COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bumgardner and Humphreys 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

REINADLO D. LEITAO, JR., S/K/A 

 REINALDO LEITAO, JR. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0512-02-4 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 DECEMBER 17, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY 

Jeffrey W. Parker, Judge 

 Seth I. Howard, Assistant Public Defender 

(Office of the Public Defender, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Amy L. Marshall, Assistant Attorney General 

(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 The trial court found Reinadlo D. Leitao, Jr. in violation 

of probation for the third time and revoked the balance of his 

original sentence. He contends there was no suspended sentence 

to impose. Concluding the trial court properly imposed the 

unserved remainder of the defendant's sentence, we affirm. 

On July 22, 1996, the trial court convicted the defendant 

of breaking and entering, grand larceny, and possession of 

marijuana with intent to distribute. It sentenced him to six 

years in prison. It then ordered him to serve six months in 

jail, suspended the balance of five years and six months, and 

placed the defendant on probation for two years. 
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On April 11, 1997, the trial court found the defendant 

violated probation. It revoked the five years and six months 

suspended sentence, ordered him to serve 12 months in jail, 

re-suspended the balance of the sentence, and placed the 

defendant on probation. 

On April 15, 1999, the trial court found the defendant 

violated probation a second time. It revoked the suspended 

sentence and probation, ordered him to serve one year of the 

original sentence, and placed him on probation for two years 

upon his release.1 

On February 13, 2002, the trial court found the defendant 

violated probation a third time. It revoked the suspension and 

probation and ordered the defendant to serve the balance of the 

original sentence, three years and six months. The defendant 

stipulated he had violated probation for the third time. 

 1

 The 1999 order provides, in pertinent part: 

the Court Adjudges and Orders that the 

suspension of the execution of the sentence 

and the placing of the defendant on 

probation . . . is hereby revoked . . . . 

[I]t is accordingly the judgment of this 

Court that the defendant be sentenced to 

. . . serve one year of the original 

sentence . . . [and] be placed back on 

probation . . . and . . . comply with the 

original terms of probation. 
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The defendant contends no suspended sentence remained for 

the trial court to revoke. He argues the 1999 order revoked his 

suspended sentence, sentenced him to serve a portion of it, but 

failed to re-suspend explicitly the balance of the original 

sentence. He contends no balance remained suspended for the 

trial court to order served. 

The trial court ruled the 1999 order re-suspended the 

balance of the defendant's original sentence. It stated: "When 

the suspension was revoked, the sentence would have gone into 

effect automatically. And then . . . the Court placed him back 

on probation and [by implication] re-suspended the sentence." 

We defer to the trial court's interpretation of its own order. 

Fredericksburg Constr. Co. v. J.W. Wyne Excavating, 260 Va. 137, 

144, 530 S.E.2d 148, 152 (2000); Rusty's Welding Serv., Inc. v. 

Gibson, 29 Va. App. 119, 129, 510 S.E.2d 255, 260 (1999). While 

the court has broad discretion, "that discretion must be 

exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily or capriciously." 

Smoot v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 495, 500, 559 S.E.2d 409, 412 

(2002). Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse a 

trial court's revocation of a suspended sentence under Code 

§ 19.2-306. Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 326, 228 

S.E.2d 555, 556 (1976). 

 The only logical interpretation of the 1999 order is the 

one the trial court adopted. The order only imposed a portion 

of the remaining sentence. It placed the defendant back on 
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probation upon his release. Probation was meaningless if no 

sentence remained for the court to impose if the defendant 

violated the terms imposed. "To be effective, probation must be 

concurrent with a coordinate term of suspension of sentence." 

Hartless v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 172, 175, 510 S.E.2d 738, 

739 (1999). The absence of an explicit recitation re-suspending 

the balance of the original sentence did not implicitly 

discharge the remaining sentence; it implicitly re-suspended the 

balance that the defendant had not served. 

 When a court revokes the suspension of execution of 

sentence, "the original sentence shall be in full force and 

effect." Code § 19.2-306. Contrary to the defendant's 

contention, the 1999 order could not shorten the original 

suspended sentence. Rule 1:1. The defendant concedes he has 

not served the full sentence originally imposed. 

 The 1999 order revoked the suspended sentence, and 

sentenced the defendant to serve one year of the original 

sentence. The time not served remained suspended subject to 

revocation if the defendant violated the terms of probation.2 

When the defendant did violate those terms, the trial court 

 2

 We decline to hold that the sentencing summary on the 1999 

order affects the outcome of this case. The summary appears 

after the heading "For Department of Corrections Use" and 

indicates that "0" time was suspended. The defendant maintains 

that the notation extinguished the balance of his sentence. 

This summary does not supplant the wording of the order itself. 
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could revoke that suspension and order the defendant to serve 

the three years and six months balance of his original sentence. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

 Affirmed.