[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-15619

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:14-cr-60163-WPD-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SHAUN ERIC MCKINLEY, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(April 12, 2016)

Before MARCUS, JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Shaun Eric McKinley appeals his convictions and two life sentences for 

kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), and sex trafficking, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). On appeal, McKinley argues that: (1) the evidence was 

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insufficient to convict him of sex trafficking under the Trafficking Victims 

Protection Act (“TVPA”); (2) the federal kidnapping statute is unconstitutional; (3) 

the evidence was insufficient to convict him of kidnapping; (4) the district court 

plainly erred in its evidentiary rulings; (5) the district court abused its discretion in 

denying him a mistrial; (6) the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct;

(7) the district court abused its discretion in denying him a continuance; (8) the 

admission of his prior bad acts and the improper impeachment of his witness 

cumulatively denied him a fair trial; (9) the district court erred in applying an

obstruction-of-justice enhancement; (10) his prior Florida convictions for 

controlled-substance offenses did not qualify as controlled-substance offenses for 

career-offender purposes; and (11) his sentences were substantively unreasonable. 

After thorough review, we affirm.

We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences 

in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 587 (11th Cir. 

2015). A defendant must offer more than a reasonable hypothesis of innocence --

the issue is not whether a jury reasonably could have acquitted, but whether it 

reasonably could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We also review 

the constitutionality of a federal statute de novo. United States v. Jackson, 111 

F.3d 101, 101 (11th Cir. 1997). While we typically review de novo claims of 

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prosecutorial misconduct, if a defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s 

statements before the district court, we review for plain error that is so obvious that 

failure to correct it would jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial. United 

States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2008). Plain error is (1) an 

error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects a defendant’s substantial rights. United 

States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1343 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007). If these three prongs

are met, we will only correct the error if it “‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity, 

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. An error affects substantial 

rights if it “‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’” Id. 

We review the denial of a motion for mistrial and the denial of a motion to 

continue trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 

1232 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Valladeres, 544 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 

2008). We typically review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, but will 

review for plain error if a defendant failed to preserve a challenge to an evidentiary 

ruling by contemporaneously objecting. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 

1275 (11th Cir. 2007). Similarly, if a party induced or invited the district court 

into making an error, we are precluded from reviewing that error on appeal. 

United States v. Brannan, 562 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009).

We review a district court’s findings of fact concerning an obstruction-ofjustice enhancement for perjury for clear error. United States v. Banks, 347 F.3d 

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1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2003). We review de novo the court’s decision to classify a 

defendant as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. United States v. Gibson, 

434 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006). We review the sentence a district court 

imposes for “reasonableness,” which “merely asks whether the trial court abused 

its discretion.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) 

(quotation omitted). We are bound to follow our binding precedent unless and 

until we overrule the precedent en banc or the Supreme Court overrules it. United 

States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008).

First, we are unpersuaded by McKinley’s claim that there was insufficient 

evidence to convict him of sex-trafficking. To obtain a conviction for sextrafficking a non-minor, the government must first show that the defendant 

knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, or 

maintained a person by any means. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). The government must 

then prove that the defendant knew or was in reckless disregard of the fact that 

means of force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion would be used to cause the 

person to engage in a commercial sex act. Id. Lastly, the government must prove 

that the offense was in or affected interstate or foreign commerce. Id. 

The statute defines “coercion” to include “any scheme, plan, or pattern 

intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in 

serious harm to . . . any person.” Id. § 1591(e)(2)(B). “Serious harm” is then 

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defined as “any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, 

financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the 

surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background 

and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing commercial 

sexual activity in order to avoid incurring that harm.” Id. § 1591(e)(4).

When a defendant chooses to testify, he runs the risk that, if disbelieved, the 

jury might conclude that the opposite of his testimony is true. United States v. 

Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995). Thus, a statement by a defendant, if 

disbelieved by the jury, may be considered as substantive evidence of his guilt. Id. 

Where some corroborative evidence of guilt exists for the charged offense, and the 

defendant takes the stand in his own defense, the defendant’s testimony denying 

guilt may establish, by itself, elements of the offense. Id. at 314-15. This rule 

applies with special force where the elements to be proved for a conviction include 

highly subjective elements, such as intent or knowledge. Id. at 315. Credibility 

determinations are the exclusive province of the jury, and will not be disturbed 

unless testimony the jury relied on was incredible as a matter of law. United States 

v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2005). To be incredible as a 

matter of law, testimony must be unbelievable on its face. Id. at 1291.

McKinley claims there was no evidence that he forced or coerced Ashlee 

Wilson to engage in a commercial sex act because she worked in prostitution 

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before he met her and she voluntarily engaged in a joint commercial-sextrafficking venture with him. However, sufficient evidence showed that McKinley 

knowingly harbored Wilson by the use of force, threats of force, and coercion in 

order to force her to perform commercial sex acts. Wilson herself testified that 

McKinley engaged in threats and violence to scare her to stay with him and keep

performing commercial sex. For example, after an escape attempt, McKinley 

“hog-tied” her naked and beat her with a board. She said she felt required to 

follow his orders, because the alternative “wouldn’t be good for [her].” Her 

testimony was corroborated by witness Shaquille Antonio, who said that McKinley 

had bragged to him that he had beaten Wilson so that she would not escape again. 

The only evidence directly rebutting Wilson’s testimony was McKinley’s own 

denial, but the jury was entitled to disbelieve his testimony and use it as evidence 

of his guilt. Moreover, the fact that Wilson worked as a prostitute before meeting 

McKinley does not excuse his responsibility under the statute for compelling her to 

“continue performing commercial sexual activity.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(4). 

We also reject McKinley’s constitutional challenge to the federal kidnapping 

statute. As a general rule, a facial constitutional challenge can succeed only if the 

law is unconstitutional in all of its applications. See Horton v. City of St. 

Augustine, Fla., 272 F.3d 1318, 1329 (11th Cir. 2001). We will only invalidate a 

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congressional enactment upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its 

constitutional bounds. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).

Under its commerce power, Congress may permissibly regulate the channels 

and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as well as activities having a 

substantial effect on interstate commerce. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.; United 

States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995). In Lopez, the Supreme Court held 

that the Gun-Free School Zones Act -- which criminalized possession of a firearm 

in a school zone -- was an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional authority 

because the Act neither regulated commercial activity nor required the possession 

to be connected to interstate commerce. 514 U.S. at 551. Notably, however, in 

reaching this conclusion, Lopez held it dispositive that the statute contained “no 

jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the 

firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.” Id. at 561. Based on 

Lopez, we’ve held that the express jurisdictional elements of a number of statutes 

defeated facial challenges to their constitutionality. See United States v. Drury, 

396 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (murder-for-hire); United States v. 

Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1997) (Hobbs Act); United States v. 

Chowdhury, 118 F.3d 742, 745 (11th Cir. 1997) (federal arson); United States v. 

McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 389-90 (11th Cir. 1996) (felon-in-possession-of-firearm). 

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The federal kidnapping statute at issue here prohibits the kidnapping of any 

person when an instrumentality of interstate commerce is used “in committing or 

in furtherance of the commission of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). Thus, 

unlike the statute invalidated in Lopez, the kidnapping statute contains an express 

jurisdictional element that ensures that the statute only reaches kidnapping 

furthered by the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 

559-60; United States v. Morgan, 748 F.3d 1024, 1032 n.9 (10th Cir. 2014) 

(persuasive authority) (noting failures of constitutional challenges to kidnapping 

statute). The federal kidnapping statute, therefore, is not facially constitutional. 

Next, we find no merit to McKinley’s argument that there was insufficient 

evidence that he used instrumentalities of interstate commerce in furtherance of his 

kidnapping offense. To sustain a conviction under the federal kidnapping statute, 

there must be sufficient evidence that the defendant kidnapped any person and that 

he used an instrumentality of interstate commerce “in committing or in furtherance 

of the commission of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). Cellular telephones 

are instrumentalities of interstate commerce. United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 

1176, 1180-81 (11th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the use of cell phones, even without 

evidence that the calls were routed through the interstate system, sufficiently 

satisfies the use of interstate commerce element of an offense. Id. 

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The evidence adduced at trial shows that McKinley used his cell phone 

before and during Wilson’s kidnapping. Indeed, McKinley used his cell phone to 

communicate with Chuwan Evans, an individual who set up a “date” with Wilson 

so that McKinley could kidnap her. McKinley also spoke to Evans on his cell 

phone while he was following him to find a non-public place to commit the 

kidnapping. Because sufficient evidence demonstrated that cell phones were used 

in furtherance of kidnapping Wilson, and, therefore, supported McKinley’s 

conviction, the federal kidnapping statute was constitutional as applied to him. 

Similarly, we reject McKinley’s claim that the district court erred in 

admitting evidence about his involvement with drugs and guns, a prior drug 

conviction, and testimony that he hit someone with a brick. The Federal Rules of 

Evidence prohibit the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to 

show a defendant’s character in order to prove action in conformity with his 

character, though this evidence may be admitted for other purposes. Fed. R. Evid. 

404(b). Rule 404(b), however, deals only with the admissibility of evidence 

extrinsic to the charged offenses; the rule does not cover intrinsic evidence. 

Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1344. Evidence is intrinsic if it is: (1) an uncharged offense 

arising out of the same series of transactions as the charged offense; (2) necessary 

to complete the story of the crime; or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence 

regarding the charged offense. Id. Intrinsic evidence must nevertheless satisfy 

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Rule 403’s probative-value/prejudice weighing test. Id. at 1344 & n.8. Evidence 

is inextricably intertwined with evidence of the charged offense when it forms an 

integral and natural part of the witness’s accounts of the circumstances surrounding 

the offenses for which the defendant was indicted. Id. at 1344. We’ve said that 

evidence of activities that occurred before the charged offense is admissible if it

pertains to a chain of events forming the context, motive, and set-up of the crime. 

United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1992).

In this case, the district court did not plainly err in admitting testimony of 

McKinley’s drug activities, since the testimony was intrinsic to the chain of events 

forming the context and set-up of his sex-trafficking and kidnapping offenses.1

 

Nor was there plain error when the government referenced McKinley’s “last” prior 

conviction, since the questioning was meant to resolve McKinley’s apparent 

confusion about which of his drug activities was the subject of the government’s 

questioning. Finally, testimony concerning McKinley’s brick attack was necessary 

to complete Wilson’s story and prove that McKinley forced her into performing 

commercial sex acts. The district court, therefore, did not plainly err or abuse its 

discretion in denying McKinley’s motion for mistrial on these grounds.

 1 Because McKinley did not object to the admission of evidence relating to his drug activities or 

his “last conviction,” we review those claims for plain error. McKinley did object to evidence 

relating to his attack with the brick, and, we review that claim for abuse of discretion. 

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We also reject McKinley’s claim that the district court abused its discretion 

by denying his motions for mistrial during a defense witness’ cross-examination. 

The grant of mistrial is warranted only if a defendant shows “substantial 

prejudice,” United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999), which 

is a reasonable possibility that, but for the improper remarks or evidence, the trial 

outcome would have been different, United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 

1334 (11th Cir. 2009). The district court is in the best position to evaluate the 

prejudicial effect of a statement or evidence on the jury. Id. We’ve held that the 

admission of inadmissible evidence did not affect the outcome of a jury verdict 

when there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. United States v. 

Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099, 1109 (11th Cir. 2010).

McKinley claims that the government improperly impeached a defense

witness with extrinsic evidence of drugs and guns, but he has not shown that these 

references during a single defense witness’s cross-examination would have exerted 

a substantial impact on the jury’s verdict and affected the outcome of his trial. As 

the record shows, the government introduced overwhelming evidence of 

McKinley’s guilt, including consistent testimony from multiple witnesses, 

surveillance videos of McKinley’s actions, and photographs and other records of 

McKinley’s activities. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of his 

motions for a mistrial concerning this evidence.

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Next, we disagree with McKinley’s claim that the government engaged in 

four instances of prosecutorial misconduct. A prosecutor’s statements will justify 

reversal of a conviction only if they undermined the fairness of the trial and 

contributed to a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527, 

1541 (11th Cir. 1992). To establish prosecutorial misconduct, (1) the remarks 

must be improper, and (2) the remarks must prejudicially affect the substantial 

rights of the defendant. Merrill, 513 F.3d at 1307. As we’ve noted, a defendant’s 

substantial rights are prejudicially affected when a reasonable probability arises 

that, but for the remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. 

The “mere utterance” of words such as “jail,” “prison,” or “arrest” without 

regard to context or circumstance does not necessarily constitute reversible error. 

United States v. Veteto, 701 F.2d 136, 139-40 (11th Cir. 1983). Rather, what 

matters is whether the remark was a constant reminder of the accused’s condition 

and a continuing influence throughout the trial that presented an unacceptable risk 

of impermissible factors corrupting the jury’s judgment. United States v. 

Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1058 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that a brief 

comment referencing the defendant’s imprisonment did not prejudice the jury). 

A prosecutor’s statements during closing argument require reversal only if 

the comments are both improper and prejudicial to a substantial right of the 

defendant in light of the particular facts of the case and in the context of the entire 

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record. Jacoby, 955 F.2d at 1540-41 (holding that a prosecutor’s statements during 

closing arguments that inconsistencies “were so glaring and so clear” that 

“[s]omeone is committing perjury” were neither improper nor prejudicial, albeit 

“colorful and perhaps flamboyant”). Because the statements of counsel are not 

evidence, the district court may rectify improper prosecutorial statements by 

instructing the jury that only the evidence in the case is to be considered. Id. The 

prosecutor is entitled to make a fair response to the defense counsel’s arguments. 

United States v. Hiett, 581 F.2d 1199, 1204 (5th Cir. 1978).2

McKinley argues that taken together, these four instances of prosecutorial 

misconduct denied him a fair trial: (1) eliciting testimony of other crimes during 

cross-examination; (2) alluding to McKinley’s prior drug conviction; (3) 

referencing McKinley’s prior time in prison; and (4) referencing “smoke and 

mirrors” and “red herrings” during its rebuttal of his closing argument. However, 

our review of the record reveals that the government did not plainly engage in 

prosecutorial misconduct because these comments and actions were not improper. 

Moreover, given the substantial evidence of McKinley’s guilt, he has not shown 

that, but for these four instances, his verdict would have been different.

We also are unconvinced by McKinley’s claim that the district court abused 

its discretion in denying his motion to continue that he submitted before trial and 

 2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), we adopted as 

binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981.

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his oral request to continue that he submitted before jury selection. It is the 

defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the denial of a motion to continue was an 

abuse of discretion and that it produced specific substantial prejudice. United 

States v. Smith, 757 F.2d 1161, 1166 (11th Cir. 1985). The following factors are 

relevant in assessing claims that counsel did not have adequate time to prepare: the 

time available for preparation, the likelihood of prejudice from denial, the 

accused’s role in shortening the effective preparation time, the degree of 

complexity of the case, and the availability of discovery from the prosecution. 

United States v. Uptain, 531 F.2d 1281, 1286 (5th Cir. 1976).

To the extent McKinley challenges the district court’s denial of his pretrial 

motion to continue, we are precluded from reviewing it because McKinley invited 

the error by insisting on going to trial. To the extent he challenges his oral motion 

to continue, the district court had previously provided him with ample opportunity 

to receive a continuance. As the record reveals, the court did not previously grant 

a continuance because McKinley insisted on going to trial that Monday, in spite of 

his attorney’s lack of preparation. Even after McKinley requested more time on 

the morning of the trial, the district court accommodated his request by offering an 

extended lunch break so that he could discuss his case with his attorney. In any 

event, McKinley has not identified any specific, substantial prejudice resulting 

from the denial, instead resorting to generalized arguments about the shortness of 

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preparation time and the severity of the sentences he faced. On this record, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance.

Likewise, we are unpersuaded by McKinley’s argument that the admission 

of his prior bad acts and the improper impeachment of his witness cumulatively 

denied him a fair trial. Under the cumulative error doctrine, an aggregation of 

plain errors failing to necessitate reversal and harmless errors can yield a denial of 

the constitutional right to a fair trial, which calls for reversal. United States v. 

Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Davis 

v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006). The harmlessness of cumulative error is 

determined by conducting the same inquiry as for individual error, under which we 

look to see whether the defendant’s substantial rights were affected. Id. The total 

effect of the errors on the trial will depend, among other things, on the nature and 

number of the errors committed, their interrelationship, their combined effect, how 

the district court dealt with the errors as they arose, the strength of the 

government’s case, and the length of trial. Id.

In this case, there was no cumulative error with regard to the district court’s 

evidentiary rulings and denials of McKinley’s motions for mistrial. Not only has 

he failed to show any reversible error, as we’ve discussed above, but he has failed 

to demonstrate or explain how the aggregate effect of these errors substantially 

influenced the outcome of his trial.

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We likewise disagree with McKinley’s claim that the district court erred in 

applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on his untruthful 

testimony and his attempts to procure false exonerating letters during recorded 

jailhouse phone calls. When applying this enhancement, a district court should 

make specific findings as to each alleged instance of obstruction by identifying the 

materially false statements individually. United States v. Arguedas, 86 F.3d 1054, 

1059 (11th Cir. 1996). However, a general finding that an enhancement is 

warranted suffices if it encompasses all of the factual predicates necessary for a 

perjury finding. United States v. Singh, 291 F.3d 756, 763 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, a defendant receives a two-level enhancement if:

[T]he defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or 

impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, 

prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and . . . the 

obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and 

any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense[.]

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 

A defendant may obstruct justice by committing perjury during his trial. 

Singh, 291 F.3d at 763. Perjury is defined as false testimony concerning a material 

matter made with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a 

result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. Id. Testimony concerns a material 

matter if it would tend to influence the jury’s consideration of the matters at hand if 

it were believed. Id. This materiality requirement is a low one. United States v. 

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Dedeker, 961 F.2d 164, 167 (11th Cir. 1992). The district court may conclude that 

a defendant’s testimony is false when it is irreconcilable with the record. United 

States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 839, 845 (11th Cir. 2010). A defendant may also 

obstruct justice by “threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing 

a . . . witness . . . directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, 

comment. (n.4(a)). Encouraging a potential witness to lie is considered 

“unlawfully influencing” for purposes of an obstruction enhancement. See United 

States v. Amedeo, 370 F.3d 1305, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004).

Here, the district court did not clearly err in determining that McKinley’s 

testimony that he had not bled on the night of the kidnapping was perjurious, since 

his testimony contradicted the testimony of three witnesses, all of whom said he 

had been covered in blood, as well as the DNA evidence that identified blood in 

the car as his. Nor did the district court clearly err in finding that McKinley’s 

attempt to influence potential witnesses to write letters declaring his innocence --

which he admitted to at trial -- supported the obstruction enhancement. Moreover, 

contrary to McKinley’s claim, the district court identified each material false 

statement individually and made specific factual findings for each. Accordingly, 

the court did not clearly err in imposing an obstruction enhancement.

We also are unpersuaded by McKinley’s claim that his prior Florida 

convictions for controlled-substance offenses were not controlled-substance 

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offenses for career-offender purposes. For a defendant to be a career offender, he 

must have at least two prior felony convictions for a controlled substance offense. 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A “controlled substance offense” is “an offense under federal 

or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that 

prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a 

controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent 

to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” Id. § 4B1.2(b).

Under Florida law, it is a crime to “sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess 

with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance.” Fla. Stat. § 

893.13(1)(a). We have determined that a prior conviction under Fla. Stat. § 

893.13(1) is a “controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) and, 

therefore, qualifies as a predicate felony for the purposes of the career offender 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262,

1267-68 (11th Cir. 2014). We held that no element of mens rea with respect to the 

illicit nature of the controlled substance is expressed or implied in the Guidelines’ 

definition of a controlled substance offense. Id. at 1267. 

Under our binding precedent, the district court did not err in determining that 

McKinley’s prior convictions under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1) were controlled 

substance offenses for purposes of the career offender enhancement. See id. at 

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1267-68; Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1236. Accordingly, the district court properly 

applied a career-offender enhancement.

Finally, we reject McKinley’s argument that his sentences of life 

imprisonment were substantively unreasonable. In reviewing the “‘substantive 

reasonableness of [a] sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,’” 

we consider the “‘totality of the circumstances.’” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190 (quoting 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). The district court must impose a 

sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes” 

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).3

 “[W]e will not second guess the weight (or lack 

thereof) that the [court] accorded to a given [§ 3553(a)] factor ... as long as the 

sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances 

presented.” United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(quotation, alteration and emphasis omitted). We will vacate a sentence only if the 

district court (1) did not account for a factor that should have received significant 

weight, (2) gave significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or (3) 

 3 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the 

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the 

offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to 

protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training 

or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the 

pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted 

sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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committed a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors. United 

States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

While we do not automatically presume a sentence falling within the 

guideline range to be reasonable, we ordinarily expect that sentence to be 

reasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). The party 

challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is unreasonable. United 

States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). 

McKinley’s two life sentences are not substantively unreasonable. For 

starters, life sentences are within his guidelines range, which means that we expect 

them to be reasonable. In addition, the record reveals that the district court 

considered mitigating factors, such as McKinley’s difficult youth, past sexual 

abuse, mental health issues, and his potential to obtain a profession and become a 

productive member of society. It also considered Wilson’s prior voluntary 

prostitution and the small scale of McKinley’s sex-trafficking scheme as mitigating 

factors. After looking at the nature and circumstances of the offense, the court

determined that McKinley’s victimization of Wilson was a significant aggravating 

factor, as well as McKinley’s extensive prior criminal history. It then weighed the 

aggravating and mitigating factors and determined that life sentences were fair and 

just. In short, the district court properly weighed all the relevant factors, and did 

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not commit a clear error in judgment when it balanced the mitigating and 

aggravating factors. We affirm McKinley’s convictions and sentences. 

AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-15619 Date Filed: 04/12/2016 Page: 21 of 21