2015 UT App 28

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARTYN E. KINGSTON AND LOUISE D.S. KINGSTON,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

STATE FARM AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY AND STATE FARM 

FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendants and Appellees.

Opinion

No. 20131045-CA

Filed February 5, 2015

Third District Court, Silver Summit Department

The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy

No. 110500838

Bret M. Hanna and Thomas E. Shaw, Attorneys 

for Appellants

Paul M. Belnap, Jennifer R. Carrizal, and Nicholas 

E. Dudoich, Attorneys for Appellees

JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES STEPHEN L. ROTH and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN

concurred.

VOROS, Judge:

¶1 This case arises from an insurance claim made after an 

automobile collision involving an underinsured driver. Because 

of the risk posed by underinsured motorists, state law contains a 

default coverage provision. This provision mandates that all 

automobile insurance policies provide underinsured motorist 

(UIM) coverage limits equal to (1) the maximum UIM limits 

available under that policy or (2) that policy’s liability limits, 

whichever is less, unless the insured purchases coverage in a 

lesser amount or rejects UIM coverage altogether by signing an 

acknowledgment form containing specified disclosures. Here, 
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the district court ruled on summary judgment that the insureds 

were not entitled to default maximum UIM coverage, because 

the insurer had adequately informed them about UIM coverage 

and the insureds had knowingly opted for lower coverage limits. 

We affirm that ruling.

BACKGROUND

¶2 This case involves two insurance policies: an Automobile 

Insurance Policy and a $1,000,000 Personal Liability Umbrella 

Policy. Plaintiffs Martyn E. Kingston and Louise D.S. Kingston 

are the insureds under both policies. State Farm Automobile 

Insurance Company issued the Automobile Policy; State Farm 

Fire and Casualty Company issued the Umbrella Policy 

(collectively, State Farm). After the accident giving rise to this 

case, State Farm paid the Kingstons an amount equal to the UIM 

coverage limits stated in the Automobile Policy. However, the 

Kingstons contend that because State Farm failed to comply with 

statutory requirements, they are entitled to an additional 

$150,000 under the Automobile Policy and an additional 

$1,000,000 under the Umbrella Policy.

¶3 In 2004, the Kingstons purchased the Umbrella Policy. 

The Umbrella Policy application stated, ‚If the applicant does 

not want Uninsured/Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage, or 

does not have Uninsured/Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage 

limits of 250/500, the Rejection below must be signed.‛ On the 

Umbrella Policy application, applicants could check a box 

rejecting UIM coverage ‚on all vehicles‛ or a box rejecting 

coverage ‚on recreational vehicles only.‛ State Farm’s 

representative checked both boxes. Mr. Kingston reviewed the 

information contained in the Umbrella Policy application and 

signed it. Ms. Kingston did not sign the Umbrella Policy 

application. 
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20131045-CA 3 2015 UT App 28

¶4 In 2006, the Kingstons insured their new Subaru Outback 

with State Farm. State Farm offered the Kingstons the option to 

purchase UIM coverage to complement their ordinary collision 

coverage.1 As part of the process of purchasing UIM coverage, 

State Farm presented the Kingstons with a ‚Selection/Rejection 

of Underinsured Motorist Coverage Form‛ as required under 

section 31A-22-305.3 of the Utah Insurance Code (the UIM 

statute). See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(b) (LexisNexis 

Supp. 2008). The Selection/Rejection Form notified the Kingstons 

of the scope of their UIM coverage:

This coverage selection or rejection shall be 

applicable to the policy of insurance on the vehicle 

described below [the Subaru], on all future 

renewals of the policy, and on all replacement 

policies unless and until I make an express written 

request to add or increase the coverage(s). I sign 

this acknowledgment on behalf of all applicants 

and insureds under the policy.

The Kingstons each signed and dated the Selection/Rejection 

Form after selecting UIM coverage limits of $100,000 per person 

and $300,000 per occurrence (100/300). The 100/300 limits were 

for an amount less than the policy’s maximum liability limits of 

$250,000 per person and $500,000 per occurrence (250/500). State 

Farm issued policy number 050-0493 for the Subaru.

¶5 In 2008, the Kingstons purchased another vehicle, a 

Chevrolet Suburban, and garaged the Subaru. State Farm 

 

1. The UIM issues we discuss could also arise with respect to 

uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A22-305 (LexisNexis 2014). But here the driver at fault was under-, 

rather than un-, insured. Accordingly, we address only the UIM 

statute and associated caselaw.
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substituted the Chevrolet for the Subaru on the Automobile 

Policy but made no other changes to the policy. State Farm did 

not obtain from the Kingstons a fresh Selection/Rejection Form 

naming the Chevrolet. And State Farm did not send the 

Kingstons a notice ‚reasonably explain*ing+ the purpose of 

*UIM+ coverage.‛ See id. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(b)(iv). Under the 2012 

version of the UIM statute, this ‚Important Notice Regarding 

Uninsured and Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage‛ 

(Important Notice) should have been sent within thirty days of 

the date the Kingstons substituted the Chevrolet for the Subaru. 

See id. § 31A-22-305.3(3)(c)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).2

¶6 Two months later, State Farm sent the Kingstons a notice 

stating that it had automatically renewed the Automobile Policy 

(the Automatic Renewal). The Automatic Renewal notice stated 

the 100/300 UIM policy limits and listed the Chevrolet as the 

covered vehicle. The Automatic Renewal also directed the 

Kingstons to contact State Farm if they wanted to increase their 

UIM coverage to 250/500.

¶7 Months later, while driving the insured Chevrolet, Ms. 

Kingston suffered injuries in a collision with an underinsured 

driver. The Kingstons filed a claim, and State Farm paid 

$100,000, an amount equal to the limit of the Kingstons’ UIM 

liability coverage under the Automobile Policy. More than two 

years after accepting the $100,000 payment, the Kingstons sent a 

letter to State Farm seeking an additional $150,000 under the 

Automobile Policy and $1,000,000 under the Umbrella Policy. 

State Farm declined to pay the additional benefits, and the 

Kingstons sued.

 

2. As explained below, the Kingstons contend that the 2012 

version of the statute applies to this dispute. See supra ¶¶ 19–23.
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20131045-CA 5 2015 UT App 28

¶8 The Kingstons alleged that State Farm failed to 

adequately inform them of UIM coverage for the Chevrolet in 

two respects. First, they asserted State Farm failed to obtain a 

fresh Selection/Rejection Form when adding the Chevrolet to the 

Automobile Policy. See id. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 

2008). Second, they asserted that State Farm failed to send the 

Kingstons an Important Notice about UIM coverage within 

thirty days of the Kingstons’ acquiring the Chevrolet. See id.

§ 31A-22-305.3(3)(c)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).

¶9 The Kingstons also alleged that State Farm owed them the 

maximum $1,000,000 of coverage under the Umbrella Policy. The 

2004 Umbrella Policy application required the Kingstons to sign 

a rejection provision if they opted to reject maximum UIM 

coverage. Mr. Kingston signed the rejection provision. The 

Kingstons asserted that they were nevertheless entitled to the 

$1,000,000 maximum coverage for three reasons. First, they 

asserted that the Umbrella Policy application violated the UIM 

statute because the application did not ‚reasonably explain[] the 

purpose of underinsured motorist coverage.‛ See Utah Code 

Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(b)(iv) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008). Second, 

they asserted that Mr. Kingston’s rejection did not bind Ms. 

Kingston, the injured driver. And third, they asserted that the 

rejection provision of the Umbrella Policy application was 

ambiguous.

¶10 After discovery, the Kingstons moved for partial 

summary judgment. State Farm responded with a cross-motion 

for partial summary judgment. The district court denied the 

Kingstons’ motion and granted State Farm’s motion. The district 

court ruled that State Farm was ‚not obligated to provide 

coverage in excess of the $100,000 limit‛ stated in the 

Automobile Policy and that the Kingstons were ‚not entitled to 

umbrella coverage.‛ The Kingstons timely appealed.
Kingston v. State Farm

20131045-CA 6 2015 UT App 28

ISSUES

¶11 First, the Kingstons contend that the district court erred in 

denying them $250,000 in UIM coverage under the Automobile 

Policy pursuant to the default provision of the UIM statute. See 

id. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(b); id. § 31A-22-305.3(3)(c)(iii) (LexisNexis 

Supp. 2012).

¶12 Second, the Kingstons contend that the district court erred 

in denying them the maximum $1,000,000 coverage under the 

Umbrella Policy. See id. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(b)(iv) (Supp. 2008).

¶13 Summary judgment is appropriate when ‚the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as 

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.‛ Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review a 

district court’s ‚legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of 

summary judgment for correctness, and view[] the facts and all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.‛ Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 

¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. The Automobile Insurance Policy

¶14 The UIM statute requires that ‚*f+or new policies written 

on or after January 1, 2001,‛ insurers must provide uninsured 

motorist coverage limits equal to the maximum UIM limits 

available under that policy or that policy’s liability coverage 

limits, whichever is less, unless the insured waives maximum 
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UIM coverage. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(b) 

(LexisNexis Supp. 2008).3

¶15 Utah passed the uninsured and underinsured motorist 

statutes ‚in response to an urgent concern that citizens of the 

state did not understand the consequences of not carrying 

uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.‛ Iverson v. State 

Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 UT 34, ¶ 16, 256 P.3d 222. The UM/UIM 

statutes require that insurers notify policyholders about the 

UM/UIM coverage options available to them. Id. ¶ 17; see also 

General Sec. Indem. Co. of Ariz. v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109, ¶¶ 11–

15 & n.6, 158 P.3d 1121 (detailing the legislative history and 

public policy considerations motivating Utah’s UM/UIM 

statutes). The UM/UIM statutes do not require insureds to 

purchase UM/UIM coverage; instead, they permit insureds to 

select a lower amount of UM/UIM coverage than the amount of 

liability coverage they have, or none at all. But the statutes 

require insurers to ‚affirmatively inform*+ insureds about the 

costs of various levels of UM[/UIM] coverage before they decide 

whether to purchase it and in what amounts.‛ Tipton, 2007 UT 

App 109, ¶ 12 (first alteration in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

¶16 If an insurer issues a ‚new‛ automobile insurance policy 

without obtaining a waiver of UIM coverage from the insured, 

 

3. This section was amended in 2014. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-

305.3 (LexisNexis 2014). Because this dispute arose before the 

amendments were passed, they do not affect our analysis. See 

State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 11, 251 P.3d 829 (holding that unless 

a statutory provision ‚is expressly declared to be retroactive‛ or 

its ‚purpose . . . is to clarify the meaning of an earlier 

enactment . . . . the retroactivity ban holds, and courts must 

apply the law in effect at the time of the occurrence regulated by 

that law‛ (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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20131045-CA 8 2015 UT App 28

the insured receives UIM coverage in the maximum amount that 

she could have purchased under the type of policy she owns, 

rather than the amount she in fact purchased. See id. ¶¶ 20, 22–23 

(concluding that the maximum UM coverage ‚available by the 

insurer under the insured’s . . . policy‛ refers to the maximum 

amount the insured could have purchased rather than the 

amount actually purchased). 

¶17 The Kingstons contend that they are entitled to $250,000, 

rather than $100,000, in benefits under the Automobile Policy. 

The Kingstons’ Automobile Policy had liability coverage of 

$250,000 per person or $500,000 per occurrence. Because $250,000 

is ‚the lesser of the limits of the insured’s motor vehicle liability 

coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage 

limits available by the insurer under the insured’s motor vehicle 

policy,‛ the Kingstons are entitled to this amount of coverage if 

State Farm failed to obtain a UIM waiver. See Utah Code Ann. 

§ 31A-22-305.3(2)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).

¶18 The Kingstons signed such a waiver when they purchased 

the Automobile Policy in 2006 but not when they added the 

Chevrolet to the policy in 2008. The Kingstons assert that by 

substituting the Chevrolet for the Subaru on the Automobile 

Policy and issuing the Automatic Renewal State Farm issued a 

‚new policy‛ without obtaining a fresh Selection/Rejection Form. 

See id. They also assert that State Farm violated the UIM statute 

by failing to send them an Important Notice explaining the 

purpose of UIM insurance within thirty days of adding the 

Chevrolet to the Automobile Policy. The Kingstons argue that 

these two violations triggered the default provision of the UIM 

statute, and as a result they are entitled to the policy limit of 

$250,000. See id. § 31A-22-305.3(3)(c)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).

A. The Selection/Rejection Form

¶19 The Kingstons first assert that State Farm violated the 

UIM statute by failing to obtain a fresh Selection/Rejection Form 
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20131045-CA 9 2015 UT App 28

when it issued the Automatic Renewal replacing the Subaru 

with the Chevrolet on the Automobile Policy.

¶20 As explained above, the UIM statute requires that ‚*f+or 

new policies written on or after January 1, 2001,‛ insurers 

provide underinsured motorist coverage ‚equal to the lesser of 

the limits of the insured’s motor vehicle liability coverage or the 

maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available by 

the insurer under the insured’s motor vehicle policy.‛ Id. § 31A22-305.3(2)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008). An insured can decline 

maximum UIM coverage by signing a Selection/Rejection Form 

that, among other things, ‚waives the higher coverage,‛ 

‚reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist 

coverage,‛ and ‚discloses the additional premiums required to 

purchase underinsured motorist coverage.‛ Id. § 31A-22-

305.3(2)(b)(iii)–(v). 

¶21 Accordingly, the Kingstons are entitled to the higher 

coverage limits mandated by this section only if the Automatic 

Renewal qualifies as a ‚new policy.‛ The Kingstons signed a 

Selection/Rejection Form when they purchased the Automobile 

Policy in 2006. In 2008, State Farm issued the Kingstons the 

Automatic Renewal listing the Chevrolet as the insured vehicle. 

But the Kingstons did not sign a fresh Selection/Rejection Form. 

Because State Farm issued the Automatic Renewal after January 

1, 2001 without obtaining a fresh Selection/Rejection Form, it 

violated the UIM statute if the Automatic Renewal constituted a 

‚new policy.‛

¶22 Whether the Automatic Renewal constituted a ‚new 

policy‛ depends upon what definition of ‚new policy‛ applies in 

this case. Prior to 2012, the UIM statute did not define ‚new 

policy.‛ We first consider whether the definition of ‚new policy‛ 

added in 2012 to the UIM statute applies to this 2008 dispute. If 

not, we apply the pre-2012 common-law definition of ‚new 

policy.‛ Generally, ‚we apply the law as it exists at the time of 
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20131045-CA 10 2015 UT App 28

the event regulated by the law in question.‛ State v. Clark, 2011 

UT 23, ¶ 13, 251 P.3d 829. ‚A provision of the Utah Code is not 

retroactive, unless the provision is expressly declared to be 

retroactive.‛ Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (LexisNexis 2011).

¶23 The 2012 version of the UIM statute specifies that the 

statutory definition of ‚new policy‛ applies retroactively in 

certain cases:

[The definition of ‚new policy‛+ applies 

retroactively to any claim arising on or after 

January 1, 2001 for which, as of May 1, 2012, an 

insured has not . . . filed a complaint in a court of 

competent jurisdiction.

Id. § 31A-22-305.3(3)(e)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). In this case, 

the accident giving rise to the Kingstons’ claim occurred after 

January 1, 2001, but they filed their complaint on November 4, 

2011. Therefore, by its own terms, the statutory definition of 

‚new policy‛ in the 2012 version of the statute does not apply to 

this case.

¶24 We accordingly turn to caselaw. The Utah Supreme Court 

defined ‚new policy‛ in Iverson v. State Farm Mutual Insurance 

Co., 2011 UT 34, 256 P.3d 222. This definition constitutes ‚the law 

as it exist[ed] at the time of the event regulated by the law in 

question,‛ see Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 13. Accordingly, Iverson’s 

interpretation of ‚new policy‛ governs. In Iverson, our supreme 

court held that ‚an individual has a ‘new policy’ under the 

statute if she enters a new contractual relationship with her 

insurer, or if there is a material change in her existing policy.‛ 

2011 UT 34, ¶ 20. Declining to ‚categorically say that a particular 

change is always material or immaterial,‛ the court concluded 

that the primary focus should be on whether a change to a policy 

‚would meaningfully alter the risk relationship between the 

insurer and the insured.‛ Id. ¶ 22.
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20131045-CA 11 2015 UT App 28

¶25 ‚*T+o determine whether a change to an existing policy is 

so material that it creates a new policy under the *UIM+ statute,‛ 

id., we consider three relevant, though not determinative, 

factors: (1) whether ‚the change to the policy was one requested 

by the insured or a routine . . . change made by the insurance 

company‛; (2) whether ‚the average insured would want to 

reevaluate the amount of risk she would be willing to bear under 

the policy‛ in response to the policy change; and (3) whether the 

‚character of the changes would lead the average insured to 

believe she was receiving a new policy.‛ Id.

¶26 Considering the ‚totality of circumstances,‛ id., noted 

above, the district court concluded that the substitution of the 

Chevrolet for the Subaru did not constitute a ‚material change[] 

to an existing policy that alter[ed] the risk relationship between 

the insurer and the insured,‛ see id. ¶ 15. We agree.

¶27 The Automatic Renewal consisted of a single form, clearly 

labeled ‚Auto Renewal.‛ State Farm had sent an ‚Auto 

Renewal‛ form to the Kingstons on at least four prior occasions 

during their business relationship. The Automatic Renewal 

listed the Chevrolet as the insured vehicle under policy number 

050-0493, the same policy number State Farm issued for coverage 

of the Subaru. The Kingstons were not required to complete a 

new application. The Automatic Renewal did not change the 

insureds, the premium, or the coverages. In particular, the 

Kingstons’ 100/300 UIM coverage remained the same. In fact, 

‚the Automatic Renewal directed them to contact State Farm if 

they wished to increase their UIM coverage.‛ They did not do 

so.

¶28 The substitution of vehicles on the policy ‚was one 

requested by the insured.‛ Id. ¶ 22. But the Kingstons give no 

reason why ‚the average insured would want to reevaluate the 

amount of risk she would be willing to bear under the policy,‛ 

see id.; nor would the insured have a reason to reevaluate where, 
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20131045-CA 12 2015 UT App 28

as here, the amount of risk was identical under the original 

policy and the Automatic Renewal. Nor have the Kingstons 

shown that ‚the character of the change*+ would lead the 

average insured to believe she was receiving a new policy.‛ See 

id. On the contrary, the character of the change—pursuant to 

which insureds, premiums, and coverages all remained the 

same—as well as the title of the document (‚Automatic 

Renewal‛), would lead the average insured to believe that she 

was receiving a renewal of the original policy, not a new policy. 

The Chevrolet was merely ‚a newly acquired or replacement 

motor vehicle covered under the terms of the *existing+ policy.‛ 

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(a)(ii)(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 

2008).

¶29 Because the substitution of the Chevrolet for the Subaru 

constituted neither a ‚new contractual relationship with *State 

Farm+,‛ nor a ‚material change in *the Kingstons’+ existing 

policy,‛ the Automobile Policy does not qualify as a ‚new 

policy‛ for purposes of the UIM statute. See Iverson v. State Farm 

Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 UT 34, ¶ 20, 256 P.3d 222. Accordingly, the 

UIM statute did not require State Farm to obtain a fresh 

Selection/Rejection Form for the Chevrolet.

¶30 The Kingstons next argue that even if the substitution of 

the Chevrolet did not create a ‚new policy‛ under the statute, 

State Farm was nonetheless required to obtain a fresh 

Selection/Rejection Form for the Chevrolet because the original 

form by its own terms applied only to the Subaru. In support of 

this argument, the Kingstons rely on this passage in the 

Selection/Rejection Form:

This coverage selection or rejection shall be 

applicable to the policy of insurance on the vehicle 

described below [the Subaru], on all future renewals of 

the policy, and on all replacement policies unless and 

until I make an express written request to add or 
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20131045-CA 13 2015 UT App 28

increase the coverage(s). I sign this 

acknowledgment on behalf of all applicants and 

insureds under the policy.

(Emphasis added.) The Kingstons assert that the phrase 

‚replacement policies‛ contains an ambiguity because it could be 

read to refer to replacement policies on the Subaru only (a 

reading that would favor them) or to replacement policies on 

vehicles replacing the Subaru (a reading that would favor State 

Farm). This ambiguity, they contend, must be resolved in their 

favor.

¶31 But the district court’s ruling did not rely on the phrase 

the Kingstons challenge. The quoted provision refers not only to 

‚replacement policies,‛ but also to ‚all future renewals of the 

policy.‛ And as the district court observed, ‚whether the policy 

was ‘replaced’ or not, it was clearly ‘renewed,’ meaning that the 

selection/rejection form continued to apply.‛ Because the 

Automatic Renewal qualified as a ‚future renewal*+ of the 

policy,‛ the UIM statute did not require State Farm to obtain a 

fresh Selection/Rejection Form from the Kingstons.

B. The Important Notice

¶32 The Kingstons next assert that the 2012 version of the 

UIM statute required State Farm to send an Important Notice to 

them within thirty days of adding the Chevrolet to the 

Automobile Policy. The Kingstons argue that ‚whenever a 

consumer buys a new car, one of two things must happen: either 

the insurance company must get a selection/rejection form, or it 

must send out the [Important Notice] within thirty days of the 

purchase of that vehicle.‛ They argue that because State Farm 

did not obtain a new signed Selection/Rejection Form for the 

Chevrolet, ‚the Kingstons were entitled to such notice‛ in a 

timely manner. State Farm concedes that it did not provide the 

Important Notice. But it denies any obligation to do so on the 

ground that the Important Notice requirement set forth in the 
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20131045-CA 14 2015 UT App 28

2012 version of the UIM statute does not apply retroactively to 

this 2008 dispute.

¶33 The Important Notice requirement, which first appeared 

in the 2012 version of the UIM statute, requires insurers to notify 

policyholders of the purpose of UIM coverage:

If an additional motor vehicle is added to a 

personal lines policy where underinsured motorist 

coverage has been rejected, or where underinsured 

motorist limits are lower than the named insured’s 

motor vehicle liability limits, the insurer shall 

provide a notice to a named insured within 30 days 

that: (A) reasonably explains the purpose of 

uninsured motorist coverage; and (B) encourages 

the named insured to contact the insurance 

company or insurance producer for quotes as to 

the additional premiums required to purchase 

uninsured motorist coverage . . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(3)(c)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 

2012). But the events giving rise to this dispute occurred in 2008. 

Therefore, State Farm must adhere to the Important Notice 

requirement only if it applies retroactively. 

¶34 ‚A provision of the Utah Code is not retroactive, unless 

the provision is expressly declared to be retroactive.‛ Id. § 68-3-3 

(LexisNexis 2011). The 2012 version of the UIM statute specifies 

that subsection (3)(b) is retroactive, but is silent as to the 

provision at issue here, subsection (3)(c). See id. § 31A-22-

305.3(3)(e)(i) (Supp. 2012).

¶35 Because we must ‚seek to give effect to omissions in 

statutory language by presuming all omissions to be 

purposeful,‛ Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, 

¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863, we must conclude subsection (3)(c)(iii)’s 

Important Notice requirement applies only prospectively. 
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Accordingly, State Farm was not required to provide Important 

Notice in 2008.

¶36 Furthermore, as the district court noted, retroactively 

applying the Important Notice provision would produce absurd 

results: 

[T]he statute would impose a duty on an insurer to 

do something the insurer had no way of knowing it 

was required to do. Under the *Kingstons’+ theory, 

State Farm had to send a 30-day notice in 

July/August of 2008, even though the 30-day notice 

requirement did not become part of the statute 

until 2012—years later.

We agree with the district court that the statute does not 

command the impossible—in this case, time travel—from 

insurers.

¶37 In conclusion, we affirm the district court’s partial 

summary decision pertaining to the Automobile Policy. The 

district court did not err in concluding that State Farm was not 

required to obtain a new Selection/Rejection Form when it 

substituted the Chevrolet for the Subaru. Nor did the district 

court err in concluding that State Farm was not required to 

provide the Kingstons the Important Notice required under the 

2012 version of the UIM statute.4

 

4. The Kingstons also argue that ‚even assuming the 

[Selection/Rejection Form] could apply to the 2008 Chevrolet, 

State Farm must establish that the Kingstons directed State 

Farm‛ to replace the Subaru with the Chevrolet. Because, the 

Kingstons argue, State Farm cites ‚no evidence for that 

assertion,‛ it ‚cannot meet that burden.‛ However, the 

Kingstons do not explain why this argument favors them. 

(continued<)
Kingston v. State Farm

20131045-CA 16 2015 UT App 28

II. The Umbrella Policy

¶38 The Kingstons also contend the district court erred in 

rejecting their claim for $1,000,000 under the Umbrella Policy. 

The Kingstons assert three reasons for this result. First, they 

argue that the Umbrella Policy application failed to ‚reasonably 

explain*+ the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage.‛ Utah 

Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(b)(iv) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008). 

Second, the Kingstons argue that Mr. Kingston could not sign 

the Umbrella Policy rejection on Ms. Kingston’s behalf, because 

‚Utah law is clear that a husband is not an agent for his wife as a 

matter of law.‛ See, e.g., Fox v. Lavender, 56 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah 

1936) (noting that the ‚mere fact that there was the relationship 

of husband and wife does not show agency‛). Finally, the 

Kingstons assert that the Umbrella Policy application contains 

ambiguities that should be construed against State Farm as a 

matter of law. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Versaw, 2004 UT 73, 

¶ 24, 99 P.3d 796 (‚*B+ecause insurance policies are adhesion 

contracts, they are to be construed liberally in favor of the 

insured . . . so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of 

insurance.‛ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶39 The difficulty with the Kingstons’ argument on this point 

lies in the fact that it challenges only one of two grounds for the 

district court’s ruling. ‚This court will not reverse a ruling of the 

trial court that rests on independent alternative grounds where 

the appellant challenges only one of those grounds.‛ Salt Lake 

County v. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp., 2013 UT App 30, 

 

(<continued)

Because the argument contains no ‚reasoned analysis based 

upon relevant legal authority,‛ it is inadequately briefed. State v. 

Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, ¶ 13, 72 P.3d 138; see also Utah R. App. 

P. 24(a)(9). Furthermore, our review of the record indicates the 

record does not support it.
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20131045-CA 17 2015 UT App 28

¶ 28, 297 P.3d 38; see also Simmons Media Group, LLC v. Waykar, 

LLC, 2014 UT App 145, ¶¶ 32–35, 335 P.3d 885.

¶40 The district court set forth two independent, alternative 

rationales for granting partial summary judgment to State Farm 

on the question of the Kingstons’ Umbrella Policy. First, the 

court concluded that under the terms of the Umbrella Policy, the 

Kingstons were required to carry UIM coverage of $250,000/ 

$500,000 on the underlying Automobile Policy to qualify for 

UIM umbrella benefits.5 The court ruled—properly, as we hold 

above—that the Kingstons’ Automobile Policy did not provide 

$250,000/$500,000 UIM coverage, nor were they entitled to this 

coverage by operation of law. ‚Thus,‛ the court concluded, 

‚based on the terms of the Umbrella Policy itself, State Farm has 

no obligation to pay benefits.‛

¶41 The Kingstons do not challenge this ground for the 

district court’s ruling. Accordingly, under the authorities cited 

above, we affirm the ruling of the district court.

¶42 After explaining the principal ground for its ruling, the 

court continued, ‚But even if the foregoing was not true, the 

Kingstons as a matter of law, would still not be entitled to the 

benefits under the umbrella policy, because the umbrella policy 

is not a motor vehicle insurance policy and compliance with the 

uninsured/underinsured motorist statutes is not required.‛ If the 

district court got that right, whether Ms. Kingston received the 

notices and made the waivers required by the UIM statute 

makes no difference. The Kingstons challenge this ground for 

the court’s ruling. As explained above, even if this challenge 

succeeded, reversal would not result. But in any event, their 

challenge falls short.

 

5. The Kingstons do not dispute this reading of the Umbrella 

Policy.
Kingston v. State Farm

20131045-CA 18 2015 UT App 28

¶43 The Kingstons contend that because the Umbrella Policy 

‚actually covers damages caused by uninsured/underinsured 

motorists, it would be logical to apply the uninsured/ 

underinsured motorist statute to such a policy.‛ They 

acknowledge that ‚Utah has not determined whether or not an 

umbrella policy such as the one at issue here is covered by 

UM/UIM coverage statutes.‛ But, they assert, other states have 

done so. Under their analysis, the Umbrella Policy would be 

subject to the requirement that it include ‚underinsured motorist 

coverage under Section 31A-22-305.3, unless affirmatively 

waived.‛ See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302(1)(c) (LexisNexis 

Supp. 2008). In other words, the Kingstons would be entitled by 

operation of law to additional UIM coverage—perhaps as much 

as $1,000,000.

¶44 State Farm responds that ‚creation of the UIM statute had 

nothing to do with umbrella policies,‛ that the statute evinces no 

clear legislative intent to apply to umbrella policies, and that a 

‚strong majority‛ of state courts hold that UM/UIM 

requirements do not apply to umbrella policies.

¶45 We conclude that the Kingstons have not shown that the 

full panoply of protections found in the UIM statute apply to an 

umbrella policy on the ground that it supplements the UIM 

coverage of an insured’s automobile policy. Such a showing 

would require an analysis of the text of section 31A-22-305.3 and 

of the specific provisions of the Umbrella Policy. The parties 

have not engaged in this level of analysis. For example, the 

Kingstons have not identified the portion of the statute that they 

contend refers to umbrella policies. And while they refer to the 

Umbrella Policy application, they point to no provision of the 

Umbrella Policy itself that would allow us to conclude that the 

Umbrella Policy meets the statutory requirements of an 

automobile insurance policy. See id. § 31A-22-303(1)(a). We are 

unwilling to adopt a new and expansive reading of the UIM 

statute without adequate briefing of the issue.
Kingston v. State Farm

20131045-CA 19 2015 UT App 28

¶46 Furthermore, our review of the law of other states 

suggests that umbrella policies differ from the automobile 

insurance policies referred to in UM/UIM statutes. For example, 

the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine rejected a similar argument 

in Dickau v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Co., 2014 ME 158. There, 

the insured, Dickau, urged the court to interpret the term ‚motor 

vehicle insurance policies‛ in Maine’s UM statute ‚to include 

any policy that contains any provision for any coverage of a 

motor vehicle, including umbrella policies.‛ Id. ¶ 32 (emphasis in 

original). The court stated, ‚Because this interpretation would 

require us to ignore the history of insurance law, set aside the 

meaning of well-established terms of art, and reject the counsel 

of dozens of decisions from other jurisdictions, we decline to 

interpret ‘motor vehicle insurance policies’ in *Maine’s UM 

statute+ as Dickau suggests.‛ Id.

¶47 The court noted, ‚On numerous grounds, a majority of 

jurisdictions treat ‘automobile or vehicle insurance,’ or some 

derivation thereof, as a term of art with a meaning 

distinguishable from the references to motor vehicles found in 

an umbrella policy.‛ Id. ¶ 33 (citations omitted). The court 

continued, ‚A motor vehicle insurance policy describes the 

particular drivers and the particular vehicles for which the 

insurance is afforded, and its premiums are calculated with 

reference to the specific attributes of those vehicles and drivers—

i.e., the age, condition, and safety features of the vehicles, and 

the age and accident history of the insured drivers.‛ Id. In 

contrast, it noted, ‚Dickau’s umbrella policy refers only to 

‘*a+utos’ in general, without describing any particular 

automobiles.‛ Id. (alteration in original).

¶48 The court also observed that ‚motor vehicle insurance 

relates only to liability arising out of the use or ownership of 

motor vehicles. Dickau’s umbrella policy, in contrast, insures 

him against liability stemming from activities associated with his 

use of watercraft and aircraft, as well as homeowners’ liability 
Kingston v. State Farm

20131045-CA 20 2015 UT App 28

and general personal liability.‛ Id. ¶ 35 (citation omitted). 

Additionally, ‚*m+otor vehicle insurance premiums, reflecting 

their status as primary insurance based on vehicle-specific 

liability, are also significantly higher than premiums for the 

catastrophic basic liability of umbrella policies.‛ Id. ¶ 36 (citation 

omitted). ‚In summary,‛ the court concluded, ‚the very nature 

of UM coverage differs from that of umbrella coverage. UM 

coverage is ‘first-party coverage’ in that it pays an amount to the 

insured based on a third party’s liability; umbrella coverage is 

third-party coverage, payable to a third party based on the 

insured’s liability.‛ Id. ¶ 37 (citations omitted).

¶49 Finally, here the fact that State Farm Automobile 

Insurance Company issued the Automobile Policy whereas State 

Farm Fire and Casualty Company issued the Umbrella Policy 

underscores the difference in the character of the two policies.

¶50 In sum, because the Kingstons challenge the district 

court’s ruling on the Umbrella Policy on only one of the court’s 

two ‚independent alternative grounds,‛ see Salt Lake County v. 

Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp., 2013 UT App 30, ¶ 28, 297 

P.3d 38, they have not shown that the district court erred in 

granting partial summary judgment for State Farm on this issue. 

Furthermore, even if the district court’s ruling rested solely on 

its backup rationale, the Kingstons have not demonstrated error 

in that rationale.

CONCLUSION

¶51 We affirm the order of the district court in all respects.