2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
1-9-2004 

# V e al v . U SA P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-1116

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

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w . vi l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/1102* The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsy lvania, sitting by desig

nation. NOT PRE CEDENT IAL THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

___________ No. 03-1116

___________ ANN VEAL, Appellant
v.
UNIT ED STA TES OF AMERI CA; DOVE R AIR FORCE BASE
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DIST RICT COURT

FOR THE DI STRI CT OF DELAWARE (CivilAction No. 01-cv- 00407) Distri ct Judge: The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet

___________ Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

January 9, 2004 BE FO RE : BA RR Y a nd S M ITH , Circuit Judges , and P OLLAK, Distri ct Judge .* (Fil ed: Januar

y 9, 2004)

___________ OPINI ON OF THE COURT

___________1 The Di stri ctCour t h ad j ur is di ct io n purs uan t t o the F ede ra l To rt Cla ims Act , 2 8 U. S. C. § 26 71, et seq. Th is C our t has juris dicti on p ursu ant to 28 U .S.C . § 12 91.
2 Although Veal di d initially obt ain counsel , that counselresi gned prior to the e xpiration of the si x month li mitat ions per iod provi ded for under t he FTCA. Veal is now repres ented by coun sel in this a ppea l. 2 SM ITH , Circu it Judge
. App ellant Ann Veal ch allenges the O rders of the D istrict Court of D elaware granting the Unite d States ’ Motion to Dis miss, denying her Motion to Vacat e, and denying her Motion for Re- Argument. The is sue rai sed on appealis whether the Dist rict Court abused i ts di scret ion in di smissi ng Veal’s cas e for fai lure t o timel y se rve the Attorney G eneral in her su it brought un der the Fed eral Tort C laims Ac t (“FTC A”). 1 The United S tates filed a M otion for S umm ary Affirma nce in this app eal. Becau se Vea l’s arguments on appe al pres ent a subs tanti al question concer ning the interpr etat ion of Rule 4 (as d iscu ssed belo w) , the U nited Sta tes’ M otio n fo r Su mm ary A ffir ma nce is de nied
. I. An n V eal filed an ad minis trative cla im ag ainst the Un ited Sta tes A ir Forc e on J uly 20, 2000, pur suant t o the FTCA based on injur ies she sustained during a May27, 2000 visit to the Do ver A ir Forc e Ba se Po st Ex chan ge. A fter tha t claim w as de nied b y the Air Force, Vealfile d a pro se complaint and peti tion t o proceed in form a pa uper is with the United States District Court for the Dis tri ct of Delaware. 2 The Distri ct Court granted that petit ion and the C om plain t wa s file d on Jun e 15 , 200 1.3 The Un ited Sta tes also base d that M otion to Dism iss on th e inclu sion o f D over Air

Force Base as an improper part y t o the sui t and that the s ix-month s tatute of li mitat ions provided under the F TC A ha d run be fore V eal filed her suit. Ne ither of these ba ses are relevant to this app eal, how ever. 3 On October 23, 2001, the Dist rict Court order ed Veal to show good cause why she had not y et effected servi ce on the defendants. After she expl ained the reasons for her delay, the D istrict Co urt exte nded the tim e for V eal to e ffec t prop er serv ice un til November 22, 2001. Veal t hen contact ed the Cler

k of the Dist

rict Court, who provi ded her “with instruc tions and forms to be pr epared i n order t o effectuate servi ce.” Veal Br. at 6. On January

7, 2002, Vealserved t

he Dover Air Force Base and t he United States Attorney . The United St ates fi led a moti on to dis miss based on Veal ’s fai lure t o serve t he Attorney G eneral as requ ired under F ederal Ru le of Civil Pro cedure 4 (i)(1)(B). 3 Th e D istrict Co urt g ran ted th e M otio n to Dis mis s in a n O rde r da ted J une 26, 2 002
. In that O rder, the Distric t Cou rt noted that V eal ha d “no t, to date, sh ow n go od ca use a s to wh y the time lim it for ser vice sh ould be fu rther en larged .” In gra nting th e M otion to Dismiss, the Dist

rict Court st ated: In consideration of the plai ntiff’s pro se stat us, and t he harsh effe ct that would resul t from a si mple dismi ssal wit hout prej udice, the court will gr ant the U nited S tates’ m otion to dism iss, but w ill allow Ve al fiftee n days to file a motion t o vacate. Veal should foc us her moti on on demonstrating good caus e for h er failu re to effect p rope r servic e of p roces s as req uired b y Rule 4(i)( 1) a nd R ule 4 (m)
. In her Motion t o Vacate and her Repl y t o the Unite d States ’ Oppositi on to that Motion, Veal expl ained that (1) she had rel ied upon the advice of t he cler k in attempting4

to serve the defendants and had been assured that service on the Dover Air Force Base and the U.S. Attorney

was suffici ent; ( 2) she had, since l earning of the need t o do so, served t he United States Att orney General; (3) her

medical condition( s) had i mpaired her ability to procee d with the s uit; and (4) her writt en corres pondence with t he Clerk’s office had h indere d effective com mu nicatio n of the pro per p roced ures for co mp liance with Ru le 4. In an August 27, 2002 Order, t he Distr ict Court

denied Veal’ s Motion to Vacat e, noting t hat the Clerk’s Office “has no dut y t o provide pro se plaintiffs wit h step by step guidance i n every

case,” and that

her “fai lure t o read or under stand Rule 4 doe s not
cons titute go od ca use for he r failure to effect pro per se rvice in com plianc e w ith Ru le 4(i) .” The Dist

rict Court Judge al so concluded t hat Veal’ s medicalconditi on was “neithe r so sudden nor s o debilitating as to cons tit ute good cause .” Fina lly , Veal fi led a Motion for Re-Argument on Sept ember 5, 2002, which was denied i n an Order date d November 6, 2002, for essential ly t he same reasons. II. We review the Dist

rict Court’s de nial of

an extensi on of time under Rule 4(m) for abu se o f dis creti on. MCI Telecom. Corp. v. Tel econcepts, Inc. , 71 F.3d 1 086 (3d Cir. 1995). The Third Circuit has cons trued Rule 4(m) as re quiri ng a court to extend t ime for
serv ice w her e the plain tiff d em ons trate s go od c aus e. McCu rdy v . Am er. Bd . of Pla stic5

Surgery , 157 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1998). Such a s howing requir es a demonstr ation of good faith on the part

of the party

seeking enl argement and s ome reasonabl e basis for
non com plian ce w ithin the ti me spe cifie d by th e ru le. MCI, 71 F.3d at 1097. Without

the showing of good cause, the deci sion whether to grant the reque st for

more time i n which to se rve , or to dism iss th e co mp laint , “fa lls sq uar ely w ithin the C our t’s so und disc retio n.” Id. W hen ente rtain ing a m otio n to exte nd t ime for serv ice, [f]ir st, the dis tri ct court should det ermine whether good cause exi sts for

an extensi on of time. If good cause i s present , the district court must

extend time for servi ce and the i nquiry is ended. If, however, good cause does not exist, t he court may in it s discreti on decide whether to dismiss the case without pr ejudic e or exte nd time for servi ce. Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Rat zinger , 46 F.3d 1298, 1305 (3d Cir. 1995). The Petru celli decisio n clarif

ied tha t, “the dis trict cou rt must consider whether any

other fa ctors warrant extendi ng time even t

hough good cause was not s hown.” Id. at 13 07.

III. A review of the Dist

rict Court’s Order s reveal s that there i s adequate legaland factualsupport f

or the Dis tri ct Court’ s good cause det erminations. Reliance upon t he Cle rk’s adv ice d id n ot co nstitu te go od c aus e. See P etruce lli , 46 F.3d at 1307. We agree with the Dis tri ct Court’ s conclus ion that Veal’s medic al condi tions were not “so s udden nor so debi lit ating a s to constitut e good cause. ” Cf. Habib v. General Motors Corp. , 15 F.3d 72, 74 (6th C ir. 1994 ); Moorehead v. Mille r , 102 F.R .D. 8 34, 8 36 ( D.V .I. 19 84)
.4 The Distric t Judg e did e xpre ss his re cogn ition of the “h arsh e ffec t that w ould result” from dismis sal wit

hout prej udice and al lowed the pl ainti ff addit ional time to show good cause. Such an allowance i s not, however, tantamount t o explic itly per forming the requir ed second st ep of the Petru celli analysi s. 6 Ve al’s failu re to rea d or u nder stand Ru le 4 do es no t excu se he r failure to pro vide tim ely
serv ice. Tuke v. United States , 76 F.3d 155, 156 (7th Cir . 1996). Under our deferential review of the Distr ict Court ’s det erminat ion as t o whether Veal made a showing of good cause, we fi nd no abuse of dis creti on. IV. A review of the sec ond requir ed step in the Dist rict Court’s analy sis of t

he Motion to Dismis s for fai lure t o effect timely servi ce is more problemati c, however. As noted pre vio usly, Petru celli and its p roge ny mak e clear that a d istrict cou rt mu st consider whether any

other fa ctors warrant ext ending time even though good cause was not shown. 46 F .3d at 1 307 ; Boley v. Kayma rk , 123 F .3d 75 6, 758 (3d C ir. 1997 ); MCI, 71 F.3d at 109 8. Th e D istrict Co urt’s ord ers, gra nting th e M otion to Dism iss, den ying the M otion to Vacate and deny ing the Moti on for Re-Argument, focus entirely on the fi rst s tep of the
ana lysis, i.e
. , wh ether V eal ha d sho wn goo d cau se. Th e learn ed D istrict Jud ge ap paren tly failed to reco gnize that, abs ent a sh ow ing o f go od ca use, h e still had the disc retion to determi ne that

the time for servi ce could be ext ended. 4 The prese nce o f sev eral fa ctors in this case which would fre quently weigh in favor

of exerci sing such di scret ion—including that Vealwas a pro se litigant, that t he stat ute of l imit ations had run on her cl aim, and t hat the ser vice re quired was of a kind often found t o be confusing—highli ghts the absence of7

this signi ficant

and required step in the Dist rict Court’s analy sis. Finally, the Dist rict Court’s instruc tion t o Veal in the Order Granti ng the Motion t o Dismiss t o focus her motion t o vacate on “de monstrat ing good cause f or her fai lure t o effect pr oper ser vice of pro ces s” c onfirms that i t view ed th e ba ses for g ran ting an e xten sion too nar row ly. Inste ad of undert aking the second st ep in the analy sis, the Dist rict Court si mply r epeated the first. In doi ng s o, th e D istrict Co urt a bus ed its disc retio n. Boley , 123 F.3d at 760. V. For th e fore goin g reas ons, th e U nited S tates’ M otion for Su mm ary Affirma nce is denied. We will vacat e the Order gr anting t he United States’ Motion to Dismis s Pursuant to Rule 4(m) and remand for furt her procee dings consi stent with thi s opini on.
TO THE C LERK: Please fi le the foregoing opinion. By the C ourt, /s/ D. Brooks Smith Circuit Judge