Filed 2/7/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

THE NORTH RIVER 

INSURANCE COMPANY et al.,

Defendants and 

Appellants.

 B322752

 Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. F1765160

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 

Clara County, My-Le Jacqueline Duong, Judge. Affirmed.

Jefferson T. Stamp for Appellants.
2

James R. Williams, County Counsel, Christopher A. 

Capozzi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

In this bail forfeiture action, the North River Insurance 

Company and its bail agent (collectively, North River) challenge a 

trial court’s order denying a continuance. We decided a similar 

case against a surety in People v. Tingcungco (2015) 237 

Cal.App.4th 249 (Tingcungco). As we explained in Tingcungco, 

North River’s position is contrary to the language and legislative 

history of Penal Code section 1305, subdivisions (g) and (h).

North River posted a bail bond on a defendant who fled 

California. North River chased him but found him too late to get 

the prosecution’s decision on extradition, which is a necessary 

part of the statutory process. To save itself now, North River 

maintains legislative purpose should override, or guide, the 

interpretation of the words of this statute.

When construing this statute, our job indeed is to effectuate 

its purpose. (E.g., Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 

128, 135 (Apple).) “The dominant mode of statutory 

interpretation over the past century has been one premised on 

the view that legislation is a purposive act, and judges should 

construe statutes to execute that legislative purpose. This 

approach finds lineage in the sixteenth-century English decision 

Heydon’s Case, which summons judges to interpret statutes in a 

way ‘as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy.’ ” 

(Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014) p. 31, italics added.)

Here the legislative history shows the Legislature 

considered the purpose North River proposes but rejected this 

approach in favor of the current statute’s wording, which is 
3

inhospitable to this proposed interpretation. The decision in 

Tingcungco explained all that. North River does not negate or 

engage that analysis. Its claim to fidelity to legislative purpose 

lacks a footing in text or history.

We therefore affirm. Section citations are to the Penal 

Code. 

I

The prosecution filed a complaint alleging Geovanni 

Quijadas Silva committed a lewd or lascivious act on a child by 

force, violence, duress, menace, and fear. North River posted a 

$100,000 bond to release Silva.

The trial court declared the bond forfeited when Silva did 

not appear for a hearing on February 22, 2018. The court mailed 

notice of the forfeiture on February 26, 2018. The forfeiture 

would become final in 180 days (plus five days for mailing), on 

August 30, 2018, unless Silva came to court or was in custody by 

then.

At North River’s request, the court granted two extensions 

for a total of 180 days from the first extension. March 20, 2019,

was the final day of this new interval. On that final day, North 

River moved to vacate the forfeiture and to exonerate the bond 

under section 1305, subdivision (d) or (g). In the alternative, it 

moved to toll time under section 1305, subdivision (e) or (h).

North River’s motion included a declaration by an 

investigator who said he found Silva in Mexico on March 15, 

2019. The investigator temporarily detained Silva in the 

presence of a Mexican law enforcement officer, who positively 

identified Silva. The motion had other exhibits, including Silva’s 

Mexican identification card and fingerprints, photos of Silva and 

the investigator, and statements from the officer and Silva.
4

The prosecution opposed the motion because it could not 

make an extradition decision within the appearance period—

which is to say by March 20, 2019—nor did it decline to extradite 

within that period. The prosecution noted that North River 

served the motion on the last day of the appearance period and, 

moreover, served it to an office where the prosecutor of record 

and the prosecutor who handles contested bail motions did not 

work. The prosecution also said the fingerprints were not usable.

In reply, North River said the prosecution violated due 

process by not giving notice of its extradition decision and by not 

saying whether it would agree to tolling. North River 

alternatively argued the court should toll time under section 

1305, subdivision (h) or should grant a continuance under section 

1305, subdivision (j).

On June 28, 2019, the court denied North River’s motion. 

It found the matter was untimely because the prosecution had 

not made a decision about extradition by the end of the 

appearance period, March 20, 2019, and no statutory provisions 

required the prosecution to make a decision by then. The court 

also denied the alternate requests to toll the forfeiture period or 

to continue the matter.

On July 10, 2019, the court entered a judgment of $100,000 

against North River. North River appealed. It is the sole 

appellant: no one who may have helped post bond is involved in 

this appeal.
5

II

We survey law about bail and forfeiture and then show this 

law did not require the court to extend the appearance period.

A

We independently review the trial court’s interpretation of 

statutes. (County of Los Angeles v. Financial Casualty & Surety, 

Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 309, 314.)

When a person for whom a bail bond has been posted fails 

without sufficient excuse to appear as required, the trial court 

must declare the bond forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a).)

The surety then has an appearance period either to produce 

the defendant or to demonstrate that other circumstances require 

the court to set aside the forfeiture. (§ 1305, subd. (c); People v. 

United States Fire Ins. Co. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 991, 1000 [this 

period is commonly called the “appearance period” or the 

“exoneration period”].) This period lasts 180 days (plus five days 

for mailing) from when the court mails the notice of forfeiture.

(§ 1305, subd. (b).) If the surety shows good cause, the court may 

extend this period for up to 180 days from the date of the order 

granting the extension. (§ 1305.4.)

If the defendant appears during the appearance period, the 

court must vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond. (§ 1305, 

subd. (c)(1).) If the court does not set aside the forfeiture by the 

end of the appearance period, it must enter summary judgment 

against the surety. (§ 1306, subd. (a).)

Section 1305, subdivision (j) allows the court to hear a 

motion after the appearance period expires. It says, “A motion 

filed in a timely manner within the 180-day period may be heard 

within 30 days of the expiration of the 180-day period. The court 
6

may extend the 30-day period upon a showing of good cause.” 

(§ 1305, subd. (j).)

Defendants skipping bail may flee California. Those 

defendants are bad news for their bail bond companies, but 

section 1305, subdivision (g) gives these companies a potential 

out. This section requires the court to vacate the forfeiture and 

to exonerate the bond—but only if two prerequisites obtain. 

First, the bail agent must temporarily detain the defendant in 

the presence of a local law enforcement officer, who must 

positively identify the defendant in an affidavit. (Ibid.) Second, 

and pertinent to this appeal, the prosecution must decide not to 

seek extradition. (Ibid.)

In cases arising under section 1305, subdivision (g), the 

court may toll the appearance period under subdivision (h). To 

do so, the bail agent and the prosecution must agree it will take 

more time to return the defendant to the court’s jurisdiction, and 

the prosecution must agree to tolling. (Ibid.)

To interpret these provisions, we look first to the words of 

the statute and try to give effect to their ordinary meaning. 

(Tingcungco, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 253.) Generally, we 

strictly construe bail statutes to avoid forfeiture. (People v. 

Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 301, 308 

(Lumbermens).) The policy disfavoring forfeiture cannot, 

however, overcome a statute’s plain meaning. (Ibid.) Our 

polestar is devotion to the statute’s purpose. (Apple, supra, 56 

Cal.4th at p. 135.)

B

The law did not require the trial court to continue the 

appearance period. We first address section 1305, subdivisions 

(g) and (h), and then turn to subdivision (j).
7

Section 1305, subdivisions (g) and (h) did not require a 

continuance. On similar facts, Tingcungco decided this issue. A 

defendant failed to appear, and the court ordered the bail 

forfeited. (Tingcungco, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 252.) Three 

days before the extended appearance period expired, the surety 

told the prosecution it found the defendant in Mexico and asked 

the court to toll the appearance period. The court denied the 

request. (Ibid.) Like North River, the surety in Tingcungco

argued it had complied fully with section 1305, subdivision (g) 

and the prosecution’s indecision about extradition should not 

frustrate exoneration of the bond. (Tingcungco, at p. 256.)

As the Court of Appeal in Tingcungco explained, section 

1305, subdivisions (g) and (h) do not support North River’s 

position. Subdivision (h) does not apply because the prosecution 

did not agree to toll the appearance period. (Tingcungco, supra, 

237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 258–259.) As for subdivision (g), the 

surety must find the defendant “far enough in advance of the end 

of the 180-day appearance period to allow the prosecutor to 

decide whether or not to extradite.” (Tingcungco, at pp. 258–259; 

cf. People v. Seneca Ins. Co. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1082 

[bail bond not exonerated under subd. (g) simply because 

prosecutor has not completed, or even initiated, extradition 

before end of appearance period].) North River gave less than a 

day’s notice. This was insufficient. North River did not satisfy 

subdivision (g) or (h).

The Court of Appeal in Tingcungco also examined 

legislative history that contradicts North River’s interpretation. 

(Tingcungco, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 255–258.) The 

Legislature considered an amendment in 2012 that would have 

required tolling of the appearance period pending prosecutors’ 
8

extradition decisions and would have exonerated bonds if the 

prosecution did not decide within a reasonable time. (Id. at p. 

255.) The Legislature did not enact these proposals. It replaced 

them with the substance of what is now section 1305, subdivision 

(h). As Tingcungco explained, that subdivision allows such 

tolling only after the prosecution has decided to extradite and it 

agrees it needs more time to do so. The Legislature therefore 

considered a scheme like the one North River advocates but 

enacted a different one.

The Court of Appeal in Tingcungco acknowledged some 

people may find its holding unfair, but “this was (and may again 

become) an issue for the Legislature to resolve.” (Tingcungco, 

supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 259.)

Under Tingcungco, North River’s interpretation is 

incorrect.

North River offers no reason to ignore Tingcungco. It 

dismissively refers to it only once in its opening appellate brief 

without attempting to distinguish it, or to fault it, or to engage its 

thoughtful and thorough analysis of legislative history. The 

number of cases giving negative treatment to the Tingcungco 

decision is zero. The prosecution’s appellate brief explains the 

case’s pertinence. North River filed no reply brief. Then it 

waived oral argument.

We apply Tingcungco because its reasoning is sound and 

because North River neither discredits nor distinguishes it.

North River’s reliance on section 1305, subdivision (j) is 

unavailing because a continuance under that provision does not 

extend the appearance period. This subdivision apparently did 

not come up in Tingcungco. Unlike subdivision (h), subdivision 

(j) does not reference subdivision (g) or extradition at all. 
9

Subdivision (j) is merely about when a motion “may be heard.” 

As the Court of Appeal in People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2007) 150 

Cal.App.4th 638 (Ranger) explained, a continuance under this 

subdivision extends the date of the hearing but it does not extend 

the appearance period. (Id. at pp. 649–650 [referring to former 

subd. (i), now subd. (j)]; see Lumbermens, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 

312–313 [this subdivision provides a “30–day grace period for 

hearings,” and under § 1306, subd. (a), court must enter 

summary judgment after appearance period expires unless court 

has set aside forfeiture].) The appearance period is the time to 

establish the grounds for relief, so a party must establish the 

facts of its section 1305 motion “before [the appearance] period 

expires”, notwithstanding an extension of the hearing date. 

(Ranger, at pp. 649–650, emphasis added.) The appearance 

period ended March 20, 2019, before North River established the 

fact of the prosecution deciding to seek extradition under 

subdivision (g) or of the prosecution agreeing to tolling under 

subdivision (h). North River’s interpretation of subdivision (j) 

clashes with Ranger and the plain meaning of these 

interconnected provisions.

Interpreting section 1305, subdivision (j) to apply only to 

extend the hearing date in accordance with the language of that 

subdivision does not make the extension moot. There are many 

reasons to extend a hearing date. Parties may need more time to 

write briefs. The court’s or parties’ scheduling constraints may 

necessitate an extension. Someone may be sick. Subdivision (j) 

has a purpose, but not the one North River proposes.

It would be unwise to adopt a new and expansive 

interpretation of section 1305, subdivision (j) based on North 

River’s diffident arguments. In the trial court, North River 
10

raised this issue for the first time in its reply brief. On appeal, 

North River spends a single paragraph analyzing the issue. 

North River acknowledges Ranger but does not discredit or 

distinguish it. Like most Hail Marys, this attempt fails.

Counterarguments are unavailing.

People v. Far West Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 791 (Far 

West) does not help North River. It predates the legislative 

history Tingcungco analyzed. Furthermore, in Far West, 

Oakland police told Georgia authorities to release a defendant. 

(Far West, at pp. 793, 797.) Alameda County prosecutors claimed 

this was an error and it did not bind the county. The Court of 

Appeal explained the crux of the case was—given that the surety 

had done everything required of it under the statute and bond—

“who, as between the surety and the county, must bear the 

consequences of the error.” (Id. at pp. 797–798.)

The facts of the present case are a close fit to Tingcungco 

but a far cry from Far West. The nub of the problem in Far West 

was that the Oakland police told apprehending authorities in 

Georgia to release the California fugitive. (Far West, supra, 93 

Cal.App.4th at p. 793.) That is, after the bail agent had tracked 

the runaway to Georgia and secured him there, California police 

officials told their Georgia counterparts to let the flight risk flee. 

But then California prosecutors told the court this police error 

should not bind the County Counsel’s office. (Id. at p. 797.) 

Telling a court that government errors should not bind the 

government required some audacity. The trial court put up with 

it but the Court of Appeal did not. We have nothing like that 

here.

North River cites People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 99 

Cal.App.4th 1229 for the proposition that it is entitled to a 
11

continuance as a matter of law. That case was about extending a 

hearing due to a judge’s schedule, not about extending an 

appearance period for an extradition decision. (See id. at p.

1235.)

In a five-line paragraph, North River argues due process 

required the court to grant a continuance. North River cites one 

case: Ursino v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 611 . In 

Ursino, restaurateurs appealed an agency’s issuance of a building 

permit to an appeals board. (Id. at p. 615.) The board lacked a 

quorum within the 40-day period in which a local ordinance 

allowed it to decide the case. (Id. at p. 620.) The Court of Appeal 

held that, notwithstanding the 40-day limitation, due process 

required a hearing with at least four of five board members. (Id.

at pp. 620–622.) The facts of Ursino are unlike the present case, 

and North River does not explain how or why the case should 

apply here.

The bail business involves risk. When risk is a feature of a 

business environment, economic actors build that feature into 

their decisionmaking. They seek to profit from gauging risks 

correctly. Sometimes that pays off and sometimes not. Rescuing 

a business when the risk did not pay off is an unsound reason to 

reject valid precedent. Rescuing anyone who may have pledged 

assets as security for the bond is not an issue before us, for North 

River is the lone appellant.

///
12

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to the 

respondent.

WILEY, J.

I concur: 

GRIMES, J. 
1

STRATTON, P.J., Dissenting

Appellant made a timely motion under Penal Code1 section 

1305, subdivision (g) for relief from forfeiture of the bail bond it 

posted on behalf of the fugitive defendant. Subdivision (g) 

provides: “In all cases of forfeiture where a defendant is not in 

custody and is beyond the jurisdiction of the state, is temporarily 

detained, by the bail agent, in the presence of a local law 

enforcement officer of the jurisdiction in which the defendant is 

located, and is positively identified by that law enforcement 

officer as the wanted defendant in an affidavit signed under 

penalty of perjury, and the prosecuting agency elects not to seek 

extradition after being informed of the location of the defendant, 

the court shall vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond on 

terms that are just and do not exceed the terms imposed in 

similar situations with respect to other forms of pretrial release.” 

(§1305, subd. (g).)

The motion would have been granted had appellant been 

able to show that the People had decided not to extradite him to 

the United States to face the pending charge. At the time of the 

hearing, the People had not yet made that decision, so appellant 

could not make its case for vacatur of the bond forfeiture. It 

asked the court to continue the hearing on the motion so that the 

People could make their decision, a decision totally out of 

appellant’s power to effectuate one way or another. 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.
2

Our courts of appeal have not devised a uniform standard 

by which to analyze these issues. Some courts insist upon a strict 

literal reading of the statute (see, e.g., People v. Tingcungco 

(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 159; People v. Seneca Ins. Co. (2010) 

189 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1082–1083); some courts resort to 

principles of equity upon which to base their analysis. (See, e.g., 

People v. Far West Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 791, 795 (Far 

West), and cases cited therein.) Our Supreme Court has 

acknowledged “[i]t is true as a general rule that the bail statutes 

are strictly construed to avoid forfeiture.” (People v. Indiana 

Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 301, 308 (Indiana 

Lumbermens).) In my mind “strict construction” does not require 

a strict literal meaning devoid of considerations of fairness. 

Further guidance in this regard from the legislature and our 

Supreme Court would sort out these issues.

I prefer the proposition that courts must, where feasible, 

strictly construe statutory language in favor of the surety to 

avoid the harsh results of a bail bond forfeiture. (People v. The 

North River Ins. Co. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 443, 448.) And we are 

not just talking about the surety’s interests. Strict construction 

of bail forfeiture statutes compels courts to protect the surety, 

and more importantly, the individual citizens who pledge to the 

surety their property on behalf of persons seeking release from 

custody in order to obtain the corporate bond. (People v. United 

States Fire Ins. Co. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 991, 999.) Courts 

should not “blindly follow” the literal meaning of every word if to 

do so would frustrate the legislative purpose of those words. 

(People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1384.)
3

Under section 1305, subdivision (j), a “motion filed in a 

timely manner within the 180-day period may be heard within 

30 days of the expiration of the 180-day period. The court may 

extend the 30-day period upon a showing of good cause.” (§ 1305, 

subd. (j).) The Legislature provided a 30-day grace period for the 

hearing instead of allowing such motions to be filed after the 

expiration of the 180-day period. (Indiana Lumbermens, supra, 

49 Cal.4th at p. 312 [motions to vacate must be timely brought 

within the statutory period to avoid a forfeiture within the 

180 days].) Here, the trial court continued the hearing on the 

timely filed motion for 68 days, a postponement to which no party 

objected.

I find the majority’s use of section 1305, subdivision (j) 

contrary to the way we should interpret this statute. If the court, 

as expressly empowered, finds good cause and extends the 

statutory 30-day grace period within which to hear a timely-filed 

motion for relief from forfeiture, it follows that the forfeiture 

period is necessarily extended as well; otherwise the relief 

requested is rendered moot despite the continuance. Factual 

events may continue to unfold within the extended grace period, 

which the trial court should be able to consider.

Comparing subdivision (h)2 to subdivision (j) is not true to 

the way section 1305 lays out procedures for different factual 

2 Section 1305, subdivision (h) states, “In cases arising under 

subdivision (g), if the bail agent and the prosecuting agency agree 

that additional time is needed to return the defendant to the 

jurisdiction of the court, and the prosecuting agency agrees to the 

tolling of the 180-day period, the court may, on the basis of the 

agreement, toll the 180-day period within which to vacate the 
4

scenarios. (Far West, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 795 [“As we 

read it, the statutory bail forfeiture scheme can be parsed as a 

series of contemplated possibilities, defined in terms of the 

defendant’s location vis-à-vis the jurisdiction of the superior court 

that set bail.”].) Under section 1305, subdivision (h), the parties 

are permitted to essentially stipulate to the tolling of the 180-day 

period to file a motion to vacate and the court is empowered to 

order the requested tolling. This subdivision is a way to get the 

vacatur ball rolling without the need to file a vacatur motion 

within the 180-day period where the parties and the court are in 

agreement that the defendant will eventually be returned, given 

enough time to arrange that return. Subdivision (h) does not 

govern what should happen after such a motion has been timely 

filed where, as here, the prosecuting agency has not agreed to 

tolling.

Here the denial of the motion to vacate the forfeiture works 

an injustice on the surety and whomever may have pledged their 

assets as security for the bail bond. As there are no judicial 

findings to the contrary, the surety did everything it was 

supposed to do under the statute. It located the fugitive 

defendant and notified the People of his whereabouts with the 

appropriate affidavits. It asked the People whether they 

intended to extradite the defendant for prosecution. At this point 

the fate of the bond forfeiture was in the hands of the People.

What did the People do? Nothing. Instead of making a 

timely decision about whether to extradite the defendant, they 

simply told the court they had not decided. Were they pressed for 

forfeiture. The court may order tolling for up to the length of 

time agreed upon by the parties.” (§1305, subd. (g).)
5

time and therefore unable to decide? The majority says the 

People had “less than a day’s notice” to decide and therefore the 

timely motion was made “too late.” That is speculation, and, I 

believe, misreads the record. We don’t know any of that because 

the trial court did not insist on an explanation, even after it had 

continued the hearing on the motion for 68 days. Once on notice, 

I would hold 68 days is enough time to require the People to 

make up their mind whether to extradite. If it was not enough 

time, a further continuance should have been granted. I see 

neither rhyme nor reason to base denial of the vacatur of the 

bond forfeiture on the People’s indecision.

The bond is a contract between the surety and the People 

governed by section 1305. (See Far West, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 797–798 [where surety’s conduct was not unreasonable and 

was in line with its obligations under the bond contract, 

forfeiture is reversed where People’s conduct prevented return of 

fugitive defendant]; People v. Rolley (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 639 

[where surety did everything it contracted to do, but return of 

defendant was impeded by law enforcement, forfeiture is 

vacated].) The surety complied with its obligation under the 

contract with the People. The trial court effectively vitiated the 

contract by not requiring the People to make the decision it 

contracted to make when it accepted the surety’s bond.

I embrace the general concept that courts should not 

interfere with prosecutorial decisions. (People v. Financial 

Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 369, 380–381 

[Courts “have consistently read subdivision (g) of section 1305 as 

leaving the timetable and criteria for deciding whether to 

extradite squarely in the hands of the prosecuting agency.”].) But 

I do not embrace the proposition that no matter the violence to 
6

contractual obligations or the efforts of the surety, courts must 

defer to prosecutorial indecision under section 1305. Nor should 

courts be permitted to hamstring sureties by deferring to 

prosecutorial indecision. A fair reading of the statute 

contemplates a prosecutorial decision on extradition before bail is 

forfeited. The trial court should have required the People to 

make that decision in response to the motion to vacate the 

forfeiture or it should have continued the hearing until the 

People did so. Forfeiture under these circumstances is not right.

STRATTON, P. J.