## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S

O F T E X A S

N O

. P D

- 1 4 0 2

- 0 9

W I L L I A M R A Y P H I L L I P S

, A p p e l l a n t

v

.

T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

O N A P P E L L A N T ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E T E N T H C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

M C L E N N A N C O U N T Y

C O C H R A N

, J

. , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t i n w h i c h P R IC E

, W O M A C K

,

J O H N S O N a n d A L C A L A

, J J

. , j o i n e d

. K E L L E R

, P

. J

. , f i l e d a d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n i n w h i c h

K E A S L E R a n d H E R V E Y

, J J

. , j o i n e d

. M E Y E R S

, J

. , d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e

.

O P I N I O N

A p p e l l a n t w a s c o n v i c t e d o f t w e l v e c o u n t s o f s e x u a l o f f e n s e s a g a i n s t h i s d a u g h t e r t h a t

o c c u r r e d i n 1 9 8 2 a n d 1 9 8 3

. B u t p r o s e c u t i o n u n d e r t h e 2 0 0 7 i n d i c t m e n t c h a r g i n g a p p e l l a n t

w a s a b s o l u t e l y b a r r e d b y t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s i n 1 9 9 3

. T h e s e c h a r g e s c o u l d n o t b e

r e s u r r e c t e d b y a 1 9 9 7 s t a t u t e e x t e n d i n g t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s f o r s e x u a l o f

f e n s e s

. N o

o n e

– n o t t h e t r i a l j u d g e

, t h e p r o s e c u t o r

, t h e d e f e n s e

, o r t h e c o u r t o f

a p p e a l s

– r e c o g n i z e d t h i sP h i l l i p s P a g e 2

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e x p o s t f

a c t o v i o l a t i o n

. B e c a u s e t h i s i s a n i m p o r t a n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e t h a t

w i l l u n d o u b t e d l y r e c u r g i v e n t h e e v e n m o r e r e c e n t s t a t u t o r y e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e o f

l i m i t a t i o n s f

o r s o m e s e x u a l o f

f e n s e s

, w e g r a n t e d a p p e l l a n t ’ s p e t i t i o n f o r d i s c r e t i o n a r y

r e v i e w

. A l t h o u g h t h e S t a t e P r o s e c u t i n g A t t o r n e y ( S P A ) a g r e e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s

1

h a d r u n b e f

o r e a p p e l l a n t ’ s i n d i c t m e n t

, s h e a r g u e s t h a t a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d t o p r e s e r v e t h i s i s s u e

f o r a p p e a l b e c a u s e h e d i d n o t o b j e c t i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t

. W e r e a f f i r m o u r p r i o r o p i n i o n s t h a t

h a v e s t a t e d t h a t a n a b s o l u t e s t a t u t e

- o f

- l i m i t a t i o n s b a r i s n o t f

o r f e i t e d b y t h e f

a i l u r e t o r a i s e

i t i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t

. W e r e v e r s e t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

, w h i c h h e l d t h a t a p p e l l a n t ’ s p r o s e c u t i o n

w a s n o t b a r r e d

. 2

I

.

S

. P

. r a n i n t o h e r f

a t h e r

, a p p e l l a n t

, i n 2 0 0 5 w h e n s h e w a s 2 6 a n d g o i n g t o s c h o o l i n

W a c o

. H e

, t o o

, w a s l i v i n g i n W a c o

. S h e w a s s c a r e d b e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t h a d s e x u a l l y a b u s e d

Appellant’s thre e g rounds for r eview r ead a s follows. 1

1. Did the [i ntermedia te] appellate court improperly apply the decision in Stogner v. Calif ornia

, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) allowing convictions for offe nses which had been exti ng uished by the

runni ng of limit ations and there by violate the ex post facto provisions of the Tex as an d

Fe dera l Consti tutions?

2. Did the [i ntermedia te] appellate court improperly interpre t the ex post facto and retroactive

law prohibit ions of t he Tex as and Fe dera l Constit utions and thereby allow convictions for

time-barr ed offe nses that contained differ ent elements with differ ent available defe nses that

had bee n repe aled a

nd wer e inca

pable of being prosec uted by

the State?

3. The Court i m proper ly char g ed the jury as to the corr ect statute of limit ations and there by

ca u s ed Petitioner eg reg ious harm and this cause should be rema nded for a harm anal y s i s

consistent with Almanza v. State , 686 S.W .2d 157 (Tex. Crim App. 1984).

Be cause we ag ree with appellant on his first gro u n d for revie w, we dismiss the second and third

g rounds.

Phillips v. State

, No. 10-07-00346- CR, 2009 WL 2644430 (Tex

. App—Waco Aug

. 26,

2

2009) (not desig nated f

or publication).P h i l l i p s P a g e 3

h e r w h e n s h e w a s a t o d d l e r

, a n d s h e h a d t h o u g h t s h e w a s r i d o f h i m

. S h e d i d n o t k n o w w h a t

t o d o

. S h e h a d g o n e t o t h e F B I w i t h a l l e g a t i o n s o f a b u s e b e f o r e

, b u t s h e w a s t o l d t h a t i t w a s

t o o l a t e

– t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s h a d r u n o n a n y o f f e n s e s o c c u r r i n g i n 1 9 8 2 o r 1 9 8 3

,

w h e n s h e w a s t w o t o f

o u r y e a r s o l d

. S

. P

. c a l l e d t h e W a c o p o l i c e t o f i n d o u t w h e r e h e r f

a t h e r

l i v e d s o s h e “ w o u l d k n o w w h e r e t o s t a y a w a y

. I w a n t e d t o f i n i s h s c h o o l

, b u t I w a n t e d t o f e e l

s a f e

. I d i d n ’ t k n o w i f I c o u l d g e t a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r

. ” T h e p o l i c e s u g g e s t e d t h a t s h e g o t o t h e

A d v o c a c y C e n t e r i n W a c o f o r c o u n s e l i n g

. S h e d i d

. O n e t h i n g l e d t o a n o t h e r

, a n d i n 2 0 0 7

a p p e l l a n t w a s c h a r g e d w i t h v a r i o u s s e x u a l o f f e n s e s a g a i n s t S

. P

. o c c u r r i n g “ o n o r a b o u t ”

s p e c i f i e d d a t e s f

r o m S e p t e m b e r 3 0

, 1 9 8 2

, t o N o v e m b e r 1

, 1 9 8 3

. 3

I t w a s t h e S t a t e ’ s t h e o r y a t t r i a l t h a t

, b e c a u s e t h e o f f e n s e s a l l e g e d o c c u r r e d w i t h i n

t h r e e y e a r s ( t h e o r i g i n a l s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s ) o f t h e 1 9 8 5 a m e n d m e n t s t o t h e s t a t u t e o f

l i m i t a t i o n s

, t h e o f

f e n s e s c o u l d b e c a r r i e d f o r w a r d u n d e r e a c h s u c c e s s i v e a m e n d m e n t t o t h e

The offe nses included ag g rava ted sexual abuse, indece ncy with a chi l d by contac t, 3

indece ncy with a child by

exposure, ag g rava ted ra

pe of a child, and ag g rava ted sexual assault.

The latest offe nse in the indictment w as count 12, alleg ing an ag g rava ted sexual a ssault on

or about November 1, 1983. Until September 1, 1983, the limit ations period was three y ear s. T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C

. art. 12.01 (Ve rnon 1981). Effe ctive S eptember 1, 1983, the l imitatio n s p er i o d

for ag g rava ted sexual assault was incre ased to five y ear s. Act of May 31, 1983, 68th L eg

., R.S., ch.

977, §§ 7, 14, 1983 Tex. Gen. L aws 5317. So, prosec ution for co u nt 12 would be barr ed afte r

November

1, 1988. But be fore those five y ear s were up, the leg islature ag ain extended the statute

of limit ations. Effe ctive September 1, 1987, the limit ations period for ag g rava ted sexual assault of

a child wa s increa sed to ten y ear s. See Act of June 1, 1987, 70th L eg ., R.S., ch. 716, §§ 1, 3, 1987

Tex. Gen L aws 2591. So, prosec ution for count 12 would be barr ed afte r November 1, 1993. The

limit ations statute was not ame nded ag ain until 1997, almost four y ear s afte r t his prosec ution was

barr ed. Effe ctive September 1, 1997, the limit ations period for ag g rava ted sexual assault was “ten

y ear s from the 18th birthday of the victim of the offe nse.” Act of May 28, 1997, 75th L eg

., R.S., ch.

7 4 0

, §§ 1, 4, 1997 Tex. Gen. L aws 2403. Be cause count 12 was alre ady barr ed at the t i m e t h e

amendment beca

me eff ective, application of the 1997 amend me n t v io la

te d th e E x P o s t F a c to Clause.

All of the other a lleg ed off enses, ha ving oc curr ed ea

rlier, we re a lso barre d.P h i l l i p s P a g e 4

1 9 9 7 l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d o f t e n y e a r s a f

t e r t h e v i c t i m ’ s e i g h t e e n t h b i r t h d a y

. T h e J a n u a r y 1 0

,

2 0 0 7 i n d i c t m e n t w a s f

i l e d j u s t w e e k s b e f

o r e S

. P

. ’ s t w e n t y

- e i g h t h b i r t h d a y

.

A t v o i r d i r e

, t h e S t a t e e x p l a i n e d t o p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s i t s t h e o r y o f w h y p r o s e c u t i o n o f

a p p e l l a n t ’ s t w e n t y

- f

i v e

- y e a r

- o l d c r i m e s w a s n o t b a r r e d :

T h e l a w u s e d t o b e

, b a c k w h e n I s t a r t e d t h i s

, t h a t i f w e d i d n ’ t g e t t h e m i n d i c t e d

w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s a f

t e r t h e e v e n t o c c u r r e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s r a n a n d

w e c o u l d n ’ t c h a r g e t h e m

. S o t h a t m e a n t t h e k i d h a d t o r e p o r t i t

, t h e

i n v e s t i g a t i o n h a d t o t a k e p l a c e

, a n d w e h a d t o g e t t h e c a s e t o t h e G r a n d J u r y

w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s a f

t e r i t h a p p e n e d o r t h e y

– t h e y w a l k

. T h e y n e v e r g e t c a u g h t

.

A n d t h e n i t s w i t c h e d t o w h e r e i t w a s t e n y e a r s

. W e h a d t o g e t i t

i n v e s t i g a t e d

, t h e k i d h a d t o r e p o r t i t

, w e h a d t o g o t o t h e G r a n d J u r y

, a n d w e

h a d t o g e t t h e c h a r g e s f i l e d w i t h i n t e n y e a r s a f t e r t h e 1 8 t h b i r t h d a y o f t h e

v i c t i m

. W e l l

, d o t h e m a t h

, 1 8 p l u s t e n

, y o u g e t u n t i l t h e y t u r n 2 8

.

W e l l

, t h i s l a s t f

a l l g u e s s w h a t t h e y d i d ? T h e r e ’ s n o s t a t u t e o f

l i m i t a t i o n s a n y m o r e

. I t ’ s w h e n e v e r w e w a n t t o

. A n d s o

. . . t h a t ’ s p a r t o f t h e

r e a s o n w h y w e e n d u p i n s i t u a t i o n s l i k e t h i s b e c a u s e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a d

c o n t i n u e d t o m a k e t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s l o n g e r a n d l o n g e r

.

A t t r i a l

, S

. P

. t e s t i f

i e d t h a t s h e h a d l i v e d w i t h h e r m o t h e r

, b u t

, u n t i l s h e w a s f i v e y e a r s

o l d

, s h e r e g u l a r l y v i s i t e d h e r f a t h e r

. S h e r e c o u n t e d s e v e r a l e p i s o d e s d u r i n g t h e s e v i s i t s i n

w h i c h h e

, a n d s o m e t i m e s h i s f r i e n d s

, w o u l d s e x u a l l y a s s a u l t h e r a n d t a k e p o r n o g r a p h i c

p h o t o s o f h e r

. T h e e a r l i e s t s u c h e p i s o d e o c c u r r e d w h e n s h e w a s t w o

. T h e a b u s e s u b s i d e d

w h e n

, a t a g e f

o u r

, s h e m o v e d t o E a s t T e x a s

.

I n h e r c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t

, t h e p r o s e c u t o r a r g u e d t h a t a n y o f f e n s e o c c u r r i n g b e f

o r e

S e p t e m b e r 1

, 1 9 8 2

, w a s b a r r e d b y t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s

, b u t t h o s e c o m m i t t e d a f t e r t h a t

d a t e w o u l d n o t b e b a r r e d b e c a u s e “ l i m i t a t i o n s c h a n g e d

. . . . [ I ] t c h a n g e d s o a n y t h i n g a f t e r t h a t

i s n o t b a r r e d b y t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s a s l o n g a s t h e i n d i c t m e n t w a s r e t u r n e d b e f o r e [ S

. P

. ]P h i l l i p s P a g e 5

t u r n e d 2 8

. A n d t h a t w a s J a n u a r y t h e 2 6 t h o f 2 0 0 7

. ”

I n h i s w r i t t e n c h a r g e

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t h a t “ t h e C o u r t h a s t a k e n

j u d i c i a l n o t i c e t h a t t h e d a t e i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t i n t h i s c a s e

. . . w a s J a n u a r y 1 0

, 2 0 0 7

, a n d t h a t

t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s f o r t h e o f f e n s e c h a r g e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t i s n o t m o r e t h a n t e n y e a r s

b e y o n d t h e 1 8 t h b i r t h d a y o f [ S

. P

. ]

. ” A p p e l l a n t m a d e n o o b j e c t i o n t o t h e c h a r g e a n d d i d n o t

o t h e r w i s e r a i s e a c o m p l a i n t b a s e d o n l i m i t a t i o n s

. T h e j u r y f o u n d a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y o n a l l

c o u n t s

, a n d s e n t e n c e d h i m t o t h e m a x i m u m p u n i s h m e n t o n e a c h

.

O n d i r e c t a p p e a l a p p e l l a n t a r g u e d

, f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e

, t h a t t h e e x p o s t f a c t o p r o v i s i o n s

o f t h e T e x a s a n d f

e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s w e r e v i o l a t e d b e c a u s e t h e a p p l i c a b l e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d

h a d e x p i r e d b e f

o r e t h e 1 9 9 7 l i m i t a t i o n s s t a t u t e b e c a m e e f f e c t i v e

. T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

a s s u m e d

, w i t h o u t d e c i d i n g

, t h a t t h e e x p o s t f a c t o i s s u e w a s n o t f

o r f e i t e d a n d a g r e e d w i t h t h e

S t a t e ’ s t h e o r y : B e c a u s e t h e c h a r g e d o f f e n s e s w e r e c o m m i t t e d w i t h i n t h r e e y e a r s ( t h e o r i g i n a l

l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d ) o f t h e l i m i t a t i o n s a m e n d m e n t t h a t t o o k e f f e c t i n 1 9 8 5

, t h e y c o u l d b e

c a r r i e d f o r w a r d u n d e r e a c h s u c c e s s i v e a m e n d m e n t t o t h e 1 9 9 7 l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d o f t e n y e a r s

a f t e r t h e v i c t i m ’ s e i g h t e e n t h b i r t h d a y

. A p p e l l a n t p e t i t i o n e d t h i s C o u r t f o r r e v i e w

, a r g u i n g 4

t h a t h i s o f

f e n s e s h a d b e e n e x t i n g u i s h e d b y t h e r u n n i n g o f l i m i t a t i o n s a n d c o u l d n o t b e r e v i v e d

b y t h e 1 9 9 7 v e r s i o n o f

t h e s t a t u t e o f

l i m i t a t i o n s w i t h o u t v i o l a t i n g t h e E x P o s t F a c t o C l a u s e

o f b o t h t h e f

e d e r a l a n d T e x a s c o n s t i t u t i o n s

.

B e f o r e t h i s C o u r t

, t h e S P A c a n d i d l y a d m i t s t h a t t h e S t a t e w a s m i s t a k e n a t t r i a l a n d o n

Phillips v. State

, No. 10-07-00346- CR, 2009 WL 2644430, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug

. 4

26, 2009) (not desig nated f or publication).P h i l l i p s P a g e 6

d i r e c t a p p e a l a n d a g r e e s w i t h a p p e l l a n t t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s h a d r u n b y 1 9 9 3

. T h e 5

S P A a r g u e s

, h o w e v e r

, t h a t b e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e l i m i t a t i o n s b a r a t t r i a l

, h e

c a n n o t r a i s e i t n o w

.

I I

.

A

. T h e “ A b s o l u t e ” R i g h t t o B e F r e e f r o m t h e A p p l i c a t i o n o f E x P o s t F a c t o L a w s

.

1

. T h e f

o u r C a l d e r v

. B u l

l c a t e g o r i e s

.

A n e x p o s t f

a c t o l a w i s o n e “ p a s s e d a f t e r t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f a f a c t o r c o m m i s s i o n o f

a n a c t

, w h i c h r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y c h a n g e s t h e l e g a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o r r e l a t i o n s o f s u c h f a c t o r

d e e d

. ” T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d T e x a s c o n s t i t u t i o n s b o t h f o r b i d e x p o s t f

a c t o l a w s

. I n 1 7 9 8

, 6 7

t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t s e t o u t t h e f o u r c a t e g o r i e s o f e x p o s t f a c t o l a w s i n C a l d e r v

. B u l l : 8

1 s t

. E v e r y l a w t h a t m a k e s a n a c t i o n d o n e b e f o r e t h e p a s s i n g o f t h e l a w

, a n d

w h i c h w a s i n n o c e n t w h e n d o n e

, c r i m i n a l ; a n d p u n i s h e s s u c h a c t i o n

. 2 d

. E v e r y

l a w t h a t a g g r a v a t e s a c r i m e

, o r m a k e s i t g r e a t e r t h a n i t w a s

, w h e n c o m m i t t e d

.

3 d

. E v e r y l a w t h a t c h a n g e s t h e p u n i s h m e n t

, a n d i n f l i c t s a g r e a t e r p u n i s h m e n t

,

t h a n t h e l a w a n n e x e d t o t h e c r i m e

, w h e n c o m m i t t e d

. 4 t h

. E v e r y l a w t h a t a l t e r s

t h e l e g a l r u l e s o f e v i d e n c e

, a n d r e c e i v e s l e s s

, o r d i f f e r e n t

, t e s t i m o n y

, t h a n t h e

l a w r e q u i r e d a t t h e t i m e o f t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f

t h e o f f e n c e

, i n o r d e r t o c o n v i c t

SPA’s Br ief at 2-3 (“ Al l the parties at trial, and the State and Tenth Court on appea l, 5

believed the statutes of limit ations applicable to the twelve counts ag ainst appellant wer e extended

by succe ssive amendments to article 12.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e. They wer e not.

Be cause the Tenth Co u rt p roceede d to mistakenly adopt the State’s seconda ry arg ument, the

threshold issue of pre serva tion must be addr essed.” ).

B L A C K ’ S L A W D I C T I O N A R Y 580 (6th ed. 1990). 6

U.S. C O N S T . art. I , §§ 9 cl. 3, 10 cl. 1; T E X

. C O N S T . art. I , § 16. 7

3 U.S. 386 (1798). 8P h i l l i p s P a g e 7

t h e o f f e n d e r

. A l l t h e s e

, a n d s i m i l a r l a w s

, a r e m a n i f e s t l y u n j u s t a n d o p p r e s s i v e

. 9

T h e E x P o s t F a c t o C l a u s e a p p l i e s n o t o n l y t o l a w s t h a t a r e f a c i a l l y r e t r o a c t i v e

, b u t

a l s o t o l a w s t h a t a r e a p p l i e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y

. F o r e x a m p l e

, i n C a r m e l l v

. T e x a s

, t h e S u p r e m e 1 0

C o u r t h e l d t h a t a r e v i s e d v e r s i o n o f T e x a s C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e A r t i c l e 3 8

. 0 7

, w h i c h

l e s s e n e d “ t h e q u a n t u m o f e v i d e n c e r e q u i r e d t o c o n v i c t

, ” f e l l “ s q u a r e l y ” i n t o t h e f o u r t h

C a l d e r v

. B u l l c a t e g o r y w h e n t h a t l a w w a s a p p l i e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y

. T h e r e v i s e d A r t i c l e 3 8

. 0 7 1 1

a u t h o r i z e d c o n v i c t i o n o f c e r t a i n s e x u a l o f f e n s e s o n t h e v i c t i m ’ s t e s t i m o n y a l o n e

, a l t h o u g h

c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e h a d p r e v i o u s l y b e e n r e q u i r e d

. T h u s

, a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e n e w l a w t o 1 2

C a r m e l l

– w h o h a d c o m m i t t e d t h e o f f e n s e b e f o r e t h e l a w w a s e n a c t e d

– r a n a f o u l o f t h e

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t e x p o s t f a c t o l a w s e v e n t h o u g h t h e l a w i t s e l f w a s n o t

f a c i a l l y r e t r o a c t i v e

.

S i m i l a r l y

, i n S c o t t v

. S t a t e

, P r e s i d i n g J u d g e K e l l e r

, w r i t i n g f o r a u n a n i m o u s c o u r t

, 1 3

h e l d t h a t t h e E

x P o s t F a c t o C l a u s e p r o h i b i t e d t h e u s e o f a s u c c e s s f u l l y c o m p l e t e d d e f

e r r e d

a d j u d i c a t i o n t o e n h a n c e t h e p u n i s h m e n t f o r a l a t e r o f

f e n s e w h e n t h e s t a t u t e p e r m i t t i n g s u c h

a n e n h a n c e m e n t “ d i d n o t e x i s t a t t h e t i m e a d j u d i c a t i o n w a s d e f

e r r e d

. ” T h e d e f

e n d a n t h a d 1 4

Id. at 390-91. 9

529 U.S. 513 (2000). 1 0

Id . at 530-31. 1 1

Id. at 517-19. 1 2

55 S.W .3d 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 1 3

Id. at 595, 597-98. 1 4P h i l l i p s P a g e 8

p l e d g u i l t y i n 1 9 9 1 t o i n d e c e n c y w i t h a c h i l d a n d s u c c e s s f u l l y c o m p l e t e d h i s d e f e r r e d

a d j u d i c a t i o n p r o b a t i o n

. A t t h a t t i m e

, t h e d e f e r r e d

- a d j u d i c a t i o n s t a t u t e p r o v i d e d t h a t a 1 5

s u c c e s s f u l l y d i s c h a r g e d p r o b a t i o n w o u l d n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d a c o n v i c t i o n f o r p u r p o s e s o f

e n h a n c e m e n t

. I n 1 9 9 7

, t h e L e g i s l a t u r e a m e n d e d t h e l a w t o m a k e d e f e r r e d a d j u d i c a t i o n f

o r 1 6

a s e x o f f e n s e c o u n t a s a p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n f o r p u r p o s e s o f i m p o s i n g a n a u t o m a t i c l i f e s e n t e n c e

f o r a s e c o n d s e x

- o f

f e n s e c o n v i c t i o n

. A l t h o u g h t h e s t a t u t o r y a m e n d m e n t w a s n o t f a c i a l l y 1 7

r e t r o a c t i v e

– i n d e e d i t c o n t a i n e d t h e s t a n d a r d s a v i n g s c l a u s e s

– t h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t i t s

a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e d e f

e n d a n t v i o l a t e d t h e E

x P o s t F a c t o C l a u s e

.

[ W ] h e n a s t a t u t e e x p l i c i t l y r e s t r i c t s t h e c o l l a t e r a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a n o f f e n s e

,

t h e d e f e n d a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o r e l y o n t h a t r e s t r i c t i o n

. P u n i s h m e n t f o r t h e o f f e n s e

i s i n c r e a s e d b y t h e r e m o v a l o f t h e s t a t u t o r y r e s t r i c t i o n

, a n d s u c h a n i n c r e a s e i n

p u n i s h m e n t c o n s t i t u t e s a n e x p o s t f a c t o l a w

. 1 8

A p p l y i n g t h e S c o t t r e a s o n i n g i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a s t a t u t e

- o f

- l i m i t a t i o n s b a r

, w h e n a s t a t u t e

e x p l i c i t l y r e s t r i c t s t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s t o a p a r t i c u l a r p e r i o d

– s u c h a s

, i n t h i s c a s e

, a t o t a l

o f t e n y e a r s

– t h e d e f

e n d a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o r e l y o n t h a t r e s t r i c t i o n

. O n c e t h a t p e r i o d e x p i r e s

,

“ t h e r e i s a n i r r e b u t t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t a d e f e n d a n t ’ s r i g h t t o a f

a i r t r i a l w o u l d b e

p r e j u d i c e d

. ” A n d p u n i s h m e n t f o r s u c h a t i m e

- b a r r e d o f f e n s e c o n s t i t u t e s a n e x p o s t f a c t o 1 9

Id. at 595. 1 5

Id. 1 6

Id. at 595-96. 1 7

Id . at 597-98. 1 8

United States v. Marion , 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971). 1 9P h i l l i p s P a g e 9

a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e l a w

.

2

. T h e r i g h t t o b e f r e e f r o m t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f e x p o s t f a c t o l a w s i s a n

“ a b s o l u t e ” o n e

.

T h e r i g h t t o b e f

r e e f r o m e x p o s t f

a c t o l a w s o r t h e e x p o s t f a c t o a p p l i c a t i o n o f a l a w

i s a n “ a b s o l u t e ” r i g h t

– a f i r s t c a t e g o r y M a r i n r i g h t

. I t c a n n o t b e w a i v e d o r f o r f e i t e d

. I n 2 0

I e p p e r t v

. S t a t e

, w e s t a t e d

,

2 1

e x p o s t f a c t o p r o h i b i t i o n s d o n o t m e r e l y c o n f e r u p o n t h e p e o p l e a w a i v a b l e o r

f o r f e i t a b l e r i g h t n o t t o h a v e t h e i r c o n d u c t p e n a l i z e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y

. I n d e e d

, t h e

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t e x p o s t f a c t o l e g i s l a t i o n i s n o t r e a l l y a n

i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t a t a l l

. I t i s a c a t e g o r i c a l p r o h i b i t i o n d i r e c t e d b y t h e p e o p l e t o

t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t

. S h o r t o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t

, t h e p e o p l e m a y n o t

w a i v e t h i s p r o h i b i t i o n

, e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l l y o r c o l l e c t i v e l y

, a n y m o r e t h a n t h e y

m a y c o n s e n t t o b e i m p r i s o n e d f o r c o n d u c t w h i c h d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e a c r i m e

. 2 2

T h u s

, i n I

e p p e r t

, w e h e l d t h a t a d e f

e n d a n t c o u l d r a i s e a c l a i m f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e o n a p p e a l t h a t

h i s c o n v i c t i o n s w e r e b a r r e d b y t h e E x P o s t F a c t o C l a u s e b e c a u s e t h e s t a t u t e u n d e r w h i c h h e

w a s p r o s e c u t e d h a d n o t y e t b e e n e n a c t e d a t t h e t i m e o f h i s a l l e g e d l y c r i m i n a l c o n d u c t

.

I e p p e r t h a d b e e n c h a r g e d i n m u l t i p l e i n d i c t m e n t s w i t h a g g r a v a t e d s e x u a l a s s a u l t o f a c h i l d

u n d e r f o u r t e e n

. W h e n h e c o m m i t t e d t h e o f f e n s e s

, t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e s r e q u i r e d p r o o f o f

a n e l e m e n t t h e n e w s t a t u t e s t h a t h e w a s p r o s e c u t e d u n d e r d i d n o t r e q u i r e

– t h a t t h e o f f e n s e s

See Marin v. State

, 851 S.W .2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“[O]ur sy stem may be 2 0

thought to contain rules of three distinct kinds: (1) absolute require ments and prohibitions; (2) rig hts

of litigants which must be implemented by the sy stem unless expressly waived; and (3) rig hts of

litigants which are to be implemented upon reque st.”), overruled on other grounds by Cain v. State

, 947 S.W .2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

908 S.W .2d 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 2 1

Id. at 220. 2 2P h i l l i p s P a g e 1 0

b e c o m m i t t e d “ w i t h i n t e n t t o a r o u s e o r g r a t i f y t h e s e x u a l d e s i r e o f a n y p e r s o n

. ” W e h e l d 2 3

t h a t p r o s e c u t i o n f

o r c o n d u c t w h i c h w a s n o t i l l e g a l w h e n c o m m i t t e d w a s n o t a f o r f e i t a b l e

i r r e g u l a r i t y

. I n 2 0 0 5

, w e r e a f f i r m e d t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n o f e x p o s t f a c t o l a w s 2 4

i s a M a r i n c a t e g o r y

- o n e

, “ a b s o l u t e r e q u i r e m e n t ” t h a t i s n o t s u b j e c t t o f o r f e i t u r e b y t h e f

a i l u r e

t o o b j e c t

. 2 5

B

. A p p l i c a t i o n o f a N e w L a w t o R e v i v e a P r e v i o u s l y T i m e

- B a r r e d P r o s e c u t i o n

V i o l a t e s t h e E

x P o s t F a c t o C l a u s e

.

S t a t u t e s o f l i m i t a t i o n s r e f l e c t “ a l e g i s l a t i v e j u d g m e n t t h a t

, a f t e r a c e r t a i n t i m e

, n o

q u a n t u m o f e v i d e n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n v i c t

. ” T h a t j u d g m e n t “ t y p i c a l l y r e s t s

, i n l a r g e p a r t

, 2 6

u p o n e v i d e n t i a r y c o n c e r n s

– f o r e x a m p l e

, c o n c e r n t h a t t h e p a s s a g e o f t i m e h a s e r o d e d

m e m o r i e s o r m a d e w i t n e s s e s o r o t h e r e v i d e n c e u n a v a i l a b l e

. ” B e c a u s e s t a t u t e s o f l i m i t a t i o n s 2 7

a r e m e a s u r e s o f

p u b l i c p o l i c y “ e n t i r e l y s u b j e c t t o t h e w i l l o f

t h e L e g i s l a t u r e

, ” t h e y “ m a y b e

c h a n g e d o r r e p e a l e d w i t h o u t v i o l a t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n s a g a i n s t e x p o s t f a c t o l a w s

i n a n y c a s e w h e r e a r i g h t t o a c q u i t t a l h a s n o t b e e n a b s o l u t e l y a c q u i r e d b y t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f

Id . (B aird, J., concurring ). 2 3

Id. at 218. 2 4

Sanchez v. State

, 120 S.W .3d 359, 365-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“[W] e have rec og nized 2 5

three more absolute require ments since Marin: a constitutional require ment that a district court must

conduct its proc eeding s at the county seat, the c onstitut ional prohibition of ex post fac to laws, and

cer tain constitutional restra ints on t he comments of a judge .”) (interna l quotation marks and

footnotes omitted).

Stogner v. California , 539 U.S. 607, 615 (2003). 2 6

Id. 2 7P h i l l i p s P a g e 1 1

t h e p e r i o d o f l i m i t a t i o n s

. ” 2 8

A n d T e x a s c o u r t s

, l i k e a l l f e d e r a l c i r c u i t s t h a t h a v e r u l e d o n t h e i s s u e

, h a v e u p h e l d t h e

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f

e x t e n d i n g a n u n e x p i r e d c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s

. T h u s

, a s t a t u t e 2 9

o f l i m i t a t i o n s m a y b e e x t e n d e d b y t h e l e g i s l a t u r e

, b u t a p r o s e c u t i o n w i t h i n t h e n e w t i m e

p e r i o d w i l l b e p e r m i t t e d o n l y i f t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d h a d n o t a l r e a d y r u n b e f o r e t h e l a w w a s

c h a n g e d

. I n r e c e n t y e a r s

, l e g i s l a t u r e s h a v e b e e n p a r t i c u l a r l y a m e n a b l e t o s u c h e x t e n s i o n s :

“ I n t h e e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s

, s p u r r e d b y a g r o w i n g s o c i e t a l a w a r e n e s s o f a n d s e n s i t i v i t y t o c h i l d a b u s e

,

b o t h f e d e r a l a n d s t a t e g o v e r n m e n t s b e g a n t o e n a c t l e g i s l a t i o n l e n g t h e n i n g t h e l i m i t a t i o n s

p e r i o d s f o r p r o s e c u t i n g c h i l d a b u s e c a s e s

. ” T e x a s i s n o e x c e p t i o n

. A s t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s 3 0

Vasquez v. State, 557 S.W .2d 779, 781 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (op. on reh’ g ) (citing 2 8

Hill v. State

, 171 S.W .2d 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1943)). The rationale for the rule was perha ps best

explained by

J udg e L ear

ned Ha nd in Falter v. United States , 23 F.2d 420 ( 2d Cir. 1928):

Certainly it is one thing to revive a prosec ution a lrea dy dead, a nd another

to give it

a longe r lease of life. The question turns upon how much violence is done to our

instinctive fee lings of justice and fair play

. For the state to assure a man that he has

become safe from its pursuit, and there afte r to withdraw its assura nce, seems to most

of us unfair and di shonest. But, while the chase is on, it does not shock us to have

it ex tended be y ond the time first set, or, if it does, the stake forg ives it.

Id. at 425-26.

Archer v. State

, 577 S.W .2d 244, 244 (Tex. C rim. App. 1979); United St ates v. Grimes

, 2 9

142 F.3d 1342, 1351 (11t h C i r. 1998) (joining eig ht other circ uits in holding that “extending a

limit ations period bef

ore the prosec ution is barred doe s not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause”)

.

Ry an D. Fr ei, Case Note

, Does Time Eclipse Crime? Stogner v. California and the Court’s 3 0

Determ ination of the Ex Post Facto Limitat ions on Retroactive J ustice , 38 U. R I C H

. L

. R E V . 1011,

1012, 1026 (2004) (“A round that time, leg islatures nationwide beg an to rea liz e that child victims of

sexual abuse fre q u en t l y re fra in from repor ting their abuse to authorities beca use they are easily

manipulated by offe nders in positions of authority and trust, and becau s e ch i l d ren have difficulty

reme mbering the crime or fac ing the trauma it can cause

. States that limit ed the time for prosec uting

child sex abuse case s beg an to signific antly aug ment the time period for filin g char g es afte r theP h i l l i p s P a g e 1 2

p o i n t e d o u t i n t h i s c a s e

, t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s f o r c e r t a i n s e x o f

f e n s e s e x p a n d e d f

r o m

t h r e e y e a r s t o f

i v e y e a r s t o t e n y e a r s t o t h e 1 9 9 7 l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d o f t e n y e a r s a f t e r t h e

v i c t i m ’ s 1 8 t h b i r t h d a y

. N o w t h e r e i s n o s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s

. B u t t h e T e x a s L e g i s l a t u r e 3 1

d i d n o t a n d c o u l d n o t “ r e s u r r e c t ” c a s e s a l r e a d y b a r r e d w i t h t h e s e n e w l y e x p a n d e d l i m i t a t i o n s

p e r i o d s

. I n d e e d

, e a c h a m e n d m e n t s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e v i s e d s t a t u t e d i d n o t a p p l y t o a n o f f e n s e 3 2

abuse.” ) (inter

nal quotation marks and f ootnotes omitt ed).

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C

. art. 12.01 (“no limit ation” for “(A ) murder and manslaug hter; (B ) 3 1

sexual a ssault unde r Section 22.011(a) (2), Penal Code, or ag g rava ted sexual a ssault unde r Section

22.021(a) (1)( B)

, Penal Code; (C) sexual assault, if during the investiga tion of the offe nse biologica l

matter is collecte d and subjected to fore nsic DNA testing and the testing results show that the matter

does not match the victim or any other person whose identity is rea dily asce rtained; (D) continuous

sexual abuse of y oung child or children under Section 21.02, Penal Code; (E) indece ncy with a child

under Sec tion 21.11, Penal Code . . .”).

Both the State and appellant rec og nize that the i s s u e co n cerning the applicability of the 3 2

statute of limit ations deals with a leg islative enac tment and the application of ex post facto laws, not

any application of judg e-ma de or judicia lly abrog ated c ommon law. See Rogers v. T ennese e

, 532

U.S. 451, 462 (2001) ( holding that the r etroa ctive application of a judicial dec ision abolishing the

common law “y ear and a day ” rule was not an ex post facto violation beca use that constitutional

clause applies to leg islative acts–blac k letter law–not to judicial decisionmaking ); Johnson v. United

States

, 529 U.S. 694, 699 (2000) (“The hear t of the Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I , § 9,

bars a pplication of a la

w ‘that c hang es the punishment, and inflicts a g rea ter punishment, than the

l aw annex ed to the crime, when committed

. . . .’ To preva il on this sort of ex post facto claim,

J ohnson must show both that the law he challeng es opera tes retroa ctively (that it applies to conduct

completed befor e its enac tment) and that it raises the penalty from whateve r the law provided when

he acte d.”); compare Ortiz v. State

, 93 S.W .3d 79, 91 (Tex. C ri m

. Ap p

. 2 0 02) (distinguishing

betwee n the application of ex post facto laws enac ted by the leg islatu re an d the judicial decisionmaking err or in including, in a jury char g e, lang uag e from a statute that had been amende d afte r the

defe ndant had comm i t t ed t he offe nse). I n Ortiz

, a capital- murder case alleg ing the underlying

offe nse of reta liation for harming or threa tening to harm another for his “ser vice” as a public serva

nt,

the trial j u d ge mistakenly included the phrase “ser vice or status” as a public serva nt in his jury

char g e. The reta liation statute had been a mended be tween the offe nse date and the trial to inc lude

a threa t to harm another because of hi s “status” as well as his “ser vice” as a public serva

nt. Id. at

91. This err or did not constitute an ex post facto application of the reta liation statute; the char g e was

simply “er

roneous beca

use it relied on the wrong version of the statute.” Id. But it did not cause the

defe ndant eg reg ious harm beca use “[t] here is littl e differ ence betwee n a prospec tive witness’ statusP h i l l i p s P a g e 1 3

i f p r o s e c u t i o n o f t h a t o f f e n s e h a d b e c o m e b a r r e d b y l i m i t a t i o n s b e f o r e t h e p a s s a g e o f t h e

a m e n d e d s t a t u t e

. 3 3

I n S t o g n e r v

. C a l i

f o r n i a

, t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t c l a r i f i e d t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e E x P o s t 3 4

F a c t o C l a u s e t o a c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s

. T h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t a C a l i f o r n i a s t a t u t e

a u t h o r i z i n g t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f a “ s e v e n t y

- e i g h t

- y e a r

- o l d m a n f o r c r i m e s t h a t h a d b e e n

t i m e

- b a r r e d f

r o m p r o s e c u t i o n f

o r o v e r t w e n t y

- t w o y e a r s w a s a n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e x p o s t f a c t o

l a w

. ” S t o g n e r h a d b e e n i n d i c t e d i n 1 9 9 8 f o r s e x o f f e n s e s a l l e g e d l y c o m m i t t e d b e t w e e n 3 5

1 9 5 5 a n d 1 9 7 3 i n C a l i f o r n i a

. A t t h a t t i m e

, a t h r e e

- y e a r l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d a p p l i e d t o s e x

3 6

o f f e n s e s

. B u t i n 1 9 9 3

, C a l i f o r n i a p a s s e d a n e w s t a t u t e a l l o w i n g p r o s e c u t i o n f o r s e x

- r e l a t e d 3 7

c h i l d a b u s e a f

t e r t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d h a d e x p i r e d i f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n w a s b e g u n w i t h i n o n e

and his service .” Id. at 92. The situation in Ortiz would be an ex post facto violation under Johnson

if the reta liation statute did not include protec tion of “a public serva nt” at the time Ortiz committed

the murder , but the State alleg ed that the victim was “ a public ser vant.”

I f, at the t i m e o f the offe nse, the statute did not criminalize reta liation ag ainst “a public

serva nt,” then any application of that new statute to conduct that had occur red befor e its enac tment

would be an ex post facto violation of the law.

Acc ord , Act of J une 3, 2009, 81st L eg

., R.S., ch. 1227, § 42, 2007 Tex. Gen. L aws 3930 3 3

(“( a) The chang e in law m ad e by this Act applies only to an offe nse committed on or afte r the

eff ective date of this Act [S eptember 1, 2009]. For purposes of this section, an offe nse is committed

befor e the eff

ective date o f t his Act if any element of the offe nse occur s befor e that date. (b) An

offe nse committed befor e the eff ective date of this Act is go v er n ed b y t h e law in eff ect when the

offe nse wa s committed, and the for mer lawis continued in eff ect f or that purpose .”).

539 U.S. 607 (2003). 3 4

Fr ei, supra note 30, at 1013. 3 5

Stogner , 539 U.S. at 609. 3 6

Id . at 610. 3 7P h i l l i p s P a g e 1 4

y e a r o f t h e v i c t i m ’ s r e p o r t t o p o l i c e

. T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t a g r e e d w i t h S t o g n e r t h a t t h i s 3 8

f a c i a l l y r e t r o a c t i v e l a w t h a t r e v i v e d a p r e v i o u s l y t i m e

- b a r r e d o f f e n s e v i o l a t e d t h e E

x P o s t

F a c t o C l a u s e

. I t n o t e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e w a s a n u n f a i r e x t e n s i o n o f a l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d a f t e r 3 9

t h e S t a t e h a d “ a s s u r e d a m a n t h a t h e h a s b e c o m e s a f e f r o m i t s p u r s u i t

, ” a n d t h a t i t r e f l e c t e d 4 0

a g o v e r n m e n t r e f

u s i n g b o t h “ t o p l a y b y i t s o w n r u l e s ” a n d t o g i v e “ f a i r w a r n i n g ” t o a m a n

t o p r e s e r v e e x c u l p a t o r y e v i d e n c e

. 4 1

T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t p o i n t e d t o h i s t o r y a n d n o t e d t h a t “ n u m e r o u s l e g i s l a t o r s

, c o u r t s

,

a n d c o m m e n t a t o r s h a v e l o n g b e l i e v e d i t w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t t h e E x P o s t F a c t o C l a u s e f

o r b i d s

r e s u r r e c t i o n o f a t i m e

- b a r r e d p r o s e c u t i o n

. ” T h e C o u r t c i t e d a n e a r l y T e x a s d e c i s i o n

, S t a t e 4 2

v

. S n e e d

, i n w h i c h t h e T e x a s S u p r e m e C o u r t s t a t e d

,

4 3

I n t h i s c a s e t h e b a r o f t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o f o n e y e a r w a s c o m p l e t e d

b e f o r e t h e c o d e w e n t i n t o o p e r a t i o n

, b y w h i c h t h e p e r i o d o f l i m i t a t i o n o f

p r o s e c u t i o n s i n s u c h m i s d e m e a n o r s w a s e x t e n d e d t o t w o y e a r s

. T h e s t a t e

h a v i n g n e g l e c t e d t o p r o s e c u t e w i t h i n t h e t i m e p r e s c r i b e d f o r i t s o w n a c t i o n

, l o s t t h e r i g h t t o p r o s e c u t e t h e s u i t

. T o g i v e a n a c t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e

, p a s s e d

a f t e r s u c h l o s s

, t h e e f

f e c t o f r e v i v i n g t h e r i g h t o f a c t i o n i n t h e s t a t e

, w o u l d g i v e

i t a n o p e r a t i o n e x p o s t f a c t o

, w h i c h w e c a n n o t s u p p o s e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e

Id. at 609. 3 8

Id. at 610. 3 9

Id . at 611 (c itation and internal quotation marks omitted). 4 0

Id . (citations and inter

nal quotation marks omitted). 4 1

Id. at 616. 4 2

State v. Snee d , 25 Tex. 66 (1860). 4 3P h i l l i p s P a g e 1 5

i n t e n d e d

. 4 4

T h u s

, a s e a r l y a s 1 8 6 0

, T e x a s c o u r t s h e l d t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f a n o t h e r w i s e v a l i d l a w

e x t e n d i n g t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s t o a n o f f e n s e t h a t w a s a l r e a d y t i m e

- b a r r e d v i o l a t e d t h e

E x P o s t F a c t o C l a u s e

. T h e S t o g n e r C o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t “ w h e r e c o u r t s h a v e u p h e l d

e x t e n s i o n s o f u n e x

p i r e d s t a t u t e s o f l i m i t a t i o n s

. . . t h e y h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d

s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d s h a v e e x p i r e d

. ” 4 5

I n P e o p l e v

. S h e d d

, a C o l o r a d o c a s e s i m i l a r t o t h e p r e s e n t o n e

, t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s 4 6

c h a r g e d w i t h s e x u a l a s s a u l t o f a c h i l d

, a l l e g e d t o h a v e o c c u r r e d b e t w e e n S e p t e m b e r 1 a n d

D e c e m b e r 3 1

, 1 9 7 7

. A t t h a t t i m e

, t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s w a s t h r e e y e a r s

, b u t i n 1 9 8 2

, t h e 4 7

l e g i s l a t u r e i n c r e a s e d t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d f o r s e x u a l o f

f e n s e s t o t e n y e a r s

. H o w e v e r

,

b e c a u s e t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t h a d a l r e a d y e x p i r e d

, a t t h e l a t e s t

, o n

D e c e m b e r 3 1

, 1 9 8 0

, “ t h e n e w t e n

- y e a r s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s d i d n o t r e v i v e t h e c o u r t ’ s

Id. at 67. 4 4

Stogner

, 5 3 9 U.S. at 618. Texas is no exception. See Archer v. State, 577 S.W .2d 244, 4 5

244 (T ex

. Crim. App. 1979) (“c omplete defe nse” acc rued under statute of limit ations cannot “be

taken away by a subsequent re p ea l o r amendment”; howeve r, st atute ex tending limit ations period

“applies to all offe nses not barr ed at the time of the passag e of the act, so that a prosec ution may be

commence d at any time within the newly established period, althoug h the old period of limit ations

has then expired”); Rose v. State, 716 S.W .2d 162, 165 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, pet. ref ’d)

(“Where a complete defe nse has acc rued under a statute of limitations, i t cannot be taken aw ay by

subsequent re peal or amendment; howeve r, a statute extending the pe riod of limitations applies to

all offe nses not barr ed at the time of the pass age o f the act, so that the prosec ution may be

commence d at any time within the newly established period, althoug h the old period of limitation

has expired.”)

.

702 P.2d 267 (Colo. 1985) (en banc ) ( per curiam ). 4 6

Id. at 268. 4 7P h i l l i p s P a g e 1 6

j u r i s d i c t i o n t o h e a r t h e c a s e

. ” A s t h e C o l o r a d o S u p r e m e C o u r t e x p l a i n e d

, 4 8

A c a s e b a r r e d f

r o m p r o s e c u t i o n b y a s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s c a n n o t b e r e v i v e d

b y s u b s e q u e n t l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t a c t s t o e x t e n d t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d

. R e t r o a c t i v e

a p p l i c a t i o n o f a s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s t o r e v i v e a p r e v i o u s l y b a r r e d p r o s e c u t i o n

v i o l a t e s t h e f

u n d a m e n t a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t e x p o s t f a c t o

l e g i s l a t i o n

. 4 9

T h e S h e d d d e c i s i o n w a s c i t e d f a v o r a b l y b y t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t i n S t o g n e r

, a n d i t i s 5 0

p r e c i s e l y a n a l o g o u s t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e

.

I I I

.

A

. A p p l y i n g t h e 1 9 9 7 V e r s i o n o f t h e S t a t u t e o f L i m i t a t i o n s t o R e v i v e a P r e v i o u s l y

T i m e

- B a r r e d P r o s e c u t i o n V i o l a t e s t h e E x P o s t F a c t o C l a u s e

.

1

. A p p e l l a n t ’ s e

x p o s t f a c t o c l a i m i s v a l i d

.

A l t h o u g h t h e 1 9 9 7 s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s a m e n d m e n t i s n o t a n e x p o s t f a c t o l a w o n i t s

f a c e

, a s w a s t h e o n e a t i s s u e i n S t o g n e r

, i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e s t a t u e o f

l i m i t a t i o n s h a d a l r e a d y r u n b e f o r e i t s e n a c t m e n t v i o l a t e s t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n

. A s i n

S t o g n e r

, a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e 1 9 9 7 v e r s i o n f a l l s i n t o t h e C a l d e r v

. B u l l s e c o n d c a t e g o r y a s

Id. 4 8

Id. (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Roche leau

, 533 N.E.2d 1333, 1334 4 9

(Mass. 1989); United States v. F r a i d i n

, 6 3 F.Supp. 271, 276 (D.C. Md. 1945) (“w here a statute

extends a period of l imitations or provides for the tolling t here of, i t applies t o offe ns es not barr ed

at the time of the statute' s passag e; but such a statute cannot opera te to r evive offe nses which wer e

barr ed at the time of its enac tment since it would in such case be ex post fac to”; prosec ution barr ed

by limit ations).

See Stogne r , 539 U.S. at 617, 618. 5 0P h i l l i p s P a g e 1 7

a p p l i e d t o a p p e l l a n t ’ s p r o s e c u t i o n

. T h e p r o p e r l y e x t e n d e d t e n

- y e a r s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s 5 1

h a d e x p i r e d i n 1 9 9 3

, a n d

, f r o m t h a t d a y f

o r w a r d

, p r o s e c u t i o n o f a l l t w e l v e c o u n t s w a s f o r e v e r

a n d a b s o l u t e l y b a r r e d

. N o n e w s t a t u t e c o u l d e v e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e s u r r e c t t h e m

. T h e S P A 5 2

d o e s n o t n o w a r g u e o t h e r w i s e

. I n s t e a d

, s h e c l a i m s t h a t a p p e l l a n t f o r f e i t e d t h i s a b s o l u t e

l i m i t a t i o n s b a r b y f

a i l i n g t o c o m p l a i n i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t

.

2

. A p p e l l a n t ’ s e

x p o s t f a c t o i s s u e w a s n o t f

o r f e i t e d

.

T h e S P A a r g u e s t h a t a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d t o p r e s e r v e h i s c o m p l a i n t f o r a p p e a l b e c a u s e h i s

i s s u e w a s n o t a t r u e e x p o s t f a c t o i s s u e t h a t c o u l d b e r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e o n a p p e a l u n d e r

I e p p e r t a n d t h a t t h i s i s t r u e b e c a u s e s t a t u t e s o f l i m i t a t i o n s a r e n o t “ s t r u c t u r a l

. ” T h a t 5 3

a r g u m e n t m i x e s a p p l e s w i t h o r a n g e s

. “ S t r u c t u r a l r i g h t s ” a r e t h o s e r i g h t s t o w h i c h t h e

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l h a r m l e s s

- e r r o r r u l e d o e s n o t a p p l y : i f t h e d e f e n d a n t s h o w s t h a t t h e r i g h t w a s

v i o l a t e d

, a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s m u s t r e v e r s e t h e c o n v i c t i o n w i t h o u t a n y a n a l y s i s o f w h e t h e r t h a t

e r r o r w a s h a r m f

u l

. “ C a t e g o r i c a l r i g h t s ” a r e t h o s e “ a b s o l u t e r e q u i r e m e n t s a n d p r o h i b i t i o n s

, 5 4

See Stogner

, 539 U.S. at 612-13 (stating that the retroa ctive California l aw fell into the 5 1

second Calder v. Bull ex post facto cate g ory –any “law tha t ag g rava

tes a c rime, or make s it g rea ter

than it was, when committed”–bec ause, afte r the orig i n al s t at u t e of limit ations law had expired,

Stogner was not “liable to any punishment”; “California ’s n ew statute there fore ‘ag g rava ted’

Stogner ’s alleg ed crime, or made it ‘g rea ter than it wa s, when committed,’ in the sense that, and to

t he extent that, it ‘inflicted punishment’ for past criminal conduct that (whe n th e n ew l aw wa s

enac ted) did not trig g er a

ny such liability .”) ( some internal quotation mar ks omitt ed).

See Stogne r , 539 U.S. at 616-19; State v. Snee d , 25 Tex. 66, 67 (1860). 5 2

State’s Br ief at 7 (citing Johnson v. United States

, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1 9 97) (listing 5 3

those rig hts deemed struc tural by the Supreme Court))

.

See J ohnson , 520 U.S. at 468-69. 5 4P h i l l i p s P a g e 1 8

l i k e r i g h t s w h i c h a r e w a i v a b l e o n l y

, [ t h a t ] a r e t o b e o b s e r v e d e v e n w i t h o u t p a r t i s a n r e q u e s t

.

B u t u n l i k e w a i v a b l e r i g h t s

, t h e y c a n ’ t l a w f u l l y b e a v o i d e d e v e n w i t h p a r t i s a n c o n s e n t

. ” I n 5 5

I e p p e r t

, w e e x p l i c i t l y h e l d t h a t a d e f e n d a n t c o u l d r a i s e t h e c l a i m o f a s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s

b a r f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e o n a p p e a l b e c a u s e i t w a s a “ c a t e g o r i c a l p r o h i b i t i o n ” w h i c h m a y n o t b e

w a i v e d o r f

o r f e i t e d b y t h e f

a i l u r e t o o b

j e c t

. A s w e s t a t e d

, t h i s b a r i s n o t o n l y f o r t h e b e n e f

i t 5 6

o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f

e n d a n t

, i t i s i n t e n d e d t o k e e p s a c r e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s p r o m i s e t o i t s

c i t i z e n s

. 5 7

T h e S P A h a s a n o t h e r

, m o r e s u b t l e

, a r g u m e n t : T h i s i s n o t a n e x p o s t f a c t o c l a i m u n d e r

S t o g n e r

, a n d t h e r e f

o r e i t c o u l d n o t b e r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e o n a p p e a l

, b e c a u s e S t o g n e r

i n v o l v e d a l a w t h a t o v e r t l y “ p e r m i t [ t e d ] r e s u r r e c t i o n o f o t h e r w i s e t i m e

- b a r r e d c r i m i n a l

p r o s e c u t i o n s

, ” a n d t h i s c a s e i n v o l v e s n o s u c h o v e r t l y r e t r o a c t i v e l a w

. T h a t i s

, n o t h i n g i n 5 8

t h e 1 9 9 7 s t a t u t e e x p r e s s l y p e r m i t t e d t h e r e s u r r e c t i o n o f a p r e v i o u s l y b a r r e d p r o s e c u t i o n ;

i n d e e d

, t h e s t a t u t e i t s e l f s t a t e s j u s t t h e o p p o s i t e

. T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s i r r e l e v a n t b e c a u s e t h e

e x p o s t f a c t o r e s u l t i s t h e s a m e

– t h e r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n h e r e “ r e v i v e d ” a p r e v i o u s l y b a r r e d

Marin v. State

, 851 S.W .2d 275, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), overruled on other grounds 5 5

by Cain v. State

, 947 S.W .2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). I n a post- Marin case

, howeve r, we have

noted that a party may be estopped from rely ing u p o n a “c at eg ory one” absolute require ment.

Sanchez v . State , 120 S.W .3d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Ieppe rt v. State

, 908 S.W .2d 217, 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see also Saldano v. State

, 5 6

70 S.W .3d 873, 888-89 (Te x . Crim. App. 2002) (citing Ieppe rt for the proposition that one Marin

nonforf eitable “ absolute re quirement” is the constitutional prohibit ion of ex post facto laws).

Id

. 5 7

SPA’s Brief

at 5-6 (quoting Stogner , 539 U.S. at 609). 5 8P h i l l i p s P a g e 1 9

p r o s e c u t i o n

. A n d

, i n C a r m e l l

, t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n o f

5 9

s t a t u t e s t h a t a r e n o t e x p r e s s l y a n d f a c i a l l y r e t r o a c t i v e n o n e t h e l e s s v i o l a t e s t h e E x P o s t F a c t o

C l a u s e

. 6 0

3

. P r o c t o r v

. S t a t e d o e s n o t a p p l y

.

A s t h e S P A n o t e s

, i n P r o c t o r v

. S t a t e

, w e h e l d t h a t a d e f e n d a n t w i l l f

o r f e i t a s t a t u t e

6 1

o f

- l i m i t a t i o n s d e f

e n s e i f h e d o e s n o t a s s e r t i t a t o r b e f o r e t h e g u i l t s t a g e o f t r i a l

. W e 6 2

d e c l a r e d t h a t “ a l i m i t a t i o n s d e f e n s e ” i s a M

a r i n t h i r d

- c a t e g o r y r u l e t h a t m u s t b e i m p l e m e n t e d

o n l y u p o n r e q u e s t

. B u t P r o c t o r g o v e r n s s t a t u t e

- o f

- l i m i t a t i o n s d e f

e n s e s t h a t a r e b a s e d o n 6 3

f a c t s ( c h a l l e n g i n g a p l e a d i n g t h a t i n c l u d e s a “ t o l l i n g p a r a g r a p h

, ” “ e x p l a n a t o r y a v e r m e n t s

, ”

o r e v e n “ i n n u e n d o a l l e g a t i o n s

, ” t h a t s u f f i c e t o s h o w t h a t t h e c h a r g e d o f f e n s e i s n o t

, a t l e a s t

o n t h e f a c e o f t h e i n d i c t m e n t

, b a r r e d b y l i m i t a t i o n s )

, n o t p u r e l a w ( c h a l l e n g i n g a n i n d i c t m e n t

t h a t s h o w s o n i t s f

a c e t h a t p r o s e c u t i o n i s a b s o l u t e l y b a r r e d b y t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s )

. T h e

p l e a d i n g t h a t g i v e s r i s e t o a l i m i t a t i o n s f a c t u a l d e f

e n s e i s r e p a r a b l e

. T h e p l e a d i n g t h a t g i v e s

See Sne ed , 25 Tex. at 67; Shedd , 702 P.2d at 268; Fraidin , 63 F.Supp. at 276. 5 9

Carmell v

. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 530-31 (2000). 6 0

967 S.W .2d 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 6 1

Id. at 844. 6 2

Id. (“I t seems to us that a defe ndant, havi n g b ee n g iven the statute of limit ations as a 6 3

defe nse, ought to have the burden of asser ting that de fense or l osing it, just as he would any other

defe nse.

. . . We also conclude that placing limit ations i n t h e s ec o nd Marin cate g ory is equally

inappropria te. Howeve r important the statute of limit ations might be to a defe ndant in a g iven case

, the statute can hardly be deeme d ‘funda mental to the proper functioning of our adjudicator y sy stem.’

I n d ee d

, at common law there was no limit ation as to the time within which offe nses could b e

prosec uted.”)

.P h i l l i p s P a g e 2 0

r i s e t o a s t a t u t e

- o f

- l i m i t a t i o n s b a r i s n o t

. T h e f i r s t i s f o r f e i t e d u n l e s s r a i s e d b e f

o r e o r d u r i n g

t h e t r i a l a n d c a n n o t b e r a i s e d i n a p r e t r i a l w r i t

. T h e s e c o n d

– a t r u e e x p o s t f a c t o v i o l a t i o n

– i s

n o t f o r f e i t a b l e u n d e r I

e p p e r t

. W e h a v e s t a t e d

, i n a p o s t

- P r o c t o r c a s e

, t h a t a l i m i t a t i o n s b a r

m a y b e r a i s e d i n a p r e t r i a l m o t i o n t o q u a s h o r d i s m i s s

, a p r e t r i a l w r i t

, a t t r i a l

, o n d i r e c t

a p p e a l

, o r i n a c o l l a t e r a l p r o c e e d i n g

. “ [ I ] f t h e p l e a d i n g

, o n i t s f a c e

, s h o w s t h a t t h e o f

f e n s e 6 4

c h a r g e d i s b a r r e d b y l i m i t a t i o n s

, t h e n i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t h a b e a s c o r p u s r e l i e f b e g r a n t e d

. ” 6 5

T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e f a c t u a l s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s “ d e f e n s e ” a n d t h e l e g a l b a r

w a s e x p l a i n e d b y t h e K a n s a s S u p r e m e C o u r t i n S t a t e v

. G a r c i a

. I n t h a t c a s e

, t h e d e f e n d a n t 6 6

r a i s e d

, f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e o n a p p e a l

, a S t o g n e r

- b a s e d c l a i m t h a t t h e r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n o f

a n e w s t a t u t e t o r e v i v e h i s t i m e

- b a r r e d p r o s e c u t i o n f o r r a p e v i o l a t e d t h e E

x P o s t F a c t o

C l a u s e

. R e

j e c t i n g t h e S t a t e ’ s c l a i m t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t w a i v e d a n y c l a i m r e l a t e d t o t h e 6 7

s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s b y f a i l i n g t o r a i s e i t i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t

, t h e K a n s a s C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t h e

S t a t e ’ s a r g u m e n t s m u d d y t h e i s s u e

. B y t h e t i m e t h e r a p e c h a r g e w a s f i l e d

Ex parte Smith

, 178 S.W .3d 797, 801-02 (Tex. C ri m

. Ap p

. 2005) (“A pretria l writ of 6 4

habea s corpus may be used, howeve r, to challeng e the j u ri s d i ct i o n of the court if the fac e of the

indictment shows that an y p ro s ecution is barr ed by the statute of limit ations. This is beca use the

defe ct is incura

ble and irrepa

rable

. L imitations is an absolute bar to prosec ution. There is no point

in wasting scar ce judic i al an d s o cietal resour ces or putting the defe ndant to g rea t expense,

inconvenienc e, and a

nx iety if the ultimate result is never in question.”) (f

ootnotes omitt ed).

Ex parte Tamez, 38 S.W .3d 159, 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); see also Tita v. State

, 267 6 5

S.W .3d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (distinguishing betwee n a statute of limit ations defe nse that

relies upon fac tual proof under Proctor and an irrepa rable bar under the applicable statute of

limit ations).

169 P.3d 1069 (Kan. 2007). 6 6

Id. at 1075. 6 7P h i l l i p s P a g e 2 1

a g a i n s t G a r c i a i n l a t e J a n u a r y 2 0 0 4

, t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s a l r e a d y h a d b e e n

e x t e n d e d b y t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o 1 y e a r a f t e r h i s A u g u s t 2 0 0 3 D N A t e s t i n g

- t o

A u g u s t 2 0 0 4

. A c c o r d i n g l y

, t h e p r o p e r q u e s t i o n i s n o t w h e t h e r h e w a s b e i n g

p r o s e c u t e d o u t s i d e o f t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s

. U n d e r t h e a m e n d e d s t a t u t e

, h e

c l e a r l y f e l l w i t h i n t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d ; t h e r e f o r e

, t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s

d e f e n s e w a s n o t a v a i l a b l e t o h i m

, a n d c a s e l a w c o n c e r n i n g w a i v e r o f a

l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d a s a n a f f i r m a t i v e d e

f e n s e i s i n a

p p l i c a b l e

. R a t h e r

, t h e p r o p e r

q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r t h e a m e n d e d s t a t u t e l e n g t h e n i n g t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d w a s

a p p l i e d c o n t r a r y t o a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n

, i

. e

. , t h e E x P o s t F a c t o C l a u s e

,

a n d w e h a v e h e l d t h a t i t w a s

. 6 8

B e c a u s e t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f G a r c i a v i o l a t e d t h e E x P o s t F a c t o C l a u s e

, h i s c o n v i c t i o n w a s

r e v e r s e d

. T h e s a m e i s r e q u i r e d i n t h i s c a s e

. P r o c t o r i s i n a p p l i c a b l e h e r e

. S t o g n e r

, S n e e d

, a n d

I e p p e r t c o n t r o l t h i s c a s e a n d o t h e r s l i k e i t

. F o r t h e s e r e a s o n s

, w e r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e

c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a n d r e m a n d t h i s c a s e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o e n t e r a n o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g t h e

i n d i c t m e n t

.

D e l i v e r e d : J u n e 1 5

, 2 0 1 1

P u b l i s h

Id. at 1076 (empha sis supplied). The G a r c ia c ourt conclude d, “Ha d the constitutional issue

6 8

bee n p reviously raised, Gar cia would likely not have been prosec uted for the rape char g e, which

resulted in a conviction and attendant sentenc e of 408 months’ imprisonment consec utive to his life

sentenc e for felony

murder. T here fore , we c onclude that at a minimum

, considera tion of t he is sue

is nece ssary to serve the ends of justice and to preve nt a denial of fundame ntal rig hts. I n light of our

holding that application of the amendment to revive Gar cia’ s previously time-barr ed prosec ution for

rape violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, the convic tion is reverse d.” Id.