[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Weller v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4300.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-4300

THE STATE EX REL. WELLER, APPELLANT, v. TUSCARAWAS COUNTY BOARD 

OF ELECTIONS, APPELLEE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Weller v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip 

Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4300.] 

Elections—Mandamus—Writ of mandamus sought to compel board of elections to 

certify appellant’s name on November 2019 ballot as mayoral candidate for 

village of Sugarcreek—By failing to complete the nominating-petition 

portion of the part-petitions signed by electors, appellant failed to 

substantially comply with R.C. 3513.261 and to strictly comply with R.C. 

3513.251—Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ affirmed. 

(No. 2019-1348—Submitted October 11, 2019—Decided October 18, 2019.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Tuscarawas County, No. 2019 AP 09 0037, 

2019-Ohio-4032. 

__________________ 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Clayton Weller, appeals the Fifth District Court of 

Appeals’ judgment denying his request for a writ of mandamus ordering appellee, 

the Tuscarawas County Board of Elections, to certify Weller’s name to the 

November 2019 ballot as a candidate for mayor of the village of Sugarcreek. We 

affirm the Fifth District’s judgment. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} On June 21, 2019, Weller submitted his petition to the board. The 

petition was comprised of four part-petitions, all on Form No. 3-O, which is the 

form that the secretary of state has prescribed for candidates running for 

nonpartisan municipal offices. On each part-petition, Weller completed the 

statement-of-candidacy portion and the circulator-statement portion, but he left 

blank the nominating-petition portion, which precedes the lines on which electors 

place their signatures and states: 

We, the undersigned, qualified electors of the State of Ohio, 

whose voting residence is in the county, city, village, or township 

set opposite our names, hereby nominate [NAME OF 

CANDIDATE] as a candidate for election to the office of [OFFICE] 

in the City or Village of [NAME OF CITY OR VILLAGE] for the: 

[CHECK ONE] * * * full term or * * * unexpired term ending 

[unexpired term ending date], to be voted for at the next general 

election, and certify said person is, in our opinion, well qualified to 

perform the duties of the office or position to which the person 

desires to be elected. 

On August 19, the board rejected Weller’s petition because he had not completed 

the nominating-petition portions of the Form No. 3-O part-petitions. 
January Term, 2019 

3

{¶ 3} On September 9, Weller filed a complaint in the Fifth District seeking 

a writ of mandamus ordering the board to certify his name to the November ballot. 

2019-Ohio-4032, ¶ 1. Weller argued that (1) he had completed the statement-ofcandidacy portions of his part-petitions and that the information omitted from the 

nominating-petition portion of Form No. 3-O is merely duplicative of the 

information in the statement-of-candidacy portion and (2) there was no strict 

requirement that he fill in the blanks in that portion of the Form No. 3-O and 

therefore, by completing the statement of candidacy, his petition substantially 

complied with R.C. 3513.261. Id. at ¶ 6, 8. 

{¶ 4} On September 30, the Fifth District denied the writ based on its 

conclusion that Weller’s petition did not substantially comply with R.C. 3513.261. 

Id. at ¶ 14, 16. The court reasoned that Weller’s failure to complete the nominatingpetition portion of Form No. 3-O “does not relate merely to the ‘form’ of the 

nominating petition, but goes to its very substance,” id. at ¶ 12, and that Weller’s 

omissions essentially “resulted in the signators nominating nobody as a candidate,” 

id. at ¶ 10. 

{¶ 5} Weller filed a notice of appeal on October 3. He also filed a motion 

to expedite, which we granted. __ Ohio St.3d __, 2019-Ohio-4095, __ N.E.3d __. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Mandamus Standard

{¶ 6} Weller is entitled to a writ of mandamus if he establishes by clear and 

convincing evidence that (1) he has a clear legal right to have his name placed on 

the ballot, (2) the board has a clear legal duty to place his name on the ballot, and 

(3) he lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. 

Davis v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 137 Ohio St.3d 222, 2013-Ohio-4616, 998 

N.E.2d 1093, ¶ 12. Because of the proximity of the November election, Weller 

lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See State ex rel. 
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Finkbeiner v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 122 Ohio St.3d 462, 2009-Ohio-3657, 

912 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 18. 

{¶ 7} With respect to the remaining elements, courts look to whether the 

board has “engaged in fraud, corruption, or abuse of discretion, or acted in clear 

disregard of applicable legal provisions.” Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of 

Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 216, 2002-Ohio-5923, 778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 11. Weller does 

not allege fraud or corruption, so the question is whether the board abused its 

discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law. A board abuses its discretion when 

it acts in an “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable fashion.” State ex rel. 

McCann v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 155 Ohio St.3d 14, 2018-Ohio-3342, 

118 N.E.3d 224, ¶ 12. 

B. Nominating Petitions

{¶ 8} “[T]he general rule is that unless there is language allowing 

substantial compliance, election statutes are mandatory and must be strictly 

complied with.” State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 15. 

{¶ 9} R.C. 3513.251 states, “Nomination of nonpartisan candidates for 

election as officers of a municipal corporation having a population of two thousand 

or more, as ascertained by the next preceding federal census, shall be made only by 

nominating petition.” (Emphasis added.)1

 R.C. 3513.251 does not contain 

language permitting substantial compliance. It therefore imposes a mandatory, 

strict requirement that Weller’s nomination as a candidate for election as mayor of 

Sugarcreek be made by nominating petition. 

 

1. Sugarcreek’s population was recorded as 2,220 in the 2010 census, see United States Census 

Bureau, American FactFinder, available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav 

/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml. 
January Term, 2019 

5

{¶ 10} R.C. 3513.261 provides that nominating petitions “shall be 

substantially in the form prescribed in this section.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the 

statute “requires only substantial compliance with the prescribed ‘form’ of the 

nominating petition, but [it] contains no language regarding substantial compliance 

as to other matters.” State ex rel. Simonetti v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 151 

Ohio St.3d 50, 2017-Ohio-8115, 85 N.E.3d 728, ¶ 26. 

{¶ 11} Weller was therefore required to strictly comply with the 

requirement that his nomination to office be achieved by nominating petition and 

to substantially comply with the statutory form of the nominating petition. The 

parties appear to have overlooked R.C. 3513.251; they have briefed only the 

question whether Weller substantially complied with R.C. 3513.261. We agree 

with the Fifth District that Weller’s submission of part-petitions on which he did 

not complete the nominating-petition portions of Form No. 3-O constituted a failure 

to substantially comply with R.C. 3513.261. Under the facts of this case, in which 

Weller utilized the form prescribed by the secretary under R.C. 3513.261, his 

failure to substantially comply with R.C. 3513.261 means that he has also failed to 

strictly comply with R.C. 3513.251. 

{¶ 12} In State ex rel. Allen v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Elections, 170 Ohio St. 19, 

161 N.E.2d 896 (1959), the relator had submitted four part-petitions with invalid 

circulator’s affidavits.2

 Id. at 20. The relator argued that “since the only 

requirement for a circulator’s affidavit appears in the statutory form and * * * the 

statute requires only that a nominating petition form shall be substantially the same 

as the statutory form, the circulator’s oath is not an essential part of the petition 

paper.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. This court rejected that argument, stating, “Substantial 

compliance does not contemplate complete omission.” Id. The court further 

explained: 

 

2. At the time, what is now the circulator’s statement was required to be a circulator’s affidavit. 

Allen at 19, citing the version of R.C. 3513.261 then in effect. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

The statutory form, like any suggested statutory form, need not be 

followed absolutely as to its wording. The statute [prescribing the 

form] itself provides for only substantial compliance. However, as 

we have said, substantial compliance would not warrant complete 

omission of the jurat of the circulator. Such jurat is a vital and 

material part of the nominating petition paper, and its inclusion is a 

condition precedent to the acceptance and validation of a 

candidate’s nominating petition paper by a board of elections. 

Id. (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 13} In State ex rel. Wilson v. Hisrich, 69 Ohio St.3d 13, 630 N.E.2d 319 

(1994), the relator had filed one part-petition that contained a declaration of 

candidacy and had attached to it three additional part-petitions that did not contain 

declarations of candidacy. Id. at 15. This court held that this violated R.C. 

3513.09’s strict requirement that the signed declaration of candidacy “shall be 

copied on each other separate petition paper.” Wilson at 15-16. The relator argued 

that R.C. 3513.07, which prescribed the applicable petition form, required only 

substantial compliance and that he had met that requirement in light of affidavits 

from all of the signers of his petition averring that they were shown the declaration 

of candidacy when they signed the part-petitions. Id. at 16. This court disagreed, 

explaining, “R.C. 3513.07 may be satisfied by substantial compliance with the form 

of a declaration of candidacy and petition, but the omission of the entire declaration 

from three petition papers would hardly qualify as substantial compliance.” Id. 

{¶ 14} Weller points out that he completed the statement-of-candidacy 

portions of his part-petitions and that all of the information that he would have 

added to the nominating-petition portion of Form No. 3-O was included in his 

statement of candidacy on the same form. However, it is apparent from the 
January Term, 2019 

7

language and structure of R.C. 3513.261 and the form of the “nominating petition 

and statement of candidacy” set forth therein that the nominating petition and the 

statement of candidacy are different components of a part-petition that serve 

different purposes. (Emphasis added.) In the statement of candidacy, the candidate

declares to the petition signers his intention to seek a particular office and attests to 

his qualifications. Id. (“I [name of candidate] * * * hereby declare that I desire to 

be a candidate for election to the office of [name of office] * * * ”). In the 

nominating petition, the petition signers declare to the board of elections their 

desire to nominate the candidate to the office that he seeks. Id. (“We, the 

undersigned * * * hereby nominate [name of candidate] as a candidate for election 

to the office of [name of office] * * *”). 

{¶ 15} Because the statement-of-candidacy portion of the form contains no 

language actually nominating the candidate to office, we conclude that the 

nominating-petition portion of the form is a “vital and material part of the 

nominating petition paper,” Allen, 170 Ohio St. at 20, 161 N.E.2d 896, and that 

Weller’s submission of Form No. 3-O part-petitions that omitted his name and the 

office he sought from the nominating-petition portion of the forms did not amount 

to substantial compliance with R.C. 3513.261. Our conclusion is bolstered by R.C. 

3513.251’s mandate that a nominating petition is the only vehicle through which 

Weller could achieve nomination to office, although this court reached its 

conclusion in Allen even in the absence of such a strict requirement. 

{¶ 16} Under the facts of this case, in which Weller utilized Form No. 3-O, 

his failure to substantially comply with R.C. 3513.261 means that he also failed to 

strictly comply with R.C. 3513.251’s mandate that he be nominated to office via 

nominating petition; Weller cannot be nominated to office solely by Form No. 3-

O’s statement of candidacy. 

{¶ 17} Weller argues that no one who signed his petition was misled or 

confused about who the form was nominating as a candidate for mayor, because he 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

is a two-term incumbent mayor, he is well known in Sugarcreek, he was the sole 

circulator of his own part-petitions, and the information missing from the 

nominating petition was present in the statement of candidacy. However, this 

argument is similar to the argument this court rejected in Wilson—that the petition 

signers all saw the missing declaration of candidacy—and in Wilson there were 

affidavits from the petition signers, not just from the candidate. 69 Ohio St.3d at 

16, 630 N.E.2d 319. Regardless, Weller did not comply with the statutory 

requirements, so this argument is irrelevant. 

{¶ 18} The cases Weller cites in support of his argument are distinguishable 

because in each case, there was no requirement that the information that was 

omitted from or incorrectly stated on the part-petition be included. See State ex rel. 

Phillips v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 62 Ohio St.3d 214, 217, 581 N.E.2d 513 

(1991); State ex rel. Phillips v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 93 Ohio St.3d 535, 

540, 757 N.E.2d 319 (2001); State ex rel. Stewart v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 

124 Ohio St.3d 584, 2010-Ohio-1176, 925 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 38. Here, by contrast, 

R.C. 3513.251 mandates that Weller be nominated by nominating petition. 

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 19} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Fifth 

District denying the writ. 

Judgment affirmed. 

FISCHER, DEWINE, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs, with an opinion joined by STEWART, J. 

KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 

FRENCH and DONNELLY, JJ., dissent. 

_________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J., concurring.

{¶ 20} I join the majority opinion. I write separately in response to the basic 

contention of the dissenting opinion that we should “let the people vote,” dissenting 
January Term, 2019 

9

opinion at ¶ 25, and the suggestion that the majority’s decision undermines the right 

to vote. I too am a proponent of the right to vote. However, this appeal does not 

involve one’s right to vote. Rather, the central issue in this case is the right of a 

candidate to appear on the ballot. 

{¶ 21} The dissenting opinion contends that “ ‘any restrictions on the [right 

to vote] strike at the heart of representative government.’ ” Id. at ¶ 42, quoting 

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). 

However, that view creates a tension between our right to vote and the rule of law. 

The rule of law plainly requires that appellant Clayton Weller’s nomination be 

made only by a nominating petition, R.C. 3513.251, and that the nominating 

petition be substantially in compliance with the form prescribed in R.C. 3513.261. 

{¶ 22} The dissenting opinion seemingly conflates the requirement of 

substantial compliance as to the form of the nominating petition, which is all that 

R.C. 3513.261 addresses, with strict compliance as to its substance and contents. 

This distinction is one the court unanimously recognized in State ex rel. Simonetti 

v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 151 Ohio St.3d 50, 2017-Ohio-8115, 85 N.E.3d 

728, when addressing the relator’s contention that public policy favors “ ‘free 

competitive elections’ over ‘absolute compliance with each technical requirement 

in the petition form.’ ” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting the relator’s brief. We held,

Here, R.C. 3513.261 provides that a nominating petition “shall be 

substantially in the form prescribed in this section.” Thus, the 

statute requires only substantial compliance with the prescribed 

“form” of the nominating petition, but the statute contains no 

language regarding substantial compliance as to other matters. 

Id. at ¶ 26. As Weller’s nominating petition pictured in the dissenting opinion 

clearly illustrates, there was simply no compliance whatsoever because the contents 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

of the nominating petition that precedes the electors’ signatures is entirely blank. 

Simply because the secretary of state chose to combine the statement of candidacy 

and the nominating petition into one form does not repudiate the statute’s 

requirement of strict compliance as to content. It is our duty to follow the election 

laws of this state regardless of whether they lead us to the result we desire. 

{¶ 23} “As we have consistently held, ‘ “[c]ounty boards of elections are of 

statutory creation, and the members thereof in the performance of their duties must 

comply with applicable statutory requirements.” ’ ” State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 

123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 11, quoting Whitman v. 

Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 216, 2002-Ohio-5923, 778 N.E.2d 

32, ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Babcock v. Perkins, 165 Ohio St. 185, 187, 134 

N.E.2d 839 (1956). So too must we. 

{¶ 24} To hold county boards of election to a standard other than what the 

General Assembly has prescribed does not promote the public policy favoring free, 

competitive, and fair elections but, rather, opens the door to allowing county boards 

and the judiciary to ignore the rule of law and play to subjective evaluation or 

political whims. I therefore concur in the court’s judgment affirming the Fifth 

District Court of Appeals’ judgment denying the writ. 

STEWART, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 25} Because I would let the people vote, I dissent and would reverse the 

judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals and grant the writ. 

{¶ 26} R.C. 3513.261 requires nominating petitions to be in substantial 

compliance with the form set out in the statute, and for more than 50 years, we have 

recognized that the determination whether a petition substantially complies with 

the form depends on whether a petition signer would be misled by an error or 

omission in the petition, whether there was fraud or deception perpetrated, and 
January Term, 2019 

11

whether there was sufficient compliance for the board of elections to determine that 

the petition is valid. See Stern v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 14 Ohio St.2d 

175, 184, 237 N.E.2d 313 (1968); State ex rel. Stewart v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of 

Elections, 124 Ohio St.3d 584, 2010-Ohio-1176, 925 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 28. 

{¶ 27} Applying this standard here, appellant Clayton Weller’s petition to 

be a candidate for mayor of the village of Sugarcreek on the November ballot 

sufficiently conformed with R.C. 3513.261. He complied with the express 

requirements of the statute by completing and signing the candidate’s statement of 

candidacy and the circulator’s statement, and a sufficient number of qualified 

electors signed the petition and provided their voting-residence address and date of 

signing. And although he failed to fill in the blanks of the nomination section of 

the petition with the same information that appears in his candidate’s statement, 

neither the statute nor the form itself expressly instructed him to do so. And Weller 

substantially complied with the form set out in R.C. 3513.261. A review of the 

petition reveals that no elector would be misled in nominating a candidate when the 

candidacy statement is included at the top of the form. Moreover, there is no claim 

of fraud or deception, and there is no doubt that the electors who signed the petition 

intended to nominate Weller as a candidate for mayor of Sugarcreek and were 

qualified to do so. I therefore would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 

and grant a writ of mandamus compelling the Tuscarawas County Board of 

Elections to place Weller on the November ballot for mayor of the village of 

Sugarcreek. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 28} Weller submitted four part-petitions to the board of elections in order 

to be placed on the ballot for mayor of Sugarcreek. On each part-petition, Weller 

completed the statement of candidacy, but no one filled in the nomination section 

of the petition: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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January Term, 2019 

13

{¶ 29} Although no one filled in the blanks in the nomination section, 

electors nonetheless signed and dated the petition and provided their addresses. The 

petition had sufficient valid signatures and no protest was filed—in fact, no other 

candidate has submitted a valid petition—but the board of elections nonetheless 

rejected the petition because no one had filled in the blanks in the nomination 

section on any of the part-petition forms. 

{¶ 30} The Fifth District Court of Appeals denied Weller’s request for a 

writ of mandamus ordering the board to certify his name to the November ballot. 

2019-Ohio-4032, ¶ 16. The court of appeals explained that the failure to complete 

the nomination section of the petition form “does not relate merely to the ‘form’ of 

the nominating petition, but goes to its very substance,” because this part of the 

petition “identifies the person who is being nominated by the signators and the 

office being sought by the candidate.” Id. at ¶ 12. The court concluded that 

Weller’s failure to fill in the blanks of the nomination section essentially “resulted 

in the signators nominating nobody as a candidate.” Id. at ¶ 10. 

Law and Analysis 

{¶ 31} The General Assembly has imposed specific requirements for a 

nominating petition in addition to providing a sample form. R.C. 3513.261 

expressly requires each nominating petition to “contain a statement of candidacy 

* * * signed by the candidate” that includes “a declaration made under penalty of 

election falsification that the candidate desires to be a candidate for the office 

named in it, and that the candidate is an elector qualified to vote for the office the 

candidate seeks.” Similarly, R.C. 3501.38(C) requires each signer of a petition to 

place the date of signing and the place of the signer’s voting residence on the 

petition, while R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) requires the petition circulator to indicate the 

number of signatures contained on the petition and to sign a statement that the 

circulator witnessed every signature and that to the best of the circulator’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

knowledge and belief, all signers were qualified to sign and all signatures are 

genuine. 

{¶ 32} These are substantive requirements. The candidate’s signed 

statement of candidacy is required to confirm that the candidate is willing to accept 

the nomination and serve in the elective office while also verifying that he or she is 

qualified to do so. The addresses of the signers and the date of signing are needed 

to confirm that each signer is eligible to nominate the candidate. And the 

circulator’s statement is needed to protect against forged signatures. And this is 

why the Form No. 3-O promulgated by the secretary of state states in bold type that 

“[t]he candidate must fill in, sign and date this statement of candidacy before the 

signatures of electors are affixed” and that the circulator statement “[m]ust be 

completed and signed by the circulator.” 

{¶ 33} In one case on which the majority relies, State ex rel. Wilson v. 

Hisrich, 69 Ohio St.3d 13, 630 N.E.2d 319 (1994), we refused to order a board of 

elections to place a candidate’s name on the ballot. The board had rejected his 

petition because it omitted the candidate’s declaration of candidacy on three partpetitions, a flaw that involved such an express, substantive requirement that it 

affected the validity of the petition. 

{¶ 34} In contrast, this court has held that a petition’s failure to contain 

material included in the sample petition form but not expressly required by the 

statute does not necessarily invalidate a petition. For example, the sample form 

provided by R.C. 3513.261 (and the Form No. 3-O promulgated by the secretary of 

state) include space for the appointment of a committee to represent the candidate. 

In State ex rel. Phillips v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, however, we explained that 

even though the petition form included these blanks for the candidate to fill out, 

“R.C. 3513.261 does not expressly require the appointment of a committee.” 62 

Ohio St.3d 214, 216, 581 N.E.2d 513 (1991). Because the statute had been 

amended, “the express requirement to name a committee was gone, and only the 
January Term, 2019 

15

reference to the form of the petition remained.” Id. Therefore, appointment of a 

committee was not mandatory and leaving those blanks empty did not invalidate 

the petition. Id. at 217. 

{¶ 35} Similarly, neither the relevant statutes nor the form itself provides 

any specific instruction that the candidate, the signers, or the circulator must fill out 

the blanks in the nomination section of the petition. Rather, R.C. 3513.261 states 

only that 

[t]he form of the nominating petition * * * shall be substantially as 

follows: 

* * * 

We, the undersigned, qualified electors of the state of Ohio, 

whose voting residence is in the County, City, Village, Ward, 

Township or Precinct set opposite our names, hereby nominate 

.................... as a candidate for election to the office of 

........................... in the ............................ (State, District, County, 

City, Village, Township, or School District) for the ................. (Full 

term or unexpired term ending ...................) to be voted for at the 

general election next hereafter to be held, and certify that this person 

is, in our opinion, well qualified to perform the duties of the office 

or position to which the person desires to be elected. 

{¶ 36} The majority holds that another statute, R.C. 3513.251, not R.C. 

3513.261, makes filling in the blanks in the nomination section subject to strict 

compliance. But that statute simply explains when a candidate for municipal office 

must be nominated by petition and when a municipality may use a primary election 

to nominate candidates. It says nothing about what specific language the candidate 

must use in circulating a nominating petition, nor does indicate whether filling in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

the blanks of the nominating petition are subject to strict or substantial compliance. 

Moreover, the majority’s conclusion that strict compliance applies is inconsistent 

with the plain language of R.C. 3513.261, which “expressly permits substantial 

compliance with the form of the nominating petition.” (Emphasis sic.) State ex 

rel. Phillips v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 93 Ohio St.3d 535, 539, 757 N.E.2d 

319 (2001). And filling in the form exactly as specified in the sample form is a 

formal requirement, not a substantive one. Even the instructions given to county 

boards by the secretary of state recognize that “[t]he question of whether the board 

may certify a prospective candidate’s petition when the ‘Nominating Petition’ 

portion of the form is incomplete is a substantial compliance decision for the board 

of elections to make in consultation with its legal counsel, the county prosecuting 

attorney.” Secretary of State Directive 2019-17, Section 1.02, Ohio Election 

Official Manual, at 11-4. 

{¶ 37} Importantly, we have explained that strict compliance is appropriate 

when “ ‘such complete and absolute conformance to each technical requirement of 

the printed form serves a public interest and a public purpose.’ ” Stewart, 124 Ohio 

St.3d 584, 2010-Ohio-1176, 925 N.E.2d 601, at ¶ 28, quoting Stern, 14 Ohio St.2d 

at 180, 237 N.E.2d 313. As we observed in Stewart: 

“The public policy which favors free competitive elections, 

in which the electorate has the opportunity to make a choice between 

candidates, outweighs the arguments for absolute compliance with 

each technical requirement in the petition form, where the statute 

requires only substantial compliance, where, in fact, the only 

omission cannot possibly mislead any petition signer or elector, 

where there is no claim of fraud or deception, and where there is 

sufficient substantial compliance to permit the board of elections, 

based upon prima facie evidence appearing on the face of the jurat 
January Term, 2019 

17

which is part of the petition paper, to determine the petition to be 

valid.” 

Id., quoting Stern at 184. Our decision in State ex rel. Allen v. Lake Cty. Bd. of 

Elections, 170 Ohio St. 19, 161 N.E.2d 896 (1959), on which the majority relies—

and which upheld the rejection of a petition because the circulator’s jurat included 

only in the statutory form was invalid—predates our adoption of this substantialcompliance standard. 

{¶ 38} A nominating petition with an incomplete nomination section can 

constitute substantial compliance, because the signer’s intent to nominate the 

candidate for the office and term indicated in the candidate’s statement of 

candidacy is unambiguously manifested by the fact that the signer has affixed his 

or her signature to the nominating petition—there is no conceivable reason that an 

elector would sign a nominating petition if the elector did not genuinely intend to 

nominate the candidate. See State ex rel. Myles v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 328, 

2008-Ohio-5097, 899 N.E.2d 120, ¶ 23 (“the ‘only reason to complete the form was 

to obtain an absentee ballot for the November 4, 2008 election,’ and signing it 

necessarily indicated that the applicant represented, ‘I am a qualified elector and 

would like to receive an Absentee Ballot for the November 4, 2008 General 

Election,’ regardless of whether the box next to the statement was marked”). 

{¶ 39} Further, any concerns that a petition signer or elector could be misled 

by the failure to fill in the blanks in the nomination section of the petition are 

dispelled when that information is wholly duplicative of information prominently 

included in the candidate’s statement. See Stewart at ¶ 38 (noting that a signer 

would not be misled by the omission of the primary-election date on a declaration 

of candidacy). Nor does it invite fraud or deception, because a mismatch between 

the candidate’s statement and the nomination section of the petition would attract a 

board’s scrutiny and presumably result in the invalidation of the petition. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

18 

{¶ 40} In the last analysis, Weller met the express requirements of R.C. 

3513.261: his nominating petition includes the signed candidate’s statement, the 

signed circulator’s statement, and sufficient signatures of electors with their votingresidence address and the date of signing. The nominating petition language 

appears only in the statute’s sample form, and substantial compliance is therefore 

permissible. When there is no possibility that any elector could have been misled 

by the nominating petition he or she signed, when there is no claim of fraud or 

deception, and when there is no doubt that the signers of the petition intended to 

nominate Weller to be a candidate for mayor of Sugarcreek, substantial compliance 

has been established and the public interest would be served by allowing the 

petition. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 41} Weller, the incumbent mayor of the village of Sugarcreek, circulated 

his own petition. A sufficient number of qualified electors signed that petition. No 

protest was brought against his candidacy. But now, the board’s action removing 

the incumbent from the ballot based on the inadvertent failure to fill in all the blanks 

of the prescribed form means that the people of the village will be deprived of their 

right to vote for an individual who may be their candidate of choice for that office. 

See R.C. 3505. 

{¶ 42} Rather than elevate form over substance and ignore reality, we 

should “ ‘avoid unduly technical interpretations that impede the public policy 

favoring free, competitive elections.’ ” Myles, 120 Ohio St.3d 328, 2008-Ohio5097, 899 N.E.2d 120, at ¶ 22, quoting State ex rel. Ruehlmann v. Luken, 65 Ohio 

St.3d 1, 3, 598 N.E.2d 1149 (1992). After all, “[t]he right to vote freely for the 

candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any 

restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.” Reynolds 

v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). “Other rights, 
January Term, 2019 

19

even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Wesberry v. 

Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). 

{¶ 43} For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court of 

appeals and grant the requested writ. 

_________________ 

Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, James F. Mathews, and Tonya 

J. Rogers, for appellant. 

Ryan D. Styer, Tuscarawas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Robert R. 

Stephenson II, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

_________________