NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IBRAHEEM ABBAS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

MICHAEL S. TRAYLOR, Counsel for 

Plaintiff, 

Appellant, 

 v. 

VERTICAL ENTERTAINMENT, LLC; et 

al., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

CRIMSON MULTIMEDIA, LTD.; et al., 

Defendants.

No. 19-56248 

D.C. No. 

2:18-cv-07399-CBM-AFM 

MEMORANDUM*

IBRAHEEM ABBAS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

MICHAEL S. TRAYLOR, Counsel for 

No. 19-56279

D.C. No. 

2:18-cv-07399-CBM-AFM 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

AUG 3 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Plaintiff, 

Appellee, 

VERTICAL ENTERTAINMENT, LLC; et 

al., 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

CRYSTALSKY MULTIMEDIA 

MARKETING, INC.; et al., 

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 30, 2021**

Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and MÁRQUEZ,*** District 

Judge.

Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee Ibraheem Abbas (Abbas) appeals 

dismissal of his copyright-infringement claims against several foreign individuals 

and entities relating to the animated film Bilal: A New Breed of Hero (Bilal). Abbas 

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Rosemary Márquez, United States District Judge for the 

District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
3 

also appeals the district court’s orders imposing sanctions against his counsel under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and denying him leave to amend his complaint. 

Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants Ayman Jamal (Jamal), Barajoun 

Entertainment FZ-LLC (Barajoun), Vertical Entertainment, LLC (Vertical), Resnick 

Interactive Development, LLC (Resnick), and Lakeshore Records, LLC (Lakeshore)

(collectively, Appellees), cross appeal the denial of a motion for attorney’s fees and 

costs under 17 U.S.C. § 505, and the motion for Rule 11 sanctions to the extent the 

district court failed to award the full amount sought and did not impose sanctions 

jointly against Abbas and his counsel. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, 

we do not recount them here, except as necessary to provide context to our ruling.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district 

court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin 

Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004), and review an order denying 

reconsideration for an abuse of discretion, Kerr v. Jewell, 836 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th 

Cir. 2016).

1. The district court properly granted Jamal’s and Barajoun’s motion to dismiss 

for lack of personal jurisdiction.

1 Abbas fails to establish that Jamal or Barajoun had 

any contacts with California that would permit the court to exercise personal 

1 We previously granted Crystalsky Multimedia Marketing, Inc.’s (Crystalsky)

motion to dismiss the appeal because Abbas did not mention Crystalsky in his

opening brief.
4 

jurisdiction over them. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800; Cal. Code Civ. Proc 

§ 410.10. Specifically, Abbas fails to satisfy the effects test from Calder v. Jones, 

465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984), and fails to show that his claims arise out of any contacts 

that Jamal or Barajoun purportedly had with California under Walden v. Fiore, 571 

U.S. 277, 284 (2014). See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, 

San Francisco Cnty., 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017).

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Abbas’ motion for 

reconsideration of the order dismissing Jamal and Barajoun for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. The district court applied the correct legal standard and properly denied 

the motion because Abbas provided no legal support for his argument that purported

consent to jurisdiction in an unrelated dispute could establish personal jurisdiction 

over Jamal and Barajoun in this case. See Szynalski v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 

4th 1, 7–8 (2009).

3. We review the district court’s decision to impose sanctions under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 11 for an abuse of discretion. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 

Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). The district court issued sanctions against Abbas’ 

counsel after finding the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint—that Jamal is a 

“resident of the County of Los Angeles” and that Barajoun has a “principal place of 

business in Los Angeles County”—were “undisputedly false.” Abbas admits these 

statements were false, but contends sanctions were inappropriate because the 
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allegations were made “on information and belief” and “carefully crafted” to 

“cautiously” allege the defendants’ residences. But Abbas offers no authority 

supporting his contention that issuing Rule 11 sanctions is an abuse of discretion 

when demonstrably false allegations are levied in a carefully crafted fashion. In light 

of the district court’s findings regarding the demonstrable falsity of the jurisdictional 

allegations, the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees 

under Rule 11 for the costs of defending against those frivolous allegations. See 

Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 676–77 (9th Cir. 2005).

4. On cross appeal, Appellees contend the district court abused its discretion by 

not awarding sanctions jointly and severally against Abbas and his counsel, and by 

limiting the award of attorney’s fees to only those fees incurred defending against 

the jurisdictional allegations. While Appellees provide authority for the position that 

the district court could have awarded sanctions jointly and severally against Abbas 

and his counsel, they offer no authority supporting the position that the district court 

abused its discretion by awarding sanctions only against the attorney who signed and 

submitted the complaint containing the false allegations to the court with knowledge 

those allegations were unsupported. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1) (“[T]he court may 

impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the

rule or is responsible for the violation.”); Holgate, 425 F.3d at 675 (“Abuse of 

discretion may be found if the district court based its decision on an erroneous view 
6 

of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”). Similarly, 

Appellees provide authority for the contention that the district court could have 

awarded all of the requested sanctions based on findings that the remainder of 

Abbas’ claims were frivolous or brought in bad faith, but fail to provide authority 

indicating the district court applied the wrong legal standard or otherwise abused its 

discretion in limiting the fee award to the complaint’s demonstrably false 

jurisdictional allegations. See Holgate, 425 F.3d at 675. Accordingly, the district 

court applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion by granting 

Jamal’s and Barajoun’s Rule 11 motion for sanctions and limiting the sanctions 

award to the fees incurred defending against the demonstrably false jurisdictional 

allegations.

5. Abbas also claims that the district court erred by granting the motion for 

judgment on the pleadings as to Vertical, Resnick, and Lakeshore based on the threeyear statute of limitations. A dismissal on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(c) is reviewed de novo. See Daewoo Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Opta Corp., 

875 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2017). As the district court correctly found, Abbas’ 

claims turn on whether Abbas can establish ownership of Bilal, rather than on 

subsequent infringement of the film. Based on Abbas’ allegations, the district court 

correctly reasoned that, under Seven Arts Filmed Entertainment Ltd. v. Content 

Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013), the gravamen of Abbas’ 
7 

claims is ownership because Appellees admitted that they distributed Bilal, but 

defended their purportedly infringing acts by contending that Abbas is not the owner 

of the film or any materials incorporated into it. See id. (“[T]his dispute is about 

ownership—Paramount concedes it is exploiting the pictures, but denies that Seven 

Arts owns the copyrights.”).

As the district court recognized, ‘“claims of co-ownership’ . . . accrue only 

once, ‘when plain and express repudiation of co-ownership is communicated to the 

claimant.’” Id. (citations omitted). Under these circumstances, a plaintiff must bring 

suit within three years of receiving notice of the repudiation of his or her ownership 

rights. See id. at 1258; Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 

2000). While Abbas does not address the three-year statute of limitations in his 

briefing, thus waiving the issue, the district court correctly found that Barajoun 

expressly repudiated Abbas’ ownership claim by June 9, 2015, when Barajoun filed 

the copyright-infringement lawsuit against Abbas in Saudi Arabia. That lawsuit, in 

which Jamal and Barajoun asserted ownership of Bilal, notified Abbas that Jamal 

and Barajoun claimed ownership of the materials that were allegedly incorporated 

into Bilal. Accordingly, Abbas’ complaint, which was filed on August 23, 2018, is

barred by the three-year statute of limitations. See Seven Arts, 733 F.3d at 1255; Zuill 

v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366, 1370–71 (9th Cir. 1996).
8 

6. Abbas also challenges the district court’s denial of reconsideration of its 

statute of limitations ruling, arguing that the ruling incorrectly assumed that Abbas 

is asserting ownership over Bilal. But as the district court correctly determined, 

Abbas could have, but failed, to make that argument when opposing the motion for 

judgment on the pleadings, so that argument was an improper basis for 

reconsideration.

Even if it were a proper basis for reconsideration, as discussed above, the 

district court correctly rejected that argument because the “complaint explicitly 

alleges that all of Abbas’ claimed original works were incorporated into the final 

Bilal film” and that, as a result, “the Saudi dispute, in which [Jamal and Barajoun] 

asserted ownership of Bilal, necessarily notified Abbas that [they] claimed 

ownership of the same material of which he asserts ownership.” Abbas fails to show 

this conclusion was an abuse of discretion. 

7. The district court also did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend.

See Curry v. Yelp Inc., 875 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2017). Abbas never provided 

any additional facts that he could allege to establish personal jurisdiction over Jamal

or Barajoun, or that would remedy his time-barred ownership claims. Abbas also 

failed to provide any such facts in his appellate briefing. Accordingly, amendment 

would be futile and dismissal without leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. 

See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) 
9 

(recognizing that dismissal with prejudice is proper when amendment would be 

futile); Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding no 

abuse of discretion for denial of leave to amend where plaintiff failed to identify 

facts that could cure the deficiencies in the complaint).

8. Finally, Appellees argue that the district court abused its discretion by denying 

the motion for attorney’s fees and costs under 17 U.S.C. § 505. Under § 505, a 

district court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party

in a copyright suit. See 17 U.S.C. § 505. The district court denied the § 505 motion

based on its finding that an award of attorney’s fees would not further the purposes 

of the Copyright Act. However, “[u]nder the Copyright Act, the question is whether 

a successful defense of the action further[s] the purposes of the Act, not whether 

a fee award would do so.” Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 

816 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994)). 

Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by applying the incorrect legal 

standard,so we reverse and remand for the district court to consider the § 505 motion 

for attorney’s fees under the proper legal standard.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.2

2 The motion to take judicial notice (Dkt. 58) is GRANTED. Each party shall bear 

its own costs on appeal.