VIRGINIA: 

 In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme 

Court Building in the City of Richmond, on Friday, the 12th 

day of April, 2013. 

Present: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and 

Powell, JJ., and Lacy and Koontz, S.JJ. 

William Charles Morva, Petitioner, 

 against Record No. 102281 

Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, Respondent. 

Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus filed December 3, 2010, and the respondent’s 

motion to dismiss, the Court is of the opinion that the 

motion should be granted and the writ should not issue. 

Petitioner, William Charles Morva, was convicted in 

the Circuit Court of Washington County of capital murder 

while in custody, Code § 18.2-31(3), capital murder of a 

law-enforcement officer, Code § 18.2-31(6), capital murder 

of more than one person within a three-year period, Code 

§ 18.2-31(8), assaulting a law-enforcement officer, Code § 

18.2-57(C), escape, Code § 18.2-478, and two counts of use 

of a firearm in the commission of murder, Code § 18.2-53.1. 

After finding the aggravating factors of vileness and 

future dangerousness, the jury fixed Morva’s sentence at 
2

death for each of the three capital murder convictions and 

sixteen years’ imprisonment for the remaining convictions. 

The trial court sentenced Morva in accordance with the 

jury’s verdicts. This Court affirmed Morva’s convictions 

and upheld his sentence of death in Morva v. Commonwealth, 

278 Va. 329, 683 S.E.2d 553 (2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 

___, 131 S.Ct. 97 (2010). 

CLAIM (I) 

In claim (I), Morva alleges that a juror concealed 

information during voir dire that, if disclosed, would 

likely have resulted in the juror’s exclusion from the jury 

panel for cause. Morva contends juror Richard M. Bouck 

failed to disclose that he had two relatives in lawenforcement who were also close friends, that he knew the 

relatives were within the scope of the voir dire question, 

and that he intentionally chose not to reveal those 

relationships. 

Morva argues that had Bouck disclosed this 

information, which Morva did not discover until after his 

direct appeal was final, Bouck could have been stricken for 

cause and, as a result of Bouck’s failure to disclose the 

relationships, Morva’s Sixth Amendment right to an 

impartial jury was violated. The Court holds that this 

claim is without merit. 
3

In support of this claim, Morva relies on the 

affidavit of a law student who interviewed jurors on 

Morva’s behalf, after Morva’s appeal became final. The law 

student describes an interview with Bouck and relates a 

number of hearsay statements purportedly made by Bouck. 

The record, including Bouck’s affidavit, demonstrates that 

Bouck and the interviewer discussed two men who worked in 

law-enforcement, Bouck’s step-mother-in-law’s nephew and a 

former co-worker’s brother. In his affidavit, Bouck 

asserts that he “barely know[s] either of these men. They 

are, at best, mere acquaintances. They are not relatives 

or close friends.” 

Morva fails to proffer any evidence, such as 

affidavits from Bouck’s friends or family or from the 

individuals Bouck identified as persons known to him to be 

in law-enforcement, to support his allegation that Bouck 

failed to answer honestly when asked by the trial court if 

he had “any close friends or family members or associates 

who are employed in law enforcement.” Thus, Morva has 

failed to demonstrate that juror Bouck failed to answer 

honestly a material question during voir dire and he has 

consequently failed to show he was denied the right to an 

impartial jury. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. 

Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). 
4

CLAIM (II)(A) 

In claim (II)(A), Morva asserts his due process rights 

were violated because he was visibly restrained during 

trial. Morva alleges he wore visible handcuffs upon 

entering and exiting the courtroom while jurors were 

present, wore leg restraints that were visible to jurors 

beneath counsel table, and wore a stun belt under his 

clothing that was sufficiently bulky to attract attention. 

Morva also alleges that the remote control for the stun 

belt held by an officer in proximity to Morva was visible 

to the jury. 

The Court holds claim (II)(A) is barred because this 

non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial 

and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Slayton v. Parrigan, 

215 Va. 27, 29, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974), cert. denied, 

419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 

CLAIM (II)(B) 

In claim (II)(B), Morva asserts he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 

object to any restraints Morva was made to wear during 

trial, absent a judicial determination of necessity. In 

addition, he asserts that counsel failed to ensure that the 

restraints were invisible and failed to ensure that 
5

security and court personnel were advised that the jurors 

should not see or learn about the restraints. 

Morva contends counsel should have taken remedial 

steps, such as placing litigation bags or boxes in front of 

counsel table, monitoring strict compliance with the rule 

that restrained defendants not be moved into or out of the 

courtroom when jurors are present, and providing Morva with 

a blazer to hide the bulge from the stun belt. Morva 

contends he was prejudiced because the visible restraints 

undermined the presumption of innocence, and, at 

sentencing, underscored the message presented by the 

Commonwealth that he was a danger to society. He asserts 

that this contributed to his decision not to take the stand 

to present evidence of his “fear that he would die if he 

remained in, or was returned to, the toxic Montgomery 

County [J]ail.” 

The Court holds claim (II)(B) satisfies neither the 

“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 

test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984). The record, including the manuscript record, 

the affidavits of several jurors, and the affidavit of 

Charles Partin, Master Deputy with the Montgomery County 

Sheriff’s Office, who was responsible for coordinating 

transportation and security for Morva in connection with 
6

his trial, demonstrates that Morva’s right to a fair trial 

was not undermined by courtroom security. The record 

indicates that all visible restraints were removed from 

Morva prior to the jurors entering the courtroom; Morva 

wore a stun belt that was beneath his clothing and thus 

designed to be invisible to jurors, and a leg-stiffening 

restraint strapped to Morva’s leg was worn under his pants 

and was not visible on the outside of his clothing. 

Accordingly, Morva’s allegation that he wore restraints 

visible to the jurors and was prejudiced because visible 

restraints undermined the presumption of innocence, or at 

sentencing indicated he was a danger to society, has no 

merit. 

Although some jurors executed affidavits after the 

trial stating that during the trial they became aware that 

Morva was wearing a stun belt, Morva proffers no evidence 

to suggest Morva’s counsel was or should have been aware 

any juror had learned that information during trial. 

Because Morva was not visibly restrained in the presence of 

the jury and because there is no evidence that counsel was 

or should have been aware that jurors had learned Morva was 

wearing a stun belt under his clothing, trial counsel’s 

failure to object to the restraints or stun belt placed on 

Morva was not deficient performance. Moreover, the 
7

security measures were justified given Morva’s demonstrated 

history, which showed a willingness to use violence to 

effect and maintain an escape from custody, and were not 

inherently prejudicial. See Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 

Va. 203, 263, 661 S.E.2d 415, 446 (2008). Thus, Morva has 

failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 

deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. 

CLAIM (III) 

In a portion of claim (III), Morva asserts he was 

denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 

failed to point out that Jennifer Preston, who witnessed 

Morva shoot Derrick McFarland, was not looking at McFarland 

at the time of the shooting and could not have seen the 

gestures McFarland made. Morva contends he interpreted 

McFarland’s “movements” as an attempt to draw a weapon and 

that Morva did not know until later that McFarland was 

unarmed. 

Morva also argues that counsel did not use Preston or 

other witnesses to “point out the significance of the dark, 

Special Weapons and Tactics [S.W.A.T.] team/paramilitarystyle uniform McFarland wore that night.” Counsel failed 

to note that the dark color of the uniform and the multiple 
8

pockets and bulges made it difficult to detect the absence 

of a weapon, which would have rebutted the Commonwealth’s 

assertion that Morva knew McFarland was unarmed. 

The Court holds that this portion of claim (III) 

satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 

prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland. The 

record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates 

Preston testified that the events she witnessed, including 

the shooting, took mere seconds. She testified that she 

observed McFarland standing very still with his hands 

outstretched in a supplicating gesture, and Morva standing 

very still and pointing a gun at McFarland. She stated she 

clearly saw the expression on each man’s face, and then she 

saw Morva shoot McFarland. There is no evidence in the 

record, and Morva proffers none, that Preston was not 

looking at McFarland when Morva pulled the trigger. 

The witnesses testified that McFarland’s uniform 

consisted of a dark shirt with a patch and matching 

trousers. Morva does not proffer any evidence, nor is 

there any in the record, to support his claim that 

McFarland’s uniform was paramilitary or likely mistaken for 

that of armed law-enforcement personnel. Furthermore, 

Morva fails to provide evidence of any gestures made by 
9

McFarland that would indicate he was reaching for a firearm 

before he was shot. 

Even if McFarland was armed and was wearing a 

paramilitary type uniform, Morva shot McFarland as he stood 

in front of Morva with his hands in a supplicating gesture. 

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a 

frivolous argument that Morva was justified in shooting 

McFarland. Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate that 

counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. 

In another portion of claim (III), Morva contends he 

was denied the effective assistance of counsel because 

counsel failed to obtain a corrective jury instruction when 

Preston testified improperly that McFarland looked at her 

with “warning eyes to tell me there was danger.” Although 

counsel objected that the statement was speculative, and 

the court agreed, counsel did not ask for a curative 

instruction. Morva contends the jury was instructed that 

they may not arbitrarily disregard believable testimony, 

and as there was nothing innately unbelievable about 

Preston’s testimony, the jury was compelled to consider it. 

Morva contends further that the error was compounded 
10

because Preston was also allowed to testify that McFarland 

“looked scared,” and “like he was trying to appease 

[Morva],” who was “scowling” and “looking angry.” 

The Court holds that this portion of claim (III) 

satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 

prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland. The 

record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that 

counsel objected to Preston’s speculation as to what 

information she perceived McFarland was attempting to 

impart to her, which objection was sustained. Thus, such 

testimony was not admitted into evidence. 

Preston was permitted to describe what she observed, 

and she demonstrated for the jury how McFarland was 

standing. Preston also testified that she was in the 

hallway with McFarland and Morva, that Morva was standing 

two feet from McFarland pointing a “big gun” at McFarland’s 

face while McFarland stood very still with his hands 

outstretched, and that Morva then shot McFarland. Under 

these circumstances, Morva cannot demonstrate that 

counsel’s failure to ask for a curative instruction 

concerning Preston’s perceptions of the information the 

victim was attempting to convey with his facial expression 

was deficient performance. The testimony was excluded from 

evidence and to ask for a curative instruction may have 
11

emphasized the testimony. See Manetta v. Commonwealth, 231 

Va. 123, 127 n.2, 340 S.E.2d 828, 830 n.2 (1986). Such 

tactical decisions are an area of trial strategy left to 

the discretion of counsel and should not be second-guessed 

in habeas corpus. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. 

Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 

performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. 

In another portion of claim (III), Morva maintains he 

was denied the effective assistance of counsel because 

counsel failed to adequately cross-examine Officer Brian 

Roe. Morva contends that Roe’s testimony regarding Eric 

Sutphin’s gun holster being snapped shut contradicted other 

witnesses who reported, but did not testify, that upon 

seeing Sutphin’s body later, the weapon was in its holster, 

but the holster was unsnapped. Morva contends this 

information supports his account that he believed Sutphin 

was drawing a weapon, that he warned Sutphin not to draw 

his weapon, and that Morva only fired after the warning was 

given. 

The Court holds that this portion of claim (III) 

satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 

prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland. No 
12

witnesses testified that Deputy Sutphin’s holster was 

unsnapped and Officer Roe could not have been crossexamined on the hearsay reports of others. Morva fails to 

establish that more comprehensive cross-examination would 

have resulted in Officer Roe changing his unequivocal, 

uncontradicted testimony. Thus, Morva has failed to 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. 

CLAIM (IV) 

In claim (IV), Morva argues he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 

adequately investigate and develop evidence relating to the 

conditions at Montgomery County Jail. Morva contends that 

conditions at the jail included extreme overcrowding, nonexistent medical care, an ever-present threat of violent 

attack, and lack of privacy when going to the bathroom. 

Morva contends that this evidence would have helped jurors 

understand how Morva’s “horrendous experience at the jail 

influenced his actions.” Morva further contends that 

failure to provide this information “undermines confidence 

in [the] jurors’ decision at the trial’s guilt and penalty 

phases.” 
13

The Court holds that claim (IV) satisfies neither the 

“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 

test enunciated in Strickland. The record, including 

Morva’s exhibits, demonstrates that Morva was not exposed 

to any unique conditions of confinement and Morva was not 

denied medical treatment. Morva’s conditions of 

confinement would not have provided a viable defense to the 

murders he committed, and would not have mitigated the 

murders. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise 

frivolous arguments. Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate 

that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. 

CLAIM (V) 

In claim (V), Morva alleges he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 

present evidence and argument of Morva’s belief that “the 

specific combination of his longstanding and significant 

medical problems and lack of immediate treatment options 

while incarcerated presented an imminent, life-threatening 

situation, and that he would die soon if he remained in the 

jail.” Morva contends that his escape from the jail and 

subsequent killing of the two victims to avoid being 
14

returned to the jail “were motivated by his belief that his 

actions were acts of self-defense and necessary responses 

to the immediate threat posed by his particular experience 

of the circumstances at the jail.” Thus, according to 

Morva, even if the jury found his “fear to be unreasonable, 

the evidence was sufficient to present argument and 

instruction . . . with regard to a potential lesserincluded offense and in mitigation of the death sentence.” 

The Court holds that claim (V) satisfies neither the 

“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 

test enunciated in Strickland. There is no support in law 

for the proposition that one attempting to escape legal 

incarceration because of what he perceives as a threat of 

harm is thereby privileged to kill any individual, no 

matter how innocent or lacking in culpability, who presents 

a bar to that escape. Moreover, the record, including the 

trial transcript and Morva’s exhibits, demonstrates no 

person could reasonably have apprehended imminent death or 

serious bodily harm from McFarland or Sutphin. 

Morva’s alleged fear that his return to Montgomery 

County Jail might result in his death within a few months 

from some unnamed danger did not create a valid claim of 

self-defense, nor was it reasonably probable that the jury 

would have perceived his alleged fear as mitigating 
15

evidence for his murder of two innocent people. Also, the 

record does not support Morva's allegation that he was 

persistently denied necessary medical attention. In fact, 

he had been taken to the hospital for medical treatment at 

the time he attacked two of the victims and escaped. 

Counsel is not ineffective for failing to pursue a 

frivolous position or argument. Thus, Morva has failed to 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. 

CLAIM (VI)(A) 

In claim (VI)(A), Morva asserts he received multiple 

punishments in violation of the double jeopardy clause. 

Morva contends his case is indistinguishable from Clagett 

v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 472 S.E.2d 263 (1996), in that 

Morva’s capital conviction and death sentence for killing 

both McFarland and Sutphin within three years was 

derivative of the underlying capital murders of McFarland 

and Sutphin. Morva contends “the legislature must be 

deemed to have authorized a defendant’s conviction and 

death sentence for multiple-homicide offenses only when he 

is not also convicted and sentenced to death for the 

predicate murders.” 
16

 The Court holds that claim (VI)(A) is barred because 

this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at 

trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in 

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Slayton, 215 Va. 

at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 

CLAIM (VI)(B) 

In claim (VI)(B), Morva asserts he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 

object to, and thus failed to protect Morva from, multiple 

convictions and multiple punishments in violation of the 

double jeopardy clause. Morva contends that had counsel 

objected, the third death sentence would not have been 

imposed or would have been vacated. 

The Court holds that claim (VI)(B) satisfies neither 

the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 

test enunciated in Strickland. In Payne v. Commonwealth, 

257 Va. 216, 227-29, 509 S.E.2d 293, 300-01 (1999), this 

Court addressed whether a defendant could be subjected to 

multiple punishments where the convictions are for the 

violation of distinct statutory provisions for which 

separate statutory punishments are authorized. The Court 

held that such punishments do not violate double jeopardy. 

Id. 
17

Morva was sentenced to death for three separate 

capital offenses: capital murder while in custody, Code § 

18.2-31(3), capital murder of a law-enforcement officer, 

Code § 18.2-31(6), and capital murder of more than one 

person within a three-year period, Code § 18.2-31(8). The 

elements of capital murder while in custody are: (1) the 

willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing; (2) of 

another; (3) by a prisoner of a state or local correctional 

facility, or while in the custody of an employee of such 

facility. The elements of capital murder of a lawenforcement officer are: (1) the willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated killing; (2) of a law-enforcement officer; (3) 

for the purpose of interfering with the performance of his 

official duties. The elements of capital murder of more 

than one person within a three-year period are: (1) the 

willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing; (2) of more 

than one person; (3) within a three-year period. The 

elements of each of these capital offenses are different 

and each carries its own separate penalty. 

There was no double jeopardy violation under the 

circumstances of this case, and counsel is not ineffective 

for failing to raise a frivolous argument. Thus, Morva has 

failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 

deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, 
18

but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. 

CLAIM (VII) 

In claim (VII), Morva contends he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel because counsel 

unreasonably failed to investigate and present powerful 

mitigation evidence that Morva had saved a man’s life and 

helped the Commonwealth prosecute the man’s assailant. 

Morva alleges that he once put his own life at risk to help 

the victim of an assault, Kevin Grizzard, and that Morva’s 

later testimony against one of the assailants led to that 

person’s conviction. Morva also alleges that, as a result 

of his own actions, he suffered bullying and harassment, 

including while he was confined in the Montgomery County 

Jail. Morva contends that both he and Grizzard would have 

testified to the events in question, if they were called at 

an evidentiary hearing, and that there is a reasonable 

probability that the omitted testimony would have provided 

jurors with a better understanding of Morva’s background 

and character, and would have moved at least one juror to 

select life without parole as the appropriate sentence. 

The Court holds that claim (VII) satisfies neither the 

“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 

test enunciated in Strickland. Morva fails to proffer an 
19

affidavit from Grizzard to verify that he would have 

testified as Morva contends, and the affidavits Morva has 

provided contain hearsay statements concerning the attack 

and Morva’s involvement. Furthermore, the information 

provided by Morva establishes that Grizzard had been 

recruited by Morva to participate in a number of burglaries 

in 2005, and that Morva had become increasingly anti-social 

leading up to the murders, had expressed his disdain for 

law-enforcement, and felt justified in his criminal 

behavior. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to 

present evidence that has the potential of being “doubleedged.” Lewis v. Warden, 274 Va. 93, 116, 645 S.E.2d 492, 

505 (2007). Such tactical decisions are an area of trial 

strategy left to the discretion of counsel and should not 

be second-guessed in habeas corpus. See Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 689-90. Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate that 

counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. 

CLAIM (VIII) 

In claim (VIII), Morva asserts he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 

conduct an adequate investigation into Morva’s childhood 
20

and family background, and failed to meaningfully present 

the limited evidence they uncovered about Morva’s home 

life. Morva contends counsel “cut short” the investigation 

into Morva’s family, which Morva contends would otherwise 

have revealed “influential genetic and environmental 

factors at play.” Morva contends counsel should have 

pursued information regarding Morva’s father’s ties to 

Hungary because Morva’s father fled Hungary during the 

revolution and was a Catholic of Jewish heritage who had 

suffered through the Holocaust. Morva argues this 

information was necessary for jurors to accurately 

understand Morva’s background. 

The Court holds that claim (VIII) satisfies neither 

the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 

test enunciated in Strickland. The record, including 

Morva’s exhibits, demonstrates that counsel conducted an 

exhaustive investigation and spoke with the witnesses upon 

whose affidavits Morva now relies. These affidavits 

contain vast amounts of negative information that shows 

Morva as self-absorbed, manipulative, aggressive, and 

uncaring. As such, testimony from these witnesses would 

have been “double-edged.” Lewis, 274 Va. at 116, 645 

S.E.2d at 505. Furthermore, Morva has not demonstrated 

what impact, if any, his parents’ upbringings had on his 
21

actions. The information about his parents that Morva now 

provides does not concern Morva’s personal background or 

history, or the circumstances of the offense, and does not 

mitigate Morva’s actions. Thus, Morva has failed to 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. 

CLAIM (IX)(A) 

In claim (IX)(A), Morva asserts he did not receive 

constitutionally guaranteed assistance of experts in the 

preparation of his defense because the experts who 

evaluated Morva did not serve as advocates for him, but 

instead improperly maintained objectivity. In order to 

fulfill the constitutional guarantee of expert assistance, 

Morva asserts that the experts should have identified, 

developed and presented evidence to cast Morva’s history, 

character, background, and mental condition in the light 

most favorable to him. 

The Court holds claim (IX)(A) is barred because this 

non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial 

and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Slayton, 215 Va. at 

29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
22

CLAIM (IX)(B) 

In claim (IX)(B), Morva contends he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 

object after being put on notice that the appointed experts 

would not act in Morva’s best interest or advocate on his 

behalf. As a result, the experts did not fulfill their 

roles as advocates and Morva was denied his constitutional 

right to expert assistance. 

The Court holds that claim (IX)(B) satisfies neither 

the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 

test enunciated in Strickland. Morva proffers no authority 

for his contention that the experts appointed to assist 

Morva should be biased in Morva’s favor. Morva was 

entitled to, and received, “access to [] competent” mental 

health experts to “conduct an appropriate examination and 

assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of” 

Morva’s defense, as required by Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 

68, 84 (1985). Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate that 

counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. 
23

CLAIM (X) 

In claim (X), Morva asserts he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 

conduct an adequate enough investigation to enable the 

mental health experts to make an informed and accurate 

diagnosis. Morva contends counsel should have obtained 

information from Morva’s family and friends about the 

symptoms of his descent into mental illness. He also 

claims that counsel should have obtained medical records 

from Morva’s immediate family, and that without such 

information, mental health experts under-diagnosed the 

severity of Morva’s mental illness. 

The Court holds that claim (X) satisfies neither the 

“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 

test enunciated in Strickland. Morva proffers no competent 

evidence to substantiate his claim that he suffered from a 

“true mental illness,” or that providing additional 

information to the mental health experts who examined Morva 

in preparation for trial and sentencing would have changed 

the experts’ conclusions. Thus, Morva has failed to 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. 
24

CLAIM (XI) 

In a portion of claim (XI), Morva asserts he was 

denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 

failed to provide appointed mental health experts with even 

the minimal information counsel had obtained that would 

have enabled the experts to make an informed and accurate 

diagnosis. Morva contends counsel should have given the 

mental health experts the names of several individuals with 

whom Morva spent time in the years before the murders. He 

contends that had counsel done so, the experts would have 

interviewed these individuals and would likely have 

determined Morva suffered from a “true mental illness” such 

as delusional or schizophrenic disorder. 

The Court holds that this portion of claim (XI) 

satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 

prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland. Morva 

proffers no competent evidence to substantiate his claim 

that he suffered from a “true mental illness,” or that 

providing additional information to the mental health 

experts who examined Morva in preparation for trial and 

sentencing would have changed the experts' conclusions. 

Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 

performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
25

probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. 

In another portion of claim (XI), Morva asserts he was 

denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 

failed to reconcile the expert testimony with that of lay 

witnesses. Morva contends these conflicts led the jury to 

conclude that all of Morva’s penalty phase evidence was 

unreliable. 

The Court holds that this portion of claim (XI) 

satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 

prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland. Morva 

fails to state how counsel could possibly have reconciled 

the testimony of all the various witnesses, who had each 

known and spent time with Morva at different periods of his 

life, and who each had different experiences with and 

perceptions of him. Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate 

that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. 

CLAIM (XII) 

In claim (XII), Morva asserts he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 

object to damaging evidence that lacked a proper 
26

evidentiary foundation and was therefore irrelevant to the 

jurors’ sentencing decisions. Specifically, Morva contends 

counsel should have objected when the Commonwealth elicited 

testimony from Morva’s mental health experts regarding 

narcissism and predatory aggression because neither expert 

found a basis for diagnosing Morva as having narcissistic 

personality disorder or predatory aggression. 

The Court holds that claim (XII) satisfies neither the 

“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 

test enunciated in Strickland. Morva’s experts found that 

Morva “met diagnostic criteria for narcissistic personality 

disorder” or had “narcissistic personality features.” 

Thus, there was sufficient foundation for the Commonwealth 

to question Morva’s experts regarding narcissistic traits. 

Moreover, the Commonwealth presented evidence that showed 

Morva’s actions were aggressive, premeditated, and goal 

oriented and that Morva did not regret his actions, thus 

establishing a foundation for the questions regarding 

predatory aggression. Counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to raise a frivolous argument by objecting to such 

evidence. Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate that 

counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
27

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. 

CLAIM (XIII) 

In claim (XIII), Morva contends he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 

impeach Gregory Nelson by causing him to admit part of his 

in-court testimony was inconsistent with interview 

statements he made to police officers. Nelson testified 

during the penalty phase of the trial that he and Morva 

participated in various crimes and that Morva had 

threatened Nelson and others. 

Counsel attempted to impeach Nelson by showing that in 

his interviews with police, Nelson did not say that Morva 

had threatened him. When Nelson denied this, counsel 

attempted to use the interview statements to refresh 

Nelson’s recollection, but the Commonwealth’s objection was 

sustained because Nelson had not signed the statements. 

Morva contends that although counsel reserved the right to 

recall the police officers and Nelson, counsel failed to do 

so as a result of inadvertence instead of strategy. Morva 

contends impeaching Nelson through the police officer's 

testimony would have minimized the effect of evidence 

regarding Morva's future dangerousness. 
28

The Court holds that claim (XIII) satisfies neither 

the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 

test enunciated in Strickland. Morva does not provide the 

police report, or affidavits from the police officers or 

from Nelson to demonstrate the testimony they would have 

provided had counsel recalled them. In addition, Morva 

proffers no evidence to support his claim that counsel’s 

“failure was the result of inadvertence.” Thus, Morva has 

failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 

deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. 

Upon consideration whereof, Morva’s motions for leave 

to supplement the record, to amend the petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus, for discovery and production of 

documents, for appointment of experts, and for an 

evidentiary hearing are denied. Morva’s motion for en banc 

consideration is denied as moot. 

Upon consideration of the respondent’s motion to 

strike portions of Morva’s appendix and Morva’s reply, the 

motion to strike is denied. The exhibits contained in the 

appendices are considered pursuant to the appropriate 

evidentiary rules.
29

Accordingly, the petition is dismissed and the 

respondent shall recover from Morva the costs expended in 

his defense herein. 

This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 

Respondent’s costs: 

 Attorney’s fee $50.00 

 A Copy, 

 Teste: 

 Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk