REVERSE in part; REMAND in part; AFFIRM and Opinion Filed August 

22, 2024 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-22-01298-CV 

BRADFORD PLACE APARTMENTS, Appellant 

V. 

TED RAWLINGS AND CAITLIN KENNEDY, Appellees 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 

Hunt County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC2200074 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Goldstein 

Opinion by Justice Goldstein 

Bradford Place Apartments appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of Ted 

Rawlings and Caitlin Kennedy in this landlord-tenant repair or remedy dispute. In 

two issues, Bradford argues the trial court erred in ruling for Rawlings and Kennedy 

on their repair or remedy case because they failed to comply with certain provisions 

of the property code and in awarding Rawlings and Kennedy attorney’s fees. We 

reverse and remand in part and affirm in part. 

BACKGROUND 
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In April 2022, Rawlings and Kennedy initiated repair and remedy proceedings 

in justice court against Bradford alleging that a pipe burst and flooded their 

apartment, rendering it unlivable and unsafe. The petition requested a court order to 

repair or remedy the condition; “all housing, living, and moving costs for period not 

in unit”; a civil penalty of one month’s rent plus $500; attorney’s fees; and court 

costs. The justice court entered judgment in favor of Rawlings and Kennedy and 

awarded them $1699.99 as a civil penalty and $1700.51 as actual damages. 

Bradford appealed to the county court. At a trial de novo in May 2022, 

Rawlings and Hoffman testified with regard to the substance of the repair and 

remedy dispute and we provide only those facts necessary for a resolution of the 

issues raised on appeal.1

 

Rawlings testified he and Kennedy moved into apartment 412 at Bradford in 

June 2019 and renewed the lease in 2020 and again in 2021.2

 As of February 28, 

2022, the lease on the apartment was paid in full through February 28, 2022, and 

there was a $134.04 credit balance on the account. Rawlings and Kennedy had 

previously had “an ongoing guest bathroom toilet issue which had been reported 

multiple times to multiple managers.” As recently as January 18, Rawlings had a 

1

 Bradford does not challenge the amounts alleged as a result of the disposition in favor of Rawlings 

and Kenney, including attorneys’ fees, only the liability for failure to meet the statutory requirements for 

entitlement. 

2

 The parties admitted various videos which were shown to the court of apartment 412: one of the 

flooding event, one of the condition on March 7th, and several depicting the condition of apartment 414. 

Also in evidence were text messages and the lease, admitted by agreement at the commencement of trial. 
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telephone conversation with Chasadie Hoffman, the “new property manager” about 

the issue. Hoffman agreed that the file contained a complaint about the toilet 

constantly running. 

On the night of February 28, 2022, Rawlings and Kennedy went to sleep and 

woke up after midnight to “significant water flooding” and water coming out of the 

guest room toilet. There was “water everywhere in the apartment” and “significant 

water damage throughout the entire apartment.” Rawlings immediately reported the 

flooding via an email and a phone call to Hoffman. Hoffman did not answer, and 

neither did the maintenance line for 24-hour maintenance emergencies, so Rawlings 

left voicemails. 

Hoffman and maintenance arrived the next morning to address the water leak. 

Between March 1st and March 4th, Bradford endeavored to clean up from the water 

leak, but the apartment had a bad odor and both parties ultimately agreed Rawlings 

and Kennedy had to move out of 412. Apartment 414 was identified as an option, 

but it required work to be made ready. 

On Friday, March 4, Rawlings and Kennedy moved out of 412. Bradford paid 

for Rawlings and Kennedy to stay at the Magnuson hotel “for two nights, for Friday 

night and Saturday night.” The contentious factual dispute commenced on March 

7th, relative to the availability of units 412 and 414, as well as other purported 

remedies offered and rejected. When unit 414 was not ready on March 7th, Rawlings 

and Kennedy returned to the Magnuson. Thereafter, Rawlings and Kennedy were 
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locked out of both units. Bradford did not provide Rawlings and Kennedy with 

another acceptable place to live and did not refund any rent or their security deposit. 

Rawlings testified to out-of-pocket expenses incurred for not being able to occupy 

either 412 or 414, including the Magnuson for thirteen nights, meals, and electricity 

charges incurred during the failed attempt to relocate to 414. 

Rawlings and Kennedy had paid their March rent “the same way that [they] 

always [had] for almost three years,” “by rote,” and the payment portal indicated 

they “paid $1,055.” Bradford did not notify Rawlings and Kennedy that they were 

behind on their rent; rather, Rawlings discovered “there was a $9 shortage” when 

doing his bookkeeping while displaced, and he corrected the shortage the following 

week. Rawlings testified that, at the time Rawlings and Kennedy filed their repair 

and remedy case, their rent was paid in full. Bradford’s counsel objected that, 

[u]nder the statute, you have to be paid at the time that you sent your notice, which 

was on the 1st of March.” Counsel complained that Rawlings was “testifying now 

that he made it current at the time he filed the lawsuit,” and “you can’t bring a lawsuit 

unless you’re current at the time of the notice.” Rawlings and Kennedy’s counsel 

responded that Bradford was “notified of an event on March 1st” but “not notified 

of a repair and remedy at that time.” The trial judge said he was “not going to do a 

directed verdict based on those facts” and proceeded with Rawlings’ testimony. 

On March 18, Rawlings and Kennedy filed their petition to repair and remedy 

asserting that they were never notified an apartment was repaired and ready for them 
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to reoccupy. Bradford sent them a notice of eviction “for harassment”3

 and “then the 

tiny holes in the walls was on the other notice that was listed in the apartment as well 

underneath the dart board.” 

In closing argument, Rawlings and Kennedy’s counsel stressed that they were 

not in default on their rent when they gave the notice of the need for repair. Their 

rent was not due until midnight on March 1, and they were not “in default on the rent 

until at the earliest March the 2nd.” Bradford’s counsel responded that Rawlings 

did not check a box on his petition that would have indicated he was current on his 

rent, so according to Rawlings’ pleadings, he was delinquent on his rent. Counsel 

argued Bradford’s efforts did not “meet the culpability that should be awarded under 

a repair and remedy case,” and “[n]othing could be done to satisfy” Rawlings and 

Kennedy. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court stated that, after hearing the 

evidence and reviewing the testimony and exhibits, it found in favor of Rawlings 

and Kennedy and awarded them “the single penalty” of one month’s rent plus $500 

totaling $1,699.99, damages of $1,751, and $2,200 in attorney’s fees. On November 

14, 2022, the trial court entered judgment in conformity with its oral award. This 

appeal followed. 

 

3

 Hoffman testified as to the alleged harassment that formed the basis of the eviction notice. 
 –6– 

ANALYSIS 

In its first issue, Bradford asserts the trial court erred in ruling in favor of 

Rawlings and Kennedy on their repair and remedy case under property code sections 

92.052 and 92.056 because they: 

a. failed to send two written notices to repair conditions to 

Bradford, as required under the statute; 

b. failed to provide any evidence that the condition materially 

affected their physical health and safety; 

c. failed to show they were not delinquent in rent when they sent 

their notices; and 

d. failed to give Bradford a reasonable time to repair or remedy 

the condition; and consequently, 

e. were not entitled to damages under §92.056(e). 

Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, Bradford 

argues, they are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency to support them. 

In an appeal from a bench trial, the trial court’s findings of fact have the same 

weight as a jury verdict. Sheetz v. Slaughter, 503 S.W.3d 495, 502 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2016, no pet.). When the appellate record contains a reporter’s record, as it 

does in this case, findings of fact are not conclusive and are binding only if supported 

by the evidence. Id. We review a trial court’s findings of fact under the same legal 

and factual sufficiency of the evidence standards used when determining if sufficient 

evidence exists to support jury findings. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 

(Tex. 1994). Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on the parties and the 

reviewing court. Employers Cas. Co. v. Henager, 852 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied). 
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When an appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on 

which he did not have the burden of proof at trial, he must demonstrate there is no 

evidence to support the adverse finding. Fulgham v. Fischer, 349 S.W.3d 153, 157 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet). When reviewing the record, we determine 

whether any evidence supports the challenged finding. Id. If more than a scintilla 

of evidence exists to support the finding, the legal sufficiency challenge fails. Id.; 

see also King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003) (more than 

a scintilla of evidence exists when evidence “rises to a level that would enable 

reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions”). 

When an appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we 

consider all the evidence supporting and contradicting the finding. Sheetz, 503 

S.W.3d at 502. In a bench trial, the trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses. Fulgham, 349 S.W.3d at 157. The trial court may 

choose to believe one witness over another, and we may not impose our own opinion 

to the contrary. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 

2003). We set aside the finding for factual insufficiency only if the finding is so 

contrary to the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Fulgham, 349 

S.W.3d at 157 (citing Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam)). 

When a party challenges a trial court’s conclusions of law, we review the 

challenged conclusions de novo. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 

S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). The trial court’s conclusions of law are not subject to 
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challenge for lack of factual sufficiency, but we may review the legal conclusions 

drawn from the facts to determine their correctness. Id.; Dallas Cnty. v. Sweitzer, 

881 S.W.2d 757, 763 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied); see also Walker v. 

Anderson, 232 S.W.3d 899, 908 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (trial court’s 

conclusions of law are independently evaluated to determine whether trial court 

correctly drew legal conclusions from facts). We are not bound by the trial court’s 

legal conclusions, but conclusions of law will be upheld on appeal if the judgment 

can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Sheetz, 503 S.W.3d 

at 502. 

On March 8, 2023, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of 

law which read in their entirety as follows: 

FINDINGS OF FACT 

The Court finds that the material allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ 

Original Petition are true and that the requested relief should be granted. 

The Court further finds: 

A. This case was heard by this Court de novo following appeal by 

Defendants from judgement rendered in a proceeding in Justice Court, 

Precinct No. 2 under Cause No. 21 RR220002. 

B. The issue in the case was whether Plaintiffs were entitled to statutory 

and compensatory damages arising out of a water leak in an apartment 

unit demised to Plaintiff. 

C. The water leak rendered the demised premises unfit for habitation. 

D. Plaintiff gave Defendant immediate notice of the water leak. 

E. The Defendant was not able to repair the demised premises or to 

provide a substitute apartment. 
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F. Plaintiffs were not delinquent in the payment of rent at the time of 

notice of the water leak condition was given to the Defendant. 

G. Due to the condition of the premises Plaintiff was compelled to 

relocate to a motel for 13 days and incurred the additional costs of meals 

until Plaintiffs could secure an alternative place of abode. 

H. The Plaintiffs incurred a charge from the electric utility company of 

$150.00 for electric services to an apartment offered a substitute but 

which apartment was not adequate. 

I. The Plaintiffs incurred legal fees for hiring attorney to represent them 

who charged $2,200.00. 

Conclusions of Law 

A. The Court has jurisdiction. 

B. The Defendant landlord was not able to repair or remedy the water 

leak condition to the apartment demised to Plaintiff in time required by 

statute. 

C. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for statutory civil penalty of one 

month’s rent $1,199.99 plus $500.00. 

D. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment for $1,751.00 for their actual 

damages in securing alternate place to abode. 

E. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment for $2,200.00 attorney's fees: an 

amount appearing to be reasonable and necessary. 

The pertinent provisions of the property code at issue are as follows: 

Section 92.052 of the property code provides: 

(a) A landlord shall make a diligent effort to repair or remedy a 

condition if: 

(1) the tenant specifies the condition in a notice to the person to 

whom or to the place where rent is normally paid; 

(2) the tenant is not delinquent in the payment of rent at the time 

notice is given; and 
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(3) the condition: 

(A) materially affects the physical health or safety of an 

ordinary tenant; or 

(B) arises from the landlord’s failure to provide and 

maintain in good operating condition a device to supply 

hot water of a minimum temperature of 120 degrees 

Fahrenheit. 

TEX. PROP.CODE § 92.052. An interrelated statute on which Bradford relies, section 

92.056 of the property code, provides: 

(a) A landlord’s liability under this section is subject to Section 

92.052(b) regarding conditions that are caused by a tenant and Section 

92.054 regarding conditions that are insured casualties. 

(b) A landlord is liable to a tenant as provided by this subchapter if: 

(1) the tenant has given the landlord notice to repair or remedy a 

condition by giving that notice to the person to whom or to the 

place where the tenant's rent is normally paid; 

(2) the condition materially affects the physical health or safety 

of an ordinary tenant; 

(3) the tenant has given the landlord a subsequent written notice 

to repair or remedy the condition after a reasonable time to repair 

or remedy the condition following the notice given under 

Subdivision (1) or the tenant has given the notice under 

Subdivision (1) by sending that notice by certified mail, return 

receipt requested, by registered mail, or by another form of mail 

that allows tracking of delivery from the United States Postal 

Service or a private delivery service; 

(4) the landlord has had a reasonable time to repair or remedy the 

condition after the landlord received the tenant's notice under 

Subdivision (1) and, if applicable, the tenant's subsequent notice 

under Subdivision (3); 

(5) the landlord has not made a diligent effort to repair or remedy 

the condition after the landlord received the tenant’s notice under 
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Subdivision (1) and, if applicable, the tenant’s notice under 

Subdivision (3); and 

(6) the tenant was not delinquent in the payment of rent at the 

time any notice required by this subsection was given. 

(c) For purposes of Subsection (b)(4) or (5), a landlord is considered to 

have received the tenant’s notice when the landlord or the landlord’s 

agent or employee has actually received the notice or when the United 

States Postal Service has attempted to deliver the notice to the landlord. 

(d) For purposes of Subsection (b)(3) or (4), in determining whether a 

period of time is a reasonable time to repair or remedy a condition, there 

is a rebuttable presumption that seven days is a reasonable time. To 

rebut that presumption, the date on which the landlord received the 

tenant’s notice, the severity and nature of the condition, and the 

reasonable availability of materials and labor and of utilities from a 

utility company must be considered. 

TEX. PROP. CODE § 92.056. 

 Bradford argues the trial court erred in ruling in favor of Rawlings and 

Kennedy because they (1) failed to send two written notices to repair conditions to 

Bradford, as required by the property code; (2) failed to provide evidence that the 

condition affected their physical health and safety; (3) failed to show they were not 

delinquent in rent when they sent their notices; and (4) failed to give Bradford a 

reasonable time to repair or remedy the condition. 

 The trial court found that “Plaintiff gave immediate notice of the water leak.” 

As to the “two written notices” requirement, Bradford characterizes the email 

Rawlings sent on March 1, 2022, as the first written notice and complains that no 

second notice was given. Bradford cites the provision of Rawlings and Kennedy’s 

lease that requires a “request or notice of repair” “MUST BE SIGNED AND IN 
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WRITING,” essentially arguing that the first notice of the leak had to be the written 

one. However, the lease further provides that the “signed and in writing” 

requirement applies “except in case of fire, smoke, gas, explosion, overflowing 

sewage, uncontrollable running water” or certain other circumstances. Here, the 

evidence showed the source of the leak was a toilet and involved “uncontrollable 

running water” that flooded the apartment. Thus, the terms of the lease excepted the 

situation in this case from the “signed and in writing” requirement. 

 Sections 92.052(a)(1) and 92.056(b)(1) require only that the tenant provide 

“notice.” See id. §§ 92.052(a)(1), 92.056(b)(1). Rawlings testified that he 

communicated their dissatisfaction with the situation daily to “multiple personnel” 

at Bradford via texts, phone calls, and emails. It is not disputed that Rawlings and 

Kennedy were displaced and not in a Bradford apartment from and after March 4th. 

Hoffman agreed that there had been a prior complaint to a previous manager 

regarding the toilet constantly running and maintenance addressed the situation. 

Actual notice of the condition of the repairs and status of the proposed remedies are 

not at issue. Based on this evidence, the trial court could have found that they 

satisfied the requirement of 92.056(b)(3) that they provide a second written notice 

in accordance with the “material allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ Original 

Petition” the trial court found were true. 

 The trial court found, and the evidence supported, that the water leak rendered 

the demised premises unfit for habitation. Regarding evidence that the condition 
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affected their physical health and safety, Rawlings testified the flooding came from 

a toilet and created a bad odor, Rawlings and Kennedy could not sleep without the 

windows open, and Hoffman herself told Rawlings and Kennedy that, in her opinion, 

“they needed to reside in a different unit.” Hoffman tried to accommodate Rawlings 

and Kennedy’s desire to stay in 412 “to see what we could do on any other way 

rather than having to make them move, but I didn’t think that there would be an 

option.” On March 4th, Hoffman “notified them that they’re not going to be able to 

stay in that unit.” The evidence supports the trial court finding that the “water leak 

rendered the demised premises unfit for habitation.” 

 The trial court found, and the evidence supported, that Rawlings and Kennedy 

were not delinquent in the payment of rent at the time of notice of the water leak 

condition was given to Bradford. The testimony reflects that the water leak occurred 

after Rawlings and Kennedy went to sleep February 28th, and they woke after 

midnight to significant flooding. Rawlings testified he first notified Bradford of the 

flooding on March 1, 2022, at a time when the rent was paid and the time for making 

the March payment had not passed. Rawlings testified that he “paid $1,055” for 

March rent, and Bradford did not notify Rawlings and Kennedy that they were 

behind on their rent. Rawlings discovered “there was a $9 shortage,” and he 

corrected that himself. Thus, there was no evidence Rawlings and Kennedy were 

“delinquent” in their rent at the time the notice of the water leak was sent. The 

evidence supports the trial court’s finding that appellants “were not delinquent in the 
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payment of rent at the time of notice of the water leak condition was given” to 

Bradford. 

 The record reflects, and trial court found, that Bradford was not able to repair 

the demised premises or to provide a substitute apartment. The evidence showed 

Rawlings and Kennedy lived in a hotel at their own expense for thirteen days, nearly 

twice the seven-day period that is presumptively a reasonable time to repair or 

remedy a condition under section 92.056(d). See TEX. PROP.CODE § 92.056(d). The 

evidence further showed the condition of both unit 412 and 414 during the time 

period between March 1 and March 18. On this record, the trial court did not err in 

concluding that Bradford was not able to repair or remedy the water leak condition 

to the apartment demised in the time required by statute. 

 On this record, we conclude the evidence was legally and factually sufficient 

to support the trial court’s findings that the “material allegations contained in 

Plaintiffs’ Original Petition” were true and ruling in Rawlings and Kennedy’s favor 

on their repair and remedy case under property code sections 92.052 and 92.056 See

Fulgham, 349 S.W.3d at 157. We overrule Bradford’s first issue. 

 In its second issue, Bradford complains that the trial court erred in awarding 

Rawlings and Kennedy attorney’s fees because the fees were not shown to be 

reasonable and necessary. We agree. 

 We review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny attorney’s fees for an 

abuse of discretion. Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C. v. Sw. Sec., Inc., 372 S.W.3d 244, 
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251 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (“The fixing of a reasonable attorney’s fee is 

a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its judgment will not be 

reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.”). Legal and factual 

sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds under this standard of 

review but are relevant factors we may consider in assessing whether the trial court 

abused its discretion. Id.

 Section 92.005 of the property code provides that a party who prevails in a 

suit brought under this subchapter or Subchapter B, E, or F may recover the party’s 

costs of court and reasonable attorney’s fees in relation to work reasonably 

expended. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.005. Section 92.056 is in Subchapter B. Id.

§ 92.056.

A claimant seeking an award of attorney’s fees must prove the attorney’s 

reasonable hours worked and reasonable rate by presenting sufficient evidence to 

support the fee award sought. Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 

578 S.W.3d 469, 501–02 (Tex. 2019) (citations omitted). General, conclusory 

testimony devoid of any real substance will not support a fee award. Id. at 501. 

Sufficient evidence includes, at a minimum, evidence of (1) particular services 

performed, (2) who performed those services, (3) approximately when the services 

were performed, (4) the reasonable amount of time required to perform the services, 

and (5) the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing such services. Id. at 

502. Contemporaneous billing records are not required to prove the requested fees 
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are reasonable and necessary. Id. However, billing records are strongly encouraged 

to prove the reasonableness and necessity of requested fees when those elements are 

contested. Id. Regardless, the proof must be sufficient to permit a court “to perform 

a meaningful review of [the] fee application.” El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 

757, 764 (Tex. 2012).

Here, Rawlings and Kennedy’s attorney’s testimony, in its entirety, was as 

follows: 

I am a licensed attorney in the State of Texas. I have an office 

and practice in Hunt County, Texas. I am familiar with what the 

reasonable and necessary fees are in cases of this type. I charge $200 

per hour. I have a total of 11 hours. I am anticipating that this would 

take another hour or so today, for attorney's fees of $2,200, which I 

believe is a reasonable and necessary fee and considering the nature and 

complexity of the case and the time spent on it. 

While counsel’s testimony provides “some” evidence, it was general, conclusory, 

and fails to meet the Rohrmoos standard. See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 498–502. 

Accordingly, Rawlings and Kennedy presented insufficient evidence to support the 

requested fee award. Id. at 501; Ferrant v. Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, L.L.P., 

No. 05-19-01552-CV, 2021 WL 2963748, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 14, 2021, 

no pet.) (mem. op.) (law firm presented insufficient evidence to support fee award 

where firm offered no testimony or documentary evidence of the specific tasks 

performed by attorneys and staff or the amount of time spent on specific tasks). 

 However, property code section 92.005 provided for the recovery of 

attorney’s fees, and Rawlings and Kennedy provided some evidence legal services 
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were required to prosecute its claims.4

 See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.005; 

Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 505–06. When the record lacks the requisite details to 

support a requested fee award, the appropriate remedy is a remand for further 

proceedings on the attorney fee request. Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 506; In re S.W., 

No. 05-20-00582-CV, 2022 WL 2071110, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 9, 2022, 

no pet.) (mem. op.) (remanding to trial court for further proceedings on request for 

attorney's fees where attorney provided some evidence of hourly rates and hours 

worked on case but did not provide sufficient evidence of the particular services 

performed, who performed the services, when the services were performed, and a 

reasonable amount of time required to perform the services); Ferrant, 2021 WL 

2963748, at *6 (same). Accordingly, we conclude remand to the trial court for a 

redetermination of Rawlings and Kennedy’s attorney’s fees through trial is 

appropriate. See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 506. We sustain Bradford’s second 

issue. 

 

 

4

 Rawlings and Kennedy filed the repair and remedy case in justice court as self-represented litigants. 

The record reflects legal counsel appeared for trial de novo after Bradford appealed. 
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We reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and remand to the trial court for 

a redetermination of Rawlings and Kennedy’s attorney’s fees through trial. In all 

other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

221298F.P05 

 

/Bonnie Lee Goldstein/

BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN 

JUSTICE 
 –19– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

BRADFORD PLACE 

APARTMENTS, Appellant 

No. 05-22-01298-CV V. 

TED RAWLINGS AND CAITLIN 

KENNEDY, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the County Court at 

Law No. 2, Hunt County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC2200074. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Goldstein. Justices Molberg and 

Pedersen, III participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We REVERSE that portion 

of the trial court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees to Ted Rawlings and Caitlin 

Kennedy. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. We 

REMAND this cause to the trial court for a redetermination of Rawlings and 

Kennedy’s attorney’s fees through trial. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee Ted Rawlings and Caitlin Kennedy recover 

their costs of this appeal from appellant Bradford Place Apartments. 

Judgment entered this 22nd day of August 2024.