### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-11-00807- CV
Janos Far kas, App ellant

v. Second Congress, Ltd., App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 261 ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 0-0 0363 2, H ONO RAB LE JO N N. WI SSER, JUDGE P RESIDING
NO. 03-13-00379- CV
Janos Far kas, App ellant

v. Second Congress, Ltd., App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 261 ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 0-0 0363 2, H ONO RAB LE LO RA J. LI VINGSTO N, JUDGE P RESIDING

NO. 03-13-00388- CV

Janos Far kas, App ellant

v. Second Congress, Ltd., App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 261 ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 0-0 0363 2, H ONO RAB LE J. DAVID P HI LLIP S, JUDGE P RESIDINGM E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

These three appea ls stem from the same underly ing cause of action co n ce rni ng J anos Farka s’s decision not to fulfill an ag ree ment to buy a condominium from Second Cong ress, L td. The trial court g rante d Second Congr ess’s motion for summary judgme nt and awa rded $86,000 in damag es on its brea ch-of -contra ct claim ag ainst Fa rkas. I t later appointed a rec eiver for Fa rkas’ s assets to help satisfy the judgme nt, then imposed $1,000 as sanctions for the attorney ’s fee s Second Congr ess incurre d in seeking to compe l Fa rk as to comply with post-judgme nt discovery

. Fa rkas challeng es all of these ruling s. We aff irm the judgme nt and the sanctions awa rd and dismiss as moot the appea l of

the orde r appointing a re ceive r bec ause the challeng ed orde r has be en super seded by a subseque nt amended or der.

03-11-00807- CV: The sum m ary judgm ent

Fa rkas signe d an Ag ree ment of Sale and Purchase for a condo from Second Congr ess and provided an $86,000 chec k written on an a ccount of his business to satisfy the earnest-mone y require ment. Second C ong ress ag ree d in a written addendum to the Agre ement to hold the check for fourtee n day s to permit Fa rkas to repla ce the chec k with a letter of cre dit. The substitut ion never

occur red, but Second Congr ess d i d n o t deposit the chec k and deliver the proce eds to the title company as ag ree d in the addendum. Fa rkas decide d not to buy the condo—re portedly due to

some financ ial losses—and stopped pay ment on the chec k. The Ag ree ment provided that the seller could reta in the ear

nest money as liquidated damag es and its sole reme dy for the buy er’ s failure to purcha se. Second Congr ess sued an d obtained a summary judgme nt in the amount of the ear nest money , plus interest and a ttorney ’s fe es.

2On appea l, Fa rkas contends that the trial court err ed by g ranting Second Congr ess’s motion for summary judgme nt beca use (1) Second Congr ess d i d n o t es t ablish the exis tence of a valid contra ct, (2) the ear nest money provision was a condition prec edent to the formation of the
contra ct that was not fulfilled, (3) Fa rkas was within his rig hts to resc ind the contra ct and withdraw his ear nest money beca

use the amount require d was i n deter minate under the contra ct, and (4) the proper ty was late r sold to a third party for more than Fa rkas’ s contra ct price , meaning that Second Congr ess was not da mag ed by Fa rkas’ s decision not to buy the condo. We revie w the summary -judg ment motion and response de novo to deter mine if the competent s u

mm a r y - ju d g me n t e v id e n c e included with those pleading s shows that there is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to summary judgme nt as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c ); Valence Operating Co. v

. Dorsett , 164 S.W .3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). We take as true all evidenc e favor able to the non-movant, and we indulge ever y rea sonable infere nce and resolve any doubts in the no n -m o v ant’s favor

. See Valence , 164 S.W .3d at 661. Under the “tra ditional” summary -judg ment standard, the movant has t he ini tial burden of demons t ra t i n g the absenc e of a g enuine issue of materia l fac t and entitlement to judgme nt as a matter of law. See M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. W illri ch , 28 S.W .3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000). Did the par

ties form a c ontrac t? To prove that a contra ct exis ts, a party must show the following elements: (1) an offe r; (2) an acc eptanc e in strict compliance with t h e t er m s o f t he offe r; (3) a meeting of the minds; (4) eac h party ’s consent to the terms; (5) consideration; and, if the contra ct i s i n writing ; (6) execution and delivery of the contra ct with the intent that it be mutual and binding. Advantage Physical Therapy, Inc. v. Cruse , 16 5 S .W.3d 21, 24 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005,
3no pet.). “Ev i d en ce o f m utual assent in written contra cts g ener ally consists of signa tures of the

parties and delivery with the intent to bind.” Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen , 221 S.W .3d 632, 635 (Tex. 2007). The primary conce rn of a court in construing a written contra ct is to asce rtain the
true intent of the parties as expressed in the instrument. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus. , 907 S.W .2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995). Second Congr ess sued Fa rkas for brea ching the ear nest-money provision of the contra ct by stopping pay ment on the chec k, failing to pay the chec k, and ultimately failing to comply

with the ear

nest-money

provision. Fa rkas contends that the trial court should not have enfor ced the Ag ree ment beca use neither he nor the title company ever “re cei v ed ” the contra ct—i.e., it was not “deliver ed.” He contends that a

bsence of deliver

y preve nted the Ag ree ment from bindi ng him and st opped it from becoming “ef

fec tive” by its own terms. He also contends that he withdrew his offe r befor e the title company rec eived the c ontrac t. Deliver y , along with execution, is rele vant to show that the party delivering the agr eeme nt intends to be bound by i t s p ro mises. Fa rkas relies on Sonnichsen , in which Baylor University ag ents prepa

red and signe d an employ ment contra ct but did not deliver it to the prospec tive employ ee and, t here fore , Ba y lor was not bound by its terms. See 221 S

. W

. 3 d at 635. Her e, the packe t of documents with the Ag ree ment including a limit ed war ranty for the condo appea

r to have been prepa

red by Second Congr ess and prese nted/delivere d to Fa rkas for his signa ture. Both p ar t i es h av e signe d the Ag ree ment—Fa rkas on J uly 2, 2010, and Second Congr ess on J uly 7, 2010—indicating that Fa

rkas delivere d the Ag ree ment to Second Congr ess afte r signing it. Unlike i n S o nnichsen , the party seeking to enfor ce the contra ct in this case rec eived a signe d copy fr o m the other party
. See id. We also note that, in his deposition, Fa rkas stated that, when he signe d the

4Ag reem en t , h e i n tended to proce ed and that his subsequent attempt to terminate the Ag ree ment

s t em m ed from his own unexpected financ ial setbac ks. The rec ord supports the trial court’s conclusion that the Ag ree ment was e x ecute d and deliver ed with the intention that it be binding.

Fa rkas contends that he never theless is not bound by the Ag ree ment beca use the title company never rec eived it and, thus, the “ef fec tive date” was not trig g ere d. The “ef fec tive date” is

a term of the Ag ree ment, not a common-law element of a contra ct, see Cruse , 165 S

. W

. 3 d at 24 (listing elements but not including eff ective date)

. Section 9.03 states t h at the “Eff ective Date of this Ag ree m en t refers to the date on which this Ag ree ment has been rec eipted by the Title Company

. . . .” But the Ag ree ment does not state that delivery to the title company is a prer equisite to the formation of a contra ct. I n section 2.03, the eff ective date trig g ers a

30-day period in w hich the buy er may terminate the ag ree ment by g iving the se ller written notice of termination based on his inability to obtain financ ing for the purcha se. I n section 4.01 of the Ag ree ment, the eff ective date trig g ers a 30-day period in which the buy er must make customiz ation selec tions for the condo unit. The buy er expressly acknow ledg es th at the unit may not be complete on the eff ective date. The Ag ree ment does not use the term “ef fec tive date” with reg ard to any other terms. The fac t tha t the title company did not rec eive the Ag re em en t may have tolled some obliga tions define d under the Ag ree ment, but it did not bar the formation of a binding c ontrac t betwee n the par ties.

Earne st money

provision was not a c ondition prece dent: Fa rkas contends that providing ear nest money for the Ag ree m ent was a condition prec edent t o fo rm at ion of a contra ct and that his failure to provide it preve nted the formation of

a contra ct. Second Congr ess arg ues that the ear

nest-money provision is a covena nt of the contra ct. A co n d ition prec edent is an event that must happen or be perf ormed befor e a rig ht can acc rue t o
5enfor ce an obliga tion. Solar Applications Eng’g, Inc. v. T.A. Operating Corp. , 327 S.W .3d 104, 108

(Tex. 2010). I f an express condition prec edent is no t s at i s fied, then the party whose performa nce is conditioned is excused from any obliga tion to perf orm. Id

. By contra st, a covena nt is an ag ree ment to act or ref

rain from acting in a cer

tain way . Id. Br eac h of a covena nt may g ive rise to

a ca u se of action for damag es, but does not aff ect the enfor cea

bility of the rema ining provisions of the contra ct unless the brea ch is a materia l or total brea ch. Id

. Courts should avoid finding a forf eiture through n oncompliance with a condition prec edent if another rea sonable rea ding of the
contra ct is possible. Schwarz-Jordan, Inc. v. Delisle Constr. Co. , 569 S.W .2d 878, 881 (Tex. 1978). We e x amine the lang uag e of the contra ct as a whole looking for lang uag e that makes perf ormanc e conditional, such as “if,” “provide d that,” “on condition that,” or simil ar terms. The absenc e of such words is not nece ssarily dispositi ve, but it is probative of the parties’ intention that a promise is made rathe r than a

condition imposed. Solar , 327 S.W .3d at 109. The ear nest-money provisions of the Ag reem en t h er e are a covena nt, not a

co n d i t i o n p recede nt. Section 2.02 of t he contract states as follows: “Ea rnest Money : I n order t o

secur e Buy er’ s perf

ormanc e under this Ag ree ment, Buy er shall deposit upon execution here of cash

. . . .” That states the purpose for the deposit, but not a prec ondition to the Ag ree ment. There is an addendum to the Ag ree ment conce rning Fa rkas’ s delivery of a ch ec k t o Second Congr ess and Fa rkas’ s intention to seek another form of secur ity , as well as provisions for the possibili ty that another buy er will appea

r and make an offe r that Second Congr ess can take afte r g iving Fa rkas the chanc e esse ntially

to match the offe r. The addendum does not ma ke Fa rkas’ s provision of ea

rnest money a condition prec edent to the formation of a contra ct. There are provisions in section 8.02 of the Ag ree ment for Second Congr ess to provide notice of and an extension of a time in which to cure

6a brea ch of the Ag ree ment, but “no such n o t i ce and extension is require d in the event of Buy er’ s

defa ult under Section 2.02 of this Ag ree ment.” Secti o n 8

. 0 2 s t ates that Fa rkas’ s defa

ult entitles Second Cong ress to

terminate this Ag ree ment and reta in the Earne st Money as liquidated damag es, it being acknow ledg ed and ag ree d that Sell er would not have enter ed into this Ag ree ment except in relianc e on Buy er’ s p er fo rm i ng its obliga tions here under

. . . [and] that the Earne st Money re p re s en t s a rea sonable estimate, at the time of the execution of this Ag ree ment, of the damag es Seller is anticipated to incur in the event of B uy er’ s defa

ult.

Under the terms of the contra ct, the prov i s i o n o f earnest money is not a prec ondition for enfor cea bility , but is instead a financ ial commitment that provides an incentive for compliance

. I ts forf eiture is a liquidated da

mag es mea sure f

or the bre ach of

the Ag ree ment.

Was Far kas entitled to resc ind beca use the e arne st money

was not a pa

rticular a mount? F a r k a s c o n te n d s th a

t th e e arne st money require ment was unenfor cea ble b e c a u s e it w a s not a set amount, pointing to the provision in the addendum permitting Second Congr ess to require additional ear

nest money from Fa

rkas to secur e his rig ht to purcha se in the event t hat another buy er of fer ed to pay

a highe r price

. He cites Antwine v

. Ree d , in w hich a buy er made an offe r that did not inclu d e ea rn est money , the s eller’ s counter offe r required earne st money but failed to state

an amount, the seller resc inded the offe r befor e the buy er deposited any ear nest money , and the court reje cted the buy er’ s reque st for specific perf ormanc e of the proposed- but-not-timely -consummated
counter offe r. 199 S.W .2d 482, 484-86 (Tex. 1947). I n that case , the contra ct could not be enfor ced beca use the parties never ag ree d simult aneously on the terms of the contra ct, including the amount of ear nest money . Her e, howeve r, the parties ag ree d to the sales price and the amount of money to

7be paid as ear nest money that would serve as liquidated damag es, both parties signe d the Ag ree ment, and Fa rkas delivere d a chec k as permitted to satisfy the ear nest-money require ment. No resc ission

or brea ch occur

red until later. The parties ag ree d t o an am o u n t of ear nest money to secur e the
contra ct and a

means of doing

so—the $86,000 chec k that the Ag ree ment’s adde ndum rec ites that Fa rkas had alre ady delivere d. The letter of cr edit with which Fa

rkas wa s to replac e the c heck was to be for the same amount. The only amount that was n ot set was a possible incre ase that was conting ent on a hy

pothetical competing offe r, and there is no evidenc e that t h i s p rovi sion was invoked or that a competing offe r arr ived while Fa rkas still intended to f

ulfill the Ag ree ment. The only evidenc e is that Fa

rkas tried to g et a letter of cre dit but did not, and that he then terminated the Ag ree ment beca

use of his own financ ial setbac ks—not due to any action by Second Congr ess or any

uncer tainty or mistake conc erning the amount of e arne st money require d.

Does the subse quent adva ntag eous sale r elieve F arka s of his obliga tion for damag es? Fa rkas c ontends that Second Congr ess is not e ntitled to recove r dama g es fr om him beca use it sold a co n d o t o someone else for more than he ag ree d to pay . I n his brief, as at trial, Fa rkas focuse s on the sale of a condo that he had previously ag ree d to buy but de cided ag ainst, not the condo that is the subject of the Ag ree ment that Second Congr ess seeks to rec over damag es

conce rning in this case . The Ag ree ment at issue here does not ref er to the other condo, nor does the liquidated damag es provision conce rning the ear nest money mention offse ts from a subsequent sale of the c ondo at issue in this or any other c ontrac t. A party challeng ing a liquidated damag es provision bear s the burden of proving that it is unenfor cea

ble, either beca

use the harm cause d by the brea ch is not difficult or i m possible to estimate or beca

use the amou n t o f d am ages set is not a rea sonable fore cast of just compensa tion.
8Phillips v. Phillips , 820 S.W .2d 785, 788 (Tex. 1991); GPA Holding, In c. v. B a yl o r Health Care Sys. , 344 S.W .3d 467, 475 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. den i ed ). We find no such arg ument or proof in Fa

rkas’ s pleading s at trial or here on appea l. I nstead, the Ag ree ment rec ites “that Seller’s damag es in the event of a defa ult by Buy er are difficult to estimate, but that t h e E ar nest Money repr esents a rea sonable es t i mate, at the time of the execution of this Ag ree ment, of the damag es Seller is anticipated to incur in the event of Buy er’ s defa ult.” The ear

nest money is intended to compensa te for Fa

rkas’ s ref usal to purcha se the unit list ed in the Ag ree ment, not for his previous failure to purcha se a differ ent condo. The trial court did not err by reje cting Fa rkas’ s arg uments on the proprie ty

of the liquidated da mag es provision as the mea sure of Second Cong ress’s da

mag es. Be cause Fa

rkas ’s arg uments ag ainst the judgme nt fail, we aff irm the judgme nt challeng ed in appe llate ca use number 03- 11-00807-CV.

03-13-00379- CV: The re ceive r appoin tm ent

Fa rkas challenges t h e o rder appointing a rec eiver to take possession of and sell his assets to satisfy the judgme nt. He challeng es the sufficien cy o f t he supporting evidenc e, the specific ity of the application, the brea dth of the order , the rea sonablene ss of the rec eiver ’s fee , and the propriety of the proce dures outlined in the order

. The trial court signe d the order he challeng es on April 3, 2013.

Second Congr ess moves to dismiss this appeal as moot beca use the trial court signe d amende d order s appointing a rec eiver on Dec ember 6, 2013, and Dec ember 9, 2 0 1 3

. An amende d final order ty

pically superse des a prio r fi n al order when the new order amounts to something more than a m i n o r cler ical chang e. Bahar v. Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. , 330 S.W .3d 379, 386 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (citing Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Scott , 846 S.W .2d 832,
9833 n.2 (Tex. 1993)). When the trial cour t s igns an amende d order , the orig inal order become s a

nullity and cannot support an appea l. Id. The chang es—at least betwee n the April 3 order and the Dec ember 6 order

—appea r to be more than cler ical. The order that Fa rkas challeng es in this appea l has bee n superse ded and c annot support an a ppeal. We dismiss appellate cause number 03-13-00379- CV without reg ard to the merits of the issues raise d here or the va lidity of the subseque nt orders. 1

03-13-00388- CV: Sanctions

Fa rkas challeng es an order that he pay $ 1 , 000 in sanctions for the attorney ’s fee s Second Congr ess incurre d in seeking to compel him to provide post-judgme nt discovery

. The trial court overr

uled all of Fa

rkas’ s o b j ec t i o ns to Second Congr ess’s reque sts for production and interrog atories in aid of judgme nt and order ed Fa rkas to comply with those reque sts. The following
events a t trial are rele vant to this appeal: 2

Dec ember

20, 2011 Second Cong ress ser ves post-judg ment discovery reque sts.

Fa rkas contends in his reply brief that there are problems with the new order s appointing 1 rec eiver s, some of which are new and some of which persist throug h provisions car ried over from the orig inal order appointing a rec eiver

. He asser ts in his reply brief that, unless the trial court corr ects the problems, he will challeng e the amende d order by appea l. We note that this case is distinct from Bahar in tha t F arka s did timely appea l the orig inal order appointing a rec eiver

. See Bahar v. Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc

. , 330 S.W .3d 379, 386 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) . Acc ording ly , if he timely and proper ly appea ls from the proper amende d order , he will b e able to addre ss problems timely and prope rly

appea led in the orig inal order

. Fa rkas discusses many other motions, response s, and order s following the May 6 order , but 2 none of those documents is part of the cler k’s rec ord i n t h i s ca s e, nor did they form part of the trial court ’s d ecision on May 6, 2013 from which Fa rkas appea ls. Fa

rkas also ref

ers to and the cler k’s re cord inc ludes documents related to motions filed by the receive r. Howe ver, the rec eiver d i d not reque st the di scover y or t he sanctions that are part of the M ay 6 order

. We wi l l d i s re gar d these doc uments as irre levant to the orde r appe aled. 10J anuar y 20, 2012 Fa

rkas f iles responses a cting pro se. April 26, 2013 S ec o n d C o n gre s s fi les motion to compel and for sanctio n s reg arding the Dec ember

20 post-judgme nt discovery

. Fa rkas files aff

idavit of neg ative net worth and $ 1 for superse deas bond. April 29, 2013 S ec o n d C o n gre s s fi l es a motion to strike and a con t es t t o

Fa rkas’ s aff idavit of net worth. May 6, 2013 Cour t o v er ru l es o b j ec tions, compels discovery , and aw ards sanctions.

On appea l, Fa

rkas challeng es only the imposit ion of sanctions, not the aspec ts of the order compelling discovery

. He contends th at t h e d i s covery that Second Congr ess reque sted in Dec ember 2011 exceede d the scope of that permitted afte r the filing of a superse deas bond, which h e fi l ed in April 2013, and that the trial court should not have awa rded sanctions fo r t h e attorney ’s fee s incurre d in seeking to compel the i m p er m issible discovery in April/May 2013. Fa rkas acknow ledg es that the post-judgme nt discovery reque s t s wer e pending for sever al months befor e he fil ed t h e superse deas bond, but asser ts that the trial court should not have imposed sanctions rela ting to the motion to compel that wa s filed and arg ued afte r he filed the superse deas bond.

We revie w the trial court’s order assessing sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Cire

v. Cummings , 134 S.W .3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004). I mpositi on of sanctions is appropr iate (1) if there is a direc t rela tionship betwee n the improper conduct and the sanctions imposed—i.e., the sanctions

mu s t b e d i re ct ed ag ainst the abuse and abuser and be tailored to reme dy any prejudice the abuse

cause d—and (2) if the sanctions are not excessive—i.e., the p u n i s h m ent should fit the crime. TransAmerican Natural Gas Cor p. v. Powell , 811 S.W .2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991).

11A s a judgme nt cre ditor, Second Congr ess was entitled to u s e p o s t- ju d g me n t d is c o v e r

y tools to help i t enfor ce the judgme nt
. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 621a. Even after a superse deas bond is f il e d s u s p e n d ing execution on the judgme nt, a cre ditor may conduct rea sonable discovery conce r n in g the judgme nt debtor’s net worth when contemplating a contest to the judgme nt debtor’s aff idavit of
net worth. Tex. R. App. P. 24.2(c) (2). Second Congr ess’s discovery reque sts long preda ted Fa rkas’ s filing of the superse deas bond. I ts motion to compel discovery was fi l ed o n t h e same day as his bond and aff

idavit of net worth, and the motion appea rs o n t h e t ri al court’s docket sheet slightly above his deposit. Second Congr ess filed a challeng e to the aff idavit of net worth three day s later—a

wee k befor e the trial court’s order on the m o t i o n t o compel discovery and for sanctions that is appea led her e. Although Fa rkas does not ask that we alter the discover y r u li n g s o n this direc t appea l, 3 he contends that we must revie w them beca use they underlie the sanctions award. The scope of discovery is within the trial court’s discretion. In re Graco Children’s Prods., Inc. , 210 S.W .3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2006) (orig

. proce eding ). Whil e Second Cong ress initially soug ht the discovery

to help

ex ec u t e o n the judgme nt, many of the querie s wer e rele vant to Fa rkas’ s aff idavit of neg ati v e net worth and the rela ted sufficie ncy of the $1 superse deas bond. The trial court found that Fa rkas’ s response s wer e inadequa te and that his objections wer e meritless. The trial court also stated in open court that “ [t ]he order to produc e this discovery is spe cifica lly in a id of the hea ring on the validity of his net worth aff

idavit

. . . [The discovery materia l is] require d to be produce d so that we can have

a meaning ful hear ing on the objection to his net worth aff idavit.” Ex amples of querie s that Fa rkas

Orde rs compelling compliance with o v er l y b ro ad discovery reque sts are proper ly the 3 subject of a

petition for writ of manda mus. In re Grac o Children’s Prods., Inc. , 210 S.W .3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2006) (orig . proce eding ). 12lists support the court’s decision. For example, the re l ev an ce of bank statements and acc ounts

rec eivable to net worth is self-e vident, and insurance policies and income tax returns could provide information useful to the inquiry

. Fa rkas has not de monstrated that the trial court abused 4 its discretion in compelling the discovery

.

Fa rkas has likewise not shown an abuse of discreti on in the sanctions awa rd. Second Congr ess filed the motion to compel th e d i s co v ery only afte r waiting fiftee n months af t er making its initial reque st. The sanction awa rded ag ainst Fa

rkas is direc tly rela ted t o Second Congr ess’s expenses incurre d in filing the motion to compel him to comply with the discovery that he had resisted for

fiftee n months. The $1,000 awa rd represe nts less than four hours of work
at Second Congr ess’s attorney ’s hourly rate of $275. That work incl u d ed p re p ar i ng the motion and prepa ring for the hear ing, the focus of which abruptly chang ed with Fa rkas’s fi l i n g o f the superse deas bond. The trial court did not abuse its discre tion by finding that the amount awa rded was not excessive a

nd was a n appropr iate re medy

for F arka s’s conduc t. We affir m the sanctions orde r in appe llate ca use number 03- 13-00388-CV.

Fa rkas arg ues that Second Congr ess failed to respond to his interrog atories demanding 4 that Second Congr ess explain how its discovery reque sts rela te to a deter mination of his net worth. Setting aside the fac t that Second Congr ess objected to tho s e requests as irrele vant and not rea sonably calc ulated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidenc e, Fa rkas sen t h i s re quests o n J une 5, 2013—a month after the sanctions decision he challeng es. Second Con gre s s ’s objections/responses, filed J uly 7, 2013, play ed no part in the trial court’s order of May 6, 2013, and do n o t s h o w t h at the trial court err ed when it made the decision challeng ed here based on the arg uments and evide nce be fore it when it made the de cision. See Tex. R. App. P . 33.1(a)

. 13CONCLUSION We a ffirm the judgme nt on the merits in a ppellate cause number 03-11-00807- CV,

we dismiss as moot the appea l of the order appointing a rec eiver in a ppellate cause number 03-13- 00379-CV, and we aff

irm the sanctions orde r in appe llate ca use number 03- 13-00388-CV.

J eff Rose, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pemberton a nd Rose 03-11-00807- CV Affir med 03-13-00379- CV Dismissed as Moot 03-13-00388- CV Affir med Filed: Apr il 25, 2014

14