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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 

Docket No. 44800

STATE OF IDAHO,

 Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MATTHEW ELLIOT COHAGAN,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Boise, June 2017 Term

2017 Opinion No. 94

Filed: August 24, 2017

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Canyon County. Hon. Thomas J. Ryan, District Judge. 

The district court order denying the motion to suppress is reversed and the case 

is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Maya P. Waldron argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M. 

Lorello, argued.

_________________________________

HORTON, Justice.

Matthew Elliot Cohagan appeals the Canyon County district court’s denial of his motion 

to suppress. Following the denial of his motion, Cohagan entered a conditional guilty plea to 

possession of methamphetamine. The appeal was originally assigned to the Idaho Court of 

Appeals, which reversed the district court. This Court granted the State’s timely petition for 

review. We reverse the district court’s order denying Cohagan’s motion to suppress.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 26, 2014, Officers Curtis and Otto observed Matthew Elliot Cohagan on the 

southwest corner of 12th Avenue South and 7th Street South in Nampa, Idaho. As they drove by, 

Officer Curtis thought Cohagan resembled an individual who had an outstanding arrest warrant. 

Officers Curtis and Otto turned their vehicle around to get a better look at Cohagan. However, by 

the time they drove back through the intersection, Cohagan had entered a grocery store located 

on the same corner. 
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The officers entered the grocery store and Officer Otto, without Officer Curtis present, 

made contact with Cohagan. Officer Otto requested Cohagan’s driver’s license, and Cohagan 

complied. After inspecting Cohagan’s license, Officer Otto determined that Cohagan was not the 

individual Officer Curtis suspected had an outstanding arrest warrant. Both officers then left the 

store. 

Before leaving the parking lot, however, the officers received a radio request to go back 

into the grocery store and retrieve surveillance video for an unrelated incident. While Officer 

Otto went to obtain the requested video, Officer Curtis decided he wanted to confirm Officer 

Otto’s identification of Cohagan. Officer Curtis stated that he felt Cohagan might have given 

Officer Otto false identification and, because Officer Otto was new to the force, Officer Curtis

wanted to confirm that Cohagan was not the person he suspected had an outstanding arrest 

warrant. Officer Curtis found Cohagan shopping in one of the aisles. Officer Curtis testified that 

as he approached Cohagan he recognized that Cohagan was not the individual he suspected. 

However, Officer Curtis decided he still wanted to ask Cohagan his name and look at his 

identification. 

Officer Curtis activated his lapel camera and made contact with Cohagan. The video 

shows that Officer Curtis asked if he could see Cohagan’s identification. Cohagan replied

“absolutely man” and handed his identification to Officer Curtis. Officer Curtis then took 

Cohagan’s identification, told Cohagan that he resembled another man they were looking for, 

and asked Cohagan if he had any outstanding warrants. Cohagan stated that he did not. Officer 

Curtis replied that he was going to check to see if Cohagan had any warrants and radioed 

dispatch to run a warrant check.

While Officer Curtis waited for dispatch to respond to the warrant check, Cohagan asked 

if he could continue shopping. Officer Curtis told Cohagan that he could, and Cohagan began 

walking away. Seconds later, however, Officer Curtis appeared to receive notice from dispatch 

that Cohagan might have a warrant and stated, “Hey, come here, they’re telling me you might 

have a warrant. I don’t want you running around the store here.” Officer Curtis then quickly 

caught up to Cohagan, put his hand on Cohagan’s shoulder, and told Cohagan to walk to the 

front of the store. On the way to the front of the store, Officer Curtis and Cohagan were joined 

by Officer Otto, and the three of them then stood at the front of the store and waited until the 

warrants were confirmed. Once the warrants were confirmed, Cohagan was escorted out of the 
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store and arrested. During the search incident to arrest, officers discovered a yellow box 

containing a glass-smoking device with white crystal residue that tested positive for 

methamphetamine. 

Cohagan was charged with possession of methamphetamine. He promptly filed a motion 

to suppress all evidence seized as a result of his arrest. The State conceded that Cohagan was 

illegally seized when Officer Curtis retained his license to run a warrant check, but argued that 

suppression was unwarranted because the discovery of methamphetamine was sufficiently 

attenuated from the illegal seizure. The district court denied Cohagan’s motion to suppress 

because it found that the discovery of the outstanding warrant was an intervening circumstance 

that sufficiently purged the discovery of the methamphetamine from the taint of the illegal 

seizure. 

Following the denial of his motion, Cohagan entered a conditional guilty plea to

possession of methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 

suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the State’s timely petition for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“In cases that come before this Court on a petition for review of 

a Court of Appeals decision, this Court gives serious consideration to the views of 

the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of the lower court.” State 

v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007). “This Court thus acts as 

if the case were on direct appeal from the district court.” State v. James, 148 

Idaho 574, 576, 225 P.3d 1169, 1171 (2010). “In reviewing a district court order 

granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the standard of review is 

bifurcated.” Id. (quoting State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 

(2009)). “This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are 

clearly erroneous.” Id. “However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s 

application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.” Id.

State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, No. 44443, 2017 WL 2569786, at *2 (Idaho June 14, 2017).

III. ANALYSIS

Cohagan asserts the district court erred in denying his suppression motion. Specifically, 

Cohagan argues that the evidence seized when he was arrested should have been suppressed

because it was “the direct result of the illegal detention because Officer Curtis detained [him] so 

that he could run a warrant check.”

A. Whether the district court erred in denying Cohagan’s suppression motion under the 

Fourth Amendment.
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The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be 

secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.

Const. amend IV. It has been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to apply to the states. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 

(1961).1 Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary 

rule, which requires unlawfully seized evidence to be excluded from trial. E.g., Wong Sun v. 

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 

(2004). The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of both “primary evidence obtained as a 

direct result of an illegal search or seizure” and, pertinent here, “evidence later discovered and 

found to be derivative of an illegality,” the proverbial “ ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’ ” Segura v. 

United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984); accord, e.g., State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810–11, 

203 P.3d 1203, 1209–10 (2009).

However, there are various exceptions to the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Murray v. 

United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (describing the independent source doctrine); Nix v. 

Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443–44 (1984) (describing the inevitable discovery doctrine). At issue 

here is the attenuation doctrine. The attenuation doctrine allows evidence to be admitted “when 

the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been 

interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional 

guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’ ” 

Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 

(2006)). 

As a threshold matter, the State maintains on appeal, even though it conceded the point 

below, that the Court must decide whether the interaction between Cohagan and Officer Curtis 

was lawful. This is incorrect. It is true that the question of whether a seizure occurred is a 

question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 247, 

787 P.2d 231, 233 (1990). It is also true that this Court is not “limited by the prosecutor’s 

argument or the absence thereof.” State v. Veneroso, 138 Idaho 925, 930, 71 P.3d 1072, 1077 

(Ct. App. 2003). However, it is equally true that “[i]ssues not raised below will not be considered 

 1 The Idaho Constitution offers protection for unlawful search and seizure as well. Idaho Const. art. I, § 17. 

However, Cohagan does not argue that Idaho’s Constitution provides greater protection than the U.S. Constitution;

thus, our analysis is limited to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In re Doe, 155 Idaho 36, 39 n.2, 304 

P.3d 1202, 1205 n.2 (2013).
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by this court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was 

presented to the lower court.” Garcia-Rodriguez, 2017 WL 2569786 at *3 (quoting Heckman 

Ranches, Inc. v. State, By & Through Dep’t of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799–800, 589 P.2d 

540, 546–47 (1979)); see also Weil v. Herring, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (N.C. 1934) (“An examination 

of the record discloses that the cause was not tried upon that theory, and the law does not permit 

parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount in the Supreme Court.”).

In its briefing before the district court, the State stated that it “concedes that [Cohagan] 

was unjustifiably seized at the point Officer Curtis chose to retain his license and hold it while 

running [Cohagan’s] information for active warrants.”2 To allow the State to change positions on 

appeal and argue that the stop was not illegal would sharply cut against our longstanding and 

recently re-affirmed policy of requiring parties to present their arguments to the court below:

It is manifestly unfair for a party to go into court and slumber, as it were, on his 

defense, take no exception to the ruling, present no point for the attention of the 

court, and seek to present his defense, that was never mooted before, to the 

judgment of the appellate court. Such a practice would destroy the purpose of an 

appeal and make the supreme court one for deciding questions of law in the first 

instance. 

Garcia-Rodriguez, 2017 WL 2569786 at *4 (quoting Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 128, 131 (1867)).

As we will discuss further when considering the State’s claim of attenuation, Officer 

Curtis’s retention of Cohagan’s license resulted in an unlawful detention. We therefore proceed 

to the question of attenuation: i.e., whether the discovery of the warrant sufficiently breaks the 

causal chain between the unlawful stop and the discovery of the evidence. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 

at 2062 (proceeding to the analysis of the attenuation factors without deciding whether the stop 

was illegal because the State conceded the point).

1. Whether the discovery of the arrest warrant was a sufficient intervening event to 

break the causal chain between the unlawful stop and the discovery of the evidence.

“There are three factors for a court to consider when determining whether unlawful 

conduct has been adequately attenuated.” Page, 140 Idaho at 846, 103 P.3d at 459; see also 

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975). Those factors are: “(1) the elapsed time between 

the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening 

circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.” Page, 

 2 The State also stated at the hearing on the motion to suppress: “[W]e admit holding the ID was probably a seizure; 

we do admit that.” And, “Now as I indicated, the state admits that once the officer has that ID, under the law that is a 

seizure.”
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140 Idaho at 846, 103 P.3d at 459; accord, e.g., Brown, 422 U.S. at 603–04; Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 

2062.

a. Elapsed time

In addressing the first factor, the district court found “there was a minimal lapse of time 

between the seizure of the license and the discovery [of] a valid arrest warrant.” The district 

court, however, looked to the wrong period of time. It is not the period of time between the 

misconduct and the intervening circumstance that matters. Rather, as this Court and the U.S. 

Supreme Court have both stated, the period of time to consider is “the elapsed time between the 

misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence.” Page, 140 Idaho at 846, 103 P.3d at 459; 

Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (“First, we look to the ‘temporal proximity’ between the 

unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence . . . .”). “[T]his factor favors attenuation 

unless ‘substantial time’ elapses between an unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained.” 

Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (citing Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 (2003) (per curiam))).

Here, drug contraband was discovered on Cohagan’s person within minutes of the illegal 

stop. Such a short period of time between the illegal stop and the discovery of evidence weighs 

in favor of suppression. Id. (noting that the space of minutes between the misconduct and the 

discovery of evidence “counsels in favor of suppression”). 

b. Intervening circumstances

The intervening circumstance, in this case, is the discovery of an arrest warrant for 

Cohagan. The discovery of an arrest warrant as an intervening circumstance “strongly favors the 

State.” Id. “Where the discovery of an arrest warrant constitutes an intervening circumstance, ‘it 

is an even more compelling case for the conclusion that the taint of the original illegality is 

dissipated.’ ” United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 495 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States 

v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 522 (7th Cir. 1997)). 

Here, it is undisputed that the arrest warrant was valid. Indeed, counsel for Cohagan

admitted at the suppression hearing that there were actually three warrants. “[A] warrant valid on 

its face is prima facie sufficient authority for the officer to arrest and deliver the accused.” In re 

Martz, 83 Idaho 72, 75, 357 P.2d 940, 942 (1960). Furthermore, in Monson v. Boyd, this Court 

held that the existence of a valid arrest warrant imposes a duty on peace officers to make an 

arrest. 81 Idaho 575, 579, 348 P.2d 93, 95 (1959) (“Plaintiff contends that the word ‘may’ in the 

foregoing statute is permissive only, and does not charge the peace officer with a duty to make 
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an arrest. On the contrary, we think the statute imposes a duty on peace officers.”); accord 

Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (“A warrant is a judicial mandate to an officer to conduct a search or 

make an arrest, and the officer has a sworn duty to carry out its provisions.” (quoting United 

States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 n.21 (1984))). Thus, the discovery of the outstanding warrant, 

independent of the stop, compelled Cohagan’s arrest. And there is no question that the search 

that revealed the drug contraband was lawful as a search incident to arrest. See State v. LaMay, 

140 Idaho 835, 838, 103 P.3d 448, 451 (2004); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009). 

Accordingly, this factor weighs strongly in favor of attenuation. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062; 

Simpson, 439 F.3d at 495.

c. Flagrancy and purpose

The purpose of the exclusionary rule, under federal law, is to deter police misconduct.3

Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37. Accordingly, the third factor only favors exclusion 

“when the police misconduct is most in need of deterrence—that is, when it is purposeful or 

flagrant.” Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (emphases added).

The State argues that the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Strieff controls the 

outcome of this case and dictates that we find attenuation rather than suppression. Because 

Cohagan has not argued that the Idaho Constitution affords greater protection than the U.S. 

Constitution, we agree that Strieff controls. However, Strieff differs factually from the present 

case, and we hold that those differences are sufficient to warrant suppression. 

In Strieff, an officer received an anonymous tip about drug activity occurring in a 

residence. Id. at 2059. Over the course of a week, and after observing multiple people make brief 

visits to the residence, the officer became suspicious that the occupants of the residence were 

dealing drugs. Id. While watching the home, the officer observed the defendant exit the house 

and walk toward a nearby convenience store. Id. at 2060. The officer detained the defendant in 

the store parking lot and asked the defendant what he was doing at the residence. Id. The officer 

 3 In State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988–98, 842 P.2d 660, 667–77 (1992), this Court declined to accept deterrence 

of police misconduct as the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule under Idaho’s Constitution; rather, we instructed 

that the exclusionary rule serves to: 

1) provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an unreasonable 

government search and/or seizure; 2) deter the police from acting unlawfully in obtaining 

evidence; 3) encourage thoroughness in the warrant issuing process; 4) avoid having the judiciary 

commit an additional constitutional violation by considering evidence which has been obtained 

through illegal means; and 5) preserve judicial integrity.

Id. at 993, 842 P.2d at 672.

However, as noted, Cohagan makes no argument concerning the Idaho Constitution. 
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also requested the defendant’s identification and relayed the defendant’s information to dispatch, 

which reported that the defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant. Id. The officer then arrested 

the defendant and searched him incident to arrest. Id. The search revealed a baggie of 

methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Id.

In determining whether the officer’s conduct was flagrant, the Supreme Court noted that 

the officer’s decision to run a warrant check was a “ ‘negligibly burdensome precaution’ for 

officer safety” and the officer’s conduct “was at most negligent” and the result of “two goodfaith mistakes.” Id. at 2063 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2016)). It 

also noted that the officer’s purpose in approaching the defendant was to determine what was 

going on in the house and that “the stop was an isolated instance of negligence that occurred in 

connection with a bona fide investigation of a suspected drug house.” Id. Based on those 

observations, the Supreme Court held that the officer’s conduct did not reflect “flagrantly 

unlawful police misconduct.” Id.

Here, there was no “bona fide investigation.” Officer Otto had asked Cohagan for his 

identification just a few minutes before Officer Curtis interacted with Cohagan and confirmed 

that Cohagan was not the person they suspected. The only proffered purpose for Officer Curtis’s 

stop of Cohagan was that Officer Curtis suspected that Cohagan might have given Officer Otto a 

false identification card, but there are no objective grounds to support this belief or the 

subsequent seizure. Cf. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660–62, 152 P.3d 16, 21–23 (2007).

Indeed, Officer Curtis admitted that before stopping Cohagan, he knew Cohagan was not the 

person he suspected.4 Thus, there was no cause for Officer Curtis to stop Cohagan because both 

Officer Otto and Officer Curtis himself had already confirmed that Cohagan was not the 

suspected individual. Further, there was no need for Officer Curtis to stop Cohagan and run a 

warrant check as a precaution for officer safety. Officer Otto had just checked Cohagan’s 

identification and there was no reason Officer Curtis could not have run a warrant check before 

he made contact with Cohagan. Indeed, the more prudent and safe approach for Officer Curtis 

would have been to check for warrants before making contact.

Ultimately, there was simply no reason for Officer Curtis to stop Cohagan and run a 

warrant check. Unlike in Strieff, where the defendant had just exited a residence the officer 

 4 Officer Curtis testified: “So as [Cohagan] got close, maybe 10 or 15 feet away, I realized it was not him, but at that 

point I still wanted to ask his name and ID him.”
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suspected was a source of drugs, here, there was no indication that Cohagan was involved in 

illegal activity. Also unlike in Strieff, where the officer did not already know the defendant’s 

name, Officer Otto had already identified Cohagan and there was no reason Officer Curtis could 

not have run a warrant check before stopping Cohagan. As Officer Curtis stated: “So as 

[Cohagan] got close, maybe 10 or 15 feet away, I realized it was not him, but at that point I still 

wanted to ask his name and ID him.” Having already stated his realization that Cohagan was not 

the suspected person, Officer Curtis’s decision to request Cohagan’s identification and run a 

warrant check was nothing more than “a suspicionless fishing expedition ‘in the hope that 

something would turn up.’ ” Id. at 2064 (quoting Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691 (1982)). 

Such purposeful conduct is simply untenable and is exactly the type of flagrantly unlawful 

conduct the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect against. See, e.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 

U.S. 626, 633, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2003) (finding flagrant violation where officers knew they 

lacked probable cause to detain the defendant but did so anyway); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 

590, 605 (1975) (holding that a stop that was solely investigatory and conducted on the hope that 

something might turn up violates the protections of the Fourth Amendment).

Our decision in State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004), warrants further 

discussion when evaluating Officer Curtis’s conduct.

In Page, a police officer noticed Page walking down the middle of a street in the middle 

of the night. Id. at 842, 103 P.3d at 455. The officer approached Page and, “[a]fter inquiring 

about his well-being,” asked for Page’s identification. Id. at 842–43, 103 P.3d at 455–56. The 

officer took Page’s driver’s license back to his patrol car and contacted dispatch. Id. at 843, 103 

P.3d at 456. After dispatch informed the officer that Page had an outstanding warrant for his 

arrest, the officer arrested Page. Id. The ensuing search incident to arrest led to the discovery of 

methamphetamine, marijuana and drug paraphernalia on Page’s person. Id. Page moved to 

suppress the evidence. Id. The district court found that Page was unlawfully seized and granted 

his motion to suppress. Id. 

We reversed. Id. at 847, 103 P.3d at 460. We agreed with the district court’s 

determination that Page was unlawfully seized, id. at 845, 103 P.3d at 458, but held that the 

discovery of the outstanding warrant attenuated the taint of the unlawful seizure. Id. at 846–47, 

103 P.3d at 459–60. 
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Page is important for its discussion of the illegal seizure. There, the State relied on our 

decision in State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 826 P.2d 452 (1992), in support of its argument that:

the brief retention of a driver’s license or other identifying paperwork during an 

otherwise lawful police contact is reasonable, because the intrusion upon the 

person’s privacy interest is minimal when compared to the valid 

public/governmental interests, including the officer’s need to properly identify the 

person with whom he is dealing, prepare accurate reports and ensure officer 

safety.

Page, 140 Idaho at 845, 103 P.3d at 458. We rejected this argument. We first distinguished 

Godwin from the facts presented in Page, noting: 

the Court in Godwin was heavily influenced by the fact that I.C. § 49-316 requires 

a driver to surrender a driver’s license to a police officer upon demand and that 

the statutory authority for police to demand a driver’s license would mean little if 

the police could not check the validity of the license. 

Id. (internal quotation, citation and alteration omitted). We held that there was “[n]o equally 

compelling policy or statutory authority” that would support seizure of a driver’s license from a 

pedestrian. Id. We then took note of our statement in Godwin “that ‘police officers do not have 

unfettered discretion to stop drivers and request a display of a driver’s license’ to conduct a 

random status and/or warrants check.” Id. (quoting Godwin, 121 Idaho at 496, 826 P.2d at 457). 

Most significantly, we expressed concern “about the implications of a rule allowing law 

enforcement officers the ability to initiate consensual encounters with pedestrians in order to 

seize identification and run a warrants check.” Id. 

It appears that our holding regarding the illegality of Page’s seizure and the concern we 

identified has been obscured by the result of the decision—reversal of the district court’s order 

suppressing the evidence. This leads us to discuss an implicit component of the exclusionary rule 

that receives little attention: the fact that application of the rule leads law enforcement officers to 

receive training in the law of search and seizure. The United States Supreme Court has 

explained:

The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the 

police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has 

deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a 

result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating 

officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights 

of an accused.
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Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (emphasis added). In the landmark decision 

announcing the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the United States Supreme Court 

explained:

The objective standard we adopt, moreover, requires officers to have a reasonable 

knowledge of what the law prohibits. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542, 

95 S.Ct. 2313, 2320, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975). As Professor Jerold Israel has 

observed:

“The key to the [exclusionary] rule’s effectiveness as a deterrent lies, I believe, in 

the impetus it has provided to police training programs that make officers aware 

of the limits imposed by the fourth amendment and emphasize the need to operate 

within those limits. [An objective good-faith exception] is not likely to result in 

the elimination of such programs, which are now viewed as an important aspect of 

police professionalism. Neither is it likely to alter the tenor of those programs; the 

possibility that illegally obtained evidence may be admitted in borderline cases is 

unlikely to encourage police instructors to pay less attention to fourth amendment 

limitations. Finally, [it] should not encourage officers to pay less attention to what 

they are taught, as the requirement that the officer act in ‘good faith’ is 

inconsistent with closing one’s mind to the possibility of illegality.” Israel, 

[Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 

Mich.L.Rev. 1319, 1412–1413 (1977)] (footnotes omitted).

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 n.20 (1984) (emphasis added, bracketed material 

(except for Israel citation) in original). 

Although the record is silent as to Officer Curtis’s training, it appears that law 

enforcement’s “takeaway” from our decision in Page may differ from that which this Court 

intended. Rather than recognizing the illegality of seizing identification belonging to a pedestrian 

not suspected of criminal conduct, Page may have been interpreted as granting law enforcement 

officers license to engage in fishing expeditions. Stated differently, it appears that some members 

of law enforcement have interpreted Page as meaning that this Court will apply the attenuation 

doctrine to excuse a constitutional violation in the event that a fishing expedition proves 

successful. 

In our view, the training that law enforcement officers receive regarding the law of search 

and seizure should play a role in evaluating the flagrancy of their behavior. As the Arkansas 

Supreme Court has stated:

It is the duty of those who enforce the law to follow it, and ignorance 

thereof can no more excuse the conduct of officers and judges than it would 

excuse the conduct of a defendant. If anything, a higher duty of compliance rests 

on those whose responsibility it is to enforce the law than on the general 

[populace]. 
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State v. Kelley, 210 S.W.3d 93, 99 (Ark. 2005). Today’s decision should remove any lingering 

doubt as to whether this Court will sanction the unjustified, suspicionless seizure of citizens. It is 

difficult to imagine how similar conduct, following the release of this opinion, can be 

characterized as anything but purposeful or flagrant.

In summary, although the discovery of the arrest warrant strongly favors attenuation, the 

other two factors support a finding of suppression. Accordingly, we hold that the discovery of 

the evidence was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop as to break the causal chain

between the unconstitutional stop and the discovery of the evidence. The district court’s denial of 

Cohagan’s motion to suppress is reversed. 

IV. CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court’s denial of Cohagan’s motion to suppress and remand to the 

district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices EISMANN, JONES and BRODY, CONCUR.