### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs J

uly 25, 2001

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ALONZO CHATMAN

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County No. 70370 Ray L. Jenkins, Judge

No. E2000-03123-CCA-R3-CD October 5, 2001

Alonzo Chatma

n appeals the Knox Co

unty Criminal

Court’s revocati

on of his probatio

nary sentence

. Because the lower court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation and ordering the original sentence into exec

ution, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Ju

dgment of the Crim

inal Court Affirme

d.

J AMES C URWOOD W ITT , J R ., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which T HOMAS T. W OODALL and R OBERT W. W EDEMEYER , JJ., joined.

Mark Stephens, Knox County

Public Defender; Paula R. Voss and Aubrey Davis, Assistant Public Defenders, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Alonzo Chatman.

Paul G. Summers, Attorne y General & Reporter; Patricia C. Kussman, Assistant Attorney Ge

neral; Randall E. Nichols, Distric

t Att orn ey General; and Deborah Herston, Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On July 26, 2000, judgment was entered on the defendant

’s guilty pl

ea to the offense of aggravated assaul

t. The def

endant received a three-year proba tionary sentence. The judgment recites that during the probationary period, the defendant must refra in from violating the law, refrai n from activities inconsistent with good citizenship, pay court costs, have no further contact with the victim, and abide by any conditions established by the probation office.

On September 6, 2000, a probation violation warrant issued which alleged that the defendant had failed to

provide the p robation office with proof of emplo

yment and ha

d failed to report to the p robation of

fice. Apparently, the defendant was taken into custody . Court minutes from September 18, 2000 reflect that the defendant was “released from custody under supervision of the State Pr

obation Office . . . conditioned upon his residing at Coker Hall.” The case wa s continued until November 17, 2000 for a revocation h earing. However, on November 1, 2000, a-2-

second revocation wa

rrant issued which alleged that the defendant had been arrested for two additional offen

ses and had faile

d to report those a

rrests.

On November 17, 2000, the court held a revocation hearing. Neither side presented evidence. The state argu

ed that the defen

dant had never r

eported to his probation supervisor, never reported to the halfway house where he was supposed to

reside, and incu

rred two additiona

l charges. In response, the defense acknowledged that the defendant never reported to the probation office or the halfway house. However, the defense asked the court to impose “enhanced probation rather than sending him off to prison . . . .” The court revoked the d efendant’s probationary sentence and ordered that he serve his

sentence in the Department of Correction. The trial court found only that “the defendant has been guilt y of violating the laws of this State, and has otherwise violated the conditions of his probation.”

In this appeal,the defendant c omplains that (1) th

e trial court fai

led to make specif

ic findings on the record, thereby violating his due process rights, (2) the s tate f

ailed to prove the conditions of probation or that the defendant had been arrested while on

probation, and (3) the trial court should have allowed the defendant to complete his sentence on enhanced probation.

The standard of review upon ap peal of an order revoking probation is abuse of discretion. State v. Harkins , 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991). There is no abuse of discretion unless the reviewing court finds that the record contains no substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trial judge that a violation of the terms of probation has occurred. Id. at 82; State v. Delp , 614 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). The trial court is required only to find that the violation of probation occurred by

a preponderance of

the evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(e) (Supp. 2000). Upon finding a vio lation, the trial c

ourt is vested with t

h e statu tory authority to "revoke probation and suspension of sentence and cause the defendan t to comme nce the execution of the judgment as originally entered." Id. Furthermore, when probation is revoked, "the original judgment

so rendered by

the trial judge s

hall be in full force and effect from the date of the revocation of such suspension." Id. § 40-35-310 (1997). The trial judge retains the discretionary author ity to order the defendant to serve the original sentence. See State v. Duke , 902 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

In this case, the defendant conceded that he had never reported to his probation officer. See State v. Michael Emler , No. 01C01-9512-CC-00424, slip op. at 4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nash ville, Nov. 27, 1996) (where the defendant admits violation of the terms of probat ion
, revocation by the trial court is not arbitrary or ca pri cious); Stat e v. Mitzi Ann Boyd , No. 03C01-9508-CC-00246, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Nov. 1, 1996). Under th e terms of the judgment, the defendant was to submit to pro bation supervision . His failure to do s o amounted to a violation of probation.

Thus, the only rem aining question is whether the cour

t abused its discre

tion in ordering the defendant to serve the remainder of

his sentence in

the Department of Correction. The lower court was statutorily authorized to impose the original sentence upon revocation of probation.-3-

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-310 (1997). Moreover, t he trial cou rt was not re quired at t hat stage
to reconsider the sentencing principles. State v. Howard Luroy Will iamso n, Jr. , No. 02C01-9507-CC-002

01, slip op. at 4

(Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Sept. 30, 1996). The defendant has amply demonstrated his lack of suitability f

or further proba

tionary ef forts via his admitted failure
to report to his probation officer, to submit to supervision of the probation department, and to reside in the halfw

ay hou se. We see no error in the trial court’s revocation of pr obation and order

ing into execution the original sentence.

Despite this holding, we feel co mpelled to address def iciencies i n the proceed ings below. Neither party offered any evidence whatsoever at the revocation hearing. The state alleg ed that the d efendant faile

d to report his arr

est on two new cha

rges, but it offe

red no proof that t

h e crim inal charges actually existed or that the terms of probation required that they be reported. Likewise, the state failed to offer a ny proof that the ter

ms of probation re

quired the defen

dant to provide proof

of employment. The lower court had no evidentiary basis for finding that the defendant “has beenguilty of vi

olating the laws o

f this state.” Furthermore, the court failed to specify how the defendant “has otherwise violated the conditions of his p robation” and make supporting factual findings.

We are concerne

d by these se

veral shortcomin

gs; however, on the f

acts of this

case, they do not dictate a result other than the o ne we have rea ched. The defe

ndant, through c

ounsel, admitted that he did not report to his probation officer; in othe r word s, he admitted a probation violation. The defendant is now i ll situated to compla in that the court did

not make a specif

ic finding to this effect. Only one basis for revocation is necessary . Therefore, the

court’s failure

to make specific finding

s relativ e to any

other ground s for revocat ion includ ed in “other wise viola t[ing] the conditions of . . . probation” and finding that the defendant violated the law despite the state’s lack of proo f on that basi s are not fatal. See, e.g., State v. Daryl McKinley Robinson , No. W1999-01386-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 2-3 (Te nn. Crim. App., Jackson, May 4, 2000) (appella

te court not required to address lower court’s deficiencies in fact finding on additional basis for probation revocation where defendant admitted other violations of probationary te rms).

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

___________________________________ JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE