SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1469-22 

GAIL KRZYZCZUK, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 

 Defendant-Respondent. 

________________________

Argued April 9, 2024 – Decided May 15, 2024 

Before Judges Smith and Torregrossa-O'Connor. 

On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Public 

Employees' Retirement System, Department of 

Treasury, PERS No. xx0987. 

Marguerite Schaffer argued the cause for appellant 

(Shaffer, Shain, Jalloh, PC, attorneys; Raymond J. 

Stine, on the briefs). 

Roza Dabaghyan, Deputy Attorney General, argued the

cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney 

General, attorney; Sara M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Roza Dabaghyan, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1469-22

PER CURIAM 

 Petitioner, Gail Krzyzczuk, appeals the final decision of the Public 

Employment Retirement System Board of Trustees (Board), which concluded 

that, while petitioner simultaneously held three jobs with the Borough of 

Bradley Beach at the time of her retirement in 2019, she was eligible for a 

pension from just one of those jobs. She appeals, arguing, among other things, 

that the Board erred when it failed to interpret the controlling statute, N.J.S.A. 

43:15A-25.2, so as to calculate her pension based on the combined salaries of 

the three jobs. We affirm for the reasons which follow. 

I.

Petitioner had been an employee of the Borough of Bradley Beach 

(Borough) since 1994. The record shows she began there as an administrative 

assistant and was eventually promoted to assistant chief financial officer. 

Effective January 1, 2010, petitioner was also appointed assistant sewer 

collector and deputy tax collector. 

In 2016, petitioner's longtime supervisor, Joyce Wilkins, retired. Wilkins 

was the Borough's chief financial officer (CFO), as well as its tax collector and 

sewer collector. After Wilkins's retirement, the Borough appointed petitioner to 

the CFO, tax collector, and sewer collector positions, effective October 1, 2016. 
3 A-1469-22

The record shows petitioner held two state licenses, one qualifying her to 

perform the duties of CFO, and another qualifying her to perform the duties of 

tax and sewer collector. The Borough continuously employed petitioner in all 

three jobs until her retirement on December 31, 2019.1

When petitioner retired, she applied for her pension based upon the 

salaries associated with the three jobs. The Division of Pensions and Benefits 

(Division) found petitioner was eligible for a pension based only upon her CFO 

position, i.e., the one with the highest salary. In its initial decision, the Division 

found the tax collector and sewer collector positions to be "additional salaried 

positions on top of [petitioner's] highest salaried position as [CFO]." 

Petitioner appealed to the Board, who also denied her application for a 

pension based on all three jobs. The Board found that the "positions of CFO, 

[t]ax [c]ollector and [s]ewer [c]ollector are listed as separate job titles with 

separate salaries." The Board also found that "the duties of the [t]ax [c]ollector 

and [s]ewer [c]ollector positions are not permanently assigned to the CFO 

position . . ." The Board rejected petitioner's argument that the tax and sewer 

collector positions were a part of her official CFO duties. 

1

 Upon petitioner's retirement, the Borough hired three separate individuals to

fulfill the CFO, tax collector, and sewer collector positions. 
4 A-1469-22

Applying N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2, the Board found the Borough hired 

petitioner for the CFO, tax collector, and sewer collector jobs on or about 

October 1, 2016, nearly six years after the effective date of the statute, May 21, 

2010. The Board concluded the statute's express language, in light of petitioner's 

October 1, 2016 hire date, mandated that petitioner receive a pension based only 

on her CFO salary. 

On appeal, plaintiff makes several arguments, which we summarize this 

way: the Board's final decision was arbitrary, capricious and unsupported by 

the record; the Board mistakenly interpreted N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2 to require 

petitioner receive a pension based solely on her CFO salary; and the Board's 

final decision is contrary to public policy. 

II. 

In Meyers v. State Health Benefits Comm'n, 474 N.J. Super 1, 8 (App. 

Div. 2022), aff'd, 256 N.J. 94 (2023), we articulated our standard of review used 

when an agency has issued a final administrative decision concerning a public 

employee's pension. 

"[We] have 'a limited role' in the review of

[agency] decisions." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194

(2011) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 

571, 579 (1980)). "[A] 'strong presumption of

reasonableness attaches to [an agency decision].'" 

Parsells v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Somerville, 472
5 A-1469-22

N.J. Super. 369, 375 (App. Div. 2022) (citing In re

Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001)). 

"Board decisions are afforded a deferential standard of

review and will be reversed only if 'there is a clear 

showing that [the decision] is arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the

record.'" S.L.W. v. N.J. Div. Pensions & Benefits, 238 

N.J. 385, 393 (2019) (alterations in original) (citing 

Mount v. Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 233 N.J. 402,

418 (2018)). 

We "may not substitute [our] own judgment for 

the agency's, even though [we] might have reached a 

different result." Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting 

In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). "This is

particularly true when the issue under review is directed 

to the agency's special 'expertise and superior 

knowledge of a particular field.'" Id. at 195 (quoting In

re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)). "Furthermore, 

'an administrative agency's interpretation of statutes 

and regulations within its implementing and enforcing 

responsibility is ordinarily entitled to our deference.'" 

Parsells, 472 N.J. Super. at 376 (quoting In re Appeal 

by Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J. Super. 93, 102

(App. Div. 1997)). 

[Id. at 8-9 (alterations in original).] 

However, we are "in no way bound by the agency's interpretation of a 

statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue." Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., 

Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007) (quoting In re Taylor, 

158 N.J. 644, 658 (1999)). We continue to "apply de novo review to an agency's 

interpretation of a statute or case law." Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's 
6 A-1469-22

Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 

173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002)). 

When considering pension-related claims, we note our statutes should be 

liberally construed "in favor of persons intended to be benefitted thereby," 

Bumbaco v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys, 325 N.J. Super. 90, 94 (App. Div. 

2000), however "eligibility is not to be liberally permitted," Smith v. State, Dep't 

of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 

2007). By the same token "the applicable guidelines must be carefully 

interpreted so as not to 'obscure or override considerations of . . . a potential 

adverse impact on the financial integrity of the [f]und.'" Ibid. (alteration in 

original) (quoting Chaleff v. Tchrs.' Pension & Annuity Fund Trs., 188 N.J. 

Super. 194, 197 (App. Div. 1983)). 

III. 

Mindful that petitioner bears the burden to establish pension eligibility, 

Patterson v. Bd. of Trs., State Police Ret. Sys., 194 N.J. 29, 50-51 (2008), we

consider her arguments in turn. 

First, petitioner contends that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2 

requires that each of the three jobs she held at retirement be deemed pension 
7 A-1469-22

eligible by the Board. After our de novo review of the statute, Russo, 206 N.J. 

at 27, we are unpersuaded. 

N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2(a) states: 

Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the 

contrary, after the effective date[, May 21, 2010,] of 

[this statute], a person who is or becomes a member of 

the [PERS] and becomes employed in more than one 

office, position, or employment covered by the 

retirement system or commences service in a covered

office, position, or employment with more than one 

employer shall be eligible for membership in the 

retirement system based upon only one of the offices, 

positions, or employments held concurrently. In the

case of a person who holds more than one office, 

position, or employment covered by the retirement 

system, the retirement system shall designate the 

position providing the higher or highest compensation 

for the person with such concurrent positions as the 

basis for eligibility for membership and the 

compensation base for contributions and pension 

calculations. 

A plain reading of subsection (a) leads to a simple conclusion. After May 

21, 2010, a person who becomes "employed in more than one office, position, 

or employment covered by the retirement system" shall have the highest salaried 

of those positions designated by the Board, or its representative, as the 

"compensation base for contributions and pension calculations." Stated 

differently, after May 21, 2010, public employees who are members of the PERS 
8 A-1469-22

system can no longer combine salaries of pension-eligible jobs in order to 

increase that employee's compensation base for pension calculation purposes. 

The record here shows: petitioner was appointed to the three positions 

after the effective date of the statute; her CFO position was separate and distinct 

from her other two positions; and the Borough never permanently assigned the 

duties of the tax collector and sewer collector to the CFO. On these facts we 

agree with the Board's interpretation of the law and find no error.2

We briefly comment on petitioner's other salient arguments. Petitioner 

contends that the Borough treated the CFO, tax collector, and sewer collector 

jobs as one by: hiring one person to do the work over a two-decade period; and 

paying one salary "in regular, periodic installments," first to Wilkins, then to 

petitioner. According to petitioner, the Borough's practice of combining her 

jobs for purposes of paying petitioner's bi-monthly salary should have 

constrained the Board to combine the three salaries for pension calculation 

purposes. We disagree. The Borough had opportunity over the long arc of 

Wilkins's and petitioner's employment to legislatively combine the duties of the 

2

 Each position held by petitioner at the time of her retirement is authorized by 

separate legislation. N.J.S.A. 40A:9-140.10 requires each municipality to

appoint a chief financial officer. N.J.S.A. 40A:9-141 requires each municipality 

to appoint a tax collector. Borough Ordinance section 380-12 establishes the 

position of sewer utility collector. 
9 A-1469-22

three jobs under one title. There is nothing in the record to suggest the Borough 

ever made the attempt.3 The Board had sufficient support in the record to

conclude the positions were separate and distinct municipal jobs. We defer to 

the findings of the Board when supported by credible facts in the record. See 

S.L.W., 238 N.J. at 393. 

Petitioner next argues that the positions of tax collector and sewer 

collector are "legislatively mandated part-time" positions. She posits that the 

Board has improperly distinguished between PERS members who hold multiple 

"part-time" jobs, and PERS members that hold one job where multiple duties 

have been "merged" under one title. Petitioner cannot show authority to support 

the proposition that any of the three statutorily created positions at issue in this 

appeal are "legislatively mandated part-time" jobs. Indeed, the enabling 

legislation for each job suggests otherwise. In our view, this argument 

manufactures a legal issue where none exists, and we decline further comment. 

Petitioner also makes a series of public policy arguments to support 

reversal, using various elements of the record combined with selected sections 

of the Administrative Code. The common theme of her arguments is that the 

3

 We agree with the Board's observations on this point, made in its final 

administrative decision on December 8, 2022. 
10 A-1469-22

Borough's residents benefitted from municipal efficiencies gained by

"assigning" the tax collector and sewer collector responsibilities to the CFO. 

Petitioner further argues that this long-standing informal and "practical" 

arrangement promoted "efficient governmental function," and "adequately 

addresse[d] the concerns and abuses the legislature sought to remedy" in the 

pension system. We are satisfied that these statements are true, as far as they 

carry. The record shows petitioner faithfully performed her assigned duties in 

Bradley Beach for close to three decades. We are confident the community 

benefitted from her dedicated public service. However, given our standard of 

review, we find no version of petitioner's public policy arguments persuasive. 

In sum, we find the Board's final decision was not arbitrary, capricious, 

or unreasonable. It had fair support in the record for its findings. See S.L.W., 

238 N.J. at 393. Our de novo review of the Board's N.J.S.A. 43:15A-25.2 

analysis satisfies us that it is proper to defer to the "agency's interpretation of

statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility." 

See Parsells, 472 N.J. Super. at 376. To the extent we have not addressed any 

remaining arguments of petitioner, we conclude they are without sufficient merit 

to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.