UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ RODNEY R. BRADSHAW, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. BRUCE GATTERMAN, in his individual and representative capacity; KYLER KNOBBE, in his individual and representative capac ity; CHARLES HERD, in his individual and representative capacity; RANDALL HENRY, in his individual and representative capacity; CURTIS CAMPBELL, in his individual and representative capacity; MICHAEL HITZ, in his individual and representative capacity; JANICE BRADSHAW; JOYCE BRADSHAW; CHERYL BUCKNER; CAROL MIDDLETON; PAMELA BELL; DEBRA WEAVER; CORELIA SUE JOHNSON; JOHN AND/ OR JANE DOES 1-10; COUNTY OF HODGEMAN, KANSAS; MICHAEL GLEASON; MICHAEL MACNAIR; DOUGLAS COSSMAN; SCOTT MACNAIR; WILBURN BRADSHAW; FORD COUNTY STATE BANK; MARCIA SNODGRASS; ROBERT SCHROEDER; RONALD RIDLEY; BOBBIE BRADSHAW; ELIZABETH SCHROEDER; BARBARA COSSMAN; BRIT SCHROEDER; SCOTT KREGER; CRAIG CROSSWHITE, Defendants - Appellees. No. 15-3246 (D.C. No. 6:15-CV -01086-MLB-GEB) (D. Kan.) FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 27, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 ________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before KELLY , O’BRIEN , and GORSUCH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Rodney Bradshaw appeals from the dismissal of myri ad claims seeking to overturn a settlement agreement he signe d and upon which a state court entered judgment. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars some of hi s claims and the remaining one cannot survive the constraints imposed by Heck v. Humphrey . We affirm. 1 This case arises from the probate of th e estate of Bradshaw’s father, whose will divided his assets equally among ei ght children, Bradshaw and his seven siblings. There was bad blood among them resulting in a suit contesting the will. 2 During the will contest trial all beneficiar ies agreed to settle and the settlement agreement was read in to the record in open court on May 23, 2013. The state judge polled all parties to the agre ement and, upon their consent, approved the settlement.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Our jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

2 During probate proceedings , allegations surfaced th at Bradshaw improperly managed his father’s assets while he was still alive. At one point, Bradshaw was charged with and pleaded guilty to assaulti ng his sister, and was sentenced to 90 days in jail.3 Bradshaw’s attorney specifi cally said the agreement “accurately reflects [his] understanding of the settlement,” R. at 150, and Bradshaw himself later signed a written document formalizing the settlement, R. at 262. Nevertheless, on November 14, 2013, Bradshaw objected to the settle ment and filed a motion to set aside the settlement agreement, which the state court summaril y denied. Bradshaw did not appeal from the order approving the settlemen t agreement or the denial of his motion to set it aside. Instead, and more than a year later, on March 20, 2 015, Bradshaw brought this suit in federal court. His complaint, as amended, a lleged the following causes of action: (1) violations of the Racketeer Influenced an d Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); (2) RICO conspiracy; (3) constituti onal violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983; (4) abuse of proces s; and (5) tortious interfe rence. The aggregate of Bradshaw’s allegations is that the state judge, his attorney s, his siblings, and various other parties all conspired to deprive him of his rights during the state-court proceedings. On motion brou ght by every defendant, the district court dismissed Bradshaw’s claims for want of jurisdiction. Specifically, and among other things, the court held, “[v]iewed to the out er limits of liberal construc tion, plaintiff’s allegations raise claims that were decided by the Kans as court or are inex tricably intertwined with the state judgments,” R. at 617, and are thus barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co ., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923) (prohibiting lower federal courts from consideri ng claims decided by a state court); D.C. Court of4 Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983) (same for claims inextricably intertwined). In this appeal, Br adshaw argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to this case because the doctrine does not bar (1) cl aims asserting state-court judgments had been obtained by “extrinsic fraud” and (2) “independent action[s]” brought under federal-question jurisdiction. Opening Br. at 3–4. We re view the district court’s dismissal de novo. Mann v. Boatright , 477 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2007). Because Bradshaw proceeds wi thout the assistance of counsel, we construe his pleadings liberally. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka , 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine establishes, as a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction, that only the United States Supreme Court has appellate authority to review a state-court decision.” Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nudell , 363 F.3d 1072, 1074–75 (10th Ci r. 2004) (footnote omitted). Rooker-Feldman “is confined to . . . cases brought by state-c ourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendere d before the [federal] c ourt proceedings commenced and inviting district court review a nd rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp ., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In other words,

“ Rooker-Feldman bars cases in federal court that are inextricab ly intertwined with a prior state court judgment.” Johnson v. Riddle , 305 F.3d 1107, 1116 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation ma rks omitted).5 Bradshaw has identified no basis upon whic h to overturn the dismissal in this case. His argument that ex trinsic fraud can override Rooker-Feldman is supported only by authority from another circuit. See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc. , 359 F.3d 1136, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2004). Our precedent goes the other way: “new allegations of fraud might create grounds for a ppeal . . . [but] that appeal should be brought in the
state courts.” Tal v. Hogan , 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 (10th Cir. 2006). Presumably realizing the implications of his failure to lodge a timely appeal in state court, Bradshaw tells us he is currently seeking a writ of mandamus from the Kansas Supreme Court. While ongoing state proceedings are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Exxon Mobil , 544 U.S. at 292, Bradshaw’s unorthodox approach is not an exception to the finality concerns underpinning the doctrine. His failure to appropriately seek appellate relief at the st ate level bars his current allegations of fraud. Moreover, and despite his arguments to the contrary, his fe deral claims do not constitute an “indepe ndent action” under Exxon Mobil . In that case the Supreme Court narrowed Rooker-Feldman , which by then had become so bloated as to absorb parts of the abstention a nd preclusion doctrines. See 544 U.S. at 292–93. Bradshaw is correct that the Court held Rooker-Feldman inapplicable to a plaintiff presenting an “independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclu sion that a state court has reached in a case to wh ich he was a party.” Id . at 293 (internal quotation marks omitted). In such a situati on, “there is jurisd iction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under pr inciples of preclusion.” Id . But Bradshaw’s claims6 are not independent. Though styled as a suit to redress a byzantine conspiracy perpetrated by his attorneys and the state c ourt, what lies beneath are his requests for “an injunction against any furt her orders, judgments or ru lings” rendered by the state judge, the “return of all lands taken” pursuant to the se ttlement agreement, and the “return of the $264,000 that was wrongfully taken” under th e agreement. R. at 78. The requested relief plainly strikes at the stat e court’s judgment, or, at the very least, are inextricably intertwined w ith it. The district judge properly dismissed his claims. Even if his RICO and § 1983 claims we re independent, Bradshaw has fallen woefully short of stating a claim even under the most liberal construction of his complaint. Most not ably, the allegations supporting hi s RICO claims are conclusory and do not describe with a ny particularity the purported conspiracy other than it existed to remove him as ex ecutor of his father’s esta te. Additionally, Bradshaw does not even mention the settl ement agreement or the fact he signed it. And to the extent he seeks to recover damages for hi s allegedly unconstitutiona l criminal assault conviction, he has not come close to show ing the conviction has been invalidated by reversal, expungement, or declaration by e ither a Kansas court or a federal court on habeas corpus review. See Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). In sum, Bradshaw’s federa l case is exactly what Justice Ginsburg admonished federal courts not to entertain under Rooker-Feldman — he is a state-court loser complaining of injuries caused by a state- court judgment rendered beforehand, and is7 inviting review and rejection of the judgment. See Exxon Mobil , 544 U.S. at 284. We are without jurisdiction to entertain his claims.
AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Terrence L. O’Brien Circuit Judge