Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d. 571, 573 (1992), and the jury's verdict will not be 

disturbed on appeal where, as here, substantial evidence supports the 

verdict, see NRS 453.337; NRS 453.3385(3); Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 

73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981). 

Second, Bright argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial because the State claimed 

in its opening statement that Bright gave a fake name to law enforcement 

and no witness testified to such at trial. Bright is mistaken. Officer 

Anton Gorup testified that Bright gave his name as "Michael Harris" to 

either himself or another officer. Bright did not object and this testimony 

and was not stricken from the record. We conclude that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion by denying Bright's request for a mistrial on 

this ground. 1 See Rudin, 120 Nev. at 142-44, 86 P.3d at 586-87 (noting 

that a defendant's request for a mistrial may be granted where "prejudice 

occurs that prevents the defendant from receiving a fair trial," and giving 

deference to a district court's decision whether a mistrial is warranted). 

Third, Bright argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial because evidence was 

presented at trial that was not provided to the defense in violation of 

discovery orders and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We review a 

district court's resolution of a Brady claim de novo, Mazzan v. Warden, 116 

Nev. 48, 66, 993 P.2d 25, 36 (2000), and a district court's enforcement of 

'We note that the district court incorrectly used the "manifest 

necessity" or "manifest injustice" standard when ruling on Bright's 

multiple motions for mistrials. Nonetheless, we will affirm the district 

court's rulings if it reached the correct result. See Rudin v. State, 120 Nev. 

121, 142, 86 P.3d 572, 586 (2004). 

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discovery orders for an abuse of discretion, Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 

638, 28 P.3d 498, 518 (2001). Bright contends that the State failed to turn 

over an administrative subpoena which established that he owned a cell 

phone found at the scene. Because there is not a reasonable possibility 

that the verdict would have been different had the evidence been timely 

turned over, see Mazzan, 116 Nev. at 66, 67, 993 P.2d at 36, 37 

(summarizing the three components of a Brady violation), and Bright 

failed to demonstrate prejudice or that the State acted in bad faith, see 

Evans, 117 Nev. at 638, 28 P.3d at 518, we conclude that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion by denying Bright's motion for a mistrial on 

these grounds. See Rudin, 120 Nev. at 142, 86 P.3d at 586. 

Fourth, Bright argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial when the arresting police 

officer stated that a confidential informant identified the defendant. 2 

Bright contends that a mistrial was warranted because the statement was 

hearsay and he was unable to cross-examine the informant in violation of 

his right to confrontation. The district court concluded that a mistrial was 

not warranted because Bright opened the door to this testimony by asking 

questions regarding the confidential informant—even after being cautioned 

by the district court about doing so—and by asking the question which 

prompted the officer's response. We agree, and conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bright's request for a 

2To the extent that Bright contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his request to dismiss the charges against him 

outright, he fails to support this claim with any relevant authority or 

cogent argument and therefore we decline to consider it. See Maresca v. 

State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987). 

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' 

mistrial. See Rudin, 120 Nev. at 142, 86 P.3d at 586; see also United 

States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 733 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that "a 

defendant can open the door to the admission of evidence otherwise barred 

by the Confrontation Clause," and discussing cases). 

Fifth, Bright argues that cumulative error entitles him to 

relief. Because we have found no error, this claim lacks merit. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 3 

GHLYbons 

Dougl 

Saitta 

cc: Hon. Valorie J. Vega, District Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

3We note that appellant's fast track statement does not contain 

adequate citation to the appendix. See NRAP 3C(e)(1)(c). We caution 

appellant's counsel, Kedric A. Bassett, that future failure to comply with 

the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure when filing briefs with this court 

may result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n). 

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