Filed 7/12/23 In re Mason C. CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re MASON C. et al., Persons 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B318507

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 21CCJP03450A-C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DARLENE C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Martha Matthews and Nancy Ramirez, Judges. 

Dismissed as moot.
2

David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

_______________________________

The juvenile court in February 2022 declared then-10-yearold Mason C., two-year-old Mariah A. and seven-month-old

Marisol G. dependent children of the court after sustaining 

allegations pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code former 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1),

1 that Marisol had a positive 

1 Senate Bill No. 1085 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2022, 

ch. 832, § 1), effective January 1, 2023, amended Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, in part, by rewriting 

subdivision (b)(1), to now provide in separate subparagraphs that 

a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if 

“(1) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the

child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of

any of the following: [¶] (A) The failure or inability of the child’s

parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.

[¶] (B) The willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or

guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the

conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left. [¶]

(C) The willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to

provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical

treatment. [¶] (D) The inability of the parent or guardian to

provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or

guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance

abuse.” 

New section 300, subdivision (b)(2), provides, “(2) A child

shall not be found to be a person described by this subdivision

solely due to any of the following: [¶] (A) Homelessness or the
3

toxicology screen for amphetamine at birth; the children’s 

mother, Darlene C., was a recent user of amphetamine, which 

interfered with her ability to provide the children with 

appropriate care and supervision; Darlene’s male companion 

Marco G. (Mariah and Marisol’s presumed father) had a history 

of illicit drug use that endangered the children’s safety; and 

Darlene, knowing of Marco’s serious drug problem, failed to 

protect the children by allowing Marco to reside in the children’s 

home and to have unlimited access to the children. The children 

remained released to Darlene under the supervision of the 

Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 

Services.

Darlene appealed, challenging only the jurisdiction findings 

concerning the danger to the children from her use of 

amphetamine shortly before Marisol was born. While her appeal 

was pending, the court terminated dependency jurisdiction with 

juvenile court custody orders granting Darlene joint physical and 

legal custody of Mason (with his nonoffending presumed father, 

Rafael C.) and sole physical custody of Mariah and Marisol. We 

dismiss Darlene’s appeal as moot.

lack of an emergency shelter for the family. [¶] (B) The failure of

the child’s parent or alleged parent to seek court orders for

custody of the child. [¶] (C) Indigence or other conditions of

financial difficulty, including, but not limited to, poverty, the

inability to provide or obtain clothing, home or property repair, or

childcare.”

All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions

Code.
4

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In late June 2021 the Department received a referral 

stating Darlene and her newborn child had tested positive for 

amphetamine. Darlene denied knowingly consuming 

amphetamine, claiming she had been given what she believed 

was an over-the-counter pain pill by a friend two days before the 

birth when she was experiencing contractions. She insisted she 

had no current or past history with drugs and agreed to drug test 

if necessary. Darlene acknowledged she had not had any inperson prenatal care, explaining she only had “scattered” 

telehealth appointments due to COVID-19 protocols.

The Department filed a non-detain petition on behalf of the 

children on July 26, 2021 pursuant to former section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect). At the detention hearing 

the juvenile court found a prima facie case existed that the 

children were minors described by section 300 but allowed their

continued release to their parents (Mason to Darlene and Rafael; 

Mariah and Marisol to Darlene and Marco).

On December 1, 2021 the Department filed a section 385 

petition to remove Mariah and Marisol from Marco’s custody 

based on Marco’s positive tests for marijuana and 

methamphetamine. The juvenile court issued a removal order on 

December 6, 2021. At approximately the same time Darlene 

moved with all three children from the family residence to her 

parents’ home. 

The jurisdiction hearing took place over several days in 

December 2021 and January and February 2022. Marco pleaded 

no contest to an amended petition alleging, in part, that he had a 

history of illicit drug use and had a positive test for 

methamphetamine on November 16, 2021 while the dependency 
5

case was pending. Darlene and two Department social workers 

testified. The evidence before the court indicated Darlene was in 

full compliance with services, including participation in alcohol 

and drug education and relapse prevention classes and negative

tests for drugs. The social workers found Darlene’s care created 

no child safety issues.

On February 8, 2022 the court sustained the petition’s 

allegation pursuant to former section 300, subdivision (b)(1), that 

Marisol was born suffering from a detrimental condition 

consisting of a positive toxicology screen for amphetamine, which 

placed the child at risk of serious physical harm. After changing 

“current” to “recent,” the court also sustained the allegation that 

Darlene was a recent user of amphetamine, which rendered her 

incapable of providing regular care for Marisol and interfered 

with her ability to provide appropriate care and supervision for 

all three children. Finally, in addition to its findings that Marco

had a history of illicit drug use and had recently tested positive 

for methamphetamine, the court sustained the allegation that 

Darlene had failed to protect the children by allowing Marco to 

reside in the children’s home and have unlimited access to them. 

Explaining its ruling on the first count, the court stated it 

did not find credible Darlene’s explanation why she and her 

newborn child had tested positive for amphetamine. The court

also expressed its concern that Darlene went for at least five 

months after she knew she was pregnant without seeing a doctor, 

which created a clear health risk to the child.2 

2 The court acknowledged that Marisol was a healthy baby. 

“But,” the court observed, “the reason people get prenatal care is 

to make sure everything is all right.” 
6

With respect to the second count, the court commended 

Darlene for the positive steps she had been taking, “even though 

she’s still sort of fighting the factual allegations in this case,”

referring to her vehement denial of knowingly taking illegal 

drugs during her pregnancy.

The court declared the children dependents of the court, 

allowed them to remain in Darlene’s care under the supervision 

of the Department and ordered family maintenance services for 

Darlene and enhancement services for Marco. The court, again 

agreeing that Darlene was doing well, scheduled a section 364 

review hearing in three months.

In its report for the review hearing the Department stated 

Darlene had fully cooperated and was in complete compliance 

with court-ordered programs and services, including an 

outpatient drug treatment program with aftercare, weekly 

therapy sessions and negative drug tests. At the review hearing 

on May 10, 2022 the court, in accord with the Department’s 

recommendations, terminated its jurisdiction and several days 

later signed juvenile custody orders granting Darlene and Rafael 

joint physical and legal custody of Mason and Darlene sole 

physical custody and Darlene and Marco joint legal custody of 

Mariah and Marisol.

Darlene filed timely notices of appeal from the February 8, 

2022 jurisdiction findings and disposition orders and the May 10 

and May 13, 2022 orders terminating jurisdiction and juvenile 

custody orders. We ordered the two appeals consolidated.

In her opening brief, although conceding Marisol had tested 

positive for amphetamine at birth, Darlene argued there was 

insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding the 

child was born with any condition that placed her at risk of 
7

serious physical harm. Similarly, Darlene argued substantial 

evidence did not support the finding that her recent use of 

amphetamine—a single, one-time use (whether intentional or 

inadvertent)—created an ongoing risk to the children’s physical 

health and safety. Darlene did not challenge the court’s

additional jurisdiction findings regarding Marco’s substance 

abuse and Darlene’s failure to protect the children from Marco. 

Nor did she argue the court erred in terminating jurisdiction on 

May 10, 2022 or entering the May 13, 2022 custody orders.

DISCUSSION

1. In re D.P.: Moot Dependency Appeals and Our 

Discretion To Decide Them

The Supreme Court in In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266 

explained the mootness doctrine and confirmed it applied to 

dependency appeals: “A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide 

actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into 

effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract 

propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot 

affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”’ [Citation.] A 

case becomes moot when events ‘“render[] it impossible for [a] 

court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant 

him any effect[ive] relief.”’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’

two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must 

complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be 

redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the 

plaintiff seeks.” (Id. at p. 276.)

In In re D.P., the juvenile court had terminated its 

jurisdiction without issuing any order that continued to impact 

the parents. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277.) In that 

context, the Court held, “relief is effective when it ‘can have a
8

practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ 

[Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the

plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from

a change in legal status. Although a jurisdictional finding that a

parent engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally

stigmatizing, complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to

sustain an appeal. The stigma must be paired with some effect

on the plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of being redressed by

a favorable court decision.” (Ibid.) The Court gave as examples

of nonmoot challenges to jurisdiction findings cases in which a

jurisdiction finding affected parental custody rights, curtailed a

parent’s contact with his or her child or resulted in disposition

orders that continued to adversely affect a parent. (Id. at

pp. 277-278.) The Court expressly held, disapproving contrary

case law, that “speculative future harm” is not sufficient to avoid

mootness. (Id. at p. 278.)3

Despite its reaffirmation of the applicability of the 

mootness doctrine to dependency appeals, the Supreme Court 

3 Specifically addressing the appellant father’s argument 

that the challenged jurisdiction finding of neglect could result in

his inclusion in California’s Child Abuse Central Index (CACI) 

(Pen. Code, § 11170), which carries several legal consequences, 

the Supreme Court noted that, when a child protective agency 

forwards a substantiated report of abuse or neglect to the 

California Department of Justice for inclusion in CACI, it must 

provide written notice to the person whose conduct was reported. 

(In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 279.) Absent evidence in the 

record that any such report had been submitted or a showing that 

the type of neglect allegation at issue in the case (“general 

neglect,” rather than “severe neglect”) was even reportable, the 

Court held, “Father’s CACI claim is too speculative to survive a 

mootness challenge.” (Id. at p. 280.)
9

emphasized that, even when a case is moot, courts may exercise 

their “inherent discretion” to reach the merits of the dispute. 

(In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) That discretion, the 

Court explained, is generally exercised only when the case 

presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, 

when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the 

parties or when a material question remains for the court’s 

determination. (Ibid.) 

Nevertheless, because features of dependency proceedings 

tend to make appeals prone to mootness problems, the Court, 

without intending to be exhaustive, identified several additional 

factors for the courts of appeal to evaluate when deciding 

whether discretionary review of a moot case may be warranted 

outside of those instances. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

pp. 284-286.) First, a court may analyze whether the challenged 

jurisdiction finding could potentially impact the current or future 

dependency proceedings, for example, by influencing the child 

protective agency’s decision to file a new dependency petition or 

the juvenile court’s determination about further reunification 

services. (Id. at p. 285.) Second, a court may take into account 

the nature of the allegations against the parent: “The more 

egregious the findings against the parent, the greater the 

parent’s interest in challenging such findings.” (Id. at p. 286.) 

Third, a court may consider whether the case became moot due to 

prompt compliance by the parents with their case plan: “It would

perversely incentivize noncompliance if mootness doctrine

resulted in the availability of appeals from jurisdictional findings

only for parents who are less compliant or for whom the court has

issued additional orders.” (Ibid.)
10

2. Discretionary Review of This Moot Appeal Is Not 

Warranted

Emphasizing that the dependency case was terminated 

with orders granting Darlene custody of her children and, as a 

consequence, Darlene is no longer under the supervision of the 

Department, the Department has requested we dismiss Darlene’s 

appeal as moot. Anticipating that request, in her opening brief 

Darlene urges us to review the merits of her challenge to the 

findings relating to her substance abuse (but not to her failure to 

protect the children from exposure to Marco and his drug use) 

because she could suffer prejudice in future dependency or family 

law proceedings from the juvenile court’s incorrect findings. 

Because we can provide no effective relief to Darlene—that 

is, relief that “‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the 

parties’ conduct or legal status’” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at

p. 277)—her appeal is moot. And after considering the factors

identified in In re D.P., we decline to exercise our discretion to

consider a moot appeal.

In an argument devoid of specificity, Darlene contends the

juvenile court’s incorrect jurisdiction findings and order could

prejudice her in future dependency or family law proceedings.

She also asserts our failure to review the merits of her appeal

will encourage the Department to pursue jurisdiction in similar

meritless cases. As discussed, however, the Supreme Court held

the type of speculative future harm posited by Darlene is 

insufficient to avoid mootness. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

p. 278.) And unlike In re J.S. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, upon 

which Darlene relies and where the court of appeal reached the 

merits of an arguably moot case to address the broad and largely 

unresolved question when use of marijuana becomes substance 
11

abuse (id. at p. 1046), whether Darlene’s intentional use of 

amphetamine during the final days of her pregnancy created a 

substantial risk of harm to her child does not present an issue of

broad public interest. (See In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th

156, 159 [fact-specific question whether the mother’s current 

circumstances created a substantial risk of serious physical harm 

to her young son is the type of issue presented to appellate courts 

multiple times every year]; In re M.C. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 

784, 802 [same].)

No other factor justifies reaching the merits of this moot 

appeal. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286 [“no single 

factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise 

discretionary review of a moot appeal”].)4 In light of the 

necessary concession by Darlene that Marisol tested positive for 

amphetamine at birth, the additional findings concerning the 

impact of Darlene’s use of an illicit drug on her ability to care for 

her children are not particularly egregious. Moreover, in any 

future dependency or family law proceeding, Darlene will be able 

to demonstrate the court in this case never detained the children 

from her, complimented her on her positive efforts to deal with 

any substance abuse issues and terminated its jurisdiction with 

orders granting Darlene custody of her children not long after 

assuming jurisdiction over them. Exercise of our discretionary 

authority to consider the merits of Darlene’s moot appeal is not 

warranted.

4 Under the facts of this case, there is no reason to believe 

the decision not to exercise our discretion to review Darlene’s 

moot appeal will disincentivize prompt compliance with juvenile 

court orders in future cases. 
12

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed as moot.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. 

FEUER, J.