# Official Journal C 188/2009

| | ISSN 1725-2423
  doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2009.188.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 188 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5211 August 2009 |

ISSN 1725-2423

doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2009.188.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 188

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5211 August 2009

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| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 188/01 | Communication from the Commission — Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility of State aid for training subject to individual notification | 1 |
| 2009/C 188/02 | Communication from the Commission — Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility of State aid for the employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers subject to individual notification | 6 |
| 2009/C 188/03 | Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  ) | 11 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

2009/C 188/01

Communication from the Commission — Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility of State aid for training subject to individual notification

1

2009/C 188/02

Communication from the Commission — Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility of State aid for the employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers subject to individual notification

6

2009/C 188/03

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  )

1

11

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 188/04 | Euro exchange rates | 12 |
| 2009/C 188/05 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant positions given at its meeting of 7 March 2008 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/38.543 — International removal services (2) — Rapporteur: Italy | 13 |
| 2009/C 188/06 | Final report of the Hearing Officer in case COMP/38.543 — International removal services (Pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of Commission Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of Hearing Officers in certain competition proceedings — OJ L 162, 19.6.2001, p. 21) | 14 |
| 2009/C 188/07 | Summary of Commission Decision of 11 March 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/38.543 — International removal services) (
  1
  ) | 16 |
| | NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES |
| 2009/C 188/08 | Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production of agricultural products and amending Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 | 19 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

2009/C 188/04

Euro exchange rates

12

2009/C 188/05

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant positions given at its meeting of 7 March 2008 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/38.543 — International removal services (2) — Rapporteur: Italy

13

2009/C 188/06

Final report of the Hearing Officer in case COMP/38.543 — International removal services (Pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of Commission Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of Hearing Officers in certain competition proceedings — OJ L 162, 19.6.2001, p. 21)

(Pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of Commission Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of Hearing Officers in certain competition proceedings — OJ L 162, 19.6.2001, p. 21)

14

2009/C 188/07

Summary of Commission Decision of 11 March 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/38.543 — International removal services) (
  1
  )

1

16

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

2009/C 188/08

Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production of agricultural products and amending Regulation (EC) No 70/2001

19

| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 188/09 | Communication from the French Government concerning Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons (Notice regarding an application for a licence to prospect for oil and gas, designated the Permis de Chéroy)
   (
  1
  ) | 22 |
| 2009/C 188/10 | Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of sodium gluconate originating in the People's Republic of China | 24 |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 188/11 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.5533 — Bertelsmann/KKR/JV) (
  1
  ) | 29 |
| | OTHER ACTS |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 188/12 | Publication of an amendment application pursuant to Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs | 30 |
| 2009/C 188/13 | Publication of an application pursuant to Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs | 35 |

V   Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY

Commission

2009/C 188/09

Communication from the French Government concerning Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons (Notice regarding an application for a licence to prospect for oil and gas, designated the Permis de Chéroy)
   (
  1
  )

(Notice regarding an application for a licence to prospect for oil and gas, designated the Permis de Chéroy)

1

22

2009/C 188/10

Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of sodium gluconate originating in the People's Republic of China

24

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY

Commission

2009/C 188/11

Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.5533 — Bertelsmann/KKR/JV) (
  1
  )

1

29

OTHER ACTS

Commission

2009/C 188/12

Publication of an amendment application pursuant to Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs

30

2009/C 188/13

Publication of an application pursuant to Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs

35

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| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
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EN

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

| 11.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 188/1 |
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11.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/1

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Communication from the Commission — Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility of State aid for training subject to individual notification

2009/C 188/01

1.   INTRODUCTION

| 1. | The Lisbon European Council in March 2000 set a strategic goal for the European Union to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. The Lisbon conclusions stressed the central role of education and training as the main instruments to increase human capital and its impact on growth, productivity and employment. Training usually has positive external effects for society as a whole since it increases the pool of skilled workers from which undertakings can draw and it improves the competitiveness of the economy and promotes a knowledge society capable of embracing a more innovative development path. |
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1.

The Lisbon European Council in March 2000 set a strategic goal for the European Union to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. The Lisbon conclusions stressed the central role of education and training as the main instruments to increase human capital and its impact on growth, productivity and employment. Training usually has positive external effects for society as a whole since it increases the pool of skilled workers from which undertakings can draw and it improves the competitiveness of the economy and promotes a knowledge society capable of embracing a more innovative development path.

| 2. | Undertakings may, however, provide less than a socially optimal level of training if employees are free to change employers and other undertakings can benefit from recruiting employees trained by them. This is particularly true of training targeted at skills that are transferable between undertakings. State aid may help to create additional incentives for employers to provide training at a level that is socially desirable. |
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2.

Undertakings may, however, provide less than a socially optimal level of training if employees are free to change employers and other undertakings can benefit from recruiting employees trained by them. This is particularly true of training targeted at skills that are transferable between undertakings. State aid may help to create additional incentives for employers to provide training at a level that is socially desirable.

| 3. | This Communication sets out guidance as to the criteria the Commission will apply for the assessment of training aid measures. This guidance is intended to make the Commission’s reasoning transparent and to create predictability and legal certainty. Pursuant to Article 6(1)(g) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption Regulation) (1) any individual training aid, whether granted ad hoc or on the basis of a scheme, will be subject to this guidance when its grant equivalent exceeds EUR 2 million per training project. |
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3.

This Communication sets out guidance as to the criteria the Commission will apply for the assessment of training aid measures. This guidance is intended to make the Commission’s reasoning transparent and to create predictability and legal certainty. Pursuant to Article 6(1)(g) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption Regulation) (1) any individual training aid, whether granted ad hoc or on the basis of a scheme, will be subject to this guidance when its grant equivalent exceeds EUR 2 million per training project.

| 4. | The criteria set out in this guidance will not be applied mechanically. The level of the Commission’s assessment and the kind of information it may require will be proportional to the risk of distortion of competition. The scope of the analysis will depend on the nature of the case. |
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4.

The criteria set out in this guidance will not be applied mechanically. The level of the Commission’s assessment and the kind of information it may require will be proportional to the risk of distortion of competition. The scope of the analysis will depend on the nature of the case.

2.   POSITIVE EFFECTS OF THE AID

2.1.   Existence of market failures

| 5. | Skilled workers contribute to increasing the productivity and competitiveness of undertakings. Nevertheless, employers and employees may under-invest in training for a number of reasons. Employees may limit their investment in training if they are risk averse, suffer from financial constraints or have difficulties signalling the level of their acquired knowledge to future employers. |
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5.

Skilled workers contribute to increasing the productivity and competitiveness of undertakings. Nevertheless, employers and employees may under-invest in training for a number of reasons. Employees may limit their investment in training if they are risk averse, suffer from financial constraints or have difficulties signalling the level of their acquired knowledge to future employers.

| 6. | Undertakings may refrain from training their workforce at the level that would be optimal for society as a whole. This is due to the market failure linked with the positive externalities of training and to difficulties in appropriating the rents if employees are free to change employers. Undertakings may invest less into training, if they are concerned that once trained, an employee will leave before the undertaking has recouped its investment. Undertakings may be reluctant to provide sufficient training to their workers unless training pays off quickly or is rather specific to the needs of the undertaking concerned, or unless contractual clauses can prevent the trained employee from leaving the undertaking before the training cost have been amortised or (part of) the training expenses have been reimbursed. |
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6.

Undertakings may refrain from training their workforce at the level that would be optimal for society as a whole. This is due to the market failure linked with the positive externalities of training and to difficulties in appropriating the rents if employees are free to change employers. Undertakings may invest less into training, if they are concerned that once trained, an employee will leave before the undertaking has recouped its investment. Undertakings may be reluctant to provide sufficient training to their workers unless training pays off quickly or is rather specific to the needs of the undertaking concerned, or unless contractual clauses can prevent the trained employee from leaving the undertaking before the training cost have been amortised or (part of) the training expenses have been reimbursed.

| 7. | Underinvestment in training may even occur if the undertaking can fully recoup its investment but its private benefits are smaller than the benefits for society as a whole. Such positive externalities of training may arise in particular if training improves transferable skills; that is to say, skills that can be used in more than one undertaking. In contrast, specific training only yields productivity gains in a specific undertaking and can be easily appropriated by undertakings (2). Thus the scope for positive externalities of specific training is less pronounced than the scope for such externalities of general training. |
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7.

Underinvestment in training may even occur if the undertaking can fully recoup its investment but its private benefits are smaller than the benefits for society as a whole. Such positive externalities of training may arise in particular if training improves transferable skills; that is to say, skills that can be used in more than one undertaking. In contrast, specific training only yields productivity gains in a specific undertaking and can be easily appropriated by undertakings (2). Thus the scope for positive externalities of specific training is less pronounced than the scope for such externalities of general training.

| 8. | Where undertakings are faced with higher costs and uncertain benefits for training disadvantaged or disabled workers (3) there may be an incentive to provide less training to those groups. However, training disadvantaged or disabled workers can usually be expected to produce positive externalities for society as a whole (4). |
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8.

Where undertakings are faced with higher costs and uncertain benefits for training disadvantaged or disabled workers (3) there may be an incentive to provide less training to those groups. However, training disadvantaged or disabled workers can usually be expected to produce positive externalities for society as a whole (4).

| 9. | Member States should demonstrate that there is a market failure justifying the aid. In its analysis, the Commission will, among other things, consider the following elements:






  1. | The nature of the training — whether it is specific or general within the meaning of Article 38 of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008; a single training project can comprise both general and specific elements; general training will produce more positive externalities. |
| --- | --- | --- |

9.

Member States should demonstrate that there is a market failure justifying the aid. In its analysis, the Commission will, among other things, consider the following elements:

1.

The nature of the training — whether it is specific or general within the meaning of Article 38 of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008; a single training project can comprise both general and specific elements; general training will produce more positive externalities.

| 2. | The transferability of the skills acquired during the training; the more transferable the skills the higher the likelihood of positive externalities training will be considered to provide transferable skills if, for example:






  (a) | training is jointly organised by several independent undertakings, or if employees of different undertakings may benefit from the training; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The transferability of the skills acquired during the training; the more transferable the skills the higher the likelihood of positive externalities training will be considered to provide transferable skills if, for example:

(a)

training is jointly organised by several independent undertakings, or if employees of different undertakings may benefit from the training;

| (b) | training is certified, leads to a recognised diploma or is validated by public authorities or institutions; |
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(b)

training is certified, leads to a recognised diploma or is validated by public authorities or institutions;

| (c) | training targets the categories of employees that are characterised by a high turnover in the undertaking and in the sector concerned; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

training targets the categories of employees that are characterised by a high turnover in the undertaking and in the sector concerned;

| (d) | training could be valuable for the employee beyond his current job (future occupations in another undertaking, social life, well-being etc.). |
| --- | --- |

(d)

training could be valuable for the employee beyond his current job (future occupations in another undertaking, social life, well-being etc.).

| 3. | The participants in the training: the inclusion of disabled or disadvantages workers may increase the positive externalities of the training. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The participants in the training: the inclusion of disabled or disadvantages workers may increase the positive externalities of the training.

2.2.   State aid as an appropriate policy instrument

| 10. | State aid is not the only policy instrument available to Member States to encourage training. Most training is provided through education systems (for example, universities, schools, vocational training carried out or sponsored by state authorities). Training can also be undertaken by the individuals themselves, with or without the support of their employers. |
| --- | --- |

10.

State aid is not the only policy instrument available to Member States to encourage training. Most training is provided through education systems (for example, universities, schools, vocational training carried out or sponsored by state authorities). Training can also be undertaken by the individuals themselves, with or without the support of their employers.

| 11. | Where the Member State has considered other policy options, and the advantages of using a selective instrument such as State aid for a specific undertaking are established, the measures concerned are considered to constitute an appropriate instrument. The Commission will in particular take account of any impact assessment of the proposed measure the Member State may have made. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Where the Member State has considered other policy options, and the advantages of using a selective instrument such as State aid for a specific undertaking are established, the measures concerned are considered to constitute an appropriate instrument. The Commission will in particular take account of any impact assessment of the proposed measure the Member State may have made.

2.3.   Incentive effect and necessity of the aid

| 12. | State aid for training must result in the aid beneficiary changing its behaviour so that it provides more and/or better training than would have been the case without the aid. If such an increase in the quantity or quality of planned training activities does not take place, the aid is considered not to have an incentive effect. |
| --- | --- |

12.

State aid for training must result in the aid beneficiary changing its behaviour so that it provides more and/or better training than would have been the case without the aid. If such an increase in the quantity or quality of planned training activities does not take place, the aid is considered not to have an incentive effect.

| 13. | Incentive effect is identified by counterfactual analysis, comparing the levels of intended training with aid and without aid. Most employers find it necessary to train their workforce in order to ensure the proper functioning of their undertakings. It cannot be presumed that State aid for training, especially for specific training, is always needed. |
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13.

Incentive effect is identified by counterfactual analysis, comparing the levels of intended training with aid and without aid. Most employers find it necessary to train their workforce in order to ensure the proper functioning of their undertakings. It cannot be presumed that State aid for training, especially for specific training, is always needed.

| 14. | Member States should demonstrate to the Commission the existence of the incentive effect and the necessity of the aid. First, the beneficiary must have submitted an application for the aid to the Member State concerned before it started the training project. Second, the Member State must demonstrate that the State aid leads to an increase, by comparison to the situation without aid, in the size, quality, scope or targeted participants of the training project. The additional amount of training offered with aid can be shown, for example, by higher number of training hours or courses, higher numbers of participants, shifting from undertaking-specific to general training, or increasing the participation of certain categories of disadvantaged or disabled workers. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Member States should demonstrate to the Commission the existence of the incentive effect and the necessity of the aid. First, the beneficiary must have submitted an application for the aid to the Member State concerned before it started the training project. Second, the Member State must demonstrate that the State aid leads to an increase, by comparison to the situation without aid, in the size, quality, scope or targeted participants of the training project. The additional amount of training offered with aid can be shown, for example, by higher number of training hours or courses, higher numbers of participants, shifting from undertaking-specific to general training, or increasing the participation of certain categories of disadvantaged or disabled workers.

| 15. | In its analysis, the Commission will consider, among other things, the following elements:






  (a) | internal documents of the aid beneficiary on training costs, budgets, participants, content and scheduling for two scenarios: training with aid and training without aid; |
| --- | --- | --- |

15.

In its analysis, the Commission will consider, among other things, the following elements:

(a)

internal documents of the aid beneficiary on training costs, budgets, participants, content and scheduling for two scenarios: training with aid and training without aid;

| (b) | the existence of a legal obligation for employers to provide a certain type of training (for example, safety): if such an obligation exists, the Commission will normally conclude that there is no incentive effect; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the existence of a legal obligation for employers to provide a certain type of training (for example, safety): if such an obligation exists, the Commission will normally conclude that there is no incentive effect;

| (c) | the credibility of the project submitted, for example, by referring to and comparing it with training budgets for previous years; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the credibility of the project submitted, for example, by referring to and comparing it with training budgets for previous years;

| (d) | the relationship between the training programme and the business activities of the aid beneficiary: the closer the relationship, the less likely the incentive effect. For example, training on the introduction of a new technology in a specific sector is unlikely to have an incentive effect since undertakings have no choice but to train their workforce on the newly introduced technology. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the relationship between the training programme and the business activities of the aid beneficiary: the closer the relationship, the less likely the incentive effect. For example, training on the introduction of a new technology in a specific sector is unlikely to have an incentive effect since undertakings have no choice but to train their workforce on the newly introduced technology.

2.4.   Proportionality of the aid

| 16. | The Member State must demonstrate that the aid is necessary and the amount is kept to the minimum in order to achieve the objective of the aid.
  Eligible costs must be calculated in accordance with Article 39 of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 and be limited to the costs arising from training activities which would not be undertaken without aid.
  Member States should provide evidence that the aid amount does not exceed the part of the eligible costs that cannot be appropriated by the undertaking (5). In any case, aid intensities must never exceed those laid down in Article 39 of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 and will be applied to the eligible costs (6). |
| --- | --- |

16.

The Member State must demonstrate that the aid is necessary and the amount is kept to the minimum in order to achieve the objective of the aid.

Eligible costs must be calculated in accordance with Article 39 of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 and be limited to the costs arising from training activities which would not be undertaken without aid.

Member States should provide evidence that the aid amount does not exceed the part of the eligible costs that cannot be appropriated by the undertaking (5). In any case, aid intensities must never exceed those laid down in Article 39 of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 and will be applied to the eligible costs (6).

3.   NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE AID

| 17. | If the aid is proportionate to achieve the objective of the aid the negative effects of the aid are likely to be limited and an analysis of the negative effects may not be necessary (7). However, in some cases, even where aid is necessary and proportionate for a specific undertaking to increase the amount of training provided, the aid may result in a change in the behaviour of the beneficiary which significantly distorts competition. In those cases the Commission will conduct a thorough analysis of the distortion of competition. The extent of the distortion of competition caused by the aid can vary depending on the characteristics of the aid and of the markets affected (8). |
| --- | --- |

17.

If the aid is proportionate to achieve the objective of the aid the negative effects of the aid are likely to be limited and an analysis of the negative effects may not be necessary (7). However, in some cases, even where aid is necessary and proportionate for a specific undertaking to increase the amount of training provided, the aid may result in a change in the behaviour of the beneficiary which significantly distorts competition. In those cases the Commission will conduct a thorough analysis of the distortion of competition. The extent of the distortion of competition caused by the aid can vary depending on the characteristics of the aid and of the markets affected (8).

| 18. | The aid characteristics that may affect the likelihood and the extent of the distortion are:






  (a) | selectivity; |
| --- | --- | --- |

18.

The aid characteristics that may affect the likelihood and the extent of the distortion are:

(a)

selectivity;

| (b) | the size of the aid; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the size of the aid;

| (c) | the repetition and duration of the aid; |
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(c)

the repetition and duration of the aid;

| (d) | the effect of the aid on the undertaking's costs. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the effect of the aid on the undertaking's costs.

| 19. | For example, a training scheme used to encourage undertakings in general in a Member State to undertake more training is likely to have a different effect on the market than a large amount of aid given to a single undertaking to enable it to increase its training. The latter is likely to distort competition more significantly as the aid beneficiary’s competitors become less able to compete (9). The distortion will be even greater if the training costs in the beneficiary's business represent a high share of the total costs. |
| --- | --- |

19.

For example, a training scheme used to encourage undertakings in general in a Member State to undertake more training is likely to have a different effect on the market than a large amount of aid given to a single undertaking to enable it to increase its training. The latter is likely to distort competition more significantly as the aid beneficiary’s competitors become less able to compete (9). The distortion will be even greater if the training costs in the beneficiary's business represent a high share of the total costs.

| 20. | In assessing the market characteristics, which can give a much more accurate picture of the likely impact of an aid, the Commission will among other things consider:






  (a) | the structure of the market; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

20.

In assessing the market characteristics, which can give a much more accurate picture of the likely impact of an aid, the Commission will among other things consider:

(a)

the structure of the market; and

| (b) | the characteristics of the sector or industry. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the characteristics of the sector or industry.

| 21. | The structure of the market will be assessed through the concentration of the market, the size of undertakings (10), importance of product differentiation (11) and barriers to entry and exit. Market shares and concentration ratios will be calculated once the relevant market has been defined. In general, the fewer undertakings there are, the larger their share of the market, and the less competition one would expect to observe (12). If the affected market is concentrated with high barriers to entry (13) and the aid beneficiary is a major player on it then it is more likely that competitors will have to alter their behaviour in response to the aid. |
| --- | --- |

21.

The structure of the market will be assessed through the concentration of the market, the size of undertakings (10), importance of product differentiation (11) and barriers to entry and exit. Market shares and concentration ratios will be calculated once the relevant market has been defined. In general, the fewer undertakings there are, the larger their share of the market, and the less competition one would expect to observe (12). If the affected market is concentrated with high barriers to entry (13) and the aid beneficiary is a major player on it then it is more likely that competitors will have to alter their behaviour in response to the aid.

| 22. | While examining the characteristics of the sector the Commission will look among other things at the importance of the trained workforce for the business, the existence of overcapacity, whether the markets in the industry are growing, mature or declining, financing strategies of competitors for training (State aid, employees, employers). For example, training aid in a declining industry may increase the risk of a distortion of competition by keeping an inefficient undertaking afloat. |
| --- | --- |

22.

While examining the characteristics of the sector the Commission will look among other things at the importance of the trained workforce for the business, the existence of overcapacity, whether the markets in the industry are growing, mature or declining, financing strategies of competitors for training (State aid, employees, employers). For example, training aid in a declining industry may increase the risk of a distortion of competition by keeping an inefficient undertaking afloat.

| 23. | Training aid may, in particular cases, lead to distortions of competition in respect of market entry and exit, effect on trade flows and crowding out of training investment. |
| --- | --- |

23.

Training aid may, in particular cases, lead to distortions of competition in respect of market entry and exit, effect on trade flows and crowding out of training investment.

Market entry and exit

| 24. | In a competitive market undertakings sell products that generate profits. By altering costs, State aid alters profitability, and can therefore affect the undertaking's decision to offer a product or not. For example, State aid that would reduce the ongoing costs of production such as training for staff would make entry more appealing and enable undertakings with otherwise poor commercial prospects to enter a market or introduce new products to the detriment of more efficient competitors. |
| --- | --- |

24.

In a competitive market undertakings sell products that generate profits. By altering costs, State aid alters profitability, and can therefore affect the undertaking's decision to offer a product or not. For example, State aid that would reduce the ongoing costs of production such as training for staff would make entry more appealing and enable undertakings with otherwise poor commercial prospects to enter a market or introduce new products to the detriment of more efficient competitors.

| 25. | The availability of State aid may also affect an undertaking's decision to leave a market where it is already operating. State aid for training could reduce the size of losses and enable an undertaking to stay in the market for longer — which may mean that other, more efficient undertakings that do not get aid are forced to exit instead. |
| --- | --- |

25.

The availability of State aid may also affect an undertaking's decision to leave a market where it is already operating. State aid for training could reduce the size of losses and enable an undertaking to stay in the market for longer — which may mean that other, more efficient undertakings that do not get aid are forced to exit instead.

Effect on trade flows

| 26. | State aid for training may result in some territories benefiting from more favourable production conditions than others. This may result in the displacement of trade flows in favour of the regions where such aid is given. |
| --- | --- |

26.

State aid for training may result in some territories benefiting from more favourable production conditions than others. This may result in the displacement of trade flows in favour of the regions where such aid is given.

Crowding out of training investment

| 27. | To survive in the marketplace and maximize profits, undertakings have incentives to invest in training of staff. The amount of investment in training which each undertaking is willing to make also depends on how much its competitors invest. Undertakings which are subsidised by the state may reduce their own investment. Alternatively, if the aid induces the aid beneficiary to invest more, competitors may react by reducing their own expenditure in training. If, to achieve the same objective, aid beneficiaries or their competitors spend less in the presence of the aid than in its absence, their private investment in training of staff is crowded out by the aid. |
| --- | --- |

27.

To survive in the marketplace and maximize profits, undertakings have incentives to invest in training of staff. The amount of investment in training which each undertaking is willing to make also depends on how much its competitors invest. Undertakings which are subsidised by the state may reduce their own investment. Alternatively, if the aid induces the aid beneficiary to invest more, competitors may react by reducing their own expenditure in training. If, to achieve the same objective, aid beneficiaries or their competitors spend less in the presence of the aid than in its absence, their private investment in training of staff is crowded out by the aid.

4.   BALANCING AND DECISION

| 28. | The last step in the analysis is to evaluate the extent to which the positive effects of the aid outweigh its negative effects. This will be done on a case-by-case basis. In order to balance the positive and the negative effects, the Commission will assess them and make an overall assessment of their impact on producers and consumers in each of the markets affected. Unless quantitative information is readily available the Commission will use qualitative information for the purposes of the assessment. |
| --- | --- |

28.

The last step in the analysis is to evaluate the extent to which the positive effects of the aid outweigh its negative effects. This will be done on a case-by-case basis. In order to balance the positive and the negative effects, the Commission will assess them and make an overall assessment of their impact on producers and consumers in each of the markets affected. Unless quantitative information is readily available the Commission will use qualitative information for the purposes of the assessment.

| 29. | The Commission is likely to take a more positive stance and therefore accept a higher degree of distortion of competition, if the aid is necessary, well targeted and proportionate for a specific undertaking to increase its training activities and society benefits from the extra training provided more than the aid beneficiary. |
| --- | --- |

29.

The Commission is likely to take a more positive stance and therefore accept a higher degree of distortion of competition, if the aid is necessary, well targeted and proportionate for a specific undertaking to increase its training activities and society benefits from the extra training provided more than the aid beneficiary.

---

(1)  OJ L 214, 9.8.2008, p. 3. For ad-hoc training aid to a large undertaking below the threshold of EUR 2 million, the Commission will mutatis mutandis apply the principles as outlined in this Communication, though in a less detailed manner.

(2)  However, externalities of general training can also be appropriated by the undertakings through special clauses in contracts requiring the trained employee to remain in the undertaking for a defined period of time after he had received such training.

(3)  Disabled and disadvantaged workers are defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008.

(4)  For example, society will attach more value to training received by young and low skilled workers than an undertaking will do due to a perceived or real lower productivity.

(5)  This equals the part of the extra costs of the training that the undertaking cannot recover by benefiting directly from the skills acquired by its employees during the training.

(6)  See also current case practice, for example, C 35/2007, Training aid to Volvo Cars in Gent, Commission Decision 2008/948/EC of 23 July 2008 on measures by Germany to assist DHL and Leipzig Halle airport (OJ L 346, 23.12.2008, p. 1) and Commission Decision 2007/612/EC of 4 April 2007 on State aid C 14/06 which Belgium is planning to implement for General Motors Belgium in Antwerp (OJ L 243, 18.9.2007, p. 71).

(7)  In addition, if the labour market functioned perfectly, employees could always extract a larger salary for their better skills due to the training received and internalise positive externalities of the training.

(8)  A number of markets can be affected by the aid, because the impact of the aid may not be restricted to the markets where the aid beneficiary is active but it can extend to other markets, for example input markets.

(9)  It should be noted however, that training aid given to a whole sector in one Member State may lead to a distortion on trade between Member States.

(10)  Size of the undertaking can be expressed in the terms of market shares as well as turnover and/or employment.

(11)  The lower the degree of product differentiation, the greater the effect of the aid on competitors’ profits will be.

(12)  It is important to note however, that some markets are competitive despite there being few undertakings present.

(13)  It should be noted however, that sometimes granting of an aid helps to overcome entry barriers and allows new undertakings to enter a market.

---

| 11.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 188/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/6

---

Communication from the Commission — Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility of State aid for the employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers subject to individual notification

2009/C 188/02

1.   INTRODUCTION

| 1. | The promotion of employment and social cohesion is a central aim of the economic and social policies of the Community and of its Member States. Unemployment and, in particular, structural unemployment, remains a significant problem in some parts of the Community, and certain categories of workers still encounter difficulties in entering the labour market. State aid in the form of subsidies to wage costs, where wage cost means the total amount actually payable by the beneficiary of the aid in respect of the employment concerned, comprising: (a) the gross wage, before tax; and (b) the compulsory contributions, such as social security charges; and (c) child care and parent care costs (‘wage subsidies’) can provide additional incentives to undertakings to increase their levels of employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers. The objective of such aid is thus to encourage the recruitment of the targeted categories of worker. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The promotion of employment and social cohesion is a central aim of the economic and social policies of the Community and of its Member States. Unemployment and, in particular, structural unemployment, remains a significant problem in some parts of the Community, and certain categories of workers still encounter difficulties in entering the labour market. State aid in the form of subsidies to wage costs, where wage cost means the total amount actually payable by the beneficiary of the aid in respect of the employment concerned, comprising: (a) the gross wage, before tax; and (b) the compulsory contributions, such as social security charges; and (c) child care and parent care costs (‘wage subsidies’) can provide additional incentives to undertakings to increase their levels of employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers. The objective of such aid is thus to encourage the recruitment of the targeted categories of worker.

| 2. | This Communication sets out guidance as to the criteria the Commission will apply for the assessment of State aid in the form of wage subsidies that needs to be notified individually pursuant to Article 6(1)(h) and (i) of the Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption Regulation (1)). This guidance is intended to make the Commission’s reasoning transparent and to create predictability and legal certainty. |
| --- | --- |

2.

This Communication sets out guidance as to the criteria the Commission will apply for the assessment of State aid in the form of wage subsidies that needs to be notified individually pursuant to Article 6(1)(h) and (i) of the Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption Regulation (1)). This guidance is intended to make the Commission’s reasoning transparent and to create predictability and legal certainty.

| 3. | This guidance applies to State aid in the form of wage subsidies for disadvantaged workers, severely disadvantaged workers and disabled workers within the meaning of Article 2(18), (19) and (20) of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008. Any individual measure, whether granted ad hoc or on the basis of a scheme, will be subject to this guidance when its grant equivalent exceeds EUR 5 million per undertaking per year for the employment of disadvantaged workers and severely disadvantaged workers (hereinafter referred to together as ‘disadvantaged workers’) and EUR 10 million per undertaking per year for the employment of disabled workers (2). |
| --- | --- |

3.

This guidance applies to State aid in the form of wage subsidies for disadvantaged workers, severely disadvantaged workers and disabled workers within the meaning of Article 2(18), (19) and (20) of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008. Any individual measure, whether granted ad hoc or on the basis of a scheme, will be subject to this guidance when its grant equivalent exceeds EUR 5 million per undertaking per year for the employment of disadvantaged workers and severely disadvantaged workers (hereinafter referred to together as ‘disadvantaged workers’) and EUR 10 million per undertaking per year for the employment of disabled workers (2).

| 4. | The criteria set out in this guidance will not be applied mechanically. The level of the Commission’s assessment and the kind of information it may require will be proportional to the risk of distortion of competition. The scope of the analysis will depend on the nature of the case. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The criteria set out in this guidance will not be applied mechanically. The level of the Commission’s assessment and the kind of information it may require will be proportional to the risk of distortion of competition. The scope of the analysis will depend on the nature of the case.

2.   POSITIVE EFFECTS OF THE AID

2.1.   Existence of an objective of common interest

| 5. | Certain categories of worker experience particular difficulty in finding jobs, because employers consider them to be less productive or have prejudices against them. This perceived or real lower productivity may be due either to lack of recent experience in employment (for example, young workers or long-term unemployed) or to a permanent disability. Because of their perceived or real lower productivity the workers are likely to be excluded from the labour market unless employers are offered compensation for their employment. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Certain categories of worker experience particular difficulty in finding jobs, because employers consider them to be less productive or have prejudices against them. This perceived or real lower productivity may be due either to lack of recent experience in employment (for example, young workers or long-term unemployed) or to a permanent disability. Because of their perceived or real lower productivity the workers are likely to be excluded from the labour market unless employers are offered compensation for their employment.

| 6. | It is socially desirable that all categories of workers are integrated in the labour market. This means that a share of the domestic income may be redistributed to the categories of workers concerned by the measures. State aid may help disadvantaged and disabled workers to enter the labour market or stay in the labour market by covering the extra costs resulting from their perceived or real lower productivity. |
| --- | --- |

6.

It is socially desirable that all categories of workers are integrated in the labour market. This means that a share of the domestic income may be redistributed to the categories of workers concerned by the measures. State aid may help disadvantaged and disabled workers to enter the labour market or stay in the labour market by covering the extra costs resulting from their perceived or real lower productivity.

| 7. | Member States should demonstrate that the aid will address the objective of common interest. In its analysis, the Commission will, among other things, consider the following elements:






  (a) | the number and categories of workers concerned by the measure; |
| --- | --- | --- |

7.

Member States should demonstrate that the aid will address the objective of common interest. In its analysis, the Commission will, among other things, consider the following elements:

(a)

the number and categories of workers concerned by the measure;

| (b) | employment rates of the categories of workers concerned by the measure on the national and/or regional level and in the undertaking or undertakings concerned; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

employment rates of the categories of workers concerned by the measure on the national and/or regional level and in the undertaking or undertakings concerned;

| (c) | unemployment rates for the categories of workers concerned by the measure on the national and/or regional level; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

unemployment rates for the categories of workers concerned by the measure on the national and/or regional level;

| (d) | particularly marginalised sub-groups within the broader categories of disabled and disadvantaged workers. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

particularly marginalised sub-groups within the broader categories of disabled and disadvantaged workers.

2.2.   State aid as an appropriate policy instrument

| 8. | State aid in the form of wage subsidies is not the only policy instrument available to Member States to encourage employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers. Member States can also use general measures such as reduction of the taxation of labour and social costs, boosting investment in education and training, measures to provide guidance and counselling, assistance and training for the unemployed and improvements in labour law. |
| --- | --- |

8.

State aid in the form of wage subsidies is not the only policy instrument available to Member States to encourage employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers. Member States can also use general measures such as reduction of the taxation of labour and social costs, boosting investment in education and training, measures to provide guidance and counselling, assistance and training for the unemployed and improvements in labour law.

| 9. | Where the Member State has considered other policy options, and the advantages of using a selective instrument such as State aid for a specific undertaking are established, the measures concerned are considered to constitute an appropriate instrument. The Commission will in particular take account of any impact assessment of the proposed measure the Member State may have made. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Where the Member State has considered other policy options, and the advantages of using a selective instrument such as State aid for a specific undertaking are established, the measures concerned are considered to constitute an appropriate instrument. The Commission will in particular take account of any impact assessment of the proposed measure the Member State may have made.

2.3.   Incentive effect and necessity of the aid

| 10. | State aid for the employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers must result in the aid beneficiary changing its behaviour so that the aid results in a net increase in the number of disadvantaged or disabled employees in the undertaking concerned. Newly recruited disadvantaged or disabled employees should only fill newly created posts or posts that have fallen vacant following voluntary departure, disability, retirement on grounds of age, voluntary reduction of working time or lawful dismissal for misconduct. Posts resulting from redundancy are not to be filled with subsidised disadvantaged or disabled workers. Thus State aid cannot be used to replace workers in respect of whom the undertaking no longer receives a subsidy and who have consequently been dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

10.

State aid for the employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers must result in the aid beneficiary changing its behaviour so that the aid results in a net increase in the number of disadvantaged or disabled employees in the undertaking concerned. Newly recruited disadvantaged or disabled employees should only fill newly created posts or posts that have fallen vacant following voluntary departure, disability, retirement on grounds of age, voluntary reduction of working time or lawful dismissal for misconduct. Posts resulting from redundancy are not to be filled with subsidised disadvantaged or disabled workers. Thus State aid cannot be used to replace workers in respect of whom the undertaking no longer receives a subsidy and who have consequently been dismissed.

| 11. | Member States should demonstrate to the Commission the existence of the incentive effect and the necessity of the aid. First, the beneficiary must have submitted an application for the aid to the Member State concerned before the categories of workers concerned by the measures were employed. Second, the Member State must demonstrate that the aid is paid in respect of a disadvantaged or disabled worker in an undertaking, where the recruitment would have not occurred without the aid. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Member States should demonstrate to the Commission the existence of the incentive effect and the necessity of the aid. First, the beneficiary must have submitted an application for the aid to the Member State concerned before the categories of workers concerned by the measures were employed. Second, the Member State must demonstrate that the aid is paid in respect of a disadvantaged or disabled worker in an undertaking, where the recruitment would have not occurred without the aid.

| 12. | In its analysis, the Commission will consider, among other things, the following elements:






  (a) | internal documents of the aid beneficiary on employment costs in relation to the categories of workers concerned by the measure for two scenarios: with aid and without aid; |
| --- | --- | --- |

12.

In its analysis, the Commission will consider, among other things, the following elements:

(a)

internal documents of the aid beneficiary on employment costs in relation to the categories of workers concerned by the measure for two scenarios: with aid and without aid;

| (b) | existing or past wage subsidies in the undertaking concerned: categories and number of workers subject to subsidies; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

existing or past wage subsidies in the undertaking concerned: categories and number of workers subject to subsidies;

| (c) | annual turnover of the categories of workers concerned by the measure. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

annual turnover of the categories of workers concerned by the measure.

2.4.   Proportionality of the aid

| 13. | The Member State must demonstrate that the aid is necessary and the amount is kept to the minimum in order to achieve the objective of the aid.
  Member States should provide evidence that the aid amount does not exceed the net additional costs of employing the categories of workers concerned by the measure compared to the costs of employing workers who are not disadvantaged or disabled (3).
  In any case, aid intensities must never exceed those laid down in Articles 40 (4) and 41 (5) of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008. Eligible costs, to which aid intensities are to be applied, must be calculated in accordance with Articles 40 (6) and 41 (7) of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008. |
| --- | --- |

13.

The Member State must demonstrate that the aid is necessary and the amount is kept to the minimum in order to achieve the objective of the aid.

Member States should provide evidence that the aid amount does not exceed the net additional costs of employing the categories of workers concerned by the measure compared to the costs of employing workers who are not disadvantaged or disabled (3).

In any case, aid intensities must never exceed those laid down in Articles 40 (4) and 41 (5) of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008. Eligible costs, to which aid intensities are to be applied, must be calculated in accordance with Articles 40 (6) and 41 (7) of Regulation (EC) No 800/2008.

3.   NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE AID

| 14. | If the aid is proportionate to achieve the objective of the aid, the negative effects of the aid are likely to be limited and an analysis of the negative effects may not be necessary. However, in some cases, even where the aid is necessary and proportionate for a specific undertaking to increase the employment of categories of workers concerned by the measure, the aid may result in a change in the behaviour of the beneficiary which significantly distorts competition. In those cases the Commission will conduct an analysis of the distortion of competition. The extent of the distortion of competition caused by the aid can vary depending on the characteristics of the aid and of the markets affected (8). |
| --- | --- |

14.

If the aid is proportionate to achieve the objective of the aid, the negative effects of the aid are likely to be limited and an analysis of the negative effects may not be necessary. However, in some cases, even where the aid is necessary and proportionate for a specific undertaking to increase the employment of categories of workers concerned by the measure, the aid may result in a change in the behaviour of the beneficiary which significantly distorts competition. In those cases the Commission will conduct an analysis of the distortion of competition. The extent of the distortion of competition caused by the aid can vary depending on the characteristics of the aid and of the markets affected (8).

| 15. | The aid characteristics that may affect the likelihood and the extent of the distortion are:






  (a) | selectivity; |
| --- | --- | --- |

15.

The aid characteristics that may affect the likelihood and the extent of the distortion are:

(a)

selectivity;

| (b) | the size of the aid; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the size of the aid;

| (c) | the repetition and duration of the aid; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the repetition and duration of the aid;

| (d) | the effect of the aid on the undertaking's costs. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the effect of the aid on the undertaking's costs.

| 16. | For example, an aid scheme used to encourage undertakings in general in a Member State to employ more disadvantaged or disabled workers is likely to have a different effect on the market than a large amount of aid given ad hoc to a single undertaking to enable it to increase its employment of a certain category of workers. The latter is likely to distort competition more significantly as the aid beneficiary's competitors become less able to compete. The distortion will be even greater if the labour costs in the beneficiary's business represent a high share of the total costs. |
| --- | --- |

16.

For example, an aid scheme used to encourage undertakings in general in a Member State to employ more disadvantaged or disabled workers is likely to have a different effect on the market than a large amount of aid given ad hoc to a single undertaking to enable it to increase its employment of a certain category of workers. The latter is likely to distort competition more significantly as the aid beneficiary's competitors become less able to compete. The distortion will be even greater if the labour costs in the beneficiary's business represent a high share of the total costs.

| 17. | In assessing the market characteristics, which can give a much more accurate picture of the likely impact of an aid, the Commission will among other things consider:






  (a) | the structure of the market; |
| --- | --- | --- |

17.

In assessing the market characteristics, which can give a much more accurate picture of the likely impact of an aid, the Commission will among other things consider:

(a)

the structure of the market;

| (b) | the characteristics of the sector or industry; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the characteristics of the sector or industry;

| (c) | the situation on the national/regional labour market. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the situation on the national/regional labour market.

| 18. | The structure of the market will be assessed through the concentration of the market, the size of undertakings (9), importance of product differentiation (10), and barriers to entry and exit. Market shares and concentration ratios will be calculated once the relevant market has been defined. In general, the fewer undertakings there are, the larger their share of the market, and the less competition one would expect to observe (11). If the affected market is concentrated with high barriers to entry (12) and the aid beneficiary is a major player on it then it is more likely that competitors will have to alter their behaviour in response to the aid, for example postpone or abandon the introduction of a new product or technology or exit the market all together. |
| --- | --- |

18.

The structure of the market will be assessed through the concentration of the market, the size of undertakings (9), importance of product differentiation (10), and barriers to entry and exit. Market shares and concentration ratios will be calculated once the relevant market has been defined. In general, the fewer undertakings there are, the larger their share of the market, and the less competition one would expect to observe (11). If the affected market is concentrated with high barriers to entry (12) and the aid beneficiary is a major player on it then it is more likely that competitors will have to alter their behaviour in response to the aid, for example postpone or abandon the introduction of a new product or technology or exit the market all together.

| 19. | The Commission will also look at the characteristics of the sector, such as the existence of overcapacity and whether the markets in the industry are growing (13), mature or declining. For example, the presence of overcapacity or of mature markets in an industry may increase the risk of aid leading to inefficiency and displacement of output among undertakings which do not have subsidised workers. |
| --- | --- |

19.

The Commission will also look at the characteristics of the sector, such as the existence of overcapacity and whether the markets in the industry are growing (13), mature or declining. For example, the presence of overcapacity or of mature markets in an industry may increase the risk of aid leading to inefficiency and displacement of output among undertakings which do not have subsidised workers.

| 20. | Finally, the measure will be placed in the context of the situation on the labour market, that is to say, unemployment and employment rates, wage levels, and labour law. |
| --- | --- |

20.

Finally, the measure will be placed in the context of the situation on the labour market, that is to say, unemployment and employment rates, wage levels, and labour law.

| 21. | Wage subsidies may in particular cases lead to the distortions of competition discussed in paragraphs 22 to 27. |
| --- | --- |

21.

Wage subsidies may in particular cases lead to the distortions of competition discussed in paragraphs 22 to 27.

Substitution and displacement effect

| 22. | The substitution effect relates to the situation where jobs given to a certain category of workers simply replace jobs for other categories. A wage subsidy which targets a specific subgroup of workers splits the labour force into subsidised workers and unsubsidised workers, and may induce undertakings to replace unsubsidised workers with subsidised workers. This occurs because relative wage costs for subsidised and unsubsidised workers are changed (14). |
| --- | --- |

22.

The substitution effect relates to the situation where jobs given to a certain category of workers simply replace jobs for other categories. A wage subsidy which targets a specific subgroup of workers splits the labour force into subsidised workers and unsubsidised workers, and may induce undertakings to replace unsubsidised workers with subsidised workers. This occurs because relative wage costs for subsidised and unsubsidised workers are changed (14).

| 23. | Since undertakings which employ subsidised workers, compete in the same markets for goods or services as those which do not employ subsidised workers, wage subsidies can contribute to the reduction of jobs elsewhere in the economy. Such a situation occurs when an undertaking employing subsidised workers increases output, but displaces output among undertakings who do not employ subsidised workers and, as a result, the aid crowds-out unsubsidised employment. |
| --- | --- |

23.

Since undertakings which employ subsidised workers, compete in the same markets for goods or services as those which do not employ subsidised workers, wage subsidies can contribute to the reduction of jobs elsewhere in the economy. Such a situation occurs when an undertaking employing subsidised workers increases output, but displaces output among undertakings who do not employ subsidised workers and, as a result, the aid crowds-out unsubsidised employment.

Market entry and exit

| 24. | Employment costs form part of the normal operating costs of any undertaking. It is therefore particularly important that aid should have a positive effect on employment and should not merely enable undertakings to reduce costs which they would otherwise bear. For example, wage subsidies reduce the ongoing costs of production and thus would make entry more appealing and enable undertakings with otherwise poor commercial prospects to enter a market or introduce new products to the detriment of more efficient competitors. |
| --- | --- |

24.

Employment costs form part of the normal operating costs of any undertaking. It is therefore particularly important that aid should have a positive effect on employment and should not merely enable undertakings to reduce costs which they would otherwise bear. For example, wage subsidies reduce the ongoing costs of production and thus would make entry more appealing and enable undertakings with otherwise poor commercial prospects to enter a market or introduce new products to the detriment of more efficient competitors.

| 25. | The availability of State aid may also affect an undertaking's decision to leave a market where it is already operating. Wage subsidies could reduce the size of losses and enable an undertaking to stay in the market for longer — which may mean that other, more efficient undertakings that do not receive aid are forced to exit instead. |
| --- | --- |

25.

The availability of State aid may also affect an undertaking's decision to leave a market where it is already operating. Wage subsidies could reduce the size of losses and enable an undertaking to stay in the market for longer — which may mean that other, more efficient undertakings that do not receive aid are forced to exit instead.

Investment incentives

| 26. | In the markets where wage subsidies are granted undertakings are discouraged from competing and may reduce their investments and attempts to increase efficiency and innovation. There may be a delay in the introduction of new less labour intensive technologies by the aid beneficiary due to the change in relative costs for labour intensive and technology intensive production methods. Manufacturers of competing or complementary products may also decrease or delay their investment. As a consequence, the overall investment level in the industry concerned will decline. |
| --- | --- |

26.

In the markets where wage subsidies are granted undertakings are discouraged from competing and may reduce their investments and attempts to increase efficiency and innovation. There may be a delay in the introduction of new less labour intensive technologies by the aid beneficiary due to the change in relative costs for labour intensive and technology intensive production methods. Manufacturers of competing or complementary products may also decrease or delay their investment. As a consequence, the overall investment level in the industry concerned will decline.

Effect on trade flows

| 27. | Wage subsidies within a particular region may result in some territories benefiting from more favourable production conditions than others. This may result in the displacement of trade flows in favour of the regions where such aid is given. |
| --- | --- |

27.

Wage subsidies within a particular region may result in some territories benefiting from more favourable production conditions than others. This may result in the displacement of trade flows in favour of the regions where such aid is given.

4.   BALANCING AND DECISION

| 28. | The last step in the analysis is to evaluate the extent to which the positive effects of the aid outweigh its negative effects. This will be done on a case-by-case basis for all individual measures. In order to balance the positive and the negative effects, the Commission will assess them and make an overall assessment of their impact on producers and consumers in each of the markets affected. Unless quantitative information is readily available the Commission will use qualitative information for the purposes of the assessment. |
| --- | --- |

28.

The last step in the analysis is to evaluate the extent to which the positive effects of the aid outweigh its negative effects. This will be done on a case-by-case basis for all individual measures. In order to balance the positive and the negative effects, the Commission will assess them and make an overall assessment of their impact on producers and consumers in each of the markets affected. Unless quantitative information is readily available the Commission will use qualitative information for the purposes of the assessment.

| 29. | The Commission is likely to take a more positive stance and therefore accept a higher degree of distortion of competition if the aid is necessary and well targeted to achieve the objective of the aid and is limited to the net extra costs of compensating for the lower productivity of the categories of workers concerned by the measure. |
| --- | --- |

29.

The Commission is likely to take a more positive stance and therefore accept a higher degree of distortion of competition if the aid is necessary and well targeted to achieve the objective of the aid and is limited to the net extra costs of compensating for the lower productivity of the categories of workers concerned by the measure.

---

(1)  OJ L 214, 9.8.2008, p. 3.

(2)  Due to their specific nature, individual measures applying to the compensation for the additional cost of employing disabled workers and additional costs incurred by social enterprises of which the grant equivalent exceeds EUR 10 million per undertaking per year will be assessed on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For ad-hoc aid for the employment of disadvantaged workers below EUR 5 million and ad-hoc aid to large undertakings for the employment of disabled workers below EUR 10 million, the Commission will mutatis mutandis apply the principles as outlined in this guidance, though in a less detailed manner.

(3)  Net additional costs take into account the costs corresponding to the employment of the targeted categories of disadvantaged or disabled workers (for example, due to lower productivity) and benefits, which the aid beneficiary extracts from this employment (for example, due to an improvement of the image of the undertaking).

(4)  The aid intensity for disadvantaged workers must not exceed 50 % of the eligible costs.

(5)  The aid intensity for disabled workers must not exceed 75 % of the eligible costs.

(6)  For the employment of disadvantaged workers eligible costs are the wage costs over a maximum period of 12 months following recruitment. However, where the worker concerned is a severely disadvantaged worker, eligible costs are the wage costs over a maximum period of 24 months following recruitment.

(7)  For the employment of disabled workers eligible costs are the wage costs over any given duration during which the disabled worker is being employed.

(8)  A number of markets can be affected by the aid, because the impact of the aid may not be restricted to the markets where the aid beneficiary is active but can extend to other markets, for example input markets.

(9)  Size of the undertaking can be expressed in the terms of market shares as well as turnover and/or employment.

(10)  The lower the degree of product differentiation, the greater the effect of the aid on competitors’ profits will be.

(11)  However, some markets are competitive despite there being few undertakings present.

(12)  However, granting aid sometimes helps to overcome entry barriers and allows new undertakings to enter a market.

(13)  The existence of growing markets will usually lead to a less pronounced effect of the aid on competitors.

(14)  Such substitution effect depends on the elasticity of demand for labour, both for subsidised and unsubsidised workers.

---

| 11.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 188/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/11

---

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty

Cases where the Commission raises no objections

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 188/03

| Date of adoption of the decision | 20.5.2009 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of State Aid | N 456/08 |
| Member State | The Netherlands |
| Region | Alle regio’s |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | (Concept) Regeling van de Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat houdende bepalingen met betrekking tot de verstrekking van subsidies voor duurzame mobiliteit, logistiek en duurzaam waterbeheer (Kaderregeling subsidie duurzaamheid verkeer en waterstaat) |
| Legal basis | (Concept) Regeling van de Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat houdende bepalingen met betrekking tot de verstrekking van subsidies voor duurzame mobiliteit, logistiek en duurzaam waterbeheer (Kaderregeling subsidie duurzaamheid verkeer en waterstaat)
  De (Concept) Kaderregeling subsidie duurzaamheid verkeer en waterstaat is gebaseerd op de Kaderwet subsidies Verkeer en Waterstaat (artikelen 2, aanhef, onderdelen a, c, e, 3 en 4). |
| Type of measure | Aid scheme |
| Objective | R&D&I aid, environmental aid |
| Form of aid | Direct grant, State loans and State shortfall guarantees |
| Budget | EUR 750 million |
| Intensity | — |
| Duration (period) | Six years (upon approval by the Commission) |
| Economic sectors | Transport |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat |
| Postbus 20901 |
| 2500 EX Den Haag |
| NEDERLAND |

Date of adoption of the decision

20.5.2009

Reference number of State Aid

N 456/08

Member State

The Netherlands

Region

Alle regio’s

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

(Concept) Regeling van de Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat houdende bepalingen met betrekking tot de verstrekking van subsidies voor duurzame mobiliteit, logistiek en duurzaam waterbeheer (Kaderregeling subsidie duurzaamheid verkeer en waterstaat)

Legal basis

(Concept) Regeling van de Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat houdende bepalingen met betrekking tot de verstrekking van subsidies voor duurzame mobiliteit, logistiek en duurzaam waterbeheer (Kaderregeling subsidie duurzaamheid verkeer en waterstaat)

De (Concept) Kaderregeling subsidie duurzaamheid verkeer en waterstaat is gebaseerd op de Kaderwet subsidies Verkeer en Waterstaat (artikelen 2, aanhef, onderdelen a, c, e, 3 en 4).

Type of measure

Aid scheme

Objective

R&D&I aid, environmental aid

Form of aid

Direct grant, State loans and State shortfall guarantees

Budget

EUR 750 million

Intensity

—

Duration (period)

Six years (upon approval by the Commission)

Economic sectors

Transport

Name and address of the granting authority

Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat

Postbus 20901

2500 EX Den Haag

NEDERLAND

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/index.htm

---

IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

| 11.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 188/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/12

---

Euro exchange rates (1)

10 August 2009

2009/C 188/04

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,4202 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 138,01 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4450 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,85355 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 10,2129 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,5345 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 8,6940 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 25,678 |
| EEK | Estonian kroon | 15,6466 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 269,31 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Latvian lats | 0,7006 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,1154 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,2095 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 2,0929 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,6895 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,5361 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 11,0070 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 2,0985 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 2,0468 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 742,67 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 11,4031 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 9,7062 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,3269 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 14 103,40 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,9771 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 67,729 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 45,0035 |
| THB | Thai baht | 48,322 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 2,5813 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 18,3135 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 67,9000 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,4202

JPY

Japanese yen

138,01

DKK

Danish krone

7,4450

GBP

Pound sterling

0,85355

SEK

Swedish krona

10,2129

CHF

Swiss franc

1,5345

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

8,6940

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

25,678

EEK

Estonian kroon

15,6466

HUF

Hungarian forint

269,31

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,4528

LVL

Latvian lats

0,7006

PLN

Polish zloty

4,1154

RON

Romanian leu

4,2095

TRY

Turkish lira

2,0929

AUD

Australian dollar

1,6895

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,5361

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

11,0070

NZD

New Zealand dollar

2,0985

SGD

Singapore dollar

2,0468

KRW

South Korean won

1 742,67

ZAR

South African rand

11,4031

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

9,7062

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,3269

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

14 103,40

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,9771

PHP

Philippine peso

67,729

RUB

Russian rouble

45,0035

THB

Thai baht

48,322

BRL

Brazilian real

2,5813

MXN

Mexican peso

18,3135

INR

Indian rupee

67,9000

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

---

| 11.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 188/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/13

---

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant positions given at its meeting of 7 March 2008 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/38.543 — International removal services (2)

Rapporteur: Italy

2009/C 188/05

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission as regards the addressees of the draft decision and that fines should be imposed on the addressees. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission as regards the addressees of the draft decision and that fines should be imposed on the addressees.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission on the basic amounts of the fines as well as on the respective Commission’s reasoning to fix them. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission on the basic amounts of the fines as well as on the respective Commission’s reasoning to fix them.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission's assessment regarding the non-applicability of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission's assessment regarding the non-applicability of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the application of the Commission’s 2002 Leniency Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the application of the Commission’s 2002 Leniency Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the fine reduction based on the 2002 Leniency Notice. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the fine reduction based on the 2002 Leniency Notice.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that there are no grounds for reducing the amounts of the fines under point 35 of the Fining Guidelines as was requested by five undertakings. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that there are no grounds for reducing the amounts of the fines under point 35 of the Fining Guidelines as was requested by five undertakings.

| 7. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's granting of a reduction, as well as on the amount of the reduction, to one undertaking on the basis of its inability to pay and other particular circumstances concerning its individual situation. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's granting of a reduction, as well as on the amount of the reduction, to one undertaking on the basis of its inability to pay and other particular circumstances concerning its individual situation. A minority abstains.

| 8. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the final amounts of the fines. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the final amounts of the fines. A minority abstains.

| 9. | The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

---

| 11.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 188/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/14

---

Final report of the Hearing Officer in case COMP/38.543 — International removal services

(Pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of Commission Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of Hearing Officers in certain competition proceedings — OJ L 162, 19.6.2001, p. 21)

2009/C 188/06

The draft Decision gives rise to the following observations:

INTRODUCTION

In late August of 2003, the Commission decided to carry out inspections in Belgium in September 2003 at the premises of Allied Arthur Pierre, Interdean, Transworld and Ziegler. Following these inspections, Allied Arthur Pierre applied for immunity, or failing the availability of immunity, reduction of the potential fine, pursuant to the Commission's 2002 Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases. Since the Commission had already carried out a targeted inspection and obtained evidence of the cartel, immunity was not available. However, based on [*] (1), the Commission intended to grant a reduction of the fine of between 30-50 % to Allied Arthur Pierre.

In February, September, October 2005 as well as in July and October 2007 the Commission sent requests for information under Article 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 to the undertakings concerned, as well as to competitors and a professional organisation of removal companies in Belgium.

The Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that the addressees of the draft Decision had participated in a cartel in international removal services in Belgium, whereby the undertakings involved fixed prices, shared customers and manipulated the submission of bids, thereby infringing Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. The duration of the cartel was 19 years, from at least 1984 until 2003.

Statement of Objections and the time to reply

The Statement of Objections (‘SO’) was sent on 19 October 2006 to 32 addressees: Allied Arthur Pierre NV; North American International Holding Corporation; North American Van Lines Inc.; Sirva Inc.; Exel International Holdings (Belgium) NV; Exel International Holdings (Netherlands I) BV; Exel International Holdings (Netherlands II) BV; Exel International Holdings Limited; Exel Investments Limited; Realcause Limited; Amcrisp Limited; Interdean AG; Interdean Group Limited; Interdean Holding BV; Interdean International Limited; Interdean NV; Interdean SA; Iriben Limited; Rondspant BV; Team Relocations NV; Team Relocations Limited; Trans Euro Limited; Amertranseuro International Holdings Limited; [*]; Mozer Moving International SPRL; Gosselin World Wide Moving NV; Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje; Compas International Movers NV; Transworld International NV; Putters International NV; Verhuizingen Coppens NV; and Ziegler SA.

The addressees received the SO between 20 and 23 October 2006, with a two-month deadline to reply. Upon their reasoned requests, extensions were granted to Coppens until 15 January 2007; to Gosselin until 22 January 2007; and to Stichting and Interdean until 22 January 2007. All of the parties replied within the designated time limits.

Access to File

The parties had access to the file in the form of a DVD, which was sent upon request to all parties. Other documents in the file were made available at the Commission premises, and 28 undertakings took the opportunity to examine these. None of the parties addressed any issues relating to access to file to the Hearing Officer, with the exception of Ziegler. Ziegler made a written request to the Hearing Officer for access to the other parties’ replies to the SO. The Hearing Officer denied access, taking the view that information received after notification of the SO does not form part of the investigation file and, as such, is not accessible. Parties only have the right of access to other parties’ replies to the SO if information contained therein is inculpatory and the Commission relies upon it in a final decision, or if it has exculpatory value (2).

Oral Hearing

The Oral Hearing was held on 22 March 2007. All of the parties or their representatives attended the hearing, except for the Exel group of companies (parent companies of Allied Arthur Pierre), [*], Mozer, Putters, and Gosselin and Stichting.

Letter of Facts

Subsequent to the hearing, [*] evidence [*]. The Commission found this additional evidence to be useful in supporting the arguments made in the SO. Therefore, a Letter of Facts was sent on 23 August 2007 to all parties, setting out the nature of the evidence and explaining the way in which the Commission intended to use it in the draft Decision, together with a CD-ROM containing the additional pages of evidence. The parties were given two weeks to respond to the Letter of Facts.

The new evidence did not lead to any additional or new objections against the parties, but merely corroborated and supported the evidence already in the Commission's investigation file.

THE DRAFT DECISION

[*] The durations of the infringement as indicated in the draft Decision with regard to two undertakings are shorter than those set out in the SO.

The draft Decision submitted to the Commission only contains objections in respect of which the parties have been afforded the opportunity of making known their views.

I conclude that the rights of the parties to be heard have been respected in the present case.

Brussels, 25 February 2008.

Karen WILLIAMS

---

(1)  Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.

1

(2)  CFI judgment of 27 September 2006 in case No T-43/02, Jungbunzlauer.

2

Jungbunzlauer

---

| 11.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 188/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/16

---

Summary of Commission Decision

of 11 March 2008

relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement

(Case COMP/38.543 — International removal services)

(Only the English, French and Dutch texts are authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 188/07

I.   INTRODUCTION

| 1. | On 11 March 2008 the Commission adopted a decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (1), the Commission herewith publishes the names of the parties and the main content of the decision, including any penalties imposed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 11 March 2008 the Commission adopted a decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (1), the Commission herewith publishes the names of the parties and the main content of the decision, including any penalties imposed.

II.   CASE DESCRIPTION

1.   Procedure

| 2. | This case started as an ex-officio investigation with dawn raids on 16 and 17 September 2003 at the premises of Allied Arthur Pierre NV, Interdean NV and Transworld International NV and on 16 to 18 September 2003 at Ziegler SA in Belgium. Several written price-fixing agreements and many other documents proving indirect price fixing in the form of so-called ‘commissions’, as well as bid rigging and sharing of customers, were found. The evidence indicated that in total nine undertakings were involved in the cartel and that the cartel was functioning from October 1984 to early 1990 and from April 1997 to September 2003. |
| --- | --- |

2.

This case started as an ex-officio investigation with dawn raids on 16 and 17 September 2003 at the premises of Allied Arthur Pierre NV, Interdean NV and Transworld International NV and on 16 to 18 September 2003 at Ziegler SA in Belgium. Several written price-fixing agreements and many other documents proving indirect price fixing in the form of so-called ‘commissions’, as well as bid rigging and sharing of customers, were found. The evidence indicated that in total nine undertakings were involved in the cartel and that the cartel was functioning from October 1984 to early 1990 and from April 1997 to September 2003.

| 3. | The Statement of Objections was adopted on 18 October 2006 and notified to 32 addressees between 20 and 23 October 2006. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Statement of Objections was adopted on 18 October 2006 and notified to 32 addressees between 20 and 23 October 2006.

| 4. | A hearing was held on 22 March 2007. |
| --- | --- |

4.

A hearing was held on 22 March 2007.

| 5. | A letter of facts was sent on 23 August 2007 to all the parties indicating that the Commission intended to use this evidence against Allied Arthur Pierre NV, Interdean NV and Ziegler SA. |
| --- | --- |

5.

A letter of facts was sent on 23 August 2007 to all the parties indicating that the Commission intended to use this evidence against Allied Arthur Pierre NV, Interdean NV and Ziegler SA.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions issued a favourable opinion on 18 February and 7 March 2008. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions issued a favourable opinion on 18 February and 7 March 2008.

2.   Summary of the infringement

| 7. | The cartel concerns the provision of international removal services in Belgium. These include the international removal of goods of both natural persons — private individuals or employees of an undertaking or a public institution — and of undertakings or public institutions. Such international removals can be from Belgium to another country or from another country to Belgium. The distinguishing feature is that Belgium is either the starting place or the destination. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The cartel concerns the provision of international removal services in Belgium. These include the international removal of goods of both natural persons — private individuals or employees of an undertaking or a public institution — and of undertakings or public institutions. Such international removals can be from Belgium to another country or from another country to Belgium. The distinguishing feature is that Belgium is either the starting place or the destination.

| 8. | The decision concludes that 10 undertakings, namely Allied Arthur Pierre NV, Compas International NV, Gosselin Group NV, Interdean NV, Mozer Moving International SPRL, Putters International NV, Team Relocations NV, Transworld International NV, Verhuizingen Coppens NV and Ziegler SA operated a cartel in the market for international removal services in Belgium by fixing prices and sharing the market from 4 October 1984 to 10 September 2003. They agreed on prices, allocated removal contracts between themselves by way of bid rigging in the form of bogus quotes called ‘cover quotes’ and benefited from a system of financial compensation called ‘commissions’. These commissions were a hidden element of the final price that the consumer had to pay. The individual involvement of the participants in the cartel varied in length from 3 months to more than 18 years. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The decision concludes that 10 undertakings, namely Allied Arthur Pierre NV, Compas International NV, Gosselin Group NV, Interdean NV, Mozer Moving International SPRL, Putters International NV, Team Relocations NV, Transworld International NV, Verhuizingen Coppens NV and Ziegler SA operated a cartel in the market for international removal services in Belgium by fixing prices and sharing the market from 4 October 1984 to 10 September 2003. They agreed on prices, allocated removal contracts between themselves by way of bid rigging in the form of bogus quotes called ‘cover quotes’ and benefited from a system of financial compensation called ‘commissions’. These commissions were a hidden element of the final price that the consumer had to pay. The individual involvement of the participants in the cartel varied in length from 3 months to more than 18 years.

3.   Addressees

| 9. | The addressees of the decision are the 31 legal entities forming part of the 10 participating undertakings listed in paragraph 21, it being they that participated in the cartel or are liable for such participation. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The addressees of the decision are the 31 legal entities forming part of the 10 participating undertakings listed in paragraph 21, it being they that participated in the cartel or are liable for such participation.

| 10. | The liability of parent companies for their subsidiaries which participated in the cartel is based on the consideration that they are part of the same undertaking within the meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. All the parent companies own directly or indirectly 100 % (or almost 100 %) of the capital of their subsidiary/subsidiaries. It can therefore be presumed that the parent companies exercised decisive influence over the commercial policy of their subsidiary/subsidiaries. The decision finds that this presumption has not been rebutted by any of the parent companies. |
| --- | --- |

10.

The liability of parent companies for their subsidiaries which participated in the cartel is based on the consideration that they are part of the same undertaking within the meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. All the parent companies own directly or indirectly 100 % (or almost 100 %) of the capital of their subsidiary/subsidiaries. It can therefore be presumed that the parent companies exercised decisive influence over the commercial policy of their subsidiary/subsidiaries. The decision finds that this presumption has not been rebutted by any of the parent companies.

4.   Remedies

| 11. | The basic amount of the fine is determined as follows: a proportion, depending on the degree of gravity of the infringement, of the value of the sales of the relevant service made by each undertaking in the relevant geographic area during the last full business year of its participation in the infringement (‘variable amount’), is multiplied by the number of years of participation by the undertaking in the infringement, plus an additional amount (‘entry fee’), also calculated as a proportion of the value of sales, in order to deter horizontal price-fixing, market-sharing and output-limitation agreements (2). |
| --- | --- |

11.

The basic amount of the fine is determined as follows: a proportion, depending on the degree of gravity of the infringement, of the value of the sales of the relevant service made by each undertaking in the relevant geographic area during the last full business year of its participation in the infringement (‘variable amount’), is multiplied by the number of years of participation by the undertaking in the infringement, plus an additional amount (‘entry fee’), also calculated as a proportion of the value of sales, in order to deter horizontal price-fixing, market-sharing and output-limitation agreements (2).

| 12. | The factors taken into account in the present case in order to determine these proportions are related to the nature of the infringement (price fixing, market sharing and bid rigging). The decision applies in this case a variable amount of 17 % and an entry fee of 17 %. |
| --- | --- |

12.

The factors taken into account in the present case in order to determine these proportions are related to the nature of the infringement (price fixing, market sharing and bid rigging). The decision applies in this case a variable amount of 17 % and an entry fee of 17 %.

| 13. | The variable amount is multiplied for each undertaking by the number of years of its participation in the infringement; this number ranges from 0,5 to 19 in the present case. |
| --- | --- |

13.

The variable amount is multiplied for each undertaking by the number of years of its participation in the infringement; this number ranges from 0,5 to 19 in the present case.

| 14. | There are no aggravating circumstances to be taken into account in the present case. |
| --- | --- |

14.

There are no aggravating circumstances to be taken into account in the present case.

| 15. | A number of parties have argued for the application of a series of mitigating circumstances such as limited involvement in the infringement, effective cooperation with the Commission outside the scope of the Leniency Notice and anticompetitive behaviour authorised or encouraged by public authorities. These claims are all rejected in the decision. |
| --- | --- |

15.

A number of parties have argued for the application of a series of mitigating circumstances such as limited involvement in the infringement, effective cooperation with the Commission outside the scope of the Leniency Notice and anticompetitive behaviour authorised or encouraged by public authorities. These claims are all rejected in the decision.

| 16. | The amount of the fine imposed on certain undertakings is limited by the ceiling of 10 % of their total turnover in the preceding business year (see Article 23(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003). |
| --- | --- |

16.

The amount of the fine imposed on certain undertakings is limited by the ceiling of 10 % of their total turnover in the preceding business year (see Article 23(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003).

| 17. | The decision grants Allied Arthur Pierre NV a 50 % reduction of its fine. The reduction takes account of the significant added value which the evidence transmitted by that undertaking represents. |
| --- | --- |

17.

The decision grants Allied Arthur Pierre NV a 50 % reduction of its fine. The reduction takes account of the significant added value which the evidence transmitted by that undertaking represents.

| 18. | The decision concludes that, pursuant to the last paragraph of point 23 of the 2002 Leniency Notice, Allied Arthur Pierre NV will not be fined for the period before April 1997. |
| --- | --- |

18.

The decision concludes that, pursuant to the last paragraph of point 23 of the 2002 Leniency Notice, Allied Arthur Pierre NV will not be fined for the period before April 1997.

| 19. | Five undertakings applied for a reduction of their fine on grounds of their inability to pay under paragraph 35 of the Guidelines. The decision concludes that these applications must be rejected. |
| --- | --- |

19.

Five undertakings applied for a reduction of their fine on grounds of their inability to pay under paragraph 35 of the Guidelines. The decision concludes that these applications must be rejected.

| 20. | In this case, the decision takes into account the specific circumstances concerning the individual situation of Interdean NV and its parent companies. The decision accordingly grants Interdean NV a 70 % reduction of its fine. |
| --- | --- |

20.

In this case, the decision takes into account the specific circumstances concerning the individual situation of Interdean NV and its parent companies. The decision accordingly grants Interdean NV a 70 % reduction of its fine.

III.   DECISION

| 21. | The addressees of the decision are 31 legal entities forming part of the 10 undertakings which infringed Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement by directly and indirectly fixing prices for international removal services in Belgium, sharing part of the market, and manipulating the procedure for the submission of bids during the periods indicated:






  (a) | Allied Arthur Pierre NV, from 4 October 1984 to 9 September 2003; with Exel Investments Limited, Exel International Holdings Limited, Realcause Limited, Exel International Holdings (Netherlands I) BV, Exel International Holdings (Netherlands II) BV and Exel International Holdings (Belgium) NV from 9 November 1992 to 18 November 1999; with Sirva Inc., North American Van Lines Inc. and North American International Holding Corporation from 19 November 1999 to 9 September 2003; |
| --- | --- | --- |

21.

The addressees of the decision are 31 legal entities forming part of the 10 undertakings which infringed Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement by directly and indirectly fixing prices for international removal services in Belgium, sharing part of the market, and manipulating the procedure for the submission of bids during the periods indicated:

(a)

Allied Arthur Pierre NV, from 4 October 1984 to 9 September 2003; with Exel Investments Limited, Exel International Holdings Limited, Realcause Limited, Exel International Holdings (Netherlands I) BV, Exel International Holdings (Netherlands II) BV and Exel International Holdings (Belgium) NV from 9 November 1992 to 18 November 1999; with Sirva Inc., North American Van Lines Inc. and North American International Holding Corporation from 19 November 1999 to 9 September 2003;

| (b) | Compas International Movers NV from 26 January 1996 to 8 July 2003; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Compas International Movers NV from 26 January 1996 to 8 July 2003;

| (c) | Gosselin Group NV from 31 January 1992 to 18 September 2002; with Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje from 1 January 2002 to 18 September 2002; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Gosselin Group NV from 31 January 1992 to 18 September 2002; with Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje from 1 January 2002 to 18 September 2002;

| (d) | Interdean NV from 4 October 1984 to 10 September 2003; with Interdean Holding BV from 2 November 1987 to 23 June 1999; with Interdean Group Limited, Iriben Limited, Interdean International Limited, Amcrisp Limited, Rondspant Holding BV, Interdean Holding BV, Interdean SA and Interdean AG from 24 June 1999 to 10 September 2003; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Interdean NV from 4 October 1984 to 10 September 2003; with Interdean Holding BV from 2 November 1987 to 23 June 1999; with Interdean Group Limited, Iriben Limited, Interdean International Limited, Amcrisp Limited, Rondspant Holding BV, Interdean Holding BV, Interdean SA and Interdean AG from 24 June 1999 to 10 September 2003;

| (e) | Mozer Moving International SPRL from 31 March 2003 to 4 July 2003; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

Mozer Moving International SPRL from 31 March 2003 to 4 July 2003;

| (f) | Putters International NV from 14 February 1997 to 4 August 2003; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

Putters International NV from 14 February 1997 to 4 August 2003;

| (g) | Team Relocations NV from 20 January 1997 to 10 September 2003; with Trans Euro Limited and Team Relocations Limited from 20 January 1997 to 7 September 2003; with Amertranseuro International Holdings Limited, Trans Euro Limited and Team Relocations Limited from 8 September 2000 to 10 September 2003; |
| --- | --- |

(g)

Team Relocations NV from 20 January 1997 to 10 September 2003; with Trans Euro Limited and Team Relocations Limited from 20 January 1997 to 7 September 2003; with Amertranseuro International Holdings Limited, Trans Euro Limited and Team Relocations Limited from 8 September 2000 to 10 September 2003;

| (h) | Transworld International NV from 4 October 1984 to 31 December 2002; |
| --- | --- |

(h)

Transworld International NV from 4 October 1984 to 31 December 2002;

| (i) | Verhuizingen Coppens NV from 13 October 1992 to 29 July 2003; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

Verhuizingen Coppens NV from 13 October 1992 to 29 July 2003;

| (j) | Ziegler SA from 4 October 1984 to 8 September 2003. |
| --- | --- |

(j)

Ziegler SA from 4 October 1984 to 8 September 2003.

| 22. | For the infringement referred to in paragraph 21, the following fines are imposed:






  (a) | EUR 2 600 000 on Allied Arthur Pierre NV, of which:
  Sirva Inc., North American Van Lines Inc. and North American International Holding Corporation are held jointly and severally liable for the amount of EUR 2 095 000; |
| --- | --- | --- |

22.

For the infringement referred to in paragraph 21, the following fines are imposed:

(a)

EUR 2 600 000 on Allied Arthur Pierre NV, of which:

Sirva Inc., North American Van Lines Inc. and North American International Holding Corporation are held jointly and severally liable for the amount of EUR 2 095 000;

| (b) | EUR 1 300 000 jointly and severally on Exel Investments Limited, Exel International Holdings Limited, Realcause Limited, Exel International Holdings (Netherlands I) BV, Exel International Holdings (Netherlands II) BV and Exel International Holdings (Belgium) NV, for which:
  Allied Arthur Pierre NV is held jointly and severally liable; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

EUR 1 300 000 jointly and severally on Exel Investments Limited, Exel International Holdings Limited, Realcause Limited, Exel International Holdings (Netherlands I) BV, Exel International Holdings (Netherlands II) BV and Exel International Holdings (Belgium) NV, for which:

Allied Arthur Pierre NV is held jointly and severally liable;

| (c) | EUR 7 600 000 jointly and severally on Exel Investments Limited, Exel International Holdings Limited, Realcause Limited, Exel International Holdings (Netherlands I) BV, Exel International Holdings (Netherlands II) BV and Exel International Holdings (Belgium) NV; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

EUR 7 600 000 jointly and severally on Exel Investments Limited, Exel International Holdings Limited, Realcause Limited, Exel International Holdings (Netherlands I) BV, Exel International Holdings (Netherlands II) BV and Exel International Holdings (Belgium) NV;

| (d) | EUR 134 000 on Compas International Movers NV; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

EUR 134 000 on Compas International Movers NV;

| (e) | EUR 4 500 000 on Gosselin Group NV, of which:
  Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje is held jointly and severally liable for the amount of EUR 370 000; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

EUR 4 500 000 on Gosselin Group NV, of which:

Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje is held jointly and severally liable for the amount of EUR 370 000;

| (f) | EUR 3 185 000 on Interdean NV, for which:
  Interdean Holding BV is held jointly and severally liable for the amount of EUR 3 185 000; and
  Interdean Group Limited, Iriben Limited, Interdean International Limited, Amcrisp Limited, Rondspant Holding BV, Interdean Holding BV, Interdean SA and Interdean AG are held jointly and severally liable for the amount of EUR 3 000 000; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

EUR 3 185 000 on Interdean NV, for which:

Interdean Holding BV is held jointly and severally liable for the amount of EUR 3 185 000; and

Interdean Group Limited, Iriben Limited, Interdean International Limited, Amcrisp Limited, Rondspant Holding BV, Interdean Holding BV, Interdean SA and Interdean AG are held jointly and severally liable for the amount of EUR 3 000 000;

| (g) | EUR 1 500 on Mozer Moving International SPRL; |
| --- | --- |

(g)

EUR 1 500 on Mozer Moving International SPRL;

| (h) | EUR 395 000 on Putters International NV; |
| --- | --- |

(h)

EUR 395 000 on Putters International NV;

| (i) | EUR 3 490 000 on Team Relocations NV, of which:
  Trans Euro Limited and Team Relocations Limited are held jointly and severally liable for the amount of EUR 3 000 000; and
  Amertranseuro International Holdings Limited, Trans Euro Limited and Team Relocations Limited are held jointly and severally liable for the amount of EUR 1 300 000; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

EUR 3 490 000 on Team Relocations NV, of which:

Trans Euro Limited and Team Relocations Limited are held jointly and severally liable for the amount of EUR 3 000 000; and

Amertranseuro International Holdings Limited, Trans Euro Limited and Team Relocations Limited are held jointly and severally liable for the amount of EUR 1 300 000;

| (j) | EUR 246 000 on Transworld International NV; |
| --- | --- |

(j)

EUR 246 000 on Transworld International NV;

| (k) | EUR 104 000 on Verhuizingen Coppens NV; |
| --- | --- |

(k)

EUR 104 000 on Verhuizingen Coppens NV;

| (l) | EUR 9 200 000 on Ziegler SA. |
| --- | --- |

(l)

EUR 9 200 000 on Ziegler SA.

The undertakings referred to in paragraph 21 must immediately bring the infringement referred to in that paragraph to an end, in so far as they have not already done so. They must refrain in future from repeating any act or conduct referred to in paragraph 21, as well as any act or conduct which has the same or a similar object or effect as that infringement.

---

(1)  OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1419/2006 (OJ L 269, 28.9.2006, p. 1).

(2)  Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (OJ C 210, 1.9.2006, p. 2).

---

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

| 11.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 188/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/19

---

Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production of agricultural products and amending Regulation (EC) No 70/2001

2009/C 188/08

Aid No: XA 135/09

Member State: Spain

Region: Comunitat Valenciana

Title of aid scheme or name of company receiving an individual aid: Ayudas a las Agrupaciones de Defensa Sanitaria Ganaderas de la Comunitat Valenciana

Legal basis: Borrador de Orden de la Conselleria de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, por la que se establecen las bases reguladoras de las ayudas a las Agrupaciones de Defensa Sanitaria Ganaderas de la Comunitat Valenciana y se convocan para el año 2009

Annual expenditure planned under the scheme or overall amount of individual aid granted to the company: EUR 1 400 000

Maximum aid intensity: 100 % of the eligible expenditure

Date of implementation: From the date of publication of the registration number of the request for exemption on the website of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

Duration of scheme or individual aid award: Until 31 December 2013

Objective of aid: Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006. Aid in respect of animal and plant diseases and pest infestations

Sector(s) concerned: Small businesses which are on the Comunitat Valenciana's Register of Livestock Holdings for pigs, bovines, sheep, goats, rabbits, bees and equines

Name and address of granting authority:

| Conselleria de Agricultura Pesca y Alimentación |
| --- |
| C/Amadeo de Saboya, 2 |
| 46010 Valencia |
| ESPAÑA |

Conselleria de Agricultura Pesca y Alimentación

C/Amadeo de Saboya, 2

46010 Valencia

ESPAÑA

Website: http://www.agricultura.gva.es/especiales/ayudas_agrarias/pdf/ayuda%20agrupaciones%20de%20defensa%20sanitaria%20ganaderas.pdf

Other information: —

Aid No: XA 138/09

Member State: Cyprus

Region: Cyprus

Title of aid scheme or name of company receiving an individual aid: Πρόγραμμα Επιτήρησης Μεταδοτικής Σπογγώδους Εγκεφαλοπάθειας Βοοειδών

Legal basis:

| 1. | Item 03525 of the 2009 budget — Participation in European Union Programmes. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Item 03525 of the 2009 budget — Participation in European Union Programmes.

| 2. | Ο περί της Εφαρμογής Κοινοτικών Κανονισμών στον Τομέα της Κτηνιατρικής Νόμος του 2004 (Ν 149(Ι)/2004) (application of Regulation (EC) No 999/2001). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Ο περί της Εφαρμογής Κοινοτικών Κανονισμών στον Τομέα της Κτηνιατρικής Νόμος του 2004 (Ν 149(Ι)/2004) (application of Regulation (EC) No 999/2001).

| 3. | Νόμος που προνοεί για την Υγεία των Ζώων (Ν.109(Ι)2001)






  ‘4. (1) | The competent authority has the power and the competence to ensure:






  (c) | that the epidemiological investigation of the animal population is carried out, in order to detect the existence of any infectious, parasitic or other animal diseases.’ |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.

Νόμος που προνοεί για την Υγεία των Ζώων (Ν.109(Ι)2001)

‘4. (1)

The competent authority has the power and the competence to ensure:

(c)

that the epidemiological investigation of the animal population is carried out, in order to detect the existence of any infectious, parasitic or other animal diseases.’

| 4. | Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 309 και ημερομηνία 3 Απριλίου 2009 (Official Journal of the Republic of Cyprus No 4355 of 10 April 2009, p. 1540) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Απόφαση Εφόρου Ελέγχου Κρατικών Ενισχύσεων με αριθμό 309 και ημερομηνία 3 Απριλίου 2009 (Official Journal of the Republic of Cyprus No 4355 of 10 April 2009, p. 1540)

Annual expenditure planned under the scheme or overall amount of individual aid granted to the company: EUR 68 000

Maximum aid intensity: 100 %

Date of implementation: The programme will be implemented only after it has been published by the European Commission in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006

Duration of scheme or individual aid award:

Objective of aid: Animal diseases (Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006). The scheme concerns: (i) aid to compensate farmers for the costs of prevention and eradication of animal diseases (Article 10(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006) and (ii) aid to compensate farmers for losses caused by animal diseases (Article 10(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006)

Sector(s) concerned: NACE code

A10401 — Raising of dairy cattle

Name and address of the granting authority:

| Ktiniatrikes Ypiresies |
| --- |
| Ypourgeio Georgias |
| Fysikon Poron kai Perivallontos |
| Tmima Ktiniatrikon |
| Ypiresion Ktiniatreio Athalassas |
| 1417 Λευκωσία/Nicosia |
| ΚYΠΡΟΣ/CYPRUS |

Ktiniatrikes Ypiresies

Ypourgeio Georgias

Fysikon Poron kai Perivallontos

Tmima Ktiniatrikon

Ypiresion Ktiniatreio Athalassas

1417 Λευκωσία/Nicosia

ΚYΠΡΟΣ/CYPRUS

Website: http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/vs/vs.nsf/All/0A919596426A5D59C225758C0043265C/$file/bse%20final.pdf?OpenElement

http://www.publicaid.gov.cy/publicaid/publicaid.nsf/All/92619A79959C4C7BC2257594003762CA/$file/Απόφαση%20Αρ.%20309.pdf

Other information: The objective of the notified measure is to implement the programme for monitoring transmissible spongiform encephalopathy in bovine animals, in accordance with the provisions of Community legislation (Regulation (EC) No 999/2001).

The disease is included in the list of the International Office of Epizootic Diseases (OIE) and in the Annex to Council Decision 90/424/EEC (list of diseases that can receive co-financing). The expenditure planned for 2009 for the programme for monitoring transmissible spongiform encephalopathy in bovine animals was notified to the European Commission under the co-financing programmes.

The beneficiaries of aid under the measure are cattle farmers in the areas controlled by the Republic of Cyprus. Under the programme for the eradication of the disease, aid will be paid to cattle farmers in respect of whose animals the presence of the disease is suspected or confirmed. The disease monitoring programme will include the laboratory testing of bovine animals of a fixed age that are slaughtered for human consumption and of all dead animals from all bovine holdings.

Aid No: XA 139/09

Member State: Federal Republic of Germany

Region: Freistaat Sachsen

Title of aid scheme or name of company receiving individual aid: Gemeinsames Umsetzungsdokument zum Operationellen Programm der grenzübergreifenden Zusammenarbeit Sachsen — Polen 2007-2013

Legal basis: Aid is granted in line with:

the Operational programme (CCI code 2007CB163PO017),

the joint implementation document, and

Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production of agricultural products and amending Regulation (EC) No 70/2001, as amended.

The aid is also granted in line with sections 23 and 44 of Saxony’s Budget Regulations (Sächsiche Haushaltsordnung — SäHO, SächsGVBl. 2001, p. 154) and the corresponding administrative provisions, as amended, enacted by the Saxony State Ministry of Finance, subject to the variant or special rules set out in the joint implementation document

Annual expenditure planned under the scheme or overall amount of individual aid granted to the company: EUR 1 million per annum

Maximum aid intensity: 50 %

Date of implementation: After publication of the summary information by the Commission

Duration of scheme or individual aid award: Until 31 December 2013

Objective of aid: The specific objectives of the aid are the following:

shaping and implementing cross-border economic and environmental activities in the Saxony-Polish assisted area by developing common strategies for sustainable territorial development,

sustainably increasing the competitiveness of the region within Europe,

achieving, in a targeted manner, the development potential of the assisted area through efficient cross-border cooperation.

The following provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 will be applied for this purpose:

Article 5: Conservation of traditional landscapes and buildings, particularly for measures concerning the tourist infrastructure (Part II, No 1.2.1 of the joint implementation document) and protection and improvement of the environment (Part II, No 1.4.1 of the joint implementation document), excluding measures for implementing NATURA 2000,

Article 15: Provision of technical support in the agricultural sector, particularly for measures to boost/support economic and/or scientific contacts (Part II, No 1.1.1 of the joint implementation document) and to promote cooperation on the environment (Part II, No 1.4.2 of the joint implementation document).

The provisions of Articles 5 and 15 of Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 also apply to the eligibility of expenditure for assistance.

The aid will be granted only for small and medium-sized undertakings which produce agricultural products

Sector(s) concerned: Agriculture (growing of non-perennial crops, growing of perennial crops, running nurseries, livestock farming, mixed farming, providing agricultural services)

Name and address of the granting authority:

| Sächsische Aufbaubank — Förderbank |
| --- |
| Pirnaische Straße 9 |
| 01069 Dresden |
| DEUTSCHLAND |

Sächsische Aufbaubank — Förderbank

Pirnaische Straße 9

01069 Dresden

DEUTSCHLAND

Website: http://www.sn-pl.eu/media/de/2009-03-25_Umsetzungsdokument_SN-PL_korr.pdf

Other information:

| Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Saxony) |
| --- |
| Referat 56, Verwaltungsbehörde des EU-Programms „Grenzübergreifende Zusammenarbeit“ (Section 56, administrative authority for EU programme on cross-border cooperation) |
| Wilhelm-Buck-Straße 2 |
| 01097 Dresden |
| DEUTSCHLAND |

Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Saxony)

Referat 56, Verwaltungsbehörde des EU-Programms „Grenzübergreifende Zusammenarbeit“ (Section 56, administrative authority for EU programme on cross-border cooperation)

Wilhelm-Buck-Straße 2

01097 Dresden

DEUTSCHLAND

Thomas TREPMANN

Referatsleiter (Head of Sector)

Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Umwelt und Landwirtschaft (Ministry for the Environment and Agriculture of Saxony)

---

V Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY

Commission

| 11.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 188/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/22

---

Communication from the French Government concerning Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons (1)

(Notice regarding an application for a licence to prospect for oil and gas, designated the ‘Permis de Chéroy’)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 188/09

On 4 March 2009 Lundin International, a company with its registered office at Maclaunay, 51210 Montmirail, France, applied for a five-year licence, designated the ‘Permis de Chéroy’, to prospect for oil and gas in an area of approximately 871 km2 covering part of the departments of Seine-et-Marne, Loiret and Yonne.

The perimeter of the area covered by this licence is made up of the meridian and parallel arcs successively joining the points defined below by their geographical coordinates in grads (NTF (Nouvelle Triangulation de la France), Paris meridian):

| Points | Longitude | Latitude |
| --- | --- | --- |
| A | 0,60 gr E | 53,80 gr N |
| B | 0,90 gr E | 53,80 gr N |
| C | 0,90 gr E | 53,40 gr N |
| D | 0,60 gr E | 53,40 gr N |
| E | 0,60 gr E | 53,50 gr N |
| F | 0,50 gr E | 53,50 gr N |
| G | 0,50 gr E | 53,60 gr N |
| H | 0,60 gr E | 53,60 gr N |

Points

Longitude

Latitude

A

0,60 gr E

53,80 gr N

B

0,90 gr E

53,80 gr N

C

0,90 gr E

53,40 gr N

D

0,60 gr E

53,40 gr N

E

0,60 gr E

53,50 gr N

F

0,50 gr E

53,50 gr N

G

0,50 gr E

53,60 gr N

H

0,60 gr E

53,60 gr N

Submission of applications and criteria for awarding rights

The initial applicants and competing applicants must meet the requirements specified in Articles 4 and 5 of Decree No 2006-648 of 2 June 2006 on mining rights and underground storage rights (Journal officiel de la République française, 3 June 2006).

Interested companies may, within ninety days of the publication of this notice, submit a competing application in accordance with the procedure summarised in the ‘Notice regarding the granting of mining rights for hydrocarbons in France’, published in
  Official Journal of the European Communities C 374 of 30 December 1994, p. 11, and established by Decree No 2006-648 on mining rights and underground storage rights. Competing applications must be sent to the Minister responsible for mines at the address below.

The decisions on the initial application and the competing applications will be based on the criteria governing the award of mining rights, as set out in Article 6 of the abovementioned Decree, and will be taken by 25 March 2011 at the latest.

Conditions and requirements regarding performance of the activity and cessation thereof

Applicants are referred to Articles 79 and 79.1 of the Mining Code and to Decree No 2006-649 of 2 June 2006 on mining and underground storage operations and the regulations governing mining and underground storage (Journal officiel de la République française, 3 June 2006).

Further information can be obtained from the following address: Ministère de l'écologie, de l'énergie, du développement durable et de l'aménagement du territoire (Direction générale de l'énergie et climat, Direction de l'énergie, Sous-direction de la sécurité d'approvisionnement et des nouveaux produits énergétiques bureau exploration production des hydrocarbures), Arche de La Défense, 92055 La Défense Cedex (tel. +33 140819537, fax +33 140819529).

The abovementioned laws and regulations can be consulted at: Légifrance http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr

---

(1)  OJ L 164, 30.6.1994, p. 3.

---

| 11.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 188/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/24

---

Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of sodium gluconate originating in the People's Republic of China

2009/C 188/10

The Commission has received a complaint pursuant to Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), alleging that imports of sodium gluconate, originating in the People's Republic of China (‘the country concerned’), are being dumped and are thereby causing material injury to the Community industry.

1.   Complaint

The complaint was lodged on 30 June 2009 by the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) (‘the complainant’) on behalf of producers representing a major proportion, in this case more than 50 %, of the total Community production of sodium gluconate.

2.   Product

The product allegedly being dumped is dry sodium gluconate with a Customs Union and Statistics (CUS) number 0023277-9 originating in the People's Republic of China (‘the product concerned’), currently falling within CN code ex 2918 16 00. This CN code is given only for information.

3.   Allegation of dumping

In view of the provisions of Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation, the complainant established normal value for the People's Republic of China on the basis of the price in a market economy country, which is mentioned in point 5.1(d). The allegation of dumping is based on a comparison of normal value, thus calculated, with the export prices of the product concerned when sold for export to the Community.

On this basis, the dumping margin calculated is significant.

4.   Allegation of injury

The complainant has provided prima facie evidence that imports of the product concerned from the People's Republic of China have increased overall in absolute terms and in terms of market share.

It is alleged that the volumes and the prices of the imported product concerned have, among other consequences, had a negative impact on the market share held, the quantities sold and the level of prices charged by the Community industry, resulting in substantial adverse effects on the overall performance and in particular on the financial situation of the Community industry.

5.   Procedure

Having determined, after consulting the Advisory Committee, that the complaint has been lodged by or on behalf of the Community industry and that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of a proceeding, the Commission hereby initiates an investigation pursuant to Article 5 of the basic Regulation.

5.1.   
  Procedure for the determination of dumping and injury

The investigation will determine whether the product concerned originating in the People's Republic of China is being dumped and whether this dumping has caused injury.

(a)   Sampling

In view of the apparent large number of parties involved in this proceeding, the Commission may decide to apply sampling in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

(i)   Sampling for exporters/producers in the People's Republic of China

In order to enable the Commission to decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, all exporters/producers, or representatives acting on their behalf, are hereby requested to make themselves known by contacting the Commission and providing the following information on their company or companies within the time limit set in point 6(b)(i) and in the format indicated in point 7:

| — | name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers and contact person, |
| --- | --- |

—

name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers and contact person,

| — | the turnover in local currency and the volume in metric tonnes of the product concerned sold for export to the Community during the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 for each of the 27 Member States separately and in total, |
| --- | --- |

—

the turnover in local currency and the volume in metric tonnes of the product concerned sold for export to the Community during the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 for each of the 27 Member States separately and in total,

| — | the turnover in local currency and the volume in metric tonnes of the product concerned sold on the domestic market during the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009, |
| --- | --- |

—

the turnover in local currency and the volume in metric tonnes of the product concerned sold on the domestic market during the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009,

| — | the precise activities of the company worldwide with regard to the production of the product concerned, |
| --- | --- |

—

the precise activities of the company worldwide with regard to the production of the product concerned,

| — | the names and the precise activities of all related companies (2) involved in the production and/or selling (export and/or domestic) of the product concerned, |
| --- | --- |

—

the names and the precise activities of all related companies (2) involved in the production and/or selling (export and/or domestic) of the product concerned,

| — | any other relevant information that would assist the Commission in the selection of the sample. |
| --- | --- |

—

any other relevant information that would assist the Commission in the selection of the sample.

By providing the above information, the company agrees to its possible inclusion in the sample. If the company is chosen to be part of the sample, this will imply replying to a questionnaire and accepting an on-the-spot investigation of its response. If the company indicates that it does not agree to its possible inclusion in the sample, it will be deemed to not have cooperated in the investigation. The consequences of non-cooperation are set out in point 8 below.

In order to obtain the information it deems necessary for the selection of the sample of exporters/producers, the Commission will, in addition, contact the authorities of the exporting country, and any known associations of exporters/producers.

Since a company cannot be certain that it will be selected in the sample, exporters/producers that wish to claim an individual margin pursuant to Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation are advised to request a questionnaire and the market economy treatment and/or individual treatment (MET/IT) claim form within the deadline foreseen in point 6(a)(i) of this notice, and file these within the deadlines specified in point 6(a)(ii) first paragraph and 6(d) respectively of this notice. However, attention is drawn to the last sentence of point 5.1(b) of this notice.

(ii)   Sampling for importers

In order to enable the Commission to decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, all importers, or representatives acting on their behalf, are hereby requested to make themselves known to the Commission and to provide the following information on their company or companies within the time limit set in point 6(b)(i) and in the formats indicated in point 7:

| — | name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers and contact person, |
| --- | --- |

—

name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers and contact person,

| — | the total turnover in euro of the company during the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009, |
| --- | --- |

—

the total turnover in euro of the company during the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009,

| — | the total number of employees, |
| --- | --- |

—

the total number of employees,

| — | the precise activities of the company with regard to the product concerned, |
| --- | --- |

—

the precise activities of the company with regard to the product concerned,

| — | the volume in metric tonnes and value in euro of imports into and re-sales made in the Community market during the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 of the imported product concerned originating in the People's Republic of China, |
| --- | --- |

—

the volume in metric tonnes and value in euro of imports into and re-sales made in the Community market during the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 of the imported product concerned originating in the People's Republic of China,

| — | the names and the precise activities of all related companies (3) involved in the production and/or selling of the product concerned, |
| --- | --- |

—

the names and the precise activities of all related companies (3) involved in the production and/or selling of the product concerned,

| — | any other relevant information that would assist the Commission in the selection of the sample. |
| --- | --- |

—

any other relevant information that would assist the Commission in the selection of the sample.

By providing the above information, the company agrees to its possible inclusion in the sample. If the company is chosen to be part of the sample, this will imply replying to a questionnaire and accepting an on-the-spot investigation of its response. If the company indicates that it does not agree to its possible inclusion or inclusion in the sample, it will be deemed to not have cooperated in the investigation. The consequences of non-cooperation are set out in point 8 below.

In order to obtain the information it deems necessary for the selection of the sample of importers, the Commission will, in addition, contact any known associations of importers.

(iii)   Final selection of the samples

All interested parties wishing to submit any relevant information regarding the selection of the sample must do so within the time limit set in point 6(b)(ii).

The Commission intends to make the final selection of the samples after having consulted the parties concerned that have expressed their willingness to be included in the sample.

Companies included in the samples must reply to a questionnaire within the time limit set in point 6(b)(iii) and must cooperate within the framework of the investigation.

If sufficient cooperation is not forthcoming, the Commission may base its findings, in accordance with Articles 17(4) and 18 of the basic Regulation, on the facts available. A finding based on facts available may be less advantageous to the party concerned, as explained in point 8.

(b)   Questionnaires

In order to obtain the information it deems necessary for its investigation, the Commission will send questionnaires to the Community industry and to any association of producers in the Community, to the sampled exporters/producers in the People's Republic of China, to any known association of exporters/producers, to the sampled importers, to any known association of importers, and to the authorities of the exporting country concerned.

Exporters/producers in the People's Republic of China claiming an individual margin, with a view to the application of Articles 17(3) and 9(6) of the basic Regulation, must submit a completed questionnaire within the time limit set in point 6(a)(ii) of this notice. They therefore have to request a questionnaire within the time limit set in point 6(a)(i). However, such parties should be aware that if sampling is applied to exporters/producers, the Commission may nonetheless decide not to calculate an individual margin for them, if the number of exporters/producers is so large that individual examination would be unduly burdensome and would prevent the timely completion of the investigation.

(c)   Collection of information and holding of hearings

All interested parties are hereby invited to make their views known, submit information other than questionnaire replies and to provide supporting evidence. This information and supporting evidence has to reach the Commission within the time limit set in point 6(a)(ii).

Furthermore, the Commission may hear interested parties, provided that they make a request showing that there are particular reasons why they should be heard. This request must be made within the time limit set in point 6(a)(iii).

(d)   Selection of the market economy country

In accordance with Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation, it is envisaged to choose the United States of America as an appropriate market economy country for the purpose of establishing normal value in respect of the People's Republic of China. Interested parties are hereby invited to comment on the appropriateness of this choice within the specific time limit set in point 6(c).

(e)   Market economy treatment and individual treatment claims

For those exporters/producers in the People's Republic of China who claim and provide sufficient evidence that they operate under market economy conditions, i.e. that they meet the criteria laid down in Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation, normal value will be determined in accordance with Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation. Exporters/producers intending to submit duly substantiated claims must do so within the specific time limit set in point 6(d). The Commission will send claim forms to all exporters/producers in the People's Republic of China who have either been included in the sample or named in the complaint and to any association of exporters/producers named in the complaint, as well as to the authorities of the People's Republic of China. This claim form may also be used by the applicant to claim individual treatment, i.e. that it meets the criteria laid down in Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation.

5.2.   
  Procedure for the assessment of Community interest

In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation and in the event that the allegations of dumping and injury caused thereby are substantiated, a decision will be reached as to whether the adoption of anti-dumping measures would not be against the Community interest. For this reason the Commission may send questionnaires to the known Community industry, importers, their representative associations, representative users and representative consumer organisations. Such parties, including those not known to the Commission, provided that they prove that there is an objective link between their activity and the product concerned, may, within the general time limits set in point 6(a)(ii), make themselves known and provide the Commission with information. The parties which have acted in conformity with the preceding sentence may request a hearing setting the particular reasons why they should be heard within the time limit set in point 6(a)(iii). It should be noted that any information submitted pursuant to Article 21 of the basic Regulation will only be taken into account if supported by factual evidence at the time of submission.

6.   Time limits

(a)   General time limits

(i)   For parties to request a questionnaire or other claim forms

All interested parties should request a questionnaire or other claim forms as soon as possible, but not later than 10 days after the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(ii)   For parties to make themselves known, to submit questionnaire replies and any other information

All interested parties, if their representations are to be taken into account during the investigation, must make themselves known by contacting the Commission, present their views and submit questionnaire replies or any other information within 40 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, unless otherwise specified. All exporters/producers concerned by this proceeding, who wish to apply for individual examination in accordance with Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation, must also submit a questionnaire reply within 40 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, unless otherwise specified. Attention is drawn to the fact that the exercise of most procedural rights set out in the basic Regulation depends on the party's making itself known within the aforementioned period.

Companies selected in a sample must submit questionnaire replies within the time limit specified in point 6(b)(iii).

(iii)   Hearings

All interested parties may also apply to be heard by the Commission within the same 40-day time limit.

(b)   Specific time limit in respect of sampling

| (i) | The information specified in points 5.1(a)(i) and 5.1(a)(ii) should reach the Commission within 15 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, given that the Commission intends to consult parties concerned that have expressed their willingness to be included in the sample on its final selection within a period of 21 days of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(i)

The information specified in points 5.1(a)(i) and 5.1(a)(ii) should reach the Commission within 15 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, given that the Commission intends to consult parties concerned that have expressed their willingness to be included in the sample on its final selection within a period of 21 days of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

| (ii) | All other information relevant for the selection of the sample as referred to in point 5.1(a)(iii) must reach the Commission within a period of 21 days of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

All other information relevant for the selection of the sample as referred to in point 5.1(a)(iii) must reach the Commission within a period of 21 days of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

| (iii) | The questionnaire replies from sampled parties must reach the Commission within 37 days from the date of the notification of their inclusion in the sample. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

The questionnaire replies from sampled parties must reach the Commission within 37 days from the date of the notification of their inclusion in the sample.

(c)   Specific time limit for the selection of the market economy country

Parties to the investigation may wish to comment on the appropriateness of the United States of America which, as mentioned in point 5.1(d), is envisaged as a market economy country for the purpose of establishing normal value in respect of the People's Republic of China. These comments must reach the Commission within 10 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(d)   Specific time limit for submission of claims for market economy and/or for individual treatment

Duly substantiated claims for market economy treatment (as mentioned in point 5.1(e)) and/or for individual treatment pursuant to Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation, must reach the Commission within 15 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, unless otherwise specified.

7.   Written submissions, questionnaire replies and correspondence

All submissions and requests made by interested parties must be made in writing (not in electronic format, unless otherwise specified) and must indicate the name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers of the interested party. All written submissions, including the information requested in this notice, questionnaire replies and correspondence provided by interested parties on a confidential basis shall be labelled as ‘Limited’ (4) and, in accordance with Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation, shall be accompanied by a non-confidential version, which will be labelled ‘For inspection by interested parties’.

Commission address for correspondence:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Trade |
| Directorate H |
| Office: N105 04/92 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22956505 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Trade

Directorate H

Office: N105 04/92

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22956505

8.   Non-cooperation

In cases in which any interested party refuses access to or does not provide the necessary information within the time limits, or significantly impedes the investigation, findings, affirmative or negative, may be made in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, on the basis of the facts available.

Where it is found that any interested party has supplied false or misleading information, the information shall be disregarded and use may be made, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, of the facts available. If an interested party does not cooperate or cooperates only partially, and use of facts available is made, the result may be less favourable to that party than if it had cooperated.

9.   Schedule of the investigation

The investigation will be concluded, according to Article 6(9) of the basic Regulation within 15 months of the date of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. According to Article 7(1) of the basic Regulation, provisional measures may be imposed no later than 9 months from the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

10.   Processing of personal data

It is noted that any personal data collected in this investigation will be treated in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (5).

11.   Hearing Officer

It is also noted that if interested parties consider that they are encountering difficulties in the exercise of their rights of defence, they may request the intervention of the Hearing Officer of Trade DG. He acts as an interface between the interested parties and the Commission services, offering, where necessary, mediation on procedural matters affecting the protection of their interests in this proceeding, in particular with regard to issues concerning access to file, confidentiality, extension of time limits and the treatment of written and/or oral submission of views. For further information and contact details interested parties may consult the Hearing Officer's web pages of the website of Trade DG (http://ec.europa.eu/trade).

---

(1)  OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, p. 1.

(2)  For guidance on the meaning of related companies, please refer to Article 143 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ L 253, 11.10.1993, p. 1).

(3)  For guidance on the meaning of related companies, please refer to Article 143 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ L 253, 11.10.1993, p. 1).

(4)  This means that the document is for internal use only. It is protected pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43). It is a confidential document pursuant to Article 19 of the basic Regulation and Article 6 of the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-dumping Agreement).

(5)  OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1.

---

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY

Commission

| 11.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 188/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/29

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.5533 — Bertelsmann/KKR/JV)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 188/11

| 1. | On 4 August 2009, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Bertelsmann AG (‘Bertelsmann’, Germany) and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co LP (‘KKR’, United States) acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation joint control of the undertaking Newco by way of purchase of shares in a newly created company constituting a joint venture. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 4 August 2009, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Bertelsmann AG (‘Bertelsmann’, Germany) and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co LP (‘KKR’, United States) acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation joint control of the undertaking Newco by way of purchase of shares in a newly created company constituting a joint venture.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:






  — | for Bertelsmann: international media company active in TV, book and magazine publishing, media services and book and media clubs, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—

for Bertelsmann: international media company active in TV, book and magazine publishing, media services and book and media clubs,

| — | for KKR: private equity investment, |
| --- | --- |

—

for KKR: private equity investment,

| — | for Newco: management and exploitation of recorded music rights and music publishing rights transferred from Bertelsmann (BMG Rights Management business) and to be acquired from Crosstown Songs America LLC. |
| --- | --- |

—

for Newco: management and exploitation of recorded music rights and music publishing rights transferred from Bertelsmann (BMG Rights Management business) and to be acquired from Crosstown Songs America LLC.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301 or 22967244) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.5533 — Bertelsmann/KKR/JV, to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| J-70 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301 or 22967244) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.5533 — Bertelsmann/KKR/JV, to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

J-70

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

OTHER ACTS

Commission

| 11.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 188/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/30

---

Publication of an amendment application pursuant to Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs

2009/C 188/12

This publication confers the right to object to the amendment application pursuant to Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006. Statements of objection must reach the Commission within six months of the date of this publication.

AMENDMENT APPLICATION

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 510/2006

Amendment application according to Article 9

‘PECORINO TOSCANO’

EC No: IT-PDO-0117-0020-09.07.2004

PGI ( ) PDO ( X )

1.   Heading in the specification affected by the amendment:

| — |  | Name of product |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | | Description of product |
| — |  | Geographical area |
| — |  | Proof of origin |
| — | | Method of production |
| — |  | Link |
| — | | Labelling |
| — |  | National requirements |
| — |  | Other (to be specified) |

—



Name of product

—

Image

Description of product

—



Geographical area

—



Proof of origin

—

Image

Method of production

—



Link

—

Image

Labelling

—



National requirements

—



Other (to be specified)

2.   Type of amendment:

| — |  | Amendment to single document or summary sheet |
| --- | --- | --- |
| — | | Amendment to specification of registered PDO or PGI for which neither the single document nor summary sheet has been published |
| — |  | Amendment to specification that requires no amendment to the published single document (Article 9(3) of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006) |
| — |  | Temporary amendment to specification resulting from imposition of obligatory sanitary or phytosanitary measures by the public authorities (Article 9(4) of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006) |

—



Amendment to single document or summary sheet

—

Image

Amendment to specification of registered PDO or PGI for which neither the single document nor summary sheet has been published

—



Amendment to specification that requires no amendment to the published single document (Article 9(3) of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006)

—



Temporary amendment to specification resulting from imposition of obligatory sanitary or phytosanitary measures by the public authorities (Article 9(4) of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006)

3.   Amendment(s):

3.1.   Description:

The characteristics of the finished product are described in greater detail.

3.2.   Method of production:

In particular, it is specified that the whole sheep’s milk intended for the production of Pecorino Toscano may either be raw or undergo thermal treatment, including pasteurisation, and may be inoculated with cultures of natural or selected indigenous milk enzymes.

The minimum maturing period for the cheese is also specified.

3.3.   Labelling:

When marketed for consumption, the heel of Pecorino Toscano PDO cheeses must be marked in ink for soft cheeses and hot-marked for semi-hard cheeses. Pre-packed portions are marked on the packaging, provided this is done in the area of origin.

Pecorino Toscano may be packaged in portions outside the area of origin, but must bear the mark on the heel as placed by the dairy or the maturer. Packers must however enter an agreement with the Protection Association (Consorzio di tutela). The symbol under the logo identifies the cheese producer/maturer/cutter certified by the inspection body placing the ‘Pecorino Toscano’ on the market. The cheeses or cheese portion packages must bear a label, authorised by the Protection Association, with the wording ‘Pecorino Toscano D.O.P.’ or ‘Pecorino Toscano D.O.P. stagionato’ standing out in respect of other wording on the label in terms of size, font and position, with the mark in colour, affixed one or more times and measuring at least 15 mm.

SUMMARY

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 510/2006

‘PECORINO TOSCANO’

EC No: IT-PDO-0117-0020-09.07.2004

PDO ( X ) PGI ( )

This summary sets out the main elements of the product specification for information purposes.

1.   Responsible department in the Member State:

| Name: | Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali |
| --- | --- |
| Address: | Via XX Settembre 20 |
| 00187 Roma RM |
| ITALIA |

Name:

Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali

Address:

Via XX Settembre 20

00187 Roma RM

ITALIA

Tel.

+39 0646655106

Fax

+39 0646655306

E-mail:

saco7@politicheagricole.it

2.   Group:

| Name: | Consorzio per la tutela del Pecorino Toscano D.O.P. |
| --- | --- |
| Address: | Via Goffredo Mameli 17 |
| 58100 Grosseto |
| ITALIA |

Name:

Consorzio per la tutela del Pecorino Toscano D.O.P.

Address:

Via Goffredo Mameli 17

58100 Grosseto

ITALIA

Tel.

+39 0564420038

Fax

+39 0564429504

E-mail:

info@pecorinotoscanodop.it

Composition:

Producers/processors ( X ) Other ( )

3.   Type of product:

| Class 1.3: | Cheeses |
| --- | --- |

Class 1.3:

Cheeses

4.   Specification:

(summary of requirements under Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006)

4.1.   Name:

‘Pecorino Toscano’

4.2.   Description:

Pecorino Toscano is a soft or semi-hard cheese made of whole sheep’s milk coming from the production area. It has a distinctive creamy texture, is matured for a short or long period depending whether it is intended as table cheese or for grating and has a cylindrical shape with flat faces and a slightly convex heel. Its size varies as follows: face diameter between 15 and 22 cm, heel height between 7 and 11 cm, weight between 0,75 and 3,50 kg and fat content in dry matter of no less than 40 % for semi-hard cheeses and no less than 45 % for soft cheeses. The crust is yellow of varying hues up to deep yellow for the soft type. The colour of the crust may depend on the treatments the cheese has undergone. The colour of the body of the cheese is white/light straw-coloured for the soft type and between light straw-coloured and straw-coloured for the semi-hard type. The latter type has a compact consistency and is firm when cut, possibly with unevenly distributed small holes. The strong, fragrant flavour is typical of the special production processes used. The minimum maturing period is 20 days for soft cheese and no less than four months for the semi-hard type.

4.3.   Geographical area:

The production area of Pecorino Toscano comprises the whole of the Region of Tuscany, the whole of the adjacent municipalities of Allerona and Castiglione del Lago, in the Region of Umbria, and the whole of the municipalities of Acquapendente, Onano, San Lorenzo Nuovo, Grotte di Castro, Gradoli, Valentano, Farnese, Ischia di Castro, Montefiascone, Bolsena and Capodimonte in the Region of Lazio.

4.4.   Proof of origin:

Each phase of the production process must be monitored, listing all inputs and outputs. Product traceability is ensured by this, by compiling specific registers managed by the inspection body of livestock farmers, collection centres, producers/maturers, dairies, packagers and cutters, by keeping production and packaging registers and by notification to the inspection body of the quantities produced. Furthermore, the quantity of milk produced and the sheep from which the milk comes must undergo checks. The registers of the sheep raised, indicating the total number of animals on the farm, must be always up to date. A milk production/unloading register regarding the quantity of milk produced must also be kept. In dairies, the storage tanks must be identified, the milk suitable for producing Pecorino Toscano must be kept separate from other milk and milk storage and handling operations must be recorded. A Pecorino Toscano production register must also be kept. All natural and legal persons recorded in the lists are subject to checks by the inspection body, according to the terms of the production specification and the corresponding inspection plan.

4.5.   Method of production:

Pecorino Toscano must be produced only with whole sheep’s milk from the production area. Sheep must mainly be fed with green or dried fodder from local natural pastures, possibly supplemented with hay and concentrated straight feedingstuffs. The milk must be coagulated at a temperature of between 33 and 38 °C, using calf rennet to obtain coagulation over 20-25 minutes. The milk may either be used raw or undergo thermal treatment, including pasteurisation, and may be inoculated with cultures of natural or selected indigenous milk enzymes. During processing, the curd is broken up until the lumps are the size of a hazelnut for soft cheese and a grain of maize for semi-hard cheese. For preparing the latter, the curd may also undergo thermal treatment (cooked) at 40-42 °C for 10-15 minutes. After breaking-up and cooking, if any, the curd is placed in appropriate moulds for draining. Draining is carried out by manual pressing or steaming. The cheeses are immersed in sodium chloride brine at 17 to 19 %, i.e. 15 to 17° Baumé. For each kg of weight, the cheeses must remain in the brine for at least 8 hours for soft cheese and at least 12-14 hours for semi-hard cheese. Curing may also be carried out by directly adding salt. The cheese may be treated externally with an anti-mould product and must mature in suitable rooms at a temperature of 5 to 12 °C with a relative humidity of 75-90 %. The minimum maturing period is 20 days for soft cheese and no less than four months for the semi-hard type.

The area of origin of the milk and of the production and maturing of Pecorino Toscano is the production area specified in point 4.3.

4.6.   Link:

This cheese of ancient origin, whose existence in Etruscan times is the object of extensive historical evidence, has spread over the centuries in the ‘Maremma’ area, most of which lies in Tuscany. Traditionally, the product was designated by names referring to its geographical origin or by the more general term of ‘toscano’ (Tuscan). Over time, given its largely common features, a single production standard and a designation related in etymological terms to its historical and geographical characteristics were established. As regards natural factors, note should be taken of the special characteristics of the areas used for sheep farming, including the farming of animals living freely in the wild, using natural pastures rich in wild plants giving the milk used for cheese making distinctive qualities. As regards human factors, beside their historically proven economic importance, the farms involved play an important social role by using ‘marginal’ land, which would otherwise be progressively abandoned with the subsequent impoverishment of natural resources.

4.7.   Inspection body:

| Name: | Certiprodop S.r.l. |
| --- | --- |
| Address: | Via Roggia Vignola 9 |
| 24047 Treviglio (BG) |
| ITALIA |

Name:

Certiprodop S.r.l.

Address:

Via Roggia Vignola 9

24047 Treviglio (BG)

ITALIA

Tel.

+39 0363301014

Fax

+39 0363301014

E-mail:

certiprodop@virgilio.it

4.8.   Labelling:

Products for sale are marked with the designation of origin. The heel is marked in ink for soft cheeses and hot-marked for semi-hard cheese. Pre-packed portions are marked on the packaging, provided this is done in the area of origin. The Pecorino Toscano may be packaged in portions outside the area of origin, but must bear the mark on the heel as placed by the dairy or the maturer. Packers must however enter an agreement with the Protection Association (Consorzio di tutela). The symbol under the logo identifies the cheese producer/maturer/cutter certified by the inspection body placing the ‘Pecorino Toscano’ on the market. The cheeses or cheese portion packages must bear a label, authorised by the Protection Association, with the wording ‘Pecorino Toscano D.O.P.’ or ‘Pecorino Toscano D.O.P. stagionato’ standing out in respect of other wording on the label in terms of size, font and position, with the mark in colour, affixed one or more times and measuring at least 15 mm.

Mark to be affixed on the whole cheeses or on the portion packaging:

Image

The first digit indicates the body releasing the cheese for consumption: 1 to 3: dairies; 4 to 6: maturers; 7 to 9: cutters located in the area.

The second and third digits identify the number of the dairy/maturer/cutter whose product has been checked by the inspection body.

Mark to be affixed on the labels:

Image

It may be bright green, white and bright red or of one colour only.

---

| 11.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 188/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/35

---

Publication of an application pursuant to Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs

2009/C 188/13

This publication confers the right to object to the application pursuant to Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006. Statements must reach the Commission within six months of the date of this publication.

SUMMARY

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 510/2006

‘PROSCIUTTO DI SAURIS’

EC No: IT-PGI-0005-0512-07.12.2005

PDO ( ) PGI ( X )

This summary sets out the main elements of the product specification for information purposes.

1.   Responsible department in the Member State:

| Name: | Ministero Delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali |
| --- | --- |
| Address: | Via XX Settembre 20 |
| 00187 Roma RM |
| ITALIA |

Name:

Ministero Delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali

Address:

Via XX Settembre 20

00187 Roma RM

ITALIA

Tel.

+39 0646655106

Fax

+39 0646655306

E-mail:

saco7@politicheagricole.gov.it

2.   Group:

| Name: | Associazione Temporanea tra Imprese per la presentazione della richiesta e l’ottenimento del riconoscimento delle I.G.P. «Speck e Prosciutto di Sauris» |
| --- | --- |
| Address: | Sauris di Sotto 88 — I |
| 33020 Sauris UD |
| ITALIA |

Name:

Associazione Temporanea tra Imprese per la presentazione della richiesta e l’ottenimento del riconoscimento delle I.G.P. «Speck e Prosciutto di Sauris»

Address:

Sauris di Sotto 88 — I

33020 Sauris UD

ITALIA

Tel.

+39 043386054

Fax

+39 043386149

E-mail:

claudio.p@wolfsauris.it

Composition:

Producers/processors ( X ) Other ( )

3.   Type of product:

| Class 1.2: | Meat products |
| --- | --- |

Class 1.2:

Meat products

4.   Specification:

(summary of requirements under Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006)

4.1.   Name:

‘Prosciutto di Sauris’

4.2.   Description:

Prosciutto di Sauris PGI is a smoked and salted raw ham that has been aged for a minimum of 10 months. After aging, it is presented whole, bone-in and without the hoof. The skin is of an even golden walnut colour tinged with orange. The visible lean meat is dark red in colour. The texture is firm but springy, including where the meat is cut vertically. A whole, bone-in Prosciutto di Sauris PGI ham weighs 7,5 kg or more and, when cut, reveals a red or pink colour, that of the lean meat. The fat has a brilliant white or pinkish-white colour. The scent is delicate and the flavour sweet, with a pleasant tinge of smokiness. When released for consumption the ham has the following physical and chemical characteristics: moisture less than 64 %; salt (chlorides)/moisture: more than 7,2 but less than 11,2, based on the percentage composition; protein: more than 24 % but less than 30 %. These characteristics were laid down on the basis of objective parameters measured in 2001-2005 by Sincert-approved laboratories, with checks being carried out quarterly (a total of 120 tests). The following methods were used for the tests:

| — | protein (N x 6.25), UM: g/100 g, ISO 937:1991 method, |
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protein (N x 6.25), UM: g/100 g, ISO 937:1991 method,

| — | sodium chloride, UM: g/100 g, AOAC 935.47 ed. 17th 2003 method, |
| --- | --- |

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sodium chloride, UM: g/100 g, AOAC 935.47 ed. 17th 2003 method,

| — | dry matter, UM: g/100 g, ISO 1442:1997 method. |
| --- | --- |

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dry matter, UM: g/100 g, ISO 1442:1997 method.

4.3.   Geographical area:

Consists of the municipality of Sauris in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region.

4.4.   Proof of origin:

The production process must be monitored throughout, recording both inputs (products entering the establishment) and outputs (products leaving the premises). Together with the registers of farmers, slaughterers, cutters, processors, packers and slicers kept by the inspection body, and the prompt declaration, to the latter, of the quantities produced, this allows full traceability of the product throughout the production chain. All natural or legal persons whose names appear on the registers are subject to checks by the inspection body in accordance with the specification and the relevant control plan.

4.5.   Method of production:

The raw material used in the production of the PGI must come from: traditional Large White Italiana and Landrace Italiana breeds, as improved in accordance with the Italian Breed Book, or male offspring of boars of those breeds; male offspring of boars of the Duroc Italian breed, as improved in accordance with the Italian Breed Book; male offspring of boars of other breeds or hybrid boars, provided they are the result of selection plans or crosses whose aims are not incompatible with those of the Italian Breed Book for heavy pigs. Slaughter takes place from the ninth month but no later than the 15th month following birth. The carcases of the slaughtered animals must be classed as heavy in accordance with Regulation (EEC) No 3220/84 and Commission Decision 2001/468/EC of 8 June 2001 and, by and large, be ranked within the central classes under the official system for evaluating meatiness.

Each leg must weigh more than 11 kg and must be subjected to the production process within one day of delivery. Salting takes place in three stages and must end within 21 days of the process commencing. Smoking is carried out in special premises, with the smoke — produced by beechwood-fired external stoves — channelled to enter through the floor. The smoking process as a whole lasts 72 hours. The temperature inside the smoking chamber ranges from 15 to 20 °C and the relative humidity is between 50 and 90 %. After drying, the hams are placed in aging chambers fitted with windows in order to ensure both that they are ventilated naturally and that the air is renewed. Aging takes place at a temperature of 16 to 22 °C and with a relative level of humidity of 50 to 90 %. While the aging is in progress a paste consisting of 60-80 % pig fat, up to 25 % cereal meal, 1 % salt and 1-30 % pepper is spread over the cracks in the hams. After this process, known as stuccatura, the hams are aged for a minimum of 10 months, calculated by adding 10 equal periods of 30 days to the day on which salting began.

A whole bone-in Prosciutto di Sauris PGI must weigh 7,5 kg or more. It may be marketed whole, bone-in, boneless or boneless cut and sliced and pre-packed. If it is marketed boneless or cut, it must be vacuum-packed. If it is marketed sliced and pre-packed it must be vacuum-packed or in a modified-atmosphere packaging. The boning, cutting, slicing and packing of Prosciutto di Sauris PGI must take place on premises located within the area defined at 4.3 in order to guarantee the consumer a product which conforms to the special characteristics of Prosciutto di Sauris, in particular with regard to the flavour and typical smoky smell of the latter.

4.6.   Link:

The distinctive characteristics of Prosciutto di Sauris are closely linked to the area of production, in particular the microclimate in the Sauris Valley, and the traditional way in which pork is smoked. The Valley runs from east to west, is shaped like a bowl and enjoys lower levels of rainfall than do the remaining Carnic and Julian Alps. Its location — more than 1 000 metres above sea level — and the air currents originating in the valley bottom and the surrounding mountains result in constant and seldom fierce winds which, thanks in particular to the presence of a reservoir, take the form of gentle breezes which blow uphill during the day and downhill at night and help to dehydrate the sausages as part of the curing process. In the course of the latter, aided both by biochemical processes linked to endogenous enzymes and the salt, microscopic flora (more especially moulds, whose spores are present naturally in the curing chambers) develop on the surface of the ham and give the product its special organoleptic characteristics. The product's characteristic sweetness can be ascribed to the cool air from the upper Lumiei Valley which is allowed to enter the curing chambers, to having the right quantities of salt present, and to the lack of oxidation of the covering fat. It is in this sense that the production of Prosciutto di Sauris is closely linked to the environmental (i.e. climatic) and biological characteristics of the area. To this unique environment is added the age-old local know-how in terms of the salt-curing and smoke-curing of meat. Smoking, a technique brought to the area by the earliest settlers, imparts special sensory characteristics to the product, in particular with regard to its colour and, above all, its smell and flavour. Now, as in the past, locally grown beechwood is used, the smoke giving the product a soft and delicate aroma which is characteristic of the PGI. Moreover the local population's skill in combining the practice of smoking — a Germanic tradition — and the more usual subalpine tradition of salting, helps to give Prosciutto di Sauris its special organoleptic characteristics, in particular its pleasant smoky smell and flavour.

4.7.   Inspection body:

The inspection body complies with Standard EN 45011.

| Name: | Istituto Nord Est Qualità — I.N.E.Q. |
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| Address: | Via Nazionale 33/35 |
| 33030 Villanova di San Daniele del Friuli UD |
| ITALIA |

Name:

Istituto Nord Est Qualità — I.N.E.Q.

Address:

Via Nazionale 33/35

33030 Villanova di San Daniele del Friuli UD

ITALIA

Tel.

+39 0432956951

Fax

+39 0647822439

E-mail:

info@ineq.it

4.8.   Labelling:

Each ham must be stamped — using indelible ink — or hot-branded to show both the date, month (in Roman numerals) and year when processing began and the slaughterhouse of origin. The Protected Geographical Indication ‘Prosciutto di Sauris’ must appear, in Italian, in clear and indelible characters readily distinguishable from any other writing on the label, followed, immediately afterwards, by the words ‘Indicazione geografica protetta’ and/or the abbreviation IGP. Indications may be used which refer to privately owned brands or names, provided they are not laudatory or are such as to mislead the consumer. The PGI logo must be reproduced on the labels, packaging and any additional graphic material.

The PGI logo consists of a green-edged dark blue oval. Within the latter, surmounted by the outline of a white mountain and two green firs, the word ‘Sauris’ is written in yellow with, below it, two sky blue wavelets.

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