In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-2638

MIREILLE TCHEMKOU,

Petitioner,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES,

Respondent.

____________

Petition for Review of an Order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals

No. A79 573 118

____________

ARGUED JUNE 4, 2007—DECIDED JULY 31, 2007

____________

Before RIPPLE, ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Mireille Tchemkou, a native and

citizen of Cameroon, arrived in the United States on a

visitor’s visa and timely applied for asylum. An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied her request, and the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed that denial. Ms.

Tchemkou timely petitioned for review in this court. We

now grant the petition.
2 No. 06-2638

I

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Ms. Tchemkou is a native of Cameroon and a member of

the ethnic minority Bamileke tribe. Her troubles with the

Cameroonian government began in 1993 during her

senior year in high school. At that time, she was involved

in the United Nations Education, Science and Culture

Organization (“UNESCO”) at Mbanga High School. In

April and May of 1993, the teachers at Mbanga High School

went on strike because they, unlike teachers in nonBamileke regions, had not been paid for several months.

Because of the teachers’ absence, the Mbanga students

were not able to prepare for a national examination required for admittance to Cameroon’s universities. Ms.

Tchemkou helped organize a protest to end the strike;

specifically, the students, together with parents and

teachers, planned to march from the high school to the

regional leader’s office.

On the day of the march, the police intercepted the

students. Their presence frightened away most of the

students with the exception of the six UNESCO board

members. The police confronted Ms. Tchemkou and,

according to Ms. Tchemkou’s testimony, stated:

Do you think that you can change the government, do

you think that these activities that you are, these

activities that you have will end up somewhere? You

should just shut up if you want to lead a quiet life

in this country. We do not want people like you creating chaos and giving us so much work. If you want

to stay alive you must keep away from these kind of

activities which you have now started.
No. 06-2638 3

1 During her stay in prison, she also contracted a chronic

fungal nail infection that still afflicts her today.

A.R.99. The police then began beating Ms. Tchemkou and

the other students with batons; Ms. Tchemkou was

struck in the jaw, loosening several teeth. The students

then were forced into a police truck and taken to the police

station where the beatings continued.

At the station, the police interrogated Ms. Tchemkou,

threatened her life and told her that they would teach her

a lesson for speaking out against the government. A.R.558.

The police detained Ms. Tchemkou in a cell with numerous

other prisoners. During her three-day incarceration, she

had nothing to eat or to drink, and the cell in which

she was placed did not have sanitation facilities. Because

the cell was crowded and did not contain any benches or

other furniture, Ms. Tchemkou was forced to stand

throughout the duration of her detention. Additionally,

because she was the only female in the cell, she was

forced to clean the male prisoners’ excrement off the floor.

Upon Ms. Tchemkou’s release, she required a two-week

hospital stay to recover from severe dehydration, fever,

stomach pain and other physical injuries.1

 After Ms.

Tchemkou’s hospitalization, her parents feared for her

safety and sent her to the neighboring country of Benin.

She stayed in Benin for two and one-half years. During

that time, she received psychological counseling to overcome depression. Ms. Tchemkou returned to Cameroon in

December 1996 against her parents’ wishes. Although she

returned, she kept to her parents’ home for another year.

In January 1998, Ms. Tchemkou began attending the

University of Dschang. There, she became friendly with
4 No. 06-2638

several members of the Social Democratic Front (“SDF”),

the primary political opposition organization in Cameroon.

Ms. Tchemkou learned that her uncle, an SDF official, was

hosting a party in a nearby town. Ms. Tchemkou traveled

to the party with several members of the SDF in a bus

decorated with SDF banners. On the return trip, the police

stopped the bus, demanded the students’ identity papers

and took down their names. The police asked Ms.

Tchemkou whether she had “come [to the university] to

study or do politics?” A.R.105.

In May 1998, Ms. Tchemkou learned that the university

was closing its psychology department. According to Ms.

Tchemkou, the government believed that the professors

and students in the department were sympathetic to

opposition groups. See A.R.108-09, 559. Ms. Tchemkou

met with other psychology students to discuss ways to

prevent the department’s closure. Shortly after the meeting

began, police, armed with guns and batons, raided the

meeting. They told the students to disband and to leave

any papers behind, including the attendance sheet the

students had signed.

Later that night, as Ms. Tchemkou prepared for bed,

she heard pounding and shouting at her apartment door.

When she answered, three men wearing Cameroonian

military uniforms forced their way into the apartment and

turned out the lights. They immediately started questioning Ms. Tchemkou. After Ms. Tchemkou identified herself

in response to their queries, “[t]hey said so yes indeed

you are the person we are looking for.” A.R.110. They

accused Ms. Tchemkou of being a “Bamileke” and “against

the government.” Id. Ms. Tchemkou then was gagged,

blindfolded, forced into the abductors’ car and driven

away from her apartment. After the car stopped, the
No. 06-2638 5

soldiers dragged her through a wooded area, beat her and

kicked her; as a result, she suffered scarring on her arms

and shins. One of her abductors tore part of Ms.

Tchemkou’s left ear and told her not to return to campus.

A.R.560. The soldiers then threw Ms. Tchemkou back in

the car where she fainted from pain.

When Ms. Tchemkou regained consciousness, she was

in a hospital where she remained for 24 days. During this

time she was treated for a serious cut to her left earlobe as

well as muscle aches. A.R.331. After her release, she

returned to her parents’ home and continued to receive

physical therapy and psychological treatment.

Ms. Tchemkou did not return to school for over a

year. In October 2000, she began attending the British

College of Professional Management in Douala. In January

2001, local police in Douala arrested nine males for allegedly stealing a neighbor’s cooking gas. It was feared that

the teens had been executed, and Ms. Tchemkou coordinated with several political groups to try to determine

what had happened to these young men. Together these

groups organized peaceful demonstrations to pressure the

government to disclose this information. The first demonstration was on March 4, 2001. When the protestors arrived,

security officers already were on the scene and began

attacking the crowd. Ms. Tchemkou suffered a baton

blow to the head as police dispersed the protestors.

A second protest was scheduled for March 11, 2001.

Again the police intervened, this time using tear gas and

using water canons laced with chemicals to disperse the

crowd. Police also beat the protestors with batons. Ms.

Tchemkou was knocked to the ground; she was kicked and

beaten with a baton on her back, elbows and shins. Ms.

Tchemkou saw that the police were arresting some of the
6 No. 06-2638

2 In addition to her oral testimony, Ms. Tchemkou provided the

IJ with documentation concerning her hospitalizations, her

recent health examinations and Cameroon’s poor human rights

record. The record also contains a letter from Ms. Tchemkou’s

uncle and SDF parliamentarian, Paul Tchatchouang, stating that,

because Ms. Tchemkou previously had opposed the Cameroonian government, she continued to face a serious risk of abuse

(continued...)

protestors and fled to a nearby church for sanctuary. The

pastor of the church, after hearing of the police tactics,

advised Ms. Tchemkou to stay at the church under his

protection to assure her safety. Ms. Tchemkou remained

at the church for two weeks while the pastor worked

with Ms. Tchemkou’s family to obtain an exit visa. The

pastor also arranged for financing for Ms. Tchemkou’s

airfare and used his status as a clergyman to escort her

through the airport without government involvement.

After Ms. Tchemkou arrived in the United States on April

9, 2001, the Cameroonian government issued two summonses for her to appear before the authorities.

B. Administrative Proceedings

A few months after Ms. Tchemkou had arrived in the

United States, she applied for asylum. The asylum officer

denied her request, and she was served with a notice to

appear.

Before the IJ, Ms. Tchemkou conceded deportability but

renewed her request for asylum, withholding of deportation and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). At the hearing, Ms. Tchemkou testified to the

above events.2

 The IJ found that Ms. Tchemkou was
No. 06-2638 7

2 (...continued)

and death should she return to Cameroon. He also noted that

many of the students with whom Ms. Tchemkou had associated

in the past had died after her departure and that the government of Cameroon would do its best to destroy anyone who had

opposed it. A.R.248-53.

3 The IJ’s characterization of the first incident was equally

benign: “One of the incidents occurred when the respondent

was very young and in the equivalent of high school. She had

to do some unpleasant duty cleaning toilets. However distasteful, I don’t think this constitutes persecution.” A.R.53.

4 The cases cited by the IJ as examples of this court’s jurisprudence on persecution were Asani v. INS, 154 F.3d 719 (7th Cir.

1998), Vaduva v. INS, 131 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 1997), and Dandan

v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2003). See A.R.52.

“genuinely credible,” A.R.55, but nevertheless determined

that Ms. Tchemkou had not established past persecution.

The IJ first stated that the mistreatment suffered by

Ms. Tchemkou in 1993, 1998 and 2001 “were disparate

offense[s] in which the most serious mistreatment that

she experienced was a cut to her earlobe.” A.R.53.3

 The

IJ continued:

I don’t think these are comparable to which the Seventh Circuit[4] has found past persecution. The incidents, although united by detention and beating in

two of the three cases, and by government security

forces either administering the beating or arresting the

respondent or pursuing her, do share that theme.

However, otherwise, they’re very different. Namely

they involve different places, respondent being involved in different activities. This is not a case for

example, where the respondent’s activity, the same
8 No. 06-2638

activity participated encounters with government

forces each time.

Id.

Additionally, the IJ determined that Ms. Tchemkou was

not likely to suffer persecution upon her return to Cameroon:

I think that, given the sporadic and varied nature of the

incidents separated one from another time and the

rather mild encounter that the respondent had, [in]

2001, which was the last incident and the incident on

which she claimed she based her decision to depart

Cameroon, I am just not convinced that there is an

objective basis for her fear of returning to that country

now. . . .

Id. at 55. Having determined that Ms. Tchemkou did not

meet her burden for asylum, the IJ also denied her withholding of removal. Finally, he did not “think that the

mistreatment that she suffered rises to the level [of]

torture,” and the type of treatment she endured did not

“portend[] future mistreatment [that] would meet the

definition of Section 1 of the Convention Against Torture.

Therefore, Torture Convention relief is denied.” Id. at 56.

The BIA affirmed. The Board stated that “we find the

record adequately supports the Immigration Judge’s

finding that the respondent’s ‘genuinely credible’ testimony failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded

fear or clear probability of future persecution or torture

in Cameroon.” A.R.2 (citing Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307,

313-14 (7th Cir. 2004)). The Board also noted that “the

record does not sufficiently show that the government

remains interested in the respondent. Despite having 6

police summons on record dating from November 2000,
No. 06-2638 9

the respondent was able to continue her education, and

obtain an exist [sic] visa and use her passport to leave

Cameroon without any problems.” Id.

Ms. Tchemkou timely petitioned for review of the BIA’s

decision.

II

ANALYSIS

A.

Ms. Tchemkou first maintains that the BIA erred when

it determined that she had not suffered past persecution.

Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision and also

supplements the IJ’s decision with its own reasoning, the

IJ’s decision, as supplemented, forms the basis for this

court’s review. See Gjerazi v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 800, 807 (7th

Cir. 2006). We review the agency’s legal analysis de novo.

See Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2003).

However, our review of the agency’s denial of asylum

is deferential: “[W]e require only that the decision be

supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative

evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Gjerazi, 435

F.3d at 807 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We shall reverse an agency’s determination only if

the record compels a contrary result. Bevc v. INS, 47 F.3d

907, 910 (7th Cir. 1995).

In the present case, we believe that the IJ and the BIA

committed legal error with respect to the standard applied to Ms. Tchemkou’s claim and also that the agency’s

factual conclusions find no support in the record. As noted

in our recitation of the standard of review, the agency is

obligated to consider the evidence of record “as a whole.”
10 No. 06-2638

Gjerazi, 435 F.3d at 807. This court, as well as other courts

of appeals, have cautioned IJs against viewing events in

the record “in isolation, rather than considering what kind

of patterns they composed,” Kantoni v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d

894, 898 (7th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases), and against

employing the “erroneous” “technique of addressing the

severity of each event in isolation, without considering its

cumulative significance,” Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d

70, 79 (2d Cir. 2005). Yet, compartmentalization of this

evidence is precisely the approach taken by the IJ. The IJ

viewed the incidents as “sporadic and varied [in] nature,”

as well as “separated one from another.” A.R.55.

The BIA did not correct this error in its opinion. However, perhaps wary of the approach taken by the IJ,

the Board notes that “[e]ven when analyzed in the aggregate . . . the incidents of which the respondent complained

do not reveal harm that rises to the level of persecution.”

A.R.2. The BIA relies on Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 313-14

(7th Cir. 2004), to support this conclusion. We disagree that

Liu provides any support for the conclusion that Ms.

Tchemkou has not suffered past persecution.

In Liu, the petitioner was detained for two days while the

police interrogated her about her sale of unauthorized

literature. The petitioner was not beaten, nor was she

deprived of food and water. However, on two occasions

during her detention, police pulled her hair in an effort to

make her confess to the crimes. One month after her

release, the police ransacked her home to teach her a

lesson. In reviewing these incidents, we stated:

Here, Mei Dan’s detainment was relatively short. As

physical brutality goes, hair-pulling and pushing rank

on the less serious end. The search and ransack was a

singular event and it is unclear if the officials caused
No. 06-2638 11

any serious, permanent damage to her home. Taken as

a whole, it was not improper for the BIA to determine

that these and the other incidents of which Mei Dan

complained are more akin to abusive or harassing

treatment than persecution.

Id. at 313.

The atrocities suffered by Ms. Tchemkou in Cameroon

bear no resemblance to the comparatively minor abuses

suffered by the petitioner in Liu. Unlike the petitioner in

Liu, Ms. Tchemkou was detained under terrible conditions:

She was deprived of food, water and sanitation facilities

and was forced to clean human waste off the floor of the

cell—a crowded cell in which she was the only woman.

Prior to her detention, she had been beaten by police, and,

after her release, she required two weeks of hospitalization to recover from the ordeal.

If this were the sum of the abuses suffered by Ms.

Tchemkou, it would be sufficient to establish past persecution; however, there is more. Ms. Tchemkou was interrogated by police and abducted from her apartment in 1998;

she was dragged through the woods, beaten, kicked and

had her earlobe severed. Her hospitalization following

this incident lasted twenty-four days. This ordeal was not

Ms. Tchemkou’s last run-in with Cameroonian police.

Following a peaceful demonstration in 2001, Ms. Tchemkou

again was beaten with a baton and chased away by police.

She was able to escape detention only by seeking sanctuary in a church.

This court has defined persecution as “ ‘punishment’ or

‘the infliction of harm’ which is administered on account

of . . . race, religion, nationality, group membership, or

political opinion . . . .” Asani v. INS, 154 F.3d 719, 723 (7th
12 No. 06-2638

5 In support of his determination that Ms. Tchemkou did not

suffer past persecution under this court’s case law, the IJ relied

(continued...)

Cir. 1998) (quoting Borca v. INS, 77 F.3d 210, 214 (7th Cir.

1996)). “Although the conduct in question need not necessarily threaten the petitioner’s ‘life or freedom,’ it must

rise above the level of mere ‘harassment’ to constitute

persecution.” Borca, 77 F.3d at 214 (citations omitted). The

record before us conclusively demonstrates that Ms.

Tchemkou suffered something much greater than mere

harassment at the hands of the Cameroonian government;

indeed, she endured serious bodily harm on two occasions,

she was threatened with additional retaliation, and she had

her freedom curtailed. These mirror the types of abuses

that we previously have held to constitute persecution. See,

e.g., Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 2007)

(reversing agency finding of no persecution where petitioner had been beaten, had his home invaded and had

been threatened, and noting that “[t]here is no requirement . . . that a person must endure repeated beatings

and physical torment in order to establish past persecution”); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 737 (7th Cir.

2005) (holding that imprisonment for two weeks, during

which time petitioner was beaten, denied adequate food

and water, and had salt rubbed in his wounds, constituted

past persecution); Vaduva v. INS, 131 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir.

1997) (noting that “the Board reasonably concluded

Vaduva . . . suffered at least one instance of political

persecution” when “he was beaten up (he was punched,

his face bruised, and his finger broken) by strangers who

told him to stay away from the pro-democratic forces in

the country”). Furthermore, neither the IJ, nor the BIA,

has come forward with any case suggesting the contrary.5
No. 06-2638 13

5 (...continued)

on three cases. In the first case, Asani v. INS, 154 F.3d 719, 723

(7th Cir. 1998), the petitioner was detained once for a two-week

period during which he was forced to remain in a standing

position; he also was deprived of sufficient food and water. On

another occasion, he was detained and beaten with a stick; the

beating resulted in the loss of two teeth. The BIA determined

that these incidents did not rise to the level of persecution. This

court remanded because it appeared that the BIA had required

a showing that the petitioner must have suffered “serious

injuries” before being eligible for asylum. In doing so, the

court reiterated the proper standard for determining persecution: “punishment or infliction of harm that rises above the level

of mere harassment.” Id. at 723 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Although the initial detention in Asani was longer than

that endured by Ms. Tchemkou, this court did not suggest in

Asani (or in any subsequent cases) that the abuses suffered by

Asani established the standard for determining whether an

individual had endured past persecution. Asani is simply an

example of a petitioner who met his burden.

The IJ also relied on Vaduva v. INS, 131 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 1997).

In Vaduva, the BIA had determined, and this court agreed, that

the petitioner’s experiences in Romania constituted past

persecution and rendered the petitioner presumptively eligible

for asylum. Specifically, the petitioner had been beaten twice,

the more serious of which resulted in bruises and a broken

finger. Nevertheless, the court determined that changed

conditions in Romania since the incidents rebutted the presumption. We fail to see how Vaduva supports the IJ’s conclusion that

Ms. Tchemkou did not meet her burden. The abuses suffered by

Ms. Tchemkou at least match those detailed by the petitioner in

Vaduva.

Finally, in Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2003), the

BIA had determined that the petitioner had not suffered past

(continued...)
14 No. 06-2638

5 (...continued)

persecution when, on one occasion, he was detained without

food for three days and was beaten, causing his face to become

swollen. This court held that the evidence did not compel a

contrary finding: “While it is distasteful to have to quantify

suffering for the purposes of determining asylum eligibility,

that is our task. A standard of review that requires our being

compelled to reach a conclusion contrary to the BIA means that

we necessarily search for specifics, not generalities,” id. at 574,

and Dandan had not provided the necessary specifics to compel

a result contrary to that reached by the BIA. However, the IJ

noted that the presentation of evidence by the petitioner in

Dandan differed materially from that of Ms. Tchemkou, who

provided the specifics that the petitioner in Dandan had not,

namely the way in which she was beaten, the injuries she had

suffered, the abhorrent circumstances of her confinement and

the length of her ensuing hospital stay.

The Government acknowledges that Ms. Tchemkou

suffered abuse, but argues that her experiences do not

constitute persecution for several reasons, none of which

we find persuasive. First, the Government maintains that

these incidents “were wholly unrelated and do not support any pattern of abuse targeting Ms. Tchemkou specifically.” Appellee’s Br. at 20. The Government provides no

support for the proposition that oppression needs to be

in response to the same issue in order to be considered in

the aggregate. Furthermore, the record does not support

a conclusion that Ms. Tchemkou was not targeted for

retaliation. Far from losing interest in Ms. Tchemkou’s

activities over time, the record reflects that Cameroonian

police consistently responded aggressively to Ms.

Tchemkou’s activities over an eight year period. As well,
No. 06-2638 15

the record establishes that, at least with respect to the 1998

incident, the police abducted and beat Ms. Tchemkou only

after confirming that “you are the person we are looking

for.” A.R.110.

Equally unconvincing is the Government’s contention

that Ms. Tchemkou did not suffer any harassment different

in kind from the general population of Cameroon. According to the Government, hers “were abuses of short

duration that were commonly experienced by the people of

Cameroon, a country that maintains a poor human rights

record. The evidence in the record shows only the existence

of general conditions of political conflict in Cameroon . . . .”

Appellee’s Br. at 21. Again, this assertion is belied by the

record. On three different occasions, Ms. Tchemkou was

singled out for abuse because of her political opposition to

government action. She did not suffer the general deprivations and danger of individuals living in a war-ridden

nation.

Finally, the Government argues that any abuse suffered

by Ms. Tchemkou cannot be considered persecution

because she was able to live without incident for several

years at a time and was able to pursue her education. The

record actually demonstrates the opposite. Ms. Tchemkou

became politically active in 1993. Her initial efforts on

behalf of striking teachers were met with violence, as was

every other effort of hers to speak out against government

oppression. The only time that Ms. Tchemkou did not

experience difficulties was when she spent several years in

exile in Benin and when she was confined to her parents’

house. When she did reappear and express opinions in

opposition to the government, she was severely punished.

The fact is that Ms. Tchemkou suffered two severe

beatings (and other less severe ones) after voicing opposi-
16 No. 06-2638

tion to government policies. One of those beatings (followed by three days of incarceration) resulted in her being

hospitalized for 14 days; another beating resulted in her

being hospitalized for 24 days. Both of these incidents

conclusively establish that Ms. Tchemkou has suffered

persecution as a result of her political opinion. She, therefore, is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that she will

suffer future persecution if returned to Cameroon, thus

meeting the eligibility requirements for asylum.

B.

Ms. Tchemkou also challenges the BIA’s and the IJ’s

conclusion that she has not demonstrated a well-founded

fear of future persecution if she is returned to Cameroon.

The burden is on Ms. Tchemkou to establish a “reasonable

possibility of future persecution,” Kllokoqi v. Gonzales, 439

F.3d 336, 345 (7th Cir. 2005), a burden that may be satisfied

by showing “that there is even a 10 percent chance that

[s]he will be shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted,” id.

With respect to future persecution, Ms. Tchemkou must

establish that she genuinely fears returning to Cameroon

and that “a reasonable person in [her] circumstances

would fear persecution if forced to return to [her] native

country.” Id.

Even absent the rebuttable presumption of future

persecution to which Ms. Tchemkou is entitled, she has met

this burden. Indeed, the evidence compels such a finding. Ms. Tchemkou, and her participation in opposition

activities, are known to the authorities in Cameroon. The

Cameroonian government has attempted to quell her

activism over a number of years and has used brutal tactics

to achieve this objective. The evidence in the record shows
No. 06-2638 17

that, even after her departure from the country, the government of Cameroon remained interested in Ms. Tchemkou;

indeed, it issued summonses for her appearance after she

had departed. A.R.335-36. Finally, Ms. Tchemkou’s uncle

submitted a letter in support of her asylum application

explaining that many of the young people with whom

Ms. Tchemkou previously had associated were no longer

alive and that Ms. Tchemkou had reason to fear for her life

as well. A.R.248. In short, all of the evidence in the record

points to a reasonable possibility that Ms. Tchemkou would

be subjected to persecution if she were returned to Cameroon.

The Government argues that Ms. Tchemkou’s belief that

she will suffer harm upon her return to Cameroon is

speculative, and that the reasonableness of her belief is

undermined by the fact that her family has lived in Cameroon without incident since her departure. The Government

points to Bhatt v. Reno, 172 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 1999), Lwin v.

INS, 144 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 1998), and Toptchev v. INS, 295

F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2002), in support of this argument.

However, none of these cases presented a situation similar to that of Ms. Tchemkou.

In Bhatt, the petitioner was claiming persecution on the

basis of his religion—a trait he shared with other family

members. Consequently, the fact that family members in

his home country had not suffered harm was probative of

what the petitioner’s experience would be if returned to

his home country.

Similarly, in Lwin, the petitioner claimed that he would

suffer future persecution because the Burmese government

would “impute” to him the political opinions of his eldest

son. However, petitioner’s wife and other sons had re-
18 No. 06-2638

mained in Burma without incident. Consequently, the

petitioner’s fears were merely speculative. See Lwin, 144

F.3d at 510.

Finally, in Toptchev, this court agreed that any presumption of future persecution was rebutted by the State

Department report, which recounted Bulgaria’s movement

toward democracy since the petitioners’ departure. This

conclusion was bolstered by the fact that other family

members, some of whom also had been active in speaking out against the former communist regime, had lived

in Bulgaria undisturbed. See Toptchev, 295 F.3d at 722.

Here, however, there is no evidence that Cameroon’s

human rights record has improved since Ms. Tchemkou’s

departure, nor is there any evidence that Ms. Tchemkou’s

parents or siblings were involved in the type of protests in

which she had participated while in Cameroon. Consequently, the fact that her family members have lived in

Cameroon without incident does not speak to how Ms.

Tchemkou would be treated upon her return.

C.

Ms. Tchemkou also challenges the IJ’s and the BIA’s

conclusion that she is not entitled to relief under the CAT.

8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) sets forth the standard for obtaining

relief under the CAT: “The burden of proof is on the

applicant . . . to establish that it is more likely than not that

he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed

country of removal.” The regulations define torture as

any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether

physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a

person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her

or a third person information or a confession, punish-
No. 06-2638 19

ing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has

committed or is suspected of having committed, or

intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person,

or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,

when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the

instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a

public official or other person acting in an official

capacity.

8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a); see also Mabasa v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d

902, 907 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting regulation), superseded on

other grounds by Mabasa v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 740 (7th Cir.

2006). In making the determination whether an alien has

met her burden, the regulations direct that the following

factors “shall be considered”: evidence of past torture;

evidence that the applicant could relocate to a different

part of her home country; evidence of “gross, flagrant or

mass violations of human rights within the country of

removal”; and other relevant country conditions. See 8

C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(i)-(iv).

Here again we believe that the record compels a finding

that Ms. Tchemkou is entitled to relief under the CAT.

There is no question that her prior experiences in Cameroon constituted torture as defined by the regulations. Both

Ms. Tchemkou’s initial run-in with police, which included

a beating and a detention under deplorable conditions, as

well as her 1998 abduction and beating, only could be

described as the intentional infliction of severe pain or

suffering for the purposes of punishing Ms. Tchemkou’s

political activity and preventing such behavior in the

future. Furthermore, other regulatory considerations

strongly suggest that Ms. Tchemkou will suffer torture if

returned to Cameroon: She has not been able to escape

government retaliation regardless of her location in
20 No. 06-2638

Cameroon, and Cameroon admittedly continues to have a

poor civil rights record. On this record, it is more likely

than not that Ms. Tchemkou will be tortured if removed

to Cameroon.

Conclusion

In sum, the record compels a conclusion that Ms.

Tchemkou has suffered past persecution and will suffer

future persecution if returned to Cameroon. Additionally,

the record establishes that Ms. Tchemkou has endured

torture and likely will endure additional torture if returned to Cameroon. We therefore grant the petition for

review. We reverse the decision of the BIA and remand this

case for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PETITION GRANTED; REVERSED and REMANDED

A true Copy:

Teste:

 _____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
No. 06-2638 21

USCA-02-C-0072—7-31-07