Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 59A01-1604-CR-745 | January 19, 2017 Page 1 of 14

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

David A. Smith

McIntyre & Smith

Bedford, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Daniel Ray Holloway,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 19, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

59A01-1604-CR-745

Appeal from the Orange Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Larry R. Blanton, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

59C01-1402-FA-93

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Daniel Ray Holloway (“Holloway”) appeals his convictions, received following 

a jury trial, for Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine,1 Class D felony 

maintaining a common nuisance,2 and Class D felony possession of chemical 

reagents or precursors.3 At trial, the trial court admitted, over Holloway’s 

objection, evidence of items used in methamphetamine manufacturing that 

investigators had discovered during a warrantless search of Holloway’s car. On 

appeal, Holloway argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 

this evidence because the search that produced it violated his right to privacy 

under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. We conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion because the exigent circumstances exception 

to the prohibition against warrantless searches under the United States 

Constitution applied, and the search was reasonable under the Indiana 

Constitution.

[2] We affirm.

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1). The dealing in methamphetamine statute has since been amended, and 

Holloway’s conviction would now be considered a Level 5 felony. However, because Holloway committed 

his offense in February 2014, we will apply the version of the statute in effect at that time. 

2

I.C. § 35-48-4-13(b)(2). The maintaining a common nuisance statute has also been amended, and 

Holloway’s offense would now be considered a Class A misdemeanor. However, we will apply the version 

of the statute in effect at that time.

3

I.C. § 35-48-4-14.5(e). This offense would now be considered a Level 6 felony. Holloway was also 

convicted of resisting law enforcement and criminal recklessness and adjudicated an habitual substance 

offender, but he does not challenge those convictions or his adjudication on appeal. 
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Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence 

obtained as a result of a warrantless search of Holloway’s vehicle.

Facts

[3] In the early morning hours of February 10, 2014, Harrison County Sheriff’s 

Department Deputy, Michael Andry (“Deputy Andry”), was on duty in 

Palmyra, Indiana. He was patrolling a gas station when he saw a black Honda 

vehicle parked in front of the gas station door. He found the parking of the 

vehicle “odd” because it was “blocking the door completely,” in spite of the fact 

that the parking lot was empty and there were actual parking spots available. 

(Tr. 122). As a result, he called dispatch and requested that the dispatcher

check the BMV records for the Honda’s license plate. The dispatcher ran the 

license plate and reported to him that the plate’s registration was inactive and 

was associated with a different car, a Mitshubishi.

[4] Deputy Andry followed the Honda, which had departed the gas station while

he was checking its records, and activated his lights and siren. The Honda did 

not stop or pull over. Instead, it led Deputy Andry on a chase that lasted for 

fifty minutes and reached speeds of over 100 miles per hour. Eventually, 

Deputy Andry followed the Honda onto a street that he knew was a dead end. 

He exited his vehicle, believing that the occupants of the Honda were going to

attempt to escape on foot. However, the Honda made a u-turn and drove back 

in his direction. As it attempted to get around his police car, Deputy Andry slid 

on some ice on the road, and the Honda ran into him. Deputy Andry fell onto 
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the car’s hood and, as a result of the impact, accidentally discharged his 

firearm. The driver of the Honda, who was later identified as Holloway, 

“revv[ed] the motor up,” and Deputy Andry then intentionally discharged his 

firearm three more times in Holloway’s direction to make him stop the vehicle. 

(Tr. 132). Holloway suffered injuries to both of his hands as a result of the 

gunshots but finally stopped the vehicle. 

[5] Conservation Officer Neal Bouwington (“Officer Bouwington”), who had 

followed Deputy Andry for part of the pursuit, arrived on the scene after the 

shooting. He and Deputy Andry determined that there were three people inside 

of the Honda and arrested all three of them. Officer Bouwington also looked 

into the vehicle and observed that it was a “mess,” although he did not identify 

any specific items or conduct a search. (Tr. 223).

[6] Subsequently, other officers arrived as backup. Those officers learned the 

identities of the three people who had been in the Honda and became 

concerned, based on their prior knowledge of those individuals, that there might 

be a mobile methamphetamine laboratory in the vehicle. Rachel Kirkham

(“Kirkham”), one of the passengers, also admitted that “there may be 

something methamphetamine related in the vehicle.” (Tr. 243-44). As a result, 

the officers contacted State Police Detective Paul Andry (“Detective Andry”), 

who was trained to investigate methamphetamine labs.

4

 

 

4 Deputy Andry and Detective Andry are second cousins.
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[7] When Detective Andry responded to the scene, he saw a glass 

methamphetamine pipe lying in the snow outside of the Honda, which “led 

[him] to believe that methamphetamine might be involved.” (Tr. 238). He 

performed a preliminary search of the vehicle and removed a zipped bag from 

the back of the vehicle. He opened the bag and discovered chemicals 

commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine, but he did not discover an 

active methamphetamine lab. Because the chemicals were not interacting, he 

determined that the Honda was safe to move, and the officers transported it to 

the Sheriff’s Department. At that point, the officers obtained a search warrant 

and inventoried the remaining items in the car. During the inventory, they

discovered several additional items commonly used in manufacturing

methamphetamine, including, among other items, pseudophedrine, lithium 

batteries, muriatic acid, Coleman fuel, sulfuric acid, lye, instant cold packs, 

baggies, and a scale. They also found methamphetamine residue on a coffee 

filter, four baggies of methamphetamine, and a baggie containing a substance 

that appeared to be marijuana.

[8] That same day, February 10, 2014, the State charged Holloway with Class A 

felony attempted murder; Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine; Class D 

felony maintaining a common nuisance; Class D felony possession of chemical 

reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture a controlled substance; Class 

D felony resisting law enforcement; and Class A misdemeanor criminal 

recklessness. The State also alleged that Holloway was an habitual substance 
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offender because he had two or more prior unrelated substance abuse 

convictions. 

[9] A jury trial was held on February 9, 10, and 11, 2016. At trial, Holloway 

objected to the admission of the evidence found in the bag that Detective Andry

had searched without a warrant. He argued that the search had violated his 

constitutional right to privacy and that the evidence seized as a result of the 

search should be excluded. In response to Holloway’s objection, the trial court 

heard testimony from Detective Andry outside of the presence of the jury. 

Detective Andry testified that he had known the three individuals in the Honda 

from prior investigations. He also testified that he had been working on an 

active investigation that included them when he responded to the instant case. 

As a result, Detective Andrey knew that they had been involved in procuring 

precursors for methamphetamine manufacturing “as recent[ly] as the week 

before” the car chase. (Tr. 242). He testified that this knowledge made him 

afraid that there might be a mobile methamphetamine lab in the car. He 

explained, “When [an officer] told [him] that there had been a pursuit that had 

gone on for a lengthy period of time[,] [he] was concerned that these chemicals 

could be [] potentially explosive.” (Tr. 243). Because there was a danger that 

one of the officers could be injured moving the car if there were an explosion, 

he believed that the car should not be moved until he could inspect its interior 

to make sure none of the chemicals was “in reaction.” (Tr. 243). He also noted 

that there was a risk that evidence would be destroyed if there were an 

explosion. 
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[10] After hearing Detective Andry’s testimony, the trial court overruled Holloway’s 

objection to the admission of the evidence discovered during the search of the 

bag. As a basis for its conclusion, the trial court reasoned that public safety 

concerns justified the search. Then, at the beginning of the next day of the jury 

trial, the trial court again addressed its reasoning for overruling Holloway’s 

motion. It clarified that it thought the search was permissible under the exigent 

circumstances exception to the prohibition on warrantless searches—due to the 

need for officer safety and the potential for destruction of evidence—and under 

the custodial arrest exception.

[11] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted Holloway of attempted murder,

but it found him guilty of the remaining charges. Holloway then pled guilty to 

the habitual substance offender allegation. The trial court sentenced him to 

fourteen (14) years for dealing methamphetamine; one (1) year for maintaining 

a common nuisance; one (1) year for possession of chemical reagents; one (1) 

year for resisting law enforcement; and one (1) year for criminal recklessness, 

with all of the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court also 

enhanced Holloway’s sentence for dealing methamphetamine by four (4) years 

for his habitual substance offender adjudication, resulting in an eighteen (18)-

year aggregate sentence. Holloway now appeals his convictions for dealing in 

methamphetamine, maintaining a common nuisance, and possession of 

chemical reagents.
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Decision

[12] On appeal, Holloway argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting the evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing chemicals and 

supplies that Detective Andry discovered during his warrantless search of the 

bag in Holloway’s Honda. He argues that the search violated his right to 

privacy under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 

Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and, accordingly, the evidence 

discovered in the search should have been excluded. Although the Federal and 

State constitutional provisions have similar structures, their interpretations and 

applications vary. Accordingly, we will address Holloway’s argument under 

each provision separately. 

[13] Preliminarily, though, we note that the trial court has broad discretion to rule 

on the admissibility of evidence. Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 

2016). We review its rulings “‘for abuse of that discretion and reverse only 

when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.’” Id. (quoting 

Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh the 

evidence and will resolve any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the trial 

court’s ruling. Miller v. State, 51 N.E.3d 313, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g 

denied. However, the “‘constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of 

law, and we review it de novo.’” Bradley, 54 N.E.3d at 999 (quoting Kelly v. 

State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013)).
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1. Fourth Amendment

[14] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons 

from unreasonable searches and seizures by prohibiting, as a general rule, 

searches and seizures conducted without a warrant supported by probable 

cause. Moore v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1095, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied. 

As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained in violation of this rule is 

generally not admissible absent evidence of a recognized exception. Id. 

“‘Where a search or seizure is conducted without a warrant, the State bears the 

burden to prove that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the 

time of the search or seizure.’” Mullen v. State, 55 N.E.3d 822, 827 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2016) (quoting Brooks v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1234, 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010), trans. denied). “‘Whether a particular warrantless search violates the 

guarantees of the Fourth Amendment depends on the facts and circumstances 

of each case.’” Weathers v. State, 61 N.E.3d 279, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)

(quoting Trotter, 933 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)).

[15] Here, the trial court determined that there were exigent circumstances 

supporting Detective Andry’s warrantless search. We have previously held that 

“‘[t]he warrant requirement becomes inapplicable where the ‘exigencies of the 

situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the 

warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” 

McDermott v. State, 877 N.E.2d 467, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Holder v. 

State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 936 (Ind. 2006)), trans. denied. Among the well-known 

circumstances that have justified a warrantless search or seizure include entries: 
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(1) to prevent bodily harm or death; (2) to aid a person in need of assistance; (3) 

to protect private property; and (4) to prevent actual or imminent destruction or 

removal of incriminating evidence before a search warrant may be obtained. 

Notably, in Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013), our supreme court 

found that there were exigent circumstances to justify a search when, as in the 

instant case, officers suspected the presence of a mobile methamphetamine lab 

in the defendant’s car. 

[16] Holloway argues that the exigent circumstances exception did not apply here 

because Detective Andry and the other officers did not have probable cause to 

believe there was a methamphetamine lab in his car.5 As Holloway argues, we 

have previously noted that “‘while exigent circumstances justify dispensing with 

a search warrant, they do not eliminate the need for probable cause.’” 

Montgomery v. State, 904 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting 

Cudworth v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. 

denied. “‘[I]n an emergency, the probable cause element may be satisfied where 

the officers reasonably believe a person is in danger.’” Id. (quoting United States 

v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied). Holloway 

 

5 Holloway also argues that the trial court abused its discretion for denying his objection to the admission of 

the evidence on one ground and then later clarifying that it intended to deny the objection on different 

grounds. He asserts that, as a result of the trial court’s inconsistency, we should only address the trial court’s

original justification for denying the objection. However, we find that the trial court was consistent in its 

conclusion that there were public safety concerns justifying the search. Moreover, we may affirm a trial 

court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence if it is sustainable on any basis in the record. Barker v. 

State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied. Accordingly, the trial court’s basis for admitting the 

evidence is not dispositive. 
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contends that the officers could not reasonably have believed that there was a 

methamphetamine lab in the car because the car did not smell like a meth lab.

[17] We conclude that Holloway’s argument is essentially a request for us to 

reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Miller, 51 N.E.3d at 315. Even 

if there was not a methamphetamine smell outside of the car, there was 

evidence supporting the officers’ belief that there might be a methamphetamine 

lab in the car. Detective Andry knew the occupants from prior and 

contemporaneous methamphetamine investigations and knew that Holloway

had purchased precursors for making methamphetamine in the prior week. 

When Deputy Andry attempted to stop Holloway, Holloway led him on a fiftyminute chase. Then, Detective Andry found a methamphetamine pipe resting 

on the snow outside of the vehicle when he arrived on the scene. In light of 

these factors, and Detective Andry’s testimony that chemicals in 

methamphetamine manufacturing could be explosive after a fifty-minute-long 

car chase, we conclude that Detective Andry and the other officers involved 

had probable cause to believe that the Honda might contain a mobile 

methamphetamine lab and that bystanders might be in danger. Accordingly, 

we conclude that there were exigent circumstances and, thus, the search did not 

violate Holloway’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.

2. Article 1, Section 11

[18] Alternatively, Holloway argues that Detective Andry’s search violated his right 

to privacy under the Indiana Constitution. Like the Fourth Amendment, 

Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protects against warrantless 
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searches. However, the legality of a search under the Indiana Constitution 

“turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the 

totality of the circumstances.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 

2005). Reasonableness of a search depends on a balance of: (1) the degree of 

concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the degree of 

intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary 

activities; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Id. at 361. It is the 

State’s burden to show that its intrusion into “‘those areas of life that Hoosiers 

regard as private,’” was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. 

Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013) (quoting State v. Quirk, 842 

N.E.2d 334, 339 (Ind. 2006)). 

[19] The State argues that Holloway has waived his claim by failing to present an 

independent analysis. Although Holloway cited the Indiana Constitution and 

the Litchfield factors in his brief, he did not provide any analysis of the factors 

independent from his analysis under the Fourth Amendment. As the State 

notes, a defendant cannot invoke analysis of an issue under the Indiana 

Constitution without a separate and independent analysis of the claim. Dye v. 

State, 717 N.E.2d 5, 24 (Ind. 1999). Accordingly, we agree with the State that 

Holloway has waived his state constitutional claim. See Francis v. State, 764 

N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that failure to provide a separate 

and independent Indiana Constitution analysis results in waiver).

[20] Waiver notwithstanding, it is clear that Detective Andry’s search was 

reasonable under Article 1, Section 11. Specifically, he had a high degree of 
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suspicion that a violation had occurred because he was in the process of 

investigating Holloway in another methamphetamine investigation and knew 

he had purchased precursors the week before; Kirkham, the passenger in the 

Honda, had admitted that “there may be something methamphetamine related 

in the vehicle;” (Tr. 243-44); and he had found a methamphetamine pipe 

outside the vehicle. 

[21] In addition, the intrusion of his search was slight. Holloway had already been 

arrested and transported to the hospital when the search occurred, so it did not 

involve a search of Holloway’s person. Harris v. State, 19 N.E.3d 298, 303 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the intrusion of a search was “slight” when the 

defendant was already handcuffed and the search was not an invasive search of 

his person), trans. denied. Moreover, Detective Andry ended his preliminary 

search when he determined that the chemicals in the bag were not interacting 

and, therefore, there was not a safety risk that they would explode. The officers 

did not search the remainder of the vehicle until they had obtained a search 

warrant.

[22] Finally, law enforcement needs were high. As Detective Andry noted, there 

was a chance that the methamphetamine chemicals were explosive after the 

fifty-minute car chase and could injure officers if they exploded while the car 

was being transported to the station. This created a safety risk for the officers 

and also a risk that the evidence in the car would be destroyed.
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[23] In light of the above factors, we conclude that Detective Andry’s search was 

reasonable and did not violate Holloway’s right to privacy under the Indiana 

Constitution. Because we have also found that the search did not violate the 

Fourth Amendment, we, thus, also conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in admitting the evidence discovered as a result of the search.

[24] Affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.