IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 49103-6-II

Respondent,

v.

ROBERT DENGLER, JR., UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

JOHANSON, P.J. — Robert Dengler Jr. appeals his convictions for one count of third degree 

child rape and three counts of third degree child molestation.1 Dengler argues that his counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to argue for the admission of a witness’s testimony 

as extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement under ER 613. We hold that Dengler did 

not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm Dengler’s convictions. 

 

1 RCW 9A.44.079 and .089, respectively. 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

October 17, 2017
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FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

In 2014, 14-year-old TM2accused Dengler, TM’s 54-year-old uncle, of sexually abusing 

her while she lived in Dengler’s home between June and October. The State ultimately charged 

Dengler with one count of third degree child rape and three counts of third degree child 

molestation. 

II. TRIAL

A. STATE’S EVIDENCE

1. TM’S TESTIMONY

At trial, TM testified that between approximately 2004 and 2006, she lived with Dengler 

and his then-wife, Corrie Dengler.3 In June 2014, TM returned to live with Dengler. 

TM testified that Dengler sexually abused her “[a]bout every third night-ish” when she 

lived with him; she described four incidents in detail. 3 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 117. During 

the first incident, a “week or two” after TM moved in, Dengler inappropriately touched her, 

including penetration, while she was lying on a “recliner chair” in the living room. 3 RP at 107, 

108. TM detailed both the clothes that she and Dengler were wearing and that TM stood up and 

left the living room to “[go] to bed.” 3 RP at 114. Dengler told TM, “‘I don’t want to be that 

creepy uncle.’” 3 RP at 114. The second incident occurred when Dengler “cuddle[d]” in TM’s 

 

2 We use initials instead of names for victims of sex crimes to protect their privacy. Gen. Order 

2011-1 of Division II, The Use of Initials or Pseudonyms for Child Witnesses in Sex Crime Cases

(Wash. Ct. App.).

3 The Denglers were no longer married by the time of trial. 
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bed with her and touched her inappropriately. 3 RP at 118. The third incident occurred in October, 

when TM was preparing to leave for her homecoming dance. Dengler grabbed TM and said her 

dress made him “horny.” 3 RP at 125. 

The fourth incident that TM described occurred when Dengler carried TM from a futon in 

the living room to his bed, where he rubbed himself against her. TM could not recall all the details 

of the fourth incident because she had “tried to block [it] out.” 3 RP at 129. TM also described 

another incident in October, sometime before the fourth incident, when TM had asked Dengler to 

take her to a resort. Dengler agreed, and after booking rooms, Dengler said, “‘I want you as a 

daughter outside and I want you as a girlfriend in the room.’” 3 RP at 153. TM did not respond, 

angering Dengler, and he cancelled the reservation. 

The day after the fourth incident, TM disclosed the abuse to her boyfriend and Rhianna 

Wilson, a woman who lived with TM’s boyfriend, and the three made a plan to reveal the abuse 

to a school counselor the next day. TM claimed that Wilson told TM that the police would not 

“do anything” unless the abuse was “in the process of” happening. 3 RP at 136.

TM explained that she did not disclose the abuse earlier because she feared being put into 

foster care and because she “didn’t think anything would happen.” 3 RP at 141. TM testified that 

“[n]obody listens to me about anything” and that in “every case, nothing happens. . . . Nothing 

gets reported.” 3 RP at 163. TM also stated that she disclosed the abuse to one of her friends in 

July, hoping that the friend would help TM, but that “[n]othing” had happened. 3 RP at 171.

2. OTHER STATE’S WITNESSES’ TESTIMONY

Wilson recounted TM’s disclosures to her. TM had told Wilson that TM’s uncle “touched 

her inappropriately” and described three or four separate incidents. 3 RP at 200. Wilson contacted 
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both Child Protective Services and police; the police “indicated they could not take any action 

unless . . . [TM] was actively being abused.” 3 RP at 204.

Officer Ray Readwin testified that TM disclosed to him “general details” about Dengler 

sexually abusing her an unspecified number of times between June and October. 3 RP at 181. 

Officer Readwin opined that it was incorrect that the police would not respond to reports of sexual 

abuse unless the abuse was happening at the moment of the report. 

When Officer Readwin offered to bring TM to a hospital, she declined because she had 

taken a shower and “‘[t]here would be no evidence.’” 3 RP at 183. A subsequent examination by 

Nurse Michelle Breland revealed no injuries, which was inconclusive as to whether abuse had 

occurred. 

B. EVIDENCE OF PRIOR ALLEGATIONS AND SUICIDE ATTEMPT

1. PRETRIAL MOTIONS 

Before trial, the State moved to exclude evidence related to incidents that occurred before 

June 2014, namely any prior sexual abuse or activity of TM, TM’s suicide attempt, and TM’s prior 

accusations of sexual abuse against people other than Dengler. The State argued that this evidence 

was irrelevant and overly prejudicial and that evidence related to prior sexual abuse or activity or 

prior accusations of sexual abuse was inadmissible under the rape shield statute. Dengler opposed 

the State’s motion on the basis that he intended to call witnesses to testify that TM had made prior 

false accusations of sexual abuse against others and that such evidence was relevant and admissible 

under the rape shield statute. Dengler did not oppose the exclusion of evidence about the suicide 

attempt. 
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At the beginning of the trial, the trial court ruled that Dengler’s witnesses would not be 

allowed to testify about prior false accusations against third parties. But the trial court stated that 

it might allow Dengler’s witnesses to testify that TM had a reputation of being untruthful if Dengler 

made a sufficient offer of proof. The trial court ruled that it would not allow evidence of TM’s 

suicide attempt. 

2. OFFER OF PROOF

After the State rested, Dengler made an offer of proof regarding TM’s reputation for 

untruthfulness. Corrie4; Harry Tachell, Corrie’s father; and Joseph Dengler, TM’s father, testified 

outside the jury’s presence as to the basis of their knowledge of TM’s untruthful character. 

Corrie testified that she and Dengler had been TM’s foster parents between approximately 

2003 and 2007. After approximately 2007, when TM returned to live with her mother, Corrie 

intermittently spoke with or visited TM. Between 2008 and 2014, Corrie explained that two to 

three times a year, she would hear of allegations that TM or her sister had been molested by 

different people. Corrie estimated a total of nine or ten different prior accusations, all of which 

Corrie had believed and at least two of which had resulted in criminal proceedings. Corrie also 

mentioned that she and Dengler “had been under the assumption [TM] had attempted suicide 

before he got her.” 4 RP at 261.

In summer 2014, when TM lived with Dengler, Corrie resumed speaking with TM almost 

daily. TM told Corrie during one of their conversations that TM’s suicide attempt had been “a 

ploy to get out of” TM’s mother’s house. 4 RP at 265. TM also told Corrie that “every one of” 

 

4 We refer to Corrie Dengler by her first name to avoid confusion.
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the sexual abuse allegations had been a lie and that TM’s mother had “made the girls say these 

things because . . . they could get out of there.” 4 RP at 266. Although at one point Corrie said 

that TM admitted all the allegations were lies, Corrie also testified that TM told her two of the 

prior accusations had been true. 

Corrie cut off contact with TM in October, after TM disclosed that Dengler had abused 

her. In Corrie’s opinion, TM was “a liar,” and Corrie had warned Dengler “to be cautious” with 

TM because TM would “do what she will to get her way.” 4 RP at 267, 293. 

3. ER 608 RULING

After hearing Dengler’s offers of proof, the trial court ruled that neither Corrie, Tachell, 

nor TM’s father could testify about TM’s reputation for untruthfulness in the community under 

ER 608. However, the trial court discussed Corrie’s “credible” testimony about specific instances 

in which she learned that the prior accusations were false. 5 RP at 358. “[H]ad I understood the 

specificity of the offer of proof information,” the trial court stated, “I would have ruled that 

[defense counsel] was allowed, on cross-examination, to cross-examine [TM] about whether or 

not the facts as described by [Corrie] did or did not happen.” 5 RP at 358-59. The trial court ruled 

that Corrie would not be recalled no matter what TM said because ER 608 did not allow extrinsic 

evidence to be “prov[ed] up.”5 5 RP at 362. After discussing its concerns, the trial court adjourned 

the trial for the parties to brief the issue under ER 608. 

 

5 ER 608(a) allows evidence of a witness’s reputation for untruthfulness, but ER 608(b) generally 

bars the use of extrinsic evidence about specific instances of the witness’s conduct to attack a 

witness’s credibility. ER 608(b) does allow for cross-examination about specific instances of a 

witness’s conduct relevant to the witness’s credibility.
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When the trial court reconvened, the State argued that information that TM had falsified 

prior accusations of sexual assault was inadmissible and requested that if questioning of TM were 

allowed, it be limited so that the questions asked would not result in “back door” admission of the 

inadmissible evidence. Dengler replied that he should be allowed to “cross-examin[e TM] about 

prior false allegations that she made without the followup of impeachment by specific instances of 

conduct that we all agree is not allowed.” 6 RP at 392.

The trial court ruled that it would allow Dengler to recall TM as a witness and inquire about 

two matters raised by Corrie’s testimony: “the false suicide allegations”6and prior allegations of 

abuse. 6 RP at 392. The trial court determined that TM’s testimony that no one had believed her 

in the past when she made similar allegations opened the door to allow Dengler to ask whether 

TM had made prior allegations of “‘[i]nappropriate conduct.’”7 6 RP at 401. Dengler could ask 

about whether “[TM] shared any of the situations with [Corrie] and if [TM] ever told [Corrie] that 

some of those accusations were actually not true but done for another reason. . . . [I]f [TM] says, 

‘I don’t remember that; it didn’t happen,’ then so be it, and we’re done.” 6 RP at 393. In making 

its ruling, the trial court reemphasized that Corrie’s testimony was impermissible extrinsic 

evidence under ER 608 and would not be allowed. 

 

6 At first, the trial court ruled that Dengler had to refer to whether TM’s attempted suicide was 

false without using the word suicide, in light of a pretrial ruling to exclude references to “attempted 

. . . suicide.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 20. But the State withdrew its motion in limine to bar 

references to “attempted . . . suicide,” and the trial court then ruled that Dengler could refer to the 

matter using the word suicide. CP at 20.

7 The State argued that Dengler could ask whether TM made only prior false allegations. 
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C. DENGLER’S EVIDENCE

1. TM’S TESTIMONY

Dengler called TM as one of his witnesses. TM admitted that she had spoken to Corrie 

shortly after returning to Dengler’s home. When Dengler inquired about the prior suicide attempt 

and accusations, the following exchange occurred:

[Dengler:] [D]o you remember talking to [Corrie] about the suicide attempt?

[TM:] I don’t.

[Dengler:] Do you remember her asking about it?

. . . . 

[TM:] About why?

[Dengler:] Right. Whether it was actually a real suicide attempt or it was 

something faked?

[TM:] I don’t recall.

[Dengler:] Do you recall ever telling her that you had faked that suicide attempt 

in order to get out of your living arrangements?

[TM:] No, that is not true.

[Dengler:] Okay. All right. Do you remember, during your conversation with 

[Corrie], telling her about some of the prior assaults upon yourself 

by other people?

[TM:] Which one, which, like --

[Dengler:] Something prior to 2014, other incidents?

[TM:] No, I did not speak to her about that.

[Dengler:] Did you ever tell her that some of them were actually falsely made 

by yourself and some were true?

[TM:] That is incorrect.

[Dengler:] Okay. What did you tell her about that?

. . . . 

[TM:] I -- I didn’t tell her any -- anything about any previous of June.

[Dengler:] Okay. What did you tell her about the -- the suicide attempt? Did 

you tell her what you did or some facts about it?

[TM:] I guess. I don’t remember, so --

[Dengler:] That’s all the questions I have at this point.

6 RP at 408-09 (emphasis added). On cross-examination, TM confirmed that she had attempted 

to commit suicide in June, immediately before returning to Dengler’s home. TM stated that she 
No. 49103-6-II

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had never made any false allegations of sexual misconduct and that her suicide attempt was not 

staged. 

2. DENGLER’S TESTIMONY

Dengler denied ever sexually assaulting TM. He claimed that as punishment for TM lying 

about going to her boyfriend’s house, he had placed TM “on restriction” the day before she 

disclosed the abuse at school. Dengler also claimed that he allowed TM to book rooms at the 

resort but cancelled the reservations within minutes when he remembered that TM was “on 

restriction.” 6 RP at 484.

D. JURY’S VERDICT AND SENTENCING

The jury found Dengler guilty on all counts. Dengler was sentenced to concurrent 60-

month sentences on each count and 36 months on community custody. Dengler appeals. 

ANALYSIS

Dengler argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to argue 

that under ER 613(b), the false allegations against others and staged suicide attempt8testimony

was admissible. Dengler acknowledges that the trial court allowed Dengler to question TM about 

the prior allegations and the suicide attempt under ER 608 but argues that his counsel should have 

relied upon ER 613, so that extrinsic evidence—the false allegation and staged suicide attempt 

testimony—would have been allowed. We disagree.

 

8 Because Corrie would have testified that TM said she had staged her suicide attempt, we refer to 

Corrie’s proposed testimony as the “staged” suicide attempt testimony. At trial, TM denied that 

she had staged her attempted suicide. 
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I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which present mixed 

questions of law and fact. State v. Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870, 883, 204 P.3d 916 (2009). To prevail, 

the defendant must show that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency 

prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 

2d 674 (1984). If either prong of the test is not met, the defendant’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim fails and the inquiry ends. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

B. ER 613 AND ER 608

ER 613, related to witnesses’ prior statements, allows the admission of extrinsic evidence 

of a witness’s prior inconsistent statements in some circumstances. See ER 613(b). ER 613(b) 

states that 

[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible 

unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the 

opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the 

interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions 

of a party-opponent as defined in rule 801(d)(2).

ER 613(b) does not allow the admission of extrinsic evidence about a “collateral” matter. State v. 

Dickenson, 48 Wn. App. 457, 466-68, 740 P.2d 312 (1987). Extrinsic evidence allowed under ER 

613(b) is not probative of substantive facts but allowed solely for impeachment. State v. 

Clinkenbeard, 130 Wn. App. 552, 569, 123 P.3d 872 (2005).

ER 608, related to evidence of a witness’s character and conduct, allows a witness’s 

credibility to be attacked by reputation evidence referring to the witness’s character for truthfulness 

or untruthfulness. ER 608(a). Extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a witness’s conduct is 
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inadmissible to attack or support the witness’s credibility. ER 608(b). However, specific instances 

of a witness’s conduct may, 

if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross examination 

of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or 

untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of 

another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has 

testified.

ER 608(b).

C. COLLATERAL MATTERS

“For purposes of [ER 613], prior inconsistent statements are not collateral, and extrinsic 

evidence is therefore admissible, if the statements have as their subject, (1) facts relevant to the 

issues in the cause, or (2) facts which are themselves probable by extrinsic evidence to discredit 

the witness,” such as “bias, prejudice, or interest of the witness.” 5A KARL B. TEGLAND,

WASHINGTON PRACTICE: EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 613.11, at 597 (6th ed. 2016). The test 

for whether a matter is collateral is “[c]ould the fact upon which error is based have been brought 

into evidence for a purpose independent of the contradiction?” Dickenson, 48 Wn. App. at 468. 

Courts have held that evidence a rape victim has accused others is not relevant and is thus 

inadmissible unless the defendant demonstrates that the prior accusation against others was false. 

See State v. Demos, 94 Wn.2d 733, 735, 737, 619 P.2d 968 (1980); State v. Harris, 97 Wn. App. 

865, 872, 989 P.2d 553 (1999). 

II. ANALYSIS

Because it is not deficient performance to fail to make a motion that would be futile, 

Dengler must show that Corrie’s testimony about the false allegations and staged suicide attempt 

would have been admitted under ER 613(b) had Dengler’s attorney so argued. See State v. Denny, 
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173 Wn. App. 805, 811, 294 P.3d 862 (2013). To do so, Dengler must show that the trial court 

would not have ruled that the false allegation and staged suicide attempt testimony concerned a 

collateral matter.9 

Corrie would have testified that, contrary to TM’s trial testimony, TM had told Corrie that 

the suicide attempt was a ploy and that most of the prior allegations against others had been 

falsified. Dengler relies on his argument that the false allegation and staged suicide attempt 

testimony was relevant because it pertained to TM’s credibility. But a witness’s credibility is 

always in issue. ROBERT H. ARONSON & MAUREEN A. HOWARD, LAW OF EVIDENCE IN 

WASHINGTON § 7:06(2)(a) (5th ed. 2017). Dengler’s counsel had to do more than argue that the 

evidence was relevant because it pertained to credibility: he had to establish that the matter was 

not collateral. See Dickenson, 48 Wn. App. at 468. That is, the matter must have been able to be 

“brought into evidence for a purpose independent of the contradiction.” Dickenson, 48 Wn. App. 

at 468. Dengler fails to show that the false allegation and staged suicide attempt testimony was 

admissible under this test.

State v. Simonson is illustrative. See 82 Wn. App. 226, 234-35, 917 P.2d 599 (1996). In 

that case, the defendant was charged with child molestation and child rape and sought to introduce 

 

9 ER 613(b) requires that a foundation be laid for extrinsic evidence and that the extrinsic evidence 

actually be inconsistent with the witness’s trial testimony. Clinkenbeard, 130 Wn. App. at 569. 

TM was given an opportunity to explain or deny that she had said that the suicide attempt was 

staged and that the prior accusations were false, and the prosecutor cross-examined TM 

immediately after her testimony. TM denied both that she and Corrie discussed the suicide attempt 

or prior allegations and that she had said that the suicide attempt was staged or that the prior 

allegations were false. Thus, both the foundational and inconsistency requirements were satisfied 

and whether Corrie’s testimony would have been admitted rests upon whether the matter was 

collateral. See Dickenson, 48 Wn. App. at 467-68.
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a police officer’s testimony that the victim had told the officer that she and the defendant had 

penetrative intercourse multiple times per day. Simonson, 82 Wn. App. at 228, 231. The defendant 

contended that the officer’s testimony could be admitted under ER 613 to impeach the victim’s 

testimony that the defendant had molested her (without penetration) three times weekly. 

Simonson, 82 Wn. App. at 234-35. The court held that the officer’s testimony was inadmissible

on the molestation counts because the officer’s testimony did not relate to nonpenetrative sexual 

intercourse. Simonson, 82 Wn. App. at 235. The officer’s testimony showed “only a specific 

instance of conduct probative of untruthfulness,” which was “not . . . provable by extrinsic 

evidence.” Simonson, 82 Wn. App. at 235.

Here, TM testified that she had never stated that the prior accusations against others were 

false or that her suicide attempt was staged. If believed, Corrie’s testimony about the false 

allegations and staged suicide attempt would have contradicted TM by showing that TM had, in 

fact, told Corrie that the prior accusations were false and that her suicide attempt was staged. 

Although these inconsistencies did somewhat discredit TM, they did so as to a specific instance 

probative of untruthfulness and not by directly contradicting TM’s testimony accusing Dengler of 

raping and assaulting TM. As Simonson illustrates, Corrie’s testimony was therefore inadmissible 

because it was collateral. See 82 Wn. App. at 235. 

Further supporting the conclusion that Corrie’s testimony was inadmissible for a purpose 

independent of the contradiction is the rule expressed in Demos and Harris that evidence of prior 

accusations against others is irrelevant where the prior accusations are not demonstrated to be 

false. See Demos, 94 Wn.2d at 737; Harris, 97 Wn. App. at 872. Although showing that 

sometimes TM said that the allegations were false and sometimes that they were true, Corrie’s 
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testimony did not necessarily demonstrate that TM had falsified prior allegations, and thus Corrie’s 

testimony was not admissible.

Dengler argues that the false allegation and staged suicide attempt testimony would have 

been admitted because it was evidence of a motive to lie. It is true that evidence tending to show 

a motive to lie is not collateral and may be used to impeach. See State v. Roberts, 25 Wn. App. 

830, 834, 611 P.2d 1297 (1980); see also 5A TEGLAND,supra, § 613.11 (evidence is not collateral 

if it shows the witness’s “bias, prejudice, or interest”). But Dengler’s argument overlooks that 

evidence admitted under ER 613(b) “is not probative of the substantive facts encompassed by the 

evidence.” Clinkenbeard, 130 Wn. App. at 569. Under this rule, the false allegation and staged 

suicide attempt testimony would not have been admitted as proof that TM had, in fact, falsified 

accusations or staged her suicide attempt in order to leave her home and thus would not have 

established that TM had a motive to lie when she accused Dengler of abusing her. 

The false allegation and staged suicide attempt testimony could not have been admitted for 

a purpose independent of the contradiction and accordingly was collateral. See Dickenson, 48 Wn. 

App. at 468. Further, the false allegation and staged suicide attempt testimony did not establish a 

motive for TM to lie. For these reasons, a motion to admit Corrie’s testimony about the June 

conversation under ER 613(b) would have been futile.10 Dengler fails to establish that his counsel 

rendered deficient performance, and our inquiry ends. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

 

10 Because the right to present a defense does not include the right to present inadmissible evidence, 

we also reject Dengler’s cursory argument that his right to present a defense was violated. See 

State v. Aguirre, 168 Wn.2d 350, 363, 229 P.3d 669 (2010).
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We affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

JOHANSON, P.J.

We concur:

LEE, J.

MELNICK, J.