1

The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 06-2985

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Clinton Bell, *

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: December 14, 2006

 Filed: March 27, 2007

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Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Clinton Bell (Bell) conditionally pled guilty to being in possession of a stolen

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), reserving the right to appeal the district

court’s1

 denial of Bell’s motion to suppress. On appeal, Bell renews his challenge to

the denial of his suppression motion. We affirm.
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I. BACKGROUND

On July 29, 2005, an early-morning burglary of Fort Thompson Sporting Goods

(Fort Thompson) in Little Rock, Arkansas, resulted in the theft of seventy-seven

handguns and three assault rifles. Given the nature of the items stolen, the North

Little Rock Police Department (NLRPD) prioritized the burglary’s investigation and

deployed a large number of NLRPD detectives and officers. Employees of the store

informed NLRPD the stolen guns were new with price tags still attached. Neither the

information regarding the store’s identity nor the guns bearing price tags was made

public before 10:00 p.m. on July 29 at the earliest.

Around 3:00 p.m. that day, Detective R. C. Cox (Detective Cox), a NLRPD

police officer with fifteen years of experience, received a call from a patrol officer,

who stated an individual (the informant) voluntarily contacted the police and had

information about the Fort Thompson burglary. Detective Cox met with the

informant, picking the informant up and interviewing her at the NLRPD. Although

the informant had not previously provided information to the NLRPD, the informant

knew details of the Fort Thompson burglary that were not yet public knowledge. The

informant gave Detective Cox the names of some persons possibly involved in the

burglary, but did not specifically mention Bell’s name. The informant reported

observing “brand-new” guns, still bearing their price tags, being sold from Apartment

31 at Hemlock Courts, a housing development in North Little Rock. The informant

reported she saw guns being moved from the apartment and observed the guns in the

trunk and under the hood of a “newer looking, clean, white Honda [Accord].” The

informant reported the white Honda Accord was parked in front of or near Apartment

31. Before ending the meeting, Detective Cox obtained the informant’s name, phone

number, and other contact information.

NLRPD Detective Brandt Carmical (Detective Carmical) took an unmarked

vehicle to investigate the informant’s tip. While driving through Hemlock Courts,

Detective Carmical observed only one white Honda Accord, which was parked in a

lot near Apartment 31. According to Detective Carmical’s testimony, shortly after he
2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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began surveillance, a man and a woman exited either Apartment 30 or 31 (which were

located next door to each other), entered the white Honda Accord, and drove out of

the parking lot. Detective Carmical contacted his supervisor, who instructed Detective

Carmical to follow the vehicle and stop it to search for guns. Detective Carmical then

contacted dispatch and requested a patrol officer stop the vehicle. 

NLRPD Officer Michael Miller (Officer Miller) responded to Detective

Carmical’s call. Officer Miller was advised the vehicle was linked to the Fort

Thompson burglary and might contain firearms. Given the risk the vehicle might

contain weapons, Officer Miller was instructed to treat the investigative stop as a

felony stop and to handcuff the vehicle’s occupants in accordance with NLRPD

practice.

Upon stopping the vehicle, Officer Miller and the other responding officers

approached the vehicle with their weapons drawn and shouted at the occupants to exit

the vehicle. The driver, later identified as Bell, turned and reached back toward the

dashboard and console area before exiting. The officers handcuffed Bell and his

passenger, Deundra Baker (Baker). Officer Miller looked inside the vehicle,

observing clumps of a white powdery substance scattered across the driver’s side floor

mat and a plastic baggie sticking up underneath the console. Officer Miller then

pulled a plastic baggie containing suspected (later confirmed) crack cocaine from the

vehicle’s console. Officer Miller arrested Bell and Baker, and transported them to the

NLRPD.

At the NLRPD, Detective Cox read Bell his Miranda2

 rights. Bell waived his

rights and admitted in a taped statement he had one of the stolen Fort Thompson guns.

After giving his statement, Bell accompanied officers to retrieve the gun from his

apartment. Officers later confirmed the gun was one of the Fort Thompson guns

stolen earlier that day.
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Following Bell’s indictment for being a felon in possession of a firearm and for

possession of a stolen firearm, Bell moved to suppress the gun and his post-arrest

statement. The district court denied Bell’s motion, holding the officers (1) had

reasonable suspicion to stop Bell’s vehicle, (2) did not use unreasonable force during

the stop given their suspicion the vehicle might contain weapons, and (3) had probable

cause to arrest Bell for the drugs found in the vehicle. Bell thereafter entered a

conditional plea of guilty to possession of a stolen firearm, reserving the right to

appeal the district court’s order. The district court sentenced Bell to 51 months’

imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. On appeal, Bell renews his challenge

to the stop, detention, and arrest.

II. DISCUSSION

When reviewing a district court’s denial of a suppression motion, we review for

clear error the district court’s factual findings and review de novo whether the Fourth

Amendment was violated. See United States v. Sledge, 460 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir.

2006), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2007 WL 469747 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2007) (No. 06-

9403). “Guided by this standard, we must affirm the district court’s decision on a

suppression motion unless it is not supported by substantial evidence on the record;

it reflects an erroneous view of the applicable law; or upon review of the entire record,

[we are] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”

United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 686 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted).

Bell first argues the arresting officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his

car. The Fourth Amendment permits an investigative stop of a vehicle if officers have

a reasonable suspicion the vehicle or its occupants are involved in criminal activity.

United States v. Bell, 183 F.3d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1999). Officers must possess “a

particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity. United States v.

Jacobsen, 391 F.3d 904, 906 (8th Cir. 2004). “Whether the particular facts known to

the officer amount to an objective and particularized basis for a reasonable suspicion

of criminal activity is determined in light of the totality of the circumstances.” United

States v. Maltais, 403 F.3d 550, 554 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1345
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(2006). “[T]he standard employed is less demanding than the standard of probable

cause that governs arrests and full-scale Fourth Amendment searches, both with

respect to the amount of supporting information that is required to establish reasonable

suspicion and with respect to the degree of reliability that the information must

exhibit.” United States v. Spotts, 275 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Alabama

v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)); see, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,

7 (1989). 

Reasonable suspicion may be based on an informant’s tip where the tip is both

reliable and corroborated. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972);

Jacobsen, 391 F.3d at 906. In this case, the suspicion to stop Bell’s vehicle was based

on more than “inarticulate hunches.” See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 22 (1968). An

informant reported observing some of the stolen firearms both at Apartment 31 in

Hemlock Courts and in a newer-looking white Honda Accord parked in front of or

near Apartment 31. In assessing the informant’s reliability and credibility, Detective

Cox considered the informant’s willingness to contact NLRPD officials voluntarily,

to meet at the NLRPD with Detective Cox personally, and to provide the informant’s

own personal information. See United States v. Carpenter, 422 F.3d 738, 744 (8th

Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1115 (2006) (holding officers could assess the

informant’s credibility and reliability given the information was provided in person).

Detective Cox also considered the informant’s knowledge of certain details of the

burglary, specifically, information that was not yet publicly known, including the

identity of the store burglarized and the fact the guns stolen were new and still

displayed price tags. Detective Carmical corroborated the informant’s tip through his

investigation and surveillance of Apartment 31 and the white Honda Accord (the only

vehicle of its description located at the Hemlock Courts apartment complex), thus

strengthening the reliability of the tip. See id. Accordingly, Detective Carmical had

reasonable suspicion to believe the vehicle might be carrying some of the firearms

stolen from Fort Thompson, thereby permitting an investigative stop of the vehicle.
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Bell next argues, even assuming there was reasonable suspicion to stop his

vehicle, the officers’ conduct exceeded the legitimate bounds of an investigative stop

because they drew their weapons, ordered Bell out of the car and to the ground,

handcuffed him, and placed him under arrest. Again, we disagree. “The scope of the

detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification,” and “the

investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably

available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” Florida

v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); see, e.g., United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d

910, 916 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc). During any investigative stop, “officers may take

steps reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety.” United States v.

Shranklen, 315 F.3d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 2003). In light of the nature of the suspected

crime of possession of stolen handguns and assault rifles, as well as the possibility of

firearms inside the vehicle, the officers’ actions were reasonably necessary to maintain

the status quo, protect the officers, and allow them to conduct a limited search of the

vehicle immediately and without interference. See United States v. Navarrete-Barron,

192 F.3d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding officers’ actions of drawing firearms while

approaching defendant’s vehicle, handcuffing vehicle’s occupants, and placing them

in a police unit were reasonable given officers’ reasonable suspicion the vehicle’s

occupants “had been or were engaged in drug trafficking, which very often is

accompanied by dangerous weapons”). 

Additionally, we agree with the district court that Officer Miller’s observation

of Bell’s furtive movement toward the vehicle’s console immediately following the

stop “further counseled for caution on the part of the officers.” Given the nature of

the firearms burglary, the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe Bell might be

reaching for a weapon and thus were justified in searching the vehicle’s interior and

console under the limited protective search doctrine. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.

1032, 1047-49 (1983). Because “investigative detentions involving suspects in

vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers,” the Supreme Court has

recognized that once reasonable suspicion is established, a limited search of an

automobile’s passenger compartment for weapons is permissible. Id. at 1047, 1049.
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“This limited search is no less permissible where, as here, the occupants have been

removed from the automobile before the search is made.” United States v. Cummins,

920 F.2d 498, 502 (8th Cir. 1990). Once Officer Miller looked into the vehicle and

observed in plain view both the clumps of white powder on the floor mat and a plastic

baggie sticking out from the console, Officer Miller conducted a limited search of the

vehicle’s console, where Bell had reached before exiting the vehicle, and discovered

the baggie of crack cocaine. At that point, Officer Miller had probable cause to arrest

Bell for the drugs. See id. (concluding officers had probable cause to arrest upon

discovering drugs on the floor of defendant’s car). 

Because Bell’s stop, detention, and arrest were valid under the Fourth

Amendment, Bell’s post-arrest statement and the firearm he retrieved for the NLRPD

officers should not be suppressed. 

III. CONCLUSION

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of Bell’s motion to suppress.

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