UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

RODNEY R. BRADSHAW, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

BRUCE GATTERMAN, in his individual 

and representative capacity; KYLER 

KNOBBE, in his individual and 

representative capacity; CHARLES HERD, 

in his individual and representative 

capacity; RANDALL HENRY, in his 

individual and representative capacity; 

CURTIS CAMPBELL, in his individual 

and representative capacity; MICHAEL 

HITZ, in his individual and representative 

capacity; JANICE BRADSHAW; JOYCE 

BRADSHAW; CHERYL BUCKNER; 

CAROL MIDDLETON; PAMELA BELL; 

DEBRA WEAVER; CORELIA SUE 

JOHNSON; JOHN AND/OR JANE DOES 

1-10; COUNTY OF HODGEMAN, 

KANSAS; MICHAEL GLEASON; 

MICHAEL MACNAIR; DOUGLAS 

COSSMAN; SCOTT MACNAIR; 

WILBURN BRADSHAW; FORD 

COUNTY STATE BANK; MARCIA 

SNODGRASS; ROBERT SCHROEDER; 

RONALD RIDLEY; BOBBIE 

BRADSHAW; ELIZABETH 

SCHROEDER; BARBARA COSSMAN; 

BRIT SCHROEDER; SCOTT KREGER; 

CRAIG CROSSWHITE, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-3246 

(D.C. No. 6:15-CV-01086-MLB-GEB) 

(D. Kan.) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

July 27, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Rodney Bradshaw appeals from the dismissal of myriad claims seeking to 

overturn a settlement agreement he signed and upon which a state court entered 

judgment. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars some of his claims and the remaining 

one cannot survive the constraints imposed by Heck v. Humphrey. We affirm.1

 This case arises from the probate of the estate of Bradshaw’s father, whose 

will divided his assets equally among eight children, Bradshaw and his seven 

siblings. There was bad blood among them resulting in a suit contesting the will.2

During the will contest trial all beneficiaries agreed to settle and the settlement 

agreement was read into the record in open court on May 23, 2013. The state judge 

polled all parties to the agreement and, upon their consent, approved the settlement. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Our jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

2

 During probate proceedings, allegations surfaced that Bradshaw improperly 

managed his father’s assets while he was still alive. At one point, Bradshaw was 

charged with and pleaded guilty to assaulting his sister, and was sentenced to 90 days 

in jail. 
3 

Bradshaw’s attorney specifically said the agreement “accurately reflects [his] 

understanding of the settlement,” R. at 150, and Bradshaw himself later signed a 

written document formalizing the settlement, R. at 262. Nevertheless, on November 

14, 2013, Bradshaw objected to the settlement and filed a motion to set aside the 

settlement agreement, which the state court summarily denied. Bradshaw did not 

appeal from the order approving the settlement agreement or the denial of his motion 

to set it aside. 

 Instead, and more than a year later, on March 20, 2015, Bradshaw brought this 

suit in federal court. His complaint, as amended, alleged the following causes of 

action: (1) violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 

(RICO); (2) RICO conspiracy; (3) constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 

and 1983; (4) abuse of process; and (5) tortious interference. The aggregate of 

Bradshaw’s allegations is that the state judge, his attorneys, his siblings, and various 

other parties all conspired to deprive him of his rights during the state-court 

proceedings. On motion brought by every defendant, the district court dismissed 

Bradshaw’s claims for want of jurisdiction. Specifically, and among other things, the 

court held, “[v]iewed to the outer limits of liberal construction, plaintiff’s allegations 

raise claims that were decided by the Kansas court or are inextricably intertwined 

with the state judgments,” R. at 617, and are thus barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, see Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923) (prohibiting 

lower federal courts from considering claims decided by a state court); D.C. Court of 
4 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983) (same for claims inextricably 

intertwined). 

In this appeal, Bradshaw argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to this 

case because the doctrine does not bar (1) claims asserting state-court judgments had 

been obtained by “extrinsic fraud” and (2) “independent action[s]” brought under 

federal-question jurisdiction. Opening Br. at 3–4. We review the district court’s 

dismissal de novo. Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2007). 

Because Bradshaw proceeds without the assistance of counsel, we construe his 

pleadings liberally. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 

2003). 

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine establishes, as a matter of subject-matter 

jurisdiction, that only the United States Supreme Court has appellate authority to 

review a state-court decision.” Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nudell, 

363 F.3d 1072, 1074–75 (10th Cir. 2004) (footnote omitted). Rooker-Feldman “is 

confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by 

state-court judgments rendered before the [federal] court proceedings commenced 

and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil 

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In other words, 

“Rooker-Feldman bars cases in federal court that are inextricably intertwined with a 

prior state court judgment.” Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1116 (10th Cir. 2002) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 
5 

Bradshaw has identified no basis upon which to overturn the dismissal in this 

case. His argument that extrinsic fraud can override Rooker-Feldman is supported 

only by authority from another circuit. See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 

1140–41 (9th Cir. 2004). Our precedent goes the other way: “new allegations of 

fraud might create grounds for appeal . . . [but] that appeal should be brought in the 

state courts.” Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 (10th Cir. 2006). Presumably 

realizing the implications of his failure to lodge a timely appeal in state court, 

Bradshaw tells us he is currently seeking a writ of mandamus from the Kansas 

Supreme Court. While ongoing state proceedings are not barred by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292, Bradshaw’s unorthodox 

approach is not an exception to the finality concerns underpinning the doctrine. His 

failure to appropriately seek appellate relief at the state level bars his current 

allegations of fraud. 

Moreover, and despite his arguments to the contrary, his federal claims do not 

constitute an “independent action” under Exxon Mobil. In that case the Supreme 

Court narrowed Rooker-Feldman, which by then had become so bloated as to absorb 

parts of the abstention and preclusion doctrines. See 544 U.S. at 292–93. Bradshaw 

is correct that the Court held Rooker-Feldman inapplicable to a plaintiff presenting 

an “independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has 

reached in a case to which he was a party.” Id. at 293 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In such a situation, “there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether 

the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.” Id. But Bradshaw’s claims 
6 

are not independent. Though styled as a suit to redress a byzantine conspiracy 

perpetrated by his attorneys and the state court, what lies beneath are his requests for 

“an injunction against any further orders, judgments or rulings” rendered by the state 

judge, the “return of all lands taken” pursuant to the settlement agreement, and the 

“return of the $264,000 that was wrongfully taken” under the agreement. R. at 78. 

The requested relief plainly strikes at the state court’s judgment, or, at the very least, 

are inextricably intertwined with it. The district judge properly dismissed his claims. 

Even if his RICO and § 1983 claims were independent, Bradshaw has fallen 

woefully short of stating a claim even under the most liberal construction of his 

complaint. Most notably, the allegations supporting his RICO claims are conclusory 

and do not describe with any particularity the purported conspiracy other than it 

existed to remove him as executor of his father’s estate. Additionally, Bradshaw 

does not even mention the settlement agreement or the fact he signed it. And to the 

extent he seeks to recover damages for his allegedly unconstitutional criminal assault 

conviction, he has not come close to showing the conviction has been invalidated by 

reversal, expungement, or declaration by either a Kansas court or a federal court on 

habeas corpus review. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). 

In sum, Bradshaw’s federal case is exactly what Justice Ginsburg admonished 

federal courts not to entertain under Rooker-Feldman — he is a state-court loser 

complaining of injuries caused by a state-court judgment rendered beforehand, and is 

 
7 

inviting review and rejection of the judgment. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. 

We are without jurisdiction to entertain his claims. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Terrence L. O’Brien 

Circuit Judge