NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ROBERT REUBEN SANCHEZ, III, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 13-0847

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2012-106152-001

The Honorable Roland J. Steinle, III, Judge

AFFIRMED AS CORRECTED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Joel M. Glynn

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. SANCHEZ

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2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge John C. Gemmill joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Robert Reuben Sanchez, III timely appeals from his 

convictions and sentences for: count one, possession or use of dangerous 

drugs, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) section 13-3407

(Supp. 2014),1 a class 4 felony; count two, possession or use of marijuana, in 

violation of A.R.S. § 13-3405 (Supp. 2014), a class 6 felony; counts three and 

four, misconduct involving weapons, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3102 (Supp. 

2014), class 4 felonies; and count five, misconduct involving body armor, in 

violation of A.R.S. § 13-3116 (2010), also a class 4 felony. After searching 

the record on appeal and finding no arguable question of law that was not 

frivolous, Sanchez’s counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), and State v. 

Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), asking this court to search the record 

for fundamental error. This court granted counsel’s motion to allow

Sanchez to file a supplemental brief in propria persona, but Sanchez did not 

do so. After reviewing the entire record, we find no fundamental error and, 

therefore, affirm Sanchez’s convictions and sentences as corrected. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

¶2 At 8:44 p.m. on January 27, 2012, two police officers saw an 

SUV speeding on Buckeye Road in Phoenix, Arizona. They stopped the 

SUV, and after the driver—Sanchez—rolled down the side window one of 

the officers smelled an “overwhelming odor” of perfume or air freshener, 

that at trial he explained was frequently used to conceal the odor of 

 

1Although the Arizona Legislature amended certain statutes 

cited in this decision after the date of Sanchez’s arrest, the revisions are 

immaterial to the resolution of this appeal. Thus, we cite to the current 

version of these statutes. 

2We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining 

the jury’s verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Sanchez. See

State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989). 
STATE v. SANCHEZ

Decision of the Court

3

marijuana. The officer also noted Sanchez was wearing a large black jacket 

zipped to the top of his neck. Sanchez told the officer he did not own the 

SUV, but he could not identify who did. 

¶3 After running the SUV’s registration and license plate and 

determining the SUV’s owner, the officers requested another police 

department contact the owner to find out whether it had been stolen. For 

their own safety while they waited to hear back from the other police 

department, the officers asked Sanchez to step out of the SUV so they could 

“pat [him] down,” that is, frisk him, for weapons. During the weapons 

frisk, one of the officers discovered Sanchez was wearing a bulletproof vest. 

The officers then became concerned Sanchez might be armed. They

handcuffed him and completed the frisk. One of the officers felt a large, 

bulky, soft object concealed in Sanchez’s sock which he believed contained 

narcotics. The officer lifted Sanchez’s pant leg and saw baggies containing

a green leafy substance the officer believed to be marijuana. He also found 

one baggie containing a white crystal-like substance he believed to be 

methamphetamine. The officers arrested Sanchez and placed him in the 

backseat of their patrol car. The officer who conducted the frisk then 

searched the SUV and found a loaded rifle, loaded magazines for the rifle, 

a loaded revolver, a knife, and an expandable baton, all within reach of a 

person sitting in the driver’s seat. 

¶4 Before trial, Sanchez moved to suppress the drugs and all 

items found in the SUV. At the suppression hearing, Sanchez conceded the 

officers were justified in conducting a frisk for weapons; his only argument 

was that the frisk exceeded a search for weapons when the officer lifted his

pant leg and removed the package from his sock. The officer testified, 

however, that based on the circumstances and his experience, when he felt 

the soft bulge in Sanchez’s sock, he was certain it was packaged contraband. 

See State v. Watkins, 207 Ariz. 562, 568, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d 1174, 1180 (App. 2004)

(“Contraband may be seized if during a lawful frisk, the officer feels an 

object he knows is contraband without the need to manipulate it.”). The 

superior court denied the motion to suppress based on the totality of the 

circumstances and the credibility of the officer’s testimony that in his 21 

years of experience he “never found a bulge in somebody’s sock that has 

not been packaged narcotics.” We see no error in the superior court’s ruling 

on Sanchez’s motion to suppress. State v. Baggett, 232 Ariz. 424, 426, ¶ 7, 

306 P.3d 81, 83 (App. 2013) (appellate court reviews a superior court’s 

denial of motion to suppress for abuse of discretion and will “defer to the 

[superior] court’s determinations of the credibility of the officers and the 

reasonableness of the inferences they dr[a]w, but [will] consider the 
STATE v. SANCHEZ

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4

[superior] court’s legal decisions de novo”) (citation omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).3

¶5 At trial, a Phoenix Police Department criminalist testified 

each baggie contained either marijuana or methamphetamine. Certified 

latent print examiners testified Sanchez’s left middle finger print was on the 

revolver and his thumbprint matched the thumbprint on a certified 

sentencing minute entry in a prior felony case. A superior court civil-rights 

restoration clerk testified the superior court had not entered an order 

restoring Sanchez’s right to possess weapons in that prior felony case. The 

jury found Sanchez guilty on all counts. 

¶6 At the sentencing hearing, Sanchez admitted to having two 

historical prior felony convictions and also avowed in a plea agreement 

accepted by the court in an unrelated matter to having two other prior 

felony convictions. The superior court sentenced him as a category 3 

repetitive offender to the presumptive term of 10 years for counts one, 

three, four, and five, and the presumptive term of 3.75 years for count two;

all sentences to be served concurrently. See A.R.S. § 13-703(C), (J) (Supp. 

2014). The court correctly calculated and awarded Sanchez 490 days of 

presentence incarceration credit. 

DISCUSSION

¶7 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and 

find none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881. Sanchez received a 

 

3Although the police handcuffed, arrested, and placed 

Sanchez in the backseat of their patrol car before searching the SUV, 

Sanchez did not separately challenge their search of the SUV under Arizona 

v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009) (subject to 

certain exceptions, search incident to arrest exception to warrant 

requirement does not apply to search of defendant’s vehicle when

defendant secured in patrol car and could not reasonably access vehicle). 

The record as developed by the parties at the suppression hearing does not 

allow us to evaluate the validity of the search of the SUV under Gant. If 

Sanchez believes the search of the SUV was invalid, nothing in this decision 

should be construed as precluding him from seeking post-conviction relief

based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32. 

 
STATE v. SANCHEZ

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5

fair trial. He was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings 

and was present at all critical stages.

¶8 The evidence presented at trial was substantial and supports 

the verdicts. The jury was properly comprised of 12 members and the court 

properly instructed the jury on the elements of the charges, Sanchez’s 

presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, and the necessity of 

a unanimous verdict. The superior court received and considered a 

presentence report, Sanchez was given an opportunity to speak at 

sentencing, and he did so. His sentences were within the range of 

acceptable sentences for his offenses.

¶9 In our review of the record, we discovered errors in the 

superior court’s sentencing minute entry. First, the minute entry 

incorrectly references “A.R.S. § 13-3102” under “Count 5 MISCONDUCT 

INVOLVING BODY ARMOR.” The correct statute for misconduct 

involving body armor is A.R.S. § 13-3116, and thus we correct the minute 

entry to reflect the same. Second, the minute entry describes Sanchez’s 

convictions as “non-repetitive,” and lists “A.R.S. 13-702,” the “First time 

felony offenders” statute under each offense. The record is abundantly 

clear, however, the superior court intended to, and did, sentence Sanchez 

as a category 3 repetitive offender. Not only did the superior court find at 

sentencing that Sanchez had two historical prior felony offenses, but 

Sanchez avowed he had two other prior felony convictions. Also, the term 

of each sentence the court imposed matched the appropriate term under the 

repetitive offender statute, A.R.S. § 13-703. Thus we correct the sentencing 

minute entry to replace each reference to “A.R.S. § 13-702” with “A.R.S. § 

13-703” and to describe each conviction as “repetitive.”
STATE v. SANCHEZ

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CONCLUSION

¶10 We decline to order briefing and affirm Sanchez’s convictions

and sentences as corrected.

¶11 After the filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations 

pertaining to Sanchez’s representation in this appeal have ended. Defense 

counsel need do no more than inform Sanchez of the outcome of this appeal 

and his future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue 

appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for 

review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 

(1984).

¶12 Sanchez has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, 

if he wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. On the court’s 

own motion, we also grant Sanchez 30 days from the date of this decision 

to file an in propria persona motion for reconsideration.