alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Doyle Lee HAMM v. Jefferson S. DUNN, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.

Nos. 17-7855 (17A900).

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 22, 2018.

The motion for leave to file documents under seal with redacted copies for the public record is granted. The application for stay of execution of sentence of death presented to Justice THOMAS and by him referred to the Court is denied. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. The order heretofore entered by Justice THOMAS is vacated.

Justice BREYER, respecting the denial of the application for stay and the denial of certiorari.

This case reflects the special circumstances of trying to execute a person who has been on death row for 30 years and has cancer. As I have previously written, rather than develop a "constitutional jurisprudence that focuses upon the special circumstances of the aged," I would reconsider the constitutionality of the death penalty itself. *Dunn v. Madison,* 583 U.S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 9, 13, 199 L.Ed.2d 243 (2017) (BREYER, J., concurring).

Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice SOTOMAYOR joins, dissenting from the denial of the application for stay and the denial of certiorari.

Petitioner Doyle Lee Hamm is a 61-year-old Alabama inmate whose medical conditions leave him in a vulnerable physical state. An independent physician, appointed by the District Court, determined that "no veins in either [of his arms] would be readily accessible" for the placement of the two intravenous catheters Alabama's lethal-injection execution protocol requires. *Hamm v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections,* No. 18-10636, ---F.Supp.3d ----, ----, 2018 WL 1020051 (C.A.11, Feb. 22, 2018), p. 5. Nonetheless, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed the District Court's denial of Hamm's request for a preliminary injunction barring intravenous lethal injection. The District Court and Eleventh Circuit erroneously premised their rejection of Hamm's claims on novel understandings about how Hamm's execution would be carried out-understandings gleaned from a stipulation and an affidavit to which Hamm was given no opportunity to respond. An adversarial process should *829have tested the risk of "serious illness and needless suffering," *Glossip v. Gross,* 576 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2737, 192 L.Ed.2d 761 (2015) (quoting *Baze v. Rees,*553 U.S. 35, 50, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 1531, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008) ), presented by the insertion of intravenous catheters into Hamm's leg or central veins. That method of execution, although it fits within the compass of the State's execution protocol, has, by all accounts before us, never been tried before in Alabama. I therefore respectfully dissent from the denial of certiorari.
# L_2011044EN.01000102.xml

| 18.2.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 44/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.2.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 44/1

---

Information relating to the entry into force of the Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation

The Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation will enter into force on 1 March 2011, the procedure provided for in Article 23 of the Agreement having been completed on 18 January 2011.

---
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 4069 

To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to harmonize the definition 

of employee with the common law. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 25, 2019 

Ms. STEFANIK (for herself, Mr. BYRNE, and Mr. DAVID P. ROE of Tennessee) 

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 

Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to 

harmonize the definition of employee with the common law. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Modern Worker Em5 powerment Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 

7 ACT OF 1938 TO HARMONIZE THE DEFINITION 

8 OF EMPLOYEE. 

9 (a) DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE.—Section 3(e)(1) of 

10 the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4069 IH

1 203(e)(1)) is amended by inserting before the period the 

2 following: ‘‘, as determined under the usual common law 

3 rules (as applied for purposes of section 3121(d) of the 

4 Internal Revenue Code of 1986)’’. 

5 (b) DEFINITION OF EMPLOY.—Section 3(g) of the 

6 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203(g)) is 

7 amended by inserting ‘‘an employee’’ after ‘‘permit’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
Mary L. LAVELLE, petitioner, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee.

No. 17-6393.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 8, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County denied.
In the Matter of DISBARMENT OF Rufus Seth WILLIAMS.

No. D-3006.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 8, 2018.

Disbarment order entered.
Irek Ilgiz HAMIDULLIN, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 18-6011.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 19, 2019.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 1**  **134**

MICHAEL EUGENE PITTS; ARTHUR EUGENE PITTS, JR., a/k/a Sean Michael Pitts; DEBRA LYNN PITTS

- RYLES; STEPHANIE PITTS

- EVANS Plaintiffs

- Appellants

v. RICHARD GLASSER, Esq. et al; BETH VAUGHN, Esq.; HORTENSIA PITTS; RANDOLPH CARLSON, II, Esq. Defendants

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at N orfolk
. Mark S. Davis , District Judge. ( 2 :11

- cv - 00 337

- MSD

- D EM )

Submitted : April 26, 2012 Decided: April 30, 2012

Before GREGORY, AGEE, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Michael Eugene Pitts; Arthur Eugene Pitts, Jr.; Debra Lynn Pitts

- Ryles; Stephanie Pitts

- Evans , Appellant s Pro Se. James Arthur Cales, III, FURNISS, DAVIS, RASHKIND & SAUNDERS, Norfolk, Virginia; Jerome David Crain, Jr., WILLCOX & SAVAGE, PC, Norfolk, Virginia; Farnaz Farkish, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appel lees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Michael Eugene Pitts, Arthur Eugene Pitts, Jr., Debra Lynn Pitts

- Ryles, and Stephanie Pitts

- Evans appeal the district
court ’ s order granting the Defendants’ motion to dis miss their civil complaint . We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Pitts v. Glasser , No. 2:11

- cv - 00337

- MSD

DEM (E.D. Va. Dec. 23, 2011) . We dispense with oral argum ent because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
John P. DEWEY, petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 17-5441.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 2, 2017.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
# Official Journal C 334I/2021

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 334I |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6420 August 2021 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 334I

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6420 August 2021

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | IV   Notices |
| | NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES |
| 2021/C 334 I/01 | Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries | 1 |

Contents

page

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

2021/C 334 I/01

Information communicated by Member States regarding closure of fisheries

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
```
 
 
CRUDE OIL, LIGHT SWEET - ICE FUTURES EUROPE                          Code-067411
FUTURES ONLY POSITIONS AS OF 07/13/10                         |
--------------------------------------------------------------| NONREPORTABLE
      NON-COMMERCIAL      |   COMMERCIAL    |      TOTAL      |   POSITIONS
--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------
  LONG  | SHORT  |SPREADS |  LONG  | SHORT  |  LONG  | SHORT  |  LONG  | SHORT
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(CONTRACTS OF 1,000 BARRELS)                         OPEN INTEREST:      484,616
COMMITMENTS
  40,057   16,426   99,606  326,976  348,815  466,639  464,847   17,977   19,769

CHANGES FROM 07/06/10 (CHANGE IN OPEN INTEREST:     -5,326)
   5,177   -7,744   -6,375   -4,615    8,881   -5,813   -5,238      487      -88

PERCENT OF OPEN INTEREST FOR EACH CATEGORY OF TRADERS
     8.3      3.4     20.6     67.5     72.0     96.3     95.9      3.7      4.1

NUMBER OF TRADERS IN EACH CATEGORY (TOTAL TRADERS:      108)
      17       18       30       58       68       92      102
```

----

Updated July 16, 2010
Donna ROBERTS, petitioner, v. OHIO.

No. 17-7066.

Supreme Court of the United States

Feb. 20, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Ohio denied.
Richard BRAKEBILL, et al. v. Alvin JAEGER, North Dakota Secretary of State.

No. 18A335.

Supreme Court of the United States

Oct. 9, 2018.

The application to vacate the stay entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on September 24, 2018, presented to Justice GORSUCH and by him referred to the Court, is denied. Justice KAVANAUGH took no part in the consideration or decision of this application.

Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice KAGAN joins, dissenting from denial of the application to vacate stay.

I would grant the application to vacate the Eighth Circuit's stay because last-minute "[c]ourt orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls." *Purcell v. Gonzalez* , 549 U.S. 1, 4-5, 127 S.Ct. 5, 166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006) (*per curiam* ). The risk of voter confusion appears severe here because the injunction against requiring residential-address identification was in force during the primary election and because the Secretary of State's website announced for months the ID requirements as they existed under that injunction. Reasonable voters may well assume that the IDs allowing them to vote in the primary election would remain valid in the general election. If the Eighth Circuit's stay is not vacated, the risk of disfranchisement is large. The Eighth Circuit observed that voters have a month to "adapt" to the new regime. But that observation overlooks specific factfindings by the District Court: (1) 70,000 North Dakota residents-almost 20% of the turnout in a regular quadrennial election-lack a qualifying ID; and (2) approximately 18,000 North Dakota residents also lack supplemental documentation sufficient to permit them to vote without a qualifying ID. Although the unchallenged portion of the injunction permitting the use of more informal supplemental documents somewhat lessens this concern, that relief, by itself, scarcely cures the problem given the all too real risk of grand-scale voter confusion. True, an order by this Court vacating the stay would be yet another decision that disrupts the status quo as the election draws ever closer. But the confusion arising from vacating the stay would at most lead to voters securing an additional form of ID. That inconvenience pales in comparison *11to the confusion caused by the Eighth Circuit's order, which may lead to voters finding out at the polling place that they cannot vote because their formerly valid ID is now insufficient.
Exhibit 31.2**Certification of Chief Financial Officer**Pursuant to Securities Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(a) or Rule 15d-14(a)I, Edward J. Puisis, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A of Dayton Superior Corporation;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;  b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recentfiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annualreport) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors: a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likelyto adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.   December 15, 2006 /s/Edward J. Puisis     Edward J. Puisis  Executive Vice President and Chief Financial
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

November 1, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

131281 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

ROY WALLER, Personal Representative Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, of the Estate of Jesse Waller, Deceased, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 131281 

 COA: 266288 

Ingham CC: 04-001581-NH

ALAN ATKINSON, D.O., and

PULMONARY & CRITICAL CARE
 CONSULTANTS, P.C., SPARROW 

HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., and DAVID

YOUNG, 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 14, 2006 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the case of 

Washington v Sinai Hospital of Greater Detroit (Docket No. 130641) is pending on 

appeal before this Court and that the decision in that case may resolve an issue raised in 

the present application for leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in 

ABEYANCE pending the decision in that case. 

l1025 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

November 1, 2006 

 Clerk
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-08-00033-CR

NO. 03-08-00034-CR

Mary Phoung Hill, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NOS. 61499 & 61500, HONORABLE JOE CARROLL, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

In each of these cases, appellant Mary Phoung Hill pleaded guilty and judicially

confessed to committing forgery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.21 (West Supp. 2007). The court

assessed punishment for each offense at twenty-three months in state jail, to run concurrently.

Appellant’s court-appointed attorney filed briefs concluding that the appeals are

frivolous and without merit. The briefs meet the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the records demonstrating why there are

no arguable grounds to be advanced. See also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); High v. State,

573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);

Jackson v. State, 485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137

(Tex. Crim. App. 1969). Appellant received a copy of counsel’s brief and was advised of her right

to examine the appellate records and to file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has been filed.
2

We have reviewed the records and counsel’s briefs and agree that the appeals are

frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the records that might arguably support the appeals.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

The judgments of conviction are affirmed.

__________________________________________

Jan P. Patterson, Justice

Before Justices Patterson, Puryear and Henson

Affirmed

Filed: May 8, 2008

Do Not Publish
Matthew Gene ROCKWELL, petitioner, v. COLORADO.

No. 17-6880.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 8, 2018.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Colorado denied.
**EXHIBIT
      99.3**




**Certification
      Pursuant to**


**18
      U.S.C. Section 1350,**


**As
      Adopted Pursuant to**


**Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**







The
      undersigned, being the Chief Executive Officer of Northcore Technologies Inc.
      (the “Company”) hereby certifies that to the best of my knowledge:




(1)
      The Annual Report on Form 20-F/A of the Company for the fiscal year ended
      December 31, 2006 (the “Report”) which this certification accompanies,
      fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.




(2)
      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
      as
      at, and for the fiscal year ended on, December 31, 2006.




A
      signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
      provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
      the
      Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.







Dated**:**August
                20, 2007
            /s/
                Duncan CopelandDuncan
                CopelandChief
                Executive Officer














8
In Re Calvin J. WILLIAMS, petitioner.

No. 17-6369.

Supreme Court of the United States

Nov. 6, 2017.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.
Exhibit 10.13


 Poly Circuits                           215 Park St. Bensenville, IL 60106
                                         Phone: 630-860-3560
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Date: May 27, 1999                      Fax Number: 214-503-8607

 To: Mr. Ron Allen                       Company:Performance Interconnect
 From: Joseph A. Turek


 Subject: Sale of Frisco building to Brinkman

 Dear Ron,

 I have  discussed your proposal  with the  M-Wave  Directors  and they  have
 given their approval to move forward.   I have outlined your proposal as  we
 understand it.  If there is an error please get back to me ASAP.

 1.  The current Note of $293,025 which  is to be paid out monthly  beginning
 May 1, 1999 at a rate of $50K per month as per the original agreement.

 2.  The Royalty agreement would convert to a monthly payment $25K per  month
 until the balance of $5OOK is paid.

 3.  We  would roll  the inventory  note of  $773,479 and  50%. of  the sales
 commission into a 30 month note with interest on this note at Prime plus 1%.

 4.  We would  credit you $15K  for your investment  in documents to purchase
 the property.  M-Wave would gain  ownership of those documents which will be
 delivered to M-Wave upon the acceptance of this agreement.

 5.  PC Dynamics of Texas would  immediately give notice that they would  not
 be purchasing the Frisco, TX facility and allow M-Wave to sell the  building
 to a  third party,  provided all  the  provision of  the lease  and  current
 agreements with M-Wave are met.

 If you are in agreement with the above, please put this in a legal form  for
 me to sign  off on.   Or if you  wish, I can  have Sonnenschein  draft up  a
 letter.


 /s/

 Best Regards
 Joseph A. Turek