COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00378-CV

DAVID J. KANTNER AND WIFE, 

SHERI K. KANTNER, JON D. 

MATHE, DAVID MOORE, AND

WIFE, SYLVIA MOORE, AND

MICHAEL MORRIS AND WIFE, KIM 

MORRIS

APPELLANTS

V.

CHESAPEAKE ENERGY 

CORPORATION AND

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, 

LLC

APPELLEES

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FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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NO. 02-11-00379-CV

BRENT MUSSELMAN AND WIFE, 

TERRI MUSSELMAN, JAMIE R. 

OLDHAM AND WIFE, JENEE L. 

OLDHAM, TOMMY D. OSBORNE

AND WIFE, LORI M. OSBORNE, 

AND MARK DEVEN PITT AND

APPELLANTS
2

WIFE, KRISTIN E. PITT

V.

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, 

LLC AND CHESAPEAKE ENERGY 

CORPORATION

APPELLEES

------------

FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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NO. 02-11-00380-CV

FRANCOIS PELLETIER AND WIFE, 

DARIE BERUBE, BILL J. RALSTON 

AND WIFE, MADALYN M. 

RALSTON, JOSEPH A. SIMON AND

WIFE, KAY L. SIMON,1 AND MARC 

G. WILSON AND WIFE, ROSE M. 

WILSON

APPELLANTS

V.

CHESAPEAKE ENERGY 

CORPORATION AND

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, 

LLC

APPELLEES

 

1Kay L. Simon was named as an appellant in the notice of appeal, but she 

had previously nonsuited her claims against Appellees. Therefore, we dismiss 

her appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Motor Vehicle Board of the Tex. Dep't of 

Transp. v. El Paso Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass'n, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 108, 110 (Tex.

1999); Preston v. Am. Eagle Ins. Co., 948 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

1997, no writ).
3

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FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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NO. 02-11-00381-CV

WARDELL HAMILTON, SR. AND

WIFE, DIANE HAMILTON; 

BARBARA A. HARRIS; REBECCA 

HERNANDEZ; WILLIAM D. 

KOLODZIE AND WIFE, MARY M. 

KOLODZIE

APPELLANTS

V.

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, 

LLC AND CHESAPEAKE ENERGY 

CORPORATION

APPELLEES

------------

FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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NO. 02-11-00382-CV

MATTHEW PLATTS, G.L. POTTS 

AND WIFE, JENNIFER POTTS, 

DEAN A. SCHUERMAN AND WIFE, 

GINGER C. SCHUERMAN, AND

JOHN G. WOODS

APPELLANTS

V.

CHESAPEAKE ENERGY 

CORPORATION AND

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, 

LLC

APPELLEES
4

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FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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NO. 02-11-00383-CV

JAMES M. REAVES AND WIFE, 

TERRI E. REAVES; MARK C. 

RICHMOND AND WIFE, DEBRA M. 

RICHMOND; AND CALVIN R. 

WASHINGTON AND WIFE, 

MAYRION A. WASHINGTON

APPELLANTS

V.

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, 

LLC AND CHESAPEAKE ENERGY 

CORPORATION

APPELLEES

------------

FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

------------

NO. 02-11-00384-CV

HOWARD L. EASTER AND WIFE, 

GLENDA K. EASTER, GARY L. 

ELLIOTT AND WIFE, KAYE T. 

ELLIOTT, JERRY D. FUSELIER 

AND WIFE, RHONDA M. 

FUSELIER, AND DAVID G. 

GARDNER AND WIFE, DONNA 

GARDNER

APPELLANTS

V.
5

CHESAPEAKE ENERGY 

CORPORATION AND

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, 

LLC

APPELLEES

------------

FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

------------

NO. 02-11-00385-CV

JERRY L. SIMMANK, JR.; 

RICHARD D. WILSON AND WIFE, 

MARY D. WILSON; AND CARL E. 

YOUNGBLOOD AND WIFE, 

JENNIFER M. YOUNGBLOOD

APPELLANTS

V.

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, 

LLC AND CHESAPEAKE ENERGY 

CORPORATION

APPELLEES

------------

FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

------------

NO. 02-11-00386-CV

DAVID D. DEES AND WIFE, 

SARAH M. DEES, JOHN ROBERT 

GRANT AND WIFE, BRENDA J. 

GRANT, ROBBIE GRIGGS, JR. 

AND WIFE JANICE T. GRIGGS, 

AND THOMAS CHARLES 

APPELLANTS
6

HASENBECK AND WIFE MARY 

JOHNSON HASENBECK

V.

CHESAPEAKE ENERGY 

CORPORATION AND

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION,

LLC

APPELLEES

------------

FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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NO. 02-11-00387-CV

JOHN C. BRIGHT AND WIFE 

HEATHER M. BRIGHT; LANDON G. 

COX, JR. AND WIFE, PATRICIA M. 

COX; MERAL O. CRAWFORD; 

FREDERICK EARL DAVIS AND

WIFE, ELLEN J. DAVIS

APPELLANTS

V.

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, 

LLC AND CHESAPEAKE ENERGY 

CORPORATION

APPELLEES

------------

FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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NO. 02-11-00388-CV
7

RIC A. ALEXANDER AND WIFE, 

JILL R. ALEXANDER, ELAINE 

ANDERS, FRANK ANDREWS AND

WIFE, LYNDA L. ANDREWS, 

MURIEL B. BROOKS AUTHER, 

DALE C. BAKER AND WIFE, SHARI 

D. BAKER, DANNY E. BRAWNER 

AND WIFE, MARY ALICE 

BRAWNER, MELISSA LOU

BROWN, SAM O. BRUCE, DAVID 

E. BRYANT AND WIFE, JANET L. 

BRYANT, JERRY ALLEN BURNS 

AND WIFE, ELAYNE RENEE 

BURNS, LIONEL H. CANTU AND

PAULA A. CANTU, DAVID NATHAN 

CHERNOW AND WIFE, TANYA E. 

CHERNOW, BRYAN B. CORNISH 

AND WIFE, CHERYL A. CORNISH, 

JOHN D. COSTA AND WIFE, JULIE 

A. COSTA, TANYA HYNSON 

CROCKETT, DWAYNE DANIEL 

AND WIFE, SHAWNA DANIEL, 

RICHARD B. DARMON, JR. AND

WIFE, CYNTHIA L. DARMON, 

DANIEL G. DARWIN AND WIFE, 

GAYLE E. DARWIN, SALAM H. 

DAVID AND WIFE, WADDELL 

DAVID, JAMES HENRY DONOVAN 

AND WIFE, CAROL ANNETTE 

DONOVAN, THOMAS J. DUCOTE 

AND WIFE, MITZI T. DUCOTE, 

DAVID GEORGE DUMAN AND

WIFE, ANDREA JANE DUMAN, 

GAYLE T. EUBANKS, DOUGLAS 

FORD AND WIFE, DELOIS FORD, 

RICKY D. FREE AND WIFE, 

SHARON D. FREE, CASEY L. 

GLENDENNING AND WIFE, 

SUSAN S. GLENDENNING, 

MICHAEL C. HABBESTAD AND

WIFE, SHAWNETTE C. 

HABBESTAD, MICHAEL HALL AND

WIFE, SADIE HALL, JOHN TODD 

APPELLANTS
8

HAWKINS AND WIFE, SHANNON 

K. HAWKINS, EDWIN C. HELLER 

AND WIFE, DONNA L. HELLER, 

MICHAEL EUWANE HELM,

RANDALL S. HENDRICKSEN AND

WIFE, LISA L. HENDRICKSEN, 

BILLY JACK HINDS AND WIFE, 

FAYE HINDS, JAMES R. HUNT, III 

AND WIFE, DENISE S. HUNT, 

RICKY HUTTO AND WIFE, DEBRA 

HUTTO, JOHN H. JACOBSON AND

WIFE, MARY E. JACOBSON, TIM 

JOHNS AND WIFE, BRENDA 

JOHNS, PAUL MARCUS JONES 

AND WIFE, CAROLYN MARY 

JONES, AND THE LURA JONES 

TRUST

V.

CHESAPEAKE ENERGY 

CORPORATION AND

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, 

LLC

APPELLEES

------------

FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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NO. 02-11-00389-CV

PHILIP R. KASTNER AND WIFE, 

LAURA H. KASTNER; PATRICK 

LANG; ARTHUR L. LAXSON AND

WIFE, SANDRA L. LAXSON; LEOLA 

SHARONA LEWIS; TIMOTHY 

LYNCH AND WIFE, RENETTE 

LYNCH; STEVEN L. MADSEN AND

WIFE, LAURA E. MADSEN; 

APPELLANTS
9

CHARLES MARMOLEJO AND

WIFE, ROSA VELIA MARMOLEJO; 

JASON R. MENDOZA; STEPHEN 

MICHLER; MARVEL BROWN; 

DAVID ALAN NIXON AND WIFE, 

DEBORAH NIXON; JEFFREY RAY 

OAKLEY AND WIFE, TARA ANN 

OAKLEY; TIMOTHY J. O’REILLY 

AND WIFE, MELISSA K. O’REILLY; 

LARRY W. PERMANN AND WIFE, 

GERTRUDE M. PERMANN;

WILLIAM DAVID PHILLIPS AND 

WIFE, CYNTHIA M. PHILLIPS; 

DAVID ALAN RAMSEY AND WIFE, 

DEBRA LYNN RAMSEY; JAMES S. 

ROLLER, JR. AND WIFE, ROBIN L.

ROLLER; FOUAD SAADE AND 

WIFE, SANDRES GHANTOUS; 

RAJA SAADE AND WIFE, GUITTA 

SAADE; NOUHAD SAADE; RANDY 

SEYLER; JOHN EDWARD SHAW 

AND WIFE, MELISSA WHORTON 

SHAW; MICHAEL P. SHERMAN 

AND WIFE, MELISSA D.

SHERMAN; MARK A. SMITH AND 

WIFE, ELLA L. SMITH; JERRY 

WAYNE SMITH AND WIFE,

CATHERINE HOUSE SMITH; 

WILLIAM J. STONE AND WIFE, 

ALICE B. STONE; ARLY SURPRIS 

AND WIFE, PASCALE BARLATIERSURPIS; STEVEN R. TATE AND 

WIFE, DEONNAH S. TATE; 

RONALD C. TAYLOR AND WIFE, 

TERRI S. TAYLOR; RONALD L. 

TOVSEN AND WIFE, MARTHA J. 

TOVSEN; RICK TOWNZEN AND 

WIFE, LEE ANNE TOWNZEN; 

RICKY L. TRUITT AND WIFE, 

CYNTHIA A. TRUITT; MICHAEL R. 

UNDERHILL AND WIFE, VICKY L. 

UNDERHILL; KEN L. VAUGHAN 

AND WIFE, PHYLLIS A. VAUGHAN; 
10

ROBERT J. WALKER AND WIFE, 

KERRY E. WALKER; ALEX D. 

WAYNE AND WIFE, KAREN L. 

WAYNE; RICHARD A. WEBER AND 

WIFE, DENISE A. WEBER; MARC 

D. WHITE AND WIFE, REIGH E. 

WHITE; ARTHUR W. WIKOFF AND 

WIFE, GLORIA A. WIKOFF; AND 

BRIAN J. WRIGHT

V.

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, 

LLC AND CHESAPEAKE ENERGY 

CORPORATION

APPELLEES

------------

FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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NO. 02-11-00390-CV

SAMUEL V. ALLEN, JR. AND WIFE, 

CIGNORAY M. ALLEN, JEFFERY L. 

BRANDON AND WIFE, BRENDA T. 

BRANDON, BRYAN THOMAS 

HILGARDNER AND WIFE, 

THERESA SUE HILGARDNER, 

JOSE E. RAMOS, SR. AND WIFE, 

BETTY J. RAMOS, JAMES M. 

WILSON AND WIFE, TANYA L. 

WILSON, AND CURTIS EUGENE 

WOOD

APPELLANTS

V.
11

CHESAPEAKE ENERGY 

CORPORATION AND

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, 

LLC

APPELLEES

------------

FROM THE 67TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION2

------------

Appellants are owners of property in the Deer Creek Estates addition to 

the City of Crowley, Texas who possessed unleased mineral interests in their 

property. In 2007 or early 2008, to facilitate the negotiation of natural gas and 

mineral leases en masse for Deer Creek Estates residents, a Deer Creek Estates 

Residents Oil & Gas Lease Committee (the Committee) was formed. Appellants 

argue that eventually, a contract was negotiated between the Committee and 

Appellees Chesapeake Energy Corporation and Chesapeake Exploration, LLC 

(collectively, Chesapeake). Appellants claim that two documents form the 

contract between the Committee and Chesapeake: the Supplemental 

Agreement Regarding Gas Lease3and the “form lease.”4 Appellants concede 

 

2See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

3

The Supplemental Agreement Regarding Gas Lease is a six-paragraph 

document signed by Chesapeake and by Matthew B. Platts as “committee 

member” for the Committee.
12

that the Committee had no authority to bind any Appellant to the terms of the 

form lease; the form lease acknowledges that no Appellant is required to sign the 

form lease and provides that each Appellant has the right to negotiate his or her 

own lease terms. No Appellant signed a lease with Chesapeake. Based on the 

downturn in the economy, Chesapeake decided to not go forward with leasing 

minerals in the Deer Creek Estates neighborhood.

Appellants sued. Appellants’ suit claimed that Chesapeake breached the 

contract5that purportedly existed between the Committee and Chesapeake by 

not offering to each Appellant a mineral lease containing the form lease terms––a 

$27,000 per net mineral acre signing bonus, a 25.25% royalty, a three-year term 

with no renewal option, and the signing bonus to be paid by a thirty-day bank 

draft delivered at the time of signing. In their suit, Appellants sought 

Chesapeake’s specific performance of the unexecuted form leases for each 

Appellant.

Concerning their breach of contract claims, Appellants acknowledge that 

they did not execute the Supplemental Agreement Regarding Gas Lease or 

 

4

The “form lease” is a template; it contains blanks for the date of execution, 

for the name of the Lessor, for the address of the property, for the gross acreage, 

and for the signatures of the parties.

5Appellants asserted other causes of action against Chesapeake as well, 

and the trial court granted summary judgment for Chesapeake on all of 

Appellants’ claims. On appeal, Appellants challenge only the summary judgment 

granted on their breach of contract claims; thus we need not, and do not, address 

the trial court’s summary judgments on Appellants’ other claims.
13

execute any form lease. Appellants nonetheless claim that they possess 

standing to sue Chesapeake for breach of contract because they are intended 

third-party beneficiaries of the purported contract between the Committee and 

Chesapeake. The trial court granted Chesapeake’s no-evidence and traditional 

motions for summary judgment against all Appellants. One of the grounds on 

which the trial court granted summary judgment for Chesapeake on Appellants’ 

breach of contract claims was that no summary judgment evidence existed that 

Appellants are third-party beneficiaries of any agreement between the Committee 

and Chesapeake.

Appellants raise six issues in their appeal challenging the summary 

judgment granted for Chesapeake on their breach of contract claims. For 

purposes of our opinion, we assume that the Supplemental Agreement 

Regarding Gas Lease and the form lease together constitute a contract between 

the Committee and Chesapeake. We therefore need not address Appellants’ 

first and second issues, including the six subissues set forth in Appellants’ 

second issue, arguing the existence of the contract. See Tex. R. App. 47.1 

(requiring appellate court to address only issues necessary to the disposition of 

the appeal). Additionally, for purposes of our opinion, we will consider the 

affidavits of Appellants’ expert registered professional land surveyors, so we 

need not address Appellants’ third issue claiming that the trial court erred by 

sustaining objections to these experts’ affidavits. Because we ultimately hold, as 

set forth below, that Appellants lack standing to assert breach of contract claims 
14

against Chesapeake, we also need not address their fifth and sixth issues 

concerning the statute of frauds. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S.,

858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993) (recognizing that appellate court must affirm 

summary judgment if any ground for summary judgment specifically found by the 

trial court supports summary judgment).

Our disposition of these appeals is controlled by Maddox v. Vantage 

Energy LLC, No. 02-11-00210-CV, 2012 WL 407269 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 

Feb. 9, 2012, pet. filed).6 In Maddox, we held under very similar facts that,

although a nonprofit, unincorporated association named Southwest Fort Worth 

Alliance, or SFWA, negotiated an agreement with Vantage Energy concerning a 

template uniform oil and gas lease to be used by Vantage for any leases it 

obtained in the SFWA neighborhoods, the purported contract between Vantage 

and SFWA did not identify any third-party beneficiaries with sufficient specificity 

to confer third-party-beneficiary status. 2012 WL 407269, at *3–4. We also held 

that, even if the purported contract between Vantage and SFWA could be 

construed as sufficiently identifying third-party beneficiaries, any such 

beneficiaries nonetheless failed to qualify as third-party beneficiaries because 

they were neither creditor beneficiaries nor donee beneficiaries. Id. at *5. 

Consequently, in Maddox, we assumed the existence of a contract between 

 

6See also Eastern Express, LP v. XTO Energy, Inc., Nos. 02-10-00395-CV, 

02-10-00396-CV, 02-10-00397-CV, 2012 WL 1059080, at *3 (Tex. App.––Fort 

Worth Mar. 29, 2012, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (applying Maddox to similar facts).
15

SFWA and Vantage, held that the plaintiffs/appellants lacked third-partybeneficiary status and accordingly lacked standing to assert a breach of any 

SFWA/Vantage contract, and that plaintiffs/appellants’ breach-of-contract claims 

should be dismissed.

We assume for purposes of this opinion that a contract existed between 

the Committee and Chesapeake. Here, like in Maddox, Appellants are not 

parties to and did not sign the purported contract between the Committee and 

Chesapeake. Thus here, like in Maddox, Appellants may sue to enforce this 

purported contract only if they are third-party beneficiaries of it. See id. at *3–4. 

Here, like in Maddox, Appellants are not specifically named as third-party 

beneficiaries in the purported contract they seek to enforce. See id. 

Appellants are not identified by address, nor is any map attached to the 

purported contract that would identify Appellants by lot numbers or by addresses 

in Deer Creek Estates.7 No summary judgment evidence exists identifying which 

Deer Creek Estates property owners possessed unleased mineral interests; 

counsel conceded during oral argument that around twenty Deer Creek Estate 

property owners had leased their mineral interests. We pointed out in Maddox

that the property owners had not cited and we had not located any Texas case 

“supporting the proposition that persons who in a contract are unnamed, 

 

7Although the Supplemental Agreement Regarding Gas Lease purports to 

have a map attached to it, the parties concede that no map was attached when 

the document was executed, and the summary judgment record contains no 

such map attached to the Supplemental Agreement.
16

unidentified by address or by property description, and are unidentifiable by 

membership in a specifically defined, discrete, limited group can be intended by 

the contracting parties to be beneficiaries of that contract.” Id. at *4.8 Thus, we 

hold here, as we did in Maddox, that the purported contract between the 

Committee and Chesapeake does not sufficiently identify Appellants to enable 

them to attain third-party-beneficiary status.9 See Maddox, 2012 WL 407269, at 

*4.

To the extent that, by some stretch, the purported contract between the 

Committee and Chesapeake could be construed as specifically identifying these 

particular Appellants, the summary judgment evidence nonetheless conclusively 

 

8Appellants point to the case of Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dynex 

Commercial, Inc., 348 S.W.3d 894, 900–01 (Tex. 2011) as supporting this 

proposition. The factual distinctions between Basic Capital and the present facts 

are extensive. Perhaps most importantly, in Basic Capital, two real estate trusts 

were held to be intended third-party beneficiaries of loan agreements when the 

agreements provided that the lender would loan money to single asset, 

bankruptcy remote borrowing entities (SABREs) created for the benefit and 

protection of the lender and when the lender knew the SABREs were wholly 

owned by the two real estate trusts. Id. Here, the Committee is not a whollyowned subsidiary of Appellants and in fact lacked the authority to even bind any 

Appellant to the Supplemental Agreement Regarding Gas Lease or to any form 

lease. In short, unlike in Basic Capital where the agreement to loan money to the 

SABREs automatically benefited the owners of the SABREs––the two real estate 

trusts, here, the purported agreement between the Committee and Chesapeake 

does not automatically benefit Appellants; Appellants must determine their own 

lease terms and assign their mineral rights to Chesapeake.

9We have reviewed the affidavits of registered professional land surveyors 

W. Thad Murley, III and Douglas L. Authur. Each affidavit states that the 

surveyor can identify the boundaries of the individual residential lots within Deer 

Creek Estates. Nothing in those affidavits or the exhibits to those affidavits adds 

to the identifiability of Appellants in the alleged contract.
17

establishes that Appellants are not donee beneficiaries of any contract between 

the Committee and Chesapeake.10 Appellants’ position is that they are donee 

beneficiaries because Chesapeake’s offer to lease their minerals as set forth in 

the purported contract was a pure donation to them; Appellants’ counsel 

explained during oral argument his theory that the offer itself, apart from any 

acceptance by Appellants, “had value” and caused Appellants to attain donee

third-party-beneficiary status. But Appellants have cited no case law, and we 

have located none, supporting the proposition that an offer, absent any

acceptance of the offer, has value. Moreover, recovery of the value of the offer 

independent of any acceptance is not the relief Appellants seek; they seek 

specific performance by Chesapeake of the unexecuted form lease containing 

the provisions for a $27,000 per net mineral acre signing bonus, a 25.25% 

royalty, a three-year term with no renewal option, and the signing bonus to be 

paid by a thirty-day bank draft delivered at the time of signing. Thus, Appellants 

are not as a matter of law donee beneficiaries because the performance 

allegedly promised by Chesapeake that Appellants seek specific performance 

of––the offer and execution of a lease in accordance with the terms of the form 

lease––will, when rendered, not come as a pure donation but will be made in 

 

10Appellants’ brief makes no argument that Appellants are creditor 

beneficiaries of the purported contract between the Committee and Chesapeake; 

and during oral argument, Appellants’ counsel conceded that Appellants were not 

creditor beneficiaries, so we need not address Appellants’ creditor beneficiary 

status. Additionally, the affidavits of the two registered professional land 

surveyors have no impact on our donee beneficiary analysis.
18

exchange for the lease of Appellants’ mineral rights. See id. at *5.

The summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that Appellants 

are not third-party beneficiaries of any contract between the Committee and 

Chesapeake both because Appellants are not sufficiently identified to attain thirdparty-beneficiary status and because Appellants are not donee beneficiaries of 

any contract between the Committee and Chesapeake and do not claim to be 

creditor beneficiaries.

Having addressed Appellants’ fourth issue, the only issue necessary for 

the disposition of this appeal in light of our assumption that a contract existed 

between the Committee and Chesapeake and in light of our inclusion of 

Appellants’ expert surveyors’ reports in our review of the summary judgment 

evidence, we hold that Appellants lack standing to assert breach of contract 

claims against Chesapeake. We render judgment dismissing Appellants’ breach 

of contract claims against Chesapeake.

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE

PANEL: WALKER, MCCOY, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DELIVERED: May 10, 2012