2023 IL App (1st) 220231

SIXTH DIVISION

Filing Date June 2, 2023 

No. 1-22-0231 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ISREAEL DAVIS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the 

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 20 CR 02786 

The Honorable 

Adrienne Davis, 

Judge, Presiding. 

JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices C.A. Walker and Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant Isreael Davis was convicted of aggravated possession 

of a stolen motor vehicle (aggravated PSMV) (625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7)(A) (West 2018)), 

simple possession of a stolen motor vehicle (PSMV) (id. § 4-103(a)(1)), and two counts of 

aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer (id. § 11-204.1(a)(1), (4)). He was 

sentenced to concurrent prison terms of four years for aggravated PSMV, three years for 

PSMV, three years for aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, and two years 
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for fleeing and eluding. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to challenge a police officer’s identification testimony and failing to move for 

discovery sanctions or seek a continuance to rebut the testimony, (2) he was not proven guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt where his conviction rested solely on that officer’s identification, 

(3) the State never established that the officer pursuing defendant was in a police uniform, and

(4) his PSMV conviction is a lesser included offense of aggravated PSMV and that both the 

aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer and fleeing and eluding were based 

on the same act of fleeing that officer. For the reasons that follow, we affirm and remand for 

correction of the mittimus.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant’s arrest and subsequent trial stem from events that occurred on November 10, 

2019, when he was arrested and charged with aggravated PSMV, simple PSMV, and two 

counts of aggravated attempting to flee or elude a peace officer. 

¶ 4 A. Trial 

¶ 5 Terry Hobson testified for the State that on November 7, 2019, he owned a gray 2007 Ford 

Edge. On that day, he was at a gas station in Riverdale. He left the car running while he went 

inside to pay for the gas, and while returning to his car, he saw two black males in his vehicle 

driving away. Hobson was unable to see the faces of the men that took his car. He called the 

police and reported the car stolen. On cross-examination, Hobson stated that defendant was 

one of the men in his car that night, but he admitted that he did not give any identifying 

information or description to the Riverdale police. Hobson next saw his car on November 10, 

2019, at the South Holland car pound. The car was very damaged, the airbags were deployed, 

and all of his personal property was missing from the car. Hobson identified defendant in court 
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as someone he recognized from around the neighborhood. Hobson stated that defendant did 

not have permission to be in possession of his 2007 Ford Edge on November 10, 2019. 

¶ 6 Chicago police officer Matthew Parisi testified that during the evening of November 9 and 

early morning hours of November 10, 2019, he was assigned to the Chicago Police 

Department, Fifth District,1 and was on duty as a tactical unit officer. He was working with his 

partner, Officer Steven Kotrba, and their duties included responding to shootings and gang 

activity in the area. Both he and his partner were dressed in plain clothes but were wearing 

badges and bulletproof vests with designators indicating that they were Chicago police. Officer 

Parisi stated that they were in an unmarked police vehicle that was equipped with lights and 

sirens, and he rode in the front passenger seat. 

¶ 7 Officer Parisi testified that he and his partner were responding to a ShotSpotter alert in the 

area of 116th Street and Prairie Avenue. They proceeded to the area heading north from 119th 

Street. They arrived at the intersection of 116th Street and Michigan Avenue at approximately 

12:03 a.m., and Officer Parisi saw a dark-colored Ford Edge stopped at the intersection. The 

police vehicle was on Michigan Avenue facing north, and the Ford Edge was on 116th Street, 

facing west. Office Parisi testified that he had an unobstructed view of the driver of the Ford 

Edge, and the area was illuminated by numerous streetlights. Officer Parisi identified 

defendant in court as the person he saw in the driver’s seat of the Ford Edge. 

¶ 8 Officer Parisi testified that defendant looked in his direction, then moved his body 

consistent with placing something under the driver’s seat. Defendant then accelerated and 

turned in front of the police vehicle and continued south on Michigan Avenue at a high rate of 

1

The Fifth District is located at 727 East 111th Street in Chicago. 
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speed. Officer Parisi turned and recorded the license plate of the Ford Edge, while Officer 

Kotrba made a U-turn, activated the lights and sirens, and pursued the Ford Edge. Officer Parisi 

ran the license plates of the Ford Edge and learned that it was stolen. He testified that the police 

vehicle was traveling approximately 60 miles per hour (mph) to catch defendant and that the 

speed limit in the area was 35 mph. During the chase, Officer Parisi saw defendant disregard 

a stop sign at 117th Street and Michigan Avenue, as well as a solid red light at 119th Street 

and Michigan Avenue. The officers continued pursuing the Ford Edge until they received an 

order to terminate the chase due to it becoming a threat to the public. Officer Kotrba stopped 

the police vehicle, and Officer Parisi saw defendant continue to flee and enter the Bishop Ford 

Expressway. Officer Parisi further testified that, later that morning, he and Officer Kotrba went 

to South Holland, Illinois, where they saw the dark colored Ford Edge had crashed in a strip 

mall. He also saw defendant in the back of an Illinois State Police squad car and identified him 

on the scene as the driver of the Ford Edge. 

¶ 9 On cross-examination, Officer Parisi testified that he looked at defendant for three to four 

seconds, that defendant looked directly at the police vehicle, and that he recognized defendant 

from a prior arrest in 2018 that defendant had in the same district. Officer Parisi acknowledged 

that the Ford Edge was never fingerprinted and that there may have been other individuals in 

the Ford Edge. 

¶ 10 South Holland police officer Robert Flores testified that he was on duty in the early 

morning hours of November 10, 2019, and received a dispatch regarding a vehicle chase 

coming through his area. He was on patrol and was in full police uniform. Officer Flores 

testified that he observed the Ford Edge traveling at a high rate of speed southbound on State 

Street and he pursued the vehicle at approximately 1:15 a.m. Officer Flores lost sight of the 
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vehicle shortly thereafter and terminated his pursuit. However, he saw the vehicle again a short 

time later after it crashed into another vehicle near a strip mall at 162nd Street and South Park 

Avenue in South Holland. The gray Ford Edge was subsequently towed to the South Holland 

impound lot. Officer Flores did not make any arrests that night, but he saw defendant in custody 

following the crash. On cross-examination, Officer Flores admitted that he did not see the 

accident or who was driving the Ford Edge. 

¶ 11 The State requested a continuance to bring in the Illinois State Police officers as witnesses, 

but they did not appear at the next court date, and the trial court denied the State’s motion for 

a second continuance. The State admitted its exhibits into evidence and rested. Defendant 

moved for a directed finding, which was denied. Defendant then rested without presenting any 

evidence after being admonished of his right to testify. 

¶ 12 The trial court found defendant guilty on all counts, finding that the police officers testified 

credibly. The court noted that Officer Parisi saw defendant, recognized him, and identified him 

in court as the driver of the Ford Edge. The court also noted that Officer Parisi testified that he 

was wearing designators indicating that he was a police officer on the night of the pursuit and 

further that defendant was detained in custody in the area of the Ford Edge following the crash.

¶ 13 B. Posttrial Proceedings 

¶ 14 Following trial, on December 16, 2020, defendant indicated to the trial court that he wished 

to file a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against his trial counsel. Defendant also 

stated that he wished to proceed pro se and that he had other motions for a new trial, which he 

later filed. In his various motions, defendant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for

(1) insufficiently communicating with defendant while he was in custody pending trial, 

(2) coercing defendant not to testify at trial, (3) inadequately investigating and preparing for 
No. 1-22-0231 

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trial, (4) not objecting to Officer Parisi’s testimony about defendant’s 2018 arrest, and (5) not 

impeaching Officer Parisi with defendant’s 2018 arrest report and complaints filed against 

Officer Parisi.The trial court continued the matter for a Krankel hearing (see People v. Krankel, 

102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984)). 

¶ 15 On February 10, 2021, defendant’s trial counsel moved to withdraw because defendant 

filed a complaint against him with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, 

which the trial court granted. The case was continued for defendant to obtain new counsel, but 

the public defender was subsequently appointed to represent defendant for posttrial motions 

and sentencing at defendant’s request. Posttrial counsel filed an amended motion for a new 

trial in August 2021, alleging that the State failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt and that his trial counsel coerced him into not testifying, failed to sufficiently 

communicate with defendant prior to trial, inadequately investigated the case, failed to object 

to improper testimony, and failed to impeach Officer Parisi with defendant’s 2018 arrest 

reports, which showed that he was not involved with defendant’s 2018 arrest. 

¶ 16 The trial court conducted a pre-Krankel inquiry and held a hearing on all of defendant’s 

motions on September 29, 2021. Defendant argued that trial counsel’s performance was 

deficient particularly for not impeaching Officer Parisi with defendant’s 2018 arrest reports, 

which showed that Parisi was not an arresting or assisting officer. Defendant argued that the 

court could infer that Officer Parisi lied about recognizing defendant and then found him not 

credible. He also argued that a motion to suppress that testimony could have been granted 

based on that inference and should have been filed by trial counsel. There was no argument 

made about any alleged discovery violations by the State, as now raised on appeal. 
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¶ 17 In response, the State argued that Officer Parisi did not lie, as he never stated that he was 

involved in defendant’s 2018 arrest. The State also argued that trial counsel could not have 

been ineffective for failing to impeach Officer Parisi with defendant’s 2018 arrest reports 

because counsel did not know before trial that the officer would testify that he knew defendant 

from a prior arrest. 

¶ 18 The trial court denied defendant’s motion for new trial, noting that an alleged lack of 

credibility was not a legal basis for filing a motion to suppress, and further found that 

defendant’s arguments amounted to a claim that trial counsel should have further crossexamined Officer Parisi on his identification of defendant. The trial court also rejected 

defendant’s argument that counsel had not communicated with defendant, as it saw trial 

counsel talking with defendant in court. The court ultimately found that trial counsel was 

prepared and sufficiently cross-examined each witness. 

¶ 19 The case moved to sentencing, where evidence was presented in aggravation and 

mitigation, as well as arguments from the State and defense. Defendant told the court that he 

wished to be heard, and he was sworn in. Defendant stated that he wished to proceed pro se

and made a verbal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against posttrial counsel and filed 

a motion in support. Sentencing was continued so that defendant’s pro se posttrial motion 

could proceed, and defendant filed a second pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of 

counsel. 

¶ 20 On January 27, 2021, the trial court heard defendant’s pro se arguments on his claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel as to both trial counsel and posttrial counsel, which the court 

described as a Krankel hearing. Defendant raised the same arguments as in his initial motion 

in reference to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, and the trial court again found that defendant 
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had not made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel to warrant further 

hearings. The trial court then clarified that the hearing was a pre-Krankel inquiry and that it 

did not find any indication of ineffectiveness.2 

¶ 21 Defendant was then sentenced to four years’ imprisonment for aggravated PSMV, three 

years’ imprisonment for PSMV, three years’ imprisonment for aggravated fleeing and eluding, 

and two years’ imprisonment for fleeing and eluding. The trial court stated that the sentences 

were concurrent and merged with each other for a total prison term of four years. 

¶ 22 This timely appeal followed. 

¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 24 On appeal, defendant contends that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge Officer Parisi’s identification testimony and failing to move for discovery sanctions 

or seek a continuance to rebut the testimony, (2) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt where his conviction rested solely on Officer Parisi’s identification, (3) the State never 

established that the officer pursuing defendant was in a police uniform, and (4) his PSMV 

conviction is a lesser included offense of aggravated PSMV and the aggravated fleeing or 

attempting to elude a peace officer and fleeing and eluding were based on the same act of 

fleeing Officer Parisi. We will examine each of defendant’s contentions below. 

¶ 25 A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 26 Defendant first contends that, where his conviction rests “solely” on Officer Parisi’s 

identification of him and was deemed reliable because of Parisi’s prior familiarity of defendant, 

2

Although the trial court did not explicitly indicate that this was defendant’s second pre-Krankel

inquiry, the record itself establishes that this was a second preliminary investigation into defendant’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims and no full Krankel hearing was held after either pre-Krankel

inquiry. 
No. 1-22-0231 

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defense counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach the officer’s testimony, move for 

discovery sanctions against the State for its failure to disclose Parisi’s identification statement, 

and request a short recess or continuance to secure defendant’s 2018 arrest records to refute 

Parisi’s testimony. 

¶ 27 A criminal defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel under both the 

United States and Illinois Constitutions. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 

(1984). In determining whether a defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, this 

court applies the familiar two-prong test set forth in Strickland. A defendant must demonstrate 

that (1) trial counsel’s representation was deficient and (2) the deficient performance 

prejudiced defendant. People v. Burnett, 2019 IL App (1st) 163018, ¶ 9. If a defendant fails to 

establish either prong, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. People v. Colon, 225 

Ill. 2d 125, 135 (2007). 

¶ 28 To establish deficient performance, the defendant must show that his attorney’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. People v. Thomas, 2017 IL 

App (4th) 150815, ¶ 10 (citing People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 219 (2004)). Effective counsel 

refers to competent, not perfect, representation. People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (1994). 

To establish the second prong of Strickland, a defendant must show that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. Thomas, 2017 IL App (4th) 150815, ¶ 11 (citing People v. Houston, 229 

Ill. 2d 1, 4 (2008)). A “reasonable probability” has been defined as a probability that would be 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. While the defendant must 

satisfy both prongs to prevail, the reviewing court may analyze the facts under either prong 

first, and if it deems that the standard for that prong is not satisfied, it need not consider the 
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other prong. People v. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130152, ¶ 33. We analyze claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel by considering the entire record. Burnett, 2019 IL App (1st) 

163018, ¶ 9. The ultimate question of whether counsel’s actions support a claim for ineffective 

assistance of counsel is subject to de novo review on appeal. People v. Max, 2012 IL App (3d) 

110385, ¶ 64. However, if a trial court has reached a determination on the merits of defendant’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we will reverse only if the trial court’s action was 

manifestly erroneous. People v. Tolefree, 2011 IL App (1st) 100689, ¶ 25 (citing People v. 

McCarter, 385 Ill. App. 3d 919, 941 (2008)). “Manifest error” is error that is clearly plain, 

evident, and indisputable. Id. (citing People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155 (2004)). 

¶ 29 We give substantial deference to an attorney’s decisions as there is a strong presumption 

that an attorney acted adequately. People v. Steele, 2014 IL App (1st) 121452, ¶ 38. A 

defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction might 

have been the product of sound trial strategy. Id. Every effort must be made to eliminate the 

effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of challenged conduct, and to evaluate 

the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Because 

effective assistance refers to competent and not perfect representation, mistakes in trial strategy 

or judgment will not, standing alone, render the representation incompetent. Steele, 2014 IL 

App (1st) 121452, ¶ 38. 

¶ 30 As noted above, defendant makes several claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness:

(1) failure to impeach Officer Parisi’s testimony with the arrest report because the arrest report 

did not mention the officer’s prior familiarity with defendant, (2) failure to move for discovery 

sanctions against the State for failing to disclose that Officer Parisi had previously encountered 

defendant in 2018, and (3) failure to move for a short recess or continuance to investigate 
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Officer Parisi’s testimony and to obtain defendant’s 2018 arrest records to refute the officer’s 

claim that he knew defendant from his 2018 arrest. We shall examine each below. 

¶ 31 Upon examination of the record, we find that defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel are without merit, as he has not established that the outcome of his trial would have 

been different were it not for the complained-of errors.

¶ 32 With respect to defendant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach 

Officer Parisi’s testimony with the arrest report that did not mention any prior familiarity with 

defendant, this court has consistently held that a lack of details in an arrest report does not 

render an officer’s testimony inconsistent and that defense counsel is not ineffective for failing 

to impeach the officer about the absent details. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130152, ¶¶ 44-45 

(citing People v. Vasquez, 368 Ill. App. 3d 241, 256 (2006)). Accordingly, we find that the 

lack of detail in the arrest report regarding Officer Parisi’s prior knowledge of defendant from 

a prior arrest was not a basis for impeaching the officer; thus trial counsel was not ineffective 

for failing to cross-examine Officer Parisi regarding the arrest report.

¶ 33 Defendant’s next claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is based on counsel’s 

failure to move for discovery sanctions against the State for failing to disclose that Officer 

Parisi had previously encountered defendant in 2018. He contends that the State’s failure to 

disclose Officer Parisi’s statement prior to trial was a violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

412 (eff. Mar. 1, 2001). Defendant argues that, because his conviction was solely based on 

Officer Parisi’s identification of him, this evidence should have been suppressed and its 

admission at trial amounted to error. We disagree for the reasons stated below. 

¶ 34 Rule 412(a)(i) provides that, upon written motion of defense counsel, the State shall 

disclose to defense counsel the names and last known addresses of persons whom the State 
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intends to call as witnesses, together with their relevant written or recorded statements, 

memoranda containing substantially verbatim reports of their oral statements, and a list of 

memoranda reporting or summarizing their oral statements. Ill. S. Ct. R. 412(a)(i) (eff. Mar. 1, 

2001). Additionally, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 415(b) (eff. Oct. 23, 2020) places a 

continuing duty to disclose on the parties, providing that, if a party discovers additional 

material or information subject to disclosure, he or she must promptly notify the other party or 

his counsel of the existence of the additional information. 

¶ 35 Here, while the record does not contain a copy of defendant’s pretrial discovery request 

motion, a copy of the State’s answer to defendant’s discovery request is included. The State’s 

answer to the discovery request motion indicated that discovery would include statements 

made by persons the State may call as witnesses. However, the record does not include any 

written or verbal statements made by Officer Parisi other than those reflected in the various 

documents related to defendant’s arrest, including the arrest report and citations. The record is 

also silent as to whether the State knew that Officer Parisi was familiar with defendant from a 

prior arrest, as it was not mentioned during the State’s opening statement. In the absence of 

evidence that the State had additional statements of Officer Parisi that it failed to disclose, it is 

highly unlikely that a motion for discovery sanctions would have succeeded, and thus 

defendant cannot show he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to request them. See Steele, 

2014 IL App (1st) 121452, ¶ 41. 

¶ 36 Moreover, the report of proceedings reveals that Officer Parisi’s prior familiarity with 

defendant was elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination in response to questioning 

related to Officer Parisi’s ability to observe and identify defendant. The State subsequently 

commented on this evidence during its closing argument. It is well settled that, where defense 
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counsel elicits particular testimony on cross-examination, the defendant cannot later complain 

about that which is elicited. People v. Hambrick, 68 Ill. App. 3d 447, 451 (1979); People v. 

Taylor, 357 Ill. App. 3d 220, 227 (2005) (when a defendant procures, invites, or acquiesces in 

the admission of evidence, even though the evidence is improper, he cannot contest the 

admission on appeal (citing People v. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d 318, 332 (2005))). As such, this cannot 

serve as the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

¶ 37 Defendant also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a short 

recess or continuance to investigate Officer Parisi’s testimony and to obtain defendant’s 2018 

arrest records to refute the officer’s claim that he knew defendant from his 2018 arrest. The 

record reveals that defendant attached a copy of his 2018 arrest report to his pro se posttrial 

motion for ineffective assistance of counsel that was presented to the trial court for review. 

Defendant’s July 7, 2018, arrest report indicates that the arresting officers were on a gang 

suppression mission and observed “offender” walking in an alley with a backpack on in an 

area of recent shootings. The reporting officer knew the offender to be defendant and knew his 

criminal history. A loaded gun was subsequently recovered after defendant was detained, and 

he was charged with aggravated unlawful use of a weapon without possession of a firearm 

owner’s identification or conceal and carry card. The arresting and reporting officers were 

Officers Dicera and Ramos. The 2018 arrest report and the arrest report for the case at bar both 

indicate that defendant was processed at the 727 East 111th Street police station. 

¶ 38 While defendant is correct that the 2018 arrest report does not indicate Officer Parisi’s 

involvement with his arrest, the arrest report alone does not conclusively establish that Officer 

Parisi was not familiar with defendant. Officer Parisi’s testimony on cross-examination was 

that “[h]e was attempting to conceal something, looked right at us, and I recognized Mr. Isreael 
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Davis from a prior arrest in 2018 he had in the same district.” Officer Parisi did not testify that 

he was involved in defendant’s prior arrest; thus it is therefore unclear how the 2018 arrest 

report, standing alone, would have changed the outcome of defendant’s case, necessary to 

establish prejudice under Strickland. See Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135. 

¶ 39 In short, all of defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail because he has 

not established prejudice. See People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 54 (an error by counsel, 

even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal 

proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment). Strickland asks whether it is “reasonably 

likely” the result would have been different; a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different is a “ ‘probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Strickland

requires a defendant to “affirmatively prove” that prejudice resulted from counsel’s errors. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. Satisfying the prejudice prong requires a showing of actual 

prejudice, not simply speculation that defendant may have been prejudiced. Johnson, 2021 IL 

126291, ¶ 55. 

¶ 40 Contrary to defendant’s assertions on appeal, his conviction did not rest solely on Officer 

Parisi’s identification of him. The evidence presented by the State established that on 

November 7, 2019, Hobson’s gray Ford Edge was stolen by two individuals from a gas station 

in Riverdale. On November 10, 2019, Officer Parisi and his partner were on patrol near 116th 

Street and Michigan Avenue when they heard a report of shots fired from the ShotSpotter in 

the vicinity. The police vehicle arrived at the intersection of 116th Street and Michigan Avenue 

at the same time as a gray Ford Edge with three people inside. The gray car was facing west, 

to the right of the officers’ vehicle. Officer Parisi was on the passenger side and testified that
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he was clearly able to see the driver of the vehicle. Officer Parisi saw the driver look over at 

the police vehicle, duck down, and make a motion like he was putting something under the 

seat before quickly turning in front of the officers and driving off at a high rate of speed. The 

officers activated their emergency equipment and pursued the vehicle, but it did not stop. The 

officers also checked the license plate of the vehicle and learned that it was reported stolen 

three days prior. The officers pursued the vehicle in a high-speed chase to the expressway, 

where they stopped the pursuit for safety reasons. However, Officer Flores from South Holland 

subsequently pursued the vehicle after notification of the chase in South Holland. Although he 

lost sight of the vehicle, shortly thereafter, he learned that the vehicle crashed near a strip mall 

in South Holland. When Officer Flores arrived at the scene, defendant and another person were

handcuffed in the back of an Illinois State Police squad car, which had responded to the crash 

scene. It was reported that three individuals fled from the crashed vehicle before being 

apprehended by the state police. A gun was recovered from the vehicle. When Officer Parisi 

arrived at the scene, he identified defendant as the driver of the vehicle.

¶ 41 A conviction can be sustained upon circumstantial evidence as well as direct, and to prove 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean that the factfinder must disregard the inferences 

that flow normally from the evidence before it. People v. Saxon, 374 Ill. App. 3d 409, 417 

(2007). Circumstantial evidence is proof of facts or circumstances that give rise to reasonable 

inferences of other facts that tend to establish the guilt or innocence of defendant. Id. The trier 

of fact does not have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of every link in the chain of 

circumstantial evidence. Id. It is sufficient if all the evidence taken as a whole satisfies the trier 

of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. An inference is a factual conclusion that can rationally 

be drawn by considering other facts. Id. at 416. Thus, an inference is merely a deduction that 
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the factfinder may draw in its discretion, but it is not required to draw as a matter of law. Id.

Additionally, flight is generally considered some evidence of a guilty mind. People v. Aljohani, 

2021 IL App (1st) 190692, ¶ 64. In particular, a defendant’s flight from police also indicates 

consciousness of guilt. See People v. Ross, 2019 IL App (1st) 162341, ¶ 32. 

¶ 42 We find that the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to sustain defendant’s 

conviction. The trial evidence, including the high-speed pursuit of the stolen vehicle which 

crashed near a strip mall with defendant subsequently being captured attempting to flee from 

the scene, would have been sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction even without Officer 

Parisi’s statement that he was familiar with defendant because of his prior arrest in 2018. As 

such, defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have 

been different without the claimed errors by trial counsel. We conclude that defendant’s claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail, as he cannot establish prejudice, and that the trial 

court’s findings regarding defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not 

manifestly erroneous. 

¶ 43 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Defendant’s Issues II and III) 

¶ 44 1. Aggravated Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle 

¶ 45 Defendant next contends that the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated PSMV 

where it did not establish that he was the driver of the stolen vehicle. He argues that the poor 

conditions of Officer Parisi’s view of the driver and his “momentary glimpses” could not have 

allowed for a positive identification of defendant as the driver. Defendant’s claim is without 

merit.

¶ 46 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the question is whether, after 

reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could 
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have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact 

on issues concerning the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. People v. 

Robinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, ¶ 11. We may reverse a conviction if the evidence is so 

unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt or when proof of an 

element is wholly lacking. Id.

¶ 47 To prove defendant guilty of aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle, as charged 

here, the State must prove that defendant was the driver or operator of a vehicle, he was not 

entitled to possession of that vehicle, and he knew it was stolen or converted. 625 ILCS 5/4-

103.2(a)(7)(A) (West 2018). The State must also prove that he was given a signal by a peace 

officer directing him to bring the vehicle to a stop and that he willfully failed or refused to 

obey the direction, increased his speed, extinguished his lights, or otherwise fled or attempted 

to elude the officer. Id. The State is not required to prove ownership of a stolen vehicle (People 

v. Smith, 226 Ill. App. 3d 433, 438 (1992)); however, the State must prove that someone other 

than the defendant had a superior interest in the car identified in the charging instrument 

(People v. Fernandez, 204 Ill. App. 3d 105, 109 (1990)). 

¶ 48 Here, defendant’s argument again focuses on Officer Parisi’s identification of him as the 

driver. As noted above, Officer Parisi testified that, when he first saw the driver of the vehicle, 

he was in the passenger seat of the police vehicle and the stolen vehicle was at the same 

intersection to his right, with the driver clearly visible to him. Contrary to the circumstances 

presented in In re O.F., 2020 IL App (1st) 190662, ¶¶ 25-38, cited by defendant, Officer 

Parisi’s view of defendant was not made from across an intersection, through the glare of two 

cars’ windows, but was rather made while sitting in the passenger side of the police vehicle 
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where he could see the stolen vehicle and its driver directly to his right. Also, Officer Parisi 

had a second opportunity to view the driver when the stolen vehicle turned in front of the police 

vehicle to travel south on Michigan Avenue. Although he only saw the driver for a few

moments altogether before the driver turned in front of the police vehicle and took off at a high 

rate of speed, Officer Parisi identified defendant at the crash site as the driver of the vehicle 

and identified him in court as the driver of the vehicle. Officer Parisi’s inability to clearly 

identify the passenger is reasonable considering that the passenger was farther away from his 

line of sight. The trial court, in its position as factfinder, found that the various officers’ 

testimonies were credible. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we 

find that it was sufficient to establish that defendant was the driver of the stolen vehicle.

¶ 49 2. Aggravated Fleeing or Attempting to Elude a Peace Officer 

¶ 50 Likewise, defendant’s claim that his conviction for aggravated fleeing or attempting to 

elude a peace officer should be reversed because the State failed to prove the essential element 

that the officer was wearing a “police uniform” is also without merit. 

¶ 51 To prove the offense of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, the State 

must prove that the driver fled or attempted to elude a peace officer after being given a visual 

or audible signal by a peace officer in the manner prescribed by the Illinois Vehicle Code. 625 

ILCS 5/11-204.1(a) (West 2018). That section further mandates that the officers giving such 

signal shall be in police uniform and the vehicle shall display illuminated oscillating, rotating, 

or flashing red or blue lights. Id. 

¶ 52 Here, Officer Parisi testified that he and his partner were in an unmarked police vehicle 

equipped with emergency equipment consisting of lights and sirens when they encountered the 

stolen vehicle. Both he and his partner were in plain clothes; however, Officer Parisi 
No. 1-22-0231 

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specifically testified that he was wearing a bulletproof vest with his designators on it and had 

his badge on. Officer Parisi and his partner pursued the stolen vehicle with emergency lights 

and sirens activated. The record does not indicate whether Officer Flores or the Illinois State 

Police officers that ultimately arrested defendant were in full police uniform or in plain clothes. 

¶ 53 Defendant argues that there was no evidence that the officers who stopped him were in 

uniform and the fact that Officer Parisi wore a bulletproof vest over his civilian clothes did not 

demonstrate the “distinctive” or “characteristic” design of a police uniform.

¶ 54 This exact argument has been rejected by this court in People v. Cavitt, 2021 IL App (2d) 

170149-B.3 In Cavitt, the defendant was convicted of aggravated fleeing or eluding a police 

officer and argued that the State failed to prove the essential element that the officer was 

wearing a police uniform. Id. ¶ 165. The Cavitt court, following People v. Maxey, 2018 IL App 

(1st) 130698-B, ¶¶ 120-21, and People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133582, ¶¶ 14-16, 

considered this to be an issue of statutory construction and noted that the court’s objective 

involves ascertaining and carrying out the true intent and meaning of the legislature evidenced 

by the language used. Cavitt, 2021 IL App (2d) 170149-B, ¶¶ 167, 169. The court noted that 

the statute has been strictly construed. Id. ¶ 169; see Maxey, 2018 IL App (1st) 130698-B, 

¶¶ 120-21 (reversing the defendant’s conviction for aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude 

a peace officer when the evidence did not show what the officers were wearing at the time of 

the stop). The court concluded that a vest with police markings can, under certain 

3

This same argument was also rejected by this court in People v. Brown, 2020 IL App (1st) 

181511-U, based on the reasoning set forth in the original Cavitt decision (People v. Cavitt, 2019 IL App 

(2d) 170149), which was subsequently vacated pursuant to a supervisory order of the Illinois Supreme 

Court to reconsider a different issue in the case (No. 125398 (Ill. Nov. 18, 2020)). We note however that 

we reversed the defendant’s conviction in People v. Smith, 2020 IL App (2d) 180321-U, where the State 

presented no evidence of whether the police officer in question was wearing a police uniform. 
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circumstances, constitute a police uniform under the statute and that the totality of the evidence 

here was sufficient to establish this element of the offense and that the statute includes this 

requirement to ensure that the defendant is fleeing or eluding an actual police officer. Cavitt, 

2021 IL App (2d) 170149-B, ¶ 174. 

¶ 55 Defendant urges this court to reject the holding in Cavitt as not binding and also because it 

is factually distinguishable. In Cavitt, the defendant was apprehended by a nonundercover 

police officer who ordered defendant to stop his car and who was in defendant’s range of 

vision, wearing a black tactical vest with police markings and a police badge around his neck. 

Id. ¶ 175. We are not persuaded by defendant’s argument. 

¶ 56 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that the State 

presented sufficient evidence that Officer Parisi was in a police uniform when he and his 

partner attempted to curb the stolen vehicle during the chase with their emergency equipment 

activated. Officer Parisi testified that he was in civilian clothes, but he was wearing a 

bulletproof vest with his designations on it and had his badge. It is of no consequence what the 

other officers were wearing; the initial instance of the offense occurred when Officer Parisi 

and his partner attempted to curb the vehicle and defendant did not stop but instead led the 

officers on a high-speed chase that ultimately ended when the vehicle crashed into a building. 

¶ 57 C. Lesser Included Offense/Multiple Convictions From the Same Act

¶ 58 Finally, defendant contends that, because his conviction of simple PSMV is a lesser 

included offense of aggravated PSMV and because his two convictions of aggravated fleeing 

or attempting to elude a police officer were based on the same act of fleeing Officer Parisi, the 

additional convictions are improper. 
No. 1-22-0231 

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¶ 59 The State concedes that under the one-act, one-crime rule, where more than one offense is 

carved from the same physical act and the lesser offense is a lesser-included offense of the 

greater offense, the defendant should be sentenced for the most serious offense; the less serious 

offenses should be vacated. People v. Lucious, 2016 IL App (1st) 141127, ¶ 57. The State thus 

agrees that this court should direct the trial court to correct the mittimus to conform to its oral 

pronouncement merging the PSMV into aggravated PSMV and merging the two separate 

counts of aggravated fleeing and eluding a peace officer. 

¶ 60 Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for correction of the mittimus to reflect that 

defendant’s convictions are for one count of aggravated PSMV and one count of aggravated 

fleeing and attempting to elude a peace officer, with concurrent sentences of four years and 

two years respectively. People v. Jones, 376 Ill. App. 3d 372, 395 (2007) (oral pronouncement 

controls when there is a conflict). 

¶ 61 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 62 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and

remand for correction of the mittimus as directed herein.

¶ 63 Affirmed and remanded with directions. 
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People v. Davis, 2023 IL App (1st) 220231 

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 20-CR02786; the Hon. Adrienne Davis, Judge, presiding. 

Attorneys

for

Appellant:

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Elizabeth A. Botti, of 

State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. 

Attorneys

for

Appellee:

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique 

Abraham, Noah Montague, and Taylor Dall, Assistant State’s 

Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.