UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS
No. 02-0399(E )
F RA N CI S P. S ERRA , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. R

. J A M ES N I C HOL S ON , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
. On Appellant’ s Application for A ttorney Fe es and Expenses
(De cided August 5, 2005 )

Clark C. Evans , o f N or

th L itt le Roc k, Ar

ka ns a s, wa s o n th e ple a din g s f or the a pp e lla nt.
Tim S. Mc Lai n , G e ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , A ssi sta

nt G e ne ra l Co un se l; John D. McName e , Acting Deputy Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Re be c c a A . B air

d , all of Washington, D.C., were on the pleadingfor the a ppellee.
Be fore I VERS, Chief Judge , and GREENE a nd HAGEL , Judges

.

I VERS, Chief Judge : Be fo re the Court is Rhonda Serra' s application for attorney fee s and expenses pursuant to the Equal Acc ess t o J ustice Ac t (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), in the amount of $11,465.40. Also bef

ore the Court is her " Motion to S ubstitut e a Par ty ," the Secre tary ' s "Motion to Recall Mandate," and two supplementa l EAJ A applications. For the r easons set forth below, the C o u rt w i l l d e n y th e m o t i o n t o s u b s t i tu t e , g r a n t t h e m o t i o n t o r e c a l l m a n d a t e , a n d de ny the E A JA

a pp lic a tio n a

nd the su pp le me nta l a

pp lic a tio ns
.

I. BACKG ROUND A Dec ember

4, 2001, decision of the Board of Veter ans' Appea ls (B oard or BV A) denied the appellant, F ranc is S er ra , entitlement to an ef fec tive date pr ior to J une 23, 1997, for an aw ard of service connec tion for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). On March 19, 2003, the Court issued a sing le-judg e o rd er va cating the B oard de cision and re manding the matter f or re adjudication2

purs ua nt t o th e Ve te ra

ns Cla ims As sis tanc e Ac t of 20 00 (V CA A) , Pu

b. L . N o. 10 6- 47 5, 11 4 St a t. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000). Judgme nt was ente red on A pril 10, 2003. On J une 5, 2003, the a

ppellant died. On June 9, 2003 , the Secr etar y , unawa re of the appellant' s death, a

p p ea l ed t h i s Court's Ma

rch 19, 2003, de cision to the United States Court of Appea ls for the Fe dera l Circ uit ( Fe dera l Circ uit). The Secre tary later filed a motion to dismis s the appea l, and on April 23, 2004, the Fe dera l Circ uit g rante d his moti on. Mandate of this Court issued on April 26, 2004. On May 7, 2004 , Mrs. Serra , the appe llant’s widow, throug h counsel, filed a n opposed mot ion to s ub sti tut e he rs e lf

fo r t he a pp e lla nt f or EA JA purp os e s p urs uan t to Rul e 43 (a )( 2) of thi s Court's Rules of Practice and P roce dure (Rules). On May 11, 2004, she filed a

n EAJA application. I n the motion to subst itute, counsel states that he learne d of the a ppellant' s death " [w] hile this matter was pe nding on a

ppeal be fore the [Fede ral Circuit]," which indicates that h e was informed of the appellant' s death at some point be tween J une 9, 2003, the date of the Secre tary ' s appea l to the Fede ral Cir c uit , a nd Ap ri l 23 , 2 00 4, the date of the F e de ra l Cir c uit ' s d ism is sal of the a pp e a l. M oti on

to Sub sti tut e a t 1. Couns e l a rgue s: " Whe re the Court ha s jur isd ic tio n ov e r a pr oc e e din g in w hic h a ll matters except an EAJA application have been f inally conclude d, the death of the appe llant does not pr e c lud e the Court

fr om d isp os ingof

the a pp lic a tio n f

or EA JA a tto rn e y ' s f

e e s. " Mo tio n to Sub sti tut e
a t 2; se e Coh e n v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 5 ( 1995). On M ay 24, 2004, the S ecr etar y filed a motion to rec all the April 26, 2004, mandate of the Court, to vacate the Dec ember 4, 2001, Boa

rd dec ision, and to dismi ss the appea l beca use the

a p p e ll a n t d ie d

w h il e th e a

p p e a l w a s p e n d in g b e f

o r e th is Co u rt. T h e Se c r e ta r y a r g u e s th a t t

he underlying a

ppeal should be dismissed pursuant to Lan dic ho v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 42, 46-49 (1994) , in wh i ch t h e C ourt held that substituti on by a par ty claiming acc rued be nefits under 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a) is not permissible in this Court when an a ppellant dies while the de nial by the B oard of

the appellant' s claim for disability compensation under chapter 11 of title 38, U.S. Code, is pending he re on appea l. Se e Ze v al kin k v. B ro wn , 102 F.3d 1236, 1243- 44 (F ed. Cir. 1996) (e x pressly ag ree ing wi th thi s Co ur

t' s Landicho ho ldi ng ); se e als o S wan so n v . W

est , 13 Vet.App. 197 ( 1999). Ac cording to the Secre tary , appellant' s counsel notified him of the a ppellant' s death "on or about May 6, 2004." Secre tary ' s Opposed Motion to Recall Mandate at 2. Thus, appe llant's c ounsel waited until afte r3

mandate issued to infor

m the Secre tary

of the a ppellant' s death. On May 28, 2004, Rhonda Serra filed an " Opposition to R eca ll of the Mandate ," stating that her intent wa s to substi tute for the limited purpose of pursuing EAJA fe es. On May 29, 2004, she filed a supplemental EAJA application. I n her opposition to rec all of the mandate, she argues that the re is a dif

fe re nc e be tw e e n a c a se wh e re the a ppell ant di e s before the Court has re ndere d a decis io n, and

wh e re the a

pp e lla nt, a s h e re , d ie s aft e r the Court ha s r e nd e re d a

de c isi on . Sh e a lso

a rgue s th a t th e de c isi on

to dis mis s is d isc re tio na

ry . Sh e a c kn ow le dg e s Swa ns on , s up ra , wher e the Court found that the appe llant's de ath, coming one day prior to the issuance of an op i n ion, served to moot the appe al, but she noted that the Court in Swanson state d th a t " [t]he sit uatio n in thi s c a se is arg uab l y d i ff

er ent from the que stion that would be prese nted had the a ppellant died af

ter the op ini on ha d b e e n is su e d– e ith e r b e fo re the jud g me nt, or a ft e r t he jud g me nt b ut b e fo re the mand a te hadis su ed. " Swanson , 1 3 V e t.A pp . at 19 8. F ina lly , she a sse rt s th a t is su a nc e of mand a te is m e re ly min ist e ri a l, a s is state d in Rul e 41 (a ) o f t

his Court ' s Ru le s. On J une 10, 2004, the Sec re t ar y fi led a r esponse to the EA J A application, arg uing f or dismiss al base d on lack of jurisdiction. The S ecr etar y argues t hat t he appeal bec ame moot by virtue of the a pp e lla nt' s dea th, a nd the re fo re it s ho uld

be dis mis se d. F ur

the rm or e he a rgue s th a t, a s a re su lt, the appe llant is no longer a pre vailing pa

rty and the EA J A application should be dismi ssed. On J uly 13, 2004, this c ase was submitt ed to a panel. On J uly 22, 2004, the Secr etar y filed an opposed motion to file a suppleme ntal response to Mrs. Serra ’s EAJA application. On September 1, 20 04 , th e Court

g ra nte d th e Se c re tary ' s motio n, a nd a sk e d f or su pp le me nta l r e sp on se s f

ro m bo th parties. T h e S e c r e t a r

y r e s p o n d e d

o n S e p t e m b e r

8 , 2 0 0 4

. H e a g r e e s t h a tm a n d a t e i s m i n i s t e r ia l. H o w e v e r , h e s tate s th a t th is d o e s n o t ma k e ma n d a te p o in tl e s s o r in s ig n if ic a n t. H e a ls o p o in ts out that Coh e n, su

pr a , w hic h M rs . Serr a cit e s f or its a llo wa

nc e of su bs tit uti on fo r E AJA p ur

po se s, is inapposite bec ause it involved a c ase w here mandate ha d alre ady issued befor e the appellant died. The S ecr etar

y g oes on to express his sy mpathy for a ppellant' s counsel, ac knowledg ing the work that he did , a nd the fa vo ra ble jud g me nt h e re c e ive d. Ho we ve r, he a rgue s th a t th e Cou rt sh ou ld d ism iss the a p p e a l i n o r d e r

to e n s u r e th a t t

h e B o a r d ' s d e c is io n

h a s n o p r e c lu s iv e e f

f e c t o n a n y

acc rued be ne fi ts c la im b ro ug ht b y Mr s. Se rr a . F ina lly , th e Se c re tary c ite s Sagnella v. Principi , 15 Vet.App.4

242 (2001), in which t h e C o u rt held that, when a n appellant dies be fore mandate issues, the appropr iate re medy

is to dism iss the appea l for lac k of jurisdiction. Mrs. Serra filed a re ply

on September 23, 2004, pointing out that she is not pursuing a ccr ued benef its, but EAJA f

ees. She argues that, contra ry to the Secre tary ' s contentions, the Court does have ju r is d ic ti o n to c o n s id e r th e a p p li c a ti o n
. Sh e ta

k e s is s u e w it

h th e Se c r e ta

r y ' s c it ation to Sagn e lla , arguing that that case is differe nt from the pre sent one be cause S a gnella involved a question of

acc rue d b e n e f

it s w h il e th is o n e in v o lv e s E A JA f e e s
. O n Se p te mb e r 2 7 , 2 0 0 4 , s h e s ubmitted a second suppleme ntal EAJA application.

II. AN AL YSI S W e h a v e b e f

o r e u s f i v e m a t t e r s t o a d dr e s s: The Mo t i o n t o S u b s t i tu t e a P a rt y f o r E A JA purposes, the Secreta

ry ' s Motion to Reca ll Mandate, the EA J A application, and two supplemental EAJA applications. With r espec t to the two supplemental EAJA applications, Rule 39(d)(1) of the Court's Rules of Pra ctice a nd Procedur e (Rules) states: "[A] party whose [EAJ A application] has been g r a n te d in w h o le o r in p a r t ma y , n o t late r th a n 2 0 d a y s a f te r th e Co u rt a c ti o n g r anting such application, file a

supplemental application for attorne y fee s and other e x penses." Be cause no application has be en g rante d, the supplemental EAJA applications ca nnot be dea lt with in it ially ; they

a re c omp le te ly de pe nd e nt upo n the status of the ini tia l EAJA ap pli c a tio n. L ike wi se , with re sp e c t to the motion for substituti on, it obviousl y is depende nt upon the s tatus of the EAJA application, and cannot be considere d initially . Finally , the EAJA a p plication itself is completely depende nt upon the status of

the un de rl y ingc a se , b e c a use it is to be fi le d " no t late r t ha n 3 0 d a y s a

ft e r th e Co u r t'

s j u d g me n t b ec o me s f

i n a l p u r s u a n t t o 3 8 U. S

. C

. § 7 2 9 1 (a) (which oc curs 60 da y s after entry of judgme nt under Rule 36) or , consistent with Rule 41(b), upon the issuance of an or der on c onsent dismiss ing, te rminating , or re manding a ca se." Rule 39(a) (empha sis added). The only portion of the ca se bef

ore us that c an be c onsidered initially , and in conjunction wi th t he un de rl y ing c a se , is the Se c re tary ' s Moti on to R e c a ll M a nd a te , a

nd that is ho w w e wi ll b e g in

our a na ly sis

. We wi ll the n a

na ly ze t he EA JA a

pp lic a tio n, a nd

the su pp le me nta l a

pp lic a tio ns , w ith

re sp e c t to the un de rl y ingc a se . F ina lly , w e wi ll l oo k at th e law o f s ub sti tut ion of pa rt ie s. A. The Situation Absent the EAJA Submi ssions5

We mu s t fi rs t ex amine the status of the underlying c ase. The Secre tary challeng es the via bil ity of the un de rl y ingc a se in h is M oti on to R e c a ll Ma

nd a te . Re c a ll o f m a nd a te is n ot o rd ina ri ly allowed. How ever , a cour t has the p o we r t o s et aside any judgme nt and to rec all mandate, w here

nece ssary to protect the integ rity of its own proce sses. See Sargent v. Columbia Fore st Prods., Inc., 75 F .3 d 8 6, 89 (2 nd Cir . 1 99 6) ; but see Boston and Me . Corp. v. Town of Hampton, 7 F.3d 281, 282- 83 (1 st C ir . 1 99 3) (q

ue sti on ingthe " inh e re nt a uth or ity " to r e c a ll a

mand a te ). Th e ex erci se of this power is within t he discre tion of the court. Zipfel v. Halliburt on Co., 861 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1988). However, such discretion may be exerc ised only

for g ood cause or to preve nt injust ice, a nd only when " unusual circ umstances e x ist sufficient to justify modification or re call of a prior ju dgmen t. " Ibid. " E v e n i f a u t h o r i t y t o r e c a l l a m a n d a t e s t i l l e x i s t s , i t ' s h o u l d b e e x e r c i s e d

s p a r i n g l y, andon ly up on a sh owi ng of ex c e p t i o n al c ir cum st ances .'" Boston and Me. Corp. , 7 F.3d at 283 (citations omitted). Under the strict standards g overningthe exercise of power to rec all a mandate, the me re qu e sti on ingof

a c ourt ' s r e a so nin g , c on str uc tio n, or app li cat ion

of the re le va

nt l a w i s insufficient by

itself to justi fy

the re call of a

mandate. See Sarge nt, 75 F.3d at 90 (citing Hines v. Royal Inde m. Co., 25 3 F .2 d 1 11 , 1 14 (6 th C ir . 1 95 8) ); Bo sto n a nd Ma ineCor

p. , s up ra . Am on g the " e xce pti on a l cir c ums tanc e s" jus tif y ing a c ourt ' s exer c ise of the po we r t o r e c a ll

a mandate are the discovery that the judgme nt w as obtained by fra ud, see Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. , 322 U. S

. 238, 248-50 (1944) , and the c orre ction of cle rica l mist akes a nd judicial oversig hts, see, e .g., Patterson v. Crabb, 90 4 F .2 d 1 17 9, 11 80 (7 th Cir

. 19 90 ) ( re c a lli ngits mandate w here its dismissal of petitioner' s claim was based on the abse nce of a re quired fina l order, wh ic h ha d be e n en te re d but wa s ove rl oo ke d b y c ourt ); Lamb v. Farmers I ns. Co., Inc., 586 F.2d 96, 97 (8th Cir. 1978) (re calling mandate beca use error in court clerk' s office cause d court' s err oneous de c isi on ); Verrilli v. City of Concord, 55 7 F .2 d 6 64 , 6 65 (9 th C ir . 1 97 7) (r e c a lli ngmand a te be c a us e court si mp ly o v e r lo o k e d a n e xis ti n g s tatute a p p li c a b le to th e c a s e )

. " A n o th e r e xa mp le o f an

' exceptional circ umstance' is wher e it was discove red that the petitioner had die d prior to the iss ua nc e of t

he ma nd ate ." Mc Nar on v . B ro wn , 1 0 V e t.A pp . 6 1 ( 19 97 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; s ee Ke el

v . B ro wn , 9 Ve t.A

pp
. 12 4 ( 19 96 ) ( pe r c ur iam or de r) ; se e als o F e rre ll v . E ste lle , 573 F.2d 867, 868 (5th Cir. 1978). Mrs. Serra

"c oncede s that the Court has found that the death of an a ppellant bef

ore this Court6

has issued its decision is such an ' unusual circ umstance' so as t o justify the extraordinar

y measure of recall." Reply to Secre tary ' s Supplemental EAJA Response at 3. The iss ue then is whe ther or not the ca s e s h o u ld

b e d is mi s s e d

b e c a u s e th e a p p e ll a n t d ie d

a f te r a d e c is io n b u t b e f

o r e mandate. With ou t th e EA JA a

pp lic a tio n in

thi s c a se , w e wo uld

be fa c e d w iththe sit

uation add res sed i n Landicho and numer ous other ca ses bef ore this Court, wher e a c ase is dismiss ed when it is found that the appe llant died while the ca se wa s pending

. T h e C o u rt held in Landicho t h a ts u b s t i tu t i o n b y a party claiming acc rued be nefits under 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a) is not permissible in this C ourt when a n appellant dies w hile the denial by the Board of his claim for disability compensation under cha pter 11 of title 38, U.S. Code, is pending he re on a ppeal. Se e Ze v alk

ink v . B ro wn , 102 F.3d at 1243-44. Under such circ umstances, the a ppropriate reme dy

is to va cate the Boa

rd decision and to dismi ss the appea l. Landicho , 7 Vet.App. at 54. Vac ating the B oard de cision ensure s that it and the underly ing RO de c isi on (s ) w ill have no pr e c lus ive e ff e c t in the a dju dic a tio n o f a

ny accru e d- be ne fi ts c la ims de ri ve d f ro m th e ve te ra

n' s e nti tle me nts . I t a lso nu lli fi e s the pr e vio us me ri ts ad jud ic a tio n by

the RO beca use t h at decision was subsumed in the Boa rd dec ision. Se e Y

om a v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 298 (1995) ( per c uriam orde r) ( relying on R o b i n e t t e v
. B ro wn , 8 Vet .App . 6 9, 80 (1 99 5) ); se e als o Hu dg ins v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 365, 368 (1995) (per curiam order). Be cause an appe al bec omes moot by virtue of the a

ppellant' s death, the a

ppeal is dismissed. See Landicho , 7 Vet.App. at 53-54. Mrs. Serra

does not take issue with this proce ss in case s wher e the appellant' s death pre cede s a dec ision of this C ourt. She does, howe ver, c ontest that proce ss in case s where the appe llant dies

a ft e r a de c isi on is t e nd e re d b ut b e fo re mand a te iss ue s. As state d a bo ve , s he c ite s, a s th e ba sis fo r h is argument, Swanson , which states: " The situation in this case is arguably differ ent from the que stion that would be pre sented ha d the appe llant died afte r the opinion had be en is sued – either befor e the ju dgmen t, or aft er th e ju dgmen t b ut befo re t he m and ate hadis su ed. " Swanson , 13 Vet.App. at 198. She is c or re c t to say

that th e sit

uatio n is arguably differ ent, an d i n fa ct, the situation is dif fe re nt. Ho we ve r, the dif

fe re nc e may

no t lead to a

dif fe re nt r e su lt. As state d a bo ve , th e Cou

rt he ld i n Landicho that substitut ion is not per missibl e when an appellant dies while his c laim is pe nding he re on appea l. The thrust of her argument appea

rs to be that the c ase w as somehow no t pe nd ingbe c a us e the Court ha d is su e d a

de c isi on . Sh e sa

y s: C er t ai n l y , this Court has ruled, beg inning with Landicho , th a t t h e d e a th o f an7

appellant while the appeal i s pending befor e the Court moots t he appe al. Landicho v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. [at 47]. I n t h at case, and other s that followed, the Court vacated the BV A dec isions on appeal. That is done to ensure the Boa rd dec ision and the under ly ing RO de cision(s) will have n o prec lusive eff ect in the a djudication of an y ac cr u ed -b e n e f

i t s cl ai m s , u n d er

3 8 U. S

. C

. § 5 1 2 1 , d er i v edfr o m t h e v et er an 's entitlements. Id. at 54-55. I t is important to remembe r, howe ver, that in Landicho the BV A dec ision was indeed pe nding on a ppeal, i.e., the Court had not ruled on the me ri ts. Opposition to R eca ll of the Mandate at 5. She def ines "pe nding" as a situation wher e the Court has

no t r ule d o n th e me ri ts. She su g gest s th a t, o nc e a de c isi on of thi s Co ur t ha s b e e n is su e d, the c a se is no longe r pending

. This Court has held that in a case in which a decision has be en issued, but judg ment has not b e e n e n te r e d , th e c a s e is s ti ll p e n d in g
. See Tay lor v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 206, 208 ( 1998) (" [A] ppellant' s appea l was pendingbefor e the Court at the time of his death bec ause judg ment had not issue d

a t t h a t t im e a n d

th e Co u rt' s d e c is io n h a d th u s n o t b e c o me b in d in g o n th e p a rti e s a nd fi na l." ); se e als o B owe rs v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 25 (1995). Fur thermore , as t o when the de ath of the appellant oc curs be tween judg ment and mandate, t he Court in Sagn e lla fo un d th a t th e c a se sh ou ld b e d is mi s s e d pursuant to Landicho beca use the c ase w as still pending. The appellant in Sagn e lla

a rgue d th a t th a t c a se c ou ld " be dis tin g uis he d f ro m Zevalkink and Landicho beca use . . . the a

ppellant did no t di e duri ngthe pe nd e nc y of his a pp e a l, b ut r a the r n ine mon ths a ft e r t he Court a wa rd e d h im an inc reas e in ben efi ts and su bs equ ent to th e Co urt 's ent ry of j ud gment ." Sagn e lla , 15 Vet.App. at 244. The Court wa s unpersua ded and it conc luded that, bec ause the appellant ha d died prior to fina l judgme nt, i.e., prior to mandate , his claims were , there fore , still pending , and they s h o uld be dis mis se d. Thus , it

a pp e a rs we ll s e ttl e d th a t a c a se re ma ins pe nd in g i n th is C ourt un til mand a te iss ue s. I n addition, it may be helpf ul to take a c loser look at how this Court has define d "pe nding." "I n deter minin g t h e plain meaning of statutory lang uag e, ' leg islative purpose is expressed by the ord in ary mea ni ng of t he w ord s u sed .'" J on es v . B ro wn , 41 F.3d 634, 638 (F ed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Ar de sta ni v . I NS , 5 02 U. S. 1 29 (1 99 1) ); see Brown v. G ardner , 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). Pending is de f in e d a s " b e g u n , b u t n o t y e t c o mp le te d ; d u r in g ; b e f

o r e th e c o n c lu s io n o f

;
. . . in p r o c e s s of settlement or adjustment. . . . Thus, an ac tion or suit is ' pending ' from its inception until the rendition8

of fin al j ud gment ." B LACK ' S L AW D I CT I O N A RY 1134 (6th ed. 1990) [here inafter B LACK ' S ]. The term "f inal judgme nt" is defined by EAJA as "a judgment t hat i s final and not appea lable." 28 U.S.C. § 24 12 (d )( 2) (G ); see 38 U. S.C. § 72 91 (a ) (" A de c isi on of the Un ite d Sta te s Court of Ve te ra ns Ap pe a ls shall become final upon the e x piration of the time a llowed for f iling . . . a notice of appe al from suc h decision, if no such notice is duly filed within such time.") . So, as defined by this Court, B LACK ' S , a nd our s ta tut e s, a

c a se re ma ins pe nd ingun til fi na l ju dg me nt, no t me re ly un til jud g me nt. Mrs. Serra

acknow ledg es that mandate had not issued in the ca s e, b u t s h e asserts that issuance of mandate is ministerial. She is absolutely corr ect. Rule 41(a ) of this Court' s Rules states that mandate is ministerial. The r ule also states t hat m andate "is mer ely evidenc e that a judg ment has bec ome final." Rule 41(a)

. Thus, the onl y true purpose of m andate is to show that judgme nt has be c ome fi na l. A s st a te d a

bo ve , unti l ju dg me nt i s fi na l, the c a se re ma ins pe nd ing . T he re fo re , b e c a us e the c a se wa s p e nd inga t th e tim e of the app ella

nt' s d e a th, a

bs e nt t he EA JA a

pp lic a tio n, thi s c a se would follow the re asoning , and the p ro ce dures, unde rtake n in Landicho a nd its pr og e ny , a

nd it would be dismissed. The Court is compelled to note he re t h at , b y appellant's c ounsel' s admission, he defe rre d notify ing the Secre tary

of the a ppellant' s death for

a per iod of up to 11 months. I n fac t, it appear s that he wa ited until af

ter mandate issued in or der to notify the Secre tary

. I t appea rs that he may

have

wa ite d unti l a ft e r mand a te iss ue d to i nf or m th e Se c re ta

ry of the a pp e lla nt' s d e a th i n th e ho pe that th is

case could then b e cha

rac terized as one of

substitut ion for EAJA purposes. Appe llant's c ounsel presumabl y does not contest the likely fate of this case had he inf ormed the Sec reta

ry of the

a pp e lla nt' s d e a th i n a

tim e ly fa sh ion . How e ve r, be c a us e he ha s su

bmi tte d a n E AJA a pp lic a tio n, it appea rs that he be lieves that that somehow a lters the natur e of the underly ing c ase. B . Wh e the r t

he Ap pli c a tio n Ch a ng e s th e Ou tc ome of the Ca se B e c a u s e a n E A JA a

p p l i c a t i o n h a s b e e n f

i l e d , t h i s m a t t e r

c a n be c ha r a c t e r i z e d

a s a n E A JA

c a s e , a n d w e m u s t a d dr e s s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n
. H o w e v e r , u n f o rtu n a t e l y f

o r M r s
. S e r

r a , t h e E A JA application does not c hang e the nature of the case , for the application is completely depende nt upon the fate of the unde rly ing c ase. A s stated above , in Rule 39(a) , an EAJA application must follow a final j udg men t i n th is Co u rt. A ls o , to b e e li g ib le f o r a n E A JA a w a r d , th e a

p p li c a n t m

u s t f il e the

a pp lic a tio n w ith in t

he 30 -d a y pe ri od se t f or th i n 2 8 U .S. C. § 24 12 (d )( 1) (B ), a nd the a pp lic a tio n mu st9

inc lud e (1 ) a sh ow ing that the a pp lic a nt is a pr e va ili ng pa rt y ; (2 ) a sh ow ingthat he is a

pa rt y e lig ibl e for a n awa rd under EAJA because his net worth does not excee d $2,000,000; (3) an alleg ation that the Secr etar

y ’s position was not substantially justified; and (4) an itemiz ed stateme nt of the fe es
so ug ht. 28 U. S.C. § 2 41 2( d) ; see Sc arborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004); see also Sumne r
v
. P r in cipi , 1 5 Vet.App. 256, 260 ( 2001) (e n banc) , aff' d sub nom. Vaughn v. Principi , 336 F.3d 1351 (F ed. Cir. 2003), cert. de nied , 5 41 U.S. 9 87 (2 00 4) . T he a pp lic a tio n w a s ti me ly , a

nd it included mater ial addre ssing a ll of these re quirements. Howe ver, be cause there is no final judgme nt in th is c a s e , th e E A JA a

p p li c a ti o n c a n n o t b e g r a n te d

. T h is Co u rt h a s h e ld th a t to be elig ible for EAJA fees and e x penses, a n appellant must be a

"pr evailing party " a

nd that, upo n t h e re ca l l of judgme nt and mandate and withdrawal of the C ourt' s order in a particular case, there is no l ong er a decision of the Court in which the appellant could be said to be a pre vailing pa rty

. Kaw ad

v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 61 ( 1998). As indicate d above, the order mus t b e wi t h draw n, and ther efor e, the

a p p e l l a n tc a n n o tb e s a i d

t o b e a p r e v a i l i n g p a rt y. C. EAJ A L aw on Substituti on Finally , Mrs. Serra cites to c ases supporting her contention that substitut ion f or a dec ease d

a pp e lla nt i s a llo we d f

or EA JA purp os e s. Th e pr ima ry c a se that sh e c ite s is Cohe n , wher e
su bs tit uti on wa s all ow e d for

EA JA purp os e s. I n th a t c a se , th e Court c on c lud e d th a t Landicho did not control its analy sis. See Cohe n , 8 Vet.App. at 7. It he ld that " the death of the appellant is not

a jurisdictional ba

r to its consider ation of an othe rwise pr oper EA J A application, where the appe llant had prev ail ed on the mer it s of the benef it s clai m pri or to hi s d eat h. " Id. Howeve r, Cohen is not on point. I n that case , not only had m an d at e already

issued, but the EAJA application was also filed be fo re the a

pp e lla nt d ie d. Thus , unli ke thi s c a se , ju dg me nt i n th e un de rl y ingc a se wa s f ina l.

III . C ON CL USI ON Up on c on sid e ratio n o f the f or e g oin g , th e Se c re tary ' s Mo tio n to Re c a ll M a nd a te is GRANTED, a

nd the Court' s April 26, 2004 mandate is re called. T he Court' s Marc h 19, 2003, order

va c ating the B oa

rd de c isi on is R EV OKED , a

nd the De c e mbe r 4 , 2 00 1, B oa rd de c isi on is VACATED. The appeal is DI SMI SSED for lack of jurisdiction. Finally , the EAJ A application, the Mo tio n to Sub sti tut e , a

nd the tw o s up ple me nta l E AJA a pp lic a tio ns a re DENI ED a s mo ot.