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16-928-cr 

United States v. Zandi 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A 

COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

27th day of February, two thousand seventeen. 

Present: 

JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,

 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

 Circuit Judges, 

 VINCENT L. BRICCETTI, 

 District Judge.* 

_____________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Appellee, 

v. 16-928-cr 

 

MAHMUD ZANDI, 

 

 Defendant-Appellant, 

MOHAMED NASSIR, AHMED SHAAT A/K/A EDWARD 

LEE MIKE, SADEQ H. ALABUDI A/K/A AL, 

 

 Defendants. 

_____________________________________ 

 

*

 Judge Vincent L. Briccetti, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 

sitting by designation. 
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For Appellee: NOMI D. BERENSON (Jo Ann M. Navickas, on the 

brief) for Robert L. Capers, United States Attorney for 

the Eastern District of New York, New York, New 

York 

For Defendant-Appellant: KHALIL KAMEL EL ASSAAD (James C. Neville, on the 

brief), Lumer & Neville, New York, New York 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

New York (Wexler, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-Appellant Mahmud Zandi is serving a 240-month prison sentence after 

conviction for conspiracy and attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 

841(b)(1)(A)(viii), and to possess and distribute pseudoephedrine to be used to manufacture 

methamphetamine, see id. §§ 846, 841(c). Zandi appeals the district court’s denial of his motion 

for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) and Amendment 782 to the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, 

procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

We review de novo a district court’s determination of a defendant’s eligibility for a 

sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 

2013). Under § 3582(c)(2), a district court may reduce the sentence of “a defendant who has 

been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently 

been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(2). In 2014, the United States 

Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 782, reducing by two the offense levels for certain 

controlled-substances offenses. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual supp. to app. C, 
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amend. 782 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016). The Sentencing Commission also issued 

Amendment 788, providing for the retroactive application of Amendment 782. Id. amend. 788. 

As the district court correctly held, Zandi is ineligible for a sentence reduction under 

§ 3582(c) because Amendment 782 did not lower the sentencing range applicable to him. 

When sentencing Zandi in 2007, the district court determined that his base offense level was 38 

according to the then-applicable drug quantity table. At the time, this offense level applied to a 

defendant responsible for 15 kilograms or more of methamphetamine. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) 

(2006 ed.). Zandi fell into this category because the district court adopted the finding of the 

United States Probation Office (“Probation”), noted in its Presentence Investigation Report 

(“PSR”), that Zandi was responsible for the equivalent of 300 kilograms of methamphetamine. 

In light of Zandi’s criminal history category of II, the Guidelines sentencing range was between 

262 and 327 months. Under the post–Amendment 782 drug quantity table, an offender 

responsible for the equivalent of 300 kilograms of methamphetamine would still have a base 

offense level of 38. Id. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2016 ed.) (assigning this offense level to defendants 

responsible for 45 kilograms or more of methamphetamine). If the offender’s criminal history 

category were II, the Guidelines sentencing range would remain between 262 and 327 months. 

Because this range is the same as the one applicable to Zandi in 2007, § 3582(c)(2) does not 

authorize the district court to reduce his sentence. 

Zandi argues that although at his sentencing the district court recited his base offense 

level of 38, the fact that the district court imposed a 240-month below-Guidelines prison 

sentence means the district court effectively sentenced him based on a lower base offense level 

of 36. However, even if we were to adopt this position, for which the record provides no 

support, Zandi would remain ineligible for a § 3582(c) sentence reduction. This is because, as 
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illustrated above, Amendment 782 did not alter the sentencing ranges applicable to certain base 

offense levels, it changed the base offense levels applicable to defendants responsible for certain 

drug quantities. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2016 ed.); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2006 ed.). To the 

extent Zandi contends he received a below-Guidelines sentence because the district court held 

him responsible for a lower quantity of methamphetamine, there is no support for that conclusion 

in the record either. Significantly, Zandi concedes that the district court adopted Probation’s 

finding, noted in the PSR, that he was responsible for the equivalent of 300 kilograms of 

methamphetamine. 

Because Zandi is ineligible for a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction, we need not reach his 

contention that application to him of a 2011 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines removing a 

district court’s discretion to grant a downward departure upon resentencing if the defendant had 

received a comparable departure at his initial sentencing would be an ex post facto violation. 

See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b) (2016 ed.); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. app. n.3 (2006 ed.); see also

United States v. Steele, 714 F.3d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). We note, however, that 

our recent decision in United States v. Ramirez, 846 F.3d 615 (2d Cir. 2017), forecloses this 

argument. 

We have considered all of Zandi’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without 

merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk