NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1679-14T4

GINAMARIE GOMES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE COUNTY OF MONMOUTH, a body

politic of the State of New Jersey,

and CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, 

Defendants-Respondents.

______________________________________

Submitted February 22, 2016 – Decided 

Before Judges Sabatino, Accurso and Suter.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, 

Docket No. L-2096-14.

Law Offices of Herbert I. Ellis, P.C., 

attorneys for appellant (Mr. Ellis and Amy 

B. Francesco, on the brief).

Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien, Doherty & Kelly, 

P.C., attorneys for respondents (Melissa J. 

Brown and Sean X. Kelly, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SABATINO, P.J.A.D.

This appeal raises in part the novel issue of whether a 

plaintiff, who was treated by a private medical provider under 

contract to provide care to inmates at a county jail, must serve 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

April 14, 2016

APPELLATE DIVISION

April 14, 2016
2 A-1679-14T4

that private entity with a tort claims notice before she can sue 

the company for negligence. We hold that the Tort Claims Act

(the "TCA" or the "Act"), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to :14-4, does not 

require service of such a notice upon a private government 

contractor. Consequently, we reverse the trial court's 

dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the contractor for 

failure to serve it with a notice. 

In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we affirm the 

trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's intentional tort claims 

against co-defendant County of Monmouth. We vacate the court's 

dismissal of the other remaining claims as premature, and remand 

for discovery and other further proceedings.

I.

The record in its present incomplete state reflects the 

following pertinent facts and allegations. The case arises out 

of plaintiff GinaMarie Gomes's brief incarceration at the 

Monmouth County Correctional Institution (the "MCCI" or the 

"County jail"), where defendants allegedly denied plaintiff 

access to her prescribed antibiotic medication. The MCCI is a 

unit within defendant County of Monmouth, a public entity. Codefendant Correct Care Solutions, Inc. ("CCS") is a private 

company. During the relevant time period, CCS provided medical 
3 A-1679-14T4

services to inmates housed at the MCCI pursuant to a contract 

with the County.1

On June 2, 2012, plaintiff reported to the MCCI because of 

an acknowledged parole violation. As part of the intake process 

that day, the medical staff conducted an initial screening in 

which plaintiff disclosed her medical history. A mental health 

screening was also conducted, which found nothing of particular 

relevance.

According to the screening forms, plaintiff alerted the 

medical staff that she suffered from asthma, heroin withdrawal, 

kidney disease, hepatitis C, and several other medical issues. 

She reported that she had seen a physician within the preceding 

two weeks regarding "kidney issues." Plaintiff also reported 

that she had been prescribed a variety of medications, including

Cipro, a broad-spectrum antibiotic, and an asthma inhaler. All 

of the medical staff at the jail who performed these intake 

services allegedly were employees of CCS.

According to plaintiff, Cipro had been prescribed by her 

physician and filled at a pharmacy prior to her admission at the 

MCCI to address a "severe infectious condition." For reasons 

that remain unclear, the antibiotic was confiscated from 

plaintiff during the intake process. The screening records 

 

1 The parties have not furnished us with a copy of the contract.
4 A-1679-14T4

indicate that medical staff ordered a new five-day dosage of 

Cipro, but that prescription apparently was cancelled pending 

blood work and the jail's receipt of plaintiff's prior medical 

records. Plaintiff contends that she never received a dosage of 

Cipro, or any other antibiotic, during her time at the MCCI.

Over the course of the next twenty-three days, plaintiff 

repeatedly complained of a sore throat, coughing, and other 

ailments. She also began complaining of lower back pain and 

decreased mobility. Plaintiff was seen by CCS medical personnel

on twenty-seven occasions during this time, and she was 

prescribed various palliative medications. Nearly all of the 

documents and records relating to plaintiff's care at the MCCI 

bear the CCS company name and logo. 

By June 25, 2012, plaintiff's back pain and mobility issues

had become so acute that she was transferred to a local 

hospital. Further medical investigation revealed that she was 

suffering from a "large epidural abscess with cord compression,"

a diagnosis which plaintiff alleges has left her permanently 

paralyzed and incontinent. She further alleges that the 

condition could have been prevented had the medical staff at the 

jail provided her with the Cipro that she was originally 

prescribed and had brought with her to the facility. 
5 A-1679-14T4

Through her counsel, plaintiff initially served a notice of 

tort claim upon the County, the MCCI, and the State Attorney 

General's Office on August 24, 2012. Plaintiff's counsel 

received a written response dated December 26, 2012 from PMA 

Companies ("PMA"), the third-party administrator for the County, 

acknowledging receipt of the notice. The response further 

stated in relevant part:

We have reported the claim as well to 

Correct Care Solutions, of Memphis, 

Tennessee. This is the private contractor 

which provides the medical staff at Monmouth 

County Correctional Institution. Their 

insurance carrier is Allied Insurance, and I 

have been advised a claim has been reported 

to this company. 

Plaintiff's counsel separately received a letter from the Office 

of the Attorney General2 informing her that MCCI was a "local 

public entity" and that the claim, therefore, did not involve 

the State.

Plaintiff thereafter filed a six-count complaint in the Law 

Division against the County, CCS, and various fictitious 

parties. The complaint asserts various claims of negligence, 

intentional tort, and breach of contract. Each count is 

premised on a theory that defendants negligently or 

 

2 After this appeal was briefed, we invited the Attorney General 

to participate as an amicus or intervenor to address the 

statutory issues raised here under the Tort Claims Act. The 

Attorney General declined our invitation.
6 A-1679-14T4

intentionally confiscated and withheld plaintiff's prescribed 

medication, causing her personal harm. Although plaintiff does 

not explicitly style any of her claims as claims for medical 

negligence or medical malpractice, she alleges in count four 

several related theories of liability, including negligent 

observation; inadequate medical testing procedures; inadequate 

documentation and record keeping; negligent hiring of medical 

staff; and failure to "adhere to the Internal Management 

Procedures for Medication Administration as mandated and 

required by, for and of the New Jersey Department of Corrections 

Internal Management Procedures[.]"

The co-defendants, the County and CCS, each moved to 

dismiss the complaint in lieu of an answer. The primary 

arguments advanced by defendants in favor of dismissal were 

that: (1) plaintiff failed to serve a notice of tort claim upon 

CCS; (2) plaintiff failed to state a prima facie claim of 

negligence or intentional tortious conduct against either 

defendant; and (3) plaintiff is not an intended beneficiary of 

the contract between the County and CCS and therefore lacks 

standing to complain about any breaches of that agreement. 

After hearing oral argument, the motion judge dismissed the 

complaint with prejudice as to both defendants. In his written 

statement of reasons, the judge ruled that plaintiff's lawsuit 
7 A-1679-14T4

against CCS was barred under the TCA because she had not served 

a tort claims notice upon the contractor within the ninety-day 

period set forth in N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. 

The judge determined that CCS, as the provider of medical 

care to inmates at a county jail, is a "public entity" within 

the meaning of the statute. In making this finding, the judge 

substantially relied upon this court's opinion in Hoag v. Brown, 

397 N.J. Super. 34, 47-48, 53 (App. Div. 2007), which treated an 

employee of a private contractor that provided medical services 

to a State prison as an employee of the State for purposes of 

her claim that she had been harassed in her workplace in 

violation of the Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), N.J.S.A.

10:5-1 to -42. The judge also noted unpublished opinions of 

this court and the trial court likewise treating employees of a 

private contractor to a State prison to be the functional 

equivalent of public employees working for the prison.3 

The judge reasoned that because the medical staff that 

allegedly acted negligently here worked at the jail and could be 

 

3 We do not cite the unpublished opinions, as they are nonprecedential. R. 1:36-3. That said, we recognize that the 

notice issue presented here has not been the subject of a 

reported case, and that there appear to be several unreported 

opinions that have addressed the issue. We by no means fault 

the trial judge for considering the unpublished cases, as he is 

permitted to do under Rule 1:36-3, in his conscientious effort 

to grapple with this issue without the guidance of precedent. 
8 A-1679-14T4

considered the functional equivalent of public employees for 

certain purposes as in Hoag, their employer CCS should be 

treated as a public entity that must be served with a tort 

claims notice. Since no such timely notice was served upon CCS,

the judge dismissed plaintiff's tort-based claims against that 

co-defendant. The judge rejected plaintiff's argument that her 

service of notice upon the County sufficed as notice to CCS 

under the circumstances. The judge also rejected plaintiff's 

claims against CCS founded upon her theory that she was an 

intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between CCS and 

the County.

The judge then dismissed all of plaintiff's claims against 

the County. He rejected, as a matter of law, plaintiff's claims 

of intentional tort against the County as a public entity 

because N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 directs that public entities are not 

vicariously liable for acts or omissions of public employees 

constituting a "crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful 

misconduct." The judge also found non-viable plaintiff's 

negligence claims against the County because she had not alleged 

that any County employees had been involved in her medical 

screening or her medical care. In addition, the judge dismissed 

plaintiff's contract-based claims against the County,

essentially for the same reasons that the judge had noted in 
9 A-1679-14T4

dismissing the contract claims against CCS. Lastly, the judge 

dismissed plaintiff's claims for punitive damages.

II.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the dismissal of her 

complaint against both defendants was legally erroneous and 

premature. She also asserts various criticisms of the manner in 

which the trial judge proceeded to rule on her claims, 

complaining about the judge's citation to unpublished authority.

In considering these arguments, we adhere to the wellestablished principle that before a court dismisses a civil 

complaint with prejudice, it must "search[] the complaint in 

depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of 

a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement 

of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary." 

Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 

746 (1989) (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 43 

N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)). 

Nevertheless, a purely legal question of whether a 

defendant is insulated from liability because of an immunity or 

some other statutory provision ideally should be resolved, if 

possible, at an early stage of the litigation. See Rivera v. 

Gerner, 89 N.J. 526, 536 (1982) (noting that resolving issues 

involving the TCA through the pretrial process "is to be 
10 A-1679-14T4

encouraged"); Hurwitz v. AHS Hosp. Corp., 438 N.J. Super. 269, 

305-06 (App. Div. 2014) (observing in a statutory immunities 

case that issues involving those immunities should be 

adjudicated at an "early stage of litigation," and that an 

"unfettered right to discovery" would "dilut[e] the practical 

benefit of the immunity protection"). Indeed, in keeping with 

the need for expedition, interlocutory appeals from orders 

granting or denying leave to file a late tort claims notice are 

now immediately appealable under the Rules of Court as of right. 

R. 2:2-3(a)(3). Our review of such legal determinations by a

trial court is de novo. Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of 

Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 564 (2012).

A.

The novel and important issue that most warrants our 

attention here is whether plaintiff was obligated to serve a 

separate tort claims notice upon co-defendant CCS, a private 

contractor to the County. We hold that there is no such 

obligation, either in the language of the Tort Claims Act or one 

logically compelled by the policies underlying the statutory 

scheme.

The TCA indisputably governs causes of action in tort 

against governmental agencies within New Jersey. Velez v. City 

of Jersey City, 180 N.J. 284, 289-90 (2004). The Legislature 
11 A-1679-14T4

enacted the Act in recognition of "the inherently unfair and 

inequitable results which occur in the strict application of the 

traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity," while still 

recognizing that government — which cannot abstain from its 

obligation to govern in the way a private actor can choose not 

to engage in certain conduct — "should not have the duty to do 

everything that might be done." N.J.S.A. 59:1-2; Lopez v. City 

of Elizabeth, 245 N.J. Super. 153, 164 (App. Div. 1991).

Generally, a defendant organization falls within the 

purview of the TCA if it is considered a "public entity," as

that term is defined in N.J.S.A. 59:1-3. See S.E.W. Friel Co. 

v. N.J. Turnpike Auth., 73 N.J. 107, 113-17 (1977). Section 1-3

of the Act denotes a "public entity" to include "the State, and 

any county, municipality, district, public authority, public 

agency, and any other political subdivision or public body in 

the State." N.J.S.A. 59:1-3. The Attorney General's 1972 Task 

Force Comment to N.J.S.A. 59:1-3 clarifies that the TCA's 

definition of "public entity" is intended to encompass "all 

entities exercising governmental functions." Margolis & Novack, 

Claims Against Public Entities, 1972 Task Force Comment on 

N.J.S.A. 59:1-3 (2016).

The TCA likewise defines the related concept of a "public 

employee." According to N.J.S.A. 59:1-3, a "public employee" is 
12 A-1679-14T4

simply "an employee of a public entity[.]" The term "employee" 

means "an officer, employee, or servant, whether or not 

compensated or part-time, who is authorized to perform any act 

or service; provided, however, that the term does not include an 

independent contractor." Ibid. (emphasis added).

When an injured party wishes to pursue a claim against a 

public entity or a public employee, that party must first file a 

notice of claim with the public entity involved. Because 

plaintiff's alleged mistreatment occurred at a County jail, the 

notice provision concerning local governmental entities

pertains. See N.J.S.A. 59:8-7 ("A claim for injury . . . 

arising under this act against a local public entity shall be 

filed with that entity.") (emphasis added); N.J.S.A. 59:8-2 

("'[L]ocal public entity' means a public entity other than the 

State."). This notice must be filed "within 90 days of accrual 

of the claim," subject to potential extension by the court which 

is not implicated by the present appeal. N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. If 

the claimant fails to do so, the statute dictates that he or she 

"shall be forever barred from recovering against a public entity 

or public employee[.]" Ibid. 

Functionally, this notice requirement within the TCA is 

largely intended to "compel a claimant to expose his intention 

and information early in the process in order to permit the 
13 A-1679-14T4

public entity to undertake an investigation while witnesses are 

available and the facts are fresh." O'Neill v. City of Newark, 

304 N.J. Super. 543, 549 (App. Div. 1997) (emphasis added)

(quoting Lutz v. Twp. of Gloucester, 153 N.J. Super. 461, 466 

(App. Div. 1977)). 

As our Supreme Court explained in Beauchamp v. Avedio, 164 

N.J. 111 (2000), the recognized goals of the TCA's notice 

provision are:

(1) to allow the public entity at least six 

months for administrative review with the 

opportunity to settle meritorious claims 

prior to the bringing of suit; (2) to 

provide the public entity with prompt 

notification of a claim in order to 

adequately investigate the facts and prepare 

a defense[;] (3) to afford the public entity

a chance to correct the conditions or 

practices which gave rise to the claim; and 

(4) to inform the State [or local public 

entity] in advance as to the indebtedness or 

liability that it may be expected to meet.

[Id. at 121-22 (first alteration in 

original) (emphasis added) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).]

The first two goals are derived from the Task Force Comment to 

N.J.S.A. 59:8-3, and the last two goals come from Fuller v. 

Rutgers, 154 N.J. Super. 420, 426 (App. Div. 1977), certif. 

denied, 75 N.J. 610 (1978). See Margolis & Novack, supra, 

comment on N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, at p. 266 (2016).
14 A-1679-14T4

The contents of a proper notice of claim under the TCA are

governed by N.J.S.A. 59:8-4, which specifies the following 

minimum information that a claimant's notice must contain:

A claim shall be presented by the claimant 

. . . and shall include:

a. The name and post[-]office 

address of the claimant;

b. The post-office address to 

which the person presenting the 

claim desires notice to be sent;

c. The date, place and other 

circumstances of the occurrence or 

transaction which gave rise to the 

claim asserted;

d. A general description of the 

injury, damage, or loss incurred 

so far as it may be known at the 

time of presentation of the claim;

e. The name or names of the public 

entity, employee or employees

causing the injury, damage or 

loss, if known; and

f. The amount claimed as of the 

date of presentation of the claim, 

including the estimated amount of 

any prospective injury, damage, or 

loss, insofar as it may be known 

at the time of the presentation of 

the claim, together with the basis 

of computation of the amount 

claimed.

[(Emphasis added).]
15 A-1679-14T4

Under N.J.S.A. 59:8-6, a public entity may, "by rule or 

regulation," adopt its own standardized form that requests 

information beyond the minimum level of detail enumerated in 

N.J.S.A. 59:8-4.

By way of illustration, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-4 and -6, 

the State has issued its own standard tort claims notice form. 

That form asks the claimant to identify the State "agency" 

allegedly responsible for the claimant's injury. There is no 

place on the State form for the claimant to identify a private 

actor or entity as a responsible party.4 In fact, case law 

instructs that a claimant's failure to use the public entity's 

prescribed form supplying the necessary information can at times 

support a finding that the entity failed to receive timely and 

proper notice under N.J.S.A. 59:8-4 and -6. See Wood v. Cty. of 

Burlington, 302 N.J. Super. 371, 378 (App. Div. 1997) (ruling 

that plaintiffs were required to use the defendant township's 

"specialized notice of claim form"). 

Likewise, although the County of Monmouth does not 

apparently post a standard tort claims notice form on the 

 

4 See Initial Notice of Claim for Damages Against the State of 

New Jersey, Dep't of the Treasury, Bureau of Risk Mgmt., 

http://www.nj.gov/treasury/riskmgt/pdf/ClaimLongForm.pdf (last 

visited Mar. 31, 2016) (asking the claimant to identify the 

"state agency or agencies" that caused the damages and the 

"names of State employees whom you claim were at fault").
16 A-1679-14T4

Internet, a number of other local governments do.5 None of those 

standard notice forms that our research has uncovered ask the 

claimant to identify any private actors or entities. Instead, 

the forms simply ask the claimant to indicate the governmental 

agencies involved.

Here, presumably because a standardized form from the 

County was not readily available, the notice served on the 

County by plaintiff was a typed letter prepared by her counsel. 

The letter addressed the six items required for proper notice 

under N.J.S.A. 59:8-4. 

To require claimants such as plaintiff in this case to 

serve a pre-suit tort claims notice upon a defendant government 

contractor would clash with both the text of the TCA and the 

 

5 See, e.g., Notice of Tort Claim Against Gloucester County, New 

Jersey and/or Its Entities, Gloucester Cty., http://www.

gloucestercountynj.gov/civica/filebank/blobdload.asp?BlobID=4215

(last visited Mar. 31, 2016) (asking the claimant to identify 

"each and every Department, Division, Agency or Authority" and 

"each and every County employee" the claimant contends is 

liable); Notice of Claim for Damages Against the County of 

Passaic, Passaic Cty., http://www.passaiccountynj.org/Document

Center/View/108 (last visited Mar. 31, 2016) (requesting 

claimants to specify the "names of County Employees whom you 

claim were at fault" and "the negligence or wrongful act of the 

County Agency and County employees which caused your damages"); 

Tort Claim for Damages Against the City of Trenton, City of 

Trenton, http://www.trentonnj.org/FCpdf/notice%20of%20tort%

20claim.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2016) (requesting the "name 

and address of the City Department, Division or Agency that you 

claim caused [the claimant's] damage/injury" and "the names of 

the City employees whom you claim were at fault").
17 A-1679-14T4

objectives of the statute's notice provision. A private 

enterprise like CCS is not a "county, municipality, district, 

public authority, public agency, [or] any other political 

subdivision or public body in the State." N.J.S.A. 59:1-3. 

Instead, it is a private independent contractor, whose workers 

are specifically carved out of Section 1-3's definition of a 

public employee.

To be sure, as the private contractor hired by Monmouth

County to provide medical services based at the County jail, CCS 

apparently performs certain functions that the County otherwise 

would have had to perform itself. We agree with defendants that 

the provision of such medical services to County inmates – had 

they been performed by the County's own workers – would comprise 

a governmental function. Under the contractual agreement with 

CCS, the County has apparently delegated at least some of those 

functions to CCS. That delegation does not, however, 

automatically convert CCS into a "public entity" for all 

purposes under the TCA.

We recognize that, in appropriate circumstances, private 

contractors retained by State and local governments to perform 

some of their functions may be protected by the TCA's immunities

and special defenses under the concept of "derivative immunity." 

See, e.g., Rodriguez v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 193 N.J. 
18 A-1679-14T4

Super. 39, 44-46 (App. Div. 1983) (finding that a private 

security company that provided security and guards for a public 

entity was entitled to derivative immunity, noting that a

contractor could still be liable for negligence "in the 

execution of the contract"), certif. denied, 96 N.J. 291 (1984); 

Cobb v. Waddington, 154 N.J. Super. 11, 18 (App. Div. 1977) 

(finding that a construction company hired by the State to 

perform roadwork and install barriers to divert traffic was 

entitled to derivative immunity), certif. denied, 76 N.J. 235 

(1978). 

We do not resolve on this limited record whether CCS, in 

fact, is entitled to such second-hand "derivative" substantive

immunity, particularly since the record lacks evidence of the 

actual contract between the County and CCS, and where discovery 

on this pivotal subject has yet to be conducted. As an 

analytical point, however, we note that there would be no need 

for courts to recognize the concept of derivative immunity if 

private contractors hired by government agencies were per se 

regarded for all purposes under the TCA as "public entities." 

We need not decide comprehensively in this appeal what 

portions of the TCA afford protection to private contractors 

such as CCS, and which portions do not. The narrow issue posed 

before us is simply whether the notice provisions under N.J.S.A.
19 A-1679-14T4

59:8-8 and :8-9 require courts to treat such contractors as 

public entities that must be served with tort claims notices as 

a precondition to them being sued. The answer is no.

None of the four goals of the notice provision, as 

identified by the Supreme Court in Beauchamp, support construing 

N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 to require service of a notice upon a private 

entity that serves as a government contractor. Each of those 

enumerated purposes involves providing the government with a 

timely opportunity to consider and react to an incident that the 

claimant is contending to be a negligent failure by government 

to discharge its functions properly. It is of no concern to CCS 

whether plaintiff has given the County enough time to: (1) 

administratively review and possibly settle a meritorious claim; 

(2) adequately investigate the matter and prepare the 

government's defense; (3) correct the conditions or practices 

relating to the governmental function that gave rise to the 

claim; or (4) apprise the government of its potential 

indebtedness as a matter of fiscal planning. See Beauchamp, 

supra, 164 N.J. at 121-22. 

We recognize that a private contractor might similarly want 

to have such claim-related information provided to it, at a presuit stage, for its own business or risk management reasons. 

But the central objectives of the TCA's notice provision are 
20 A-1679-14T4

solely related to the benefit of governmental decision-makers 

and, ultimately, the taxpayers who might bear the costs of a 

successful claim. It is revealing that the tort claims notice 

forms that have been created by the State and other public 

entities are designed to require claimants to specify which 

governmental agency or agencies that he or she alleges was 

responsible for causing the injury. 

When plaintiff duly served her notice upon the County, she 

was specifically apprised that the medical staff who dealt with 

her at the jail were employees of CCS, a private entity, whose 

insurance carrier was identified in the County's response. 

Plaintiff should not have been required to assume that she was 

supposed to provide any more notice of the incident than what 

she had already supplied to the County. The Legislature has not 

directed that duplicative notices be served upon private 

contractors or their insurers. Of course, the Legislature is 

free to amend the statute to so require, but that is not how the 

law is presently worded or structured.

The trial judge's reliance on Hoag, supra, 397 N.J. Super.

at 53-54, in reaching his contrary conclusion on the notice 

issue was misplaced. There was no issue of notice involved in 

Hoag. That case instead turned on whether an employee of a 

private contractor, who had been working at a State prison and 
21 A-1679-14T4

allegedly mistreated by a State employee supervising her, should 

be regarded as a public employee for purposes of the State's 

anti-discrimination laws and the TCA. 

Hoag specifically involved whether the worker's

relationship with the State Department of Corrections was 

fundamentally one of an employer and employee for purposes of

liability under the LAD. This court found that the State in 

those circumstances potentially could be regarded as the 

plaintiff's "employer," given the allegations of its close 

involvement in the conditions of her workplace, and thereby 

could be responsible for perpetuating a hostile work 

environment. Id. at 47-53. Even so, because the record in Hoag

was not fully developed as to those issues, we remanded the 

matter for further factual development. Id. at 53.

We do not endorse the trial judge's overbroad reading of 

Hoag with respect to the TCA notice issues presented here. 

Unlike the plaintiff in Hoag, plaintiff Gomes was not employed 

in a government facility. She was only housed there as an 

inmate less than a month, before her medical condition became so 

severe that she had to be transferred to the hospital. The 

scope of Gomes's statutory obligation to provide notice of her 

tort claims is fundamentally different in character than the 

question of whether, by comparison, Ms. Hoag's substantive 
22 A-1679-14T4

rights to a discrimination-free workplace were infringed by the 

State when it was acting as her employer. For these many 

reasons, the analysis in Hoag is inapposite to the notice

question posed here under N.J.S.A. 59:8-8.

We therefore reverse the trial judge's dismissal of CCS for 

lack of service of a timely notice under N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. We

accordingly reinstate CCS as a co-defendant in the case, and 

remand for further proceedings.

B.

[At the discretion of the court, the 

published version of this opinion omits Part 

II(B), which addresses issues unrelated to 

the notice issue.]

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. 

We do not retain jurisdiction.