NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ABRAHAM ESTRADA FLORES, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0674

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County

No. S1400CR201500114

The Honorable Maria Elena Cruz, Judge

AFFIRMED AS CORRECTED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Yuma County Public Defender’s Office, Yuma

By Edward F. McGee

Counsel for Appellant

Abraham E. Flores, Buckeye

Appellant
STATE v. FLORES

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge Maurice Portley joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Abraham Estrada Flores timely appeals from his conviction

and sentence for aggravated assault, a Class 3 dangerous felony. See Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 13-1204(A)(2) (Supp. 2014). After searching the record on appeal 

and finding no arguable question of law that was not frivolous, Flores’

counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 

S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 

878 (1969), asking this court to search the record for fundamental error, and 

also raising several issues at Flores’ request. This court granted counsel’s 

motion to allow Flores to file a supplemental brief in propria persona, and he

did so. We reject the arguments raised in Flores’ counsel’s brief and Flores’ 

supplemental brief, and, after reviewing the entire record, we find no 

fundamental error. Therefore, we affirm Flores’ conviction and sentence as 

corrected.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 Victim J.C. testified that on January 30, 2015, he was working 

at an agricultural farm when he received a call to come help repair a broken 

sprinkler pipe. After receiving the call, he and two coworkers, J.C.B. and 

J.H.B., met a foreman, C.C., at the location of the broken pipe to start 

repairing it. Flores arrived shortly thereafter and began “arguing with 

[C.C.] and cursing at him,” calling him “a snitch” and other obscenities

because C.C. had told Flores’ boss about the leaking pipe. Flores repeatedly 

challenged C.C. “to hit him,” but C.C. told Flores “he wasn’t getting paid 

to fight.” Flores eventually walked to his car, yelled several obscenities to 

the whole group, and got in his car. 

¶3 J.C. then approached Flores “to ask [Flores] why he was 

saying that to [him]” because Flores barely knew him. According to J.C., 

 

1We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining 

the jury’s verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Flores. State 

v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989).
STATE v. FLORES

Decision of the Court

3

he “wasn’t approaching [Flores] with the intention of arguing or fighting.” 

Flores got out of his car when J.C. approached, so J.C. “turned around to 

walk away” and “started ignoring him” to avoid trouble. As he was 

walking away, C.C. yelled, “watch out.” J.C. “glanced back and [] got a 

glimpse of [Flores] coming at [him] with [a] machete,” and he got “really 

scared.” J.C. thought Flores “was going to hit [him] on the head, but” 

because he was able to duck down, Flores struck his back with the machete

instead. 

¶4 C.C., J.C.B., and J.H.B. testified and described the incident in 

similar terms. They also testified that when J.C. was walking away, Flores 

got out of his car and retrieved the machete from his trunk. J.C. and the 

other witnesses also testified that when J.C. approached the car, J.C. had his 

“hands on his back” and did not make any threats to Flores. J.H.B. also 

testified that at “no time at all” did Flores appear to be in fear of J.C. 

¶5 An eight-member jury found Flores guilty of aggravated 

assault, a dangerous offense. The superior court sentenced Flores to a 

mitigated term of five years’ imprisonment with 38 days of pre-sentence 

incarceration credit. 

DISCUSSION

I. Supplemental Brief and Anders Brief Arguments

¶6 As we construe his supplemental brief and the arguments he 

asked his counsel to raise in the Anders brief, Flores first argues the facts 

supported his claim of self-defense. We reject this argument. We must not 

“take the case away from the jury” by reviewing the record for evidence 

supporting a conclusion or inference different from the resulting decision. 

Flanders v. Maricopa Cty., 203 Ariz. 368, 371, ¶ 5, 54 P.3d 837, 840 (App. 2002). 

“Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict 

merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or 

conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.” 

Id. As the finder of fact, the jury rejected Flores’ self-defense claim. We do 

not reweigh the evidence presented at trial to reach an opposite conclusion.

¶7 Flores next argues his conviction was not supported by 

sufficient evidence. Based on our review of the record, however, the State 

presented sufficient evidence supporting Flores’ conviction, see supra ¶¶ 2-

4, and any inconsistencies or weaknesses in the evidence merely went to the 

weight of the evidence. See State v. Erivez, 236 Ariz. 472, 476, ¶ 16, 341 P.3d 

514, 518 (App. 2015).
STATE v. FLORES

Decision of the Court

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¶8 Flores next argues three witnesses, C.C., J.C.B., and J.H.B.,

gave perjured and biased testimony and coordinated their initial witness 

statements to police. The record does not support these arguments.

¶9 Flores next argues the trial was unfair and he was the victim 

of a conspiracy among the trial judge, the prosecutor, and his lawyer to see 

him convicted (“unfair trial argument”). In support of his unfair trial

argument, he asserts his counsel never provided him paperwork 

confirming he wanted to go to trial; the prosecutor and judge repeatedly 

got his last name wrong; J.C. lied at the conditions of release hearing; the 

day after giving evidence, J.C., J.C.B., and J.H.B. celebrated with a box of 

doughnuts because J.C.B. and J.H.B. had supported J.C. with their 

testimony; the superior court required Flores to go to trial, but denied him 

the opportunity to present other witnesses; and he was the victim of racism 

because he is Mexican and does not speak English. The record does not 

support these arguments. Furthermore, a trial judge is presumed to be 

unbiased, State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 546, 944 P.2d 57, 61 (1997), and 

rebutting this presumption requires a party to prove bias or prejudice by a 

preponderance of the evidence. State v. Hurley, 197 Ariz. 400, 404-05, ¶ 24, 

4 P.3d 455, 459-60 (App. 2000). Flores has not submitted any evidence to 

rebut the presumption.

¶10 Flores raises several other arguments in further support of his 

unfair trial argument. First, he points out he was never offered a plea 

agreement. The State, however, is not required to offer a plea agreement. 

See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.4(a). Second, he asserts the superior court did not 

permit him to offer evidence that J.C. had been fired from his previous 

employment for fighting his boss. Based on our review of the record, 

however, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 

evidence that J.C. had been fired from his previous job for fighting with his 

boss. The evidence was only marginally relevant, at best, and could be 

misleading or confusing to the jury. See Ariz. R. Evid. 403. Third, he argues 

the superior court should not have limited him to presenting evidence of 

J.C.’s prior aggressive acts to only the single act Flores knew about before 

the incident in this case—J.C. fighting his prior boss. In Arizona, “a 

defendant may not introduce evidence of specific acts unknown to the 

defendant at the time of the alleged crime to show that the victim was the 

initial aggressor.” State v. Fish, 222 Ariz. 109, 121, ¶ 35, 213 P.3d 258, 270 

(App. 2009). “Accordingly, the superior court properly excluded the 

specific act evidence” unknown to Flores for the purpose of showing J.C. 

was the initial aggressor. Id.; see Ariz. R. Evid. 404(a)(2), 405. 
STATE v. FLORES

Decision of the Court

5

¶11 Flores also argues his trial counsel was ineffective. This court 

will not consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. 

State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (2002) (ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims must be raised in Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32 proceedings).

¶12 Finally, Flores argues his sentence was excessive. If a 

sentence is within the permissible statutory limits, we will not modify or 

reduce it unless it is clearly excessive. See State v. Gillies, 142 Ariz. 564, 573, 

691 P.2d 655, 664 (1984). The record does not support Flores’ contention 

that his sentence was clearly excessive. See generally State v. Vermuele, 226 

Ariz. 399, 403, ¶ 15, 249 P.3d 1099, 1103 (App. 2011) (appropriate sentence 

within statutory range rests in trial court's discretion; abuse of discretion 

characterized by failure to consider factors relevant to imposing sentence). 

Flores received a mitigated sentence—the minimum sentence allowed 

under the statute. His sentence was within the prescribed statutory range 

and was imposed lawfully.

II. Anders Review

¶13 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and 

find none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881. Flores received a fair 

trial. He was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and 

was present at all critical stages.

¶14 As discussed, the evidence presented at trial was substantial 

and supports the verdict. The jury was properly comprised of eight 

members, and the court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the 

charge, Flores’ presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, and 

the necessity of a unanimous verdict. The superior court received and 

considered a presentence report, Flores was given an opportunity to speak 

at sentencing and did so, and, as discussed, his sentence was within the 

range of acceptable sentences for his offense. 

¶15 We note, however, the judgment and sentence of 

imprisonment incorrectly states the superior court imposed a presumptive 

sentence, when in fact the court imposed a mitigated sentence. We 

therefore correct the superior court’s judgment and sentence of 

imprisonment to reflect the superior court imposed a mitigated sentence. 

CONCLUSION

¶16 We decline to order briefing and affirm Flores’ conviction and 

sentence as corrected.
STATE v. FLORES

Decision of the Court

6

¶17 After the filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations 

pertaining to Flores’ representation in this appeal have ended. Defense 

counsel need do no more than inform Flores of the outcome of this appeal 

and his future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue 

appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for 

review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984).

¶18 Flores has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if 

he wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. On the court’s own 

motion, we also grant Flores 30 days from the date of this decision to file an 

in propria persona motion for reconsideration.