UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4183

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff − Appellee,

v.

COREY CHRISTOPHER FELDER,

Defendant − Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. 

(1:09−cr−00306−CCB−1)

Argued: September 23, 2011 Decided: December 13, 2011

Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Motz and Judge Keenan joined.

ARGUED: Lisa Jo Sansone, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. 

Peter Marshall Nothstein, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Warren A. Brown, 

LAW OFFICE OF WARREN A. BROWN, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

Corey Christopher Felder pleaded guilty to one count of 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a), and one count of possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 924(c). Felder reserved the right to appeal the denial 

of a pretrial motion to suppress. On appeal, Felder contends 

the district court erred by failing to suppress evidence 

obtained from a series of searches conducted at two apartments 

he occupied. We find the searches were lawful and therefore

affirm.

I.

A.

Early in the morning on July 10, 2008, officers from the 

Maryland Division of Parole and Probation went to Apartment 707 

at 601 North Eutaw Place, Baltimore, Maryland (“601 N. Eutaw”)

to execute a parole retake warrant for Felder’s brother, Martin 

Felder. Martin Felder had reported to his parole officer that

601 N. Eutaw was his place of residence. Officers entered the 

apartment at approximately 7:00 a.m. to execute the arrest 

warrant but found no one inside. While searching the apartment 

for Martin Felder, officers observed two boxes of .50 caliber 

ammunition in plain view.
3

A maintenance worker at the apartment building confirmed

that Martin Felder lived at 601 N. Eutaw and described his two 

vehicles to officers. Officers observed that neither vehicle 

was present that morning. A second employee told officers that 

Corey Felder was the sole lessee of 601 N. Eutaw and that Corey 

and Martin Felder were in the process of moving out.

Officers relayed their findings to Detective Sergeant Allen 

Meyer of the Baltimore County Police Department who, in turn, 

applied for and obtained a search warrant for 601 N. Eutaw. The 

application for the warrant averred that there was probable 

cause to believe that Martin Felder, who was a convicted felon,

possessed ammunition in violation of state and federal law. 

Although the application and affidavit correctly identified the 

place to be searched and items to be seized, the search warrant 

itself contained several errors. First, the warrant incorrectly 

listed the place to be searched as “8601 N. Eutaw.” Next, in 

reciting the basis for probable cause, the warrant misstated the 

caliber of the ammunition identified by officers—referring to it 

as .25 caliber rather than .50 caliber. The probable cause 

section of the warrant also referred to an individual with no 

connection to the instant case, Jamie Lee Overton, as the 

subject of the search. Finally, the list of items subject to 

seizure referred to a second individual, David Paul Frederick, 

who also had no involvement in the case. Despite the errors, 
4

the warrant correctly identified the apartment number and stated 

that it was occupied by Martin Felder.

Early in the evening on July 10, Meyer and other officers 

executed the search warrant at 601 N. Eutaw. They discovered 

several boxes of ammunition, a bag containing six smaller 

baggies of marijuana, a bag containing cocaine, an 

identification card for Martin Felder, a work identification 

card for Corey Felder covered in suspected cocaine residue, and 

mail addressed to both Felders. Officers also discovered a 

rental truck receipt that indicated Corey Felder had moved to a 

different apartment building in Baltimore located at 511 West

Pratt Street.

Following the search, Meyer went to 511 West Pratt Street

to investigate. There he learned that Corey Felder had recently 

rented and moved in to 511 West Pratt Street, Apartment 1607

(“511 W. Pratt”). Detective Ryan Guinn and other officers went 

to the apartment door and knocked several times with no answer. 

Guinn smelled what he believed to be the strong odor of 

marijuana, and he and the other officers thought they heard

movement from within the apartment. Officers obtained a key 

from building management and entered 511 W. Pratt. They

discovered no one inside but did see in plain view a plastic bag 

containing marijuana and two handguns. Officers then secured 

the apartment while Guinn left to obtain a search warrant.
5

In his affidavit seeking the search warrant, Guinn first 

summarized the evidence discovered by officers during the 

earlier search at 601 N. Eutaw, including the ammunition, bags 

of marijuana, cocaine residue on Corey Felder’s identification 

card, and truck rental receipt that led officers to 511 W. 

Pratt. Next, Guinn described the officers’ observations when 

they arrived at 511 W. Pratt, including that they smelled 

marijuana and heard movement as they stood outside the 

apartment. Finally, Guinn stated that officers saw marijuana 

and handguns in plain view after entering the apartment. The 

judge’s signature indicated the warrant for 511 W. Pratt issued 

at 7:31 p.m.

With the search warrant for 511 W. Pratt in hand, officers 

seized the firearms and marijuana discovered in plain view. 

Additionally, officers found a carry bag containing 

approximately 325 grams of heroin and digital scales, a safe 

containing approximately $71,000 in cash, and a box of 9 mm 

ammunition. The return for the warrant noted that the search of 

511 W. Pratt took place at 7:10 p.m.

While officers were executing the search warrant, Corey 

Felder arrived at 511 W. Pratt. Officers immediately placed 

Felder under arrest and advised him of his Miranda1

 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

rights. 
6

Felder stated that he understood his rights and proceeded to 

answer questions without requesting an attorney. Felder 

confirmed that he had leased the apartment at 511 W. Pratt. He 

also told officers that he had not been selling drugs long and 

that he was not afraid of retaliation for losing the drugs 

because they “were paid for.” J.A. 97.

B.

Felder was charged in a superseding indictment with the 

following four counts: Count One, possession with intent to

distribute cocaine or cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1); Count Two, conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute heroin, cocaine, or cocaine base, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 846; Count Three, possession with intent to distribute 

heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and Count Four, 

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 924(c).2

Prior to trial, Felder moved to suppress all unlawfully 

seized evidence and all involuntary statements or admissions. 

At the suppression hearing, Felder challenged the searches at 

both apartments. Felder argued that the search warrant for 601

 2 Several of Felder’s charges stemmed from evidence obtained 

from a confidential informant who purchased cocaine from Felder. 

We do not recite those facts here, however, because Felder has 

not challenged his conviction on those counts.
7

N. Eutaw contained numerous errors and was therefore invalid,

and that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the

warrantless entry of 511 W. Pratt, which in turn tainted the 

second search warrant.3

The district court concluded that the searches were lawful. 

The court found that the errors in the search warrant for 601 N. 

Eutaw resulted from “careless[ness] with [a] word processor” but 

nevertheless held that the search was “valid” because the 

application for the search contained “the specific accurate 

information on which the search was based.” J.A. 47. With 

respect to the search of 511 W. Pratt, the court did not reach 

the issue of exigent circumstances but instead ignored 

references to what officers saw when they first entered the 

apartment. The court concluded that even without that 

information there was sufficient evidence to support a finding 

of probable cause. Accordingly, the court denied Felder’s 

motion.

 

Felder entered a conditional plea of guilty to Counts One 

and Four of the superseding indictment, reserving his right to 

appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court 

 3 Felder also noted an objection to admission of the 

statements he made to officers following his arrest. The 

district court reserved ruling on the issue but later dismissed 

the claim in a brief order.
8

sentenced Felder to 120 months on Count One and 60 months on 

Count Four to run consecutively. Felder timely appealed.

II.

On appeal, Felder contends that (1) the initial entry of

601 N. Eutaw was unlawful because officers lacked a reasonable

belief Martin Felder was there; (2) the search warrant for 601 

N. Eutaw contained numerous errors and was therefore invalid;

(3) the search of 511 W. Pratt was unlawful because there were 

no exigent circumstances justifying the initial entry and the 

subsequently obtained search warrant was invalid; and (4) 

Felder’s statements to officers were the product of an unlawful 

arrest and were therefore involuntary. We consider each of 

Felder’s claims in turn, reviewing the district court’s factual 

findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United 

States v. Blauvelt, 638 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing 

United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 2009)).

A.

Felder contends that the officers’ entry into 601 N. Eutaw 

to execute the arrest warrant for Martin Felder was unlawful and 

that it tainted the subsequent searches. According to Felder, 

officers did not have reason to believe Martin Felder was at the 
9

apartment the morning of July 10, 2008. We disagree and 

conclude the officers’ entry was lawful.

Officers may enter a home “without a search warrant in 

order to execute an arrest warrant only if ‘there is reason to 

believe [that the subject of the warrant] is within.’ ” United 

States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980)). If officers 

possess the requisite reasonable belief to enter a residence, 

they may search any place within that residence where the 

suspect might be found. United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 

375–76 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 

332-33 (1990)). To determine whether officers may lawfully 

enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant, we apply a twopart test that evaluates “(1) whether there is reason to believe 

that the location is the defendant’s residence, and (2) whether 

or not there was a reasonable belief that he would be home.” 

Hill, 649 F.3d at 262 (citations omitted). 

We consider first whether officers had reason to believe

that Martin Felder was a resident of 601 N. Eutaw. Officers 

initially went to 601 N. Eutaw because Martin Felder reported it 

as his place of residence to parole officials. Parolees are 

obligated to provide parole officers accurate, up-to-date

information regarding their place of residence. Accordingly, we 

find that officers had reason to believe that 601 N. Eutaw was 
10

Martin Felder’s residence. See United States v. Thomas, 429 

F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (concluding officers’ belief as 

to residency was reasonable because “[as] a condition of his 

parole, [the defendant] was required to keep his current address 

on file with his parole supervision officer”); United States v. 

Lovelock, 170 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasizing “that 

probationers are required to report to their probation officers 

any change of residence” as a key factor supporting officers’ 

reasonable belief).

We next consider whether officers had reason to believe 

Martin Felder was home on the morning of July 10 when they

arrived at 601 N. Eutaw to execute the arrest warrant. The 

government relies on the early hour to support the officers’

reasonable belief. Felder counters that the officers could not 

reasonably believe his brother was home that morning because 

information obtained from apartment workers suggested otherwise.

Courts routinely rely on the time of day as a key factor in 

determining whether officers could reasonably believe the 

subject of an arrest warrant was home. E.g., United States v. 

Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236, 1248 (3d Cir. 1995), vacated on other 

grounds, 80 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1996) (reasoning that 6:45 a.m.

was “early enough that it was unlikely someone living in the 

apartment would have already departed for the day”). The 

Eleventh Circuit has noted that “officers may presume that a 
11

person is home at certain times of the day—a presumption which 

can be rebutted by contrary evidence regarding the suspect’s 

known schedule.” United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 

(11th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 

1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2000) (“It was reasonable to believe, in 

the absence of contrary evidence, that [the suspect] would be at 

his residence at 6:00 in the morning.”). Similarly, the D.C. 

Circuit has concluded, without citing any other factors, that 

“the early morning hour was reason enough” for officers to 

believe a defendant was home when they attempted to execute an

arrest warrant between 6:00 and 6:30 a.m. Thomas, 429 F.3d at 

284, 286.

Based on these authorities, we find that it was reasonable 

for officers to believe, absent contrary evidence, that Martin 

Felder was home at 7:00 a.m. on the morning of July 10. Felder 

contends, however, that the officers had such contrary evidence 

because they knew that the apartment was not leased to Martin 

Felder, that Martin Felder’s cars were not in the parking lot, 

and that workers at the apartment building told the officers

that Martin Felder had moved out. The government responds that 

the warrant and affidavit show that the officers learned these 

facts from the apartment workers after the initial entry.
12

Because Felder did not request a Franks4

Although the affidavit does not explicitly delineate the 

chronology, the description of the officers’ initial entry 

appears prior to the summary of their discussions with the 

apartment workers. Accordingly, the logical inference is that 

the officers learned that Martin Felder’s cars were not at the 

apartment complex and that he had recently moved out, after 

their initial entry into the apartment. See United States v. 

Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008) (explaining that where 

the district court denies a defendant’s motion to suppress, we 

construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government) (citing United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 

(4th Cir. 2006)).

hearing to challenge the 

officers’ statements in the warrant affidavit, the district 

court accepted them as true.

We therefore hold that officers had reason to believe both 

that Martin Felder lived at 601 N. Eutaw and that he was home at 

7:00 a.m. on July 10. Accordingly, the officers’ initial entry 

into the apartment at 601 N. Eutaw was lawful and did not taint 

the subsequent searches.

 4 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
13

B.

In the alternative, Felder argues that even if the initial 

entry into 601 N. Eutaw was lawful, the search warrant contained 

so many errors that it was invalid and could not be relied on by 

a reasonable officer. Felder notes that the warrant incorrectly 

identified the caliber of the ammunition observed by the 

officers in plain view, misstated the address of the apartment, 

and referred to two individuals with no connection to the 

instant case. The district court determined that these errors 

were the result of drafters who were “careless with their word 

processor” but nevertheless concluded that the search warrant 

was valid. J.A. 47. We agree.

The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment requires any 

warrant to “particularly describe[] the place to be searched, 

and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

A search warrant satisfies the particularity requirement if the 

description enables an officer to ascertain and identify the 

place to be searched with reasonable effort. United States v. 

Owens, 848 F.2d 462, 463 (4th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, “[a]n 

erroneous description . . . does not necessarily invalidate a 

warrant and subsequent search.” Id. Furthermore, we have held 

that “[a]s a general rule, a supporting affidavit or document 

may be read together with (and considered part of) a warrant 

that otherwise lacks sufficient particularity ‘if the warrant 
14

uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting 

document accompanies the warrant.’ ” United States v. Hurwitz, 

459 F.3d 463, 470–71 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 

540 U.S. 551, 557–58 (2004)).

Here, despite the typographical errors, the warrant for 601 

N. Eutaw correctly described Apartment 707 as the place to be 

searched and identified Martin Felder as a resident. The 

warrant also expressly incorporated and attached the affidavit 

filed in support of the search warrant. And unlike the warrant, 

the affidavit correctly stated the address of 601 N. Eutaw. 

Thus, although the warrant was not prepared with care, it, along 

with the incorporated affidavit, was sufficient to enable 

officers to identify the place subject to search and items 

subject to seizure. Accordingly, the warrant satisfied the 

Fourth Amendment and was valid.

C.

With respect to the search of 511 W. Pratt, Felder contends 

that the officers’ initial entry was not justified by exigent 

circumstances and that the unlawful entry tainted the 

subsequently obtained warrant. We need not reach the issue of 

exigent circumstances, however, because the warrant was 

supported by probable cause even without the evidence obtained 

as a result of the officers’ initial entry.
15

The determination by a judicial officer to issue a warrant 

on probable cause involves “a practical commonsense decision 

whether, given all the circumstances[,] . . . there is a fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 

in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 

(1983). When a warrant is supported in part by evidence 

obtained in an unlawful search, we routinely exclude that 

evidence and consider whether probable cause exists based on the 

remaining facts. E.g., United States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 164, 

173 (4th Cir. 2011). Under this approach, a warrant is valid if 

after excising the unlawfully obtained evidence, there is

“sufficient untainted evidence . . . to establish probable 

cause.” Id. (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 

(1984)); United States v. Moses, 540 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 

2008).

Probable cause for the 511 W. Pratt search warrant was 

based both on the prior search at 601 N. Eutaw and evidence from 

the initial entry at 511 W. Pratt. The first two paragraphs of 

the affidavit recounted the evidence recovered from the search 

at 601 N. Eutaw, including the ammunition, drugs, identification 

cards, and truck rental receipt that led officers to 511 W. 

Pratt. The third paragraph highlighted the circumstances that 

led to the officers’ initial entry at 511 W. Pratt, including 

the smell of marijuana and sound of movement from within the 
16

apartment. Finally, the third paragraph described the marijuana 

and handguns that officers observed in plain view after entering

the apartment. 

Like the district court, we need not consider whether 

exigent circumstances justified the officers’ initial 

warrantless entry into 511 W. Pratt. Even after excising the 

third paragraph describing the results of the initial entry, the 

affidavit for 511 W. Pratt contained sufficient evidence to 

establish probable cause. The affidavit averred that officers 

seized evidence of drugs and weapons from 601 N. Eutaw,

collected evidence tying Felder to the contraband, suspected 

Felder had moved to 511 W. Pratt based on the truck rental 

receipt, and confirmed with building management that he had 

recently rented the apartment. Based on this information alone, 

there was probable cause to believe officers would locate 

evidence of criminal activity at 511 W. Pratt. Cf. United 

States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 218 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is 

reasonable to suspect that a drug dealer stores drugs in a home 

to which he owns a key.”).

Felder nevertheless contends for the first time on appeal 

that no reasonable officer could have believed the warrant for 

511 W. Pratt was valid because it was signed following execution 

of the search. Felder points out that the note in the judge’s 

signature block for the 511 W. Pratt search warrant indicated it 
17

was signed at 7:31 p.m., while the return stated that the search 

occurred at 7:10 p.m. According to Felder, this discrepancy 

proves officers executed an unsigned warrant. We disagree.

Because Felder did not raise this issue in the district 

court, we review for plain error, which requires Felder to 

demonstrate an error that is plain and affects substantial 

rights. United States v. Claridy, 601 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 

2010). The discrepancy in the time notations could very well 

have been clerical in nature. In any event, because Felder did 

not alert the district court to the issue, it did not receive 

testimony or make any specific findings. There is no question, 

however, that a judge ultimately signed the warrant and that it

was supported by probable cause. Accordingly, we find no plain 

error and hold that the warrant was valid.

D.

Finally, Felder contends that the statements he made to 

officers following his arrest were tainted by the illegal search 

and must be suppressed. Felder concedes that officers 

administered Miranda warnings and that his statements were not 

otherwise involuntary. Because we conclude that the searches 

were lawful, we reject Felder’s argument and hold that his 

statements were voluntary.
18

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court.

AFFIRMED