Filed 10/24/23 In re Z.Q. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re Z.Q., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

SOCIAL SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.Q.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F086423

(Super. Ct. No. 23CEJ300032-1)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Michael G. 

Idiart, Judge.

Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Daniel C. Cederborg, County Counsel, and Lisa R. Flores, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P. J., Peña, J. and Snauffer, J.
2.

INTRODUCTION

J.S. (mother) and R.Q. (father) are the parents of son Z.Q. (born May 2008). 

Father appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition order. He contends the Fresno 

County Department of Social Services (department) and the juvenile court failed to 

comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law because he reported he may have 

Indian ancestry through two unknown tribes, but the department did not contact the 

Bureau of Indian Affairs or send notice.1 The department disagrees.

Consistent with our decisions in In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566 (K.H.) and 

In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123 (E.C.), we conclude “the error is prejudicial 

because neither the [department] nor the court gathered information sufficient to ensure a 

reliable finding that ICWA does not apply and remanding for an adequate inquiry in the 

first instance is the only meaningful way to safeguard the rights at issue. ([In re A.R. 

(2021)] 11 Cal.5th [234,] 252–254 [(A.R.)].) Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the 

juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion, as set forth herein.” (K.H., at p. 591; accord, E.C., at 

pp. 157–158.)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

Petition and Detention

On February 8, 2023, the department filed a petition on behalf of Z.Q. pursuant to 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1).3 Z.Q. was detained and 

1 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even 

though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are 

preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

2 Because the sole issue on appeal concerns ICWA, we restrict our facts to those 

bearing on that issue or helpful for clarity.

3 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

otherwise noted.
3.

placed with relative mentors Michael and Deborah H. The petition contained an Indian 

Child Inquiry Attachment (ICWA-010(A)) form stating father gave no reason to believe 

Z.Q. was or could be an Indian child. That same day, the department held a team 

decision making meeting in which father, father’s friend A.K., maternal grandmother 

J.Y., and maternal aunt E.H. participated. The “Team Decision-Making Summary 

Report” stated “[a]ll present family was inquired about Native American ancestry and all 

family stated there was none.”

On February 9, 2023, father filled out a Parental Notification of Indian Status 

(ICWA-020) form, but there he stated he was or could be a member of, or eligible for 

membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe. Father did not identify a tribe.

The detention report stated ICWA did or could apply because father had reported 

he did not have Indian ancestry, but it was unknown if mother had ancestry as she had not 

had contact with the department.

On February 9, 2023, the juvenile court conducted a detention hearing. Father 

appeared, but mother did not. The court inquired with father about Indian ancestry. 

Father stated he had ancestry through both paternal grandfather and paternal 

grandmother’s sides of the family with two different tribes, but did not specify which 

tribes. The court did not make an ICWA finding, but found a prima facie case had been 

established and ordered Z.Q. detained.

Jurisdiction and Disposition

On February 15, 2023, father was interviewed and asked about Indian ancestry 

again. He stated that growing up he thought he was Native American, however, his aunt 

told him the family did not have Indian ancestry. He then denied any tribal affiliation. 

The social worker asked if there were any family members who might know about the 

family’s Indian ancestry. Father stated both paternal grandmother and paternal 

grandfather had passed away, and he had lost contact with family. The social worker 
4.

advised him to inform the department if he believed any family member could provide 

further information.

On February 16, 2023, father filled out another ICWA-020 form—this time 

denying having Indian ancestry.

On February 22, 2023, mother denied having Indian ancestry.

The jurisdiction and disposition report stated ICWA did not apply because both 

parents had denied having Indian ancestry. The department noted it would attempt to 

make contact with any known relatives in order to make further inquiry.

On March 8, 2023, mother filled out an ICWA-020 form denying having Indian 

ancestry.

On March 9, 2023, the juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction and disposition 

hearing. Mother and father were both present, but the hearing was continued several 

times.

On April 27, 2023, at a jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court found ICWA 

did not apply, found the allegations in the petition true, ordered Z.Q. detained, bypassed 

mother for reunification services, and ordered father to participate in reunification 

services. A six-month review hearing was set.

On June 13, 2023, father filed a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. ICWA

A. Legal Principles

“ ‘ICWA is a federal law giving Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over state 

court child custody proceedings that involve Indian children living off of a reservation’ 

[citations], in furtherance of ‘federal policy “ ‘that, where possible, an Indian child should 

remain in the Indian community’ ” ’ [citations]. ‘ICWA establishes minimum federal 

standards, both procedural and substantive, governing the removal of Indian children 

from their families’ [citations], and ‘[w]hen ICWA applies, the Indian tribe has a right to 
5.

intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 

566, 594, fn. omitted; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 138, fn. omitted.)

“ ‘In 2006, California adopted various procedural and substantive provisions of 

ICWA.’ [Citations.] The Legislature’s ‘primary objective ... was to increase

compliance with ICWA. California Indian Legal Services (CILS), a proponent of the 

bill, observed that courts and county agencies still had difficulty complying with ICWA 

25 years after its enactment, and CILS believed codification of [ICWA’s] requirements 

into state law would help alleviate the problem. [Citation.]’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 

Cal.App.5th at p. 595; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 138–139.)

“ ‘In 2016, new federal regulations were adopted concerning ICWA compliance. 

[Citation.] Following the enactment of the federal regulations, California made 

conforming amendments to its statutes, including portions of the Welfare and Institutions 

Code related to ICWA notice and inquiry requirements. [Citations.] Those changes 

became effective January 1, 2019 ....’ [Citation.] Subsequently, the Legislature 

amended section 224.2, subdivision (e), to define ‘reason to believe,’ effective

September 18, 2020.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 595–596, fn. omitted; accord, 

E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.)

1. Summary of Duties of Inquiry and Notice

“[W]hether a child is a member, or is eligible for membership, in a particular tribe 

is a determination that rests exclusively with the tribe, and neither the [department] nor 

the court plays any role in making that determination. [Citations.] ‘ “Because it typically 

is not self-evident whether a child is an Indian child, both federal and state law mandate 

certain inquiries to be made in each case.” ’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 596; 

accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 139–140.)

“In California, section 224.2 ‘codifies and elaborates on ICWA’s requirements of 

notice to a child’s parents or legal guardian, Indian custodian, and Indian tribe, and to the 

[Bureau of Indian Affairs].’ ” (In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 204.) California 
6.

law imposes “an affirmative and continuing duty [on the court and the county welfare 

department] to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under [s]ection 300, ... may 

be or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)

“The [state law] duty to inquire begins with the initial contact, including, but not 

limited to, asking the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any 

information that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “If a child is 

placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to 

[s]ection 306 ... the county welfare department ... has a duty to inquire whether that 

child is an Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, 

legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest 

in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may 

be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” 

(§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Additionally, “[a]t the first appearance in court of each party, the 

court shall ask each participant present in the hearing whether the participant knows or 

has reason to know that the child is an Indian child. The court shall instruct the parties to 

inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know 

the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)

“If the initial inquiry provides ‘reason to believe’ that an Indian child is involved 

in a proceeding—that is, if the court or social worker ‘has information suggesting that 

either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership 

in an Indian tribe’—then the court or social worker ‘shall make further inquiry’ regarding 

the child’s possible Indian status as soon as practicable.” (In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 

Cal.App.5th 984, 999 (Ezequiel G.), citing § 224.2, subd. (e).) “Further inquiry 

‘includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: [¶] (A) Interviewing the parents, 

Indian custodian, and extended family members[;] [¶] (B) Contacting the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social Services[; and] [¶] (C) Contacting the 

tribe or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to have information 
7.

regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.’ ” (Ezequiel G., at 

p. 999.)

“If there is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child, the [department] shall 

provide notice to the relevant tribes and agencies in accordance with section 224.3, 

subdivision (a)(5).” (Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 999, citing § 224.2, 

subd. (f).) “There is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child if any one of six statutory 

criteria is met—i.e., if the court is advised that the child ‘is an Indian child,’ the child’s or 

parent’s residence is on a reservation, the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court, or 

either parent or the child possess an identification card indicating membership or 

citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (Ezequiel G., at p. 999, citing § 224.2, subd. (d).)

County welfare departments “must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a 

detailed description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all 

information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as well as evidence of how 

and when this information was provided to the relevant tribes. Whenever new 

information is received, that information must be expeditiously provided to the tribes.” 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5).)4

B. Standard of Review

“The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the proceeding rests on 

two elemental determinations, ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the 

evidence.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, 

E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 142–143.) First, “[t]he court must find there is ‘no 

reason to know whether the child is an Indian child,’ which is dependent upon whether 

any of the six circumstances set forth in subdivision (d) of section 224.2 apply.” (K.H., at 

p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., at p. 143.) Second, “[t]he juvenile 

4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
8.

court must ... find a ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence ....’ ” (K.H., 

at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2), accord, E.C., at p. 143.)

Under the substantial evidence standard, “ ‘a reviewing court should “not reweigh 

the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” 

[Citation.] The determinations should “be upheld if ... supported by substantial 

evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court 

might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.” ’ [Citations.] The 

standard recognizes that ‘[t]rial courts “generally are in a better position to evaluate and 

weigh the evidence” than appellate courts’ [citation], and ‘an appellate court should 

accept a trial court’s factual findings if they are reasonable and supported by substantial 

evidence in the record’ [citation]. ‘[I]f a court holds an evidentiary hearing, it may make 

credibility determinations, to which an appellate court would generally defer.’ ” (K.H., 

supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143.)

The juvenile court’s finding on the second element, however, “is ultimately 

discretionary because it requires the juvenile court to ‘engage in a delicate balancing of’ 

various factors in assessing whether the [department’s] inquiry was proper and adequate 

within the context of ICWA and California law, and whether the [department] acted with 

due diligence.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting In re Caden C. (2021) 11 

Cal.5th 614, 640; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143; Ezequiel G., supra, 81 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1004–1005.) Therefore, we employ a hybrid standard and review the 

court’s determination for substantial evidence and abuse of discretion. (K.H., at p. 601; 

accord, E.C., at pp. 143–144; Ezequiel G., at pp. 1004–1005.)

“ ‘Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different [from review for substantial 

evidence], focused not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal standard. 

A court abuses its discretion only when “ ‘ “the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal 

discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” 

[Citation.] But “ ‘ “[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the 
9.

facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial 

court[.]” ’ ” [Citations.] [¶] While each standard here fits a distinct type of 

determination under review, the practical difference between the standards is not likely to 

be very pronounced.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord, E.C., supra, 85 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 143–144.)

“Review of the juvenile court’s findings under the foregoing standards is 

deferential, but ‘ “an appellate court [nevertheless] exercises its independent judgment to 

determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” ’ [Citations.] Where the material 

facts are undisputed, courts have applied independent review to determine whether 

ICWA’s requirements were satisfied.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord, 

E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 144.)

C. Analysis

1. Summary of ICWA Inquiry

In the present case, father went back and forth claiming he had Indian ancestry. 

Initially, he denied having Indian ancestry, but when the juvenile court inquired of him at 

the detention hearing, he said he believed he had ancestry through both paternal 

grandparents with two unspecified tribes. The court, however, did not order a further 

inquiry or make an ICWA finding at that time. Father later reported to a social worker he 

did not have Indian ancestry. He said that growing up he believed he had Indian 

ancestry, but an aunt told him otherwise. He then filled out an ICWA-020 form denying 

ancestry. As for mother, she denied having Indian ancestry all along. At the combined 

jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court found ICWA did not apply.

Father argues the juvenile court’s finding was erroneous because there was 

insufficient information to conclude he did not have Indian ancestry. He argues the 

department should have “attempted to complete a form ICWA-030” or contacted the 

Bureau of Indian Affairs, and failure to do so resulted in prejudicial error. The 

department concedes inquiry was not perfect, but argues that there were no other known 
10.

relatives to inquire of and father did not give reason to believe Z.Q. could be an Indian 

child. Accordingly, the department asserts prejudicial error did not occur.

In K.H. and E.C., we addressed ICWA error at the inquiry stage. There, we 

explained our decision not to follow the approaches articulated by other appellate courts 

for determining whether ICWA error requires reversal and concluded that the Supreme 

Court’s decision in A.R. supplies the appropriate framework for assessing prejudice in 

this context. (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 607–608, citing A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th 

at pp. 252–254; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.) Applying the standards 

we articulated in K.H. and E.C., as we discuss below, we conclude the department’s error 

is prejudicial and remand for the department to conduct a proper, adequate, and duly 

diligent inquiry is necessary.

2. The Department and Juvenile Court Erred

As previously mentioned, “[i]f the court, social worker, or probation officer has 

reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does not have 

sufficient information to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an Indian 

child, the court, social worker, or probation officer shall make further inquiry regarding 

the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.” 

(§ 224.2, subd. (e).) “There is reason to believe a child involved in a proceeding is an 

Indian child whenever the court, social worker, or probation officer has information 

suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible

for membership in an Indian tribe. Information suggesting membership or eligibility for 

membership includes, but is not limited to, information that indicates, but does not 

establish, the existence of one or more of the grounds for reason to know enumerated in 

[section 224.2, subdivision (d)(1) to (6)].” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1), italics added.) “When 

there is reason to believe the child is an Indian child, further inquiry is necessary to help 

the court, social worker, or probation officer determine whether there is reason to know a 

child is an Indian child. Further inquiry includes ... [¶] [c]ontacting the Bureau of Indian 
11.

Affairs and the State Department of Social Services for assistance in identifying the 

names and contact information of the tribes in which the child may be a member, or 

eligible for membership in, and contacting the tribes and any other person that may 

reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child’s membership status or 

eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(B).) 

Here, father appeared to be uncertain about the family’s Indian ancestry. He went 

back and forth claiming and disclaiming ancestry. However, there was reason to believe 

Z.Q. could be an Indian child because father stated he could have ancestry through 

two unknown tribes. Therefore, the department should have contacted the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs for assistance in identifying the names of any possible tribes. (§ 224.2, 

subd. (e)(2)(B).) 

3. Prejudice

“Where, as here, the deficiency lies with the [department’s] duty of [...] inquiry 

and a juvenile court’s related finding of ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due 

diligence’ (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)), the error is one of state law ([In re] Benjamin M., supra, 

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742). Under the California Constitution, ‘[n]o judgment shall be set 

aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of 

the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of 

pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of 

the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error 

complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)” 

(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 606; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 151.)

“ ‘[T]o be entitled to relief on appeal from an alleged abuse of discretion, it must 

clearly appear the resulting injury is sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage of 

justice’ [citations], and California law generally interprets its constitutional miscarriage 

of justice requirement ‘as permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it 

reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but 
12.

for the error.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 606–607; accord, E.C., supra, 85 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 151–152.)

However, in A.R., the Supreme Court “recognized that while we generally apply a 

Watson[5]likelihood-of-success test to assess prejudice, a merits-based outcome-focused 

test is not always appropriate because it cannot always adequately measure the relevant 

harm. [Citation.] In other words, where the injury caused by the error is unrelated to an 

outcome on the merits, tethering the showing of prejudice to such an outcome misplaces 

the measure, at the expense of the rights the law in question was designed to protect.” 

(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609, italics omitted.)

As we explained in K.H., “ ‘ICWA compliance presents a unique situation ....’ ” 

(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 608.) “ICWA is not directed at reaching, or 

protecting, a specific outcome on the merits.” (Id. at p. 609; accord, E.C., supra, 85 

Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) Rather, “ ‘[t]he purpose of ICWA and related California statutes 

is to provide notice to the tribe sufficient to allow it to determine whether the child is an 

Indian child, and whether the tribe wishes to intervene in the proceedings’ [citation], and 

an adequate initial inquiry facilitates the information gathering upon which the court’s 

ICWA determination will rest.” (K.H., at p. 608; accord, E.C., at pp. 152–153.) Yet, 

“while the appealing party is usually a parent, parents do not bear the burden of gathering 

information in compliance with ICWA [citations], and parents may raise the claim of 

error for the first time on appeal.” (K.H., at p. 608; accord, E.C., at p. 153.) Further, the 

ultimate determination whether a child is an Indian child rests with the tribe, not with a 

parent, the department, or the juvenile court. (K.H., at p. 590; accord, E.C., at pp. 139–

140.) “[W]here the opportunity to gather the relevant information critical to determining 

whether the child is or may be an Indian child is lost because there has not been adequate 

inquiry and due diligence, reversal for correction is generally the only effective 

5 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.
13.

safeguard.” (K.H., at p. 610, citing A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 252–254; accord, E.C.,

at p. 155.) 

Here, the department’s inquiry, “ ‘fell well short of that required to gather the 

information needed to meaningfully safeguard the rights of the tribes, as intended under 

ICWA and California law’ ” (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 156, quoting K.H., supra, 

84 Cal.App.5th at p. 620), and “[a] finding of harmlessness on this record would 

necessarily require speculation and ‘is at odds with the statutory protections that ICWA 

and California law intend to afford Indian children and Indian tribes.’ ” (E.C., at p. 155, 

quoting K.H., at p. 611.) Therefore, the error is prejudicial and reversal is required.

Accordingly, the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is 

conditionally reversed and the matter is remanded. The court is instructed to ensure the 

department conducts “ ‘a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry under section 224.2, 

subdivision[s] (b) [and (e)], and document its inquiry in the record in compliance with 

rule 5.481(a)(5).’ ” (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157, quoting K.H., supra, 84 

Cal.App.5th at p. 621.) “ ‘This should not be interpreted as requiring an exhaustive 

search for and questioning of every living relative of [Z.Q.]’ but ‘[w]e leave that 

determination for the juvenile court in the first instance because it is better positioned to 

evaluate the evidence provided by the [d]epartment. So long as the court ensures the 

inquiry is reasonable and of sufficient reach to accomplish the legislative purpose 

underlying ICWA and related California law, the court will have an adequate factual 

foundation upon which to make its ICWA finding. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)’ ” (E.C., at 

p. 157, quoting K.H., at p. 621.)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is conditionally reversed, 

and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to order the department to 

comply with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2, 

subdivisions (b) and (e), and rule 5.481(a)(5). If, after determining that an adequate 
14.

inquiry was made consistent with the reasoning in this opinion, the court finds that ICWA 

applies, the court shall vacate its existing order and proceed in compliance with ICWA 

and related California law. If the court instead finds that ICWA does not apply, its 

ICWA finding shall be reinstated. In all other respects, the juvenile court’s order is 

affirmed.