2023 IL 127547

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 127547) 

RITA LINTZERIS et al., Appellants, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee. 

Opinion filed January 20, 2023.

CHIEF JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Neville, Overstreet, and Holder White concurred in the judgment and 

opinion. 

 Justices Cunningham, Rochford, and O’Brien took no part in the decision. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiffs Rita Lintzeris, William Moraitis, Zaron Jossel, and Clarence Daniels 

brought an action for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, on behalf of 

themselves and others similarly situated, against the City of Chicago (City). 

Plaintiffs challenged the City’s authority to enact an ordinance imposing 

administrative penalties on the owners of impounded vehicles (Chicago Municipal 
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Code § 2-14-132 (amended Nov. 16, 2016)). Plaintiffs contended that the ordinance 

is an invalid exercise of the City’s home rule authority because it is preempted by 

section 11-208.7 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-208.7 (West 2016)). 

The Cook County circuit court dismissed the complaint under section 2-615 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016)), and the appellate court 

affirmed. 2021 IL App (1st) 192423-U. For the following reasons, we affirm the 

judgment of the appellate court. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The Impoundment Ordinance 

¶ 4 In 1998, the City enacted an ordinance setting forth the applicable procedures, 

penalties, and fees that apply to vehicle owners when their vehicle has been 

impounded because of its use in certain enumerated municipal code offenses. See 

Chicago Municipal Code § 2-14-132 (added Apr. 29, 1998). Under the ordinance, 

as generally relevant here, within 15 days of the impoundment, an owner may 

request a preliminary hearing, at which an administrative law officer determines 

within 48 hours whether there is probable cause to believe the owner’s vehicle was 

used in one of the enumerated offenses. Chicago Municipal Code § 2-14-132(a)(1)

(amended Nov. 16, 2016). If the administrative law officer finds probable cause, 

the vehicle owner may regain possession of the vehicle by paying the administrative 

penalty applicable to the municipal code offense, plus towing and storage fees, as 

well as any outstanding debt arising from other vehicle offenses. Id. § 2-14-

132(a)(1)-(2). If probable cause is lacking, the vehicle is returned to the owner, and 

no penalty or fees are owed. Id. § 2-14-132(a)(3).

¶ 5 Additionally, the owner of the vehicle has a right to request a hearing to 

challenge the impoundment. If the administrative law officer finds by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the vehicle was used in the offense, the owner 

is liable for the administrative penalty applicable to that offense, plus towing and 

storage fees. Id. § 2-14-132(b)(3)(A). If the administrative law officer does not find 

by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner’s vehicle was involved, the 

vehicle is returned, and the owner receives a refund of any penalty and fees paid. 

Id. § 2-14-132(b)(3)(B). If the owner does not request a hearing or fails to appear 

at the hearing, the administrative law officer enters a default order imposing the 
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applicable administrative penalty, plus towing and storage fees. Id. § 2-14-

132(b)(4). An administrative penalty constitutes a debt due to the City and may be 

enforced as a judgment in accordance with applicable law. Id. § 2-14-132(c). 

¶ 6 The Vehicle Code

¶ 7 The Vehicle Code covers vehicle regulation in the state, including traffic 

regulation in chapter 11, titled “Rules of the Road.” 625 ILCS 5/ch. 11 (West 2016). 

Article II of chapter 11 concerns obedience to and the effect of traffic laws. Id. ch. 

11, art. II. Section 11-207 provides that the provisions in chapter 11 are to be 

uniform throughout the State; while local authorities can adopt additional traffic 

regulations, “no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance rule or 

regulation in conflict with the provisions of this Chapter unless expressly 

authorized herein.” Id. § 11-207. The Vehicle Code further provides within chapter 

11 that home rule units, such as the City, cannot adopt inconsistent local police 

regulations, subject to exceptions not at issue in this case. Id. § 11-208.2. 

¶ 8 In 2012, the General Assembly amended the Vehicle Code to add a provision 

to chapter 11, article II, governing administrative fees and procedures for the 

release of impounded vehicles. See Pub. Act 97-109, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2012) (adding 

625 ILCS 5/11-208.7). That section authorizes counties and municipalities to 

“provide by ordinance procedures for the release of properly impounded vehicles” 

and to impose “a reasonable administrative fee related to [a county’s or 

municipality’s] administrative and processing costs associated with the 

investigation, arrest, and detention of an offender, or the removal, impoundment, 

storage, and release of the vehicle.” 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7(a) (West 2016). 

¶ 9 Procedural History 

¶ 10 In 2017, plaintiffs brought an action on behalf of themselves and a purported 

class of vehicle owners who either paid administrative penalties or had default 

judgments entered against them for such penalties under the impoundment 

ordinance from 2012 to the time of the complaint. Plaintiff Lintzeris alleged that 

her son borrowed her vehicle and was arrested for driving while intoxicated and 

possessing unlawful drugs. Her vehicle was impounded, and she paid an 
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administrative penalty, as well as fees for towing and storage. Plaintiff Moraitis 

alleged that his son was arrested for driving with a suspended license. After a full 

hearing, an administrative law officer upheld the impoundment of his vehicle and 

ordered that he pay an administrative penalty, storage costs, and a towing fee. 

Moraitis did not allege that he paid the penalty or fees. Plaintiff Jossel alleged that 

his vehicle was impounded after he was arrested for possessing a controlled 

substance. He paid an administrative penalty, as well as towing and storage fees. 

Plaintiff Daniels alleged that his vehicle was impounded after he was arrested for 

driving while intoxicated. He alleged that he was assessed an administrative penalty 

and fees, which he did not pay. 

¶ 11 Plaintiffs challenged the impoundment ordinance, alleging that the Vehicle 

Code prohibits the City from imposing the administrative penalties in connection 

with a vehicle’s impoundment. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that section 11-208.2 

expressly limits the City’s authority to adopt local police regulations that are 

inconsistent with chapter 11 and that section 11-208.7 allows for only towing, 

storage, and other reasonable administrative costs. Therefore, plaintiffs alleged that 

the impoundment ordinance’s imposition of administrative penalties is inconsistent 

with section 11-208.7 and thereby unenforceable. 

¶ 12 In count I of the complaint, plaintiffs sought a declaration that the City is not 

authorized to impose the penalties. In count II, plaintiffs sought an injunction 

barring the City from imposing any further administrative penalties. In counts III 

and IV, plaintiffs asserted claims for unjust enrichment and conversion and sought 

a refund of administrative penalties collected since 2012, as well as proceeds from 

the sale of impounded vehicles. 

¶ 13 The City then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-615 

of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016). The City argued 

that plaintiffs’ claims failed as a matter of law because the ordinance is not 

inconsistent with section 11-208.7 and because section 11-208.7 does not apply to 

home rule units. After briefing and a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the 

complaint, finding that prior to the enactment of section 11-208.7 the City had home 

rule authority to impose the penalties and that adding section 11-208.7 did not 

preempt the City’s home rule authority to impose the penalties because the statute’s 

authorization to impose fees did not include a prohibition of penalties. As an 
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alternative basis, the court determined that section 11-208.7 did not apply to home 

rule units. 

¶ 14 The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 2021 IL App 

(1st) 192423-U. The court found that “nowhere in [section 11-208.7] is there an 

explicit limitation on the power of a home rule unit to charge an administrative 

penalty or fine for the underlying violation that led to the impoundment of the 

vehicle.” Id. ¶ 49. Accordingly, the court held that “[t]he impoundment ordinance 

is not inconsistent with the Vehicle Code and operates concurrently with the 

Vehicle Code.” Id. ¶ 50. 

¶ 15 We subsequently allowed plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 

315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). We also allowed the Illinois Counties Risk Management 

Trust to file an amicus curiae brief. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). 

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 The central issue in this appeal is whether the City’s ordinance, imposing 

administrative penalties on owners of vehicles impounded for certain municipal 

violations, is a valid exercise of the City’s home rule power. Plaintiffs contend that 

the statutory provisions of the Vehicle Code and the limitations on home rule 

authority in the Vehicle Code foreclose the City’s imposition of administrative 

penalties, thus rendering the ordinance unenforceable. 

¶ 18 The appeal comes to this court from the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ 

complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 

(West 2016). A motion to dismiss under that section tests the legal sufficiency of 

the complaint based on defects apparent on its face. O’Connell v. County of Cook, 

2022 IL 127527, ¶ 18. The essential question presented is whether the allegations 

of the complaint, taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 

Id. Our review of an order granting a section 2-615 motion is de novo. Id. ¶ 19. 
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¶ 19 The City’s Home Rule Authority 

¶ 20 The City is a home rule unit. See Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium 

Ass’n, 2013 IL 110505. As such, our analysis begins with the scope of its home rule 

authority. The 1970 Illinois Constitution bestows broad authority on home rule 

units. Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 30 (citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(m)); 

Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 174 (1992). As expressed in article 

VII, section 6(a), of the Illinois Constitution: 

“Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power 

and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, 

but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, 

safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” Ill. Const. 1970, 

art. VII, § 6(a). 

¶ 21 Thus, under section 6(a), the City, as a home rule unit, draws its power to 

regulate for the protection of the public safety directly from the constitution. This 

power does not depend on a grant of authority by the General Assembly, as was the 

design prior to the 1970 constitution. City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 

512-13 (1998). Section 6 further provides that the “[p]owers and functions of home 

rule units shall be construed liberally.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(m). This broad 

power vested in home rule units is premised on the understanding that problems 

affecting units of local government and their residents should be addressed with 

solutions tailored to meet those local needs. Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 29. 

¶ 22 Although the constitutional power of home rule units is deliberately broad, the 

General Assembly may preempt the exercise of a home rule unit’s powers by 

expressly limiting that authority. As provided under article VII, section 6(h), the 

General Assembly “may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise by 

the State of any power or function of a home rule unit.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, 

§ 6(h). We have previously explained that, if the legislature intends to limit or deny 

the exercise of a home rule unit’s powers, it must provide an express statement to 

that effect. Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31; Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 520. The General 

Assembly has codified this principle in section 7 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 

70/7 (West 2016)) and in enacting section 5 of the Home Rule Note Act (25 ILCS 

75/5 (West 2016)). 
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¶ 23 If there is no express limitation or denial of home rule authority, a municipal 

ordinance and a state statute may operate concurrently as provided in article VII, 

section 6(i): “Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State 

any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly 

by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the 

State’s exercise to be exclusive.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(i). These 

constitutional provisions reflect an intention to minimize limitations on home rule 

powers, and by constitutional design “courts should step in to compensate for 

legislative inaction or oversight only in the clearest cases of oppression, injustice, 

or interference by local ordinances with vital state policies.” (Emphasis and internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 34. 

¶ 24 Vehicle Code’s Impact on the City’s Home Rule Authority

¶ 25 With an understanding of home rule authority and its constitutional 

underpinnings, we now consider plaintiffs’ contention that several Vehicle Code 

provisions collectively preempt the City’s home rule authority to impose the 

penalties at issue here, which they assert are inconsistent with the Vehicle Code. 

The question of preemption is a question of law and requires that we construe the 

Vehicle Code and the ordinance; our review is de novo. International Ass’n of Fire

Fighters, Local 50 v. City of Peoria, 2022 IL 127040, ¶ 11. 

¶ 26 The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect 

to the legislature’s intent, and the best indicator of that intent is the statutory 

language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. O’Connell, 2022 IL 127527, ¶ 21. 

“Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will enforce it as 

written and will not read into it exceptions, conditions, or limitations that the 

legislature did not express.” Sigcho-Lopez v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2022 

IL 127253, ¶ 27. Additionally, we must consider the words and phrases in the 

statute in view of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Id. ¶ 28. 

¶ 27 We begin with the statutory provisions of the Vehicle Code central to plaintiffs’ 

argument. Section 11-207 of the Code provides, in pertinent part: 

“The provisions of this Chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this 

State and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein, and no local 
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authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance rule or regulation in conflict with 

the provisions of this Chapter unless expressly authorized herein. Local 

authorities may, however, adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in 

conflict with the provisions of this Chapter ***.” 625 ILCS 5/11-207 (West 

2016). 

Thus, the General Assembly has plainly provided for the uniformity of the 

provisions of chapter 11, and local authorities may not adopt an ordinance that 

conflicts with those provisions. See also id. § 11-208.1 (“The provisions of this 

Chapter of this Act *** shall be applicable and uniformly applied and enforced 

throughout this State ***.”). 

¶ 28 Further, section 11-208.2 is an express limitation on the power of home rule 

units. Specifically, section 11-208.2 provides that “[t]he provisions of this Chapter 

of this Act limit the authority of home rule units to adopt local police regulations 

inconsistent herewith except pursuant to Sections 11-208, 11-209, 11-1005.1, 11-

1412.1, and 11-1412.2 of this Chapter of this Act.” Id. § 11-208.2. 

¶ 29 Accordingly, although the General Assembly has not entirely preempted the 

field of vehicle regulation, section 11-208.2 limits home rule units’ authority to 

enact ordinances that are not inconsistent with the provisions of chapter 11 and that 

do not upset the uniform enforcement of those provisions. See Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 

at 517-18 (generally recognizing section 11-208.2 as a limitation on home rule 

units). 

¶ 30 Prior to 2012, there were no regulations in chapter 11 relating to the 

impoundment of vehicles and none directed at the owners of impounded vehicles. 

Therefore, between 1998 and 2012 there could be no inconsistency or lack of 

uniformity between the impoundment ordinance and chapter 11 of the Vehicle 

Code. See id. at 514-15 (“different [home rule units] which perceive a problem 

differently may adopt different measures to address the problem, provided that the 

legislature has taken no affirmative steps to circumscribe the measures that may be 

taken and that the measures taken are reasonable” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). We also note that the City’s authority to impose administrative penalties 

was found to be otherwise constitutionally sound. See, e.g., McGrath v. City of 

Kankakee, 2016 IL App (3d) 140523, ¶¶ 18-25 (holding a similar ordinance did not 

violate due process); Sloper v. City of Chicago, Department of Administrative 
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Hearings, 2014 IL App (1st) 140712, ¶¶ 25-28 (holding that the administrative 

penalties under the ordinance related to a particular code violation were not 

constitutionally prohibited as excessive fines). 

¶ 31 Plaintiffs maintain that the 2012 amendment to the Vehicle Code in section 11-

208.7 preempts the City’s imposition of administrative penalties when viewed with 

the limitations on home rule authority in the Code. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that 

section 11-208.7 is inconsistent with the ordinance, because remedial costs are 

inconsistent with punitive penalties, and that nothing in the text authorizes 

penalties. Section 11-208.7(a) provides, in pertinent part, that 

“[a]ny county or municipality may, consistent with this Section, provide by 

ordinance procedures for the release of properly impounded vehicles and for 

the imposition of a reasonable administrative fee related to its administrative 

and processing costs associated with the investigation, arrest, and detention of 

an offender, or the removal, impoundment, storage, and release of the vehicle. 

The administrative fee imposed by the county or municipality may be in 

addition to any fees charged for the towing and storage of an impounded 

vehicle.” 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7(a) (West 2016). 

Further, section 11-208.7(b) limits the fees that may be imposed to certain 

enumerated underlying violations. Id. § 11-208.7(b). Moreover, any such fee “shall 

be in addition to (i) any other penalties that may be assessed by a court of law for 

the underlying violations; and (ii) any towing or storage fees, or both, charged by 

the towing company.” Id. § 11-208.7(c)(2). 

¶ 32 Notably, in 2016, the legislature amended section 11-208.7, adding subsection 

(j) directed at home rule units. See Pub. Act 99-848, § 105 (eff. Aug. 19, 2016) 

(adding 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7(j)). That subsection states that the fee limitations 

provided in subsection (b) do not apply to home rule units that tow a vehicle on a 

public way if a circumstance requires the towing or if the vehicle is towed due to a 

violation of a statute or local ordinance and the home rule unit owns and operates a 

towing facility and owns or operates tow trucks. 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7(j) (West 

2016). 

¶ 33 The plain language of the statute provides that counties and municipalities 

“may” choose to charge “a reasonable administrative fee” to cover various costs 
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associated with an impoundment. For an ordinance to be consistent with the 

authorization of fees, the fees imposed must be reasonable and must relate to 

specified administrative and processing costs. The question then, is whether the 

statutory authorization to charge a reasonable fee for various costs related to an 

impoundment of a vehicle is inconsistent with the City’s imposition of 

administrative penalties related to the impoundment. 

¶ 34 We find that a home rule unit’s imposition of penalties does not interfere with 

and is not inconsistent with the State’s efforts to allow municipalities to recoup the 

remedial costs incurred by an impoundment. Rather, the imposition of a penalty is 

compatible with the authorization of fees in section 11-208.7. A fee is imposed to 

recoup the costs incurred in providing a service, while a fine is intended to be 

punitive or act as a deterrent. People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 581-82 (2006); Carter 

v. City of Alton, 2015 IL App (5th) 130544, ¶ 37. There is no express language of 

prohibition or exclusion in the statute stating that only fees may be charged. The 

statute is silent with respect to the imposition of administrative penalties. Moreover, 

nothing in the statute expressly negates the authority to impose administrative 

penalties. The imposition of fines and fees are not mutually repugnant. In other 

words, there is no contradiction in implementing the statute and the ordinance. 

¶ 35 Given the plain language of the statute and considering that the powers and 

functions of home rule units are to be construed liberally (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, 

§ 6(m)), we hold that section 11-208.7, when viewed in consideration of the rest of 

chapter 11, does not preclude the City from imposing an administrative penalty. As 

a result, the ordinance is not preempted by the General Assembly’s subsequent 

passage of section 11-208.7. 

¶ 36 The cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their argument regarding 

inconsistency and lack of uniformity are distinguishable. For example, in People 

ex rel. Ryan v. Village of Hanover Park, 311 Ill. App. 3d 515, 518-19 (1999), 

various villages had ordinances that “allow[ed] the traffic offender to pay a 

settlement fee in lieu of court adjudication” and “eliminate[d] the possibility of the 

offender receiving a conviction for the offense and having the conviction reported 

to the Secretary of State.” Under the Vehicle Code, a traffic offense is adjudicated 

in circuit court, and if a driver is convicted, the clerk of the court reports the 
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conviction to the Secretary of State, who maintains records of repeat offenders and 

may suspend or revoke their driver’s licenses. Id. at 518. 

¶ 37 The appellate court found that the ordinances gave “the offender an opportunity 

to circumvent the potential consequences of committing the offense, namely, a 

chance to avoid an adjudication in the circuit court, a finding of guilty, and a guilty 

finding being reported to the Secretary of State.” Id. at 527. It further found they 

“derail[ed] one of the Secretary of State’s most important duties—monitoring 

traffic offenders through reports of convictions.” Id. By interfering with the 

Secretary of State’s exclusive responsibility to suspend or revoke driving 

privileges, the ordinances “undermine[d] the policies set forth by the 

legislature.” Id. at 528. Therefore, the court concluded that the ordinances were 

unenforceable. Id. 

¶ 38 Unlike the village ordinances, the City’s addition of penalties here does not 

circumvent the authorization of fees, create an obstacle to charging fees, or derail 

any state function. If the General Assembly wishes to deny or restrict the City’s 

home rule authority to impose an administrative penalty, it may enact language 

expressly providing for that limitation. 

¶ 39 Whether the Subject Pertains to the City’s 

 “Government and Affairs” 

¶ 40 For the first time in its opening brief in this court, plaintiffs argue that the 

ordinance does not pertain to the City’s local government and affairs as required by 

article VII, section 6(a), of the constitution and, therefore, falls outside the grant of 

home rule authority. The City contends that the issue is forfeited. We agree. 

¶ 41 Plaintiffs never asserted this theory in their complaint. The issue raised therein 

was legislative preemption of the City’s home rule authority based on the 

provisions of the Vehicle Code. Allowing a party to change its theory of a case on 

appeal weakens the adversarial process and likely prejudices the opposing party.

See Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536 (1996). Furthermore, even 

broadly construed, the issue was never raised in response to the City’s motion to 

dismiss, in the appellate court, or in plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. Thus, 

the trial and appellate courts never had an opportunity to consider and rule upon 
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this question, and the City’s first opportunity to respond to this argument is in its 

response brief in this court. 

¶ 42 We have held on numerous occasions that the failure to raise an issue in either 

the trial or appellate court may result in forfeiture. See, e.g., Vine Street Clinic v. 

HealthLink, Inc., 222 Ill. 2d 276, 301 (2006). We have further held that the failure 

to raise an issue in a petition for leave to appeal may also result in forfeiture. See, 

e.g., People v. Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 26. Whether to review a forfeited

issue under these circumstances is within this court’s discretion. In re Rolandis G., 

232 Ill. 2d 13, 37 (2008). When an issue is not specifically raised in a party’s

petition for leave to appeal but it is “ ‘inextricably intertwined’ ” with other matters 

properly before the court, review is appropriate. Id. (quoting Hansen v. Baxter 

Healthcare Corp., 198 Ill. 2d 420, 430 (2002)). If, however, the forfeited issue is 

not inextricably intertwined with the issues properly before the court, the forfeiture 

rule should be given effect. Id. 

¶ 43 We do not find the issues articulated to be inextricably intertwined. As we have 

explained, a home rule unit may act concurrently with the State if the subject being 

regulated pertains to its local government and affairs and if the legislature has not 

expressly preempted its home rule authority. Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶¶ 29-31. 

Here, plaintiffs’ theory of the case regarding legislative preemption presupposes 

that the subject of the ordinance otherwise pertained to the City’s local government 

and affairs. Thus, rather than being inextricably intertwined, it is merely a separate, 

alternative argument. 

¶ 44 Additionally, both in the appellate court and in this court, plaintiffs 

acknowledged that the legislature only began regulating issues related to 

impoundments in 2012. Prior to the enactment of section 11-208.7, the Vehicle 

Code did not prevent home rule units from adopting local impoundment 

regulations, including the City’s impoundment ordinance. Plaintiffs’ 

acknowledgement is a tacit agreement that until the enactment of section 11-208.7, 

home rule units had constitutional authority to regulate in this area. 

¶ 45 Nevertheless, we have relaxed the forfeiture rules if the issue is one of law, the 

issue is fully briefed and argued by the parties, and the public interest favors 

considering the issue. Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64, 73 

(2002). Even considering the issue, we find plaintiffs’ argument lacks merit. As set 
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forth in Roman, section (6)(d)(2) of article VII of the constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, 

art. VII, § 6(d)(2)) specifically allows home rule units to impose fines and jail 

sentences for nonfelonies. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at 513-14. Additionally, the City’s 

imposition of a penalty has been recognized as a legitimate deterrence tool related 

to its interest in the safety and welfare of its residents. See Towers v. City of 

Chicago, 173 F.3d 619, 624 (7th Cir. 1999) (the fine serves the “purpose of 

deterring owners from allowing their vehicles to be used for prohibited purposes”). 

In Towers, although not expressly addressing the concurrent exercise of home rule 

authority, the court explained that, by facilitating illegal activity, the plaintiffs had 

contributed, however unwittingly, to the spread of drugs in their community. Id. at 

625. The court found that this was a major concern of a city responsible for the 

safety and health of its people and a particular concern for a city the size of Chicago 

and, thus, the City was on solid ground in creating an additional layer of deterrence 

against this type of prohibited activity. Id. 

¶ 46 While the history of the Vehicle Code evinces a statewide role in the regulation 

of vehicles generally, nothing in the Vehicle Code remotely suggests that the 

General Assembly sought to entirely preempt a home rule unit in the field of vehicle 

regulation, much less with respect to the specific problem addressed by the 

ordinance. See, e.g., 625 ILCS 5/11-207 (West 2016) (expressly acknowledging the 

authority of municipalities to adopt additional traffic regulations not in conflict with 

chapter 11). Moreover, comprehensive state regulation cannot be the basis to 

“render an area entirely outside of local control under section 6(a).” Palm, 2013 IL 

110505, ¶ 73 (Thomas, J., specially concurring). 

¶ 47 Rather, as here, a statutory provision that partially preempts home rule authority 

presupposes that local governments otherwise have concurrent authority in the area. 

See Illinois Road & Transportation Builders Ass’n v. County of Cook, 2022 IL 

127126, ¶ 48. By enacting section 11-208.2 of the Vehicle Code, the General 

Assembly recognized that home rule units had concurrent authority under section 

6(i) but chose to limit that authority in chapter 11 to those police regulations that 

are not inconsistent with its provisions. If vehicle regulation under chapter 11 did 

not pertain to a home rule unit’s government and affairs, then the limitation in 

section 11-208.2 would be unnecessary. Accordingly, for all these reasons, we find 

that plaintiffs’ new assertion lacks merit. 
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¶ 48 Double Jeopardy 

¶ 49 Lastly, plaintiffs raise the “parameters of double jeopardy” to demonstrate the 

“General Assembly’s intent to proscribe administrative penalties.” The City argues 

this issue has also been forfeited. A violation of the double jeopardy clause was 

never raised in plaintiffs’ complaint. And contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion that the 

double jeopardy claim was raised in their response to the motion to dismiss, the 

record reflects that the issue raised was that the ordinance conflicted with section 

11-208.7. Neither the circuit court nor appellate court considered whether the 

impoundment ordinance violated double jeopardy. We have held that, in a civil 

case, a party’s failure to challenge the constitutionality of a statute in the circuit 

court normally forfeits that challenge on appeal. Forest Preserve District of 

Du Page County v. First National Bank of Franklin Park, 2011 IL 110759, ¶ 27. 

Yet, to the extent the issue is one of law, is fully briefed, and the public interest 

favors considering it, we consider the merits and find the penalty does not violate 

double jeopardy. 

¶ 50 The double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution provides that no 

“person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 

limb.” U.S. Const., amend. V. “The Clause protects only against the imposition of 

multiple criminal punishments for the same offense [citations] and then only when 

such occurs in successive proceedings [citation].” Hudson v. United States, 522 

U.S. 93, 99 (1997). In determining whether a particular punishment is criminal or 

civil, we look to whether there is an express or implied intent in the legislation to 

establish a civil or criminal penalty. Id. Here, the ordinance by its plain language 

provides for an “administrative penalty,” imposed by an administrative agency. See 

Chicago Municipal Code § 2-14-132 (amended Nov. 16, 2016). An ordinance 

administered by an administrative agency is presumptively civil, as it does not 

provide for the same procedural safeguards that criminal proceedings do. See 

Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 429 (7th Cir. 2000) (statute administered by an 

agency is presumptively civil because agency enforcement mechanisms do not 

contain the same procedural safeguards that criminal proceedings do). 

¶ 51 Even if the legislation is intended as a civil penalty, we then consider “whether 

the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect” “as to transfor[m] 

what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” (Internal 
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quotation marks omitted.) Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99. Plaintiffs must establish the 

“clearest proof” that the penalties are “so punitive in form and effect as to render 

them criminal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 104. Several factors have 

been considered as “useful guideposts”: 

“(1) [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; 

(2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it 

comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will 

promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; 

(5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an 

alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; 

and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 

assigned.” (Internal quotation marks omitted). Id. at 99-100. 

¶ 52 Plaintiffs argue the first five factors present clear proof that the penalties are 

criminal. We disagree. With respect to the first and second factors, the penalties do 

not involve an affirmative disability or restraint as those terms are generally 

understood. The sanction is a monetary penalty, and the penalty imposed is 

“certainly nothing approaching the ‘infamous punishment’ of imprisonment.” 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 104. Additionally, monetary penalties 

have not historically been considered as punishment. Id. With respect to the third 

factor, the penalty does not come into play only on a finding of scienter. Rather, 

the penalty imposed does not require the vehicle owner’s knowledge of the 

vehicle’s use in the underlying offense, only that the offense occurred. See Chicago 

Municipal Code § 2-14-132(b)(3)(A) (amended Nov. 16, 2016). 

¶ 53 With respect to the fourth factor, while the ordinance indeed aims to deter 

conduct, civil penalties may have some deterrent effect without being rendered 

criminal in nature, and that alone is not sufficient to transform the penalty into a 

criminal sanction. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105. As to the fifth factor, that some conduct 

triggering the penalties under the City’s ordinance may be criminal in nature is also 

alone insufficient to transform the monetary penalties into criminal penalties. See 

id. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not met the high burden to show by the clearest 

proof that the administrative penalty imposed under the ordinance is so punitive in 

purpose or effect to transform it into a criminal penalty. Consequently, plaintiffs 
- 16 - 

cannot establish that the penalty violates the double jeopardy clause. 

¶ 54 CONCLUSION

¶ 55 In sum, we hold that the motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint was properly 

granted. The City, as a home rule unit, was not preempted by the Vehicle Code 

from imposing an administrative penalty in its impoundment ordinance; the 

imposition of the penalty is a valid exercise of its home rule authority and does not 

constitute a criminal penalty for purposes of double jeopardy. Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court’s 

dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint.

¶ 56 Affirmed.

¶ 57 JUSTICES CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN took no part in the 

consideration or decision of this case.