted 

under oath that she had made a false report to the police regarding a physical 

altercation in November 2016. The false report occurred only four months before 

Tara told the police about Strong’s alleged conduct in this case. The fact that Tara 

lied to the police in November 2016 tended to make it more likely that she lied to 

the police about Strong’s conduct. The recording was therefore highly relevant to 

Tara’s credibility. Furthermore, Tara’s credibility was a critical issue at trial, as 

none of the State’s other witnesses could directly corroborate her allegations that 
No. 2020AP1197-CR

14

Strong had flicked her temples, pulled her hair, pushed her head against a wall, put 

his hand around her throat, or hit her face.

8

¶27 On the other side of the balance, the audio recording was not 

unfairly prejudicial. The recording would not have influenced the outcome of the 

case by improper means, appealed to the jury’s sympathies, aroused its sense of 

horror, provoked its instinct to punish, or otherwise caused the jury to base its 

decision on something other than the established propositions in the case. See 

Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 789-90. Moreover, the recording would not have raised 

any significant risk of confusing the issues, misleading the jury, or causing undue 

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. See WIS.

STAT. § 904.03. The recording contains Tara’s admission, while under oath, that 

she lied to the police regarding the November 19, 2016 incident. Consequently, 

Strong correctly notes that the recording “was not disputed evidence that would 

[have] require[d] a significant diversion in the case.” On this record, we cannot 

conclude that the recording’s probative value would have been substantially 

outweighed by any of the considerations set forth in § 904.03.

¶28 Finally, we observe that the erroneous exclusion of evidence is 

subject to the harmless error rule. See Hunt, 360 Wis. 2d 576, ¶26 (citing WIS.

 

8

 In a footnote, the State argues that the audio recording has “very little if any probative 

value as to [Tara’s] character for untruthfulness.” To the contrary, the State asserts that the 

recording actually “shows [Tara’s] character for truthfulness” because it reveals that after Tara 

made her initial false statement to the police, she promptly called the officer back and admitted 

that her initial statement was untrue. The State is correct that a jury could interpret the recording 

as showing Tara’s character for truthfulness. However, a jury could also conclude, based on the 

recording, that Tara has a character for untruthfulness because she was willing to lie to the police 

in the first instance. We agree with Strong that given the conflicting inferences that could be 

drawn from the recording, the jury was entitled to hear the recording and weigh its impact on 

Tara’s credibility.
No. 2020AP1197-CR

15

STAT. § 901.03(1)). For an error to be deemed harmless, the party that benefited 

from the error—here, the State—must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. See id. Stated differently, an error is 

harmless if it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have 

found the defendant guilty absent the error.” Id. (citation omitted). Factors to be 

considered in a harmless-error analysis include: “the importance of the 

erroneously admitted or excluded evidence; the presence or absence of evidence 

corroborating or contradicting the erroneously admitted or excluded evidence; the 

nature of the defense; the nature of the State’s case; and the overall strength of the 

State’s case.” Id., ¶27. Whether a circuit court’s error in excluding evidence was 

harmless is a question of law that we review independently. State v. Monahan, 

2018 WI 80, ¶31, 383 Wis. 2d 100, 913 N.W.2d 894.

¶29 In this case, the State has not developed any argument that the circuit 

court’s exclusion of the audio recording constituted harmless error. In any event, 

based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the error was harmless. 

As discussed above, the recording was important to Strong’s case, as it tended to 

show that Tara was willing to lie to the police, which was relevant to Tara’s 

credibility in this criminal proceeding. Given the nature of the State’s case, which 

rested entirely on the jury believing Tara’s testimony regarding Strong’s conduct, 

evidence impeaching Tara’s credibility was critical to Strong’s defense. 

Furthermore, there was no other evidence corroborating the fact that Tara had 

made a false report to the police in November 2016, as Tara denied making a false 

report during her cross-examination. Under these circumstances, we cannot 

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found Strong 

guilty absent the court’s erroneous exclusion of the audio recording.
No. 2020AP1197-CR

16

¶30 In summary, the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by 

excluding the audio recording in which Tara admitted making a false report to the 

police, and the State has failed to establish that the error was harmless. We 

therefore reverse Strong’s judgment of conviction and the order denying his

postconviction motion, and we remand for a new trial.

By the Court.—Judgment and order reversed and cause remanded 

for further proceedings.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)4.