### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 13, 200 4
ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v
. WI LL IA M KE IT H M A TT HE WS

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Houston County

No. 4510 Robert

E. Bu rch, Judge

No. M2003- 01889-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Fe bruary 4, 2005

This is a direct appeal as of right from a bench t rial conviction of first deg ree preme ditated murder

. The De fendant, Wi lliam Keith M atthews, was sentenc ed to life i n prison. On appe al, the De fendant arg ues f o u r is s u e s : ( 1 ) th e r e w a s in s u f f ic ie n t e v id e n c e to f

in d th e D e f

e n d a n t g u il ty

o f f ir s t de g ree preme ditated murder

bey ond a re asonable doubt, and in the alternative, the defense of insanity was e sta bli sh e d; ( 2) the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d inno t g ranti ng the De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n f or jud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l; (3) the Def

endant was not c ompetent to sta nd trial; and (4) the Tenne ssee statute providing for the insanity defe nse is unconstitutional. W e af firm the judg ment of the trial c ourt. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., joined.

Wil l i am B. “J ak e” L o ck er t , I I I , P u b l i c D ef en d er , As h l an d C i t y , T en n es s ee , fo r t h e a p p el l an t , Wil liam Ke ithMatth e ws

.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; El i z a b e thB

. Ma

rn e y , A ssi stant A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Dan Alsobrooks, D istrict At torney Gene ral; and Car ey

Thompson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION

F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND I n the late e vening hours of F ebrua ry 20, 2001, the Def

endant stabbe d to de ath and mutilated his g rand mothe r, Ms. B ob bie Jea n J ud kin s, in he r hom e in ru ra l H ou sto n Co un ty . T he De fe nd a nt, who lived in the same hou s e wi th his mot her and the victim, stripped nude, stabbe d his sleeping g randmother

over thirty

times with kit chen knive s, cut her open, and attempted to eat her liver. T he Def endant, who has a his tory of mental illness, claimed he killed his grandmother at the r equest of a voice in his head and f

or “r elig ious purposes.” I n September of 2001, a Houston County

g rand jury indicted the De fendant for first de g ree preme ditated murder

.T he i ni t i al co urt o rder d i rect ed t he D efend ant t o b e eval uat ed b y t he H arri et C o hn P sy cho l o gi cal C ent er. I n 1
A pri l of 200 1, H ar r i et Co hn i nf ormed t he t r i al cour t t hat i t was un abl e t o m ake a c om pet en cy det er mi nat i onon on an out pat i ent bas i s , an d re com mended t he D ef endan t be s ent t o t he Foren s i c Ser vi ces D i vi s i on of M i dd l e T enn es s ee M ent al H eal t h Ins t i t ut e (M T M H I) fo r a mo re ext ensi ve eval uat i o n. I n M ay o f 20 0 1 , t he t ri al co urt i ss ued an ord er di rect i ng t he D e fen d a n t t o b e e v a lua te d b y the M T M H I.

T h e M T M H I a l s o n ot ed i n t h e l et t er t o t h e cou r t t h at t h e D ef en dan t n o l on g er me t t h e s t an dar ds for 2

co m m i t m ent and t hey were d i schargi ng hi m t o t he H o ust o n C o unt y Sheri f f ’ s O f f i ce, but t hat t he Ins t i t ut e d i d s up p o rt t he D e fen d a n t’s use o f t h e insa n ity d e fen se a t t ria l.
-2- A c ou rt or de r w a s e nte re d d ir e c tin g theDe fe nd a nt t o b e e va luate d to d e te rm ine his competenc y

to stand trial, and to assess the me rits of a potential insanity defe nse. The re sults of the 1 evaluation were prese nted during an evidentiary hearing in Septe mber of 2002, at the conc lusion of wh ic h th e tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th e De fe nd a nt n ot c omp e te nt t o s ta nd tr ia l. A c ou rt or de r w a s is su e d in Oc tob e r o f 2 00 2, c omm itt ing the De fe nd a nt to a men ta l hea lth fa c ili ty wi th d ir e c tio ns that th e fa c ili ty
re po rt ba c k to the c ou rt

e ve ry six mo nth s o n t he Defen dan t’ s p ro g re ss a s it pe rt a ine d to his
c omp e te nc y

to s ta ndtr a il.

In a l e t t e r d a t e d J a n u ar y

1 5 , 2 0 0 3 , t h e M i d d l e T e n n e s s e e M e n t a l H e a l t h In s t i t u t e ( M T M H I) notified the trial court that the Def endant’ s treatment w as succ essful and his condition had improve d to the point that his doctors believed he was competent to stand trial. The De fendant was found 2 competent to stand trial, waived his rig ht to a jury , and was tried in a be nch trial ove r the c ourse of four day s in March of

2003.
At trial, the State ca lled Offic er Darr ell Allison of the Houston CountySheriff’ s Offic e, who testified that he wa s the first office r on the scene

. When he arrived at the victim’s house the nig ht of the killing, he met the Def endant’ s distraug ht mother at the fr ont door. Sh e i n fo rm ed Offic er Allison that her mother ha d been murdere d and that the Def endant wa s missi ng . As Off icer Allison
was sec uring the crime scene , he observed the De fendant walking toward the house. The Defe ndant identified himself and w as ar rested w ithout incident. Office r All ison stated t he De fendant had a c ut on his hand that he a

ppare nt l y b an d age d himself, was dre ssed neatly , and exhibited no unusual be ha vio r. Th e De fe nd a nt w a s r e a d h is M ir a nd a ri g hts

.
Dr . Ch arl e s W a

r re n H arl a n, wh o c on du c te d th e auto ps y on the vic tim , te sti fi e d th a t th e vic tim died as a result of “ loss of blood from the multiple stab wounds which she r ece ived to the che st and abdomen.” Dr. Har lan’s autopsy report identified thirty -three wounds, the larg est ten inche s by five inches on the vic tim’s abdomen, wher e the De fendant had attempted to g et the victim’s liver. Dr

. Har lan testified that the fore nsic evidenc e sug g ested the victim strugg led during the stabbing , and likely died within fifteen minutes to an hour

. The last witness the State c alled in its case in chie f, Specia l Ag ent J oe Craig of the Te nnessee Bur eau of I nvestig ation (TB I ), testified that he interviewe d the Def endant the day

he wa s arr ested
a nd on ly ho ur s a ft e r the mur de r. Ag e nt C raig de sc ri be d th e De fe nd a nt’ s d e me a no r a s “ ve ry c a lm, very non-emotional . . . very

cooper ative.” T he De fendant admitted that he kil led his g randmother ,-3-

a ndse e me d to re c og nize that the kil lin g wa s wr on g

. He state d th a t he plann e d th e c ri me in the e arl y afte rnoon, then late that night whe n his gr andmother w as aslee p he we nt to the kitc h en, chose a knife, a nd proce eded to stab his gr andmother. The Def endant a lso informed Ag ent Craig that he bel iev ed he w ou ld l ike ly g o to ja il f

or his a c tio ns a ndind ic a te d h e un de rs too d th e natur e of his
a c tio ns . T he De fe nd a nt s a id n oth ing abo ut he ari ng vo ic e s. As to m oti ve , th e De fe nd a nt s ta te d o nly that he commit ted t he crime “out of respe ct” for hi s g randmother and for “re ligious purpose s.” He also stated that he be lieved “some thing g ood will come out of it.”

At the c on c lus ionof

the State ’s c a se in c hie f, the de fe ns e mov e d for a jud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l. Se e Ten n. R. Cr im. P. 2 9. I n s up po rt of thi s mo tio n, the de fe ns e c la ime d th a t th e State faile d to pr ov e the pr e me dit a tio n ele me nt of fi rs t deg re e mur de r. I n ad dit ionthede fe ns e arg ue d th a t th e State had ac tually

proven that the Def

endant wa s insane and theref ore not g uiltyby

rea son of insanity . The trial court de nied the motion, stating that the evidenc e, observed in the l ight most favor able to the State, did indicate premeditation and fell short of proving the Def endant was insane. The court noted the Def endant’ s retrie val of a knife from the kitchen as we ll as his confession of a dvance planning as evide nce of

preme ditation. As to insanity , the trial court admitted “evidenc e of bizarr e beha vior” on the Def

endant’ s part, but c oncluded that mental illness had not been de monstrated in the State’s proof. Upon de nial by

the court, the d ef

ense c hose not to stand on its mot ion for a judg ment of acquittal, and pr ocee ded to pre sent its case.

The de fense called the Def endant’ s mother, who testified about the Def endant’ s long history of mental il lness. She stated t hat the De fendant had stopped taking his anti-psy chotic medications two wee k s p r io r to th e mu r d e r , a n d o f te n “ h u f f e d ” g a s o li n e

. Sh e f

u r th e r te s ti f

ie d th a t s h e had discovere d her mother ’s body that night, plac ed the c all to 911 reporting the incident, and told the authorities that she be lieved her son may have c ommit t ed the c rime. She also stated that she had been inf ormed that for ensic e vidence , including blood in the doorway and on the door

knob to her bedroom, indicated the De fendant also entere d her r oom the night of the murder

while she wa s sleeping , but did not attack her

.
Detec tive David Hicks, an investigator with the district attorney ’s office, testi fied that he had interviewe d the Def

endant on se vera l dif

fer ent occ asions following his arre st. Mr. Hicks stated that wh e n a sk e d w hy

he c omm itt e d th e c ri me , th e De fe nd a nt re pli e d that he didso be c aus e pe op le sh ou ld not g e t o ld , h e b e li e v e d h e w a s d o in g h is g r a n d mo th e r a f a v o r , a n d th a t h e a c tu a ll y s h o w ed her

“ re sp e c t” b y k i l l i n g h e r

. T h e D e f e n d a n t f u r t h e r i n f o r m e d D e t e c t i v e H i c k s t h a t h e d i d n o t k i ll h is mother as he had initially p l an n ed beca use killing his g randmother did not produce the spiritual
e ff e c t h e b o t h a n t i c i p a t e d a n d d e s i r e d

. A l t h o u g h n o t c e r t i f i e d b y t h e c o u r t a s a n e xp e r t in ps y c h o l o g y , D e t e c t i v e H i c k s o f f e r e d h i s l a y m a n ’ s o p i n i o n t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t w a s “ n utt ya s a fruitca ke.”

The de fense called two w itnesses in fore nsic psy cholog y from MTMHI , Dr. Sam Craddoc k and Dr . I okey e F arooque , both stipul ated to be e x perts. Dr . Craddock te stified that he examined and observe d the Def

endant f or appr ox imately

three months, from the time the Def endant was de clar edI n t h e t r i al t r an s cr i pt , D r

. Cr addoc k s t at es t h e t h r ee mon t h s beg an wh en t h e D ef en dan t w as “ det er mi n ed t o be 3

co m p et ent t o s t and t ri al ” and ad m i t t ed t o hi s f aci l i t y o n O ct o b er 21 , 20 0 2

. H o wever, t hi s i s an o b vi o us m i ss t at em ent
a s t h e r e c o r d c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e De fe n d a n t w a s d e c l a r e d n o t c o m p e t e n t t o s t a n d t r i a l a n d c o m m i t t e d t o t h e M TM HI b y c o u rt o rd e r in O c to b e r o f 2 0 0 2 . T h e D e fen d a n t wa s su b se q u e n tly re le a se d in J a n u a ry o f 2 0 0 3

.

T h e D e fen d a n t ne v e r h a d a twin siste r. 4

-4- incompetent to stand trial and c ommitt ed to his fa ci l i t y u n til the tim e of his discha rg e. Dr. 3 Craddock c oncluded that while the Def endant r esponded w ell to anti-psy chotic medication, he was at the time of the murder delusional. Dr. Cra ddock testified that the D efe ndant explained to him that he believe d he would rece ive a “spiritual ex perie nce” from kil ling his g randmother ; he loved her but kil le d h e r f

or “ re lig iou s r e a so ns ” ; a ndthat he he ardthe vo ic e of his tw in sis te r, wh o told him to kill his gr andmother so they co u l d b e t o get her. Dr. Cra ddock also testified that he believe d the 4 Def endant wa s not malin ger ing, or faking mental illness for his own bene fit. Dr. Craddoc k conclude d that at the time of the m u rder the Def endant suff

ere d from both delusions and ha llu c inat io ns , andit w a s h is o pin ionthat th e De fe nd a nt “ faile d to app re c ia te the natur e of his conduct,” and “f

ailed to appr eciate the wr ong fulness [of his conduct].”

Dr . F aro oq ue te sti fi e d th a t th e De fe nd a nt ha d b e e n a dmi tte d to MT MH I on fo ur se pa rate
occa sions, and she evaluated hi m on one such occa sion in J uly of 2001. Dr. F arooque diag nosed the Def endant a s suffering f

rom schizophreni a. She admitted that the De fendant was assig ned many dif fe re nt d ia g no se s o ve r the y e ars a nd wa s a lso a su bs ta nc e abu se r w itha

pr e fe re nc e fo r i nh a la nts

. She noted that while in jail and in me ntal instit utions he did not have ac cess to illeg al substance s but continue d to b e d e lu s io n a l. Wh e n q u e s ti o n e d ab o u t th e D e f e n d a n t’ s s tate o f

mi n d d u r in g the
c omm iss ionof

the c ri me , D r. F aro oq ue te sti fi e d that sh e wa s o f the op ini on that “ he wa s at th a t ti me so psy chotic and he had the loss of touch w ith realit y t h at h e

-- he wa s not able to appre ciate the wrong fulness of his -- that particula r ac t and the natur e of that.”

Th e State c a lle d a s a

re bu tta l w itn e ss D r. Ki mbe rl y Sta lf or d, a c on su lti ng liaiso n p syc hiatr ist , whom the cou rt re co g nized as an expert in psy chiatry afte r a voir dir e examination. Dr. Stalford testified that af

ter seve ral mee tings with the Defe n d an t an d car eful re view of a ll his records, she disag ree d with Dr. Craddoc k’s and Dr . Fa rooque’ s diag noses. Dr. Stalfor d conclu d ed t h at t he Def endant’ s primary

problems wer e poly substance a buse and anti-social per sonality disorder. She ref ere nced the Def

endant’ s long history o f i n h al ant depe ndence as we ll as L SD, marijuana and
c oc a ine abu se to s up po rt he r dia g no sis

. She a lso po int e d out the De fe nd a nt’ s f re qu e nt p ro ble ms w ith the law, pe nchant f

or dishonesty

and thef t , an d impulsi ve beha vior as evide nce of his anti-social persona lity disorder. I n her view, the Def endant’ s drug use led to symptoms t h at re s em b led psy chosis, b u t th a t h e w a s n o t s c h iz o p h r e n ic

. D r

. St a lf o r d n o te d th a t w h e n th e D e f e n d a n t w as hospitaliz ed and ha d no acc ess to illega l drug s he im proved, but his hallucinations returned during the times he wa s relea sed and a dmitted to abusing inhalants. Dr. S talford further testified that she believed D r. Craddock’ s tests w ere unreliable beca use the Def

endant r efuse d to cooper ate with the proce ss, and simply disag ree d with D r. Fa rooque’ s diag nosis of schizophrenia. Dr. Stalford testified that th e De fe nd a nt’ s r e c itatio n of hi s so c ia l, o c c up a tio na l a nddr ug his torie s w a s r e mark ably org anized and in her

opinion did not i ndicate sc hizophrenia. Furthermore , she conclude d that theT h e D e fen d a n t ha d e a rlie r sig n e d a w a ive r o f his rig h t t o tes tif y. 5

Se e M omon v

. St at e, 18 S. W

. 3d 152 ( T en n

. 1999) ( h ol di n g t h at t h e r i g h t of a cr i mi n al def en dan t t o t es t i f

y on 6
hi s o r her o wn b ehal f

is a fundam ent al , c o nst i t ut i o nal ri ght guarant eed by bo t h t he fed eral and s t at e co nst i t ut i o ns, and such r i ght can o nl y be wai ved pe rs o nal l y by t he d efend ant ).
-5- Def endant’ s rec orded interview with the authorities shortlyafte r the murder showed no e vidence of psy chotic beha vior, and noted that a per son is not psy chotic one moment a nd then per fec tly sane the next.

When asked if the D efe ndant appreciated t he nature of his act, Dr. Stalford answe red in the
a ff ir ma tiv e , n oti ng that the De fe nd a nt ha d be e n “c on sis te nt ab ou t the fa c t th a t hewa s st abb ing his g randmother ,” and when a sked why he kept stabbing her, his answ er w as that “she just didn’t die,” which indicate d that “he unde rstood he wa s ending her life .” Dr

. S t alford f urther stated that she be lie ve d “ he app re c ia te d th e wr on g fu lne ss of his a c t,” sp e c if ic a lly no tin g that: he ran a way be c aus e he knew the police we re c oming; he admitted that at the time of the c rime he be lieved killing
someone was wrong ; and he didn’t tell any one that a full wee k prior to the cr i m e h e h ea rd voices telling him t o kill his g randmother beca use he knew he would g et in trouble. Dr. Stalfor d conclude d that while the re ason the Def endant g ave for killing his g randmother was c erta inly

delusional, the act itself wa s not. Ag a ins t th e a dv ic e of

his c ou ns e l, the De fe nd a nt i ns ist e d u po n te sti fying a t the tria l de sp ite his earlier indication that he would not. The trial court conducte d an examination of the Defe ndant 5 and determined that the Def endant ha d chang ed his mind and made an informed de cision to testify on his own behalf. When as k ed i f he knew why he wa s in court, the De fendant answer ed 6 aff irmatively

and stated, “ I

killed my g randmother .” The De fendant also testified that he planne d the mur de r e arl ie r i n th e day in h is b e dr oo m w ithhis tw in s ist e r andwaite d u nti l mi dn ig ht b e c aus e that was when “me and my sister planned to kill my g randmother .” The Defendant testified that at the time of the murder he believed he had a twin sister, she was spea king to him, and that if he killed his g rand mothe r h e c ou ld h a ve a “relat ion sh ip” a nd“ e te rn a l li fewi th h e r, ” bu t he no lon g e r h e ld such belief

s.
When asked to desc ribe his plan to t he court, the Defenda nt stated: “My sister told me that day , afte r I

ag ree d to do it, she wanted to have some ty pe of a -- a bloodbath or or g y or something like that with either my

mother or my

g randmother , whicheve r one. You know? And t hat’s what
we de c ide d to do .” Th e De fe nd a nt d e sc ri be d th e e ve nts of themur der a s f

oll ow s: h e le ft

his bedroom a nd selec ted a knife from the kitchen; his g randmother was sleeping when he we nt into her be dr oo m a ndst arte d s ta

bb ing he r; sh e str

ug g le d a ndple a de d w ithhim to s top ; w he n s he tr ie d to
rea ch for the phone he cut t he cord; the first kni fe he used broke and he c ut his own hand; he we nt to the kitchen and obta ined another knife a nd continued stabbing the victim; the stabbing took a total of seven to ten m inutes; afte r the victim was de ad he c ut her ope n beca use “that’s what we [he and his tw in s ist e r] p la nn e d to do ” a ndbe c aus e “ we were g oin g to e a t a n o rg a n. ” Af te r kill ing his g rand mothe r, he te sti fi e d th a t he we nt to his m oth e r’ s b e dr oo m a ndc on sid e re d kill ing he r a s w e ll,O n t h e s t an d a t t ri al , t h e D ef en dan t w as u n abl e t o g i v e a r ea s on for n ot a l s o k i l l i n g h i s mot h er a s pl an n ed. 7
H o w e v e r, in a n inte rv ie w w ith M r. H ic k s the D e fen d a n t state d he d id no t kill h is m o the r b e c a u se he “d id n ’t thin k it w o u ld d o any goo d ” co nsi d eri ng he f ai l ed t o get t he spi ri t ual res p o nse he ho p ed fo r af t er ki l l i ng hi s grandm o t her. A l so, D r. S ta lfo rd tes tif

ie d th a t th e D e fen d a n t in fo rm e d h e r tha t h e d id n o t kill h is m o the r b e c a u se sh e w a s yo u n g e r a n d it w o u ld h a v e b e e n ha rd e r to kill he r, a n d he w a s n o t sur e ho w sh e w o u ld tur n o u t sinc e sh e stil l ha d m a n y ye a rs a h e a d

.

T he p rosecut i o n asked t hi s same que st i o n of t he t wo de fense expe rt w i t ness es. D r. C radd o ck t est i f i ed t hat t he 8
D e fen d a n t wo u ld li k e ly ha v e “w a ited ” fo r a n o the r t im e w h e n th e re w e re no w itne sse s, w h ile D r. F a ro o q u e re fus e d to
a n sw e r th e q u e stio n

. -6- but ultim ately

decide d not to. The Def

endant stated that af

ter the murde r he took a

shower, dr essed, 7 and ra n i n t o the woods to hide fr om police bec ause he knew they would come. He stated that he returne d and surre ndere d upon observing all the police ve hicles that re sponded to the crime scene that night, a nd afte r re alizing he did not want to spend his life on the run.
The De fendant also testified that he w as n o t the “ty pe” of person who killed pe ople, and explained the murder of

his gr andmother by

stating, “ I

just made a mistake.” He f urther stated that

“ it jus t hap pen e d o ne day

. . . I los t my min d a nd

did n’ t kn ow wh a t I

wa s d oin g .” On c ro ssexamination, the Defe ndant was asked if he would have killed his g randmother if someone ha d been there watching . He r esponded that he would not have. 8

At the conclusion of the trial, the judge issued his r uling from the bench, stating: “this court fi nd s, be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t, that the de fe nd a nt int e nti on a lly kil le d the de c e a se d.

. . [an d] th is killing was pr emeditated.” The c ourt noted as e vidence of preme ditation the fac t that the Def endant

“ de c ide d to kil l th e de c e a se d w hil e he wa s inhis be dr oo m, w e nt i nto the kit c he n, arm e d h ims e lf wi th a kitchen knif

e, we nt into the decea sed’s be droom and stabbe d her w hile she wa s sleeping .”
Observing that the primary issue befor e the court was the i nsanity defe nse, the c ourt furthe r fo un d th a t th e Defen dan t hadpr ov e n b y c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e that he su ff e re d f ro m a “seve re me ntal disease or defe ct at the time of the crime.” Additionally , the court found
by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e that as a

res u lt of such disease or def ect the de fe nd a nt w a s u na

ble to a pp re c ia te the wr on g -- natur e a nd wro ng fu lne ss o f h is actions; but finds that it has not been established by clea r and convincing evidenc e that as a result of such disea se or de fec t the defe ndant was una ble to appre ciate the
natur e or wr on g fu lne ss o f h is a c tio ns

. There fore , the court concluded that the Def endant ha d failed to establish a def ense of insanity , found him g uilty of murder in the first deg ree , and sentenc ed him to life in prison. The Def endant f iled a motion for a new trial in Marc h of 2003, and the trial court de nied the motion after an evide ntiary hearing in Julyof 2003. The D efe ndant timely filed a notice of appe al with this Court.For t he pur po s es o f cl ar i t y and ef

f i ci enc y , we hav e c om bi ned t he D ef endan t ’ s s i x i s s ues i nt o t he four addres s ed 9
bel ow.
-7- AN AL YSI S On app ea l , t he De fendant outlined six specific arg uments in his appellate brie f: (1) the evi d e n c e w a s in s u f

f ic ie n t to s u p p o r t a c o n v ic ti o n f o r f ir s t d e g r e e mu r d e r ; ( 2 ) th e D e f e n d a nt was insane a nd there fore incapa ble of pre meditated murde r; (3) the De f e n d an t w a s not competent to stand tr ia l or te sti fy on his ow n be ha lf ; ( 4) the statut ory a ndc a se la w d e fi nit ion s o f T e nn e sse e ’s ins a nity de fe ns e are un c on sti tut ion a lly va g ue ; ( 5) thebu rd e n o f p ro of r equ ir e d b y theTe nn e sse e ins a nity statute is unconstituti o n al l y u n fa ir; and (6) the trial court erre d in not gr anting the Def endant’ s mot ionfo r j ud g me nt of a c qu itt a l at the e nd of the State ’s pr oo f. We f indtheDe fe nd a nt’ s a

rg ume nts
un pe rs ua siv e on e a c h c la im. 9

I. Insu ff icient Evidence I n his first two c laims, the Defe ndant cha lleng es the suff iciency of the e vidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that, firs t , h e wa s g uiltyof pre meditated murde r, and se cond, that he failed to e stablish the defe nse of insanity by clea r and c onvincing ev i d en ce . The De fendant interming les the two issues in his brief under the singula r theory that the Def

endant wa s insane and there fore incapa

ble of premeditation, an ele ment of the c rime for which he w as convic ted. Howe ver, beca use the standa

rd of a ppellate review for i nsufficie nt evidenc e is signific antly differ ent from our
r e v i e w o f t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e o f i n s a n i t y, w e w i l l a d d r e s s t h e t w o i s s u e s s e p ar a t e l y.
A. Suf fi ciency of Evid ence R eview On appea l f

rom a bench trial, the finding s of the trial judge car ry the same we ight a s a jury verdic t. See S t at e v

. Wil son, 990 S.W .2d 726, 729 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) . Tenne ssee Rule of Appellate Proc edure 13(e) presc ribes that “[f]indings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury

shall be set aside if the evidenc e is insuff icient to support the finding s by the trier of

fac t of g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt.” A convic ted criminal defendant w ho challeng es the suff iciency of the e vid e nc e on app e a l be ars the bu rd e n o f d e mon str a tin g wh y th e evi den c e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt t o support the ver dict, beca

use a ve rdict of g uilt destroy s the presumption of innoce nce and imposes
a pr e su mpt ionof

g uil t. S e e State v. Ev a ns , 1 08 S.W. 3d23 1, 23 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; State v. Carr uth e rs , 35 S.W. 3d 51 6 , 5 5 7

- 5 8 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ; S t a t e v

. T u g g l e , 6 3 9 S

. W

. 2 d 9 1 3 , 9 1 4 ( T e n n

. 1 9 8 2 )

. T h is Court must reject a c onvicted criminal defendant’s challeng e to the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e if, afte r considering the evidenc e in a l i gh t m o s t favor able to the pr osecution, we determine that any
ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of thec ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. See Jackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999).

On app e a l, the State is e nti tle d to thestr on g e st l e g itima te vi e w o f the e vid e nc e a nda ll
rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces which may be dra wn there from. See Ca rruther s, 35 S.W .3d at 558; Hall, 8 S.W .3d at 599. A g uilty verdic t by the trier of fac t a ccr edits the testimony of the State’s wi tne sse s and re so lve s all c on fl ic ts in the e vid e nc e in fa vo r of the pr os e c uti on ’s the ory . Se e State v. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997)

. Qu es tions about the cre dibilit y of witnesses, the weig ht and value of t he evidence, as well as all fac tual issues raised by the evidenc e ar e re solved by-8-

the trier of

fac t, and this Court will not re-w eig h or re -eva luate the evidenc e. See Evans, 108 S.W .3d at 236; B land, 958 S.W .2d at 659. Nor will this Court substitute its own infere nces d ra wn from circ umstant i al evidence f or those dra wn by

the trier of

fac t. See Evans, 108 S.W.3d at 236-37; Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d at 557.
First deg ree murder a s char g ed in this case is the “ preme ditated a n d i n t en t i onal killing of another .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 3 9 -1 3 -2 0 2 (a )(1) . I n the ca se at ha nd, it is undi sputed that the Def endant killed the victim by intentionally stabbing her to de ath. The D efe ndant now ar g ues that th e St a te ’ s e v id e n c e w a s in s u f f ic ie n t t o s u p p o r t th e p r e me d it a ti o n e le me n t o f f ir s t de g r e e mu r d e r

. We disag ree

.

I n Tenne ssee, “ preme ditation,” for the pur pose of pr emeditated f

irst deg ree murder, is “an act done afte r the e x erc ise of ref lection and judgme nt,” in which “the intent to kill must have bee n formed prior to the ac t itself.” T enn. C ode Ann. § 39- 13-202(d) . Whether a de fendant has ac ted with premeditation is a question of fac t for the f inder of f act to dete rmine, and may be infe rre d from the ma nn e r and cir cum st ances of the kil lin g . Se e State v. Ge ntry , 8 81 S.W. 2d1, 3 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1993). The evidenc e re veals that the D efe ndant planned the murder i n his bedroom seve ral ho ur s b e fo re e xec uti ng his plan. Th e De fe nd a nt c are fu lly se le c te d th e ti me of the mur de r t o corr espond with when the v i ct i m wa s most li kely to be aslee p. The De fendant went first to the kitchen, sele cted a

knife, a nd then proc eede d to the victim’s bedroom to car ry out his plan. B ased
o n t h i s ev i d en ce , viewed in a light most favor able to the State, a rational finde r of f

act c ould find bey ond a re asonable doubt that the Defenda nt killed the victim intentionallyand with pre meditation. Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

B. Ins anity Defense Review The De fendant also arg ues that he w as inca pab l e of c ommitt ing a

preme ditated killing beca use he w as insane at the t i m e of the murde r. The D efe ndant asserts that there wa s no motive for him to murder his g randmother , who was his primary car e-g iver during his formative y ear s and wh om h e “ lov e d. ” Th e De fe nd a nt a lso c la ims he wa s si nc e rein h is b e lie f that by ki ll ing his g randmother

he wa s showing r espec t for her , and he w ould obtain some sort of spi ritual benef it and an ete rnal re lationship with his imagina ry twin sister. The De fendant now arg ues that his lack of a logic al motive as we ll a s the sincerity of his bizarr e beliefs pr ove he w as insane. A dditionally , the Def endant attempts to accre dit the testimonyof the two e x p erts who concluded at his trial that he failed to a pprec iate the nature or wrong fulness of his ac ts while discrediting the State’s expert who held a c ontrary

opinion. In summary , the Def endant claims that he prese nted suffic ient evidenc e at tria l to p r o v e th e a f

f irmati v e d e f

e n s e o f in s a n ity , a n d th e r e f o r e th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d in it s ru li n g

. We disag ree

.
Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-11-501 provides f or the insanity defe nse in Tenne ssee a s f oll ow s: (a) I t is an aff irmative def

ense to prose cution th at , at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offe nse, the defe ndant, as a result of a sever e mental di sease or defect, wa s unable to appr eciate the natur e or w rong fulness of suc hT he i nsani t y de fense s t at ut e was am end ed in 1 9 9 5 , w hi ch res ul t ed i n s everal s i gni f i cant changes. See F l ake 10 I, 8 8 S .W .3 d a t 5 5 0 -5 5 1 (o u tli n ing the p rin c ip le c h a n g e s in th e insa n ity d e fen se a fter the 1 9 9 5 a m e n d m e n t).
-9- defe ndant’s ac ts. Mental disease or defe ct does not otherw ise constitute a def ense. The de fendant has the burde n of proving t h e d ef en s e of insanityby

clea r and convincing evidenc e. (b) As use d in this section, “mental disease or def ect” does not include any
abn orma lit y

ma nif e ste d o nly

by re pe a te d c ri min a l or

oth e rw ise a nti so c ia l c on du c t. (c) No expert witness may testify as to whethe r the de fendant was or wa s not insane a s set forth in subsection (a ). S u ch ultimate issue is a matter f or the trier

of fac t alone.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-501(a ) - ( c). The standard f or sustaining an ins anity

defe nse is thus twopart: a de fendant must demonstrate first, a “seve re mental disease or defe ct,” a nd second, pr ove that
as a r esult he wa s unable to “a pprec iate the nature or w rong fulness” of the criminal act. I t is worthy of note that unde r this statute the “de finition of insanity has bee n narr owed so that the de fense now applies o n ly w h e n th e d e f e n d a n t h a s a s e v e r e me n ta l d is e a s e o r d e f e c t, ” a n d th a t in s a n ity is an aff irmative def

ense w here the State no long er must prove sanity , but rather “the de fendant bear s the burden” of proving insanity “by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e.” State v. Flake , 88 S.W .3d 540, 550- 51 (Tenn. 2002) (F lake I ) (empha sis in orig inal). “‘Clea r and c onvincing evidenc e means evidenc e 10 in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the corr ectne ss of the conc lusions drawn fr om the evidenc e.’” I d. at 551 (c iting State v. Holder , 15 S.W .3d 905, 911 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)). Although a

highe r standar d than “pr eponder ance of the evidenc e,” this standar d is less than “bey ond
a re asonable doubt.” O’D aniel v. Messier , 905 S.W .2d 182, 188 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

.
Our Supreme Court has dec lare d that “appe llate courts in Tennessee should apply the
re a so na ble ne ss s ta nd ard ” wh e n r e vie wi ng a re je c tio n o f the ins a nity

de fe ns e , f

urthe r s ta tin g :

app e llate c ou rt s in Te nn e ssee sh ou ld r e ve rs e a jury ve rd ic t r e

je c tin g the ins a nity defe nse only

if, cons i d ering the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, no reasona

ble trier of

fac t c ould have f

ailed to find that the de fendant’s insanity at the time of the offense was e stablished by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e.

Flake I , 88 S.W .3d at 554. The Court we n t o n to note that “[a] reviewing court a pply ing the
re a so na ble ne ss sta nd ard sh ou ld co ns ide r al l the e vid e nc e in the re c or d in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to the state in dete rmining w hether the [fact finde r] appropriate ly reje cted the insa nity

defe nse.” I d. Such evidenc e properly includes “the fac ts surrounding the crime, testimonyof lay witnesses, and expert testimony .” I d. at 556. Furthermore , the Court decla red:T he t rial jud ge no t ed t ha t t he D efen d an t d i d p ro ve he wa s una b l e to ap p rec i ate the n ature o r wro ng f ulne ss 11
of hi s ac t i ons by a “ preponder anc e of t he evi dence , ” but not by t he hi gh er bur den of “ cl ear an d convi nci ng ” a s mandat ed b y the sta tute

. -10- [t ]he weig ht and value to be g iven expert testimony is a question for the jury . Where there is a conflict in the e vidence , the trier of fac t is no t re q u i re d t o acc ept expert testimonyover othe r evide nce and must determine the weig ht and cre dibilit y of ea ch in light of a ll the fac ts and circ umstances of the ca se. Que st i o n s co n cerning the
cre dibilit y

of wit n es s es , the weig ht and value of evidenc e, as w ell as all fa ctual disputes raised by

the evidence, a

re f or the trier

of fa ct; appellate courts do not
rew eig h the evidenc e or r eeva luate cr edibilitydeterminations.

I d. at 554 (interna l citations omit ted).

I n the case at hand, the trial court found that the Def endant pr oved by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that he suf

fer ed fr om a serious menta l disease or defe ct, but co n cl u d ed that he had not proven by clea r and convincing evidenc e that as a result he was unable to appre ciate the nature or wr on g fu lne ss o f h is a c t. I n su pp ort of its ru lin g , the c ou rt lis te d fo ur fa c tor s it fo un d p art ic ula

rl y 11 signific ant in rea ching its conclusion: (1) the De fendant resisted the a lleg ed voice s on prior
occa sions; (2) the Defenda nt cut t he telephonecord during the stabbing to preve nt notification of the authorities; (3) the D efe ndant fled the scene ; and ( 4 ) i m m ediately afte r committing the c rime the Def endant “ considere d and re jected the impulse or direc tion to kill his mother.” The court noted that all these factors indicated t hat t he Defendant was able to appre ciate the nature and wrong fulness of his actions at th e t i m e o f t h e crime. The judg e also stated he was “ impressed” by Dr. Stalford’ s analy sis of the Def

endant.

Additionally , the evidenc e in the re cord r evea ls that the Defenda nt thoughtf ully planned the
mur de r, kn e w h e wa s e nd ing a lif e a s e vid e nc e d b y

his a dmi ssi on that he ke pt s ta bb ing his vic tim beca use “she would not die,” and a dmitted that he would not ha ve killed his g randmother if someone had bee n there to observe his a ctions. Whi le there was c onflicting testimonyfrom the thre e expert witnesses conc erning the Def endant’ s abilityto appre ciate the natu r eand wrong fulness of his ac tions at the time of the c rime, such c onflict is resolved by the trier of fac t. I ndeed, our Supreme Court has stated that “[w]here the proof is c ontested, appellate courts should rar ely reve rse a jury ’s re jection of the ins a nity

de fe ns e un de r this de fe re nti a l stand ard of re vie w. ” F lake I , 8 8 S. W.3 d at 55 6. Th is princ ipl e app lie s w ithe qu a l f or c e to f ind ing s at a

be nc h tria l.

Reviewing the evidenc e in this case unde r the princ iples outlined above, we conclude that the Def endant ha s failed to esta

blish that no reasona

ble trier of

fac t could have found that he failed to prove by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that he w as insane at the time of the off ense. The-11-

evidenc e is sufficie nt to just ify the Def endant’ s conviction of first de g ree murder. This issue has no
me ri t. II. Jud gm ent of Acquittal The De fendant also arg ues that the trial court err ed in not g ranting his motion for a judgme nt of a c qu itt a l ent e re d at the e nd of the State ’s pr oo f at tr ia l. Se e Te nn . R. Crim. P. 29. Ho we ve r, it i s we l l e s t a b l i s h ed t h ata d ef en d an twa i v es ap p el l at e r ev i ew o f t h e i s s u e o f w h et h era t ri al j u d ge committed error

in deny ing a m otion for judg ment of ac quittal at the conclusion of the State’ s proof, wh e re the de fe nd a nt e le c ts n ot t o s ta ndon his mot ion , but rathe r p ro c e e ds to i ntr od uc e e vid e nc e in support of his case . See Mathis v. State, 590 S.W .2d 449, 453 (Tenn. 1979) ; State v. Peat, 790 S.W .2d 547, 548-49 (Te nn Crim. App. 1990). The r ecor d on appea l r efle cts that immediately afte r the tr ia l c ou rt

de nie d his moti on fo r a jud g me nt of a c qu itt a l, the De fe nd a nt ca lle d h is f ir st w itn e ss, and continued to pr esent e vidence over the course of the n ex t t h ree day s. There fore , we f ind the Def endant ha s waived this issue.

Whil e thi s is su e wa s pro c e du ra lly waive d, we brie fl y no te that th e De fe nd a nt’ s c la im a lso fails on the merits. “The standa rd for revie wing the denial or

g rant of a

motion for judgme nt of acquittal is analog ous to the standard employ ed when revie wing the sufficie ncy of the c onvicting evidenc e af

ter a conviction h as b ee n imposed.” State v. Robinson, 146 S.W .3d 469, 524 (Tenn. 2004). Thus, we re w e to examine the m er i t s of whe ther the tria l court er red in de ny ing the Def endant’ s motion for acquittal, we wo u l d fi n d n o err or for the same r easons a ddresse d in our pr e vio us re vie w o f the Defen da nt’ s su ff ic ie nc y of e vid e nc e c ha lle ng e . T hu s, thi s is su e is a lso without merit.

III. Com petency t o Stand Trial Th e De fe nd a nt c la ims that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d infi nd ing him

c omp e te nt t o ta

ke the standto testify on his own behalf, and also in finding him compe tent to stand trial. We disag ree

.
The rig ht of a cr i m i n al d efendant to testify on his or her be half is a f undamental right g uaranteed by

both the Fe dera l and Tenne ssee Constit utions. See U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV; Tenn. Const. art. I , § 9 ; s ee also Momon v. S tate, 18 S.W.3d 152, 161 (Tenn. 1999). The trial court
rec og nized that the Defe ndant “e x presse d his desire to testify ” afte r having car efully been r eminded of the a dvantag es and disadvantag es of doing so by his own counsel. We find the t rial court did not
err in rec og nizi ng and g ranting the Def endant’ s constitutional right to testify on his own behalf.

Ho we ve r, the De fe nd a nt a lso c la ims he wa s not co mpe te nt t o s ta ndtria l, andthe re fo resh ou ld
never have be en plac ed in a position of having to decide whe ther to testify on his own behalf. T he test for de termining whether a defenda nt is competent to stand trial is whether the defendant ha s the “ca pacity to understand the nature a nd object of the proce eding s ag ainst him, to consult with counsel and to assist in preparing his de fense .” State v

. Bl ac k , 815 S.W .2d 166, 174 (Tenn. 1991)

. Furthermore , “[t] he burde n is on the defendant to establish his incompetenc y by a pre ponderance ofIn this sa m e lette r to the c o u rt, the M T M H I a lso sta te d th a t th e y “ d id s u p p o rt a n in sa n ity d e fen se ,” d e sp ite 12
the fac t th a t th e y d e c la re d th e D e fen d a n t n o lo n g e r m e t th e r e q u ire m e n ts o f c o m itt m e n t, a n d w a s c o m p e te n t t o sta n d trial.

-12- the evidenc e.” State v. O ody , 823 S.W .2d 554, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). On appe llate re view, “the tria l court’s finding s are conclusive unle ss the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise.” State v. L eming , 3 S.W .3d 7, 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

.

The Defendant was ini tially decla red incompetent to stand trial and subseque ntly committed to the car e of a

mental institut ion following his arr est. Howeve r, approx imately three months after his commitm ent, the De fendant was re lease d from the hospital. In J anuary of 2003, the trial c ourt
was a dvised by

the MTMHI

that the Def

en d an t h ad “im proved suf ficiently ” due to suc cessf ul tr e a tme nt, a ndthat th e “ te a m c lin ic ia ns ” we re of the op ini on that th e De fe nd a nt w a s “ c omp e te nt t o stand trial.” This de termination was made based on the ir opinion that the Defe ndant “unde rstands the c ha rg e (s ) p e nd ing a g a ins t hi m a ndthe c on se qu e nc e s w hic h mi g ht f oll ow a ndthat he is a

ble to advise counsel and participate in his own defense .” In addition to the MTMHI evaluation, the trial 12 judge also consider ed his own observations of the De fendant, and base d on all the evidenc e, conclude d that the Def

endant wa s indeed c ompetent to stand trial.

At the hea

ring on the Defenda nt’s motion for a new trial, the trial judg e stated: “ I observe d [t he def endant] during the trial. As much as I could determine, he wa s competent to stand trial, then,
a ndI thi nk he ’s c omp e te nt n ow .” On app e a l, the De fe nd a nt h a s n ot poi nte d to e vid e nc e that w ou ld sug g est he wa s incompetent at the time of his trial. We note that while the MTMHI provided two
e xpe rt s w ho te sti fi e d th a t the De fe nd a nt wa s insane a t the tim e of the c ri me , th is s a me fa c ili ty a lso conclude d the Def

endant wa s competent to stand trial. Thus, ther e was no differ ence of opinion among the expert witnesses conc erning the Def endant’ s competenc y

to stand trial. The De fendant ha s f a ile d to de mon str a te that the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t the c on c lus ionof the tria l c ou rt

. Ac c or din g ly , th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

IV . C ons ti tu ti ona l C hal le nge to Te nne sse e Ins ani ty De fens e The De fendant’s final two issues pre sented on a ppeal a r eth at t he Te nnessee statute providing for the insa nity

defe nse is unconstitutional, first because the “statutory and ca se law de finitions” are
so va g ue a s to be un c on sti tut ion a l, and secon d, be c aus e the bu rd e n o f p ro of is u nc on sti tut ion a l. Ho we ve r, be c aus e theDe fe nd a nt f a ile d to inc lud e a ny

le g a l auth ority

or arg ume nt i n s up po rt

of his
c la ims , h e ha s w a ive d th e se iss ue s.

O u r C o u r tr e q u i r e s t h a ta

d e f e n d a n to n ap p e a l p r e s e n ta n ar g u m e n t , m ak e ap p r o p ri a te ref ere nces to the re co rd , and cite r eleva nt leg al authority in support of his or her a rg ument. See“I ss ues whi ch are not supp o rt ed by argument, ci t at i o n t o aut ho ri t i es, or ap p rop ri at e ref erences t o t he reco rd 13

w ill b e tre a te d a s w a ive d in this c o u rt.” T e n n C t. C rim . A p p . R . 1 0 (b ).

“ T h e br i ef

of t h e appe l l an t s h al l c on t ai n

. . . [ a] n a r g u men t , w h i ch ma y be pr ec ede d by a s ummar y of 14
argum ent , s et t i ng fo rt h t he co nt ent i o ns o f t he ap p el l ant wi t h res p ect t o t he i ss ues present ed , and t he reasons t herefo r, inc lud ing the re a so n s w h y the c o n te n tio n s re q u ire a p p e llate re lie f, w ith c itatio n s to the a u tho rities a n d a p p ro p ria te ref erences t o t he reco rd (whi ch m ay b e q uo t ed verbati m ) r el i ed on.” T enn. R

. A p p

. P

. 27 (a), (a) (7).
-13- Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10( b). Additionally , all Tenne ssee appellate courts requirethe appe llant’s 13 brief to c ontain an ar g ument, citations to authorities, and appropriate refe renc es t o the record. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a) (7). Fa ilure to comply with these basic r

ules will o rd i n ar i l y

constitute a 14 waiver of the issue. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b); State v. Thompson, 36 S.W .3d 102, 108 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)

.

I n the pre sent ca se, the De fendant’s “ar g ument” as to both claims consists of a one- sentenc e conclusory

statement that the Te nnessee insanity defe nse statute al l o ws “a situation whe re a Def endant, who is more likely than not, not guilty

by rea son of insanity

is convicted of f

irst deg ree mur de r. ” Th e De fe nd a nt m ake s n o r e fe re nc e a t a ll t o wh a t te rm s h e be lie ve s to be un c on sti tut ion a lly
va g ue . T he De fe nd a nt c ite s n o le g a l auth ority in s up po rt

of e ith e r o f the se c la ims

. We not e that th is Cou rt ha s h e ld the ins a nity de fe ns e statut e ’s bu rd e n of pr oo f of “ c le ar a ndc on vin c ing e vid e nc e ” to be c on sti tut ion a l. S e e State v. Pe rry , 1 3 S. W.3 d 7 24 , 741 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 9) ; se e a lso State v. Holton, 126 S.W .3d 845, 861 (Tenn. 2 0 0 4 ) (holding that placing the burde n of proof on the defe ndant to prove insani t y i s not unconstituti onal). In any event, we do not addre ss these issues beca use they are waived. CO NC LU SION F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE.