IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-CA-01759-COA GRAHAM READ IRBY, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH KAREN COLLINS, MOTHER AND NEX T FRIEND APPELLANT

v. SUDHAKAR MADAKASIRA, M.D. AND PSYCAMORE, LLC APPELLEES

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/24/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN HUEY EMFINGER COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JOHN W . CHRISTOPHER W I LLIAM P. FEATHERSTON JR. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: CLIFFORD B. AMMONS CLIFFORD BARNES AMMONS JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/28/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 04/11/2017 - GRANTED; AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART - 05/29/2018 MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC. BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT: MODIFIED OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING ¶1. The m otion f

or rehearing is granted. The previous opinion of this Court is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted in its place. ¶2. Graham Read Irby , by and through his m o ther, Karen Collins, f iled a wrongf

ul-death suit against the p sy chiatrist who treated his f ather, Stuart M. Irby (Irby ), prior to Irby ’s death by suicide. The suit a lleged the psy chiatrist’s inten t i o n a l a n d negligent acts created anirresistible im pulse in Irby to com m it suicide. T he circuit court dism issed the action, f inding that the claim s of intentiona l a c t s w e r e barred by t he one-y e ar statute of lim itations f or intentional torts and that Irby ’s suicide was a superseding event t hat barred any negligence claim s. On appeal, Collins originally argued that despite allegations of i ntentional acts, the

com plaint was based in negligence, f or which a two-y ear statute of l im itations applied, and the negligence action was not barred. ¶3. Five day s prior to this Court’s origina l d e c i s i o n , t h e Mississippi Suprem e Court decided Pioneer C

ommunity Hospital o

f N e w t o n v. Roberts , 214 So. 3d 259 (Miss. 2017), in which it held that the m inor’s saving statute, Mississippi C ode Annotated section 15-1-59 (Rev. 2012), applies to wrongf u l-death actions where a qualif ied person is a vailable to f ile suit during the lim itations period, but does not d o so. On rehearing, Collins argues that under
Pioneer , the m i nor’s savings statute applied a nd prevented t he dism is s a l o f the c om plaint,

as Graham is a m inor, and no qualif ied person brought s uit during the l im itations period. W e
agree w ith Collins’s argum ent on rehearing that the savings s tatute a p plies. Thus, we reverse and rem and this ma t t e r t o the trial court f or f u rther proceedings. However, the rem and
p r oceedings shall be lim ited to Collins’s intentional-tort claim

. W e f ind, a s we d i d i n o u r original decision, that the trial court correctly dism issed C ollins’s negligence cause of action,

as there is no basis f

o r a n egligence action f o r wrongf

ul death by suicide. Thus, it is
unnecessary f

or the trial c ourt to re v i s i t t he negligence issue on rem a n d. Theref ore, we af f irm in part and reverse and rem and in part.
FACTS

2¶4. Prior to h is death, Irby sought p sy chiatric t reatm ent f rom Dr. Sudhakar Madakasira,

a phy sician specializing in psy chiatry

. Dr. Madakasira treated Irby f or v arious conditions, including bipolar disorder, anger m anagem ent, and alcohol abuse. On Februa r y 1 1 , 2009, Irby and h is wif

e, Karen Irby , n ow Karen Collin s , were involved in a car a c cident. Irby suf f e red a severe, traum a tic f r ontal-lobe brain injury . He continued to see Dr. Madakasira
f or the brain injury

. ¶5. Due to that injury , Irby was deem ed incapable of conducting his o wn business af f airs, and c oconservators w ere appointed by the Hinds County Chancery Court, F i r st Judicial District. The conservators petitioned the c hancery court f or authority to f

ile a divorce

com plaint on Irby ’s behalf against Collins. T h e p e t i t i o n was granted. In support of the divorce com

plaint, the conservators a t t ached an af f idavit executed by D r. M adakasira on October 2 8, 2011, while Irby was under his care. The af f idavit stated that Irby had told Dr. Madakasira that he was unsure if he wanted a divorce f r o m C o l l i n s. However, Dr. Madakasira swore in h i s af f idavit that due to the brain injury , Irby w a s not capable of m aking

a d e cision in his o r Graham ’s best interest regarding the divorce. Dr. Madakasira opined that

a divorce was i n I r

b y ’s best interest and that i t would be detrim e n tal to Irby ’s health to

rem ain m arried to Collins. Dr. Madakasira testif ied consis t e n t l y at the divorce hearing. Although Irby

testif ied he did not want a divorce, the divorce was granted. ¶6. O n J a n u a r y 1 7, 2012, Irby told Collins over the phone t hat he was f orced into t h e divorce and had no reason to live. Irby com m itted suicide at his hom e later that day

. ¶7. On Decem

ber 16, 2013, Collins se n t D r . Madakasira a n d his em ploy e r, Psy cam ore

3LLC, a notice of intent to com m ence a m edical-m alpractice action based on wrongf ul death.
See Miss. Code A nn. § 15-1-36(15) (Rev. 2012) (requiring at least sixty day s’ prior written notice of i ntent t o begin a prof essional-negligence claim against healthcare providers). On March 17, 2014, Collins f i l e d h er com

plaint i n Hinds County Circuit Court, First Judicial District. The com

plaint alleged that Dr. Madakasira and Psy cam o re, through the doctrine of respondeat superior, negligently caused Irby ’s death by suicide. I t was later determ ined that the proper venue was Rankin County , and an agreed order was entered transf e rring the case to Rankin County Circuit Court. ¶8. Af ter t h e c a s e w a s t r a n s f

e r r e d , C ollins was granted leave to f ile an am ended

com plaint. The am ended com plaint alleged negligence and added a c l aim f or “intentional
acts.” The am e nded portion of the com plaint alleged that “[ a ]s a direct and proxim ate result of the intentional a cts o f Dr. Madakasira in assisting the c onservators in the prosecution of the divorce action and the granting of a divorce by the Chancer y C o u r t[ ,] Stuart M. Irby developed an irresistible im p ulse to com m i t suicide[ .]” ¶9. Dr. Madakasira m oved to d ism i ss t he case o n the grounds that t he one-y ear statute of lim itations f

or intentional torts barred the action a n d that any negligence c laim s were barred
f or f ailure to state a claim upon which relief can b e g ranted. Af ter a hearing, the circuit court granted t he m otion to dism iss. Collins’s m otion f or reconsideration w as denied. O n appeal, Collins argued t hat t he two-y ear statute of lim itations f or p rof essional negligence applies and that the case should be reversed and r em anded f o r discovery a nd f

urther proceedings. 1 On

1 C o llin s s e n t a n o t ice-o f

-claim letter o n D ecem

b e r 1 6 , 2 0 1 3 , w h ich to lled th e statu te o f l i m i t a tio n s f

o r six ty d ay s. S

ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 1 5

- 1 -3 6 (1 5 ) (“If th e n o tice is serv ed

4rehearing, Collins f urther ar g u e s t hat the statute of lim itations was tolled by the m inor’s savings clause.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶10. We r e v i e w de novo a trial court’s decision to grant a m otion to dis mi s s u n d e r Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) f or f ailure to state a claim f

or which relief can be granted. Stockstill v. State , 854 So. 2d 1017, 1019-20 (¶4) (Miss. 2003). W hen considering a Rule 12 ( b ) ( 6 ) mo tion to dism iss, “the allegations in t he com plaint m ust be taken as true, and the m otion should not be granted u nless it appears bey ond doubt that the plaintif f w ill be unable to p rove any set of f acts in support o f her claim

. ” Stockstill , 854 So. 2d at 1020 (¶4).
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the m inor’s savings c lause tolled the statute of lim i tations. ¶11. The circuit court f o und t hat the one-y ear statute of lim itations f or i n t e n t ional torts applied, barring the c laim

. I t f urther dism issed Collins’s negligence claim , f inding that while within the two-y ear statute of lim itations f or negligence, a negligence cause o f action cannot be sustained f

or a claim f o r wrongf ul death by

suicide. ¶12. On rehearing, Collins asserts f o r the f i rst tim e that the statute of lim itations was tolled by the m inor’s saving statute, thus m aking the com plaint tim e ly under b oth the o ne- and twoy ear statutes of lim itations. Collins’s argum ent is based on the Mississippi Suprem e Court’s

w i th in six ty (6 0 ) d ay s p rio r t o t h e ex p iratio n o f th e ap p licab le s tatu te o f lim i tatio n s, th e t im e f o r t h e co m m en c em en t o f th e actio n sh all b e ex ten d ed six ty (6 0 ) d ay s f ro m th e s erv ice o f th e n o tice f o r said h e alth care p ro v id ers an d o th e rs.”). T h u s, th e t w o - y ear statu te o f lim itatio n s w o u l d h av e ru n o n M arch 1 8 , 2 0 1 4

. 5decision in P i o n e e r , 2 1 4 So. 3 d at 259, which handed down on March 23, 2017, f ive day s prior to our original decision af f irm ing the circuit court’s dism issal. 2 ¶13. Pioneer changed the law regarding t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of the m inor’s savings statute, section 15-1-59, to wrongf ul-death actions. P rior to P ioneer , the binding case on this issue

was C u r r y v. Turner , 832 So. 2d 508 ( Miss. 2008). Curry held that the m inor’s savings
statute d id not toll the period to f ile a wrongf

u l-death a ction when a qualif ied person existed
to bring suit during the lim itations period. Id. ; see TRK LLC v. Myles , 214 So. 3 d 191, 197 (¶21) (Miss. 2017) (citing Miss. Co d e A n n . § 11-7-13 (Supp. 2016)) (Qualif ied persons include: (1) the deceased’s personal representative; (2) the d e c e a s e d ’ s w i d o w , h u s b a n d , c h i l d , f ather, m other, sister or brother or unborn quick child; and (3) “all interested parties.”). The
suprem e court in Pioneer held t hat Curry went too f ar in f inding “ that the mere existence of

som eone qualif

ied to bring a w r o n g f

ul-death suit

. . . p recluded the application of the [ m i nor’ s s a vings] statute[ .]” Pioneer , 214 So. 3d at 261 (¶3) ( em phasis in original). The
suprem e court f

ound instead that “only w hen som eo n e w h o is qualif ied t o bring a wrongf ul-death suit actually files a wrongful-death suit on the mi n o r b enef iciaries’ behalf

2 G en erally , t h is C o u rt w ill n o t co n sid er issu es th at w ere n o t f irst p resen ted to th e trial co u rt. M id -S

. R etin a L L C v. C o n n er , 7 2 S o . 3 d 1 0 4 8 , 1 0 5 1 (¶1 1 ) (M iss. 2 0 1 1 ). H o w e v er, an ex cep tio n to t h i s r u le is m ad e f o r ch an g es in l aw th at o ccu r d u rin g th e p en d en cy o f an ap p eal. Id

. at 1 0 5 2 (¶1 3 ). A s o u r su p rem e co u rt h as h eld , u n less d e sig n ated as p ro sp ectiv e, “n ew ly en u n ciated r

u les o f law are ap p lied retro a ctiv e ly to cases th at are p en d i n g trial o r t h at are o n ap p eal, an d n o t f

in al a t t h e tim e o f th e en u n ciatio n .” Id

. Wh en P io n eer w as d ecid ed , th is ap p eal w as p en d in g b ef o re th is C o u rt. A s P io n eer i s an in terv e n i n g ch an g e in law

— d ecid e d af

ter trial b u t b e f

o r e th e co m

p letio n o f t h i s ap p eal— an d is n o t d esig n ated as p ro sp ectiv e, C o llin s “is en titled to h av e [ th i s] case d ecid ed in acco rd a n c e w ith it.” Ja m es v. S ta te , 8 2 9 S o . 2 d 7 2 8 , 7 2 9 (¶7 ) (M iss. C t. A p p . 2 0 0 2 ). T h u s, t h is issu e m ay b e raised f o r th e f irst tim e o n ap p eal. M

id -S . R etin a , 7 2 S o . 3 d at 1 0 5 2 (¶1 4 ).

6w i l l t h e m inors s a vings clause not apply , because, once the suit is f iled, the running of the
statute of l im itations i s im m a terial.” Id. (em phasis added). I m

portantly , t he wrongf

ul-death
statute states that “there s hall be but one (1) suit f or the sam e death[ ,] which shall ensue f or the benef it of all parties concerned, but the determ ination of such suit shall not bar another action unless it be decided on its m erits.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13. ¶14. Collins asserts on rehearing that she d id not argue tolling bef ore the trial court or in her initial brief o n appeal because, at that t im e, Curry was s till i n ef f ect, and qualif

ied
persons existed who could have brought suit during the statute of lim i tations. Collins is not qualif ied to recover under the wrongf ul-death statute, since she and Irby were divorced at the tim e of his death. See id. (W rongf ul-de a th b enef

iciaries—a m ore lim i ted c lass than one qualif ied to bring suit under the wrongf ul-death statute—include: “the widow, h u s b a n d, child, f ather, m other, sist e r o r brother of t he d eceased or unborn quick child[ .]”). Collins
states that Irby w as survived by two a dult children, who were qualif ied under the statute to bring suit. Thus, under Curry , the lim itations period in the w rongf u l-death statute was not tolled by the m inor’s saving statute because qualif ied persons existed. Collins now argues that since the suprem e court’s decision in Pioneer overruled Curry ’s h olding, the statute of lim itations under the m inor’s savings clause as to Graham was tolled, m aking the suit tim ely

. ¶15. In Pioneer , t he m inor benef iciaries (the d ecedent’s children) had a n a u n t w h o was qualif ied u nder the wrongf

ul-death statute as the decedent’s sister to f ile a wrongf

ul-death suit, b ut she did n ot f

ile o ne. Pioneer , 214 So. 3d at 261 (¶3). 3 Th e a u n t p e t i t i o n e d f or

3 Wh ile sh e h ad stan d in g to f ile su it, th e au n t in P io n eer w as “statu to rily

p reclu d ed f ro m reco v erin g a n y d am ag e s . . . , [ as] an y w ro n g f u l-d eath d am a g e s b elo n g [ ed ] ex clu siv ely 7guardianship of the children, specif ically requesting authorization to f ile a wrongf

ul-death claim or m ake a settlem e nt f or dam ages on thei r behalf

. Id. at 262 (¶7). The chancellor granted the petition and e ntered an order o f guardianship as to the o lder child. Id. at (¶8).
A notice-of

-claim letter was sent to the treati n g h o s p i t a l and p hy sician, but a suit was not pursued. Id. at 2 61 (¶6). Later, the guardianship action was dism i ssed as to the older child because t he aunt never f

iled an o ath or letters o f guardianship. Id. at 262 (¶8). An order of guardianship was never entered f or the y ounger c hild, and this action was dism issed as well. Id. ¶16. Shortly af

ter turning twenty -one, t he older child f iled a wrongf

ul-death suit on behalf of all w r o n g f

u l

- death b e nef

iciaries against the hospital and phy s ician. Id. at (¶9). The hospital and phy sician a rgued the statute of lim itations h ad run b ecause the aunt could have
f iled suit during the lim itations period. Id. at 2 64 (¶22). The suprem e court f ound that the

m inor’s s a v ing statute tolled t he statute o f lim itations because the aunt “ had been neither appointed guardian nor authorized by the chancery court to b ring an action on [ the children’s] behalf .” I d

. a t 2 6 6 ( ¶¶29-31). It f

urther f ound that the aunt’s existence as a person with standing did not preclude application of the m i nor’s saving statute. Id. ¶17. The suprem e court in Pioneer cited U.S. Fidelity & G u aranty Co. v. Conservatorship of Melson , 809 S o. 2d 647, 653 (¶25) (Miss. 2002), which f ound the m i nor’s saving clause i n a pplicable w here the m inor had a conservator w ith f ull authority to bring suit during t h e
statute of lim itations. Pioneer , 214 So. 3d at 266 (¶28). B ecause the legal right to f ile suit

to [ th e d eced en t ’s] tw o d au g h ters.” P io n eer , 2 1 4 S o . 3 d a t 2 6 5 -6 5 (¶2 3 ) (“[ W] h o h as statu to ry stan d in g to b rin g su it is b ro ad er th an w h o m ay reco v er d am ag es.”). 8lay with the conservator, Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-53 (Rev. 2012) precluded

tolling. Section 15-1-53 states:
W h en the legal t i t l e t o p roperty or a right in action is in an executor, adm inistrator, guardian, or other trustee, the t im e d uring which any s tatute of limi t a tions runs against such trustee shall be com p uted against the person benef icially i nterested in such property or right i n action, although such person m ay b e under disability and within the saving of any statute of lim itations; and m ay be availed of

in any suit or actions by

such person. ¶18. “[ U]nder [ section] 15-1-53, if a person who i s subject to inf ancy or unsoundness of

m ind does in f

act have a guardian or conservator appointed for them , then the action m ay be brought in the nam e of that guardian or c onservator, w i t h o u t t he consideration of any savings clause.” Melson , 809 So. 2d at 6 5 3

- 5 4 ( ¶ 2 7) (em phasis added). In holding the savings statute inapplicable in Melson , the suprem e court reasoned that “[ w]here a guardian

or conservator has been court [

- ] appointed f or a ward, there is no logical or equitable reason
to prevent the running of the statute of lim itations inasm uch a s that g uardian or conservator is f ully authorized t o em

ploy attorney s and bring actions on their b ehalf .” I d. at 654 (¶27) (em phasis added) ( citing McCain v. Memp his Hardwood Flooring Co. , 725 So. 2d 788 (Miss. 1998) (f

i nding that the statute of lim itations is not tolled when a person of unsound

m ind has a guardian)). ¶19. Apply ing this holding in Pioneer , the suprem e court held that because “no oath had been f i led” b y the aunt “ a n d n o letters of guardianship had been entered” on behalf of the oldest of t he m inor children, t he child “did not ‘in f a ct h a v e a guardian appointed f or her’ who had the legal authority t o bring a suit on h er b ehalf .” Pioneer , 214 So. 3d a t 266 (¶30) (quoting Melson , 809 So. 2 d at 653-54 ( ¶27)). Thus, because there w as no one with a legal

9duty to bring suit on the m inors’ b ehalf , the savings statute tolled the statute of lim itations. Id. ¶20. There is no i n d i c a t i o n here that Collins had a legal duty to f i le suit on Graham ’s behalf

. Collins did not appear as Graham ’s court-appointed guardian. Rather, she appeared

as h is m other and next f

riend. As Graham ’s m other, Collins had standing to f i le suit on his behalf

. However, o ur decision h i n ges on whether Collins’s status a s his m other and next f riend bestowed o n h er the duty to f ile suit within the s tatute of lim i tations. B l a c k ’ s L a w Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) def ines “next f

riend” as “ [ s ] om e o ne who appears in a l awsuit to
act f o r the benef

it of an incom

petent or m inor plaintif

f , b ut who is not a p arty to the lawsuit and is not appointed as a guardian.” ¶21. W h ile not in the context o f a wrongf ul-death claim , the suprem e court d iscussed this issue in Vice v
. D epartment of Human Se r vices , 702 So. 2d 3 97 (Miss. 1997). In Vice , Pam ela Sm i th sued Ronald Vice f or a child-support a r

rearage he had b een ord e r e d t o p ay

seven y ears prior. Id. at 398 (¶2). Sm ith argued the m inor’s savings statute tolled the threey ear statute of lim itations. Id. at 399 (¶10). Vice countered that the m inor’s savings statute

was inapplicable b ecause Sm ith could h ave brought suit on t he children’s behalf during the
statute o f lim itations. Id. at 400 (¶15). The suprem e c ourt f ound n o me r i t t o Vice’s
argum ent. I

d. The suprem e h eld that because Sm ith, the custodial parent, w a s “ n o t a real party i n interest suf

f icient to bar t he child’s recovery of past-due support pay m e nts[ ,]

. . . it would ‘def

y reason’ to allow the statute of lim itations to r un during t h e d i s ability of the child.” Id. at (¶17). Instead, “where a m inor holds t h e l e g a l right,

. . . the statute of

1 0lim itations does not begin to run until the disability of m inority is rem o ved.” Id. at (¶14). ¶22. Further, in Thiroux ex rel. Cruz v. Austin ex rel. Arceneaux , 749 S o . 2 d 1 040, 1041 (¶1) (Miss. 1 999), W illiam Albert Thiroux J r. w as m urdered, l eaving h is two m inor children

as his sole heirs at l aw. A l mo s t three and a half y ears l ater, t he c h ildren’s legal guardian brought a wrongf

ul-death suit on their behalf against the m urderer. Id. W h ile t he suprem e court’s o p i nion in Thiroux does not discuss t he guardian’s relationship to the children, the
suprem e court in Curry noted that “[ t]he c hildren’s guardian i n Thiroux did not m eet the qualif ication o f being a person i n esse because, u nder the wrongf ul[ -]death s tatute, the guardian was n ot entitled to b ring the suit.” Curry , 832 So. 2d at 516 n.5. The suprem e court in Thiroux f

ound that the m inor’s s avings statute tolled the one-y ear statute of lim itations as to the m inor children. Thiroux , 749 So. 2d at 1042 (¶4). ¶23. Collins was not a qualif ied benef iciary under the wrongf

ul-death statute, nor is there
any evidence she had b een court appointed to b ring suit on Grah a m’s b ehalf

. Rather, she brought suit as Graham ’s m other and next f riend. Apply ing Pioneer , we f ind that the m inor’s

s a v i n g statute tolled the statute of lim itations, m aking t he suit tim e ly under either the one or two-y e a r statute of l im i tations. Thus, w e reverse and rem and f or f u r t h e r proceedings. However, as e xplained below, the proceedings shall be lim i ted to Collins’s intentional-tort claim , as the trial court correctly dism issed Collins’s negligence cause of action.
II. Whether Collins can sustain a negligence cause of a ction for Irby ’s suicide. ¶24. To the extent that Collins’s com plaint alleges negligence, we f ind these claim s were correctly dism issed f

or f a ilure to state a claim

upon which relief

can be granted.

1 1¶25. Collins’s original com p l a i n t a l l e g ed o nly m edical negligence. In Novem ber 2014, af ter C ollins’s com

plaint was f

iled, the Mississippi Suprem e C ourt handed down its decision in Truddl e v
. B a

ptist Memorial Hospital-DeSoto Inc. , 150 So. 3d 692 (Miss. 2014). The parties agree that Truddle is the controlling case f or actions f

o r wrongf ul death by suicide. Truddle states that “ to sustain a cause of action f or a suicide

. . . , the plaintif f m ust s how that the def e ndant c om m itted an intentional act that [ p roxim ately caused] an irresistible im pulse [ in the d e cedent] to c om m it suicide[ .]” Id. at 6 97 (¶19) (em phasis added) (citing State ex rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth , 214 So. 2d 579, 586-88 (M i s s . 1 9 6 8 ) )

. This is an exception to

com m on law, which prohibited recovery f or wrongf

ul death by suicide, as “ suicide is an ‘unf oreseeable, intervening c ause[ ,] w h i c h b reaks the causal connection between the wrongf ul act and the d eath.’” Truddle , 150 So. 3 d at 695 (¶11) (quoting Edgeworth , 214 So. 2d at 586). ¶26. Af ter Truddle handed down, the c i r c u i t c o u r t g r a nted Collins leave to am end the

com plaint to com

ply w ith Truddle ’s intentional-act pleading r equirem e nt. H o w ever, the

am ended com

p laint still contained negligence allegations. ¶27. Collins’s am ended com plaint alleges the f

ollowing negligent a cts: (1) Dr. Madakasira “[ f ]ail[ ed] to properly m o nitor [ Irby ’s] m ental health”; and ( 2) Dr. Madakasira “[ f ]ail[ ed] to prescribe an appropriate treatm e nt f or . . . Irby to prevent his suicide in spite of the f act that
Dr. Madakasira was w e l l a w a re of Irby ’s history and his suicidal i deations.” These negligence allegations do n ot state a cause o f action under Truddle , s i nce a wrongf ul-death action f or suicide cannot be sustained solely based on allegations of “ m edical m alpractice,

1 2i.e., negligence.” Truddle , 150 So. 3d at 697 (¶15). 4

¶28. “A m edical-m alpractice cause of action in Mississippi tracks the ty pical negligence action[ .]” Id. at (¶16). The plaintif f m ust prove: “(1) the existence of a duty by the def endant
to conf orm to a specif

ic standard of conduct f o r the pr o t e c t i o n of others against an unreasonable risk o f injury ; (2) a f ailure to conf

orm t o the required standar d ; and (3) an injury to the plaintif

f proxim ately caused by the breach of such a duty by the def endant.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Pace , 1 2 2 So. 3d 66, 68 (¶8) (Miss. 2013)). In proving these elem ents, the plaintif

f m ust show “ a causal connection b etween t he breach and t he [ injury ], such that the breach is the pro x i ma t e c a u s e o f the [ injury ] .” Double Quick Inc. v. Lymas , 50 So. 3d 292, 298 (¶30) (Miss. 2010) (em p hasis added). ¶29. However, “ suicide c onstitutes ‘an independent, intervening[ ,] and superseding event that s evers the causal nexus between any w rongf u l action on the part of t h e d e f endant.’” Truddle , 150 So. 3d at 697 (¶17) (quoting Shamburger v. Grand Casino o f Miss. Inc./Biloxi , 84 F. Supp. 2d 794, 798 (S.D. M iss. 1998)). “[ A] r ebuttable presum ption exists ‘that a
person will not destroy him self by suicide.’” Id. a t 695 (¶11) (quoting Edgeworth , 214 So. 2d at 585). Recovery f

or a wrongf

ul suicide death is perm issible only when the def endant

com m itted a n intentional act that created “an irresistible im p ulse in the decedent to take his

or her own lif

e.” Id. (citing E

dgeworth , 2 14 So

. 2 d a t 5 8 6 -88). “ [ W ]here the suicide is

com m itted in response to an uncontrollable im pulse, recovery m ay be had if the m ental state

4 T h e su p rem e co u rt d iscu ssed an ex cep tio n to its f in d in g in T

r u d d le f o r cases w h ere th e d eced en t w as u n d er th e d ef en d an t’s cu sto d y an d co n t ro l, su ch as in a me n t a l f acility

. T ru d d le , 1 5 0 S o . 3 d at 6 9 7 -9 8 (¶¶2 0 -2 2 ). T h e ex cep tio n d o es n o t ap p ly h ere, as t h ere is n o alleg atio n th at Irb y

w as u n d er D r . M ad ak asira’s o r P sy cam o re’s cu sto d y o r co n t ro l. 1 3of [ the] deceased was substantially caused by t he def e nda n ts’ intentional w r ongf ul acts.” Edgeworth , 214 So. 2d at 587. In r ecognizing this exception to the com m on-law rule barring
recovery f

or suicide, “[ t]he Edgeworth [ c]ourt reasoned t hat intentional acts which cause an irresistible im

pulse to com m it suicide should b e com pensable because ‘a higher degree of responsibility is im

posed upon a wrongdoer whose conduct was intended to cause harm than
upon one whose conduct was negligent.’” T r u d d l e , 1 5 0 So. 3d at 696 (¶11) (quoting Edgeworth , 214 So. 2d at 587). ¶30. “Nothing in M ississippi caselaw, save the irresistible-im pulse doctrine,

. . . abrogates the g eneral rule that suic i d e c o n s t i t u t e s ‘an independent, i ntervening[ ,] and superseding event that severs the causal nexus between a ny wrongf u l action on the part of the def endant.’” Id.
at (¶17). As stated by the United Sta t e s D istrict Court f or the Northern District of Mississippi, “[ a]pply i ng t he substantive law of the State of Mississippi, a claim f or wrongf ul suicide death can be m aintained only where i t can be shown that a s a result of def endant’s intentional torts, d ecedent acted under an irresistible im pulse in com m itting suicide.” Hare

v. City of Corinth , 814 F. Supp. 1312, 1326 (N.D. M iss. 1993) (vacated and rem anded on other grounds, 74 F.3d 633 ( 5th Cir. 1996)). T he holding in Truddle specif ically extended this principle to m edical-m a lpractice claim s. Truddle , 150 So. 3d at 697 (¶18). ¶31. Theref

ore, under T

ruddle , while a c l a i m f o r w r o n g f

u l s u icide death under the i r r e s i stible-im

pulse doctrine set out in Edgeworth m ay be s u stained based on a doc t o r ’ s actions, the claim cannot lie in m edical negligence. Id. at (¶17). 5 W hile Truddle discusses

5 In f in d in g th at th e i rresistib le-im p u l s e d o ctrin e ex ten d s to m ed ical-n eg lig en ce claim s, th e su p rem e co u rt cited H a ne y v
. Ri v e r O ak

s H o sp ita l , 2 0 0 6 -C A -0 0 2 1 9

- S C T (O rd er, 1 4a possible exception f or c ircum stances w here the decedent was under the custody and control of a phy s ician or f

acility , such as a m ental institution, that exception does not apply here. Id.
at 697-98 (¶¶20-22). Theref ore, the claim m

u st stem f rom an intentional tort. Id. Because the suicide a ction m

ust b e based o n an intentional tort, Collins’s ne gligence claim s do not state a cause of

action f or which relief

can be granted and were correctly dism issed. ¶32. W e d isagree with the di s s e n t ’ s f i n d i n g that Truddle perm its a m e dical-negligence cause of action f or Irby ’s suicide death. First, T ruddle clearly

states that an intentional act

m ust b e pled to support a cause of action f or suicide, and our caselaw is w ell established that

an intentional act cannot f orm the basi s of a negligence claim

. Id. at 697 (¶19); Jordan v. W ilson , 5 So. 3d 442, 447 (¶18) (Miss. C t

. A p p . 2008) (“[ A]n intentional tort cannot be

com m itted negligently .”). S econd, a m edical-negligence claim cannot b e sustained based on Irby ’s suicide because “ suicide constitutes ‘an independent, intervening[ ,] a nd superseding
event that severs t he causal nexus between any wrongf ul action’” of Dr. Mad a kasira and Irby ’s death. Truddle , 1 50 So. 3d at 697 (¶17) (quoting Shamburger , 84 F. Supp. 2d at 798).
If Irby ’s d e a th h ad not been the result o f suicide, we would a gree w ith the dissent that the

m edical-negligence action could be sustained. However, in wrongf ul-suicide-death cases, “a h igher degree o f responsibility ” than n egligence m ust be dem onstrated to recover dam ages. Truddle , 150 S o. 3d at 696 (¶11). Thus, based on the f acts p resented, there is no negligence cause of

action f o r which relief

can be granted.

M ay 1 7 , 2 0 0 7 ), w h ich in v o lv e d “a m ed ical-n eg lig en ce a ctio n a g ain st a d o cto r an d h o sp ital w h ere a p atien t co m m i tted su i cid e af ter b ein g released f

ro m th e h o sp ital o v e r h er f am ily ’s o b j e c tio n s .” T

ru d d le , 1 5 0 S o . 3 d at 6 9 7 (¶1 8 ). T h e su p rem e co u rt n o ted t h a t it a f f i rm ed p er cu riam th e f in d i n g o f su m m ary j u d g m en t in f

av o r o f th e d o cto r

an d h o sp ital. I

d

. 1 5¶33. The dissent argues that the suprem e court’s recent decision in S inging River Health
S y s t e m v. Vermilyea , 2016-IA-01096-SCT, 2018 W L 1 323581 (Miss. Mar. 15, 2018) , provides an e x ception allowing Collins to pursue her negligence c laim b ased on Dr. Madakasira’s assum

ption of a duty of care as Irby ’s psy chiatrist. W e disagree. In Singing
River , Randy Verm i ly ea threatened to com m it s uicide by jum p ing of f a b ridge. Id. at *1 (¶2). Law-enf o rcem ent of

f icers spent ninety m inutes talking him of f the edge of t he bridge and then took him to the Singing River Hospital em ergency room . Id. He was adm itted, evaluated, and released a f ew hours later—alone, without shoes, and without any attem pt by hospital staf

f to contact his f

am ily to inf

orm them o f t he s uicide attem pt. I d

. V e rm ily ea called h i s d a u g hter to p ick him up, and, within m inutes of his discharge, he jum ped to his death f rom a bridge. Id. Verm ily e a’s wif e and daughter sued Singing River, claim ing in an

am ended c om

plaint that it h a d f

ailed to exercise reasonable care a nd attention to his m ental and em otional condition—specif ically , that it:
f ailed to a ssess and treat

. . . Verm i ly ea’s psy chiatric condition, f a i l ed to hospitalize him , negligently and prem aturely released h im f rom the hospital, f ailed t o take r easonable steps t o prevent him f rom harm ing him self

, f ailed to f ollow the standard of c are applicable to a depressed and suicidal patient, and f ailed to inf

orm [ his wif

e o r daughter] of his attem p t e d suicide and need f

or f ollow-up care. Id. at ( ¶3). H is daughter also alleged negligent inf liction of em otional d i s t r e s s, as she had witnessed the suicide. Id. 6

6 T h e am en d e d co m

p lain t actu ally alleg ed in ten tio n a l in f lictio n o f em o tio n al d istress. S in g i n g R iver , 2 0 1 8 WL 1 3 2 3 5 8 1 , at * 1 (¶3 )

. H o w ev er, th e su p rem e co u rt f o u n d th e claim w a s m islab eled an d w as actu ally o n e f o r n e g lig en t in f

lictio n o f em o tio n al d istress. Id

. at * 7 (¶2 8 ) (citin g S

a n d erso n F a rm s I n c. v. M cC u llo u g h , 2 1 2 S o . 3 d 6 9 , 7 4 -7 5 (¶1 3 ) (M iss. 2 0 1 7 ) (h o ld in g th at a co m

p lain t’s “su b s tan ce p rev ails o v e r f o rm ”)). 1 6¶34. Singing Riv e r mo v e d t o d i s mi ss the am ended c om plaint under Rule 12(b)(6) f or f ailure to state a claim upon which relief c ould be g ranted because all the claim s were negligence based. Id. a t *2 (¶4). Citing Truddle , Singing River a r g u e d t h at the plaintif f s

were required to plead intentional conduct, leading to an irresistibl e i mp u l se in Verm ily ea
to com m it suicide. Id. W i thout an allegation of intentional conduct, S inging River argued, the claim f

ailed as a m atter of

law. Id. The trial court denied the m otion, and t he suprem e
court af f irm ed the decision upon interlocutory review. Id. at * 7 (¶29). The suprem e court, also citing Truddle , f

ound t hat w hile s uicide generally breaks t he causal nexus between the def endant’s actions a n d t h e suicide d eath in a m edical-negligence c ase, this rule does not apply when the f

acility had the duty to saf

eguard a decedent/patient who was in its “custody and control” and the f

acility had “the ability to control the patient’s conduct.” Id. at *5 (¶19). ¶35. W h en the f

acility assum es a duty of care f o r a patie n t w h o i s u n d er its custody and control, a n d it is f

o reseeable that a breach of that duty could result in i m m ediate suicide, liability exists “f

or the [ f a cility ’s] negligent f

ailure to prevent

. . . [ t he] act of self -harm .” Id.
T h e suprem e court held that t his exception includes the negligent discharge of a s u i c i d a l patient, because “[ n]egligently discharging a s u icidal patient and lea v i n g him to his own devices is not m aterially dif f erent f rom f ailing to provide a s a f

e e n v ironm ent inside the
f acility

. ” Id. at *7 (¶26). ¶36. W h ile the a m e nded com plaint here alleged that D r. Madakasira k new t h a t Irby

had thr e a t e n ed s uicide in the p ast and that his suicide was f oreseeable, there w as no allegation that I rby was under Dr. Madakasira’s custody or control o r t hat h e had r ecently been under

1 7any doctor’s or f acility ’s custody or contr o l a n d negligently discharged, a s Singing River

r e q u i res. Id. a t *5 ( ¶19) (citing Truddle , 150 So. 3d a t 695 (¶6) (holding that n o m ed i c a l

negligence cause o f action existed f or the decedent’s s u icide death where t he decedent was discharged f

rom the hospital six day s prior t o his death)). Rather, Irby was sim ply receiving
treatm ent f

rom Dr. Madakasira as his psy c hiatrist. T h us, the dissent’s reliance on Singing
River is m isplaced. W e do note, however, that the suprem e court in Singing River reaf f irm ed that “the general rule that suicide is ‘an independent, i ntervening a nd superseding event’ that breaks the causal nexus between the def endant’s w rongf

ul act and the d e a t h ” and that this principle “ extends to m edical-m alpracti c e claim s . ” Id. at *3 (¶13). That is, in a m edicalnegligence action f

o r a s u i c i d e death, unless an exception to the g eneral rule is f ound, the third elem ent of negligence—causation— c a n n o t be sustained. Id. The dissent cites no exception to the general rule. On rem and, Collins can a ssert the allegations in the am ended

com plaint that raise an intentional-tort cause of action; but there is no basis i n our law f o r a negligence c ause of actio n , s i n c e n o exception to the i ntentional-act pleading requirem ent has been alleged. ¶37. W e also disagree with t he dissent’s s tatem ent that our decision ef f ectively holds “that intentional c onduct cannot serve a s the basis f or a m edical-m alpractice action.” The dissent
asserts that this decision departs f rom our h old i n g i n C

h i t ty v. Terracina , 16 So. 3d 774 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). In C hitty , we h eld that whether a doctor’s “ a lleged actions were intentional, or m erely negligent, i s not d etermi n a t i v e ” o f whether a claim f alls under the

m edical-m alpractice statute; rather, “the m ain issue” is “whether the tort a r i s e s o u t of the

1 8course of m e dical, surgical or other prof essional s e rvices.” Id. a t 779 (¶12). W e do not stray f rom that d e c i s i o n . W e acknowledge that the plain language of our m edical-m a lpractice
statute encom

passes a ll a

pplicable torts against p hy sicians; it is not lim ited to the tort of negligence. The statute specif ically states th a t “ n o c l a i m in tort m a y be b rought against a licensed p hy sician

. . . [ f

or] w rongf

ul death arising out o f the c ourse of m edical, surgical or other prof

essional serv i ces[ .]” Miss. C ode Ann. § 15-1-36(2) ( em phasis added). 7 Regardless, the issue bef

ore us on rehearing is not whether an intentional tort can f orm the basis of a m edical-m a lpractice c laim , but whether a m edical prof essional’s negligence can be the proxim ate cause of Irby ’s suicide. ¶38. T a k i n g t h e a l l e g a t i o n s i n the com plaint as true, Collins’s m edica l

- n e g l i g e n c e allegations do not state a c laim upon which relief can be granted. Suicide is an independent, intervening, and superseding event that breaks the nexus between any alleged wrongf ul act of Dr. Madakasira and Irby ’ s death. W ithout this nexus, a causal connection f or a m edicalnegligence a ction cannot be f orm ed, and the claim s cann o t b e s u s t ained. T he trial court correctly dism issed the negligence allegations in the com plaint.
III. Whether Collins’s com plaint alleges an intentional tort suffici e nt to sustain a cause of action for w rongful death by suicide. ¶39. To com

ply with Truddle’s intentional-act pleading requirem ent, Collins m oved f or,

7 We n o te th a t th e m ed i cal-m alp ractice statu te also states t h at “[ n ] o actio n b ased u p o n th e h ealth care p r o v id er’s p ro fessio n a l n e

g lig en ce m ay b e b eg u n u n less th e d ef en d an t h as b een g iv en at least six t y (6 0 ) d ay s’ p rio r w ritten n o tice o f t h e in ten tio n to b eg in t h e actio n .” M iss. C o d e A n n . § 1 5 -1 -3 6 (1 5 ) (em p h asis ad d ed ). E ith er th is m ean s t h at n o tice is o n ly req u ired f

o r n eg lig e n ce claim s, o r th at o n ly n eg lig en ce a c t i o n s c an b e b ro u g h t u n d er th e m ed ical-m alp ractice statu te. H o w ev er, th i s issu e h as n o t b een d ecid ed b y o u r s u p r em e co u rt, an d it is u n n ecessary

to ad d r ess it h ere. 1 9and was granted, leave to am end the com plai n t

. The pertinent section of t he am ended

com plaint reads:
INTENTIONAL ACTS OF DEFENDANT

. . . . 15. Dr. Madakasira knowingl y e n gaged in a course of conduct with the conservators of Stuart M. Irby to have a divorce g ranted to Irby by the action prosecuted by the conservators even though Stuart Irby expressed his o pposition to t he divorce. By advising w ith the c onservators in the di v o r c e action, which resu lted in a divorce being granted, Dr. Madakasira stepped outside of the psy chiatrist-patient relationship a nd c reated a conf lict of interest with his patient, Stuart Irby

. As Irby ’s a ttending psy chiatrist f or several y ears, Dr. Mad akasira k

new that Stuart Irby was m entally and e m otionally f ragile and that he had t h r e a t [ en]ed to com m it suicide in the past. However, notwithstanding his personal knowledge of lrby ’s m e n t a l condition[ ,] Dr. Madakasira intentionally participated w ith the conservators to sec u r e a divorce f or Stuart Irby f

r om his wif

e, [ Collins,] and took a n active part i n the c hancery court p r oceedings w hich resulted in the divorce b eing granted against Stuart Irby ’s will.
16. As a direct a nd proxim at e r e s u l t of the intentional a c ts of Dr. Madakasira in assisting the conse r v a t ors in the prosecution of t he divorce action and the granting of a divorce by t h e C h a ncery Court[ ,] Stuart M. Irby developed an irresistible im pulse to com m it suicide and on January 17, 2012[ ,] he com m itted suicide.
17. The intentional conduct of Dr. M adakasira, as af oresaid, create d a n ir r e s i s t i b l e im

pulse in S tuart Irby to com m it suicide so that he took his o wn lif e. Based u

pon the negligence and intentional acts of the def endants it was f oreseeable that Stuart M. Irby would com m it suicide.
18. M a d a k a s i r a ’ s i n t e n t i o n a l conduct, as af oresaid, was the p rox i m a t e c a u s e or a proxim ate contributing cause of the irresistible i m p ulse suf f ered b y Stuart M. Irby to com mi t suicide and rendered him unable to discern the nature or consequences of sui c i d e which was the proxim ate cause or w as a proxim ate contributing cause of

Stuart Irby ’s wrongf

ul death. ¶40. The trial court f

ound the allegations in t he am ended com p laint s ounded in intentional tort, and t hus w ere b a r r e d by t he one-y ear statute of l im itations. In her original brief on
2 0appeal, Collins vehem ently argued that all claim s in the com p laint were negligence-based,

as any intentional-tort claims were barred by the one-y ear statute o f lim itations. On the contrary , on re h e a r i n g , w e are only looking at the intentional-act allegations, which were required to be pled under Truddle , to determ ine if the a m ended com plaint states a claim upon which relief

can be granted. ¶41. Wh i l e w e h a v e f

ound t he statute of lim itations was tolled as to either c l a i m, t h e distinction betwe e n t h e c laim s is im portant, as we m

ust d eterm i ne whether Collins’s

com plaint states a claim f

or which r e l i e f can be granted on rem and. Although Collins origina l l y argued that the com plaint alleged only negligence, “[ s]ubstance prevails over f orm .” Sanderson Farms Inc. v
. McCullough , 212 So. 3d 69, 74 (¶13) (Miss. 2017). W e are “not b oun d b y t he claim s set f orth in [ t he com

plaint].” Id. R ather, “[ t]he question

. . . is whether t he substance of [ the] c laim

. . . sounds in i ntentional t ort or negligence.” Id. at 75 (¶13). ¶42. Despite Collins’s original assertion t hat the claim s sound in negligence, an intentional

a c t cannot f

orm the basis of a negligence claim

. “Negligence is a f ailure to do w h a t [ a ] reasonable person would do under the sam e or sim ilar circum stances,” resulting in a breach of the applicable standard o f care and injury to the p laintif f

. Estate of St. M

artin v. Hixson , 145 So. 3d 1124, 1128 ( ¶9) ( Miss. 2014). Intent “denotes that the actor desires to cause the
consequences of his act.” S. Farm Bu r e a u C as. Ins. v. Allard , 611 So. 2d 966, 968 (Miss. 1992) (quoting Restatem en t ( S e c o n d ) o f T orts § 8A(a) (1965)). I ntentional behavior designed to bring about the p laintif f ’s injury f

orm s the b a s is of a n intentional tort, id. , and

2 1“an intentional tort cannot be com m itted negligently .” Jordan , 5 So. 3d at 447 (¶18).

¶43. “[ A] claim alleging an intentional tort and a claim alleging negligence are m utually exclusive, in that, one who is f o un d to have acted negligently cannot at the sam e tim e be
f ound to have acted i ntentionally .” Id. W hile our law perm its a party to allege inconsistent claim s based o n negligence and intentional tort, id. a t 448 (¶19) (citing M.R.C.P. 8), this is
not what Collins alleges. Rather, Collins alleges that Dr. M adakasira’s i ntentional acts serve

as t he b asis f

or the negligence claim

. There is no basis in our law to support this a rgum ent. See id. at 447-48 (¶¶18-19). ¶44. Thus, w e look to the a m e nded com plaint’s substance t o determ ine whether its claim s lie in negligence or intentional t ort. See Howard v
. W ilson , 62 So. 3d 955, 956 (¶6) (Miss. 2011). Collins’s am ended c om plaint alleges t he f

ollowing intentional acts: “Dr. Madakasira intentionally participated with the conservators to secure a divorce f or . . . Irby f

r om his wif

e, [ Collins,] and took an active part in the chancery cour t p r o c e e dings which resulted in the divorce being granted against . . . Irby ’s will,” and this “intentional conduct

. . . created an irresistible i m

pulse i n . . . Irby t o c om m it suicide.” The f i rst sentence of the punitivedam ages s ection of the com plaint states, “Dr. Madakasira[ ] willf ully , deliberately [ ,] and intentionally participated in the divorce proceedings against the w i ll a nd wishes o f

. . . Irby [ ,] which resulted in a d ivorce which M r. I rby did not want and resulted in M r. Irby being f orced to divorce his wif

e against his will.” ¶45. W e f

ind these allegations—that D r. Madakasira acted “knowingly ,” “intentionally ,” “active[ ly ],” “willf

ully ,” and “deliberately ”—sound in intentional tort, regardless of the title

2 2Collins gives them

. 8 W e f urther f ind that Collins’s i ntentional-tort c l aim s do n ot s tate a claim
f or m edical m alpractice. A m edical-m alpractice claim m ust “ a ri s [ e ] o u t of t he course of

m edical, surgical[ ,] or other prof essional services[ .]” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(2). The

am ended com

plaint, under the section titled “INTENTIONAL ACTS OF DEFENDANT,”
states that “[ b]y a dvising w ith t he conservators in t h e divorce a ction, w hich resulted in a divorce being granted, Dr. Madakasira stepped o u t s i d e o f t h e p s y c h i a t r i s t

- p a t i e n t r e l

a t i o nship and created a conf

lict of interest with his patient, Stuart Irby .” (Em p hasis added). As Collins alleges Dr. Madakasira’s intentional acts were com m itted “outside o f the psy chiatrist-patient relationship,” not arising o u t o f t h e course of it, t he i ntentional-act allegations do not f all within the m edical-m alpractice statute. ¶46. Looking at the substance of the am ended com

plaint, we f

ind the alleged i ntentional
acts lie in intentional tort. W hile we m a ke no f i nding as to the m erits of the com plaint, we f ind that the com

p laint alleges suf

f icient intentional acts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion
to dism iss. As the statute of lim itation s i s n o l o n ger at issue d ue to t he m i nor’s saving statute, we f

ind the intentional act allegations in the com plaint m ay

be viable, even though those acts arise in a m edical context. Theref ore, we rem and this m atter to the circuit court
f or f urther proceedings on Collins’s intentional-tort claim s . CONCLUSION ¶47. U n d e r the suprem e court’s holding in Pioneer , we f ind the m inor’s savings sta t u t e

8 Wh ile n o t titled as su ch , th e claim s s o u n d ak i n to in ten tio n al in f lictio n o f e m o tio n al d istress, w h ich “ is o f lik e k in d o r classif icatio n a s th e to rts en u m e rated in

. . . [ s] e ctio n 1 5 -1

- 3 5 [

. ] ” Jo n es v. F

lu o r D a n iel S

ervs. C o rp
. , 3 2 S o . 3 d 4 1 7 , 4 2 5 (¶3 6 ) (M iss. 2 0 1 0 ).

2 3tolled the statute of lim itations. W hile m aking no com m e nt as to the m erits o f the c om plaint,

we f urther f i nd that Collins’s am ended c o m p l a i n t a l l e g ed suf

f icient intentional acts to survive

a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss. T h us, we reverse this m atter f or f urther proceedings. However, as the wrongf

ul

- d e a t h claim f

or Irby ’s suicide m

ust lie in intentional tort, the

rem and proceedings s hall b e l i m i t e d t o the c l aim s raised f or i ntentional tort. S

ee Truddle , 150 So. 3d at 697 ( ¶17). Collins’s negligence claim s were correctly dism issed f or f ailure to
state a c laim upon w h i ch relief can be granted, as a negligence cause of action f or suicide cannot be sustained on the f acts of this case. ¶48. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. GRIFFIS, P.J., WILSON, GREENLEE A ND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR. LEE, C.J., C ONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS I N PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY IRVING, P.J., CARLTON A ND WESTBROOKS, JJ. FAIR, J., NOT PARTICIPATING. LEE, C.J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: ¶49. I agree with the m ajority t hat pursuant to the suprem e court’s decision i n P i o n eer Community Hospital of

Newton v. Roberts , 214 So. 3d 2 59 ( Miss. 2017), the m inor’s saving
statute applies to Irby ’s claim through Coll i n s and tolled the statutory lim itations period. Theref ore, Collins’s claim

was tim ely

. ¶50. However, I disagree with the m a jority that the application of the m i n o r ’ s s a v ing statute is necessary to preserve C ollins’s intentional-act claim and that the trial court was correct in dism issing Collins’s negligence claim

. Additionally , I still disagree––a s I d i d w i th the previous, now-withdrawn opinion—with the m ajority decision t h a t C ollins’s claim on

rem and is lim ited to s im

p ly an i ntentional tort. Collins’s am ended c om plaint asserted two

2 4m edical-m alpractice claim s f or Irby ’s wrongf

ul death b y suicide—one f or negligence and

one f or an intentional act. Both are m edical-m alpractice claim s to which the two-y ear statute of lim itations applies—theref ore, both of

Collins’s claim s were already tim ely f i led. ¶51. The m ajority s tates that “the trial court c orrectly dism issed Collins’s negligence cause of action as there is no basis f or a negligence action f

or wrongf ul d eath by suicide. Thus, it is unnecessary f

o r the t rial court to revisit the negligence issue o n rem and.” However, I f ind that suprem e court’s recent d ecision in Singing Riv e r Health Systems v. Vermilyea , 2016-IA-01096-SCT, 2018 W L 1323581 (Miss. Mar. 15, 2018), clearly dem onstrates that both the c l aim s asserted in this case are r ecoverable t heories u nder m edical m alpractice, and
f urther, t hat it was e rror f

or the trial court to dism iss the negligence count f or f ailure to state

a claim

. I also f

ind that the m ajority

m isconstrues T

ruddle v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.-DeSoto
Inc ., 150 So. 3d 6 9 2 (Miss. 2014), in which our suprem e court unequivocally categorized the intentional-act claim a t i ssue as one f or m edical m alpracti c e . A ccordingly , I f ind that—notwithstanding t he application of the m i nor’s saving statute—Collins’s claim s were already tim ely f

iled under the t wo-y ear statute which applies to m edical-m alpractice claim s. As such, I also f

i nd that, o n rem and, both of Collins’s claim s are f or m edical-m a lpractice and the suit on rem and is not lim ited to, nor c h aracterized as sim p l y a n i ntentional-tort claim

. Thus, I respectf

u lly dissent. ¶52. Mississippi’s m edical-m alpractice statute, Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-
36 (Rev. 2012), “m akes no such distinction between intentional a nd unintentional torts

. . . .” Chitty v. T

erracina , 16 So. 3d 774, 778 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, “the m ain issue

2 5[ is] whether t h e tort ‘arises o ut of the c o u r s e o f me d i cal, surgical or other prof essional services.’” Id

. at 779 (¶12) ( c i t i n g M iss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36)). T hus, w hether Dr. Madakasira’s “ alleged actions were intentional, or m erely negligent, is not determ inative.” Id. H ere, both o f Collins’s claim s asserted ag a i nst D r. Madakasira c om plain of tortious conduct arising out of the c ourse of his m e d ical-prof essional services as Irby ’s psy chiatrist. Theref ore, Collins’s claim s are m e dical-m a l practice claim s. The suprem e court’s decisions in both Truddle and S

inging River dem onstrate as m uch. ¶53. In the instant case, Collins’s am ended com plaint f or Irby ’s wrongf

ul death by suicide stated two counts f

or recovery : (1) negligence—“that D r . Madakasira breached the m inim um standards of care which he owed to [ Irby ] . . . [ and] [ a ]s a direct and proxim ate cause, or a

c o ntributing c ause . . . Irby com m itted suicide[ ,]” and (2) irresistible-im p ulse/intentiona l act—that “[ a]s a direct and proxim ate r esult of the intentional acts of Dr. Madakasira

. . . Irby developed an irresistible im pulse to com m it s u icide and on January 17, 2012[ ,] he com m itted suicide.” The suprem e court has held bot h t heories viable in the context of m edicalm alpractice claim s f

or wrongf ul death by

suicide. ¶54. In Truddle , the suprem e court discussed the irresistible-im pulse doctrine as it applies
to m edical-m alpractice c l aim s. Truddle , 150 S o. 3d at 697 (¶18) (Miss. 2014). Most recently , in S

inging River Health Systems , the suprem e court explained that Truddle actually “discussed two lines of

cases concerning a third party ’s liability f or another’s suicide” and
“f irst reviewed the line of cases concerning the irresis t i b l e - i m p u l s e d o c trine[ ,]” but then “also recognized precedent holding that liability exists if t he plaintif f shows t h a t t h e d e f

endant

2 6owed the decedent a certain duty of care and breached that duty ,”—i.e. n egligence. Singing

R i v e r , 2018 W L 1 323581, at *6-7 (¶8), *17 ( ¶24). Thus, Collins’s suit against Dr. Madakasira f

or t h e w rongf

ul death of Irby by suicide is one f or m edicalm alpractice—whether it i s pursued under the irresistibl e - i mp u l se doctrine o r under a negligence theory

. I. Negligence ¶55. The m ajority f

inds that the trial c ourt correctly dism issed Collins’s negligence cause of action f or f ailure to state a claim because it f inds, per its interpretation of T ruddle , there is no b asis f

or a negligence action f o r wrongf

ul d eath by suicide. But Singing River explicitly rejects the m a

jority ’s f inding. ¶56. In Singing River , the p laintif f s f iled a wrongf

u l-death suit based in m edical n e g l i g ence against the hospital and m edical providers f or the d ecedent’s s uicide f ollowing his hospital discharge. Id

. at *2 (¶ 1 )

. T h e d ef endants m oved to dism iss the claim , arguing Truddle operated as “an absolute bar t o [ t h e p l a i ntif f ’s] ability to r ecover f

o r t he suicide of [ the decedent].” Id

. at *4 (¶4), *6 (¶7). The trial court denied the m otion to dism iss f inding that
T r u d d le did not apply t o bar the plaintif f s’ m edical-negligence claim

. Id

. at *5 ( ¶ 5 )

. T h e def endants f iled an interlocutory appeal and t he suprem e c o u r t a f f irm ed the trial court’s decision, rejecting the def endant/appellant’s a r g u me n t. Id

. at *1 ( ¶1). “W e reject this
argum ent[ ,]” that, because [ t h e plaintif f ’s] am ended com

plaint is grounded in m edical negligence and does not a llege that [ the decedent] com m itted suicide either (1) while in the def

endants’ custody , or (2) under a n irresistible im pulse, proxim ately caused by the def e ndant’s intentional conduct, that rendered him

2 7unable to discern the nature and consequences of s u icide, the com plaint f ails to state a claim

upon which relief

m ay be granted. Id

. at *17 (¶23). Thus, in Singin g R i v e r , the suprem e court explained that in m edicalm alpractice cases a cause of action f or wrongf ul death by s uicide, m ay be m aintained under the irresistible-im

pulse doctrine or negligence given certain f actual circum stances. W h ile Truddle h eld that the principle that suicide is an i ntervening, superseding cause that breaks the causal c onnection between t he wrongf ul act and the dea t h a pplies i n m edical negligence cases, the c ase also recognized precedent h olding that liability exists if the plaintiff shows that the defendant owed the decedent a certain duty of care and breached that duty. Id . at *17 (¶24) (em

phasis added). ¶57. The suprem e co u r t i n T r u d d l e n o t e d a p a r t i c ular instance where, in a m edicalma l p r a c t ice case, the p laintif f ’s claim f

or wrongf ul death by suicide could be m aintai n e d under a theory of negl i g e n c e

— w hen suicide is com m itted while the person is in the def endant’s custody

. Id

. But, in Singing River , the suprem e court negated the assum ption that this exam

p l e given i n Truddle was the o nly instance where a n egligence claim could apply

. The def

endants argue that t he f

act t hat [ the decedent’s] suicide o ccurred when he was outside the hospital’s custody is f atal to [ the] claim

. They contend t hat Truddle s tands f

or the p roposition that the decedent m ust have been under the custody and c o n t rol of the f acility at the tim e of the death or there can be no liability f or a suicide allegedly caused by m edical negligence. The dissent takes t h is position as well. Consid e ring t he specif i c f acts alleged in the am ended com

p laint, w e disagree

. Id . at 18-19 (¶26) (em

phasis added). ¶58. The Singing River Court noted the def endants were “on notice that the decedent was suicidal,” and that “they s pecif ically a ccepted h im f

or treatm ent f

or being suicidal and

2 8d e p r e s s e d

. ” Id

. at *17-18 (¶25). As such, the suprem e court stated t he def endants h a d
“assum ed a duty toward [ the decedent] to exercise reasonable care to s a f eguard h im f

rom the known danger he presented to him self , and to exercise s uch reasonable care f or his saf ety as his m ental condition required.” Id

. The suprem e court went o n to f i nd t hat under the f

acts of the case “plaintif

f s did present a claim of m edical negligence regarding the death of [ the decedent]” and t hat “the m edical negligence claim was not s ubject to dism issal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id . at *20 (¶28). ¶59. Sim ilarly , here, C o l l i n s ’ s a mended com plaint a sserted a negligence claim that Dr. Madakasira, as Irby ’s trea t i n g p s y c h i a t r i s t , k n e w o f I r b y ’ s m ental c ondition including suicidal ideatio n s , a n d also knew that Irby did not desire the divorce f rom Collins. The com

plaint
f urther a lleges t hat i n light o f this knowledge, D r. Madakasira breached t he m inim u m standards of care b y f

ailing to properly m onitor Irby ’s m ental health; executing an af f idavit in the divorce proceeding while serving as I rby ’s treating p hy sician and psy chiatrist that it would b e i n Irby ’s best i nterest to have a divorce g ranted—which was in direct conf lict with Irby ’s desire a nd testim ony ; and b y f ailing to prescribe an appropriate treatm ent f or Irby to prevent his suicide. Finally , the negligence claim concludes that a s a “direct and proxim ate
cause, or a contributing cause, of the breac h o f t h e m i n i m um standard of care by [ Dr. Madakasira]

. . . Irby com m itted suicide.” The f acts alleged in the am e n ded com plaint state that I rby told his wif

e Collins in a telephone conversation that he was f orced into the divorce which he did not want a nd that he had no reason to live. A short tim e later Irby was f ound dead in his residence, having com m itted suicide. I d o n ot consider t he m erits of the

2 9com

plaint and also r ecognize that negligence is an issue f or t he f act f inder. However, taking the a llegat i o n s of the am ended com plaint a s true, C ollins’s am ended com p laint stated a negligence claim f

or Irby ’s death by

suicide which, i n a c cordance with Singing River , was
not subject to d ism issal u nder Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly , I would reverse the trial court’s dism issal of Collins’s negligence claim a nd r em and f or f urther proceedings. Theref ore, with respect to this issue, I dissent.
II. Irresistible-Im p ulse Doctrine ¶60. In addition to C ollins’s negligence claim , which the trial court erroneously dism issed
f or f a ilure to state a c laim , Collins’s am ended com plaint asserted an intentional-act claim via the irresistible-im

pulse doctrine. The m ajority f inds that Collins’s claim under the irresistible-im

pulse doctrine, which was otherwise precluded by t he statute of li m i t a t i ons governing torts, is saved by the m inor’s savings statute. Additionally , the m ajority s tates that

on rem a n d, C ollins’s wrongf ul-death claim u nder the irresistible-im pulse doctrine is sim

ply

an intentional tort and not one f or m edical m alpractice. However, in Truddle , t he suprem e
court a ddressed the irresistible-im pulse doctrine as it a

pplies to m edical-m alpractice claim s arising f rom an individual’s suicide. T ruddle , 150 So. 3d at 6 97 (¶17). The claim does not

cease t o be one f

or m edical ma l p r a ctice s im ply because the irresistible-im pulse doctrine requires the claim ant to plead and prove an intentional act. ¶61. Again, a m edical m alpractice claim is one f or “injuries o r wrongf

u l death arising out

o f t he course of m e dical, surgical or other prof essional services

. . . [ ,]” notwithstanding whether the act is negligent or i ntentional. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36. This i s exactly the

3 0claim Collins’s m akes—that Irby ’s wrongf ul d e a t h arose out of the course of m edical, prof essional services, rendered by Dr. Madakasira—under the irresistible-im pulse doctrine.
T h us, because this claim is a m e dical-m a lpractice claim , the m inor’s savings statute i s n o t
necessary to preserve it, as it was already t ime l y f i led under the applicable statute of lim itations governing m edical-m alpractice cases. ¶62. Under Mississippi law, the irresistible-im pulse doctrine is the exception to the general rule that a third p a r

ty cannot be held liable f or a decedent’s suicide. Id

. According to the irresistible-im

pulse doctrine, a decedent’s suicid e i s a ctionable against a third-party def endant as a wrongf

ul-death claim “only if t he suicide was proxim ately caused by t he intentional a ct of the def

endant, c r e a t i ng an irresistible im p ulse in the decedent to take his

or her own lif

e.” Id. a t 695 (¶11) (citing S tate ex rel. Richardson v. E dgeworth , 214 So. 2d 579, 585 (Miss. 1968)). Again, Truddle specif ically discusses how this d octrine applies to

m edical-m alpractice actions. ¶63. In Truddle , t he suprem e court specif ically stated that the issue w a s “ w h e t h e r . . . Mississippi law bars medical-negligence actions arising f rom an individual’s suicide.” Id.
at 695 (¶¶9-10). The suprem e court noted that a third party cannot be held liable f or a decedent’s suicide except unde r the irresistible-im pulse doctrine, a nd t hat “this principle extends to m edical-m alpractice claim s.” Id . at (¶18). The m ajority opinion acknowledges that the Truddle case is one o f m edical m alpractice. Yet the m ajority goes o n to f ind that the

m edical-m alpractice claim in the instant c ase is an intentional-tort c laim a n d thus subject to

a o n e-y ear statute o f lim itations. Mississippi law is clear that a t wo-y e ar s tatute o f lim itations

3 1applies to m edical-m a lpractice claim s. Estate of Johnson ex rel. Shaw v. G raceland Care

Ctr. of Oxford LLC , 41 So. 3d 692, 695 (¶10) (Miss. 2010). ¶64. A f t e r e x p l icitly stating the issue was “whether

. . . Mississippi law b a r s me d i c a l

negligence actions arising f rom an individual’s suicide,” t he Truddle court went on to discuss the irresistible-im

pulse doctrine’s application to m e d ical-m alpractice cases. T h e Truddle
court noted that t he “ crux of [ the plaintif f ’s] argum e n t

. . . is that [ the decedent’s] suicide was the result of m edical m alpractice, i.e., n egligence.” Truddle , 150 So. 3d

. at 6 9 6

- 9 7 ( ¶ 1 5). The court stated that in m edical-m alpractice claim s, the burden is upon the plaintif f to
p rove (1) the existence of a duty by the d ef endant to conf

orm to a speci f

i c standa r d of c onduct f

or t he protection of others against an unreasonable r isk of i njury ; (2) a f

ailure to conf

orm to the required standard; and (3) an injury to the plaintif

f proxim ately caused by the b reach of such a duty by the def endant. Id. at 697 (¶16). The court explained that n othing in o ur caselaw has a bolished the rule that suicide constitutes a n “independent, intervening and superseding event that severs t he causal

nexus between a ny w rongf ul action on the part o f t he def endant,” except for t he irresistibleim p ulse d o c t r i n e. I

d. a t (¶17) ( “Nothing

. . . save the i rresistible-im pulse doctrine

. . . .” (em phasis added)). The court r ea s o n e d t h a t t h e i r r e s istible-im

pulse doctrine im

poses a higher degree of responsibility

because of

the nature of the act, and stated: “ t his principle extends
to medical-malpractice claim s.” Id. at (¶¶17-18) ( em phasis added). Accordingly , the
suprem e court held that “[ i ]n such a case,”

— b e i n g one f

or m edical m alpractice—“the plaintif f m ust s how that the def

endant com m itted an intentional act that led to an irresistible im p ulse to com m it s uicide in order to prevail.” Id. at (¶19). T he m ajority , however, conf lates Truddle ’s requirem e nt that the c laim a nt plea d a n i n t entional act or i ntentional

3 2conduct with a claim f or m e rely an intentional tort and rem oves it f rom t h e s c ope of the

m edical-m alpractice statute. ¶65. In the instant case, Collins am ended t he com plaint in order to c o m

ply with the legal standard set f

o rth in T ruddle —specif

ically , the pleading requirem ents. Again,
to r ecover against a t hird party f or a decedent’s s uicid e , . . . a plaintif f m ust plead and p rove: ( 1) t he decedent w as under an i rresistible im pulse rendering him or her u nable to discern the nature or consequences of suicide, and (2) the irresistible im

p ulse was proxim a tely caused by t he def endant’s intentional conduct

. Id. at 6 96 (¶12) (em

p hasis added). As such, Collins’s am ended com plaint alleged that Dr. Madakasira’s intentional conduc t o f e n gaging with Irby ’s conservators, executing an af f idavit, and testif

y ing in c ourt proceedings to o btain a d ivorce against I rby ’s wishes created

an irresistible im

p ulse i n Irby to com m it s u i cide and thus constituted m edical m alpractice. Truddle does not require the claim ant to p lead and prove that the def en d a n t i ntended the decedent to com m it suicide. Rather, Truddle requires that the claim ant plead and prove the int e n t i o nal conduct the def endant engaged in that created the irresistible im pulse in the decedent to com m i t suicide—thereby com m itting m edical-m alpractice. ¶66. The supr e m e c o u r t i n T r u d d l e u n e q u i vocally stated that the irresistible-im pulse doctrine’s heightened p leading requirem ents apply to m edical-m alpractice c laim s . Id. at 697 (¶¶17-18). Truddle d id not bar m edical-m a lpractice actions arising f r om an individual’s suicide, n or did it characterize the action as s im pl y a n i ntentional tort. Rather, the court repeatedly discussed t he irresistible-im pulse doctrine in the context of m edical-m a lpractice claim s and f

ound that it did in f

act apply in m edical

- ma l practice claim s: “[ T]his principle

3 3extends to m edical-m alpractice claim s.” I d. a t (¶18). A s s u c h , Collins’s intentional-act claim is a m edical-m alpractice claim —to which the statute of lim itati o n s t hat governs m edicalm alpractice claim s applies: two y ears. ¶67. In Truddle , the t rial c o u r t g r anted sum m ary judgm ent f or the def endants due to the plaintif f ’s f ailure to “ple a d [ ]

. . . [ or] create a genuine i ssue of m aterial f act as to any wrongf ul act c om m i tted by the def endant that caused [ the decedent] to com m it suicide.” Id.
at 695 (¶8). That is n ot the case here. Collins’s am ended com p laint p led with specif

icity the alleged intentional acts of Dr. Madakasira that allegedly c reated an irresistible im pulse in Irby to com m it s uicide—a claim t hat T ruddle characterizes a s one of m edical m alpractice.
W h ether there is truth or m erit t o Collins’s claim is not bef ore this Court. Rather, the issue is w hether t he c laim f

alls under a one-y e a r statute of lim itations or a two-y ear statute of lim itations. Because the s u p rem e court has very clearly categorized the c laim as one f or

m edical ma l p r a c t ice, it is equally clear that the statute of lim itations governing m edicalm alpractice claim s applies. ¶68. Again, our law is clear that a two-y ear s tatute o f l i mi t a t i o n s a pplies to m edicalm alpractice claim s. Section 15-1-36(2) provides:
F o r any claim accruing on or af ter July 1, 1998, and except as otherwis e provided in this section, no claim i n tort m ay b e b r o u g ht against a licensed phy sician, osteopath, dentist, hospital, institution f or the aged or inf

irm , n urse, pharm acist, podiatrist, optom etrist[ ,] or chiropractor f or injuries or wrongf

ul death arising out of the course o f m edical, surgica l [ ,] or o ther prof essional services unless it i s f

i l e d within two (2) y ears f rom the d ate t he a l leged act, om issio n or n e glect s hall or with reasonable diligence m ight have been f irst known or discovered, a nd

. . . in no event m ore than seven (7) y ears af ter the alleged act, om ission or neglect occurred.

3 4¶69. I n d e t e rm ining whether t he two-y ear m edical-m alpractice s t a t u t e o f l i mi t a t i o n s

applies, this Court h as previously stated: “the m ain is s u e [ is] w hether the tort arises out of the course of m edical, surgical[ , ] or other prof essional services.” C

hitty v. Terracina , 16 So. 3d 774, 779 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). H ere, it is clear that the conduct of D r . Madakasira—which Collins alleged created the irresistible im p ulse in Irby to com m it suicide and served as the basis f

o r the tort claim

—arose out of the course o f p rof essional psy chiatric

care rendered by Dr. Madakasira. Dr. M adakasira, in the course and scope of care as Irby ’s
psy c h iatrist, m et with Irby ’s conservators, e xecuted an a f f idavit, an d t e s t i f

i ed in court proceedings regarding Irby ’s best interests in term s of his m ental health. I n Chitty , t his Court f urther stated that where the tort claim arises out of t he course of m edical, surgical, or other prof essional services, “whether [ the m edical provider’s] alleged actions were intentional, or

m erely n egligent, is not determ inative.” Id

. The m ajority now departs f rom that reasoning,
f inding that intentional conduct cannot serve as the basis f or a m edical-m alpractice action. Moreover, in doing so, the m ajority departs f r om the s uprem e court’s explicit and repetitive characterization of

the action in the instant case as one f or m edical m a lpractice. ¶70. Nothing in Truddle characterizes the cause of action as s im

ply an intentional tort or

rem oves the action f

rom t h e m edical-m alpractice statute a nd its governing statute of lim itations. The m ajority erroneously interprets Truddle as characterizing a claim against a phy sician f

or a patient ’ s s u icide a s nothing m ore than an intentional tort. Rather, Truddle consist e n t l y characterizes the action as one f or m edical m alpractice—to which a two-y ear statute of lim itations applies.

3 5¶71. The m ajority states that, “If Irby ’s death had not been the result of suicide, we would

agree with t h e d i s s e nt that the m edical-negligence action c ould be s u stained.” Citing Truddle , the m ajority reasons this is b ecause “suicide constitutes ‘an i n d e pendent, interve n i n g [ , ] a nd superseding event that severs the causal n exus between any wrongf ul action’” of Dr. Madakasira and Irby ’s death. This reasoning, h owever, c o nveniently om its the s uprem e court’s qualif i er to the f

o regoing statem ent, a n d thus patently ignores the
suprem e c ourt’s exception to t his rule: the irresistibl e - i mp ulse doctrine. “Nothing in Mississippi caselaw, save t he irresistible-impulse doctrine , abrogates t he general ru l e that suicide constitutes ‘an independent, intervening and superseding event that severs t he causal

nexus between any wrongf ul action on the part o f t h e d e f endant.’ ” Id

. ( em

phasis added).

“ [ T ] h e i rresistible-im

pulse doctrine a

pplie[ s] as an exception to the general rule regardin g suicide

. . . . ” Id

. (em

phasis added). It is an exception that applies to the i nstant medicalm alpractice case. ¶72. The m ajority states that Collins’s “suicide action m ust be based on an intentional tort” and thus, h er “negligence claim s do not state a cause of action f or which relief can b e granted and were correctly dism issed .” Again, as discussed, the suprem e court rejected this a rgum ent in Singing River

. Both Collins’s negli g e n c e c laim a nd i ntentional-act claim are

m edical-m alpr actice claim s. As s uch, it is unnecessary t o apply the savings statute in the instant case, as both claim s were already tim ely under the m edical-m a lpractice s tatute of lim itations. ¶73. W h ile I do n o t consider the m erits of Collins’s com plaint, I do f

ind t hat both Collins’s

3 6claim s—in a ccordance with Truddle and Singing River —were f or m edical m alpractice. As such, I believe Collins’s m ed i cal-m alpractice claim s were subject to a two-y ear statute of lim itations. Theref

o re, I would a lso reverse a nd rem and f or this reason, notwithstanding the

m ajority ’s application of t he m inor’s saving s tatute. For the f oregoing reasons, I respectf ully dissent. IRVING, P.J., CARLTON AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

3 7