**Case T-133/07**

**Mitsubishi Electric Corp.**

**v**

**European Commission**

(Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Market in gas insulated switchgear projects – Decision finding an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement – Market-sharing – Rights of the defence – Proof of the infringement – Duration of the infringement – Fines – Starting amount – Reference year – Equal treatment)

Summary of the Judgment

1.      *Competition – Administrative procedure – Observance of the rights of the defence – Access to the file – Scope – Failure to
communicate a document – Consequences*

*(Art. 81(1) EC; EEA Agreement, Art. 53(1))*

2.      *Competition – Administrative procedure – Observance of the rights of the defence – Communication of responses to the statement
of objections – Conditions – Limits*

*(Art. 81(1) EC; EEA Agreement, Art. 53(1))*

3.      *Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Agreements between undertakings – Evidence of the infringement
– Written witness statements of employees of a company involved in an infringement – Probative value – Assessment*

*(Art. 81(1) EC)*

4.      *Competition – Administrative procedure – Statement of objections – Provisional nature – Necessary content – Limits*

*(Art. 81 EC)*

5.      *Community law – Principles – Fundamental rights – Presumption of innocence – Procedure in competition matters*

*(Art. 6(2) EU; Art. 81(1) EC; EEA Agreement, Art. 53(1))*

6.      *Competition – Administrative procedure – Commission decision finding an infringement – Means of proof – Reliance on a body
of evidence*

*(Art. 81(1) EC)*

7.      *Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Agreements between undertakings – Evidence of the infringement
– Assessment of the probative value of various items of evidence – Criteria*

*(Art. 81(1) EC; EEA Agreement, Art. 53(1))*

8.      *Competition – Administrative procedure – Commission decision finding an infringement – Burden on the Commission of proving
the infringement and its duration*

*(Art. 81(1) EC; Commission Notice 2002/C 45/03)*

9.      *Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Agreements between undertakings – Adverse effect on competition
– Criteria for assessment – Anti-competitive purpose – Sufficient finding*

*(Art. 81(1) EC; EEA Agreement, Art. 53(1))*

10.    *Competition – Administrative procedure – Commission decision finding an infringement – Burden on the Commission of proving
the infringement and its duration – Extent of the burden of proof*

*(Art. 81(1) EC; EEA Agreement, Art. 53(1))*

11.    *Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Gravity and duration of the infringement – Discretion of the Commission*

*(Article 81(1) EC; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2) and (3))*

12.    *Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Compliance with the principles of equal treatment and proportionality*

*(Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2); Commission Notice 98/C 9/03, Section 1A)*

1.      A corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, the right of access to the file means that, in administrative
proceedings concerning the application of the competition rules, the Commission must give the undertaking concerned the opportunity
to examine all the documents in the investigation file which may be relevant for its defence. Those documents include both
incriminating and exculpatory evidence, save where the business secrets of other undertakings, the internal documents of the
Commission or other confidential information are involved.

The failure to communicate a document on which the Commission based its decision to inculpate an undertaking constitutes a
breach of the rights of the defence only if the undertaking concerned shows that the result at which the Commission arrived
in its decision would have been different if the document which was not communicated had to be disallowed as incriminating
evidence.

Where an exculpatory document has not been communicated, the undertaking concerned must only establish that its non-disclosure
was able to influence, to its disadvantage, the course of the proceedings and the content of the decision of the Commission.
It is sufficient for the undertaking to show that it would have been able to use the exculpatory document for its defence,
in the sense that, had it been able to rely on it during the administrative procedure, it would have been able to invoke evidence
which was not consistent with the inferences made at that stage by the Commission and therefore could have had an influence,
in any way at all, on the assessments made by the Commission in the decision, at least as regards the gravity and duration
of the conduct in which the undertaking was found to have engaged and, accordingly, the level of the fine.

(see paras 40, 45-46)

2.      In the context of proceedings brought for infringement of the competition rules, it is not until the beginning of the inter
partes administrative stage that the undertaking concerned is informed, by means of the notification of the statement of objections,
of all the essential evidence on which the Commission relies at that stage of the procedure and that that undertaking has
a right of access to the file in order to ensure that its rights of defence are effectively exercised. Consequently, the replies
to the statement of objections of the other undertakings alleged to have participated in the cartel are not, in principle,
included in the documents of the investigation file that the parties may consult.

However, if the Commission wishes to rely on a passage in a reply to a statement of objections or on a document annexed to
such a reply in order to prove the existence of an infringement in a proceeding under Article 81(1) EC, the other undertakings
involved in that proceeding must be placed in a position in which they can express their views on such evidence. In such circumstances
the passage in question from a reply to the statement of objections or the document annexed thereto constitutes incriminating
evidence against the various undertakings alleged to have participated in the infringement.

By analogy, if a passage in a reply to a statement of objections or in a document annexed to such a reply may be relevant
for the defence of an undertaking in that it enables that company to invoke evidence which is not consistent with the inferences
made at that stage by the Commission, it constitutes exculpatory evidence. In that case, the undertaking concerned must be
authorised to examine the passage or the document concerned and to give its view thereon.

(see paras 41-43)

3.      The written witness statements of the employees of a company, drawn up under the supervision of that company and submitted
by it in its defence in the administrative procedure for infringement of the competition rules carried out by the Commission
cannot, in principle, be classed as evidence which is both different from, and independent of, the statements made by that
same company. Generally speaking, the position of a company as to the truth of the facts set out against it by the Commission
is based, primarily, on the knowledge and opinions of its employees and management.

(see para. 59)

4.      In the context of administrative proceedings in competition cases, the statement of objections must set forth clearly all
the essential facts upon which the Commission is relying at that stage of the procedure. However, that may be done summarily
and the decision is not necessarily required to be a replica of the Commission’s statement of objections, since the statement
of objections is a preparatory document containing assessments of fact and of law which are purely provisional in nature.
Thus, although the Commission cannot allege that the persons concerned have committed infringements other than those referred
to in the statement of objections and may take into consideration only facts on which the persons concerned have had the opportunity
of making known their views, it must however take into account the factors emerging from the administrative procedure in order
either to abandon such complaints as have been shown to be unfounded or to supplement and redraft its arguments both in fact
and in law in support of the complaints which it maintains.

(see para. 66)

5.      Any doubt in the mind of the Court must operate to the advantage of the undertaking to which the decision finding an infringement
of Article 81(1) EC was addressed. The Court cannot therefore conclude that the Commission has established the infringement
at issue to the requisite legal standard if it still entertains any doubts on that point, in particular in proceedings for
annulment of a decision imposing a fine.

In the latter situation, it is necessary to take account of the principle of the presumption of innocence resulting in particular
from Article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights, which is one of the fundamental rights which are general principles
of Community law. Given the nature of the infringements in question and the nature and degree of gravity of the ensuing penalties,
the principle of the presumption of innocence applies in particular to the procedures relating to infringements of the competition
rules applicable to undertakings that may result in the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments.

(see paras 73-74)

6.      As regards competition, the Commission must show precise and consistent evidence in order to establish the existence of the
infringement. However, it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy those criteria
in relation to every aspect of the infringement. It is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by the institution, viewed
as a whole, meets that requirement.

In addition, as anti-competitive agreements are known to be prohibited, the Commission cannot be required to produce documents
expressly attesting to contacts between the traders concerned. The fragmentary and sporadic items of evidence which may be
available to the Commission should, in any event, be capable of being supplemented by inferences which allow the relevant
circumstances to be reconstituted. The existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement may therefore be inferred from
a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, can, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute
evidence of an infringement of the competition rules.

Moreover, where the Commission bases its decision solely on the conduct of the undertakings at issue on the market to conclude
that there was an infringement of Article 81(1) EC, it is sufficient for those undertakings to prove the existence of circumstances
which cast the facts established by the Commission in a different light and thus allow another, plausible explanation of those
facts to be substituted for the one adopted by the Commission in concluding that the Community competition rules had been
infringed.

That rule does not apply to all cases in which the infringement is established solely on the basis of non‐documentary evidence.
As regards the evidence which may be relied on to establish an infringement of Article 81 EC, the prevailing principle of
Community law is the unfettered evaluation of evidence.

Consequently, even if the lack of documentary evidence may be relevant in the global assessment of the set of indicia relied
on by the Commission, it does not, in itself, enable the undertaking concerned to call the Commission’s claims into question
by submitting an alternative explanation of the facts. That is only the case where the evidence submitted by the Commission
does not enable the existence of the infringement to be established unequivocally and without the need for interpretation.

(see paras 75-76, 79-82)

7.      In the context of proceedings concerning infringement of Article 81(1) EC, the sole criterion relevant in evaluating the different
items of evidence is their reliability. According to the general rules regarding evidence, the reliability and, thus, the
probative value of a document depends on its origin, the circumstances in which it was drawn up, the person to whom it is
addressed and its content.

As regards statements made by undertakings, particularly high probative value may be attached to those which, first, are reliable,
second, are made on behalf of an undertaking, third, are made by a person under a professional obligation to act in the interests
of that undertaking, fourth, go against the interests of the person making the statement, fifth, are made by a direct witness
of the circumstances to which they relate and, sixth, were provided in writing deliberately and after mature reflection.

However, a statement by one undertaking accused of having participated in a cartel, the accuracy of which is contested by
several other undertakings similarly accused, cannot be regarded as constituting adequate proof of an infringement committed
by the latter unless it is supported by other evidence, though the degree of corroboration required may be less in view of
the reliability of the statements at issue.

(see paras 84-87)

8.      Even if some caution as to the evidence provided voluntarily by the main participants in an unlawful cartel is generally called
for, considering the possibility that those participants have a tendency to provide most of the incriminating evidence in
relation to the activity of their competitors, the fact remains that seeking to benefit from the application of the Commission
notice on immunity from fines and reductions of fines in cartel cases in order to obtain immunity from, or a reduction of,
the fine does not necessarily create an incentive to submit distorted evidence in relation to the participation of the other
members of the cartel. Indeed, any attempt to mislead the Commission could call into question the sincerity and the completeness
of the cooperation of the person seeking leniency, and thereby jeopardise its chances of benefiting fully under the Leniency
Notice.

As regards the particular case of witness statements, it is indeed possible that the employees of an undertaking which has
sought leniency, who are required to act in the interests of the undertaking, have a common desire to submit as much incriminating
evidence as possible since their cooperation in the procedure may also have a positive impact on their future career. However,
if that is the case, the employees at issue will also be aware of the possible negative consequences of submitting inaccurate
evidence, which are more sensitive given the requirement for corroboration.

(see paras 88,107)

9.      In order for there to be an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC and Article 53(1) of the Agreement on the European
Economic Area (EEA), it is sufficient that the undertakings in question expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves
on the market in a specific way. There is no need to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement when it is apparent
that it has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. In that regard, the existence of a mutual
agreement necessarily implies the existence of a meeting of minds, even if there is no evidence which makes it possible to
determine with precision the exact point in time that meeting of minds was manifested or which formalised its expression.

(see paras 230-231)

10.    When there is a dispute concerning the existence of an infringement, the requirement of legal certainty, on which economic
operators are entitled to rely, means that the Commission, which bears the burden of proving infringements which it finds,
must adduce evidence which will sufficiently establish the existence of the facts constituting the infringement. With specific
regard to the alleged duration of an infringement, the same principle of legal certainty requires that, if there is no evidence
directly establishing the duration of an infringement, the Commission should adduce at least evidence of facts sufficiently
proximate in time for it to be reasonable to accept that that infringement continued uninterruptedly between two specific
dates.

In addition, the fact that the evidence of the existence of a continuous infringement was not adduced for certain specific
periods does not preclude the infringement from being regarded as having been established during a more extensive overall
period than those periods, provided that such a finding is based on objective and consistent indicia. In the context of an
infringement extending over a number of years, the fact that a cartel reveals itself at different periods, which may be separated
by more or less lengthy intervals, has no impact on the existence of that cartel, provided that the various actions which
form part of the infringement pursue a single aim and come within the framework of a single and continuous infringement.

(see paras 241-242)

11.    In the context of proceedings concerning infringement of Article 81(1) EC, the Commission has a margin of discretion when
fixing the amount of fines, in order that it may direct the conduct of undertakings towards compliance with the competition
rules.

The amount of the fine is set by the Commission according to the gravity of the infringement and, where appropriate, to its
duration. The gravity of an infringement has to be determined by reference to criteria such as the particular circumstances
of the case, its context and the dissuasive effect of the fines. Objective factors such as the content and duration of the
anti-competitive conduct, the number of incidents and their intensity, the extent of the market affected and the damage to
the economic public order must be taken into account. The analysis must also take into consideration the relative importance
and market share of the undertakings responsible and also any repeated infringements.

(see paras 264-265)

12.    Each time the Commission decides to impose fines pursuant to competition law, it must observe general principles of law, which
include the principles of equal treatment and proportionality as interpreted by the Community Courts.

The principle of equal treatment or non‐discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently
and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified.

Thus, to the extent to which reliance is to be placed on the turnover of undertakings involved in the same infringement for
the purpose of determining the proportions between the fines to be imposed, the period to be taken into consideration must
be ascertained in such a way that the resulting turnovers are as comparable as possible.

The principle of proportionality, for its part, requires that measures adopted by Community institutions do not exceed the
limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question;
when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages
caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.

Thus, when the Commission relies on different years to determine the value of the worldwide sales of certain undertakings
and calculates the starting amount of the fines to be imposed on them for the period of their participation in a cartel as
individual undertakings on the basis of their turnover made in different years, it does not treat those undertakings equally.
Although the objective referred to by the Commission is legitimate since it makes it possible to compare the capacity of the
shareholders of a joint venture to harm competition during the period prior to the creation of the joint venture, it does
not justify, however, such unequal treatment where it is evident that the Commission could have used other methods to achieve
its objective without treating the undertakings unequally in its choice of reference year.

(see paras 266-269, 271-272, 275-276)

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)

12 July 2011 (*)

(Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Market in gas insulated switchgear projects – Decision finding an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement – Market-sharing – Rights of the defence – Proof of the infringement – Duration of the infringement – Fines – Starting amount – Reference year – Equal treatment)

In Case T-133/07,

**Mitsubishi Electric Corp.,** established in Tokyo (Japan), represented by R. Denton, Solicitor, and K. Haegeman, lawyer,

applicant,

v

**European Commission,** represented initially by F. Arbault and J. Samnadda, then by X. Lewis, and subsequently by P. Van Nuffel and J. Bourke, and
finally by P. Van Nuffel and N. Khan, acting as Agents,

defendant,

APPLICATION, primarily, for the annulment of Commission Decision C (2006) 6762 final of 24 January 2007 relating to a proceeding
under Article 81 [EC] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas insulated switchgear) to the extent to
which it concerns the applicant and TM T & D, in the alternative, for the annulment of Article 2(g) of that decision and Article
2(h) thereof, to the extent to which it concerns the applicant and, in the further alternative, amendment of Article 2 of
that decision so as to cancel or, failing which, reduce the fine imposed on the applicant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber),

composed of I. Pelikánová (Rapporteur), President, K. Jürimäe and S. Soldevila Fragoso, Judges,

Registrar: C. Kantza, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 11 December 2009,

gives the following

**Judgment**

**Background to the dispute**

1.     *Applicant*

1        The applicant, Mitsubishi Electric Corp., is a Japanese company active in various sectors, in particular the sector for gas-insulated
switchgear (‘GIS’). Between October 2002 and April 2005, its GIS business was carried on within a joint venture, TM T & D
Corp., jointly owned in equal shares with Toshiba Corp. and dissolved in 2005.

2.     *Goods*

2        GIS is used to control energy flow in electricity grids. It is heavy electrical equipment, used as a major component for power
sub-stations. GIS is sold across the world either as part of turnkey power substations or as separate equipment which has
to be integrated into a turnkey power substation.

3.     *Administrative procedure*

3        On 3 March 2004, ABB Ltd informed the Commission of the European Communities (now ‘the European Commission’) of anti‐competitive
practices in the GIS sector in connection with an oral application for immunity from fines pursuant to the Commission Notice
of 19 February 2002 on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 2002 C 45, p. 3) (‘the Leniency Notice’).

4        ABB’s request for immunity was supplemented by oral observations and documentary evidence. It gave rise, on 24 April 2004,
to a Commission decision granting conditional immunity to ABB.

5        On the basis of ABB’s statements, the Commission initiated an investigation and, on 11 and 12 May 2004, it carried out inspections
at the premises of various companies active in the GIS sector.

6        On 20 April 2006, the Commission adopted a statement of objections which was notified to 20 companies including the applicant.
The Commission held hearings on 18 and 19 July 2006 for the companies to which the statement of objections had been sent.

4.     *Contested decision*

7        On 24 January 2007, the Commission adopted Decision C(2006) 6762 final relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] and
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas-insulated switchgear) (‘the contested decision’).

8        In recitals 113 to 123 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that the various undertakings which participated in
the cartel had coordinated the allocation of GIS projects worldwide – except for specific markets – according to agreed rules
in order to maintain quotas largely reflecting estimated historic market shares. It pointed out that the allocation of GIS
projects had been carried out on the basis of a joint ‘Japanese’ quota and a joint ‘European’ quota, which the Japanese and
European producers then had to distribute among themselves. An agreement signed in Vienna on 15 April 1988 (‘the GQ Agreement’)
established rules allowing the allocation of GIS projects to either Japanese producers or to European producers and to set
their value against the corresponding quota. In addition, in recitals 124 to 132 of the contested decision, the Commission
stated that the various undertakings which participated in the cartel had entered into an unwritten agreement (‘common understanding’),
under which GIS projects in Japan, on the one hand, and in the countries of European members of the cartel, on the other –
together described as the ‘home countries’ for GIS projects – were reserved to Japanese members and European members of the
cartel respectively. GIS projects located in the ‘home countries’ were not the subject of information exchanges between the
two groups and were not charged to their respective quotas.

9        The GQ Agreement also contained rules relating to the exchange of information necessary for operation of the cartel between
the two groups of producers, carried out in particular by their respective secretaries, and to the manipulation of the bidding
procedures concerned and the fixing of prices for GIS projects which could not be allocated. Under the terms of Annex 2 to
the GQ Agreement, the agreement applied worldwide, except in the United States, Canada, Japan and 17 Western European countries.
Furthermore, under the common understanding, GIS projects in European countries, other than the ‘home countries’, were also
reserved for the European group, as the Japanese producers had undertaken not to submit bids for GIS projects in Europe.

10      According to the Commission, the sharing of GIS projects between the European producers was governed by an agreement also
signed in Vienna on 15 April 1988, entitled ‘E-Group Operation Agreement for GQ Agreement’) (‘the EQ Agreement’). It indicated
that the distribution of GIS projects in Europe followed the same rules and procedures as those governing the distribution
of GIS projects in other countries. In particular, GIS projects in Europe also had to be notified, recorded, allocated, arranged
or have received a minimum price.

11      On the basis of the findings of fact and legal assessments made in the contested decision, the Commission found that the undertakings
implicated had infringed Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘EEA Agreement’) and
imposed on them fines calculated in accordance with the methods set out in the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed
pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (OJ 1998 C 9, p. 3) (‘the guidelines’),
and in the Leniency Notice.

12      In Article 1 of the contested decision, the Commission found that the applicant had participated in the infringement from
15 April 1988 to 11 May 2004.

13      For the infringement found in Article 1 of the contested decision, the applicant was fined, in Article 2 of the contested
decision, EUR 118 575 000, of which EUR 4 650 000, corresponding to the infringement committed by TM T & D, to be paid jointly
and severally with Toshiba.

**Procedure and forms of order sought**

14      By application lodged at the Court Registry on 18 April 2007, the applicant brought the present action. On 6 June 2007, the
applicant applied for the adoption of measures of organisation of procedure concerning the disclosure by the Commission of
the turnover figures of the various addressees of the contested decision.

15      The defence was lodged on 21 August 2007.

16      By a document lodged at the Court Registry on 1 November 2007, the applicant requested that judgment should be given in its
favour by default, under Article 122 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. It lodged a reply on 5 November 2007.

17      By decision of the Court (Second Chamber) of 29 January 2008, the request that judgment be given by default was rejected.

18      The written procedure closed with the lodging of the rejoinder on 18 March 2008.

19      Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur, the Court (Second Chamber) decided, on 22 September 2009, to open the oral
procedure. By way of measures of organisation of procedure provided for in Article 64 of the Rules of Procedure, it invited
the Commission to submit certain documents and requested the parties to express their views on the relevance of those documents
in relation to the arguments alleging infringement of the right of access to the file. The Court also put questions to the
parties in writing, inviting them to give their reply at the hearing.

20      In response to the Court’s request, the Commission forwarded the documents concerned on 26 October 2009. The applicant submitted
its observations on those documents on 19 November 2009. On 2 December 2009, the Commission submitted an additional document
and on 3 December 2009, it replied to the applicant’s observations.

21      The parties presented oral argument and submitted their replies to the Court’s written and oral questions at the hearing on
11 December 2009.

22      The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        primarily, annul the contested decision to the extent to which it applies to it and to TM T & D;

–        in the alternative, annul Article 2(g) and (h) of the contested decision to the extent to which it applies to it;

–        in the further alternative, modify Article 2 of the contested decision to the extent to which it applies to it so as to annul
or, failing that, reduce the fine imposed on it;

–        in any event, order the Commission to pay the costs.

23      The Commission contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action as unfounded;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

**Law**

24      First of all, the applicant disputes the admissibility of the defence and submits that it is incoherent and fails to respond
to the pleas set out in the application.

25      In that regard, the Court points out that, pursuant to Article 46(1)(b) of the Rules of Procedure, the defence must contain
the arguments of fact and law relied on by the defendant.

26      The defence submitted in this case meets that requirement, irrespective of the separate issue as to whether the arguments
relied on by the Commission are relevant or well founded. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument alleging that the defence
is inadmissible must be rejected.

27      As regards the substance, the applicant puts forward fifteen pleas. By its first plea it alleges that the Commission did not
establish that the applicant infringed Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement by participating in a cartel having
as its object or effect the restriction of competition in the European Economic Area (‘the EEA’). By its second plea the applicant
alleges that the Commission failed to establish the existence of an agreement infringing Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the
EEA Agreement to which the applicant was a party. By its third plea it argues that the Commission committed an error in disregarding
the evidence explaining its lack of presence in, and proving its difficulty entering, the European market. By its fourth plea
the applicant alleges that the Commission infringed the rules of evidence in reversing the burden of proof and infringed the
principle of the presumption of innocence. By its fifth plea the applicant claims that the Commission infringed the principles
of equal treatment and proportionality in calculating the starting amount of the fine imposed on it on the basis of its 2001
turnover. By its sixth plea the applicant submits that the Commission infringed its duty to state reasons in choosing to calculate
the fine on the basis of its 2001 turnover. By its seventh plea the applicant alleges that the Commission erred in defining
the worldwide GIS market and the applicant’s share of it, thereby infringing the principles of equal treatment and proportionality.
By its eighth plea the applicant claims that the Commission infringed its duty to state reasons in finding that the applicant
controlled between 15 and 20% of the worldwide market. By its ninth plea the applicant submits that the Commission infringed
the principle of sound administration in estimating the worldwide market value. By its tenth plea the applicant claims that
the Commission infringed the principles of equal treatment and proportionality in calculating the deterrent factor applicable
to it. By its eleventh plea the applicant maintains that the Commission infringed the principle of proportionality in calculating
its fine by the same method as that employed to calculate the fines imposed on the European producers. By its twelfth plea
the applicant claims that the Commission failed to take account of relevant economic and technical evidence in calculating
its fine. By its thirteenth plea the applicant argues that the Commission erred in determining the duration of the cartel.
By its fourteenth plea the applicant maintains that the Commission infringed its rights of defence and its right to a fair
hearing by not granting it access to incriminating and exculpatory evidence. By its fifteenth plea the applicant submits that
the Commission infringed its rights of defence by not putting forward to it its conclusions on the theory of compensation
inherent in the common understanding.

28      The Commission considers that the applicant’s pleas are unfounded.

29      It should be noted, at the outset, that the applicant has not specified which of its pleas support the various claims which
it has made. In that regard, it should be considered, first of all, that pleas one to four and pleas thirteen to fifteen have
been raised by the applicant in support of its main claim. If one of those pleas is upheld, it will be necessary to annul,
at least in part, both Article 1 and Article 2 of the contested decision in so far as they concern the applicant. Next, it
must be considered that pleas five to twelve concern the calculation of the fine imposed on the applicant and have thus been
raised by the applicant in support of its application in the alternative seeking the annulment of Article 2(g) and (h) of
the contested decision in so far as it applies to it. Finally, the Court notes that no autonomous plea has been raised by
the applicant in support of its claim in the further alternative.

1.     *The main application, seeking the annulment of the contested decision to the extent to which it applies to the applicant and
TM T & D*

30      In so far as the annulment of the contested decision for infringement of the applicant’s rights of defence would render the
examination of the substance of the decision devoid of purpose, the fourteenth and fifteenth pleas will be addressed first
of all. Secondly, the first, third and fourth pleas will be addressed together as they are all related to proof of the common
understanding. Thirdly, the second plea, concerning the classification of that understanding as an infringement of Article
81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, will be examined. Fourthly, the thirteenth plea, relating to the duration of the
alleged cartel, will be examined.

*The fourteenth plea, alleging that the Commission infringed the applicant’s right of defence and its right to a fair hearing
by not granting it access to incriminating and exculpatory evidence*

Arguments of the parties

31      The applicant considers that it did not have access to certain items of incriminating and exculpatory evidence in the Commission’s
file, contrary to the principle of the respect for the rights of the defence and of the right to a fair hearing.

32      As regards incriminating evidence, the applicant maintains that the contested decision discloses evidence of which it had
no knowledge and on which it was consequently unable to express its views. First, the applicant was unable to consult the
evidence provided by Fuji on 21 November 2006, according to which the GQ Agreement could not have operated without the common
understanding.

33      Second, the applicant claims that the evidence provided in November 2006, from which it results that Alstom and Areva did
not contest the existence of the common understanding, was likewise not disclosed.

34      As regards exculpatory evidence, the applicant submits, first, that it provided the Commission on 8 November 2006 with exculpatory
witness statements in respect of several other undertakings, but they were not disclosed to the other parties.

35      Second, Hitachi’s supplementary reply to the statement of objections, in which Hitachi challenged the Commission’s interpretation
of certain statements in the initial reply relating to the notification and project loading mechanism, was not disclosed.

36      Third, the applicant complains that it did not have access to the evidence calling into question the existence of the common
understanding and reaffirming the existence of obstacles to entry on to the GIS market in the EEA, submitted by Siemens, the
undertaking belonging to the group of which VA TECH Transmission & Distribution GmbH & Co KEG (‘VA TECH’) formed part, Hitachi
and Toshiba, and in particular to statements and economic or technical reports submitted by Hitachi and Toshiba, to witness
statements of employees of Siemens and Hitachi and VA TECH’s reply to the statement of objections. It affirms that, in finding
in recital 130 of the contested decision that VA TECH did not openly dispute the existence of the common understanding, the
Commission distorted VA TECH’s position.

37      Fourth, the applicant argues that it did not have access to Mr S’s statements, submitted on behalf of Alstom, concerning termination
of the cartel in 1999.

38      The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.

Findings of the Court

39      Respect for the rights of the defence requires that the person concerned must have been afforded the opportunity, during the
administrative procedure, to make known his views on the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on
the documents used by the Commission to support its claim that there has been an infringement of the Treaty (Joined Cases
C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C 211/00 P, C‐213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P *Aalborg Portland and Others* v *Commission* [2004] ECR I‐123, paragraph 66).

40      A corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, the right of access to the file means that the Commission
must give the undertaking concerned the opportunity to examine all the documents in the investigation file which may be relevant
for its defence. Those documents include both incriminating and exculpatory evidence, save where the business secrets of other
undertakings, the internal documents of the Commission or other confidential information are involved (*Aalborg Portland and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 39 above, paragraph 68).

41      In this respect, it should be recalled that it is not until the beginning of the *inter partes* administrative stage that the undertaking concerned is informed, by means of the notification of the statement of objections,
of all the essential evidence on which the Commission relies at that stage of the procedure and that that undertaking has
a right of access to the file in order to ensure that its rights of defence are effectively exercised. Consequently, the replies
to the statement of objections of the other undertakings alleged to have participated in the cartel are not, in principle,
included in the documents of the investigation file that the parties may consult (Case T‐161/05 *Hoechst* v *Commission* [2009] ECR II‐3555, paragraph 163).

42      However, if the Commission wishes to rely on a passage in a reply to a statement of objections or on a document annexed to
such a reply in order to prove the existence of an infringement in a proceeding under Article 81(1) EC, the other undertakings
involved in that proceeding must be placed in a position in which they can express their views on such evidence. In such circumstances
the passage in question from a reply to the statement of objections or the document annexed thereto constitutes incriminating
evidence against the various undertakings alleged to have participated in the infringement (see *Hoechst* v *Commission*, paragraph 41 above, paragraph 164, and the case‐law cited). That case‐law is applicable, by analogy, to Article 53(1) of
the EEA Agreement.

43      By analogy, if a passage in a reply to a statement of objections or in a document annexed to such a reply may be relevant
for the defence of an undertaking in that it enables that company to invoke evidence which is not consistent with the inferences
made at that stage by the Commission, it constitutes exculpatory evidence. In that case, the undertaking concerned must be
authorised to examine the passage or the document concerned and to give its view thereon.

44      However, the mere fact that other undertakings put forward the same arguments as the undertaking concerned and that they may
have used more resources for their defence is not sufficient for those arguments to be regarded as exculpatory evidence (see,
to that effect, Case T‐43/02 *Jungbunzlauer* v *Commission* [2006] ECR II‐3435, paragraphs 353 and 355).

45      As regards the consequences of granting access to the file contrary to those rules, the failure to communicate a document
on which the Commission based its decision to inculpate an undertaking constitutes a breach of the rights of the defence only
if the undertaking concerned shows that the result at which the Commission arrived in its decision would have been different
if the document which was not communicated had to be disallowed as incriminating evidence (*Aalborg Portland and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 39 above, paragraphs 71 and 73).

46      Where an exculpatory document has not been communicated, the undertaking concerned must only establish that its non-disclosure
was able to influence, to its disadvantage, the course of the proceedings and the content of the decision of the Commission.
It is sufficient for the undertaking to show that it would have been able to use the exculpatory document for its defence,
in the sense that, had it been able to rely on it during the administrative procedure, it would have been able to invoke evidence
which was not consistent with the inferences made at that stage by the Commission and therefore could have had an influence,
in any way at all, on the assessments made by the Commission in the decision, at least as regards the gravity and duration
of the conduct in which the undertaking was found to have engaged and, accordingly, the level of the fine (*Aalborg Portland and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 39 above, paragraphs 74 and 75).

47      The possibility that a document which was not disclosed might have influenced the course of the proceedings and the content
of the Commission’s decision can be established only if a provisional examination of certain evidence shows that the documents
not disclosed might – in the light of that evidence – have had a significance which ought not to have been disregarded (*Aalborg Portland and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 39 above, paragraph 76).

48      In the present case, as regards the incriminating evidence, the Commission admits, firstly, that it was not able to rely on
Fuji’s observations which were not disclosed to the applicant in support of the grounds of complaint raised against the latter
in the contested decision, but disputes actually having used them as incriminating evidence. It must be noted, none the less,
that, in recitals 125 and 255 of the contested decision, the Commission referred to Fuji’s supplementary observations, in
particular those of 21 November 2006, to corroborate the existence of a common understanding.

49      Second, the Commission submits that it did not rely on the alleged neutral position of Alstom and Areva in concluding that
the common understanding existed, but merely noted their position. Although that interpretation is confirmed by the wording
of recital 125 of the contested decision, in which no corroborative value is accorded to the position of Alstom, Areva and
VA TECH, unlike Fuji’s statements confirming the existence of the common understanding, it is called into question in recital
255 of that decision, in which the Commission refers to the implicit acknowledgement of the existence of the common understanding
by certain European producers.

50      In any event, the neutral position of Alstom and Areva cannot be interpreted as evidence of the existence of the common understanding.
Given that the burden of proof is on the Commission in proceedings under Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement,
an undertaking’s failure to challenge a fact does not mean that the fact in question is established. Consequently, irrespective
of whether the rights of the defence were respected, the Commission was not able to rely on the position of Alstom and Areva
as incriminating evidence.

51      Accordingly, the outcome of the applicant’s arguments concerning the incriminating evidence depends on the result of the examination
of the first plea relating to proof of the existence of a common understanding. If the existence of such an understanding
is established to the requisite legal standard even after disallowing Fuji’s observations and the alleged neutral position
of Alstom and Areva as incriminating evidence, it will be necessary to reject this part of the plea. By contrast, if it is
found that that evidence constitutes necessary evidence in support of the findings made in the contested decision in relation
to the existence of a common understanding, it will be necessary to uphold the applicant’s argument and, consequently, to
annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns it.

52      As regards the exculpatory evidence, the applicant’s argument, alleging that some of the evidence submitted by it was not
disclosed to the other addressees of the statement of objections, must be rejected from the outset. Even supposing that that
evidence was not disclosed to the other addresses, that could affect the defence of those addressees at the most, but not
that of the applicant.

53      Moreover, the Court requested the Commission to produce all the documents which the applicant identified with a modicum of
precision.

54      First, it should be noted, that, contrary to the applicant’s claim, Hitachi’s supplementary reply to the statement of objections
does not call into question the factual content of the latter’s statements concerning the notification and project loading
mechanism. In that supplementary reply, Hitachi merely disputed the Commission’s interpretation of those statements, in particular
in relation to their relevance as evidence of the common understanding and of the existence of a single infringement involving
both the common understanding and the GQ Agreement. Hitachi had already raised those same arguments in the extract from its
first reply to the statement of objections, which the Commission sent to the applicant. Consequently, Hitachi’s supplementary
reply to the statement of objections cannot be regarded as exculpatory evidence whose communication could have influenced
the course of the proceedings and the content of the contested decision.

55      Second, as the applicant claims, VA TECH explicitly contested the existence of the common understanding in its reply to the
statement of objections. However, although that circumstance has to be taken into account during the examination of the first
plea concerning proof of the existence of the common understanding, it does not show, in itself, that the applicant’s rights
of defence were infringed, given that the applicant does not state the extent to which the misinterpretation of VA TECH’s
position made its defence more difficult.

56      Moreover, in their statements, VA TECH, Hitachi, Toshiba and Siemens disputed the existence of a common understanding and
described the existence of barriers to entry to the European market. Furthermore, Hitachi and Toshiba submitted expert reports
to support their positions in that regard.

57      During the administrative procedure, the applicant itself disputed the existence of a common understanding and of discussions
relating thereto, referred to the existence of ‘high’ barriers to entry on the European market, and submitted expert reports
concerning the latter, similar to the reports submitted by Hitachi and Toshiba. Accordingly, the statements and reports from
other addressees of the statement of objections cannot be regarded as exculpatory evidence.

58      In so far as concerns the witness statements of the employees of Hitachi and Siemens, those employees stated that the GQ Agreement
did not apply to GIS projects in Europe, disputed the existence of a common understanding and of discussions relating thereto
and referred to the existence of ‘high’ barriers to entry on the EEA market. In addition, Hitachi’s witnesses gave details
of a proposal made by Alstom in July 2002 relating to an understanding between European and Japanese producers and of Hitachi’s
rejection of that proposal.

59      In that regard, it should be noted, first, that the written witness statements of the employees of a company, drawn up under
the supervision of that company and submitted by it in its defence in the administrative procedure carried out by the Commission
cannot, in principle, be classed as evidence which is both different from, and independent of, the statements made by that
same company. Generally speaking, the position of a company as to the truth of the facts set out against it by the Commission
is based, primarily, on the knowledge and opinions of its employees and management.

60      Second, as noted in paragraph 57 above, during the administrative procedure, the applicant itself disputed the existence of
a common understanding and of discussions relating thereto and referred to the existence of ‘high’ barriers to entry on the
European market. It also asserted that the GQ Agreement did not concern EEA territory. Consequently, the fact that other undertakings
raised those arguments cannot be regarded as exculpatory evidence.

61      Also, the details of Alstom’s proposal of July 2002 were disclosed in the statement of objections. Consequently, that evidence
does not constitute exculpatory evidence.

62      Third, after gaining access to Mr S’s statements, the applicant did not identify within those statements any evidence which
might have been useful for its defence. Therefore, the general claim that those statements constitute exculpatory evidence
must be rejected as unsubstantiated.

63      In the light of all of the foregoing, the applicant’s arguments relating to access to the exculpatory evidence must be rejected.
However, as is apparent from paragraph 51 above, the outcome of this plea depends on the result of the examination of the
first plea.

*The fifteenth plea, alleging that the Commission infringed the applicant’s rights of defence by not putting forward to it
its conclusions on the theory of compensation inherent in the common understanding*

Arguments of the parties

64      The applicant submits that the Commission did not indicate in the statement of objections that the compensation granted to
the Japanese producers by the European producers under the common understanding, by means of the notification and project
loading mechanism, constituted evidence of the existence of that understanding. In its view, that theory is mentioned for
the first time in the contested decision. Therefore, the Commission infringed the obligation to give interested parties the
opportunity to express their views on the evidence on which it based its decision.

65      The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.

Findings of the Court

66      According to the case‐law, the statement of objections must set forth clearly all the essential facts upon which the Commission
is relying at that stage of the procedure. However, that may be done summarily and the decision is not necessarily required
to be a replica of the Commission’s statement of objections, since the statement of objections is a preparatory document containing
assessments of fact and of law which are purely provisional in nature (*Aalborg Portland and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 39 above, paragraph 67). Thus, although the Commission cannot allege that the persons concerned have committed
infringements other than those referred to in the statement of objections and may take into consideration only facts on which
the persons concerned have had the opportunity of making known their views, it must however take into account the factors
emerging from the administrative procedure in order either to abandon such complaints as have been shown to be unfounded or
to supplement and redraft its arguments both in fact and in law in support of the complaints which it maintains (see, to that
effect, Case 41/69 *ACF Chemiefarma* v *Commission* [1970] ECR 661, paragraphs 92 to 94).

67      In the present case, it must be conceded that, in the statement of objections, the Commission did not state explicitly that
the notification and project loading mechanism constituted compensation offered by the European producers to the Japanese
producers, which were viewed as potential credible competitors, in return for compliance with the common understanding.

68      However, first, the statement of objections describes the facts on which that theory is based. The common understanding and
the project loading mechanism are summarised in paragraphs 100, 106 and 110 of the statement of objections and described in
detail subsequently in that document. Similarly, it is apparent from paragraph 120 of the statement of objections that, in
the Commission’s view, the Japanese producers were potential credible competitors in respect of GIS projects in the EEA.

69      Second, in point 59 of its reply to the statement of objections, the applicant noted that the Commission referred to the notification
and project loading mechanism as evidence of the existence of the common understanding. It must therefore be found that the
applicant had understood, on the basis of the statement of objections, the importance which the Commission gave to the notification
and project loading mechanism as regards evidence of the alleged infringement. Similarly, in paragraphs 59 to 64 of its reply
to the statement of objections, the applicant expressed its point of view in detail regarding the evidence of that mechanism
and its relevance to the alleged common understanding.

70      Therefore, it must be found that the content of the statement of objections enabled the applicant to express its view on the
facts on which the Commission based its complaint in that statement and in the contested decision.

71      Consequently, the fifteenth plea must be dismissed.

*The first, third and fourth pleas, alleging that the Commission has not established that the applicant participated in the
alleged cartel, that the Commission erred in dismissing the evidence explaining the applicant’s absence from the European
market and the impossibility of entering that market, and that the Commission infringed the rules governing evidence by reversing
the burden of proof, thereby infringing the presumption of innocence*

72      According to the case‐law, the Commission must prove the infringements which it has found and adduce evidence capable of demonstrating
to the requisite legal standard the existence of the facts constituting an infringement (see Joined Cases T-44/02 OP, T-54/02
OP, T 56/02 OP, T-60/02 OP and T-61/02 OP *Dresdner Bank and Others* v *Commission*[2006] ECR II‐3567, paragraph 59, and the case‐law cited).

73      In that regard, any doubt in the mind of the Court must operate to the advantage of the undertaking to which the decision
finding an infringement was addressed. The Court cannot therefore conclude that the Commission has established the infringement
at issue to the requisite legal standard if it still entertains any doubts on that point, in particular in proceedings for
annulment of a decision imposing a fine (*Dresdner Bank and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 72 above, paragraph 60).

74      In the latter situation, it is necessary to take account of the principle of the presumption of innocence resulting in particular
from Article 6(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on
4 November 1950, which is one of the fundamental rights which are general principles of Community law. Given the nature of
the infringements in question and the nature and degree of gravity of the ensuing penalties, the principle of the presumption
of innocence applies in particular to the procedures relating to infringements of the competition rules applicable to undertakings
that may result in the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments (see, to that effect, *Dresdner Bank and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 72 above, paragraph 61, and the case-law cited).

75      Thus, the Commission must show precise and consistent evidence in order to establish the existence of the infringement. However,
it is important to emphasise that it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy those
criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement. It is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by the institution,
viewed as a whole, meets that requirement (see *Dresdner Bank and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 72 above, paragraphs 62 and 63, and the case‐law cited).

76      In addition, as anti-competitive agreements are known to be prohibited, the Commission cannot be required to produce documents
expressly attesting to contacts between the traders concerned. The fragmentary and sporadic items of evidence which may be
available to the Commission should, in any event, be capable of being supplemented by inferences which allow the relevant
circumstances to be reconstituted. The existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement may therefore be inferred from
a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, can, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute
evidence of an infringement of the competition rules (see *Dresdner Bank and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 72 above, paragraphs 64 and 65, and the case‐law cited).

77      The applicant submits, in that regard, that there is no longer any justification for applying a more lenient evidential standard
because of the difficulties faced by the Commission when trying to prove an infringement. In its view, first, fines imposed
in cartel cases have constantly increased in recent years, which must affect the intensity with which the Commission’s decisions
are reviewed. Second, given the existence of the Leniency Notice and the parties’ cooperation obtained pursuant thereto, it
is no longer necessary to grant the Commission a broad discretion when assessing evidence. Third, in the present case, the
Commission seeks to rely on a document attesting the existence of a cartel outside of the European Union, namely the GQ Agreement,
to find an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

78      However, those arguments of the applicant cannot be upheld. First, it is true that the increase in the amounts of fines may
have more serious consequences for the parties on which such fines are imposed. However, since the Commission’s initiative
in that regard is generally well known, the result is that, if undertakings make themselves liable for an infringement, they
will make an even greater effort to limit as far as possible the number of items which may serve as evidence, thereby making
the Commission’s task more difficult. Second, in order for the Commission to validly rely on it as evidence of an infringement,
the evidence received from interested undertakings must, in any event, satisfy the applicable criteria in the case‐­law. Thus,
the existence of the leniency programme per se does not simplify the Commission’s role. Third, the fact that the GQ Agreement
did not concern the territory of the European Union is relevant in assessing the probative value of that element. By contrast,
that fact cannot influence the assessment of the other evidence put forward by the Commission.

79      Moreover, where the Commission bases its decision solely on the conduct of the undertakings at issue on the market to conclude
that there was an infringement, it is sufficient for those undertakings to prove the existence of circumstances which cast
the facts established by the Commission in a different light and thus allow another, plausible explanation of those facts
to be substituted for the one adopted by the Commission in concluding that the Community competition rules had been infringed
(see, to that effect, Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 *JFE Engineering and Others* v *Commission* [2004] ECR II‐2501, paragraph 186, and the case‐law cited).

80      Contrary to what the applicant claims, that rule does not apply to all cases in which the infringement is established solely
on the basis of non‐documentary evidence.

81      As regards the evidence which may be relied on to establish an infringement of Article 81 EC, the prevailing principle of
Community law is the unfettered evaluation of evidence (Case T‐50/00 *Dalmine* v *Commission*[2004] ECR II‐2395, paragraph 72). That case-law is applicable, by analogy, to Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

82      Consequently, even if the lack of documentary evidence may be relevant in the global assessment of the set of indicia relied
on by the Commission, it does not, in itself, enable the undertaking concerned to call the Commission’s claims into question
by submitting an alternative explanation of the facts. That is only the case where the evidence submitted by the Commission
does not enable the existence of the infringement to be established unequivocally and without the need for interpretation
(see, to that effect, the judgment of 12 September 2007 in Case T 36/05 *Coats Holdings and Coats* v *Commission*, not published in the ECR, paragraph 74).

83      In addition, no provision or any general principle of Community law prohibits the Commission from relying, as against an undertaking,
on statements made by other undertakings accused of having participated in the cartel. If that were not the case, the burden
of proving conduct contrary to Article 81 EC, which is borne by the Commission, would be unsustainable and incompatible with
the task of supervising the proper application of those provisions (*JFE Engineering and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 79 above, paragraph 192). That case-law is applicable, by analogy, to Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

84      However, a statement by one undertaking accused of having participated in a cartel, the accuracy of which is contested by
several other undertakings similarly accused, cannot be regarded as constituting adequate proof of an infringement committed
by the latter unless it is supported by other evidence, though the degree of corroboration required may be less in view of
the reliability of the statements at issue (*JFE Engineering and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 79 above, paragraphs 219 and 220).

85      As regards the probative value of the various items of evidence, the sole criterion relevant in evaluating the evidence adduced
is its reliability (*Dalmine* v *Commission*, paragraph 81 above, paragraph 72).

86      According to the general rules regarding evidence, the reliability and, thus, the probative value of a document depends on
its origin, the circumstances in which it was drawn up, the person to whom it is addressed and its content (Joined Cases T‐25/95,
T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T‐37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95,
T-46/95, T‐48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T‐57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95,
T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T‐65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T‐104/95 *Cimenteries CBR and Others* v *Commission* [2000] ECR II-491, paragraphs 1053 and 1838).

87      As regards statements, particularly high probative value may be attached to those which, first, are reliable, second, are
made on behalf of an undertaking, third, are made by a person under a professional obligation to act in the interests of that
undertaking, fourth, go against the interests of the person making the statement, fifth, are made by a direct witness of the
circumstances to which they relate and, sixth, were provided in writing deliberately and after mature reflection (see, to
that effect, *JFE Engineering and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 79 above, paragraphs 205 to 210).

88      In addition, even if some caution as to the evidence provided voluntarily by the main participants in an unlawful cartel is
generally called for, considering the possibility, referred to by the applicant, that those participants have a tendency to
provide most of the incriminating evidence in relation to the activity of their competitors, the fact remains that seeking
to benefit from the application of the Leniency Notice in order to obtain immunity from, or a reduction of, the fine does
not necessarily create an incentive to submit distorted evidence in relation to the participation of the other members of
the cartel under investigation. Indeed, any attempt to mislead the Commission could call into question the sincerity and the
completeness of the cooperation of the person seeking to benefit from the Leniency Notice, and thereby jeopardise its chances
of benefiting fully under it (see, to that effect, Case T‐120/04 *Peróxidos Orgánicos* v *Commission* [2006] ECR II‐4441, paragraph 70).

89      It must also be noted, in that regard, that the potential consequences of the submission of distorted evidence are even more
serious since, as is apparent from paragraph 84 above, a statement of an undertaking that is disputed must be corroborated
by other evidence. That being so, the likelihood of the Commission and the other undertakings involved of detecting the inaccurate
nature of those statements is increased.

90      As regards the application of those rules to the present case, it should be noted, at the outset, that, according to the findings
made in the contested decision, the common understanding was an unwritten understanding which encompassed, first, the commitment
of the Japanese undertakings not to enter the market for GIS projects in the EEA, second, the commitment of the European undertakings
not to enter the Japanese market for GIS projects and, third, the commitment of the European undertakings to notify the Japanese
undertakings of the GIS projects in the European countries other than the home countries and to load those projects in the
joint ‘European’ quota laid down in the GQ Agreement. According to the Commission, the purpose of the notification and project
loading mechanism was to offer compensation to the Japanese undertakings, viewed by the European undertakings as potential
competitors on the EEA market.

91      Among the various components of the common understanding listed in paragraph 90 above, it is the alleged commitment of the
Japanese undertakings not to enter the EEA market which constitutes the basis of the Commission’s complaint against the applicant.
Consequently, it is the existence of that commitment which needs to be established to the requisite legal standard. However,
the other components of the common understanding, if proven, may also serve as indirect evidence from which the existence
of the corresponding commitment on the part of the Japanese undertakings may be inferred.

92      The applicant disputes, in the context of the first plea, the existence of a common understanding and its participation therein.
It criticises the probative value of the various items of evidence relied on by the Commission in the contested decision and
refers to other evidence which, in its view, suggests that there was no common understanding. The applicant infers from this
that, in adopting the contested decision, the Commission went beyond the limits of its powers. It adds, in the context of
the third plea, that, in those circumstances, the Commission was required to accept the alternative explanation for the absence
of Japanese producers on the GIS market in the EEA, related to the existence of legal, technical and commercial barriers to
entry on that market. In the context of the fourth plea, the applicant submits that, by failing to establish the existence
of the common understanding to the requisite legal standard, the Commission reversed the burden of proof and infringed the
principle of the presumption of innocence.

93      The Commission submits that the existence of a common understanding, and in particular the commitment of the Japanese undertakings
not to enter the EEA market, is established to the requisite legal standard by a body of evidence comprising documentary evidence,
statements from undertakings, witness statements and evidence relating to the actual operation of the cartel. Therefore, the
Commission considers, first, that the alternative explanation proposed by the applicant is irrelevant and, second, that it
bore the burden of proof incumbent upon it and, consequently, respected the principle of the presumption of innocence.

94      It is therefore necessary to assess the reliability and the content of the various items of evidence concerned in order to
assess whether, taken as a whole, the evidence relied on by the Commission establishes a firm conviction that a common understanding
existed which is not able to be called into question by the evidence adduced by the applicant.

95      The applicant’s complaint alleging that the Commission went beyond its powers and the third and fourth pleas are based on
the premiss that the Commission did not prove that a common understanding existed and that the applicant participated therein.
Consequently, if the applicant’s arguments relating to the evidence of the existence of the infringement and of the applicant’s
participation therein must be rejected, that necessarily implies, first, that the Commission is competent to penalise the
infringement found, second, that the alternative explanation provided by the applicant is irrelevant in the light of what
has been set out in paragraphs 79 to 82 above and, finally, that the Commission bore the burden of proof incumbent upon it
and thus respected the principle of the presumption of innocence. By contrast, if it is concluded that the applicant’s participation
in the alleged infringement has not been shown in the contested decision, that finding would justify, in itself, the annulment
of that decision in so far as it concerns the applicant.

The evidence furnished by ABB

–       Arguments of the parties

96      The applicant submits that Mr M’s witness statement submitted on behalf of ABB is not reliable and does not make it possible
to conclude that the common understanding existed.

97      First, as a beneficiary of conditional immunity, ABB would have had an incentive to furnish incriminating evidence. In addition,
Mr M was aware of the fact that ABB had an interest in him not contesting the existence of the common understanding. By contrast,
he was aware that he was not liable to civil proceedings as a result of his statements and was sure that his witness statement
would not be subject to cross-examination. Similarly, it was evident that Mr M’s statements were not going to produce additional
harmful effects for ABB, since that undertaking’s liability had been established by other evidence.

98      ABB’s wish to submit incriminating evidence was manifested at the interview with Mr M, by the interventions of ABB’s representative,
who interjected to correct and clarify Mr M’s statements, and at one point even answered the Commission’s questions himself.

99      Second, Mr M’s witness statement was submitted more than 18 months after ABB applied for immunity from fines.

100    Third, Mr M’s witness statement is merely a witness statement from a former ABB employee, rather than a statement made on
ABB’s behalf. According to the applicant, at the time of the interview concerned, Mr M had gone into retirement and was not
required to act in ABB’s interests.

101    Fourth, the oral witness statement of Mr M does not result from studied reflection. Similarly, in so far as Mr M made several
statements during the administrative procedure, the evidence provided should be regarded as a series of constantly changing
statements, rather than as one single statement, revised upon reflection. In addition, the fact that the earlier statements
made by that witness were not provided to the applicant implies that they contain no evidence of the common understanding,
which detracts from the reliability of the later statements made by that witness.

102    Fifth, even if Mr M was a direct witness to certain aspects of the alleged cartel, he did not take part in any discussion
concerning the common understanding and in particular was not present at its inception, which implies that he was not a direct
witness in that regard.

103    Sixth, Mr M’s witness statement is vague regarding the formation, content and implementation of the common understanding and
does not mention any meeting or discussion. In the applicant’s view, Mr M’s statements regarding that understanding amount
to a personal feeling rather than a complete and coherent account of the facts concerning an agreement.

104    Seventh, Mr M’s witness statement is not corroborated by contemporaneous written evidence, but is contradicted both by the
GQ and EQ Agreements and by other witness statements. Moreover, Mr M’s statements are inconsistent with other statements made
by ABB and conflict with evidence furnished by other cartel participants.

105    In particular, the applicant submits that ABB’s immunity application of 11 March 2004 did not contain any description of the
common understanding as presented in the contested decision, since ABB’s statements did not give the impression that the applicant
had undertaken not to enter the European market. Similarly, Mr V.‐A., another ABB employee, stated that he had been informed
by Mr M that Europe and North America were excluded from the scope of the cartel.

106    The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.

–       Findings of the Court

107    First, it is apparent from paragraphs 88 and 89 above that it is not necessary to treat automatically with caution evidence
furnished by an undertaking which has sought to benefit from immunity from fines. As regards the particular case of witness
statements, it is indeed possible that the employees of such an undertaking, who are required to act in the interests of the
undertaking, have a common desire to submit as much incriminating evidence as possible since their cooperation in the procedure
may also have a positive impact on their future career. However, if that is the case, the employees at issue will also be
aware of the possible negative consequences of submitting inaccurate evidence, which are more sensitive given the requirement
for corroboration.

108    In addition, it cannot be considered that the evidence furnished by ABB was not capable of damaging that undertaking. Since
that evidence was furnished before the statement of objections was sent, neither ABB, nor its employees nor its former employee
could be certain of the extent and exact content of the objections which were going to be raised against ABB.

109    As regards Mr M, the applicant rightly submits that a former employee is no longer required, in principle, to act in the interests
of his former employer when it comes to voluntary cooperation in administrative proceedings. However, that also implies that,
in principle, he has no interest in providing inaccurate evidence in that respect, irrespective of whether he was liable to
civil proceedings as a result and whether he knew that his statements were not going to be subject to cross‐examination.

110    It is also true that ABB’s outside counsel intervened at one point during Mr M’s interview in order to suggest to him that
it could be beneficial for the Japanese producers to enter the European market, of which Mr M did not appear to be convinced.
Consequently, it should be held that Mr M expressed doubts as to the commercial interest of such a step and account needs
to be taken of that fact when assessing the content of his witness statement. However, the applicant does not explain how
the intervention of ABB’s outside counsel affects the reliability of Mr M’s witness statement in other respects.

111    Second, the fact that a period of time elapsed between the submission of the application for immunity by ABB and Mr M’s interview
does not call into question, as such, the probative value of that witness statement. It is justified for the Commission to
obtain additional evidence during its investigation, in order to have at its disposal all the information necessary to assess
whether there was an infringement, in particular in the light of the observations of the undertakings concerned. By contrast,
the period of time which elapsed between the submission of the witness statement and the facts to which it relates may be
relevant in the assessment of its reliability, given that witnesses may provide, as a general rule, more detailed and more
reliable evidence in respect of recent events. However, in the present case, the period of three years and three months time
which elapsed between the end of Mr M’s involvement in the cartel and the submission of his witness statement is not sufficiently
long to influence its reliability.

112    Third, it is not apparent that Mr M made his statement as an official representative of ABB. First of all, that role appears
to have been assumed, for the main part, by ABB’s outside counsel. Next, as noted in paragraph 109 above, when giving his
witness statement Mr M was no longer required, a priori, to act in the interests of his former employer and there is also
no indication that he systematically prepared for the interview by consulting other employees of ABB and documents held by
that company. Finally, the questions put by the Commission at the interviews did not concern ABB’s official position on the
subjects addressed, but rather the individual knowledge of Mr M.

113    Fourth, the applicant rightly submits that Mr M’s witness statement does not appear to result from studied reflection and
that it was also not revised after reflection and additional verifications. The witness statement was made orally and there
are no indications that written questions were put beforehand to Mr M by the Commission nor that the statements relating to
the common understanding and the barriers to entry on the EEA market were subsequently verified and revised by Mr M.

114    By contrast, the fact that Mr M made several successive statements which were not all put forward by the Commission does not
call the reliability of his witness statement into question. It is normal, first, for a witness to make subsequent comments
on different aspects and details of a subject and, second, for some of those statements not to be relevant to the Commission’s
investigation or to relate to facts which are established more convincingly by other evidence.

115    Fifth, the applicant’s claim that Mr M was not a direct witness of the events at issue must be dismissed. Mr M was one of
ABB’s representatives in the cartel between 1988 and 2002, that is during almost its entire duration, at which time ABB itself
was one of the main operators. Mr M was thus a direct and privileged witness of the facts which he disclosed.

116    In that regard, it must be conceded that, in his witness statement, Mr M confirmed that he was not present when the common
understanding was concluded. Similarly, when asked whether the issue of the common understanding had been raised at meetings
which he had attended, Mr M responded that it was not necessary to refer to it since the common understanding went without
saying. However, this does not call into question the probative value of Mr M’s witness statement. First, a witness is perfectly
able to furnish evidence of a long-standing phenomenon even if he was not present at its inception. Second, although Mr M
stated that the issue of the common understanding had not been referred to explicitly at the meetings which he had attended,
it is apparent from his witness statement that, in his view, this was so because the content of the common understanding was
understood, accepted and implemented by the participants to the cartel without the need for an explicit discussion.

117    Sixth, as regards the content of his witness statement, Mr M stated that an understanding relating to the mutual protection
of domestic markets, predating the GQ Agreement, existed between the Japanese and European producers, that that understanding
was a prerequisite for the conclusion of agreements relating to other regions and that compliance with its rules implied that
the Japanese producers were not to enter the domestic market of the European producers, even though they would have been able
to do so at a technical level. Mr M also explained, in that context, the notification and project loading mechanism and the
fact that the GIS projects in the home countries were not discussed between the two groups of producers and were not charged
to the quotas set under the GQ Agreement.

118    Thus, the statements made by Mr M confirm the existence of the common understanding alleged by the Commission and cannot be
regarded as a vague personal feeling since they provide information on the duration of that understanding, its content and
its participants. The lack of information on the implementation of that understanding is hardly surprising given that the
essential commitment of the parties was not to be active on certain markets. Moreover, Mr M described the part of the common
understanding which required implementation measures, namely the notification and project loading mechanism.

119    Seventh, the question whether Mr M’s witness statement is corroborated, in accordance with the case‐law set out in paragraph
84 above, and whether it is called into question by evidence from other undertakings or by the GQ and EQ Agreements, will
be addressed in paragraphs 129 to 195 below.

120    As regards the alleged incoherencies between Mr M’s witness statement and the other evidence furnished by ABB, the latter
explicitly referred in its observations of 11 March 2004 to the existence of a common understanding, pursuant to which the
two Japanese companies would not bid for European projects and the European companies would not bid for Japanese projects.

121    In that respect, it is normal that ABB referred to two Japanese companies, namely Japan AE Power Systems Corp. and TM T &
D, since, at the time when it submitted its statements, the GIS activities of Fuji, Hitachi, the applicant and Toshiba were
grouped within those joint ventures. None the less, the Commission was entitled to interpret that statement as indicating
that those undertakings themselves participated in the common understanding. In its initial application for leniency for immunity
from fines of 3 March 2004, ABB had already stated that, to its knowledge, the cartel had been in existence for over 10 years,
which implies that it came into being well before Japan AE Power Systems and TM T & D were created.

122    As regards the witness statements of ABB’s employees, Mr Wi stated that the absence of Japanese undertakings on the European
market was the result of a system in place to protect the Japanese and European markets, motivated by the fact that neither
of the two groups of producers wanted the other group to enter its domestic market. Similarly, Mr P referred to a common understanding
with the Japanese undertakings pursuant to which the latter undertook not to participate in the European market and the European
undertakings undertook not to participate in the Japanese market. Thus, Mr Wi’s and Mr P’s witness statements confirm the
existence of the common understanding.

123    The same finding is applicable to the witness statement provided by Mr V.-A. When asked whether there was any form of arrangement
between Japanese and European producers, Mr V.-A referred to an understanding between Japanese and European producers pursuant
to which the European undertakings agreed not to ‘attack’ the Japanese undertakings on the Japanese market and vice versa.
Moreover, Mr V.‐A stated that he had participated in a discussion between the European undertakings and the representative
of a Japanese undertaking specifically regarding compliance with that understanding which was brought about by attempts on
the part of the Japanese undertakings to enter the European market.

124    As regards the alleged exclusion of certain territories from the scope of the worldwide cartel, Mr V.-A stated, first, that
North America was excluded for a specific reason, namely the risk of the penalties if the cartel were to be discovered. Second,
he explained that the exclusion of Western European countries meant that the GIS projects concerned were not discussed by
the European producers at meetings at which he was present, that is to say the meetings of the worldwide cartel previously
governed by the GQ and EQ Agreements, but on another occasion. Those statements are fully in line with Mr M’s witness statement.

125    It must be conceded, however, that, as noted in paragraph 110 above, Mr M was not convinced of the commercial interest for
the Japanese undertakings in entering the European GIS market. None the less, the position of Mr M, which was shared by Mr
P, does not affect the fact that, according to both ABB’s four witnesses and ABB itself, the Japanese undertakings were committed
to not entering the EEA market even though they were capable of doing so at a technical level.

126    In conclusion, it must be found that the evidence furnished by ABB is capable of proving the existence of the common understanding.
Similarly, that evidence is coherent in respect of the existence and fundamental content of the common understanding.

127    Furthermore, ABB’s statements were provided on behalf of an undertaking and it is apparent from their content that they are
founded on internal research and on discussions with employees of that undertaking. Consequently, a certain degree of probative
value must be attributed to them.

128    The statements made by the four witnesses concerned are credible since they were made by direct witnesses of the events to
which they refer and it is not apparent from the circumstances of the case that those witnesses were encouraged to make inaccurate
statements. Thus, they must be regarded as being of high probative value.

The corroboration of the evidence furnished by ABB

–       Arguments of the parties

129    The applicant disputes that the evidence furnished by ABB has been sufficiently corroborated in the present case.

130    First, the statements made by Fuji in its reply to the statement of objections are not directly contrary to its interests,
and can thus not serve to corroborate the existence of the common understanding. In addition, Fuji stated that its absence
from the European GIS market was due to economic and technical obstacles. Similarly, since Fuji did not participate in all
the meetings on the GQ Agreement, it could have a different perception from that of the other parties which consider that
the common understanding did not exist.

131    Second, the rejection by Hitachi of the proposal made by Alstom in July 2002 to conclude an understanding covering GIS projects
in Europe and covering Central and Eastern Europe does not constitute evidence of the existence of the common understanding.
According to the applicant, the Commission failed to take account of Hitachi’s reference to commercial obstacles limiting
the presence of Japanese producers on the European market. In addition, supposing that the common understanding was essential
for the functioning of the GQ Agreement, the refusal to ring-fence the European market should have led to the collapse of
the entire arrangement; but that did not happen.

132    Third, the fact that Areva and Alstom did not contest the existence of the common understanding is irrelevant in the present
case.

133    The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.

–       Findings of the Court

134    First, in its reply to the statement of objections, Fuji stated that it was aware of the common understanding, pursuant to
which the Japanese producers would not attempt to enter the European market, while stating that the main reason for Fuji’s
absence from the EEA market was that it was not a credible significant GIS supplier in Europe.

135    In so far as Fuji admitted, at least indirectly, that its absence from the European market was in part due to the common understanding,
it acknowledged a fact which could have been held against it by the Commission. Consequently, contrary to what the applicant
claims, Fuji’s statement goes against its interests given that it implicitly acknowledged that it participated in an infringement.

136    It is true that Fuji’s statement is relatively vague since that undertaking merely refers to the commitment of the Japanese
producers not to enter the European market. However, in doing so, Fuji corroborated the key element resulting from the evidence
submitted by ABB and imputed to the Japanese producers by the Commission. Thus, that statement is not irrelevant in this case.

137    The Court also notes that Fuji played a secondary role within the cartel, as the applicant essentially submits. In particular,
as is apparent from recital 150 of the contested decision, Fuji was the only Japanese undertaking which was not a member of
the committee of the group of Japanese producers responsible, in particular, for the coordination of the two groups of producers
within the context of the GQ Agreement. However, in principle, an undertaking which plays a secondary role within a cartel
is aware of the main content of the agreements encompassed by that cartel, even if that undertaking is not aware of its detailed
operation and all the information exchanged within it.

138    In addition, it is true that, in its statement, Fuji referred to the existence of technical and commercial obstacles to entry
to the EEA market. However, those obstacles were not referred to as being the sole reason for Fuji’s absence from that market,
but merely as being the main reason. Furthermore, when Fuji listed the various obstacles at issue, it referred to its small
share of the worldwide market which placed it at a disadvantage compared with its larger competitors, both European and Japanese.
Therefore, it is not apparent that its arguments in that regard can be transposed to those of the other Japanese producers.

139    In the light of the above, it must be concluded that the statement made by Fuji in its reply to the statement of objections
tends to corroborate the evidence furnished by ABB, although its probative value is limited.

140    It is apparent from recital 127 of the contested decision that, at the meeting of 10 July 2002 during which there was discussion
of the development of the modes of operation of the cartel after Siemens and Hitachi had withdrawn from it, Alstom proposed
that the European producers should stay in Europe and the Japanese producers should stay in Japan and not attempt to enter
the European market. In addition, it is stated in that recital that, at the following meeting on 15 July 2002, Hitachi’s representative
had stated that Hitachi rejected that proposal, that the European producers had reacted by stating that Europe, including
Central and Eastern Europe, was their market and that they wanted to maintain the prices they were currently charging in Western
Europe and had also said that the issue was to be raised again, even though that was not the case.

141    It must be admitted that, at first sight, that summary of the meetings of 10 and 15 July 2002, based on the evidence furnished
by Hitachi, suggests that Alstom actually proposed that a new understanding be concluded, which was rejected by Hitachi and
was not discussed subsequently, which implies that, at least as of July 2002, there was no understanding in existence relating
to the conduct of the Japanese producers on the EEA market.

142    However, the summary of the meeting of 15 July 2002 shows, first, that Hitachi did not reject the very idea of allocating
markets, but only Alstom’s concrete proposal. Second, it is stated in that summary that Hitachi had pointed out that the claims
made by the European producers included Central and Eastern Europe, which suggests that its opposition was related to that
specific aspect, but not to the situation in Western Europe.

143    It should also be noted that Alstom’s presentation of the proposal at issue calls into question the applicant’s and Hitachi’s
arguments in relation to competition on the EEA market. If, as claimed by the applicant and Hitachi, the Japanese producers
were not perceived as credible competitors on the EEA market because of the existence of insurmountable barriers to entry,
an understanding relating to that very market would indeed not have served any purpose. In such a situation, the European
producers, aware of that fact as a result of their privileged position in Europe, would have had no reason to propose such
an understanding. However, it is apparent from the summary provided by Hitachi that Alstom’s proposal concerned the EEA market
as well as the Central and Eastern European market.

144    Accordingly, it is necessary to uphold the interpretation that, at the meeting of 10 July 2002, Alstom proposed extending
the common understanding, as alleged by the Commission, to include Central and Eastern European countries.

145    First, that interpretation implies that Alstom’s proposal constitutes proof that the common understanding existed at the time
that it was made. Second, the rejection of that proposal by Hitachi does not amount to a rejection of the common understanding
as such, but represents merely a refusal to extend it. Consequently, the applicant’s claim that the GQ Agreement should have
‘collapsed’ following the meeting of 15 July 2002 is based on a false premiss.

146    In the light of all of the above, it must be found that the proposal made by Alstom at the meeting of 10 July 2002 corroborates
the evidence furnished by ABB.

147    Third, as has been noted in paragraph 50 above, the alleged neutral position of Alstom and Areva cannot be interpreted as
proof of the existence of the common understanding. Consequently, that factor cannot corroborate the evidence furnished by
ABB.

The notification and project loading mechanism

–       Arguments of the parties

148    The applicant submits that the existence of the notification and project loading mechanism is implausible and has not been
established.

149    First, the Japanese producers were not perceived to be a competitive threat on the European market, so that it would not have
been necessary to offer them compensation via that mechanism. In the applicant’s view, if notifications had been made for
the purpose of project loading, the European producers would not have had any incentive to notify.

150    Second, given the precise nature of the GQ Agreement, it is unrealistic that the agreement itself or subsequent documents
would not mention the notification and project loading mechanism.

151    Third, the theory put forward by the Commission is based on mandatory and systematic notification, since only a mechanism
covering at least a significant proportion of the GIS projects concerned could enable the Japanese producers to monitor and
verify the loading procedure. In the present case, the Commission has not established to the requisite legal standard the
existence of the notification and project loading mechanism nor the systematic nature of that mechanism.

152    In that regard, in their witness statements, Mr M and Mr P indicated that the lists of European GIS projects and the allocation
of them were not discussed with the Japanese undertakings. Moreover, the lists at issue cannot establish the existence of
systematic notification.

153    The statements made by Hitachi in its leniency application and in its reply to the statement of objections are merely an interpretation
of the facts by that undertaking. In any event, such statements did not relate to the period subsequent to Hitachi’s withdrawal
from the cartel in 1999. Moreover, Hitachi provided a supplementary reply to the statement of objections, which detracts from
the value of the statements in question. Similarly, given the detail of Hitachi’s leniency application, the statements in
question, which were submitted later, lack any credibility.

154    Furthermore, the Commission itself acknowledged, in recitals 148 and 162 of the contested decision, that notification could
not have been carried out on a regular basis. Fuji confirmed this in its response to the statement of objections and Hitachi
did not dispute it in its statements concerning notification and loading. As regards the content of the EQ Agreement, the
applicant states, first, that it was unaware of the existence of that document and the latter is therefore not relevant so
far as it is concerned. Second, according to Annex 2 to the said agreement, the notification of European GIS projects to Japanese
producers was voluntary and not mandatory.

155    The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.

–       Findings of the Court

156    The Court notes, first, that the Commission’s claims relating to the notification and project loading mechanism are not based
exclusively on the assumption that the Japanese producers were perceived as credible competitors on the EEA market. The Commission
considers that it gathered positive evidence of the existence of that mechanism. Accordingly, the probative value of the evidence
put forward by the Commission must be examined in order to assess whether it establishes, to the requisite legal standard,
the existence of the notification and project loading mechanism.

157    In that regard, the applicant’s argument that, if notification aimed to enable project loading, the European producers would
not have had any incentive to notify is not substantiated. That argument is based solely on an assessment of the notification
and project loading mechanism as an isolated element. However, that approach is not in line with the Commission’s position,
as resumed in paragraph 90 above, that that mechanism formed part of the general context of the common understanding.

158    Second, although the notification and project loading mechanism required certain measures for its implementation, those measures
were not particularly complicated, since they essentially consisted in the disclosure of certain information by the European
group to the Japanese group, a disclosure which, in addition, took place in parallel with the information disclosed under
the GQ Agreement concerning GIS projects outside of the EEA. Consequently, it is not apparent that those measures or the notification
and project loading mechanism itself necessarily required written rules, also given the will of parties to the cartel, attested
by the organisational and technical precautions referred to in recitals 170 to 176 of the contested decision, to reduce the
risk of that agreement being discovered.

159    Third, in his witness statement, Mr M explicitly affirmed the existence of the notification and project loading mechanism.
He also stated that that mechanism did not concern the GIS projects in the home countries, that is to say in Japan and in
certain European countries.

160    The existence of a mechanism whereby the value of GIS projects in the EEA was charged to the worldwide quota laid down in
the GQ Agreement was also confirmed in ABB’s statements.

161    By contrast, as the applicant submits, it is not apparent from the lists of projects provided by ABB that GIS projects in
Europe were regularly notified to the Japanese producers. Therefore, those lists do not constitute evidence of the notification
and project loading mechanism.

162    In so far as concerns the evidence furnished by Hitachi, it should be noted that, read in the context of the sentences which
immediately precede it, the statement that Siemens would regularly circulate tables summarising a share of the GIS projects
allocated to the various members of the cartel refers to GIS projects outside of the EEA. Consequently, that statement is
also not relevant as evidence of the notification and project loading mechanism, as alleged by the Commission, concerning
GIS projects in the EEA.

163    By contrast, in its reply to the statement of objections, Hitachi stated that, before it discontinued its participation in
the cartel in 1999, the European producers disclosed to the Japanese producers details of GIS projects which they would be
supplying in Europe, to ensure that those projects were taken into account when agreeing the quota of GIS projects outside
of the EEA allocated to the two groups of producers under the GQ Agreement.

164    That statement expressly confirms the existence of the notification and project loading mechanism referred to by the Commission
until 1999. In addition, it is of a high probative value for two reasons. First, that statement goes against Hitachi’s interests,
since it implies the existence of a link between the collusive activities within the EEA and the Japanese producers and constitutes,
as a result, incriminating evidence. Second, it is apparent from reading the relevant passage of the reply to the statement
of objections that Hitachi was not aware of the inferences which could be made from that statement.

165    In addition, as noted in paragraph 54 above, Hitachi did not alter the factual content of its statements relating to the notification
and project loading mechanism in its supplementary reply to the statement of objections.

166    Furthermore, the fact that the notification and project loading mechanism was not referred to in Hitachi’s leniency application,
which predated the reply to the statement of objections, does not reduce the probative value of that undertaking’s statements
relating to that mechanism. It is normal, during the procedure, for an undertaking to specify its position in relation to
certain circumstances of the case, in particular following the communication of the statement of objections, which formalises
the complaints and the evidence put forward by the Commission.

167    Fuji, for its part, stated in its reply to the statement of objections that the information concerning the allocation of GIS
projects in the European countries excluded from the scope of the GQ Agreement was not systematically provided to the Japanese
producers and that, consequently, Fuji did not know about the operation of the EQ Agreement.

168    It should be noted none the less that Fuji’s position is not contrary to its own interests since it seeks to call into question
the existence of any infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. It is thus of a lower probative value
than the relevant evidence furnished by ABB and Hitachi. Moreover, Fuji’s secondary role within the cartel, noted in paragraph
137 above, may explain the fact that Fuji was not privy to all the information exchanged by the group of European producers.
That also calls into question the reliability of Fuji’s statements in that regard compared with that of the evidence furnished
by ABB and Hitachi, which were members of the committees of their respective groups and were, for that reason, more closely
associated with the detailed operation of the alleged cartel.

169    As regards the EQ Agreement, in accordance with point 4 of part ‘E (E‐Members)’ of Annex 2 to the EQ Agreement, the European
producers ‘decide about notification of [E]uropean projects to [the group of Japanese producers]’. It is apparent from the
context of Annex 2 that the information was to be communicated prior to the allocation of the GIS projects concerned.

170    By contrast, the provision referred to above did not relate to the monitoring of projects which had already been allocated.
Consequently, although its content suggests that the Japanese producers were regarded as credible competitors for the provision
of certain GIS projects in the EEA (see paragraphs 184 to 191 below), the measures which it provided for are not part of the
notification and project loading mechanism as claimed by the Commission. Therefore, both Annex 2 to the EQ Agreement and the
references to the content of that annex made in recitals 148 and 162 of the contested decision are of no use for proving that
mechanism.

171    In the light of all of the foregoing, it must be concluded that the existence of the notification and project loading mechanism
has been established to the requisite legal standard by the evidence furnished by ABB, as corroborated by Hitachi’s statements
in its reply to the statement of objections.

172    Contrary to what the applicant claims, it is not apparent from the evidence referred to in the preceding paragraph that the
notification and project loading mechanism was implemented occasionally and in a discretionary manner. Although ABB’s and
Hitachi’s statements and Mr M’s witness statement do not address that subject explicitly, it is clear from the wording used
in the documents at issue that notification was carried out regularly and applied to all of the participants and projects
concerned. As explained in paragraph 168 above, Fuji’s statements are less reliable in that respect than the evidence provided
by ABB and Hitachi. In addition, it has been noted in paragraph 170 above that Annex 2 to the EQ Agreement is not relevant
in that regard.

173    As regards the implementation period of the notification and project loading mechanism, ABB’s statements do not refer to a
specific period and may therefore, a priori, be interpreted as referring to the entire duration of the infringement. As for
Mr M’s statements, they refer to the period during which he was involved in the cartel, that is to say from 1988 to June 2002.
However, in so far as it has been noted in paragraph 84 above that the evidence provided by ABB had to be corroborated by
other evidence, it must be pointed out that Hitachi’s statements concern the period preceding the date when it discontinued
its participation in the cartel in 1999. Therefore, it must be considered that the existence of the notification and project
loading mechanism was established for that latter period.

174    As regards the relevance of that mechanism, it must be found that it constitutes a serious indicator that the Japanese producers
were perceived by the European producers as potential credible competitors on the EEA market. If the European market was actually
impenetrable for the Japanese producers because of the barriers to entry, the European producers would have no reason to notify
the results of the allocation of certain GIS projects in the EEA and, *a fortiori*, to load those projects into the joint ‘European’ quota provided for in the GQ Agreement, since such loading would deprive
them of a share of the GIS projects in the regions covered by the GQ Agreement. Consequently, the existence of such a notification
and project loading mechanism implies that the Japanese undertakings could have entered the European market. If they did not
do so it is because they committed themselves not to, in exchange for a larger share of the GIS projects outside of the EEA.
Thus, the mechanism at issue constitutes a link between the collusive activities within the EEA and the Japanese producers
and, as a result, indirect evidence of the existence of the common understanding.

175    In the light of all of the above, it must be held that the regular notification to the group of Japanese producers of certain
GIS projects in the EEA after their allocation and the loading of those projects into the joint ‘European’ quota, provided
for in the GQ Agreement, has been established in so far as concerns the period from 1988 to Hitachi’s withdrawal from the
cartel in 1999 by ABB’s statements, those of Hitachi and Mr M’s witness statement. In addition, the mechanism at issue constitutes
indirect evidence of the existence of the common understanding alleged by the Commission.

The evidence allegedly contradicting the existence of the common understanding

–       Arguments of the parties

176    First, the applicant maintains that the contemporaneous documents do not refer to the common understanding. In its view, whilst
the GQ and EQ Agreements lay down the detailed rules for the operation of the cartel, they exclude Europe from their scope.
It is implausible that the agreements concerned failed to even mention one of the essential elements of the cartel. The applicant
considers that, if the GIS producers had intended to create a global cartel by reserving the markets of the home countries
to themselves, they would have included defence clauses in their written agreement, rather than excluding the territories
in question from its scope and relying on an unwritten understanding.

177    Thus, the applicant claims that the GQ and EQ Agreements cannot be regarded as documentary evidence of the existence of the
common understanding. That is all the more so since the Japanese producers did not participate in the EQ Agreement and were
not aware of it.

178    Moreover, the EQ Agreement corroborates the fact that the Japanese producers did not represent a credible threat on the European
market, since it provides that, with regard to European projects, only the European producers were to submit supporting bids.
That implies that European customers would not have regarded a bid from a Japanese producer as credible.

179    Second, the applicant adds that its employees were unaware of the common understanding and that none of them participated
in activities related thereto.

180    Similarly, the applicant states that the Commission did not take account of evidence, including witness statements, provided
by the applicant, Hitachi, Siemens, Toshiba and VA TECH, which shows that the common understanding never existed.

181    In that context, the probative value of Siemens’s and VA TECH’s statements is all the more important because those two undertakings
had no incentive to deny the existence of the common understanding, in so far as their participation in an infringement was
established by other evidence.

182    The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.

–       Findings of the Court

183    First, it is common ground between the parties that the GQ Agreement sets out the organisation of a cartel for worldwide GIS
projects. However, first, as the applicant submits, that agreement does not refer to a common understanding and, second, according
to Annex 2 to that agreement, Japan, the twelve Member States of the European Community at that time and five other Western
European countries were excluded from its scope of application.

184    The EQ Agreement, for its part, is an agreement implementing the GQ Agreement, which concerns, inter alia, the distribution
of the joint ‘European’ quota provided for in the GQ Agreement. The EQ Agreement was concluded solely by the European undertakings.
The applicant was thus not a party to it. In addition, that agreement does not explicitly mention the common understanding.

185    Accordingly, the GQ and EQ Agreements cannot be regarded as constituting documentary evidence of the existence of a common
understanding.

186    However, the lack of explicit reference to that understanding in the GQ and EQ Agreements does not imply that such an understanding
did not exist. The commitment of a group of producers not to enter a market reserved to the other group, such as the commitment
alleged by the Commission against the Japanese producers, is based on a simple concept which may be implemented easily. Also,
its implementation does not require, in principle, interaction between the undertakings concerned. Consequently, such a commitment
is perfectly capable of existing as an unwritten understanding, which also reduces the likelihood of its discovery.

187    Furthermore, in so far the Japanese producers did not participate in the EQ Agreement, the obligation to submit supporting
bids, set out in Article 6(4) of that agreement, could not apply to them. Consequently, that provision does not imply that
the Japanese producers were not perceived as potential competitors on the EEA market.

188    The Court also notes that, as pointed out in paragraph 169 above, in accordance with point 4 of part ‘E (E-Members)’ of Annex
2 to the EQ Agreement, the European producers could decide about notification of certain GIS projects in Europe to the group
of Japanese producers, prior to allocating the GIS projects concerned.

189    This makes it possible to dismiss, to a certain extent, the applicant’s arguments, since it suggests that the European producers
considered that the Japanese producers might have been interested, at the very least, in the allocation process of certain
GIS projects in the EEA, and that they were therefore potential competitors for such projects.

190    However, nothing in the EQ Agreement or in the other evidence adduced by the Commission proves that the mechanism concerned
was implemented by the European producers or that the Japanese producers were aware of its existence.

191    Therefore, the EQ Agreement constitutes merely an indication that the Japanese producers were regarded as credible competitors
for the provision of certain GIS projects in the EEA, as claimed by the Commission.

192    Second, the Commission did not err in considering that the statements and witness statements of ABB, the statements of Fuji
relating to the existence of the common understanding and the statements of Hitachi relating to notification and project loading
had to be regarded as being of a higher probative value than the claims made by the applicant, Hitachi, Siemens, Toshiba and
VA TECH and the evidence furnished by those undertakings that there was no common understanding.

193    Unlike the first group of evidence, the claims at issue are not contrary to the interests of the undertakings concerned, since
they seek to call into question the existence of any infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. That
finding also applies to the witness statements of the employees and former employees, since, as set out in paragraph 59 above,
in principle they are not independent items of evidence. Moreover, as regards the common understanding, the witness statements
do not contain any additional evidence to that furnished by the addressees of the statement of objections.

194    In addition, it cannot be considered that the European undertakings, including Siemens and VA TECH, had no interest in contesting
the existence of the common understanding, since that understanding was interpreted by the Commission in the statement of
objections as a collusive agreement between the European producers and the Japanese producers in relation to the EEA market
and thus constituted an infringement of Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. Indeed, such a finding was detrimental
to the interests of the European producers, or at least could potentially have been, if the Commission had not been able to
establish the other objections against them to the requisite legal standard.

195    In the light of the foregoing, it must be found that the evidence furnished by the applicant does not call into question the
value of the evidence furnished by the Commission to establish the existence of the common understanding.

The allocation of GIS products in the EEA

–       Arguments of the parties

196    The applicant submits that the evidence relied on does not constitute proof that it participated in the allocation of GIS
projects in the EEA.

197    The applicant admits that it attended meetings with the European producers, but maintains that those meetings concerned only
the GQ Agreement and did not therefore constitute an infringement of Article 81 EC or Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

198    The applicant also contests the allegation that Japanese producers sometimes envisaged responding to European invitations
to tender for GIS projects in the EEA. It states that, with the exception of one instance, it never received any invitations
to tender from a European company during the cartel period.

199    As regards the various items of evidence referred to in the contested decision, the applicant maintains that it never had
any knowledge of the project lists from ABB and Fuji. It expressly denies ever having any knowledge of the Spanish ‘MSP via
GC’ project dating back to 1997 in which, according to one of the lists of projects provided by ABB, it expressed an interest.

200    Similarly, the evidence from VA TECH referred to in recital 204 of the contested decision does not in any way link GIS projects
in the EEA to the applicant or to any other Japanese producer.

201    The Commission considers that the applicant’s arguments are unfounded.

–       Findings of the Court

202    The file does not contain any evidence which suggests that GIS projects in the EEA were discussed at GQ Agreement meetings
in which the Japanese members of the cartel participated.

203    Similarly, it is not apparent from the lists of projects provided by ABB and Fuji that GIS projects in the EEA were discussed
with the Japanese producers, with the exception of the applicant’s alleged interest in the ‘MSP via GC’ project in Spain.
It cannot be ruled out that the reference to interest shown by the applicant in the list of projects provided by ABB is a
mistake, given the length of the list of projects concerned and the fact that the Commission did not identify other cases
in which a Japanese producer showed interest in a GIS project in the EEA. In any event, the content of the list of projects
from ABB is not corroborated by other evidence, and in particular by Fuji’s list of projects, in respect of the ‘MSP via GC’
project and cannot therefore be taken into consideration in that regard.

204    In addition, when the Commission stated in recital 125 of the contested decision that the Japanese producers sometimes considered
replying to European tenders, but normally declined them and mentioned the projects concerned to the European producers, it
based its findings solely on ABB’s statements and on the witness statements given by its employees. Consequently, since that
statement is not corroborated by other evidence, it cannot be taken into consideration.

205    Finally, the handwritten notes of a representative of VA TECH, referred to in recital 204 of the contested decision, contain
a reference to a GIS project in the EEA and a reminder to discuss a package of GIS projects with the Japanese producers. However,
the two passages concerned are separated by several pages containing notes relating to other subjects. In addition, the reference
to the Japanese undertakings is immediately preceded by notes relating to a GIS project outside of the EEA. Accordingly, those
notes do not enable conclusions to be drawn in respect of the interest of the Japanese undertakings in GIS projects in Europe.

206    In the light of all of the above, it must be found that it has not been established that the Japanese undertakings participated
in the allocation of GIS projects in the EEA.

Global assessment

–       Arguments of the parties

207    The applicant submits, at the outset, that, contrary to what the Commission claims, it was not necessary to protect the domestic
markets from the two groups of producers. In its view, there was no risk or danger of the Japanese producers being able to
compete on the European market, or vice versa. The applicant also adds that it was invited only exceptionally to submit a
bid for a GIS project in the EEA during the alleged cartel period.

208    The applicant maintains that the purpose and the content of the common understanding have not been established. The evidence
relied on by the Commission does not identify the members of the common understanding, the date on which it was concluded
or what happened to it after Siemens and Hitachi withdrew from the cartel in 1999. Thus, the evidence furnished by ABB does
not disclose the existence of a collusive agreement but represents a ‘subconscious expression’ that the Japanese producers
were not in a position to penetrate the European market and vice versa.

209    In addition, the Commission failed to take account of the consequences of Siemens’s and Hitachi’s withdrawal from the cartel.
According to the applicant, even if the parties were a credible competitive threat to each other’s home markets, the common
understanding would have been called into question by the withdrawal of two key members of the GQ Agreement. Furthermore,
during the two years Siemens and Hitachi were absent from the arrangement, Hitachi would have recorded sales in Europe and
Siemens would have recorded sales in Japan.

210    Finally, the applicant submits that account should not be taken of the Commission’s claims relating to the ‘home countries’
and the relevance of the notification and project loading mechanism. In its view, those claims, in particular the claim that
the Japanese undertakings were aware of the ‘home countries’, is not supported by any evidence other than Mr M’s witness statement.
Moreover, the latter’s statements that the identity and ownership of the home countries were well established, did not need
to be discussed and predated the GQ Agreement, are contradicted by other evidence referred to by the Commission, pursuant
to which those circumstances changed over time. Consequently, Mr M’s witness statement is not credible in that regard.

211    The Commission argues that the applicant’s arguments are unfounded.

–       Findings of the Court

212    It is apparent from the examination carried out in paragraphs 107 to 175 above, first, that ABB’s statements and the witness
statements of its employees and of its former employee show that an understanding existed whereby the European and Japanese
producers undertook mutually not to enter the domestic markets of the other group. Those items of evidence also make it possible
to identify the parties to the understanding, among which the applicant, and to conclude that, although it was probably concluded
prior to the GQ Agreement, it was concluded, at the latest, at the time the GQ Agreement was concluded.

213    Second, the existence of the mutual understanding referred to above is corroborated by the proposal made by Alstom at the
meeting of 10 July 2002. The existence of the commitment of the Japanese undertakings not to enter the European market is
also corroborated by Fuji’s statements.

214    Third, it is apparent from ABB’s statements and its witness statement, corroborated by Hitachi’s statements, that the Japanese
producers accepted, at least in so far as concerns the period from 1988 to 1999, the regular notification of the results of
the allocation of certain GIS projects in the EEA and their loading into the joint ‘European’ quota provided for in the GQ
Agreement. Similarly, under Point 4 of Part ‘E (E (Members)’ of Annex 2 to the EQ Agreement, the European producers foresaw
the possibility of providing the Japanese producers with the details of certain GIS projects in the EEA prior to their allocation.
Those two factors suggest that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the Japanese producers were regarded as credible competitors
for the provision of certain GIS projects in the EEA, but that they had committed not to enter the European market in exchange
for a larger share of the GIS projects in other regions. They thus constitute indirect evidence of the existence of the mutual
understanding between the European producers and the Japanese producers.

215    Thus, the evidence produced by the Commission supports its assertions regarding the existence of the common understanding,
as summarised in paragraph 90 above. By contrast, the evidence relied on by the applicant and evaluated in paragraphs 183
to 195 above is not capable of calling those statements into question.

216    In that regard, it has not been established that the Japanese undertakings participated, with the European producers, in the
allocation of GIS projects in the EEA. However, it should be pointed out that, in the light of the nature of their alleged
commitment under the common understanding, their participation in it would not have been necessary. The Japanese producers
would have had no interest in intervening in the actual allocation of GIS projects in the EEA which they had committed themselves
not to take. Their sole interest would have been to learn the value of the projects concerned and the identity of the undertakings
to which they were awarded, in order to be able to monitor the loading into the joint ‘European’ quota provided for in the
GQ Agreement. At least in so far as concerns the period from 1988 to 1999, that information was communicated to the Japanese
producers via the notification mechanism.

217    As regards the consequences of Siemens’s and Hitachi’s withdrawal from the cartel, first, it is apparent from recital 187
of the contested decision and Mr M’s witness statement that that event had an appreciable repercussion on the effectiveness
of the cartel, but the cartel did not ‘collapse’. Second, the period of absence of the two undertakings is insufficient for
there to have been a significant entry on to the EEA market, given, first, the existence of certain technical and commercial
obstacles, which is not disputed by the Commission, second, the fact that the privileged position of the various producers
on their domestic markets was artificially strengthened as a result of the cartel between 1988 and 1999 and finally, the fact
that the other producers thought of adopting retaliatory measures against Siemens and Hitachi, as is apparent from Mr M’s
witness statement.

218    Finally, pursuant to the reasoning set out in paragraphs 174 and 214 above, it is not necessary to establish that the notification
and project loading mechanism did not concern GIS projects in the European home countries or that Japan constituted a home
country to be able to regard that mechanism as a relevant indication of the existence of the common understanding. Consequently,
the fact that Mr M’s witness statement may not be corroborated in that regard is of no significance.

219    The Court also notes that there is no inconsistency between Mr M’s witness statement and the other evidence referred to by
the Commission in so far as concerns the home countries concept. According to Mr M, the very concept of the common understanding,
as a mutual commitment not to enter the domestic markets of the other group, was in fact well established, did not need to
be discussed and predated the GQ Agreement. That being so, later in his witness statement, Mr M himself notes that, in certain
cases, the ownership of a home country changed as a result of mergers between the various operators concerned.

220    In the light of all of the above, it must be found that the existence of the common understanding has been established to
the requisite legal standard and that the Commission did not go beyond the limits of its powers in fining the applicant for
its participation in that understanding.

221    Therefore, the first plea must be dismissed.

222    In addition, as explained in paragraph 95 above, since the Commission did not base its findings solely on the conduct of the
undertakings at issue on the market in concluding that the alleged infringement had been committed, it is not sufficient for
the applicant to substitute its own alternative plausible version of the facts for the version given by the Commission. Consequently,
the third plea must be dismissed.

223    Similarly, the conclusion that the existence of the common understanding has been established to the requisite legal standard
implies that the Commission discharged its burden of proof and thus respected the principle of the presumption of innocence.
Therefore, the fourth plea must be dismissed.

224    Finally, it is apparent from the foregoing that the Commission was able to conclude that the common understanding existed
without taking account of Fuji’s observations, which were not disclosed to the applicant, and the alleged neutral position
of Alstom and Areva, as incriminating evidence. Consequently, in accordance with what has been stated in paragraph 51 above,
ultimately it is necessary to dismiss the fourteenth plea, alleging an infringement of the right of access to the file.

*The second plea, alleging that the Commission failed to establish the existence of an agreement infringing Article 81 EC and
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement*

–       Arguments of the parties

225    The applicant maintains that the Commission has not identified any agreement justifying the application of Article 81 EC and
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. In its view, the Commission did not indicate the time at which the parties expressed their
joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way and did not furnish evidence of contacts, discussions
or agreements between them. However, without any evidence, the provisions referred to above cannot be used so as to prohibit
persons from coming to the same conclusion on a certain issue.

226    The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.

–       Findings of the Court

227    According to the case‐law, it is for the Commission to gather sufficiently precise and consistent evidence to support the
firm conviction that the alleged infringement constitutes an agreement or a concerted practice within the meaning of Article
81(1) EC (Joined Cases T‐185/96, T‐189/96 and T‐190/96 *Riviera Auto Service and Others*v *Commission* [1999] ECR II‐93, paragraph 47). The case‐law cited is applicable, by analogy, to Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.

228    In the contested decision, the Commission did not comment expressly on the issue whether the conduct imputed to the Japanese
undertakings constituted an agreement or a concerted practice. In recital 248 of the contested decision, it merely observed
that the infringement consisted of several actions which may be classed as agreements or concerted practices.

229    Consequently, it should be assessed, first, whether the common understanding constitutes an agreement between undertakings
within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.

230    In that regard, in order for there to be an agreement within the meaning of those provisions, it is sufficient that the undertakings
in question expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way (see, by analogy, *Cimenteries CBR and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 86 above, paragraph 958, and the case‐law cited). There is no need to take account of the concrete effects of
an agreement when it is apparent that it has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition (see *Cimenteries CBR and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 86 above, paragraph 837, and the case‐law cited).

231    In the present case, it is apparent from the various items of evidence produced by the Commission, and in particular ABB’s
and Fuji’s statements and the witness statements of Mr M and Mr V.-A, that, at the time of conclusion of the GQ Agreement
at the latest, the European and Japanese producers mutually agreed not to enter the domestic markets of the other group. The
existence of a mutual agreement necessarily implies the existence of a meeting of minds, even if there is no evidence which
makes it possible to determine with precision the exact point in time that meeting of minds was manifested or which formalised
its expression. In addition, it is apparent from paragraph 116 above that Mr M considered that it was not necessary to refer
to the common understanding during the discussions in which he participated, since the content of that understanding was understood,
accepted and implemented by all the participants to the cartel without the need for any specific discussion on it. Moreover,
as set out in paragraph 123 above, Mr V.‐A stated that he participated in discussions between the European undertakings and
the representative of a Japanese undertaking expressly concerning compliance with the common understanding.

232    Similarly, the acceptance over a number of years – confirmed by ABB’s statements and witness statement and by Hitachi’s statements
– by the Japanese producers of the notification of the results of the allocation of certain GIS projects in the EEA and the
monitoring of their loading into the joint ‘European’ quota provided for in the GQ Agreement is not consistent with the mere
parallel conduct of competitors with no meeting of minds.

233    Furthermore, the object of the common understanding was to determine the conduct of the Japanese undertakings in relation
to the EEA market, since those undertakings committed themselves not to enter that market. Thus, that understanding effectively
amounted to reserving the EEA market for European producers.

234    Consequently, the Commission was right to find that the common understanding constituted an agreement between undertakings
within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.

235    Accordingly, it is not necessary to examine whether the common understanding constituted a concerted practice within the meaning
of those provisions.

236    In the light of all the foregoing, the second plea must be dismissed.

*The thirteenth plea, alleging that the Commission erred in determining the duration of the cartel*

–       Arguments of the parties

237    The applicant maintains, first, that following Siemens’s departure from the cartel in September 1999, the small group comprising
the other undertakings developed into a loose discussion forum with no anti‐competitive object or effect with respect to the
European Union.

238    Second, Siemens’s return to the cartel in 2002 did not lead to arrangements that had the object or effect of restricting competition
in Europe, since Hitachi rejected Alstom’s proposal that the European and Japanese markets should be reserved, respectively,
for European and Japanese producers.

239    Consequently, the applicant considers that it was wrong for it to be fined for the period from 1 September 1999 to 11 May
2004 or, at least, from 10 July 2002 to 11 May 2004.

240    The Commission considers the applicant’s arguments to be unfounded.

–       Findings of the Court

241    According to the case‐law, when there is a dispute concerning the existence of an infringement, the requirement of legal certainty,
on which economic operators are entitled to rely, means that the Commission, which bears the burden of proving infringements
which it finds, must adduce evidence which will sufficiently establish the existence of the facts constituting the infringement.
With specific regard to the alleged duration of an infringement, the same principle of legal certainty requires that, if there
is no evidence directly establishing the duration of an infringement, the Commission should adduce at least evidence of facts
sufficiently proximate in time for it to be reasonable to accept that that infringement continued uninterruptedly between
two specific dates (Case T‐43/92 *Dunlop Slazenger* v *Commission* [1994] ECR II‐441, paragraph 79; Case T‐62/98 *Volkswagen* v *Commission*[2000] ECR II‐2707, paragraph 188; and Case T‐279/02 *Degussa* v *Commission* [2006] ECR II‐897, paragraphs 114 and 153).

242    In addition, the fact that the evidence of the existence of a continuous infringement was not adduced for certain specific
periods does not preclude the infringement from being regarded as having been established during a more extensive overall
period than those periods, provided that such a finding is based on objective and consistent indicia. In the context of an
infringement extending over a number of years, the fact that a cartel reveals itself at different periods, which may be separated
by more or less lengthy intervals, has no impact on the existence of that cartel, provided that the various actions which
form part of the infringement pursue a single aim and come within the framework of a single and continuous infringement (Case
C‐113/04 P *Technische Unie* v *Commission* [2006] ECR I‐8831, paragraph 169).

243    In the present case, it should be noted, at the outset, that, in so far as the commitment of the Japanese undertakings under
the common understanding did not consist in a positive action, but in a failure to act, it is inherently difficult to prove
that that understanding was respected continuously.

244    None the less, first, it is apparent from Mr M’s witness statement that, until the end of his involvement in the cartel in
June 2002, both the GQ Agreement and the common understanding continued to be implemented together with the Japanese undertakings
other than Hitachi, in spite of the fact that the latter’s absence and that of Siemens made its operation less effective.
The other witness statements of ABB’s employees confirm that the common understanding continued between July 2002 and May
2004. The content of the witness statements concerned is also reflected in ABB’s statements.

245    Second, in its reply to the statement of objections, Fuji confirms that the Japanese undertakings participated in the infringement,
including in the common understanding, until September 2000, the point at which it claims to have left the cartel.

246    Third, it has been concluded in paragraph 144 above that, at the meeting of 10 July 2002, Alstom proposed to extend the common
understanding to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. That implies that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the
understanding existed both at the time of the meeting and for a certain amount of time prior to and after the meeting.

247    Fourth, the continuous absence of the Japanese producers from the European GIS market during the period concerned also suggests
that the common understanding continued to be implemented.

248    Fifth, in so far as, first, the applicant does not expressly criticise the fact that the Commission concluded that there was
a single infringement encompassing inter alia the common understanding and the GQ Agreement and, second, the examination of
pleas one to four has not led the Court to find that the Commission erred in that regard, it must be found that evidence of
the continuous functioning of the GQ Agreement constitutes a relevant indication that the common understanding was also implemented
during that period. Given the single nature of the infringement, it is plausible that the disappearance of the common understanding
would have compromised the functioning of the GQ Agreement.

249    Indeed, the applicant does not dispute the findings in recitals 191 to 198 of the contested decision relating to the exchange
of a series of faxes concerning the allocation of projects under the GQ Agreement in December 2000 and January 2001, to meetings
of the GQ Agreement which were to be held in 2000 and 2001, and to agreements relating to certain GIS projects concluded in
1998 and 1999 and operative until October 2001.

250    Similarly, the applicant does not raise any arguments specifically calling into question the Commission’s findings in recitals
199 to 216 of the contested decision concerning the renewed participation of Hitachi, Siemens and VA TECH in the cartel and
the continuation of the cartel from July 2002 to 2004.

251    In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s argument that, during the period concerned, the meetings on the GQ Agreement
became a discussion forum without any anti‐competitive object or effect cannot be upheld. That is all the more true given
that that argument is not corroborated by any evidence other than Toshiba’s unsubstantiated statements.

252    Therefore, it must be found that the evidence relied on by the Commission in respect of the implementation of the common understanding
and the GQ Agreement between September 1999 and March 2004 relates to facts sufficiently proximate in time, which means that
evidence of a continuous infringement was adduced in relation to the period concerned.

253    Consequently, the thirteenth plea must be dismissed.

254    Since none of the pleas raised in support of the main claim can succeed, that claim must be rejected.

2.     *The claim in the alternative, seeking the annulment of Article 2(g) of the contested decision and Article 2(h) thereof, to
the extent to which it concerns the applicant*

255    It is first necessary to address the fifth plea, alleging that the Commission infringed the principles of equal treatment
and proportionality in calculating the starting amount of the fine imposed on the applicant on the basis of its 2001 turnover.

Arguments of the parties

256    The applicant maintains that, by calculating the starting amount of the fines of the Japanese producers on the basis of their
worldwide sales of GIS for 2001, while using 2003 as the reference year for the European producers, the Commission infringed
the principles of equal treatment and proportionality.

257    First, the Commission did not provide any objective justification for the unequal treatment of the Japanese producers. According
to the applicant, the fact that it chose, as part of a legitimate commercial strategy, to carry on its GIS business through
TM T & D, is irrelevant in that regard, since the market fluctuations that occurred as from 2003 would have affected its situation,
even if its choice had been different. In this case, the Commission should have used, as a starting amount, a part of TM T
& D’s turnover corresponding to the portion of its capital held by the applicant. In addition, that same methodology was applied
to Schneider regarding its participation in a joint venture with VA TECH.

258    Second, according to the applicant, the result of the Commission’s approach was that the starting amount applied to it was
calculated on the basis of a year during which the market situation was substantially different from that in the year used
for the European undertakings, thereby overstating the extent of its participation in the infringement. The applicant submits,
in that regard, that between 2001 and 2003, both the European and Japanese GIS markets in general and its turnover in that
area suffered a substantial decline.

259    The Commission points out that it has discretion regarding the choice of factors to be taken into account in determining the
amount of fines, which in turn influences the intensity of judicial review in that area. It infers that arguments based on
general principles of law can only temper that discretion where it has been exercised in flagrant disregard of the facts of
the case.

260    The Commission adds that where, as in this case, the infringement is found to be very serious, it is entitled to apply differential
treatment in order to reflect the effective capacity of the undertakings concerned to cause significant damage to competition
and to ensure proper deterrence.

261    In this case, the starting amount allocated to the applicant was determined on the basis of the abovementioned factors. 2001
was chosen because it was the last year before the transfer of the applicant’s GIS business to TM T & D. That difference of
treatment is justified, according to the Commission, by the fact that for most of the duration of the cartel the applicant
participated as an individual undertaking, which means that the 2003 sales do not faithfully reflect the applicant’s actual
capacity to cause damage to competition.

262    Furthermore, according to the Commission, the mere fact that 2001 was a better year than 2003 for the applicant is not sufficient
to argue that the starting amount is disproportionate.

263    Finally, the Commission emphasises that it did not set a separate starting amount for TM T & D so that the applicant did not
have to bear an undue burden.

Findings of the Court

264    The Court notes, at the outset, that the Commission has a margin of discretion when fixing the amount of fines, in order that
it may direct the conduct of undertakings towards compliance with the competition rules (see Joined Cases T‐236/01, T-239/01,
T-244/01 to T‐246/01, T‐251/01 and T-252/01 *Tokai Carbon and Others* v *Commission* [2004] ECR II‐1181, paragraph 216, and the case‐law cited).

265    The amount of the fine is set by the Commission according to the gravity of the infringement and, where appropriate, to its
duration. The gravity of an infringement has to be determined by reference to criteria such as the particular circumstances
of the case, its context and the dissuasive effect of the fines. Objective factors such as the content and duration of the
anti-competitive conduct, the number of incidents and their intensity, the extent of the market affected and the damage to
the economic public order must be taken into account. The analysis must also take into consideration the relative importance
and market share of the undertakings responsible and also any repeated infringements (*Aalborg Portland and Others* v *Commission*, paragraph 39 above, paragraphs 89 to 91).

266    However, each time the Commission decides to impose fines pursuant to competition law, it must observe general principles
of law, which include the principle of equal treatment as interpreted by the Community Courts (Case T‐59/02 *Archer Daniels Midland* v *Commission* [2006] ECR II‐3627, paragraph 315).

267    According to settled case‐law, the principle of equal treatment or non‐discrimination requires that comparable situations
must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is
objectively justified (see Case T‐311/94 *BPB de Eendracht* v *Commission* [1998] ECR II‐1129, paragraph 309, and the case‐law cited).

268    To the extent to which reliance is to be placed on the turnover of undertakings involved in the same infringement for the
purpose of determining the proportions between the fines to be imposed, the period to be taken into consideration must be
ascertained in such a way that the resulting turnovers are as comparable as possible (Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 *Musique Diffusion française and Others* v *Commission* [1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 122).

269    The principle of proportionality, for its part, requires that measures adopted by Community institutions do not exceed the
limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question;
when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages
caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (Case C‐331/88 *Fedesa and Others* [1990] ECR I‐4023, paragraph 13, and Case C‐180/96 *United Kingdom* v *Commission* [1998] ECR I‐2265, paragraph 96).

270    In the present case, it is apparent from recitals 480 to 490 of the contested decision that, when calculating the starting
amounts, the Commission decided, in accordance with section 1 A of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines, to apply
differential treatment to the cartel participants on the basis of their capacity to harm competition. To that end, it placed
the various undertakings into five groups in accordance with the size of their worldwide turnovers obtained from GIS sales.
In that regard, the Commission considered that the turnovers relating solely to the EEA market did not constitute a reliable
criterion for assessment in so far the common understanding aimed to ensure that the Japanese producers did not enter that
market.

271    In so far as concerns the reference year, it is apparent from recitals 481, 482 and 484 of the contested decision that, when
determining the value of worldwide sales, the Commission used the figures for 2001 for the applicant, Fuji, Hitachi and Toshiba,
while it used 2003, that is the last full year of infringement, as the reference year for the European producers. Similarly,
the calculation of the starting amount of the fines for the applicant, Fuji, Hitachi and Toshiba for the period of their participation
in the cartel as individual undertakings was made on the basis of their turnovers for 2001, whereas the calculation of the
starting amount of the fines of the European producers was made on the basis of their turnovers for 2003.

272    Therefore, the Commission did not treat the Japanese producers, including the applicant, and the European producers equally
in terms of its choice of reference year. Consequently, in accordance with the case‐law cited in paragraph 267 above, it needs
to be assessed whether there was an objective justification for that difference in treatment.

273    In that regard, in recital 482 of the contested decision, the Commission stated that the use of 2001 as the reference year
for the applicant was justified by the fact that, for the most part of the period of infringement, the applicant participated
in the cartel as an individual undertaking, and not through the joint venture TM T & D which took over the applicant’s and
Toshiba’s GIS activities in 2002.

274    At the hearing, the Commission stated that its objective was to take account of the uneven competitive position of the two
shareholders of TM T & D at the time the latter was created, due to the fact that the applicant held a considerably larger
share of the worldwide GIS market than Toshiba. According to the Commission, by referring to the last full year of the applicant’s
and Toshiba’s participation in the cartel as individual undertakings, that is to say 2001, it was able to reflect that disparity
when calculating the fines, which would not have been possible with the method consisting in dividing TM T & D’s turnover
for 2003 between the two shareholders in accordance with their respective shareholdings in the joint venture.

275    The objective referred to by the Commission is legitimate since it makes it possible to compare the capacity of the shareholders
of a joint venture to harm competition during the period prior to the creation of the joint venture. In addition, it is apparent
from recital 489 of the contested decision that the same objective was pursued in the case of Schneider, yet the lack of relevant
turnover figures for that undertaking for 2001 or 2003 led the Commission to take Schneider’s shareholding in the share capital
of the joint venture as the starting amount for its fine. By contrast, relevant turnover figures are available for both 2001
and 2003 in respect of the applicant.

276    However, it is evident that the Commission could have used other methods to achieve its objective without treating the Japanese
producers and the European producers unequally in its choice of reference year. By way of example, when determining the fines
for the applicant and Toshiba for the period prior to the creation of TM T & D, the Commission could have taken the starting
amount of TM T & D’s fine, calculated on the basis of its turnover for 2003 and divided it between the applicant and Toshiba
in accordance with the proportion of GIS sales made by them during the year prior to the creation of the joint venture, namely
2001.

277    Consequently, it must be found that, in the present case, the Commission’s wish, in calculating the fines, to faithfully reproduce
the relative positions of the applicant and Toshiba does not justify the unequal treatment of the applicant.

278    In the light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that, in choosing 2001 as the reference year for the determination of
the value of the worldwide sales of the Japanese producers and for the calculation of the fine imposed on the applicant for
its individual participation in the cartel, the Commission infringed the principle of equal treatment.

279    That infringement directly invalidates the calculation of the fine imposed on the applicant in Article 2(g) of the contested
decision for its participation in the cartel as an individual undertaking. Indirectly, through the determination of the value
of worldwide sales and market shares, it affects the calculation of the fine imposed on the applicant in Article 2(h) of the
contested decision, relating to the period of TM T & D’s existence.

280    Therefore, the fifth plea must be upheld and consequently, Article 2 (g) and (h) of the contested decision must be annulled.

281    In addition, there is no need to examine pleas six to twelve raised by the applicant. Even if those pleas were upheld, the
contested decision could not be annulled to any further extent than in the preceding paragraph.

282    Finally, given that the applicant’s claim in the alternative has been upheld, it is no longer necessary to give judgment on
either its claim in the further alternative or on its application for measures of organisation of procedure.

**Costs**

283    Under Article 87(3) of the Rules of Procedure, where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads, the Court may order
that the costs be shared or that each party bear its own costs.

284    In so far as the application seeking annulment of Article 1 of the contested decision has been rejected, the applicant has
been unsuccessful in a significant part of its pleadings, even though it has been successful in respect of a part of them.

285    Accordingly, the applicant must be ordered to bear three quarters of the costs incurred by the parties before the Court and
the Commission ordered to bear a quarter of those costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)

hereby:

1.      **Annuls Article 2(g) and (h) of Commission Decision C (2006) 6762 final of 24 January 2007 relating to a proceeding under Article
81 [EC] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas insulated switchgear) in so far as it concerns Mitsubishi
Electric Corp;**

2.      **Dismisses the action as to the remainder;**

3.      **Orders Mitsubishi Electric to bear three quarters of the costs incurred by the parties before the Court;**

4.      **Orders the European Commission to bear a quarter of the costs incurred by the parties before the Court.**

| Pelikánová | Jürimäe | Soldevila Fragoso |
| ---------- | ------- | ----------------- |

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 12 July 2011.

[Signatures]

Table of contents

Background to the dispute

1.  Applicant

2.  Goods

3.  Administrative procedure

4.  Contested decision

Procedure and forms of order sought

Law

1.  The main application, seeking the annulment of the contested decision to the extent to which it applies to the applicant
and TM T & D

The fourteenth plea, alleging that the Commission infringed the applicant’s right of defence and its right to a fair hearing
by not granting it access to incriminating and exculpatory evidence

Arguments of the parties

Findings of the Court

The fifteenth plea, alleging that the Commission infringed the applicant’s rights of defence by not putting forward to it
its conclusions on the theory of compensation inherent in the common understanding

Arguments of the parties

Findings of the Court

The first, third and fourth pleas, alleging that the Commission has not established that the applicant participated in the
alleged cartel, that the Commission erred in dismissing the evidence explaining the applicant’s absence from the European
market and the impossibility of entering that market, and that the Commission infringed the rules governing evidence by reversing
the burden of proof, thereby infringing the presumption of innocence

The evidence furnished by ABB

–  Arguments of the parties

–  Findings of the Court

The corroboration of the evidence furnished by ABB

–  Arguments of the parties

–  Findings of the Court

The notification and project loading mechanism

–  Arguments of the parties

–  Findings of the Court

The evidence allegedly contradicting the existence of the common understanding

–  Arguments of the parties

–  Findings of the Court

The allocation of GIS products in the EEA

–  Arguments of the parties

–  Findings of the Court

Global assessment

–  Arguments of the parties

–  Findings of the Court

The second plea, alleging that the Commission failed to establish the existence of an agreement infringing Article 81 EC and
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement

–  Arguments of the parties

–  Findings of the Court

The thirteenth plea, alleging that the Commission erred in determining the duration of the cartel

–  Arguments of the parties

–  Findings of the Court

2.  The claim in the alternative, seeking the annulment of Article 2(g) of the contested decision and Article 2(h) thereof,
to the extent to which it concerns the applicant

Arguments of the parties

Findings of the Court

Costs

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- Language of the case: English.