United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-40082

Brandie Cunningham,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Thomas Castloo,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:19-CV-18

Before Jolly, Southwick, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge: 

This interlocutory appeal presents the question whether Sheriff 

Thomas Castloo enjoys qualified immunity from Brandie Cunningham’s 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 claims premised on the denial of a name-clearing hearing in 

violation of procedural due process. The district court answered no. Citing 

factual disputes, and holding that Cunningham’s right to a name-clearing 

hearing was clearly established, the district court denied qualified immunity 

on summary judgment. The district court’s holding was error. Because “the 

violative nature” of Sheriff Castloo’s “particular conduct” was not clearly 

established, Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam), Sheriff 

Castloo may claim qualified immunity. Accordingly, we REVERSE the 

denial of qualified immunity and REMAND for further proceedings not 

inconsistent with this opinion.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 18, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I

As laid out above, Sheriff Castloo appeals a summary judgment 

denying him qualified immunity from this lawsuit. In our review, then, we 

take Cunningham’s version of the facts as true. See Kinney v. Weaver, 367 

F.3d 337, 347–48 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

Brandie Cunningham joined the Wood County Sheriff’s Office as a 

deputy in April 2016. Before that, she worked at the Hopkins County Jail. 

And before that, she worked as a mental health specialist in the military. Her 

military duties included reviewing discharge forms, known as DD214s.1

 

During Cunningham’s stint at the Hopkins County Jail, one of her 

superiors had asked her to review the DD214 of a jailer named David McGee. 

Cunningham concluded, based on her military experience, that the DD214

was “altered.”

Like Cunningham, McGee moved from Hopkins County to Wood 

County. By January 2017, he had become a supervisor at the Wood County 

Jail. His friend, Thomas Castloo, had taken office as Wood County Sheriff

on January 1. The events that led to this litigation occurred over a one-week 

period, beginning on Wednesday, January 18. 

On Wednesday the 18th, Cunningham approached Tony Crouse, a 

Wood County criminal investigator, and asked how she could “go about 

filing a federal crime.” She believed that she had an obligation to report that, 

in her opinion, McGee’s DD214 had been altered. Crouse told Cunningham

to bring her concerns to Sheriff Castloo. 

On Thursday the 19th, Cunningham and Crouse met with Sheriff 

Castloo. Cunningham told Sheriff Castloo that she suspected that McGee 

had altered his DD214. She did not think she was violating her chain of 

1 According to the district court, “[t]he DD214 is a discharge form used by all 

branches of the United States Military and has the same function as the F-5 discharge form 

for law enforcement agencies. It indicates whether a servicemember separating from 

military service is being released with an honorable, general, or dishonorable discharge.” 

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command by bringing her concerns to Crouse and Sheriff Castloo. She spoke 

to Crouse first because she knew him from Hopkins County. And she spoke 

to Sheriff Castloo next because Crouse “instructed” her to do so and because 

she thought that Sheriff Castloo was McGee’s supervisor. After the meeting, 

Cunningham told her chain of command what she had reported. She also 

told at least one person outside her chain of command—Deputy Justin 

Bowring. 

On Friday the 20th, Cunningham met with Sheriff Castloo and Chief 

Deputy Bobby Sanders. Sheriff Castloo called Cunningham a “liar” and said

that “the only reason” she “was doing this to McGee was because [she] 

hated him.” Sheriff Castloo asked her “numerous times” how many people 

she had told about her suspicion that McGee had altered his DD214. She 

gave Sheriff Castloo the names of everyone she told within her chain of 

command. Because Sheriff Castloo was yelling at her, however, she says that 

she forgot that she had told Deputy Bowring. Neither Sheriff Castloo nor 

Chief Deputy Sanders told Cunningham that she was under investigation for 

lying and violating the chain of command. 

Later that day, Cunningham remembered that she had told Deputy 

Bowring of her suspicion that McGee had altered his DD214. So she sent a 

text message to Captain Robert Holland, “asking if [she] could meet with the 

[S]heriff because [she] needed to tell him more information.” Captain 

Holland remained silent. 

That night, Cunningham received a call from Lieutenant William 

Burge. Lieutenant Burge told her to report to Sheriff Castloo’s office on 

Monday morning. She asked Lieutenant Burge if she “was going to be able 

to speak with” Sheriff Castloo. Lieutenant Burge responded that she “was 

not allowed to speak with the [S]heriff that day,” but she could speak to him 

on Monday morning. 

On the morning of Monday the 23rd, Cunningham met with Chief 

Deputy Sanders, Lieutenant Burge, and Captain Holland. Thereupon, she 

was fired for “improper use of chain of command and lying.” She was not 

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told how she had lied or how her “use” of the chain of command was 

“improper.” She “ask[ed] to speak with the [S]heriff at that time,” but 

“they would not allow [her] to talk to him.” She did not receive a written 

notice describing the charges against her, nor was she “allowed” to respond 

to the oral charges made against her. When she tried to speak, Chief Deputy 

Sanders cut her off, saying, “I don’t need to hear anything further from you 

. . . .”2 

The next day, Sheriff Castloo signed Cunningham’s F-5. The F-5 is 

filed with the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement and indicates the 

nature of an officer’s discharge: honorable, dishonorable, or general. Sheriff 

Castloo designated the discharge as “dishonorable,” which is the “only 

option” when the employee is “found guilty of either lying or lack of clarity.” 

Since Cunningham was dishonorably discharged, she has not found further 

work. 

Cunningham sued Wood County and Sheriff Castloo—in his 

individual and official capacities—in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

She alleged that Sheriff Castloo violated, among other rights, her Fourteenth 

Amendment right to procedural due process by denying her request for a 

name-clearing hearing. Sheriff Castloo claimed qualified immunity. 

After discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The 

district court denied Cunningham’s motion in full and granted Wood County 

and Sheriff Castloo’s motion in part, dismissing all but the procedural-dueprocess claims against Sheriff Castloo and Wood County. Although Sheriff 

Castloo raised a qualified-immunity defense to that claim, the district court 

held that Cunningham had “successfully rebutted” it. The district courtsaid

that factual disputes, when resolved in Cunningham’s favor, established a 

2 Two days after Cunningham was fired, Texas Rangers arrested McGee for 

altering government documents, among other felonies. The arrest was not for altering the 

DD214 that Cunningham considered altered. 

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procedural-due-process violation and satisfied qualified-immunity’s 

constitutional-violation prong. Qualified immunity’s clearly established 

prong was met, the district court reasoned, because Wisconsin v. 

Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), and Bledsoe v. City of Horn Lake, 449 F.3d

650 (5th Cir. 2006), had “placed beyond debate” Cunningham’s “liberty 

interest in the opportunity to clear her name of stigmatizing charges.” 

Sheriff Castloo timely filed this interlocutory appeal.3

 

II

We begin with our jurisdiction and the standard of review. Sheriff 

Castloo challenges the denial of qualified immunity on summary judgment.

That denial is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine to 

the extent that it turned on an issue of law. Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 

261 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc). We lack jurisdiction to review the genuineness

of the factual disputes the district court identified, but we have jurisdiction 

to review their materiality. Id. That means “our review is limited to 

determining whether the factual disputes that the district court identified are 

material to the application of qualified immunity.” Samples v. Vadzemnieks, 

900 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis omitted) (citing Thompson v. 

Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001)). We review legal 

conclusions, materiality determinations, and the scope of clearly established 

law de novo. Amador v. Vasquez, 961 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations 

omitted).

In determining materiality, we take Cunningham’s version of the facts 

as true and view those facts through the lens of qualified immunity. See

Samples, 900 F.3d at 660. If Sheriff Castloo would still be entitled to qualified 

immunity under this view of the facts, then any disputed facts are not 

material, the district court’s denial of summary judgment was improper, and 

3 Although the notice of appeal is entitled “Defendants’ Notice of Appeal,” the 

body of the document makes clear that only Sheriff Castloo appeals. Wood County is not 

a party to this appeal but remains a defendant in the underlying case. The district court 

administratively closed that case pending disposition of this interlocutory appeal. 

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we must reverse. See Lytle v. Bexar Cnty., 560 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2009). 

These precepts are clear, though perhaps less so to Cunningham. She 

contends that we lack jurisdiction because the district court said that it found

genuine disputes of material fact. Not so. The mere fact that the district 

court said that, in its view, material factual disputes preclude summary 

judgment does not deprive us of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722, 729 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Although the district 

court explicitly stated that material fact issues remain . . . this in itself does 

not preclude appellate review.”). We may of course decide whether the 

factual disputes the district court said were material are in fact material. See 

Melton, 875 F.3d at 261.

Assured of our jurisdiction, we turn to the merits.

III

Sheriff Castloo contends the district court erred in denying him 

qualified immunity on summary judgment. We begin with the doctrine of 

qualified immunity. We next lay out the underlying substantive law that 

dictates whether Sheriff Castloo is entitled to the defense. We last apply the 

substantive law and doctrine to the facts of this case.

A

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability in 

their individual capacity so long as their conduct “‘does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). It “protects ‘all but the 

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Mullenix, 577 

U.S. at 12 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 

Our qualified-immunity inquiry is two-pronged. Garcia v. Blevins, 957 

F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2020). First, we ask whether the facts, viewed in the 

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the official’s 

conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. Second, we ask whether the right 

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was “clearly established.” Id. We “can analyze the prongs in either order 

or resolve the case on a single prong.” Id. 

The “clearly established” prong is difficult to satisfy. See Morrow v. 

Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019). A right is “clearly established” 

only if it “is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have 

understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at. 

11. We must define the right “with specificity.” City of Escondido v. Emmons, 

139 S.Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (per curiam) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). A case “directly on point” is not required, but “existing precedent 

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). In other words, “there must be 

adequate authority at a sufficiently high level of specificity to put a reasonable 

official on notice that his conduct is definitively unlawful.” Vincent v. City of 

Sulphur, 805 F.3d 543, 547 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). This rule is a 

“demanding standard,” Dist.of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589 (2018) 

(citation omitted), and the Supreme Court “repeatedly” has told us “not to 

define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 

at 742. Ultimately, “[t]he dispositive question is whether the violative nature 

of the particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 

(citation omitted). We undertake that inquiry “in [the] light of the specific 

context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Id. (quoting 

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)). 

When an official raises qualified immunity on summary judgment, as 

Sheriff Castloo did here, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the 

defense does not apply. See Bryant v. Gillem, 965 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 

2020). To meet that burden, the plaintiff must present evidence, viewed in 

her favor, satisfying both qualified-immunity prongs by showing that the 

defendant (1) violated a constitutional right (2) that was clearly established at 

the time of the defendant’s conduct. See id. We turn now to examine 

whether Cunningham has made such a showing. 

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B

The Fourteenth Amendment is the source of the substantive law that 

dictates whether Sheriff Castloo is entitled to qualified immunity. See U.S. 

Const. amend. XIV. In Rosenstein v. City of Dallas, we relied on Supreme 

Court cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize a 

government employee’s procedural-due-process right to a name-clearing 

hearing in certain circumstances. 876 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1989). We 

declared it “beyond any doubt” that “discharge from public employment 

under circumstances that put the employee’s reputation, honor[,] or 

integrity at stake gives rise to a liberty interest under the Fourteenth 

Amendment to a procedural opportunity to clear one’s name.” Id. at 395

(citations omitted). We said that a government employer deprives an 

employee of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment if the “government 

employer discharges [the] individual under circumstances that will do special 

harm to the individual’s reputation and fails to give that individual an 

opportunity to clear his name[.]” Id. 

We further confected a seven-element “stigma-plus-infringement” 

test to determine whether a government employer violates a discharged 

employee’s procedural-due-process rights by denying her request for a nameclearing hearing. Seeid. at 395–96; Bledsoe, 449 F.3d at 653. To prevail under 

that test, the discharged employee must show that (1) she was discharged; 

(2) stigmatizing charges were made against her in connection with the 

discharge; (3) the charges were false; (4) she was not provided notice or an 

opportunity to be heard pre-discharge; (5) the charges were made public; (6) 

she requested a hearing to clear her name; and (7) the employer denied the 

request. Bledsoe, 449 F.3d at 653.

C

Thus, against this background of qualified immunity and the 

substantive law of the Fourteenth Amendment, we move further to address 

the merits of this case. The district court concluded that, on the facts as 

viewed most favorably to Cunningham, Sheriff Castloo violated 

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Cunningham’s clearly established procedural-due-process right by denying 

her request for a name-clearing hearing. The district court said that 

Cunningham had a clearly established right to “clear her name of 

stigmatizing charges.” Clearly establishing that right, in the district court’s 

view, were two decisions: Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437, and Bledsoe, 449 

F.3d at 653. The district court read Constantineau to clearly establish a 

government employee’s right to “notice and an opportunity to be heard” 

when that employee’s “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake 

because [of] government action[.]” And the district court read Bledsoe to 

clearly establish an employee’s “procedural due process right to notice and 

an opportunity to clear [her] name” if the employee meets the seven-element 

“stigma-plus-infringement” test. 

The cited cases, however, do not reflect clearly established law under 

the facts presented in this case. Neither Constantineau nor Bledsoe “clearly 

prohibit[ed] the [Sheriff’s] conduct in the particular circumstances before 

him.” Wesby, 138 S.Ct. at 590. 

Constantineau is far afield. 400 U.S. at 434. That case involved a

constitutional challenge to a state law allowing the public posting, without 

notice or a hearing, of notices forbidding the sale of alcohol to particular 

individuals. Id. at 434–35. Besides articulating general principles of 

procedural due process, that case has no application to this one. Id.; see, e.g., 

Vincent, 805 F.3d at 547 (explaining that “abstract or general statements of 

legal principle untethered to analogous or near-analogous facts are not 

sufficient to establish a right ‘clearly’ in a given context”). 

Bledsoe is also unhelpful to Cunningham’s case. 449 F.3d at 651. In 

Bledsoe, we affirmed a summary judgment dismissing a procedural-dueprocess claim premised on the alleged denial of a request for a name-clearing 

hearing, holding that the plaintiff never requested such a hearing. Id. at 655. 

We found no procedural-due-process violation. Id. So Bledsoe—even if it 

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were factually similar (and it is not)4—is incapable of providing “fair notice”

of a procedural-due-process violation. See Morrow, 917 F.3d at 875 

(explaining that “clearly established law comes from holdings”). 

The district court’s reliance on broad pronouncements from 

Constantineau and Bledsoe evinces a methodological error: It defined clearly 

established law too generally for any controlling relevance in this case. 

Courts must “frame the constitutional question with specificity and 

granularity.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874–75. The district court did not do that. 

Instead, the district court appears to have asked whether, generally, the 

procedural-due-process right to a name-clearing hearing was clearly 

established. That wording is the wrong way to frame the question, as the 

Supreme Court repeatedly has told us. See, e.g., Emmons, 139 S.Ct. at 503–

04 (reversing Ninth Circuit for framing clearly established law too generally);

Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1154–55 (2018) (per curiam) (same); Wesby, 

138 S.Ct. at 593 (same, D.C. Circuit); White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548, 552–53 

(2017) (per curiam) (same, Tenth Circuit); Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 18–19 

(same, this court); Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 20 (2014) (per curiam) 

(same, Third Circuit); Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 670 (2012) (same, 

Tenth Circuit); al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743–44 (same, Ninth Circuit). 

“The dispositive question,” we emphasize, is whether “the violative 

nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12. 

The answer here is no.

To further explain that compact response, we begin by describing the 

4 Bledsoe arose from a city fire chief’s forced resignation after he was accused of 

altering time sheets, brandishing a firearm in his office, and falsifying reports. 449 F.3d at 

652. Before he was forced to resign, the city’s board of aldermen questioned him during 

a meeting; he “largely” denied the alleged misconduct. Id. Days after that meeting, the 

board of aldermen convened another—this time, behind closed doors and without the fire 

chief. Id. The fire chief found out about the closed-door meeting “shortly before it was to 

occur.” Id. Obviously concerned, he “asked the board to either postpone the meeting until 

his attorney could be with him or to record the proceedings.” Id. This request, we held, 

did not constitute a request for a name-clearing hearing under the “stigma-plusinfringement” test. Id. at 653. 

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particular conduct for which Cunningham seeks to hold Sheriff Castloo 

liable. See Wesby, 138 S.Ct. at 590. Sheriff Castloo’s subordinates—Chief 

Deputy Sanders, Lieutenant Burge, and Captain Holland—met with 

Cunningham and fired her for “improper use of chain of command and 

lying,” without further explanation. In response, Cunningham asked “to 

speak with the Sheriff,” but Sheriff Castloo’s subordinates did not “allow” 

her to do so. Sheriff Castloo was not present at the meeting, and there is no 

evidence that he instructed his subordinates to deny Cunningham’s request 

“to speak with” him.

Having first described Sheriff Castloo’s particular conduct, as 

reflected by the summary-judgment record and viewed in Cunningham’s 

favor, we now ask whether the “violative nature,” vis-à-vis the Constitution,

was clearly established. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12. 

We conclude that it was not.5

 Specifically, the law was not clearly 

established that Cunningham’s request “to speak with” Sheriff Castloo

constituted a request for a name-clearing hearing in the context of our

“stigma-plus-infringement” test, such that denying the request would 

amount to a procedural-due-process violation. Our cases are quite unclear, 

even confusing, on what constitutes a request for a name-clearing hearing. 

Compare Bledsoe, 449 F.3d at 653–54 with Rosenstein, 876 F.2d at 396. What 

is clear, however, is that none of our cases—and certainly none from the 

Supreme Court—holds that an employee requests a name-clearing hearing,

triggering procedural-due-process protections, when she asks only “to speak 

with” her boss in the context of her discharge. Of importance, granting 

5 Like the district court, Cunningham offers only general statements of legal 

principle, unmoored from the facts of this case, in her attempt to satisfy the clearly 

established law requirement. None of the cases she cites speaks to the specific and 

dispositive question we decide today, i.e., whether it was clearly established, at the time of 

Sheriff Castloo’s conduct, that a public official violates a discharged employee’s 

procedural-due-process right when one of the public official’s subordinates, acting without 

instruction from the official and outside the official’s presence, denies the discharged 

employee’s request “to speak with” the official.

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Cunningham’s request “to speak with” Sheriff Castloo would not have 

provided Cunningham a “public forum” of any sort; it would have resulted 

only in a private audience with Sheriff Castloo. See Bledsoe, 449 F.3d at 654. 

That fact alone distinguishes this case from Rosenstein, in which case “[t]he 

appeals procedure would [have] provide[d] the officer ‘with a public forum 

to clear his name before the governing body that discharged him.’” Id.

(quoting Rosenstein, 876 F.2d at 396).

All told, Cunningham has failed to cite “adequate authority at a 

sufficiently high level of specificity” to put Sheriff Castloo “on notice that 

his conduct is definitively unlawful.” Vincent, 805 F.3d at 547 (citing Morgan 

v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). She therefore failed 

to satisfy her burden of defeating Sheriff Castloo’s claim of qualified

immunity. Sheriff Castloo is entitled to qualified immunity, and the district 

court erred in denying that defense.

IV

We sum up. In this opinion, we have fully accepted Cunningham’s 

version of the summary-judgment record as true. We have held that, even

under this view of the record, Sheriff Castloo is entitled to qualified 

immunity. The law was not clearly established that Sheriff Castloo’s 

particular conduct violated Cunningham’s procedural-due-process right to a 

name-clearing hearing. Because the alleged violative nature of Sheriff

Castloo’s conduct was not clearly established as unconstitutional, we 

REVERSE the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and REMAND

the case to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 

opinion.

 REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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