NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA

, Appell ee ,

v.

ROBERT REUBEN SANCHEZ, III

, Appell ant

.

No. 1 CA

- CR 13

- 0847

Ap peal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2012

- 106152

- 001
The Honorable Roland J. Steinle, III

, Judge

AFFIRMED AS CORRECTED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix By Joseph T. Maziarz Counsel for Appell ee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix By Joel M. Glynn
C ounsel for Appell antSTATE v. SANCHEZ
Dec ision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge John C. Gemmill joined.

N O R R I S
, Judge:

¶1 Robert Reuben Sanchez, III timely appeals from his
conviction s and sentence s for : count one, possession or use of da ngerous drugs, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) section 13

- 3407 (Supp. 2014), 1 a class 4 felony; count two, possession or use of marijuana, in viola tion of A.R.S. § 13

- 3405 (Supp. 2014), a class 6 felony; counts three and four, misconduct involving weapons, in violation of A.R.S. § 13

- 3102 (Supp. 2014), class 4 felonies; and count five, misconduct involving body armor, in
violation of A.R.S. § 13

- 3116 (2010)

, also a class 4 felony. After searching the record on appeal and finding no arguable question of law that was not frivolous, Sanchez ’s counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1 967) , and State v.
Leon , 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969) , asking this court to search the record for fundamental error. This court granted counsel’s motion to allow
Sanchez to file a supplemental brief in propria persona

, but Sanchez did not do so. Af ter reviewing the entire record, we find no fundamental error and, therefore, affirm Sanchez’ s conviction s and sentences as corrected

.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2

¶2 At 8:44 p.m. on January 27, 2012, two police officers saw an SUV speeding on Buckeye R oad in Phoenix, Arizona. They stopped the SUV, and after the driver

— Sanchez

— rolled down the side window one of the officers smelled an “overwhelming odor” of perfume or air freshener,
that at trial he explained was frequently used to conceal the odor of

1 Although the Arizona Legislature amended certain statutes cited in this decision after the date of Sanchez’s arrest, the revisions are immaterial to the resolution of this appeal. Thus, we cite to the current
version of these statutes.

2 We view the f acts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Sanchez

. See
State v. Guerra , 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989)

.STATE v. SANCHEZ
Dec ision of the Court

3 m arijuana. The officer also noted Sanchez was wearing a large black jacket zipped to the top of his neck. Sanchez told the officer he did not own the SUV, but he could not identify who did.

¶3 After running the SUV ’s registration and license plate and determining the SUV’s owner, the officers reques ted another police department contact the owner to find o ut whether it had been stolen. F or their own safety while they waited to hear back from the other police department , the officers asked Sanchez t o step out of the SUV so they could “pat [him] down ,” that is, frisk him, for weapons. During the weapons frisk , one of the officers discovered Sanchez was wearing a bulletproof vest.
T he officers then became concerned Sanchez might be armed. They
handc uffed him and completed the frisk . One of the officers felt a large, bulky, soft object concealed in Sanchez’s sock which he believed contained

narcotics. The officer lifted Sanchez’s pant leg and saw baggies containing a green leafy substance the office r believed to be marijuana. He also found

one baggie containing a white crystal

- like substance he believed to be methamphetamine. The officers arrested Sanchez and placed him in the backseat of their patrol car. The officer who conducted the frisk then
searched the SUV and found a loaded rifle , loaded magazines for the rifle,

a loaded revolver, a knife, and an expandable baton, all within reach of a person sitting in the driver’s seat.

¶4 Before trial, Sanchez moved to suppress the drugs and all
items fou nd in the SUV. At the suppression hearing, Sanchez conceded the officers were justified in conducting a frisk for weapons; his only argument
was that the frisk exceeded a search for weapons when the officer lifted his pant leg and removed the package from his sock. The officer testified, however, that based on the circumstances and his experience

, when he felt
the soft bulge in Sanchez’s sock

, he was certain it was packaged contraband.
See State v. Watkins , 207 Ariz. 562, 568, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d 1174, 1180 ( App. 2004) ( “C ontraband may be seized if during a lawful frisk , the officer feels an object he knows is contraband without the need to manipulate it .” ). The superior court denied the motion to suppress based on th e totality of t he
circumstances and the credibility of the officer’s testimony that in his 21 years of experience he “never found a bulge in somebody’s sock that has not been packaged narcotics.” W e see no error in the superior court’s ruling on Sanchez’s motion to supp ress. State v. Baggett , 232 Ariz. 424, 426, ¶ 7, 306 P.3d 81, 83 (App. 2013) ( appellate court reviews a superior court’ s denial of motion to supp ress for abuse of discretion and will “defer to the [superior] court’s determinations of the credibility of th e officers and the reasonableness of the inferences they dr [ a ] w , but [will] consider theSTATE v. SANCHEZ
Dec ision of the Court

4 [superior] court’ s legal decisions de novo ”) ( citati on omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 3

¶5 At trial, a Phoenix Police Department criminalist testified
each baggie contained either marijuana or methamphetamine. Certified latent print examiners testified Sanchez’s left middle finger print was on the
revolver and his thumbprint matched the thumbprint on a certified sentencing minute entry in a prior felony case

. A superior court civil

- rights

restor ation clerk testified the superior court had not entered an order restoring Sanchez’s right to possess weapons in that prior felony case

. The jury found Sanchez guilty on all counts.

¶6 At the sentencing hearing, Sanc hez admitted to having two historical prior felony c onvictions and also avowed in a plea agreement accepted by the court in an unrelated matter to having two other prior felony convictions. T he superior court sentenced him as a category 3 repetitive offen der to the presumptive term of 10 years for count s one, three, four, and five, and the presumptive term of 3.75 years for count two ; all sentences to be served concurrently. See A.R.S. § 13

- 703(C), (J) (Supp. 2014). The court correctly calculated and awa rded Sanchez 490 days of presentence incarceration credit.

DISCUSSION

¶7 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and
find none. See Leon , 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881

. Sanchez received a

3 Although the police handcuffed, arrested, and placed
Sanchez in the backseat of their patrol car before searching the SUV,
Sanchez did not separately challenge their search of the SUV under Arizona
v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009) ( subject to certain exceptions, search incident to arr est exception to warrant requirement does not apply to search of defendant’s vehicle when
defendant secured in patrol car and could not reasonably access vehicle )

. The record as developed by the parties at the suppression hearing does not
allow us to eval uate the validity of the search of the SUV under Gant

. If
Sanchez believes the search of the SUV was invalid, nothing in this decision
should be const rued as precluding him from seeking post

- conviction relief
based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
32.STATE v. SANCHEZ
Dec ision of the Court

5 fair trial. He was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and was present at all critical stages.

¶8 The evidence presented at tri al was substantial and supports the verdicts. The jury w as properly comprised of 12 members and the court properly ins tructed the jury on the elements of th e charges

, Sanchez ’s presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, and the necessity of a unanimous verdict. The superior court received and considered a presentence report, Sanchez was given an opportunity to speak at sentencing, and he did s o. H is sentences were within the range of acceptable sentences for his offense s.

¶9 In our review of the record, we discovered errors in the superior court’s sentencing minute entry. First, t he minute entry incorrectly references “ A.R.S. § 13

- 3102 ” under “Coun t 5 MISCONDUCT INVOLVING BODY ARMOR.” The correct statute for misconduct involving body armor is A.R.S. § 13

- 3116 , and thus we correct the minute entry to reflect the same. Second, t he minute entry describes Sanchez’s
convictions as “ non

- repetitive, ” and lists “ A.R.S. 13

- 702

, ” the “First time felony offenders” statute under each offense. The record is abundantly
clear , however, the superior court intended to
, and did, sentence Sanchez

as a c ategory 3 repetitive offender. Not only did the superior court find at sentencing that Sanchez had two historical prior f elony offenses, but
Sanchez avowed he had two other prior felony convictions. Also, the term
of each sentence the court imposed matched the appropriate term under t he repetitive offender statute, A .R.S. § 13

- 703

. Thus we correct the sentencing minute entry to r eplace each reference to “A.R.S. § 13

- 702” with “A.R.S. §
13

- 703” and to describe each conviction as “repetitive.”STATE v. SANCHEZ
Dec ision of the Court

6 CONCLUSION

¶10 We decline to order briefing and affirm Sanchez ’s convi ction s and sentence s as corrected

.
¶11 After the filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations pertaining to Sanchez ’s representation in this appeal have ended. Defense
counsel need do no more than inform Sanchez of the outcome of this appeal

a nd his future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for
review. See State v. Shattuck , 140 Ariz. 582, 584

- 85, 684 P.2d 154, 156

- 57 (1984)

.
¶12 Sanchez has 30 days from the date of th is decision to proceed, if he wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. On the court’s own motion, we also grant Sanchez 30 days from the date of this decision
to file an in propria persona motion for reconsideration.