DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

LENA BAILEY,

Appellant,

v.

KENNETH BAILEY, CAROLYN BAILEY, and

BAILEY'S BOTANICAL ART, INC. d/b/a THE STALK MARKET,

Appellees.

No. 4D19-3459

[January 27, 2021]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Karen M. Miller, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

502019DR000013XXXX-NB.

Anthony M. Barbuto of Barbuto Law Firm, P.A., Wellington, for 

appellant.

Caryn A. Stevens and Gina M. Szapucki of Ward, Damon, Posner, 

Pheterson & Bleau, West Palm Beach, for appellee Carolyn Bailey. 

Preston J. Fields, Sr., of Preston J. Fields, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, 

for appellee Bailey’s Botanical Art, Inc. d/b/a The Stalk Market.

KUNTZ, J.

Lena Bailey, the mother-in-law, appeals the circuit court’s order 

denying her request to intervene in Kenneth and Carolyn Bailey’s marital 

dissolution proceeding. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Because 

the mother-in-law alleged she jointly owned real property at issue in the 

dissolution proceeding, we reverse the portion of the circuit court’s order 

denying her motion to intervene as to the real property.

Background

Kenneth Bailey, the Husband, petitioned for dissolution of marriage

from Carolyn Bailey, the Wife. The Husband also sought to equitably 

distribute a business—Bailey’s Botanical Art, Inc. d/b/a The Stalk Market

(“the Company”)—that he claimed was marital property jointly owned by 
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him and the Wife. The Company was named an additional third-party 

respondent in the proceeding.

The Wife answered the petition and counter-petitioned for dissolution 

of marriage. She sought equitable distribution of the parties’ marital 

assets and asserted two more claims for partition. First, the Wife sought 

to partition, divide, or sell a condo located in Volusia County, Florida, that 

she owned with the Husband as tenants by the entirety. Second, she 

sought to partition real property located in Wellington, Florida (“the 

Wellington Property”). The Wife joined the mother-in-law as an 

indispensable party, asserting the Husband, Wife, and mother-in-law held 

title to the Wellington Property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.

But the Wife later voluntarily dismissed both partition claims. 

Nevertheless, the mother-in-law moved to intervene in the dissolution. 

At a hearing on the motion to intervene, the mother-in-law argued that she 

maintained a substantial financial interest in the dissolution proceeding. 

Specifically, the mother-in-law claimed that she was the Company’s 

creditor as a result of money owed to her from an allegedly unfulfilled stock 

purchase agreement. In addition, the mother-in-law claimed that

although the Husband and Wife held interests in the Wellington Property, 

the Wellington Property was really held in a constructive trust solely for 

her. 

The court denied the mother-in-law’s motion to intervene without 

elaboration. 

Analysis

A court engages in a two-step process to determine if intervention is 

proper:

First, the trial court must determine that the interest asserted 

is appropriate to support intervention. (Citation omitted.)

Once the trial court determines that the requisite interest 

exists, it must exercise its sound discretion to determine 

whether to permit intervention. In deciding this question the 

court should consider a number of factors, including the 

derivation of the interest, any pertinent contractual language, 

the size of the interest, the potential for conflicts or new 

issues, and any other relevant circumstance.
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Second, the court must determine the parameters of the 

intervention[.] . . . Thus, intervention should be limited to the 

extent necessary to protect the interests of all parties.

Farese v. Palm Beach Partners, Ltd., 781 So. 2d 419, 420–21 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2001) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Union Cent. Life Ins. 

Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So. 2d 505, 507–08 (Fla. 1992)). Although described 

as a two-step process, the first step itself can be broken into a two-part

inquiry: (1) requisite interest, and (2) whether intervention should occur.

Here, the mother-in-law argues that she maintains an interest in the 

dissolution proceedings because she once owned a fifty-percent interest in

the Company and because she holds an ownership interest in the 

Wellington Property.

We disagree with the mother-in-law that her former ownership interest 

in the Company is enough to permit intervention. Her interest in the 

Company primarily rests in her status as a founder and former owner. 

However, she acknowledges that she sold her interest in the Company. As 

such, her previous interest in the Company is not direct and immediate. 

See Grimes v. Walton Cty., 591 So. 2d 1091, 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“We 

are unable to see any direct and immediate interest which the intervenors 

have in this action; nor would they stand to gain or lose by the direct legal 

operation and effect of the judgment in this action.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)); see also Stefanos v. Rivera-Berrios, 673 So. 2d 12, 13 (Fla. 

1996) (“A showing of indirect, inconsequential or contingent interest is 

wholly inadequate.”) (citation omitted). 

But we do agree with the mother-in-law regarding her alleged partial 

ownership interest in the Wellington Property, which will be distributed in 

the dissolution proceeding. She allegedly owns the Wellington Property 

with the Husband and Wife as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. 

The caselaw supports the mother-in-law’s argument that she has an 

interest in the action. In Salituri v. Salituri, we reversed a judgment 

purporting to distribute property in a dissolution proceeding when the 

partial owner of the property was not a party. 184 So. 3d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2016) (citation omitted). Similarly, in Matajek v. Skowronska, the 

Fifth District reversed a dissolution judgment because the former 

husband’s son was not a named party and the court adjudicated his 

ownership interest in real property. 927 So. 2d 981, 985 (Fla. 5th DCA 

2006). 
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Stated more directly, “[i]n [a] dissolution action, the trial court does not 

have jurisdiction to adjudicate property rights of nonparties.” 

Noormohamed v. Noormohamed, 179 So. 3d 379, 380 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)

(second alteration in original) (quoting Minsky v. Minsky, 779 So. 2d 375, 

377 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)).

We agree with the mother-in-law that she alleged an interest in the 

Wellington Property at issue in the dissolution action. We also agree that 

intervention is appropriate. While the Wife correctly argues the court will 

only adjudicate the Wife’s and Husband’s respective 1/3 interest in the 

Wellington Property, that adjudication will likely impact the right of 

survivorship in the property held as joint tenants. See, e.g., Crockett v. 

Crockett, 708 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). 

Because the distribution of the Wellington Property potentially impacts

the mother-in-law’s ownership interest, she should be permitted to 

intervene. Of course, the intervention must be limited to that specific 

ownership interest.

Conclusion

We affirm in part and reverse in part. The circuit court’s order denying 

intervention as to the property the mother-in-law owns as a joint tenant is 

reversed. The order is otherwise affirmed.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

MAY and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.