COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Overton and Senior Judge Baker 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

RANDY M. KING 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2619-97-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 DECEMBER 8, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

Von L. Piersall, Jr., Judge 

 (LeeAnn Bierowicz, Assistant Public Defender, 

on brief), for appellant. Appellant 

submitting on brief. 

 Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Randy M. King (defendant) was convicted by a jury for 

operating a motor vehicle after being adjudged an habitual 

offender, a second offense. On appeal, defendant complains that 

the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence his 

inculpatory statement to police. We disagree and affirm the 

conviction. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to 

disposition of the appeal. 

 Upon review from a trial court's denial of a motion to 

suppress, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prevailing party, granting to it all reasonable inferences 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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fairly deducible therefrom. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. 

App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). 

 The record discloses that a vehicle operated by defendant 

collided with one driven by Molly Baines. Immediately following 

the accident, Baines approached the car occupied by defendant and 

found him "lying in the street." Defendant "apologized" and 

explained that he was experiencing "chest pains and . . . trying 

to get to the emergency room" of a nearby hospital. Portsmouth 

Police Officer Patrick Hudgens arrived at the scene shortly 

thereafter, an ambulance was summoned, and defendant was 

transported to the hospital. Both Baines and Hudgens detected an 

odor of alcohol about defendant and noted his "bloodshot eyes." 

 Pursuing his investigation of the accident, Officer Hudgens 

followed defendant to the hospital and, en route, ascertained 

through a "DMV check" that he had been adjudicated an habitual 

offender. While in the emergency room, Hudgens was allowed 

access to defendant, then still "behind a white curtain," and 

inquired "why [defendant] was operating the vehicle on a revoked 

license." Defendant responded "that he was only driving because 

he thought he was having a heart attack and he needed to get to 

the hospital." Defendant was released from the hospital after 

"about an hour." 

 In a pretrial motion and, again, during trial, defendant 

moved the court to suppress his statement, contending that it was 

the product of a custodial interrogation unattended by the 
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requisite Miranda warnings, and, therefore, inadmissible into 

evidence. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The 

trial court, however, denied the motions, and the instant 

conviction and appeal followed. 

 It is well established that the safeguards of Miranda

pertain only to "custodial interrogation." See Pruett v. 

Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 271, 351 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1986), cert. 

denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987). In determining whether a suspect is 

"in custody" for Miranda purposes, "'the ultimate inquiry is 

simply whether there is a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom 

of movement" of the degree associated with formal arrest.'" 

Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 554, 564, 500 S.E.2d 257, 262 

(1998) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) 

(citation omitted)). Resolution of this issue "presents a mixed 

question of law and fact qualifying for independent review" on 

appeal. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102 (1995). However, 

"[w]e review the trial court's findings of historical fact only 

for 'clear error.'" Quinn v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 702, 712, 

492 S.E.2d 470, 475 (1997) (citations omitted). To prevail, 

defendant must "show that the trial court's decision constituted 

reversible error." Id. (citation omitted). 

 Here, the statement in issue was prompted by a single 

question, posed by one police officer to an unrestrained 

defendant, in a neutral hospital setting, incidental to the 

routine investigation of a traffic accident. Clearly, such 
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circumstances did not create the "'sort of coercive environment 

to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which 

it is limited.'"1 Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 605, 450 

S.E.2d 124, 129 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1053 (1995) 

(quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)); see

Bottenfield v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 316, 329, 487 S.E.2d 

883, 889 (1997) (citation omitted) ("Miranda does not apply to a 

police officer's general questioning in the course of the 

fact-finding process."). 

 Accordingly, the trial court properly admitted the statement 

into evidence, and we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.

 

 1 "Any interview of one suspected of a crime by 

a police officer will have coercive aspects 

to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the 

police officer is part of a law enforcement 

system which may ultimately cause the suspect 

to be charged with a crime. But police 

officers are not requested to administer 

Miranda warnings to everyone whom they 

question. Nor is the requirement of warnings 

to be imposed simply . . . because the 

questioned person is one whom the police 

suspect. Miranda warnings are required only 

where there has been such a restriction on a 

person's freedom as to render him 'in 

custody.'" 

Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 604-05, 450 S.E.2d 124, 129 

(1994) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).