COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

March 4, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2020AP212-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2018CF100

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

CHELSEA JO HOWELL,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Crawford County: 

LYNN M. RIDER, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Fitzpatrick, P.J., Graham, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2020AP212-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Chelsea Jo Howell appeals a judgment of 

conviction. Howell argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s 

guilty verdict for possession of methamphetamine. More specifically, Howell 

argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to reasonably infer that she 

possessed the methamphetamine knowingly, as is required for a finding of guilt. 

We affirm.

Background

¶2 The possession charge against Howell arose out of a traffic stop 

involving Howell and Howell’s friend, who was driving Howell’s vehicle. The 

police officer who conducted the stop testified at trial, and so did Howell.

¶3 The officer testified that, after initiating the stop and upon speaking 

with Howell’s friend, he could detect an odor of raw marijuana coming from the 

vehicle. Both Howell and her friend denied that there was a smell, and they also 

both denied that there was marijuana in the vehicle. The officer conducted a 

search of the vehicle and found a medical marijuana container in the center 

console that contained marijuana “shake.” Additionally, the officer found 

marijuana shake in the back of the vehicle. The officer called a “K9” officer to the 

scene, and the drug-sniffing dog provided a positive alert for the odor of narcotics 

in the vehicle.

¶4 Upon further search of the vehicle, the officer located a purse on the 

floor near the seat where Howell had been sitting. Inside the purse, the officer 

found two small plastic containers. He opened the containers and observed a 

white crystalized substance that was lining the inside. The amount was very small 

but enough for the officer to collect and conduct a field test on the substance. 

Based on his training and experience, the officer suspected the substance was 
No. 2020AP212-CR

3

indicative of crystal methamphetamine, and the field test yielded a positive result 

for the drug.

1

¶5 The officer questioned Howell about the containers in the purse. He 

asked what was in them, and Howell said she had “no idea.” He then asked what 

the containers would test positive for, and Howell said “I don’t know.” She told 

the officer that the purse was a new purse that she got from a friend or at a garage 

sale.

¶6 When Howell testified, she admitted that she had put the containers 

in her purse and that the story she told the officer about getting the purse at a 

garage sale was false. Howell testified that she “freaked ... out” when the officer 

informed her there were drugs in the containers and she “didn’t want to get 

anybody in trouble,” so she said the first thing that popped into her head.

¶7 Howell continued to maintain that she was unaware of any drugs in 

the containers, testifying that she thought they were empty. She testified that she 

found the containers in her vehicle after loaning the vehicle to her friend on a 

long-term basis. Howell stated that her friend had returned the vehicle earlier in 

the day on the same day they were stopped. She said that she found the containers 

while cleaning out the vehicle, and that she put them in her purse because she 

thought she could use them for medications. Howell stated that she did not open 

the containers, and that she believed they were empty based on shaking them.

 

1

 State Crime Lab testing later confirmed that the substance in the containers was 

positive for methamphetamine.
No. 2020AP212-CR

4

Discussion

¶8 An appellate court reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient to 

support a conviction “may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact 

unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, is so 

lacking in probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could 

have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 

493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). “If any possibility exists that the trier of fact 

could have drawn the appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to 

find the requisite guilt, an appellate court may not overturn a verdict even if it 

believes that the trier of fact should not have found guilt based on the evidence 

before it.” Id.

¶9 “[N]o minimum quantity of a controlled substance is necessary to 

sustain a conviction for possession.” Id. at 508. “However, to convict an 

individual of possession of a controlled substance, the state must prove not only 

that the defendant was in possession of a dangerous drug but also that the 

defendant knew or believed that he or she was.” Id.

¶10 Howell does not dispute that she was in possession of the 

methamphetamine in the containers. She contends only that the evidence was 

insufficient to show that she knew or believed that she was. Howell asserts that it 

was “undisputed” that she found the containers in her vehicle after loaning it to her 

friend, that she did not open the containers before placing them in her purse, and 

that she believed the containers were empty. Howell contends that the State failed 

to provide any evidence showing that she knew that the containers contained 

methamphetamine. We disagree.
No. 2020AP212-CR

5

¶11 “[K]nowledge or belief may be shown circumstantially by conduct, 

directly by admission, or indirectly by contradictory statements from which guilt 

may be inferred.” State v. Trimbell, 64 Wis. 2d 379, 384-85, 219 N.W.2d 369 

(1974). Similarly, as the jury was instructed, knowledge may be found “from the 

[d]efendant’s acts, words or statements, if any, and from all the facts and 

circumstances in this case bearing upon knowledge or belief.” See WIS JI—

CRIMINAL 6030.

¶12 Having considered the evidence here, we conclude that the jury 

could reasonably infer based on all of the facts and circumstances that Howell 

knew that she was in possession of methamphetamine. The containers were in 

Howell’s purse, and the officer’s testimony established that they contained a very 

small but readily observable amount of the drug. Further, Howell’s false story to 

the officer regarding her purse supported an inference of guilty knowledge 

regarding the contents of the containers inside. Given this evidence and the other 

evidence described, the jury could reasonably infer that Howell knew what was in 

the containers. The jury was free to reject Howell’s testimony to the contrary.2

¶13 Howell argues that, although her false story about her purse may 

support a permissible inference of guilty knowledge, the false story is insufficient 

standing alone to prove knowledge. She points to several cases as support for this 

argument. For example, the court in State v. Kreuser, 91 Wis. 2d 242, 280 

N.W.2d 270 (1979), stated:

 

2

 The parties dispute whether the facts here are more like the facts in State v. Poellinger, 

153 Wis. 2d 493, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990), in which a possession conviction was upheld, or 

instead more like the facts in Kabat v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 224, 251 N.W.2d 38 (1977), in which a 

possession conviction was overturned. We are not persuaded that the facts of Howell’s case are 

so similar to those in either Poellinger or Kabat as to make either case dispositive.
No. 2020AP212-CR

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[T]here is a permissible inference that the untruth of the 

defendant’s story as to how he acquired the vehicle shows 

his guilty knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. Edwards 

v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 249, 174 N.W.2d 269 (1970). To be 

sure, this negative inference will not carry the burden of 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt establishing the element 

of guilty knowledge. Peters v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 22, 233 

N.W.2d 420 (1975). However, it will support an inference 

of guilt in combination with other inferences drawn from 

other facts.

Id. at 249; see also Stewart v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 185, 194-95, 265 N.W.2d 489 

(1978) (fabrication of alibi did not support conviction without other proof of 

guilt); Edwards, 46 Wis. 2d at 252-53 (refusal to reveal to police how a vehicle 

was obtained did not, standing alone, provide sufficient proof of defendant’s 

knowledge that vehicle was stolen).

¶14 Relying on these cases, Howell argues that any negative inference 

the jury could draw from her false story regarding her purse is unsupported by 

other evidence. We disagree.

¶15 As we have explained, the jury heard other evidence to support a 

finding of knowledge, including the unrefuted evidence that the containers in 

Howell’s purse contained a visible amount of methamphetamine. Although the 

amount was very small, it was enough for the officer to visually identify and field 

test. Further, apart from Howell’s false story regarding her purse, the jury heard 

other evidence that bore on Howell’s credibility, including the officer’s testimony 

that he smelled and found marijuana in Howell’s vehicle while Howell denied the 

smell or presence of marijuana.

¶16 In sum, for the reasons stated above, we conclude that the evidence 

was sufficient to support Howell’s conviction.
No. 2020AP212-CR

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By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5. (2017-18).