United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 13-1290

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Joshua Munroe; Tiffany Munroe

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.

Continental Western Insurance Company, a Foreign Limited Liability Company

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: September 24, 2013

 Filed: November 7, 2013

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Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Operating his employer’s truck, Joshua Munroe was injured. After settling

with the tortfeasors, Munroe and his wife sued Continental Western Insurance

Company for underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in his employer’s policy. 

Continental moved for partial summary judgment on its maximum liability. The

district court granted the motion in part, holding that the Munroes could not “stack”
their claims. The court denied the motion in part, finding a UIM limit of $2,000,000

rather than $500,000. Both parties appeal. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1292(b), this court affirms in part and reverses in part.

I.

On November 6, 2006, Munroe’s tractor-trailer, owned by his employer,

collided with three other vehicles. Munroe was seriously injured. He and his wife

settled with the tortfeasors. 

The Munroes then sued Continental, seeking UIM coverage under the

employer’s commercial automobile insurance policy. The policy’s “Motor Carrier

Declarations” specify a $500,000 UIM limit, and a $2,000,000 bodily-injury liability

limit. 

One endorsement to the policy—“Missouri Underinsured Motorists

Coverage”—specifies a $500,000 UIM limit for each “accident.” The “Coverage”

section of the endorsement says:

We will pay all sums the “insured” is legally entitled to recover as

compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an “underinsured

motor vehicle.” The damagesmust result from“bodily injury” sustained

by the “insured” caused by an “accident.” The owner’s or driver’s

liability for these damages must result fromthe ownership, maintenance

or use of the “underinsured motor vehicle.”

The “Limit of Insurance” section of the endorsement says:

Regardless of the number of covered “autos”, “insureds”, premiums

paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the “accident”, the most we

will pay for all damages resulting from any one “accident” is the limit

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of Underinsured Motorists Coverage shown in the Schedule or

Declarations.

Another endorsement to the policy is a form—“Selection/Rejection of

Underinsured Motorist Coverage”:

Under Missouri Insurance Law (379.203), Underinsured Motorist

Coverage is optional. The insured named in the policy may select a

limit of Underinsured Motorist Coverage lower than the bodily injury

liability coverage limit in the policy, but not less than the state financial

responsibility limit or the insured named in the policy may choose to

reject Underinsured Motorist Coverage.

Check item selected:

G Underinsured Motorist Coverage has been offered to me,

however, it is being rejected.

G Agreesto purchase Underinsured Motorist Coverage at the

state financial responsibility limits of 25/50.

G Agreesto purchase Underinsured Motorist Coverage at the

limit indicated below which is less than the policy bodily

injury limit.

(Enter limits of liability selected) 

$ each accident

When Munroe’s employer received the policy, the formwas blank. On the date of the

collisions, the form was still blank. The employer signed and returned it one month

later, selecting a $500,000 UIM limit—the same as the declarations page and UIM

coverage endorsement.

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Continental moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that

its maximum UIM liability is $500,000. The Munroes sought up to $2,000,000 in

UIM coverage. They further argued that the policy allows stacking, permitting them

six claims (two against three drivers) for a total of $12,000,000. 

The district court first ruled that the policy does not permit stacking (thus

allowing only one UIM claim). However, finding the UIM limit ambiguous, the court

applied the $2,000,000 bodily injury limit. Continental appeals the denial of its

motion for partial summary judgment. The Munroes cross-appeal the rejection of

their stacking claim.

This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing the record

most favorably to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferencesfor that

party. Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2011). This court

reviews de novo the district court’s construction of an insurance policy and

interpretation ofstate law. Arkansas Power and LightCo. v. Hartford Steam Boiler 1

Inspection and Ins. Co., 257 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2001) (insurance policy); Salve

Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239 (1991) (state law).

II.

The Munroes argue that the policy’s selection form creates an ambiguity in the

UIM limit, necessitating a $2,000,000 limit. Under Missouri law, courts apply the

general rules of contract construction when interpreting an insurance policy. Todd

v. Missouri United Sch. Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo. banc 2007). “The

key is whether the contract language is ambiguous or unambiguous.” Peters v.

Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 853 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Mo. banc 1993). If the policy is

unambiguous, it will be enforced as written, absent statutory or policy considerations. 

The parties agree Missouri law applies. 1

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Rodriguez v. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. banc 1991). If

ambiguity exists, the court interprets the policy in favor of the insured. Todd, 223

S.W.3d at 160. “An ambiguity exists when there is duplicity, indistinctness, or

uncertainty in the meaning of the language in the policy. Language is ambiguous if

it is reasonably open to different constructions.” Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505,

509 (Mo. banc 2010), quoting Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129, 132

(Mo. banc 2007). “Courts should not interpret policy provisions in isolation but

rather evaluate policies as a whole.” Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307

S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. banc 2009). Courts must also “endeavor to give each

provision a reasonable meaning and to avoid an interpretation that renders some

provisions useless or redundant.” Dibben v. Shelter Ins. Co., 261 S.W.3d 553, 556

(Mo. App. 2008). 

The Munroes rely on the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Rice v. Shelter

Mutual Insurance Co., 301 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Mo. banc 2009). There, an exclusionary

clause limited coverage to the statutory minimum, but another policy provision

granted more coverage. Id. The court held for the insured, finding that the provisions

are “entirely inconsistent and cannot be reconciled. The policy expressly limits

coverage to the statutory minimum and yet purports to grant full coverage to all

provisions that exceed the statutory minimums.” Id. The court reiterated “wellsettled Missouri law” that “inconsistent and irreconcilable provisionsin an insurance

policy create an ambiguity that will be resolved in favor of the insured.” Id. at 49.

Rice is distinguishable. Its policy language expressly granted coverage in one

section and limited it in another. Id. at 48. Here, the policy’s declarations page and

UIM coverage endorsement specify $500,000 in UIM coverage. See Wasson v.

Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 358 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Mo. App. 2011) (“Ordinarily, one

begins with the declarations page and the coverage declarations there.”). The blank

selection form does not indicate a UIM limit. It, therefore, does not withdraw UIM

coverage or change its limit. See Browning v. GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. Co.,

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341 S.W.3d 897, 903 (Mo. App. 2011) (“Here, the declarations page clearly stated the

specific terms under which UM Coverage was provided . . . we find nothing in the

Policy that ‘changed’ the declarations page or reflected a ‘different intention’

anywhere else in Policy.”). The formdoes not create an irreconcilable difference with

the policy’s governing documents. Rice, 301 S.W.3d at 48-49. See also Christensen

v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 307 S.W.3d 654, 658 (Mo. App. 2010), quoting Jackson

v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 720 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Mo. App. 1986) (“When the

declarations page clearly communicates the coverage provided by the insurance

contract, and the other policy provisions neither expressly change the coverage nor

‘reflect a different intention than that clearly expressed on the declarations page,’ the

declarations page controls.”). And it does not render the policy open to two

interpretations. See Mendota Ins. Co. v. Ware, 348 S.W.3d 68, 71 (Mo. App. 2011)

(“An insured is entitled to a pro-coverage interpretation of an insurance policy if the

terms are susceptible of two possible interpretations and there is room for

construction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Burns, 303 S.W.3d at

512. Accordingly, the selection formcreates no inconsistency, duplicity, uncertainty,

or indistinctness. See Burns, 303 S.W.3d at 509; Rice, 301 S.W.3d at 48. 

The selection form does allow a modification of the policy, changing the UIM

limit from $500,000 or rejecting coverage. However, to determine UIM coverage for

Munroe, this court looks to the policy in effect on the date of the collisions. See

generally Stewart v. Royal, 343 S.W.3d 736, 737 (Mo. App. 2011); Mansion Hills

Condo. Ass’n v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 62 S.W.3d 633, 635 (Mo. App.

2001). A policy is not ambiguous because it can be amended at a future date. See

American Standard Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Stinson, 404 S.W.3d 303, 311 (Mo.

App. 2012) (“[T]he subsequent policy is not an issue in this case and therefore is not

relevant. . . . What was clear and unambiguous did not become ambiguous due to

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change in the verbiage of a subsequent insurance policy.”). On the day of the

collisions, the policy provided a $500,000 UIM limit.

2

Because the declarations page and UIM coverage endorsement specify a

$500,000 UIM limit and the selection form does not contradict this limit, there is no

ambiguity. The district court erred in finding a $2,000,000 UIM limit.

III.

On cross-appeal, the Munroes argue that the policy permits stacking, allowing

them each to bring a claim against the three other drivers, for a total of six UIM

Continental concedes that if the employer never completed and returned the

2

selection form, the policy’s UIM limit may be ambiguous (but because it was

eventually returned—confirming the $500,000 UIM limit on the declarations page

and UIM coverage endorsement—there is no ambiguity). This concession is baseless. 

See Gander v. Livoti, 250 F.3d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The law is clear that

stipulations of law are not binding on the court.”), citing Sanford’s Estate v.

Commissioner of IRS, 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939). The form does not say it must be

returned in order to have UIM coverage. See Haggard Hauling & Rigging Co. v.

Stonewall Ins. Co., 852 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Mo. App. 1993) (“The rule requiring that

an insurance policy be construed favorably to an insured in cases of ambiguity does

not permit a strained interpretation of the language of the policy in order to create an

ambiguity where none exists.”). 

The district court believed that the selection form’s language “may select a

limit of Underinsured Motorist Coverage lower than the bodily injury liability

coverage limit in the policy” necessarily implied that “the default coverage limit for

underinsured motorists is the bodily injury liability coverage limit.” To the contrary,

this language tells the insured that the maximum UIM coverage is $2,000,000. Also

contrary to the district court’s view, the blank selection form is useful, allowing

changes to the UIM limit from that on the declarations page and UIM coverage

endorsement.

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claims. Continental contends the stacking issue is not properly before this court

because the Munroes did not timely raise it.

A.

When a district court certifies an interlocutory order for immediate appeal, the

appellant must file a petition for permission to appeal the certified order within 10

days. 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). “A party may file an answer in opposition or a crosspetition within 10 days after the petition is served.” Fed. R. App. P. 5(b)(2). The

deadline is extended by three days if the party is served by mail. Fed. R. App. P.

26(c). See also Fed. R. App. 26(a)(1) (method of computing days).

On December 14, 2012, the district court certified its December 5, 2011 partial

summary-judgment order and its September 24, 2012 order on reconsideration for

interlocutory appeal. Specifically, the district court found a “controlling question of

law . . . regarding the amount of coverage under the policy.” Within 10 days,

Continental petitioned for permission to appeal the question “Does the Continental

WesternPolicy provide $500,000.00 ofinsurance coverage or $2 Million ofinsurance

coverage?” 

Continental served the Munroes on December 26, 2012 via United States mail.

On January 8, this court requested the Munroes “make the necessary arrangements

to have [their] response filed immediately.” The Munroes requested an extension “to

file their Response and/or Cross-Petition for Permission to Appeal,” asserting that

Continental consented. This court granted the extension “to file response to the

application for permission to appeal.” On January 11, three days after the crossappeal deadline, the Munroes filed a “Cross-Petition for Permission to Appeal.” 

Continental did not object based on timeliness. On February 11, this court granted

the petition for permission to appeal and the cross-appeal.

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The ten-day filing requirement for interlocutory appeals in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

is mandatory and jurisdictional. See Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrs., 434 U.S.

257, 264 (1978); Bartunek v. Bubak, 941 F.2d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 1991). When the

petition to appeal is not timely filed, this court and other circuits reject interlocutory

appeals on jurisdictional grounds. See, e.g., General Television Arts, Inc. v. S. Ry.,

725 F.2d 1327, 1330 (11th Cir. 1984); Nuclear Eng’g Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241,

246-47 (7th Cir. 1982); Hellerstein v. Mr. Steak, Inc., 531 F.2d 470, 471-72 (10th

Cir. 1976); Hanson v. Hunt Oil Co., 488 F.2d 70, 72 (8th Cir. 1973); Alabama

LaborCouncil, AFL–CIO Pub. Emps. Union, Local No. 1279 v. Alabama, 453 F.2d

922, 925 (5th Cir. 1972); Milbert v. Bison Labs., Inc., 260 F.2d 431, 435 (3d Cir.

1958). 

Similarly, some circuits hold that a Rule 5(b)(2) cross-appeal is a prerequisite

to appellate review of issues raised by appellees on interlocutory appeal. See, e.g.,

Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350, 1367 n.44 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The plaintiff’s

failure to file a cross-appeal violates the requirement of Fed. R. App. P. 5(b)(2) and

means that the plaintiffs have not preserved this issue for appeal.”), abrogated on

other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). See

also Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 689 (9th Cir. 2011)

(suggesting but not deciding that a “cross-appeal is a prerequisite to appellate review

of issues raised by appellees on interlocutory appeal”). But see Tristani ex rel.

Karnes v. Richman, 652 F.3d 360, 365-66 (3d Cir. 2011) (allowing a cross-appeal

where cross-appellant failed to petition for permission to appeal), citing Yamaha

Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996).

Whether failure to timely file an interlocutory cross-appeal precludes appellate

jurisdiction is a closer question. In Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, the

Supreme Court explained: “As the text of § 1292(b) indicates, appellate jurisdiction

applies to the order certified to the court of appeals. . . . [Therefore,] the appellate

court may address any issue fairly included within the certified order.” Yamaha, 516

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U.S. at 205. Yamaha does not address how section 1292(b) interacts with Rule

5(b)(2)’s requirement that cross-appeals be filed within 10 days of receipt of the

appellant’s petition. Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing

the tension between section 1292(b) and Rule 5). The Munroes’ stacking claimarises

from the same certified order Continental appeals. Yet, the claim “appears to be a

‘cross-petition’ within the compass of Rule 5, which must be timely filed.” Id.

TheMunroes’ failure to timely file their cross petition does not preclude review

of the stacking issue. The Munroes cross-appeal the same certified order Continental

appeals. See Tristani, 652 F.3d at 366 (finding that a grant of appellant’s leave to

appeal pursuant to § 1292(b) gives the court jurisdiction over the entire certified order

of the district court, “including any portions that were decided in the appellant’s

favor” even though appellees failed to properly cross-appeal). Rule 5(b)(2) is not

jurisdictional. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452-56 (2004) (holding that nonstatutory rules of procedure are not jurisdictional because only Congress may

determine a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction). This court granted the

petition to cross-appeal, and will consider it. Butsee Tranello v. Frey, 962 F.2d 244,

248 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The failure to file the petition for permission to cross-appeal

within the time provided is a jurisdictional defect, barring this Court from hearing

Tranello’s cross-appeal.”); Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., 917 F.2d 664, 668-69 (1st Cir.

1990).3

B.

On the merits of the stacking issue, the Munroes first argue that the policy

provides separate UIM coverage for both of them against each of the three

underinsured motorists, for a total of six UIM claims. By the UIM coverage

Tranello and Rodriguez based their analyses in part on Federal Rule of 3

Appellate Procedure 5. Since these cases, the Supreme Court has held that nonstatutory rules of procedure are not jurisdictional. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452-56.

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endorsement’s “Coverage” section, Continental will pay all sums “the insured is

legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an

underinsured motor vehicle.” The Munroes reason that they both are “the insured”

under this section, and the accident involved three underinsured motor vehicles. 

Therefore, they are entitled to six claims.

This argument ignoresthe endorsement’s “Limit ofInsurance” section (an antistacking provision):

Regardless of the number of covered “autos”, “insureds”, premiums

paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the “accident”, the most we

will pay for all damages resulting from any one “accident” is the limit

of Underinsured Motorists Coverage shown in the Schedule or

Declarations.

This provision limits damages “resulting from any one accident” to $500,000 (the

limit of UIM coverage in the policy) regardless of the number of covered autos,

insureds, premiums paid, claims made, or vehicles involved.

The Munroes attack the anti-stacking provision as ambiguous. See Krombach

v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210-11 (Mo. banc 1992) (“Ambiguous

provisions of a policy designed to cut down, restrict, or limit insurance coverage

already granted . . . must be strictly construed against the insurer.”). They contend

the phrase “involved in the accident” modifies only the word “vehicles” and not the

antecedents “autos,” “insureds,” “premiums paid,” or “claims made.” The Munroes

also maintain the limit is inapplicable because it applies to “vehicles,” not

“underinsured motor vehicles,” which it argues is a separate and distinct class. See

generally Versaw v. Versaw, 202 S.W.3d 638, 645 (Mo. App. 2006). 

These arguments are without merit. The Munroes provide no authority for

limiting the phrase “involved in the accident” to the word “vehicles.” More

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importantly, they fail to articulate the importance of that phrase to their interpretation

of the policy. Removing the contested language, the provision reads: “Regardless of

the number of covered ‘autos,’ ‘insureds,’ premiums paid, claims made or vehicles,

the most we will pay for all damagesresulting fromany one ‘accident’ is[$500,000].” 

Even without the language, the provision limits recovery to $500,000 regardless of

the number of vehicles or people involved in the accident. 

Similarly, the Munroes fail to explain how “underinsured motor vehicles” are

not a subclass of “autos” or “vehicles” covered by the anti-stacking provision. The

policy defines “underinsured motor vehicles” as “a land motor vehicle or trailer” with

insufficient coverage at the time of the accident. “Autos” are defined as “a land

motor vehicle, ‘trailer’ orsemitrailer designed for travel on public roads.” The policy

does not define the word “vehicles.” When an insurance policy uses an undefined

term, it “will be viewed in the meaning that would ordinarily be understood by the

layman who bought and paid for the policy.” Manner v. Schiermeier, 393 S.W.3d

58, 62 (Mo. banc 2013), quoting Krombach, 827 S.W.2d at 210. See also American

Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peck, 169 S.W.3d 563, 567 (Mo. App. 2005) (“The fact that

a termremains undefined in a policy does not necessarily render it ambiguous.”). “To

determine the ordinary meaning of a term, courts consult standard English language

dictionaries.” Lupo v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 70 S.W.3d 16, 22 (Mo. App. 2002). 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “vehicle” as “an agent of

transmission: carrier.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2538 (3d

ed. 1961). 

Applying these definitions to the policy, a lay person would understand that

“underinsured motor vehicles” are a subclass of “autos” and “vehicles” covered by

the anti-stacking provision. See Corrigan v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. ED 99380,

2013 WL 4815158, at *7 (Mo. App. Sept. 10, 2013) (“Applying the definition of

‘vehicle’ to the terms of the insurance policy at hand, it is reasonable to assume a lay

person would understand that a motorcycle is encompassed within the definition of

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vehicle, such that the policy’s restrictions and limits on liability with regards to

vehicles also apply to motorcycles.”).

Most significantly, the Munroes ignore the unambiguous language that “the

most [Continental] will pay for all damages resulting from any one ‘accident’” is

$500,000. The Munroes inject ambiguity where none exists. Rodriguez v. Gen.

AccidentIns. Co., 808 S.W.2d 379, 381-83 (Mo. banc 1991) (finding an anti-stacking

provision clear and unambiguous where it applied “regardless of the number of

‘insureds’; claims made; vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or vehicles

involved in the accident”). The only reasonable construction of the anti-stacking

provision is: For each accident, Continental is liable for up to $500,000. See

Haulers Ins. Co. v. Wyatt, 170 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Mo. App. 2005) (“The policy

unambiguously limits liability coverage to $500,000 per accident, regardless of the

number of people injured in that accident. The policy language clearly provides, in

describing the limits of insurance for accidents involving a covered auto, that

‘[r]egardless of the number of . . . claims made or vehicles involved . . . the most we

will pay for the total of all damages . . . resulting from any one accident involving a

covered auto is the Each Accident Limit of Insurance.’”) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Finally, the Munroes assert that the collisions constituted more than one

accident, entitling them to multiple UIM limits. There are two ways to interpret the

word “accident.” The “cause” approach finds that “an insured’s single act is

considered the accident from which all claims flow.” Kansas Fire & Cas. Co. v.

Koelling, 729 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Mo. App. 1987). The “effect” approach finds that

“each claim arising out of an insured’s act is considered a separate accident.” Id. See

also Haulers, 170 S.W.3d at 545. 

The cause approach is appropriate here. Missouri courts apply the cause

approach to similar policies. See Haulers, 170 S.W.3d at 545; Kansas Fire, 729

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S.W.2d at 252. See also Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McBee, No. 08-0534-CVW-HFS, 2009 WL 1124973, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 27, 2009) (adopting the cause

approach for policies that limit recovery resulting from one occurrence regardless of

the number injured). Like Haulers, the policy here defines “accident” as “continuous

or repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property

damage.’” See Haulers, 170 S.W.3d at 544. Like Haulers and Kansas Fire, the antistacking provision here applies regardless of the number of vehicles, claims, or

insureds. See id. at 543; Kansas Fire, 729 S.W.2d at 252. 

In light of the policy’s definition of “accident” and its unambiguous antistacking provision, it is unreasonable to conclude that Munroe was involved in three

accidents. See Rodriguez, 808 S.W.2d at 383-84 (where policy language

unambiguously prohibits stacking, courts will not create extra coverage). Under the

cause approach in Haulers and Kansas Fire, Munroe’s injuries resulted from

continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions (collisions) and constitute a

single accident.

The district court properly denied the Munroes’ stacking claim.

******* 

The portion of the district court’s partialsummary-judgment order denying the

Munroes’ stacking claim is affirmed. The portions of the district court’s partial

summary-judgment order and order on reconsideration finding a $2,000,000 UIM

limit are reversed. The case isremanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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