UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ JAMES RUDNICK, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. RICK RAEMISCH; JOHN CHAPDELAINE; JENNIFER ANDERSON; NICOLE WILSON; ERIC HOFFMAN; BROWN; DAVID CUSTER; DARREN COREY; WILLIAM SHERWOOD, Defendants - Appellees. No. 18-1260 (D.C. No. 1:16-CV -02071-RM-KLM) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , McKAY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ James Rudnick appeals a distr ict court order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Exercising jurisdic tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I Rudnick sued numerous individuals employed by the Colorado Dep artment of

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in t he determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G ). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument. This order and judgme nt is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res j udicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, howev er, for its persuasive value c onsistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 22, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Corrections (“CDOC”). He alleged defendants violated his const itutional rights by restricting his access to the pri son’s law library and his abil ity to print legal materials; viewing, sharing, and threatening to delete his legal files; an d confiscating his personal eyeglasses and replacing them w ith state-issued eyeglasses. From the 186 pages comprising th e second amended complaint, th e district court discerned seven claims for relief: (1) blocked access to the c ourts in violation of the First Amendment; (2) seizure of legal m aterials in violation of the F ourth Amendment; (3) denial of due process and e qual protection regarding access to legal files; (4) violation of the right to confidentiality; (5) retaliation in violation o f the First Amendment; (6) deliberate indifference to m edical needs; and (7) unconstit utional policies concerning administrative remedies. Acting under 28 U.S. C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the district court sua sponte dismissed various defendants against whom there were no allegations of pe rsonal participation, and dismissed claims for monetary dam ages against other defendants sued in their official capacities. It also denied Rudnic k’s motion for injunctive rel ief. In an interlocutory appeal, we affirmed the injunctio n ruling. See Rudnick v. Raem isch, 731 F. App’x 753, 756 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished). The remaining defendants moved to dismiss in the district cour t. A magistrate judge recommended Rudnick’s claims be dismissed because he fail ed to allege a plausible constitutional violati on and defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Over Rudnick’s objections, the d istrict court accepted that rec ommendation and entered judgment in defendants’ fa vor. Rudnick now appeals.3 II We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) due to qualified immunity. Den ver Justice & Peace Comm., Inc. v. City of Golden, 405 F.3d 923, 927 (10th Ci r. 2005). “To survive a motion to dismis s based on qualified immunity, the plaintiff must alle ge sufficient facts that show— when taken as true—the defendant plausibly violated h is constitutional rights, which w ere clearly established at the time of violation.” Schwa rtz v. Booker, 702 F.3d 573, 579 (10th Cir. 2012). Rudnick argues that dismissal w as inappropriate because his cl aims were supported by the weight of the e vidence and because the distric t court did not consider all his filings cumulatively. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, however, the focus of the judicial inquiry is on the complaint’s factual allegations. See SEC v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 640 (10th Cir. 2014). A district cour t may consider “documents tha t the complaint incorporates by reference” and “documents referred to in the co mplaint if the documents are central to the plaintiff’s c laim and the parties do not dis pute the documents’ authenticity.” Gee v . Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1 178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). But Rudnick does not explain how any specific document he filed supports the plausibility of any particula r claim for relief. Although we l iberally construe a pro se litigant’s filings, we neverthele ss require a pro se litigant t o provide “succinct, clear and accurate” arguments “with citati ons to the authorities and part s of the record on which [he] relies.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840-41 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). We may not “serv[e] as the litigant ’s attorney in constructing arguments and searching th e record.” Id. at 840.4 Rudnick contends the district c ourt erred by deciding the moti on to dismiss without a hearing. But a heari ng on a motion to dismiss is not required. See Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F. 3d 1204, 1214 (10th Cir. 2003), a brogated on other grounds by Jones v. B ock, 549 U.S. 199, 2 15 (2007). To the ext ent Rudnick asserts that his right to a jury trial forecl oses a motion to dismiss, he is mistaken. See Smith v. Kitchen, 156 F.3d 1025, 1029 (10th Cir. 1997). Rudnick further argues the district court erred by failing to include in its ruling the facts and law cit ed in his injunction appeal and by construing his complaint as c ontaining seven claims rather t han five claims. But he again fails to explain how thes e points bear on the plausibilit y of any of his claims for relief. On the merits, Rudnick argues the deprivation of proper eyeglas ses violates the Eighth Amendment. He is correct that “the removal of [an inmat e’s] prescription eyeglasses” is constitutionally p roblematic. Mitchell v. Mayna rd, 80 F.3d 1433, 1443 (10th Cir. 1996). But Rudnick alle ged he was given state-issue d eyeglasses that matched a prior prescription, and he wa s given the oppo rtunity for an e ye exam and new stateissued eyeglasses within one y ear. These allegations do not su pport a plausible deliberate indifference claim, which require s that a prison official “know s of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Next, Rudnick contests the dismi ssal of his claim that CDOC gr ievance procedures violate h is procedural due process rights. As the m agistrate judge correctly pointed out, however, p risoners lack a liberty interest in grie vance procedures. See Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001); see also G eiger v. Jowers, 4045 F.3d 371, 374 (5th C ir. 2005) (per curiam). Accordingly, Rudni ck’s procedural due process claim fails. Finally, Rudnick challenges the dismissal of his access-to-cou rts claim. But a plausible access-to-courts claim requires a prisoner demonstrat e he “was frustrated or impeded in his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim con cerning his conviction or his conditions of confinement.” G ee, 627 F.3d at 1191. Rudnic k fails to carry this burden.
III
AFFIRMED . Because Rudnick fails to adva nce “a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised o n appeal,” DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991), we DENY his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and we direct him to make full and immediate payment of all outstanding appellate filing fees. 1

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge

1 To the extent Rudnick’s May 2, 2019 “Demand for Order” request s waiving the appellate filing fee due to the e xpenses of his multiple other court cases, the request is denied. See 28 U.S. C. § 1915(b)(1).