### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 ON MOTION F OR REHEARING

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 NO. 03- 05 -00 412 -CV

K at in C or p. , A ppe lla nt

v. Bea Loesch , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 261S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN40077 3 , HO NORAB LE DARLENE BY RNE , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Katin Corp. has filed a motion for rehea ring
. We withdraw our opinion and judg ment dated August 24, 2006, and substitut e this opinion. W e deny Katin’s motion for re hear ing. B e a L oe sc h s ue d K a tin

Cor p. fo r ne g lig e nc e in a pr e mis e s lia bil ity c la im. Katin

did not answer , and a defa

ult judg ment was enter ed awa rding L oesch $100,000 in da mag es. Katin filed a motion for new

trial, which the tria l court denie d. Katin appe als, contendingthat the court a bused its dis c re tio n in

de nyingKatin ’s mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l. We a ff

ir m th e de fa

ult jud g me nt.
F AC TS L oesch broug ht a premises liability claim ag ainst Katin for pe rsonal injuries ar ising fr om h e r e mpl oy

me nt at a re sta ur ant a lle g e dly ow ne d by

Katin . Sh e c la ime d th a t w hil e in t he c ours e2

and sc op e of he r e mpl oy

me nt, sh e inj ur e d h e r k

ne e , r e qu ir ingkn e e surg e ry . Sh e a lso c la ime d th a t, other than her init ial appointment, Katin di d not pay for he r medica l treatment a nd terminated he r
e mpl oy me nt b e c a

us e sh e c ou ld no lon g e r wo rk a s a wa itr e ss. L oe sc h all e g e d th a t th e wr on g fu l a c ts and omi ssions of Katin and it s ag ents cause d her to suff er lost wag es, impaired e arningcapa city , and past and futur e phy sical pain a nd suffe ring , mental anguish, reas o n ab le and ne cessa ry medical
e xpe ns e s, ph y sic a l im

pa ir me nt, and ph y sic a l di sf

ig ur e me nt. She so ug ht a c tua l da ma g e s, int e re st,
c os ts o f c ourt , a

nd me nta l anguis h d a ma g e s. L oesch attempted to serve c itation on Katin’s reg istered a g ent, Martin P. Adler, thre e tim e s in thr e e dif fe re nt wa y s. F ir st, on

Marc h 2 3, 20 04 , L oe sc h atte mpt e d s e rv ic e by c e rt if ie d ma il; on April 17, 2004, this certified ma il was retur ned and marked “REFUSED,” and the process ser ver state d in his sw or n a ff ida vit that he be lie ve d K a tin

wa s atte mpt ingto e va de se rv ic e . Ne xt, on Ap ri l 23 , 2 00 4, L oes ch att empt e d to e ff e c t pe rs on a l se rv ic e , u sin g a dif fe re nt p ro c e ss s e rv e r. I n h is aff idavit, the second pr ocess server stated t hat he left a business card a fter be ing told Adler was not in. When Adler fa iled to respond, the proce ss se rver attempted service ag ain on May 21, 2004, when he wa s to ld t

hat A dle r w a s in

bu t “ wo uld no t c ome ou t to a c c e pt t he pr oc e ss t

hat [he ] wa s tr

y ingto deliver.” He a

verr ed that he be lieved Adler was avoiding se rvice of proc ess. F ina lly , on Se pte mbe r 15 , L oe sc h s e rv e d K a tin thr ou g h th e Te xas S e c re tary of State pursuant to ar

ticle 2.11 of the Te x as B usiness Corporation Act. See Te x. B us . Co rp . A c t A nn . a rt
. 2.11, § B ( West S upp. 2006). Unde r ar ticle 2.11, if a c orporation’s reg istered a g ent cannot be found with rea sonable dilig ence , then an individual attempting service on th e co rp o ration may serve citation with the Secre tary of State. Id. Up on re c e ipt of se rv ic e , th e Se c re tary

of State fo rw a rd s a3

co p y o f t he citation by

reg istered mail, addr essed to the c orporation at its reg istered of fice , to be ret u rn ed wi t h in thirty

day s. Id. To show that a c ourt may proper ly exercise jurisdiction over a de fe nd ant w ho ha s b e e n s e rv e d thro ug h th e Secret ary of State , p la int if

f m ay pr od uc e a c e rt if ic a te issued by the Secr etar

y stating that copies of the c itation and petition were forwa rded to the defe ndant. See W

hitney v. L &L Realty Corp. , 5 00 S.W. 2d 94 , 9 6 ( Te x. 19 73 ). I n a c c or da nc e wi th his statutory

duty , t h e S ecretar

y of State issued a c ertifica te stating that a copy

of the c itation and petition were forwa

rded to Adle r on September 20, 2004. The cer

tificate states that on September 28, 2004, the proc ess was r eturne d to the Secre tary of State “be aringthe notation Refused.” After Katin failed to a

nswer, a defa

ult judg ment was e ntere d ag ainst it. Twenty -eig ht day s later, K atin filed a motion for ne w trial asse rting that its failure to answe r wa s the result of
acc ident and mistake, attaching Adler’ s aff idavit, which disavowe d knowledg e of r efusa l of servic e:
I t is not m y cust om, prac tice, or intent to avoid ser vice of proce ss on behalf of

the c or po ratio ns fo r w hic h I

a m th e re g ist e re d a g e nt. I t w a s n ot my in ten tio n to a vo id service of proc ess in the above entitled and number ed ca use. . . . Idid no t r e c e ive [the se c on d pr oc e ss se rv e r’ s] bu sin e ss c ard
. . . . Ha d I re c e ive d [hi s] business car d Iwould have c ontacted him as I have done on many occa sions in the past to arr ang e to re ceive the citation. Whil e I have no personnel [ sic] knowledg e as to who m ay have ma de [the statement that I would not acc ept s ervic e], Ican state without reser vation that Idid not direct or authorize anyone to tell [t he proc ess serve r] that I would not c ome out to acce pt service of proc ess. I

was not told on May

21, 2004 that [t he proc ess s erve r] was at my office attempting se rvice of proc ess. B ut, it i s p o s s i ble that I was e ither in a me e ti n g o r o n th e te le p h o n e an d h a d in s tr u c te d my s ta f

f n o t to d is tu

r b or interr

upt me. My office
. . . is lo c a te d in a b u il d in g w h ic h Is h ar e w it h anI H O P f

r an c h is ee restaur ant. I n the past, we have had problems with cer tified mail being acc epted a nd signe d for by

restaur ant employ ees a

nd then misplaced or

mishandled and not being passed on to the proper recipient. As a result, it has become necessar y to instruct the4

restaur ant ca shiers and wait staff not to acc ept certified mail on beha lf of Katin Corp. When we re ceive notice t h at t h er e is cer tified mail for Katin Corp. or the other corpor ations for whic h I am the reg istered ag ent, I g o to our Post Office to sig n for and re tr ie ve our c e rt if

ie d ma il. I did no t c on sc iou sly dis re g ard or int e nti on a lly

re fu se rec eipt of ce rtified mail from a proce ss server

of the Te x as Secr eta ry

of State. I f I had re ceive d notice that there was certified mail for Katin Corp. at the time servic e wa s b e inga tte mpt e d b y

c e rt if ie d ma il i n th is c a se , I wou ld have se nt s ome on e to retrie ve the mail fr om the Post Office. . . .
Th e tr ia l c ourt

de nie d K a tin ’s mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l, a

nd Katin fi le d it s n oti c e of

a pp e a l.
DI SCU SSIO N On appe al, Katin ar g ues that the trial court err ed in de ny ing its motion for ne w trial and that the default judg ment order should be reve rsed, c iting to Cra dd oc k v . S un sh ineBu s Lin es, Inc. , 133 S.W .2d 124 (Tex. 1939). Katin asse rts that any ref usal of ser

vice was not intentional or the re su lt o f c on sc iou s in dif fe re nc e . K a tin

a sse rt s th a t it

had no a c tua l kn ow le dg e of the laws uit befor e the e ntry

of the de fault judg ment, and, ther efor e, that it s failure to answe r was not intentional or t he result of conscious indiffer ence . See id. at 126. Katin fur ther c laims that it has a meritorious defe nse bec ause it neither employ ed L oesch nor

owned or

controlled the pr em i s es wh er e she was injured. See id. Fi n al l y , Ka t in asserts that, bec ause it off ere d to reimburse L oesch’ s costs of obtaining a

defa u l t judgment, she would suffe r no dela y or pre judice by the cour t’s g ranting the motion for new tria l. See id. Acc ording ly , Katin asser ts, i t h as satis fied the e lements of the Craddock test and is entitled to a new tr ial. We reviewa trial court’s decision on a motion for new tria l for an a

buse of discr etion. Se e Strac k

be in v . P re witt , 671 S.W .2d 37, 38 (Tex. 1984)
. The test for an abuse of discre tion is not whether we be lieve the f

acts pre sent an a

ppropr i at e ca s e fo r the trial c ourt’s dec ision, but ratherThe re cord shows that L oesch stric tly compl i ed wi t h t he rule s g overningservice of 1 proce ss. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 16 (proc essor must e ndorse citation, descr ibe manner of ser vice, a nd g ive tim e and

pla c e se rv e d) , 9 9 ( re qu ir e me nts of c itatio n) , 1 05 (p e rs on

re c e ivi ngpro c e ss m

us t endorse and g ive time of receipt), 106(a)( 2) (allowing service by reg istered or

cer tified mail), 107 (g ov e rn ingre tur

n o f s e rv ic e ); see also G.F.S. Ve ntures , In c . v . H arris , 934 S
. W
. 2d 813, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t D ist.] 1996, no writ) (strict compliance must a ppear on fac e of r ecor d). 5 whether the trial cour

t’s ruling was arbitra

ry or unrea sonable. Cire v. Cummings , 134 S.W .3d 835, 838-39 (Te x . 2004). Tria l courts d o not have “ unbridled discre tion to decide ca ses as they might deem pr oper, w ith o ut refe renc e to any g uiding r ule or princ iple.” Craddock , 133 S.W .2d at 126. Th e de fa ult ing pa rt y mus t pro ve that its fa ilure to a pp e ar w a s n ot n e g lig e nt, int e nti on a l, o r t he re su lt of consc ious indiffere nce. Atay a v . S tat e , No. 14-05-01264- CV, 2007 Tex. App. L EXI S 895, at *10 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] F e b. 8, 20 07 , p e t. den ied ) (me m. o p. ); see Estate of Pollack v. Mc Murrey , 8 58 S.W. 2d

38 8, 39 1 ( Te x. 19 93 ); W

ard v. Nava , 488 S.W .2d 736, 738 (Tex. 1972). “Conscious indiffer ence means failing to take some a ction which would see m indicated to a pe rson of re asonable sensibiliti es under simil ar ci rc u m s t an ces.” State v. Sledge , 982 S.W .2d 911, 914 (Tex
. App .—Ho us ton

[14t h D ist .] 19 98 , n o p e t.) ; se e Pa dr ino Ma rit im e, I nc . v . R izo , 130 S.W .3d 243, 248 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.).

After two unsucce ssful attempts to serve c itation, L oesch se rved K atin with citation purs ua nt to the B us ine ss Cor

po ratio n A c t. See Te x. B us . Cor p. Ac t A nn . a

rt . 2 .1 1. Un de r t

he Ac t, 1 if a c orporation’s reg istered a g ent ca nno t “ with rea sonable dilig ence be found at the reg istered of fice , the n the S ecr e tary

of State sh a ll b e an a g e nt o f s uc h c or po ratio n u

po n w ho m any

su c h p ro c e ss, notice, or de mand may

be ser ved.” Id . art. 2.11, § B . Once proce ss is served on the S ec re tary of State, he is statutorily

require d to i m m ediately forwa rd the doc uments by

reg istered mail to theKatin notes that the Sec reta ry of State’ s certificate did not attac h a copy of the re turned 2 envelope or certified mail car d. Howeve r, “[c]ertificates issued by the Secr etar

y of State ar e re ceive d in all courts as prima f

acie evidenc e of the fac ts recited the rein.” G.F.S. Venture s , 9 3 4 S. W. 2 d

at 817. Katin did not present e vidence rebutting that the delivery attempt was re turned with a “ ref used” notation. 6 corpor ation at its re g istered office
. Id
. “When substituted service on a statutory ag ent is allowed, the desig nee is not an a g ent for se rving but for re c e iv ing pr oc ess on the de fe nd an t’s b e ha lf

.” Campus Invs., Inc . v. Culleve r , 1 44 S.W. 3d 46 4, 46 6 ( Te x. 20 04 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d)
. A c e rt if ic a te from the Secreta

ry of State “ conclusive ly establishes that proce ss w as serve d,” that ther e has be en proper citation and ser

vice. Id . Katin doe s n o t at t ack the Secre tary ’s ce rtificate or ar g ue that the Se c re tary fa ile d in his statut or

y du tie s re g ard ingthe ha

nd lin g of L oe sc h’ s p e tit ion

up on re c e ipt , see

2 Te x. B us . Cor

p. Ac t Ann . ar

t. 2.1 1, §§ B , C, nor

do e s K a tin

argue tha t L oe sc h d id n ot u se re a so na ble diligenc e bef

ore turning to substitut ed service through the Secre tary of State. See I

ngram Indus., Inc

. v. U.S. Bolt Mfg., Inc

. , 121 S.W .3d 31, 34-35 (Te x . App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

T h u s, althoug h it never r ece ived the petition, Katin was se rved w ith citation. See Te x. B us . Co rp . A c t A nn . a rt . 2 .1 1, § B ; Cam

pu s Inv s. , 144 S.W .3d at 466, BLS Li mousine Serv ., Inc. v. Buslease

, Inc. , 680 S.W .2d 543, 546 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, wr it n.r.e.) ( “[a]lt houg h the
c itatio ns we re re tur

ne d to the Se c re tary

be ari ngthe no ta tio n ‘refused ,’ a pp e lla nts we re se rv e d in
acc ordanc e with the re quirements” of article 2.11’s pre dece ssor). The ref ore, the defa

ult judgment will s ta n d u n le s s K a ti n c an s h o w th a t it s f a il u r e to an s w e r w a s u n in te n ti o n a l an d n o t th e r e s u lt of conscious indiffe renc e, but due to mistake or a ccide nt; set out a meritorious defe nse; and show that
s ett ing a side the def

ault would not cause delay or otherw ise injure L oesch. See Craddock , 13 3 S.W.2 d at 1 26 ; see also Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Dre wery Constr. Co. , 186 S.W .3d 571, 574-Director, St. Employe es W orkers’ Comp. Div. v. Ev ans , 889 S.W .2d 266, 270 (Tex. 1994) 3 (whe ther de fenda

nt set up meritorious defe nse is deter mined by fac ts alleg ed in def

endant’ s motion and a ff ida vit s, “ re g ard le ss o f w he the r t ho se fa c ts a

re c on tr ov e rt e d” ); Iv

yv . Ca rre ll , 407 S.W .2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966) (if de fenda nt alleg es fa cts that would constitute defe ns e t o plaintiff’s cla ims and supports alleg ation with a ffidavit or other evidenc e, “it is improper to try the def ensive issues made by the motion or the pleading s” and tria l court should not consider any controve rting aff idavits or te sti mony of fe re d b y pla int if f) ; se e Strac k

be in v . P re witt , 6 71 S.W. 2d 37 , 3 8- 39 (T e x. 19 84 ) ( if movant’s af

fidavit is not controve rted, c onscious indiffer ence is determined “ in the same manne r as a c la im of me ri tor iou s def

e ns e ,” me anin g “ [i]t is su ff ic ie nt t hat th e mov ant’ s mo tio n a nd a ff ida vit s set forth fa cts which, if true , would neg ate intentional or c onsciously indiffer ent conduc t”). 7 75 (Tex. 2006) (ap p l y i n g Craddock wh e re re g ist e re d a g e nt r e c e ive d c itatio n b ut f a ile d to forwa rd it to party

). Katin asser

ts that it di d not own the re stau ra n t at wh i ch L oesch w orked, the reby descr ibing a

meritorious defe nse, and it has offer ed to pay L oesch’ s expenses, thus setting aside the judgme nt arguably

would not harm L oesch othe r than de laying he r possible rec overy . See Craddock , 133 S.W .2d at 126. Thus, the only question is whe ther Katin showed that its fa ilure to a nswer w as not intentional or the result of c onscious indiffer ence , but rathe r due to mi stake or a ccide nt. Se e id
. Katin asser

ts that be cause L oesch did not reque st a n evidentiar

y hear ing, A dler’s a ffidavit must be taken a s true and ne g ates a ny conscious indiffe renc e or intentional e vasion of ser vice. I f a pla intiff does not controve rt the def endant’ s aff

idavit in support of its motion for new tria l, the trial court should ac cept a ll as true the af fi d avit’s fa ctual asse rtions reg ardingthe elements of the Craddock test. See D irector, St. Employe es W orkers’ Comp. D iv. v. Ev ans , 889 S.W. 2d 26 6, 26 9 ( Te x. 19 94 ); se e als o S tra c k be in , 671 S.W. 2d

a t 38 (“ Whe re fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns in
a mov a nt’ s a ff ida vit are no t c on tr ov e rt e d, a c on sc iou s ind if fe re nc e qu e sti on mus t be de te rm ine d in the same ma

nner a s a cla im of meritorious defe nse.”) . Fur ther, e ven if the pla intiff controve rts the de fe nd ant’ s a ff

ida vit , th e tr ia l c ourt

sh ou ld a c c e pt a s tr

ue the de fe nd ant’ s fa c tua l ass e rt ion s abo ut i ts meritorious defe nse. Evans , 8 89 S.W. 2d a t 27 0; Iv yv . Ca rre ll , 407 S.W .2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966). 38

Ho we ve r, the c ourt

is no t bo un d to a c c e pt t

he de fe nd ant’ s controve rted asser tions related to ac cident or mistake and ma

y decide the issue base d on the evidenc e in the re cord be fore the cour t. See W alker v. Gutierrez , 111 S.W .3d 56, 64 (Tex. 2003) (“I f the fac tual asser tions in the claimant’s testimony
are not controver

ted by the opposing party , the claimant satisfies his or her bur den if the te stimony
se ts f or th f a c ts that, i f t

ru e , n egate in te nti on a l or c on sc iou sly

ind if fe re nt c on du c t by

the c la ima

nt. I n d e te rm ining if the c la ima nt’ s f a c tua l a sse rt ion s a

re c on tr ov e rt e d, we loo k to a ll the e vid e nc e in the re c or d. ” (c itatio ns omi tte d) ); see also Ev ans , 889 S.W .2d at 269 (“ I f the fa ctual asse rtions in the de fe nd ant’ s a ff

ida vit are no t c on tr ov e rt e d b y

the pla int if

f, the de fe nd ant s a tis fi e s h is b ur de n if his aff idavit sets forth fa cts that, if true, ne g ate intentiona l o r co n s ci ously indiffer ent conduc t by

the de fe nd ant. I n d e te rm ini ngif the de fe nd ant’ s f

a c tua l a sse rt ion s are c on tr ov e rt e d, the c ourt loo ks to
a ll the e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d. ” (c itatio ns omi tte d) ); Ataya , 2007 Tex. App. L EXI S 895, at *11-13 (def endants a rg ued that trial c ou rt erred in basing fac t finding on a ffidavits, without hear ing t e s t i m o n y; c o u rth e l d

t h a t b e c a u s e h e ar i n g w a s h e l d

an d p art i e s h a d

o p p o rtu n i t y t o p r e s e n tt e s t i m o n y, court did not abuse its discre tion by basing its ruling on af

fidavit evidenc e bef

ore it). To su pp or t its c on te nti on

tha t A dle r’ s a ff

ida vit mus t be take n a s tr

ue , K a tin c ite s to Smith v. Holmes , 53 S.W .3d 815 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, n o p et
. ), and Ave ritt v. Bruton Paint & Floor Co. , 773 S.W .2d 574 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 1989, no writ). Havingcar efully revie wed thi s li ne of

c a se s, we be lie ve the y

are c on sis te nt w ithour a ff ir manc e of the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt. I n consideringwhether

the def endant’ s motion for new trial s et u p a mer itorious defe nse, the Av e rit t court stated that “[o] n a motion for new trial, the trial cour

t is bound to acce pt as true the aff

idavits of the movant, unless t h e o pponent re quests an evide ntiary hear ing.” 773 S.W .2d at 576. The court noted t hat, wit h reg ard to the defendant’s assertion of fa cts showing an excuse for

his failure to a

ppear , t h e “unc ontroverte d alleg ation” showe d that the def endant9

neg ated intentionally or consciously indiffer ent conduc t. Id . I n Sm ith , this Court cited Av e rit t for the proposition that the trial court mu s t ac ce p t a movant’s af fidavits as true unle ss the opponent reque sts an evidentiar

y hear ing. 53 S.W .3d at 818. We he ld that a lthough the plaintiffs showed that notice of the t r ia l s e tt in g w a s d e li v e r e d to th e p r is o nw h e r e Sm it h w a s in c ar c e r a te d , th e y

“ d id n ot introduce a

ny other e vidence to show th at ” notice wa s delivere d, and Smith’s uncontroverte d aff idavit established that he ne ver a ctually rec eived the notice
. Id
. To support its h o lding that the tr ial court must acc ept a movant’ s aff idavit as true unless the opponent re quests an evide ntiary hear ing, the Av e rit t court c ited Healy v . W ick Building Systems, I nc. , 560 S.W .2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1977, writ ref ’d n.r.e .), and Dallas Heating Co. v. Pardee , 561 S.W .2d 16 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1977, writ ref ’d n.r.e.)
. 773 S.W .2d at 576. I n Healy , th e c o u rt c o n s id e r e d c o mp e ti n g a f

f id a v it s o nth e is s u e o f

c o n s c io u s in d if

f e r e n c e. 560 S.W .2d at 721 (op. on re h’g ). The Healy court stated that althoug h a trial c ourt may not consider contra ry evidenc e in deter

mining whe ther the de fenda nt set up a meritorious def ense, a trial court may deter mine disputed fac t issues with r espec t to conscious indiffer ence if it he ars e vidence
. Id
. B e c a us e the de fe nd ants ’ a lle g a tio ns of a c c ide nt o r mis take we re dis pu te d b y the pla int if

f’ s a ff ida vit but no evidentiary

hear ing w as re quested or he ld, the court he ld that “under these circ umstances,
. . . a cour t cannot make findi ng s of fact s olely from the rec ord on file wit hout hear ing evidence and . . . is bound to acce pt as true the aff idavits of the movant unless his opponent re quests an evide ntiary h ea ri n g, ” c i t i n g Pardee as support. Id
.

Pardee , howeve r, i s not so broad in its statement of the l aw. I nstead, the Pardee court stated:10

We rec og nize that the t rial cour t filed numerous finding s of fa ct in this case, a nd that these finding s have be en re l i ed u pon to support, among other a rg uments, Pardee ’s contention re g ardingDallas Heating ’s conscious indiffer ence . Howeve r, we cannot consider the se finding s beca use t h e re citals in Dallas He ating ’s af fidavit wer e not controve rted by Pardee
. No fact issue was drawn reg arding the allegations and in t he absenc e of disputed f

acts, finding s of fa ct are u n au thorized. I n such a c ase, the conscious indiffe renc e question must be determined in the same manner as the issue of me ri tor iou s d e fe ns e , a

nd it i s su ff ic ie nt t hat th e mot ion

and a ff ida vit se t f or th f a c ts wh ic h, if tr ue , w ou ld n e g a te int e nti on a l or c on sc iou sly

ind if fe re nt c on du c t.
56 1 S. W.2 d at 19 -2 0 ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see also Cragin v. He nderson County Oil Dev . Co. , 280 S.W . 554, 555-56 (Te x . 1926) (alleg ations of meritorious def ense taken as true , but alleg ations of excuse for

failure to appea

r may be contr overte d and dete rmined by trial court)
. Fur ther, the supr eme c ourt has held that a trial court may deter

mine controve rted fa ct is s u es b as ed on all the evidenc e conta ined in the re cord. See W alker , 1 11 S.W. 3d

a t 64 ; Evans , 889 S.W .2d at 269. Thus, controve rted assertions relate d to a def endant’ s excuse for its defa ult need not be taken a s true, eve n if the plaintiff doe s not request a n evidentiar

y hear ing. O nly

when f actua l
a lle g a tio ns of

e xcu se are no t con tr ov e rt e d by the pla int if f may a tr ia l court de te rm ine the iss ue “ in the same ma

nner a s the issue of mer itorious defense .” Pardee , 561 S.W .2d at 20. Katin filed its motion for new tria l, along with Adler’s a ffid av i t
. L o esch filed a response , including a ffidavits a n d o th e r evide nce, a sserting that Katin had e vaded se rvice by ref using the cer tified mail a

nd ref using to spe ak to the proce ss se rver when he ca lled on Adler. The trial court the n h e ld a he ari ng a t whic h att or ne y s for bo th part ie s p re se nte d a rgume nts ba se d o n th e a ff ida vit s but neither pa

rty called a ny witnesses. We hold that L oesch’ s failure to expl icitly reque st an evidentiar y hear ing did not re quire the tria l court to take a s true Katin’s controver ted statements of fac t reg ardingacc ident or mistake. See A taya , 2007 Tex. App. L EXI S 895, at *12. The trial c ourt11

was e ntitled to consider L oesch’ s evidenc e re lated to Katin’s f actua l alleg ations of mistake or
acc ident, as we ll as any

conflicting infere nces th at ar o s e from Adler’s af fidavit. Se e Av e rit t , 773 S.W .2d at 576-77 (K inkeade , J ., d i s senting ) (“ Even whe n an af fidavit is taken as true , the aff idavit may

permit conflictinginfere nces.” ). Adler a verr ed that Katin had in the past had trouble re ceivingmail due to confusion at the nea rby restaur ant, g oing so f

ar a s to instruct employ ees “ not to acce pt cer tified mail” for

Katin. Despite that history , Katin continued to use that office for its reg istered a g ent, who has a statutory duty to a cce pt service of proc ess, and Adle r did not descr ibe a r eliable pr ocess that wa s put into pl ace t o en s u re t h at h e w o u l d

re ce i v e n o t i ce o f d el i v ery at t em p t s . He av erre d

t h at h e h adn o kn o wl ed ge of any ref usal, but admitted that he mi gh t have told his staff not to disturb him and did not aver that he inv e sti g a te d a

nd le arn e d th a t no on e in his of fi c e re fu se d any ma il or sa id that he “ wo uld no t c ome
ou t to a c c e pt t

he pr oc e ss. ” I n othe r wo rd s, be y on d s ta tin gthat he did no t pe rs on a lly

te ll a ny on e to “re fuse” service and that he did not know of the attempts to serve K atin, Adler did not explain why
cer tified mail addre ssed to Katin was twic e re tu rn ed as “R ef used” or why one proc ess serve r wa s to ld th a t A d le r w o u ld n o t a c c e p t s e r v ic e . A d le r , a s K a ti n ’ s a g e n t f o r s e r v ic e , w a s r e s p o n s ib le for what happ e n e d in h is o f

f ic e , f o r w h a t p r o c e s s s e r

v e r s w e r e to ld , an d f

o r e n s u r in g th a t n otice of
cer tified mail would make its way to him. Con sc iou s in dif

fe re nc e is t

he fa ilure to a c t in

a wa y that a re a so na ble pe rs on

wo uld act unde r similar circ umstances. Sledge , 9 82 S.W. 2d a t 91 4. A r e g ist e re d a g e nt i s r e qu ir e d to “ac cept se rvice of process and otherwise perfor m the functions of a

reg istered a g ent” dur ing nor mal12

business hours. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. a rt. 2.09(A) (2) ( West S upp. 2006). De spite Adler’ s disavowal of a

ny knowledg e of r efusa l, the Secre tary of State’s c ertificate and a n aff idavit by one of the fir st two process se rver s stated t hat certified mail to Katin was returne d “re fused,” the other proce ss server

aver red that Adler seeme d to be “avoiding ” service , and Adler a cknowledg ed having dif fi c ult y re c e ivi ngc e rt if

ie d ma il i n th e pa st. Th e S ecret ary of State ’s c e rt if

ic a te is “ pr ima

fa c ie evidenc e of the fac ts recited the rein,” G

. F

. S

. V e n t u r es , I n c . v . H a r ris , 9 3 4 S.W .2d 813, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist
. ] 1 9 9 6, no writ), and thus is prima fa cie e vidence that the United States Postal S ervic e re turned the c ertified mail with a “r efuse d” notation. This is supported by the proce ss server ’s af

fi d av i t stating that his attempt at service throug h cer tified mail was re turned “re fused.” Katin has not cited a nd we have not found a

ny case s where a def

ault judgme nt was set
as i d e after se rvice has bee n ref used, as oppose d to “unclaimed” or re turned for lack of a forwa rding addre ss. “Conflicting infere nces” may be draw n from Adler’ s aff idavit, a nd the trial court’ s int e rp re ta tio n o f t

he a ffida vit in v ie w o f L oe sc h’ s e vid e nc e is n ot c on tr ary to t he on ly pe rm iss ibl e view of the evidenc e. See In re Barber , 982 S.W. 2d 36 4, 36 6 (T e x. 19 98 ) (tri a l c ourt do e s n ot a

bu se its discretion if it bases its decision on conflicting evidenc e and some evidenc e supports dec ision, but it d o e s a

b u s e it s d is c r e ti o nif

it s d e c is io nis “ c o n tr ar

y to th e o n ly

p e r mi s s ib le v ie w o f

the evidenc e”)
. We c annot hold that the trial court’ s resolution of the evide ntiary conflicts or de nial of Katin ’s mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l w a s an a

bu se of dis c re tio n. We o ve rr

ule Katin ’s so le iss ue on

a pp e a l.13 CO NC LU SION Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d K a tin ’s so le iss ue on a pp e a l, we a ff

ir m the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton and B . A. Smith* Affir med on Motion for Rehea ring Filed: August 10, 2007

* Be fore Be a Ann Smith, J ustice (r etired) , Third Court o f Ap p ea l s , s i t t ing by assig nment. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.003(b) ( West 1998).