[Cite as State v. Blair, 2015-Ohio-5416.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 102548

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

EDWARD BLAIR, III

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

VACATED AND REMANDED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-13-575294-A 

BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, P.J., Stewart, J., and Blackmon, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 24, 2015 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John F. Corrigan 

405 Lake Forest Drive 

Bay Village, Ohio 44140 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Melissa Riley 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Edward Blair III (“Blair”), appeals his conviction. He 

raises one assignment of error for our review: 

1. The trial court committed prejudicial error by involving itself in the plea 

bargain process and threatening appellant with the maximum sentence if he 

exercised his right to trial by jury. 

{¶2} However, an error in the trial court’s procedure compels us to vacate the 

trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentence. 

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶3} Blair was charged with breaking and entering, felonious assault, aggravated 

menacing, carrying a concealed weapon, improper handling of a firearm, and two counts 

of having weapons while under disability. The charges included firearm and repeat 

violent offender specifications. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Blair pleaded guilty to 

attempted felonious assault, aggravated menacing, and having weapons while under 

disability, each with forfeiture specifications. The remaining charges and specifications 

were nolled. The court sentenced Blair to two years of community control sanctions on 

all counts, collectively, with a six-year suspended sentence. 

{¶4} A few months later, the trial court found Blair in violation of his community 

control sanctions. Consequently, the court revoked his community control and imposed 

36-month prison terms on each count. Blair subsequently filed this delayed appeal, in 

which he challenges the validity of his plea. 

{¶5} Pursuant to State v. Tate, 140 Ohio St.3d 442, 2014-Ohio-3667, 19 N.E.3d 

888, ¶ 20, we sua sponte asked the parties to brief an issue not raised in the parties’ briefs: 

whether the journal entry dated February 4, 2014 that sentenced Blair to community 

control sanctions was a valid judgment. We find this issue dispositive of this appeal. 

II. Void Sentence
{¶6} Blair appealed from a judgment finding him in violation of his community 

control sanctions and sending him to prison. On its face, this judgment would be a final, 

appealable order. However, we find the journal entry that sentenced Blair to community 

control sanctions is not a valid judgment because it violates Crim.R. 32(C) and Ohio’s 

felony sentencing provisions. 

{¶7} Crim.R. 32(C) provides that “[a] judgment entry of conviction shall set forth 

the fact of conviction and the sentence.” “A sentence is a sanction or combination of 

sanctions imposed for an individual offense.” State v. Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 

2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, paragraph one of the syllabus, citing State v. Saxon, 109 

Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 

824. Thus, a criminal “conviction” consists of both a finding of guilt and the imposition 

of a sentence. See State v. Henderson, 58 Ohio St.2d 171, 389 N.E. 2d 494 (1979). 

{¶8} Ohio’s felony sentencing scheme does not allow sentences to be grouped 

together in a “sentencing package.” Rather, it requires a judge to impose a separate 

sentence for each offense, individually. State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 

2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 8-9, citing R.C. 2929.11 through 2929.19. The 

statutory mandate that sentences must be imposed on offenses individually applies to 

community control sanctions. State v. Williams, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-10-02, 

2011-Ohio-995, ¶ 19-27. Indeed, community control sanctions are criminal penalties 

subject to the sentencing provisions set forth in R.C. Chapter 2929. 
{¶9} Thus, in State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102314, 2015-Ohio-2409, we 

held that “it is error for a trial court to sentence a defendant to a single term of community 

control sanctions for multiple convictions.” The state acknowledges Jones, but argues our 

decision “is incorrect,” and that we should follow State v. South, 120 Ohio Ohio St.3d 

358, 2008-Ohio-6693, 899 N.E.2d 146, instead. 

{¶10} In South, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed a judgment of the Third 

Appellate District that held that a journal entry imposing a single term of community 

control sanctions on multiple counts was not a final, appealable order. However, the 

Ohio Supreme Court did not provide any opinion or reasoning for its reversal. And 

despite South, the Third Appellate District continues to hold that a blanket sentence of 

community control sanctions on multiple counts is not a valid sentence, and is therefore 

not a final, appealable order. State v. Williams, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-10-02, 

2011-Ohio-995, ¶ 24. 

{¶11} Blair was convicted of three charges, and the trial court imposed community 

control sanctions on all the charges in a blanket sentence. Because Crim.R. 32(C) 

requires the court to impose a separate sentence on each count individually, the court’s 

original sentencing entry is contrary to law. A sentence that does not comply with 

statutorily mandated terms is void. State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 

942 N.E.2d 332, citing State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984). 

Therefore, the February 4, 2014 journal entry that sentenced Blair to community control 

sanctions is void. 
{¶12} The state argues that because Blair never appealed any error arising from the 

February 4, 2014 journal entry, he is barred by res judicata from doing so now. 

However, a nonfinal order cannot become res judicata because it was never ripe for 

appeal. Id. at ¶ 25. 

{¶13} Having determined that the court’s original sentencing entry is a nullity, 

the trial court could not find Blair in violation of it. Accordingly, we vacate both the the 

trial court’s original sentence and the judgment revoking community control. We further 

remand this case to the trial court to resentence Blair on each count to which he pleaded 

guilty. 

{¶14} Two judgments vacated and cause remanded to trial court for de novo 

resentencing on each count individually. 

It is ordered that appellant recover of said appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial court for 

execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., and 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR