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 The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 07-3789

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri. 

David M. Defoor, *

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: June 10, 2008

Filed: August 1, 2008

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Before MELLOY, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

David Defoor appeals the sentence imposed after the district court1

 found he

violated the terms of his supervised release. We affirm. 

I. Background

Defoor pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, a violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g) and a Class C felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (defining a Class C
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felony as an offense with a maximum term of imprisonment of “less than twenty-five

years but ten or more years”). The district court sentenced Defoor to 57 months of

imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Upon the

government’s motion, Defoor’s term of imprisonment was later reduced to 36 months,

but his term of supervised release remained unchanged. 

In July 2007, Defoor completed his 36 months of imprisonment and

commenced his three years on supervised release. In October 2007, the probation

office notified the court of various alleged violations of Defoor’s supervised release

conditions. The district court conducted a revocation hearing. At the revocation

hearing, Defoor admitted violating the terms of his supervised release by using

methamphetamine, but he denied other alleged violations. The government

introduced evidence in support of the other alleged violations, and the district court

concluded Defoor violated the terms of his supervised release by: (1) violating state

law by committing an aggravated assault against Aaron Hassen; (2) using

methamphetamine; (3) using alcohol in excess; (4) failing to report to his probation

officer as required; and (5) associating with a felon. 

Defoor does not appeal the court’s determination as to his violations. However,

we briefly summarize the facts of some of his violations to provide background for his

sentence, which Defoor does challenge. On October 18, 2007, Defoor stabbed Hassen

in the head with a kitchen knife with a five to six inch blade. The resulting six-inch

laceration ran from the top of Hassen’s head to the back of his ear and required staples

and stitches to close. Defoor stabbed Hassen, a felon, because Defoor suspected

Hassen of drinking his vodka. 

Based upon these violations, the district court revoked Defoor’s term of

supervised release. The court determined the assault constituted a grade A violation,

resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 18 to 24 months of imprisonment. See

U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1 & 7B1.4. The court sentenced Defoor to 24 months’
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imprisonment, to be followed by 12 months of supervised release. Defoor did not

object to the sentence. 

II. Discussion

Defoor alleges the district court was not authorized to impose an additional 12

months of supervised release to follow his post-revocation term of imprisonment. He

further contends the new term of supervised release, if within the court’s statutory

authority, was unwarranted and in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), particularly the

“parsimony” doctrine, which provides that the sentence imposed should be the least

severe sanction necessary to achieve the purpose of sentencing. We disagree. 

This court addressed whether an additional term of supervised release exceeds

the district court’s statutory authority in United States v. Walker, 513 F.3d 891 (8th

Cir. 2008), under facts identical to those presented here. Like Defoor, Walker was

sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment and a 12-month term of supervised release

when the district court revoked a term of supervised release imposed after he was

convicted of a Class C and D felony. Id. at 893. Walker claimed the additional term

of supervised release exceeded the punishment authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3583, as

Defoor does. Id. The Walker court analyzed the applicable provisions of § 3583 and

concluded that the “sentence of 24 months of imprisonment plus a term of 12 months

of supervised release does not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by 18

U.S.C. § 3583.” Id. For the reasons set forth in Walker, we conclude the district court

did not exceed its statutory authority in sentencing Defoor. 

We interpret Defoor’s argument that the new term of supervised release was

unwarranted and inconsistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as a challenge to the

reasonableness of the sentence. See United States v. Cotton, 399 F.3d 913, 916 (8th

Cir. 2005) (holding that the Booker “reasonableness” standard applies to revocation
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proceedings). We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuseof-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defoor

to a 12-month term of supervised release, in addition to 24 months of imprisonment.

Defoor violated the terms of his supervised release just three months after his release

from prison. His violations included a serious act of violence. The district court

considered these circumstances, as well as the need to protect society, Defoor’s

criminal history, and Defoor’s need for medical help and counseling, in determining

his sentence. The resulting sentence was not unreasonable. 

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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