Filed 4/29/21 In re I.S. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re I.S., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

I.S.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G058740

 (Super. Ct. No. 17DL0773)

 ORDER MODIFYING

 OPINION AND DENYING

 PETITION FOR REHEARING;

 NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

The opinion filed on April 1, 2021, is hereby modified as follows: 

At the end of the first paragraph on page 22, a new passage is added that 

reads:
2

In a petition for rehearing, I.S. seeks to avoid forfeiture by claiming he in 

fact did object to “the admission of his post-Miranda statements on the ground that he did 

not understand his Miranda rights.” (Fn. omitted.) In support, he points to the reporter’s 

transcript of defense counsel’s argument at the conclusion of the suppression motion 

hearing, where he asserted I.S. was “not capable of understanding a Miranda

advisement.” (Italics added.) 

He now argues this incapacity comment, a topic never mentioned in his 

written motion to suppress, sufficiently preserved for review the more fully 

encompassing claim that he did not understand his Miranda rights “and knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily waived them.” He does not dispute that no Miranda-related 

arguments were raised in his written motion to suppress, let alone any suggestion he was 

intellectually incapable of understanding Miranda.

A defense motion to suppress solely predicated on voluntariness does not 

require the prosecutor to anticipate and address the unarticulated argument that a 13-yearold minor has no capacity to understand Miranda and that any waivers were thereby 

invalid. Indeed, the former question focuses on external police coercion, while the latter 

deals with an individual’s internal mental states.

Moreover, when viewed in context, counsel’s comment came after the 

evidentiary portion of the suppression motion hearing had concluded and the court was 

prepared to rule. The prosecutor had completed presenting his evidence responding to 

the grounds that were raised in the motion to suppress, and was never on notice to 

respond to this newly-minted incapacity remark. Indeed, in his final argument to the 

court, defense counsel acknowledged he was not suggesting “that anything was done 

inappropriate in terms of the Miranda advisement,” but then went on to say, “the unique 

thing here . . . is just we have a 13-year-old boy who clearly is not capable of 

understanding a Miranda advisement.” And that closing aside was his entire argument in 

support of the new ground for suppression. 

To avoid forfeiture, I.S. was not only obligated to raise specific grounds for 

suppression, but to also do so in a timely fashion. (Polk, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1194; see Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); cf. People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 

20 [“‘“‘[D]efendant’s failure to make a timely and specific objection’ on the ground 

asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable.”’” (Italics added)]; see alsoUnited 

States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725, 731 [“‘No procedural principle is more familiar to 

this Court than that a constitutional right,’ or a right of any other sort, ‘may be forfeited 

in criminal . . . cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal 

having jurisdiction to determine it.’” (Italics added)].)

Had I.S. desired to raise intellectual incapacity as a ground for suppressing 

his statements, i.e., to contest the underlying validity of his Miranda waivers, he was 

obligated to do so in his motion to suppress, and not toss it in during his final

postevidentiary hearing remarks. In these circumstances, the forfeiture doctrine applies.
3

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is DENIED. This modification does not 

change the judgment.

ARONSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

THOMPSON, J.
Filed 4/1/21 In re I.S. CA4/3 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re I.S., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

I.S.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G058740

 (Super. Ct. No. 17DL0773)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Douglas 

Hatchimonji, Judge. Affirmed.

Robert F. Somers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers, 

Christopher Beesley, and Adrianne S. Denault, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 

and Respondent.
2

* * *

A wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) alleged I.S. murdered his 

mother and personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon in doing so. (Pen. Code.

§§ 187, subd. (a); 12022, subd. (b)(1).)1 After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the 

juvenile court found I.S. committed the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, 

subd. (a)), and found the weapon use allegation true. It also determined clear and 

convincing evidence showed I.S. appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct. (§ 26.) 

The court declared I.S. a ward of the juvenile court, and set the offense as a felony, with a 

maximum 12-year period of confinement, comprising 11 years for the manslaughter, plus 

1 year for the enhancement. 

I.S. contends the juvenile court erred in sustaining the wardship petition 

because the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he did not act in selfdefense. I.S. also argues the court erroneously denied his motion to compel the 

prosecutor to grant his father immunity for his testimony, which purportedly was “clearly 

exculpatory and essential” to his self-defense claim. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s 

refusal to grant father immunity constituted reversible prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, 

he contends the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress some of the statements 

he made to police because they were involuntary and obtained in violation of Miranda v.

Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). We affirm.

I

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Despite a jurisdictional hearing spanning five months, a reporter’s 

transcript of 4,604 pages, 41 witnesses, and over 100 exhibits, the basic facts of this 

matter are neither disputed nor complicated, and we need not recite them in extensive 

detail. We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the fact finder’s

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

determinations. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 504.) We have included facts 

based in part on some of I.S.’s post-Miranda statements to police, the admissibility of 

which we discuss post. Additional facts necessary to resolve the issues I.S. raises on 

appeal are discussed below.

On May 1, 2017, the district attorney filed two wardship petitions against 

13-year-old I.S. (born August 2003). One petition charged him with an April 28 

residential burglary and with giving false information to a police officer; the other alleged 

a March 22 school burglary and vandalism. While these two petitions were pending, on 

May 2 the juvenile court released I.S. to his mother’s custody, subject to several 

conditions, including wearing a GPS enabled ankle monitor. 

On the morning of May 3, during PE class, I.S. told his friend, Jesse S., 

“‘I’m going to hurt my Mom,’ or something like that.” Jesse did not ask I.S. to explain 

because he “didn’t really believe him or really listen to him.” 

That afternoon, I.S.’s mother picked up I.S. after school. They returned 

home and a while later I.S. and his mother argued about household chores. I.S. claimed 

his mother had an “evil” look in her eyes, was yelling, and chasing him around the house. 

At some point, I.S. went into the kitchen, pulled a knife with an eight-inch blade from the 

knife block, and returned with it to the living room. He plunged the full length of the 

blade in an upward path into his mother’s abdomen, withdrew the knife, and repeated the 

same thrust with the knife into his mother’s abdomen. 

I.S. returned to the kitchen, found a pair of scissors, and cut off his GPS 

monitor. He fled out the back door into an alleyway, where he dropped the monitor into 

a trash can. At a nearby cross-street, he discarded the knife into a planter area and buried 

it under dirt and debris. 

Meanwhile, mother left the house through the front door. She came out to 

the front sidewalk, profusely bleeding from her abdomen, and tried to wave down passing 

cars for help. A deliveryman stopped, assisted her, and called 911. 
4

Mother was lying in a pool of blood when police and paramedics arrived to 

render aid. She told a police officer and two paramedics that I.S. had stabbed her. She 

was taken to a nearby hospital where she died later that evening. The ER trauma surgeon 

described mother’s injuries as the worst he had seen out of thousands of stab wounds. 

Police officers found I.S. about a half mile from his home, behind an 

abandoned shopping center. Initially, I.S. lied about his name and age, but the officers 

eventually confirmed his identity and took him into custody. 

That night, two detectives interviewed I.S. He admitted he stabbed his 

mother twice with a large kitchen knife during an argument over household chores. He 

also described verbal and physical abuse his mother had inflicted upon him in the past. 

I.S. said he felt fearful and threatened by his mother when he stabbed her, but could not 

specify her exact words or conduct that caused his fear or made him feel threatened. I.S. 

claimed that when he returned from the kitchen with the knife, his mother kept 

approaching him, and he had to use the knife to prevent her from hurting him. After he 

stabbed her, she screamed and ran out through the front door. 

To support his self-defense claim, I.S. presented the testimony of relatives, 

some of I.S.’s acquaintances, and teachers and school staff, all of whom suggested an 

apparent history of physical and mental abuse inflicted on I.S. by his mother. They also 

described I.S. as normally nonviolent and nonaggressive. The witnesses described 

mother’s volatile history of occasional violence with other family members, including 

with her ex-husband, I.S.’s father. 

I.S. testified, and described instances where his mother physically and 

emotionally abused him. I.S. testified he had feared her for several months. On the day 

of the killing, she made him do chores after school. He described her as “acting 

unpredictable,” and “a little more angry” than normal. After doing chores for about an 

hour, I.S. took a break, which angered his mother because she thought he had quit, and he 
5

talked back to her in response. She then started yelling at him to finish his chores and not 

to sit down. This upset him because he already had cleaned half the house. 

I.S. could not remember exactly why tensions rose further, but as the 

situation escalated, his mother became more enraged and aggressive. I.S. testified she

then chased him through the house. I.S. ran because he feared she was going to hit him 

and hurt him like she had in the past. He insisted “[s]he had a look in her eyes, and it was 

just her vibe, like, it was not a good vibe.” He explained he had seen her look “evil”

before, but never as much as on this occasion. I.S., however, did not explain how he was 

able to obtain the knife while he was being chased around the house.

I.S. testified he vaguely recalled his mother trying to grab him to hit him. 

He got the knife because he was in fear, but insisted he did not plan to use it or to hurt

her, and did not remember actually using the knife. He testified he held out the knife to 

“show it” to her, but claimed she did not see it because “she was so mad, she wasn’t 

thinking.” 2 

When asked for more details, I.S. claimed he could not recall. He also 

could not recall later demonstrating to detectives how he had used the knife to stab his 

mother. But he insisted he did not see his mother “put her hands in front of her to try and 

stop what was happening.”3

After the stabbing, I.S. admitted he cut off his ankle monitor and ran out of 

the house. He was unsure what his mother was doing at this point and what was going to 

happen next. He put the monitor in a trash can in the alley behind his house and pushed 

the knife with his foot into the dirt at the end of the alley because he did not want to be 

2 Several witnesses testified mother was “terrified of knives,” and did not want to be 

around them when people were doing the dishes. I.S. acknowledged he was aware of his

mother’s fear of knives. 

3 The forensic pathologist found incised wounds on mother’s left hip and the inside 

of her left wrist consistent with “defense-type” wounds. Similarly, an experienced 

detective opined these two wounds were “a defense-type injury.” 
6

seen in public with it. He did not think he had seriously injured his mother because he 

did not think the knife had penetrated deeply. I.S. testified he loved his mother and just 

wanted her to stop hurting him and for their relationship to be good. 

A defense expert concluded I.S.’s past experiences placed him in constant 

fear of physical abuse. Another expert opined a 13-year-old would stab someone 

threatening him more readily than an adult because he would experience threats more 

intensely, and would have less ability to control an impulse to immediately stop the 

threat. Another expert was permitted to testify that, in her opinion, I.S. acted in selfdefense. 

II

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Negating Self-Defense

I.S. contends the prosecution failed to introduce sufficient evidence to 

prove he did not act in self-defense. He argues the evidence instead showed he “acted in 

self-defense against [mother] because he reasonably believed that he was in imminent 

danger of suffering great bodily injury or death from her” and “reasonably believed that 

the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against this danger.” 

1. Additional Factual Background

At the time of the killing, I.S. was five feet eight inches tall, and weighed 

160 pounds. Mother was five feet four inches tall, weighed 143 pounds, and was 48 

years old. 

I.S. told detectives he had an argument with his mother, but initially 

downplayed it as “nothing really serious,” merely a miscommunication about 

housecleaning. A detective told I.S. they had spoken to his mother, and she said I.S. had 

cut her. When asked what he and his mother argued about, I.S. suggested the detective 

should ask I.S.’s sister, Brittney S., because mother also beat her. 
7

I.S. claimed, “[A]t this point, I was protecting myself. I didn’t know what 

to do. She was about to start hitting me and beating me. She’s done this before and I 

haven’t said anything . . . I was getting really scared and I – I did what I did. I couldn’t 

do anything else. I was scared and felt threatened.” When asked what mother was doing 

that made him feel threatened, I.S. replied, “Well, she gets – when she gets angry, she 

gets into a mode of like, ‘I’m going to hurt you.’ Like that. She herniated a disc in my 

back . . . almost a year ago.” 

Although the stabbing occurred in the living room, I.S. said he was able to 

run into the kitchen, get the knife, and come back to the living room, where “she was still 

coming toward me.” Describing the stabbing, I.S. said, “So . . . she was still approaching 

me, even though I had the knife in my hand, so like I have to do this. There was no – I 

don’t want to hurt – get hurt right now . . . [¶] . . . I had to do what I had to do. Like I just 

– I didn’t want to get hurt again, like I did last time.” “She – she came at me and I got 

her . . . [¶] . . . I stabbed her; yes.” 

I.S.’s testimony at the jurisdictional hearing was similar to what he told 

detectives during their interview. I.S. spoke with his father on the phone just before the 

stabbing, who told him to listen and obey his mother. But at this point I.S.’s memory 

became less than clear about the details of the stabbing. He explained, “[t]his is where it 

starts getting a little blurry. Kind of like, it’s kind of like my memory starts skipping.” 

I.S. remembered at “[s]ome point having a knife,” but now claimed he did 

not “recall grabbing it.” Defense counsel asked, “[W]hat happened next,” and I.S. replied 

“I don’t even recall. . . . I recall there being blood,” but “I didn’t think it was that bad. I 

thought it was just like a little scrape or something like a little cut.” When asked if, while 

he was running from mother, she was able to “get[] to you,” I.S. claimed he did not 

know, explaining his next memory was running out the back door. 

Later in his testimony, when asked again about the knife, I.S. stated, “I do 

not recall when I grabbed the knife. I do remember grabbing the knife because I was 
8

scared. The initial reason for grabbing the knife wasn’t to use [it], but more to – not even 

to use [it]. I wasn’t even going to use it.” But he still insisted he did not remember 

actually using the knife, or how many times he stabbed his mother. 

On cross-examination, I.S. admitted on the day of the stabbing his mother 

had not physically harmed him, “[t]hat I can remember right now.” He felt “like at some 

point she tried to grab me to like – like get me closer to hit me,” but acknowledged he 

was not injured that day. When asked whether he had told police his mother had punched 

him three times in the face with a closed fist, he responded “I don’t have an independent 

recollection of saying it.” He admitted she did not threaten to kill or hurt him that day, 

but “body language-wise” she was threatening.4 

On redirect examination, I.S. now remembered his mother once had 

threatened to kill him in the past, although he could not remember any details. He also 

now recalled she had thrust a scissor at him and inflicted a cut when he blocked it with 

his hand. He admitted he never mentioned these incidents before, either in his direct 

examination, his statements to police, or in multiple pretrial interviews with the defense 

experts. 

When asked about his interview with the detectives, in which he admitted 

to stabbing his mother and telling them “just take me to Juvenile Hall” because “I stabbed 

my mom and I deserve it,” and after seeing a transcript of that interview, I.S. claimed not 

to recall discussing that during the interview. 

In a lengthy and reasoned “Statement of Decision,” the juvenile court

concluded I.S. committed the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. It also 

specifically found that “self-defense was disproved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

4 The court took an overnight recess at this point in the prosecutor’s crossexamination. During the night, I.S. escaped from Juvenile Hall. He was apprehended the 

next day, but the jurisdictional hearing did not recommence until almost a month later. 
9

In explaining its rulings, the juvenile court found “substantial evidence” 

showed I.S. “act[ed] under the influence of intense emotion obscuring his reasoning and 

judgment.” Furthermore, mother’s “provocation, in the form of verbal and physical 

abuse, would cause an average adolescent to act rashly and without due deliberation.” 

Addressing self-defense, the court further found “there is no basis to find 

that [I.S.] reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of suffering great bodily injury 

or that he reasonably believed deadly force was necessary [citation]; that is whether a 

reasonable person in a similar situation would have believed deadly force was 

necessary.” (Original italics.) The court “discount[ed] [I.S.’s] credibility,” but “even if 

his trial testimony were given full weight, at best, it establishes that he subjectively 

believed he was in danger and needed to defend himself.” The court, however, 

concluded there was “no basis” to show I.S.’s “subjective belief was objectively 

reasonable.” 

2. Standard of Review

“The same standard governs review of the sufficiency of evidence in adult 

criminal cases and juvenile cases: we review the whole record in the light most favorable 

to the judgment to decide whether substantial evidence supports the conviction, so that a 

reasonable fact finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In re Matthew A.

(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540; see also In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.) 

Under this standard, the critical inquiry is “whether, after reviewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 

443 U.S. 307, 318-319.)

We do not reweigh the evidence, or resolve factual conflicts, which are 

functions reserved for the trier of fact. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359,

1372.) “Moreover, we must be ever mindful of the fact that it is the exclusive province 

of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the 
10

facts upon which a determination depends.” (Ibid.) “Thus, in an appeal from a juvenile 

criminal as in any other criminal appeal, we are in no position to weigh any conflicts or 

disputes in the evidence. The juvenile trial court was the trier of fact and the sole judge of 

the credibility of witnesses; we are not. Even if different inferences can reasonably be 

drawn from the evidence, we cannot substitute our own inferences or deductions for those 

of the trial court. . . . In short, in juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law the power of 

an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a 

determination of whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, 

contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the decision of the trier of fact.” (Id. 

at p. 1373.)

Moreover, “[i]ssues arising out of self-defense, including whether the 

circumstances would cause a reasonable person to perceive the necessity of defense, 

whether the defendant actually acted out of defense of himself, and whether the force 

used was excessive, are normally questions of fact for the trier of fact to resolve.” 

(People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 378, disapproved on another ground in 

People v. Blakely (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 92.) Here, we must defer to the trier of fact and 

its fact-intensive determination on the objective reasonableness of I.S.’s reaction to the 

fear and threat he allegedly perceived. (See People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 

1044 [“‘“where some of the evidence tends to show a situation in which a killing may not 

be justified then the issue is a question of fact for the [fact finder] to determine”’”].)

3. Legal Background: Self-Defense

“Homicide, the killing of one human being by another, is not always 

criminal. In certain circumstances, a killing may be excusable or justifiable. [Citations.] 

Murder and manslaughter are the forms of criminal homicide. ‘Murder is the unlawful 

killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Elmore

(2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 132 (Elmore).) “By contrast, ‘Manslaughter is the unlawful 

killing of a human being without malice.’ [Citation.] ‘The vice is the element of malice;
11

in its absence the level of guilt must decline.’” (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 

773 (Christian S.).)

“Actual,” or “perfect,” self-defense, which is “based on a reasonable belief 

that killing is necessary to avert an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury, is a 

complete justification, and such a killing is not a crime.” (Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 

pp. 133-134; see § 197, subd. 3.) Mere fear is not enough to establish perfect selfdefense, however. (See § 198 [“A bare fear . . . is not sufficient to justify” a homicide].) 

Rather, “the circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person, 

and the party killing must have acted under the influence of such fears alone.” (Ibid.) 

Moreover, “““[t]he peril must appear to the defendant as immediate and present and not 

prospective or even in the near future.””” (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 

581 (Manriquez).)

“A killing committed when that belief is unreasonable is not justifiable.

Nevertheless, ‘one who holds an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend 

against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury does not harbor malice and commits 

no greater offense than manslaughter.’ [Citation.] . . . [T]his mental state . . . is most 

accurately characterized as an actual but unreasonable belief.” (Elmore, supra,

59 Cal.4th at pp. 133-134; cf. Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 581 [“‘imperfect selfdefense is not an affirmative defense, but a description of one type of voluntary 

manslaughter’”]; Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 771 [“when the trier of fact finds that 

a defendant killed another person because the defendant actually, but unreasonably, 

believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the defendant . . . can 

be convicted of no crime greater than voluntary manslaughter”].)

4. Analysis

The question before us is whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s conclusion it was objectively unreasonable for I.S. to believe the immediate use 

of deadly force was necessary because he was in imminent danger of suffering great 
12

bodily injury or death. We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

decision.

Notably, as the court observed, I.S.’s testimony, like his statements to 

police, did not show exactly what mother “did or said to make [I.S.] scared” other than 

“saying ‘she was still coming towards me’” and that she had hurt him in the past. I.S.

insisted his mother “had a look in her eyes,” a bad “vibe,” and looked “evil,” explaining

he had seen this “evil” look before, but never as much as on this occasion. Even so, I.S. 

admitted mother did not touch him, she had no weapon, and she did not verbally threaten 

to kill or severely injure him; she only seemed threatening “body language-wise.” This 

was at odds with what I.S. initially told detectives about the argument, in which he 

downplayed its seriousness as a mere “miscommunication” over housecleaning chores: 

“We had a little bit of an argument. It was just over cleaning though. . . . Nothing big.” 

Both in his statements to police and his testimony, I.S. failed to explain the 

actual nature of the threat he perceived. At best, he said he vaguely feared for what 

mother might do, but never that she was about to kill him or cause him great bodily 

injury. He claimed he stabbed his mother to protect himself because he believed she 

“was about to start hitting [him] and beating [him]” because she had done it before, but 

he based this nebulous fear on her face and eyes, not her actions or words. Without more, 

mother’s mere visage does not reasonably point to the need for a peremptory use of lethal 

force.

Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s conclusion I.S. lacked 

an objective basis to believe I.S.’s mother posed the threat of death or great bodily injury 

undermines I.S.’s perfect self-defense argument. Consequently, the absence of evidence 

showing an imminent threat shows that I.S.’s subjective belief on the necessity of lethal 

force was objectively unreasonable under these circumstances.

I.S. argues we should reject the juvenile court’s findings and instead find 

his beliefs and resulting actions were reasonable, and his use of lethal force was 
13

appropriate in these circumstances. His argument essentially asks us to reweigh the 

evidence, which we cannot do. Where “‘the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of 

fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the 

circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’” (People v. 

Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890; People v. Brown (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 968, 

979 [“It is of no consequence that the [fact finder’s] believing other evidence, or drawing 

different inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion”]; cf. People v. Mora and 

Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 490 [“Whether a reasonable trier of fact could reach a 

different conclusion based upon the same facts does not mean the verdict is not supported 

by sufficient evidence”].) 

“A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that 

upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support”’” the fact 

finder’s conclusions. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Given our limited 

role, I.S. “bears an enormous burden” to prevail on a sufficiency of the evidence claim. 

(People v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 330.) Substantial evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s factual and legal determinations that I.S. killed his mother in an actual, 

but unreasonable, belief that lethal self-defense was necessary. We therefore find no 

basis to overturn the voluntary manslaughter finding. 

B. Testimonial Immunity for I.S.’s Father

I.S. next claims the juvenile court erred in denying his request to order the 

prosecutor to grant use immunity to I.S.’s father for his “clearly exculpatory and 

essential” testimony, which supposedly would have supported a perfect self-defense 

claim. He argues his father was the last person to speak to I.S. and his mother before the 

killing, and he could have described their demeanor about 40 minutes beforehand. In 

addition, father could have provided information regarding mother’s abusive conduct 

toward father during their 25-year relationship. 
14

I.S. further contends the prosecutor’s refusal to grant his father immunity 

was prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor “us[ed] deceptive and reprehensible 

methods to persuade the juvenile court.” I.S. argues we should reverse the judgment, 

remand for a new trial, and order the prosecution to either grant use immunity to his 

father for his testimony or “have [I.S.] acquitted.” 

1. Additional Factual Background

Before I.S.’s defense case began, his counsel requested the juvenile court 

grant immunity—or order the prosecutor to grant immunity—to I.S.’s father because the 

father intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination if called 

and questioned as a witness.5 The prosecutor earlier had refused to grant father 

immunity. 

I.S.’s proffer of what father would testify to included a phone conversation 

he had with mother and I.S. about 40 minutes before the stabbing, where father would say 

mother and I.S. were arguing about chores. Purportedly at mother’s request, father told 

I.S. to listen and obey his mother. I.S.’s father would testify he thought I.S. was listening 

to his advice and not upset about the argument, but mother was “really upset” at I.S. 

Father also would testify about mother’s conduct in the past year; how he and I.S. had 

been bonding in the month before the stabbing; and describe mother and father’s efforts 

to find I.S. after he ran away from home. He also would testify about mother’s alleged 

drug use and that she could become violent and upset when using drugs; about father’s 

and mother’s past verbal and physical fights; and about father’s interactions with mother 

and I.S. in the days before the stabbing. 

The juvenile court first pointed out it could not itself grant immunity to a 

defense witness, citing People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019 (Masters). As for 

5 Other than giving his name, and identifying I.S. as his son and I.S.’s mother as his 

ex-wife whom he had known for 25 years, father invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege 

against self-incrimination and refused to answer defense counsel’s questions. 
15

ordering the prosecutor to grant immunity, the court found it could do so only if the 

prosecutor’s decision to withhold immunity rose to the level of prosecutorial misconduct, 

citing Masters and People v. Hull (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1003. 

The juvenile court denied I.S.’s motion to compel the prosecutor to grant 

immunity. In explaining its ruling, the court observed: “[I]t’s not sufficient that the 

proffered evidence is exculpatory. It has to be more than that. It has to be clearly 

exculpatory. [¶] It’s not a question of whether or not the prosecution is sequestering the 

truth. It’s whether the prosecution is sequestering clearly exculpatory evidence. That’s 

what pushes . . . the case into prosecutorial misconduct. . . . [¶] . . . There has to be a 

showing of a deliberate intention on the part of the prosecutor to distort the factfinding 

process.” 

The juvenile court found father’s proffered testimony would not be clearly 

exculpatory because it would only assist the court in determining mother’s character, and 

“who [mother] was doesn’t tell me in a clear way what happened in the moments before 

the homicide occurred.” Thus, the court “found that the [proffered evidence] is not 

clearly exculpatory . . . that [father’s] testimony is not essential . . . and that based upon 

that, the motion is denied.” 

2. Legal Background

In Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1019, our Supreme Court held that 

“California courts have no authority to confer [judicial] use immunity on witnesses.” 

(Id. at p. 1051.) Instead, “‘the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the 

executive.’” (Id. at pp. 1050-1051.) Consequently, the juvenile court correctly denied 

I.S.’s request for judicial immunity for I.S.’s father.

“[P]rosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to 

witnesses in order to assist a defendant.” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 622; 

see People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 127-128 (Samuels) [prosecutor did not 

commit misconduct by not granting immunity to a nonessential defense witness who 
16

asserted her right against self-incrimination and refused to testify].) Even so, the Masters

court recognized that, in certain circumstances, “due process may compel a defense 

witness to be immunized.” (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1051.)

“If a defendant can show that the prosecutor refused to grant immunity 

‘“with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial factfinding process,”’ a retrial is 

necessary.” (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1051.) Thus, to establish a due process 

violation, the defendant must demonstrate all of the following: the prosecutor’s refusal to 

grant immunity was deliberately designed to distort the factfinding process; it resulted in 

the loss of testimony that was “‘“clearly exculpatory”’” and “‘“essential”’” to the 

defense; and there are “‘“no strong governmental interests which countervail against a 

grant of immunity.”’” (Id. at pp. 1051-1052, citing United States v. Quinn (3rd Cir. 

2013) 728 F.3d 243, 251 (en banc) (Quinn).)6

On appeal, we apply the traditional prosecutorial misconduct test: “‘When 

a prosecutor’s intemperate behavior is sufficiently egregious that it infects the trial with 

such a degree of unfairness as to render the subsequent conviction a denial of due 

process, the federal Constitution is violated. Prosecutorial misconduct that falls short of 

rendering the trial fundamentally unfair may still constitute misconduct under state law if 

it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the trial court or the 

jury.’” (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1052.) We review de novo whether 

prosecutorial misconduct violated a defendant’s due process rights. (People v. Uribe

(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 860 (Uribe).) 

3. Analysis

In general, statements or threats that interfere with a defendant’s 

compulsory process right to call witnesses amount to prosecutorial misconduct. (People 

6 The Masters court assumed, but did not hold, that the factors outlined in Quinn

“state the appropriate test for evaluating a constitutional claim arising from the denial of 

witness immunity. . . .” (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1052.)
17

v. Treadway (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 562, 568.) That is not the case her, however,

because there is no indication in the record the prosecutor said anything to the father

suggesting he would be prosecuted for any crimes he revealed in the course of his 

testimony, or that the prosecutor threatened the father with a perjury prosecution. (Ibid.) 

Nor is there any suggestion the prosecutor advised I.S.’s father not to testify or told the 

father his testimony would not be immunized. (Id. at p. 569.)

The record also belies I.S.’s contention the prosecutor’s refusal to grant 

immunity violated due process because I.S.’s father would have provided “clearly 

exculpatory” testimony that was “essential” to his defense. Father was not a neutral 

witness; he had an obvious natural motive to protect his son. (See Quinn, supra, 

728 F.3d at p. 263 [defense witness’s familial connection to defendant undermined claim 

that witness’s proposed testimony required the government to grant immunity because 

the testimony would have been clearly exculpatory].) Moreover, as the juvenile court 

aptly noted, father’s proffered testimony would not have revealed anything about what 

actually happened after I.S. retrieved the knife from the kitchen and returned to face his 

mother; in other words, it was not clearly exculpatory.

Nor would father’s testimony have been “essential.” The juvenile court 

heard extensive testimony from I.S., other family members, expert witnesses, and several 

others both in support of his self-defense claim and to describe mother’s character. And, 

as the court further observed, father would not have been able to shed any additional light 

on how the argument escalated and the stabbing ultimately occurred. 

I.S. argues father could “corroborate” I.S.’s and other witnesses’ testimony 

regarding mother’s violent propensity and her mood just before she was killed. 

Corroborative evidence is generally not considered essential, however. (See, e.g., United 

States v. Whiteford (3rd Cir. 2012) 676 F.3d 348, 363-364 [“Testimony that is 

‘ambiguous . . . cumulative, or . . . found to relate only to the credibility of the 

government’s witnesses’ is not clearly exculpatory”]; cf. Samuels, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 
18

pp. 127-128 [cumulative evidence is not essential].) And when, as here, the source of the 

corroborative evidence has a close personal relationship with the accused, the importance 

of that corroborative evidence is further diminished. We conclude father was not such an 

important witness for the defense that the prosecutor’s failure to grant him immunity 

infringed I.S.’s fair trial rights.

Furthermore, we find nothing in the record showing the prosecutor’s 

“‘intemperate behavior . . . sufficiently egregious that it infect[ed] the trial with such a 

degree of unfairness as to render the subsequent [juvenile court findings] a denial of due 

process,’” nor any use by the prosecutor of “‘deceptive or reprehensible methods to 

persuade the [juvenile] court. . . .’” (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1052.) The 

prosecutor explained that he was “not intending to distort the factfinding process,” but 

rather, when comparing father’s criminal history and major credibility issues, along with 

the minimal probative value of father’s proffered testimony, he “does not believe that 

there’s anything justifying the granting of immunity.” 

I.S. bore the burden of showing “the prosecutor refused to grant immunity 

‘“with the deliberate intention of distorting the factfinding process.”’” (Masters, supra, 

62 Cal.4th at p. 1051.) Here, I.S. fails to make this showing either below or in this court. 

Thus, I.S. has failed to establish that “‘the prosecutor intentionally refused to grant 

immunity to a key defense witness for the purpose of suppressing essential, 

noncumulative exculpatory evidence,’ thereby distorting the judicial factfinding process.” 

(People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 470.) Similarly, I.S. did not rebut the 

prosecutor’s reasons for not offering immunity and, therefore, “failed to show there was 

no countervailing governmental interest against granting immunity” to father. (Masters,

supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1053.)

In sum, “we cannot characterize the prosecutor’s decision not to grant 

immunity to [father] as egregious, unfair, deceptive, or reprehensible. The prosecutor’s 

decision was not misconduct.” (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) Consequently, 
19

the juvenile court did not err in denying I.S.’s request to order the prosecutor to grant 

father use immunity.

7

C. Admissibility of I.S.’s Post-Miranda Statements

Lastly, I.S. contends the juvenile court erred on two interrelated grounds by 

denying his motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements to police. First, he argues 

the prosecutor failed to show I.S. understood and knowingly waived his Miranda rights. 

Second, he claims the coercive circumstances of his detention rendered his statements 

involuntary. 

1. Additional Factual Background

About 6:30 p.m., uniformed officers detained I.S. behind the shopping 

center, handcuffed him and placed him in the back of a patrol car. Corporal Aaron 

Nelson asked I.S., “Do you mind going with me to the police department?” I.S. agreed to 

do so. Nelson brought I.S. to the Juvenile Justice Center, where Nelson stayed with him 

for about two and a half-hours while the investigation developed. I.S. was seated in a 

chair in a “bullpen” multi-desk open office area, which was empty because the normal 

everyday staff had left for the day. I.S. had one handcuff placed loosely around his wrist 

and the other cuff was attached to the chair. 

After Detective Richard Desbiens learned I.S.’s mother had died, he told 

Nelson to formally arrest I.S. and advise him of his Miranda rights. And about 9:00 p.m., 

7 For the first time on appeal, I.S. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by 

refusing to specifically rule on whether there was prosecutorial misconduct, having found 

only that father’s testimony was neither clearly exculpatory nor essential and denying the 

motion to compel immunity on those grounds alone. He claims the court’s “failure to 

rule on prosecutorial misconduct caused the court not to compel the prosecution to 

immunize [father], which was an error,” and reversal is required. But it was the 

prosecutor, not defense counsel, who asked the court to rule on the misconduct issue. 

Thus, we find the claim forfeited. And in any event, we review rulings on claims of 

prosecutorial misconduct de novo, and not for an abuse of discretion. (Uribe, supra, 199 

Cal.App.4th at p. 860.)
20

Nelson arrested I.S. for aggravated assault,8 and read him his Miranda rights from a 

standard prebooking form. When Nelson asked whether he understood those rights, I.S. 

stated he did. I.S. did not request to speak to an attorney or tell Nelson he did not want to 

speak. Nelson testified that during the entire two and a half-hours he spent with I.S. he 

had no concerns about I.S.’s ability to comprehend and respond to questions. At no time 

did Nelson “display [his] weapon” to I.S., or threaten him in any way. On at least two 

occasions, I.S. asked if he could call his mother, but Nelson told him, “Not right now.” 

After the Miranda advisement, two detectives interviewed I.S. about 10:00 

p.m. that night. The interview took place in an interview room at the police station. He 

was no longer handcuffed. The interview lasted about an hour and five minutes. 

Detective Desbiens began the interview by introducing himself, and telling 

I.S., “And I know Officer Nelson had already told you that you’re under arrest?” I.S. 

replied, “Right.” He asked I.S., “And [Nelson] read you your Miranda rights?” to which 

I.S. nodded affirmatively. He asked, “And do you understand what those were?” to 

which I.S. again nodded that he did. Desbiens testified neither he nor his partner, 

Detective Farley, threatened I.S. in any way.9 During the interview, the officers provided 

I.S. food and drink at his request. 

The detectives were aware of I.S.’s age. I.S. told them he took Abilify for 

ADHD and was afflicted with “lower autism.” Desbiens and I.S. discussed how those 

issues “exhibit[] and affect[] him.” Desbiens also took this information “into account in 

conducting the rest of the interview,” because based on his 27 years of experience, 

“different suspects require different approaches when it comes to interviewing.” 

I.S. brought a motion to suppress all his statements to police, arguing he 

“was interrogated by police for approximately two hours,” and “[t]he statement was not 

8 Nelson was not told I.S.’s mother had died at 8:12 p.m. Neither was I.S.

9 The entire interview was videotaped and played for the court during the 

jurisdictional hearing. 
21

voluntary and should be excluded.” In his motion, I.S. did not challenge the adequacy of 

the Miranda advisement or his understanding of his rights, and did not claim he had 

invoked them; he challenged only the voluntariness of his statements. 

The juvenile court granted I.S.’s motion to suppress the pre-Miranda

statements he made after he was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car, finding a 

“technical” Miranda violation.10 The court, however, found those statements were 

neither coerced nor involuntary, and ruled the prosecutor could use them for 

impeachment purposes. (See People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 936; see also Harris v. 

New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 225-226.)

As for I.S.’s post-Miranda statements, the juvenile court found the 

prosecutor met his burden of showing I.S. was advised of and understood his rights. 

After viewing the videotape of the interview and discussing the relevant circumstances, 

the court also found I.S. voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and his statements were 

voluntary. 

2. Analysis

a. Miranda

I.S. first argues the prosecutor failed to prove he understood and 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights. However, 

“unless a defendant asserts in the trial court a specific ground for suppression of his or 

her statements to police under Miranda, that ground is forfeited on appeal, even if the 

defendant asserted other arguments under the same decision.” (People v. Polk (2010) 

190 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194 (Polk).) As noted, I.S. in the juvenile court did not 

challenge the adequacy of his Miranda advisement or claim he did not understand his 

rights. His sole claim below rested on the voluntariness of his statements. 

10 During I.S.’s initial detention in the field, officers informally questioned but did 

not advise I.S. of his Miranda rights. The juvenile court found I.S. was in custody when 

he was placed in the back of the patrol car in handcuffs, and suppressed those statements. 
22

I.S.’s motion to suppress based on involuntariness was “simply not 

sufficient to preserve the [Miranda] issue . . . because [it] did not call to the attention of 

the trial court the substantive inadequacy of the warnings under Miranda and provide the 

trial court an opportunity to avoid error on that ground.” (Polk, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1194-1195.) Consequently, I.S. has forfeited his Miranda claims on appeal 

because he did not raise the issue in the juvenile court. (Id. at p. 1194; see People v.

Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1166 (Linton) [forfeiture by failing to raise a “custod[y]” 

issue for Miranda purposes]; cf. People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 669 (Cruz) 

[voluntariness claim forfeited by only objecting on Miranda grounds in the trial court].) 

But even assuming the issue was not forfeited, we find I.S.’s Miranda 

claim also fails on the merits.

Like adults, juveniles may validly waive their Miranda rights. (People v. 

Jones (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 787, 809; People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 384 

[paranoid schizophrenic 13-year-old understood and waived his Miranda rights]; In re 

Charles P. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 768, 772 [valid waiver from a 12-year-old with prior 

juvenile court experience]; In re Brian W. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 590, 602-603 [15 yearold-with an IQ of 81 validly waived his Miranda rights].) Juveniles also may impliedly 

waive their Miranda rights. (People v. Lessie (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1169 (Lessie).)

An implied waiver occurs when, after being apprised of his rights, a minor “willingly 

answer[s] questions after acknowledging that he understood those rights.” (Ibid.; Cruz, 

supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 667.)

On review of a trial court’s ruling on a claimed Miranda violation, “‘we 

accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of 

credibility, if supported by substantial evidence. We independently determine from 

[those facts] whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.’” (People v. 

Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 385; People v. Delgado (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1092, 

1104 (Delgado).) In doing so, we give great weight to the considered conclusions of a 
23

lower court that previously has reviewed the same evidence. (People v. Whitson (1998)

17 Cal.4th 229, 248.)

“To establish a valid waiver of Miranda rights, the prosecution must show 

by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary.” (People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 374-375 (Nelson); Colorado v. 

Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 168 [same].) “Determining the validity of a Miranda

rights waiver requires ‘an evaluation of the defendant’s state of mind’ [citation] and 

‘inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ [citation].” (Nelson, 

supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 375.) Factors to consider include “‘the juvenile’s age, experience, 

education, background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the capacity to 

understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and 

consequences of waiving those rights.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) “This approach allows the 

necessary flexibility for courts ‘to take into account those special concerns that are 

present when young persons, often with limited experience and education and with 

immature judgment, are involved.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 379.)

“[T]here is no presumption that a minor is incapable of a knowing, 

intelligent waiver of his rights.” (In re Eduardo G. (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 745, 756.) 

“‘“Neither a low I.Q. nor any particular age of minority is a proper basis to assume lack 

of understanding, incompetency, or other inability to voluntarily waive the right to 

remain silent under some presumption that the Miranda explanation was not 

understood.”’” (Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 384.)

The juvenile court’s finding officers questioned I.S. without a proper 

Miranda advisement does not necessitate suppression of his post-Miranda statements at 

the police station. “Case law makes clear that an initial Miranda violation does not 

necessarily require the exclusion of statements following proper advisements. Indeed, we 

have explained, ‘[e]ven when a first statement is taken in the absence of proper 

advisements and is incriminating,’ a subsequent voluntary confession made after proper 
24

advisements ‘is not tainted simply because it was procured after a Miranda violation.’

[Citation.] ‘“The relevant inquiry”’ is whether the statement was ‘“voluntarily made”’

following proper warnings.” (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 924; see also 

Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 318.)

Here, I.S. was 13 years and 9 months old. However, this was not his first 

experience with the criminal justice system, as he already was facing two separate 

allegations of felonious criminal conduct for which he had been released from custody 

just the day before the killing. He responded appropriately to Nelson’s initial inquiries 

and Desbiens’s reminders, and his demeanor throughout the interview suggests he was 

fully aware of what was transpiring. Nothing suggests I.S. lacked an understanding of or 

was confused about the meaning of the Miranda advisement and his rights. His cogent, 

and often evasive, responses during the interview itself also support the juvenile court’s 

conclusion I.S. was fully capable of understanding the Miranda warnings, the nature of 

the rights at stake, and the consequences of waiving those rights. 

Nelson testified he informed I.S. of each of his Miranda rights from a 

standard advisal form, and I.S. stated he understood each of those rights. Nothing in the 

record indicates he had any confusion on these points. The defense offered nothing to 

rebut the prosecutor’s showing of compliance with Miranda. I.S.’s youth and purported 

learning disabilities did not preclude him from making a knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent waiver. (See Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 384.) 

“In consideration of the totality of circumstances surrounding the 

interrogation, we find [I.S.’s] responses to [Nelson’s] inquiries reciting his Miranda

rights reflect a knowing and intelligent understanding of those rights, and that [I.S.’s]

willingness to answer questions after expressly affirming on the record his understanding 

of each of those rights constituted a valid implied waiver of them. [Citations.] . . . ‘[T]he 

record is devoid of any suggestion that the police resorted to physical or psychological 

pressure to elicit statements from [I.S.]. To the contrary, [I.S.’s] willingness to speak with 
25

the officers is readily apparent from his responses. He was not worn down by improper 

interrogation tactics, lengthy questioning, or trickery or deceit.’ [Citation.]” (Cruz, 

supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 668-669; see also Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 726-

727.) 

Thus, forfeiture notwithstanding, and considering the totality of the 

circumstances, we conclude the prosecutor met his burden to show I.S. was fully advised 

of and voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his Miranda rights.

b. Voluntariness

“The use of an involuntary confession in a delinquency proceeding violates 

a minor’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.” (In re Anthony L. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 438, 

452 (In re Anthony L.). Whether a confession is voluntary presents “‘a mixed question of 

law and fact that is nevertheless predominantly legal . . . .’ [Citation.] Hence, ‘“[o]n 

appeal, the determination of a trial court as to the ultimate issue of the voluntariness of a 

confession is reviewed independently . . . . [¶] . . . However, “the trial court’s findings as 

to the circumstances surrounding the confession—including ‘the characteristics of the 

accused and the details of the interrogation’ [citation]—are clearly subject to review for 

substantial evidence. . . .”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 296.)

Thus, “‘[w]here the voluntariness of a confession is raised on appeal, the 

reviewing court should examine the uncontradicted facts to determine independently 

whether the trial court’s conclusion of voluntariness was proper. If conflicting testimony 

exists, the court must accept that version of events that is most favorable to the 

[prosecution] to the extent it is supported by the record.’ [¶] ‘“[T]he question in each 

case is whether the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed. ‘The burden 

is on the prosecution to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was 

voluntary. [Citation.]’”’” (Delgado, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107; see also Lego v. 

Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 489 [preponderance burden].)
26

“We consider statements involuntary—and thus subject to exclusion under 

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution—if they are the product 

of ‘coercive police conduct.’ [Citation.] We evaluate this question by looking to the 

totality of the circumstances to determine ‘whether the defendant’s “‘will has been 

overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired’” by coercion.’ 

[Citation.] The presence of police coercion is a necessary, but not always sufficient, 

element. [Citation.] We also consider other factors, such as the location of the 

interrogation, the interrogation’s continuity, as well as the defendant’s maturity, 

education, physical condition, and mental health. [Citation.]” (People v. Caro (2019) 

7 Cal.5th 463, 492.) 

“While a determination that a confession was involuntary requires a finding 

of coercive police conduct [citations], ‘“‘the exertion of any improper influence’”’ by the 

police suffices.” (In re Elias V. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 568, 577.) Simply put, the test 

for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant’s “will was 

overborne at the time he confessed.” (Lynumn v. Illinois (1963) 372 U.S. 528, 534.) 

“A confession may be found involuntary if extracted by threats or violence, 

obtained by direct or implied promises, or secured by the exertion of improper

influence.” (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 347.) Here, there was no 

violence or threats directed at I.S. by Nelson or the detectives. Similarly, there were no 

promises made, direct or implied, and no improper influence exerted.

I.S. suggests Nelson used an improper or coercive interrogation technique 

when he urged I.S. to “tell the truth.” There is nothing coercive in “officers urging 

defendant to tell the truth and informing defendant of the obvious point that the sooner he 

told the truth, the sooner the interview would finish.” (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at 

p. 1195; see People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115 [“‘mere advice or exhortation 

by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied 

by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary’”]; 
27

People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 444 [same]; cf. People v. Ray (1996) 

13 Cal.4th 313, 340 [“[O]nly those psychological ploys which, under all the 

circumstances, are so coercive that they tend to produce a statement that is both 

involuntary and unreliable” are prohibited].)

I.S. selectively quotes from Gallegos v. Colorado (1962) 370 U.S. 49, 54 

(Gallegos), and asserts, “‘[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, . . . [¶] 

would have no way of knowing . . . the consequences of his confession . . .’ without 

advice on his rights from a mature person looking out for the minor’s interests.” 

However, the Supreme Court did not create a bright-line rule that a 14 year old cannot 

make a voluntary statement absent a “mature person’s” assistance. The juvenile suspect 

in Gallegos v. Colorado had been subjected to a “five-day detention—during which time 

the boy’s mother unsuccessfully tried to see him and he was cut off from contact with any 

lawyer or adult advisor. . . .” (Gallegos, supra, at p. 54, italics added.) Those 

circumstances, more than merely the minor’s age, were the determinative coercive factors 

in that case. “The youth of the petitioner, the long detention, the failure to send for his 

parents, the failure immediately to bring him before the judge of the Juvenile Court, the 

failure to see to it that he had the advice of a lawyer or a friend—all these combine to 

make us conclude that the formal confession on which this conviction may have rested

[citation] was obtained in violation of due process.” (Id. at p. 55.) Thus, Gallegos does 

not support I.S.’s voluntariness argument because it is so factually distinct from the case 

before us, and I.S.’s attempt to derive a general rule from the high court’s opinion is 

unavailing.

I.S. also places heavy reliance on In re T.F. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 202, and 

asserts “the circumstances of [I.S.’s] interrogation were at least as coercive as the 

circumstances” in that case. Not so. Indeed, the circumstances of that case are again 

qualitatively distinct from the case before us. 
28

In In re T.F., the appellate court held that a minor’s confession was 

involuntary where the minor had a documented intellectual disability, “had been 

interrogated in a small room at his school by two armed officers” (In re T.F., supra,

16 Cal.App.5th at p. 221) for nearly an hour without being given a Miranda warning. 

During the interrogation he denied the crime “at least 23 times” (id. at p. 208, fn. 8), was 

“very emotional” (id. at p. 209), “sobbed uncontrollably” (id. at p. 221), and ultimately 

confessed. Officers then handcuffed the minor, placed him under arrest, and in a “rapid 

recitation” (id. at p. 209) gave the Miranda warning, during which officers did not take 

the time to determine whether the minor understood all of his rights. Officers then 

subjected the minor to another “accusatory interrogation” at the police station that was 

“dominating, unyielding, and intimidating” (id. at p. 218). There is no comparison 

between the instant case and In re T.F.11

Here, while I.S. was at the police department, Nelson was never accusatory 

nor coercive. They talked about I.S.’s school, his plans for the summer, and his family, 

but they did not discuss the stabbing. Once at the station, Nelson told I.S. he was “still 

just being detained,” and that “[j]ust because you’re here, it doesn’t mean you’re under 

arrest; right?” I.S. replied, “Oh, yeah.” Nelson agreed to get I.S. some water, and they 

continued a casual conversation, with Nelson again asking I.S. about his parents, cars, 

11 I.S. points out the police failed to comply with Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 627, which requires officers to inform an in-custody minor of his right to make 

two telephone calls; although he acknowledges its inapplicability. Indeed, “the bare 

violation of [Welf. & Inst. Code] section 627” does not provide for “exclusion as a 

remedy.” (Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1170.) He also cites Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 625.6, a statute enacted after I.S.’s interrogation in this case, which now 

provides that “[p]rior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of any Miranda

rights,” minors under the age of 17 “shall consult with legal counsel. . . .” (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 625.6, subd. (a).) It too is irrelevant because “[s]ection 625.6 does not authorize 

a court to exercise its discretion to exclude statements if those statements are admissible 

under federal law.” (In re Anthony L., supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 450.) “[T]he proper 

inquiry remains not whether officers complied with the state statute, but whether federal 

law compels exclusion of the minor’s statements.” (Ibid.)
29

television, and about I.S.’s school and social life.12 He explained: “When we got back to 

the station we had a lot of conversation, a lot of time to sit around and talk and it had 

nothing to do with this case. We talk[ed] about school and things like that. I wasn’t 

trying to dig or get into – that was just conversation we were having.” At one point, I.S. 

asked Nelson, “What does detained mean?” Nelson explained: “It means you’re not 

under arrest. You’re just not free to leave until we figure out what’s going on with this. 

Whatever happened at your house. I don’t know. I wasn’t there.” 

Nelson observed that “[b]ased on [I.S.’s] demeanor, body language and 

answers to [Nelson’s] questions,” he had no “doubt about [I.S.’s] willingness to speak to 

[Nelson] about the incident,” or to accompany Nelson to the police department, and 

stated I.S. was cooperative during their entire encounter. The juvenile court “found 

Corporal Nelson to be a very credible, frank and straightforward witness,” and we find 

nothing in the record to indicate otherwise. 

When detectives finally learned I.S.’s mother had died, Nelson was 

instructed to formally arrest I.S. and advise him of his Miranda rights. And as discussed 

above, he did so fully, and I.S. affirmatively acknowledged he understood his rights.

Similarly, during the interview itself, the detectives’ demeanor and 

questions were unlike that seen in In re T.F. None of the circumstances in this case show

I.S. was induced to give a false confession or that his will was overborne through 

aggressive and suggestive tactics. Unlike the minor in In re T.F., I.S. had been read his 

Miranda rights and was reminded of them a second time. There was strong independent 

evidence of I.S.’s culpability for the stabbing, and the detectives did not forcefully insist 

on I.S.’s guilt in the face of persistent denials. (Compare In re Elias V., supra, 237 

12 Nelson admitted that establishing a friendly relationship with a suspect is an oftenused investigatory technique, but he also insisted: “I really developed a rapport with I.S. 

And if he was feeling bad, I was there to talk to him. I wasn’t there just to be the bad 

guy.” 
30

Cal.App.4th at p. 600 [“The voluntariness of inculpatory statements made during an 

interrogation conducted on the basis of no more than the interrogator’s ‘speculative, 

intuitive, and risky guess’ that the subject is guilty warrants particularly careful judicial 

scrutiny”]; id. at pp. 591-592 [“Corroboration is ‘[t]he ultimate test of the trustworthiness 

of a confession’”].) 

Notably, I.S. initially lied to the detectives, telling them he was outside 

working on his scooter, heard a scream, walked into the house, saw blood everywhere, 

and then fled. I.S.’s initial false story, designed to mislead detectives, suggested he was 

in full control of what information he wanted to provide. “[F]ar from reflecting a will 

overborne by official coercion,” I.S.’s initial false account “suggests instead a still 

operative ability to calculate his self-interest in choosing whether to disclose or withhold 

information.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 58.)

Throughout the interview, the detectives’ tone and demeanor was calm and 

was never inappropriate. No threats or promises were made, deception or trickery used, 

and nothing indicates I.S. was coerced in any manner. Ultimately, I.S. admitted what he 

had done, and his statements to detectives generally were consistent with his testimony—

and defense— at trial. “[T]he police took care to inform [I.S.] of his rights and to ensure 

that he understood them. The officers did not intimidate or threaten [I.S.] in any way. 

Their questioning was restrained and free from the abuses that so concerned the Court in 

Miranda. [Citation.] The police did indeed indicate that a cooperative attitude would be 

to [I.S.’s] benefit, but their remarks in this regard were far from threatening or coercive.” 

(Fare v. Michael C., supra, 442 U.S. at p. 727.)

In sum, none of the investigatory techniques the police used in this case 

were “of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement” (People v. Farnam

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 182), and the record reflects I.S.’s will was not “‘overborne at the 

time he confessed.’” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 501). The prosecution met 

its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that I.S.’s post-Miranda 
31

statements were freely and voluntarily given, were not the product of police coercion, and 

the juvenile court therefore properly admitted them.

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

ARONSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P.J.

THOMPSON, J.