UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

ROBERT G. MOYA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CITY OF CLOVIS; BRENT AGUILAR, 

officer, in his individual capacity and as an 

employee of the City of Clovis; JAMES 

GURULE, Sergeant, in his individual 

capacity and as an employee of the City of 

Clovis, 

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 20-2001 

(D.C. No. 2:18-CV-00494-GBW-KRS) 

(D. N.M.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, McHUGH, and EID, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Robert Moya filed this case to recover damages for injuries inflicted by a 

police dog after he attempted to evade arrest. He appeals from the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment to Defendants Brent Aguilar, James Gurule, and the City 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

October 5, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court
2 

of Clovis, New Mexico, on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Exercising jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I. Background 

Before the events giving rise to this case, Moya engaged police in what he 

described as “[a] lot of cat-and-mouse chase[s].” R. at 153. Moya testified that “[a] 

lot of times [he] was able to get away,” id., but police also arrested him “[m]any, 

many times,” id. at 152. 

On May 29, 2015, Clovis Police Department Detective Adriana Munoz spotted

Moya. Munoz recognized Moya from prior encounters and checked to see if he had 

any outstanding warrants. After learning that he did, Munoz turned her car around 

and activated her emergency equipment. Moya fled. 

 Munoz pursued Moya on foot. Defendants Gurule and Aguilar joined Munoz

in her pursuit. Aguilar brought his police dog, Leo, with him. They found Moya 

standing on top of a shed in a backyard. Moya recalls Aguilar saying “‘[s]top or I’m 

gonna release the dog. Get off of the shed and just surrender.’” Id. at 158.

Moya jumped down from the shed and took off running. Aguilar then released 

Leo. Moya sprinted across the yard with Leo hot on his heels and Aguilar trailing in 

pursuit. Moya reached the house next door and began scrambling onto the roof. Leo 

“grabbed [him] by the foot” as he climbed but Moya “was able to yank [him]self up” 

“and the dog slipped off [his] foot.” Id. at 159. 

At this point, Moya stood safely on the roof well aware that Leo roamed 

below. But instead of surrendering, Moya continued to flee. He jumped into the 
3 

neighboring yard and began throwing things and running. Leo leapt over a wall 

separating the two properties and tracked Moya down. Aguilar followed Leo over 

the wall and caught up within seconds. He found Moya lying face down on the 

ground with Leo biting and holding him by the left arm. Aguilar grabbed hold of Leo 

while other officers arrived and handcuffed Moya. Aguilar then commanded Leo to 

release Moya. Leo’s “bite lasted no longer than twenty seconds.” Supp. R. at 13. 

Moya sued to recover damages for the injuries Leo inflicted on him during 

their second encounter. He claimed Aguilar violated his Fourth Amendment rights 

by, among other things, using excessive force against him via Leo. He also alleged 

that Gurule violated his Fourth Amendment rights by failing to stop Aguilar’s use of 

excessive force and that the City of Clovis should be held liable for these actions 

under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. It applied the 

doctrine of qualified immunity and rejected Moya’s Fourth Amendment claims against 

Aguilar because, among other things, his decision to deploy Leo was constitutionally 

reasonable under the circumstances. It then rejected Moya’s claims against Gurule and 

the City of Clovis because those claims depended on a finding that Aguilar violated 

Moya’s constitutional rights. 

Moya filed a notice of appeal and a motion with the district court to proceed

in forma pauperis on appeal. The district court denied Moya’s in forma pauperis

motion because he did “not show the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument 
4 

on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” Supp. R. at 33 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

II. Discussion 

A. Merits

“We review de novo the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to [a] 

[d]efendant in the context of summary judgment.” Culver v. Armstrong, 

832 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2016). 

Moya proceeds pro se on appeal.1

 “Although a pro se litigant’s pleadings are 

to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers, this court has repeatedly insisted that pro se parties follow the 

same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby Connor 

Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (brackets, citation, and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “An appellant’s opening brief must identify ‘appellant’s 

contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the 

record on which the appellant relies.’” Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 

(10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A)). 

1. Reasonableness of Aguilar’s Use of Force 

Moya’s first issue on appeal asks: “[A]fter being attacked by [officer] Leo 

was the use of officer Leo [really] needed[?]” Aplt. Br. at 3. He argues that the 

1 Moya had counsel before the district court.
5 

district court failed to consider the “grounds to show [and] prove that force was 

needed to [r]estrain” him. Id. at 4.

In a Fourth Amendment excessive force case like this one, “[t]he ultimate 

question is whether the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of the 

facts and circumstances confronting them.” Emmett v. Armstrong, 

No. 18-8078, --- F.3d ---, 2020 WL 5200909, at *5 (10th Cir. Sept. 1, 2020) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “This is a ‘totality of the circumstances’ analysis.” Reavis 

v. Frost, 967 F.3d 978, 985 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 

471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)). “[W]e specifically consider . . . : (1) ‘the severity of the 

crime at issue,’ (2) ‘whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of 

the officers or others,’ and (3) ‘whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to 

evade arrest by flight.’” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

The district court’s decision contains extended discussion regarding the 

reasonableness of Aguilar’s decision to deploy Leo in light of the circumstances 

confronting Aguilar. See Supp. R. at 14–20. The court concluded: “Given the 

numerous warnings, [Moya’s] history of fleeing, his flight from the officers on the 

instant day, and the potential danger to officers and bystanders of a prolonged chase 

through a residential neighborhood which included [Moya] jumping on roofs and 

running through backyards, deploying Leo was a reasonable choice.” Id. at 20. The 

district court’s decision also addressed the reasonableness of Aguilar’s delay in 

calling Leo off after Leo apprehended Moya: 
6 

When Leo left . . . Aguilar’s side to jump the wall into the yard where 

he detected [Moya’s] scent, . . . Aguilar immediately followed. Officer 

Aguilar was always close enough to Leo for Leo to be able to hear any 

verbal commands. Leo was not out of Officer Aguilar’s sight for more 

than ten seconds. The longest Leo’s bite could have lasted was twenty 

seconds and Officer Aguilar ended it ten seconds after he reached 

[Moya] and immediately upon [Moya’s] handcuffing. [Moya] alleges 

that he was in the act of surrendering when Leo bit him, but . . . Aguilar 

had no way of knowing this fact. When . . . Aguilar approached 

[Moya], [he] was lying face down, but it is unclear whether he was 

already on the ground or was taken down by Leo. In light of [Moya’s]

history of evasion both before and during the subject incident, it was 

reasonable for . . . Aguilar to believe that [Moya] had still been fleeing 

and would continue to flee if given the opportunity. Therefore, it was 

reasonable for . . . Aguilar to wait until other officers were able to 

handcuff [Moya] before commanding Leo to let go. 

Id. at 20–21.

Moya’s brief does not address the district court’s decision and does not cite the 

record. Contrary to Moya’s suggestion, the district court did consider whether the 

evidence supported his excessive force claim. To the extent Moya argues that the 

district court erred in evaluating the reasonableness of Aguilar’s use of force, we 

decline to consider this argument because Moya has not explained how the district 

court erred. See Reedy v. Werholtz, 660 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting

that where “[t]he argument section of [an appellant’s] opening brief does not 

challenge the [district] court’s reasoning on [a] point[, w]e . . . do not address the 

matter”). We therefore affirm the district court’s conclusion that Aguilar’s use of 

force was constitutionally reasonable.
7 

2. Issues Not Presented to the District Court 

Moya contends on appeal that unnamed officers violated his unspecified rights 

by releasing him without taking him to jail, allegedly in contravention of Clovis city 

policy. But Moya’s complaint does not allege a cause of action based on officers’ 

failure to incarcerate him. And Moya failed to provide a record citation 

demonstrating that he raised this issue to the district court. See Pac. Frontier v. 

Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221, 1238 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that “parties must 

cite the precise reference in the record where the issue was raised and ruled on.”

(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)). In our independent review of the 

record, we did not locate any argument presented to the district court that officers 

violated Moya’s rights by releasing him.

2

 

“When an appellant fails to preserve an issue and also fails to make a plainerror argument on appeal, we ordinarily deem the issue waived (rather than merely 

forfeited) and decline to review the issue at all—for plain error or otherwise.” United 

States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019). “Under such circumstances, 

2 Moya did argue to the district court that officers’ decision to wait “for close 

to two weeks before booking him on the warrant that the officers claim justified the 

use of a canine attack” supported his argument that he did not pose a threat of 

violence on the date of his arrest. R. at 210. But this is a different argument than the 

one Moya presses on appeal. See Little v. Budd Co., 955 F.3d 816, 821 (10th Cir. 

2020) (“[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, arguments raised for the first time on 

appeal are waived. This is true whether the newly raised argument is a bald-faced 

new issue or a new theory on appeal that falls under the same general category as an 

argument presented” to the district court. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 
8 

the failure to argue for plain error and its application on appeal surely marks the end 

of the road for an argument not first presented to the district court.” Id. (ellipses and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Moya does not argue for plain error review and 

we therefore decline to consider Moya’s argument related to his release without 

incarceration.

Moya further urges reversal due to “other issues [his] attorneys never 

mention[ed].” Aplt. Br. at 4. He does not identify these issues or argue for plain 

error review. We therefore decline to consider this argument for the reasons 

previously stated. 

B. Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis 

Moya filed a motion with this court to proceed in forma pauperis. To be 

granted in forma pauperis status, Moya must show “a financial inability to pay the 

required filing fees and the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the 

law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” Watkins v. Leyba, 

543 F.3d 624, 627 (10th Cir. 2008) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because he is incarcerated, Moya must also submit “a certified copy of [his prison]

trust fund account statement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Moya did not file the 

required account statement and we find no reasoned, nonfrivolous argument here. 

We therefore deny Moya’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 
9 

III. Conclusion 

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants. We 

deny Moya’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and direct him to make full and 

immediate payment of the outstanding appellate filing fee.

Entered for the Court 

Carolyn B. McHugh 

Circuit Judge