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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 122,566

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER SCOTT EGAN,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Butler District Court, DAVID A. RICKE, judge. Opinion filed April 2, 2021. 

Affirmed. 

Stephen T. Ariagno, of Wichita, for appellant. 

Cheryl M. Pierce, assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee. 

Before ATCHESON, P.J., GARDNER and WARNER, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Christopher Egan pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual 

exploitation of a child in exchange for the State's promise to drop the remaining 34 

counts. A few days later Egan regretted his decision, so he hired new counsel and moved 

to withdraw his plea. The district court denied that motion. Egan appeals, yet finding no 

error we affirm. 
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Factual and Procedural Background

This case began when Google reported to the National Center for Missing and 

Exploited Children (NCMEC) Cybertipline hotline that someone had uploaded 303 files 

to a Dropbox online storage account linked to an email address listed as eganc@cox.net.

That account was owned by Egan. 

The district court later bound Egan over for trial on 37 counts of felony sexual 

exploitation of a child. Egan agreed to plead no contest to three of those counts and the 

State agreed to drop the remaining charges. At the plea hearing, Egan's attorney, Darren 

Patterson, told the district court he had reviewed with Egan the amended plea agreement 

and possible sentences and that Egan was prepared to plead to the amended charges. The 

district court then went through the routine plea colloquy discussing Egan's rights. Egan 

told the district court that he understood the extended reporting requirements, that he 

would be on lifetime postrelease supervision because of the nature of his crimes, and that 

he would face offender registration consequences for the plea. The district court then 

asked Egan if he was being threatened or promised anything to enter the plea, and Egan 

replied, "No." Egan said that he was satisfied with Patterson's representation. The district 

court then accepted Egan's plea of no contest to three counts of sexual exploitation of a 

child and found Egan guilty of those charges.

Within a few days, Egan had hired new counsel, Stephen Ariagno, and had moved 

to withdraw his plea. At the hearing on that motion, Ariagno stated that Egan maintained 

his innocence, that Egan never intended to plea, that Egan had felt coerced and pressured 

to enter the plea, and that Egan had felt pressured to say he was satisfied with Patterson's 

legal services. Patterson did not testify. Egan testified:
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• He wanted Patterson to hire a computer expert to look into the computer evidence 

and independently investigate the IP addresses and the files found on the 

computer;

• the expert did not review the computers until the day before the plea hearing;

• Egan went to Patterson's office the day of the plea hearing thinking they would be 

asking for a continuance; but

• Patterson pressured Egan to accept the plea, which he reluctantly did. 

The State presented no evidence but argued that Egan had entered the plea 

knowingly and voluntarily and then later regretted it. The State also argued that the 

district court had conducted a thorough and appropriate plea colloquy and had given 

Egan plenty of opportunity at the plea hearing to speak up about his concerns. The district 

court denied Egan's motion. 

Egan timely appeals. 

Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Egan's Presentence Motion to 

Withdraw His Plea?

Egan argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his presentence 

motion to withdraw his plea. He argues his testimony met all three of the Edgar factors: 

counsel competency, coercion to enter the plea, and whether the plea was 

"understandingly made." State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 (2006). In 

contrast, the State contends Egan met none of those factors.

Standard of Review and Basic Legal Principles

Because the district court, in its discretion, determines whether to allow the 

defendant to withdraw his plea before sentencing, we review that decision under an 
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"abuse of discretion" standard. State v. Williams, 290 Kan. 1050, 1053, 236 P.3d 512 

(2010). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision stemmed from an error of law or 

fact, or no reasonable person would agree with the decision. State v. Jones, 306 Kan. 948, 

Syl. ¶ 7, 398 P.3d 856 (2017). As the moving party, Egan bears the burden of showing an 

abuse of discretion. See Williams, 290 Kan. at 1053.

Generally, a defendant may not withdraw a no-contest or guilty plea. K.S.A. 2020 

Supp. 22-3602(a). But under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3210(d), the district court may allow 

the defendant to withdraw the plea once "good cause is shown." See State v. Brown, 46 

Kan. App. 2d 556, 562, 263 P.3d 217 (2011). 

The Edgar court set out three factors that the district court should evaluate to 

determine whether the defendant has shown "good cause" to withdraw his or her plea:

1. Was the defendant represented by competent counsel;

2. was the defendant misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken 

advantage of, and 

3. was the plea fairly and understandingly made? 281 Kan. at 36.

A district court abuses its discretion by failing to consider the Edgar factors when 

deciding whether good cause exists to withdraw a plea. See State v. Freeman, 292 Kan. 

24, 30, 253 P.3d 1 (2011). But the district court need not make express findings on each 

Edgar factor; an implicit consideration of the factors is enough. State v. Harper, No. 

121,943, 2020 WL 7636424, at *3 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished decision) (discussing 

that the district court does not have to make express findings on each Edgar factor 

because the district court's implicit reference to the factors is enough), petition for rev. 

filed January 21, 2021. And the district court need not find that all three factors weigh in 

Egan's favor to establish "good cause." 290 Kan. at 513. The district court may consider 

factors other than the three Edgar factors. See State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 512-13, 
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231 P.3d 563 (2010). But the district court is not required to consider Edgar factors that 

the defendant has not argued. Williams, 290 Kan. at 1055-56. 

Although the district court did not explicitly cite Edgar, the record shows that it 

reviewed Edgar's factors in making its decision. 

Representation by Competent Counsel

The first Edgar factor requires the district court to determine whether Egan was 

represented by competent counsel. See 281 Kan. at 36. Although Egan raised several 

reasons at the plea withdrawal hearing why Patterson's representation was not competent, 

his appellate brief mentions only one—that Egan had outstanding discovery questions for 

Patterson yet he ignored his repeated inquiries. "'Where [a party] fails to brief an issue, 

that issue is waived or abandoned.'" Mid-Continent Specialists, Inc. v Capital Homes, 279 

Kan. 178, 191, 106 P.3d 483 (2005). We thus address only the discovery issue Egan has 

briefed, as Egan has waived all others. 

According to Egan's testimony, Patterson presented the plea to him an hour before 

the plea hearing. Egan thought Patterson was going to ask for a continuance so the 

computer expert could have time to complete his theory on the computer evidence. But 

on cross-examination, Egan admitted that although Patterson had ignored Egan's emails 

for the previous two weeks, Patterson had finally replied, "'I'll work on the plea.'" And 

Egan shows no evidence that he objected to that approach or told Patterson to work on 

discovery rather than the plea.

Egan also testified that Patterson forced him to tell the judge that he had 

"competent counsel." When asked whether he was untruthful to the court during his plea 

hearing, Egan replied, "Under duress, yes." But the same judge presided over both 

hearings—the change of plea hearing and the motion to withdraw plea hearing. The judge 
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recalled Patterson and his performance. He reviewed Patterson's qualifications to serve as 

an attorney, determined that Patterson was an experienced trial attorney, and had dealt 

with Patterson before yet could not recall any other complaint where Patterson had 

improperly pressured a client to accept a plea. The district court thus discredited Egan's 

testimony that Patterson had forced him to commit perjury by saying he was satisfied 

with his representation. We cannot revisit that credibility issue. See Creecy v. Kansas 

Dept. of Revenue, 310 Kan. 454, 469, 447 P.3d 959 (2019) ("In reviewing a court's 

findings, an appellate court will not weigh conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of 

witnesses, or redetermine questions of fact.").

We find no error in the district court's finding that Egan had competent counsel. 

Misled, Coerced, Mistreated, or Unfairly Taken Advantage of

The second Edgar factor requires the district court to determine whether the State, 

the court, or Patterson had misled, coerced, or taken unfair advantage of Egan. See 

Edgar, 281 Kan. at 36. Egan argues that he stressed to the district court "on several 

occasions through his testimony that he felt coerced by counsel, describing the plea as 

being 'jammed down [his] throat.'" Again, Egan alleges that Patterson forced him to tell 

the district court that he received adequate representation.

To the contrary, the district court found Egan was not misled, coerced, mistreated, 

or unfairly taken advantage of. For the same reasons set forth above, we find no error in 

that determination. Egan failed to prove the second Edgar factor. 

Fairly and Understandingly Made

The third Edgar factor requires the district court to determine whether the plea 

was fairly and understandingly made. 281 Kan. at 36. Here, Egan argues that he 
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maintained his innocence throughout his case and that Patterson pushed him to accept a 

plea offer just hours before the plea hearing, yet a decision of that magnitude "requires 

reflection and consideration." 

The district court found that Egan understood what he was doing when he entered 

the plea. The district court also held that Egan appeared to understand the nature of 

entering a plea and that Egan "answered all questions to this Court without hesitation and 

without concern." (Emphasis added.) The district court found nothing in the record that 

suggested Egan's plea was "anything but fairly and understandingly made." Thus, the 

district court determined that the third Edgar factor was not established and could not be 

the basis for "good cause." 

We find no error in that conclusion. The Kansas Supreme Court has held that a 

district court is in the best position to observe the demeanor of a defendant and draw 

conclusions about whether the plea was knowingly and intelligently made. State v.

Macias-Medina, 293 Kan. 833, 839, 268 P.3d 1201 (2012). Here, the same judge 

presided over both the plea hearing and the plea withdrawal hearing. The district court 

observed Egan's behavior and demeanor during the plea colloquy and was in the best 

position to determine whether the defendant's later claims of misunderstanding were not

enough to overcome its conclusion the plea was fairly and understandingly made.

Conclusion

The district court denied Egan's motion because Egan failed to show "good 

grounds" for the court to allow him to withdraw his plea. The record shows that the 

district court relied on a proper understanding of the law in determining that Egan failed 

to show "good cause" to allow Egan to withdraw his plea. See Aguilar, 290 Kan. at 511. 

We find no errors of law or fact and find that a reasonable person could have taken the 
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view adopted by the trial court. Egan thus fails to show that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his plea. 

Affirmed.