Filed 7/24/24 Garcia v. Bowman CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

FRANZ CHRISTIAN GARCIA,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAKE BOWMAN,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G063062

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-

01319398)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, 

Melissa R. McCormick, Judge. Affirmed. 

Gilbert & Sackman, Joshua F. Young, Benjamin M. O’Donnell

and Mitzi Marquez-Avila for Defendant and Appellant.

Theodora Oringher, Antony Buchignani, Adam Wentland and

Lindley G. Round for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

Jake Bowman appeals from the trial court’s order denying his

special motion to strike based on the anti-SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 425.16.)1 He was sued for publishing allegedly defamatory social media 

posts that claimed his employer’s animals were being abused by “the head 

horse trainer,” coworker Franz Christian Garcia.

The trial court denied Bowman’s motion, concluding that even 

though his publications were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, Garcia

had carried his burden to demonstrate a sufficient probability of success

under the statute. We affirm.

FACTS2

I. Context

The parties were both employed by a company operating as 

“Medieval Times Dinner and Tournament” (company), which Garcia

describes as “a family-friendly dinner theater featuring staged medieval-style 

games, sword-fighting, and jousting.” The company operates multiple 

locations in different states, each called a “castle.” At the California castle, a

typical dinner show would “feature multiple horses performing in a variety of 

choreographed routines, including dancing, cantering, galloping, trotting, 

prancing, and jousting.” At all relevant times, Garcia was employed there as 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of 

Civil Procedure.

2 Our factual summary is a compilation of complaint allegations, 

declarations, and other evidence submitted in support of the anti-SLAPP 

motion. (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017)

17 Cal.App.5th 245, 249.) For ease of reading, some capitalizations have been 

omitted from our quotations of the record.
3

a lead horse trainer and Bowman was employed as a knight, which he 

describes as “a job that required him to perform feats of horsemanship.”

In November 2022, about four months before the social media 

posts at issue, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certified the 

American Guild of Variety Artists (the union) as the collective bargaining 

representative for some of the company’s employees, including knights like 

Bowman. One month later, Bowman was elected to act as the union steward 

and co-lead for the union’s bargaining committee. 

On February 11, 2023 (all further dates will refer to the year 

2023), the union began a strike against the company. Around the same time, 

Bowman received a video recording of Garcia training a company horse

named Opal (the Opal training session).

Bowman published different versions of the recording in March 

and April. As his counsel describes it, “at the time of [his] posts, [he] and his 

coworkers were on strike and the union was actively attempting to negotiate 

horse treatment with” the company. 

It is undisputed that on March 22, an attorney for the union 

wrote to the company’s counsel a letter containing the following subject line: 

“Stopping the ongoing abuse of horses by two trainers at the Buena Park 

castle of Medieval Times.” Two days later, the company’s counsel responded

with a two-page letter asserting bad faith, as follows: “On February 15, 2023, 

the union provided a list of non-wage safety concerns. The treatment of 

horses does not appear on that list. Now, for the first time, [the union] raises 

issues about the treatment of our horses. This fact alone suggests an ulterior 

motive and that [the union] has no real concern for the treatment of our 

horses.”
4

The same day, March 24, Bowman commenced publishing five

social media posts on three different platforms. Bowman states in his briefing 

that he did so “to place public pressure and force Medieval Times to take 

horse treatment and employee health and safety seriously.” Specifically, 

between March 24 and April 2, Bowman published (among other 

communications) multiple videos depicting Garcia. In the post we focus on,

Bowman referred to Garcia not by name but as “the head horse trainer . . . on 

site.”

II. The March 24 Social Media Post

As we explain below, because of the way Bowman framed his 

motion underlying this appeal, we will focus on a social media post published 

on March 24. The post runs just under four minutes in duration and consists 

of multiple visual depictions. The first depiction is a headshot view of 

Bowman speaking with a logo behind him (saying “Medieval Times 

Performers”) and, on the bottom right corner of the screen, his username.

3

 

He begins with the following introduction:

“Hello everyone, my name is Jake and I am a knight at Medieval 

Times in Buena Park. Unfortunately, I’m sitting on my couch right now 

instead of doing this:”

The post then shows 11 seconds of two combined video clips, with 

the same background music playing continuously. The first clip shows 

knights jousting on horses, and the second shows a knight being vanquished 

3 The username references only his account for the platform he 

published the post on, TikTok. In contrast, in some of his posts on a different 

platform, Bowman referenced his TikTok account.
5

in a mock sword fight. The clip then goes back to Bowman in front of the logo, 

for his following monologue:

“Last November we voted to unionize, uh, due to low pay, uh, 

health and safety concerns—the fact that they don’t take very good care of us 

whenever we get hurt, and we get hurt all the time—uh, and now, hum, an 

issue that I want to bring to your attention which is unfortunately extremely 

sad and, and uh, not something that I necessarily wanted to . . . to post about, 

but something that we have to, which is animal abuse. 

“Unfortunately, over the past year and a half of working at the 

current location, Medieval Times, I have witnessed multiple occasions of 

animal abuse from the head horse trainer and assistant head horse trainer 

on site. Uh, now, to clarify, I don’t necessarily think that this is an issue at 

every single one of the castles, but it is an issue at the castle in California.

“Um, it’s a situation in which we’ve brought up multiple 

instances of a trainer, uh, riding a horse too hard or using his spurs too much 

or whipping a horse repeatedly or using these standard tools that you would 

use in horse training, but using them excessively to the point where they’re 

actually weapons. Um, we’ve brought that to management multiple times. 

We’ve been ignored, we’ve been shot down, um, and now I am here today to

tell you about it and also to post at the end of this video, of it actually 

happening so, content warning ahead: If you are going to stay until the end of 

this video you are going to see, um, and hear a, uh, pretty rough instance of, 

of some horse abuse. Um, just to clarify a few things about this video: Um, 

obviously there-there, you know, spurs and whips and riding crops and 

different things like that are definitely tools that can be used for horse 

training. But, when they’re used excessively, um, and too much, they become 

a weapon and not a tool and that’s when it crosses the line into horse abuse. 
6

“Uh, the reason that this is important outside of just the fact that 

we don’t want our horses to be abused—we want them to be taken care of and 

treated very well—um, is that a stressed out horse and a horse that’s been 

abused or a horse that’s in a situation where, um, they are unhappy and 

they’re trying to lash out because they’re unhappy of something that’s 

happening, um, that puts us in danger, right? That puts us in more danger 

than we already are, just the nature of our job. Um, and there’ve been 

multiple instances where a horse has been ‘trained,’[

4] um, right before we’re 

supposed to get on them and that’s caused a lot of issues with them trying to 

buck the riders off; our horses tend to kick and bite a lot more, um, than 

horses that I have experienced outside of this company. 

“Uh, and it’s just an, uh, unfortunate and sad situation that, um,

we now need to get the public involved in, because we’ve been shut down 

repeatedly when we’ve talked to management. We’ve talked to management;

we’ve talked to the CEO of the company—he doesn’t care. We’ve even brought 

in animal control recently, um, in the Buena Park area, and they did a tour of 

the barn, found that the horses were being fed—which . . . they’re not being 

fed enough in my opinion or at least they’re not getting their proper, uh,

vitamins and nutrition for, like, a high-performance horse—um, but 

irregardless, you know, they found that they were being fed and that the 

barn was relatively clean and because of that, they just sort of left so, here we 

are now and I’m going to show you this video and, um, you know, trigger 

warning ahead for horse abuse. Uh, I hope that you can help us get the word 

out and, um, hold the company accountable for everything that they’ve done.”

4 We use quotations marks here to denote our interpretation of 

Bowman’s hand gesture during his pronunciation of the word as implying the 

word is not his, but attributable to some other speaker.
7

The visual of Bowman is then replaced by a one-second

screenshot with a faint picture of a white horse in the background, with the 

following words written in white font: “CONTENT WARNING.” The 

remaining 39 seconds of the post contain no words but whip-cracking sounds 

are repeatedly heard throughout a 30-second video of the Opal training 

session. The video is immediately followed by nine seconds of three pictures 

showing injuries to horses that are undisputedly not Opal, but not obviously 

so through the visuals. According to a declaration in the appellate record, the 

pictures (and a fourth picture that was not included in the post) were sent to 

Bowman by a coworker in connection with Garcia’s training of horses other 

than Opal.

5

 

III. Garcia’s Lawsuit and Bowman’s Anti-SLAPP Motion

Three weeks after Bowman’s March 24 post, Garcia sued

Bowman, alleging four causes of action: (1) defamation; (2) false light; 

(3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) negligence. Bowman 

responded with the underlying special motion to strike based on the antiSLAPP statute, seeking to strike each of Garcia’s causes of action, in their 

entirety. Both the motion and Garcia’s opposition were accompanied by 

multiple declarations. Garcia objected to some of Bowman’s declarations, but 

not news articles he attached to his declaration, claiming news media 

coverage of union organizing efforts beginning 11 months earlier. Among 

other issues, the parties disputed whether federal labor law was implicated

by Garcia’s defamation allegations.

5 Garcia submitted a declaration by the company’s veterinarian to 

support that no animal abuse was evidenced by the pictures.
8

The trial court overruled all of Garcia’s evidentiary objections but

denied Bowman’s motion on the merits. The court agreed with the parties 

that Garcia’s claims were based on activity protected by the anti-SLAPP 

statute, but concluded that Garcia had met his burden to demonstrate a 

sufficient probability of success for his causes of action, even after impliedly 

finding that federal labor law applied. Bowman timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Bowman presents two main contentions about the trial court’s 

denial of his anti-SLAPP motion: (1) the court erroneously concluded that

Garcia sufficiently showed “‘Bowman acted with actual malice,’” as required 

by federal labor law; and (2) Bowman’s statements constitute nonactionable 

opinions. As discussed further below, because Bowman’s March 24 post was 

not sufficiently connected to “union organizing efforts” (Letter Carriers v. 

Austin (1974) 418 U.S. 264, 279 (Austin)), we conclude the court reached the 

correct result. 

I. Standard of Review and Anti–SLAPP Principles

Anti-SLAPP motions are “‘intended to end meritless SLAPP suits

early without great cost to the target’ [citation], not to abort potentially 

meritorious claims due to a lack of discovery.” (Sweetwater Union High 

School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 949.) “The 

procedure made available to defendants by the anti-SLAPP statute has a 

distinctive two-part structure. [Citations.] A court may strike a cause of 

action only if the cause of action [both] (1) arises from an act in furtherance of 

the right of petition or free speech ‘in connection with a public issue,’ and 

(2) the plaintiff has not established ‘a probability’ of prevailing on the claim. 

[Citation.]” (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 619-

620.)
9

The California Supreme Court has “described th[e] second [part

of anti-SLAPP analysis] as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ [Citation.]” 

(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384-385.) The moving defendant “can 

prevail either by establishing a defense or the absence of a necessary 

element,” but “[i]f there is a conflict in the evidence (the existence of a 

disputed material fact), the anti-SLAPP motion should be denied.” (Billauer 

v. Escobar-Eck (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 953, 964-965.) The overall purpose of 

the second prong analysis is to determine “whether the plaintiff has stated a 

legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to 

sustain a favorable judgment.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384-385.) A 

finding of sufficient merit for anti-SLAPP purposes has no evidentiary value 

for future trial court proceedings for the matter. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(3).)

II. Defamation and Federal Preemption Principles

A libel cause of action cannot rest on a mere opinion; it requires a 

provably false fact. (Overhill Farms, Inc. v. Lopez (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 

1248.) Notwithstanding, there is no “wholesale defamation exemption for 

anything that might be labeled ‘opinion’” and courts must endeavor to 

distinguish assertions of facts from protected “‘imaginative expression’ or the 

‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has traditionally added much to the discourse of 

our Nation.” (Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990) 497 U.S. 1, 18, 20

(Milkovich).) To discern, we apply a “totality of the circumstances test.”

(Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 375, 385.) 

The essential elements of a defamation cause of action are (1) “a 

publication that is ([2]) false, ([3]) defamatory, ([4]) unprivileged, and 

([5]) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” (Taus v. 

Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720; see Civ. Code, §§ 44-46.) For defamation

causes of action asserted by “private-figure plaintiffs,” the standard of 
10

liability that applies is based on negligence principles. (Brown v. Kelly 

Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 741-742.) Above this baseline, some

defamation defendants enjoy circumstance-specific defenses. 

For example, starting with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

(1964) 376 U.S. 254 (New York Times), the United States Supreme Court 

established that when the plaintiff is a “public figure,” defendants should not 

incur defamation liability unless it is shown, by clear and convincing 

evidence (Milkovich, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 15), that defendants’ statements

were made with actual malice, which is defined as “statements published 

with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they 

were true or false” (Linn v. Plant Guard Workers (1966) 383 U.S. 53, 65 

(Linn); see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 347, 349 

[extending malice requirement to statements made in connection with issues 

of public concern, for presumed and punitive damages]). 

Relevant to Bowman’s contentions, the high court in Linn, supra, 

383 U.S. at page 65, “adopted by analogy, rather than under constitutional 

compulsion,” New York Times’s actual malice rule to apply to defamatory 

conduct covered by the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.)

(NLRA). Today, this Linn rule requires a plaintiff asserting defamation to 

prove, by clear and convincing evidence, actual malice (attributable to the 

defendant) and actual injury (suffered by the plaintiff) for “any publication 

made during the course of union organizing efforts, which is arguably 

relevant to that organizational activity.” (Austin, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 279.)

III. Analysis

A. Protected Activity

We agree with the trial court and the parties that Garcia’s claims 

at issue in Bowman’s motion arise from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP 
11

statute. (§ 425.16, subds. (e)(3) [“any written or oral statement or writing 

made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an 

issue of public interest”].) We therefore move to the second step of antiSLAPP motion analysis. 

B. Probability of Prevailing 

The remainder of our independent review begins with the aim of 

Bowman’s motion. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 

1010 [central component of anti-SLAPP analysis is a “claim” which can be 

narrower than a cause of action].) Because the motion aims at Garcia’s causes 

of action in their entirety, we now focus our analysis on Bowman’s abovequoted March 24 post. It allows sufficient analysis of whether Garcia’s four 

causes of action should have been struck in their entirety. 

1. Defamation Cause of Action

a. The Linn Rule

Garcia argues that Bowman’s publications should be subject to 

the baseline negligence standard of liability that applies to private-figure 

plaintiffs, not the Linn rule. Bowman disagrees, but we conclude he has not 

carried his burden to demonstrate that his asserted affirmative defense (see 

Longshoremen v. Davis (1986) 476 U.S. 380, 398-399) justifies striking any of 

Garcia’s causes of action. 

The Linn rule reflects “partial preemption of state libel law” 

(Austin, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 293) based on a balancing between federal labor 

policies and traditional state policy interests. The rule has a two-part trigger

that requires, first, the existence of a “‘labor dispute,’” as defined by the 
12

NLRA,

6

and second, a sufficient connection between the dispute and allegedly 

defamatory publication at issue. 

Linn and Austin remain authoritative guidance on what 

constitutes a sufficient connection. In Linn, an “assistant general manager” 

sued a “union, two of its officers and a[n] . . . employee” of the manager’s 

employer because the employee had circulated leaflets “among the 

[employer’s] employees” that claimed the manager (among others) had lied 

about “52 men” who worked for the same employer at a different location. 

(Linn, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 55-57.) The allegedly defamatory 

communication claimed that the managers (including Linn) had lied about 

the existence of the men, meaning the 52 men “‘were deprived of their right 

to vote in three N.L.R.B. elections.’” (Id. at p. 56.) 

Austin involved a different factual context: the post-election 

phase of union organizing. (Austin, supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 266-267 [union had 

already been “recognized . . . as the exclusive local collective-bargaining 

representative” for the relevant unit of employees at issue].) There, three

non-union employees sued a union after they were listed as “scabs” on the 

union’s newsletters. (Id. at pp. 268-269.) A state supreme court affirmed a 

jury award of compensatory and punitive damages against the union, but the 

United States Supreme Court reversed. (Id. at pp. 270, 287.) The majority 

opinion’s holding was that, because the label of “scab” amounted to 

nonactionable opinion, the plaintiffs had no cause of action for state court 

6

“The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning 

terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or 

representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or 

seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether 

the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.” 

(29 U.S.C. § 152(9).)
13

relief. (Id. at pp. 282-287.) That aspect of the case is not material to our 

analysis here.

What is relevant is that Austin elaborated on what qualifies as a 

sufficient connection between an NLRA labor dispute and allegedly libelous 

statements, for the purposes of triggering the Linn rule. The majority in 

Austin explained: “[W]e think that any publication made during the course of 

union organizing efforts, which is arguably relevant to that organizational 

activity, is entitled to the protection of Linn.” (Austin, supra, 418 U.S. at 

p. 279; cf. id. at pp. 294-295 (dis. opn. of Powell, J.) [“federal labor law [was 

not] sufficiently implicated” by the facts presented “to warrant [partial] 

preemption of state libel law”].)

Garcia argues that “none of Bowman’s social media posts are 

entitled to federal protection under the NLRA preemption doctrine described 

in Linn because” federal labor law is not sufficiently implicated. We agree 

with Garcia because the March 24 post at issue here is unlike the 

publications at issue in Linn and Austin. 

In Linn, the alleged defamatory statements had been “circulated 

among the employees [of the company at issue there, through] leaflets.”

(Linn, supra, 383 U.S. at p. 56.) In Austin, the publication at issue had been 

communicated in a “union newsletter” (Austin, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 266) that 

was “distributed to members of the local union, and . . . posted on the ‘station’ 

bulletin board” (Letter Carriers v. Austin, Et. Al. (1972) 213 Va. 377, 379

[192 S.E.2d 737, 739], overruled by Austin, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 287). In 

contrast to the publications focused on company personnel in Linn and 

Austin, Bowman’s March 24 post was intentionally unlimited in scope of 

intended audience. Moreover, in this matter, there is no assertion equivalent 

in nature to what was asserted in Linn, i.e., that elections governed by 
14

federal labor law were wrongfully influenced by the conduct characterized in 

the allegedly defamatory communication. (Linn, supra, 383 U.S. at p. 56

[votes of 52 employees prevented for each of three elections].)

Based on the combination of the two contrasting aspects (nature

of topic and intended audience), we conclude Bowman has not carried his 

burden to show a sufficient connection between his publication and an NLRA 

“labor dispute” that satisfied the second part of the trigger for the Linn rule.

(See Operating Engineers v. Jones (1983) 460 U.S. 669, 676 [even where 

conduct is arguably protected or prohibited by NLRA, preemption analysis 

requires a “sensitive balancing of any harm to the regulatory scheme 

established by Congress, either in terms of negating the [NLRB]’s exclusive 

jurisdiction or in terms of conflicting substantive rules, and the importance of 

the asserted cause of action to the state as a protection to its citizens”].)

b. Merits of Defamation Cause of Action

Garcia carried his anti-SLAPP burden to show a sufficient 

probability of prevailing. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) He asserts that Bowman’s 

March 24 post was “doctored” because the video of the Opal training session 

was immediately followed by pictures of different horses, without any 

explanation that they were different.

7

According to Garcia, by posting the 

sequence of visuals depicting injured horses, Bowman intended to give the 

audience an impression that the injuries were suffered by Opal and caused by 

Garcia’s actions during the Opal training session. 

7 Garcia does not dispute he was connected to the other horses 

pictured, but his assertion that they are not Opal is not disputed by Bowman. 

It is also undisputed that even though Bowman received four pictures of 

injuries on different horses, he only included three of them for the March 24 

post we analyze.
15

The argument is sufficient to show a trier of fact could render 

judgment in Garcia’s favor. Given our conclusion that the Linn rule has not 

been triggered, we need not resolve Bowman’s arguments about malice, such 

as his contentions that the trial court “fail[ed] to analyze evidence of 

Bowman’s subjective state of mind” and erroneously considered the evidence 

on “actual malice in the light most favorable to Garcia.”8 Given our 

agreement that Garcia’s theory of “doctored” visuals is sound, Bowman 

cannot show prejudice resulting from the court’s assessment of the evidence

that was presented for his motion.

c. Nonactionable Opinion and Truth

Bowman asserts that his statements in his March 24 post 

amounted to nonactionable opinions. (Milkovich, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 20; 

Austin, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 284.) We apply the “totality of the circumstances 

test” (Overhill Farms, Inc. v. Lopez, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1261) and 

conclude Bowman’s “assertion of [animal abuse], when viewed in th[e] 

specific factual context [presented by the record], is not merely a hyperbolic 

characterization of [the company’s, and by extension Garcia]’s black . . . 

8 Notwithstanding, we note that Garcia’s “doctored” argument for 

the March 24 post would be sufficient for anti-SLAPP analysis to show a trier 

of fact could render judgment in his favor under the Linn rule, because a trier 

of fact could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Bowman fabricated a 

version of events that attempted to enhance credibility with knowledge of 

falsity. The undisputed nature of the material evidence would make it 

unnecessary for us to weigh in on a split of authority as to what degree of 

proof on malice should be met for anti-SLAPP analysis purposes. (Compare 

Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 71, 86 [for antiSLAPP analysis, “plaintiffs must demonstrate ‘actual malice’ by clear and 

convincing evidence”] with Young v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (2012) 

212 Cal.App.4th 551, 563 [sufficient to show “reasonable probability that” 

plaintiff “can produce clear and convincing evidence showing that the 

statements were made with actual malice”].)
16

heart—it represents an accusation of concrete, wrongful conduct.” (Id. at 

p. 1262.) 

Garcia has sufficiently shown that Bowman’s published words, 

and their surrounding context, support a conclusion that he asserted facts to 

support his opinions. Indeed, Bowman’s monologue was presented as a 

summarization of past events that included having “witnessed multiple 

occasions of animal abuse from the head horse trainer.” The record shows no 

specialized knowledge or expectations attributable to Bowman’s audience,

i.e., the general public, that would have materially influenced how the

communicated information would be received other than at face value, as 

factual matters. 

Bowman also attempts to rely on the well-established principle

that “[t]ruth, of course, is an absolute defense to any libel action.” 

(Campanelli v. Regents of University of California (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 572, 

581.) Garcia disagrees as to the truthfulness of Bowman’s publication 

statements but additionally argues that the truth cannot assist Bowman 

because he in any case failed to disclose material facts connected to his 

statements. For example, on the Opal training session video, Garcia asserts 

the whip-cracking noise was the result of “a sound making device on the tip

[of the whip] referred to as a ‘popper’”9 which Bowman failed to disclose 

despite his knowledge about the device.

9 Garcia asserts “[t]he popper on the whip creates a snapping 

noise when cracking in the air directly behind the horse to provide auditory 

cues during the training session. This is the training method displayed in the 

[Opal training session] video.”
17

Bowman counterargues that his nondisclosure about the “popper” 

did not change the character of his statements because it was factually true 

that Garcia’s whip touched Opal in the video.10 (See Franklin v. Dynamic 

Details, Inc., supra,116 Cal.App.4th at p. 387 [opinion nonactionable if 

underlying facts stated].) We need not decide the debate because it would not 

change our conclusion that, based on the objective information communicated 

by Bowman, Garcia has sufficiently demonstrated that Bowman’s publication 

went beyond nonactionable opinions. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Garcia carried 

his burden to show a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits of his 

defamation cause of action.

2. False Light Cause of Action

For the second claim Bowman aims at, we adhere to the principle

that “[w]hen a false light claim is coupled with a defamation claim, the false 

light claim is essentially superfluous, and stands or falls on whether it meets 

the same requirements as the defamation cause of action.” (Eisenberg v. 

Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1385, fn. 13; Balla v. 

Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 687.) For the reasons just discussed with 

respect to Garcia’s defamation cause of action, we conclude Garcia carried his 

10 Bowman asserts in the alternative that he sufficiently 

disclosed all necessary information to appropriately inform his audience 

about the bases for his opinions. As we noted earlier, Bowman’s March 24 

post that we focus on did not reference any other social media platform or 

username he used. The point negates Bowman’s claim that when he 

published the pictures of horses that were not Opal, he disclosed facts about 

the difference through the following disclaimer: “Here are additional pictures 

of injuries from the overuse of a whip.” His citation for the quote is to his post

on a different platform, then known as Twitter, that was not referenced in 

any way in the March 24 post published on TikTok.
18

anti-SLAPP second prong burden to demonstrate sufficient probability of 

prevailing on his false light cause of action. 

3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Cause of Action

Next, a “cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress exists when there is ‘“‘“(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the 

defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the 

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe 

or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the 

emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”’”’ [Citations.] A 

defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘“‘extreme as to exceed all 

bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’”’ [Citation.] And 

the defendant’s conduct must be ‘“‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in 

with the realization that injury will result.’”’ [Citation.]” (Hughes v. Pair

(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.) 

We apply the above-discussed facts underlying Garcia’s theory of 

“doctored” visual communication to the essential requirements of an

intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action. We conclude the 

facts on fabrication and resulting harm are sufficient, for anti-SLAPP 

analysis purposes, to demonstrate that a trier of fact could render judgment 

in Garcia’s favor on the cause of action.11 (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(3) [anti-SLAPP 

sufficient merit determination carries no future evidentiary value].)

11 Garcia asserts he suffered severe emotional distress that 

included not being able to work because of the distress, “difficulty sleeping, 

headaches, chest pains, and loss of appetite and weight.” We reject Bowman’s 

assertion that the facts and reasonable inferences from them are insufficient 

as a matter of law before discovery. (Billauer v. Escobar-Eck, supra, 

88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 964-965.)
19

4. Negligence Cause of Action

Finally, we agree with Garcia that he has shown a sufficient 

probability of prevailing on his negligence cause of action. Garcia cites to the 

elements enumerated by CACI No. 400, which would instruct a jury to render 

a verdict in Garcia’s favor if he shows: (1) “That [Bowman] was negligent”; 

(2) “That [Garcia] was harmed”; and (3) “That [Bowman]’s negligence was a 

substantial factor in causing [Garcia]’s harm.” 

Again, based on the facts underlying Garcia’s theory of “doctored” 

visual communication, we conclude there is a sufficient probability that a 

jury could find all essential negligence elements shown. Bowman argues

there is an insufficient probability of Garcia prevailing on a negligence

theory, “for the same reasons” as his defamation, false light, and intentional 

infliction of emotional distress causes of action. 

Because Bowman has not carried his burden to show his 

entitlement to an affirmative defense or the negation of an essential element

for any of the preceding causes of action (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 

pp. 384-385 [“‘summary-judgment-like procedure’”]; see Oldcastle Precast, 

Inc. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 554, 564-

565 [shifting summary judgment burden of proof]), we are not persuaded by 

his argument on Garcia’s negligence cause of action. In sum, we conclude the 

trial court reached the correct result in denying Bowman’s special motion to 

strike Garcia’s four causes of action in their entirety, Abased on the antiSLAPP statute. 
20

DISPOSITION

The order denying Bowman’s motion to strike pursuant to section 

425.16 is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules 

of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, J.

GOODING, J.