[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-12093

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D.C. Docket No. 9:17-cv-80327-KAM

LORI ANN HUEBNER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

RIC BRADSHAW,

as Sheriff of Palm Beach County,

PETER MCDONOUGH,

both individually and in his official capacity, 

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(August 22, 2019)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

NEWSOM, Circuit Judge: 

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You can’t make this stuff up. We have hair-pulling, wrist-scratching, facepunching, and rock-throwing—all the makings of a good old-fashioned schoolyard 

scrap. But alas, the combatants in the fracas underlying this Fourth Amendment

case were grown-ups—sisters, in fact. Sheesh.

Sister No. 1, Lori Huebner, was arrested for simple battery following an 

altercation with Sister No. 2, Kathleen Dobin. Huebner later sued Deputy Peter 

McDonough, alleging that he violated her Fourth Amendment rights (1) by 

arresting her without probable cause—in particular, by relying on what she claims 

was untrustworthy information and by failing to conduct an adequate 

investigation—and (2) by using excessive force in the course of effectuating the 

arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to McDonough, and Huebner 

now appeals.

We hold that McDonough had ample probable cause to arrest Huebner—the 

underlying information indicating that she had battered her sister was credible and 

his investigation was sufficient—and that McDonough didn’t use excessive force 

in making the arrest.1

1 Huebner also brought state-law claims against both McDonough and Ric Bradshaw, the Sheriff 

of Palm Beach County. The district court granted summary judgment against her on those 

claims, as well. Huebner doesn’t challenge those rulings on appeal.

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I

A

The sad story underlying this appeal began when one of our two antagonists, 

Kathleen Dobin, dropped off her elderly mother at her sister Lori Huebner’s home 

in Palm Beach County, Florida. Just as Dobin was about to leave, she and 

Huebner got into a dispute, apparently over the specifics of their cancer-stricken 

mother’s last wishes.

2

 Dobin alleged that as she was pulling away, Huebner ran 

outside, reached into Dobin’s car, and “pulled her by the hair, punched her several 

times in her left cheek, and scratched her on the left wrist.” Dobin called 911; just 

11 minutes later, Huebner did the same. About half an hour after the fight, Deputy 

Yhon Gutierrez met Dobin down the street from Huebner’s house. He took 

Dobin’s statement, in which she alleged that Huebner had tried to attack her while 

she was inside her car—“pulling [her] hair” and “punching [her] in the face”—and 

that even Huebner’s husband got in on the action, coming out of his house to 

“throw[] rocks at [Dobin’s] car.” Roughly an hour after the 911 calls came in, 

Deputy Peter McDonough arrived to relieve Gutierrez. He examined Dobin for 

2 We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Huebner, the party against whom summary 

judgment was granted. See Cozzi v. City of Birmingham, 892 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2018), 

cert. denied sub nom., Thomas v. Cozzi, 139 S. Ct. 395 (2018) (mem.).

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scratches or other injuries but didn’t find any. Dobin’s car showed no signs of 

damage. 

McDonough then went to Huebner’s home, where her daughter answered the 

door. Huebner came to the door and identified herself, and McDonough placed her 

under arrest. Huebner said that she was the one who had called 911, that she had 

“a cut on [her] arm where [Dobin] scratched [her],” and that she had “two 

witnesses” to the incident with her sister—presumably her daughters. McDonough 

declined to speak with Huebner’s “witnesses”; instead, Huebner alleges, he

handcuffed her and “tried to pull [her] rings off [her] finger.” Throughout the 

arrest, Huebner says, she repeatedly complained that McDonough was hurting 

her—that the handcuffs were too tight, that her arms were pulled too far back, and 

that his efforts to remove her rings were painful.

3

McDonough initially took Huebner to a police sub-station, where he had to 

complete domestic-battery paperwork before he could transport her to the main 

detention center. Because the small sub-station didn’t have a place to hold 

arrestees, Huebner remained in the patrol car for what she says was between an 

hour and a half and two hours. McDonough explained to Huebner how to position 

herself in the car to minimize the discomfort caused by the handcuffs, but she 

3 McDonough contends that he removed Huebner’s rings as a courtesy so that he wouldn’t have 

to impound them at the jail. 

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declined because it too, she said, was uncomfortable. Although the record isn’t 

clear about exactly what happened next, we think we can fairly deduce that 

McDonough took Huebner from the sub-station to the central jail, where she was 

processed and then later released.

Huebner alleges that as a result of her arrest, she suffers from neck and

shoulder pain as well as and nerve damage. She has received epidural and 

cortisone shots for the pain, and her doctor attributes her injuries to her 

handcuffing.

B

Huebner brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that her arrest 

violated the Fourth Amendment in two respects. First, she asserted that 

McDonough arrested her without probable cause. In particular, she said, 

McDonough failed to conduct a reasonable investigation because he relied solely 

on her sister’s unreliable and uncorroborated statements and ignored exculpatory 

evidence. Second, and separately, Huebner alleged that McDonough used 

excessive force during the arrest by pulling her arms too far behind her back, 

cinching the cuffs too tight, and tugging on her fingers and arms to remove her 

rings. Huebner complains that she now has nerve damage that causes neck and

shoulder pain as well as numbness in her arms and fingers, all as a result of the 

cuffing.

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The district court granted summary judgment to McDonough on both counts. 

It concluded that McDonough had probable cause to believe that Huebner had 

committed simple battery, in violation of Florida Statute § 784.03(1)(a). The court 

explained that McDonough was entitled to rely on Dobin’s recitation of events and, 

further, that the absence of visible injury to Dobin’s body, which Huebner 

emphasized, didn’t prevent a probable-cause finding because Florida battery 

requires only a slight intentional touching—physical harm isn’t an element. 

Alternatively, the district court found that even if McDonough didn’t have actual 

probable cause, he at least had “arguable probable cause,” which entitled him to 

qualified immunity. 

The district court also held that the painful handcuffing that Huebner 

alleged, without more, didn’t amount to excessive force. In so holding, the court 

observed that McDonough’s cuffing technique was relatively common and 

accepted. 

Huebner appeals both rulings.

II

To receive qualified immunity, an officer bears the initial burden of 

establishing that he was acting within his discretionary authority. Vinyard v. 

Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). Once he does so, the plaintiff must 

show that qualified immunity isn’t appropriate. Id. To meet her burden, a plaintiff 

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must show both (1) that she suffered a violation of a constitutional right and (2) 

that the right she claims was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged 

misconduct. Id. (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), and Saucier v. Katz, 

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Neither party here disputes that McDonough was 

acting within his discretionary authority when he arrested Huebner, so we turn to 

the two-part test to determine whether qualified immunity is appropriate. See id. 

We may address the two parts in either order. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 

223, 242 (2009). Here, we begin—and find we can end—at step one, by asking 

whether Huebner has demonstrated that McDonough violated her Fourth 

Amendment rights.4

The Fourth Amendment, of course, protects against “unreasonable searches 

and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Huebner contends that her arrest—her 

“seizure”—was “unreasonable” in two respects. First, she says that McDonough 

arrested her without the necessary probable cause because he didn’t have 

reasonably trustworthy information indicating her guilt and because he failed to 

conduct an adequate investigation. Second, she complains that McDonough used 

excessive force in the course of effectuating the arrest. We will consider those 

contentions in turn.

4 We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Cozzi, 892 F.3d at 1293. 

Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and if McDonough is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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A

In order to make an arrest without a warrant, a police officer must have 

probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a crime. Beck v. Ohio, 379 

U.S. 89, 91 (1964). In Beck, the Supreme Court described the probable-cause 

inquiry as follows: whether, at the time of the arrest, “the facts and circumstances 

within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 

information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the 

petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.” Id. Probable cause 

exists when an arrest is “objectively reasonable under the totality of the 

circumstances.” Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting 

another source). 

Huebner contends that McDonough lacked probable cause to arrest her for 

two primary reasons: first, she says, he didn’t have reasonably trustworthy 

information; and second, he didn’t conduct an adequate investigation. Again, we’ll 

take Huebner’s arguments in order.

1

As already indicated, McDonough arrested Huebner for simple battery. In 

relevant part, Florida law defines battery as follows:

The offense of battery occurs when a person:

1. Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person 

against the will of the other; or

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2. Intentionally causes bodily harm to another person.

Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a) (2019). It doesn’t take much to commit battery under 

Florida law. As the statute’s plain text indicates—in particular, the first part of the 

first part of the disjunction—any unwanted “touch[]” will suffice. Id. The Florida 

Supreme Court has confirmed that “no matter how slight” the touching is, if it’s

intentional, that’s enough. Florida v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 218 (Fla. 2007). 

Physical injury, moreover, is not required—the battery “may be committed with 

only nominal contact.” Id. at 218–19. 

So, did McDonough have probable cause to arrest Huebner for simple 

battery? We think it clear that he did. To begin, McDonough had Dobin’s 911 call

identifying Huebner as her assailant, so at the very least he had reason to believe 

that this was a two-party tango. More importantly, McDonough had (twice over) 

Dobin’s sworn statement, in which she alleged that Huebner had “pull[ed] [her] 

hair” and “punch[ed] [her] in the face.” McDonough initially received the 

statement that Dobin had given to Deputy Gutierrez, who got to the scene first. 

And when McDonough arrived, he personally verified Dobin’s account with her. 

Dobin’s statement gave McDonough everything he needed—it clearly described 

(at the very least) an intentional unwanted touching. And indeed, Huebner seems 

to admit that Dobin’s statement was sufficient: “Based solely on Dobin’s sworn 

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statement,” she concedes in her brief to us, “McDonough may have had probable 

cause for the arrest ....”

Huebner says, though, that the probable cause that Dobin’s statement 

provided evaporated “once [McDonough] found no physical evidence” to 

corroborate it—no scratches, red marks, etc. We reject that contention for two 

reasons. First, as just explained, physical injury isn’t an element of Florida battery; 

a mere touching (of the sort that wouldn’t necessarily leave marks) will suffice. So 

as a matter of law, the absence of any evidence of such an injury isn’t particularly 

probative. Second, and moreover, given the particular allegations here—which 

comprised only hair-pulling, cheek-punching, and wrist-scratching—the absence of 

physical evidence was hardly surprising, especially given that McDonough didn’t 

see Huebner until an hour after the incident.

McDonough was “not required to forego arresting” Huebner “based on 

initially discovered facts showing probable cause simply because [Huebner] 

offered a different explanation.” Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1507 n.6 

(11th Cir. 1990); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 

(2018) (“[P]robable cause does not require officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent 

explanation for suspicious facts.”). Nor was McDonough “required to sift through 

conflicting evidence or resolve issues of credibility, so long as the totality of the 

circumstances present[ed] a sufficient basis for believing that an offense ha[d] been 

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committed.” Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2002), abrogated on 

other grounds by Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018). We 

think that the totality of the evidence here provided ample basis for concluding that 

Huebner had committed a battery as defined by Florida law.

* * *

Battery, we understand, will often be a he-said/she-said affair—or, as is the 

case here, she-said/she-said. And for that reason, one could perhaps make the case 

that police should exercise discretion not to arrest in circumstances like those 

presented by the sister-squabble between Huebner and Dobin. But that doesn’t 

mean that they violate the Constitution when they do so. McDonough had Dobin’s 

911 call, her sworn statement, and his own follow-up conversation with her. That 

was enough to give him probable cause to believe, at the very least, that Huebner 

had touched Dobin against her will. Cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 

318, 346–55 (2001) (recognizing that a police officer “at best[] exercise[ed] 

extremely poor judgment” when he arrested a woman for violating a fine-only 

seatbelt statute but nonetheless rejecting the woman’s Fourth Amendment 

challenge because her arrest was supported by probable cause). 

2

Huebner separately (but relatedly) argues that in the course of developing 

probable cause to arrest, McDonough failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. 

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Seemingly in an effort to set the constitutional baseline for investigational 

adequacy, Huebner relies principally on Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220

(11th Cir. 2004). Kingsland, though, is distinguishable. 

To call the facts of Kingsland jarring would be an understatement. The 

plaintiff there, Misty Kingsland, was involved in a car accident with an off-duty 

police officer, after which she climbed out of the wreck and “sat down in a pile of 

shattered glass.” Id. at 1223. Although a number of officers responded to the 

scene—ultimately as many as 20—none of them approached Kingsland for a full 

30 minutes, either to ask for her version of events or to inquire about her wellbeing. Id. When they finally did, Kingsland told the officers that she “had 

sustained injuries to her head” and “was dizzy and could not stand up.” Id. No 

one offered Kingsland any medical care—at the scene, or ever. Id. at 1223–25. 

Although one officer claimed to have detected an odor of cannabis emanating from 

Kingsland and her vehicle, nobody ever searched her truck, summoned drugsniffing dogs, or found any pot. Id. at 1223–24. When Kingsland (presumably 

still dizzy and sick) failed her field-sobriety tests, the officers put her in a cruiser 

and told her “that she was being transported to the hospital for treatment and more 

tests”; in fact, they took her into custody and drove her to “a DUI testing facility.” 

Id. at 1224. Once there, the officers administered multiple Breathalyzer tests, “all 

of which came back negative—with a 0.000% alcohol content.” Id. Notably—and 

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unsettlingly—in the face of the clean results, the officer completing paperwork 

asked a colleague “what he should then write.” Id. Told to shift the focus back to 

marijuana—“to write that Kingsland had a strong odor of cannabis emitting from 

her breath”—the officer “threw away the form he was writing on and started 

writing on a new form.” Id. After taking additional tests and providing a urine 

sample—which also later came back clean— Kingsland was handcuffed, 

transported to jail (still no medical care) and charged with DUI. Id. at 1225. 

Kingsland sued, and the district court granted the officers summary judgment, but 

we reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether 

the officers had conducted a reasonable investigation. Id. at 1225, 1230–31.

Citing Kingsland, Huebner contends that McDonough’s “failure to 

objectively investigate, failure to interview reasonably available witnesses, and 

failure to obtain easily obtainable evidence” require the conclusion that her arrest 

was unlawful—and indeed so clearly unlawful that McDonough should be denied 

qualified immunity. We don’t think so. Kingsland and this case are apples and 

oranges. In Kingsland, the arresting officers didn’t just fail to follow-up or even 

turn a blind eye, they affirmatively misrepresented their intentions and came 

dangerously close—if they didn’t go all the way—to manufacturing evidence. 

Here, as already noted, Huebner concedes that “[b]ased solely on Dobin’s sworn 

statement, McDonough may have had probable cause for the arrest of ... Huebner”

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as an initial matter. And for reasons we have already explained, we reject 

Huebner’s contention that probable cause evanesced “once [McDonough] found no 

physical evidence”—first because physical injury isn’t a required element of 

simple battery, and second because the sort of battery alleged here wouldn’t 

necessarily (or even likely) have left any lasting marks. In any event, not looking 

for scratches when making an arrest for a crime that doesn’t require them just isn’t 

the same as not looking for drugs or alcohol when making an arrest for DUI. Cf.

Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1224.5

* * *

We hold that Huebner hasn’t shown that McDonough lacked probable cause 

to arrest her for battery, that he relied on untrustworthy information in formulating 

probable cause, or that he failed to conduct an adequate investigation into her 

guilt.

6

5 Huebner also cites Cozzi, 892 F.3d 1288, for the proposition that because McDonough didn’t 

find any “physical evidence corroborating her version of events” he didn’t conduct a reasonable 

investigation. But in Cozzi, we held that an officer failed to conduct a reasonable investigation 

where he arrested a man with “only one tattoo” after showing the man’s roommate a picture of 

the suspect with “numerous tattoos up and down his arm.” Id. at 1292. Cozzi’s (relative) lack of 

body art should have been immediate and conclusive evidence that he wasn’t the guy; in 

contrast, even an investigation that proved that Dobin didn’t have any scratches would not (for 

reasons already explained) have exonerated Huebner of simple battery.

6 Accordingly, we needn’t reach the question whether McDonough had “arguable probable 

cause,” which comes into play only at the second, “clearly established” step of the qualifiedimmunity analysis. See Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993). 

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B

We can make quicker work of Huebner’s excessive-force claim. The Fourth 

Amendment prohibits “the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest.” Lee v. 

Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989)). Huebner challenges McDonough’s use of force as 

excessive in several respects. For starters, Huebner asserts that when McDonough 

handcuffed her, she complained that the cuffs were too tight, and he replied that 

they were “man handcuffs” and tightened them again. Huebner further contends

that McDonough “repeatedly and forcefully tugged on her fingers and arms in an 

effort to remove her rings.” Finally, Huebner complains that she was left, 

handcuffed, in a patrol car for as long as two hours. All of this, she says, led to 

“significant, permanent and debilitating injuries,” including severe neck damage, 

shoulder pain and numbness, as well as the need for disc-replacement surgery. 

At this procedural juncture, “the question we ask is whether, under [the 

plaintiff’s] version of the facts, [the officer] behaved reasonably in the light of the 

circumstances before him.” Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th 

Cir. 2017) (citations and quotations omitted). And when looking specifically at an 

excessive-force claim, we look to “whether an officer’s conduct in making an 

arrest is objectively reasonable or if it is an over-reactive, disproportionate action 

for the situation.” Id. at 1317. 

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We have long and repeatedly recognized that when making a custodial 

arrest, “some use of force ... is necessary and altogether lawful.” Durruthy v. 

Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1094 (11th Cir. 2003). The force used “must be reasonably

proportionate” to the need, which we measure by “the severity of the crime, the 

danger to the officer, and the risk of flight.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198 (citing Graham, 

490 U.S. at 394–95). Even though Huebner exhibited no meaningful flight risk, 

and even though her crime was relatively minor, the force employed by 

McDonough here wasn’t remotely unusual or disproportionate. Officers routinely

pull arrestees’ arms behind their backs, and we have repeatedly held that painful 

handcuffing alone doesn’t constitute excessive force. See Rodriguez v. Farrell, 

280 F.3d 1341, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that even where an officer 

“grabbed plaintiff’s arm, twisted it around plaintiff’s back, jerk[ed] it up high to 

the shoulder and then handcuffed plaintiff as plaintiff fell to his knees screaming 

that [the officer] was hurting him” the officer’s actions didn’t constitute excessive 

force); see also Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1348 n.13 (collecting cases holding that 

painful handcuffing and pushing of arrestees, including against vehicles, is not 

excessive force).7

7 It’s true, as Huebner contends, that we may consider the severity of a plaintiff’s injuries as 

relevant to the excessive-force inquiry. See, e.g., Stephens, 852 F.3d at 1324–27; Rodriguez, 280 

F.3d at 1351–52. Two problems. First, beyond fragments of her own deposition testimony, 

Huebner didn’t provide any evidence—medical records, etc.—to substantiate her claimed 

injuries. But cf., Stephens, 852 F.3d at 1327 (noting that plaintiff’s injuries were “documented 

by treating physicians”); Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at 1351 (noting testimony of “[p]laintiff’s 

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McDonough employed a common handcuffing technique, and he attempted 

(to no avail) to tell Huebner how to get more comfortable in the patrol car. The 

force that McDonough used in arresting Huebner was not constitutionally 

excessive.

III

We hold (1) that McDonough had probable cause to arrest Huebner for 

simple battery—the information underlying his probable-cause assessment was 

sufficient and his investigation was adequate—and (2) that McDonough didn’t use 

excessive force in the course of effectuating the arrest. Because Huebner hasn’t 

shown a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights, McDonough is entitled to 

qualified immunity.8

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

orthopedic surgeon”). Second, even when substantiated by medical records or expert testimony, 

we have rejected excessive-force claims predicated on handcuffing-related harms similar to—

and even worse than—those alleged here. See, e.g., Stephens, 852 F.3d at 1326 n.30 (rejecting 

Fourth Amendment claim based on allegation that arresting officer left suspect handcuffed “for 

almost three hours in handcuffs that were too tight” and thereby caused “physical injuries, pain 

and suffering including, among other things headaches, back pain, and loss of sensation in [his] 

right hand”); Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at 1351 (rejecting claim based on allegation that officer’s 

handcuffing technique aggravated a preexisting injury requiring “more than twenty-five 

subsequent surgeries and ultimately amputation of the arm below the elbow”).

8 Because we hold that Huebner hasn’t shown that her constitutional rights were violated, we 

have no cause to consider the second-order qualified-immunity question whether the law on 

which she relies was “clearly established” at the time of her arrest.

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