IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2023 WY 79

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2023

 August 10, 2023

JESSE JODEAN VEATCH,

Appellant 

(Defendant), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee 

(Plaintiff).

S-23-0070 

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County

The Honorable James Michael Causey, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Jesse Jodean Veatch, pro se. 

Representing Appellee:

Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; 

Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; John J. Woykovsky, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General. 

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN JJ. 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before 

final publication in the permanent volume. 
1

BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.

[¶1] Jesse Jodean Veatch appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. 

He asserts two consecutive sentences for two counts of delivery of methamphetamine 

violated his constitutional protections against double jeopardy. Finding no abuse of 

discretion by the district court, we affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] The single issue presented is whether the district court abused its discretion when it 

denied Mr. Veatch’s motion to correct an illegal sentence.

FACTS

[¶3] On two occasions on May 28, 2019, Mr. Veatch sold methamphetamine to the same

confidential informant. One sale occurred in the late morning and involved one half-gram 

of methamphetamine in exchange for fifty dollars. The second sale occurred in the late 

afternoon and involved two and one-half grams of methamphetamine in exchange for three 

hundred dollars. The State charged Mr. Veatch with two counts of delivery of a controlled 

substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2017).

[¶4] Following a bench trial, the district court found Mr. Veatch guilty on both counts. 

The court sentenced him to three to six years on each count, to run consecutively. The 

sentences were suspended for a five-year period of probation. Five months later, the State 

petitioned to revoke probation when law enforcement found Mr. Veatch in possession of 

methamphetamine in violation of his probation conditions. The State also charged Mr. 

Veatch, in a separate action, with a new count of possession of a controlled substance. Mr. 

Veatch admitted to the probation violation.

[¶5] The State and Mr. Veatch’s counsel submitted a plea agreement that requested the 

trial court reimpose the original sentence of three to six years for each of the two counts 

for delivery, to run consecutively. The parties also asked for a concurrent sentence of two 

to two and one-half years for the new charge of possession of a controlled substance. The 

court accepted the plea agreement and imposed those sentences.

[¶6] Mr. Veatch filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 

Rule 35(a). He asserted the two sentences for delivery of a controlled substance should be 

concurrent because the charges appeared in the same charging document, arose from the 

same arrest, and were tried under the same district court docket number. The district court 

held the two counts were distinct and separate crimes and denied Mr. Veatch’s motion. 

This appeal timely followed.
2 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

[¶7] We review the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence for an abuse of 

discretion. E.g., Harrell v. State, 2022 WY 76, ¶ 5, 511 P.3d 466, 468 (Wyo. 2022) (citing 

Best v. State, 2022 WY 25, ¶ 5, 503 P.3d 641, 643 (Wyo. 2022)). Whether a sentence is 

illegal as a violation of the double jeopardy clause is a question of law which we review de 

novo. Winters v. State, 2019 WY 76, ¶ 100, 446 P.3d 191, 221 (Wyo. 2019). 

DISCUSSION 

[¶8] An illegal sentence is one that exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of

imprisonment for the same offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or other law. 

Mebane v. State, 2014 WY 72, ¶ 6, 326 P.3d 928, 929 (Wyo. 2014) (citing McDaniel v.

State, 2007 WY 125, ¶ 7, 163 P.3d 836, 838 (Wyo. 2007)). Mr. Veatch asserts his 

consecutive sentences violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy. 

[¶9] The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the states 

through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits multiple prosecutions and punishments for 

the same offense. U.S. Const. amend V (“. . . nor shall any person be subject for the same 

offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”); Cercy v. State, 2019 WY 131, ¶ 11, 

455 P.3d 678, 682 (Wyo. 2019) (citations omitted). Article 1, Section 11 of the Wyoming 

Constitution also prohibits multiple prosecutions and punishments for the same offense. 

Wyo. Const. art 1, § 11 (“. . . nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 

offense.”). We give the two constitutional provisions the same meaning, consider them 

“coextensive in application,” and can look to federal court decisions regarding the Fifth 

Amendment’s double jeopardy protections for persuasive authority. Tucker v. State, 2010 

WY 162, ¶ 41, 245 P.3d 301, 311–12 (Wyo. 2010); Vigil v. State, 563 P2d 1344, 1350 

(Wyo. 1977). The double jeopardy clauses protect against: (1) second prosecutions for the 

same offense after an acquittal; (2) second prosecutions for the same offense after a 

conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Tucker, 2010 WY 162, 

¶ 41, 245 P.3d at 311–12; Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 864 (Wyo. 1992). 

[¶10] Mr. Veatch relies on the third protection by asserting the two consecutive sentences 

were for the same offense. However, if multiple offenses charged are “separate and 

distinct” due to the statutory definition of the offenses, or if they “grow out of separate 

transactions” and different evidence is needed to prove each offense, then double jeopardy 

does not attach. Mebane, 2014 WY 72, ¶ 9, 326 P.3d at 930 (quoting Gesier v. State, 920 

P.2d 1243, 1244 (Wyo. 1996)). The two charges against Mr. Veatch are for violations of 

the same statutory offense, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (delivery of a controlled 

substance), so we must look at the statutory definition of the offense and whether the two 

charges arose from separate transactions. 
3

[¶11] This is not our first opportunity to examine double jeopardy protections where

multiple violations of the same statute occurred within a short period of time. In Mebane, 

we affirmed that two convictions for delivery of methamphetamine were separate offenses 

because they were two separate transactions, each occurring on different dates. 2014 WY 

72, ¶¶ 7, 10–12, 326 P.3d at 929, 930. We held that the different dates for each crime were 

unique elements in the charges and therefore double jeopardy did not apply. Id. ¶ 10, 326 

P.3d at 930. In Geisier, we affirmed that a conviction on two counts of check fraud did not 

violate double jeopardy because each offense occurred in a different county, at different

times, with different victims. 920 P.2d at 1244–45. We held the differences in victims and 

venues altered the elements of each crime and therefore double jeopardy did not attach. Id.

[¶12] Mr. Veatch asks us to look at the elements of his two charges—where the events 

occurred on the same date, in the same county, and with the same person—and apply the 

same-elements test, also known as the Blockburger test. We adopted the same-elements 

test from federal jurisprudence in State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1131 (Wyo. 1980)

(adopting the same-elements test from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.

Ct. 180, 82, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932) and its progeny). See also Hartley v. State, 2020 WY 

40, ¶ 8, 460 P.3d 716, 718–19 (Wyo. 2020) (applying the same-elements test to determine 

if a lesser-included offense instruction is available); Sweets v. State, 2013 WY 98, 307 P.3d 

860 (Wyo. 2013) (applying the same-elements test to determine whether convictions 

should merge for sentencing). The same-elements test asks whether each offense charged 

contains an element not contained in the other. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. If the 

elements are the same, they are the same offense, and the double jeopardy clause therefore 

protects against successive prosecution and multiple punishments arising from those 

offenses. Id.; United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696–98, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 125 L. Ed.

2d 556 (1993); see also 5 Crim. Proc. § 17.4(b) (4th ed.) (Nov. 2022 update) (discussing 

the development of the same-elements test after Blockburger).

[¶13] However, as we stated in Tucker, the same-elements test applies only in cases where 

charges arise from different statutes. The test does not apply in cases that involve two 

violations of the same statute. Tucker, 2010 WY 162, ¶ 42, 245 P.3d at 312. When two 

violations arise from the same statute “we look directly to the intent of the legislature to 

determine the appropriate ‘unit of prosecution.’” Id. (citing Amrein, 836 P.2d at 865). Our 

approach is consistent with that of other state and federal courts. E.g., Sanabria v. United 

States, 437 U.S. 54, 69–70, 98 S. Ct. 2170, 57 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1978) (“[O]nce Congress has 

defined a statutory offense by its prescription of the ‘allowable unit of prosecution,’ that 

prescription determines the scope of protection afforded by a prior conviction or acquittal. 

Whether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct ‘offenses’ under the 

statute depends on this congressional choice.” (citations omitted)); State v. Koch, No. A15-959, 2016 WL 3083135, at *5 (Neb. Ct. App. May 16, 2016) (“[T]hat test [from 

Blockburger] is applicable only if the same act or transaction violates two distinct statutory 

provisions. Where, as here, a defendant’s course of conduct involves one or more distinct 

offenses under a single statutory provision, the appropriate analysis focuses on the 
4

allowable unit of prosecution.” (citations omitted)); State v. Rasabout, 299 P.3d 625, 630–

31 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (“[D]istinguishing a single, continuous offense from separate, 

distinct offenses is primarily a question of interpreting the text of the statute defining the 

crime. . . . The key question in reviewing the statute is what the legislature has determined 

to be the ‘allowable unit of prosecution.’” (citations omitted)); Woellhaf v. People, 105 

P.3d 209, 215 (Colo. 2005) (“It is the province of the legislature to establish and define 

offenses by prescribing the allowable unit of prosecution. . . . [T]hat prescription 

determines the scope of protection offered by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Thus, whether 

a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct ‘offenses’ under the statute

depends on legislative choice.” (citations omitted)).

[¶14] We have not had the opportunity to evaluate same-day drug transactions by 

determining what unit of prosecution the legislature prescribed for this offense. We have 

applied this analysis for other offenses. In Tucker, we determined the unit of prosecution 

in the aggravated vehicular homicide statute is one charge per victim because the 

legislature used the singular clause, “death of another person.” 2010 WY 162, ¶ 46, 245 

P.3d at 313. That language indicated a crime per person killed, as opposed to one crime 

per event if there are multiple victims. Id. We reached a similar result when evaluating an 

assault statute that used the singular term “any human being.” Vigil, 563 P.2d at 1349–54. 

In two sexual assault cases we determined the language of the sexual assault statutes at the 

time permitted separate acts during the same encounter with the same person on the same 

day to be prosecuted as separate charges without violating double jeopardy. Baum v. State, 

745 P.2d 877, 882 (Wyo. 1987); Hamill v. State, 602 P.2d 1212, 1216–17 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶15] We reached a different conclusion in Amrein v. State, which is a case Mr. Veatch 

asks us to consider. In Amrein, we found multiple charges for violating the same animal 

cruelty statute to be a single offense, resulting in a violation of double jeopardy protections. 

836 P.2d at 865. Mr. Amrein was sentenced for nine counts of cruelty to animals for failure 

to provide food, water, and shelter to six horses and three cows, with each count associated 

with a different animal. Id. at 863, 865. On appeal, we concluded the nine offenses, one 

for each animal, were a single offense. Id. at 865. We reached this conclusion by looking 

at the statutory language. We found the animal cruelty statute ambiguous because 

sometimes it used the singular word, “animal,” and sometimes it used the plural, “animals”

when defining the offense. Id. In the face of ambiguity, we applied the rule of lenity and 

held in Mr. Amrein’s favor. Id.

[¶16] The Amrein result is consistent with a presumption we articulated more recently in 

Solis v. State, 2013 WY 152, 315 P.3d 622 (Wyo. 2013). “[W]hen the question presented 

is the propriety of multiple convictions under one statute where the same course of conduct 

is involved, there is a presumption the legislature intended one conviction only.” Id. ¶ 71, 

315 P.3d at 638. The conduct in Amrein involved a single course of conduct that injured 

nine animals. 836 P.2d at 863, 865. We noted in Solis that the one-conviction presumption 

can be overcome by a showing the legislature intended otherwise, citing Tucker as an 
5

example. Solis, 2013 WY 152, ¶ 71, 315 P.3d at 638 (discussing Tucker, 2010 WY 162, 

245 P.3d 301).

[¶17] Looking to how the legislature intended to punish same-day drug transactions, we 

have noted Wyoming’s controlled substance statute is “derived primarily from the federal 

statute, and we accept federal case law as persuasive authority” in determining legislative 

intent for our own controlled substances statute. Hardison v. State, 2022 WY 45, ¶ 11, 507 

P.3d 36, 41 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Pool v. State, 2001 WY 8, ¶ 12, 17 P.3d 1285, 1288 

(Wyo. 2001)). Federal courts evaluating same-day drug transactions subject to the 

Uniform Controlled Substances Act look closely at statutory language and consider 

whether conduct was continuous or comprised of separate transactions.1

[¶18] 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) prohibits the distribution of controlled substances. Distribution 

includes “delivery” which, as in Wyoming, means “the actual, constructive, or attempted 

transfer of a controlled substance.” Compare 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(8), (11) with Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 35-7-1002(a)(vi). Individual acts of distribution under that statute may be 

separately prosecuted and punished without violating double jeopardy protections if they 

are separate transactions. E.g., United States v. Zuleta-Molina, 840 F.2d 157, 158–59 (1st 

Cir. 1988) (“The language of [21 U.S.C. § 841] unequivocally indicates that the 

government may prosecute each individual act of distribution.” (citations omitted)); United 

States v. Weatherd, 699 F.2d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he simple and unambiguous 

language of [21 U.S.C. § 841] ‘clearly defines the unit of prosecution to be the act of 

delivering controlled substances into the hands of another’ . . . [W]hen there are distinct, 

physical acts of transfer, each such act is a ‘delivery’ under the statute, even though 

occasioned by a single financial plan.” (citations omitted)); Borja-Guzman, 912 P.2d at

1 An early example occurred almost a century ago in a different section of Blockburger that looked at 

statutory language to evaluate whether two charges for separate sales of a controlled substance were the 

same offense or one continuous offense. 284 U.S. at 301–03; Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821, 829 (Wyo. 

1990) (discussing Blockburger’s first issue of whether two sequential drug transactions must be treated as 

one offense); State v. Borja-Guzman, 912 P.2d 277, 280–81 (N.M. App. 1996) (“In addition to the issue of 

multiple charges in violation of multiple statutes, the Blockburger Court also addressed multiple violations 

of the same statute.”). Mr. Blockburger delivered a controlled substance to the same purchaser on two 

consecutive days and was charged with separate offenses for each delivery. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301–

02. The Court reviewed the legal distinction between offenses that are continuous in nature over some 

duration of time and those offenses that are individual in nature, in isolation from one another even if they 

occur consecutively. Id. at 302 (discussing In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 7 S. Ct. 556, 30 L. Ed. 658 (1887) 

and Wharton’s Criminal Law § 34 (11th ed.)). It also looked at the statutory prohibition at issue, which 

prohibited “any sale” of narcotics; it determined the statute did not address the business of selling drugs 

which might entail a continuous course of conduct. Id. at 300–02 (discussing Harrison Narcotic Act, 26 

U.S.C. § 692). The Blockburger Court concluded the Narcotics Act prohibited each sale. Id. at 303 (citing 

Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625, 35 S. Ct. 710, 59 L. Ed. 1151). Mr. Blockburger’s delivery of drugs 

occurred in two separate transactions, with each sale consummated when it occurred, followed by a new 

transaction. Id. at 301. Prosecution for the two charges did not violate double jeopardy protections because 

each sale was a separate offense. Id. at 303–04.
6

281–82 (reviewing federal case law involving same-day narcotics transactions and 

affirming successive same-day sales could be separately prosecuted and sentenced). There 

are federal decisions where certain consecutive sales were held to be continuous 

transactions, and therefore limited to a single prosecution or single punishment. E.g., 

Costco v. United States, 904 F.2d 344, 347 (6th Cir. 1990) (concluding the Fifth 

Amendment prohibited multiple punishments where distribution of a sample immediately 

followed by delivery of three kilograms of cocaine were intended to be the same continuous 

transaction); United States v. Palafox, 764 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding the 

Fifth Amendment prohibited multiple punishments “where the defendant distributes a 

sample and retains the remainder for the purpose of making an immediate distribution to 

the same recipient at the same place and at the same time[.]”); see also Borja-Guzman, 912 

P.2d at 281–82 (comparing factual scenarios in federal appellate decisions involving

continuous transactions).

[¶19] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i), like its federal counterpart, prohibits “delivery” 

of a controlled substance. The legislature defined “delivery” as “the actual, constructive, 

or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance[.]” Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 35-7-1002(a)(vi). “Delivery” and “transfer” are both used in the singular. 

Consistent with our reasoning in Tucker, Vigil, Amrein, and federal cases interpreting 

identical language in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, these singular words indicate 

the unit of prosecution prescribed by the legislature is each transfer. Therefore, each 

transfer by Mr. Veatch was chargeable as a separate and distinct offense under the statutory 

definition of the offense.

[¶20] We also conclude after reviewing the record that each charge arose from a separate 

transfer. Mr. Veatch transferred methamphetamine to the confidential agent on two 

occasions on the same day. The two sales occurred at different times, for different amounts, 

and for a different exchange of money. Each sale was consummated before the next sale 

occurred. There is no indication in the record presented that one transaction was dependent 

on the other. Mr. Veatch does not direct us to legal authority or facts in the record to 

suggest his two transactions were a continuous transaction, such that we should consider 

the two sales as a continuous offense. We therefore conclude, as we did in Mebane and as 

the United States Supreme Court concluded in Blockburger, supra note 1, that Mr. Veatch

committed two separate criminal acts in two separate transactions. It does not violate 

double jeopardy protections to sentence Mr. Veatch for each separate offense.2

2 Mr. Veatch also invites us to consider the law governing joinder of offenses by citing to Dobbins v. State, 

483 P.2d 255 (Wyo. 1971). Joinder of offenses for the purposes of trial requires the trial court to consider,

among other things, whether prejudice will occur as a result of joinder and whether evidence for each 

offense would be admissible. Id., 483 P.2d at 259. Mr. Veatch provides no authority that a joinder of 

offenses for trial results in a joinder of the offenses into a single offense. We therefore decline to consider 

this issue further. 
7

CONCLUSION

[¶21] The two charges for delivery of methamphetamine were separate offenses, arising 

from different transactions. Double jeopardy protections were not violated by the entry of 

consecutive sentences for the two offenses. We affirm.