FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANCISCA VILLEGAS SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 16-73745

Agency No.

A208-595-370

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted January 12, 2021

San Francisco, California

Filed March 11, 2021

Before: Jay S. Bybee and Ryan D. Nelson, Circuit Judges, 

and Robert H. Whaley,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge R. Nelson

* The Honorable Robert H. Whaley, United States District Judge for 

the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
2 VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND

SUMMARY**

Immigration

Denying Francisca Villegas Sanchez’s petition for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision 

upholding an immigration judge’s denial of her applications 

for asylum and withholding of removal, the panel held that 

substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination 

that she failed to establish past harm rising to the level of 

persecution, and that her proposed social groups were not 

cognizable.

The panel held that Villegas Sanchez did not establish 

past persecution, where her alleged persecutor issued vague 

threats, confronted her several times over a period of weeks, 

did not perform any acts of violence, and never followed 

through on any of his threats. The panel explained that, 

though condemnable, the unfulfilled threats were not so 

overwhelming to necessarily constitute persecution. 

The panel held that substantial evidence supported the 

Board’s determination that petitioner’s proposed social 

groups comprised of “Salvadoran women who refuse to be 

girlfriends of MS gang members” and “Salvadoran women 

who refuse to be victims of violent sexual predation of gang 

members” lacked social distinction. Noting that the 

government did not contest that the proposed groups satisfy 

the first social distinction requirement of sharing “a common 

immutable characteristic,” the panel wrote that women either 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND 3

cannot change, or should not be required to change their 

gender because it is fundamental to their identity, and 

women should not be required to change their choice not to 

submit to gang members and enter into a sexual relationship 

in order to avoid persecution. The panel concluded that 

Villegas Sanchez failed to present sufficient evidence to 

compel the finding that society in general perceives, 

considers, or recognizes persons sharing her proposed 

particular characteristics to be a group. Explaining that the 

social distinction inquiry encompasses principles that will 

ordinarily demand some type of corroborative, objective 

evidence other than an applicant’s testimony, the panel 

concluded that the evidence Villegas Sanchez presented, 

including country report evidence stating generally that 

women in El Salvador can be ill-treated, and her aunt’s 

suggestion that she leave El Salvador, did not compel the 

conclusion that Salvadoran society perceives women 

similarly situated to her as a group. The panel also rejected 

Villegas Sanchez’s assertion that the Board did not perform 

the required evidence-based inquiry as to whether the 

relevant society recognized her proposed groups.

COUNSEL

Teresa A. Reed Dippo (argued), Munger Tolles & Olson 

LLP, San Francisco, California, for Petitioner.

Kathryn M. McKinney (argued), Attorney; Stephen J. Flynn, 

Assistant Director; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C.; for Respondent.
4 VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND

OPINION

R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

Francisca Villegas Sanchez petitions for review of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision upholding 

an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her applications for 

asylum and withholding of removal. Villegas Sanchez 

argues she suffered past persecution and has a well-founded 

fear of future persecution based on her membership in the 

proposed particular social groups of “Salvadoran women 

who refuse to be girlfriends of MS gang members” and 

“Salvadoran women who refuse to be victims of violent 

sexual predation of gang members.” Because substantial

evidence supports the BIA’s dismissal of her past 

persecution claim and its conclusion that her proposed 

particular social groups are not distinct in Salvadoran 

society, we deny the petition.

I

Villegas Sanchez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, 

attempted to enter the United States on October 24, 2015. In 

secondary inspection, Villegas Sanchez expressed a credible 

fear of returning to El Salvador and her case was referred to 

an IJ. Villegas Sanchez conceded her inadmissibility but 

applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”) relief. She claimed that, if 

deported, she would face persecution and torture at the hands 

of a man, “Cabezon,” whose romantic advances she refused.

Villegas Sanchez testified at her IJ removal hearing that 

after 16 years of being neighbors with Cabezon, her 

difficulties with him began when he asked her on a date 
VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND 5

several times in August 2015.1 After she refused, Cabezon 

“got mad.” In at least one phone conversation overheard by 

Villegas Sanchez, Cabezon said: “There is a gal. What are 

we going to do with her?” Villegas Sanchez believed 

Cabezon was a member of the MS-13 street gang because of

his tattoos, the way he dressed, and the people he associated 

with.

Villegas Sanchez testified that Cabezon threatened her 

three times over a period of several weeks. Cabezon told 

Villegas Sanchez that he would send her “to the tomb” if she 

did not date him; sent her two text messages with images of 

caskets and asking whether she wanted black or red roses; 

and ultimately told her he was not “kidding around” and 

gave her a two-day deadline to respond. Villegas Sanchez

did not report Cabezon’s behavior to Salvadoran police 

because she did not think they would help. Villegas Sanchez

left El Salvador two days later, on September 9, 2015, to stay 

with her mother in California.

Villegas Sanchez supplemented her testimony with 

several reports, including the 2014 U.S. Department of State 

Human Rights Report for El Salvador, which detailed the 

country’s handling of violence against women. When 

Villegas Sanchez told her aunt living in New York about the 

threats, her aunt advised, “well, the only way was to leave El 

Salvador.”

Relying on this evidence, Villegas Sanchez asserted 

before the IJ that she experienced past persecution and has a 

well-founded fear of future persecution based on her 

membership in one of three proposed particular social 

1 The IJ found Villegas Sanchez to be a credible witness and the BIA 

did not find the IJ’s finding to be clearly erroneous.
6 VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND

groups: “Salvadoran women who are unable to leave a 

domestic relationship;” “Salvadoran women who refuse to 

be girlfriends of MS gang members;”2 and “Salvadoran 

women who refuse to be victims of violent sexual predation 

of gang members.”

After recounting the evidence presented, the IJ 

concluded that Cabezon’s three threats were insufficient to 

constitute past persecution. Villegas Sanchez had not been 

threatened by any other gang members nor was she ever 

physically harmed, and Cabezon had not taken any other 

action in 16 years that would constitute past persecution.3 

The IJ also found that Villegas Sanchez did not meet her 

burden of showing her proposed particular social groups 

were socially distinct in El Salvador.

Villegas Sanchez appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, 

which denied relief. The BIA agreed with the IJ that the 

threats did not rise to the level of past persecution. It also 

agreed that Villegas Sanchez had not shown she was a 

member of a socially distinct particular social group, 

precluding her claim that she had a well-founded fear of 

future persecution.4 The BIA held she was thus ineligible 

2 According to country conditions evidence in the record, “MS” or 

“MS-13” refers to Mara Salvatrucha, an international criminal gang, that 

has proliferated in El Salvador.

3 Villegas Sanchez also argues the Salvadoran government is unable 

or unwilling to control Cabezon. The IJ found Villegas Sanchez had not 

demonstrated that the Salvadoran government was “unwilling or unable” 

to control Cabezon, but because the BIA explicitly declined to rely on 

this, it is not properly before us. Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 

1075 (9th Cir. 2020).

4 The BIA noted Villegas Sanchez was not in a domestic relationship 

with Cabezon, precluding her membership in the particular social group 
VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND 7

for asylum and withholding of removal.5 The BIA also held 

that the IJ did not clearly err in concluding that Villegas 

Sanchez’s “experiences and the general assertion that there 

is gang violence in El Salvador” were insufficient to obtain 

CAT relief. Villegas Sanchez petitioned for review only of 

the BIA’s denial of her asylum and withholding of removal 

claims.

II

“We review only the BIA’s opinion, except to the extent 

that it expressly adopted portions of the IJ’s decision.” 

Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 

2020) (quoting Rayamajhi v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 1241, 1243 

(9th Cir. 2019)). “Our review is limited to those grounds 

explicitly relied upon by the [BIA].” Diaz-Reynoso, 

968 F.3d at 1075 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

We review agency factual findings for substantial 

evidence. Zumel v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 

2015). Under “the substantial-evidence standard[,] [t]he 

agency’s ‘findings of fact are conclusive unless any 

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 

the contrary.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 

(2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Evidence in the 

record compelling a contrary conclusion must be 

demonstrated “with the degree of clarity necessary to permit 

she had proposed of “Salvadoran women who are unable to leave a 

domestic relationship.” At oral argument, Villegas Sanchez’s counsel 

conceded this BIA finding was correct.

5 The IJ also found Villegas Sanchez had a subjective fear of being 

harmed but her fear was not objectively well-founded. Because the BIA 

did not mention this as a ground for denial, we do not review it. DiazReynoso, 968 F.3d at 1075.
8 VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND

reversal . . . .” See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 

(1992).

III

To be eligible for asylum, Villegas Sanchez must show 

she is “unable or unwilling” to return to El Salvador due to 

past “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

particular social group, or political opinion.” Baghdasaryan 

v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). Villegas Sanchez “has the 

burden of establishing that (1) h[er] treatment rises to the 

level of persecution; (2) the persecution was on account of 

one or more protected grounds; and (3) the persecution was 

committed by the government, or by forces that the 

government was unable or unwilling to control.” Id. at 1023 

(citation omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B); 8 

C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(a), (b)(1).

A

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination, 

including its specific reliance on the IJ’s findings that the 

threats here do not amount to past persecution. The BIA 

agreed with the IJ that the threats, though “understandably 

frightening,” did not rise to the level of past persecution 

because “unfulfilled threats generally ‘constitute harassment 

rather than persecution,’” citing our holdings in Hoxha v. 

Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003), and Lim v. 

INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision. 

Villegas Sanchez’s neighbor, Cabezon, issued vague threats, 

confronted her several times over a period of weeks, did not 

perform any acts of violence, and never followed through on 
VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND 9

any of his threats. Though condemnable, these threats were 

not “so overwhelming so as to necessarily constitute 

persecution.” Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 

1995); see also Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (“Persecution is an extreme concept that does not 

include every sort of treatment our society regards as 

offensive.” (internal quotation omitted)). Cabezon’s 

interactions likely induced fear, but they do not constitute 

the “extreme” case where threats alone compel a finding of 

past persecution. See Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 

1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (threats by phone and in person, 

without acts of violence, did not compel finding past 

persecution).

Villegas Sanchez asserts that a general culture of 

violence against women in her hometown and Cabezon’s 

membership in a violent street gang made his threats 

menacing enough to constitute past persecution. Villegas 

Sanchez relies on her vague recollection that an unidentified 

woman in her hometown disappeared, which she ascribed to 

gang activity without supporting evidence. But the BIA 

(adopting the IJ’s findings) found Cabezon’s threats did not 

represent MS-13 and no “general threat from the gang as a 

whole.” Villegas Sanchez was friendly with her neighbor 

Cabezon for 16 years and testified she never felt threatened 

until he asked her out.

Moreover, despite Villegas Sanchez painting a picture of 

near-inevitable gang violence against women, she has “never 

been bothered by gangs” or “physically harmed” in El 

Salvador. She expressly disclaimed any fear upon return, 

other than of Cabezon specifically. Mere threats, without 

more, do not necessarily compel a finding of past 

persecution. See Lim, 224 F.3d at 932 (dealing with 

unfulfilled threats from a militant dissident group with a 
10 VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND

history of violent interactions with petitioner). In Lim, we 

held that unfulfilled threats were indicative of future 

persecution rather than past persecution itself. Id. Here, 

substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that 

Cabezon’s unfulfilled threats were not so extreme as to 

constitute past persecution.

B

Villegas Sanchez also asserts a well-founded fear of 

future persecution based on her membership in two groups:6 

“Salvadoran women who refuse to be girlfriends of MS gang 

members” and “Salvadoran women who refuse to be victims 

of violent sexual predation of gang members.”7 The BIA 

noted that the record does not “reflect that Salvadoran 

society perceives women similarly situated to her as a 

group.” Thus, the BIA rejected Villegas Sanchez’s claim of 

future persecution, agreeing with the IJ’s finding that she did 

not establish her groups as “socially distinct on this record.” 

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that 

Villegas Sanchez has not met her burden of showing 

membership in socially distinct groups. See Diaz-Reynoso, 

6 Because Villegas Sanchez abandons her proposed group dealing 

with domestic relationships, we do not address Matter of A-R-C-G-, 

26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), which the BIA cited but did not rely 

upon, or Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), which

overruled Matter of A-R-C-G-. Villegas Sanchez concedes Matter of AB- would not affect her conclusions but argues in Reply the BIA should 

address Matter of A-B- on remand. This new rationale for remand is 

unsupported by authority and likely forfeited. See Martinez-Serrano v. 

INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996).

7 In Reply, Villegas Sanchez reframes her groups as a new group of 

“women who resist gang members’ sexual advances.” Her new 

formulation would not change the analysis, if not forfeited. See 

Martinez-Serrano, 94 F.3d at 1259.
VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND 11

968 F.3d at 1084. Villegas Sanchez’s argument that the BIA 

conducted an inadequate inquiry into the record regarding 

social distinction is unavailing.

1

“We have endorsed two companion Board decisions that 

clarified the elements underlying the particular social group 

analysis: Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 

2014) and Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 

2014).” Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 

2020). “The Board has . . . interpreted the phrase ‘particular 

social group’ to refer to a group that is ‘(1) composed of 

members who share a common immutable characteristic, 

(2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within 

the society in question.’” Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 

1103 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & 

N. Dec. at 237).8

Social distinction requires “those with a common 

immutable characteristic [to be] set apart, or distinct, from 

other persons within the society in some significant way.” 

Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238. Specifically, 

social distinction requires “evidence showing that society in 

general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing 

8 The IJ found the groups were “defined with particularity” and the 

BIA did not overturn that finding. See Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d at 1075. 

Villegas Sanchez argues for remand to explain how her groups were 

particular but not socially distinct. But “[t]he ‘social distinction’ and 

‘particularity’ requirements each emphasize a different aspect of a 

particular social group” and overlap only “because the overall definition 

is applied in the fact-specific context of an applicant’s claim for relief.” 

Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 241. A finding of particularity 

and a finding that a proposed particular social group lacks social 

distinction “each serves a separate purpose.” Id.
12 VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND

the particular characteristic to be a group.” Matter of W-GR-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 217. “[T]he social group must exist 

independently of the fact of persecution” because “the 

persecutors’ perception is not itself enough to make a group 

socially distinct.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec.

at 236 n.11, 242; see also Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 

1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 2020). However, “persecutory action 

taken toward a group can be relevant to that group’s . . .

social distinction” because “persecution itself ‘may be the 

catalyst that causes’ a society to distinguish a group in a 

meaningful way and consider it distinct.” Diaz-Reynoso, 

968 F.3d at 1083, 1090 (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. 

& N. Dec. at 243).

“The particular social group analysis does not occur in 

isolation, but rather in the context of the society out of which 

the claim for asylum arises.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & 

N. Dec. at 238. And though “‘various factors, such as 

immutability, cohesiveness, homogeneity, and visibility, are 

helpful in various contexts,’ . . . we should also follow the 

‘traditional common law approach, looking at hypothetical 

cases and commonalities in cases that go one way or the 

other.’” Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (quoting Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206, 

1220 (9th Cir. 2009)). However, “the agency must make a 

case-by-case determination as to whether the group is 

recognized by the particular society in question.” Pirir-Boc 

v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014).

“The BIA’s conclusion regarding social distinction—

whether there is evidence that a specific society recognizes 

a social group—is a question of fact that we review for 

substantial evidence.” Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1242 

(citations omitted).
VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND 13

2

The government does not contest that these proposed 

groups of “Salvadoran women who refuse to be girlfriends 

of MS gang members” and “Salvadoran women who refuse 

to be victims of violent sexual predation of gang members” 

satisfy the first social distinction requirement of sharing “a 

common immutable characteristic.” See Matter of M-E-VG-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238. Women “either cannot change, 

or should not be required to change” their gender “because 

it is fundamental to their . . . identit[y] . . . .” See Matter of 

W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 210 (quotation omitted). And 

women “should not be required to change” their choice not 

to submit to gang members and enter into a sexual 

relationship “in order to avoid persecution.” See id. at 213; 

see also Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 

2010) (noting women in certain vulnerable circumstances 

can constitute a particular social group).

But Villegas Sanchez has not presented sufficient 

evidence to compel finding “that society in general 

perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the 

particular characteristic to be a group.” Matter of W-G-R-, 

26 I. & N. Dec. at 217. Importantly, “the social distinction 

inquiry encompasses principles that will ordinarily demand 

some type of corroborative, objective evidence” other than 

Villegas Sanchez’s testimony. Diaz-Torres v. Barr, 

963 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2020).

Villegas Sanchez argues mainly that her proposed 

groups are socially distinct because violence against women, 

including domestic violence, is a widespread problem in 

Salvadoran society. But the report cited does not address 

how Salvadoran society perceives “women who refuse to be 

girlfriends of MS gang members” or “women who refuse to 

be victims of violent sexual predation of gang members” 
14 VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND

distinctly. Rather, the report states generally that women in 

El Salvador can be ill-treated. These generalized statistics 

do not compel a finding that these proposed groups are 

socially distinct. See Diaz-Torres, 963 F.3d at 979 (holding 

no particular social group where documentary evidence did 

not show “society views either of the[] groups as distinct”); 

Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1243 (same); Reyes v. Lynch, 

842 F.3d 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2016) (same).9

Villegas Sanchez also cites the fact that her aunt, living 

in New York, urged her to leave El Salvador. She does not 

explain how her relative living in New York represents the 

views of society in El Salvador. And her aunt’s response—

“well, the only way was to leave El Salvador”—says nothing 

about how Salvadoran society, rather than Cabezon 

specifically, might view Villegas Sanchez distinctly. The 

BIA considered all the evidence and concluded the record 

does not “reflect that Salvadoran society perceives women 

similarly situated to her as a group.” The evidence does not 

compel a contrary conclusion. Villegas Sanchez’s proposed 

groups are not “set apart, or distinct, from other persons 

within the society in some significant way.” Matter of M-EV-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238.

9 Villegas Sanchez also argues that Cabezon asking her to be his 

girlfriend could be relevant to social distinction. But even if his advances 

could “catalyze” society to perceive her differently, she again has no 

evidence that Salvadoran “society in general,” as opposed to Cabezon 

alone, “perceives, considers, or recognizes” her proposed groups 

distinctly. See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 217; see also 

Cordoba v. Barr, 962 F.3d 479, 483 (9th Cir. 2020) (denying petition 

because petitioner did not link his alleged persecutor’s views to “society 

generally”).
VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND 15

3

Villegas Sanchez asserts that the BIA “did not perform 

the required evidence-based inquiry as to whether the 

relevant society recognizes” her proposed groups, quoting 

Pirir-Boc, 750 F.3d at 1084. Thus, according to Villegas 

Sanchez, the BIA’s decision “lacks an adequate statement of 

the legal or factual bases for resolving the ‘social 

distinctness’ issue.” This argument is unconvincing.

Pirir-Boc requires only that the BIA does a case-specific 

analysis and not reject a claim solely based on similarities to 

other cases. See 750 F.3d at 1084. The BIA did this here. 

The BIA noted that “the record does not reflect . . . that 

Salvadoran society perceives women similarly situated to 

her as a group,” agreeing with the IJ’s similar determination 

that “the evidence does not show that they are socially 

distinct within the society in question.” And the BIA 

demonstrated it reviewed the evidence cited by Villegas 

Sanchez, noting her “experiences and the general assertion 

that there is gang violence in El Salvador” later in its 

decision. Moreover, the BIA explicitly “defer[red] to the 

Immigration Judge’s factual findings,” which 

comprehensively recounted the relevant facts, as detailed 

above.

All indications show that the BIA reviewed the full 

record, including the portions cited below and before this 

court, and merely found it lacking. Cf. Cole v. Holder, 

659 F.3d 762, 771–72 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting indications 

that the agency did not review the record “include misstating 

the record and failing to mention highly probative or 

potentially dispositive evidence”). The BIA’s “statement of 

its reasons for denying the petitioner relief [is] adequate for 

us to conduct our review.” Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1430 

(9th Cir. 1995) (citing Castillo v. INS, 951 F.2d 1117, 1121
16 VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND

(9th Cir. 1991)). It “state[d] with sufficient particularity and 

clarity the reasons for denial of asylum.” Castillo, 951 F.2d 

at 1121 (citations omitted).

Essentially, Villegas Sanchez asks us to remand because 

the BIA did not meticulously repeat verbatim every piece of 

evidence already listed in the IJ’s findings. But the agency 

“need not discuss each piece of evidence submitted,” 

Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 

2018), even when reviewing CAT claims where regulations 

“explicitly require . . . consider[ing] ‘all evidence relevant to 

the possibility of future torture,’” Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 

594 F.3d 701, 705 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 C.F.R. 

§ 208.16(c)(3)). Likewise, the BIA need not discuss each 

piece of evidence in asylum and withholding of removal 

claims, especially in a case like this one where it agrees with 

and adopts the IJ’s factual findings. Adopting Villegas 

Sanchez’s argument would impermissibly “impose 

unnecessarily burdensome or technical requirements on the 

Board.” See Ghaly, 58 F.3d at 1430.

The BIA did not ignore (nor did the IJ’s analysis as 

adopted by the BIA) any of Villegas Sanchez’s arguments 

and the complete record supports that the BIA and IJ fully 

reviewed the evidence. See Montes-Lopez v. Gonzales, 

486 F.3d 1163, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007). We agree with the 

Second Circuit, which “do[es] not require . . . that an IJ 

expressly parse or refute on the record each and every one of 

a petitioner’s purported explanations . . . .” Xiao Ji Chen v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 159 n.13 (2d Cir. 2006) 

(citation omitted).

IV

Withholding requires that “life or freedom . . . be 

threatened for a reason” tied to protected grounds, defined in 
VILLEGAS SANCHEZ V. GARLAND 17

the same way as for asylum. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 

846 F.3d 351, 358–59 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1231(b)(3)(C)) (emphasis omitted); Rios v. Lynch, 

807 F.3d 1123, 1124 (9th Cir. 2015). “A failure to satisfy 

the lower standard of proof required to establish eligibility 

for asylum therefore necessarily results in a failure to 

demonstrate eligibility for withholding of deportation.” 

Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(citing Ghaly, 58 F.3d at 1429). Because Villegas Sanchez 

is ineligible for asylum, as her proposed particular social 

groups are not socially distinct, she is ineligible for 

withholding of removal. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 

1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.