alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Jamie R. MADRIGAL, petitioner, v. OHIO.

No. 18-7137.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 25, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Lucas County denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1999
<CASH>                                          25,343
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  214,800
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (2,500)
<INVENTORY>                                    268,087
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               544,714
<PP&E>                                         124,747
<DEPRECIATION>                                  42,104
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,043,030
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,456,883
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    26,370,418
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,181,266
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,043,030
<SALES>                                      2,082,515
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,082,515
<CGS>                                        1,682,905
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,682,905
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              58,085
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (916,733)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   136,830
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,053,563)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,053,563)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.04)


</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-10750

 Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JEFFERY H. REYNOLDS, III,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(3:96-CR-003-H)

- - - - - - - - - -

July 8, 1997

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jeffery H. Reynolds, III, federal prisoner # 61306080,

appeals his conditional guilty-plea conviction for wire fraud,

count two of a 20-count superseding indictment. He argues that

the district court erred in denying his request for a hearing

pursuant to Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), and

in calculating the amount of intended loss used to determine his

offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(R).
2

Our review of the record and the arguments and authorities

convince us that no reversible error was committed. Under the

facts and circumstances of this case, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Reynolds’ request for a Kastigar

hearing. We recognize that testimony obtained under a grant of

act-of-production immunity could not be used directly or

derivatively against Reynolds as the custodian of the corporate

documents. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 117

(1988). Reynolds’ production of the subpoenaed corporate

documents, however, did not constitute testimonial and selfincriminating evidence that the documents existed. See Fisher v.

United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). The subpoenaed

documents were the kind usually associated with a corporation and

their existence was not at issue. Id. at 411-12.

Further, the district court’s finding that the amount of

intended loss was the total coverage of the policies written is

not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Krenning, 93 F.3d

1257, 1269 (5th Cir. 1996). The district court employed a

reasonable methodology and made a reasonable determination of the

loss. Id.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Reynolds’ pro se motion for leave to file a supplemental brief is

DENIED. See Myers v. Johnson, 76 F.3d 1330, 1335 (5th Cir.

1996).
Timothy RYAN, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-9172.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 1, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GHASSEN MONCEF BEN YOUNES,

AKA Ghassen Ben Younes,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 10-71824

Agency No. A079-638-202

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 7, 2014** 

San Francisco, California

Before: BENAVIDES,*** TALLMAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges. 

Ghassen Ben Younes (“Younes”), a native and citizen of Tunisia, petitions

for review of the final order of removal entered against him by the Board of

FILED

APR 14 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

 *** The Honorable Fortunato P. Benavides, Senior Circuit Judge for the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Immigration Appeals. The order dismissed his appeal from an immigration judge’s

decision denying his application for withholding of removal and relief under the

Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We

review the agency’s legal determinations de novo, and factual findings for

substantial evidence. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). 

We deny the petition for review.

Younes has not shown that he was persecuted in the past and does not

demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution that is both subjectively

genuine and objectively reasonable. Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156,

1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Younes has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than

not that he will be persecuted were he to return to Tunisia. Id.; 8 C.F.R. §

208.16(b)(2). Likewise, Younes has failed to bring evidence showing that it is

more likely than not that he will be tortured should he return to Tunisia. Lanza v.

Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 936 (9th Cir. 2004).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED
WILFRED H., petitioner, v. WEST VIRGINIA.

No. 18-7395.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 25, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia denied.
I

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1360

To amend the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States to provide

for equitable duty treatment for certain wool used in making suits.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 25, 1999

Mr. WALSH (for himself, Mr. HOUGHTON, Ms. SLAUGHTER, Mr. ROGERS, Mr.

BOEHLERT, and Mr. FORBES) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United

States to provide for equitable duty treatment for certain

wool used in making suits.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DUTY TREATMENT OF CERTAIN FABRICS.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is

6 amended—

7 (1) by adding at the end of the U.S. notes the

8 following new note:
2

•HR 1360 IH

1 ‘‘13. For purposes of headings 9902.51.11 and

2 9902.51.12, the term ‘suit’ has the same meaning such

3 term has for purposes of headings 6203 and 6204.’’; and

4 (2) by inserting in numerical sequence the fol5 lowing new headings:

‘‘ 9902.51.11 Fabrics, of carded or

combed wool, all the foregoing certified by the importer as ‘Super 70’s’ or

‘Super 80’s’ intended for

use in making suits, suittype jackets or trousers

(provided for in subheadings

5111.11.70, 5111.19.60,

5112.11.20, or 5112.19.90) 19.8% No change No change On or before

12/31/2004

9902.51.12 Fabrics, of carded or

combed wool, all the foregoing certified by the importer as ‘Super 90’s’ or

higher grade intended for

use in making suits, suittype jackets or trousers

(provided for in subheadings

5111.11.70, 5111.19.60,

5112.11.20, or 5112.19.90) Free Free

(CA,IL,MX)

No change On or before

12/31/2004 ’’.

6 (b) STAGED RATE REDUCTION.—Any staged reduc7 tion of a rate of duty set forth in heading 6203.31.00 of

8 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States that

9 is proclaimed by the President on or after the date of en10 actment of this Act shall also apply to the corresponding

11 rate of duty set forth in heading 9902.51.11 of such

12 Schedule (as added by subsection (a)).

13 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

14 subsection (a) apply with respect to goods entered, or

15 withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after

16 the 15th day after the date of enactment of this Act.
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I, R. Brian Gibson, certify that:



|1. | I have reviewed this 10-K/A of LookSmart, Ltd.;
|-- | -----------------------------------------------



|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: April 29,
2008



|                                                                               
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                               
|/s/    R. BRIAN GIBSON                                                         
|R. Brian Gibson Principal Accounting Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer
In Re William W. FREY, petitioner.

No. 18-7630.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 1, 2019.

Petition for writ of mandamus denied.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-7961

HARVEY LEE WILLIAMS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

GENE JOHNSON, Director, Virginia Department of

Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior

District Judge. (CA-03-56)

Submitted: April 28, 2004 Decided: June 16, 2004

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Harvey Lee Williams, Appellant Pro Se. John H. McLees, Jr., OFFICE

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Harvey Lee Williams, a state prisoner, seeks to appeal

the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). The order is not appealable unless

a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will

not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner

satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists

would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that

any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also

debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336

(2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee,

252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed

the record and conclude that Williams has not made the requisite

showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process. 

DISMISSED
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1275 Introduced in House (IH)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1275

To amend the Animal Welfare Act to prohibit the interstate movement of 
 live birds for the purpose of having the birds participate in animal 
                               fighting.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 24, 1999

  Mr. Peterson of Minnesota introduced the following bill; which was 
                referred to the Committee on Agriculture

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Animal Welfare Act to prohibit the interstate movement of 
 live birds for the purpose of having the birds participate in animal 
                               fighting.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION OF INTERSTATE MOVEMENT OF LIVE BIRDS FOR ANIMAL 
              FIGHTING.

    (a) Removal of Current Exception.--Section 26 of the Animal Welfare 
Act (7 U.S.C. 2156) is amended--
            (1) by striking subsection (d); and
            (2) by redesignating subsections (e) through (h) as 
        subsection (d) through (g), respectively.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Damilola ANIMASHAUN, petitioner, v. William SCHMIDT, et al.

No. 18-7437.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 18, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.
Exhibit 10.2

ANNUAL INCENTIVE PLAN

The Company maintains an annual incentive plan whereby certain employees are eligible to receive cash bonuses equal to a percentage of their base salaries if certain corporate financial objectives are achieved. The employees selected each year to participate in the annual incentive plan, as well as the performance targets on which the cash bonuses are based and the amount of the cash bonuses are determined each year in the discretion of the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of the Company. 

Employees in the following categories are eligible to participate in the plan: members of the senior management team and other employees who can have a significant impact on the financial results of the Company.  Each year, the Chief Executive Officer recommends to the Compensation Committee the employees whom he believes should participate in the plan, and the final determination is made by the Compensation Committee. The participation of such employees in the plan is evidenced by written notice from the Company.

If the Company achieves the performance targets set by the Compensation Committee, the designated management employees receive specified percentages of their annual salaries in the form of cash bonuses. Company performance below the target levels will result in lower or no bonus payments, and Company performance above the target levels will result in higher bonus payments.

----
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Edward J. Puisis, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Dayton
Superior Corporation (the "Company"), do hereby certify in accordance with 18
U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to my knowledge:

     The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ending
     September 26, 2003 (the "Periodic Report") fully complies with the
     requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
     1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and

     The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Company.

Dated: November 10, 2003

                                      /s/ Edward J. Puisis

                                      Edward J. Puisis

                                      Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 467 

To amend the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 to encourage 

a victim-centered approach to combating human trafficking, and for 

other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 10, 2019 

Mr. KINZINGER (for himself and Ms. KELLY of Illinois) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 

to encourage a victim-centered approach to combating 

human trafficking, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Reducing the Demand 

5 for Human Trafficking Act of 2019’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 467 IH

1 SEC. 2. IMPLEMENTING A VICTIM-CENTERED APPROACH 

2 TO COMBATING HUMAN TRAFFICKING. 

3 Section 107(b)(2) of the Trafficking Victims Protec4 tion Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7105(b)(2)) is amended by 

5 adding at the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(D) PREFERENCES.—The Attorney Gen7 eral shall provide affirmative preferences to ap8 plicants for grant funding under this paragraph 

9 whose grant application includes an attestation 

10 that grant funds awarded to a State or local 

11 law enforcement agency will be used in part to 

12 assist in strengthening efforts to reduce de13 mand for human trafficking through the inves14 tigation and prosecution of persons who solicit 

15 or purchase commercial sex.’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
Carlos Alberto FUENTES-CANALES, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-5969.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 18, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                       4,550,606
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                       5,094,658
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                          0
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                      83,042,848
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                        81,967,400
<LOANS>                                    292,983,398
<ALLOWANCE>                                  1,122,320
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             397,730,270
<DEPOSITS>                                 326,768,250
<SHORT-TERM>                                13,700,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          5,654,950
<LONG-TERM>                                  8,035,362
<COMMON>                                    10,773,820 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                  32,797,888
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             397,730,270
<INTEREST-LOAN>                             11,347,514
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            3,141,642
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               220,546
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            14,709,702
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           7,925,476
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           8,675,261
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        6,034,441
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                   87,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              4,421,243
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,773,896
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   1,765,807
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,765,807
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .27
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .27
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                       0
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                     0
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        0
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                    0
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 13.2 

CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION

      Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, the undersigned  officer of Thomson, a French company (the “Company”), hereby certifies,  to such officer’s knowledge, that the Company’s Annual Report on Form  20-F for the year ended December 31, 2004 (the “Report”) fully complies  with the requirements of § 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly  presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations  of the Company. 

  

| Dated: June 3, 2005 |   | /s/ Julian D. Waldron                          |
|---------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------|
|                |   |                                           |
|                |   | Julian D. Waldron      Chief Financial Officer |

 	The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.
Gregory SCARPA, Jr., petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-6741.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 8, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.

Justice SOTOMAYOR took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Adam Lee LOPEZ, petitioner, v. Warren L. MONTGOMERY, Warden.

No. 18-7429.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 18, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.