1

 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

2

 The Honorable Charles A. Shaw, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 03-1126

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United States of America, *

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Kenneth White, * 

* 

Appellant. *

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Submitted: September 9, 2003

Filed: January 26, 2004 

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Before SMITH, LAY, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.

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SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Kenneth White appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession of a

firearm.1

 White contends the clerical deficiencies in a police search warrant and in the

district court's2

 jury instructions should invalidate his conviction. We disagree and

affirm.
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I.

On February 26, 2002, based on evidence obtained through a confidential

informant ("CI"), Officer Joseph Crews sought a search warrant to search 3515

Minnesota Street in St. Louis, Missouri. In the affidavit, Crews stated that a week

earlier, a CI visited White's residence and reported the visit to Crews. While at

White's residence, the CI observed White (known to the CI as "Stink") in possession

of crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana and saw him sell narcotics to several

individuals. The CI also informed Crews that White protected his business with a

handgun and a rifle stored at the residence. The affidavit showed that within twentyfour hours of the warrant application, Officer Crews and another officer had

surveilled the residence twice. Each time, they observed several individuals enter the

residence, stay briefly, and then leave. 

Crews presented the search warrant application and affidavit to a state court

judge on February 26, 2002. The judge acknowledged Officer Crews's signature on

both documents, and the date and time were entered at the bottom of the application

and affidavit. The judge found probable cause and issued the warrant. In doing so, he

specifically referenced the warrant application and affidavit. The dates on the

affidavit and the warrant application did not match. A typewritten date of February

13, 2002, appeared on the warrant, rather than February 26, 2002, the actual date of

the warrant application.

Officer Crews testified that the date of February 13, 2002, appeared on the

warrant due to a clerical error. Officer Crews used a pre-typed search warrant

application form in applying for the warrant. The date of February 13, 2002, from a

previous warrant application remained in the date space; however, Crews failed to

change the date to February 26, 2002, when he submitted the application. The

previous date was in a different typeface than the information entered on February 26,

2002. Neither the affiant nor the judge noticed the clerical error, and the warrant was

signed and dated by the judge on February 26, 2002. 
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On February 28, 2002, Officer Crews and approximately ten other officers

executed the search warrant seeking cocaine, heroin, marijuana, weapons, currency,

and other items identified in the warrant. Upon arrival, the uniformed officers

knocked on the door and loudly announced their identities and that they had a search

warrant. After receiving no answer, the officers forced open the door to the home.

Upon entry, the officers found five individuals, illegal narcotics, and a

handgun. One male, later identified as White, was found in the bathroom. They asked

White whether his nickname was "Stink," and he said "yes." The officers then

performed a pat-down search (for officer safety) of White. During the pat-down, the

officers found marijuana in the pocket of White's pants. As Officer Crews grasped the

marijuana, White said, "[i]t's just weed." They also found crack cocaine and keys in

the front pocket of White's pants. At this point, White was read his Miranda rights

and placed under arrest.

During the search, the officers noticed a locked cabinet in White's bedroom.

The officers unlocked the cabinet with one of the keys found on White's person, and

found heroin, marijuana, currency, a scale, a blender, and a Sturm Ruger .357

revolver. After the search was complete, White was advised of all of the items seized.

White was again read his Miranda rights. White stated that he understood his rights.

According to the officers, he did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs or

alcohol. An officer asked White if he wanted to talk about anything that had

transpired, and White responded by saying that his life was over and that he had

nothing to lose. 

On March 14, 2002, the federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment

charging White as a felon in possession of a Sturm Ruger .38 revolver. However, the

gun found at White’s residence was a Sturm Ruger .357 revolver. White's trial

commenced on October 7, 2002. The jury found White guilty of being a felon in

possession of a firearm. On December 27, 2002, the district court issued a final
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judgment of conviction and sentenced him, finding White in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. This appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, White argues that the search warrant used to search his residence

was facially invalid because of an incorrect date. White also claims that the

confiscated drugs and drug-related evidence were inadmissible as evidence of a

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Lastly, White argues that the jury instructions

were misleading and caused the jury to speculate. We will review each of these

contentions in turn.

A.

First, White asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress evidence seized in the search, arguing that, because of an incorrect date

typed on the pre-printed application form, officers obtained evidence in violation of

his Fourth Amendment rights. In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we

examine for clear error the factual findings underlying the district court's denial of the

motion and review de novo the ultimate question of whether the Fourth Amendment

has been violated. United States v. Allen, 297 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 2002) (internal

quotations omitted). We will uphold the district court's denial of a motion to suppress

if it had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. United States

v. Smith, 63 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 1995). Our review convinces us that sufficient

credible information supported a finding of probable cause for the issuance of the

warrant.

The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV.

Under the standard established in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the task of

a judge issuing a search warrant is to determine if a warrant sufficiently describes the
3

 In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court carved out

a good-faith exception reasoning that evidence should not be suppressed where police

officers rely in reasonable good-faith on a properly-obtained warrant that proves to

be invalid. 

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place to be searched, enabling the executing officer to locate and identify the

premises with reasonable effort, and whether there is any reasonable probability that

other premises might be mistakenly searched. United States v. Nichols, 344 F.3d 793,

797 (8th Cir. 2003). The duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the judge

had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois, 462 U.S.

at 238–39. "Courts are to interpret affidavits in a nontechnical, common-sense

fashion, and the [judge's] determination of probable cause is entitled to great

deference." United States v. Arenal, 768 F.2d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1985). 

White's challenge to the validity of the warrant is without merit. White urges

that the incorrect date on the face of the warrant renders it invalid for lack of

sufficient probable cause. We disagree. Our court recently addressed the technicality

issue in United States v. Thomas, 263 F.3d 805, 806 (8th Cir. 2001). In Thomas,

police officers searched appellant's apartment at 3202 South 62nd Street, but the

warrant used by the officers contained a previous address occupied by the appellant.

Id. The officer prepared a search warrant for the appellant's previous address five

days earlier, but had decided not to execute the warrant. Within six days, however,

the appellant moved to a new address, and the officer overseeing the case began

surveilling the new apartment. Less than ten days after the first warrant request was

drafted, the officer prepared an application and affidavit, which included the proper

address and a detailed description of the premises to be searched, in support of the

warrant. Id. However, the officer used the previous warrant he had prepared and

forgot to update the address. Id. at 807. Neither the issuing judge nor the officer

noticed the incorrect address on the warrant. Id. We reasoned that the officer made

an error by submitting the wrong address; however, the warrant could be saved under

the good-faith exception.3 Id. at 808. As a result, we concluded that the wrong address
4

 Fed. R. Evid. 403 states in part, "Although relevant, evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice . . . ."

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found in the warrant was nothing more than a clerical error and that the officers in

good-faith relied on the warrant and should not be punished for the judge's oversight.

Thomas, 263 F.3d at 809. We held that despite the clerical error, the issuing judicial

officer, as the final reviewing authority, bears the primary responsibility for ensuring

the accuracy of the warrant. Id. at 809

Here, the inconsistency between the date on the warrant-application form and

the date on the search warrant does not eliminate probable cause. The warrant

described the premises and items to be seized with particularity. Crews testified that

it was common practice for him to re-use application forms when applying for a

search warrant. Crews failed to change the date typed onto his pre-printed application

form. The district court found Crews's testimony of a clerical error credible. Based

upon our review, the district court's denial of White's motion to suppress was not

clearly erroneous. 

B.

Second, White claims that evidence of his drug possession was inadmissible

at trial because this evidence was not probative of firearm possession. White argues

that the court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 4034

 in denying

his motion to exclude certain prejudicial evidence. Specifically, White asserts that

admitting evidence of drug possession or drug dealing in the prosecution of the

charge of a felon in possession of a firearm deprived White of a fair trial. Reviewing

the relevant precedents and evidence rules, we conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion.
5

 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) provides: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or act is not admissible to prove the

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It

may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or

absence of mistake or accident . . . . 

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Evidentiary rulings of the district court are reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard. United States v. Becht, 267 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing

United States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999)). Great deference is

given to the district court's determination in balancing the prejudicial effect and

probative value of evidence of other crimes. United States v. Simon, 767 F.2d 524,

526 (8th Cir. 1985). We will reverse only when the evidence admitted clearly has no

bearing on any issue involved. Id.

Rule 404(b)5

 is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion and admits evidence

of other crimes or acts relevant to any issue in the trial, unless it tends to prove only

criminal disposition. Simon, 767 F.2d at 526. A trial judge acts within his sound

discretion in admitting evidence of wrongful acts when the evidence is relevant to an

issue in question other than the defendant's character; clear and convincing evidence

exists that the defendant committed the prior wrongful act; and the potential unfair

prejudice of the evidence does not substantially outweigh its probative value. Id.;

United States v. Smith, 49 F.3d 475, 478 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sykes, 977

F.2d 1242, 1246 (8th Cir. 1992). 

In the instant case, the drug-related evidence was related to White's firearm

possession. Our court recognizes the known correlation between drug dealing and

weapons, and accepts that they are closely and integrally related to the issue of
6

 Section 922(g)(1) criminalizes the knowing possession a firearm by a person

who has been convicted in a court of the United States, or of a state or any political

subdivision thereof, of a felony, if the firearm was in or affecting interstate or foreign

commerce.

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possession of a firearm. See Smith, 49 F.3d at 478; Simon, 767 F.2d at 527. We allow

a factfinder to infer a connection between drugs and firearms when a defendant

distributes quantities of illegal drugs because firearms are viewed as a tool of the

trade for drug dealers. United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 686 (8th Cir. 1997).

The fact that drugs were found in White's possession bears some relevance to the

issue of whether White was in possession of the firearm. Testimony and evidence

presented at trial showed that White used the firearm to protect himself and the drugs

found in his residence; the keys used to unlock the cabinet were found on White's

person; and the drugs found inside the cabinet were with the firearm, indicating that

the drugs and firearm were integrally related. The potential unfairness of admitting

evidence of White's drug possession was outweighed by its probative value. We find

no abuse of discretion.

C.

Finally, White contends that he was denied a fair trial because the jury

instructions misidentified the firearm found in White's possession. Specifically, White

contends that the jury was unable to answer whether White possessed the specific

firearm alleged in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).6

 The jury instructions included

a definition of a felon in possession of a firearm as follows:

. . . a defendant herein, having been convicted previously of crimes

punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 1 year under the laws

of the State of Missouri, did knowingly and intentionally possess a

firearm to wit: a Sturm Ruger .38 revolver . . .
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However, the gun recovered during the search of White's residence was a Sturm

Ruger .357 revolver. 

The trial court has broad discretion to instruct the jury, which will not be

disturbed on appeal unless the instructions, taken as a whole, are confusing or

misleading in presenting the principles of law applicable to the case. Feingold v.

United States, 49 F.3d 437, 439 (8th Cir. 1995). 

A specific type of firearm possessed by a felon is not an essential element of

the offense charged under § 922(g)(1). The elements do not require proof of a specific

firearm, but merely require a defendant to knowingly and intentionally possess a

firearm. The instructions, therefore, did not misstate the law. We are satisfied that the

instructions clearly and properly explained to the jury the legal principles governing

the case. 

III.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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