UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4491

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

MONTRELLE LAMONT CAMPBELL, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District 

Judge. (2:07-cr-01123-PMD-1) 

Submitted: December 5, 2008 Decided: January 15, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Montrelle Lamont Campbell appeals the district court’s 

judgment entered pursuant to his guilty plea to possession of a 

firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 924(c) (2006). Counsel for 

Campbell filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), in which he asserts there are no meritorious 

issues for appeal, but asks this court to review the adequacy of 

the plea hearing, the district court’s imposition of a fourlevel offense level enhancement, and the reasonableness of 

Campbell’s sentence. Campbell was notified of the opportunity 

to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has failed to do so. 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

 Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1), the district court 

must address the defendant in open court and inform him of the 

following: the nature of the charge; any mandatory minimum 

sentence and the maximum possible sentence; the applicability of 

the Sentencing Guidelines; the court’s obligation to impose a 

special assessment; the defendant’s right to an attorney; his 

right to plead not guilty and be tried by a jury with the 

assistance of counsel; his right to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses; his right against self-incrimination; and his right 

to testify, present evidence, and compel the attendance of 

witnesses. The defendant also must be told that a guilty plea 

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waives any further trial and that his answers at the proceeding 

may be used against him in a prosecution for perjury. Under 

Rule 11(b)(2), the court must address the defendant to determine 

that the plea is voluntary. The court must determine a factual 

basis for the plea under Rule 11(b)(3) and require disclosure of 

any plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(2). Because Campbell did 

not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, any 

challenges to the Rule 11 hearing are reviewed for plain error. 

See United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-25 (4th Cir. 

2002). 

 After a thorough review of the record, we find there 

were no errors with respect to the Rule 11 plea colloquy. 

During the plea hearing, the district court properly informed 

Campbell of the rights he was forfeiting as a result of his plea 

and the nature of the charges and penalties he faced, found that 

Campbell was competent and entering his plea voluntarily, and 

determined there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea. 

Therefore, the record establishes Campbell knowingly and 

voluntarily entered into his guilty plea with a full 

understanding of the consequences, and there was no error in the 

district court’s acceptance of his plea. 

 Campbell next asks this court to review whether the 

district court erred in imposing a four-level offense level 

enhancement for possession or use of a firearm in connection 

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with another felony offense. The purpose of the enhancement 

under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2K2.1(b)(6) 

(2007) is “to ensure that a defendant receives more severe 

punishment if, in addition to committing a firearms offense 

within the scope of § 2K2.1, he commits a separate felony 

offense that is rendered more dangerous by the presence of a 

firearm.” United States v. Blount, 337 F.3d 404, 406 (4th Cir. 

2003) (citing former USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2001)). To determine 

whether the enhancement should apply, the district court must 

consider whether the defendant committed a separate felony 

offense and whether the firearm underlying the conviction was 

possessed in connection with the additional felony. Id. at 406-

07. The district court’s factual findings concerning sentencing 

factors need only be supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence. United States v. Morris, 429 F.3d 65, 72 (4th Cir. 

2005). 

 According to the presentence report, the four-level 

enhancement was warranted on the ground that Campbell used or 

possessed a firearm in connection with his possession of 

marijuana with intent to distribute. At sentencing, Campbell 

asserted there was insufficient evidence that the firearm was 

possessed in connection with a drug trafficking crime. However, 

the substantial quantity of drugs recovered, in conjunction with 

his possession of a handgun, constituted sufficient evidence of 

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Campbell’s involvement in narcotics distribution. See United 

States v. Fisher, 912 F.2d 728, 730-31 (4th Cir. 1990). 

Furthermore, the weapon was possessed to facilitate, or had a 

tendency to facilitate, the felony distribution offense, as its 

presence was not the result of accident or coincidence. See

Blount, 337 F.3d at 411 (citations omitted); see also United 

States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259, 266 (4th Cir. 2000). Finally, 

as the Government noted at sentencing, Campbell’s brandishing of 

the firearm would be sufficient to support a state felony charge 

for assault of a high and aggravated nature. See South 

Carolina v. Murphy, 471 S.E.2d 739, 740-41 (S.C. App. 1996). 

Therefore, we find the district court did not err in imposing a 

four-level offense level enhancement for use or possession of a 

firearm in connection with another felony offense. 

 Finally, Campbell asks this court to review the 

reasonableness of his sentence. Following United States v. 

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a district court must engage in a 

multi-step process at sentencing. First, it must calculate the 

appropriate advisory Guidelines range. It must then consider 

the resulting range in conjunction with the factors set forth in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) and determine an appropriate 

sentence. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007). 

We review the district court’s imposition of a sentence for 

abuse of discretion. Id. at 597; see also United States v. 

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Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). This court “must 

first ensure that the district court committed no significant 

procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly 

calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 

mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting 

a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to 

adequately explain the chosen sentence--including an explanation 

for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. 

at 597. 

 If there are no procedural errors, we then consider 

the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. 

“Substantive reasonableness review entails taking into account 

the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any 

variance from the Guidelines range.” Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, this 

court may presume a sentence within the Guidelines range to be 

reasonable. Id. Mere disagreement with the district court’s 

exercise of sentencing discretion does not permit us to 

substitute our judgment for that of the lower court. Id. at 

473-74. “Even if we would have reached a different sentencing 

result on our own, this fact alone is ‘insufficient to justify 

reversal of the district court.’” Id. at 474 (quoting Gall, 128 

S. Ct. at 597). 

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 Aside from his objection to the four-level enhancement 

for possession or use of a firearm in connection with a felony 

offense, Campbell raised no further objections at the sentencing 

hearing. The district court appropriately treated the 

Sentencing Guidelines as advisory, considered the relevant 

factors under § 3553(a), and sentenced Campbell below the 

statutory maximum and within the properly calculated Guidelines 

range of 84 to 105 months. Campbell has failed to demonstrate 

that his sentence is either procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable, as his 105-month term of incarceration was within 

the Guidelines range. Therefore, we find the sentence imposed 

by the district court was reasonable. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If the client requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

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in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED