COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Felton and Senior Judge Willis 

SHAWN BRADLEY HOLLEY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 3397-02-3 PER CURIAM 

 JUNE 10, 2003 

AMHERST COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AMHERST COUNTY 

J. Michael Gamble, Judge 

 (P. Scott De Bruin; De Bruin & Layne, P.C., 

on brief), for appellant. 

 (J. Thompson Shrader; Jennifer R. Tuggle; 

J. Thompson Shrader & Associates, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 (Wanda Phillips Yoder, on brief), Guardian 

ad litem for Wilson Andrew Holley. 

 Shawn Bradley Holley (father) appeals a decision of the 

trial court terminating his parental rights to his son Wilson, 

pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C). On appeal, father 

contends the trial court erred by (1) admitting into evidence 

two reports of a court-appointed special advocate (CASA), and 

(2) finding the Amherst Department of Social Services (Amherst 

DSS) had provided him with adequate services. We find this 

appeal to be without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the 

decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
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BACKGROUND

 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't 

of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). 

So viewed, the evidence established Wilson was born on November 

21, 1997 and has never been in father's custody. Wilson 

remained with his mother, Penny L. Stanley (mother) until he was 

placed in the care of the Lynchburg Department of Social 

Services (Lynchburg DSS). 

 In June 1999, Lynchburg DSS received a child neglect 

complaint that Wilson had been seen trying to cross a busy city 

street after he had been left unattended by mother. Lynchburg 

DSS received additional complaints, and the Lynchburg Juvenile 

and Domestic Relations District Court awarded Wilson's paternal 

grandmother, Diane Holley, custody on August 23, 1999. 

 On October 18, 2000, Diane Holley approached Amherst DSS 

seeking to place Wilson with it. She explained she could no 

longer care for Wilson because of interference from mother. 

Rick Groff, a senior social worker, testified that at 

approximately the same time he had received a complaint of 

neglect. The complaint came from the police department. The 

police had been summoned to Diane Holley's residence. When they 

arrived, the officers discovered father unconscious in the front 

yard and Wilson wandering, unattended, in the road. Father was 
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later convicted of child neglect based upon the incident. Diane 

Holley signed an entrustment agreement with Amherst DSS, and 

Wilson was placed with his half-siblings (mother's other 

children) in the foster care of the Smith family. 

 On December 21, 2001, Amherst DSS petitioned the court to 

terminate father's residual parental rights. Between the time 

of Wilson's foster care placement and the date of the 

termination petition, father was either incarcerated or in a 

state hospital for all but an eight-week period. During the 

eight weeks father was not detained, he was provided supervised 

visitation with Wilson. 

 Groff testified he met with father on November 1, 2001, to 

discuss the requirements for Wilson's return from foster care. 

Groff referred father to parenting classes, "children in the 

middle" classes, and counseling. Father made initial contact to 

receive class schedules but was again incarcerated before 

beginning any classes or counseling. Father attended his 

scheduled visits with Wilson for a six-week period before his 

incarceration. 

 Father admitted he suffered from mental health problems and 

alcohol addiction. He was institutionalized at Western State 

Hospital for depression. Father admitted he was convicted of 

child neglect following the incident at his mother's house. He 

had also been twice charged with assaulting his mother, which 

resulted in one conviction. Appellant had also been convicted 
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on numerous charges of public drunkenness. At the time of the 

circuit court hearing, father was incarcerated awaiting trial on 

charges of hit and run, driving while intoxicated, and driving 

after having been declared an habitual offender. Father 

asserted if he gained custody of Wilson he would arrange for the 

boy to live with his grandmother in Danville, Virginia. 

ANALYSIS

CASA REPORTS

 At trial, Amherst DSS sought to introduce two CASA reports 

and their attachments. The CASA advocate who prepared the 

reports was out of the country and unable to testify at trial. 

Melanie Wright, a CASA advocate manager, testified the reports 

were prepared by case worker Jill Fernandez. Father objected to 

the admission of the reports, arguing they contained 

inadmissible hearsay and that their admission violated his due 

process rights by depriving him of the opportunity to 

cross-examine a witness against him. 

Hearsay

 Father concedes Code § 9.1-153 allows the court to admit as 

evidence CASA reports. He also correctly notes that the CASA 

advocate who prepared the report "may testify if called as a 

witness." Code § 9.1-153. He argues the statute "violates 

. . . the hearsay rule . . . ." 

"While in the construction of statutes the 

constant endeavor of the courts is to 

ascertain and give effect to the intention 
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of the legislature, that intention must be 

gathered from the words used, unless a 

literal construction would involve a 

manifest absurdity. Where the legislature 

has used words of a plain and definite 

import the courts cannot put upon them a 

construction which amounts to holding the 

legislature did not mean what it has 

actually expressed." 

Barr v. Town & Country Properties, 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 

672, 674 (1990) (quoting Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 924, 930, 172 

S.E. 445, 447 (1934)). 

 Code § 9.1-153 requires the CASA advocate to "[s]ubmit to 

the court [] a written report of his investigation in compliance 

with the provisions of § 16.1-274. The report . . . may include 

recommendations as to the child's welfare." Code § 16.1-274 

directs the advocate to "file such report with the clerk of the 

court directing the investigation." The CASA reports were 

properly prepared and filed, and the trial court did not err by 

admitting the reports and their attachments pursuant to Code 

§ 9.1-153. 

Due Process

 Appellant contends the admission of the CASA reports under 

Code § 9.1-153 violated his due process rights by depriving him 

of an opportunity to confront the witnesses against him. 

 When a state infringes upon a parent's 

constitutional right to the companionship of 

his or her child in order to protect the 

child from abuse and neglect, it must 

satisfy the mandates of procedural due 

process. Therefore, if the state seeks to 

sever the parent-child relationship, the 
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state is required to provide the parent with 

"fundamentally fair" procedures in the 

termination proceeding. 

Wright v. Alexandria Div. of Soc. Servs., 16 Va. App. 821, 829, 

433 S.E.2d 500, 505 (1993) (citations omitted). In this case, 

appellant was provided an extensive two-day hearing, was 

provided the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him, 

including a CASA representative, and his parental rights were 

terminated only after the trial court concluded the petition was 

supported by clear and convincing evidence. Father "was 

afforded the process that []he was due in protecting h[is] 

liberty interest in enjoying the companionship of h[is] child. 

Nothing in the Constitution guarantees continuation of the 

parent-child relationship once fundamentally fair procedures 

have been followed to prove parental unfitness." Id. at 830, 

433 S.E.2d at 505. 

SUFFICIENCY

 Father argues the evidence was insufficient to support the 

trial court's conclusion that Amherst DSS provided him all 

reasonable and appropriate services as required by Code 

§ 16.1-283. 

The statutory language contained in Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(1) requires "reasonable and 

appropriate" efforts to be made to provide 

services. We must interpret the statutory 

mandate in accordance with the language 

chosen by the legislature. "Reasonable and 

appropriate" efforts can only be judged with 

reference to the circumstances of a 

particular case. Thus, a court must 
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determine what constitutes reasonable and 

appropriate efforts given the facts before 

the court. 

Ferguson v. Stafford Dep't of Social Services, 14 Va. App. 333, 

338, 417 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1992). 

 The record reveals father has been incarcerated or 

hospitalized for mental illness for most of Wilson's life. 

During a brief period when he was not detained, he allowed 

Wilson to wander in the roadway near railroad tracks as he lay 

unconscious and intoxicated in his mother's yard. Father was 

convicted of child neglect. Despite being advised to complete 

parenting classes and substance abuse classes, father did not 

even start the courses before again being incarcerated. His 

continued incarceration prevented Amherst DSS from providing 

father with more extensive services. 

[W]hile long-term incarceration does not, 

per se, authorize termination of parental 

rights or negate the Department's obligation 

to provide services, it is a valid and 

proper circumstance which, when combined 

with other evidence concerning the 

parent/child relationship, can support a 

court's finding by clear and convincing 

evidence that the best interests of the 

child will be served by termination. 

Id. at 340, 417 S.E.2d at 5. 

 We conclude that this record contains sufficient evidence 

that the trial court did not err in terminating father's 
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parental rights. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision 

of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

Affirmed.