1 

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

Lawyer Disciplinary Board, 

Petitioner

vs.) No. 21-0590 

James M. Pierson, 

Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The Lawyer Disciplinary Board (“LDB”) initiated this disciplinary proceeding against 

respondent, James M. Pierson (“Mr. Pierson”).1

 The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) and 

Mr. Pierson entered into joint stipulations of fact and conclusions of law, including specific 

violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, before the Hearing Panel Subcommittee (“HPS”) 

convened a hearing. Following the hearing the HPS recommended a ninety-day suspension of Mr. 

Pierson’s law license, in addition to the following agreed-upon sanctions: (1) one year of 

supervised practice upon reinstatement; (2) completion of an additional nine Continuing Legal 

Education (“CLE”) credits in law office management, with at least six of those specific to Interest 

on Lawyers’ Trust Account (“IOLTA”) management; (3) compliance with Rule 3.28 of the Rules 

of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure; and (4) that Mr. Pierson pay the costs of the proceedings 

pursuant to Rule 3.15 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure. Mr. Pierson objected to the 

HPS’s recommendation; accordingly this Court scheduled this matter for briefing and oral 

argument. 

This Court has now carefully considered the briefs, oral arguments, submitted record, and 

the pertinent authorities. Upon review, we find that the record supports the findings and 

recommendation of the HPS, and accordingly, impose the recommended sanctions as set forth 

below. Because there is no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error, a memorandum 

decision is appropriate pursuant to Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.2

1 The LDB is represented by Rachael L. Fletcher Cipoletti, Esq., Chief Lawyer Disciplinary 

Counsel, and Andrea J. Hinerman, Esq., Senior Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel. Mr. Pierson is 

represented by Paul S. Saluja, Esq. 

2 See, e.g., Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Davis, No. 20-0871, 2022 WL 421119 (W. Va. Feb. 

11, 2022) (memorandum decision) (suspending attorney’s license for six months and imposing 

other sanctions); Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Anderson, No. 17-0896, 2019 WL 2176339 (W. Va. 

May 20, 2019) (memorandum decision) (same).

FILED

November 8, 2023

released at 3:00 p.m.

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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I. Factual and Procedural History 

Mr. Pierson was admitted to the West Virginia State Bar in 1985 and practices in 

Charleston, West Virginia. The instant disciplinary matter concerns Mr. Pierson’s representation 

of a single client in both a divorce proceeding and a personal injury lawsuit. In December 2014 

the client initially retained Mr. Pierson to represent her in a divorce, and during that representation 

she inquired whether he would also represent her in a personal injury matter stemming from a 2014 

car accident. Thereafter, in February 2015, the client signed an authorization for Mr. Pierson to 

review the personal injury claim, which stated that if he agreed to represent her the two would 

enter into a separate retainer agreement. The client and Mr. Pierson both testified that they recalled 

signing such an agreement, but a copy of the agreement was not produced during these 

proceedings.3 

The personal injury matter was resolved expeditiously; in July 2016 Mr. Pierson negotiated

a $5,000.00 settlement with the other driver’s insurer, State Farm. The client executed a release 

of State Farm and State Farm issued the settlement check, which Mr. Pierson then deposited into 

his Premier Bank IOLTA account. The personal injury file contains an unsigned settlement 

statement breaking down the intended disbursement of the settlement proceeds as follows: (1) 

$1,666.66 in attorney’s fees to Pierson Legal Services; (2) $217.37 to Pierson Legal Services for 

advanced expenses; (4) $1,260.88 to Nationwide for its subrogation claim;4 (4) $362.78 to the 

Centers for Medicare/Medicaid Services (“CMS”) for its subrogation claim;5 and (5) $1,492.31 to 

the client. 

In both September and October 2016 CMS sent billing statements directly to the client

seeking reimbursement for medical expenses it paid on her behalf in connection with the accident. 

The client delivered these billing statements to Pierson Legal Services in November 2016. 

However CMS was not reimbursed, resulting in CMS sending the client a letter in January 2017 

notifying her that it intended to refer the debt to a collection agency, and that her government 

payments—including her Social Security disability income—may be garnished to cover the debt. 

Rather than risk this occurrence, the client paid CMS in February 2017 by personal check in the 

amount of $456.71.

In mid-2017, the client retained a different attorney, Shari Collias, Esq., to represent her in 

a bankruptcy proceeding. As part of this representation attorney Collias requested Mr. Pierson’s 

files regarding the client’s divorce and personal injury lawsuit. Upon review of the files, attorney 

Collias contacted another attorney to file a formal disciplinary complaint against Mr. Pierson for 

3 While Mr. Pierson stipulated to the absence of a proper written contingent fee agreement, 

the HPS apparently determined that charge was not proven, presumably due to the client’s 

concession that she recalled signing such an agreement. We decline to disturb that finding; 

therefore, further discussion of this aspect of the proceedings is unnecessary. 

4 It is unclear how Mr. Pierson calculated this amount. In May 2016, before the settlement 

was finalized, Nationwide notified Mr. Pierson of its subrogation claim in the amount of $2,000.00. 

Nationwide later agreed to reduce its claim to $1,333.33, reflecting its pro rata share of Mr. 

Pierson’s attorney’s fees. 

5 Medicare Part B covered certain medical expenses at the time of the accident.
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failing to execute a written contingent fee agreement in the personal injury lawsuit, and for failing 

to properly disburse the settlement funds for the subrogation claims.6

Mr. Pierson responded to the complaint,7 indicating that the client “constant[ly] 

communicated” with his office and ran up a significant legal bill. He agreed that he “believe[d] 

that [his office] made errors with regard to the handling of the Nationswide [sic] subordination 

[sic] claim and the medicare [sic] claim[,]” but did not elaborate further at that time. In support of 

his response, Mr. Pierson indicated that he was attaching twelve exhibits, but no exhibits were 

produced until more than two years later.8 Notably, upon examining those exhibits, the 

Investigative Panel of the LDB determined that, in addition to the allegations in the complaint, Mr. 

Pierson had also comingled personal funds in his IOLTA account by depositing $2,734.25 in “farm 

sale proceeds” into that account. 

After reviewing the information set forth above, the LDB filed a formal statement of 

charges against Mr. Pierson on July 23, 2021, and scheduled a hearing before the HPS. Prior to 

the hearing, Mr. Pierson and ODC entered into agreed joint stipulations setting forth the above 

facts and Mr. Pierson’s admitted violation of the following Rules of Professional Conduct: (1) 

Rule 1.5(c) for failing to execute a written contingent fee agreement in the personal injury suit;9

(2) Rule 1.15(d) for failing to timely pay the subrogation claims; (3) Rule 1.15(a) for failing to 

safeguard funds and comingling personal funds with client funds in his IOLTA account10; and (4) 

Rules 1.15(b) and (f), and State Bar Administrative Rule 10 for failing to properly manage his 

IOLTA account. 

On the day of the hearing Mr. Pierson tendered to the client a check reimbursing her for 

the amount she paid to CMS, plus interest. During the hearing, Mr. Pierson testified regarding his 

failure to promptly pay the Nationwide subrogation claim, explaining that he had originally issued 

a check from the IOLTA account to Nationwide in November 2016, but that he later discovered 

Nationwide never received that payment. When Nationwide notified him of this in March 2017, 

he issued a replacement check in the amount of $1,333.33 from his firm’s general account. He did 

not advance a defense to failing to pay CMS at that time. Mr. Pierson also testified regarding the 

deposit of the farm sale proceedings into his IOLTA account, explaining that the deposit was 

6 The complaint also alleged that Mr. Pierson failed to pay the client her portion of the 

settlement proceeds, however, during the proceedings the client testified that her portion was 

returned to Mr. Pierson as payment of her outstanding legal fees. 

7 Shortly after filing his response, Mr. Pierson was administratively suspended from the 

practice of law on July 8, 2019, for failing to comply with mandatory CLE requirements. He was 

reinstated two days later. 

8 Similarly, after his October 2020 sworn statement, the LDB requested Mr. Pierson 

provide supplemental documents—the client’s billing records—which he provided in late 

December 2020.

9 See supra note 3. 

10 Mr. Pierson’s personal funds (the “farm sale proceeds”) were deposited in the IOLTA 

account, but immediately (within hours of the deposit) removed upon discovery of the mistake.
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merely a technical mistake that was rectified immediately upon discovery. Mr. Pierson’s 

testimony also established that he had four prior admonishments for violating Rule 1.4(a) and (b)

(failing to properly communicate with a client), Rule 1.5(a) (charging an excessive fee), Rule 

1.16(d) (failing to provide a client with their complete file), and Rule 8.1(b) (failing to promptly 

respond to ODC). Finally, he testified to experiencing medical issues which he believed to 

constitute mitigating factors in these proceedings, but later conceded that the medical issues did 

not occur during his representation of this client.

Thereafter, Mr. Pierson and ODC submitted proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, 

and recommended sanctions to the HPS. In brief, their recommended sanctions were identical,

save the recommended length of any imposed suspension of his law license. Mr. Pierson requested

that the HPS impose a thirty-day suspension, while ODC requested the imposition of a two-year 

suspension. 

Ultimately, the HPS concluded that Mr. Pierson violated Rules 1.15(a), (b), (d), and (f), as 

well as State Bar Administrative Rule 10. The HPS found that Mr. Pierson violated his duties to 

his client, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession, that he acted intentionally and 

knowingly in committing the violations of the rules, that the client suffered an actual injury as a 

result of his misconduct, and that there were several aggravating factors—and no mitigating 

factors—present during Mr. Pierson’s representation of the client. Accordingly, the HPS 

concluded that a suspension was warranted and recommended that Mr. Pierson’s license to practice 

law be suspended for ninety days, in addition to the imposition of the other agreed-upon sanctions. 

Mr. Pierson objected to the HPS recommendation, arguing that a ninety-day suspension would be 

excessive. In contrast, LDB urged this Court to increase the suspension to six months. 

II. Standard of Review

It is well-established that “[t]his Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must 

make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys’ 

licenses to practice law.” Syl. Pt. 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 174 W. Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 

671 (1984). With respect to the HPS’s findings:

A de novo standard applies to a review of the adjudicatory 

record made before the [HPS] as to questions of law, questions of 

application of the law to the facts, and questions of appropriate 

sanctions; this Court gives respectful consideration to the [HPS’s] 

recommendations while ultimately exercising its own independent 

judgment. On the other hand, substantial deference is given to the 

[HPS’s] findings of fact, unless such findings are not supported by 

reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Syl. Pt. 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics v. McCorkle, 192 W. Va. 286, 452 S.E.2d 377 (1994). With 

these standards in mind, we proceed to consider the HPS’s recommendation as to Mr. Pierson’s 

misconduct.

III. Analysis

The question before this Court is the appropriate period of suspension of Mr. Pierson’s 
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license to practice law. Mr. Pierson argues that his conduct was the result of inadvertence and the 

compounding of small errors, that the actual harm to his client was negligible, and that his 

cooperation in stipulating to the violations is a mitigating factor warranting either a lesser period 

of suspension or no suspension. In contrast, the LDB argues that the suspension should be 

increased to a period of six months, contending that a ninety-day suspension is inadequate in view 

of the seriousness of the violations. On review, we believe the HPS struck the proper balance in 

recommending a ninety-day suspension, and we therefore adopt the HPS’s recommendation.

As stated, Mr. Pierson stipulated to the facts underlying this disciplinary proceeding and 

admitted to the violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct ultimately found by the HPS; 

accordingly, we turn our attention directly to the appropriateness of the HPS’s recommended 

sanction. In that endeavor, this Court has explained that

[i]n deciding on the appropriate disciplinary action for 

ethical violations, this Court must consider not only what steps 

would appropriately punish the respondent attorney, but also 

whether the discipline imposed is adequate to serve as an effective 

deterrent to other members of the Bar and at the same time restore 

public confidence in the ethical standards of the legal profession. 

Syl. Pt. 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Walker, 178 W. Va. 150, 358 S.E.2d 234 (1987). In so doing, 

we are guided by the factors enumerated in Rule 3.16 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary 

Procedure, as explained in the following holding:

Rule 3.16 of the West Virginia Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary 

Procedure enumerates factors to be considered in imposing 

sanctions and provides as follows: “In imposing a sanction after a 

finding of lawyer misconduct, unless otherwise provided in these 

rules, the Court [West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals] or Board 

[Lawyer Disciplinary Board] shall consider the following factors: 

(1) whether the lawyer has violated a duty owed to a client, to the 

public, to the legal system, or to the profession; (2) whether the 

lawyer acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; (3) the 

amount of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s 

misconduct; and (4) the existence of any aggravating or mitigating 

factors.”

Syl. Pt. 4, Off. of Law. Disciplinary Couns. v. Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495, 513 S.E.2d 722 (1998). 

We consider each of the factors in turn. 

The HPS found that Mr. Pierson knowingly violated duties owed to his client, to the public, 

to the legal system, and to the profession. Mr. Pierson concedes that he knowingly violated duties 

owed to this client in that he failed to properly administer the proceeds of the personal injury 

settlement. The HPS further found that the client suffered actual harm as the result of this failure. 

Moreover, the HPS also observed that Mr. Pierson violated his duties to the public, to the legal 

system, and to the legal profession insofar as lawyers “are officers of the court and must act in a 

manner to maintain the integrity of the Bar and the profession, and [Mr. Pierson’s] admitted 
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conduct in this matter fell short” of those obligations. Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Ball, 219 W. Va. 296, 633 S.E.2d 241 (2006) (“Lawyers who engage in the practice of law in West 

Virginia have a duty to know the Rules of Professional Conduct and to act in conformity 

therewith.”). We agree with these findings and conclusions as to the first three Jordan factors. 

The remaining factor for our consideration is the existence of any aggravating or mitigating 

factors. “Aggravating factors in a lawyer disciplinary proceeding are any considerations or factors 

that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.” Syl. Pt. 4, Law. Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Scott, 213 W. Va. 209, 579 S.E.2d 550 (2003). The HPS found several aggravating factors 

to be present, including multiple violations of the rules during his representation of this client, that 

this client was a vulnerable client, and that Mr. Pierson exhibited a pattern of misconduct and 

indifference to making restitution. The HPS also found that Mr. Pierson had substantial experience 

in the practice of law and prior disciplinary offenses on his record.

We conclude that these HPS findings of aggravating factors are supported by the record, 

which demonstrates that Mr. Pierson admitted to a number of rule violations in this matter and that 

he had prior admonishments from the Investigative Panel of the LDB,11 both of which indicate an 

overall pattern of misconduct. See Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Ryan, 241 W. Va. 264, 273, 823 S.E.2d 

702, 711 (2019) (explaining that the attorney exhibited a pattern of misconduct through multiple 

violations during a single representation and had four prior LDB admonishments for different 

conduct). Moreover, Mr. Pierson agreed that he knew this client was a fragile client when he 

undertook representation of her, and that he has more than forty years of experience in the practice 

of law. Finally, as discussed supra, there was delay in making restitution, which the HPS properly 

considered to be an aggravating factor. Accordingly, we defer to the HPS’s findings regarding the 

existence of aggravating factors.

With respect to mitigating factors, this Court has explained that mitigating factors may 

include “full and free disclosure to [the] disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the 

proceedings.” Scott, 213 W. Va. at 210, 579 S.E.2d at 551, syl. pt. 3, in part. Mr. Pierson urges 

this Court to consider that he entered into stipulations as to his violations of the Rules which is 

indicative of his cooperative attitude toward the proceedings. This Court has previously found 

that “by working toward stipulations of fact, violations, and factors considered in terms of 

sanctions, [an attorney] demonstrated a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings.” Law. 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Thompson, 238 W. Va. 745, 758, 798 S.E.2d 871, 884 (2017). While we 

commend Mr. Pierson’s cooperation in this regard, we also note the HPS afforded him no 

mitigation, observing that Mr. Pierson delayed in responding to ODC’s requests for additional 

information. To the extent his conduct was mitigated by his entering into stipulations, this 

mitigating factor was tempered by those delays. 

With respect to the appropriateness of the recommended sanction, Rule 3.15 of the Rules 

of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure provides:

A [HPS] may recommend or the Supreme Court of Appeals 

11 See Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Sturm, 237 W. Va. 115, 128, 785 S.E.2d 821, 834 (2016) 

(“[W]e have treated an Investigative Panel Admonishment to be aggravating just like any other 

disciplinary action.”). 
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may impose any one or more of the following sanctions for a 

violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct . . .: (1) probation; 

(2) restitution; (3) limitation on the nature or extent of future 

practice; (4) supervised practice; (5) community service; (6) 

admonishment; (7) reprimand; (8) suspension; or (9) annulment. 

When a sanction is imposed, the [HPS] or the Court shall order the 

lawyer to reimburse the [LDB] for the costs of the disciplinary 

proceedings unless the panel or the Court finds the reimbursement 

will pose an undue hardship on the lawyer. Willful failure to 

reimburse the Board may be punished as contempt of the Court.

Id. In recommending a ninety-day suspension of Mr. Pierson’s law license, the HPS was guided 

by this Court’s prior cases as well as the ABA Model Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 

(“ABA Model Standards”). Standard 4.12 of the ABA Model Standards provides that “suspension 

is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should have known that he is dealing improperly 

with client property and causes injury . . . to a client[.]” 

A review of our prior cases indicates that a ninety-day suspension is appropriate under 

these circumstances. We have imposed harsher sanctions for conduct which, although similar, 

was more egregious in that it involved misappropriation of client funds. See, e.g., Law. 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Atkins, 243 W. Va. 246, 842 S.E.2d 799 (2020) (imposing a nine-month 

suspension where the attorney failed to disburse settlement funds, held those funds in a nonIOLTA account, comingled funds, and misappropriated client funds). On the other hand, we have 

imposed lesser sanctions for conduct which, although similar, was more promptly rectified. See, 

e.g., Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Downes, 239 W. Va. 671, 805 S.E.2d 432 (2017) (imposing a thirtyday suspension where the attorney mishandled client funds but promptly rectified the issue).

Upon review of this matter, we believe Mr. Pierson’s conduct falls somewhere in the 

middle. He failed to properly manage settlement funds, as was the case in Atkins, but the amount 

of funds involved was not substantial, the actual injury was not extensive, and Mr. Pierson did not 

misappropriate any funds. He mishandled funds and rectified the issue, as was the case in Downes, 

but did not rectify the issue promptly. Ultimately, upon consideration of all the circumstances of 

this case, we are persuaded that the ninety-day suspension recommended by HPS strikes the 

appropriate balance.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we adopt the recommendation of the HPS and order that Mr. 

Pierson’s law license be suspended for a period of ninety days, and that upon his reinstatement he 

be placed on one year of supervised practice by an active attorney in his geographic area in good 

standing with the West Virginia State Bar and agreed upon by ODC. We also order that Mr. 

Pierson be required to complete an additional nine hours of continuing legal education in the area 

of law office management, including at least six hours in IOLTA management prior to 

reinstatement; that he comply with the mandates of Rule 3.28 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary 

Procedure; and that he pay the costs of these proceedings pursuant to Rule 3.15 of the Rules of 

Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure. 
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Law license suspended and other sanctions imposed.

ISSUED: November 8, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice John A. Hutchison

Justice William R. Wooton

Justice C. Haley Bunn