NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 18-3696

__________

EMMANUEL ADEYINKA, 

 Appellant

v.

HOWARD S. LOMAX

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-04897)

District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 23, 2019

Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and PORTER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 7, 2020)

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OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Emmanuel Adeyinka, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint. For the 

 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Adeyinka filed a complaint against Howard Lomax, a police officer, and the City 

of Philadelphia in 2018. Although the complaint is unclear, it appears to arise out of 

Adeyinka’s arrest on January 16, 2008, and his confinement related to two criminal cases 

brought against him in Philadelphia Municipal Court. Adeyinka refers to the state court 

criminal dockets as the basis for his complaint and claims cruel and unusual punishment

based on, among other things, the presence of vermin, flies, and mildew in prison. He 

also refers to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and “Miranda Rights.” Adeyinka seeks a total of 

$5,400,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 

The District Court screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

The District Court dismissed any claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a criminal statute 

prohibiting certain false statements, as legally baseless because the statute does not 

provide a basis for civil liability. The District Court also ruled that Adeyinka does not 

state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he had not stated what Lomax or 

the City of Philadelphia did to violate his rights. The District Court decided that, even if 

it construed Adeyinka’s complaint to raise claims against Lomax based on his 2008 arrest 

and the City based on the conditions of his confinement, his claims fail because they are 

barred by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations.

The District Court also ruled that, even if not time-barred, Adeyinka had not stated 

a claim based on the conditions of his confinement because his allegations did not 

suggest that he was exposed to an unconstitutional threat to his life or safety. In addition, 
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the District Court stated that Adeyinka did not identify a municipal policy or custom that 

would establish a basis for liability against the City of Philadelphia. The District Court 

ruled that amendment of the complaint would be futile because the claims are time-barred 

and dismissed the complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim for relief. This 

appeal followed.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our standard of review of the 

District Court’s dismissal of the complaint is plenary. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 

530 (3d Cir. 2003); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 

Adeyinka’s arguments on appeal are for the most part unclear. He appears to 

agree that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are time-barred, see Appellant’s 

Brief at 6-7, and to contend that his conditions of confinement violated his constitutional 

rights. He also states that he was not read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 

436 (1966). 

We agree with the District Court that Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of 

limitations applies to Adeyinka’s § 1983 claims, that any claims for false arrest and false 

imprisonment accrued in 2008, when Adeyinka was detained pursuant to legal process, 

and that these claims are time-barred. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato, 

549 U.S. 384, 387, 396 (2007). A claim based on Miranda is similarly time-barred.

Adeyinka’s conditions of confinement claims also appear to be time-barred for 

substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, and even if they are not, Adeyinka 

fails to state a plausible constitutional claim based on those conditions in his complaint. 
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See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). He has not elaborated on the conditions

of his confinement on appeal or shown that the District Court should have allowed him to 

amend his complaint.

To the extent Adeyinka seeks to bring a malicious prosecution claim, see

Appellant’s Brief at 13, he has shown no error in the District Court’s ruling that such a 

claim is not cognizable because his convictions for indecent exposure have not been 

vacated, or its ruling that a claim based on charges that were withdrawn in 2009 are timebarred. The state court dockets reflect that partial expungement orders have been issued 

in Adeyinka’s criminal cases since he filed his brief, but there is no indication that these 

orders affect these rulings. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.