1

Filed 11/21/ 22 Certified for Publication 12/16/22 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STEVEN V. BLA S ER et al.,

Plaintiffs and Responde nts,

v.

CALIFORNIA ST ATE TEACHERS’ RE TIREMENT SYSTEM,

Defendant and Appella nt. H04 9277 (Monterey County Sup er. Ct. No. 16CV 0 003 2 8 )

I. INTRODUCTION California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) is th e state agency responsible for managing contribution s made by employ ees and membe r school districts

to the State Teachers’ Retirem ent Fund. (See Ed. Code, § 22000 et seq. ; Teachers ’

Retirement Law

. ) 1 In February 2016
, respondents
, who are 31 retired teac hers (Teachers) formerly employed by the Salinas Uni fied High School District (District)
, filed a petition

f or writ of mandate and a complaint for declarato ry and injunctive relief aga inst CalSTRS

and the District

. Teacher s challenged r eductions that CalS TRS had made and continued

to m ake to their monthly retirement benef it s a fter determin ing t h a t the District had erred in its reporting to CalSTRS ; those errors result ed in the o verstatement of Teachers ’ monthly b e n e fits . T he reductions by CalSTRS adjust ed ongoin g monthly benefits to their

1 All fur ther statuto ry r e f

erences are to the Educatio n Code unless othe rwis e
s p eci f ied.2

proper amount s an d recoup ed prior overpayments

. In July 2017
, t he trial c ourt granted

the petition
, concluding that CalSTRS ’s claims to reduce Teachers’ retirement benefits and collect overpayments w e re time

- barr ed

. I n July 2019, a panel of this court reversed
, conclu d ing the t rial co urt had err ed in holding that CalSTRS ’s efforts to recoup overpayments were time

- barred as to all monthly retirement payments, both past and future. (See B laser v. State Teach ers’

Retir em ent System (201 9 ) 37 Cal.App.5th 34 9 ( B laser I ).) T his court f

ound that the

continuous a ccrual theory applied. ( Id. at p p

. 365

- 3 6 8 .) In so concluding
, we relied on

our prior decision
, Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement Syst em (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 3 40 ( Baxter ) . T h ere , the pension benefits of 11 other retired s choolt e achers (collectively, the Baxter petitioners) ha d likewise been overstated due to reporting errors by the District
, and the cas e thus concer ned “ the s ame periodic (monthly) pension
payment s ” a t issu e in Blaser I

. ( Blaser I
, supra , at p. 36 8.) This co ur t held in Blaser I

that CalS TR S was not barred from adjusting to the correct amounts Teachers ’ monthly benefit payments accru ing on or after Febr uary 1, 2013, and it was not barred from

asse rting claims for prior overpayments f o r periodic ben efits accru ing o n or after that

da te

. ( Blaser I
, supra , at p. 378. )

In their respond ents ’ brief in Blaser I
, Teachers had raised t he defenses of equitable estoppel and laches, which they argued preclu ded CalSTRS from adjusting monthly benefits or from asserting overpa yment claim s

. Bec ause the se def ense s had not

been raised belo w and therefore the trial court had not co nside red them, t h is court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine, fi rst, whether Teachers had

forfeited the defenses by failin g to asser t them , and second (if the trial court determined they had not been forfeited ) , w h ether e ither defense served as a bar to Ca lSTRS ’ s adjustment of benefits a nd its claims for overpayment s o f prior benefi ts

. ( B laser I
, supr a , 37 Cal.App.5 th at p. 3 7 9 .)3

On remand, after briefing and argument, th e trial court decided both questions in

favor of Te a chers. In an order filed March 16 , 2 02 1 , the court ruled that Te a c h e r s were

no t barred by forfei ture from asserting equitable esto ppel and laches , a nd it held t hat t he

tw o defenses applied

. In the judgment and writ of mandate filed May 21, 2021 , the co u rt
directed that CalSTRS refrain from red ucing Teache rs ’ monthly pension benefits or fr om seeking recovery of claimed overpayments

. CalSTRS challeng es the judgment
, arguing , inter alia, that (1) the undis puted

evidence shows that Teachers for f eited the defenses by never a sserti ng the m prior to

remand ; (2) on the merits, estoppel may not be asserted i n this instan ce against the public

agency, CalSTRS
, because to do so would run contrary to statu tory limitations upon its
conduct; and (3) laches , an equitable defe nse, is not a vai lable here to claims see king

m on ey judgmen t s

. We conclude that the equitab l e estoppe l and laches defense s cou ld not b e asserted

in this case as a matter of law. W hile equitable estoppel may be asserte d in a proper case

aga inst a governmental entity, i t “ may not be invoked t o di rectly contravene stat utory
limitations

. ” ( Medi na v . Board o f Retirement (2003) 112 Ca l.App. 4 th 864, 86 9
( Medina )

. ) In this case, the court erred in apply ing equitable estoppel because doing so

req uir ed CalSTRS to continue to m iscal culate Teachers ’ m onth ly pension benefits in

contraven tion of the Edu catio n Code. W e hold fur ther that laches , whi c h is an eq uitable

defense
, was unavail able to defeat the claims of law at issue here

. And, related to this
conclusion, because this co urt p reviously held in Blaser I that CalSTRS was not barred

— ba sed upon the appl ication of the continuou s accrual the ory

— from ma king benefit adju st m ents or from assert ing overpayment claims for benefits accruing on or after February 1, 2013
, laches may not be a sserted to nega te th is prior determination

. Because
of these conclusions, we need not d ecide wh eth e r Teachers forfeited th e de fenses of equita ble estoppel and lache s by failing to raise them below prior to the appeal in Blaser

I

.4

Accordingl y, we will reverse the judgm ent.

I I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2

A

. Pre

- Suit Ba ckground

The 31 petition e rs/ Teacher s in the pres ent case

— like t he 11 Baxter p etitioners
( Baxt er , supra , 18 Cal.App.5 th a t p. 349 )

— are classroom teachers who had t aught within

the District be fore r etiri ng and becoming “ member [ s ] of CalSTRS and of its Define d

Benefit Pro gram (DB Pr o gram)

. A portion of Te ache rs’ compensation was repo rted by

the District as being defer red to T eachers’ respective DB P rogram accounts fo r the

pu rpose of their receivin g p ostre tir ement benefits. ” ( B laser I
, supra , 37 Cal.App.5th a t

p. 356.)

As this court explained in Baxter : “ Scho ols with in the D istrict u tilized a six period schedule. [Schoolteachers] within the District typica lly taught five of t hose

pe riods an d used th e add iti onal period to prepare prospective lesson plans. So me of

them
, h owever, inc l uding [the Baxter petit ione rs], agr eed to t each duri ng their sixth period time for additional compensation, and to shift their prep aration time to before or
after the regu la r s cho ol day. [The Baxter petitioners] believed that this additional

c ompensation would be credited towar d th eir reti rement p lan [ i.e. , the DB P rogram , which was] . . . administered by CalS TRS.” ( Baxter
, supr a , 1 8 Cal.App.5t h at p. 349 .)

Simi larly her e , “ T ea c hers elected to work the sixth period for one or mor e sch ool year s,
and in d o ing so, belie ved that t heir compensat ion fo r that wo r k would be credited toward their respective DB P rogram a ccounts. ” ( B laser I
, s upra , 37 Ca l.App.5th a t p. 35 7 .) The

m an ner in which t he District rep ort ed to CalSTRS the compensa tion earned f or sixth

pe r iod work by the Baxter peti tioners and by T eachers

—upon which CalSTRS based its

2 Th is section is larg el y derived from Baxter
, sup ra , 18 C al.App.5 t h 3 40 a n d B laser I
, su

p ra , 37 Cal. App.5th 34 9

.5

calcu lati on of the schoolteachers ’ monthly retirement b enefit s

— was at th e heart of th e

co ntrov ers y in both cases

. 3

We note that legislation was enacted
, effective January 1 , 2001, that provided supplemen tal benefits for members of the DB Program. (§ 25000; see S tats. 200 0, ch. 74, § 69, p. 1261 .) “ As a result, a Defined Benefit Supple m ent Program (DBS Program) was established to provide, inter alia, re tirement benefits tha t are separate from those paid

under the DB Pro gram. After the DBS Program was established by s tatu te , the hours that

CalST RS me mbers worked beyond full

- time work (i

. e., in excess of 1,000 ho urs), such as

overtime or summer sc hool wor k, were creditable to the DBS Program. ” ( Bla ser I
,
supra , 37 Cal.Ap p.5th at p

. 357 .)

On December 1, 200 8, an account ing firm retained by C a lS TRS to audit District

records d e termined that the D istrict had adopted a practice of coding i mpro perly the

sixth

- p e riod earnings of the Bax ter petitioners as cred itab le to their resp ective DB

P ro gram accoun ts

. Therea fter, on May 27, 2010, Ca lSTRS i ssued a draft a udit report adopt ing t hi s conclusion and in dicated that the District ’ s incorre ct cod i ng o f sixth period

ea r nings had resulted in 15 CalSTRS members who we re s ampled in the au dit
, includin g
the Baxte r petitione rs , r eceiving overstat e d monthly retirement benefit s

. CalSTRS issu e d

its final audit repo rt on July 30, 2010, upholding the draf t re port’s fin ding

. ( Ba x ter ,
supra , 18 Cal.Ap p.5th at p p. 3 4 9

- 350 .)

CalSTRS mailed t he fina l audit report to the Di strict and to the Baxter petition e rs

. ( Baxter
, supra , 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 37 1 .) At the same time, “CalSTRS apprised each of the [Baxter p et it ioners] in separate l etters that it had co ncluded from its final audit t hat

3 T he natur e of the p roblem was expl ai ne d in a declaration filed below b y P e ter Haley, director of CalS TRS’s member a ccou nt s ser v ice s : “[T]h e reporting of the p ar t

- time compens ation a s par t of the member’ s re gul a r full

- time com p ensati o n (i .e., creditin g it to t he DB Program) will inflate th e me mb er’s DB account resulting in t he

m ember receiving an enhanced lifet ime pens ion bene fit tha t [he or she is ] not entitled t o receive.”6

the District had ‘incorrectly report ed (coded) your sixth period teac h in g assignment (extra duty) earnings .

. . a s creditable compensati on to the Defined Benefit (DB) Program fo r the .

. . school yea r ending in your retir ement. Under state law, these extra duty assi gnment payments should h ave been cr edited to the Defined B en efit Su pplement (DBS) program, thus it doe s not count toward the calculation of your DB retirement

allow an ce

. These reporting e r rors caused your mont hly retirement allowance to be

overstated

. . . . ’ Each letter advised further tha t CalSTRS was entitled un der the law to recover the overpaym ent by r educing future payment s to each of the [Baxter petitioners] by no more than 5 perce nt, because the overpayment was due to error by the school system, b ut CalSTRS had requested t hat the Dis trict reimburse the ov e rp ayments on behalf of each of the [B axte r p e titioners]. Lastly, C alSTRS advised e ach of the [Baxter petiti oners] that if he or sh e disagreed with its determination, he or she was required to

app e al it through an administ rative hear ing process within 90 d ay s of the letter.” ( I bi d.
, fn. omitted. )

T h e Baxte r pe titioners appealed the se final audit findi ngs on Dec ember 3, 20 10.
( Bax ter , supra , 18 Ca l. App.5th at pp. 349

- 350.)

Th e fina l audit report o f July 30, 2010, included orders to the District to provide

CalSTRS wit h ( 1) corr ections t o reverse the i mproper ly c redited compensation for the

15 CalSTRS me mber s sampled in the audit “ ‘ and all other members who for which [the reported (c oded) pay rate] was incorrectly reporte d ’ ” ; and (2) “ ‘ “ the total
overpayments th at had be en m a de for the retired mem bers

. ” ’ [Citation.] ” ( Blaser I
,
supra , 37 Cal.App.5th at p

. 35 8 .) The District did not com ply with the se two directives

. As a result, on March 2, 201 2, CalSTRS notified the Baxter petitioners that , beginning April 1, 2012, it would begin to r educe their monthly retirement benefits to the ir cor rect

amount s, and it would reduce the ir mon thl y payments by five percent to c ollect prior7

o verp ayments. ( Baxte r , supra , 18 Cal. App.5th at p

. 350.) Th is offset practice was

s p ecified in t he Education Code, specifically, section 24616

. 4

On Jul y 6, 2012, CalSTRS file d a statement of issues w ith the Office of

Administrative Hearings

. ( Baxter
, supra , 18 Cal. App.5th a t p

. 350.) Thi s filing , which

resulted in the initia tion of adm i nistrative p roceedings under the Admin istrative

Procedure Act ( s ee Gov. Code, §§ 1134 0 to 11529, incl.) , co nstitute d the co mmencement of an action by the agency to re solve the dispute between CalSTRS an d th e Baxter petitio ners. ( Baxter
, supra , at p p

. 3 74

- 375 .) Afte r a two

- day administrative hearing in February 2013, the a dminist rative l a w j ud ge (ALJ) issue d a propose d decisi on in favor of

CalSTRS

. The appeals committee of Ca lSTRS rejected t he p roposed decision , solicited

additional briefing, r eco nsidered the record
, and issued a decision in favor of CalSTRS

o n January 23, 2014. ( I

d. at p. 350.)

B

. The Bax ter Litigation

O n M arch 24, 2014, t he Baxter petitioners chal leng ed the administrative decision

of CalSTRS ’ s appeals committee by fil ing a petition f or a peremp to r y writ o f

administrative mandamu s under Code of Civil Proc edure section 1094 .5. ( Baxter
, supra , 18 Cal.A pp.5th at p. 351 .) They argued, inter alia, that CalSTRS w as barred from

r ecove ring overpayments and from taking any action t o reduce th e Baxter pe ti ti oners ’

m onthly retirement benefits under the applicable s tatute of limitati ons, secti on 22008

. ( Baxter
, s upra , at p p . 3 47

- 348 .) The Baxter petitioners did not di sput e th at their monthly

benefi t amou nts had been miscalculat ed by the D is tr ict. ( I d. at p. 347.) On May 1, 2015
,

“ [ t] he trial cour t concluded that C alSTRS’s claims against [th e Baxter petitioners] to

4 “ Any over payment made to or on be h alf of any member, fo r mer member, or beneficiary,

. . . shall be deducted from any subsequent benefit that may b e paya ble under either the Defined Benefit Prog ram,

. . . , except as provided in Section 24616.5. These d eductio ns sh all be p ermitted concurr e ntly with any suit fo r res titution, and recovery of

o verpayment by adjustment shall reduce by the amount of the re cove ry the extent of liabil ity for restitutio n. ” ( § 24616.)8

r ecover monies paid erroneously due to miscalc ul ation of reti rement b enefits were time

barred, and CalS TRS was fur ther barred f ro m redu c i ng [the Baxte r petitioners’] futur e monthly benef

its.” ( I d. at p. 351. )

CalSTRS fi l ed a n appe al , and this court rever s ed the judgment on

December 12, 2017 . T h is court c oncluded that th e trial court was c orrect in finding t h at some of CalSTRS’ s claims w ere barred under the applic able three

- year statute of

limi tations ( § 2200 8, subd s . (a ) , (c) ) ; but we f ound, applyin g the continuous accrual

theo ry , that th e trial court had erred in conclu ding that CalSTRS was e nt i rely precluded from pursuing a ny a ction against the Baxter petition e r s f or overpayments or from adjust ing future mo nthly paym ents. ( Baxter
, sup ra , 18 Cal.Ap p.5th at p. 34 8.) We held
,

r e l y i n g o n C a l i f

o r n i a S u p r e m e C o u r t p recedent
, that “ [ t ] he r ig ht of e ach of the [ Baxter petiti on er s] to receive monthly pay ments, an d the obligation of CalSTRS to d isburse
them, are continu ing ones that a ccrue when such pay ments beco me du e

. [Citation.] ”
( Bax ter , supra , at p. 3 80

. ) Accordingly, we concluded th at , although CalS TRS could not adju st bene fits or assert overpayment cl aims for monthly benefits accruing more than

thre e years prior to Jul y 6, 2012 (i.e., the date C alST RS co mmenced th e “action ”)
, it could pursue claims for pa st or fu ture pay ments that a ccru ed on or afte r July 6, 2009. ( Id

.
at p. 382.) The case was remand ed to the trial court for further proceedings to address

defense s of equitable estoppel and lach e s as a p otential b ar to CalSTRS’s claims ; those

defenses had been asserted b y the Baxter petitioners , but the trial co urt h ad not addressed

them because of its conclusion that CalSTRS was barred by the statute of li mitations.
( Baxter
, su

pra , 18 Cal.App.5 th at p. 375.)

C

. B laser I

“ At various times bet ween June 20 14 and February 2015 [while the Baxter case

was pending in t he trial cou rt] , Teacher s (with four exce pt ion s ) rec eived correspon dence from CalSTRS advising th em that thei r resp ec tive monthly DB Prog ram b en efit
payment s would be reduced and that Ca lSTRS woul d c ollect monies from Teach ers that9

they had received a s o ve rpayments at th e rate of 5 percent per m o nth. In th a t same time

pe riod, CalSTRS reduced the m onthly retireme nt benef its of Teachers (wit h fou r exception s ). ” ( B laser I
, supra , 37 C al.Ap p.5th at p

. 35 9, fn. omitt ed

. )

On Februa ry 1, 2016

— after judgment wa s entered in favo r of the Baxter petitioner s and while CalSTRS ’ s appe al in Baxter was pending

— Teacher s filed their (l ater amended) ve rifi ed pe titi on for wri t of mandate and complaint for declaratory and

in junctive relie f. Tea chers ch allenged CalSTRS ’ s r ed uc tion of th eir monthly retirement

benefi ts a n d collect i on of monies to recoup prior overpa yments made to T eachers.

T eachers conte n d ed, inter ali a, t hat t he statute of limitations barred CalSTRS fr o m taking

any ac tion to red u ce the ir retirement benefit s

. O n J une 2, 2017, the trial court filed i ts in te nded decision findin g in favor of

Teachers
, “ conclud [ ing ] that CalSTRS’s claims aga ins t T eachers t o reduc e their

retirement benefits and to collect ov e rpayments were time

- barred

. It reas oned that ‘ by no

la te r th an July 30, 2010, [CalSTRS] was “ awar e of the p ossi bility ” that there were

District me mbers, other tha n those identif ied in the au dit , who had receiv ed DB credit for

sixth

- period service . . . [ b ut] CalSTRS did not take a c tion unti l 2014, more than

t hr ee y ears later. ’ And the trial court conc lud ed t ha t th e continuous accrual theory did not apply

. I t t h u s reject e d C alSTRS’s a r g u m e n t t ha t, even i f the sta tute of limitations barred its claims in pa rt, it was entit led t o (1) r ecover overp ayments made le s s than three years

before it took a ction an d (2) reduce benefits going forward. ” ( B laser I
, supra , 37

C al.A p p.5th at p

. 3 63

- 364

. ) O n July 10 , 2017
, t he cou rt entered judgment gran ting th e
issuance o f a p e remptory w rit o f mand a te (1) dir ecting CalSTRS to re store Te achers ’ benefit levels by inc luding c ompensa tion for sixth period work as DB c re ditabl e , and
(2) prohibiti ng CalSTRS from “ ‘ revisi t [ ing ] the issue of the in clusion of six th period

ea r nings in each [Teacher ’ s] f i nal compensatio n for ret irement pu rp oses ’ in any

s ubsequent audit. ” ( Id. at p. 364.)10

T his court reversed

. We c on cl uded, following Dryde n v. Board of Pension

Commrs. (1936 ) 6 Cal.2d 575 ( Dryd en ) and Baxter, supra, 18 Ca l.App.5th 340, that the

con tin uo us accrual theo r y applied. ( Blaser
, supra , at p p

. 365

- 3 6 8 .) We thus held that

“ CalSTRS may pursue a cla im as to any pe riodic pension b enefits t hat acc ru ed not more
than three years bef

ore CalSTRS commenced an ‘ action ’ with in the meaning of section

2 200 8 [ , s ubdivision] (a)

. [Citation. ] ” ( Id. at p. 375
, citing Baxter
, s upra , 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 382 .)

This court h eld furth er that “ the fi ling of T eachers ’ petit ion and c om pl aint [ on
Febru ary 1, 2016, ] . . . suspended (or toll ed the statute o f limitatio ns a s to any cla ims by

CalSTR S again s t Teac hers that were timely file d a s of [that date]

. ” ( B laser I
, supra , 37 Cal.App.5th a t p. 378.) W e reasoned that “ under well

- estab lished principl es g overning

civil litigation, t h e plaintiff ’ s filing of a compla in t sus pe nds the running of the statute of

limitations as to a ny claims by t he defendant again st the pla in ti ff that are not time

- barred

when the action is filed. [Citations.] ” ( B laser I
, su pra , at p. 3 77.) A p plying the

t h ree

- year statute of lim itations ( § 2200 8, su bd. (a)), we concluded that CalSTRS was not
b arred from adjustin g Teachers ’ m onthl y period i c payments a ccru ing on or after

Fe br uary 1, 2013, a nd it was not precluded from recovering o verpayments that had been

made for benefi ts that had accrued on or a ft er that date

. ( Blaser I
, supra , a t p. 378. ) 5
Lastly, this court no ted that Teacher s had ass erte d in t heir respondents ’ b rie f ( as a
fina l argument ) that CalSTRS should be precluded from initi a ting a n administrative

5 At issue in this appeal is whether CalSTR S is pr eclud ed from ( 1 ) havi ng made p rior adjustments to c o rre c t benefit amount s so they d id not include compe nsation for sixth

- period work as D B

- cr editable for mo n thly pa yment s accru ing on or after February 1, 2013 ; (2) deducting from monthly benefits the amount s a t tribu table to overpa yments previous ly m ade for b en efits accr uing on or after February 1
, 2013; and (3) correcting benefit amount s go ing forwar d so that they do not includ e compensation for sixth

- period work as DB

- creditable . For shorthan d purpo s e s , we w ill refe r to these three act io ns t hat the trial co urt on remand indicated in its judgment were prohibited collectively as “ b e nef

it a djustments

. ”11

pr o ceeding agains t Teac hers t o r ecou p o verpa yments

— a proceeding which CalSTRS had

n o t initiated previously

— based upon the princip les of la ches and equitable estoppel.
( B laser I
, supra , 37 Cal.Ap p.5th at p. 378 .) We observed t hat Teache rs had no t rai sed

either the ory at t he t ri al level, a n obs ervat ion that was spe c ificall y made by th e trial court
in its intende d decision. ( Id

. at p. 3 99 .) S ince , we noted, both laches and equitabl e estoppel were questi ons of fact for d etermina tion b y the tr ial court ( i d

. at p p . 378

- 3 79 ),

we rem anded the case w ith d irections that the trial court , “ up on request, address whether

Teachers are en titled to assert lache s and/or estoppel, and, in the eve nt it determines

Teach e rs may do so, w hether lach es and /or estoppe l serv e as a b a r to the as sertion b y
CalSTRS of cla ims r elated to over p aymen ts. ” ( I d. at p. 379. )

D

. Blaser Pro ceeding s on Remand

On remand, T eachers filed a motion for leave to argue the a ddition al defenses of

laches and equitable esto pp el

. Teachers also re q uested , if leave to argue the defenses

were g r anted , that they be gra nted ju dgment in their favor on the ground that such

defenses barred CalSTRS from procee ding with b enefit a djustments

. Teachers argued

that th e evidence from t h e pr ior hearing demonstra ted that the de fenses were meri torious

. They a ssert ed that CalSTRS waited years af ter learning of the circumstanc es that gave

ris e to the mis calcula tion of their monthly benefits to ta ke action in redu cin g them in

2014 to 201 5 , and ev en then, Teachers “ w ere given no di scernible reason for the

reductio n

. ” They ar gued tha t “ [t]he lack of information, and/ or loss of recol lection,

eng endered by CalSTRS ’ s extr aordinary de lay in acting , h as o perated to the prej ud ice d of
[Teachers]
, ” warrant ing a finding of la ches. Te achers argued fu rther th at CalSTRS was

e q uita bly estopped from reducing their month ly payments.

CalST RS fi led opposition to Teacher s ’ motion.

After he s uperior court on remand heard argum e nt on t he motion , it issued a
writ ten ruling on M a r c h 16, 2021, in f a vor of Teachers. The co urt held that Teac hers ha d

not wa ived (or forfeited) the defenses of equitable est oppel and laches by failing t o rais e12

them earlier

. It concluded further that Te achers had sh own that the f a cts warrant ed the

ap plication of equitable estoppel and l aches to bar CalSTRS ’ s atte mpts to r eco up past overpayments or to red uce Teachers ’ retirement benefit s going forwa rd. T he trial court

did no t address CalSTRS ’ s positio n on the me rits that, as a matter of law, under the

circumstances of this case
, Teachers could not asser t the defen ses of equitable estoppel or

laches

. 6 On May 21, 2021, th e court entered a formal j u dgment for the issuan ce of a
peremptory wr it of mandat e directing CalSTRS to refrain from reducin g Teachers ’
benefits, a s sess ing overpaym ents , o r cond ucting audit act ivi ty re lative to Te ac he rs ’

retirement benefit accounts b ased upon sixth

- p eriod w or k they had previo usly performed.

C al STRS filed a timely appeal from the judgment.

I I I

. DI SCU SSI O N

A. Stan dard s of Revi ew
We will address whe ther the tri al court erre d i n fin din g t hat CalST R S was barre d

under the doctrin e of equitable estop pe l from making b enefit a djustments

. Although “ t h e

ex istence of an est oppel is generally a question of fact ” ( Albers v. Los Angeles County
(1965) 62 Ca l. 2 d 250, 266 ) th at is reviewed f or ab use of disc reti o n ( Bro wn v. Chi ang (2011) 198 C al. A pp

. 4th 120 3, 1229 )
, “ where the facts are undis puted and only one

reason ab le conclusion can be drawn from them, whethe r e stoppel appl ies ” is a legal question that is subje ct to de novo review ( Fedunia k v. C ali fornia Coast a l Co m. ( 2007)

6 The trial court also o bse rv ed in its ruling tha t the superior court in Baxter v. CalSTRS (app arentl y on re man d after appeal) had “ found tha t la ches and equita ble estoppel prevented CalSTRS from reco uping any overpayments and reducin g [t he Baxter] petitioners ’ retirement benefits b ased on the issue of s ixth period earnings. ” A ny developments in th e Bax t er liti gation subsequent to o ur reman d of that case ar e not be for e
us , are n o t part of this record, an d are not relev ant t o th is app eal

. We are aware that in the case involving the Baxter petiti oners , C alSTRS filed a notice of appea l from a judgment ( file d Mar ch 8, 2019) granting a p etit ion for issuance of a w rit of ma ndate

. (See Baxter v. State Tea ch ers’ Retirement System , H04 70 0 8 .) CalSTRS filed a no tic e o f ab an do nm ent of that appeal i n Novem ber 2019. W e take judicial notice of our file s in that appea l. ( Se e Freeman v. Schack (20 07) 1 54 Cal.A pp.4th 719, 7 23, fn. 3 .)13

148 C al.App.4th 1346, 1360 ( Fed un ia k ) )

. But CalSTRS ’ s position here is that equitable
estop pel cannot be appl ied beca u se doing so would require CalSTRS to conduct itself in a

manner that “ directly con t rav ene [s] statuto ry limi ta t ions

. ” ( Med in a , supra , 11 2

Ca l.App.4th at p. 869

. ) Ac co rdingly , we will review this issue of law de novo. ( See C i t y

o f Pleasanton v. B oard of Administration (2 012) 211 Cal.App.4 th 522
, 543 ( C i t y o f

Pleasanton ) [ based upon con s tr u ction of pension stat ute s, cou rt con cl u des that ar gu ment that entity wa s estopp ed from d e nying that extra pay w as pensionable was “ barred as a

matter of law ” ] ; K

reeft v. City of Oakla n d (1998) 68 Cal.App. 4th 46, 53 [ appellate court

exercise s “ independe n t j udgment on legal iss u es, such as the i n terpretatio n of statutory retirement pro vi sions ” ]

. )
Further, we will consider whether the trial court erred in concludin g that CalST RS was barred by lac hes from ma king b enefit a d j ustments

. Al though
, general ly
, “ the

existenc e of l a ches is a question o f fact to be d et ermined by the trial court in light of all

of th e a pplicable circumstance s ” ( Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Cen ter (1980) 27 Cal.3d
614, 624 ( Miller ) ) and is reviewed for substantial evidence ( Johnson v . C ity of Lom a
Lind a (20 00) 24 Cal.4th 61 , 67 )
, t he i ss ue may be determined “ as a matter of law

w here

. . . t he rel eva nt facts are undisputed. [ C itat ion. ] ” ( B akersfield E lementary

Teach ers Assn. v. Bakersf ield Cit y School Dist. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4t h 1260, 1274 .)

Moreover , as we discuss, pos t , CalSTRS a sserts that laches is unavailable here because it is an equitable defense that cannot be asse r ted again st a l egal claim for a money judgment. Thi s is an is sue of law that we will revi ew de novo. ( Co n nolly v . Trabue
(2012) 204 C al. App.4th 1154
, 1 160 ( Co nn olly ) [ where potential application of the

doctrine of laches to claim is one of law, the appe l late cour t will review the issue de
novo] ; People v. ConAgra G rocery Products Co. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 51
, 135
( C onAgra ) [ “ whethe r lac hes is a legall y a vailabl e defense is a legal issue subject to de

novo review ” ]

. )14

B

. Impact of Remand in Blaser I

Teachers in their respondents ’ brief make several assertions concer ning the

remand of this case in Blaser I
, and the im pa ct of that rem and u pon the matt er s pr es ently

on review. We therefore address this preliminary matter before considering the merits of

CalSTRS ’ s challenges on appeal that the trial court erred by conclu ding that (1) Teachers

had not forfeited the defens e s of equitable e s topp el and lache s , and (2) C alSTRS was barred by principles of equitable estoppel and by the equitable de fense of laches from making benefit adjustments to Teachers ’ monthly pension payme nts.
Teacher s filed a petition for rehearing in Blas er I

. Th e ir las t arg ument addres se d

thi s cou rt ’ s discussion in the opinion concerning eq uitab le e stoppel and laches defenses

t hat the t ri al court h ad observed i n its intend e d decision had not been assert ed by

Teachers

. Tea cher s a sserted that th is court h ad impr operly co nclud e d th at they had

forfeit ed these defen s es. CalST RS reiterated in its answer to th e reh earing petit ion that

Teachers ha d fo rfeite d the equ itable estoppel and lac hes de fenses

. Signifi cantly, neither

Teachers nor CalSTRS addre ssed in th e reh earing peti tion or th e an swer , respectiv ely
, whether the defenses could appropriately be asserted in this case

. Specifically, b eca use equitable estoppel and laches had not been asserted by Teachers below, the legal issues presented to the trial court after remand an d r ev iew ed in the current appe al

— whe ther estoppel w as inapplicable because it would require CalSTRS to perform act s beyond its statutory authority, and whether the equitable defense of lac hes was unavailable becau se
the action was one at la w

— were not advan ced b y the partie s

. O n August 6, 201 9, this court issued an ord er de n ying the petiti on for re he aring

and o rderin g t hat the o pinion be mod ified in several respect s. As it c oncerned Teacher s ’

failure to asse rt e q uitable est oppel and lac hes, the op i nio n was modi f i ed to delete the

conclusion th at the defenses had b een forfeited
, and repl aced it w ith language remanding

th e cas e to the trial court t o consider, upon request, wheth er T eachers w oul d be permitted

to asse r t the two defen ses, and, if i t foun d th ey cou ld b e asserted, “ to determ ine whethe r15

under such doctrine (s), CalSTRS is precluded from a sse rting cla ims related t o

ove rpaym ents not otherw is e time

- barred. ” ( B laser I
, supra , 37 Cal.Ap p.5 th at p. 37 9 .)

In the pr e sen t appeal, Teach er s argu e that “ th is Cou rt w a s n ot p ersuaded ” by

CalSTRS ’ s a rgume nts in opposition to the rehearing petition in Blaser I
, a n d therefore

because CalSTRS “ raises essentially th e same issue s n ow that could, an d shou ld , ha ve
been raise d earl i er [
, it] . . . shou ld now be barred from s uch c o nte ntio ns on appeal.
[Citatio n.] ” In essence, as this court understands it, Teachers assert that CalSTRS

pros pectively waived or abandoned its appellate challenges to the trial cou rt ’ s later

fi n din gs on remand that (1) Teachers had not forfeited th e un a s serted defenses of equitable e stoppel and laches
, and (2) those defens es applied to bar CalSTRS from making benefit adjustment s to Teachers ’ monthly payments. And Teache rs argue on appeal that
, i n r emand ing the case to the trial cour t after co n sider i ng a n d denying

Teachers ’ petition f

or rehearing ( Blaser I
, su

pra , 37 Ca l.App.5 th at page 379 )
, this court in the prior appeal “ implici t ly rejected ” CalSTRS ’ s contention here t hat laches i s
unavailable in this contin u ous a ccr ual case.

Teac hers misapprehen d th e effect of this court ’ s modification order in Blase r I and the impact of remanding the c ase to the trial court. This court i n its modificatio n order in the prior appeal did not adjud icat e

— as Teachers suggest in m ul tiple locat i ons of t he ir appel late b rief h e re

— that Teachers had or ha d not forfeited the equitabl e estoppel and

laches de f

enses. Nor did this court
, in mod if ying th e opinion in Bla s er I
, determi ne
whether or not (assuming t he defen se s were not f orf eited) equit able es to pp el o r lache s appl ied to b a r CalSTRS ’ s overpa yment claim. Specifically, th is court in the prior appeal

did not reach the m erits of the q uestions presente d i n this appeal
, including (1) whether estoppel w as in applicable because it would require CalSTRS t o pe rfo rm act s beyo nd i ts

st atutory authority ; (2) whether the equitable defense of laches was unavailable becau se
the action was o ne at law ; and (3) whether laches could be determined to apply here
,

no twithstan ding th is court ’ s holding in Blaser I that under the continuou s accr ual t heory,16

som e , b ut not all, of CalSTRS ’ s actions in making benefit adjustments wer e time

- barre d.

Rath er, th is court

—

be c ause the equita ble defenses h ad not been asserted by Teacher s
bel o w and thus had no t been consi dered in the prior pro ceedings ( as th e tria l court

ex p res sly noted )

— deter mi ne d that these two issues shoul d b e decided initia lly (if requested to do so) by the t r ial court
, and this court re manded the case for t hat purpos e

. T he opinion , a s modified, in Bl aser I did n ot

— as appa ren tly cla im ed b y Tea chers here

—

act as a prospective bar to Cal STRS ’ s challenge of any subsequen t ruling by the tri al

cou rt on r emand, nor di d it immunize that ruling f rom ap pellate review.

C

. Cl aim T hat Defense s of Equitabl e Est oppel and Laches Were Forfe ited

1

. U nd erly ing P rocedural H

is tory The procedural history related to CalSTRS ’ s position that Teachers forfeited (or waived) the defenses of equitable estoppel and laches is undisputed. 7 Teachers did not allege equitable estoppel o r l aches as defense s in thei r v er ifie d or first ame nd ed petition s and complaint s

. 8 B ut Teachers did asse rt in bot h plea d in gs anothe r d efense to

CalST RS’ s claim of overpaymen t s wi th respect to Teachers ’ pension benefits , i.e

. , t he

statute of limitations

. From the rec or d befor e us, it a pp e ars that the s tatute of li mi ta ti ons

7 “ Althoug h the los s of the right to challenge a ru ling on appeal because of the failure to o bject in the trial cou rt is ofte n referred to as a ‘ waiver, ’ th e co rr ect l egal term for the l oss o f a right based on f ailur e to ti mely ass ert it is ‘ for feiture, ’ bec ause a p erson who fails to preserve a claim forfe its that claim. ” ( In re S.B. (2004) 32 Ca l.4th 1287, 1293, f n. 2
, supers e ded by s tatute on other gr o und s as s tated in In re S.J. (20 0 8) 16 7 Cal.App.4th 953, 9 62 ; s e e a lso Mi n t on v. Cavaney (19 61) 56 Cal.2d 576, 58 1 [holdin g that defendant “ waived the def ense of the statute of limitations ” ].)

8 The reco rd in the p res ent appeal incl udes s elec ted po rtions of the appellate rec ord in Blase r I. Ce rtain portions of the r ecor d i n B l aser I that ar e re levant in t he i ns tant ap peal are not part of ou r appell ate record here. Acc ordingly, afte r ad v isin g t he parties and giving th em an oppo rtuni ty to stat e thei r respecti ve po sitions concern ing the p o tential inclusion of the enti r e ap pel lat e rec ord in Bla se r I in the i n st an t appea l, and having received responses i ndica ting th at neither party had obj ection
, w e take j udicial notice on

our own m otion o f th e appellat e reco rd in Bl a se r I (to t he ext ent port ions o f that record are not in cluded in the record in this case )

. (See Evid . Code, § 4 59, subd. (a) .)17

argum ent Teachers made below was based
, at least chi e fly, upon the same underlying

facts s upporting the d efen ses of laches and estoppel. 9 A n d at t he heari ng in A p ril 20 17

on Teachers ’ petition for wr it of m andate, th ei r co unsel did not co nten d tha t Ca l STRS

was bar red from ma kin g b e nefit a djustments based up on principles of equitable estoppel

or laches. I n t he trial court’s intende d decision follo w ing t he h earing on the writ petition,

it noted that Te achers had nev er as sert ed eq uitabl e estoppel o r la ch es, “s o the court d oes
not consider them.” Teachers raised laches a n d estop pe l for the first ti me i n their

r espondents’ brief f

il ed in August 2018 in Blaser I

. 2

. This Court Need Not Resolve Forfeiture Issue

On appeal, T each ers f

a il to address CalSTRS ’ s contention that the trial court erred in concluding that Teachers had not fo rf ei ted the right to assert t h e defen ses of equi table

esto pp el a nd laches

. T e ache rs , however, made two arguments before the tri al cou rt in

su p p or t of thei r pos ition that they sho ul d be allowed to assert the defen ses

. First
, Te a chers argued in their mot io n th at they had not asserted def enses “ in the P etition based

o n laches and estoppe l becau s e

. . . [ those] doctr ines . . . are essentia lly equ i t a ble d e fe nse s to an action [ cit at io n ]

. ” ( O rigina l underscoring

. ) Therefore, Teache r s argued, beca use
CalSTRS ’ s reduc tion of benefits ( beginn ing in 2014 ) was based “ on

. . . no viable legal or

p rocedural claim,

. . . there was no legal theory fo r Petiti on ers to defen d against

. ”
( O rigina l underscoring

. ) Seco nd, Teachers argu e d below that w hen the y f i led the p etition

and com plai nt , “ th e y had no idea w hat th e basis for [ Ca lSTRS ’ s ] action was, ” and did not
know ( until it was d etermine d by this court in Bla se r I )
, “ t ha t the fili ng of the Petition[]

wo uld itself b e deemed to have c ons tituted [ Ca lSTR S ’ s ] ‘ a ctio n. ’ ” The trial cou rt

g ranted Teac hers leave to ass ert the defenses

. It found “ that it woul d b e in equitable t o

9 It shou ld be noted that the two defenses of statute of limitations and laches are of ten r aised i n ta ndem. (See, e.g., Shewry v. Begil (2005) 128 Cal. App.4th 63 9, 645

- 646 ( Shewry ); David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley (1988 ) 20 3 Cal.App.3 d 8 84, 893, disapproved of o n other grounds by Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Ca l.4th 1225, 1239.)18

require them to have ra ised a ffi rmative d ef e nses base d upon a l ater Court of Appea l [ ’ s ]

cons t ruction i n this case as to w hen an ‘ action ’ commenced, which [Teach ers ] co uld not

have for eseen. ”

CalSTRS argues on appeal that Teachers ’ fir st argu ment fails because it i s
immaterial whether t he unas se rted de fense s were equitable or legal ; Teachers s hould have alleg ed t hem. And CalSTRS points out that the fa ct that Teachers did assert anoth er
defense b elow

— that CalSTRS ’ s benefit adjustments w ere bar red by the statute of

l imitations

— negated the ir argu me nt that they could not have allege d e arlier the defenses

of e quitable estoppel or laches. 10 In response to Teachers ’ second ar gu ment, CalSTRS

states that any claim that Tea chers did not know “ th e basis for [ Ca lSTRS ’ s ] a ction ” does

not withstand sc rutiny, b ecause Teach ers “ discuss ed the sixth [

- ] period compensa t ion
issue [that was the basis for reducing Teachers ’ benefits ] a t length in their writ petition. ” (Original italics. ) CalSTRS argues that Tea chers therefore forfeit ed the defenses of equitab le esto pp el or l aches by failing to plead or otherwis e assert them bel ow. (See
Roam v. Koop (1974) 4 1 Cal.App.3d 10 35 , 1044 [estoppel forfeited]; Caviglia v. Jarvis
(1 955) 135 Cal. App.2d 415, 420 [laches fo rfeited].)

As we discuss below, we conclude as i ssue s o f law tha t th e de fense s of equit a ble estoppel and la ch es were not available in this case

. Th e re fore, it is unnecessary for us to

decide whether the trial co u r t err ed in conc luding that T eachers ha d not forfeit ed the

unasserted defenses. ( Bena ch v. County o f Los A ngele s (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836,

84 5, f n. 5 [a ppellate courts will not address iss u es whose resolution is unnecessary to the dispo si tion of the appeal ] .)

10 CalSTRS also n ote s that t he attorney who represented the petition er s i n Bax te r

— in which the d efen ses of e quitabl e estoppel and laches were specific al ly alleged

on b ehalf of the Baxter petitioners

— was also one of the a ttorneys repre sen ting Teachers here.19

D

. Potent ia l A p plicati on of Equ itable Estoppe l Defense

1

. Equitable Estoppel Gener ally

The d octrin e of equ itable estop pel is fou nde d on “ ‘ “ [ t ] he vital principle

. . . that
[ a pe rso n ] w ho by his [or her] la ngua ge or conduct le ad s an other to do wha t he [or she]

wo uld not other wise have done shall no t subject such person to loss or in jur y by

dis ap pointi ng th e expect ations upon which he [or she ] ac ted. Such a change of position i s

s ter n ly forbidden. It involv es f raud and falseho od , an d the law abhor s both. ” ’
[Cit ation.] ” ( Ci ty o

f Lon g Beach v. Man sell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 488 ( Mans ell ) .) “ Th e
elemen ts of the doct rin e a re t hat (1) the party to be estopped must be ap pri s e d o f the facts; (2) he [or she ] must intend th at his [or her] condu ct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the p a rty asserting the estoppel has a ri gh t to believ e i t was so i ntende d; (3 ) t he

oth er par ty m ust be i gnorant of the true state of facts; an d (4) he [or she ] must rely upon
the conduct t o his in

jury. [Citatio n.] ” ( Strong v. County of Sant a Cruz (1975) 15 C a l.3d
720, 725 .) The doctrine may b e invoked to pre c lude a pa rty fr om as serting a st atu te o f

li mita tions defense

. ( See, e.g., Lantzy v. Cente x Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 3 63, 38 4

. ) 11

I n general, equitabl e es toppel “ mus t be plead e d, eit her as a part of the c a use of

a ction or as a defense

. [Citation.] ” ( Cent ral Nati o n al Ins . Co. v. California Ins.

Gua rant ee Assn. (1985) 1 65 Cal.App.3d 453, 460 ; se e also Transport I ns. Co

. v. TIG Ins.

Co. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 984, 1 0 0 1

. ) The par t y ass e rti ng the estop pel de fe ns e be ar s
the burden of proving its applicati on

. ( Buschin g v. Sup erior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 44,

53

. )

11 The doctrin e o f e q uitab le estoppel is codifi ed i n Eviden ce Code section 6 23: “Wh enever a pa rty h a s, b y his [o r her] own statement o r conduct, i nt en tiona lly and delibera tely led anot her to believe a particu lar thing true and to act u pon su ch belief, he [ or she] is not
, i n a n y lit igation arising out o f su ch state ment or conduct, permitt ed to contr adict it. ”20 2

. Estoppel Against Gove rnmental Enti ty

E quitab le est op pel may be asserted as a def e n se , in appropri at e circumstan ces , to
d efea t action by a governm ent al ent it y “ ‘where jus tice and right require it.’ ” ( Man s el l
,

su pra , 3 Cal.3d a t p. 4 93 ; see a lso Feduniak
, supra , 14 8 Cal.App.4t h at p. 1359 [ “ [t] he

go vernme nt is no t immune from the doctr i ne ” of equitabl e estoppel] .) But “ [ e ] sto p pel against the gove rnm ent ma y be applied ‘ only in the most extraordinar y case wh er e the inju stice is great and the pr eced ent set by the esto ppel is narr ow

. ’ [Citat ion.] ” ( Cl ary v. City of Crescent City (2017) 1 1 Cal.App.5th 274, 285 .) Ca l STRS does not disagree that
estopp el may be applied against a gov ernmental entity

. B u t it asserts tha t in th is instance,

the tr ial court erred as a ma tter of law by applying e quitable e stoppe l. Cal S TRS bases

th is p o sitio n on the fact t hat “ principles of estoppel may no t be invoked to dir ectly

contra vene statutory limitations

. ” ( Medina
, s u pra , 112 Ca l.Ap p. 4t h at p. 869

. )

The Calif orn ia S u p reme Court has held that “ it is cle ar ‘ tha t neither the doctrine of estoppel no r a ny other equitable princip le may b e invoked against a governmen tal bo dy where it would operate to defeat th e effect ive o p e rat i on of a pol icy a dopted to protect the publ ic. ’ [Citation.] ” ( Kaji ma/Ray Wil so n v. L os An g eles County Metropolitan Transp.

Aut h or ity (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 316 .) Likewise, “no court has expre ssly i nvo ked principles of estoppel to contr avene di rectl y any statutory o r con stituti onal limitations.”
( Longshore v. County of V entura (19 79 ) 25 C al.3d 14, 28 ( Longshore ) ; see also Smith v

. Gov erning B d. of Elk Grove Unif ie d Sc hool Di st. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 563 , 569
[es toppel may not be asserted against a p u bli c entity whe r e doi ng so would “ rewr ite a

st atutory limitation on a b enefit or privilege ” ]

. )

In Me din a , supra , 112 Cal.App.4th 8 64

— re lied on by CalSTRS

— the appella nts

were tw o County of Los Angeles (C ounty) deputy district at to r neys who ha d previousl y been emplo yed as C oun ty deputy sheriffs. ( Id. at p. 866 .) Unde r the C o unty ’ s public

ret irement system
, as d eputy sh eriffs, the appella nts we re cl as sifi ed properly as safety

member s, but th ey should have been , but were not, reclassifie d as g eneral m em b ers upon21

becoming d eput y distri ct attorneys. ( Ib id. ) A fter the error w as di sc overed seve r al years later during an a udit, the ret irement associa tion re clas sified the appellant s and sent them

r efunds fo r exc ess retirement contributions

. Th e y c hallen ged this action by fili ng a

pe tition for writ of man date and complai n t , cont e nd ing (u n s uccessfully) that the

rec l assif ication was barred by p rinci pl es o f equitable estoppel , and “ they [ha d] obtained a

v ested right to be classified as sa fet y memb ers

. ” ( Ibi d. )

T he appellate cou rt i n M

edina not ed that the S u preme C ou rt had held in

Lo ngshor e , supra , 25 Cal.3d at page s 2 8 t o 29
, that in public e m ployee pension case s
where estoppel had been f oun d applicable
, the court s had “emphasi zed th e u niqu e
im port an ce of pension r ig hts to an empl oy ee ’ s well

- being. ’ [Citat ion. ] ‘ In ea ch of th e s e instances the potential injustice t o e mpl oyees or their depende n ts clearly outweighed any

adverse ef

fects on e sta blished public policy. However
, no c ourt h as expr essl y in vo ked principles of estoppel to c on tra vene directly any stat utor y or cons ti tution a l limitations. ’
[Citations.] ” ( Medin a , sup ra , 112 Cal.App.4th at p

. 869, ori ginal italics. ) The Medi na

court f oun d that under relevant p rovisions of t he Gov ern ment Cod e, i t was clear that

co unty prosecuto rs we re not safety members, and the reti re ment b o a rd had no authority to classify the a p pe lla nt s as safety members. ( Id. at pp. 8 69

- 870.) Holding that the appel lan ts could not claim that the government al en tit y wa s es topp ed from reclassif yi n g them, t he M ed ina court concluded: “ [E ] stoppel is barred wh e re the g overnment agency to be estopped does n ot pos sess the author ity to do what it appeared to be doing. He re, respondent s cannot be est opped from reclassifyi n g ap pellants a s general membe rs,
becau s e they d id not possess the author ity to continue to cl a ssify a p pellants as safety

members after the y be came di strict attor neys e ven though they appeared to be doing so. [Citation s.] ” ( Id. at p p. 8 70

- 87 1 .)

S im ila r ly, in Fle ice v

. Chualar Union E l e mentary S chool Dist

. (1988) 206

Ca l.App.3d 886
, 888 ( F l eice )
, a schoo l t ea che r , aft er working one y ear, was mistakenly

classified by the school dist r ict as a permanent tenured e mployee pri or t o serving t he22

requisite two years of probat ion ar y service . The dist rict , after disc over i ng the e r ror,
reclassified her a s a probation a r y emp loyee and therea fter d ecided not to rehire her.
( I bi d. ) T he school teac her filed a petition for wri t of ma ndat e t o compel he r rehiring as a

tenured emplo yee , wh ic h was denied

. ( Id. at p. 889.) On appeal, she a rgued, inter al ia,

that t he school di s t r ict was equitably es toppe d from revoki ng its prior erroneous g rant of

tenured statu s. ( Id. at pp. 889
, 893 .) A pa n e l of t his cou rt rejected this argument,

ackno wle dg in g the excepti on “ t hat estoppe l can not expand a public agency ’ s powers. Thus, princi p l e s of estoppel are no t inv ok ed to contr avene statutes and cons t itutional provisions that define an agency ’ s powers. [ Ci tati ons.] ” ( Id. at p . 8 9 3

. ) Because, as t he

co ur t found, the Educa tion Code r equir ed teachers t o serve a two

- year probat ionary perio d a nd therefore a schoo l boa rd lacked the power to grant early t e nure ( i d. at

p p

. 889

- 893 ) , it concluded th at equitabl e es topp el did not apply: “ Fleice asks the cou rt to

o rder a public agen cy to do wh at it has no stat u tory power to do

. . . . The common l a w doctrine of equitab le es to ppel does n ot authorize us to rewr i te the Education Code. ” ( Id.
at pp. 8 94

- 895 .)

Furt h e r, in C i t

y o f Pleasanton
, supra , 211 Cal.App. 4th 5 22 , which involv ed

c ircumstances not d issimilar t o those presented here
, a retiree (Li n h a rt) invoked equitabl e estoppel where the amount of hi s benef its had been erroneously calculate d (in his fa vor)

. In the eight y ears prior to Linhart ’ s retirement, the C i ty of Pleasant on (C i t y) had mad e
Cal ifornia Pub lic Employees ’ Retirement System (PER S) c o ntribu t ions for hi m and five

ot her empl oyees that wer e calcu lated to incl u de standby pay as being specia l

compens atio n , and tho se empl o yees believed the ir re tir ement b e nefits wo uld be based in
part on su ch standby pay. ( Id. at pp. 52 7

- 52 8 .) PER S be c a me aware in July 2006 that standby pay had been includ ed i n the reported base pay for Linhart, and it then a dvised

th e C i ty that “ s ta ndby pay was not reportable com pen sa ti o n for ret ire m ent purposes and

that payroll reporting for Linhart had to be cor re ct e d to exclude it. ” ( Id

. a t p. 528 .) In its

estimate , t he C i ty ha d advised Lin h art that his pensionabl e final comp ensa tion would23

inc lu de st andby pay. ( Ibid. ) T he C ity
, on behalf of its elf and several e mploy ees , filed an

unsu ccessful adm inistrative appeal

. ( I d. at pp. 528

- 530

. ) T he C i ty and Linhart then filed

a peti tion for writ of mandate to c ompel PERS t o re troactive ly i ncrease t he monthly

reti re me n t allowance to Linh ar t

. ( I d

. at pp . 525, 530

. ) The tria l cour t ruled in favor of

L inhart. ( Id. at p . 5 3 1.)

T h e appellate cour t reversed. It c onclude d from its review of the P ublic Employees' Ret irement Law ( Gov

. Code
, § 200 00 et seq. ; PERL ) and ap pl ic a ble regulation s tha t Linhart ’s stan dby pay was no t i nclud a b le in cal culating his pensionabl e
final com pen sation. ( C i t

y o f Pleas anton , supra , 211 Cal.App .4th at p . 537 .) T he court

then addressed L in hart ’s argument that PER S w as “ esto pp ed by its own conduct fro m denying him hi gher pension b enefi t s

. ” ( I d. a t p. 54 2.) Noting that PERS c o nt ended, quoting Medin a , supra , 112 Cal.App.4 th at pa ge 870, th at “estoppel is not available

‘ where the go vernment agency to be est opped doe s no t posse ss t h e authority to do what it

appea red t o be doing ’ [ c it ation s ]
, ” the app ellat e court held that Linhart co uld not assert
estop pel. ( C i t

y o f Pleasant on , supra , 211 C al .App. 4th at p. 542 .) The court reasoned:

“ Linhart makes no claim [ Gov ernmen t Co de] sec ti on 20125 or any other provision of

PERL a uthorized the board t o make his sta n dby pay p e nsionable even tho ugh i t did not quali fy a s such under [Gov er nment Code] sectio n 20636.

. . . Beca u s e w e

. . . f i nd
[ G ov ernment Code] section 2063 6 did at all times preclu de PE R S from treatin g Linhart ’ s

stan db y pay as pe nsi on a ble compens ati on, w e hold any award of bene fits to Linha rt
based on es toppel is barred as a matter of law. ” ( Id. at p. 543 .) Lastly, in McGlyn n v. State of California (2018) 2 1 Cal.App .5th 548 , 551
( M cGlyn n )
, six judges brought a p etiti on for writ o f m an d ate contending they were entitled to pensio n benefits as provided f or under the Judges ’ Re tirement System II (JRS

II ) in 2012 when the judges w er e e lected , even though they did not take off ice until

Ja nuary 7, 201 3

. “ [ O ] n January 1 , 201 3, JRS II bec ame s u bject to the p rovis ions of the

California P ublic Employees' Pension Re form Act of 2013 (PE PRA), which amended24

virtually all state employee reti re me n t systems , ” including JRS II

. ( Ibid

. , fn . omitted. )

The p etitio ners app ealed after the tr ial court s ust ai ned a demurrer to th eir petition on
various grounds, including the g rou nd that “ estoppel co uld not apply because the state respondents could not b e c ompelled to act beyond their authorit y, w hich they wo uld d o if

th ey treat ed appellan ts as w ithin pre

- P EPR A JRS II. ” ( Id. at p. 55 3 .) The appellate co urt
held that estoppel w as unavailable , conclud ing that , notwithstanding that “ state personnel

told [the petiti oners] several t im e s P EPRA did not apply to the m and for more than a year

the state t reated them as mem bers of pre

- P EPR A JRS I I

. . . , r espondents cannot be

e stopped from correcting a legal mistak e and ensuring that JRS II is managed in conformance with the operative s ta tu t es , in cluding PEPRA. ” ( I d. at p. 561

. )

3

. Estop

pel May N

o t Be I n voked b y Teach ers
T h e u n d e r l y i n g cir cumst ances here , like those in the fou r cases discussed above
, support the conclusion that estoppel is not available aga inst the governmental entity

because it s i nv oca t io n wo uld re qu ire CalSTRS to take action beyond i ts st atut o ry

au th ority

. Those cir c umstan ces are not in di spute and have been recited in th is court ’ s opinions in Baxter and Blas er I.

a. Description of Reporting (Coding) Error The overpa yment issue was ide n ti f ied in t he accounting fir m ’ s a udi t fin d ings of

Dece mber 1, 2 00 8, in CalSTRS ’ s late r draft a ud it r e port , and its final July 30, 2010 au dit

rep ort t hat resulte d in the administrative proceeding and later writ proceeding involving

the B axter petitioners. T he essence of th os e findings was th at t h e D is trict had impro pe rly

coded and rep orted the sixth

- per i o d earnings of CalSTRS mem bers that w e re par t of the audit ( including the Baxter petitioners) as cred itable to their res pe ctive DB P ro gram

accounts , result i ng in the o verstatement of th eir mon th ly p ens i on benefits

. ( Ba xter ,
supra , 18 C al.App .5th at p p. 3 4 9

- 350 .) A s e xplained in the fina l au dit: “ T he District

inc or re ctly reported (coded) 11 members ’ extra si xth period earnings to the DB program.

The D i st r i ct created a sixth [

- ] period salar y s ch e dule wh ich added 16

. 6 6 p ercent (1/6) o f'25

ea r n ings b a sed o n a regular full

- time teaching ass ignment to the affected teache rs ’

salaries

. The D i str i c t reported th i s e xtra l 6 .6 6 percent salary t o the DB Program usi ng
As s i gn men t Cod e 57 (full

- t i m e employ e e ) C o ntribut ion Code l (no r ma l m ember

c ont r ib u tio n s )

. T his co d i n g along with adding the extra e a rni ngs to regular salary

in co rrectly resulted in crediting member comp en sation and employe r and member

contributions to t he D B P rogram. The Distr ic t is requi re d t o report the extra

16.6 6 percent ea rnin gs for teaching t he s i xth pe ri od o n a separate report ing lin e us ing Assig nment Code 55 (pa r t

- time employee) Contribution Cod e l (normal member contributions). This reporting w il l re sult in correctly crediting th e emp l oyer an d mem be r
contri bu tions to t he D efi ned Benefit Supp l e m ent (DBS ) Program. ” It was als o noted in

the fina l audi t report that it was probable that “ t he District also incorrectly reported (coded) these earn ings for other mem b ers to CalS TR S a f ter the 2006

- 07 school year. ”
( S ee i d. at p. 371.)

b. Statutory Dis cussion

T he D is tr ict ’ s coding and re po rt ing of Teachers ’ compensation for sixth

- period as
DB

- creditable con travened the Education Code for the reasons we dis cuss

. 12 (Be cause
there ar e several defi ne d t e rms in the Educa t i on Code that are imp ortant to this a nal ys is,

for c lar ity, we will add bol d i talics w herever those terms appear in th is paragraph an d the

succe eding five p aragraphs .) Unde r th e sta tutory framew ork, r etire ment allowance s are
calcula te d b y the administr ato r, CalSTRS , based u p on a member ’ s comp e ns a tion

ear nable in his or her fin al co mpensat ion period. ( § § 23134.5 , subd. (a)
, 22135,

subd. (a)

. ) 13 Under former section 22215, su bdiv ision (a), in ef fe ct as of Ja nuary 1, 201 3
,

12 At th is cour t ’ s request, th e parties sub mitt ed supplementa l briefing concerning whether the District ’ s c o d ing and reporting o f Teachers ’ comp ensation for sixth

- period work as DB

- creditable contravened the Education Code. We have c onsidered that briefin g in our analysis here.

13 Ci tations to the Educa tion Code in this para graph and th e su cceeding three paragraphs are to the versions curren tly in effect , unless o therwise specified

. T he statutes26

“ c ompensation earnable ” was defin ed a s “ creditable com pensation . . . , e xclu d ing

service f or which contributions are credited by the system to the Defined Benefit Supplement Program.” (See Stats.2013, c h. 55 9
, § 3 , p. 4581
, emph asis added

. ) 14

“ C reditable compensation ” is “ remuneration th at is paid i n cash by an employer

to a ll persons who are in the sa me c lass of employees and i s paid to an employee for

per forming credi table service in that position

. ” ( § 22119.2, subd. ( a )
, emp hasis added .)

Such “ cre dita ble com

pensation ” in cludes “ [ s]al ar y or wages paid i n accor da nce with a publicly available written contrac tual agreemen t, including, but not l imited to, a salar y schedule or empl o ym en t agreement , ” and “ [ r ] e mun e ration t hat is p ai d in addi ti o n to salary or wages, provid ed it is pa id t o all p e rsons who are in the same class of e mpl oyees
in th e sa me dollar amo unt, the same per centage of salary or wa ges , or the same

pe rcen tage of the amount being distributed. ” ( I d.
, subd. (a ) (1)
, ( 2)
, emphasis added .)

And u nd er that statu te, “ creditable compe n s ation ” ex clu des “ [r] emuneration that is no t paid in cash or is not pai d to all persons who are in th e same class of e mploye es

. ” ( Id.
, subd. ( d ) (1)
, emphasis added .)

Additio n ally, the policy considerati ons o f “ creditable comp ens atio n ” ar e
delin eate d in t he stat ute : “ Thi s de fin ition of ‘ cr editabl e compe n s ation ’ re fl ects s o und principl es tha t support the integrity of the re t ir ement fund

. Those principles includ e , but

are not lim ited to, consist ent trea t m en t of co mpensa tion throughout a me mb er ’ s c areer,

co ns isten t t r eatmen t of compensation a mong an entire class of em ployees
, consistent

cited here (excep t section 221 12.5) w ere amended subseq uent to F e br uary 1 , 201 3

. (P ursua nt to this court ’ s h olding in Blaser I
, Ca lSTRS may ma ke m onthly benefit

a djustm ents on a going forward basis on or after February 1, 2013

. ) We have considered the subs eque nt amendments to the sta tutes a nd have conc luded that they do n ot impact

our a nalys is he re.

14 Sec tion 22115, subdivision (c), currently provides: “ Compensation earnable excludes creditable compensati on for which contributions are credited by the syst em to the Defined Benefit Su pplemen t Progr am. ”27

treatm ent of compen sation for the position
, preventing adverse se lect ion, and excluding

from co m pensation e a rn able remuner ation that i s p aid to enhanc e a me m b e r ’ s benefi ts

. The system shall det ermine the appro pr iate crediting of contributions bet we en the

Def ine d Bene f

it Pro gram and the Defined Be n efit Suppl e m e n tal Prog ram according to these pri n cipl es , to the extent n o t oth e rw i s e specified pur sua nt to this pa rt

. ” ( § 22119.2,

sub d. ( g )
, empha sis added

. )

Furthe r , t he E ducation Code d efines “ ‘ class of employee s ’ ” as “ a n umber of empl oyees considered as a group b ecause they are employe d to perform si mi lar dutie s , are employed in the same type o f program, o r sh ar e other simi lar ities related to the natur e
of the w ork being pe rformed. ” ( § 22112.5, subd. (a)
, emphasis added .) “ ‘ Fu ll time ’

means the day s or h ours of creditable serv ice the employer requi r es to be performed by a

c l a ss of employees in a school term in order to earn th e annualize d pa y rate a s d e f i n e d i n
S e c t i on 22104. 8 and speci fied under t he terms of a collective bar ga in ing agr eement or

emp loymen t agreement

. ” ( § 22138 .5, subd. (a) (1)
, emph asis added .) 15

c . Educatio n Code Does Not Authorize T re atment o f

Co mpen sa tion for Sixth

- Peri o d Work As DB

- Creditab le Based upon the st atutory framewor k disc ussed abo ve , the D istrict ’ s coding and reporting of Teachers ’ compensat i on for sixth

- p eriod work as DB

- c reditable was

erroneous and contrar y to law

. As a g eneral matt er, we conc lude it wa s in contrave ntion

of the Education Code because t he District ’ s codi ng t reat ed some member

- teachers

wit hin the “ same class of employe es ” ( § 22119. 2, subd. (a )
, emphasis add ed ) differently

tha n ot hers

. Compe ns ation for sixth

- period work perf ormed by t hose memb er s

— such as

15 The definition “

full

- time ” is r eleva nt in determining a member ’ s benefits. Unde r section 22104.8, subdivision (a), “ ‘ [ a ] nnualized pay rate ’ means the sa lary or wages, as described in Section 22119.2 or 22 119.3, a person could earn during a school term for an assignmen t if creditable s ervic e were performed for that as signment on a fu ll

- time basis. ” (E mphasis added .)28

T eachers and the Baxter pet itioners

— was deemed by the District to be “ [ c ] reditable

compens ation
, ” notwithstanding that i t was not “ remuneration

. . . paid i n cash by an employer to all per so ns who are in the sa me class of emp loyees

. ” ( § 2211 9. 2, su bd

. (a)
, empha sis added ; s ee also id

. , subd. ( d ) (1)
, emphasis added [ “ creditable compen sation ”

exclu des “ [r] em uneration that is not paid in cash or is not pai d to all persons who are in

the same class of e mploye es ” ]

. ) The coding an d reporting of sixt h

- period earnings as

DB

- cr edit able wa s also contrary to the policy consid erations of the Education Code that

there be “ consistent treatment of compensation

. . . among an entire class of employ ees

. ”
( Id.
, § subd. (g )
, e mphasis added

. ) Moreover, because t he schedule of full

- t ime wor k
(see § 22138.5, subd. (a )(1) ) for the cl ass of emp loyees at issue here consisted of t he fi ve

t eaching period s and a s ixth prep ara tion (non teaching) period, the ad ditional compensation p a id t o me mbers who ele cted to te ach the s ixth perio d (and perform their

pre paration either bef

o re o r afte r the work day) was c r editable to the DBS Program ; it was

not creditable to the DB P r ogram . ( Se e § 22703
, subd. (b) ; see also Bl a ser I
, supra , 37

Cal.A p p. 5t h at p. 357 [af

te r establishment of DBS Program
, hours worked beyond

full

- time work , s uch as o vertime or summer school work, “ were credit able to the DBS Program ” ] .) 16

Th e sa lient consider ation is that it cannot be r easo n ably arg ued that membe r

teac hers w ho performed sixth

- period wo rk ( such a s Teachers) we r e in a different class of employe es from teachers who taugh t the normal fi ve periods and util ized the si xth perio d

for lesson p lans

. Th ey all “ perform[e d] similar du ties , [were] employed in the sa m e t yp e

16 “ A member ’ s creditable service that exceeds 1.000 in a school year shall not be credited to the Defined Ben efit Pro gram. Commenci ng July 1, 2002, contr ib utions by the

e mploy er and the member that ar e deposited in the Tea chers' Retir emen t Fund for creditable compensation paid to the member f or service that exceeds 1.000 in a school year,

. . . , shall be credit ed t o th e Defin ed Benef it Supplement Program. ” ( § 22703
, subd .(b). )29

of program, [ and ] s hared o ther simil arities related t o the nature of the work being

pe rformed. ” ( § 22112.5, s ubd. (a).) 17

Therefo re, t he District ’ s coding ( report ing ) of the compensatio n of C al STRS

member s (including Teachers) for sixth

- period wo rk as DB

- c reditabl e was con trary t o t h e provis ions of the Educat ion Co de. This w as the find ing in the final audi t rep ort, a nd t hat finding was upheld by the ALJ and by the CalSTRS appeals committee a fter a n
ad mini st rative a ppeal by the District and the Ba xter petit ion ers

. The s ubs tance of the

final audit fi ndin gs

— that the Di s trict ’ s rep ortin g of members ’ comp ensation for sixth

period work as DB

- credi table was erro neous and not i n compliance w ith the law

— was

no t ch a llenged by the Baxter petiti o ne r s

. ( Baxter
, supra , 18 Cal.App.5t h a t p . 3 4 7 [no

“ dispu te that the D i strict misca l cu lated [th e Baxter petitioners ’ ] monthly bene fit

amo unts ” ] .) Nor was the s ubstan ce of the fin dings in t he final audit report challenged by

T eachers in the inst ant case

. ( B l aser I
, supra , 37 Cal.A p p. 5 th at p. 369 & f n. 13.) 18

Si nce the coding (reporting) of Teachers ’ si xth

- p eriod compensa tion as DB

creditab le was contrary to the terms of the Educat ion Code, es toppel canno t be asserted

here to compel the agency, CalSTRS , t o c a l culate and pay mon thly benefits tha t

errone ously inc lu de credi t for work that mu s t be credit ed to the DBS Program.

17 We note that the sta t ute defining “ [ c ] lass o f employe es ” rea d s in the dis junctive ( § 22112.5, subd. (a) , empha sis added ) , thus indicating that an y one of the three criteria will suffice . Here
, all t h re e cri teria are present demo nst rat ing t hat me mbe rs performing sixth

- p eriod work were in the “ s ame class of employee s ” as tho se who worked fi ve teaching periods and a si xth nonteaching period

.

18 Teachers alleged in the ir am ended petition and compl aint th at the District had violated the law betwee n June 20 14 and February 2015 by recod ing Teachers ’ comp ensation for sixth

- period work to be creditable to their DBS Program accounts
, thereby reduc ing their pension benefits. ( Blaser I
, supra , 3 7 Cal.Ap p .5th at p. 363 .) “ B ut

a s t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o n c l u d e d
, T eacher s did n ot co ntest the substance of the fin al audit ’ s concl u sion th at the District had incorrec tly report ed CalSTRS members ’ si xth

- pe riod

c ompe nsation as DB

- creditable; instead, Te achers a sserted ‘ technica l challenges ’ that CalSTRS ’ s claim was time

- barred. ” ( Id. at p. 369, original ita lics .)30

Borrowing from Fl eice
, supra , 206 Cal.Ap p.3d a t p ages 894 t o 895 : “ [ Teachers] ask []

the court to o rd er a public agency to do what it h as n o statutory power t o do

. . . . T he

common l aw doctrine of equi tab le estoppel doe s not author ize us to rewri te the E ducation

Code. ”

Eac h of the four cases dis cusse d, ante , suppo rts this c onclusion. I n Medina
, supra , 11 2 Ca l.App.4th 864
, estoppe l w a s u navailable because its applic ation would compel the

agency to classify the em ployees as safety mem bers , resulti ng in the inf lation of their

retirement ben efits
, in contraven tion of t he law. Similarly, i n Fleice
, su pra , 206

Cal .App.3d 886
, because “ estoppel cannot expand a publi c agency ’ s powers ” ( id. at

p. 893)
, it could n ot be asserted to requ i re t he dis trict to violate the Education Code b y classify ing the pet itioner

- teac her as a tenured empl oy ee , wh en she did not meet the

st atutory qualifications of a permanent

- status emp lo ye e

. In C i t y o f Pl e asanton , supra , 2 1 1 Cal.App.4 th 522
, the a gency, PERS , could not be compelled, th rough the application

o f equit able estoppel, to in clude

— as it h ad p reviously done in e rror

— extra (standby ) pay

as pe nsionable, where under the appl icable pen sion laws (PERL), the ag en c y had no authority t o act in that fashion. And in McGlynn
, supra , 21 Cal.App.5th 548
, estoppe l

could not be applied to c ompel the Boar d of A d m inistration of C alPE RS ( Cali fornia

Publ ic Employees ’ Retirement System ) to t re at p etit ioners as being i ncluded w i t hin the

retirement plan ( JRS II ) under pre

- PEPRA requirements , when the agency h ad no statutory autho rity to do so. As was true in each of these fo ur cases, appl ying es toppe l

here would r equire CalSTRS , from as early as Februar y 1, 201 3, 19 to mi s calculate

Teachers ’ m o nth ly retirement be nefits to inc lude cred it for compensation th at is not

DB

- credit abl e , in violation of the Educatio n Code. B orrowing language from McG ly nn , CalSTR S “ c annot be estopped from correcting a legal mistak e and en suring th at [the

19 As th is c ourt held
, CalST RS was not barr ed by the statute of limitations from making adjustments to Teachers ’ monthly benefits accruing on or after Februar y 1, 201 3. ( Se e Blaser I
, supra , 37 Cal.A p p. 5 th a t p. 378.)31

Teachers ’ R etir ement Law] is m anag ed in conformance with t he operative statu t e s

. ”
( McGlynn
, supra , 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 5 61

. )

F u rther, equitable est oppel cannot be appl ied her e t o effectively perpetuate the

erroneou s cal culation a nd payme nt of mon thly benef its becau se t o do so would

c ontr avene the law prohibitin g a gift of public f unds. “Section 6 of article XVI of the California Constitution provide s that the Legislatu re has no power ‘to make any gift or

authorize the making of a ny gift, of any p ublic money or thin g of value to any i ndiv idual, municipal or othe r corporation

. . . .’ ” ( Jordan v. Depa rtment of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 43 1, 450.) An entity ’ s p ayment of retirement benefits in an amount

g reater than tha t to whi ch a reti red public employee is entitled consti tute s an impermissible gift of public funds. ( A tchley v. City of Fresno (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d
635, 651.)

d. Teachers ’ Additional Arguments

Teacher s argue on appeal that Med ina and McGlynn do not sup port Cal STRS ’ s

po s i ti on concerning t he unavailability of e quitab le e stoppel here

. W h ile Teacher s acknowledg e th e princip le th at “ estoppel coul d not be asserted [against a governm ent agency] in the face o f a direct statutory limitation
, ” they argue that th is is not the cas e
here. Teachers a ssert tha t bec ause th e Educa tion Code contains “ no e xplicit

pronounceme n t on the cred itability of sixth [

- ] p eriod earnings pe r se , ” and it is si mply

CalSTRS ’ s current in terpretation that sixth

- period compensation is no t D B creditable,

the re is n o “ direct s t atuto ry l imitation ” p r eventi ng t he application of es toppel.

W e disagree

. First, Teachers ’ argument is tan tamount to their challeng ing the

results of the July 30, 201 0 final audit rep ort of CalSTRS . S u ch a pos ition is directly

co ntra r y to the posit ion t aken by Tea c hers throughout this case

. Te achers d id not rais e a substantive challenge to t he f inal audi t report

. I n stead , as the tr ial court found after t he original hear ing on the writ petitio n, “ Teachers did not cont est the subs tanc e of the fin al

audi t ’ s concl usion

. . . ; inste ad, Teachers as serted ‘ technical ch allenges ’ that CalSTRS ’ s32

clai m was time

- barred. ” ( Blas er I
, supra , 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 36 9
, original ita lics .)

Teachers ’ new p osit ion appears to be preclud ed under the the o ry of trial do ctri n e :

“ Where the parties try the cas e on the assumpt ion that cer tain issues are raised by the pleadings, or that a part icular issue is controlling, neither pa rty can chan ge t his theory for

purposes of review on appeal. [C itation.] ” ( Ful l er v. Departme nt o f Transportatio n (2019) 38 C al.App.5th 1034 , 1041 .) Second, 20 b as ed upon the various provisi ons of the

Education Code discussed above, CalSTRS was prohibited by statute in t he circumstances prese n ted here from calculating and paying mont h ly benefits by tre a ting

members ’ c ompensation for sixth

- perio d work a s DB

- credita ble. The fact that the

Educ a tion Code does not proscri be such agency a ction by specifically a ddressing th e

tr eatment of compensation for sixth

- period work is of no conse qu en c e to the analy sis. Lastly, Teache r s cite Cr umpler v. Board of Admi n istration ( 1973) 32 Cal.App.3d

567 ( Crum

pler ) as holding that an a gency , through a pplication of e stoppel, can “ be

forced to pay benefits in exce ss of its statutory mandate

. ” In Cru mpl er , t he PERS board

s ough t to reclassify animal c ontrol o fficers (th e officers) und er the retirement syste m
from local safe ty officers to m iscellaneous members, w ith a c orrespond ing reduction i n
retire ment benefits, notwithstanding the officers ’ having been tol d up on hiring th at t hey

would be entitled to th e same r etirement be nefi ts as polic e officers. ( Id. at p. 57 2.) T he Crump ler court ackn ow ledged the principle ap plicabl e here , n amely, that estoppel c annot

“ ‘ enlarge the power of a governmen t a gency or exp an d the authorit y of a public official. ’
[Citation.] ” ( Id. at p . 58 0 .) But becaus e th ere, the co urt identified a s tatute p roviding that

the board was “ ‘ the sole judge of the co nditions under which persons may be a dmitted to

and continue to receive benefi ts under [th e] syst em ’ [citation] ” ( id. at p . 578 )
, it fou nd

t h at the PERS board c oul d be estopp ed from retroactively r ecla ssifying the o fficers ( i d. at

20 The court ’ s a p plic ation of the t he ory of the case doctrine to preclude the appe llate ar g ument is discretiona ry. ( Arteaga v. Superior Court (2015) 233 Cal. App.4 th 851, 868 .) W e will therefore c onside r the merit s of Te ach ers ’ argument here.33

p. 584 )

. T he court rea soned that “this is not a case where th e government agency ‘utt erly lacks the po wer to effec t t hat which an estopp e l agains t it would accompli s h.’
[C itation.]” ( I

bi d. ) 21 I n contrast, h ere , there is no statute of the type relied on in

Cru mpler that vest s CalSTR S wit h the dis cretion to treat extra pay (compe nsation fo r
sixt h

- period wo rk perf

orm e d by onl y some members of a class of employees ) a s
D B

- creditable. Crumpler of fers no sup port for Teac hers ’ posi tion. Accordingly, the court e rred i n concluding that equitable estoppel applied to bar

CalSTRS from making benefit adjust ments for m onthly payme nts acc ruing on or after

Febr uary 1, 2013

. T ea c he r s ’ defense that CalSTRS was equitably estopped from making

b enefit a djustments to eli mina te compensation for six th

- period wo rk as DB

- creditable
,

was , as an issue of law, barred . (S ee C i t y o f P leasanton
, sup ra , 2 11 Cal.App.4 t h at

p

. 543

. ) 22

21 The c our t i n Cr umpler declined to “ e xt end es toppel to preclu de the b o ard f rom reclassifyi ng petitioners prospectively

. . . . Public int erest and policy would be adversely affected if [the officers] , des pi te the discovery o f the mist aken classification, w ere
re qu i red to be continued to be car ried a s local safety me mbers wh e n al l other contract members of the retirement system throughout th e sta te performing like duties and functions are cla ssified as misc el laneou s members. Manifestly , it would have a disr uptive e ff

ec t on the administration of the r etirement system. ” ( Crum p ler
, supra , 32 Cal.A pp.3d at p. 584 .) Further, the court rejected “ [ the officers ’ ] contention that the board is forever precluded fro m reclas sifying them b ecause the y have a vested right to be classi fied as l ocal safety mem bers

. . . . [ C] orrection of an e r r oneous classificati on cannot be equated to a modification or alter ation of earned pension rights. [The officers] have no vested r ig ht in an erroneous cl assificati on. ” ( Id. at pp. 585

- 586.)

22 At Teac hers request, we ha ve tak en judicial notice of recent ly ena cted legis lation, A ssembl y B ill No. 1667 (2021

- 2022 Reg Sess.) , effective January 1, 2023. The new legislation , inter alia, a me nds se ction s 24616 and 24617, and i t creates

se ctio n 24616 .2, addressing the c ollection of the overpayment of benefits to Ca lSTRS ’ s members

. The parties have not requested that this co urt address the impact, if any, of A ssembly B ill No

. 1667 upon this c as e, and we express no opini on on that issue.34

E

. Po tenti al A p plication o f Laches Defense

We will consider next whe ther the trial court properly found t hat CalS T RS was
barred by laches from making b enefit a dj ustments

.

1

. Laches Generall

y
As exp lained by the United S t ates S u preme C o urt, “ lach es is a defense develo p ed by cour ts of equity; its principal applic ation was
, a n d remains
, to claims of an equitabl e
cast for which the L egislature has pr ovided no fixed time limitation. [ Cit ati on .] Bot h

be fore an d after the mer g er o f law and equity in 1 938, this Court has ca u ti oned aga in st invoking laches to bar legal relief. [C i t ations.] ” ( Petrella v. Metro

- Goldw yn

- Mayer, Inc. (2 014 ) 572 U.S. 66 3, 678 , fn

. omitted ( Petrella ) .) Thus, “ [ t ] he doctr ine of l aches a pp lies

in e quit a ble ac tions alone. [Cita tions.]” ( Blue Cross o f Northern California v . Cory
(1981) 120 Cal .App.3d 723
, 743

- 744 .) It may be asse rted as a defense in “ an equitab le

action s eek ing a writ of mandamus

. ” ( Julian Volunte er Fire Co. Assn . v. Juli an

Cuyamaca F i re P ro tection Dist. (2021 ) 62 Cal.App.5th 583, 6 01

. )
Laches, as a succe ss ful affirmativ e de fense, requ i res a show i ng o f the plaintiff ’ s

unr easonable delay in fil ing suit, t o ge ther with either the plaintiff ’ s acquiesc enc e in the

cond uct about which it co m p lain s o r prejudice result ing to the defendan t b e ca use of the delay. ( Mi ll er , supra , 27 Cal. 3d at p. 62 4 .) The pr o pon e nt of the laches defe nse bears

the burden o f establi sh i ng its application. ( Ibid. )

2

. Un avai lability of Laches Defense

C a lSTRS asserts that the trial court erred in fi nd ing that CalSTRS was barred by

laches from ma king benefit adjustmen ts. First , it contends that Teachers could not asse rt
laches because i t is an e quitable def e n se t hat w as unavailable here to d efeat claim s f or

money judgments. Second, CalSTRS assert s

— r elated to , and further supporting the first
argument

— tha t because t h i s c our t held that under the conti nuous accrual theory
, CalSTRS’s b e ne f

i t a djustments were no t entirely time

- barred ( B lase r I
, supra , 3 735

Cal. App .5th at p p

. 365

- 3 6 8 )
, laches is unavailable as a defense to those su rviving claims.

We address these interrelated arg u me nts , which both involve questions of law, below. 23

a. Lac hes a s an Equit able De fense

“ [I] t is well

- estab lished, both in Califor ni a and gene r ally, tha t laches applies to

e quitab le actions, not actions at law. [C i tations.] ” ( Connolly
, supra , 204 Cal.App.4th a t

p

. 1164 ; see als o Petrella
, supr a , 572 U.S. at p. 67 8 [ “ courts of e quit y ” developed laches,

and “ its princi pal app lic ation w a s , a n d rema i ns, to claims of an equitabl e cast for which

the Legislature has pr ovid e d no fixed time limita tion ” ]

. ) Even where equ it able claims are

co mbined with act ions at law, laches r emains unavail able as a defense to the legal c laims.
( Abbo tt v. City of Los Ange l es (195 8) 50 Cal.2d 438, 462 ( Abbo tt ) [ equitabl e claim for

declarato ry r elief combined with cl aim seek ing money judgment ] .) Indeed, Teachers
, in

their mot ion after remand ex plaining their rea sons for not assertin g the d efense s of la che s

or eq uitable estoppel ear lier , stated that the y had not done so “ becau s e

. . . [ those]

doc tr ines . . . are essen tially equi ta ble d efe nses to an action [ cit at io n ]

. ” ( O rigina l underscoring

. )

I n R eid v. Cit

y of San Di ego (2018) 24 Cal.App.5t h 3 4 3 , 353 ( Reid )
, ho tel guests brought a putative class actio n in t he form of a c o mplaint for declaratory relief and a petition for writ of mandate in wh ich they challenged assessments levied that they

clai m ed cons titute d illegal t axes. The plaintiffs ap pea l ed from a judgmen t of dismissal

after the trial cour t sust ained a d emurrer in p art, upon st atute of limitations g roun ds. ( Id.
at p . 354.) The plaintiffs argued that, because the prim ary re lief they so ug ht was equitable in nature (declarator y relief and r estitut ion), the defense of laches, r ather than a

23 CalSTRS a ls o a s sert s briefly on appeal that Teachers su bmitted evidenc e in support of lache s ( o r est oppel) as t o only three of the 31 peti tioners in th is case. CalSTRS di d not devel op this apparent eviden tiary ar gum e nt in suppo rt of its claim of

err or a nd we there fore do not consider it. (See Stu a rd v. Stuar d (2016) 244 Cal.A pp .4th 768, 780 [a ppellant ’s undevelop ed argument d eemed forfeited ] .)36

30

- d a y s tatute of limitatio ns, should hav e been applied by the trial court. ( Id. at p. 362.) The appellat e court found no m erit to this posit ion. It he ld that “ ‘ whether lache s is

available in a declara t ory rel ief procee ding depend s upon th e nat u re of the u n der lying

claim. ’ [Citation.] Accor dingly, laches does no t apply as a defense to causes of action

see king money judgmen ts, e ven where joi ned with cl aim s in equity. [Citati on.]

. . . Plaintiffs ’ und er lying claim is th e City imp osed an un lawf u l t ax that r ais e s approximately
$25 million annu ally. Plaintiffs seek a legal reme dy

— ‘ monies paid by Plaintiffs a nd the

Class me mbe rs for the TMD Ass essment as t ra nsie nt occupants. ’ ” ( Ibid. )

We note at the o ut set of our discus sion a pro cedural an omal y in conside r ing

wh ether , as assert ed by CalSTRS
, laches cannot be asserted by Teachers because it was presented as a defense to a legal, not an equitable
, claim. From a stric t vi ewpoint of the pl eadings, the parti es allegi ng the c laims
, Teachers , wer e the ones asse rting the de f ens e

o f estoppel, not the defendant/ respondent CalSTRS defending a gainst the cl aims

. Thus,

Teachers ’ u nple aded defense of l aches was set i n the following pro cedural co ntex t : (1) R ather t ha n bri ng ing an act ion to recover o verp ayments made to Teachers
, CalSTRS
, beginning in 2014
, reduc ed Teach e rs ’ monthly payments to their correct amounts and

ma de ded uct ions for prior overpayments ; (2) Tea ch ers a lleged in t heir petition and complain t that C al STR S ’ s reduction s of their monthl y b e nefits was i mproper ; (3) CalSTRS defended Te a chers ’ petition and co mplaint by asserting that the challenged

reductions were justifi ed b ec ause prior paym ents had been o ver stated du e to the District ’ s

erroneous coding and re porting of com p e nsation for sixth

- period work as DB

- creditable;

and ( 4 ) Teachers , in response to CalSTRS ’ s d efense justif ying the reductions
, claimed on
remand that CalS TR S was barred by laches from ta king action to reduc e t he monthly

benefits

. (See Bl ase r I
, s upra , 37 C al.App.5 th at p

. 3 77 [holding tha t “ C al S TRS ’ s
conduct o f reducin g Teachers ’ monthly retirement benefits between Ju ne 2014 and

F ebruary 2015 di d not c o nst it ute the commenc ement of an ‘ ac tion ’ to s at isfy the statute
of limitatio ns under se cti on 2 2008 ” ].) A t the heart of the controversy was whe th e r37

CalSTRS could make reduc tions to reflect correctly t he cal culation of mo nthly benefits and to recoup prior over pa yments, or, alt ernatively, whe ther Teach er s could recover for

the alleg ed underpay men t of monthl y b e n efits

. An action at l aw is impli cate d, w hether

viewed from the lens of Teacher s ’ entitlement to recover y based up on underpayment of

benefits
, or fro m Ca lS TRS ’ s entitleme nt to collect o verpayments and corr ect prospectively the calculatio n o f monthly bene fi ts

. I t is clear that th e claims allege d by Teachers i n the first amended petition and complaint to which th e ir a sse rtion of laches was attach ed wer e le ga l, not equitabl e,
claims. A n examination of Teach ers ’ original and amended petiti on s and comp laint s
confirms th is co nc lusi on. Based upon t he prayer in bot h pleadings as to two causes of

action for traditional mand ate , Teachers s ought affirmative mo neta ry relief
, namely the

immediate restoration of (1) t heir benefits to amounts they ha d r eceived before t he re

reporting of sixth

- period w ork as DBS

- creditable had re s ulted i n a reduction of their

benefits ; (2) amounts previously deducted after the re

- re port in g of sixt h

- pe ri od work as

DBS

- creditable
, by “ payi ng such amounts immediately to P e ti tioners, along w ith interes t
there on at the legal rate ” ; and (3) amount s prev i ously deducted from their benefits for alleged overp ayments made to Teachers
, by “ payin g su ch am ounts immedi ately to

Petiti oners, along with in terest thereon at the legal rate

. ” F urther, thro ug h out the proceedin gs belo w ( includin g the proceedings on remand), Tea c hers asserted that CalSTRS, in reducing th eir mon thly pe nsion p ayments , had depri ved them o f the i r vested

benefit s. 24

24 I n Blaser I
, Teachers arg ued against th e application of the continu ous accrua l theor y “ becau se ‘ they hav e a vested righ t to th eir respective retireme nt benefit

. ’ ” ( Blaser I
, supr

a , 37 Cal.App. 5 th at p. 373.) This cou rt rejec t ed the argument: “ Although

w e agree that Teachers cl early hold ves ted rights to proper ly calcu lat e d retirement benefits , they have no s uch rights, vested or otherwise, to exces s payments based upon inc orre ct calc ulations

. ” ( Ibid .) Teachers do n ot renew their vested rights argument in th e p resent appeal.38

Based upon the p rayer in the ori ginal and amen de d peti tions and c om plain ts and

th ei r conten tions in the litig a tion, it is clear that Teachers asserted claims for money judgment s , i.e., recovery of Teachers ’ mon thl y pensi o n fund s alleged to have been

w r on gfully withheld by CalSTRS

. (See Abbott
, supra , 5 0 Cal.2d at p. 4 59 [ claim for money ju dgmen t is “ action [] at law ” ]. ) These are leg al claims ; the y are no different than the legal claims for recovery of alleg edly improper hotel assessments in Reid
, supra , 24 Cal.App.5th 343

. E ven i f Teachers ’ monetary cl aims we re j oined with equita ble claim s (de claratory relief

)
, the equitable defens e of estoppel could not be asserted a gainst th e legal claims. ( Id. at p. 3 62 ; se e also Abb ott , supra , 50 Cal.2d at p. 462 [ l aches

unavai lable in action t o enforce pension pay ments wh ere claim involved “ seek [ i n g ] to

r ecover money due [,] as the vested c ontr actual right of plai ntiff s ” was actio n at law, not in eq uity ] ; Shewr

y , supra , 128 Cal.App.4 th at pp. 6 45

- 646 [ laches defens e unavailab le to legal claim seeki ng reimbursement o f Medi

– Cal expend itures ]

. ) 25 Furth e r, alth ough

Teachers a ssert t hat the fact that they proceeded by fil in g a petition for writ of mandate suggest that the act ion was entire ly equitable, the form of the p l eading is not

determi native; the fact r emains that T eachers ’ amended petit i on an d complai nt, albe it its

inclu sion of decl aratory relief, also sou ght recovery of money which cons tituted a legal

claim

. ( Reid
, supra , at p. 3 62

.

b

. Continuous Acc r ual Theory

T his court hel d in Baxter that CalSTRS’ s right to m ake b enef it a dj us tments w as only part ially barre d un der the applic ab le three

- year statu te of limi tations of section

2200 8, subd ivision (a )

. ( Bax ter , supra , 18 Cal.Ap p .5th at p. 34 8.) W e concluded,

a pply ing the cont inuous accrual the ory as described by th e Supreme Court i n Dryden
,

25 Teachers ar g ue on appeal t hat th e y “ seek no damages, or a ny money s oth er than to retain the benefi t s which the y were repea tedly promised. ” This argument is b elied by Teachers ’ ple adings i n dicati ng that they are clearl y seeking to recover the portion of th eir monthly benefits they claim CalSTRS ’ s wr o ngfully withhe ld , be g inn ing in 2014 to 20 1 5

.39

supra , 6 C a l.2d at pages 5 80 to 5 81
, that “ t he right of e ach of the [ Baxter petitioners] to
receive m onthly pa y ments, an d th e oblig ation of Ca lSTRS to d isbu rse them, are
continu i ng ones that a cc rue when such payme nts become due

. [ Citation.] ” ( B ax ter ,
supra , at p. 3 80

. ) Acc ordingly, o nly the overpayment cl aims assert ed by CalSTRS

rel a tive to pension ben efits ac cruing more than th re e yea rs prior to the date CalS TRS

commenced the “act ion ” w ere time

- b ar red

. ( I d

. at p. 382 )

. F oll owing Baxter

, thi s court likewise app lied the c onti nuous acc rua l the ory in

B laser I
, holding th at “ CalSTRS may pursue a cla im as to any pe riod i c pension ben efits

t hat accru e d not more tha n thr ee years bef ore C alSTRS commenced an ‘ action ’ with in the meaning of se ction 2 2008 [ , subdivision ] (a)

. [Citation.] ” ( B las er I
, s up ra , 37

Cal.A pp.5th at p. 375

. ) Therefore, i n Blaser I
, we con clude d that CalSTRS was no t barred by the statut e of limitations f rom makin g benefit adjustments for monthl y

pa yments accruing on or after Feb ru ar y 1, 2013. ( B las e r I
, s upra , 37 Cal.A pp.5th at

p. 3 7 8 .) CalSTRS argues in this second appeal that Teac hers “ cannot avoid ” this holding

b y asserting laches a s a bar to CalST RS ’ making benefit adjustments

. Teachers do not

re s pon d su bsta ntively to t his a rgument. 26

As discuss ed below, we agree with CalSTRS

. Teachers ’ leg al defense of th e
statute of limitations was a pplied in Blaser I to bar
, in p art , CalSTRS ’ s e fforts to reduce monthly be nefits an d to recoup overpayments

. Teachers may no t em ploy the equit able

defense of lach es to p reclude CalSTRS from pursuin g benefit adjustments for mon thly

26 Teachers argue th at , in reman d ing the case to the trial court
, th is court

“ implici t ly rejected ” Ca lSTRS ’ s contention here t hat laches is unavailable in this contin u ous accrual case. As discussed in part III .B., ante , t h is court did not

— expressly or impli citly

— decide whethe r , on reman d, laches , as sum in g it was not for fe ited, could be

asser ted by Teachers as a defe nse, notwithsta nding the holding in Blaser I that the continuous accrual th eory appli ed t o pe rmi t CalST RS to make some, but no t all, of its b enef it a d justments

.40

payments a cc ruing on or af ter February 1, 2013
, where a sse rti ng t he d efense against l egal

claims w ould circumvent a pplica tion of the contin uous accrua l theory

. We note that there is a pau c i ty of legal auth ority addressing this question.

CalSTRS cites two un publ ished federa l cases ; they are of some assista nce to t his court

. 27

T h e only other case relied on by CalSTRS is Talbot v. City of Pasadena (1938) 2 8

C al.A pp.2d 271 ( Talbo t )
, disapproved of on other gro unds in Dill on v. Board of Pension

Com ’ rs of City of Los Angeles (1941 ) 18 Cal

. 2d 427, 4 3 1

. ) Talbot offers su p port for

CalSTRS ’ s po s ition. In Ta lbot

, the widow of a fir eman su ed to recover pension ben efi ts

s ome six ye ars af

ter her hu sband ’s death. ( T alb ot , supra , at pp. 272

- 273.) T he appel la t e

court reje cted the defendant ’s contention that th e sustaining of a d emurrer to the

27 CalSTRS cit es Underwood v. Fu ture Income Paym en ts, LL C (C.D. Cal., Apr. 26, 2018, No. S A CV 17

- 1570

- DOC

- DF M x ) 201 8 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2335 39 ( Underwood ). T h ere, the d ist rict c our t , i n co nnec t ion wi th a motion to dismiss
, held that the con tinuou s accrua l theory ap plied to the plaintif f ’ s cla ims that were bas ed upon the defendant ’ s periodic monthly c ollection of the pl aintiff ’ s pension benefits, i ncluding violatio n s of California la w concer ning us ur y, unfair competition
, and consumer protect ion

. ( Underwood
, supra , 201 8 U.S. Dist. Lexis 233539 .) The court , notin g that the defenda nt had a l s o asserted lac hes, concluded that “ [b] ecause Pl aintiff has shown t hat the statute of l imit ati o n s d oes n ot total ly bar his state law clai ms, the Cou rt

. . . declines to apply la ches to these claim s, to the extent that the c laims may fall wit hin the s t atute of limitation period

. ” ( Id. at * 34 , fn. 2.) CalSTRS also c ites Woods v. Hamkar (E. D. C al., A u g. 14, 2 01 5, No. 2:12

- cv

- 0562 MCE CKD P ) 201 5 U.S. Di st. Lex is 107411 ( Woods )

. T h ere, the plaintiff, a s tate prisoner, allege d claims based upon the def e n d ants ’ alleged deliberate ind ifference to the pl aintiff ’ s medical n eeds
, and he included a c lai m that t he def end ant s had breached the terms o f a settlemen t agree ment arising ou t of a federal action

. ( I d. at * 1 .) The d istrict c o urt , applying the continu o u s accrual theory, determined that the plaintiff ’ s claim ba sed upon the defendants ’ con tinuing contrac tu al dut y to provide medical ca re was not ti me

- barred to the extent the breaches had occurre d within the four

- year limi tations period. ( Id. at * 1 2

- 13 .) The court concluded fu rther that

“ [g] iven the applicability of Calif ornia's continuo us a ccrual [the ory ]
, the c ourt finds unpersuasive defendant Kel so ’ s argument t hat plaintif f ’ s claims are barred by laches. ” ( Id. at * 13
, fn. 4

. ) W e will r ely on t h e se two cases t o the extent t h ey offer so me guid ance on the qu estio n before us

. (See Yvano va v . New Centur y Mor tg. C orp. (2016 ) 62 Cal.4th 9 19, 940 [ Cali fornia appellat e courts may cite unreported fede ral court decisions as pers uasive authority ]

. )41

plaint i ff ’s co mplain t wi thout leave to amend based upon t he applicable three

- ye ar s tatute
of limita tions was proper . ( Id. at p . 2 73.) T h e Talbot court conclud ed that th e existence

o f claims for pension benefits that w ere time

- barred becau s e they accrued m ore t h an three year s be fore the action was filed did not justify a complete ba r of the actio n . ( I bid. ) In rejecting the defenda nts ’ argument that the plaintiff could not proceed because she had

not made successive demands for pension benefits as they acc rued, t he court not ed t hat

“ [t] he right, if any, to a pension is a cont i nui ng one

. W e do no t understand that where the

owner the reof has once made p roper demand, and the claim is flatly rejected by the city,

he [or she] must continue to make demands for the accruals on said pen sion. ” ( I d. at

p. 2 74

. ) The defendant arg ued furth er that the c ompl aint was demurrab l e because the plain tiff had failed to plead facts that justified a six

- y ear delay in filing suit, and therefore

the co mp laint was barred by laches. ( Ibid. ) The T a lbot court r ejected this argument,
concludi ng th at “ [t ] he answer is t h at t he pl aintiff ’ s ri g ht to a pensi on, if any, is a continuing one and that laches woul d not a pply to the accrual, for insta nce, which

occur re d in the last month prior to the commenceme n t of the act ion. ” ( Ibid. )

“ U nder the contin uous ac crual theory, ‘ a s e ries of wrongs or inju ries may be

v iewed as each triggeri n g its own limitations period, such t hat a suit for relie f may be partially time

- barr ed as to older eve nts but timely a s to thos e with in the applicable

lim itations period. [ Cita tio n.] ’ [Citation.] ” ( B axter , supra , 1 8 Cal.App.5th at

pp. 3 78

- 379 , quoting A r

yeh v. Canon Busi ness Solutions, I nc

. (2 013) 5 5 C a l

. 4 th 1185
, 1 192 ( Aryeh ) .) “ [T] he theory of continuous accrual supports recov ery only for da mages arising fr om those bre a c h es fa lling within the li mit ations p eriod. ” ( Aryeh
, supra , at

p

. 11 9 9 .) C ases in whi ch the theory has been applied ha ve “ i nclude [d] a var iety of

instanc es in which t he plaintiff asserted a right to, or challen ged the assessm ent of, periodic payments under c ont ract or under Ca lif orn ia statu tes or r egulations.
[Citatio ns.] ” ( Baxter
, supra , at p. 379 ; see Aryeh
, supra , at p p. 1198

- 1200 .) W i thin this

subca tegory are pe nsion cases in which the re tiree ’ s right to rece ive periodi c benefits and42

t he plan a dministr ato r ’ s o bligation t o d isb urse “ th em [] are continuing one s that a ccrue
when such payments be come due

. [Citation.] ” ( Id. at p

. 3 8 0 , citi ng Dryden
, supr a , 6

Cal.2d a t pp. 580

- 581 ; see also Blaser I
, supra , 37 Cal. App.5 th at p p . 366

- 367 .)

As this cou rt reaso ned furt her in Baxt er

— whi ch reaso ning is equally applicable

he re

— if the continuou s accrual theory were not applied t o pe rmit b enefit a dj ustments for periodic paymen t s accruing within the statute o f limit ation s, t he recurring practi c e of th e plan admini strator pay i ng , and t he retir e e receiving
, incorrectly calculated benefi ts could

never be remedi ed. ( Baxter
, su pra , 1 8 Cal. App. 5th at pp. 3 80

- 3 81. ) This absence of

rem edy , a p plied he re to the payment of monthly pen sion benefits, would work bo th ways: (1) A plan ad m inistrator ( CalST R S ) w ould be precluded from correct in g a system in

wh ich per iodic benefits were over stated or from recoup ing amou nts overpaid wit hin the limitations period
, the r eby “ permit[ting] a retire e to receive, potentially for years,

mon th ly pension ben efits tha t we re not earned ” ( id. at p. 380); and ( 2) a retiree would b e barred from pursuing a n action for und erpayment of mon thly benefits th at occurred

within the limit ati o ns period, thereby permi tt ing the plan a dministrator to escape lia bi lity

f rom the obliga tio n to pay ti mely and properly c alculated b enefits ( i d. at pp

. 3 80

- 381 )

. A p plying th e defense of lach es to bar suc h cl aims by a pla n a dministrator o r by a retiree

t hat are not otherwise bar red by a specifie d limitations period wou ld negate the

co ntinuous ac crua l the ory.
The Califo rnia S u preme Co urt has explained that the continuous accr ual “ theory is

a response to t he i nequities that w ould arise if the expiration o f the limitations period

fol lowing a first breach of duty or insta nce of m iscond uc t were t rea ted as su fficient t o bar

s uit for any sub sequent breach or misconduct; parties enga ged in long

- stand ing

misfeasan ce w ould thereby obt ain immunity in perpetuity f r o m suit even for recent and

o ngoing misfeas ance

. . . . [ ¶ ] To address these con cer ns, we h a ve lo ng settled th a t
separat e, recurring i nvasions of the sam e right can each trigger th eir own statute of

limitati ons

. ” (

Aryeh
, sup ra , 55 Cal.4 th at p

. 11 98.)43

Applying these pr inciples her e, t he plan a dministr ator ’ s miscalculation (whether

on its own o r thr ough reliance up on info rmation from t he employer) resulting in the

retire e ’ s receipt of lower period i c benefits than tha t to which he or she is entitled woul d

constit ut e a “ breach of duty

. ” Further, w hile th e term “ breach of duty ” appears less apt in

the ca s e of a claim aga inst a retir ee, t h ere is no question that the “ o bli gations [ of a public

retirem e nt board such as Ca lSTR S ]

. . . do no t pe rmit the payment of benefi ts not
otherwise auth orized [ c itati on ] ” ( D uarte v. State Teachers ’ Retir e ment System (2014 ) 2 32 Cal.App.4th 3 70, 3 85 ( Duarte ) )
, an d tha t an action, under section 22008, subdivision (a), may be brought against a CalSTRS member to adjust benefits based upon erron eous

paym en ts ma de under the DB or DBS Program s ( see Baxter
, supra , 1 8 Cal.App.5th at

p. 3 56 )

. (Se e also Blaser I
, supra , 37 Ca l.App.5 th at p p . 3 70

- 3 7 2 [ rejecting Teachers ’

contention that continuous a c c rual theory was in appl icable because Tea chers had not

act ed “ ‘ wro ng fully ’ ” ] .) “ [ I ] nequities

. . . would arise ” ( Aryeh
, supra , 55 cal.4 th at

p

. 11 98 ) in either instanc e if the aggrieve d par ty

— the under paid retiree or the plan

admini str ator that overpaid benefits

— w ere prohibited fro m see king redress for c laims arising out of perio di c paym ents accruing w ithin the li mitation s period.

We c o n c l u d e that lach es can not be asser ted b y Teachers as a b ar to C alSTRS ’ s making b e nefit a djustments for monthly pension benefits ac cruing within the l i mita tions period, i.e. , on or after Feb ruary 1, 2013. To conclude othe rw ise would negate t his

court ’ s prior application o f the con t inuous a ccrua l theory in this case, a n application that was legally correct and w as found ed upon the theory ’ s policy goals a s id entified by the

Ca lifornia Supreme C o urt

. 28

28 T he r e is a potential further rea s on that laches cann ot be applied here. Teache rs , in asserting lac hes, are doing so as a n offensive vehicle to e stablish thei r right to rece ive (both pros pectively and re trospect ively ) overstated monthly pe nsion benefits. A s such, the ir assertion of the defense appear s to r un a foul of the principle that “ [l] aches may be

use d only as a shield
, not as a s word. [Citat ions .] ” ( In re Marri a ge of Parker (2017) 14 Cal.A pp.5th 681, 6 88 ; see also LaPrade v. Ros ins ky (D.C. 2005) 882 A.2d 192, 198 .)44 c. Sum mary: Teachers May Not Assert Lache s In this case, T eachers have previously assert ed “ the legal defense of the statute of

limitations

. ” ( Magic Kitche n LLC v. Good Things Internat., Ltd. (2007) 153 Cal. App.4th
1144, 1156 , italics added

. ) In Blas er I , this court held t hat the statut e of lim itations under

se ction 22008 barred CalSTRS in part fr om reducing mon thly be nefits and from recouping overpayments. ( B l as er I
, s upra , 37 Cal.A pp.5th at p

. 3 75 .) But w e ap plied the

continuo us accrual the ory to con cl ude that CalSTRS was no t time

- barred f ro m making

benefit adjustments for m onthl y pa yments ac cr uing on or after Feb ruary 1 , 2013. ( Id. at

p. 3 7 8 .)

Teachers on r emand could not assert la ches to preclu de CalST R S fr om making

benefit adjustments th at were not otherwise time

- barred, because lache s, a s a n equitable

de fense , was u navai lable here to an a ct ion at law. ( Reid
, supra , 24 Cal.App.5th a t

p. 3 62.) Moreover, b ecause of our conclusion in Bla ser I that Teach e rs ’ legal defense of

t he statute of limitations did not bar CalSTRS fro m making b ene fit a djustments to

pe riodic (monthly ) pension benefits a cc r uing on or after Fe bruary 1, 2013, the equitable defense o f lache s cannot serve a s a basis f or Teachers to overr i de o ur prior holding t hat

the contin uo us accrual theory applied in this instance.

As a panel of this co urt has explained
, “ The equit able d oc trine of l aches has a legal equivalent in the statutes of limitati ons. To allow a laches defense in a legal acti o n

wo uld be to override a time limi t mandated by the Legislature. ” ( Uni logic, Inc. v.
Bu rroughs Corp. (19 92) 10 Cal.App.4t h 612, 619 ; s ee al so Petrella
, supra , 57 2 U.S. at

M oreover , it is difficult t o imag in e how laches , based upon CalSTRS ’ s “ unreasona ble delay ” ( Mi ller
, su

pra , 27 C al.3d at p. 624)
, co uld apply to bar its ri ght to reduce Teachers ’ monthly pens ion benefits pros p e ctively

. ( See Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp. (9th Cir. 2001) 263 F.3d 942, 959

- 960 [ “ [l ] a ches stems from prejudice to the d efendant occasioned by the plai n tiff ’ s p ast delay, but a lmos t by definition, the pl aintiff ’ s past dilatori ness is unrel ated to a defendant ’ s ongoi ng behavior that thre aten s future harm ” ].)45

p. 678 [ “ [ United Stat es Supreme Court ] has ca utioned aga in st invoking laches to bar lega l

relief ” ] .) Finally, as discus sed in part III. D

. , an te , Teachers as a ma tter of la w were

pr eclu ded from asserting th e de fe nse of equitab le estop pel
, beca u se doing so would require Ca lSTRS to continue to calc u lat e and pay benefits in a manner that “ d irectl y

contravene [s] statuto ry limit a tions

. ” ( Medina
, sup ra , 112 Ca l.A pp.4th at p. 869

. ) A

conc lu sion t hat laches bar red Cal ST RS from making benefit adjustments that are not

time

- barred would circumvent that pri ncip le that estoppel cannot apply to compe l a

go vernmental entit y to act in a w ay that i s contrary to its statutor y authority. ( Ib id .) Based upon o u r de n ovo review of th is legal issue ( ConAgra
, supra , 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 135 )
, we conclude that t he tr ial court er red by con cluding th at the equitable defen se of laches barred CalSTRS from making benefit adjustments th at were

no t barred by the applicabl e statute of l imitations

. F

. Concl u si on
Even if Teachers did n ot for feit the equitable estoppel and laches defen ses by

f ailing to raise them in the pr ocee din gs below , th ose de fenses are n ot maint aina ble here.

A lthoug h e quitable estoppel m ay be asserted a g a ins t a gov ernmental entity
, the de fe nse
was unavailable here because it s applica tion would req uir e CalSTRS to continue to

miscal culate Teachers ’ mont hly pension benefits contr a ry to the provisio ns o f the

Education Code. ( See Medi na , sup r a , 112 Ca l.App.4t h at p. 869 [ e stop pel a gain st an

ag en cy “ may not be invok ed to directly contraven e statutory limitations ” ]

. ) Moreover,

laches was una vailable to Teac hers as a defense bec ause ( 1) it is a n equita ble defense and

unavailable here to defeat t he claims of law presented h ere (see Abb ott , supra , 50 Cal.2d
at p. 462 ; R eid
, supra , 24 Cal.App.5 th at p. 3 62 ) ; and (2) its assertion would negate the

continuous accr ual theory that this court determined in Blas er I applied to this case (see

B las er I
, s u

p ra , 37 Cal.App.5t h at p. 375 ; Talbot
, su pra , 28 Cal. Ap p.2d at p. 27 4 ) . F o r
the se reasons, the jud gment must be reversed.46

Teachers ’ defenses of e quitable estopp el and lach es fail because , under the

circum stances p res ented here, they may not be asserted a s a matter of law

. Consistent

with this court ’ s opini on in B laser I
, supra , 37 C al.App.5 th 34 9
, Cal STRS , for any monthly pension payment accru ing on or a fter February 1 , 2 0 13
, may (1) adjust the

benefit am ount to excl u de sixth

- period work a s creditable comp en sation under th e
DB Plan ; (2) deduct from monthly be nefit s, to the exten t per mitted by law, amou nts attributable to overpayments previously made on monthly pension b en ef its accruing on or
after Februar y 1, 2013 ; an d (3) may correct month ly pension benefi ts going forward to

amount s that do not incl ude comp en sation for sixth

- per iod w ork as DB

- creditabl e

. This court acknowledges that the out c ome here , based upon expecta t ions of

Teachers pri or to retirement, will be dis appointing to them

. And the court appre ciates the
great contributio ns and s acrifice s made b y schoolteache rs in ge neral and by Teachers in particu lar that benefit our society. But pension pr ovisions such as tho se contained in the

Teach er s Reti rem ent L aw, while “ ‘ broadly construed in favor of t h os e [ person s ] .

. . intende d to be benefite d thereb y ’ ” ( Chaidez v. Board of A dministration etc. (2014) 2 23 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1431 ), ca nnot be rewr itte n to provide fo r be nefits contrary to the

stat ute en acted. (See Fleice
, supra , 206 Cal.App.3d at p p. 89 4

- 895 ; see also D u arte ,

su pr a , 232 C al .App.4 t h at p

. 3 85 [pension provisio ns “ ‘ “ c anno t be construed so a s t o
confer ben efits on pers on s no t entitl ed theret o ” ’ ” ].) Bec ause this court must follow the

l aw , it m ust in this instance conclude that the defen ses of equitable estoppel an d laches

are una vailab le a s a matter of law be cause the ir application would ef fectively require

CalSTRS to perform acts that are beyond i ts sta tutory authority.

I V

. DISPOSIT ION

The judg ment entered Ma y 21
, 20 21 , is reve rsed. The court is dir ected to en ter a

ne w and di fferent ju dgment provid i ng as follo ws: “CalSTRS is barred by the three

- year
statute of limitations of Education Code sec ti on 2 2008 from asserting a ny claims ag ainst

Pe titi oner s related to overpayments for period ic pension benefi ts to them that acc rued47

mor e than t hr ee years befo r e Febr uary 1, 2016

. To the extent Cal STRS has previously

deducted from the benefits of Petitione rs mo n ies claimed due for overpay ments on perio dic pens ion benefits accruing prior to Febru ary 1, 2013, CalS TRS is dire cted (as applica ble) to ei ther return s u ch col lecte d funds to Petitioners, or to credit said amounts against overpayments made to Petitio ne rs w ith respect to monthly pension be nefits

a ccru ing on or after Febr uary 1, 2013. CalST RS, under the con tinuous acc rual the ory, is
not prec lu ded from asse r ting a ny cl aim regarding p ast overpaym ent s , collecting upon

such past overpayments , or adjusting a ny fu t ure monthly pension benefit paym ents of

P etit ione rs, where such periodic payments ac crued on or after February 1, 2013. ” Appella nt and r e spondents shal l bear, resp ectively, its and his/her c osts on appeal.48 BAMATTRE

- MANOUKIAN
, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DANNER
, J.

WILSON , J.

Bla ser et al. v. California S tate Teachers’ Ret i rement System H0 4 92 771

Filed 12/16/22 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STEVEN V. BLASER et al.
,
Plaintiff s and Respondents
,

v.

CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM
,
Defendant and Appellant

. H04 9 277 ( Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 16 CV0 0 0 3 2 8 )

ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION

THE COURT: The opinion in the above

- entitled matter filed on November 21 , 20 2 2 , was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. Defendant and appellant California State Teachers’ Retirement System as well as t he California Public Employ e e s’ Retirement Sys tem ha ve requested the opinion be certified for publication. Under California Rules
of Court, rule 8.110 5 (c)
, the opinion is ordered published

.2 B AMATTRE

- MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J.

DANN E R , J.

W I LSON , J.

Blaser et al. v. California State Teachers’ Retirement System H04 92773

Trial Court: Monterey County Superior Court Superior Court No.: 1 6 CV0 0 0328

Trial Judge: Hon. Robert O’Farrell

Attorney s for Plaintiff s and Respondent s : Steven V. Blaser et al. Barry Jay Bennett Ann Marie Bennett Law Offices of Bennett, Sharpe & Bennett Inc.

Robert E. Rosenthal Paul Anthony Rovell a JRG Attorneys at Law

Attorney s for Defendant and Appellants : Cal i forni a State Te a chers’ Retirement S ystem Robert J. Stumpf Jr. Raymond Charles Marshall S heppard Mullin LLP

Attorney for Real Party in Interest: Salinas Union High School District Eric James Bengtson Davis & Young, APLC

Blaser et al. v. California State Teachers’ Retirement System H04 9 277