2020 IL App (2d) 190713WC-U 

No. 2-19-0713WC 

Order filed November 18, 2020 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be 

cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 

23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

Workers’ Compensation Commission Division

______________________________________________________________________________ 

CITY OF ELGIN, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

) of McHenry County, Illinois 

Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 18-MR-632 

) 

THE ILLINOIS WORKERS’ ) 

COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. ) Honorable 

) Thomas A. Meyer, 

(Gregory A. Schneider, Appellee). ) Judge, Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hoffman, Hudson, and Barberis concurred in the 

judgment 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: By finding that the petitioner suffered a sudden, severe emotional shock traceable 

to a definite time, place, and cause which resulted in a psychological injury, the 

Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission did not make a finding that was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 2 Petitioner, Gregory A. Schneider, was a police officer employed by respondent, the City 

of Elgin (Elgin). The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) found he had 

sustained a psychological injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, in subduing a prisoner who was 

trying to escape. The Commission ordered Elgin to pay temporary total disability benefits, 
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temporary partial disability benefits, and medical expenses. Elgin sought judicial review. The 

circuit court of McHenry County confirmed the Commission’s decision. Elgin appeals. We 

disagree with Elgin that the Commission’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, 

although, at Elgin’s request, we make a minor modification in the amount of temporary partial 

disability benefits. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment, which confirmed the 

Commission’s decision, except that we reduce the amount of temporary partial disability benefits 

by $223.05. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On March 17, 2012, Schneider was assigned to transport two prisoners to the courthouse 

in Rolling Meadows, Illinois, for the Saturday morning bond call. He was running late. He cuffed 

their hands in front of them, instead of behind their back, so that they would be as comfortable as 

possible and would not request him to pull over to adjust their handcuffs. He had them climb into

the backseat of a squad car that was equipped with a grill separating the backseat from the front 

seat. Then he set off for Rolling Meadows. It was just he and the two prisoners. 

¶ 5 Schneider was driving north in the righthand lane of Illinois Route 53, at 65 miles per hour, 

when one of the prisoners began kicking the rear passenger-side window with his bare feet. As 

Schneider was slowing down the squad car and pulling onto the right shoulder, the prisoner 

succeeded in kicking out the window and dived out of the squad car. Somehow, the prisoner ended 

up in front of the squad car, in the righthand traffic lane. Schneider pulled the squad car across the 

traffic lanes to protect the prisoner, who was lying on the highway. Unable to get radio reception, 

Schneider called 911 on his cell phone. The prisoner stood up. Schneider drew his pistol and 

ordered him to stay where he was. About three or four cars per minute were going by on both sides 

of the squad car at 35 to 40 miles per hour. At some point, according to Schneider’s testimony, his 
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legs were brushed by a passing vehicle. The prisoner ran to another car, which was stopped in 

traffic on the righthand shoulder, and tried to enter that car, pulling first on the driver-side door 

handle and then on a passenger-side door handle. Both doors were locked, and the prisoner was 

unable to get in. Schneider tried to spray the prisoner with pepper spray, but the prisoner took off 

running again. Fearing that the prisoner might reach a neighboring commercial area, Schneider 

fired his pistol at him three times, striking him twice in the back. The prisoner rolled down a grassy 

area and stayed put. He survived his gunshot wounds. 

¶ 6 Ambulances and other police units arrived. Schneider testified that his heart was racing 

and that he was fatigued and unable to catch his breath. Paramedics took Schneider to the 

emergency room of Northwest Community Hospital, where Schneider was diagnosed with acute 

stress disorder and was discharged in stable condition, with no work restrictions. 

¶ 7 From March 18 to April 1, 2012, Schneider was on administrative leave, with full salary. 

He testified that, during that period, he was anxious, depressed, and fidgety; had difficulty 

sleeping; and was distant toward his three-month-old child. 

¶ 8 On April 2, 2012, Schneider sought follow-up treatment from his family doctor, Dr. Shital 

Tanna. He reported to Dr. Tanna that he was worried about the criminal investigation and internal

affairs investigation that almost certainly would be initiated. Also, it seemed to him that he had 

not yet “ ‘emotionally recovered from the event.’ ” Specifically, he complained of mood swings; 

a loss of pleasure and interest in daily activities, such as interacting with his son; a dulling of his 

powers of memory; and difficulty staying asleep. Four to six times in the night, he woke up, often 

in a sweat. His wife had been complaining that he was impatient, restless, irritable, and 

overreactive to trivial things. Dr. Tanna diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder, for which she 

prescribed medication. But she wrote a note that Schneider was medically able to return to work.
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¶ 9 On April 19, 2012, upon referral from Dr. Tanna, Schneider began receiving counseling 

from a licensed clinical professional counselor, Karen S. Chesney. He described to her his 

symptoms. He told her he could not help reliving the shooting incident in his head and that, 

whenever he did so, his powers of concentration were dissipated. He woke up repeatedly in the 

night. He lacked energy. He was forgetful. He was anxious and easily frustrated and yelled more 

often than he used to. He felt paranoid. 

¶ 10 On June 18, 2012, Dr. Tanna re-examined Schneider. The medication she had prescribed,

Effexor, seemed to be improving Schneider’s mood. His wife reported that he was still having 

slight mood swings, but Schneider thought he was now more in control of his emotions. Although 

he was still having night sweats and occasional restlessness and fatigue, he now was taking more 

pleasure in parenting and family life. His ability to concentrate had returned. Dr. Tanna refilled 

the Effexor, with plans to taper the medication in three months, and she advised Schneider to 

continue his counseling sessions with Chesney. Dr. Tanna wrote that Schneider was “medically 

stable” and that he “appeared to be healing well.” She deemed him capable of returning to his 

regular duties as a police officer.

¶ 11 On July 27, 2012, Schneider saw Dr. Tanna again. He was still in counseling and had been 

taking his medication. He was concerned that his symptoms, instead of going away, had reached 

a plateau. Also, he was in a dilemma: if he took his medication in the morning, he had anxiety at 

night, but if he took his medication at night, he had uncontrolled symptoms during the day. 

Schneider now was wondering if he should see a psychiatrist. Dr. Tanna increased the medication 

and referred him to a psychiatrist.

¶ 12 On August 28, 2012, Elgin issued to Schneider a notification of administrative charges. It 

appeared that he had violated rules of the police department by (1) failing to cuff the prisoners’ 
2020 IL App (2d) 190713WC-U 

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hands behind their backs and (2) using potentially deadly force against a prisoner when the 

circumstances did not so warrant. Three days later, Elgin served upon Schneider a warning that he 

was under administrative investigation and that he would be formally interrogated under oath. 

¶ 13 On September 5, 2012, Dr. Tanna re-examined Schneider, noting the new “[s]tressors [of 

being] served with charges last week by [the] Internal Affairs Dep[artment].” Schneider reported 

having such difficulty falling asleep and staying asleep that he got no more than three hours of 

sleep a night. He had trouble driving because his thought processes were scattered. Because 

Schneider was having trouble focusing and even driving, Dr. Tanna wrote a note taking him off 

work until his appointment with a psychiatrist on September 11, 2012. 

¶ 14 Schneider had been working in the evidence room, without any problems with his 

performance, since early April 2012. 

¶ 15 On September 11, 2012, on referral from Dr. Tanna, Schneider consulted a psychiatrist, 

Dr. Syed Waliuddin, complaining chiefly of difficulty sleeping. Dr. Waliuddin diagnosed posttraumatic stress disorder and ordered Schneider to remain off work until September 25, 2012. 

¶ 16 On September 25, 2012, Schneider saw Dr. Waliuddin again. According to the history that 

Dr. Waliuddin took that day, Schneider continued to struggle with anxiety, sleeplessness, and night 

sweats, and he kept reliving the incident in his head and having a startle reflex each time he did 

so. Because of the worsening of the symptoms, Dr. Waliuddin ordered Schneider to remain off 

work until October 16, 2012. 

¶ 17 Also on September 25, 2012, Schneider underwent a formal interrogation at city hall. 

According to Deputy Chief Bill Wolf’s testimony in the arbitration hearing, a video of the incident 

was shown during the formal interrogation, and Schneider displayed no emotion during the 

showing of the video or at any point during the interrogation. 
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¶ 18 On November 6, 2012, Dr. Waliuddin wrote another note recommending that, because of 

the worsening of his symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, Schneider should remain off 

work. 

¶ 19 On December 18, 2012, and January 8, 2013, at the request of Elgin, Schneider met with 

an independent medical expert, Dr. Alexander E. Obolsky, a forensic psychiatrist. On the basis of 

his interview of Schneider, his review of the medical records, and the results of psychological tests 

he administered, Dr. Obolsky concluded that Schneider was malingering and that, instead of 

suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, he had anxiety and depression resulting from 

disagreements with his employer. Dr. Obolsky was unconvinced that, for a police officer, the 

shooting incident would have been traumatic enough to cause post-traumatic stress disorder.

Besides, Dr. Obolsky found objective evidence that Schneider had been less than honest with him. 

In two of the five cognitive tests, Schneider performed worse than someone would perform who 

had a brain injury, a cognitive impairment, or dementia. And in two other tests, Schneider’s 

performance was so inconsistent as to show poor effort. Schneider had presented himself as having 

psychological problems that were so abundant and disturbing that his exaggeration was patent.

¶ 20 On February 8, 2013, Dr. Waliuddin wrote a letter opining, “with a reasonable degree of 

medical and psychiatric certainty,” that (1) Schneider “suffer[ed] from Post Traumatic Syndrome, 

which was caused by involvement in an on[-]duty shooting on March 17, 2012,” and (2) he was 

“not able to return to his job duties as a police officer at this time.” 

¶ 21 Having reviewed the video of the incident, Elgin concluded that, contrary to his account, 

Schneider was never brushed by a passing vehicle. Elgin was unconvinced that Schneider was 

physically endangered at any point during the incident. On July 29, 2013, on the basis of Elgin’s 

own internal affairs investigation of Schneider’s conduct, Elgin terminated his employment.
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¶ 22 On August 1, 2013, at the request of his attorney, Schneider was examined by a 

neuropsychologist, Dr. Aaron Malina, who administered the same battery of tests that Dr. Obolsky 

had administered. Dr. Malina did not know how to explain the test results that Dr. Obolsky had 

obtained. When Dr. Malina administered to Schneider the same cognitive effort tests that Dr. 

Obolsky had administered, Dr. Malina obtained normal results. On the basis of a clinical interview, 

a review of the medical records, and the results of psychological testing, Dr. Malina diagnosed 

post-traumatic stress disorder related to the shooting incident. He opined that Schneider needed 

further psychiatric treatment and that he was disabled from returning to work as a police officer at 

that time. In an evidence deposition, Dr. Malina was asked why, in his opinion, Schneider should 

not yet resume his occupation as a police officer. Dr. Malina answered: 

“He’s still actively symptomatic. It would be unsafe.

Q. Who would it be unsafe for? 

A. The public potentially. He’s a police officer, and he’s armed.” 

¶ 23 On cross-examination, Dr. Malina admitted that the prospect of being unemployed could 

contribute to depression and anxiety. Dr. Malina explained, however, that unemployment typically 

would not cause the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder of which Schneider—credibly, in 

Dr. Malina’s view—had complained: hypervigilance, an increased startle reaction, and intrusive 

experiences such as nightmares, flashbacks, and the irresistible recurrence of the traumatic event 

in the mind.

¶ 24 On March 21 and September 10, 2013, at the request of Elgin’s pension board, Schneider 

was evaluated by a psychiatrist, Dr. Richard Harris. On the basis of his interview of Schneider and 

his examination of the medical records and psychiatric reports, Dr. Harris concluded that, instead 

of suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, Schneider was suffering from non-disabling 
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anxiety and depression. Dr. Harris admitted, however, that he lacked the training to administer 

psychological tests and that he rarely used them in the formulation of his psychiatric opinions. He 

acknowledged that there were psychological tests which could be used to ascertain whether 

someone was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. He did not recall if he had reviewed 

the results of such tests that were administered to Schneider.

¶ 25 Dr. Stevan Weine was another psychiatrist hired by Elgin’s pension board. After examining 

Schneider on April 9, 2013, and after reviewing the medical records and Dr. Obolsky’s report, Dr. 

Weine concluded that Schneider did not have post-traumatic stress disorder. Instead, in Dr. 

Weine’s opinion, Schneider had an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and a depressed mood, 

a condition that would not significantly impair Schneider as a police officer. Dr. Weine had four 

reasons for concluding that Schneider did not meet the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress 

disorder. First, Schneider exaggerated or feigned his symptoms, giving affirmative answers to 

almost everything even though it was apparent he did not have the symptoms in question. Second, 

Schneider exaggerated the degree of trauma in the shooting incident. Third, he minimized the 

contribution of other stressors, such as having a first child, buying a new house, marital discord, 

and his discontent in the workplace. Fourth, he was distressed and anxious about being transferred 

and investigated, and he tended to assign that distress and anxiety to the shooting incident—which, 

in Dr. Weine’s view, was an event of only moderately traumatic intensity. Unlike Dr. Obolsky, 

Dr. Weine was not certain that Schneider was malingering, but he had strong concerns that 

Schneider was malingering. 

¶ 26 On September 30, 2013, in a divorce case, Schneider petitioned for temporary and 

permanent custody of his son. In support of his petition, he submitted an affidavit in which he 

attested that he was “a physically and emotionally healthy person.” 
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¶ 27 In February 2014, Schneider withdrew his application for a line-of-duty disability pension.

¶ 28 Schneider testified that although he had never been released to return to work and although 

he continued to have difficulty sleeping and still had flashbacks a few times each month, the bills

had been piling up and, consequently, he began looking for work. (He had to stop seeing Chesney 

and Dr. Waliuddin because their bills were going unpaid and he could not afford any further 

treatment.)

¶ 29 From August 2013 to April 2014, Schneider worked as a doorman and bouncer at a 

restaurant, supervising 12 other doormen, checking identifications, and ensuring the bar was a safe 

environment. 

¶ 30 In May 2014, the school district in Huntley, Illinois, hired Schneider as a security assistant, 

at an hourly rate lower than that which he would have received as a police officer employed by 

Elgin. His job at the Huntley school district is to supervise the renovation of the high school, do 

background checks on construction personnel, and monitor them at the construction site. He 

continues to work in this position, in which he has no weapon or police powers and in which he is 

not required to physically confront individuals. 

¶ 31 Although Schneider, by his own account, still loses sleep a few times per month and has 

some bouts of anxiety and although he now and then finds himself reliving the incident, he believes 

that the frequency and intensity of his symptoms have decreased. He now takes no medications. 

He has read a book on post-traumatic stress disorder, from which he has learned helpful strategies 

for managing the condition. 

¶ 32 On February 14, 2017, the Commission found that the shooting incident had inflicted posttraumatic stress disorder on Schneider. The Commission ordered Elgin to pay him 86 4/7 weeks 
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of temporary total disability benefits for the period of September 5, 2012, to May 4, 2014, and also 

to pay his medical bills through May 5, 2014. 

¶ 33 Both parties petitioned for judicial review. On August 24, 2017, the circuit court of 

McHenry County confirmed the Commission’s decision, concluding that the Commission’s 

findings with respect to an accident, medical causation, temporary total disability benefits, and 

medical expenses were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court remanded the 

case to the Commission, however, to determine whether Schneider was entitled, additionally, to 

temporary partial disability benefits. 

¶ 34 On August 15, 2018, the Commission issued its second decision, which awarded temporary 

partial disability benefits to Schneider for the period of May 5 to September 20, 2015. Elgin 

petitioned for judicial review.

¶ 35 On August 2, 2019, the circuit court confirmed the Commission’s decision.

¶ 36 This appeal followed.

¶ 37 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 38 A. The Law of the Case

¶ 39 In its review of the decision that the Commission issued on remand, the circuit court 

assumed that the decision the court made previously, when remanding the case to the Commission, 

was now the law of the case. In its previous decision, the court held that the Commission’s decision 

regarding causation, temporary total disability, and medical expenses was not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. After so holding, the court remanded the case to the Commission for the 

limited purpose of addressing the issue of temporary partial disability benefits. The Commission 

issued its decision on remand, and Elgin sought judicial review again. In the second action for 

judicial review, the court believed it was precluded by the law of the case from further reviewing 
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the issues of causation, temporary total disability, and medical expenses. The court derived that 

belief from Relph v. Board of Education of DePue Unit School District No. 103, 84 Ill. 2d 436 

(1981). 

¶ 40 Relph, however, discussed remands from the appellate court or the supreme court to a lower 

tribunal, not remands from the circuit court to the Commission. Id. at 443. Assume that, in an 

initial appeal, the appellate court expounds its view of the law, reverses the circuit court’s 

judgment, and remands the case for further proceedings in accordance with that exposition of the 

law. If, after the circuit court issued its decision on remand, the case were appealed again to the 

appellate court, the law of the case would bind the appellate court to the legal principles it 

propounded in the first appeal. Id. It is important to note, however, that the appellate court’s first 

decision (the decision remanding the case to the circuit court) would be a final, appealable

judgment—an essential element of the law of the case. Only an unreversed final judgment can 

become the law of the case in subsequent proceedings. See Ming Auto Body/Ming of Decatur, Inc. 

v. Industrial Comm’n, 387 Ill. App. 3d 244, 253 (2008). The circuit court’s decision remanding 

the case to the Commission for the consideration of temporary partial disability benefits was not a 

final judgment. See Pace Bus Co. (South Division) v. Industrial Comm’n, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 

1069 (2003). The law-of-the-case doctrine was, therefore, inapplicable in the second action for 

judicial review. See Ming, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 253. 

¶ 41 B. Sudden, Severe Emotional Shock Resulting in Psychological Disability

¶ 42 Before Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 62 Ill. 2d 556 (1976), “mental disability was 

compensable only if it was precipitated by physical contact or injury.” Diaz v. Illinois Workers’

Compensation Comm’n, 2013 IL App (2d) 120294WC, ¶ 23. In other words, if the claim was for 

psychological injuries, the theory of recovery had to be “physical-mental,” meaning that “the 
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injuries [were] related to and caused by a physical trauma or injury.” Matlock v. Industrial 

Comm’n, 321 Ill. App. 3d 167, 171 (2001). After Pathfinder, the theory of recovery could be, 

alternatively, “mental-mental, [if] the [psychological] injuries [were] caused by sudden[,] severe 

emotional shock traceable to a definite time and place and cause even though no physical trauma 

or injury was sustained.” Id.; see also Diaz, 2013 IL App (2d) 120294WC, ¶ 23. This is the theory 

of recovery that Schneider advances in the present case: a “mental-mental” theory.

¶ 43 To recover workers’ compensation benefits under a “mental-mental” theory, the claimant 

must prove that he or she “suffered a ‘sudden, severe emotional shock traceable to a definite time, 

place[,] and cause which causes psychological injury or harm.’ ” Chicago Transit Authority v. 

Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2013 IL App (1st) 120253WC, ¶ 20 (quoting 

Pathfinder, 62 Ill. 2d at 563); see also Diaz, 2013 IL App (2d) 120294WC, ¶ 33. Whether the 

claimant suffered such an emotional shock is a matter of inference and, as such, a factual question. 

See Chicago Transit, 2013 IL App (1st) 120253WC, ¶ 24. On appeal, we defer to the 

Commission’s findings of fact unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence (see id.), 

that is, unless “no rational trier of fact could have agreed with” the Commission (McAllister v. 

Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2020 IL 124848, ¶ 30). 

¶ 44 Elgin argues that because Schneider’s physical safety was never seriously at risk and 

because he witnessed no grave bodily injury, it is against the manifest weight of the evidence that 

he suffered a “sudden, severe emotional shock.” Pathfinder, 62 Ill. 2d at 563. When attempting to 

escape, the prisoner never tried to harm Schneider and never threatened to do so. Also, Elgin 

argues, the video of the incident refuted Schneider’s testimony that he was brushed by a passing 

vehicle. As soon as the prisoner began kicking out the window, Schneider slowed down and pulled 

over, and, consequently, the prisoner was apparently uninjured by his exit from the car. 
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¶ 45 Of course, Schneider witnessed the serious injuries that he himself deliberately inflicted 

upon the prisoner, but Schneider could not have been shocked, properly speaking—i.e., he could 

not have experienced “a feeling of disturbed surprise”—at his or her own volitional act of shooting 

the prisoner twice. New Oxford American Dictionary 1575 (2001) (definition of “shock”). 

Intentionally shooting someone may well provoke strong emotions in the shooter, but sudden 

shock or surprise would not be among them. One is “shocked,” in the true sense of the word, only 

by what happens to oneself or another, not by what one chooses to do. 

¶ 46 Arguably, though, other aspects of Schneider’s experience on Illinois Route 53 on March 

17, 2012, would have been severely shocking to “a person of normal sensibilities.” Pathfinder, 62 

Ill. 2d at 567. While Schneider was driving down the highway, one of the prisoners kicked out a 

passenger-side window and dived out of the car, onto a travel lane of the highway and into the path 

of oncoming traffic. That self-endangering act by the prisoner could have provoked in Schneider 

an intense feeling of disturbed surprise. And Schneider might well have suffered a further shock 

when the prisoner picked himself up off the highway and tried to enter another vehicle, which had

been approaching from behind and had slowed and stopped. This development was, by Schneider’s 

account, especially disturbing to him because if the prisoner had gained entry to one of the stopped 

vehicles, the prisoner could have harmed people in the vehicle and could have weaponized the 

vehicle against Schneider, who, because of the prisoner’s close proximity to the innocent 

occupants of the vehicle, would have been ill able to protect himself. Arguably, that Schneider felt 

compelled to shoot the prisoner tended to confirm that Schneider was in an extreme state 

emotionally. For all those reasons, it is inferable that Schneider’s experiences on March 17, 2012, 

caused him to suffer “a sudden, severe emotional shock.” Id. at 563. 
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¶ 47 Elgin contends, however, that because Schneider’s “symptoms were not sufficiently 

immediate and severe after the accident,” it was against the manifest weight of the evidence “that 

the shooting incident caused a sudden and severe emotional shock required by Pathfinder.” But 

Schneider testified that, after shooting the prisoner, he “experienced a rapid heartbeat and could 

not catch his breath.” (We quote from the arbitrator’s decision.) He also testified that “he was 

fatigued” and “that he had never experienced these symptoms before this occurrence.” A rapid 

pulse, breathlessness, and a feeling of being drained of strength are commonly known to be 

physical manifestations of a sudden and severe emotional shock. Assuming, then, for the sake of 

argument, that outward symptoms of a sudden and severe emotional shock must be immediately 

evident to satisfy Pathfinder (cf. General Motors Parts Division v. Industrial Comm’n, 168 Ill. 

App. 3d 678, 687 (1988), and Diaz, 2013 IL App (2d) 120294WC, ¶ 8), a reasonable trier of fact 

could believe Schneider’s testimony that he immediately experienced such outward symptoms (see 

McAllister, 2020 IL 124848, ¶ 30). 

¶ 48 There was, however, a further factual question: whether the sudden, severe emotional 

shock caused a psychological injury that disabled Schneider from continuing to serve as a police 

officer. See Pathfinder, 62 Ill. 2d at 563. The Commission found him to be temporarily disabled 

and, accordingly, awarded him two kinds of disability benefits: temporary partial disability 

benefits and temporary total disability benefits. “When the employee is working light duty on a 

part-time basis or full-time basis and earns less than he or she would be earning if employed in the 

full capacity of the job or jobs, then the employee shall be entitled to temporary partial disability 

benefits.” 820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2012). “[T]emporary total disability occurs when an employee 

is unable to perform any work except that for which no labor market of reasonable stability exists.” 

Dolce v. Industrial Comm’n, 286 Ill. App. 3d 117, 122 (1996). To recover those types of benefits, 
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“a claimant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has suffered a disabling

injury arising out of and in the course of his or her employment.” (Emphasis added.) Land & Lakes 

Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 359 Ill. App. 3d 582, 591-92 (2005). 

¶ 49 Elgin disputes that Schneider sustained a psychological disability “arising out of” his 

employment. Id. Elgin’s reason for disputing the arising-out-of element is this. Seventeen days 

after the shooting incident, Schneider returned to full-time duty as a police officer. He was assigned 

to the evidence room. During the five months he worked in the evidence room, he manifested no 

disabling psychological symptoms or deficits in performance. Then, when Elgin served upon him 

a notice that discipline was being contemplated against him, his purportedly disabling 

psychological symptoms suddenly flared up. Being investigated, formally interrogated, and 

ultimately fired for misconduct might well cause a growing sense of anxiety and insecurity but not 

“a sudden, severe emotional shock.” Pathfinder, 62 Ill. 2d at 563. Again, under a “mental-mental” 

theory, the “psychological injury or harm” must be “cause[d]” by “a sudden, severe emotional 

shock traceable to a definite time, place[,] and cause.” Id.; Diaz, 2013 IL App (2d) 120294WC, 

¶ 33 (referring to “the sudden, severe emotional shock which must be proved” (emphasis added

and internal quotation marks omitted)); Chicago Transit, 2013 IL App (1st) 120253WC, ¶ 20 

(interpreting Pathfinder as “requir[ing] a claimant alleging a mental-mental claim to prove that 

she suffered a sudden, severe emotional shock” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Dread of an 

administrative investigation is not the sudden, jarring emotional disturbance that Pathfinder

describes. It might be a gnawing anxiety, but it would not be a sudden, severe shock. 

¶ 50 Citing Esco Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 169 Ill. App. 3d 376, 384 (1988), and Skidis v. 

Industrial Comm’n, 309 Ill. App. 3d 720, 723 (1999), Elgin argues that a claimant’s anxiety over 

the loss of employment is not compensable. Indeed, the appellate court repeatedly has interpreted 
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Esco as “reject[ing] claims for mental disabilities resulting from *** disciplinary actions taken by 

employers.” Chicago Transit, 2013 IL App (1st) 120253WC, ¶ 19 n.1; see also Northwest 

Suburban Special Education Organization v. Industrial Comm’n, 312 Ill. App. 3d 783, 788 (2000). 

It follows that, insomuch as Schneider suffered a disabling psychological injury resulting from the 

internal affairs investigation, the formal interrogation, and the involuntary termination of his 

employment, his injury is non-compensable. See Chicago Transit, 2013 IL App (1st) 120253WC, 

¶ 19 n.1; Northwest Suburban, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 788. These “disciplinary actions” were “nothing 

more than the usual employment tensions.” Northwest Suburban, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 788. 

“[A]nxiety, emotional stress[,] or depression which develop[s] over time in the normal course of 

an employment relationship does not constitute a compensable injury within the holding of 

Pathfinder.” General Motors, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 687. 

¶ 51 Before Elgin issued to Schneider the anxiety-inducing charges, he might have appeared on 

the surface to be functioning well enough. In both April and June 2012, Dr. Tanna had opined that 

Schneider was able to return to work as a police officer, without restrictions. On April 3, 2012, 

Elgin assigned Schneider to work in the evidence room, not because he was suffering from any 

known psychological malady but because it was routine to remove a police officer from the field 

while the officer’s shooting of someone in the line of duty was being investigated. From April 3 

to September 4, 2012, a period of five months, Schneider worked in the evidence room without 

any problems with his performance. On August 30, 2012, while Schneider apparently was doing 

fine in the evidence room, Elgin issued to him administrative charges and a notice that he would 

be formally interrogated. On September 5, 2012, less than a week after he received the charges, 

Schneider went to Dr. Tanna, complaining that he was worried and irritable about everything, 

especially the charges, and that he was having difficulty focusing and even driving. Dr. Tanna then 
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took Schneider off work and referred him to a psychiatrist. Since September 5, 2012, Schneider

has never returned to work as a police officer. Since then, however, he has worked in other, lowerpaying occupations, and, in a child-custody case, he has sworn to his emotional health.

¶ 52 Despite all those facts, the Commission could reasonably believe Dr. Malina’s opinion that 

the “accident” of March 17, 2012, left Schneider psychologically disabled from being a police 

officer. We have five reasons for regarding the Commission’s resolution of this factual issue as 

not being against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 53 First, Dr. Tanna was a family physician, whereas—perhaps more relevantly to the issues 

in this case—Dr. Waliuddin was a psychiatrist and Dr. Malina was a neuropsychologist. Although 

Dr. Tanna opined on June 18, 2012, that Schneider was medically stable and could return to his 

regular work duties, Dr. Waliuddin and Dr. Malina had professional expertise that, arguably, was 

more specific to the question of whether Schneider’s post-traumatic stress disorder was disabling. 

The Commission could have reasonably given greater weight to the opinions of Dr. Waliuddin and

Dr. Malina. After all, it was Dr. Tanna who had referred Schneider to Dr. Waliuddin.

¶ 54 Second, Schneider’s successful five-month stint in the evidence room, in which his only 

duties were to assist the evidence custodian and do paperwork, had little tendency to refute Dr. 

Malina’s opinion that post-traumatic stress disorder incapacitated Schneider from being a police 

officer. It might be true that, notwithstanding the post-traumatic stress disorder, Schneider was 

capable of doing many of the mundane, day-by-day tasks a police officer would perform. Dr. 

Malina’s concern, however, was quite narrow: he was concerned that, until Schneider was 

asymptomatic, it would be detrimental to public safety to allow him to serve as a police officer 

armed with a gun. In other words, in Dr. Malina’s opinion as we understand it, what made the 

post-traumatic stress disorder disabling for Schneider as a police officer was the potential 
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distortion of judgment in circumstances of greatly heightened stress, specifically, the judgment of 

whether to use deadly force. In the evidence room, Schneider did not have to deal with rowdies 

and ruffians while armed with a gun. In sum, then, we acknowledge that, after the shooting 

incident, Schneider showed himself capable of doing a variety of things. As Elgin observes, he 

could file paperwork, go to the shooting range, undergo a formal interrogation without losing his 

composure, eject intoxicated patrons from a bar, and oversee the security of a school construction 

site. But none of those observations speak to Dr. Malina’s concern.

¶ 55 Third, Schneider began undergoing psychological counseling on April 19, 2012, the month 

after the shooting incident. In that respect, his case is distinguishable from General Motors, 168 

Ill. App. 3d at 688, in which the claimant sought no treatment for his psychological condition until 

15 months after the allegedly traumatizing event. Also, Schneider began complaining to Dr. Tanna 

of symptoms early on, beginning on April 2, 2012. It is not that, after he was served with the 

administrative charges in September 2012, Schneider suddenly began alleging symptoms. 

¶ 56 Fourth, although Dr. Tanna admitted that unemployment could contribute to Schneider’s 

sadness and anxiety, unemployment typically would not cause the hypervigilance, intrusive 

memories, nightmares, and flashbacks that were characteristic of post-traumatic stress disorder.

¶ 57 Fifth, even though in September 2013, in a child-custody case, Schneider filed an affidavit 

averring that he was emotionally healthy, the Commission could have disbelieved the affidavit.

Self-assessments of psychological health are not infallible. That is why people undergo 

psychological evaluations. 

¶ 58 To be sure, the psychological evaluations in this case are in sharp conflict. Dr. Obolsky 

and Dr. Weine found Schneider to be exaggerating or feigning mental-health symptoms, but Dr. 

Malina found no evidence of malingering. These differing findings are explainable. Because it was 
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Schneider’s attorney who had sent him to Dr. Malina whereas it was Elgin who had sent him to 

Dr. Obolsky and Dr. Weine, Schneider might have felt more inclined to be honest with Dr. Malina, 

whom he perceived as friendly, than with Dr. Obolsky and Dr. Weine, whom he perceived as being 

hostile. Likewise, Schneider might have been more open and honest with Dr. Waliuddin, to whom 

Dr. Tanna had referred him. Even if Schneider was dishonest with Dr. Obolsky and Dr. Weine, it 

did not necessarily follow that he was dishonest with Dr. Waliuddin and Dr. Malina. It could be 

that, when Schneider gave an honest account of his symptomology, post-traumatic stress disorder

was indeed indicated. The Commission took into account that Dr. Obolsky, Dr. Weine, and Dr. 

Harris differed in their assessments from Dr. Waliuddin and Dr. Malina, and the Commission 

chose to believe Dr. Waliuddin and Dr. Malina. We cannot say it would be impossible for a 

reasonable trier of fact to believe Dr. Waliuddin and Dr. Malina over Dr. Obsolsky, Dr. Weine, 

and Dr. Harris. Therefore, we defer to the Commission’s assessment of credibility. See McAllister, 

2020 IL 124848, ¶ 30. 

¶ 59 In sum, by finding that, on March 17, 2012, Schneider “suffer[ed] a sudden, severe 

emotional shock traceable to a definite time, place[,] and cause which cause[d] psychological 

injury or harm” to him (Pathfinder, 62 Ill. 2d at 563), the Commission did not make a finding that 

was against the manifest weight of the evidence (see Chicago Transit, 2013 IL App (1st) 

120253WC, ¶ 24). 

¶ 60 C. Medical Expenses

¶ 61 Under section 8(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2012)), 

Schneider “is entitled to recover reasonable medical expenses that are causally related to the 

accident and that are determined to be required to diagnose, relieve, or cure the effects of” his posttraumatic stress disorder. F & B Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Comm’n of Illinois, 325 Ill. App. 
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3d 527, 534 (2001). He “is entitled to recover only those medical expenses which are reasonable 

and causally related to an industrial accident.” Zarley v. Industrial Comm’n, 84 Ill. 2d 380, 389 

(1981). “The question of whether medical treatment is causally related to a compensable injury is 

one of fact to be determined by the Commission, and its finding on the issue will not be reversed 

on review unless [the finding is] contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” Elmhurst 

Memorial Hospital v. Industrial Comm’n, 323 Ill. App. 3d 758, 764-65 (2001). 

¶ 62 Because, in Elgin’s view, Schneider’s psychological symptoms resulted from the internal 

affairs investigation and the disciplinary proceedings and not from the shooting incident, and 

because Dr. Tanna found Schneider to be medically stable and fit to resume his normal job duties 

as of June 18, 2012, Elgin disputes its obligation to pay for medical treatment beyond that date. 

Elgin represents that it paid Schneider’s medical bills through June 18, 2012, and even some 

medical bills that he incurred afterward. The Commission decided, however, that Elgin’s liability 

for medical expenses should not end there. The Commission found Elgin to be liable for 

prospective medical care. That finding, Elgin contends, is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence because medical care beyond June 18, 2012, is causally unrelated to the shooting 

incident.

¶ 63 If, however, Schneider continued to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and if the 

work-related “accident” of March 17, 2012, had caused this psychological injury, Schneider would 

be entitled to compensation for prospective medical treatment that was “reasonably required to 

cure or relieve from the effects of” the psychological injury (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2012)). See 

Plantation Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 294 Ill. App. 3d 705, 710 (1997). The 

Commission found those statutory conditions to be proven, and as we have discussed, the 

Commission’s finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Dye v. Illinois 
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Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2012 IL App (3d) 110907WC, ¶ 10. Therefore, the premise 

behind Elgin’s challenge to its continued obligation to pay for medical treatment is unsound. 

¶ 64 D. Temporary Total Disability and Temporary Partial Disability

¶ 65 Elgin asserts that it “offered [Schneider] light duty,” i.e., assignment to the evidence room, 

and that “he stopped working light duty on September 5, 2012[,] even though he had no problems 

working light duty.” On the authority of Sharwarko v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 

2015 IL App (1st) 131733WC, ¶ 49, Elgin argues that if the employer is willing to accommodate 

an injured employee’s medical restrictions, the employee’s refusal to work within those restrictions

authorizes the termination of temporary total disability benefits and temporary partial disability 

benefits.

¶ 66 But continuing to work in the evidence room on September 5, 2012, was not within 

Schneider’s medical restrictions, for, on that date (to quote from Elgin’s brief), Dr. Tanna “issued 

a note indicating [that Schneider] was unable to work for medical reasons.” And soon afterward, 

Dr. Waliuddin, the psychiatrist to whom Dr. Tanna had referred Schneider, likewise “ordered 

[Schneider] to remain off work” (to quote again from Elgin’s brief.)

¶ 67 Assuming that Schneider is entitled to temporary partial disability benefits, Elgin points 

out that the Commission miscalculated the amount of such benefits for the period of September 8 

to 21, 2014. On the third page of the decision that the Commission issued on remand on August 

15, 2018 (case No. 18-IWCC-0500), the Commission listed Schneider’s gross pay as $1151.20. 

According to an earnings statement, however, from Consolidated School District 158, Schneider’s 

gross pay for that period actually was $1485.77. Thus, the correct difference between the potential 

wage of $3437.24 and the actual gross pay of $1485.77 is $1951.47. Section 8(a) of the Workers’ 

Compensation Act provides that an employee working light duty is entitled to temporary partial 
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disability benefits equal to two-thirds of the difference between the “average amount that the 

employee would be able to earn” in the full performance of the employee’s duties and the net 

amount the employee is earning in the modified job. 820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2012). Two-thirds 

of the difference of $1951.47 is $1300.98, which is the correct amount of temporary partial 

disability benefits owed for September 8 to 21, 2014, instead of the $1524.03 the Commission 

awarded for that period. Thus, Elgin explains, the Commission awarded $223.05 more of 

temporary partial disability benefits for the period of September 8 to 21, 2014, than it should have

awarded ($1524.03 minus $1300.98). Elgin requests us to reduce the award of such benefits 

accordingly from $45,436.68 to $45,213.63 ($45,436.68 minus $223.05 equals $45,213.63). In his 

brief, Schneider does not appear to dispute this requested adjustment.

¶ 68 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 69 We affirm the circuit court’s judgment, which confirmed the Commission’s decision on 

remand, except that we reduce the award of temporary partial disability benefits to $45,213.63. 

¶ 70 Affirmed as modified.