Fat her di d n ot appeal t he t r i al cour t ’ s order t er mi nat i ng hi s pare nt al r i gh t s t o M

. J. J. T her efore, i n a s much as 1
i t i s po s s i bl e , t h i s op i n i on w i l l om i t r e fe r e n c e s t o Fa t h e r a n d a dd r e s s e x c l u s i v e l y M ot h e r ’ s i n v ol v e me n t i n t h e mat t er bel ow. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d O n B ri ef

Marc h 17 , 200 5

In Th e M at te r of : M
. J. J.

Direc t Appeal from the Juvenile Court for P utnam C ounty

No. 683-DC S John Hud son, Ju dge

No. M2004- 02759-COA-R 3-P T - F iled April 14, 2005

I n this termination of pare ntal rig hts case, the juvenile court terminated the pa renta l rig hts of the mothe r andfathe r, a ndthe mothe r a pp e a ls. We a ff

ir m.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Juv e nile Co ur t A ffirm e d and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

J oe McL err an, Cookeville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, H.F .H.

Paul G. Summers , At t o rn ey Gene ral a nd Reporter

and Juan G. Villasenor, Assistant Attorney Ge ne ra l, f or the app e lle e , St a te of

Te nn e sse e , D e pa

rt me nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s.
OP IN ION

I. F ACT S AND P R OC EDU R A L B ACKG ROUND

I n this parental rights termination case, H .F.H. ( “Mother” ) and F ather ar e the biologic al 1 pare nts of M.J .J ., the child who is the s u b j ect of this action. On May

7, 2003, M.J .J . was born testing positive for m ethampheta mine and opiates. Mother likewise tested positive for methamphetamine a nd also admitted to inge sting hy drocodone , alcohol, and othe r non-pr escribed,
over- the-c ounter medic ations duri n g h er p re g nancy with M.J .J . On May

9, 2003, based upon a finding of depende ncy and neg lect, M.J .J

. was place d in the temporary protec tive custody of t he Tenne ssee Depa

rtment of Children’s Service s (“D CS”). M.J .J

. has rema ined in f oste r c ar e s i nce May 15, 2003.-2-

On J une 18, 2003, with the assistanc e of Bry an McCrary , the DCS Case Manag er a ssigne d to this c a se , M oth e r d e ve lop e d a Pe rm a ne nc y Pla n (th e “ Pla n” ), wi th c on c ur re nt p e rm a ne nc y

g oa ls of either returning M.J .J . to Mother or pre paring for the adoption of M.J.J . Pursuant to the Plan, Mo the r w a s r e q u i r e d t o : ( 1 ) s u b m i t t o a n a l c o h o l a n d d ru g ( “ A & D ” ) a s s e s s m e n t a n d f o llo w a ll
rec ommendations; (2) submit to random drug testing producing neg ative re sults for six consec utive months; (3) submit t o a par enting assessment and f ollow a ll r ecommendations; (4) maintain safe and suitable housing f

or six consec utive months, and (5 ) s u b m i t t o a psy cholog ical asse ssment and follow all rec ommendations.

On J uly 15, 2003, Mother under went an A &D Assessment per formed by Debbie Cleve ng er of B r a d f o r d H e a lt hServ ic e s ( “ B r a d f

o r d ” )

. M o th e r ’ s A& D Assessment indicate d alcohol depe ndency and amphe tamine abuse . Ms. Cleveng er r ecommende d that Mother beg in an eig ht-wee k, thirty -two session I ntensive Outpatient P rog ram (“I OP”), followed by “Af terc are ” once per w eek f

or one y ear

. Ms. Cleveng er a lso recommende d that Mother att en d t h ree meeting s per we ek of A lcoholics Anony mo u s ( “ A A ” ) o r N ar c o ti c s A n o n y mo u s ( “ N A ” ) f o r o n e y e ar , w ith d o c u me n tation of attendanc e. Mother w as sche duled to beg in I OP at Br adfor d the following wee k, J uly 21, 2 0 03. Acc ord in g to M r

. M c Cr ar y ’ s te s ti mo n y , M o th e r d idn o t s h o w u p f

o r th is in it ia l s e s s io n

. Mr. McCrary testified that he made sever al attempts to resche dule the beg inning of I OP sessions for the dates of Aug ust 11, 12, 18, 20 of 2003 and S eptember 15, 2003. Howeve r, Mot her failed to attend on any of these dates. L ikewise, Mother never attended any

AA or N A meeting s.
As for othe r re sponsibili ties und er t h e P l an, Mr. McCrary testified that Mother be g an attending pare nting c lasses on Aug ust 6, 2003. After attending only two or three classes, how ever , she fa iled to be pre sent for a ny other c lasses. Moth er al s o never underw ent a psy cholog ical assessment. Mr. McCrary testified that on three separ ate occa sions be tween J une 18, 2003 and June 25, 2004, Mother tested positive f or methamphetamine. Howeve r, Mother ref used a drug scre en on three dates during J uly , 2003.

I n addition to the various requirements of Mother under the Plan, Mother was a llowed one hour per wee k of super vised visitation with M .J .J . After the implementation of the Plan, she be g an arriving late for visits with M.J .J., while completely missing others. B etwee n May 21 and September 17, 2003, Mot h er m i ssed nine visits with M.J .J ., while ca lling only twice to cancel in adva nce. Mother ce ased visiting M.J.J . afte r September 17, 2003.

On Dec ember

30, 2003, DCS filed a petition to terminate the pa renta l rig hts of Mother and F a the r t o M .J.J. O n Jan ua ry 2, 20 04 , B e tsy

Du nn , a Chi ld P ro te c tiv e Se rv ic e s Mana g e r, a lon g wi th Mr. McCra

ry and Dekalb C ounty law enforce ment office rs, went to Mother’s residence to serve the petition. Accor ding to Ms. Dunn’ s testimony , when they arrived at Mother’ s reside n ce , Father invited Ms. Dunn and Mr. McCra ry into the hom e. Upon entering the residence, Ms. Dunn, who has sp e c ia lize d tr a ini ng wi th d ru g e nd a ng e re d c hil dr e n in ve sti g a tio ns a ndme thamp h e t am i n eo p e ratio ns , immediately s m ell ed “a n overw helming odor ” indicating the re cent manuf actur e of methamphetamine. Ms. Dunn te stified that she and Mr . McCrary quickly exit ed the location.-3-

On May 8, 2004, Br i an L o ng , a Cookeville police of fice r traine d in investiga ting methamphetamine ope rat i o n s , responde d to neig hbors’ c omplaints reg arding chemica l odors
e ma natin g fr om M oth e r’ s r e sid e nc e . U po n o btaini ng Mo the r’ s c on se nt t o s e arc h th e pr e mis e s, Offic er L ong and other office rs found numer ous items consistent with the operation o f a
me thamphet ami ne la

bo ratory , in c lud ing the fo llo wi ng : app ro xima te ly fi ve g rams o f f

re sh ly manufa cture d, “we t” methampheta mine; a plasti c b ag co n taining insulin syring es, one of which contained m et h amphetamine; fifteen g rams of iodine c ry stals; thirtyg rams of e phedrine , six teen
ou nc e s o f l y e ; on e g a llo n o f muria tic a c id; ru bb ing a lc oh ol; six to e ig ht g rams o f r e d p ho sp ho ro us ; pla sti c ma sk s; g lov e s; p la sti c ba g g ie s; c of fe e fi lte rs , d ist ill e d w a te r; a n e mpt y bo ttl e of iod ine ; e mpt y bottles of pseudoephe drine; a ba g of matches missing the striker plates; and a g as g ener ator. Offic er L on g te sti fi e d th a t, b a se d o n his tr ain ing a nde xpe ri e nc e , me thamph e ta min e wa s ma nu fa c tur e d in Mother’s r esidenc e the night prec eding the office rs’ sear ch. Offic er L ong also testified that anothe r woman by

the name of Ali cia Batdorf and her two y oung children w ere prese nt when he pe rformed the sea rch. A ccor ding to his testimony , there wer e mattre sses and quilts on the floor, and it appe are d to Offic er L ong that Ms. Batdorf and her c hildren we re te mporarily stay ing at Mother’s re sidence

.
I n its terminat i o n p et ition, DCS alleg ed as g rounds for te rmination that: (1) Mother ha d abandone d M.J .J . by

failure to visit or provide s u p p o rt fo r more tha n four c onsecutive months prec eding the filing of t he petiti on; (2) Mother had not s ubstantially complied with the provisions of the Plan; ( 3) the conditions tha t le d to the remova l of M.J .J

. persisted; (4) Mother had committed
se ve re c hil d a

bu se by us ing me tha mph e ta min e du ri ng he r p re g na nc y wi th M. J.J.; a nd (5 ) it w a s in the best intere sts of M.J .J

. that Mother’s pare ntal rig hts be terminated. F ollowing tria l, where the only proof pr esente d was put on by DCS, the juvenile court e ntere d an orde r terminating Mother’s pare ntal rig hts to M.J .J . I n its order terminating Mother ’s par ental rig hts, the juvenile court de cre ed t h e f o l l o wi n g:
That [Mot her] has willfully abandone d [M.J .J .] for more than four (4) co n secutive months prior to the filing of this P etition; that fo r t h e fo u r (4) months following
re m o v al DC S h as m ad e r ea s o n ab l e e ff o rt s t o as s i s tt h e p ar en ti n e s t a b l i s h i n g a suitable home for the child, but the par ent has made no rea sonable e ffort to provide a suitable home a nd has demonstra ted a lac k of conc ern for t he child to such a de g ree that it app e ars un lik e ly

that sh e wi ll b e able to p ro vid e a su ita ble ho me at an earl y date; that she ha s been substantially non-compliant with the statement of responsibilities in the permane ncy plan; that the child has been remove d from the custody of the pa rents more than six (6) months; that the condit i o n s t h at l ed to t he child’s re moval still exis t or other c onditions ex ist which in all probability subject the child to fu rt h er ne g lect or a buse if re turned home; ther e is littl e likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an ea rly date so that the c hild could be re turned to [M oth e r] i n th e ne ar f

utu re ; th a t the c on tin uatio n of the pa re nt/ c hil d r e la tio ns hip g reatly diminis hes t

h e c h ild’s chanc es of e arly integ ration into a stable a nd perma nent h o m e; t h at s he has c ommitt ed seve re c hild abuse as de fined by T.C.A. 37-1-102
a g a ins t [M.J.J.]; a nd that it is in the be st int e re st of [M.J.J.] that a ll the pa re nta l r ig hts of [Mo th e r ] b e f

o r e v e r te r mi n a te d , a n dth a t th e c o mp le te c u s to d y , c o n tr o l, a nd-4-

g uardia nship of [M.J .J .] be awar ded to the State of Te nnessee , [DCS ], wit h the rig ht to p la c e sa id c hil d f

or a do pti on a ndto c on se nt t o s a id a do pti on in l oc o p are nti s.

Mo the r h a s a

pp e a le d f ro m th e juv e nil e c ou rt ’s ord er. We p e rc e ive the iss ue s o n a pp e a l to be a s f oll ow s: ( 1 ) Wh e th e r D CS e s ta b li s h e d b y c le ar a n d c o n v in c in g e v id e n c e o n e of the
asserted g rounds for the termination of Mother’s pare ntal rig hts to M.J .J ., and
(2) Whether cle ar a nd convincing evidenc e exists t hat termination of Mother’ s p ar e n t a l r i g h t s w a s i n t h e b e s ti n t e r e s t s o f M

. J. J.

II. D I S CUS S I ON

Gene rally , in case s tried without a jury , we r eview the rec ord de novo , while g ranting the trial
c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t a pres um pt ion of

c or re c tne ss. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) (2 00 4) ; Bogan v. Bogan , 6 0 S. W.3 d 7 21 , 7 27 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . T he tr ia l c ou rt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s w ill be su sta ine d u nle ss they are contra

ry to the pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e. Sullivan v. Sullivan , 107 S.W .3d 507, 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). T he trial c ourt’s leg al conc lusions, however, are revie wed unde r a pur e de
novo standard and are acc orded no such presumption of cor rec tness. Johnson v. J

ohnson , 37 S.W .3d 892, 894 (Tenn. 2001) . I n pare ntal rig hts termination case s, section 36-1-113( c) of the Tenne ssee Code requir es that the g rounds for te rmination be established by clear and c onvincing evidenc e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( c) ( Supp. 2004). As such, “w e must determine w hether the fa cts, either as found by t h e t ri al court or as supported by the pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e, cle arly

and convincing ly

establish the g rounds for te rminating the biologic al par en t ’s p ar ental rig hts.” In re Adoption of T

.A.M. , No. M2003-02247-COA- R3-PT, 2004 W L 1085228, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. May 12, 2004) ( no perm. app. filed ).

Th e “ c le a r a ndc on vin c ing e vid e nc e ” sta nd ardha s b e e n e xpla ine d a s f oll ow s:
The “ cle ar an d convincing evidenc e” sta ndard de fies pre cise de finition. Ma jor s v . S mi th , 7 7 6 S

. W.2d 538, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). While it i s more exacting tha n the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e standa rd, Santosky v . Kramer , 455 U. S. at 76 6, 10 2 S. Ct. a t 14 01 ; Rentenbac h Eng'g Co. v. Genera l Realty Ltd. , 707 S.W .2d 5 2 4 , 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), it does not re quire such c erta inty as the bey ond a re asonable doubt s t an d ard. Brandon v. W right , 838 S.W .2d 532, 536 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) ; State v. Grov es , 735 S.W .2d 843, 846 (Tenn. C ri m

. App. 1987).

Clear a nd convincing evidenc e eliminates a ny serious or su b s t an t ial doubt
co n cerning the corr ectne ss of the conc lusions to be drawn fr om the evidenc e. See Hodges v . S.C. Toof

& Co. , 8 33 S.W. 2d89 6, 90 1 n . 3 (T e nn . 199 2) . It sh ou ld pr od uc e in the fa c t- fi nd e r’ s mi nda fi rm be lie f or c on vic tio n with re g ard to the truth-5-

of t he allegations soug ht to be established. In re Estate of Armstrong , 859 S.W .2d 32 3, 32 8 (T e nn . Ct. App . 1 99 3) ; Brandon v. W right , 83 8 S.W. 2da t 53 6; W iltcher v. Bradley , 708 S.W .2d 407, 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).

O’Danie l v. Me ssier , 905 S.W .2d 182, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). H oweve r, whe re the trial court’ s determinations are ba sed upon its assessment of a witness’s credibility , we will not ree valuate that assessment absent clea

r and convincing evidenc e to the contra ry

. In re C.T.S. , No. W2003-01679- COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL

1838441, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug

. 16, 2004), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004).

Whil e “it is well s ettled t hat parents have a fundamental rig ht to the car e, custody , and contr ol of their c hildren,” In re Drinnon , 7 7 6 S

. W

. 2 d 9 6 , 9 7 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 8 8 ) ( ci t i n g Sta nle y v . I lli no is , 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), “this rig ht is not absolute.” Id

. (c i t i n g Santosky v . Kramer , 455 U.S. 745 (1982)) . “[P] are ntal rig hts may be terminated if there i s clea r and c onvincing evidenc e justify ing such termination under

the applica

ble statute.” Id

. A. G ROUND S F OR T E RM I NAT I ON
Under section 36-1- 113(g ) of the T ennesse e Code, a number of sta tutory

g rounds exist for the termination of a

p er s o n ’s par ental rig hts. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g )(1) –(9) ( Supp. 2004). “To te rminate pa renta l rig hts, a court must determine that cl ear and convinc ing e vidence proves not only

that statutory g rounds ex ist but also that termination is in the child' s best interest.” In re Vale ntine , 7 9 S. W.3 d 5 39 , 5 46 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; se e als o Tenn. C o d e Ann. § 36-1-113(c). Howeve r, “[t] he trial c ourt is r equire d to find only one statutory

g round for

termination of par ental rig hts.” In re D.L.B. , 118 S.W .3d 360, 367 (Tenn. 2003)

.
I n this case, the juve nile court found c lear and convinc ing e vidence that Mother’s pa renta l rig hts sh o u l d b e terminated on the following g rounds: (1) a bandonment; (2) substantial noncompliance with the Permane ncy Plan; ( 3) failure to remedy persistent conditions that preve nt the child’s saf

e re turn; and (4) sever e child abuse . We will address ea ch of the se g rounds in turn.
(1) Aba ndo nment

Under section 36-1- 113(g )(1) of the Te nnessee Code, pare nta l r ig h ts ma y b etermi n ated whe n the court finds that “[a]bandonment by the par ent or g uardia n, as def ined in § 36-1-102, ha s occur red.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g )(1)

. Section 36-1-102 pr ovides five se parate def initions of aba ndonment. Se e id . § 36-1-102 ( 1)(A) (Supp. 2004). I n this case , the j uvenile court found that Mo the r h a d a

ba nd on e d M .J.J. by

(1 ) f a ili ng to p ro vid e fo r the c hil d’ s su pp ort a nd(2 ) b y faili ng to make r easona

ble ef forts to provide a

suitable home for

the child.

Under section 36-1- 102(1)( A)(I ), aba ndonment is defined a s the willful fail u re t o visit or willful failure to support, or ma ke re asonable pay ments toward s u p p o rt , for a period of f

our consec utive months im mediately prec eding the fil i n g o f a ter mination petition. Id . § 36-1-102-6-

(1)( A)(I ). I n this case, the r eleva nt four month period that we must be conce rned w ith is t he period of time betwe en Aug ust 30, 2003 and Dec ember 30, 2003, the date the termination petition was filed. The juvenile court found that Mother had not c ontributed to the support of M.J.J . since May 9, 2003, the date the child was taken into protec tive custody

. The court further found t hat M other was ablebodied and c apable of wo rk i n g t o s u p port the child and tha t her drug abuse w as a w illful act and, there fore , not a justifiable excuse for failing to provide child support. Acc ording ly , the t rial court found that Mother ha d abandoned M

. J

. J

. b yfailing to contribute to the child’s support for the statutory period.

After a ca ref ul review of the rec ord, we conclude that the evidenc e in the re cord c lear ly and convincing ly

establishes that Mot her willfullyfailed to c ontribute to M.J .J .’s support. Althoug h Mr. McCrary testified t h at M o t her sometimes broug ht “some diape rs and c lothes” to visits “in the beg inning,” it is undi sputed that Mother pro v i ded no mea ns of support for the child, whether monetary or otherw ise, afte r Aug ust, 2003. There fore , it is clea r t hat Mother pr ovided no support during the relevant t ime period. Furthermore , it is clear that Mother understood her

obligation and had the c apac ity

to pay support, but failed to do so. On June 18, 2003, DCS provided Mother a d o c u me n t e n ti tl e d “ Crit e r ia & Pr o c e d u r e s f

o r T e rmi n a ti o n o f

Pa r e n ta l R ig h ts , ” w h ic h , b y her signature, she a cknowledg ed her duty to provide support. Acc ording ly , we be lieve that the e vidence
c le arl y e sta bli sh e s Mo the r’ s a

ba nd on me nt b y

failu re to p ro vid e su pp ort. Abandonment may also be e stablished under the statute wher e, following the re moval of the
c hil d f ro m th e pa

re nt’ s h ome , th e pa

re nt h a s n ot m a de re a so na ble e ff orts to p ro vid e a

su ita ble ho me for the c hild. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1 -1 0 2 (1)( A)(ii)( Supp. 2004). Specifica lly , section 36-1- 10 2( 1) (A )( ii) de fi ne s a

ba nd on me nt a s f

oll ow s:
The c hild has been r emoved f rom the home of the pa

rent(s) or g uardia n(s) a s the re sult of a petit ion filed in the juvenile court in which the child was f ound to be a dependent and neg lected child, as defined in § 37-1-102, a nd the child was pla ced in the c us tod y

of the de pa rt me nt o r a

lic e ns e d c hil d- pla c ing a g e nc y , th a t th e juv e nil e court found, or

the court where the termination of pa renta l r i gh t s p et i tion is filed fi nd s, that the de pa

rt me nt or a lic e ns e d ch ild -p la c ing a g e nc y ma de re a so na

ble e ff orts to pr ev en t re m oval of the c hild or that the circ umstances of the child' s situation preve nted re asonable eff

orts from being made prior to the child' s removal; and f or a period of f

our (4) months following the remova l, the department or ag ency has made
re a so na ble e ff orts t o ass ist the pa

re nt( s) or g ua rd ia n( s) to e sta

bli sh a su ita ble ho me fo r the c hil d, bu t th a t th e pa re nt( s) or g ua rd ia n( s) ha ve ma de no re a so na ble e ff orts t o pr ov id e a su ita ble ho me a ndha ve de mon str a te d a la c k o f c on c e rn fo r the c hil d to
su c h a de g re e that it app e ars un lik e ly that the y wi ll b e able to p ro vid e a

su ita ble ho me for the c hild at an ea

rly date[.]

Id . § 36-1-102( 1)(A) (ii).-7-

Her e, the juvenile c ourt found M.J.J . to be depe n d en t an d n eglec ted shortly afte r she wa s born base d upon a finding that Mother had use d methamphetamine and other drug s during her preg nancy , an d M .J .J . was born w ith those substances in her sy stem. As such, the c ircumstance s wa rr a nte d th e pr omp t pl a c e me nt o f M .J.J. in to the state ’s c us tod y

. L ik e wi se , th os e sa me c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e v e n t e d D C S f r o mm ak i n g r e a s o n ab l e e f f o r t s t o p r e v e n tt h e r e m o v a l o f M

. J. J.

For the four months following M.J .J .’s re moval, DCS took num erous steps to fa cilitate the safe retur n o f M

. J

. J ., including, a mong othe r thing s, making M.J .J . available for visitation and assisting Mother

with transportation costs by purcha sing two pr e-pa id ga s card s ; ar ra n ging a nd funding drug scre ens; making fre quent visits to M other’s home ; s cheduling and f unding psy cholog ical asse ssments and A& D asse s s m en t s ; p ro v i d i n g M o t h erwi t h co n t act information relate d to A&D trea tment sessions and pare nting c lasses. Howe ver, de spite the eff orts of D CS, Mot her consistentl yfailed to a ttend A& D treatment sessions, parenting classes, a nd psy cholog ical evaluations. Mother also failed or ref used to ta ke a number of drug tests. Mother incre asing ly failed to show up for weekly visits with M.J .J . I n addition, a dismantled methampheta mine labora tory was discovere d at Mother’ s residenc e. Ac cording ly , we c onclude ther e is clea r and c onvincing evidenc e in the re c or d th a t, f

or a pe ri odof fo ur mon ths fol lo wi ng M. J .J.’ s r e mov a l, D CS ma de re a so na ble
e ff orts to a ssi st Mo the r in e sta bli sh ing a su ita ble ho me . H ow e ve r, Mo the r m a de no sim ila r e ff orts
a ndde mon str a te d a

la c k o f c on c e rn fo r the c hil d to su c h a de g re e that it app e ars un lik e ly that sh e wi ll be able to provide a suitable home for M.J

. J . at an e arly date. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1- 102(1)( A)(ii).
(2) Subs tantial Noncom pliance with Perman ency P lan

Under section 36-1- 113(g )(2) , pare ntal rig hts may be termina t ed wh en there has bee n “substantial noncompli an ce b ythe par ent or g uardia n with the statement of r esponsibiliti es in a pe rm a ne nc y

plan.

. . .” Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( g )( 2) (S up p. 20 04 ). Th is Cou rt ha s p re vio us ly explained what must be proven to e stablish substantial noncompliance with a pe rmane ncy plan:

Pr io r to te r mi n a ti n g p ar e n ta l r ig h ts b a s e d o n T e n n

. Co de Ann. § 36-1-113( g )(2) , the trial court must find that the requireme nts of the permanenc y plan that the pare nt a lleg edly did not satisfy are “re asonable and are rela ted to reme dy ing the conditi ons which necessitate foster care placeme nt.” In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W .3d at 547 (quoti n g Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 2-403(a )(2) (C)). De termining whether substantial noncompliance ha s been shown is a question of law that must also be revie wed without a pr esumption of corr ectne ss. I d. at 548.

I n o rd e r f or no nc omp lia nc e to j us tif

y th e te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts , it
m u s t b e “substantial.” Id

. a t 5 4 8

. I n o th e r w o r d s , me r e te c h n ic a l n o n c o mp li a n ce alone is not sufficie nt to justify the t ermination of parenta l rig hts. Id

. Noncompliance wi th r e q u i r e m e n t s i n a p e r m a n e n c y p l a n t h a t ar e n e i t h e r r e a s o n ab l e n o r r e l a t e d to
reme dy ing the conditions that led t o the re moval of the c hild from the par ent’s
cus to d y is n o t r e le v a n t f

o r p u rp o s e s o f T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 3 ( g ) ( 2). Id

. at-8-

548–49. Additionally , the par ent’s deg ree of noncomplianc e with a rea sonable a nd related re quirement must be asse ssed.

In re T.A.R. , N o. M2 00 3- 02 80 1- CO A- R3- PT, 20 04 Te nn

. Ap p. LEX I S 61 8, a t *2 9– 30 (T e nn . Ct

. App. Sept. 20, 2004) ( no perm. app. filed ).
First, the r equire ments of the Plan wer e cle arly rea sonable a nd rela t ed t o re m edy ing the conditions that led to the child’s remova l. See I n re Valentine , 79 S.W .3d 539, 547 (Tenn. 2002)

. The re quirements that Mother submit to A& D treatment, d rug scre ening , pare nting c lasses, a ps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio n, a ndma int a in s a fe ho us ing fo r six con secut ive mon ths are c e rt a inl y rea sonable a nd desig ned to re medy the environme nt of drug and alcohol addic tion in which Mother lived. I n revie wing the record, it is our opinion that the evidenc e cle arly supports the juvenile court’s fi nd ing of

Mo th er’s no nco mplia nc e wi th the re sp on sib ili tie s u nd e r the Pla n. We b e lie ve it i s u n n e c e s s a r y t o r e g u r g itate he re the fa c ts d e mon str a tin g Mo the r’ s n on c omp lia nc e , a s th e y are se t f orth previously

in this opi nion. I t is sufficient simplyto state that Mother did not approa ch complianc e with the Plan. Accor dingly , we af firm the juvenile c ourt’s finding that Mother wa s in substantial noncompliance with the statement of r esponsibiliti es in the Permane ncy Plan.
(3) Pe rsi ste nc e of Cond itions

T h e gro u n d of per sistence of conditions is set forth under se ction 36-1-113( g )(3) and pr ov ide s th a t pa

re ntal r ig hts ma y

be te rm inate d u nd e r the fo llo wi ng c on dit ion s: (3)( A) The child has bee n remove d from the home of the par ent or g uardia n by order of a c ourt for a

period of six (6) months and: (I ) The c onditions which led to the child’s remova l or other c onditions which in a ll r e a so na

ble pr ob a bil ity wo uldc a us e th e c hil d to be su bje c te d to fu rthe r a bu se or neg lect and w hich, there fore , preve nt the child ’s s af e return to the car e of the pa re nt( s) or g ua rd ia n( s) , s til l pe rs ist ; (i i) Th e re is l itt le lik e lih oo d th a t th e se c on dit ion s w ill be re me die d a t a n e arl y date so that the c hild can be safe ly returne d to the parent(s) or g uardia n(s) in t he nea r future; a nd (i ii) Th e c on tin uation of the pa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n a ndc hil d r e la tio ns hip g re a tly diminis hes the c hild’s c hance s of early integ ration into a safe , stable and permanent home.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g )(3) (S upp. 2004). “U nder the clea r lang uag e of the statute, the conditions w hich preve nt the child’s safe return to the home may be either (1) the conditions that led to r emoval or (2) other conditions likelyto cause further neg lect.” In re T.A.R. , No. M2003-02801- COA-R3-PT, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXI S 618, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. S ep. 20, 2004) ( no perm. app. filed); s e e a l s o In r e S

. Y. . 121 S.W .3d 358, 369 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) ( finding that, althoug h the conditions that led to the children’ s removal ha d been re me d ied, other c onditions warra nted a f inding that children w ould be subject to further ne g lect if re turned to the pa rent).-9-

I n this case, M.J.J . was re moved from Mother’s custody by court order on May 9, 2003 afte r s h e w a s b o r n w i t h m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e a n d o t h e r d ru g s i n h e r s y s t e m

. A tt h e t i m e o f

t h e tr i a l , M

. J. J. had been in the custody of DCS for over f ifteen months. The r ecor d clea rly ref lects that, during that time, Mother continued to use me thamphetamine, a s evidenc ed by numerous posi tive test results and other re fusals by

Mother to submit to drug sc ree ns. Furth er , t h er e i s undisputed evidence that methamphetamine was being manufa cture d in Mother’s re sidence in the prese nce of y oung children as late a s May

of 2004, and she has been periodica lly incar cer ated for s uch ac tivity . Moreove r, the
rec ord re flec ts that Mother has g one to g reat le ng ths to sustain her methamphetamine ha

bit, going so far as to maintain sophisticated vi deo surveillance of the out side of her residenc e. After re viewing the re cord, it is clea

r to us that the per sistence of Mother’s c ontinued drug us e p re v en t s t he saf e re turn o f M .J.J. to the c us tod y of Mo the r andthat the re is l itt le lik e lih oo d th a t th e se c on dit ion s w ill be reme died at an e arly

date.. F urther, w e conc lude that clea r and c onvincing evidenc e supports the juv e nil e c ou rt ’s fi nd ing that th e c on tin uatio n o f the pa re nt- c hild rel ati on sh ip i n th is c a se wo uld g reatly d i m inish M.J .J .’s cha nces of integ rating into a safe , stable, and pe rmane nt home. The
un c on tr ov e rt e d e vid e nc e a t tria l w a s th a t M. J.J. i s a he a lth y , d e ve lop ing c hil d w ho ha s b on de d w ith foster pa rents who wish to ado p t . There fore , we c onclude that c lear and convinc ing e vidence supports the juvenile court’s termination of Mot her’ s pare ntal rig hts based upon the persistence of the c on dit ion s w hic h le d to the c hil d’ s r e mov a l.
(4) Se v e re Chil

d Ab use
Under section 36-1- 113(g )(4) of the Te nnessee Code, sever e child abuse is als o a g rounds for termination of pare ntal rig hts. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g )(4) (Supp. 2004). S ection 36-1- 113(g )(4) specific ally

provides that par ental rig hts may be terminated if:
The pa rent o r gu ar d i an has be en found to ha ve committed seve re c hild abuse as define d in § 37-1-102, u n d er an y prior orde r of a court or is found by

the court hearing the petition to terminate pare ntal rig hts or the petition for adoption to have committed severe child abuse a g ainst the child who is the subject of the petition or ag ainst any

sibling or hal f- s i b l i ng of such c hild, or any other c hild residing temporarily

or permanently

in the home of such pa

rent or g uardia n.
Id . “Sever e child abuse ” is define d, in releva nt part, as “ [t ]he knowing e x posure of a child to or the knowing failure to protect a child from abuse or neg lect that is likely to c ause g reat bodilyharm or death a nd the knowing us e of forc e on a child that is likely to cause g reat bodilyharm or de ath.” Id

. § 37-1-102( b)(21) (A)( Supp

. 2 004). I n 2002, the Gene ral Asse mbly amende d the def

inition of “seve re c hild abuse” to include “[k] nowing ly allowing a child to be prese nt w ithin a structure wher e the a c t of c re a tin g me tha mph e ta min e , a s that su bs ta nc e is ide nti fi e d in § 39 -1 7- 40 8(d )(2 ), is
occur ring .” Id . § 37-1-102( b)(21) (D)( Supp. 2004).

I n th e pr e se nt c a se , th e juv e nil e c ou rt fo un d th a t Mo the r ha d c omm itt e d s e ve re c hil d a bu se by us ing me tha mph e ta min e du ri ng he r pr e g na nc y wi th M.J.J. Th e c ou rt fo un d tha t, b y takin g thi s i l l e g a l , c o n tr o l l e d s u b s t a n c e , M o t h e r h a d e x p o s e dM

. J

. J

. t o a s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k o f g r e a tb o d i l y i n

j u r y.-10-

We are inclined to ag ree

. The rec ord ref lects Mother a lso inge sted hy drocodone , alcohol and othe r non-pre scribed over- t he-c ounter medic ations. M.J .J . was born w ith tremors as a r esult of the pr e nata l e xpos ur e to the se ill ic it d ru g s Mo the r w a s ta kin g du ri ng he r p re g nancy

. Fortu nate ly , it appea rs that M.J .J . has otherw ise enjoy ed a he althy childhood. Howeve r, the he althy development of the c hild in thi s case does not diminish t he seve rity of the ha rm to which the child was e x posed. There fore , we c onclude that the r ecor d clea rly supports the trial court’s findin g that Mother’s prenatal drug use constituted seve re c hild abuse for purposes of pa

renta l rig hts termination.

I n addition to our conclusion in the fore g oing pa rag raph , we b el i eve that the rec ord additionally

supports a finding of seve re c hild abuse base d upon the oper ation o f a me th amp h etamine la bo ratory in M oth e r’ s r e sid e nc e in the pr e se nc e of chi ld ren. Altho ug h ma de in the c ou rs e of its conclusions re g arding other g rounds for te rm i n at i on, the juvenile court did find that methamphetamine laboratorie s wer e found in Mother’s home a nd that methamphetamine ha d been
ma nu fa c tur e d in the pr e se nc e of tw o ch ild re n, c on se qu e ntl y pla c ing tho se c hil dr e n in imm ine nt risk of g reat harm. The juve nile court’s finding in this respe ct i s clea rly supported by

the re cord. U nder section 37-1- 102(b)( 21)(D) of the Te nnessee Code, this ty pe of criminal activity is, for g ood rea son, plainly define d as seve re c hild abuse. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102( b)(21) (D). A cc o rd i n gl y , we conclude that Mother commit ted s ever e child abuse based on her act of knowing ly allowing children to be pre sent within a structure wher e methamphe tamine was be ing c reated. Se e id

.
B. B EST I N TERESTS OF THE C HILD
After g rounds for termination have been established by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, the fi na l st e p in the a na ly sis is a fi nd ing by

the c ou rt of wh e the r te rm inatio n is in the c hil d’ s bes t in te re st. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c )(2)

. I n making this determination, the court is g uided bya number of non-e x haustive fa ctors set out in section 36-1- 113(I ) of the T ennesse e Code:

(1) Wh e th e r th e p ar e n t o r g u ar d ian h a s ma d e s u c h a n a d ju s tm e nt of
c ir c ums ta nc e , c on du c t, o r c on dit ion s a s to mak e it sa fe a nd in the c hil d' s b e st i nte re st to be in the home of the pare nt or g uardia n; (2) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n has fa iled t o eff ect a lasting a djustment
a ft e r r e a so na

ble e ff orts by a va ila

ble so c ia l ser vic e s ag e nc ie s for su c h d ur a tio n o f t ime that lasting a djustment does not reasona bly appea r possible; (3) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n has maintained reg ular visitation or other contac t with the child; (4) Whether

a mea ningf

ul relationship has otherw ise b een e stablished betwee n the par ent or g uardia n and the c hild; (5 ) T he e ff

e c t a c ha ng e of

c are take rs and ph y sic a l e nv ir on me nt i s li ke ly to have on the child' s emotional, psy cholog ical and me dical condition; (6) Whether

the par ent or gua

rdian, or othe r per son residing with the pare nt or g uardia n, has shown bruta lity , phy sical, sexual, e motional or psy cholog ical abuse , or neg lect towar d the child, or a nother c hild or adult in the family or household;-11- (7 ) Wh e the r the ph y sic a l e nv ir on me nt o f the pa re nt' s o r g ua

rd ia n' s h ome is he a lth y a ndsa fe , w he the r the re is c ri min a l a c tiv ity in the ho me , o r w he the r the re is such use of

alcohol or c ontrolled substance s as m ay re n der thepare nt or g uardia n consistently

unable to ca

re f or the c hild in a safe and stable manne r; (8 ) Wh e the r the pa

re nt' s o r g ua

rd ia n' s men ta l a nd

/or e mot ion a l st a tus wo uld be det ri menta l to the c hil d o r p re ve nt the pa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n f ro m e ff e c tiv e ly providing safe and stable c are and super vision for the child; or (9) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n has paid child support consistent with the child support g uidelines promulg ated by the depa rtment pursuant to § 36-5- 101.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(i)( Supp. 2004).
Apply ing the fore g oing f

actor s, it is clearly

evident from the r ecor d that Mother has f ailed to make a la sting a djustment to her conduct a nd the conditions of her livi n g en v i ro n m ent, and a return of M.J .J

. to that e nvironment would not be saf e or in the c hild’s best interest. The trial court found that Mother ha d failed to maintain re g ular visitation or contac t, and, as a r esult, a mea ningf ul relationship had not be en established betwee n her a nd M.J .J . Mother fa iled to provide support for the c hil d. Th e c ou rt

a lso fo un d th a t a

c ha ng e of

c are take rs a ndph y sic a l e nv ir on me nt w ou ld l ike ly have a detrimental e ffe ct on M.J .J .’s emoti onal, ps y cholog ical, and medical condition. Mother has
a llo we d me tha mph e ta min e to be ma nu fa c tur e d in the pr e se nc e of c hil dr e n, re nd e ri ng he r u na ble to
car e for M.J .J . in a safe and stable ma nner. As the court further found, M.J .J . is a fra g ile infant who ha s e sta bli sh e d a str on g bo ndwi th h e r f

os te r p are nts

. She ha s re ma ine d c on tin uo us ly in the sa me foster home , and the foster pa rents wish to adopt. These finding s by the trial court are clea

rly and convincing ly

supported by

the re cord. A ccor dingly , we conclude that termination of Mother’ s p ar e n t a l r i g h t s i s i n t h e b e s ti n t e r e s t s o f t h e c h i l d , M

. J. J.

III. C ONCL US I ON
The e vidence in the rec ord cle arly and con v in c in g ly

e s ta b li s h e s one or more statutory g rounds for termination. I n addition, termination is in M.J .J .’s best interest, having been shown by clea r and convincing evidenc e. Ac cording ly , we affirm the trial court’s judgme nt terminating the par ental
r i g h t s o f M o t h e r , H

. F

. H

. C o s t s o f t h i s ap p e a l ar e t a x e d a g a i n s tt h e ap p e l l a n t , H

. F

. H

. , a n d h e r s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________

DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE