This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A16-0772

Jason Donald Matakis, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

Filed January 3, 2017

Affirmed

Larkin, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court

File No. 18-CR-10-3074

Bradford Colbert, Peter LaCourse (certified student attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota (for 

appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Rockwell J. Wells, Assistant County 

Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Reilly, 

Judge. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

LARKIN, Judge

Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his second postconviction

petition as time-barred, arguing that his petition falls under the interests-of-justice 

exception to the two-year time limit in the postconviction statute. We affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jason Donald Matakis with three 

counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and three counts of second-degree criminal 

sexual conduct. The complaint alleged that Matakis regularly engaged in sexual 

intercourse with his daughter when she was between the ages of 9 and 11. 

Matakis entered an Alford guilty plea to one count of first-degree criminal sexual 

conduct, pursuant to a plea agreement in which the state agreed to request a 144-month 

prison term and dismiss the remaining charges. During the plea hearing, Matakis’s attorney 

asked him, “[H]as anyone made any threats or promises to you to get you to plead guilty 

today?” Matakis responded, “No.” Matakis submitted a petition in support of his guilty 

plea, which reiterated that no one had made any threats or promises to get him to plead 

guilty.

On May 12, 2011, the district court sentenced Matakis to a 144-month prison term. 

Matakis did not file a direct appeal.

In September 2012, appellate counsel was appointed to represent Matakis. In 

December, Matakis mailed his appellate attorney a detailed statement listing potential 

justifications for plea withdrawal. 
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On May 10, 2013, three days before expiration of the two-year time limit on 

postconviction petitions, Matakis’s appellate attorney filed Matakis’s first postconviction 

petition, seeking to withdraw his plea on the grounds that it “was not knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently made” because “there is reason to question the accuracy of 

the factual basis underlying the plea and the circumstances under which he pled guilty 

suggest that it was not voluntarily entered.” The postconviction petition stated that “[d]ue 

to conflicting schedules with caseworkers at MCF-Faribault and [Matakis’s] counsel,”

necessary documentation for the petition “could not be finalized prior to the filing of [the] 

petition.” The petition stated that “[c]ounsel will obtain the necessary records, and then 

provide a Memorandum of Law in Support of the Petition for Postconviction Relief with 

an affidavit from petitioner.” 

On June 4, the postconviction court denied Matakis’s petition, reasoning that

Matakis “failed to provide any facts at all to support [his] claim that his plea was not 

properly entered into, and therefore his Petition did not meet the content requirements of 

[the postconviction-relief statute].” Matakis appealed to this court. We affirmed, 

concluding that Matakis’s “petition does not allege any facts necessary to justify the relief 

he seeks and its promise of a later pleading is insufficient.” Matakis v. State, 842 N.W.2d 

689, 693 (Minn. App. 2014), aff’d, 862 N.W.2d 33 (Minn. 2015). 

The supreme court granted review. Matakis obtained new appellate counsel and

moved to stay the appellate proceedings in order to submit evidence to the district court 

regarding his initial appellate attorney’s ineffectiveness. Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 
4

39 n.6 (Minn. 2015). The supreme court denied the motion because Matakis did not claim 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his petition. Id. 

On April 8, 2015, the supreme court affirmed this court’s decision. Id. at 41. The 

supreme court concluded that the petition lacked “a factual basis for the suggestion that 

[Matakis’s] guilty plea was improper.” Id. at 37. The supreme court acknowledged that 

Matakis may have had factual support for his claim that was not included in the petition. 

Id. at 38. But the supreme court stated that “under the postconviction statute, the 

postconviction court is not required to order an evidentiary hearing purely on the basis of 

the potential of new, undisclosed information.” Id. The supreme court also stated that it 

was “aware that Matakis did not file a direct appeal and that [its] decision . . . may mean 

that his guilty plea will not be subject to appellate review,” but it ultimately concluded that 

Matakis did not have a right to an evidentiary hearing on his petition because the petition 

failed to meet the factual requirements of the postconviction statute. Id. at 34, 40. 

On January 6, 2016, Matakis filed his second postconviction petition. Matakis once 

again sought “to withdraw his plea because it was not voluntary.” Matakis included a

supporting affidavit, asserting that shortly before he pleaded guilty, he had learned that his 

daughter “had been cutting her wrists with a knife.” Matakis’s affidavit also stated that a

social worker testified at a CHIPS hearing that Matakis’s daughter was “stressed about 

having to testify at [Matakis’s] criminal trial” and that a plea deal was proposed to Matakis 

after the CHIPS hearing that “would eliminate the need for [his] daughter to testify at the

trial.” Matakis alleged that he “would not have pled guilty but for the pressure [he] felt out 

of concern for [his] daughter” and “felt coerced into pleading guilty.” Matakis
5

acknowledged that he filed his petition more than two years after he was sentenced, but he 

argued that “it [was] nonetheless timely because [he] was denied his constitutional right to 

the effective assistance of counsel when he first tried to file a postconviction petition.” 

The postconviction court summarily denied Matakis’s petition as untimely.1 The 

postconviction court agreed that Matakis’s initial appellate counsel had been ineffective

and could be a basis to apply the interests-of-justice exception to the two-year time limit 

on petitions for postconviction relief. However, the postconviction court determined that 

Matakis did not satisfy the two-year time limit applicable to a claim brought under the 

interests-of-justice exception. This appeal follows. 

D E C I S I O N

Matakis contends that the postconviction court erred by determining that his petition 

was time barred. The postconviction statute allows a person convicted of a crime to petition 

for relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2014). Generally, a petition for postconviction 

relief must be filed within two years of the later of “(1) the entry of judgment of conviction 

or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s 

direct appeal.” Id., subd. 4(a) (2014). 

A court may hear a petition for postconviction relief filed outside of the two-year 

timeframe if “the petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is 

 

1 The state did not challenge the timeliness of Matakis’s second postconviction petition. 

The Minnesota Supreme Court recently stated that a postconviction court can raise and 

determine a timeliness issue sua sponte, so long as the court gives the parties notice and an 

opportunity to be heard. Weitzel v. State, 883 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. 2016). Matakis 

does not argue for relief under Weitzel. Moreover, because Matakis raised and argued the 

timeliness issue in his postconviction submissions, Weitzel’s requirements are satisfied. 
6

not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.” Id., subd. 4(b)(5) (2014). A petition 

invoking the interests-of-justice exception “must be filed within two years of the date the 

claim arises.” Id., subd. 4(c) (2014). A petitioner’s claim for relief under the interests-ofjustice exception “arises when the petitioner knew or should have known that he had a 

claim.” Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 560 (Minn. 2012). The “knew or should have 

known” standard is an objective standard, and not a subjective, actual knowledge standard. 

Id. at 558-59. If a petitioner’s request for relief under the interests-of-justice exception is 

based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the claim arises when the petitioner knew or 

should have known that counsel was ineffective, and not when petitioner became 

subjectively aware of the claim. Id. at 559-60.

A postconviction court may deny a petition without a hearing if the petition is 

untimely. Bolstad v. State, 878 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Minn. 2016). This court reviews a 

postconviction court’s denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Wayne v. 

State, 870 N.W.2d 389, 392 (Minn. 2015). This court reviews the postconviction court’s 

determination regarding when an interests-of-justice claim arose for clear error. Sanchez, 

816 N.W.2d at 560.

The second postconviction court determined that Matakis knew or should have 

known that his first appellate attorney was ineffective on June 4, 2013, the date the

postconviction court denied Matakis’s first petition without an evidentiary hearing. The

postconviction court reasoned that all of the elements of ineffective assistance of counsel

were apparent on that date and Matakis should have known that “(1) the First Petition was 

deficient, (2) the First Petition was deficient because of ineffective assistance of appellate 
7

counsel, (3) the deficiency resulted in the First Petition being dismissed without meaningful 

review, and (4) the deficiency caused [Matakis] to miss the two-year post-conviction 

window without any meaningful review.” 

Matakis argues that “[u]ntil the Minnesota Supreme Court issued [its] opinion” 

affirming the denial of his first postconviction petition, he “did not have a claim for 

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Matakis relies on Noske v. Friedberg, 670 N.W.2d 740 

(Minn. 2003). In Noske, the supreme court explained:

A legal malpractice cause of action based on a criminal 

conviction resulting from alleged ineffective assistance of 

defense counsel accrues and the statute of limitations begins to 

run when the cause of action can withstand a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure on 

each element required to bring such a cause of action. In order 

to demonstrate that an attorney proximately caused a plaintiff’s 

damages and that but for the attorney’s negligence the criminal 

defendant-plaintiff would have been acquitted, a plaintiff must 

first obtain relief from the criminal conviction. 

Id. at 741. The supreme court based its conclusions on the general rule that “a person 

convicted of a crime may not attack a valid criminal conviction in a subsequent civil 

proceeding.” Id. at 744, 746. 

Matakis’s reliance on Noske is unavailing. In Sanchez, the supreme court explained 

that: 

Noske does not provide a basis for us to depart from the 

objective standard in determining when a claim arises under 

Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). In Noske, we followed our 

well-established rule that a claim arises when it will survive a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Sanchez is 

correct that a claim of legal malpractice based on legal advice 

in a criminal matter cannot arise until sometime after the 

conviction has been overturned. This rule of accrual, however, 
8

has nothing to do with the plaintiff’s subjective or objective 

knowledge of his claim. In Minnesota, a valid criminal 

conviction cannot be attacked in a subsequent civil proceeding 

because of the conviction’s presumption of regularity. The 

plaintiff in Noske therefore could not bring a claim for legal 

malpractice—and thus his claim did not arise—until his 

conviction was overturned. But the plaintiff’s subjective 

awareness of the malpractice has no bearing on the accrual of 

the plaintiff’s cause of action, and Noske does not suggest that 

we should vary from our usual rule that a claim arises when the 

claimant knew or should have known of the claim.

816 N.W.2d at 559-60 (citations omitted). 

Matakis argues that “[i]t is unrealistic, at best, to suggest that somehow [he] should 

have understood that his attorney was providing him ineffective assistance of counsel” 

when the postconviction court denied his first petition, given that he was represented by 

the same attorney from the time he filed the first petition until his petition for review was 

granted by the supreme court. This argument is unavailing because it is based on a 

subjective standard. We apply an objective standard. See id. at 560. And under an 

objective standard, Matakis knew or should have known that his first appellate attorney 

was ineffective when the postconviction court dismissed his petition because it did not 

include any of the reasons that he had provided his attorney as support for the petition.

In sum, the second postconviction court did not clearly err by determining that 

Matakis should have known that his first appellate attorney was ineffective when the first 

postconviction court denied his petition. Because Matakis filed his second postconviction 

petition more than two years after the denial, his request for relief under the interests-ofjustice exception is untimely. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). The postconviction 
9

court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying Matakis’s second petition 

summarily.

Although we affirm based on the postconviction court’s determination that 

Matakis’s second petition was untimely, we also note that the petition is frivolous. A court 

may hear a petition for postconviction relief filed outside of the two-year time limit if “the 

petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous and is 

in the interests of justice.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5). A petition is frivolous if 

“it is perfectly apparent, without argument, that the claims in the petition lack an objective, 

good-faith basis in law or fact.” Wayne v. State, 860 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn. 2015) 

(quotation omitted). 

Matakis’s second petition asserts that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty 

plea as involuntary because he “pled guilty because he was concerned about his daughter’s 

well-being after he learned that she was cutting herself because she was afraid to testify at 

his trial.” “[T]he court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely 

motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a 

manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a 

guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). To be valid, 

a guilty plea must be “accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 

678, 688 (Minn. 1997). The voluntariness of a plea is determined by considering all of the 

relevant surrounding circumstances. State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994). 

“The voluntariness requirement ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to 

improper pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. Improper pressure or coercion 
10

generally requires a threat or promise made to induce a defendant to plead guilty. See, e.g., 

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970) (“[A]gents of the 

State may not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion 

overbearing the will of the defendant.”); Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 

2016) (noting the fact that a defendant denied that he had been “subjected to threats or 

promises” was further evidence that his plea was voluntary); State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 

670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (“A guilty plea cannot be induced by unfulfilled or unfulfillable 

promises . . . .”). 

Matakis’s postconviction submissions do not allege that the state, his district court

attorney, or anyone else used his daughter’s circumstances to induce him to plead guilty. 

Instead, his submissions suggest that he pressured himself to plead guilty. Although 

Matakis may have felt pressured to plead guilty out of concern for his daughter, he does

not cite authority supporting his contention that his concern for his daughter’s well-being 

amounted to coercion sufficient to invalidate his plea. Because it is apparent that Matakis’s 

plea-withdrawal theory lacks an objective, good-faith basis in law or fact, his 

postconviction petition is frivolous and would not qualify for a hearing even if it were 

timely. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5). 

Lastly, we observe that Matakis’s second postconviction petition may also be barred 

under caselaw. “[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and 

all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for 

postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976). 

“The Knaffla rule provides that when a petition for postconviction relief follows a direct 
11

appeal of a conviction, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims of which the 

defendant knew or should have known at the time of the direct appeal are procedurally 

barred.” Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775, 787 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). “The 

Knaffla rule also bars consideration of claims that were raised, or could have been raised, 

in a previous postconviction petition.” Id. The Knaffla rule is intended to preserve “the 

goals of finality and efficiency where appropriate and overrides them only where necessary 

in the interests of justice.” Torres v. State, 688 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 2004). 

A court may consider an otherwise Knaffla-barred claim if “(1) the defendant 

presents a novel legal issue or (2) the interests of justice require the court to consider the 

claim.” Hooper, 838 N.W.2d at 787 (quotation omitted). “To be reviewed in the interests 

of justice, a claim must have merit and be asserted without deliberate or inexcusable delay.” 

Buckingham v. State, 799 N.W.2d 229, 231 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). 

Matakis’s first postconviction petition requested plea withdrawal based on his claim 

that “the circumstances under which he pled guilty suggest that [the plea] was not 

voluntarily entered.” Matakis’s second postconviction petition once again requested plea 

withdrawal, claiming that his plea “was not voluntary.”2 Allowing Matakis to go forward 

with the second petition would result in consideration of a claim that was previously raised, 

contrary to the Knaffla rule. And because Matakis has not provided a good-faith basis in 

law or fact for his second plea-withdrawal claim, the claim lacks merit and the interests-

 

2 Although Matakis asserted ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis to avoid the twoyear time limit on postconviction petitions, he did not claim ineffective assistance of 

counsel as a separate basis for postconviction relief.
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of-justice exception to the Knaffla rule would not apply. In sum, Matakis’s plea withdrawal 

claim appears to be barred under caselaw, as well as statute. 

Affirmed.