In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-2126 

JOSE ANTONIO SIMENTAL-GALARZA, 

Petitioner, 

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General 

of the United States, 

Respondent. 

____________________ 

Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals 

No. A206-274-723 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 17, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 2, 2020 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. Jose Antonio Simental-Galarza, a 36-year-old 

citizen of Mexico, seeks relief from removal, contending that 

he is a battered spouse and would suffer extreme hardship if 

removed. The Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that Simental-Galarza did not qualify for 

relief because he did not establish hardship. Because the IJ 

and Board adequately evaluated the relevant factors and the 
2 No. 19-2126 

evidence that Simental-Galarza presented, we deny the petition for review. 

Background 

 Simental-Galarza unlawfully entered the United States 

from Durango, Mexico, in 2001. He married Jolene Avitia, a 

United States citizen, in 2013; they divorced three years later. 

Around the time of the divorce, Simental-Galarza came to the 

attention of immigration authorities. He was charged as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for having entered and remained in the 

United States without lawful admission. 

Simental-Galarza conceded to the charge but sought cancellation of removal as a battered spouse under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(b)(2). Under § 1229b, the Attorney General may cancel Simental-Galarza’s removal if he demonstrates that he was 

battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by his spouse and 

that his removal would result in extreme hardship. 

§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(I), (b)(2)(A)(v). (In the alternative, Simental-Galarza asked for voluntary departure.) At his immigration hearing, Simental-Galarza offered evidence of physical, verbal, and psychological abuse. During three unhappy 

years of marriage with Avitia, he explained, she attacked him, 

slapping him more than 20 times. At other times, she insulted 

him, yelled at him, and called him obscene names. She also 

often threatened to call the authorities to “come after” him. 

Finally, she was unfaithful and stole money from him. 

 Because of the toll that this abuse took on SimentalGalarza and his long ties to the United States, he argued to the 

IJ that removal would cause him extreme hardship. He testified that the abuse left him depressed and unable to start 
No. 19-2126 3 

another romantic relationship. His sister-in-law confirmed 

that since the divorce, Simental-Galarza rarely talked, never 

laughed, and did not trust people. A licensed clinical social 

worker diagnosed him with anxiety, severe depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and dependent personality disorder. Therefore, the social worker advised, he should continue 

therapy in a stable, supportive environment. SimentalGalarza thought that the United States was the best environment for him: Most of his family resides here—his parents are 

deceased, and three brothers and two sisters live here. Also, 

in the 17 years that he has lived here, he has had steady work 

(as a landscaper, at his brother’s restaurant, and removing 

snow in the winter). By contrast, “it’s very hard” in Mexico, 

where wages are low, violence is high, and it is difficult to find 

employment without a strong family network. His sister-inlaw predicted that if Simental-Galarza were removed, he 

would “shut down” physically and emotionally because all 

his close family members reside in the United States. She also 

speculated that Mexico did not have the mental health resources that are available here, but no witness offered evidence that Simental-Galarza could not receive mental health 

treatment in Mexico. 

Simental-Galarza did not receive cancellation of removal. 

The IJ concluded that he had failed to establish that he is a 

battered spouse or that his return to Mexico would cause extreme hardship, as required under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2). Although Simental-Galarza would lose family ties and employment in the United States, the IJ reasoned, that loss is a consequence of most removals, and no medical condition disabled 

him from finding employment in Mexico. (The IJ then granted 

Simental-Galarza’s alternative request for voluntary departure.) The Board dismissed Simental-Galarza’s appeal. It 
4 No. 19-2126 

assumed that he was a battered spouse but affirmed that he 

had not shown hardship beyond that which is typical from 

removal. The Board first ruled that Simental-Galarza had not 

demonstrated that he could not obtain work in Mexico. And 

although Mexico can be violent, the Board acknowledged, Simental-Galarza had not shown that he would personally face 

violence. Finally, the Board supplemented the IJ’s rationale by 

observing that Simental-Galarza had “not shown that he 

could not obtain treatment for his anxiety and depression in 

Mexico.” 

Analysis 

When, as here, the Board dismisses an appeal from an IJ’s 

decision and supplements that decision with its own reasoning, we review both decisions together. See Pouhova v. Holder, 

726 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2013). Because the Board assumed that Simental-Galarza was a battered spouse under 8 

U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), the parties dispute whether the Board 

wrongly decided the question of extreme hardship. 

Simental-Galarza mainly contends that the IJ and Board 

did not explicitly mention his post-traumatic stress disorder, 

dependent personality disorder, and lack of treatment options in Mexico. He argues that the agency’s failure to address 

this material evidence constituted a legal error and that we 

should remand for the agency to consider his mental health 

evidence anew. 

Before turning to the merits, however, we must first address our ability to consider Simental-Galarza’s petition. We 

generally do not have jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions from immigration proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1252(a)(2)(B)(i). But under § 1252(a)(2)(D), we retain 
No. 19-2126 5 

jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and questions of 

law. Simental-Galarza contends that he has raised a legal 

question—whether, in deciding the matter of extreme hardship, the IJ and Board failed to consider his evidence about a 

lack of treatment options in Mexico. The government maintains that his petition merely questions the agency’s discretionary decision to deny cancellation of removal, which is unreviewable. 

Simental-Galarza is correct about jurisdiction. He does not 

quarrel with how the agency weighed the evidence that it actually considered; we would not have jurisdiction to review 

such a dispute. See Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d 991, 997 

(7th Cir. 2012). Rather, he contends that the agency ignored 

material evidence. That contention generally raises a legal 

question that this court can review. See, e.g., Arej v. Sessions, 

852 F.3d 665, 667 (7th Cir. 2017); Silais v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 736, 

743 (7th Cir. 2017); Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528, 531 (7th 

Cir. 2008). We therefore have jurisdiction to address his argument that the IJ and Board ignored relevant evidence. 

Four categories of evidence are relevant to whether an alien has met the extreme-hardship standard: (1) the alien’s familial ties in the United States; (2) the significant conditions of 

the alien’s health and the availability of medical care in the 

country of relocation; (3) the conditions of, and the alien’s ties 

to, the country of relocation; and (4) the financial impact of 

departure from the United States. See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I & N Dec. 560, 565–66 (BIA 1999); see also 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1240.58(b), (c). The IJ and Board “are not required to offer an 

independent analysis of each listed factor.” 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1240.58(a). 

The IJ and Board discussed all four factors. 
6 No. 19-2126 

To begin with, the IJ and Board considered the evidence 

that Simental-Galarza presented about the first and fourth 

factors—his family ties in the United States and the financial 

impact of removal. In terms of family ties, the IJ acknowledged Simental-Galarza’s employment and family connections in the United States but concluded that severing these 

ties is no different from what happens in a typical removal 

case. The IJ also considered whether Simental-Galarza, who 

had worked here for over a decade as a landscaper and in a 

restaurant, was physically or mentally unable to work in Mexico. Despite Simental-Galarza’s worries that wages in Mexico 

are low and jobs are not as abundant as in the United States, 

the IJ did not believe that Simental-Galarza was disabled from 

finding gainful work in Mexico. Thus, in terms of financial 

impact and lost familial ties, the IJ concluded that the hardship that Simental-Galarza would face was not extreme. 

Simental-Galarza principally focuses on the other two factors—his poor mental health and need for family support in 

the United States to help treat him, and the violence in his native state of Durango. His argument, however, is unpersuasive. True, the IJ did not explicitly analyze Simental-Galarza’s 

mental health, but the IJ did state in its decision that it considered Simental-Galarza’s documentary evidence, which included his psychological assessment. Furthermore, the Board 

did address Simental-Galarza’s mental health. It acknowledged Simental-Galarza’s mental ailments and ruled that, despite concerns that the United States was a better place for him 

to heal, he had not shown that he could not obtain effective 

treatment for his mental health conditions in Mexico. The 

Board also acknowledged that Mexico can be violent, but correctly noted that Simental-Galarza had not provided evidence 

that he personally was at risk of it. 
No. 19-2126 7 

This discussion of the four factors was legally adequate. 

The Board and IJ considered the evidence that SimentalGalarza presented and decided that it did not establish extreme hardship under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(v). See PerezFuentes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he IJ is 

not required to mention each piece of evidence in its decision; 

the IJ need only consider the evidence.”). Although the 

agency’s discussion was brief, it sufficed to show that the 

agency considered his arguments. See Cruz-Moyaho, 703 F.3d 

at 998. To the extent that Simental-Galarza disagrees with the 

assessment of his argument that the United States is a better 

place for him, as stated earlier, that contention is beyond this 

court’s jurisdiction. See Jawad v. Holder, 686 F.3d 400, 404 (7th 

Cir. 2012). 

Accordingly, Simental-Galarza’s petition for review is 

DENIED.