IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-0596

Filed May 25, 2016

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

SCOTT ANTHONY SUDBECK,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Emmet County, Patrick M. Carr, 

Judge.

Defendant appeals conviction for first-degree murder, challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence and contending the district court erred in denying his 

motion for a new trial. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Benjamin M. Parrott, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard by Potterfield, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.

On February 26, 2014, Scott Sudbeck shot and killed his ex-girlfriend,

Michaela Jordan. He was tried and convicted of murder in the first degree in 

violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 707.2 (2013). On appeal, he 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. He relatedly contends the district 

court erred in denying his motion for new trial on the basis the conviction was 

against the weight of the evidence. 

I.

Sudbeck and Jordan had been in a long-term relationship. Until January 

2014, they resided together. At that time, their relationship ended, and Jordan 

obtained a no-contact order against Sudbeck when he was charged with a 

different crime committed against her. Jordan and her four children continued to 

live in the home she had shared with Sudbeck. 

Sudbeck was experiencing several personal problems around this time. 

He was prohibited from contact with Jordan. She continued to reside in his 

home; he had to find another residence. He was having problems with his 

employer. He was in a dispute with the Internal Revenue Service. He was 

behind on his child support, and he was disputing a child support calculation. He 

was being asked to pay back some amount of workers’ compensation benefits. 

On the morning of the shooting, he learned his son might have leukemia. 

Sudbeck was drinking heavily—five to seven large vodka drinks per day. He had 

been doing this for a long period of time prior to the shooting.

On the evening of February 26, Sudbeck testified, he left his home shortly 

before 8:00 p.m. to visit a friend. The friend, however, was not home. While 
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driving, Sudbeck observed Jordan drive by, and he decided to drive to her home 

to speak with her. He knew in doing so he would be in violation of the no-contact 

order. Sudbeck arrived at the home and parked away from the residence. He 

walked up to the front of the home. He was carrying a .45 caliber pistol with him. 

He held the pistol in his right hand—his dominant hand—without any attempt to 

conceal it. Jordan was still outside at this time. Sudbeck and Jordan engaged in 

a short conversation outside the front door. Jordan then told Sudbeck to leave.

The State and the defendant’s versions of events diverge at this point. 

The State contends Sudbeck intentionally shot and killed Jordan as she turned to 

go inside. Sudbeck testified Jordan turned to go into the home and he turned to 

walk back to his truck. As he did so, he testified, he threw his hands up and the 

gun accidentally discharged. He testified he did not turn back to see where the 

bullet went or whether it struck anyone or anything. He left the property and 

returned home. 

The bullet struck Jordan in the back, continued through a lung, hit her 

jugular vein, and exited through her neck. She entered the home, where her 

mother, brother, and children were. Jordan said, “He shot me.” Jordan’s mother 

asked, “Who shot you, baby?” Jordan replied, “Scott shot me, Mommy.” Jordan 

took a few more breaths and died in her mother’s arms. 

Sudbeck spent the rest of the evening communicating with another 

woman, Jennifer Yates, by text message and telephone until 2:30 a.m. At no 

time did he mention to Yates that his gun discharged. He did message to her 

several statements indicative of a guilty mind. He told Yates, “I’m sorry and 

goodbye.” He also messaged, “After tomorrow if you hear from me, I’ll be
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surprised.” He also messaged her, stating, “I’m gonna go away.” He was 

arrested in the early morning.

During their investigation, the police observed a bullet hole in the front 

door of Jordan’s residence and a corresponding hole in the interior closet door. 

The police found a .45 caliber bullet on the top shelf of the closet. They found a 

.45 caliber shell casing near the front steps. At Sudbeck’s residence, police 

discovered a .45 caliber Hi-Point brand handgun in between stacked boxes. 

Forensic analysis showed the bullet found in the closet could only have been 

fired from a .45 caliber Hi-Point brand handgun. The gun was equipped with two 

safety mechanisms—one active, one passive1—to protect against accidental 

firing. The gun required 8.5 pounds of pressure to fire, which “could be a little 

heavy for a pistol,” according to an expert’s testimony. While awaiting trial in jail, 

Sudbeck told two cellmates he accidentally shot his girlfriend.

II.

Sudbeck challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

conviction. Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed for errors 

at law. See State v. Bash, 670 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Iowa 2003). The court will 

uphold a jury verdict if supported by substantial evidence. See id. Evidence is 

considered substantial if it would convince a rational fact finder the defendant is 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. The court reviews the evidence, 

including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly be deduced from 

the evidence, in the light most favorable to the State. See id. The State has the 

 

1 The “passive” safety mechanism prevents the gun from firing if the magazine is not 

properly inserted or not inserted at all. 
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burden to prove every fact necessary to constitute the claims with which the 

defendant is charged. See id. The evidence presented must raise a fair 

inference of guilt and do more than create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture. 

See id. 

When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the 

evidence in light of the unchallenged instructions provided to the jury. See State 

v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Iowa 2009). The jury was instructed the State 

had to prove the following to convict the defendant of murder in the first degree:

1. On or about February 26, 2014, the defendant shot Michaela 

Jordan.

2. Michaela Jordan died as a result of being shot.

3. The defendant acted with malice aforethought.

4. The defendant acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and 

with a specific intent to kill Michaela Jordan.

Sudbeck challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the third and 

fourth elements. Sudbeck argues he accidentally shot Jordan and that he did not 

know he accidentally shot her because he never turned to see where the gun 

discharged. In support of his argument, he states he did not try to flee the area, 

did not dispose of the gun, and did not mention the shooting to Yates. In his 

telling, he only learned Jordan was shot after he was arrested. He further argues 

his habitual handling of his gun shows his specific brandishing of it here does not 

demonstrate premeditation. 

Malice aforethought is a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm 

to another that exists prior to the act being committed. See State v. Artzer, 609 

N.W. 2d 526, 529 (Iowa 2000). It does not need to exist for any specific time 

before the act occurs. See id. at 530. The relationship between malice 
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aforethought and the homicidal act “is more accurately characterized as a causal 

relationship rather than as a temporal relationship.” State v. Bentley, 757 N.W.2d 

257, 265 (Iowa 2008). “In other words, the malice must result in the homicidal 

act.” Id. The district court issued the following jury instruction:

“Malice” is a state of mind which leads one to intentionally do a 

wrongful act to the injury of another out of actual hatred, or with an 

evil or unlawful purpose. It may be established by evidence of 

actual hatred, or by proof of a deliberate or fixed intent to do injury. 

It may be found from the acts and conduct of the Defendant, and 

the means used in doing the wrongful and injurious act. Malice 

requires only such deliberation that would make a person 

appreciate and understand the nature of the act and its 

consequences, as distinguished from an act done in the heat of 

passion. “Malice aforethought” is a fixed purpose or design to do 

some physical harm to another which exists before the act is 

committed. It does not have to exist for any particular length of 

time.

The jury instruction correctly set forth the law.

Premeditation is “to think or ponder upon the matter before acting.” State 

v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 48 (Iowa 2003). Like malice aforethought, 

premeditation need not exist “for any particular length of time.” Id. 

When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient 

evidence Sudbeck acted with malice aforethought. There was acrimony between 

the parties. They had separated only a month prior, at which time Jordan 

obtained a court order prohibiting Sudbeck from contacting her. Evidence of an 

acrimonious relationship is “highly relevant to the issue of malice aforethought.” 

State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 21 (Iowa 2006). Sudbeck used a deadly weapon 

to carry out the murder. The use of a deadly weapon supports an inference of 

malice. See State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 2001).
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When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient 

evidence Sudbeck acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with a specific 

intent to kill Jordan. Sudbeck drove himself from his residence to Jordan’s 

residence on a cold and dark night. See State v. St. Clair, 301 P.2d 752, 755 

(Utah 1956) (finding late-night trip to victim’s home supported inference of 

premeditation). He brought with him a loaded .45 caliber pistol. See State v. 

Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471, 480 (Iowa 1981) (discussing defendant’s decision to 

transport gun with him to victim’s residence as supporting inference of 

premeditation); State v. Matheson, 261 N.W. 787, 792 (Iowa 1935) (finding jury’s 

inference of premeditation warranted by defendant’s travel to home of intended 

victim armed with revolver). Sudbeck shot Jordan in the back with the handgun. 

See Reeves, 636 N.W.2d at 25 (stating the use of a deadly weapon can support 

an inference of deliberation and premeditation). The gun was equipped with both 

active and passive safety systems designed to prevent accidental discharge of 

the weapon, which Sudbeck would have had to overcome before firing the 

weapon. The trigger required 8.5 pounds of pressure before firing, which the 

State’s expert testified was heavy, militating against this being an accidental 

shooting. Finally, Sudbeck’s testimony that he spun around, accidentally 

discharged his pistol with the effect of killing his girlfriend, and was so 

unconcerned that he never bothered to turn around to see whether he hurt

anyone is so implausible that it supports an inference of premeditation. See 

State v. Nance, 533 N.W.2d 557, 563 (Iowa 1995) (“The evidence as to how the 

gun ‘accidentally’ discharged could be rejected by the jury as a false story. The 

use of a false story could also be treated as an implied admission.”).
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III.

Sudbeck contends the district court erred in denying his motion for new 

trial. A district court has broad discretion to rule on motions for a new trial 

contending the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. See State v. 

Nichter, 720 N.W.2d 547, 559 (Iowa 2006). We will reverse only when the district 

court abuses its discretion. See id. To prove such abuse, Sudbeck must show 

the court “exercised its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or 

to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Brown, 856 N.W.2d 685, 688 (Iowa 

2014).

The district court may grant a new trial when “the verdict is contrary to law 

or evidence.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(6). This means “contrary to the weight 

of the evidence,” rather than unsupported by substantial evidence. State v. Ellis, 

578 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998). Weight of the evidence means a 

determination by the trier of fact “that a greater amount of credible evidence 

supports one side of an issue or cause than the other.” Id. at 658.

Sudbeck argues he lacked the necessary malice aforethought and specific 

intent for murder in the first degree. Specifically, he argues his intoxication 

negates the element of specific intent. “The difference between first-degree 

murder and second-degree murder is that the former requires specific intent to 

kill, whereas the latter requires only a general criminal intent.” State v. Klindt, 

542 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Iowa 1996). Evidence of intoxication may negate specific 

intent. See State v. Caldwell, 385 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1986). Courts “have 

traditionally required a high level of intoxication to support a finding of no specific 

intent.” State v. Guerrero-Cordero, 861 N.W.2d 253, 259 (Iowa 2015). The 
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intoxication “must be to the extent that the designing or framing of such purpose 

is impossible.” Id. “[T]he defense is not sustained by mere evidence of 

intoxication.” Id. at 261.

We cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion in denying 

Sudbeck’s motion. Sudbeck was drinking heavily on the night in question (four or 

five large drinks), and he did have a problem with alcohol, as his family members

and Yates testified. However, Sudbeck testified he had been drinking in such a 

manner for three years. It does not seem unreasonable to believe he had built 

up a tolerance to heavy drinking. Indeed, by his own admission, he had not 

drunk as much on the day of the shooting as he did on a typical day. There is no 

evidence his drinking impaired his faculties on that day. He was able to drive to 

his friend’s house. He was able to drive to Jordan’s house. He communicated, 

without any apparent impairment, by phone and text message immediately 

before and after the shooting. Yates testified he did not sound intoxicated on the 

phone.

IV.

The jury’s function “is to sort out the evidence and place credibility where it 

belongs.” State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 1993) (citation omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). There is no reason to disturb the jury’s verdict 

in this case. 

AFFIRMED.