IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-60758

Summary Calendar

FIDENCIO MUNOZ-GRANADOS, also known as Fidencio Munoz, 

 Petitioner

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Before SMITH, DENNIS, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Fidencio Munoz-Granados, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for 

review of the dismissal by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) of his

appeal from the order by the immigration judge (IJ) denying his applications

for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 

Against Torture (CAT). He also seeks review of the denial by the BIA of his 

motion to remand. We deny the petition.

I.

At his hearing before the IJ on December 20, 2017, Munoz-Granados 

testified that he came to the United States as a teenager in 2003. Several years 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 12, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 19-60758

2

later, Munoz-Granados learned from his father, Jose Fidencio Munoz de Hoyos 

(“Jose”), who remained in Mexico as a flea market vendor and member of the 

Confederation of Mexican Workers, that a trio of unknown individuals had

extorted and beat him around the time Munoz-Granados left for the United 

States. Jose paid the money and the threats ended. A similar event transpired 

in 2006. As before, Jose paid the demand to unidentified extortionists and the 

matter ended. Munoz-Granados then testified that around 2010 a drug cartel, 

Los Zetas, arrived in his home state of Coahuila. The Zetas began extorting 

300 pesos per week from Jose as a quota for protection and the right to 

participate in the flea markets.1 Jose’s fellow flea market vendors received 

similar treatment. After learning about the situation, Munoz-Granados, who 

had become a construction worker in Louisiana, began sending money to his 

family in Mexico to help cover expenses.

At one point, around April 2014, the Zetas apparently beat Jose after he 

forgot to make his quota payments on time. According to Munoz-Granados, 

Jose responded by reporting the incident to the police,2 after which the Zetas 

beat him again and destroyed his merchandise until another vendor

interceded. Later, the Zetas told Jose they forgave him but would kill the first 

of his sons to return to Mexico. At this point Munoz-Granados became worried 

for his family and, because he was afraid to return to Mexico, applied for 

asylum in the United States. 

1 Three hundred pesos was equivalent, in 2010, to approximately $24 USD. MunozGranados explained that his father worked six days per week, earning an average of 1200–

2000 pesos per day. Thus, the quota represented approximately 3% of Jose’s average weekly 

earnings.

2 The record contains a copy of what Munoz-Granados identifies as Jose’s police

complaint, dated April 8, 2014. However, the complaint only recounts economic extortion that 

began six months prior and was carried out by unknown individuals. There is no mention of 

Los Zetas, missed payments, or a beating. To the contrary, the complaint indicates Jose “paid 

no attention” to the demands and consistently refused to make any payments. 
No. 19-60758

3

Meanwhile, back in Coahuila, Jose continued making weekly payments 

to the Zetas for several more years until he died from long-term health issues 

on October 3, 2017. Munoz-Granados testified that his family stopped paying 

quotas to Los Zetas when Jose died and had not received any demands or

threats since doing so. Nevertheless, Munoz-Granados stated that he remained 

afraid to return to Mexico because he believed the Zetas had identified him and 

would kill him. When asked by the IJ why he believed the Zetas would kill him 

upon his return to Mexico instead of extorting money from him, MunozGranados responded that the Zetas were mad at Jose for going to the police. 

When pressed about the possibility of settling elsewhere in Mexico, such as 

with his girlfriend’s family in San Luis Potosí, Munoz-Granados testified that 

he believed the Zetas were “everywhere” in Mexico such that there were no 

places he could live safely. Munoz-Granados also explained that his 

construction skills would be useless in Mexico, so he would have little income. 

Even so, he clarified that fear, not making less money, was the more important 

reason he did not want to return to Mexico. 

The IJ was “troubled” by inconsistencies between Munoz-Granados’s 

testimony and the documentary evidence he submitted, but nevertheless found 

Munoz-Granados “marginally credible.” The IJ then denied Munoz-Granados’s 

applications for asylum and withholding of removal, but declined to rule on his

application for voluntary departure. Munoz-Granados appealed to the BIA, 

which dismissed his appeal, denied his motion to remand, and granted his 

application for voluntary departure.

II.

We review the BIA’s decision and will consider the underlying decision 

of the IJ only if, as here, it influenced the BIA’s decision. Ontunez-Tursios v. 

Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 348 (5th Cir. 2002). “We review [the BIA’s] decision for 

substantial evidence and reverse only if the evidence is so compelling that no 
No. 19-60758

4

reasonable fact finder could fail to find the petitioner statutorily eligible for 

relief.” Qorane v. Barr, 919 F.3d 904, 909 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. 

Ct. 907 (2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We review the 

BIA’s conclusions of law de novo.” Ontunez-Tursios, 303 F.3d at 348.

III.

A.

Munoz-Granados asserts that substantial evidence does not support the 

BIA’s rulings on asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. We 

disagree.

i.

The Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to an alien who is 

a “refugee.” Milat v. Holder, 755 F.3d 354, 360 (5th Cir. 2014); see 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(A). To qualify for asylum as a refugee, an applicant must 

demonstrate either past persecution or a reasonable, well-founded fear of 

future persecution on account of one of the five grounds enumerated in 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(42)(A), including, as relevant here, “membership in a particular 

social group.”3 Milat, 755 F.3d at 360; see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 

“Persecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of 

3 Munoz-Granados claims he experienced past persecution and has a well-founded fear 

of future persecution on account of membership in a particular social group composed of his 

father Jose’s family. The BIA, citing Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (U.S. Att’y Gen. 

2019), rejected this claim, holding that Jose’s family was not a cognizable social group 

because there was no evidence “establishing that the respondent’s father’s family is socially 

distinct in the eyes of Mexican society.” Munoz-Granados does not challenge the BIA’s 

holding that his father’s family fails to meet the standard set forth in Matter of L-E-A-. 

Instead, he contends the BIA erred by retroactively applying Matter of L-E-A- which, 

according to Munoz-Granados, “constituted a radical departure from what was, up to that 

point, a highly settled tenet of US asylum law.” We are not so sure. As we recently explained, 

L-E-A- “is not at odds with any precedent in the Fifth Circuit.” Pena Oseguera v. Barr, 936 

F.3d 249, 251 (5th Cir. 2019). In any event, we need not and do not decide whether the BIA 

erred in applying the L-E-A- standard since even if Munoz-Granados’s father’s family was a 

cognizable social group, Munoz-Granados’s claims would still fail because the alleged acts do 

not rise to the level of persecution.
No. 19-60758

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treatment our society regards as offensive.” Arif v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 677, 680 

(5th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). 

To prevail on a claim of past persecution, an alien must establish that he 

suffered persecution at the hands of “the government or forces that a 

government is unable or unwilling to control.” Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 

F.3d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 2006). “Neither we nor the BIA has ever held that an 

alien can seek asylum based upon the alleged past-persecution of another.” 

Morales v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2017).

The BIA determined that Munoz-Granados failed to establish that he 

suffered past persecution because, inter alia, the actions and threats directed 

at his family did not rise to the level of persecution. The evidence does not 

compel a contrary conclusion. Munoz-Granados mainly argues that he 

experienced past persecution when the Zetas threatened Jose that they would 

kill the first of Jose’s sons to return to Mexico. But even assuming arguendo 

that Munoz-Granados could have experienced past persecution without having 

been present in Mexico, the alleged act does not rise to the level of persecution.

We have explained that, “even assuming threats can constitute past 

persecution, threats that are ‘exaggerated, non-specific, or lacking in 

immediacy’ should not suffice.” Qorane, 919 F.3d at 910 (quoting Corado v. 

Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)). Munoz-Granados was 

never directly threatened by his father’s extortionists, and whatever indirect 

threats he experienced were too lacking in immediacy to constitute past 

persecution, insofar as the Zetas only threatened to kill him or his brother if 

one of them returned to Mexico, which neither of them did.

“To establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, an alien must 

demonstrate a subjective fear of persecution, and that fear must be objectively 

reasonable.” Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 307 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] finding of a well-founded fear of 
No. 19-60758

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persecution is negated if the applicant can avoid persecution by relocating to 

another part of his home country.” Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 189 (5th 

Cir. 2004) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii)). When there is no showing of past 

persecution, petitioner bears the burden to establish that relocation is 

unreasonable, unless the persecution is by a government or is governmentsponsored. Id. at 194 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3)(i)). 

The BIA concluded that Munoz-Granados failed to establish a wellfounded fear of future persecution because Jose’s extortionists had not harmed, 

threatened, or made demands of Munoz-Granados’s mother and siblings since 

Jose passed away and, further, because Munoz-Granados had not established 

that he would be unable to avoid his father’s extortionists by relocating to a 

different part of Mexico. Again, the evidence does not compel a contrary 

conclusion. Munoz-Granados testified that Jose made weekly payments to the 

Zetas starting in 2010, and that in 2014 the Zetas beat Jose the one time he 

was late in making payments. Yet Munoz-Granados stated that his family 

stopped making payments altogether in 2017 when Jose died and had received 

no demands or threats in the 3 months between Jose’s death and MunozGranados’s hearing before the IJ. This weakens Munoz-Granados’s claim of 

likely future persecution. See Eduard, 379 F.3d at 193 (citing Matter of A-E-M-, 

21 I. & N. Dec. 1157, 1160 (BIA 1998)). 

More importantly, Munoz-Granados failed to meet his burden to 

establish that it would be unreasonable for him to relocate to another part of 

Mexico, away from his father’s extortionists. See id. at 193–94 (holding any 

BIA errors concerning fear of future persecution “are harmless if Petitioners 

could safely relocate within [Petitioners’ country]”). As both the IJ and BIA 

acknowledged, Munoz-Granados’s sole basis for claiming he could not 

reasonably relocate to another part of Mexico was his belief that the Zetas are

“everywhere.” This is not enough. First of all, Munoz-Granados himself 
No. 19-60758

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conceded that “the Zetas are not as prominent in some parts of Mexico.” 

Second, while we do not question whether Los Zetas remains a forceful 

criminal enterprise, a fear of general violence and civil disorder is not sufficient

to support a fear of future persecution. Id. at 190.

ii.

To qualify for withholding of removal, an alien “must demonstrate a clear 

probability of persecution upon return.” Roy v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 138 (5th 

Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As “[w]ithholding 

of removal is a higher standard than asylum,” one who fails to show 

entitlement to asylum fails to show entitlement to withholding of removal. 

Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 906 (5th Cir. 2002). Because substantial evidence 

supports the BIA’s finding that Munoz-Granados failed to meet his burden for 

asylum, he has also failed to carry his burden for withholding of removal. See 

Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 518 (5th Cir. 2012).

iii.

“For a petitioner to be entitled to CAT relief, he or she must show that it 

is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the 

proposed country of removal.” Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 885, 891 (5th Cir. 

2014) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). “Torture includes only pain or suffering 

inflicted by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 

person acting in an official capacity.” Qorane, 919 F.3d at 911 (cleaned up) 

(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)).

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that Munoz-Granados did not 

establish eligibility for CAT protection. Once more, the record does not compel 

a different conclusion. For one thing, because the actions and threats discussed 

above do not even rise to the level of persecution, “[i]t follows a fortiori they do 

not constitute torture.” Id. Moreover, Munoz-Granados fails to show that the 

Zetas—to the extent they torture others in Mexico—do so with the 
No. 19-60758

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acquiescence of public officials. See id. (“[A] government’s inability to protect

its citizens does not amount to acquiescence.”). 

In sum, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s rulings on asylum, 

withholding, and eligibility for CAT protection.

B.

Munoz-Granados devotes the bulk of his opening brief to arguing that 

the BIA erred by determining his defective Notice to Appear (NTA), which 

lacked certain required information, was cured by a subsequent Notice of 

Hearing containing the missing information, thus triggering the “stop-time” 

rule for cancellation of removal. Various amici join Munoz-Granados in 

pressing this claim. As Munoz-Granados now concedes, however, this 

argument has been foreclosed by Yanez-Pena v. Barr, 952 F.3d 239, 241 (5th 

Cir. Feb. 28, 2020) (holding that “(1) the information statutorily required to be 

contained in an NTA may be supplied in more than one document, and (2) an 

NTA is perfected, and the stop-time rule is triggered, when the alien receives 

all required information, whether in one document or more”), petition for cert. 

filed (U.S. Apr. 10, 2020) (No. 19-1208). Accordingly, the BIA did not err in 

determining that the Notice of Hearing triggered the stop-time rule.

C.

Lastly, Munoz-Granados claims the BIA engaged in impermissible 

factfinding by adjudicating—and granting—his request for voluntary 

departure, rather than remanding the matter to the IJ. But even if the BIA so 

erred, the error would be harmless. Had the BIA remanded the matter to the 

IJ, and had the IJ granted Munoz-Granados’s application for voluntary 

departure, that grant—just like the BIA’s grant—would have automatically 

terminated upon Munoz-Granados’s filing the present petition for review. See 

8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i).
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* * *

Accordingly, Munoz-Granados’s petition for review is DENIED.