[Cite as State ex rel. Balas-Bratton v. Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 527, 2014-Ohio-1406.] 

THE STATE EX REL. BALAS-BRATTON v. HUSTED ET AL. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Balas-Bratton v. Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 527, 

2014-Ohio-1406.] 

Elections—Prohibition—Allegation of biased board of elections member—

Secretary of state not required to remove board of elections member for 

alleged bias—Secretary of state did not abuse his discretion in breaking 

board of elections tie in favor of denying protest against candidate for 

sheriff—Writ denied. 

(No. 2014-0374—Submitted March 28, 2014—Decided April 2, 2014.) 

IN PROHIBITION. 

____________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, we consider a challenge to George 

Maier’s appearance on the primary ballot for Stark County sheriff. Last year, we 

ousted Maier from that same office. State ex rel. Swanson v. Maier, 137 Ohio 

St.3d 400, 2013-Ohio-4767, 999 N.E.2d 639. After his ouster, Maier obtained 

full-time employment as a Harrison County deputy sheriff. The Stark County 

Democratic Central Committee (“DCC”) apparently believed that this 

employment cured the defect in his qualifications identified in Swanson and once 

again appointed him Stark County sheriff. So that he can run for that office to fill 

the still-unexpired term, he submitted an application to be a candidate for sheriff 

in the May 6, 2014 Democratic primary election. 

{¶ 2} Relator, Cynthia Balas-Bratton, filed a protest with the Stark 

County Board of Elections (“BOE”) claiming that Maier remains unqualified to 

be a candidate for sheriff. The BOE’s vote on the protest ended in a tie regarding 

some of Maier’s qualifications, and respondent Secretary of State Jon Husted 
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broke the tie in favor of denying the protest and allowing Maier to remain on the 

primary ballot. Balas-Bratton filed this action in prohibition to order the BOE and 

Husted to remove a BOE member for purposes of this protest because the member 

is biased in favor of Maier and to order Husted to remove Maier from the primary 

ballot. 

{¶ 3} The issues in this case are (1) whether a member of the BOE 

should (or could) have been removed from the BOE for bias in favor of Maier and 

(2) whether Husted abused his discretion in breaking the BOE’s tie vote on 

Maier’s qualifications and allowing Maier to remain on the ballot. 

{¶ 4} Because neither Husted nor the BOE has the clear authority to 

remove a board of elections member for bias and because Husted did not abuse 

his discretion in allowing Maier to remain on the ballot, we deny the writ. 

Facts 

Maier’s ouster as sheriff of Stark County 

{¶ 5} George Maier was appointed by the DCC as sheriff of Stark 

County when the sheriff-elect was unable to assume the office for health reasons. 

His appointment was challenged in quo warranto, and last year, this court issued a 

writ ousting him as Stark County sheriff. Swanson, 137 Ohio St.3d 400, 2013-

Ohio-4767, 999 N.E.2d 639, ¶ 40. We based our decision on Maier’s failure to 

meet the requirements under R.C. 311.01(B)(8), subsection (a),1

 which requires, 

among other things, that a county sheriff have been employed within the four 

years immediately prior to the statutory qualifying date as a highway patrol 

officer or “as a full-time peace officer as defined in section 109.71 of the Revised 

Code performing duties related to the enforcement of statutes, ordinances, or 

codes.” Although he had been a highway patrol officer, his employment there 

ended before the qualifying time period. Id. at ¶ 30. 

 

1. Maier acknowledged in that action that he did not qualify under R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(b). 

Swanson, 137 Ohio St.3d 400, 2013-Ohio-4767, 999 N.E.2d 639, ¶ 29. 
January Term, 2014 

3 

{¶ 6} Maier held two other positions that he asserted qualified him under 

R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(a), but the court found that neither satisfied the statute, as he 

had held neither position full-time. The first position, assistant director of the 

Department of Public Safety, was not full-time, because not all his working hours 

were devoted to peace-officer duties. Id. at ¶ 37. The second, a brief stint as a 

deputy sheriff of Harrison County, was not full-time, because he worked only a 

single weekend, and therefore failed to meet the definition of “full-time” for 

county employees in R.C. 325.19, that is, a total of 40 hours a week. Id. at ¶ 38. 

Because we found him unqualified under R.C. 311.01(B)(8), we declined to 

consider the challenges to his qualifications under R.C. 311.01(B)(9). Id. at ¶ 39. 

Maier is reappointed as sheriff 

{¶ 7} Shortly after he was ousted, Maier went back to work for Harrison 

County as a deputy sheriff, but this time remained in the position full-time for 

four weeks. Apparently believing that this cured the defect in his qualifications 

found by the court, he then sought reappointment to the position as Stark County 

sheriff and was successful. His current appointment to the office of sheriff began 

on December 12, 2013. His current tenure in that position has not been 

challenged. 

Maier’s application for candidacy is protested by Balas-Bratton 

{¶ 8} So that he may run for sheriff in the 2014 general election, Maier 

submitted an application for candidacy with the BOE on January 28, 2014. On 

February 11, 2014, Balas-Bratton filed a protest with the BOE claiming that 

Maier failed to meet the statutory qualifications for a candidate for sheriff, 

specifically, R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(a) or (b) and (B)(9)(a) or (b). The protest sought 

to prevent Maier’s name from appearing on the May 6, 2014 Democratic primary 

ballot. 

 
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Balas-Bratton asserts that board member St. John is biased 

{¶ 9} Prior to the BOE hearing on the protest, Balas-Bratton sent 

correspondence to the BOE and Husted requesting that BOE member 

Deametrious St. John recuse himself from participating in the protest hearing or 

be prevented from participating in the protest hearing. Balas-Bratton alleges that 

she claimed in her correspondence that St. John could not be fair and impartial 

because he had previously voted to appoint Maier as sheriff, had signed a letter 

supporting the appointment of Maier for sheriff in February 2013, and had made 

statements to a newspaper reporter indicating that he believed that Maier met the 

qualifications. 

{¶ 10} On February 14, 2014, BOE member St. John executed an affidavit 

that he submitted to the BOE attesting that he could be fair and impartial at the 

protest hearing. 

{¶ 11} One day before the protest hearing was scheduled to take place, 

Balas-Bratton filed an action in prohibition and mandamus against the BOE in the 

Fifth District Court of Appeals to prevent St. John’s participation in the protest 

hearing. That court did not issue a writ before the hearing. After the hearing, the 

court of appeals dismissed the action as moot. That dismissal is currently on 

appeal to this court. State ex rel. Balas-Bratton v. St. John, case No. 2014-0367. 

The BOE’s hearing resulted in a tie vote 

{¶ 12} On February 21, 2014, the BOE held a public hearing on the 

protest. After a day-long hearing in which four witnesses testified and were 

cross-examined, and the parties submitted 23 exhibits, the BOE voted on the 

protest. On the issue of Maier’s qualifications under R.C. 311.01(B)(8), the BOE 

voted to deny the protest. However, as to Maier’s qualifications under R.C. 

311.01(B)(9), the BOE produced a tie vote, with the two Democrats, Ferrucio and 

St. John, voting to deny the protest and the two Republicans, Cline and Braden, 

voting to grant the protest. 
January Term, 2014 

5 

The tie vote was broken by Husted 

{¶ 13} The matter was referred to Husted to break the tie under R.C. 

3501.11(X). On March 7, 2014, Husted issued his decision, voting to deny the 

protest. Husted found that R.C. 311.01(B)(9) “needs more clarity” and “is in need 

of rewriting in a manner that is unambiguous.” Nevertheless, he found that the 

record lacked evidence to demonstrate that Maier was unqualified under R.C. 

311.01(B)(9). He therefore broke the BOE tie in favor of denying the protest. 

{¶ 14} Balas-Bratton initiated this action in prohibition, requesting 

expedited review and an order precluding Husted and the BOE from including 

Maier on the May primary ballot. 

Analysis 

Prohibition 

{¶ 15} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, Balas-Bratton 

must establish that (1) a lower tribunal is about to or has exercised judicial or 

quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and 

(3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy 

exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 

114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18 and 23; State ex rel. Miller v. Warren 

Cty. Bd. of Elections, 130 Ohio St.3d 24, 2011-Ohio-4623, 955 N.E.2d 379, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 16} Moreover, “[i]n extraordinary-writ actions challenging a decision 

of the secretary of state, the standard is whether the secretary engaged in fraud, 

corruption, or abuse of discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable law.” 

State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt. v. Brunner, 125 Ohio 

St.3d 427, 2010-Ohio-1873, 928 N.E.2d 1072, ¶ 9. There is no evidence of fraud 

or corruption here, so the dispositive issue is whether Husted abused his 

discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law. 

{¶ 17} Because Balas-Bratton cannot satisfy the elements of prohibition, 

we deny the writ. 
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Alleged bias of board member St. John 

{¶ 18} Balas-Bratton first asks the court for a writ of prohibition directing 

Husted not to recognize St. John’s vote against her protest. This claim is based on 

Balas-Bratton’s assertion that St. John was biased in favor of Maier and against 

her protest. She bases this assertion on the grounds that St. John, as a member of 

the DCC, had twice voted to appoint Maier sheriff, both before and after his 

ouster; that he had signed a letter directed to fellow DCC members and supporting 

Maier; and that he had stated to a reporter that he had always believed that Maier 

met the qualifications. 

{¶ 19} As explained above, prohibition requires that a tribunal be 

exercising or about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power. We have 

therefore refused to issue writs of prohibition against boards of elections if the 

board is not required to hold a hearing on the matter at issue. State ex rel. 

Baldzicki v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 90 Ohio St.3d 238, 241, 736 N.E.2d 

893 (2000), citing State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 72 

Ohio St.3d 69, 72, 647 N.E.2d 769 (1995). Here, Balas-Bratton fails to allege or 

demonstrate that the BOE or Husted had any obligation to hold a hearing or other 

quasi-judicial procedure with respect to her contention regarding St. John’s 

alleged bias. Thus, neither respondent is about to exercise nor has exercised 

quasi-judicial power, and the first requirement for a writ of prohibition is not met. 

{¶ 20} Additionally, Balas-Bratton cites no authority allowing the BOE to 

remove or suspend one of its members, and the authority she cites for the 

proposition that Husted can intervene in this way does not support her argument. 

The cited statute, R.C. 3501.16, allows the secretary to remove a board member 

under very specific circumstances: 

The secretary of state may summarily remove or suspend 

any member of a board of elections, or the director, deputy 
January Term, 2014 

7 

director, or any other employee of the board, for neglect of duty, 

malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, for any willful 

violation of Title XXXV of the Revised Code, or for any other 

good and sufficient cause. Except as otherwise provided in section 

3501.161 of the Revised Code, vacancies in the office of 

chairperson, director, or deputy director shall be filled in the same 

manner as original selections are made, from persons belonging to 

the same political party as that to which the outgoing officer 

belonged. If those vacancies cannot be filled in that manner, they 

shall be filled by the secretary of state. 

Balas-Bratton does not, and cannot, assert that Husted was required to remove or 

suspend St. John, and indeed, this court has previously rejected the argument that 

the secretary may remove a board member for a conflict of interest: 

R.C. 3501.16 does not grant the Secretary of State broad 

discretion in removing election board members. He is required to 

submit more than “his reasons for believing” the individual should 

be removed. Indeed, he cannot remove them except for certain 

very specific reasons and “other good and sufficient cause.” Given 

the language of the statute and the fact that an individual who is 

already an election board member has a greater constitutional 

interest in keeping that position than does an individual who has 

not yet been appointed * * * we do not find that the Secretary of 

State has a clear legal duty to remove [the member] from, or vacate 

his appointment to, the Board of Elections of Mahoning County. 
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State ex rel. Hough v. Brown, 50 Ohio St.2d 329, 332, 364 N.E.2d 275 (1977). 

Thus, under Hough, Husted could not remove or suspend St. John simply because 

of an allegation of bias or conflict of interest. 

{¶ 21} We deny a writ of prohibition on the issue of removing St. John 

from the BOE for alleged bias. 

Maier’s qualification as sheriff 

R.C. 2733.14 

{¶ 22} Balas-Bratton’s claim hinges on whether Husted abused his 

discretion by breaking the tie in favor of leaving Maier’s name on the ballot. She 

cites R.C. 2733.14 for the proposition that Maier’s ouster as Stark County sheriff 

permanently precludes him from ever again being sheriff of Stark County. The 

statute states: 

When a defendant in an action in quo warranto is found 

guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or 

exercising an office, franchise, or privilege, judgment shall be 

rendered that he be ousted and excluded therefrom, and that the 

relator recover his costs. 

Balas-Bratton interprets this statute to mean that once a person is ousted from a 

position he can never again hold that position. This is, at best, a strained reading 

of the statute. The ousted party is excluded from the office only at the time of the 

quo warranto action, not forever. If Maier can now qualify as a candidate for 

sheriff, he may run for the office, even though he did not qualify last year. 

Maier satisfies R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a)

{¶ 23} Balas-Bratton contends that Maier does not qualify under either 

R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a) or (b). R.C. 311.01(B)(9) requires that a candidate for 

sheriff meet at least one of the following two requirements: 
January Term, 2014 

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(a) Has at least two years of supervisory experience as a 

peace officer at the rank of corporal or above, or has been 

appointed pursuant to section 5503.01 of the Revised Code and 

served at the rank of sergeant or above, in the five-year period 

ending immediately prior to the qualification date; 

(b) Has completed satisfactorily at least two years of postsecondary education or the equivalent in semester or quarter hours 

in a college or university authorized to confer degrees by the Ohio 

board of regents or the comparable agency of another state in 

which the college or university is located or in a school that holds a 

certificate of registration issued by the state board of career 

colleges and schools under Chapter 3332. of the Revised Code. 

Thus, to qualify for county sheriff, a candidate must meet the qualifications set 

forth in R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a) or R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b). Maier need not meet both 

qualifying conditions, but must meet at least one. 

{¶ 24} As to R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a), Maier claims that he has a total of 39 

months of the requisite supervisory experience that qualify under this provision. 

Specifically, he claims that he served for 23 months during the qualifying period 

as the assistant director and interim director of the Ohio Department of Public 

Safety, and during that time, he supervised several units of peace officers, 

including the Ohio Investigative Unit and the Ohio Homeland Security unit. As 

the assistant director, he supervised and directed coordination of all criminal 

investigations with the governor’s chief legal counsel and the State Highway 

Patrol. The superintendent of the Highway Patrol, who holds the rank of colonel, 

reported to Maier on active investigations on a weekly basis. He was also a 
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certified peace officer during the time he served as supervisor for the various units 

at the Department of Public Safety. 

{¶ 25} Second, he served as the safety and service director of the city of 

Massillon for 14 months, and in that position, he supervised the police and fire 

departments and held a peace officer’s commission. Third, he served 

unchallenged as Stark County sheriff for two months within the qualifying period. 

{¶ 26} Balas-Bratton’s argument that Maier’s supervisory experience 

must be consecutive is without merit. Specifically, she asserts that Maier cannot 

add the time periods of his various supervisory positions together to satisfy the 

requirement of 24 months of supervisory experience. But the statute does not 

explicitly require that the two years of experience be consecutive, and absent such 

language, we hold that nonconsecutive supervisory experience may be used to 

satisfy R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a). 

{¶ 27} Balas-Bratton also argues that Maier’s supervisory experience as 

assistant director of the Department of Public Safety was “civilian administrative 

service” and such “rankless” service does not satisfy the statute. This argument is 

also without merit. 

{¶ 28} Balas-Bratton relies on three cases to support her argument, all of 

which are inapposite here. The first, State ex rel. Wolfe v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of 

Elections, 88 Ohio St.3d 182, 724 N.E.2d 771 (2000), does not hold that the 

experience must be at a paramilitary rank to qualify. Rather, Wolfe held that the 

candidate’s experience did not qualify because some of it was clearly not served 

at the rank of corporal or above. Id. at 185. In the second case, State ex rel. 

Watson v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 88 Ohio St.3d 239, 725 N.E.2d 255 

(2000), the candidate admitted that he had never served as a peace officer at the 

rank of corporal or above. Id. at 241. And in the third case, Wellington v. 

Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 143, 2008-Ohio-554, 882 N.E.2d 

420, again, the candidate admitted that he had not served as a peace officer at the 
January Term, 2014 

11 

rank of corporal or above, but had served only on a United States Marshal task 

force. 

{¶ 29} Maier’s experience as Stark County sheriff after he was 

reappointed obviously qualifies as supervisory experience as a peace officer at or 

above the rank of corporal. The question is whether his experience at the 

Department of Public Safety and the city of Massillon satisfies that same statutory 

criterion. 

{¶ 30} Maier was assistant director of the Department of Public Safety, 

and during that time, he was a certified peace officer. He was unequivocally a 

“peace officer,” and he held a “supervisory position.” The highest-ranking officer 

of the Highway Patrol, a colonel, reported to Maier. At the city of Massillon, 

both the chief of police and the fire chief reported to him. He therefore had 

“supervisory experience as a peace officer” over officers “at the rank of corporal 

or above.” Although Maier was not himself a ranked officer in these positions, he 

was supervising officers well above the rank of corporal, so it is clear that this 

experience satisfies the statutory requirement. 

{¶ 31} Based on our findings, it is clear that Husted did not abuse his 

discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable law in finding that Maier met the 

qualifications under R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a). Because Maier qualifies under R.C. 

311.01(B)(9)(a), we need not address his qualifications under R.C. 

311.01(B)(9)(b). 

Conclusion 

{¶ 32} For the foregoing reasons, we deny the writ of prohibition. 

Writ denied. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and

O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 

____________________ 
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Craig T. Conley, for relator. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Ryan L. Richardson and Erin 

Butcher-Lyden, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent Secretary of State 

Jon Husted. 

David M. Bridenstine, for respondent Stark County Board of Elections. 

Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Thomas L. Rosenberg, and Michael R. 

Traven, for intervening respondent George T. Maier. 

Law Offices of Robert L. Berry, L.L.C., and Robert L. Berry, urging 

denial of the writ for amicus curiae, Buckeye State Sheriffs Association. 

_________________________