J-S38041-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

KATHLEEN BANG WHAN CHUNG AND 

MYONG JA JHANG, 

 Appellants 

 v.

KYUNG SOON KIM AND 

SOOK HEE KIM, 

 Appellees 

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

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: No. 2128 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the Order Entered June 14, 2013, 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, 

Civil Division, at No. 2011-33371. 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES and SHOGAN, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 04, 2014 

Pro se Appellants, Kathleen Bang Whan Chung and Myong Ja Jhang, 

appeal from the order denying their motion for special injunctions, a 

temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction in this matter 

brought against Appellees, Kyung Soon Kim and Sook Hee Kim.1

 We affirm. 

 The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows: 

This matter arises out of a dispute on the financing and 

governance of the Global Mission Theological School (“GMTS”) in 

Elkins Park, PA. [Appellants] claim to have been members of 

 

1

 We note that while the denial of a preliminary injunction is not a final 

order, it is, nevertheless, an interlocutory order appealable as of right 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4). Accordingly, this appeal is properly before 

this Court. 
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GMTS’ Board of Directors and officers of the school, which is 

incorporated as a non-profit corporation. [Appellants] further 

claim to have together loaned large sums of money to 

[Appellees,] GMTS’ president and fellow board member, Kyung 

Soon Kim, and his wife Sook Hee Kim . . . . [Appellants] claim, 

[Appellees] have misappropriated the loaned money and have 

not paid [Appellants] back as promised. 

[Appellants] filed an underlying claim for money damages 

but also a motion seeking a preliminary injunction against 

[Appellees]. [Appellants] sought to have [Appellees] (1) turn 

over to [Appellants] all GMTS bank accounts, funds, and student 

tuition money; (2) provide [Appellants] with a full accounting of 

tuition receipts and expenses incurred by [Appellees] on behalf 

of GMTS; (3) turn over to [Appellants] all GMTS computer 

system identifications and passwords; and (4) stay away from 

GMTS facilities. Hearings were held in this matter on four 

separate dates, and, on June 14, 2013, this Court denied 

[Appellants’] motion for a preliminary injunction. [Appellants] 

now appeal from that denial. 

[Appellants’] claims are not clear, and the evidence 

presented at the preliminary injunction hearings was 

inconclusive. Furthermore, there is no immediate irreparable 

harm to [Appellants] as a result of actions taken by [Appellees] 

in and through an entity which [Appellants] never owned or had 

any controlling interest. Accordingly, a preliminary injunction 

was not warranted. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/25/13, at 1-2.

 Subsequently, on December 18, 2013, during the pendency of this 

appeal and after their appellate brief was due to be filed, pro se Appellants 

filed a “Motion for Stay” with this Court alleging that they “filed a similar 

case with federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on October 31, 

2013.” Motion for Stay, 12/18/13, at 1. In their motion to stay, Appellants 

alleged that (1) the federal court had pendent jurisdiction, and (2) that 
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perjury and fraud transpired in the lower court. Id. In conclusion, 

Appellants requested that this Court hold the decision in this matter “until 

the federal court makes a ruling regarding pendent jurisdiction.” Id. 

 In their response dated January 14, 2014, and filed on January 16, 

2014, Appellees pointed out that, “[a]ccording to the Superior Court Briefing 

Schedule for this appeal, the Appellants were required to file their brief in 

support of their appeal on November 12, 2013. The Appellants failed to file 

their Brief on the due date, and, almost two months later, still have not filed 

a brief.” Appellees’ Response, 1/16/14, at 1. Appellees offered the following 

conclusion, “[T]he Motion for Stay is moot, and the Appellants[’] appeal 

should be, if it is not already so, dismissed with prejudice.” Id. 

 Also on January 14, 2014, this Court issued a per curiam order that 

denied Appellants’ motion to stay and extended the period in which they 

could file their appellate brief.2

 Order, 1/14/14, at 1. Appellants filed their 

brief with this Court on February 11, 2014.3

 

2 The complete text of this Court’s per curiam order of January 14, 2014, 

provides as follows: 

Appellants’ motion for stay, is DENIED. Appellants have 

not successfully demonstrated the satisfaction of the 

requirements for issuance of a stay as set forth in Pa. Public 

Utility Cmm’n v. Process Gas Consumers Group, 467 A.2d 

805 (Pa. 1983), i.e. (1) they are likely to prevail on the merits of 

this appeal; (2) without the requested relief, they will suffer 

irreparable injury; (3) the issuance of a stay will not 
J-S38041-14

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 Appellants purport to raise the following issues for our review: 

1. When there is a federal claim which is closely related to a 

state law claim, does the federal court have pendent jurisdiction 

over the state claim to encourage both “economy in litigation” 

and “fairness” by eliminating the need for separate federal and 

state trials hearing essentially the same facts yet potentially 

reaching opposite conclusions? 

2. Are Appellants entitled to a Stay of state court proceedings 

due to pendent jurisdiction in federal claims? 

Appellants’ Brief at 4.

 

substantially harm other interested parties; and (4) the issuance 

of a stay will not adversely affect the public interest.

Appellants’ brief and reproduced record were due to be

filed on or before November 12, 2013. See Pa.R.A.P. 1972

(unless otherwise ordered by the appellate court, a motion under 

this rule shall not relieve any party of the duty of filing his or her 

briefs and reproduced records within the time otherwise

prescribed therefor). Accordingly, appellants are directed to file 

their brief and reproduced record within 30 days of the date of 

this order. No further extensions will be granted. 

3 On March 11, 2014, Appellees filed a “motion to quash or dismiss appeal.” 

On April 1, 2014, Appellants filed their pro se “brief in opposition to motion 

to squash [sic] or dismiss appeal . . . .” On April 14, 2014, this Court 

entered a per curiam order that deferred disposition on Appellees’ motion to 

quash or dismiss until review by a merits panel. The full text of our order 

dated April 14, 2014, provides as follows: 

Disposition of [A]ppellees’ motion to quash or dismiss this 

appeal, is hereby deferred to the panel that will decide the 

merits of this appeal. Appellee’s [sic] brief shall be filed within 

30 days of the date of this order. 

For the reasons set forth in this memorandum, we deny Appellees’ 

motion to quash as moot. 
J-S38041-14

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 Initially, we observe that appellate briefs must materially conform to 

the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. Chapter 21. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

2111 provides specific guidelines regarding the content of an appellant’s 

brief. In addition, Pa.R.A.P. 2114 through 2119 specify in greater detail the 

material to be included in briefs on appeal. 

 More specifically, Pa.R.A.P. 2116 addresses the statement of questions 

involved and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

Rule 2116. Statement of Questions Involved 

 (a) General rule. The statement of the questions involved 

must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the 

terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary 

detail. The statement will be deemed to include every subsidiary 

question fairly comprised therein. No question will be 

considered unless it is stated in the statement of 

questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby. . . . 

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (emphasis added). Furthermore, we have long stated 

that our Court’s review is limited to addressing only the order that 

Appellants designated in their notice of appeal, which in this case is the 

order of June 14, 2013. See Commonwealth v. Hottinger, 537 A.2d 1, 2 

(Pa. Super. 1987) (observing that the appellant could address no other 

issues in the appeal except those pertaining to the order on appeal). 

We recognize that Appellants are acting pro se. However, their status 

as pro se litigants does not relieve them of their responsibility to conform to 
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the applicable rules. See Laird v. Ely & Bernard, 528 A.2d 1379 (Pa. 

Super. 1987) (quashing pro se appeal where defects in the appellant’s pro 

se brief were so substantial that meaningful review was not possible). In 

First Union Mortgage Corp. v. Frempong, 744 A.2d 327 (Pa. Super. 

1999), we stated the following: 

While this court is willing to liberally construe 

materials filed by a pro se litigant, we note that 

appellant is not entitled to any particular advantage 

because he lacks legal training. As our supreme 

court has explained, “any layperson choosing to 

represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to 

some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his 

lack of expertise and legal training will prove his 

undoing.”

O’Neill v. Checker Motors Corp., . . . 567 A.2d 680, 682 (Pa. 

Super. 1989) (citations omitted). Appellant has chosen to 

proceed pro se and he cannot expect our court to act as his 

attorney. See Commonwealth v. Sanford, . . . 445 A.2d 149, 

150 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“We decline to become appellant’s 

counsel. When issues are not properly raised and developed in 

briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific 

issues for review, a court will not consider the merits thereof.”).

First Union Mortgage Corp., 744 A.2d at 337-338.

 Our review of the certified record before us on appeal reflects that 

Appellants have initiated this appeal from the trial court order dated June 

14, 2013, which denied Appellants’ motion for special injunction, a 

temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction. However, a 

careful review of Appellants’ statement of questions involved reveals that 

none of the issues presented in their Rule 2116 statement of questions 
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involved addresses the order dated June 14, 2013, from which this appeal 

lies. Appellants’ Brief at 4. Any issue not raised in the statement of 

questions is waived. Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). As such, Appellants have waived 

any challenge to the trial court’s determination that is the subject of this 

appeal. Hottinger, 537 A.2d at 2. Thus, because there are no issues 

before us pertaining to the order properly on appeal, we are constrained to 

affirm the order of the court of common pleas. 

Motion to quash denied. Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/4/2014