*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 2, 2005*

Decided June 3, 2005

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 04-3449

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANGELA K. TRUDELLE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Western

District of Wisconsin

No. 04-CR-53-S-01

John C. Shabaz, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Pursuant to a written agreement, Angela Trudelle pleaded guilty to one

count of conspiracy to distribute at least 500 grams methamphetamine. See 21

U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1). After crediting Trudelle for the 17 months already served

on a state conviction arising from the conspiracy, the district court imposed a term

of 119 months to run concurrent with the remainder of her state sentence. Trudelle

now challenges the calculation of her criminal history score. Having concluded that

the district court incorrectly calculated Trudelle’s criminal history score, we vacate

her sentence and remand to the district court.

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-3449 Page 2

Trudelle’s conspiracy ran from August 2001 to April 2003 and encompassed

three state convictions all for methamphetamine offenses. The first state offense

occurred in October 2002, when Trudelle was arrested in Wisconsin for possession

of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and released on bond. Before that

charge was resolved, she left for Minnesota and was caught there with

methamphetamine in November 2002. Upon conviction for this second offense, the

Minnesota court sentenced Trudelle to five days in jail and three years’ probation. 

And once back in Wisconsin she was also convicted of what the parties describe as

“bail jumping.” Trudelle was still on probation for the Minnesota offense when she

was arrested yet again in Wisconsin for possession of methamphetamine in April

2003. In August 2003 she was sentenced to 10 years’ probation on this last offense,

and at the same time she was sentenced for her October 2002 offense to 30 months’

imprisonment. Trudelle began serving this Wisconsin sentence before the federal

prosecution commenced. 

In calculating Trudelle’s criminal history, the probation officer assigned her

zero criminal-history points for the three state drug convictions because, as both the

government and Trudelle agreed, all three are for conduct that was part of the

conspiracy prosecuted in federal court. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.1 (explaining

that prior convictions arising from same conduct underlying current federal

prosecution are ignored in scoring defendant’s criminal history). But reasoning

that bail jumping is distinct from drug trafficking and thus not relevant conduct for

the conspiracy charge, the probation officer assigned 1 criminal-history point for

that conviction. And since Trudelle engaged in acts relating to the conspiracy while

on probation for her November 2002 offense committed in Minnesota, the probation

officer added 2 more points under § 4A1.1(d) on the theory that the conspiracy was

committed while Trudelle was under a “criminal justice sentence,” i.e., probation. 

These 3 points resulted in a Criminal History Category of II and made Trudelle

ineligible for relief under the “safety valve.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (should

defendant meet five criteria, including having no more than 1 criminal-history

point, court may impose sentence without regard to statutory mandatory minimum

penalties); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (same); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(7) (providing two-level

decrease in offense level for drug offenders who satisfy § 3553(f) criteria). This

criminal history calculation, coupled with the total offense level of 31 proposed by

the probation officer, yielded an imprisonment range of 121 to 151 months. 

The government endorsed the probation officer’s recommendations at

sentencing, but Trudelle posed several objections. First she argued that her

conviction for bail jumping should not lead to even 1 criminal history point because,

she said, it too arose from conduct comprising the federal conspiracy just like her

other three state offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.1. Likewise, Trudelle

argued, she should not be given 2 criminal history points for committing the

conspiracy while on probation for her Minnesota conviction because under the
No. 04-3449 Page 3

guidelines these points can be assessed only when the offense of conviction was

committed while under a “criminal justice sentence,” which by definition excludes

prior offenses like her Minnesota case that do not result in criminal history points. 

See id. § 4A1.1(d), cmt. n.4. It followed, Trudelle explained, that her criminal

history score was really zero, and so she was eligible for relief under the safety

valve. Finally, Trudelle objected to being sentenced under the guidelines in light of

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and our then-recent decision in

United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004). 

The district court rejected Trudelle’s objections to the criminal history points,

but sustained her Booker challenge and, consequently, proceeded as though the

guidelines were advisory. The district court selected 136 months as an appropriate

term but reduced that number to 119 to account for the time Trudelle already had

served on her 30-month Wisconsin sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). Section

5G1.3(b) authorized the court to impose a term below the otherwise-applicable 10-

year minimum mandatory term as necessary to account for the state time. See 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii); United States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594-95 (7th Cir.

2000). Had Trudelle prevailed on just her objection to the 2 criminal history points

imposed by the court under § 4A1.1(d), a sentence as low as 70 months would have

been within the guideline range.

And indeed, as the government candidly concedes, Trudelle should have

prevailed at least with respect to those criminal history points. When calculating

the criminal history score, the guidelines allow for 2 points to be added “if the

defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence,

including probation.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). The guidelines define a “criminal justice

sentence” as a sentence countable under § 4A1.2. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, cmt. n.4. Here

the district court did not count the sentence imposed for the Minnesota conviction

because that offense was committed as part of the conspiracy prosecuted in federal

court. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1) & cmt. n.1 (excluding from definition of “prior

sentence” countable under § 4A1.1 any sentence impose based on conduct that is

part of instant offense); United States v. Garecht, 183 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1999).

And given that the district court did not count the Minnesota conviction, Trudelle’s

commission of the federal conspiracy while on probation for her Minnesota

conviction should not have resulted in the assessment of any points under

§ 4A1.1(d). Correcting this error reduces Trudelle’s criminal history score to 1,

making her eligible for the safety valve. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). We need not

address whether imposing the additional 1 point for bail jumping was also error

because that additional point has no further impact on Trudelle’s sentence. 

Although after United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the sentencing

guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory, we have held that an incorrect

application of the guidelines still requires resentencing. See United States v. Scott,
No. 04-3449 Page 4

405 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 2005). In the post-Booker era the guidelines “continue

to inform the district courts,” so a sentencing judge must calculate the range

accurately and explain its reasons if it imposes a sentence outside that range. 

United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 472-73 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Accordingly, we REMAND for resentencing in accordance with this order.