### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d onBr ie fs O ct obe r 3, 200 7
TERRYJAM AR

NO RRIS v. T ONYPA RKE R, WAR DEN
Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Laud erdale County

No. 6128 Joseph H. Walk er, III, Judge

No. W2007-00594-C CA-R 3-HC - F iled Dece m ber 3, 2007

Th e pe tit ion e r, Te rr

y Jama r No rr is, a pp e a ls the summa

ry dis mis sa l of

his pro se petition for wr it of habea s corpus. F ollowing our revie w, we a ffirm the dismissal of the pe tition. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.
Terr y J amar Norris, He nning, T ennesse e, Pro Se.
Robert E. C o oper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a

nd Reporter ; and David H. F indley , Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION
F AC TS
On J une 3, 1999, the pet i t i o ner w as convic ted by a Shelby County jury of sec ond deg ree murder f or the Mar ch 10, 1997, shooting death of an acqua intance. He was sente nced by the trial c ourt as a vi ole nt o ff

e nd e r t o tw e nty -o ne y e ars in t he De pa rtme nt o f C or

re c tio n at 10 0% re le a se elig ibilit y . The pe titioner’s conviction wa s aff irmed on direc t a

ppeal, and our supre me cour t denied his application for pe rmission to appeal. S tate v. Te rry Norris, No. W2000-00707-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL1042184, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App. May 21, 2002), per m. to appeal de nied (Te nn. Nov. 4, 2002). The pe titioner later unsuc cessf ully soug ht p o st-conviction re lief fr om his conviction. See Terr y J amar Norris, No. W2005-01502-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL2069432, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App. J uly 26, 2006), per

m. to appeal de nied (Te nn. Dec . 18, 2006).
On Februa

ry 23, 2007, the petitioner filed a pr o s e petition f or writ of habea s corpus in the Circuit Court of L auder dale County , alleg ing that his conviction was void beca use at the time he was-2-

sentenced , T en n essee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-209( e) did not provide f or 100% se ntencing as a violent off

ender . On Fe bruar

y 26, 2007, the habe as cour t summar i l y d i s m i s s ed the petition, finding that there was nothingon the fa ce of the judg ment to show that the petitioner’s c onviction was void or his sentenc e expired. The c ourt noted that Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-35- 501, in effe ct at the time of the petitioner’s sentenc ing, mandated a 100% rele ase e ligibility date f or a convic tion for sec ond deg ree murder. T he petitioner the n filed an a ppeal to this court.
AN AL YSI S
On a pp e a l, t he pe tit ion e r a g a in c ites Ten nesse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -2 09 (e ) t o argue that th e 10 0% re le a se e lig ibi lity po rt ion of his se nte nc e re nd e rs his s ent ence il le g a l and his conviction void. The State a rgues that the sentence is not illega l beca use Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-35- 501 mandates that cer tain enumer ated of

fense s, including se cond degree murder, be serve d at 100% re lease elig ibilit y . We ag ree with the State.
I t is we ll- e sta

bli sh e d in Te nn e sse e that th e re me dy pr ov ide d b y

a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s is limit ed in scope and may only be invoked whe re the judgme nt is void or the petitioner’s term of imp ri so nme nt ha s e xpir e d. State v. Ritc hie , 2 0 S. W.3 d 6 24 , 6 29 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; State v. Da ve np or t, 980 S.W .2d 407, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). A judg ment is void “only when ‘ [i ]tappea

rs upon the fac e of the judgme nt or the rec ord of the proce eding s upon which the judg ment is render ed’ that a convic ting c ourt was without jurisdiction or authority to sentenc e a de fenda nt, or that a de fenda

nt’s sentenc e of im p ri s o n m ent or other restra int has expi red.” Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting Ritchie, 20 S.W .3d at 630) (othe r citations omitted). The petiti on e r

b e ar s th e b ur d e no f

s h o w in gb y

a p r e p o n d e r an c e o f

th e e v id e n c e th at t

he conviction is void or that the petitioner’s sentenc e has expired. Passare lla v. State, 891 S.W .2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Be cause the determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be g rante d is a question of law, w e re view this issue de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss give n to the finding s of the lower court. Ha

rt v. State, 21 S.W .3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)

. Th e statut e on

wh ic h th e pe tit ion e r r e lie s in su pp or t of his c la im that hi s se nte nc e is i lle g a l, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-2 09(e) , lists t he diffe rent infor mation that must be included on the unifor

m judgment document for e ach c onviction. At the time of the petitioner’ s c onvic tio n a

nd se nte nc ing , th e statut e state d in pe rt ine nt p art : (e ) A ft e r t

he de fe nd ant is se nte nc e d, the dis tr ic t atto rn e y g e ne ra l sh a ll complete the uniform judgme nt doc ument for the c onviction which shall indicate f or e a c h o ff e ns e the fo llo wi ng : (1) The ty pe of of fense for which the defe ndant was c harg ed and c onvicted, and the se nte nc e imp os e d; (2) Whether

the def endant wa s sentence d as a standa rd off ender ;-3- . . . . (6 ) Wh e the r t

he de fe nd ant w a s se nte nc e d a s a re pe at vi ole nt o ff

e nd e r; (7) Whether

the def endant wa s sentence d as an e speci al l y mitigated offe nder[.]
Tenn. Code Ann. 40- 35-209(e ) (1997) . In 2000, the st atut e wa s amende d by the inclusion of the following languag e, desig nated a s subsection (7), w ith t h e remaining subsec tions renumbere d acc o r d in g ly : “ Wh e th e r th e d e f e n d an t w a s s e n te n c e d a s a o n e hun dr e d p e r c e n t ( 1 0 0 % ) off ender pursuant to § 40-35-501( i)[.] ” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 209(e) (7) ( Supp. 2000).
In eff ect at the t ime the petit ioner wa s sentence d, howeve r, wa s Tennesse e Code Annotated se c tio n 4 0- 35 -5 01 , e nti tle d “ Re le a se e lig ibi lity status -C a lc ulatio ns ,” wh ic h state s in pe rt ine nt p art :

(i)(1) There shall be no rele ase eligibility for a person c ommitt ing a n offe nse, on or a ft e r Jul y

1, 19 95 , th at is e nume rate d in su bd ivi sio n ( 2) . Su c h p e rs on shall serve one hundre d perc ent (100%) of the sente nce imposed by the court less sentenc e cre dits ear

ned and reta ined. Howeve r, no sentenc e reduction cre dits authorized by § 4 1

- 2 1

- 2 3 6 , o r

an y o th e r p r o v is io no f

la w , s h a ll o p e r ate to r e d

u c e th e s e n te nce imposed by

the cour t by more than f

ifteen pe rce nt (15%). (2 ) T he of

fe ns e s to wh ic h th e pr ov isi on s o f s ub div isi on (1 ) a pp ly are :

. . . . ( B ) M ur d e r

in th e s e c o n d

d e g r e e [. ] Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-501(i)( 1), (2) (B ) (1997)

. The pe titioner has n o t , there fore , met his burden of showingby a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that his sentenc e is illeg al and his convic tion void.
CO NC LU SION
Ba sed on our r eview, we conclude that the l ower court did not err in summarily

dismiss ing the petition for wr it of habea s corpus. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the judg ment of the ha beas c ourt.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL ENN, JUDGE