J-A07032-16 

2016 PA Super 92 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

RASHEE BEASLEY 

 Appellant No. 1149 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 6, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001275-2013 

 CP-02-CR-0003835-2013 

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J. 

OPINION BY JENKINS, J.: FILED APRIL 28, 2016

Appellant Rashee Beasley appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas following his bench 

trial convictions for intimidation of witnesses, terroristic threats, conspiracy 

and hindering apprehension.1 We affirm. 

The underlying facts and procedural history of this appeal are as 

follows. On April 17, 2012, Officer Michael Kosko and Officer David Derbish 

approached a Jeep Cherokee that had just parked without using a turn 

signal. N.T., 11/12/2013, at 20-23. Officer Kosko asked the driver a few 

questions through the window of his car. Id. at 23. After the officers 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4952(a)(1), 2706(a)(1), 903(c), and 5105(a)(1), 

respectively. 
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ascertained that the driver, Jamal Knox, did not have a valid license, Knox 

drove the Cherokee away from the scene quickly, with Appellant as his 

passenger. Id. at 23-25. After crashing a few times, the vehicle became 

disabled, and Knox and Appellant exited the Jeep through their respective 

windows and fled from the police on foot. Id. at 26-28. Police recovered 30 

stamp bags of heroin and $1,489.00 from Knox and two cell phones and 

$323.00 from Appellant Id. at 28, 37. Additionally, Officer Gromek searched 

the vehicle and found a firearm. Id. at 30. Officer Daniel Zeltner also 

responded to the scene and advised the other officers that Knox, who had 

identified himself as “Dante Jones,” was actually Jamal Knox. Id. at 66. He 

knew this because of previous dealings with Knox. Id. Officer Zeltner had 

also encountered Appellant on September 26, 2011, when Appellant fled 

after Officer Zeltner pulled him over. Appellant was charged with fleeing or 

attempting to elude law enforcement. Id. at 143-144. Neither the April 17, 

2012 nor the September 26, 2011 incidents are the subject of this appeal, 

but criminal cases relating to these incidents were pending when police 

discovered the YouTube video that gave rise to most of Appellant’s present 

convictions. 

On November 15, 2012, Officer Aaron Spangler viewed the Facebook 

page of Beaz Mooga, whom Officer Spangler believed was Appellant. Id. at 

178-79. From the Facebook page, Officer Spangler accessed several links to 

YouTube pages that showed rap music videos made by Knox and Appellant, 
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one of which was entitled “Fuck the Police.” Id. at 187. The video showed 

pictures of Appellant and Knox, and the song referenced Officer Zeltner, the 

officer involved in the September 26, 2011 incident, and Officer Kosko, one 

of the officers involved in the April 17, 2012 incident. Id. at 192. The video 

made references to killing police officers. Id. at 193. The song provides, in 

relevant part: 

“Fuck the Police” 

This first verse is for Officer Zeltner and all you FED 

force bitches and Mr. Kosko can suck my dick for 

knocking my riches. 

Want beef, well cracker I’m wit it, that whole department 

can get it. 

All these soldiers in my committee gonna fuck over you 

bitches, fuck the police bitch, I said it loud 

The fuckin city can’t stop me 

Ya’ll gonna need Jesus ta bring me down 

And he ain’t fuckin wit you dirty devils, 

We makin prank phone calls and as soon as you bitches 

come we bustin heavy metal (sound of gunfire) 

So now (Kosko?) gonna chase me through these streets 

and I’m a jam this rusty knife all in his guts and chop his 

feet. 

You takin money away from Beaz, and all that shit away 

from me, well your shift over at three and I’m a fuck 

up where you sleep. 

(Unintelligible) has got you watchin my moves and talkin 

bout me to your partner, 

I’m watchin you to and I see better when it’s darker. 

Highland Park gonna be Jurassic Park, keep on fuckin wit 

me. 

Hey Beaz go grab (Dre?) and (Squeeze?) and them two

two threes, It’s Mayhem. 

... 

The cops be on my dick like a rubber when I’m fuckin, so 

them bitches better run and duck for cover when I’m

buckin. 

Thetto superstar committee bitch we ain’t scared of

nothing. 
J-A07032-16 

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I keep a forty on waist, I’m gonna wet you like a mop 

nigga, clip filled to the tippy top wit som cop killas. 

Fuck the police, don’t bring us no peace 

That’s why I keep my heat when I’m roamin the 

streets, cause if you jump out it’s gonna be a dump out. 

I got my glock and best believe dog gonna bring the pump 

out, and I’m hittin your chest. Don’t tell me stop cause 

I’m resisting arrest. 

I ain’t really a rapper, but I spit wit the best. 

I ain’t carry no 38 dog, I spit wit a tec 

Tha’t like 50 shots nigga, that’s enough to hit one cop on 

50 blocks nigga 

I said fuck the cops nigga. 

They got me sittin in a cell, watchin my life just pass me, 

but I ain’t wit that shit like Poploski,[2] I’m strap nasty. 

... 

They killed Rhine, and ever since then I’ve been mugging 

you bitches. 

My Northview niggas they don’t fuck wit you bitches, I 

hate your fuckin guts, I hate you. 

My momma told me not to put this on C.D., but I’m 

gonna make this fuckin city believe me, so nigga turn 

me up. 

If Dre was here they wouldn’t fuck wit dis here. 

Loccs in the army, when he comes back it’s real nigga, you 

bootin up. 

Fuck the police, I said it Loud, we’ll repeat that.

Fuck the Police, I’m blowin loud wit my seat back. 

They cool and that, well Mr. Fed, if you can hear me bitch, 

go tell your daddy that we’re booming bricks. 

And them informants that you got, fit to be layin in the 

posse and I know exactly who workin, and I’m gonna 

kill him wit a glock. 

Quote that! 

Cause when you find that pussy lyin in the street, look at 

the shells and put my shit on repeat, and that’s on. 

Jesus’ blood. 

____________________________________________ 

2

 “Poploski” is the spelling in the affidavit of probable cause. In 2009, 

Richard Poplawski opened fire on Pittsburgh police officers, ultimately killing 

three and injuring other officers. See Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 130 

A.3d 697, 708 (Pa.2015). 
J-A07032-16 

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Let’s kill these cops, cause they don’t do us no good, pullin 

your glock out cause I live in the hood. 

You dirty Bitches, Bitch. 

Affidavit of Probable Cause3 (emphasis added). Officer Spangler sent the 

video to Officers Zeltner and Kosko, and Appellant was charged at CP-02-

CR-0003835-2013 with two counts each of intimidation of a witness or 

victim, retaliation against a witness, victim or party, and terroristic threats, 

and one count of criminal conspiracy. 

On January 8, 2013, Detective Michael Wilkes went to Tara Beasley’s4

home to serve an arrest warrant on Knox. Paul Webb answered the door 

and told the officer that only he and his sons were at the residence, but then 

let the officer in after a voice called from upstairs not to let the police into 

the house. Detective Wilkes saw several males upstairs and, believing him 

to be Knox and calling him Knox, arrested Appellant. Appellant did not 

protest or tell the detective that he was not Knox. He later identified himself 

at the police station when officers asked for his name. Detective Wilkes 

returned to the home and found Knox hiding in the ceiling behind tiles that 

he had noticed were loose when he arrested Appellant. At CP-02-CR-

____________________________________________ 

3

 During trial, the officers testified about some of the lyrics, and the YouTube 

video was introduced into evidence. 

4

 Tara Beasley is Appellant’s mother. 
J-A07032-16 

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0001275-2013, Appellant was charged with two counts of hindering 

apprehension or prosecution.5 

On November 21, 2013, the court found appellant guilty of two counts 

each of intimidation of witnesses and terroristic threats, and one count each 

of criminal conspiracy and hindering apprehension. The court acquitted 

Appellant of retaliation against a witness. 

On February 6, 2014, the court sentenced Appellant to 12-36 months’ 

incarceration, plus 2 years’ probation for intimidation of witnesses. The 

court imposed concurrent 2-year terms of probation on the second 

intimidation of witnesses count, and each of his 2 terroristic threat counts, 

and a concurrent term of 6-12 months’ incarceration for hindering 

apprehension. The court imposed no further penalties on his other 

convictions. 

On February 14, 2014, Appellant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, 

which the court denied by operation of law on June 19, 2014. On July 18, 

2014, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. On September 3, 2014, the 

court ordered Appellant to file a 1925(b) statement by November 2, 2014. 

On November 7, 2014, Appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) statement along with a 

motion for nunc pro tunc extension to file a 1925(b) statement. On 

____________________________________________ 

5

 On June 26, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a motion for joinder for CP-02-

CR-0001275-2013 and 02-CR-0003835-2013, which the court granted. 
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December 4, 2014, the court granted Appellant’s motion and deemed 

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement timely filed. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

1. WERE [APPELLANT’S] DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER 

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I § 9 OF THE 

PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS 

CONVICTED OF TWO COUNTS OF 18 PA.C.S. § 2706 

TERRORISTIC THREATS, TWO COUNTS OF 18 PA.C.S. § 

4952 ATTEMPTED INTIMIDATION OF A WITNESS, ONE 

COUNT OF 18 PA.C.S. § 903 CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, AND 

ONE COUNT OF 18 PA.C.S. § 5105 HINDERING 

APPREHENSION OR PROSECUTION BASED ON LEGALLY 

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE? 

2. WITH RESPECT TO [APPELLANT’S] TWO TERRORISTIC 

THREATS CONVICTIONS, WAS THE EVIDENCE TO 

CONVICT HIM OF THOSE CHARGES INSUFFICIENT AS A 

MATTER OF LAW, WITH THE COMMONWEALTH HAVING 

FAILED TO PROVE, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT 

EITHER APPELLANT OR A PERSON FOR WHOSE CONDUCT 

HE WAS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE HAD COMMUNICATED, 

EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, A THREAT — IN THIS 

CASE, A PERCEIVED THREAT AGAINST THE TWO 

OFFICERS CONTAINED IN THE RAP VIDEO “F— THE 

POLICE” — TO EITHER OFFICER MICHAEL KOSKO OR 

DETECTIVE DANIEL ZELTNER? 

3. WITH RESPECT TO [APPELLANT’S] TWO ATTEMPTED 

INTIMIDATION OF WITNESS CONVICTIONS, WAS THE 

EVIDENCE TO CONVICT HIM OF THOSE CHARGES 

INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, WITH THE 

COMMONWEALTH HAVING FAILED TO PROVE, BEYOND 

REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF 

APPELLANT AND/OR A PERSON FOR WHOSE CONDUCT HE 

WAS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE WAS, IN CREATING THE “F— 

THE POLICE” RAP VIDEO AND HAVING IT UPLOADED 

ONTO THE INTERNET WEBSITE YOUTUBE, TO INDUCE 

EITHER OFFICER MICHAEL KOSKO OR DETECTIVE DANIEL 

ZELTNER TO EITHER REFRAIN FROM TESTIFYING AGAINST 

APPELLANT AND/OR HIS CO-DEFENDANT, JAMAL KNOX, 
J-A07032-16 

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REGARDING THE EVENTS RESULTING IN THE ARREST OF 

THE TWO MEN ON APRIL 17, 2012, OR ELSE TO PROVIDE 

FALSE OR MISLEADING TESTIMONY REGARDING THOSE 

EVENTS, OR ELSE TO FAIL TO APPEAR IN COURT TO 

TESTIFY REGARDING THOSE EVENTS, WITH HIS OR THEIR 

ULTIMATE GOAL BEING TO OBSTRUCT, IMPEDE, IMPAIR, 

PREVENT, OR OTHERWISE INTERFERE WITH THE 

ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE? 

4. WITH RESPECT TO [APPELLANT’S] CRIMINAL 

CONSPIRACY CONVICTION, WAS THE EVIDENCE TO 

CONVICT HIM ON THAT CHARGE INSUFFICIENT AS A 

MATTER OF LAW, WITH THE COMMONWEALTH HAVING 

FAILED TO PROVE, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT 

APPELLANT HAD ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT WITH 

JAMAL KNOX SEEKING TO COMMUNICATE A THREAT TO 

EITHER OFFICER KOSKO OR DETECTIVE ZELTNER, WITH 

THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THAT COMMUNICATION BEING 

TO INDUCE THE OFFICERS TO REFRAIN FROM TESTIFYING 

AGAINST THEM IN THEIR PENDING CRIMINAL CASE OR 

OTHERWISE SLANT THEIR TESTIMONY IN A MANNER THAT 

WOULD FAVOR THE DEFENSE IN THAT CASE? 

5. FINALLY, WITH RESPECT TO [APPELLANT’S] HINDERING

APPREHENSION OR PROSECUTION CONVICTION, WAS THE 

EVIDENCE TO CONVICT HIM OF THAT CHARGE 

INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, WITH THE 

COMMONWEALTH HAVING FAILED TO PROVE, BEYOND A 

REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT APPELLANT WAS AWARE OF 

THE FACT THAT JAMAL KNOX WAS HIDING INSIDE HIS 

MOTHER’S HOUSE AND THAT HE (I.E., APPELLANT) 

AFFIRMATIVELY ACTED TO CONCEAL KNOX WITHIN THAT 

RESIDENCE? 

Appellant’s Brief at 3-6. 

Appellant’s issues challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for his 

convictions. 

When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, our 

standard of review is as follows: 
J-A07032-16 

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The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there 

is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In

applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the

combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain 

its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire 

record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact 

while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super.2011), appeal 

denied, 32 A.3d 1275 (Pa.2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 

A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super.2005)).

In his second issue,6 Appellant claims the Commonwealth failed to 

present sufficient evidence that he communicated the video to the officers. 

He argues that neither he nor Knox tried to communicate the video and that 

their posting of the video on YouTube and linking it to a Facebook page does 

not constitute the requisite communication because it is not direct 

____________________________________________ 

6

 Appellant’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for all of 

his convictions. Our discussion of Appellant’s second through fifth issues will 

resolve his first issue. 
J-A07032-16 

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communication. He claims that the video was not posted with intent or 

reckless disregard to terrorize the police officers. He argues that because 

communication is an element of terroristic threats, the evidence is 

insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree. 

The crime of terroristic threats is defined as follows:

§ 2706. Terroristic threats

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the crime of 

terroristic threats if the person communicates, either 

directly or indirectly, a threat to: 

(1) commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize 

another; 

(2) cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or 

facility of public transportation; or 

(3) otherwise cause serious public inconvenience, or 

cause terror or serious public inconvenience with 

reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or 

inconvenience. 

18 Pa.C.S. § 2706. 

 For a defendant to be convicted of terroristic threats, 

“the Commonwealth must prove that 1) the defendant 

made a threat to commit a crime of violence, and 2) the 

threat was communicated with the intent to terrorize 

another or with reckless disregard for the risk of causing 

terror.” Commonwealth v. Tizer, 684 A.2d 597, 600 

([Pa.Super.]1996). “Neither the ability to carry out the 

threat, nor a belief by the person threatened that the 

threat will be carried out, is an element of the offense.” In 

re J.H., 797 A.2d 260, 262 (Pa.Super.2002). “Rather, the 

harm sought to be prevented by the statute is the 

psychological distress that follows from an invasion of 

another’s sense of personal security.” Tizer, 684 A.2d at 

600. 
J-A07032-16 

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Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 730 (Pa.Super.2003). 

 Here, Appellant does not claim that he did not sing the words of his 

rap song, which unquestionably threaten violence. Further, he does not aver 

that the officers never saw the threatening video. He argues, rather, that he 

did not intentionally or recklessly communicate the threat to the officers. 

Here, the terroristic threats statute is clear and 

unambiguous that a communication must be conveyed. 

See 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 2706(a)(1); see also 1 Pa.C.S.[] § 

1928(b)(1). The official comment to Section 2706 states, 

“[t]he purpose of the section is to impose criminal liability 

on persons who make threats which seriously impair 

personal security or public convenience.” 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 

2706, official comment–1972; see also 1 Pa.C.S.[] § 

1921(a); Commonwealth v. Hardwick, 445 A.2d 796, 

797 ([Pa.Super.]1982) (same). 

Therefore, while the statute does not expressly address 

whether to construe a threat as being made at the time it 

is uttered or at the time it is received, we observe that a 

person’s “personal security” cannot be “seriously 

impair[ed]” by a threat unless he hears it. Id. Accordingly, 

based on the statute’s plain meaning, our strict 

construction of it, and the legislature’s stated purpose in 

enacting it, we conclude that the term, “communicates,” as 

used in the terroristic threats statute, contemplates that 

the threat be received. 

Commonwealth v. Vergilio, 103 A.3d 831, 833-34 (Pa.Super.2014)

appeal denied, 114 A.3d 416 (Pa.2015). 

 Terroristic threats do not have to be communicated directly. See 

Commonwealth v. Kelley, 664 A.2d 123, 127 (Pa.Super.1995) (holding a 

threat was communicated when the appellant gave a secretary a message to 

threaten violence to certain intended recipients). Further, a defendant does 
J-A07032-16 

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not need to intend to carry out the consequence of the threat to 

communicate a threat. See Commonwealth v. Cancilla, 649 A.2d 991, 

994 (Pa.Super.1994) (holding a threat was communicated by a phone call 

that stated a bomb was in a building, although there was no bomb). 

 The Supreme Court of the United States addressed the subject of 

Facebook posts as terroristic threats in Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 

2001, 2011, 192 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2015). In that case, the defendant posted 

threatening comments on Facebook in response to people having viewed his 

posts. The jury convicted the defendant of terroristic threats after the trial 

court instructed that the Government needed to prove that a reasonable 

person would regard the defendant’s communications as threats. The 

Supreme Court found this jury instruction was error because it failed to 

consider the defendant’s mental state. The Supreme Court held that “[t]he 

mental state requirement must therefore apply to the fact that the 

communication contains a threat.” Id. at 2012. In reaching this holding, the 

Court considered how the “presumption in favor of a scienter requirement 

should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise 

innocent conduct.” Id. 

 Here, Appellant had a link on his Facebook page to a YouTube video 

titled “Fuck the Police.” Although his Facebook page did not list his full, legal 

name, he used the name “Beaz Mooga” which does not completely disguise 

his last name, Beasley. The rap video specifically threatened to kill Officers 
J-A07032-16 

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Zeltner and Kosko “wit a glock.” We need not ponder whether deciding to 

broadcast songs or linking YouTube videos to one’s Facebook page generally 

indicates intent to communicate, because Appellant stated his intent by 

saying in his rap song: “My momma told me not to put this on C.D., but I’m 

gonna make this fuckin city believe me, so nigga turn me up.” Appellant 

chose not to listen to his mother because he wanted Officers Zeltner and 

Kosko to hear his message, and they did. He successfully and intentionally 

communicated his threat. Thus, Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence for his terroristic threats convictions merits no relief. 

Next, Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him 

of intimidation of a witness or attempt thereof, because the Commonwealth 

did not present evidence that he posted the video on YouTube with the 

intent of getting the police to do any of the enumerated objectives in the 

intimidation statute. 

Appellant was convicted under the following statute: 

§ 4952. Intimidation of witnesses or victims

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if, 

with the intent to or with the knowledge that his conduct 

will obstruct, impede, impair, prevent or interfere with the 

administration of criminal justice, he intimidates or 

attempts to intimidate any witness or victim to: 

(1) Refrain from informing or reporting to any law 

enforcement officer, prosecuting official or judge 

concerning any information, document or thing relating 

to the commission of a crime. 
J-A07032-16 

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(2) Give any false or misleading information or 

testimony relating to the commission of any crime to 

any law enforcement officer, prosecuting official or 

judge. 

(3) Withhold any testimony, information, document or 

thing relating to the commission of a crime from any 

law enforcement officer, prosecuting official or judge. 

(4) Give any false or misleading information or 

testimony or refrain from giving any testimony, 

information, document or thing, relating to the 

commission of a crime, to an attorney representing a 

criminal defendant. 

(5) Elude, evade or ignore any request to appear or

legal process summoning him to appear to testify or

supply evidence. 

(6) Absent himself from any proceeding or investigation 

to which he has been legally summoned. 

18 Pa.C.S. § 4952. 

Further, we observe: 

[A]ctual intimidation of a witness is not an essential 

element of the crime. The crime is committed if one, with 

the necessary mens rea, “attempts” to intimidate a witness 

or victim. ...The trier of the facts, therefore, could find that 

appellant attempted to intimidate his accuser and that he 

did so intending or, at least, having knowledge that his 

conduct was likely to, impede, impair or interfere with the 

administration of criminal justice.... The Commonwealth is 

not required to prove mens rea by direct evidence. 

Frequently such evidence is not available. In such cases, 

the Commonwealth may rely on circumstantial evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Collington, 615 A.2d 769, 770 (Pa.Super.1992). 

 Here, Appellant posted a rap song on YouTube that specifically 

threatened to kill Officers Zeltner and Kosko while Appellant had criminal 
J-A07032-16 

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charges pending against him in which these officers were going to testify.7 

This was sufficient evidence from which the court could infer that Appellant 

posted the video in an attempt to interfere with the administration of the 

justice system by convincing the police to withhold testimony, and from 

which the court found the elements of intimidation of a witness beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

Next, Appellant argues that he and Knox never conspired to commit 

any crime, and thus they could not be guilty of criminal conspiracy. He 

admits that they made the video together but contends it was not a crime to 

do so. Again, we disagree. 

The crime of criminal conspiracy is defined by statute: 

§ 903. Criminal conspiracy

(a) Definition of conspiracy.--A person is guilty of 

conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a 

crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its 

commission he: 

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they 

or one or more of them will engage in conduct which

constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to 

commit such crime; or 

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the 

planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt 

or solicitation to commit such crime. 

* * * 

____________________________________________ 

7

 As previously discussed, Appellant intended to communicate his message. 
J-A07032-16 

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(e) Overt act.--No person may be convicted of conspiracy 

to commit a crime unless an overt act in pursuance of such 

conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by him 

or by a person with whom he conspired. 

18 Pa.C.S. § 903. 

 Appellant and Knox made a YouTube video together in which they 

threatened to kill Officers Zeltner and Kosko, a communication which 

supported Appellant’s terroristic threats and intimidation of witness 

convictions. Thus, his creation of the video was an overt act, and he and 

Knox were part of a criminal conspiracy to commit terroristic threats and 

intimidation of witnesses. 

In his final issue, Appellant argues that he did not affirmatively hinder 

the apprehension of Knox, and that his decision to refrain from stating his 

name or telling police that he was not Knox was permissible. He claims that, 

in the criminal information, the Commonwealth asserted that he had 

“concealed” Knox in his home, but it did not assert that he harbored him. 

Further, he contends the Commonwealth failed to produce evidence that 

Appellant knew Knox was hiding in the ceiling of his mother’s home, a few 

feet above where police accidentally arrested Appellant because they 

believed he was Knox. Appellant’s final issue merits no relief. 

 The relevant statute regarding hindering apprehension or prosecution 

provides:

§ 5105. Hindering apprehension or prosecution
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(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if, 

with intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, 

conviction or punishment of another for crime or violation 

of the terms of probation, parole, intermediate punishment 

or Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition, he: 

(1) harbors or conceals the other; 

(2) provides or aids in providing a weapon, 

transportation, disguise or other means of avoiding

apprehension or effecting escape; 

(3) conceals or destroys evidence of the crime, or 

tampers with a witness, informant, document or other 

source of information, regardless of its admissibility in 

evidence; 

(4) warns the other of impending discovery or 

apprehension, except that this paragraph does not 

apply to a warning given in connection with an effort to 

bring another into compliance with law; or 

(5) provides false information to a law enforcement

officer. 

18 Pa.C.S. § 5105. 

In Commonwealth v. Haynes, 116 A.3d 640, 657 (Pa.Super.2015), 

appeal denied, 125 A.3d 1199 (Pa.2015), this Court held that evidence of a 

defendant giving shelter to a fugitive for one night was sufficient to sustain 

the jury’s finding of hindering apprehension. 

Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant was 

upstairs in a room in his mother’s home when the police came to the door 

looking for Knox. Someone in that room called down and asked the man 

who had opened the door not to let the police inside the house, but the 

police came inside anyway. When the officer entered the room, he saw scuff 
J-A07032-16 

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marks on the wall, leading up toward the ceiling, where a ceiling tile was out 

of place. He arrested Appellant, calling him “Knox,” and Appellant did not 

correct him or tell the officer that Knox was in the ceiling. The court 

reasonably inferred that Appellant was aware Knox was hiding in the ceiling 

from the evidence that both Knox and Appellant were in Appellant’s mother’s 

home, Appellant was aware police were searching for Knox, and there were 

scuffmarks on the walls leading up toward a displaced ceiling tile. 

Although Appellant did not affirmatively lie to police and stated his 

true name when questioned, like the appellant in Haynes, Appellant 

concealed Knox’s whereabouts so that he would not be arrested, and 

harbored Knox. Although Appellant contends that he was not charged with 

“harboring” Knox, the statute specifically states that one is guilty of 

hindering apprehension if one conceals or harbors another. Here, there was 

sufficient evidence for the court to conclude that Appellant concealed Knox. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/28/2016