Affirmed and Opinion filed October 27, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00412-CV

JOSEPH PEINE, Appellant

V.

HIT SERVICES L.P., WOOD GROUP USA, INC., JOHN WOOD GROUP 

PLC, WOOD GROUP POWER GP, LLC, AND WOOD GROUP 

MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Appellees

On Appeal from the 269th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2010-60099

O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from an order granting a traditional motion for summary 

judgment. Appellant Joseph Peine sued appellees, HIT Services, L.P., Wood 

Group USA, Inc., John Wood Group PLC, Wood Group Power GP, LLC, and 

Wood Group Management Services, Inc., alleging that he was wrongfully 

discharged for refusing to commit a crime. Peine argues on appeal that the trial 
2

court erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment because the 

summary judgment evidence showed a genuine issue of material fact on whether 

his refusal to commit a criminal act was the sole cause of his termination. We 

overrule Peine’s issue because the summary judgment evidence conclusively 

proved that he was terminated, at least in part, because he breached his 

confidentiality duties when he sent confidential company information to a reporter. 

We therefore affirm the trial court’s summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND

Peine is a certified public accountant. Appellee HIT Services, L.P., hired 

him as its Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in February 2007. HIT Services is part of 

the Heavy Industrial Turbines Strategic Business Unit, which is in turn a division 

of appellee John Wood Group, PLC, a multinational corporation.

According to Peine’s summary judgment evidence, HIT Services was a 

troubled company with a history of inflating its earnings. Peine alleged he was 

hired by HIT Services as part of an effort to turn the company’s performance 

around. The letter in which HIT Services offered Peine the CFO job stated: “in 

this role, you will be responsible for all finance and accounting aspects as it relates 

to the management of the business including financial reporting, month/year end 

closings, budgeting, forecasting, profitability analyses, management of accounting 

department/personnel and other associated responsibilities . . . .” Peine also served 

as secretary of Wood Group Power GP, LLC, the general partner of HIT Services. 

In that position, Peine served as an officer of the company and was charged with 

the responsibility of ensuring “that appropriate filings are made on time and 

accurately.” 

Due to his various responsibilities, Peine reported to different supervisors. 

One of those supervisors was Durg Kumar, the financial director for the Heavy
3

Industrial Turbines Strategic Business Unit. Peine alleged that in December 2008,

Kumar instructed him to overstate HIT Services’ profits by approximately $2.5 

million. According to Peine, Kumar ordered him to falsify records by booking the 

entire value of a project with a sister company, Wood Power Solutions, even 

though HIT Services had not yet completed the project. Peine refused, believing 

such an action would violate accounting standards and the law. Peine alleged that 

Kumar threatened to “clean house” if Peine and his staff did not follow Kumar’s 

orders.

In January 2009, Peine brought the matter to the attention of Scott Jessiman, 

the controller of the Heavy Industrial Turbines Strategic Business Unit. As a result 

of his conversations with Jessiman, Peine “prevailed and the income was not 

overstated in HITS’ books.” Instead, Jessiman authorized Peine to close HIT 

Services’ 2008 accounting out of balance with Wood Power Solutions. According 

to Peine, HIT Services did not materially misstate its 2008 performance as a result 

of Jessiman authorizing this action. The next month, Kumar called Peine into his 

office and told him that “it was not working out” and that he needed to learn how 

to “play the game.” Peine was not fired at that time, however. 

That same month, Peine met with Chris Wilkinson, the president of HIT 

Services, to discuss his problems with Kumar. Wilkinson told Peine he would 

report the problems to Nick Blaskoski, the president of the Heavy Industrial 

Turbines Strategic Business Unit. Peine also reported the issue to Grant Johnston, 

the Wood Group’s Western Hemisphere Controller. Johnston asked Peine for time 

to fix the problem.

According to Peine, he discovered in July 2009 that Kumar was going 

around him and his staff to book substantially inflated earnings estimates for jobs 

in June 2009. Peine reported the problem to Johnston. Johnston told Peine that the 
4

earnings estimates were internal numbers only and were not reported externally. 

Johnston directed Peine to correct the earnings estimates by the end of the year.

In the ordinary course of his responsibilities to certify HIT Services’ 

financial condition on a quarterly basis, Peine objected to attesting to the accuracy 

of the July 2009 quarterly certification because he believed HIT Services’ 

accounting data contained false information. As a result, Peine believed that 

signing the quarterly certification without qualifying language would constitute tax 

fraud. Peine sent a letter to Wilkinson explaining his position: “although we are 

unaware of any material misstatement in our financial statements, based on our 

documented experience, we have serious concerns about the Internal Control 

Environment . . . .” Appellees did not order Peine to sign the certification without 

qualifying language. Instead, they acceded to his concerns. Wilkinson and Kumar 

inserted language qualifying the reported numbers, and with that concession, Peine 

signed the quarterly certification.

That same month, Peine reported his concerns about Kumar’s actions to 

Todd Harper, a John Wood Group corporate officer working in the Shared Services 

Department. Shared Services was absorbing some of the accounting functions that 

had been performed internally at HIT Services. Harper, in turn, reported Peine’s 

complaints to Christopher Watson, the CFO of the Gas Turbine Division of the 

John Wood Group. Watson told Harper to conduct an independent review of 

Peine’s allegations. 

On July 27, 2009, Harper warned Peine that he would be fired if he did not 

withdraw his accusations against Kumar. Harper explained that one or the other 

would be fired and it would most likely be Peine because Watson did not believe 

his accusations. Peine refused to withdraw his accusations against Kumar. Peine 

was not fired at that time. Instead, on July 28, Harper forwarded to Watson the 
5

documents that Peine had provided to him in support of his claims. Watson then 

consulted with Blaskoski, the president of the Heavy Industrial Turbines Strategic 

Business Unit, and they ordered the John Wood Internal Audit Department to 

investigate Peine’s accusations.

On July 30, Peine, believing “there was an endemic, serious, catastrophic 

failure within Wood Group and that they weren’t going to do anything to fix it,”

emailed internal company documents to Robert Gibbons, a Thomson Reuters 

reporter. These documents included not only those Peine had previously sent to 

Harper, but also additional documents, including earnings forecasts. In his email 

to the reporter, Peine wrote: “Let’s give them a chance to fix it . . . . if they choose 

not to, you have a front row seat.”

On August 6, Western Hemisphere Controller Johnston emailed Gas Turbine 

Division CFO Watson about Peine’s calls reporting problems at HIT Services. 

Watson responded: “Joe is a liability and please do not take anything he says at 

face value. I will call you later to discuss.” Watson then forwarded Johnston’s 

email to Blaskoski, writing: “Nick. We need to take action now. Chris.”

Peine and his staff then sent a letter and accompanying documents to 

Wilkinson, HIT Services’ president, explaining their concerns about the company’s 

accounting issues. Wilkinson turned those documents over to the personnel 

conducting the internal audit. After receiving the documents, Abby Yates, an inhouse attorney involved in the audit, recommended that Peine be placed on paid 

leave pending the completion of the investigation. Yates also recommended that 

Kumar be removed from his position overseeing HIT Services’ accounting 

functions during the investigation. Both recommendations were accepted and 

implemented. 

During the course of the internal audit into Peine’s accusations, Yates 
6

learned that Peine had sent confidential company documents to a reporter. When 

confronted with his email to the reporter, Peine admitted that he had sent both the 

email and the documents to the reporter. Yates recommended that Peine be 

terminated immediately for violating his confidentiality obligations. Company 

management did not oppose terminating Peine, and he was terminated on 

September 16, 2009.

Peine then sued appellees, alleging that he was wrongfully terminated for 

refusing to perform the illegal act of falsifying HIT Services’ financial records by 

inflating earnings.

1

 Appellees eventually filed a traditional motion for summary 

judgment, asserting that the summary judgment evidence conclusively proved that 

Peine’s refusal to perform an illegal act was not the sole cause of his termination, 

thereby defeating his Sabine Pilot cause of action.2 See Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. 

v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (creating narrow exception to 

employment-at-will doctrine to provide cause of action to employee terminated 

“for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act.”). The trial 

court granted the motion and this appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Peine argues that the trial court erred when it granted appellees’ motion for 

summary judgment because the summary judgment evidence he produced 

generated a genuine issue of material fact on whether his refusal to commit an 

illegal act was the sole cause of his termination. We disagree.

 

1 Appellees did not move for summary judgment on the ground that the allegedly illegal 

act underlying Peine’s lawsuit, falsifying HIT Services’ earnings, was not in fact illegal. We 

therefore assume, for purposes of this appeal, that the act appellees ordered Peine to do was

illegal.

2 We previously reversed a summary judgment for appellees because they did not present 

grounds for summary judgment in their motion itself. Peine v. HIT Servs., L.P., No. 14-12-

00991-CV, 2014 WL 586430 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 13, 2014, no pet.). On 

remand, appellees did present grounds in their motion as discussed above.
7

I. Standard of review and applicable law

We review a trial court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. MidCentury Ins. Co. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2007). The movant for 

traditional summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. 

Civ. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 

S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). A defendant who conclusively negates an essential 

element of a plaintiff’s claim is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. 

Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). 

Evidence is considered conclusive if reasonable people could not differ in their 

conclusions. Dias v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., 214 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

The general rule in Texas is that an employee may be terminated at will and 

without cause. Montgomery Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 

(Tex. 1998). In Sabine Pilot, the Supreme Court of Texas created a narrow public 

policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 687 S.W.2d at 735. This 

exception allows an employee to sue for wrongful termination if he is fired for the 

sole reason that he refused to perform an illegal act. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs. 

v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. 1995); see Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez, 365 

S.W.3d 655, 664 (Tex. 2012) (“A plaintiff may not bring a Sabine Pilot claim 

immediately after being asked to perform an illegal activity, but must first refuse 

and be fired.”). A Sabine Pilot plaintiff has the burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence that his discharge was for no reason other than the 

refusal to commit an illegal act—in other words, the refusal was the sole cause of 

his discharge. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 633. If an employer discharges an employee 

both for refusing to perform an illegal act and for a legitimate reason, it cannot be 
8

liable for wrongful discharge. Id. 

II. Appellees conclusively proved a legitimate reason for discharging Peine,

and Peine’s evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact on 

his Sabine Pilot cause of action.

Peine’s Sabine Pilot cause of action is based on his allegation that he was 

terminated for refusing to commit an illegal act. Appellees could obtain summary 

judgment on this cause of action by proving, as a matter of law, at least one 

legitimate reason for terminating Peine. See id. Appellees’ summary judgment 

evidence conclusively established that one reason for terminating Peine was his 

disclosure of confidential information to a reporter. See Winters v. Houston 

Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 724–25 (Tex. 1990) (declining to 

extend Sabine Pilot exception to include employees who are discharged for 

reporting illegal activities). This evidence includes, among other things, Peine’s

own admissions that he sent confidential information to a reporter and that a 

violation of HIT Services’ confidentiality policy constituted a terminable offense. 

See Robinson v. Devereux Foundation, No. 14-01-00081-CV, 2002 WL 1315631, 

*3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 6, 2002, pet. denied) (holding employer 

entitled to summary judgment on Sabine Pilot claim because it conclusively 

proved other reasons for termination, including some admitted by employee, 

thereby negating essential element that sole reason for termination was refusal to 

perform illegal act). 

On appeal, Peine does not dispute the evidence showing that (1) he sent 

internal company documents to a reporter, and (2) the stated reason for his 

termination by HIT Services was his breach of his confidentiality obligations he 

owed to his employer. Instead, citing Continental Coffee Products v. Cazarez, 937 

S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1996), Peine asserts that direct evidence and inferences from 

circumstantial evidence in the summary judgment record create genuine issues of 
9

material fact regarding whether he was terminated for refusing to perform an 

illegal act.

In Casarez, the supreme court examined the types of evidence that are 

legally sufficient to establish a causal link between an employer’s termination of 

an employee and the employee’s filing of a workers’ compensation claim, thereby 

shifting the burden to the employer to show a legitimate reason for the termination. 

Id. at 450–51; see also Parker v. Valerus Compression Servs., LP, 365 S.W.3d 61, 

66–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). Because a plaintiff in a 

workers’ compensation retaliatory-discharge case is not required to prove that his 

termination was caused solely by his filing of a claim, we conclude this standard 

from Cazarez does not apply here. Compare Safeshred, 365 S.W.3d at 662 

(confirming sole causation standard for Sabine Pilot claim), with Cazarez, 937 

S.W.2d at 451 n.3 (stating that plaintiff need not prove that filing of workers’ 

compensation claim was sole cause of her termination). Instead, we consider 

whether the evidence and inferences Peine identifies create a genuine issue of 

material fact regarding the element of his claim that he was terminated solely for 

refusing to perform an illegal act.

A. Peine has not presented direct evidence that he was fired solely 

for refusing to commit an illegal act.

Initially, Peine puts forward what he considers “direct evidence” that he was 

terminated solely because he refused to perform an illegal act. This evidence 

includes: (1) Kumar’s threat to “clean house” if Peine did not follow his orders; (2)

Harper’s warning to Peine that, if he did not retract his statements about Kumar, he 

would be fired; (3) Watson’s email to Grant Johnston that “Joe is a liability and 

please do not take anything he says at face value. I will call you later to discuss;”

and (4) Watson’s email to Blaskoski stating: “Nick. We need to take action now. 
10

Chris.” According to Peine, this evidence constitutes direct evidence that he was 

fired solely because he refused to perform an illegal act. We disagree.

Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, proves the fact without 

inference or presumption. See College of the Mainland v. Glover, 436 S.W.3d 384, 

392 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). The evidence detailed 

above is circumstantial rather than direct evidence because, among other things, it 

does not address whether any of the speakers had a role in Peine’s firing. Thus, an 

inference would be required to reach Peine’s suggested conclusion that he was 

fired solely for refusing to perform an illegal act. We discuss below whether the 

record supports such an inference. 

B. Peine’s circumstantial evidence does not generate a fact issue.

In Cazarez, the supreme court listed some types of circumstantial evidence 

that an employee can use to establish, as part of his prima facie case, a causal link 

between his termination and his filing of a workers’ compensation claim. 937 

S.W.2d at 451. This includes evidence that: (1) those making the decision to

terminate an employee have knowledge of the workers’ compensation claim; (2) 

expression of a negative attitude toward the employee’s injuries by those making 

the termination decision; (3) a failure to adhere to established company policies; 

(4) discriminatory treatment in comparison to other similarly-situated employees; 

and (5) evidence that the stated reason for the employee’s termination was false. 

Id. Even if we assume that such circumstantial evidence could, in some cases, also 

create a fact issue on the sole-cause element of a Sabine Pilot claim, we conclude 

Peine has not identified a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he was 

terminated solely because he refused to perform an illegal act. We discuss each of 

the categories of circumstantial evidence and suggested inferences that Peine 

references in his appellate briefing.
11

1. Statements by division-level employees do not support an 

inference that Peine was terminated for refusing to perform

an illegal act.

We turn first to the evidence Peine initially argued was direct evidence: (1) 

Kumar’s threat to “clean house” if Peine did not follow his orders; (2) Harper’s 

warning to Peine that he would be fired if he did not retract his statements about 

Kumar; (3) Watson’s email to Johnston, the Wood Group Western Hemisphere 

Controller, that “Joe is a liability and please do not take anything he says at face 

value. I will call you later to discuss;” and (4) Watson’s email to Blaskoski, the 

president of the Heavy Industrial Turbines Special Business Unit, stating: “Nick. 

We need to take action now. Chris.” According to Peine, this evidence supports 

an inference that his corporate superiors decided to terminate him for refusing to 

perform an illegal act because it demonstrates they had a negative attitude toward 

him and possessed knowledge of his refusal. We disagree.

With regard to Kumar’s threat, the undisputed summary judgment evidence 

established that it was made some eight months before Peine was terminated. The 

evidence also was undisputed that Kumar had been removed from any role 

supervising Peine and the HIT Services accounting team pending the outcome of 

the internal investigation. The undisputed evidence further established that this 

removal occurred before the decision was made to terminate Peine. Kumar’s 

threat, therefore, cannot support an inference that Peine was terminated for 

refusing to commit an illegal act. See M. D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. 

Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2000) (holding that stray remarks, remote in time 

from plaintiff’s termination, and not made by a person directly connected with the 

decision to terminate the plaintiff, are not enough to raise a fact issue on whether 

stated reason for termination was false).

The same reasoning applies to any statements or actions by Harper. Peine 
12

has not pointed to any evidence in the summary judgment record demonstrating 

that Harper had any role in the decision to terminate him. Therefore, Harper’s 

warning cannot support Peine’s suggested inference. Id.

Turning to Watson’s emails, the summary judgment evidence indicates 

Watson did not make the decision to terminate Peine, but was instead asked only if 

he had any objection to Peine being terminated. Watson testified that he did not 

object because Peine had disclosed confidential company documents. Even if we 

assume this evidence is sufficient to establish that Watson was directly connected 

with the decision to terminate Peine, we conclude that Peine’s suggested inference 

from those emails is not reasonable. See Suarez v. City of Texas City, 465 S.W.3d 

623, 634 (Tex. 2015) (“Circumstantial evidence can establish actual knowledge but 

such evidence must either directly or by reasonable inference support that 

conclusion.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although Peine argues that Watson’s emails support an inference that he 

was fired for refusing to falsify HIT Services’ internal financial books, other 

evidence in the record suggests an alternative view. See AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 

272 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. 2008) (stating, in an appeal from a judgment following 

a jury trial, that even when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 

challenged verdict, it must be viewed in its proper context with other evidence). 

This evidence, including Watson’s own deposition testimony, establishes that an 

internal audit had been ordered to investigate Peine’s accusations. According to 

Watson, his email to Blaskoski referred not to firing Peine, but to moving forward 

on that investigation into Peine’s accusations. There was also evidence in the 

record that upper management was growing increasingly concerned about Peine’s 

performance as CFO and that management had directly expressed those concerns 

to Peine shortly before he went to Harper in July 2009. 
13

A fact may not be inferred from circumstantial evidence that could support 

multiple inferences if none are more probable than the others. Smith v. Landry’s 

Crab Shack, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 512, 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no 

pet.); see Suarez, 465 S.W.3d at 634 (“An inference is not reasonable if it is 

susceptible to multiple, equally probable inferences, requiring the factfinder to 

guess in order to reach a conclusion.”). Even when viewing Peine’s proffered 

evidence in the light most favorable to him, his suggested inference is, at best, no 

more probable than appellees’ suggested explanation for the emails. Therefore, it 

is not reasonable and does not create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to 

avoid summary judgment. See Suarez, 465 S.W.3d at 634 (affirming grant of plea 

to the jurisdiction after concluding that plaintiff’s evidence raised two equally 

possible inferences, one that governmental entity had subjective awareness of 

dangerous condition, the other that it did not, and therefore constituted no evidence 

that governmental entity was subjectively aware of the danger).

Additionally, Peine’s proposed view of Watson’s emails—that he was fired 

solely for refusing to commit an illegal act—would require the court to

impermissibly stack one inference on another. With respect to Watson’s email to 

Johnston, the multiple inferences required include: (1) Watson was referring to 

Peine as a liability because he had refused to go along with falsifying HIT 

Services’ books (rather than due to poor performance as CFO) more than six 

months before; (2) Watson also communicated those same concerns to Yates; and 

(3) Yates decided to fire Peine solely for that reason. Turning to Watson’s email to 

Blaskoski, we would have to infer: (1) that Watson was referring to Peine; (2) that 

the action they had to take immediately was to fire Peine; and (3) that they had to 

fire Peine solely because he had refused to falsify HIT Services’ books more than 

six months before. We may not stack one inference on top of another to create a 
14

fact issue. See Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex. 2003) 

(explaining that an inference stacked on other inferences is legally insufficient 

evidence); Zavala v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 355 S.W.3d 359, 373 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (“Stacking inferences is insufficient to create a fact 

issue precluding summary judgment.”); Rivas v. City of Houston, 17 S.W.3d 23, 28 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. den.) (“[A] vital fact may not be 

established by stacking an inference upon an inference.”). Moreover, even if the 

first two inferences were reasonable, Watson’s emails would at most suggest that 

Peine’s refusal to perform an illegal act was a reason for his firing. Particularly in 

light of the evidence discussed above regarding other reasons for Peine’s firing, 

Watson’s emails do not support an inference that the refusal was the sole reason 

for his firing. Therefore, Watson’s emails do not create a fact issue on the solecause element of Peine’s Sabine Pilot claim.

To the extent Peine argues that Yates—the person the undisputed summary 

judgment established made the decision to terminate him—possessed a negative 

attitude toward him, he does not point to any evidence in the record supporting that 

contention. Accordingly, we conclude this argument also does not create a fact 

issue.

2. Peine offered no evidence that the decision to terminate him 

was made in violation of company policy.

Peine next argues that the decision to terminate his employment was not 

made in compliance with company policy, which creates an inference that the 

stated reason he was terminated was false. Here, the evidence was undisputed that 

Yates made the decision to terminate Peine’s employment after she learned he had 

sent confidential company information to a reporter. According to Peine, an inhouse attorney firing an employee violated company policy. Peine does not, 
15

however, point to any evidence in the record establishing which policy was 

violated and how Yates firing him violated it. Instead, Peine quotes a statement his 

attorney made in posing a question during Watson’s deposition: “Well, Mr. 

Blaskoski told me Abby Yates made the decision. But that’s a managerial decision 

and not a lawyer decision.” Watson’s answer did not confirm that Yates firing 

Peine violated a company policy, and Peine does not point to any other witness

who so testified. Because Peine offered no evidence that company policy was 

violated when he was terminated, this argument does not create a fact issue.

3. The outside auditor’s report is not evidence that Peine was 

terminated for refusing to perform an illegal act.

Peine also argues that an outside auditor’s report regarding the events 

surrounding his termination supports an inference that the stated reason for his 

termination was false. According to the report,

[d]uring the year, the financial controller of HIT Services LP made a 

number of allegations against his superiors at a local and divisional 

level. Since the original allegations were made, the employee was 

suspended and later left the Group. These allegations have been made 

public and the employee pursued a number of potential legal claims 

against the Group, all of which have been unsuccessful.

Peine contends the auditor misstated the facts surrounding his termination because 

it reported that he (1) was suspended rather than placed on paid leave, and (2) had 

left the Group rather than specifically stating he had been terminated.

We disagree. First, the report does not state how or why Peine left the 

Group. Second, the report does not misstate the facts of his termination or his 

administrative leave with pay. “Suspended” is defined as “to bar temporarily from 

a privilege, office, or function;” while “leave” is defined as “authorized absence 

from duty.” The Merriam-Webster Dictionary New Edition (2004). In this context, 

then, being “suspended” does not imply anything materially different from being 
16

placed on “paid leave.” Accordingly, the report does not support an inference that 

the stated reason for Peine’s termination was false. 

4. Peine’s expert’s testimony did not create a fact issue that he 

was terminated solely for refusing to commit an illegal act.

Peine next cites to the deposition testimony of his retained “governance 

compliance expert,” Donna Boehme. According to Peine, Boehme’s testimony 

created a fact issue because she testified that this case “presented a textbook case 

of retaliation.” Boehme did not, however, render an opinion on whether Peine’s 

disclosure to the reporter constituted a breach of his confidentiality obligations to 

his employer, or on what role this disclosure may or may not have had in his 

termination. Because Boehme did not exclude breach of Peine’s confidentiality 

obligations as a reason for his termination, her testimony does not generate a 

material issue of fact on the sole-cause element of Peine’s Sabine Pilot cause of 

action. See Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 633 (“An employer who discharges an employee 

both for refusing to perform an illegal act and for a legitimate reason or reasons 

cannot be liable for wrongful discharge.”).

5. Peine’s co-workers’ experiences after his termination do not 

create a fact issue on Peine’s Sabine Pilot cause of action.

In his appellate briefing, Peine recounts the experience of Patricia Solis, a 

staff accountant he had hired at HIT Services, following his termination. 

Specifically, Peine points out that Solis had to respond to rumors that he had been 

fired for “cooking the books at HIT Services,” and that Solis was “relieved of a 

fully functional workstation and computer for performing her job.” Without 

further explanation, Peine asserts that these episodes support an inference that he 

was terminated for refusing to perform an illegal act. But Peine does not explain

how these seemingly disconnected events—a third party responding to rumors and 

losing a desk and computer—can support an inference that he was terminated for 
17

refusing to perform an illegal act. Without more, these events offer no support for 

Peine’s Sabine Pilot cause of action. See Suarez, 465 S.W.3d at 634 (“An 

inference is not reasonable if it is premised on mere suspicion . . . .”).

6. Temporal proximity does not support an inference that the 

sole cause of Peine’s termination was his refusal to perform

an illegal act.

Peine next asserts that the temporal proximity between his refusal to perform 

an illegal act and his termination supports an inference that he was fired in 

violation of Sabine Pilot. Peine alleges that he refused to follow Kumar’s orders to 

falsify HIT Services’ financial books in December 2008 and that he started 

reporting, and then continued to report, Kumar’s attempted accounting 

wrongdoings through July 2009. Peine then argues that because he was terminated

six weeks later, temporal proximity supports an inference that he was fired for 

refusing to perform an illegal act. Even assuming that temporal proximity could, 

in some cases, create a fact issue on the sole-cause element of a Sabine Pilot claim, 

we disagree that the evidence on which Peine relies does so in this case. Cf. 

Safeshred, 365 S.W.3d at 664 (“[T]he nature of a Sabine Pilot claim means that the 

illegal activity an employee is asked to do never actually occurs (because the 

employee will have refused to do it and been fired).”); Marx v. Electronic Data 

Sys. Corp., 418 S.W.3d 626, 635 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.) (“[E]ven 

under the but for causation standard applicable to Title VII retaliation cases, the 

mere temporal proximity between protected conduct and adverse action is 

insufficient to show a causal link.”).

As explained above, reporting allegedly illegal acts is not protected by 

Sabine Pilot. Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 724–25 (rejecting request to extend Sabine 

Pilot cause of action to private at-will employees who are discharged for reporting 

illegal activities). Because Peine contends that he made only a single refusal in 
18

December 2008, approximately eight months before he was terminated, the timing 

of his termination does not support an inference that he was fired solely as a result 

of his refusal to commit an illegal act. See Green v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 199 

S.W.3d 514, 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet denied) (concluding, 

in workers’ compensation retaliation case, that four-month gap between filing of 

compensation claim and termination did not support causal link between the two).

Peine attempts to shorten this gap between his refusal to commit an illegal 

act and his termination by citing to Hawthorne v. Star Enterprise, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 

757, 761–62 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied). In Hawthorne, the 

employer issued a standing order to employees that they physically smell water 

samples to determine whether hazardous materials had been removed. Id. at 758. 

Hawthorne refused the order, directed his subordinates not to comply with it, and 

then reported the order to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 

Hawthorne was then terminated by the employer. Id. at 759. The trial court 

granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment based on Hawthorne’s 

testimony that he was fired not only for refusing to commit an illegal act, but also 

for reporting the order to OSHA. Id. The court of appeals reversed the summary 

judgment, concluding that Hawthorne’s report of the illegal order was not a 

separate act but instead was a continuation of his initial refusal. Id. at 761. Peine 

makes the same argument here: that his reports of Kumar’s order to falsify HIT 

Services’ financial records were a continuation of his initial refusal to perform an 

illegal act.

We initially note that Hawthorne is not binding on this Court and also that 

no other appellate court has cited Hawthorne for the proposition that a Sabine Pilot

refusal to commit an illegal act can be continued over time by reporting the order 

to perform an illegal act to governmental authorities. We need not decide today 
19

whether to follow Hawthorne, however, because it is distinguishable. First, unlike 

in Hawthorne, there is no evidence here that Peine continued to refuse to follow an 

order to perform any illegal act. Instead, the record reflects that Peine’s superiors 

accommodated his demands. Second, the manager involved in Hawthorne’s 

termination testified during his deposition that he was not aware that Hawthorne 

had made a report to OSHA at the time the decision was made to fire him. This 

admission alone created a fact issue on whether Hawthorne was terminated solely 

as a result of his refusal to perform an illegal act. Id. at 762. Because there is no 

similar testimony here, Hawthorne does not support Peine’s effort to shorten the 

time gap between his refusal to falsify HIT Services’ financial records and his 

termination. 

Finally, Peine makes several public policy arguments that he was justified in 

reporting Kumar’s order to falsify HIT Services’ financial records to company 

management and the press, and he contends these policies in favor of reporting 

illegal activity served to continue his initial refusal. The Supreme Court of Texas 

has previously addressed this issue, and it has consistently rejected every attempt 

to extend the Sabine Pilot exception and recognize a common-law cause of action 

for retaliatory discharge of an employee who reports illegal activities in a private 

workplace. Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 400 (Tex. 1998) 

(“Because the Legislature has been so proactive in promulgating statutes that 

prohibit retaliation against whistleblowers in many areas of the private sector, we 

decline to recognize a common-law cause of action.”); id. at 403 (rejecting public 

policy arguments to extend Sabine Pilot to reporting violations of the law because 

doing so “would in large part eviscerate the specific measures the Legislature has 

already adopted”); Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 724–25; see also Ed Rachal Found. v. 

D’Unger, 207 S.W.3d 330, 332 (Tex. 2006) (“Sabine Pilot protects employees 
20

who are asked to commit a crime, not those who are asked not to report one.”). 

This Court has likewise rejected requests to extend Sabine Pilot to terminations 

based on reports or investigations of illegal activity, concluding such expansion 

should be left to the Supreme Court of Texas or the Legislature. See Melendez v. 

Exxon Corp., 998 S.W.2d 266, 273 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no 

pet.); Mayfield v. Lockheed Eng’g & Scis. Co., 970 S.W.2d 185, 187–88 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). Because Sabine Pilot does not 

apply to reports of illegal activity, Peine’s reports of Kumar’s actions cannot 

continue his refusal to commit an illegal act. Accordingly, Peine has failed to 

identify evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding the element 

of his claim that he was terminated solely for refusing to perform an illegal act.

CONCLUSION

Having addressed and rejected each argument raised in Peine’s single issue 

on appeal, we overrule that issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ J. Brett Busby

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Busby, and Brown.