MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2020	ME 137 Docket: WCB

- 20

- 60 Argued : September	16,	2020 Decided: December	15,	2020 Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY, and HORTON , JJ.

LORRAINE	SOMERS

v. S.D.	WARREN	COMPANY et	al.

MEAD,	J. [ ¶1] In	December	2014,	the	Workers’	Compensation	Board	( Elwin,	HO ) 1 entered	a	decree	permitting S .D.	Warren	Company	and	its	insurer,	Constitution State	 Services	 (collectively	 S.D.	 Warren), to	 discontinue	 paying	 Lorraine Somers	 partial	 incapacity benefits	 because	 those	 payments	 had	 reached	 a 520

- week	statutory limit

. See 3 9

- A	M.R.S.	§	213 (1)(A),	(4) (20 14 ). 2 [¶ 2 ]	 	 Somers	 petitioned	 to	 have	 her	 benefits	 reinstated, asserting that
S.D. Warren had	failed	to	comply	with Me. W.C.B.	Rule,	ch. 2,	§ 5(1) (2017) (“the

1 Before	October	 15,	 2015,	 Administrative	 Law	 Judges deciding	workers’	 compensation	 cases were	known	as	Hearing	Officers. See P.L. 2015,	ch.	297 (effective	Oct.	15,	2015).

2 The	statute	has	since	been	amended,	but	not	in	a	way	that	affects	this	appeal. P.L.	2015,	ch.	297, §	8	(effective	Oct.	15,	2015); P.L.	2017,	ch.	288 ,	§	A

- 50	(effective	July	15,	2017) (codified	at	39

- A	M.R.S. §	213(1)(A),	(4)	(2020))

.2 former	Rule”) 3 by	not	providing	her , before	it	ceased	making	payments, with notice	that	she	could	be	eligible	for	an	extension	of	weekly	benefits

. A lthough

an Administrative	Law	Judge	( Elwin,	ALJ )	denied the petition	for	reinstatement of	bene fits ,	the	Workers’	Compensation	Board	Appellate	Division	vacated	that decision	after	Somers	appealed. [¶ 3 ] The	Appellate	Division	concluded	that	the	notice	requirement	of the former	Rule was	applicable	to	Somers’s petition and	that , because	S.D. Warren admitted	 that	 it	 had not	 sent	 the	 notice,	 it	 was	 required	 to	 pay	 Somers	 all benefits	 owed	 to	 her	 from	 t he	 date	 they	 were	 discontinued	 pursuant	 to	 the 2014	decree. The	Appellate	Division	further	concluded	that	the decree	did	not impose	a	res judicata	bar	o n	Somers’s	petition. On	S.D.	Warren’s	appeal	from the	decision	of	the	Appellate	Division,	w e affirm.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 4 ] I n	 December	 2000,	 Somers	 suffered	 a	 right	 knee	 injury	 while working	for	S.D.	Warren.		She	returned	to	work	in	a	work

- hardening	capaci ty

3 The	Rule	was	amended	on	September	1,	2018,	by	adding	subsection	1

- A,	which	shifts	the	burden to provide	notice	from	the	employer	to	the	Board	in	cases	where	an	order	of	compensation	has	been entered. See Me.	W.C.B.	Rule, ch.	2 ,	§	5(1)

- (1

- A)	(2020).		Accordingly,	the	principal	legal	issue	in	this case	 will	 not	 recur	 in	 petitions	 filed	 after	 the	 amend ment	 took	 effect.	 	 The version	 of	 the	 rule applicable	to	Somers’s	petition,	Me.	W.C.B.	Rule,	ch.	2,	§ 5(1)	(2017),	is	referred	to	in	this	opinion	as

“ the	 former	 Rule.”	 	 The	 former	 Rule	 was	 virtually	 unchanged	 during	 the	 twenty	 years	 from	 its adoption in	19 98	to	its	2018	amendment

.3 in	October	 2001	 and	 resumed	 her	 regular	job	in	December 2001. After her symptoms	worsened , she	went	out	of	work i n	March	2005	and	was	terminated two	years	later. [¶ 5 ] In	a	July	2008	decree,	the	Workers’	Compensation	Board	found	that the injury Somers sustained	in	2000	was	compensable	and that she was	entitled

to ongoing 100	percent	partial	incapacity	benefits.		In	March 2013,	S.D.	Warren filed	a	petition	 for	review	seeking	 to	discontinue	benefits	on	 the	ground	 that Somers’s	entitlement	to them had ende d pursuant	to a 520

- week	statutory	cap.
See 39

- A	M.R.S.	§ 213 (1)(A),	(4)

. T he Board found in	its	December	2014	decree that 520	 weeks	 of	 benefits	 had	 been	 paid	 and	 that Somers’s	 permanent impairment	 level	 fell	 below	 the	 11.8 percent	 threshold established	 by
Me. W.C.B.	Rule, ch.	2 ,	§	1(1) (20 14 ) ,	and therefore S.D. Warren	was	entitled	to discontinue	payment	 of	benefits, see 39

- A M.R.S.	 §§ 205 (9)(B)(2),	213 (1)(A), (4) (20 14 )

. [¶ 6 ] In	May	2015,	Somers	filed	a	petition	for	reinstatement	of	benefits,

see 39

- A	M.R.S.	§ 205 (9)(C)	(2020),	arguing	that S.D.	Warren had	failed	to send the notice required	by the	former	Rule and	that	she	was	entitled	to	continuing4 benefits	until the	company di d	so

. 4 T he	version	of	the Rule in	effect	at	the	time provided, Prior	 to	cessation	of	benefits	pursuant	 to	39

- A	M.R.S.A.	§ 213(1), the	 employer	 must	 notify	 the	 employee	 that	 the	 employee’s	 lost time	benefits	are	due	 to	expire.		The	notice	must	be	 sent	at least 21 days	 in	 advance	 of	 the	 expiration	 date,	 and	 must	 include	 the date	 the	 lost	 time	 benefits	 are	 due	 to	 expire	 and	 the	 following paragraph: If	you	are	experiencing	extreme	financial	hardship	due to	inability	to	return	to	gainful	employment,	you	may be	eligible	for	an	extension	of	your	weekly	benefits. To request	such	an	extension,	you	must	file	a	Petition	for Extension	 of	 Benefits	 within	 30	 calendar	 days	 of	 the date	 that	 benefits	 expire,	 or,	 in cases	 where	 the expiration	date	is	contested,	within	30 calendar	days	of a	final	decree	as	to	the	expiration	date. Failure	 to	send	 the	 required	 notice	will	automatically	extend	 the employee’s entitlement	to	lost	time	benefits	for	the period	that the notice	was	not	sent. Notice	shall	be	considered	“sent”	if	i t	is	mailed	to	the	last	address to	which	a	compensation	check	was	sent. Me.	W.C.B.	Rule,	ch.	2,	§	5(1)	(2017). [¶ 7 ] In	a	2017	decision denying	Somers’s	petition , the	Board ( Elwin, ALJ ) construed the	 former Rule as applying solely to	 cases	in	which	 an	 employer seeks	a	“prospective”	discontinuation	of	benefits,	rather	than	in	cases	where,	as

4 The	parties	stipulated	that	S.D.	Warren had not	issue d a	notice	of	Somers’s	right	to	request	an extension	of	benefits	for	extreme	financial	hardship	pursuant	to the	former	Rule

.5 here,	a B oard	decree allows “immediate”	discontinuation	of	benefits. Somers moved	 for	 further	 findings

. See 39

- A	M.R.S.	§ 318 (2020)

. When her motion was	denied ,	Somers	appealed to	the	Appellate	Division

. See 39

- A	M.R.S.	§ 321

- B (2020)

. [¶ 8 ] In	 January	 2020,	 the	 Appellate	 Division	 vacated	 the decision , construing the plain	 language	 of	 the former	 Rule	 to require	 the	 prescribed notice	 before S.D.	Warren	 could	 terminate	 Somers’s	 benefits.	 	 The	 Appellate
Division further concluded	 that	 the	 former	 Rule	 did	 not	 exceed	 the	 Board’s rulemaking	 authority	 and	 that	 Somers’s	 notice	 argument	 was	 not	 barred	 by

res judicata. We granted	 S.D.	 Warren’s	 petit ion	 for	 appellate	 review. See
39

- A M.R.S.	§ 322 (3) (2020);	M.R.	App.	P. 23

. II.		DISCUSSION
A. Res	Judicata [¶ 9 ] S.D.	Warren	contends	that because	Somers	did	not claim	a lack	of
notice when contesting the	company’s 2013 petition	seeking	to	terminate	her benefits,	the	res	judicata	doctrine	barred	her	from	doing	so when	she	sought	to reinstate	 her	 benefits following the	 Board ’s 2014	 decree .	 	 The	 Appellate Division	disagreed, conclud ing	that “[b]eca u se	S.D. Warren	did	not	cease	paying benefits	 until	 after	 t he	 2014	 decree,	 the	 factual	issue	 of	whether	 notice	was6 provided	to	Ms.	Somers	was	not	before	 the	board	during	that	litigation.” W e review de	novo th e	Appellate	Division’s determination that res	judicata did	not bar	Somers’s	petition	to	reinstate	her	bene fits

. See Portland	Water	Dist.	v.	Town of	Standish ,	2008	ME 23,	¶	7,	940 A.2d	1097. [¶1 0 ] “ [V] alid	and	final	decisions	of	the	Workers ’ Compensation	Board are	subject	to	the	general	rules	of	res	judicata

. .	.	. ” Bailey	v.	City	of	Lewiston , 2017 ME 160,	 ¶	 10,	 168	 A.3d	 762	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 The	 claim preclusion branch of	res	judicata “ forecloses	relitigation	of	claims	only	when (1)	 the	same	parties	 or	 their	privies	are	involved	in	both	actions;	 (2)	a	 valid final	judgment	was	entered	in	the	p rior	action;	and	(3)	the	matters	presented for	decision	in	the	second	action	were,	or	might	have	been,	litigated	in	the	first
action. ” Berry	v.	MaineStream	Fin. ,	2019	ME	27,	¶	8,	202	A.3d	1195	(quotation marks	omitted).		It	is	the	third	element	that	is	at issue	here. [¶1 1 ] We	 agree	 with the	 Appellate	 Division’s determination that

res judicata does	 not	 bar	 Somers’s	 petition	 for	 reinstatement	 of	 her	 benefits because , prior	 to	 the	 decree allowing S.D.	 Warren	 to discontinue pay ing benefits , she could	 not	have	 known	 that the	company would	 fail	 to	 send the notice	required	by	the	former	Rule

. See 39

- A	M.R.S.	§	205(9)(B)(2) ( providing that	an	employer “may	not	reduce	or	discontinue	benefits	until	the	matter	has7 been	resolved	by	a	decree	issued	by	a n	administrative	law	judge” ). S.D.	Warren was	not	required	to send	the	notice	prospectively

— although	it	could	have	done so	and	avoided	much	 of	 the	 obligation	 that	 the	Appellate	Division ultimately ordered	it	to	pay 5

— and	so,	as	the	Appellate	Division determined ,	the	company “did	not	violate	the	[former	Rule]	until	it	ceased	paying	benefits.” Accordingly, the notice issue was	not	before	the	Board	in	the	201 3 action,	and thus was	not barred	by res	judicata in Somers’s appeal	to	the	Appellate	Division. See Berry , 2019	ME	27,	¶	8,	202	A.3d	1195.
B. Application of	the	Former	Rule [¶1 2 ] S.D.	 Warren next	 contends	 that	 the	 Appellate	 Division	 erred	 in concluding that	 the	 former	 Rule	 applied to	 require	 notice in a	 case	 like Somers’s,	that	is,	after	the	Board ha d issued	a	decree	allowing	an	employer	to terminate	 benefits,	 because	 that	 construction	 is	 in	 conflict	 with (1)	 an employer’s	statutory	right	to	discontinue	benefits	immediately	upon	issuance of	the	decree	and	(2)	the presumptive 520

- week limit on	benefi ts	for	an	injured worker at Somers’s level	 of	 incapacity

. See 39

- A	 M.R.S.	 §§ 205(9)(B)(2),
213 (1) (A),	(4)

.

5 At	oral	argument,	Somers reported that	S.D. Warren	sent	the	notice	required	by	the	former	Rule after	the	Appellate	Division	issued	its	decision.8 [¶1 3 ] We	disagree. On	questions	of	law 6 we	review	the	decision	of	the Appellate	 Division	 directly and	 deferentially , “ afford [ing] appropriate deference	to	the	Appellate	Division ’ s	reasonable	interpretation	of	the	workers ’ compensation	 statute	 and

.	 .	 . uphold [ing] the	 Appellate	 Division ’ s interpretation	unless	the	plain	language	of	the	statute	and	its	legislative	history compel	a	co ntrary	result. ” Bailey ,	2017	ME	160,	¶	9,	168	A.3d	762	(citation	and quotation	marks	omitted) ; see Bridgeman	v.	S.D.	Warren	Co. ,	2005 ME	38,	¶	11, 872	A.2d	961	(“ We	give	great	deference	to	Board	rules	interpreting	the	Act,	and we	have	encouraged	the	Board to	enact	rules	to	fill	in	the ‘ gray	areas ’ that	were intentionally	left	in	the	Act. ”)

. [¶1 4 ] S.D. Warren’s	burden	is thus a	significant	one

. I n Bailey , we	cited Kroeger	 v.	 Department	 of	 Environmental	 Protection ,	 2005	 ME	 50,	 ¶	 7,
870 A.2d 566 , for	the	proposition	that	“ we	will	only	vacate	an	agency ’ s	decision where	that	decision	violates	the	Constitution	or	statutes;	exceeds	the	agency ’ s authority;	is	 procedurally	unlawful;	is	 arbitrary	 or	capricious;	constitutes	an abuse	of	discretion;	or	is	a ffected	by	bias	or	an	error	of	law .”		2017	ME	160,	¶	9, 168	A.3d	762	(alteration and	quotation	marks omitted).

6 A hearing	officer ’s or	ALJ ’ s	findings	of	fact	are	final ,	absent	fraud.		39

- A	M.R.S.	§§ 318 , 322(3) (2020).9 [¶1 5 ] No	such	error	is	present	here. T he	plain	language	of	39

- A	M.R.S. § 205(9) (B) (2)	does	not	give	an	employer	a n	automatic right	 to	immediat ely
cease	pay ing benefits without	giving notice	to	the	employee as	required	by	the former	Rule

. The	statute provides that [i] f	an	order	or	award	of	compensation	 or	compensation	scheme has	been	entered,	the	employer

.	.	. shall	petition	the	board	for	an order	 to	 reduce	 or	 discontinue	 benefits	 and	 may	 not	 reduce	 or discontinue	benefits	until	the	matter	has	been	resolved	by	a	decree issued	by	an	administrative	law	judge.
39

- A	M.R.S.	§	205(9)(B)(2).		Th e	statu te thus directs that	an	employer	may	not
cease	p aying	benefits	to	an	employee	before the B oard issues	a decree; it	does
not, however , say	 that	 the	 issuance	 of	 a	 decree	 is	 the sole requirement for discontinu ing benefits.		Although	the	statute allows an	employer to	“ reduce	or discontinue	benefits

.	.	. pe nding	a	motion	for	findings	of	fact	and	conclusions	of law	or	pending	an	appeal	from [the] decree ,” id. ,	it	does	not	bar	the	Board	from imposing	 other	 requirements on	 the	 termination	 of	 benefits	 that	 are not addressed	in	the	statute but are consistent	with it .		The	former	Rule	imposes just	such	a	requirement. [¶1 6 ] S ection	 205(9)(B)(2)	 must	 be	 read	 in	 conjunction	 with	 section 213, which provides that,	for	workers	with	Somers’s	level	of	incapacity,10 an	employee	is	not	eligible	 to	 receive	compensation

.	 .	 . after	 the employee	has	received	a	total	of	260	weeks [ 7 ] of	compensation

.	.	. . The	board	may	in	the	exercise	of	its	discretion	extend	the	duration	of benefit	 entitlement	 beyond	 260	 weeks	 in	 cases	 involving	 extreme financial	hardship	due	to	inability	to	r eturn	to	gainful	employment

. 39

- A	M.R.S.	§	213(1)(A)	(emphasis	added ); see 20	Thames	St.	LLC	v.	Ocean	State Job	 Lot	 of	Me.	 2017,	 LLC ,	 2020	ME	 55,	 ¶	 8,	 231	 A.3d	 426	 (“We	interpret	 the statute	in	the	context	of	the	entire	statutory	scheme	.	.	.	.”). S ectio n	213 (1)(A) explicitly gives the	Board	the broad discretion to determine when	the “ extreme financial	hardship ” exception	 to	 the presumptive cap applies ;	 that	discretion includes the	latitude	to establish	notice	requirements

. T he	Board’s authority to extend	benefit	payments,	reflected	in	the	language	of	the	notice	required	by	the former	Rule

— “[i]f	you	are	experiencing	extreme	financial	hardship	.	.	.	you	may be	 eligible	 for	 an	 extension	 of	 your	 weekly	 benefits,” Me. W.C.B.	 Rule,	 ch.	 2, § 5(1)	 (2017 )

— exists	whether the	employer	 seeks	 to	end benefits through a certificate	 sent	 to	 the	 employee	 or	 by	 Board	 decree. See 39

- A M.R.S. § 213(1)(A)

. [¶1 7 ] Furthermore,	 c ontrary	 to	 S.D.	 Warren’s	 contention,	 the former Rule	does	not , as	applied	in	this	case, “expressly	mandate[]	that	the	durational

7 Although	the	statute	presumptively	limits	benefits	to	260	weeks,	under	specified	conditions	the presumptive	limit	may	be	extended	to	a	maximum	of	520	weeks.		39

- A	M.R.S.	§	213(4)	(2020); see Buckley	v.	S.D.	Warren	Co. ,	2010 ME	53,	¶	9	&	n.4,	997	A.2d	747

.11 cap	 is	 extended	 beyond	 the	 defined	 eligibility	 limit	 set	 by	 the	 Legislature.” Rather, the R ule was	adopted pursuant	 to	 the	Board’s	discretion to	 fill	in	 the “gray	 area[]”	 intentionally	 left	 in	 section	 213 (1)(A) ’s e xception	 for extreme financial	hardship ,	which	provides	 that	 “[t] he	board may	in	 the	exercise	of	its discretion extend	the	duration	of	benefit	entitlement

. ” 39

- A	M.R.S.	§	213(1)(A) (emphasis	 added ); s ee Johnson	 v.	 Home	 Depot	 USA,	 Inc. ,	 2014	 ME	 140,	 ¶	 10,
106 A.3d	 401	 (“ We	 have	 recognized

.	 .	 . that , subject	 to	 concrete	 statutory requirements,	there	are ‘ gray	areas ’ in	the	Workers ’ Compensation	Act	that	the Legislature	 knew	 would	 require ‘ flexible	 and	 realistic	 solutions

. ’ ”	 (quoting Bridgeman ,	2005	ME	38,	¶ 11,	872	A.2d	961 ))

. The	Board’s	broad	discretion extends	 to	 requiring	 that	 notice	 of	 the	 hardship	 exception	 be	 given	 to	 the employee. As	 we	 said	 i n	 discussing	 another	 section	 of	 the Workers’ Compensation Act, “notice	provisions	.	.	. would	be	rendered	m eaningless	if the employee’s	rights were	cut	off	before	receiving	notice	of	those	rights. ” Graves v.	Brockway

- Smith	Co. ,	2012 ME	128,	¶	18,	55 A.3d	456. [¶1 8 ] Our	 jurisprudence and the decisions	 o f the	 Board	 support	 our conclusion	that	S.D.	Warren	was required	to	give	Somers	notice	pursuant	to	the former	Rule	before	 terminating	her	benefits. I n Bridgeman we upheld	a r ule that	attached	a	greater	penalty	than that specified	by statute	to	an	employer’s12 failure	 to	 file	a	notice	 of	controversy	within	 fourte en	days	 of	 the	employee’s notice	of a claim. 2005	ME	38, ¶¶	2

- 3 ,	12 , 15 ,	872	A.2d	961 .		The r ule	at	issue
in Bridgeman imposed	 the	same	penalty	on	 the	employer	as does the	 former Rule	 at	 issue	 in	 this	 case

— an	 automatic	 continu ation of	 benefits	 until	 the

e mployer’s	compliance	with a notice	requirement. I d. ¶	7; see Me.	W.C.B.	Rule, ch. 2,	 §	 5(1) (2017)

. We concluded	 that	 the r ule ’s imposition	 of a	 greater penalty	than	the	statute	“ [did] not	compel	a	conclusion	that	the	Board	exceeded its	authority	in	prom ulgating [the r ule] to	implement	the	statute	and	carry	out the	purposes	of	the	Act.” Bridgeman , 2005 ME	38,	¶	15,	872	A.2d	961. [¶1 9 ] Additionally, during	 the	 twenty	 years	 that t he	 former	 Rule remained	 essentially	 unchanged following its	 enactment, see	 supra n. 3 ,	 the Board	released	a	number	of	decisions that	predicted the	Appellate	Division’s interpretatio n — some against	 S.D.	 Warren

. See	 Waters	 v.	 Sappi	 Fine	 Paper , W.C.B. 99

- 01

- 98

- 48	(Me.	2017)	( Jerome,	ALJ )	(“Whether	benefits	are	being	paid voluntar ily	or	by	Board	order,	benefits	will	be	‘due	to	expire’	after	the	30 day notice	period	required	by [the	former Rule ]

. .	.	. ”); Bridgeman	v.	S.D.	Warren Co. , W.C.B.	 98

- 01 9 729	 (Me.	 2016)	 ( Collier, ALJ )	 (concluding	 that	 sections 205(9)(B)(2)	and	213(1) were not	mutually	exclusive	as	S.D.	Warren	suggest ed and	 that	 the	 notice	 rule	 was	 applicable); Smith	 v.	 Cummings	 Health	 Care ,13 W.C.B. 00

- 00

- 53

- 14	 (Me.	 2008)	 ( Pelletier, HO )	 (“[The R ule]	 requires	 that	 the notice	 with	 the	 required	 language	 be	 sent	 to	 the employe e before benefits actually	cease,	whether	or	not	 the	expiration	date	is	set	by	 the	insurer	or	by Board	decree.”). 8 [¶ 20 ] S.D.	 Warren	 does	 not	 cite	 any	 decision apart	 from the	 ALJ’s decision	 in	 th is case to establish that	 the	 Appellate	 Division’s	 interpreta tion here is	inconsistent with	longstanding	Board	practice. To	the	contrary ,	when the	 Rule	 was	 amended	 in	 2018 , the	 Board	 made	 it	 explicit	 that	 notice concerning	an	employee’s	 right	 to	 request	an extension	 of	benefits based	 on extreme	financial	hardship m ust	be	given	to	the	employee when a	Board	order has	been	entered. Me.	W.C.B.	Rule,	ch.	2,	§ 5(1

- A) (2000) .		Although	the	current rule	provides	that the notice	must	be	included	in	the	decree	itself , as	opposed to	being	 sent	by	 the	 employer, id. ,	if	S.D.	Wa rren’s	argument

— asserting	 “the fallacy that	 in	 litigated	 cases	 the	 financial	 hardship	 extension	 notification	 is necessary”

— were	correct,	then	notice would	not	be required at	all. [¶ 2 1] Finally,	a s we	have noted , see	supra ¶ 11 ,	S.D.	Warren	could	have satisfied	the	former	Rule’s	requirement	that	it	notify	Somers	that	her	benefits were	“due	 to	expire,” Me.	W.C.B.	Rule,	ch.	2,	§ 5(1)	(2017) ,	by	applying	basic

8 See	 also	Adams	v.	Presque	 Isle	Nursing	Home ,	W.C.B.	95

- 017695H	(Me.	2008)	( Pelletier,	HO ); Chaput	v.	Adecco	N.	Am.,	LLC ,	W.C.B.	01

- 017391	(Me.	2007)	( Goodnough,	HO ).14 math	and	sending	the	notice twenty
- one	days	before	reaching	the	presumpt ive 520

- week	 benefit	 limit.	 	We	 reject	 S.D.	 Warren’s	 argument	 that	 it	 could	 not know	the	exact	date	the	Board	would	enter	its	decree	and	so	could	not	know when	it	should	send	Somers’s	notice

— the	former	Rule	requires	notice “ at	least 21	days	in	advance	of	t he	expiration	date,” Me. W.C.B.	Rule,	ch.	2,	§ 5(1)	(2017) (emphasis	added) ,	not exactly twenty
- one	days	in	advance.		S.D.	Warren	always knew	 when	 Somers’s	 benefits could be	 terminated

— at 520 weeks

— and	 by referencing	 that	 date	 and sending	 notice	 twenty

- one days	 in	 advance	 of it (or before) , the	company c ould	have	 satisfied	 the	 former	Rule	 and	protected itself	against	the	judgment about which	it	now	complains , regardless	of	when the	 Board’s	 decree	 was actually entered. Had	 S.D.	 Warren	 done	 so ,	 Somers would have	known	exactly	when	her	petition	for	an	extension	of	benefits	was due:	“ within	30	calendar	days	of	the	date	that	benefits	expire,	or,	in	cases	where the	expiration	date	is	contested,	within	30 calendar	days	of	a	final	decree	as	to the	expiration	date. ” Me.	W.C.B.	Rule,	ch.	2,	§ 5(1)	(2017). [¶ 22 ] In	 sum,	 affording	 the	 Appellate	 Division’s	 decision	 appropriate deference,	we	discern	no	error. See	Bailey ,	2017	ME	160,	¶	9,	168	A.3d	762; Johnson ,	 2014	 ME	 140,	 ¶	 10,	 106	 A.3d	 401; Bridgeman ,	 2005	 ME	 38,	 ¶ 11,
872 A.2d	961.15 The	entry	is: The	decision	of	the	Workers’	Compensation Board	Appellate	Division	is affirmed.

Daniel	F.	Gilligan,	Esq. (orally) ,	Troubh	Heisler	LLC,	Portland,	for	appellants	S.D. Warren	Company and	Constitution	State	Services James	J.	MacAdam,	Esq. (orally) ,	Nathan	A.	Jury,	Esq.,	and	Donald	M.	Murphy, Esq.,	MacAdam	Jury,	P.A.,	Freeport,	for	appellee	Lorraine	Somers Robert	 W.	 Bower,	 Jr.,	 Esq.,	 and	 David	 A.	 Goldman,	 Esq.,	 Norman	 Hanson	 & DeTroy,	 LLC,	 Portland,	 for a mic i c uriae	 Maine	 Workers’	 Compensation Coo rdinating	Council	and	Maine	Council	of	Self

- Insurers

Workers	Compensation	Board Appell ate	Division docket	number	17

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