*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that

have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."

Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 94-30074

Summary Calendar

_____________________

JOE ELLISON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

ED C. DAY, Warden, ET AL.,

Respondents-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Louisiana

(94-CV-2288)

_________________________________________________________________

( July 14, 1995 )

Before KING, JOLLY, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Joe Ellison argues in this appeal from the dismissal of his

petition for federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

that he was denied due process in the Louisiana state courts during

his multiple offender adjudication, because, before reading to him

the Bill of Information and advising him of his rights, the

prosecutor and defense counsel entered into a stipulation that he
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was the same person who had been previously convicted as alleged in

the multiple bill. Ellison acknowledges that he was advised of his

rights before he admitted the allegations of the multiple bill, and

that he admitted the allegations in the multiple bill after it was

read to him. Ellison argues, however, that this did not remedy the

alleged constitutional violation. Ellison argues that his plea was

involuntary because his guilt had been established by the

stipulation between counsel. Ellison also argues that the state

courts denied him due process by failing to recognize sua sponte

error patent on the record.

A review for error patent on the record is a state law

appellate procedure predicated on a state statute. Ellison's

underlying argument is based on the trial court's alleged violation

of a state law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 15:529.1(D), which provides

that a party charged under a multiple bill is entitled to be

advised of his right to a hearing during which the State is

required to prove its allegations against him and of his right to

remain silent. A failure to comply with state law requirements

presents a federal habeas issue only if it involves a federal

constitutional issue. See Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 702-03

(5th Cir. 1986). 

In ascertaining whether a federal habeas petitioner has been

afforded due process at his arraignment on a multiple offender

bill, we look to the totality of circumstances to determine whether

the petitioner was aware of his rights. See Johnson v. Puckett,
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930 F.2d 445, 449 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 252

(1991).

At Ellison's sentencing hearing, the prosecutor advised the

court that a multiple offender bill had been filed against Ellison.

Defense counsel stated that "we can make a stipulation from the

factual standpoint[,]" and the prosecutor agreed. It appears from

their statements that defense counsel was aware of the multiple

bill charge and that the prosecutor would be addressing it at the

sentencing hearing. While counsel were discussing the stipulation,

the trial court interrupted and stated that Ellison's rights should

be read to him prior to any further proceedings. Counsel agreed,

but defense counsel also stipulated on the record that Ellison had

been previously convicted of armed robbery. The trial court

reiterated that it would read Ellison his rights prior to receiving

such stipulations: "I want him to be sworn and I want to read him

this, and then you can do all these stipulations."

Ellison was placed under oath. The trial court advised

Ellison that he had been charged as a multiple offender and the

multiple bill was read to Ellison. The court advised Ellison that

the State was required to prove that he was the same person

convicted in the cases named in the multiple bill and that he was

entitled to a formal hearing at which time the State would be

required to prove the allegations. The court also advised Ellison

that he had the right to deny the allegations in the bill or the
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right to remain silent. Ellison, after conferring with his

attorney, then admitted the allegations in the multiple bill. 

The record reflects that Ellison was informed of the

allegations in the multiple offender bill and was also advised of

his right to dispute such allegations, or to remain silent, prior

to his personal admission of the correctness of the allegations in

the multiple bill. Ellison did not dispute that he was the

individual described in the multiple bill at the hearing nor did he

make such a claim in his habeas petition. Ellison has not alleged

that he was unaware of the consequences of his plea. The totality

of the circumstances surrounding the plea demonstrates that Ellison

"knew what he was admitting and intended to admit it." See Lee v.

Whitley, No. 93-3791, slip op. at 4 (5th Cir. June 28, 1994). The

record reflects that Ellison was not denied due process and that

his plea was not rendered involuntary because his counsel agreed to

stipulate that he was the individual named in the multiple bill.

Although Ellison argues that his rights were read "too late,"

after the stipulation was entered, the trial court did not accept

the stipulation until after those rights were read. 

In State v. Griffin, 525 So.2d 705, 706-07 (La. Ct. App. 1st

Cir. 1988), a case relied upon by Ellison, the defendant stipulated

to the provisions of the multiple bill as a part of his plea

agreement and at a subsequent hearing, the defendant, his counsel,

and the prosecutor stipulated that the multiple offender charges

were correct. The state appellate court determined that there was
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error patent on the record because the trial court failed to advise

the defendant of the specific allegations in the multiple offender

bill or of his right to a contradictory hearing or to remain silent

prior to obtaining the stipulations. Id. at 707. Ellison argues

that the facts in Griffin are identical to those in his case

because Griffin was not advised of his rights prior to entering the

stipulation. Griffin is distinguishable from Ellison's case

because the trial court did not advise the defendant of his rights

at any time prior to his personally admitting the allegations in

the multiple bill.

Ellison also relies on State v. McIntyre, 496 So.2d 1204, 1207

(La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 1986), in which the appellate court determined

that there was error patent on the record because the trial court

failed to advise the defendant of his right to remain silent prior

to his admission that he was the individual named in the multiple

bill. McIntyre is also distinguishable from this case because

Ellison was advised of his right to remain silent.

Because Ellison failed to demonstrate constitutional error,

the state court did not have grounds for finding error patent on

the record and the district court had no basis for granting 

§ 2254 relief.

For the reasons given herein, the judgment of the district

court is

A F F I R M E D.