NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

PAUL ANTHONY ROBLEDO, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0379 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2009-110121-001

The Honorable Phemonia L. Miller, Judge Pro Tempore

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix

By Diane Meloche

Counsel for Respondent

Paul Anthony Robledo, Buckeye

Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the court, in 

which Judge Patricia K. Norris and Chief Judge Michael J. Brown joined. 
STATE v. ROBLEDO

Decision of the Court

2

J O H N S E N, Judge: 

¶1 Paul Anthony Robledo petitions this court for review of the 

dismissal of his fourth petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR") filed 

pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. We have considered 

the petition for review and, for the reasons stated, grant review, but deny 

relief.

¶2 In January 2010, Robledo pled guilty to attempted first-degree 

murder, a Class 2 dangerous felony and domestic violence offense. The 

superior court found four aggravating factors as alleged by the State, 

determined those factors outweighed any mitigating factors, and imposed 

the maximum 21-year prison sentence. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 13-

704(A) (2017).

1

¶3 This court dismissed as untimely Robledo's petition for 

review from his first Rule 32 proceeding, in which he asserted a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel and challenged the lawfulness of his 

sentence under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). In 2013, Robledo 

filed a second notice of PCR, again raising claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel, asserting that under a significant change in the law, he was 

entitled to effective assistance of counsel in the plea bargain process. The 

superior court summarily dismissed the notice, and this court granted 

review, but denied relief. State v. Robledo, 1 CA-CR 13-0615, 2015 WL 503217 

(Ariz. App. Feb. 5, 2015) (mem. decision). In a third PCR, Robledo again 

sought relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and the 

purported unlawfulness of his sentence under Blakely. State v. Robledo, 2 

CA-CR 2015-0194, 2015 WL 4040775, at *1, ¶ 2 (Ariz. App. July 1, 2015)

(mem. decision). According to Robledo, he also had recently discovered 

that he suffered from a mental illness that had caused him to commit the 

crime. The superior court summarily dismissed the petition, and this court 

granted review, but denied relief. Id. at ¶ 3.

¶4 Robledo then filed a fourth notice and petition for PCR. 

Robledo raised claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(e), (g) and (h), arguing newly 

discovered facts exist that probably would have changed the verdict or 

sentence, there has been a significant change in the law that would probably 

overturn his sentence, and actual innocence. All his claims were based 

either on (1) his assertion that, as he argued in previous Rule 32 

proceedings, his sentence was illegal because a judge, not a jury, found 

 

1 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite 

a statute's current version.
STATE v. ROBLEDO

Decision of the Court

3

aggravating factors, or (2) pursuant to a 1974 Arizona Supreme Court 

opinion he "just learned of," his conviction was unlawful because Arizona 

does not recognize the offense of attempted first-degree murder. See State 

v. Durgin, 110 Ariz. 250, 252 (1974) ("There is no crime of attempted first 

degree murder in Arizona, and when a person is charged with attempted 

murder it is construed as attempted murder in the second degree."). The 

superior court dismissed the notice and denied the petition.

¶5 On review, Robledo argues the superior court erroneously 

failed to consider his Rule 32 petition or the attachments thereto. Without 

deciding the merits of that assertion, we will affirm the court's ruling if it is 

correct for any reason. State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464 (1984); State v. Cantu, 

116 Ariz. 356, 358 (App. 1977).2

¶6 Robledo argues he is entitled to Rule 32 relief because he "did 

not discover the ruling in State v. Durgin until December of 2014." We reject 

this argument for two reasons. First, Durgin was decided in 1974 and 

Robledo was sentenced in 2010; thus, that case does not constitute a 

significant change in the law entitling Robledo to relief. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.1(e), (g).

¶7 Second, Robledo's reliance on Durgin is misplaced. At the 

time Durgin was decided, Arizona's statutory scheme relating to sentencing 

for "attempt" convictions permitted punishment "by a term not exceeding 

one-half of the longest term of the imprisonment prescribed upon 

conviction for the offense so attempted." State v. Williams, 103 Ariz. 284, 284

(1968). A sentence for the completed crime of first-degree murder could be 

life in prison; therefore, Arizona's appellate courts determined that, for 

sentencing purposes, attempted first-degree murder "is not a crime . . . 

because the sentencing statute covering it has impossible limits as to both 

minimum and maximum sentences." State v. Lenahan, 12 Ariz. App. 446, 

449-50 (App. 1970). As a result, a conviction of attempted first-degree was 

"construed as attempted murder in the second degree." Durgin, 110 Ariz. 

at 252; accord Lenahan, 12 Ariz. App. at 450.

¶8 Long ago, however, the legislature amended the sentencing 

provision at issue in Durgin. Now, and at the time Robledo was sentenced, 

an attempt conviction subjects a defendant to a definitive range of years of 

 

2 "We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a petition for postconviction relief absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Swoopes, 216 

Ariz. 390, 393, ¶ 4 (App. 2007).
STATE v. ROBLEDO

Decision of the Court

4

incarceration. See A.R.S. §§ 13-704(A), -1001(C)(1) (2017). Since those 

amendments, Arizona's appellate courts have recognized the lawfulness of 

the offense of attempted first-degree murder. State v. Rossi, 146 Ariz. 359, 

369 (1985) (after completing fundamental error review, affirming 

conviction for attempted first-degree murder); State v. Nunez, 159 Ariz. 594, 

597 (App. 1989) ("[A]ttempted first degree murder can be knowingly 

committed and, as such, is an offense in Arizona."); see also State v. Emery, 

141 Ariz. 549, 553 (1984) (implicitly recognizing as a general matter that

attempted first-degree murder is an offense in Arizona).

¶9 Next, without presenting any argument or explanation, 

Robledo, as he did in superior court, contends Alleyne v. United States, 133 

S. Ct. 2151 (2013), "is a significant change in the law," apparently suggesting 

that case requires him to be resentenced after a jury trial on the aggravating 

factors alleged by the State. This summary assertion is insufficient. See State 

v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 452, ¶ 101, n.9 (2004) ("Merely mentioning an

argument is not enough . . . ."). To the extent Robledo continues to argue 

he was entitled to a jury trial on the aggravating factors alleged by the State, 

Robledo expressly waived his right to a jury trial on aggravating factors

when he pled guilty. Robledo offers no authority supporting the 

proposition that an express waiver by a pleading defendant is lawfully 

invalid.

¶10 The superior court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 

Robledo's fourth notice and petition for PCR. Accordingly, we grant 

review, but deny relief.