NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 14

- 3648

___________ MICHAEL J. DANIELS ,

Appellant

v. LAURIE E. CYNKIN; ANDREW M. ROSENBERG; SUSAN J. SNYDER LIVING TRUST; ESTAT E OF SUSAN J. SNYDER

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 1

- 13

- cv - 06027 ) District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle

__________________________________ __ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 16, 2014
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 2 2 , 2015 )

___________ OPINION *

___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full C ourt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute bindi ng precedent.2

PER CURIAM
Michael J. Daniels, a retired attorney proceedi ng pro se, appeals from the order of
the United States District Cou rt for the District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint that arose from divorce proceedings in Florida state court. For the reasons t hat follow, we will affirm the District Court’s orde r. I. In 2002, Daniels and Susan J. Snyder signed a prenuptial agreement and then
married

. Daniels received Social Security benefits due to the marriage, which were in addition to his own Social Security benefits. In 2009, Snyder left Daniels and file d for
divorce in Florida state court , alleging that the marriage was irretrievably broken. In August 2010, a Florida trial court issued a divorce decree that upheld the prenuptial agreement, dissolved the marriage , and held that Daniels was not entitled t o alimony or attorneys’ fees

. Daniels filed an appeal in Florida state court challenging the lack of a money award, but that appeal was unsuccessful.
In July 2011, Snyder passed away. After her death, Daniels learned that he had
been disinherited from h er will, which he believed was a violation of the prenuptial agreement. 1 He moved to set aside the divorce decree, but the trial court denied that request and his appeal was unsuccessful

. 2

1 Daniels alleges that Snyder induced him to sign the prenuptial agreement by promising to “provide for [him ] as she had provided for [her second husband], as long as we were married.” (Compl. 5.) 2 Daniels later filed additional challenges in Florida state court but those, too, were3

Thereafter, in October 2013, Daniels filed a pro se complaint in the District Court , raising a host of allegations relating to the divorce proceedings. The complaint, brought against Snyder’s two adult children (her heirs), her estate, and the Susan J. Snyder Living
Trust (“Appellees”) , sought (1) a declaration that th e prenuptial agreement was null and void, (2) modification, vacatur, or reversal of the divorce decree, (3) reinstatement of the Social Security benefits that had ceased due to the divorce, and (4) attorney s’ fees from
the Fl orida state court proceedings. Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint. On July 23, 2014, the Di st rict Court granted that motion, concluding that it “lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine, the domestic relations exception, [ 3 ] and federal
law regarding finality for Social Security appeals.” (J.A. at 24.) This appeal followed. 4
II. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Dani els’s complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, s ee Freidrich v. Davis , 767 F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir.

unsuccessful. 3 “The Supreme Court has long recognized a domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction.” Matusow v. Trans

- County Title Agency, LLC , 545 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Anken brandt v. Richards , 504 U.S. 689, 693

- 94 (1992)). This exception encompasses “cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child cu stody decree .” Ankenbrandt , 504 U.S. at 704

. 4 Because Daniels concedes that the District Court lacked jurisdict ion over his request to reinstate the Social Security benefits t hat ceased after the divorce, ( s ee Daniels’s Opening Br. 10), we do not discuss that issue further here.4

2014 ). W e may affirm the court’s decision on any basis supported by the record. S ee Murray v. Bledsoe , 650 F.3d 246, 2 47 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curia m).
The Rooker

- Feldman doctrine bars a federal court from exercising jurisdiction

over “cases brought by state

- court losers complaining of injuries caused by state

- court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting d istrict court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Four requirements must be met for the doctrine to apply: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘ complain [ s ] of injuries caused by [ the ] state

- court judgments ’ ; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP , 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) ( alterations in original ) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. , 544 U.S. at 284)

. Much of Daniels ’s complaint attacked the Florida trial court’s handling of his divorce proceedings and sought to disturb th e trial court’ s rulings in that case. For substantially the reasons provided by the District Court, we agree with the District Court that these claims are barred by the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine. Daniels’ s complaint also alleged that Snyder br eached the pr enuptial agreement , and that she and her attorney, Leanna Freeman , misled and lied to the Florida trial court during the divorce proceedings. Additionally, Daniels claimed that Snyder’ s children conspired with Freeman “to keep the truth from being told . . . and to keep all of the benefits that they have received.” (Compl. 15.) These claims are not barred by the5

Rooker

- Feldman doctrine. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. , 615 F.3d at 167 (explaining that, when “a federal plaintiff asserts injury caused b y the defendant’s actions and not by the state

- court judgment, Rooker

- Feldman is not a bar to federal jurisdiction” ) ; see also id. at 168 (“ Even though the injuries of which the plaintiff complained helped to cause the adverse state judgments, these claims were independent because they stemmed from some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions.” ) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. Furthermore, to the extent that these claims allege d constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 an d 1985 , they are not barred by
the “ domestic relations exception. ” 5 See McLaughlin v. Pernsley , 876 F.2d 308, 312

- 13 (3d Cir. 1989)

. Nevertheless, as explained below, these claims were properly dismissed. To obtain relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the defendant(s) acted under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; Great W. Mining &
Mineral Co. , 615 F.3d at 175

- 76. Here, however, all of the actors

— Snyder, her children, and Freeman (who is not even named as a defendant in this lawsuit)

— were

5 To the extent that these claims were brought under state law and pursuant to the Dist rict Court’s federal diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, we agree with the District Court that they are barred by the domestic r elations exception because Daniels has asserted them as a means to modify, vacate, or reverse the divorce decree, see Matusow , 545 F.3d at 244

- 45. To the extent that Daniels argues that the District Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 was a basis to exercise jurisdiction over these claims, we disagree because all o f his constitutional claims were sub ject to dismissal. See Hedges v. Musco , 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]here the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless consi derations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”) (quotation marks omitted).6

private parties. “Although a private party can be liable under § 1983 if he or she willfully participates in a joint conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of a constitutional right,” Max v. Republican Comm. of Lancaster Cnty. , 587 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2009 ),
those circumstances are not present here. 6 Accordingly, Daniels’s § 1983 claims were subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Any claims brought by Daniels under § 1985 were also subject to dismissal

. That statute contains three subparts. Section 1985(1) is clearly inapplicable here, as that provision “prohibits two or more persons from interfering with a federal officer’s performance of his duties.” Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes

- Barre , 321 F.3d 411, 423 n.1 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Sections 1985(2) and (3) do not apply here either because, inter alia, Daniels has not alleged that Snyder and the others “colluded with the requisite racia l [] or

. . . otherwise class

- based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” Davis v. Twp. of Hillside , 190 F.3d 167, 171 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing § 1985(2) ) ; see Farber v. City of Paterson , 440 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (di scussing § 1985(3) ).

6 Daniels alleged that Snyder and Freeman “acted under the color of law made possible by status of th e [Florida trial court] judge.” (Compl. 7.) This allegation is insufficient to trigger § 198 3 because there is no indication that the judge participated in the alleged conspiracy

. Cf. Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. , 615 F.3d at 176. Indeed, Daniels’s al legations that Snyder and Freeman misled and li ed to the judge make clear that the judge was not part of the alleged conspiracy.7

In light of the above, the District Court did not err in dismissing Daniels’s complaint. 7 We will affirm that judgment.

7 There was no need for the District Court to grant Daniels leave to amend his complaint because any amendment would be futi le. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp. , 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).