1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TAYLOR LAMBERT Plaintiff,

v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF BRICKLAYERS AND ALLIED CRAFTWORKERS, Defendant. Civil Action No. 2 3

- 309 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION (July 18 , 2023) Plaintiff Taylor Lambert (“Lambert” or “Plaintiff”) brought an action in the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia against Defendant International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers (“BAC” or “Defendant”), alleging that Defendant violated Ti tle VII and
“other C ivil R ights A cts.” See generally Compl. Defendant removed this action from D.C. Superior Court to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction. Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s [10] Motion to Reman d , in which Plain tiff argues that Defendant’s removal was improper for three reasons: first, that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction ; second, that
Defendant’s notice of removal was not timely ; and third, that Defendant “partook in gamesmanship” by removing the ca se before being served. See Pl.’s Mot. at 1

– 4. Upon
consideration of the briefing , 1 the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court
shall DENY Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.

1 The Court ’s consideration has focused on the following documents :
• Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1

- 1 (“Compl.”);

• Defendant’s Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 (“Notice of Removal”);

• Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 10 (“ Pl.’s Mot. ”);

• Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Remand, ECF No. 11 (“ Def. ’s Opp’n ”);

• Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Opposition to Remand, ECF No. 12 (“ Pl.’s Reply ”).2 I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Taylor Lambert , who is proceeding pro se , worked for Defendant until October
2021 . Notice of Removal ¶ 2. Defendant suggests that Plaintiff resigned after indicating that she
would not comply with Defendant’s COVID

- 19 v accination p olicy. Id

. Contrarily, P laintiff

co ntends that she did not resign and was merely informing Defendant of her vaccination status.
See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 5. In response to these events, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in D.C. Superior Court on December 13, 2022, alleging that Defendant violated Title VII and “other Civil Rights Acts .” Compl

. ¶ 3. On February 3, 2023, Defendant removed the C omplaint to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). See Notice of Removal at 2. Defendant then filed a [7] Motion to Dismiss on February 21, 2 023, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See generally ECF
No. 7. On March 6, 2023, prior to the deadline to respond to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion to Remand

. The Court then vacated the briefing schedule and held in abeyance the Motion to Dismiss pending the resolution of Plaintiff ’ s Motion to Remand.
See Minute Order, Mar. 8, 2023. Plaintiff ’ s Motion to Remand is now fully briefed and ripe for
resolution.
II. LEGAL STANDARD “Only state

- court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)

. Upon filing a notice of removal, the defendant “bears the burden of prov ing that jurisdiction exists in federal court.” Downey v. Ambassador Dev., LLC , 568 F. Supp. 2d 28, 30

In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argum ent in this action would not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).3

(D.D.C. 2008) (JDB). Similarly, “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks to have a case that has been removed to federal court remanded back to state court, the party opposing a motion to remand bears the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists in federal court.” Mizell v. SunTrust
Bank , 26 F. Supp. 3d 80, 84 (D.D.C. 2014) (KBJ) (quotation omitted). Courts in this jurisdiction “construe[] removal jurisdiction strictly, favoring remand where the propriety of removal is
unclear.” Ballard v. D.C. , 813 F. Supp. 2d 34, 38 (D.D.C. 2011)

. III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s removal was improper for three reasons: first, that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction ; second, that Defendant’s notice of removal was not timely ; and third, that Defendant “partook in gamesmanship” by removing the case before being
served. See Pl.’s Mot. at 1

– 4 . The Court now addresses thes e arguments in turn

. A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 , a defendant may properly remove a civil action filed in state court to a federal district court that has original subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Accordingly, a defendant in a state court action may remove a case on the basis of the
federal court ’ s diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (providing for original subject matter jurisdiction over cases between citizens of different states, where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000), or because the case raises a cognizable question of federal law,

see id. § 1331 (providing for original subject matter jurisdiction over “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States ”), among other bases.
Here , Plaintiff argues that the case was improperly removed to federal court

–– and, therefore, should be remanded to D.C. Superior Court

–– because both parties are domiciled in the
District of Columbia and therefore there is no diversity jurisdiction

. Pl.’s Mot. at 1. However,4

Defendant removed Plaintiff’s action based on federal question jurisdiction, not diversity jurisdiction

. See Def.’s Opp’n at 5; see also Notice of Removal ¶ 3. “The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well

pleaded complaint rule,’” Caterpillar , 482 U.S. at 392 , which provides that “a suit ‘arises under’ federal law ‘only when the plaintiff ’ s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law],’” Vaden v. Discover Bank , 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (quoting Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley , 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) ). In the instant case, a federal question clearly appears on the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint : Pl aintiff asserts a federal cause of action when she argues that Defendant has “vehemently violated Title VII , ” a federal statute. See Compl. ¶ 3. Therefore, Defendant’s removal of the case to federal court pursuant to federal question jurisdiction was unquestionably proper. Plaintiff also raises violations of “other Civil Rights Acts” in her Complaint. See Compl. ¶ 3. To the extent this was intended to refer to state law claims, including perhaps the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, as Defendant suggests, see Def.’s Opp’n at 3, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367

. In certain circumstances where “a federal court has an independent basis for exercising federal jurisdiction,” it may also exercise

“ supplemental jurisdiction over related claims under state law.” Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep ’ t of Corr. v. District of Columbia , 93 F.3d 910, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

. First, the court must
determine “whether the state and the federal claims ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact.’” Id. (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) ) ; see also Lindsay v. Gov ’

t Employees Ins. Co. , 448 F.3d 416, 423

– 24 (D.C. Cir. 2006) . If so, the court then has the power under Article III of the Constitution to hear the state claims, Women Prisoners , 93 F.3d at 920; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) ; if the claims do not derive from a common nucleus of5

operative fact, the court cannot exer cise supplemental jurisdiction and the state claims must be dismissed, Wisey’s #1 LLC v. Nimelli s Pizzeria LLC , 952 F. Supp. 2d 184, 188 (D.D.C. 2013) (JDB)

. Next, even if the court has the power to adjudicate the state law claims, it must consider certain bases for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as enumerated by
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (b) and (c)

. See Lindsay , 448 F.3d at 421.
Plaintiff’s Title VI I claim and state law claims under “other Civil Rights Acts , ” if they are to be construed as such, derive from a common nucleus of operative fact : the controversy surrounding the end of Plaintiff’s employment relating to Defendant’s COVID

- 19 v accination

p olicy. See Compl. ¶ 3; Pl.’s Mot. ¶ 3. None of the factors that may lead courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction are present. Therefore, at this time and on the present record,
the Court chooses to a ssert supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that Plaintiff intended to plead , although they were not expressly articulated as such.
B. Timeliness of Filing Next, Plaintiff argues that Defendant filed its Notice of Removal after the deadline to do so had passed

. Pl.’s Mot. ¶ 2. Pursuant to statute , a d efendant has thirty days after receipt of the initial pleading , through service or otherwise, to file a noti ce of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)

. Here, Defendant filed its Notice of Removal on February 3, 2023 . Therefore, t o be timely filed,
Defendant must have received a copy of the C omplaint no earlier than January 4, 2023

. Defendant contends that it first obtained a copy of the Complaint on January 4, 2023 , see
N otice of Removal ¶ 1 , which it supports through sworn declarations from both its outside
counsel of record and General Counsel, see ECF No. 11

- 1 (“Kekacs Decl.”); ECF No. 11

- 2 (“O’Connor Decl.”). On December 28, 2022, Defendant received in the mail a Notice of Remote Initial Scheduling Conference in D.C. Superior Court for the case brought by Plaintiff Lambert

.6

Kekacs Decl. ¶ 3 ; O’Connor Decl. ¶ 2

. Defe ndant states that at that time, they had not yet been served with or otherwise received the Complaint. O’Connor Decl. ¶ 3. On January 3, 2023, Defendant’s General Counsel reached out to its outside counsel of record, Bredhoff & Kaiser P.L.L.C., with this information. Kekacs Decl. ¶ 2; O’Connor Decl. ¶ 4. The following day, January 4, 2023, a paralegal at Bredhoff & Kaiser contacted the office of the Clerk at D.C. Superior Court and requested a copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Kekacs Decl. ¶ 4. A deputy clerk emailed a copy of the Complaint to the paralegal that same day. Id. ; Kekacs Decl. at 7 (email from clerk to paralegal sent on January 4, 2023, with subject line including case number and text “eCopy of Complaint”) ; see also O’Connor Decl. ¶ 5.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant obtained a copy of the Complaint prior to January 4, 2023. Pl.’s Mot. ¶ 2. To support this, she points to Defendant’s Notice of Removal, in which Defendant attached said “Notice of Remote Initial Scheduling Conference” that was stamped with
“Received Dec 28 2022”. See id. ; Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 2 at 12. Defendant admits that they received the Notice of Remote Initial Scheduling Conference on December 28, 2022, as discussed previously, and , furthermore, this does nothing to support Plaintiff’s assertion that De fendant
received the Complaint at that time or any time before January 4, 2023. Plaintiff ’s only other
argument is that she claims in her reply brief that “Defendant has a long

- standing history of manipulating facts, events and even dates.” Pl.’s Reply at 2

– 3 (citing ECF No. 12

- 1 (“Lindsay Decl.”) ¶¶ 7

– 8 (declaration from an ex

- employee of International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers suggesti ng that they had been “persuaded by” or “pressured by” their employer “to falsify” certain information))

. This does not do anything to confirm, let alone suggest, that Defendant received the Complaint prior to January 4, 2023. Accordingly, w ithout more co ncrete evidence to support Plaintiff’s position that7

Defendant received the Complaint prior to January 4, 2023 , this Court finds that Defendant timely filed its notice of removal.
C. Improper Procedure Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendant engaged in impro per “gamesmanship” by removing the action to federal court prior to service of the Complaint. Pl.’s Mot. at 4. Case law is clear that “[f] ederal courts have held that formal service is not required before removing a case.” See Middlebrooks v. Godwin Corp., 279 F.R.D. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2011) (BAH) (collecting cases). One exception is the forum defendant rule , under which “[a] civil
action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U. S.C. § 1441(b)(2)

. That rule is not applicable here, where the case was properly removed based on federal question jurisdiction

. See Notice of Removal ¶ 3. T he Court therefore finds that Defendant’s removal of the action prior to service of the C omplain t was not improper.
IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s [ 10 ] Motion to Remand. An appropriate O rder accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

/s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR

- KOTELLY United States District Judge