United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 23, 2019*

Decided April 24, 2019

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 18‐2740

CHARLES DONELSON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

Q. TANNER, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 17 C 8078

Gary Feinerman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Charles Donelson, an Illinois inmate, alleges that prison officials acted with

deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment when they forced him to

eat off food trays that he considered unsanitary. The district court dismissed the case

because he lied on his application to proceed in forma pauperis. Because the court did

                                                 

* The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not

participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument

because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral

argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18‐2740    Page 2

not clearly err in finding that Donelson lied about his financial and litigation history,

and it did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case as a sanction, we affirm.  

When Donelson applied to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court denied

his application and issued a show cause order. The court demanded to know why the

case should not be dismissed given that Donelson had omitted portions of his litigation

history (despite the application’s instruction that he disclose his entire history), his

financial disclosures were inconsistent, and he had failed to pay past filing fees even

after receiving thousands of dollars that should have enabled him to do so.  

Donelson’s reply did not satisfy the court. He insisted that he was “under

extreme distress medically and mentally” and that led to a “mistake” regarding his

litigation history, his finances, and payment of past‐due fees from his funds. He later

submitted a revised application to proceed without prepaying filing fees, but the district

court rejected it and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court stressed that

Donelson’s omissions in his first application were too extensive to be inadvertent. He

had omitted more than one‐third of his cases (17 out of 45), lied materially under

penalty of perjury about his financial information, and willfully failed to pay any

past‐due filing fees even though at one point he knew that he had over $4,000 at his

disposal. The court ruled that these omissions were fraudulent, “inexcusable,” and

warranted a “weighty sanction.” Donelson moved for reconsideration under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 59, but the court denied the motion because his arguments

either were frivolous or repeated his previous response.  

We review the district court’s finding of fraud for clear error and its dismissal of

the claims for abuse of discretion. See Hoskins v. Dart, 633 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir. 2011).

Donelson first argues that the court clearly erred when it found that he

defrauded the court, maintaining that his inconsistencies and omissions were

unintentional. But the court’s findings were not clearly erroneous for at least two

reasons. First, when a litigant fails to disclose litigation history—something readily

known to the litigant—a court may permissibly find that the litigant intended to

defraud. See Hoskins, 633 F.3d at 543. Donelson admitted that he did not disclose in his

initial application a significant portion of the cases that he had previously filed, despite

the application’s order that he list all lawsuits. Second, a court may find that a litigant

committed fraud by lying about the amount of money that he can access. See Thomas v.

Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 306, 308 (7th Cir. 2002). Donelson did just

that. He acknowledged that his statement of available funds substantially understated

the amount reflected in the prison’s records, even though those records were available
No. 18‐2740    Page 3

to him. Thus, the court did not clearly err when it found that when Donelson signed his

application and swore that the financial information he provided was correct to the best

of his knowledge, he knew that he was lying. The court, therefore, did not clearly err in

rejecting Donelson’s claim of innocence. See Hoskins, 633 F.3d at 543.

Nor did the court abuse its discretion when dismissing the case as a sanction.

District courts may dismiss a case when a litigant fails to disclose litigation history.

See Hoskins, 633 F.3d at 544; Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 1999). Courts may

also dismiss a case when a litigant, in applying for the privilege to litigate without

prepaying filing fees, lies to the court about his financial status. See Rivera v. Drake, 767

F.3d 685, 686–87 (7th Cir. 2014); Thomas, 288 F.3d at 308. Because Donelson had a history

of failing to pay filing fees, the court reasonably thought that more financial sanctions

would not work. See Rivera, 767 F.3d at 686–87. Dismissal was a permissible result.

AFFIRMED