RENDERED: AUGUST 19, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2019-CA-1719-MR

EARNEST BRADLEY HALL, JR. APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JOHNNY RAY HARRIS, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 13-CR-00147 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

VACATING AND REMANDING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Earnest Bradley Hall, Jr., appeals from an order of the Floyd 

Circuit Court denying his motion to return personal property seized upon his arrest. 

For the reasons stated herein, we vacate and remand.

Hall was arrested on or about July 13, 2013, in Floyd County, 

Kentucky, after a law enforcement officer approached Hall’s vehicle and witnessed 

Hall engaged in oral sex with a juvenile. Upon Hall’s arrest, various items of 
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personal property were seized. Hall was indicted on September 18, 2013, under 

Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 510.155, unlawful use of electronic means 

originating or received within the Commonwealth to induce a minor to engage in 

sexual or other prohibited activities. On February 19, 2014, the Commonwealth 

motioned the circuit court to dismiss the indictment because Hall had been indicted 

in federal court “for the conduct that resulted in the Floyd County indictment.” 

The circuit court granted the motion and the indictment against Hall was dismissed 

by order entered the following day. 

On June 30, 2017, more than three years after the indictment was 

dismissed, the Commonwealth filed a motion in the circuit court pursuant to KRS 

500.090 for forfeiture and destruction of twenty-three items of personal property 

seized upon Hall’s arrest. The Commonwealth cited KRS 218A.410, which refers 

to property subject to forfeiture following a conviction for certain offenses in KRS 

Chapter 218A related to controlled substances. The matter came before the circuit 

court for a hearing on July 6, 2017. Only the Commonwealth was present. After 

reviewing the motion, the court stated on the record, “Well, we are not going to 

destruct anything because we probably don’t have it. So, that is moot.” However, 

an order was never entered denying the Commonwealth’s motion. 

On August 29, 2019, Hall, pro se, filed a motion from federal prison

for the return of his personal property seized upon his arrest. Hall included a list of 
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twenty-nine items of personal property he sought returned.1 The matter came 

before the circuit court on October 31, 2019. Hall was not present. The 

Commonwealth advised the circuit court that the property Hall sought had already 

been forfeited. The circuit court entered an order on November 4, 2019, that 

simply overruled the motion. The circuit court entered a second order on 

November 12, 2019, that also overruled the motion, but indicated the court had 

been “advised that said property has been forfeited.” 

Hall subsequently filed a motion for appointment of counsel and a 

notice of appeal. The motion came before the circuit court on December 5, 2019. 

Only the Commonwealth was present and informed the circuit court, “You could 

appoint a million counsels and there’s nothing I could do because the property has 

been forfeited.” The circuit court overruled Hall’s motion, but a written order does 

not appear in the court record. This appeal follows. 

In forfeiture proceedings, the circuit court’s factual findings are 

reviewed on appeal for clear error, while its rulings of law are reviewed de

novo. Commonwealth v. Coffey, 247 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Ky. 2008).

Hall’s primary argument on appeal is that his personal property was 

improperly forfeited because he was neither indicted nor convicted under KRS 

1 According to Earnest Bradley Hall, Jr.’s motion, the motor vehicle that was seized had 

apparently been returned to Hall’s mother. 
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218A. We agree that Hall was not convicted of any crime in the Floyd Circuit 

Court; therefore, his personal property was not subject to forfeiture. However, the 

disposition of his personal property is unclear from the record before us. We 

therefore vacate the circuit court’s order denying the return of Hall’s property and 

remand for factual findings regarding the disposition of the personal property. 

Hall was indicted under KRS 510.155. Although we agree KRS 

Chapter 218A is inapplicable only to the extent Hall was not indicted nor convicted 

for an offense related to controlled substances, KRS 500.0922also allows for 

forfeiture of personal property provided various criteria are met. KRS 500.092 

provides, in relevant part:

(1) (a) Notwithstanding KRS 500.090, all personal 

property which is not used as a permanent residence in 

this state which is used in connection with or acquired 

as a result of a violation or attempted violation of any 

of the statutes set out in subsection (3) of this section 

shall be subject to forfeiture under the same terms, 

conditions, and defenses and using the same process 

as set out in KRS 218A.405 to 218A.460 for 

property subject to forfeiture under that chapter.

(b) Notwithstanding KRS 500.090, all real 

and personal property in this state which 

is used in connection with or acquired as a 

result of a violation or attempted violation 

of KRS 531.310 or 531.320 shall be 

subject to forfeiture under the same terms, 

conditions, and defenses and using the 

2 Kentucky Revised Statutes 500.092 became effective on June 25, 2013, or approximately two 

and one-half weeks before Hall’s arrest in Floyd County.
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same process as set out in KRS 218A.405 

to 218A.460 for property subject to 

forfeiture under that chapter.

(2) Administrative regulations promulgated under KRS 

218A.420 shall govern expenditures derived from 

forfeitures under this section to the same extent that 

they govern expenditures from forfeitures under KRS 

218A.405 to 218A.460.

(3) The following offenses may trigger forfeiture of 

personal property under subsection (1)(a) of this 

section:

(a) KRS 17.546;

(b) KRS 508.140 and 508.150 involving the 

use of any equipment, instrument, 

machine, or other device by which 

communication or information is 

transmitted, including computers, the 

Internet or other electronic network, 

cameras or other recording devices, 

telephones or other personal 

communications devices, scanners or 

other copying devices, and any device 

that enables the use of a transmitting 

device;

(c) KRS 510.155[.]

KRS 500.092(1), (2), and (3) (emphasis added).

 Turning to KRS Chapter 218A for the proper procedural process, we 

note KRS 218A.460(2) instructs:

Following conviction of a defendant for any violation 

of this chapter, the court shall conduct an ancillary 

hearing to forfeit property if requested by any party other 
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than the defendant or Commonwealth. The 

Commonwealth’s attorney, or county attorney if the 

proceeding is in District Court, shall initiate the hearing 

by filing a motion requesting entry of a final order of 

forfeiture upon proof that the property was being used in 

violation of the provisions of this chapter. The final 

order of forfeiture by the court shall perfect in the 

Commonwealth or appropriate law enforcement agency, 

as provided in KRS 218A.420, right, title, and interest in 

and to the property. The Commonwealth may transfer 

any real property so forfeited by deed of general 

warranty.

 Hall was not convicted of a crime in the Floyd Circuit Court. 

Therefore, any forfeiture of his personal property, if it occurred, was improper. At 

the various hearings before the circuit court, the Commonwealth insisted Hall’s 

property had already been forfeited; however, the circuit court did not grant the 

Commonwealth’s motion, filed in 2017, to forfeit and destroy the property. Now, 

before this Court, the Commonwealth acknowledges Hall raises a valid point in his 

assertion that there is no record of when or if his personal property was forfeited. 

 Accordingly, the circuit court’s finding that Hall’s personal property 

had already been forfeited was clear error. The disposition of Hall’s property 

remains unknown. We therefore vacate the order of the Floyd Circuit Court and 

remand for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Andrea Reed

Assistant Public Advocate

Department of Public Advocacy

Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Christina L. Romano

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky