In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-3237 

NANCY KNUDTSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

COUNTY OF TREMPEALEAU, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 3:18-cv-00354-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2020 — DECIDED DECEMBER 9, 2020 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. When his friend and mentor passed 

away, Taavi McMahon, the District Attorney for Trempealeau 

County, Wisconsin, decided to close his office for the day of 

the funeral and encouraged his staff to attend the service. One 

of those staff members, Nancy Knudtson, refused to attend 

because she wanted to complete some work at the office. Mr. 

McMahon took issue with Ms. Knudtson’s decision and both 

dug in their heels for what became a bitter dispute. 
2 No. 19-3237 

Eventually, the County placed Ms. Knudtson on paid administrative leave in an effort to de-escalate the dispute. Later, the 

County offered her another position at the same pay grade; 

Ms. Knudtson declined the alternate position. Because the 

County had no other available position, it then terminated her 

employment. 

Ms. Knudtson filed this action in the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, alleging that Mr. 

McMahon and Trempealeau County had violated the Establishment Clause because the funeral that she had refused to 

attend took place at a church and involved a religious service.1

In due course, Mr. McMahon and the County moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion. Because the district court correctly determined that the guarantees of the Establishment Clause were not violated by the actions of the defendants, we now affirm the judgment of the 

district court. 

I 

BACKGROUND 

At the time of her termination in March 2018, Ms. Knudtson had worked for the County for over forty-five years. Since 

1990, she had been assigned to work in the District Attorney’s 

Office. At first, she was a secretary and receptionist; then she 

became a legal secretary, and finally, starting in 2013, she 

worked as a paralegal/office manager. 

For the final six years of Ms. Knudtson’s tenure in the District Attorney’s office, Mr. McMahon served as the District 

1 The jurisdiction of the district court was predicated on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 

and 1443. 
No. 19-3237 3

Attorney. In addition to Ms. Knudtson, two other county employees worked in the District Attorney’s office; Robin Leonard served as the victim witness coordinator, and Carol Betthauser served as a legal assistant. Although Ms. Knudtson 

was a county employee, her written job description as a paralegal and office manager stated that she worked under the direction of the District Attorney. 

The events that precipitated this case began in September 

2017, when Gerald Fox, Mr. McMahon’s mentor and the District Attorney for Jackson County, Trempealeau’s neighboring county, passed away unexpectedly. Mr. Fox’s funeral was 

scheduled for September 8 at a Methodist church. The day before, Mr. McMahon emailed his staff, informing them that he 

planned to close his office on the day of Mr. Fox’s funeral so 

that employees could attend the service. Mr. McMahon also 

wrote, in part: “It is my preference that we all go to pay our 

respects but I will not require attendance, I will only encourage it.”2

 

A few hours after Mr. McMahon sent the email, 

Ms. Knudtson responded that she and the other two 

county-employed staff members in the DA’s office preferred 

to work in the office rather than attend Mr. Fox’s funeral. She 

explained that, under the County’s HR handbook, staff members were required to use vacation time to attend the funeral. 

She also noted that she was scheduled to meet with a law enforcement officer at the time of the funeral service to finish 

work on a recently assigned criminal complaint. 

2 R.45 ¶22. 
4 No. 19-3237 

Ms. Knudtson also informed Mr. McMahon that she planned 

to attend Mr. Fox’s wake that evening. 

In her deposition, Ms. Knudtson said that when she told 

Mr. McMahon that she did not want to attend Mr. Fox’s funeral, she did not know that the funeral would be a religious 

service. She had learned from Mr. Fox’s obituary that he was 

Methodist, but her decision not to attend Mr. Fox’s funeral 

had nothing to do with its religious nature.3

 

On the same day, September 7, Ms. Knudtson spoke with 

Amy Spriggle, the County’s Human Resources Director. 

Ms. Spriggle confirmed that if employees wished to attend 

the funeral, they would have to take a vacation day; the 

County’s rules require employees to use vacation time to attend a funeral for anyone other than a close relative. 

Ms. Spriggle then consulted the County Corporation Counsel, 

Rick Niemeier, who in turn called Mr. McMahon and told him 

that he must keep the District Attorney’s Office open to allow 

staff to work. Mr. McMahon declined to follow Mr. Niemeier’s advice. In his view, it was unfair to require employees 

to take vacation time in order to attend the funeral. 

On the day of the funeral, Mr. McMahon gathered 

Ms. Knudtson, Ms. Betthauser, and Ms. Leonard in a conference room and informed them that he still planned to close 

the office for the funeral. Mr. McMahon told Ms. Betthauser 

that if she was worried about the County’s requirement that 

she take a vacation day to attend the funeral, he would pay 

her out of his own pocket. Ms. Knudtson and Ms. Betthauser 

3 The parties do not dispute that Mr. Fox’s funeral was held in a Methodist 

church, that the service involved several scripture readings and religious 

songs, and that a pastor led the services. 
No. 19-3237 5

still wished to work rather than attend; Ms. Leonard agreed 

to attend. Ms. Knudtson recounts that Mr. McMahon became 

agitated. (It is disputed, but immaterial, exactly how agitated.) Mr. McMahon then gave Ms. Knudtson and Ms. Betthauser their options: (1) go to the funeral; (2) work from 

home; or (3) take a vacation day. Ms. Betthauser became upset 

and began to cry during this exchange with Mr. McMahon. 

Ms. Knudtson left the conference room to find Ms. Spriggle, the Human Resources Director. Ms. Knudtson and 

Ms. Spriggle then walked back to the District Attorney’s office, where Ms. Spriggle told Mr. McMahon that he could not 

force County staff to work from home. Eventually Ms. Betthauser agreed to attend the funeral despite her earlier reluctance. She testified in her deposition that she did not “want to 

make any waves.”4

Mr. McMahon then gave Ms. Knudtson three revised options: (1) attend the funeral; (2) work from home; or (3) take 

leave. Ms. Spriggle, during her deposition, recalled the third 

option as being a suspension.5 Ms. Spriggle informed 

Mr. McMahon that the County did not have a work from 

home policy, so the second option was essentially off the table. Mr. McMahon took issue with Ms. Spriggle’s involvement in his office’s affairs; the parties dispute whether 

Mr. McMahon voiced his displeasure using profanity. Endeavoring to de-escalate the situation, Ms. Knudtson left 

Mr. McMahon’s office to take a walk around the County 

building. 

4 R.49 ¶52. 

5 R.53 ¶55. 
6 No. 19-3237 

After Ms. Knudtson left the office, Mr. McMahon called 

the building maintenance staff to have the lock on the main 

office door changed. He next called the State’s information 

technology department in Madison, Wisconsin, to freeze 

Ms. Knudtson’s account and instructed that it was not to reactivate her account until he told it to do so. 

A short time after leaving Mr. McMahon’s office, 

Ms. Knudtson went to the County’s human resources department to speak with Ms. Spriggle and Mr. Niemeier. Ms. Spriggle assured Ms. Knudtson that she had done nothing wrong 

and that her job was not in jeopardy. Ms. Knudtson, in her 

deposition, recalled that Ms. Spriggle and Mr. Niemeier 

asked her whether she would consider attending the funeral, 

and she reiterated her desire not to attend.6

 Ms. Spriggle and 

Mr. Niemeier then decided to send Ms. Knudtson home for 

the day with full pay; Ms. Spriggle authorized Ms. Knudtson’s timesheet, which recorded Ms. Knudtson as working on 

September 8. The County then placed Ms. Knudtson on paid 

administrative leave until the situation stabilized. 

On either Monday, September 11, or Tuesday, September 

12 (during the week after the County placed Ms. Knudtson on 

paid administrative leave), Ms. Spriggle informed 

Mr. McMahon of Ms. Knudtson’s status. Then, on the day of 

that conversation or the next, Mr. McMahon met with 

Ms. Spriggle and Mr. Niemeier. During that meeting, 

Ms. Spriggle told Mr. McMahon that the options he had presented to Ms. Knudtson on the day of the funeral had not been 

feasible. Mr. McMahon then informed Ms. Spriggle that if Ms. 

Knudtson returned to the office, it would not be as the office 

6 R.19 at 30–31. 
No. 19-3237 7

manager and mentioned possibly terminating her. Ms. Spriggle left this conversation with the understanding that it would 

be highly difficult for Ms. Knudtson to return to work with 

Mr. McMahon. Later that week, Ms. Knudtson spoke to Ms. 

Spriggle over the phone and reiterated her desire to return to 

work as soon as possible.7

 

On September 18, Ms. Spriggle arranged for a meeting 

later in the week with Mr. McMahon, Ms. Knudtson, and 

Mr. Niemeier to discuss Ms. Knudtson’s return to work. That 

meeting took place on September 20. County Board Chairman 

Dick Miller and Chairman of the Executive/Finance Committee Dick Frey also attended. Mr. McMahon did not attend, apparently because he was hospitalized with chest pains. 

A week later, Mr. McMahon sent a letter to Ms. Spriggle. 

In the letter, Mr. McMahon wrote that Ms. Knudtson had 

abandoned her job and that he had not heard from her since 

the day of Mr. Fox’s funeral. Ms. Spriggle and Mr. Niemeier 

then clarified with Mr. McMahon that Ms. Knudtson had not 

abandoned her position; rather the County had placed her on 

paid administrative leave until the dispute cooled down. 

Mr. McMahon then conveyed that he was no longer interested in Ms. Knudtson’s returning to work in his office. 

From September 2017 until her eventual termination, 

Ms. Knudtson expressed a desire to return to work; she also 

expressed, however, a desire to no longer work with 

Mr. McMahon. In November 2017, the County Board 

7 Whether the County had the authority to order Ms. Knudtson back to 

work in the DA’s office is an unclear area of Wisconsin state law. Because 

that legal ambiguity ultimately does not impact our decision in this case, 

we have no reason to wade into the state law question. 
8 No. 19-3237 

attempted to facilitate another reconciliation between 

Mr. McMahon and Ms. Knudtson, but Mr. McMahon reiterated his belief that Ms. Knudtson’s return to the office would 

not be feasible. 

In January 2018, Ms. Spriggle contacted Ms. Knudtson 

about a possible new position with the County. During a 

closed-door session of the Executive/Finance Committee and 

Personnel/Bargaining Committee, County Board members 

discussed creating a new position for Ms. Knudtson. The idea 

was to transfer some of the DA’s Office’s duties (certain work 

on cases involving children in need of protective services or 

termination of parental rights) to the Corporation Counsel’s 

Office. Ms. Knudtson would work on the transferred cases in 

the new position, which would be at the same pay grade as 

her office manager position with the District Attorney’s Office.8

 But, because the plan involved transferring duties out of 

the DA’s office, a legal review and approval from other entities would be necessary. 

At the meeting, Ms. Knudtson requested a description of 

the new position, but the County told her that it did not yet 

have a position description.9 The day after the meeting, 

Ms. Knudtson told Ms. Spriggle that she would not accept the 

new position without a job description. In Ms. Knudtson’s 

8 R.44 ¶¶103–04. 

9 In her deposition, Ms. Spriggle did not recall Ms. Knudtson requesting 

a position description, but the differences in recollection are immaterial. 

Ms. Spriggle also testified that she would “like to think” she would have 

produced a job description if asked. R.16 at 25. 
No. 19-3237 9

view, she could not accept without knowing what duties the 

job entailed. 

A few weeks later, on February 13, 2018, the County sent 

Ms. Knudtson a letter terminating her effective March 9, 2018. 

In part, the County wrote: “Trempealeau County has 

attempted numerous times to resolve your employment 

situation in the District Attorney’s Office. The County 

attempted to return you to your position in the District 

Attorney’s Office, however, ... this has not been possible.” 

The County then noted Ms. Knudtson’s decision to turn down 

the potential new position: “The County also offered to create 

a new position ... in an attempt to allow you to continue your 

employment with [the] County ... . [Y]ou advised Ms. 

Spriggle that you were not interested in the proposed new 

position. Unfortunately, the County does not have an 

equivalent position available for you.”10 

Ms. Knudtson then filed this action. Her complaint alleged 

a violation of her rights under the Establishment Clause and 

under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. 

§ 215(a)(3).11 She brought no other federal claims and no state 

claims. 

Ms. Knudtson abandoned her FLSA claim at the summary 

judgment stage and proceeded with her Establishment Clause 

claim. The County and Mr. McMahon moved separately for 

summary judgment; the district court granted the motions. In 

its opinion, the district court rejected Ms. Knudtson’s Establishment Clause claim under both of her proposed theories—

10 R.49 ¶147. 

11 R.3. 
10 No. 19-3237 

the coercion test and primary effect prong of the Lemon test. 

With respect to the coercion argument, the district court took 

the view that neither the County nor Mr. McMahon had coerced Ms. Knudtson to participate in a religious activity because, in the end, she had the choice of attending the funeral 

or being placed on paid administrative leave and because she 

never actually attended Mr. Fox’s service. The district court 

also noted that Ms. Knudtson never objected on religious 

grounds to attending the funeral. As for the primary effect argument under the Lemon test, the district court concluded that 

Mr. McMahon’s and the County’s actions did not have the 

primary effect of establishing or inhibiting religion. 

Ms. Knudtson, the district court observed, refused to attend 

the funeral simply because she wanted to work in the office 

during the service. And Mr. McMahon wanted to close the office to honor his friend, not to advance or inhibit religion. No 

reasonable observer, therefore, would understand the governmental actions to be about religion. Therefore, the district 

court held that, on both Establishment Clause theories, 

Ms. Knudtson’s claim failed. 

Upon the district court’s entry of a final judgment, 

Ms. Knudtson timely filed this appeal.12

II 

DISCUSSION 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. Kimberly-Clark 

Corp., 647 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is 

appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

12 Our jurisdiction is secure under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
No. 19-3237 11

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We must draw “all justifiable 

inferences” in the nonmoving party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 

provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 

establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Its 

protections also operate against state and municipal 

governments. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 

1, 14–18 (1947). The Supreme Court has articulated several 

frameworks for evaluating Establishment Clause claims. Yet, 

irrespective of which analytical framework applies, “the 

touchstone for Establishment Clause challenges remains ‘the 

principle that the First Amendment mandates government 

neutrality between religion and religion, and between 

religion and nonreligion.’” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. 

Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 850 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting 

McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005)). We 

have noted frequently that Establishment Clause analysis 

requires a fact-intensive and context-intensive inquiry. See, 

e.g., id. 

Ms. Knudtson asks that we evaluate her claim under two 

Establishment Clause frameworks: the coercion test and the 

primary effect prong of the Lemon test. We therefore will examine the case under both of these frameworks. 

A. 

We turn first to the coercion test. This test “seeks to determine whether the government has applied coercive pressure 

on an individual to support or participate in religion.” Id. It is 

grounded in a pair of Supreme Court decisions: Lee v. 
12 No. 19-3237 

Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), and Santa Fe Independent School 

District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). In Lee, the Supreme Court 

invalidated a public school district’s practice of including 

benedictions at its middle and high school graduation ceremonies. The Supreme Court noted that school officials exercised a “high degree of control” over the ceremony. Lee, 505 

U.S. at 597. The middle school principal in Lee decided to include an invocation and benediction in the graduation ceremony. Id. at 587. He also chose the rabbi to perform the invocation and benediction. Consequently, the Supreme Court 

concluded, the school district “in every practical sense compelled attendance and participation in an explicit religious exercise at an event of singular importance to every student.” Id. 

at 598. 

In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court, following its precedent in 

Lee, invalidated a school district’s policy that authorized 

student-led prayer before high school football games. See 530 

U.S. at 301. There, the Court observed that the “invocations 

[were] authorized by a government policy and [took] place on 

government property at government-sponsored schoolrelated events.” Id. at 302. The Court also rejected the school 

district’s argument that the football games’ extracurricular 

status meant there was no coercion for students to attend. 

Some students—cheerleaders and members of the band—

were required to attend the games. And the Court observed 

that the choice between taking part in the tradition of high 

school football and avoiding “personally offensive religious 

rituals is in no practical sense an easy one.” Id. at 312. The 

Court ended its coercion test discussion by stating that “the 

Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively 

sponsors the particular religious practice.” Id. at 313. 
No. 19-3237 13

In Lee and Santa Fe, the religious activity or setting at issue 

was fairly attributed to the government. The religious element of the case was not mere happenstance. In Lee, the principal chose to have an invocation and selected the rabbi to offer a prayer. In Santa Fe, the school enacted a policy to facilitate the student-led prayer at football games. Similarly, in Doe 

ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District, 687 F.3d at 843, 855–56, 

we held that a school district’s decision to book a church as its 

graduation venue despite the danger of proselytization resulted in impermissible coercion. Moreover, in all three cases, 

the government took an affirmative step to involve religion in 

an activity it pressured individuals to participate in or a setting it pressured them to attend. See also Town of Greece, N.Y. 

v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 590 (2014) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) 

(noting Lee’s emphasis on the school’s control over the conduct of the students and substance of the graduation ceremony). The connection between the governmental pressure 

and the religious activity or setting must be tight enough that 

the government can be said to have “affirmatively sponsor[ed] the particular religious practice” at issue. See Santa Fe, 

530 U.S. at 313. 

Although Lee and Santa Fe both involved religious coercion at school, we have applied the coercion test in the employment context as well. In Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 

956, 970 (7th Cir. 1997), we held that a city police chief violated 

the Establishment Clause when he pressured an employee to 

“bring her thinking and her conduct into conformity with the 

principles of his own religious beliefs” and threatened to terminate her if she did not. 

Other circuits also have addressed religious coercion in 

the employment context, and their cases are illustrative of the 
14 No. 19-3237 

principle. In Warnock v. Archer, 380 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 2004), 

our colleagues in the Eighth Circuit addressed an art 

teacher/part-time bus driver’s challenge to a superintendent’s 

prayer at mandatory faculty meetings and the display of 

religious items in the superintendent’s office. It held that the 

superintendent’s conduct violated the Establishment Clause 

under the endorsement test, but not the coercion test. See id. 

at 1080. In rejecting the coercion claim, the court noted that 

the teacher’s relationship to the school was “contractual,” 

unlike the inherently coercive nature of the schoolchildren-toschool relationship seen in Lee and Santa Fe. In addition, the 

court noted that the teacher was “clearly a strong-willed adult 

who is unlikely to be indoctrinated by the religious activity of 

his employer.” Id. The Sixth Circuit reached a similar holding 

in Chaudhuri v. State of Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997). 

There, a professor at a state college challenged prayer at 

certain university events, including commencement. The 

Sixth Circuit held that there was no impermissible coercion 

because the school did not require faculty attendance at the 

events and, in any event, there was little risk that the Ph.D.-

credentialed professor would be susceptible to coercion in the 

same way that schoolchildren were in Lee. See id. at 238–39. 

On the other hand, in Marrero-Méndez v. Calixto-Rodríguez, 

830 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2016), the First Circuit concluded that unlawful coercion had occurred. In that case, commanding officers in the Puerto Rico Police Department ordered an officer to 

remain present during a group prayer and publicly chastised 

him for being atheist. Id. at 41–42. The court held that the considerable pressure to conform, the isolation the officer experienced, and the demotion resulting from his complaint about 

the incident constituted impermissible coercion. Id. at 44–45. 
No. 19-3237 15

The context that we encounter here is quite different from 

the cases in which our court and others have found government conduct to be coercive. The County’s agents, Ms. Spriggle and Mr. Niemeier, never pressured Ms. Knudtson to attend the funeral. They asked at one point whether Ms. Knudtson would consider attending the funeral, but, when considered in context, that question was posed in a manner clearly 

designed to cool off the increasingly heated dispute between 

Mr. McMahon and Ms. Knudtson. The lack of coercion is 

evinced in Ms. Spriggle and Mr. Niemeier’s support of 

Ms. Knudtson’s decision not to attend. Ms. Knudtson’s eventual termination stemmed not from her refusal to attend the 

funeral, but from her decision to decline the alternate position 

the County offered, an offer that further shows that the 

County did not exert impermissible pressure on Ms. Knudtson. 

As for Mr. McMahon, even though his initial email suggested attending the funeral was voluntary, his subsequent 

demeanor toward Ms. Knudtson and Ms. Betthauser perhaps 

suggested otherwise. Still, Mr. McMahon’s pressure on 

Ms. Knudtson—though short of the temperament we hope to 

see public officials display—is different in kind from that at 

the heart of Lee and Santa Fe. Here, Mr. McMahon’s affirmative decision was simply to close his office for the day of 

Mr. Fox’s funeral. Mr. McMahon’s pressure on Ms. Knudtson 

and Ms. Betthauser stemmed not from their refusal to attend 

the funeral, but from their challenge to his authority to close 

his office. That Mr. McMahon also voiced frustration with 

Ms. Spriggle and Mr. Niemeier’s similar challenge to his authority only confirms the conclusion that closing the office 

was at the front of Mr. McMahon’s mind. Moreover, it is clear 

that Mr. McMahon would have made the same decision to 
16 No. 19-3237 

close his office had Mr. Fox’s funeral been at a Baptist church, 

a Catholic church, a Synagogue, a Mosque, or someplace entirely secular. Mr. McMahon’s conduct was unrelated to the 

religious nature of Mr. Fox’s funeral. He did not control or 

choose the venue for Mr. Fox’s funeral. He also had no say 

about the content of the funeral service. In short, that 

Mr. Fox’s funeral took place at a Methodist church had nothing to do with Mr. McMahon’s actions. Nor did Ms. Knudtson’s objection to attending have anything to do with the religious nature or venue of the ceremony. This case is an ordinary employment dispute about business hours and leave; it 

does not invoke the concerns central to the Establishment 

Clause. 

Our observation that the challenged religious activity 

must be fairly attributed to the government does not mean the 

government must act with a religious motive in order to fail 

the coercion test. For example, the principal in Elmbrook chose 

the church to host the school’s graduation because the 

school’s gymnasium, a prior graduation venue, had a history 

of uncomfortable seating and temperature. See 687 F.3d at 844. 

Nothing in that case suggested that the principal acted with 

the motive of exposing the schoolchildren to religion. Still, we 

said that the principal’s decision to hold the graduation 

ceremony—an event of immense importance to the 

students—in an indisputably religious setting constituted 

impermissible religious coercion. Yet, there, unlike here, the 

government chose affirmatively to involve religion in the 

mandatory graduation ceremony. 

As we have said in the past, “before we can find that something runs afoul of the Establishment Clause, we must do 

more than spot a single religious component of a challenged 
No. 19-3237 17

activity, no matter how inconsequential.” Mayle v. United 

States, 891 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)). Context is key in ascertaining 

whether the government has endorsed religion or preferred 

one religion over another. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 315. Here, 

two factors are especially important to our holding that neither Mr. McMahon nor the County impermissibly coerced 

Ms. Knudtson. First, Ms. Knudtson is an adult. Both Lee and 

Santa Fe involved schoolchildren—primarily middle and high 

school students. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 593; see Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 

at 311–12. We also have highlighted the “heightened” concerns of coercion when young students are involved, particularly when the students are a “captive audience.” See Freedom 

from Religion Found., Inc. v. Concord Cmty. Schs., 885 F.3d 1038, 

1048–49 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 592). In other 

cases, the Supreme Court has noted that adults are less susceptible to pressure. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 

(1983) (Adults are “presumably not readily susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination’ or peer pressure.” (internal citations 

omitted)). 

Second, this case involves a funeral. A sad, but ordinary, 

part of being an adult in our society is attending funerals for 

family, friends, neighbors, and coworkers. In our pluralistic 

society, an individual inevitably will attend the funeral of 

someone who chooses to mark the end of life in a manner different from one’s own traditions. Those in public life, or public service as representatives of the community, probably encounter this situation more often than most of their fellow citizens. In our contemporary American culture, funeral services 

are, at least in part, different from other religious services. It 
18 No. 19-3237 

is common for members of many faiths, or no faith, to attend 

funeral services. Funeral services offer an opportunity for 

people to come together to remember and honor the deceased. Absent extraordinary circumstances, Americans perceive no threat of religious coercion when obligations of office, employment, or social relationships require attendance 

at a religious funeral service. Such community participation 

simply does not raise the degree of concern that accompanied 

the practices in Lee or Santa Fe. Organizing a delegation from 

a public office to attend a funeral normally raises no implication that the government, or any of its officials, endorse the 

religion of the deceased person. 

B. 

Ms. Knudtson also invokes the Lemon test’s primary effect 

analysis. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971), the 

Supreme Court held that government action violates the Establishment Clause if it: (1) lacks a legitimate secular purpose; 

(2) has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; 

or (3) fosters an excessive entanglement with religion. Justice 

O’Connor later wrote that Lemon’s primary effect prong 

means that government may not communicate a message of 

religious endorsement or disapproval. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 

(O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor’s opinion in 

Lynch—articulating the so-called “endorsement test”—is a 

“legitimate part of Lemon’s second prong.” Elmbrook, 687 F.3d 

at 850. “Under the ‘endorsement’ approach, that inquiry is designed to show whether the government is pushing for the 

adoption of a particular religion.” Mayle, 891 F.3d at 684. And, 

critically, we apply the primary effect test—and the endorsement articulation of that test—through the lens of an objectively reasonable observer. Id. 
No. 19-3237 19

Assessed under the endorsement test, Ms. Knudtson’s 

claim again fails. No reasonable observer would conclude 

that Mr. McMahon’s encouraging his staff to attend his mentor’s funeral was an endorsement of religion. As we have 

noted earlier, considering the totality of the circumstances, it 

is clear that religion did not play any role in Mr. McMahon’s 

request for his staff to attend Mr. Fox’s funeral or in 

Ms. Knudtson’s refusal to attend. A reasonable observer 

would conclude that the encouragement to attend the funeral 

was related to Mr. McMahon’s admiration for Mr. Fox, not a 

stance on the religious aspects of the funeral service.13 Thus, 

Ms. Knudtson’s Establishment Clause claim fails under the 

endorsement test. 

Conclusion 

Under either of the analytical approaches proffered by 

Ms. Knudtson, the same result obtains: there has been no violation of the Establishment Clause. The reason why 

Ms. Knudtson’s claim fails, as the district court astutely realized, is that religion played no part in Mr. McMahon’s entreaty to his staff to attend the funeral. At bottom, his dispute 

with his staff, including Ms. Knudtson, was over the closure 

of the office. The County’s agents never coerced Ms. Knudtson to attend the funeral and certainly never took any action 

that implicated religion. 

13 Cf. Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523, 527–29 (7th 

Cir. 2009) (violation of Establishment Clause when Sherriff invited religious group to his office multiple times and allowed the group to convey 

religious messages to the government-employed staff). 
20 No. 19-3237 

The district court correctly granted summary judgment to 

the defendants; its judgment is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED