COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Petty, AtLe e and Senior Judge Clements

SHARNICE CROMARTIE MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1943-15-2 PER CURIAM MAY 31, 2016 HOPEWELL DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HOPEWELL W. Allan Sharrett, Judge (Linda L. Johnson, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (Joan M. O’Donnell; W. Ed ward Tomko, III, Guardian ad litem for the minor children; Ol d Towne Lawyers, LLP; Novey & Tomko, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication. Sharnice Cromartie (mother) ap peals the orders terminating her parental rights to her children. Mother argues that th e trial court erred by (1) finding that she subjected the child to aggravated circumstances of abuse pursuant to Co de § 16.1-283(E)(iv); (2) finding that she had not responded to services and “it wa s not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in the neglect or abuse could be corrected or eliminated in a reasonable pe riod of time” pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B); (3) fa iling to award custody of th e children to the maternal grandmother or maternal aunt; and (4) finding that it was in the children’s be st interests to terminate her parental rights. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that the tr ial court did not err. Accordingly, we affirm the d ecision of the trial court.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). Mother and Deljuan Curry (father) are the bi ological parents to th e two children who are the subject of this appeal. 1 The older child was born in September 2013. On December 9, 2013, mother took the child to the pediatrician fo r a perceived upper respiratory infection. The pediatrician noticed swelling in the child’s ri ght leg and recommended he have x-rays at John Randolph Hospital. The x-rays revealed a fr acture in the child’s tibia. The Hopewell Department of Social Services (the Department) was notified. The child was taken to MCV Hospital for further testing. Dr. Robin Foster was the at tending physician at MCV Hospital. Dr. Foster noticed the swelling in the child’s right leg and ordered additional x-rays. Dr . Foster determined that the tibia was fractured two to three weeks earlier. Th e child also had healed fractures in his right and left clavicle. Dr. Foster estimated that the in juries to the clavicle we re approximately four to six weeks old. Dr. Foster reviewed the child’s medical record s. There were no indications that the child was injured at birth. At the child’s check-ups in September 2013, the pediatrician did not note any swelling or injury to the child’s body. On October 14, 2013, mother told the pediatrician about a “bump” on the child’s clavicle. The pedi atrician referred her to an orthopedist, but the orthopedist never saw the ch ild. On November 10, 2013, the child went to John Randolph Hospital because he had an abscess in the groi n area. When the medical staff at John Randolph

1 Mother also has four older ch ildren. Father is not the biol ogical parent to the four older children.- 3 - was unable to insert an IV, the child was transferred to Chippenham Hospital, where he was treated. The notes from both hospitals did not indicate the child’s leg was swollen. Dr. Foster concluded, with a reasonable degr ee of medical certainty, that the child was a victim of physical abuse. The tibia fracture was a non-accidental injury. There was no organic reason for the child’s multiple broken bones. The Department learned that father and mo ther were the child’s primary caregivers. Mother told the Department that the child’s cl avicles may have been broken during the birthing process. She also stated that the child’s tib ia may have been broken at John Randolph Hospital when they brought him in for the abscess. Ho wever, the medical reco rds do not support these theories. On January 14, 2014, the Department filed petit ions alleging abuse and neglect in the Hopewell Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the JDR court). The Department placed the child in foster care. 2 Since the child has been in fost er care, he has not had any broken bones. The JDR court found that the child was an abus ed or neglected child. The initial foster care plan required mother to participate in a psychological evaluati on, individual counseling, parenting classes, and supervised visitations. She also was required to obtain and maintain housing and employment. Mother completed the psychological evaluation. She started counseling, but stopped after three se ssions. She attended all of the scheduled, supervised visits. She maintained full-time employment, and the Department did not have significant concerns about her housing. In December 2014, mother gave birth to the second child who is the subject of this appeal. The parents did not tell the Department that mother was pregnant or that she had the

2 Mother’s four older children also were placed in foster care.- 4 - baby. Once the Department learned that moth er had given birth, it obtained an emergency removal order, and the child was placed in foster care. The JDR court terminated mother’s and fath er’s parental rights to both children and approved the foster care plans w ith the goal of adoption. Both pa rents appealed the JDR court’s orders to the circuit court. On November 2, 2015, the parties appeared before the circuit court. Mother denied harming the child. She testified th at there were mistakes in the child’s medical records and her counseling records. Mother pr esented evidence that a maternal aunt and the maternal grandmother were willing to take custo dy of the children, if th e court was not going to return the children to her. After hearing all of the evidence and argum ent, the circuit court entered orders terminating mothe r’s and father’s parental rights to the two children pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), (C)(2), and (E)(iv). The tria l court found there were no suitable relatives to take custody of the children, so they remained in the Depart ment’s custody. This appeal followed. 3
ANALYSIS I. and IV. Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that she subjected the child to aggravated circumstances and in terminating her parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(E). She contends the termination of her parental righ ts was not in the childr en’s best interests. When considering termination of parental ri ghts, “the paramount c onsideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463.

3 Father also appealed the circuit court’s orde r terminating his parental rights. See Curry v. Hopewell Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Record No. 1930-15-2 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2016).- 5 - Code § 16.1-283(E)(iv) states that a court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it is in the best interests of the child and there is clear and convincing evidence that “the parent has subjected any child to ag gravated circumstances.” Code § 16.1-283(E) defines a ggravated circumstances as torture, chronic or severe abuse, or chronic or severe sexual abuse, if the victim of such conduct was a child of the parent or a child with whom the parent resided at the time such conduct occurred, including the failure to protect such a child from such conduct, which conduct or failure to pr otect: (i) evinces a wanton or depraved indifference to human lif e, or (ii) has resulted in the death of such a child or in serious bodily injury to such a child. The statute further defines chronic abuse as “recurri ng acts of physical abus e which place the child’s health, safety and well- being at risk.” Id. The statute defines serious bodily injury as “bodily injury that involves substantial risk of death, extreme p hysical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty.” Id. The circuit court specifically held that the child was subjected to aggravated circum stances, as defined in Va. Code § 16.1-283E, while in the care of his pa rents, . . . in that the child was residing with the parents at the time of his injuries; the severity of the child’s injuries in cludes a failure to protect by the parents; the nature of the injuries resulted in serious bodily injury to such a child. Code § 16.1-283(E)(iv) applies to “any” ch ild who has been subjected to aggravated circumstances. Since the olde r child was subjected to aggr avated circumstances, Code § 16.1-283(E) also applies to the younger child. Mother argues that she did not cause the chil d’s injuries, and she so ught medical attention when she detected a problem with the child. However, the evidence supports the trial court’s findings. At different times, the child suffered from a fractured ti bia and fractured clavicles, while in the parents’ care. Dr. Foster determined, with a reasonable de gree of medical certainty, that the fractured bones were non-accidental an d a result of physic al child abuse.- 6 - The trial court had the opportunity to see an d hear the witnesses. It held that the Department’s witnesses were more credible thanthe parents and their witnesses. “It is well established that the trier of fact ascertains a witness’ credibility, determines the weight to be given to their testimony, and has th e discretion to accept or reject a ny of the witness’ testimony.” Street v. Street, 25 Va. App. 380, 387, 488 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1997) ( en banc ) (citation omitted). At the time of the final hear ing, the children had been in fo ster care for approximately twenty-two months. The evidence proved that the children were doing well in foster care. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resu ming his [or her] responsi bilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). The trial court did not err in finding that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate mother’s pare ntal rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(E).
II. Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that sh e had not responded to services and “it was not reasonably li kely that the conditions which resulted in the negl ect or abuse could be corrected or eliminated in a reasonable period of time” pur suant to Code § 16.1-283(B). The trial court terminat ed mother’s parental rights pursuan t to Code § 16.1-283(B), (C)(2), and (E)(iv). When a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court, and if so, we need not address the other grounds. See Fields v. Dinwiddie Cty. De p’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (the Court affirmed termination of parental rights under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 and did not need to address termination of parental rights pursuant to another subsection). As stated above, the trial court did not err in terminating- 7 - mother’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(E). Therefore, we will not consider whether the trial court erred in terminating mother’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B).
III. Mother argues that the tria l court erred by failing to award custody of the children to the maternal aunt or maternal grandmother. Both te stified that they were willing to take care of the children. Before terminating a parent’s rights, “the court shall give a consideration to granting custody to relatives of the child, including grandparents.” Code § 16.1-283(A). The “Department has a duty to produce sufficient evid ence so that the court may properly determine whether there are relatives willing and suitable to take custody of the child, and to consider such relatives in comparison to other placement opti ons.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 131, 409 S.E.2d at 465. The maternal grandmother testified that she lived in a two-be droom house with her seventeen-year-old son and, sometimes, his father . She did not work and relied on her son’s father for support. She testified that she curr ently was not able to take the children. She indicated that she would need approximately thr ee weeks before she could take the children, in order for her to move to a bigger house. The ma ternal grandmother testified that she saw the children daily prior to their remova l. She believed the children were safe in mother’s care. She said that she and the mother visit approximately four times per week. The Department expressed concern about the maternal grandmother having custody of the children because she violated a safety plan when she cared for the child in January 2014. The maternal aunt testified that she livedin a three-bedroom home with her son and daughter. Her plan was for mother’s children to share rooms with her children. She works and testified that another sister may help her with the children. She admitted that she received a- 8 - referral to child protective services when one of her children wandered away from a family cookout. The police return ed the child to her. The trial court received sufficient evidence to evaluate the maternal aunt and maternal grandmother as possible placements for the ch ildren. See Hawthorne v. Smyth Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 33 Va. App. 130, 139, 531 S.E.2d 639, 644 (2000) (although the Department did not investigate a relative, the relative te stified at trial, so “the trial court was presented with evidence for its consideration as to the suitability” of placing the child with a relative before it ordered termination of the parent’s rights). Based on the record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there were no suit able relatives for placement of the children.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the tr ial court’s ruling is affirmed. Affirmed.