### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Jul y 9, 200 3 S es sio n

OVERNI TE TRANSPORT ATI ON COMPANY

v. TEA MST ERS LOC AL UN ION N O. 480, AF FILIA TED WITH THE INTE RN ATION AL BRO THERHOOD OF TEA MST ERS , C HAU FF EUR S, WAREHOU SEM EN AN D H ELP ERS OF AM ERIC A, AF L-C IO; AND 

### BILLYD. CU LLEN ; ED DIE M IMS; KEN NIE G EOR GE; IS OM (“BU TCH ”) F OLSOM , I NDIVI DUALLY AND I N THEI R CAP ACITY AS OF F ICERS AN D M AN AGIN G AGE NT S OF 

### T EA M STER S 

### L OCAL 

### U NIO N 

### 480; AND



### SEVERAL JOHN DOE S

An Appeal f

rom the Chancer y Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 99-3105 III Ellen H. L yle, Chancellor

No. M2002- 02116-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Fe bruary 27, 2004

This case arose out of a labor dispute. I n October

1999, the def

endant union beg an a labor strike at the plaintiff truc king c ompany ’s Nashville facility

. The c ompany filed a pe tition i n the lower court seekingto enjoin the union from eng ag ing in violenc e and intimi dation in c onnection with the strike. The c ompany

later a mended its complaint to include a c laim ag ainst the unio n for intentional interfe renc e with business relations. Betwe en Oc tober 1999 and January 2000, the trial cour

t entere d five injunctions ag ainst the u n i o n , eac h more re strictive than the one befor e, enjoiningthe union from enga g ing in the a lleg ed unlawf ul violence a

nd intimi dation. In Aug ust 2000, the trial court iss ue d a sh owc a us e ord er, citi ng12 8 a lle g e d v iol a tio ns of the inj un c tio ns , r e qu ir ingthe un ion to show ca use why it should not be held in civil contempt. I n Marc h 2002, the trial cour t determined that the company ’s petition for civil contempt wa s moot because , by that t i m e, t he conte mptuous conduct ha d cea sed. I

n Aug ust 2002, the trial court dismiss ed the company ’s claim for intentional interfe renc e with business relations for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff truc king c ompany now appea ls. W e re verse the dismiss al of the civil contempt petition, finding that the c ompany may seek damag es caused by conduct in violation of t he inj unctions, and affirm t he dis missal of the intentional interfe renc e cla im.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed in p art and Reverse d in part and Rem andedT he ap p eal was decided i n 20 0 2

. O n a p p eal
, the F o urt h C i rcui t C o urt o f A p p eal s d et erm i ned t hat
, al t ho ugh 1

O v e rn ite h a d vio la te d the N a tio n a l L a b o r R e la tio n s A c t (“N L R A ” ), a m a n d a to ry b a rg a inin g o rd e r w a s n o t an a p p ro p ria te

re m e d y b e c a u se o f t h e n u m b e r o f em p lo ye e s h ire d sinc e the e le c tio n

. Se e Ove r ni t e Tr an s p. Co. v . NLRB , 240 F. 3d 325 (4 th C ir. 2 0 0 1 ), rev’d , 28 0 F.3d 41 7 (4t h C i r. 20 0 2 ) ( en ba nc)

.
-2- H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., and D A V ID R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Kenne th A. Weber, Na shville, Tennessee ; a nd Christopher A. Johl ie and Me lissa Crawfor d Mazz eo, C h i c a g o , Il l i n o i s , f

o r t h e a p p e l l an t , O v e r

n i t e T r an s p o rt at i o n

C o mp an y.

J ames G. Stranc h, I I I , and Mar k A. May hew, N a s hv ille, T ennesse e, for the appe llee, Te amsters L ocal Union No. 480.

Ge or g e E. B arr e tt, Na sh vil le
, Te nn e sse e , fo r the ind ivi du a l a pp e lle e s, B ill y

D. Cul le n, Ed die Mim s, Ke nn ie Ge or g e , I so m ( “ B utc h” ) F ols om.

OP IN ION
Plaintiff/Appellant Over nite Transpor tation Company

(“O vernite” ) is a truc king c ompany based in Ri c h mo n d
, V ir g in ia

. O v e r n it e o p e r a te s a s e r

v ic e c e n te r in L a V e r g n e , T e n n e s s e e , near Nashville (“ the Nashvill e facility ”). D efe ndants/Appellee s, Teamster s L ocal Union No. 480 ( “the Union”), is a ffiliated with the I nternational Brothe rhood of Te amsters, Chauf fer s, Warehouseme n,
and He lpe rs of

Am e ri c a . T he fo ur

ind ivi du a ls, De fe nd ants /App e lle e s B ill y Cu lle n, Ed die Mim s, Ke nny Ge or g e , a nd I so m “B utc h” F ols om (c oll e c tiv e ly , “in div idu a l def e nd ants ” ), we re su e d in

the ir individual capac ities and as off icer s of the Union.

Th is c a se ari se s o ut o f t

he Un ion ’s le ng thy

c ampa ig n to re pr e sent Ov e rn ite e mpl oy e e s in

c oll e c tiv e ba

rg a ini ng . In 1 99 5, a

re pr e se ntatio n e le c tio n w a s c on du c te d at Over nit e ’s Na sh vil le fac ility for Ove rnite employ ees to vote on whether the Union would repr esent them in collec tive barg aining with Ov er n ite’s manag ement. The Union lost the election, and c onsequently filed an elec tion protest with the National L abor Rel at i o n s Boa rd (“NL RB”) . The NL RB set a side the elec tion and order ed Ove rnite to barg ain with the Union without conductinga new elec tion. Se eIn re Ov ernite Transp. C

o. , 1999 WL 33453666 (NL RB J uly 13, 1999), and In re Overnite Transp. Co. , 2001 WL 946528 (NL RB August 16, 2001). The NL RB’ s o rd er wa s appea led to the United State s Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls f

or the F ourt h Ci rc uit

.
Whil e the a

pp e a l of the NL RB or de r w a s p e nd ing
, Ov e rn ite and the Un ion

e ng a g e d in 1 collective ba

rg aini ng . After

numerous bar g aining sessions betwee n Over nite and the Union, the parties c ould n o t re s o l v e their diffe renc es. Consequently , on October 24, 1999, the international Teamsters org anization commenced a nationwide strike ag ainst Overnite. T he loca l chapter of the Un ion a t the Na sh vil le fa c ili ty a c tiv e ly pa rt ic ipate d in the str ike and se t up pic ke t li ne s th e re . Within ho ur s o f c omm e nc e me nt o f t he str ike , nume ro us inc ide nts inv olv ing vio le nc e , we a po ns , a nd thr e a tsT he af f i davi t s by O ver ni t e e mp l oy ees al l ege d t hat U ni on r epre s ent at i ves cu r s ed at t hem an d t hr eat ene d t hem 2

wi t h bodi l y ha r m, wi el di ng kn i ves and gu ns and wa r ni ng t hem n ot t o cr oss t he pi cke t l i ne. Anot her af f i davi t al l ege d t hat U n io n re p re se n ta tive s p u lled the ir c a r s i n fro n t o f O v e rn ite tru c k s a n d sla m m e d o n the ir b ra k e s, c a u sin g the O v e rn ite
emp l oy ees al s o t o s l am on t hei r b r ake s t o avoi d an a cci dent

. St i l l an ot her af f i davi t al l ege d t hat U ni on r epre s ent at i ves

m a y ha v e b e e n re sp o n sib le fo r p u tti n g a b u llet h o le in a n O v e rn ite e m p lo ye e ’s w ind sh ie ld

.

O verni t e al l eged t hat t he U ni o n e xceed ed the num b er o f p i cket s as set fort h i n t he t em p o rary i njunct i o n, and 3

t hat i t al so f

ai l ed t o repo rt t hei r p i cket l i ne l ead ers t o O verni t e securi t y guards as requir ed b y t he i njunct i o n. In add i t i o n, O v e rn ite a lleg e d tha t U n io n m e m b e rs c o n tinu e d to sh a tter w ind o w s o f p e rs o n a l ve h ic le s b e lo n g ing to O v e rn ite

em p l o yee s, t hro w o b je cts at t he em p l o yee s, an d st rike O ve rnit e truck s wit h sti ck s and p i ck ets.

A mo ng ot her t hi ng s , f

i r ecr ack er s wer e s et of

f dur i ng t he eve ni ng of

N ovemb er 4 and t he mo r ni ng of N ovemb er 4

5 , 1 9 9 9 , an d gu n sh o ts w e re fi re d a t t w o p o rta b le li g h ts tha t ha d b e e n p la c e d ju st insid e the e n tra n c e ga te to the fac ili ty. A l s o, an O ver ni t e di s pat che r r ece i ved a bom b t hr eat , r equi r i ng eva cua t i on of t he O ver ni t e Ser vi ce C ent er wh i l e pol i ce

se a rc h e d the p re m ise s.

-3- beg an to occ ur, with the appa rent objec tive of intimidating Ove rnite emplo y ees who crosse d the picket line in orde r to work.

On Octobe r 27, 1999, Ove rnite filed the i nstant lawsuit seeking injunctive relief ag ainst the Un ion , a s w e ll a s a c tua l and punit ive dama g e s. At

a he ari ng hel d on Oc tob e r 2 9, 19 99 , O ve rn ite submitt ed an a

mended c omplaint with a ttached a ffidavits alleg ing that Union members we re brandishingg uns and knives, blockingand dama g ing ve hicles as they wer e beingdriven in and out of the fa cility , and thre ateningto harm worke rs phy sically who attempted to cr oss the line. At the 2 conclusion of the he aring , the trial cour t issued a t empora

ry injunction order . I n that order , the trial court prohibited the Union and its supporters fr om making c ontact with Over nite employ ees or equipment; require d the Union to desig nate a responsible leader; and require d the Union to reduc e its mass of picketer s to a rea sonable number

. Despite the injunction, incidents of violenc e and intimidation esca lat ed. On Novembe r 4, 3 19 99 , O ve rn ite fi le d a

mot ion se e kin g to r e qu ir e the Un ion to sho w ca us e why it s ho uld no t be he ld in c on te mpt

of c ou rt fo r vio latin g the Oc tob e r 29 , 19 99 or de r, a nd a lso to mod if

y the inj un c tio n to place more restric tions on the Union. In support of its motion, Over nite submitt ed videotaped footag e of some of

the conduc t of which it complained. O n the same da y , the trial cour

t dissolved its original or der a

nd issued a sec ond, more restrictive temporary restra ining order. The trial c ourt not ed that it had “not he ard the Teamsters’ side,” but concluded that a re straining order was
nece ssary to preve nt irrepa

rable harm to per sons and prope rty . A hea ring was set f

or Nove mber 8, 1999, to determine whether an eve n more re strictive tempora ry injunction was war

rante d.

The sec ond inj unction appar ently did litt le to curb the misconduct. The ne x t day , on November

5, 1999, Over

nite filed an “eme rg ency” motion to require the Union to show ca use why it should not be held in conte mpt for violating the trial cou rt ’s Novembe r 4, 1999 orde r, and reque sting fur

ther modification of the temp o ra ry injunction. Overnite pre sented e vidence of gun shots, bomb threats, and more window-shatter ing activity

. On t he same day , the trial cour t entere d 4

an o r d e r s u

p p le me n ti n g it s p r e v io u s o r d e r

. T h e tr ia l c o urt f o un d th a t th e e v id e n c e s u bmitted byT he cl ai m f o r i nt ent i o nal i nt erf

erence wi t h busi ness rel a tio n s had be en al l eged agai nst t he U ni o n and t he 5

i n di v i du al de f

en dan t s i n a s epa r at e a ct i on f i l ed i n a D av i ds on C ou n t y C i r cu i t C ou r t i n N ov embe r 1999. I n J an u ar y 2000,
t he def endan t s i n t hat ca s e f

i l ed a mot i on t o di s mi s s b as ed on t he do ct r i ne of f ormer su i t p endi ng , ci t i ng t he cas e a t bar as the fi rst suit f

i l ed

. In li gh t o f

t ha t m o t i o n, O ve rnit e w as p erm i t t ed t o co m b i ne i t s circuit co urt acti o n w i t h thi s ca se

an d, t o t h at e n d, f

i l ed t h e Ja n u ar y 2000 mot i on t o a men d.

T he U ni o n cl ai m s t hat i t was unab l e t o o b t ai n a co p y o f t he b o nd f rom t he co urt cl erk’ s o f f i ce unt i l Feb ruary 6

2 0 0 0 , b e c a u se the fi le w a s n o t l o d g e d w ith the c le rk & m a ste r, b u t wa s w ith the c o u rt.

-4- Over nite established incidents of c riminal activity
, but did not link the criminal activity to the local Te amst e rs g ro up . T he tr ia l c ourt state d in its or de r t

hat a c ourt is “ no t th e e nti ty

de sig nate d to ha lt such esse nt i al l y

anony mous criminal activity ,” and that “[a]n i njunction is not t he wa y to stop crime.” Neve rtheless, the N ovemb e r 4 r estrainingorder

rema ined intact and f

urther r estrictions wer e place d on the Union. On Nove mber 8, 1999, a fter a hear ing, the trial court converted the November 5 and 6 tempora

ry restra ining or ders into a tempor ary injunction.

On Novembe r 24, 1999, Overnite fil ed another m otion to modify the tempora

ry injunction and to address further unlawful conduct since the entry of t he November 8 orde r. L ike the pre vious mot ion s, the No ve mbe r 2 4 mo tio n re qu e ste d that the Un ion be re qu ir e d to sh ow c a us e why it s ho uld

no t be he ld i n c on te mpt

of c ourt . O n Janu ary 14 , 2 00 0, the tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d O ve rn ite ’s mot ion

to modify the injunction and, for the fifth time
, ad d ed fu rt h er r estrictions. The tria l court denie d Over nite’s reque st f

or a show cause order with r espec t to criminal contempt char g es, finding that Over nite had fa iled to proffe r par ticularized fac ts linki ng the alleg ed mi s co n d u ct to the local Te amst e rs or g anizatio n. Th e tr ia l c ourt a lso de nie d O ve rn ite ’s re qu e st f or a sh owc a us e or de r w ith

re sp e c t t o c i v i l c o n t e mp t , s t a t i n g t h a t O v e r n i t e h a d f

a i l e d t o s p e c i f

y th e p art i c u l ar d ama g e s it

su ff e re d, a s w e ll a s the amou

nt o f s uc h d ama g e s, and

did no t sh owthat th e Un ion

wa s r e sp on sib le for the da mag es.

On J anuar

y 2 1 , 2000, Over

nite filed a motion to amend its complaint to add a c laim for intentional int erf

ere nce w ith business relationships, and also to add as de fenda nts the four individual members of

the Union named a

bove, Cullen, Mims, Georg e, and F olsom, alleg in g that they participated in the strike misconduct. On Fe bruary 4, 2000, the trial cour

t gr anted Ove rnite’s 5 motion to amend.

I n Fe bruar

y 2000, the Union lear

ned that the b o n d posted by Over nite for the initial inj un c tio n w a s unti me ly

and su bs tanti ve ly

de fe c tiv e un de r R

ule 65 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Procedur e. Consequently , on Fe bruar y 14, 2000, in the pl eading filed by the Union in opposition 6 to Overnite’ s petition for contempt, the Union raised the issue of the de fec tive bond. The Union alleg ed that the bond posted by Over nite was not a

n injunction bond, but w as actua lly a cost bond. I t argued that the failure to file a proper bond voided any injunction orders issued by the trial cour

t

and , th e re fo re , b arr e d a

ny c on te mpt pr oc e e din g s. On Ma

rc h 10, 20 00 , w ith out c on c e din g the me ri ts of the Union’s position, Over nite filed an amende d bond. On Marc h 14, 2000, the trial cour t entere d an orde r re

jectingthe Union’s ar g ument reg ardingthe def ective bond, noting that Rule 65.05(3) of the T e n n e s s e e Ru le s o f Ci v il Pr o c e d ur e p r o v id e s a me an s b y w h ic h a p arty c an c h a ll e n g e theT h e a n sw e r wa s tit le d “A n sw e r o f D e fen d a n ts,” w h ic h p re su m a b ly i n c lud e d the ind ivid u a l d e fen d a n ts a s w e ll 7

as t he U ni o n.

T h r e e of t h e a l l e g e d v i ol a t i on s w e r e n ot i n c l u de d be c a u s e t h os e a l l e g a t i on s di d n ot i n di c a t e t h a t t h e l ocal 8

T e a m ste rs o rg a n iz a tio n p a rtic ip a te d in tha t co n d u c t.

-5- su ff ic ie nc y of a bo nd . O n th is b a sis , th e tr ia l c ourt he ld t hat th e Unio n wa s f

or e c los e d at th a t late date f rom cha lleng ing the sufficie ncy of the bond.

On Marc h 27, 2000, the Union filed a n answe r to Over

nite’s complaint, asser

ting se vera l aff irmative def

enses. Among other thing s, the Union contende d that Over nit e’ s claim was 7
pree mpted by

fede ral law , and that the law ful publication of i t s gri evanc es ag ainst Overnite w as pr ote c ted sp eech un de r t he fe de ra l and

state c on sti tut ion s. Th e Un ion ma int a ine d th a t no va lid injunction had ever been enter ed ag ainst it, since Over nite failed to file a

valid injunction bond as require d under Rule 65 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure . In addition, the Union claimed that Tenne ssee doe s not recognize a claim for intentional inter fer ence with business relationships or, in the alter

native, that such a

claim would also be pr eempted by fede ral law

.
On J une 23, 200 0 , Ov ernite filed an ame ndment to its m otion for an or der to show c ause, attachingaff

idav i ts detailing 131 spe cific a lleg ations of contemptuous conduc t by the Union. On Augu s t 4, 2000, the trial cour t entere d an orde r findingthat Over nite had pre sented suff

icient evidenc e to re quire the U nion to show cause why it should not be held in criminal conte mpt for 128 of the a lle g e d v iol a tio ns

. 8

On Novembe r 21, 2000, t he trial c ourt enter ed an or der c oncluding that Over nite was e ntitled to s e e k c omp e ns a tor

y dama g e s r e su lti ngfr om t he Un ion ’s c on te mpt

uo us c on du c t, p ur su ant t o Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d § 29 -9 -1 05 . T his statut e pr ov ide s:

I f t h e co n t empt consists in the perfor mance of a f

orbidden a ct, the per son may be imprisoned until the act is rec tified by placingmatters and p er s on in status quo, or by the pa y me nt o f d ama g e s.

Te nn . Code Ann. § 29- 9- 10 5 (20 00 ). Th e tr ia l court re a so ne d th a t th e pla in l angua g e of the statut e pr ov ide s f

or dama g e s a s a

re me dy , a

nd that T e nn e sse e c a se law also su pp or te d O ve rn ite ’s c la im. Th e tr ia l c ourt

re ite rate d it s p re vio us re

je c tio n o f t

he Un ion ’s argume nt that Ov e rn ite ’s fa ilure to p os t

an adeq uat e bo nd

re nd e re d th e inj un c tio ns vo id. Th e tr ia l c ourt re c og nize d th a t, i n s ome jurisdictions, the failure to post a n ad eq u ate bond make s an injunction void ab ini tio ; in other jurisdictions the injunction i s merely voidable. The t ri al cour

t adopted the r easoningthat such an injunction is voi dable, not v o id, and is enfor cea ble eve n if the bond posted in support of it was inadequate. In addition, the trial court stated that it would consolidate the hea ring on the cr iminal contempt cha

rg e with the hea

ring on Over

nite’s petition to recove r dama g es. The Un i on filed an application for

an interlo cu t ory

appea l from the trial c ourt’s orde r, but the application was denied by this Court.The U ni on d id n ot r ea ss ert tha t the f

ai lure to po st an ad eq

ua te bo nd inv al id at ed

th e tr ia l c ourt ’s 9 inj unction

ord ers.

T h e trial c o u rt a lso d ism isse d O v e rn ite’s “d a m a g e to p e rs o n a l p ro p e rty” c la im
, findingthat there w as n o 10

suc h act ion in T enn ess ee l aw. I t opi ned , however, that such a cla im woul d not be pre empted by fede ra l la w.

-6- On J anuar

y 21, 2001, the District Attorney Gene ral for Davidson County submitt ed a notice to the trial court that it dec lined to prosec ute the cr iminal contempt char g es. On June 19, 2001, the trial court se t a trial date of April 1, 2002 for the c ivil contempt charg es. On January 18, 2002, the Union filed a motion to dismis s or, i n the alternative, for summary judgme nt. On the same da y , the individual defenda

nts also filed a motion to dismi ss or fo r summary judgme nt, adopting a

nd incorpora ting by ref ere nce the motion filed by the Union. In its motion, the Union claimed, among other thi ng s, that Over

nite was not entitled to rec over da mag es for civil contempt, beca

use it sought retrospe ctive punishment ins t ead of prospec tive reme dial action. The Union maintained that “compe n s at o ry

civil contempt” wa s not recognized in Tennessee and that, ther efor e, Ove rnite’s claims should be dismissed. 9

On Marc h 12, 2002, the trial court enter ed an order g rantingin part the Union’s motion for

summa ry jud g me nt. Th e tr ia l c ourt dis mis sed Ove rni te’ s p e tit ion fo r c ivi l c on te mpt

a s mo ot, beca use it was undisputed that the picke ting had not be en in pla ce for over a y ear prior to the trial court’s decision. The trial court re cog nized its previous Nove mber 2000 ruling“that compe nsatory damag es ar e re cover able in an a ction for c ivil contempt pu rs u an t t o section 29-9- 105.” The trial court noted, how ever , that “[t] he fa cts . . . in the ca se at ba r have chang ed.” T he trial c ourt rea soned that, “since the strike is no long er b eing conduc ted, ac tion taken by this Court on t he conte mpt petition would not be coer cive a nd reme dial (i.e. c ivil contempt) but in the nature of a punishment (i.e. c riminal contempt).” T here fore , the trial cour t concluded that the petition for civil contempt was moot.
On August 9, 2002, the trial court e ntere d an orde r dismissing Over nite’s cl ai m for intentional interfer ence with business relationships. Over nite had sti p u l at ed that it was not 10

asser ting a cause of ac tion for interfe renc e with prospec tive economic a dvantag e, but r ather that the Union had interf

ere d with Overnite’ s relationship with its employ ees a nd the sec urity

g uards it had hired to p r o te c t th e e mp lo y e e s f r o m v io le n c e

. T h e tr ia l c o urt c o n c lu d e d th a t O v e r n it e ’ s c a u s e of action was actua lly a claim of induce ment to brea ch a c ontrac t. Be cause Over nite made no a lleg ation that it had incurre d damag es re sulting fr om a bre ach of contra ct – a ne cessa

ry element in a c laim for inducement to bre ach – the trial court concluded that the a verme nt failed to state a

claim for r elief. The trial c ourt conc luded, in the al t er n ati ve, that, eve n if a prope r cla im for induceme nt to breac h had bee n asser

ted, s ummary judgme nt should be gra nted t o the Union, beca

use Overnite submitted no evidenc e of a

brea ch of c ontrac t. The trial cour t added that, to the ex t en t t h at Overnite soug ht

rec overy of ec onomic damag es re sulting fr om intentional interfe renc e with business relations, such a cla im would have bee n pree m p t ed b y fede ral law . The trial c ourt’s orde r dismissed all of Ov e rn ite ’s c la ims a s to a ll d e fe nd ants , s tatin g e xplic itl y that it wa s a fi na l or de r. Ov e rn ite fi le d th is tim e ly a pp e a l.T houg h t he U ni on ar gu ed i n t he t r i al cour t t hat t he pet i t i on f or ci vi l cont emp t was pree mp t ed by f eder al l aw, 11

it h a s n o t m a d e tha t ar g u m e n t o n a p p e a l.

-7- On a p p e a l, O v e r

n it e f ir s t ar g u e s th a t th e tr ia l c o urt e r r e d in d is mi s s in g it s claim for compensatory damag es resulting from the Union’s civil c ontempt. Over nite asser ts th at re co v ery for damag es ca

used b y t h e Union’s contemptuous conduc t is authorized under Tenne ssee Code Anno tate d § 29 -9 -1 05 , re g ard le ss of wh e the r the Un ion me mbe rs c on tin ue d to e ng a g e in c on du c t in

c on te mpt of the inj un c tiv e or de rs . O ve rn ite a lso argues that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in dis mis sin g its int e nti on a l in te rf

e re nc e c la im, c on te nd ingthat a br e a c h o f c on tr a c t is no t an el e me nt o f s uc h a c a us e of ac tion. Overnite c ontends furthe r that t h e t ri al court erre d in determining that its claim for intentional interfer ence would be pre empted by fede ral law

.

I n response , the Union argues that the trial c ourt corr ectly dismiss ed Ove rnite’s c laims. The Union as s erts, howe ver, that the trial court should have also dismissed Overnite’s pe tition for contempt because the defe ctive bond posted by Over nite rende red the injunctions void. The Union also maintains that the trial cour t was cor rec t in dism issing Ove rnite’s c laim fo r intentional interfe renc e with business relationships, because that claim is pree mpted by the federa l law, and 11 beca use the e vidence was insuffic ient to support such a claim. The individual defe ndants filed an

a p p e ll a te b r ie f

o n th e ir o w nb e h a lf

, ar g u in g th a t, b e c a

u s e th e s h o w c a

u s e o r d e r is s u e d b y th e trial court a pplied only

to the Union, the individual ap p el l ee s were never a par ty to the civil contempt pr oceed ing s. Se c on d, the ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants argue that, b e c a us e Ov e rn ite fa ile d to re sp on d to the ir mot ion to d ism iss or

fo r s ummary ju dgment, th e ir mot ion sh ou ld h ave be e n g ra

nte d o n th is basis.

The trial c ourt’s fa ctual finding s are revie wed de novo on the rec ord with a presumption of

corr ectne ss, unle ss the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is otherwise

. Reed v . Ham ilton , 39 S.W .3d 115, 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); T enn. R . Civ. P . 13(d). The trial court’ s conclusions of law a re revie wed de novo
, w it

hn o s u c hp resumption. R eed, 39 S.W .3d at 117. I ssues of statutory interpre tation and the application of a statute to par ticular facts i nvolve questi ons of l aw, which are subject to de novo revie w. Shelton v. ADS E n vi r o n m en tal Serv. , 100 S.W .3d 214, 216 (Tenn. 20 03 ); Ga nze v oo rt v

. Rus se ll , 949 S.W .2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997)

.
We f irst a ddress Over

nite’s claim for damag es under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 29-9- 105, which states that if the contemptuous conduct is the perf ormanc e of a forbidden act, “the person may be imprisoned until the act is re ctified . . . by the pay ment of damag es.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 9- 105 (2000). The trial court c oncluded in its November 21, 2000 order

that section 29-9- 105 authorizes the re cover

y of compe nsatory

damag es in a c ontem p t proce edingwhen the c ontempt involves the perf

ormanc e of a

forbidden a ct. Citing seve ral c ases, th e t ri al court reasone d that damag es under

the statute ar e compe nsatory in nature, se rving to compensate the ag g rieve d party for losses sustained as a r esult of wrong ful and c ontemptuous actions. L ate r, i n its March 12, 2002 order , the trial cour

t acknowle dg ed its previous ruling , but noted that “[t] he fa cts .

. . in the ca se at bar have chang ed.” Be cause the Union had no pickets in pla ce for over a y ear , and the c ontemptuous

c on du c t ha d th e re fo re c e a se d, the tr ia l cou rt de e me d th e pe tit ion

fo r c ivi l c on te mpt

to b e moo t.-8-

Thus, when the tr ial court’s or ders a re rea d toge ther, it c oncluded that compensatory damag es under section 29-9- 105 ar e available only when the c ontemptuous conduct is ong oing a nd the awa

rd of such dama g es would ser

ve to coe rce the contemnor into compliance with the c ourt’s orde r.
As noted by

the trial cour

t, a petition for civil contempt compels “ the doing of something by the contemnor, which, when done, will work his dischar g e.” Ship le t v . St ate , 400 S.W .2d 542, 543 (T e nn . 1 96 6) . A n e sse nti a l e le me nt o f c ivi l c on te mpt is the a bil ity of the c on te mno r to c omp ly wi th the order at the time of the contempt and be able to purg e himself of the contempt. Ahe rn v . Ahe rn , 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d 7 3 , 7 9 (T en n

. 2 0 0 0 ). T h e co n t em n o r h as th e “k ey s t o th e j ai l
, ” wh i ch m ea n s h e c an p u rge his contempt by

complying w ith the court’s orde r. Id. On the oth e r h a

nd , c ri mi nal con tem pt i s “punitive in char acte r, and the proce eding is to vindicate the a uthority of the lawand the c ourt as an org an of society .” Id. “[A] fine levied afte r the c ontemnor def ies a thre at imposed to deter f uture conduct” has t he attributes of a criminal sanc tion. Young v . Young , No. 01-A- 01-9609-CV-00415, 1997 WL 107159, at *1 n.1 (Te nn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1997).

The Union a

rgues that, in this c ase, any monetary awa rd could only

be punitive, not coer cive, since it is und i s p u t ed t hat, by the time of the he aring

on damag es, the c ontemptuous conduct had

cea sed. Ther efor e, as f

ound by th e t rial cour

t, an awa rd of c ivil contempt sanctions at that point

wo uld have be e n f

ru itl e ss, and

se c tio n 2 9- 9- 10 5 d oe s n ot a uth or ize c ri min a l sa

nc tio ns

.
Th e Un ion c on c e de s that the re may be sit uatio ns in wh ic h c on te mpt re me die s so un d in

bo th civil and cr iminal contempt. I t asserts, howe ver, that section 29-9-105 doe s not apply in case s involving labor

dispute injunctions, because contempt ar ising fr om a Union’s vi o l at i ons of an injunction is alway s “c riminal rather than civil in nature.” See Stru nk v. Lewis Coal C o. , 547 S.W. 2d 25 2, 25 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 76 ); Nashville Corp. v. Uni ted Steelworkers of Am erica , 215 S.W .2d 818, 820 (Tenn. 1948) (holding that the union’s violation of an inj unction “fa lls under the criminal class as distinguished from civ i l ”)

. I n Stru nk , the trial cour t issued an injunction prohibiting the union fr om eng ag ing in violenc e or mass picketing

. The union violated that orde r, and the c oal company

filed a petition for contempt. On appea l was the sing le issue of whe ther the trial court had applied the appropr iate st andar d of proof in determining g uilt. Stru nk , 547 S.W .2d

a t 25 3. I n d e c idi ngthe iss ue , th e tr ial co ur t de te rm ine d th a t th e c on te mpt a lle g e d w a s c ri min a l in nature , rathe r than c ivil, “reg ardle ss of the fa ct that t he original proc eedingwas brought in a court of equity .” Id. Th e Un ion c ite s th is a

uth or ity a s e sta bli sh ingthat the vio latio n of an in jun c tio n in

a la bo r d isp ute is always criminal in nature , and that civil re medies ar e ther efor e not ava ilable.

Howeve r, the c ases upon whic h the Union relies do not discuss the application of the se ction 29 -9-10 5, no r d o th e y

su pp or t th e Un ion ’s br oa d a sse rt ion tha t all c o n te mp t p e ti ti o n s in

la bor disputes must be deeme d criminal i n nature . Rather, c ases a ddressingthe applica bility of sec tion 29- 9-105 indicate that, when a party violates an order forbidding the per formanc e of a cer tain act, the statute authorizes the person injured by contemptuous conduct to file a petition for civil contempt and to re quest that the par ty in contempt be imprisoned “until the act is rec tified . . . by the pay ment of damages .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-9-105 (2000) (empha sis a dded). The trial c ourt rec og nized the eff ect of this provision i n its November 2000 or d er , ci t i ng sever al ca ses in which cour ts haveT he t r i al cour t ci t ed t he R eed d ec i si o n in sup p o rt o f i t s N o ve m b er 2 0 0 0 d ec i si o n, b ut d i d n o t give the c ase 12

a u tho rita tive w e igh t b e c a u se the c a se w a s u n p u b lishe d a t t h a t t im e

.

T ha t st atute p ro vid es: 13

(a) T he p uni shment f

o r cont em p t m ay b e b y f i ne o r by i m p ri sonm ent , or b o t h.

(b ) W h e re no t o the rw ise sp e c ia lly p ro v id e d , t h e c irc u it, c h a n c e ry, a n d a p p e llate c o u rts a re li m ited to a f i ne of f i f t y dol l ar s ($50

. 00 )
, and i mp r i s onment not excee di ng t en ( 10 ) d ay s , and, except as provi ded i n § 2 9

- 9

- 1 0 8 , al l other co urt s are l i m i t ed t o a f i ne o f t en d o l l ars ($1 0

. 0 0 ).

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 2 9

- 9

- 1 0 3 (20 0 0 ).

-9- assessed c ompensatory

damag es in a c ivil contempt procee ding f or injury arisingout of the contemnor’ s disobedience

.

For example, in Reed v

. Ham ilton , 39 S.W .3d 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), the plaintiffs filed

a de c larator

y jud g me nt a c tio n, re qu e sti nga de c laratio n that an ea se me nt exis te d ove r t he de fe nd ants ’

rea l property

for the be nefit of the pla intiffs, i n order to affor d the plaintiffs ac cess to their own proper ty

. Soon after t h e l aw s u i t was filed, the trial court issued a temporar y restra ining or der 12 enjoining the defe ndants “fr om interfer ing, obstructing, or preve nting” the plaintiffs fr om using the claimed e aseme nt. Reed, 39 S.W .3d at 116. L ater , the plaintiffs filed se para t e p et i tions for contem p t , all eg ing that the defe ndants had violated the restra ining or der by deprivingthem of the use of the ease ment and acce ss to their properties. The tria l court held a hear ing a nd deter mined that the defendants had, in fac t, willfully violated i ts previous orde r. Id. at 117. Subsequently , the trial court e ntere d an orde r findingthat the defe ndants wer e in c ivil conte mpt of court, but conc luding that the plaintiffs had not sust ained any actua l damag es as a result of t he def endants’ a ctions. Howeve r, the trial cour

t awar ded the plaintiffs attorney ’s fee s as “sanc tions a nd damag es” unde r sec tion 29-9- 105. Id.

On appe al, the Reed defe ndants challeng ed the trial court’s authority to assess “sa nctions and damag es” a g ainst th em i n t h e ci v il procee dings, pa rticularly in light of the c ourt’s findingthat no actua l damag es had been suffer ed. The defe ndants argued that, under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 29-9-103, the trial court was not authorized to impose a fine for civil contempt over $50. The 13 appellate court disag ree d, concluding that the damag es aw arde d wer e re cover able unde r sec tion 29- 9-105:

As a d ir e c t r e s u lt

o f th e [d e f e n d an ts ’ ] a c ti o n s , [th e p la inti f f s ] w e r e f o r c e d to in c ur at t o rn ey ’ s fe es as s o ci at edwi t ht h e f i l i n g o f p et i t i o n s fo r c o n t em p tan d h ea ri n gs subsequently held there on. As noted by this Court i n [ Keeley

v. Massey , No. 02A01- 9307-CH-00159, 1994 WL 59556 (Tenn. Ct. App. Fe b. 28, 1994)], damag es under section 29-9- 105 are compensatory in nature

. The trial court’s aw ard of attorney ’s fee s serve d to compensate [ the pl aintiffs] for the loss they sustained as a

result of the

wr on g fu l and

c on te mpt uo us a c tio ns of the [de fe nd ants ]. Un de r su c h c ir c ums tanc e s,T he Robbi ns Cour t di s cu s s ed s ec t i on 4107, w h i ch w as e s s en t i al l y i den t i ca l t o T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed § 14

29- 9- 105.

-10- we thi n k th a t t h e c o u rt p r o p e r ly

c o n c lu d e d

th a t t h e a tt o r n e y ’ s f e e s in c ur r e d b y [the plaintiffs] are among the ty pes of damag es t hat are compe nsable unde r sec tion 29-9- 105.

Id. a t 12 0. Thus , the c ourt he ld t hat da ma g e s und e r s e c tio n 2 9- 9- 10 5 a re ava ila ble to c omp e ns a te an injured pa

rty for injuries c aused by

contemptuous conduc t.

I n rea chingthis conclusion, the Reed c o urt r e li e d o n tw o case s, Keeley v. Massey , No. 02A01-9307-CH- 00159, 1994 WL59556 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 2 8 , 1 9 94), and Kuykendall v. Latham , 1991 WL 10178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Fe b. 4, 1991). In Keeley , the appellate court upheld an

awa rd of attorney ’s fee s as damag es arising out of the conte mnor’s disobedienc e. The Keeley court opined that “the chanc ellor was vested with the power to assess damag es under T.C.A. § 29-9-105. Damag es are to be compensatory in na ture, and the appropr iate measure fo r c i v i l co ntempt compensat o ry d am age s i s actua l loss.” Keeley , 1994 WL59556, at *5. The c ourt adde d that the damag e aw ard c ould include attorne y ’s fe es. Id. In Kuyke nda ll , t h e trial c ourt enjoined the defe ndants from ope ratinga business that was a lleg edly in violation of a cove nant not to compete. The de fenda

nts violated the injunction, and the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt. The trial court de te rm ine d th a t th e de fe nd ants we re in c on te mpt of c ourt , a nd awa rd e d th e pla int if

f $ 35 0 in attorney ’s fe es and $1,750 in damag es as a result of t h e v i o lation. The appe llate cour t upheld the tr ia l c ourt ’s dama g e awa rd , s tatin g that “ [t]he c ourt ha d th e a

uth or ity to a wa rd dam a g e s in

thi s contempt proc eedingby

virtue of T.C.A. § 29- 9-105 . . . .” Kuyke nda ll , 1991 WL 10178, at *2. The Kuy ke nda ll co urt observe d that there could be no damag e aw ard unle ss actual damag es had be en proven. Id.

Other c ases ha

ve also re cog nized that compensato ry d amag es under section 29-9- 105 are available when the contempt i nvolves the per formanc e of a forbidden a ct. See Bryan v. Le ach , 85 S. W

. 3 d 136, 161, n. 27 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) ( rec og nizi ng that “Te nnessee appea rs to have incorpora ted the conc ept of damag es ar ising fr om contempt in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 9-105 . . . .”) ; Brummett v

. M c Cour y , No. 03A01-9512, 1996 WL 285405, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that dama g e s ari sin g out of c on te mpt is a uto ri zed by the statut e ). In d isc us sin g the pr e de c e sso r t o
s e c ti o n 2 9

- 9

- 1 0 5 , th e T e n n e s s e e Su p r e me Co urt e xplained in Robbin s v. Frazier , 52 Tenn. (5 14 Heisk) 100 ( 1871), that the damag es asse ssed combine punishm ent, vi ndicating the authority of the

c ourt , w ithc omp e ns a tio n in fa vo r o f t he pa rt y inj ured by the p e rf

or manc e of a fo rb idd e n a c t. Rob bin s , 5 2 T e nn . ( 5 H e isk ) at 10 4; s ee H ea d r i ck v. Carter , 897 S.W .2d 256, 261 (Tenn. 1995) (c i t i n g Rob bin s with approva l). The mea sure of damag es in such a ca se is the ac tual damag es sustained by

the injured pa

rty

. Rob bin s , 52 Tenn. (5 H eisk) at 104.

The Union a

rgues, and the trial court appar ently found, that damag es under section 29-9- 105

are not available if

the contemptuous conduc t has ce ased. A nd y et, eve n if t h e contemptuous“R e c tif y” m e a n s “to se t righ t” o r to re m e d y. W EBSTE R ’ S N E W C O L L EGI ATE D I CT I ON ARY 95 9 (19 8 1 ). 15

-11- conduct ha s cea sed, the doingof the for bidden ac t has not been “ rec tified,” i.e. ma de ri g ht, un til 15 damag es have been paid to make whole the party ag ainst whom the forbidde n act wa s committed. Unlike a sa

nction imposed solely

to vindicate the a

uthority of the c ourt, a m o n et ar y aw ard is not

a uth or ize d unle ss a c tua l da ma g e s h ave be e n s us ta ine d, a t le a st t o th e ex te nt t hat th e pa rt y a g a ins t wh om t he c on te mpt

wa s c omm itt e d w a s c omp e lle d to take le g a l a c tio n, and incur a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, in or d er t o secur e complianc e with the injunction. Reed, 39 S.W .3d at 120. Under the Union’s

rea sonin g, a p ar ty

that cause d damag es by

its contemptuous conduct could extinguish the injured pa rt y ’s c la im f

or dama g e s me re ly

by c e a sin g the c on temp tu ou s c on du c t, whic h, of c ours e , s ho uld have be e n d on e to b e g in w ith . T his re a so nin g is s imp ly wr on g . T hu s, un de r t

he se c ir c ums tanc e s,
we mus t c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in dis mis sin g a s mo ot O ve rn ite ’s pe tit ion fo r c ivi l

c on te mpt dama g e s.

This conclusion does not end our inquiry

. The Union argues that, eve n if Over nite’s petition fo r c ivi l c on te mpt

is n ot m oo t, t

his Court sh ou ld dis mis s the pe tit ion
, be c a us e Ov e rn ite ’s fa ilure to post an ade quate bond pur suant to Rule 65.05( 1) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedur e re ndere d the inj un c tio ns vo id. Rul e 65 .0 5( 1) pr ov ide s:
(1) Ex cept in such actions as may be brought on pauper ’s oath, no re straining order or tempora

ry injunction shall be g ranted ex cept upon the givingof a bond by the applicant, with sure ty

in such sum as the cour t t o wh o m t he applica tion is m ade deems prope r, for

the pay ment of such c osts and damag es as may be incur red or suffe red by

any person who is found to have be en wr ong fully restra ined or e njoined.

. . .

Te nn . R. Civ . P. 65 .0 5( 1)

. Thus , Rul e 65 .0 5( 1) re qu ir e s that the bo nd be ma de to p ro te c t th e pa rt y
e njo ine d f

ro m “ su c h c os ts a

nd dama g e s a s ma

y be inc ur re d o r s uf fe re d. ” Th e Un ion

argue s th a t, beca use neither

the orig inal nor the am en d ed b o n d i n u red to its benef it to compensate it for a wrong ful injunction, then the bond was de ficient a nd the injunctions, theref

ore, w ere void ab ini tio

.

I n addition, the Union argues that the injunctions issued by the trial cou rt co n t ained mandatory

“self- executing” lang uag e, providingthat injunctive relief was e x pressly

conditioned on Over nite posting a

proper bond. The Oc tober 29, 1999 orde r provided:

9. The plaintiff shall post a fiftee n thousand dollar ($15,000.00) bond on or befor e 12:00 p.m. November 1, 1999, to maintain the injunction.

10 . Pr ov idi ngthe pla int if f p os ts the bo nd in the tim e a llo c a te d by the Court , the inj un c tio n s ha ll r e ma in i n e ff e c t until fu

rt he r o rd e r o f t

he Court

.-12-

There fore , the trial cour

t’s order provided that Over

nite “shall” post a bond “to maintain the inj un c tio n, ” and that th e inj un c tio n w ou ld r e ma in “ [p]r ov idi ngthe pla int if f p os ts the bo nd

in t he tim e allocate d by

the Court.”

Th e fa c ts sur

ro un din g thi s is su e are un dis pute d in the re c or d. At

a pp ro ximate ly

12 :11 p. m.
on No ve mbe r 1 , 1 99 9, e le ve n mi nute s p a st the de a dli ne , O ve rn ite fax ed a cop y of the bo nd it intended to file to the c lerk of the trial court. On N ovember 2, 1999, at 11:02 a.m., one da y afte r the deadline, a

bond was posted by Over nite. Although it wa s titl ed “injunction bond,” the bond posted was only a cost bond; i t did not rec ite that it was security for damag es to the Union. The tr ial court presumed the bond to ha

ve been sufficie nt, stating in subse quent order s that “[t] he bond which ha s be e n p os te d b y

the pla int if

f i n s up po rt

of the Oc tob e r 2 9, 19 99 te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n is the se c ur ity for the issuanc e of this re straining order [or temporary

injunction] .”

Th e Un ion

did no t obje c t to the bo nd un til F e br ua ry 20 00 , ove r thr e e months a ft e r t he fi rs t injunction was issued. I n its response to Overnite’ s J anuar y 2000 motion for contempt, the Union argued for

the first time that the injunctions we re void be cause of the untimeliness and insufficie ncy of the bond posted by

Over nite. On Marc h 10, 2000, Over nite filed a r eplac ement b o n d , without

conce ding th e merits of the Union’s position. The Union c laimed that the re place ment bond was defe ctive as w ell, b ec au s e it inured to the be nefit of the c ourt cler k, not to the Union for dama g es sustained from a

wrong fully

issued injunction.

As we ha ve noted, Rule 65.05(1) requires that a bond be post ed in order to issue a re straining order or tem p o ra ry i n

j u n ction. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.05(1). Rule 65.05(3) provide s a re medy for a pa rt y wh o a sse rt s th a t a

sure ty is i ns uf fi c ie nt o r t

he amou nt o f t he bo nd is i ns uf fi c ie nt:
A part y re str a ine d or en

joi ne d may mov e the cou rt for a dd iti on a l sec ur ity ; and if it

a pp e ars on

su c h mo tio n th e sure ty

is i ns uf fi c ie nt o r t

he amount of the bo nd

is ins uf fi c ie nt, the c ourt

may va c a te the re str a ini ngor de r o r t e mpo ra ry inj un c tio n unle ss within a rea sonable time suffic ient secur ity is give n.

Te nn . R. Civ . P. 65 .0 5( 3) . T he tr ia l c ourt re a so ne d tha t the Rul e , pr ov idi ng the e njo ine d p art y wi th

a re me dy fo r ch a lle ng ing the su ff ic ie nc y of a bo nd

tog e the r w ith

a uth or izin g the tr ia l c ourt

to v a c a te the injunction if sufficient se curity is not given, impl ies that an ins ufficie nt bond does not void the issuance of

an injunction but rather

makes the injunction voidable. The trial court obse rved that jurisdictions are split as t o wh et h er the failure to post the require d injunction bond makes the i n j u n cti on issued void ab ini tio , o r v o id a b le un ti l th e in

ju n c ti o n is v a c a te d

. N o v e mb e r 21, 2000 Orde r (quoting 42 Am. J u r. 2d, Injunctions § 291 (2000)) . Given the f act that Rule 65.05(3) provides a r emedy

for inade quate se curity , the trial cour t held that Tenne ssee would a dhere to the view that an injunction base d on inadequate sec urity is v o i d ab l e, n o t void. Under that view , the injunction is voidable “until e ither an undertaking is pr ovided or the injunction is vacated, and the enjoined party ’s sole reme dy is to seek to c ompel the procur ing party to f ile the under

taking .” Id.-13-

The trial c ourt also re lied upon the rea soning in a fede ral case that decide d a similar issue. I n Popular B ank of Flori da v. Ban co Popular de Puerto Ri co , 180 F.R.D. 461 (S.D. F la. 1998), the def endants re ceive d the trial cour t’s preli m i n ary

injunction order, but soon there afte r eng ag ed in the pr oh ibi te d c on du c t. Th e de fe nd ants a sse rt e d that the y we re no t bo un d b y the inj un c tio n unti l the tr ia l c ourt

ru le d o n th e po sti ngof

se c ur ity un de r R ul e 65 (c) o f t

he F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Procedur e, which is essentially identical to the Tennessee Rule 65.05(1). The tria l court disag ree d. The court deter

mined that the failure to inc lude the bond require ment with its preliminary injunction order did not render

the pre liminary injunction order invalid or w ithout effec t. Po pul ar Bank , 180 F.R.D. at 465. Noting that the defe ndants had other means of r aisingthe issue of the suf ficienc y of the bond, the trial c ourt held that, “if the defe ndants believe that the pre limi n ar y i n j u nction was proce durally

defe ctive for

failure to post bond, before violating the pr eli m i n ar y i n junction the defe ndants should have f

iled a timely

motion to require the plaintiff to post bond.” Id. at 466.

The trial c ourt below in this case also looked t o other Te nnessee case s indicating that Tenne ssee would f

ollow those jurisdictions holdi ng that an injunction is voidable, not void ab ini tio , if it is based on inadequate sec urity

. See Nashville Corp. , 215 S.W .3d at 820 (holdingt h at t he pic ke te rs , w ho a lle g e d th a t th e inj un c tio n v iol ate d th e ir c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts, we re no t f re e to sp e c ulate on le g a lity of the inj un c tio n; rathe r, the inj un c tio n must be ob e y e d w hil e it c on tin ue d in fo rc e ); P y o tt L a nd & M in in g Co

. v . T arwater , 150 S.W . 539, 540 (Tenn. 1912) (holding that damag es ca

nnot exceed amount of bond, a nd that the defe ndants ca

n protec t themselves by

applying to the tr ia l c ourt

to i nc re a se the amou

nt o f t he bo nd ). I n a dd iti on , O ve rn ite c ite s Ta y lor v . M orris , No

. 01 A0 1- 98 04 -C H- 00 21 1, 19 99 WL 67 51 38 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. Se pt. 1, 19 99 ), in which a par ty

a lle g e d th a t he wa s w ro ng fu lly e njo ine d a

nd so ug ht t o r e c ov e r o n th e inj un c tion bo nd . D ue to oversig ht, however
, the t rial court had not require d the par ty that obtained the injunction to post an injunction bond be fore the subject restra ining order was issued. The appellate court noted the lack

o f ab o n d
, b u tal l o we d

t h e c l ai m t o p ro ce ed o n a m al i ci o u s p ro s ec u t i o nth eo ry

. C i t i n g Py ott La nd & Mi ning , t h e a

p p e l l a t e c o urts t a t e d

t h a t“ i t w a s i n c u mb e n tu p o n[ th e w r o n g f

u l l y e n j o i n e d p arty] to bring this overs i gh t to the attention of the trial c ourt in a timely manner .” Taylor , 1 9 9 9 WL 675138, at *11 n.5.

We ag ree with the trial court’ s conclusion on this issue, as well as its re asoning . When the bo nd po ste d is fo un d to be ins uf fi c ie nt, Rul e 65 .0 5( 3) pr ov ide s a re me dy , a llo wi ngthe e njo ine d p art y to “ mov e the c ourt

fo r a dd iti on a l se c ur ity .” Th e Rul e pr ov ide s fu rt he r that if the bo nd is f ound to be insuffic ient, “the court may vacate t he restraining order or tempora

ry injunction unless within a

rea sonable time suf

ficient secur ity is g iven.” This la ng uag e indicates that the injunction is vac ated by thec ou rt , a

nd tha t th is d oe s n ot h a

pp e n au tom a tic a lly

in t he a bs e nc e of a c tio n b y the c ourt . T his is consistent with established law that a party must obey an inj unction while i t is in forc e and ma y not ig nore the order based on the par ty ’s opinion that it is unenfor cea ble. See Nuclear Fuel Servs., Inc. v. Local No. 3-677, Oil, Chem . & Atom ic Workers Int’l Union , 719 S.W .2d 550, 552 (Tenn. Ct. Crim

. Ap p

. 1 9 8 6 ) (“These c ontemnors ca nnot disreg ard w ith impuni ty an orde r fr om a cour

t wh ic h h a d ju

ri sd ic tio n o f t

he su bject matte r. ” ); Stream v. Stream , No. 01-A- 019201-CV-00011, 1992 WL 18477 1 , at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Aug . 5, 1992) (“ Howeve r er roneous, the or der must be obey ed until it is set aside.” ).Ar g u abl y , t h e l an g u ag e i n t h e t r i al cou r t ’ s O ct ober 29, 1999 or der i s n ot s el f

- ex ec u t i n g , i n t h at i t doe s n ot 16

p ro v id e sp e c ifi c a lly tha t t h e inj u n c tio n is vo id if a su ff ic ie n t b o n d is no t p o ste d b y the re q u ire d d a te

.
-14- The Union a lso argues that the injunction was invalid ab ini tio beca use the orde r included “self- ex ec u t i n g” languag e re quiring a bond to be posted by noon on November

1, 1999, and conditioned the ef

fec tiveness of the or der on the posting of suc h bond, and bec ause O vernite f ailed to strictly comply with these terms. On the un d i s p u t ed facts, the trial c ourt appa rently did not 16 disreg ard the specific provisions of its October 29, 1999 or der; rather, it found that these pr ovisions

wer e substantially

fulfilled. We find no err or in the trial cour t’s conclusion, particula

rly in light of the fa ct that the Union made no objection at the time to the trial c ourt’s ac cepta nce of the late bond. There fore , we a ffirm the tria l court’s holdingthat the injunct i o n s we re not void because the bond po ste d b y Ov e rn ite wa s d e fe c tiv e or ins uf fi c ie nt.

Under these c ircumstance s, the dismiss al of Over nite’s petition for civil contempt must be

reve rsed, and the cause remanded for furthe r proc eeding s. The individual defe ndants emphasize that the tr ia l c ourt ’s sh ow c a

us e or de r wa s d ir e c te d to the Un ion , a nd no t to the ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants , and that the indivi dual defendants are not named parties t o the contempt proce eding s. The trial c ourt did not address this issue, and may addre ss any

issues reg arding t h e i n d i v idual defe ndants on

rema nd.

We next a d dr e s s O v e r

n it e ’ s a s s e rti o no na

p p e a l t h a t t h e tr ia l c o urt e r

r e d in d is missing Over nite’s claim for

intentional interfer ence with business relations. In its August 9, 2002 order, the tr ial court c oncluded that Ove rnite’s c laim was leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient. In rea chingthat conclusi o n , the trial cour t noted that Over

nite stipulated that it was not assertinga cla im for interfe renc e with prospec tive economic a dvantag e. Rather, Over nite maintained that the Union had int e rf e re d in the re latio ns hip be tw e e n O ve rn ite and its e mpl oy e e s a

nd th e se c ur ity

g ua rd s h ir e d to protec t employ ees a

nd others fr om the strike-re lated violence and intimid at i o n

. The trial c ourt conclude d that, beca

use there was no c laim of interfe renc e with prospec tive economic a dvantag e, Over nite’s claim wa s in reality a cla im of inducement to brea ch. A necessar y element of

a cla im of ind uc e me nt t o b re a c h is that da ma g e s mu st a

ri se fr om a

br e a c h of c on tr a c t. B e c a

us e the ave rm e nts in the complaint did not alleg e that dama g es were suffere d from the induce ment of a br eac h, the trial court dismissed Over

nite’s claim on the f

ace o f t h e complaint. I n the alter native, the tria l court g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt a g a ins t O ve rn ite on its c la im o f i nterfer e nc e wi th b us ine ss r e latio ns , beca use Ove rnite prof

fer ed no evide nce that contract s b etween Over nite and its employ ees a

nd

secur ity g uards we re br eac hed or te rminated be cause of the a lleg ed wr ong ful conduct of the Union. There fore , Over

nite’s claim for

inte n t i o n al i nterfe renc e wa s dismis sed base d on the fa ce of the complaint and on summary judgme nt as well.

On ap p ea l
, Ov ern i t e as s er t s t h at th e tr i al co urt erre d i n h o l d i n g th at i t wa s re qu i re d t o al l ege and prove the exist ence of a br eac hed contr act in orde r to rec over f or i ntentional interfe renc e, be c a us e the e xistence of a contr a c t is no t an e le me nt o f s uc h a c la im. Ov e rn ite ma int a ins that it s
ame nd e d c omp la int

c on ta ine d a ll o f t

he re qu ir e d ele me nts of a c la im f or int e nti on a l in te rf

e re nc e wi th business relationships.S u c h re p re se n ta tio n s w e re a lso m a d e a t t h e a p p e llate o ra l ar g u m e n t. 17

-15- I n r e vie wi ngthe su ff

ic ie nc y of Ov e rn ite ’s c omp la int

un de r T e nn e ssee Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e dure 12 .0 2( 6) , th e c omp la int mus t be vie we d in

a lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to O ve rnit e, and a ll

re a so na ble inf e re nc e s mu st b e dr awn

in i ts f avo r. A c omp la int

c ann ot b e dismi ss ed f

or fa ilure to state a c laim unless there is no set of f acts to support the c laim. Trau- Me d o f A m., Inc

. v . Al lst ate Ins. C o. , 71 S.W .3d 691, 696 (Tenn. 2002)

.

I n J anuar y 2000, Over

nite amende d its orig inal complaint to inc lude a c laim for intentional interfe renc e with business relat i o nships. That claim was ba sed on the same fac ts as Over nite’s reque st for injunctive re lief. T he per tinent alleg ations in the amende d complaint reg arding int e nti on a l in te rf

e re nc e are a s f

oll ow s:

43. Over nite has valid business re lationships with i ts customers , v e n d o r s , and its e mpl oy e e s.

44. Pr i or to Octobe r 24, 1999, De fenda nts had knowledg e of O vernite’ s bu sin e ss r e latio ns hip s w ithits c us tom e rs , v e nd or s, and e mpl oy e e s.

4 5

. D e f e n d a nts’ misconduct was tortious and inter fer ed with the employ ment relati o n s h i p betwee n Over nite and its employ ees by adver sely

impacting the safe

wo rk e nv ir on me nt t

hat O ve rn ite ma int a ins fo r i ts e mpl oy e e s.

46 . A s a dir e c t r e su lt o f t

his tor tio us c on du c t, Defend ants int e rf e re d w ith Over nite’s leg itimate business relationships with its empl o y ee s , customers a nd vendors a nd cause d brea ches in these relationships. . . .

47. Def endants ’ t o rt i o u s m i s co n d u ct p ro x i m at el y

cau s edOv ern i t e si gnificant damag es including , but not limit ed to, inc rea sed employ ee pa y roll expense resulting from De fenda

nts’ delay ing of Over

nite employ ees in the pe rfor mance of his or her

ass i gn ed duties, increa sed ser vice c ost by

delay ing f reig ht to customers, incre ased costs for se curi t y

g uards a nd related equipment, costs assoc iated with re imbursing

e mpl oy e e s f

or dama g e to t

he ir pe rs on a l ve hic le s, and

los s o f g oo dwi ll wi th its

c us tom e rs

. Though t h e complaint includes alleg ations of intentional interfe renc e with re spect to Ove rnite’s

re latio ns hip wi th i ts c us tom e rs , O ve rn ite re pr e se nte d to the tr ia l c ourt that it int e nd e d to purs ue its claims only

with respe ct t o Over

nite’s relationships wit h its employ ees a nd secur ity

g uards, a nd that it did not s eek r ecove ry

for loss of prospe ctive ec onomic advanta g e. 17O v e rn ite’s a lleg a tio n th a t th e s trike -re la te d m isc o n d u c t “in te rfe re d ” w ith O v e rn ite’s b u sin e ss r e la tio n sh ip 18

wi t h t h e s ec u r i t y gu ar ds does not m ak e s en s e. T h e s ec u r i t y g u ar ds w er e h i r ed bec aus e of the strik e -re la te d m isc o n d u c t; t he gua rd s’ j o b d u t i es were t o pro t ect em p l o y ees and o t hers f rom t he vi o l ent and i nt i m i d at i ng be havi o r. T hus, t he

m i sco nd uc t wo uld no t “i nterfere” wit h these d uti es.

T h e U n io n a rg u e s tha t Tr au-M ed sh o u ld no t b e a p p lied re tro a c tive ly i n this c a se , an d tha t O v e rn ite’s c la im 19

m ust be d i sm i ssed b ec au se T en ne ssee d i d no t rec o gn i ze a c au se o f a c tio n for intenti o na l i nterferen ce wit h b usiness

r el at i ons hi ps pre- Tr au-M ed

. B ec au s e of ou r c on cl u s i on h er ei n , t h i s a r g u men t n ee d n ot be a ddr es s ed.

-16- I n Tr a u -M

ed of Am ., Inc. v. Allstat e Ins. Co. , 7 1 S. W.3 d 6 91 (T e nn . 2 00 2) , th e Sup re me Court of Tenne ssee state d that a plaintiff se ekingto rec over on a claim for intentional inter fer ence wi t hb u s i n es s re l at i o n s h i p s m u s ts h o w t h e f o l l o wi n g:
(1) a n exis ting business re lationship with sp ec ific third par ties or a pr ospective

re latio ns hip wi th a

n id e nti fi a

ble c la ss o f t

hir d p e rs on s;
(2) the defe ndant’s knowledg e of that relationship and not a mer e aw are ness of the pla int if f’ s b us ine ss d e a lin g s w ithoth e rs in g e ne ra l;

(3 ) t he de fend ant ’s int e nt t o c a us e the br e a c h o r t e rm inatio n o f t he bu sin e ss
re latio ns hip ;
(4) the de fenda

nt’s improper motive or imprope r mea ns, . . . and finally
, (5) da mag es re sulting fr om the tortious interfer ence

.
Trau-Med , 71 S.W .3d at 701 (footnotes omitted). Thus, a claim for intentional interfe renc e re quires an alleg ation of dama g es fr om tortious int erf ere nce, not nece ssarily damag es resulting from a bre ach of c on tr a c t.

Neve rtheless, in light of Trau-Med, it is apparent that Ove rnig ht’s complaint falls short of stating a claim for relief in many respe cts. Under Trau-Med, a n inte nti on a l in te rf

e re nc e c la im mus t alleg e interf

ere nce w ith “an existi ng business relationship with specific third parties.” There are no specific third parties named in the complaint, only g ener al categ ories of pe rs o n s , such as “employ ees.”

I n addition, O vernite’ s complaint does not asser t that the Union intended to ca use a br eac h in O vernite’ s relationships with its e mploy ees and secur ity g uards. The complaint st at ed that 18 “De fenda nts’ misconduct was intentional and interfe red with the employ ment relationship between Ov e rn ite and

its e mpl oy e e s b y adv ers e ly imp a c tin g the sa fe wo rk e nv ir on me nt t

hat O ve rn ite maintains for its employ ee s .” Ove rnite ar g ues that this is sufficient to show that the Union intentionally

cause d a bre ach of

a “busine ss relationship.” In our view, how ever , the alleg ation that the Union’s conduc t “was intentional” does not s at i s fy the re quirement of a lleg ing that the Union intended to cause a bre ach in the busine ss relationship at issue. Rather, O vernite must alleg e that the Union intentionally

cause d a breac h in Over

nite’s relationships. This the complaint fails to do. 19-17-

F or the se re a so ns , we c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr in d ism iss ingOv e rn ite ’s c la im for intentional interf

ere nce w ith business relationships, pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tenne ssee Rul e s of Civ il Pr oc e dure , fo r fa ilure to state a c la im. Th is h old ingpr e te rm its oth e r i ssu e s r a ise d in thi s a pp e a l.

The de cision of t he trial court is aff irmed i n part and reve rsed in part as set for th above, a

nd the ca se is rema

nded for further proce eding s not inc onsistent with this Opinion. Costs on appeal ar e to be taxed equally

to Appellant Over

nite Transpor

tat ion Company , and its surety , and Appe llee Te amst e rs L oc a l Un ion No

. 48 0, Af fi liate d wi th the Inte rn a tio na l B ro the rh oo d of T e amst e rs , C h a u f f e u r s , W ar e h o u s e m e n , an d H e l p e r s o f A m e r i c a , f

o r w h i c he x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e , i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ HOL L Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE