“P ri o r t o t he set t i ng of o ral argument, t he C o urt s hal l revi ew the r eco rd and bri ef s and co nsi d er al l err o rs 1

a ssig n e d . T h e C o u rt m a y e n te r an o rd e r d e sig n a ting tho se issu e s it w ish e s a d d re sse d a t o ra l a rg u m e n t.” T e n n

. S u p . C t. R. 12. 2. 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 5, 200 6 S es sio n
STA TE OF TENNES SEE v . LEONARD J . YOUNG

Aut om at ic App e al fr omth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty Nos. 00-04017, 00-04018, 00- 04019 Joseph B. Dail ey, P residing Ju dge; Jon Ke rry Blackwood , Special Jud ge

No. W2002-03012-SC- DDT-DD - F iled on Ju ne 30, 2006

Def endant, L eonar d J . Young , was c onvicted by a jury of first deg reepreme ditated murder
, espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping , and thef t over $1,000 but less than $10,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39 -1 3- 20 2( a )( 1) (S up p. 19 99 ), 39 -1 3- 30 5( a )( 1) (1 99 7) , 3 9- 14 -1 03 (1 99 7) . T he jury su bs e qu e ntl y sentenc ed Defendant to death for the murde r, applying thr ee a g g ravating c ircumstance s: (a) Def endan t wa s previously

convicted of

one or more felonies, other than the pre sent cha

rg e, the statutory elements of w hich involve the use of violence to the pe rson; (b) the offe nse wa s committed for the pur

pose of a voiding, inter fering w ith, or preven t ing a lawful a rre st or prosec ution of Def endant or another ; and (c ) the murder was knowing ly committed, solicited, direc ted, or a ided by Def endant, while D efe ndant had a substantial r ole in c ommitt ing or attempting to c ommit, or was flee ing a fter ha ving a

substantial r ole in c ommitt ing or attempting to c ommit, theft. See id. § 39-13- 20 4( i) (2 ), (6 ), (7 ) ( Sup p. 19 99 ). Th e tr ia l c ou rt se nte nc e d D e fe nd a nt a s a ca reer off ender to s ixty y ear s for the espec ially

ag g ravated kidnapping conviction and a s a ca ree r off ender to twelve y ear s for the theft convic tion. The trial court ordere d all sentenc es to be served conse cutively . The Court of Criminal Appea ls affirme d the convictions and the death se ntence

.
After the ca se wa s dockete d in this Court, we entere d an orde r identifying se vera l issues for

or a l arg ume nt. We n ow ho ld a s f oll ow s: ( 1) the e videnc e wa s su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh ve nu e in 1 Shelby County ; (2) the death in the immediate f amily of the orig inal trial judg e constituted an “ other dis abil ity ” un de r T e nn e sse e Rul e of Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re 25 (a ) s uc h th a t app oin tme nt of a su bs titute judge was prope r; (3) the trial court c ommitt ed harmless error in all owing into evidence sever al photogr aphs of the victim as a child; (4) the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support Def endant’ s conviction of fi rs t de g re e pr e me dit a te d mu rd e r; (5 ) the tr ia l c ou rt c omm itt e d ha rm le ss e rr or in a dmi tti ng c e rt a in victim impact evidence ; (6) the tria l court committed harmless e rror in i n s t ru ct i n g the jury

that Def endant’ s 1999 Missis s i p p i conviction of kidnapping was a n offe nse, the statutory elements of-2-

which involve the use of violence to the person; and ( 7) the de ath sentenc e is valid under this Court’s mandatory

revie w pursuant to Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-206( c)( 1) (2003 )

. Wea g r ee with the Court of Criminal Appe als’ conclusions with r espec t to the rema ining issues and attac h as an appe ndix to this opi nion the rele vant portions of that court’s decision. The judg ment of the Court of Criminal Appea ls is affirmed.

Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 39-13-206(a) (1); Judgme nt of th e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Affir m e d

C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM M

. BAR KE R , C.J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , and J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J J ., joined. A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J ., filed a

concur ring and dissenting opinion.
Tony N. Br ayton and Gar land Erg üden (on appea l) and Wil liam Johnson a nd Dianne Thac kery (at trial), Shelby

CountyPublic Defe nder’ s Offic e, for the appe llant, L eonar d J . Young

.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l E. Moor e , Solic ito r G e ne ra l; A ng e le M. Gre g ory , Assistant A ttorney Gene ral; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; Amy

Weirich and Jennifer Nic hols, Assistant Dist rict Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

IN TR OD UC TIO N

To a ssi st the re a de r in pla c ing int o co nte xt the fo llo wi ng su mma ry of the State ’s pr oo f i n th is

c a se , w e of

fe r this brie f i ntr od uc tio n w hic h in c lud e s f a c ts that w e re no t a dd uc e d u nti l the p e na lty phase of Def

endant’ s trial. I n mid-November 1999 in Missi ssippi, Defendant kidnapped one ma n and then killed anothe r. De fenda nt was attempting to evade his apprehe nsion for these c rimes when he appe are d at J essie Cochran’s fa rm in Harde man County , Tenne ssee.

F AC TS A DD UC ED DU RI NG G UI LT P HA SE

J es s i e C o ch ra n t es t i fi ed t h at s h e me t De fe n d an t i n 1 9 9 0 an d d at ed h i mi n t er m i t t en t l y t h ro u gh 1993. On Novembe r 16, 1999, M s

. Cochran r eturne d home to find Def endant in her

house, uninvited. Defe ndant had a sawe d-off shotgun but did not threaten her with it. They spoke for about forty -five minutes. De fenda nt then left, re questing
, “Please do not call the law.” After Def endant left, Ms. Cochra n beg an che cking to see if Def endant had taken any thing. As she l ooked out one of her w indows, she saw he r Mer cede s-B enz car being d ri ven down the driveway . She reported the the ft , a ndhe r c ar w a s su bs e qu e ntl y loc a te d a bo ut t we nty -thr e e mil e s a way in A sh la nd , M iss iss ipp i. Ms. Cochran explained that he r farm w as located about one and one-ha lf miles from the Mississippi border “if y ou went straig ht throug h the woods.” After Def endant’ s appea

ranc e, Ms. Cochra n left her home and stay ed with a r elative until Dec ember 11, 1999.-3-

Af t erab an d o n i n g M s

. C o c h r an ’s ca r, De fe n d an tfo u n d a B ro n co k ep ti n a l o ck ed s t o ra ge building on a f

arm in Benton County , Mississ ippi, just south of Ashland, Mississippi . The ke y s were still in the Br onco, as w ell as seve ral guns. Def endant took the B ronco and drove to Memphis. The B ro nc o’ s o wn e r, Mr . Ri c ha rdRic e , id e nti fi e d a

ph oto g ra ph of the B ro nc o at tria l.

Vi rg ini a Da vis , D e fe nd a nt’ s n ie c e , testi fi ed th a t D e fe nd a nt c a me by he r r e sid e nc e in Midtown Memphis on a Thursday evening in November

1999. Def

endant wa s driving a

Br onco. Ms. Davis identified the B ronco a s the same one picture d in the photogr aph identified pr eviously by Mr. Rice. Ms. Da vis stated that Def endant visited with her f

or about forty -five minutes. H e aske d her if she had a c ar; she did not. He also asked if her f ather still lived in Texas, to which she replied in the aff irmative. De fenda nt told Ms. Davis he wa s g oing to Te x as to visit her fathe r. De fenda nt le ft a t a bo ut 5 :00 p. m. Two day s later, on a

Saturday , Def

endant r eturne d to Ms. Da v i s ’ residence in Midtown Me mph is, sti ll d ri vin g the B ro nc o. He pa rk e d th e B ro nc o n e arb y

a ndwa lke d to he r ho us e . Sh e did not admit him because, in the me antime, police of fice rs had v i s i t ed her. D uring their visit, she learned some thi ng s about Def endant that she was not “ha ppy with.” Howe ver, she advised De fe nd a nt that “ the la w b e e n th e re loo kin g fo r [h im]. ” Pur su a nt t o th e of fi c e rs ’ i ns truc tio ns , M s. Davis conta cted them a

bout Defe ndant’s sec ond visit.
Kathryn Crane te stified that, in November 1999, she wa s em p l oy ed by Seessel’s, a supermar ket l ocate d in Midtown Memphis. She was the store ’s bookkee per. Ms. Cra ne identified

a c a sh re g ist e r r e c e ipt

g e ne rate d b y

the sto re date d N ov e mbe r 2 0, 19 99 , at 5: 27 p. m. M s. Cr a ne a lso identified a de bit card r ece ipt for the purc hase r efle cted by the ca sh reg ister re ceipt.

Michelle Na ef testified that she was a gra duate student at t he University of Memphis in the fall of 1999, study ing f

or a ma ster’s deg ree in philosophy

. She and the victim, Ms. Hillary J ohnson,

wer e teac hing assistants f or the same profe ssor and be came friends. That fall, the victim lived “on M c L e a n a n d L i n d e n

. ” M s

. N a e f a n d t h e v i c t i mh a d p l a n n e d t o s p e n d t i m e t o g e t h e r o n S u n d a y, No ve mbe r 2 1, 19 99

. Th e vic tim ha d ag re e d to c a ll M s. Na e f that Su nd a y mornin g to c on fi rm

the ir plans

.
Ms. Naef

last spoke with the victim on the m orning of S aturda y , November 20, 1999. When Ms. J ohnson did not call the next m orning as had be en ar rang ed, Ms. Nae f ca lled the victim at about 11:00 a.m. but did not rece ive an a nswer. Ms. Na ef le ft a messa g e. Not hea ring b ac k , Ms. Naef called a g ain in the ea

rly afte rnoon an d l ef

t an o t h er me ssag e. With st ill no return ca ll, Ms. Naef called a third time. This ti me, the victim’s answe ring machine was full and not taking additional

me ssa g e s. A tt h i s p o i n t , M s

. N a e f b e c a m e “ s c ar e d

. ” M s

. N a e f a n d “ a l l o f

t h e g r a d u a t e s t u d e nts ” spent the next severa l day s sear ching for Ms. Johnson i n person, ove r the phone, and by posting sig ns

. On Sunday , November 21, 1999, Offic er Jeffre y

H e r b is o no f th eM e mp h is Po lic e De partment found the B ronco pa

rked ne ar Ms. Da vis’ residenc e. He waited for someone to re turn to the vehicle
,-4-

but no one did. Afte r some hours, the police department towed it away . Offic er H erbison identified on an aerial photog raph the locations of Seesse l’s, Ms. Davis’ apa rtment, the plac e whe re the Br onco
was found abandone d, and the victim’s re sidence . Offic er H erbison testified that a ll of these plac es
wer e located in Memphis, Shelby County , Tenne ssee.

Na n cy M cP i k e te s t i fi ed t h at h erd au gh t er , t h e v i ct i mHi l l ar y J o h n s o n , m o v ed fr o mC h i ca go to Memphis in Aug ust 1999 to attend g raduate school at the Univer sityof Memphis. After arriving in Memphis, Ms. J ohnson purcha sed a w hite Hyundai automobile for $1,350. On Friday , November 19, 1999, Ms. McPike spoke wit h her daug hter over t he phone. Ms. McPike called Ms. Johnson on Sunday
, November 21, 1999, but did not rec eive an answe r. S he ca lled ag ain late Sunday night, but ag ain re ceive d no answe r. Afte r spea king w ith severa l of her da ug hter’s f riends, Ms

. McPike contac ted the police. Ms. McPike identified a jac ket shown to her at trial as belong ing to he r daug hter.
During the late a fternoon of Saturday , November

20, 1999, Def

endant c arja cked H illary J o h n s o n a s s h e w a s s i t t i n g a l o n e i n h e r c ar a ta s t o p s i g n i n M i d t o w n M e m p h i s , S h e l b y C o u n t y, T en n es s ee

. De fe n d an tfo rc ed M s

. J o h n s o n i n t o t h e p as s en gers ea to f h er ca r, an d h e b ega n d ri v i n g. Def endant drove Ms. Johnson to a remote location in F ay ette County , Tenne ssee. The re, he stabbed he r o nc e in the ba c k w ith su c h f or c e that th e kn if

e bla de re ma ine d e mbe dd e d in he r bod y , th e ha nd le detac hed. De fenda nt drag g ed Ms. J ohnson about twenty y ards a nd conce aled he r under a shee t of tin near a n old ag ricultural f uel tank. De fendant left Ms. J ohnson to die of the knife wound. He left the sit e of

th e ki ll in g i n Ms . Joh ns on ’s c ar anddr ov e ou t of state , s til l try ing to a vo id h is appre hension.

Def endant r eturne d to southwest Tennesse e seve ral day s later. He hid Ms. J ohnson’s ca r behind an old abandoned house and wa lked to J essie Cochran’s re sidence . Def endant e ntere d her house whe n he found it unocc upied.

L ieutenant Rick Marlar of the Mississ ippi Highway Patrol testified that, on November 29, 19 99 , h e ov e rh e arda

br oa dc a st that Ms . Joh ns on ’s c ar h a d b e e n f ou ndhid de n b e hin d a n o ld h ou se in Tippah County , Mississ ippi. He re ported to the sce ne; he de scribed the are a at trial as “ve ry
rura l.” B eca

use he was alre ady involved in the sear ch for Def endant, he and ac companying of fice rs proce eded to Ms. Cochran’s house, whic h was only a short distance away . As Lt. Marlar looked throug h a window, he saw Def endant sitti ng inside the house, watching television with a 9 mm. gun lay ing near

by

. Speaking throug h the window, Lt. Marlar order ed De fendant to “fre eze.” De fendant
ma de a mov e tow ardhis g un , c a us ing Lt. M arl ar t o th re a te n to “ kil l hi m.” De fe nd a nt the n r a ise d h is hands. Off

icer s broke throug h the door a nd took D efe ndant into custody . On Def endant’ s person
we re dis c ov e re d a

.2 2 p ist ol anda

kn if e . Lt. M arl ar a dv ise d D e fe nd a nt o f h is M ir and a ri g hts immediately

afte r ar resting him.

L ie ute na nt D a vidSha w o f the Mis sis sip pi H ig hw a y Pa t r o l a r ri v e d an d q u e s tio ne d D e fe nd a nt, ag ai n a d v is in g h im o f h is M ir a n d a r ig h ts

. D e f e n d a n t e xe c u te d a w r itte n w a iv e r o f h is r ights a nd state d h e wo ulda ns we r L t. S ha w’ s q ue sti on s. Lt. Sha w de sc ri be d De fe nd a nt’ s de me a no r a s “ c a lm-5-

and coop er ative.” L

t. Shaw took an audio re cording of his interview of Def endant, whic h was subsequently

transcribed. The audio rec ording was play ed for the jury , and the jury

was further provided with copie s of the tra nscript.
During this November 29 statement, Defenda nt admitted to taking Ms. Cochran’ s car . When the police then “ g ot a fter” him, he “hit the woods” and “jumped out.” He rema ined in the woods two or three day s when he found t h e s t o ra ge building in whic h the B ronco w as located. He took the Br onco and dr ove to Memphis, wher e he visited his niece
, Virg inia. He then dr ove to Texas, looking for Vir g inia’s father. Unsuccessf ul in his sear ch, Defendant returne d to Memphis. He par ked the Br onco nea

r his niece ’s re sidence and wa lked to her ap ar tment. She told him that “the law been there looking f

or [him] .” He then “[t] ook off r unning.” He saw a “g irl at a stop sign” in a white ca r. He “ jumped in the car ” on the pa sseng er’ s side and made t he drive r pull over. He “g rabbe d her around the neck” and made her switch pla ce s wi th him. He then drove them out Highw ay 64. Def endant state d that he dropped the woman off on Hig hway 64 afte r t aking some cre dit cards f rom her. H e then dr ove the woma n’s ca r into Alabama

and on into Flor i d a. Af ter seve ral day s, he returne d to Ms. Cochran’s r esidenc e. He lef t the white ca

r “of f a g rave l road be hind an old house” and wa lked from ther e to Ms. Cochran’ s house.

Def endant de nied that the driver of the white car had been with him at the old house wher e he le ft the c ar. He state d th a t he ha d tw o p ist ols wi th him wh e n he jumpe d inthe wh ite c ar, bu t di d not pull either on the driver. He explained that the g uns had bee n in his boots. He stated that, when he g ot in the c ar, “ [s]he a sk e d me do n’ t hu rt he r. I sa id I a in’ t g on e [sic ] hurt y ou la dy , a ll I want t o do is git [ sic] away

. Not g one [sic] hurt y ou.” De fendant insist ed that he the n put the driver out on the hig hway

and that whe n he lef

t, “that g irl was standing rig ht there i n that g rave l road. I didn’t harm that g irl.” De fenda nt acknowle dg ed having obtained the 9 mm. pistol from the Br onco.

L ieutenant Ge rald B lum with the Memphis P olice De partment testified that he had been assig ned to investig ate the vic tim’s disappe arance. He initially questioned De fendant on November 30, 1999. During that interview, D efe ndant told Lt. B lum that “ he wa s at an a ddress in Midtown on the stree t, and he a

pproac hed a w hite car .” Def endant told Lt. Blum t hat he g ot in the car and for ced the fe male drive r to drive a round t h e ci t y u ntil they

trave led down Hig hway

64, at which time he

r e le a s e d th e d r iv e r a n d k e p t th e c ar

. Wh e n Lt. B lu m a s k e d D e f e n d a n t w h a t h e should tell the victim’s family , Def

endant sa id, “Tell them I ’m not the one that hurt her.” Def endant then pa

used and adde d, “Well, if she’s hurt.”
Also reporting to the sc ene w h er e M s. J ohnson’s ca r wa s found was F eder al B ureau of I nvestig ation Special Ag ent C. M. Sturgis, who beg an in v e s tigating the vic tim’s disappearance w hen it developed into “more than a missing person” case

. Ag ent S turg is testified t hat no blood was found in Ms. J ohnson’s ca

r. I n the aba ndoned house be hind which the victim’s ca r wa s found, off

icer s found a w oman’s jac ket, which wa s subsequently identified by

Ms. McPike as belong ing to the victim. Found a short distance away from the house was a plasti c shoppi ng bag bearing the Seessel’s supermar ket log o.S h e riff B u d d y E a st is t h e S h e riff o f L a faye tte C o u n ty, M ississip p i. 2

-6- Fr ustrated at not having disc overe d Ms. J ohnson’s wher eabouts by early Dec ember , Ag ent Stu rg is t ra ve le d o n D e c e mbe r 3 , 1 99 9, to the ja il i n O xfor d, Mis sis sipp i, wh e re De fe nd a nt w a s in custody

. Acc ompany ing him wa s Special Ag ent J oseph Rinehart. The two ag ent s s p en t s ev era l hours with D efe ndant, sitting tog ether in the common are a of the jail and watc hing te levision. Ag ent Sturgis testified that the thr ee of them “talked a

bout every thing unde r the sun” and watc hed a football g ame. At one point
, Ag ent S turg is showed De fendant severa l photogr aphs of Ms. Johnson

a s a c hil d a nd in famil y se tti ng s. Ag e nt Stu rg is e xpla ine d that it wo uldbe a g oo d th ing if

the famil y could re solve her w here abouts befor e Christmas. Some time after this, De fen dant tapped A g ent Sturgis on the c hest and told him he was g oing to give him something. De fendant took the envelope in which the photog raphs ha d been ke pt and dre w a map on it. De fendant describe d an ar ea to Ag ent Sturgis and told him that, next to an ag ricultural fuel tank in this area, “ under two pie ces of tin, y ou will find what y ou’re looking f or.”
Ag ents Sturgis a nd Rinehart spent the ne x t couple of hours attempti ng to communicate by te le ph on e to o the r l a w e nf or c e me nt of

fi c e rs the loc a tio n o f the are a de sc ri be d to the m by

De fe nd a nt. B e c a us e o f t h e d i f

f i c u l t y i n d e s c r i b i n g t h e e xa c t l o c a t i o n , t h e f i e l d o f f i c e r s w e r e u n s u c c e s s f

ul i n finding the spot described by Def endant. Def

endant of fer ed seve ral times to take Ag ents Sturgis a nd Rinehart to the location if they would put him in a car . Eventually , Def endant wa s allowed to lea ve the jail in Sheriff Buddy East’s car

. Taking direc tions from Defe ndant, Sheriff East, ac companied 2 by Ag ent Rinehart, trav el ed t o a re mote and rur al location in Fay ette County , Tenne ssee. Ag ent Sturgis and L

t. Shaw followed in a se cond ca r. Upon a

rr i ving at the location desc ribed by Defen d an t , an d af

t erfo l l o wi n g De fe n d an t ’s d i re ct i o n s , t h e m en fo u n d M s

. J o h n s o n ’s b o d y under two piece s of tin next to an old ag ricultural f uel t ank. At this point, Ag ent Sturg is testified, Defe ndant

“ sta rt e d c rying .” De fe nd a nt w a s th e n r e turne d to the Oxf or d, Mis sis sip pi, ja il b y

She ri ff Ea st.

Lt. Gera ld Blum with the Memphis Poli ce Depa rtment took a statement fr om Defe ndant on Dec ember

4, 1999. This statement was tape rec orded and subsequently transcribed. The audio tape was play ed for

the jury and copie s of the tra nscript provided to it. I n t h i s s t at em ent, Defenda nt
a dmi tte d th a t he wa s r e sp on sib le fo r M s. John so n’ s d e a th. He state d th a t Ms . Joh ns on ha d “ c ome
ou t be hin d th e [ca

r] s e a t” wi th a

kn if e a ndthat he “ g ra

bb e d h e r arm a ndtoo k it

a way fr om h e r. ” Th is

occur red “[w] hen [ they ] g ot out the car up there in the woods.” He stated that they “foug ht” and that he had to use forc e to disa rm Ms. J ohnson. Defe ndant denied having be en hurt during the fig ht but

a c kn ow le dg e d th a t Ms . Joh ns on “ g ot c ut. ” He did no t, how e ve r, re me mbe r sta bb ing he r. Af

te r the ir fi g ht, he “ pu t he r un de r so me tin ” a ft e r dr a g g ing he r tw e nty y a rd s. De fe nd a nt state d that th e vic tim was “ try in’ to move” a s he dra g g ed her , but he did not know if she was de ad or a live afte r he pla ced her under the tin. Def

endant stated that he dec ided to reve al the victim’s wher eabouts be cause he

“ w a n t e d h e r

t o b e w i t h h e r f

a m i l y f o r C h r i s t m a s a n d g e t t h i s o v e r w i t h

. It w a s e a t i n g [ h i m ] u p

. It

was e ating [hi m] alive.”T h e h an dl e t o t h e k n i fe wa s a ppar en t l y n ev er f ou n d. 3

-7- Dr. O. C. Smith testi fied that he perf ormed a n aut o p s y o n t h e victim . X-ray s indicated a “re tained knife blade prese nt in her le ft che st cavity .” The knife had ente red the victim’s upper lef t 3 ba c k a ndpe ne tr a te d th e vic tim ’s lun g a nda orta . T he kn if e wo un d c a us e d the vic tim ’s de a th w ith in “[a] matter of minutes.” Dr. Smith also testified that the victim had bruises a long the line of her le ft jaw, nea r her rig ht ey e, on the rig ht side of her neck, and on the bac k of her rig ht thigh. The injuries causing these bruise s prec eded the victim’s death by an hour or

two.

De fe nd a nt p re se nte d n o p ro of a t th e g uil t ph a se of

his tr ia l.
Up on the c on c lus ion of

pr oo f, th ej u r

y c o n v i c t e d D e f e nd a nt o f the ft

un de r $ 10 ,0 00 , e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated kidnapping , and first de g ree preme ditated murder

.

F AC TS A DD UC ED DU RI NG P EN AL TY P HA SE
Prior to the State adducing any testimonyduring the pena lty phase of Def endant’ s trial, the trial court h e ar d th e p r o p o s e d te s ti mo n y o f D r

. Ro n a ldSu n d s tr o m an d M s

. M c Pi k e ina ju r y -out hearing. Dr. Sundstrom is a profe ssor of philosophy at the University of Memphis an d empl oy ed the victim as his teaching assistant. Dr. S undstrom described t he ef fec t of the victim’s murder on him se lf, h is u nd e rg ra du a te stu de nts, hi s gr a du a te stu de nts , a nd the ph ilo so ph y

de pa rt me nt a s a whole. Ms. McPike is the victim’s mother. She desc ribed the e ffe ct of the vic tim’s murder on her famil y a ndthe vic tim ’s frie nd s. Th e tr ia l c ou rt fo un d th a t th is p ro po se d te sti mon y wa s “ ba sic a lly related to the emotional and psy cholog ical impact that i t ’s h ad on the family and friends and

c oll e a g ue s” a ndru le d th a t th e pr ob a tiv e va lue of thi s e vid e nc e ou tw eighe d it s pre jud ic ia l e ff

e c t. Acc ording ly , the trial court determined this testimony was a dmissibl e.

Th e re a ft e r, wi th the jury re turne d to the c ou rt ro om, Dr . Su nd str om t e sti fi e d th a t th e vic tim ha d b e e n h is t e a c hin g a ssi sta nt w hil e a g ra du a te stu de nt at th e sc ho ol. She be g a n w or kin g fo r h im in Aug ust 1999. As one of his teac hing a ssistants, the victim m en tored sixt y of his one hundre d eig hty students, gr ading their paper s, teac hing some discussion sessions, and counseling them about their cour sework. Prior to he r death, the victim had met with thes e s t u d en t s six times. Dr. Sundstrom testi fied a

bout the impact of th e victim’s disappear ance and death on the philosophy de pa rt me nt:
Well, the impact was treme ndous. I t’s hard to quantify

. The psy cholog ical impact S the eve ry -day -life impac t was treme ndo u s o n[t he students she mentore d, her associate g raduate students, and the fac ulty ]. The unde rg raduates whom she taug ht w[ere] very

a f r a idth a t, y o u k n o w , th e c o u r s e w a s n ’ t g o in g to g o o n

. T h e y wer e traumatized S s o m e o n e t h e y k n e w i n t i m a t e l y w a s m u r d e r e d i n t h i s w a y.

. . . .-8-

Ma ny of the m c ou ldn ’t

fi nis h S ma ny of the m c ou ld n ot g o o n. Ma ny of the m c ou ld not c o mp le te th e ir p ap e r s

. I t w a s v e r y d if f ic u lt f o r th e u n d e r g r a d u a te s . Ihad a number of unde rg raduates approa ch me, a nd y ou know, who wa s ca ri ng for the

un de rg ra du a te s? The re we re so ma ny of the m to c are fo r. Som e wo uldapp ro a c h me in tears a bout this. I t w as very

difficult for the m, and unfortunately I didn’t have the

abil ity to c are fo r the m. T he re we re too ma ny of the m.

Th e sa me wi th the se g ra du a te stu de nts

.

. . . . [T]he wh ole de pa

rt me nt g ro un d to a

ha lt. Th e stu de nts didno t tu rn in the ir pa pe rs

. Tea cher s did not teach. Life just didn’t g o on as w e wa t ch ed the ne ws and a s we waited f or her to come bac k.

. . . .
Numbers of

the other faculty , including my self, could not tea ch. We just couldn’t t ea ch
, y o u k n o w, u n d ert h o s e c i rc u m s t an ce s

. Ou r l i v es we re d ev as t at ed

. E v er y t h i n g,
a g a in, g r o u n d t o a

h a l t

. T h e r e w a s l i t t l e t o n o a c t i v i t y ar o u n d
, y o u k n o w , thi s
e d u c a t i o n t h a tw e ’ r e s u p p o s e d t o b e p r o v i d i n g t o e v e r yb o d y. The gra duate students themselves were sever ely aff ecte d beca

use, y ou know, t h i s wa s their prog ram. The y hoped to be S

t o g e t m a s t e r d e g r e e s o r P h

. D

. ’ s in philosophy , and many

of them just couldn’t finish classes S c ou ldn ’t turn inpa

pe rs

.
Dr. Sundstrom testified that he be lieved one of the g raduate students left “be cause of this.” Other g raduate students wer e unable to complete their c oursewor k and re ceive d “incompletes.” Some of the g raduate students wer e not able t o co m p l ete these course s later, r esulting in the “incomplete” g rade s becoming “F ’s.” Dr . Sundstrom testi fied that, for these students, “their f uture is very much in que stion a s profe ssors of philosophy .” Dr . Sundstrom continued: “the structure of

an ac ademic de partment wa s b ro u gh t to a complete standstill, and we just huddled tog ether and crie d. That wa s it. That’s all we c ould do.”

Nanc y McPike, the victim’s mother
, testified that the victim’s death “ never , ever leave s” her family . She testified about the diff iculties the vi ctim’s y oung er br other ha d doing his schoolwor k in sixth andse ve nthg ra de s. She te sti fi e d a bo ut h e r h us ba nd ’s ina

bil ity to s tart ne w p ro je c ts. Ms. McPike herse lf had been unable to complete her g raduate school cour sework. Ms. Mc Pike’s mother, the victim’s g randmother , “cries” a nd “doesn’ t understand.”

Ms. Mc Pik e e xpla ine d th a t th e vic tim ’s be st f ri e ndha d h a d a n ar g ume nt with the vic tim jus t befor e the kidnapping . Ms. McPike testified that “[t] hey can never make up” and that the f riend ha s-9-

“ be e n in the ra

py e ve r sin c e

. She ha d he rs e lf a dmi tte d to a hosp ita l bec a us e sh e wa s af raid s he wo uld take he r own life be cause of this.” Ms. McPike continued:

You know, I

told y ou every one loved Hillary . Every one just loved her right

away . She has a w hole army of friends out here who came t o witness this. S he has friends a ll over the wor ld who will never ha ve her aga i n

. S h e was such a g reat friend, and it makes y ou sick to y our stomach. Sometimes when I think that she’s dead, I just can’t bre athe a ny more. When I saw he r picture S

this beautiful picture, I could har dly

breathe.

. . . .
I t’s devastating. It’s devastating. I don’t know what it m ea n s for he r to be dead and for me to be alive. I just don’t know what it means.

J oe Warre n, an employ ee in the Criminal Court Clerk’s Of fice in Shelby

County , Tenne ssee, testified that Def

endant wa s convicted in Shelby County in 1974 of t hree counts of robbery with a deadly wea pon and one c ount of rape

. Mary Alice B usby , the Circuit Court Clerk in L afay ette County , Mississ ippi, testified that De fe nd a nt w a s c on vic te d in 20 01 in Mis sis sip pi o f kidn app ing a ndma ns laug hte r. Con c e rn ing thi s kidnapping conviction, J ames Allen N ault of Oxford, Mississippi, testified that, on November 15, 19 99 , h e sa w De fe nd a nt try ing to kid na p his wi fe

. Mr . N a ult

app ro a c he d D e fe nd a nt, a t w hic h ti me Def endant pointed a

shotgun at him. Mr. Nault told Def endant to take him instead of his wife , and Def endant ag ree d. They g ot into Mr. Nault’s car with Mr. Nault driving and Defendant keeping the g un pointed at Mr. Nault. W hile they drove, D efe ndant threatened to kill severa l people that Mr. Nault knew. A t Defe ndant’s dire ction, Mr. Nault drove them down a g rave l road. De fenda nt got out and walke d off into the woods.
Concerning the Mississi ppi manslaug hter c onviction, S h er iff B uddy East testified that he beg an looking for Defe ndant after hea ring of Mr. Nault’s kidnapping. H e sent investig ators to the residenc e of Mr

. Wil liam Bramlett, one of the pe rsons Def endant ha d threatened while ta lking to Mr. Nault. These law enfor ceme nt pe rsons located Mr. Br amlett and warned him a bout D efe ndant. They continued looking for De fenda nt but were unable to locate him. The nex t morning , November 16, 1999, Mr. B ramlett wa s reported missing. Mr. B ramlett’s ve hicle wa s not at his residence . Sheriff East put out an alert f

or Mr. B ramlett and his pick- up truck. Of fice rs walke d throug h Mr. B ramlett’s

re sid e nc e bu t di d n ot f

indhim . T he nex t day , a f a mil y me mbe r f

ou ndMr . B ramle tt’ s b od y in h is home, hidden under

a mattre ss. Mr. Br amlett had bee n shot with a .22 caliber pis t ol. L aw enfor ceme nt then rele ased information throug h the m edia in an effort to apprehend D efe ndant. The information indicated that D efe ndant was wanted f or ca pital murder. Sheriff Ea st testified that Mr. Br amlett’s truck w as eve ntually found two or thre e miles from Jessie Cochran’ s house.-10-

As i t s f i n a l p i e c e o f e v i d e n c e d u r i n g t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e o f D e f e n d a n t ’ s tr i a l , th e Sta te submitt ed ce rtified re cords from Alabama ref lecting Def

endant’ s 1982 conviction of robbe ry in the first deg ree

.
Def endant put on no proof

. Upon conc lusion of the proof, t h e j u ryfound the e x istence of three ag g ravating circ umstances: (a ) De fenda nt was pre viouslyconvicted of one or more fe lonies, other than the prese nt char g e, the statutory elements of w hich involve the use of violence to the pe rson; (b) the of fe ns e wa s c omm itt e d fo r the pu rp os e of a vo idi ng , in te rf

e ri ng wi th, or

pr e ve nti ng a

la wf ul a rr e st or prose cution of De fenda nt or an o t h er; a nd (c) the murder was knowing ly

committed, solicited, direc ted, or a ided by Def

endant while Def

endant had a substantial r ole in committing or attempting to c omm it, or

wa s f le e in g af te r h a vin g a

su bs ta nti a l r ole in c omm itt ing or a tte mpt ing to c omm it, theft. S ee T en n

. C o d e Ann. § 39-13-204(i)( 2), (6) , (7). The jury further determined that the

a g gra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s o utw e ig he d a ny mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. Acc ording ly , the jury

sentenc ed De fendant to death for his fi rst deg ree preme ditated murder of Hillary J ohnson. This appea l followed.

AN AL YSI S

I. VENUE

Def endant c ontends t h at t he State failed to establish that Shelby Countywas the c orre ct venue in whic h to try him for his first deg ree preme ditated m urder of Ms . J ohnson, arg uing that the proof e stablished that Def endant murdered the victim in Fay ette C ounty wher e her body was found. We disag ree

.
Our Constit ution pr ovides that an acc used must be tried in the county in which the crime was committed. Tenn. Cons t. art. I , § 9; see a lso Tenn. R. Crim. P . 18(a) (“Except as othe rwise pr ovided by statute or by these rule s, offe nses shall be prose cuted in the c ounty wher e the of

fense was committed.”). “ Proof of ve nue is nec essary to establish the jurisdiction of the court, but it is not an element of

any offe nse an d n ee d o n l y b e prove d by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e.” State v. Hutcher son, 790 S.W .2d 532, 535 (T en n

. 1990); see a lso Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11- 201(e) (“N o person may

be convic ted of an offe nse unless venue is prove n by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e.”)

. Venue is a question for

the jury , State v. Hamsley , 672 S.W .2d 437, 439 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984)
, and may be proven by circ umstantial evidence . State v. Be nnett, 549 S.W .2d 949, 950 (Tenn. 1977)

. I n determining venue , the jury is entitled to draw rea sonable infere nces from the evidenc e. State v. J ohnson, 673 S.W .2d 877, 882 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) . I mportantly , wher e diffe rent e lements of the same of

fense are committed in differe nt co u nties, “the off ense ma y be prose cuted in either county .” Te nn. R. Crim. P . 18(b).

First deg ree preme ditated murder is de fined as the “pre meditated and intentional killing of another .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 202(a) (1). A pr emeditated killing is one “done afte r theL t. B lum te stif ie d th a t a S e e sse l’s re c e ip t w a s fo u n d in th e v ic tim ’s p o c k e t. T h is re c e ip t wa s d a te d S a tur d a y, 4
N o vem b er 20 , at 5:27 p.m. A See ss el ’ s shop p i ng ba g was f o und near t he l o c a tio n w h e re D efend ant ab and o ned t he

v ic tim ’s ca r. T h is c irc u m sta n tial e v id e n c e ind ic a te s tha t D e fen d a n t i n te rc e p te d the vic tim a fter s h e left S e e sse l’s, a sup erm ark et l o ca t ed i n M i d t o w n M em p his. D efen d an t d o es no t d i sp ute ve nu e as t o t he kid na p p i ng an d t he f t o f fen ses. W e the re fo re c o n c lud e tha t D e fen d a n t’s i n iti a l ap p re h e n sio n o f t h e vic tim o c c u rr e d in S h e lb y C o u n ty.
-11- exercise o f reflection and judg ment.” I d. at (d). Spec ifically , “‘[p]remeditation’ means that the intent to kil l m u st have be en formed prior to the a ct itself.” I d. The State a rg ues that De fendant formed his i n t ent to kill the victim whil e in Shelby County , there by

confe rring venue in Shelby Cou nty . Se e Ca g le v. Sta te , 5 07 S .W. 2d12 1, 13 0- 31 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 73 ) ( ho ldi ng that, althoug h victim’s body

was found in Jeffe rson County , “the jury was fullyjustified in finding . . . that the m alicious and deliberate design to kill the dec ease d S the evil pre meditation S

took f orm in the defe ndant’s mind in Hamblen County ” whe re de fendant was tried) . We ag ree

.
De f e n d a n tt o l d p o l i c e o f

f i c e r s i n h i s D e c e mb e r

4 t h s t a t e m e n tt h a th e w a s i n M e m p his “runnin’ f rom the law out of Mississippi.” Whil e vis iting his niece in Memphis, he learned that “the law wa s looking” for him there

. He left his niece ’s Midtown apartment on foot, abandoning the stolen Br onco in which he had ar rived. As he started acr oss a street, “this g irl pulled up and aske d [him ] a q ue sti on a ndwh e n s he did , [he ] jumpe d inthe c ar w ith he r. ” De fe nd a nt tol d poli c e in h is No ve mbe r 2 9thstate me nt that he jumpe d in the pa sse ng e r sid e of the c ar andthe n ma de the vic tim “pull over, pull ac ross the stree t, down another street a nd made he r switch plac es with [him ].” Def endant e x plained that he f orce d the victim to chang e plac es with him by “g rabb[ing] her a

round the nec k.” De fenda nt said that the victim told him that “she’ d cooper ate as long a s [he] didn’t hurt her . . . th a t sh e ’dwa it u nti l sh e g ot b a c k to he r a pa rt me nt b e fo re sh e c a lle d th e la w. Gi ve [him ] enoug h time, why

she said that [he] d[ idn’t] know.” Defe ndant re peate d: “I just gra bbed her around the nec k and made her g et over in the passeng er’ s side and I g ot unde r the driver’ s seat. I didn’t hurt her.”

De fe nd a nt w a s tr

y ing to e lud e c aptu re a t th e tim e he c omm a nd e e re d t he vi ctim’ s c ar i n She lby Cou nty

. He c ou ld h a ve le t he r g o b ut h e de lib e rate ly a ndfo rc e fu lly ke pt he r in the c ar w ith 4 him

. Hi s ov e ra

rc hin g c on c e rn wa s e va din g app re he ns ion . T he vic tim ’s c on ta c t w ith him a dd e d to the risk of his ca

pture if she was allowed to speak with any one. It was re asonable for the jury to infer that, at th e tim e De fe nd a nt d e te rm ine d to ke e p the vic tim wi th h im i n th e c ar, he de te rm ine d to kil l her. D efe ndant was in Shelby Countyat the time he f

orce d the victim to leave the driver’ s seat and sit in t he passe ng er’ s seat. Ac cording ly
, we conclude that the State adduce d sufficie nt proof for the jury to infer that De fenda nt determined to kill the victim while still in Shelby Countyand that Def endant ther eby

committed an eleme nt of the offe nse of pr emeditated mur der w hile still in Shelby County . Venue in Shelby County for prosec ution of the preme ditated murder of Hillary J ohnson was there by established.

Def endant r elies upon R ey nolds v. State, 287 S.W .2d 15 (Tenn. 1956) , for the pr oposition that a murder is pr esumed to ha ve been committed where the body is found. Def

endant’ s relianc e is mispl ace d. I n Rey nolds, the defendant wa s convicted of second de g ree murder. T he victim had last been se en alive in W ilson County , her body was found in Wil son County , her clothes wer e found-12-

in Wi lson County , and the victim “died f rom a broke n neck w hich appa rently would keep he r fr om wande ring around a ny .” I d. at 16. I n short, there was no proof adduce d to rebut the pre sumption t hat her murde r had be en committed entire ly in Wi lson County . I d.

I n this case, a s set forth above , the victim was last see n alive by any one other than Def endant in S he lby Cou nty a ndwa s k idn app e d in She lby Cou nty

. Al tho ug h he r bo dy wa s f ou ndin F a y e tte County , we have conc luded that the jury was e ntitled to infer that Def endant de termined to kill the victim while they

wer e in Shelb y

County , there by

committing one of

the eleme nts of first deg ree preme ditated murder

in Shelby

County . This case is, then, distinguishable fr om Rey nolds.

Def endant is not entitled to a new trial on this basis.

II . S UB S TI TU TI ON OF T RI AL JUD GE

After the jury was sworn and opening statements had been ma de, but prior to any witnesses b e i n g c a l l e d
, t h e o r i g i n a l tr i a l j u d g e a n n o u n c e d t h a t h e h a d s u f f e r e d a d e a t h i n h i s i m m e d i a t e f

a m i l y. Sta tin g that th e re wa s “ simply no way [he ] can p ro c e e d wi th th is tr ia l th is w e e k u nd e r the se circ umstances,” the judg e explained that he c onsidered himself una ble t o p ro ce ed byrea son of a “disability ” as c ontemplated by Tenn es s ee Rule of

Criminal Procedure 25(a) . The judg e further explained that another tria l judge was pre paring to proce ed with the trial. Defense counsel objec ted, reque sting that the tria l be continued instea d. Def endant’ s objection was de nied.

L a te r that a ft e rn oo n, Judg e Jon Ke rry B la c kw oo d fr om S ome rv ill e re c omm e nc e d th e tr ia l. Def ense c ounsel rene wed their objection, s tating that they “would consent to a continuanc e rather than having a spec ial judgecome in to hea r the matter .” Judge Blac kwood overruled the objec tion, and the tria l proce eded. Def endant now contends that the original t rial j udg e shoul d have de clar ed a mistrial, arg uing that the death in the origina l trial judge ’s i mmediate family did not constitut e a “disability ” under

Rule 25(a) . We disag ree

.
Our Rules of Criminal Proce dure pr ovide that,

I f by rea son of death, sickness or other disabilit y the jud g e be fo re wh om a jury tr ia l has c omm e nc e d is una ble to pr oc e e d withthe tr ia l, any oth e r j ud g e re g ula

rl y sitti n g in o r w h o may b e a s s ig n e d to th e c o u r t, u p o n c e r ti f y in g th a t h e o r s he has be c ome famil iar w ith the re c or d o f the tr ia l, m a y pr oc e e d w ith a ndfi nis h th e tr ia l.

Te nn

. R. Cr im. P. 25 (a ) (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Th e me a nin g of “ oth e r d isa

bil ity ” in this pr ov isi on is a matter of f

irst impression in Tennessee

.
Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proce dure 25 is modeled a fter F eder al R u l e of Criminal Procedur e 25. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 25 Advisory Commi ssion Comments. Neither our Rule nor its fede ral counterpart contains a definition of t he term “other disability .” See F ed. R. Crim. P. 25.-13-

Our re sear ch has reve aled no case addre ssing the issue of whether the term include s a death in the

orig ina l ju dg e ’s imm e diate famil y . We no w h oldthat it do e s. This Court has previously rec og nized that the rules of construction applicable to statutes are likewise applica

ble to the Rules of Criminal Procedur e. State v. Crowe , 168 S.W .3d 731, 744 (Tenn. 2005). One of those rules of construction is “ ejusdem g eneris,” which means that “whe re g ener al words follow spec ial words which limit the scope of the statute, g ener al words will be c onstrued as apply ing t o t h i n gs of the same kind or class a s those indicated by the pre ceding specia l words.” Ly ons v

. R as ar , 8 72 S.W .2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1994) . Wit h respe ct to Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Procedur e 2 5 (a) , the “spe cial wor ds” ar e “de ath” a nd “sickne ss.” The g ener al words a re “ other dis abil ity .” Th us , w e loo k to thi ng s o f the sa me kin d or cl a ss as a tr ia l ju dg e ’s de a th o r s ic kn e ss i n construing the term “ other disability .”

O b v i o u s l y, a

j u d g e ’ s d e a t h r e n d e r s h i m o r h e r “ u n ab l e t o p r o c e e d w i t h t h e tr i a l

. ” S i m i l ar l y,
a jud g e ’s ill ne ss m a y

re nd e r h im or he r a t le a st te mpo ra ri ly un a ble to p ro c e e d w ith the tr ia l. B oth of these e v e n ts ar e b e y o n d a ju d g e ’ s im me d iate c o n tr o l. N e ith e r o f th e s e e v e n ts is th e r e s u lt of a simple sc heduling conflict or a conflict in pr ofessional priorities. All pe rsons, in a ll wa lks of life,

are subject to the sometimes sudden dema nds of their he alth.

Simi larly , all persons, including t rial j udg es, are subj ect to the sometim es sudden de mands of the he alth of their immediate f amilies. I n this case, the origina l trial judge ’s mother-in- law died

u n ex p ec t ed l y

. A s w i t h a b o u to f s er i o u s p er s o n al i l l n es s , t h e p er s o n al d em an d s u p o n t h e j u d ge imm e diate ly

be c a me ur g e nt and im pera tiv e . A s w ith a bo ut o f s e ri ou s p e rs on a l il lne ss, tho se de ma nd s r e nd e re d th e jud g e te mpo ra ri ly bu t un a vo ida

bly “ un able to p ro c e e d w ith the tr ia l.” I n te rm s of re ndering a judg e tempora rily unable to proc eed w ith a trial, we se e li ttle differ ence in cause or eff ect be tween a j udg e’s own illness and a death in the judge ’s immediate family . Acc ording ly , we
c on s tru e t h e t e r m “ o t h e r d i s ab i l i t y ” a s u s e d i n T e n n e s s e e R u l e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e 25 (a ) t o encompa ss the death of

an immediate f

amily member of

the orig inal trial judg e.

We note t hat t he term “other disability ” is not limi ted to “other physical dis abil ity .” Th us , we do not construe the term a s requiring that the judg e experienc e some phy sical impairment to have suffe red a n “other

disability .”

We further

note that subsection (b) of Rule 25 permits a substitution of judges a fter a verdic t of g uilt, where the orig inal judge is unable to “pe rform the dut ies to be performe d by the court after

a ver dict of g uilt,” “by re ason of absence , d e a th, sic kn e ss o r o the r d isa bil ity .” Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 25(b) ( emphasis adde d). B eca use the term “other disability ” is used in addition to the term

“ a b s e n c e ” i n t h i s p r o v i s i o n , i ti s c l e ar t h a tt h e t w o t e r m s h a v e d i f f e r e n tm e a n i n g s

. O b v i o u s l y,

“ abs e nc e ” is a

br oa de r c a te g ory

than “ oth e r d isa

bil ity ,” a lth ou g h w e c on str ue the te rm

“ abs e nc e ” in thi s p ro vis ion a s, a g a in, be ing of the sa me “ ty pe ” a s “de a th, sic kn e ss, or oth e r dis abil ity ,” in that it

w o u l d b e a n ab s e n c e c a u s e d b y s o m e u n f o r s e e n a n d u n a v o i d ab l e e v e n t : f o r i n s t a n c e , tr a v e l d e l a ys
cause d by weather or a ccide nts.-14-

Upon the orig inal judge ’s disability , a substitut e j udg e may proce ed with the trial “ upon
ce rt i fy i n g t h at h e o r s h e h as b ec o m e f am i l i arwi t h t h e r e c o rd o f t h e t ri al

. ” In t h i s ca s e, J u d ge Bl ac k wo o d s t at ed o n t h e re co rd t h at h e ha d fa m i l i ar i z ed h i m s el f wi t h t h e re co rd i n t h i s ca u s e. J u d ge Bla ckwood f

urther e ntere d an orde r ce rtify ing that he had “ revie wed the ple ading s in this matter and [had] sufficie ntly

familiarized [hi mself] with the re cord in this matter in complianc e with Rule 25 of t he Tennessee Rules of C riminal Procedur e.” The trial then proceede d. Def endant points to no prejudice he suffere d as a result of J udg e B lackwood’ s assumption of the orig inal judge ’s duties, and the re cord doe s not indicate that De fendant suffer ed a n y i n h ere nt prejudice resulting from the substitut ion. Both the orig inal and substitute judge s complied with Rule 25( a)

. W e h o l d that Def endant wa s not entitled to a continuance or the de clarat i o n o f a mistrial upon the orig inal trial judge ’s disabilityand that he is not now e ntitled to a new trial on the ba sis of the substitut ion.

III . A DM ISSI ON OF P HOTO G RA P HS OF VI CT IM

Whil e talking to Def

endant at the Ox ford jail, Ag ent Sturg is display ed seve ral photog raphs of the vic tim

take n w hil e sh e wa s a c hil d. Ei the r he or Ag e nt R ine ha

rt re mark e d, “ She wa s a

pr e tty child S s h e w a s s u c h a p r e tt y c h il d
, a n d it ’ s ju s t a s h a me th a t w e c a n ’ t f in d h e r

. ” L ater , one of the ag ents said, “I f we could just ge t her body back that the family

could be re solved and it was c oming up on Christ ma s ti me S

it was a ve ry

difficult time for the family
, and if she was ly ing out somew here
, the animals mig ht be get t i n g to her, a nd that would just be so sad.” It was sometime af ter the photogr aphs had be en display ed and the se comm e n ts ma d eth at D efe ndant beg an desc ribing to Ag ent Sturgis whe re the victim’s body could be f

ound.
During Ag ent Sturg is’s testimonyat trial, one of the prosec utors showed him an e nvelope, which Ag ent Sturg is identified as t h e o n e t hat had c ontained the photog raphs a nd on which De fe nd a nt h a d draw n a

map to the vic tim ’s bo dy . Wh ile e xami nin g the e nv e lop e , A g e nt S tur g is stated, “I believe the re a

re still photos in here of the y oung lady .” The prosec uting at t orney there upon asked that the envelope be made an exhibi t to Ag ent Sturg is’s testimony . Def ense c ounsel objected to admission of the photogra phs contained in the e nvelope on the g rounds that the photogr aphs we re not re levant. The trial court ove rruled the objection. Def endant now c ontends that the trial court thereby

err ed.

Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 402 provides that “[ a]ll relevant evide nce is a dmissibl e except as provided by the C onstitut ion of t he United States, the C onstitut ion of Tennessee, these rules, or other rule s of g ener al application in the courts of Tenne ssee. Evide nce w hich is not releva nt is not

a dmi ssi ble .” Ev ide nc e is rel eva nt i f i t ha s “ a ny te nd e nc y to m ake the e xiste nc e of a ny fa c t th a t is of conse quence to the determination of the action more probable or less proba ble than it would be without the evidence. ” Tenn. R. Evid. 401. Howe ver, “ [a] lthough r eleva nt, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantia l l y outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, confusion of the i ssues, or m isleading the j ury , or by considerations of undue delay , waste of time,

or nee dless prese ntation of cumulative e vidence .” I d. at R. 40 3

. T he dec ision reg arding the admissibili ty

of photog raphs pur suant to these Rul es l ies within the s ound discretion of the trial courtT h e S ta te a rg u e s tha t “the vo lun ta rin e ss a n d ve ra c ity o f [D e fen d a n t’s] ultim a te c o n fe s s io n w a s [s ic ] c le a rly 5

a n issu e fo r th e ju ry to re so lve .” W h ile w e a g re e tha t t h e ju ry h a d to d e te rm ine ultim a te ly wh e the r D e fen d a n t’s

c o n fes sio n w a s tru e , t h e m o st d a m n ing p ie c e o f ev id e n c e a g a ins t D e fen d a n t wa s h is kn o w le d g e o f wh e re the vic tim ’s b o d y w a s lo c a te d

. H is m o tive s in c h o o sin g to r e v e a l th is p ie c e o f u n iq u e info rm a tio n w e re , re la tive ly sp e a k ing , o f o n ly

m ino r im p o rta n c e

. -15- and will not be overturne d on appea l a bsent a clea

r showing of an abuse of that discre tion. St ate v. Ba nks, 564 S.W .2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978)

.
The ch a ll e n g e d p h o to g r ap h s ap p e ar to h a v e f ig u r e d in to D e f

e n d a n t’ s mo ti v e s in d e c iding to c on fe ss h is mur de r of the vic tim to la w en fo rc e me nt. De fe nd a nt’ s mo tiv e s in c on fe ssi ng wo uld be at issue Sand evide nce r el at i n g to his mot ives there by rele vant S

on ly if the ve ra c ity

of his confe ssion was at issue. Except in the most ge nera l sense, howe ver, the vera city o f Defenda nt’s

c on fe ssi on wa s n ot b e fo re the jury . T hat is , D e fe nd a nt d id n ot atta c k at tria l th e cred ib il it y of his

c o n f e s s i o n

. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e m o t i v e s u n d e r l y i n g h i s c o n f e s s i o n h a d o n l y

m ar g i n a l r e l e v a n c e

. “ In 5 assessing probative value, the court must unde rstand the proof and theory of the c ase, and whether there is a re al d isp ute about the issue the evidenc e is to prove.” Neil P. Cohen, Sarah Y. Sheppe ard & Donald F. Paine, Tenne ssee L aw of Evidence
, § 403.[5] (5th ed. 2005) ( emphasis adde d). Ther e was no “ rea l dispute” at trial about the vera city of Def endant’ s confe ssion. His mot ives for ma king the conf ession wer e, ther efor e, of little probative va lue.

Given the mar g inal rele vance of Def endant’ s motives in c onfessing , the probative value of the photog raphs wa s al s o o n l y s l ight. The dang er of unfair pr ejudice, on the other ha nd, was signific ant. We ag ree with the C ourt of C riminal Appea ls that “the photog raphs take n throug hout the victim’s childhood had the distinct probability o f ap p ea l i n g to the emotions of the jury .” The very rea son that Ag ent S turg is display ed the photos to Def endant, a nd the fa ct that Def endant’ s sy mpathies wer e so stirred thereby that he finally confe ssed t o murdering the victim, make plain the power possessed by

these pa rticular photog raphs. “ Prejudice be comes unfair when the primary pu rp os e of

the e vid e nc e a t i ssu e is t o e lic it e mot ion s o f ‘ bia s, sympathy , h a tr e d, c on te mpt , re tr ibu tio n, or

ho rr or .’ ” Sta te v. Col lin s, 98 6 S. W.2 d 13 , 20 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ) (q uo tin g M. Graham, Handbook of

Fe dera l Evidence , 182-83 (2d e d. 1986)).

Moreove r, the photog raphs we re c umulative t o Agent S turg is’ testimonyabout what pr omp te d De fe nd a nt to c on fe ss. To the e xten t the jury ne e de d to kn ow wh y De fe nd a nt d e c ide d to tell law enf

orce ment wher e the victim’s body could be f

ound, Ag ent Sturg is’ testimonywas
su ff ic ie nt t o a ns we r that qu e sti on . T he a c tua l ph oto g ra ph s v iew ed by

De fe nd a nt w e re ne e dle ssl y cumulative to that issue.

We hold, there fore
, that the trial court err ed in permitti ng the photog raphs to re main in the envelope that was a dmitted into evidenc e. See State v. D icks, 615 S.W .2d 126, 128 (Tenn. 1981) (holding that photo of murder victim while alive should have been e x cluded “ since it adde d littl e or nothing to the sum total knowledg e o f t h e j u ry ”)

. Whil e the State a rg ues that the re cord doe s not ref lect that the jury

actua lly remove d the photog raphs from the envelope and viewed them, we a re
no t pe rs ua de d to a do pt this lin e of re a so nin g

. Al l of

the e xhibi ts a dmi tte d at tria l w e re a va ila ble to-16-

the jury during its deliberations. See Te nn. R. Crim. P . 30.1. We do not require pr oof that j u ro rs actua lly viewed c omponents of exhibit s in order to determine whe ther a dmission of the component

was e rrone ous.

We are persua ded, however, that the t rial court’s err or i n permitting the photogr aphs to be le ft in th e env elope wa s h arm le ss. Th e pr oo f i n th is c a se that D e fe nd a nt mur de re d th e vic tim
, intentionally and with pr emeditation, is ove rwhe lming. Whil e the jury ’s sy mpathies may have be en stirred by the photog raphs of

the victim as a c hild, we are convinced bey ond any doubt that the jury would have r ender ed the same verdic t of g uilt had the photogr aphs bee n excluded from the r ecor d. Def endant is not entitled to a new t ri al on the basis of the trial court’ s err oneous admission of the photos.

Def endant also contends that the admission of the photos “se rved in the se ntencing determination to d i v er t the jury ’s attention from f ocusing on the individual circumstanc es of the defe ndant and his mitigation in viol ation of the Eig hth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Consti tution,” and that the photos “must have w eighe d h eavily upon the jury ’s mind when assessing whether

to impose the d ea t h p en alty .” While we have alre ady determined that the photogr aphs should not ha ve bee n admitted during the g uilt phase of De fendant’s trial, we a re not pe rs ua de d th a t th e y

ha d a pre jud ic ia l impa c t upon the jury ’s se nte nc ing de lib e ratio ns

. As se t f orth more fully

below, the State in this case adduce d sufficie nt evidence to est ablish three a g g ravating circ umstances, a

single one of which would have entitled the jury to sentence Def

endant to death. None of the evidenc e adduc ed in support of these three ag g ravating c ircumstance s included the photogr aphs. The pr osecution did not mention the photogr aphs during its openi n g statement or closing arg uments in the penalty phase of Def endant’ s trial. The tria l court’s instructions to the jury during the penalty phase did not include any ref ere nce to the phot os. Acc ording ly
, we c onclude that

su bmi ssi on of

the ph oto g ra

ph s to the jury did no t pr e jud ic e De fe nd a nt d uring the se nte nc ing ph a se of his tr ia l. D e fe nd a nt i s n ot e nti tle d to a ne w s e nte nc inghearin g o n the b a sis of the e rr on e ou sly admitted photogr aphs.

IV . SU F F IC IEN CY OF THE E VI DE NC E

De fe nd a nt a sse rt s tha t the e vid e nc e is not su ff ic ie nt to es ta

bli sh that he mur de re d th e vic tim with premeditation. We disag ree

. When evaluating the suffic iency of the e vidence , we must determine whether “ any rational trier of fac t could have f

ound the essential e lements of the c rime b ey o n d a re asonable doubt.” J ackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). I n making this de termination, we aff o rd the pr os e c uti on the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e a s w e ll a s a ll r eas on able a ndle g iti ma te infere nces w hich may

be dra wn there from. Stat e v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). Questio n s co n cerning the cr edibilityof the witnesse s, the weig ht to be g iven the evide nce, and fa c tua l issu e s ra ise d by the e vid e nc e are re so lve d by the tr ie r of fa c t. I d. B e c a us e a ve rd ic t of

g uil t
remove s the presumption of innoce nce and imposes a pr esumption of g uilt, the defendant upon-17-

c on vic tio n b e ars the bu rd e n o f s ho wi ng wh y the e vid e nc e is ins uf

fi c ie nt to sup po rt the ve rd ic t. S ta te v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 661 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

Our c riminal code pr ovides that the term “ preme ditation” as used in our first deg ree murder statute ref ers to

an act done afte r the exercise of ref lection and judg ment. “Preme ditation” means that the intent to kill m ust have be en formed prior to the act itself. I t is not necessary that the purpose to kill pre- exis t in the mind of the ac cu s ed for a ny definite pe riod of tim e

. Th e me nta l state of the a c c us e d a t the tim e the a c c us e d a lle g e dly de c ide d to kil l must be car efully

considere d in order to de termine whe ther the a ccuse d was sufficie ntly

fre e fr om excitement and passion as to be c apable of pre meditation.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-202(d) . The element of pre meditation is a question for the jury which may be esta blished by

proof of the circ umstances surr ounding the killin g. Bl and, 958 S .W.2d at 660. Fa ctors supporting the exist ence of pre meditation include the use of a dea dly wea pon upon an
unarme d victim, the particular crue lty of the killing, a nd prepa ration bef

ore the killing for

conce alment of the crime. I d. Additionally , the “e stablishment of a motive for the killing is another fac tor from which the jury may infer premeditation.” State v. Sims, 45 S.W .3d 1, 8 (Tenn. 2001)

.
Th e pr oo f i n th is c a se e sta bli sh e d th a t D e fe nd ant ca rj a c ke d th e vic tim

a ndfo rc e d h e r t o
re m ai n i n t he ca

r with him. He commande ere d the victim’s car beca use he w as trying to e vade

arr est. Def

endant c laimed to have a ssured the vic tim that he was not g oing to hurt her, fr om which the jury could have inferr ed that De fendant had ende avore d to ke ep the victim from trying to e scape

. Contrary to his assurance s, Defe ndant subsequently drove the victim to a remote a rea and stabbe d her in the back
, leaving the knife bla de embe dded in her chest. The victim was unarme d when De fe nd a nt s ta

bb e d h e r. Whil e sh e wa s st ill mov ing , D e fe nd a nt dra g g e d th e vic tim so me tw e nty y ards a nd hid her body under some sheets of tin. He then left her to die, driving away and out of the state in her c ar.

De fe nd a nt’ s mo tiv e in h is m ur de ro us c ri me sp re e be g a n a nde nd e d w ith his a tte mpt to a vo id appre hension. He c arja cked the victim with that goal in mind and dete rmined to kill her with that g oal in min d

. The manne r and c ircumstance s of the killing support the jury ’s infer ence that De fe nda nt kill e d th e vic tim int e nti on a lly

a ndwi th p re me dit a tio n. Th e e vid e nc e is s uf fi c ie nt t o support Def

endant’ s conviction of first deg ree preme ditated murder. Acc ording ly
, Def endant is not entitled to relief on this g round.

V. VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE

Def endant aver s that the testimony of Dr. Sundstrom and Ms. Mc Pike w ent far b ey o nd proper ly ad m i s s i b l e victim impact evidence and ther eby violated his due proc ess rig hts to a

“ fu nd a me nta lly

fair pe na lty de te rm inatio n. ” Th e State dis a g re e s.-18-

I nitially , we note that Dr. Sundstrom and Ms. McPike wer e the fi rs t wi tnesses to testify during the sentenc ing phase of Def endant’ s trial. We de termined in State v. Nesbit, howeve r, that “victim impact evidenc e should not be admitted until the trial court determines that evidenc e of one or more ag g ravating circumstance s is alre ady prese nt in the record.” 978 S.W .2d 872, 891 (Tenn. 1998). De fenda nt did not object to the order of the State’s proof

and does not rais e t his issue on appea l. Moreover , proof o f De fendant’s motive for killing the vic tim, relevant to the (i) (6) ag g ravating circ umstance, and proof that he committed the murde r during his theft of the victim’s

c ar, re le va nt t o th e (i )( 7) a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e , h a d b e e n a dmi tte d d uring the g uil t ph a se of his trial. Acc ording ly , we hold that any er ro r resulti ng from the or der of the State’s proof

during the sentenc ing pha se was harmless. See State v. Austin, 87 S.W .3d 447, 463-64 (Te nn. 2002) (f inding harmless e rror

wher e victim impact evidenc e wa s introduced b ef ore tria l court dete rmined that evidenc e of a g g ravating c ircumstance s was in re cord)

.
Ou r c ri min a l c od e pr ov ide s th a t

The c ourt shall permit a member or member s, or a r epre sentative or r epre sentatives of the vic tim ’s famil y

to t e sti fy a t the [ca

pit a l] se nte nc ing he ari ng abo ut the vic tim and about the impac t of the murder on the fa milyof the victim and other rele vant pe rs on s.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(c ) (Supp. 1999). This C ourt has pre viouslyheld that this provision “does not e x pressly

restric t or limit the introduction of other types of victim impact evidenc e authorized by

law deve loped in our pri o r ca s es

. ” State v. McKinney , 74 S.W .3d 291, 309 (Tenn. 20 02 ). Ra the r, vic tim

imp a c t e vid e nc e ma y

fa ll i nto thr e e c a te g orie s: “ [1] in fo rm a tio n d e sig ne d to show those unique cha

rac teristics which provide a brie f g limpse into t he life of the individual who has bee n killed, [ 2] t he conte m p o ra n eo u s an d p ro s p ec t i v e c i rc u m s t an ce s s u rr o u n d i n g t h e indi vidual’s de a th, a nd[3] ho w tho se c ir c ums ta nc e s fi nan c ia lly , e mot ion a lly , p sy c ho log ic a lly or ph y sic a lly imp a c te d upo n membe rs of the vic tim ’s imm e diate famil y .” Ne sb it, 97 8 S.W.2 d at 89 1 ( fo otn ote omitted). As we recog nized in McKinney , “the statutory provision essentially

identifies the third of these c ateg ories.” 74 S.W.3d at 309.

I n McKinney , a cowor

ker of the murder

victim testified about the victim’s service as a police office r, including a desc ription of the victim’s duties and ac tiviti es. We noted that the witness’s testimony“wa s limi ted to fac tual backg round S he didno t te sti fy

abo ut t he e ff e c t of the vic tim ’s de a th on himself, other officer s, society
, or t he Memphis Police Depa rtment.” I d. at 310. We conclude d that this testim ony

was “ limit ed to providing a ‘brief g limpse’ into the life of the victim and that such a g limpse did not vi olate the de fenda nt’s rig ht to due proce ss or equa l protection.” I d.

I n our earlier decision in Nesbit, we e mphasized that “not any and all victim impact evidenc e the prosec ution wishes to offer at a c apital sentenc ing hearing is a dmissibl e.” 978 S.W.2d at 891. We further

rec o gn i z ed that “ther e is no brig ht-line test, and the a dmissibi lityof spec ific ty pes of victim impact evidence must be determined on a case -by -ca se basis.” I d. “[S] uch evid en ce . . . should be cl o s el y

scrutinized and re strained so a s not to be unduly prejudicia l or appe al to the-19-

emotions or sy mpathies of the jury

. ” M cK i n n ey , 74 S.W .3d at 309. Further, “ victim impact

e vid e nc e wh ic h thr e a te ns to r e nd e r the tr ia l f un da me nta lly

un fair or wh ic h p os e s a

da ng e r o f u nf

a ir prejudice is not appropriate and should be excluded by the trial judge .” Nesbit, 978 S.W .2d at 891. We turn now to the victim impact evidenc e at issue in this case

. We ag ree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the majority of Dr. Sundstrom’s testimony

w e n tb e y o n d t h e s c o p e o f t h a t v i c t i m i m p a c te v i d e n c e c o n t e m p l a t e d b y o u r d e c i s i o n i n N e s b i t

. In line with McKinney , his testimonyabout the victim’s d u t i es and activities while a student and teac hing a ssis t an t at the Univer sityof Memphis was pr oper. H oweve r, the majority of Dr. Sun ds tr om’ s te sti mon y

wa s a bo ut the e ff

e c t of the vic tim ’s de a th o n e ve ry on e in his de pa rt me nt:
un de rg ra du a te stu de nts , g ra du a te stu de nts , an d f a c ult y . H e te sti fi e d th a t th e de pa rt me nt “ g ro un d to

a ha lt” : stud e nts were un able to c omp le te the ir wo rk a ndpr of e sso rs un able to t e a c h th e ir c la sse s. He we nt s o f

ar a s to cla im tha t the mur de r thr e a te ne d th e c are e r a sp ir a tio ns of so me of the stu de nts

. Dr. Sundstrom’s testimony detailed the f

ar- rea ching eff

ects that a single murder c an have

. His description of the virtual collapse of the philosophy d ep ar t m en t illust rate d how interwove n a single individual’s life is w ith many others. To that e x tent, his testimonyhad probative value. See Pa y ne v. Te nn e sse e , 5 01 U. S. 8 08 , 8 25 (1 99 1) (r e c og nizi ng that th e pr osecu tio n h a s a le g iti ma te int e re st i n a dd uc ing pr oo f that “ ‘the vic tim is an in div idu a l w ho se de a th re pr e se nts a un iqu e los s to society ’”) (quoting Booth v. Mary land, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987)) . We a re constraine d to conclude, ho we ve r, th a t th e da ng e r o f u nf a ir pr e jud ic e wa s su c h a s to ou tw e ig h th e pr ob a tiv e va lue of thi s proof. Dr . Sundstrom’s testim ony was not limit ed to a “brief glimpse” of the vi ctim’s life, but rathe r l ai d t h e d eb i l i t at i n g gri ef

o f o v ero n e h u n d re d p eo p l e at De fe n d an t ’s fe et

. T h e ri s k o f i n fl am i n g a jury ’s passions with such testimony is simpl y too gr eat to allow its admission.
We also ag ree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that portions of Ms. McPike’s testimony sh ou ld n ot h a v e b e e n a d m i t t e d

. M s

. M c P i k e t e s t i f i e d t h a t o n e o f t h e v i c t i m ’ s f r i e n d s h a d b e e n in the ra py sin c e the mur de r and “ wa s af raid she wo uld take he r ow n lif e be c a us e of thi s. ” Ag a in, thi s te sti mon y e xce e ds the sc op e of

pe rm iss ibl e vic tim imp a c t e vid e nc e

. We f ur the r c on c lud e that Ms

. McPike should not have bee n allowed to testify that the victim h ad “a whole army of friends out here ” and that “friends all over the world will never have he r ag ain.” Such testimony g oes bey ond describing the e ffe ct of the vic tim’s murder on her family and bey ond providing a g limpse into her life. See State v. B urns, 979 S.W.2d 276, 283 (Tenn. 1998) (holdin g that victim’s mother’s testimony about how the murde rs had a dverse ly aff ecte d the entire community exceede d the scope of victim impact evidenc e conte mplated by Nesbit).
Notwithstanding the err oneous admission of this evidence
, we conclude that the trial court’s

e rr or in this re g arddidno t r e nd e r th e pro c e e din g s f un da me nta lly

un fair or un du ly pr e jud ic ia l to Def endant. See Burns, 979 S.W .2d at 283. The pr osecutor’ s ref ere nce to this testimony

was limited during closing arg ument to the foll owing : “Dr

. Sundstrom and Nancy McPike took the stand and testified about the e motional an d p s y ch o l og ical impact of Hillary J ohnson’s murder

in those two communities. That is not S that is not an ag g ravating c ircumstance for y ou to consider.” The trial

c o u r tl a t e r

i n s tru c t e d t h e j u r y:-20- The prose cution h as i ntroduce d what is known as victim-impac t evidence

. Th is e vid e nc e ha s be e n int ro du c e d to sh ow the fi na nc ia l, e mot ion a l, p sy c ho log ic a l,

or ph y sic a l e ff

e c ts of the vic tim ’s de a th on the me mbe rs of the vic tim ’s imm e diate f a m i l y.

Yo u may c on sid e r thi s e vid e nc e in d e te rm ini ng a n a pp ro pria te pu nis hme nt; ho we ve r, y ou r co ns ide ratio n must be lim ite d to a ra tio na l inqu iry int o th e c ulp abil ity of the de fe nd a nt, no t a n e mot ion a l r e sp on se to the vic tim S pa rd on me S not as an emotion [ sic] response to the evide nce. Victim-impact evide nce is n ot the same a s an ag g ravating c ircumstance

. Proof of a n ad v er s e i m p ac t on the victim’s family is not proof of an a g g ravating circ umstance. Introduct i o n of this victim-impact evidenc e, in no way , relieve s the state of its burden to pr ove, bey ond a re asonable d o u b t , at least one a g g ravating circ umstance w hich has be en alleg ed. You may con s id e r this victim-impact e vidence in determining the appr opriatene ss of the death pe nalty , only if y ou first find that the exis tence of one or

more a g g ravating c ircumstance s has bee n prov en , bey ond a

rea sonable doubt, by

evidenc e indepe ndent from the vic tim-impact evidenc e a n d f ind that the ag g ravating c ircumstance or cir cu m s t an ces f ound outweig h the finding of

on e or mor e mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t.
This instruction conforms with that requir ed by Nesbit, 978 S.W .2d at 892. Furthermore , testimony about the victim’s importance to her friends and her gr aduate department had already come be fore the jury during the g uilt phase of the tria l. Ms. McPike had testified,
Hillary was a g irl who made f

riends fa st. She would go dow n to the park a nd

c o m e h o m e a n d s a y, “ I m e t s o m e f r i e n d s t o d a y. ” A n d w e w o u l d l o o k a th e r a n d s a y, “How c an they

be y our friends beca

use i t’s only a day ? ” She deve loped very warm relationships very quickly

. She had g reat, g reat stude nts to be friends with there at the university . They

wer e ter rified themse lves.
The jury in this case dete rmined that the S tate proved three ag g ravating c ircumstance s: (a) Def endant wa s previously

convicted of o n e o r more fe lonies, other than the pr esent c harg es, the statutory elements o f wh i ch invol ve use of violence to the pe rson; (b) De fendant committed the offe nse for

the purpose of

avoiding , interfe ring with, or preve nting his lawf ul arre st or prosec ution; and (c ) De fenda nt knowingly committed the murder while he had a substantial r ole in committi ng or attempting to commit, or was flee ing a fter having a substantial r ole in c ommitt ing or attempting to commit, theft. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(2), (6) and (7). As set forth below, we have determined that the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support each of these ag g ravating circ umstances. The jury c ou ld h a ve pr op e rl y

se nte nc e d D e fe nd a nt t o d e a th o n th e ba sis of a si ngle on e of

the se circ umstances. See id. at (i).-21-

The jury hear d sever al minutes of victim impact testimony that i t s h o u l d n o t have he ard. Howeve r, the trial court proper ly instructed the jury about how it wa s to consider this evidenc e. The jury is presumed to follow its instructions. St ate v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 904 (Tenn. 2001)

. Moreove r, the prose cution did not re ly o no r stress the er

roneously admitted testimonyduring closing arg uments. We are the ref ore c onvinced be y ond a re asonable doubt that the jury would have

s e n t e n c e d D e f

e n d a n tt o d e a t h e v e n h a d i tn o t h e ar d t h e i m p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d t e s t i m o n y. A c c o r d i n g l y, Def endant is entitled to no relief on this basis.

VI . I NST RU CT ION RE G AR DI NG P RI ORVI OLEN T F ELON IES

The State introduce d proof during the sentenc ing phase that Def endant ha d been c onvicted in 1 97 4 o f thr e e cou nts of ro bb e ry wi th a de a dly we apo n a ndon e c ou nt o f r ape . A ll o f the se
c on vic tio ns aro se in T e nn e sse e . T he Sta te a lso a dd uc e d pr oo f that De fe nd a nt ha d be e n p re vio us ly

c on vic te d in Mis sis sip pi o f kidn app ing a ndma ns laug hte r, a ndin A la ba ma of ro bb e ry in the fi rs t de g re e . T he tr ia l c ou rt

su bs e qu e ntl y

ins truc te d th e jury

a s f oll ow s:

The de fenda nt was pre viously convicted of one or more felonies other than the pre sent cha

rg e, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violenc e to the person. The state is relying upon the crimes of robbe ry first-deg ree , robbery

with a deadly wea pon, kidnaping , manslaug hter, a nd rape
, which ar e fe lonies, the statutory elements of w hich involve the use of violence to the pe rson.

Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 13 -2 04 (i )( 2) . D e fe nd a nt n ow c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in ins truc tin g the jury

that e a c h o f the se fe lon ie s w a s a c ri me wh os e statut or

y e le me nts inv olv e the us e of vio le nc e to the pe rs on , a

rg uin g that it wa s up to the jury to de te rm ine that iss ue

. I n ma kin g thi s
ar g u m e n t , D e f

e n d a n tr e l i e s o n A p p r e n d i v

. N e w J e r s e y, 5 3 0 U

. S

. 4 6 6 ( 2 0 0 0 ) , a n d i t s p r o g e n y. We have pr ev i o usly

reje cted this arg ument in State v. Cole, 155 S.W .3d 885, 904 (Tenn. 2005). I n Cole, we re examined our dec ision in S ims, 45 S .W.3d at 11-12, in which we se t forth the proce dure f

or a t ri al court to follow where the State alleg es that a c apital def endant ha s a prior

c on vic tio n f

or a fe lon y wh os e statut ory

e le me nts inv olv e the us e of vio le nc e to the pe rs on . In Si ms, the def endant ha d two prior convic tions for ag g ravated ass ault. Recog nizi ng that the offe nse of ag g ravated assault may

be committed with or without violence to the pe rson, this Court held:

I n determining whe ther the statutory elements of a

pri o r fe lony

conviction involve the use of violenc e ag ainst the person f or purpose s of § 39-13-204( i)(2), w e hold that t h e t ri al judg e must nece ssarily examine the fac ts underly ing the prior felony if the statutory

elements of that felony may be satisfied with or without proof of violence

.
Sims , 45 S.W .3d at 11-12. Ree x amining this holding in Cole in response to t he def endant’ s Appre ndi arg ument, we he ld:Pri or t o pr es en t i n g a n y pr oof t o t h e j u r y , t h e pr os ec u t i on pr ov i ded t o the t r i al c ou r t c er t i f i ed copi es of 6
d o cu m en t s re fle c ting D efen d an t ’ s p rior c o nv i cti o ns. T he t rial co urt co nd uc t ed i t s S i m s ana l ysi s o n the b asis of t he se d o cu m en t s.
-22-

Th e Sims pr oc e du re invol ves a l e g a l de te rm inatio n, a nd a s su c h th is proce dure doe s not transg ress the dic tates of Appr endi and its prog eny . The (i) (2) ag g ravating circumstance require s only that the sta tutor y e le me nts of the prior f

elony involve the use of violence to the person. The Sims proce dure authorizes trial judge s
mere ly to examine the fac ts, r ecor d, and evide nce underlying the prior c on vic tio n to
asce rtain which “ statutory elements” serve d as the ba sis o f the prior felony conviction. This is a leg al determination that neither r equire s nor allows trial judg es to m ake fa c tua l fi nd ing s a s to wh e the r the prior c on vic tio n in vo lve d v iol e nc e . T his leg al determination i s an alog ous to the preliminary questions trial judge s often ar e called upon to de cide whe n determining the a dmissibi lityof evide nce.
Cole, 155 S.W .3d at 904.
We ag ain upheld the S ims proce dure in two rece nt case s. I n Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 668-69, we

c on sid e re d th e Sims pr oc e du re in l ight of th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt ’s re c e nt d e c isi on in Shepard v. U nited States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). I n Shepard, the Court held that, in determining the

un de rl y ing c ha

ra c te r o f a pr e dic a te of

fe ns e to wh ic h the de fe nd a nt ha d ple d g uil ty , the tr ia l c ou rt “ is g e ne ra lly lim ite d to e xami nin g the statut ory de fi nit ion
, c ha rg ing do c ume nt, writt e n p le a a g re e me nt, transcript of plea c olloquy , and any expli cit fac tual finding by the trial judg e to which the de fendant assented.” I d. at 16. When the prior c onviction resulted fr om a jury trial, the trial court is li mited to examini ng the cha

rg ing doc uments filed in the court of conviction and instructions g iven to the jury . I d. at 20 (c iting Tay lor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990))

. I n R ice, we determined that

“ She pa rddo e s n ot c ha ng e a

jud g e ’s abil ity to fi nd the ‘f a c t of a pri or c on vic tio n, ’” bu t si mpl y lim its “the sc ope of the judge ’s inquir y to reliable judicia l rec ords re g arding the prior c onviction and prec lude s th e ju d g e f

r o m r e

- e xa mi n in g th e f

a c ts u n d e r lyin g th a t c o n v ic ti o n

. ” 1 8 4 S. W. 3 d a t 6 6 9. Simi larly , we he ld in St ate v. I vy , 188 S.W .3d 132, 151 (Tenn. 2006) , that “S h ep ar d clarifies but does not invalidate the pr ocedur es this Court adopted in Sims .” Thus, when the State a lleg es prior violent felony

convi ct i o n s, the statutory elements of w hich do not nece ssarily involve the use of violence to the pe rson, the trial c ourt must co n d u ct t h e Sims analy sis, lim iting its inquiry to the

re c or ds de lineate d by S he pa rd . We turn n ow to the prior fe lon ie s r e lie d u po n b y

the Sta te in this

case

. 6

Def

endant was convicted in 1974 of four f elonies he c ommitt ed in Tenne ssee in 1972: three robberies with a dea dly

wea pon and one rape

. I n support of the robbe ry convictions, the prose cution p ro v i d ed t o t h e t ri al co u rt ce rt i fi ed co p i es o f t h e i n d i ct m en t s an d m i n u t e en tri es s i gn ed b y t h e j u d ge ref lecting Def

endant’ s pleas of g uiltythere to. I n 1972, our statute def ining t h e crime of robbery provided that “ [r] obbery

is the felonious and for cible t ak i n g fr o m the per son of another , g oods or money of any value, by violence or

putting the person in f

ear .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 3901 (Supp. 1972). I n Def

endant’ s three c ases, e ach of the indictmen t s al l egi n g the robbe ries spec ifies thatIn s up p o rt of t hi s co nvi ct i o n, t he Stat e i nt rod uced cert i f i ed co p i es o f

t he i nd i ct m ent (chargi ng cap i t al m urder), 7
D e fen d a n t’s wr itt e n p le a o f gu ilt y, an d the ju d g m e n t o f sen te n c e o n the p le a o f gu ilt y.
-23- De fe nd a nt c omm itt e d th e c ri me by us e of a pis tol a nd“ did the n an d the re un la wf ull y a ndfe lon iou sly and with f

orce and violence afor esaid, steal, take and car ry away from the person o f [ t h e n amed victim] ” a sum of mone y . Def endant plea ded g uiltyto eac h of these indicte d offe nses as c harg ed. Acc ording ly , the trial court did not err in determining that the statutory element s o f t h ese three crimes involved violenc e to the per son. See McKinne y , 74 S.W .3d at 305-06 (r ecog nizi ng that “the use of a deadly wea pon, such as pointing a g un at the victim, constitutes violence.” ).
As to the rape conviction, the indictment char g ing Def endant with this crime a lleg es that he “did unlawf

ully and feloniously

have unla wful ca

rnal knowle dg e of [the named vic tim] , a fe male, tw e lve (1 2) y e ars of

a g e , f or c ibl y a nda g a ins t he r w ill .” A jury de te rm ine d De fe nd a nt t o b e g uil ty of this crime a s char g ed. I n 1972, at t he time Def endant c ommitt ed this offe nse, ra pe wa s defined by our criminal code as “the unlawful carnal knowledg e of a woman, for cibly

and ag ainst her will.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-3701 (1955). Thus, the t rial court did not err in conc luding that the statutory elements of this crime involve the use of violenc e to the per son.

Def endant plea ded g u i l t y t o co mmitt ing “ robbery first deg ree ” in 1981 in Alabama . That

c ri me is d e fi ne d a s the com mi ss io n of a ro bb e ry in the thi rdde g re e wh ile arm e d w ith a de a dly

wea pon or dang erous instrument, or in whic h the ac cused c auses se rious phy sical injury to another. Al a . Co de 19 75 § 1 3A -8 -4 1 (20 06 ). Rob be ry in the thi rd de g re e is de fi ne d, in turn, a s, in the c ou rs e of committing a thef

t, the acc used uses for ce a g ainst the person of the owner

or any person pr esent with intent to overcome his phy sical re sistance or phy sical powe r o f re s istance, or threatens the imminent use of forc e ag ainst the person of the owner or any person present with intent to compel acquie scenc e to the taking of or e scaping with the property . I d. at § 13A-8- 43. The indictment

a lle g ing thec ri me to wh ic h D e fe nd a nt p le a de d g uil ty , a c e rt if ie d c op y of wh ic h w a s a dmi tte d in to evidenc e, provide s that Defe ndant “did, in t he cour se of c ommitt ing a theft, . . . use f

orce ag ainst the person of [named victim]
, with the i ntent to overc ome her phy sical resistance or phy sical power of resistanc e, while a

rmed with a de adly

wea pon.” Also in the rec ord is a certified copy of De fendant’s g uiltyplea to this ch ar ge. The trial c ourt committed no err or in determining that the statutory elements of the robbery

to which Def

endant p l eaded g uiltyinvolved the use of violenc e to the person.

I t is obvious wit hout f u rt h er comm ent that the crime of manslaug hter, whic h Def endant ple a de d g uil ty to c omm itt ing in N ov e mbe r 1 99 9 inMis sis sip pi, is an o ff e ns e the statut ory

e le me nts 7 of which involve the use of violenc e to the per son.

We turn n o w to D e f

e n d a n t’ s c o n v ic ti o n in M is s is s ip p i o f k id n ap p in g

. I n 1 9 9 9 , the Mis sis sip pi c ri min a l c od e de fi ne d th a t of fe ns e a s f oll ow s:
Any person who shall without l awf ul authority

forc ibly seize and conf

ine any other pe rson, or

shall inveig le or kidnap any other pe rson with intent to cause suc hA ce r t i f i ed copy of

t h e i n di ct men t i s c on t ai n ed i n t h e r ec or d. 8

W e rec o g n iz e th a t t he Stat e al so ad d uced t est i m o ny f rom t he ki d nap p i ng vi ct i m ab o ut t he cri m e d uri ng t he 9

s en t en ci n g ph as e of

D ef en dan t ’ s t r i al

. O u r l eg i s l at u r e h as au t h or i ze d s u ch t es t i mon y

. Se e T en n

. Code An n

. § 39- 13- 204( c) ( “ I n a l l c as es w h er e t h e s t at e r el i es upon t h e a g g r av at i n g f ac t or t h at t h e def en dan t w as pr ev i ou s l y c on v i ct ed of

o ne (1) or m o re f

el o ni es, other t han t he p res ent charge , who se s t at ut o ry el em ent s i nvo l ve t he use of vi o l ence t o t he per s on , e i t h er pa r t y s h al l be pe r mi t t ed t o i n t r odu ce e v i den ce c on ce r n i n g t h e f act s and c i rcums t an ce s of t h e pr i or
co nvi ct i on

. ”)

. A v i ct i m’ s t es t i mon y a t a s u bs equ en t t r i al doe s n ot , h owe v er , e s t abl i s h for t h e t r i al c ou r t t h e s t at ut o ry el eme n t s u pon wh i ch t h e con v i ct i on r es t ed. T h at i s a l eg al de t er mi n at i on r equ i r i n g a n e x ami n at i on of t h e r el ev an t r ec or ds f r om t he or i gi nal pro secut i o n.
-24- person to be secretly confine d or i mprisoned aga inst his or her will, . . . shall, upon

c on vic tio n, be imp ri so ne d f or life i n the s ta te pe nit e nti ary if the pu nis hme nt i s so fix ed by the jury in its verdict.
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-53 (2000) (empha sis added). The Mississ ippi Supreme Court has

rec og nized that, under this statute, “the c rime of kidnapping may be acc omplished by trickery and dece it as well as by

forc e.” Wilcher

v. State, 448 So. 2d 927, 935 (Miss. 1984). Thus, the statutory elements of this crime do not nece ssarily involve the use of violenc e to the per son.

The indictment cha

rg ing D efe ndant with kidnapping rec ites that, on or about Nove mber 15, 8 1999, Def endant “ did then and there unlawfully
, willfully
, feloniously and without authority

of law forc ibly seize and conf

ine, inveig le, or

kidnap” the named victim. (emphasis adde d). The Judgme nt of Guilt on J ury

Ver dict ref

lects simply that the jury found De fendant “g uiltyof kidnaping but are unable to fix th e p enalty .” The State did not present the tria l court with the jury instructions provided to the jury

at Def endant’ s kidnapping trial.

We conclude that the information provide d to the trial court wa s not a sufficie nt basis upon which to conc lude that the statutory elements of the kidnapping of which Def endant was c onvicted

nece ssarily involved the us e of violence to the person. Acc ording ly , we a re f orce d to conclude that 9 the trial court erre d when it instructed the jury that it could consider De fendant’s kidnapping conviction in determining whe ther to apply the (i)( 2) ag g ravating c ircumstance

.
We determined in I vy

that the appropriate analy sis to use in a ddressing this error is a nalog ous to that utili zed in St ate v. How ell, 868 S.W .2d 238, 259-62 (T en n

. 1 9 9 3 ), wher e an a g g ravating circ umstance w as held invalid but other val i d aggr avating circ umstances r emained. See I vy , 188 S.W .3d at 152. I n that event, the invalid a g g ravating circ umstance is ha rmless if the re viewing court conclude s “bey ond a re asonable doubt that the sentenc e would have been the same ha d the jury g iven

n o w e ig h t t o th e in v a li d

. . . a g g r a v a ti n g [c ir c u ms tan c e ]. ” H o w ell, 8 6 8 S. W. 2 d a t 2 6 2

. We cautioned, how ever , that

[i ]n or d er t o g uara ntee the pr ecision that individualiz ed sente ncing

c on sid e ratio ns de ma nda ndpr ov ide a princ ipl e d e xpla nation fo r o ur c on c lus ion in

e a c h c a se , it

is i mpo rt a nt, wh e n c on du c tin g ha rm le ss e rr or

re vie w, to c omp le te ly-25-

examine the rec ord for

the pre sence o f fa ct o rs which potentially influence the sentenc e ultimately

imposed. These inc lude, but are not limi ted to, the number a nd streng th of rema ining va lid ag g ravating c ircumstance s, the prosec utor’s ar g ument at sentenc ing, the evidenc e admitted to establish the invalid ag g ravator, and the nature, quality and streng th of mitigating evidenc e.

I d. at 260-61 (f

ootnote omitted).

I n this case, the r ecor d demonstrates th at t h e trial court’ s err or wa s harmless bey ond a

rea sonable doubt. The jury was prope rly

instructed about De fendant’s prior convic tions of

ma ns laug hte r, fo ur

c ou nts of

arm e d r ob be ry , a ndon e c ou nt o f r ape . T he se prior c onvi cti on s, pa rt ic ula rl y the ma ns laug hte r andra

pe , w e re ob

je c tiv e ly re lia ble a ndqu a lit a tiv e ly

pe rs ua siv e a s to the (i)( 2) ag g ravating circumstance

. Furthermore
, the j ury was prope rly instructed on the ( i)(6) a nd (i)(7) ag g ravating c ircumstance s, i.e., the killing wa s committed to avoid lawful ar rest or prosec ution, and was knowing ly committed in the pe rpetration of a thef t. Whi le the prose cutor made a brie f re fer ence to the kidnapping in he r closing arg uments and sever al ref ere nces to “seve n” prior convictions in s u p p ort of the ( i)(2) a g g ravating c ircumstance , the transc ript demonstrates that the prosec utor’s ar g uments would have be en no less eff ective with no ref

ere nce to the kidna

pping and ref ere nces to “ only ” six prior convictions. Moreove r, t he transcript demonstrates that the prosec utor pla c e d abo ut a s muc h e mph a sis on the e vid e nc e su pp ortin g the oth e r t wo a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s. Finally , the “nature, qua lityand streng th” of the mitig ating evidenc e wa s minim al, as De fenda nt chose not to adduc e any

such proof

.
I n sum, we ar e co n v i n ce d bey ond a re asonable doubt that the jury would have se ntence d Def endant to death even without the t ri al court’s errone ous instruction reg arding Def endant’ s kidnapping conviction. Def endant is entitled to no relief on this basis.

IV . M AN DA TOR Y R EV IEW

When a defendant has been sentence d to death, we must conduct a mandatory revie w of the sentenc ing pr ocess pur suant to Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 39-13-206(c )(1) . That provision of our c rimin al co d e re q u ires us to determine whether (1) the de ath sentenc e wa s imposed in any

arb itr ary fa sh ion ; ( 2) th ee vid e nc e su pp orts the jury ’s fi nd ing of statut ory a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s; (3) the e vidence supports the jury ’s f i n d i n g that the ag g ravating c ircumstance s outweig h any mitigating circ umstances; and ( 4) the sente nce of death is excessive or disproport i o n ate to the penalty imposed in simi lar c ases, c onsidering both the nature of the c rime and the defe ndant. I d.

A. Im position of Death P enalty

I nit ia lly , w e fi ndthat th e se nte nc ing ph a se of De fe nd a nt’ s tria l w a s c ondu cted p ur su a nt t o t he proc edure established in the applica ble statutory

provisions and rules of c riminal proce dure. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the de ath pena lty was not imposed in an ar bitrary fashion.-26- B. Su ff iciency of Aggravating Circum stances

We turn now to the s u ff

i ci en cyof the e vidence supporting the jury ’s finding of statutory ag g ravating c ircumstance s: (a) D efe ndant was previously convicted of one or more fe lonies, other than the pre sent cha

rg e, whose statutor y el ements i nvolve the use of violence to the pe rson; (b) De fe nd a nt c omm itt e d th e of fe ns e fo r the pu rp os e of

a vo idi ng , i nt erf

e ri ng wi th, or

pr e ve nti ng his lawful a rre st or prosec ution; and (c) D efe ndant kno wi n gly committed the murder w hile he had a substantial role in committing theft. See id. § 39-13-204(i)( 2), (6) , (7). We must now review the

e vid e nc e su pp ortin g e a c h of the se a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to the Sta te and dete rm i n e whether

a ra tional trier of f

act c ould have f

ound the exist ence of ea ch bey ond a

rea sonable doubt. State v. B ane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 426 (Tenn. 2001)

.
1. P r ior Co nvi c ti ons

As set forth a

bove, the State introduced proof t hat Def endant ha d been pr eviously convicted of four counts of robbe ry

involving a de adly

wea pon, one count of

manslaug hter, one count of ra pe, and one count of kidnapping

. Although we have held that the trial court err ed in al l o wi n g the k id n ap p in g c o n v ic ti o n to b e u s e d a s p r o o f o f th is a g g r a v a ti n g c ir c u ms tan c e , th e proof of the

re ma ini ng c on vic tio ns wa s p ro pe r andmor e than s uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the jury ’s fi nd ing of

thi s ag g ravating c ircumstance . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(2)

.

2. Murder C om m itted to A void Arrest or P rosec ution

De fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e is not su ff ic ie nt to e sta

bli sh that he kil le d th e vic tim in order to a void his arre st and prosec ution. See id

. at (i )( 6 ). We disag ree . This ag g ravating

c ir c ums ta nc e fo c us e s o n a de fe nd a nt’ s mo tiv e s in kil lin g the vic tim . I vy , 1 88 S.W. 3da t 14 9; S ta te v. Reid, 164 S.W .3d 286, 315 (Tenn. 2005) ; Terry v. State, 46 S.W .3d 147, 162 (Tenn. 20 01). Although the re must be some “particular proof” supporting this ag g ravating c ircumstance , State v. Ha rt ma n, 42 S.W. 3d44 , 5 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) , th e S tat e nee d n ot p ro ve that th e de fe nd a nt’ s d e sir e to avoid prosec ution was his sole motive in murdering the victim. Terry , 46 S.W .3d at 162.

I n this case, De fenda nt admitted that he commande ere d the victim’s car beca use he w as “on the ru n” fr om la w en fo rc e me nt fo r crime s he co mmi tte d els e wh e re

. He c ou ld ha ve e je c te d th e vic tim fro m h er ca r at the moment he took it, but he force d her to re main in the car with him. He subsequently

drove he r to a re mote location, stabbed he r, and c oncea led her body . Def endant then fled the state in the victim’s car . This proof wa s sufficient to esta bl i s h that Def

endant killed the victim at least in part to pre vent his apprehe nsion. See, e.g ., Reid, 164 S.W .3d at 316 (proof supported (i)( 6) ag g ravating c ircumstance wher e def endant r obbed and kidna

pped the victims, took them to a remote are a, stabbed them, and abandone d them); State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 399 (T e nn . 2 00 3) (p ro of

su pp orte d ( i) (6 ) ag gravatin g c ir c ums ta nc e wh e re de fe nd a nt a bd uc te d v ic tim from her driveway , drove he r to a re mote location, robbe d and ki l l ed her , and lef t her body

in a storag e room). A pplication of this ag g ravating c ircumstance is supported by sufficie nt proof.T he t rial co urt i nstructed t he jury ab o ut m i t i ga t i ng circum st an ce s as fo l l o w s: 10 [ T ] he j ur y s hal l cons i der, as pre vi ous l y i ndi cat ed, an y mi t i gat i ng ci r cums t anc es r ai s ed by t he evi dence whi ch shal l i ncl ud e b ut are not l i m i t ed t o t he fo l l o wi ng: N o

. 1

. A ny t est i m o ny t hat he was coo p erat i ve i n a ss i st i ng to f

i nd the vi ct i m ’ s b o d y , thus a l l o wi ng the f am i l y to gi ve her a pro p er buri al

. N o

. 2. A ny te stim o n y he c rie d s h o w ing r e m o rs e w h e n h e a rr ive d a t la w e n fo rc e m e n t o ff ic e in F a ye tte C o u n ty t o
reco ver t he vi ct i m ’ s b o d y

. N o

. 3. A ny t est i m o ny s ho wi ng t hat he only has a t hi rd- grade ed ucat i o n. N o. 4. Any ot h er m i t i g at i n g f ac t or wh i ch i s ra i s ed by t h e e v i den ce produ ce d by e i t h er t h e pr os ec u t i on
o r de fen s e at e i t h er t h e g u i l t or s en t en ci n g h ea r i n g ; t h at i s y ou s h al l c on s i der a n y a s pec t of t he d ef end ant ’ s c h ar ac t er or r ec or d or a n y a s pec t of t h e ci r cu ms t an ce s of

t h e of fen s e f av or abl e t o t he d efend ant , whi ch i s supp o rt ed by t he evi d ence. N o d i st i nct i o n s hal l be m ad e b et ween t he m i t i gat i ng
c irc u m sta n c e s listed a n d tho se o the rw ise ra ise d b y the e v id e n c e

. -27- 3

. K il li ng C o m m it t e d D ur in g Th e ft

Our c riminal code pr ovides that an a g g ravating c ircumstance is established wher e
[t ]he murder wa s knowing ly committed, solicited, directed, or aide d by the de fe nd a nt, wh ile the de fe nd a nt ha d a su bs ta nti a l r ole in c omm itt ing or a tte mpt ing to
c omm it, or

wa s f le e ing a ft e r h a vin g a

su bs ta nti a l r ole in c omm itt ing or a tte mpt ing to
co m m i t , an y

fi rs td egr ee m u rd er , ar s o n , ra p e, ro b b er y , b u rgl ar y , t h ef t , k i d n ap p i n g, airc raf t piracy , or unlawf

ul throwing , placing or dischar g ing of a de structive devic e or bomb[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(i)( 7). The pr oof in this case is uncontr overte d that Def endant stabbe d the victim to death with a single blow to he r back following his theft of her car . The stab wound w as
so power ful that the knife bla de wa s left embedde d in the victim’s body , the knife ha ndle g one. The victim was unarme d at the time Def enda n t k illed her. Af

ter killing the victim and conce aling her body , Def endant dr ove aw ay

in the victim’s c ar. This pr oof is more than sufficie nt to establish that Def endant knowing ly

murdere d the victim in conjunction with his t heft of he r ca r.
C. Aggravating Circum stances Outweigh Mitigating Circum stances

Du ri n g t h e sentencing phase of Def endant’ s trial, the def

ense pr esente d no proof of any mitigating circ umstances that mig ht c o u n ter a c t t h eSt a te ’ s p r o o f o f ag g ravating c ircumstance s. Proof in th e n a tu r e o f

mi ti g a ti n g c ir c u ms tan c e s p r e s e n te d d u r in g th e g u il t p h a s e o f D e f e n d a n t’ s trial

c o n s i s t e d o f

A g e n tS t u r g i s ’ s t e s t i m o n y ab o u tD e f e n d a n t ’ s c o o p e r a t i o n i n l o c a t i n g t h e v i c t i m ’ s b o d y, his remorse f

or the killing, and his w eeping at the scene wher e the victim’s body was found. A lso,

a w a iv e r o f r ig h ts f orm signe d by De f

e n d a n t i n d ic a te s th a t h e h a s a th ir d

- g r a d e e d u c a ti o n

. We 10 conclud eth at t

h eSt ate ’ s p r o o f

o f a g g r avating circ umstances outwe ighs any mitigating circ umstances be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t.

D. P roportionality

We turn now to our ana ly s i s o f wh et h er the sentenc e imposed in this case is excessive or d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e p e n a l t y i m p o s e d i n s i m i l ar c a s e s

. T h i s r e v i e w i d e n t i f i e s ab e rr a n t , ar

b i tr ar y,-28-

or ca pricious sentenc ing by

determining whe ther the de ath sen t en ce is “ ‘disproportionate to the punishment imposed on other s convicted of the same crime.’ ” Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 662 (quoting Pulley v. Har

ris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1984))

. We be g in w ith the presumption that a death se ntence i s proportional with the crime of first deg ree murder. State v. H all, 976 S.W .2d 121, 135 (Tenn. 1998).

I n conducting this review, we employ the pre cede nt-seeking method of compa rative pr op ortio na lit y

re vie w, in wh ic h we c omp are thi s c a se wi th oth e r c a se s inv olv ing sim ila r d e fe nd a nts
a ndsim ila

r crime s. Se e B la nd , 958 S.W. 2d a t 665- 67

. Whil e no de fe nd a nts or c ri me s a re ide nti c a l,

a de a th s e nte nc e is d isp ro po rt ion a te if a c a se is “ plainl y

la c kin g in c ir c ums ta nces consis te nt w ith those in case s where the death penalty has bee n imposed.” I d. at 668. Our inquiry , howeve r, does not require a finding that “a s en t en ce l ess t han death was neve r imposed in a ca se with similar

c ha ra c te ri sti c s. ” I d. a t 665. Th is Cou rt ha s re pe a te dly he ld that th e po ol o f c a se s c on sid e re d b y thi s Court in its proportionality revie w i ncludes “those first deg ree murder c ases in which the State seeks the death penalty , a capital sentenc ing hearing is he ld, and the sente ncing jury determines whether the sentenc e should be life imprisonment, life imprisonment wi t h o u t the possibilit y of par ole, or death.” Reid, 164 S.W .3d at 316.

I n revie wing the app l i cable pool of ca ses, we c onsider numer ous fac tors reg arding the offe nse: (1) the me ans of de ath; (2) the ma nner of death; (3) the motivation for the killing; (4) the place of death; (5) the victim’s ag e, phy sical condition, and psy cholog ical condition; (6) the a bsence or presence of premeditation; (7) the absenc e or presenc e of pr ovocation; (8) the absenc e or pr esenc e of justification; and (9) the injury to and ef fec t upon non-dec edent victims. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 667

. I n a d d it io n , w e c o n s id e r n u me r o u s f a c to r s ab o u t th e d e f

e n d a n t: ( 1 ) p r io r c r im in a l r ecor d or activity ; (2) ag e, ra ce, and g ender ; (3) mental, e motional, and phy s i ca l co n d i tion; (4) role in the murder; ( 5) coope ration with authorities; (6) le vel of re mor s e; (7 ) knowledge of the victim’s helplessness; and ( 8) potential for reha bilitation. I d.; see a lso Bane , 57 S.W .3d at 428-29.

I n this case, De fenda nt kidnapped a ma n in Missi ssippi, killed another man there , and then be g a n s te a lin g ve hic le s w ith wh ic h to e va de the po lic e . When De fe nd a nt le arn e d fr om his nie c e in Memphis that he had be en tra cked to that location, he car jacke d the victim’s c ar as she wa s stopped

a t a sto p s ig n. He the n v iol e ntl y fo rc e d h e r t o sw itc h pla c e s wi th him , k e e pin g he r i n th e c ar w ith him wh ile a ssu ri ng he r that he wou ld no t hu rt he r. I n o rd e r t o p re ve nt h e r f ro m a ssi sti ng in h is appre hension, Def

endant subseque ntly

dro v e t he victim to a re mote location and killed her by stabbing her onc e in the back with suc h forc e that the knife bla de re mained embe dded in her back. Th e vic t i mw a s u n ar m e d

. W h i l e s h e w a s s t i l l m o v i n g , D e f e n d a n td r a g g e dh e r

b o d y ab o u tt w e n ty y ards a nd cover ed her

with sheets of tin. Def

endant then a

bandoned the victim to die.

T h e v i ctim was a y oung woman attending g raduate school in Memphis. She left behind a fathe r, mother, y oung er br other, g randmother s, coworke rs and f riends. The victim had no prior kn ow le dg e of

De fe nd a nt b ut w a s, rathe r, a c omp le te ly

rand om v ic tim who tr agic a lly ha pp e ne d to be in the wr ong place at the wr ong time. There was a bsolutely no justification for her

murder.-29-

Def endant is a white male, fifty -four y ear s old at the time he murde red the victim. He has

a lon g his tory

of vio le nt c ri me s, inc lud ing a prior kil lin g

. He de nie d h is r ole in the vic tim ’s de a th for severa l day s. Although he finally cooper ated with the authoriti es, he did so in order to relieve his ow n torment. He has expressed some remorse for his ac tions. Defendant exhi bits no potential for r ehabilitation.

I n St a te v. Th a c ke r, 16 4 S. W.3 d 2 08 (T e nn . 2 00 5) , th e de fe nd a nt t ri e d to us e a

sto le n c re dit

car d at a se rvice station. The station ow ner w ould not return the c ard after it wa s rejec ted. The defe ndant knew he was “wa nted i n other states,” so he st abbed the station owner to death and “took off.” The jury

convicted the defe ndant of fir st deg ree murder and sentenc ed h i m t o death a fter fi nd ing tw o a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s: the de fe nd a nt co mmi tte d the mur de r in o rd e r t o a vo id h is prosec ution, and he committed the murde r in the course of committing a first deg ree murder, a rson, rape , robbery , burg lary , or theft. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(6), ( 7). This Court aff irmed the sentenc e of de ath.

I n St a te v. B la nto n, 97 5 S. W.2 d 26 9 (Tenn. 1 99 8) , th e de fe nd a nt h a d e sc ape d f ro m a Ke ntu c k y p r i s o n w i t h s e v e n o t h e r i n m a t e s

. T h e d e f e n d a n t a n d t w o o t h e r e s c ap e e s tr a v e l e d to Te nn e sse e wh e re the y

sh ot andsta

bb e d to de a th a

c ou ple in the ir

ho me . D e fe nd a nt andhis c oh orts then stole the couple s’ vehicle and fle d the area. The jury convicted the defe ndant of two counts of first deg ree preme ditated murder and sentenc ed him to death on both mur ders, app l y i n g t h ree
a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s: the de fe nd a nt ha d prior vio le nt fe lon ie s, he c omm itt e d th e mur de rs to
a vo id a rr e st a nd /or pr os e c uti on , an d he c omm itt e d the mur de rs in the c ou rs e of c omm itt ing a ny

fi rs t deg ree murder, a

rson, ra pe, robbe ry , burg lary , larcen y , kidnapping , airc raf t piracy , or unlawf

ul throwing , placing or dischar g ing of a destruc tive device or bomb. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(2) , (6), (7). The jury applied as a fourth ag g ravating circ umstance to de fendant’s murder of the wi fe that it was espec ially heinous, atroc ious or crue l. See id. at (i)( 5). The de fendant’s two codef endants we re a lso sentence d to death for their participation in the mur der of the wife , with the jury apply ing the same four ag g ravating c ircumstance s plus circumstance (i)(8) (murder committed during esca

pe fr om lawful custody

or fr om a place of lawf

ul confineme nt). See Ha ll, 976 S.W .2d

a t 12 3. Th is C ou rt

up he ld a ll o f the se de a th s e nte nc e s.

I n State v. Bates, 804 S.W .2d 868 (Tenn. 1991), the de fendant had esc aped f rom a Ke ntucky jail. He broke into a home and st ole a shotgun. While on foot nea r an inter state in Tenne ssee, whe re he int e nd e d to ste al a car, the d e fe nd a nt c a me up on the vic tim , a tw e nty -e ig ht y e ar o ld f

e ma le mecha nical eng ineer

visiti ng the are a during the course of her work. The victim was jog g ing. T he de fe nd a nt pul le d the sh otg un on he r an d wa lke d he r i nto so me ne arb y wo od s. Th e de fe nd a nt t old the vic tim that he wa s not g oin g to hurt her , tha t he ne e de d he r t o d ri ve him to C hatta no og a

be c aus e he wa s o n th e ru n. Th e de fe nd a nt tie d th e vic tim to a tr e e , g a g g e d h e r, a ndtol d h e r h e wa s g oin g to
re tr ie ve he r c ar f

ro m he r m ote l. T he de fe nd a nt the n s te pp e d b e hin d th e vic tim a ndsh ot h e r o nc e in the back o f t he hea d, killing her . The de fendant hid the victim’s body under some br anche s and bru sh and th e n s tol e he r c ar andso me tr a ve le r’ s c he c ks . A ft e r c on vic tin g the de fe nd a nt o f f ir st deg ree murder, the jury

sentenc ed the de fendant to death, apply ing the (i)(2)
, (6), a nd (7) a g g ravating circ umstances. This Court upheld the de ath sentenc e.-30-

I n Stat e v. Thomps on , 7 68 S.W. 2d23 9 ( Te nn . 1 98 9) , th e de fe nd a nt anda juv e nil e fe ma le trav el ed toge ther by

bus from Ge org ia to Tenne ssee. The y spent the nig ht at an ac quaintance ’s house. When the acquaintance discovere d that the t wo were not m arried, she c alled and r eporte d the juvenile as a

runaw ay . The two lef

t and loitered at a nea

rby Wal-Mar t

. T h er e, the def endant abducte d a woman at knife-point and force d her to drive them to a remote location. The defendant then stabbed the woman to death, leaving her body on the g round and stea ling he r ca r. The jury convicted the defe ndant of first deg ree murder and sentenc ed him to death, applying the (i)(5) , (6), and (7) ag g ravating c ircumstance s. This Court upheld the death sente nce.

I n State v. Carter , 714 S.W .2d 241 (Tenn. 1986) , the def endant a pprehe nded a ma n at a truc k sto p in or de r t o ste a l the ma n’ s veh ic le to use in a pla nn e d rob be ry . The de fe nd a nt t oo k th e ma n to a cliff above a lake, shot and killed him, and ro l l ed his body over the cliff. The defe ndant then absconde d in the victim’s vehicle. The jury convict ed the de fendant of first deg ree murder and

se nte nc e d him to death, app ly ing the (i )( 6) a nd (7 ) a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s. Th is C ou rt up he ld the death sentence

. This Court has upheld the death penalty in numerous ca ses wher e the sole a ggravating

c i r c u m s t a n c e w a s t h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s p r i o r

c o n v i c t i o n o f

a v i o l e n t f

e l o n y o f f e n s e

. S e e , e

. g

. , M c K i n n e y, 74 S.W .3d at 314 (u pholding de ath sentenc e of de fendant convicted of preme ditated murder

for shooting a nd killing an of

f-duty police off icer at nig ht c lub w here sole ag g ravating c ircumstance was based on de fenda nt’s prior convic tion of ag g ravated robbe ry ); State v. Chalmers, 28 S

. W

. 3 d 913 (Tenn. 2000) (upholding death sentenc e of defe ndant convicted of felony murder for shooting and killing victim during robbery wher e sole a g g ravating c ircumstance was ba sed on def endant’ s prior convictions of attempted espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry

and attempted f

irst deg ree murder) ; State v. Keoug h
, 1 8 S. W. 3 d 1 7 5 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( u p h o ld in g d e a ths e n te n c e o f d e f e n d a n t c o n v ic te d of preme ditated murder

for stabbing and killing e strang ed wife d u ri n g arg ument wher e ag g ravating circ umstance w as based on de fendant’s prior convic tions for assault to commit voluntary

ma ns laug hte r andma ns laug hte r) ; State v. Smith, 99 3 S. W.2 d 6 (T e nn . 1 999) (up ho lding de a th sentenc e of de fenda nt convicted of felon y m urder

for shooting and killing victim during robbery wh e re a g g ra vatin g ci rcums ta nc e wa s b a se d o n d e fe nd a nt’ s p ri or c on vic tio ns of

ro bb e ry a ndfi rs t deg ree murder) ; State v. Adki ns, 725 S.W .2d 660 (Tenn. 1987) (upholding death se ntence of defe nd an t co nvicted of f

irst deg ree murder f

or shooting and killing estra ng ed g irlfriend’ s friend wher e ag g ravating c ircumstan c ew a s b a s e d o nd e f e n d an t’ s p rio r

c onvictions of second de g ree murder and ag g ravated assault). A s this C ourt has frequently stated, this ag g ravating c ircumstance is “more qu a lit a tiv e ly

pe rs ua siv e a ndob

je c tiv e ly re lia ble than othe r[]” a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s. Ho we ll, 868 S.W .2d at 261.

Ba sed upon our r eview of these a n d m an y o t h er cases in which this Court has upheld a sentenc e of de ath following a convic tion of fi rst deg ree murder, w e conc lude that the sente nce imp os e d in thi s c a se is ne ith e r e xce ssi ve no r dis pr op ortio nate to the pe na lty imp os e d insim ila

r c a se s.

CO NC LU SION-31-

I n acco rd an ce w ith Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-206( c)( 1) and the principles adopted in prior de cisions, we have considered the entire recor d in this case and c onclude that the sentenc e of death has not be en imposed arbitra rily , that the evidenc e supports the jury ’s finding that the a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s o utw e ig h a ny mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s bey on d a r e a so na ble do ub t, and that the se ntence is not ex cessive or disproportionate.

We have r eviewe d all of the issues raised by Def endant and conclude that they do not warr ant relief . Wit h respe ct t o i s s u es t hat wer e raised in this C ourt but not addresse d in this opi nion, we aff irm the dec ision of the Cour t o f C ri m i n al Appea ls. Relevant portions of that opinion are incorporated her ein and a re atta ch ed as an a

ppendix. Defenda nt’s convictions of first de g ree preme ditated murder , espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping
, and theft over $1,000 but le ss tha n $10,000

are a ff ir me d. Th e sen tenc e of

de a th f or the mur de r, the se nte nc e of sixty y e ars fo r the e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated kidnapping , and the se ntence of twelve y ear s for the the ft are aff irmed. The se ntence of de a th s ha ll be c arrie d out as pr ov ide d b y la w o n th e 2n d d a y

of No ve mbe r, 20 06 , u nle ss o the rw ise order ed by

this Court or other proper au t h o ri t y

. I t appea ring that De fe nd a nt L e on ardJ. Yo un g is indige nt, costs of this appeal a re ta x ed to the State of Te nnessee

.

_________________________________ CO RN ELI A A . CLAR K, JUSTI CE