NOTICE FILED 

This order was filed under Supreme December 3, 2019 2019 IL App (4th) 180243-U Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender 

as precedent by any party except in 4th District Appellate the limited circumstances allowed NO. 4-18-0243 

Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT 

OF ILLINOIS 

FOURTH DISTRICT 

DEDRIC T. MOORE, ) Appeal from 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of 

v. ) Sangamon County 

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, J.B. PRITZKER, ) No. 17MR27 

KWAME RAOUL, THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT ) 

OF CORRECTIONS, JOHN R. BALDWIN, and ) Honorable 

CIRCUIT COURT OF CHAMPAIGN, ) Esteban F. Sanchez, 

Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Steigmann and Harris concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER 

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court properly granted 

defendants’ motion to dismiss where plaintiff’s claims were barred by 

res judicata. 

¶ 2 In January 2017, plaintiff, Dedric T. Moore, filed a pro se complaint for 

declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of his resentencing hearing and 

resentence in Champaign County case No. 98-CF-1558, naming as defendants the State of 

Illinois, Kwame Raoul, the Illinois Department of Corrections, John R. Baldwin, the Circuit 

Court of Champaign County, and Bruce Rauner, then-governor of Illinois. (Because Rauner has 

been replaced in his official capacity by J.B. Pritzker, Pritzker has been substituted as defendant 

on appeal by operation of law (see 735 ILCS 5/2-1008(d) (West 2016))). 

¶ 3 In July 2017, defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the 

Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016)), where (1) plaintiff’s 
 

 

 

 

 

complaint failed to state a cause of action against any defendant, (2) plaintiff’s claims were 

barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, (3) plaintiff’s claims against the circuit court of 

Champaign County were barred because it is not an entity capable of being sued, and 

(4) plaintiff’s claims were barred by laches. In March 2018, the trial court granted defendants’ 

motion to dismiss. 

¶ 4 Plaintiff appeals, arguing the trial court erred by granting defendants’ motion to 

dismiss where (1) his complaint stated a cause of action against defendants, (2) his claims were 

not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel, (3) the circuit court of Champaign County is an 

entity capable of being sued, and (4) his claims were not barred by laches. For the following 

reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 6 In March 1999, a jury convicted plaintiff of (1) attempt (first degree murder) (720 

ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 1998)), (2) home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2) (West 1998)), 

(3) residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3 (West 1998)), (4) aggravated criminal sexual abuse 

(720 ILCS 5/12-16(a)(1) (West 1998)), and (5) aggravated arson (720 ILCS 5/20-1.1(a)(1) (West 

1998)). (Champaign County case No. 98-CF-1558). In May 1999, the trial court sentenced 

plaintiff to a total of 75 years’ imprisonment: a 60-year extended term for attempt (first degree 

murder), concurrent to a 60-year extended term for home invasion, concurrent to a 30-year 

sentence for aggravated arson, concurrent to a 7-year sentence for aggravated sexual abuse, and 

consecutive to a 15-year sentence for residential burglary. (Champaign County case No. 98-CF1558). 

¶ 7 A. Plaintiff’s Direct Appeal 

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¶ 8 Plaintiff appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing, in part, the trial court 

erred by imposing consecutive and extended-term sentences in violation of the United States 

Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (The Court held that 

any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory 

maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.). Specifically, 

plaintiff claimed that applying the consecutive and extended-term sentencing provisions of 730 

ILCS 5/5-8-4 (West 1998) and 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West 1998) to him violated his 

constitutional right to due process and violated his right to a jury trial by subjecting him to 

increased punishment without notice or a jury finding based upon proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt of the facts necessary for imposing the increased terms of imprisonment. 

¶ 9 In January 2002, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. People v. Moore, 

No. 4-99-0499 (January 11, 2002) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). In 

its decision, this court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 

269, 286, 752 N.E.2d 430, 441 (2001), found that consecutive sentencing does not violate 

Apprendi. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a petition for leave to appeal. In February 2003, the Illinois 

Supreme Court denied the petition but ordered this court to vacate the judgment and to 

reconsider in light of People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378, 392, 781 N.E.2d 292, 300 (2002). People 

v. Moore, 202 Ill. 2d 688, 783 N.E.2d 32 (2003) (supervisory order). 

¶ 10 Upon reconsideration, in April 2003, this court vacated plaintiff’s extended-term 

sentence as violating Apprendi and remanded for retrial or resentencing at the election of the 

State pursuant to section 5-5-3(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 

5/5-5-3(d) (West 2002)). People v. Moore, No. 4-99-0499 (April 4, 2003) (unpublished order 

under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). The State sought resentencing. In July 2003, the trial 

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court resentenced plaintiff to a total of 75 years’ imprisonment: 30 years for home invasion, 

consecutive to 30 years for aggravated arson, consecutive to 15 years for residential burglary, 

concurrent to 30 years for attempt (first degree murder), and concurrent to 7 years for aggravated 

criminal sexual abuse. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider which the court 

denied. 

¶ 11 In March 2005, plaintiff appealed his sentence arguing the trial court improperly 

increased his sentence by ordering formerly concurrent sentences to run consecutively. In 

September 2005, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. People v. Moore, No. 4-03-0790 

(September 26, 2005) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). Subsequently, 

plaintiff petitioned for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. In January 2006, the 

supreme court denied plaintiff’s petition. 

¶ 12 B. Plaintiff’s First Postconviction Petition 

¶ 13 In April 2002, while his first petition for leave to appeal was pending with the 

Illinois Supreme Court, plaintiff filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that he was denied 

effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. (Champaign County case No. 98-CF-1558). 

In May 2002, the trial court denied plaintiff’s petition finding that the claims plaintiff raised were 

“frivolous and patently without merit.” Plaintiff appealed. In December 2003, this court 

affirmed the trial court’s judgment. People v. Moore, No. 4-02-0523 (December 3, 2003) 

(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). Plaintiff petitioned for leave to 

appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court and in March 2004, the supreme court denied plaintiff’s 

petition for leave to appeal. 

¶ 14 C. Plaintiff’s Second Postconviction Petition 

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¶ 15 In July 2006, plaintiff filed a second pro se postconviction petition alleging 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel where counsel failed to argue that the 

victim’s injury did not satisfy the statutory criteria for imposing consecutive sentences under 

section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 2004). The trial court denied 

plaintiff’s petition finding it “frivolous, patently without merit and outrageous given the record in 

this case.” Specifically, the court stated, “since trial counsel and appellate counsel never argued 

against a position that the trial court didn’t take, they cannot be considered ineffective.” The 

court sentenced plaintiff pursuant to section 5-8-4(b) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) 

(West 2004). In August 2006, the court denied plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the denial of his 

postconviction petition. In January 2009, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 16 D. Plaintiff’s Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus 

¶ 17 In February 2007, plaintiff filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, arguing, in relevant part, that the 

imposition of consecutive sentences at resentencing improperly increased his sentence. In 

January 2008, the district court denied plaintiff’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Moore v. 

Hulick, 2008 WL 268793 (This court may take judicial notice of the district court order entered 

pursuant to Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Kmiecik, 2013 IL App (1st) 121700, ¶ 37, 992 N.E.2d 

125.). In May 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found there was 

no substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right and denied plaintiff’s certificate for 

appealability. In June 2008, the court issued its mandate. 

¶ 18 E. Current Proceedings 

¶ 19 In January 2017, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint for declaratory judgment and 

injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of his resentencing hearing and resentence in 

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Champaign County case No. 98-CF-1558. Specifically, plaintiff (1) requested the trial court 

declare section 5-8-4(b) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 2004)), 

unconstitutional as applied to him and vacate his sentence and (2) claimed he was denied 

effective assistance of counsel at his resentencing hearing. 

¶ 20 In July 2017, defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the 

Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016)), where (1) plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a cause of 

action against any defendant, (2) plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata and collateral 

estoppel, (3) plaintiff’s claims against the circuit court of Champaign County were barred 

because it is not an entity capable of being sued, and (4) plaintiff’s claims were barred by laches. 

In March 2018, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

¶ 21 This appeal followed. 

¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 23 On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred by granting defendants’ motion to 

dismiss where (1) his complaint stated a cause of action against defendants, (2) his claims were 

not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel, (3) the circuit court of Champaign County was 

an entity capable of being sued, and (4) his claims were not barred by laches. As we find the 

issue dispositive, we turn to whether plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata. 

¶ 24 Defendants argue the trial court properly granted their motion to dismiss where 

plaintiff’s claims were all based on the same events involved in plaintiff’s previous actions and 

thus barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff argues res judicata does not apply because 

at no time was plaintiff a party to any actions that resulted in a final judgment relating to the 

constitutionality of section 5-8-4(b) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 2004)). 

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Orders dismissing an action pursuant to section 2-615 or section 2-619 of the Code are reviewed 

de novo. Thurman v. Champaign Park District, 2011 IL App (4th) 101024, ¶ 7, 960 N.E.2d 18. 

¶ 25 “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a 

court of competent jurisdiction acts as a bar to a subsequent suit between the parties involving 

the same cause of action.” River Park, Inc. v. Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 302, 703 N.E.2d 

883, 889 (1998). “ ʻThe purpose of res judicata is to promote judicial economy by requiring 

parties to litigate, in one case, all rights arising out of the same set of operative facts and also [to] 

prevent[ ] the unjust burden that would result if a party could be forced to relitigate what is 

essentially the same case.ʼ ” Id. at 319 (quoting Henstein v. Buschbach, 248 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 

1015-16, 618 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (1993)). 

¶ 26 It is well established that res judicata bars not only matters that were decided in 

the first action, but all matters that could have been decided in that action. Id. at 302. “For the 

doctrine of res judicata to apply, the following three requirements must be satisfied: (1) there 

was a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) there is an 

identity of cause of action, and (3) there is an identity of parties or their privies.” Id. (citing 

Downing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 162 Ill. 2d 70, 73-74, 642 N.E.2d 456, 458 (1994)). We 

analyze the three requirements below. 

¶ 27 First, we analyze whether a final judgment on the merits was entered in plaintiff’s 

prior cases. A judgment is final when it terminates the litigation and fixes absolutely the rights 

of the parties, leaving only enforcement of the judgment. A & R Janitorial v. Pepper 

Construction Co., 2018 IL 123220, ¶ 17, 124 N.E.3d 962. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 273 

provides: 

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“Unless the order of dismissal or a statute of this State otherwise 

specifies, an involuntary dismissal of an action, other than a 

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure 

to join an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the 

merits.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 273 (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). 

¶ 28 A final judgment on the merits was entered in plaintiff’s criminal case. 

(Champaign County case No. 98-CF-1558). In July 2003, the trial court resentenced plaintiff to 

75 years’ imprisonment. Plaintiff appealed and in September 2005, this court affirmed the trial 

court’s judgment. People v. Moore, No. 4-03-0790 (September 26, 2005) (unpublished order 

under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). In January 2006, the Illinois Supreme Court denied 

plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal. 

¶ 29 A final judgment on the merits was entered in plaintiff’s postconviction 

proceedings. A dismissal of a postconviction petition as frivolous or patently without merit is a 

final judgment. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2016). In plaintiff’s first postconviction 

petition, the trial court denied plaintiff’s petition finding the claims raised were “frivolous and 

patently without merit.” In December 2003, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 

People v. Moore, No. 4-02-0523 (December 3, 2003) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 23). In March 2004, the Illinois Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s petition for leave 

to appeal. 

¶ 30 In plaintiff’s second postconviction petition, the trial court again denied plaintiff’s 

petition finding it “frivolous, patently without merit and outrageous given the record in this 

case.” In January 2009, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 

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¶ 31 A final judgment on the merits was also entered in plaintiff’s federal 

habeas corpus case. Moore v. Hulick, 2008 WL 268793. In January 2008, the district court 

denied plaintiff’s petition for habeas corpus. Plaintiff appealed and the Seventh Circuit found no 

substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right and denied plaintiff’s certificate for 

appealability. In June 2008, the court issued its mandate. Accordingly, we find the first 

requirement for applying res judicata was met where a final judgment on the merits was entered 

in plaintiff’s prior cases. 

¶ 32 Second, we analyze whether there is an identity of cause of action between 

plaintiff’s present cause of action and his causes of action in his prior cases. “A cause of action 

is defined by the facts which give a plaintiff a right to relief.” Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 

Ill. 2d 325, 338, 665 N.E.2d 1199, 1206 (1996). In determining whether actions are the same for 

res judicata purposes, Illinois courts apply the transactional test. River Park, Inc., 184 Ill. 2d at 

310-11. Under this approach, “separate claims will be considered the same cause of action for 

purposes of res judicata if they arise from a single group of operative facts, regardless of 

whether they assert different theories of relief.” Id. at 311. 

¶ 33 Plaintiff’s present cause of action is based on the same operative facts as 

plaintiff’s causes of action in his prior cases. Here, plaintiff claimed that his resentencing 

hearing and resentence in Champaign County case No. 98-CF-1558 was unconstitutional where 

(1) the trial court imposed consecutive sentences on him pursuant to section 5-8-4(b) of the 

Unified Code, in violation of his right to due process where it allowed the judge, instead of a 

jury, to find that the sentence was required to protect the public and allowed the judge to impose 

this sentence without giving proper notice and (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel 

at his resentencing hearing. 

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¶ 34 In his criminal case, plaintiff on direct appeal claimed that applying the 

consecutive and extended-term sentencing provisions of 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4 (West 1998) and 730 

ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West 1998) to him violated his constitutional right to due process and 

violated his right to a jury trial by subjecting him to increased punishment without notice or a 

jury finding based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the facts necessary for imposing the 

increased terms of imprisonment. (Champaign County case No. 98-CF-1558). After this court 

vacated and the trial court resentenced plaintiff, plaintiff appealed his resentence arguing the trial 

court improperly increased his sentence by ordering formerly concurrent sentences to run 

consecutively. 

¶ 35 In his second postconviction proceeding, plaintiff alleged ineffective assistance of 

trial and appellate counsel where counsel failed to argue that the victim’s injury did not satisfy 

the statutory criteria for imposing consecutive sentences under section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified 

Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 2004). Furthermore, in his federal habeas corpus case, 

plaintiff argued the imposition of consecutive sentences on resentencing improperly increased 

his sentence. 

¶ 36 We find plaintiff’s present cause of action is based on the same causes of action in 

plaintiff’s criminal case, postconviction proceedings, and federal habeas corpus case where the 

causes of action arise from the same core of operative facts. Like plaintiff’s prior cases, 

plaintiff’s present cause of action is related to plaintiff’s sentence in Champaign County case No. 

98-CF-1558. Accordingly, we find the second requirement for applying res judicata was met 

where there is an identity of cause of action between plaintiff’s present cause of action and his 

causes of action in his prior cases. 

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¶ 37 Third, we analyze whether there is an identity of parties or their privies between 

plaintiff’s present case and his prior cases. In deciding whether parties are identical or in privity, 

the nominal identity of the parties does not control. People ex rel. Burris v. Progressive Land 

Developers, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 285, 296, 602 N.E.2d 820, 825-26 (1992). Rather, it is the identity 

of interests that is determinative. Id. Privity is said to exist between parties who adequately 

represent the same legal interests. Id. 

¶ 38 Plaintiff is a party to the present case and to all prior cases. While defendants 

were not parties in plaintiff’s prior cases, they are in privity with the State of Illinois from 

plaintiff’s criminal case and postconviction proceedings and the warden from plaintiff’s federal 

habeas corpus case where they all maintain the same legal interests. As we stated above, the 

cause of action in the present case mirrors the causes of action in plaintiff’s prior cases, thus the 

parties in the present case and the parties in the prior cases interests are substantially aligned. 

¶ 39 Accordingly, because the third requirement was met, we find plaintiff’s claims are 

barred by res judicata. Therefore, the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 41 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 42 Affirmed. 

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