### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma y 3, 200 5

JOHNN Y L . B UTL ER v. ST ATE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -28609 Chris Craft, Judge

No. W2004-02237-C CA-R 3-CO - F iled Jul y 26, 2005

Th e pe tit ion e r, John ny L

. B utl e r, app e a ls the dis mis sa l of his pe tit ion fo r w ri t of

e rr or c or a m no bis

. I n this appeal, he asserts that his conviction is voi d beca use the indictment wa s defe ctive and that his guilty plea wa s not knowingly

and intellige ntly

made. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., delivere d t h e o p inion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

J ohnny L . Butler , Memphis, Tennesse e, pro se

.
Paul G. Summers, A ttorney Gene ral & Reporter ; D avid H. Findley , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; and J ames Wax, Assi stant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

On No ve mbe r 1 9, 19 74 , the pe tit ion e r e nte re d a ple a of g uil ty to on e c ou nt o f r ob be ry wi th a dea dly wea pon. By ag ree ment, he re ceive d a ten- y ear sentenc e in the De partment of Corr ection. I n J une of 2004, the petitioner file d a petition for writ of err or cor am nobis, contending that the ind ic tme nt w a s d e fe c tiv e . T he tria l c ou rt c on c lud e d th a t be c a us e th e pe tit ion e r a lle g e d n o n e wl y dis c ov e re d ev ide nc e a nd be c a us e the statut e of lim itatio ns fo r p ur su ing a writ o f e rr or

c or a m no bis had expired, the pe tition s hould be treated as a petition for habe as cor

pus relief

. T he court determined that the petitioner wa s not entitled to habeas c orpus re lief bec ause the lang uag e of the indictment was " sufficie nt to put the defendant on notice of the crime char g ed" and dismissed the petition.

I n this appeal, the pe titioner as s er t s t h at the indictment is defe ctive bec ause it make s no ref ere nce to the statute which wa s violated and is otherw ise insufficien t t o char g e the of fense of

ro bb e ry wi th a de a dly we apo n. I n a

re la te d iss ue , he c la ims that his g uil ty ple a wa s n ot kno wi ng ly and intellige ntly

enter ed because the faulty indictment deprive d the t rial court of j urisdiction. The-2-

state s u b mi ts th a t th e p e ti ti o n e r is n o t e n ti tl e d to a w r it o f e rr o r c o r a m n o b is b e c a u s e th e r e is no alleg ation of n ew l y discovere d evidenc e. In addition, the state conte nds that the petitioner is not entitled to habea s corpus re lief bec ause he is not "re strained of his libert y " as a re sult of the challeng ed convic tion.

The writ of err or cor am nobis develope d at common law as a proce dural mec hanism to allow

c ou rt s to pr ov ide re lie f at a tim e wh e n the re wa s n o mo tio n f or ne w t ri a l a ndno ri g ht t o a

pp e a l. S ta te v. Mix on, 983 S.W .2d 661, 667 (T en n

. 1999). The pr ocedur e permitted the trial court " to reope n and corr ect its judg ment upon discovery of a substantial f actua l e rror not a

ppearin g i n t h e record which, if known at the time of judg ment, would have pr evente d t h e j u d gm ent from be ing pronounce d." I d. The c ommon law writ was c odified in 1858 and later extended to criminal ca ses in 1 95 5. I d. Th e c ur

re nt s ta tut e pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s: Th e re is h e re by

ma de a va ila

ble to c on vic te d d e fend ant s in c ri min a l c a se s a pr oc e e din g in the natur e of a writ of e rr or c or a m no bis , to be g ov e rn e d b y the sa me rules and pr ocedur e applica ble to the writ of error coram nobis in civil case s, except insofar as inconsistent here with. Notice of the suing out of the writ shall be se rved

on the dis tr i c t a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l

. N o j u d g e s h a l l h a v e a u t h o r i t y t o o r d e r t h e w r i tto operate as a supersede as. The c ourt shall have a uthority to order the person ha ving custody of the pe titioner to produce the petitioner in court f or the he aring of the proce eding . The re lief obtaina b l e by this procee ding sha ll be confine d to error s dehors the r ecor d and to matters that wer e not or could not have be en litigated on the trial of the c ase, on a

motion for a new trial, on appe al in the natureof a w rit of er ror, on writ of er

ror, or in a habeas corpus proce eding

. Upon a showing by the def endant that the def

endant wa s without fault in failing to pre sent ce rtain evide nce at the proper time, a writ of err or cora m nobis will lie for subsequently or new ly discovere d evidenc e re lating to matter s which we re litig ated at the trial if the judg e dete rmines that such evide nce may

have resulted in a differe nt judgment, ha d it been pre sented

a tt h e tr i a l

. T h e i s s u e s h a l l b e t r i e d b y t h e c o u r tw i t h o u tth e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f a j u r y, and if the de cision be in favor of the petitioner, the judg ment complained of shall be set aside a nd the def

endant sha ll be g rante d a new trial in that cause

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 26-105. " [A] petiti o n fo r writ of e rror coram nobis must be dismissed as

un tim e ly un le ss i t is fi le d w ith in on e y e ar of the date on wh ic h the jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n b e c a me final in the trial court." Mixon, 983 S .W.2d at 670.

As the state points out, the petitioner does not assert any "subse quently

or new ly discovere d

e v i d e n c e

. " In c o n s e q u e n c e , t h e tr i a l c o u r td i d n o te rr b y d e n y i n g t h e w r i t o f e rr o r c o r a m n o b i s

. In addition, because the pe titioner alleg ed tha t t h e t ri al court was without jurisdiction to convict or sentenc e him, the trial court properly treated the petition as one for habeas corpus relief

. See Norton v. Everha rt, 895 S.W .2d 317, 319 (Tenn. 1995) (" I t is well settled that a trial court is not bound by the title of the plea ding, but ha s the discre tion to treat the plea ding a ccor ding to the relief soug ht.") ;
see a lso Arzolia Charles Goines v. State, No. E1999-0 2 4 59-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Aug . 25, 2000).T h e Po s t

- Co n v i c t i o n Pr o c e d u r e A ct c odi f i ed at T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on s 40- 30- 101 t h r u 40- 30- 122 1
des cr i bes t h e pr oce du r e for f i l i n g a pe t i t i on for pos t

- con v i ct i on re l i ef

. T h e or i g i n al P os t

- Conv i ct i on P r oce du r e Act of 1 9 6 7 d i d no t i nc l ud e a st atute o f l i m i t ati o ns. In 19 8 6 , t he G en era l A ssem b l y ad o p t ed a three

- yea r st atute o f l i m i t ati o ns. Se e T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 0

- 1 0 2 (rep eal ed 19 9 5 ). I n 19 9 5 , our l egi sl at ure ame nd ed t he P o st

- C o nvi ct i o n P roce d ure A ct s uch t hat und er o ur current law, a p et i t i o ner m ust seek p o st

- co nvi ct i o n rel i ef " wi t hi n o ne (1) year o f the d at e o f

t he f i nal ac t i on of t he hi gh es t s t at e appel l at e cour t t o w hi ch an appeal i s t ake n or , i f no appeal i s t ake n, wi t hi n one ( 1) y ear of t h e dat e on w h i ch t h e j u dg men t bec ame f i n al

. " T en n

. Code An n

. § 40- 30- 102( a) ( 2003)

. Ac cor di n g l y , a pe t i t i on for po s t

- convi ct i on r el i ef

i s t i me- barr ed i n t hi s ca s e.
-3- The writ of

h ab e a s c o rp u s is g u ar a n te e d b y A r ti c le 1 , s e c ti o n 1 5 o f th e T e n n e s s ee Constit ution, which provides that "the privilege of the writ of Habe as Corpus shall not be suspende d,

un le ss wh e n in ca se of re be lli on or inv a sio n, the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y sh a ll d e c lare the pu bli c sa fe ty requ ir es it ." Te nn . Co ns t. a rt . I , § 15 . A lth ou g h th e writ o f h abe a s c or pu s is c on sti tut ion a lly g uara nteed, it has be en re g ulated by statute for more than a hundr ed y ear s. See Ussery v. Avery , 222 Tenn. 5 0 , 432 S.W .2d 656, 657 (1968). Our curr ent code provides that " [a] ny person imprisoned or restrained of liberty
, under any prete nse whatsoever, e x cept in ca ses spec ified in § 29-21-102, ma y prosec ute a writ of habea s corpus, to inquire into the ca use of suc h imprisonment and restraint." Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 21-101.

Al tho ug h th e la ng ua g e of the statut e is b ro a d, the c ou rt s of th is sta te ha ve lon g he ld that a writ of habe as cor

pus may be g rante d only

when the pe titioner has established a lack of jurisdiction for the o r d e r o f c o n f

in e me n t o r th a t h e is o th e r w is e e n ti tl e d to im me d iate r e le a s e b e c a u s e of the expiration of his sente nce. See Ussery , 432 S.W .2d at 658; State ex re l. Wade v. Norve ll, 1 Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 44 7, 44 3 S.W.2 d 839 (1 96 9) . U nli ke the fe de ra l w ri t of ha be a s c or pu s, re lie f i s a va ila

ble in this st ate only

when it appe ars o n the fa ce of the judg ment or the re cord that the trial court wa s without jurisdi ction to convict or sente nce the petitioner or that the se ntence of imprisonment has otherwise e x pired. Ar cher v. State, 851 S.W .2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993); Potts v. State, 833 S.W .2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992). Unlike t he post -convic tion petition, which would afford a means of r elief f

or
c on sti tut ion a l vio la tio ns , su c h a s the de privatio n of the e ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l, the pu rp os e of the ha be a s c or pu s p e tit ion is t o c on te st a vo id, no t mer e ly

a vo ida ble , ju dg me nt. State e x re l. 1 Newsome v. Hende rson, 221 Tenn. 24, 424 S.W .2d 186, 189 (1969). A petitioner c annot attac k a fa c ia lly va lidc on vic tio n in a

ha be a s c or pu s p ro c e edi ng. P otts, 83 3 S. W.2 d at 62 ; State e x re l. Holbrook v. B omar, 211 Te nn. 243, 364 S.W .2d 887, 888 (1963).
The poli cy behind l imiti ng habea s corpus relief to fa cially void convictions is "g rounded on the strong presumption of validi ty that attache s to final judg ments of courts of g ener al jurisdiction." State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W .3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000) . I n Ritchie, o u r s u p re m e co u rt reiter ated the limit ed natur e of ha

beas c orpus re lief:

I n a ll c a se s w he re a pet it ion e r mus t in tr od uc e pr oo f b e y on d th e re c or d to

e sta bli sh the inv a lid ity

of his c on vic tio n, the n th a t con vic tio n b y de fi nit ionis m e re ly voidable, and a

Tenne ssee co u rt cannot issue the w rit of habe as cor pus under suc h

c ir c ums ta nc e s. Un lik e the pr oc e du re s g ov e rn ing the a va ila bil ity of the fe de ra l w ri t of ha be a s cor pu s, ou r p ro c e du re s d o n ot c on te mpl a te that a pe tit ion e r m a y

re lit itg a te-4-

fac ts in a habea s corpus proce eding

. Be cause a convic tion is either void on its face for want of j urisdiction, or i t is not, the need for a n evidentiary hearing in a

habea s corpus pr ocee ding should ra rely arise . . . . I d.

I n th i s ca s e, the petitioner a sserts that the trial c ourt was without jurisdiction because the indictment was def

ective. H e also a lleg es t hat bec ause the indictment was def ective, his g uiltyplea

wa s n ot knowing ly

a ndvo lun tari ly

e nte re d. Th e pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th a t he is r e str a ine d o f h is liberty by the 1974 conviction bec ause that conviction was used to enhanc e his sentenc e for a later fe de ra l c on vic tio n. Th e te n- y e ar se nte nc e he re c e ive d f or that c on vic tio n e xpir e d mo re than tw e nty y ear s ag o.

Rece ntly , in Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16 (Tenn. 2004), our supr eme c ourt addre ssed whether a petitioner w as entitled to seek ha b ea s co rp us relief

from a judg ment when the se ntence had bee n fully

serve d but the conviction was use d to enhanc e the se ntence for a subsequent off

ense. I n Hickman, the pe titioner pled guilty to one count of possession of marijuana in 1986 and re ceive d a ten- day suspended se ntence and a f ifty -dollar f

ine. Some six teen y ear s later, a fter be ing c onvicted of a su bs e qu e nt c ri me a ndfa c ing po ssi ble se nte nc e e nh a nc e me nt i n th e Un ite d State s Di stric t Co urt, the petitioner filed a

petition for writ of habea s corpus, contending that the possibili ty of sentenc e enha n ce m en t b as ed upon the 1986 conviction was a r estraint on his liberty . Our supre me court aff irmed the trial c ourt' s dismis sal of the petition, holding that while a person may be re strained of lib e rt y wi tho ut b e ing ph y sic a lly c on fi ne d, the po ssi bil ity of fu tur e se nte nc e e nh a nc e me nt w a s n ot a restrai n t o f l iberty

sufficie nt to permit the filing of a petition for writ of habea s corpus. I d. at 22. Our hig h court rule d that a petitioner may seek ha beas c orpus re l i ef only

"w hen the c halleng ed jud g me n t it s e lf im

p o s e s a r e s tr a in t u p o n th e p e ti ti o n e r ' s f r e e d o m o f a c ti o n o r mo v e me nt." I d. Further, the hig h court he ld that "[u]se of t he challeng ed judgment t o enhanc e the sentenc e imposed

o n a s ep ar at e c o n v i c t i o n i s n o ta r es tra i n to f l i b er t y s u ff i ci en tt o p er m i ta h ab ea s co rp u s ch al l en ge to the orig inal conviction long afte r the sente nce on the orig inal conviction has e x pired." I d. at 23.

I n our view, this ca se is indisti ng uishable fr om Hickman. The petitioner, inca rce rate d for a fede ral c onviction, seeks re lief fr om his 1974 Tenne ssee c onviction. His ten-y ear sentenc e has long sinc e ex pired. B eca

use the pe titioner is no longer restrained of his liberty

as a r esult of the 1974 conviction, he may

not seek ha

beas c orpus re lief. See id.

I n any event, the pe titioner has fa iled to establish that his conviction is void, a r equire ment fo r the g rant of ha

be a s c or pu s re lie f. Th e ind ic tme nt, wh ic h the pe tit ion e r c la ims is ins uf fi c ie nt t o
c ha rg e a n o ff e ns e , p ro vid e s a s f

oll ow s: The g rand juror s of the State of Te nnessee , duly elec ted, empane led, sworn

a ndc ha rg e d to inq uir e in andfo r the bo dy of the Cou nty

of She lby , in the Sta te
a f o r e s a i d
, u p o n t h e i r

o a t h
, p r e s e n t t h a t[ t h e d e f e n d a n t ]

. . . d i d u n l a w f u l l y, feloniously , violently

and for cibly

by Use of D eadly

Weapons to-wit: pistol s and knife make an assault on the person of Jerry Palmer and putting him in gr eat da ng er
a ndbo dil y

fe ar o f h is lif

e , an d did the n an d the re un la wf ull y a ndfe lon iou sly

a ndwi th-5-

forc e and violenc e af

oresa id, steal, take and car ry away fr o m the per son of J erry Palmer, [money

and prope rty

with a value of

] $395.95. T h i s l an gu age tra ck s t h e l an gu age o f t h e s t at u t o ry p ro v i s i o n s i n ef fe ct att h e t i m e o f t h e p et i t i o n er 's conviction. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-3901, -4914 (Supp. 1974). That t he indi ctment does not contain a statutory citation does not rende r i t defe ctive. See gene rally State v. Hill, 924 S.W .2d 725 (Tenn. 1997) . I n our view, the indictment provided adequate notice to the petitioner of the char g ed of fe ns e a nda

pr op e r b a sis fo r the e ntry of jud g me nt.

Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE