AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed January 27, 2020 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-01118-CR 

JEROME JORDAN, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F-1675605-J 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Evans 

Opinion by Justice Reichek 

Jerome Jordan appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery. Bringing two issues, 

appellant contends the trial court erred by submitting a jury charge that did not require a unanimous 

verdict and the judgment should be reformed to reflect the correct offense for which he was 

convicted. We agree the judgment should be reformed as appellant requests. We disagree, 

however, that the court’s charge was erroneous. Accordingly, we reform the judgment to reflect 

the correct offense and, as modified, we affirm. 

Factual Background

In early 2016, appellant was a passenger on a Greyhound bus being driven by Brandon 

Patterson. Both Patterson and appellant lived in Dallas and they discussed getting together to 

smoke marijuana. The two men sent text messages to each other for several weeks until Patterson 
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sent appellant a message on April 20, 2016 asking if they could meet. Appellant sent Patterson 

his address. 

 Patterson drove to appellant’s apartment complex and appellant invited him inside. 

Appellant suggested they go get some “weed” and Patterson responded that he only had $20 with 

him. Appellant asked “Why would you come over here with only $20 and we were talking about 

getting high?” 

At that point, appellant went into his bathroom and came out with an assault rifle. 

Appellant pointed the gun at Patterson and told him to hand over his phone and keys, take off his 

shoes, and get on the ground. Appellant said, “I know you’re not gonna make me kill you over 

some money.” When Patterson refused to get on the ground, appellant shot him in the leg. 

Once Patterson was laying on the floor, appellant began circling around, ranting about 

money. He then picked up some cables and Patterson thought appellant was going to use the cables 

to tie him up. When appellant placed the gun against the wall, Patterson crawled towards it and 

he and appellant grabbed the gun at the same time. As they struggled over control of the gun, it 

discharged. Appellant shouted that his brother was in the other room and Patterson had forced 

him to shoot through the wall. Appellant then stabbed Patterson in the chest with a knife Patterson 

had earlier seen lying on a nearby table. Patterson testified he remembered being stabbed twice. 

Patterson heard someone come to the apartment door, bang on the outside, and ask if 

everything was okay. Patterson yelled back that appellant was trying to kill him and asked the 

person to call the police. Appellant became more upset and tried to stab Patterson in the neck, but 

the knife either “folded” or broke. Appellant then fled the apartment. Police found appellant the 

next day in a truck parked in the apartment complex parking lot. Patterson’s wallet was recovered 

from the truck. Appellant was arrested and indicted for aggravated robbery. The indictment 

alleged that appellant used and exhibited both a gun and a knife during the course of the offense. 
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 Appellant was tried before a jury. After the evidence was presented, the trial court 

submitted a jury charge to which appellant did not object. The abstract portion of the charge 

instructed the jury that “[a] person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing 

theft and with intent to obtain and maintain control of property of another, he intentionally or 

knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.” It further 

instructed that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated robbery if the person committing 

robbery uses or exhibits a deadly weapon.” “Deadly weapon” was defined as “a firearm or 

anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of causing death or serious bodily 

injury, or anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or 

serious bodily injury.” The application portion of the charge read as follows: 

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 

20th day of April, 2016, in Dallas County, Texas, the defendant, JEROME 

JORDAN, did then and there intentionally or knowingly, while in the course of 

committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control of said 

property, threaten or place BRANDON PATTERSON in fear of imminent bodily 

injury or death, and the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to-wit: a 

firearm, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery as charged 

in the indictment. 

Alternatively, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or 

about the 20th day of April, 2016, in Dallas County, Texas, the defendant, 

JEROME JORDAN, did then and there intentionally or knowingly, while in the 

course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control 

of said property, threaten or place BRANDON PATTERSON in fear of imminent 

bodily injury or death, and the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, towit: a knife, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery as 

charged in the indictment. 

The jury was instructed that its verdict was required to be by a unanimous vote of all members and 

the verdict form returned by the jury stated it unanimously found appellant guilty of aggravated 

robbery. Appellant brought this appeal. 
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Analysis 

I. Unanimity of Verdict

In his first issue, appellant contends the jury charge erroneously allowed the jury to convict 

him without requiring it to agree unanimously on all essential elements of the offense. Appellant 

argues the jury was required to make a unanimous decision regarding the type of deadly weapon 

used and submission of different theories of the offense in the disjunctive allowed for an 

impermissible non-unanimous verdict. We note that appellant does not challenge the sufficiency 

of the evidence supporting a finding on either weapon. 

 It has long been held that, when the State alleges differing methods of committing an 

offense in the conjunctive, it is proper for the jury to be charged in the disjunctive. See Kitchens 

v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). Further, where alternative 

methods of committing the same offense are submitted to the jury in the disjunctive, it is 

appropriate for the jury to return a general verdict if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding 

under any of the theories submitted. Id. There is no requirement that the jury reach an agreement 

on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict. Id. Although the jury must 

unanimously agree that the defendant committed one specific crime, the jury need not find 

unanimously that the defendant committed the crime in one specific manner or using the same 

specific means. Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Russell v. State, 

No. 05-17-00124-CR, 2018 WL 525559, at *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 24, 2018, pet. ref’d) (jury 

need only agree unanimously as to fact that appellant committed murder, not as to specific manner 

and means of how appellant committed murder). 

The element of the offense at issue here is the jury’s finding that appellant used or exhibited 

a deadly weapon. As stated above, appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a finding that a knife and/or gun was used in the offense. Nor does he dispute that both 
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were deadly weapons under the facts of this case. Because the element of the offense on which 

the jury had to agree was only that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, and both weapons 

alleged by the State qualified as such, there was no need for the jury to unanimously agree on 

which weapon was used. See Landrian, 268 S.W.3d at 535; see also Ruiz v. State, No 03-97-

00051-CR, 1998 WL 644299, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 17, 1998, pet. ref’d) (proper to 

submit in disjunctive the nature of the deadly weapon used or exhibited during commission of 

offense). We conclude the court’s charge on the issue was proper. We overrule appellant’s first 

issue. 

II. Judgment Modification

 In his second issue, appellant requests this Court modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect 

the correct offense for which he was convicted. The State agrees. Appellant was tried and 

convicted for the offense of aggravated robbery. The judgment, however, states appellant was 

convicted for the offense of “AGGRAVATED ASSALT [sic] WITH A DEADLY WEAPON – 

TO WIT: A FIREARM/KNIFE.” We have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth 

when we have the necessary information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 

865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Because the record affirmatively shows appellant was 

convicted for aggravated robbery, we modify the trial court’s judgment by striking the word 

“ASSALT” from the space provided for “Offense for which Defendant Convicted” and replace it 

with the word “ROBBERY.” 

 

 
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As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 

181118F.U05 

 

/Amanda L. Reichek/ 

AMANDA L. REICHEK 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

JEROME JORDAN, Appellant 

No. 05-18-01118-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the Criminal District Court 

No. 3, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F-1675605-J. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Reichek. 

Justices Molberg and Evans participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED

as follows: 

The word "ASSALT" in the space provided for "Offense for which Defendant 

Convicted” is STRUCK and REPLACED with the word "ROBBERY." 

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered January 27, 2020