alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We
hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-129058, 333-126360, 333-111841,
333-111830, 333-38896, 333-61284, 333-61278, 333-72704, 333-89396 and 333-145853) of ValueClick, Inc. of our report dated
February 27, 2009 relating to the financial statements, financial statement scheduled and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which appears in this
Form 10-K.

/s/
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Los
Angeles, California
February 27, 2009

---



QuickLinks
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

OSCEOLA REGIONAL HOSPITAL, D/B /A OSCEOLA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

,

Petitioner

,

v. Case No. 5D 17

- 4097

ASHLEY CALZADA AND JUAN L. CALZADA, INDIVIDUALLY AND O/B/O J.L.C.O., A CHILD, ERIC FRENDAK, CRNA, OSCEOLA OB/GYN, MICHAEL R. DENARDIS, D.O., OB HOSPITALIST GROUP, LLC, EZER A. OJEDA, M.D., ET AL.

, Respondent s

.
________________________________/

Opinion filed July 6, 2018

Petition for Certior ari Review of Order from the Circuit Court for Osceola County, Margaret H. Schreiber , Judge.

Jason M. Azzarone, David S. Nelson, and Louis J. La Cava, of La Cava & Jacobson, P.A., Tampa , for Petitioner.

Heather M. Kolinsky, of Law Office of Chad A. Barr, P.A., Altamonte Springs, for Re spondent s Ashley Calzada and Juan Calzada, individually an d on behalf of J.L.C.O., a Child.

No Appearance for other Respondents.2

PER CURIAM

. Osceola Regional Hospital, d/b/a Osceola Regional Medical Center (“Osceola

Hospital”)

, a def endant in a medical malpractice action bro ught by Ashley and Juan

Calzada, seeks certiorari review of an order denying its motion to dismiss complaint

. I n
its motion, Osceola Hospital alleged

, inter alia

, that the Calzadas had failed to comply

with certai n presuit investigation requirements applicable to medical malpractice cases

under chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2013)

, with regard to their claims that Osceola

Hospital was liable for the actions of three identified nurses

. Because the trial court

denied the motion without making necessary findings, we grant the petition.

Osceola Hospital’s motion required the trial court to determine whether the

Calzadas complied with chapter 7 66. However, after conducting a non

- evidentiary

hearing, the trial court sim ply denied the motion without explanation. By doing so, the

trial court “effected a denial of the procedural safeguards of chapter 766 for which

certiorari relief is appropriate.” PP Transition, LP v. Munson , 232 So. 3d 515, 516 (Fla.

2d DCA 2017) ( grant ing certiorari relief where trial court denied hospital’s motion to

dismiss without making express findings on plaintiff s ’ compliance with presuit

investigation requirements applicable to medical malpractice cases ) ; see also Martin

Mem ’l Med

. C tr. , Inc. v. Herber

, 984 So. 2d 661 , 663 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding that

trial court departed from essential requirements of law by failing to determine whether

patient conducted reasonable investigation and whether her claim rested on reasonable3

basis). On reman d , the trial court shall make express finding s as to whether the

Calzadas complied with chapter 766’s presuit requirements. 1

PETITION GRANTED.

SAWAYA

, TORPY AND EVANDER , JJ., concur.

1 Our decision does not preclude the trial court from addressing the Calzadas’ claim that they were excused from providing a corroborating affidavit because of Osceola Hospital’s alleged failure to timely provide requested medical records pursuant to section 766.204, Florida Statutes (2013).
Arvin D. ROCHELL, petitioner, v. Earnest LEE, et al.

No. 17-5007.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 27, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Mississippi denied.
Marcellus FRENCH, petitioner, v. ILLINOIS.

No. 18-7764.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 18, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District denied.
ILLINOIS LIBERTY PAC, et al., petitioners, v. Kwame RAOUL, Attorney General of Illinois, et al.

No. 18-755.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1318 Introduced in House (IH)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1318

To authorize the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade 
          relations treatment) to the products of Kyrgyzstan.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 25, 1999

   Ms. Dunn (for herself, Mr. Berman, and Mr. Crane) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To authorize the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade 
          relations treatment) to the products of Kyrgyzstan.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Kyrgyzstan has been found to be in full compliance with 
        the freedom of emigration requirements under title IV of the 
        Trade Act of 1974.
            (2) Since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, 
        Kyrgyzstan has made great progress towards democratic rule and 
        towards creating a free-market economy system.
            (3) Kyrgyzstan concluded a bilateral investment treaty with 
        the United States in 1994.
            (4) Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated a strong desire to build a 
        friendly and cooperative relationship with the United States.
            (5) The extension of unconditional normal trade relations 
        treatment to the products of Kyrgyzstan will enable the United 
        States to avail itself of all rights under the World Trade 
        Organization with respect to Kyrgyzstan.

SEC. 2. TERMINATION OF APPLICATION OF TITLE IV OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 
              TO KYRGYZSTAN.

    (a) Presidential Determinations and Extensions of Nondiscriminatory 
Treatment.--Notwithstanding any provision of title IV of the Trade Act 
of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2431 et seq.), the President may--
            (1) determine that such title should no longer apply to 
        Kyrgyzstan; and
            (2) after making a determination under paragraph (1) with 
        respect to Kyrgyzstan, proclaim the extension of 
        nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations treatment) 
        to the products of that country.
    (b) Termination of Application of Title IV.--On or after the 
effective date of the extension under subsection (a)(2) of 
nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of Kyrgyzstan, title IV of 
the Trade Act of 1974 shall cease to apply to that country.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 23.1 

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in theRegistration Statements on Form S-8 (No. 333-118486, 333-121830 and 333-121923) of Domino’s Pizza, Inc. of our report dated March 3, 2006 relating to the financial statements and the financial statement schedule, management’sassessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which appears in this Annual Report on Form 10-K. 

/s/     PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 

Detroit, Michigan 

March 3, 2006
Juan B. ORTIZ, petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General.

No. 18-992.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 1, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
FREDERICK CHARLES 

DUTTON, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

___________________________/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-3099

Opinion filed October 6, 2014.

Petition for Writ of Mandamus -- Original Jurisdiction.

Frederick Charles Dutton, Jr., pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See Munn v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 

807 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

THOMAS, ROBERTS, and ROWE, JJ., CONCUR.
YI S., petitioner, v. ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES OF the CITY OF NEW YORK.

No. 18M129.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 15, 2019.

Motion to direct the Clerk to file a petition for writ of certiorari out of time under Rule 14.5 denied.
Edmund Lavonne JENKINS, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-9343.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 1, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 89 (Monday, May 9, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 27631]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-09898]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project No. 14980-000]


Lock\+TM\ Hydro Friends Fund XXVIII, LLC; Notice of Surrender of 
Preliminary Permit

    Take notice that Lock\+TM\ Hydro Friends Fund XXVIII, LLC, 
permittee for the proposed Nockamixon Dam Hydropower Project, has 
requested that its preliminary permit be terminated. The permit was 
issued on January 7, 2020 and would have expired on December 31, 
2023.\1\ The project would have been located at the Pennsylvania 
Department of Conservation and Natural Resources' Nockamixon Dam on 
Tohickon Creek in Bucks County, Pennsylvania.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 170 FERC ] 62,007 (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The preliminary permit for Project No. 14980 will remain in effect 
until the close of business, June 2, 2022. But, if the Commission is 
closed on this day, then the permit remains in effect until the close 
of business on the next day in which the Commission is open.\2\ New 
applications for this site may not be submitted until after the permit 
surrender is effective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ 18 CFR 385.2007(a)(2) (2021).

    Dated: May 3, 2022.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2022-09898 Filed 5-6-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
# C_2009082EN.01002902.xml

| 4.4.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 82/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.4.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 82/29

---

Action brought on 21 January 2009 — Engelhorn v OHIM — The Outdoor Group (peerstorm)

(Case T-30/09)

(2009/C 82/52)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: Engelhorn KGaA (Mannheim, Germany) (represented by: W. Göpfert, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM: The Outdoor Group Limited (Northampton, United Kingdom)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM:

Form of order sought

| — | annul Decision R-167/2008-5 of the Fifth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 28 October 2008; and |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Decision R-167/2008-5 of the Fifth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 28 October 2008; and

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for a Community trade mark: the applicant.

Applicant for a Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: the word mark ‘peerstorm’ for goods and services in Class 25 (Community trade mark application No 4 115 382)

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: The Outdoor Group Limited

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited in opposition: the word mark ‘PETER STORM’ for goods in Class 25 (Community trade mark No 833 566) and the British trade mark ‘PETER STORM’ for goods in Class 18

Mark or sign cited in opposition:

Decision of the Opposition Division: opposition rejected

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: annulment of the decision of the Opposition Division and rejection of the application for a Community trade mark

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (1) as there is no likelihood of confusion between the opposing trade marks, and infringement of Rule 22 of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 (2) inasmuch as use preserving the right to use the trade mark cited in opposition has not been sufficiently proven.

Pleas in law:

1

2

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1).

1

(2)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1995 L 303, p. 1).

2

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 10-QSB
FOR THE PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1999, FOR ONSITE ENERGY CORPORATION, AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.

</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                         585,325
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  4,690,765
<ALLOWANCES>                                   35,000
<INVENTORY>                                    183,760
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               6,760,913
<PP&E>                                         2,406,791
<DEPRECIATION>                                 1,122,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 8,205,700
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          12,814,840
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    699
<COMMON>                                       18,641
<OTHER-SE>                                     (4,952,490)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   8,205,700
<SALES>                                        9,575,572
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               9,575,572
<CGS>                                          7,433,959
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  7,433,959
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               2,764,305
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             198,284
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (753,353)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   3,600
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (738,953)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (738,953)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  0.08
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0.08



</TABLE>
---

EXHIBIT 13.2

|CERTIFICATION OF                             
|---------------------------------------------
|CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER                      
|                                             
|PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,          
|AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO                       
|SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Nathalie Pilon, Chief Financial Officer of Lincoln Gold
  Corporation (the Company), hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
  as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to
  the best of my knowledge:

| | (i)  | the Annual Report on Form 20-F, of the Company for the
      fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 (the Annual Report) fully complies
      with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
      Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | ---- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
| | (ii) | the information contained in the Annual Report fairly
      presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.                                                                                  

| | By:    | /s/
      Nathalie Pilon
| | ------ | ------------------------
| | Name:  | Nathalie Pilon          
| | Title: | Chief Financial Officer 
| |        |                         
| | Date:  | July 14, 2009           

This certification accompanies this Annual Report on Form
  20-F pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not,
  except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for
  purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
  "Exchange Act"). Such certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by
  reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the
  Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it
  by reference.

---
Oscar Lamar MIMS, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-8464.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 22, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1404 Introduced in House (IH)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1404

   To amend title 11 of the United States Code to include the earned 
income credit in property that the debtor may elect to exempt from the 
                                estate.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 14, 1999

Mr. Brown of Ohio introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                     the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title 11 of the United States Code to include the earned 
income credit in property that the debtor may elect to exempt from the 
                                estate.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AMENDMENTS.

    Section 522(d)(10) of title 11, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (E) by striking the period at the end 
        and inserting ``; or'', and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(F)(i) any refund of tax imposed by subtitle A of 
                the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for any taxable year 
                to the extent that the amount of the refund does not 
                exceed the credit allowed by section 32 of such Code 
                for such year, and
                    ``(ii) any advance payment of such credit under 
                section 3507 of such Code.''.

SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.

    (a) Effective Date.--Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act 
and the amendments made by section 1 shall take effect on the date of 
the enactment of this Act.
    (b) Application of Amendments.--The amendments made by this Act 
shall apply only with respect to cases commenced under title 11 of the 
United States Code on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Cornell Winfrei McCLURE, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-7951.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 25, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-50767

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RICARDO FLORES BURCIAGA,

also known as Ricardo Flores-Burciaga,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. DR-02-CR-53-1-FB

--------------------

February 20, 2003

Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ricardo Flores Burciaga appeals the sentence imposed

following his guilty plea conviction of attempting to illegally

reenter the United States after deportation/removal in violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He contends that the sentence is invalid

because it exceeds the two-year maximum term of imprisonment

prescribed in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Burciaga complains that his

sentence was improperly enhanced pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). 

He argues that the sentencing provision is unconstitutional. 
No. 02-50767

-2-

Alternatively, Burciaga contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the

prior conviction that resulted in his increased sentence was an

element of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that

should have been alleged in his indictment.

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Burciaga acknowledges that his arguments are foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his arguments for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
Robyn G. EDWARDS, et al., petitioners, v. GENE SALTER PROPERTIES, et al.

No. 18-7234.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 25, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.