FI L ED U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S EL EVENTH CI RCUI T FEB RUARY 23, 2012
J OHN L EY CL ERK [DO N OT PUBLISH]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 1 1- 13 45 0 Non -Arg um en t Ca le nd ar

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D.C. Dock et No. 8 :0 9- cv -0 19 20 -RAL-AEP

CLINTON KNOW LES,

ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll Pla in ti ff-Ap pe ll an t,

ve rs us

SHERIFF , in hi s o ffi ci al cap aci ty as Sara so ta Co un ty Sheri ff an d h ead of th e Sar as ot a Co un ty Sheri ff’s Offi ce, a p ol it ic al su bd iv is io n o f Sara so ta Co un ty, Fl or id a,

Defen da nt -Ap pe ll ee.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

th e Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co ur t for th e Mi dd le Dis tri ct of F lo rid a

__

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ (Feb ru ary 23 , 20 12 )

Befo re HULL, MARCUS an d B LACK, Circ ui t J ud ge s.PER CURI AM:

Cl in to n Kno wles ap pe al s th e di st ric t co ur t’s gr an t of su m m ary jud gm en t to hi s

em pl oyer, th e Sh eri ff of Sara so ta Co un ty, Fl or id a, in hi s em pl oym en t-d is cri m in at io n

su it br ou gh t un de r th e Am eri can s wit h Dis ab il it ie s Act (“ ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12 11 1,

th e Fl or id a Ci vi l Ri gh ts Act ( “ FCRA” ), Fl a. St at

. Ann

. § 76 0.1 0, an d th e

Reh ab il it at io n Act (“ Reh ab Act” ), 29 U.S.C. § 70 1. On ap pe al
, Kno wles arg ue s th at

th e di st ric t co ur t erre d in gr an ti ng su m m ary jud gm en t whe n it co nc lu de d th at

Kno wles fai le d to es ta bl is h a pr im a faci e cas e of di sa bi li ty di sc riminat io n: (1 ) ba se d

on hi s cl ai m th at hi s al co ho li sm co ns ti tu te d a di sa bi li ty un de r th e ADA; an d (2 ) ba se d

on hi s fai lu re to sh ow th at he was de ni ed a reas on ab le acco m m od at io n. Afte r care fu l

rev ie w, we affi rm

.

W e rev ie w a di st ric t co ur t’s or de r gr an ti ng su mm a ry jud gm en t de no vo ,

“ vi ewin g al l th e ev id en ce, an d dr awin g al l reas on ab le in fere nc es , in fav or of th e

no n- m ov in g pa rty.” Ves se ls v. Atl an ta In de p. Sch

. Sy s., 40 8 F.3 d 76 3, 76 7 (1 1t h Ci r.

20 05 ). Summ ary jud gm en t i s o nl y pro pe r if th ere a re n o g en ui ne is su es of m at eri al

fact
, an d th e m ov in g pa rty is en ti tl ed to ju d g m en t as a m at te r of la w. Id

. “ A m ere

‘scin ti ll a’ of ev id en ce su pp or ti ng th e op po si ng pa rty’ s po si ti on wil l no t su ffi ce; th ere

m us t be en ou gh of a sh owi ng th at th e jury co ul d r e as on ab ly fin d fo r th at pa rty.”

B r o ok s v. Cn ty. Co m

m ’n of Je ffer so n Cn ty., Ala., 44 6 F.3 d 11 60
, 11 62 (1 1t h Ci r.

220 06 ) (q uo ta ti on om it te d)

. W e m ay affi rm on an y gr ou nd th at ap pe ars in th e reco rd
,

reg ard le ss of whe th er th at gr ou nd was co ns id ered or rel ie d up on by th e di st ric t co ur t.

Tho m as v

. Co op er Lig ht in g, In c., 50 6 F.3 d 13 61
, 13 64 (1 1t h Ci r. 20 07 ). W e

ge ne ral ly wil l no t co ns id er is su es or th eo rie s th at were no t rai se d in th e di st ric t co ur t.

W rig ht v. Han na Ste el Co rp ., 27 0 F .3d 13 36 , 13 42 (11 th Cir . 20 01 ).

The ADA pr ov id es th at no co ve red em pl oyer “ sh al l di sc r i mina te ag ai ns t a

qu al ifi ed in di vi du al on th e ba si s of di sa bi li ty in reg ard to

. . . di sc ha rg e of em pl oyees”

an d an y of th e “ te rm s, co nd it i o ns , an d pr iv il eg es of em pl oym en t.” 42 U.S.C. §

12 11 2( a) (2 00 7)

. W e ev al ua te di sa bi li ty-di sc riminat io n cl ai m s b r o u gh t un de r th e

ADA un de r th e McDo nn el l Dou gl as Co rp

. v. Green
, 41 1 U.S. 79 2 (1973)
, fram ewo rk
,

un de r whi ch th e pl a i n t i f

f mu st fir st es ta bl is h a pr im a faci e cas e of di sc riminat io n.

Cl ev el an d v. Hom e Sh op pi ng Netwo rk
, In c., 36 9 F.3 d 11 89
, 11 93 (1 1t h Cir. 20 04 ).

To es ta bl is h a pr im a faci e cas e of em pl oym en t di sc riminat io n un de r th e ADA,

a pl ai nt iff m

us t sh ow th at : (1 ) he ha s a di sa bi li ty; (2 ) he is a qu al ifi ed in di vi du al wit h

or wit ho ut a reas on ab le acco m m od at io n; an d (3 ) h e was di sc riminat ed ag ai ns t

be cau se of hi s di sa bi li ty. Ro ss ba ch v. Ci ty of Mi am i, 37 1 F.3 d 13 54
, 13 56 -5 7 (1 1t h

Ci r. 20 04 ). As to th e th ird el em en t ne ed ed to es ta bl is h a pr im a faci e cas e, a qu al ifi ed

in di vi du al is un la wfu ll y di sc riminat ed a g a i n s t if th e em pl oyer do es no t m ak e

3reas on ab le acco m m od at io ns fo r th e di sa bi li ty, un le ss su ch an acco m m od at io n wou ld

im po se an un du e h ard sh ip on th e em pl oyer. 42 U.S.C. § 1 21 12 (b )(5 )(A).

Cl ai m s br ou gh t un de r th e Reh ab Act an d t h e F C R A are an al y zed un de r th e

sa m e f r a mew or k as th e ADA, an d, th us , ne ed no t be ad dr es se d se pa rat el y

. See

Green be rg v. Bel lS ou th Tele co m m s., In c., 49 8 F.3 d 12 58
, 12 63 -6 4 (1 1t h Ci r. 20 07 )

(s ta ti ng th at th e FCRA is an al y zed un de r th e sa m e fram ewo rk as th e ADA); Cas h v.

Sm it h, 23 1 F.3 d 13 01
, 13 05 (1 1t h Ci r. 20 00 ) (s ta ti ng th at th e Reh ab Act is go ve rn ed

by the same sta nd ard s u se d i n ADA cas es ).

The pl ai nt iff be ars th e bu rd en of id en ti fy in g a reas on ab le acco m m od at io n, an d

an em pl oyer is no t req ui red to acco m m od at e an em

pl oyee in an y m an ne r in whi ch th e

em pl oyee de si res

. St ewart v. Hap py Herm an ’s Ch es hi re Bri dg e, In c., 11 7 F.3 d 12 78
,

12 85 -8 6 (1 1t h C i r

. 1 99 7)

. The reg ul at io ns go ve rn in g th e ADA pr ov id e th at , to

d et erm in e th e ap pr op ria te reas on ab le acco m m od at io n, it m ay be ne ces sa ry fo r a n

em pl oyer “ to i n i t i a t e an in fo rm al
, in te ract iv e pr oc es s wit h th e in di vi du al wit h a

di sa bi li ty in ne ed of an a c c o mm od at io n” to id en ti fy th e pe rs on ’s li m it at io ns an d

po ss ib le acco m

m od at io ns

. 29 C.F.R. § 16 30 .2(o )(3 ) (2 00 7)

. Fo r ex am pl e, we ha ve

he ld th at , whe re th e em

pl oyee fai le d to id en ti fy a reas on ab le acco m m od at io n, th e

em pl oyer ha d no affi rm at iv e du ty to en ga ge in an “i n t erac ti ve pr oc es s.” Earl v.

Mer vyns , Inc ., 20 7 F .3d 13 61 , 13 67 (11 th Cir . 20 00 ).

4Si m il arl y , i n St ewart , we he ld th at th ere c ou ld be no li ab il it y un de r th e ADA

whe re th e em

pl oyer di d no t ob st ru ct th e in fo rm al in te ra ct ive pr oc es s, m ad e reaso na bl e

effo rts to co m

m un ic at e wit h th e em

pl oyee an d to pr ov id e acco m m od at io ns ba se d on

th e in fo rm at io n it po ss es se d, an d whe re th e em pl oyee’s act io ns cau se d th e br eak do wn

in th e in te ract iv e pr oc es s. 11 7 F.3 d at 12 87

. Mo reo ve r, th e em pl oyee in St ewart ha d

fai le d to en ga ge in th e in te ract iv e pr oc es s be cau se sh e di d no t gi ve th e em pl oyer an y

su bs ta nt iv e reas on s as to why th e pr of fere d acco m

m od at io ns were un reas on ab le
, bu t

in st ead si m

pl y de m an de d t ha t t he em

pl oyer gra nt he r de m an ds . Id. at 12 86 -8 7.

An acco m

m od at io n is “ reas on ab le ,” an d, th us , req ui red by th e ADA, on ly if it

en ab l e s t h e em

pl oyee to pe rfo rm th e es se nt ia l fu nc ti on s of th e job

. Luc as v. W .W

.

Grai ng er, In c., 25 7 F. 3 d 12 49
, 12 55 (1 1t h Ci r. 20 01 ). The du ty to pr ov id e a

reas on ab le acco m

m od at io n is no t tri gg ered un le ss th e pl ai nt iff m ak es a sp eci fic

de m an d fo r an acco m

m od at io n. See Gas to n v. Bel li ng rat h G a r d e n s & Hom e, In c.,

16 7 F.3 d 13 61
, 13 63 (1 1t h Ci r. 19 99 ) (s ta ti ng th at th is req ui rem en t, whi ch was

es ta bl is he d in th e co nt ex t of th e Reh ab Act
, a p p l i ed fo r pu rp os es of de fin in g th e

sc op e of th e du ty to pr ov id e a reas on ab le acco m m od at io n un de r th e ADA). Thu s, th e

in it ia l bu rd en of req ue st in g an acco m m od at io n is on th e em

pl oyee, an d on ly aft er th e

em pl oyee ha s sa ti sf

ie d th at bu rd en an d th e em pl oyer fai l e d to pr ov id e th e

acco m m od at io n can th e em

pl oyee pr ev ai l on a di sc riminat io n cl ai m

. Id

. at 13 64

. The

5pl ai nt iff be ar s th e ul ti m at e bu rd en of pe rs ua si on wit h res pe ct to sh owi ng th at an

acco m m od at io n i s re as on ab le . Stewa rt, 1 17 F.3d at 1 28 6.

Eve n as s u mi n g th at Kno wles ’s al co ho li sm co ns ti tu te d a di sa bi li ty un de r th e

A D A

- - a n i s s u e we ne ed no t reac h -- th e di st ric t co ur t di d no t err in gr an ti n g

su m m ary jud gm en t be cau se Kno wles fai le d to es ta bl is h th at he was de ni e d a

reas on ab le acco m

m od at io n. The reas on able ac co m m oda tio n th at Kno wles id en ti fie s 1

i s t ha t th e Sara so ta Co un ty Sh eri ff’s Offi ce (“ SCSO” ) sh ou ld ha ve al lo wed h i m t o

se ek tre at m en t i n t he Em pl oyee Ass is ta nc e Pro gr am (“ EAP”), whi ch th e SCSO

pr ov id e d a n d mad e av ai la bl e to an y em pl oyee who wis he d to en te r th e pr og ram

.

Kno wles kn ew th at he co ul d vo lu nt ari ly en te r th e pr og ram at an y ti m e, bu t he arg ue s

th at th e co m

m un ic at io n br eak do wn reg ard in g whe th er he was to be di rect ed to en te r

th e pr og ram ev id en ces a fai lu re t o a cco m m od at e. Ess en ti al ly, Kno wles arg ue s t ha t

he wou ld ha ve vo lu nt ari ly en te red th e pr og ram if he was no t un de r th e m is ta ke n

be li ef t ha t h e wou ld be di rect ed to do so , and , th us , th e Sh eri ff’s fai lu re to al le vi at e

hi s co nf us io n p rev en te d h is reas on ab le acco m m od at io n.

As an initial matter , i t ap p ears that Knowles did not specific ally demand a rea sonable 1

acc ommodation for his alcoholism, which means that the Sheriff had no duty to provide any

rea sonable acc ommodation to Knowles. See Gaston, 167 F.3d at 1363. Neve rtheless, we assume, for pur poses of this opinion, that he did make a spe cific de mand.

6Yet whi le Kno wles m ay no t ha ve e n t e r e d t h e EAP du e to hi s co nf us io n, he

do es no t al le ge th at hi s co nf us io n res ul te d fro m ba d fai th
, or th at he wou ld ha ve be en

de ni ed vo lu nt ary acce ss to th e EAP ha d he at te m pt ed to en te r th e pr og ram

. Kno wles

al so do es no t ci te an y bi nd in g p r e c ed en t es ta bl is hi ng th at a fai lu re to al le vi at e an

em pl oyee’s co nf

us io n co ns ti tu te s a de ni al of a reas on ab le acco m m od at io n. The

ev id en ce of a co mm

u ni cat io n br eak do wn, or th at so m eo ne “ dr op pe d th e ba ll ,”

il lu st rat es th at th e co m

m un ic at io n be twee n Kno wles an d th e SCSO was in effe ct iv e,

bu t it do es no t es ta bl is h th at th e Sh eri ff de ni ed or pr ev en te d Kno wles fro m en te rin g

th e EAP. Si m il arl y , al th ou gh Kno wles as ke d Lieu te na nt Pen ny Kim ba ll a b o u t hi s

st at us reg ard in g th e EAP, he ne ve r in di cat ed to he r th at he wou ld no t en te r th e EAP

fo r al co ho l co un se li ng un ti l he was cl ear on whe th er he wou ld be di rect ed to en te r th e

pr og r a m. Th us , Kno wles fai le d to es ta bl is h th at he was un la wfu ll y di sc riminat ed

ag ai ns t be cau se he was no t de ni ed a reas on ab le acco m m od at io n. See Ro ss ba ch
, 37 1

F.3 d a t 1 35 6- 57

. Acco rd in gl y , we affi rm

. 2

AFFIRMED.

To the extent that the district court inacc urate ly ref lected Knowles’s pr ecise arg ument by 2 focusing on whether Knowles could challeng e his termination or whe ther the SCS O was require d
to forc e him into the EAP, Knowles does not arg ue that this mischara cter ization war rants reve rsal, but instead he clar ifies his arg ument. Fur ther, to the extent that Knowles raises an independe nt claim for disability discrimination based on an alleg ed brea kdown of the interac tive proce ss, assuming that such an independe nt claim exis ts, Knowles did not raise that issue befor e the district court, and, thus,

we ne ed not consider

that issue. Wright, 270 F .3d at 1342.

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