# Official Journal L 41/2023

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
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| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 41 |
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| English edition | Legislation | Volume 6610 February 2023 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 41

English edition

Legislation

Volume 6610 February 2023

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| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
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| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/265 of 9 February 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye | 1 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/266 of 9 February 2023 laying down technical information for the calculation of technical provisions and basic own funds for reporting with reference dates from 31 December 2022 until 30 March 2023 in accordance with Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (
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  ) | 77 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

REGULATIONS

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/265 of 9 February 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye

1

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/266 of 9 February 2023 laying down technical information for the calculation of technical provisions and basic own funds for reporting with reference dates from 31 December 2022 until 30 March 2023 in accordance with Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (
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  )

1

77

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| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance. |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance.

1

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
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EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.

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II Non-legislative acts

REGULATIONS

| 10.2.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 41/1 |
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10.2.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 41/1

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COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/265

of 9 February 2023

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 9 thereof,

Whereas:

1.   PROCEDURE

PROCEDURE

1.1.   Initiation

Initiation

| (1) | On 13 December 2021, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye (‘the countries concerned’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (2) (‘the Notice of Initiation’). |
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(1)

On 13 December 2021, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye (‘the countries concerned’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (2) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

Official Journal of the European Union

2

| (2) | The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 3 November 2021 by the European Ceramic Tile Manufacturers’ Association (‘CET’ or ‘the complainant’). The complaint was made on behalf of the Union industry of ceramic tiles in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation. |
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(2)

The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 3 November 2021 by the European Ceramic Tile Manufacturers’ Association (‘CET’ or ‘the complainant’). The complaint was made on behalf of the Union industry of ceramic tiles in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

1.2.   Interested parties

Interested parties

| (3) | In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the complainant, other known Union producers, the known exporting producers and the India’s and Türkiye’s authorities, known importers, suppliers and users, traders, as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate. |
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(3)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the complainant, other known Union producers, the known exporting producers and the India’s and Türkiye’s authorities, known importers, suppliers and users, traders, as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate.

| (4) | Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. The Commission held hearings with an exporting producer from Türkiye and its related companies, the Government of Türkiye (‘GoT’) and the Cement, Glass, Ceramic and Soil Products Exporters Association from Türkiye (‘CGCSA’). |
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(4)

Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. The Commission held hearings with an exporting producer from Türkiye and its related companies, the Government of Türkiye (‘GoT’) and the Cement, Glass, Ceramic and Soil Products Exporters Association from Türkiye (‘CGCSA’).

1.3.   Comments on the initiation of the investigation

Comments on the initiation of the investigation

| (5) | The GoT, the Bien & Qua Group, CGCSA, Morbi Ceramic Association, Indian Council of Ceramic Tiles and Sanitaryware (‘Indian Council and Association’), and a number of Indian producers/exporters provided comments on the complaint and the initiation of the investigation. The complainant also submitted comments rebutting the interested parties’ submissions. |
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(5)

The GoT, the Bien & Qua Group, CGCSA, Morbi Ceramic Association, Indian Council of Ceramic Tiles and Sanitaryware (‘Indian Council and Association’), and a number of Indian producers/exporters provided comments on the complaint and the initiation of the investigation. The complainant also submitted comments rebutting the interested parties’ submissions.

| (6) | At the outset, the Commission noted that it carried out its examination of the complaint in accordance with Article 5 of the basic Regulation and came to the conclusion that the requirements for initiation of an investigation were met, i.e. that there was sufficient evidence to initiate the investigation. |
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(6)

At the outset, the Commission noted that it carried out its examination of the complaint in accordance with Article 5 of the basic Regulation and came to the conclusion that the requirements for initiation of an investigation were met, i.e. that there was sufficient evidence to initiate the investigation.

| (7) | According to Article 5(2) of the basic Regulation, a complaint shall contain such information as is reasonably available to the complainant. The legal standard of evidence required for the purpose of initiating an investigation (‘sufficient’ evidence) is different from that which is necessary for the purpose of a preliminary or final determination of the existence of dumping, injury or of a causal link. Therefore, evidence which is insufficient in quantity or quality to justify a preliminary or final determination of dumping, injury or causation, may nevertheless be sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation (3). |
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(7)

According to Article 5(2) of the basic Regulation, a complaint shall contain such information as is reasonably available to the complainant. The legal standard of evidence required for the purpose of initiating an investigation (‘sufficient’ evidence) is different from that which is necessary for the purpose of a preliminary or final determination of the existence of dumping, injury or of a causal link. Therefore, evidence which is insufficient in quantity or quality to justify a preliminary or final determination of dumping, injury or causation, may nevertheless be sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation (3).

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| (8) | The GoT, Indian exporting producers, the Bien & Qua Group, Indian Council and Association and CGCSA took issue with the Commission’s analysis of the degree of support for the complaint (‘standing analysis’). |
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(8)

The GoT, Indian exporting producers, the Bien & Qua Group, Indian Council and Association and CGCSA took issue with the Commission’s analysis of the degree of support for the complaint (‘standing analysis’).

| (9) | These parties remarked that only a “small portion” of domestic producers supported the complaint, namely 25,8 % of the total ceramic tiles production in the Union in 2020 according to the complaint. |
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(9)

These parties remarked that only a “small portion” of domestic producers supported the complaint, namely 25,8 % of the total ceramic tiles production in the Union in 2020 according to the complaint.

| (10) | These parties also claimed that such percentage could not be considered a major proportion of the domestic industry according to Article 4 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘WTO ADA’), and that it was doubtful that the complaint was made by or on behalf of domestic producers fulfilling the 25 % threshold set in Article 5(4) of WTO ADA. They also remarked that some ceramic tiles producers in the Union were not even listed in Annex 4 of the complaint as Union producers and requested that the Commission disclosed its standing analysis and methodology, or that the complainant did not provide evidence that the decision to lodge the complaint was supported by all its members. |
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(10)

These parties also claimed that such percentage could not be considered a major proportion of the domestic industry according to Article 4 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘WTO ADA’), and that it was doubtful that the complaint was made by or on behalf of domestic producers fulfilling the 25 % threshold set in Article 5(4) of WTO ADA. They also remarked that some ceramic tiles producers in the Union were not even listed in Annex 4 of the complaint as Union producers and requested that the Commission disclosed its standing analysis and methodology, or that the complainant did not provide evidence that the decision to lodge the complaint was supported by all its members.

| (11) | All claims on standing were dismissed. The Commission carried out its own standing analysis. It contacted all know producers of ceramic tiles in the Union before initiation and asked them to express their position regarding the initiation of the investigation and report their production for the investigation period (1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021). Over 30 % of the total EU production expressed support and no producer expressed opposition or a neutral position regarding the initiation of the investigation. Therefore, the relevant thresholds as set out in Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation were met. The result, the companies contacted, the non-confidential replies, and the methodology, were made available in the non-confidential file of the investigation (‘note for the file on standing’). |
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(11)

All claims on standing were dismissed. The Commission carried out its own standing analysis. It contacted all know producers of ceramic tiles in the Union before initiation and asked them to express their position regarding the initiation of the investigation and report their production for the investigation period (1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021). Over 30 % of the total EU production expressed support and no producer expressed opposition or a neutral position regarding the initiation of the investigation. Therefore, the relevant thresholds as set out in Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation were met. The result, the companies contacted, the non-confidential replies, and the methodology, were made available in the non-confidential file of the investigation (‘note for the file on standing’).

| (12) | Article 5(2)(a) of the basic Regulation requires that the complaint contains a list of all domestic producers known to the complainant; this is not necessarily all producers. The standing analysis was carried out on the basis of the producers known at the time, as explained in recital (11). This list of domestic producers might not have been complete; however, no other Union producers came forward following the initiation of the investigation that would have made the assessment of representativeness of the complaint invalid. |
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(12)

Article 5(2)(a) of the basic Regulation requires that the complaint contains a list of all domestic producers known to the complainant; this is not necessarily all producers. The standing analysis was carried out on the basis of the producers known at the time, as explained in recital (11). This list of domestic producers might not have been complete; however, no other Union producers came forward following the initiation of the investigation that would have made the assessment of representativeness of the complaint invalid.

| (13) | Interested parties provided no evidence why the complaint, notably the injury indicators based on the companies that provided data for the complaint, would result in a distorted analysis that would not be representative of the Union industry as a whole. They merely remark that 25,8 % of domestic producers supporting the complaint is “very low” and “uncommon”. |
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(13)

Interested parties provided no evidence why the complaint, notably the injury indicators based on the companies that provided data for the complaint, would result in a distorted analysis that would not be representative of the Union industry as a whole. They merely remark that 25,8 % of domestic producers supporting the complaint is “very low” and “uncommon”.

| (14) | Regarding the definition of the Union industry, interested parties were mixing Article 4 of the basic Regulation regarding the definition of the Union industry and Article 5 of the basic Regulation that sets the rules for the initiation of proceedings. The threshold of 25 % of production required for initiation does not necessarily address the standard of “major proportion” (4). |
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(14)

Regarding the definition of the Union industry, interested parties were mixing Article 4 of the basic Regulation regarding the definition of the Union industry and Article 5 of the basic Regulation that sets the rules for the initiation of proceedings. The threshold of 25 % of production required for initiation does not necessarily address the standard of “major proportion” (4).

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| (15) | Indian exporting producers claimed that, when establishing production in the Union for year 2020, the complainant unreasonably set aside PRODCOM production figures on frivolous grounds. |
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(15)

Indian exporting producers claimed that, when establishing production in the Union for year 2020, the complainant unreasonably set aside PRODCOM production figures on frivolous grounds.

| (16) | The Commission disagreed. Interested parties did not provide any evidence of why the data reported to the complainant by its members (national associations of producers) would be deficient, other than stating that no methodology was provided, and that the CET data were neither audited nor verified by any government or agency. The complainant in fact crosschecked PRODCOM figures against data gathered directly from the national associations, and duly explained why it considered the latter more reliable. The Commission considered the argumentation in the complaint to be reasonable. |
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(16)

The Commission disagreed. Interested parties did not provide any evidence of why the data reported to the complainant by its members (national associations of producers) would be deficient, other than stating that no methodology was provided, and that the CET data were neither audited nor verified by any government or agency. The complainant in fact crosschecked PRODCOM figures against data gathered directly from the national associations, and duly explained why it considered the latter more reliable. The Commission considered the argumentation in the complaint to be reasonable.

| (17) | Indian exporting producers and the Bien & Qua Group claimed that the companies that decided not to cooperate in the investigation as sampled companies did therefore not provide support to the complaint. The Commission should therefore assess the level of support taking away the production of these companies. |
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(17)

Indian exporting producers and the Bien & Qua Group claimed that the companies that decided not to cooperate in the investigation as sampled companies did therefore not provide support to the complaint. The Commission should therefore assess the level of support taking away the production of these companies.

| (18) | The claim was dismissed. The support for the complaint at pre-initiation stage, as well as the standing analysis, are governed by Article 5 of the basic Regulation, and relate to the initiation of proceedings. Sampling, on the other hand, is based on Article 17 of the basic Regulation and relates to the investigation. The fact that a company that supports the initiation of the investigation later decides to withdraw from the sample chosen by the Commission has no impact on the standing analysis. These companies are still Union producers that supported the initiation of the investigation. |
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(18)

The claim was dismissed. The support for the complaint at pre-initiation stage, as well as the standing analysis, are governed by Article 5 of the basic Regulation, and relate to the initiation of proceedings. Sampling, on the other hand, is based on Article 17 of the basic Regulation and relates to the investigation. The fact that a company that supports the initiation of the investigation later decides to withdraw from the sample chosen by the Commission has no impact on the standing analysis. These companies are still Union producers that supported the initiation of the investigation.

| (19) | The GoT, Indian exporting producers, Indian Council and Association challenged the Commission’s granting of anonymity to some Union producers on various grounds. These parties claimed that to make allegations about injury, the identity of the complainants had to be disclosed, as injury claims could not be assessed without this knowledge. They also claimed that the anonymity was a deliberate attempt by the complainant to avoid legitimate protests from the Union user industry. Further, they claimed a breach of rights of defence as, without knowing the identities, the Union producers’ data could not be crosschecked with public sources. |
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(19)

The GoT, Indian exporting producers, Indian Council and Association challenged the Commission’s granting of anonymity to some Union producers on various grounds. These parties claimed that to make allegations about injury, the identity of the complainants had to be disclosed, as injury claims could not be assessed without this knowledge. They also claimed that the anonymity was a deliberate attempt by the complainant to avoid legitimate protests from the Union user industry. Further, they claimed a breach of rights of defence as, without knowing the identities, the Union producers’ data could not be crosschecked with public sources.

| (20) | The Commission disagreed. The granting of confidential treatment of identity did not affect the possibility of interested parties to assess the injury alleged in the complaint. Indeed, the complaint contained all the necessary injury indicators as well as an explanation of its sources, including the number of companies that provided relevant indicators. Interested parties had the opportunity to provide, and in fact provided, comments on the injury assessment of the complaint. The Commission also noted that anonymity was granted only to those companies that showed a good cause and substantiated the risk of retaliation, as explained in the note on the file on standing. |
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(20)

The Commission disagreed. The granting of confidential treatment of identity did not affect the possibility of interested parties to assess the injury alleged in the complaint. Indeed, the complaint contained all the necessary injury indicators as well as an explanation of its sources, including the number of companies that provided relevant indicators. Interested parties had the opportunity to provide, and in fact provided, comments on the injury assessment of the complaint. The Commission also noted that anonymity was granted only to those companies that showed a good cause and substantiated the risk of retaliation, as explained in the note on the file on standing.

| (21) | Regarding standing, as explained in recital (11), the result was available on the non-confidential file, and it included the non-confidential replies of all companies that participated. These replies, although anonymous, still contained the data necessary to allow other interested parties to assess the Commission’s analysis, namely data per company on production and sales, among other factors. |
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(21)

Regarding standing, as explained in recital (11), the result was available on the non-confidential file, and it included the non-confidential replies of all companies that participated. These replies, although anonymous, still contained the data necessary to allow other interested parties to assess the Commission’s analysis, namely data per company on production and sales, among other factors.

| (22) | The allegation that this was a deliberate attempt to avoid legitimate protests from the user industry was without grounds. The reason behind the granting of anonymity was the risk of retaliation. This did not in any way prevent users from providing their views. The Commission contacted all known users upon initiation and invited them to cooperate in the investigation and make submissions in the framework of the assessment of Union interest (5). Those that registered as interested parties had access to the non-confidential version of the complaint and were granted the opportunity to provide comments on the complaint and initiation (6). |
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(22)

The allegation that this was a deliberate attempt to avoid legitimate protests from the user industry was without grounds. The reason behind the granting of anonymity was the risk of retaliation. This did not in any way prevent users from providing their views. The Commission contacted all known users upon initiation and invited them to cooperate in the investigation and make submissions in the framework of the assessment of Union interest (5). Those that registered as interested parties had access to the non-confidential version of the complaint and were granted the opportunity to provide comments on the complaint and initiation (6).

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| (23) | The GoT, the Bien & Qua Group and CGCSA challenged the period used in the complaint (1 January 2017 to 31 December 2020) as it was not as close as possible to the date of initiation and was different from the investigation period chosen by the Commission. The GoT referred to the final report of the panel in the WTO dispute settlement case Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes (7) in this regard. |
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(23)

The GoT, the Bien & Qua Group and CGCSA challenged the period used in the complaint (1 January 2017 to 31 December 2020) as it was not as close as possible to the date of initiation and was different from the investigation period chosen by the Commission. The GoT referred to the final report of the panel in the WTO dispute settlement case Mexico – Steel Pipes and Tubes (7) in this regard.

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| (24) | The Commission noted that there was no legal requirement in the basic Regulation regarding the period chosen by the complainants, nor any that the period chosen for the investigation had to be the same as the one chosen by the complainants. The Commission can however, as it did in this case, choose a more recent period, normally covering a period of no less than six months immediately prior to the initiation of proceedings for the purpose of a representative finding as required by Article 6 of the basic Regulation. This did not mean that the period chosen by the complainants was not valid for the purpose of the complaint. Further, interested parties did not provide any evidence to the contrary. |
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(24)

The Commission noted that there was no legal requirement in the basic Regulation regarding the period chosen by the complainants, nor any that the period chosen for the investigation had to be the same as the one chosen by the complainants. The Commission can however, as it did in this case, choose a more recent period, normally covering a period of no less than six months immediately prior to the initiation of proceedings for the purpose of a representative finding as required by Article 6 of the basic Regulation. This did not mean that the period chosen by the complainants was not valid for the purpose of the complaint. Further, interested parties did not provide any evidence to the contrary.

| (25) | Finally, the WTO panel cited by the GoT does not apply to the period chosen by the complainant as the matter at issue in that dispute was the choice of the investigation period by the investigating authority, which in that case coincided with the period in the complaint. Moreover, the contentious point as quoted by the GoT was a gap of eight months between the investigation period chosen by the investigating authority and the initiation of the proceeding. In this case, the gap was less than six months. |
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(25)

Finally, the WTO panel cited by the GoT does not apply to the period chosen by the complainant as the matter at issue in that dispute was the choice of the investigation period by the investigating authority, which in that case coincided with the period in the complaint. Moreover, the contentious point as quoted by the GoT was a gap of eight months between the investigation period chosen by the investigating authority and the initiation of the proceeding. In this case, the gap was less than six months.

| (26) | The GoT remarked that the constructed normal value used in the dumping calculations by the complainant for Türkiye was overly inflated due to the source used in the complaint for the calculation of salaries in Türkiye. It also remarked that under Annex 10 of the complaint, in the document titled “Dumping calculation for Türkiye – Methodology and SG&A” in Step 5 of dumping calculation, Indian EXW and CIF export prices were mentioned in the title and text. It requested the Commission to clarify whether this was a typo or whether Indian EXW and CIF prices were used for Turkish exports in order to calculate the dumping. |
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(26)

The GoT remarked that the constructed normal value used in the dumping calculations by the complainant for Türkiye was overly inflated due to the source used in the complaint for the calculation of salaries in Türkiye. It also remarked that under Annex 10 of the complaint, in the document titled “Dumping calculation for Türkiye – Methodology and SG&A” in Step 5 of dumping calculation, Indian EXW and CIF export prices were mentioned in the title and text. It requested the Commission to clarify whether this was a typo or whether Indian EXW and CIF prices were used for Turkish exports in order to calculate the dumping.

| (27) | The figures on which the normal value was based were supported by sufficient evidence as confirmed by the Commission services’ analysis. As pointed out in recital (7), the figures used by the complainant were those reasonably available to it. The Commission confirmed that the mention to Indian EXW and CIF export prices was a typo and that Turkish EXW and CIF prices were used for Turkish exports in order to calculate dumping. |
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(27)

The figures on which the normal value was based were supported by sufficient evidence as confirmed by the Commission services’ analysis. As pointed out in recital (7), the figures used by the complainant were those reasonably available to it. The Commission confirmed that the mention to Indian EXW and CIF export prices was a typo and that Turkish EXW and CIF prices were used for Turkish exports in order to calculate dumping.

| (28) | Indian exporting producers submitted that the complaint included no evidence of dumping regarding India because the complainant constructed normal value. According to them, Article 5.2 of WTO ADA required the applicant to provide such information as was reasonably available to it on the prices at which the product in question was sold when destined for consumption in the domestic market of the subject countries. |
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(28)

Indian exporting producers submitted that the complaint included no evidence of dumping regarding India because the complainant constructed normal value. According to them, Article 5.2 of WTO ADA required the applicant to provide such information as was reasonably available to it on the prices at which the product in question was sold when destined for consumption in the domestic market of the subject countries.

| (29) | The claim was dismissed. As set out in the complaint, the complainant first attempted to obtain domestic prices in India. It asked all its member associations to collect domestic invoices, quotes or price lists referring to year 2020. One of the national manufacturers’ associations specifically commissioned a report for that purpose, and provided the report to the complainant. This report included domestic Indian invoices for only two months of the investigation period used in the complaint. The complainant therefore recurred to constructing the normal value. Article 5.2 of WTO ADA, and Article 5(2)(c) of the basic Regulation, clearly state that the normal value can be based on the constructed value of the product. |
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(29)

The claim was dismissed. As set out in the complaint, the complainant first attempted to obtain domestic prices in India. It asked all its member associations to collect domestic invoices, quotes or price lists referring to year 2020. One of the national manufacturers’ associations specifically commissioned a report for that purpose, and provided the report to the complainant. This report included domestic Indian invoices for only two months of the investigation period used in the complaint. The complainant therefore recurred to constructing the normal value. Article 5.2 of WTO ADA, and Article 5(2)(c) of the basic Regulation, clearly state that the normal value can be based on the constructed value of the product.

| (30) | Indian exporting producers submitted that the complaint had an excessive use of confidentiality and that this precluded them from assessing important elements and adequately addressing the claims in the complaint. |
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(30)

Indian exporting producers submitted that the complaint had an excessive use of confidentiality and that this precluded them from assessing important elements and adequately addressing the claims in the complaint.

| (31) | The Commission disagreed. It considered that the version open for inspection by interested parties of the complaint contained all the essential evidence and non-confidential summaries of data provided confidentially, in order for interested parties to exercise their rights of defence throughout the proceeding. |
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(31)

The Commission disagreed. It considered that the version open for inspection by interested parties of the complaint contained all the essential evidence and non-confidential summaries of data provided confidentially, in order for interested parties to exercise their rights of defence throughout the proceeding.

| (32) | Article 19 of the basic Regulation allows for the safeguarding of confidential information in circumstances where disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from whom that person acquired the information. The Commission assessed the information provided in the sensitive annexes to the complaint and considered that it fell under those categories. |
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(32)

Article 19 of the basic Regulation allows for the safeguarding of confidential information in circumstances where disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from whom that person acquired the information. The Commission assessed the information provided in the sensitive annexes to the complaint and considered that it fell under those categories.

| (33) | In any event, the Commission noted that Indian exporting producers simply flagged the parts of the complaint labelled as “sensitive” as problematic, without explaining why. For each and every part flagged, the complainant provided a meaningful summary of the information contained in the sensitive annexes of the complaint so that interested parties could have a “reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence” as set forth by Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation. |
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(33)

In any event, the Commission noted that Indian exporting producers simply flagged the parts of the complaint labelled as “sensitive” as problematic, without explaining why. For each and every part flagged, the complainant provided a meaningful summary of the information contained in the sensitive annexes of the complaint so that interested parties could have a “reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence” as set forth by Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation.

| (34) | For example, it was clear from the non-confidential version of the complaint that it was lodged on behalf of 29 Union producers of ceramic tiles, what the size of these Union producers was, and that two additional Union producers officially supported the complaint. Non-confidential annexes 7, 8 and 9 included the lists of Indian and Turkish producers. Non-confidential annex 10 contained a comprehensive explanation of the constructed normal value and the dumping margin for India. Non-confidential annex 11 contained the data on the trade flows analysis. Non-confidential annex 12, as well as the non-confidential body of the complaint, contained all injury indicators (aggregated). Undercutting and underselling calculations, including the prices and methodology used, were explained in the body of the complaint. Non-confidential annexes 22 and 23 both explained what information was submitted in confidence and contained a summary of that information. |
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(34)

For example, it was clear from the non-confidential version of the complaint that it was lodged on behalf of 29 Union producers of ceramic tiles, what the size of these Union producers was, and that two additional Union producers officially supported the complaint. Non-confidential annexes 7, 8 and 9 included the lists of Indian and Turkish producers. Non-confidential annex 10 contained a comprehensive explanation of the constructed normal value and the dumping margin for India. Non-confidential annex 11 contained the data on the trade flows analysis. Non-confidential annex 12, as well as the non-confidential body of the complaint, contained all injury indicators (aggregated). Undercutting and underselling calculations, including the prices and methodology used, were explained in the body of the complaint. Non-confidential annexes 22 and 23 both explained what information was submitted in confidence and contained a summary of that information.

| (35) | The Bien & Qua Group and CGCSA challenged the complaint’s cumulation of Turkish and Indian imports. They based this challenge on the different import prices between both countries and between Türkiye and the Union prices, the different imports trends, the geographical distribution of imports, alleged product differences, and the EU-Türkiye Association Agreement. |
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(35)

The Bien & Qua Group and CGCSA challenged the complaint’s cumulation of Turkish and Indian imports. They based this challenge on the different import prices between both countries and between Türkiye and the Union prices, the different imports trends, the geographical distribution of imports, alleged product differences, and the EU-Türkiye Association Agreement.

| (36) | The Commission disagreed. At the outset, and as the complainant argued in its submission on initiation, the EU-Türkiye Association Agreement was immaterial for the purpose of the analysis under Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation. |
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(36)

The Commission disagreed. At the outset, and as the complainant argued in its submission on initiation, the EU-Türkiye Association Agreement was immaterial for the purpose of the analysis under Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation.

| (37) | On the other reasons raised by interested parties, the Commission found that the conditions for cumulation of the countries concerned under Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation were met at the stage of the complaint on the basis of the available information and statistics. The dumping margins were found to be above de minimis. As shown by available official import statistics, dumped imports were above de minimis for all countries concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

On the other reasons raised by interested parties, the Commission found that the conditions for cumulation of the countries concerned under Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation were met at the stage of the complaint on the basis of the available information and statistics. The dumping margins were found to be above de minimis. As shown by available official import statistics, dumped imports were above de minimis for all countries concerned.

de minimis

de minimis

| (38) | Furthermore, the conditions of competition were considered similar, as






  — | There was overlap in terms of geographical presence among the products from the countries concerned and the Union industry’s, as also argued by the complainant in its submission. Moreover, the Union is one single market and the fact that imports from India and Türkiye were more predominant in some Member States than others did not imply that these products were not competing in the same market, among themselves and with domestic Union production; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(38)

Furthermore, the conditions of competition were considered similar, as

—

There was overlap in terms of geographical presence among the products from the countries concerned and the Union industry’s, as also argued by the complainant in its submission. Moreover, the Union is one single market and the fact that imports from India and Türkiye were more predominant in some Member States than others did not imply that these products were not competing in the same market, among themselves and with domestic Union production;

| — | Prices from both India and Türkiye were below Union industry price and full cost levels. The different trends of imports and the difference between Türkiye and Indian prices were not a reason for decumulation. As stated above, both countries imports are above de minimis and the complainant provided evidence of dumping for both; |
| --- | --- |

—

Prices from both India and Türkiye were below Union industry price and full cost levels. The different trends of imports and the difference between Türkiye and Indian prices were not a reason for decumulation. As stated above, both countries imports are above de minimis and the complainant provided evidence of dumping for both;

de minimis

| — | There was a significant market presence of imports from both countries concerned, whether in absolute or relative terms, during the period examined. |
| --- | --- |

—

There was a significant market presence of imports from both countries concerned, whether in absolute or relative terms, during the period examined.

| — | The complaint provided sufficient evidence that Turkish and Indian products were very similar within a wide range of product types, from small to large tiles to large slabs, porcelain and non-porcelain. |
| --- | --- |

—

The complaint provided sufficient evidence that Turkish and Indian products were very similar within a wide range of product types, from small to large tiles to large slabs, porcelain and non-porcelain.

| (39) | The GoT, Indian exporting producers, the Bien & Qua Group and CGCSA submitted that some injury indicators as analysed in the complaint (for example production capacity, sales volume in the Union market, sales prices in the Union market, employment and stocks) developed positively over the period examined, and this clearly showed that the complainants were not injured. The GoT also claimed that the injury differed depending on the group (large, medium-sized and small Union companies) and that the Commission should analyse injury as a whole. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The GoT, Indian exporting producers, the Bien & Qua Group and CGCSA submitted that some injury indicators as analysed in the complaint (for example production capacity, sales volume in the Union market, sales prices in the Union market, employment and stocks) developed positively over the period examined, and this clearly showed that the complainants were not injured. The GoT also claimed that the injury differed depending on the group (large, medium-sized and small Union companies) and that the Commission should analyse injury as a whole.

| (40) | As a preliminary comment, at complaint stage, the assessment of sufficiency of evidence of injury requires an examination, inter alia, of the relevant factors as described in Article 5(2)(d) of the basic Regulation. Article 5(2) of the basic Regulation does not require that all injury factors mentioned in Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation show deterioration in order for material injury to be established. Indeed, the wording of Article 5(2) of the basic Regulation states that the complaint shall contain the information on changes in the volume of the allegedly dumped imports, the effect of those imports on prices of the like product on the Union market and the consequent impact of the imports on the Union industry, as demonstrated by relevant (not necessarily all) factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the Union industry, such as those listed in Articles 3(3) and 3(5) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, not all factors must show deterioration in order for sufficient evidence of injury to be established, nor did the complaint need to necessarily examine all of them. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

As a preliminary comment, at complaint stage, the assessment of sufficiency of evidence of injury requires an examination, inter alia, of the relevant factors as described in Article 5(2)(d) of the basic Regulation. Article 5(2) of the basic Regulation does not require that all injury factors mentioned in Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation show deterioration in order for material injury to be established. Indeed, the wording of Article 5(2) of the basic Regulation states that the complaint shall contain the information on changes in the volume of the allegedly dumped imports, the effect of those imports on prices of the like product on the Union market and the consequent impact of the imports on the Union industry, as demonstrated by relevant (not necessarily all) factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the Union industry, such as those listed in Articles 3(3) and 3(5) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, not all factors must show deterioration in order for sufficient evidence of injury to be established, nor did the complaint need to necessarily examine all of them.

inter alia

| (41) | Regarding injury, the specific analysis of the complaint showed that there was sufficient evidence pointing to increased penetration of the Union market (both in absolute and relative terms) by imports of ceramic tiles from India and Türkiye. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Regarding injury, the specific analysis of the complaint showed that there was sufficient evidence pointing to increased penetration of the Union market (both in absolute and relative terms) by imports of ceramic tiles from India and Türkiye.

| (42) | Specifically, according to evidence provided in the complaint, from 2017 to 2020, imports in volumes from Türkiye increased by 48 % (from 32 million m2 in 2017 to 46 million m2 in the IP), resulting in a market share of 5,7 % in 2020 (from 4,1 % in 2017). Turkish prices decreased on average by 3 % in this period. During the same period, imports from India tripled in volume (from approximately 8 million m2 to more than 25 million m2), resulting in a market share of 3,1 % in 2020 (from slightly over 1 % in 2017). Also according to the evidence provided in the complaint, these imports were made at dumped prices which substantially undercut the Union industry’s prices. This appeared to have had a materially injurious impact upon the state of the Union industry, shown for example by decreases in market share or by a deterioration of financial results. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

Specifically, according to evidence provided in the complaint, from 2017 to 2020, imports in volumes from Türkiye increased by 48 % (from 32 million m2 in 2017 to 46 million m2 in the IP), resulting in a market share of 5,7 % in 2020 (from 4,1 % in 2017). Turkish prices decreased on average by 3 % in this period. During the same period, imports from India tripled in volume (from approximately 8 million m2 to more than 25 million m2), resulting in a market share of 3,1 % in 2020 (from slightly over 1 % in 2017). Also according to the evidence provided in the complaint, these imports were made at dumped prices which substantially undercut the Union industry’s prices. This appeared to have had a materially injurious impact upon the state of the Union industry, shown for example by decreases in market share or by a deterioration of financial results.

2

2

2

2

| (43) | The GoT argued that the split of the Union industry into three different groups according to production per company was a deliberate attempt on the part of the complainant to underline the alleged injury for the small group of the complainants. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The GoT argued that the split of the Union industry into three different groups according to production per company was a deliberate attempt on the part of the complainant to underline the alleged injury for the small group of the complainants.

| (44) | The Commission disagreed. The complaint included the micro-economic injury indicators for all three groups separately and for the three of them together, and the macro-economic injury indicators for the whole Union industry. Therefore, the complaint contained sufficient evidence of injury to the whole Union industry and allowed a more detailed analysis as the trends were not the same for the three groups. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Commission disagreed. The complaint included the micro-economic injury indicators for all three groups separately and for the three of them together, and the macro-economic injury indicators for the whole Union industry. Therefore, the complaint contained sufficient evidence of injury to the whole Union industry and allowed a more detailed analysis as the trends were not the same for the three groups.

| (45) | The GoT, Indian exporting producers, Indian Council and Association, CGCSA, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that the complaint did not contain sufficient evidence of a causal link between the allegedly dumped imports and the claimed injury to the Union industry. These parties claimed that the alleged injury had other causes, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, increases in the Union industry’s costs or its poor export performance. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The GoT, Indian exporting producers, Indian Council and Association, CGCSA, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that the complaint did not contain sufficient evidence of a causal link between the allegedly dumped imports and the claimed injury to the Union industry. These parties claimed that the alleged injury had other causes, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, increases in the Union industry’s costs or its poor export performance.

| (46) | The Commission disagreed. In section 6, the complaint analysed other known factors that may have had an impact on the performance of the Union industry, including its export performance, its rising costs, the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, or imports from countries other than India and Türkiye. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Commission disagreed. In section 6, the complaint analysed other known factors that may have had an impact on the performance of the Union industry, including its export performance, its rising costs, the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, or imports from countries other than India and Türkiye.

| (47) | Concretely, the complaint acknowledged that the exports of the companies that provided data for the complaint decreased but they still represented 24 % of their total sales. It also stated that the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic affected the Union tiles industry. Factories were closed for several months in some Member States, i.e. Italy, Spain, due to strict sanitary measures and these lockdowns affected largely the production but the industry could maintain their volume of sales by selling from stocks. Regarding imports from other third countries, no third country other than the countries concerned achieved a market share above the de minimis level of 1 %. Regarding costs, the complaint also acknowledged the increase, but provided evidence that unit prices increased less than the cost of production, and this was due to the increased penetration of imports from India and Türkiye at dumped prices that undercut the prices of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

Concretely, the complaint acknowledged that the exports of the companies that provided data for the complaint decreased but they still represented 24 % of their total sales. It also stated that the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic affected the Union tiles industry. Factories were closed for several months in some Member States, i.e. Italy, Spain, due to strict sanitary measures and these lockdowns affected largely the production but the industry could maintain their volume of sales by selling from stocks. Regarding imports from other third countries, no third country other than the countries concerned achieved a market share above the de minimis level of 1 %. Regarding costs, the complaint also acknowledged the increase, but provided evidence that unit prices increased less than the cost of production, and this was due to the increased penetration of imports from India and Türkiye at dumped prices that undercut the prices of the Union industry.

de minimis

| (48) | In the Commission’s view, none of these factors, as analysed in the complaint, disproved the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence for the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the point that dumped imports had a materially injurious impact on the state of the Union industry, as explained in recital (42). |
| --- | --- |

(48)

In the Commission’s view, none of these factors, as analysed in the complaint, disproved the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence for the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the point that dumped imports had a materially injurious impact on the state of the Union industry, as explained in recital (42).

| (49) | CGCSA and the Bien & Qua Group submitted that the threat of injury analysis provided in the complaint did not meet the relevant legal standard by covering only up to the second quarter of 2021. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

CGCSA and the Bien & Qua Group submitted that the threat of injury analysis provided in the complaint did not meet the relevant legal standard by covering only up to the second quarter of 2021.

| (50) | These comments were irrelevant regarding the Commission’s analysis of the complaint and the initiation of the case. As summarised in section 4 of the Notice of Initiation, there was sufficient evidence that the complaint met the requirements for initiation on the basis of material injury. Concretely, the complainant provided sufficient evidence that imports of the product under investigation from the countries concerned increased overall in absolute terms and in terms of market share, and that such increase and the price levels of imports had a negative impact on the level of prices charged and on the market share held by the Union industry, resulting in substantial adverse effects on the overall performance of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

These comments were irrelevant regarding the Commission’s analysis of the complaint and the initiation of the case. As summarised in section 4 of the Notice of Initiation, there was sufficient evidence that the complaint met the requirements for initiation on the basis of material injury. Concretely, the complainant provided sufficient evidence that imports of the product under investigation from the countries concerned increased overall in absolute terms and in terms of market share, and that such increase and the price levels of imports had a negative impact on the level of prices charged and on the market share held by the Union industry, resulting in substantial adverse effects on the overall performance of the Union industry.

| (51) | On the basis of the above, the Commission confirmed that the relevant thresholds for the initiation of the investigation as set out in Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation were met, and that the complainant provided sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and a causal link, thereby satisfying the requirements set out in Article 5.2 of WTO ADA and Article 5(2) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the complaint met the requirements for initiation. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

On the basis of the above, the Commission confirmed that the relevant thresholds for the initiation of the investigation as set out in Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation were met, and that the complainant provided sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and a causal link, thereby satisfying the requirements set out in Article 5.2 of WTO ADA and Article 5(2) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the complaint met the requirements for initiation.

| (52) | Following final disclosure, a number of interested parties reiterated some of their comments made at the initiation of the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Following final disclosure, a number of interested parties reiterated some of their comments made at the initiation of the investigation.

| (53) | The GoT, CGCSA, Sogutsen Seramik from Türkiye and sixteen Indian exporting producers reiterated their claims concerning standing made after initiation. In particular, they recalled that the two Union producers, which were replaced in the sample when they informed the Commission that they would not be able to fill in the questionnaire, should not be considered as supporting the initiation. Furthermore, they repeatedly submitted that the support to initiation of the proceeding was too low and could not be considered a major proportion of the domestic industry according to Article 4 of WTO ADA. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The GoT, CGCSA, Sogutsen Seramik from Türkiye and sixteen Indian exporting producers reiterated their claims concerning standing made after initiation. In particular, they recalled that the two Union producers, which were replaced in the sample when they informed the Commission that they would not be able to fill in the questionnaire, should not be considered as supporting the initiation. Furthermore, they repeatedly submitted that the support to initiation of the proceeding was too low and could not be considered a major proportion of the domestic industry according to Article 4 of WTO ADA.

| (54) | Claims concerning standing were addressed in recitals (11) to (16) and (18). Since the parties did not bring forward any new arguments, the Commission confirmed their rejection. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Claims concerning standing were addressed in recitals (11) to (16) and (18). Since the parties did not bring forward any new arguments, the Commission confirmed their rejection.

| (55) | Sixteen Indian exporting producers and the Turkish company Sogutsen Seramik reiterated that their rights of defence were breached by granting anonymity to some Union producers. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Sixteen Indian exporting producers and the Turkish company Sogutsen Seramik reiterated that their rights of defence were breached by granting anonymity to some Union producers.

| (56) | Claims concerning the anonymity of certain Union producers and the alleged breach of rights of defence were addressed in recitals (20) to (22). The Commission confirmed the rejection of these claims. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Claims concerning the anonymity of certain Union producers and the alleged breach of rights of defence were addressed in recitals (20) to (22). The Commission confirmed the rejection of these claims.

1.4.   Sampling

Sampling

| (57) | In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

1.4.1.   Sampling of Union producers

Sampling of Union producers

| (58) | In its Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of six Union producers. The Commission selected the sample on the basis of the largest representative volume of sales and production, taking into account geographical spread and also the high fragmentation of the ceramic tiles industry in line with the methodology detailed in recitals (59) to (63). |
| --- | --- |

(58)

In its Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of six Union producers. The Commission selected the sample on the basis of the largest representative volume of sales and production, taking into account geographical spread and also the high fragmentation of the ceramic tiles industry in line with the methodology detailed in recitals (59) to (63).

| (59) | In previous investigations concerning dumped imports of ceramic tiles (8), the Commission concluded that the ceramic tiles industry is significantly fragmented. Therefore, to ensure that the results of large companies did not dominate the injury analysis and that the situation of small and medium-sized producers, which collectively account for a significant share of the Union production, was adequately reflected, the Commission decided to establish three producer categories based on the annual production quantity:






  — | Category 1: large producers – annual production over 10 million m2, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(59)

In previous investigations concerning dumped imports of ceramic tiles (8), the Commission concluded that the ceramic tiles industry is significantly fragmented. Therefore, to ensure that the results of large companies did not dominate the injury analysis and that the situation of small and medium-sized producers, which collectively account for a significant share of the Union production, was adequately reflected, the Commission decided to establish three producer categories based on the annual production quantity:

8

—

Category 1: large producers – annual production over 10 million m2,

2

| — | Category 2: medium-sized producers – annual production between 5 and 10 million m2, |
| --- | --- |

—

Category 2: medium-sized producers – annual production between 5 and 10 million m2,

2

| — | Category 3: small producers – annual production below 5 million m2. |
| --- | --- |

—

Category 3: small producers – annual production below 5 million m2.

2

| (60) | Although the present investigation revealed a shift towards large producers, the Union industry remained highly fragmented with small and medium-sized producers accounting for approximately half of the Union production in the investigation period. Accordingly, the Commission considered that the fragmentation of the Union industry should also be taken into consideration in this investigation. It, therefore, decided to apply the same methodology for the selection of the sample as in the previous investigations and considered that all categories of producers should be represented in the sample. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Although the present investigation revealed a shift towards large producers, the Union industry remained highly fragmented with small and medium-sized producers accounting for approximately half of the Union production in the investigation period. Accordingly, the Commission considered that the fragmentation of the Union industry should also be taken into consideration in this investigation. It, therefore, decided to apply the same methodology for the selection of the sample as in the previous investigations and considered that all categories of producers should be represented in the sample.

| (61) | The provisional sample consisted of six Union producers. The sampled Union producers accounted for 6 % of total estimated Union production and 8 % of total Union industry’s sales in the investigation period. Companies from all three categories were represented: one large producer, two medium-sized producers and three small producers. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The provisional sample consisted of six Union producers. The sampled Union producers accounted for 6 % of total estimated Union production and 8 % of total Union industry’s sales in the investigation period. Companies from all three categories were represented: one large producer, two medium-sized producers and three small producers.

| (62) | To reflect different situations that could be encountered in the Union in the different Member States, when selecting the sample, the Commission also took into account the geographical spread as mentioned in recital (58). The sampled producers were situated in Italy, Poland, Spain and a central European country. The sample thus covered Member States where approximately 90 % of the production was situated. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

To reflect different situations that could be encountered in the Union in the different Member States, when selecting the sample, the Commission also took into account the geographical spread as mentioned in recital (58). The sampled producers were situated in Italy, Poland, Spain and a central European country. The sample thus covered Member States where approximately 90 % of the production was situated.

| (63) | Consequently, the Commission considered that the methodology applied ensured the sample was representative of the Union production as a whole and thus complied with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Consequently, the Commission considered that the methodology applied ensured the sample was representative of the Union production as a whole and thus complied with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation.

| (64) | The Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received within the deadline and the provisional sample was therefore confirmed. The sample was considered representative of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received within the deadline and the provisional sample was therefore confirmed. The sample was considered representative of the Union industry.

| (65) | Following the confirmation of the sample, one small producer from Italy included in the sample informed the Commission that it was not in a position to provide a questionnaire reply. Subsequently, the Commission replaced this company by another small producer from Italy and informed the interested parties of the revision to the definitive sample. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Following the confirmation of the sample, one small producer from Italy included in the sample informed the Commission that it was not in a position to provide a questionnaire reply. Subsequently, the Commission replaced this company by another small producer from Italy and informed the interested parties of the revision to the definitive sample.

| (66) | After the first revision of the definitive sample, the newly added company informed the Commission that it was not able to submit a questionnaire reply either. The Commission revised the definitive sample again and replaced the company with another small producer from Italy. The second revision of the definitive sample was disclosed to the interested parties. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

After the first revision of the definitive sample, the newly added company informed the Commission that it was not able to submit a questionnaire reply either. The Commission revised the definitive sample again and replaced the company with another small producer from Italy. The second revision of the definitive sample was disclosed to the interested parties.

| (67) | The definitive sample after the second revision represented 6 % of total estimated Union production and 8 % of total Union industry’s sales in the investigation period and covered four Member States where approximately 90 % of the Union production was located. The Commission considered that the definitive sample was representative in terms of total Union production and sales, geographical spread and it took into account the fragmentation of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The definitive sample after the second revision represented 6 % of total estimated Union production and 8 % of total Union industry’s sales in the investigation period and covered four Member States where approximately 90 % of the Union production was located. The Commission considered that the definitive sample was representative in terms of total Union production and sales, geographical spread and it took into account the fragmentation of the Union industry.

| (68) | Following final disclosure, the GoT, CGCSA and four Turkish companies (EGE Seramik, Kale Seramik, Sogutsen Seramik, and Yurtbay Seramik) made comments concerning the sample of Union producers. In particular, they claimed that a sample representing 6 % of Union production was not sufficiently representative. The GoT and Yurtbay Seramik claimed that the Commission should have examined all 29 companies that provided information for the complaint. The GoT and CGCSA accused the Commission of manipulating the selection of the sample by selecting either companies with financial difficulties or companies that produced high-end ceramic tiles, e.g. artisanal or designer products. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Following final disclosure, the GoT, CGCSA and four Turkish companies (EGE Seramik, Kale Seramik, Sogutsen Seramik, and Yurtbay Seramik) made comments concerning the sample of Union producers. In particular, they claimed that a sample representing 6 % of Union production was not sufficiently representative. The GoT and Yurtbay Seramik claimed that the Commission should have examined all 29 companies that provided information for the complaint. The GoT and CGCSA accused the Commission of manipulating the selection of the sample by selecting either companies with financial difficulties or companies that produced high-end ceramic tiles, e.g. artisanal or designer products.

| (69) | The GoT furthermore submitted that the Commission failed to explain the composition of the sample, i.e. the number of companies selected in each producer category. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

The GoT furthermore submitted that the Commission failed to explain the composition of the sample, i.e. the number of companies selected in each producer category.

| (70) | First, the Commission noted that none of the parties mentioned in recital (68) commented on the sample of the Union producers within the applicable deadline. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

First, the Commission noted that none of the parties mentioned in recital (68) commented on the sample of the Union producers within the applicable deadline.

| (71) | Further, the Commission was neither obliged nor able to sample all Union producers that provided information for the complaint or expressed support for the initiation of the investigation for that matter. The Commission selected a representative sample of Union producers “which can reasonably be investigated within the time available”, in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation. To increase the representativeness of the sample, the Commission sampled double the number of Union producers than it usually samples. To reflect the fragmentation of the Union industry, where small and medium-sized producers accounted for approximately half of the Union production in the investigation period, as explained in recital (60), instead of sampling the three largest Union producers as per usual practice, the Commission sampled six companies in the three categories discussed in recital (59). Had the Commission sampled only the three largest Union producers, such sample would not increase in a meaningful way in terms of proportion of the production (from 6 % to 9 % of the Union production) and would not reflect the “largest representative volume of production” as it would not take into consideration the fragmentation of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

Further, the Commission was neither obliged nor able to sample all Union producers that provided information for the complaint or expressed support for the initiation of the investigation for that matter. The Commission selected a representative sample of Union producers “which can reasonably be investigated within the time available”, in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation. To increase the representativeness of the sample, the Commission sampled double the number of Union producers than it usually samples. To reflect the fragmentation of the Union industry, where small and medium-sized producers accounted for approximately half of the Union production in the investigation period, as explained in recital (60), instead of sampling the three largest Union producers as per usual practice, the Commission sampled six companies in the three categories discussed in recital (59). Had the Commission sampled only the three largest Union producers, such sample would not increase in a meaningful way in terms of proportion of the production (from 6 % to 9 % of the Union production) and would not reflect the “largest representative volume of production” as it would not take into consideration the fragmentation of the Union industry.

representative

| (72) | The Commission sampled a number of Union producers that could reasonably be investigated in the time available. The Commission chose the largest producers in each producer category while also taking into account the geographical spread. The number of Union producers in each category reflected the structure of the Union industry known to the Commission at the moment of initiation. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Commission sampled a number of Union producers that could reasonably be investigated in the time available. The Commission chose the largest producers in each producer category while also taking into account the geographical spread. The number of Union producers in each category reflected the structure of the Union industry known to the Commission at the moment of initiation.

| (73) | Finally, the Commission disagreed with the assertion by the GoT and CGCSA of having manipulated the sample in favour of companies with higher costs and prices or companies in financial difficulties. The selection of the sample was based on objective criteria and information available to the Commission at initiation. Interested parties had opportunity to comment on the selection of the sample but no comments were received within the deadline. The Commission recalled that the parties’ subsequent allegations were not supported by any evidence. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, the Commission disagreed with the assertion by the GoT and CGCSA of having manipulated the sample in favour of companies with higher costs and prices or companies in financial difficulties. The selection of the sample was based on objective criteria and information available to the Commission at initiation. Interested parties had opportunity to comment on the selection of the sample but no comments were received within the deadline. The Commission recalled that the parties’ subsequent allegations were not supported by any evidence.

| (74) | Consequently, all claims concerning the sampling of Union producers were rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Consequently, all claims concerning the sampling of Union producers were rejected.

1.4.2.   Sampling of importers

Sampling of importers

| (75) | To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

| (76) | Five companies provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. One of the companies, OBI Group Holding SE & Co. KGaA, almost exclusively purchased the product under investigation originating in India and Türkiye from independent importers acting as wholesalers. Therefore, the Commission considered that the company should be investigated as a user. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Five companies provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. One of the companies, OBI Group Holding SE & Co. KGaA, almost exclusively purchased the product under investigation originating in India and Türkiye from independent importers acting as wholesalers. Therefore, the Commission considered that the company should be investigated as a user.

| (77) | In view of the low number of replies from importers, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary. The Commission informed the interested parties of its decision. No comments were received in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

In view of the low number of replies from importers, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary. The Commission informed the interested parties of its decision. No comments were received in this respect.

1.4.3.   Sampling of exporting producers in India

Sampling of exporting producers in India

| (78) | To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in India to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of India to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in India to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of India to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

| (79) | More than 140 exporting producers in India provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 17(1) and 17(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission announced, through a Note to the open file published on 22 December 2021, the selection of a preliminary sample of three groups of exporting producers based on the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. The authorities of India were also consulted on the preliminary sample selection. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

More than 140 exporting producers in India provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 17(1) and 17(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission announced, through a Note to the open file published on 22 December 2021, the selection of a preliminary sample of three groups of exporting producers based on the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. The authorities of India were also consulted on the preliminary sample selection.

| (80) | Three parties commented on the preliminary sample. Two of them asked for their inclusion in the sample; however, they did not contest that the three preliminarily sampled companies were the largest exporting producers, nor did they claim that their inclusion instead of one of those three would improve the representativity of the sample. One non-sampled group of exporting producers submitted that the combined volume of Union sales reported in the sampling forms individually by the related entities of this group would qualify it for the sample as it would be ranked within the top three. The Commission checked the issue and confirmed that indeed it was amongst the three largest exporting producers. Consequently, the Commission published, on 3 January 2022, a Note to the open file announcing a revised sample of three Indian exporting producers. The revised sample, consisting of the Lavish Granito Group, the Icon Granito Group and the Conor Granito Group, accounted for 20 % - 25 % of the sales to the European Union in the investigation period in m2 reported by all Indian companies that submitted sampling replies and 16.5 % - 20.5 % of m2 of the ceramic tiles imports from India in that period. The sample was therefore considered representative. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

Three parties commented on the preliminary sample. Two of them asked for their inclusion in the sample; however, they did not contest that the three preliminarily sampled companies were the largest exporting producers, nor did they claim that their inclusion instead of one of those three would improve the representativity of the sample. One non-sampled group of exporting producers submitted that the combined volume of Union sales reported in the sampling forms individually by the related entities of this group would qualify it for the sample as it would be ranked within the top three. The Commission checked the issue and confirmed that indeed it was amongst the three largest exporting producers. Consequently, the Commission published, on 3 January 2022, a Note to the open file announcing a revised sample of three Indian exporting producers. The revised sample, consisting of the Lavish Granito Group, the Icon Granito Group and the Conor Granito Group, accounted for 20 % - 25 % of the sales to the European Union in the investigation period in m2 reported by all Indian companies that submitted sampling replies and 16.5 % - 20.5 % of m2 of the ceramic tiles imports from India in that period. The sample was therefore considered representative.

2

2

| (81) | Following this Note, the group of exporting producers that had initially been sampled but was excluded from the revised sample requested to be re-included in the sample. The submission included revised export figures, which showed bigger Union sales volumes than initially reported in the sampling form. The party argued that by including them in the sample – either by re-establishing the initial sample or by adding it to the sample as a fourth party – its representativeness would improve. The Commission rejected the request. It noted that the revised export figures did not have an impact on the representativeness of the sample and that these figures were submitted after the deadline to submit sampling information. The Commission also noted that adding a fourth party to the sample could prevent completion of the investigation in good time. Consequently, the Commission confirmed the sample in a Note to the open file of 12 January 2022. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Following this Note, the group of exporting producers that had initially been sampled but was excluded from the revised sample requested to be re-included in the sample. The submission included revised export figures, which showed bigger Union sales volumes than initially reported in the sampling form. The party argued that by including them in the sample – either by re-establishing the initial sample or by adding it to the sample as a fourth party – its representativeness would improve. The Commission rejected the request. It noted that the revised export figures did not have an impact on the representativeness of the sample and that these figures were submitted after the deadline to submit sampling information. The Commission also noted that adding a fourth party to the sample could prevent completion of the investigation in good time. Consequently, the Commission confirmed the sample in a Note to the open file of 12 January 2022.

| (82) | Following final disclosure, Biuro Handlowe Netto PLUS Sp. z o.o. Sp. k., Cortina Outlet & Salon Płytek Cezary Krzysztof Dąbrowski and Cortina Outlet & Salon Płytek Izabela Awier (‘Netto and Cortina’ or ‘Ceramika Netto’ (9)) argued that the Commission should have investigated all exporting producers that came forward. According to the company, the technical complexity of the case and complex structures of the cooperating Indian exporting producers did not warrant the limitation of the investigation to a sample of companies. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

Following final disclosure, Biuro Handlowe Netto PLUS Sp. z o.o. Sp. k., Cortina Outlet & Salon Płytek Cezary Krzysztof Dąbrowski and Cortina Outlet & Salon Płytek Izabela Awier (‘Netto and Cortina’ or ‘Ceramika Netto’ (9)) argued that the Commission should have investigated all exporting producers that came forward. According to the company, the technical complexity of the case and complex structures of the cooperating Indian exporting producers did not warrant the limitation of the investigation to a sample of companies.

9

| (83) | The Commission disagreed. Given the large number of Indian exporting producers, under Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission was entitled to use sampling. The Commission selected a representative sample “which can reasonably be investigated within the time available”, in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation. Moreover, Ceramika Netto did not comment on the sample of Indian exporting producers within the applicable deadline. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The Commission disagreed. Given the large number of Indian exporting producers, under Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission was entitled to use sampling. The Commission selected a representative sample “which can reasonably be investigated within the time available”, in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation. Moreover, Ceramika Netto did not comment on the sample of Indian exporting producers within the applicable deadline. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim.

1.4.4.   Sampling of exporting producers in Türkiye

Sampling of exporting producers in Türkiye

| (84) | To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in Türkiye to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Permanent Representation of Türkiye to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in Türkiye to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Permanent Representation of Türkiye to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

| (85) | Eighteen (groups of) exporting producers in Türkiye provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 17(1) and 17(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission announced, through a Note to the open file published on 22 December 2021, the selection of a preliminary sample of three (groups of) exporting producers on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. The authorities of Türkiye were also consulted on the preliminary sample selection. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

Eighteen (groups of) exporting producers in Türkiye provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 17(1) and 17(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission announced, through a Note to the open file published on 22 December 2021, the selection of a preliminary sample of three (groups of) exporting producers on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. The authorities of Türkiye were also consulted on the preliminary sample selection.

| (86) | The Government of Türkiye, one group of Turkish exporting producers and two associations representing the interests of Turkish manufacturers made substantive comments on the preliminary sample. The group of Turkish exporting producers proposed weight (instead of m2) as the key to rank companies. The four parties contested the sample initially proposed and casted doubts on the data in some sampling forms and the eligibility of some of the sampled parties. Therefore, on 3 January 2022, the Commission asked two companies initially ranked within the top three for a clarification of data in their sampling forms. One company made a minor revision of the data initially submitted but another company made a major revision of those data which resulted in significantly lower export volumes. That correction impacted the top-three ranking of company/groups. As a result, the Commission published, on 4 January 2022, a Note to the open file announcing a revised sample of three Turkish exporting producers. The Commission based the ranking on m2, i.e. the usual reference unit in the ceramic tiles business. The revised sample, consisting of Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş., Vitra Karo Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş., and the group composed of Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş. and Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş, accounted for almost 51 % of the ceramic tiles imports from Türkiye in m2 in the investigation period based on the information available at that stage. The revised sample was therefore considered representative. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Government of Türkiye, one group of Turkish exporting producers and two associations representing the interests of Turkish manufacturers made substantive comments on the preliminary sample. The group of Turkish exporting producers proposed weight (instead of m2) as the key to rank companies. The four parties contested the sample initially proposed and casted doubts on the data in some sampling forms and the eligibility of some of the sampled parties. Therefore, on 3 January 2022, the Commission asked two companies initially ranked within the top three for a clarification of data in their sampling forms. One company made a minor revision of the data initially submitted but another company made a major revision of those data which resulted in significantly lower export volumes. That correction impacted the top-three ranking of company/groups. As a result, the Commission published, on 4 January 2022, a Note to the open file announcing a revised sample of three Turkish exporting producers. The Commission based the ranking on m2, i.e. the usual reference unit in the ceramic tiles business. The revised sample, consisting of Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş., Vitra Karo Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş., and the group composed of Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş. and Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş, accounted for almost 51 % of the ceramic tiles imports from Türkiye in m2 in the investigation period based on the information available at that stage. The revised sample was therefore considered representative.

2

2

2

| (87) | The Turkish group that made comments on the initial sample reiterated its requests for a ranking in weight, which would result in that group ranking amongst the top three and recalled its willingness to be part of the sample. No other comments were received on the revised sample. The Commission found no compelling arguments that would justify abandoning the reference unit normally used in the ceramic tiles business. Hence, the Commission confirmed the sample in a Note to the open file of 12 January 2022. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

The Turkish group that made comments on the initial sample reiterated its requests for a ranking in weight, which would result in that group ranking amongst the top three and recalled its willingness to be part of the sample. No other comments were received on the revised sample. The Commission found no compelling arguments that would justify abandoning the reference unit normally used in the ceramic tiles business. Hence, the Commission confirmed the sample in a Note to the open file of 12 January 2022.

1.5.   Individual examination

Individual examination

| (88) | Four groups of exporting producers in India and five groups of exporting producers in Türkiye requested individual examination under Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation by submitting a questionnaire reply within the set deadline of 30 days from the notification of the sample. The Commission decided that the examination of those requests would have been unduly burdensome and would have prevented the completion of the investigation in good time. This was due to the number of requests, the complexity of the corporate structure of some requesting parties and the size and complexity of the sample of the exporting producers investigated. The individual examination requests were thus rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

Four groups of exporting producers in India and five groups of exporting producers in Türkiye requested individual examination under Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation by submitting a questionnaire reply within the set deadline of 30 days from the notification of the sample. The Commission decided that the examination of those requests would have been unduly burdensome and would have prevented the completion of the investigation in good time. This was due to the number of requests, the complexity of the corporate structure of some requesting parties and the size and complexity of the sample of the exporting producers investigated. The individual examination requests were thus rejected.

| (89) | Well beyond the earlier mentioned deadline, in August 2022, Ceramika Netto, a Polish importer of ceramic tiles submitted, as an annex to a written representation, letters of two Indian producers requesting individual examination. Such letters, not accompanied by a questionnaire reply, submitted by a third party and six months after the deadline for individual examination requests had expired, cannot be considered requests for individual examination pursuant to Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation. In any event, would they have been considered, they would have been rejected for the same reasons as the properly submitted requests referred to in recital (88). |
| --- | --- |

(89)

Well beyond the earlier mentioned deadline, in August 2022, Ceramika Netto, a Polish importer of ceramic tiles submitted, as an annex to a written representation, letters of two Indian producers requesting individual examination. Such letters, not accompanied by a questionnaire reply, submitted by a third party and six months after the deadline for individual examination requests had expired, cannot be considered requests for individual examination pursuant to Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation. In any event, would they have been considered, they would have been rejected for the same reasons as the properly submitted requests referred to in recital (88).

1.6.   Request for confidentiality by the Union producers

Request for confidentiality by the Union producers

| (90) | The complainants and supporters of the complaint, represented by CET, requested that their names be kept confidential in line with Article 19(1) of the basic Regulation for the fear of retaliation. CET noted that the confidentiality treatment granted at pre-initiation stage should be extended to the investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

The complainants and supporters of the complaint, represented by CET, requested that their names be kept confidential in line with Article 19(1) of the basic Regulation for the fear of retaliation. CET noted that the confidentiality treatment granted at pre-initiation stage should be extended to the investigation.

| (91) | In this respect, the complainants and supporters submitted that there was a risk of retaliation by their suppliers of raw materials located in particular in Türkiye, by their Union customers which relied also on imports from the countries concerned, and by their customers in the countries concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

In this respect, the complainants and supporters submitted that there was a risk of retaliation by their suppliers of raw materials located in particular in Türkiye, by their Union customers which relied also on imports from the countries concerned, and by their customers in the countries concerned.

| (92) | The Commission examined the requests and the supporting evidence submitted by each company individually. In addition, the Commission noted that in the investigation concerning imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China (10) and the subsequent expiry review (11), the identity of the Union producers was kept confidential. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

The Commission examined the requests and the supporting evidence submitted by each company individually. In addition, the Commission noted that in the investigation concerning imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China (10) and the subsequent expiry review (11), the identity of the Union producers was kept confidential.

10

11

| (93) | The Commission concluded that the risk of retaliation existed with regard to four sampled Union producers. On this basis, the Commission granted confidential treatment to the identity of these companies throughout the proceeding. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Commission concluded that the risk of retaliation existed with regard to four sampled Union producers. On this basis, the Commission granted confidential treatment to the identity of these companies throughout the proceeding.

| (94) | On the contrary, the Commission found that the risk of retaliation did not exist with regard to the Spanish producer Azteca Products & Services, S.L.U. Consequently, the Commission decided to disclose the name of the company. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

On the contrary, the Commission found that the risk of retaliation did not exist with regard to the Spanish producer Azteca Products & Services, S.L.U. Consequently, the Commission decided to disclose the name of the company.

| (95) | It should be noted that the request for confidentiality by the VIVES Group was found unjustified already at the pre-initiation stage (for the composition of the VIVES Group, see recital (101)). |
| --- | --- |

(95)

It should be noted that the request for confidentiality by the VIVES Group was found unjustified already at the pre-initiation stage (for the composition of the VIVES Group, see recital (101)).

1.7.   Questionnaire replies

Questionnaire replies

| (96) | The Commission sent a questionnaire requesting the macro-indicators of the Union industry to the complainant and requested the six sampled Union producers, the three groups of exporting producers in India and the three groups of exporting producers in Türkiye to fill in the relevant questionnaires. Since sampling of unrelated importers was abandoned, all unrelated importers and all users were invited to fill in the respective questionnaires. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

The Commission sent a questionnaire requesting the macro-indicators of the Union industry to the complainant and requested the six sampled Union producers, the three groups of exporting producers in India and the three groups of exporting producers in Türkiye to fill in the relevant questionnaires. Since sampling of unrelated importers was abandoned, all unrelated importers and all users were invited to fill in the respective questionnaires.

| (97) | The questionnaires for Union producers, unrelated importers, users, exporting producers in India and exporting producers in Türkiye were made available online (12) on the day of initiation. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The questionnaires for Union producers, unrelated importers, users, exporting producers in India and exporting producers in Türkiye were made available online (12) on the day of initiation.

12

| (98) | The Commission received questionnaire replies from the six sampled Union producers, the complainant, three importers, one user, the three sampled groups of exporting producers in India and the three sampled groups of exporting producers in Türkiye. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The Commission received questionnaire replies from the six sampled Union producers, the complainant, three importers, one user, the three sampled groups of exporting producers in India and the three sampled groups of exporting producers in Türkiye.

| (99) | Following an initial analysis of the questionnaire replies submitted by importers, the Commission enquired about their potential relationship with producers in India and Türkiye. One importer confirmed that it was a legally recognised partner in business of a ceramic tiles producer in India. Therefore, it could not be considered an unrelated importer. Subsequently, the Commission disregarded its questionnaire reply. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

Following an initial analysis of the questionnaire replies submitted by importers, the Commission enquired about their potential relationship with producers in India and Türkiye. One importer confirmed that it was a legally recognised partner in business of a ceramic tiles producer in India. Therefore, it could not be considered an unrelated importer. Subsequently, the Commission disregarded its questionnaire reply.

1.8.   Verification visits

Verification visits

| (100) | The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for a provisional determination of dumping, resulting injury and Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:


  Union producers and their related traders, and the complainant








  — | Four sampled Union producers and, where relevant, their related traders, which were granted confidential treatment as explained in section 1.6. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(100)

The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for a provisional determination of dumping, resulting injury and Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:

Union producers and their related traders, and the complainant

Union producers and their related traders, and the complainant

—

Four sampled Union producers and, where relevant, their related traders, which were granted confidential treatment as explained in section 1.6.

| — | Azteca Products & Services, S.L.U. and its related trader Kerstone, S.L., both located in Alcora (Castellón), Spain |
| --- | --- |

—

Azteca Products & Services, S.L.U. and its related trader Kerstone, S.L., both located in Alcora (Castellón), Spain

| — | The European Ceramic Tile Manufacturers’ Association, Brussels, Belgium |
| --- | --- |

—

The European Ceramic Tile Manufacturers’ Association, Brussels, Belgium

Exporting producers in India

Exporting producers in India

| — | Icon Granito Limited and related companies, Morbi, India (‘the Icon Group’) |
| --- | --- |

—

Icon Granito Limited and related companies, Morbi, India (‘the Icon Group’)

| — | Conor Granito Limited and related companies, Morbi, India (‘the Conor Group’) |
| --- | --- |

—

Conor Granito Limited and related companies, Morbi, India (‘the Conor Group’)

| — | Lavish Granito Limited and related companies, Morbi, India (‘the Lavish Group’) |
| --- | --- |

—

Lavish Granito Limited and related companies, Morbi, India (‘the Lavish Group’)

Exporting producers in Türkiye

   (13)

Exporting producers in Türkiye

13

| — | Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. and related companies, Uşak and Istanbul, Türkiye (‘the Hitit Group’) |
| --- | --- |

—

Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. and related companies, Uşak and Istanbul, Türkiye (‘the Hitit Group’)

| — | Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş., Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş., and related companies, Istanbul, Bilecik and Söke, Türkiye (‘the Bien & Qua Group’) |
| --- | --- |

—

Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş., Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş., and related companies, Istanbul, Bilecik and Söke, Türkiye (‘the Bien & Qua Group’)

| — | Vitra Karo Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. and related companies, Bozüyük and Istanbul, Türkiye (‘the Vitra Group’) |
| --- | --- |

—

Vitra Karo Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. and related companies, Bozüyük and Istanbul, Türkiye (‘the Vitra Group’)

| (101) | The Commission carried out remote crosschecks (‘RCC’) of the following parties:


  Union producers and their related traders








  — | Ceramica Vives S.A. and Ferraes Ceramica S.A. and their related traders Vives Azulejos y Gres S.A. and Arcana Ceramica S.A., all located in Alcora (Castellón), Spain (‘the VIVES Group’) |
| --- | --- | --- |

(101)

The Commission carried out remote crosschecks (‘RCC’) of the following parties:

Union producers and their related traders

Union producers and their related traders

—

Ceramica Vives S.A. and Ferraes Ceramica S.A. and their related traders Vives Azulejos y Gres S.A. and Arcana Ceramica S.A., all located in Alcora (Castellón), Spain (‘the VIVES Group’)

User

User

| — | OBI Group Holding SE & Co. KGaA, Wermelskirchen, Germany |
| --- | --- |

—

OBI Group Holding SE & Co. KGaA, Wermelskirchen, Germany

Traders related to exporting producers in Türkiye

Traders related to exporting producers in Türkiye

| — | Vitra Fliesen GmbH & Co. KG, Merzig, Germany |
| --- | --- |

—

Vitra Fliesen GmbH & Co. KG, Merzig, Germany

| — | V&B Fliesen GmbH, Merzig, Germany |
| --- | --- |

—

V&B Fliesen GmbH, Merzig, Germany

1.9.   Investigation period and period considered

Investigation period and period considered

| (102) | The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021 (‘the investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2018 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’). |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021 (‘the investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2018 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’).

| (103) | The Bien & Qua Group and CGCSA challenged the investigation period chosen by the Commission. They claimed that it was not “close enough” or “immediate enough” to the initiation date as provided for in Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation. Also, they claimed that the Covid-19 pandemic had made the year 2020 unprecedented, characterised by significant market volatility and thus not representative as such for the purpose of objective dumping and injury determinations. For these reasons, the Bien & Qua Group stated that the Commission should have chosen 1 October 2020 to 30 September 2021 as investigation period and 1 January 2017 to 30 September 2021 as period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

The Bien & Qua Group and CGCSA challenged the investigation period chosen by the Commission. They claimed that it was not “close enough” or “immediate enough” to the initiation date as provided for in Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation. Also, they claimed that the Covid-19 pandemic had made the year 2020 unprecedented, characterised by significant market volatility and thus not representative as such for the purpose of objective dumping and injury determinations. For these reasons, the Bien & Qua Group stated that the Commission should have chosen 1 October 2020 to 30 September 2021 as investigation period and 1 January 2017 to 30 September 2021 as period considered.

| (104) | Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation does not require a period that is “immediate enough”; it states that the investigation period chosen by the Commission shall, normally cover a period of “no less than six months immediately prior to the initiation of proceedings”. The Commission’s choice of investigation period was fully in line with that provision. The Commission took into consideration the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic for this investigation (in particular, see section 5.2.5 of this Regulation). In this regard, the Commission noted that the Bien & Qua Group provided no evidence on why the period they suggested would have led to more appropriate findings, in particular since it was also affected by the market volatility due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The claims were dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation does not require a period that is “immediate enough”; it states that the investigation period chosen by the Commission shall, normally cover a period of “no less than six months immediately prior to the initiation of proceedings”. The Commission’s choice of investigation period was fully in line with that provision. The Commission took into consideration the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic for this investigation (in particular, see section 5.2.5 of this Regulation). In this regard, the Commission noted that the Bien & Qua Group provided no evidence on why the period they suggested would have led to more appropriate findings, in particular since it was also affected by the market volatility due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The claims were dismissed.

| (105) | Following final disclosure, two Turkish interested parties, Yurtbay Seramik and Sogutsen Seramik, reiterated that when setting the investigation period, the Commission did not choose a period close enough to the date of initiation and thus did not examine the most recent data available. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

Following final disclosure, two Turkish interested parties, Yurtbay Seramik and Sogutsen Seramik, reiterated that when setting the investigation period, the Commission did not choose a period close enough to the date of initiation and thus did not examine the most recent data available.

| (106) | This claim was already addressed (see recitals (103) and (104)). Since the parties did not present any new arguments, the Commission confirmed the rejection of the claim. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

This claim was already addressed (see recitals (103) and (104)). Since the parties did not present any new arguments, the Commission confirmed the rejection of the claim.

1.10.   Non-imposition of provisional measures

Non-imposition of provisional measures

| (107) | Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the basic Regulation, the deadline for the imposition of provisional measures was 12 August 2022. On 15 July 2022, in accordance with Article 19a(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed the interested parties of its intention not to impose provisional measures and gave the interested parties the opportunity to submit additional information and/or to be heard. One group of Turkish exporting producers recalled its request for individual examination and the potential effects that measures could have on its investments in the Union. One importer submitted a request for individual examination of its trade partners in India (see recital (89)). The same importer also presented further details concerning its business model and the impact of potential measures on its activities at a hearing. The Commission furthermore organised a hearing on product scope with one Indian exporting producer. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the basic Regulation, the deadline for the imposition of provisional measures was 12 August 2022. On 15 July 2022, in accordance with Article 19a(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed the interested parties of its intention not to impose provisional measures and gave the interested parties the opportunity to submit additional information and/or to be heard. One group of Turkish exporting producers recalled its request for individual examination and the potential effects that measures could have on its investments in the Union. One importer submitted a request for individual examination of its trade partners in India (see recital (89)). The same importer also presented further details concerning its business model and the impact of potential measures on its activities at a hearing. The Commission furthermore organised a hearing on product scope with one Indian exporting producer.

| (108) | Since no provisional anti-dumping measures were imposed, no registration of imports was performed. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

Since no provisional anti-dumping measures were imposed, no registration of imports was performed.

1.11.   Subsequent procedure

Subsequent procedure

| (109) | The Commission continued to seek and verify all the information it deemed necessary for its final findings. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

The Commission continued to seek and verify all the information it deemed necessary for its final findings.

| (110) | Following the analysis of the collected and verified data, the Commission informed the Bien & Qua Group of its intention to apply facts available to certain parts of their questionnaire replies in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. The Commission gave the company the opportunity to comment. The reasons for the application of facts available and the comments submitted by the company are addressed in section 3.2.1 of this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

Following the analysis of the collected and verified data, the Commission informed the Bien & Qua Group of its intention to apply facts available to certain parts of their questionnaire replies in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. The Commission gave the company the opportunity to comment. The reasons for the application of facts available and the comments submitted by the company are addressed in section 3.2.1 of this Regulation.

| (111) | When reaching its definitive findings, the Commission considered the comments submitted by interested parties. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

When reaching its definitive findings, the Commission considered the comments submitted by interested parties.

| (112) | On 28 October 2022, the Commission informed all interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye (‘final disclosure’). All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the final disclosure. |
| --- | --- |

(112)

On 28 October 2022, the Commission informed all interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye (‘final disclosure’). All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the final disclosure.

| (113) | One sampled exporting producer from Türkiye received a clarification to its final disclosure as a clerical error in one part of the disclosure had resulted in a contradiction with another element of the disclosure. One sampled exporting producer from Türkiye and two sampled exporting producers from India received additional final disclosures. In addition, since some of the comments received subsequent to the final disclosure resulted in a revision of the dumping, undercutting, and injury margins as well as the Commission’s findings on injury and causation, on 5 December 2022 the Commission sent additional partial disclosure (‘additional partial disclosure’) to all interested parties. |
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(113)

One sampled exporting producer from Türkiye received a clarification to its final disclosure as a clerical error in one part of the disclosure had resulted in a contradiction with another element of the disclosure. One sampled exporting producer from Türkiye and two sampled exporting producers from India received additional final disclosures. In addition, since some of the comments received subsequent to the final disclosure resulted in a revision of the dumping, undercutting, and injury margins as well as the Commission’s findings on injury and causation, on 5 December 2022 the Commission sent additional partial disclosure (‘additional partial disclosure’) to all interested parties.

| (114) | Following the final disclosure and the additional disclosures, comments were received from all sampled exporting producers, several non-sampled exporting producers from both countries concerned, the Government of Türkiye, the Government of India (‘GoI’), the complainant and three Union importers. The Commission held hearings with two sampled exporting producers from Türkiye, several non-sampled exporting producers from Türkiye and their association, the GoT, the three sampled exporting produces from India, a group of non-sampled exporting producers from India, the GoI and one Union importer. The Hearing Officer held a hearing with Ceramika Netto. |
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(114)

Following the final disclosure and the additional disclosures, comments were received from all sampled exporting producers, several non-sampled exporting producers from both countries concerned, the Government of Türkiye, the Government of India (‘GoI’), the complainant and three Union importers. The Commission held hearings with two sampled exporting producers from Türkiye, several non-sampled exporting producers from Türkiye and their association, the GoT, the three sampled exporting produces from India, a group of non-sampled exporting producers from India, the GoI and one Union importer. The Hearing Officer held a hearing with Ceramika Netto.

2.   PRODUCT UNDER INVESTIGATION, PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

PRODUCT UNDER INVESTIGATION, PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT

2.1.   Product under investigation

Product under investigation

| (115) | The product under investigation is ceramic flags and paving, hearth or wall tiles; ceramic mosaic cubes and the like, whether or not on a backing; finishing ceramics, currently falling under CN codes 6907 21 00, 6907 22 00, 6907 23 00, 6907 30 00 and 6907 40 00 (‘the product under investigation’). |
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(115)

The product under investigation is ceramic flags and paving, hearth or wall tiles; ceramic mosaic cubes and the like, whether or not on a backing; finishing ceramics, currently falling under CN codes 6907 21 00, 6907 22 00, 6907 23 00, 6907 30 00 and 6907 40 00 (‘the product under investigation’).

| (116) | Ceramic tiles are slabs of ceramic material used in interiors and exteriors to cover floors and walls (including countertops etc.). Ceramic tiles come in different sizes, ranging from mosaics to large slabs with sides as long as 3 meters or more. Their surface may be naturally smooth, mechanically polished, rough or with reliefs for special purposes (e.g. tactile tiles, anti-slip tiles). Ceramic tiles can be glazed, unglazed or decorated in the ceramic body with special mixtures. Glazes are mixtures of various materials and composites (glass, kaolin, siliceous sand, oxides, colouring pigments etc.) and give the ceramic tiles aesthetic and technical properties that the body cannot provide to the required degree. Ceramic tiles may be rectified or non-rectified. Rectification is a process of precise mechanical grinding of the edges after firing. |
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(116)

Ceramic tiles are slabs of ceramic material used in interiors and exteriors to cover floors and walls (including countertops etc.). Ceramic tiles come in different sizes, ranging from mosaics to large slabs with sides as long as 3 meters or more. Their surface may be naturally smooth, mechanically polished, rough or with reliefs for special purposes (e.g. tactile tiles, anti-slip tiles). Ceramic tiles can be glazed, unglazed or decorated in the ceramic body with special mixtures. Glazes are mixtures of various materials and composites (glass, kaolin, siliceous sand, oxides, colouring pigments etc.) and give the ceramic tiles aesthetic and technical properties that the body cannot provide to the required degree. Ceramic tiles may be rectified or non-rectified. Rectification is a process of precise mechanical grinding of the edges after firing.

| (117) | The body of a ceramic tile is mainly produced from a mixture of clays, feldspars, sands, carbonates and kaolins. The mixture of raw materials is dry or wet milled. Wet-milled mixture is further spray dried to reduce its moisture content. Milled raw materials are mixed into a consistent paste. Tiles are formed from that paste by dry pressing or extrusion. The formed body of a tile is further dried in horizontal or vertical dryers. After this step, glazes may be applied. Finally, the tiles are fired in a kiln. The firing process has three stages: preheating, firing and cooling. Additional treatment, such as polishing or rectification, is carried out after the firing. |
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(117)

The body of a ceramic tile is mainly produced from a mixture of clays, feldspars, sands, carbonates and kaolins. The mixture of raw materials is dry or wet milled. Wet-milled mixture is further spray dried to reduce its moisture content. Milled raw materials are mixed into a consistent paste. Tiles are formed from that paste by dry pressing or extrusion. The formed body of a tile is further dried in horizontal or vertical dryers. After this step, glazes may be applied. Finally, the tiles are fired in a kiln. The firing process has three stages: preheating, firing and cooling. Additional treatment, such as polishing or rectification, is carried out after the firing.

| (118) | European standard EN 14411 that provides for definitions, classification, characteristics and marking criteria divides ceramic tiles into groups by their water absorption rate and shaping process. Their technical characteristics include mechanical strength and resistance to abrasion. |
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(118)

European standard EN 14411 that provides for definitions, classification, characteristics and marking criteria divides ceramic tiles into groups by their water absorption rate and shaping process. Their technical characteristics include mechanical strength and resistance to abrasion.

2.2.   Product concerned

Product concerned

| (119) | The product concerned is the product under investigation originating in India and Türkiye (‘the product concerned’). |
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(119)

The product concerned is the product under investigation originating in India and Türkiye (‘the product concerned’).

2.3.   Like product

Like product

| (120) | The investigation showed that the following products have the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses:






  — | the product concerned when exported to the Union; |
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(120)

The investigation showed that the following products have the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses:

—

the product concerned when exported to the Union;

| — | the product under investigation produced and sold on the domestic market of countries concerned; and |
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—

the product under investigation produced and sold on the domestic market of countries concerned; and

| — | the product under investigation produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry. |
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—

the product under investigation produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry.

| (121) | Therefore, the Commission decided that those products are like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation. |
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(121)

Therefore, the Commission decided that those products are like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

2.4.   Claims regarding product scope

Claims regarding product scope

| (122) | A number of Indian producers and their associations, the Indian Council and Association, made several claims concerning the product scope. The parties requested that double-charge tiles, large slabs, specialty tiles (high-gloss tiles, high-depth tiles, carving tiles and tiles with granular surface) and tiles manufactured using a roller press be excluded from the product scope of the investigation and that, with regard to wall tiles, only single-fired tiles remain in the product scope. One exporting producer reiterated its request for an exclusion of large slabs during a hearing held after the Commission informed parties it would not impose provisional measures. |
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(122)

A number of Indian producers and their associations, the Indian Council and Association, made several claims concerning the product scope. The parties requested that double-charge tiles, large slabs, specialty tiles (high-gloss tiles, high-depth tiles, carving tiles and tiles with granular surface) and tiles manufactured using a roller press be excluded from the product scope of the investigation and that, with regard to wall tiles, only single-fired tiles remain in the product scope. One exporting producer reiterated its request for an exclusion of large slabs during a hearing held after the Commission informed parties it would not impose provisional measures.

| (123) | CET argued that the definition of ceramic tiles by international standard ISO 13006:2018 should be used to determine whether a certain type of ceramic tiles falls within the scope of this investigation. The standard defined ceramic tiles as “thin slabs made from clays and/or other inorganic raw materials, generally used as covering for floors and walls, usually shaped by extruding (A) or pressing (B) at room temperature, but may be formed by other processes (C), then dried and subsequently fired at temperature sufficient to develop the required properties”. The complainant submitted that this definition covered different types of ceramic tiles with the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics and the same basic uses. With regard to the use, CET argued that the definition allows for uses other than the covering of floors and walls. |
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(123)

CET argued that the definition of ceramic tiles by international standard ISO 13006:2018 should be used to determine whether a certain type of ceramic tiles falls within the scope of this investigation. The standard defined ceramic tiles as “thin slabs made from clays and/or other inorganic raw materials, generally used as covering for floors and walls, usually shaped by extruding (A) or pressing (B) at room temperature, but may be formed by other processes (C), then dried and subsequently fired at temperature sufficient to develop the required properties”. The complainant submitted that this definition covered different types of ceramic tiles with the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics and the same basic uses. With regard to the use, CET argued that the definition allows for uses other than the covering of floors and walls.

| (124) | The Indian Council and Association and exporting producers submitted that ceramic tiles with a minimum side length of 120 cm (‘large slabs’) should be excluded from the product scope. The parties claimed that large slabs were manufactured using a different production process and equipment, they had different cost of production, price, end applications, consumer perception and technical parameters, e.g. the weight of a large slab per square meter was higher than the weight of a standard tile. The parties submitted that the large slabs in question were not used as floor or walls covering. |
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(124)

The Indian Council and Association and exporting producers submitted that ceramic tiles with a minimum side length of 120 cm (‘large slabs’) should be excluded from the product scope. The parties claimed that large slabs were manufactured using a different production process and equipment, they had different cost of production, price, end applications, consumer perception and technical parameters, e.g. the weight of a large slab per square meter was higher than the weight of a standard tile. The parties submitted that the large slabs in question were not used as floor or walls covering.

| (125) | With regard to the production process, several Indian exporting producers argued that ceramic tiles manufactured using the roller press technology should be excluded. The parties explained that this technology was used to produce ceramic tiles of a large dimension. It was, therefore, understood that those parties also effectively requested the exclusion of large slabs. One Indian exporting producer, Lioli Ceramica Private Limited (‘Lioli’), also claimed that companies manufacturing large slabs normally did not produce standard tiles. It added that the differences in production process concerned the mixture of raw materials used, the higher temperature at which the large slabs were fired, the addition of netting on the back of the large slabs and the pressure at which the large slabs were packed. |
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(125)

With regard to the production process, several Indian exporting producers argued that ceramic tiles manufactured using the roller press technology should be excluded. The parties explained that this technology was used to produce ceramic tiles of a large dimension. It was, therefore, understood that those parties also effectively requested the exclusion of large slabs. One Indian exporting producer, Lioli Ceramica Private Limited (‘Lioli’), also claimed that companies manufacturing large slabs normally did not produce standard tiles. It added that the differences in production process concerned the mixture of raw materials used, the higher temperature at which the large slabs were fired, the addition of netting on the back of the large slabs and the pressure at which the large slabs were packed.

| (126) | Lioli moreover argued that large slabs had different physical, chemical and technical characteristics, different channels of distribution, and that they did not compete and were not interchangeable with standard tiles. This company produced large slabs primarily used for kitchen countertops or bathroom fixtures. The company claimed that such slabs could be used as floor and walls covering. Standard tiles, however, could not be used as countertops or bathroom vanities. Thus there was a lack of interchangeability and competition with standard tiles. Large slabs and standard tiles were, according to the company, sold via different sales channels – shops selling countertops would not offer standard tiles and not all shops offering standard tiles would also sell countertops. With regard to physical characteristics, the exporting producer pointed at the dimensions and thickness of large slabs, which were greater than for standard tiles; the different look of the surface once plastered with large slabs instead of standard tiles; and the addition of netting on the back of the large slabs enabling their installation. With regard to chemical and technical characteristics, the company argued that the large slabs had to be tested as they came in contact with food; they had lower water absorption; and higher resistance to abrasion and scratches. |
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(126)

Lioli moreover argued that large slabs had different physical, chemical and technical characteristics, different channels of distribution, and that they did not compete and were not interchangeable with standard tiles. This company produced large slabs primarily used for kitchen countertops or bathroom fixtures. The company claimed that such slabs could be used as floor and walls covering. Standard tiles, however, could not be used as countertops or bathroom vanities. Thus there was a lack of interchangeability and competition with standard tiles. Large slabs and standard tiles were, according to the company, sold via different sales channels – shops selling countertops would not offer standard tiles and not all shops offering standard tiles would also sell countertops. With regard to physical characteristics, the exporting producer pointed at the dimensions and thickness of large slabs, which were greater than for standard tiles; the different look of the surface once plastered with large slabs instead of standard tiles; and the addition of netting on the back of the large slabs enabling their installation. With regard to chemical and technical characteristics, the company argued that the large slabs had to be tested as they came in contact with food; they had lower water absorption; and higher resistance to abrasion and scratches.

| (127) | In addition to the arguments described in recitals (125) and (126), the Indian exporting producer argued at a hearing that the large slabs required different storage and handling, cutting tools, installation methods, tools and professionals involved as compared to small tiles. Finally, the interested party recalled that the complaint did not contain any evidence of dumping with regard to large slabs from India. |
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(127)

In addition to the arguments described in recitals (125) and (126), the Indian exporting producer argued at a hearing that the large slabs required different storage and handling, cutting tools, installation methods, tools and professionals involved as compared to small tiles. Finally, the interested party recalled that the complaint did not contain any evidence of dumping with regard to large slabs from India.

| (128) | The complainant submitted that large slabs were produced in the Union in sufficient quantities and it would be incorrect to assume that the Indian large slabs were not comparable to slabs produced by the Union industry. In fact, it was the Union producers that first developed large slabs and placed them on the market. The size of a tile per se did not have an impact on its chemical and technical characteristics. In fact, the chemical composition of large porcelain slabs was comparable to other porcelain tiles. Technical characteristics such as water absorption, strength and durability were not captured by the definition of ceramic tiles provided by ISO 13006:2018. Water absorption was, however, one of the characteristics determining various types of ceramic tiles – porcelain tiles having a water absorption of less than 0,5 %. A small porcelain tile had a water absorption similar to a large porcelain slab. The complainant submitted that also the suggestion that only large slabs had to be tested as they came in contact with food was wrong. According to CET, even smaller porcelain tiles used, for example, in industrial kitchens or food manufacturing facilities, required similar levels of hygiene and safety. Finally, CET argued that the production process, i.e. roller press used for large slabs as compared to hydraulic press used for standard tiles, did not alter the basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics of the final product. |
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(128)

The complainant submitted that large slabs were produced in the Union in sufficient quantities and it would be incorrect to assume that the Indian large slabs were not comparable to slabs produced by the Union industry. In fact, it was the Union producers that first developed large slabs and placed them on the market. The size of a tile per se did not have an impact on its chemical and technical characteristics. In fact, the chemical composition of large porcelain slabs was comparable to other porcelain tiles. Technical characteristics such as water absorption, strength and durability were not captured by the definition of ceramic tiles provided by ISO 13006:2018. Water absorption was, however, one of the characteristics determining various types of ceramic tiles – porcelain tiles having a water absorption of less than 0,5 %. A small porcelain tile had a water absorption similar to a large porcelain slab. The complainant submitted that also the suggestion that only large slabs had to be tested as they came in contact with food was wrong. According to CET, even smaller porcelain tiles used, for example, in industrial kitchens or food manufacturing facilities, required similar levels of hygiene and safety. Finally, CET argued that the production process, i.e. roller press used for large slabs as compared to hydraulic press used for standard tiles, did not alter the basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics of the final product.

per se

| (129) | The investigation confirmed that large slabs were also produced in the Union. In fact, two of the sampled Union producers manufactured such slabs. Therefore, large slabs imported from India were in competition with slabs produced by the Union industry. In this respect, the product types defined for the purpose of this investigation captured amongst others such characteristics as working surface size and water absorption. Such definition of product types provided for a fair comparison and ensured that large slabs were not compared to ceramic tiles of smaller sizes. The inclusion of working surface size in the determination of product types further ensured that any differences in the cost of production between the roller press and the hydraulic press technologies were taken into consideration. With regard to the lack of evidence of dumping, the Commission considered that the complaint contained sufficient prima facie evidence of dumped imports of the product concerned originating in India. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim. |
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(129)

The investigation confirmed that large slabs were also produced in the Union. In fact, two of the sampled Union producers manufactured such slabs. Therefore, large slabs imported from India were in competition with slabs produced by the Union industry. In this respect, the product types defined for the purpose of this investigation captured amongst others such characteristics as working surface size and water absorption. Such definition of product types provided for a fair comparison and ensured that large slabs were not compared to ceramic tiles of smaller sizes. The inclusion of working surface size in the determination of product types further ensured that any differences in the cost of production between the roller press and the hydraulic press technologies were taken into consideration. With regard to the lack of evidence of dumping, the Commission considered that the complaint contained sufficient prima facie evidence of dumped imports of the product concerned originating in India. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim.

prima facie

| (130) | Following final disclosure, Lioli reiterated their request for an exclusion of large slabs, i.e. tiles manufactured using the roller press production process. The company recalled that the production of large slabs included an additional step – adding of netting at the back. In addition, the company submitted a research article, which presented results of testing of large slabs. The research showed inter alia that the water absorption of large slabs was below 0,1 %. |
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(130)

Following final disclosure, Lioli reiterated their request for an exclusion of large slabs, i.e. tiles manufactured using the roller press production process. The company recalled that the production of large slabs included an additional step – adding of netting at the back. In addition, the company submitted a research article, which presented results of testing of large slabs. The research showed inter alia that the water absorption of large slabs was below 0,1 %.

inter alia

| (131) | The GoI and sixteen Indian exporting producers supported an exclusion of large slabs for the purpose of fair comparison. |
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(131)

The GoI and sixteen Indian exporting producers supported an exclusion of large slabs for the purpose of fair comparison.

| (132) | CET reiterated their opposition and their arguments against an exclusion of large slabs from the product scope. |
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(132)

CET reiterated their opposition and their arguments against an exclusion of large slabs from the product scope.

| (133) | The Commission recalled that large slabs had physical, chemical and technical characteristics similar to other types of ceramic tiles. In addition, large slabs were produced in the Union, including by two sampled Union producers. In fact, the research quoted by Lioli was conducted on large slabs produced by three manufacturers in Italy and Spain. It did not prove that large slabs produced in India were not comparable to large slabs produced in the Union. In this respect, the Commission ensured fair comparison as it included the working size of ceramic tiles in the definition of product types. Consequently, the Commission confirmed the rejection of this exclusion request. |
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(133)

The Commission recalled that large slabs had physical, chemical and technical characteristics similar to other types of ceramic tiles. In addition, large slabs were produced in the Union, including by two sampled Union producers. In fact, the research quoted by Lioli was conducted on large slabs produced by three manufacturers in Italy and Spain. It did not prove that large slabs produced in India were not comparable to large slabs produced in the Union. In this respect, the Commission ensured fair comparison as it included the working size of ceramic tiles in the definition of product types. Consequently, the Commission confirmed the rejection of this exclusion request.

| (134) | The Indian associations and producers claimed that double-charge tiles should be excluded from the product scope. Double-charge tiles were produced by infusing two layers together. The upper layer contained pigments and was about 3 to 4 mm thick. The lower layer consisted of the base body. According to the parties, double-charge tiles were thicker than normal flooring tiles, low maintenance, extremely durable, of superior quality and sold at higher prices. |
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(134)

The Indian associations and producers claimed that double-charge tiles should be excluded from the product scope. Double-charge tiles were produced by infusing two layers together. The upper layer contained pigments and was about 3 to 4 mm thick. The lower layer consisted of the base body. According to the parties, double-charge tiles were thicker than normal flooring tiles, low maintenance, extremely durable, of superior quality and sold at higher prices.

| (135) | With regard to this claim, CET submitted that the parties did not provide any elements which would suggest that double-charge tiles did not share the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as other tiles. The complainant further pointed out that double-charge tiles fell under the definition of ceramic tiles provided by ISO 13006:2018. Finally, CET emphasised that with regard to thickness, the complaint described the product as “ranging from approximately 3 mm for some wall-covering ceramic tiles to 20 – 30 mm for extruded and ceramic tiles used for raised floors or thick floors” (14), thus including ceramic tiles of higher thickness in the product scope of the complaint. |
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(135)

With regard to this claim, CET submitted that the parties did not provide any elements which would suggest that double-charge tiles did not share the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as other tiles. The complainant further pointed out that double-charge tiles fell under the definition of ceramic tiles provided by ISO 13006:2018. Finally, CET emphasised that with regard to thickness, the complaint described the product as “ranging from approximately 3 mm for some wall-covering ceramic tiles to 20 – 30 mm for extruded and ceramic tiles used for raised floors or thick floors” (14), thus including ceramic tiles of higher thickness in the product scope of the complaint.

14

| (136) | The claim was dismissed. Double-charge ceramic tiles were made of the same raw materials, used the same production processes as other ceramic tiles and thus had the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as other tiles. Depending on the final use, thickness (and other criteria) may vary and all ceramic tiles, regardless of thickness, were included in the scope of the investigation as defined in the Notice of Initiation. The fact that double-charge tiles were manufactured by infusing two layers of tiles together, making them thicker than most standard tiles and thus offering more strength and durability, making them specially suitable for high traffic areas, did not justify an exclusion. Their final use, covering floors, was the same as that of other ceramic tiles, with which they shared the same characteristics and with which they were interchangeable, as a customer may opt for one or the other. |
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(136)

The claim was dismissed. Double-charge ceramic tiles were made of the same raw materials, used the same production processes as other ceramic tiles and thus had the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as other tiles. Depending on the final use, thickness (and other criteria) may vary and all ceramic tiles, regardless of thickness, were included in the scope of the investigation as defined in the Notice of Initiation. The fact that double-charge tiles were manufactured by infusing two layers of tiles together, making them thicker than most standard tiles and thus offering more strength and durability, making them specially suitable for high traffic areas, did not justify an exclusion. Their final use, covering floors, was the same as that of other ceramic tiles, with which they shared the same characteristics and with which they were interchangeable, as a customer may opt for one or the other.

| (137) | The Indian Council and Association and exporting producers further submitted that certain special tiles, such as high gloss tiles, high depth tiles, carving tiles and tiles with granular surface (so called “sugar finish”), should be excluded from the product scope as their cost of production and subsequently their sales price were higher when compared to other ceramic tiles. The difference in cost and price was caused by the use of additional raw materials. The parties further submitted that the sugar finish tiles have different characteristics from other tiles as they hide dirt well and are slip resistant. In addition, the manufacturing process of sugar finish tiles was unique and advanced, as claimed by the Indian producers. |
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(137)

The Indian Council and Association and exporting producers further submitted that certain special tiles, such as high gloss tiles, high depth tiles, carving tiles and tiles with granular surface (so called “sugar finish”), should be excluded from the product scope as their cost of production and subsequently their sales price were higher when compared to other ceramic tiles. The difference in cost and price was caused by the use of additional raw materials. The parties further submitted that the sugar finish tiles have different characteristics from other tiles as they hide dirt well and are slip resistant. In addition, the manufacturing process of sugar finish tiles was unique and advanced, as claimed by the Indian producers.

| (138) | The complainant submitted that those special tiles fell within the definition of ceramic tiles by ISO 13006:2018. The main difference between the special tiles and other tiles was in their design. For example, the sugar finish was applied after the tile body was already produced. Therefore, the special design did not change the basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics of the tiles. Furthermore, the addition of another raw material had a marginal effect on the cost of production. Finally, these special tiles were also produced by the Union industry and thus in direct competition and causing injury to the Union producers. The production process was well known to the Union industry and it was specifically included in the complaint (15). |
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(138)

The complainant submitted that those special tiles fell within the definition of ceramic tiles by ISO 13006:2018. The main difference between the special tiles and other tiles was in their design. For example, the sugar finish was applied after the tile body was already produced. Therefore, the special design did not change the basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics of the tiles. Furthermore, the addition of another raw material had a marginal effect on the cost of production. Finally, these special tiles were also produced by the Union industry and thus in direct competition and causing injury to the Union producers. The production process was well known to the Union industry and it was specifically included in the complaint (15).

15

| (139) | The claim was dismissed. Sugar finish tiles have the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as other tiles. The parties provided no evidence to the contrary. Sugar finish tiles were also interchangeable with other tiles; their special design may make them especially suitable for some uses such as kitchen flooring due to their non-skid properties, but these uses were the same as those of other tiles. |
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(139)

The claim was dismissed. Sugar finish tiles have the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics as other tiles. The parties provided no evidence to the contrary. Sugar finish tiles were also interchangeable with other tiles; their special design may make them especially suitable for some uses such as kitchen flooring due to their non-skid properties, but these uses were the same as those of other tiles.

| (140) | Following final disclosure, sixteen Indian exporting producers reiterated their request for an exclusion of tiles with granular surface (i.e. sugar finish tiles) based on their claim that there was not a sufficient production capacity in the Union for ceramic tiles with such finish. |
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(140)

Following final disclosure, sixteen Indian exporting producers reiterated their request for an exclusion of tiles with granular surface (i.e. sugar finish tiles) based on their claim that there was not a sufficient production capacity in the Union for ceramic tiles with such finish.

| (141) | The Commission noted that the companies did not provide any evidence concerning the alleged insufficient production capacity of sugar finish tiles in the Union. The claim was dismissed. |
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(141)

The Commission noted that the companies did not provide any evidence concerning the alleged insufficient production capacity of sugar finish tiles in the Union. The claim was dismissed.

| (142) | Finally, the Indian producers, Council and Association submitted that the product scope should be limited to single-fired tiles as far as it concerns wall tiles. The parties claimed that double-fired wall tiles were a high-end product requiring better raw materials and higher cost of production. |
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(142)

Finally, the Indian producers, Council and Association submitted that the product scope should be limited to single-fired tiles as far as it concerns wall tiles. The parties claimed that double-fired wall tiles were a high-end product requiring better raw materials and higher cost of production.

| (143) | The complainant stated that double-fired wall tiles fell within the definition of ceramic tiles by ISO 13006:2018. It further submitted that the quality of raw materials was not a legitimate reason for an exclusion. On the contrary, double-fired wall tiles produced by Indian exporting producers and exported to the Union were in direct competition with such tiles produced by the Union industry and thus it was necessary they remained in the product scope. CET pointed out that the sampled Union producers manufactured double-fired wall tiles. |
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(143)

The complainant stated that double-fired wall tiles fell within the definition of ceramic tiles by ISO 13006:2018. It further submitted that the quality of raw materials was not a legitimate reason for an exclusion. On the contrary, double-fired wall tiles produced by Indian exporting producers and exported to the Union were in direct competition with such tiles produced by the Union industry and thus it was necessary they remained in the product scope. CET pointed out that the sampled Union producers manufactured double-fired wall tiles.

| (144) | The Commission found that double-fired wall tiles produced by the Indian exporting producers were no different from the ones produced by the Union industry in their basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics and in their use. In addition, the product types’ definition distinguished between single-fired and double-fired tiles, thus ensuring a fair comparison. Consequently, the claim was rejected. |
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(144)

The Commission found that double-fired wall tiles produced by the Indian exporting producers were no different from the ones produced by the Union industry in their basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics and in their use. In addition, the product types’ definition distinguished between single-fired and double-fired tiles, thus ensuring a fair comparison. Consequently, the claim was rejected.

| (145) | In addition to the above product scope exclusions, the Indian producers, including two of the sampled companies, suggested that the definition of product types for the purpose of fair comparison should take into account water absorption, manufacturing process (roller or hydraulic press), width, length, thickness, coating type (glazed or unglazed), glaze type (glossy, high gloss, matte or sugar), surface finishing (polished or unpolished). |
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(145)

In addition to the above product scope exclusions, the Indian producers, including two of the sampled companies, suggested that the definition of product types for the purpose of fair comparison should take into account water absorption, manufacturing process (roller or hydraulic press), width, length, thickness, coating type (glazed or unglazed), glaze type (glossy, high gloss, matte or sugar), surface finishing (polished or unpolished).

| (146) | The Commission noted that water absorption, width and length through the working surface size, thickness, glazing and polishing were already reflected in the definition of product types. Since the roller press technology was used in the manufacturing of large slabs, the working surface size characteristic implicitly enabled to separate the two production processes. The Commission also took into account colouring of the body, rectification and consistency with a quality standard equivalent to ISO 13006:2018. The Commission considered that those characteristics were sufficient to capture the differences in costs and prices among various product types and thus ensure fair comparison. Therefore, the Commission rejected the suggested revision of the product types’ definition. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

The Commission noted that water absorption, width and length through the working surface size, thickness, glazing and polishing were already reflected in the definition of product types. Since the roller press technology was used in the manufacturing of large slabs, the working surface size characteristic implicitly enabled to separate the two production processes. The Commission also took into account colouring of the body, rectification and consistency with a quality standard equivalent to ISO 13006:2018. The Commission considered that those characteristics were sufficient to capture the differences in costs and prices among various product types and thus ensure fair comparison. Therefore, the Commission rejected the suggested revision of the product types’ definition.

| (147) | After final disclosure, the Conor Group reiterated the claim referred to under recital (145), in particular by arguing that the Commission had erroneously considered that the difference in the cost and selling price of products did not differentiate with the change in the physical characteristic of glaze type products. The Commission’s finding that the adjustments for the physical characteristics were sufficient to capture the differences in costs and prices among various product types and thus ensure a fair comparison would not be supported by facts presented by Conor Group in their submissions to the Commission. Therefore, it submitted that the rejection of the suggested PCN for Conor Group is unjustified and inconsistent with Article 2(10)(a) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

After final disclosure, the Conor Group reiterated the claim referred to under recital (145), in particular by arguing that the Commission had erroneously considered that the difference in the cost and selling price of products did not differentiate with the change in the physical characteristic of glaze type products. The Commission’s finding that the adjustments for the physical characteristics were sufficient to capture the differences in costs and prices among various product types and thus ensure a fair comparison would not be supported by facts presented by Conor Group in their submissions to the Commission. Therefore, it submitted that the rejection of the suggested PCN for Conor Group is unjustified and inconsistent with Article 2(10)(a) of the basic Regulation.

| (148) | The claim was rejected. The Commission could not establish, based on the cost of production reported by the Conor Group, that there was a consistent material difference in production costs for ‘matt’, ‘glossy’ or ‘sugar’ products. Moreover, the reiterated claim by the Conor Group was not further corroborated by any additional analysis, which would support it. For confidentiality reasons, further details concerning the Commission’s reasoning on this point were sent only to the Conor Group. |
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(148)

The claim was rejected. The Commission could not establish, based on the cost of production reported by the Conor Group, that there was a consistent material difference in production costs for ‘matt’, ‘glossy’ or ‘sugar’ products. Moreover, the reiterated claim by the Conor Group was not further corroborated by any additional analysis, which would support it. For confidentiality reasons, further details concerning the Commission’s reasoning on this point were sent only to the Conor Group.

| (149) | Following final disclosure, Serapool Porselen, a Turkish producer of ceramic tiles, enquired about the definition of the product scope and claimed that swimming pool tiles should be excluded. The company claimed that pool tiles had lower water absorption (0,3 % – 0,5 %) than other porcelain tiles (0,5 %), were produced on order for customers which make decisions based on quality and design over price, were sold via different distribution channels (e.g. direct contact with the customer without the involvement of wholesalers), and had special properties (coating preventing bacteria formation, superior strength and durability). |
| --- | --- |

(149)

Following final disclosure, Serapool Porselen, a Turkish producer of ceramic tiles, enquired about the definition of the product scope and claimed that swimming pool tiles should be excluded. The company claimed that pool tiles had lower water absorption (0,3 % – 0,5 %) than other porcelain tiles (0,5 %), were produced on order for customers which make decisions based on quality and design over price, were sold via different distribution channels (e.g. direct contact with the customer without the involvement of wholesalers), and had special properties (coating preventing bacteria formation, superior strength and durability).

| (150) | The Commission noted that, as specified in section 2 of the Notice of Initiation, the deadline for submission of information on product scope including any exclusion requests was 10 days after the initiation of the proceeding, i.e. on 23 December 2021. Serapool Porselen submitted their claim on 9 November 2022, i.e. ten and a half months after the deadline. At this stage of the investigation, the Commission was unable to assess whether swimming pool tiles had such distinct characteristics that would justify an exclusion from the product scope. Nevertheless, the investigation showed that porcelain tiles produced by the sampled Union producers had water absorption of less than 0,5 %. Therefore, the argument concerning the differences in water absorption between pool tiles and other porcelain tiles could not be accepted. Moreover, exclusion of tiles based on their potential use rather than a specific property or characteristic would make the measures susceptible to circumvention. Consequently, the Commission clarified that swimming pool tiles were covered by the investigation and rejected the request for their exclusion from the product scope. |
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(150)

The Commission noted that, as specified in section 2 of the Notice of Initiation, the deadline for submission of information on product scope including any exclusion requests was 10 days after the initiation of the proceeding, i.e. on 23 December 2021. Serapool Porselen submitted their claim on 9 November 2022, i.e. ten and a half months after the deadline. At this stage of the investigation, the Commission was unable to assess whether swimming pool tiles had such distinct characteristics that would justify an exclusion from the product scope. Nevertheless, the investigation showed that porcelain tiles produced by the sampled Union producers had water absorption of less than 0,5 %. Therefore, the argument concerning the differences in water absorption between pool tiles and other porcelain tiles could not be accepted. Moreover, exclusion of tiles based on their potential use rather than a specific property or characteristic would make the measures susceptible to circumvention. Consequently, the Commission clarified that swimming pool tiles were covered by the investigation and rejected the request for their exclusion from the product scope.

3.   DUMPING

DUMPING

3.1.   India

India

3.1.1.   Normal value

Normal value

| (151) | The Commission first examined whether the total volume of domestic sales for each sampled exporting producer was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales are representative if the total domestic sales volume of the like product to independent customers on the domestic market per exporting producer represented at least 5 % of its total export sales volume of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. On this basis, the total sales by each sampled exporting producer of the like product on the domestic market were representative. |
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(151)

The Commission first examined whether the total volume of domestic sales for each sampled exporting producer was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales are representative if the total domestic sales volume of the like product to independent customers on the domestic market per exporting producer represented at least 5 % of its total export sales volume of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. On this basis, the total sales by each sampled exporting producer of the like product on the domestic market were representative.

| (152) | The Commission subsequently identified the product types sold domestically that were identical or comparable with the product types sold for export to the Union. To that end, the Commission excluded transactions of subprime quality from the domestic sales used for the assessment of the normal value. During the production process, after ocular quality control, the exporting producers deem ceramic tiles that are of less the perfect quality as “subprime” quality. These sub-standard tiles are sold on the domestic market at significant discounts, while only tiles of prime quality are sold to the Union. In order to make a fair comparison with the price to the Union, only sales on the domestic market of prime quality have been included in the calculation of the normal value. All sampled exporting producers sold tiles of subprime quality on the domestic market whereas they sold solely prime quality for export to the Union. |
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(152)

The Commission subsequently identified the product types sold domestically that were identical or comparable with the product types sold for export to the Union. To that end, the Commission excluded transactions of subprime quality from the domestic sales used for the assessment of the normal value. During the production process, after ocular quality control, the exporting producers deem ceramic tiles that are of less the perfect quality as “subprime” quality. These sub-standard tiles are sold on the domestic market at significant discounts, while only tiles of prime quality are sold to the Union. In order to make a fair comparison with the price to the Union, only sales on the domestic market of prime quality have been included in the calculation of the normal value. All sampled exporting producers sold tiles of subprime quality on the domestic market whereas they sold solely prime quality for export to the Union.

| (153) | After the final disclosure, the Conor Group claimed in this respect that the Commission suo moto decided to add quality of the product as a parameter for comparison, without having considered it as a PCN characteristic at any stage of the proceeding. Therefore, the Commission’s application of the PCN methodology would be invalidated as the changes in PCN proposed by Conor Group were rejected (see section 2.4 above), whereas a physical characteristic which had not been proposed by any interested party was incorporated in the methodology to carry out a comparison under Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. |
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(153)

After the final disclosure, the Conor Group claimed in this respect that the Commission suo moto decided to add quality of the product as a parameter for comparison, without having considered it as a PCN characteristic at any stage of the proceeding. Therefore, the Commission’s application of the PCN methodology would be invalidated as the changes in PCN proposed by Conor Group were rejected (see section 2.4 above), whereas a physical characteristic which had not been proposed by any interested party was incorporated in the methodology to carry out a comparison under Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation.

suo moto

| (154) | This claim had to be rejected. The Commission only learned during the verifications in India that sales of subprime quality were sold in not insignificant quantities on the domestic market, while such tiles were not exported. By ocular inspection, the Commission officials on the spot in India could establish that subprime tiles were of a clearly lower quality than prime tiles. Prices invoiced for such sales were overall lower than prices for prime quality sales of corresponding product types. On the domestic sales invoices, such sales could be clearly identified. Keeping such subprime sales in the domestic sales used for assessing the normal value would be in conflict with conducting a fair comparison of like with like products. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

This claim had to be rejected. The Commission only learned during the verifications in India that sales of subprime quality were sold in not insignificant quantities on the domestic market, while such tiles were not exported. By ocular inspection, the Commission officials on the spot in India could establish that subprime tiles were of a clearly lower quality than prime tiles. Prices invoiced for such sales were overall lower than prices for prime quality sales of corresponding product types. On the domestic sales invoices, such sales could be clearly identified. Keeping such subprime sales in the domestic sales used for assessing the normal value would be in conflict with conducting a fair comparison of like with like products.

| (155) | The Commission then examined whether the domestic sales by each sampled exporting producer on its domestic market for each product type that is identical or comparable with a product type sold for export to the Union were representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales of a product type are representative if the total volume of domestic sales of that product type to independent customers during the investigation period represents at least 5 % of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the Union. The Commission established that the domestic sales of part of the sold product types were representative. Some product types were not sold in representative volumes on the domestic market, i.e. in volumes below 5% of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the Union. |
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(155)

The Commission then examined whether the domestic sales by each sampled exporting producer on its domestic market for each product type that is identical or comparable with a product type sold for export to the Union were representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales of a product type are representative if the total volume of domestic sales of that product type to independent customers during the investigation period represents at least 5 % of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the Union. The Commission established that the domestic sales of part of the sold product types were representative. Some product types were not sold in representative volumes on the domestic market, i.e. in volumes below 5% of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the Union.

| (156) | The Commission next defined the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market for each product type sold in representative volumes during the investigation period in order to decide whether to use actual domestic sales for the calculation of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation. |
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(156)

The Commission next defined the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market for each product type sold in representative volumes during the investigation period in order to decide whether to use actual domestic sales for the calculation of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation.

| (157) | The normal value is based on the actual domestic price per product type, irrespective of whether those sales are profitable or not, if:






  (a) | the sales volume of the product type, sold at a net sales price equal to or above the calculated cost of production, represented more than 80 % of the total sales volume of this product type; and |
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(157)

The normal value is based on the actual domestic price per product type, irrespective of whether those sales are profitable or not, if:

(a)

the sales volume of the product type, sold at a net sales price equal to or above the calculated cost of production, represented more than 80 % of the total sales volume of this product type; and

| (b) | the weighted average sales price of that product type is equal to or higher than the unit cost of production. |
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(b)

the weighted average sales price of that product type is equal to or higher than the unit cost of production.

| (158) | In this case, the normal value is the weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that product type during the investigation period. |
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(158)

In this case, the normal value is the weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that product type during the investigation period.

| (159) | The normal value is the actual domestic price per product type of only the profitable domestic sales of the product types during the investigation period, if:






  (a) | the volume of profitable sales of the product type represents 80 % or less of the total sales volume of this type: or |
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(159)

The normal value is the actual domestic price per product type of only the profitable domestic sales of the product types during the investigation period, if:

(a)

the volume of profitable sales of the product type represents 80 % or less of the total sales volume of this type: or

| (b) | the weighted average price of this product type is below the unit cost of production. |
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(b)

the weighted average price of this product type is below the unit cost of production.

| (160) | The analysis of domestic sales showed that, depending on the product type, 9 to 60 % of all domestic sales of the Conor Group, 0 to 100 % of all domestic sales of the Icon Group and of the Lavish Group respectively were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was, as long as more than 5% of the domestic sales of the respective product type were profitable, higher than the cost of production. Accordingly, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales during the investigation period or a weighted average of the profitable sales only. |
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(160)

The analysis of domestic sales showed that, depending on the product type, 9 to 60 % of all domestic sales of the Conor Group, 0 to 100 % of all domestic sales of the Icon Group and of the Lavish Group respectively were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was, as long as more than 5% of the domestic sales of the respective product type were profitable, higher than the cost of production. Accordingly, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales during the investigation period or a weighted average of the profitable sales only.

| (161) | For the product types where the weighted average sales price was lower than the cost of production, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the profitable sales of that product type. |
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(161)

For the product types where the weighted average sales price was lower than the cost of production, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the profitable sales of that product type.

| (162) | Where there were no sales of a product type of the like product in the ordinary course of trade, or where a product type was not sold in representative quantities on the domestic market, the Commission constructed the normal value in accordance with Article 2(3) and (6) of the basic Regulation. |
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(162)

Where there were no sales of a product type of the like product in the ordinary course of trade, or where a product type was not sold in representative quantities on the domestic market, the Commission constructed the normal value in accordance with Article 2(3) and (6) of the basic Regulation.

| (163) | Normal value was constructed by adding the following to the average cost of production of the like product of each cooperating sampled exporting producer during the investigation period:






  (a) | the weighted average selling, general and administrative (‘SG&A’) expenses incurred by each cooperating sampled exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the investigation period; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(163)

Normal value was constructed by adding the following to the average cost of production of the like product of each cooperating sampled exporting producer during the investigation period:

(a)

the weighted average selling, general and administrative (‘SG&A’) expenses incurred by each cooperating sampled exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the investigation period; and

| (b) | the weighted average profit realised by each cooperating sampled exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the investigation period. |
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(b)

the weighted average profit realised by each cooperating sampled exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the investigation period.

| (164) | For the product types not sold in representative quantities on the domestic market, the average SG&A expenses and profit of transactions made in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market for those types were added. For the product types not sold at all on the domestic market, the weighted average SG&A expenses and profit of all transactions made in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market were added. |
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(164)

For the product types not sold in representative quantities on the domestic market, the average SG&A expenses and profit of transactions made in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market for those types were added. For the product types not sold at all on the domestic market, the weighted average SG&A expenses and profit of all transactions made in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market were added.

3.1.2.   Export price

Export price

| (165) | The sampled groups of exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers or through related companies in India. |
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(165)

The sampled groups of exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers or through related companies in India.

| (166) | Therefore, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation. |
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(166)

Therefore, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

3.1.3.   Comparison

Comparison

| (167) | The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the sampled groups of exporting producers on an ex-works basis. |
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(167)

The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the sampled groups of exporting producers on an ex-works basis.

| (168) | Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments for freight, insurance, handling, credit costs and bank charges were deducted from domestic and/or export sales prices where reported and found justified. Claims for allowances for credit costs on the domestic sales side were rejected, as it was not clear from the invoice or sales contract what the payment terms were. |
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(168)

Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments for freight, insurance, handling, credit costs and bank charges were deducted from domestic and/or export sales prices where reported and found justified. Claims for allowances for credit costs on the domestic sales side were rejected, as it was not clear from the invoice or sales contract what the payment terms were.

| (169) | The sampled producers sold the product concerned either directly or through related producers/traders for export to the EU. In the latter cases, i.e. where sales were made through related producers/traders, the prices of these transactions have been adjusted to account for the mark-up achieved by the related producers/traders pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. Concerning these trading transactions, the Commission calculated one single weighted average mark-up resulting from the difference between prices related to purchases from unrelated suppliers in India and subsequent resale prices to independent customers in the Union. The Commission opted for a single weighted average mark-up for the traders of all three sampled groups in order to ensure that the volumes in the equation were largely representative and ensured a trustworthy result. This mark-up was properly adjusted to exclude double counting of allowances already made and net of these allowances deducted from these related traders’ export price. Further details of the adjustment were provided as part of the company specific disclosures in order to ensure confidentiality. |
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(169)

The sampled producers sold the product concerned either directly or through related producers/traders for export to the EU. In the latter cases, i.e. where sales were made through related producers/traders, the prices of these transactions have been adjusted to account for the mark-up achieved by the related producers/traders pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. Concerning these trading transactions, the Commission calculated one single weighted average mark-up resulting from the difference between prices related to purchases from unrelated suppliers in India and subsequent resale prices to independent customers in the Union. The Commission opted for a single weighted average mark-up for the traders of all three sampled groups in order to ensure that the volumes in the equation were largely representative and ensured a trustworthy result. This mark-up was properly adjusted to exclude double counting of allowances already made and net of these allowances deducted from these related traders’ export price. Further details of the adjustment were provided as part of the company specific disclosures in order to ensure confidentiality.

| (170) | Following the final disclosure, the Lavish Group claimed that, as the Commission intended to reject the mark-up realised from transactions with related parties because they were not considered to be at arm’s length, the mark-up adjustment pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation should be based on the actual commission paid by the Lavish Group for export sales to the Union to an unrelated agent for carrying out the functions of an agent on a commission basis. |
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(170)

Following the final disclosure, the Lavish Group claimed that, as the Commission intended to reject the mark-up realised from transactions with related parties because they were not considered to be at arm’s length, the mark-up adjustment pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation should be based on the actual commission paid by the Lavish Group for export sales to the Union to an unrelated agent for carrying out the functions of an agent on a commission basis.

| (171) | This claim had to be rejected. The transactions at stake were exports of the product concerned that were purchased from related producers within the Lavish Group. These transactions are similar to and most resembling exports of the product concerned that were purchased from unrelated suppliers in India. In such cases, a mark-up within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation is received by the exporting trader. By contrast, revenues on commissions, as referred to under the second subparagraph of Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation, are subject to specific contractual conditions. Unlike a trader, an agent working on a commission basis does not buy and resell the product concerned but simply brokers the transaction between seller and buyer. Moreover, under the Commission’s practice, mark-up adjustments were consistently calculated based on the mark-up received by the relevant trader, i.e. an amount for selling, general and administrative costs plus a profit. As the present mark-up that was made when the exporting trader purchased from a related producer was unreliable in view of the relationship between the concerned parties, the Commission had to replace it with a mark-up that reflected arm’s length conditions, i.e. the mark-up that an exporting trader would receive when purchasing from unrelated suppliers in India. |
| --- | --- |

(171)

This claim had to be rejected. The transactions at stake were exports of the product concerned that were purchased from related producers within the Lavish Group. These transactions are similar to and most resembling exports of the product concerned that were purchased from unrelated suppliers in India. In such cases, a mark-up within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation is received by the exporting trader. By contrast, revenues on commissions, as referred to under the second subparagraph of Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation, are subject to specific contractual conditions. Unlike a trader, an agent working on a commission basis does not buy and resell the product concerned but simply brokers the transaction between seller and buyer. Moreover, under the Commission’s practice, mark-up adjustments were consistently calculated based on the mark-up received by the relevant trader, i.e. an amount for selling, general and administrative costs plus a profit. As the present mark-up that was made when the exporting trader purchased from a related producer was unreliable in view of the relationship between the concerned parties, the Commission had to replace it with a mark-up that reflected arm’s length conditions, i.e. the mark-up that an exporting trader would receive when purchasing from unrelated suppliers in India.

| (172) | The Conor Group and the Government of India claimed that the mark-up adjustment to the export price is inconsistent with Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. It argued that the adjustment to the export price on account of the mark-up received by a trader under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation was applied without demonstrating that trading activities within related companies resulted in difference in price comparability between the domestic market and the export market (third sentence of Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation). |
| --- | --- |

(172)

The Conor Group and the Government of India claimed that the mark-up adjustment to the export price is inconsistent with Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. It argued that the adjustment to the export price on account of the mark-up received by a trader under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation was applied without demonstrating that trading activities within related companies resulted in difference in price comparability between the domestic market and the export market (third sentence of Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation).

| (173) | This claim was considered flawed. The investigation confirmed the existence of a mark-up for export sales while there was none for domestic sales, therefore creating a difference in price comparability within the meaning of the third sentence of Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation which needed to be offset pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(173)

This claim was considered flawed. The investigation confirmed the existence of a mark-up for export sales while there was none for domestic sales, therefore creating a difference in price comparability within the meaning of the third sentence of Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation which needed to be offset pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation.

| (174) | Moreover, the Conor Group argued that, in applying the adjustment, the Commission had not expressly requested information from it nor was it asked to demonstrate if these prices were at arm’s length or not (i.e. indicative whether the prices were reliable or not). According to the Conor Group, all evidence on the record indicated that all transactions within the Conor Group were at arm’s length. In light of the above, it found that the application of the mentioned mark up was not justified. |
| --- | --- |

(174)

Moreover, the Conor Group argued that, in applying the adjustment, the Commission had not expressly requested information from it nor was it asked to demonstrate if these prices were at arm’s length or not (i.e. indicative whether the prices were reliable or not). According to the Conor Group, all evidence on the record indicated that all transactions within the Conor Group were at arm’s length. In light of the above, it found that the application of the mentioned mark up was not justified.

| (175) | In relation to this argument, the Commission found that the most important trader within the Conor Group (in terms of the volume of total EU exports), purchased the product concerned from related suppliers at prices [10% to 15%] greater than from unrelated suppliers. Moreover, the mark-up realised on the ceramic tiles exported to the Union after being purchased from unrelated suppliers was more than two times greater than the mark-up realised on the ceramic tiles exported to the Union after being purchased from related suppliers. The Commission considered these price and mark-up differences demonstrated that transactions between related parties within the Conor Group were not made at arm’s length. |
| --- | --- |

(175)

In relation to this argument, the Commission found that the most important trader within the Conor Group (in terms of the volume of total EU exports), purchased the product concerned from related suppliers at prices [10% to 15%] greater than from unrelated suppliers. Moreover, the mark-up realised on the ceramic tiles exported to the Union after being purchased from unrelated suppliers was more than two times greater than the mark-up realised on the ceramic tiles exported to the Union after being purchased from related suppliers. The Commission considered these price and mark-up differences demonstrated that transactions between related parties within the Conor Group were not made at arm’s length.

| (176) | The Conor Group added that Concor International carried out no specific activities other than logistics and packing of finished goods because all sales were negotiated and finalised for all entities within the Conor Group. The Commission clarified that the activities of Concor International went beyond those described under this claim. For confidentiality reasons, further details were sent only to the Conor Group. |
| --- | --- |

(176)

The Conor Group added that Concor International carried out no specific activities other than logistics and packing of finished goods because all sales were negotiated and finalised for all entities within the Conor Group. The Commission clarified that the activities of Concor International went beyond those described under this claim. For confidentiality reasons, further details were sent only to the Conor Group.

| (177) | The Conor Group also recalled that the Commission had requested information from unrelated merchant exporters in the month of April 2022. Later on, the Commission requested information on the purchase cost for each sale of traded goods during the on-spot verification. Both sets of data were requested without identification of the purpose or the manner in which the Commission might consider this information. In the absence of such request or clarification, the information used by the Commission from the submissions of Conor Group and other interested parties lacked accuracy as demonstrated in the clerical errors in computation of the mark-up value by the Commission. The Conor Group added that such analysis by the Commission should have been conducted as usually, in cooperation with interested parties, including Conor Group, and explaining how and why the relevant data were collected. Therefore, there would be no factual and legal basis for the application of the markup and a breach of due process right of Conor Group. |
| --- | --- |

(177)

The Conor Group also recalled that the Commission had requested information from unrelated merchant exporters in the month of April 2022. Later on, the Commission requested information on the purchase cost for each sale of traded goods during the on-spot verification. Both sets of data were requested without identification of the purpose or the manner in which the Commission might consider this information. In the absence of such request or clarification, the information used by the Commission from the submissions of Conor Group and other interested parties lacked accuracy as demonstrated in the clerical errors in computation of the mark-up value by the Commission. The Conor Group added that such analysis by the Commission should have been conducted as usually, in cooperation with interested parties, including Conor Group, and explaining how and why the relevant data were collected. Therefore, there would be no factual and legal basis for the application of the markup and a breach of due process right of Conor Group.

| (178) | The claim had to be rejected. The Commission is not under the obligation to explain a priori to investigated parties, or other parties from which it seeks cooperation, for which exact purpose certain information is requested, verified and/or will be used, provided that confidentiality requests are respected. Moreover, the Commission is not able to foresee at an early stage of an anti-dumping proceeding including the stage of conducting on-spot verifications at the premises of exporting producers, for which purpose exactly each set of collected data will be used. The process of requesting, collecting and verifying data has the purpose of fact-finding. The legal analysis and assessment, which includes determining for which purpose the available data are used, is conducted subsequently. The Commission has disclosed all information on which it based its findings, justifying and giving the reasons thereof and giving the opportunity for parties to comments on all the findings. Therefore, it has complied with its obligations in terms of transparency, reasoning and rights of defence. |
| --- | --- |

(178)

The claim had to be rejected. The Commission is not under the obligation to explain a priori to investigated parties, or other parties from which it seeks cooperation, for which exact purpose certain information is requested, verified and/or will be used, provided that confidentiality requests are respected. Moreover, the Commission is not able to foresee at an early stage of an anti-dumping proceeding including the stage of conducting on-spot verifications at the premises of exporting producers, for which purpose exactly each set of collected data will be used. The process of requesting, collecting and verifying data has the purpose of fact-finding. The legal analysis and assessment, which includes determining for which purpose the available data are used, is conducted subsequently. The Commission has disclosed all information on which it based its findings, justifying and giving the reasons thereof and giving the opportunity for parties to comments on all the findings. Therefore, it has complied with its obligations in terms of transparency, reasoning and rights of defence.

a priori

| (179) | The Conor Group further claimed that, if the adjustment to the export price on account of the mark-up received by a trader under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation was applied to its sales, it should be computed based on the actual mark-up earned by unrelated merchant traders purchasing from the Conor Group and reselling for export, or the average profit earned by trading companies in India for ceramic tiles, or an average of these two methods. Any of these methods being applied would ensure that the single weighted average mark-up is “largely representative” and “trustworthy” based on the information available on the record of this investigation with the Commission. The Conor Group added that the use of other sampled companies data for computation of the dumping margin for the Conor Group is not consistent with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(179)

The Conor Group further claimed that, if the adjustment to the export price on account of the mark-up received by a trader under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation was applied to its sales, it should be computed based on the actual mark-up earned by unrelated merchant traders purchasing from the Conor Group and reselling for export, or the average profit earned by trading companies in India for ceramic tiles, or an average of these two methods. Any of these methods being applied would ensure that the single weighted average mark-up is “largely representative” and “trustworthy” based on the information available on the record of this investigation with the Commission. The Conor Group added that the use of other sampled companies data for computation of the dumping margin for the Conor Group is not consistent with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation.

| (180) | The claim was rejected. The transactions that were subject to the application of the said mark-up adjustment were exports made by traders/producers of the sampled exporting producers that had purchased the product concerned from related suppliers. As mentioned in recital (175), the mark-up realised on these transactions could not be used by the Commission as a basis for the adjustment under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation because it was tainted by the relationship between the parties concerned. Obviously, the mark-up realised by the same exporting producers when purchasing the product concerned from unrelated suppliers was the closest available surrogate to replace the former mark-up. By contrast, the margins proposed by the Conor Group were realised by parties that are not part of the sampled groups of exporting producers. |
| --- | --- |

(180)

The claim was rejected. The transactions that were subject to the application of the said mark-up adjustment were exports made by traders/producers of the sampled exporting producers that had purchased the product concerned from related suppliers. As mentioned in recital (175), the mark-up realised on these transactions could not be used by the Commission as a basis for the adjustment under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation because it was tainted by the relationship between the parties concerned. Obviously, the mark-up realised by the same exporting producers when purchasing the product concerned from unrelated suppliers was the closest available surrogate to replace the former mark-up. By contrast, the margins proposed by the Conor Group were realised by parties that are not part of the sampled groups of exporting producers.

| (181) | As to the argument that the use of other sampled companies’ data for computation of the dumping margin for the Conor Group was in breach with the basic Regulation, the Commission clarified that the basic Regulation indeed provides for scenarios where other parties’ data are used for the sake of calculating a dumping margin applicable to an individual exporting producers. This is for instance the case when an export price is adjusted under Article 2(9), involving the use of a profit margin realised by unrelated importers in the Union. With regard to the present case, the Commission reiterated that the calculation of the weighted average mark-up based on transactions made by all three sampled groups ensured the application of a widely representative adjustment under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(181)

As to the argument that the use of other sampled companies’ data for computation of the dumping margin for the Conor Group was in breach with the basic Regulation, the Commission clarified that the basic Regulation indeed provides for scenarios where other parties’ data are used for the sake of calculating a dumping margin applicable to an individual exporting producers. This is for instance the case when an export price is adjusted under Article 2(9), involving the use of a profit margin realised by unrelated importers in the Union. With regard to the present case, the Commission reiterated that the calculation of the weighted average mark-up based on transactions made by all three sampled groups ensured the application of a widely representative adjustment under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation.

| (182) | The Conor Group further noted that in calculating the amount for the adjustment the Commission should keep in mind two dictionary meanings of the word “mark-up”, being, first, “an amount added to the cost price to determine the selling price, broadly: profit”, and, second, “an increase in the price of something, for example the difference between its cost and the price that it is sold for.” It argued that in both instances, the comparison of cost price to the selling price, resulting in the profit is the value of the mark-up. In reply, the Commission recalled that under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation, duly considering the applicable jurisprudence, a mark-up consists of an amount for selling, general and administrative expenses and a profit, which insofar deviates from the suggested encyclopaedic definitions. |
| --- | --- |

(182)

The Conor Group further noted that in calculating the amount for the adjustment the Commission should keep in mind two dictionary meanings of the word “mark-up”, being, first, “an amount added to the cost price to determine the selling price, broadly: profit”, and, second, “an increase in the price of something, for example the difference between its cost and the price that it is sold for.” It argued that in both instances, the comparison of cost price to the selling price, resulting in the profit is the value of the mark-up. In reply, the Commission recalled that under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation, duly considering the applicable jurisprudence, a mark-up consists of an amount for selling, general and administrative expenses and a profit, which insofar deviates from the suggested encyclopaedic definitions.

| (183) | The Conor Group also alleged that there were clerical errors in the computation of the mark-up. Specifically, the Conor Group argued that if the sales value included the recovery of packing costs from the customer, but the purchase cost did not include this amount, it would amount to double counting of the amount of packing cost in the allowances as first, the packing cost was included in the allowance for the mark-up and, second, packing cost was itself adjusted again from the export price in the Commission’s calculation of total allowances. |
| --- | --- |

(183)

The Conor Group also alleged that there were clerical errors in the computation of the mark-up. Specifically, the Conor Group argued that if the sales value included the recovery of packing costs from the customer, but the purchase cost did not include this amount, it would amount to double counting of the amount of packing cost in the allowances as first, the packing cost was included in the allowance for the mark-up and, second, packing cost was itself adjusted again from the export price in the Commission’s calculation of total allowances.

| (184) | In addition, the Conor Group claimed that the total cost of general and administrative expenses and finance expenses should be added to the cost before comparing to the sales value, and that the Commission had added to the mark-up percentage the refund of duties expected to be received by exporters. Should the Commission continue applying this addition, it should also allow an adjustment to the normal value for the allowance claimed on import charges and indirect taxes. |
| --- | --- |

(184)

In addition, the Conor Group claimed that the total cost of general and administrative expenses and finance expenses should be added to the cost before comparing to the sales value, and that the Commission had added to the mark-up percentage the refund of duties expected to be received by exporters. Should the Commission continue applying this addition, it should also allow an adjustment to the normal value for the allowance claimed on import charges and indirect taxes.

| (185) | The Commission rejected these claims. First, with regard to the claim that packing costs would be deducted twice from the export price, the Commission noted that the Conor Group did not substantiate its claim, least not as it never proved let alone quantified the amount of any packing costs included in the total purchase costs of the tiles in question. Moreover, the Commission confirmed that the data on file did not point at any double-counting of packing costs, as the Conor Group seemed to suggest. Most importantly, the claim suffers from a fundamental flaw as to the concept of the mark-up within the meaning of Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. The mark-up equals the difference between the full purchase price paid (irrespective of what costs, such as packing costs, the supplier may have incurred) and the total sales revenue realised by the respective trader. In other words, the mark-up consists of selling, general and administrative expenses and finance expenses and profit, plus any other specific revenues realised on the export sales in question. To account for all these elements, the Commission’s approach to use the gross margin between purchase prices invoiced by unrelated suppliers and the resale prices to independent customers is appropriate as long as the thus resulting adjustment does not include any other adjustments made under Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. For this reason, the Conor Group’s claim concerning any wrongful inclusion of general and administrative expenses and finance expenses in the applied mark-up under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation was likewise dismissed. Third, the Commission recalled that refund of duties that the exporters have received increases effectively the revenue realised on the export sales in question. By contrast, the domestic sales are not subject to any such refund. Applying an adjustment to the normal value for the export refunds received would therefore be flawed. |
| --- | --- |

(185)

The Commission rejected these claims. First, with regard to the claim that packing costs would be deducted twice from the export price, the Commission noted that the Conor Group did not substantiate its claim, least not as it never proved let alone quantified the amount of any packing costs included in the total purchase costs of the tiles in question. Moreover, the Commission confirmed that the data on file did not point at any double-counting of packing costs, as the Conor Group seemed to suggest. Most importantly, the claim suffers from a fundamental flaw as to the concept of the mark-up within the meaning of Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. The mark-up equals the difference between the full purchase price paid (irrespective of what costs, such as packing costs, the supplier may have incurred) and the total sales revenue realised by the respective trader. In other words, the mark-up consists of selling, general and administrative expenses and finance expenses and profit, plus any other specific revenues realised on the export sales in question. To account for all these elements, the Commission’s approach to use the gross margin between purchase prices invoiced by unrelated suppliers and the resale prices to independent customers is appropriate as long as the thus resulting adjustment does not include any other adjustments made under Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. For this reason, the Conor Group’s claim concerning any wrongful inclusion of general and administrative expenses and finance expenses in the applied mark-up under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation was likewise dismissed. Third, the Commission recalled that refund of duties that the exporters have received increases effectively the revenue realised on the export sales in question. By contrast, the domestic sales are not subject to any such refund. Applying an adjustment to the normal value for the export refunds received would therefore be flawed.

| (186) | The Conor Group also identified that the Commission’s formula used for calculating the total allowance in the export sales of Concor International double-counted “Clearing & Forwarding Charges” as they were already included in the formula to compute “handling loading and ancillary expenses at the premises in exporting country” in the export sales listing. The Commission accepted this claim and therefore corrected the identified clerical error in favour of the Conor Group’s exporting producers. |
| --- | --- |

(186)

The Conor Group also identified that the Commission’s formula used for calculating the total allowance in the export sales of Concor International double-counted “Clearing & Forwarding Charges” as they were already included in the formula to compute “handling loading and ancillary expenses at the premises in exporting country” in the export sales listing. The Commission accepted this claim and therefore corrected the identified clerical error in favour of the Conor Group’s exporting producers.

| (187) | Pursuant to final disclosure, the Icon Group claimed that the Commission should not have deducted the mark-up from the Icon Group’s indirect export sales to the EU pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation as the Icon Group’s related producers and traders form a Single Economic Entity (‘SEE’) (16). |
| --- | --- |

(187)

Pursuant to final disclosure, the Icon Group claimed that the Commission should not have deducted the mark-up from the Icon Group’s indirect export sales to the EU pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation as the Icon Group’s related producers and traders form a Single Economic Entity (‘SEE’) (16).

16

| (188) | In this context, the Icon Group alleged that the producers within the Icon Group share a unitary organisation of personal, tangible and intangible elements, supply and industry know-how between themselves in order to deliver a high-quality Icon brand and have a formal and personal interest in the economic success of their related companies. In addition, so the Icon Group continued, it shares one product catalogue and has one single website, called “Icon World of Tile”, which refers to “the company”. That website has one single point of contact for customer orders. |
| --- | --- |

(188)

In this context, the Icon Group alleged that the producers within the Icon Group share a unitary organisation of personal, tangible and intangible elements, supply and industry know-how between themselves in order to deliver a high-quality Icon brand and have a formal and personal interest in the economic success of their related companies. In addition, so the Icon Group continued, it shares one product catalogue and has one single website, called “Icon World of Tile”, which refers to “the company”. That website has one single point of contact for customer orders.

| (189) | The Icon Group pointed to the Court of Justice judgment in Matsushita Electric Industrial, according to which “the division of production activities and sales activities within a group made up of legally distinct companies can in no way alter the fact that those companies are an SEE which organises in that way activities that in other cases are carried on by what is, also from a legal point of view, a single entity.” (17) |
| --- | --- |

(189)

The Icon Group pointed to the Court of Justice judgment in Matsushita Electric Industrial, according to which “the division of production activities and sales activities within a group made up of legally distinct companies can in no way alter the fact that those companies are an SEE which organises in that way activities that in other cases are carried on by what is, also from a legal point of view, a single entity.” (17)

17

| (190) | The claim of the exporting producers within the Icon Group to be considered an SEE was rejected. For confidentiality reasons, details with regard to this assessment were sent only to the Icon Group. |
| --- | --- |

(190)

The claim of the exporting producers within the Icon Group to be considered an SEE was rejected. For confidentiality reasons, details with regard to this assessment were sent only to the Icon Group.

| (191) | The Icon Group further claimed that the Commission had not adduced any evidence as to why it considered that “for indirect transactions the related exporting producers acted as traders whose functions were similar to those of an agent working on a commission basis.” |
| --- | --- |

(191)

The Icon Group further claimed that the Commission had not adduced any evidence as to why it considered that “for indirect transactions the related exporting producers acted as traders whose functions were similar to those of an agent working on a commission basis.”

| (192) | The Commission considered this claim unfounded. It is uncontested that the relevant transactions were carried out in two steps, first a trader/producer within the Icon Group purchased the product concerned from a related producer, second the same trader/producer exported the thus purchased product concerned to the Union. There is therefore evidence that trader’s activities are carried out by the respective trader/producer in the Icon Group. |
| --- | --- |

(192)

The Commission considered this claim unfounded. It is uncontested that the relevant transactions were carried out in two steps, first a trader/producer within the Icon Group purchased the product concerned from a related producer, second the same trader/producer exported the thus purchased product concerned to the Union. There is therefore evidence that trader’s activities are carried out by the respective trader/producer in the Icon Group.

| (193) | In the alternative, the Icon Group submitted that domestic and export sales should be treated equally, meaning that a mark-up should also be applied to the Group’s indirect domestic sales. |
| --- | --- |

(193)

In the alternative, the Icon Group submitted that domestic and export sales should be treated equally, meaning that a mark-up should also be applied to the Group’s indirect domestic sales.

| (194) | The Commision rejected the claim as the domestic sales contracts and export sales contracts differed by nature. For confidentiality reasons, details with regard to this assessment were sent only to the Icon Group. |
| --- | --- |

(194)

The Commision rejected the claim as the domestic sales contracts and export sales contracts differed by nature. For confidentiality reasons, details with regard to this assessment were sent only to the Icon Group.

| (195) | One group of exporting producers claimed adjustments to the normal value and export price for inventory credit costs, i.e. theoretical financial cost for goods in stock, under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation. The claim was rejected, as it could not be substantiated that the difference in time during which goods sat in stock affected price comparability. |
| --- | --- |

(195)

One group of exporting producers claimed adjustments to the normal value and export price for inventory credit costs, i.e. theoretical financial cost for goods in stock, under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation. The claim was rejected, as it could not be substantiated that the difference in time during which goods sat in stock affected price comparability.

| (196) | The same group of exporting producers also claimed an adjustment related to advertising costs, consisting of costs on setting up billboards near Morbi/Gujarat, the production location, incurred for sales on the domestic market, under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation. The group was neither able to quantify such adjustment nor to demonstrate that it affected price comparability. The claim has therefore been rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(196)

The same group of exporting producers also claimed an adjustment related to advertising costs, consisting of costs on setting up billboards near Morbi/Gujarat, the production location, incurred for sales on the domestic market, under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation. The group was neither able to quantify such adjustment nor to demonstrate that it affected price comparability. The claim has therefore been rejected.

| (197) | Finally, all sampled companies claimed adjustments to the normal value under Article 2(10)(b) of the basic Regulation on alleged import charges and indirect taxes. The investigation revealed however that the claim was unfounded. In fact, the sampled exporters received, under two schemes (Notification No. 07/2020-CUSTOMS (N.T.) and Remission of Duties and Taxes on Exported Products (RODTEP)) export refunds worth 2% of the export invoice value, irrespective of whether any import duties or indirect taxes were paid for the raw materials that were incorporated in the exported tiles. The refunds were granted on the mere proof of the goods being exported. These claims were rejected, because the actual export refunds could not be linked to any amounts corresponding to any import charges or indirect taxes borne by the like product and by materials physically incorporated therein, as provided by Article 2(10)(b) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(197)

Finally, all sampled companies claimed adjustments to the normal value under Article 2(10)(b) of the basic Regulation on alleged import charges and indirect taxes. The investigation revealed however that the claim was unfounded. In fact, the sampled exporters received, under two schemes (Notification No. 07/2020-CUSTOMS (N.T.) and Remission of Duties and Taxes on Exported Products (RODTEP)) export refunds worth 2% of the export invoice value, irrespective of whether any import duties or indirect taxes were paid for the raw materials that were incorporated in the exported tiles. The refunds were granted on the mere proof of the goods being exported. These claims were rejected, because the actual export refunds could not be linked to any amounts corresponding to any import charges or indirect taxes borne by the like product and by materials physically incorporated therein, as provided by Article 2(10)(b) of the basic Regulation.

3.1.4.   Dumping margins

Dumping margins

| (198) | For the sampled cooperating groups of exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(198)

For the sampled cooperating groups of exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

| (199) | To this end, for all exporting producers within a group, a specific dumping margin has been calculated on the basis of the methodology laid down above. Thereafter, a weighted average dumping margin for the whole group was calculated. |
| --- | --- |

(199)

To this end, for all exporting producers within a group, a specific dumping margin has been calculated on the basis of the methodology laid down above. Thereafter, a weighted average dumping margin for the whole group was calculated.

| (200) | In the company specific final disclosure of 28 October 2022, the Commission had disclosed to two of the sampled exporting producers, Conor Group and Icon Group, that it had found appropriate to recalculate the CIF prices they had provided using transport data from the IHS Markit Global Trade AtlasTM database. After the final disclosure, both parties claimed that the Commission should have provided more detailed information on why the Commission had not accepted their reported CIF-prices and had established CIF prices on an alternative basis. After the Commission had provided this additional explanation through a Note to the file, they claimed, inter alia, that one of the datasets used by the Commission needed to be adjusted. The Commission agreed that the underlying data it had used were inaccurate and it revised the calculations accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(200)

In the company specific final disclosure of 28 October 2022, the Commission had disclosed to two of the sampled exporting producers, Conor Group and Icon Group, that it had found appropriate to recalculate the CIF prices they had provided using transport data from the IHS Markit Global Trade AtlasTM database. After the final disclosure, both parties claimed that the Commission should have provided more detailed information on why the Commission had not accepted their reported CIF-prices and had established CIF prices on an alternative basis. After the Commission had provided this additional explanation through a Note to the file, they claimed, inter alia, that one of the datasets used by the Commission needed to be adjusted. The Commission agreed that the underlying data it had used were inaccurate and it revised the calculations accordingly.

| (201) | After the final disclosure, the Conor Group pointed to an inaccuracy in its dumping calculation as the Commission had double counted the allowance for certain logistics costs made to its sales to the Union. The claim was accepted and the calculation was corrected accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(201)

After the final disclosure, the Conor Group pointed to an inaccuracy in its dumping calculation as the Commission had double counted the allowance for certain logistics costs made to its sales to the Union. The claim was accepted and the calculation was corrected accordingly.

| (202) | The definitive dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:






  Company | Definitive dumping margin |
| --- | --- | --- |
| The Conor Group | 8,7 % |
| The Icon Group | 6,7 % |
| The Lavish Group | 0 % |

(202)

The definitive dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company

Definitive dumping margin

The Conor Group

8,7 %

The Icon Group

6,7 %

The Lavish Group

0 %

| (203) | For the cooperating exporting producers outside the sample, the Commission calculated the weighted average dumping margin, in accordance with Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, that margin was established on the basis of the margins of the two sampled groups of exporting producers for which a dumping margins could be established, while disregarding the margin of the group of exporting producer with zero dumping margin. |
| --- | --- |

(203)

For the cooperating exporting producers outside the sample, the Commission calculated the weighted average dumping margin, in accordance with Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, that margin was established on the basis of the margins of the two sampled groups of exporting producers for which a dumping margins could be established, while disregarding the margin of the group of exporting producer with zero dumping margin.

| (204) | On this basis, the provisional dumping margin of the non-sampled cooperating exporting producers is 7,3 %. |
| --- | --- |

(204)

On this basis, the provisional dumping margin of the non-sampled cooperating exporting producers is 7,3 %.

| (205) | After final disclosure, several non-sampled Indian exporting producers claimed that the Commission failed to provide the detailed methodology used by the Commission for calculating the margins for sampled and non-sampled Indian companies. This claim was linked to similar claims made by the sampled Indian exporting producers that formed part of the Conor Group and the Lavish Group. These claims are addressed under recitals (170) to (186). |
| --- | --- |

(205)

After final disclosure, several non-sampled Indian exporting producers claimed that the Commission failed to provide the detailed methodology used by the Commission for calculating the margins for sampled and non-sampled Indian companies. This claim was linked to similar claims made by the sampled Indian exporting producers that formed part of the Conor Group and the Lavish Group. These claims are addressed under recitals (170) to (186).

| (206) | For all other exporting producers in India, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers to the Union expressed as proportion of the total imports from the country concerned to the Union in the investigation period, that were established on the basis of import statistics from Eurostat (Comext). |
| --- | --- |

(206)

For all other exporting producers in India, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers to the Union expressed as proportion of the total imports from the country concerned to the Union in the investigation period, that were established on the basis of import statistics from Eurostat (Comext).

| (207) | The level of cooperation in this case was considered high because the exports of the cooperating exporting producers constituted around 84 % of the total imports during the investigation period. On this basis, the Commission considered it appropriate to establish the dumping margin for non-cooperating exporting producers at the level of the cooperating sampled group of exporting producers with the highest dumping margin. |
| --- | --- |

(207)

The level of cooperation in this case was considered high because the exports of the cooperating exporting producers constituted around 84 % of the total imports during the investigation period. On this basis, the Commission considered it appropriate to establish the dumping margin for non-cooperating exporting producers at the level of the cooperating sampled group of exporting producers with the highest dumping margin.

| (208) | The definitive dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:






  Company | Definitive dumping margin |
| --- | --- | --- |
| The Conor Group | 8,7 % |
| The Icon Group | 6,7 % |
| The Lavish Group | 0 % |
| Other cooperating companies | 7,3 % |
| All other companies | 8,7 % |

(208)

The definitive dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company

Definitive dumping margin

The Conor Group

8,7 %

The Icon Group

6,7 %

The Lavish Group

0 %

Other cooperating companies

7,3 %

All other companies

8,7 %

3.2.   Türkiye

Türkiye

3.2.1.   Article 18 of the basic Regulation

Article 18 of the basic Regulation

3.2.1.1.   The Bien & Qua Group

| (209) | With regard to the Bien & Qua Group, during the investigation, the Commission inquired about the nature of the relationship between the manufacturers and the related traders in Türkiye part of the Bien & Qua Group. The information provided by the companies and collected by the Commission from other sources led the Commission to conclude that the group failed to provide the necessary information concerning written contractual arrangements. |
| --- | --- |

(209)

With regard to the Bien & Qua Group, during the investigation, the Commission inquired about the nature of the relationship between the manufacturers and the related traders in Türkiye part of the Bien & Qua Group. The information provided by the companies and collected by the Commission from other sources led the Commission to conclude that the group failed to provide the necessary information concerning written contractual arrangements.

| (210) | The Commission informed the company of its intention to apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation in relation to the information that it failed to provide. |
| --- | --- |

(210)

The Commission informed the company of its intention to apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation in relation to the information that it failed to provide.

| (211) | The explanations provided by the Bien & Qua Group following the Article 18 letter did not change the Commission’s conclusion that the group failed to provide the necessary information concerning written contractual arrangements. |
| --- | --- |

(211)

The explanations provided by the Bien & Qua Group following the Article 18 letter did not change the Commission’s conclusion that the group failed to provide the necessary information concerning written contractual arrangements.

| (212) | As a result, the Commission confirmed the application of Article 18 of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(212)

As a result, the Commission confirmed the application of Article 18 of the basic Regulation.

3.2.1.2.   The Hitit Group

| (213) | On 21 November 2022, the Hitit Group requested the Commission to disregard the information provided in its questionnaire response as errors in it would not allow the Commission to calculate a “reasonably accurate finding” in the sense of Article 18(3) of the basic Regulation, and to treat the Hitit Group as a non-sampled cooperating exporting producer which would entail that it would be made subject to the sample average duty level. In this submission, it also proposed some corrections to its response and provided an alternative dumping calculation with the corrections made. On 7 December 2022, the party reiterated its request to apply Article 18 to the information provided and verified and the request was supported by the GOT. |
| --- | --- |

(213)

On 21 November 2022, the Hitit Group requested the Commission to disregard the information provided in its questionnaire response as errors in it would not allow the Commission to calculate a “reasonably accurate finding” in the sense of Article 18(3) of the basic Regulation, and to treat the Hitit Group as a non-sampled cooperating exporting producer which would entail that it would be made subject to the sample average duty level. In this submission, it also proposed some corrections to its response and provided an alternative dumping calculation with the corrections made. On 7 December 2022, the party reiterated its request to apply Article 18 to the information provided and verified and the request was supported by the GOT.

| (214) | As a threshold matter, the Commission recalled that the submission of a revised dumping margin calculation post final disclosure and the request to apply Article 18 to the information provided and verified in due course were made at a stage where the Commission was no longer in a position to verify and therefore consider new data. For this reason only, the request and the new explanations and data provided by the Hitit Group should be rejected. The information submitted by the Hitit Group during the course of the investigation was found by the Commission not to be deficient to the point of causing undue difficulty in arriving at a reasonably accurate finding. The information was submitted in good time and verified during a verification visit. Therefore even, if the information was not ideal in all respects, it was not disregarded in accordance with Article 18(3) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(214)

As a threshold matter, the Commission recalled that the submission of a revised dumping margin calculation post final disclosure and the request to apply Article 18 to the information provided and verified in due course were made at a stage where the Commission was no longer in a position to verify and therefore consider new data. For this reason only, the request and the new explanations and data provided by the Hitit Group should be rejected. The information submitted by the Hitit Group during the course of the investigation was found by the Commission not to be deficient to the point of causing undue difficulty in arriving at a reasonably accurate finding. The information was submitted in good time and verified during a verification visit. Therefore even, if the information was not ideal in all respects, it was not disregarded in accordance with Article 18(3) of the basic Regulation.

| (215) | For the sake of completeness and without prejudice to the above, the Commission noted that the fact that the Hitit Group presented an alternative dumping calculation contradicted their allegation that a dumping margin for the Hitit Group could not be determined. Moreover, the Hitit Group’s argument on the basis of Article 18(3) of the basic Regulation should be dismissed as it is based on an a contrario reading on this provision. Article 18(3) requires the Commission to use the information provided, unless certain conditions are met. It does not require the Commission to disregard the data if the Commission considers such data appropriate since it was provided by the company and verified by the Commission. The Commission further noted that the alleged mistakes in the questionnaire response claimed by the party mainly concerned a misclassification of some transactions under the relevant PCNs for product types representing a minor share of its EU sales transactions only. The Commission underlined that it calculated the Hitit Group’s dumping margin in the way presented in the sections below in light of datasets that were timely submitted and verified. The company also had the opportunity to make comments on the verification report. No allegations were made in time about incorrectness in the data provided and verified by the Commission. Once the Commission has received the necessary data, verified it and consider it reliable to make its dumping calculations, allegations by the company about errors in the underlying data are both unwarranted and unverifieable. Thus, those late allegations should be rejected and the data submitted and verified by the Commission should be accepted in accordance with Article 18(3) of the basic Regulation. For confidentiality reasons, the detailed reasons why the Hitit Group’s claims dated 7 December 2022 could not be retained were disclosed only to the party concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(215)

For the sake of completeness and without prejudice to the above, the Commission noted that the fact that the Hitit Group presented an alternative dumping calculation contradicted their allegation that a dumping margin for the Hitit Group could not be determined. Moreover, the Hitit Group’s argument on the basis of Article 18(3) of the basic Regulation should be dismissed as it is based on an a contrario reading on this provision. Article 18(3) requires the Commission to use the information provided, unless certain conditions are met. It does not require the Commission to disregard the data if the Commission considers such data appropriate since it was provided by the company and verified by the Commission. The Commission further noted that the alleged mistakes in the questionnaire response claimed by the party mainly concerned a misclassification of some transactions under the relevant PCNs for product types representing a minor share of its EU sales transactions only. The Commission underlined that it calculated the Hitit Group’s dumping margin in the way presented in the sections below in light of datasets that were timely submitted and verified. The company also had the opportunity to make comments on the verification report. No allegations were made in time about incorrectness in the data provided and verified by the Commission. Once the Commission has received the necessary data, verified it and consider it reliable to make its dumping calculations, allegations by the company about errors in the underlying data are both unwarranted and unverifieable. Thus, those late allegations should be rejected and the data submitted and verified by the Commission should be accepted in accordance with Article 18(3) of the basic Regulation. For confidentiality reasons, the detailed reasons why the Hitit Group’s claims dated 7 December 2022 could not be retained were disclosed only to the party concerned.

a contrario

3.2.2.   Normal value

Normal value

| (216) | The Commission first examined whether the total volume of domestic sales for each sampled cooperating exporting producer was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales are representative if the total domestic sales volume of the like product to independent customers on the domestic market per exporting producer represent at least 5 % of its total export sales volume of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. On this basis, the total sales by each sampled exporting producer of the like product on the domestic market were representative. |
| --- | --- |

(216)

The Commission first examined whether the total volume of domestic sales for each sampled cooperating exporting producer was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales are representative if the total domestic sales volume of the like product to independent customers on the domestic market per exporting producer represent at least 5 % of its total export sales volume of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. On this basis, the total sales by each sampled exporting producer of the like product on the domestic market were representative.

| (217) | The Commission subsequently identified the product types sold domestically that were identical or comparable with the product types sold for export to the Union for the exporting producers with representative domestic sales. The Commission found that sampled exporting producers sold tiles of prime and subprime quality on the domestic market whereas they sold basically solely prime quality for export to the Union. During the production process, after several quality controls, the exporting producers deem ceramic tiles that are of less the perfect quality as “subprime” quality. These sub-standard tiles were sold at reduced prices. Thus, in order to make a fair comparison with the price to the Union, the Commission considered only domestic sales of prime quality for the calculation of the normal value. Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group asked for the inclusion of sub-standard tiles in its calculations on the grounds that volumes were significant and that it was possible to make adjustments for the differences between subprime versus prime quality products. The Commission dismissed the Hitit Group’s request, absent of any concrete proposal about how such an adjustment could have been made. Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group asked for the inclusion in its dumping calculation of one specific subcategory of products which had been considered by the Commission of subprime quality and was therefore, in line with the above considerations, excluded from the normal value calculation. The request was based on the grounds that the sales volumes of this category of products were significant and that these products concerned prime products. After due analysis of the data provided by the company, the Commission concluded that this subcategory of products qualified as prime products and it therefore accepted the Hitit Group’s request. |
| --- | --- |

(217)

The Commission subsequently identified the product types sold domestically that were identical or comparable with the product types sold for export to the Union for the exporting producers with representative domestic sales. The Commission found that sampled exporting producers sold tiles of prime and subprime quality on the domestic market whereas they sold basically solely prime quality for export to the Union. During the production process, after several quality controls, the exporting producers deem ceramic tiles that are of less the perfect quality as “subprime” quality. These sub-standard tiles were sold at reduced prices. Thus, in order to make a fair comparison with the price to the Union, the Commission considered only domestic sales of prime quality for the calculation of the normal value. Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group asked for the inclusion of sub-standard tiles in its calculations on the grounds that volumes were significant and that it was possible to make adjustments for the differences between subprime versus prime quality products. The Commission dismissed the Hitit Group’s request, absent of any concrete proposal about how such an adjustment could have been made. Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group asked for the inclusion in its dumping calculation of one specific subcategory of products which had been considered by the Commission of subprime quality and was therefore, in line with the above considerations, excluded from the normal value calculation. The request was based on the grounds that the sales volumes of this category of products were significant and that these products concerned prime products. After due analysis of the data provided by the company, the Commission concluded that this subcategory of products qualified as prime products and it therefore accepted the Hitit Group’s request.

| (218) | The Commission then examined whether the domestic sales by each sampled exporting producer on its domestic market for each product type that is identical or comparable with a product type sold for export to the Union were representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales of a product type are representative if the total volume of domestic sales of that product type to independent customers during the investigation period represents at least 5 % of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the Union. The Commission established that the domestic sales of most product types were representative. For each of the three exporters, for some product types that were exported to the Union during the investigation period there were either no domestic sales at all, or the domestic sales of that product type were below 5 % in volume and thus not representative. |
| --- | --- |

(218)

The Commission then examined whether the domestic sales by each sampled exporting producer on its domestic market for each product type that is identical or comparable with a product type sold for export to the Union were representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales of a product type are representative if the total volume of domestic sales of that product type to independent customers during the investigation period represents at least 5 % of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the Union. The Commission established that the domestic sales of most product types were representative. For each of the three exporters, for some product types that were exported to the Union during the investigation period there were either no domestic sales at all, or the domestic sales of that product type were below 5 % in volume and thus not representative.

| (219) | The Commission next defined the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market for each product type during the investigation period in order to decide whether to use actual domestic sales for the calculation of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(219)

The Commission next defined the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market for each product type during the investigation period in order to decide whether to use actual domestic sales for the calculation of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation.

| (220) | The normal value is based on the actual domestic price per product type, irrespective of whether those sales are profitable or not, if:






  (a) | the sales volume of the product type, sold at a net sales price equal to or above the calculated cost of production, represented more than 80 % of the total sales volume of this product type; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(220)

The normal value is based on the actual domestic price per product type, irrespective of whether those sales are profitable or not, if:

(a)

the sales volume of the product type, sold at a net sales price equal to or above the calculated cost of production, represented more than 80 % of the total sales volume of this product type; and

| (b) | the weighted average sales price of that product type is equal to or higher than the unit cost of production. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the weighted average sales price of that product type is equal to or higher than the unit cost of production.

| (221) | In this case, the normal value is the weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that product type during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(221)

In this case, the normal value is the weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that product type during the investigation period.

| (222) | The normal value is the actual domestic price per product type of only the profitable domestic sales of the product types during the investigation period, if:






  (a) | the volume of profitable sales of the product type represents 80 % or less of the total sales volume of this type: or |
| --- | --- | --- |

(222)

The normal value is the actual domestic price per product type of only the profitable domestic sales of the product types during the investigation period, if:

(a)

the volume of profitable sales of the product type represents 80 % or less of the total sales volume of this type: or

| (b) | the weighted average price of this product type is below the unit cost of production. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the weighted average price of this product type is below the unit cost of production.

| (223) | The analysis of domestic sales showed that over 60% of all domestic sales of the Vitra Group and over 70 % of all domestic sales of the Hitit Group and the Bien & Qua Group were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was higher than the cost of production. Accordingly, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales during the investigation period or a weighted average of the profitable sales only. |
| --- | --- |

(223)

The analysis of domestic sales showed that over 60% of all domestic sales of the Vitra Group and over 70 % of all domestic sales of the Hitit Group and the Bien & Qua Group were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was higher than the cost of production. Accordingly, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales during the investigation period or a weighted average of the profitable sales only.

| (224) | Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group contested the exclusion from the company’s domestic sales listing of certain sales labelled by the party as “export-registered sales” in view of their high volume. In view of elements on the file supporting the claim, the Commission accepted to include these sales volumes in the normal value calculations insofar as it could not be established that these sales were eventually exported. |
| --- | --- |

(224)

Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group contested the exclusion from the company’s domestic sales listing of certain sales labelled by the party as “export-registered sales” in view of their high volume. In view of elements on the file supporting the claim, the Commission accepted to include these sales volumes in the normal value calculations insofar as it could not be established that these sales were eventually exported.

| (225) | Where a product type was not sold in representative quantities on the domestic market, the Commission constructed the normal value in accordance with Article 2(3) and (6) of the basic Regulation. Where there were no or insufficient sales of a product type of the like product in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market, normal value was either constructed (because the domestic sales price of other sampled producers for that product type could not be disclosed in a meaningful manner without breaching the confidentiality of those producers) or the price of another exporter in the ordinary course of trade was used, and an appropriate non-confidential summary of that information was provided to the interested party concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(225)

Where a product type was not sold in representative quantities on the domestic market, the Commission constructed the normal value in accordance with Article 2(3) and (6) of the basic Regulation. Where there were no or insufficient sales of a product type of the like product in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market, normal value was either constructed (because the domestic sales price of other sampled producers for that product type could not be disclosed in a meaningful manner without breaching the confidentiality of those producers) or the price of another exporter in the ordinary course of trade was used, and an appropriate non-confidential summary of that information was provided to the interested party concerned.

| (226) | Normal value was constructed by adding the following to the average cost of production of the like product of each cooperating sampled exporting producer during the investigation period:






  (a) | the weighted average SG&A expenses incurred by the cooperating sampled exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the investigation period; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(226)

Normal value was constructed by adding the following to the average cost of production of the like product of each cooperating sampled exporting producer during the investigation period:

(a)

the weighted average SG&A expenses incurred by the cooperating sampled exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the investigation period; and

| (b) | the weighted average profit realised by the cooperating sampled exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the weighted average profit realised by the cooperating sampled exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the investigation period.

| (227) | For the product types not sold in representative quantities on the domestic market, the average SG&A expenses and profit of transactions made in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market for those types were added. For the product types not sold at all on the domestic market, the weighted average SG&A expenses and profit of all transactions made in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market were added. |
| --- | --- |

(227)

For the product types not sold in representative quantities on the domestic market, the average SG&A expenses and profit of transactions made in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market for those types were added. For the product types not sold at all on the domestic market, the weighted average SG&A expenses and profit of all transactions made in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market were added.

| (228) | Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group stated that in the calculations certain PCNs had unusually high SG&A and the profit as compared to the company ratios. Considering the additional explanations provided by the party, including mistakes in its reporting, on an exceptional basis and in light of the specific situation of the case, for two PCNs the Commission constructed the normal value on company basis. Following the additional partial disclosure, the Hitit Group asked to disregard the production costs of some tiles, deemed to be unrepresentative. The Commission dismissed the claim, which was based in a new unverified dataset that could not be reconciled with verified data. The Commission disclosed its reasoning in more detail via an individual disclosure only to the party concerned for confidentiality reasons. |
| --- | --- |

(228)

Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group stated that in the calculations certain PCNs had unusually high SG&A and the profit as compared to the company ratios. Considering the additional explanations provided by the party, including mistakes in its reporting, on an exceptional basis and in light of the specific situation of the case, for two PCNs the Commission constructed the normal value on company basis. Following the additional partial disclosure, the Hitit Group asked to disregard the production costs of some tiles, deemed to be unrepresentative. The Commission dismissed the claim, which was based in a new unverified dataset that could not be reconciled with verified data. The Commission disclosed its reasoning in more detail via an individual disclosure only to the party concerned for confidentiality reasons.

| (229) | Following final disclosure, the Vitra Group contested the inclusion of certain sales transactions in their normal value calculations as they would concern products manufactured outside Türkiye. After having duly assessed the supporting evidence, the Commission accepted the claim and it revised the calculations accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

(229)

Following final disclosure, the Vitra Group contested the inclusion of certain sales transactions in their normal value calculations as they would concern products manufactured outside Türkiye. After having duly assessed the supporting evidence, the Commission accepted the claim and it revised the calculations accordingly.

3.2.3.   Export price

Export price

| (230) | The sampled exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers or through related importers. |
| --- | --- |

(230)

The sampled exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers or through related importers.

| (231) | When the product concerned was exported directly to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(231)

When the product concerned was exported directly to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

| (232) | When the product concerned was exported to the Union through a related importer, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses, and for profits accruing, based on the profit established in this investigation for unrelated importers (see recitals (429) and (430)). |
| --- | --- |

(232)

When the product concerned was exported to the Union through a related importer, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses, and for profits accruing, based on the profit established in this investigation for unrelated importers (see recitals (429) and (430)).

| (233) | Following final disclosure, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that no deduction of SG&A and profit was warranted under Article 2(9) because the different entities in the group formed a single economic entity. The party stated that related companies acted as part of the producers’ exporting network, that all entities were economically controlled and managed by the same persons and that verification visits took place basically only at the premises of the producers. It alleged that the fact that related companies had unrelated suppliers and/or dealt with other products did not have any impact of the status of the single economic entity of the group. The Bien & Qua Group claimed as well that no deduction of SG&A and profit was warranted under Article 2(9) for a related trader located outside the Union with no importing functions. |
| --- | --- |

(233)

Following final disclosure, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that no deduction of SG&A and profit was warranted under Article 2(9) because the different entities in the group formed a single economic entity. The party stated that related companies acted as part of the producers’ exporting network, that all entities were economically controlled and managed by the same persons and that verification visits took place basically only at the premises of the producers. It alleged that the fact that related companies had unrelated suppliers and/or dealt with other products did not have any impact of the status of the single economic entity of the group. The Bien & Qua Group claimed as well that no deduction of SG&A and profit was warranted under Article 2(9) for a related trader located outside the Union with no importing functions.

| (234) | It is noted that, even if the group would have been a single economic entity (quod non, as concluded in the next section), Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation calls for the Commission to establish the export price on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union. Given how the group organised sales into the Union, it would be unfair to treat in the same way sales that exporting producers channelled to the Union via related importers and direct sales to the Union. The Commission thus concluded that, when the product concerned was exported to the Union through a related importer, it was justified to perform adjustments for SG&A expenses and for profits accruing of the importer as established by Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. As to the adjustments for a related trader outside the Union, the Commission clarified that, contrary to what the Commission had stated in the specific disclosure to the group, the legal basis for the adjustment was Article 2(10)(i), which is in line with the Commission’s practice in other investigations, justified even if the trader would have had no importing functions. |
| --- | --- |

(234)

It is noted that, even if the group would have been a single economic entity (quod non, as concluded in the next section), Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation calls for the Commission to establish the export price on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union. Given how the group organised sales into the Union, it would be unfair to treat in the same way sales that exporting producers channelled to the Union via related importers and direct sales to the Union. The Commission thus concluded that, when the product concerned was exported to the Union through a related importer, it was justified to perform adjustments for SG&A expenses and for profits accruing of the importer as established by Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. As to the adjustments for a related trader outside the Union, the Commission clarified that, contrary to what the Commission had stated in the specific disclosure to the group, the legal basis for the adjustment was Article 2(10)(i), which is in line with the Commission’s practice in other investigations, justified even if the trader would have had no importing functions.

quod non

| (235) | Two of the sampled groups sold negligible volumes of tiles of subprime quality (see recital (217) to the Union. These sales were excluded from the volumes used to establish the export price. This approach was maintained after final disclosure, as noted in recital (217) in fine. |
| --- | --- |

(235)

Two of the sampled groups sold negligible volumes of tiles of subprime quality (see recital (217) to the Union. These sales were excluded from the volumes used to establish the export price. This approach was maintained after final disclosure, as noted in recital (217) in fine.

in fine

3.2.4.   Comparison

Comparison

| (236) | The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers on an ex-works basis. |
| --- | --- |

(236)

The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers on an ex-works basis.

| (237) | Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs, customs clearance and assimilated costs, commissions, discounts and rebates. |
| --- | --- |

(237)

Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs, customs clearance and assimilated costs, commissions, discounts and rebates.

| (238) | Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group contested that fact that the Commission had rejected a credit cost adjustment. The Commission dismissed the claim. The Commission rejected the adjustment because the party failed to prove, as requested in Article 2(10) the basic Regulation, that the cost of any credit granted was indeed a factor taken into account in the determination of the prices charged. |
| --- | --- |

(238)

Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group contested that fact that the Commission had rejected a credit cost adjustment. The Commission dismissed the claim. The Commission rejected the adjustment because the party failed to prove, as requested in Article 2(10) the basic Regulation, that the cost of any credit granted was indeed a factor taken into account in the determination of the prices charged.

| (239) | During the investigation period, the Hitit Group often exported ceramic tiles to the Union through related traders located in Türkiye. The Commission found that the functions of these related traders were similar to those of an agent as they received a mark-up for their services. |
| --- | --- |

(239)

During the investigation period, the Hitit Group often exported ceramic tiles to the Union through related traders located in Türkiye. The Commission found that the functions of these related traders were similar to those of an agent as they received a mark-up for their services.

| (240) | The Bien & Qua Group’s related traders in Türkiye involved in sales to the Union received a mark-up for their services and had functions similar to those of an agent remunerated on a commission basis. |
| --- | --- |

(240)

The Bien & Qua Group’s related traders in Türkiye involved in sales to the Union received a mark-up for their services and had functions similar to those of an agent remunerated on a commission basis.

| (241) | The Commission disclosed further details of these findings via an individual disclosure only to the group concerned for confidentiality reasons. |
| --- | --- |

(241)

The Commission disclosed further details of these findings via an individual disclosure only to the group concerned for confidentiality reasons.

| (242) | In light of the above, for all the (groups of) sampled exporting producers, for sales to the Union involving related parties in Türkiye, the export price was adjusted pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. The Commission deducted from the export price the SG&A costs of the related party(ies) and the profit described in recital (232) in fine. |
| --- | --- |

(242)

In light of the above, for all the (groups of) sampled exporting producers, for sales to the Union involving related parties in Türkiye, the export price was adjusted pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. The Commission deducted from the export price the SG&A costs of the related party(ies) and the profit described in recital (232) in fine.

in fine

| (243) | Following final disclosure, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that no deduction of SG&A and profit was warranted under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation because the different entities in the group formed a single economic entity. |
| --- | --- |

(243)

Following final disclosure, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that no deduction of SG&A and profit was warranted under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation because the different entities in the group formed a single economic entity.

| (244) | In the Commission’s view, several factors contradict the claim for a single economic entity for this group. The fact that the Bien & Qua Group entities were economically controlled and managed by the same persons and that verification visits took place mostly at the premises of the producers did not necessarily make the group a single economic entity. The Commission noted that the producers and related traders were based in different locations (with registered offices in places different from those of the related manufacturers) and that the related traders often had unrelated suppliers and/or dealt with products other than the product under investigation. In addition, there were sales departments in different entities, including the manufacturing entities, with different roles. Those related traders thus could not be said to be operating as the internal sales department of the related producers. These elements, and also taking into account the absence of sufficiently substantiated information allowing for a clear understanding of the arrangements amongst related entities in the Bien & Qua Group (see section 3.2.1.), prevented the Commission from accepting the Bien & Qua Group’s overall claim for a single economic entity. |
| --- | --- |

(244)

In the Commission’s view, several factors contradict the claim for a single economic entity for this group. The fact that the Bien & Qua Group entities were economically controlled and managed by the same persons and that verification visits took place mostly at the premises of the producers did not necessarily make the group a single economic entity. The Commission noted that the producers and related traders were based in different locations (with registered offices in places different from those of the related manufacturers) and that the related traders often had unrelated suppliers and/or dealt with products other than the product under investigation. In addition, there were sales departments in different entities, including the manufacturing entities, with different roles. Those related traders thus could not be said to be operating as the internal sales department of the related producers. These elements, and also taking into account the absence of sufficiently substantiated information allowing for a clear understanding of the arrangements amongst related entities in the Bien & Qua Group (see section 3.2.1.), prevented the Commission from accepting the Bien & Qua Group’s overall claim for a single economic entity.

| (245) | Following final disclosure, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that no deduction of SG&A and profit was warranted under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation because of the Commission’s approach in a recent investigation (18), according to which an adjustment under Article 2(10)(i) would be inconsistent with Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(245)

Following final disclosure, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that no deduction of SG&A and profit was warranted under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation because of the Commission’s approach in a recent investigation (18), according to which an adjustment under Article 2(10)(i) would be inconsistent with Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation.

18

| (246) | The Commission disagreed. First, the Commission noted that, indeed, Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, which determines the normal value, and Articles 2(8) and 2(9) of the basic Regulation, which determine the export price, are worded differently. The fact that export prices are established in a different manner than domestic prices does not in itself give rise to an unfair comparison. Moreover, the party compared incomparable factual situations. The investigation quoted by the Bien & Qua Group refers to a steel service center that was integrated in the production chain of the manufacturer. In light of its operations, that steel service center could not be considered to be carrying out functions similar to those of an agent acting on a commission basis within the meaning of Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. The situation was certainly different in the present investigation, with related traders not being integrated in the production chain of the Bien & Qua Group. |
| --- | --- |

(246)

The Commission disagreed. First, the Commission noted that, indeed, Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, which determines the normal value, and Articles 2(8) and 2(9) of the basic Regulation, which determine the export price, are worded differently. The fact that export prices are established in a different manner than domestic prices does not in itself give rise to an unfair comparison. Moreover, the party compared incomparable factual situations. The investigation quoted by the Bien & Qua Group refers to a steel service center that was integrated in the production chain of the manufacturer. In light of its operations, that steel service center could not be considered to be carrying out functions similar to those of an agent acting on a commission basis within the meaning of Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. The situation was certainly different in the present investigation, with related traders not being integrated in the production chain of the Bien & Qua Group.

| (247) | Following final disclosure, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that, should the Commission reject the claim for a single economic entity, any deduction of SG&A and profit under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation was unfounded because it created unjustified differences and an unfair comparison of the normal value and the export price. The party added that its sales channels were the same on the domestic and export markets. This last statement contradicted other statements made by the party in early stages of the proceeding (19) and was found to be incorrect as in the domestic market, the main strategy of the Bien & Qua Group entities was, on the basis of a common price list, to keep a broad base of local dealers. Those dealers had access to the manufacturers’ ERP system automatically in order to place orders. In contrast, in the export market, the order-sale flow differed and manufacturers expected the group’s foreign trade companies to create added value starting from the common price list. The Commission found therefore that the deductions of SG&A and profit under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation were justified with respect to the export side of the group’s operations. |
| --- | --- |

(247)

Following final disclosure, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that, should the Commission reject the claim for a single economic entity, any deduction of SG&A and profit under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation was unfounded because it created unjustified differences and an unfair comparison of the normal value and the export price. The party added that its sales channels were the same on the domestic and export markets. This last statement contradicted other statements made by the party in early stages of the proceeding (19) and was found to be incorrect as in the domestic market, the main strategy of the Bien & Qua Group entities was, on the basis of a common price list, to keep a broad base of local dealers. Those dealers had access to the manufacturers’ ERP system automatically in order to place orders. In contrast, in the export market, the order-sale flow differed and manufacturers expected the group’s foreign trade companies to create added value starting from the common price list. The Commission found therefore that the deductions of SG&A and profit under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation were justified with respect to the export side of the group’s operations.

19

| (248) | Finally, the Commission also underlined that, although repeatedly requested, at no point in time during the investigation had the Bien & Qua Group provided clarity on the contractual arrangements that the producers had with the related entities active in selling their products domestically and on the export markets (see also recitals (209)). This lack of information prevented the Commissions from fully assessing the claim that the situation with regard to domestic and export sales would be exactly the same for those traders involved in both sales flows. In any event, the Bien & Qua Group never submitted any information concerning the level and quantification of the adjustment to the normal value; let alone any underlying evidence justifying a concrete level of adjustment. |
| --- | --- |

(248)

Finally, the Commission also underlined that, although repeatedly requested, at no point in time during the investigation had the Bien & Qua Group provided clarity on the contractual arrangements that the producers had with the related entities active in selling their products domestically and on the export markets (see also recitals (209)). This lack of information prevented the Commissions from fully assessing the claim that the situation with regard to domestic and export sales would be exactly the same for those traders involved in both sales flows. In any event, the Bien & Qua Group never submitted any information concerning the level and quantification of the adjustment to the normal value; let alone any underlying evidence justifying a concrete level of adjustment.

| (249) | On that basis, the claim that any deduction of SG&A and profit under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation resulted in an unfair comparison between the normal value and the export price was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(249)

On that basis, the claim that any deduction of SG&A and profit under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation resulted in an unfair comparison between the normal value and the export price was rejected.

| (250) | Sampled exporting producers contested the deduction of the profit described in recital (232) in fine on the grounds that the scope of the activities of the parties related to the sampled exporting producers and importers in the Union were different. The Commission deemed that claim unfounded, as the level of the profit was reasonable and consistent with the target profit declared by one sampled group for a Turkish related trader. |
| --- | --- |

(250)

Sampled exporting producers contested the deduction of the profit described in recital (232) in fine on the grounds that the scope of the activities of the parties related to the sampled exporting producers and importers in the Union were different. The Commission deemed that claim unfounded, as the level of the profit was reasonable and consistent with the target profit declared by one sampled group for a Turkish related trader.

in fine

| (251) | Some currency conversion issues were identified. Article 2(10)(j) of the basic Regulation provides that the date of sale should be the date of invoice, and that the date of contract, purchase order or order confirmation might be used if these more appropriately establish the material terms of sale. Consequently, given that during the investigation period the Turkish Lira’s exchange rate fluctuated (and overall fell significantly) strongly against the Euro (20), the Commission considered that the material terms of sale were settled at the time of the purchase order rather than at the date of invoice. The gap between the customer purchase order and the date of the invoice varied, but was around two months on average. |
| --- | --- |

(251)

Some currency conversion issues were identified. Article 2(10)(j) of the basic Regulation provides that the date of sale should be the date of invoice, and that the date of contract, purchase order or order confirmation might be used if these more appropriately establish the material terms of sale. Consequently, given that during the investigation period the Turkish Lira’s exchange rate fluctuated (and overall fell significantly) strongly against the Euro (20), the Commission considered that the material terms of sale were settled at the time of the purchase order rather than at the date of invoice. The gap between the customer purchase order and the date of the invoice varied, but was around two months on average.

20

| (252) | Following the final disclosure, several parties complained that the above methodology artificially depressed export prices (increasing thus artificially dumping margins) and asked the Commission to consider that the material terms of sale were settled by the date of the invoice. Given the undeniable exchange rate fluctuation of the Turkish Lira against the Euro during the investigation period, the Commission deemed it unjustified to consider that the Union customer paid a price in euro higher than the one frozen at the time of the customer purchase order. The claim, unsupported, was dismissed. Following the final disclosure, the Hitit Group claimed that, should the Commission stick to its approach, it should then account for domestic inflation when establishing domestic prices. In the absence of any concrete proposal on how to proceed, the Commission dismissed the claim. |
| --- | --- |

(252)

Following the final disclosure, several parties complained that the above methodology artificially depressed export prices (increasing thus artificially dumping margins) and asked the Commission to consider that the material terms of sale were settled by the date of the invoice. Given the undeniable exchange rate fluctuation of the Turkish Lira against the Euro during the investigation period, the Commission deemed it unjustified to consider that the Union customer paid a price in euro higher than the one frozen at the time of the customer purchase order. The claim, unsupported, was dismissed. Following the final disclosure, the Hitit Group claimed that, should the Commission stick to its approach, it should then account for domestic inflation when establishing domestic prices. In the absence of any concrete proposal on how to proceed, the Commission dismissed the claim.

3.2.5.   Dumping margins

Dumping margins

| (253) | For the sampled cooperating exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(253)

For the sampled cooperating exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

| (254) | Following final disclosure, the Vitra Group put forward calculation errors under the sections above. The Commission corrected those errors. The correction resulting in a definitive dumping margin below de minimis for the Vitra Group. |
| --- | --- |

(254)

Following final disclosure, the Vitra Group put forward calculation errors under the sections above. The Commission corrected those errors. The correction resulting in a definitive dumping margin below de minimis for the Vitra Group.

de minimis

| (255) | On this basis, the definitive weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:






  Company | Definitive dumping margin |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | 20,9 % |
| Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.
  Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş. | 4,8 % |
| Vitra Karo Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | 0 % |

(255)

On this basis, the definitive weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company

Definitive dumping margin

Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

20,9 %

Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.

Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.

4,8 %

Vitra Karo Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

0 %

| (256) | For the non-sampled cooperating exporting producers, the Commission calculated the weighted average dumping margin, in accordance with Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, that margin was established on the basis of the weighted average margins of the sampled exporting producers, at 9,2 %. |
| --- | --- |

(256)

For the non-sampled cooperating exporting producers, the Commission calculated the weighted average dumping margin, in accordance with Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, that margin was established on the basis of the weighted average margins of the sampled exporting producers, at 9,2 %.

| (257) | For all other exporting producers in Türkiye, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers to the Union expressed as proportion of the total imports from the country concerned to the Union in the investigation period, that were established on the basis of import statistics from Eurostat (Comext). |
| --- | --- |

(257)

For all other exporting producers in Türkiye, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers to the Union expressed as proportion of the total imports from the country concerned to the Union in the investigation period, that were established on the basis of import statistics from Eurostat (Comext).

| (258) | The level of cooperation in this case is high because the exports of the cooperating exporting producers constituted around 90 % of the total imports in m2 during the investigation period. On this basis, the Commission found it appropriate to establish the dumping margin for non-cooperating exporting producers at the level of the sampled company with the highest dumping margin. |
| --- | --- |

(258)

The level of cooperation in this case is high because the exports of the cooperating exporting producers constituted around 90 % of the total imports in m2 during the investigation period. On this basis, the Commission found it appropriate to establish the dumping margin for non-cooperating exporting producers at the level of the sampled company with the highest dumping margin.

2

| (259) | The definitive dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:






  Company | Definitive dumping margin |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | 20,9 % |
| Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş. Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş. | 4,8 % |
| Vitra Karo Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | 0 % |
| Other cooperating companies | 9,2 % |
| All other companies | 20,9 % |

(259)

The definitive dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company

Definitive dumping margin

Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

20,9 %

Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş. Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.

4,8 %

Vitra Karo Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

0 %

Other cooperating companies

9,2 %

All other companies

20,9 %

| (260) | Several parties contested the high dumping margin established for non-sampled exporting producers and called for a reduction of its level via, for instance, ignoring the sampled company with the highest dumping margin, claimed to be unrepresentative. Following the additional partial disclosure, several parties added that establishing the duty for cooperating companies on the basis of findings for the two remaining exporting producers, which together accounted for less than 25% of total Turkish imports, was unfair, unobjective and/or contrary to the general principle of law of proportionality. Some parties stated that the fact that the basic Regulation read that the dumping margin for cooperating parties “shall not exceed” the weighted average dumping established with respect to the sampled parties gave the Commission the discretion to set their duty at a level lower level that the weighted average dumping established with respect to the sampled parties. In this respect, a party proposed a duty of 4,58 % for cooperating companies, i.e. an alternative calculation based on the weight of the two remaining exporters in the sample. The Commission recalled that it had established the duty rate for cooperating non-sampled exporting producers in light with its standard practice and according to the provisions in Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation and that it had no indication that the rate thus calculated was unrepresentative. The claim was therefore dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

(260)

Several parties contested the high dumping margin established for non-sampled exporting producers and called for a reduction of its level via, for instance, ignoring the sampled company with the highest dumping margin, claimed to be unrepresentative. Following the additional partial disclosure, several parties added that establishing the duty for cooperating companies on the basis of findings for the two remaining exporting producers, which together accounted for less than 25% of total Turkish imports, was unfair, unobjective and/or contrary to the general principle of law of proportionality. Some parties stated that the fact that the basic Regulation read that the dumping margin for cooperating parties “shall not exceed” the weighted average dumping established with respect to the sampled parties gave the Commission the discretion to set their duty at a level lower level that the weighted average dumping established with respect to the sampled parties. In this respect, a party proposed a duty of 4,58 % for cooperating companies, i.e. an alternative calculation based on the weight of the two remaining exporters in the sample. The Commission recalled that it had established the duty rate for cooperating non-sampled exporting producers in light with its standard practice and according to the provisions in Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation and that it had no indication that the rate thus calculated was unrepresentative. The claim was therefore dismissed.

| (261) | The GOT contested the high dumping margins established as compared to other anti-dumping investigations against Türkiye. The Commission recalled that it has established the duty rates on an objective basis, according to the provisions in the basic Regulation. The claim was therefore dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

(261)

The GOT contested the high dumping margins established as compared to other anti-dumping investigations against Türkiye. The Commission recalled that it has established the duty rates on an objective basis, according to the provisions in the basic Regulation. The claim was therefore dismissed.

4.   INJURY

INJURY

4.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

Definition of the Union industry and Union production

| (262) | As mentioned in recital (59), the ceramic tiles industry in the Union is highly fragmented. The like product was manufactured by over 300 producers in the Union during the investigation period. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(262)

As mentioned in recital (59), the ceramic tiles industry in the Union is highly fragmented. The like product was manufactured by over 300 producers in the Union during the investigation period. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

| (263) | As further mentioned in recitals (59) and (60), the Union industry was divided into three categories of producers based on their annual production volume: small, medium-sized and large. Large producers represented approximately half of the total Union production (see recital (306)). |
| --- | --- |

(263)

As further mentioned in recitals (59) and (60), the Union industry was divided into three categories of producers based on their annual production volume: small, medium-sized and large. Large producers represented approximately half of the total Union production (see recital (306)).

| (264) | The total Union production during the investigation period was established at around 1,2 billion m2. The Commission based the production figure on verified information provided by CET. CET collected production volumes from its individual members and national associations. Where such information was not available, CET supplemented the production statistics with data from PRODCOM (21), which where necessary were extrapolated for the first half of 2021 using the manufacturing index published by Eurostat (22). |
| --- | --- |

(264)

The total Union production during the investigation period was established at around 1,2 billion m2. The Commission based the production figure on verified information provided by CET. CET collected production volumes from its individual members and national associations. Where such information was not available, CET supplemented the production statistics with data from PRODCOM (21), which where necessary were extrapolated for the first half of 2021 using the manufacturing index published by Eurostat (22).

2

21

22

| (265) | As indicated in recital (67), the six sampled Union producers represented 6 % of the total Union production of the like product. |
| --- | --- |

(265)

As indicated in recital (67), the six sampled Union producers represented 6 % of the total Union production of the like product.

| (266) | Netto and Cortina provided numerous submissions throughout the investigation arguing against the existence of injury, dumping and Union interest in connection with Indian exports into the Union. These are addressed below. Furthermore, they claimed to be Union producers, labelling themselves the “Manufacturers from Białystok”. However, the investigation revealed that none of these companies had manufacturing activity in the Union; they imported ceramic tiles from their business partners in India. Therefore, they could not be considered part of the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(266)

Netto and Cortina provided numerous submissions throughout the investigation arguing against the existence of injury, dumping and Union interest in connection with Indian exports into the Union. These are addressed below. Furthermore, they claimed to be Union producers, labelling themselves the “Manufacturers from Białystok”. However, the investigation revealed that none of these companies had manufacturing activity in the Union; they imported ceramic tiles from their business partners in India. Therefore, they could not be considered part of the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

4.2.   Union consumption

Union consumption

| (267) | The Commission established the Union consumption by adding the sales of the Union industry, established on the basis of verified information as provided by CET, and the import volumes. The information on import volumes was sourced from Eurostat (Comext database). |
| --- | --- |

(267)

The Commission established the Union consumption by adding the sales of the Union industry, established on the basis of verified information as provided by CET, and the import volumes. The information on import volumes was sourced from Eurostat (Comext database).

| (268) | Union consumption developed as follows:

  Table 1


  Union consumption (m2) | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Investigation period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Total Union consumption | 785 188 575 | 811 717 138 | 814 739 259 | 834 201 394 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 103 | 104 | 106 |
| Source: CET, Eurostat, sampled Union producers |

(268)

Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 1

Table 1

Union consumption (m2)

Union consumption (m2

2018

2019

2020

Investigation period

Total Union consumption

785 188 575

811 717 138

814 739 259

834 201 394

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

103

103

104

104

106

106

Source: CET, Eurostat, sampled Union producers

Source:

| (269) | In the period considered, the Union consumption grew continuously. In the investigation period, it was 6 % higher than in 2018. The increase in the Union consumption was served mainly by imports. |
| --- | --- |

(269)

In the period considered, the Union consumption grew continuously. In the investigation period, it was 6 % higher than in 2018. The increase in the Union consumption was served mainly by imports.

4.3.   Imports from the countries concerned

Imports from the countries concerned

4.3.1.   Cumulative assessment of the effects of imports from the countries concerned

Cumulative assessment of the effects of imports from the countries concerned

| (270) | The Commission examined whether imports of ceramic tiles originating in the countries concerned should be assessed cumulatively, in accordance with Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(270)

The Commission examined whether imports of ceramic tiles originating in the countries concerned should be assessed cumulatively, in accordance with Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation.

| (271) | Save for the Lavish Group and the Vitra Group, the margins of dumping established in relation to the imports from India and Türkiye were above the de minimis threshold laid down in Article 9(3) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(271)

Save for the Lavish Group and the Vitra Group, the margins of dumping established in relation to the imports from India and Türkiye were above the de minimis threshold laid down in Article 9(3) of the basic Regulation.

de minimis

| (272) | The volume of non-dumped imports from the Lavish Group amounted to [6 – 9 %] of total imports from India in the investigation period, and around [40 – 45 %] of sampled imports. To establish whether the findings with regard to this company could be extended to all non-sampled imports, the Commission compared the prices of the Lavish Group to prices from the other two sampled exporting producers, non-sampled cooperating exporting producers and the average price of all Indian imports (excluding Lavish) from Eurostat. Based on the information submitted in the sampling forms, the Lavish Group’s average export price was [19 – 22 %] higher than the average export price of the more than 140 Indian exporters that submitted sampling replies. The total export volume of those companies accounted for 84% of all imports from India into the Union (see recital (207)). The group’s CIF export price was [7 – 9 %] higher than the average CIF price of all imports from India and [14 – 16 %] higher than those of the other two sampled exporting producers. Therefore, the Commission considered that it could not extend the findings of absence of dumping regarding the Lavish Group to the non-sampled exporting producers. |
| --- | --- |

(272)

The volume of non-dumped imports from the Lavish Group amounted to [6 – 9 %] of total imports from India in the investigation period, and around [40 – 45 %] of sampled imports. To establish whether the findings with regard to this company could be extended to all non-sampled imports, the Commission compared the prices of the Lavish Group to prices from the other two sampled exporting producers, non-sampled cooperating exporting producers and the average price of all Indian imports (excluding Lavish) from Eurostat. Based on the information submitted in the sampling forms, the Lavish Group’s average export price was [19 – 22 %] higher than the average export price of the more than 140 Indian exporters that submitted sampling replies. The total export volume of those companies accounted for 84% of all imports from India into the Union (see recital (207)). The group’s CIF export price was [7 – 9 %] higher than the average CIF price of all imports from India and [14 – 16 %] higher than those of the other two sampled exporting producers. Therefore, the Commission considered that it could not extend the findings of absence of dumping regarding the Lavish Group to the non-sampled exporting producers.

| (273) | The volume of non-dumped imports from the Vitra Group amounted to over 25 % of total imports from Türkiye in the investigation period, and over half of sampled imports. To establish whether the findings with regard to this company could be extended to all non-sampled imports, the Commission compared the prices of the Vitra Group to the weighted average price of non-sampled cooperating exporting producers as reported in the sampling form. On this basis, the Vitra Group’s average export price was [18 – 20 %] higher than the average export price of 70 % of the volumes sold by non-sampled Turkish exporters that submitted sampling replies, for which the Commission had no normal value findings. The total export volume of the companies that submitted sampling replies accounted for around 90 % of all imports from Türkiye into the Union (see recital (258)). Therefore, the Commission considered that it could not extend the findings of absence of dumping regarding the Vitra Group to the non-sampled exporting producers. Following the additional partial disclosure, the GOT and some cooperating exporters contested this conclusion. Some Turkish cooperating exporters asked the Commission to extend the findings of absence of dumping regarding the Vitra Group to them (on the grounds that their sampling replies showed export prices equal or higher than those of the Vitra Group) and/or to non-sampled exporting producers. The Commission dismissed their claims on the grounds explained in section 3.2.5. |
| --- | --- |

(273)

The volume of non-dumped imports from the Vitra Group amounted to over 25 % of total imports from Türkiye in the investigation period, and over half of sampled imports. To establish whether the findings with regard to this company could be extended to all non-sampled imports, the Commission compared the prices of the Vitra Group to the weighted average price of non-sampled cooperating exporting producers as reported in the sampling form. On this basis, the Vitra Group’s average export price was [18 – 20 %] higher than the average export price of 70 % of the volumes sold by non-sampled Turkish exporters that submitted sampling replies, for which the Commission had no normal value findings. The total export volume of the companies that submitted sampling replies accounted for around 90 % of all imports from Türkiye into the Union (see recital (258)). Therefore, the Commission considered that it could not extend the findings of absence of dumping regarding the Vitra Group to the non-sampled exporting producers. Following the additional partial disclosure, the GOT and some cooperating exporters contested this conclusion. Some Turkish cooperating exporters asked the Commission to extend the findings of absence of dumping regarding the Vitra Group to them (on the grounds that their sampling replies showed export prices equal or higher than those of the Vitra Group) and/or to non-sampled exporting producers. The Commission dismissed their claims on the grounds explained in section 3.2.5.

| (274) | The volume of imports from each of the countries concerned, excluding the volume of non-dumped imports from the Lavish Group and the Vitra Group, was not negligible within the meaning of Article 5(7) of the basic Regulation. Market shares in the investigation period were [3,5 – 3,6 %] for India and [4,6 – 4,7 %] for Türkiye (23). |
| --- | --- |

(274)

The volume of imports from each of the countries concerned, excluding the volume of non-dumped imports from the Lavish Group and the Vitra Group, was not negligible within the meaning of Article 5(7) of the basic Regulation. Market shares in the investigation period were [3,5 – 3,6 %] for India and [4,6 – 4,7 %] for Türkiye (23).

23

| (275) | The conditions of competition between the dumped imports from India and Türkiye and between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the like product were similar. More specifically, the imported products competed with each other and with the ceramic tiles produced in the Union because they were sold through the same sales channels and to similar categories of customers. |
| --- | --- |

(275)

The conditions of competition between the dumped imports from India and Türkiye and between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the like product were similar. More specifically, the imported products competed with each other and with the ceramic tiles produced in the Union because they were sold through the same sales channels and to similar categories of customers.

| (276) | Therefore, all the criteria set out in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation were met and imports from India and Türkiye were examined cumulatively for the purposes of the injury determination. |
| --- | --- |

(276)

Therefore, all the criteria set out in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation were met and imports from India and Türkiye were examined cumulatively for the purposes of the injury determination.

| (277) | Following final disclosure, sixteen Indian exporting producers claimed that the cumulative assessment of imports from the countries concerned put India into a disadvantageous position. They pointed out that the prices of Indian imports grew over the period considered while the prices of Turkish imports decreased. The companies further submitted that the increased imports from India only supplemented the insufficient production volume by Union producers. Consequently, they claimed that by cumulating with Türkiye, the effects of Indian imports were overestimated. Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoI also opposed the cumulative assessment and recalled the criteria that allowed for cumulation. |
| --- | --- |

(277)

Following final disclosure, sixteen Indian exporting producers claimed that the cumulative assessment of imports from the countries concerned put India into a disadvantageous position. They pointed out that the prices of Indian imports grew over the period considered while the prices of Turkish imports decreased. The companies further submitted that the increased imports from India only supplemented the insufficient production volume by Union producers. Consequently, they claimed that by cumulating with Türkiye, the effects of Indian imports were overestimated. Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoI also opposed the cumulative assessment and recalled the criteria that allowed for cumulation.

| (278) | The Commission recalled that the volume of Indian imports more than doubled in the period considered. In view of a capacity utilisation, which would have allowed the Union industry to increase their production volume to satisfy the demand in the Union market, the Commission considered that the argument of insufficient production volumes by Union producers was not justified. Furthermore, while the Indian import price rose, it remained below the level of the Turkish import price. Finally, the Commission noted that all criteria laid down by Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation were met in this proceeding. With regard to the GoI’s statement, the Commission recalled that the criteria for cumulation were met as discussed in detail in recitals (271) to (276). Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim. |
| --- | --- |

(278)

The Commission recalled that the volume of Indian imports more than doubled in the period considered. In view of a capacity utilisation, which would have allowed the Union industry to increase their production volume to satisfy the demand in the Union market, the Commission considered that the argument of insufficient production volumes by Union producers was not justified. Furthermore, while the Indian import price rose, it remained below the level of the Turkish import price. Finally, the Commission noted that all criteria laid down by Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation were met in this proceeding. With regard to the GoI’s statement, the Commission recalled that the criteria for cumulation were met as discussed in detail in recitals (271) to (276). Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim.

4.3.2.   Volume and market share of the imports from the countries concerned

Volume and market share of the imports from the countries concerned

| (279) | The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Comext data. The market share of the imports was established by comparing those imports to the Union consumption determined in line with the explanation described in recital (267). |
| --- | --- |

(279)

The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Comext data. The market share of the imports was established by comparing those imports to the Union consumption determined in line with the explanation described in recital (267).

| (280) | Imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

  Table 2


  Import volume (m2) and market share | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Investigation period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| India – import volume | [13 000 000 – 14 000 000 ] | [17 000 000 – 18 000 000 ] | [22 000 000 – 23 000 000 ] | [29 000 000 – 30 000 000 ] |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 134 | 167 | 220 |
| India – market share | [1,7 – 1,8  %] | [2,2 – 2,3  %] | [2,7 – 2,8  %] | [3,5 – 3,6  %] |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 130 | 161 | 207 |
| Türkiye – import volume | [26 000 000 -27 000 000 ] | [31 000 000 – 32 000 000 ] | [35 000 000 – 36 000 000 ] | [38 000 000 – 39 000 000 ] |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 118 | 135 | 147 |
| Türkiye – market share | [3,3 – 3,4 %] | [3,8 – 3,9 %] | [4,4 – 4,5 %] | [4,6 – 4,7 %] |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 115 | 130 | 138 |
| Total countries concerned – import volume | [39 000 000 – 41 000 000 ] | 48 000 000 – 50 000 000 ] | [57 000 000 – 59 000 000 ] | [67 000 000 – 69 000 000 ] |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 124 | 146 | 172 |
| Total countries concerned – market share | [5 - 5,2 %] | [6 – 6,2 %] | [7,1 – 7,3 %] | [8,1 – 8,3 %] |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 120 | 141 | 161 |
| Source: Eurostat, sampled exporting producers |

(280)

Imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 2

Table 2

Import volume (m2) and market share

Import volume (m2

2018

2019

2020

Investigation period

India – import volume

[13 000 000 – 14 000 000 ]

[17 000 000 – 18 000 000 ]

[22 000 000 – 23 000 000 ]

[29 000 000 – 30 000 000 ]

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

134

134

167

167

220

220

India – market share

[1,7 – 1,8  %]

[2,2 – 2,3  %]

[2,7 – 2,8  %]

[3,5 – 3,6  %]

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

130

130

161

161

207

207

Türkiye – import volume

[26 000 000 -27 000 000 ]

[31 000 000 – 32 000 000 ]

[35 000 000 – 36 000 000 ]

[38 000 000 – 39 000 000 ]

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

118

118

135

135

147

147

Türkiye – market share

[3,3 – 3,4 %]

[3,8 – 3,9 %]

[4,4 – 4,5 %]

[4,6 – 4,7 %]

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

115

115

130

130

138

138

Total countries concerned – import volume

[39 000 000 – 41 000 000 ]

48 000 000 – 50 000 000 ]

[57 000 000 – 59 000 000 ]

[67 000 000 – 69 000 000 ]

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

124

124

146

146

172

172

Total countries concerned – market share

[5 - 5,2 %]

[6 – 6,2 %]

[7,1 – 7,3 %]

[8,1 – 8,3 %]

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

120

120

141

141

161

161

Source: Eurostat, sampled exporting producers

Source:

| (281) | Imports from the countries concerned as well as their market share increased steadily over the period considered. Imports from the countries concerned increased by 72 %, which translated into an increase of their market share by 61 %. The Union market share of imports from the countries concerned was [8,1 – 8,3 %] during the investigation period, from [5 – 5,2 %] in 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(281)

Imports from the countries concerned as well as their market share increased steadily over the period considered. Imports from the countries concerned increased by 72 %, which translated into an increase of their market share by 61 %. The Union market share of imports from the countries concerned was [8,1 – 8,3 %] during the investigation period, from [5 – 5,2 %] in 2018.

| (282) | Following final disclosure, the GoT argued that the increase in Turkish imports was of temporary nature and the additional imports merely replaced Union products as the Union production was temporarily interrupted due to the Covid-19-related sanitary measures adopted by the Member States. To support this claim, the GoT compared the volume of exports to the Union in first ten months of 2021 with the same period of 2022. The Turkish exports of ceramic tiles to the Union dropped by approximately 3,5 million m2. The GoT and Sogutsen Seramik reiterated this claim in their comments on the additional partial disclosure. |
| --- | --- |

(282)

Following final disclosure, the GoT argued that the increase in Turkish imports was of temporary nature and the additional imports merely replaced Union products as the Union production was temporarily interrupted due to the Covid-19-related sanitary measures adopted by the Member States. To support this claim, the GoT compared the volume of exports to the Union in first ten months of 2021 with the same period of 2022. The Turkish exports of ceramic tiles to the Union dropped by approximately 3,5 million m2. The GoT and Sogutsen Seramik reiterated this claim in their comments on the additional partial disclosure.

2

| (283) | In this respect, the Commission noted that imports from Türkiye increased continuously throughout the whole period considered while only 2020 was affected by the temporary interruption in the production by Union producers. In addition, the closing stock levels of the Union industry at the end of 2019 were more than sufficient to replace the reduction in production volumes. Finally, increasing Turkish exports of ceramic tiles did not respond to an increasing demand in the Union that could not be served by the Union producers. Rather, the Turkish ceramic tiles industry was under pressure of contracting domestic consumption of tiles during the period considered thus pushing for exports at what it described as competitive prices (24). The reduction in exports to the Union in 2022 could not be accepted as a proof of the GoT’s claims as the exports to the Union might have dropped as a consequence of the ongoing investigation. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim. |
| --- | --- |

(283)

In this respect, the Commission noted that imports from Türkiye increased continuously throughout the whole period considered while only 2020 was affected by the temporary interruption in the production by Union producers. In addition, the closing stock levels of the Union industry at the end of 2019 were more than sufficient to replace the reduction in production volumes. Finally, increasing Turkish exports of ceramic tiles did not respond to an increasing demand in the Union that could not be served by the Union producers. Rather, the Turkish ceramic tiles industry was under pressure of contracting domestic consumption of tiles during the period considered thus pushing for exports at what it described as competitive prices (24). The reduction in exports to the Union in 2022 could not be accepted as a proof of the GoT’s claims as the exports to the Union might have dropped as a consequence of the ongoing investigation. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim.

24

| (284) | The GoT also claimed that the percentage change in the market share between 2018 and the IP only appeared to be high (+42 %) because the market share of Turkish imports was low in the base year. |
| --- | --- |

(284)

The GoT also claimed that the percentage change in the market share between 2018 and the IP only appeared to be high (+42 %) because the market share of Turkish imports was low in the base year.

| (285) | First, the Commission noted that the evolution of the market share of dumped Turkish imports changed as the Vitra Group was found not to have been dumping after final disclosure. After excluding those volumes, the percentage change in market share of Türkiye amounted to 38%, constituting a significant increase of dumped imports. This increase in the market share is a fact established by the investigation, reflecting the actual change that took place. The Commission disagrees however that the market share of Türkiye was low in the base year. Throughout the period considered, Türkiye was the first third country supplier of the Union, constituting one third of all imports. The increase in terms of volume, amounting to around 12 000 000 square metres that were found to be dumped, was significant and had an impact in the performance of the Union industry. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim. |
| --- | --- |

(285)

First, the Commission noted that the evolution of the market share of dumped Turkish imports changed as the Vitra Group was found not to have been dumping after final disclosure. After excluding those volumes, the percentage change in market share of Türkiye amounted to 38%, constituting a significant increase of dumped imports. This increase in the market share is a fact established by the investigation, reflecting the actual change that took place. The Commission disagrees however that the market share of Türkiye was low in the base year. Throughout the period considered, Türkiye was the first third country supplier of the Union, constituting one third of all imports. The increase in terms of volume, amounting to around 12 000 000 square metres that were found to be dumped, was significant and had an impact in the performance of the Union industry. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim.

| (286) | Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoT noted that the Turkish imports and their market share grew at a slower pace during the period considered after the Vitra Group was found not dumping. The GoT argued that the reduced market share of [4,6 – 4,7] % could not be considered injurious to the Union industry. Similarly, the GoI argued that the import volumes following the exclusion of the Vitra Group were too low to cause injury. |
| --- | --- |

(286)

Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoT noted that the Turkish imports and their market share grew at a slower pace during the period considered after the Vitra Group was found not dumping. The GoT argued that the reduced market share of [4,6 – 4,7] % could not be considered injurious to the Union industry. Similarly, the GoI argued that the import volumes following the exclusion of the Vitra Group were too low to cause injury.

| (287) | The Commission recalled that the import volumes and their market share must be examined cumulatively for both countries concerned. The Commission considered that the market share of [8,1 – 8,3] %, which reflects dumped imports from the countries concerned, was sufficient to cause injury in the present case, in particular taking into account the structure of the Union industry and its fragmentation. |
| --- | --- |

(287)

The Commission recalled that the import volumes and their market share must be examined cumulatively for both countries concerned. The Commission considered that the market share of [8,1 – 8,3] %, which reflects dumped imports from the countries concerned, was sufficient to cause injury in the present case, in particular taking into account the structure of the Union industry and its fragmentation.

4.3.3.   Prices of the imports from the countries concerned: price undercutting/price suppression

| (288) | The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat (Comext database). The verified values (at CIF level) and volumes of imports from the Lavish Group and the Vitra Group were deducted from the imports from India and Türkiye respectively for the purpose of this exercise. |
| --- | --- |

(288)

The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat (Comext database). The verified values (at CIF level) and volumes of imports from the Lavish Group and the Vitra Group were deducted from the imports from India and Türkiye respectively for the purpose of this exercise.

| (289) | The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

  Table 3


  Import prices (EUR/m2) | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Investigation period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| India | 4,35 | 4,79 | 5,12 | 5,49 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 110 | 118 | 126 |
| Türkiye | 6,63 | 6,08 | 5,97 | 5,94 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 92 | 90 | 90 |
| Total countries concerned | 5,86 | 5,61 | 5,64 | 5,75 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 96 | 96 | 98 |
| Source: Eurostat, sampled exporting producers |

(289)

The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Table 3

Import prices (EUR/m2)

Import prices (EUR/m2

2018

2019

2020

Investigation period

India

4,35

4,79

5,12

5,49

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

110

110

118

118

126

126

Türkiye

6,63

6,08

5,97

5,94

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

92

92

90

90

90

90

Total countries concerned

5,86

5,61

5,64

5,75

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

96

96

96

96

98

98

Source: Eurostat, sampled exporting producers

Source:

| (290) | The average import prices from the two countries concerned together remained stable over the period considered. The average import prices from Türkiye dropped by 10 % between 2018 and the investigation period, while the average import prices from India grew continuously and increased by 26 % between 2018 and the investigation period. The import prices from both countries were significantly lower than the prices and the cost of production of the sampled Union producers throughout the period considered (see table 7). |
| --- | --- |

(290)

The average import prices from the two countries concerned together remained stable over the period considered. The average import prices from Türkiye dropped by 10 % between 2018 and the investigation period, while the average import prices from India grew continuously and increased by 26 % between 2018 and the investigation period. The import prices from both countries were significantly lower than the prices and the cost of production of the sampled Union producers throughout the period considered (see table 7).

| (291) | The Commission determined the price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing:






  (1) | the weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(291)

The Commission determined the price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing:

(1)

the weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and

| (2) | the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the sampled exporting producers from India and Türkiye to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a cost, insurance, freight (‘CIF’) basis, with appropriate adjustments for customs duties and post-importation costs. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the sampled exporting producers from India and Türkiye to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a cost, insurance, freight (‘CIF’) basis, with appropriate adjustments for customs duties and post-importation costs.

| (292) | The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary, and after deduction of rebates and discounts. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ theoretical turnover during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(292)

The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary, and after deduction of rebates and discounts. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ theoretical turnover during the investigation period.

| (293) | The above comparison showed a weighted average undercutting margin on the Union market of between 42,5 % and 54,7 % for India and 33,8 % and 57,7 % for Türkiye, depending on the exporting producer. Competition for ceramic tiles is largely driven by prices, thus the undercutting margins are very significant. The Commission further noted that a minority of the Union industry’s sales were made through related parties and that, given the level of the SG&A expenses and profit of those related parties, the finding of undercutting for the cumulated imports would not be undermined even if the calculations had to be adjusted for those factors. Moreover, when excluding from that calculation the Union industry sales through related parties, which amounted to less than 25%, there was still significant undercutting, between 36 % and 54,7 % for India and 19,9 % to 61,7 % for Türkiye. Indeed, all Indian sampled cooperating exporters sold directly to the Union, and almost half of the imports made by the sampled cooperating exporters in Türkiye were also direct sales. Thus, under any alternative method, undercutting would remain significant. |
| --- | --- |

(293)

The above comparison showed a weighted average undercutting margin on the Union market of between 42,5 % and 54,7 % for India and 33,8 % and 57,7 % for Türkiye, depending on the exporting producer. Competition for ceramic tiles is largely driven by prices, thus the undercutting margins are very significant. The Commission further noted that a minority of the Union industry’s sales were made through related parties and that, given the level of the SG&A expenses and profit of those related parties, the finding of undercutting for the cumulated imports would not be undermined even if the calculations had to be adjusted for those factors. Moreover, when excluding from that calculation the Union industry sales through related parties, which amounted to less than 25%, there was still significant undercutting, between 36 % and 54,7 % for India and 19,9 % to 61,7 % for Türkiye. Indeed, all Indian sampled cooperating exporters sold directly to the Union, and almost half of the imports made by the sampled cooperating exporters in Türkiye were also direct sales. Thus, under any alternative method, undercutting would remain significant.

| (294) | In addition, regardless of the findings about significant undercutting, the Commission found that because of the price suppression caused by the volumes and low prices of imports from India and Türkiye, the Union industry was unable to increase their prices to a level that would generate reasonable profits. The average price of imports from the countries concerned was below the cost of the sampled Union producers throughout the period considered (see table 3 in recital (289) and table 7 in recital (320)). Although the average sale price of the Union producers on the Union market increased by 19 % between 2018 and the IP, it remained below the cost of production throughout the period considered (see table 7 in recital (320)). |
| --- | --- |

(294)

In addition, regardless of the findings about significant undercutting, the Commission found that because of the price suppression caused by the volumes and low prices of imports from India and Türkiye, the Union industry was unable to increase their prices to a level that would generate reasonable profits. The average price of imports from the countries concerned was below the cost of the sampled Union producers throughout the period considered (see table 3 in recital (289) and table 7 in recital (320)). Although the average sale price of the Union producers on the Union market increased by 19 % between 2018 and the IP, it remained below the cost of production throughout the period considered (see table 7 in recital (320)).

| (295) | The price suppression found at macro level was further confirmed by findings at company level. The injury elimination levels were determined per product type thus taking into account any potential differences between the product mix of imports and domestic sales of the Union industry. In the investigation period, the imports from the sampled exporting producers were underselling the domestic sales prices of the sampled Union producers by 92,7% to 168,7% with regard to India and by 80,8% to 150,6 % with regard to Türkiye (for details see section 6.1). |
| --- | --- |

(295)

The price suppression found at macro level was further confirmed by findings at company level. The injury elimination levels were determined per product type thus taking into account any potential differences between the product mix of imports and domestic sales of the Union industry. In the investigation period, the imports from the sampled exporting producers were underselling the domestic sales prices of the sampled Union producers by 92,7% to 168,7% with regard to India and by 80,8% to 150,6 % with regard to Türkiye (for details see section 6.1).

| (296) | Following final disclosure, the GoT pointed out that not only the import prices from Türkiye were below the cost of production of the Union producers but also the Union producers’ own prices in the Union market were lower than the cost of production. In addition, while the Turkish import price decreased during the period considered, the Union producers’ domestic price increased leading to improved profitability. In this respect, the GoT repeated its accusations of the Commission having manipulated the sample of Union producers towards companies with higher cost and worse financial indicators. Moreover, the GoT argued that companies included in the small producer category were boutique firms serving high-end market and working on tailor-made basis. |
| --- | --- |

(296)

Following final disclosure, the GoT pointed out that not only the import prices from Türkiye were below the cost of production of the Union producers but also the Union producers’ own prices in the Union market were lower than the cost of production. In addition, while the Turkish import price decreased during the period considered, the Union producers’ domestic price increased leading to improved profitability. In this respect, the GoT repeated its accusations of the Commission having manipulated the sample of Union producers towards companies with higher cost and worse financial indicators. Moreover, the GoT argued that companies included in the small producer category were boutique firms serving high-end market and working on tailor-made basis.

| (297) | The GoT reiterated its issues with the representativity of the Union producers’ sample and its effect on the comparison of prices after the additional partial disclosure. |
| --- | --- |

(297)

The GoT reiterated its issues with the representativity of the Union producers’ sample and its effect on the comparison of prices after the additional partial disclosure.

| (298) | First, the Commission noted that the import prices from countries concerned must be examined on a cumulative basis, not individually. The average import price established on such basis remained rather stable, and significantly below the Union industry’s cost of production, over the period considered. The Union industry was pressured to navigate between extremely low import prices from the countries concerned and increasing cost of production. Although its domestic prices increased, the Union industry was not able to achieve a sustainable level of profit, barely breaking even in the IP. |
| --- | --- |

(298)

First, the Commission noted that the import prices from countries concerned must be examined on a cumulative basis, not individually. The average import price established on such basis remained rather stable, and significantly below the Union industry’s cost of production, over the period considered. The Union industry was pressured to navigate between extremely low import prices from the countries concerned and increasing cost of production. Although its domestic prices increased, the Union industry was not able to achieve a sustainable level of profit, barely breaking even in the IP.

| (299) | Second, the Commission recalled that the sample was selected based on objective criteria as described in recital (72) and (73). Producers sampled in the small producer category were companies offering collections of ceramic tiles to a wide range of customers, including to general public. |
| --- | --- |

(299)

Second, the Commission recalled that the sample was selected based on objective criteria as described in recital (72) and (73). Producers sampled in the small producer category were companies offering collections of ceramic tiles to a wide range of customers, including to general public.

| (300) | Consequently, the Commission rejected all claims concerning price undercutting and price suppression. |
| --- | --- |

(300)

Consequently, the Commission rejected all claims concerning price undercutting and price suppression.

4.4.   Economic situation of the Union industry

Economic situation of the Union industry

4.4.1.   General remarks

General remarks

| (301) | In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(301)

In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

| (302) | As mentioned in section 1.4.1, sampling was used for the determination of possible injury suffered by the Union industry from the imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye. |
| --- | --- |

(302)

As mentioned in section 1.4.1, sampling was used for the determination of possible injury suffered by the Union industry from the imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye.

| (303) | For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire reply of CET relating to all Union producers, crosschecked where necessary with trade statistics available in Eurostat and the questionnaires from the sampled Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the six sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were duly verified or remotely crosschecked and found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(303)

For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire reply of CET relating to all Union producers, crosschecked where necessary with trade statistics available in Eurostat and the questionnaires from the sampled Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the six sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were duly verified or remotely crosschecked and found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

| (304) | The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping. |
| --- | --- |

(304)

The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

| (305) | The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital. |
| --- | --- |

(305)

The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

| (306) | Taking into account the fragmentation of the Union industry and the practice established in previous investigations concerning the same product, certain micro-economic indicators in each of the producers’ categories as defined in recital (59) were weighted using their share on the total Union production. As mentioned in recital (60), the structure of the industry has shifted towards large producers. Therefore, the relevant micro-indicators for large, medium-sized and small producers were weighted based on the ratio of 53:19:28, respectively. The weighting of results was used for sales prices, cost of production, profitability and return on investments, i.e. indicators that are not determined by simply adding up the results of the individual sampled Union producers but rather as a percentage or an average unit value, as well as for the average export price to unrelated customers of the sampled Union producers. The weighting ensured that the results of large producers were not overrepresented in the findings on injury and that the situation of small and medium-sized producers was properly accounted for. |
| --- | --- |

(306)

Taking into account the fragmentation of the Union industry and the practice established in previous investigations concerning the same product, certain micro-economic indicators in each of the producers’ categories as defined in recital (59) were weighted using their share on the total Union production. As mentioned in recital (60), the structure of the industry has shifted towards large producers. Therefore, the relevant micro-indicators for large, medium-sized and small producers were weighted based on the ratio of 53:19:28, respectively. The weighting of results was used for sales prices, cost of production, profitability and return on investments, i.e. indicators that are not determined by simply adding up the results of the individual sampled Union producers but rather as a percentage or an average unit value, as well as for the average export price to unrelated customers of the sampled Union producers. The weighting ensured that the results of large producers were not overrepresented in the findings on injury and that the situation of small and medium-sized producers was properly accounted for.

4.4.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

Macroeconomic indicators

4.4.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

| (307) | The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 4


  Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Investigation period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Production volume (m2) | 1 229 823 662 | 1 197 848 970 | 1 097 490 246 | 1 229 257 050 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 97 | 89 | 100 |
| Production capacity (m2) | 1 455 493 248 | 1 438 233 198 | 1 441 597 966 | 1 440 337 389 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 99 | 99 | 99 |
| Capacity utilisation | 84  % | 83  % | 76  % | 85  % |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 99 | 90 | 101 |
| Source: CET |

(307)

The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 4

Table 4

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

2018

2019

2020

Investigation period

Production volume (m2)

2

1 229 823 662

1 197 848 970

1 097 490 246

1 229 257 050

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

97

97

89

89

100

100

Production capacity (m2)

2

1 455 493 248

1 438 233 198

1 441 597 966

1 440 337 389

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

99

99

99

99

99

99

Capacity utilisation

84  %

83  %

76  %

85  %

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

99

99

90

90

101

101

Source: CET

Source:

| (308) | During the period considered, the production volume, production capacity and capacity utilisation remained rather stable with year 2020 being a single outlier. The drop in production volume and consequently in capacity utilisation in 2020 was caused by the short-term interruptions in production following sanitary measures imposed by the Member States in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. |
| --- | --- |

(308)

During the period considered, the production volume, production capacity and capacity utilisation remained rather stable with year 2020 being a single outlier. The drop in production volume and consequently in capacity utilisation in 2020 was caused by the short-term interruptions in production following sanitary measures imposed by the Member States in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

4.4.2.2   Sales volume and market share

| (309) | The sales of the Union industry were established by subtracting export volumes from production volumes as provided by CET and applying an adjustment accounting for the stock variation. The stock variation adjustment was based on the complaint for years 2018 – 2020. For the investigation period, it was based on company-specific data collected by CET. Production volume was determined as explained in recital (264). The information on export volumes was sourced from Eurostat, and adjusted following evidence provided by CET (25). |
| --- | --- |

(309)

The sales of the Union industry were established by subtracting export volumes from production volumes as provided by CET and applying an adjustment accounting for the stock variation. The stock variation adjustment was based on the complaint for years 2018 – 2020. For the investigation period, it was based on company-specific data collected by CET. Production volume was determined as explained in recital (264). The information on export volumes was sourced from Eurostat, and adjusted following evidence provided by CET (25).

25

| (310) | The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 5


  Sales volume and market share | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Investigation period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sales volume on the Union market (m2) | 707 146 016 | 724 457 535 | 717 890 003 | 726 565 367 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 102 | 102 | 103 |
| Market share | 90,1  % | 89,2  % | 88,1  % | 87,1  % |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 99 | 98 | 97 |
| Source: CET |

(310)

The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 5

Table 5

Sales volume and market share

Sales volume and market share

2018

2019

2020

Investigation period

Sales volume on the Union market (m2)

2

707 146 016

724 457 535

717 890 003

726 565 367

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

102

102

102

102

103

103

Market share

90,1  %

89,2  %

88,1  %

87,1  %

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

99

99

98

98

97

97

Source: CET

Source:

| (311) | The Union industry’s sales volume slightly increased between 2018 and 2019. It remained stable in 2020 in spite of the reduction in the Union industry’s production volume due to sales from stocks (traditionally high in the ceramics industry). Following a recovery in the construction sector in 2021 (26), Union industry’s sales volume slightly increased in the investigation period compared to 2020. |
| --- | --- |

(311)

The Union industry’s sales volume slightly increased between 2018 and 2019. It remained stable in 2020 in spite of the reduction in the Union industry’s production volume due to sales from stocks (traditionally high in the ceramics industry). Following a recovery in the construction sector in 2021 (26), Union industry’s sales volume slightly increased in the investigation period compared to 2020.

26

| (312) | The market share of the Union industry decreased in the period considered, from 90,1 % in 2018 to 87,1 % in the investigation period. The Union industry was not able to take full advantage of the expansion in Union consumption (see recital (268)). |
| --- | --- |

(312)

The market share of the Union industry decreased in the period considered, from 90,1 % in 2018 to 87,1 % in the investigation period. The Union industry was not able to take full advantage of the expansion in Union consumption (see recital (268)).

4.4.2.3.   Growth

| (313) | The Union industry was not able to realise the full potential from growth in the context of a growing Union consumption of ceramic tiles and the post-Covid-19 recovery of the construction market. It retained a rather stable level of production volume and booked only a slight increase in sales on the Union market. |
| --- | --- |

(313)

The Union industry was not able to realise the full potential from growth in the context of a growing Union consumption of ceramic tiles and the post-Covid-19 recovery of the construction market. It retained a rather stable level of production volume and booked only a slight increase in sales on the Union market.

4.4.2.4.   Employment and productivity

| (314) | Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 6


  Employment and productivity | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Investigation period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Number of employees | 55 544 | 55 089 | 54 470 | 54 412 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 99 | 98 | 98 |
| Productivity (m2/employee) | 22 141 | 21 744 | 20 148 | 22 592 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 98 | 91 | 102 |
| Source: CET |

(314)

Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Table 6

Employment and productivity

Employment and productivity

2018

2019

2020

Investigation period

Number of employees

55 544

55 089

54 470

54 412

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

99

99

98

98

98

98

Productivity (m2/employee)

2

22 141

21 744

20 148

22 592

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

98

98

91

91

102

102

Source: CET

Source:

| (315) | Union employment in the ceramic tiles sector had a slightly decreasing trend throughout the whole period considered. The number of employees involved in the ceramic tiles production was reduced by 2 % between 2018 and the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(315)

Union employment in the ceramic tiles sector had a slightly decreasing trend throughout the whole period considered. The number of employees involved in the ceramic tiles production was reduced by 2 % between 2018 and the investigation period.

| (316) | Productivity slightly decreased between 2018 and 2019. It dropped by an additional 7 % in 2020 as a consequence of reduced production due to the Covid-19-related sanitary measures. The recovery of the production volume to its pre-Covid-19 level translated into an increase in productivity by 12 % between 2020 and the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(316)

Productivity slightly decreased between 2018 and 2019. It dropped by an additional 7 % in 2020 as a consequence of reduced production due to the Covid-19-related sanitary measures. The recovery of the production volume to its pre-Covid-19 level translated into an increase in productivity by 12 % between 2020 and the investigation period.

4.4.2.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

| (317) | With the exception of one sampled Indian exporting producer and one sampled Turkish producer, all dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was not negligible, given the volume and prices of imports from the countries concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(317)

With the exception of one sampled Indian exporting producer and one sampled Turkish producer, all dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was not negligible, given the volume and prices of imports from the countries concerned.

de minimis

| (318) | Ceramic tiles have already been subject to anti-dumping investigations. The Commission found that, during the period 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010, the situation of the Union industry was significantly affected by dumped imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’). Provisional measures were imposed on 17 March 2011. (27) Definitive measures were imposed on 15 September 2011. (28) |
| --- | --- |

(318)

Ceramic tiles have already been subject to anti-dumping investigations. The Commission found that, during the period 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010, the situation of the Union industry was significantly affected by dumped imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’). Provisional measures were imposed on 17 March 2011. (27) Definitive measures were imposed on 15 September 2011. (28)

27

28

| (319) | Following an expiry review, the Commission extended the measures on 23 November 2017 (29) based on the likelihood of continuation of dumping and the likelihood of recurrence of injury. The investigation established that the Union industry recovered from past dumping from the PRC due to the measures in place. A second expiry review of these measures was initiated on 22 November 2022 (30). |
| --- | --- |

(319)

Following an expiry review, the Commission extended the measures on 23 November 2017 (29) based on the likelihood of continuation of dumping and the likelihood of recurrence of injury. The investigation established that the Union industry recovered from past dumping from the PRC due to the measures in place. A second expiry review of these measures was initiated on 22 November 2022 (30).

29

30

4.4.3.   Microeconomic indicators

Microeconomic indicators

4.4.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices

| (320) | The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union, and its cost of production, developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 7


  Sales prices and cost of production in the Union | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Investigation period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Average unit sales price in the Union on the total market (EUR/ m2) | 8,84 | 9,42 | 10,44 | 10,52 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 106 | 118 | 119 |
| Unit cost of production (EUR/ m2) | 9,79 | 11,08 | 11,31 | 10,77 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 113 | 116 | 110 |
| Source: | Sampled Union producers |

(320)

The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union, and its cost of production, developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Table 7

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union

2018

2019

2020

Investigation period

Average unit sales price in the Union on the total market (EUR/ m2)

2

8,84

9,42

10,44

10,52

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

106

106

118

118

119

119

Unit cost of production (EUR/ m2)

2

9,79

11,08

11,31

10,77

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

113

113

116

116

110

110

Source:

Source:

Sampled Union producers

| (321) | The average unit sales price grew by 19 % between 2018 and the investigation period. The greatest increase was recorded in 2020. The average unit sales price remained below the unit cost of production throughout the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(321)

The average unit sales price grew by 19 % between 2018 and the investigation period. The greatest increase was recorded in 2020. The average unit sales price remained below the unit cost of production throughout the period considered.

| (322) | Unit cost of production increased by 13 % between 2018 and 2019 and by an additional 3 % in 2020. In the investigation period, unit cost of production decreased in comparison to 2020 but remained above the level of 2018 by 10 %. |
| --- | --- |

(322)

Unit cost of production increased by 13 % between 2018 and 2019 and by an additional 3 % in 2020. In the investigation period, unit cost of production decreased in comparison to 2020 but remained above the level of 2018 by 10 %.

4.4.3.2.   Labour costs

| (323) | The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 8


  Average labour costs per employee | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Investigation period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Average labour costs per employee (EUR) | 37 923 | 39 432 | 37 316 | 39 568 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 104 | 98 | 104 |
| Source: Sampled Union producers |

(323)

The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Table 8

Average labour costs per employee

Average labour costs per employee

2018

2019

2020

Investigation period

Average labour costs per employee (EUR)

37 923

39 432

37 316

39 568

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

104

104

98

98

104

104

Source: Sampled Union producers

Source:

| (324) | Average labour cost per employee grew between 2018 and 2019 by 4 %. In 2020, following the Covid-19-related short-term interruptions of production, the cost decreased by 6 % compared to 2019 only to return to its 2019 level in the investigation period. In the investigation period, average labour cost per employee increased by 4 % in comparison to 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(324)

Average labour cost per employee grew between 2018 and 2019 by 4 %. In 2020, following the Covid-19-related short-term interruptions of production, the cost decreased by 6 % compared to 2019 only to return to its 2019 level in the investigation period. In the investigation period, average labour cost per employee increased by 4 % in comparison to 2018.

4.4.3.3.   Inventories

| (325) | Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 9


  Inventories | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Investigation period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Closing stocks (m2) | 28 561 422 | 27 030 762 | 24 368 066 | 24 436 327 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 95 | 85 | 86 |
| Closing stocks as a percentage of production | 49 % | 51 % | 44 % | 39 % |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 104 | 91 | 79 |
| Source: Sampled Union producers |

(325)

Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Table 9

Inventories

Inventories

2018

2019

2020

Investigation period

Closing stocks (m2)

2

28 561 422

27 030 762

24 368 066

24 436 327

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

95

95

85

85

86

86

Closing stocks as a percentage of production

49 %

51 %

44 %

39 %

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

104

104

91

91

79

79

Source: Sampled Union producers

Source:

| (326) | Closing stock decreased between 2018 and 2019 in absolute terms. Nevertheless, in the same period it increased by 4 % (or 2 percentage points) when expressed as a percentage of production. Due to reduced production volumes and growing demand, the Union industry was able to reduce the volume of closing stock in absolute terms and when expressed as a percentage of production in 2020. As the production volume returned to its 2018 levels and the demand continued growing in the investigation period, closing stock expressed as percentage of production further dropped in the IP. |
| --- | --- |

(326)

Closing stock decreased between 2018 and 2019 in absolute terms. Nevertheless, in the same period it increased by 4 % (or 2 percentage points) when expressed as a percentage of production. Due to reduced production volumes and growing demand, the Union industry was able to reduce the volume of closing stock in absolute terms and when expressed as a percentage of production in 2020. As the production volume returned to its 2018 levels and the demand continued growing in the investigation period, closing stock expressed as percentage of production further dropped in the IP.

4.4.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

| (327) | Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 10


  Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Investigation period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover) | -5,4  % | -8,9  % | -5,9  % | 0,6  % |
| Index (2018=100) | - 100 | - 166 | - 110 | 10 |
| Cash flow (EUR) | 24 347 831 | 45 471 749 | 89 781 804 | 97 367 062 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 187 | 369 | 400 |
| Investments (EUR) | 68 496 866 | 27 469 167 | 22 525 713 | 26 179 748 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 40 | 33 | 38 |
| Return on investments | 1 % | -9 % | -10 % | 4 % |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | -1 600 | -1 832 | 660 |
| Source: Sampled Union producers |

(327)

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Table 10

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

2018

2019

2020

Investigation period

Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover)

-5,4  %

-8,9  %

-5,9  %

0,6  %

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

- 100

- 100

- 166

- 166

- 110

- 110

10

10

Cash flow (EUR)

24 347 831

45 471 749

89 781 804

97 367 062

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

187

187

369

369

400

400

Investments (EUR)

68 496 866

27 469 167

22 525 713

26 179 748

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

40

40

33

33

38

38

Return on investments

1 %

-9 %

-10 %

4 %

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

-1 600

-1 600

-1 832

-1 832

660

660

Source: Sampled Union producers

Source:

| (328) | The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. The Union industry was lossmaking in the first three years of the period considered, and barely broke even in the investigation period. The loss increased between 2018 and 2019 from -5,4 % to -8,9 %. The sales price of the Union industry grew faster than the cost of production in 2020 (see table 7 in recital (320)). This resulted in a reduction of loss to -5,9 % in 2020. In the IP, the Union industry was able book a profit slightly above the breakeven point. |
| --- | --- |

(328)

The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. The Union industry was lossmaking in the first three years of the period considered, and barely broke even in the investigation period. The loss increased between 2018 and 2019 from -5,4 % to -8,9 %. The sales price of the Union industry grew faster than the cost of production in 2020 (see table 7 in recital (320)). This resulted in a reduction of loss to -5,9 % in 2020. In the IP, the Union industry was able book a profit slightly above the breakeven point.

| (329) | The Union industry was able to achieve a minor profit in the IP although its average sales price to unrelated customers in the Union remained below the average cost of production (see table 7 in recital (320)). This was caused by the differences in product mix produced and product mix sold in the Union during the IP. The differences concerned not only the product types but also the time when the sold goods where produced (that is, whether they were sales from stock). |
| --- | --- |

(329)

The Union industry was able to achieve a minor profit in the IP although its average sales price to unrelated customers in the Union remained below the average cost of production (see table 7 in recital (320)). This was caused by the differences in product mix produced and product mix sold in the Union during the IP. The differences concerned not only the product types but also the time when the sold goods where produced (that is, whether they were sales from stock).

| (330) | The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The net cash flow almost doubled between 2018 and 2019. It further considerably increased in 2020, and, at a more moderate pace, in the investigation period. The evolution of cash flow was to a large extent linked to the evolution of sales and therefore stocks. In 2018, one sampled Union producer recorded a large stock variation of finished goods, i.e. the company produced for stock. In 2019, this situation did not repeat thus turning a negative cash flow of this company into a positive one. This explained the majority of the cash flow increase between 2018 and 2019. The value of cash flow in 2020 and in the investigation period was linked to the fact that the sampled Union producers temporarily interrupted their production due to Covid-19-related lockdowns but continued selling from stock, which as shown in table 9 (see recital (325)) historically represented approximately half of their annual production quantity. The closing stock of finished goods decreased in 2020 and in the IP leading to a stock variation, which added value to the decreasing loss (2020) or the slight profit (IP). |
| --- | --- |

(330)

The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The net cash flow almost doubled between 2018 and 2019. It further considerably increased in 2020, and, at a more moderate pace, in the investigation period. The evolution of cash flow was to a large extent linked to the evolution of sales and therefore stocks. In 2018, one sampled Union producer recorded a large stock variation of finished goods, i.e. the company produced for stock. In 2019, this situation did not repeat thus turning a negative cash flow of this company into a positive one. This explained the majority of the cash flow increase between 2018 and 2019. The value of cash flow in 2020 and in the investigation period was linked to the fact that the sampled Union producers temporarily interrupted their production due to Covid-19-related lockdowns but continued selling from stock, which as shown in table 9 (see recital (325)) historically represented approximately half of their annual production quantity. The closing stock of finished goods decreased in 2020 and in the IP leading to a stock variation, which added value to the decreasing loss (2020) or the slight profit (IP).

| (331) | Following final disclosure, the GoT argued that since only one company could influence the results of cash flow, the sample was not representative. |
| --- | --- |

(331)

Following final disclosure, the GoT argued that since only one company could influence the results of cash flow, the sample was not representative.

| (332) | The cash flow presented in table 10 was a simple addition of all cash flow values of the sampled Union producers. This means that any events or evolution in one of the sampled companies influenced the final indicator no matter what share of Union production the sample would have represented. In recital (330), the Commission clarified the fluctuations in cash flow. Consequently, the claim made by the GoT was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(332)

The cash flow presented in table 10 was a simple addition of all cash flow values of the sampled Union producers. This means that any events or evolution in one of the sampled companies influenced the final indicator no matter what share of Union production the sample would have represented. In recital (330), the Commission clarified the fluctuations in cash flow. Consequently, the claim made by the GoT was rejected.

| (333) | Investments decreased by 62 % in the period considered. The largest decrease of 60 % was recorded between 2018 and 2019. The investments further decreased in 2020, to then increase in the investigation period (16 % compared to 2020). Investments were in most cases financed with cash flow and bank credits. The majority of investments were in maintaining capacity and replacement. Investments in research and development and innovation, that made up for 38 % of total investments by the sampled producers in 2018, decreased by 97 % in the period considered and made up for only 3 % of their investments in the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(333)

Investments decreased by 62 % in the period considered. The largest decrease of 60 % was recorded between 2018 and 2019. The investments further decreased in 2020, to then increase in the investigation period (16 % compared to 2020). Investments were in most cases financed with cash flow and bank credits. The majority of investments were in maintaining capacity and replacement. Investments in research and development and innovation, that made up for 38 % of total investments by the sampled producers in 2018, decreased by 97 % in the period considered and made up for only 3 % of their investments in the investigation period.

| (334) | The sampled Union producers’ ability to raise capital was affected by the negative profitability. The sampled Union producers reported that the negative profitability prevented them from financing the necessary investments to exploit the growing market potential. One sampled Union producer reported that it had to downsize capacity due to its problems to raise capital. Some sampled Union producers are part of larger groups, making their ability to raise capital better than that of stand-alone companies in a similar financial situation. Yet their low profitability and prospects influence the decision of the parent companies to provide funds, that may decide to invest elsewhere. |
| --- | --- |

(334)

The sampled Union producers’ ability to raise capital was affected by the negative profitability. The sampled Union producers reported that the negative profitability prevented them from financing the necessary investments to exploit the growing market potential. One sampled Union producer reported that it had to downsize capacity due to its problems to raise capital. Some sampled Union producers are part of larger groups, making their ability to raise capital better than that of stand-alone companies in a similar financial situation. Yet their low profitability and prospects influence the decision of the parent companies to provide funds, that may decide to invest elsewhere.

| (335) | The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It decreased significantly in 2019 and 2020 to register an increase in the investigation period, following the trend in profitability. |
| --- | --- |

(335)

The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It decreased significantly in 2019 and 2020 to register an increase in the investigation period, following the trend in profitability.

4.5.   Conclusion on injury

Conclusion on injury

| (336) | In the period considered, the Union industry could not benefit from an expanding market, as shown by macro-indicators presenting negative or rather stable trends in a scenario of increasing demand. Production, production capacity, capacity utilisation or employment remained at the same level throughout the period considered. Union sales increased at a slower pace than consumption (3 % growth of Union sales in a market that grew 6 %). Consequently, the market share of the Union industry decreased from 90,1 % in 2018 to 87,1 % in the IP. |
| --- | --- |

(336)

In the period considered, the Union industry could not benefit from an expanding market, as shown by macro-indicators presenting negative or rather stable trends in a scenario of increasing demand. Production, production capacity, capacity utilisation or employment remained at the same level throughout the period considered. Union sales increased at a slower pace than consumption (3 % growth of Union sales in a market that grew 6 %). Consequently, the market share of the Union industry decreased from 90,1 % in 2018 to 87,1 % in the IP.

| (337) | Despite the increase of 19 % in its sales price, the Union industry could not raise prices in the Union to levels high enough to recover its costs during most of the period considered. As a result, throughout the period considered it was either lossmaking (-5,4 % in 2018, -8,9 % in 2019, -5,9 % in 2020) or just breaking even (0,6 % in the investigation period, influenced by the post-Covid-19 economic recovery, including increasing construction output as explained in recital (311), and where the Union industry sold significant quantities from stocks). The level of profitability achieved in the investigation period could not be considered sustainable. The Union industry could not increase their sales prices in the Union to a level that would ensure profitability levels necessary to cover its costs of production for most of the period considered and to exploit the growth in the Union market, for example by making new investments for expansion, research and development and for continuing to be active in developing segments like large slabs. Indeed, in this situation, investments decreased by 62 % and capacity remained constant, showing that the Union industry could not grow with the growing market. |
| --- | --- |

(337)

Despite the increase of 19 % in its sales price, the Union industry could not raise prices in the Union to levels high enough to recover its costs during most of the period considered. As a result, throughout the period considered it was either lossmaking (-5,4 % in 2018, -8,9 % in 2019, -5,9 % in 2020) or just breaking even (0,6 % in the investigation period, influenced by the post-Covid-19 economic recovery, including increasing construction output as explained in recital (311), and where the Union industry sold significant quantities from stocks). The level of profitability achieved in the investigation period could not be considered sustainable. The Union industry could not increase their sales prices in the Union to a level that would ensure profitability levels necessary to cover its costs of production for most of the period considered and to exploit the growth in the Union market, for example by making new investments for expansion, research and development and for continuing to be active in developing segments like large slabs. Indeed, in this situation, investments decreased by 62 % and capacity remained constant, showing that the Union industry could not grow with the growing market.

| (338) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(338)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

| (339) | Following final disclosure, a number of interested parties commented on the injury findings and conclusions. |
| --- | --- |

(339)

Following final disclosure, a number of interested parties commented on the injury findings and conclusions.

| (340) | Ceramika Netto expressed concerns about the validity of data the Commission used for its findings on injury. In particular, the company submitted the financial statements for 2021 of three Polish producers of ceramic tiles and news articles summarising the performance of the ceramics industry in Italy and Spain in 2021. |
| --- | --- |

(340)

Ceramika Netto expressed concerns about the validity of data the Commission used for its findings on injury. In particular, the company submitted the financial statements for 2021 of three Polish producers of ceramic tiles and news articles summarising the performance of the ceramics industry in Italy and Spain in 2021.

| (341) | CGCSA claimed that the Union producers were willing to provide information for the full year 2021 and if the Commission examined that information, it would have found that the injury stemmed solely from the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. |
| --- | --- |

(341)

CGCSA claimed that the Union producers were willing to provide information for the full year 2021 and if the Commission examined that information, it would have found that the injury stemmed solely from the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.

| (342) | The Commission noted that the investigation was conducted on information, that was verified on-spot, submitted by sampled Union producers for the IP and the period considered. Ceramika Netto did not submit any comments on the sample of Union producers within the applicable deadline. Any information concerning the full year 2021 would cover a post-IP period and therefore could not be used for the determination of injury. In addition, the Commission is not aware of any proactive offers by the Union industry to submit post-IP data. Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claims by Ceramika Netto and GCSCA. |
| --- | --- |

(342)

The Commission noted that the investigation was conducted on information, that was verified on-spot, submitted by sampled Union producers for the IP and the period considered. Ceramika Netto did not submit any comments on the sample of Union producers within the applicable deadline. Any information concerning the full year 2021 would cover a post-IP period and therefore could not be used for the determination of injury. In addition, the Commission is not aware of any proactive offers by the Union industry to submit post-IP data. Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claims by Ceramika Netto and GCSCA.

| (343) | The GoI, GoT, GCSCA, the Turkish company Sogutsen Seramik and sixteen Indian exporting producers claimed that the Union industry did not suffer material injury. In this respect, the GoI, GoT, GCSCA and sixteen Indian exporting producers submitted that most macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators remained stable or improved during the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(343)

The GoI, GoT, GCSCA, the Turkish company Sogutsen Seramik and sixteen Indian exporting producers claimed that the Union industry did not suffer material injury. In this respect, the GoI, GoT, GCSCA and sixteen Indian exporting producers submitted that most macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators remained stable or improved during the period considered.

| (344) | For example, the sixteen companies pointed out that production volume, capacity utilisation and productivity substantially increased in the IP in comparison to 2020, and that closing stocks substantially decreased in the IP in comparison to 2018. In addition, the Indian exporting producers argued that despite a reduction in market share of the Union industry by 3 percentage points in the period considered, it maintained high market shares over the whole period considered. The companies referred to the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Court’) in eurocylinder systems AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt (31). The Court ruled that the Council committed a manifest error when it concluded that a loss of five percentage points market share was an indicator of material injury as the Union industry maintained high market share and experienced an increase in sales volumes and sales prices. |
| --- | --- |

(344)

For example, the sixteen companies pointed out that production volume, capacity utilisation and productivity substantially increased in the IP in comparison to 2020, and that closing stocks substantially decreased in the IP in comparison to 2018. In addition, the Indian exporting producers argued that despite a reduction in market share of the Union industry by 3 percentage points in the period considered, it maintained high market shares over the whole period considered. The companies referred to the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Court’) in eurocylinder systems AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt (31). The Court ruled that the Council committed a manifest error when it concluded that a loss of five percentage points market share was an indicator of material injury as the Union industry maintained high market share and experienced an increase in sales volumes and sales prices.

31

| (345) | The GoT submitted that indicators such as profitability, production, sales volume, Union sales price, capacity utilisation, productivity, inventories, cash flow and return on investments experienced a temporary negative evolution in 2020, a year affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, but returned to a positive trend in the IP. Furthermore, the GoT argued that a few indicators showing negative trends over the period considered were not sufficient to conclude on the existence of material injury. |
| --- | --- |

(345)

The GoT submitted that indicators such as profitability, production, sales volume, Union sales price, capacity utilisation, productivity, inventories, cash flow and return on investments experienced a temporary negative evolution in 2020, a year affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, but returned to a positive trend in the IP. Furthermore, the GoT argued that a few indicators showing negative trends over the period considered were not sufficient to conclude on the existence of material injury.

| (346) | Similarly, the GoI claimed that there was no volume injury as the market share of Indian imports was small throughout the period considered. The GoI also noted that despite losing market share, the Union industry maintained a high market share. In addition, its sales volume increased and its domestic sales price increased at a higher pace than cost of production thus leading to improved profitability. |
| --- | --- |

(346)

Similarly, the GoI claimed that there was no volume injury as the market share of Indian imports was small throughout the period considered. The GoI also noted that despite losing market share, the Union industry maintained a high market share. In addition, its sales volume increased and its domestic sales price increased at a higher pace than cost of production thus leading to improved profitability.

| (347) | GCSCA also argued that many macroeconomic indicators, such as production volume and capacity utilisation, sales volume, high market share, maintained neutral or positive trends over the period considered. With regard to microeconomic indicators, the association pointed out that the Union domestic sales price grew at a higher pace than the cost of production of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(347)

GCSCA also argued that many macroeconomic indicators, such as production volume and capacity utilisation, sales volume, high market share, maintained neutral or positive trends over the period considered. With regard to microeconomic indicators, the association pointed out that the Union domestic sales price grew at a higher pace than the cost of production of the Union industry.

| (348) | The Commission noted that the indicators must be examined not only in the light of their evolution but also with regard to the achieved levels. The Commission maintained that the Union industry suffered material injury due to increasing volumes of dumped imports from India and Türkiye. Although the Union domestic price grew faster than the Union industry’s cost of production, the Union industry was lossmaking in almost every year of the period considered, only being able to reach the break even point in the IP. In addition, the Union industry lost market share, despite an increase in consumption. |
| --- | --- |

(348)

The Commission noted that the indicators must be examined not only in the light of their evolution but also with regard to the achieved levels. The Commission maintained that the Union industry suffered material injury due to increasing volumes of dumped imports from India and Türkiye. Although the Union domestic price grew faster than the Union industry’s cost of production, the Union industry was lossmaking in almost every year of the period considered, only being able to reach the break even point in the IP. In addition, the Union industry lost market share, despite an increase in consumption.

| (349) | Furthermore, the parties referred to the Commission’s findings concerning certain indicators (production volume, capacity utilisation) that were negatively affected by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 but recovered in the IP. The parties must, however, also recognise that the pandemic led to the improvement of certain indicators, e.g. closing stocks volume and cash flow. Subsequently, the Commission could not agree to the parties describing the change in the IP as substantially improved in comparison to the previous period since they already agreed that the especially poor performance in those indicators in 2020 was caused by the pandemic. |
| --- | --- |

(349)

Furthermore, the parties referred to the Commission’s findings concerning certain indicators (production volume, capacity utilisation) that were negatively affected by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 but recovered in the IP. The parties must, however, also recognise that the pandemic led to the improvement of certain indicators, e.g. closing stocks volume and cash flow. Subsequently, the Commission could not agree to the parties describing the change in the IP as substantially improved in comparison to the previous period since they already agreed that the especially poor performance in those indicators in 2020 was caused by the pandemic.

| (350) | With regard to the preliminary ruling of the Court in eurocylinder systems AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt, the Commission noted that each case must be assessed on its own merits. In the investigation concerned by the Court ruling, the Union industry experienced an increase in sales volume and sales prices while maintaining high market share and double-digit profits over the period considered. (32) The situation in the present case is considerably different. Although the Union producers’ sales price increased and their sales volume also slightly grew, the companies remained lossmaking in almost all years of the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(350)

With regard to the preliminary ruling of the Court in eurocylinder systems AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt, the Commission noted that each case must be assessed on its own merits. In the investigation concerned by the Court ruling, the Union industry experienced an increase in sales volume and sales prices while maintaining high market share and double-digit profits over the period considered. (32) The situation in the present case is considerably different. Although the Union producers’ sales price increased and their sales volume also slightly grew, the companies remained lossmaking in almost all years of the period considered.

32

| (351) | Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claims described in recitals (343) to (347). |
| --- | --- |

(351)

Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claims described in recitals (343) to (347).

5.   CAUSATION

CAUSATION

| (352) | In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the countries concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are imports from other third countries including non-dumped imports from India, the export performance of the Union industry, the evolution of demand, the evolution of the cost of production of the Union industry and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. |
| --- | --- |

(352)

In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the countries concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are imports from other third countries including non-dumped imports from India, the export performance of the Union industry, the evolution of demand, the evolution of the cost of production of the Union industry and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.

5.1.   Effects of the dumped imports

Effects of the dumped imports

| (353) | The volume of imports from the countries concerned increased by 72 % during the period considered, from [39 000 000 – 42 000 000] m2 in 2018, representing a market share of [5 – 5,2] %, to [67 000 000 – 69 000 000] m2 in the IP, representing a market share of [8,1 – 8,3 ] % during the IP. The increase of imports from the countries concerned (72 %) significantly outpaced both the increase of consumption in the Union market (6%) and the increase of Union sales (3 %). The more than 3 percentage points increase in the market share of dumped imports paralleled a loss of 3 percentage points in the market share of the Union industry, from 90,1 % in 2018 to 87,1 % in the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(353)

The volume of imports from the countries concerned increased by 72 % during the period considered, from [39 000 000 – 42 000 000] m2 in 2018, representing a market share of [5 – 5,2] %, to [67 000 000 – 69 000 000] m2 in the IP, representing a market share of [8,1 – 8,3 ] % during the IP. The increase of imports from the countries concerned (72 %) significantly outpaced both the increase of consumption in the Union market (6%) and the increase of Union sales (3 %). The more than 3 percentage points increase in the market share of dumped imports paralleled a loss of 3 percentage points in the market share of the Union industry, from 90,1 % in 2018 to 87,1 % in the investigation period.

2

2

| (354) | This gain in market share by the dumped imports was therefore at the expense of the Union industry that could not benefit from the continuously increasing consumption. |
| --- | --- |

(354)

This gain in market share by the dumped imports was therefore at the expense of the Union industry that could not benefit from the continuously increasing consumption.

| (355) | The increase in imports was based on dumped, low prices. As established in recital (293), the prices from the sampled exporting producers in the Union market significantly undercut those of the Union industry, at least by 36 % for India and 19,9 % for Türkiye, in the investigation period, and in any event were significantly lower than the Union industry’s costs of production. |
| --- | --- |

(355)

The increase in imports was based on dumped, low prices. As established in recital (293), the prices from the sampled exporting producers in the Union market significantly undercut those of the Union industry, at least by 36 % for India and 19,9 % for Türkiye, in the investigation period, and in any event were significantly lower than the Union industry’s costs of production.

| (356) | In addition to the findings of significant undercutting during the investigation period, the average import prices from the countries concerned were also much lower than those of the Union industry throughout the period considered. The price difference (based on Eurostat average figures) between the dumped imports and the prices of the Union industry was significant, and increased during the period considered, going from 2,98 EUR/m2 in 2018 to 4,77 EUR/m2 in the investigation period, an increase of 60 %. |
| --- | --- |

(356)

In addition to the findings of significant undercutting during the investigation period, the average import prices from the countries concerned were also much lower than those of the Union industry throughout the period considered. The price difference (based on Eurostat average figures) between the dumped imports and the prices of the Union industry was significant, and increased during the period considered, going from 2,98 EUR/m2 in 2018 to 4,77 EUR/m2 in the investigation period, an increase of 60 %.

2

2

| (357) | Due to the dumped imports, whose prices were also below the cost of production of the Union industry throughout the period considered, thereby causing significant price suppression, and to avoid further losing market share, the Union industry could not increase its prices in the Union above its cost of production during most of the period considered (see table 7 in recital (320)). It only barely broke even in the investigation period, which coincided with the post-Covid-19 recovery and with an increase in construction output (see recital (311)). In any event, the Union industry’s level of profit in the investigation period was very low (0,6 %) and cannot be considered sustainable (see recital (337)). The dumped imports also outpaced Union sales in the post-Covid-19 recovery: while the Union industry’s sales increased by 1,2 % in the investigation period compared to 2020, the dumped imports increased by 17,5 %. |
| --- | --- |

(357)

Due to the dumped imports, whose prices were also below the cost of production of the Union industry throughout the period considered, thereby causing significant price suppression, and to avoid further losing market share, the Union industry could not increase its prices in the Union above its cost of production during most of the period considered (see table 7 in recital (320)). It only barely broke even in the investigation period, which coincided with the post-Covid-19 recovery and with an increase in construction output (see recital (311)). In any event, the Union industry’s level of profit in the investigation period was very low (0,6 %) and cannot be considered sustainable (see recital (337)). The dumped imports also outpaced Union sales in the post-Covid-19 recovery: while the Union industry’s sales increased by 1,2 % in the investigation period compared to 2020, the dumped imports increased by 17,5 %.

| (358) | It follows from the above that the increase of dumped imports at low prices led to lost sales and prevented the Union industry from reaching reasonable levels of profit. The Commission therefore concluded that there is a causal link between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(358)

It follows from the above that the increase of dumped imports at low prices led to lost sales and prevented the Union industry from reaching reasonable levels of profit. The Commission therefore concluded that there is a causal link between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

5.2.   Effects of other factors

Effects of other factors

5.2.1.   Imports from third countries

Imports from third countries

| (359) | The volume of imports from other third countries developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 11


  Imports from third countries











  Country | | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Investigation period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye | Volume (m2) | [8 000 000 –
  10 000 000 ] | [10 000 000 –
  12 000 000 ] | [13 000 000 –
  15 000 000 ] | [14 000 000 –
  16 000 000 ] |
| | Index (2018=100) | 100 | 132 | 160 | 173 |
| | Market share | [1 – 1,2 ] % | [1,4 – 1,6 ] % | [1,6 – 1,8 ] % | [1,7 – 1,9 ] % |
| | Average price (EUR/ m2) | [6,1 – 6,4 ] | [6,4 – 6,7 ] | [6,5 – 6,8 ] | [6,4 – 6,7 ] |
| | Index (2018=100) | 100 | 105 | 106 | 105 |
| Ukraine | Volume (m2) | 5 641 163 | 5 104 655 | 4 890 265 | 5 546 233 |
| | Index (2018=100) | 100 | 90 | 87 | 98 |
| | Market share | 0,7  % | 0,6  % | 0,6  % | 0,7  % |
| | Average price (EUR/m2) | 4,22 | 4,44 | 4,37 | 4,55 |
| | Index (2018=100) | 100 | 105 | 103 | 108 |
| China | Volume (m2) | 8 534 901 | 6 739 211 | 6 488 766 | 4 836 581 |
| | Index (2018=100) | 100 | 79 | 76 | 57 |
| | Market share | 1,1  % | 0,8  % | 0,8  % | 0,6  % |
| | Average price (EUR/m2) | 5,11 | 5,18 | 4,81 | 4,95 |
| | Index (2018=100) | 100 | 101 | 94 | 97 |
| United Arab Emirates | Volume (m2) | 3 443 921 | 3 220 877 | 3 448 721 | 3 194 145 |
| | Index (2018=100) | 100 | 94 | 100 | 93 |
| | Market share | 0,4  % | 0,4  % | 0,4  % | 0,4  % |
| | Average price (EUR/m2) | 9,29 | 7,30 | 6,57 | 6,93 |
| | Index (2018=100) | 100 | 78 | 71 | 75 |
| Others (excluding Countries concerned) | Volume (m2) | 12 091 485 | 11 671 162 | 10 263 420 | 11 036 430 |
| | Index (2018=100) | 100 | 97 | 85 | 91 |
| | Market share | 1,5  % | 1,4  % | 1,3  % | 1,3  % |
| | Average price (EUR/m2) | 6,68 | 6,24 | 6,96 | 7,15 |
| | Index (2018=100) | 100 | 105 | 106 | 107 |
| Total of all third countries except the countries concerned, including non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye ) | Volume (m2) | [38 000 000 – 40 000 000 ] | [37 000 000 – 39 000 000 ] | [38 000 000 – 40 000 000 ] | [39 000 000 – 41 000 000 ] |
| | Index (2018=100) | 100 | 100 | 101 | 103 |
| | Market share | [4,8 – 5 ] % | [4,6 – 4,8 ] % | [4,7 – 4,9 ] % | [4,7 – 4,9 ] % |
| | Average price (EUR/m2) | [6 – 6,3 ] | [5,9 – 6,2 ] | [6 – 6,3 ] | [6,2 – 6,5 ] |
| | Index (2018=100) | 100 | 98 | 100 | 103 |
| Source: Eurostat, sampled exporting producer |

(359)

The volume of imports from other third countries developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Table 11

Imports from third countries

Imports from third countries

Country

2018

2019

2020

Investigation period

Non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye

Volume (m2)

2

[8 000 000 –

10 000 000 ]

[10 000 000 –

12 000 000 ]

[13 000 000 –

15 000 000 ]

[14 000 000 –

16 000 000 ]

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

132

132

160

160

173

173

Market share

[1 – 1,2 ] %

[1,4 – 1,6 ] %

[1,6 – 1,8 ] %

[1,7 – 1,9 ] %

Average price (EUR/ m2)

2

[6,1 – 6,4 ]

[6,4 – 6,7 ]

[6,5 – 6,8 ]

[6,4 – 6,7 ]

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

105

105

106

106

105

105

Ukraine

Volume (m2)

2

5 641 163

5 104 655

4 890 265

5 546 233

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

90

90

87

87

98

98

Market share

0,7  %

0,6  %

0,6  %

0,7  %

Average price (EUR/m2)

2

4,22

4,44

4,37

4,55

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

105

105

103

103

108

108

China

Volume (m2)

2

8 534 901

6 739 211

6 488 766

4 836 581

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

79

79

76

76

57

57

Market share

1,1  %

0,8  %

0,8  %

0,6  %

Average price (EUR/m2)

2

5,11

5,18

4,81

4,95

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

101

101

94

94

97

97

United Arab Emirates

Volume (m2)

2

3 443 921

3 220 877

3 448 721

3 194 145

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

94

94

100

100

93

93

Market share

0,4  %

0,4  %

0,4  %

0,4  %

Average price (EUR/m2)

2

9,29

7,30

6,57

6,93

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

78

78

71

71

75

75

Others (excluding Countries concerned)

Volume (m2)

2

12 091 485

11 671 162

10 263 420

11 036 430

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

97

97

85

85

91

91

Market share

1,5  %

1,4  %

1,3  %

1,3  %

Average price (EUR/m2)

2

6,68

6,24

6,96

7,15

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

105

105

106

106

107

107

Total of all third countries except the countries concerned, including non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye )

Volume (m2)

2

[38 000 000 – 40 000 000 ]

[37 000 000 – 39 000 000 ]

[38 000 000 – 40 000 000 ]

[39 000 000 – 41 000 000 ]

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

100

100

101

101

103

103

Market share

[4,8 – 5 ] %

[4,6 – 4,8 ] %

[4,7 – 4,9 ] %

[4,7 – 4,9 ] %

Average price (EUR/m2)

2

[6 – 6,3 ]

[5,9 – 6,2 ]

[6 – 6,3 ]

[6,2 – 6,5 ]

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

98

98

100

100

103

103

Source: Eurostat, sampled exporting producer

Source:

| (360) | Imports from all third countries except the countries concerned but including the non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye (hereinafter ‘all third countries’) increased by 3 % over the period considered. Imports from other third countries amounted to [36 – 38] % of total imports into the Union in the investigation period (down from [48 – 50] % of imports in 2018). Their share of the Union market decreased year-on-year, going from [4,8 – 5] % in 2018 to [4,7 – 4,9] % in the investigation period. With the exception of non-dumped imports from the countries concerned, and China in year 2018, no other single country achieved a market share of more than 1 % throughout the period considered. |
| --- | --- |

(360)

Imports from all third countries except the countries concerned but including the non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye (hereinafter ‘all third countries’) increased by 3 % over the period considered. Imports from other third countries amounted to [36 – 38] % of total imports into the Union in the investigation period (down from [48 – 50] % of imports in 2018). Their share of the Union market decreased year-on-year, going from [4,8 – 5] % in 2018 to [4,7 – 4,9] % in the investigation period. With the exception of non-dumped imports from the countries concerned, and China in year 2018, no other single country achieved a market share of more than 1 % throughout the period considered.

| (361) | The average price of imports from all third countries first decreased by 2 % from 2018 to 2019, then slowly increased from 2020 to reach a level 3% higher in the investigation period compared to 2018. The prices of those imports were higher than the import prices of dumped imports from the countries concerned throughout the period considered. The biggest difference was registered in the IP, when the average price from all third countries was [8-12] % higher than the average import price of dumped imports from the countries concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(361)

The average price of imports from all third countries first decreased by 2 % from 2018 to 2019, then slowly increased from 2020 to reach a level 3% higher in the investigation period compared to 2018. The prices of those imports were higher than the import prices of dumped imports from the countries concerned throughout the period considered. The biggest difference was registered in the IP, when the average price from all third countries was [8-12] % higher than the average import price of dumped imports from the countries concerned.

| (362) | Non-dumped imports from the countries concerned increased by 73% over the period considered, from [8 000 000 – 10 000 000] square metres in 2018 to [16 000 000 – 18 000 000] in the investigation period. Their market share increased from [1 – 1,2] % in 2018 to [1,7 – 1,9] % in the investigation period. The prices of those imports were higher than the import prices of dumped imports from the countries concerned throughout the period considered. In 2019, 2020 and the investigation period they were at least 14% higher than the average import price of dumped imports from the countries concerned. The average import prices were below those of the Union industry throughout the period considered. Therefore, these imports and their increase had a negative impact in the performance of the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(362)

Non-dumped imports from the countries concerned increased by 73% over the period considered, from [8 000 000 – 10 000 000] square metres in 2018 to [16 000 000 – 18 000 000] in the investigation period. Their market share increased from [1 – 1,2] % in 2018 to [1,7 – 1,9] % in the investigation period. The prices of those imports were higher than the import prices of dumped imports from the countries concerned throughout the period considered. In 2019, 2020 and the investigation period they were at least 14% higher than the average import price of dumped imports from the countries concerned. The average import prices were below those of the Union industry throughout the period considered. Therefore, these imports and their increase had a negative impact in the performance of the Union industry.

| (363) | Imports from all third countries except the countries concerned but including the non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye might therefore have contributed to a limited extent to the material injury suffered by the Union industry. However, given that their average prices are higher than those of dumped imports from the countries concerned, that the volumes are smaller and did not gain market share in the period considered, those imports, both collectively and individually, do not attenuate the causal link established with the dumped imports from India and Türkiye. |
| --- | --- |

(363)

Imports from all third countries except the countries concerned but including the non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye might therefore have contributed to a limited extent to the material injury suffered by the Union industry. However, given that their average prices are higher than those of dumped imports from the countries concerned, that the volumes are smaller and did not gain market share in the period considered, those imports, both collectively and individually, do not attenuate the causal link established with the dumped imports from India and Türkiye.

| (364) | Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoT argued that the Commission’s conclusions concerning the effect of non-dumped imports from the countries concerned and from all third countries on the situation of the Union industry were biased as the Commission found that the non-dumped imports from the countries concerned had a negative impact on the performance of the Union industry while the imports from all third countries contributed to the material injury only in a limited extent, in particular since the imports form all third countries reached a volume four times higher than non-dumped imports from the countries concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(364)

Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoT argued that the Commission’s conclusions concerning the effect of non-dumped imports from the countries concerned and from all third countries on the situation of the Union industry were biased as the Commission found that the non-dumped imports from the countries concerned had a negative impact on the performance of the Union industry while the imports from all third countries contributed to the material injury only in a limited extent, in particular since the imports form all third countries reached a volume four times higher than non-dumped imports from the countries concerned.

| (365) | The Commission noted that recitals (362) and (363) had to be read together. Taking into account their volumes and prices, both, the non-dumped imports from the countries concerned and other third country imports, had a negative impact on the Union industry’s performance, but not of a magnitude to attenuate the causal link. As explained in recital (360), the category “all third countries” includes also the non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim. |
| --- | --- |

(365)

The Commission noted that recitals (362) and (363) had to be read together. Taking into account their volumes and prices, both, the non-dumped imports from the countries concerned and other third country imports, had a negative impact on the Union industry’s performance, but not of a magnitude to attenuate the causal link. As explained in recital (360), the category “all third countries” includes also the non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim.

| (366) | Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoI argued that the imports from India were in terms of volume and prices similar to the imports from third countries (excluding the non-dumped imports from the countries concerned). The Commission, nevertheless, did not investigate those third countries. According to the GoI, this proved that the Union industry did not suffer injury due to dumped imports from India but due to high cost of production. In addition, the GoI pointed out that since the profitability of the Union industry improved as the Indian imports increased, there was not causal link between the dumped imports from India and the material injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(366)

Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoI argued that the imports from India were in terms of volume and prices similar to the imports from third countries (excluding the non-dumped imports from the countries concerned). The Commission, nevertheless, did not investigate those third countries. According to the GoI, this proved that the Union industry did not suffer injury due to dumped imports from India but due to high cost of production. In addition, the GoI pointed out that since the profitability of the Union industry improved as the Indian imports increased, there was not causal link between the dumped imports from India and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

| (367) | The Commission recalled that it examined the impact of imports from India and Türkiye that were found to be made at dumped prices. The investigation was initiated based on sufficient evidence of dumping provided by the complainant. As no such evidence was submitted with regard to other third countries, the Commission did not investigate those countries and therefore, could not make any findings of dumping in this investigation. The Commission acknowledged that the imports from all third countries contributed to the material injury in a limited manner (see recital (363)). As far as it concerns the import volumes, the Commission analysed the requirements for a cumulative assessment of dumped imports and found that all requirements were met in this investigation. Thus, the imports from India could not be considered as negligible. Finally, as explained in recital (298), although the Union industry was able to increase its prices and by doing so improve its financial performance, it was only able to achieve profitability levels slightly above the breakeven point in the IP. In addition, as explained in recitals (293) to (295), the Commission found substantial undercutting and price suppression caused by the dumped imports from India and Türkiye. Therefore, the claim that the imports from India could not, in terms of volumes and prices, cause material injury to the Union industry was rejected. |
| --- | --- |

(367)

The Commission recalled that it examined the impact of imports from India and Türkiye that were found to be made at dumped prices. The investigation was initiated based on sufficient evidence of dumping provided by the complainant. As no such evidence was submitted with regard to other third countries, the Commission did not investigate those countries and therefore, could not make any findings of dumping in this investigation. The Commission acknowledged that the imports from all third countries contributed to the material injury in a limited manner (see recital (363)). As far as it concerns the import volumes, the Commission analysed the requirements for a cumulative assessment of dumped imports and found that all requirements were met in this investigation. Thus, the imports from India could not be considered as negligible. Finally, as explained in recital (298), although the Union industry was able to increase its prices and by doing so improve its financial performance, it was only able to achieve profitability levels slightly above the breakeven point in the IP. In addition, as explained in recitals (293) to (295), the Commission found substantial undercutting and price suppression caused by the dumped imports from India and Türkiye. Therefore, the claim that the imports from India could not, in terms of volumes and prices, cause material injury to the Union industry was rejected.

5.2.2.   Export performance of the Union industry

| (368) | The Commission examined the evolution of exports and prices for the whole EU Industry based on Eurostat’s Eurostat data (33).

  Table 12


  Exports from the Union | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Investigation period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Export volume (m2) | 470 484 212 | 470 086 762 | 447 819 312 | 514 369 625 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 100 | 95 | 109 |
| Average price (EUR/m2) | 8,58 | 8,53 | 8,78 | 8,77 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 99 | 102 | 102 |
| Source: CET, Eurostat |

(368)

The Commission examined the evolution of exports and prices for the whole EU Industry based on Eurostat’s Eurostat data (33).

33

Table 12

Table 12

Exports from the Union

Exports from the Union

2018

2019

2020

Investigation period

Export volume (m2)

2

470 484 212

470 086 762

447 819 312

514 369 625

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

100

100

95

95

109

109

Average price (EUR/m2)

2

8,58

8,53

8,78

8,77

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

99

99

102

102

102

102

Source: CET, Eurostat

Source:

| (369) | According to Eurostat data, Union exports of ceramic tiles increased by 9 % during the period considered. Exports remained stable the first two years of the period considered to then decrease by 5 % between 2019 and 2020, then increase in the investigation period, namely 15 % year-on-year. The average price of exports remained rather stable throughout the period considered, registering an increase of 2 %. |
| --- | --- |

(369)

According to Eurostat data, Union exports of ceramic tiles increased by 9 % during the period considered. Exports remained stable the first two years of the period considered to then decrease by 5 % between 2019 and 2020, then increase in the investigation period, namely 15 % year-on-year. The average price of exports remained rather stable throughout the period considered, registering an increase of 2 %.

| (370) | Interested parties claimed, based on the data in the complaint, that the export performance of the Union industry was a cause of injury, due to the decline in 2020 and the fact that the average export price was lower than the cost of production of the complainants. |
| --- | --- |

(370)

Interested parties claimed, based on the data in the complaint, that the export performance of the Union industry was a cause of injury, due to the decline in 2020 and the fact that the average export price was lower than the cost of production of the complainants.

| (371) | Such comparison was incorrect. First, Eurostat data included all Union exports (including those to related customers outside the Union) while the cost of production of the complainants represented only part of Union exports. Second, the investigation period covered a different period than the one used in the complaint. |
| --- | --- |

(371)

Such comparison was incorrect. First, Eurostat data included all Union exports (including those to related customers outside the Union) while the cost of production of the complainants represented only part of Union exports. Second, the investigation period covered a different period than the one used in the complaint.

| (372) | In any case, the Commission also analysed the export performance of the Union sampled producers, based on verified data. The volume and average price of exports to unrelated customers of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

  Table 13


  Export performance of the sampled Union producers | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Investigation period |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Export volume (m2) | 6 906 051 | 7 483 379 | 7 105 324 | 9 669 741 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 108 | 103 | 140 |
| Average price (EUR/m2) | 13,60 | 13,81 | 11,63 | 11,24 |
| Index (2018=100) | 100 | 102 | 85 | 83 |
| Source: Sampled Union producers |

(372)

In any case, the Commission also analysed the export performance of the Union sampled producers, based on verified data. The volume and average price of exports to unrelated customers of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 13

Table 13

Export performance of the sampled Union producers

Export performance of the sampled Union producers

2018

2019

2020

Investigation period

Export volume (m2)

2

6 906 051

7 483 379

7 105 324

9 669 741

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

108

108

103

103

140

140

Average price (EUR/m2)

2

13,60

13,81

11,63

11,24

Index (2018=100)

Index (2018=100)

100

100

102

102

85

85

83

83

Source: Sampled Union producers

Source:

| (373) | The volume of exports of the sampled Union producers increased by 40 % during the period considered. The biggest increase was registered in the investigation period, namely 36 % year-on-year (i.e. when compared to 2020). The average price of exports from the sampled Union producers decreased by 17 % over the period considered. It first increased slightly, then went down in 2020 and the investigation period. Despite this decrease, the average export price of the sampled Union producers was above their cost of production throughout the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(373)

The volume of exports of the sampled Union producers increased by 40 % during the period considered. The biggest increase was registered in the investigation period, namely 36 % year-on-year (i.e. when compared to 2020). The average price of exports from the sampled Union producers decreased by 17 % over the period considered. It first increased slightly, then went down in 2020 and the investigation period. Despite this decrease, the average export price of the sampled Union producers was above their cost of production throughout the investigation period.

| (374) | Given its positive evolution, the export performance of the sampled Union producers or of the whole Union industry could not have contributed to the material injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(374)

Given its positive evolution, the export performance of the sampled Union producers or of the whole Union industry could not have contributed to the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

| (375) | Following final disclosure, the GoT claimed that the loss in market share by Union industry could not be attributed to dumped imports from the countries concerned. The party pointed out the growing export volume of the Union industry and argued that the loss of market share was caused by the Union industry prioritising exports over domestic sales. The GoT reiterated this claim after the additional partial disclosure. |
| --- | --- |

(375)

Following final disclosure, the GoT claimed that the loss in market share by Union industry could not be attributed to dumped imports from the countries concerned. The party pointed out the growing export volume of the Union industry and argued that the loss of market share was caused by the Union industry prioritising exports over domestic sales. The GoT reiterated this claim after the additional partial disclosure.

| (376) | The Commission disagreed. The volume of closing stock and the level of capacity utilisation of the Union industry would have enabled the Union industry to increase its export volumes and domestic sales volumes at the same time. Therefore, the improved export performance of the Union industry over the period considered could not justify the loss of the Union industry’s market share, that was due to the increasing volumes of dumped imports that undercut and suppressed the Union industry’s prices, as concluded in recital (358). The Commission rejected the claim. |
| --- | --- |

(376)

The Commission disagreed. The volume of closing stock and the level of capacity utilisation of the Union industry would have enabled the Union industry to increase its export volumes and domestic sales volumes at the same time. Therefore, the improved export performance of the Union industry over the period considered could not justify the loss of the Union industry’s market share, that was due to the increasing volumes of dumped imports that undercut and suppressed the Union industry’s prices, as concluded in recital (358). The Commission rejected the claim.

5.2.3.   Consumption

Consumption

| (377) | Some parties claimed that the global decline in ceramic tiles consumption was a cause of injury to the Union industry. As established in recitals (267) to (269) however, consumption increased steadily in the Union throughout the period considered. Therefore, it cannot have contributed to the material injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(377)

Some parties claimed that the global decline in ceramic tiles consumption was a cause of injury to the Union industry. As established in recitals (267) to (269) however, consumption increased steadily in the Union throughout the period considered. Therefore, it cannot have contributed to the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

5.2.4.   Evolution of the cost of production

Evolution of the cost of production

| (378) | Interested parties submitted that increases in costs of raw materials, energy, transport and CO2 emission allowances were a cause of injury for the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(378)

Interested parties submitted that increases in costs of raw materials, energy, transport and CO2 emission allowances were a cause of injury for the Union industry.

2

| (379) | The cost of production of the Union industry was higher than its sales price, and it increased, for most of the period considered. Therefore, the Union industry registered heavy losses throughout the period considered. However, as explained in recital (357), the Union industry could not increase its prices in the Union above its cost of production during most of the period considered, or made sustainable levels of profit, to avoid losing more market share to the dumped imports at low prices. |
| --- | --- |

(379)

The cost of production of the Union industry was higher than its sales price, and it increased, for most of the period considered. Therefore, the Union industry registered heavy losses throughout the period considered. However, as explained in recital (357), the Union industry could not increase its prices in the Union above its cost of production during most of the period considered, or made sustainable levels of profit, to avoid losing more market share to the dumped imports at low prices.

| (380) | Following final disclosure, the GoI, GoT and sixteen Indian exporting producers claimed that the Commission failed to examine other factors, such as increasing cost of raw materials, energy, CO2 allowances and labour. |
| --- | --- |

(380)

Following final disclosure, the GoI, GoT and sixteen Indian exporting producers claimed that the Commission failed to examine other factors, such as increasing cost of raw materials, energy, CO2 allowances and labour.

2

| (381) | The Commission examined the verified information of the sampled Union producers and found that the cost of raw materials (per m2) increased only slightly (by approximately 4 %) over the period considered. The cost of energy and labour per m2 actually decreased. Compliance cost per m2 remained rather stable over the period considered. In addition, as explained in recital (379), the Union industry suffered losses to its inability to increase prices under the price pressure from imports from India and Türkiye. Consequently, the claim was dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

(381)

The Commission examined the verified information of the sampled Union producers and found that the cost of raw materials (per m2) increased only slightly (by approximately 4 %) over the period considered. The cost of energy and labour per m2 actually decreased. Compliance cost per m2 remained rather stable over the period considered. In addition, as explained in recital (379), the Union industry suffered losses to its inability to increase prices under the price pressure from imports from India and Türkiye. Consequently, the claim was dismissed.

2

2

2

5.2.5.   Covid-19 effects

Covid-19 effects

| (382) | Interested parties claimed that the Covid-19 pandemic was a cause of injury for the Union industry due to production shutdowns. They further claimed that this was the reason behind their cost increases, given their reliance on imports of raw materials and the supply chain disruptions created by the Covid-19 pandemic. Finally, some interested parties claimed that the fact that the Union industry did not lay off workforce despite the shutdowns was also a cause for the cost increase and amounted to self-inflicted injury. |
| --- | --- |

(382)

Interested parties claimed that the Covid-19 pandemic was a cause of injury for the Union industry due to production shutdowns. They further claimed that this was the reason behind their cost increases, given their reliance on imports of raw materials and the supply chain disruptions created by the Covid-19 pandemic. Finally, some interested parties claimed that the fact that the Union industry did not lay off workforce despite the shutdowns was also a cause for the cost increase and amounted to self-inflicted injury.

| (383) | On the supply side, during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, in the first half of 2020, most Union producers had to temporarily shut down their production facilities. This was clearly reflected in the production volume, which dropped by 11 % in 2020 when compared to 2018 and by 8 % when compared to 2019. However, production recovered in the IP (see Table 4). |
| --- | --- |

(383)

On the supply side, during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, in the first half of 2020, most Union producers had to temporarily shut down their production facilities. This was clearly reflected in the production volume, which dropped by 11 % in 2020 when compared to 2018 and by 8 % when compared to 2019. However, production recovered in the IP (see Table 4).

| (384) | The Commission also analysed the impact on the sampled Union producers. This analysis confirmed the Union-wide findings. The measures taken because of the Covid-19 pandemic varied between producers located in different Member States. Four of the sampled Union producers had to shut down their production facilities in the first half of year 2020 (March and April), while two of them did not close but reduced production. All sampled Union producers reported a decrease in production during the shutdowns when compared to the same period of previous year, but production recovered in the IP. |
| --- | --- |

(384)

The Commission also analysed the impact on the sampled Union producers. This analysis confirmed the Union-wide findings. The measures taken because of the Covid-19 pandemic varied between producers located in different Member States. Four of the sampled Union producers had to shut down their production facilities in the first half of year 2020 (March and April), while two of them did not close but reduced production. All sampled Union producers reported a decrease in production during the shutdowns when compared to the same period of previous year, but production recovered in the IP.

| (385) | Despite the closures, the cost of production only went up slightly (+2 %) in 2020 as compared to 2019 (see recital (320)). One sampled Union producer reported that, in the second half of 2020, it benefited from low costs of raw materials and of all production factors, especially energy and transport costs, due to the unusual availability of labour, services and supplies. Any supply chain impact was thus negligible. Regarding the workforce, the measures taken by the sampled producers varied in different Member States, from reducing salaries, putting employees on short time work, use of redundancy funds or vacation time, or protection schemes that led to savings. |
| --- | --- |

(385)

Despite the closures, the cost of production only went up slightly (+2 %) in 2020 as compared to 2019 (see recital (320)). One sampled Union producer reported that, in the second half of 2020, it benefited from low costs of raw materials and of all production factors, especially energy and transport costs, due to the unusual availability of labour, services and supplies. Any supply chain impact was thus negligible. Regarding the workforce, the measures taken by the sampled producers varied in different Member States, from reducing salaries, putting employees on short time work, use of redundancy funds or vacation time, or protection schemes that led to savings.

| (386) | On the demand side, as seen in recital (268), the Union market kept growing during the Covid-19 pandemic. The trends of consumption, imports and Union industry sales in the Union increased steadily across the period considered, with imports from the countries concerned growing at much faster paces than the sales of the Union industry and consumption, also in 2020. The Union industry was able to maintain its volume of sales in 2020, despite the temporary factory closures, by selling from stocks, as this particular industry is characterised by very high levels of stocks (around 50 % of production). Accordingly stocks registered a reduction in 2020 and in the IP (see recital (325)). |
| --- | --- |

(386)

On the demand side, as seen in recital (268), the Union market kept growing during the Covid-19 pandemic. The trends of consumption, imports and Union industry sales in the Union increased steadily across the period considered, with imports from the countries concerned growing at much faster paces than the sales of the Union industry and consumption, also in 2020. The Union industry was able to maintain its volume of sales in 2020, despite the temporary factory closures, by selling from stocks, as this particular industry is characterised by very high levels of stocks (around 50 % of production). Accordingly stocks registered a reduction in 2020 and in the IP (see recital (325)).

| (387) | Therefore, as demand remained stable and the Union industry was able to resume production fast after the closures and use its stock to maintain its sales volume, the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Union industry were limited and did not attenuate the causal link established with the dumped imports from India and Türkiye. |
| --- | --- |

(387)

Therefore, as demand remained stable and the Union industry was able to resume production fast after the closures and use its stock to maintain its sales volume, the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Union industry were limited and did not attenuate the causal link established with the dumped imports from India and Türkiye.

| (388) | Following final disclosure, the GoI, GoT, CGCSA, Sogutsen Seramik and Yurtbay Seramik reiterated that the inury was caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and claimed that the Commission did not examine its impact sufficiently. CGCSA submitted that the Commission failed to collect quantitative data to examine the effects of Covid-19. |
| --- | --- |

(388)

Following final disclosure, the GoI, GoT, CGCSA, Sogutsen Seramik and Yurtbay Seramik reiterated that the inury was caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and claimed that the Commission did not examine its impact sufficiently. CGCSA submitted that the Commission failed to collect quantitative data to examine the effects of Covid-19.

| (389) | The claim that injury was caused by the Covid-19 pandemic was already addressed in recitals (383) to (387). The Commission examined the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the performance of the Union industry both on the supply side and the demand side, both at the level of the whole Union industry and also at the level of the sampled Union producers (see recitals (384) and (385)). The Commission collected data on all injury indicators and examined the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on that basis. It acknowledged that the pandemic had a clear impact on the production volumes of the Union industry, that recovered quickly, and on their level of stocks, but a negligible one on sales volume, costs, imports and consumption. Moreover, the Commission collected additional information on the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic from the sampled Union producers, such as the duration of the closures for those companies that closed or the measures they took regarding the workforce. Interested parties have not provided any new evidence or arguments that could change these conclusions, nor any evidence of what other data the Commission should have collected or analysed. Consequently, the Commission dismissed these claims. |
| --- | --- |

(389)

The claim that injury was caused by the Covid-19 pandemic was already addressed in recitals (383) to (387). The Commission examined the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the performance of the Union industry both on the supply side and the demand side, both at the level of the whole Union industry and also at the level of the sampled Union producers (see recitals (384) and (385)). The Commission collected data on all injury indicators and examined the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on that basis. It acknowledged that the pandemic had a clear impact on the production volumes of the Union industry, that recovered quickly, and on their level of stocks, but a negligible one on sales volume, costs, imports and consumption. Moreover, the Commission collected additional information on the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic from the sampled Union producers, such as the duration of the closures for those companies that closed or the measures they took regarding the workforce. Interested parties have not provided any new evidence or arguments that could change these conclusions, nor any evidence of what other data the Commission should have collected or analysed. Consequently, the Commission dismissed these claims.

5.3.   Conclusion on causation

Conclusion on causation

| (390) | The Commission established a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from India and Türkiye. The increase of dumped imports from the countries concerned coincided with a decrease of the Union industry’s market share in the Union market. Most of the growing demand in the Union was taken up by the imports. The increase of imports from the countries concerned was based on low, dumped prices that were below the cost of production of the Union industry, significantly undercut the Union industry sales prices in the Union market and prevented the Union industry from setting prices at sustainable levels necessary to achieve reasonable profit margins. |
| --- | --- |

(390)

The Commission established a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from India and Türkiye. The increase of dumped imports from the countries concerned coincided with a decrease of the Union industry’s market share in the Union market. Most of the growing demand in the Union was taken up by the imports. The increase of imports from the countries concerned was based on low, dumped prices that were below the cost of production of the Union industry, significantly undercut the Union industry sales prices in the Union market and prevented the Union industry from setting prices at sustainable levels necessary to achieve reasonable profit margins.

| (391) | The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. The effect of non-dumped imports, of the export performance of the Union industry, of the evolution of the Union consumption, of the evolution of the Union industry’s cost of production and of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Union industry’s negative performance concerning its market share and profitability was only limited. |
| --- | --- |

(391)

The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. The effect of non-dumped imports, of the export performance of the Union industry, of the evolution of the Union consumption, of the evolution of the Union industry’s cost of production and of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Union industry’s negative performance concerning its market share and profitability was only limited.

| (392) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury. |
| --- | --- |

(392)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury.

| (393) | Following final disclosure, the GoI pointed out with regard to the conclusions on causation that the Union industry experienced losses already in 2018 when Indian imports were negligible. In addition, as the Indian imports grew, the profitability situation of the Union producers improved too. Therefore, according to the GoI, there was no causal link between Indian imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(393)

Following final disclosure, the GoI pointed out with regard to the conclusions on causation that the Union industry experienced losses already in 2018 when Indian imports were negligible. In addition, as the Indian imports grew, the profitability situation of the Union producers improved too. Therefore, according to the GoI, there was no causal link between Indian imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

| (394) | The Commission noted that the impact of imports from India and Türkiye was assessed cumulatively, not individually. In any case, the investigation established that Indian dumped imports more than doubled from 2018 to the investigation period. This increase was based on dumped prices that were below the cost of production of the Union industry throughout the period considered. Faced with this increase, the Union industry both lost sales to the dumped imports and, to avoid losing further sales, could not set its prices at levels necessary to achieve reasonable profit margins. Therefore, there is a clear causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry. Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claim. |
| --- | --- |

(394)

The Commission noted that the impact of imports from India and Türkiye was assessed cumulatively, not individually. In any case, the investigation established that Indian dumped imports more than doubled from 2018 to the investigation period. This increase was based on dumped prices that were below the cost of production of the Union industry throughout the period considered. Faced with this increase, the Union industry both lost sales to the dumped imports and, to avoid losing further sales, could not set its prices at levels necessary to achieve reasonable profit margins. Therefore, there is a clear causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry. Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claim.

| (395) | Following the analysis of comments received after final disclosure, the Commission confirmed its findings concerning causation. |
| --- | --- |

(395)

Following the analysis of comments received after final disclosure, the Commission confirmed its findings concerning causation.

6.   LEVEL OF MEASURES

LEVEL OF MEASURES

| (396) | To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(396)

To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.

6.1.   Injury margin

Injury margin

| (397) | The injury would be removed if the Union industry were able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(397)

The injury would be removed if the Union industry were able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.

| (398) | In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the countries under investigation, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %. |
| --- | --- |

(398)

In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the countries under investigation, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

| (399) | Neither the complainant nor any of the sampled Union producers made any substantiated claim regarding the level of the target profit. |
| --- | --- |

(399)

Neither the complainant nor any of the sampled Union producers made any substantiated claim regarding the level of the target profit.

| (400) | The complaint used a target profit of 6 %, the minimum provided for in Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, and provided no evidence that it should be set at a higher level. The complaint merely stated that the complainant expected the underselling calculation during the investigation to be based on a higher target profit reflecting significantly higher environmental costs expected in the Union during the period of application of the measures. However, future environmental costs are not a factor for the determination of the target profit according to Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation. Indeed, these costs are reflected in the final target price according to Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(400)

The complaint used a target profit of 6 %, the minimum provided for in Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, and provided no evidence that it should be set at a higher level. The complaint merely stated that the complainant expected the underselling calculation during the investigation to be based on a higher target profit reflecting significantly higher environmental costs expected in the Union during the period of application of the measures. However, future environmental costs are not a factor for the determination of the target profit according to Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation. Indeed, these costs are reflected in the final target price according to Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.

| (401) | Only two sampled Union producers commented on the appropriate level of the target profit. One of them proposed using a target profit of [6 – 7 %], the profit it achieved in 2018, when the presence of the dumped imports was lower. The second sampled Union producer stated it was unable to provide an answer as it had been competing with imports from India and Türkiye throughout the period considered and even before. |
| --- | --- |

(401)

Only two sampled Union producers commented on the appropriate level of the target profit. One of them proposed using a target profit of [6 – 7 %], the profit it achieved in 2018, when the presence of the dumped imports was lower. The second sampled Union producer stated it was unable to provide an answer as it had been competing with imports from India and Türkiye throughout the period considered and even before.

| (402) | Given the fragmentation of the EU industry, the profit of a single sampled Union producer in a given year is not sufficient basis to establish the target profit for the whole Union industry. Moreover, imports from the countries concerned were already present in the market in 2018 at prices below the Union industry’s cost of production, and the Union industry was loss-making. |
| --- | --- |

(402)

Given the fragmentation of the EU industry, the profit of a single sampled Union producer in a given year is not sufficient basis to establish the target profit for the whole Union industry. Moreover, imports from the countries concerned were already present in the market in 2018 at prices below the Union industry’s cost of production, and the Union industry was loss-making.

| (403) | Indeed, as shown in Tables 2 and 10, the Union industry was loss-making or barely breaking even throughout the period considered, while the presence of imports from the countries concerned was already significant in 2018 and increased steadily. None of these years would therefore qualify for providing a target profit in line with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(403)

Indeed, as shown in Tables 2 and 10, the Union industry was loss-making or barely breaking even throughout the period considered, while the presence of imports from the countries concerned was already significant in 2018 and increased steadily. None of these years would therefore qualify for providing a target profit in line with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation.

| (404) | No sampled Union producer provided a calculation of the profitability of the product under investigation for ten years before the initiation of the investigation, as asked in the questionnaire. The Commission also took note of the target profit established for this industry in the ceramic tiles investigation against China (3,9 %), that however dates back to 2010 (34), as well as the profitability achieved by the Union industry in the period considered for the expiry review investigation on imports originating in China, throughout which the Union industry was loss-making (35). |
| --- | --- |

(404)

No sampled Union producer provided a calculation of the profitability of the product under investigation for ten years before the initiation of the investigation, as asked in the questionnaire. The Commission also took note of the target profit established for this industry in the ceramic tiles investigation against China (3,9 %), that however dates back to 2010 (34), as well as the profitability achieved by the Union industry in the period considered for the expiry review investigation on imports originating in China, throughout which the Union industry was loss-making (35).

34

35

| (405) | Finally, none of the sampled producers made a substantiated claim or provided any evidence that their level of investments, research and development (‘R&D’) and innovation during the period considered would have been higher under normal conditions of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(405)

Finally, none of the sampled producers made a substantiated claim or provided any evidence that their level of investments, research and development (‘R&D’) and innovation during the period considered would have been higher under normal conditions of competition.

| (406) | In view of the above facts, the Commission resorted to the use of the minimum target profit of 6 % as per Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation. This target profit margin was added to the Union industry’s actual cost of production to establish the non-injurious price. |
| --- | --- |

(406)

In view of the above facts, the Commission resorted to the use of the minimum target profit of 6 % as per Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation. This target profit margin was added to the Union industry’s actual cost of production to establish the non-injurious price.

| (407) | In accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia of the basic Regulation that the Union industry would incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. Based on the evidence available (based on the companies’ accounting systems, their reporting tools and forecasts), the Commission established an additional cost in a range between 0,06 to 0,65 EUR/m2. |
| --- | --- |

(407)

In accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia of the basic Regulation that the Union industry would incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. Based on the evidence available (based on the companies’ accounting systems, their reporting tools and forecasts), the Commission established an additional cost in a range between 0,06 to 0,65 EUR/m2.

2

| (408) | This cost comprised the additional future cost to ensure compliance with the Union Emissions Trading System (‘EU ETS’). The EU ETS is a cornerstone of the Union’s policy to comply with Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Such additional cost was calculated on the basis of the estimated price of the Union Allowances (‘EUAs’) which will have to be purchased during the period of the application of the measures. The additional costs also took account of indirect CO2 costs stemming from an increase in electricity prices over the same period linked to the EU ETS and the forecasted prices of EUAs. |
| --- | --- |

(408)

This cost comprised the additional future cost to ensure compliance with the Union Emissions Trading System (‘EU ETS’). The EU ETS is a cornerstone of the Union’s policy to comply with Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Such additional cost was calculated on the basis of the estimated price of the Union Allowances (‘EUAs’) which will have to be purchased during the period of the application of the measures. The additional costs also took account of indirect CO2 costs stemming from an increase in electricity prices over the same period linked to the EU ETS and the forecasted prices of EUAs.

2

| (409) | On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price for the like product of the Union industry by applying the target profit margin (see recital (406)) to the cost of production of the sampled Union producers during the investigation period and then adding the adjustments under Article 7(2d) on a type-by-type basis. |
| --- | --- |

(409)

On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price for the like product of the Union industry by applying the target profit margin (see recital (406)) to the cost of production of the sampled Union producers during the investigation period and then adding the adjustments under Article 7(2d) on a type-by-type basis.

| (410) | The Commission then determined the injury margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in India and Türkiye, excluding the cooperating exporting producers that were not found to be dumping, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value. |
| --- | --- |

(410)

The Commission then determined the injury margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in India and Türkiye, excluding the cooperating exporting producers that were not found to be dumping, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

| (411) | The injury elimination level for ‘other cooperating companies’ and for ‘all other companies’ is defined in the same manner as the dumping margin for these companies (see recitals (203) to (207) and (256) to (258)).








  Country | Company | Dumping margin | Injury margin |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| India | The Conor Group | 8,7 % | 168,7  % |
| India | The Icon Group | 6,7 % | 92,7 % |
| India | Other cooperating companies | 7,3  % | 115,8  % |
| India | All other companies | 8,7  % | 168,7  % |
| Türkiye | Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | 20,9  % | 150,6  % |
| Türkiye | Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.,
  Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş. | 4,8  % | 80,8  % |
| Türkiye | Other cooperating companies | 9,2  % | 100,5 % |
| Türkiye | All other companies | 20,9 % | 150,6  % |

(411)

The injury elimination level for ‘other cooperating companies’ and for ‘all other companies’ is defined in the same manner as the dumping margin for these companies (see recitals (203) to (207) and (256) to (258)).

Country

Company

Dumping margin

Injury margin

India

The Conor Group

8,7 %

168,7  %

India

The Icon Group

6,7 %

92,7 %

India

Other cooperating companies

7,3  %

115,8  %

India

All other companies

8,7  %

168,7  %

Türkiye

Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

20,9  %

150,6  %

Türkiye

Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.,

Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.

4,8  %

80,8  %

Türkiye

Other cooperating companies

9,2  %

100,5 %

Türkiye

All other companies

20,9 %

150,6  %

| (412) | Following final disclosure, the GoT claimed that the injury elimination margins were distorted by taking into consideration future compliance cost. The GoT enquired about how such cost was reflected in the calculation and whether potential introduction of the carbon border adjustment mechanism was taken into account. In this respect, CGCSA argued that an adjustment for future compliance cost was not compatible with WTO standards. |
| --- | --- |

(412)

Following final disclosure, the GoT claimed that the injury elimination margins were distorted by taking into consideration future compliance cost. The GoT enquired about how such cost was reflected in the calculation and whether potential introduction of the carbon border adjustment mechanism was taken into account. In this respect, CGCSA argued that an adjustment for future compliance cost was not compatible with WTO standards.

| (413) | In addition, CGCSA submitted that high levels of underselling confirmed the inclusion in the sample of Union producers manufacturing artisanal or special design products. |
| --- | --- |

(413)

In addition, CGCSA submitted that high levels of underselling confirmed the inclusion in the sample of Union producers manufacturing artisanal or special design products.

| (414) | Finally, CGCSA claimed that brand is an important factor in pricing decisions. Therefore, an adjustment for brand should be made when comparing the import prices of Turkish producers with the non-injurious prices of Union producers. To support this claim, CGCSA referred to the average export price of Italian and Spanish producers where the average export price of Italian producers was higher than the average export price of ceramic tiles exported from Spain. The interested party used trade statistics for the comparison. |
| --- | --- |

(414)

Finally, CGCSA claimed that brand is an important factor in pricing decisions. Therefore, an adjustment for brand should be made when comparing the import prices of Turkish producers with the non-injurious prices of Union producers. To support this claim, CGCSA referred to the average export price of Italian and Spanish producers where the average export price of Italian producers was higher than the average export price of ceramic tiles exported from Spain. The interested party used trade statistics for the comparison.

| (415) | The GoT’s claim concerning future compliance cost was reiterated after the additional partial disclosure. |
| --- | --- |

(415)

The GoT’s claim concerning future compliance cost was reiterated after the additional partial disclosure.

| (416) | The Commission noted that the inclusion of future compliance cost in the calculation of the injury elimination level was in line with the provisions of Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation. The parties failed to specify which provisions of WTO ADA the Commission allegedly breached by considering them for the non-injurious price. |
| --- | --- |

(416)

The Commission noted that the inclusion of future compliance cost in the calculation of the injury elimination level was in line with the provisions of Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation. The parties failed to specify which provisions of WTO ADA the Commission allegedly breached by considering them for the non-injurious price.

| (417) | To establish the value of such adjustment to the actual cost of production, the Commission compared the unit compliance cost in the IP with the estimated unit compliance cost in the following five years. The average excess value of such unit cost was added to the actual cost of production used in the calculation of non-injurious price. In the present case, the effect of future compliance cost was minor, representing on average approximately 3 % of the non-injurious price. Consequently, the Commission rejected the GoT’s claim that the calculation of the injury elimination level was distorted. |
| --- | --- |

(417)

To establish the value of such adjustment to the actual cost of production, the Commission compared the unit compliance cost in the IP with the estimated unit compliance cost in the following five years. The average excess value of such unit cost was added to the actual cost of production used in the calculation of non-injurious price. In the present case, the effect of future compliance cost was minor, representing on average approximately 3 % of the non-injurious price. Consequently, the Commission rejected the GoT’s claim that the calculation of the injury elimination level was distorted.

| (418) | Further, the assertions made by Turkish interested parties with regard to the composition of the sample of Union producers were already addressed in recitals (70) to (74) and (299). |
| --- | --- |

(418)

Further, the assertions made by Turkish interested parties with regard to the composition of the sample of Union producers were already addressed in recitals (70) to (74) and (299).

| (419) | Finally, the Commission noted that neither CGCSA nor any sampled exporting producer requested an adjustment for brand during the investigation. Therefore, the Commission was not able to take position on the respective CGCSA’s claim. In any case, a simple comparison of export prices by Italian and Spanish producers could not be considered as supporting the party’s claim. The differences might have been caused by a number of other factors such as the exported product mix. |
| --- | --- |

(419)

Finally, the Commission noted that neither CGCSA nor any sampled exporting producer requested an adjustment for brand during the investigation. Therefore, the Commission was not able to take position on the respective CGCSA’s claim. In any case, a simple comparison of export prices by Italian and Spanish producers could not be considered as supporting the party’s claim. The differences might have been caused by a number of other factors such as the exported product mix.

| (420) | Consequently, the Commission rejected the claims concerning the determination of the injury elimination level described in recitals (412) to (414). |
| --- | --- |

(420)

Consequently, the Commission rejected the claims concerning the determination of the injury elimination level described in recitals (412) to (414).

6.2.   Conclusion on the level of measures

Conclusion on the level of measures

| (421) | Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation:







  Country | Company | Definitive anti-dumping duty |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| India | The Conor Group | 8,7 % |
| India | The Icon Group | 6,7  % |
| India | Other cooperating companies | 7,3  % |
| India | All other companies | 8,7  % |
| Türkiye | Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | 20,9  % |
| Türkiye | Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.,
  Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş. | 4,8  % |
| Türkiye | Other cooperating companies | 9,2  % |
| Türkiye | All other companies | 20,9  % |

(421)

Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation:

Country

Company

Definitive anti-dumping duty

India

The Conor Group

8,7 %

India

The Icon Group

6,7  %

India

Other cooperating companies

7,3  %

India

All other companies

8,7  %

Türkiye

Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

20,9  %

Türkiye

Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.,

Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.

4,8  %

Türkiye

Other cooperating companies

9,2  %

Türkiye

All other companies

20,9  %

7.   UNION INTEREST

UNION INTEREST

| (422) | The Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, users, and consumers. |
| --- | --- |

(422)

The Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, users, and consumers.

| (423) | Following final disclosure, the GoI, GoT, the Turkish companies Seramiksan and Sogutsen Seramik, sixteen Indian exporting producers, and Ceramika Netto claimed that the Commission did not conduct a fair and complete Union interest test. Their claims are addressed in the respective sections below. |
| --- | --- |

(423)

Following final disclosure, the GoI, GoT, the Turkish companies Seramiksan and Sogutsen Seramik, sixteen Indian exporting producers, and Ceramika Netto claimed that the Commission did not conduct a fair and complete Union interest test. Their claims are addressed in the respective sections below.

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

Interest of the Union industry

| (424) | The Union industry is composed of more than 300 producers in 24 Member States and employs directly over 54 500 people (FTE). The main producing Member States, representing over 85% of total EU production, are Spain, Italy and Poland. As mentioned in recital (59), the Union industry is fragmented; the majority of producers, over 240, are small and medium enterprises (‘SMEs’). As stated in recital (11), over 30% of the total EU production expressly supported the initiation of the investigation and no Union producer expressed opposition or a neutral position. There was also wide support for the investigation by national associations that cooperated with the investigation by providing data to the complainant. |
| --- | --- |

(424)

The Union industry is composed of more than 300 producers in 24 Member States and employs directly over 54 500 people (FTE). The main producing Member States, representing over 85% of total EU production, are Spain, Italy and Poland. As mentioned in recital (59), the Union industry is fragmented; the majority of producers, over 240, are small and medium enterprises (‘SMEs’). As stated in recital (11), over 30% of the total EU production expressly supported the initiation of the investigation and no Union producer expressed opposition or a neutral position. There was also wide support for the investigation by national associations that cooperated with the investigation by providing data to the complainant.

| (425) | The investigation has shown that the Union industry is suffering material injury due to the dumped imports from India and Türkiye. As concluded in sections 4 and 5, the situation of the whole Union industry deteriorated as a result the increasing quantities of dumped imports from India and Türkiye at low prices. Those imports at such prices have constantly gained market share in the Union at the expense of the Union industry and prevented the Union industry from raising its prices to reasonably profitable levels that would allow it to reach the target profit. |
| --- | --- |

(425)

The investigation has shown that the Union industry is suffering material injury due to the dumped imports from India and Türkiye. As concluded in sections 4 and 5, the situation of the whole Union industry deteriorated as a result the increasing quantities of dumped imports from India and Türkiye at low prices. Those imports at such prices have constantly gained market share in the Union at the expense of the Union industry and prevented the Union industry from raising its prices to reasonably profitable levels that would allow it to reach the target profit.

| (426) | Anti-dumping measures against imports from India and Türkiye are expected to restore fair trade conditions on the Union market. This is expected to enable the Union industry to regain the some of the market share lost to dumped imports and do it at fair prices, improving its profit levels, which in turn would allow the industry to increase their investments. Indeed, investment is critical in this industry not only for maintenance, but also for innovation and investment in developing segments like large slabs. As a result of the measures, Union producers are expected to recover from the injurious situation, further invest and fulfil their commitments, including social and environmental ones. |
| --- | --- |

(426)

Anti-dumping measures against imports from India and Türkiye are expected to restore fair trade conditions on the Union market. This is expected to enable the Union industry to regain the some of the market share lost to dumped imports and do it at fair prices, improving its profit levels, which in turn would allow the industry to increase their investments. Indeed, investment is critical in this industry not only for maintenance, but also for innovation and investment in developing segments like large slabs. As a result of the measures, Union producers are expected to recover from the injurious situation, further invest and fulfil their commitments, including social and environmental ones.

| (427) | The non-imposition of measures would worsen the already materially injured situation of the Union industry, which is not strong enough to further withstand an increase of dumped imports at prices even below the Union industry’s costs of production. Should measures not be imposed, it can be expected that the increase of imports of dumped, low-priced ceramic tiles from India and Türkiye would continue. In that situation, the Union industry would be unable to raise its prices to profitable levels and would keep on losing sales to the dumped imports. |
| --- | --- |

(427)

The non-imposition of measures would worsen the already materially injured situation of the Union industry, which is not strong enough to further withstand an increase of dumped imports at prices even below the Union industry’s costs of production. Should measures not be imposed, it can be expected that the increase of imports of dumped, low-priced ceramic tiles from India and Türkiye would continue. In that situation, the Union industry would be unable to raise its prices to profitable levels and would keep on losing sales to the dumped imports.

| (428) | The Commission therefore concluded that the imposition of measures is in the interest of the Union Industry. |
| --- | --- |

(428)

The Commission therefore concluded that the imposition of measures is in the interest of the Union Industry.

7.2.   Interest of unrelated importers

Interest of unrelated importers

| (429) | On the date of initiation, more than 900 known importers (36) in the Union were contacted and invited to cooperate in the investigation. As explained in recitals (98) and (99), only two unrelated importers cooperated. Both companies replied to the Commission’s deficiency letter following the analysis of their questionnaires, but later stopped cooperating as none of them agreed to an on-spot verification or an RCC. The following analysis is based on their questionnaire replies and their replies to the deficiency letters, and the Commission’s own research (37). |
| --- | --- |

(429)

On the date of initiation, more than 900 known importers (36) in the Union were contacted and invited to cooperate in the investigation. As explained in recitals (98) and (99), only two unrelated importers cooperated. Both companies replied to the Commission’s deficiency letter following the analysis of their questionnaires, but later stopped cooperating as none of them agreed to an on-spot verification or an RCC. The following analysis is based on their questionnaire replies and their replies to the deficiency letters, and the Commission’s own research (37).

36

37

| (430) | Those two importers accounted for [3-4] % of the imports from the countries concerned in the investigation period, with India representing the bulk of their imports from the countries concerned. For one of them, the product under investigation was most of its activity in terms of turnover, while for the second, it represented about 1/4. The share of imports from the countries concerned in their total purchases was around 1/4. Both of them purchased significant quantities from Union producers in the investigation period and in 2020, and some smaller quantities from third countries other than the countries concerned. Their weighted average profitability related to the product under investigation, established as explained in recital (429) is in the range of [5-7%]. |
| --- | --- |

(430)

Those two importers accounted for [3-4] % of the imports from the countries concerned in the investigation period, with India representing the bulk of their imports from the countries concerned. For one of them, the product under investigation was most of its activity in terms of turnover, while for the second, it represented about 1/4. The share of imports from the countries concerned in their total purchases was around 1/4. Both of them purchased significant quantities from Union producers in the investigation period and in 2020, and some smaller quantities from third countries other than the countries concerned. Their weighted average profitability related to the product under investigation, established as explained in recital (429) is in the range of [5-7%].

| (431) | Based on the above, while from a pure cost perspective any duty would have an impact on the activity of unrelated importers, given the level of the duties, the impact of the duty on the profit margins of the importers, and of those for which trading in ceramic tiles is not their only activity, would be limited, even if they had to absorb it completely. Finally, the investigation has shown that unrelated importers can also source non-dumped imports from other third countries and from the Union, as they did in 2020 and the investigation period. As shown in tables 1 and 4, the Union industry has sufficient capacity to cover demand in the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(431)

Based on the above, while from a pure cost perspective any duty would have an impact on the activity of unrelated importers, given the level of the duties, the impact of the duty on the profit margins of the importers, and of those for which trading in ceramic tiles is not their only activity, would be limited, even if they had to absorb it completely. Finally, the investigation has shown that unrelated importers can also source non-dumped imports from other third countries and from the Union, as they did in 2020 and the investigation period. As shown in tables 1 and 4, the Union industry has sufficient capacity to cover demand in the Union.

| (432) | On the other hand, not imposing measures would worsen the materially injured situation of the Union industry as explained in recital (427). To be noted that, unlike importers, the Union industry barely made profits during the investigation period. Moreover, as importers rely on both the Union industry and other sources for their purchases, allowing imports to continue entering the Union at dumped prices at the expense of the Union industry would also affect their sources of supply. |
| --- | --- |

(432)

On the other hand, not imposing measures would worsen the materially injured situation of the Union industry as explained in recital (427). To be noted that, unlike importers, the Union industry barely made profits during the investigation period. Moreover, as importers rely on both the Union industry and other sources for their purchases, allowing imports to continue entering the Union at dumped prices at the expense of the Union industry would also affect their sources of supply.

| (433) | On this basis, the Commission concluded that the effect of the measures on unrelated importers would be limited. |
| --- | --- |

(433)

On this basis, the Commission concluded that the effect of the measures on unrelated importers would be limited.

| (434) | Following final disclosure, Seramiksan submitted that the Union interest test was affected by the fact that the Commission did not receive any information from and examine the interests of approximately 900 importers in the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(434)

Following final disclosure, Seramiksan submitted that the Union interest test was affected by the fact that the Commission did not receive any information from and examine the interests of approximately 900 importers in the Union.

| (435) | The Commission noted that it informed all known Union importers about the initiation of the investigation. The Commission analysed and took into account information submitted by all those companies that decided to cooperate or sent submissions. Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claim. |
| --- | --- |

(435)

The Commission noted that it informed all known Union importers about the initiation of the investigation. The Commission analysed and took into account information submitted by all those companies that decided to cooperate or sent submissions. Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claim.

| (436) | Following final disclosure, a number of Union importers indicated that the imposition of measures on imports from Türkiye would cause harm to them as they invested in the development of new collections in cooperation with the Turkish producers. |
| --- | --- |

(436)

Following final disclosure, a number of Union importers indicated that the imposition of measures on imports from Türkiye would cause harm to them as they invested in the development of new collections in cooperation with the Turkish producers.

| (437) | The Commission noted that those Union importers did not cooperate at an earlier stage of the investigation and did not submit any factual information that would enable the Commission to assess the impact of the measures on those interested parties. In addition, based on comments received from Turkish sampled exporting producers after final disclosure, one Turkish exporting producer was found not to be dumping and the average level of the measures applicable to imports from Türkiye decreased. Thus, the Commission maintained that the effect of the duties on Union importers will be limited. |
| --- | --- |

(437)

The Commission noted that those Union importers did not cooperate at an earlier stage of the investigation and did not submit any factual information that would enable the Commission to assess the impact of the measures on those interested parties. In addition, based on comments received from Turkish sampled exporting producers after final disclosure, one Turkish exporting producer was found not to be dumping and the average level of the measures applicable to imports from Türkiye decreased. Thus, the Commission maintained that the effect of the duties on Union importers will be limited.

| (438) | Ceramika Netto made also several procedural claims following final disclosure. |
| --- | --- |

(438)

Ceramika Netto made also several procedural claims following final disclosure.

| (439) | The company argued that the Commission incorrectly used terms like “so-called” or “labelling themselves as” manufacturers. The company submitted that it was recognised as manufacturer under the Union law, in particular under Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (38). |
| --- | --- |

(439)

The company argued that the Commission incorrectly used terms like “so-called” or “labelling themselves as” manufacturers. The company submitted that it was recognised as manufacturer under the Union law, in particular under Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (38).

38

| (440) | The Commission noted that the definitions used in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 305/2011 as per that article were only applicable to matters governed by that regulation. This investigation was conducted under the basic Regulation. Therefore, the definition of a manufacturer laid down by Regulation (EU) 305/2011 did not apply in this proceeding. In fact, according to the information available to the Commission, the company was a Union importer. |
| --- | --- |

(440)

The Commission noted that the definitions used in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 305/2011 as per that article were only applicable to matters governed by that regulation. This investigation was conducted under the basic Regulation. Therefore, the definition of a manufacturer laid down by Regulation (EU) 305/2011 did not apply in this proceeding. In fact, according to the information available to the Commission, the company was a Union importer.

| (441) | Ceramika Netto disagreed with the Commission’s statements in recital (461) concerning the price at which it imported to be dumped. In this respect, the company referred to domestic sales invoices and export sales invoices of its Indian suppliers provided to the Commission that, according to the company, proved that its import prices were not dumped. |
| --- | --- |

(441)

Ceramika Netto disagreed with the Commission’s statements in recital (461) concerning the price at which it imported to be dumped. In this respect, the company referred to domestic sales invoices and export sales invoices of its Indian suppliers provided to the Commission that, according to the company, proved that its import prices were not dumped.

| (442) | The Commission recalled that the investigation of dumping behaviour was conducted on a sample of Indian exporting producers. Therefore, any sales invoices submitted by Ceramika Netto were irrelevant for the findings of dumping. In recital (272), the Commission concluded that its findings regarding Conor Group and Icon Group could be extended country-wide. Consequently, those findings applied to imports from Ceramika Netto’s Indian suppliers. |
| --- | --- |

(442)

The Commission recalled that the investigation of dumping behaviour was conducted on a sample of Indian exporting producers. Therefore, any sales invoices submitted by Ceramika Netto were irrelevant for the findings of dumping. In recital (272), the Commission concluded that its findings regarding Conor Group and Icon Group could be extended country-wide. Consequently, those findings applied to imports from Ceramika Netto’s Indian suppliers.

| (443) | Ceramika Netto disagreed with the Commission’s assessment that it was a non-cooperating company. The company argued that the Notice of Initiation enabled it to submit information not only in the form of a questionnaire reply but also in free format. Ceramika Netto further claimed that the Commission should have informed the company about any information it was missing in the free-format submission. |
| --- | --- |

(443)

Ceramika Netto disagreed with the Commission’s assessment that it was a non-cooperating company. The company argued that the Notice of Initiation enabled it to submit information not only in the form of a questionnaire reply but also in free format. Ceramika Netto further claimed that the Commission should have informed the company about any information it was missing in the free-format submission.

| (444) | As noted in recital (440), Ceramika Netto is an importer for the purposes of this investigation. As noted in recitals (75) to (77) the company did not request to be considered as a cooperating importer. The Commission confirmed that, as a Union importer, the company had the option to submit information concerning Union interest in free format. It must be however noted that such information is not subject to deficiency process unlike a full questionnaire reply. The Commission was not obliged to request additional information, in particular as the type of information sought by the Commission was made publicly available via the questionnaires at initiation. |
| --- | --- |

(444)

As noted in recital (440), Ceramika Netto is an importer for the purposes of this investigation. As noted in recitals (75) to (77) the company did not request to be considered as a cooperating importer. The Commission confirmed that, as a Union importer, the company had the option to submit information concerning Union interest in free format. It must be however noted that such information is not subject to deficiency process unlike a full questionnaire reply. The Commission was not obliged to request additional information, in particular as the type of information sought by the Commission was made publicly available via the questionnaires at initiation.

7.3.   Interest of users and consumers

Interest of users and consumers

| (445) | On the date of initiation, the Commission contacted eight associations of users of ceramic tiles in the Union. None of them cooperated in the investigation or sent any submission. Notably, the construction sector, one of the biggest users of ceramic tiles in the Union, did not send any submission. The low level of cooperation from users would suggest that the sector does not rely on imports from the countries concerned or that anti-dumping duties would not have a significant impact on their activities. |
| --- | --- |

(445)

On the date of initiation, the Commission contacted eight associations of users of ceramic tiles in the Union. None of them cooperated in the investigation or sent any submission. Notably, the construction sector, one of the biggest users of ceramic tiles in the Union, did not send any submission. The low level of cooperation from users would suggest that the sector does not rely on imports from the countries concerned or that anti-dumping duties would not have a significant impact on their activities.

| (446) | The Commission also contacted nine distributors. Only one of them, OBI Group Holding SE & Co, KGaA, agreed to cooperate. For the reasons explained in recital (76), the Commission considered that the company should be investigated as a user/trader of the product under investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(446)

The Commission also contacted nine distributors. Only one of them, OBI Group Holding SE & Co, KGaA, agreed to cooperate. For the reasons explained in recital (76), the Commission considered that the company should be investigated as a user/trader of the product under investigation.

| (447) | The company opposes the imposition of measures and stated that the large production capacities in India and Türkiye cannot be fully replaced by EU producers, but it did not provide any supporting evidence for this statement. As shown in tables 1 and 4, the Union industry has enough capacity to meet EU demand. The company acknowledged the possibility of switching suppliers. |
| --- | --- |

(447)

The company opposes the imposition of measures and stated that the large production capacities in India and Türkiye cannot be fully replaced by EU producers, but it did not provide any supporting evidence for this statement. As shown in tables 1 and 4, the Union industry has enough capacity to meet EU demand. The company acknowledged the possibility of switching suppliers.

| (448) | The company purchases ceramic tiles from India and Türkiye mainly from independent importers acting as wholesalers and then resells them via its own large-scale stores and franchising partners. More than half of its purchases of ceramic tiles are Union products. Its profitability deriving from ceramic tiles is [1,5% - 3%], lower than its average profitability. Ceramic tiles represent only a very small part of the total company’s turnover. Therefore, and for the same reasons outlined in recitals (431) and (432), the Commission concluded that the impact on this company would be very limited. |
| --- | --- |

(448)

The company purchases ceramic tiles from India and Türkiye mainly from independent importers acting as wholesalers and then resells them via its own large-scale stores and franchising partners. More than half of its purchases of ceramic tiles are Union products. Its profitability deriving from ceramic tiles is [1,5% - 3%], lower than its average profitability. Ceramic tiles represent only a very small part of the total company’s turnover. Therefore, and for the same reasons outlined in recitals (431) and (432), the Commission concluded that the impact on this company would be very limited.

| (449) | On this basis, and also given the low level of cooperation, the Commission concluded that the effect of the measures on users and traders would be limited. |
| --- | --- |

(449)

On this basis, and also given the low level of cooperation, the Commission concluded that the effect of the measures on users and traders would be limited.

| (450) | No association of consumers cooperated in the investigation. In its response to the questionnaire requesting the macro-indicators of the Union industry, CET submitted that it expects the impact on companies operating in the downstream markets – namely distributors and users/consumers – to be very limited, given the alternative sources of supply, and the findings of past investigations on ceramic tiles, that confirmed that ceramic tiles have a marginal bearing on final costs in the construction sector (39) and that the imposition of measures translates in limited price increases for the final consumer (40). |
| --- | --- |

(450)

No association of consumers cooperated in the investigation. In its response to the questionnaire requesting the macro-indicators of the Union industry, CET submitted that it expects the impact on companies operating in the downstream markets – namely distributors and users/consumers – to be very limited, given the alternative sources of supply, and the findings of past investigations on ceramic tiles, that confirmed that ceramic tiles have a marginal bearing on final costs in the construction sector (39) and that the imposition of measures translates in limited price increases for the final consumer (40).

39

40

| (451) | The current investigation has confirmed the existence of alternative sources of supply other than India and Türkiye, as importers source from the Union and also from third countries other than India and Türkiye (see recitals (430) and (431)). In the absence of any substantiated submission from any consumer association, the Commission cannot accurately assess the impact, if any, that the duties would have on the final consumers, and there is no evidence suggesting that the findings of past investigation would not apply to this one. Also, given the level of the duties, even in case of price increases, these would rather have a limited impact on consumers. |
| --- | --- |

(451)

The current investigation has confirmed the existence of alternative sources of supply other than India and Türkiye, as importers source from the Union and also from third countries other than India and Türkiye (see recitals (430) and (431)). In the absence of any substantiated submission from any consumer association, the Commission cannot accurately assess the impact, if any, that the duties would have on the final consumers, and there is no evidence suggesting that the findings of past investigation would not apply to this one. Also, given the level of the duties, even in case of price increases, these would rather have a limited impact on consumers.

| (452) | On this basis, and also given the low level of cooperation, the Commission concluded that the effect of the measures on consumers would be limited. |
| --- | --- |

(452)

On this basis, and also given the low level of cooperation, the Commission concluded that the effect of the measures on consumers would be limited.

| (453) | Following final disclosure, sixteen Indian exporting producers claimed that the Commission did not take into account the numerous submissions made by Union importers and users. Ceramika Netto also referred to the submissions made by the company on behalf of its customers and trading partners. According to the company, those submissions indicated how harmful the imposition of measures would be to the company, its Indian supplier, Union importers, users and final customers. |
| --- | --- |

(453)

Following final disclosure, sixteen Indian exporting producers claimed that the Commission did not take into account the numerous submissions made by Union importers and users. Ceramika Netto also referred to the submissions made by the company on behalf of its customers and trading partners. According to the company, those submissions indicated how harmful the imposition of measures would be to the company, its Indian supplier, Union importers, users and final customers.

| (454) | The Commission noted that it analysed the numerous submissions referred to by the Indian exporting producers and Ceramika Netto, and those were deficient in several aspects. First, they were made by companies which never registered as interested parties to the investigation. Second, they were submitted to the Commission by Ceramika Netto, an interested party that had not been empowered to act on behalf of those companies. Third, many of the submissions were made after the deadline(s) laid down by the Notice of Initiation. Finally, the submissions were mostly expressing opinions but lacked factual information and evidence that would support the opinions of those companies. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claims. |
| --- | --- |

(454)

The Commission noted that it analysed the numerous submissions referred to by the Indian exporting producers and Ceramika Netto, and those were deficient in several aspects. First, they were made by companies which never registered as interested parties to the investigation. Second, they were submitted to the Commission by Ceramika Netto, an interested party that had not been empowered to act on behalf of those companies. Third, many of the submissions were made after the deadline(s) laid down by the Notice of Initiation. Finally, the submissions were mostly expressing opinions but lacked factual information and evidence that would support the opinions of those companies. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claims.

7.4.   Other factors

Other factors

| (455) | Besides the cooperating parties mentioned above, a number of interested parties made submissions stating that the imposition of measures would be against the Union interest. |
| --- | --- |

(455)

Besides the cooperating parties mentioned above, a number of interested parties made submissions stating that the imposition of measures would be against the Union interest.

| (456) | The following recitals analyse the claims, but, at the outset, the Commission notes that none of these interested parties, allegedly importers or users of ceramic tiles, or even so-called Union manufacturers (see recital (266)) (41), according to their submissions, cooperated with the investigation or sent a questionnaire reply. Their submissions are statements not supported by any evidence. Therefore, the Commission cannot assess how dependent these companies are on imports from the countries concerned or the potential impact of any duty on them. |
| --- | --- |

(456)

The following recitals analyse the claims, but, at the outset, the Commission notes that none of these interested parties, allegedly importers or users of ceramic tiles, or even so-called Union manufacturers (see recital (266)) (41), according to their submissions, cooperated with the investigation or sent a questionnaire reply. Their submissions are statements not supported by any evidence. Therefore, the Commission cannot assess how dependent these companies are on imports from the countries concerned or the potential impact of any duty on them.

41

| (457) | First, these parties pointed to potential supply chain difficulties, also given the current geopolitical events like the war in Ukraine. These parties stated that any duty would force buyers to rely exclusively on the Union industry. According to them it is necessary to keep all importing options open since the Union industry is struggling to cater Union demand and that users cannot rely on the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(457)

First, these parties pointed to potential supply chain difficulties, also given the current geopolitical events like the war in Ukraine. These parties stated that any duty would force buyers to rely exclusively on the Union industry. According to them it is necessary to keep all importing options open since the Union industry is struggling to cater Union demand and that users cannot rely on the Union industry.

| (458) | The claims are dismissed. First, they are unsubstantiated. Second, the investigation revealed that the Union industry has enough capacity to supply the whole Union market. The investigation has also shown that importers and users have recourse to non-dumped imports from third countries other than the countries concerned; in fact, the importers and users that cooperated with the investigation sourced from both the Union industry and third countries other than the countries concerned in 2020 and the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(458)

The claims are dismissed. First, they are unsubstantiated. Second, the investigation revealed that the Union industry has enough capacity to supply the whole Union market. The investigation has also shown that importers and users have recourse to non-dumped imports from third countries other than the countries concerned; in fact, the importers and users that cooperated with the investigation sourced from both the Union industry and third countries other than the countries concerned in 2020 and the investigation period.

| (459) | The Commission acknowledged that it might be difficult to source from Ukraine (a traditional, if minor, source of supply of ceramic tiles to the Union, see table 11). However, as stated in the previous recital, there are still sources of non-dumped imports and those channels are not affected by the current situation. Brazil, Vietnam, Iran, Indonesia and Egypt were on the top 10 manufacturing countries worldwide in 2020; Iran, Brazil, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates were among the top 10 exporters in the same period (42). |
| --- | --- |

(459)

The Commission acknowledged that it might be difficult to source from Ukraine (a traditional, if minor, source of supply of ceramic tiles to the Union, see table 11). However, as stated in the previous recital, there are still sources of non-dumped imports and those channels are not affected by the current situation. Brazil, Vietnam, Iran, Indonesia and Egypt were on the top 10 manufacturing countries worldwide in 2020; Iran, Brazil, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates were among the top 10 exporters in the same period (42).

42

| (460) | Second, with a focus on imports from India, these parties expressed concern that any potential duty would limit consumer’s choice as well as the possibility to outsource production to India. In their statements, Netto & Cortina attached several letters from their customers expressing satisfaction with their purchases as “evidence” that it is not in the Union interest to impose measures as it would, also, limit consumer choice by “forcing” them to buy from the Union industry. |
| --- | --- |

(460)

Second, with a focus on imports from India, these parties expressed concern that any potential duty would limit consumer’s choice as well as the possibility to outsource production to India. In their statements, Netto & Cortina attached several letters from their customers expressing satisfaction with their purchases as “evidence” that it is not in the Union interest to impose measures as it would, also, limit consumer choice by “forcing” them to buy from the Union industry.

| (461) | The Commission noted that the allegations were unsubstantiated. These parties did not provide any evidence that the ceramic tiles they import from India could not be produced and sold by the Union industry. In fact, these parties acknowledged that the choice of consumers is driven by price (43), when they mentioned the “right to choose the best offer at the best price”. In this case, these prices were found to be dumped. The aim of the anti-dumping duties is to restore the level playing field by counteracting dumping. Consumers, importers and users will still be able to buy the products from the countries concerned, or outsource production to then import them, but at fair prices by paying the anti-dumping duties, and they will also be able to source from the Union industry or other countries. |
| --- | --- |

(461)

The Commission noted that the allegations were unsubstantiated. These parties did not provide any evidence that the ceramic tiles they import from India could not be produced and sold by the Union industry. In fact, these parties acknowledged that the choice of consumers is driven by price (43), when they mentioned the “right to choose the best offer at the best price”. In this case, these prices were found to be dumped. The aim of the anti-dumping duties is to restore the level playing field by counteracting dumping. Consumers, importers and users will still be able to buy the products from the countries concerned, or outsource production to then import them, but at fair prices by paying the anti-dumping duties, and they will also be able to source from the Union industry or other countries.

43

| (462) | Third, many of these parties stated that Indian products are not dumped in the Union, and that the enormous increase of international transport costs (allegedly by more than 1 000%) made them more expensive in the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(462)

Third, many of these parties stated that Indian products are not dumped in the Union, and that the enormous increase of international transport costs (allegedly by more than 1 000%) made them more expensive in the Union.

| (463) | The claim also was dismissed as unsubstantiated. The parties did not provide any evidence regarding transport costs. Dumping was found on the basis of the normal value and export price, both at ex-works level, of the sampled exporting producers during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(463)

The claim also was dismissed as unsubstantiated. The parties did not provide any evidence regarding transport costs. Dumping was found on the basis of the normal value and export price, both at ex-works level, of the sampled exporting producers during the investigation period.

| (464) | Fourth, these parties alleged that any potential anti-dumping duty would not be in the Union interest as it would lead to high price pressure on consumers on top of the current high level of inflation in the Union, curtail healthy competition and cause many businesses that rely on those imports to close down, especially in the poorer parts of the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(464)

Fourth, these parties alleged that any potential anti-dumping duty would not be in the Union interest as it would lead to high price pressure on consumers on top of the current high level of inflation in the Union, curtail healthy competition and cause many businesses that rely on those imports to close down, especially in the poorer parts of the Union.

| (465) | The claims were dismissed as unsubstantiated. The parties did not provide any evidence of the potential impact of any duty on consumers or businesses. |
| --- | --- |

(465)

The claims were dismissed as unsubstantiated. The parties did not provide any evidence of the potential impact of any duty on consumers or businesses.

| (466) | The allegations submitted by Netto and Cortina regarding close-downs; bankruptcy: mass reduction of jobs in the Union, and not only those of importers, consumers and traders, but also of other industries, like logistics or design, especially in the poorest regions, referring specifically to Poland; are also unsubstantiated. The investigation established that the impact of the duties on importers, consumers and traders is likely to be limited (see recitals (429) to (431)), and therefore close-downs, bankruptcies or mass reduction of jobs are unlikely. The investigation has also established that manufacture of ceramic tiles takes place across the Union, with Poland being the third manufacturing country in the EU, and that, unlike traders or importers, the Union industry has not been able to recover its costs and steadily lost market share to imports from India and Türkiye. |
| --- | --- |

(466)

The allegations submitted by Netto and Cortina regarding close-downs; bankruptcy: mass reduction of jobs in the Union, and not only those of importers, consumers and traders, but also of other industries, like logistics or design, especially in the poorest regions, referring specifically to Poland; are also unsubstantiated. The investigation established that the impact of the duties on importers, consumers and traders is likely to be limited (see recitals (429) to (431)), and therefore close-downs, bankruptcies or mass reduction of jobs are unlikely. The investigation has also established that manufacture of ceramic tiles takes place across the Union, with Poland being the third manufacturing country in the EU, and that, unlike traders or importers, the Union industry has not been able to recover its costs and steadily lost market share to imports from India and Türkiye.

| (467) | Regarding the indirect impact on other industries, and while Netto & Cortina submitted no evidence or quantification, the Commission notes the non-imposition of duties would also affect other industries. For example, according to the Spanish association of manufacturers (ASCER) the ceramic tiles industry generated, both direct and indirect, 60 000 jobs in Spain, amounting to 2,4 % of industrial employment. Each direct job was estimated to create a further 3,8 indirect jobs (44). Regarding impact on regions, in the area of Castellon in Spain ceramic tiles producers are part of a cluster where most of the companies are SMEs and directly or indirectly depend on the ceramic tile production industry. |
| --- | --- |

(467)

Regarding the indirect impact on other industries, and while Netto & Cortina submitted no evidence or quantification, the Commission notes the non-imposition of duties would also affect other industries. For example, according to the Spanish association of manufacturers (ASCER) the ceramic tiles industry generated, both direct and indirect, 60 000 jobs in Spain, amounting to 2,4 % of industrial employment. Each direct job was estimated to create a further 3,8 indirect jobs (44). Regarding impact on regions, in the area of Castellon in Spain ceramic tiles producers are part of a cluster where most of the companies are SMEs and directly or indirectly depend on the ceramic tile production industry.

44

| (468) | In sum, the interested parties have not submitted any evidence that the non-imposition of duties would outweigh the positive consequences for the Union industry of imposing measures, as explained in recitals (424) to (428). |
| --- | --- |

(468)

In sum, the interested parties have not submitted any evidence that the non-imposition of duties would outweigh the positive consequences for the Union industry of imposing measures, as explained in recitals (424) to (428).

| (469) | Following final disclosure, the GoT and sixteen Indian exporting producers argued that the Commission should have taken into account the effects of the Russian invasion in Ukraine on the Union market of ceramic tiles. In particular, the parties claimed that the war led to increasing energy prices and blocked access to raw materials that might, together with existing barriers such as the anti-dumping measures on imports of ceramic tiles originating in China, negatively affect the supply chains and put more pressure on the Union importers and users. |
| --- | --- |

(469)

Following final disclosure, the GoT and sixteen Indian exporting producers argued that the Commission should have taken into account the effects of the Russian invasion in Ukraine on the Union market of ceramic tiles. In particular, the parties claimed that the war led to increasing energy prices and blocked access to raw materials that might, together with existing barriers such as the anti-dumping measures on imports of ceramic tiles originating in China, negatively affect the supply chains and put more pressure on the Union importers and users.

| (470) | Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoT reiterated that the Covid-19 pandemic proved the importance of well functioning supply chains. The GoT maintained that open channels of supply from Türkiye to the Union remained crucial in energy intensive industries like the production of ceramic tiles, in particular in context of the ongoing Russian invasion in Ukraine, the sanctions imposed by the Union and the subsequent increase in energy prices. |
| --- | --- |

(470)

Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoT reiterated that the Covid-19 pandemic proved the importance of well functioning supply chains. The GoT maintained that open channels of supply from Türkiye to the Union remained crucial in energy intensive industries like the production of ceramic tiles, in particular in context of the ongoing Russian invasion in Ukraine, the sanctions imposed by the Union and the subsequent increase in energy prices.

| (471) | With regard to the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the Commission noted that it has had a negative effect on the Union producers in the first place. The impact of the war on importers and users is limited as the volume of imports from Ukraine was already negligible during the period considered. In addition, the non-imposition of the measures on two sampled exporting producers (Lavish Group and Vitra Group) will reduce any additional pressure put on supply chains due to the war. Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claims described in recitals (469) and (470). |
| --- | --- |

(471)

With regard to the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the Commission noted that it has had a negative effect on the Union producers in the first place. The impact of the war on importers and users is limited as the volume of imports from Ukraine was already negligible during the period considered. In addition, the non-imposition of the measures on two sampled exporting producers (Lavish Group and Vitra Group) will reduce any additional pressure put on supply chains due to the war. Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claims described in recitals (469) and (470).

| (472) | Following the additional partial disclosure, CGCSA argued that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the highly integrated ceramic tiles industries in the Union and in Türkiye. In this respect, the association pointed out that the Turkish ceramic tiles producers sourced their raw and consumable materials, fixed assets, and spare parts from the Union. Total value of such purchases increased from 163 million EUR in 2019, through 188 million EUR in 2020, 233 million EUR in 2021 up to 309 million EUR in the first ten months of 2022. In addition, Turkish companies invested in ceramic tiles manufacturing, logistics and services in the Union. Total value of such investments reached 366 million EUR over the period of 2019 – 2021 and created approximately 1 700 jobs. At a hearing with the Commission services, the GoT made similar arguments. |
| --- | --- |

(472)

Following the additional partial disclosure, CGCSA argued that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the highly integrated ceramic tiles industries in the Union and in Türkiye. In this respect, the association pointed out that the Turkish ceramic tiles producers sourced their raw and consumable materials, fixed assets, and spare parts from the Union. Total value of such purchases increased from 163 million EUR in 2019, through 188 million EUR in 2020, 233 million EUR in 2021 up to 309 million EUR in the first ten months of 2022. In addition, Turkish companies invested in ceramic tiles manufacturing, logistics and services in the Union. Total value of such investments reached 366 million EUR over the period of 2019 – 2021 and created approximately 1 700 jobs. At a hearing with the Commission services, the GoT made similar arguments.

| (473) | The Commission acknowledged the interdependencies between the Turkish and Union ceramic tiles industry. Nevertheless, the Commission noted that there was no evidence that the procurement of raw and consumable materials, fixed assets, and spare parts was directly linked to the ceramic tiles exports to the Union. For example, the purchase value substantially increased between 2021 (full year) and 2022 (first ten months) although, as confirmed by the GoT (see recital (282)), the volume of ceramic tiles exports from Türkiye to the Union decreased in the first ten months of 2022 as compared to the same period of 2021. In addition, restoring the level playing field should lead to an increased production in the Union thus providing the Union suppliers of raw and consumable materials, fixed assets, and spare parts with new business opportunities. |
| --- | --- |

(473)

The Commission acknowledged the interdependencies between the Turkish and Union ceramic tiles industry. Nevertheless, the Commission noted that there was no evidence that the procurement of raw and consumable materials, fixed assets, and spare parts was directly linked to the ceramic tiles exports to the Union. For example, the purchase value substantially increased between 2021 (full year) and 2022 (first ten months) although, as confirmed by the GoT (see recital (282)), the volume of ceramic tiles exports from Türkiye to the Union decreased in the first ten months of 2022 as compared to the same period of 2021. In addition, restoring the level playing field should lead to an increased production in the Union thus providing the Union suppliers of raw and consumable materials, fixed assets, and spare parts with new business opportunities.

| (474) | Moreover, the Commission took note of the investment activities by Turkish companies in the ceramic tiles industry in the Union. Those investments increase employment and foster economic development in the respective regions. Restoring a level playing field in the Union will benefit the investments already realised by Turkish producers and may motivate further investments. Finally, the party failed to specify to what extent those purchases and investments were carried out by the Vitra Group, which was found not to be dumping and will thus not be affected by the anti-dumping measures. |
| --- | --- |

(474)

Moreover, the Commission took note of the investment activities by Turkish companies in the ceramic tiles industry in the Union. Those investments increase employment and foster economic development in the respective regions. Restoring a level playing field in the Union will benefit the investments already realised by Turkish producers and may motivate further investments. Finally, the party failed to specify to what extent those purchases and investments were carried out by the Vitra Group, which was found not to be dumping and will thus not be affected by the anti-dumping measures.

| (475) | In view of the considerations described in recitals (473) and (474), the Commission concluded that the measures may have a very limited impact on the Union suppliers of raw and consumable materials, fixed assets, and spare parts and be in favour of these investments realised by Turkish producer in the Union. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claims presented in recital (472). |
| --- | --- |

(475)

In view of the considerations described in recitals (473) and (474), the Commission concluded that the measures may have a very limited impact on the Union suppliers of raw and consumable materials, fixed assets, and spare parts and be in favour of these investments realised by Turkish producer in the Union. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claims presented in recital (472).

7.5.   Conclusion on Union interest

Conclusion on Union interest

| (476) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye. |
| --- | --- |

(476)

On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye.

8.   DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

| (477) | On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned. Anti-dumping duties should be set in accordance with the lesser duty rule. As mentioned in section 3, anti-dumping duties are not applicable to the Indian exporting producer Lavish Group and to the Turkish exporting producer Vitra Group. |
| --- | --- |

(477)

On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned. Anti-dumping duties should be set in accordance with the lesser duty rule. As mentioned in section 3, anti-dumping duties are not applicable to the Indian exporting producer Lavish Group and to the Turkish exporting producer Vitra Group.

| (478) | On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:







  Country | Company | Definitive anti-dumping duty |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| India | The Conor Group | 8,7  % |
| India | The Icon Group | 6,7  % |
| India | Other cooperating companies | 7,3  % |
| India | All other companies | 8,7  % |
| Türkiye | Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | 20,9  % |
| Türkiye | Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.,
  Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş. | 4,8  % |
| Türkiye | Other cooperating companies | 9,2  % |
| Türkiye | All other companies | 20,9  % |

(478)

On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

Country

Company

Definitive anti-dumping duty

India

The Conor Group

8,7  %

India

The Icon Group

6,7  %

India

Other cooperating companies

7,3  %

India

All other companies

8,7  %

Türkiye

Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

20,9  %

Türkiye

Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.,

Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.

4,8  %

Türkiye

Other cooperating companies

9,2  %

Türkiye

All other companies

20,9  %

| (479) | The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the countries concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates. |
| --- | --- |

(479)

The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the countries concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

| (480) | A company, among those specifically mentioned in this Regulation, may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (45). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(480)

A company, among those specifically mentioned in this Regulation, may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (45). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

45

| (481) | To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other companies should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period. |
| --- | --- |

(481)

To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other companies should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

| (482) | To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(4) of this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’. |
| --- | --- |

(482)

To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(4) of this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.

| (483) | While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(4) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law. |
| --- | --- |

(483)

While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(4) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

| (484) | Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty. |
| --- | --- |

(484)

Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

| (485) | Exporting producers that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period should be able to request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the IP; (ii) it is not related to an exporting producer that did so; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities. |
| --- | --- |

(485)

Exporting producers that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period should be able to request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the IP; (ii) it is not related to an exporting producer that did so; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

9.   FINAL PROVISIONS

FINAL PROVISIONS

| (486) | In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (46), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month. |
| --- | --- |

(486)

In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (46), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

46

Official Journal of the European Union

| (487) | The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. |
| --- | --- |

(487)

The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036.

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.   A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of ceramic flags and paving, hearth or wall tiles; ceramic mosaic cubes and the like, whether or not on a backing; finishing ceramics, currently falling under CN codes 6907 21 00, 6907 22 00, 6907 23 00, 6907 30 00 and 6907 40 00 and originating in India or Türkiye.

2.   The rates of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows:

| Country | Company | Definitive anti-dumping duty | TARIC additional code |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| India | Conor Granito Pvt Ltd.; Corial Ceramic Pvt Ltd. | 8,7  % | C898 |
| India | Acecon Vitrified Pvt Ltd.; Avlon Ceramics Pvt Ltd.; Duracon Vitrified Pvt Ltd.; Eracon Vitrified Pvt Ltd.; Evershine Vitrified Pvt Ltd.; Icon Granito Pvt Ltd.; Venice Ceramics Pvt Ltd. | 6,7 % | C899 |
| India | Other cooperating companies listed in Annex I | 7,3 % | |
| India | All other companies | 8,7 % | C999 |
| Türkiye | Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | 20,9  % | C900 |
| Türkiye | Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.;
  Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş. | 4,8  % | C901 |
| Türkiye | Other cooperating companies listed in Annex II | 9,2  % | |
| Türkiye | All other companies | 20,9  % | C999 |

Country

Company

Definitive anti-dumping duty

TARIC additional code

India

Conor Granito Pvt Ltd.; Corial Ceramic Pvt Ltd.

8,7  %

C898

India

Acecon Vitrified Pvt Ltd.; Avlon Ceramics Pvt Ltd.; Duracon Vitrified Pvt Ltd.; Eracon Vitrified Pvt Ltd.; Evershine Vitrified Pvt Ltd.; Icon Granito Pvt Ltd.; Venice Ceramics Pvt Ltd.

6,7 %

C899

India

Other cooperating companies listed in Annex I

7,3 %

India

All other companies

8,7 %

C999

Türkiye

Hitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

20,9  %

C900

Türkiye

Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.;

Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.

4,8  %

C901

Türkiye

Other cooperating companies listed in Annex II

9,2  %

Türkiye

All other companies

20,9  %

C999

3.   Anti-dumping duties are not applicable to the Indian exporting producer the Lavish Group, consisting of Lavish Granito Pvt Ltd., Lavish Ceramics Pvt Ltd., Lakme Vitrified Pvt Ltd. and Liva Ceramics Pvt Ltd. (TARIC additional code C903), and are not applicable to the Turkish exporting producer Vitra Karo Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. (TARIC additional code C902).

4.   The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2, as well as the non-application of any anti-dumping duty rate for the companies mentioned in paragraph 3, shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States’ customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function, drafted as follows:
  ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the [volume] of [product concerned] sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by [company name and address] (TARIC additional code) in [country concerned]. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’
  If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other companies shall apply.

5.   Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

Article 1(2) may be amended to add new exporting producers from India or Türkiye and make them subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that:

| (a) | it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) originating in India or Türkiye during the period of investigation (1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021); |
| --- | --- |

(a)

it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) originating in India or Türkiye during the period of investigation (1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021);

| (b) | it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation, and which could have cooperated in the original investigation; and |
| --- | --- |

(b)

it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation, and which could have cooperated in the original investigation; and

| (c) | it has either actually exported the product concerned or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

it has either actually exported the product concerned or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation.

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 9 February 2023.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

---

(1)  
  OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21.

1

(2)  Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye. OJ C 501, 13.12.2021, p. 25.

2

(3)  Judgment of the General Court of 11 July 2017, Viraj Profiles Ltd v Council of the European Union, Case T-67/14, ECLI:EU:T:2017:481, para. 98.

3

(4)  European Communities – definitive anti-dumping measures on certain iron or steel fasteners from China, Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS397/AB/R), para 418. See also Judgment of 8 September 2015, Philips Lighting, C-511/13 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:553, paras. 60 - 73.

4

Philips Lighting

(5)  Notice of initiation, section 5.5.

5

(6)  Notice of initiation, section 5.2.

6

(7)  Mexico - Anti-dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from Guatemala - Final Report of the Panel (WT/DS331/R), paras. 7.234-7.236.

7

(8)  Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011 of 12 September 2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 238, 15.9.2011, p. 1) and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2179 of 22 November 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People's Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 307, 23.11.2017, p. 25).

8

(9)  During the proceeding, the three companies informed the Commisison that they merged into a single company Ceramika Netto Sp. z o.o. Sp.K.

9

(10)  Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011 of 12 September.

10

(11)  Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2179.

11

(12)  https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2559

12

(13)  For organisational purposes, the verification visit of some related companies took place at the premises of the manufacturing entity.

13

(14)  Executive summary of the Complaint, p.1.

14

(15)  Annexes 5 and 20 of the Complaint.

15

(16)  The Icon Group referred to C-468/15 P, PT Musim Mas v Council, EU:C:2016:803, para. 39; and C-468/15 P, PT Musim Mas v Council, EU:C:2016:803, para. 42; Case T-716/19, Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe Nizhnedneprovsky Tube Rolling Plant v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2021:457, para.133.

16

(17)  C-104/90, Matsushita Electric Industrial v Council, EU:C:1993:837, para. 9

17

(18)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1395 of 11 August 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain corrosion resistant steels originating in Russia and Türkiye (OJ L 211, 12.8.2022, p. 127), recital (126).

18

(19)  See namely sections D and E of the open versions of the questionnaire replies submitted by the two manufacturers available in t22.001010.

19

(20)  From 1 euro = 7,884 Turkish Lira in July 2020, to 1 euro = 10,382 Turkish Lira in June 2021 (i.e., -32 % overall). Sources: The European Central Bank, DG Budget, Pacific Exchange Rate Service.

20

(21)  Available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/prodcom/data/database (last viewed 19 September 2022).

21

(22)  Available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sts_inpr_q/default/table?lang=en (last viewed 19 September 2022).

22

(23)  As one of the sampled exporting producers in India and one of the sampled exporting producers in Türkiye were not dumping, their imports were deducted from the total imports and analysed as non-dumped imports. The Commission used the questionnaire replies of the Lavish Group and the Vitra Group to exclude their volumes and values from total exports. For the Vitra Group, the Commission excluded traded products not produced by the group on the basis of verified information for the investigation period. The regulation uses ranges for some figures because otherwise it would disclose confidential data from these sampled exporting producers, as the import statistics at CN level are publicly available.

23

(24)  See Türkiye: ceramic tile exports continue to grow in 2020. Available at https://ceramicworldweb.com/en/economics-and-markets/Türkiye-ceramic-tile-exports-continue-grow-2020 (last viewed 19 November 2022). See also The Turkish ceramic tile industry pushes on exports. Avalailable at https://ceramicworldweb.com/en/economics-and-markets/turkish-ceramic-tile-industry-pushes-exports (last viewed 19 November 2022).

24

(25)  Corrected regarding volumes for the investigation period for Spain following evidence provided by the complainant upon verification of the macro-indicators questionnaire.

25

(26)  The European construction market to 2024. Available at https://www.ceramicworldweb.com/index.php/en/economics-and-markets/european-construction-market-2024 (last viewed 20 September 2022).

26

(27)  Commission Regulation (EU) No 258/2011 of 16 March 2011 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 70, 17.3.2011, p. 5).

27

(28)  Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011.

28

(29)  Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2179.

29

(30)  Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ C 442, 22.11.2022, p. 3).

30

(31)  Judgment of the Court of 4 February 2021, eurocylinder systems AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt, Case C-324/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:94, paragraphs 49 and 52.

31

(32)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 289/2009 of 7 April 2009 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of iron or steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 94, 8.4.2009, p. 48).

32

(33)  Corrected regarding volumes for the investigation period for Spain following evidence provided by the complainant upon verification of the macro-indicators questionnaire.

33

(34)  For the original investigation period of the investigation against ceramic tiles from China, see recital (24) of Regulation (EU) No 258/2011. For the target profit of that investigation, see recitals (164) and (197) of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011.

34

(35)  Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2179.

35

(36)  Complaint, annex 8.

36

(37)  Since the unrelated importers stopped cooperating after the deficiency stage (they did not agree to a verification / RCC), the Commission’s analysis is based on the information they submitted including the supporting evidence (such as financial statements) and publicly available information (financial statements from a company register, financial data published by https://www.romanian-companies.eu/).

37

(38)  Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 laying down harmonised conditions for the marketing of construction products and repealing Council Directive 89/106/EEC (OJ L 88, 4.4.2011, p. 5).

38

(39)  Regulation (EU) No 258/2011, recital (150).

39

(40)  Regulation (EU) No 258/2011, recital (153); Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011, recital (183); and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2179, recital (206).

40

(41)  For example, GANDALF Pawel Gagorowski (Poland) or ILCOM s.r.l (Italy) identified themselves as importers, VEDMAX s.r.l. (Romania) or Orient Ceramic (Romania) identified themselves as users/importers, Ogrodnik Niemirscy Sp.J (Poland) identified itself as a “seller”, while Netto & Cortina (Poland) identified themselves throughout the investigation as “the manufacturers from Białystok”.

41

(42)  Source: macroquestionnaire, section D.2.1. and complaint, ps 49 and 52.

42

(43)  See for example Netto & Cortina’s “Additional statement in the case AD684” pages 8 and 14.

43

(44)  Impacto socioeconómico y fiscal del sector de azulejos y pavimentos cerámicos en España. Available at https://transparencia.ascer.es/media/1039/informe-impacto-socioeco-sector-cer%C3%A1mico_ascer.pdf (last viewed 7 October 2022).

44

(45)  European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Wetstraat 170 Rue de la Loi, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

45

(46)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

46

---

ANNEX I

Indian cooperating exporting producers not sampled

| Country | Name | TARIC additional code |
| --- | --- | --- |
| India | Arkiton Tiles LLP
  Ncraze Ceramic LLP | C919 |
| India | Asian Granito India Limited
  Crystal Ceramic Industries Private Limited
  Affil Vitrified Private Limited
  Amazoone Ceramics Limited | C920 |
| India | Color Tiles Private Limited
  Color Granito Private Limited
  Subway Tiles LLP
  Senis Ceramic Private Limited | C921 |
| India | Comet Granito Private Limited
  Corus Vitrified Private Limited | C922 |
| India | Granoland Tiles LLP
  Landgrace Ceramic Private Limited
  Landdecor Tiles LLP | C923 |
| India | Sunshine Tiles Company Private Limited
  Sunshine Vitrious Tiles Private Limited
  Sunshine Ceramic
  Jaysun Ceramics
  Sunray Tiles Private Limited
  Sologres Granito Private Limited
  Leesun Ceramic Tiles Co
  Grenic Tiles Private Limited
  Antonova Tiles (India) | C924 |
| India | Aajveto Manufacturing Private Limited
  The President Group
  Artos International LLP
  Spolo Ceramic Private Limited
  Veritaas Granito LLP
  Pioneer Ceramic Industries
  Zed Vitrified Private Limited
  Indesign Ceramics LLP | C925 |
| India | Accord Vitrified Private Limited
  Accord Plus Ceramics Private Limited | C927 |
| India | Alinta Granito Private Limited
  Avalta Granito Private Limited | C928 |
| India | Alpas Cera LLP
  Cosa Ceramic Private Limited | C929 |
| India | Ambani Vitrified Private Limited | C930 |
| India | Solizo Vitrified Private Limited | C931 |
| India | Axison Vitrified Private Limited
  Axiom Ceramic Private Limited
  Swellco Ceramic | C935 |
| India | Blizzard Vitrified LLP
  Blizzard Ceramica LLP | C937 |
| India | Blueart Granito Private Limited
  Iyota Tiles LLP | C938 |
| India | Bluetone Impex LLP | C939 |
| India | Bluezone Vitrified Private Limited
  Bluezone Tiles LLP
  Bluegrass Porcelano LLP | C940 |
| India | Bonza Vitrified Private Limited
  Boffo Granito LLP
  Big Tiles | C941 |
| India | Cadillac Granito Private Limited
  Captiva Ceramic Industries | C942 |
| India | Capron Vitrified Private Limited | C943 |
| India | Classy Tiles LLP | C944 |
| India | Claystone Granito Private Limited
  Favourite Plus Ceramic Private Limited
  Clayart Granito LLP
  Torino Tiles LLP
  Astila Ceramic Private Limited | C945 |
| India | Commander Vitrified Private Limited
  Creanza Ceramic Private Limited
  Commander Ceramic Industries
  Amora Tiles Private Limited
  Amora Ceramics Private Limited | C946 |
| India | Cruso Granito Private Limited | C947 |
| India | Cyber Ceramics | C948 |
| India | Delta Ceramic | C949 |
| India | Dureza Granito Private Limited | C950 |
| India | Emcer Tiles Private Limited
  Emcer Granito LLP
  Sanford Vitrified Private Limited
  Parker Tiles Private Limited
  Ascent Ceramica Private Limited
  Lenswood Ceramic | C951 |
| India | Exotica Ceramic Private Limited | C952 |
| India | Exxaro Tiles Limited | C953 |
| India | Face Ceramics Private Limited
  Fea Ceramics
  Cygen Ceramic LLP
  Sorento Granito Private Limited
  Soriso Ceramic Private Limited
  Soriso Granito LLP
  Angel Ceramic Pct Limited
  Blue Art Granito Private Limited
  Face Impex Private Limited | C954 |
| India | Favourite Plus Ceramic Private Limited | C956 |
| India | Flavour Granito LLP
  Rex Ceramic Private Limited | C957 |
| India | Fusion Granito Private Limited
  Vivanta Ceramic Private Limited | C958 |
| India | Gold Cera International | C959 |
| India | Gryphon Ceramics Private Limited
  Cosa Ceramics Pct Limited
  RAK Ceramics Private Limited
  Gris Ceramic LLP
  Grupo Griffin Ceramica LLP
  Alpas Cera LLP | C960 |
| India | Handmada International | C961 |
| India | Hilltop Ceramic | C962 |
| India | Ibis Smart Marble Private Limited
  Silverpearl Tile Private Limited | C963 |
| India | Italica Granito Private Limited
  Italica Floor Tiles Private Limited
  Soriso Ceramic Private Limited | C964 |
| India | Ita Lake Ceramic Private Limited
  Itaca Ceramic Private Limited
  Sperita Granito LLP | C966 |
| | | |
| India | Itacon Granito Private Limited
  U-Con Ceramica LLP
  Tecon Tiles Private Limited
  Valencia Ceramic Private Limited
  Livolla Granito LLP
  Velloza Granito LLP | C968 |
| India | Italia Ceramics Limited
  Piccolo Mosaic Limited | C969 |
| India | Italus Vitrified LLP | C971 |
| India | Itcos Granito LLP
  Icera Tiles LLP | C972 |
| India | Itoli Granito LLP
  Imlis Ceramica LLP | C973 |
| India | K2D Exim | C974 |
| India | Kag Granito LLP
  Rollza Granito LLP | C975 |
| India | Kajaria Ceramics Limited
  Jaxx Vitrified Private Limited
  Cosa Ceramics Private Limited
  Kajaria Tiles Private Limited
  Vennar Ceramics Limited | C976 |
| India | Keezia Tiles LLP | C977 |
| India | Kitco Ceramic | C978 |
| India | Kripton Granito Private Limited
  Kripton Ceramic Private Limited
  La Berry Ceramics Private Limited
  Nice Ceramic Private Limited
  Gresart Ceramica Private Limited | C979 |
| India | Latto Tiles LLP
  Spinora Tiles Private Limited | C980 |
| India | Laxveer Ceramic LLP
  Lovato Ceramic Private Limited | C981 |
| India | Leopard Vitrified Private Limited
  Livon Ceramic
  Letoza Granito LLP | C982 |
| India | Lexus Granito India Limited
  Lioli Ceramica Private Limited | C983 |
| India | Lezora Vitrified Private Limited
  Lemzon Granito LLP
  Lezwin Tiles LLP
  Sisam Granito LLP | C984 |
| India | Livenza Granito LLP
  Livanto Ceramic Private Limited
  Lizzart Granito LLP
  Linia Ceramic LLP
  L Tile Granito LLP | C986 |
| India | Lorence Vitrified LLP
  Lepono Porcelano LLP
  Lanford Ceramic Private Limited | C987 |
| India | Lycos Ceramic Private Limited
  Livolla Granito LLP
  Crevita Granito Private Limited | C988 |
| India | Maps Granito Private Limited
  Perth Ceramic Private Limited | C989 |
| India | Marbilano Tiles LLP
  Marbilano Surface LLP | C990 |
| India | Max Granito Private Limited
  Epos Tiles LLP | C119 |
| India | Metropole Tiles Private Limited
  Metro City Tiles Private Limited
  Metro Ceramics
  Mactile India Private Limited | C120 |
| India | Millennium Granito India Private Limited
  Lorenzo Vitrified Tiles Private Limited
  Millenium Vitrified Tile Private Limited
  Millenium Tile LLP
  Clan Vitrified Private Limited
  Millenium Ceramic LLP
  Millenia Ceramica Private Limited
  Millenium Cera Tiles Private Limited | C121 |
| India | Montana Tiles
  Plazma Granito Private Limited
  Raykas Ceramic LLP | C122 |
| India | Motto Ceramic Private Limited
  Motto Tiles Private Limited
  Slimtile Private Limited
  Monza Granito Private Limited
  Rossa Tiles Private Limited
  Motto Stone Private Limited | C123 |
| India | Mox tiles LLP
  Itile LLP
  Swell Granito LLP | C124 |
| India | Neelson Ceramic LLP
  Neelson Porselano LLP
  Win Tel Ceramics Private Limited
  Theos Tiles LLP | C125 |
| India | Nehani Tiles Private Limited
  Neha Ceramic Industries
  Orinda Granito LLP
  Orinda Industries LLP | C126 |
| India | Nessa Vitrified LLP
  LGF Vitrified Private Limited | C127 |
| India | Nexion International Private Limited
  Simpolo Vitrified Private Limited | C130 |
| India | Nitco Limited | C131 |
| India | Oasis Vitrified Private Limited
  Oasis Tiles LLP
  Max Ceramics Private Limited
  Revenza Ceramics | C132 |
| India | Olwin Tiles (India) Private Limited | C133 |
| India | Onery Tiles LLP | C134 |
| India | Oscar Ceramics | C136 |
| India | Pavit Ceramics Private Limited
  Victory Ceratech Private Limited | C138 |
| India | Prism Johnson Limited
  Antique Marbonite Private Limited
  Coral Gold Tiles Private Limited
  Sanskar Ceramics Private Limited
  Spectrum Johnson Tiles Private Limited
  Small Johnson Floor Tiles Private Limited
  Sparten Granito Private Limited | C142 |
| India | Q-BO (Savion Ceramic) | C308 |
| India | Qutone Ceramic Private Limited | C631 |
| India | Range Ceramic Private Limited | C633 |
| India | Rey Cera Creation Private Limited
  Simbel Ceramic Private Limited
  Adoration Ceramica Private Limited | C636 |
| India | Scientifica Tiles LLP
  Saiwin Ceramic Private Limited
  Saimax Ceramic Private Limited
  Siscon Tiles LLP
  Aland Ceramic Private Limited | C639 |
| India | Seron Granito Private Limited | C640 |
| India | Sez Vitrified Private Limited | C641 |
| India | Silon Granito LLP | C642 |
| India | Simero Vitrified Private Limited
  Simero International LLP | C643 |
| India | Simola Tiles LLP | C644 |
| India | Skajen Vitrified Private Limited
  Spice Ceramic Private Limited
  Legend Ceramic Private Limited | C646 |
| India | Skytouch Ceramic Private Limited
  Icolux Porcelano LLP | C648 |
| India | Sober Plus Ceramics
  Sober Ceramics | C649 |
| India | Solizo Vitrified Private Limited | C650 |
| India | Somany Ceramics Limited
  Vintage Tiles Private Limited
  Vicon Ceramic Private Limited
  Amora Tiles Private Limited
  Amora Ceramics Private Limited
  Acer Granito Private Limited
  Somany Fine Vitrified Private Limited
  Sudha Somany Ceramics Private Limited and
  Somany Piastrelle Private Limited | C651 |
| India | Sparron Vitrified LLP | C652 |
| India | Square Ceramic Private Limited
  Casva Tiles Private Limited | A004 |
| India | Starco Ceramic | A005 |
| India | Sunland Ceramic Private Limited | A006 |
| India | Sunworld Vitrified Private Limited
  Shagun Ceramics | A007 |
| India | Swellco Ceramic
  Axison Vitrified Private Limited
  Axiom Ceramic Private Limited | A008 |
| India | Titanium Vitrified Private Limited
  Moral Ceramic Private Limited
  Onery Tiles LLP | A010 |
| India | Varmora Granito Private Limited
  Tocco Ceramics Private Limited
  Solaris Ceramics Private Limited
  Nextile Marbosys Private Limited
  Fiorenza GRanito Private Limited
  Sentosa Granito Private Limited,
  Renite Vitrified LLP
  Avalta Granito Private Limited and
  Covertek Ceramica Private Limited | A013 |
| India | Velsaa Vitrified LLP
  Velsaa Enterprises LLP
  Boss Ceramics
  Magnum Ceramics | A014 |
| India | Verona Granito Private Limited | A016 |
| India | Wallmark Ceramic Industry | A017 |
| India | Zarko Granito Private Limited | A019 |
| India | Zealtop Granito Private Limited | A020 |
| India | Vita Granito | C926 |

Country

Name

TARIC additional code

India

Arkiton Tiles LLP

Ncraze Ceramic LLP

C919

India

Asian Granito India Limited

Crystal Ceramic Industries Private Limited

Affil Vitrified Private Limited

Amazoone Ceramics Limited

C920

India

Color Tiles Private Limited

Color Granito Private Limited

Subway Tiles LLP

Senis Ceramic Private Limited

C921

India

Comet Granito Private Limited

Corus Vitrified Private Limited

C922

India

Granoland Tiles LLP

Landgrace Ceramic Private Limited

Landdecor Tiles LLP

C923

India

Sunshine Tiles Company Private Limited

Sunshine Vitrious Tiles Private Limited

Sunshine Ceramic

Jaysun Ceramics

Sunray Tiles Private Limited

Sologres Granito Private Limited

Leesun Ceramic Tiles Co

Grenic Tiles Private Limited

Antonova Tiles (India)

C924

India

Aajveto Manufacturing Private Limited

The President Group

Artos International LLP

Spolo Ceramic Private Limited

Veritaas Granito LLP

Pioneer Ceramic Industries

Zed Vitrified Private Limited

Indesign Ceramics LLP

C925

India

Accord Vitrified Private Limited

Accord Plus Ceramics Private Limited

C927

India

Alinta Granito Private Limited

Avalta Granito Private Limited

C928

India

Alpas Cera LLP

Cosa Ceramic Private Limited

C929

India

Ambani Vitrified Private Limited

C930

India

Solizo Vitrified Private Limited

C931

India

Axison Vitrified Private Limited

Axiom Ceramic Private Limited

Swellco Ceramic

C935

India

Blizzard Vitrified LLP

Blizzard Ceramica LLP

C937

India

Blueart Granito Private Limited

Iyota Tiles LLP

C938

India

Bluetone Impex LLP

C939

India

Bluezone Vitrified Private Limited

Bluezone Tiles LLP

Bluegrass Porcelano LLP

C940

India

Bonza Vitrified Private Limited

Boffo Granito LLP

Big Tiles

C941

India

Cadillac Granito Private Limited

Captiva Ceramic Industries

C942

India

Capron Vitrified Private Limited

C943

India

Classy Tiles LLP

C944

India

Claystone Granito Private Limited

Favourite Plus Ceramic Private Limited

Clayart Granito LLP

Torino Tiles LLP

Astila Ceramic Private Limited

C945

India

Commander Vitrified Private Limited

Creanza Ceramic Private Limited

Commander Ceramic Industries

Amora Tiles Private Limited

Amora Ceramics Private Limited

C946

India

Cruso Granito Private Limited

C947

India

Cyber Ceramics

C948

India

Delta Ceramic

C949

India

Dureza Granito Private Limited

C950

India

Emcer Tiles Private Limited

Emcer Granito LLP

Sanford Vitrified Private Limited

Parker Tiles Private Limited

Ascent Ceramica Private Limited

Lenswood Ceramic

C951

India

Exotica Ceramic Private Limited

C952

India

Exxaro Tiles Limited

C953

India

Face Ceramics Private Limited

Fea Ceramics

Cygen Ceramic LLP

Sorento Granito Private Limited

Soriso Ceramic Private Limited

Soriso Granito LLP

Angel Ceramic Pct Limited

Blue Art Granito Private Limited

Face Impex Private Limited

C954

India

Favourite Plus Ceramic Private Limited

C956

India

Flavour Granito LLP

Rex Ceramic Private Limited

C957

India

Fusion Granito Private Limited

Vivanta Ceramic Private Limited

C958

India

Gold Cera International

C959

India

Gryphon Ceramics Private Limited

Cosa Ceramics Pct Limited

RAK Ceramics Private Limited

Gris Ceramic LLP

Grupo Griffin Ceramica LLP

Alpas Cera LLP

C960

India

Handmada International

C961

India

Hilltop Ceramic

C962

India

Ibis Smart Marble Private Limited

Silverpearl Tile Private Limited

C963

India

Italica Granito Private Limited

Italica Floor Tiles Private Limited

Soriso Ceramic Private Limited

C964

India

Ita Lake Ceramic Private Limited

Itaca Ceramic Private Limited

Sperita Granito LLP

C966

India

Itacon Granito Private Limited

U-Con Ceramica LLP

Tecon Tiles Private Limited

Valencia Ceramic Private Limited

Livolla Granito LLP

Velloza Granito LLP

C968

India

Italia Ceramics Limited

Piccolo Mosaic Limited

C969

India

Italus Vitrified LLP

C971

India

Itcos Granito LLP

Icera Tiles LLP

C972

India

Itoli Granito LLP

Imlis Ceramica LLP

C973

India

K2D Exim

C974

India

Kag Granito LLP

Rollza Granito LLP

C975

India

Kajaria Ceramics Limited

Jaxx Vitrified Private Limited

Cosa Ceramics Private Limited

Kajaria Tiles Private Limited

Vennar Ceramics Limited

C976

India

Keezia Tiles LLP

C977

India

Kitco Ceramic

C978

India

Kripton Granito Private Limited

Kripton Ceramic Private Limited

La Berry Ceramics Private Limited

Nice Ceramic Private Limited

Gresart Ceramica Private Limited

C979

India

Latto Tiles LLP

Spinora Tiles Private Limited

C980

India

Laxveer Ceramic LLP

Lovato Ceramic Private Limited

C981

India

Leopard Vitrified Private Limited

Livon Ceramic

Letoza Granito LLP

C982

India

Lexus Granito India Limited

Lioli Ceramica Private Limited

C983

India

Lezora Vitrified Private Limited

Lemzon Granito LLP

Lezwin Tiles LLP

Sisam Granito LLP

C984

India

Livenza Granito LLP

Livanto Ceramic Private Limited

Lizzart Granito LLP

Linia Ceramic LLP

L Tile Granito LLP

C986

India

Lorence Vitrified LLP

Lepono Porcelano LLP

Lanford Ceramic Private Limited

C987

India

Lycos Ceramic Private Limited

Livolla Granito LLP

Crevita Granito Private Limited

C988

India

Maps Granito Private Limited

Perth Ceramic Private Limited

C989

India

Marbilano Tiles LLP

Marbilano Surface LLP

C990

India

Max Granito Private Limited

Epos Tiles LLP

C119

India

Metropole Tiles Private Limited

Metro City Tiles Private Limited

Metro Ceramics

Mactile India Private Limited

C120

India

Millennium Granito India Private Limited

Lorenzo Vitrified Tiles Private Limited

Millenium Vitrified Tile Private Limited

Millenium Tile LLP

Clan Vitrified Private Limited

Millenium Ceramic LLP

Millenia Ceramica Private Limited

Millenium Cera Tiles Private Limited

C121

India

Montana Tiles

Plazma Granito Private Limited

Raykas Ceramic LLP

C122

India

Motto Ceramic Private Limited

Motto Tiles Private Limited

Slimtile Private Limited

Monza Granito Private Limited

Rossa Tiles Private Limited

Motto Stone Private Limited

C123

India

Mox tiles LLP

Itile LLP

Swell Granito LLP

C124

India

Neelson Ceramic LLP

Neelson Porselano LLP

Win Tel Ceramics Private Limited

Theos Tiles LLP

C125

India

Nehani Tiles Private Limited

Neha Ceramic Industries

Orinda Granito LLP

Orinda Industries LLP

C126

India

Nessa Vitrified LLP

LGF Vitrified Private Limited

C127

India

Nexion International Private Limited

Simpolo Vitrified Private Limited

C130

India

Nitco Limited

C131

India

Oasis Vitrified Private Limited

Oasis Tiles LLP

Max Ceramics Private Limited

Revenza Ceramics

C132

India

Olwin Tiles (India) Private Limited

C133

India

Onery Tiles LLP

C134

India

Oscar Ceramics

C136

India

Pavit Ceramics Private Limited

Victory Ceratech Private Limited

C138

India

Prism Johnson Limited

Antique Marbonite Private Limited

Coral Gold Tiles Private Limited

Sanskar Ceramics Private Limited

Spectrum Johnson Tiles Private Limited

Small Johnson Floor Tiles Private Limited

Sparten Granito Private Limited

C142

India

Q-BO (Savion Ceramic)

C308

India

Qutone Ceramic Private Limited

C631

India

Range Ceramic Private Limited

C633

India

Rey Cera Creation Private Limited

Simbel Ceramic Private Limited

Adoration Ceramica Private Limited

C636

India

Scientifica Tiles LLP

Saiwin Ceramic Private Limited

Saimax Ceramic Private Limited

Siscon Tiles LLP

Aland Ceramic Private Limited

C639

India

Seron Granito Private Limited

C640

India

Sez Vitrified Private Limited

C641

India

Silon Granito LLP

C642

India

Simero Vitrified Private Limited

Simero International LLP

C643

India

Simola Tiles LLP

C644

India

Skajen Vitrified Private Limited

Spice Ceramic Private Limited

Legend Ceramic Private Limited

C646

India

Skytouch Ceramic Private Limited

Icolux Porcelano LLP

C648

India

Sober Plus Ceramics

Sober Ceramics

C649

India

Solizo Vitrified Private Limited

C650

India

Somany Ceramics Limited

Vintage Tiles Private Limited

Vicon Ceramic Private Limited

Amora Tiles Private Limited

Amora Ceramics Private Limited

Acer Granito Private Limited

Somany Fine Vitrified Private Limited

Sudha Somany Ceramics Private Limited and

Somany Piastrelle Private Limited

C651

India

Sparron Vitrified LLP

C652

India

Square Ceramic Private Limited

Casva Tiles Private Limited

A004

India

Starco Ceramic

A005

India

Sunland Ceramic Private Limited

A006

India

Sunworld Vitrified Private Limited

Shagun Ceramics

A007

India

Swellco Ceramic

Axison Vitrified Private Limited

Axiom Ceramic Private Limited

A008

India

Titanium Vitrified Private Limited

Moral Ceramic Private Limited

Onery Tiles LLP

A010

India

Varmora Granito Private Limited

Tocco Ceramics Private Limited

Solaris Ceramics Private Limited

Nextile Marbosys Private Limited

Fiorenza GRanito Private Limited

Sentosa Granito Private Limited,

Renite Vitrified LLP

Avalta Granito Private Limited and

Covertek Ceramica Private Limited

A013

India

Velsaa Vitrified LLP

Velsaa Enterprises LLP

Boss Ceramics

Magnum Ceramics

A014

India

Verona Granito Private Limited

A016

India

Wallmark Ceramic Industry

A017

India

Zarko Granito Private Limited

A019

India

Zealtop Granito Private Limited

A020

India

Vita Granito

C926

---

ANNEX II

Turkish cooperating exporting producers not sampled

| Country | Name | TARIC additional code |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Türkiye | Akgün Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. (1)

  Akgün Toprak Sanayi İnşaat ve Ticaret A.Ş.
  Veli Akgün Seramik İnşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | C904 |
| Türkiye | Anka Toprak Ürünleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | C905 |
| Türkiye | Decovita Yapi Ürünleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | C906 |
| Türkiye | Ege Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | C907 |
| Türkiye | Etili Seramik İnşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | C908 |
| Türkiye | Graniser Granit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | C909 |
| Türkiye | Kaleseramik Çanakkale Kalebodur Seramik Sanayi A.Ş. | C910 |
| Türkiye | Karo Metro Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | C911 |
| Türkiye | NG Kütahya Seramik Porselen Turizm A.Ş. | C912 |
| Türkiye | Seramiksan Turgutlu Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | C913 |
| Türkiye | Seranit Granit Seramik Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş. | C914 |
| Türkiye | Söğütsen Seramik Sanayi İnşaat Madencilik İthalat İhracat A.Ş. | C915 |
| Türkiye | Termal Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. | C916 |
| Türkiye | Uşak Seramik Sanayi A.Ş. | C917 |
| Türkiye | Yurtbay Seramik Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş. | C918 |

Country

Name

TARIC additional code

Türkiye

Akgün Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. (1)

Akgün Toprak Sanayi İnşaat ve Ticaret A.Ş.

Veli Akgün Seramik İnşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

C904

Türkiye

Anka Toprak Ürünleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

C905

Türkiye

Decovita Yapi Ürünleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

C906

Türkiye

Ege Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

C907

Türkiye

Etili Seramik İnşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

C908

Türkiye

Graniser Granit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

C909

Türkiye

Kaleseramik Çanakkale Kalebodur Seramik Sanayi A.Ş.

C910

Türkiye

Karo Metro Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

C911

Türkiye

NG Kütahya Seramik Porselen Turizm A.Ş.

C912

Türkiye

Seramiksan Turgutlu Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

C913

Türkiye

Seranit Granit Seramik Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş.

C914

Türkiye

Söğütsen Seramik Sanayi İnşaat Madencilik İthalat İhracat A.Ş.

C915

Türkiye

Termal Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

C916

Türkiye

Uşak Seramik Sanayi A.Ş.

C917

Türkiye

Yurtbay Seramik Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş.

C918

---

(1)  A.Ş. stands for Anonim Şirketi

---

| 10.2.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 41/77 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.2.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 41/77

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/266

of 9 February 2023

laying down technical information for the calculation of technical provisions and basic own funds for reporting with reference dates from 31 December 2022 until 30 March 2023 in accordance with Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (1), and in particular the third subparagraph of Article 77e(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | In order to ensure uniform conditions for the calculation of technical provisions and basic own funds by insurance and reinsurance undertakings for the purposes of Directive 2009/138/EC, technical information on relevant risk-free interest rate term structures, fundamental spreads for the calculation of the matching adjustment and volatility adjustments should be laid down for every reference date. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the calculation of technical provisions and basic own funds by insurance and reinsurance undertakings for the purposes of Directive 2009/138/EC, technical information on relevant risk-free interest rate term structures, fundamental spreads for the calculation of the matching adjustment and volatility adjustments should be laid down for every reference date.

| (2) | Insurance and re-insurance undertakings should use the technical information, which is based on market data related to the end of the last month preceding the first reporting reference date to which this Regulation applies. On 5 January 2023, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority provided the Commission with the technical information related to end of December 2022 market data. That information was published on 5 January 2023 in accordance with Article 77e(1) of Directive 2009/138/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Insurance and re-insurance undertakings should use the technical information, which is based on market data related to the end of the last month preceding the first reporting reference date to which this Regulation applies. On 5 January 2023, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority provided the Commission with the technical information related to end of December 2022 market data. That information was published on 5 January 2023 in accordance with Article 77e(1) of Directive 2009/138/EC.

| (3) | Given the need for the immediate availability of the technical information, it is important that this Regulation enters into force as a matter of urgency. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Given the need for the immediate availability of the technical information, it is important that this Regulation enters into force as a matter of urgency.

| (4) | For prudential reasons it is necessary that insurance and reinsurance undertakings use the same technical information for calculating technical provisions and basic own funds irrespective of the date on which they report to their competent authorities. This Regulation should therefore apply from the first reporting reference date to which this Regulation applies. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

For prudential reasons it is necessary that insurance and reinsurance undertakings use the same technical information for calculating technical provisions and basic own funds irrespective of the date on which they report to their competent authorities. This Regulation should therefore apply from the first reporting reference date to which this Regulation applies.

| (5) | To provide legal certainty as soon as possible, it is duly justified on imperative grounds of urgency related to the availability of the relevant risk-free interest rate term structure that measures provided for in this Regulation be adopted in accordance with Article 8, in conjunction with Article 4, of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2), |
| --- | --- |

(5)

To provide legal certainty as soon as possible, it is duly justified on imperative grounds of urgency related to the availability of the relevant risk-free interest rate term structure that measures provided for in this Regulation be adopted in accordance with Article 8, in conjunction with Article 4, of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2),

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.   Insurance and reinsurance undertakings shall use the technical information referred to in paragraph 2 when calculating technical provisions and basic own funds for reporting with reference dates from 31 December 2022 until 30 March 2023.

2.   For each relevant currency, the technical information used to calculate the best estimate in accordance with Article 77 of Directive 2009/138/EC, the matching adjustment in accordance with Article 77c of that Directive and the volatility adjustment in accordance with Article 77d of that Directive shall be the following:

| (a) | the relevant risk-free interest rate term structures set out in Annex I; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the relevant risk-free interest rate term structures set out in Annex I;

| (b) | the fundamental spreads for the calculation of the matching adjustment set out in Annex II; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the fundamental spreads for the calculation of the matching adjustment set out in Annex II;

| (c) | for each relevant national insurance market, the volatility adjustments set out in Annex III. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

for each relevant national insurance market, the volatility adjustments set out in Annex III.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

It shall apply from 31 December 2022.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 9 February 2023.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

---

(1)  
  OJ L 335, 17.12.2009, p. 1.

1

(2)  Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13).

2

---

ANNEX I

Relevant risk-free interest rate term structures to calculate the best estimate, without any matching adjustment or volatility adjustment

| Term to maturity (in years) | Euro | Czech koruna | Danish krone | Forint | Krona | Kuna |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 3,176 % | 6,512 % | 3,166 % | 13,655 % | 3,474 % | 2,494 % |
| 2 | 3,295 % | 6,226 % | 3,285 % | 12,506 % | 3,414 % | 2,829 % |
| 3 | 3,203 % | 5,777 % | 3,193 % | 11,342 % | 3,323 % | 3,038 % |
| 4 | 3,152 % | 5,361 % | 3,142 % | 10,379 % | 3,236 % | 3,195 % |
| 5 | 3,131 % | 5,054 % | 3,121 % | 9,665 % | 3,163 % | 3,348 % |
| 6 | 3,110 % | 4,866 % | 3,100 % | 9,171 % | 3,104 % | 3,512 % |
| 7 | 3,091 % | 4,754 % | 3,081 % | 8,857 % | 3,060 % | 3,684 % |
| 8 | 3,086 % | 4,682 % | 3,076 % | 8,686 % | 3,030 % | 3,867 % |
| 9 | 3,088 % | 4,635 % | 3,078 % | 8,622 % | 3,013 % | 4,030 % |
| 10 | 3,092 % | 4,602 % | 3,082 % | 8,609 % | 3,010 % | 4,151 % |
| 11 | 3,100 % | 4,576 % | 3,090 % | 8,625 % | 3,019 % | 4,236 % |
| 12 | 3,085 % | 4,553 % | 3,075 % | 8,635 % | 3,035 % | 4,295 % |
| 13 | 3,071 % | 4,532 % | 3,061 % | 8,624 % | 3,055 % | 4,335 % |
| 14 | 3,053 % | 4,512 % | 3,043 % | 8,585 % | 3,075 % | 4,360 % |
| 15 | 3,022 % | 4,491 % | 3,012 % | 8,510 % | 3,095 % | 4,375 % |
| 16 | 2,974 % | 4,469 % | 2,964 % | 8,422 % | 3,114 % | 4,381 % |
| 17 | 2,916 % | 4,446 % | 2,906 % | 8,328 % | 3,131 % | 4,382 % |
| 18 | 2,859 % | 4,423 % | 2,849 % | 8,231 % | 3,147 % | 4,377 % |
| 19 | 2,807 % | 4,399 % | 2,797 % | 8,133 % | 3,162 % | 4,368 % |
| 20 | 2,765 % | 4,376 % | 2,755 % | 8,035 % | 3,176 % | 4,357 % |
| 21 | 2,735 % | 4,352 % | 2,725 % | 7,937 % | 3,189 % | 4,344 % |
| 22 | 2,715 % | 4,330 % | 2,705 % | 7,840 % | 3,200 % | 4,329 % |
| 23 | 2,703 % | 4,307 % | 2,693 % | 7,746 % | 3,211 % | 4,313 % |
| 24 | 2,697 % | 4,285 % | 2,688 % | 7,654 % | 3,221 % | 4,297 % |
| 25 | 2,695 % | 4,264 % | 2,687 % | 7,564 % | 3,230 % | 4,280 % |
| 26 | 2,698 % | 4,243 % | 2,689 % | 7,477 % | 3,238 % | 4,262 % |
| 27 | 2,703 % | 4,223 % | 2,695 % | 7,393 % | 3,246 % | 4,245 % |
| 28 | 2,711 % | 4,203 % | 2,703 % | 7,312 % | 3,253 % | 4,228 % |
| 29 | 2,720 % | 4,184 % | 2,712 % | 7,234 % | 3,260 % | 4,210 % |
| 30 | 2,730 % | 4,166 % | 2,723 % | 7,159 % | 3,266 % | 4,193 % |
| 31 | 2,742 % | 4,149 % | 2,734 % | 7,087 % | 3,272 % | 4,177 % |
| 32 | 2,753 % | 4,132 % | 2,746 % | 7,018 % | 3,278 % | 4,160 % |
| 33 | 2,766 % | 4,115 % | 2,759 % | 6,952 % | 3,283 % | 4,145 % |
| 34 | 2,778 % | 4,100 % | 2,772 % | 6,888 % | 3,288 % | 4,129 % |
| 35 | 2,791 % | 4,084 % | 2,784 % | 6,827 % | 3,293 % | 4,114 % |
| 36 | 2,804 % | 4,070 % | 2,797 % | 6,768 % | 3,297 % | 4,099 % |
| 37 | 2,816 % | 4,055 % | 2,810 % | 6,712 % | 3,301 % | 4,085 % |
| 38 | 2,829 % | 4,042 % | 2,823 % | 6,659 % | 3,305 % | 4,071 % |
| 39 | 2,841 % | 4,029 % | 2,835 % | 6,607 % | 3,309 % | 4,058 % |
| 40 | 2,853 % | 4,016 % | 2,848 % | 6,557 % | 3,312 % | 4,045 % |
| 41 | 2,865 % | 4,004 % | 2,860 % | 6,510 % | 3,316 % | 4,032 % |
| 42 | 2,877 % | 3,992 % | 2,871 % | 6,464 % | 3,319 % | 4,020 % |
| 43 | 2,888 % | 3,981 % | 2,883 % | 6,421 % | 3,322 % | 4,008 % |
| 44 | 2,899 % | 3,970 % | 2,894 % | 6,378 % | 3,325 % | 3,997 % |
| 45 | 2,910 % | 3,959 % | 2,905 % | 6,338 % | 3,328 % | 3,986 % |
| 46 | 2,920 % | 3,949 % | 2,915 % | 6,299 % | 3,330 % | 3,975 % |
| 47 | 2,931 % | 3,939 % | 2,925 % | 6,262 % | 3,333 % | 3,965 % |
| 48 | 2,940 % | 3,930 % | 2,935 % | 6,226 % | 3,335 % | 3,955 % |
| 49 | 2,950 % | 3,921 % | 2,945 % | 6,191 % | 3,338 % | 3,945 % |
| 50 | 2,959 % | 3,912 % | 2,954 % | 6,158 % | 3,340 % | 3,936 % |
| 51 | 2,968 % | 3,903 % | 2,963 % | 6,126 % | 3,342 % | 3,927 % |
| 52 | 2,977 % | 3,895 % | 2,972 % | 6,095 % | 3,344 % | 3,918 % |
| 53 | 2,985 % | 3,887 % | 2,981 % | 6,065 % | 3,346 % | 3,910 % |
| 54 | 2,993 % | 3,879 % | 2,989 % | 6,037 % | 3,348 % | 3,902 % |
| 55 | 3,001 % | 3,872 % | 2,997 % | 6,009 % | 3,350 % | 3,894 % |
| 56 | 3,009 % | 3,864 % | 3,005 % | 5,982 % | 3,352 % | 3,886 % |
| 57 | 3,016 % | 3,857 % | 3,012 % | 5,956 % | 3,353 % | 3,879 % |
| 58 | 3,024 % | 3,850 % | 3,020 % | 5,931 % | 3,355 % | 3,872 % |
| 59 | 3,031 % | 3,844 % | 3,027 % | 5,907 % | 3,357 % | 3,865 % |
| 60 | 3,037 % | 3,837 % | 3,033 % | 5,884 % | 3,358 % | 3,858 % |
| 61 | 3,044 % | 3,831 % | 3,040 % | 5,861 % | 3,360 % | 3,851 % |
| 62 | 3,050 % | 3,825 % | 3,047 % | 5,839 % | 3,361 % | 3,845 % |
| 63 | 3,057 % | 3,819 % | 3,053 % | 5,818 % | 3,363 % | 3,839 % |
| 64 | 3,063 % | 3,814 % | 3,059 % | 5,797 % | 3,364 % | 3,833 % |
| 65 | 3,069 % | 3,808 % | 3,065 % | 5,777 % | 3,365 % | 3,827 % |
| 66 | 3,074 % | 3,803 % | 3,071 % | 5,758 % | 3,367 % | 3,821 % |
| 67 | 3,080 % | 3,798 % | 3,076 % | 5,739 % | 3,368 % | 3,816 % |
| 68 | 3,085 % | 3,793 % | 3,082 % | 5,721 % | 3,369 % | 3,811 % |
| 69 | 3,090 % | 3,788 % | 3,087 % | 5,703 % | 3,370 % | 3,805 % |
| 70 | 3,095 % | 3,783 % | 3,092 % | 5,686 % | 3,371 % | 3,800 % |
| 71 | 3,100 % | 3,778 % | 3,097 % | 5,669 % | 3,372 % | 3,795 % |
| 72 | 3,105 % | 3,774 % | 3,102 % | 5,653 % | 3,373 % | 3,791 % |
| 73 | 3,110 % | 3,769 % | 3,107 % | 5,637 % | 3,375 % | 3,786 % |
| 74 | 3,114 % | 3,765 % | 3,111 % | 5,621 % | 3,376 % | 3,782 % |
| 75 | 3,119 % | 3,761 % | 3,116 % | 5,606 % | 3,377 % | 3,777 % |
| 76 | 3,123 % | 3,757 % | 3,120 % | 5,592 % | 3,377 % | 3,773 % |
| 77 | 3,127 % | 3,753 % | 3,124 % | 5,578 % | 3,378 % | 3,769 % |
| 78 | 3,132 % | 3,749 % | 3,128 % | 5,564 % | 3,379 % | 3,765 % |
| 79 | 3,136 % | 3,745 % | 3,133 % | 5,550 % | 3,380 % | 3,761 % |
| 80 | 3,139 % | 3,742 % | 3,136 % | 5,537 % | 3,381 % | 3,757 % |
| 81 | 3,143 % | 3,738 % | 3,140 % | 5,524 % | 3,382 % | 3,753 % |
| 82 | 3,147 % | 3,735 % | 3,144 % | 5,512 % | 3,383 % | 3,749 % |
| 83 | 3,151 % | 3,731 % | 3,148 % | 5,499 % | 3,384 % | 3,746 % |
| 84 | 3,154 % | 3,728 % | 3,151 % | 5,487 % | 3,384 % | 3,742 % |
| 85 | 3,158 % | 3,725 % | 3,155 % | 5,476 % | 3,385 % | 3,739 % |
| 86 | 3,161 % | 3,721 % | 3,158 % | 5,464 % | 3,386 % | 3,735 % |
| 87 | 3,164 % | 3,718 % | 3,162 % | 5,453 % | 3,387 % | 3,732 % |
| 88 | 3,168 % | 3,715 % | 3,165 % | 5,442 % | 3,387 % | 3,729 % |
| 89 | 3,171 % | 3,712 % | 3,168 % | 5,432 % | 3,388 % | 3,726 % |
| 90 | 3,174 % | 3,709 % | 3,171 % | 5,421 % | 3,389 % | 3,723 % |
| 91 | 3,177 % | 3,706 % | 3,174 % | 5,411 % | 3,389 % | 3,720 % |
| 92 | 3,180 % | 3,704 % | 3,177 % | 5,401 % | 3,390 % | 3,717 % |
| 93 | 3,183 % | 3,701 % | 3,180 % | 5,391 % | 3,391 % | 3,714 % |
| 94 | 3,186 % | 3,698 % | 3,183 % | 5,382 % | 3,391 % | 3,711 % |
| 95 | 3,188 % | 3,696 % | 3,186 % | 5,373 % | 3,392 % | 3,708 % |
| 96 | 3,191 % | 3,693 % | 3,189 % | 5,363 % | 3,393 % | 3,706 % |
| 97 | 3,194 % | 3,691 % | 3,191 % | 5,355 % | 3,393 % | 3,703 % |
| 98 | 3,196 % | 3,688 % | 3,194 % | 5,346 % | 3,394 % | 3,700 % |
| 99 | 3,199 % | 3,686 % | 3,197 % | 5,337 % | 3,394 % | 3,698 % |
| 100 | 3,201 % | 3,683 % | 3,199 % | 5,329 % | 3,395 % | 3,695 % |
| 101 | 3,204 % | 3,681 % | 3,202 % | 5,321 % | 3,395 % | 3,693 % |
| 102 | 3,206 % | 3,679 % | 3,204 % | 5,312 % | 3,396 % | 3,691 % |
| 103 | 3,209 % | 3,677 % | 3,206 % | 5,305 % | 3,396 % | 3,688 % |
| 104 | 3,211 % | 3,674 % | 3,209 % | 5,297 % | 3,397 % | 3,686 % |
| 105 | 3,213 % | 3,672 % | 3,211 % | 5,289 % | 3,398 % | 3,684 % |
| 106 | 3,215 % | 3,670 % | 3,213 % | 5,282 % | 3,398 % | 3,682 % |
| 107 | 3,218 % | 3,668 % | 3,215 % | 5,274 % | 3,398 % | 3,679 % |
| 108 | 3,220 % | 3,666 % | 3,218 % | 5,267 % | 3,399 % | 3,677 % |
| 109 | 3,222 % | 3,664 % | 3,220 % | 5,260 % | 3,399 % | 3,675 % |
| 110 | 3,224 % | 3,662 % | 3,222 % | 5,253 % | 3,400 % | 3,673 % |
| 111 | 3,226 % | 3,660 % | 3,224 % | 5,246 % | 3,400 % | 3,671 % |
| 112 | 3,228 % | 3,658 % | 3,226 % | 5,240 % | 3,401 % | 3,669 % |
| 113 | 3,230 % | 3,657 % | 3,228 % | 5,233 % | 3,401 % | 3,667 % |
| 114 | 3,232 % | 3,655 % | 3,230 % | 5,227 % | 3,402 % | 3,665 % |
| 115 | 3,234 % | 3,653 % | 3,232 % | 5,220 % | 3,402 % | 3,663 % |
| 116 | 3,236 % | 3,651 % | 3,234 % | 5,214 % | 3,402 % | 3,662 % |
| 117 | 3,237 % | 3,649 % | 3,235 % | 5,208 % | 3,403 % | 3,660 % |
| 118 | 3,239 % | 3,648 % | 3,237 % | 5,202 % | 3,403 % | 3,658 % |
| 119 | 3,241 % | 3,646 % | 3,239 % | 5,196 % | 3,404 % | 3,656 % |
| 120 | 3,243 % | 3,644 % | 3,241 % | 5,190 % | 3,404 % | 3,655 % |
| 121 | 3,245 % | 3,643 % | 3,243 % | 5,184 % | 3,404 % | 3,653 % |
| 122 | 3,246 % | 3,641 % | 3,244 % | 5,179 % | 3,405 % | 3,651 % |
| 123 | 3,248 % | 3,640 % | 3,246 % | 5,173 % | 3,405 % | 3,650 % |
| 124 | 3,249 % | 3,638 % | 3,248 % | 5,168 % | 3,406 % | 3,648 % |
| 125 | 3,251 % | 3,637 % | 3,249 % | 5,163 % | 3,406 % | 3,646 % |
| 126 | 3,253 % | 3,635 % | 3,251 % | 5,157 % | 3,406 % | 3,645 % |
| 127 | 3,254 % | 3,634 % | 3,252 % | 5,152 % | 3,407 % | 3,643 % |
| 128 | 3,256 % | 3,632 % | 3,254 % | 5,147 % | 3,407 % | 3,642 % |
| 129 | 3,257 % | 3,631 % | 3,255 % | 5,142 % | 3,407 % | 3,640 % |
| 130 | 3,259 % | 3,629 % | 3,257 % | 5,137 % | 3,408 % | 3,639 % |
| 131 | 3,260 % | 3,628 % | 3,258 % | 5,132 % | 3,408 % | 3,637 % |
| 132 | 3,262 % | 3,627 % | 3,260 % | 5,127 % | 3,408 % | 3,636 % |
| 133 | 3,263 % | 3,625 % | 3,261 % | 5,123 % | 3,409 % | 3,635 % |
| 134 | 3,264 % | 3,624 % | 3,263 % | 5,118 % | 3,409 % | 3,633 % |
| 135 | 3,266 % | 3,623 % | 3,264 % | 5,113 % | 3,409 % | 3,632 % |
| 136 | 3,267 % | 3,622 % | 3,265 % | 5,109 % | 3,409 % | 3,630 % |
| 137 | 3,268 % | 3,620 % | 3,267 % | 5,104 % | 3,410 % | 3,629 % |
| 138 | 3,270 % | 3,619 % | 3,268 % | 5,100 % | 3,410 % | 3,628 % |
| 139 | 3,271 % | 3,618 % | 3,269 % | 5,096 % | 3,410 % | 3,627 % |
| 140 | 3,272 % | 3,617 % | 3,271 % | 5,091 % | 3,411 % | 3,625 % |
| 141 | 3,274 % | 3,615 % | 3,272 % | 5,087 % | 3,411 % | 3,624 % |
| 142 | 3,275 % | 3,614 % | 3,273 % | 5,083 % | 3,411 % | 3,623 % |
| 143 | 3,276 % | 3,613 % | 3,274 % | 5,079 % | 3,411 % | 3,622 % |
| 144 | 3,277 % | 3,612 % | 3,276 % | 5,075 % | 3,412 % | 3,620 % |
| 145 | 3,278 % | 3,611 % | 3,277 % | 5,071 % | 3,412 % | 3,619 % |
| 146 | 3,280 % | 3,610 % | 3,278 % | 5,067 % | 3,412 % | 3,618 % |
| 147 | 3,281 % | 3,609 % | 3,279 % | 5,063 % | 3,413 % | 3,617 % |
| 148 | 3,282 % | 3,608 % | 3,280 % | 5,059 % | 3,413 % | 3,616 % |
| 149 | 3,283 % | 3,607 % | 3,281 % | 5,056 % | 3,413 % | 3,615 % |
| 150 | 3,284 % | 3,606 % | 3,283 % | 5,052 % | 3,413 % | 3,614 % |

Term to maturity (in years)

Euro

Czech koruna

Danish krone

Forint

Krona

Kuna

1

3,176 %

6,512 %

3,166 %

13,655 %

3,474 %

2,494 %

2

3,295 %

6,226 %

3,285 %

12,506 %

3,414 %

2,829 %

3

3,203 %

5,777 %

3,193 %

11,342 %

3,323 %

3,038 %

4

3,152 %

5,361 %

3,142 %

10,379 %

3,236 %

3,195 %

5

3,131 %

5,054 %

3,121 %

9,665 %

3,163 %

3,348 %

6

3,110 %

4,866 %

3,100 %

9,171 %

3,104 %

3,512 %

7

3,091 %

4,754 %

3,081 %

8,857 %

3,060 %

3,684 %

8

3,086 %

4,682 %

3,076 %

8,686 %

3,030 %

3,867 %

9

3,088 %

4,635 %

3,078 %

8,622 %

3,013 %

4,030 %

10

3,092 %

4,602 %

3,082 %

8,609 %

3,010 %

4,151 %

11

3,100 %

4,576 %

3,090 %

8,625 %

3,019 %

4,236 %

12

3,085 %

4,553 %

3,075 %

8,635 %

3,035 %

4,295 %

13

3,071 %

4,532 %

3,061 %

8,624 %

3,055 %

4,335 %

14

3,053 %

4,512 %

3,043 %

8,585 %

3,075 %

4,360 %

15

3,022 %

4,491 %

3,012 %

8,510 %

3,095 %

4,375 %

16

2,974 %

4,469 %

2,964 %

8,422 %

3,114 %

4,381 %

17

2,916 %

4,446 %

2,906 %

8,328 %

3,131 %

4,382 %

18

2,859 %

4,423 %

2,849 %

8,231 %

3,147 %

4,377 %

19

2,807 %

4,399 %

2,797 %

8,133 %

3,162 %

4,368 %

20

2,765 %

4,376 %

2,755 %

8,035 %

3,176 %

4,357 %

21

2,735 %

4,352 %

2,725 %

7,937 %

3,189 %

4,344 %

22

2,715 %

4,330 %

2,705 %

7,840 %

3,200 %

4,329 %

23

2,703 %

4,307 %

2,693 %

7,746 %

3,211 %

4,313 %

24

2,697 %

4,285 %

2,688 %

7,654 %

3,221 %

4,297 %

25

2,695 %

4,264 %

2,687 %

7,564 %

3,230 %

4,280 %

26

2,698 %

4,243 %

2,689 %

7,477 %

3,238 %

4,262 %

27

2,703 %

4,223 %

2,695 %

7,393 %

3,246 %

4,245 %

28

2,711 %

4,203 %

2,703 %

7,312 %

3,253 %

4,228 %

29

2,720 %

4,184 %

2,712 %

7,234 %

3,260 %

4,210 %

30

2,730 %

4,166 %

2,723 %

7,159 %

3,266 %

4,193 %

31

2,742 %

4,149 %

2,734 %

7,087 %

3,272 %

4,177 %

32

2,753 %

4,132 %

2,746 %

7,018 %

3,278 %

4,160 %

33

2,766 %

4,115 %

2,759 %

6,952 %

3,283 %

4,145 %

34

2,778 %

4,100 %

2,772 %

6,888 %

3,288 %

4,129 %

35

2,791 %

4,084 %

2,784 %

6,827 %

3,293 %

4,114 %

36

2,804 %

4,070 %

2,797 %

6,768 %

3,297 %

4,099 %

37

2,816 %

4,055 %

2,810 %

6,712 %

3,301 %

4,085 %

38

2,829 %

4,042 %

2,823 %

6,659 %

3,305 %

4,071 %

39

2,841 %

4,029 %

2,835 %

6,607 %

3,309 %

4,058 %

40

2,853 %

4,016 %

2,848 %

6,557 %

3,312 %

4,045 %

41

2,865 %

4,004 %

2,860 %

6,510 %

3,316 %

4,032 %

42

2,877 %

3,992 %

2,871 %

6,464 %

3,319 %

4,020 %

43

2,888 %

3,981 %

2,883 %

6,421 %

3,322 %

4,008 %

44

2,899 %

3,970 %

2,894 %

6,378 %

3,325 %

3,997 %

45

2,910 %

3,959 %

2,905 %

6,338 %

3,328 %

3,986 %

46

2,920 %

3,949 %

2,915 %

6,299 %

3,330 %

3,975 %

47

2,931 %

3,939 %

2,925 %

6,262 %

3,333 %

3,965 %

48

2,940 %

3,930 %

2,935 %

6,226 %

3,335 %

3,955 %

49

2,950 %

3,921 %

2,945 %

6,191 %

3,338 %

3,945 %

50

2,959 %

3,912 %

2,954 %

6,158 %

3,340 %

3,936 %

51

2,968 %

3,903 %

2,963 %

6,126 %

3,342 %

3,927 %

52

2,977 %

3,895 %

2,972 %

6,095 %

3,344 %

3,918 %

53

2,985 %

3,887 %

2,981 %

6,065 %

3,346 %

3,910 %

54

2,993 %

3,879 %

2,989 %

6,037 %

3,348 %

3,902 %

55

3,001 %

3,872 %

2,997 %

6,009 %

3,350 %

3,894 %

56

3,009 %

3,864 %

3,005 %

5,982 %

3,352 %

3,886 %

57

3,016 %

3,857 %

3,012 %

5,956 %

3,353 %

3,879 %

58

3,024 %

3,850 %

3,020 %

5,931 %

3,355 %

3,872 %

59

3,031 %

3,844 %

3,027 %

5,907 %

3,357 %

3,865 %

60

3,037 %

3,837 %

3,033 %

5,884 %

3,358 %

3,858 %

61

3,044 %

3,831 %

3,040 %

5,861 %

3,360 %

3,851 %

62

3,050 %

3,825 %

3,047 %

5,839 %

3,361 %

3,845 %

63

3,057 %

3,819 %

3,053 %

5,818 %

3,363 %

3,839 %

64

3,063 %

3,814 %

3,059 %

5,797 %

3,364 %

3,833 %

65

3,069 %

3,808 %

3,065 %

5,777 %

3,365 %

3,827 %

66

3,074 %

3,803 %

3,071 %

5,758 %

3,367 %

3,821 %

67

3,080 %

3,798 %

3,076 %

5,739 %

3,368 %

3,816 %

68

3,085 %

3,793 %

3,082 %

5,721 %

3,369 %

3,811 %

69

3,090 %

3,788 %

3,087 %

5,703 %

3,370 %

3,805 %

70

3,095 %

3,783 %

3,092 %

5,686 %

3,371 %

3,800 %

71

3,100 %

3,778 %

3,097 %

5,669 %

3,372 %

3,795 %

72

3,105 %

3,774 %

3,102 %

5,653 %

3,373 %

3,791 %

73

3,110 %

3,769 %

3,107 %

5,637 %

3,375 %

3,786 %

74

3,114 %

3,765 %

3,111 %

5,621 %

3,376 %

3,782 %

75

3,119 %

3,761 %

3,116 %

5,606 %

3,377 %

3,777 %

76

3,123 %

3,757 %

3,120 %

5,592 %

3,377 %

3,773 %

77

3,127 %

3,753 %

3,124 %

5,578 %

3,378 %

3,769 %

78

3,132 %

3,749 %

3,128 %

5,564 %

3,379 %

3,765 %

79

3,136 %

3,745 %

3,133 %

5,550 %

3,380 %

3,761 %

80

3,139 %

3,742 %

3,136 %

5,537 %

3,381 %

3,757 %

81

3,143 %

3,738 %

3,140 %

5,524 %

3,382 %

3,753 %

82

3,147 %

3,735 %

3,144 %

5,512 %

3,383 %

3,749 %

83

3,151 %

3,731 %

3,148 %

5,499 %

3,384 %

3,746 %

84

3,154 %

3,728 %

3,151 %

5,487 %

3,384 %

3,742 %

85

3,158 %

3,725 %

3,155 %

5,476 %

3,385 %

3,739 %

86

3,161 %

3,721 %

3,158 %

5,464 %

3,386 %

3,735 %

87

3,164 %

3,718 %

3,162 %

5,453 %

3,387 %

3,732 %

88

3,168 %

3,715 %

3,165 %

5,442 %

3,387 %

3,729 %

89

3,171 %

3,712 %

3,168 %

5,432 %

3,388 %

3,726 %

90

3,174 %

3,709 %

3,171 %

5,421 %

3,389 %

3,723 %

91

3,177 %

3,706 %

3,174 %

5,411 %

3,389 %

3,720 %

92

3,180 %

3,704 %

3,177 %

5,401 %

3,390 %

3,717 %

93

3,183 %

3,701 %

3,180 %

5,391 %

3,391 %

3,714 %

94

3,186 %

3,698 %

3,183 %

5,382 %

3,391 %

3,711 %

95

3,188 %

3,696 %

3,186 %

5,373 %

3,392 %

3,708 %

96

3,191 %

3,693 %

3,189 %

5,363 %

3,393 %

3,706 %

97

3,194 %

3,691 %

3,191 %

5,355 %

3,393 %

3,703 %

98

3,196 %

3,688 %

3,194 %

5,346 %

3,394 %

3,700 %

99

3,199 %

3,686 %

3,197 %

5,337 %

3,394 %

3,698 %

100

3,201 %

3,683 %

3,199 %

5,329 %

3,395 %

3,695 %

101

3,204 %

3,681 %

3,202 %

5,321 %

3,395 %

3,693 %

102

3,206 %

3,679 %

3,204 %

5,312 %

3,396 %

3,691 %

103

3,209 %

3,677 %

3,206 %

5,305 %

3,396 %

3,688 %

104

3,211 %

3,674 %

3,209 %

5,297 %

3,397 %

3,686 %

105

3,213 %

3,672 %

3,211 %

5,289 %

3,398 %

3,684 %

106

3,215 %

3,670 %

3,213 %

5,282 %

3,398 %

3,682 %

107

3,218 %

3,668 %

3,215 %

5,274 %

3,398 %

3,679 %

108

3,220 %

3,666 %

3,218 %

5,267 %

3,399 %

3,677 %

109

3,222 %

3,664 %

3,220 %

5,260 %

3,399 %

3,675 %

110

3,224 %

3,662 %

3,222 %

5,253 %

3,400 %

3,673 %

111

3,226 %

3,660 %

3,224 %

5,246 %

3,400 %

3,671 %

112

3,228 %

3,658 %

3,226 %

5,240 %

3,401 %

3,669 %

113

3,230 %

3,657 %

3,228 %

5,233 %

3,401 %

3,667 %

114

3,232 %

3,655 %

3,230 %

5,227 %

3,402 %

3,665 %

115

3,234 %

3,653 %

3,232 %

5,220 %

3,402 %

3,663 %

116

3,236 %

3,651 %

3,234 %

5,214 %

3,402 %

3,662 %

117

3,237 %

3,649 %

3,235 %

5,208 %

3,403 %

3,660 %

118

3,239 %

3,648 %

3,237 %

5,202 %

3,403 %

3,658 %

119

3,241 %

3,646 %

3,239 %

5,196 %

3,404 %

3,656 %

120

3,243 %

3,644 %

3,241 %

5,190 %

3,404 %

3,655 %

121

3,245 %

3,643 %

3,243 %

5,184 %

3,404 %

3,653 %

122

3,246 %

3,641 %

3,244 %

5,179 %

3,405 %

3,651 %

123

3,248 %

3,640 %

3,246 %

5,173 %

3,405 %

3,650 %

124

3,249 %

3,638 %

3,248 %

5,168 %

3,406 %

3,648 %

125

3,251 %

3,637 %

3,249 %

5,163 %

3,406 %

3,646 %

126

3,253 %

3,635 %

3,251 %

5,157 %

3,406 %

3,645 %

127

3,254 %

3,634 %

3,252 %

5,152 %

3,407 %

3,643 %

128

3,256 %

3,632 %

3,254 %

5,147 %

3,407 %

3,642 %

129

3,257 %

3,631 %

3,255 %

5,142 %

3,407 %

3,640 %

130

3,259 %

3,629 %

3,257 %

5,137 %

3,408 %

3,639 %

131

3,260 %

3,628 %

3,258 %

5,132 %

3,408 %

3,637 %

132

3,262 %

3,627 %

3,260 %

5,127 %

3,408 %

3,636 %

133

3,263 %

3,625 %

3,261 %

5,123 %

3,409 %

3,635 %

134

3,264 %

3,624 %

3,263 %

5,118 %

3,409 %

3,633 %

135

3,266 %

3,623 %

3,264 %

5,113 %

3,409 %

3,632 %

136

3,267 %

3,622 %

3,265 %

5,109 %

3,409 %

3,630 %

137

3,268 %

3,620 %

3,267 %

5,104 %

3,410 %

3,629 %

138

3,270 %

3,619 %

3,268 %

5,100 %

3,410 %

3,628 %

139

3,271 %

3,618 %

3,269 %

5,096 %

3,410 %

3,627 %

140

3,272 %

3,617 %

3,271 %

5,091 %

3,411 %

3,625 %

141

3,274 %

3,615 %

3,272 %

5,087 %

3,411 %

3,624 %

142

3,275 %

3,614 %

3,273 %

5,083 %

3,411 %

3,623 %

143

3,276 %

3,613 %

3,274 %

5,079 %

3,411 %

3,622 %

144

3,277 %

3,612 %

3,276 %

5,075 %

3,412 %

3,620 %

145

3,278 %

3,611 %

3,277 %

5,071 %

3,412 %

3,619 %

146

3,280 %

3,610 %

3,278 %

5,067 %

3,412 %

3,618 %

147

3,281 %

3,609 %

3,279 %

5,063 %

3,413 %

3,617 %

148

3,282 %

3,608 %

3,280 %

5,059 %

3,413 %

3,616 %

149

3,283 %

3,607 %

3,281 %

5,056 %

3,413 %

3,615 %

150

3,284 %

3,606 %

3,283 %

5,052 %

3,413 %

3,614 %

| Term to maturity (in years) | Lev | Pound sterling | Romanian leu | Zloty | Króna | Norwegian krone |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 3,126 % | 4,460 % | 6,975 % | 6,401 % | 6,849 % | 3,456 % |
| 2 | 3,245 % | 4,470 % | 7,091 % | 6,602 % | 6,785 % | 3,384 % |
| 3 | 3,153 % | 4,326 % | 7,246 % | 6,719 % | 6,685 % | 3,281 % |
| 4 | 3,103 % | 4,177 % | 7,437 % | 6,751 % | 6,580 % | 3,195 % |
| 5 | 3,081 % | 4,062 % | 7,638 % | 6,744 % | 6,479 % | 3,146 % |
| 6 | 3,060 % | 3,952 % | 7,835 % | 6,722 % | 6,381 % | 3,134 % |
| 7 | 3,041 % | 3,859 % | 8,024 % | 6,693 % | 6,286 % | 3,142 % |
| 8 | 3,036 % | 3,795 % | 8,225 % | 6,669 % | 6,193 % | 3,158 % |
| 9 | 3,038 % | 3,748 % | 8,413 % | 6,658 % | 6,102 % | 3,178 % |
| 10 | 3,042 % | 3,710 % | 8,556 % | 6,648 % | 6,012 % | 3,196 % |
| 11 | 3,050 % | 3,683 % | 8,635 % | 6,621 % | 5,925 % | 3,212 % |
| 12 | 3,035 % | 3,663 % | 8,660 % | 6,576 % | 5,841 % | 3,226 % |
| 13 | 3,021 % | 3,647 % | 8,644 % | 6,519 % | 5,759 % | 3,238 % |
| 14 | 3,003 % | 3,633 % | 8,598 % | 6,454 % | 5,681 % | 3,248 % |
| 15 | 2,972 % | 3,619 % | 8,529 % | 6,385 % | 5,606 % | 3,257 % |
| 16 | 2,924 % | 3,604 % | 8,443 % | 6,311 % | 5,534 % | 3,266 % |
| 17 | 2,867 % | 3,589 % | 8,345 % | 6,237 % | 5,465 % | 3,273 % |
| 18 | 2,809 % | 3,572 % | 8,238 % | 6,161 % | 5,399 % | 3,280 % |
| 19 | 2,758 % | 3,554 % | 8,126 % | 6,086 % | 5,336 % | 3,286 % |
| 20 | 2,716 % | 3,535 % | 8,010 % | 6,012 % | 5,275 % | 3,292 % |
| 21 | 2,687 % | 3,514 % | 7,892 % | 5,939 % | 5,218 % | 3,297 % |
| 22 | 2,668 % | 3,493 % | 7,774 % | 5,868 % | 5,162 % | 3,302 % |
| 23 | 2,657 % | 3,471 % | 7,657 % | 5,799 % | 5,110 % | 3,307 % |
| 24 | 2,652 % | 3,451 % | 7,541 % | 5,731 % | 5,059 % | 3,311 % |
| 25 | 2,652 % | 3,431 % | 7,428 % | 5,666 % | 5,011 % | 3,315 % |
| 26 | 2,655 % | 3,412 % | 7,317 % | 5,604 % | 4,966 % | 3,319 % |
| 27 | 2,662 % | 3,395 % | 7,210 % | 5,543 % | 4,922 % | 3,322 % |
| 28 | 2,670 % | 3,380 % | 7,105 % | 5,485 % | 4,880 % | 3,326 % |
| 29 | 2,681 % | 3,366 % | 7,004 % | 5,429 % | 4,840 % | 3,329 % |
| 30 | 2,692 % | 3,355 % | 6,907 % | 5,375 % | 4,802 % | 3,332 % |
| 31 | 2,704 % | 3,345 % | 6,813 % | 5,323 % | 4,765 % | 3,335 % |
| 32 | 2,717 % | 3,337 % | 6,723 % | 5,274 % | 4,730 % | 3,338 % |
| 33 | 2,731 % | 3,331 % | 6,637 % | 5,226 % | 4,697 % | 3,340 % |
| 34 | 2,744 % | 3,326 % | 6,554 % | 5,181 % | 4,665 % | 3,343 % |
| 35 | 2,758 % | 3,321 % | 6,474 % | 5,137 % | 4,634 % | 3,345 % |
| 36 | 2,771 % | 3,318 % | 6,397 % | 5,095 % | 4,605 % | 3,347 % |
| 37 | 2,785 % | 3,316 % | 6,324 % | 5,055 % | 4,577 % | 3,350 % |
| 38 | 2,798 % | 3,314 % | 6,253 % | 5,016 % | 4,550 % | 3,352 % |
| 39 | 2,811 % | 3,313 % | 6,186 % | 4,979 % | 4,524 % | 3,354 % |
| 40 | 2,824 % | 3,312 % | 6,121 % | 4,944 % | 4,499 % | 3,356 % |
| 41 | 2,836 % | 3,311 % | 6,059 % | 4,910 % | 4,475 % | 3,358 % |
| 42 | 2,849 % | 3,311 % | 5,999 % | 4,877 % | 4,453 % | 3,359 % |
| 43 | 2,861 % | 3,312 % | 5,942 % | 4,845 % | 4,431 % | 3,361 % |
| 44 | 2,872 % | 3,312 % | 5,887 % | 4,815 % | 4,410 % | 3,363 % |
| 45 | 2,884 % | 3,313 % | 5,834 % | 4,786 % | 4,389 % | 3,365 % |
| 46 | 2,895 % | 3,314 % | 5,784 % | 4,758 % | 4,370 % | 3,366 % |
| 47 | 2,905 % | 3,315 % | 5,735 % | 4,731 % | 4,351 % | 3,368 % |
| 48 | 2,916 % | 3,316 % | 5,688 % | 4,705 % | 4,333 % | 3,369 % |
| 49 | 2,926 % | 3,317 % | 5,643 % | 4,680 % | 4,316 % | 3,370 % |
| 50 | 2,935 % | 3,318 % | 5,599 % | 4,656 % | 4,299 % | 3,372 % |
| 51 | 2,945 % | 3,320 % | 5,558 % | 4,633 % | 4,283 % | 3,373 % |
| 52 | 2,954 % | 3,321 % | 5,517 % | 4,611 % | 4,267 % | 3,374 % |
| 53 | 2,963 % | 3,323 % | 5,479 % | 4,589 % | 4,252 % | 3,376 % |
| 54 | 2,971 % | 3,324 % | 5,441 % | 4,569 % | 4,238 % | 3,377 % |
| 55 | 2,980 % | 3,326 % | 5,405 % | 4,548 % | 4,224 % | 3,378 % |
| 56 | 2,988 % | 3,327 % | 5,370 % | 4,529 % | 4,210 % | 3,379 % |
| 57 | 2,996 % | 3,329 % | 5,336 % | 4,510 % | 4,197 % | 3,380 % |
| 58 | 3,003 % | 3,330 % | 5,304 % | 4,492 % | 4,184 % | 3,381 % |
| 59 | 3,010 % | 3,332 % | 5,272 % | 4,475 % | 4,172 % | 3,382 % |
| 60 | 3,018 % | 3,333 % | 5,242 % | 4,458 % | 4,160 % | 3,383 % |
| 61 | 3,024 % | 3,335 % | 5,212 % | 4,441 % | 4,149 % | 3,384 % |
| 62 | 3,031 % | 3,336 % | 5,184 % | 4,425 % | 4,137 % | 3,385 % |
| 63 | 3,038 % | 3,338 % | 5,156 % | 4,410 % | 4,127 % | 3,386 % |
| 64 | 3,044 % | 3,339 % | 5,130 % | 4,395 % | 4,116 % | 3,387 % |
| 65 | 3,050 % | 3,341 % | 5,104 % | 4,380 % | 4,106 % | 3,388 % |
| 66 | 3,056 % | 3,342 % | 5,078 % | 4,366 % | 4,096 % | 3,389 % |
| 67 | 3,062 % | 3,343 % | 5,054 % | 4,353 % | 4,086 % | 3,390 % |
| 68 | 3,068 % | 3,345 % | 5,030 % | 4,339 % | 4,077 % | 3,391 % |
| 69 | 3,073 % | 3,346 % | 5,007 % | 4,326 % | 4,068 % | 3,391 % |
| 70 | 3,078 % | 3,347 % | 4,985 % | 4,314 % | 4,059 % | 3,392 % |
| 71 | 3,084 % | 3,349 % | 4,963 % | 4,302 % | 4,051 % | 3,393 % |
| 72 | 3,089 % | 3,350 % | 4,942 % | 4,290 % | 4,042 % | 3,394 % |
| 73 | 3,094 % | 3,351 % | 4,921 % | 4,278 % | 4,034 % | 3,394 % |
| 74 | 3,098 % | 3,353 % | 4,901 % | 4,267 % | 4,026 % | 3,395 % |
| 75 | 3,103 % | 3,354 % | 4,882 % | 4,256 % | 4,019 % | 3,396 % |
| 76 | 3,108 % | 3,355 % | 4,863 % | 4,246 % | 4,011 % | 3,397 % |
| 77 | 3,112 % | 3,356 % | 4,845 % | 4,235 % | 4,004 % | 3,397 % |
| 78 | 3,116 % | 3,357 % | 4,827 % | 4,225 % | 3,997 % | 3,398 % |
| 79 | 3,120 % | 3,358 % | 4,809 % | 4,215 % | 3,990 % | 3,398 % |
| 80 | 3,125 % | 3,359 % | 4,792 % | 4,206 % | 3,983 % | 3,399 % |
| 81 | 3,129 % | 3,361 % | 4,775 % | 4,196 % | 3,977 % | 3,400 % |
| 82 | 3,132 % | 3,362 % | 4,759 % | 4,187 % | 3,970 % | 3,400 % |
| 83 | 3,136 % | 3,363 % | 4,743 % | 4,178 % | 3,964 % | 3,401 % |
| 84 | 3,140 % | 3,364 % | 4,728 % | 4,170 % | 3,958 % | 3,401 % |
| 85 | 3,144 % | 3,365 % | 4,713 % | 4,161 % | 3,952 % | 3,402 % |
| 86 | 3,147 % | 3,366 % | 4,698 % | 4,153 % | 3,946 % | 3,402 % |
| 87 | 3,151 % | 3,366 % | 4,683 % | 4,145 % | 3,940 % | 3,403 % |
| 88 | 3,154 % | 3,367 % | 4,669 % | 4,137 % | 3,935 % | 3,404 % |
| 89 | 3,157 % | 3,368 % | 4,655 % | 4,129 % | 3,929 % | 3,404 % |
| 90 | 3,161 % | 3,369 % | 4,642 % | 4,122 % | 3,924 % | 3,405 % |
| 91 | 3,164 % | 3,370 % | 4,629 % | 4,114 % | 3,919 % | 3,405 % |
| 92 | 3,167 % | 3,371 % | 4,616 % | 4,107 % | 3,914 % | 3,405 % |
| 93 | 3,170 % | 3,372 % | 4,603 % | 4,100 % | 3,909 % | 3,406 % |
| 94 | 3,173 % | 3,373 % | 4,591 % | 4,093 % | 3,904 % | 3,406 % |
| 95 | 3,176 % | 3,373 % | 4,579 % | 4,086 % | 3,899 % | 3,407 % |
| 96 | 3,179 % | 3,374 % | 4,567 % | 4,080 % | 3,894 % | 3,407 % |
| 97 | 3,181 % | 3,375 % | 4,556 % | 4,073 % | 3,890 % | 3,408 % |
| 98 | 3,184 % | 3,376 % | 4,544 % | 4,067 % | 3,885 % | 3,408 % |
| 99 | 3,187 % | 3,376 % | 4,533 % | 4,060 % | 3,881 % | 3,409 % |
| 100 | 3,189 % | 3,377 % | 4,522 % | 4,054 % | 3,876 % | 3,409 % |
| 101 | 3,192 % | 3,378 % | 4,512 % | 4,048 % | 3,872 % | 3,409 % |
| 102 | 3,195 % | 3,379 % | 4,501 % | 4,042 % | 3,868 % | 3,410 % |
| 103 | 3,197 % | 3,379 % | 4,491 % | 4,037 % | 3,864 % | 3,410 % |
| 104 | 3,199 % | 3,380 % | 4,481 % | 4,031 % | 3,860 % | 3,411 % |
| 105 | 3,202 % | 3,381 % | 4,471 % | 4,025 % | 3,856 % | 3,411 % |
| 106 | 3,204 % | 3,381 % | 4,461 % | 4,020 % | 3,852 % | 3,411 % |
| 107 | 3,206 % | 3,382 % | 4,452 % | 4,015 % | 3,849 % | 3,412 % |
| 108 | 3,209 % | 3,383 % | 4,442 % | 4,009 % | 3,845 % | 3,412 % |
| 109 | 3,211 % | 3,383 % | 4,433 % | 4,004 % | 3,841 % | 3,412 % |
| 110 | 3,213 % | 3,384 % | 4,424 % | 3,999 % | 3,838 % | 3,413 % |
| 111 | 3,215 % | 3,384 % | 4,415 % | 3,994 % | 3,834 % | 3,413 % |
| 112 | 3,217 % | 3,385 % | 4,407 % | 3,989 % | 3,831 % | 3,413 % |
| 113 | 3,219 % | 3,386 % | 4,398 % | 3,985 % | 3,827 % | 3,414 % |
| 114 | 3,221 % | 3,386 % | 4,390 % | 3,980 % | 3,824 % | 3,414 % |
| 115 | 3,223 % | 3,387 % | 4,382 % | 3,975 % | 3,821 % | 3,414 % |
| 116 | 3,225 % | 3,387 % | 4,374 % | 3,971 % | 3,818 % | 3,415 % |
| 117 | 3,227 % | 3,388 % | 4,366 % | 3,966 % | 3,814 % | 3,415 % |
| 118 | 3,229 % | 3,388 % | 4,358 % | 3,962 % | 3,811 % | 3,415 % |
| 119 | 3,231 % | 3,389 % | 4,350 % | 3,958 % | 3,808 % | 3,415 % |
| 120 | 3,233 % | 3,389 % | 4,343 % | 3,953 % | 3,805 % | 3,416 % |
| 121 | 3,235 % | 3,390 % | 4,335 % | 3,949 % | 3,802 % | 3,416 % |
| 122 | 3,236 % | 3,390 % | 4,328 % | 3,945 % | 3,799 % | 3,416 % |
| 123 | 3,238 % | 3,391 % | 4,321 % | 3,941 % | 3,797 % | 3,417 % |
| 124 | 3,240 % | 3,391 % | 4,314 % | 3,937 % | 3,794 % | 3,417 % |
| 125 | 3,242 % | 3,392 % | 4,307 % | 3,933 % | 3,791 % | 3,417 % |
| 126 | 3,243 % | 3,392 % | 4,300 % | 3,929 % | 3,788 % | 3,417 % |
| 127 | 3,245 % | 3,393 % | 4,293 % | 3,926 % | 3,786 % | 3,418 % |
| 128 | 3,246 % | 3,393 % | 4,287 % | 3,922 % | 3,783 % | 3,418 % |
| 129 | 3,248 % | 3,393 % | 4,280 % | 3,918 % | 3,780 % | 3,418 % |
| 130 | 3,250 % | 3,394 % | 4,274 % | 3,915 % | 3,778 % | 3,418 % |
| 131 | 3,251 % | 3,394 % | 4,267 % | 3,911 % | 3,775 % | 3,419 % |
| 132 | 3,253 % | 3,395 % | 4,261 % | 3,907 % | 3,773 % | 3,419 % |
| 133 | 3,254 % | 3,395 % | 4,255 % | 3,904 % | 3,770 % | 3,419 % |
| 134 | 3,256 % | 3,396 % | 4,249 % | 3,901 % | 3,768 % | 3,419 % |
| 135 | 3,257 % | 3,396 % | 4,243 % | 3,897 % | 3,766 % | 3,419 % |
| 136 | 3,258 % | 3,396 % | 4,237 % | 3,894 % | 3,763 % | 3,420 % |
| 137 | 3,260 % | 3,397 % | 4,232 % | 3,891 % | 3,761 % | 3,420 % |
| 138 | 3,261 % | 3,397 % | 4,226 % | 3,888 % | 3,759 % | 3,420 % |
| 139 | 3,263 % | 3,398 % | 4,220 % | 3,884 % | 3,757 % | 3,420 % |
| 140 | 3,264 % | 3,398 % | 4,215 % | 3,881 % | 3,754 % | 3,421 % |
| 141 | 3,265 % | 3,398 % | 4,209 % | 3,878 % | 3,752 % | 3,421 % |
| 142 | 3,266 % | 3,399 % | 4,204 % | 3,875 % | 3,750 % | 3,421 % |
| 143 | 3,268 % | 3,399 % | 4,199 % | 3,872 % | 3,748 % | 3,421 % |
| 144 | 3,269 % | 3,399 % | 4,193 % | 3,869 % | 3,746 % | 3,421 % |
| 145 | 3,270 % | 3,400 % | 4,188 % | 3,866 % | 3,744 % | 3,422 % |
| 146 | 3,271 % | 3,400 % | 4,183 % | 3,864 % | 3,742 % | 3,422 % |
| 147 | 3,273 % | 3,400 % | 4,178 % | 3,861 % | 3,740 % | 3,422 % |
| 148 | 3,274 % | 3,401 % | 4,173 % | 3,858 % | 3,738 % | 3,422 % |
| 149 | 3,275 % | 3,401 % | 4,168 % | 3,855 % | 3,736 % | 3,422 % |
| 150 | 3,276 % | 3,401 % | 4,164 % | 3,852 % | 3,734 % | 3,423 % |

Term to maturity (in years)

Lev

Pound sterling

Romanian leu

Zloty

Króna

Norwegian krone

1

3,126 %

4,460 %

6,975 %

6,401 %

6,849 %

3,456 %

2

3,245 %

4,470 %

7,091 %

6,602 %

6,785 %

3,384 %

3

3,153 %

4,326 %

7,246 %

6,719 %

6,685 %

3,281 %

4

3,103 %

4,177 %

7,437 %

6,751 %

6,580 %

3,195 %

5

3,081 %

4,062 %

7,638 %

6,744 %

6,479 %

3,146 %

6

3,060 %

3,952 %

7,835 %

6,722 %

6,381 %

3,134 %

7

3,041 %

3,859 %

8,024 %

6,693 %

6,286 %

3,142 %

8

3,036 %

3,795 %

8,225 %

6,669 %

6,193 %

3,158 %

9

3,038 %

3,748 %

8,413 %

6,658 %

6,102 %

3,178 %

10

3,042 %

3,710 %

8,556 %

6,648 %

6,012 %

3,196 %

11

3,050 %

3,683 %

8,635 %

6,621 %

5,925 %

3,212 %

12

3,035 %

3,663 %

8,660 %

6,576 %

5,841 %

3,226 %

13

3,021 %

3,647 %

8,644 %

6,519 %

5,759 %

3,238 %

14

3,003 %

3,633 %

8,598 %

6,454 %

5,681 %

3,248 %

15

2,972 %

3,619 %

8,529 %

6,385 %

5,606 %

3,257 %

16

2,924 %

3,604 %

8,443 %

6,311 %

5,534 %

3,266 %

17

2,867 %

3,589 %

8,345 %

6,237 %

5,465 %

3,273 %

18

2,809 %

3,572 %

8,238 %

6,161 %

5,399 %

3,280 %

19

2,758 %

3,554 %

8,126 %

6,086 %

5,336 %

3,286 %

20

2,716 %

3,535 %

8,010 %

6,012 %

5,275 %

3,292 %

21

2,687 %

3,514 %

7,892 %

5,939 %

5,218 %

3,297 %

22

2,668 %

3,493 %

7,774 %

5,868 %

5,162 %

3,302 %

23

2,657 %

3,471 %

7,657 %

5,799 %

5,110 %

3,307 %

24

2,652 %

3,451 %

7,541 %

5,731 %

5,059 %

3,311 %

25

2,652 %

3,431 %

7,428 %

5,666 %

5,011 %

3,315 %

26

2,655 %

3,412 %

7,317 %

5,604 %

4,966 %

3,319 %

27

2,662 %

3,395 %

7,210 %

5,543 %

4,922 %

3,322 %

28

2,670 %

3,380 %

7,105 %

5,485 %

4,880 %

3,326 %

29

2,681 %

3,366 %

7,004 %

5,429 %

4,840 %

3,329 %

30

2,692 %

3,355 %

6,907 %

5,375 %

4,802 %

3,332 %

31

2,704 %

3,345 %

6,813 %

5,323 %

4,765 %

3,335 %

32

2,717 %

3,337 %

6,723 %

5,274 %

4,730 %

3,338 %

33

2,731 %

3,331 %

6,637 %

5,226 %

4,697 %

3,340 %

34

2,744 %

3,326 %

6,554 %

5,181 %

4,665 %

3,343 %

35

2,758 %

3,321 %

6,474 %

5,137 %

4,634 %

3,345 %

36

2,771 %

3,318 %

6,397 %

5,095 %

4,605 %

3,347 %

37

2,785 %

3,316 %

6,324 %

5,055 %

4,577 %

3,350 %

38

2,798 %

3,314 %

6,253 %

5,016 %

4,550 %

3,352 %

39

2,811 %

3,313 %

6,186 %

4,979 %

4,524 %

3,354 %

40

2,824 %

3,312 %

6,121 %

4,944 %

4,499 %

3,356 %

41

2,836 %

3,311 %

6,059 %

4,910 %

4,475 %

3,358 %

42

2,849 %

3,311 %

5,999 %

4,877 %

4,453 %

3,359 %

43

2,861 %

3,312 %

5,942 %

4,845 %

4,431 %

3,361 %

44

2,872 %

3,312 %

5,887 %

4,815 %

4,410 %

3,363 %

45

2,884 %

3,313 %

5,834 %

4,786 %

4,389 %

3,365 %

46

2,895 %

3,314 %

5,784 %

4,758 %

4,370 %

3,366 %

47

2,905 %

3,315 %

5,735 %

4,731 %

4,351 %

3,368 %

48

2,916 %

3,316 %

5,688 %

4,705 %

4,333 %

3,369 %

49

2,926 %

3,317 %

5,643 %

4,680 %

4,316 %

3,370 %

50

2,935 %

3,318 %

5,599 %

4,656 %

4,299 %

3,372 %

51

2,945 %

3,320 %

5,558 %

4,633 %

4,283 %

3,373 %

52

2,954 %

3,321 %

5,517 %

4,611 %

4,267 %

3,374 %

53

2,963 %

3,323 %

5,479 %

4,589 %

4,252 %

3,376 %

54

2,971 %

3,324 %

5,441 %

4,569 %

4,238 %

3,377 %

55

2,980 %

3,326 %

5,405 %

4,548 %

4,224 %

3,378 %

56

2,988 %

3,327 %

5,370 %

4,529 %

4,210 %

3,379 %

57

2,996 %

3,329 %

5,336 %

4,510 %

4,197 %

3,380 %

58

3,003 %

3,330 %

5,304 %

4,492 %

4,184 %

3,381 %

59

3,010 %

3,332 %

5,272 %

4,475 %

4,172 %

3,382 %

60

3,018 %

3,333 %

5,242 %

4,458 %

4,160 %

3,383 %

61

3,024 %

3,335 %

5,212 %

4,441 %

4,149 %

3,384 %

62

3,031 %

3,336 %

5,184 %

4,425 %

4,137 %

3,385 %

63

3,038 %

3,338 %

5,156 %

4,410 %

4,127 %

3,386 %

64

3,044 %

3,339 %

5,130 %

4,395 %

4,116 %

3,387 %

65

3,050 %

3,341 %

5,104 %

4,380 %

4,106 %

3,388 %

66

3,056 %

3,342 %

5,078 %

4,366 %

4,096 %

3,389 %

67

3,062 %

3,343 %

5,054 %

4,353 %

4,086 %

3,390 %

68

3,068 %

3,345 %

5,030 %

4,339 %

4,077 %

3,391 %

69

3,073 %

3,346 %

5,007 %

4,326 %

4,068 %

3,391 %

70

3,078 %

3,347 %

4,985 %

4,314 %

4,059 %

3,392 %

71

3,084 %

3,349 %

4,963 %

4,302 %

4,051 %

3,393 %

72

3,089 %

3,350 %

4,942 %

4,290 %

4,042 %

3,394 %

73

3,094 %

3,351 %

4,921 %

4,278 %

4,034 %

3,394 %

74

3,098 %

3,353 %

4,901 %

4,267 %

4,026 %

3,395 %

75

3,103 %

3,354 %

4,882 %

4,256 %

4,019 %

3,396 %

76

3,108 %

3,355 %

4,863 %

4,246 %

4,011 %

3,397 %

77

3,112 %

3,356 %

4,845 %

4,235 %

4,004 %

3,397 %

78

3,116 %

3,357 %

4,827 %

4,225 %

3,997 %

3,398 %

79

3,120 %

3,358 %

4,809 %

4,215 %

3,990 %

3,398 %

80

3,125 %

3,359 %

4,792 %

4,206 %

3,983 %

3,399 %

81

3,129 %

3,361 %

4,775 %

4,196 %

3,977 %

3,400 %

82

3,132 %

3,362 %

4,759 %

4,187 %

3,970 %

3,400 %

83

3,136 %

3,363 %

4,743 %

4,178 %

3,964 %

3,401 %

84

3,140 %

3,364 %

4,728 %

4,170 %

3,958 %

3,401 %

85

3,144 %

3,365 %

4,713 %

4,161 %

3,952 %

3,402 %

86

3,147 %

3,366 %

4,698 %

4,153 %

3,946 %

3,402 %

87

3,151 %

3,366 %

4,683 %

4,145 %

3,940 %

3,403 %

88

3,154 %

3,367 %

4,669 %

4,137 %

3,935 %

3,404 %

89

3,157 %

3,368 %

4,655 %

4,129 %

3,929 %

3,404 %

90

3,161 %

3,369 %

4,642 %

4,122 %

3,924 %

3,405 %

91

3,164 %

3,370 %

4,629 %

4,114 %

3,919 %

3,405 %

92

3,167 %

3,371 %

4,616 %

4,107 %

3,914 %

3,405 %

93

3,170 %

3,372 %

4,603 %

4,100 %

3,909 %

3,406 %

94

3,173 %

3,373 %

4,591 %

4,093 %

3,904 %

3,406 %

95

3,176 %

3,373 %

4,579 %

4,086 %

3,899 %

3,407 %

96

3,179 %

3,374 %

4,567 %

4,080 %

3,894 %

3,407 %

97

3,181 %

3,375 %

4,556 %

4,073 %

3,890 %

3,408 %

98

3,184 %

3,376 %

4,544 %

4,067 %

3,885 %

3,408 %

99

3,187 %

3,376 %

4,533 %

4,060 %

3,881 %

3,409 %

100

3,189 %

3,377 %

4,522 %

4,054 %

3,876 %

3,409 %

101

3,192 %

3,378 %

4,512 %

4,048 %

3,872 %

3,409 %

102

3,195 %

3,379 %

4,501 %

4,042 %

3,868 %

3,410 %

103

3,197 %

3,379 %

4,491 %

4,037 %

3,864 %

3,410 %

104

3,199 %

3,380 %

4,481 %

4,031 %

3,860 %

3,411 %

105

3,202 %

3,381 %

4,471 %

4,025 %

3,856 %

3,411 %

106

3,204 %

3,381 %

4,461 %

4,020 %

3,852 %

3,411 %

107

3,206 %

3,382 %

4,452 %

4,015 %

3,849 %

3,412 %

108

3,209 %

3,383 %

4,442 %

4,009 %

3,845 %

3,412 %

109

3,211 %

3,383 %

4,433 %

4,004 %

3,841 %

3,412 %

110

3,213 %

3,384 %

4,424 %

3,999 %

3,838 %

3,413 %

111

3,215 %

3,384 %

4,415 %

3,994 %

3,834 %

3,413 %

112

3,217 %

3,385 %

4,407 %

3,989 %

3,831 %

3,413 %

113

3,219 %

3,386 %

4,398 %

3,985 %

3,827 %

3,414 %

114

3,221 %

3,386 %

4,390 %

3,980 %

3,824 %

3,414 %

115

3,223 %

3,387 %

4,382 %

3,975 %

3,821 %

3,414 %

116

3,225 %

3,387 %

4,374 %

3,971 %

3,818 %

3,415 %

117

3,227 %

3,388 %

4,366 %

3,966 %

3,814 %

3,415 %

118

3,229 %

3,388 %

4,358 %

3,962 %

3,811 %

3,415 %

119

3,231 %

3,389 %

4,350 %

3,958 %

3,808 %

3,415 %

120

3,233 %

3,389 %

4,343 %

3,953 %

3,805 %

3,416 %

121

3,235 %

3,390 %

4,335 %

3,949 %

3,802 %

3,416 %

122

3,236 %

3,390 %

4,328 %

3,945 %

3,799 %

3,416 %

123

3,238 %

3,391 %

4,321 %

3,941 %

3,797 %

3,417 %

124

3,240 %

3,391 %

4,314 %

3,937 %

3,794 %

3,417 %

125

3,242 %

3,392 %

4,307 %

3,933 %

3,791 %

3,417 %

126

3,243 %

3,392 %

4,300 %

3,929 %

3,788 %

3,417 %

127

3,245 %

3,393 %

4,293 %

3,926 %

3,786 %

3,418 %

128

3,246 %

3,393 %

4,287 %

3,922 %

3,783 %

3,418 %

129

3,248 %

3,393 %

4,280 %

3,918 %

3,780 %

3,418 %

130

3,250 %

3,394 %

4,274 %

3,915 %

3,778 %

3,418 %

131

3,251 %

3,394 %

4,267 %

3,911 %

3,775 %

3,419 %

132

3,253 %

3,395 %

4,261 %

3,907 %

3,773 %

3,419 %

133

3,254 %

3,395 %

4,255 %

3,904 %

3,770 %

3,419 %

134

3,256 %

3,396 %

4,249 %

3,901 %

3,768 %

3,419 %

135

3,257 %

3,396 %

4,243 %

3,897 %

3,766 %

3,419 %

136

3,258 %

3,396 %

4,237 %

3,894 %

3,763 %

3,420 %

137

3,260 %

3,397 %

4,232 %

3,891 %

3,761 %

3,420 %

138

3,261 %

3,397 %

4,226 %

3,888 %

3,759 %

3,420 %

139

3,263 %

3,398 %

4,220 %

3,884 %

3,757 %

3,420 %

140

3,264 %

3,398 %

4,215 %

3,881 %

3,754 %

3,421 %

141

3,265 %

3,398 %

4,209 %

3,878 %

3,752 %

3,421 %

142

3,266 %

3,399 %

4,204 %

3,875 %

3,750 %

3,421 %

143

3,268 %

3,399 %

4,199 %

3,872 %

3,748 %

3,421 %

144

3,269 %

3,399 %

4,193 %

3,869 %

3,746 %

3,421 %

145

3,270 %

3,400 %

4,188 %

3,866 %

3,744 %

3,422 %

146

3,271 %

3,400 %

4,183 %

3,864 %

3,742 %

3,422 %

147

3,273 %

3,400 %

4,178 %

3,861 %

3,740 %

3,422 %

148

3,274 %

3,401 %

4,173 %

3,858 %

3,738 %

3,422 %

149

3,275 %

3,401 %

4,168 %

3,855 %

3,736 %

3,422 %

150

3,276 %

3,401 %

4,164 %

3,852 %

3,734 %

3,423 %

| Term to maturity (in years) | Swiss franc | Australian dollar | Baht | Canadian dollar | Chilean peso | Colombian peso |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 1,055 % | 3,984 % | 1,185 % | 4,610 % | 8,944 % | 11,268 % |
| 2 | 1,154 % | 4,138 % | 1,454 % | 4,314 % | 7,171 % | 11,852 % |
| 3 | 1,226 % | 4,096 % | 1,632 % | 3,917 % | 6,257 % | 12,229 % |
| 4 | 1,286 % | 4,097 % | 1,766 % | 3,661 % | 5,804 % | 12,491 % |
| 5 | 1,336 % | 4,166 % | 1,889 % | 3,520 % | 5,552 % | 12,656 % |
| 6 | 1,378 % | 4,262 % | 2,019 % | 3,467 % | 5,400 % | 12,759 % |
| 7 | 1,413 % | 4,338 % | 2,161 % | 3,463 % | 5,301 % | 12,824 % |
| 8 | 1,444 % | 4,406 % | 2,313 % | 3,482 % | 5,233 % | 12,867 % |
| 9 | 1,468 % | 4,464 % | 2,466 % | 3,508 % | 5,185 % | 12,893 % |
| 10 | 1,489 % | 4,506 % | 2,616 % | 3,530 % | 5,151 % | 12,887 % |
| 11 | 1,505 % | 4,543 % | 2,759 % | 3,543 % | 5,122 % | 12,832 % |
| 12 | 1,516 % | 4,571 % | 2,891 % | 3,548 % | 5,097 % | 12,736 % |
| 13 | 1,523 % | 4,588 % | 3,011 % | 3,547 % | 5,073 % | 12,610 % |
| 14 | 1,523 % | 4,595 % | 3,116 % | 3,543 % | 5,052 % | 12,460 % |
| 15 | 1,524 % | 4,595 % | 3,206 % | 3,537 % | 5,032 % | 12,293 % |
| 16 | 1,529 % | 4,586 % | 3,280 % | 3,529 % | 5,014 % | 12,114 % |
| 17 | 1,539 % | 4,570 % | 3,340 % | 3,519 % | 4,996 % | 11,926 % |
| 18 | 1,551 % | 4,543 % | 3,389 % | 3,509 % | 4,980 % | 11,733 % |
| 19 | 1,566 % | 4,506 % | 3,429 % | 3,499 % | 4,965 % | 11,538 % |
| 20 | 1,583 % | 4,457 % | 3,462 % | 3,489 % | 4,951 % | 11,342 % |
| 21 | 1,600 % | 4,397 % | 3,489 % | 3,479 % | 4,938 % | 11,147 % |
| 22 | 1,618 % | 4,329 % | 3,511 % | 3,469 % | 4,925 % | 10,955 % |
| 23 | 1,636 % | 4,257 % | 3,529 % | 3,459 % | 4,913 % | 10,767 % |
| 24 | 1,655 % | 4,183 % | 3,544 % | 3,450 % | 4,901 % | 10,583 % |
| 25 | 1,673 % | 4,110 % | 3,556 % | 3,442 % | 4,890 % | 10,404 % |
| 26 | 1,691 % | 4,038 % | 3,565 % | 3,434 % | 4,880 % | 10,231 % |
| 27 | 1,709 % | 3,971 % | 3,573 % | 3,427 % | 4,870 % | 10,064 % |
| 28 | 1,727 % | 3,908 % | 3,579 % | 3,421 % | 4,860 % | 9,903 % |
| 29 | 1,744 % | 3,852 % | 3,583 % | 3,415 % | 4,851 % | 9,748 % |
| 30 | 1,761 % | 3,802 % | 3,587 % | 3,411 % | 4,842 % | 9,599 % |
| 31 | 1,777 % | 3,759 % | 3,589 % | 3,406 % | 4,834 % | 9,456 % |
| 32 | 1,793 % | 3,723 % | 3,591 % | 3,403 % | 4,826 % | 9,319 % |
| 33 | 1,808 % | 3,691 % | 3,592 % | 3,400 % | 4,818 % | 9,187 % |
| 34 | 1,823 % | 3,664 % | 3,592 % | 3,397 % | 4,811 % | 9,062 % |
| 35 | 1,837 % | 3,641 % | 3,592 % | 3,395 % | 4,804 % | 8,941 % |
| 36 | 1,851 % | 3,621 % | 3,592 % | 3,393 % | 4,797 % | 8,826 % |
| 37 | 1,864 % | 3,604 % | 3,591 % | 3,392 % | 4,791 % | 8,716 % |
| 38 | 1,877 % | 3,588 % | 3,590 % | 3,391 % | 4,784 % | 8,610 % |
| 39 | 1,890 % | 3,575 % | 3,589 % | 3,390 % | 4,778 % | 8,509 % |
| 40 | 1,902 % | 3,564 % | 3,588 % | 3,389 % | 4,772 % | 8,413 % |
| 41 | 1,914 % | 3,554 % | 3,586 % | 3,389 % | 4,767 % | 8,320 % |
| 42 | 1,925 % | 3,545 % | 3,585 % | 3,388 % | 4,761 % | 8,231 % |
| 43 | 1,936 % | 3,537 % | 3,583 % | 3,388 % | 4,756 % | 8,146 % |
| 44 | 1,946 % | 3,531 % | 3,581 % | 3,388 % | 4,751 % | 8,065 % |
| 45 | 1,956 % | 3,525 % | 3,580 % | 3,388 % | 4,746 % | 7,987 % |
| 46 | 1,966 % | 3,519 % | 3,578 % | 3,388 % | 4,741 % | 7,912 % |
| 47 | 1,976 % | 3,515 % | 3,576 % | 3,388 % | 4,737 % | 7,839 % |
| 48 | 1,985 % | 3,511 % | 3,574 % | 3,388 % | 4,732 % | 7,770 % |
| 49 | 1,994 % | 3,507 % | 3,572 % | 3,389 % | 4,728 % | 7,704 % |
| 50 | 2,002 % | 3,504 % | 3,570 % | 3,389 % | 4,724 % | 7,640 % |
| 51 | 2,010 % | 3,501 % | 3,569 % | 3,389 % | 4,720 % | 7,578 % |
| 52 | 2,018 % | 3,498 % | 3,567 % | 3,390 % | 4,716 % | 7,519 % |
| 53 | 2,026 % | 3,496 % | 3,565 % | 3,390 % | 4,712 % | 7,462 % |
| 54 | 2,034 % | 3,494 % | 3,563 % | 3,391 % | 4,709 % | 7,406 % |
| 55 | 2,041 % | 3,492 % | 3,562 % | 3,391 % | 4,705 % | 7,353 % |
| 56 | 2,048 % | 3,490 % | 3,560 % | 3,392 % | 4,702 % | 7,302 % |
| 57 | 2,055 % | 3,489 % | 3,558 % | 3,392 % | 4,699 % | 7,253 % |
| 58 | 2,061 % | 3,487 % | 3,557 % | 3,393 % | 4,695 % | 7,205 % |
| 59 | 2,068 % | 3,486 % | 3,555 % | 3,393 % | 4,692 % | 7,159 % |
| 60 | 2,074 % | 3,485 % | 3,553 % | 3,394 % | 4,689 % | 7,114 % |
| 61 | 2,080 % | 3,484 % | 3,552 % | 3,395 % | 4,686 % | 7,071 % |
| 62 | 2,086 % | 3,483 % | 3,550 % | 3,395 % | 4,683 % | 7,029 % |
| 63 | 2,091 % | 3,482 % | 3,549 % | 3,396 % | 4,681 % | 6,988 % |
| 64 | 2,097 % | 3,481 % | 3,547 % | 3,396 % | 4,678 % | 6,949 % |
| 65 | 2,102 % | 3,480 % | 3,546 % | 3,397 % | 4,675 % | 6,911 % |
| 66 | 2,107 % | 3,480 % | 3,545 % | 3,398 % | 4,673 % | 6,874 % |
| 67 | 2,112 % | 3,479 % | 3,543 % | 3,398 % | 4,670 % | 6,838 % |
| 68 | 2,117 % | 3,478 % | 3,542 % | 3,399 % | 4,668 % | 6,804 % |
| 69 | 2,122 % | 3,478 % | 3,541 % | 3,399 % | 4,666 % | 6,770 % |
| 70 | 2,126 % | 3,477 % | 3,540 % | 3,400 % | 4,663 % | 6,737 % |
| 71 | 2,131 % | 3,477 % | 3,538 % | 3,400 % | 4,661 % | 6,706 % |
| 72 | 2,135 % | 3,476 % | 3,537 % | 3,401 % | 4,659 % | 6,675 % |
| 73 | 2,140 % | 3,476 % | 3,536 % | 3,402 % | 4,657 % | 6,645 % |
| 74 | 2,144 % | 3,475 % | 3,535 % | 3,402 % | 4,655 % | 6,615 % |
| 75 | 2,148 % | 3,475 % | 3,534 % | 3,403 % | 4,653 % | 6,587 % |
| 76 | 2,152 % | 3,474 % | 3,533 % | 3,403 % | 4,651 % | 6,559 % |
| 77 | 2,156 % | 3,474 % | 3,532 % | 3,404 % | 4,649 % | 6,532 % |
| 78 | 2,159 % | 3,474 % | 3,531 % | 3,404 % | 4,647 % | 6,506 % |
| 79 | 2,163 % | 3,473 % | 3,530 % | 3,405 % | 4,645 % | 6,480 % |
| 80 | 2,167 % | 3,473 % | 3,529 % | 3,405 % | 4,643 % | 6,455 % |
| 81 | 2,170 % | 3,473 % | 3,528 % | 3,406 % | 4,642 % | 6,431 % |
| 82 | 2,173 % | 3,472 % | 3,527 % | 3,406 % | 4,640 % | 6,407 % |
| 83 | 2,177 % | 3,472 % | 3,526 % | 3,407 % | 4,638 % | 6,384 % |
| 84 | 2,180 % | 3,472 % | 3,525 % | 3,407 % | 4,637 % | 6,361 % |
| 85 | 2,183 % | 3,471 % | 3,524 % | 3,408 % | 4,635 % | 6,339 % |
| 86 | 2,186 % | 3,471 % | 3,523 % | 3,408 % | 4,633 % | 6,318 % |
| 87 | 2,189 % | 3,471 % | 3,522 % | 3,408 % | 4,632 % | 6,297 % |
| 88 | 2,192 % | 3,471 % | 3,522 % | 3,409 % | 4,630 % | 6,276 % |
| 89 | 2,195 % | 3,470 % | 3,521 % | 3,409 % | 4,629 % | 6,256 % |
| 90 | 2,198 % | 3,470 % | 3,520 % | 3,410 % | 4,628 % | 6,236 % |
| 91 | 2,201 % | 3,470 % | 3,519 % | 3,410 % | 4,626 % | 6,217 % |
| 92 | 2,203 % | 3,470 % | 3,518 % | 3,411 % | 4,625 % | 6,198 % |
| 93 | 2,206 % | 3,470 % | 3,518 % | 3,411 % | 4,623 % | 6,180 % |
| 94 | 2,209 % | 3,469 % | 3,517 % | 3,411 % | 4,622 % | 6,162 % |
| 95 | 2,211 % | 3,469 % | 3,516 % | 3,412 % | 4,621 % | 6,144 % |
| 96 | 2,214 % | 3,469 % | 3,516 % | 3,412 % | 4,620 % | 6,127 % |
| 97 | 2,216 % | 3,469 % | 3,515 % | 3,413 % | 4,618 % | 6,110 % |
| 98 | 2,218 % | 3,468 % | 3,514 % | 3,413 % | 4,617 % | 6,093 % |
| 99 | 2,221 % | 3,468 % | 3,514 % | 3,413 % | 4,616 % | 6,077 % |
| 100 | 2,223 % | 3,468 % | 3,513 % | 3,414 % | 4,615 % | 6,061 % |
| 101 | 2,225 % | 3,468 % | 3,512 % | 3,414 % | 4,614 % | 6,046 % |
| 102 | 2,227 % | 3,468 % | 3,512 % | 3,414 % | 4,613 % | 6,030 % |
| 103 | 2,230 % | 3,468 % | 3,511 % | 3,415 % | 4,612 % | 6,016 % |
| 104 | 2,232 % | 3,467 % | 3,511 % | 3,415 % | 4,610 % | 6,001 % |
| 105 | 2,234 % | 3,467 % | 3,510 % | 3,415 % | 4,609 % | 5,986 % |
| 106 | 2,236 % | 3,467 % | 3,509 % | 3,416 % | 4,608 % | 5,972 % |
| 107 | 2,238 % | 3,467 % | 3,509 % | 3,416 % | 4,607 % | 5,958 % |
| 108 | 2,240 % | 3,467 % | 3,508 % | 3,416 % | 4,606 % | 5,945 % |
| 109 | 2,242 % | 3,467 % | 3,508 % | 3,417 % | 4,605 % | 5,932 % |
| 110 | 2,244 % | 3,466 % | 3,507 % | 3,417 % | 4,604 % | 5,918 % |
| 111 | 2,246 % | 3,466 % | 3,507 % | 3,417 % | 4,604 % | 5,906 % |
| 112 | 2,247 % | 3,466 % | 3,506 % | 3,417 % | 4,603 % | 5,893 % |
| 113 | 2,249 % | 3,466 % | 3,506 % | 3,418 % | 4,602 % | 5,881 % |
| 114 | 2,251 % | 3,466 % | 3,505 % | 3,418 % | 4,601 % | 5,868 % |
| 115 | 2,253 % | 3,466 % | 3,505 % | 3,418 % | 4,600 % | 5,856 % |
| 116 | 2,254 % | 3,466 % | 3,504 % | 3,419 % | 4,599 % | 5,845 % |
| 117 | 2,256 % | 3,465 % | 3,504 % | 3,419 % | 4,598 % | 5,833 % |
| 118 | 2,258 % | 3,465 % | 3,503 % | 3,419 % | 4,597 % | 5,822 % |
| 119 | 2,259 % | 3,465 % | 3,503 % | 3,419 % | 4,597 % | 5,810 % |
| 120 | 2,261 % | 3,465 % | 3,503 % | 3,420 % | 4,596 % | 5,799 % |
| 121 | 2,262 % | 3,465 % | 3,502 % | 3,420 % | 4,595 % | 5,789 % |
| 122 | 2,264 % | 3,465 % | 3,502 % | 3,420 % | 4,594 % | 5,778 % |
| 123 | 2,265 % | 3,465 % | 3,501 % | 3,420 % | 4,593 % | 5,768 % |
| 124 | 2,267 % | 3,465 % | 3,501 % | 3,421 % | 4,593 % | 5,757 % |
| 125 | 2,268 % | 3,464 % | 3,500 % | 3,421 % | 4,592 % | 5,747 % |
| 126 | 2,270 % | 3,464 % | 3,500 % | 3,421 % | 4,591 % | 5,737 % |
| 127 | 2,271 % | 3,464 % | 3,500 % | 3,421 % | 4,590 % | 5,727 % |
| 128 | 2,273 % | 3,464 % | 3,499 % | 3,421 % | 4,590 % | 5,718 % |
| 129 | 2,274 % | 3,464 % | 3,499 % | 3,422 % | 4,589 % | 5,708 % |
| 130 | 2,275 % | 3,464 % | 3,498 % | 3,422 % | 4,588 % | 5,699 % |
| 131 | 2,277 % | 3,464 % | 3,498 % | 3,422 % | 4,588 % | 5,690 % |
| 132 | 2,278 % | 3,464 % | 3,498 % | 3,422 % | 4,587 % | 5,681 % |
| 133 | 2,279 % | 3,464 % | 3,497 % | 3,423 % | 4,586 % | 5,672 % |
| 134 | 2,281 % | 3,463 % | 3,497 % | 3,423 % | 4,586 % | 5,663 % |
| 135 | 2,282 % | 3,463 % | 3,497 % | 3,423 % | 4,585 % | 5,654 % |
| 136 | 2,283 % | 3,463 % | 3,496 % | 3,423 % | 4,585 % | 5,646 % |
| 137 | 2,284 % | 3,463 % | 3,496 % | 3,423 % | 4,584 % | 5,637 % |
| 138 | 2,285 % | 3,463 % | 3,496 % | 3,424 % | 4,583 % | 5,629 % |
| 139 | 2,287 % | 3,463 % | 3,495 % | 3,424 % | 4,583 % | 5,621 % |
| 140 | 2,288 % | 3,463 % | 3,495 % | 3,424 % | 4,582 % | 5,613 % |
| 141 | 2,289 % | 3,463 % | 3,495 % | 3,424 % | 4,582 % | 5,605 % |
| 142 | 2,290 % | 3,463 % | 3,494 % | 3,424 % | 4,581 % | 5,597 % |
| 143 | 2,291 % | 3,463 % | 3,494 % | 3,424 % | 4,580 % | 5,589 % |
| 144 | 2,292 % | 3,463 % | 3,494 % | 3,425 % | 4,580 % | 5,582 % |
| 145 | 2,293 % | 3,462 % | 3,493 % | 3,425 % | 4,579 % | 5,574 % |
| 146 | 2,294 % | 3,462 % | 3,493 % | 3,425 % | 4,579 % | 5,567 % |
| 147 | 2,296 % | 3,462 % | 3,493 % | 3,425 % | 4,578 % | 5,560 % |
| 148 | 2,297 % | 3,462 % | 3,493 % | 3,425 % | 4,578 % | 5,552 % |
| 149 | 2,298 % | 3,462 % | 3,492 % | 3,425 % | 4,577 % | 5,545 % |
| 150 | 2,299 % | 3,462 % | 3,492 % | 3,426 % | 4,577 % | 5,538 % |

Term to maturity (in years)

Swiss franc

Australian dollar

Baht

Canadian dollar

Chilean peso

Colombian peso

1

1,055 %

3,984 %

1,185 %

4,610 %

8,944 %

11,268 %

2

1,154 %

4,138 %

1,454 %

4,314 %

7,171 %

11,852 %

3

1,226 %

4,096 %

1,632 %

3,917 %

6,257 %

12,229 %

4

1,286 %

4,097 %

1,766 %

3,661 %

5,804 %

12,491 %

5

1,336 %

4,166 %

1,889 %

3,520 %

5,552 %

12,656 %

6

1,378 %

4,262 %

2,019 %

3,467 %

5,400 %

12,759 %

7

1,413 %

4,338 %

2,161 %

3,463 %

5,301 %

12,824 %

8

1,444 %

4,406 %

2,313 %

3,482 %

5,233 %

12,867 %

9

1,468 %

4,464 %

2,466 %

3,508 %

5,185 %

12,893 %

10

1,489 %

4,506 %

2,616 %

3,530 %

5,151 %

12,887 %

11

1,505 %

4,543 %

2,759 %

3,543 %

5,122 %

12,832 %

12

1,516 %

4,571 %

2,891 %

3,548 %

5,097 %

12,736 %

13

1,523 %

4,588 %

3,011 %

3,547 %

5,073 %

12,610 %

14

1,523 %

4,595 %

3,116 %

3,543 %

5,052 %

12,460 %

15

1,524 %

4,595 %

3,206 %

3,537 %

5,032 %

12,293 %

16

1,529 %

4,586 %

3,280 %

3,529 %

5,014 %

12,114 %

17

1,539 %

4,570 %

3,340 %

3,519 %

4,996 %

11,926 %

18

1,551 %

4,543 %

3,389 %

3,509 %

4,980 %

11,733 %

19

1,566 %

4,506 %

3,429 %

3,499 %

4,965 %

11,538 %

20

1,583 %

4,457 %

3,462 %

3,489 %

4,951 %

11,342 %

21

1,600 %

4,397 %

3,489 %

3,479 %

4,938 %

11,147 %

22

1,618 %

4,329 %

3,511 %

3,469 %

4,925 %

10,955 %

23

1,636 %

4,257 %

3,529 %

3,459 %

4,913 %

10,767 %

24

1,655 %

4,183 %

3,544 %

3,450 %

4,901 %

10,583 %

25

1,673 %

4,110 %

3,556 %

3,442 %

4,890 %

10,404 %

26

1,691 %

4,038 %

3,565 %

3,434 %

4,880 %

10,231 %

27

1,709 %

3,971 %

3,573 %

3,427 %

4,870 %

10,064 %

28

1,727 %

3,908 %

3,579 %

3,421 %

4,860 %

9,903 %

29

1,744 %

3,852 %

3,583 %

3,415 %

4,851 %

9,748 %

30

1,761 %

3,802 %

3,587 %

3,411 %

4,842 %

9,599 %

31

1,777 %

3,759 %

3,589 %

3,406 %

4,834 %

9,456 %

32

1,793 %

3,723 %

3,591 %

3,403 %

4,826 %

9,319 %

33

1,808 %

3,691 %

3,592 %

3,400 %

4,818 %

9,187 %

34

1,823 %

3,664 %

3,592 %

3,397 %

4,811 %

9,062 %

35

1,837 %

3,641 %

3,592 %

3,395 %

4,804 %

8,941 %

36

1,851 %

3,621 %

3,592 %

3,393 %

4,797 %

8,826 %

37

1,864 %

3,604 %

3,591 %

3,392 %

4,791 %

8,716 %

38

1,877 %

3,588 %

3,590 %

3,391 %

4,784 %

8,610 %

39

1,890 %

3,575 %

3,589 %

3,390 %

4,778 %

8,509 %

40

1,902 %

3,564 %

3,588 %

3,389 %

4,772 %

8,413 %

41

1,914 %

3,554 %

3,586 %

3,389 %

4,767 %

8,320 %

42

1,925 %

3,545 %

3,585 %

3,388 %

4,761 %

8,231 %

43

1,936 %

3,537 %

3,583 %

3,388 %

4,756 %

8,146 %

44

1,946 %

3,531 %

3,581 %

3,388 %

4,751 %

8,065 %

45

1,956 %

3,525 %

3,580 %

3,388 %

4,746 %

7,987 %

46

1,966 %

3,519 %

3,578 %

3,388 %

4,741 %

7,912 %

47

1,976 %

3,515 %

3,576 %

3,388 %

4,737 %

7,839 %

48

1,985 %

3,511 %

3,574 %

3,388 %

4,732 %

7,770 %

49

1,994 %

3,507 %

3,572 %

3,389 %

4,728 %

7,704 %

50

2,002 %

3,504 %

3,570 %

3,389 %

4,724 %

7,640 %

51

2,010 %

3,501 %

3,569 %

3,389 %

4,720 %

7,578 %

52

2,018 %

3,498 %

3,567 %

3,390 %

4,716 %

7,519 %

53

2,026 %

3,496 %

3,565 %

3,390 %

4,712 %

7,462 %

54

2,034 %

3,494 %

3,563 %

3,391 %

4,709 %

7,406 %

55

2,041 %

3,492 %

3,562 %

3,391 %

4,705 %

7,353 %

56

2,048 %

3,490 %

3,560 %

3,392 %

4,702 %

7,302 %

57

2,055 %

3,489 %

3,558 %

3,392 %

4,699 %

7,253 %

58

2,061 %

3,487 %

3,557 %

3,393 %

4,695 %

7,205 %

59

2,068 %

3,486 %

3,555 %

3,393 %

4,692 %

7,159 %

60

2,074 %

3,485 %

3,553 %

3,394 %

4,689 %

7,114 %

61

2,080 %

3,484 %

3,552 %

3,395 %

4,686 %

7,071 %

62

2,086 %

3,483 %

3,550 %

3,395 %

4,683 %

7,029 %

63

2,091 %

3,482 %

3,549 %

3,396 %

4,681 %

6,988 %

64

2,097 %

3,481 %

3,547 %

3,396 %

4,678 %

6,949 %

65

2,102 %

3,480 %

3,546 %

3,397 %

4,675 %

6,911 %

66

2,107 %

3,480 %

3,545 %

3,398 %

4,673 %

6,874 %

67

2,112 %

3,479 %

3,543 %

3,398 %

4,670 %

6,838 %

68

2,117 %

3,478 %

3,542 %

3,399 %

4,668 %

6,804 %

69

2,122 %

3,478 %

3,541 %

3,399 %

4,666 %

6,770 %

70

2,126 %

3,477 %

3,540 %

3,400 %

4,663 %

6,737 %

71

2,131 %

3,477 %

3,538 %

3,400 %

4,661 %

6,706 %

72

2,135 %

3,476 %

3,537 %

3,401 %

4,659 %

6,675 %

73

2,140 %

3,476 %

3,536 %

3,402 %

4,657 %

6,645 %

74

2,144 %

3,475 %

3,535 %

3,402 %

4,655 %

6,615 %

75

2,148 %

3,475 %

3,534 %

3,403 %

4,653 %

6,587 %

76

2,152 %

3,474 %

3,533 %

3,403 %

4,651 %

6,559 %

77

2,156 %

3,474 %

3,532 %

3,404 %

4,649 %

6,532 %

78

2,159 %

3,474 %

3,531 %

3,404 %

4,647 %

6,506 %

79

2,163 %

3,473 %

3,530 %

3,405 %

4,645 %

6,480 %

80

2,167 %

3,473 %

3,529 %

3,405 %

4,643 %

6,455 %

81

2,170 %

3,473 %

3,528 %

3,406 %

4,642 %

6,431 %

82

2,173 %

3,472 %

3,527 %

3,406 %

4,640 %

6,407 %

83

2,177 %

3,472 %

3,526 %

3,407 %

4,638 %

6,384 %

84

2,180 %

3,472 %

3,525 %

3,407 %

4,637 %

6,361 %

85

2,183 %

3,471 %

3,524 %

3,408 %

4,635 %

6,339 %

86

2,186 %

3,471 %

3,523 %

3,408 %

4,633 %

6,318 %

87

2,189 %

3,471 %

3,522 %

3,408 %

4,632 %

6,297 %

88

2,192 %

3,471 %

3,522 %

3,409 %

4,630 %

6,276 %

89

2,195 %

3,470 %

3,521 %

3,409 %

4,629 %

6,256 %

90

2,198 %

3,470 %

3,520 %

3,410 %

4,628 %

6,236 %

91

2,201 %

3,470 %

3,519 %

3,410 %

4,626 %

6,217 %

92

2,203 %

3,470 %

3,518 %

3,411 %

4,625 %

6,198 %

93

2,206 %

3,470 %

3,518 %

3,411 %

4,623 %

6,180 %

94

2,209 %

3,469 %

3,517 %

3,411 %

4,622 %

6,162 %

95

2,211 %

3,469 %

3,516 %

3,412 %

4,621 %

6,144 %

96

2,214 %

3,469 %

3,516 %

3,412 %

4,620 %

6,127 %

97

2,216 %

3,469 %

3,515 %

3,413 %

4,618 %

6,110 %

98

2,218 %

3,468 %

3,514 %

3,413 %

4,617 %

6,093 %

99

2,221 %

3,468 %

3,514 %

3,413 %

4,616 %

6,077 %

100

2,223 %

3,468 %

3,513 %

3,414 %

4,615 %

6,061 %

101

2,225 %

3,468 %

3,512 %

3,414 %

4,614 %

6,046 %

102

2,227 %

3,468 %

3,512 %

3,414 %

4,613 %

6,030 %

103

2,230 %

3,468 %

3,511 %

3,415 %

4,612 %

6,016 %

104

2,232 %

3,467 %

3,511 %

3,415 %

4,610 %

6,001 %

105

2,234 %

3,467 %

3,510 %

3,415 %

4,609 %

5,986 %

106

2,236 %

3,467 %

3,509 %

3,416 %

4,608 %

5,972 %

107

2,238 %

3,467 %

3,509 %

3,416 %

4,607 %

5,958 %

108

2,240 %

3,467 %

3,508 %

3,416 %

4,606 %

5,945 %

109

2,242 %

3,467 %

3,508 %

3,417 %

4,605 %

5,932 %

110

2,244 %

3,466 %

3,507 %

3,417 %

4,604 %

5,918 %

111

2,246 %

3,466 %

3,507 %

3,417 %

4,604 %

5,906 %

112

2,247 %

3,466 %

3,506 %

3,417 %

4,603 %

5,893 %

113

2,249 %

3,466 %

3,506 %

3,418 %

4,602 %

5,881 %

114

2,251 %

3,466 %

3,505 %

3,418 %

4,601 %

5,868 %

115

2,253 %

3,466 %

3,505 %

3,418 %

4,600 %

5,856 %

116

2,254 %

3,466 %

3,504 %

3,419 %

4,599 %

5,845 %

117

2,256 %

3,465 %

3,504 %

3,419 %

4,598 %

5,833 %

118

2,258 %

3,465 %

3,503 %

3,419 %

4,597 %

5,822 %

119

2,259 %

3,465 %

3,503 %

3,419 %

4,597 %

5,810 %

120

2,261 %

3,465 %

3,503 %

3,420 %

4,596 %

5,799 %

121

2,262 %

3,465 %

3,502 %

3,420 %

4,595 %

5,789 %

122

2,264 %

3,465 %

3,502 %

3,420 %

4,594 %

5,778 %

123

2,265 %

3,465 %

3,501 %

3,420 %

4,593 %

5,768 %

124

2,267 %

3,465 %

3,501 %

3,421 %

4,593 %

5,757 %

125

2,268 %

3,464 %

3,500 %

3,421 %

4,592 %

5,747 %

126

2,270 %

3,464 %

3,500 %

3,421 %

4,591 %

5,737 %

127

2,271 %

3,464 %

3,500 %

3,421 %

4,590 %

5,727 %

128

2,273 %

3,464 %

3,499 %

3,421 %

4,590 %

5,718 %

129

2,274 %

3,464 %

3,499 %

3,422 %

4,589 %

5,708 %

130

2,275 %

3,464 %

3,498 %

3,422 %

4,588 %

5,699 %

131

2,277 %

3,464 %

3,498 %

3,422 %

4,588 %

5,690 %

132

2,278 %

3,464 %

3,498 %

3,422 %

4,587 %

5,681 %

133

2,279 %

3,464 %

3,497 %

3,423 %

4,586 %

5,672 %

134

2,281 %

3,463 %

3,497 %

3,423 %

4,586 %

5,663 %

135

2,282 %

3,463 %

3,497 %

3,423 %

4,585 %

5,654 %

136

2,283 %

3,463 %

3,496 %

3,423 %

4,585 %

5,646 %

137

2,284 %

3,463 %

3,496 %

3,423 %

4,584 %

5,637 %

138

2,285 %

3,463 %

3,496 %

3,424 %

4,583 %

5,629 %

139

2,287 %

3,463 %

3,495 %

3,424 %

4,583 %

5,621 %

140

2,288 %

3,463 %

3,495 %

3,424 %

4,582 %

5,613 %

141

2,289 %

3,463 %

3,495 %

3,424 %

4,582 %

5,605 %

142

2,290 %

3,463 %

3,494 %

3,424 %

4,581 %

5,597 %

143

2,291 %

3,463 %

3,494 %

3,424 %

4,580 %

5,589 %

144

2,292 %

3,463 %

3,494 %

3,425 %

4,580 %

5,582 %

145

2,293 %

3,462 %

3,493 %

3,425 %

4,579 %

5,574 %

146

2,294 %

3,462 %

3,493 %

3,425 %

4,579 %

5,567 %

147

2,296 %

3,462 %

3,493 %

3,425 %

4,578 %

5,560 %

148

2,297 %

3,462 %

3,493 %

3,425 %

4,578 %

5,552 %

149

2,298 %

3,462 %

3,492 %

3,425 %

4,577 %

5,545 %

150

2,299 %

3,462 %

3,492 %

3,426 %

4,577 %

5,538 %

| Term to maturity (in years) | Hong Kong dollar | Indian rupee | Mexican peso | New Taiwan dollar | New Zealand dollar | Rand |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 4,854 % | 6,813 % | 11,265 % | 0,896 % | 5,488 % | 7,756 % |
| 2 | 4,505 % | 7,015 % | 10,052 % | 0,971 % | 5,340 % | 7,834 % |
| 3 | 4,207 % | 7,128 % | 9,256 % | 1,030 % | 5,082 % | 7,982 % |
| 4 | 4,026 % | 7,212 % | 8,955 % | 1,080 % | 4,894 % | 8,159 % |
| 5 | 3,964 % | 7,257 % | 8,872 % | 1,122 % | 4,787 % | 8,418 % |
| 6 | 3,915 % | 7,291 % | 8,853 % | 1,156 % | 4,752 % | 8,701 % |
| 7 | 3,867 % | 7,322 % | 8,853 % | 1,183 % | 4,735 % | 9,025 % |
| 8 | 3,827 % | 7,349 % | 8,851 % | 1,206 % | 4,728 % | 9,288 % |
| 9 | 3,799 % | 7,374 % | 8,837 % | 1,223 % | 4,729 % | 9,486 % |
| 10 | 3,784 % | 7,401 % | 8,802 % | 1,236 % | 4,738 % | 9,639 % |
| 11 | 3,783 % | 7,410 % | 8,744 % | 1,265 % | 4,751 % | 9,759 % |
| 12 | 3,789 % | 7,404 % | 8,668 % | 1,306 % | 4,767 % | 9,849 % |
| 13 | 3,800 % | 7,385 % | 8,580 % | 1,355 % | 4,783 % | 9,911 % |
| 14 | 3,811 % | 7,359 % | 8,484 % | 1,409 % | 4,798 % | 9,945 % |
| 15 | 3,820 % | 7,327 % | 8,382 % | 1,465 % | 4,811 % | 9,951 % |
| 16 | 3,826 % | 7,290 % | 8,278 % | 1,522 % | 4,820 % | 9,929 % |
| 17 | 3,829 % | 7,251 % | 8,172 % | 1,579 % | 4,826 % | 9,886 % |
| 18 | 3,829 % | 7,211 % | 8,066 % | 1,635 % | 4,828 % | 9,826 % |
| 19 | 3,828 % | 7,169 % | 7,962 % | 1,690 % | 4,825 % | 9,753 % |
| 20 | 3,826 % | 7,127 % | 7,859 % | 1,743 % | 4,817 % | 9,672 % |
| 21 | 3,823 % | 7,085 % | 7,758 % | 1,795 % | 4,804 % | 9,584 % |
| 22 | 3,818 % | 7,044 % | 7,660 % | 1,845 % | 4,787 % | 9,491 % |
| 23 | 3,814 % | 7,003 % | 7,565 % | 1,893 % | 4,766 % | 9,397 % |
| 24 | 3,808 % | 6,964 % | 7,474 % | 1,939 % | 4,744 % | 9,300 % |
| 25 | 3,803 % | 6,925 % | 7,385 % | 1,983 % | 4,720 % | 9,204 % |
| 26 | 3,797 % | 6,887 % | 7,300 % | 2,025 % | 4,695 % | 9,109 % |
| 27 | 3,791 % | 6,850 % | 7,218 % | 2,065 % | 4,670 % | 9,015 % |
| 28 | 3,785 % | 6,815 % | 7,139 % | 2,104 % | 4,644 % | 8,923 % |
| 29 | 3,779 % | 6,781 % | 7,063 % | 2,141 % | 4,618 % | 8,832 % |
| 30 | 3,772 % | 6,748 % | 6,990 % | 2,177 % | 4,592 % | 8,745 % |
| 31 | 3,766 % | 6,716 % | 6,921 % | 2,211 % | 4,566 % | 8,660 % |
| 32 | 3,760 % | 6,685 % | 6,854 % | 2,243 % | 4,541 % | 8,578 % |
| 33 | 3,754 % | 6,655 % | 6,790 % | 2,274 % | 4,516 % | 8,499 % |
| 34 | 3,748 % | 6,627 % | 6,729 % | 2,304 % | 4,492 % | 8,422 % |
| 35 | 3,742 % | 6,599 % | 6,671 % | 2,333 % | 4,468 % | 8,348 % |
| 36 | 3,736 % | 6,573 % | 6,615 % | 2,360 % | 4,445 % | 8,278 % |
| 37 | 3,731 % | 6,547 % | 6,561 % | 2,386 % | 4,423 % | 8,209 % |
| 38 | 3,725 % | 6,523 % | 6,509 % | 2,412 % | 4,401 % | 8,144 % |
| 39 | 3,720 % | 6,500 % | 6,460 % | 2,436 % | 4,380 % | 8,081 % |
| 40 | 3,715 % | 6,477 % | 6,413 % | 2,459 % | 4,360 % | 8,020 % |
| 41 | 3,710 % | 6,455 % | 6,367 % | 2,481 % | 4,340 % | 7,962 % |
| 42 | 3,705 % | 6,434 % | 6,324 % | 2,502 % | 4,321 % | 7,906 % |
| 43 | 3,700 % | 6,414 % | 6,282 % | 2,523 % | 4,303 % | 7,853 % |
| 44 | 3,695 % | 6,395 % | 6,242 % | 2,543 % | 4,285 % | 7,801 % |
| 45 | 3,691 % | 6,376 % | 6,203 % | 2,562 % | 4,268 % | 7,752 % |
| 46 | 3,686 % | 6,358 % | 6,166 % | 2,580 % | 4,251 % | 7,704 % |
| 47 | 3,682 % | 6,341 % | 6,131 % | 2,597 % | 4,235 % | 7,658 % |
| 48 | 3,678 % | 6,324 % | 6,097 % | 2,614 % | 4,220 % | 7,614 % |
| 49 | 3,673 % | 6,308 % | 6,064 % | 2,631 % | 4,205 % | 7,571 % |
| 50 | 3,670 % | 6,292 % | 6,032 % | 2,646 % | 4,191 % | 7,531 % |
| 51 | 3,666 % | 6,277 % | 6,001 % | 2,661 % | 4,177 % | 7,491 % |
| 52 | 3,662 % | 6,263 % | 5,972 % | 2,676 % | 4,163 % | 7,453 % |
| 53 | 3,658 % | 6,249 % | 5,943 % | 2,690 % | 4,150 % | 7,417 % |
| 54 | 3,655 % | 6,235 % | 5,916 % | 2,704 % | 4,138 % | 7,381 % |
| 55 | 3,651 % | 6,222 % | 5,890 % | 2,717 % | 4,125 % | 7,347 % |
| 56 | 3,648 % | 6,210 % | 5,864 % | 2,730 % | 4,114 % | 7,314 % |
| 57 | 3,645 % | 6,197 % | 5,839 % | 2,742 % | 4,102 % | 7,283 % |
| 58 | 3,642 % | 6,186 % | 5,815 % | 2,754 % | 4,091 % | 7,252 % |
| 59 | 3,639 % | 6,174 % | 5,792 % | 2,766 % | 4,080 % | 7,222 % |
| 60 | 3,636 % | 6,163 % | 5,770 % | 2,777 % | 4,070 % | 7,193 % |
| 61 | 3,633 % | 6,152 % | 5,748 % | 2,788 % | 4,060 % | 7,166 % |
| 62 | 3,630 % | 6,142 % | 5,728 % | 2,798 % | 4,050 % | 7,139 % |
| 63 | 3,627 % | 6,132 % | 5,707 % | 2,808 % | 4,041 % | 7,113 % |
| 64 | 3,625 % | 6,122 % | 5,688 % | 2,818 % | 4,032 % | 7,087 % |
| 65 | 3,622 % | 6,113 % | 5,669 % | 2,828 % | 4,023 % | 7,063 % |
| 66 | 3,619 % | 6,103 % | 5,650 % | 2,837 % | 4,014 % | 7,039 % |
| 67 | 3,617 % | 6,094 % | 5,632 % | 2,846 % | 4,006 % | 7,016 % |
| 68 | 3,615 % | 6,086 % | 5,615 % | 2,855 % | 3,998 % | 6,994 % |
| 69 | 3,612 % | 6,077 % | 5,598 % | 2,864 % | 3,990 % | 6,972 % |
| 70 | 3,610 % | 6,069 % | 5,581 % | 2,872 % | 3,982 % | 6,951 % |
| 71 | 3,608 % | 6,061 % | 5,565 % | 2,880 % | 3,975 % | 6,930 % |
| 72 | 3,606 % | 6,053 % | 5,550 % | 2,888 % | 3,967 % | 6,910 % |
| 73 | 3,604 % | 6,046 % | 5,535 % | 2,895 % | 3,960 % | 6,891 % |
| 74 | 3,602 % | 6,038 % | 5,520 % | 2,903 % | 3,953 % | 6,872 % |
| 75 | 3,600 % | 6,031 % | 5,506 % | 2,910 % | 3,947 % | 6,853 % |
| 76 | 3,598 % | 6,024 % | 5,492 % | 2,917 % | 3,940 % | 6,836 % |
| 77 | 3,596 % | 6,017 % | 5,478 % | 2,924 % | 3,934 % | 6,818 % |
| 78 | 3,594 % | 6,011 % | 5,465 % | 2,931 % | 3,928 % | 6,801 % |
| 79 | 3,592 % | 6,004 % | 5,452 % | 2,937 % | 3,922 % | 6,785 % |
| 80 | 3,590 % | 5,998 % | 5,439 % | 2,944 % | 3,916 % | 6,768 % |
| 81 | 3,589 % | 5,992 % | 5,427 % | 2,950 % | 3,910 % | 6,753 % |
| 82 | 3,587 % | 5,986 % | 5,415 % | 2,956 % | 3,904 % | 6,737 % |
| 83 | 3,585 % | 5,980 % | 5,404 % | 2,962 % | 3,899 % | 6,722 % |
| 84 | 3,584 % | 5,974 % | 5,392 % | 2,968 % | 3,894 % | 6,708 % |
| 85 | 3,582 % | 5,969 % | 5,381 % | 2,973 % | 3,888 % | 6,693 % |
| 86 | 3,581 % | 5,963 % | 5,370 % | 2,979 % | 3,883 % | 6,679 % |
| 87 | 3,579 % | 5,958 % | 5,360 % | 2,984 % | 3,878 % | 6,666 % |
| 88 | 3,578 % | 5,953 % | 5,349 % | 2,989 % | 3,873 % | 6,653 % |
| 89 | 3,576 % | 5,948 % | 5,339 % | 2,995 % | 3,869 % | 6,639 % |
| 90 | 3,575 % | 5,943 % | 5,329 % | 3,000 % | 3,864 % | 6,627 % |
| 91 | 3,574 % | 5,938 % | 5,319 % | 3,005 % | 3,859 % | 6,614 % |
| 92 | 3,572 % | 5,933 % | 5,310 % | 3,009 % | 3,855 % | 6,602 % |
| 93 | 3,571 % | 5,928 % | 5,301 % | 3,014 % | 3,851 % | 6,590 % |
| 94 | 3,570 % | 5,924 % | 5,292 % | 3,019 % | 3,846 % | 6,579 % |
| 95 | 3,568 % | 5,919 % | 5,283 % | 3,023 % | 3,842 % | 6,567 % |
| 96 | 3,567 % | 5,915 % | 5,274 % | 3,028 % | 3,838 % | 6,556 % |
| 97 | 3,566 % | 5,911 % | 5,265 % | 3,032 % | 3,834 % | 6,545 % |
| 98 | 3,565 % | 5,906 % | 5,257 % | 3,036 % | 3,830 % | 6,534 % |
| 99 | 3,564 % | 5,902 % | 5,249 % | 3,040 % | 3,826 % | 6,524 % |
| 100 | 3,562 % | 5,898 % | 5,241 % | 3,045 % | 3,822 % | 6,514 % |
| 101 | 3,561 % | 5,894 % | 5,233 % | 3,049 % | 3,819 % | 6,503 % |
| 102 | 3,560 % | 5,890 % | 5,225 % | 3,053 % | 3,815 % | 6,494 % |
| 103 | 3,559 % | 5,887 % | 5,218 % | 3,056 % | 3,812 % | 6,484 % |
| 104 | 3,558 % | 5,883 % | 5,210 % | 3,060 % | 3,808 % | 6,474 % |
| 105 | 3,557 % | 5,879 % | 5,203 % | 3,064 % | 3,805 % | 6,465 % |
| 106 | 3,556 % | 5,876 % | 5,196 % | 3,067 % | 3,801 % | 6,456 % |
| 107 | 3,555 % | 5,872 % | 5,189 % | 3,071 % | 3,798 % | 6,447 % |
| 108 | 3,554 % | 5,869 % | 5,182 % | 3,075 % | 3,795 % | 6,438 % |
| 109 | 3,553 % | 5,865 % | 5,175 % | 3,078 % | 3,792 % | 6,429 % |
| 110 | 3,552 % | 5,862 % | 5,169 % | 3,081 % | 3,789 % | 6,421 % |
| 111 | 3,551 % | 5,859 % | 5,162 % | 3,085 % | 3,786 % | 6,413 % |
| 112 | 3,550 % | 5,856 % | 5,156 % | 3,088 % | 3,783 % | 6,404 % |
| 113 | 3,550 % | 5,852 % | 5,150 % | 3,091 % | 3,780 % | 6,396 % |
| 114 | 3,549 % | 5,849 % | 5,143 % | 3,094 % | 3,777 % | 6,389 % |
| 115 | 3,548 % | 5,846 % | 5,137 % | 3,097 % | 3,774 % | 6,381 % |
| 116 | 3,547 % | 5,843 % | 5,131 % | 3,100 % | 3,771 % | 6,373 % |
| 117 | 3,546 % | 5,840 % | 5,126 % | 3,103 % | 3,768 % | 6,366 % |
| 118 | 3,545 % | 5,837 % | 5,120 % | 3,106 % | 3,766 % | 6,358 % |
| 119 | 3,545 % | 5,835 % | 5,114 % | 3,109 % | 3,763 % | 6,351 % |
| 120 | 3,544 % | 5,832 % | 5,109 % | 3,112 % | 3,760 % | 6,344 % |
| 121 | 3,543 % | 5,829 % | 5,103 % | 3,115 % | 3,758 % | 6,337 % |
| 122 | 3,542 % | 5,826 % | 5,098 % | 3,118 % | 3,755 % | 6,330 % |
| 123 | 3,541 % | 5,824 % | 5,093 % | 3,120 % | 3,753 % | 6,323 % |
| 124 | 3,541 % | 5,821 % | 5,087 % | 3,123 % | 3,750 % | 6,317 % |
| 125 | 3,540 % | 5,819 % | 5,082 % | 3,126 % | 3,748 % | 6,310 % |
| 126 | 3,539 % | 5,816 % | 5,077 % | 3,128 % | 3,746 % | 6,304 % |
| 127 | 3,539 % | 5,814 % | 5,072 % | 3,131 % | 3,743 % | 6,297 % |
| 128 | 3,538 % | 5,811 % | 5,067 % | 3,133 % | 3,741 % | 6,291 % |
| 129 | 3,537 % | 5,809 % | 5,063 % | 3,136 % | 3,739 % | 6,285 % |
| 130 | 3,537 % | 5,806 % | 5,058 % | 3,138 % | 3,736 % | 6,279 % |
| 131 | 3,536 % | 5,804 % | 5,053 % | 3,140 % | 3,734 % | 6,273 % |
| 132 | 3,535 % | 5,802 % | 5,049 % | 3,143 % | 3,732 % | 6,267 % |
| 133 | 3,535 % | 5,799 % | 5,044 % | 3,145 % | 3,730 % | 6,261 % |
| 134 | 3,534 % | 5,797 % | 5,040 % | 3,147 % | 3,728 % | 6,255 % |
| 135 | 3,533 % | 5,795 % | 5,035 % | 3,150 % | 3,726 % | 6,250 % |
| 136 | 3,533 % | 5,793 % | 5,031 % | 3,152 % | 3,724 % | 6,244 % |
| 137 | 3,532 % | 5,791 % | 5,027 % | 3,154 % | 3,722 % | 6,239 % |
| 138 | 3,532 % | 5,788 % | 5,023 % | 3,156 % | 3,720 % | 6,233 % |
| 139 | 3,531 % | 5,786 % | 5,018 % | 3,158 % | 3,718 % | 6,228 % |
| 140 | 3,530 % | 5,784 % | 5,014 % | 3,160 % | 3,716 % | 6,223 % |
| 141 | 3,530 % | 5,782 % | 5,010 % | 3,162 % | 3,714 % | 6,218 % |
| 142 | 3,529 % | 5,780 % | 5,006 % | 3,164 % | 3,712 % | 6,213 % |
| 143 | 3,529 % | 5,778 % | 5,002 % | 3,166 % | 3,710 % | 6,208 % |
| 144 | 3,528 % | 5,776 % | 4,999 % | 3,168 % | 3,709 % | 6,203 % |
| 145 | 3,528 % | 5,775 % | 4,995 % | 3,170 % | 3,707 % | 6,198 % |
| 146 | 3,527 % | 5,773 % | 4,991 % | 3,172 % | 3,705 % | 6,193 % |
| 147 | 3,527 % | 5,771 % | 4,987 % | 3,174 % | 3,703 % | 6,188 % |
| 148 | 3,526 % | 5,769 % | 4,984 % | 3,176 % | 3,702 % | 6,184 % |
| 149 | 3,526 % | 5,767 % | 4,980 % | 3,178 % | 3,700 % | 6,179 % |
| 150 | 3,525 % | 5,765 % | 4,977 % | 3,180 % | 3,698 % | 6,175 % |

Term to maturity (in years)

Hong Kong dollar

Indian rupee

Mexican peso

New Taiwan dollar

New Zealand dollar

Rand

1

4,854 %

6,813 %

11,265 %

0,896 %

5,488 %

7,756 %

2

4,505 %

7,015 %

10,052 %

0,971 %

5,340 %

7,834 %

3

4,207 %

7,128 %

9,256 %

1,030 %

5,082 %

7,982 %

4

4,026 %

7,212 %

8,955 %

1,080 %

4,894 %

8,159 %

5

3,964 %

7,257 %

8,872 %

1,122 %

4,787 %

8,418 %

6

3,915 %

7,291 %

8,853 %

1,156 %

4,752 %

8,701 %

7

3,867 %

7,322 %

8,853 %

1,183 %

4,735 %

9,025 %

8

3,827 %

7,349 %

8,851 %

1,206 %

4,728 %

9,288 %

9

3,799 %

7,374 %

8,837 %

1,223 %

4,729 %

9,486 %

10

3,784 %

7,401 %

8,802 %

1,236 %

4,738 %

9,639 %

11

3,783 %

7,410 %

8,744 %

1,265 %

4,751 %

9,759 %

12

3,789 %

7,404 %

8,668 %

1,306 %

4,767 %

9,849 %

13

3,800 %

7,385 %

8,580 %

1,355 %

4,783 %

9,911 %

14

3,811 %

7,359 %

8,484 %

1,409 %

4,798 %

9,945 %

15

3,820 %

7,327 %

8,382 %

1,465 %

4,811 %

9,951 %

16

3,826 %

7,290 %

8,278 %

1,522 %

4,820 %

9,929 %

17

3,829 %

7,251 %

8,172 %

1,579 %

4,826 %

9,886 %

18

3,829 %

7,211 %

8,066 %

1,635 %

4,828 %

9,826 %

19

3,828 %

7,169 %

7,962 %

1,690 %

4,825 %

9,753 %

20

3,826 %

7,127 %

7,859 %

1,743 %

4,817 %

9,672 %

21

3,823 %

7,085 %

7,758 %

1,795 %

4,804 %

9,584 %

22

3,818 %

7,044 %

7,660 %

1,845 %

4,787 %

9,491 %

23

3,814 %

7,003 %

7,565 %

1,893 %

4,766 %

9,397 %

24

3,808 %

6,964 %

7,474 %

1,939 %

4,744 %

9,300 %

25

3,803 %

6,925 %

7,385 %

1,983 %

4,720 %

9,204 %

26

3,797 %

6,887 %

7,300 %

2,025 %

4,695 %

9,109 %

27

3,791 %

6,850 %

7,218 %

2,065 %

4,670 %

9,015 %

28

3,785 %

6,815 %

7,139 %

2,104 %

4,644 %

8,923 %

29

3,779 %

6,781 %

7,063 %

2,141 %

4,618 %

8,832 %

30

3,772 %

6,748 %

6,990 %

2,177 %

4,592 %

8,745 %

31

3,766 %

6,716 %

6,921 %

2,211 %

4,566 %

8,660 %

32

3,760 %

6,685 %

6,854 %

2,243 %

4,541 %

8,578 %

33

3,754 %

6,655 %

6,790 %

2,274 %

4,516 %

8,499 %

34

3,748 %

6,627 %

6,729 %

2,304 %

4,492 %

8,422 %

35

3,742 %

6,599 %

6,671 %

2,333 %

4,468 %

8,348 %

36

3,736 %

6,573 %

6,615 %

2,360 %

4,445 %

8,278 %

37

3,731 %

6,547 %

6,561 %

2,386 %

4,423 %

8,209 %

38

3,725 %

6,523 %

6,509 %

2,412 %

4,401 %

8,144 %

39

3,720 %

6,500 %

6,460 %

2,436 %

4,380 %

8,081 %

40

3,715 %

6,477 %

6,413 %

2,459 %

4,360 %

8,020 %

41

3,710 %

6,455 %

6,367 %

2,481 %

4,340 %

7,962 %

42

3,705 %

6,434 %

6,324 %

2,502 %

4,321 %

7,906 %

43

3,700 %

6,414 %

6,282 %

2,523 %

4,303 %

7,853 %

44

3,695 %

6,395 %

6,242 %

2,543 %

4,285 %

7,801 %

45

3,691 %

6,376 %

6,203 %

2,562 %

4,268 %

7,752 %

46

3,686 %

6,358 %

6,166 %

2,580 %

4,251 %

7,704 %

47

3,682 %

6,341 %

6,131 %

2,597 %

4,235 %

7,658 %

48

3,678 %

6,324 %

6,097 %

2,614 %

4,220 %

7,614 %

49

3,673 %

6,308 %

6,064 %

2,631 %

4,205 %

7,571 %

50

3,670 %

6,292 %

6,032 %

2,646 %

4,191 %

7,531 %

51

3,666 %

6,277 %

6,001 %

2,661 %

4,177 %

7,491 %

52

3,662 %

6,263 %

5,972 %

2,676 %

4,163 %

7,453 %

53

3,658 %

6,249 %

5,943 %

2,690 %

4,150 %

7,417 %

54

3,655 %

6,235 %

5,916 %

2,704 %

4,138 %

7,381 %

55

3,651 %

6,222 %

5,890 %

2,717 %

4,125 %

7,347 %

56

3,648 %

6,210 %

5,864 %

2,730 %

4,114 %

7,314 %

57

3,645 %

6,197 %

5,839 %

2,742 %

4,102 %

7,283 %

58

3,642 %

6,186 %

5,815 %

2,754 %

4,091 %

7,252 %

59

3,639 %

6,174 %

5,792 %

2,766 %

4,080 %

7,222 %

60

3,636 %

6,163 %

5,770 %

2,777 %

4,070 %

7,193 %

61

3,633 %

6,152 %

5,748 %

2,788 %

4,060 %

7,166 %

62

3,630 %

6,142 %

5,728 %

2,798 %

4,050 %

7,139 %

63

3,627 %

6,132 %

5,707 %

2,808 %

4,041 %

7,113 %

64

3,625 %

6,122 %

5,688 %

2,818 %

4,032 %

7,087 %

65

3,622 %

6,113 %

5,669 %

2,828 %

4,023 %

7,063 %

66

3,619 %

6,103 %

5,650 %

2,837 %

4,014 %

7,039 %

67

3,617 %

6,094 %

5,632 %

2,846 %

4,006 %

7,016 %

68

3,615 %

6,086 %

5,615 %

2,855 %

3,998 %

6,994 %

69

3,612 %

6,077 %

5,598 %

2,864 %

3,990 %

6,972 %

70

3,610 %

6,069 %

5,581 %

2,872 %

3,982 %

6,951 %

71

3,608 %

6,061 %

5,565 %

2,880 %

3,975 %

6,930 %

72

3,606 %

6,053 %

5,550 %

2,888 %

3,967 %

6,910 %

73

3,604 %

6,046 %

5,535 %

2,895 %

3,960 %

6,891 %

74

3,602 %

6,038 %

5,520 %

2,903 %

3,953 %

6,872 %

75

3,600 %

6,031 %

5,506 %

2,910 %

3,947 %

6,853 %

76

3,598 %

6,024 %

5,492 %

2,917 %

3,940 %

6,836 %

77

3,596 %

6,017 %

5,478 %

2,924 %

3,934 %

6,818 %

78

3,594 %

6,011 %

5,465 %

2,931 %

3,928 %

6,801 %

79

3,592 %

6,004 %

5,452 %

2,937 %

3,922 %

6,785 %

80

3,590 %

5,998 %

5,439 %

2,944 %

3,916 %

6,768 %

81

3,589 %

5,992 %

5,427 %

2,950 %

3,910 %

6,753 %

82

3,587 %

5,986 %

5,415 %

2,956 %

3,904 %

6,737 %

83

3,585 %

5,980 %

5,404 %

2,962 %

3,899 %

6,722 %

84

3,584 %

5,974 %

5,392 %

2,968 %

3,894 %

6,708 %

85

3,582 %

5,969 %

5,381 %

2,973 %

3,888 %

6,693 %

86

3,581 %

5,963 %

5,370 %

2,979 %

3,883 %

6,679 %

87

3,579 %

5,958 %

5,360 %

2,984 %

3,878 %

6,666 %

88

3,578 %

5,953 %

5,349 %

2,989 %

3,873 %

6,653 %

89

3,576 %

5,948 %

5,339 %

2,995 %

3,869 %

6,639 %

90

3,575 %

5,943 %

5,329 %

3,000 %

3,864 %

6,627 %

91

3,574 %

5,938 %

5,319 %

3,005 %

3,859 %

6,614 %

92

3,572 %

5,933 %

5,310 %

3,009 %

3,855 %

6,602 %

93

3,571 %

5,928 %

5,301 %

3,014 %

3,851 %

6,590 %

94

3,570 %

5,924 %

5,292 %

3,019 %

3,846 %

6,579 %

95

3,568 %

5,919 %

5,283 %

3,023 %

3,842 %

6,567 %

96

3,567 %

5,915 %

5,274 %

3,028 %

3,838 %

6,556 %

97

3,566 %

5,911 %

5,265 %

3,032 %

3,834 %

6,545 %

98

3,565 %

5,906 %

5,257 %

3,036 %

3,830 %

6,534 %

99

3,564 %

5,902 %

5,249 %

3,040 %

3,826 %

6,524 %

100

3,562 %

5,898 %

5,241 %

3,045 %

3,822 %

6,514 %

101

3,561 %

5,894 %

5,233 %

3,049 %

3,819 %

6,503 %

102

3,560 %

5,890 %

5,225 %

3,053 %

3,815 %

6,494 %

103

3,559 %

5,887 %

5,218 %

3,056 %

3,812 %

6,484 %

104

3,558 %

5,883 %

5,210 %

3,060 %

3,808 %

6,474 %

105

3,557 %

5,879 %

5,203 %

3,064 %

3,805 %

6,465 %

106

3,556 %

5,876 %

5,196 %

3,067 %

3,801 %

6,456 %

107

3,555 %

5,872 %

5,189 %

3,071 %

3,798 %

6,447 %

108

3,554 %

5,869 %

5,182 %

3,075 %

3,795 %

6,438 %

109

3,553 %

5,865 %

5,175 %

3,078 %

3,792 %

6,429 %

110

3,552 %

5,862 %

5,169 %

3,081 %

3,789 %

6,421 %

111

3,551 %

5,859 %

5,162 %

3,085 %

3,786 %

6,413 %

112

3,550 %

5,856 %

5,156 %

3,088 %

3,783 %

6,404 %

113

3,550 %

5,852 %

5,150 %

3,091 %

3,780 %

6,396 %

114

3,549 %

5,849 %

5,143 %

3,094 %

3,777 %

6,389 %

115

3,548 %

5,846 %

5,137 %

3,097 %

3,774 %

6,381 %

116

3,547 %

5,843 %

5,131 %

3,100 %

3,771 %

6,373 %

117

3,546 %

5,840 %

5,126 %

3,103 %

3,768 %

6,366 %

118

3,545 %

5,837 %

5,120 %

3,106 %

3,766 %

6,358 %

119

3,545 %

5,835 %

5,114 %

3,109 %

3,763 %

6,351 %

120

3,544 %

5,832 %

5,109 %

3,112 %

3,760 %

6,344 %

121

3,543 %

5,829 %

5,103 %

3,115 %

3,758 %

6,337 %

122

3,542 %

5,826 %

5,098 %

3,118 %

3,755 %

6,330 %

123

3,541 %

5,824 %

5,093 %

3,120 %

3,753 %

6,323 %

124

3,541 %

5,821 %

5,087 %

3,123 %

3,750 %

6,317 %

125

3,540 %

5,819 %

5,082 %

3,126 %

3,748 %

6,310 %

126

3,539 %

5,816 %

5,077 %

3,128 %

3,746 %

6,304 %

127

3,539 %

5,814 %

5,072 %

3,131 %

3,743 %

6,297 %

128

3,538 %

5,811 %

5,067 %

3,133 %

3,741 %

6,291 %

129

3,537 %

5,809 %

5,063 %

3,136 %

3,739 %

6,285 %

130

3,537 %

5,806 %

5,058 %

3,138 %

3,736 %

6,279 %

131

3,536 %

5,804 %

5,053 %

3,140 %

3,734 %

6,273 %

132

3,535 %

5,802 %

5,049 %

3,143 %

3,732 %

6,267 %

133

3,535 %

5,799 %

5,044 %

3,145 %

3,730 %

6,261 %

134

3,534 %

5,797 %

5,040 %

3,147 %

3,728 %

6,255 %

135

3,533 %

5,795 %

5,035 %

3,150 %

3,726 %

6,250 %

136

3,533 %

5,793 %

5,031 %

3,152 %

3,724 %

6,244 %

137

3,532 %

5,791 %

5,027 %

3,154 %

3,722 %

6,239 %

138

3,532 %

5,788 %

5,023 %

3,156 %

3,720 %

6,233 %

139

3,531 %

5,786 %

5,018 %

3,158 %

3,718 %

6,228 %

140

3,530 %

5,784 %

5,014 %

3,160 %

3,716 %

6,223 %

141

3,530 %

5,782 %

5,010 %

3,162 %

3,714 %

6,218 %

142

3,529 %

5,780 %

5,006 %

3,164 %

3,712 %

6,213 %

143

3,529 %

5,778 %

5,002 %

3,166 %

3,710 %

6,208 %

144

3,528 %

5,776 %

4,999 %

3,168 %

3,709 %

6,203 %

145

3,528 %

5,775 %

4,995 %

3,170 %

3,707 %

6,198 %

146

3,527 %

5,773 %

4,991 %

3,172 %

3,705 %

6,193 %

147

3,527 %

5,771 %

4,987 %

3,174 %

3,703 %

6,188 %

148

3,526 %

5,769 %

4,984 %

3,176 %

3,702 %

6,184 %

149

3,526 %

5,767 %

4,980 %

3,178 %

3,700 %

6,179 %

150

3,525 %

5,765 %

4,977 %

3,180 %

3,698 %

6,175 %

| Term to maturity (in years) | Real | Renminbi-yuan | Ringgit | Russian rouble | Singapore dollar | South Korean won |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 13,115 % | 2,097 % | 3,367 % | 10,194 % | 4,156 % | 3,921 % |
| 2 | 12,615 % | 2,292 % | 3,595 % | 8,858 % | 3,717 % | 3,769 % |
| 3 | 12,526 % | 2,458 % | 3,705 % | 8,718 % | 3,537 % | 3,647 % |
| 4 | 12,550 % | 2,595 % | 3,791 % | 8,990 % | 3,448 % | 3,584 % |
| 5 | 12,607 % | 2,701 % | 3,864 % | 9,351 % | 3,391 % | 3,525 % |
| 6 | 12,655 % | 2,784 % | 3,924 % | 9,696 % | 3,352 % | 3,482 % |
| 7 | 12,690 % | 2,854 % | 3,972 % | 9,994 % | 3,324 % | 3,456 % |
| 8 | 12,722 % | 2,916 % | 4,016 % | 10,248 % | 3,305 % | 3,444 % |
| 9 | 12,733 % | 2,974 % | 4,052 % | 10,433 % | 3,291 % | 3,434 % |
| 10 | 12,746 % | 3,028 % | 4,090 % | 10,564 % | 3,283 % | 3,419 % |
| 11 | 12,719 % | 3,081 % | 4,131 % | 10,645 % | 3,280 % | 3,394 % |
| 12 | 12,649 % | 3,131 % | 4,175 % | 10,683 % | 3,280 % | 3,364 % |
| 13 | 12,547 % | 3,180 % | 4,221 % | 10,683 % | 3,281 % | 3,330 % |
| 14 | 12,421 % | 3,226 % | 4,270 % | 10,651 % | 3,284 % | 3,297 % |
| 15 | 12,278 % | 3,270 % | 4,322 % | 10,591 % | 3,289 % | 3,265 % |
| 16 | 12,122 % | 3,312 % | 4,378 % | 10,508 % | 3,293 % | 3,235 % |
| 17 | 11,959 % | 3,352 % | 4,434 % | 10,410 % | 3,298 % | 3,208 % |
| 18 | 11,789 % | 3,390 % | 4,486 % | 10,300 % | 3,303 % | 3,185 % |
| 19 | 11,617 % | 3,426 % | 4,531 % | 10,181 % | 3,308 % | 3,165 % |
| 20 | 11,445 % | 3,461 % | 4,567 % | 10,057 % | 3,312 % | 3,150 % |
| 21 | 11,273 % | 3,493 % | 4,590 % | 9,930 % | 3,317 % | 3,139 % |
| 22 | 11,103 % | 3,524 % | 4,603 % | 9,801 % | 3,321 % | 3,131 % |
| 23 | 10,937 % | 3,554 % | 4,608 % | 9,673 % | 3,324 % | 3,126 % |
| 24 | 10,774 % | 3,582 % | 4,607 % | 9,545 % | 3,328 % | 3,123 % |
| 25 | 10,616 % | 3,609 % | 4,601 % | 9,419 % | 3,331 % | 3,122 % |
| 26 | 10,463 % | 3,635 % | 4,591 % | 9,296 % | 3,334 % | 3,122 % |
| 27 | 10,315 % | 3,659 % | 4,577 % | 9,176 % | 3,337 % | 3,124 % |
| 28 | 10,172 % | 3,682 % | 4,562 % | 9,059 % | 3,340 % | 3,126 % |
| 29 | 10,035 % | 3,705 % | 4,544 % | 8,946 % | 3,343 % | 3,129 % |
| 30 | 9,902 % | 3,726 % | 4,526 % | 8,837 % | 3,345 % | 3,133 % |
| 31 | 9,776 % | 3,746 % | 4,506 % | 8,732 % | 3,348 % | 3,137 % |
| 32 | 9,654 % | 3,766 % | 4,486 % | 8,631 % | 3,350 % | 3,141 % |
| 33 | 9,538 % | 3,784 % | 4,466 % | 8,533 % | 3,352 % | 3,146 % |
| 34 | 9,426 % | 3,802 % | 4,446 % | 8,440 % | 3,355 % | 3,150 % |
| 35 | 9,319 % | 3,819 % | 4,425 % | 8,350 % | 3,357 % | 3,155 % |
| 36 | 9,217 % | 3,835 % | 4,405 % | 8,263 % | 3,359 % | 3,160 % |
| 37 | 9,119 % | 3,851 % | 4,385 % | 8,181 % | 3,361 % | 3,165 % |
| 38 | 9,025 % | 3,866 % | 4,366 % | 8,101 % | 3,362 % | 3,170 % |
| 39 | 8,935 % | 3,881 % | 4,346 % | 8,025 % | 3,364 % | 3,175 % |
| 40 | 8,849 % | 3,894 % | 4,328 % | 7,952 % | 3,366 % | 3,180 % |
| 41 | 8,767 % | 3,908 % | 4,309 % | 7,882 % | 3,367 % | 3,185 % |
| 42 | 8,688 % | 3,921 % | 4,292 % | 7,815 % | 3,369 % | 3,190 % |
| 43 | 8,612 % | 3,933 % | 4,274 % | 7,750 % | 3,371 % | 3,194 % |
| 44 | 8,539 % | 3,945 % | 4,258 % | 7,688 % | 3,372 % | 3,199 % |
| 45 | 8,470 % | 3,956 % | 4,241 % | 7,629 % | 3,373 % | 3,203 % |
| 46 | 8,403 % | 3,967 % | 4,226 % | 7,572 % | 3,375 % | 3,208 % |
| 47 | 8,338 % | 3,978 % | 4,210 % | 7,517 % | 3,376 % | 3,212 % |
| 48 | 8,277 % | 3,988 % | 4,195 % | 7,464 % | 3,377 % | 3,216 % |
| 49 | 8,217 % | 3,998 % | 4,181 % | 7,413 % | 3,379 % | 3,220 % |
| 50 | 8,160 % | 4,007 % | 4,167 % | 7,365 % | 3,380 % | 3,224 % |
| 51 | 8,105 % | 4,016 % | 4,154 % | 7,317 % | 3,381 % | 3,228 % |
| 52 | 8,052 % | 4,025 % | 4,141 % | 7,272 % | 3,382 % | 3,232 % |
| 53 | 8,001 % | 4,034 % | 4,128 % | 7,228 % | 3,383 % | 3,236 % |
| 54 | 7,952 % | 4,042 % | 4,116 % | 7,186 % | 3,384 % | 3,239 % |
| 55 | 7,904 % | 4,050 % | 4,104 % | 7,146 % | 3,385 % | 3,243 % |
| 56 | 7,859 % | 4,058 % | 4,093 % | 7,106 % | 3,386 % | 3,246 % |
| 57 | 7,814 % | 4,065 % | 4,082 % | 7,068 % | 3,387 % | 3,250 % |
| 58 | 7,772 % | 4,073 % | 4,071 % | 7,032 % | 3,388 % | 3,253 % |
| 59 | 7,730 % | 4,080 % | 4,061 % | 6,996 % | 3,389 % | 3,256 % |
| 60 | 7,691 % | 4,086 % | 4,051 % | 6,962 % | 3,390 % | 3,259 % |
| 61 | 7,652 % | 4,093 % | 4,041 % | 6,929 % | 3,391 % | 3,262 % |
| 62 | 7,615 % | 4,099 % | 4,032 % | 6,897 % | 3,392 % | 3,265 % |
| 63 | 7,578 % | 4,106 % | 4,023 % | 6,866 % | 3,393 % | 3,268 % |
| 64 | 7,543 % | 4,112 % | 4,014 % | 6,836 % | 3,393 % | 3,270 % |
| 65 | 7,509 % | 4,117 % | 4,005 % | 6,807 % | 3,394 % | 3,273 % |
| 66 | 7,476 % | 4,123 % | 3,997 % | 6,778 % | 3,395 % | 3,276 % |
| 67 | 7,444 % | 4,129 % | 3,989 % | 6,751 % | 3,396 % | 3,278 % |
| 68 | 7,413 % | 4,134 % | 3,981 % | 6,724 % | 3,397 % | 3,281 % |
| 69 | 7,383 % | 4,139 % | 3,973 % | 6,698 % | 3,397 % | 3,283 % |
| 70 | 7,354 % | 4,144 % | 3,966 % | 6,673 % | 3,398 % | 3,285 % |
| 71 | 7,325 % | 4,149 % | 3,959 % | 6,649 % | 3,399 % | 3,288 % |
| 72 | 7,298 % | 4,154 % | 3,951 % | 6,625 % | 3,399 % | 3,290 % |
| 73 | 7,271 % | 4,159 % | 3,945 % | 6,602 % | 3,400 % | 3,292 % |
| 74 | 7,245 % | 4,163 % | 3,938 % | 6,579 % | 3,401 % | 3,294 % |
| 75 | 7,219 % | 4,168 % | 3,931 % | 6,558 % | 3,401 % | 3,296 % |
| 76 | 7,194 % | 4,172 % | 3,925 % | 6,536 % | 3,402 % | 3,298 % |
| 77 | 7,170 % | 4,176 % | 3,919 % | 6,516 % | 3,402 % | 3,300 % |
| 78 | 7,147 % | 4,180 % | 3,913 % | 6,495 % | 3,403 % | 3,302 % |
| 79 | 7,124 % | 4,184 % | 3,907 % | 6,476 % | 3,403 % | 3,304 % |
| 80 | 7,101 % | 4,188 % | 3,901 % | 6,456 % | 3,404 % | 3,306 % |
| 81 | 7,080 % | 4,192 % | 3,896 % | 6,438 % | 3,405 % | 3,307 % |
| 82 | 7,058 % | 4,196 % | 3,890 % | 6,419 % | 3,405 % | 3,309 % |
| 83 | 7,038 % | 4,200 % | 3,885 % | 6,402 % | 3,406 % | 3,311 % |
| 84 | 7,017 % | 4,203 % | 3,880 % | 6,384 % | 3,406 % | 3,312 % |
| 85 | 6,998 % | 4,207 % | 3,875 % | 6,367 % | 3,407 % | 3,314 % |
| 86 | 6,978 % | 4,210 % | 3,870 % | 6,351 % | 3,407 % | 3,316 % |
| 87 | 6,960 % | 4,213 % | 3,865 % | 6,334 % | 3,408 % | 3,317 % |
| 88 | 6,941 % | 4,217 % | 3,860 % | 6,319 % | 3,408 % | 3,319 % |
| 89 | 6,923 % | 4,220 % | 3,856 % | 6,303 % | 3,408 % | 3,320 % |
| 90 | 6,905 % | 4,223 % | 3,851 % | 6,288 % | 3,409 % | 3,322 % |
| 91 | 6,888 % | 4,226 % | 3,847 % | 6,273 % | 3,409 % | 3,323 % |
| 92 | 6,871 % | 4,229 % | 3,842 % | 6,259 % | 3,410 % | 3,324 % |
| 93 | 6,855 % | 4,232 % | 3,838 % | 6,245 % | 3,410 % | 3,326 % |
| 94 | 6,839 % | 4,235 % | 3,834 % | 6,231 % | 3,411 % | 3,327 % |
| 95 | 6,823 % | 4,237 % | 3,830 % | 6,217 % | 3,411 % | 3,328 % |
| 96 | 6,808 % | 4,240 % | 3,826 % | 6,204 % | 3,411 % | 3,330 % |
| 97 | 6,792 % | 4,243 % | 3,822 % | 6,191 % | 3,412 % | 3,331 % |
| 98 | 6,778 % | 4,245 % | 3,818 % | 6,178 % | 3,412 % | 3,332 % |
| 99 | 6,763 % | 4,248 % | 3,815 % | 6,166 % | 3,413 % | 3,333 % |
| 100 | 6,749 % | 4,250 % | 3,811 % | 6,153 % | 3,413 % | 3,334 % |
| 101 | 6,735 % | 4,253 % | 3,807 % | 6,142 % | 3,413 % | 3,335 % |
| 102 | 6,721 % | 4,255 % | 3,804 % | 6,130 % | 3,414 % | 3,337 % |
| 103 | 6,708 % | 4,258 % | 3,800 % | 6,118 % | 3,414 % | 3,338 % |
| 104 | 6,695 % | 4,260 % | 3,797 % | 6,107 % | 3,414 % | 3,339 % |
| 105 | 6,682 % | 4,262 % | 3,794 % | 6,096 % | 3,415 % | 3,340 % |
| 106 | 6,669 % | 4,265 % | 3,791 % | 6,085 % | 3,415 % | 3,341 % |
| 107 | 6,657 % | 4,267 % | 3,787 % | 6,074 % | 3,415 % | 3,342 % |
| 108 | 6,645 % | 4,269 % | 3,784 % | 6,064 % | 3,416 % | 3,343 % |
| 109 | 6,633 % | 4,271 % | 3,781 % | 6,054 % | 3,416 % | 3,344 % |
| 110 | 6,621 % | 4,273 % | 3,778 % | 6,044 % | 3,416 % | 3,345 % |
| 111 | 6,609 % | 4,275 % | 3,775 % | 6,034 % | 3,417 % | 3,346 % |
| 112 | 6,598 % | 4,277 % | 3,772 % | 6,024 % | 3,417 % | 3,347 % |
| 113 | 6,587 % | 4,279 % | 3,769 % | 6,014 % | 3,417 % | 3,348 % |
| 114 | 6,576 % | 4,281 % | 3,767 % | 6,005 % | 3,417 % | 3,349 % |
| 115 | 6,565 % | 4,283 % | 3,764 % | 5,996 % | 3,418 % | 3,349 % |
| 116 | 6,555 % | 4,285 % | 3,761 % | 5,987 % | 3,418 % | 3,350 % |
| 117 | 6,545 % | 4,287 % | 3,758 % | 5,978 % | 3,418 % | 3,351 % |
| 118 | 6,534 % | 4,288 % | 3,756 % | 5,969 % | 3,418 % | 3,352 % |
| 119 | 6,524 % | 4,290 % | 3,753 % | 5,960 % | 3,419 % | 3,353 % |
| 120 | 6,514 % | 4,292 % | 3,751 % | 5,952 % | 3,419 % | 3,354 % |
| 121 | 6,505 % | 4,294 % | 3,748 % | 5,944 % | 3,419 % | 3,354 % |
| 122 | 6,495 % | 4,295 % | 3,746 % | 5,935 % | 3,420 % | 3,355 % |
| 123 | 6,486 % | 4,297 % | 3,743 % | 5,927 % | 3,420 % | 3,356 % |
| 124 | 6,477 % | 4,299 % | 3,741 % | 5,919 % | 3,420 % | 3,357 % |
| 125 | 6,468 % | 4,300 % | 3,739 % | 5,912 % | 3,420 % | 3,357 % |
| 126 | 6,459 % | 4,302 % | 3,736 % | 5,904 % | 3,420 % | 3,358 % |
| 127 | 6,450 % | 4,303 % | 3,734 % | 5,896 % | 3,421 % | 3,359 % |
| 128 | 6,441 % | 4,305 % | 3,732 % | 5,889 % | 3,421 % | 3,360 % |
| 129 | 6,433 % | 4,306 % | 3,730 % | 5,882 % | 3,421 % | 3,360 % |
| 130 | 6,424 % | 4,308 % | 3,728 % | 5,875 % | 3,421 % | 3,361 % |
| 131 | 6,416 % | 4,309 % | 3,725 % | 5,867 % | 3,422 % | 3,362 % |
| 132 | 6,408 % | 4,311 % | 3,723 % | 5,860 % | 3,422 % | 3,362 % |
| 133 | 6,400 % | 4,312 % | 3,721 % | 5,854 % | 3,422 % | 3,363 % |
| 134 | 6,392 % | 4,314 % | 3,719 % | 5,847 % | 3,422 % | 3,364 % |
| 135 | 6,384 % | 4,315 % | 3,717 % | 5,840 % | 3,422 % | 3,364 % |
| 136 | 6,377 % | 4,316 % | 3,715 % | 5,834 % | 3,423 % | 3,365 % |
| 137 | 6,369 % | 4,318 % | 3,713 % | 5,827 % | 3,423 % | 3,366 % |
| 138 | 6,362 % | 4,319 % | 3,711 % | 5,821 % | 3,423 % | 3,366 % |
| 139 | 6,355 % | 4,320 % | 3,710 % | 5,814 % | 3,423 % | 3,367 % |
| 140 | 6,347 % | 4,322 % | 3,708 % | 5,808 % | 3,423 % | 3,367 % |
| 141 | 6,340 % | 4,323 % | 3,706 % | 5,802 % | 3,424 % | 3,368 % |
| 142 | 6,333 % | 4,324 % | 3,704 % | 5,796 % | 3,424 % | 3,369 % |
| 143 | 6,326 % | 4,325 % | 3,702 % | 5,790 % | 3,424 % | 3,369 % |
| 144 | 6,320 % | 4,327 % | 3,701 % | 5,784 % | 3,424 % | 3,370 % |
| 145 | 6,313 % | 4,328 % | 3,699 % | 5,779 % | 3,424 % | 3,370 % |
| 146 | 6,306 % | 4,329 % | 3,697 % | 5,773 % | 3,424 % | 3,371 % |
| 147 | 6,300 % | 4,330 % | 3,695 % | 5,767 % | 3,425 % | 3,371 % |
| 148 | 6,293 % | 4,331 % | 3,694 % | 5,762 % | 3,425 % | 3,372 % |
| 149 | 6,287 % | 4,332 % | 3,692 % | 5,756 % | 3,425 % | 3,372 % |
| 150 | 6,281 % | 4,334 % | 3,691 % | 5,751 % | 3,425 % | 3,373 % |

Term to maturity (in years)

Real

Renminbi-yuan

Ringgit

Russian rouble

Singapore dollar

South Korean won

1

13,115 %

2,097 %

3,367 %

10,194 %

4,156 %

3,921 %

2

12,615 %

2,292 %

3,595 %

8,858 %

3,717 %

3,769 %

3

12,526 %

2,458 %

3,705 %

8,718 %

3,537 %

3,647 %

4

12,550 %

2,595 %

3,791 %

8,990 %

3,448 %

3,584 %

5

12,607 %

2,701 %

3,864 %

9,351 %

3,391 %

3,525 %

6

12,655 %

2,784 %

3,924 %

9,696 %

3,352 %

3,482 %

7

12,690 %

2,854 %

3,972 %

9,994 %

3,324 %

3,456 %

8

12,722 %

2,916 %

4,016 %

10,248 %

3,305 %

3,444 %

9

12,733 %

2,974 %

4,052 %

10,433 %

3,291 %

3,434 %

10

12,746 %

3,028 %

4,090 %

10,564 %

3,283 %

3,419 %

11

12,719 %

3,081 %

4,131 %

10,645 %

3,280 %

3,394 %

12

12,649 %

3,131 %

4,175 %

10,683 %

3,280 %

3,364 %

13

12,547 %

3,180 %

4,221 %

10,683 %

3,281 %

3,330 %

14

12,421 %

3,226 %

4,270 %

10,651 %

3,284 %

3,297 %

15

12,278 %

3,270 %

4,322 %

10,591 %

3,289 %

3,265 %

16

12,122 %

3,312 %

4,378 %

10,508 %

3,293 %

3,235 %

17

11,959 %

3,352 %

4,434 %

10,410 %

3,298 %

3,208 %

18

11,789 %

3,390 %

4,486 %

10,300 %

3,303 %

3,185 %

19

11,617 %

3,426 %

4,531 %

10,181 %

3,308 %

3,165 %

20

11,445 %

3,461 %

4,567 %

10,057 %

3,312 %

3,150 %

21

11,273 %

3,493 %

4,590 %

9,930 %

3,317 %

3,139 %

22

11,103 %

3,524 %

4,603 %

9,801 %

3,321 %

3,131 %

23

10,937 %

3,554 %

4,608 %

9,673 %

3,324 %

3,126 %

24

10,774 %

3,582 %

4,607 %

9,545 %

3,328 %

3,123 %

25

10,616 %

3,609 %

4,601 %

9,419 %

3,331 %

3,122 %

26

10,463 %

3,635 %

4,591 %

9,296 %

3,334 %

3,122 %

27

10,315 %

3,659 %

4,577 %

9,176 %

3,337 %

3,124 %

28

10,172 %

3,682 %

4,562 %

9,059 %

3,340 %

3,126 %

29

10,035 %

3,705 %

4,544 %

8,946 %

3,343 %

3,129 %

30

9,902 %

3,726 %

4,526 %

8,837 %

3,345 %

3,133 %

31

9,776 %

3,746 %

4,506 %

8,732 %

3,348 %

3,137 %

32

9,654 %

3,766 %

4,486 %

8,631 %

3,350 %

3,141 %

33

9,538 %

3,784 %

4,466 %

8,533 %

3,352 %

3,146 %

34

9,426 %

3,802 %

4,446 %

8,440 %

3,355 %

3,150 %

35

9,319 %

3,819 %

4,425 %

8,350 %

3,357 %

3,155 %

36

9,217 %

3,835 %

4,405 %

8,263 %

3,359 %

3,160 %

37

9,119 %

3,851 %

4,385 %

8,181 %

3,361 %

3,165 %

38

9,025 %

3,866 %

4,366 %

8,101 %

3,362 %

3,170 %

39

8,935 %

3,881 %

4,346 %

8,025 %

3,364 %

3,175 %

40

8,849 %

3,894 %

4,328 %

7,952 %

3,366 %

3,180 %

41

8,767 %

3,908 %

4,309 %

7,882 %

3,367 %

3,185 %

42

8,688 %

3,921 %

4,292 %

7,815 %

3,369 %

3,190 %

43

8,612 %

3,933 %

4,274 %

7,750 %

3,371 %

3,194 %

44

8,539 %

3,945 %

4,258 %

7,688 %

3,372 %

3,199 %

45

8,470 %

3,956 %

4,241 %

7,629 %

3,373 %

3,203 %

46

8,403 %

3,967 %

4,226 %

7,572 %

3,375 %

3,208 %

47

8,338 %

3,978 %

4,210 %

7,517 %

3,376 %

3,212 %

48

8,277 %

3,988 %

4,195 %

7,464 %

3,377 %

3,216 %

49

8,217 %

3,998 %

4,181 %

7,413 %

3,379 %

3,220 %

50

8,160 %

4,007 %

4,167 %

7,365 %

3,380 %

3,224 %

51

8,105 %

4,016 %

4,154 %

7,317 %

3,381 %

3,228 %

52

8,052 %

4,025 %

4,141 %

7,272 %

3,382 %

3,232 %

53

8,001 %

4,034 %

4,128 %

7,228 %

3,383 %

3,236 %

54

7,952 %

4,042 %

4,116 %

7,186 %

3,384 %

3,239 %

55

7,904 %

4,050 %

4,104 %

7,146 %

3,385 %

3,243 %

56

7,859 %

4,058 %

4,093 %

7,106 %

3,386 %

3,246 %

57

7,814 %

4,065 %

4,082 %

7,068 %

3,387 %

3,250 %

58

7,772 %

4,073 %

4,071 %

7,032 %

3,388 %

3,253 %

59

7,730 %

4,080 %

4,061 %

6,996 %

3,389 %

3,256 %

60

7,691 %

4,086 %

4,051 %

6,962 %

3,390 %

3,259 %

61

7,652 %

4,093 %

4,041 %

6,929 %

3,391 %

3,262 %

62

7,615 %

4,099 %

4,032 %

6,897 %

3,392 %

3,265 %

63

7,578 %

4,106 %

4,023 %

6,866 %

3,393 %

3,268 %

64

7,543 %

4,112 %

4,014 %

6,836 %

3,393 %

3,270 %

65

7,509 %

4,117 %

4,005 %

6,807 %

3,394 %

3,273 %

66

7,476 %

4,123 %

3,997 %

6,778 %

3,395 %

3,276 %

67

7,444 %

4,129 %

3,989 %

6,751 %

3,396 %

3,278 %

68

7,413 %

4,134 %

3,981 %

6,724 %

3,397 %

3,281 %

69

7,383 %

4,139 %

3,973 %

6,698 %

3,397 %

3,283 %

70

7,354 %

4,144 %

3,966 %

6,673 %

3,398 %

3,285 %

71

7,325 %

4,149 %

3,959 %

6,649 %

3,399 %

3,288 %

72

7,298 %

4,154 %

3,951 %

6,625 %

3,399 %

3,290 %

73

7,271 %

4,159 %

3,945 %

6,602 %

3,400 %

3,292 %

74

7,245 %

4,163 %

3,938 %

6,579 %

3,401 %

3,294 %

75

7,219 %

4,168 %

3,931 %

6,558 %

3,401 %

3,296 %

76

7,194 %

4,172 %

3,925 %

6,536 %

3,402 %

3,298 %

77

7,170 %

4,176 %

3,919 %

6,516 %

3,402 %

3,300 %

78

7,147 %

4,180 %

3,913 %

6,495 %

3,403 %

3,302 %

79

7,124 %

4,184 %

3,907 %

6,476 %

3,403 %

3,304 %

80

7,101 %

4,188 %

3,901 %

6,456 %

3,404 %

3,306 %

81

7,080 %

4,192 %

3,896 %

6,438 %

3,405 %

3,307 %

82

7,058 %

4,196 %

3,890 %

6,419 %

3,405 %

3,309 %

83

7,038 %

4,200 %

3,885 %

6,402 %

3,406 %

3,311 %

84

7,017 %

4,203 %

3,880 %

6,384 %

3,406 %

3,312 %

85

6,998 %

4,207 %

3,875 %

6,367 %

3,407 %

3,314 %

86

6,978 %

4,210 %

3,870 %

6,351 %

3,407 %

3,316 %

87

6,960 %

4,213 %

3,865 %

6,334 %

3,408 %

3,317 %

88

6,941 %

4,217 %

3,860 %

6,319 %

3,408 %

3,319 %

89

6,923 %

4,220 %

3,856 %

6,303 %

3,408 %

3,320 %

90

6,905 %

4,223 %

3,851 %

6,288 %

3,409 %

3,322 %

91

6,888 %

4,226 %

3,847 %

6,273 %

3,409 %

3,323 %

92

6,871 %

4,229 %

3,842 %

6,259 %

3,410 %

3,324 %

93

6,855 %

4,232 %

3,838 %

6,245 %

3,410 %

3,326 %

94

6,839 %

4,235 %

3,834 %

6,231 %

3,411 %

3,327 %

95

6,823 %

4,237 %

3,830 %

6,217 %

3,411 %

3,328 %

96

6,808 %

4,240 %

3,826 %

6,204 %

3,411 %

3,330 %

97

6,792 %

4,243 %

3,822 %

6,191 %

3,412 %

3,331 %

98

6,778 %

4,245 %

3,818 %

6,178 %

3,412 %

3,332 %

99

6,763 %

4,248 %

3,815 %

6,166 %

3,413 %

3,333 %

100

6,749 %

4,250 %

3,811 %

6,153 %

3,413 %

3,334 %

101

6,735 %

4,253 %

3,807 %

6,142 %

3,413 %

3,335 %

102

6,721 %

4,255 %

3,804 %

6,130 %

3,414 %

3,337 %

103

6,708 %

4,258 %

3,800 %

6,118 %

3,414 %

3,338 %

104

6,695 %

4,260 %

3,797 %

6,107 %

3,414 %

3,339 %

105

6,682 %

4,262 %

3,794 %

6,096 %

3,415 %

3,340 %

106

6,669 %

4,265 %

3,791 %

6,085 %

3,415 %

3,341 %

107

6,657 %

4,267 %

3,787 %

6,074 %

3,415 %

3,342 %

108

6,645 %

4,269 %

3,784 %

6,064 %

3,416 %

3,343 %

109

6,633 %

4,271 %

3,781 %

6,054 %

3,416 %

3,344 %

110

6,621 %

4,273 %

3,778 %

6,044 %

3,416 %

3,345 %

111

6,609 %

4,275 %

3,775 %

6,034 %

3,417 %

3,346 %

112

6,598 %

4,277 %

3,772 %

6,024 %

3,417 %

3,347 %

113

6,587 %

4,279 %

3,769 %

6,014 %

3,417 %

3,348 %

114

6,576 %

4,281 %

3,767 %

6,005 %

3,417 %

3,349 %

115

6,565 %

4,283 %

3,764 %

5,996 %

3,418 %

3,349 %

116

6,555 %

4,285 %

3,761 %

5,987 %

3,418 %

3,350 %

117

6,545 %

4,287 %

3,758 %

5,978 %

3,418 %

3,351 %

118

6,534 %

4,288 %

3,756 %

5,969 %

3,418 %

3,352 %

119

6,524 %

4,290 %

3,753 %

5,960 %

3,419 %

3,353 %

120

6,514 %

4,292 %

3,751 %

5,952 %

3,419 %

3,354 %

121

6,505 %

4,294 %

3,748 %

5,944 %

3,419 %

3,354 %

122

6,495 %

4,295 %

3,746 %

5,935 %

3,420 %

3,355 %

123

6,486 %

4,297 %

3,743 %

5,927 %

3,420 %

3,356 %

124

6,477 %

4,299 %

3,741 %

5,919 %

3,420 %

3,357 %

125

6,468 %

4,300 %

3,739 %

5,912 %

3,420 %

3,357 %

126

6,459 %

4,302 %

3,736 %

5,904 %

3,420 %

3,358 %

127

6,450 %

4,303 %

3,734 %

5,896 %

3,421 %

3,359 %

128

6,441 %

4,305 %

3,732 %

5,889 %

3,421 %

3,360 %

129

6,433 %

4,306 %

3,730 %

5,882 %

3,421 %

3,360 %

130

6,424 %

4,308 %

3,728 %

5,875 %

3,421 %

3,361 %

131

6,416 %

4,309 %

3,725 %

5,867 %

3,422 %

3,362 %

132

6,408 %

4,311 %

3,723 %

5,860 %

3,422 %

3,362 %

133

6,400 %

4,312 %

3,721 %

5,854 %

3,422 %

3,363 %

134

6,392 %

4,314 %

3,719 %

5,847 %

3,422 %

3,364 %

135

6,384 %

4,315 %

3,717 %

5,840 %

3,422 %

3,364 %

136

6,377 %

4,316 %

3,715 %

5,834 %

3,423 %

3,365 %

137

6,369 %

4,318 %

3,713 %

5,827 %

3,423 %

3,366 %

138

6,362 %

4,319 %

3,711 %

5,821 %

3,423 %

3,366 %

139

6,355 %

4,320 %

3,710 %

5,814 %

3,423 %

3,367 %

140

6,347 %

4,322 %

3,708 %

5,808 %

3,423 %

3,367 %

141

6,340 %

4,323 %

3,706 %

5,802 %

3,424 %

3,368 %

142

6,333 %

4,324 %

3,704 %

5,796 %

3,424 %

3,369 %

143

6,326 %

4,325 %

3,702 %

5,790 %

3,424 %

3,369 %

144

6,320 %

4,327 %

3,701 %

5,784 %

3,424 %

3,370 %

145

6,313 %

4,328 %

3,699 %

5,779 %

3,424 %

3,370 %

146

6,306 %

4,329 %

3,697 %

5,773 %

3,424 %

3,371 %

147

6,300 %

4,330 %

3,695 %

5,767 %

3,425 %

3,371 %

148

6,293 %

4,331 %

3,694 %

5,762 %

3,425 %

3,372 %

149

6,287 %

4,332 %

3,692 %

5,756 %

3,425 %

3,372 %

150

6,281 %

4,334 %

3,691 %

5,751 %

3,425 %

3,373 %

| Term to maturity (in years) | Turkish lira | US dollar | Yen |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 12,324 % | 5,074 % | -0,102 % |
| 2 | 9,703 % | 4,658 % | -0,068 % |
| 3 | 8,788 % | 4,259 % | -0,025 % |
| 4 | 8,474 % | 4,048 % | 0,061 % |
| 5 | 8,461 % | 3,949 % | 0,162 % |
| 6 | 8,630 % | 3,878 % | 0,254 % |
| 7 | 8,952 % | 3,822 % | 0,325 % |
| 8 | 9,362 % | 3,783 % | 0,377 % |
| 9 | 9,840 % | 3,742 % | 0,426 % |
| 10 | 10,213 % | 3,749 % | 0,491 % |
| 11 | 10,466 % | 3,744 % | 0,578 % |
| 12 | 10,630 % | 3,728 % | 0,679 % |
| 13 | 10,724 % | 3,717 % | 0,784 % |
| 14 | 10,766 % | 3,711 % | 0,882 % |
| 15 | 10,767 % | 3,706 % | 0,971 % |
| 16 | 10,736 % | 3,699 % | 1,048 % |
| 17 | 10,680 % | 3,689 % | 1,115 % |
| 18 | 10,606 % | 3,674 % | 1,172 % |
| 19 | 10,517 % | 3,654 % | 1,221 % |
| 20 | 10,419 % | 3,627 % | 1,263 % |
| 21 | 10,313 % | 3,593 % | 1,302 % |
| 22 | 10,202 % | 3,556 % | 1,338 % |
| 23 | 10,089 % | 3,517 % | 1,371 % |
| 24 | 9,974 % | 3,480 % | 1,402 % |
| 25 | 9,859 % | 3,444 % | 1,430 % |
| 26 | 9,745 % | 3,411 % | 1,456 % |
| 27 | 9,633 % | 3,379 % | 1,480 % |
| 28 | 9,523 % | 3,346 % | 1,504 % |
| 29 | 9,416 % | 3,310 % | 1,529 % |
| 30 | 9,312 % | 3,270 % | 1,556 % |
| 31 | 9,211 % | 3,225 % | 1,585 % |
| 32 | 9,114 % | 3,177 % | 1,617 % |
| 33 | 9,020 % | 3,127 % | 1,649 % |
| 34 | 8,929 % | 3,077 % | 1,682 % |
| 35 | 8,842 % | 3,028 % | 1,716 % |
| 36 | 8,758 % | 2,981 % | 1,750 % |
| 37 | 8,677 % | 2,936 % | 1,783 % |
| 38 | 8,600 % | 2,893 % | 1,817 % |
| 39 | 8,525 % | 2,854 % | 1,850 % |
| 40 | 8,454 % | 2,817 % | 1,882 % |
| 41 | 8,385 % | 2,784 % | 1,914 % |
| 42 | 8,319 % | 2,754 % | 1,945 % |
| 43 | 8,256 % | 2,727 % | 1,975 % |
| 44 | 8,195 % | 2,703 % | 2,004 % |
| 45 | 8,137 % | 2,683 % | 2,033 % |
| 46 | 8,081 % | 2,665 % | 2,061 % |
| 47 | 8,027 % | 2,650 % | 2,088 % |
| 48 | 7,975 % | 2,638 % | 2,115 % |
| 49 | 7,925 % | 2,630 % | 2,140 % |
| 50 | 7,877 % | 2,623 % | 2,165 % |
| 51 | 7,831 % | 2,620 % | 2,189 % |
| 52 | 7,786 % | 2,619 % | 2,213 % |
| 53 | 7,743 % | 2,620 % | 2,235 % |
| 54 | 7,702 % | 2,623 % | 2,257 % |
| 55 | 7,662 % | 2,626 % | 2,279 % |
| 56 | 7,623 % | 2,631 % | 2,299 % |
| 57 | 7,586 % | 2,637 % | 2,319 % |
| 58 | 7,550 % | 2,644 % | 2,339 % |
| 59 | 7,515 % | 2,651 % | 2,358 % |
| 60 | 7,481 % | 2,658 % | 2,376 % |
| 61 | 7,449 % | 2,666 % | 2,394 % |
| 62 | 7,417 % | 2,675 % | 2,411 % |
| 63 | 7,387 % | 2,683 % | 2,428 % |
| 64 | 7,357 % | 2,692 % | 2,444 % |
| 65 | 7,328 % | 2,701 % | 2,460 % |
| 66 | 7,300 % | 2,709 % | 2,476 % |
| 67 | 7,273 % | 2,718 % | 2,491 % |
| 68 | 7,247 % | 2,727 % | 2,505 % |
| 69 | 7,222 % | 2,736 % | 2,519 % |
| 70 | 7,197 % | 2,744 % | 2,533 % |
| 71 | 7,173 % | 2,753 % | 2,547 % |
| 72 | 7,149 % | 2,761 % | 2,560 % |
| 73 | 7,127 % | 2,770 % | 2,572 % |
| 74 | 7,104 % | 2,778 % | 2,585 % |
| 75 | 7,083 % | 2,786 % | 2,597 % |
| 76 | 7,062 % | 2,794 % | 2,609 % |
| 77 | 7,042 % | 2,802 % | 2,620 % |
| 78 | 7,022 % | 2,810 % | 2,631 % |
| 79 | 7,002 % | 2,817 % | 2,642 % |
| 80 | 6,983 % | 2,825 % | 2,653 % |
| 81 | 6,965 % | 2,832 % | 2,663 % |
| 82 | 6,947 % | 2,839 % | 2,673 % |
| 83 | 6,929 % | 2,846 % | 2,683 % |
| 84 | 6,912 % | 2,853 % | 2,693 % |
| 85 | 6,896 % | 2,860 % | 2,702 % |
| 86 | 6,879 % | 2,867 % | 2,712 % |
| 87 | 6,863 % | 2,873 % | 2,721 % |
| 88 | 6,848 % | 2,879 % | 2,729 % |
| 89 | 6,832 % | 2,886 % | 2,738 % |
| 90 | 6,818 % | 2,892 % | 2,746 % |
| 91 | 6,803 % | 2,898 % | 2,755 % |
| 92 | 6,789 % | 2,904 % | 2,763 % |
| 93 | 6,775 % | 2,909 % | 2,771 % |
| 94 | 6,761 % | 2,915 % | 2,778 % |
| 95 | 6,748 % | 2,921 % | 2,786 % |
| 96 | 6,735 % | 2,926 % | 2,793 % |
| 97 | 6,722 % | 2,931 % | 2,801 % |
| 98 | 6,709 % | 2,937 % | 2,808 % |
| 99 | 6,697 % | 2,942 % | 2,815 % |
| 100 | 6,685 % | 2,947 % | 2,821 % |
| 101 | 6,673 % | 2,952 % | 2,828 % |
| 102 | 6,662 % | 2,957 % | 2,835 % |
| 103 | 6,650 % | 2,961 % | 2,841 % |
| 104 | 6,639 % | 2,966 % | 2,847 % |
| 105 | 6,628 % | 2,971 % | 2,854 % |
| 106 | 6,618 % | 2,975 % | 2,860 % |
| 107 | 6,607 % | 2,980 % | 2,866 % |
| 108 | 6,597 % | 2,984 % | 2,872 % |
| 109 | 6,587 % | 2,988 % | 2,877 % |
| 110 | 6,577 % | 2,992 % | 2,883 % |
| 111 | 6,567 % | 2,996 % | 2,888 % |
| 112 | 6,557 % | 3,000 % | 2,894 % |
| 113 | 6,548 % | 3,004 % | 2,899 % |
| 114 | 6,539 % | 3,008 % | 2,905 % |
| 115 | 6,530 % | 3,012 % | 2,910 % |
| 116 | 6,521 % | 3,016 % | 2,915 % |
| 117 | 6,512 % | 3,020 % | 2,920 % |
| 118 | 6,503 % | 3,023 % | 2,925 % |
| 119 | 6,495 % | 3,027 % | 2,929 % |
| 120 | 6,487 % | 3,030 % | 2,934 % |
| 121 | 6,478 % | 3,034 % | 2,939 % |
| 122 | 6,470 % | 3,037 % | 2,943 % |
| 123 | 6,462 % | 3,041 % | 2,948 % |
| 124 | 6,455 % | 3,044 % | 2,952 % |
| 125 | 6,447 % | 3,047 % | 2,957 % |
| 126 | 6,439 % | 3,050 % | 2,961 % |
| 127 | 6,432 % | 3,053 % | 2,965 % |
| 128 | 6,425 % | 3,056 % | 2,970 % |
| 129 | 6,418 % | 3,060 % | 2,974 % |
| 130 | 6,410 % | 3,063 % | 2,978 % |
| 131 | 6,403 % | 3,065 % | 2,982 % |
| 132 | 6,397 % | 3,068 % | 2,986 % |
| 133 | 6,390 % | 3,071 % | 2,989 % |
| 134 | 6,383 % | 3,074 % | 2,993 % |
| 135 | 6,377 % | 3,077 % | 2,997 % |
| 136 | 6,370 % | 3,080 % | 3,001 % |
| 137 | 6,364 % | 3,082 % | 3,004 % |
| 138 | 6,357 % | 3,085 % | 3,008 % |
| 139 | 6,351 % | 3,088 % | 3,011 % |
| 140 | 6,345 % | 3,090 % | 3,015 % |
| 141 | 6,339 % | 3,093 % | 3,018 % |
| 142 | 6,333 % | 3,095 % | 3,022 % |
| 143 | 6,327 % | 3,098 % | 3,025 % |
| 144 | 6,322 % | 3,100 % | 3,028 % |
| 145 | 6,316 % | 3,103 % | 3,032 % |
| 146 | 6,310 % | 3,105 % | 3,035 % |
| 147 | 6,305 % | 3,107 % | 3,038 % |
| 148 | 6,299 % | 3,110 % | 3,041 % |
| 149 | 6,294 % | 3,112 % | 3,044 % |
| 150 | 6,289 % | 3,114 % | 3,047 % |

Term to maturity (in years)

Turkish lira

US dollar

Yen

1

12,324 %

5,074 %

-0,102 %

2

9,703 %

4,658 %

-0,068 %

3

8,788 %

4,259 %

-0,025 %

4

8,474 %

4,048 %

0,061 %

5

8,461 %

3,949 %

0,162 %

6

8,630 %

3,878 %

0,254 %

7

8,952 %

3,822 %

0,325 %

8

9,362 %

3,783 %

0,377 %

9

9,840 %

3,742 %

0,426 %

10

10,213 %

3,749 %

0,491 %

11

10,466 %

3,744 %

0,578 %

12

10,630 %

3,728 %

0,679 %

13

10,724 %

3,717 %

0,784 %

14

10,766 %

3,711 %

0,882 %

15

10,767 %

3,706 %

0,971 %

16

10,736 %

3,699 %

1,048 %

17

10,680 %

3,689 %

1,115 %

18

10,606 %

3,674 %

1,172 %

19

10,517 %

3,654 %

1,221 %

20

10,419 %

3,627 %

1,263 %

21

10,313 %

3,593 %

1,302 %

22

10,202 %

3,556 %

1,338 %

23

10,089 %

3,517 %

1,371 %

24

9,974 %

3,480 %

1,402 %

25

9,859 %

3,444 %

1,430 %

26

9,745 %

3,411 %

1,456 %

27

9,633 %

3,379 %

1,480 %

28

9,523 %

3,346 %

1,504 %

29

9,416 %

3,310 %

1,529 %

30

9,312 %

3,270 %

1,556 %

31

9,211 %

3,225 %

1,585 %

32

9,114 %

3,177 %

1,617 %

33

9,020 %

3,127 %

1,649 %

34

8,929 %

3,077 %

1,682 %

35

8,842 %

3,028 %

1,716 %

36

8,758 %

2,981 %

1,750 %

37

8,677 %

2,936 %

1,783 %

38

8,600 %

2,893 %

1,817 %

39

8,525 %

2,854 %

1,850 %

40

8,454 %

2,817 %

1,882 %

41

8,385 %

2,784 %

1,914 %

42

8,319 %

2,754 %

1,945 %

43

8,256 %

2,727 %

1,975 %

44

8,195 %

2,703 %

2,004 %

45

8,137 %

2,683 %

2,033 %

46

8,081 %

2,665 %

2,061 %

47

8,027 %

2,650 %

2,088 %

48

7,975 %

2,638 %

2,115 %

49

7,925 %

2,630 %

2,140 %

50

7,877 %

2,623 %

2,165 %

51

7,831 %

2,620 %

2,189 %

52

7,786 %

2,619 %

2,213 %

53

7,743 %

2,620 %

2,235 %

54

7,702 %

2,623 %

2,257 %

55

7,662 %

2,626 %

2,279 %

56

7,623 %

2,631 %

2,299 %

57

7,586 %

2,637 %

2,319 %

58

7,550 %

2,644 %

2,339 %

59

7,515 %

2,651 %

2,358 %

60

7,481 %

2,658 %

2,376 %

61

7,449 %

2,666 %

2,394 %

62

7,417 %

2,675 %

2,411 %

63

7,387 %

2,683 %

2,428 %

64

7,357 %

2,692 %

2,444 %

65

7,328 %

2,701 %

2,460 %

66

7,300 %

2,709 %

2,476 %

67

7,273 %

2,718 %

2,491 %

68

7,247 %

2,727 %

2,505 %

69

7,222 %

2,736 %

2,519 %

70

7,197 %

2,744 %

2,533 %

71

7,173 %

2,753 %

2,547 %

72

7,149 %

2,761 %

2,560 %

73

7,127 %

2,770 %

2,572 %

74

7,104 %

2,778 %

2,585 %

75

7,083 %

2,786 %

2,597 %

76

7,062 %

2,794 %

2,609 %

77

7,042 %

2,802 %

2,620 %

78

7,022 %

2,810 %

2,631 %

79

7,002 %

2,817 %

2,642 %

80

6,983 %

2,825 %

2,653 %

81

6,965 %

2,832 %

2,663 %

82

6,947 %

2,839 %

2,673 %

83

6,929 %

2,846 %

2,683 %

84

6,912 %

2,853 %

2,693 %

85

6,896 %

2,860 %

2,702 %

86

6,879 %

2,867 %

2,712 %

87

6,863 %

2,873 %

2,721 %

88

6,848 %

2,879 %

2,729 %

89

6,832 %

2,886 %

2,738 %

90

6,818 %

2,892 %

2,746 %

91

6,803 %

2,898 %

2,755 %

92

6,789 %

2,904 %

2,763 %

93

6,775 %

2,909 %

2,771 %

94

6,761 %

2,915 %

2,778 %

95

6,748 %

2,921 %

2,786 %

96

6,735 %

2,926 %

2,793 %

97

6,722 %

2,931 %

2,801 %

98

6,709 %

2,937 %

2,808 %

99

6,697 %

2,942 %

2,815 %

100

6,685 %

2,947 %

2,821 %

101

6,673 %

2,952 %

2,828 %

102

6,662 %

2,957 %

2,835 %

103

6,650 %

2,961 %

2,841 %

104

6,639 %

2,966 %

2,847 %

105

6,628 %

2,971 %

2,854 %

106

6,618 %

2,975 %

2,860 %

107

6,607 %

2,980 %

2,866 %

108

6,597 %

2,984 %

2,872 %

109

6,587 %

2,988 %

2,877 %

110

6,577 %

2,992 %

2,883 %

111

6,567 %

2,996 %

2,888 %

112

6,557 %

3,000 %

2,894 %

113

6,548 %

3,004 %

2,899 %

114

6,539 %

3,008 %

2,905 %

115

6,530 %

3,012 %

2,910 %

116

6,521 %

3,016 %

2,915 %

117

6,512 %

3,020 %

2,920 %

118

6,503 %

3,023 %

2,925 %

119

6,495 %

3,027 %

2,929 %

120

6,487 %

3,030 %

2,934 %

121

6,478 %

3,034 %

2,939 %

122

6,470 %

3,037 %

2,943 %

123

6,462 %

3,041 %

2,948 %

124

6,455 %

3,044 %

2,952 %

125

6,447 %

3,047 %

2,957 %

126

6,439 %

3,050 %

2,961 %

127

6,432 %

3,053 %

2,965 %

128

6,425 %

3,056 %

2,970 %

129

6,418 %

3,060 %

2,974 %

130

6,410 %

3,063 %

2,978 %

131

6,403 %

3,065 %

2,982 %

132

6,397 %

3,068 %

2,986 %

133

6,390 %

3,071 %

2,989 %

134

6,383 %

3,074 %

2,993 %

135

6,377 %

3,077 %

2,997 %

136

6,370 %

3,080 %

3,001 %

137

6,364 %

3,082 %

3,004 %

138

6,357 %

3,085 %

3,008 %

139

6,351 %

3,088 %

3,011 %

140

6,345 %

3,090 %

3,015 %

141

6,339 %

3,093 %

3,018 %

142

6,333 %

3,095 %

3,022 %

143

6,327 %

3,098 %

3,025 %

144

6,322 %

3,100 %

3,028 %

145

6,316 %

3,103 %

3,032 %

146

6,310 %

3,105 %

3,035 %

147

6,305 %

3,107 %

3,038 %

148

6,299 %

3,110 %

3,041 %

149

6,294 %

3,112 %

3,044 %

150

6,289 %

3,114 %

3,047 %

---

ANNEX II

Fundamental spreads for the calculation of the matching adjustment

The fundamental spreads set out in this Annex are expressed in basis points and do not include any increase in accordance with Article 77c(1)(c) of Directive 2009/138/EC.

1.   Exposures to central governments and central banks

The fundamental spreads apply to exposures denominated in all currencies.

The fundamental spreads for durations from 11 to 30 years are equal to the fundamental spreads for duration 10 years.

| Duration (in years) | Austria | Belgium | Bulgaria | Croatia | Czech Republic | Cyprus | Denmark |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 28 | 5 | 0 | 22 | 0 |
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 5 | 0 | 36 | 0 |
| 3 | 0 | 0 | 41 | 5 | 0 | 41 | 0 |
| 4 | 0 | 1 | 44 | 5 | 2 | 43 | 0 |
| 5 | 0 | 3 | 48 | 5 | 3 | 46 | 0 |
| 6 | 0 | 4 | 50 | 5 | 5 | 48 | 0 |
| 7 | 1 | 4 | 53 | 5 | 8 | 50 | 0 |
| 8 | 2 | 6 | 55 | 4 | 10 | 50 | 0 |
| 9 | 2 | 7 | 56 | 5 | 11 | 47 | 0 |
| 10 | 3 | 7 | 58 | 5 | 12 | 47 | 0 |

Duration (in years)

Austria

Belgium

Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech Republic

Cyprus

Denmark

1

0

0

28

5

0

22

0

2

0

0

36

5

0

36

0

3

0

0

41

5

0

41

0

4

0

1

44

5

2

43

0

5

0

3

48

5

3

46

0

6

0

4

50

5

5

48

0

7

1

4

53

5

8

50

0

8

2

6

55

4

10

50

0

9

2

7

56

5

11

47

0

10

3

7

58

5

12

47

0

| Duration (in years) | Estonia | Finland | France | Germany | Greece | Hungary | Ireland |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 354 | 4 | 14 |
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 221 | 4 | 19 |
| 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 197 | 4 | 22 |
| 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 173 | 4 | 23 |
| 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 159 | 4 | 24 |
| 6 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 156 | 4 | 25 |
| 7 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 154 | 4 | 26 |
| 8 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 158 | 3 | 27 |
| 9 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 160 | 1 | 27 |
| 10 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 162 | 4 | 28 |

Duration (in years)

Estonia

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Ireland

1

0

0

0

0

354

4

14

2

0

0

0

0

221

4

19

3

0

0

0

0

197

4

22

4

1

0

0

0

173

4

23

5

3

0

0

0

159

4

24

6

4

0

0

0

156

4

25

7

4

0

0

0

154

4

26

8

6

0

1

0

158

3

27

9

7

0

2

0

160

1

27

10

7

0

3

0

162

4

28

| Duration (in years) | Italy | Latvia | Lithuania | Luxembourg | Malta | Netherlands | Poland |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 4 |
| 2 | 14 | 9 | 10 | 0 | 19 | 0 | 4 |
| 3 | 18 | 12 | 13 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 4 |
| 4 | 21 | 14 | 15 | 0 | 23 | 0 | 4 |
| 5 | 23 | 16 | 17 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 4 |
| 6 | 25 | 17 | 19 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 4 |
| 7 | 27 | 18 | 21 | 0 | 26 | 0 | 4 |
| 8 | 28 | 20 | 22 | 0 | 27 | 0 | 4 |
| 9 | 30 | 21 | 23 | 1 | 27 | 0 | 4 |
| 10 | 32 | 21 | 24 | 2 | 28 | 0 | 4 |

Duration (in years)

Italy

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Malta

Netherlands

Poland

1

6

4

4

0

14

0

4

2

14

9

10

0

19

0

4

3

18

12

13

0

22

0

4

4

21

14

15

0

23

0

4

5

23

16

17

0

24

0

4

6

25

17

19

0

25

0

4

7

27

18

21

0

26

0

4

8

28

20

22

0

27

0

4

9

30

21

23

1

27

0

4

10

32

21

24

2

28

0

4

| Duration (in years) | Portugal | Romania | Slovakia | Slovenia | Spain | Sweden | United Kingdom |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 22 | 8 | 11 | 15 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | 36 | 15 | 13 | 18 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| 3 | 41 | 17 | 16 | 22 | 13 | 0 | 0 |
| 4 | 43 | 18 | 17 | 27 | 15 | 0 | 0 |
| 5 | 46 | 20 | 18 | 30 | 17 | 0 | 0 |
| 6 | 48 | 21 | 20 | 33 | 19 | 0 | 0 |
| 7 | 50 | 22 | 21 | 35 | 21 | 0 | 0 |
| 8 | 50 | 24 | 22 | 36 | 22 | 0 | 0 |
| 9 | 47 | 25 | 23 | 37 | 23 | 0 | 0 |
| 10 | 47 | 23 | 23 | 37 | 24 | 0 | 0 |

Duration (in years)

Portugal

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

United Kingdom

1

22

8

11

15

4

0

0

2

36

15

13

18

10

0

0

3

41

17

16

22

13

0

0

4

43

18

17

27

15

0

0

5

46

20

18

30

17

0

0

6

48

21

20

33

19

0

0

7

50

22

21

35

21

0

0

8

50

24

22

36

22

0

0

9

47

25

23

37

23

0

0

10

47

23

23

37

24

0

0

| Duration (in years) | Liechtenstein | Norway | Switzerland | Australia | Brazil | Canada | Chile |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 16 |
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 18 |
| 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 17 |
| 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 17 |
| 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 15 |
| 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 14 |
| 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 14 |
| 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 14 |
| 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 15 |
| 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 13 |

Duration (in years)

Liechtenstein

Norway

Switzerland

Australia

Brazil

Canada

Chile

1

0

0

0

0

12

0

16

2

0

0

0

0

12

0

18

3

0

0

0

0

12

0

17

4

0

0

0

0

12

0

17

5

0

0

0

0

12

0

15

6

0

0

0

0

12

0

14

7

0

0

0

0

12

0

14

8

0

0

0

0

12

0

14

9

0

0

0

0

12

0

15

10

0

0

0

0

12

0

13

| Duration (in years) | China | Colombia | Hong Kong | India | Japan | Malaysia | Mexico |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| 2 | 1 | 18 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| 3 | 2 | 27 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| 4 | 3 | 34 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| 5 | 3 | 36 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| 6 | 4 | 38 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| 7 | 4 | 40 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| 8 | 7 | 38 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| 9 | 5 | 36 | 0 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 10 |
| 10 | 5 | 38 | 0 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 10 |

Duration (in years)

China

Colombia

Hong Kong

India

Japan

Malaysia

Mexico

1

0

12

0

10

0

0

8

2

1

18

0

10

0

0

9

3

2

27

0

10

0

0

10

4

3

34

0

10

0

0

10

5

3

36

0

10

0

0

10

6

4

38

0

10

0

0

10

7

4

40

0

10

0

0

10

8

7

38

0

10

0

0

10

9

5

36

0

10

1

0

10

10

5

38

0

10

1

0

10

| Duration (in years) | New Zealand | Russia | Singapore | South Africa | South Korea | Thailand | Taiwan |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 9 | 1 | 4 |
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 11 | 0 | 4 |
| 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 12 | 0 | 4 |
| 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 13 | 0 | 4 |
| 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 13 | 15 | 0 | 4 |
| 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 14 | 15 | 0 | 4 |
| 7 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 16 | 15 | 0 | 4 |
| 8 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 18 | 15 | 0 | 4 |
| 9 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 19 | 15 | 0 | 4 |
| 10 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 21 | 15 | 0 | 4 |

Duration (in years)

New Zealand

Russia

Singapore

South Africa

South Korea

Thailand

Taiwan

1

0

0

0

7

9

1

4

2

0

0

0

10

11

0

4

3

0

0

0

11

12

0

4

4

0

0

0

12

13

0

4

5

0

2

0

13

15

0

4

6

0

5

0

14

15

0

4

7

0

7

0

16

15

0

4

8

0

11

0

18

15

0

4

9

0

16

0

19

15

0

4

10

0

16

0

21

15

0

4

| Duration (in years) | United States |
| --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 |
| 2 | 0 |
| 3 | 0 |
| 4 | 0 |
| 5 | 0 |
| 6 | 0 |
| 7 | 0 |
| 8 | 0 |
| 9 | 0 |
| 10 | 0 |

Duration (in years)

United States

1

0

2

0

3

0

4

0

5

0

6

0

7

0

8

0

9

0

10

0

2.   Exposures to financial institutions

2.1   Euro

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 6 | 19 | 42 | 111 | 224 | 514 | 1 288 |
| 2 | 6 | 19 | 42 | 111 | 224 | 514 | 1 034 |
| 3 | 8 | 21 | 44 | 105 | 221 | 511 | 839 |
| 4 | 9 | 24 | 46 | 108 | 220 | 510 | 692 |
| 5 | 10 | 26 | 51 | 111 | 220 | 510 | 580 |
| 6 | 11 | 28 | 55 | 115 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 7 | 12 | 31 | 57 | 118 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 8 | 12 | 31 | 56 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 9 | 13 | 32 | 56 | 116 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 10 | 13 | 33 | 57 | 116 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 11 | 14 | 34 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 12 | 14 | 35 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 13 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 14 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 15 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 16 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 17 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 18 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 19 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 20 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 21 | 17 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 22 | 18 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 23 | 18 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 24 | 19 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 25 | 19 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 26 | 20 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 27 | 20 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 28 | 21 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 29 | 22 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 30 | 23 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

6

19

42

111

224

514

1 288

2

6

19

42

111

224

514

1 034

3

8

21

44

105

221

511

839

4

9

24

46

108

220

510

692

5

10

26

51

111

220

510

580

6

11

28

55

115

220

510

510

7

12

31

57

118

220

510

510

8

12

31

56

117

220

510

510

9

13

32

56

116

220

510

510

10

13

33

57

116

220

510

510

11

14

34

57

117

220

510

510

12

14

35

57

117

220

510

510

13

15

36

57

117

220

510

510

14

15

36

57

117

220

510

510

15

15

36

57

117

220

510

510

16

15

36

57

117

220

510

510

17

15

36

57

117

220

510

510

18

15

36

57

117

220

510

510

19

15

36

57

117

220

510

510

20

15

36

57

117

220

510

510

21

17

36

57

117

220

510

510

22

18

36

57

117

220

510

510

23

18

36

57

117

220

510

510

24

19

36

57

117

220

510

510

25

19

36

57

117

220

510

510

26

20

36

57

117

220

510

510

27

20

36

57

117

220

510

510

28

21

36

57

117

220

510

510

29

22

36

57

117

220

510

510

30

23

36

57

117

220

510

510

2.2   Czech koruna

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 18 | 31 | 53 | 122 | 235 | 526 | 1 354 |
| 2 | 19 | 32 | 55 | 123 | 237 | 527 | 1 082 |
| 3 | 20 | 34 | 56 | 118 | 233 | 523 | 875 |
| 4 | 21 | 36 | 59 | 120 | 232 | 522 | 719 |
| 5 | 22 | 38 | 63 | 123 | 231 | 521 | 601 |
| 6 | 22 | 39 | 66 | 126 | 230 | 521 | 521 |
| 7 | 23 | 41 | 67 | 128 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 8 | 22 | 41 | 66 | 126 | 229 | 519 | 519 |
| 9 | 21 | 41 | 65 | 125 | 228 | 519 | 519 |
| 10 | 21 | 42 | 65 | 125 | 228 | 518 | 518 |
| 11 | 21 | 42 | 65 | 124 | 227 | 517 | 517 |
| 12 | 21 | 42 | 64 | 124 | 227 | 517 | 517 |
| 13 | 21 | 42 | 64 | 123 | 226 | 516 | 516 |
| 14 | 21 | 42 | 63 | 123 | 226 | 516 | 516 |
| 15 | 20 | 42 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 16 | 20 | 41 | 62 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 17 | 20 | 41 | 62 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 18 | 20 | 41 | 62 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 19 | 20 | 41 | 62 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 20 | 20 | 41 | 62 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 21 | 20 | 42 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 22 | 21 | 42 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 516 | 516 |
| 23 | 21 | 42 | 63 | 123 | 226 | 516 | 516 |
| 24 | 21 | 42 | 63 | 123 | 226 | 516 | 516 |
| 25 | 21 | 42 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 516 | 516 |
| 26 | 21 | 42 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 516 | 516 |
| 27 | 22 | 42 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 28 | 22 | 42 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 29 | 23 | 42 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 30 | 23 | 41 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

18

31

53

122

235

526

1 354

2

19

32

55

123

237

527

1 082

3

20

34

56

118

233

523

875

4

21

36

59

120

232

522

719

5

22

38

63

123

231

521

601

6

22

39

66

126

230

521

521

7

23

41

67

128

230

520

520

8

22

41

66

126

229

519

519

9

21

41

65

125

228

519

519

10

21

42

65

125

228

518

518

11

21

42

65

124

227

517

517

12

21

42

64

124

227

517

517

13

21

42

64

123

226

516

516

14

21

42

63

123

226

516

516

15

20

42

63

122

225

515

515

16

20

41

62

122

225

515

515

17

20

41

62

122

225

515

515

18

20

41

62

122

225

515

515

19

20

41

62

122

225

515

515

20

20

41

62

122

225

515

515

21

20

42

63

122

225

515

515

22

21

42

63

122

225

516

516

23

21

42

63

123

226

516

516

24

21

42

63

123

226

516

516

25

21

42

63

122

225

516

516

26

21

42

63

122

225

516

516

27

22

42

63

122

225

515

515

28

22

42

63

122

225

515

515

29

23

42

63

122

225

515

515

30

23

41

63

122

225

515

515

2.3   Danish krone

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 6 | 19 | 42 | 110 | 224 | 514 | 1 288 |
| 2 | 6 | 19 | 42 | 110 | 224 | 514 | 1 033 |
| 3 | 7 | 21 | 43 | 105 | 220 | 510 | 839 |
| 4 | 9 | 24 | 46 | 107 | 219 | 510 | 692 |
| 5 | 10 | 26 | 51 | 111 | 219 | 510 | 580 |
| 6 | 11 | 28 | 54 | 115 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 7 | 12 | 30 | 56 | 118 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 8 | 12 | 31 | 56 | 117 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 9 | 12 | 32 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 10 | 13 | 33 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 11 | 14 | 34 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 12 | 14 | 35 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 13 | 14 | 35 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 14 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 15 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 16 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 17 | 14 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 18 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 19 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 20 | 15 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 21 | 17 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 22 | 18 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 23 | 18 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 24 | 19 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 25 | 19 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 26 | 20 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 27 | 20 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 28 | 21 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 29 | 22 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 30 | 23 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

6

19

42

110

224

514

1 288

2

6

19

42

110

224

514

1 033

3

7

21

43

105

220

510

839

4

9

24

46

107

219

510

692

5

10

26

51

111

219

510

580

6

11

28

54

115

219

510

510

7

12

30

56

118

219

510

510

8

12

31

56

117

219

510

510

9

12

32

56

116

219

510

510

10

13

33

57

116

219

510

510

11

14

34

57

116

219

510

510

12

14

35

57

116

219

510

510

13

14

35

57

116

219

510

510

14

15

36

57

116

219

510

510

15

15

36

57

116

219

510

510

16

15

36

57

116

219

510

510

17

14

36

57

116

219

510

510

18

15

36

57

116

219

510

510

19

15

36

57

116

219

510

510

20

15

36

57

116

219

510

510

21

17

36

57

116

219

510

510

22

18

36

57

116

219

510

510

23

18

36

57

116

219

510

510

24

19

36

57

116

219

510

510

25

19

36

57

116

219

510

510

26

20

36

57

116

219

510

510

27

20

36

57

116

219

510

510

28

21

36

57

116

219

510

510

29

22

36

57

116

219

510

510

30

23

36

57

116

219

510

510

2.4   Forint

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 78 | 91 | 114 | 183 | 296 | 586 | 1 499 |
| 2 | 75 | 88 | 111 | 179 | 293 | 583 | 1 188 |
| 3 | 79 | 93 | 115 | 177 | 292 | 582 | 954 |
| 4 | 78 | 93 | 116 | 177 | 289 | 579 | 779 |
| 5 | 78 | 94 | 119 | 178 | 287 | 577 | 648 |
| 6 | 77 | 95 | 121 | 182 | 286 | 576 | 576 |
| 7 | 77 | 95 | 121 | 182 | 284 | 574 | 574 |
| 8 | 76 | 95 | 120 | 180 | 283 | 573 | 573 |
| 9 | 75 | 94 | 119 | 179 | 282 | 572 | 572 |
| 10 | 72 | 92 | 116 | 175 | 279 | 569 | 569 |
| 11 | 71 | 91 | 114 | 173 | 276 | 567 | 567 |
| 12 | 70 | 91 | 113 | 172 | 275 | 565 | 565 |
| 13 | 69 | 91 | 112 | 171 | 274 | 565 | 565 |
| 14 | 69 | 90 | 112 | 171 | 274 | 564 | 564 |
| 15 | 69 | 90 | 111 | 171 | 274 | 564 | 564 |
| 16 | 68 | 90 | 111 | 170 | 273 | 563 | 563 |
| 17 | 68 | 89 | 110 | 170 | 273 | 563 | 563 |
| 18 | 68 | 89 | 110 | 169 | 272 | 563 | 563 |
| 19 | 67 | 88 | 109 | 169 | 272 | 562 | 562 |
| 20 | 66 | 88 | 109 | 168 | 271 | 561 | 561 |
| 21 | 66 | 87 | 108 | 168 | 271 | 561 | 561 |
| 22 | 65 | 86 | 107 | 167 | 270 | 560 | 560 |
| 23 | 64 | 85 | 106 | 166 | 269 | 559 | 559 |
| 24 | 63 | 84 | 105 | 165 | 268 | 558 | 558 |
| 25 | 62 | 83 | 104 | 164 | 267 | 557 | 557 |
| 26 | 61 | 82 | 103 | 163 | 266 | 556 | 556 |
| 27 | 60 | 81 | 102 | 162 | 265 | 555 | 555 |
| 28 | 59 | 80 | 101 | 161 | 264 | 554 | 554 |
| 29 | 58 | 79 | 100 | 160 | 263 | 553 | 553 |
| 30 | 57 | 78 | 99 | 159 | 262 | 552 | 552 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

78

91

114

183

296

586

1 499

2

75

88

111

179

293

583

1 188

3

79

93

115

177

292

582

954

4

78

93

116

177

289

579

779

5

78

94

119

178

287

577

648

6

77

95

121

182

286

576

576

7

77

95

121

182

284

574

574

8

76

95

120

180

283

573

573

9

75

94

119

179

282

572

572

10

72

92

116

175

279

569

569

11

71

91

114

173

276

567

567

12

70

91

113

172

275

565

565

13

69

91

112

171

274

565

565

14

69

90

112

171

274

564

564

15

69

90

111

171

274

564

564

16

68

90

111

170

273

563

563

17

68

89

110

170

273

563

563

18

68

89

110

169

272

563

563

19

67

88

109

169

272

562

562

20

66

88

109

168

271

561

561

21

66

87

108

168

271

561

561

22

65

86

107

167

270

560

560

23

64

85

106

166

269

559

559

24

63

84

105

165

268

558

558

25

62

83

104

164

267

557

557

26

61

82

103

163

266

556

556

27

60

81

102

162

265

555

555

28

59

80

101

161

264

554

554

29

58

79

100

160

263

553

553

30

57

78

99

159

262

552

552

2.5   Krona

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 11 | 24 | 46 | 115 | 228 | 518 | 1 294 |
| 2 | 12 | 25 | 48 | 116 | 230 | 520 | 1 036 |
| 3 | 14 | 28 | 50 | 112 | 227 | 517 | 841 |
| 4 | 16 | 31 | 54 | 115 | 227 | 517 | 694 |
| 5 | 18 | 34 | 59 | 118 | 227 | 517 | 581 |
| 6 | 19 | 36 | 62 | 123 | 227 | 517 | 517 |
| 7 | 20 | 38 | 64 | 125 | 227 | 517 | 517 |
| 8 | 19 | 38 | 63 | 124 | 226 | 516 | 516 |
| 9 | 19 | 38 | 63 | 123 | 226 | 516 | 516 |
| 10 | 19 | 39 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 516 | 516 |
| 11 | 20 | 40 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 516 | 516 |
| 12 | 20 | 41 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 13 | 20 | 41 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 14 | 21 | 42 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 516 | 516 |
| 15 | 21 | 42 | 63 | 122 | 226 | 516 | 516 |
| 16 | 21 | 42 | 63 | 122 | 225 | 516 | 516 |
| 17 | 21 | 42 | 63 | 123 | 226 | 516 | 516 |
| 18 | 21 | 42 | 63 | 123 | 226 | 516 | 516 |
| 19 | 21 | 42 | 64 | 123 | 226 | 516 | 516 |
| 20 | 22 | 43 | 64 | 124 | 227 | 517 | 517 |
| 21 | 22 | 43 | 64 | 124 | 227 | 517 | 517 |
| 22 | 22 | 44 | 65 | 124 | 227 | 517 | 517 |
| 23 | 23 | 44 | 65 | 124 | 227 | 518 | 518 |
| 24 | 23 | 44 | 65 | 124 | 227 | 518 | 518 |
| 25 | 23 | 44 | 65 | 124 | 227 | 518 | 518 |
| 26 | 23 | 44 | 65 | 124 | 227 | 517 | 517 |
| 27 | 22 | 44 | 65 | 124 | 227 | 517 | 517 |
| 28 | 22 | 44 | 65 | 124 | 227 | 517 | 517 |
| 29 | 22 | 44 | 65 | 124 | 227 | 517 | 517 |
| 30 | 23 | 43 | 64 | 124 | 227 | 517 | 517 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

11

24

46

115

228

518

1 294

2

12

25

48

116

230

520

1 036

3

14

28

50

112

227

517

841

4

16

31

54

115

227

517

694

5

18

34

59

118

227

517

581

6

19

36

62

123

227

517

517

7

20

38

64

125

227

517

517

8

19

38

63

124

226

516

516

9

19

38

63

123

226

516

516

10

19

39

63

122

225

516

516

11

20

40

63

122

225

516

516

12

20

41

63

122

225

515

515

13

20

41

63

122

225

515

515

14

21

42

63

122

225

516

516

15

21

42

63

122

226

516

516

16

21

42

63

122

225

516

516

17

21

42

63

123

226

516

516

18

21

42

63

123

226

516

516

19

21

42

64

123

226

516

516

20

22

43

64

124

227

517

517

21

22

43

64

124

227

517

517

22

22

44

65

124

227

517

517

23

23

44

65

124

227

518

518

24

23

44

65

124

227

518

518

25

23

44

65

124

227

518

518

26

23

44

65

124

227

517

517

27

22

44

65

124

227

517

517

28

22

44

65

124

227

517

517

29

22

44

65

124

227

517

517

30

23

43

64

124

227

517

517

2.6   Kuna

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 45 | 58 | 81 | 149 | 263 | 553 | 1 275 |
| 2 | 49 | 62 | 85 | 153 | 267 | 557 | 1 025 |
| 3 | 54 | 68 | 90 | 152 | 267 | 557 | 835 |
| 4 | 58 | 73 | 95 | 156 | 268 | 558 | 691 |
| 5 | 60 | 76 | 101 | 160 | 269 | 559 | 580 |
| 6 | 61 | 78 | 105 | 165 | 269 | 560 | 560 |
| 7 | 62 | 80 | 106 | 168 | 269 | 559 | 559 |
| 8 | 61 | 80 | 105 | 166 | 268 | 559 | 559 |
| 9 | 61 | 80 | 104 | 164 | 268 | 558 | 558 |
| 10 | 60 | 80 | 104 | 163 | 266 | 557 | 557 |
| 11 | 59 | 80 | 103 | 162 | 265 | 555 | 555 |
| 12 | 59 | 80 | 102 | 161 | 264 | 554 | 554 |
| 13 | 58 | 79 | 100 | 160 | 263 | 553 | 553 |
| 14 | 57 | 78 | 99 | 159 | 262 | 552 | 552 |
| 15 | 56 | 77 | 99 | 158 | 261 | 551 | 551 |
| 16 | 55 | 77 | 98 | 157 | 260 | 550 | 550 |
| 17 | 55 | 76 | 97 | 157 | 260 | 550 | 550 |
| 18 | 54 | 76 | 97 | 156 | 259 | 549 | 549 |
| 19 | 54 | 75 | 96 | 156 | 259 | 549 | 549 |
| 20 | 53 | 75 | 96 | 155 | 258 | 548 | 548 |
| 21 | 53 | 74 | 95 | 155 | 258 | 548 | 548 |
| 22 | 52 | 73 | 94 | 154 | 257 | 547 | 547 |
| 23 | 51 | 73 | 94 | 153 | 256 | 546 | 546 |
| 24 | 51 | 72 | 93 | 153 | 256 | 546 | 546 |
| 25 | 50 | 71 | 92 | 152 | 255 | 545 | 545 |
| 26 | 49 | 70 | 91 | 151 | 254 | 544 | 544 |
| 27 | 48 | 70 | 91 | 150 | 253 | 543 | 543 |
| 28 | 47 | 69 | 90 | 149 | 252 | 542 | 542 |
| 29 | 47 | 68 | 89 | 148 | 251 | 542 | 542 |
| 30 | 46 | 67 | 88 | 148 | 251 | 541 | 541 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

45

58

81

149

263

553

1 275

2

49

62

85

153

267

557

1 025

3

54

68

90

152

267

557

835

4

58

73

95

156

268

558

691

5

60

76

101

160

269

559

580

6

61

78

105

165

269

560

560

7

62

80

106

168

269

559

559

8

61

80

105

166

268

559

559

9

61

80

104

164

268

558

558

10

60

80

104

163

266

557

557

11

59

80

103

162

265

555

555

12

59

80

102

161

264

554

554

13

58

79

100

160

263

553

553

14

57

78

99

159

262

552

552

15

56

77

99

158

261

551

551

16

55

77

98

157

260

550

550

17

55

76

97

157

260

550

550

18

54

76

97

156

259

549

549

19

54

75

96

156

259

549

549

20

53

75

96

155

258

548

548

21

53

74

95

155

258

548

548

22

52

73

94

154

257

547

547

23

51

73

94

153

256

546

546

24

51

72

93

153

256

546

546

25

50

71

92

152

255

545

545

26

49

70

91

151

254

544

544

27

48

70

91

150

253

543

543

28

47

69

90

149

252

542

542

29

47

68

89

148

251

542

542

30

46

67

88

148

251

541

541

2.7   Lev

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 6 | 18 | 41 | 110 | 223 | 513 | 1 287 |
| 2 | 6 | 18 | 41 | 110 | 223 | 513 | 1 033 |
| 3 | 7 | 21 | 43 | 104 | 220 | 510 | 838 |
| 4 | 8 | 23 | 46 | 107 | 219 | 509 | 692 |
| 5 | 9 | 25 | 50 | 110 | 219 | 509 | 580 |
| 6 | 10 | 28 | 54 | 115 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 7 | 12 | 30 | 56 | 117 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 8 | 12 | 30 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 9 | 12 | 31 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 10 | 12 | 32 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 11 | 13 | 33 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 12 | 13 | 34 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 13 | 14 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 14 | 14 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 15 | 14 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 16 | 14 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 17 | 14 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 18 | 14 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 19 | 15 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 20 | 15 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 21 | 17 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 22 | 18 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 23 | 18 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 24 | 19 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 25 | 19 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 26 | 20 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 27 | 20 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 28 | 21 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 29 | 22 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 30 | 23 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

6

18

41

110

223

513

1 287

2

6

18

41

110

223

513

1 033

3

7

21

43

104

220

510

838

4

8

23

46

107

219

509

692

5

9

25

50

110

219

509

580

6

10

28

54

115

219

509

509

7

12

30

56

117

219

509

509

8

12

30

56

116

219

509

509

9

12

31

56

116

219

509

509

10

12

32

56

116

219

509

509

11

13

33

56

116

219

509

509

12

13

34

56

116

219

509

509

13

14

35

56

116

219

509

509

14

14

35

56

116

219

509

509

15

14

35

56

116

219

509

509

16

14

35

56

116

219

509

509

17

14

35

56

116

219

509

509

18

14

35

56

116

219

509

509

19

15

35

56

116

219

509

509

20

15

35

56

116

219

509

509

21

17

35

56

116

219

509

509

22

18

35

56

116

219

509

509

23

18

35

56

116

219

509

509

24

19

35

56

116

219

509

509

25

19

35

56

116

219

509

509

26

20

35

56

116

219

509

509

27

20

35

56

116

219

509

509

28

21

35

56

116

219

509

509

29

22

35

56

116

219

509

509

30

23

35

56

116

219

509

509

2.8   Pound sterling

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 8 | 24 | 52 | 140 | 242 | 532 | 1 313 |
| 2 | 8 | 24 | 52 | 140 | 242 | 532 | 1 053 |
| 3 | 9 | 26 | 52 | 128 | 239 | 529 | 854 |
| 4 | 10 | 28 | 54 | 119 | 237 | 527 | 704 |
| 5 | 12 | 30 | 56 | 110 | 236 | 526 | 590 |
| 6 | 14 | 34 | 59 | 104 | 235 | 525 | 525 |
| 7 | 16 | 36 | 60 | 98 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 8 | 18 | 38 | 59 | 92 | 232 | 523 | 523 |
| 9 | 20 | 44 | 62 | 87 | 231 | 522 | 522 |
| 10 | 20 | 44 | 61 | 84 | 231 | 521 | 521 |
| 11 | 19 | 43 | 60 | 85 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 12 | 19 | 43 | 60 | 87 | 229 | 519 | 519 |
| 13 | 19 | 43 | 61 | 87 | 228 | 518 | 518 |
| 14 | 19 | 43 | 61 | 87 | 228 | 518 | 518 |
| 15 | 19 | 43 | 61 | 87 | 227 | 517 | 517 |
| 16 | 19 | 43 | 61 | 87 | 226 | 516 | 516 |
| 17 | 19 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 18 | 19 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 224 | 514 | 514 |
| 19 | 19 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 224 | 514 | 514 |
| 20 | 19 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 224 | 515 | 515 |
| 21 | 19 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 22 | 19 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 224 | 514 | 514 |
| 23 | 19 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 224 | 514 | 514 |
| 24 | 19 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 223 | 513 | 513 |
| 25 | 19 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 222 | 513 | 513 |
| 26 | 20 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 222 | 512 | 512 |
| 27 | 20 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 221 | 511 | 511 |
| 28 | 22 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 221 | 511 | 511 |
| 29 | 23 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 30 | 23 | 44 | 61 | 87 | 220 | 510 | 510 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

8

24

52

140

242

532

1 313

2

8

24

52

140

242

532

1 053

3

9

26

52

128

239

529

854

4

10

28

54

119

237

527

704

5

12

30

56

110

236

526

590

6

14

34

59

104

235

525

525

7

16

36

60

98

234

524

524

8

18

38

59

92

232

523

523

9

20

44

62

87

231

522

522

10

20

44

61

84

231

521

521

11

19

43

60

85

230

520

520

12

19

43

60

87

229

519

519

13

19

43

61

87

228

518

518

14

19

43

61

87

228

518

518

15

19

43

61

87

227

517

517

16

19

43

61

87

226

516

516

17

19

44

61

87

225

515

515

18

19

44

61

87

224

514

514

19

19

44

61

87

224

514

514

20

19

44

61

87

224

515

515

21

19

44

61

87

225

515

515

22

19

44

61

87

224

514

514

23

19

44

61

87

224

514

514

24

19

44

61

87

223

513

513

25

19

44

61

87

222

513

513

26

20

44

61

87

222

512

512

27

20

44

61

87

221

511

511

28

22

44

61

87

221

511

511

29

23

44

61

87

220

510

510

30

23

44

61

87

220

510

510

2.9   Romanian leu

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 84 | 97 | 120 | 189 | 302 | 592 | 1 363 |
| 2 | 83 | 96 | 119 | 187 | 301 | 591 | 1 094 |
| 3 | 83 | 97 | 119 | 181 | 296 | 586 | 891 |
| 4 | 83 | 98 | 120 | 181 | 293 | 584 | 737 |
| 5 | 82 | 98 | 123 | 182 | 291 | 581 | 619 |
| 6 | 81 | 98 | 124 | 185 | 289 | 580 | 580 |
| 7 | 80 | 98 | 124 | 186 | 287 | 577 | 577 |
| 8 | 78 | 97 | 122 | 183 | 285 | 575 | 575 |
| 9 | 76 | 96 | 120 | 180 | 283 | 573 | 573 |
| 10 | 75 | 95 | 119 | 179 | 282 | 572 | 572 |
| 11 | 75 | 95 | 118 | 177 | 280 | 570 | 570 |
| 12 | 73 | 94 | 116 | 176 | 279 | 569 | 569 |
| 13 | 72 | 93 | 115 | 174 | 277 | 568 | 568 |
| 14 | 71 | 92 | 113 | 173 | 276 | 566 | 566 |
| 15 | 70 | 91 | 112 | 172 | 275 | 565 | 565 |
| 16 | 69 | 90 | 111 | 171 | 274 | 564 | 564 |
| 17 | 68 | 89 | 110 | 170 | 273 | 563 | 563 |
| 18 | 67 | 88 | 109 | 169 | 272 | 562 | 562 |
| 19 | 66 | 87 | 108 | 168 | 271 | 561 | 561 |
| 20 | 65 | 86 | 108 | 167 | 270 | 560 | 560 |
| 21 | 64 | 86 | 107 | 166 | 269 | 559 | 559 |
| 22 | 63 | 85 | 106 | 165 | 268 | 558 | 558 |
| 23 | 62 | 83 | 105 | 164 | 267 | 557 | 557 |
| 24 | 61 | 82 | 103 | 163 | 266 | 556 | 556 |
| 25 | 60 | 81 | 102 | 162 | 265 | 555 | 555 |
| 26 | 59 | 80 | 101 | 161 | 264 | 554 | 554 |
| 27 | 58 | 79 | 100 | 160 | 263 | 553 | 553 |
| 28 | 57 | 78 | 99 | 159 | 262 | 552 | 552 |
| 29 | 56 | 77 | 98 | 157 | 261 | 551 | 551 |
| 30 | 55 | 76 | 97 | 156 | 259 | 550 | 550 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

84

97

120

189

302

592

1 363

2

83

96

119

187

301

591

1 094

3

83

97

119

181

296

586

891

4

83

98

120

181

293

584

737

5

82

98

123

182

291

581

619

6

81

98

124

185

289

580

580

7

80

98

124

186

287

577

577

8

78

97

122

183

285

575

575

9

76

96

120

180

283

573

573

10

75

95

119

179

282

572

572

11

75

95

118

177

280

570

570

12

73

94

116

176

279

569

569

13

72

93

115

174

277

568

568

14

71

92

113

173

276

566

566

15

70

91

112

172

275

565

565

16

69

90

111

171

274

564

564

17

68

89

110

170

273

563

563

18

67

88

109

169

272

562

562

19

66

87

108

168

271

561

561

20

65

86

108

167

270

560

560

21

64

86

107

166

269

559

559

22

63

85

106

165

268

558

558

23

62

83

105

164

267

557

557

24

61

82

103

163

266

556

556

25

60

81

102

162

265

555

555

26

59

80

101

161

264

554

554

27

58

79

100

160

263

553

553

28

57

78

99

159

262

552

552

29

56

77

98

157

261

551

551

30

55

76

97

156

259

550

550

2.10   Zloty

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 57 | 70 | 93 | 161 | 275 | 565 | 1 352 |
| 2 | 57 | 69 | 92 | 161 | 274 | 564 | 1 086 |
| 3 | 57 | 71 | 93 | 155 | 270 | 560 | 884 |
| 4 | 58 | 73 | 95 | 156 | 268 | 558 | 730 |
| 5 | 57 | 74 | 98 | 158 | 267 | 557 | 612 |
| 6 | 57 | 74 | 100 | 161 | 265 | 555 | 555 |
| 7 | 57 | 75 | 101 | 162 | 264 | 554 | 554 |
| 8 | 55 | 74 | 99 | 160 | 263 | 553 | 553 |
| 9 | 54 | 74 | 98 | 158 | 261 | 551 | 551 |
| 10 | 54 | 74 | 97 | 157 | 260 | 550 | 550 |
| 11 | 53 | 74 | 97 | 156 | 259 | 549 | 549 |
| 12 | 53 | 74 | 96 | 155 | 258 | 549 | 549 |
| 13 | 53 | 74 | 95 | 155 | 258 | 548 | 548 |
| 14 | 52 | 74 | 95 | 154 | 257 | 547 | 547 |
| 15 | 52 | 73 | 94 | 154 | 257 | 547 | 547 |
| 16 | 51 | 72 | 93 | 153 | 256 | 546 | 546 |
| 17 | 50 | 72 | 93 | 152 | 255 | 545 | 545 |
| 18 | 50 | 71 | 92 | 152 | 255 | 545 | 545 |
| 19 | 49 | 71 | 92 | 151 | 254 | 544 | 544 |
| 20 | 49 | 71 | 92 | 151 | 254 | 544 | 544 |
| 21 | 49 | 70 | 91 | 151 | 254 | 544 | 544 |
| 22 | 49 | 70 | 91 | 150 | 253 | 544 | 544 |
| 23 | 48 | 69 | 90 | 150 | 253 | 543 | 543 |
| 24 | 47 | 69 | 90 | 149 | 252 | 542 | 542 |
| 25 | 47 | 68 | 89 | 149 | 252 | 542 | 542 |
| 26 | 46 | 67 | 88 | 148 | 251 | 541 | 541 |
| 27 | 45 | 67 | 88 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 28 | 45 | 66 | 87 | 146 | 249 | 540 | 540 |
| 29 | 44 | 65 | 86 | 146 | 249 | 539 | 539 |
| 30 | 43 | 64 | 85 | 145 | 248 | 538 | 538 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

57

70

93

161

275

565

1 352

2

57

69

92

161

274

564

1 086

3

57

71

93

155

270

560

884

4

58

73

95

156

268

558

730

5

57

74

98

158

267

557

612

6

57

74

100

161

265

555

555

7

57

75

101

162

264

554

554

8

55

74

99

160

263

553

553

9

54

74

98

158

261

551

551

10

54

74

97

157

260

550

550

11

53

74

97

156

259

549

549

12

53

74

96

155

258

549

549

13

53

74

95

155

258

548

548

14

52

74

95

154

257

547

547

15

52

73

94

154

257

547

547

16

51

72

93

153

256

546

546

17

50

72

93

152

255

545

545

18

50

71

92

152

255

545

545

19

49

71

92

151

254

544

544

20

49

71

92

151

254

544

544

21

49

70

91

151

254

544

544

22

49

70

91

150

253

544

544

23

48

69

90

150

253

543

543

24

47

69

90

149

252

542

542

25

47

68

89

149

252

542

542

26

46

67

88

148

251

541

541

27

45

67

88

147

250

540

540

28

45

66

87

146

249

540

540

29

44

65

86

146

249

539

539

30

43

64

85

145

248

538

538

2.11   Norwegian krone

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 31 | 44 | 67 | 136 | 249 | 539 | 1 294 |
| 2 | 32 | 45 | 68 | 136 | 250 | 540 | 1 036 |
| 3 | 32 | 46 | 68 | 130 | 245 | 535 | 840 |
| 4 | 33 | 48 | 70 | 132 | 244 | 534 | 693 |
| 5 | 34 | 50 | 75 | 134 | 243 | 533 | 581 |
| 6 | 34 | 51 | 77 | 138 | 242 | 532 | 532 |
| 7 | 34 | 52 | 78 | 140 | 241 | 531 | 531 |
| 8 | 33 | 52 | 77 | 138 | 240 | 531 | 531 |
| 9 | 33 | 52 | 77 | 137 | 240 | 530 | 530 |
| 10 | 33 | 53 | 76 | 136 | 239 | 529 | 529 |
| 11 | 33 | 53 | 76 | 135 | 238 | 529 | 529 |
| 12 | 32 | 53 | 75 | 135 | 238 | 528 | 528 |
| 13 | 32 | 53 | 75 | 134 | 237 | 527 | 527 |
| 14 | 32 | 53 | 74 | 133 | 236 | 527 | 527 |
| 15 | 31 | 52 | 73 | 133 | 236 | 526 | 526 |
| 16 | 30 | 52 | 73 | 132 | 235 | 525 | 525 |
| 17 | 30 | 51 | 72 | 132 | 235 | 525 | 525 |
| 18 | 30 | 51 | 72 | 132 | 235 | 525 | 525 |
| 19 | 30 | 51 | 72 | 132 | 235 | 525 | 525 |
| 20 | 30 | 51 | 72 | 132 | 235 | 525 | 525 |
| 21 | 30 | 51 | 72 | 132 | 235 | 525 | 525 |
| 22 | 30 | 51 | 72 | 132 | 235 | 525 | 525 |
| 23 | 30 | 51 | 72 | 131 | 234 | 525 | 525 |
| 24 | 29 | 51 | 72 | 131 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 25 | 29 | 50 | 71 | 131 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 26 | 29 | 50 | 71 | 131 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 27 | 29 | 50 | 71 | 130 | 233 | 524 | 524 |
| 28 | 28 | 50 | 71 | 130 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 29 | 28 | 49 | 70 | 130 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 30 | 28 | 49 | 70 | 129 | 232 | 523 | 523 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

31

44

67

136

249

539

1 294

2

32

45

68

136

250

540

1 036

3

32

46

68

130

245

535

840

4

33

48

70

132

244

534

693

5

34

50

75

134

243

533

581

6

34

51

77

138

242

532

532

7

34

52

78

140

241

531

531

8

33

52

77

138

240

531

531

9

33

52

77

137

240

530

530

10

33

53

76

136

239

529

529

11

33

53

76

135

238

529

529

12

32

53

75

135

238

528

528

13

32

53

75

134

237

527

527

14

32

53

74

133

236

527

527

15

31

52

73

133

236

526

526

16

30

52

73

132

235

525

525

17

30

51

72

132

235

525

525

18

30

51

72

132

235

525

525

19

30

51

72

132

235

525

525

20

30

51

72

132

235

525

525

21

30

51

72

132

235

525

525

22

30

51

72

132

235

525

525

23

30

51

72

131

234

525

525

24

29

51

72

131

234

524

524

25

29

50

71

131

234

524

524

26

29

50

71

131

234

524

524

27

29

50

71

130

233

524

524

28

28

50

71

130

233

523

523

29

28

49

70

130

233

523

523

30

28

49

70

129

232

523

523

2.12   Swiss franc

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 4 | 24 | 92 | 206 | 496 | 1 247 |
| 2 | 1 | 5 | 25 | 93 | 207 | 497 | 1 000 |
| 3 | 2 | 5 | 26 | 88 | 203 | 493 | 813 |
| 4 | 2 | 6 | 29 | 90 | 202 | 492 | 672 |
| 5 | 4 | 9 | 34 | 93 | 202 | 492 | 564 |
| 6 | 4 | 11 | 37 | 98 | 202 | 492 | 492 |
| 7 | 5 | 13 | 39 | 101 | 202 | 492 | 492 |
| 8 | 7 | 14 | 39 | 100 | 202 | 492 | 492 |
| 9 | 7 | 15 | 39 | 99 | 202 | 492 | 492 |
| 10 | 8 | 16 | 39 | 99 | 202 | 492 | 492 |
| 11 | 9 | 18 | 41 | 100 | 203 | 493 | 493 |
| 12 | 9 | 17 | 39 | 99 | 202 | 492 | 492 |
| 13 | 11 | 19 | 40 | 100 | 203 | 493 | 493 |
| 14 | 12 | 19 | 40 | 99 | 202 | 493 | 493 |
| 15 | 12 | 18 | 39 | 98 | 201 | 491 | 491 |
| 16 | 13 | 17 | 38 | 97 | 200 | 491 | 491 |
| 17 | 13 | 17 | 38 | 97 | 200 | 491 | 491 |
| 18 | 14 | 17 | 38 | 98 | 201 | 491 | 491 |
| 19 | 15 | 18 | 38 | 98 | 201 | 491 | 491 |
| 20 | 15 | 18 | 39 | 98 | 201 | 492 | 492 |
| 21 | 17 | 19 | 39 | 99 | 202 | 492 | 492 |
| 22 | 17 | 20 | 39 | 99 | 202 | 492 | 492 |
| 23 | 18 | 21 | 39 | 99 | 202 | 492 | 492 |
| 24 | 18 | 22 | 39 | 99 | 202 | 492 | 492 |
| 25 | 19 | 22 | 39 | 98 | 201 | 492 | 492 |
| 26 | 20 | 23 | 39 | 98 | 201 | 491 | 491 |
| 27 | 20 | 23 | 39 | 98 | 201 | 491 | 491 |
| 28 | 21 | 25 | 40 | 98 | 201 | 491 | 491 |
| 29 | 22 | 25 | 41 | 98 | 201 | 491 | 491 |
| 30 | 23 | 26 | 42 | 98 | 201 | 491 | 491 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

0

4

24

92

206

496

1 247

2

1

5

25

93

207

497

1 000

3

2

5

26

88

203

493

813

4

2

6

29

90

202

492

672

5

4

9

34

93

202

492

564

6

4

11

37

98

202

492

492

7

5

13

39

101

202

492

492

8

7

14

39

100

202

492

492

9

7

15

39

99

202

492

492

10

8

16

39

99

202

492

492

11

9

18

41

100

203

493

493

12

9

17

39

99

202

492

492

13

11

19

40

100

203

493

493

14

12

19

40

99

202

493

493

15

12

18

39

98

201

491

491

16

13

17

38

97

200

491

491

17

13

17

38

97

200

491

491

18

14

17

38

98

201

491

491

19

15

18

38

98

201

491

491

20

15

18

39

98

201

492

492

21

17

19

39

99

202

492

492

22

17

20

39

99

202

492

492

23

18

21

39

99

202

492

492

24

18

22

39

99

202

492

492

25

19

22

39

98

201

492

492

26

20

23

39

98

201

491

491

27

20

23

39

98

201

491

491

28

21

25

40

98

201

491

491

29

22

25

41

98

201

491

491

30

23

26

42

98

201

491

491

2.13   Australian dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 45 | 58 | 80 | 149 | 262 | 553 | 1 304 |
| 2 | 45 | 58 | 81 | 149 | 263 | 553 | 1 047 |
| 3 | 46 | 60 | 82 | 143 | 259 | 549 | 850 |
| 4 | 46 | 61 | 84 | 145 | 257 | 547 | 702 |
| 5 | 47 | 63 | 88 | 147 | 256 | 546 | 589 |
| 6 | 47 | 64 | 90 | 151 | 255 | 545 | 545 |
| 7 | 47 | 65 | 91 | 153 | 254 | 545 | 545 |
| 8 | 46 | 65 | 90 | 151 | 254 | 544 | 544 |
| 9 | 46 | 65 | 90 | 150 | 253 | 543 | 543 |
| 10 | 46 | 66 | 89 | 149 | 252 | 542 | 542 |
| 11 | 45 | 66 | 89 | 148 | 251 | 541 | 541 |
| 12 | 45 | 66 | 88 | 147 | 251 | 541 | 541 |
| 13 | 45 | 66 | 87 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 14 | 44 | 66 | 87 | 146 | 249 | 539 | 539 |
| 15 | 44 | 65 | 86 | 146 | 249 | 539 | 539 |
| 16 | 43 | 64 | 85 | 145 | 248 | 538 | 538 |
| 17 | 43 | 64 | 85 | 145 | 248 | 538 | 538 |
| 18 | 42 | 63 | 85 | 144 | 247 | 537 | 537 |
| 19 | 42 | 63 | 84 | 144 | 247 | 537 | 537 |
| 20 | 42 | 63 | 84 | 143 | 246 | 537 | 537 |
| 21 | 41 | 63 | 84 | 143 | 246 | 536 | 536 |
| 22 | 41 | 62 | 83 | 143 | 246 | 536 | 536 |
| 23 | 40 | 62 | 83 | 142 | 245 | 535 | 535 |
| 24 | 40 | 61 | 82 | 141 | 244 | 535 | 535 |
| 25 | 39 | 60 | 81 | 141 | 244 | 534 | 534 |
| 26 | 38 | 59 | 81 | 140 | 243 | 533 | 533 |
| 27 | 37 | 59 | 80 | 139 | 242 | 532 | 532 |
| 28 | 37 | 58 | 79 | 139 | 242 | 532 | 532 |
| 29 | 36 | 57 | 78 | 138 | 241 | 531 | 531 |
| 30 | 35 | 57 | 78 | 137 | 240 | 530 | 530 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

45

58

80

149

262

553

1 304

2

45

58

81

149

263

553

1 047

3

46

60

82

143

259

549

850

4

46

61

84

145

257

547

702

5

47

63

88

147

256

546

589

6

47

64

90

151

255

545

545

7

47

65

91

153

254

545

545

8

46

65

90

151

254

544

544

9

46

65

90

150

253

543

543

10

46

66

89

149

252

542

542

11

45

66

89

148

251

541

541

12

45

66

88

147

251

541

541

13

45

66

87

147

250

540

540

14

44

66

87

146

249

539

539

15

44

65

86

146

249

539

539

16

43

64

85

145

248

538

538

17

43

64

85

145

248

538

538

18

42

63

85

144

247

537

537

19

42

63

84

144

247

537

537

20

42

63

84

143

246

537

537

21

41

63

84

143

246

536

536

22

41

62

83

143

246

536

536

23

40

62

83

142

245

535

535

24

40

61

82

141

244

535

535

25

39

60

81

141

244

534

534

26

38

59

81

140

243

533

533

27

37

59

80

139

242

532

532

28

37

58

79

139

242

532

532

29

36

57

78

138

241

531

531

30

35

57

78

137

240

530

530

2.14   Baht

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 17 | 30 | 53 | 121 | 235 | 525 | 1 250 |
| 2 | 21 | 34 | 56 | 125 | 238 | 529 | 1 004 |
| 3 | 25 | 39 | 61 | 122 | 238 | 528 | 817 |
| 4 | 28 | 43 | 66 | 127 | 239 | 529 | 676 |
| 5 | 31 | 47 | 72 | 132 | 240 | 531 | 568 |
| 6 | 30 | 48 | 74 | 135 | 239 | 529 | 529 |
| 7 | 35 | 53 | 79 | 140 | 242 | 532 | 532 |
| 8 | 34 | 53 | 78 | 138 | 241 | 531 | 531 |
| 9 | 35 | 54 | 79 | 139 | 242 | 532 | 532 |
| 10 | 37 | 57 | 80 | 140 | 243 | 533 | 533 |
| 11 | 38 | 59 | 81 | 141 | 244 | 534 | 534 |
| 12 | 39 | 60 | 82 | 142 | 245 | 535 | 535 |
| 13 | 40 | 61 | 82 | 142 | 245 | 535 | 535 |
| 14 | 41 | 62 | 83 | 142 | 245 | 535 | 535 |
| 15 | 41 | 62 | 83 | 143 | 246 | 536 | 536 |
| 16 | 40 | 62 | 83 | 142 | 245 | 535 | 535 |
| 17 | 40 | 62 | 83 | 142 | 245 | 535 | 535 |
| 18 | 40 | 61 | 82 | 142 | 245 | 535 | 535 |
| 19 | 40 | 61 | 82 | 142 | 245 | 535 | 535 |
| 20 | 40 | 61 | 82 | 142 | 245 | 535 | 535 |
| 21 | 40 | 61 | 82 | 142 | 245 | 535 | 535 |
| 22 | 40 | 61 | 82 | 141 | 244 | 535 | 535 |
| 23 | 39 | 60 | 82 | 141 | 244 | 534 | 534 |
| 24 | 39 | 60 | 81 | 141 | 244 | 534 | 534 |
| 25 | 38 | 60 | 81 | 140 | 243 | 533 | 533 |
| 26 | 38 | 59 | 80 | 140 | 243 | 533 | 533 |
| 27 | 37 | 59 | 80 | 139 | 242 | 532 | 532 |
| 28 | 37 | 58 | 79 | 139 | 242 | 532 | 532 |
| 29 | 36 | 58 | 79 | 138 | 241 | 531 | 531 |
| 30 | 36 | 57 | 78 | 138 | 241 | 531 | 531 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

17

30

53

121

235

525

1 250

2

21

34

56

125

238

529

1 004

3

25

39

61

122

238

528

817

4

28

43

66

127

239

529

676

5

31

47

72

132

240

531

568

6

30

48

74

135

239

529

529

7

35

53

79

140

242

532

532

8

34

53

78

138

241

531

531

9

35

54

79

139

242

532

532

10

37

57

80

140

243

533

533

11

38

59

81

141

244

534

534

12

39

60

82

142

245

535

535

13

40

61

82

142

245

535

535

14

41

62

83

142

245

535

535

15

41

62

83

143

246

536

536

16

40

62

83

142

245

535

535

17

40

62

83

142

245

535

535

18

40

61

82

142

245

535

535

19

40

61

82

142

245

535

535

20

40

61

82

142

245

535

535

21

40

61

82

142

245

535

535

22

40

61

82

141

244

535

535

23

39

60

82

141

244

534

534

24

39

60

81

141

244

534

534

25

38

60

81

140

243

533

533

26

38

59

80

140

243

533

533

27

37

59

80

139

242

532

532

28

37

58

79

139

242

532

532

29

36

58

79

138

241

531

531

30

36

57

78

138

241

531

531

2.15   Canadian dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 18 | 31 | 54 | 122 | 236 | 526 | 1 316 |
| 2 | 19 | 32 | 55 | 123 | 237 | 527 | 1 051 |
| 3 | 21 | 35 | 57 | 119 | 234 | 524 | 850 |
| 4 | 23 | 38 | 60 | 122 | 234 | 524 | 700 |
| 5 | 24 | 40 | 65 | 125 | 233 | 524 | 586 |
| 6 | 25 | 42 | 69 | 129 | 233 | 524 | 524 |
| 7 | 26 | 44 | 70 | 132 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 8 | 26 | 45 | 70 | 131 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 9 | 26 | 46 | 70 | 130 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 10 | 27 | 47 | 71 | 130 | 233 | 524 | 524 |
| 11 | 28 | 48 | 71 | 130 | 233 | 524 | 524 |
| 12 | 28 | 49 | 71 | 131 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 13 | 29 | 50 | 71 | 131 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 14 | 29 | 50 | 71 | 131 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 15 | 29 | 50 | 71 | 131 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 16 | 29 | 50 | 71 | 130 | 233 | 524 | 524 |
| 17 | 29 | 50 | 71 | 130 | 233 | 524 | 524 |
| 18 | 29 | 50 | 71 | 130 | 233 | 524 | 524 |
| 19 | 28 | 50 | 71 | 130 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 20 | 29 | 50 | 71 | 130 | 233 | 524 | 524 |
| 21 | 28 | 50 | 71 | 130 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 22 | 28 | 49 | 71 | 130 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 23 | 28 | 49 | 70 | 130 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 24 | 27 | 49 | 70 | 129 | 232 | 522 | 522 |
| 25 | 27 | 48 | 69 | 129 | 232 | 522 | 522 |
| 26 | 26 | 48 | 69 | 128 | 231 | 521 | 521 |
| 27 | 26 | 47 | 68 | 128 | 231 | 521 | 521 |
| 28 | 26 | 47 | 68 | 127 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 29 | 25 | 46 | 67 | 127 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 30 | 25 | 46 | 67 | 127 | 230 | 520 | 520 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

18

31

54

122

236

526

1 316

2

19

32

55

123

237

527

1 051

3

21

35

57

119

234

524

850

4

23

38

60

122

234

524

700

5

24

40

65

125

233

524

586

6

25

42

69

129

233

524

524

7

26

44

70

132

233

523

523

8

26

45

70

131

233

523

523

9

26

46

70

130

233

523

523

10

27

47

71

130

233

524

524

11

28

48

71

130

233

524

524

12

28

49

71

131

234

524

524

13

29

50

71

131

234

524

524

14

29

50

71

131

234

524

524

15

29

50

71

131

234

524

524

16

29

50

71

130

233

524

524

17

29

50

71

130

233

524

524

18

29

50

71

130

233

524

524

19

28

50

71

130

233

523

523

20

29

50

71

130

233

524

524

21

28

50

71

130

233

523

523

22

28

49

71

130

233

523

523

23

28

49

70

130

233

523

523

24

27

49

70

129

232

522

522

25

27

48

69

129

232

522

522

26

26

48

69

128

231

521

521

27

26

47

68

128

231

521

521

28

26

47

68

127

230

520

520

29

25

46

67

127

230

520

520

30

25

46

67

127

230

520

520

2.16   Chilean peso

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 53 | 65 | 88 | 157 | 270 | 560 | 1 402 |
| 2 | 55 | 68 | 91 | 159 | 273 | 563 | 1 102 |
| 3 | 58 | 72 | 94 | 156 | 271 | 561 | 886 |
| 4 | 61 | 76 | 98 | 159 | 272 | 562 | 727 |
| 5 | 63 | 79 | 104 | 163 | 272 | 562 | 608 |
| 6 | 64 | 81 | 108 | 168 | 273 | 563 | 563 |
| 7 | 65 | 84 | 110 | 171 | 273 | 563 | 563 |
| 8 | 65 | 84 | 109 | 170 | 272 | 562 | 562 |
| 9 | 65 | 85 | 109 | 169 | 272 | 562 | 562 |
| 10 | 66 | 86 | 109 | 169 | 272 | 562 | 562 |
| 11 | 66 | 87 | 109 | 169 | 272 | 562 | 562 |
| 12 | 66 | 87 | 109 | 168 | 271 | 561 | 561 |
| 13 | 66 | 87 | 108 | 168 | 271 | 561 | 561 |
| 14 | 65 | 86 | 107 | 167 | 270 | 560 | 560 |
| 15 | 64 | 86 | 107 | 166 | 269 | 559 | 559 |
| 16 | 64 | 85 | 106 | 165 | 268 | 559 | 559 |
| 17 | 63 | 84 | 105 | 165 | 268 | 558 | 558 |
| 18 | 62 | 84 | 105 | 164 | 267 | 557 | 557 |
| 19 | 62 | 83 | 104 | 164 | 267 | 557 | 557 |
| 20 | 61 | 82 | 104 | 163 | 266 | 556 | 556 |
| 21 | 60 | 82 | 103 | 162 | 265 | 555 | 555 |
| 22 | 60 | 81 | 102 | 161 | 265 | 555 | 555 |
| 23 | 59 | 80 | 101 | 161 | 264 | 554 | 554 |
| 24 | 58 | 79 | 100 | 160 | 263 | 553 | 553 |
| 25 | 57 | 78 | 99 | 159 | 262 | 552 | 552 |
| 26 | 56 | 77 | 98 | 158 | 261 | 551 | 551 |
| 27 | 55 | 76 | 97 | 157 | 260 | 550 | 550 |
| 28 | 54 | 75 | 96 | 156 | 259 | 549 | 549 |
| 29 | 53 | 75 | 96 | 155 | 258 | 548 | 548 |
| 30 | 52 | 74 | 95 | 154 | 257 | 547 | 547 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

53

65

88

157

270

560

1 402

2

55

68

91

159

273

563

1 102

3

58

72

94

156

271

561

886

4

61

76

98

159

272

562

727

5

63

79

104

163

272

562

608

6

64

81

108

168

273

563

563

7

65

84

110

171

273

563

563

8

65

84

109

170

272

562

562

9

65

85

109

169

272

562

562

10

66

86

109

169

272

562

562

11

66

87

109

169

272

562

562

12

66

87

109

168

271

561

561

13

66

87

108

168

271

561

561

14

65

86

107

167

270

560

560

15

64

86

107

166

269

559

559

16

64

85

106

165

268

559

559

17

63

84

105

165

268

558

558

18

62

84

105

164

267

557

557

19

62

83

104

164

267

557

557

20

61

82

104

163

266

556

556

21

60

82

103

162

265

555

555

22

60

81

102

161

265

555

555

23

59

80

101

161

264

554

554

24

58

79

100

160

263

553

553

25

57

78

99

159

262

552

552

26

56

77

98

158

261

551

551

27

55

76

97

157

260

550

550

28

54

75

96

156

259

549

549

29

53

75

96

155

258

548

548

30

52

74

95

154

257

547

547

2.17   Colombian peso

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 83 | 96 | 119 | 187 | 301 | 591 | 1 450 |
| 2 | 88 | 101 | 124 | 192 | 306 | 596 | 1 170 |
| 3 | 91 | 105 | 127 | 188 | 304 | 594 | 955 |
| 4 | 92 | 107 | 130 | 191 | 303 | 593 | 791 |
| 5 | 96 | 112 | 137 | 196 | 305 | 595 | 665 |
| 6 | 98 | 115 | 141 | 202 | 306 | 596 | 596 |
| 7 | 100 | 118 | 144 | 205 | 307 | 597 | 597 |
| 8 | 101 | 119 | 145 | 205 | 308 | 598 | 598 |
| 9 | 102 | 121 | 146 | 206 | 309 | 599 | 599 |
| 10 | 103 | 123 | 146 | 206 | 309 | 599 | 599 |
| 11 | 103 | 123 | 146 | 206 | 309 | 599 | 599 |
| 12 | 102 | 123 | 145 | 205 | 308 | 598 | 598 |
| 13 | 102 | 123 | 144 | 204 | 307 | 597 | 597 |
| 14 | 100 | 122 | 143 | 202 | 305 | 595 | 595 |
| 15 | 99 | 120 | 141 | 201 | 304 | 594 | 594 |
| 16 | 98 | 119 | 140 | 200 | 303 | 593 | 593 |
| 17 | 96 | 118 | 139 | 198 | 301 | 591 | 591 |
| 18 | 95 | 116 | 137 | 197 | 300 | 590 | 590 |
| 19 | 94 | 115 | 136 | 196 | 299 | 589 | 589 |
| 20 | 92 | 114 | 135 | 194 | 297 | 587 | 587 |
| 21 | 91 | 112 | 133 | 193 | 296 | 586 | 586 |
| 22 | 89 | 111 | 132 | 191 | 294 | 584 | 584 |
| 23 | 88 | 109 | 130 | 189 | 292 | 583 | 583 |
| 24 | 86 | 107 | 128 | 188 | 291 | 581 | 581 |
| 25 | 84 | 105 | 127 | 186 | 289 | 579 | 579 |
| 26 | 83 | 104 | 125 | 184 | 287 | 578 | 578 |
| 27 | 81 | 102 | 123 | 183 | 286 | 576 | 576 |
| 28 | 79 | 100 | 122 | 181 | 284 | 574 | 574 |
| 29 | 78 | 99 | 120 | 179 | 282 | 573 | 573 |
| 30 | 76 | 97 | 118 | 178 | 281 | 571 | 571 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

83

96

119

187

301

591

1 450

2

88

101

124

192

306

596

1 170

3

91

105

127

188

304

594

955

4

92

107

130

191

303

593

791

5

96

112

137

196

305

595

665

6

98

115

141

202

306

596

596

7

100

118

144

205

307

597

597

8

101

119

145

205

308

598

598

9

102

121

146

206

309

599

599

10

103

123

146

206

309

599

599

11

103

123

146

206

309

599

599

12

102

123

145

205

308

598

598

13

102

123

144

204

307

597

597

14

100

122

143

202

305

595

595

15

99

120

141

201

304

594

594

16

98

119

140

200

303

593

593

17

96

118

139

198

301

591

591

18

95

116

137

197

300

590

590

19

94

115

136

196

299

589

589

20

92

114

135

194

297

587

587

21

91

112

133

193

296

586

586

22

89

111

132

191

294

584

584

23

88

109

130

189

292

583

583

24

86

107

128

188

291

581

581

25

84

105

127

186

289

579

579

26

83

104

125

184

287

578

578

27

81

102

123

183

286

576

576

28

79

100

122

181

284

574

574

29

78

99

120

179

282

573

573

30

76

97

118

178

281

571

571

2.18   Hong Kong dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 12 | 25 | 48 | 116 | 230 | 520 | 1 321 |
| 2 | 15 | 28 | 51 | 119 | 233 | 523 | 1 054 |
| 3 | 18 | 32 | 54 | 116 | 231 | 521 | 854 |
| 4 | 21 | 36 | 58 | 120 | 232 | 522 | 703 |
| 5 | 23 | 39 | 64 | 124 | 233 | 523 | 589 |
| 6 | 25 | 42 | 68 | 129 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 7 | 26 | 44 | 70 | 132 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 8 | 26 | 45 | 70 | 131 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 9 | 26 | 46 | 70 | 130 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 10 | 27 | 47 | 70 | 130 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 11 | 27 | 48 | 70 | 130 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 12 | 27 | 48 | 70 | 130 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 13 | 27 | 48 | 70 | 129 | 232 | 522 | 522 |
| 14 | 27 | 48 | 69 | 128 | 231 | 522 | 522 |
| 15 | 26 | 47 | 68 | 128 | 231 | 521 | 521 |
| 16 | 25 | 47 | 68 | 127 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 17 | 25 | 46 | 67 | 127 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 18 | 25 | 46 | 67 | 127 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 19 | 25 | 46 | 67 | 127 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 20 | 25 | 46 | 67 | 127 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 21 | 25 | 46 | 67 | 127 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 22 | 25 | 46 | 67 | 127 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 23 | 25 | 46 | 67 | 127 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 24 | 25 | 46 | 67 | 127 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 25 | 25 | 46 | 67 | 127 | 230 | 520 | 520 |
| 26 | 25 | 46 | 67 | 126 | 229 | 520 | 520 |
| 27 | 24 | 46 | 67 | 126 | 229 | 519 | 519 |
| 28 | 24 | 45 | 66 | 126 | 229 | 519 | 519 |
| 29 | 24 | 45 | 66 | 126 | 229 | 519 | 519 |
| 30 | 24 | 45 | 66 | 125 | 228 | 519 | 519 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

12

25

48

116

230

520

1 321

2

15

28

51

119

233

523

1 054

3

18

32

54

116

231

521

854

4

21

36

58

120

232

522

703

5

23

39

64

124

233

523

589

6

25

42

68

129

233

523

523

7

26

44

70

132

233

523

523

8

26

45

70

131

233

523

523

9

26

46

70

130

233

523

523

10

27

47

70

130

233

523

523

11

27

48

70

130

233

523

523

12

27

48

70

130

233

523

523

13

27

48

70

129

232

522

522

14

27

48

69

128

231

522

522

15

26

47

68

128

231

521

521

16

25

47

68

127

230

520

520

17

25

46

67

127

230

520

520

18

25

46

67

127

230

520

520

19

25

46

67

127

230

520

520

20

25

46

67

127

230

520

520

21

25

46

67

127

230

520

520

22

25

46

67

127

230

520

520

23

25

46

67

127

230

520

520

24

25

46

67

127

230

520

520

25

25

46

67

127

230

520

520

26

25

46

67

126

229

520

520

27

24

46

67

126

229

519

519

28

24

45

66

126

229

519

519

29

24

45

66

126

229

519

519

30

24

45

66

125

228

519

519

2.19   Indian rupee

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 95 | 108 | 130 | 199 | 312 | 602 | 1 360 |
| 2 | 96 | 109 | 131 | 200 | 313 | 604 | 1 093 |
| 3 | 97 | 111 | 133 | 195 | 310 | 600 | 889 |
| 4 | 99 | 114 | 137 | 198 | 310 | 600 | 735 |
| 5 | 100 | 117 | 141 | 201 | 310 | 600 | 617 |
| 6 | 101 | 118 | 144 | 205 | 309 | 600 | 600 |
| 7 | 102 | 120 | 146 | 208 | 309 | 599 | 599 |
| 8 | 102 | 121 | 146 | 206 | 309 | 599 | 599 |
| 9 | 101 | 121 | 145 | 205 | 308 | 598 | 598 |
| 10 | 101 | 121 | 144 | 204 | 307 | 597 | 597 |
| 11 | 100 | 120 | 143 | 202 | 305 | 596 | 596 |
| 12 | 98 | 119 | 141 | 201 | 304 | 594 | 594 |
| 13 | 97 | 118 | 139 | 199 | 302 | 592 | 592 |
| 14 | 95 | 117 | 138 | 197 | 300 | 590 | 590 |
| 15 | 94 | 115 | 136 | 196 | 299 | 589 | 589 |
| 16 | 92 | 113 | 134 | 194 | 297 | 587 | 587 |
| 17 | 90 | 112 | 133 | 192 | 295 | 585 | 585 |
| 18 | 89 | 110 | 131 | 191 | 294 | 584 | 584 |
| 19 | 88 | 109 | 130 | 190 | 293 | 583 | 583 |
| 20 | 87 | 108 | 129 | 189 | 292 | 582 | 582 |
| 21 | 86 | 107 | 128 | 187 | 290 | 581 | 581 |
| 22 | 84 | 106 | 127 | 186 | 289 | 579 | 579 |
| 23 | 83 | 105 | 126 | 185 | 288 | 578 | 578 |
| 24 | 82 | 103 | 124 | 184 | 287 | 577 | 577 |
| 25 | 81 | 102 | 123 | 183 | 286 | 576 | 576 |
| 26 | 80 | 101 | 122 | 181 | 284 | 575 | 575 |
| 27 | 78 | 100 | 121 | 180 | 283 | 573 | 573 |
| 28 | 77 | 98 | 120 | 179 | 282 | 572 | 572 |
| 29 | 76 | 97 | 118 | 178 | 281 | 571 | 571 |
| 30 | 75 | 96 | 117 | 177 | 280 | 570 | 570 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

95

108

130

199

312

602

1 360

2

96

109

131

200

313

604

1 093

3

97

111

133

195

310

600

889

4

99

114

137

198

310

600

735

5

100

117

141

201

310

600

617

6

101

118

144

205

309

600

600

7

102

120

146

208

309

599

599

8

102

121

146

206

309

599

599

9

101

121

145

205

308

598

598

10

101

121

144

204

307

597

597

11

100

120

143

202

305

596

596

12

98

119

141

201

304

594

594

13

97

118

139

199

302

592

592

14

95

117

138

197

300

590

590

15

94

115

136

196

299

589

589

16

92

113

134

194

297

587

587

17

90

112

133

192

295

585

585

18

89

110

131

191

294

584

584

19

88

109

130

190

293

583

583

20

87

108

129

189

292

582

582

21

86

107

128

187

290

581

581

22

84

106

127

186

289

579

579

23

83

105

126

185

288

578

578

24

82

103

124

184

287

577

577

25

81

102

123

183

286

576

576

26

80

101

122

181

284

575

575

27

78

100

121

180

283

573

573

28

77

98

120

179

282

572

572

29

76

97

118

178

281

571

571

30

75

96

117

177

280

570

570

2.20   Mexican peso

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 310 | 323 | 346 | 414 | 528 | 818 | 1 450 |
| 2 | 87 | 100 | 123 | 191 | 305 | 595 | 1 147 |
| 3 | 91 | 104 | 126 | 188 | 304 | 594 | 924 |
| 4 | 94 | 109 | 131 | 192 | 305 | 595 | 760 |
| 5 | 96 | 112 | 137 | 197 | 305 | 596 | 637 |
| 6 | 98 | 115 | 141 | 202 | 306 | 596 | 596 |
| 7 | 99 | 117 | 143 | 205 | 306 | 596 | 596 |
| 8 | 100 | 119 | 144 | 205 | 307 | 597 | 597 |
| 9 | 100 | 120 | 144 | 204 | 307 | 597 | 597 |
| 10 | 101 | 121 | 144 | 204 | 307 | 597 | 597 |
| 11 | 101 | 122 | 144 | 204 | 307 | 597 | 597 |
| 12 | 102 | 123 | 145 | 204 | 307 | 597 | 597 |
| 13 | 102 | 123 | 145 | 204 | 307 | 598 | 598 |
| 14 | 103 | 124 | 145 | 205 | 308 | 598 | 598 |
| 15 | 104 | 125 | 146 | 206 | 309 | 599 | 599 |
| 16 | 105 | 126 | 147 | 206 | 309 | 600 | 600 |
| 17 | 105 | 127 | 148 | 207 | 310 | 600 | 600 |
| 18 | 106 | 128 | 149 | 208 | 311 | 601 | 601 |
| 19 | 107 | 128 | 149 | 209 | 312 | 602 | 602 |
| 20 | 108 | 129 | 150 | 209 | 312 | 603 | 603 |
| 21 | 108 | 129 | 150 | 209 | 312 | 603 | 603 |
| 22 | 107 | 128 | 149 | 209 | 312 | 602 | 602 |
| 23 | 106 | 128 | 149 | 208 | 311 | 601 | 601 |
| 24 | 105 | 127 | 148 | 207 | 310 | 600 | 600 |
| 25 | 104 | 126 | 147 | 206 | 309 | 599 | 599 |
| 26 | 103 | 124 | 145 | 205 | 308 | 598 | 598 |
| 27 | 102 | 123 | 144 | 203 | 306 | 597 | 597 |
| 28 | 100 | 121 | 143 | 202 | 305 | 595 | 595 |
| 29 | 99 | 120 | 141 | 201 | 304 | 594 | 594 |
| 30 | 97 | 119 | 140 | 199 | 302 | 592 | 592 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

310

323

346

414

528

818

1 450

2

87

100

123

191

305

595

1 147

3

91

104

126

188

304

594

924

4

94

109

131

192

305

595

760

5

96

112

137

197

305

596

637

6

98

115

141

202

306

596

596

7

99

117

143

205

306

596

596

8

100

119

144

205

307

597

597

9

100

120

144

204

307

597

597

10

101

121

144

204

307

597

597

11

101

122

144

204

307

597

597

12

102

123

145

204

307

597

597

13

102

123

145

204

307

598

598

14

103

124

145

205

308

598

598

15

104

125

146

206

309

599

599

16

105

126

147

206

309

600

600

17

105

127

148

207

310

600

600

18

106

128

149

208

311

601

601

19

107

128

149

209

312

602

602

20

108

129

150

209

312

603

603

21

108

129

150

209

312

603

603

22

107

128

149

209

312

602

602

23

106

128

149

208

311

601

601

24

105

127

148

207

310

600

600

25

104

126

147

206

309

599

599

26

103

124

145

205

308

598

598

27

102

123

144

203

306

597

597

28

100

121

143

202

305

595

595

29

99

120

141

201

304

594

594

30

97

119

140

199

302

592

592

2.21   New Taiwan dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 12 | 35 | 103 | 217 | 507 | 1 244 |
| 2 | 1 | 12 | 35 | 103 | 217 | 507 | 997 |
| 3 | 2 | 14 | 36 | 97 | 213 | 503 | 811 |
| 4 | 2 | 15 | 38 | 99 | 211 | 501 | 670 |
| 5 | 4 | 17 | 42 | 101 | 210 | 500 | 562 |
| 6 | 4 | 18 | 45 | 105 | 209 | 500 | 500 |
| 7 | 5 | 20 | 46 | 107 | 209 | 499 | 499 |
| 8 | 7 | 20 | 45 | 106 | 208 | 498 | 498 |
| 9 | 7 | 20 | 44 | 104 | 207 | 497 | 497 |
| 10 | 8 | 20 | 44 | 103 | 207 | 497 | 497 |
| 11 | 9 | 21 | 44 | 103 | 206 | 497 | 497 |
| 12 | 9 | 22 | 44 | 103 | 206 | 497 | 497 |
| 13 | 10 | 23 | 44 | 104 | 207 | 497 | 497 |
| 14 | 11 | 23 | 44 | 104 | 207 | 497 | 497 |
| 15 | 12 | 24 | 45 | 104 | 207 | 497 | 497 |
| 16 | 13 | 24 | 45 | 104 | 207 | 497 | 497 |
| 17 | 13 | 24 | 45 | 105 | 208 | 498 | 498 |
| 18 | 14 | 25 | 46 | 106 | 209 | 499 | 499 |
| 19 | 15 | 26 | 47 | 106 | 209 | 499 | 499 |
| 20 | 15 | 26 | 48 | 107 | 210 | 500 | 500 |
| 21 | 17 | 27 | 48 | 108 | 211 | 501 | 501 |
| 22 | 17 | 28 | 49 | 109 | 212 | 502 | 502 |
| 23 | 18 | 28 | 50 | 109 | 212 | 502 | 502 |
| 24 | 18 | 29 | 50 | 110 | 213 | 503 | 503 |
| 25 | 19 | 29 | 50 | 110 | 213 | 503 | 503 |
| 26 | 20 | 30 | 51 | 110 | 213 | 503 | 503 |
| 27 | 20 | 30 | 51 | 110 | 213 | 504 | 504 |
| 28 | 21 | 30 | 51 | 111 | 214 | 504 | 504 |
| 29 | 22 | 30 | 51 | 111 | 214 | 504 | 504 |
| 30 | 23 | 31 | 52 | 111 | 214 | 504 | 504 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

0

12

35

103

217

507

1 244

2

1

12

35

103

217

507

997

3

2

14

36

97

213

503

811

4

2

15

38

99

211

501

670

5

4

17

42

101

210

500

562

6

4

18

45

105

209

500

500

7

5

20

46

107

209

499

499

8

7

20

45

106

208

498

498

9

7

20

44

104

207

497

497

10

8

20

44

103

207

497

497

11

9

21

44

103

206

497

497

12

9

22

44

103

206

497

497

13

10

23

44

104

207

497

497

14

11

23

44

104

207

497

497

15

12

24

45

104

207

497

497

16

13

24

45

104

207

497

497

17

13

24

45

105

208

498

498

18

14

25

46

106

209

499

499

19

15

26

47

106

209

499

499

20

15

26

48

107

210

500

500

21

17

27

48

108

211

501

501

22

17

28

49

109

212

502

502

23

18

28

50

109

212

502

502

24

18

29

50

110

213

503

503

25

19

29

50

110

213

503

503

26

20

30

51

110

213

503

503

27

20

30

51

110

213

504

504

28

21

30

51

111

214

504

504

29

22

30

51

111

214

504

504

30

23

31

52

111

214

504

504

2.22   New Zealand dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 51 | 64 | 87 | 155 | 269 | 559 | 1 334 |
| 2 | 52 | 65 | 88 | 156 | 270 | 560 | 1 067 |
| 3 | 53 | 67 | 89 | 150 | 266 | 556 | 865 |
| 4 | 53 | 68 | 91 | 152 | 264 | 554 | 712 |
| 5 | 54 | 70 | 95 | 155 | 263 | 554 | 597 |
| 6 | 55 | 72 | 98 | 159 | 263 | 553 | 553 |
| 7 | 55 | 73 | 99 | 160 | 262 | 552 | 552 |
| 8 | 54 | 73 | 98 | 159 | 261 | 551 | 551 |
| 9 | 54 | 73 | 98 | 157 | 261 | 551 | 551 |
| 10 | 53 | 73 | 97 | 156 | 259 | 550 | 550 |
| 11 | 52 | 73 | 96 | 155 | 258 | 548 | 548 |
| 12 | 51 | 72 | 94 | 154 | 257 | 547 | 547 |
| 13 | 50 | 71 | 93 | 152 | 255 | 546 | 546 |
| 14 | 49 | 70 | 92 | 151 | 254 | 544 | 544 |
| 15 | 48 | 69 | 90 | 150 | 253 | 543 | 543 |
| 16 | 47 | 68 | 89 | 149 | 252 | 542 | 542 |
| 17 | 46 | 67 | 88 | 148 | 251 | 541 | 541 |
| 18 | 45 | 66 | 87 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 19 | 44 | 65 | 86 | 146 | 249 | 539 | 539 |
| 20 | 44 | 65 | 86 | 146 | 249 | 539 | 539 |
| 21 | 43 | 64 | 86 | 145 | 248 | 538 | 538 |
| 22 | 43 | 64 | 85 | 144 | 247 | 538 | 538 |
| 23 | 42 | 63 | 84 | 144 | 247 | 537 | 537 |
| 24 | 41 | 63 | 84 | 143 | 246 | 536 | 536 |
| 25 | 41 | 62 | 83 | 142 | 245 | 536 | 536 |
| 26 | 40 | 61 | 82 | 142 | 245 | 535 | 535 |
| 27 | 39 | 60 | 82 | 141 | 244 | 534 | 534 |
| 28 | 39 | 60 | 81 | 140 | 243 | 534 | 534 |
| 29 | 38 | 59 | 80 | 140 | 243 | 533 | 533 |
| 30 | 37 | 59 | 80 | 139 | 242 | 532 | 532 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

51

64

87

155

269

559

1 334

2

52

65

88

156

270

560

1 067

3

53

67

89

150

266

556

865

4

53

68

91

152

264

554

712

5

54

70

95

155

263

554

597

6

55

72

98

159

263

553

553

7

55

73

99

160

262

552

552

8

54

73

98

159

261

551

551

9

54

73

98

157

261

551

551

10

53

73

97

156

259

550

550

11

52

73

96

155

258

548

548

12

51

72

94

154

257

547

547

13

50

71

93

152

255

546

546

14

49

70

92

151

254

544

544

15

48

69

90

150

253

543

543

16

47

68

89

149

252

542

542

17

46

67

88

148

251

541

541

18

45

66

87

147

250

540

540

19

44

65

86

146

249

539

539

20

44

65

86

146

249

539

539

21

43

64

86

145

248

538

538

22

43

64

85

144

247

538

538

23

42

63

84

144

247

537

537

24

41

63

84

143

246

536

536

25

41

62

83

142

245

536

536

26

40

61

82

142

245

535

535

27

39

60

82

141

244

534

534

28

39

60

81

140

243

534

534

29

38

59

80

140

243

533

533

30

37

59

80

139

242

532

532

2.23   Rand

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 114 | 127 | 150 | 218 | 332 | 622 | 1 379 |
| 2 | 115 | 128 | 151 | 220 | 333 | 623 | 1 106 |
| 3 | 118 | 132 | 154 | 216 | 331 | 621 | 901 |
| 4 | 121 | 136 | 158 | 220 | 332 | 622 | 745 |
| 5 | 123 | 139 | 164 | 224 | 332 | 622 | 627 |
| 6 | 125 | 142 | 168 | 229 | 333 | 623 | 623 |
| 7 | 126 | 144 | 170 | 231 | 333 | 623 | 623 |
| 8 | 126 | 144 | 170 | 230 | 333 | 623 | 623 |
| 9 | 126 | 145 | 169 | 229 | 332 | 623 | 623 |
| 10 | 126 | 146 | 169 | 229 | 332 | 622 | 622 |
| 11 | 125 | 146 | 169 | 228 | 331 | 621 | 621 |
| 12 | 124 | 145 | 167 | 227 | 330 | 620 | 620 |
| 13 | 123 | 144 | 166 | 225 | 328 | 618 | 618 |
| 14 | 122 | 143 | 164 | 224 | 327 | 617 | 617 |
| 15 | 120 | 141 | 162 | 222 | 325 | 615 | 615 |
| 16 | 118 | 139 | 160 | 220 | 323 | 613 | 613 |
| 17 | 116 | 137 | 158 | 218 | 321 | 611 | 611 |
| 18 | 114 | 135 | 156 | 216 | 319 | 609 | 609 |
| 19 | 112 | 133 | 155 | 214 | 317 | 607 | 607 |
| 20 | 111 | 132 | 153 | 212 | 315 | 606 | 606 |
| 21 | 109 | 130 | 151 | 211 | 314 | 604 | 604 |
| 22 | 107 | 128 | 149 | 209 | 312 | 602 | 602 |
| 23 | 105 | 126 | 148 | 207 | 310 | 600 | 600 |
| 24 | 103 | 125 | 146 | 205 | 308 | 598 | 598 |
| 25 | 101 | 123 | 144 | 203 | 306 | 596 | 596 |
| 26 | 100 | 121 | 142 | 201 | 304 | 595 | 595 |
| 27 | 98 | 119 | 140 | 200 | 303 | 593 | 593 |
| 28 | 96 | 117 | 138 | 198 | 301 | 591 | 591 |
| 29 | 94 | 116 | 137 | 196 | 299 | 589 | 589 |
| 30 | 93 | 114 | 135 | 195 | 298 | 588 | 588 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

114

127

150

218

332

622

1 379

2

115

128

151

220

333

623

1 106

3

118

132

154

216

331

621

901

4

121

136

158

220

332

622

745

5

123

139

164

224

332

622

627

6

125

142

168

229

333

623

623

7

126

144

170

231

333

623

623

8

126

144

170

230

333

623

623

9

126

145

169

229

332

623

623

10

126

146

169

229

332

622

622

11

125

146

169

228

331

621

621

12

124

145

167

227

330

620

620

13

123

144

166

225

328

618

618

14

122

143

164

224

327

617

617

15

120

141

162

222

325

615

615

16

118

139

160

220

323

613

613

17

116

137

158

218

321

611

611

18

114

135

156

216

319

609

609

19

112

133

155

214

317

607

607

20

111

132

153

212

315

606

606

21

109

130

151

211

314

604

604

22

107

128

149

209

312

602

602

23

105

126

148

207

310

600

600

24

103

125

146

205

308

598

598

25

101

123

144

203

306

596

596

26

100

121

142

201

304

595

595

27

98

119

140

200

303

593

593

28

96

117

138

198

301

591

591

29

94

116

137

196

299

589

589

30

93

114

135

195

298

588

588

2.24   Real

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 167 | 180 | 203 | 271 | 385 | 675 | 1 487 |
| 2 | 176 | 189 | 212 | 280 | 394 | 684 | 1 187 |
| 3 | 182 | 196 | 218 | 279 | 395 | 685 | 964 |
| 4 | 185 | 200 | 222 | 283 | 395 | 685 | 796 |
| 5 | 186 | 202 | 227 | 287 | 396 | 686 | 686 |
| 6 | 187 | 204 | 230 | 291 | 395 | 685 | 685 |
| 7 | 187 | 205 | 231 | 292 | 394 | 684 | 684 |
| 8 | 186 | 204 | 230 | 290 | 393 | 683 | 683 |
| 9 | 185 | 204 | 229 | 289 | 392 | 682 | 682 |
| 10 | 184 | 204 | 228 | 287 | 391 | 681 | 681 |
| 11 | 183 | 204 | 226 | 286 | 389 | 679 | 679 |
| 12 | 181 | 202 | 224 | 284 | 387 | 677 | 677 |
| 13 | 179 | 200 | 222 | 281 | 384 | 674 | 674 |
| 14 | 176 | 198 | 219 | 278 | 381 | 671 | 671 |
| 15 | 173 | 195 | 216 | 275 | 378 | 668 | 668 |
| 16 | 171 | 192 | 213 | 272 | 375 | 666 | 666 |
| 17 | 168 | 189 | 210 | 269 | 372 | 663 | 663 |
| 18 | 165 | 186 | 207 | 267 | 370 | 660 | 660 |
| 19 | 162 | 183 | 204 | 264 | 367 | 657 | 657 |
| 20 | 159 | 180 | 201 | 261 | 364 | 654 | 654 |
| 21 | 156 | 177 | 198 | 258 | 361 | 651 | 651 |
| 22 | 153 | 174 | 195 | 255 | 358 | 648 | 648 |
| 23 | 150 | 171 | 192 | 252 | 355 | 645 | 645 |
| 24 | 147 | 168 | 189 | 249 | 352 | 642 | 642 |
| 25 | 144 | 165 | 186 | 245 | 349 | 639 | 639 |
| 26 | 141 | 162 | 183 | 243 | 346 | 636 | 636 |
| 27 | 138 | 159 | 180 | 240 | 343 | 633 | 633 |
| 28 | 135 | 156 | 177 | 237 | 340 | 630 | 630 |
| 29 | 132 | 153 | 175 | 234 | 337 | 627 | 627 |
| 30 | 130 | 151 | 172 | 231 | 334 | 625 | 625 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

167

180

203

271

385

675

1 487

2

176

189

212

280

394

684

1 187

3

182

196

218

279

395

685

964

4

185

200

222

283

395

685

796

5

186

202

227

287

396

686

686

6

187

204

230

291

395

685

685

7

187

205

231

292

394

684

684

8

186

204

230

290

393

683

683

9

185

204

229

289

392

682

682

10

184

204

228

287

391

681

681

11

183

204

226

286

389

679

679

12

181

202

224

284

387

677

677

13

179

200

222

281

384

674

674

14

176

198

219

278

381

671

671

15

173

195

216

275

378

668

668

16

171

192

213

272

375

666

666

17

168

189

210

269

372

663

663

18

165

186

207

267

370

660

660

19

162

183

204

264

367

657

657

20

159

180

201

261

364

654

654

21

156

177

198

258

361

651

651

22

153

174

195

255

358

648

648

23

150

171

192

252

355

645

645

24

147

168

189

249

352

642

642

25

144

165

186

245

349

639

639

26

141

162

183

243

346

636

636

27

138

159

180

240

343

633

633

28

135

156

177

237

340

630

630

29

132

153

175

234

337

627

627

30

130

151

172

231

334

625

625

2.25   Renminbi-yuan

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 32 | 45 | 68 | 136 | 250 | 540 | 1 267 |
| 2 | 33 | 46 | 69 | 137 | 250 | 541 | 1 017 |
| 3 | 34 | 48 | 70 | 132 | 247 | 537 | 828 |
| 4 | 35 | 50 | 73 | 134 | 246 | 536 | 685 |
| 5 | 36 | 52 | 77 | 137 | 246 | 536 | 575 |
| 6 | 37 | 54 | 80 | 141 | 245 | 535 | 535 |
| 7 | 37 | 55 | 81 | 143 | 244 | 534 | 534 |
| 8 | 36 | 55 | 80 | 141 | 243 | 533 | 533 |
| 9 | 35 | 55 | 79 | 139 | 242 | 533 | 533 |
| 10 | 35 | 55 | 79 | 139 | 242 | 532 | 532 |
| 11 | 35 | 56 | 79 | 138 | 241 | 531 | 531 |
| 12 | 35 | 56 | 78 | 138 | 241 | 531 | 531 |
| 13 | 35 | 56 | 78 | 137 | 240 | 530 | 530 |
| 14 | 35 | 56 | 77 | 137 | 240 | 530 | 530 |
| 15 | 35 | 56 | 77 | 136 | 239 | 530 | 530 |
| 16 | 35 | 56 | 77 | 136 | 239 | 529 | 529 |
| 17 | 35 | 56 | 77 | 136 | 239 | 530 | 530 |
| 18 | 35 | 56 | 77 | 136 | 239 | 530 | 530 |
| 19 | 35 | 56 | 77 | 137 | 240 | 530 | 530 |
| 20 | 35 | 56 | 77 | 137 | 240 | 530 | 530 |
| 21 | 35 | 56 | 77 | 137 | 240 | 530 | 530 |
| 22 | 35 | 56 | 77 | 137 | 240 | 530 | 530 |
| 23 | 35 | 56 | 77 | 136 | 239 | 530 | 530 |
| 24 | 34 | 56 | 77 | 136 | 239 | 529 | 529 |
| 25 | 34 | 55 | 76 | 136 | 239 | 529 | 529 |
| 26 | 34 | 55 | 76 | 136 | 239 | 529 | 529 |
| 27 | 33 | 55 | 76 | 135 | 238 | 528 | 528 |
| 28 | 33 | 54 | 75 | 135 | 238 | 528 | 528 |
| 29 | 33 | 54 | 75 | 135 | 238 | 528 | 528 |
| 30 | 32 | 54 | 75 | 134 | 237 | 527 | 527 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

32

45

68

136

250

540

1 267

2

33

46

69

137

250

541

1 017

3

34

48

70

132

247

537

828

4

35

50

73

134

246

536

685

5

36

52

77

137

246

536

575

6

37

54

80

141

245

535

535

7

37

55

81

143

244

534

534

8

36

55

80

141

243

533

533

9

35

55

79

139

242

533

533

10

35

55

79

139

242

532

532

11

35

56

79

138

241

531

531

12

35

56

78

138

241

531

531

13

35

56

78

137

240

530

530

14

35

56

77

137

240

530

530

15

35

56

77

136

239

530

530

16

35

56

77

136

239

529

529

17

35

56

77

136

239

530

530

18

35

56

77

136

239

530

530

19

35

56

77

137

240

530

530

20

35

56

77

137

240

530

530

21

35

56

77

137

240

530

530

22

35

56

77

137

240

530

530

23

35

56

77

136

239

530

530

24

34

56

77

136

239

529

529

25

34

55

76

136

239

529

529

26

34

55

76

136

239

529

529

27

33

55

76

135

238

528

528

28

33

54

75

135

238

528

528

29

33

54

75

135

238

528

528

30

32

54

75

134

237

527

527

2.26   Ringgit

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 30 | 42 | 65 | 134 | 247 | 537 | 1 292 |
| 2 | 31 | 44 | 67 | 135 | 249 | 539 | 1 038 |
| 3 | 34 | 48 | 70 | 132 | 247 | 537 | 844 |
| 4 | 37 | 52 | 74 | 135 | 247 | 537 | 698 |
| 5 | 39 | 55 | 80 | 139 | 248 | 538 | 586 |
| 6 | 40 | 57 | 83 | 144 | 248 | 538 | 538 |
| 7 | 42 | 60 | 86 | 147 | 249 | 539 | 539 |
| 8 | 42 | 61 | 86 | 146 | 249 | 539 | 539 |
| 9 | 42 | 62 | 86 | 146 | 249 | 539 | 539 |
| 10 | 43 | 63 | 87 | 146 | 249 | 540 | 540 |
| 11 | 44 | 65 | 87 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 12 | 45 | 66 | 88 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 13 | 45 | 66 | 88 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 14 | 45 | 66 | 87 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 15 | 45 | 66 | 87 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 16 | 45 | 66 | 87 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 17 | 45 | 66 | 87 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 18 | 45 | 66 | 87 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 19 | 45 | 66 | 88 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 20 | 46 | 67 | 88 | 147 | 250 | 541 | 541 |
| 21 | 46 | 67 | 88 | 148 | 251 | 541 | 541 |
| 22 | 46 | 67 | 88 | 147 | 250 | 541 | 541 |
| 23 | 45 | 67 | 88 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 24 | 45 | 66 | 87 | 147 | 250 | 540 | 540 |
| 25 | 44 | 66 | 87 | 146 | 249 | 539 | 539 |
| 26 | 44 | 65 | 86 | 146 | 249 | 539 | 539 |
| 27 | 43 | 65 | 86 | 145 | 248 | 538 | 538 |
| 28 | 43 | 64 | 85 | 145 | 248 | 538 | 538 |
| 29 | 42 | 63 | 84 | 144 | 247 | 537 | 537 |
| 30 | 42 | 63 | 84 | 143 | 246 | 537 | 537 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

30

42

65

134

247

537

1 292

2

31

44

67

135

249

539

1 038

3

34

48

70

132

247

537

844

4

37

52

74

135

247

537

698

5

39

55

80

139

248

538

586

6

40

57

83

144

248

538

538

7

42

60

86

147

249

539

539

8

42

61

86

146

249

539

539

9

42

62

86

146

249

539

539

10

43

63

87

146

249

540

540

11

44

65

87

147

250

540

540

12

45

66

88

147

250

540

540

13

45

66

88

147

250

540

540

14

45

66

87

147

250

540

540

15

45

66

87

147

250

540

540

16

45

66

87

147

250

540

540

17

45

66

87

147

250

540

540

18

45

66

87

147

250

540

540

19

45

66

88

147

250

540

540

20

46

67

88

147

250

541

541

21

46

67

88

148

251

541

541

22

46

67

88

147

250

541

541

23

45

67

88

147

250

540

540

24

45

66

87

147

250

540

540

25

44

66

87

146

249

539

539

26

44

65

86

146

249

539

539

27

43

65

86

145

248

538

538

28

43

64

85

145

248

538

538

29

42

63

84

144

247

537

537

30

42

63

84

143

246

537

537

2.27   Russian rouble

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 127 | 140 | 163 | 231 | 345 | 635 | 1 428 |
| 2 | 126 | 139 | 162 | 230 | 344 | 634 | 1 128 |
| 3 | 126 | 140 | 162 | 224 | 339 | 629 | 915 |
| 4 | 127 | 142 | 164 | 225 | 337 | 628 | 757 |
| 5 | 127 | 143 | 168 | 228 | 337 | 627 | 637 |
| 6 | 127 | 144 | 170 | 231 | 335 | 625 | 625 |
| 7 | 127 | 145 | 171 | 233 | 334 | 624 | 624 |
| 8 | 126 | 145 | 170 | 231 | 334 | 624 | 624 |
| 9 | 125 | 145 | 169 | 229 | 332 | 623 | 623 |
| 10 | 125 | 146 | 169 | 229 | 332 | 622 | 622 |
| 11 | 125 | 146 | 169 | 228 | 331 | 621 | 621 |
| 12 | 125 | 146 | 167 | 227 | 330 | 620 | 620 |
| 13 | 124 | 145 | 166 | 226 | 329 | 619 | 619 |
| 14 | 123 | 144 | 165 | 225 | 328 | 618 | 618 |
| 15 | 121 | 142 | 163 | 223 | 326 | 616 | 616 |
| 16 | 119 | 140 | 161 | 221 | 324 | 614 | 614 |
| 17 | 116 | 138 | 159 | 218 | 321 | 611 | 611 |
| 18 | 114 | 136 | 157 | 216 | 319 | 609 | 609 |
| 19 | 112 | 134 | 155 | 214 | 317 | 607 | 607 |
| 20 | 110 | 131 | 153 | 212 | 315 | 605 | 605 |
| 21 | 108 | 129 | 150 | 210 | 313 | 603 | 603 |
| 22 | 106 | 127 | 148 | 208 | 311 | 601 | 601 |
| 23 | 104 | 125 | 146 | 205 | 308 | 599 | 599 |
| 24 | 101 | 123 | 144 | 203 | 306 | 596 | 596 |
| 25 | 99 | 120 | 142 | 201 | 304 | 594 | 594 |
| 26 | 97 | 118 | 139 | 199 | 302 | 592 | 592 |
| 27 | 95 | 116 | 137 | 197 | 300 | 590 | 590 |
| 28 | 93 | 114 | 135 | 195 | 298 | 588 | 588 |
| 29 | 91 | 112 | 133 | 193 | 296 | 586 | 586 |
| 30 | 89 | 110 | 131 | 191 | 294 | 584 | 584 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

127

140

163

231

345

635

1 428

2

126

139

162

230

344

634

1 128

3

126

140

162

224

339

629

915

4

127

142

164

225

337

628

757

5

127

143

168

228

337

627

637

6

127

144

170

231

335

625

625

7

127

145

171

233

334

624

624

8

126

145

170

231

334

624

624

9

125

145

169

229

332

623

623

10

125

146

169

229

332

622

622

11

125

146

169

228

331

621

621

12

125

146

167

227

330

620

620

13

124

145

166

226

329

619

619

14

123

144

165

225

328

618

618

15

121

142

163

223

326

616

616

16

119

140

161

221

324

614

614

17

116

138

159

218

321

611

611

18

114

136

157

216

319

609

609

19

112

134

155

214

317

607

607

20

110

131

153

212

315

605

605

21

108

129

150

210

313

603

603

22

106

127

148

208

311

601

601

23

104

125

146

205

308

599

599

24

101

123

144

203

306

596

596

25

99

120

142

201

304

594

594

26

97

118

139

199

302

592

592

27

95

116

137

197

300

590

590

28

93

114

135

195

298

588

588

29

91

112

133

193

296

586

586

30

89

110

131

191

294

584

584

2.28   Singapore dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 1 | 14 | 37 | 105 | 219 | 509 | 1 307 |
| 2 | 3 | 16 | 39 | 107 | 221 | 511 | 1 042 |
| 3 | 6 | 19 | 41 | 103 | 219 | 509 | 845 |
| 4 | 8 | 23 | 45 | 107 | 219 | 509 | 697 |
| 5 | 10 | 26 | 51 | 111 | 219 | 509 | 584 |
| 6 | 11 | 29 | 55 | 116 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 7 | 13 | 31 | 57 | 118 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 8 | 13 | 32 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 9 | 13 | 32 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 10 | 13 | 33 | 57 | 116 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 11 | 14 | 34 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 510 | 510 |
| 12 | 14 | 35 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 13 | 14 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 14 | 14 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 15 | 14 | 35 | 56 | 115 | 218 | 509 | 509 |
| 16 | 13 | 34 | 56 | 115 | 218 | 508 | 508 |
| 17 | 14 | 34 | 56 | 115 | 218 | 508 | 508 |
| 18 | 14 | 35 | 56 | 115 | 218 | 508 | 508 |
| 19 | 15 | 35 | 56 | 115 | 218 | 508 | 508 |
| 20 | 16 | 35 | 56 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 21 | 17 | 36 | 57 | 116 | 219 | 509 | 509 |
| 22 | 18 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 23 | 18 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 24 | 19 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 25 | 19 | 36 | 57 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 26 | 20 | 36 | 58 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 27 | 20 | 37 | 58 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 28 | 22 | 37 | 58 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 29 | 22 | 37 | 58 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |
| 30 | 23 | 37 | 58 | 117 | 220 | 510 | 510 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

1

14

37

105

219

509

1 307

2

3

16

39

107

221

511

1 042

3

6

19

41

103

219

509

845

4

8

23

45

107

219

509

697

5

10

26

51

111

219

509

584

6

11

29

55

116

220

510

510

7

13

31

57

118

220

510

510

8

13

32

57

117

220

510

510

9

13

32

57

117

220

510

510

10

13

33

57

116

220

510

510

11

14

34

57

116

219

510

510

12

14

35

57

116

219

509

509

13

14

35

56

116

219

509

509

14

14

35

56

116

219

509

509

15

14

35

56

115

218

509

509

16

13

34

56

115

218

508

508

17

14

34

56

115

218

508

508

18

14

35

56

115

218

508

508

19

15

35

56

115

218

508

508

20

16

35

56

116

219

509

509

21

17

36

57

116

219

509

509

22

18

36

57

117

220

510

510

23

18

36

57

117

220

510

510

24

19

36

57

117

220

510

510

25

19

36

57

117

220

510

510

26

20

36

58

117

220

510

510

27

20

37

58

117

220

510

510

28

22

37

58

117

220

510

510

29

22

37

58

117

220

510

510

30

23

37

58

117

220

510

510

2.29   South Korean won

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 36 | 48 | 71 | 140 | 253 | 543 | 1 303 |
| 2 | 36 | 49 | 72 | 140 | 254 | 544 | 1 042 |
| 3 | 36 | 50 | 72 | 134 | 249 | 539 | 845 |
| 4 | 36 | 51 | 74 | 135 | 247 | 537 | 697 |
| 5 | 37 | 53 | 78 | 137 | 246 | 536 | 584 |
| 6 | 39 | 56 | 82 | 143 | 247 | 537 | 537 |
| 7 | 37 | 55 | 81 | 142 | 244 | 534 | 534 |
| 8 | 40 | 59 | 84 | 144 | 247 | 537 | 537 |
| 9 | 39 | 58 | 83 | 143 | 246 | 536 | 536 |
| 10 | 34 | 54 | 78 | 138 | 241 | 531 | 531 |
| 11 | 31 | 51 | 74 | 133 | 236 | 527 | 527 |
| 12 | 28 | 49 | 71 | 130 | 233 | 524 | 524 |
| 13 | 26 | 47 | 69 | 128 | 231 | 521 | 521 |
| 14 | 24 | 46 | 67 | 126 | 229 | 519 | 519 |
| 15 | 23 | 44 | 65 | 125 | 228 | 518 | 518 |
| 16 | 22 | 43 | 64 | 123 | 226 | 517 | 517 |
| 17 | 21 | 42 | 63 | 123 | 226 | 516 | 516 |
| 18 | 20 | 41 | 62 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 19 | 20 | 41 | 62 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 20 | 20 | 41 | 62 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 21 | 20 | 41 | 62 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 22 | 20 | 41 | 62 | 122 | 225 | 515 | 515 |
| 23 | 20 | 41 | 62 | 121 | 224 | 515 | 515 |
| 24 | 20 | 41 | 62 | 121 | 224 | 515 | 515 |
| 25 | 19 | 41 | 62 | 121 | 224 | 514 | 514 |
| 26 | 20 | 41 | 62 | 121 | 224 | 514 | 514 |
| 27 | 20 | 40 | 61 | 121 | 224 | 514 | 514 |
| 28 | 22 | 40 | 61 | 121 | 224 | 514 | 514 |
| 29 | 22 | 40 | 61 | 121 | 224 | 514 | 514 |
| 30 | 23 | 40 | 61 | 120 | 223 | 514 | 514 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

36

48

71

140

253

543

1 303

2

36

49

72

140

254

544

1 042

3

36

50

72

134

249

539

845

4

36

51

74

135

247

537

697

5

37

53

78

137

246

536

584

6

39

56

82

143

247

537

537

7

37

55

81

142

244

534

534

8

40

59

84

144

247

537

537

9

39

58

83

143

246

536

536

10

34

54

78

138

241

531

531

11

31

51

74

133

236

527

527

12

28

49

71

130

233

524

524

13

26

47

69

128

231

521

521

14

24

46

67

126

229

519

519

15

23

44

65

125

228

518

518

16

22

43

64

123

226

517

517

17

21

42

63

123

226

516

516

18

20

41

62

122

225

515

515

19

20

41

62

122

225

515

515

20

20

41

62

122

225

515

515

21

20

41

62

122

225

515

515

22

20

41

62

122

225

515

515

23

20

41

62

121

224

515

515

24

20

41

62

121

224

515

515

25

19

41

62

121

224

514

514

26

20

41

62

121

224

514

514

27

20

40

61

121

224

514

514

28

22

40

61

121

224

514

514

29

22

40

61

121

224

514

514

30

23

40

61

120

223

514

514

2.30   Turkish lira

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 211 | 224 | 246 | 315 | 428 | 719 | 1 471 |
| 2 | 207 | 220 | 243 | 312 | 425 | 715 | 1 146 |
| 3 | 204 | 218 | 240 | 301 | 417 | 707 | 922 |
| 4 | 201 | 216 | 238 | 299 | 411 | 702 | 758 |
| 5 | 197 | 213 | 238 | 298 | 406 | 696 | 696 |
| 6 | 193 | 210 | 237 | 297 | 401 | 692 | 692 |
| 7 | 190 | 208 | 234 | 295 | 397 | 687 | 687 |
| 8 | 185 | 204 | 230 | 290 | 393 | 683 | 683 |
| 9 | 181 | 201 | 225 | 285 | 388 | 678 | 678 |
| 10 | 178 | 198 | 221 | 281 | 384 | 674 | 674 |
| 11 | 174 | 195 | 217 | 277 | 380 | 670 | 670 |
| 12 | 170 | 191 | 213 | 273 | 376 | 666 | 666 |
| 13 | 167 | 188 | 209 | 269 | 372 | 662 | 662 |
| 14 | 163 | 184 | 205 | 265 | 368 | 658 | 658 |
| 15 | 159 | 181 | 202 | 261 | 364 | 654 | 654 |
| 16 | 156 | 177 | 198 | 258 | 361 | 651 | 651 |
| 17 | 153 | 174 | 195 | 254 | 357 | 648 | 648 |
| 18 | 149 | 171 | 192 | 251 | 354 | 644 | 644 |
| 19 | 146 | 168 | 189 | 248 | 351 | 641 | 641 |
| 20 | 143 | 165 | 186 | 245 | 348 | 638 | 638 |
| 21 | 141 | 162 | 183 | 242 | 345 | 636 | 636 |
| 22 | 138 | 159 | 180 | 239 | 342 | 633 | 633 |
| 23 | 135 | 156 | 177 | 237 | 340 | 630 | 630 |
| 24 | 132 | 153 | 174 | 234 | 337 | 627 | 627 |
| 25 | 129 | 150 | 171 | 231 | 334 | 624 | 624 |
| 26 | 126 | 148 | 169 | 228 | 331 | 621 | 621 |
| 27 | 124 | 145 | 166 | 226 | 329 | 619 | 619 |
| 28 | 121 | 143 | 164 | 223 | 326 | 616 | 616 |
| 29 | 119 | 140 | 161 | 221 | 324 | 614 | 614 |
| 30 | 117 | 138 | 159 | 218 | 321 | 612 | 612 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

211

224

246

315

428

719

1 471

2

207

220

243

312

425

715

1 146

3

204

218

240

301

417

707

922

4

201

216

238

299

411

702

758

5

197

213

238

298

406

696

696

6

193

210

237

297

401

692

692

7

190

208

234

295

397

687

687

8

185

204

230

290

393

683

683

9

181

201

225

285

388

678

678

10

178

198

221

281

384

674

674

11

174

195

217

277

380

670

670

12

170

191

213

273

376

666

666

13

167

188

209

269

372

662

662

14

163

184

205

265

368

658

658

15

159

181

202

261

364

654

654

16

156

177

198

258

361

651

651

17

153

174

195

254

357

648

648

18

149

171

192

251

354

644

644

19

146

168

189

248

351

641

641

20

143

165

186

245

348

638

638

21

141

162

183

242

345

636

636

22

138

159

180

239

342

633

633

23

135

156

177

237

340

630

630

24

132

153

174

234

337

627

627

25

129

150

171

231

334

624

624

26

126

148

169

228

331

621

621

27

124

145

166

226

329

619

619

28

121

143

164

223

326

616

616

29

119

140

161

221

324

614

614

30

117

138

159

218

321

612

612

2.31   US dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 8 | 25 | 48 | 100 | 235 | 525 | 1 325 |
| 2 | 8 | 25 | 48 | 100 | 235 | 525 | 1 057 |
| 3 | 10 | 28 | 50 | 97 | 233 | 523 | 855 |
| 4 | 12 | 32 | 54 | 95 | 233 | 523 | 704 |
| 5 | 16 | 38 | 59 | 98 | 234 | 524 | 590 |
| 6 | 18 | 42 | 63 | 95 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 7 | 19 | 44 | 63 | 90 | 234 | 525 | 525 |
| 8 | 18 | 43 | 62 | 89 | 234 | 525 | 525 |
| 9 | 19 | 45 | 64 | 92 | 234 | 525 | 525 |
| 10 | 21 | 48 | 67 | 96 | 234 | 525 | 525 |
| 11 | 23 | 50 | 68 | 99 | 234 | 525 | 525 |
| 12 | 24 | 52 | 69 | 100 | 234 | 525 | 525 |
| 13 | 26 | 54 | 70 | 100 | 234 | 525 | 525 |
| 14 | 26 | 54 | 71 | 100 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 15 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 16 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 17 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 18 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 19 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 20 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 234 | 525 | 525 |
| 21 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 235 | 525 | 525 |
| 22 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 235 | 525 | 525 |
| 23 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 235 | 525 | 525 |
| 24 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 234 | 525 | 525 |
| 25 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 26 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 27 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 234 | 524 | 524 |
| 28 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 29 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 233 | 523 | 523 |
| 30 | 26 | 55 | 71 | 100 | 233 | 523 | 523 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

8

25

48

100

235

525

1 325

2

8

25

48

100

235

525

1 057

3

10

28

50

97

233

523

855

4

12

32

54

95

233

523

704

5

16

38

59

98

234

524

590

6

18

42

63

95

234

524

524

7

19

44

63

90

234

525

525

8

18

43

62

89

234

525

525

9

19

45

64

92

234

525

525

10

21

48

67

96

234

525

525

11

23

50

68

99

234

525

525

12

24

52

69

100

234

525

525

13

26

54

70

100

234

525

525

14

26

54

71

100

234

524

524

15

26

55

71

100

234

524

524

16

26

55

71

100

234

524

524

17

26

55

71

100

234

524

524

18

26

55

71

100

234

524

524

19

26

55

71

100

234

524

524

20

26

55

71

100

234

525

525

21

26

55

71

100

235

525

525

22

26

55

71

100

235

525

525

23

26

55

71

100

235

525

525

24

26

55

71

100

234

525

525

25

26

55

71

100

234

524

524

26

26

55

71

100

234

524

524

27

26

55

71

100

234

524

524

28

26

55

71

100

233

523

523

29

26

55

71

100

233

523

523

30

26

55

71

100

233

523

523

2.32   Yen

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 3 | 15 | 83 | 197 | 487 | 1 225 |
| 2 | 1 | 5 | 13 | 82 | 195 | 485 | 981 |
| 3 | 2 | 5 | 13 | 75 | 190 | 480 | 797 |
| 4 | 2 | 6 | 15 | 76 | 188 | 478 | 659 |
| 5 | 4 | 6 | 19 | 79 | 187 | 478 | 553 |
| 6 | 4 | 7 | 22 | 83 | 187 | 477 | 477 |
| 7 | 5 | 9 | 24 | 85 | 187 | 477 | 477 |
| 8 | 7 | 9 | 23 | 84 | 187 | 477 | 477 |
| 9 | 7 | 10 | 23 | 83 | 186 | 477 | 477 |
| 10 | 8 | 10 | 24 | 83 | 187 | 477 | 477 |
| 11 | 9 | 11 | 24 | 84 | 187 | 477 | 477 |
| 12 | 9 | 13 | 24 | 84 | 187 | 477 | 477 |
| 13 | 10 | 13 | 24 | 84 | 187 | 477 | 477 |
| 14 | 11 | 14 | 25 | 84 | 187 | 477 | 477 |
| 15 | 12 | 14 | 25 | 85 | 188 | 478 | 478 |
| 16 | 13 | 15 | 26 | 85 | 188 | 478 | 478 |
| 17 | 13 | 16 | 27 | 85 | 188 | 478 | 478 |
| 18 | 14 | 17 | 28 | 86 | 189 | 479 | 479 |
| 19 | 14 | 18 | 30 | 86 | 189 | 479 | 479 |
| 20 | 15 | 18 | 31 | 87 | 190 | 480 | 480 |
| 21 | 16 | 19 | 32 | 87 | 190 | 480 | 480 |
| 22 | 17 | 20 | 33 | 87 | 190 | 481 | 481 |
| 23 | 18 | 21 | 34 | 88 | 191 | 481 | 481 |
| 24 | 18 | 21 | 36 | 88 | 191 | 481 | 481 |
| 25 | 19 | 22 | 37 | 88 | 191 | 481 | 481 |
| 26 | 19 | 23 | 38 | 88 | 191 | 481 | 481 |
| 27 | 20 | 23 | 39 | 88 | 191 | 481 | 481 |
| 28 | 20 | 25 | 40 | 88 | 191 | 481 | 481 |
| 29 | 21 | 25 | 41 | 88 | 191 | 481 | 481 |
| 30 | 22 | 26 | 42 | 88 | 191 | 481 | 481 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

0

3

15

83

197

487

1 225

2

1

5

13

82

195

485

981

3

2

5

13

75

190

480

797

4

2

6

15

76

188

478

659

5

4

6

19

79

187

478

553

6

4

7

22

83

187

477

477

7

5

9

24

85

187

477

477

8

7

9

23

84

187

477

477

9

7

10

23

83

186

477

477

10

8

10

24

83

187

477

477

11

9

11

24

84

187

477

477

12

9

13

24

84

187

477

477

13

10

13

24

84

187

477

477

14

11

14

25

84

187

477

477

15

12

14

25

85

188

478

478

16

13

15

26

85

188

478

478

17

13

16

27

85

188

478

478

18

14

17

28

86

189

479

479

19

14

18

30

86

189

479

479

20

15

18

31

87

190

480

480

21

16

19

32

87

190

480

480

22

17

20

33

87

190

481

481

23

18

21

34

88

191

481

481

24

18

21

36

88

191

481

481

25

19

22

37

88

191

481

481

26

19

23

38

88

191

481

481

27

20

23

39

88

191

481

481

28

20

25

40

88

191

481

481

29

21

25

41

88

191

481

481

30

22

26

42

88

191

481

481

3.   Other exposures

3.1   Euro

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 2 | 14 | 20 | 42 | 159 | 307 | 3 179 |
| 2 | 2 | 14 | 20 | 42 | 159 | 350 | 2 377 |
| 3 | 2 | 14 | 23 | 46 | 154 | 365 | 1 795 |
| 4 | 2 | 15 | 26 | 50 | 151 | 365 | 1 388 |
| 5 | 3 | 17 | 29 | 52 | 151 | 356 | 1 100 |
| 6 | 4 | 20 | 31 | 55 | 151 | 343 | 892 |
| 7 | 6 | 22 | 33 | 57 | 151 | 326 | 737 |
| 8 | 6 | 23 | 34 | 60 | 151 | 309 | 620 |
| 9 | 6 | 24 | 36 | 63 | 151 | 291 | 528 |
| 10 | 6 | 25 | 37 | 64 | 151 | 274 | 454 |
| 11 | 7 | 25 | 38 | 65 | 151 | 257 | 394 |
| 12 | 7 | 25 | 38 | 66 | 151 | 245 | 345 |
| 13 | 7 | 26 | 38 | 66 | 151 | 245 | 304 |
| 14 | 7 | 26 | 38 | 66 | 151 | 245 | 269 |
| 15 | 7 | 26 | 40 | 66 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 16 | 7 | 26 | 43 | 66 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 17 | 7 | 26 | 45 | 66 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 18 | 7 | 26 | 47 | 66 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 19 | 7 | 26 | 50 | 66 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 20 | 7 | 26 | 52 | 66 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 21 | 7 | 26 | 55 | 66 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 22 | 9 | 26 | 57 | 66 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 23 | 9 | 26 | 59 | 66 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 24 | 10 | 26 | 62 | 66 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 25 | 10 | 26 | 64 | 67 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 26 | 10 | 26 | 67 | 68 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 27 | 11 | 26 | 69 | 70 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 28 | 11 | 26 | 72 | 72 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 29 | 11 | 26 | 74 | 74 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 30 | 12 | 26 | 77 | 76 | 151 | 245 | 245 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

2

14

20

42

159

307

3 179

2

2

14

20

42

159

350

2 377

3

2

14

23

46

154

365

1 795

4

2

15

26

50

151

365

1 388

5

3

17

29

52

151

356

1 100

6

4

20

31

55

151

343

892

7

6

22

33

57

151

326

737

8

6

23

34

60

151

309

620

9

6

24

36

63

151

291

528

10

6

25

37

64

151

274

454

11

7

25

38

65

151

257

394

12

7

25

38

66

151

245

345

13

7

26

38

66

151

245

304

14

7

26

38

66

151

245

269

15

7

26

40

66

151

245

245

16

7

26

43

66

151

245

245

17

7

26

45

66

151

245

245

18

7

26

47

66

151

245

245

19

7

26

50

66

151

245

245

20

7

26

52

66

151

245

245

21

7

26

55

66

151

245

245

22

9

26

57

66

151

245

245

23

9

26

59

66

151

245

245

24

10

26

62

66

151

245

245

25

10

26

64

67

151

245

245

26

10

26

67

68

151

245

245

27

11

26

69

70

151

245

245

28

11

26

72

72

151

245

245

29

11

26

74

74

151

245

245

30

12

26

77

76

151

245

245

3.2   Czech koruna

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 13 | 25 | 32 | 53 | 170 | 323 | 3 351 |
| 2 | 15 | 27 | 33 | 54 | 172 | 366 | 2 496 |
| 3 | 14 | 27 | 36 | 59 | 167 | 380 | 1 878 |
| 4 | 14 | 28 | 38 | 63 | 164 | 378 | 1 446 |
| 5 | 14 | 29 | 40 | 64 | 163 | 368 | 1 143 |
| 6 | 15 | 31 | 42 | 66 | 162 | 353 | 924 |
| 7 | 16 | 32 | 43 | 67 | 161 | 336 | 763 |
| 8 | 15 | 32 | 44 | 69 | 161 | 318 | 640 |
| 9 | 15 | 33 | 44 | 71 | 160 | 299 | 545 |
| 10 | 15 | 33 | 46 | 73 | 160 | 281 | 468 |
| 11 | 14 | 33 | 45 | 73 | 159 | 264 | 406 |
| 12 | 14 | 33 | 45 | 73 | 158 | 252 | 355 |
| 13 | 13 | 32 | 45 | 72 | 158 | 251 | 313 |
| 14 | 13 | 32 | 44 | 71 | 157 | 251 | 277 |
| 15 | 13 | 31 | 44 | 71 | 157 | 250 | 250 |
| 16 | 12 | 31 | 44 | 71 | 156 | 250 | 250 |
| 17 | 12 | 31 | 46 | 71 | 156 | 250 | 250 |
| 18 | 12 | 31 | 48 | 71 | 156 | 250 | 250 |
| 19 | 12 | 31 | 51 | 71 | 156 | 250 | 250 |
| 20 | 12 | 31 | 54 | 71 | 157 | 250 | 250 |
| 21 | 13 | 31 | 57 | 71 | 157 | 250 | 250 |
| 22 | 13 | 31 | 58 | 71 | 157 | 251 | 251 |
| 23 | 13 | 32 | 61 | 71 | 157 | 251 | 251 |
| 24 | 13 | 32 | 63 | 71 | 157 | 251 | 251 |
| 25 | 13 | 32 | 66 | 71 | 157 | 251 | 251 |
| 26 | 13 | 31 | 68 | 71 | 157 | 251 | 251 |
| 27 | 13 | 31 | 71 | 72 | 157 | 250 | 250 |
| 28 | 13 | 31 | 73 | 73 | 157 | 250 | 250 |
| 29 | 13 | 31 | 76 | 75 | 157 | 250 | 250 |
| 30 | 12 | 31 | 79 | 78 | 157 | 250 | 250 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

13

25

32

53

170

323

3 351

2

15

27

33

54

172

366

2 496

3

14

27

36

59

167

380

1 878

4

14

28

38

63

164

378

1 446

5

14

29

40

64

163

368

1 143

6

15

31

42

66

162

353

924

7

16

32

43

67

161

336

763

8

15

32

44

69

161

318

640

9

15

33

44

71

160

299

545

10

15

33

46

73

160

281

468

11

14

33

45

73

159

264

406

12

14

33

45

73

158

252

355

13

13

32

45

72

158

251

313

14

13

32

44

71

157

251

277

15

13

31

44

71

157

250

250

16

12

31

44

71

156

250

250

17

12

31

46

71

156

250

250

18

12

31

48

71

156

250

250

19

12

31

51

71

156

250

250

20

12

31

54

71

157

250

250

21

13

31

57

71

157

250

250

22

13

31

58

71

157

251

251

23

13

32

61

71

157

251

251

24

13

32

63

71

157

251

251

25

13

32

66

71

157

251

251

26

13

31

68

71

157

251

251

27

13

31

71

72

157

250

250

28

13

31

73

73

157

250

250

29

13

31

76

75

157

250

250

30

12

31

79

78

157

250

250

3.3   Danish krone

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 2 | 14 | 20 | 41 | 159 | 307 | 3 179 |
| 2 | 2 | 14 | 20 | 41 | 159 | 350 | 2 376 |
| 3 | 1 | 14 | 23 | 46 | 153 | 365 | 1 795 |
| 4 | 1 | 15 | 25 | 50 | 151 | 365 | 1 388 |
| 5 | 2 | 17 | 29 | 52 | 151 | 356 | 1 100 |
| 6 | 4 | 20 | 31 | 55 | 151 | 343 | 892 |
| 7 | 5 | 22 | 33 | 57 | 151 | 326 | 737 |
| 8 | 6 | 23 | 34 | 60 | 151 | 309 | 620 |
| 9 | 6 | 24 | 35 | 62 | 151 | 291 | 527 |
| 10 | 6 | 25 | 37 | 64 | 151 | 274 | 454 |
| 11 | 7 | 25 | 38 | 65 | 151 | 257 | 394 |
| 12 | 7 | 25 | 38 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 345 |
| 13 | 7 | 25 | 38 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 304 |
| 14 | 7 | 25 | 38 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 269 |
| 15 | 7 | 25 | 40 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 16 | 7 | 25 | 43 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 17 | 7 | 25 | 45 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 18 | 7 | 25 | 47 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 19 | 7 | 25 | 50 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 20 | 7 | 25 | 52 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 21 | 7 | 25 | 55 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 22 | 9 | 25 | 57 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 23 | 9 | 25 | 59 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 24 | 10 | 25 | 62 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 25 | 10 | 25 | 64 | 67 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 26 | 10 | 25 | 67 | 68 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 27 | 11 | 25 | 69 | 70 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 28 | 11 | 25 | 72 | 72 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 29 | 11 | 25 | 74 | 74 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 30 | 12 | 26 | 77 | 76 | 151 | 245 | 245 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

2

14

20

41

159

307

3 179

2

2

14

20

41

159

350

2 376

3

1

14

23

46

153

365

1 795

4

1

15

25

50

151

365

1 388

5

2

17

29

52

151

356

1 100

6

4

20

31

55

151

343

892

7

5

22

33

57

151

326

737

8

6

23

34

60

151

309

620

9

6

24

35

62

151

291

527

10

6

25

37

64

151

274

454

11

7

25

38

65

151

257

394

12

7

25

38

65

151

244

345

13

7

25

38

65

151

244

304

14

7

25

38

65

151

244

269

15

7

25

40

65

151

244

244

16

7

25

43

65

151

244

244

17

7

25

45

65

151

244

244

18

7

25

47

65

151

244

244

19

7

25

50

65

151

244

244

20

7

25

52

65

151

244

244

21

7

25

55

65

151

244

244

22

9

25

57

65

151

244

244

23

9

25

59

65

151

244

244

24

10

25

62

65

151

244

244

25

10

25

64

67

151

244

244

26

10

25

67

68

151

245

245

27

11

25

69

70

151

245

245

28

11

25

72

72

151

245

245

29

11

25

74

74

151

245

245

30

12

26

77

76

151

245

245

3.4   Forint

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 74 | 86 | 92 | 114 | 231 | 356 | 3 733 |
| 2 | 71 | 83 | 89 | 110 | 228 | 400 | 2 761 |
| 3 | 73 | 86 | 94 | 118 | 225 | 413 | 2 063 |
| 4 | 71 | 85 | 95 | 120 | 221 | 408 | 1 579 |
| 5 | 70 | 85 | 96 | 120 | 219 | 395 | 1 242 |
| 6 | 70 | 86 | 97 | 121 | 218 | 378 | 1 001 |
| 7 | 70 | 87 | 97 | 122 | 216 | 359 | 824 |
| 8 | 69 | 86 | 97 | 123 | 215 | 339 | 690 |
| 9 | 68 | 86 | 98 | 125 | 214 | 319 | 586 |
| 10 | 66 | 84 | 96 | 124 | 210 | 304 | 504 |
| 11 | 64 | 82 | 95 | 122 | 208 | 301 | 437 |
| 12 | 62 | 81 | 94 | 121 | 207 | 300 | 382 |
| 13 | 62 | 80 | 93 | 120 | 206 | 300 | 336 |
| 14 | 61 | 80 | 93 | 120 | 206 | 299 | 299 |
| 15 | 61 | 80 | 92 | 120 | 206 | 299 | 299 |
| 16 | 61 | 79 | 92 | 119 | 205 | 298 | 298 |
| 17 | 60 | 79 | 91 | 119 | 205 | 298 | 298 |
| 18 | 60 | 78 | 91 | 118 | 204 | 298 | 298 |
| 19 | 59 | 78 | 90 | 118 | 204 | 297 | 297 |
| 20 | 59 | 77 | 90 | 117 | 203 | 296 | 296 |
| 21 | 58 | 77 | 89 | 117 | 202 | 296 | 296 |
| 22 | 57 | 76 | 88 | 116 | 202 | 295 | 295 |
| 23 | 56 | 75 | 87 | 115 | 201 | 294 | 294 |
| 24 | 55 | 74 | 86 | 114 | 200 | 293 | 293 |
| 25 | 54 | 73 | 85 | 113 | 199 | 292 | 292 |
| 26 | 53 | 72 | 84 | 112 | 198 | 291 | 291 |
| 27 | 52 | 71 | 83 | 111 | 197 | 290 | 290 |
| 28 | 51 | 70 | 82 | 110 | 196 | 289 | 289 |
| 29 | 50 | 69 | 81 | 109 | 195 | 288 | 288 |
| 30 | 49 | 68 | 83 | 108 | 194 | 287 | 287 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

74

86

92

114

231

356

3 733

2

71

83

89

110

228

400

2 761

3

73

86

94

118

225

413

2 063

4

71

85

95

120

221

408

1 579

5

70

85

96

120

219

395

1 242

6

70

86

97

121

218

378

1 001

7

70

87

97

122

216

359

824

8

69

86

97

123

215

339

690

9

68

86

98

125

214

319

586

10

66

84

96

124

210

304

504

11

64

82

95

122

208

301

437

12

62

81

94

121

207

300

382

13

62

80

93

120

206

300

336

14

61

80

93

120

206

299

299

15

61

80

92

120

206

299

299

16

61

79

92

119

205

298

298

17

60

79

91

119

205

298

298

18

60

78

91

118

204

298

298

19

59

78

90

118

204

297

297

20

59

77

90

117

203

296

296

21

58

77

89

117

202

296

296

22

57

76

88

116

202

295

295

23

56

75

87

115

201

294

294

24

55

74

86

114

200

293

293

25

54

73

85

113

199

292

292

26

53

72

84

112

198

291

291

27

52

71

83

111

197

290

290

28

51

70

82

110

196

289

289

29

50

69

81

109

195

288

288

30

49

68

83

108

194

287

287

3.5   Krona

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 6 | 18 | 25 | 46 | 163 | 309 | 3 195 |
| 2 | 8 | 20 | 26 | 47 | 165 | 351 | 2 383 |
| 3 | 8 | 21 | 29 | 53 | 160 | 366 | 1 800 |
| 4 | 9 | 23 | 33 | 57 | 159 | 366 | 1 391 |
| 5 | 10 | 25 | 36 | 60 | 159 | 357 | 1 102 |
| 6 | 11 | 27 | 38 | 63 | 159 | 343 | 893 |
| 7 | 13 | 29 | 40 | 64 | 158 | 326 | 738 |
| 8 | 12 | 30 | 41 | 66 | 158 | 309 | 620 |
| 9 | 12 | 30 | 42 | 69 | 158 | 291 | 528 |
| 10 | 12 | 31 | 43 | 70 | 157 | 274 | 454 |
| 11 | 13 | 31 | 44 | 71 | 157 | 257 | 394 |
| 12 | 13 | 31 | 44 | 71 | 157 | 250 | 345 |
| 13 | 13 | 31 | 44 | 71 | 157 | 250 | 304 |
| 14 | 13 | 31 | 44 | 71 | 157 | 251 | 269 |
| 15 | 13 | 32 | 44 | 71 | 157 | 251 | 251 |
| 16 | 13 | 31 | 44 | 71 | 157 | 250 | 250 |
| 17 | 13 | 32 | 45 | 72 | 157 | 251 | 251 |
| 18 | 13 | 32 | 47 | 72 | 158 | 251 | 251 |
| 19 | 13 | 32 | 50 | 72 | 158 | 251 | 251 |
| 20 | 14 | 33 | 53 | 73 | 158 | 252 | 252 |
| 21 | 14 | 33 | 55 | 73 | 159 | 252 | 252 |
| 22 | 15 | 33 | 58 | 73 | 159 | 252 | 252 |
| 23 | 15 | 33 | 59 | 73 | 159 | 252 | 252 |
| 24 | 15 | 33 | 62 | 73 | 159 | 253 | 253 |
| 25 | 15 | 33 | 65 | 73 | 159 | 253 | 253 |
| 26 | 15 | 33 | 67 | 73 | 159 | 252 | 252 |
| 27 | 15 | 33 | 70 | 73 | 159 | 252 | 252 |
| 28 | 15 | 33 | 72 | 73 | 159 | 252 | 252 |
| 29 | 14 | 33 | 74 | 75 | 159 | 252 | 252 |
| 30 | 14 | 33 | 78 | 77 | 159 | 252 | 252 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

6

18

25

46

163

309

3 195

2

8

20

26

47

165

351

2 383

3

8

21

29

53

160

366

1 800

4

9

23

33

57

159

366

1 391

5

10

25

36

60

159

357

1 102

6

11

27

38

63

159

343

893

7

13

29

40

64

158

326

738

8

12

30

41

66

158

309

620

9

12

30

42

69

158

291

528

10

12

31

43

70

157

274

454

11

13

31

44

71

157

257

394

12

13

31

44

71

157

250

345

13

13

31

44

71

157

250

304

14

13

31

44

71

157

251

269

15

13

32

44

71

157

251

251

16

13

31

44

71

157

250

250

17

13

32

45

72

157

251

251

18

13

32

47

72

158

251

251

19

13

32

50

72

158

251

251

20

14

33

53

73

158

252

252

21

14

33

55

73

159

252

252

22

15

33

58

73

159

252

252

23

15

33

59

73

159

252

252

24

15

33

62

73

159

253

253

25

15

33

65

73

159

253

253

26

15

33

67

73

159

252

252

27

15

33

70

73

159

252

252

28

15

33

72

73

159

252

252

29

14

33

74

75

159

252

252

30

14

33

78

77

159

252

252

3.6   Kuna

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 41 | 53 | 59 | 80 | 198 | 304 | 3 145 |
| 2 | 44 | 56 | 63 | 84 | 201 | 348 | 2 357 |
| 3 | 48 | 61 | 69 | 93 | 200 | 364 | 1 786 |
| 4 | 50 | 64 | 74 | 99 | 200 | 365 | 1 384 |
| 5 | 52 | 67 | 78 | 102 | 201 | 357 | 1 099 |
| 6 | 54 | 70 | 81 | 105 | 201 | 344 | 893 |
| 7 | 55 | 72 | 82 | 107 | 201 | 328 | 740 |
| 8 | 55 | 72 | 83 | 109 | 200 | 312 | 623 |
| 9 | 54 | 72 | 84 | 110 | 199 | 294 | 531 |
| 10 | 53 | 72 | 84 | 111 | 198 | 292 | 458 |
| 11 | 52 | 71 | 84 | 111 | 197 | 290 | 398 |
| 12 | 51 | 70 | 83 | 110 | 196 | 289 | 349 |
| 13 | 50 | 69 | 81 | 109 | 195 | 288 | 307 |
| 14 | 49 | 68 | 80 | 108 | 194 | 287 | 287 |
| 15 | 48 | 67 | 79 | 107 | 193 | 286 | 286 |
| 16 | 48 | 66 | 79 | 106 | 192 | 285 | 285 |
| 17 | 47 | 66 | 78 | 106 | 192 | 285 | 285 |
| 18 | 47 | 65 | 78 | 105 | 191 | 284 | 284 |
| 19 | 46 | 65 | 77 | 105 | 191 | 284 | 284 |
| 20 | 46 | 64 | 77 | 104 | 190 | 283 | 283 |
| 21 | 45 | 64 | 76 | 104 | 190 | 283 | 283 |
| 22 | 44 | 63 | 75 | 103 | 189 | 282 | 282 |
| 23 | 44 | 62 | 75 | 102 | 188 | 281 | 281 |
| 24 | 43 | 62 | 74 | 101 | 187 | 281 | 281 |
| 25 | 42 | 61 | 73 | 101 | 187 | 280 | 280 |
| 26 | 41 | 60 | 72 | 100 | 186 | 279 | 279 |
| 27 | 40 | 59 | 72 | 99 | 185 | 278 | 278 |
| 28 | 40 | 58 | 73 | 98 | 184 | 277 | 277 |
| 29 | 39 | 58 | 76 | 97 | 183 | 277 | 277 |
| 30 | 38 | 57 | 78 | 97 | 183 | 276 | 276 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

41

53

59

80

198

304

3 145

2

44

56

63

84

201

348

2 357

3

48

61

69

93

200

364

1 786

4

50

64

74

99

200

365

1 384

5

52

67

78

102

201

357

1 099

6

54

70

81

105

201

344

893

7

55

72

82

107

201

328

740

8

55

72

83

109

200

312

623

9

54

72

84

110

199

294

531

10

53

72

84

111

198

292

458

11

52

71

84

111

197

290

398

12

51

70

83

110

196

289

349

13

50

69

81

109

195

288

307

14

49

68

80

108

194

287

287

15

48

67

79

107

193

286

286

16

48

66

79

106

192

285

285

17

47

66

78

106

192

285

285

18

47

65

78

105

191

284

284

19

46

65

77

105

191

284

284

20

46

64

77

104

190

283

283

21

45

64

76

104

190

283

283

22

44

63

75

103

189

282

282

23

44

62

75

102

188

281

281

24

43

62

74

101

187

281

281

25

42

61

73

101

187

280

280

26

41

60

72

100

186

279

279

27

40

59

72

99

185

278

278

28

40

58

73

98

184

277

277

29

39

58

76

97

183

277

277

30

38

57

78

97

183

276

276

3.7   Lev

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 1 | 13 | 20 | 41 | 158 | 307 | 3 177 |
| 2 | 1 | 13 | 20 | 41 | 158 | 350 | 2 375 |
| 3 | 1 | 13 | 22 | 45 | 153 | 365 | 1 794 |
| 4 | 1 | 15 | 25 | 49 | 150 | 365 | 1 387 |
| 5 | 2 | 16 | 28 | 51 | 150 | 356 | 1 099 |
| 6 | 3 | 19 | 30 | 54 | 150 | 342 | 891 |
| 7 | 5 | 21 | 32 | 56 | 150 | 326 | 737 |
| 8 | 5 | 22 | 33 | 59 | 150 | 309 | 619 |
| 9 | 5 | 23 | 35 | 62 | 150 | 291 | 527 |
| 10 | 6 | 24 | 36 | 64 | 150 | 274 | 454 |
| 11 | 6 | 24 | 37 | 64 | 150 | 257 | 394 |
| 12 | 6 | 25 | 37 | 65 | 150 | 244 | 345 |
| 13 | 6 | 25 | 37 | 65 | 150 | 244 | 303 |
| 14 | 6 | 25 | 38 | 65 | 150 | 244 | 269 |
| 15 | 6 | 25 | 40 | 65 | 150 | 244 | 244 |
| 16 | 6 | 25 | 43 | 65 | 150 | 244 | 244 |
| 17 | 6 | 25 | 45 | 65 | 150 | 244 | 244 |
| 18 | 6 | 25 | 47 | 65 | 150 | 244 | 244 |
| 19 | 7 | 25 | 50 | 65 | 150 | 244 | 244 |
| 20 | 7 | 25 | 52 | 65 | 150 | 244 | 244 |
| 21 | 7 | 25 | 55 | 65 | 150 | 244 | 244 |
| 22 | 9 | 25 | 57 | 65 | 150 | 244 | 244 |
| 23 | 9 | 25 | 59 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 24 | 9 | 25 | 62 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 25 | 10 | 25 | 64 | 67 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 26 | 10 | 25 | 67 | 68 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 27 | 11 | 25 | 69 | 70 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 28 | 11 | 25 | 72 | 72 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 29 | 11 | 25 | 74 | 73 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 30 | 12 | 26 | 77 | 76 | 151 | 244 | 244 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

1

13

20

41

158

307

3 177

2

1

13

20

41

158

350

2 375

3

1

13

22

45

153

365

1 794

4

1

15

25

49

150

365

1 387

5

2

16

28

51

150

356

1 099

6

3

19

30

54

150

342

891

7

5

21

32

56

150

326

737

8

5

22

33

59

150

309

619

9

5

23

35

62

150

291

527

10

6

24

36

64

150

274

454

11

6

24

37

64

150

257

394

12

6

25

37

65

150

244

345

13

6

25

37

65

150

244

303

14

6

25

38

65

150

244

269

15

6

25

40

65

150

244

244

16

6

25

43

65

150

244

244

17

6

25

45

65

150

244

244

18

6

25

47

65

150

244

244

19

7

25

50

65

150

244

244

20

7

25

52

65

150

244

244

21

7

25

55

65

150

244

244

22

9

25

57

65

150

244

244

23

9

25

59

65

151

244

244

24

9

25

62

65

151

244

244

25

10

25

64

67

151

244

244

26

10

25

67

68

151

244

244

27

11

25

69

70

151

244

244

28

11

25

72

72

151

244

244

29

11

25

74

73

151

244

244

30

12

26

77

76

151

244

244

3.8   Pound sterling

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 10 | 22 | 44 | 177 | 313 | 3 245 |
| 2 | 0 | 10 | 22 | 44 | 177 | 356 | 2 424 |
| 3 | 1 | 10 | 23 | 49 | 172 | 372 | 1 830 |
| 4 | 1 | 13 | 26 | 54 | 169 | 371 | 1 413 |
| 5 | 1 | 16 | 28 | 58 | 168 | 362 | 1 119 |
| 6 | 2 | 18 | 32 | 59 | 166 | 347 | 906 |
| 7 | 4 | 21 | 36 | 60 | 165 | 331 | 749 |
| 8 | 6 | 24 | 37 | 59 | 164 | 313 | 628 |
| 9 | 9 | 30 | 42 | 58 | 163 | 295 | 535 |
| 10 | 11 | 34 | 42 | 57 | 162 | 277 | 460 |
| 11 | 10 | 33 | 42 | 57 | 162 | 260 | 399 |
| 12 | 9 | 32 | 42 | 57 | 161 | 254 | 349 |
| 13 | 8 | 31 | 42 | 58 | 160 | 253 | 307 |
| 14 | 8 | 31 | 43 | 58 | 159 | 253 | 272 |
| 15 | 8 | 31 | 43 | 58 | 159 | 252 | 252 |
| 16 | 8 | 31 | 43 | 58 | 157 | 251 | 251 |
| 17 | 9 | 31 | 46 | 58 | 157 | 250 | 250 |
| 18 | 9 | 31 | 48 | 58 | 156 | 249 | 249 |
| 19 | 9 | 31 | 50 | 58 | 156 | 249 | 249 |
| 20 | 9 | 31 | 53 | 58 | 156 | 250 | 250 |
| 21 | 9 | 31 | 55 | 59 | 156 | 250 | 250 |
| 22 | 9 | 31 | 58 | 61 | 156 | 249 | 249 |
| 23 | 9 | 31 | 61 | 63 | 156 | 249 | 249 |
| 24 | 10 | 32 | 63 | 65 | 155 | 248 | 248 |
| 25 | 10 | 32 | 66 | 67 | 154 | 248 | 248 |
| 26 | 10 | 32 | 67 | 69 | 154 | 247 | 247 |
| 27 | 11 | 32 | 71 | 71 | 153 | 246 | 246 |
| 28 | 11 | 32 | 73 | 73 | 153 | 246 | 246 |
| 29 | 11 | 32 | 75 | 75 | 152 | 245 | 245 |
| 30 | 12 | 32 | 78 | 77 | 152 | 245 | 245 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

0

10

22

44

177

313

3 245

2

0

10

22

44

177

356

2 424

3

1

10

23

49

172

372

1 830

4

1

13

26

54

169

371

1 413

5

1

16

28

58

168

362

1 119

6

2

18

32

59

166

347

906

7

4

21

36

60

165

331

749

8

6

24

37

59

164

313

628

9

9

30

42

58

163

295

535

10

11

34

42

57

162

277

460

11

10

33

42

57

162

260

399

12

9

32

42

57

161

254

349

13

8

31

42

58

160

253

307

14

8

31

43

58

159

253

272

15

8

31

43

58

159

252

252

16

8

31

43

58

157

251

251

17

9

31

46

58

157

250

250

18

9

31

48

58

156

249

249

19

9

31

50

58

156

249

249

20

9

31

53

58

156

250

250

21

9

31

55

59

156

250

250

22

9

31

58

61

156

249

249

23

9

31

61

63

156

249

249

24

10

32

63

65

155

248

248

25

10

32

66

67

154

248

248

26

10

32

67

69

154

247

247

27

11

32

71

71

153

246

246

28

11

32

73

73

153

246

246

29

11

32

75

75

152

245

245

30

12

32

78

77

152

245

245

3.9   Romanian leu

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 80 | 92 | 99 | 120 | 237 | 332 | 3 376 |
| 2 | 79 | 91 | 97 | 118 | 236 | 370 | 2 526 |
| 3 | 77 | 90 | 98 | 122 | 229 | 387 | 1 914 |
| 4 | 75 | 89 | 99 | 124 | 225 | 388 | 1 483 |
| 5 | 74 | 89 | 100 | 124 | 223 | 380 | 1 178 |
| 6 | 74 | 90 | 101 | 125 | 221 | 366 | 957 |
| 7 | 73 | 90 | 100 | 125 | 219 | 350 | 793 |
| 8 | 71 | 89 | 100 | 125 | 217 | 332 | 667 |
| 9 | 70 | 88 | 99 | 126 | 215 | 314 | 569 |
| 10 | 69 | 87 | 99 | 127 | 214 | 307 | 490 |
| 11 | 68 | 86 | 99 | 126 | 212 | 305 | 426 |
| 12 | 66 | 85 | 97 | 125 | 211 | 304 | 373 |
| 13 | 65 | 83 | 96 | 123 | 209 | 302 | 328 |
| 14 | 63 | 82 | 94 | 122 | 208 | 301 | 301 |
| 15 | 62 | 81 | 93 | 121 | 207 | 300 | 300 |
| 16 | 61 | 80 | 92 | 120 | 205 | 299 | 299 |
| 17 | 60 | 79 | 91 | 119 | 204 | 298 | 298 |
| 18 | 59 | 78 | 90 | 118 | 204 | 297 | 297 |
| 19 | 58 | 77 | 89 | 117 | 203 | 296 | 296 |
| 20 | 57 | 76 | 89 | 116 | 202 | 295 | 295 |
| 21 | 57 | 75 | 88 | 115 | 201 | 294 | 294 |
| 22 | 56 | 74 | 87 | 114 | 200 | 293 | 293 |
| 23 | 54 | 73 | 86 | 113 | 199 | 292 | 292 |
| 24 | 53 | 72 | 84 | 112 | 198 | 291 | 291 |
| 25 | 52 | 71 | 83 | 111 | 197 | 290 | 290 |
| 26 | 51 | 70 | 82 | 110 | 196 | 289 | 289 |
| 27 | 50 | 69 | 81 | 109 | 194 | 288 | 288 |
| 28 | 49 | 68 | 80 | 108 | 193 | 287 | 287 |
| 29 | 48 | 67 | 80 | 106 | 192 | 286 | 286 |
| 30 | 47 | 66 | 82 | 105 | 191 | 285 | 285 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

80

92

99

120

237

332

3 376

2

79

91

97

118

236

370

2 526

3

77

90

98

122

229

387

1 914

4

75

89

99

124

225

388

1 483

5

74

89

100

124

223

380

1 178

6

74

90

101

125

221

366

957

7

73

90

100

125

219

350

793

8

71

89

100

125

217

332

667

9

70

88

99

126

215

314

569

10

69

87

99

127

214

307

490

11

68

86

99

126

212

305

426

12

66

85

97

125

211

304

373

13

65

83

96

123

209

302

328

14

63

82

94

122

208

301

301

15

62

81

93

121

207

300

300

16

61

80

92

120

205

299

299

17

60

79

91

119

204

298

298

18

59

78

90

118

204

297

297

19

58

77

89

117

203

296

296

20

57

76

89

116

202

295

295

21

57

75

88

115

201

294

294

22

56

74

87

114

200

293

293

23

54

73

86

113

199

292

292

24

53

72

84

112

198

291

291

25

52

71

83

111

197

290

290

26

51

70

82

110

196

289

289

27

50

69

81

109

194

288

288

28

49

68

80

108

193

287

287

29

48

67

80

106

192

286

286

30

47

66

82

105

191

285

285

3.10   Zloty

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 53 | 65 | 71 | 92 | 210 | 322 | 3 346 |
| 2 | 52 | 64 | 71 | 92 | 209 | 368 | 2 506 |
| 3 | 51 | 64 | 72 | 96 | 203 | 384 | 1 898 |
| 4 | 50 | 64 | 74 | 99 | 200 | 385 | 1 468 |
| 5 | 50 | 65 | 76 | 99 | 199 | 376 | 1 164 |
| 6 | 50 | 65 | 77 | 101 | 197 | 361 | 944 |
| 7 | 50 | 67 | 77 | 102 | 196 | 344 | 780 |
| 8 | 49 | 66 | 77 | 103 | 194 | 326 | 655 |
| 9 | 48 | 66 | 77 | 104 | 193 | 307 | 557 |
| 10 | 47 | 65 | 78 | 105 | 192 | 289 | 479 |
| 11 | 46 | 65 | 77 | 105 | 191 | 284 | 416 |
| 12 | 46 | 64 | 77 | 104 | 190 | 284 | 364 |
| 13 | 45 | 64 | 76 | 104 | 190 | 283 | 320 |
| 14 | 45 | 63 | 76 | 103 | 189 | 282 | 283 |
| 15 | 44 | 63 | 75 | 103 | 188 | 282 | 282 |
| 16 | 43 | 62 | 74 | 102 | 188 | 281 | 281 |
| 17 | 43 | 61 | 74 | 101 | 187 | 280 | 280 |
| 18 | 42 | 61 | 73 | 101 | 187 | 280 | 280 |
| 19 | 42 | 60 | 73 | 100 | 186 | 279 | 279 |
| 20 | 42 | 60 | 73 | 100 | 186 | 279 | 279 |
| 21 | 41 | 60 | 72 | 100 | 186 | 279 | 279 |
| 22 | 41 | 59 | 72 | 99 | 185 | 279 | 279 |
| 23 | 40 | 59 | 71 | 99 | 185 | 278 | 278 |
| 24 | 40 | 58 | 71 | 98 | 184 | 277 | 277 |
| 25 | 39 | 58 | 70 | 97 | 183 | 277 | 277 |
| 26 | 38 | 57 | 70 | 97 | 183 | 276 | 276 |
| 27 | 38 | 56 | 72 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 275 |
| 28 | 37 | 55 | 75 | 95 | 181 | 274 | 274 |
| 29 | 36 | 55 | 78 | 95 | 180 | 274 | 274 |
| 30 | 35 | 54 | 80 | 94 | 180 | 273 | 273 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

53

65

71

92

210

322

3 346

2

52

64

71

92

209

368

2 506

3

51

64

72

96

203

384

1 898

4

50

64

74

99

200

385

1 468

5

50

65

76

99

199

376

1 164

6

50

65

77

101

197

361

944

7

50

67

77

102

196

344

780

8

49

66

77

103

194

326

655

9

48

66

77

104

193

307

557

10

47

65

78

105

192

289

479

11

46

65

77

105

191

284

416

12

46

64

77

104

190

284

364

13

45

64

76

104

190

283

320

14

45

63

76

103

189

282

283

15

44

63

75

103

188

282

282

16

43

62

74

102

188

281

281

17

43

61

74

101

187

280

280

18

42

61

73

101

187

280

280

19

42

60

73

100

186

279

279

20

42

60

73

100

186

279

279

21

41

60

72

100

186

279

279

22

41

59

72

99

185

279

279

23

40

59

71

99

185

278

278

24

40

58

71

98

184

277

277

25

39

58

70

97

183

277

277

26

38

57

70

97

183

276

276

27

38

56

72

96

182

275

275

28

37

55

75

95

181

274

274

29

36

55

78

95

180

274

274

30

35

54

80

94

180

273

273

3.11   Norwegian krone

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 27 | 39 | 45 | 67 | 184 | 309 | 3 194 |
| 2 | 28 | 40 | 46 | 67 | 184 | 351 | 2 382 |
| 3 | 26 | 39 | 48 | 71 | 179 | 366 | 1 799 |
| 4 | 26 | 39 | 50 | 74 | 175 | 366 | 1 390 |
| 5 | 26 | 41 | 52 | 75 | 175 | 357 | 1 102 |
| 6 | 27 | 42 | 54 | 78 | 174 | 343 | 893 |
| 7 | 27 | 44 | 55 | 79 | 173 | 327 | 739 |
| 8 | 27 | 44 | 55 | 81 | 172 | 309 | 621 |
| 9 | 26 | 44 | 56 | 83 | 172 | 292 | 528 |
| 10 | 26 | 44 | 57 | 84 | 171 | 274 | 455 |
| 11 | 26 | 44 | 57 | 84 | 170 | 264 | 395 |
| 12 | 25 | 44 | 56 | 84 | 170 | 263 | 346 |
| 13 | 24 | 43 | 56 | 83 | 169 | 262 | 304 |
| 14 | 24 | 42 | 55 | 82 | 168 | 262 | 270 |
| 15 | 23 | 42 | 54 | 82 | 168 | 261 | 261 |
| 16 | 23 | 41 | 54 | 81 | 167 | 260 | 260 |
| 17 | 22 | 41 | 53 | 81 | 167 | 260 | 260 |
| 18 | 22 | 41 | 53 | 81 | 167 | 260 | 260 |
| 19 | 22 | 41 | 53 | 81 | 166 | 260 | 260 |
| 20 | 22 | 41 | 53 | 81 | 167 | 260 | 260 |
| 21 | 22 | 41 | 55 | 81 | 167 | 260 | 260 |
| 22 | 22 | 41 | 58 | 81 | 166 | 260 | 260 |
| 23 | 22 | 41 | 59 | 80 | 166 | 260 | 260 |
| 24 | 22 | 40 | 62 | 80 | 166 | 259 | 259 |
| 25 | 21 | 40 | 65 | 80 | 166 | 259 | 259 |
| 26 | 21 | 40 | 67 | 80 | 166 | 259 | 259 |
| 27 | 21 | 39 | 70 | 79 | 165 | 259 | 259 |
| 28 | 21 | 39 | 72 | 79 | 165 | 258 | 258 |
| 29 | 20 | 39 | 74 | 79 | 165 | 258 | 258 |
| 30 | 20 | 39 | 78 | 78 | 164 | 258 | 258 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

27

39

45

67

184

309

3 194

2

28

40

46

67

184

351

2 382

3

26

39

48

71

179

366

1 799

4

26

39

50

74

175

366

1 390

5

26

41

52

75

175

357

1 102

6

27

42

54

78

174

343

893

7

27

44

55

79

173

327

739

8

27

44

55

81

172

309

621

9

26

44

56

83

172

292

528

10

26

44

57

84

171

274

455

11

26

44

57

84

170

264

395

12

25

44

56

84

170

263

346

13

24

43

56

83

169

262

304

14

24

42

55

82

168

262

270

15

23

42

54

82

168

261

261

16

23

41

54

81

167

260

260

17

22

41

53

81

167

260

260

18

22

41

53

81

167

260

260

19

22

41

53

81

166

260

260

20

22

41

53

81

167

260

260

21

22

41

55

81

167

260

260

22

22

41

58

81

166

260

260

23

22

41

59

80

166

260

260

24

22

40

62

80

166

259

259

25

21

40

65

80

166

259

259

26

21

40

67

80

166

259

259

27

21

39

70

79

165

259

259

28

21

39

72

79

165

258

258

29

20

39

74

79

165

258

258

30

20

39

78

78

164

258

258

3.12   Swiss franc

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 23 | 140 | 298 | 3 072 |
| 2 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 24 | 141 | 339 | 2 295 |
| 3 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 29 | 136 | 354 | 1 736 |
| 4 | 1 | 3 | 12 | 33 | 134 | 355 | 1 344 |
| 5 | 1 | 4 | 15 | 35 | 134 | 346 | 1 066 |
| 6 | 2 | 4 | 17 | 38 | 134 | 333 | 865 |
| 7 | 2 | 6 | 20 | 40 | 134 | 318 | 716 |
| 8 | 2 | 6 | 22 | 42 | 134 | 301 | 602 |
| 9 | 4 | 7 | 24 | 45 | 134 | 284 | 513 |
| 10 | 4 | 9 | 27 | 47 | 134 | 267 | 441 |
| 11 | 4 | 9 | 30 | 49 | 135 | 251 | 383 |
| 12 | 4 | 9 | 32 | 48 | 134 | 235 | 336 |
| 13 | 4 | 11 | 34 | 49 | 134 | 228 | 296 |
| 14 | 5 | 11 | 37 | 48 | 134 | 228 | 262 |
| 15 | 6 | 13 | 40 | 47 | 133 | 226 | 233 |
| 16 | 6 | 13 | 41 | 48 | 132 | 226 | 226 |
| 17 | 6 | 14 | 44 | 49 | 132 | 226 | 226 |
| 18 | 6 | 15 | 47 | 51 | 132 | 226 | 226 |
| 19 | 7 | 16 | 49 | 54 | 133 | 226 | 226 |
| 20 | 7 | 16 | 51 | 55 | 133 | 227 | 227 |
| 21 | 7 | 18 | 54 | 57 | 134 | 227 | 227 |
| 22 | 8 | 19 | 56 | 60 | 134 | 227 | 227 |
| 23 | 8 | 19 | 58 | 61 | 134 | 227 | 227 |
| 24 | 8 | 21 | 61 | 63 | 133 | 227 | 227 |
| 25 | 9 | 21 | 63 | 65 | 134 | 226 | 226 |
| 26 | 9 | 22 | 66 | 67 | 135 | 226 | 226 |
| 27 | 10 | 23 | 68 | 69 | 136 | 226 | 226 |
| 28 | 10 | 24 | 70 | 71 | 138 | 226 | 226 |
| 29 | 10 | 25 | 73 | 73 | 139 | 226 | 226 |
| 30 | 11 | 26 | 75 | 75 | 140 | 226 | 226 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

0

0

4

23

140

298

3 072

2

0

1

6

24

141

339

2 295

3

1

1

9

29

136

354

1 736

4

1

3

12

33

134

355

1 344

5

1

4

15

35

134

346

1 066

6

2

4

17

38

134

333

865

7

2

6

20

40

134

318

716

8

2

6

22

42

134

301

602

9

4

7

24

45

134

284

513

10

4

9

27

47

134

267

441

11

4

9

30

49

135

251

383

12

4

9

32

48

134

235

336

13

4

11

34

49

134

228

296

14

5

11

37

48

134

228

262

15

6

13

40

47

133

226

233

16

6

13

41

48

132

226

226

17

6

14

44

49

132

226

226

18

6

15

47

51

132

226

226

19

7

16

49

54

133

226

226

20

7

16

51

55

133

227

227

21

7

18

54

57

134

227

227

22

8

19

56

60

134

227

227

23

8

19

58

61

134

227

227

24

8

21

61

63

133

227

227

25

9

21

63

65

134

226

226

26

9

22

66

67

135

226

226

27

10

23

68

69

136

226

226

28

10

24

70

71

138

226

226

29

10

25

73

73

139

226

226

30

11

26

75

75

140

226

226

3.13   Australian dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 40 | 52 | 59 | 80 | 197 | 311 | 3 221 |
| 2 | 40 | 52 | 59 | 80 | 197 | 355 | 2 409 |
| 3 | 40 | 52 | 61 | 84 | 192 | 370 | 1 821 |
| 4 | 39 | 53 | 63 | 88 | 189 | 370 | 1 409 |
| 5 | 39 | 54 | 65 | 89 | 188 | 362 | 1 117 |
| 6 | 40 | 56 | 67 | 91 | 187 | 348 | 907 |
| 7 | 40 | 57 | 68 | 92 | 186 | 332 | 751 |
| 8 | 40 | 57 | 68 | 94 | 185 | 315 | 631 |
| 9 | 39 | 57 | 69 | 96 | 185 | 297 | 538 |
| 10 | 39 | 57 | 70 | 97 | 184 | 280 | 463 |
| 11 | 38 | 57 | 69 | 97 | 183 | 276 | 402 |
| 12 | 38 | 56 | 69 | 96 | 182 | 276 | 352 |
| 13 | 37 | 56 | 68 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 310 |
| 14 | 37 | 55 | 68 | 95 | 181 | 274 | 274 |
| 15 | 36 | 55 | 67 | 95 | 181 | 274 | 274 |
| 16 | 35 | 54 | 66 | 94 | 180 | 273 | 273 |
| 17 | 35 | 54 | 66 | 93 | 179 | 273 | 273 |
| 18 | 34 | 53 | 66 | 93 | 179 | 272 | 272 |
| 19 | 34 | 53 | 65 | 93 | 178 | 272 | 272 |
| 20 | 34 | 52 | 65 | 92 | 178 | 272 | 272 |
| 21 | 34 | 52 | 65 | 92 | 178 | 271 | 271 |
| 22 | 33 | 52 | 64 | 92 | 178 | 271 | 271 |
| 23 | 33 | 51 | 64 | 91 | 177 | 270 | 270 |
| 24 | 32 | 51 | 63 | 90 | 176 | 270 | 270 |
| 25 | 31 | 50 | 66 | 90 | 176 | 269 | 269 |
| 26 | 30 | 49 | 68 | 89 | 175 | 268 | 268 |
| 27 | 30 | 48 | 71 | 88 | 174 | 267 | 267 |
| 28 | 29 | 48 | 73 | 87 | 173 | 267 | 267 |
| 29 | 28 | 47 | 76 | 87 | 173 | 266 | 266 |
| 30 | 27 | 46 | 78 | 86 | 172 | 265 | 265 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

40

52

59

80

197

311

3 221

2

40

52

59

80

197

355

2 409

3

40

52

61

84

192

370

1 821

4

39

53

63

88

189

370

1 409

5

39

54

65

89

188

362

1 117

6

40

56

67

91

187

348

907

7

40

57

68

92

186

332

751

8

40

57

68

94

185

315

631

9

39

57

69

96

185

297

538

10

39

57

70

97

184

280

463

11

38

57

69

97

183

276

402

12

38

56

69

96

182

276

352

13

37

56

68

96

182

275

310

14

37

55

68

95

181

274

274

15

36

55

67

95

181

274

274

16

35

54

66

94

180

273

273

17

35

54

66

93

179

273

273

18

34

53

66

93

179

272

272

19

34

53

65

93

178

272

272

20

34

52

65

92

178

272

272

21

34

52

65

92

178

271

271

22

33

52

64

92

178

271

271

23

33

51

64

91

177

270

270

24

32

51

63

90

176

270

270

25

31

50

66

90

176

269

269

26

30

49

68

89

175

268

268

27

30

48

71

88

174

267

267

28

29

48

73

87

173

267

267

29

28

47

76

87

173

266

266

30

27

46

78

86

172

265

265

3.14   Baht

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 13 | 25 | 31 | 52 | 170 | 299 | 3 079 |
| 2 | 16 | 28 | 35 | 56 | 173 | 341 | 2 304 |
| 3 | 19 | 32 | 40 | 64 | 171 | 356 | 1 746 |
| 4 | 21 | 35 | 45 | 70 | 171 | 357 | 1 352 |
| 5 | 23 | 38 | 50 | 73 | 172 | 349 | 1 074 |
| 6 | 23 | 39 | 50 | 74 | 170 | 336 | 872 |
| 7 | 28 | 45 | 55 | 80 | 174 | 321 | 723 |
| 8 | 27 | 44 | 55 | 81 | 173 | 304 | 608 |
| 9 | 28 | 46 | 58 | 85 | 174 | 288 | 519 |
| 10 | 30 | 48 | 61 | 88 | 175 | 271 | 447 |
| 11 | 31 | 50 | 62 | 90 | 176 | 269 | 389 |
| 12 | 32 | 50 | 63 | 91 | 176 | 270 | 341 |
| 13 | 32 | 51 | 63 | 91 | 177 | 270 | 301 |
| 14 | 33 | 51 | 64 | 91 | 177 | 270 | 270 |
| 15 | 33 | 52 | 64 | 91 | 177 | 271 | 271 |
| 16 | 33 | 51 | 64 | 91 | 177 | 270 | 270 |
| 17 | 33 | 51 | 64 | 91 | 177 | 270 | 270 |
| 18 | 32 | 51 | 63 | 91 | 177 | 270 | 270 |
| 19 | 32 | 51 | 63 | 91 | 176 | 270 | 270 |
| 20 | 32 | 51 | 63 | 91 | 176 | 270 | 270 |
| 21 | 32 | 51 | 63 | 91 | 176 | 270 | 270 |
| 22 | 32 | 50 | 63 | 90 | 176 | 269 | 269 |
| 23 | 31 | 50 | 63 | 90 | 176 | 269 | 269 |
| 24 | 31 | 50 | 62 | 90 | 175 | 269 | 269 |
| 25 | 31 | 49 | 65 | 89 | 175 | 268 | 268 |
| 26 | 30 | 49 | 67 | 89 | 175 | 268 | 268 |
| 27 | 30 | 48 | 70 | 88 | 174 | 267 | 267 |
| 28 | 29 | 48 | 72 | 88 | 173 | 267 | 267 |
| 29 | 29 | 47 | 74 | 87 | 173 | 266 | 266 |
| 30 | 28 | 47 | 77 | 87 | 172 | 266 | 266 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

13

25

31

52

170

299

3 079

2

16

28

35

56

173

341

2 304

3

19

32

40

64

171

356

1 746

4

21

35

45

70

171

357

1 352

5

23

38

50

73

172

349

1 074

6

23

39

50

74

170

336

872

7

28

45

55

80

174

321

723

8

27

44

55

81

173

304

608

9

28

46

58

85

174

288

519

10

30

48

61

88

175

271

447

11

31

50

62

90

176

269

389

12

32

50

63

91

176

270

341

13

32

51

63

91

177

270

301

14

33

51

64

91

177

270

270

15

33

52

64

91

177

271

271

16

33

51

64

91

177

270

270

17

33

51

64

91

177

270

270

18

32

51

63

91

177

270

270

19

32

51

63

91

176

270

270

20

32

51

63

91

176

270

270

21

32

51

63

91

176

270

270

22

32

50

63

90

176

269

269

23

31

50

63

90

176

269

269

24

31

50

62

90

175

269

269

25

31

49

65

89

175

268

268

26

30

49

67

89

175

268

268

27

30

48

70

88

174

267

267

28

29

48

72

88

173

267

267

29

29

47

74

87

173

266

266

30

28

47

77

87

172

266

266

3.15   Canadian dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 14 | 26 | 32 | 53 | 171 | 314 | 3 253 |
| 2 | 15 | 27 | 33 | 54 | 172 | 356 | 2 421 |
| 3 | 15 | 28 | 36 | 60 | 167 | 370 | 1 822 |
| 4 | 16 | 29 | 39 | 64 | 165 | 369 | 1 405 |
| 5 | 16 | 31 | 43 | 66 | 165 | 359 | 1 112 |
| 6 | 18 | 34 | 45 | 69 | 165 | 345 | 901 |
| 7 | 19 | 36 | 47 | 71 | 165 | 329 | 745 |
| 8 | 19 | 37 | 48 | 73 | 165 | 311 | 626 |
| 9 | 20 | 38 | 49 | 76 | 165 | 294 | 533 |
| 10 | 20 | 39 | 51 | 78 | 165 | 276 | 459 |
| 11 | 21 | 39 | 52 | 79 | 165 | 259 | 398 |
| 12 | 21 | 39 | 52 | 79 | 165 | 259 | 348 |
| 13 | 21 | 40 | 52 | 80 | 165 | 259 | 307 |
| 14 | 21 | 40 | 52 | 80 | 165 | 259 | 272 |
| 15 | 21 | 40 | 52 | 80 | 165 | 259 | 259 |
| 16 | 21 | 39 | 52 | 79 | 165 | 258 | 258 |
| 17 | 21 | 39 | 52 | 79 | 165 | 259 | 259 |
| 18 | 21 | 39 | 52 | 79 | 165 | 259 | 259 |
| 19 | 21 | 39 | 52 | 79 | 165 | 258 | 258 |
| 20 | 21 | 39 | 53 | 79 | 165 | 259 | 259 |
| 21 | 21 | 39 | 55 | 79 | 165 | 258 | 258 |
| 22 | 20 | 39 | 58 | 79 | 165 | 258 | 258 |
| 23 | 20 | 39 | 61 | 79 | 164 | 258 | 258 |
| 24 | 20 | 38 | 63 | 78 | 164 | 257 | 257 |
| 25 | 19 | 38 | 65 | 78 | 164 | 257 | 257 |
| 26 | 19 | 37 | 67 | 77 | 163 | 256 | 256 |
| 27 | 18 | 37 | 70 | 77 | 163 | 256 | 256 |
| 28 | 18 | 36 | 73 | 76 | 162 | 255 | 255 |
| 29 | 17 | 36 | 75 | 76 | 162 | 255 | 255 |
| 30 | 17 | 36 | 78 | 77 | 161 | 255 | 255 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

14

26

32

53

171

314

3 253

2

15

27

33

54

172

356

2 421

3

15

28

36

60

167

370

1 822

4

16

29

39

64

165

369

1 405

5

16

31

43

66

165

359

1 112

6

18

34

45

69

165

345

901

7

19

36

47

71

165

329

745

8

19

37

48

73

165

311

626

9

20

38

49

76

165

294

533

10

20

39

51

78

165

276

459

11

21

39

52

79

165

259

398

12

21

39

52

79

165

259

348

13

21

40

52

80

165

259

307

14

21

40

52

80

165

259

272

15

21

40

52

80

165

259

259

16

21

39

52

79

165

258

258

17

21

39

52

79

165

259

259

18

21

39

52

79

165

259

259

19

21

39

52

79

165

258

258

20

21

39

53

79

165

259

259

21

21

39

55

79

165

258

258

22

20

39

58

79

165

258

258

23

20

39

61

79

164

258

258

24

20

38

63

78

164

257

257

25

19

38

65

78

164

257

257

26

19

37

67

77

163

256

256

27

18

37

70

77

163

256

256

28

18

36

73

76

162

255

255

29

17

36

75

76

162

255

255

30

17

36

78

77

161

255

255

3.16   Chilean peso

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 48 | 60 | 67 | 88 | 205 | 334 | 3 479 |
| 2 | 50 | 62 | 69 | 90 | 207 | 372 | 2 550 |
| 3 | 52 | 65 | 74 | 97 | 205 | 384 | 1 908 |
| 4 | 54 | 67 | 77 | 102 | 203 | 382 | 1 467 |
| 5 | 55 | 70 | 81 | 105 | 204 | 371 | 1 159 |
| 6 | 57 | 73 | 84 | 108 | 204 | 356 | 938 |
| 7 | 59 | 75 | 86 | 110 | 204 | 339 | 774 |
| 8 | 58 | 76 | 87 | 112 | 204 | 321 | 649 |
| 9 | 59 | 77 | 88 | 115 | 204 | 302 | 552 |
| 10 | 59 | 77 | 90 | 117 | 204 | 297 | 475 |
| 11 | 59 | 78 | 90 | 118 | 204 | 297 | 412 |
| 12 | 59 | 77 | 90 | 117 | 203 | 296 | 360 |
| 13 | 58 | 77 | 89 | 117 | 202 | 296 | 317 |
| 14 | 57 | 76 | 88 | 116 | 202 | 295 | 295 |
| 15 | 57 | 75 | 88 | 115 | 201 | 294 | 294 |
| 16 | 56 | 75 | 87 | 114 | 200 | 294 | 294 |
| 17 | 55 | 74 | 86 | 114 | 200 | 293 | 293 |
| 18 | 55 | 73 | 86 | 113 | 199 | 292 | 292 |
| 19 | 54 | 73 | 85 | 113 | 198 | 292 | 292 |
| 20 | 53 | 72 | 84 | 112 | 198 | 291 | 291 |
| 21 | 53 | 71 | 84 | 111 | 197 | 290 | 290 |
| 22 | 52 | 71 | 83 | 110 | 196 | 290 | 290 |
| 23 | 51 | 70 | 82 | 110 | 195 | 289 | 289 |
| 24 | 50 | 69 | 81 | 109 | 195 | 288 | 288 |
| 25 | 49 | 68 | 80 | 108 | 194 | 287 | 287 |
| 26 | 48 | 67 | 79 | 107 | 193 | 286 | 286 |
| 27 | 47 | 66 | 78 | 106 | 192 | 285 | 285 |
| 28 | 46 | 65 | 77 | 105 | 191 | 284 | 284 |
| 29 | 45 | 64 | 77 | 104 | 190 | 283 | 283 |
| 30 | 45 | 63 | 79 | 103 | 189 | 282 | 282 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

48

60

67

88

205

334

3 479

2

50

62

69

90

207

372

2 550

3

52

65

74

97

205

384

1 908

4

54

67

77

102

203

382

1 467

5

55

70

81

105

204

371

1 159

6

57

73

84

108

204

356

938

7

59

75

86

110

204

339

774

8

58

76

87

112

204

321

649

9

59

77

88

115

204

302

552

10

59

77

90

117

204

297

475

11

59

78

90

118

204

297

412

12

59

77

90

117

203

296

360

13

58

77

89

117

202

296

317

14

57

76

88

116

202

295

295

15

57

75

88

115

201

294

294

16

56

75

87

114

200

294

294

17

55

74

86

114

200

293

293

18

55

73

86

113

199

292

292

19

54

73

85

113

198

292

292

20

53

72

84

112

198

291

291

21

53

71

84

111

197

290

290

22

52

71

83

110

196

290

290

23

51

70

82

110

195

289

289

24

50

69

81

109

195

288

288

25

49

68

80

108

194

287

287

26

48

67

79

107

193

286

286

27

47

66

78

106

192

285

285

28

46

65

77

105

191

284

284

29

45

64

77

104

190

283

283

30

45

63

79

103

189

282

282

3.17   Colombian peso

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 79 | 91 | 97 | 118 | 235 | 345 | 3 603 |
| 2 | 84 | 96 | 102 | 123 | 240 | 395 | 2 714 |
| 3 | 85 | 97 | 106 | 129 | 237 | 415 | 2 062 |
| 4 | 85 | 99 | 109 | 133 | 235 | 416 | 1 599 |
| 5 | 88 | 103 | 114 | 138 | 237 | 408 | 1 270 |
| 6 | 90 | 106 | 117 | 142 | 238 | 393 | 1 030 |
| 7 | 93 | 109 | 120 | 144 | 238 | 375 | 852 |
| 8 | 94 | 111 | 122 | 148 | 240 | 355 | 716 |
| 9 | 95 | 113 | 125 | 152 | 240 | 335 | 609 |
| 10 | 96 | 114 | 127 | 154 | 241 | 334 | 524 |
| 11 | 96 | 114 | 127 | 154 | 240 | 334 | 454 |
| 12 | 95 | 114 | 126 | 154 | 240 | 333 | 397 |
| 13 | 94 | 113 | 125 | 153 | 238 | 332 | 349 |
| 14 | 93 | 111 | 124 | 151 | 237 | 330 | 330 |
| 15 | 91 | 110 | 122 | 150 | 236 | 329 | 329 |
| 16 | 90 | 109 | 121 | 149 | 234 | 328 | 328 |
| 17 | 89 | 107 | 120 | 147 | 233 | 326 | 326 |
| 18 | 87 | 106 | 118 | 146 | 232 | 325 | 325 |
| 19 | 86 | 105 | 117 | 145 | 230 | 324 | 324 |
| 20 | 85 | 103 | 116 | 143 | 229 | 322 | 322 |
| 21 | 83 | 102 | 114 | 142 | 228 | 321 | 321 |
| 22 | 82 | 100 | 113 | 140 | 226 | 319 | 319 |
| 23 | 80 | 98 | 111 | 138 | 224 | 318 | 318 |
| 24 | 78 | 97 | 109 | 137 | 223 | 316 | 316 |
| 25 | 76 | 95 | 108 | 135 | 221 | 314 | 314 |
| 26 | 75 | 93 | 106 | 133 | 219 | 312 | 312 |
| 27 | 73 | 92 | 104 | 132 | 218 | 311 | 311 |
| 28 | 71 | 90 | 103 | 130 | 216 | 309 | 309 |
| 29 | 70 | 88 | 101 | 128 | 214 | 308 | 308 |
| 30 | 68 | 87 | 99 | 127 | 213 | 306 | 306 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

79

91

97

118

235

345

3 603

2

84

96

102

123

240

395

2 714

3

85

97

106

129

237

415

2 062

4

85

99

109

133

235

416

1 599

5

88

103

114

138

237

408

1 270

6

90

106

117

142

238

393

1 030

7

93

109

120

144

238

375

852

8

94

111

122

148

240

355

716

9

95

113

125

152

240

335

609

10

96

114

127

154

241

334

524

11

96

114

127

154

240

334

454

12

95

114

126

154

240

333

397

13

94

113

125

153

238

332

349

14

93

111

124

151

237

330

330

15

91

110

122

150

236

329

329

16

90

109

121

149

234

328

328

17

89

107

120

147

233

326

326

18

87

106

118

146

232

325

325

19

86

105

117

145

230

324

324

20

85

103

116

143

229

322

322

21

83

102

114

142

228

321

321

22

82

100

113

140

226

319

319

23

80

98

111

138

224

318

318

24

78

97

109

137

223

316

316

25

76

95

108

135

221

314

314

26

75

93

106

133

219

312

312

27

73

92

104

132

218

311

311

28

71

90

103

130

216

309

309

29

70

88

101

128

214

308

308

30

68

87

99

127

213

306

306

3.18   Hong Kong dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 8 | 20 | 26 | 47 | 165 | 315 | 3 265 |
| 2 | 10 | 22 | 29 | 50 | 167 | 357 | 2 429 |
| 3 | 12 | 25 | 33 | 57 | 164 | 371 | 1 830 |
| 4 | 14 | 27 | 38 | 62 | 163 | 370 | 1 413 |
| 5 | 16 | 30 | 42 | 65 | 164 | 361 | 1 119 |
| 6 | 18 | 33 | 44 | 69 | 165 | 347 | 907 |
| 7 | 19 | 36 | 46 | 71 | 165 | 331 | 749 |
| 8 | 19 | 37 | 48 | 73 | 165 | 313 | 629 |
| 9 | 20 | 38 | 49 | 76 | 165 | 295 | 535 |
| 10 | 20 | 38 | 51 | 78 | 165 | 277 | 461 |
| 11 | 20 | 39 | 51 | 79 | 165 | 260 | 400 |
| 12 | 20 | 39 | 51 | 79 | 164 | 258 | 350 |
| 13 | 20 | 38 | 51 | 78 | 164 | 257 | 308 |
| 14 | 19 | 38 | 50 | 77 | 163 | 257 | 273 |
| 15 | 18 | 37 | 49 | 77 | 163 | 256 | 256 |
| 16 | 18 | 36 | 49 | 76 | 162 | 255 | 255 |
| 17 | 17 | 36 | 48 | 76 | 162 | 255 | 255 |
| 18 | 17 | 36 | 48 | 76 | 162 | 255 | 255 |
| 19 | 17 | 36 | 51 | 76 | 161 | 255 | 255 |
| 20 | 17 | 36 | 53 | 76 | 162 | 255 | 255 |
| 21 | 17 | 36 | 55 | 76 | 162 | 255 | 255 |
| 22 | 17 | 36 | 58 | 76 | 162 | 255 | 255 |
| 23 | 17 | 36 | 61 | 76 | 162 | 255 | 255 |
| 24 | 17 | 36 | 63 | 76 | 162 | 255 | 255 |
| 25 | 17 | 36 | 66 | 76 | 161 | 255 | 255 |
| 26 | 17 | 35 | 68 | 75 | 161 | 254 | 254 |
| 27 | 17 | 35 | 71 | 75 | 161 | 254 | 254 |
| 28 | 16 | 35 | 73 | 75 | 161 | 254 | 254 |
| 29 | 16 | 35 | 76 | 75 | 161 | 254 | 254 |
| 30 | 16 | 35 | 78 | 77 | 160 | 254 | 254 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

8

20

26

47

165

315

3 265

2

10

22

29

50

167

357

2 429

3

12

25

33

57

164

371

1 830

4

14

27

38

62

163

370

1 413

5

16

30

42

65

164

361

1 119

6

18

33

44

69

165

347

907

7

19

36

46

71

165

331

749

8

19

37

48

73

165

313

629

9

20

38

49

76

165

295

535

10

20

38

51

78

165

277

461

11

20

39

51

79

165

260

400

12

20

39

51

79

164

258

350

13

20

38

51

78

164

257

308

14

19

38

50

77

163

257

273

15

18

37

49

77

163

256

256

16

18

36

49

76

162

255

255

17

17

36

48

76

162

255

255

18

17

36

48

76

162

255

255

19

17

36

51

76

161

255

255

20

17

36

53

76

162

255

255

21

17

36

55

76

162

255

255

22

17

36

58

76

162

255

255

23

17

36

61

76

162

255

255

24

17

36

63

76

162

255

255

25

17

36

66

76

161

255

255

26

17

35

68

75

161

254

254

27

17

35

71

75

161

254

254

28

16

35

73

75

161

254

254

29

16

35

76

75

161

254

254

30

16

35

78

77

160

254

254

3.19   Indian rupee

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 90 | 102 | 109 | 130 | 247 | 342 | 3 367 |
| 2 | 91 | 103 | 110 | 131 | 248 | 370 | 2 522 |
| 3 | 91 | 104 | 113 | 136 | 243 | 387 | 1 910 |
| 4 | 92 | 106 | 116 | 140 | 242 | 387 | 1 479 |
| 5 | 93 | 108 | 119 | 142 | 242 | 378 | 1 173 |
| 6 | 94 | 110 | 121 | 145 | 241 | 364 | 951 |
| 7 | 95 | 112 | 122 | 147 | 241 | 347 | 787 |
| 8 | 95 | 113 | 124 | 149 | 241 | 334 | 661 |
| 9 | 95 | 113 | 124 | 151 | 240 | 333 | 563 |
| 10 | 94 | 112 | 125 | 152 | 239 | 332 | 484 |
| 11 | 93 | 111 | 124 | 151 | 237 | 330 | 420 |
| 12 | 91 | 110 | 122 | 150 | 236 | 329 | 368 |
| 13 | 89 | 108 | 120 | 148 | 234 | 327 | 327 |
| 14 | 88 | 106 | 119 | 146 | 232 | 325 | 325 |
| 15 | 86 | 105 | 117 | 145 | 230 | 324 | 324 |
| 16 | 84 | 103 | 115 | 143 | 229 | 322 | 322 |
| 17 | 83 | 101 | 114 | 141 | 227 | 320 | 320 |
| 18 | 81 | 100 | 112 | 140 | 226 | 319 | 319 |
| 19 | 80 | 99 | 111 | 138 | 224 | 318 | 318 |
| 20 | 79 | 98 | 110 | 137 | 223 | 317 | 317 |
| 21 | 78 | 97 | 109 | 136 | 222 | 316 | 316 |
| 22 | 77 | 95 | 108 | 135 | 221 | 314 | 314 |
| 23 | 75 | 94 | 107 | 134 | 220 | 313 | 313 |
| 24 | 74 | 93 | 105 | 133 | 219 | 312 | 312 |
| 25 | 73 | 92 | 104 | 132 | 217 | 311 | 311 |
| 26 | 72 | 90 | 103 | 130 | 216 | 310 | 310 |
| 27 | 71 | 89 | 102 | 129 | 215 | 308 | 308 |
| 28 | 69 | 88 | 101 | 128 | 214 | 307 | 307 |
| 29 | 68 | 87 | 99 | 127 | 213 | 306 | 306 |
| 30 | 67 | 86 | 98 | 126 | 212 | 305 | 305 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

90

102

109

130

247

342

3 367

2

91

103

110

131

248

370

2 522

3

91

104

113

136

243

387

1 910

4

92

106

116

140

242

387

1 479

5

93

108

119

142

242

378

1 173

6

94

110

121

145

241

364

951

7

95

112

122

147

241

347

787

8

95

113

124

149

241

334

661

9

95

113

124

151

240

333

563

10

94

112

125

152

239

332

484

11

93

111

124

151

237

330

420

12

91

110

122

150

236

329

368

13

89

108

120

148

234

327

327

14

88

106

119

146

232

325

325

15

86

105

117

145

230

324

324

16

84

103

115

143

229

322

322

17

83

101

114

141

227

320

320

18

81

100

112

140

226

319

319

19

80

99

111

138

224

318

318

20

79

98

110

137

223

317

317

21

78

97

109

136

222

316

316

22

77

95

108

135

221

314

314

23

75

94

107

134

220

313

313

24

74

93

105

133

219

312

312

25

73

92

104

132

217

311

311

26

72

90

103

130

216

310

310

27

71

89

102

129

215

308

308

28

69

88

101

128

214

307

307

29

68

87

99

127

213

306

306

30

67

86

98

126

212

305

305

3.20   Mexican peso

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 306 | 318 | 324 | 345 | 462 | 557 | 3 603 |
| 2 | 83 | 95 | 101 | 122 | 240 | 387 | 2 660 |
| 3 | 84 | 97 | 106 | 129 | 237 | 400 | 1 995 |
| 4 | 86 | 100 | 110 | 135 | 236 | 399 | 1 537 |
| 5 | 88 | 103 | 115 | 138 | 237 | 389 | 1 216 |
| 6 | 90 | 106 | 117 | 142 | 238 | 374 | 985 |
| 7 | 92 | 109 | 120 | 144 | 238 | 356 | 814 |
| 8 | 93 | 111 | 122 | 147 | 239 | 337 | 683 |
| 9 | 94 | 112 | 123 | 150 | 239 | 332 | 581 |
| 10 | 94 | 112 | 125 | 152 | 239 | 332 | 499 |
| 11 | 94 | 113 | 125 | 153 | 239 | 332 | 433 |
| 12 | 94 | 113 | 126 | 153 | 239 | 332 | 378 |
| 13 | 95 | 113 | 126 | 153 | 239 | 333 | 333 |
| 14 | 95 | 114 | 126 | 154 | 240 | 333 | 333 |
| 15 | 96 | 115 | 127 | 155 | 240 | 334 | 334 |
| 16 | 97 | 115 | 128 | 155 | 241 | 335 | 335 |
| 17 | 98 | 116 | 129 | 156 | 242 | 335 | 335 |
| 18 | 99 | 117 | 130 | 157 | 243 | 336 | 336 |
| 19 | 99 | 118 | 130 | 158 | 244 | 337 | 337 |
| 20 | 100 | 118 | 131 | 158 | 244 | 337 | 337 |
| 21 | 100 | 118 | 131 | 158 | 244 | 337 | 337 |
| 22 | 99 | 118 | 130 | 158 | 244 | 337 | 337 |
| 23 | 99 | 117 | 130 | 157 | 243 | 336 | 336 |
| 24 | 98 | 116 | 129 | 156 | 242 | 335 | 335 |
| 25 | 97 | 115 | 128 | 155 | 241 | 334 | 334 |
| 26 | 95 | 114 | 126 | 154 | 240 | 333 | 333 |
| 27 | 94 | 112 | 125 | 152 | 238 | 332 | 332 |
| 28 | 92 | 111 | 123 | 151 | 237 | 330 | 330 |
| 29 | 91 | 110 | 122 | 150 | 235 | 329 | 329 |
| 30 | 89 | 108 | 121 | 148 | 234 | 327 | 327 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

306

318

324

345

462

557

3 603

2

83

95

101

122

240

387

2 660

3

84

97

106

129

237

400

1 995

4

86

100

110

135

236

399

1 537

5

88

103

115

138

237

389

1 216

6

90

106

117

142

238

374

985

7

92

109

120

144

238

356

814

8

93

111

122

147

239

337

683

9

94

112

123

150

239

332

581

10

94

112

125

152

239

332

499

11

94

113

125

153

239

332

433

12

94

113

126

153

239

332

378

13

95

113

126

153

239

333

333

14

95

114

126

154

240

333

333

15

96

115

127

155

240

334

334

16

97

115

128

155

241

335

335

17

98

116

129

156

242

335

335

18

99

117

130

157

243

336

336

19

99

118

130

158

244

337

337

20

100

118

131

158

244

337

337

21

100

118

131

158

244

337

337

22

99

118

130

158

244

337

337

23

99

117

130

157

243

336

336

24

98

116

129

156

242

335

335

25

97

115

128

155

241

334

334

26

95

114

126

154

240

333

333

27

94

112

125

152

238

332

332

28

92

111

123

151

237

330

330

29

91

110

122

150

235

329

329

30

89

108

121

148

234

327

327

3.21   New Taiwan dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 7 | 13 | 34 | 152 | 297 | 3 064 |
| 2 | 0 | 6 | 13 | 34 | 151 | 338 | 2 288 |
| 3 | 1 | 7 | 15 | 39 | 146 | 353 | 1 731 |
| 4 | 1 | 7 | 17 | 42 | 143 | 354 | 1 339 |
| 5 | 1 | 8 | 19 | 43 | 142 | 345 | 1 063 |
| 6 | 2 | 10 | 21 | 45 | 141 | 332 | 862 |
| 7 | 2 | 12 | 22 | 47 | 141 | 317 | 713 |
| 8 | 2 | 12 | 23 | 48 | 140 | 300 | 600 |
| 9 | 4 | 12 | 24 | 50 | 139 | 283 | 511 |
| 10 | 4 | 12 | 27 | 52 | 138 | 266 | 440 |
| 11 | 4 | 12 | 30 | 52 | 138 | 250 | 382 |
| 12 | 4 | 12 | 31 | 52 | 138 | 234 | 334 |
| 13 | 4 | 13 | 34 | 53 | 138 | 232 | 295 |
| 14 | 5 | 13 | 37 | 53 | 139 | 232 | 261 |
| 15 | 6 | 13 | 40 | 53 | 139 | 232 | 233 |
| 16 | 6 | 13 | 41 | 53 | 139 | 232 | 232 |
| 17 | 6 | 14 | 44 | 54 | 140 | 233 | 233 |
| 18 | 6 | 15 | 47 | 54 | 140 | 234 | 234 |
| 19 | 7 | 16 | 49 | 55 | 141 | 234 | 234 |
| 20 | 7 | 17 | 51 | 56 | 142 | 235 | 235 |
| 21 | 7 | 18 | 54 | 57 | 143 | 236 | 236 |
| 22 | 8 | 19 | 56 | 60 | 143 | 237 | 237 |
| 23 | 8 | 19 | 58 | 61 | 144 | 237 | 237 |
| 24 | 8 | 21 | 61 | 63 | 144 | 238 | 238 |
| 25 | 9 | 21 | 63 | 65 | 145 | 238 | 238 |
| 26 | 9 | 22 | 66 | 67 | 145 | 238 | 238 |
| 27 | 11 | 23 | 68 | 69 | 145 | 239 | 239 |
| 28 | 11 | 24 | 71 | 71 | 146 | 239 | 239 |
| 29 | 10 | 25 | 73 | 73 | 146 | 239 | 239 |
| 30 | 11 | 26 | 75 | 75 | 146 | 239 | 239 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

0

7

13

34

152

297

3 064

2

0

6

13

34

151

338

2 288

3

1

7

15

39

146

353

1 731

4

1

7

17

42

143

354

1 339

5

1

8

19

43

142

345

1 063

6

2

10

21

45

141

332

862

7

2

12

22

47

141

317

713

8

2

12

23

48

140

300

600

9

4

12

24

50

139

283

511

10

4

12

27

52

138

266

440

11

4

12

30

52

138

250

382

12

4

12

31

52

138

234

334

13

4

13

34

53

138

232

295

14

5

13

37

53

139

232

261

15

6

13

40

53

139

232

233

16

6

13

41

53

139

232

232

17

6

14

44

54

140

233

233

18

6

15

47

54

140

234

234

19

7

16

49

55

141

234

234

20

7

17

51

56

142

235

235

21

7

18

54

57

143

236

236

22

8

19

56

60

143

237

237

23

8

19

58

61

144

237

237

24

8

21

61

63

144

238

238

25

9

21

63

65

145

238

238

26

9

22

66

67

145

238

238

27

11

23

68

69

145

239

239

28

11

24

71

71

146

239

239

29

10

25

73

73

146

239

239

30

11

26

75

75

146

239

239

3.22   New Zealand dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 46 | 59 | 65 | 86 | 203 | 318 | 3 298 |
| 2 | 47 | 59 | 66 | 87 | 204 | 361 | 2 460 |
| 3 | 47 | 60 | 68 | 92 | 199 | 376 | 1 855 |
| 4 | 46 | 60 | 70 | 95 | 196 | 375 | 1 431 |
| 5 | 46 | 61 | 73 | 96 | 195 | 366 | 1 133 |
| 6 | 47 | 63 | 74 | 99 | 195 | 352 | 919 |
| 7 | 48 | 64 | 75 | 99 | 194 | 335 | 759 |
| 8 | 47 | 65 | 76 | 101 | 193 | 317 | 638 |
| 9 | 47 | 65 | 77 | 104 | 192 | 299 | 543 |
| 10 | 46 | 65 | 77 | 104 | 191 | 285 | 467 |
| 11 | 45 | 64 | 76 | 104 | 190 | 283 | 405 |
| 12 | 44 | 63 | 75 | 103 | 189 | 282 | 355 |
| 13 | 43 | 61 | 74 | 101 | 187 | 280 | 312 |
| 14 | 41 | 60 | 73 | 100 | 186 | 279 | 279 |
| 15 | 40 | 59 | 71 | 99 | 185 | 278 | 278 |
| 16 | 39 | 58 | 70 | 97 | 183 | 277 | 277 |
| 17 | 38 | 57 | 69 | 97 | 182 | 276 | 276 |
| 18 | 37 | 56 | 68 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 275 |
| 19 | 36 | 55 | 67 | 95 | 181 | 274 | 274 |
| 20 | 36 | 55 | 67 | 94 | 180 | 274 | 274 |
| 21 | 35 | 54 | 66 | 94 | 180 | 273 | 273 |
| 22 | 35 | 53 | 66 | 93 | 179 | 273 | 273 |
| 23 | 34 | 53 | 65 | 93 | 179 | 272 | 272 |
| 24 | 33 | 52 | 65 | 92 | 178 | 271 | 271 |
| 25 | 33 | 51 | 66 | 91 | 177 | 271 | 271 |
| 26 | 32 | 51 | 68 | 91 | 177 | 270 | 270 |
| 27 | 31 | 50 | 71 | 90 | 176 | 269 | 269 |
| 28 | 31 | 49 | 73 | 89 | 175 | 268 | 268 |
| 29 | 30 | 49 | 77 | 89 | 175 | 268 | 268 |
| 30 | 29 | 48 | 79 | 88 | 174 | 267 | 267 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

46

59

65

86

203

318

3 298

2

47

59

66

87

204

361

2 460

3

47

60

68

92

199

376

1 855

4

46

60

70

95

196

375

1 431

5

46

61

73

96

195

366

1 133

6

47

63

74

99

195

352

919

7

48

64

75

99

194

335

759

8

47

65

76

101

193

317

638

9

47

65

77

104

192

299

543

10

46

65

77

104

191

285

467

11

45

64

76

104

190

283

405

12

44

63

75

103

189

282

355

13

43

61

74

101

187

280

312

14

41

60

73

100

186

279

279

15

40

59

71

99

185

278

278

16

39

58

70

97

183

277

277

17

38

57

69

97

182

276

276

18

37

56

68

96

182

275

275

19

36

55

67

95

181

274

274

20

36

55

67

94

180

274

274

21

35

54

66

94

180

273

273

22

35

53

66

93

179

273

273

23

34

53

65

93

179

272

272

24

33

52

65

92

178

271

271

25

33

51

66

91

177

271

271

26

32

51

68

91

177

270

270

27

31

50

71

90

176

269

269

28

31

49

73

89

175

268

268

29

30

49

77

89

175

268

268

30

29

48

79

88

174

267

267

3.23   Rand

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 109 | 121 | 128 | 149 | 266 | 361 | 3 417 |
| 2 | 111 | 123 | 129 | 151 | 268 | 374 | 2 556 |
| 3 | 112 | 125 | 133 | 157 | 264 | 391 | 1 937 |
| 4 | 114 | 127 | 137 | 162 | 263 | 392 | 1 500 |
| 5 | 115 | 130 | 141 | 165 | 264 | 384 | 1 192 |
| 6 | 117 | 133 | 144 | 169 | 265 | 371 | 969 |
| 7 | 119 | 136 | 146 | 171 | 265 | 358 | 804 |
| 8 | 119 | 136 | 147 | 173 | 265 | 358 | 677 |
| 9 | 119 | 137 | 149 | 175 | 264 | 358 | 577 |
| 10 | 119 | 137 | 150 | 177 | 264 | 357 | 497 |
| 11 | 118 | 137 | 149 | 177 | 263 | 356 | 432 |
| 12 | 117 | 136 | 148 | 176 | 262 | 355 | 379 |
| 13 | 116 | 134 | 147 | 174 | 260 | 353 | 353 |
| 14 | 114 | 133 | 145 | 173 | 258 | 352 | 352 |
| 15 | 112 | 131 | 143 | 171 | 257 | 350 | 350 |
| 16 | 110 | 129 | 141 | 169 | 255 | 348 | 348 |
| 17 | 108 | 127 | 139 | 167 | 253 | 346 | 346 |
| 18 | 106 | 125 | 137 | 165 | 251 | 344 | 344 |
| 19 | 104 | 123 | 136 | 163 | 249 | 342 | 342 |
| 20 | 103 | 121 | 134 | 161 | 247 | 341 | 341 |
| 21 | 101 | 120 | 132 | 160 | 246 | 339 | 339 |
| 22 | 99 | 118 | 130 | 158 | 244 | 337 | 337 |
| 23 | 97 | 116 | 129 | 156 | 242 | 335 | 335 |
| 24 | 96 | 114 | 127 | 154 | 240 | 333 | 333 |
| 25 | 94 | 112 | 125 | 152 | 238 | 331 | 331 |
| 26 | 92 | 111 | 123 | 150 | 236 | 330 | 330 |
| 27 | 90 | 109 | 121 | 149 | 234 | 328 | 328 |
| 28 | 88 | 107 | 119 | 147 | 233 | 326 | 326 |
| 29 | 87 | 105 | 118 | 145 | 231 | 324 | 324 |
| 30 | 85 | 104 | 116 | 144 | 229 | 323 | 323 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

109

121

128

149

266

361

3 417

2

111

123

129

151

268

374

2 556

3

112

125

133

157

264

391

1 937

4

114

127

137

162

263

392

1 500

5

115

130

141

165

264

384

1 192

6

117

133

144

169

265

371

969

7

119

136

146

171

265

358

804

8

119

136

147

173

265

358

677

9

119

137

149

175

264

358

577

10

119

137

150

177

264

357

497

11

118

137

149

177

263

356

432

12

117

136

148

176

262

355

379

13

116

134

147

174

260

353

353

14

114

133

145

173

258

352

352

15

112

131

143

171

257

350

350

16

110

129

141

169

255

348

348

17

108

127

139

167

253

346

346

18

106

125

137

165

251

344

344

19

104

123

136

163

249

342

342

20

103

121

134

161

247

341

341

21

101

120

132

160

246

339

339

22

99

118

130

158

244

337

337

23

97

116

129

156

242

335

335

24

96

114

127

154

240

333

333

25

94

112

125

152

238

331

331

26

92

111

123

150

236

330

330

27

90

109

121

149

234

328

328

28

88

107

119

147

233

326

326

29

87

105

118

145

231

324

324

30

85

104

116

144

229

323

323

3.24   Real

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 163 | 175 | 181 | 202 | 320 | 415 | 3 703 |
| 2 | 171 | 184 | 190 | 211 | 328 | 423 | 2 758 |
| 3 | 176 | 188 | 197 | 220 | 328 | 423 | 2 084 |
| 4 | 177 | 191 | 201 | 226 | 327 | 421 | 1 612 |
| 5 | 179 | 193 | 205 | 228 | 327 | 421 | 1 278 |
| 6 | 179 | 195 | 206 | 231 | 327 | 420 | 1 036 |
| 7 | 180 | 197 | 207 | 232 | 326 | 419 | 856 |
| 8 | 179 | 196 | 207 | 233 | 325 | 418 | 719 |
| 9 | 178 | 196 | 208 | 235 | 324 | 417 | 611 |
| 10 | 178 | 196 | 208 | 236 | 322 | 416 | 526 |
| 11 | 176 | 195 | 207 | 235 | 321 | 414 | 456 |
| 12 | 174 | 193 | 205 | 233 | 319 | 412 | 412 |
| 13 | 171 | 190 | 203 | 230 | 316 | 409 | 409 |
| 14 | 169 | 187 | 200 | 227 | 313 | 406 | 406 |
| 15 | 166 | 184 | 197 | 224 | 310 | 403 | 403 |
| 16 | 163 | 181 | 194 | 221 | 307 | 400 | 400 |
| 17 | 160 | 178 | 191 | 218 | 304 | 398 | 398 |
| 18 | 157 | 176 | 188 | 215 | 301 | 395 | 395 |
| 19 | 154 | 173 | 185 | 213 | 298 | 392 | 392 |
| 20 | 151 | 170 | 182 | 210 | 296 | 389 | 389 |
| 21 | 148 | 167 | 179 | 207 | 293 | 386 | 386 |
| 22 | 145 | 164 | 176 | 204 | 290 | 383 | 383 |
| 23 | 142 | 161 | 173 | 201 | 286 | 380 | 380 |
| 24 | 139 | 158 | 170 | 198 | 283 | 377 | 377 |
| 25 | 136 | 155 | 167 | 194 | 280 | 374 | 374 |
| 26 | 133 | 152 | 164 | 191 | 277 | 371 | 371 |
| 27 | 130 | 149 | 161 | 189 | 274 | 368 | 368 |
| 28 | 127 | 146 | 158 | 186 | 272 | 365 | 365 |
| 29 | 124 | 143 | 155 | 183 | 269 | 362 | 362 |
| 30 | 122 | 140 | 153 | 180 | 266 | 359 | 359 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

163

175

181

202

320

415

3 703

2

171

184

190

211

328

423

2 758

3

176

188

197

220

328

423

2 084

4

177

191

201

226

327

421

1 612

5

179

193

205

228

327

421

1 278

6

179

195

206

231

327

420

1 036

7

180

197

207

232

326

419

856

8

179

196

207

233

325

418

719

9

178

196

208

235

324

417

611

10

178

196

208

236

322

416

526

11

176

195

207

235

321

414

456

12

174

193

205

233

319

412

412

13

171

190

203

230

316

409

409

14

169

187

200

227

313

406

406

15

166

184

197

224

310

403

403

16

163

181

194

221

307

400

400

17

160

178

191

218

304

398

398

18

157

176

188

215

301

395

395

19

154

173

185

213

298

392

392

20

151

170

182

210

296

389

389

21

148

167

179

207

293

386

386

22

145

164

176

204

290

383

383

23

142

161

173

201

286

380

380

24

139

158

170

198

283

377

377

25

136

155

167

194

280

374

374

26

133

152

164

191

277

371

371

27

130

149

161

189

274

368

368

28

127

146

158

186

272

365

365

29

124

143

155

183

269

362

362

30

122

140

153

180

266

359

359

3.25   Renminbi-yuan

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 28 | 40 | 46 | 67 | 184 | 303 | 3 125 |
| 2 | 28 | 40 | 47 | 68 | 185 | 345 | 2 337 |
| 3 | 28 | 41 | 49 | 73 | 180 | 361 | 1 770 |
| 4 | 28 | 42 | 52 | 77 | 178 | 362 | 1 371 |
| 5 | 29 | 43 | 55 | 78 | 177 | 353 | 1 089 |
| 6 | 29 | 45 | 56 | 81 | 177 | 340 | 884 |
| 7 | 30 | 47 | 57 | 82 | 176 | 325 | 732 |
| 8 | 29 | 47 | 58 | 83 | 175 | 308 | 615 |
| 9 | 29 | 47 | 58 | 85 | 174 | 290 | 524 |
| 10 | 29 | 47 | 59 | 87 | 174 | 273 | 451 |
| 11 | 28 | 47 | 59 | 87 | 173 | 266 | 392 |
| 12 | 28 | 46 | 59 | 86 | 172 | 266 | 343 |
| 13 | 27 | 46 | 59 | 86 | 172 | 265 | 303 |
| 14 | 27 | 46 | 58 | 86 | 171 | 265 | 268 |
| 15 | 27 | 45 | 58 | 85 | 171 | 265 | 265 |
| 16 | 27 | 45 | 58 | 85 | 171 | 264 | 264 |
| 17 | 27 | 45 | 58 | 85 | 171 | 264 | 264 |
| 18 | 27 | 46 | 58 | 85 | 171 | 265 | 265 |
| 19 | 27 | 46 | 58 | 86 | 171 | 265 | 265 |
| 20 | 27 | 46 | 58 | 86 | 172 | 265 | 265 |
| 21 | 27 | 46 | 58 | 86 | 172 | 265 | 265 |
| 22 | 27 | 46 | 58 | 86 | 171 | 265 | 265 |
| 23 | 27 | 46 | 60 | 85 | 171 | 265 | 265 |
| 24 | 27 | 45 | 62 | 85 | 171 | 264 | 264 |
| 25 | 26 | 45 | 65 | 85 | 171 | 264 | 264 |
| 26 | 26 | 45 | 67 | 85 | 170 | 264 | 264 |
| 27 | 26 | 44 | 70 | 84 | 170 | 263 | 263 |
| 28 | 25 | 44 | 72 | 84 | 170 | 263 | 263 |
| 29 | 25 | 44 | 74 | 84 | 169 | 263 | 263 |
| 30 | 25 | 43 | 78 | 83 | 169 | 262 | 262 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

28

40

46

67

184

303

3 125

2

28

40

47

68

185

345

2 337

3

28

41

49

73

180

361

1 770

4

28

42

52

77

178

362

1 371

5

29

43

55

78

177

353

1 089

6

29

45

56

81

177

340

884

7

30

47

57

82

176

325

732

8

29

47

58

83

175

308

615

9

29

47

58

85

174

290

524

10

29

47

59

87

174

273

451

11

28

47

59

87

173

266

392

12

28

46

59

86

172

266

343

13

27

46

59

86

172

265

303

14

27

46

58

86

171

265

268

15

27

45

58

85

171

265

265

16

27

45

58

85

171

264

264

17

27

45

58

85

171

264

264

18

27

46

58

85

171

265

265

19

27

46

58

86

171

265

265

20

27

46

58

86

172

265

265

21

27

46

58

86

172

265

265

22

27

46

58

86

171

265

265

23

27

46

60

85

171

265

265

24

27

45

62

85

171

264

264

25

26

45

65

85

171

264

264

26

26

45

67

85

170

264

264

27

26

44

70

84

170

263

263

28

25

44

72

84

170

263

263

29

25

44

74

84

169

263

263

30

25

43

78

83

169

262

262

3.26   Ringgit

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 25 | 37 | 44 | 65 | 182 | 308 | 3 189 |
| 2 | 27 | 39 | 45 | 66 | 184 | 352 | 2 387 |
| 3 | 28 | 41 | 49 | 73 | 180 | 368 | 1 807 |
| 4 | 29 | 43 | 53 | 78 | 179 | 368 | 1 399 |
| 5 | 31 | 46 | 57 | 81 | 180 | 360 | 1 110 |
| 6 | 33 | 49 | 60 | 84 | 180 | 346 | 901 |
| 7 | 35 | 52 | 62 | 87 | 181 | 330 | 746 |
| 8 | 35 | 52 | 63 | 89 | 181 | 313 | 627 |
| 9 | 36 | 54 | 65 | 92 | 181 | 295 | 534 |
| 10 | 36 | 55 | 67 | 94 | 181 | 278 | 460 |
| 11 | 37 | 56 | 68 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 399 |
| 12 | 37 | 56 | 68 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 349 |
| 13 | 37 | 56 | 69 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 308 |
| 14 | 37 | 56 | 68 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 275 |
| 15 | 37 | 56 | 68 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 275 |
| 16 | 37 | 56 | 68 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 275 |
| 17 | 37 | 56 | 68 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 275 |
| 18 | 37 | 56 | 68 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 275 |
| 19 | 37 | 56 | 69 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 275 |
| 20 | 38 | 56 | 69 | 96 | 182 | 276 | 276 |
| 21 | 38 | 57 | 69 | 96 | 182 | 276 | 276 |
| 22 | 38 | 56 | 69 | 96 | 182 | 276 | 276 |
| 23 | 38 | 56 | 69 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 275 |
| 24 | 37 | 56 | 68 | 96 | 182 | 275 | 275 |
| 25 | 37 | 55 | 68 | 95 | 181 | 274 | 274 |
| 26 | 36 | 55 | 68 | 95 | 181 | 274 | 274 |
| 27 | 36 | 54 | 71 | 94 | 180 | 273 | 273 |
| 28 | 35 | 54 | 73 | 94 | 179 | 273 | 273 |
| 29 | 34 | 53 | 76 | 93 | 179 | 272 | 272 |
| 30 | 34 | 52 | 78 | 92 | 178 | 271 | 271 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

25

37

44

65

182

308

3 189

2

27

39

45

66

184

352

2 387

3

28

41

49

73

180

368

1 807

4

29

43

53

78

179

368

1 399

5

31

46

57

81

180

360

1 110

6

33

49

60

84

180

346

901

7

35

52

62

87

181

330

746

8

35

52

63

89

181

313

627

9

36

54

65

92

181

295

534

10

36

55

67

94

181

278

460

11

37

56

68

96

182

275

399

12

37

56

68

96

182

275

349

13

37

56

69

96

182

275

308

14

37

56

68

96

182

275

275

15

37

56

68

96

182

275

275

16

37

56

68

96

182

275

275

17

37

56

68

96

182

275

275

18

37

56

68

96

182

275

275

19

37

56

69

96

182

275

275

20

38

56

69

96

182

276

276

21

38

57

69

96

182

276

276

22

38

56

69

96

182

276

276

23

38

56

69

96

182

275

275

24

37

56

68

96

182

275

275

25

37

55

68

95

181

274

274

26

36

55

68

95

181

274

274

27

36

54

71

94

180

273

273

28

35

54

73

94

179

273

273

29

34

53

76

93

179

272

272

30

34

52

78

92

178

271

271

3.27   Russian rouble

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 123 | 135 | 141 | 163 | 280 | 375 | 3 546 |
| 2 | 121 | 133 | 140 | 161 | 278 | 381 | 2 613 |
| 3 | 120 | 133 | 141 | 165 | 272 | 397 | 1 972 |
| 4 | 119 | 133 | 143 | 168 | 269 | 398 | 1 528 |
| 5 | 120 | 134 | 146 | 169 | 268 | 390 | 1 215 |
| 6 | 120 | 136 | 147 | 171 | 267 | 376 | 988 |
| 7 | 120 | 137 | 148 | 172 | 266 | 360 | 819 |
| 8 | 120 | 137 | 148 | 174 | 265 | 359 | 689 |
| 9 | 119 | 137 | 148 | 175 | 264 | 358 | 588 |
| 10 | 119 | 137 | 150 | 177 | 264 | 357 | 506 |
| 11 | 118 | 137 | 149 | 177 | 263 | 356 | 440 |
| 12 | 117 | 136 | 148 | 176 | 262 | 355 | 385 |
| 13 | 116 | 135 | 147 | 175 | 261 | 354 | 354 |
| 14 | 115 | 134 | 146 | 174 | 259 | 353 | 353 |
| 15 | 113 | 132 | 144 | 172 | 257 | 351 | 351 |
| 16 | 111 | 130 | 142 | 170 | 255 | 349 | 349 |
| 17 | 109 | 127 | 140 | 167 | 253 | 346 | 346 |
| 18 | 107 | 125 | 138 | 165 | 251 | 344 | 344 |
| 19 | 105 | 123 | 136 | 163 | 249 | 342 | 342 |
| 20 | 102 | 121 | 134 | 161 | 247 | 340 | 340 |
| 21 | 100 | 119 | 131 | 159 | 245 | 338 | 338 |
| 22 | 98 | 117 | 129 | 157 | 242 | 336 | 336 |
| 23 | 96 | 114 | 127 | 154 | 240 | 334 | 334 |
| 24 | 94 | 112 | 125 | 152 | 238 | 331 | 331 |
| 25 | 91 | 110 | 122 | 150 | 236 | 329 | 329 |
| 26 | 89 | 108 | 120 | 148 | 234 | 327 | 327 |
| 27 | 87 | 106 | 118 | 146 | 232 | 325 | 325 |
| 28 | 85 | 104 | 116 | 144 | 230 | 323 | 323 |
| 29 | 83 | 102 | 114 | 142 | 228 | 321 | 321 |
| 30 | 81 | 100 | 112 | 140 | 226 | 319 | 319 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

123

135

141

163

280

375

3 546

2

121

133

140

161

278

381

2 613

3

120

133

141

165

272

397

1 972

4

119

133

143

168

269

398

1 528

5

120

134

146

169

268

390

1 215

6

120

136

147

171

267

376

988

7

120

137

148

172

266

360

819

8

120

137

148

174

265

359

689

9

119

137

148

175

264

358

588

10

119

137

150

177

264

357

506

11

118

137

149

177

263

356

440

12

117

136

148

176

262

355

385

13

116

135

147

175

261

354

354

14

115

134

146

174

259

353

353

15

113

132

144

172

257

351

351

16

111

130

142

170

255

349

349

17

109

127

140

167

253

346

346

18

107

125

138

165

251

344

344

19

105

123

136

163

249

342

342

20

102

121

134

161

247

340

340

21

100

119

131

159

245

338

338

22

98

117

129

157

242

336

336

23

96

114

127

154

240

334

334

24

94

112

125

152

238

331

331

25

91

110

122

150

236

329

329

26

89

108

120

148

234

327

327

27

87

106

118

146

232

325

325

28

85

104

116

144

230

323

323

29

83

102

114

142

228

321

321

30

81

100

112

140

226

319

319

3.28   Singapore dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 9 | 15 | 36 | 154 | 312 | 3 230 |
| 2 | 0 | 11 | 17 | 38 | 155 | 353 | 2 399 |
| 3 | 1 | 12 | 21 | 44 | 152 | 368 | 1 810 |
| 4 | 1 | 14 | 25 | 49 | 150 | 367 | 1 398 |
| 5 | 2 | 17 | 28 | 52 | 151 | 358 | 1 108 |
| 6 | 4 | 20 | 31 | 55 | 151 | 344 | 898 |
| 7 | 6 | 23 | 33 | 58 | 152 | 328 | 742 |
| 8 | 6 | 23 | 35 | 60 | 152 | 310 | 623 |
| 9 | 6 | 24 | 36 | 63 | 152 | 293 | 530 |
| 10 | 7 | 25 | 37 | 65 | 151 | 275 | 456 |
| 11 | 7 | 25 | 38 | 65 | 151 | 258 | 396 |
| 12 | 6 | 25 | 37 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 347 |
| 13 | 6 | 25 | 37 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 305 |
| 14 | 6 | 25 | 38 | 65 | 150 | 244 | 270 |
| 15 | 6 | 24 | 40 | 64 | 150 | 244 | 244 |
| 16 | 6 | 24 | 43 | 64 | 150 | 243 | 243 |
| 17 | 6 | 24 | 46 | 64 | 150 | 243 | 243 |
| 18 | 7 | 24 | 48 | 64 | 150 | 243 | 243 |
| 19 | 7 | 24 | 50 | 64 | 150 | 243 | 243 |
| 20 | 7 | 25 | 53 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 21 | 7 | 25 | 55 | 65 | 151 | 244 | 244 |
| 22 | 9 | 26 | 58 | 65 | 151 | 245 | 245 |
| 23 | 9 | 26 | 60 | 66 | 152 | 245 | 245 |
| 24 | 10 | 26 | 62 | 66 | 152 | 245 | 245 |
| 25 | 10 | 26 | 65 | 67 | 152 | 245 | 245 |
| 26 | 10 | 26 | 67 | 69 | 152 | 245 | 245 |
| 27 | 11 | 26 | 70 | 71 | 152 | 245 | 245 |
| 28 | 11 | 26 | 72 | 73 | 152 | 245 | 245 |
| 29 | 11 | 26 | 75 | 75 | 152 | 245 | 245 |
| 30 | 12 | 26 | 78 | 77 | 152 | 245 | 245 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

0

9

15

36

154

312

3 230

2

0

11

17

38

155

353

2 399

3

1

12

21

44

152

368

1 810

4

1

14

25

49

150

367

1 398

5

2

17

28

52

151

358

1 108

6

4

20

31

55

151

344

898

7

6

23

33

58

152

328

742

8

6

23

35

60

152

310

623

9

6

24

36

63

152

293

530

10

7

25

37

65

151

275

456

11

7

25

38

65

151

258

396

12

6

25

37

65

151

244

347

13

6

25

37

65

151

244

305

14

6

25

38

65

150

244

270

15

6

24

40

64

150

244

244

16

6

24

43

64

150

243

243

17

6

24

46

64

150

243

243

18

7

24

48

64

150

243

243

19

7

24

50

64

150

243

243

20

7

25

53

65

151

244

244

21

7

25

55

65

151

244

244

22

9

26

58

65

151

245

245

23

9

26

60

66

152

245

245

24

10

26

62

66

152

245

245

25

10

26

65

67

152

245

245

26

10

26

67

69

152

245

245

27

11

26

70

71

152

245

245

28

11

26

72

73

152

245

245

29

11

26

75

75

152

245

245

30

12

26

78

77

152

245

245

3.29   South Korean won

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 31 | 43 | 50 | 71 | 188 | 311 | 3 217 |
| 2 | 31 | 43 | 50 | 71 | 188 | 353 | 2 398 |
| 3 | 30 | 43 | 51 | 75 | 182 | 368 | 1 811 |
| 4 | 29 | 43 | 53 | 78 | 179 | 368 | 1 399 |
| 5 | 29 | 44 | 55 | 79 | 178 | 359 | 1 109 |
| 6 | 32 | 47 | 58 | 83 | 179 | 345 | 899 |
| 7 | 30 | 47 | 57 | 82 | 176 | 328 | 743 |
| 8 | 33 | 50 | 61 | 87 | 179 | 311 | 624 |
| 9 | 32 | 50 | 62 | 89 | 178 | 293 | 531 |
| 10 | 28 | 46 | 58 | 86 | 173 | 276 | 457 |
| 11 | 24 | 42 | 55 | 82 | 168 | 262 | 397 |
| 12 | 21 | 39 | 52 | 79 | 165 | 259 | 347 |
| 13 | 18 | 37 | 49 | 77 | 163 | 256 | 305 |
| 14 | 17 | 35 | 48 | 75 | 161 | 254 | 270 |
| 15 | 15 | 34 | 46 | 74 | 160 | 253 | 253 |
| 16 | 14 | 32 | 45 | 72 | 158 | 251 | 251 |
| 17 | 13 | 32 | 45 | 72 | 157 | 251 | 251 |
| 18 | 12 | 31 | 48 | 71 | 157 | 250 | 250 |
| 19 | 12 | 31 | 50 | 71 | 156 | 250 | 250 |
| 20 | 12 | 31 | 53 | 71 | 156 | 250 | 250 |
| 21 | 12 | 31 | 55 | 71 | 156 | 250 | 250 |
| 22 | 12 | 31 | 58 | 71 | 156 | 250 | 250 |
| 23 | 12 | 31 | 59 | 70 | 156 | 250 | 250 |
| 24 | 12 | 30 | 62 | 70 | 156 | 249 | 249 |
| 25 | 12 | 30 | 65 | 70 | 156 | 249 | 249 |
| 26 | 11 | 30 | 67 | 70 | 156 | 249 | 249 |
| 27 | 11 | 30 | 69 | 71 | 156 | 249 | 249 |
| 28 | 11 | 30 | 72 | 73 | 156 | 249 | 249 |
| 29 | 11 | 30 | 74 | 75 | 155 | 249 | 249 |
| 30 | 12 | 30 | 78 | 76 | 155 | 249 | 249 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

31

43

50

71

188

311

3 217

2

31

43

50

71

188

353

2 398

3

30

43

51

75

182

368

1 811

4

29

43

53

78

179

368

1 399

5

29

44

55

79

178

359

1 109

6

32

47

58

83

179

345

899

7

30

47

57

82

176

328

743

8

33

50

61

87

179

311

624

9

32

50

62

89

178

293

531

10

28

46

58

86

173

276

457

11

24

42

55

82

168

262

397

12

21

39

52

79

165

259

347

13

18

37

49

77

163

256

305

14

17

35

48

75

161

254

270

15

15

34

46

74

160

253

253

16

14

32

45

72

158

251

251

17

13

32

45

72

157

251

251

18

12

31

48

71

157

250

250

19

12

31

50

71

156

250

250

20

12

31

53

71

156

250

250

21

12

31

55

71

156

250

250

22

12

31

58

71

156

250

250

23

12

31

59

70

156

250

250

24

12

30

62

70

156

249

249

25

12

30

65

70

156

249

249

26

11

30

67

70

156

249

249

27

11

30

69

71

156

249

249

28

11

30

72

73

156

249

249

29

11

30

74

75

155

249

249

30

12

30

78

76

155

249

249

3.30   Turkish lira

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 206 | 218 | 225 | 246 | 363 | 458 | 3 660 |
| 2 | 203 | 215 | 222 | 243 | 360 | 455 | 2 661 |
| 3 | 198 | 211 | 219 | 243 | 350 | 445 | 1 991 |
| 4 | 193 | 207 | 217 | 242 | 343 | 437 | 1 533 |
| 5 | 189 | 204 | 215 | 239 | 338 | 431 | 1 214 |
| 6 | 186 | 202 | 213 | 237 | 333 | 427 | 985 |
| 7 | 183 | 200 | 210 | 235 | 329 | 422 | 816 |
| 8 | 179 | 196 | 207 | 233 | 324 | 418 | 687 |
| 9 | 175 | 193 | 204 | 231 | 320 | 413 | 587 |
| 10 | 171 | 189 | 202 | 229 | 316 | 409 | 507 |
| 11 | 167 | 186 | 198 | 226 | 312 | 405 | 441 |
| 12 | 163 | 182 | 194 | 222 | 308 | 401 | 401 |
| 13 | 159 | 178 | 190 | 218 | 304 | 397 | 397 |
| 14 | 155 | 174 | 186 | 214 | 300 | 393 | 393 |
| 15 | 152 | 170 | 183 | 210 | 296 | 389 | 389 |
| 16 | 148 | 167 | 179 | 207 | 293 | 386 | 386 |
| 17 | 145 | 163 | 176 | 203 | 289 | 382 | 382 |
| 18 | 142 | 160 | 173 | 200 | 286 | 379 | 379 |
| 19 | 139 | 157 | 170 | 197 | 283 | 376 | 376 |
| 20 | 136 | 154 | 167 | 194 | 280 | 373 | 373 |
| 21 | 133 | 151 | 164 | 191 | 277 | 370 | 370 |
| 22 | 130 | 148 | 161 | 188 | 274 | 368 | 368 |
| 23 | 127 | 146 | 158 | 186 | 271 | 365 | 365 |
| 24 | 124 | 143 | 155 | 183 | 269 | 362 | 362 |
| 25 | 121 | 140 | 152 | 180 | 266 | 359 | 359 |
| 26 | 119 | 137 | 150 | 177 | 263 | 356 | 356 |
| 27 | 116 | 135 | 147 | 175 | 260 | 354 | 354 |
| 28 | 114 | 132 | 145 | 172 | 258 | 351 | 351 |
| 29 | 111 | 130 | 142 | 170 | 256 | 349 | 349 |
| 30 | 109 | 127 | 140 | 167 | 253 | 346 | 346 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

206

218

225

246

363

458

3 660

2

203

215

222

243

360

455

2 661

3

198

211

219

243

350

445

1 991

4

193

207

217

242

343

437

1 533

5

189

204

215

239

338

431

1 214

6

186

202

213

237

333

427

985

7

183

200

210

235

329

422

816

8

179

196

207

233

324

418

687

9

175

193

204

231

320

413

587

10

171

189

202

229

316

409

507

11

167

186

198

226

312

405

441

12

163

182

194

222

308

401

401

13

159

178

190

218

304

397

397

14

155

174

186

214

300

393

393

15

152

170

183

210

296

389

389

16

148

167

179

207

293

386

386

17

145

163

176

203

289

382

382

18

142

160

173

200

286

379

379

19

139

157

170

197

283

376

376

20

136

154

167

194

280

373

373

21

133

151

164

191

277

370

370

22

130

148

161

188

274

368

368

23

127

146

158

186

271

365

365

24

124

143

155

183

269

362

362

25

121

140

152

180

266

359

359

26

119

137

150

177

263

356

356

27

116

135

147

175

260

354

354

28

114

132

145

172

258

351

351

29

111

130

142

170

256

349

349

30

109

127

140

167

253

346

346

3.31   US dollar

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 14 | 25 | 50 | 169 | 316 | 3 277 |
| 2 | 0 | 14 | 25 | 50 | 169 | 358 | 2 436 |
| 3 | 1 | 16 | 28 | 55 | 166 | 372 | 1 833 |
| 4 | 1 | 20 | 31 | 60 | 165 | 371 | 1 414 |
| 5 | 3 | 23 | 36 | 66 | 165 | 361 | 1 120 |
| 6 | 5 | 27 | 39 | 68 | 166 | 347 | 907 |
| 7 | 8 | 30 | 42 | 70 | 166 | 331 | 750 |
| 8 | 11 | 34 | 45 | 74 | 166 | 313 | 629 |
| 9 | 12 | 37 | 49 | 76 | 166 | 295 | 535 |
| 10 | 14 | 39 | 51 | 77 | 166 | 277 | 461 |
| 11 | 15 | 41 | 52 | 78 | 166 | 260 | 400 |
| 12 | 15 | 42 | 54 | 79 | 166 | 260 | 350 |
| 13 | 16 | 43 | 54 | 80 | 166 | 260 | 308 |
| 14 | 17 | 44 | 55 | 80 | 166 | 259 | 273 |
| 15 | 17 | 44 | 55 | 80 | 166 | 259 | 259 |
| 16 | 17 | 44 | 55 | 80 | 166 | 259 | 259 |
| 17 | 17 | 44 | 55 | 80 | 166 | 259 | 259 |
| 18 | 17 | 44 | 55 | 80 | 166 | 259 | 259 |
| 19 | 17 | 44 | 55 | 80 | 166 | 259 | 259 |
| 20 | 17 | 44 | 55 | 80 | 166 | 260 | 260 |
| 21 | 17 | 44 | 55 | 80 | 166 | 260 | 260 |
| 22 | 17 | 44 | 58 | 80 | 166 | 260 | 260 |
| 23 | 17 | 44 | 61 | 80 | 166 | 260 | 260 |
| 24 | 17 | 44 | 63 | 80 | 166 | 259 | 259 |
| 25 | 17 | 44 | 66 | 80 | 166 | 259 | 259 |
| 26 | 17 | 44 | 68 | 80 | 166 | 259 | 259 |
| 27 | 17 | 44 | 71 | 80 | 165 | 259 | 259 |
| 28 | 17 | 44 | 73 | 80 | 165 | 258 | 258 |
| 29 | 17 | 44 | 75 | 80 | 165 | 258 | 258 |
| 30 | 17 | 44 | 78 | 80 | 164 | 258 | 258 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

0

14

25

50

169

316

3 277

2

0

14

25

50

169

358

2 436

3

1

16

28

55

166

372

1 833

4

1

20

31

60

165

371

1 414

5

3

23

36

66

165

361

1 120

6

5

27

39

68

166

347

907

7

8

30

42

70

166

331

750

8

11

34

45

74

166

313

629

9

12

37

49

76

166

295

535

10

14

39

51

77

166

277

461

11

15

41

52

78

166

260

400

12

15

42

54

79

166

260

350

13

16

43

54

80

166

260

308

14

17

44

55

80

166

259

273

15

17

44

55

80

166

259

259

16

17

44

55

80

166

259

259

17

17

44

55

80

166

259

259

18

17

44

55

80

166

259

259

19

17

44

55

80

166

259

259

20

17

44

55

80

166

260

260

21

17

44

55

80

166

260

260

22

17

44

58

80

166

260

260

23

17

44

61

80

166

260

260

24

17

44

63

80

166

259

259

25

17

44

66

80

166

259

259

26

17

44

68

80

166

259

259

27

17

44

71

80

165

259

259

28

17

44

73

80

165

258

258

29

17

44

75

80

165

258

258

30

17

44

78

80

164

258

258

3.32   Yen

| Duration (in years) | Credit quality step 0 | Credit quality step 1 | Credit quality step 2 | Credit quality step 3 | Credit quality step 4 | Credit quality step 5 | Credit quality step 6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 14 | 131 | 293 | 3 014 |
| 2 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 13 | 130 | 333 | 2 249 |
| 3 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 16 | 123 | 348 | 1 701 |
| 4 | 1 | 3 | 11 | 19 | 120 | 348 | 1 317 |
| 5 | 1 | 4 | 15 | 21 | 119 | 340 | 1 045 |
| 6 | 2 | 4 | 16 | 24 | 119 | 327 | 849 |
| 7 | 2 | 6 | 19 | 27 | 119 | 312 | 703 |
| 8 | 2 | 6 | 21 | 29 | 118 | 296 | 591 |
| 9 | 4 | 7 | 24 | 31 | 118 | 279 | 504 |
| 10 | 4 | 8 | 27 | 33 | 118 | 263 | 434 |
| 11 | 4 | 9 | 30 | 36 | 118 | 247 | 377 |
| 12 | 4 | 9 | 31 | 38 | 119 | 232 | 330 |
| 13 | 4 | 11 | 34 | 40 | 119 | 217 | 291 |
| 14 | 5 | 11 | 37 | 42 | 119 | 212 | 258 |
| 15 | 6 | 13 | 39 | 44 | 119 | 213 | 230 |
| 16 | 6 | 13 | 41 | 46 | 120 | 213 | 213 |
| 17 | 6 | 14 | 44 | 49 | 120 | 213 | 213 |
| 18 | 6 | 15 | 46 | 51 | 120 | 214 | 214 |
| 19 | 7 | 16 | 48 | 53 | 123 | 214 | 214 |
| 20 | 7 | 16 | 51 | 55 | 125 | 215 | 215 |
| 21 | 7 | 18 | 53 | 57 | 126 | 215 | 215 |
| 22 | 8 | 19 | 55 | 58 | 129 | 216 | 216 |
| 23 | 8 | 19 | 58 | 61 | 130 | 216 | 216 |
| 24 | 8 | 21 | 60 | 63 | 132 | 216 | 216 |
| 25 | 9 | 21 | 63 | 65 | 133 | 216 | 216 |
| 26 | 9 | 22 | 65 | 67 | 135 | 216 | 216 |
| 27 | 10 | 23 | 68 | 68 | 136 | 216 | 216 |
| 28 | 10 | 24 | 70 | 70 | 137 | 216 | 216 |
| 29 | 10 | 24 | 73 | 72 | 138 | 216 | 216 |
| 30 | 11 | 26 | 75 | 75 | 140 | 216 | 216 |

Duration (in years)

Credit quality step 0

Credit quality step 1

Credit quality step 2

Credit quality step 3

Credit quality step 4

Credit quality step 5

Credit quality step 6

1

0

0

3

14

131

293

3 014

2

0

1

6

13

130

333

2 249

3

1

1

8

16

123

348

1 701

4

1

3

11

19

120

348

1 317

5

1

4

15

21

119

340

1 045

6

2

4

16

24

119

327

849

7

2

6

19

27

119

312

703

8

2

6

21

29

118

296

591

9

4

7

24

31

118

279

504

10

4

8

27

33

118

263

434

11

4

9

30

36

118

247

377

12

4

9

31

38

119

232

330

13

4

11

34

40

119

217

291

14

5

11

37

42

119

212

258

15

6

13

39

44

119

213

230

16

6

13

41

46

120

213

213

17

6

14

44

49

120

213

213

18

6

15

46

51

120

214

214

19

7

16

48

53

123

214

214

20

7

16

51

55

125

215

215

21

7

18

53

57

126

215

215

22

8

19

55

58

129

216

216

23

8

19

58

61

130

216

216

24

8

21

60

63

132

216

216

25

9

21

63

65

133

216

216

26

9

22

65

67

135

216

216

27

10

23

68

68

136

216

216

28

10

24

70

70

137

216

216

29

10

24

73

72

138

216

216

30

11

26

75

75

140

216

216

---

ANNEX III

Volatility adjustment to the relevant risk-free interest rate term structure

| Currency | National insurance market | Volatility adjustment (in bps) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Euro | Austria | 19 |
| Euro | Belgium | 19 |
| Euro | Cyprus | 19 |
| Euro | Estonia | 19 |
| Euro | Finland | 19 |
| Euro | France | 19 |
| Euro | Germany | 19 |
| Euro | Greece | 19 |
| Euro | Ireland | 19 |
| Euro | Italy | 19 |
| Euro | Latvia | 19 |
| Euro | Lithuania | 19 |
| Euro | Luxembourg | 19 |
| Euro | Malta | 19 |
| Euro | Netherlands | 19 |
| Euro | Portugal | 19 |
| Euro | Slovakia | 19 |
| Euro | Slovenia | 19 |
| Euro | Spain | 19 |
| Czech koruna | Czech Republic | 24 |
| Danish krone | Denmark | 15 |
| Forint | Hungary | 20 |
| Krona | Sweden | -3 |
| Kuna | Croatia | -1 |
| Lev | Bulgaria | 35 |
| Pound sterling | United Kingdom | 24 |
| Romanian leu | Romania | 5 |
| Zloty | Poland | 17 |
| Króna | Iceland | -6 |
| Norwegian krone | Norway | 5 |
| Swiss franc | Liechtenstein | -3 |
| Swiss franc | Switzerland | -3 |
| Australian dollar | Australia | 5 |
| Canadian dollar | Canada | 10 |
| Renminbi-yuan | China | 6 |
| Hong Kong dollar | Hong Kong | 3 |
| US dollar | United States | 52 |
| Yen | Japan | 2 |

Currency

National insurance market

Volatility adjustment (in bps)

Euro

Austria

19

Euro

Belgium

19

Euro

Cyprus

19

Euro

Estonia

19

Euro

Finland

19

Euro

France

19

Euro

Germany

19

Euro

Greece

19

Euro

Ireland

19

Euro

Italy

19

Euro

Latvia

19

Euro

Lithuania

19

Euro

Luxembourg

19

Euro

Malta

19

Euro

Netherlands

19

Euro

Portugal

19

Euro

Slovakia

19

Euro

Slovenia

19

Euro

Spain

19

Czech koruna

Czech Republic

24

Danish krone

Denmark

15

Forint

Hungary

20

Krona

Sweden

-3

Kuna

Croatia

-1

Lev

Bulgaria

35

Pound sterling

United Kingdom

24

Romanian leu

Romania

5

Zloty

Poland

17

Króna

Iceland

-6

Norwegian krone

Norway

5

Swiss franc

Liechtenstein

-3

Swiss franc

Switzerland

-3

Australian dollar

Australia

5

Canadian dollar

Canada

10

Renminbi-yuan

China

6

Hong Kong dollar

Hong Kong

3

US dollar

United States

52

Yen

Japan

2

---