NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re:

PRINCESCA N. ENE, 

 Debtor.

BAP No. NC-23-1042-SGB

Bk. No. 21-50901

MEMORANDUM*

PRINCESCA N. ENE,

 Appellant, 

v.

GINA R. KLUMP, Chapter 7 Trustee; 

PATRICE DARISME, 

Appellees.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Northern District of California 

M. Elaine Hammond, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: SPRAKER, GAN, and BRAND, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

 Chapter 71 debtor Princesca N. Ene appeals from an order approving 

a compromise under Rule 9019 between chapter 7 trustee Gina R. Klump 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for 

whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential 

value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 

1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the 

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, and all “Rule” references are to the Federal 

Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 

FILED

NOV 27 2023

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
2

and Ene’s former spouse Patrice Darisme. The compromise resolved a 

claims dispute between Klump and Darisme regarding Darisme’s $5.4 

million claim based on a prepetition family court judgment. At the time of 

the bankruptcy filing, Ene’s appeal from the family court judgment was 

pending (“Family Court Appeal”). The compromise reduced Darisme’s 

claim to $3 million and subordinated it to the claims of Ene’s general 

unsecured creditors. The compromise also resulted in the dismissal with 

prejudice of the Family Court Appeal. Ene argues that Klump undervalued 

the Family Court Appeal, which she believes would have decreased

Darisme’s judgment claim to less than $1 million.

Opposing a Rule 9019 settlement that reduces a creditor’s prepetition 

judgment pending on appeal is an uphill battle. To state the obvious, entry 

of judgment after a contested trial is conclusive evidence of the creditor’s 

claim unless revised on appeal. Contesting the claim necessarily requires

the expenditure of scarce resources and further delays distributions to the 

estate’s creditors. Klump sufficiently explained why she settled the estate’s 

claim objection; the settlement significantly reduced Darisme’s judgment 

and subordinated the claim to the other unsecured creditors’ benefit. In 

making its ruling, the bankruptcy court identified the correct legal 

standard for assessing the compromise. Ene has not asserted, let alone 

established, that any of the bankruptcy court’s findings were illogical, 

implausible, or without support in the record. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
3

FACTS2

Ene filed her chapter 11 petition in July 2021. In her schedules, she

listed a total of $7.1 million in assets and $6.4 million in liabilities. Of the 

liabilities, Ene listed Darisme as having a disputed judgment claim for 

$4,591,121.00. Aside from secured debt of $303,391.00, most of Ene’s other 

liabilities consisted of unsecured attorney’s fee claims held by a handful of 

other creditors. She disputed most of the attorney’s fee claims.

In September 2021, Darisme filed his proof of claim based on the 

family court judgment and attached the judgment and amended judgment 

entered after trial as exhibits. As amended, the proof of claim asserted that 

the following amounts were owed based on the judgment:

Description Citation to 

amended 

family court 

judgment

Amount

Damages under Cal. Fam. Code § 1101(g) for 

breach of fiduciary duty

10:8-9;

12:1

$2,402,645.70

Attorney’s fees 10:19;

15:22-23

$176,141.41

Damages under Cal. Fam. Code § 1101(h) for 

breach of fiduciary duty, with oppression, 

fraud, or malice

10:27-28;

12:4

$1,805,291.50

Sanctions under Cal. Fam. Code § 271 11:11;

16:1-3

$107,043.25

25% ownership interest in Nano Alloys 11:17-18 $785,519.00

2 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically 

filed in the underlying bankruptcy case and adversary proceeding. See Atwood v. Chase 

Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).
4

Additional award for cash paid from Nano 

Alloys and paid to Ene

11:27 $100,000.00

Fair rental value of residence of $1,933.00 per 

month from December 1, 2020 to October 1, 

2021

12:13 $21,263.00

Total $5,400,903.86

That same month, Darisme commenced a nondischargeability action 

against Ene. Darisme alleged that some of the amounts the family court 

awarded in its judgment were nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2), (a)(4), 

(a)(6), and (a)(15).

In January 2022, the bankruptcy court granted Darisme’s motion for 

appointment of a chapter 11 trustee, who promptly moved to convert the 

case to chapter 7. In March 2022, the bankruptcy court granted the motion 

to convert, and Klump was appointed the chapter 7 trustee.

In December 2022, Klump moved for approval of her compromise 

with Darisme. She simultaneously moved to substantively consolidate into 

Ene’s bankruptcy case certain non-debtor entities that Ene allegedly owned 

and controlled. According to Klump, the family court judgment indicated 

that Ene used these non-debtor entities to receive fraudulent transfers of 

her assets to avoid having to give Darisme his share of the couple’s marital 

assets. Klump additionally contended that Ene used funds putatively held 

by these entities as if they were her own personal funds.

As for the compromise, Klump explained that her proposed 

settlement with Darisme would fully and finally resolve their dispute 
5

regarding his $5.4 million claim as well as a related lawsuit brought by 

Nano Alloys, Inc. (“Nano”), one of the entities owned and controlled by 

Ene subject to the substantive consolidation motion. Nano had asserted 

claims against Darisme, and Darisme had filed crossclaims against Nano, 

Ene, and others (collectively, “Nano Litigation”).

Under the settlement, the estate would allow Darisme a general 

unsecured claim in the amount of $3 million against Ene’s estate (and 

against any substantively consolidated entities). In addition to reducing his 

claim by $2.4 million, Darisme agreed to subordinate his claim to those 

allowed claims held by all other general unsecured creditors.3 But Klump 

stated in her notice of the proposed compromise that allowance of 

Darisme’s claim against the bankruptcy estate would be “without prejudice 

to his claims as may be determined against the Debtor.” As Klump noted, 

Darisme had previously filed a nondischargeability action against Ene.

As part of the proposed settlement, Klump and Darisme further 

agreed to stipulate to the dismissal with prejudice of the Family Court 

Appeal and the Nano Litigation. Additionally, Darisme agreed to consent 

to substantive consolidation, and Klump acknowledged her statutory duty 

under § 704(a)(6) to pursue any viable, non-frivolous, and advisable 

objections to Ene receiving a discharge.

3 There is a reference in the compromise motion to certain subordinated tax 

penalties. Darisme’s allowed claim evidently was not being subordinated to the 

subordinated tax penalties.
6

In her declaration in support of the compromise, Klump detailed

why the compromise was in the estate’s best interests. She explained her 

belief that the estate held roughly $7 million in assets in various defunct 

entities, and that Darisme was the primary creditor based on his judgment.

Klump maintained that, absent settlement, numerous complex issues 

would need to be further litigated and would require the services of 

professionals with family law expertise, thereby engendering substantial 

additional risk, cost, and delay in administering the chapter 7 estate.

Klump stated that child and spousal support, and the issues regarding 

credits the former spouses might be required to give to each other, would 

not be resolved by the settlement. These issues would be resolved in the 

family court. According to Klump, however, the chapter 7 estate would 

have no post-settlement stake in these issues. They would only affect Ene 

and Darisme.

As for the allowance of Darisme’s claim in the amount of $3 million, 

Klump and her professionals reviewed the Family Court Appeal and the 

Nano Litigation. Based on their assessment of the litigation, Klump 

concluded that allowance of Darisme’s claim in the agreed-upon amount of 

$3 million was both reasonable and beneficial for the estate.

Ene opposed the compromise. First and foremost, she disputed 

Klump’s assessment of the prospects of successful further litigation. Ene 

had a much more optimistic view of the likely outcome of the Family Court 

Appeal and the Nano Litigation. She projected that the appeal would lead 
7

to reduction of the various sums awarded in the amended family court 

judgment in the following specific amounts:

Description Amended

Judgment

Amount

Ene’s Projected 

Post-Appeal 

Amount

Damages under Cal. Fam. Code 

§ 1101(g) for breach of fiduciary duty

$2,402,645.70 $0

Attorney’s fees $176.141.41 $0

Damages under Cal. Fam. Code 

§ 1101(h) for breach of fiduciary duty, 

with oppression, fraud, or malice

$1,805,291.50 $887,291.00

Sanctions under Cal. Fam. Code § 271 $107,043.25 $107,043.25

25% ownership interest in Nano Alloys $788,519.00 $788,519.00

Additional award for cash paid from 

Nano Alloys and paid to Ene

$100,000.00 $0

Fair rental value of residence of 

$1,933.00 per month from December 1, 

2020 to October 1, 2021

$21,263.00 Omitted from Ene’s 

projections without 

explanation

Total $5,400,903.86 $1,782,853.254

Ene maintained that her projections were supported by the contents 

of a motion for new trial she prepared and filed seeking to challenge the 

amended family court judgment. She attached a copy of this motion to her 

declaration in support of her opposition to the compromise. Among other 

things, she contended in her new trial motion that there was insufficient 

evidence of malice to support most of the family court’s § 1101(h) award.5

4 Ene calculated a different total—$994,334.25—but her total obviously omits the 

$718,519.00 included in Ene’s projections for 25% of Nano Alloys.

5 Neither the parties’ statements nor the record indicate when, whether, or how 
8

Ene raised multiple additional arguments: (1) her projected outcome 

of the appeal was the only correct one; (2) the proposed compromise only 

would benefit Darisme; (3) Darisme was not giving anything of value in 

exchange for the allowance of his claim in the amount of $3 million; (4) she

was being deprived of her “day in court” with respect to the Family Court 

Appeal; (5) because the compromise left unresolved the issues of 

nondischargeability, spousal support, child support, and when and how 

each spouse should receive credits for marital property distributed in 

accordance with the family court’s rulings, the compromise complicated 

rather than simplified the lingering issues for litigation; (6) other general 

unsecured creditors would be paid in full regardless of the compromise

(this argument seems to assume that Ene’s view of the prospects for a 

successful Family Court Appeal would come true); (7) the core issue in the 

bankruptcy case was a two-party dispute between Ene and Darisme that 

should be resolved in family court and not by the bankruptcy court; and 

(8) the compromise failed to balance the estate’s interests against Ene’s 

interests. Most of these arguments were not supported by any reference to 

evidence or law.

In her reply, Klump provided more detail regarding her analysis and 

assessment of the prospects of prevailing in the Family Court Appeal. First, 

she pointed out that Ene’s calculations effectively acknowledged that 

the family court finally disposed of the new trial motion; however, Klump stated that 

the state court issued a tentative ruling to deny the motion.
9

Darisme was entitled to no less than $1,782,853.25. Additionally, Klump 

specifically challenged Ene’s premise that Darisme would be denied any 

recovery for her transfer of 50% of the ownership in Nano to third party 

Wilson Eng.6 Klump explained that the family court had awarded damages 

to Darisme for the loss of the community interest in Nano based on Ene’s 

breach of fiduciary duty rather than recovering the loss as an avoidable 

transfer from Ene. Klump conceded, however, that she believed the 

community interest was overvalued as it did not account for $3.6 million in 

tax liabilities. Klump agreed it was likely that the damages awarded to 

Darisme for the loss of his community interest would be reduced from the 

$2,402,645.70 awarded to $1,502,645.70.

Klump further rejected Ene’s exclusion of any attorney fees, or the 

reimbursement for monies Ene had taken from Nano, awarded to Darisme 

in the judgment. Based on her review, and the absence of a reasonable 

justification by Ene, Klump believed there was no chance that these 

damages would be reversed on appeal.

Based on her review of the appeal and the related documents,

including Ene’s new trial motion, Darisme’s response thereto, and the 

family court’s tentative ruling denying the new trial, Klump maintained

that even after a “successful” appeal, the Darisme claim would end up 

being allowed in an amount of somewhere between $2,847,513.66 and 

6 Eng is one of the named cross-defendants in the Nano Litigation and the 

alleged recipient of the avoidable transfer of a 50% ownership interest in Nano.
10

$4,461,640.36. The ultimate amount of Darisme’s claim, according to 

Klump, largely depended on whether some other valuation of the 

community interest in Nano was required.

Klump also reiterated that the compromise would facilitate the 

efficient administration of the estate and the substantive consolidation of 

the non-debtor entities into the bankruptcy case. Klump believed that the 

compromise ultimately would make it possible to pay in full all general

unsecured creditors other than Darisme.

On January 19, 2023, the bankruptcy court held hearings on both the 

substantive consolidation motion and the compromise motion. The court 

granted the unopposed substantive consolidation motion for the reasons 

set forth in the motion.

As for the compromise motion, Ene rested on her papers. Counsel for 

Darisme represented to the court that he and Klump had spent “significant 

amounts of time” assessing the merits of the Family Court Appeal “and 

that is in large part what persuaded the parties to resolve the issue in the 

way that they have.” The bankruptcy court then made its findings of fact 

and conclusions of law orally on the record. It identified the applicable 

legal standard set forth in Martin v. Kane (In re A & C Properties), 784 F.2d 

1377, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986), which required it to consider the following 

factors: (1) the prospects of success in the litigation, (2) the difficulty of

collecting any resulting judgment, (3) the complexity of the litigation and 

the attendant expense, inconvenience, and delay associated with it, and 
11

(4) the “paramount interest of the creditors,” with “proper deference to 

their reasonable views.” Id.

The court found that the second factor was inapplicable to this 

compromise and that all the other A &C factors favored approval of the 

compromise. The court essentially credited Klump’s assessment of the 

litigation and rejected Ene’s more optimistic view. Among other things, the 

court explained that Ene’s assessment failed to account for certain awards 

and issues that necessarily would raise the aggregate amount of the postappeal judgment claim, even if Klump were to partially prevail on appeal.7

As for the complexity of the litigation, the court found that multiple 

issues were being consensually resolved that otherwise would need to be 

addressed in the state court litigation. According to the court, litigation of 

these issues would be inherently expensive. And the need to retain special 

counsel to represent the estate would take money from the pockets of the 

estate’s creditors.

With respect to the fourth factor—the paramount interest of creditors 

and deference to their reasonable views—the court observed that no 

creditors had opposed the compromise and that the only objecting party 

was Ene. The court additionally opined that capping and subordinating 

7 As part of its ruling, the court declined to consider the contents of a late-filed 

declaration by Adam R. Bernstein filed on January 13, 2023. In addition to being tardily 

filed, the court noted that it contained non-expert opinion testimony and hearsay. Ene 

has forfeited any issues related to the exclusion of the Bernstein declaration by not 

raising them on appeal.
12

Darisme’s claim would enable the other general unsecured creditors to be 

paid in full. The court further noted that, based on Klump’s projections, 

Darisme’s anticipated recovery on its allowed subordinated claim would 

be closer to $2.7 million than the $3 million allowed.

The court similarly rejected Ene’s complaint that the settlement was 

not a global settlement and offered her no benefit. The court reasoned that 

the surviving issues such as Darisme’s nondischargeability action, spousal 

support, and child support did not implicate the estate’s interests or 

involve the chapter 7 trustee. It further opined that spousal and child 

support only could be decided in state court.

On January 27, 2023, the bankruptcy court entered its order 

approving the compromise. Ene timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 

157(b)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUE

Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion when it 

approved the compromise between Klump and Darisme.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for an abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s

compromise order. Spark Factor Design, Inc. v. Hjelmeset (In re Open Med. 

Inst., Inc.), 639 B.R. 169, 180 (9th Cir. BAP 2022), aff’d in two separate 

decisions, Case No. 22-60017, 2023 WL 7123763, Case No. 22-60018, 2023 WL 
13

7122577 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 2023). The bankruptcy court abused its discretion 

if it applied an incorrect legal rule or its factual findings were illogical, 

implausible, or without support in the record. TrafficSchool.com v. Edriver 

Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011).

DISCUSSION

A. Compromise standards.

Rule 9019(a) in relevant part provides that, “[o]n motion by the 

trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a 

compromise or settlement.” To approve a compromise, the bankruptcy 

court must determine that it is “fair and equitable.” In re Open Med. Inst., 

Inc., 639 B.R. at 180 (citing In re A & C Props., 784 F.2d at 1381). For 

purposes of Rule 9019, a proposed compromise is considered “fair and 

equitable” when the bankruptcy court after considering the four A & C 

Properties factors determines that it should approve the proposed 

compromise. In re A & C Props., 784 F.2d at 1381. Those four factors are:

(a) The probability of success in the litigation; (b) the 

difficulties, if any, to be encountered in the matter of collection; 

(c) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense, 

inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; (d) the 

paramount interest of the creditors and a proper deference to 

their reasonable views in the premises.

Id. (citations omitted). When assessing the compromise, a bankruptcy court

“need not rule upon disputed facts and questions of law, but rather only 

canvass the issues. A mini trial on the merits is not required.” Burton v. 
14

Ulrich (In re Schmitt), 215 B.R. 417, 423 (9th Cir. BAP 1997) (citations 

omitted). “If the court were required to do more than canvass the issue[s], 

there would be no point in compromising; the parties might as well go 

ahead and try the case.” In re Open Med. Inst., Inc., 639 B.R. at 181 (quoting 

Suter v. Goedert, 396 B.R. 535, 548 (D. Nev. 2008)).

As A & C Properties explained, “[t]he law favors compromise and not 

litigation for its own sake, and as long as the bankruptcy court amply 

considered the various factors that determined the reasonableness of the 

compromise, the court’s decision must be affirmed.” In re A & C Props., 784 

F.2d at 1381 (citations omitted). On the other hand, the trustee as the 

proponent of the compromise bore the burden of demonstrating to the 

bankruptcy court that the compromise was fair and equitable. Id.

B. Ene’s arguments on appeal.

1. The settlement does not affect future credits Ene and Darisme 

may have.

Ene first argues that the compromise should have fully resolved the 

series of credits provided for in the amended family court judgment. But 

apart from the claims involving Nano, the settlement left any lingering 

questions concerning credits associated with the property division between

Ene and Darisme to be addressed outside of bankruptcy. Klump was aware 

of these credits and the surviving litigation issues relating to them. She

exercised her business judgment to allow Darisme’s claim in the amount of 

$3 million without attempting to resolve the complex issues arising from
15

the remaining property division and resulting credits, some of which 

remained to be determined. As part of the compromise motion

proceedings, Klump provided a detailed breakdown of the credits at issue 

which in total showed aggregate credits potentially owing to Darisme of

$2,903,133.85 and aggregate credits potentially owing to Ene of 

$2,612,484.66. Thus, in the absence of modification of the family court’s 

credit rulings, the net amount of the credits in favor of Darisme would be 

$290,649.19 ($2,903,133.85 - $2,612,484.66 = $290,649.19). Ene has never 

challenged Klump’s stated amounts.

In her opening appeal brief, Ene complained that the estate’s 

settlement unfairly benefited Darisme to her detriment. Ene explained that 

the failure to resolve the credits provided “Creditor with a greater recovery 

than allowed under the Family Court judgment by approving Creditor’s 

claims against the bankruptcy estate but not limiting the claims based on 

the debit credit system of the Amended Judgment.”

We disagree. The compromise only addressed allowance of 

Darisme’s claim for purposes of the trustee’s obligation to distribute estate 

assets to the estate’s creditors. It specifically provided that the allowance of 

Darisme’s claim in the amount of $3 million was for purposes of “full and 

final satisfaction” of his claim against the estate and the entities to be 

substantively consolidated. Critically, the allowance of his claim against the 

estate was “without prejudice to his claims as may be determined against 

the Debtor.” This necessarily cuts both ways. The family court’s ultimate 
16

determination of the net credits will control whether Ene’s personal 

liability increases or decreases. This only matters to the extent that some

part of Ene’s debt is determined to be nondischargeable. Indeed, the 

bankruptcy court’s compromise order further specifically encapsulated this 

concept by stating that, “the Settlement Agreement does not address or 

resolve issues regarding assets not subject to Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction 

or issues involving discharge of debts between Debtor and Patrice 

Darisme.”8

Ene doubtlessly would have preferred to require the estate to litigate 

on her behalf or assist her in obtaining a better deal that limited her 

potential exposure for personal liability in the event her debt to Darisme is 

held to be nondischargeable.

9 But this was not a material concern for the 

8 Furthermore, we express no opinion as to the potential preclusive effect in the

discharge action of the trustee’s dismissal of the family court appeal. See generally

Delannoy v. Woodlawn Colonial, L.P. (In re Delannoy), 2018 WL 4190874, at *7-8 (9th Cir. 

BAP Aug. 31, 2018), aff'd, 833 F. App’x 116 (9th Cir. 2020).

9 The record indicates that Ene made no effort to pursue her pending family 

court appeal after she filed her bankruptcy petition. At oral argument, Ene’s counsel 

was unable to point to anything in the record to suggest that she had sought to further 

the estate’s litigation of the appeal. Though she now makes a passing complaint that she 

has been denied her “day in court” with respect to her appeal, this is a consequence of 

her decision to file bankruptcy which divested her of control of the litigation. § 541(a). 

Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that Ene attempted to acquire the appeal rights or 

fund the estate’s litigation. Rather, Ene left the estate to litigate the appeal and Klump

chose to settle it as part of her administration of the estate. See Delannoy v. Woodlawn 

Colonial, L.P. (In re Delannoy), 615 B.R. 572, 587 (9th Cir. BAP 2020), aff'd, 852 F. App’x 

279 (9th Cir. 2021) (suggesting that debtors might forfeit defensive appeal rights by not 

seeking to preserve or pursue them while the bankruptcy case is pending but noting 

that even when debtors take such steps, the debtor’s voluntary election to file 

bankruptcy necessarily puts the appeal rights at risk of being sold or settled by a 
17

chapter 7 trustee or for the bankruptcy court. Klump, and the court, were

obliged to put the creditors’ interests first. A & C Properties describes the 

interests of creditors as “paramount.” In re A & C Props., 784 F.2d at 1381. It 

additionally requires bankruptcy courts to give due deference to the 

creditors’ views of the settlement and to preserve their rights. Id. at 1384.

This focus on the creditors’ interests necessarily disregards a chapter 7 

debtor’s complaints that a settlement was neither “fair” to her, nor in her 

best interest. Aguina v. Choong-Dae Kang (In re Aguina), 2022 WL 325579, at 

*7 (9th Cir. BAP Feb. 3, 2022), aff'd, 2023 WL 195546 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2023) 

(“In the context of a settlement, the trustee and the court must consider the 

paramount interest of creditors and need not consider the debtor’s 

interest.”); Isom v. Hopkins (In re Isom), 2020 WL 1950905, at *7 (9th Cir. BAP

Apr. 22, 2020), aff'd, 836 F. App’x 562 (9th Cir. 2020).10

bankruptcy trustee to the ultimate detriment of such debtors).

10 Isom noted that to the extent the bankruptcy estate is solvent, the chapter 7 

trustee also owes a fiduciary duty to the debtor. In re Isom, 2020 WL 1950905, at *7 n.5. 

But the mere possibility of a solvent estate does not mean that chapter 7 trustee must 

pursue litigation of questionable value for a debtor’s potential benefit at the creditors’ 

risk and expense. As we explained in Aguina: 

All litigation is risky. Plaintiffs settle cases to gain the certainty of 

recovering something and avoid the risk of recovering nothing. But when 

the plaintiff is a bankruptcy trustee, creditors and the debtor have 

different tolerance for litigation risk. The rewards and risks of litigation 

fall unequally on creditors and debtors, because creditors must get paid in 

full before the debtor receives any distribution. Therefore, a settlement 

that produces money for creditors may be worthless to the debtor. This 

means that debtors often want the trustee to pursue risky litigation, rather 

than settle, in the hope that the recovery will be big enough to pay all 
18

Ene maintains that the primacy of creditors’ interests is somehow 

negated when, as here, creditors of the estate are few. But she has 

presented no authority to support this novel proposition. Nor are we aware 

of any.11

In short, the court properly considered the benefits of the proposed 

settlement and did not abuse its discretion by approving the compromise 

even though it did not resolve Ene’s personal liability, or her and 

Darisme’s credits.

2. Ene failed to demonstrate any error with respect to the 

bankruptcy court’s compromise findings.

The bankruptcy court found that Klump’s settlement with Darisme 

obviated the need for Klump to pursue uncertain litigation which was not 

creditor claims in full and leave something for the debtor. If the gamble 

does not pay off and the litigation is unsuccessful, the creditors have lost 

the benefit of the settlement, while the debtor is no worse off (the debtor 

would have gotten nothing under the settlement and still gets nothing 

when the litigation fails).

In re Aguina, 2022 WL 325579, at *6 (emphasis added).

11 Ene further believes that the court should have denied approval of the 

settlement because the issues involved can be characterized as a two-party dispute that 

must be resolved in state court. The “two-party dispute” argument is typically raised as 

evidence of the debtor’s bad faith supporting dismissal of the bankruptcy. See, e.g., 

Liebmann v. Goden, 629 F. Supp. 3d 314, 323–24 (D. Md. 2022), aff'd sub nom., Rullan v. 

Goden, 2023 WL 4787463 (4th Cir. July 27, 2023) (chapter 7 case); Angelo v. Touch 

Worldwide Holdings Ltd. (In re Angelo), 580 B.R. 862, 866–67 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (chapter 

13 case); Sullivan v. Harnisch (In re Sullivan), 522 B.R. 604, 616–17 (9th Cir. BAP 2014) 

(chapter 11 case). Ene’s contention, even if true, in no way justifies impeding the 

chapter 7 trustee’s administration of the bankruptcy estate.
19

likely to prove as successful as Ene hoped. The court specifically found that 

such litigation would be expensive and would delay the administration of 

the estate. In contrast, the proposed settlement was likely to result in full 

payment of all general unsecured creditors other than Darisme. This led 

the court to conclude that the proposed settlement was in the best interest 

of the estate’s creditors. 

Ene disagrees with these findings. She claims that the benefits to the 

creditors are illusory and that the harm to her is real because continued 

litigation with Darisme necessarily would have led to reduction of 

Darisme’s allowed claim to less than $1 million. But Ene has done nothing 

to explain or demonstrate why the bankruptcy court’s decision was clearly 

erroneous. Ene has failed to show why the court’s reliance on Klump’s 

litigation assessment over her own was illogical, implausible, or without 

support in the record. Neither appellant’s mere disagreement with the 

bankruptcy court’s findings, nor the existence of some conflicting evidence 

are sufficient to establish clear error. Valente v. Nowland (In re Valente), 2023 

WL 3270877, at *8 (9th Cir. BAP May 5, 2023); Haig v. Shart (In re Shart),

2014 WL 6480307, at *13, 15-18 (9th Cir. BAP Nov. 19, 2014). Put differently, 

“[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s 

choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of 

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).

Klump sufficiently established that creditors’ interests would be best 

served by the settlement with Darisme and that the allowance of his claim 
20

in the amount of $3 million was fair and equitable under the circumstances. 

Indeed, the settlement materially incorporated much of the proposed 

benefits of the appeal and materially reduced the estate’s liability. Nothing 

Ene has said in the bankruptcy court or on appeal demonstrates that the 

bankruptcy court clearly erred in rendering its findings in support of 

approving the compromise. As a result, we reject Ene’s argument to the 

extent it challenges the bankruptcy court’s compromise findings.12

Ene voluntarily chose to commence a bankruptcy case. The case was 

duly converted to chapter 7. Put bluntly, in exchange for the benefits and 

protections of bankruptcy, Ene accepted the risk that her assets would be 

liquidated for the benefit of her creditors. As the chapter 7 trustee, Klump

was statutorily obligated to liquidate the estate’s assets and administer 

them for the benefit of creditors. See §§ 704(a)(1), 726. Klump necessarily 

controlled the administration of the estate’s assets, including pending 

appeals and the decision whether to pursue such appeals or consensually 

resolve them. Ene, therefore, is in no position to complain of the perceived 

unfairness of the trustee’s resolution of her defensive appeal within the 

administration of the chapter 7. See In re Delannoy, 615 B.R. at 584, 587.

12 Ene alternately argues that the bankruptcy court erred in approving the 

compromise because it was not a global settlement of all issues and failed to resolve the 

credits issues, spousal support, or child support. She further asserts that the negative 

effect of the settlement on her so dwarfs and outweighs any benefit to the estate that the 

court should not have approved the compromise. These arguments are nothing more 

than variations of the points addressed and rejected above. They fail for the same 

reasons.
21

The settlement between the bankruptcy estate and Darisme 

efficiently resolved outstanding issues and claims that Klump reasonably 

concluded had varying chances of success. The settlement further avoided 

time and costs while materially reducing the creditor’s judgment amount 

and ensuring payment in full of other creditors. Ene does not legitimately 

argue otherwise. Under these circumstances, Ene’s belief that she was 

adversely affected by the compromise is of little or no moment.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM.