NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ENOVA TECHNOLOGY CORP.,

Appellant

v.

SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY (US) HOLDINGS INC., 

SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY LLC,

Appellees

______________________ 

2016-1749, 2016-1751, 2016-2039

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. 

IPR2014-01178, IPR2014-01297, IPR2014-01449.

______________________ 

Decided: September 6, 2017

______________________ 

 DARRYL MICHAEL WOO, Vinson & Elkins LLP, San 

Francisco, CA, argued for appellant. Also represented by 

CHAO WANG; JEFFREY TA-HWA HAN, JANICE TA, Austin, 

TX.

 DAVID J.F. GROSS, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Minneapolis, MN, argued for appellees. Also represented by

LUCAS J. TOMSICH, JULIE WAHLSTRAND; CALVIN L. LITSEY,

East Palo Alto, CA; RICHARD M. MARSH, JR., Denver, CO.
2 ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, WALLACH, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

Enova Technology Corp. (“Enova”) appeals from the 

final written decisions of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 

Office (“USPTO”) Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“the 

Board”) in three inter partes review (“IPR”) proceedings 

concluding that claims 1–53 of its U.S. Patent 7,900,057 

(“the ’057 patent”) are unpatentable as obvious. See 

Seagate Tech. (US) Holdings, Inc. v. Enova Tech. Corp., 

IPR 2014-01178, 2015 WL 9301786, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 

18, 2015) (evaluating claims 1–32) (“Opinion”);1 Seagate 

Tech. (US) Holdings, Inc. v. Enova Tech. Corp., IPR 2014-

01297, 2016 WL 784980, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 4, 2016) 

(evaluating claims 33–39); Seagate Tech. (US) Holdings, 

Inc. v. Enova Tech. Corp., IPR 2014-01449, 2015 WL 

9259517, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2015) (evaluating claims 

40–53). For the following reasons, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Enova owns the ’057 patent, which generally describes an apparatus and method for cryptographic processing in a system using the serial Advanced Technology 

Attachment protocol (“SATA protocol”). See, e.g., ’057 

patent col. 1 ll. 44–40, col. 3 l. 63–col.4 l. 20. The SATA 

protocol is often used to transmit data to a connected 

electrical storage device, for example, to a computer hard 

drive. See id. col. 1 ll. 55–56. In the SATA protocol, data 

is communicated using frame information structures 

 

1 As the written decisions treat the issues challenged by Enova substantially identically, and Enova does 

not challenge any written decision separately from the 

others, we cite only the written decision in IPR 2014-

01178. 
ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 3

(“FISes”). Id. col. 2 ll. 46–53. An FIS includes two parts: 

a header, which indicates the FIS type, and a body (or 

“payload”), which contains data. Id. col. 3 ll. 11–14. 

There are two general types of FISes: nondata FISes, 

which carry information for issuing commands to the 

storage device and indicating the status of those commands, see id. col. 3 ll. 15–19, and data FISes, which can 

contain either user data or additional control information, 

id. col. 7 ll. 30–38. While user data may be encrypted, 

command and control data should not be encrypted because doing so would prevent the storage device from 

understanding the command. Id. col. 3 ll. 34–50. To 

determine whether data can be cryptographically processed, the patent indicates that conventional systems 

would unpack (or “de-encapsulate”) the received information, analyze it to determine whether it was user data 

that could be processed or command data that could not

be processed, repack (or “re-encapsulate”) the data, and 

then transmit the data for processing if possible. Id. col. 3 

ll. 43–48. This process was inefficient due to its complexity and the amount of time it took to perform. Id. col. 3 

ll. 48–50.

The patent purports to improve on the conventional 

system by not relying on de-encapsulation and reencapsulation. Id. col. 10 ll. 23–31. Instead, it maintains 

a list of commands whose FISes should bypass encryption 

(“the bypass true category”) and commands whose FISes 

should not bypass encryption (“the bypass false category”). Id. col. 7 l. 30–col. 8 l. 30. By avoiding the need to 

de-encapsulate and re-encapsulate the data, the patent 

contends that “the latency time and complexity . . . are 

dramatically reduced.” Id. col. 10 ll. 28–31. 

Claim 1 is exemplary: 

1. A cryptographic Serial ATA (SATA) apparatus, 

comprising:
4 ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 

a SATA protocol stack for communicating 

with an interface of a device;

a cryptographic engine operatively coupled 

to the SATA protocol stack for encrypting 

or decrypting at least a subset of data 

FISes (Frame Information Structures) 

communicated to or from the SATA protocol stack; and

a main controller implemented at least 

partially in hardware, the main controller 

configured to cause:

the SATA protocol stack to send at 

least first payload of a first data 

FIS to the cryptographic engine 

responsive to the first data FIS associated with a pre-defined category of command set; 

the cryptographic engine to decrypt at least a portion of the first 

payload received from the SATA 

protocol stack; and

the SATA protocol stack to process 

a Register-Device to Host FIS 

without decryption responsive to 

receiving the Register-Device to 

Host FIS from the interface of the 

device.

Id. col. 13 ll. 6–26 (emphasis added). The requirement 

that the controller sends a data FIS to the cryptographic 

engine “responsive to the first data FIS associated with a 

predefined category of command set” (“pre-defined catego-
ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 5

ry limitation”)2 reflects the FIS being sent for cryptographic processing, depending on whether the associated 

command is in the bypass true or bypass false category. 

During prosecution before the USPTO, the examiner 

rejected the then-pending claims as obvious over a combination of U.S. Patent Publication 2004/0054914 (“Sullivan”), which relates to encryption and decryption of data 

in a serial communication system, see Joint Appendix 

(“J.A.”) 576–87, in view of a technical document describing implementation of the SATA protocol (“SATA”), 

J.A. 588–891. The pre-defined category limitation was 

added, among others, in response to that rejection, and 

the examiner then indicated that the claims were ready 

for allowance with nonsubstantive additions. See J.A. 

1664–65, 1695–96. 

In 2014, Seagate Technology (US) Holdings, Inc. and 

Seagate Technology LLC (together, “Seagate”) filed three

petitions for IPR of the ’057 patent, alleging in sum that 

all claims of the ’057 patent would have been obvious at 

the time of the invention over Sullivan and SATA. The 

Board instituted each IPR. In response to Seagate’s 

petitions, Enova argued that neither Sullivan nor SATA 

disclosed the pre-defined category limitation, that the 

combination of Sullivan and SATA would have produced 

an inoperable result, and that objective indicia of nonobviousness established that the claims would not have 

been obvious. Enova offered evidence that purportedly

established (1) praise for the claimed invention from 

another company in the industry; (2) commercial success 

of its own products and Seagate’s purportedly infringing 

 

2 Although the Board referred to the pre-defined 

category limitation as the “associated with” limitation, see

Opinion, 2015 WL 9301786, at *6, we maintain the terminology used by the parties in their briefing before this 

court. 
6 ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 

products; and (3) copying and licensing by other companies. 

In its final written decisions, the Board concluded 

that the claims were unpatentable as obvious. Specifically, the Board reasoned that the combination of Sullivan 

and SATA disclosed or suggested the pre-defined category 

limitation because Sullivan disclosed that control data 

should be treated differently from user data, and SATA 

provided sufficient description of the commands in the 

SATA protocol to allow a skilled artisan to implement a 

system where user data were encrypted and control data 

were not. Opinion, 2015 WL 9301786, at *9–12. The 

Board determined that Enova’s arguments attacked each 

reference individually, when the proper analysis was 

whether the combination of references would have rendered the claimed invention obvious at the time of invention. Id. at *9. The Board also found that Enova’s 

arguments took an “unduly narrow view of Sullivan’s 

teachings.” Id. at *10. Although the Board recognized 

that the combination of Sullivan and SATA may have led 

to an inoperable result if Sullivan was read as narrowly 

as Enova argued, it found that a skilled artisan would not 

have understood the scope of Sullivan to be so narrow. Id. 

The Board also rejected Enova’s evidence of objective 

indicia on the basis that Enova had not adequately established a nexus between that evidence and the claimed 

invention. Id. at *17–19. Specifically, the Board determined that Enova’s evidence of industry praise was not 

tied to any of the claimed features; that its evidence of

commercial success did not establish that Seagate’s 

products infringed and was not linked to any sales to the 

claimed invention; and that its evidence did not establish 

that any copying and licensing was due to the claimed 

invention. Id. at *19. Accordingly, the Board concluded 

that Seagate had proven that all claims of the ’057 patent 

would have been obvious.
ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 7

Enova timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012). 

DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s factual determinations for 

substantial evidence and its legal determinations de novo. 

Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015). A finding is supported by substantial evidence 

if a reasonable mind might accept the evidence as sufficient to support the finding. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).

Obviousness is a question of law based on subsidiary 

findings of fact relating to “the scope and content of the 

prior art, differences between the prior art and the claims 

at issue, the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, 

and any objective indicia of non-obviousness.” Randall 

Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing 

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) and 

Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17−18 

(1966)). As they are findings of fact, the Board’s determinations relating to the scope and content of the prior art 

and nexus between the objective indicia and the claimed 

invention are reviewed for substantial evidence. Redline 

Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 449 

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (scope and content of the prior art); see 

Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 838 (Fed. Cir. 

2015) (nexus). 

I. Content of the Prior Art

Enova first argues that neither Sullivan nor SATA, 

alone or in combination, disclose the pre-defined category 

limitation. Enova challenges a number of the Board’s 

underlying findings. We address each in turn.

Enova first argues that because Sullivan treats the 

payloads of all packets the same, it cannot disclose or 

suggest the patented method of treating payloads differently depending on the associated command. Enova also 
8 ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 

contends that although Sullivan discloses a filter that 

allows a predetermined set of commands to pass, it still 

only processes packets with allowed commands in the 

same manner. 

Seagate responds that the Board found that Sullivan 

does not disclose treating all information the same, and 

that its expert evidence and Sullivan itself provide substantial evidence to support that finding. Seagate contends that Sullivan discloses that user data and control 

data should be treated differently, and specifically discloses that data and control information should be treated 

separately for encryption purposes. 

We agree with Seagate that the Board’s finding that 

Sullivan treats user and control data differently is supported by substantial evidence. Sullivan discloses that 

the described invention relates to “encryption of data in 

processor-based systems,” and in particular to “encryption 

of data transmitted from a host computer to a target 

device such as a storage system, where the encryption is 

carried out in-line with the data channel.” J.A. 582 

¶ [0002]. It then states that a system is needed where 

“data and control information can be treated separately

for encryption purposes.” Id. ¶ [0006]. Sullivan goes on 

to describe its own system as subjecting “[t]he control 

information, which may include commands and status 

information . . . to filtering and rejecting operations by the 

encryption unit, to pass through only a predetermined set 

of commands and/or to reject a predetermined set of 

commands.” Id. ¶ [0010]. Thus, Sullivan’s invention 

allows for filtering of “any control information that may 

be included in the packet . . . , whether or not in the 

header.” J.A. 585 ¶ [0055]. This evidence supports the 

Board’s finding that Sullivan discloses a system that does 

not encrypt all payload data, as it states that control and 

user data are treated differently for encryption purposes. 

See Opinion, 2015 WL 9301786, at *9. Considering this 

broad disclosure, the Board’s finding that Sullivan dis-
ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 9

closes that user data can be encrypted and control data 

should not be encrypted is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

Enova’s arguments to the contrary do not convince us 

otherwise. Sullivan does not disclose that all commands 

must be treated the same way; instead, it discloses that 

user data and control data should be treated differently. 

Enova also contends that Sullivan’s system simply drops 

any commands that are not encrypted. Again, Enova’s 

argument is contradicted by the broader disclosure in 

Sullivan. For example, Sullivan indicates that the encryption unit “is set up such that the host . . . can transmit and receive control information (including commands, 

header data, etc.) and data in a normal fashion,” and that 

a command that requests control information “is replied 

to by the encryption unit . . . in the same manner in which 

the target device itself would have responded if the encryption unit were not present.” J.A. 584–85 ¶¶ [0050], 

[0051]. Indeed, Seagate’s expert, Dr. Long, opined that a 

skilled artisan would not have understood Sullivan as 

requiring packets to be dropped, and the Board explicitly 

found Dr. Long’s “description of how a skilled artisan 

would have understood these teachings to be more credible.” Opinion, 2015 WL 9301786, at *14. As we give 

deference to “the Board’s findings concerning the credibility of expert witnesses,” Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 

1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010), we discern no error in the Board’s 

finding.

Enova next argues that neither Sullivan nor SATA 

discloses grouping the commands in the SATA protocol 

into pre-defined categories, or using those categories to 

determine which payloads to encrypt. Enova contends 

that the Board only reached its finding by improperly 

crediting Seagate’s expert’s conclusion that the common 

sense of a skilled artisan would have led to the claimed 

result.
10 ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 

Seagate responds that the Board’s finding that the 

combination of Sullivan and SATA suggests the claimed 

grouping is supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Seagate contends that the combination of Sullivan and 

SATA, and not either reference individually, would have 

suggested using predefined categories to determine which 

data should be encrypted. 

We agree with Seagate that the Board’s finding that 

the combination of Sullivan and SATA suggests the predefined category limitation is supported by substantial 

evidence. As explained previously, Sullivan discloses that 

control data should not be encrypted, and user data may 

be encrypted. The Board found that SATA describes the 

general manner in which the SATA protocol uses FISes to 

transfer data, that different types of FISes may be used 

for different purposes, and that certain commands are 

associated with transferring certain types of data. Opinion, 2015 WL 9301786, at *6, *11. The Board also credited Dr. Long’s testimony during his deposition that 

implementation of Sullivan’s invention using the SATA 

protocol would require using FISes, and that because 

Sullivan disclosed that control data should be treated 

differently from user data, a skilled artisan would therefore treat FISes with control data differently from FISes 

with user data. Id. at *10–11. 

Substantial evidence supports those findings. Sullivan describes a flexible system designed to “accommodate[] whatever standard is used” in the particular 

system in which it is implemented. J.A. 584–85 ¶ [0050]. 

Moreover, Sullivan discloses that its system can be used 

in “any of a number of . . . suitable serial channels, such 

as serial ATA.” J.A. 584 ¶ [0038] (emphasis added). 

Sullivan’s specific reference to serial ATA, i.e., the SATA 

protocol, clearly supports the Board’s finding that a 

skilled artisan would have understood Sullivan’s system 

as combinable with SATA. 
ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 11

Enova’s argument relating to “common sense” is unpersuasive. The Board did not rely on a common-sense 

rationale in making its finding. Indeed, the phrase 

“common sense” does not appear in the Board’s final 

written decision. Rather than finding that a skilled 

artisan would have reached a missing limitation using 

common sense, the Board found that the combination of 

Sullivan and SATA disclosed the pre-defined category 

limitation. See Opinion, 2015 WL 9301786, at *10–11. As 

we have explained, that finding is supported by substantial evidence. 

Enova next argues that even if the combination does 

disclose the pre-defined category limitation, a skilled 

artisan would not have been motivated to combine Sullivan and SATA because the combination would have been 

inoperative. Enova contends that the Board found that 

the combination would have been inoperative, but used 

that inoperability as a motivation to modify Sullivan. 

Seagate responds that the Board did not find that the 

combination would produce an inoperable device, and that 

the Board’s finding of a motivation to combine the references is supported by substantial evidence.

We agree with Seagate that the Board’s finding of a 

motivation to combine is supported by substantial evidence. The Board did not find that Sullivan and SATA 

would have produced an inoperable device, but instead 

recognized that the combination would be inoperable if 

Sullivan was read as narrowly as Enova urged. Id. at 

*10. The Board determined that that result weighed 

against reading Sullivan so narrowly, particularly where 

Sullivan specifically disclosed that it could be used in a 

SATA system. Id. Indeed, we have held that disclosures 

in a reference that might be read to teach away from 

combining two references did not overcome “the express 

teachings” of the reference suggesting combinability. 

Bayer Healthcare Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 

713 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Similarly, Sulli-
12 ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 

van’s express teaching that it can be used with the SATA 

protocol—the very protocol that SATA describes—strongly 

supports the Board’s finding of a motivation to combine. 

Accordingly, that finding is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

Enova next attacks Seagate’s expert evidence as conclusory and infected by hindsight, and argues that it was 

incomplete because it did not address Enova’s evidence of 

objective indicia of nonobviousness. Enova also argues 

that the evidence should not be given any deference on 

review because it was not given live before the Board. 

Seagate responds that there was nothing improper about 

the manner in which Dr. Long offered his testimony, and 

that there is no support for Enova’s argument that only 

live testimony should be entitled to deference. 

We agree with Seagate that the Board used Dr. Long’s 

evidence properly. Dr. Long based his conclusions on his 

own experience and the content of both Sullivan and 

SATA. See Opinion, 2015 WL 9301786, at *8–10; 

J.A. 1080–85. Moreover, Dr. Long did consider the possibility of objective indicia of nonobviousness in his original 

report, stating that he was “not aware” of such evidence 

and reserving the right to update his declaration if such 

evidence was presented. J.A. 1121. And, in any event, it 

is “the patentee [who] has the burden of going forward 

with” evidence tending to rebut a challenger’s obviousness 

case. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1360 (Fed. 

Cir. 2007). Finally, we have never required an expert to 

give live testimony to be entitled to deference. In Yorkey, 

for example, we gave deference to the Board’s weighing of 

the credibility of two expert declarations. 601 F.3d at 

1284–85. Thus, we discern no error in the manner in 

which Dr. Long offered his opinions, and give those opinions due weight in our review. 

Finally, Enova argues that the Board improperly 

shifted the burden of persuasion to Enova. Seagate 
ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 13

responds that the Board did not shift the burden, and that 

Seagate’s evidence established that the claims would have 

been obvious.

We agree with Seagate that the Board did not shift 

the burden of persuasion to Enova. The Board evaluated 

Seagate’s evidence and arguments, and ultimately concluded that Seagate established that the claims would 

have been obvious. See Opinion, 2015 WL 9301786, at 

*12. Thus, there was no error. 

II. Objective Indicia

Enova next challenges the Board’s evaluation of its 

evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. Enova 

introduced evidence that it argues established commercial 

success, industry praise, and copying and licensing by 

others. Again, we take each argument in turn.

Enova first argues that its “X-Wall” product line, 

which it contends embodies the invention claimed in the 

’057 patent, has experienced considerable commercial 

success. Enova contends that the Board erred in finding 

no nexus between the products and the claimed invention 

because Seagate did not present evidence rebutting its 

contentions. Enova also argues that Seagate’s own products, which it alleges infringe the ’057 patent, have experienced similar success. Moreover, Enova argues that 

Seagate did not provide any evidence to rebut the claimed 

success. Thus, Enova contends, the Board should have 

given weight to its evidence of commercial success. 

Seagate responds that the Board’s findings that 

Enova did not adequately prove nexus or commercial 

success are supported by substantial evidence. Seagate 

contends that Enova’s only evidence relating to Seagate’s 

products are general marketing materials, and that 

Enova did not establish that those products embodied the 

claimed invention. Seagate also responds that Enova 

failed to provide any other evidence of commercial suc-
14 ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 

cess; for example, Enova did not provide any sales figures 

or an economic or market analysis. 

We agree with Seagate that the Board’s findings are 

supported by substantial evidence. “[T]he patentee has 

the burden of going forward with” evidence tending to 

rebut a challenger’s obviousness case. Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 

1360. Thus, the Board properly began its analysis by 

determining whether Enova provided sufficient evidence 

of commercial success. Substantial evidence supports the 

finding that Enova did not provide sufficient evidence 

tying the purported success of its own products to the 

claimed invention. Indeed, the document that Enova 

argues links the success of its X-Wall products to the 

claimed invention also lists other benefits—for example, 

operating system independence—unrelated to the claimed 

invention’s cryptographic processing. See J.A. 3409. 

Moreover, Enova did not present data establishing the

commercial success of its own products or Seagate’s 

products. For example, its expert admitted that he did 

not examine any of Enova’s financial statements, sales, 

costs, units sold, or revenue. J.A. 3091–92. Moreover, 

and as the Board found, Enova also did not provide evidence of the economics or size of the relevant market. See 

Opinion, 2015 WL 9301786, at *18–19. Thus, the Board’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Enova next argues that its evidence of industry praise 

supports a conclusion of nonobviousness because it adequately linked its evidence of praise to the claimed invention. Seagate responds that the Board properly weighed 

the evidence, and that substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s finding that it was insufficient. 

We agree with Seagate that substantial evidence 

supports the Board’s finding that Enova failed to link the 

evidence of praise to the claimed invention. Enova’s 

evidence of praise only addresses the products at a high 

level, and Enova’s expert offered only conclusory opinions 
ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 15

in support. See J.A. 3404–06, 3408–09, 3735–36. Accordingly, the Board’s finding was adequately supported. 

Finally, Enova argues that the Board should have 

credited its evidence of copying and licensing. Specifically, Enova contends that because Seagate and Initio Corporation (“Initio”) purchased the X-Wall products for 

incorporation into their own products for several years

and then later released products not using Enova technology, they had sufficient access to suggest that they copied 

the claimed invention. Enova contends that this conclusion is buttressed by a consent decree Enova and Initio 

entered into in which Initio admitted that it had infringed. Moreover, Enova argues that licensing agreements between it, Initio, Initio’s customer Western Digital 

Corporation (“Western Digital”), and Buffalo, Inc. (“Buffalo”) further support a conclusion of nonobviousness. 

 Seagate responds that the Board’s findings relating to 

copying and licensing are supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Seagate contends that Enova has not 

provided any actual evidence of copying, and that Enova’s 

circumstantial evidence is insufficient. Moreover, Seagate 

contends licenses must be linked to the claimed invention 

to be given weight when determining whether claims 

would have been obvious, and Enova did not provide any 

evidence linking the licenses to the claimed invention. 

We agree with Seagate that the Board’s findings are 

supported by substantial evidence. Although we have 

recognized that knowledge of the patent and products 

embodying the patent may be relevant in determining 

whether an invention was copied, we have not held that 

such knowledge is sufficient to establish copying. See 

Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk 

Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 

Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 

1272, 1285–86 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In Transocean, for example, we reversed a district court’s grant of judgment as a 
16 ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 

matter of law that an invention would have been obvious 

where the jury found copying based in part on knowledge 

of the patent and accused products, but also based on

testimony from the infringer’s employees and an internal 

memo from the accused infringer indicating an affirmative decision to incorporate the patented features. 699 

F.3d at 1352. Similarly, in Advanced Display Systems

there was evidence that the accused product “was virtually an identical replica of the claimed invention,” direct 

testimony that the accused infringer had copied the 

patented formula, and evidence that the accused product 

was built after “disassembling [the patentee’s] prototype, 

photographing its features, and then using the photograph essentially as an instruction manual.” 212 F.3d at 

1285. 

At best, the evidence submitted by Enova establishes 

that Seagate and Initio knew of the patent and of Enova’s 

products. That evidence does not approach the evidence 

that we have held sufficient to establish copying. For 

example, although Initio admitted to infringement in the 

consent judgment, it did not admit to copying the claimed 

invention. J.A. 3611–12. Accordingly, the Board’s finding 

is supported by substantial evidence.

Similarly, the Board’s findings relating to Enova’s evidence of licensing are supported by substantial evidence. 

We have held that the existence of licenses is insufficient

to establish nonobviousness; there must be some nexus 

between the licenses and the claimed invention. In re 

Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1293–94 (Fed. Cir. 

2012). Thus, the simple fact that Initio, Western Digital, 

and Buffalo entered into licensing agreements, without 

more, is not evidence of nonobviousness. See id. As the 

Board found, the redaction of those licenses makes it 

difficult to determine the reason that they were agreed to. 

See Opinion, 2015 WL 9301786, at *19. Of the eleven 

pages of the Initio license agreement, eight are fully

redacted and the other three are almost fully redacted. 
ENOVA TECH. CORP. v. SEAGATE TECH. (US) 17

See J.A. 3574–84. Of the ten pages of the Western Digital 

license, seven are fully redacted and the other three are 

also almost fully redacted. J.A. 3585–94. Similarly, the

two provided pages of the Buffalo license are almost fully 

redacted. See J.A. 3596, 3602. As the only possibly relevant information that can be gleaned from those licenses 

is the mere fact that they exist, and not whether there is 

any connection to the claimed invention, the Board’s 

decision that they were insufficient evidence of nonobviousness is supported by substantial evidence. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered the remaining arguments, but 

find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the 

decision of the Board is affirmed.

AFFIRMED