[Cite as State v. Baldwin, 2023-Ohio-3795.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 112440

v. :

BRANDON BALDWIN, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 19, 2023

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-21-665692-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Jillian J. Piteo, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Weston Hurd, LLP, and Paul M. Shipp, for appellant. 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

Brandon Baldwin appeals his conviction for the rape of a victim under 

the age of 13, which culminated in the imposition of a life sentence with the 

possibility of parole after 25 years. For the following reasons, the conviction is 

affirmed.
The facts underlying the allegations are relatively straightforward. 

The victim, then ten years old, was sleeping on the floor of the living room in her 

home after having fallen asleep watching television. Baldwin, who was married to 

the victim’s mother, came home in the early morning hours but was not there when 

the victim fell asleep. Baldwin, although living with the victim’s family, was 

frequently in Michigan for work and to care for his ailing father. The victim woke 

up around 4:00 a.m. to Baldwin digitally raping her. When she woke up, Baldwin 

stopped and asked if she was okay. The victim recognized his voice. The assault was 

disclosed the following day to the victim’s friend, who eventually revealed the assault 

to the victim’s mother. After the victim disclosed the assault, her sister claimed to 

have been sexually assaulted by Baldwin in the past as well.

Baldwin told the investigating social services personnel that he was in 

the house that evening and remembered seeing the victim asleep on the couch. He 

claims he was looking for the remote control for the television when the victim 

awoke.

Baldwin’s trial defense, carried over into this appeal, mostly focused 

on arguably irrelevant issues. Baldwin went through great lengths to elicit testimony 

that one of the victim’s siblings had potentially sexually assaulted the victim or her 

siblings when he was six or seven years old and the victim was two years old 

(approximately eight years prior to Baldwin’s sexual assault). According to Baldwin, 

because of the sibling’s history, he must have been the perpetrator of the assault at 

issue. Baldwin also attempted to prove that the victim’s mother was lying on the 
witness stand about her relationship with her 19-year-old fiancé, who was 

introduced to the family as first becoming friends with the victim’s sibling. The 

victim’s mother testified that the relationship started after her divorce from 

Baldwin, after the fiancé reached the age of majority. Some testimony from other 

witnesses indicated the relationship began earlier, while the fiancé was a minor.

The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, found Baldwin guilty of the 

rape charge but acquitted Baldwin of several gross-sexual-imposition counts 

pertaining to the victim and her sister. This timely appeal followed.

In the first assignment of error, Baldwin claims the trial court erred 

by “excluding evidence of another suspect of the crime.” According to Baldwin, the 

victim’s sibling was a potential suspect in light of his alleged misconduct when the 

sibling was six or seven years old. 

At trial, Baldwin repeatedly attempted to question witnesses, 

including the sibling, regarding the sibling’s history with counseling and his own 

sexual misconduct allegations. Baldwin’s “theory” was to blame the assault on the 

sibling, despite the fact that the victim expressly identified Baldwin as the 

perpetrator of the assault. The trial court repeatedly precluded Baldwin from 

pursuing that line of questioning, concluding that any past misconduct, even if 

accepted as true for the sake of discussion, was not relevant to the allegations 

pertaining to Baldwin’s misconduct on the night in question. There was no evidence 

the sibling was even present at the time.
In this appeal, Baldwin claims that the trial court’s decision violated 

his fundamental right to establish a complete defense because he was not able to 

fully cross-examine witnesses on the sibling’s alleged past misconduct. 

As the state acknowledges, “the Constitution guarantees criminal 

defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense[,]” and as a 

result, competent, reliable evidence is admissible when that evidence is crucial to 

the defendant’s claim of innocence. State v. Orr, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100841, 

2014-Ohio-4680, ¶ 39, quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 

2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986). That due process right is not absolute. Id., citing 

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19-21, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); 

State v. Swann, 119 Ohio St.3d 552, 2008-Ohio-4837, 895 N.E.2d 821, ¶ 13; 

Cleveland v. Dexter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107817, 2019-Ohio-4057, ¶ 35, quoting

Swann at ¶ 12-13. The offender “‘must at least make some plausible showing of how 

[a witness’s] testimony would have been both material and favorable to his 

defense.’” Cleveland v. Alexander, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92282, 2009-Ohio-4566, 

¶ 27, quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 

73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). 

In this case, Baldwin claims that “[c]learly, the existence of another 

person in the home who had previously sexually abused the girls was essential to 

Mr. Baldwin’s defense.” It is far from clear how past allegations of abuse committed 

against other victims are relevant to the commission of the current crimes. At no 

time during the trial proceedings or in this appeal has Baldwin ever explained how 
the past sexual abuse allegations could have been relevant to his defense against the 

current charges — much less whether the excluded evidence could be deemed 

essential thereto. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 110 Ohio St.3d 306, 2006-Ohio-4571, 853 

N.E.2d 621, ¶ 68-70 (without evidence linking previous sexual offenses by another 

suspect committed against the victim to the current charges, defendant could not 

demonstrate the probative value of introducing unduly prejudicial evidence of the 

earlier offenses). Baldwin presented no evidence that anyone else was present at the 

time the victim claimed she was assaulted, much less that the sibling was even 

present in the home. Instead, he told investigators that he remembered the 

interaction from which the charges stemmed but claimed to be looking for a remote 

control to shut off the television. The trier of fact was left to decide the respective 

credibility to be afforded to those two versions of events. 

We cannot conclude that the trial court erred in deeming the past 

allegations against the sibling as being irrelevant and immaterial to the defense in 

light of the underlying factual allegations. The first assignment of error is overruled.

In the second assignment of error, Baldwin claims that the trial court 

erred by precluding him from introducing extrinsic evidence to question the veracity

of the victim’s mother’s statements that she entered a relationship with her fiancé

after he reached the age of majority. According to Baldwin, the mother engaged in 

a conversation with another witness during trial. The mother allegedly “had been 

texting [the witness] and saying that she needed to make sure that [the witness] 

understood her relationship” with her 19-year-old fiancé. When the mother 
testified, she claimed the relationship with her fiancé began after Baldwin’s alleged 

misconduct. During the direct examination of the other witness, Baldwin’s counsel 

attempted to elicit testimony regarding the mother’s attempt to contact the other 

witness. In other words, Baldwin attempted to impeach the mother’s trial testimony

through the introduction of inconsistent statements made to a third party or otheracts evidence. Under Baldwin’s theory, the mother “manipulated” the victim into 

accusing Baldwin of sexual misconduct so that the mother could continue her 

“illegal” relationship with her fiancé. 

Setting aside the fact that the victim’s initial disclosure to her friend 

occurred almost immediately after the sexual assault and that the mother did not 

learn of the assault until later, “the admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests 

within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 

N.E.2d 343 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. The trial court did not err by 

precluding Baldwin from presenting evidence of the mother’s conduct or prior 

inconsistent statements.

Baldwin claims the trial court erred, solely relying on Evid.R. 616(A), 

which provides that “bias, prejudice, interest, or any motive to misrepresent may be 

shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by extrinsic 

evidence.” Baldwin claims the trial court’s ruling was in error because he was 

permitted to impeach the mother through introduction of extrinsic evidence. 

Although extrinsic evidence contradicting a witness’s testimony may be introduced 

for the purposes of impeachment if “offered for the sole purpose of impeaching a 
witness’s testimony, [that] evidence of contradiction is inadmissible unless [it] is” 

otherwise permitted by common law or permitted by Evid.R. 608(A), 609, 613, 

616(A), 616(B), or 803(18). Evid.R. 616(C).

Baldwin assumes the applicability of Evid.R. 616(A); however, that 

conclusion is not self-evident. Baldwin’s attempt to impeach the mother with 

extrinsic evidence was not for the purpose of demonstrating her bias, prejudice, 

interest, or a motive to misrepresent her testimony regarding the allegations against 

Baldwin. Instead, Baldwin was attempting to demonstrate that the mother urged 

another witness to not disclose potentially embarrassing (if not criminal) instances 

of conduct regarding the origins of her current relationship in an effort to impact the 

mother’s general character for truthfulness, the stated basis for the evidence 

Baldwin advanced at trial. Tr. 475:3-11. 

Under Evid.R. 608(B), parties are generally precluded from 

introducing extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct solely to attack the 

witness’s character for truthfulness such that the evidence of the mother’s 

discussion with the other witness cannot be proven through extrinsic evidence. 

State v. Warmus, 197 Ohio App.3d 383, 2011-Ohio-5827, 967 N.E.2d 1223, ¶ 60 (8th 

Dist.), citing State v. Smith, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-726, 2005-Ohio-1765, 

¶ 39. A defendant may only question a witness on cross-examination regarding 

prior instances of misconduct when the questioning is “clearly probative” of the 

witness’s character for truthfulness. State v. Penland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 111531, 2023-Ohio-806, ¶ 64, quoting State v. Jones, 2015-Ohio-2151, 35 N.E.3d 
934, ¶ 37-38 (8th Dist.). But in this case, the mother was not asked about her 

conversation with the other witness during her testimony.

Mother’s alleged statement to the other witness, inasmuch as that 

statement contradicted her trial testimony, is not admissible through the other 

witness without offering the mother the opportunity to explain or deny the 

statement. Under Evid.R. 613, “extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement 

by a witness is admissible if * * * the statement is offered solely for the purpose of 

impeaching the witness, [and] the witness is afforded a prior opportunity to explain 

or deny the statement.” There is no indication in the record that Baldwin attempted 

to question the mother regarding her alleged statements to the other witness. 

Baldwin solely attempted to introduce the impeachment evidence through another 

witness without providing the mother an opportunity to explain the inconsistency. 

This is not permitted. See State v. Munoz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112006, 2023-

Ohio-1895, ¶ 13. The second assignment of error is overruled.

In the third and final assignment of error, Baldwin claims that a 

mistrial should have been granted based on the mother’s alleged conversation with 

the other witness in which the mother allegedly “had been texting [the witness] and 

saying that she needed to make sure that [the witness] understood her relationship” 

with her then fiancé. According to Baldwin, the mother’s testimony that she did not 

start a relationship with her fiancé until after the allegations of the sexual assault 

were disclosed to police officers was false. Based on that, the contact violated the 

trial court’s instruction for witnesses to avoid discussing the case with each other. 
At the time, however, the state had not subpoenaed the witness and it is unclear 

whether Baldwin had perfected a subpoena on the witness at the time of the alleged 

conversation. Tr. 378:20-25 (the witness indicated that she had not received the 

subpoena). 

Nevertheless, the trial court denied Baldwin’s request for a mistrial

after agreeing with the state that the issue was “tangential” and not relevant to the 

allegations against Baldwin.

Baldwin’s sole claim in this appeal is that the mistrial was required 

based on the “larger question of whether the mother committed perjury during her 

testimony.” The mother’s exposure to perjury charges based on her testimony 

regarding her relationship with her fiancé has no bearing on Baldwin’s guilt or the 

fairness of his trial. On this point, Baldwin’s sole claim is that “the mother’s illicit 

and illegal affair with [her fiancé] took place prior to the allegations against 

Mr. Baldwin and caused the mother to manipulate [the victim] into accusing 

Mr. Baldwin of sexual” misconduct in an effort to end her marriage and pursue a 

relationship with her fiancé. The content of the excluded testimony was limited, 

with mother asking the other witness whether she understood the mother’s

relationship with the fiancé. There is no indication in the record that the victim ever 

spoke to her mother regarding the allegations until after the victim had already 

disclosed the assault to her friend. It is a speculative leap, with several layers of 

inference stacking in between, between the content of the text message and the 

mother contriving the events by manipulating her daughter into fabricating the 
assault allegations. For the purposes of the abuse-of-discretion review, this type of 

speculation is insufficient.

A mistrial should be declared only when a fair trial is no longer 

possible. State v. Bolognue, 9th Dist. Summit No. 18171, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 

4116, 11-12 (Sept. 10, 1997), citing State v. Stewart, 111 Ohio App.3d 525, 533, 676 

N.E.2d 912 (9th Dist.1996), citing State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59, 656 N.E.2d 

623 (1995). Without more, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion in determining that the potential evidence of perjury on a tangential issue 

unrelated to elements of the crime for which Baldwin was charged deprived him of 

a fair trial. A fair trial need not be a perfect one. The third assignment of error is 

overruled.

Baldwin’s conviction is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case 

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR