The H on o rable M ic hael P. M cCuskey, U nit ed Stat es D is tr ic t  Cour tf or the Ce nt ra l Dis t ri c tofI l l i noi s , s i t t i ng by des i gna t i on.



## In the 

# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it
N o. 10

- 2947 U NI T ED S TATE SOF A MERI CA, P la intif f-A pp ellee, v. J AM ES K. T A Y L OR, D e f e ndan t

-Appe l l ant
.
A pp eal from the United S t ates Di strictC our t fo r the N o rthernDi stricto f Indian a, S outh Bend D ivisi on. No . 3:09- cr-150

—Rob ert L. Miller, Jr. , Judge .
A RG UE D D ECE MBE R 6, 2010

— D ECI DE D D ECE MBE R 29, 2010

B efore B AU ER an d W I L L I A MS, C ircu it Judges , a nd M C C USKE Y, D istrict Judge.  W I L L I A MS, Cir cu i tJudg e . J am es K
. Taylor ple aded gui l ty to bei ng a fel on in posse ssion o fa fi re ar m i n vi ol ati on o f1 8 U.S
. C. § 9 22( g) ( 1) and w as sente nced to 64 m ont hs ’ i m p risonm en t. H is senten ce w as bas ed in p art2 N o. 10

- 2947

Tayl or was al s o c har ge d with o ne c ou ntofai di ng a nd 1 ab e t t i n g the fur nish ing of f alse an d fictitiou s statem en ts dur i ng the a c q ui s i t i ono fa fi r e a r m , i n vi ol a t i on of1 8 U. S
. C. 

### (continued...) o n the di st r i ctc o ur t’ s co nc l us i o n tha t hi s p r i o r I ndi an a convi cti on f or Clas s C fe l ony batt er y, I nd
. Code § 35- 42- 2- 1( a) ( 3) , qual i fi ed as a “cr i m e ofvi ol ence” und er§ 4B1. 2( a) ofthe federa l se ntenci ng g uide l i nes, enhanci ng hi s r ecom m ended base offen se l eve l
. Tayl orappeal s the di strict c ourt ’ s fi nd i ng, ar gui ng tha t hi s ba tte ryco nvi cti on was no t a cr i m e o fv i o l en ce f o r the p urpo se s o fthe fede r als en te nc i ngg ui del i ne s. W e fi nd tha t th e I ndia na batt er y o ffense ofwh i ch Tayl or w as convi cted

— to uch i ng so m eo ne i n a r ude , ins olent, o r a ng r y manne r b y mean s ofa deadlyweapon

— quali fi es as a cri m e of violence b ec au se su c h co n d u c t w ill ord in ar ily in vo lve , at a m in imu m, th e th r e a t e n e d u s e o fp h y s i c a l f o r c e . We a ffi r m.

I . B AC KGR OUND Betwee n May 2008 a nd Oc tobe r 2 00 9, Ta y l o r, a c o nvicted felon, d irected a third p arty to m ak e s t r a w pu rc h as es of n in e fire ar m s fo r h i m a t a gu n st or e in M i s h a wa k a , I n d i a n a . A s t o r e e mpl o y e e a l e r t e d a n ATF age nt to the suspecte d str aw p u rchas es, and Tayl or w as apprehended. H e was i nd i cted o n N ove m ber12 , 20 09 , a nd o n F eb r ua r y 19 , 2 01 0 pl ea ded g ui l tyt o o ne count o fbeing a fel on in p oss ess i on o fa fi re ar m , i n vi olation of18 U
. S. C
. § 922(g)( 1). Tay lor’ s crim inal hist ory 1N o. 10

- 2947 3



### (...continued) § 922( a )(6). This c ount w as dism is se d p ursuant t o his plea ag reem en t. in c lu d ed a 20 04 co n vic tio n for C las s C felon y b at te ry in St
. J ose ph C ounty ( I nd i ana) S up er i orCourt, f or wh i ch he had r ecei ved a sente nce o ff our yea rs ’ i m pri sonm ent. I nd i ana’ s ba tte ryst atute , I nd
. Cod e § 3 5- 42- 2- 1, pro vi des i n re l evantpart : Se c . 1. (a) A p er so n w h o kn ow in gly or in te n tio n ally touches ano therper son i n a r ud e, i nsol ent, o r angr y m anner com m i ts batt er y, a Class B m i sdem eanor . H owever, the offense i s:

. . . ( 3) a Cl as s C fel o ny i f i t r es ul ts in s er i o us b od ily inj u ry to an y ot h er p er so n or if it is co m m i tt ed bymean s o fa de adl y wea po n. Speci fi cal l y, the cri m i nal i nfo rm ati on in Tayl or ’ s ba tte r y c as e st at ed th athe “ di d kno wing ly tou ch[ th e vi cti m ] i n a r ud e, i nsol ent, o r angr y m ann er , t o-w i t: by st r i k i ng[ th e vi ct i m ] i n the s to m ac h a nd s ai d t o uch i ng b e i n g c om m itt ed w ith a d ea d ly w ea p on , to-w it: a kn ife.” Tayl or ’ s pre sente nce i nvest i gat i on r epor t r eco m m ended that hi s ba se offense l eve l un d erthe gui del i nes

— w hi ch w oul d other w i se have b ee n 14 per§ 2K2.1 ( a) ( 6)

—be i nc r ea se d t o 2 0 o n the b as i s th atthi s pr i o r b attery c o nv i c t i o n qu a l i fi e d a s a “ c r i me o fv i o l e nc e . ” U
. S
. S
. G. § § 2 K2. 1( a ) ( 4 ) ( A) , 4 B1
. 2 ( a )
. T he di s t r i c tc o ur ta g r e e d, co nc l udi ngo ve r Ta y l o r ’ s o bj ecti o n tha t th e ba tt ery c o n-4 N o. 10

- 2947 vi cti on qual i fi ed as a cr i m e o fvi ol ence un d er the gui delin es . C ou p led w ith a crim in al his to ry c at eg or y o fII I, Tayl or ’ s r esul ting advi sor y guidel i ne r ange w as 57- 71 m o nths
. The c o ur t i m po se d a s en te nc e o f6 4 m o nths and tw o yea rs ’ superv i sed r el eas e.
II. A N A L Y S IS T ay lor a p p ea ls t h e d ist ric t c ou rt ’s c o n c lu sio n th at h is I nd i ana ba tte ryco nvi cti on qual i fi es as a “cri m e o fvi ol ence” f orpurposes o fthe federa l se ntencing gui del i nes. T h i s i s a qu e s t i o n o fl a w w e r e v i e w deno vo . U nited Sta tes v. Cl i nt on , 591 F.3d 968 , 972 (7th C ir. 2010). The g ui del i ne s defi ne a “ cr i m e o fv i o l en ce ” as a ny federa l o r st at e o ffense, punishabl e bym or e than a y ear ofi m pri sonm ent, that : ( 1 ) has a s a n e l e men t the us e , a t t e mpt e d us e, o r th r ea te ne d us e o fphysi ca l f o r ce a g ains t th e perso n ofano ther, o r ( 2) is bur g l ar y o fa dwel l i ng, a r so n, o r e xt o r ti o n, i nv o l ve s us e o fe xp lo si ve s, o r o th er wi se i nvo l ve s co nduc t tha t pr es en ts a s er i o us po te ntial risk ofph ysical injury to anoth er. U
. S. S. G
. § 4B 1.2( a). W e use a “cat eg or ical approach” to deter m i ne wh ether a g ive n cr im e q u a l i fies as a c rim e o f vio len c e. U nited St at e s v. Woods , 57 6 F
. 3d 400 , 4 03 (7th Cir
. 20 09)
. U nd er th e categ orical ap p roach , cou rts look to the statu tory d e f in itio n of th e o ffen se in q u es tio n, no t t o th e s p ec ificN o. 10

- 2947 5

Begay, Jam es, an d othe r c as es i n thi s ar ea appl y the 2 cat egoric al app roach t o the A rm ed Career Crim inal Act ( “ACCA”) , 18 U. S. C. § 92 4( e), w hi c h de fi ne s “vi ol en tfel ony” vi r tuall y th e s a m e wa y § 4 B1
. 2 de fi ne s “ c r i m e o fvi ol e nc e . ” As w e ha v e d o n e in p rior cases, w e refer to ca ses d ealin g w ith the A CC A a n d t he car eer of fender guid el ine prov is ion i nter
ch a n g ea b ly
. S ee U n i t e d S t a te s v . F ife, 62 4 F .3d 44 1 , 44 4 n .1 (7 th C ir . 20 1 0 ). co nduc t th atthe de fen dan t engaged i n o n tha t o cc as i o n. Id. ; s e eal so B ega y v . U nited Sta tes , 553 U
. S. 137, 141 (2008 ). “That i s, we consi de r w hetherthe elem ents o f the o ffense ar e o fthe ty pe tha t woul d j us ti fy i ts i nc l us i o n . . . wi th o ut i nquir in g i nto the s peci fi c co nd uct o fthi s par ti cul ar o ffe nd e r. ” Ja m es v. U nited Sta tes , 55 0 U.S
. 19 2, 20 2 ( 2007 ) (em p ha sis in origi na l)
. 2 W hen a sta tute describes m ult i ple m odes ofco m m i ssi on, h o we v e r, s o me tha tmi g htb e a c r i me o fv i o l e nce and som e that m i ght no t, the c ate gor i calapproa ch can not answ er the q ue stion com p letely bec au s e a cou rt cannot tel l fro m the sta tute i tse l fexact l y what offen se th e d efe n d an t c om m itt ed
. Se e, e . g. , Fife, 624 F. 3d at 445; U nite d State s v. M cD ona ld, 592 F.3d 8 0 8, 810 (7th Cir. 2010 )
. In these cases i nvol vi ng a “div i sibl e” sta tute, co urts em plo y a “m odi fi ed cate go ric alapproa ch” and l oo k t o a defe nd ant’ s charging d ocum ent, p l ea agr eem ent, o r othe r sim il ar j ud ici al r e c o r d f or the li m ited p urp ose of dete rm i ni ng wh i ch parto f t h e offense the pr i orco nvi cti on w as f or

—b u t s till not to the p arti cul arf ac ts unde r l y i ng th e c on vic tio n . See Sh epa rd v
. U n ited S ta tes , 54 4 U.S
. 13 ,6 N o. 10

- 2947 26 (20 05 ); U nite d State s v. E ll is , 62 2 F
. 3d 78 4, 798 ( 7th Cir. 2 01 0). “[ T]he add i ti onalm ate ri al s . . . m ay be use d o nl y t o de t e r mi ne w h ich cr i m e withi n a s tatute the defen d ant co m m i tte d, not how h e c om m itt ed th at cr im e.” Woods , 576 F.3d at 405 ( em p ha ses in origina l)
. The di st r i ctcou rt

— as w ell as bo th p ar tie s in th eir bri ef s o n appeal

— a pp l i e d the mo di fi e d c a t e g o r i c a l a pp ro ac h to Ind . C o d e § 35 -42 -2-1 (a)( 3), ap p ar en tly prem i sed o n an as su m pti on that the st atute r equi re s i t. C l e a r l y, § 3 5
- 4 2
- 2
- 1 ( a) ( 3 ) c a n b e v i o l a t e d i n o n e o ft wo w ays: touch ing som eon e in a rud e, insolent, or an gry m anne r tha t ( 1) “ r es ul ts i n s er i o us b o di l y i nj ur y t o a ny oth er pe rson ” or ( 2 ) “is com m itted by m ean s of a dea dl y w ea po n. ” And Tay l o r ’ s ch ar g i ngdo cument m ak es cl ea r th at he was co nv i ct ed o fthe sec o nd ca te g o r y, the “ m ea ns o fa de adl y wea po n” viol ati o n. But th e f a c tth a t§ 3 5
- 4 2
- 2
- 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) s e t s o u tt wo mo d e s o fc o mm iss ion d oe sn ’t a u to m at ic a l l y m ea n it is “d ivis ible ” in a way thatr eq uir es a m odi fi ed cate gor i calapproa ch

— if both me th o d s o fv i o l a t i n gth e s t a t u t e qua l i fy a s a c r i me ofvi ol ence f orfedera l purposes , ther e wou ld b e no nee d to l oo k a t Tay l or ’ s char gi ng docum ent forcl ar i fica tion at all. Se e, e . g. , M cD ona ld, 59 2 F
. 3d at 810 ( m odi fi ed cate

go ric al a p p ro ac h n ec es sa ry w h e n s ta tu te lists m u ltip le m odes ofco m m i ssi on, “s om e o fwh i ch m ay be c ri m es of viole n c e an d so m e n o t .” ); s e eal s o Unit e d S t at e s v. D i s m uke, 593 F. 3d 582, 589 ( 7th Cir
. 2010 ) ( sta tute is d ivi sib l e “ w hen i t desc ribes m ult i ple o ffense cate gor i es, s o me o fwhi c h wo u l d b e c r i me s o fv i o l e n c e a n d s o me of w hich w ou ld n ot.”)
.N o. 10

- 2947 7 The go ver nm ent doe s no t argue, however, thatei ther m ode o fvi ol ati on o f§ 35- 42- 2- 1( a) ( 3) would cons tit u te a c r i me o fv i ol enc e , a nd i ns t e a d p r o c e e ds o n the a s s umptio n t h a t t h e s ta tu te is infac t d ivis ible . W e w ill si m i l ar l y ap proa ch the sta tute as bei ng di vi sibl e for the purpos e o fdeci ding th i s a pp eal, and l eave f or an oth er da y the broad er qu estion of w he th er any vio l atio n o fI ndi an a’ s Cl as s C b at te r y s ta tu te woul d qua l i fy a s a c r i me o f v i o l e nc e . I t may b e the c a s e tha t the o ther p ro n g o f§ 35- 42- 2- 1( a) ( 3)

— touchi ng so m eone i n a r ud e, in so len t, or a n gr y m an n er th at “re su lts in s er iou s b od ily i nj ury to anothe r perso n”

— d oes not c ategorically qu ali fy as a cr i m e o fvi ole nce under e i therpro ng o fthe federa l d efin itio n . Se e, e . g. , Jo hn son v. U nited Sta tes,
- - - U
. S. -- - - , 13 0 S. Ct
. 1 265, 1271-72 (2010) (“touc hin g” in Flor ida ba ttery sta tute does not cate gor i cal l y e quate t o “ph ys icalf or ce” necess ar y t o quali fy a s a vi ol ent fel ony und erfi rs t par t o f A C C A d efin itio n ); Flore s v. A sh croft, 35 0 F
. 3d 666, 67 2 ( 7th Cir. 2 003) ( “to uching” i n I nd i ana m i sdem eanor batt er y s tatute incl ud es any c ontac t, howeversl i ght, and thus does not n ec es sari l y s ati sfy “ physi calf or ce” re quir em ent in anal ogo us cr i m e o fviol ence defini ti on in 18 U .S.C . § 16 ); Bega y, 55 3 U.S
. at14 3- 45 ( re si du al c lau se in s ec on d p ar t o f cr im e o f vio len c e d efin itio n is l i m i t e d t o o ffe ns e s s i mi l a r b o th i n k i nd a nd de g r e e o f risk to th ose en um e rated , de m ons trating th e sam e “p urp os efu l, vio len t, an d ag gr es siv e” co n d u c t ); Woods , 57 6 F.3d at 407( sam e). S o the que s t i o n b e f o r e u s i s wh e the r v i o l a t i ngI nd
. Co de § 3 5-4 2- 2
- 1 (a)( 3) t h e w ay T ay lor d id

— to uch i ngs o m eo ne8 N o. 10

- 2947

The gove rn m en tal s o a dvances t wo al t er nat i ve bas es f or 3 a ffi r mi n g : ( 1 ) th a tT a y l o r ’ s o ffe n s e me e t s th e d e fi n i t i o n o f“ c r i me ofviole nce” s et f orth i n § 4B1.2( a) ( 2) as w el l; a n d (2 ) that th e o ffen se al so qu a lifi es b ec a u se A p p lic a tio n N o te 1 t o § 4 B 1 .2 perm it s c our t s t o l ook t o a c t ual c har ge d co nduc ti n m aki ng a c ri m e- of-viol en c e det er m i nat i on. Bec aus e we affi rm on the ba s i s o f§ 4 B1
. 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) , we do n otr e a c h the s e a l t e r na t i ve arg u m en ts. in a ru d e, in so len t, or a n gr y m an n er , by m ea n s o f a d ea d ly w eapon

— qu a l i fi e s a s a c r i me o fv i o l e nc e . We c o nc l ud e th at it d oe s, b ec au se in t h e o r d in ar y c as e, vio lat in g In d ian a’ s Cl as s C b at te r y s ta tu te b y to uch i ngs o m eo ne i n a rude, i nsol ent, o r angr y m anner w i th a deadlyweapon w i l l a t th e v er y l eas t pr ese nt a t hre ato fphysi calf or ce, thus qual i fyi ng i t under § 4 B1. 2( a) ( 1) o fthe gui del i nes. 3 T ay lor a rg u es th at th er e a re w ay s t o t ou c h so m eo n e in a ru d e, in so len t, or a n gr y m an n er u sin g a d ea d ly w eapon that do notnece ssa ri l y invol ve the use , at
tem p ted use, or th reaten ed use of for ce. W hile there m ay be hypothet i calsi tuati ons w here thi s m i ght b e true ( o ne i nv o l vingut en si l s at a p ar ti cul ar l y c o nt en ti o us T ha nk sgivin g d inn er cam e up du ring oral argu m en t), such possibi l i ti es ar e o utl i er s. I n apply i ng the cat ego ri cal approach, we are co ncer ned w i th the o rdi narycas e, n otfrin ge p os sib ili tie s. Ja m es , 55 0 U.S
. at20 8 ( cate gor i cal ap p ro ac h d oe s n otreq u ire th at “e ve ry co n c eiv ab le fac tu al off en se ” q u alify ); Woods , 5 76 F
. 3d at4 04
. And we b el i ev e th ati n the o r di na r y c as e, t o uch i ngs o m eone rudel y, ins ole ntl y, o r angr i l y with a deadl y weapon i nvol ves, ata m i ni m um , a thre at ofphysi calf or ce.N o. 10

- 2947 9 Other ci rcui ts evaluati ng si m i l arst atute s hav e r ea ch ed th e sa m e co nc l us i o n. I n U ni t e d S t at e s v. TretoM a rtinez , 4 21 F
. 3d 11 56 ( 10 thCi r . 2 00 5) , the de fen dan t chal l enged the cl ass i fi cati on of hi s pri orco n victi on u n d e r K a n s a s ’ s a g g r a v a t e d b a t t e r y s t a t u t e a s a c r i me o fv i ol en ce . Tha t st atut e pr o hibi ts , much l i k e th e I ndi an a l aw, “inten ti o na l l y c au singphy si ca l c o nt ac t wi tha noth er per so n when do ne i n a r ude , i ns ul ting o r angry m anner w i th a deadlyweapon. ” Kan. S tat . A nn. § 21- 34 14 ( a) ( 1) ( C)
. Appl y i ngthe c at eg o r i ca l a ppr o ac h, the Te nth Ci r cui t f o und tha t to uch i ngs o m eo ne w i tha deadlyweapon i n a r ud e, i nsul ti ng, o r angr y m anner “c o ul d a l way s l ea d t o mor e su bs ta nt i ala nd v iol en t co ntact ” a nd thus wil l al w ays i ncl u d e “a t the v er y l eas t” th e t h re at en ed u se of p h ys ica l fo r c e. Treto-M a rtinez , 42 1 F .3d at11 60 ; see also U ni t e d St at e s v. R a m o n S i l va , 60 8 F. 3d 663, 67 2 ( 10th Cir
. 20 10 ) ( applying si m i l arr eason ing to N ew M ex ico aggravate d a ssau lt statut e). W e a gr ee w ith th is re as on in g a n d find it ap p lica b le to th e In d ian a s ta t u t e h er e. O th er circ u its h av e s im ilar ly hel d that t ou chi ng with a deadl y weapon cons ti tutes a “ c rim e o f vio len c e” for t h e s am e re as on . See U nited St at e s v. Gr aj e da , 5 8 1 F .3 d 11 86 , 119 2 (9 th C ir. 20 09 ) (C alif o r ni a as sa ul t o ffen se o f touchings o m eo ne wi tha d eadl y weapon qual i fi es as a cr i m e o fvi ol ence because i t “ de mon s t r a t e s a t a mi ni mum the thr e a t e ne d us e o f ac tu al for c e” ); U nited Sta tes v. D o m ing uez , 47 9 F .3d 34 5, 348 ( 5th C i r. 20 07) ( Fl or i da agg ra vate d batte ryo ffense ofi ntenti onal l y t ouchi ng so m eone with a deadl y weapon quali fi es becaus e “the touchi ng o fan ind i vi du alwith a deadly w ea pon cr eat es a s uffi ci ent threa t o ff or ce to qu ali fy as a cri m e of viol en ce.”).10 N o. 10

- 2947 W e br i efl y a dd re ss Tayl or’s argum ent that the di str i ct co ur t i m pr o per l y l o o k ed atthe a ctua l f ac ts und er l y i ng hi s ba tte ryco nvi cti on i n deter m i ni ng tha t i t qual i fi ed as a cr i m e o fv i o l en ce . A r ev i ew ofthe s en te nc i nghe ar i ng tr anscr i pt r eve al s that Tay l ori s co rr ect, al though i t doe s not affect the o utcom e h ere. In m aking a deter m i nati on a s t o w h e th e r T a y l o r ’ s c o n v i c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d a c r i me of v i ol ence, the dist ri ct j ud ge re ad the i nfo rm ati on in Ta y l o r ’ s b a t t e r y c a s e ( wh i c h s e tf o r th th e u n d e r l y i ng f ac t th atTa y l o r ha d c o m m i tt ed th e ba tt ery b y s tr i k in g s o meo ne wi th a kni fe ) a nd s t a t e d: The I nfo rm ati on in thi s ca se, however, char ges st rik in g, sp ec ifies st rik in g, w h ich is t h e u se of p h ys ic a l f o r c e a g a i ns tthe p e r s o n o fa no the r, a nd ac c o r di ngl y, it app ear s t o m e that, ev en under the Woods deci si on . . . wh at w e hav e her e i s a c rim e of vi ol ence because it i nvol ved the use o fphysi calf or ce agains t the pers on of anoth er. T his w as im pr o per , b ec au se i ns te ad o f us i ng th e ch arging d ocu m en t solel y t o de term ine w hich pa rt o f§ 3 5- 42

- 2- 1( a)( 3) Ta y l o r ha d v i o l at ed ( i
. e. , c au sing se r i o us b o di l y i nj ur y v er su s us i nga de adl y weap on), th e j ud ge w ent further, l oo ked at the actual f acts of w h at T ay lor h ad d on e, a n d foc u se d on th e “ st rik in g” in re achi ng a concl usi on. Thi s, as Tayl orco rr ectly points out, i s e xactly what Wo ods s ay s a co u rtca n n otd o in ap p lyin g t h e m od ified ca te go ric al a p p ro ac h
. Se eWoods , 5 7 6 F
. 3 d a t4 0 4 ( “ [ w] ha tthe s e nt e nc i ngc o ur t ca nno t do i s to loo ka t th e par ti cul arf ac ts unde r l y i ngthe de fen dant’s co nvi cti on. ”) ( em phasi s in or i gi n al). The er ro rN o. 10

- 2947 11

w as obvi ousl y har m l ess , however

— de s pi t e ma ki ng a m i sst ep i n how i t g ot ther e, the dist ri ct c ourtr eached the c or re ct c on cl usi on that Tay l or ’ s ba tte ryco nvi cti on q u alifie s as a c rim e of vio len c e un d e r § 4 B 1.2
. SeeEllis , 622 F. 3d at 798.
I I I . C ONC L US I ON The j ud gm ent o fthe dist ri ct c ourti s A FFI RMED .

12- 29- 10