FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DOMINGO QUEBRADO CANTOR,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 19-73085

Agency No.

A200-885-573

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted August 30, 2021

Seattle, Washington

Filed November 3, 2021

Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, M. Margaret McKeown, 

and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown
2 QUEBRADO CANTOR V. GARLAND

SUMMARY*

Immigration

Granting Domingo Quebrado Cantor’s petition for 

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 

and remanding, the panel held that the stop-time rule – which 

sets out the circumstances under which a period of 

continuous physical presence is deemed to end for 

cancellation of removal – is not triggered by a final order of 

removal.

Quebrado entered the United States in 2006. In 2011, he 

was served a notice to appear lacking the time or place of his 

removal hearing, but later was served a notice with the date, 

time, and place of his hearing. He was issued a final order 

of removal in 2014. In 2018, the Supreme Court decided

Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), concluding that, 

in order to trigger the stop-time rule, a notice to appear must 

include the “time and place” of removal proceedings. 

Quebrado then moved to reopen before the BIA, arguing he 

was statutorily eligible for cancellation. The BIA denied the 

motion, concluding that continuous physical presence ceases 

with a final order of removal – meaning that Quebardo fell 

short of the ten years of continuous physical presence 

required for cancellation.

In holding that a final order of removal does not trigger 

the stop-time rule, the panel explained that the statutory 

language of the rule, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), is 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
QUEBRADO CANTOR V. GARLAND 3

unambiguous in providing that a period of continuous 

physical presence is deemed to end upon the earlier of two 

events, which are spelled out in subsections (A) and (B). 

Under subsection (A), presence is deemed to end with the 

service of the notice to appear, and under subsection (B), it 

is deemed to end upon the commission of certain offenses. 

Observing that the stop-time rule includes no mention of a 

final order of removal as a triggering event, the panel 

explained that it was not the court’s role to rewrite the 

statute. 

The panel explained that neither subsection applied here. 

Under Pereira, the notice to appear failed to trigger the stoptime rule because it did not specify the time and date of 

proceedings. Moreover, because the Supreme Court held in 

Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021), that a notice 

to appear must be a single document, containing all the 

information Congress specified, the panel explained that the 

second notice sent to Quebrado did not cure the deficient 

notice to appear. The panel noted that all agreed that 

subsection (B) was inapplicable. Because neither subsection 

applied, the panel concluded that Quebrado’s presence was 

not deemed to end and, as a result, his claim for cancellation 

facially satisfied the ten-year presence requirement. 

Responding to the government’s contention that the 

stop-time rule should be read expansively, the panel 

explained that the stop-time rule operates as an exception to 

the command that the presence requirement is satisfied upon 

ten years of continuous physical presence. Therefore, the 

proper inference is that Congress considered which events 

ought to stop the clock and settled on only two. 

The government also suggested that Quebrado now 

found himself in an absurd situation: a notice to appear is 
4 QUEBRADO CANTOR V. GARLAND

used to initiate removal proceedings; it should therefore be 

impossible for Quebrado’s removal proceedings to have 

concluded – culminating in a final order of removal –

without subsection (A) having been triggered. In response, 

the panel explained that this improbable situation is entirely 

of the government’s own making and that it is not the court’s 

job to fashion a statutory backstop from whole cloth. The 

panel quoted the Supreme court in Niz-Chavez: “If men must 

turn square corners when they deal with the government, it 

cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square 

corners when it deals with them.” 141 S. Ct. at 1486.

Finally, the panel rejected the government’s argument 

that any error was harmless because Quebrado’s motion was 

deficient for other reasons, observing that the court’s review 

is limited to the legal reason given by the face of the BIA’s 

decision. Because the BIA did not address alternative 

grounds for denial, the panel remanded to the BIA for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

COUNSEL

Luis Cortes Romero (argued), Novo Legal Group PLLC, 

Kent, Washington; Elaine Ruth Fordyce, Law Office of 

Shara Svendsen PLLC, Mill Creek, Washington; for 

Petitioner.

Lance L. Jolley (argued), Trial Attorney; Anthony C. Payne, 

Senior Litigation Counsel; Office of Immigration Litigation, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
QUEBRADO CANTOR V. GARLAND 5

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to address, yet again, application 

of the “stop-time rule” in immigration proceedings. 

Nonpermanent residents subject to removal may apply to the 

Attorney General for cancellation of removal. To be 

eligible, a nonpermanent resident must have “been 

physically present in the United States for a continuous 

period of not less than 10 years.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). 

The question is what circumstances serve to stop the accrual 

of time. By statute, nonpermanent residents cease to accrue 

physical presence (1) once they are “served a notice to 

appear” or (2) if they commit certain crimes. Id.

§ 1229b(d)(1). Domingo Quebrado Cantor (“Quebrado”) 

alleges he was physically present in this country for twelve 

years when he sought to reopen his immigration proceedings 

to apply for cancellation of removal. The Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) saw it differently and denied 

Quebrado’s request, reasoning that the stop-time rule was 

triggered when Quebrado received a final order of removal 

four years prior to his motion to reopen. By its terms, 

however, the stop-time rule applies to only the two 

circumstances set out in the statute, and a final order of 

removal satisfies neither. Because the BIA’s decision was 

contrary to the text of the statute, we grant the petition and 

remand to the BIA for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Domingo Quebrado Cantor is a native and citizen of 

Mexico who entered the United States without inspection in 

2006. The United States Department of Homeland Security 

commenced removal proceedings against him and served 

him with a notice to appear in 2011. The notice to appear 
6 QUEBRADO CANTOR V. GARLAND

did not include the time or place of the proceedings; rather, 

Quebrado was directed to appear “on a date to be set at a 

time to be set.” Quebrado was later served with a notice that 

specified a date, time, and place for his hearing. Quebrado 

appeared at the hearing. In due course, Quebrado conceded 

removability, and pursued asylum, voluntary departure, and 

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. The immigration 

judge (“IJ”) denied Quebrado’s asylum application and 

ordered him removed if he failed to depart voluntarily. The 

BIA affirmed, and we denied Quebrado’s petition for 

review.

In 2018, the Supreme Court concluded that, in order to 

trigger the stop-time rule, a notice to appear must include the 

“time and place” of the removal proceedings. Pereira v. 

Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229(a)(1)(G)(i)). Following this decision, Quebrado 

moved to reopen his immigration proceedings before the 

BIA for the purpose of applying for cancellation of removal. 

He argued that because his notice to appear lacked a time 

and place, it was defective and did not stop accrual of 

continuous physical presence. By Quebrado’s calculation, 

he had accrued continuous physical presence since his 

arrival in the United States in 2006 and was statutorily 

eligible for cancellation of removal.

The BIA denied Quebrado’s motion to reopen. The 

government argued that the subsequent notice of hearing 

received by Quebrado had cured any defect in the initial 

notice to appear. Somewhat presciently however, the BIA 

declined to adopt the government’s argument. Rather, the 

BIA’s sole basis for denying Quebrado’s motion to reopen 

was its conclusion that “[c]ontinuous physical presence 

ceases to accrue at the entry of a final administrative 

decision.” Because a final order of removal was issued for 
QUEBRADO CANTOR V. GARLAND 7

Quebrado in 2014, the BIA determined that he “fell short of 

meeting the requisite continuous physical presence for 

cancellation of removal.” We have jurisdiction to review 

Quebrado’s petition because the BIA rested its denial of 

reopening on legal grounds. See Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 

575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016).

ANALYSIS

Noncitizens subject to removal may apply for permission 

to remain in the United States so long as they meet the 

statutory criteria for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b. These noncitizens are eligible for cancellation of 

removal if, among other things, they have “been physically 

present in the United States for a continuous period of not 

less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such 

application.” Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).

Historically, a noncitizen “continued to accrue time 

toward the presence requirement during the pendency of his 

removal proceedings.” Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 

1474, 1478–79 (2021). Some questioned, however, whether 

this practice could create an incentive to needlessly delay 

removal proceedings. See id. at 1479. “In [the Illegal 

Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 

1996 (“IIRIRA”), 110 Stat. 3009–546], Congress responded 

to these concerns with a new ‘stop-time’ rule.” Id. That rule 

provides:

For purposes of this section, any period of 

continuous residence or continuous physical 

presence in the United States shall be deemed 

to end (A) except in the case of an alien who 

applies for cancellation of removal under 

subsection (b)(2), when the alien is served a 

notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this 
8 QUEBRADO CANTOR V. GARLAND

title, or (B) when the alien has committed an 

offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of 

this title that renders the alien inadmissible to 

the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of 

this title or removable from the United States 

under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this 

title, whichever is earliest.

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).

Despite its apparent simplicity, the rule “has generated 

outsized controversy.” Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1479. 

Recently, much of that controversy has focused on what 

constitutes “a notice to appear” within the meaning of 

subsection (A). The statute defines a notice to appear as a 

“written notice . . . specifying,” among other things, the 

“time and place” of the noncitizen’s removal hearing. 

8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). In defiance of this clear statutory 

instruction, the government’s practice for many years was to 

issue notices that failed to specify these necessary details. 

See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111–12. The Supreme Court put 

an end to this practice in Pereira and Niz-Chavez, brushing 

aside the government’s policy arguments and emphasizing 

that “pleas of administrative inconvenience” can “never 

‘justify departing from the statute’s clear text.’” Niz-Chavez, 

141 S. Ct. at 1485 (quoting Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2118).

In Pereira, the Court held that a notice that fails to 

designate the “time and place” of a removal hearing “is not 

a ‘notice to appear under section 1229(a),’ and so does not 

trigger the stop-time rule.” 138 S. Ct. at 2114 (quoting 

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)). And, in the follow-on case—NizChavez—the Court held that the government could not cure 

a deficient notice to appear by later sending a letter 

specifying the hearing’s time and place, explaining that 
QUEBRADO CANTOR V. GARLAND 9

subsection (A) unambiguously required the government to 

“serve ‘a’ notice containing all the information Congress has 

specified,” and “not a mishmash of pieces with some 

assembly required.” 141 S. Ct. at 1480 (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(d)(1)). In both decisions, the Court found the text 

of the statute to be dispositive. See id. at 1484 (applying “the 

statute’s ordinary meaning”); Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2114 

(“The statutory text alone is enough to resolve this case.”). 

In so doing, the Court stressed that courts must “exhaust ‘all 

the textual and structural clues’” bearing on a statute’s 

meaning and emphasized that, where “exhausting those 

clues enables us to resolve the interpretive question put to 

us, our ‘sole function’ is to apply the law as we find it, not 

defer to some conflicting reading the government might 

advance.” Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1480 (citation omitted).

The lesson of Pereira and Niz-Chavez is clear: the 

government may not “short-circuit the stop-time rule,” id. at 

1479, by invoking administrative deference in the face of an 

otherwise unambiguous statutory command. In other words, 

“[t]he language of [the] statute is controlling when the 

meaning is plain and unambiguous.” United States v. MariaGonzalez, 268 F.3d 664, 668 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing AragonAyon v. I.N.S., 206 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is 

clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 

the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 

intent of Congress.”).

The Court’s emphasis on the language of this statute 

informs our analysis here. The precise question we consider 

is whether a final order of removal serves to invoke the stoptime rule. It does not. The language setting out the stoptime rule is unambiguous: a nonpermanent resident’s 
10 QUEBRADO CANTOR V. GARLAND

“period of continuous [physical presence] is ‘deemed to end’ 

upon the earlier of two events, which are spelled out in 

subsections (A) and (B) of the rule.” Jaghoori v. Holder, 

772 F.3d 764, 767 (4th Cir. 2014). Under subsection (A), a 

noncitizen’s presence is deemed to end when the 

government serves a notice to appear. Under subsection (B), 

a noncitizen’s presence is deemed to end upon the 

commission of an enumerated offense. Put another way, 

“time will stop accruing when the [nonpermanent resident] 

was (1) served with a notice to appear, or (2) when the 

[nonpermanent resident] committed certain removable 

offenses.” Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1020 

(10th Cir. 2007). The stop-time rule includes no mention of 

a final order of removal as a triggering event and it is not our 

role to rewrite the statute.

Neither subsection (A) nor subsection (B) applies here. 

We know from Pereira and Niz-Chavez that subsection (A) 

has not been triggered. The first notice Quebrado received 

“failed to specify the date and time of [his] removal 

proceedings.” Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113. And the second 

notice, which informed Quebrado of the date and time of his 

removal proceeding, did not cure the government’s failure to 

provide him with “‘a’ single document” containing “all the 

information Congress has specified.” Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 

at 1480. All agree that subsection (B) is inapplicable, as 

Quebrado did not commit a removable offense. Because 

neither subsection of the stop-time rule applies, Quebrado’s 

physical presence was not “deemed to end.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(d)(1). His claim for cancellation of removal 

therefore, at least facially, satisfies § 1229b(b)(1)(A)’s tenyear continuing presence requirement.

Despite the Court’s unmistakable teachings, the 

government apparently insists on “continu[ing] down the 
QUEBRADO CANTOR V. GARLAND 11

same old path,” Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1479, of ignoring 

the language of the stop-time rule. “Straining to inject 

ambiguity into the statute,” Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2116, the 

government argues the stop-time rule ought to be interpreted 

expansively. According to the government: “While the 

‘stop-time rule’ instructs that the period of continuous 

physical presence ends with the service of the notice to 

appear or the commission of certain crimes, it does not 

indicate that those are the only reasons the period of 

continuous physical presence may be deemed to end.” We 

disagree.

The presence requirement of the cancellation of removal 

statute is facially satisfied when a nonpermanent resident, 

such as Quebrado, has “been physically present in the United 

States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). The stop-time rule operates as 

an exception to this otherwise unambiguous command, 

cutting short a nonpermanent resident’s period of physical 

presence in two specifically enumerated circumstances. Id. 

§ 1229b(d)(1). “When Congress provides exceptions in a 

statute, it does not follow that courts [or, by implication, 

agencies] have authority to create others. The proper 

inference . . . is that Congress considered the issue of 

exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set 

forth.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000). 

The government’s argument would turn this principle on its 

head, using the existence of two exceptions to authorize a 

third very specific exception. But Congress, in its 

amendment to the statute, did not frame these two exceptions 

as illustrative examples of circumstances that “stop the 

clock” or otherwise indicate the stop-time rule ought to be 

read so expansively. See United States v. Hastie, 854 F.3d 

1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting that Congress may use 

certain words, such as “including,” to indicate provisions are 
12 QUEBRADO CANTOR V. GARLAND

intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive). Therefore 

the “proper inference,” Johnson, 529 U.S. at 58, is that 

Congress considered which events ought to “stop the clock” 

on a nonpermanent resident’s period of continuous physical 

presence and settled, in its legislative judgment, on only two.

The government suggests that Quebrado now finds 

himself in an absurd situation. A notice to appear is used to 

initiate removal proceedings; it should therefore be 

impossible for Quebrado’s removal proceedings to have 

concluded—culminating in a final order of removal—

without subsection (A) having been triggered. But this 

improbable situation is entirely of the government’s own 

making. The power to trigger subsection (A) rests in the 

government’s hands—it can “stop the clock” at any time, 

simply by issuing a statutorily-compliant notice to appear. 

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). By neglecting to send Quebrado 

such a notice, the government failed to trigger the stop-time 

rule. See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113–14. It is not our job to 

fashion a statutory backstop from whole cloth. “If men must 

turn square corners when they deal with the government, it 

cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square 

corners when it deals with them.” Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 

1486.

Having concluded that the BIA’s decision rests on legal 

error, the remaining question is whether to remand. The 

government argues that any error was harmless because 

Quebrado’s motion to reopen was deficient for other 

reasons. That may or may not be true, but our review is 

limited to the legal reason given on “the face of the BIA’s 

decision.” Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir.

2020). Because the BIA did not address alternate grounds 
QUEBRADO CANTOR V. GARLAND 13

for denial of the motion, we remand to the BIA for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PETITION GRANTED and REMANDED.