PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ KESHIA PORTER, as th e wrongful death representative for the claimants entitled to recover for the wrongful death of Delandis Richardson, deceased, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant - Appellee. No. 18-8028

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming (D.C. No. 1:17-CV-00133-ABJ)

________________ _________________ Vincent L. Marable III, Paul Webb , P.C., Wharton, Texas (Vance Countryman, Vance T. Countryman, P.C., Lander, Wyoming , J. Hunter Craft and Laura A. Cockrell, Craft Law Firm, P.C., Houston, T exas, with him on the briefs), for Plaint iff-Appellant. Katherine B. Wellington, Hogan Lovells US LL P, Washington, D.C. (Jessica L. Ellsworth, Hogan Lovells US LL P, Washington, D.C., and Richard A. Mincer, Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyomi ng, with her on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee.

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , McHUGH , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ LUCERO , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 12, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Keshia Porter appeals the distri ct court’s dismissal of her com plaint as time barred. The district court conc luded that this action is untim ely under Wyo. Stat. § 1-38-102 because Porter did not file a petition for appointme nt as a wrongful death representative (“WDR”) within t wo years of her husband’s death. However, such a petition was filed by a nother putative repres entative within tw o years and Porter was appointed WDR in that state cour t action. She then filed the p resent suit within thirty days of her appointment. On thes e facts, we conclude that Port er’s complaint is timely under Wyo. Stat. § 1-38-10 3(b)(ii). Exercising jurisdic tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand.
I Porter’s husband, Delandis Rich ardson, was killed in an auto a ccident in Campbell County, Wyoming , on November 25, 2014. 1 Within two years, on November 21, 2016, Vance Countr yman filed a “Petition/Action fo r the Appointment of Wrongful Death Representative” in the District Court of Camp bell County, Wyoming. 2 Countryman requested appointment as Richardson’s WDR under Wy o. Stat. §§ 1-38-101 to 105.

1 Because this case was decided on a motion to dismiss, we take the following facts from the complaint. See A costa v. Jani-King of Okla., In c., 905 F.3d 1156, 1158 (10th Cir. 2018).

2 Although the records from the st ate court action were not incl uded in the complaint, they are neverthele ss properly considered. A court may look to documents subject to judicial no tice in deciding a motion to di smiss. Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10t h Cir. 2010). And records fro m a related case may be judicially noticed. St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979).3 The state court judge expressed concern that appointing Countr yman, who would be acting as an attorney in the wrongful death suit, coul d pose ethical problems. On April 27, 2017, Por ter filed an “Amended Petition /Action for the Appointment of Wrongful Death Representative” asking the court to appoint her as Richardson’s WDR. It stated tha t “[t]his petiti on is ‘made in a separate action brought solely for appointing th e wrongful death representative ’ pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-103(b).” The document was filed in the exist ing state court action. On July 10, 2017, the court appoin ted Porter the WDR for Richar dson. Porter then filed this action ag ainst Ford Motor Company on Aug ust 7, 2017, as Richardson’s WDR. Ford move d to dismiss, arguing that Porte r’s claims were barred by Wyoming’s two-year lim itations period for wrongful de ath actions. See Wyo. Stat. § 1-38-102(d). The d istrict court agreed and dismis sed the complaint with prejudice. Porter timely appealed.
II We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Acosta, 905 F.3d at 1158. In so doing, we accep t as true all well-pled fac tual allegations and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id . “A federal court sitting in diversity applies state law fo r statute of limitations purpo ses.” Burnham v. Humphrey Hosp. REIT Trust, Inc ., 403 F.3d 709, 712 (10th Cir. 2 005). Under Wyoming law, “[t]he right to sue for wrongful death is cr eated purely by statute.” Corkhill v. Knowle s, 955 P.2d 438, 442 (Wyo. 1998 ). Any wrongful death claim must be brought in th e name of the decedent’s WDR. Wyo. Stat.4 § 1-38-102(a). “An action for wrongful death shall be commence d within two (2) years after the death of the dec edent.” § 1-38-102(d). Howeve r, “[i]f an action to appoint the [WDR] is properly f iled, the limitation period unde r [§] 1-38-102(d) and any other applicable limitation periods shall be tolled from th e time the action is filed until thirty (30) days after an o rder appointing the [WDR] is e ntered.” § 1-38-103(b)(ii). The Wyoming Su preme Court has explained tha t this limitations period is a condition precedent to filing suit. Corkhill, 955 P.2d at 442. The district court stated that the dispositive que stion is whet her Porter’s Amended Petition relates back to the Petition filed by Countrym an. We conclude that a relation back inquiry is unnecessary. The Wyoming statu te sets forth a straightforward conditional stat ement: “If an action to appoin t the [WDR] is properly filed,” then “the limitation period . . . shall be tolled from the time the action is filed until thirty (30) days after an o rder appointing the [WDR] is e ntered.” § 1-38-103(b)(ii). The anteceden t was satisfied when the Petit ion to appoint a WDR was filed within two years of Ric hardson’s death, on November 2 1, 2016. Accordingly, the limitations per iod was tolled. There is no di spute that Porter filed this case within thirty days of her appointment as WDR. Her cl aim is thus timely. In arguing to the contrary, Ford notes that Porter filed her Am ended Petition after two years had passed and c ontends the date of the Amended Petition is determinative. But the statute does not require the individual who is ultimately appointed WDR to initiate the ac tion; it applies whenever “an a ction to appoint the [WDR] is properly filed.” Id. Ford similarly treats the Amend ed Petition as if it5 were filed as an independent act ion, and thus outside the two-y ear period. But the state court did not open a new case file upon the filing of the Amended Petition, instead filing it in the existi ng action. That decision was co nsistent with the statute, which indicates that “[a]fter a n action to appoint [WDR] is fil ed . . . [n]o subsequent action for appointment may be ma intained.” § 1-38-103(b)(i). Ford points out that Porter’s A mended Petition states it was “m ade in a separate action brought solely for appointing the wrongful deat h representative,” quoting § 1-38-103(b) . And the company criticizes Porter for f ailing to caption her Amended Petition as a m otion to intervene. See § 1-38-103(b) ( stating that “[i]n any action in which appointment of th e [WDR] is sought,” a person c laiming to qualify “may intervene as a matter of right”). Ford thus contends that Porter failed to “strictly comply[]” with a cond ition precedent. Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 331 P.3d 1174, 1188 (Wyo. 2014). B ut these arguments are, in e ssence, improper collateral attacks on the state court decision. See Halliburto n Energy Servs., Inc. v. Gunter, 167 P.3d 645, 650 (Wyo. 2007) (holding a defendant lack s standing to collaterally attack the appointme nt of a WDR, absent facial inv alidity of the ruling). The state court appointed Porter as WDR in the same action that was filed within the limitations period, and Porter file d suit within thirty days of that appointment. She thus complied strictly with the statute’s requirements. Ford also argues Countryman’s P etition was not “properly filed” within the meaning of § 1-38-103(b)(ii) be cause the state court expressed concerns about the ethical problems his appointment would pose. But as we have he ld in a different6 context, the phrase “properly fi led” refers to “filing requirem ents” such as “the place and time of filing” or “the payme nt or waiver of any required f iling fees.” Habteselassie v. Novak, 209 F.3d 1208, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted). The phrase does not refer to issu es that “require analysis in s ome manner of the substance of the claim s.” Id. at 1211.
III For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.