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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

May 16, 2017 

v No. 332956 

Luce Circuit Court 

KAY MARGARET OBERLE, LC No. 15-001257-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and MURRAY and GLEICHER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of conspiracy to operate or maintain a 

methamphetamine laboratory, MCL 333.7401c(2)(f), MCL 750.157a; operating or maintaining a 

methamphetamine laboratory, MCL 333.7401c(2)(f); owning a building intended to be used as a 

location to manufacture methamphetamine, MCL 333.7401c(1)(a); possession of 

methamphetamines, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i); and delivery or possession of methamphetamines 

near a park, MCL 333.7410a. The circuit court sentenced defendant as a second habitual 

offender, MCL 333.7413, to serve 66 to 240 months for the conspiracy conviction, the operating 

or maintaining a methamphetamine lab conviction, the owning a building used to operate or 

maintain a methamphetamine lab conviction, and the possession of methamphetamine 

conviction, and to 12 months for the delivery or possession of methamphetamine near a park 

conviction. We affirm. 

I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 

 Defendant argues that she was denied a fair trial based on inadmissible, inflammatory 

arguments made by the prosecutor during his opening statement. The prosecutor described 

methamphetamine (meth) as a “terrible drug” that was “highly addictive,” “extremely 

poisonous,” “very dangerous” to ingest and to make, and “very cheap” to make. According to 

defendant, this was improper because the irrelevant statements were designed to appeal to the 

jury’s sense of “civic duty,” and to their fears and prejudices about meth. They were, according 

to defendant, designed to divert the jury from its duty to decide the case based on the evidence 

by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused. See People v Farrar, 36 

Mich App 294, 299; 193 NW2d 363 (1971). Given the evidence subsequently adduced at trial, 

the prosecutor’s statements were permissible commentary. See People v Lane, 308 Mich App 

38, 63; 862 NW2d 446 (2014) (“During opening statements, a prosecutor may state the facts that 
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will be proved at trial. A prosecutor may not offer his or her personal belief about the 

defendant’s guilt, but may summarize what he or she thinks the evidence will show.”) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted); People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995) 

(holding that prosecutors are free to argue the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences 

arising from those facts). 

 Our Supreme Court has stated that “prosecutors should not resort to civic duty arguments 

that appeal to the fears and prejudices of jury members or express their personal opinion of a 

defendant’s guilt, and must refrain from denigrating a defendant with intemperate and prejudicial 

remarks.” Bahoda, 448 Mich at 282-283. “Generally, [however,] [p]rosecutors are accorded 

great latitude regarding their arguments and conduct” and are “free to argue the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence as it relates to [their] theory of the case.” Id. at 282 

(citations and quotation marks omitted; second and third alterations in original). Similarly, 

prosecutors may summarize anticipated evidence. Lane, 308 Mich App at 63. The prosecutor’s 

statements foreshadowed the evidence presented, and thus were not improper. 

 There was ample evidence presented at trial to support the comments about meth made 

during the prosecutor’s opening statement. A Michigan State Police trooper testified about the 

“ingredients” required to make meth, and the dangers inherent in that process. Other officers 

experienced in narcotics law enforcement described meth as “very” or “highly” addictive, while 

both Joseph and Pamela Pethers testified that they were addicted to meth. This testimony 

established not only that the process of manufacturing meth was dangerous, but that the 

ingredients used to make it were quite toxic, and that the finished product was highly addictive. 

The prosecutor’s comments that meth was “highly addictive,” dangerous, and “terrible” presaged 

the trial testimony, and was not improper. There was no plain error requiring reversal. Bahoda, 

448 Mich at 282; Lane, 308 Mich App at 62-63. 

II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 

 Defendant argues that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by introducing 

evidence that defendant was previously in jail, and by failing to object to the prosecutor’s 

questions on the topic of defendant’s previous arrest and consumption of alcohol. Although 

defendant’s argument that the prosecutor improperly questioned a witness about her previous 

arrest has merit, defendant was not denied a fair trial on this basis, and is not entitled to reversal. 

A. JAIL 

 Defendant argues first that defense counsel was ineffective for introducing evidence 

during her boyfriend’s direct examination that defendant was previously in jail. Specifically, in 

response to defense counsel’s question, “How do you know [defendant]?”, the witness responded 

that he had first called defendant after a friend had told him “that she . . . was in jail, . . . and she 

needed somebody to talk to.” Defendant argues that this testimony demonstrates that defense 

counsel did not adequately investigate the witness and should have known how his relationship 

with defendant began. 

The accused has the right under the federal and state Constitutions to the effective 

assistance of counsel. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; Strickland v Washington, 466 
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US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). A defendant bears a heavy burden to show that 

counsel made errors so serious that she was not performing as the counsel guaranteed by the 

Sixth Amendment, and the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s 

performance constituted sound trial strategy. People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 396; 688 

NW2d 308 (2004). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must 

meet two criteria: first, she must “show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires 

showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 US at 687. Second, the 

defendant must show the deficient performance was prejudicial. Id. Prejudice is established 

where there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 694; People v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 

(1995). 

 Although defendant argues that trial counsel should have known that the witness first met 

defendant when she was in jail, we note that the witness testified on cross-examination that he 

met defendant “when she got out of jail,” which indicates that defendant was not incarcerated 

when they met. Thus, although defense counsel may have known that the witness and defendant 

first met close in time to when defendant was in jail, she could not have necessarily anticipated 

that the boyfriend would respond to her question, “How do you know her?” by referencing 

defendant’s time in jail, rather than by simply stating that they were in a dating relationship. 

 We also note that the purpose in calling the witness was to show that the boyfriend saw 

defendant on a regular basis, and that defendant had not appeared to have used meth on any of 

the days they were together. Defense counsel also established through the witness that defendant 

had purchased Sudafed for him as treatment for his allergies, suggesting the purchase was not for 

use as an ingredient in meth. “Decisions regarding what evidence to present, whether to call 

witnesses, and how to question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy,” People v 

Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 39; 755 NW2d 212 (2008), and “this Court will not substitute its 

judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy,” People v Davis, 250 Mich App 

357, 368; 649 NW2d 94 (2002). Defense counsel was not ineffective on the basis of this 

testimony. 

 Similarly, we are not persuaded that the prosecutor acted improperly by mentioning 

defendant’s time in jail during cross-examination of the witness. Issues of “prosecutorial 

misconduct are considered on a case-by-case basis . . . in context” to determine whether the 

“defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 465, 475; 802 

NW2d 627 (2010). Here, the prosecutor merely repeated the witness’s testimony from the direct 

examination when he asked him to clarify that he had met defendant “after she got out of jail.” 

The prosecutor did not ask why defendant had been in jail or comment further on this topic. 

Based on this very limited exchange, no error resulting in a miscarriage of justice occurred. See 

People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 134; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). 

B. PRIOR ARREST 

 Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

prosecutor’s questions concerning her previous arrest during cross-examination of defendant’s 

boyfriend. We recognize that defense counsel may have intentionally chosen not to object so as 
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not to call attention to an issue that may have negatively affected the jury’s view of defendant. 

However, even if she should have objected or requested a curative instruction, defendant has not 

shown that the error affected the outcome of her case. LaVearn, 448 Mich at 216. Other 

evidence properly introduced at trial, including the incriminating testimony of the Pethers and 

defendant’s daughter, provided sufficient evidence to show that defendant had possession of 

meth and that she allowed it to be manufactured in her home. The unchallenged testimony about 

defendant’s previous arrest did not likely affect the outcome of the case. Id.

 Nor has defendant shown that the prosecutor committed error requiring reversal by 

introducing evidence of her prior arrest. The prosecutor initially confirmed the boyfriend’s prior 

testimony that he had “met [defendant] after she got out of jail.” The prosecutor then asked him 

if he was with defendant “when she was arrested,” presumably referring to her arrest for the 

current offense, and the witness responded “not this time.” The prosecutor later asked whether 

“there [had] been a time in the past when [defendant] was arrested in your residence.” Although 

this Court has held that prosecutors have a special obligation to avoid areas of testimony that 

may unfairly prejudice a defendant, People v McCarver (On Remand), 87 Mich App 12, 15; 273 

NW2d 570 (1978), an isolated or inadvertent reference to a defendant’s prior criminal activities 

will not warrant reversal, People v Wallen, 47 Mich App 612, 613; 209 NW2d 608 (1973). 

However, we agree that the prosecutor should not have asked whether “there [had] been a time in 

the past when [defendant] was arrested in your residence” because it potentially referenced prior 

bad acts. See MRE 404(b). However, there is no indication that the error affected defendant’s 

substantial rights. Sufficient evidence was presented at trial to establish that defendant had 

possession of meth and allowed the Pethers to make it in her home. Defendant has not shown 

that the prosecutor’s improper question affected the integrity of the proceedings or that she was 

actually innocent and the prosecutor’s error caused her to be convicted. People v Thomas, 260 

Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). 

 We likewise reject defendant’s argument that the court committed error requiring reversal 

by allowing the witness to be cross-examined “about arrests not resulting in conviction or about 

the length and detail of any sentence as a result of earlier convictions,” citing People v Rappuhn, 

390 Mich 266; 212 NW2d 205 (1973). Defendant’s reliance on Rappuhn is misplaced. In 

Rappuhn, our Supreme Court stated that “ ‘in the examination or cross-examination of any 

witness, no inquiry may be made regarding prior arrests or charges against such witness which 

did not result in conviction; neither may such witness be examined with reference to higher 

original charges which have not resulted in conviction, whether by plea or trial.’ ” Id. at 270, 

quoting People v Falkner, 389 Mich 682, 695; 209 NW2d 193 (1973) (emphasis in original) The 

Rappuhn Court held that the defendant had been prejudiced by the reference to his arrest record, 

stating that “Falkner clearly speaks to the impeachment of any witness by use of an arrest record. 

Therefore, defendant is entitled to a new trial on the basis of Falkner.” Rappuhn, 390 Mich at 

270-271. Rappuhn is not applicable to the instant case because the record does not indicate that 

the prosecutor elicited testimony about defendant’s previous arrest to impeach her credibility or 

that of the witness. Further, Rappuhn prohibits counsel from making any “inquiry . . . regarding 

prior arrests or charges against such witness which did not result in conviction[.]” Id. at 270 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Defendant does not claim that her prior arrest did not 

lead to charges resulting in conviction and thus, it is not clear that the comment would have been 

prohibited under Rappuhn. But even if it did not result in conviction, again, the error did not 
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affect the integrity of the proceedings or affect the fairness of the trial, and does not require 

reversal. Thomas, 260 Mich App at 454. 

C. “DRINKING” 

 Next, defendant argues that defense counsel should have objected during the prosecutor’s 

cross-examination of her boyfriend when he was asked whether defendant was drinking at the 

time of her arrest. Defendant does not explain why counsel should have objected to these 

questions. However, we presume she believes that this line of questioning was potentially 

prejudicial or portrayed her in a bad light. Such an argument is not persuasive evidence that 

defense counsel was ineffective because defendant has not shown that the outcome of her case 

would have been different if counsel had objected. Defendant has not asserted that it would have 

been illegal for her to consume alcohol. In addition, no evidence that defendant drank alcohol 

was actually admitted as a result of the witness’s testimony because he categorically denied that 

defendant was drinking at any time in his presence or that they ever drank together. We do not 

agree that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s questions, but 

to the extent that there was any error, defendant has not shown that it affected the outcome of her 

case. LaVearn, 448 Mich at 216. 

 We agree with defendant, however, that the prosecutor improperly questioned the witness 

regarding whether she was drinking at the time of her arrest. Defendant was not charged with 

any alcohol-related offenses, and no evidence was offered to show that, for instance, she was 

under the influence of alcohol during the commission of the offenses or that consumption of 

alcohol otherwise figured in the commission of the offenses. Thus, the prosecutor delved into an 

irrelevant area. See MRE 401 and 402. However, as discussed, defendant has not argued that it 

would have been improper or illegal for her to consume alcohol for any reason, and the 

prosecutor did not suggest that defendant would have been breaking the law by drinking. 

Additionally, as noted, the witness testified that he did not see defendant drinking at any time. 

Because defendant cannot show that she was denied a fair trial based on the prosecutor’s 

questions, she is not entitled to a new trial on this basis. 

III. OV 14 

 Defendant argues that the trial court improperly assessed 10 points for offense variable 

(OV) 14, MCL 777.44, because the evidence did not support a finding that she was a leader in 

the commission of the offenses. Ten points may be assessed for OV 14 where “[t]he offender 

was a leader in a multiple offender situation.” MCL 777.44(1)(a). “The entire criminal 

transaction should be considered when scoring this variable,” and where “3 or more offenders 

were involved, more than 1 offender may be determined to have been a leader.” MCL 

777.44(2)(a) and (b). The trial court assessed 10 points for OV 14, over defendant’s objection, 

based on its finding that defendant “was certainly a willing participa[nt]” who provided money to 

the Pethers to purchase Sudafed and other materials, allowed her house to be used to 

manufacture meth, and who “solicited her daughter to purchase Sudafed.” The court 

acknowledged that others may have played an even greater role in carrying out the offense, but 

determined that it was still appropriate to assess 10 points based on defendant’s role. We agree. 
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 The statute does not define the term “leader,” so we may determine the common meaning 

of the term from the dictionary. Ter Beek v City of Wyoming, 495 Mich 1, 20; 846 NW2d 531 

(2014). One common definition of a “leader” is “[o]ne that leads or guides.” The American 

Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (2000). Under the statute, more than one offender 

may be found to be a leader when the offense involves three or more offenders. Thus, as the 

court noted, while Joseph Pethers may have played the greatest role in manufacturing the meth, it 

was still appropriate to assess 10 points for defendant’s role in the offense because the evidence 

supported a finding that she allowed her home to be used as a meth lab, she paid for the materials 

for one of the meth “cooks,” and she solicited her daughter to obtain a necessary ingredient, 

actions that could be construed as “leading” or “guiding” the creation of a meth lab. We are not 

persuaded by defendant’s argument that the court’s score was not appropriate because she “did 

not know much of anything about methamphetamine.” Although defendant may not have 

possessed the technical knowledge used by Joseph Pethers to actually make the meth, the court’s 

finding that she had a leadership role in the manufacturing process in other ways was supported 

by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Defendant argues that the court should not have considered testimony that she solicited 

her daughter to buy Sudafed to determine whether she played a leadership role, based on People 

v Rhodes (On Remand), 305 Mich App 85; 849 NW2d 417 (2014). In Rhodes, this Court 

concluded that the defendant, who had been convicted of assault with intent to commit great 

bodily harm, was not a leader in the offense because “the evidence does not show that defendant 

acted first, gave any directions or orders to” the other offender, “displayed any greater amount of 

initiative beyond” his possession of a firearm, “played a precipitating role in [the other 

offender’s] participation in the criminal transaction, or was otherwise a primary causal or 

coordinating agent.” Rhodes, 305 Mich App at 87, 90. The Court also determined that the only 

evidence of the defendant’s leadership role was that he had possessed a gun during the 

commission of the offense and the other offender had not. Therefore, the Court concluded that 

the record did not support the trial court’s finding that the defendant was a leader pursuant to OV 

14. Id. at 90. By contrast, evidence that defendant asked her daughter to buy Sudafed, in 

combination with other evidence, does support a finding that defendant was a leader. Based on 

the definition of “leader,” it was not error for the trial court to find that defendant helped to lead 

or guide by asking her daughter to purchase Sudafed, as well as by purchasing Sudafed herself, 

paying for other materials, and allowing her home to be used as a meth lab. Defendant 

“directed” her daughter to purchase Sudafed, and arguably displayed initiative by doing so. See 

Rhodes, 305 Mich App at 90. The trial court did not err by concluding that the preponderance of 

the evidence, including evidence that defendant directed her daughter to purchase Sudafed, 

supported a finding that OV 14 should be scored at 10 points. 

IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY 

 Following trial, defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 

(JNOV), in which she argued that she was being “punished more than once for the same act,” in 

violation of her protection against double jeopardy, because “the factual basis for all of the 

Counts is . . . the same.” Specifically, defendant contended that count III (owning a building 

intended to be used as a location to manufacture methamphetamine, MCL 333.7401c(1)(a)) and 

count V (delivery or possession of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a park, MCL 

333.7410a) should be dismissed because count III was a lesser included offense of count I 
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(conspiracy to operate or maintain a laboratory involving methamphetamine, MCL 

333.7401c(2)(f); MCL 750.157a), and count II (operating or maintaining a laboratory involving 

methamphetamine; MCL 333.7401c(2)(f)), and count IV (possession of a controlled substance, 

MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i)). Additionally, defendant argued that count V was a “cognate lesser 

offense to count III,” and that both counts were “cognate lesser offenses to Counts 1, 2, and 3.” 

According to defendant, count V violated double jeopardy with respect to her other convictions 

“because the same factual basis underpins . . . all of the offenses.” The court denied defendant’s 

motion without explanation. 

 On appeal, defendant renews her assertion that she is entitled to dismissal of two of her 

convictions, relying on her motion for JNOV rather than providing an argument in support of this 

statement. Defendant has, thus, abandoned this argument. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 

640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998); People v Harris, 261 Mich App 44, 50; 680 NW2d 17 (2004). 

We conclude, however, that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for JNOV 

and that her constitutional rights against double jeopardy were not violated. 

 “Both the United States and Michigan constitutions prohibit a person from twice being 

placed in jeopardy for the same offense.” People v Ford, 262 Mich App 443, 447; 687 NW2d 

119 (2004), citing US Const, Am V and Const 1963, art 1, § 15. In Ford, this Court explained 

that “[b]oth federal and Michigan double jeopardy provisions afford three related protections: (1) 

against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) against a second 

prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) against multiple punishments for the 

same offense.” Ford, at 447. At issue in this case is the third category of double jeopardy 

protection. 

 “[T]he purpose of the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for the 

same offense is to protect the defendant from having more punishment imposed than the 

Legislature intended.” Id. at 447-448. However, “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause acts as a 

restraint on the prosecutor and the courts, not the Legislature.” Id. at 448, citing Brown v Ohio, 

432 US 161; 97 S Ct 2221; 53 L Ed 2d 187 (1977) (citation omitted). Thus, “the Double 

Jeopardy Clause does not limit the Legislature’s ability to define criminal offenses and establish 

punishments . . . .” Id. (citations omitted). 

 Whether the Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments for violations of more 

than one statute during the same transaction or incident is generally determined by the 

application of the Blockburger1

 or “same-elements” test. See United States v Dixon, 509 US 

688, 696; 113 S Ct 2849; 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993); People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 707; 564 

NW2d 13 (1997). In general, the Blockburger test “inquires whether each offense contains an 

element not contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same offence’ and double jeopardy bars 

additional punishment and successive prosecution.” Ford, 262 Mich App at 448 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). The offenses for which defendant was convicted do not contain

identical elements. 

 

1

 Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932). 
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 MCL 333.7401c(1)(a) prohibits a person from owning, possessing, or using a structure

that he or she knows is to be used to manufacture a controlled substance, while MCL 

333.7401c(1)(b) prohibits a person from owning or possessing any chemical or laboratory 

equipment that he or she knows is to be used to manufacture a controlled substance. Although 

the language of the two provisions is similar, subdivision (a) required the prosecution to prove 

that defendant owned the house in which the methamphetamine was manufactured, while 

subdivision (b) required the prosecution to prove that she owned the chemicals and equipment 

apparently found in the house. To establish that defendant violated MCL 333.7410a, the 

prosecution had to show that defendant operated a meth lab within 1000 feet of a public park; 

only the element of possession is shared with the offenses arising under MCL 333.7401c(1)(a) 

and (b), which is itself one of three alternative elements listed in those subsections (i.e., 

“owning,” “possessing,” or “using”). In Ford, this Court held that “[e]ven where the same facts 

in a single trial show the commission of each [offense,] the federal Double Jeopardy Clause is 

not offended.” Ford, 262 Mich App at 458. Defendant’s convictions and sentences did not 

violate the same-elements test because the offenses arising under each statutory provision 

required the prosecution to prove an element that the other subdivision or statute did not. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher