FIFTH DIVISION                                             February 7, 1997No. 1-95-3851                                     CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,   )  Appeal from theMcDONNELL DOUGLAS FINANCE       )  Circuit Court ofCORPORATION, UNITED SERVICES    )  Cook County.AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, and     )USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,)                                )     Plaintiffs-Appellees,      )  No. 87 CH 9106                                )v.                              )                                )COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY,    )  The Honorable                                )  Dorothy Kirie Kinnaird,     Defendant-Appellant.       )  Judge Presiding.     JUSTICE HOURIHANE delivered the opinion of the court:     This case involves the issuance by Commonwealth Edison(Edison) of 340,000 shares of 15% preferred stock and theredemption of that stock by Edison on February 1, 1987. Plaintiffs, certain institutional investors, challenged theredemption on several theories, and filed suit in the chancerycourt seeking recision (count I), injunctive relief (count II),declaratory relief (count III), damages for breach of contract(count IV) and fiduciary duty (count V), and damages orinjunctive relief for violation of the Illinois Consumer FraudAct (count VI).      The trial court granted Edison's motion to dismiss thecomplaint, pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of CivilProcedure.  735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1994).  On appeal, we reversedthe dismissal of counts I through V finding that, at a minimum,an ambiguity exists in the redemption provisions of the parties'agreement which precluded conclusive determination of theirintent solely from the documents.  We also affirmed dismissal ofcount VI, holding that the Consumer Fraud Act did not apply tothis transaction.  Continental Assurance Co. v. CommonwealthEdison Co., 194 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 551 N.E.2d 1054 (1990).     On remand, Edison moved for summary judgment which wasgranted as to plaintiffs' claims for recision, injunctive relief,and breach of fiduciary duty.  Following a bench trial on the tworemaining counts for declaratory relief and for breach ofcontract, the trial court found that Edison had breached theparties' agreement and awarded $5,749,147.52 in damages.  Thisamount includes $2,774,452.52 as an equitable award ofprejudgment interest.       On appeal, Edison asserts that the trial court's damagesdetermination is not supported by the evidence, and that thetrial court lacked the authority to make an equitable award ofprejudgment interest.     We affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand forfurther proceedings.                                 ANALYSIS                                    I.     We first consider Edison's argument that the trial court'sdetermination of damages is not supported by the evidence.  It iswell settled that the determination of damages by a trial courtsitting without a jury will not be disturbed on review unlesscontrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.  Schatz v.Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 51 Ill. 2d 143, 149 (1972); Moniuszkov. Moniuszko, 238 Ill. App. 3d 523, 531, 606 N.E.2d 468 (1992);In re Estate of Chaitlen, 179 Ill. App. 3d 287, 292, 534 N.E.2d482 (1989).  The law does not require absolute certainty as tothe amount of the damages.  Rather, there need only be anadequate basis in the record for the court's determination. Schatz, 51 Ill. 2d at 147-48; Moniuszko, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 531;Chaitlen, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 292.      The record reveals that in 1982, in conjunction with thefinancing and construction of several nuclear power plants,Edison issued 340,000 shares of 15% preferred stock ("preferencestock") to certain institutional investors, plaintiffs here.  Thestock was issued pursuant to a Purchase Agreement and Resolutionof Edison's Board of Directors.      Holders of the preference stock were entitled to annualdividends of 15%, which was commensurate with the then prevailinginterest rates.  The stock was also subject to a 5-year noncallprovision, as well as certain indemnity rights of theshareholders and redemption rights of Edison.  The trial courtspecifically found that plaintiffs' decision to buy the stock wasdependent on the assumption that, for federal income taxpurposes, the dividends would be eligible for the "dividendreceived deduction" (DRD) provided for under Section 243(a)(1) ofthe Internal Revenue Code of 1954.  26 U.S.C. � 243(a)(1).  Underthe DRD, 85% of the dividends would be tax-free, resulting in anafter-tax yield of 13.965%.  If, during the 5-year noncallperiod, the holders of the stock lost the favorable tax treatmentunder the DRD, the shareholders could seek indemnity from Edisonand Edison, in turn, had the right to redeem the stock at par. Edison could also redeem the stock at any time after the fifthyear for any reason upon payment of a 6.67% premium.  Finally,the agreements provided for a "sinking fund" redemption underwhich Edison was required to redeem 20% of the issuance on eachof the sixth through tenth issuance anniversary dates, so thatthe entire issuance would be redeemed at the end of the tenthyear.  Edison had the option of doubling the amount of stockredeemed on any of the mandatory redemption anniversaries.  Allmandatory redemptions, including doubled redemptions, were atpar.      In 1986, interest rates dropped significantly and Edisoninstituted a plan to redeem, cancel, refund or refinance everyobligation carrying a high interest rate, including thepreference stock.  At the same time, the Tax Reform Act of 1986became law.  Among other things, the Act reduced the DRD from 85%to 80%, effective January 1, 1987.  See Pub. L. No. 99-514, �611(a)(1), codified at 26 U.S.C. � 243.  Based on this reductionin the DRD, on February 1, 1987, Edison redeemed the preferencestock.  Significantly, because of the phase-in provisions of theTax Reform Act and a reduction in the general corporate tax rateeffective July 1, 1987, the preference stock would have producedan after-tax yield in 1987 of 13.8%, a reduction of only .165%.      On remand, the trial court found that Edison's redemptionrights were limited by the requirement that it make a good faithdetermination prior to redemption that the shareholders "suffereda real and detrimental loss in the after-tax yield on thedividends paid on the stock and not just a de minimis loss",which Edison failed to do.  Thus, the court found that Edisonclearly breached the Purchase Agreement.       Edison does not appeal this finding.  Rather, it challengesthe trial court's determination that absent this breach, Edisonwould have redeemed the preference stock in August, 1987.  Edisonargues that the evidence establishes that Edison had in place acomprehensive program to redeem high rate issuances at the leastcost to the company.  Edison contends that the least costalternative was a "split redemption", under which Edison wouldhave redeemed 60% of the stock in August 1987 at a premium, andthe remaining 40% in August 1988 at no premium.  Edison arguesthat support for this position is found in the unrebuttedtestimony of its treasurer, Dennis O'Brien, and former vice-chairman, Wallace Behnke, Jr.     As Assistant Treasurer in the mid-1980s, O'Brien testifiedthat he reviewed Edison's high-rate instruments to determinewhether such offerings could be redeemed.  Decisions regardingredemptions were made by the board on a purely economical basis. O'Brien further opined that had Edison not redeemed thepreference stock in February 1987, the company would haveredeemed 60% of the stock in August 1987 at a premium, and theremaining 40% in February or August 1988 at par, as this wouldhave been the most economical.  He also testified that Edison hadengaged in this sort of split-redemption strategy during the mid-1980s when redeeming other high cost instruments.  Significantly,O'Brien did not commence work with Edison until August 1, 1987. He was not a member of the board, did not attend board meetings,did not make recommendations directly to the board concerningredemptions, and was not in the senior management loop withrespect to receiving strategic memoranda or minutes of boardmeetings.  His opinion as to what Edison would have done was notbased on any conversation with senior management who would haveparticipated in the decision-making process.     At retirement in 1989, Behnke was vice-chairman and a memberof Edison's board.  His duties as vice-chairman included overallresponsibility for the development of the company's strategicplanning.  Various departments reported to Behnke, includingaccounting, federal tax, purchasing, rates, and finance.  Behnketestified that Edison's strategy has been to minimize costs offinancing and to call and refund issues wherever it was clearthat such a refunding would lower the overall cost of capital,and that the preference stock was no different.     However, Behnke's own notes from the December 1986 andJanuary 1987 board meetings plainly indicate that only twopossible redemption dates were put before the board--February1987 or August 1987.  No evidence was offered that Edison'smanagement ever contemplated a split redemption for thisparticular call, or that the possibility of redemption at a dateother than February or August 1987 was ever presented to orconsidered by Edison's board.        A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence ifthe opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.  Bazydlov. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 215 (1995).  Based on the recordbefore this court, it cannot be said that the trial court'sdetermination that Edison would have redeemed the stock on theonly other date Edison's board actually considered is against themanifest weight of the evidence.  Accordingly, we affirm thetrial court's determination of damages based on redemption of100% of the issuance in August 1987 at a premium of 6.67%. Because Edison does not challenge the court's calculations basedon an August 1987 redemption, we need not review thosecalculations here.                                    II.     We next consider Edison's claim that the trial court waswithout authority to make an equitable award of prejudgmentinterest.  Without elaboration, the trial court ruled thatprejudgment interest is appropriate and that the prime rate,rather than the statutory rate, would apply.  The court cited Inre Estate of Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d 61 (1989) and People ex rel.Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 148 Ill. 2d 348 (1992)as authority for the award.     Edison argues that there was no equitable cause of actionbefore the court upon which it could exercise its equitablepowers, since the claim underlying the declaratory action was, infact, a breach of contract.  Edison further argues that anequitable award of prejudgment interest conflicts with theprovisions of the Interest Act (815 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West1994)), which Edison asserts governs interest awards in breach ofcontract cases.     Plaintiffs counter that the trial court had before it claimsthat were not solely legal in nature; that a court's equitablepowers are not, in any event, confined to cases sounding inequity; that an award of prejudgment interest was an appropriatemeans of compensating plaintiffs for the loss of use of fundsrightfully theirs; that the Interest Act does not preclude anaward of equitable prejudgment interest; and that interest couldhave been awarded under the Interest Act.     Generally, prejudgment interest is recoverable only wherecontracted for or authorized by statute.  Department ofTransportation v. New Century Engineering and Development Corp.,97 Ill. 2d 343, 352 (1983);  Ouwenga v. Nu-Way Ag, Inc., 239 Ill.App. 3d 518, 526-27, 604 N.E.2d 1085 (1992); Richman v. ChicagoBears Football Club, Inc., 127 Ill. App. 3d 75, 78, 468 N.E.2d487 (1984); Cushman & Wakefield of Illinois, Inc. v. Northbrook500 Ltd. Partnership, 112 Ill. App. 3d 951, 963, 445 N.E.2d 1313(1983).  However, "[i]n a proper case, equitable considerationspermit a court of equity to allow or disallow interest as theequities of the case may demand."  Groome v. Freyn EngineeringCo., 374 Ill. 113, 131 (1940).  Our supreme court recentlyexplained the basis for an equitable award of prejudgmentinterest:               "The goal of proceedings sounding in equity          is to make the injured party whole.  The current          trend being employed to accomplish this goal is to          allow an award of interest on funds owing so that          justice might be accomplished in each particular          case. ***  In Illinois, prejudgment interest may          be recovered when warranted by equitable          considerations, and disallowed if such an award          would not comport with justice and equity. ***               The rationale underlying an equitable award          of prejudgment interest in a case involving a          breach of fiduciary duty is to make the injured          party complete by forcing the fiduciary to account          for profits and interest he gained by the use of          the injured party's money. [Citations.] The          injured party is thus compensated for any economic          loss occasioned by the inability to use his money.           Prejudgment interest in this context acts as a          concept of fairness and equity and not as a          sanction against the defendant. [Citation.]          Fundamental principles of damages and compensation          dictate that when money has been wrongfully          withheld the victim receive interest for the          wrongdoer's retention of his money."  In re Estate          of Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d 61, 86-87 (1989).     Plaintiffs argue that the same rationale set forth inWernick should apply here.  We disagree.  We first observe thatalthough the instant case proceeded before a court of equity, thematter was nonetheless an action at law.  At the time of trial,plaintiffs' equitable claims had all been rejected, and the onlyclaims remaining were for declaratory judgment and breach ofcontract.  Actions under the declaratory judgments statute (735ILCS 5/2-701 (West 1994)) are neither legal nor equitable innature.  Rather, they are sui generis and the judgment, decree ororder take their character from the nature of the reliefdeclared.  Albright v. Phelan, 2 Ill. App. 3d 142, 146, 276N.E.2d 1 (1971).  Here, plaintiffs sought a declaration relativeto their rights under the Purchase Agreement and the courtdeclared that "the exercise by defendant Commonwealth EdisonCompany of the special redemption right contained in the $15.00Preference Stock was a breach of the Purchase Agreement."  Thus,plaintiffs' inclusion of a declaratory judgment count does nottransform what is essentially a legal claim into an equitableone.  See Crerar Clinch Coal Co. v. Board of Education, 13 Ill.App. 2d 208, 218, 141 N.E.2d 393 (1957) (court rejected argumentin declaratory judgment action that because prayer for reliefasked not only for declaration of rights under contract, but alsofor an accounting and payment of moneys, plaintiff's actionrequired the application of equitable principles, particularlythe doctrine of unjust enrichment).     While it is true, as plaintiffs assert, that every circuitcourt judge has equitable powers (Chrysler Credit Corp. v. M.C.R.Leasing Co., 114 Ill. App. 2d 43, 49, 251 N.E.2d 648 (1969)), andthat equitable relief is available even where a case is pendingin the Law Division (see Kaplan v. Keith, 60 Ill. App. 3d 804,809, 377 N.E.2d 279 (1978)), these observations merely underscorethe principle that the character or nature of the court and therelief available to a plaintiff are derived from the substance ofthe claim before it.  In other words, the availability ofequitable relief is not necessarily precluded merely because acase is proceeding in the Law Division, nor is equitable reliefautomatically awarded merely because a case is proceeding in theChancery Division.  Rather, and as already stated, it is thesubstance of the claim that determines the appropriate relief andthe nature of the court.  Here, the "substance" of the claim is abreach of contract, a classic action at law.  Eyman v. McDonoughDistrict Hospital, 245 Ill. App. 3d 394, 397, 613 N.E.2d 819(1993).  Thus, the court was not sitting in equity.     Significantly, Illinois courts have declined to apply therule governing equitable awards of prejudgment interest to casesat law, notwithstanding that an injured party who is eventuallycompensated may suffer detriment from the inability to use themoney from the date of loss to the date of compensation.  SeeWilson v. Cherry, 244 Ill. App. 3d 632, 636-40, 612 N.E.2d 953(1993) and cases cited therein.  See also Kerasotes v. Estate ofKerasotes, 238 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1030-32, 605 N.E.2d 643 (1992)(court was "sitting in equity" and could award prejudgmentinterest where former partner's action for equitable accountingand existence of fiduciary relationship among the partiesprovided a sufficient basis to invoke the equitable jurisdictionof the court).     Plaintiffs maintain nonetheless that Wernick need not beread so narrowly and that under Steward v. Yoder, 86 Ill. App. 3d223, 408 N.E.2d 55 (1980), Kozak v. Retirement Board of theFiremen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, 128 Ill. App. 3d678, 470 N.E.2d 1293 (1984), Cummings v. Beaton & Associates,Inc., 249 Ill. App. 3d 287, 618 N.E.2d 292 (1992), People ex rel.Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 148 Ill. 2d 348 (1992),and other decisions, the trial court properly exercised itsdiscretion.  However, none of the cases cited by plaintiffs opensthe door for an equitable award of prejudgment interest in anaction for breach of contract.     In Steward, a breach of contract case, this court reversedan equitable award of interest and applied the rule that"prejudgment interest is allowable only where it is so agreed bythe parties or where permitted by statute."  Steward, 86 Ill.App. 3d at 225.  We also observed that the element of bad conductnecessary for either a statutory or equitable award of interestwas not present.     Kozak involved an appeal by the Retirement Board of theFiremen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago from an order ofthe circuit court requiring the board to pay prejudgment intereston certain judgments for retroactive widows' annuity payments.  We affirmed an equitable award of interest, noting that suchawards are discretionary "in an equitable proceeding", and thatthe board deliberately concealed a change in statutoryconstruction from plaintiff.  Kozak, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 682.  In Finley v. Finley, 81 Ill. 2d 317, 331 (1980), on which the Kozakdecision is based, our supreme court held that because a divorceproceeding was in the nature of a chancery proceeding, it wouldbe governed by the rules applicable thereto, and an equitableaward of interest was appropriately assessed on past-due periodicsupport payments.  Thus, Kozak cannot be construed as authorityfor equitable awards of prejudgment interest in cases which arenot in the nature of an equitable proceeding.     In Cummings, we affirmed an award of prejudgment interest,under the interest statute, for breach of a settlement agreement,and rejected plaintiffs' claim that the prime rate, rather thanthe statutory rate, should apply.  Although we stated that, underWernick, there was "some merit" to plaintiffs' plea for thehigher interest rate, we ultimately distinguished the two cases. Unlike Wernick, the defendant in Cummings did not stand in afiduciary relationship to the plaintiff and the statutoryinterest award was not based on the vexatious delay provisions ofthe interest statute.      Finally, in Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Commission, oursupreme court affirmed an equitable award of prejudgment interestat prime on amounts the utility collected pursuant to illegalrates.  Our supreme court agreed with the circuit court thatEdison should not be allowed to "amass approximately threehundred million dollars of illegal rates over three years andthen repay it back at less than passbook rates."  Hartigan, 148Ill. 2d at 406.  In examining the refund order and the award ofinterest, our supreme court focused on the court's equitablepowers to fashion an appropriate remedy when none is providedunder the Public Utilities Act (Hartigan, 148 Ill. 2d at 393-98)and equity's goal of making the utility customers whole followingcollection of illegal rates (Hartigan, 148 Ill. 2d at 405-7). Plainly, the trial court here was not faced with the sameconsiderations.     At most, Steward, Kozak, Cummings, and Hartigan suggest thatsome element of bad conduct must be present before an equitableaward of prejudgment interest will be made, although Wernickmakes it clear that equitable awards of interest are notsanctions.  However, these cases cannot reasonably be construedas authority for an equitable award of prejudgment interest in acase for breach of contract.  We note that the Wernick opinion isframed in terms of the goal of "proceedings sounding in equity"and we decline to extend the court's rationale to cases soundingin law.  Thus, in the case sub judice, the trial court waswithout authority to enter an equitable award of prejudgmentinterest.  Accordingly, we need not consider whether the awardconstituted an abuse of discretion.  See Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d at87 (whether equitable circumstances exist which support anequitable award of interest is a matter within the sounddiscretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on reviewabsent an abuse of discretion).     We believe our decision also comports with the Interest Act(Act) which, inter alia, sets forth a limited number ofcircumstances in which, absent an agreement between the parties,interest will be allowed on moneys after they become due. 815ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 1994).  Section 2 of the Actspecifically provides for allowance of interest at the rate of 5%per annum "for all moneys after they become due on any ***instrument of writing."  815 ILCS 205/2 (West 1994).  A contractis an "instrument of writing" under the Act (Michigan AvenueNational Bank v. Evans, Inc., 176 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 1061, 531N.E.2d 872 (1988)) and the parties concede that the Act appliesto this breach of contract action.  However, interest will onlybe awarded under the Act where the amount due is fixed or easilycomputed.  Couch v. State Farm Insurance Co., 279 Ill. App. 3d1050, 1054, 666 N.E.2d 24 (1996); Bank of Chicago v. ParkNational Bank, 266 Ill. App. 3d 890, 900, 640 N.E.2d 1288 (1994). It would be a truly anomalous result if, having satisfied therequirements under the Act, a plaintiff suing on a writtencontract was awarded prejudgment interest at 5%, whereas aplaintiff who could not satisfy the statutory requirements couldnonetheless seek and receive an award of prejudgment interest andat a rate in excess of the statutory amount.  Similarly, the Actwould be rendered meaningless if a breach-of-contract plaintiffcould choose between statutory interest and equitable interest. For these further reasons, we believe that the trial court herewas without authority to make an equitable award of prejudgmentinterest.     We are mindful that, historically, prejudgment interest wasnot allowable at common law, and we are reluctant to expand theconcept beyond the narrow provisions of the Interest Act and whatone court has termed the "'equitable' safety valve" carved out byIllinois courts.  See Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 847F.2d 355, 361 (7th Cir. 1988).     Plaintiffs contend that an award of prejudgment interestneed not be limited by the provisions of the Interest Act, andthat Wernick permits the courts to apply the prime rate ratherthan the statutory rate.  See Cummings, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 319("Wernick does open the way for courts to apply the prime rate asa means of better compensating injured parties").  Wernick onlyprovides that where an equitable award of prejudgment interest isotherwise appropriate, the court need not look to the prejudgmentinterest statute to establish a sufficient rate.  Wernick doesnot provide authority to disregard the express provisions of theAct.  Thus, prejudgment interest on moneys due on an instrumentof writing is capped at 5%.  To the extent Cummings can be readto provide otherwise, we decline to follow it.  See First FederalSavings & Loan Association of Chicago v. Walker, 91 Ill. 2d 218,227 (1982) (a court of equity has no power to dispense with theplain requirements of a statute); 601 West 81st Street Corp. v.City of Chicago, 129 Ill. App. 3d 410, 418, 472 N.E.2d 827 (1984)("the equitable powers of a court may not be exercised to directa remedy in contradiction to the plain requirements of astatute").          As to the applicability of the Act to the circumstancespresent here, there is nothing in the record to suggest that thetrial court considered this matter.  Clearly, the court was notforeclosed from making an award of prejudgment interest under theAct, provided the statutory requirements are met.  We thereforeremand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings todetermine whether a statutory award of prejudgment interest isappropriate.     For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court'sdamages determination based on an August 1987 redemption, reversethe award of prejudgment interest, and remand the matter forfurther proceedings consistent with this ruling.     AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CAUSE REMANDED.     McNULTY, P.J., AND GORDON, J., concur.