In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 98-4237

RICHARD WALKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 

SOO LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 93 C 3861--Arlander Keys, Magistrate Judge.

Argued September 16, 1999--Decided March 31, 2000

 Before RIPPLE, MANION and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit

Judges.

 RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Richard Walker filed this

action against the Soo Line Railroad Company

("Soo Line"). He seeks damages for injuries

suffered by having been struck by lightning while

working in a railroad tower. At trial, Mr. Walker

sought to introduce expert testimony to establish

that electrical injury could have been the cause

of his condition. Much of that testimony was

excluded by the district court on the ground that

it lacked a scientific basis. The district court

also refused to admit testimony from an expert on

electrical safety about how lightning could have

penetrated the tower in which Mr. Walker was

working. The district court allowed testimony

from several Soo Line expert witnesses over Mr.

Walker’s objection. The jury returned a verdict

for Soo Line. We conclude that several portions

of the expert testimony excluded by the district

court should have been admitted and that their

exclusion severely curtailed Mr. Walker’s ability

to present his case. We therefore reverse the

judgment of the district court and remand the

case for a new trial.

I

BACKGROUND

 In 1991 Richard Walker was employed by Soo Line

as a tower operator. The job required him to

direct railroad cars to particular tracks by
operating switches in a control tower. On October

24, 1991, Mr. Walker was working the 11 p.m. to 7

a.m. shift at the Bensenville rail yard. He was

stationed in Tower A, one of two 75-foot towers

in the yard. There was an electrical storm in the

area that night. Mr. Walker claims that, at

around 3 a.m., he received injuries from a

lightning bolt as he was touching switches on his

control board. He relates that he experienced

chest pain and that his body heated up. Mr.

Walker was hospitalized for two days, but

returned to work a few weeks later.

 In 1995 Mr. Walker brought this action against

Soo Line under the Federal Employers’ Liability

Act, 45 U.S.C. sec. 51 et seq. ("FELA").

Initially, he claimed that the lightning strike

had affected his hearing. Later, he amended his

complaint to allege that the lightning strike had

caused him psychological damage and had impaired

his ability to work.

 Mr. Walker was evaluated by the Electrical

Trauma Research Program at the University of

Chicago in December 1996. At trial, the district

court excluded or limited the testimony of two

expert witnesses from that program. One of these

experts was Dr. Neil Pliskin, a psychologist who

had examined Mr. Walker to determine his

functional capability. Dr. Pliskin administered a

battery of tests designed to test Mr. Walker’s

IQ, his concentration, and other functions. The

district court permitted Dr. Pliskin to testify

about the results of those tests; it did not

permit, however, Dr. Pliskin’s testimony about

his evaluation of Mr. Walker’s IQ before the

incident or about any decline in his IQ since the

incident. The district court excluded this

evidence because Dr. Pliskin had not evaluated

Mr. Walker before the incident and had relied on

an erroneous account of Mr. Walker’s educational

history.

 The leader of the University of Chicago team,

Dr. Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer, was not allowed

to testify at all. Although there was no dispute

about Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer’s expertise on

the subject of electrical trauma, the district

court found that she improperly had relied on

findings of other members of her team.

Specifically, the court found that she had relied

on Dr. Pliskin’s findings about Mr. Walker’s preinjury functioning and excluded that testimony on

the ground that it was based on an unreliable

foundation. The district court also excluded as

unreliable Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer’s testimony

that Mr. Walker was suffering from post-traumatic

stress disorder because she was not a

psychiatrist or psychologist and because her

testimony conflicted with Dr. Pliskin’s findings.
 Mr. Walker also sought to introduce the

testimony of Dr. Martin Uman, an expert on

electrical safety and the chairman of the

Department of Electrical Engineering at the

University of Florida. Dr. Uman would have

testified about the different ways by which

electricity from lightning could have penetrated

Tower A even if the lightning had not struck the

tower directly. The district court barred that

testimony as too speculative. However, Dr. Uman

was allowed to testify in plaintiff’s rebuttal

case about the grounding and safety of Tower A

after one of Soo Line’s witnesses, Frank

Denbrock, a safety inspector for Soo Line,

testified that he had inspected Tower A and had

found that it was properly grounded.

 Dr. Adrian Upton was allowed to testify for Soo

Line that there was no evidence that Mr. Walker

was injured by any electrical trauma in November

1991. The district court also admitted records

from Mr. Walker’s treatment at the Madden State

Hospital. Mr. Walker received psychiatric

treatment there in 1972, 1973 and 1978.

II

DISCUSSION

 We review the district court’s evidentiary

decisions, including decisions to admit medical

expert testimony, for an abuse of discretion. See

General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, ___,

118 S. Ct. 512, 517 (1997); United States v.

Taylor, 154 F.3d 675, 683 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, 119 S. Ct. 629 (1998). In deciding

whether to admit the proffered expert testimony,

a district court must be guided by the

instructions of Daubert. See Daubert v. Merrell

Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Specifically, a district court is required to

determine (1) whether the expert would testify to

valid scientific knowledge, and (2) whether that

testimony would assist the trier of fact with a

fact at issue. See id. at 592-93. We shall

consider the district court’s decision with

respect to the testimony of each witness as well

as its decision to admit the hospital records.

A. Dr. Neil Pliskin

 Dr. Pliskin’s qualifications as a professional

psychologist are not in dispute. He was allowed

to testify about Mr. Walker’s post-incident IQ.

To establish that IQ, Dr. Pliskin administered to

Mr. Walker a battery of tests.

 The district court refused, however, to allow

testimony by Dr. Pliskin about Mr. Walker’s

functioning prior to the incident. Dr. Pliskin
acknowledged in his deposition that he relied in

part on Mr. Walker’s educational history in

determining his pre-incident IQ. Parts of Mr.

Walker’s history, apparently including his

educational history, had been reported to Dr.

Pliskin by a woman named Vanessa Harris,

described by the district court as Mr. Walker’s

girlfriend. The parties do not appear to dispute

that her statements to Dr. Pliskin were made on

behalf of Mr. Walker. The district court found,

however, that the educational history on which

Dr. Pliskin relied was inaccurate. Dr. Pliskin,

according to the court, acknowledged that, if the

account of Mr. Walker’s educational history

related to him by Harris was inaccurate, that

inaccuracy would have affected his opinion on Mr.

Walker’s pre-incident IQ. The court also found

that Dr. Pliskin was unsure whether electrical

trauma would cause the drop in IQ he claimed to

have found and that there were many other factors

in Mr. Walker’s life that might have caused his

reduction in functioning.

 Under Daubert, the first inquiry that must be

undertaken is whether Dr. Pliskin relied upon a

proper scientific methodology to determine Mr.

Walker’s pre-incident IQ. The record establishes

that Dr. Pliskin’s evaluation relied on the

medical, educational and professional histories

reported by Mr. Walker and Harris, and on his

administration of the National Adult Reading

Test, a test specifically designed to estimate a

person’s IQ before that person suffered a trauma.

Medical professionals reasonably may be expected

to rely on self-reported patient histories. See

Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson & Co., Nos. 98-4169, 98-

4222, 2000 WL 257140, at *11 (7th Cir. Mar. 7,

2000). Such histories provide information upon

which physicians may, and at times must, rely in

their diagnostic work. Of course, it is certainly

possible that self-reported histories may be

inaccurate. Dr. Pliskin himself said that it was

not unusual for patients to misrepresent their

histories to him. In situations in which a

medical expert has relied upon a patient’s selfreported history and that history is found to be

inaccurate, district courts usually should allow

those inaccuracies in that history to be explored

through cross-examination. The Supreme Court in

Daubert explained that the factual underpinnings

of expert testimony may be subject to counterattack. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 ("Vigorous

cross-examination, presentation of contrary

evidence, and careful instruction on the burden

of proof are the traditional and appropriate

means of attacking shaky but admissible

evidence."); see also Cooper, 2000 WL 257140, at

*11 (quoting Daubert). In this case, Soo Line

appropriately could have presented evidence that

Dr. Pliskin had relied upon an inaccurate history
and thereby called his conclusions into question.

"[T]he accuracy and truthfulness of the

underlying [educational] history is subject to

meaningful exploration on cross-examination and

ultimately to jury evaluation." Cooper, 2000 WL

257140, at *11. Based on such evidence, a jury

reasonably might have chosen not to credit Dr.

Pliskin’s testimony. Evidence demonstrating that

other events in Mr. Walker’s life affected his

functioning might have led a jury to conclude

that, even if Mr. Walker’s IQ had dropped after

the incident, that decrease was not due to any

electrical trauma. On the other hand, the jury

might have been convinced that, evaluating Dr.

Pliskin’s testimony in its entirety, his

conclusions remained sound despite the defects in

the patient history. The critical point is that

Dr. Pliskin employed a proper methodology to

determine Mr. Walker’s pre-incident IQ. It was

appropriate for Dr. Pliskin to rely on the test

that he administered and upon the sources of

information which he employed./1

 Having determined that Dr. Pliskin’s testimony

was based on an acceptable methodology, we must

consider whether it would have assisted the jury

with a fact at issue. Soo Line argues that Dr.

Pliskin’s testimony should have been excluded

because he does not state definitively that the

electrical trauma caused the drop in Mr. Walker’s

IQ. Under FELA, causation is a jury question. See

Scaggs v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 6 F.3d 1290,

1293-94 (7th Cir. 1993). From Dr. Pliskin’s

testimony, the jury could choose to infer that

any electrical trauma Mr. Walker suffered caused

his decline in IQ. Dr. Pliskin is not required to

have an opinion on that ultimate question to be

permitted to testify./2 His testimony could

assist the trier of fact even if he cannot say

with complete certainty that electrical trauma

caused Mr. Walker’s decline in functioning.

 The district court expressed concern that the

jury would not be "sophisticated enough to

understand the cross-examination, the attempts by

the defendant to bring out that Dr. Pliskin’s

opinion is really not as sound as he would give

it on direct examination." The Supreme Court,

however, has expressed its confidence in the

ability of juries to understand complicated

material, and we believe the district court

should have allowed the jury to consider Dr.

Pliskin’s evidence in this case. See Daubert, 509

at 595-96 (acknowledging a party’s concern about

"a ’free-for-all’ in which befuddled juries are

confounded by absurd and irrational

pseudoscientific assertions" but finding those

concerns "overly pessimistic about the

capabilities of the jury and of the adversary

system generally")./3
 Of course, as Daubert made clear, the trial

court must also keep in mind the other rules

regarding the admissibility of evidence. See

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. On this record, we

cannot discern any independent reliance on the

part of the district court on any other rule.

B. Dr. Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer

 The district court refused to allow any

testimony by Dr. Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer, the

head of the clinical team at the University of

Chicago that examined and evaluated Mr. Walker.

Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer concluded, based to a

significant extent on her discussions with

members of the team, that Mr. Walker had posttraumatic stress disorder and had lost function

because of an electrical injury. She was also

prepared to testify that it was not unusual for

electrical injuries to first manifest themselves

long after the electrical trauma that caused

them, as Mr. Walker argued his did. The district

court determined that Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer

was not qualified to testify about post-traumatic

stress disorder because she was not qualified as

a psychiatrist or psychologist. It acknowledged

that she was qualified to testify about the

effect of electrical trauma on the human body,

but still barred her testimony in its entirety.

 Although the district court’s statement of its

reasons for excluding Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer’s

testimony are not stated with optimal clarity, it

is clear that the wholesale disallowance of this

testimony was not an acceptable exercise of

discretion. At the outset, we think that it was

proper for a physician working in the role that

Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer held on the diagnostic

and evaluation team to rely on the work of her

team members in forming her opinion. Medical

professionals have long been expected to rely on

the opinions of other medical professionals in

forming their opinions. See Birdsell v. United

States, 346 F.2d 775, 779-80 (5th Cir. 1965)

("With the increased division of labor in modern

medicine, the physician making a diagnosis must

necessarily rely on many observations and tests

performed by others and recorded by them . . .

."); see also Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d

888, 892-93 (10th Cir. 1984); Jenkins v. United

States, 307 F.2d 637, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1962);

Boehme v. Maxwell, 309 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 (W.D.

Wash. 1968) (quoting Birdsell). Federal Rule of

Evidence 703, the rule governing the appropriate

bases of expert testimony, specifically

contemplates, in its advisory committee notes,

reliance on "reports and opinions from nurses,

technicians and other doctors." Fed. R. Evid.

703; see also Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed
Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing

Rule 703). Indeed, courts frequently have pointed

to an expert’s reliance on the reports of others

as an indication that their testimony is

reliable./4 Expert testimony relying on the

opinions of others should, of course, be rejected

if the testifying expert’s opinion is too

speculative, see Washington v. Armstrong World

Indus., 839 F.2d 1121, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1988),

or the underlying basis is faulty, see National

Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp.

1490, 1523-24 (E.D. Ark. 1996), aff’d, 133 F.3d

1132 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).

 Soo Line argues that Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer’s

opinion that Mr. Walker suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder is unreliable because

she relies primarily on Dr. Pliskin’s work, and

Dr. Pliskin concluded that Mr. Walker did not

have post-traumatic stress disorder. That two

different experts reach opposing conclusions from

the same information does not render their

opinions inadmissible. See Allapattah Servs.,

Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp.2d 1335, 1341

(S.D. Fla. 1999) ("Merely because two qualified

experts reach directly opposite conclusions using

similar, if not identical, data bases . . . does

not necessarily mean that, under Daubert, one

opinion is per se unreliable."). Moreover, Dr.

Capelli-Schellpfeffer also relied on the

information of other professionals who examined

Mr. Walker, including a psychiatrist, Dr. Kelly.

This additional information, coupled with her own

limited examination of Mr. Walker, reasonably

could have led her to come to a conclusion

different from Dr. Pliskin’s. To the degree that

she might have relied on faulty information, the

matter certainly could be explored on crossexamination. 

 Nor do we believe that the leader of a clinical

medical team must be qualified as an expert in

every individual discipline encompassed by the

team in order to testify as to the team’s

conclusions. The team approach to medical

diagnosis and treatment is employed to ensure

that all relevant disciplines work together for

the good of the patient. The leader of that team

is chosen because of her ability to assess

accurately the role that each member of the team

ought to play and to reconcile, when necessary,

competing perspectives. In short, the expertise

of the team leader is the capability to evaluate,

in light of the overall picture, the

contributions of each member of the team. Here,

the district court found Dr. CapelliSchellpfeffer to be an expert on the subject of

electrical trauma. As part of that expertise, she

naturally would be expected to have expertise on

the subject of whether electrical injuries could
cause post-traumatic stress disorder. Dr.

Capelli-Schellpfeffer is not a psychiatrist and

well might not be able to render an opinion about

diagnosing post-traumatic stress disorder on the

basis of something other than electrical trauma.

However, as the leader of a clinical team

specializing in electrical injury, who reasonably

relied on the expert opinions of specialists who

also examined Mr. Walker, her conclusion that Mr.

Walker suffered from post-traumatic stress

disorder was a professional opinion that the jury

had the right to consider.

C. Dr. Martin Uman

 Dr. Martin Uman, the chairman of the electrical

engineering department at the University of

Florida, testified in his deposition about

different ways that lightning could have

penetrated Tower A. Starting with the assumption

that lightning could have hit in any one of

several places in the rail yard, Dr. Uman offered

testimony of how, from those several places,

electricity could have penetrated Tower A. Dr.

Uman said that Mr. Walker could have been injured

through a direct hit to Tower A, through a hit to

the light tower near Tower A, or through a hit to

wires in the yard connected to a switch on Mr.

Walker’s control board, if Mr. Walker happened to

be touching that switch at the time. He also

acknowledged that it was possible that lightning

could have hit the yard without injuring Mr.

Walker in any way. The district court allowed

only those portions of Dr. Uman’s testimony that

addressed the possible dangers if the tower had

been struck directly by lightning; that testimony

was only allowed in Mr. Walker’s rebuttal case to

contradict the testimony of Soo Line expert Frank

Denbrock.

 We must conclude that the district court’s

decision in restricting Dr. Uman’s testimony

cannot stand even under the deferential standard

of review. Experts are allowed to posit alternate

models to explain their conclusion. See Cole v.

Control Data Corp., 947 F.2d 313, 319 (8th Cir.

1991) (permitting testimony about alternate

models for calculating damages); John Morrell &

Co. v. Local Union 304A, 913 F.2d 544, 558-59

(8th Cir. 1990) (allowing expert to testify about

eight different damages models). The jury would

have been assisted by learning different ways

that lightning could have penetrated the tower.

 This testimony could have been helpful even

though Dr. Uman cannot say with any certainty

where exactly lightning hit the rail yard, if it

hit the rail yard at all. Dr. Uman intended to

explain to the jury the ramifications of

lightning striking at different points in the

yard; the jury, based on eyewitness testimony and
on any meteorological evidence entered by the

parties, could decide whether it thought

lightning had in fact hit anywhere in the yard.

The questions of whether lightning hit the yard,

and if so where, were questions of fact. See

Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.,

286 F.2d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 1961) (lightning

striking clock tower); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.

Thompson, 175 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1949) (lightning

striking cattle). Such questions are for the

jury. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347,

373 (1995); Robinson v. Burlington Northern R.R.

Co., 131 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1997). Soo Line,

through evidence of its own, could have attempted

to show that lightning did not strike any of the

vulnerable points identified by Dr. Uman. It also

could have presented testimony contradicting Dr.

Uman’s assertions that lightning striking various

points in the rail yard could have affected

someone working in Tower A. The jury then could

have decided whether it thought lightning struck

the yard and, if it concluded that lightning did

strike, could have determined whether that

lightning injured Mr. Walker. Dr. Uman had

scientifically valid testimony that would have

assisted the jury with its inquiry, and--assuming

the testimony was in conformity with the other

Federal Rules of Evidence--the district court

should have allowed him to present that testimony

to the jury.

D. Frank Denbrock

 Frank Denbrock, an electrical engineer who has

extensive experience in the field of electrical

safety, inspected the rail yard in 1997. He

testified for Soo Line, over Mr. Walker’s

objection about the safety of Tower A. Expert

testimony from technical fields is governed by

the same concerns and criteria as the admission

of medical expert testimony. See Kumho Tire Co.

v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1174-76 (1999).

The district court admitted Denbrock’s testimony.

 Mr. Walker contends that the district court

conducted an inadequate Daubert hearing before

choosing to admit Denbrock’s testimony. We review

de novo "whether the district court properly

followed the framework set forth in Daubert."

United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1101 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2381 (1999).

"Upon a determination that the district court

properly applied the Daubert framework, the

district court’s decision to admit or exclude

expert testimony is reviewed only for an abuse of

discretion." Id. The discussion of Denbrock’s

qualifications took place in the context of a

discussion about the qualifications of several

witnesses. It is true that the district court did

not articulate explicitly Denbrock’s experience
in terms of the Daubert factors, but the district

court’s consideration of the question was not so

inadequate as to render it faulty as a matter of

law. When issuing oral rulings on Daubert

questions, trial judges need not "recite the

Daubert standard as though it were some magical

incantation." See Ancho v. Pentek Corp., 157 F.3d

512, 518 (7th Cir. 1998).

 On the factual issue of Denbrock’s

qualifications, the district court did not abuse

its discretion by admitting Denbrock’s testimony.

Mr. Walker argues that Denbrock’s testimony

should have been excluded because his inspection

was inadequate and his conclusions were faulty.

Mr. Walker is correct that shoddy preparation by

an expert might evidence a lack of professional

qualifications on the part of a proffered

witness. See Ancho, 157 F.3d at 516-19. We are

not prepared to say, however, that the district

court’s decision to admit Denbrock’s testimony

was an abuse of discretion. Denbrock was offered

as an expert on the basis of his work for a power

company, where he was responsible for ensuring

the safety of its facilities from lightning.

Denbrock demonstrated professional experience in

the area of electrical safety, and Rule 702

specifically contemplates the admission of

testimony by experts whose knowledge is based on

experience. See Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1174;

Hall, 165 F.3d at 1101. Although the district

court did not discuss Denbrock’s personal

knowledge of the site in question at the Daubert

hearing, Denbrock testified at trial that he

personally had inspected the tower. If there was

evidence that Tower A was unsafe that Denbrock

should have considered but did not, or if there

was reason to believe that Denbrock’s

investigation was shoddy, Mr. Walker could have

uncovered those flaws through cross-examination

and through the presentation of contrary

evidence. Here Denbrock provided a sufficient

showing of his expertise. The district court did

not abuse its discretion by allowing Denbrock’s

testimony.

E. Dr. Adrian Upton

 Dr. Adrian Upton is a medical expert witness who

testified for Soo Line. He testified about Mr.

Walker’s medical condition after reviewing Mr.

Walker’s medical records. Mr. Walker argues that

Dr. Upton was not qualified to testify on the

subject because he did not have sufficient

experience in trauma caused by lightning and

personally had not examined Mr. Walker.

 Dr. Upton’s specialty is the effect of electric

current on the human body. There is no dispute as

to his medical qualifications. In allowing Dr.
Upton to testify, the district court relied upon

Dr. Upton’s experience in treating patients with

electrical injuries and upon Dr. Upton’s

examination of Mr. Walker’s medical records.

These factors were a sufficient basis for the

district court to find Dr. Upton qualified as an

expert witness. The lack of an examination of Mr.

Walker does not render Dr. Upton’s testimony

inadmissible. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB

Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 762 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[W]e

think that evaluation of the patient’s medical

records, like performance of a physical

examination, is a reliable method of concluding

that a patient is ill even in the absence of a

physical examination."). Indeed, we have said

that the examination of medical records can be an

important part of an expert witness’ preparation.

See O’Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d

1090, 1107 (7th Cir. 1994). The district court

did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr.

Upton’s testimony.

F. The Madden State Hospital Records

 The district court allowed Soo Line to introduce

into evidence Mr. Walker’s records from Madden

State Hospital. Soo Line quoted from the records

during closing argument. Mr. Walker was a patient

on three occasions: in 1972, 1973 and 1978. The

portion of the record quoted by Soo Line during

closing argument noted that Mr. Walker was

admitted in 1972 for six weeks of treatment, and

then again in 1978. Mr. Walker argues that the

records should not have been admitted because his

hospitalization occurred so long before the

events at the rail yard that they could not be

relevant to his condition at that time.

Nonetheless, Dr. Pliskin, a witness for Mr.

Walker, acknowledged at trial that he would have

liked to have known about Mr. Walker’s hospital

stay when preparing his evaluation of Mr.

Walker’s pre-incident abilities. On this record,

we see no reason to disturb the decision of the

district court.

G. Harmless Error

 Soo Line also submits that any error by the

district court in the admission of evidence is

harmless. We shall vacate a jury verdict only if

error substantially influenced the jury. See

Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1339 (7th

Cir. 1997); Groom v. Days Inn, 62 F.3d 204, 208

(7th Cir. 1995). Here, the excluded testimony

from Dr. Pliskin, Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer, and

Dr. Uman formed a substantial portion of Mr.

Walker’s case. Our examination of the record

convinces us that the exclusion of their

testimony was not harmless error. 
Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, the jury verdict is

reversed, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED

/1 Mr. Walker also contends that the district court

should have allowed Dr. Pliskin to testify about

Mr. Walker’s pre-incident IQ because Soo Line

opened the door to this topic in its crossexamination of Dr. Pliskin. Because we hold that

Dr. Pliskin’s testimony should have been allowed

as part of Mr. Walker’s case-in-chief, we need

not address this argument.

/2 Historically, witnesses were expressly prohibited

from testifying about the ultimate issues facing

the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 704 advisory

committee’s note. That prohibition was eliminated

in the federal courts by Federal Rule of Evidence

704, which allows such testimony (subject to an

exception in criminal cases not relevant here).

See Fed. R. Evid. 704; United States v. Baskes,

649 F.2d 471, 479 (7th Cir. 1980). Nothing in

that rule, or any other rule governing expert

testimony, requires an expert to opine on the

ultimate issue in order to have his testimony

admitted.

/3 There may be cases in which a patient’s selfreported history is so patently misleading as to

make it unreasonable for an examining physician

to place any reliance on it. On this record,

however, it is clear that we have no such case

before us. Dr. Pliskin’s testimony should not

have been excluded under Daubert solely on the

ground that his patient’s self-reported history

contained some inaccuracies.

/4 See, e.g., Hose v. Chicago Northwestern Transp.

Co., 70 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1995); United

States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 301-02 (7th Cir.

1981); Antoine-Tubbs v. Local 513, Air Transp.

Div., 50 F. Supp.2d 601, 609 (N.D. Tex. 1998)

(citing Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 126 F.3d

679, 690-91 (5th Cir. 1997), rev’d en banc, 151

F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) and cert. denied, 119 S.

Ct. 1454 (1999)), aff’d, 190 F.3d 537 (5th Cir.

1999); Gess v. United States, 991 F. Supp. 1332,

1338 (M.D. Ala. 1997).